GUIDE TO THE MD1 SYRIA FILE

[This file is concerned with the modern Arab state of Syria and its inhabitants. Syria is located approximately between 32° 25' and 37° 25' W. latitude and 35° 50' and 42° 25' E. longitude. To the north and northeast it is bounded by Turkey, on the east and southeast by Iraq, on the south by Jordan and on the west by Israel, Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. It is approximately 72,000 square miles in area, with an estimated population in 1972 of 6,680,000. The majority of the population are Sunni Moslems but there are also many Christians. Arabic is the official language of the country. Syria is primarily an agricultural and stock-raising nation, but within recent years industrialization is increasing at a steady rate, especially in flour milling, oil refining, textile, cement, tobacco, glassware, sugar, and brassware manufacture. In 1965 nearly all industries were nationalized under the Socialist government. Historically, Syria is one of the world's oldest inhabited lands. The state (later republic) of Syria was formed from the break-up of the former Turkish Empire districts (sanjaks). Under the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres (Aug. 10, 1920), Syria was made a separate entity and divided into the states of Syria and Greater Lebanon, effective as of Sept. 1, 1920, both being administered under a French mandate (1920-1941), which terminated on September 16, 1941 when Syria was proclaimed a republic by the French administration. The powers of this newly created republic were not fully effective, however, until January 1, 1944. In February 1958 Syria joined with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic but seceded in 1961. Ten years later Syria again joined Egypt along with Libya to form a new Federation of Arab Republics. The uneasy diplomatic and military situation in the Mideast, primarily between Arab countries and Israel, has led Syria to reshuffle its diplomatic relations considerably, first by severing

relations with the United States in 1967, later with Jordan in 1971 because of fighting between Jordanian forces and the Palestinian guerrillas (whom Syria supported), and to further strengthen her ties with the Soviet Union.

The file consists of eleven English-language sources, numbered as sources 2, 4-7, 9, 11, and 14-17. Each source deals in its own way with specific facets of Syrian culture and there is no source giving an overall picture of Syria as a whole, although sources 14: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Report and 17: Syria, Directorate of Statistics do give some generalized ethnographic data. Religion is covered to some extent in 2: Belgrave, which is an account by a squadron leader in the British armed forces of his visit to the Alawites, and in 9: Hitti, written by a former professor of Semitic literature at Princeton University, on the Druze people and religion. One aspect of physical anthropology covered briefly in this file is that found in 4: Cummins and Shanklin dealing with the dermatoglyphics and palmar configurations of the Mitwali. Both authors are physical anthropologists. 6: Government of Syria is a comprehensive report on Jezirah province dealing with the ethnic and religious composition of the population, agriculture, land tenure, credit, communications, and transport. 7: Lewis is a brief study of the interrelated problems of canal irrigation systems and their maintenance in central Syria, and the concomitant health hazard they present when the systems break down. Lewis, at the time of his study, was instructor at the Middle East Center for Arab Studies. Information on the Syrian economy may be found in 5: Barakat, written by the Secretary of the Currency and Credit Council of Syria, and in the pages of the International Bank Mission's account presented in 14: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Report. Problems of archaeological preservation of monuments and sites in Syria may be found in 16: Collart, which is the report of the UNESCO mission to Syria in

1953. 15: Khadduri, prepared by a well-known scholar of Middle East law, deals with constitutional developments in Syria from the end of World War I to the date of writing (ca. 1951) 11: Hourani presents a review of the political history of Syria and Lebanon from early historical times to 1945. The author is a social scientist with area specialization in the Middle East. 17: Syria, Directorate of Statistics, as noted previously, contains some limited general data on ethnography, as well as statistical information on Syria up to 1953. Of the eleven sources in the file one is rated as "3" (good, useful source but not uniformly excellent), this being 2: Belgrave; four are rated as "4" (excellent secondary data), these being 4: Cummins and Shanklin, 6: Government of Syria, 11: Hourani, and 15: Khadduri; six are evaluated as "5" (excellent primary data), these being 5: Barakat, 7: Lewis, 9: Hitti, 14: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Report, 16: Collart, and 17: Syria, Directorate of Statistics. All sources were processed in 1955-1956.]

4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

DERMATOGLYPHICS IN PEOPLES OF THE NEAR EAST

I. LEBANESE: MITWALI

HAROLD CUMMINS AND W. M. SHANKLIN
Tulane University and American University of Beirut, Syria

121 This report is presented as a record of data toward an eventual analysis of racial variation in dermatoglyphics. It is to be hoped that a broad comparison of races on this basis may be eventually possible, but it will be necessary to continue the accumulation of records on various populations, perhaps from time to time taking stock of progress as has been done recently by Steggerda, Steggerda and Lane for the palmar features (Middle American Research Series, publication 7, Tulane University, '36).

124 The material here treated represents a population not
• 101 hitherto investigated from the standpoint of dermatoglyphics.
795 The Mitwali are a Syrian mountain people, living in the southern Lebanon range. They are Moslems, but adhere to the Shiite sect rather than to the Sunni which is common to the region. There are 138 subjects in the series, males and females being in the proportion of about two to one; in view of the small numbers the sexes are combined. The subjects are mainly children in the government schools, the adult population having proved generally unsuitable for printing—on account of extensive callouses.

141 The palmar features, main lines and patterns, are tabulated
128 in tables 1 and 2, their formulations following the methods of Cummins et al. (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XII, '29).

The data on lines A and D have been further analyzed, to determine the main-line index which has been suggested by Cummins (Middle American Research Series, Tulane University, publication 7, '36) as a value denoting the degree of slant of the general palmar configuration. For the 276 hands

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REPORT ON JAZIRAH

101 Geographically, Jazirah, i.e., "the Island", is that strip of territory lying between the rivers Dijla and Euphrates, but for the purpose of this report, the term Jazirah is understood in its administrative meaning as a Mohafaza of Syria, and will be studied as such.

AREA OF JAZIRAH AND ITS CULTIVABLE LANDS

The "Statistical Abstract of Syria" for 1950 gives the total area of Jazirah as 2,217,000 hectares divided between the Mohafaza center, i.e., Hassakeh, Qamishli, and Dijla, in the following proportion:

Mohafaza Center	1,525,000 hectares
Qada of Qamishli	392,000 hectares
Qada of Dijla	300,000 hectares

311 Of this total area, according to the same source, 444,266 hectares were cultivated in 1948-49, and 1,701,284 hectares were cultivable but uncultivated, while the uncultivable lands were only 71,450 hectares.

This terminology of cultivable and uncultivable is greatly misleading. If by cultivable is meant the lands which are not rocky or mountainous or forested, the terminology is right though it loses its economic meaning. But if by it is meant lands which can be planted and rendered productive to show some profit, then other factors have to be considered, and the productive "cultivable" area of Jazirah is greatly reduced.

132 The first of these factors is the amount of rainfall. It is really astonishing that the Syrian Government has not deemed it necessary to establish agricultural stations in different regions of Jazirah to record at least the amount of rainfall in the different localities. The only such station is at Hassakeh which is not primarily a wheat growing district and the mean annual rainfall over a period of nine years is less than 300 mm. This average is less than the minimum required for successful rain-fed cultivation.

I. The Mohafaza Center

311 Therefore about 80% of the 1,525,000 hectares mentioned as
312 cultivable in the Mohafaza Center are in fact uncultivable unless

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 744 THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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114 > MR. LEWIS, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

p. 278

9: Hitti S-5 (ca. 1926) 1928 MD1 Syria MD1
Druze MD6

[p 1]

CHAPTER I

A UNIQUE AND SECRET SECT

Two Historical Fossils:—The Druzes of Syria and the Samaritans of Palestine are two unique communities not to be found elsewhere in the whole world. Like social fossils in an alien environment, these two peoples have survived for hundreds of years in that land rightly described as a "Babel of tongues" and a "museum of nationalities."

The Samaritans are the remnants of the tribes from Assyria and Persia who were transplanted by Sargon some seven hundred years before Christ to take the place of the "ten tribes" who were carried into captivity.[1] They figured in the life of Christ as is illustrated by the case of the "Samaritan woman" and the story of the "good Samaritan." Today they are represented by about one hundred and eighty persons who intermarry among themselves and are becoming rapidly extinct. Their habitat is modern Nāblus (biblical Shechem), and their religion is ancient Judaism mixed with pagan survivals.

The Druzes have no such clear record to show regarding their origin as a people and as a sect. Their ethnographical origins, no less than their ritual practices and religious beliefs, are shrouded in mystery. Appearing for the first time on the pages of history at Wādi-al-Taym near Mt. Hermon in anti-Lebanon, as professors of the divinity of the sixth Fāṭimite Caliph in Cairo (996–1020 A.D.), the Druzes have lived their semi-independent lives secluded in their mountain fastnesses of Lebanon, unmindful of the progress of the world around them, and almost entirely forgotten by the outside world.

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[1] *Cf.* James A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans, the Earliest Jewish Sect* (Philadelphia, 1907), pp. 46–57.

Other Secret Sects:—The Druze people constitute one of the two leading secret sects found only in Syria, the other being the Nuṣayriyyah inhabiting the mountains north of Tripoli. The Ismā'īliyyah of the Ḥimṣ and Ḥamāh district, another secret sect, are descended from the Assassins,[1] who for two centuries or so struck awe and terror into the hearts of the Crusaders, and are represented today by a few other sectarians in Persia and India. The Yezīdis, so-called devil worshipers, practice their hidden rites in the out-of-the-way hills between Antioch and Aleppo and have coreligionists in Kurdistān and Armenia. SD 795 101

Special Interest of this Study:—But of all these sects Druzism is perhaps the most interesting and important. It is still a living force. Its followers form to the present day a vigorous and flourishing community in the Lebanon. Its learned system has not changed since it was first inaugurated in the early part of the eleventh century. The Islam of the Near East has changed and adapted itself to the requirements of the varying conditions. The Christianity of the Near East has changed. But the Druze system has been and still is the same. SD 795 621

The modernizing influence has in late years brought within its sphere quite a large number of the young and uninitiated Druzes. The report of the American University of Beirūt for last year indicates that there are in that institution alone thirty-six Druze students and five Druze teachers. But no one with first-hand knowledge of the situation would go so far as even to recognize the existence of a "modernist movement" alleged to be aiming at divulging the Druze beliefs, much less to declare "It is understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirūt will be the probable intermediary of communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place."[2] SD 177 873 SD

In fact the outside world knows so little about the contents of this religion that in a recent session of the Permanent Mandates 795

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[1] Arabic *Ḥashshāshīn* = those addicted to the use of a stupefying weed.

[2] De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1923), p. 244. Dr. Bliss died in 1920.

128 Other questions which would call for full discussion in a comprehensive treatise have been wholly ignored. The work has been described as an essay in order to indicate these limitations in its scope, no less than to avoid making too high a claim for the studies and experience upon which it is based.

2

121 101 It is important to make clear the way in which the term 'Syria' is used in the title and the text. Confusion has sometimes arisen from its use in several different senses: (i) In the past it has often been used to refer to the whole area stretching from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai Peninsula in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea on the west to the Syrian Desert on the east. This area constitutes in many ways a single geographical unit, and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense a single people. (ii) After the War of 1914-1918 this geographical unit was divided into two political areas; the southern area, which includes the regions now known as Palestine and Transjordan, was placed under a British Mandate, and the northern under a French. The term 'Syria' is sometimes used to refer to the whole northern area. (iii) This northern area was subdivided by the Mandatory Power into several political units, to which was given the collective name of 'Les États du Levant' or 'The Levant States'. From 1925 to 1936 they were four in number: the States of Syria and Greater Lebanon, or, as they are now called, the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and the Governments of Latakia (known at [illegible] the 'State of the Alawis') and Jebel Druze. In 1936 [illegible] two Governments were formally annexed to the State of Syria, and were known no longer as 'Governments' but as 'Provinces'. Thus the term 'Syria' is often used in a third sense, to refer to the State of Syria, before 1936 excluding, and since then including, Latakia and Jebel Druze.

The explicit subject of this essay is 'Syria' in the second of the three senses defined above. This area will ordinarily be referred to as 'the French Mandated Territories', 'Syria and Lebanon' or 'the Levant States'. In the historical chapters (I-IV), however, it has been necessary to deal in general with the larger, geographical unit of the first definition. In these chapters, therefore, the term 'Syria' will be used to

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

cover the whole of that unit, which will normally be referred to as 'geographical Syria'. Elsewhere in this book the word 'Syria' will only be employed to describe the State of Syria or Syrian Republic: that is, in the third sense. 121 101

All these terms are used simply for convenience and without any desire to prejudice the questions, which will be touched upon in the course of the essay, whether and on what grounds the political separation of the British from the French Mandated Territories, and of Syria from Lebanon, was justified.

PART ONE

I. THE HISTORY OF SYRIA[1]

I

101 EVEN were there no Syrian people a Syrian problem
131 would still exist. Syria owes its political importance less to the qualities of its population than to its geographical position. Before its history can be fully understood, it is necessary to grasp the nature of the land and its relation with the surrounding world.

Syria is part of a larger area which may be treated as a single unit, in the sense that the course of affairs in one part of it has always had a peculiarly close relationship with that in some or
131 all of the other parts. The southern base of this area is the
133 Arabian peninsula, bounded on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the east by the Persian Gulf. The west of the peninsula, the Hejaz and Yemen, is hilly and in parts fertile, and so too is a smaller area in the south-east; but the greater portion of the interior is fit only for pasturage, except in the oases. In the south, it is a sandy waste, in the centre, Nejd, a dry, hilly and often stony steppe. North of Nejd there is another belt of sand; and north of this belt is the dry steppe of the Syrian Desert, growing narrower as it goes northwards. Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the 'Fertile Crescent', a belt of cultivable land bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which run southwards through it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian Gulf; this is Iraq or Mesopotamia. The Fertile Crescent is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south-east by the head-waters of the Persian Gulf. In the north and east it is hemmed in by mountain-ranges: to the north the Taurus Mountains, the southern part of the Anatolian highlands which stretch across Asia Minor, to the north-east the mountains of Kurdistan, and to the east the Persian plateau. Joined to the western part of the Fertile Crescent by the peninsula of Sinai, but separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, is the land of Egypt, the fertile valley of the Nile surrounded by sandy deserts.

[1] In Chapters I–IV the word 'Syria' is used to refer to 'geographical Syria' as defined in the Introduction.

369 from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants
621 and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims
184 who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

10

101 The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

175 Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the
101 spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of
177 the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

175 The Turks performed also another function. Their military
177 strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

CHAPTER 1 *STRUCTURE OF THE SYRIAN ECONOMY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT*

Introduction

101 178 Syria, although an independent country only since 1945, has had a long and chequered history. It has seen many conquerors and witnessed the rise and fall of many civilizations. Since time immemorial it has been the frontier land where rival civilizations penetrating from the East and the West have contended for supremacy. The Sumerians, Chaldeans, Assyrians and Persians came from the East, and the Greeks and Romans from the West. Still later the Eastern Roman Empire of the early Christian era gave way, successively, to the Arabs and the Turks. Even after Turkish rule became firmly established, Syria remained for a long time the place where the caravans from the West and East met and an active trade in goods took place. Although it became basically eastern in its orientation, it was never wholly without contact with the West, and western influence was again reasserted when Turkish rule was terminated after the first World War.

Thus the culture, economy and political system of Syria are a mixture of East and West. The diverse elements have only been partially fused. The East and West co-exist in rather uneasy balance. Modern technology has invaded Syria in the form of factories, mechanized farms and motor cars, but the craftsmen still ply their trade in crowded bazaars, most of the land is still cultivated by time-hallowed methods and under ancient systems of tenure, and camels and donkeys still play a role—although a diminishing one—in transport. Modern commercial banks have by no means displaced the traditional money lenders and the bazaar banks or *sarafs,* and the wholehearted acceptance of western capitalism is still impeded to a small extent by the Moslem aversion to interest as usury. Democratic, parliamentary institutions have been borrowed from the West, but their stability is periodically threatened by divisive forces and the tradition of autocratic rule inherited from the past. Syrian nationalism, born as a rebellion against foreign domination, is now engaged in the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

101 178 challenging task of fusing the positive elements of both its eastern and its western heritage into a cohesive whole.

Population and Land

161 162 According to official estimates, Syria at the end of 1953 had a population of about 3.65 million, including some 150,000 Bedouins who lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Although demographic statistics are far from adequate, it appears probable that the population has been growing at an annual rate of somewhere between 2% and 3% during the last decade. Most of the population is rural:[1] about 60% live in villages and towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and each of the two largest cities—Damascus, the capital, and Aleppo, the commercial center of the country—has a population close to 400,000. About 86% of the population are Moslem or belong to offshoots of the Moslem religion, and nearly all of the balance are adherents of a considerable number of Christian denominations.

161 311 As a country with an area of 181,337 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), about three-fourths the size of the United Kingdom, Syria cannot be said to be densely populated. While less than a third of the area is cultivable, the proportion of the population to the land already under cultivation compares favorably with that of other countries in the Near and Middle East. In Syria there is one hectare[2] of cultivated land per inhabitant, or about 10% more than in Turkey and Iran, twice as much as in Greece and Iraq and eight to nine times as much as in Egypt.

311 133 There is still plenty of land available in Syria but water severely limits its utilization. The country lies to the leeward of mountain ranges in the west and north which intercept much of the rainfall. Except for the coastal region of Latakia province, Syria is largely cut off from the rain-bearing winds of the Mediterranean by mountains, the Djebel Ansariya (Alaouit mountains) in Latakia, and, farther south, after the intervening Tripoli-Homs gap, by the twin ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon which in turn give way to the Hermon range. Thus the area which can support rain-fed cultivation is confined to a rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier. Fortunately for Syria, its

[1] See Annex C, p. 292.
[2] A hectare = 2.471 acres.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Chapter Ten

SYRIA AND LEBANON

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

THE area of the present Syria and Lebanon lies to the north of Arabia Deserta and is the western horn of the Fertile Crescent. The two republics do not enclose within their boundaries a natural geographic entity and their climate and topography are best studied in relation to the surrounding countries;[1] but within the political boundaries of the two states, the following geographical divisions may roughly be distinguished:

(1) *The Coastal Strip.* This is about twenty miles wide near Latakia and rather less just north of Tripoli, but in some places disappears and the mountains meet the sea. Olives, bananas, citrus, and vegetables are cultivated intensively near Beirut.

(2) *The Mountains.* Starting from the north, the first coastal mountains are the Jebel Ansariya (also known as the Alawi Mountains) which average 4,000 feet and are well populated on the western slopes. To the south is the Homs–Tripoli gap and then starts the Lebanon range with peaks of over 10,000 feet. Even on the upper slopes of this range water is plentiful, there is close cultivation, and the villages and towns are prosperous. Near Beirut are situated the mountain resorts to which most of the city workers move each night when the summer brings its humid heat. The interior ranges of mountains lying parallel to that of the Lebanon are the Anti-Lebanon (between Homs and Zahle) reaching over 7,000 feet and the range of Hermon (between Zahle and the Israel border) which reaches 9,200 feet. Water and cultivation are far less plentiful on these than on the coastal mountains. Farther inland still and to the south of Damascus lie the Leja, a bleak area of igneous rock, and the Jebel Druze, which reaches 5,000–6,000 feet and lies north of the Jordan border.

(3) *Plains and Plateaux.* Hardly any of the territory of Syria and Lebanon lies less than 700 feet above sea-level and south of Hama almost all the land is over 1,600 feet. The richest agricultural land is on fairly high ground and forms part of a

[1] See W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East; a Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (London, Methuen, 1950).

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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6

Syria

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

The Republic of Syria was constituted in 1943, when France relinquished control over the mandated territories of Lebanon and Syria. Geographically and ethnically Syria forms an integral part of the eastern Mediterranean region, but politically it has undergone progressive modification since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Considerable confusion in terminology arises from the fact that the entire area was then designated as Syria. It was mandated to France by the League of Nations in 1923 as the separate territories of Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently, for a brief period the region was divided into the autonomous "Levant States" of Lebanon, Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. With the annexation of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz as provincial units in 1936, and the cession of the Alexandretta district to Turkey in 1939, the present boundaries of Syria were established. The country now includes an area of approximately 71,000 square miles. In the west, it has a coastline of about 104 miles on the Mediterranean Sea and, to the south, common frontiers with Lebanon and northern Israel. Inland, it is surrounded by Turkey on the north, Iraq on the east and the southeast, and Jordan on the south.

The interior of the country is essentially a semiarid plateau, sloping to the basins of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and backed by chains of mountains in the north and the west. The highlands on the Turkish border are not well defined, but those in the west differentiate distinct geographic regions. In the north, the Nusairiyeh mountains, with elevations up to 5,000 feet,

p. 135(A)

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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

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3 Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date) 1954 M1 Middle East
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crescent which (starting from the Iraqi border) comprises the Jezira, the countryside of Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, and the fertile and beautiful Biqaa valley. The cultivation of cotton and cereals is particularly successful in the north-eastern corner of Syria where there has been great general development in the last five or six years. From Homs one road leads south to the Biqaa valley which continues between the two mountain ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, past Zahle to the southern border of Lebanon. Farther inland is the road to Damascus which passes to the east of the Anti-Lebanon over the Qalamun plateau. This is mostly barren land, reaching over 2,000 feet; the areas of cultivation usually need more water, but suffer occasionally from bad floods. The oasis of Damascus is known as the Ghouta and there every drop of water in the two rivers is made use of, by an ancient system of canals which follow the contours and provide water lavishly as they gradually lose height. Between Damascus and Jordan lies the Hauran plateau much of which is about 2,000 feet above sea-level; here there is cultivation of cereals but few trees are now left and there is insufficient water to ensure good crops each year.

[241]

(4) *The Desert.* To the south and to the east of the Fertile Crescent there spreads a desert that extends southward for over

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 Syria MD1 M1 Middle East M1 Jordan MG1

Syria and Transjordan

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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

p. 136

111 MD1 Syria

2: Belgrave, Richard. A Visit to Sheikh Sulaiman Murshid, the Alawite "Lord." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 33, pp. 155-160. London: The Royal Central Asian Society, 1946.

Yale] Bj23.17.33.

[In this article by a squadron leader in the British armed forces relates the circumstances of his visit to the chief of the Alawites in Syria. There is a brief description of the Alawite sect and how their chief gained his position as semi-divine leader. The author's duties in the Alawite area began in October 1944. --Analyst]

Field date: 1945
Analyst: Beverly Meeker

Evaluation: Government Official-3
Processed in 1955

4: Cummins, Harold and W. M. Shanklin. Dermatoglyphics in Peoples of the Near East. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Vol. 22, pp. 263-265. Philadelphia: The Wistar Institute of Anatomy and Biology, 1937.

Yale: Nk.10. Am41. v22.

/This report presents data on the dermatoglyphics and palmar configuration of the Mitwali, a Syrian mountain people, members of the Shiite sect. The authors are physical anthropologists of Tulane University and the American University of Beirut, Syria. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: Beverly Meeker

Evaluation: Physical Anthropologist-4
Processed in 1955

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MD1 Syria

5: Barakat, Awad. Recent Economic Development in Syria. In Middle East Economic Papers 1954, pp. 1-25. Beirut: Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, 1954.

On loan from Fahim I. Qubain, HRAF.

/The author, Secretary of the Currency and Credit Council of Syria, briefly discusses problems of economic development in Syria, reviews economic development from 1945-1953, and analyses current problems and possible solutions. He refers to specific development projects and the part the government has played in planning, financing and administering them. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Social Scientist-5
Processed in 1955

111 MD1 Syria

6: Government of Syria. Report on Jazirah. Damascus: Government of Syria, 1952.

Pp. iii, 47

Middle East Institute Library: I. 262. Damascus 10/30/52.

/This is a comprehensive report on the Jezirah Province of Syria. It contains information on the ethnic and religious composition of the population, agriculture, land tenure, credit, communications and transportation. The report was written with the object of stating the outstanding problems obstructing higher agricultural production and a more equitable distribution of income in the Province. Suggestions as to solving the problems are included with the discussion of each problem--Analyst. /

Field date: none
Analyst: Majed Elass

Evaluation: Government Official-4
Processed in 1955

7: Lewis, Norman N. Malaria, Irrigation, and Soil Erosion in Central Syria. The Geographical Review, Vol. 39, pp. 278-290. New York: The American Geographical Society, 1948.

Yale: E10. G132. v. 39

/The author writes briefly of the interrelated problems of canal irrigation systems and their maintenance in central Syria, stagnant water from silted canals as breeding places for the Anopheles mosquito and the detriment to canals by floods and soil erosion which might create malaria-infested swamps. Norman Lewis is principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East. --Analyst/

Field date: ca. 1940-1945
Analyst: Olivia Maldonado

Evaluation: Social Scientist--5
Processed in 1955

9: Hitti, Philip K. The Origins of the Druze People and Religion with Extracts from their Sacred Writings. Columbia University Oriental Studies, Vol. XXVIII. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928.

Pp. viii, 81; 2 plates.

Yale: Bj68.221

[This source contains a resumé of various theories propounded as to the origin of the Druze people and their religion. The author advances evidence for a Persian origin of the Druze based on racial, linguistic, and other evidence. A brief section on early Druze history in Lebanon is followed by an exposition of the major tenets in Druze religious thought and practice. The text concentrates on Druze communities in Syria and Lebanon with only incidental mention of Yemen Druze. The appendices (pp. 55-81) provide examples of sacred writings and beliefs. Mr. Hitti, whose knowledge of the Druze is based on first-hand experience with them in Lebanon, was formerly Professor (now retired) of Semitic Literature at Princeton University. --Analyst]

Field date: ca. 1926
Analyst: Charles Griffith

Evaluation: Social Scientist--5
Processed in 1955

11: Hourani, A. H. Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay. London: Oxford University Press, 1946.

Pp. x, 402, 2 appendices, bibliography, maps, index.

Yale: Bj68j. 946h

[The author, a well known area specialist, reviews in this book the political history of Syria and Lebanon from early historical times to 1945. The mandate period receives a fuller coverage than earlier periods. Special emphasis is laid on the process of westernization in Syria and Lebanon, its effects and the reactions to it. Information may be found also on religious and racial minorities and their relation to the nationalist movement and to foreign interests. Part Four of the book contains the author's conclusions as to the trends and possibilities of change in the political orientation and status of the countries concerned and his recommendations as to the policies that should be followed by the western powers. The source contains two appendices. One of them is a collection of political documents connected with the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon. All documents are in French with one exception. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Majed Elass

Evaluation: Social Scientist--4
Processed in 1955

14: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Report. The Economic Development of Syria. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.

Pp. xviii, 486; 10 maps; 7 diagrams; 1 chart; tables.

Human Relations Area Files Library

[This is the report of the International Bank Mission which undertook a general review of Syria's economic potentialities and presented recommendations for a long-term development program to increase productive resources and raise the Syrian standard of living. Data were collected in the months February to April, 1954. The report is in two parts. Part I contains the Mission's recommendations for the organization and financing of a program of government action extending over five full years. Part II contains a series of Annexes consisting of technical notes on Syria's international economic position, public finance, agriculture, irrigation, agricultural

14: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Report.

institutions, industry, electric power, transportation and communications, settlements and social services. --Analyst]

Field date: 1954
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Social Scientist--5
Processed in 1956

15: Khadduri, Majid. Constitutional Development in Syria. The Middle East Journal, Vol. V, pp. 137-160. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1951.

HRAF Copy

[In this brief but competent article the author, a well-known scholar in the field of law in the Middle East, treats the constitutional development in Syria from the end of World War I to the date of writing. This period of time includes the mandate period and the endless negotiations between Syria and France directed toward greater constitutional government. With independence (1945-6) came a series of governmental upsets with the Army playing a major role. Finally the constitution of September 1950 was promulgated. This constitution, the author notes, is quite detailed and the process of amendment not flexible enough to allow for modifications necessitated daily by the changing times. However, basically, the constitution recognizes the need of evolving a political, social, and economic

15: Khadduri, Majid.

system in accordance with the needs of the nation. Whether Syria succeeds in creating for itself a stable government may well depend on (in the opinion of Professor Khadduri) "the stability and social-economic reorganization of the whole Arab world". --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Claire Nader

Evaluation: Social Scientist--4
Processed in 1956

16: Collart, Paul, Selim, Abdul-Hak, and Armando, Dillon. Syria: Problems of Preservation and Presentation of Sites and Monuments. UNESCO Museums and Monuments VII. Paris, 1954.

Pp. 35; 3 maps; 61 illustrations.

Yale: Bj68H+954U.

/This is the report of a Unesco mission to Syria in 1953. The mission consisted of an archaeologist, Mr. Paul Collart, a professor at the universities of Geneva and Lausanne, an architect, Mr. Armando Dillon, Superintendent of Historical Monuments in Palermo, and Dr. Selim Abdul-Hak, Director-General of Syrian Antiquities. The mission investigated the general situation and importance of ancient buildings and historical and archaeological sites in Syria, and recommended measures to be taken to preserve and restore them. There is brief historical material about the various sites and good descriptive information on monuments and architecture. Short bibliographies appear at the end of each section. The text has been paginated to correspond to the original source. --Analyst/

Field date: 1953
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Government Official-5
Processed in 1956

111

MD1 Syria

17: Syria, Directorate of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953. Damascus: Government Press, 1954.

Pp. ix, 218.

International Bank: 8c. 314. Sy85. 1953.

[This source is the fifth issue of the Statistical Abstract of Syria, which contains statistical information up until 1953. It was prepared by the Directorate of Statistics of the Syrian Ministry of National Economy. The data contained in the source cover the following topics: population, marriage and divorce rates, health statistics, education, foreign trade, prices, transportation and communication, government finances, economic production, and cultivation and irrigation. This source has been marked for the MD1 Syria file only. Arabic table of contents was omitted. --Analyst]

Field date: 1953
Analyst: Majed Elass

Evaluation: Government Official-5
Processed in 1956

• 113, 824, 137 Syria MD1

[For information on the useful plants of Iran and Iraq, many of which are also used in Syria, see 35: Hooper and Field, MA1 Iran, category 116. --Analyst]

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDI Syria MDI

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 944 THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (cazza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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174 > Mr. Lewis, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

p. 278

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

135
[311]



FIG. 1—The Salamiya area in its general setting. The hills are frequently given the collective name of Jebel Bil'as. Isohyets are from Charles Combier: Aperçu sur les climats de la Syrie et du Liban, avec carte au millionième des plains et vents, Délégation Générale de France au Levant, Beirut, 1945. Spelling of the place names here, and in the text in general follows the (British) Permanent Committee on Geographical Names.

of the hills and the Eocene-Oligocene marl of the plain. The limestones are predominantly pervious dolomitic limestones, separated by more or less impervious beds of flint and marl. Winter rainfall runs off in the wadis or soaks into the ground and either is soon discharged at a lower level by temporary springs or seeps slowly toward the plain, assisted by the dip of the strata.

The marl of the plain is in its unaltered state impermeable, but usually it has been affected to a considerable depth by the percolation of water through cracks and fissures. In this way calcium carbonate and silica are deposited to depths of as much as 50 feet, and the whole character of the rock is altered.[2] It becomes crumbly, permeable, and water-bearing. Above this layer of rock a hardpan develops, ranging in thickness from a few inches to four feet, which is due to the concentration by capillary action of calcium carbonate and silica.

The region is one where the desert merges into the sown. The rainfall

[2] L. Dubertret: Lithological Map of the Eastern Border of the Mediterranean, 1:500,000, with notes translated by W. R. Fish [i.e. Fisher], Fighting French Délégation Générale in the Levant, Geological Section, Beirut, 1945.

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7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE REGION THE RAINFALL

regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;[8] it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub[2] and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Palmyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

Irrigation

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

113 [8] A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Journ. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDl Syria MDl

244 except wheat and barley, and around each village is an area of irrigated land on which vegetables, fruit, cotton, maize, fodder, and grain are grown. The configuration of the ground and the peculiar properties of the marl make possible the use of subsurface water for irrigation, and past and present inhabitants have taken full advantage of these conditions.

312 [406 379] Water is distributed to irrigation ditches from wells, surface watercourses, or *foggaras* (foqqaras).[2] It is lifted from wells either by pumps or by chains of buckets geared to an animal-turned wheel. From wadis which have water in part of their course for some or all of the growing season it is taken by a gravity canal. The stream is roughly dammed and the water led, at a gentler angle than that of the watercourse, along the valley side until it reaches a suitable level for watering the ground below. Neither of these methods is of great importance as compared with foggaras, which supply most of the irrigated lands of the area.

A foggara, known elsewhere as *qanat, kariz,* or "chain of wells," is an underground conduit. The method has been used since ancient times in many parts of the Middle East. Foggaras are found in several regions of Syria and are especially numerous in the Selemiya region. Figure 4 shows the general principle by which the water-bearing layer is tapped by the gallery or subsurface canal. The most copious supplies of water are provided when the canal is driven back from a spring along the underground "stream" that feeds it. A depression that is a natural gathering ground of water is often utilized, or a wide area may be tapped by the construction of several converging galleries, as in Moufaqqar. The gradient of the gallery is sufficient to induce water flow, but it is less steep than the general slope of the ground, so that water is conducted gradually to the surface, usually to low-lying flat land suitable for irrigation. The vertical shafts, like large wells, which connect the underground canal to the surface, were used during the digging as passages of ingress and egress and serve the same purpose now when the canals are cleaned of mud, debris, and vegetation; hence they are always surrounded with mounds of accumulated spoil. Lower down, as the canal comes to the surface, it flows between steep banks, which gradually become less high, until the water is flowing at ground level. Often the hardpan forms a natural roof to the gallery.

In length, depth, and water flow the foggaras differ greatly. One canal

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[2] Foggaras in North Africa have been described and illustrated in the *Geographical Review*. See Jules Blache: Modes of Life in the Moroccan Countryside, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 477–502, references on pp. 488 and 491; R. H. Forbes: The Tuareg Conquest, Vol. 33, 1943, pp. 197–213, reference on p. 199—Edit. Note.

113

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

312 locally by the area of land each irrigates. One canal irrigates 136 acres near Selemiya town; many supply between 20 and 60 acres; and the smallest suffices only for 2.4 acres (near Tell et Tout). The larger canals are nearly all in the low-lying basinlike plain around the town of Selemiya; most of the smaller ones lie toward the northeast. A canal which supplies 68 acres of land in Selemiya delivers 8.8 gallons a second (measured at lowest water level, in October, 1945). There are today in the caza 125 such canals which are in working order and an unknown number which are not in use. These 125 canals irrigate a total of 3060 acres. The map of Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) shows typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara.[4]

History

175 312 At Misherfe-Qatna, where a modern village occupies the site of a Hittite fortress-city, 18 miles southwest of Selemiya, a foggara-like canal supplied the town in the second millennium before Christ.[5] Most of those in our region date from a much later period, and probably more were constructed from the second century of our era to the sixth than at any other time. Many can be dated by the details of their construction, or by their close association with ruins, or, occasionally, by inscriptions. During these centuries the Selemiya region was a prosperous agricultural district, well supplied with irrigation water. The Roman legacy was added to in the early period of Arab rule,[6] when Selemiya was well known as a pleasant country town, the public buildings of which, especially the baths, rivaled those in great Arab cities. Descendants of the Abbasid Prince Saleh ibn Ali ibn Abdullah ibn Abbas ibn il Motalib lived in Selemiya, and, according to Ya'qubi, writing in 891, Abdullah, the son of Saleh, "conducted thither a stream of water, and dug wells in the land, whereby the saffron grows plentifully." For a period after 893 the town became a center of the Ismaili sect, a circumstance which brought it importance then, and which was to affect the region powerfully a thousand years later.

Throughout the Arab period the water of Selemiya remained famous. As late as the fourteenth century Ahmed the Secretary praised Selemiya as "a charming and rich town, with abundant water and trees. Water comes

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[4] See the maps of Qdeym for typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara, Plans III and IV in the atlas volume of R. Mouterde and A. Poidebard: Le limes de Chalcis: Organisation de la steppe en Haute Syrie romaine (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 38), 2 vols. (text and atlas), Paris, 1945. See review elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*.

[5] Mesnil du Buisson: Le site archéologique de Michrife-Qatna, Paris, 1935.

[6] Information on the Arab period is drawn largely from the article "Salamiya" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam and from Guy le Strange: Palestine under the Moslems, Boston and New York, 1890. The quotation from Ya'qubi is from Le Strange, p. 528.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

to it in aqueducts."[7] Today there are 39 foggaras in use on the lands of Selemiya, and there are also some that are unused. Very few of the foggaras are modern, so that we may legitimately suppose about the same area to have been irrigated around the town in the Arab period as at present—1300 acres. The water was renowned for its purity, as it is today, and Hama, 18 miles away on the muddy Orontes, drank Selemiya water brought to the city by a foggara from Ain ez Zerqa. Abu el Fida (1273–1331), geographer and king of Hama, caused this canal to be cleaned, and two centuries later the following inscription from a Hama mosque shows that it was repaired or cleaned again:[8]

175 8121 175

On fifteenth Gumada I 901 [March 2, 1496] was promulgated the princely, august decree of our master, the great emir, the chief, the governor general, Sayfiddin el Arafi Qansuh as Sarifi as Sami, governor general of the province of Hama (may God glorify his victory!), prohibiting the diversion of moneys to the profit of the exchequer (may it ever prosper!) and of others, from the funds intended for the aqueduct of Selemiya, and ordering that nothing should be taken from this fund except the wages of the workmen laboring on it. Whoever should renew these exactions, let him be accursed, and may both his father and his Prophet testify against him on judgment day.

By this time the prosperous days of Selemiya were nearly over. Scattered references show that the frontier of settlement and regular agriculture in the region was retreating westward. Tamerlane ravaged all Syria in 1400, and in 1516 the country fell to the Turks. During the next four centuries Syria slowly decayed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries several great Bedouin tribes moved north out of Arabia into the Syrian Desert and its peripheral regions. After this the steppe and the desert were almost completely beyond the control of the Turkish government, and the frontiers of law, order, and settled life retreated from the edges of these uncontrolled territories. The valuable journals of some English merchants[9] who traveled through the eastern part of our region at the end of the seventeenth century show that, except for Bedouins, it was then practically deserted. The Ismaili inhabitants, according to their descendants' tradition, had left soon after

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[7] See [Maurice] Gaudefroy-Demombynes: La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 3), Paris, 1923, pp. 77–78. 113

[8] This inscription is from the Great Mosque of Hama, where there are a number of Mameluke decrees, dealing particularly with trade and taxation. It is transcribed in French by Jean Sauvaget in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas*, Vol. 3, 1933, p. 6.

[9] "An Extract of the Journals of Two Several Voyages of the English Merchants of the Factory of Aleppo, to Tadmor, Anciently Call'd Palmyra," *Philos. Trans. Royal Soc. of London*, No. 218, Vol. 19, 1695, pp. 129–147. [Also in "Miscellanea Curiosa," Vol. 3, Containing a Collection of Curious Travels, Voyages, and Natural Histories of Countries, As They Have Been Delivered in to the Royal Society, 2nd edit., revised and corrected by W. Derham, London, 1727 (originally edited by Edmund Halley in 1708), pp. 120–159.]

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDl Syria MDl

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[20] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312, Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [20] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

7: Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

ing all this great quantity of Water was past away, so that in about two Hour's Riding we could hardly perceive that there had been any Rain at all. 131

That floods are an old phenomenon in Selemiya is suggested by two traditional theories, repeated by the inhabitants today, regarding the derivation of the place name. The first theory makes the essential form Sal-Miah, "a flood of water." The other was recorded by Yaqut in 1225:

Ahmad ibn Yahyā ibn Jābir relates that there was a city in Syria, near Salamiyyah, called Al Mūtafikah [The Overturned], which was overwhelmed with all its inhabitants—all except one hundred souls. These left that place, and came and built one hundred houses, and they called the hamlet where they had made their houses Salām Miyah (Peace for the Hundred), of which the people made Salamiyyah.[12]

As told today, the story is that the "overwhelming" agent was a flood.

The floods are greatly aggravated by soil erosion. Where the trees have been cut, the bushes torn up for fuel, and the grass overgrazed, and especially where slopes have been plowed, there the soil is eroded, and many slopes are now practically bare of soil and vegetation. In summer, soil is shifted by strong winds; in winter, rain washes it into gullies or wadis with steep, crumbling sides. These are tributary to the main streams which do so much damage when they reach the plain. The runoff from bare slopes is faster and more fully loaded than that from vegetated slopes. 131 134

Past and Present Vegetation Destruction

There is no doubt that the trees of Jebel Bil'as are a remnant of a denser and more extensive growth, though there are no very good grounds for the common assumption that all the Palmyrene ranges were forested in Roman days. The Tablet of Palmyra's fiscal laws of A.D. 137[13] gives reason to suppose that the locality may have furnished considerable quantities of wood and pistachio nuts, and in the same period Jebel Bil'as and neighboring ranges were used as grazing lands for sheep and horses.[14] The location of elaborate Romano-Byzantine foggara systems, as at Moufaqqar, directly in the paths of the floods might seem to indicate that, when the foggaras were constructed, floods were not as serious as they are now. 135 137 [72]

Old stumps and roots are found within and beyond the present wooded

[12] Le Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

[13] See J.-B. Chabot: Choix d'inscriptions de Palmyre, Paris, 1922, pp. 23-38.

[14] A. Poidebard: La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie.—Le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe.—Recherches aériennes (1925-1932) (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 18), Paris, 1934; M. D. Schlumberger: Une campagne de fouilles au Djebel-el-Cheer en 1934, *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1935, pp. 250-256. 113

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDI Syria MDI

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho's* which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[25]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[26] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[25] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[26] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

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This is neither a complete bibliography nor a list of the sources on which the present work is based. Its only purpose is to offer suggestions to readers who desire to follow up any of the subjects touched on in the text. 113

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Books of travel and description are innumerable, and mostly superficial. Perhaps G. L. BELL, *Syria: the Desert and the Sown* (London, 1907) is as good an introduction as any for a reader who has never seen the country.

2. *History:* A scholarly and complete survey is H. LAMMENS, *La Syrie: précis historique*, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1921). In the modern period it tends to underestimate the achievement of the Arabs and overemphasize the French connexion, but its bias is so obvious as to be easily discounted. There are a large number of detailed studies of special subjects: e.g. R. DUSSAUD, P. DESCHAMPES and H. SEYRIG, *La Syrie antique et médiévale illustrée* (Paris, 1931); E. S. BOUCHIER, *Syria as a Roman Province* (Oxford, 1916), clear and competent; H. LAMMENS: *Études sur le règne du calife omaiyade Moâwia* 1er (Beirut, 1906), *Études sur le Siècle du Omayedes* (Beirut, 1930), and *Le Califat de Yazid* 1er (Paris, 1910), indispensable for the Umayyad period; G. LE STRANGE, *Palestine under the Moslems* (London, 1890), an interesting description, based on the Arab geographers, of what the country must have looked like in the Middle Ages; G. DE MOMBYNES: *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks* (Paris, 1923). To a great extent, however, the curious reader must go for his information to general histories of the ancient East, the Roman Empire, the Arabs, the Crusades and the Ottoman Turks.

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113 JOUPLAIN, *La Question du Liban* (Paris, 1908), which is full but not always accurate.

Some of the contemporary descriptions and analyses are still valuable as well as entertaining. C. F. VOLNEY, *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie* (Paris, 1787) is penetrating but somewhat scornful. J. L. BURCKHARDT, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1822) shows the country as it was immediately before Western penetration began. C. H. CHURCHILL, *Mount Lebanon* (3 vols., London, 1853) and *The Druzes and the Maronites under Turkish Rule* (London, 1862) are based upon great personal experience and intimate knowledge.

3. *The Religions of Syria and Lebanon:* F. J. BLISS, *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine* (New York, 1912) is authoritative and sympathetic but better on the Christian than on the Moslem Sects. On Islam there is of course an immense literature, to which H. LAMMENS, *Islam, beliefs and institutions* (English translation, London, 1929) may serve as an introduction; it has a good bibliography. Good essays on Islamic civilization will be found in T. ARNOLD and C. GUILLAUME (ed.), *The Legacy of Islam* (Oxford, 1931). H. A. R. GIBB (ed.), *Whither Islam?* (London, 1932) is a study of the present position of Islam. *The Encyclopædia of Islam* (Leiden, 1913-1936) has articles, most of them good and reliable, on specific subjects.

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A. S. TRITTON, *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects* (London, 1930) describes the position of the Christian communities under Moslem rule.

4. *Arab Nationalism:* It is hardly possible to understand Arab nationalism without knowing something of Arab history and society. The facts of Arab history are conveniently gathered together in P. K. HITTI, *History of the Arabs* (2nd ed., London, 1940); its underlying principles have been expounded for all time by IBN KHALDUN in his *Muqaddamah* (French translation, *les Prolegomènes*, trans. M. G. de Slane, Paris, 1862-1868). The unsurpassable description of the society of the Arabian Desert is of course C. M. DOUGHTY, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. (2nd ed.; London, 1921).

G. ANTONIUS, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938) is the authoritative study of the history of the Arab nationalist movement

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from its beginning almost until the present day; its early chapters are of particular importance. The description of Arab Nationalism in the first part of T. E. LAWRENCE, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London, 1935) is a marvellous poetic construction, but not always to be accepted without reserve. There is a profound philosophical analysis of the movement in W. E. HOCKING, *The Spirit of World Politics* (New York, 1932); and a more superficial but nevertheless interesting one in the works of H. KOHN, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (English translation, London, 1929) and *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (English translation, London, 1932). The sociological basis of the Arab Movement is brilliantly illuminated by H. A. R. GIBB in two essays in P. W. IRELAND (ed.), *The Near East: Problems and Prospects* (Chicago, 1942). The same author has analysed the modern Arabic literary movement in *Studies in Contemporary Arabic Literature* (*Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London, vols. IV, pp. 745-60, V, pp. 311-22, 445-66, and VII, pp. 1-22).

The student of Arabic nationalism must give particular attention to the Zionist problem in Palestine. The question is expounded with balance, clarity and insight in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine* (Cmd. 5479, London, 1937), one of the most remarkable of Blue Books. There is a very interesting sociological analysis in W. K. HANCOCK, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. I (London, 1937). The causes of Arab Opposition to Zionism are made clear in the work of G. ANTONIUS, mentioned above. The nature and history of Zionism can be studied in a large and brilliant literature. A good introduction is PAUL GOODMAN (ed.), *The Jewish National Home* (London, 1943). The standard History is A. BÖHM, *Die Zionistische Bewegung* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1935). The spirit of the movement can be gathered from T. HERZL, *Tagebücher* (3 vols., Berlin, 1922-1923) and S. LEVIN, *Youth in Revolt* (English translation, London, 1930). There is an essay on "The Jews" in L. B. NAMIER, *Conflicts* (London, 1942) which is most remarkable for its depth of thought and feeling.

5. *The French Connexion:* The history of France's relations with Syria and Lebanon may be found in F. CHARLES-ROUX, *La France et les Chrétiens d'Orient* (Paris, 1939) and R. RISTELHUEBER, *Les Traditions Françaises au Liban* (Paris, 1918). A. LAMARTINE, *Voyage en Orient* (4 vols., Paris, 1835) is important both in itself and because of its effect on the French imagination. M. BARRÈS, *Une Enquête aux pays du Levant* (Paris, 1923) is of no great value as history, but an interesting and important example of French sentiment about Syria and Lebanon.

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113 (ed.), *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. VI (London, 1924) is fair and accurate, but written too soon after the events to be definitive. G. ANTONIUS, *The Arab Awakening* (see 4 above) is very good on the war-time promises and post-war settlement, and contains a number of important documents. D. LLOYD GEORGE, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. II (London, 1938) places the Syrian question in its context of Anglo-French relations. H. N. HOWARD, *The Partition of Turkey* (Norman, 1931) is a useful work of reference. R. DE GONTAUT-BIRON, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie* (Paris, 1923), gives the French version of the quarrel with Faisal.

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8. *The Economic System:* The French Government's Annual Reports to the League of Nations (see 7 above) have valuable sections on economic development and statistical appendices. S. B. HIMADEH (ed.), *Economic Organisation of Syria* (Beirut, 1936) and *The Monetary and Banking System of Syria* (Beirut, 1935), are accurate and painstaking compilations, the indispensable groundwork of future researches. A. LATRON, *La Vie Rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, 1936) is an original and accurate study.

Halaf, Tell Ahmar and Arslan Tash. The wonderful statues from Mari are more nearly life-size. There are also a great many objects from Ras-Shamra (Ugarit) and Mari which well repay examination. The present building is old and ill-fitted for use as a museum as regards both lighting and the size of the rooms. There are plans, however, for the building of a new museum where there will be ample room and the necessary facilities to display the collections to full advantage. 217

At the present time, there are local museums at Sueida and Palmyra. The former contains an interesting collection of basalt sculpture and mosaics; the latter is scarcely more than a depository crowded with statues and stone inscriptions. The Directorate of Antiquities intends to establish other small museums at Deir-es-Zor, Homs, Hama, and Tartus or Latakia. It is hoped to provide them with a library, where the principal publications relating to the region covered, together with a few general historical and archaeological works, would be available. The existing library at Damascus is extremely useful, but the one at Aleppo would be improved by the acquisition of some additional works.

In conclusion, the following list gives the titles of a few works relating to the collections referred to above: 217 113

ABDUL-HAK, S., "L'exposition au musée de Damas des découvertes archéologiques de l'année 1952", *Museum*, vol. VII, 1954 (not yet published).

ABDUL-HAK, S. and A., *Catalogue illustré du département des antiquités gréco-romaines au musée de Damas*, Damascus, 1951.

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MEANS OF PUBLICIZING MONUMENTS AND PRESENTING THEM TO BEST ADVANTAGE 172 658

The efforts made by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities to promote the study and preservation of historical monuments might yield even better results if they were more widely understood and supported. By means of intelligent propaganda through the three channels of education, tourist development and town planning, it should be possible gradually to arouse general sympathy and interest. The important point is to show clearly that historic monuments are not merely an outdated and costly burden, but have a positive and lively interest for every individual. A publicity campaign on these lines has already been successfully undertaken, but in certain respects it might be amplified and developed.

In the field of education, interest in the country's artistic assets can be aroused by the distribution of illustrated publications and the organization of exhibitions and lectures. There are already some publications of this kind dealing with Damascus, Palmyra, Bosra and Aleppo and more could easily be produced; they should contain fine photographs and be translated into several languages. After organizing a few exhibitions of paintings and a brilliant ceremony to mark the opening of the Qasr el-Heir galleries in the Damascus Museum, the Directorate of Antiquities has recently made a conclusive experiment in this field. It has organized a wonderful exhibition of treasures discovered at archaeological sites in Syria during 1952, which has met with well-deserved success. We ourselves

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We shall have to consider town planning in greater detail

In connexion with Damascus and Aleppo. For the moment, we would merely deplore the fact that the authors of extension and development plans are all too apt to write off ancient monuments as undesirable, instead of considering them as some of the finest and most attractive focus-points around which to replan districts. The preservation and enhancement of these buildings need be no bar to a city's normal development. They merely raise problems which should always be studied in consultation with qualified experts attached to the Directorate of Antiquities. If the work is done with good taste, it will help not only to interest a few scholars anxious to learn more of the past, but to develop a love of their monuments in the inhabitants themselves, so they come consciously or unconsciously to appreciate their beauty, and, in a short time, take them as an essential and familiar ornament to their daily life.

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361 from time to time, onto vistas of monuments—such as the beautiful minarets of the Hisham Mosque and the Madanet el-Qali, and the façades and domes of the Sibaiya Madrasah and the Dervish-Pasha and Sinan-Pasha mosques—which serve as landmarks.

We might well go on to consider the special interest and characteristics of the suburbs of the meidan (with the fine Bab-Saghir cemetery), Suq-Sârouja and Salihiyah, but we dwelt on this subject at some length in describing their history, and there would be no point in repeating our remarks on the importance of preserving the characteristic atmosphere of these places.

Finally, in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, we should like once more to draw the attention of young town planning experts, who lay so much store by wide, straight streets, to the importance of preserving the picturesque, as we have advocated, and of catering for the tourist trade which, for a city with so rich an artistic heritage, is a considerable potential source of income.

There are, in our opinion, few other towns of comparable romantic and picturesque appeal. But we must make it clear that when we use the term "picturesque" we have in mind something which, though apparently haphazard, in fact possesses a beauty and logic of its own, since it has grown up spontaneously and naturally as the outcome of an earlier age and the reflection of a wealth of life and feeling. This explains why the various parts combine so naturally and necessarily. This quality of the "picturesque", which we believe should be preserved and enhanced, is not to be confused with the results of neglect, carelessness and dirt.

As regards the tourist trade, we do not, of course, advocate sacrificing the life and development of a city and subordinating its whole disposition to the tastes of foreigners in search of the novel and exotic. We simply wish to point out that the desire to attract tourists may provide an incentive to set off to best advantage those features of a town which truly deserve to be generally known, admired and appreciated.

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We are glad indeed to be able to associate ourselves with the recommendations and reservations in the report accompanying the scheme of improvements adopted by the municipality. A point we wish to stress is the need to add to the staff of the town planning services specialists (or the commission mentioned earlier), able to translate into practical terms what, in the actual plan, is suggested but not set out to the last detail.

The experience gained from the building of the new seraglio, with the ill-advised roadworks involving the destruction of the Matbakh el-Ajami (described by J. Sauvaget as "the only relic of this order existing in the Moslem East") and the mutilation of the Khan Al-Wazir ("a noteworthy collection of buildings, said to be the finest khan in Aleppo") should counsel prudence. Any work involving interference with the old quarters should be preceded by the closest study of the various factors which have gone to make them what they are. We hope it will prove possible to avoid any further disfigurement of the Khan Al-Wazir for the purpose, already announced, of compensating the property owners who have suffered loss through the widening of the street with plots carved out of the courtyard area. Anything of the kind would have the worst effect on the fine architectural balance of the khan and would be in flagrant contradiction to the principles set forth above.

The point to be remembered is that any plan for the expansion of a town must serve to lay down lines of future development which will guarantee harmony, giving due weight to all things of importance to the community. It would be useless and harmful if such a plan were carried out only in part, to serve special interests and for immediate profit.

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361 172 of the Caliph Al-Mutasim has been found there, besides fragments of stucco work, frescoes, glassware and glazed ceramics. This is but a part of a very large built area which will be systematically explored.

A word must also be said of Mari (Tell Hariri), another town on the river, which, 3,000 years before Dura, occupied a comparable position some 25 miles further south; everyone has heard of the extraordinary treasures found there since 1932 by the French mission under A. Parrot, which include statues, jewellery, mother-of-pearl mosaics and inscribed tablets. These are preserved at Aleppo and the Louvre and the most recent finds are at present on view in the exhibition at the Damascus Museum. Other notable sites are the triangular fortifications of Halibiyeh, the ancient Zenobia, built in Roman times, with its serried chain of towers, to guard the narrow pass running along the Euphrates at the foot of a high basalt cliff, and Meskené, the ancient Beliis, with its high brick minaret, at the junction of the route from Antioch and Aleppo with the river valley.

The Mesopotamian method of building with sun-dried brick, which was more or less generally employed, and the extent and isolation of the sites make it questionable whether it would be worth while to undertake costly maintenance and consolidation work. At Mari, Dura and Raqqa the treasures found are of greater interest than the buildings; once the excavations have been completed, plans drawn and photographs taken, the ruins can be left to their fate. It will then be the task of museums and publications to make them live once more.

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172 liers, which, since its restoration in 1936 (involving the removal
658 of the village built within the ramparts and the repairing of the terraces) had suffered considerable damage. The new work of restoration included the rebuilding of walls, the repairing of vaults, the reconstruction of a stairway that had collapsed, and the replacing of the missing parts of the windows and doorways in the portico of the great hall. But other misfortunes are continually occurring: a tower is struck by lightning; plants grow upon the glacis. It is constantly necessary to set to again—and the castle concerned is only one of many.

We are well aware of the great interest which the Directorate of Antiquities is taking in this matter and of its determination to continue its efforts; it is deserving of the highest praise. It would be well, however, if the skilled technicians in charge of the work could have the advice of competent specialists whenever some delicate piece of architecture is in need of repair. The same applies to the present restoration of the minaret of the Great Mosque at Aleppo.

172 We are also of the opinion—and this is our second observation—that this work would be easier and less burdensome if the tourist attraction of these magnificent buildings were taken into account. At present they are almost inaccessible, as is shown by the ridiculously small number of visitors (the average is less than 120 a month at the Krak). The Krak or Marqab can be reached only by jeep and it is impossible to travel the whole distance to Sahyun by road. Nevertheless, there were once tracks leading to these castles and they simply need a few miles of repair and regular upkeep thereafter. If that were done, there is no doubt that there would be a tremendous increase in the number of tourists, and considerable funds for the work of restoration could be derived from admission fees.

From this point of view, the region offers real advantages which it would not be difficult to exploit. It is quite near the sea and, if the road were better, a visit to the Krak could be included in the programme of the numerous cruises calling along this coast, which already visit Baalbek and Damascus. The establishment of a suitable hotel at Tartus would make it possible for travellers with the necessary time at their disposal to make interesting excursions to Ruad, Safita and Marqab, just as they can from Latakia to Jebla, Ras-Shamra and Sahyun. This would also be a good opportunity of restoring the church at Tartus, which is at present being used by the municipality as a storehouse. Moreover, if a rest-house were fitted up inside the Krak it would be easier to visit the castle from Tartus, Tripoli, Homs, Hama or even Damascus.

This would permit the successful development of a region whose natural beauties vie in attraction with its incomparable monuments, to the advantage not only of the local population but of the country as a whole.

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houses among the ancient buildings. These houses should be removed and the monuments should be consolidated and restored. It is not at all certain that the plan adopted by the authorities for the improvement of this site meets all these needs or gives sufficient attention to the appropriate presentation of the principal monuments. 346 172

In conclusion, we must draw attention to the quite outstanding interest of the great group formed by the Roman theatre and the Arab citadel. The two buildings, equal in beauty, are intimately connected. The thirteenth-century ramparts, with their great square towers and rustic work, encircle the caves of the theatre, while a building intended as a storehouse, consisting of three storeys of great vaulted rooms, one above the other, has been built on the orchestra. The Directorate of Antiquities has recently carried out large-scale excavation work to clear the tiered seats and the stage as far as possible. We feel that bolder action is necessary and that the huge block of masonry obstructing the interior of the caves, which is of no great interest in itself, should be demolished. This would restore a splendid ancient monument in its entirety, without serious detriment to the Moslem citadel. The Roman theatre at Bosra is one of the largest, most beautiful and most complete of those that still remain. Moreover, it has a number of noteworthy features, in the structure of the sloping arches supporting the tiers, the arrangement of the small stairways leading to the latter, and the wonderful ornamentation of the *frons scaenae*. The towers of the Arab citadel are also a magnificent example of medieval military architecture. If the work we have suggested were done, both buildings, instead of detracting from each other as they do at present, would be seen to greater advantage. Together, they would be an outstanding attraction for tourists. 345 172

The region of Bosra and the Jebel Druze, which can be reached quite easily from Damascus, should be much better known. The establishment of a rest-house inside the citadel of Bosra itself and the improvement of accommodation facilities at Suweida would involve little cost and make visits much easier. 172

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1 A [AT BOSRA -- ANALYST]

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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under a Christian governor. Already for one generation, after the interruption caused by the Napoleonic Wars, missionaries from Western Christendom had been laying the foundations of an intellectual revival—chiefly among the Lebanese Christians, but also in the Syrian cities; and the foundation in 1866 of the Syrian Protestant College (renamed in 1920 the American University of Beirut) is a landmark in the early history of Arab nationalism. Religious minorities thus acquired the habit of looking to some Western patron for material support and for protection against the majority of their neighbours and their governors; thus the Maronites depended on France, the Orthodox on Imperial Russia, the local Jews on the Alliance Israélite and on Britain, the Protestants on the United States, Britain, or Germany. Emigration to the Americas or Europe further opened the cultural windows of Christian Lebanon and emigrants to Egypt founded there a modern Arabic literature, while the granting of public utility concessions, especially for railways, to French companies and others increased the Western interest in the country.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Young Turks, who were at first supported by the leaders of the early Arab nationalism, rose to power; but it soon became apparent that the Young Turk was to be as much a despot as the Sultan. The Arab intelligentsia of Beirut and Damascus chose, therefore, to look to the Western Powers for support[1]—a decision which they may well now be regretting. The Ottoman Governor of Syria, Jamal Pasha, carried out a drastic 'purge' of the urban nationalist leaders in 1916, but the nationalist cause had been taken up at a safer distance by the Sharif Hussain of Mecca and his sons Faisal and Abdullah, who had been in correspondence with the British authorities in Egypt since before the outbreak of the First World War.[2] Their Arab Revolt was a response to Jamal Pasha's purge and the prospect of similar measures in the Hejaz. Brilliantly organized by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, it effectively harassed the left wing of the Ottoman front on the desert margin while Allenby was breaking the main resistance in the Palestine campaign. When the Ottoman front collapsed after the British victory at Megiddo, a small body of Arabs from the Amir Faisal's army were the first to reach Damascus. Faisal was given authority by General Allenby over all territory east of the Jordan, down to Aqaba, but by the Arabs he was regarded rather as an independent amir on the throne of the Umayyads. However, Faisal had scarcely appoint-

[1] See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, Hamilton, 1946).
[2] For this section see above, pp. 17–18.

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RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SYRIA

AWAD BARAKAT *

Introduction

433 1. Despite the great potentialities that lie in her fertile soil, the nature of her climate, the energy of her people and her geographical position, Syria is an economically underdeveloped country. Perhaps it would be more accurate to use the term *not fully developed* to describe Syria's present situation, particularly in view of the economic awakening which began after World War II and has continued to grow up to the present day.

000 2. Admitted that the economic development of any country cannot be undertaken without individual as well as governmental effort, we nevertheless intend to restrict our examination of the economic development of Syria to the part played by the government. The reasons for this restriction are: limitations of space do not allow a full analytical treatment of both individual and governmental efforts; statistics on governmental activities are far fuller and more reliable than any as yet available for private concerns; finally we believe that in a country like Syria, where private capital is inadequate and the investment habit not yet deeply rooted, economic development must depend to a very large extent upon the government. Indeed we would go so far as to say that unless the government is able to assume control of economic development and is willing to bear the greater part of the burden, little improvement can take place. Part of the government's job will be to create the conditions, lacking until now which will encourage individual efforts and investment.

3. Underdeveloped countries, generally speaking, have certain conditions in common, the most characteristic being the following: partial exploitation of natural resources and neglect of possibilities of growth: low national production and national income, resulting in weak purchasing power, low national savings and shortage of investment capital; a deficit in the balance of trade

114 * Dr. Awad Barakat is Secretary of the Currency and Credit Council of Syria.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 744 THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

114 > MR. LEWIS, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

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14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

PREFACE

121 This is the report of a mission to Syria, organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Syria. The task of the mission was to undertake a general review of Syria's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the government to formulate a long-term development program for increasing Syria's productive resources and raising the standard of living of its people. The recommendations were to concern the approximate rate of public capital expenditure which Syria can appropriately undertake, priorities for such expenditure as among different sectors of the economy and as among types of undertakings within those sectors, measures apart from capital investment for improving and increasing production and raising living standards, and economic, fiscal and administrative policies and measures necessary for the success of the development program.

114 The mission consisted of ten full-time members. The adviser on agricultural production was nominated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; one of the economists is a member of the regular staff of the International Monetary Fund. Five members (the advisers on industry, housing and community planning, water resources and power, and transportation, and the agricultural economist) were recruited by the Bank from outside its staff. The other three members are members of the Bank's regular staff. The mission chief and one of the experts are from the Netherlands; the other mission members are from Switzerland, France, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The mission arrived in Syria early in February 1954 and remained until the latter part of April. During their stay in Syria, members of the mission travelled through all of the country's nine provinces. The mission reassembled at the Bank's headquarters for the purpose of writing this report.

121 The report is in two parts. Part I, the Main Report, contains the mission's recommendations for the organization and financing of a program of government action extending over five full years. Part II contains a series

[p. vi CONTAINS NO TEXTUAL MATERIAL.]

121 in this field by the Directorate of Antiquities. We have also studied the special conditions in each of the country's great archaeological regions, the particular difficulties to which the preservation and restoration of their monuments give rise, and practical ways of applying the principles already formulated.

114 The mission, consisting of an archaeologist, Mr. Paul Collart, a professor at the universities of Geneva and Lausanne, as head of the mission, an architect, Mr. Armando Dillon, Superintendent of Historical Monuments in Palermo, and Dr. Selim Abdul-Hak, Director-General of Syrian Antiquities, spent 10 weeks, from the end of May to the beginning of August 1953, collecting the necessary information on the spot. Thanks to the facilities accorded to them, Mr. P. Collart and Mr. A. Dillon were able to travel extensively in the country and thus form a well-grounded opinion on the various questions which they had to study.

000 It is our pleasant duty here to express our very sincere gratitude to all those who helped us in our task: at Damascus, to the officials of the Antiquities Service, who gave us assistance and advice on many occasions, and particularly to Mr. Ziki Amir, who accompanied us on our tours of the city; at Aleppo to Mr. Feisal Serafi, Director of Antiquities in northern Syria, and Mr. Soubhi Saouaf, Technical Officer; at Bosra, to Mr. Souleiman Magdad, Superintendent of Antiquities; at Sueida, Palmyra, Raqqa, Qalaat Semiq, Hama and the Krak des Chevaliers, to the inspectors and attendants who so kindly welcomed us and acted as our guides. We should also like to thank Mr. Henri Seyrig, who authorized us to take our illustrations for this report from the collection of aerial photographs at the French Archaeological Institute in Beirut, and Mr. Georges Tchalenko, who gave us much useful information.

Lastly, although he was himself a member of the mission, we should like to express our gratitude to Dr. Selim Abdul-Hak for the kind welcome he gave us and all that he did to make our work easier during our stay in Syria.

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2: Belgrave G-8 (1945) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A VISIT TO SHEIKH SULAIMAN MURSHID, THE ALAWITE "LORD"

By SQUADRON-LEADER RICHARD BELGRAVE

S 648 IN June, 1945, the Alawite province of Syria was in an explosive state. To Major B—— and myself the arrival of H.M. Destroyer *Musketeer* was welcome in the extreme. With half a dozen Signals personnel we had been the only British "forces" in the area. No time was lost in putting her Captain, Commander S——, in the picture, and very swiftly and surely did he grasp the essentials of a highly complex political situation. It was clear that we had to take steps to keep the Alawites quiescent in this quarrel between the Syrian Nationalists and the French, or our efforts to prevent bloodshed could not have been successful for much longer. The story of our doings in this little-known corner of the Levant is recounted as an example of an unusual combined political operation by representatives of all three branches of the Service.

A 101 131 795 S 162 563 The Alawites constitute a religious sect of Islam, numbering some 350,000, and inhabiting the mountains just inland of Syria's 100 miles of Mediterranean coast. They are a minority to be reckoned with in Syrian politics, as they amount to roughly 10 per cent. of the population. In the main division of Islam into the two great sects, Sunni and Shiah, the Alawites are nearer to the Shiahs, while the great majority of the population of Syria are Sunni and nearly all the Nationalist leaders belonged to that sect. It was, therefore, inevitable that the Alawites should be somewhat suspicious of the Damascus Government. Alawite social life is still feudal and their religion secret: a curious blend, largely Islamic, but deriving certain characteristics from Christianity—for example, the belief in a Trinity—and from pagan and pre-Christian cults—for example, belief in reincarnation and the use of groves of trees for places of worship. A [562 774 721] Their prophets include Christ, Muhammad and Ali. Their women are not admitted to religious rites and are not regarded as possessing souls. The Alawites have the mountaineers' fondness for fighting, and have been enabled by their mountain country to preserve their identity through A 622 [511] centuries of alien rule. Their standard of living is low and all but their feudal chiefs are poor. Perhaps the most important of these chiefs at the time of Syria's latest struggle for independence was Sulaiman Murshid, often referred to by the Europeans as "god."

A 822 [illegible]5 554 Sulaiman Murshid has never to me claimed to be in any sense a "god." On the other hand, it is estimated that some 50,000 people regard him as the incarnation of the divine and can be said to worship him in the sense that he is their absolute master. The Sulaiman Effendi, as he is known locally, is a shrewd man and knew that I had stated on several occasions that it was a "shame" for a man to pretend to any of the attributes of Allah. He later explained to me that he was the "Rabb" or "Lord" in the sense that he was "lord of the manor." I think, however, that he has on occasion found it profitable to be "the Lord" in as omnipotent a

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Alawite MD7

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sense as he could get away with. The story goes that two Alawite priests, whose fortunes were at a low ebb, proclaimed that a dying shepherd boy was the incarnation of Ali. Their idea was to build him a tomb and make it a specially notable shrine to attract large numbers of worshippers. However, the boy, Sulaiman Murshid, survived, and with the aid of one or two ingenious "miracles," which were to earn him the title of "phosphorous boots" in the Royal Navy, he began to build up his reputation as a divine incarnation. He is alleged to have brought forth water from a rock by a contraption of rubber tubes running down inside his sleeve and to have gained many adherents by such wonders. Subsequently the two priests disappear from the story and Sulaiman led a chequered life, during which he greatly increased his land-holdings and therefore his wealth—the Alawite mountains grow the once-famous Latakia tobacco—by somewhat forceful methods. At one time he was on the wrong side of the French Mandatory Authorities and suffered a period of banishment, but he later obtained their favour and in due course became a Deputy in the Syrian Parliament.

S [66] A [55] 669 S 669

When I was posted to Latakia in October, 1944, Sulaiman Effendi was still a Deputy, but very much in the opposition, as he was held in forced residence by the Syrian authorities in Damascus and not allowed to return to his native mountains. He has an agreeable number of wives, one in each of his various villages, but his chief wife, Umm Fatteh, was at that time acting for her absent "Lord" and entertaining lavishly in their mountain residence at Jobit Burghal. Then came an unfortunate difference of opinion between the followers of Umm Fatteh and the local government authorities, the latter's gendarmes suffering a reverse at the hands of the former, who were found to be exceedingly well-armed. Such open flouting of their authority was intolerable to the Damascus Government, and they sent up a large force of gendarmes under an experienced campaigner, Commandant Muhammed Ali. The subsequent proceedings were complicated and there was much political activity, but the French sent Alawite and North African troops to Jobit Burghal to prevent bloodshed and remained in occupation up there during the ensuing weeks, much to the disgust of Muhammed Ali, who was confident of defeating the rebels. Meanwhile Fatteh, eldest son of Sulaiman Effendi, had returned home and was able to practise his fluent French on the various French Political Officers whose duties took them to Jobit Burghal. When the fighting broke out in Damascus and it became clear that the Syrians were determined to stake all they had on a bid for complete independence, Sulaiman Murshid found himself in a most awkward position. After a certain amount of political bargaining, he stood up in the Syrian Parliament and announced a complete change of heart, admitted that he had been wrongly guided by foreign advice, and placed himself and all his followers at the disposal of the Syrian Nationalists. Having thus rallied to the cause of independence, he could no longer be detained in Damascus, and accordingly returned home to his mountain fastness. In addition to the French Moroccan force, this now contained a British "tentacle" in the shape of Captain N——, who was camping up there with Jeep and wireless and liaising with all and sundry, albeit finding his French

2: Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1946 MD1-Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

liaison duties less cheerful than they normally are. Sulaiman Effendi's explanations of his *volte face* to the various interested parties must have tested even his considerable ingenuity. A 669 S 669

Such was the position as we held our conference in H.M.S. *Musketeer*, and our problem, since the British were now in the last resort responsible for maintaining law and order, was how to convince the Alawite leaders, and especially the biggest potential troublemaker, Sulaiman Murshid, that there was nothing to be gained by violent action. We could not be sure that he fully appreciated the realities of the situation, since news travels slowly into the Alawite mountains, and our French friends were hardly likely to tell him that the British had moved in in force to clear up the mess into which things had drifted. Neither could we be sure that his verbal adherence to the cause of independence had been more than a ruse to get out of Damascus—he had conveniently left just before the French shelled it. We were most anxious that he should support neither side by deeds, since he could put several thousand tough riflemen into the field and was even alleged by the Nationalists to possess automatics and grenades. We decided to go up to Jobit Burghal to visit the Lord in person and sent a wireless message to our tentacle to prepare him for our arrival.

We set off in two Jeeps before the heat of the day on Sunday morning. Major B—— of the British Security Mission drove Commander S—— in one, and I followed with Commandant Muhammad Ali, representing the local Syrian authorities. The French-commanded Syrian troops eyed us as we passed their defensive positions on the hill that dominates Latakia on the landward side. The summer heat was already beginning to burn the coastal plain to shades of yellow and brown as we branched off the main road and took the bumpy track that leads up into the Alawite hills. We climbed rapidly, past the spot where a truckload of Syrian gendarmerie had been forced to surrender to some of Murshid's "army" after a two-hour battle. I could not help agreeing with Muhammad Ali that it was a perfect spot for an ambush. Soon we were out of the damp heat of the coastal plain and breathing the cool mountain air redolent of the scrub oaks and aromatic trees and bushes whose smoke is used to give the Latakia tobacco its characteristic black colour. The story goes that about a hundred years ago, when Great Britain imported most of the Alawite tobacco, the villagers one year had a bumper crop, much in excess of the amount ordered for shipment. They stored the surplus, and as they were short of space, hung it in the roofs of their houses. The next year, having a bad crop, they decided to include their last year's surplus, but found it was completely black from the smoke of their wood fires. They therefore concealed it in the centre of their bales, leaving the blond tobacco on the outside. Great was their surprise when word came from England that a new kind of black tobacco had been found in the centre of the bales, was pronounced delicious by the pipe-smokers, and they were to send all they could of it. The smoking is now carried on in special buildings in the mountains, the tobacco being brought up on camel-back to the levels where the trees grow and treated there for several months before being carried down to Latakia for shipment. A 249 439

A We jolted our way through the narrow pass commanded by the ruined
342 Crusader castle of Qalaat Mehelbeh, one of the chain of Frankish forts
712 that cover these mountains. Sulaiman Effendi's front drive, though under 30 miles long, climbs 4,000 feet and is only just passable for cars, in spite of forced labour. Muhammad Ali regaled me with tales of past skirmishes, and pointed out the time-honoured defensive positions in the rocks. He knew Sulaiman Murshid well, having once come up to arrest him, and made him walk the whole way down. Presently Major B—— halted on a sharp crest, and a wonderful view lay spread out at our feet.
A We could see the houses of Jobit Burghal at the bottom of a huge bowl of
133 cultivated and terraced land; they straggled up the further slope, with the
311 Lord's house, white-painted and boxlike, higher than the rest. On all sides rose rock-covered hills, culminating in the summit of the Alawite mountain ridge about 500 feet above the village. It was almost like a "Shangri La" vision in the clear still air, but possessed a far more savage and stony grandeur than my imaginings of that ideal valley.

A Major B——, who had visited Jobit before, told us it was as well to
712 halt at this point, as Sulaiman kept a watcher permanently stationed on his roof with field-glasses, and the track winding steeply down at our feet was covered from the village at every yard of its length. Having given the Lord time to recognize us, down we went and soon came to our "tentacle," Captain N——, camped in an idyllic spot amid trees and rocks a few hundred yards short of the village. He told us that Sulaiman
000 was expecting us and that the French had been informed of our visit. We decided to pay a courtesy call on the latter first, as they were camped in the ruined houses of a rival chief at the bottom of the village, who had unwisely sided with the gendarmes and had had his houses burnt by the Lord's men and his people driven out for his pains. We were met by some junior French officers as frigidly as could be, and after they had told us that their O.C. the Commandant was away we took our leave. Recollecting scorces of happy and fraternal occasions I had spent with my
A French friends, I regretted this extremely stilted meeting. We drove off
363 up the village "street," a succession of hairpin bends and steep rocky slopes more like a river-bed than a road, and, rounding a sharp corner, pulled up in the courtyard of the Lord's house.

A Sulaiman Murshid, flanked by his son Fatteh and some of their hench-
609 men, was on the steps and greeted us with the usual Syrian welcome,
576 "Ahlan wa sahlan." His eighteen stone of bulk and rubicund fleshy face
S bore witness to his enjoyment of the good things of life and his small
[576] evasive eyes reflected a somewhat puzzled frame of mind. Indeed, it took over an hour for him to relax an extreme caution as to which way the wind was blowing for him politically. I introduced Commander S—— as the captain of the "mudammera" which was lying in Latakia harbour below, and gave a few indications of her size and power and of the purpose of her visit to Alawite territory. I found later that Sulaiman Murshid became convinced from local rumour that *Musketeer* could land a stream of shells plumb on his house in Jobit, a happy illusion which I forbore to dispel.

000 We were shown into a salon with nineteenth-century French pro-

2; Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1945 MD1 Syria

Alawite MD7

We were shown into a salon with nineteenth-century French provincial-style chairs, sofas and tables, each with its embroidered mats, arranged round the walls in the Syrian manner. Fatteh's white Arab robes concealed the bulk which the anglicized version of his name so aptly describes, better than his father's European suit, which, with the red tarboosh, is the usual dress of the Syrian politician. Conversation was stilted at first, with the Lord carefully leaving the initiative to us and Fatteh putting in a certain amount of flowery French. Sulaiman appeared to prefer discoursing through his son in French rather than directly in Arabic, and was probably relying on Fateh to make his phrases as diplomatic as possible. We afterwards learned that his caution was greatly increased by his thinking that the gold stripes on the shoulders of the Royal Navy's summer uniform indicated that Commander S—— was a French officer. It was therefore practically impossible for Sulaiman Murshid, who had recently publicly renounced his French associations and who knew the British were strongly in favour of Syrian independence, to decide what to say to his British visitors when they appeared to be accompanied by a French officer as well as by Muhammad Ali of the Syrian Gendarmerie. He kept his end up well, however, and the atmosphere thawed gradually, partly thanks to the generous tots of whisky which Ali Sulaiman, chief of Sulaiman's "army," a fine tough specimen with pale blue eyes, kept serving to all those present. Presently, after eating innumerable pistachio nuts and a small meal of *mezzé*—*i.e.*, tomatoes, hard-boiled eggs, fried meat off a skewer, etc.—just as an appetizer to the real business of lunch, there came a rhythmic stamping and clapping from outside the open window. Fatteh asked us if we would like to see the dancing, and we went out on to the verandah.

352 291 609 521 535 262

Thirty Alawite girls, picturesque in their bright-coloured local costume, which consists of a series of skirts, pinafores and shawls in contrasting flowery patterns, with printed cotton trousers tight at the ankle, were performing a "dobke" with linked arms in a long semicircle. They chanted a kind of chorus while the leader sang improvised verses, and they stamped out the measure with their leather slippers on the hard dusty courtyard. Round them stood an admiring ring of Alawite braves, their rifles put away for this occasion, who clapped their hands in time and urged on the dancers. These bold-eyed wenches twisted and turned, jumped and stamped in a regular monotonous rhythm, and the whole scene framed in the rugged background of mountains had a timelessness and a vigour that made it unforgettable. Fatteh, diffidently at first, translated the words they were chanting in honour of Commander S——, whose identity had by then been firmly established. It was enjoyable to watch the Commander's face as he translated:

291 535 609

"The handsome and brave British Admiral has come with his great ship which has sunk all the German and Italian navies. At the glance of his eyes all the flowers of the Alawite mountains have blossomed and the hearts of all the Alawite girls are aflame," and much more to the same effect.

Lunch was a gargantuan affair with a seemingly infinite succession of meat dishes; Murshid's home-grown wine, followed by French champagne, helped to some extent, however, to wash it down. We took our

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Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A 262 A 622 619

coffee seated on a row of chairs along the edge of the verandah, while the dancers, who had been performing for at least two hours, redoubled their panting efforts. I took the opportunity of having a quiet conversation about the realities of the political situation with Sulaiman Murshid, who was sitting next to me and was now in a much more forthcoming mood. I found he possessed a pronounced sense of humour and was quick to seize any nuance in what I wished to convey to him. He agreed that his wisest plan would be to keep quiet in his mountains and maintain good relations with everyone, especially the Syrian local authorities, until the larger issues of the Syrian problem had been cleared up, after which I undertook to advise the Governor of the province to give sympathetic attention to the settlement of his affairs. I took it as a compliment when at the end of our talk he remarked: "You know, I think you and I ought to go into partnership; we should do well together." Muhammad Ali then got up and made a speech, in which he dealt wisely with ticklish local problems and assured Murshid's followers that the Syrian Government regarded them all as its children and had nothing against them provided they were loyal. They looked a trifle nonplussed at this sudden change from the status of rebels to children. However, when Murshid got up and said a few words to the effect that they must now follow the Syrian Government and struggle for independence, one could feel the extent of his power in their complete acceptance of the new situation. Someone handed the leading dancer a Syrian flag in place of the coloured kerchief she was waving, and we decided to take our leave, having no desire to back one side more than the other in this quarrel but only to prevent further bloodshed. We left Jobit Burghal and climbed up out of the bowl in the mountains somewhat weighed down with a too-large lunch but hopeful of tranquillity in the mountains and stored with memories of an unforgettable day.

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4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

DERMATOGLYPHICS IN PEOPLES OF THE NEAR EAST

I. LEBANESE: MITWALI

HAROLD CUMMINS AND W. M. SHANKLIN
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121 This report is presented as a record of data toward an eventual analysis of racial variation in dermatoglyphics. It is to be hoped that a broad comparison of races on this basis may be eventually possible, but it will be necessary to continue the accumulation of records on various populations, perhaps from time to time taking stock of progress as has been done recently by Steggerda, Steggerda and Lane for the palmar features (Middle American Research Series, publication 7, Tulane University, '36).

124 101 795 The material here treated represents a population not hitherto investigated from the standpoint of dermatoglyphics. The Mitwali are a Syrian mountain people, living in the southern Lebanon range. They are Moslems, but adhere to the Shiite sect rather than to the Sunni which is common to the region. There are 138 subjects in the series, males and females being in the proportion of about two to one; in view of the small numbers the sexes are combined. The subjects are mainly children in the government schools, the adult population having proved generally unsuitable for printing—on account of extensive callouses.

141 128 The palmar features, main lines and patterns, are tabulated in tables 1 and 2, their formulations following the methods of Cummins et al. (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XII, '29).

The data on lines A and D have been further analyzed, to determine the main-line index which has been suggested by Cummins (Middle American Research Series, Tulane University, publication 7, '36) as a value denoting the degree of slant of the general palmar configuration. For the 276 hands

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4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

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in this collection the mean index is 8.50 ± 0.09. Right hands alone yield a mean of 9.33 ± 0.11, and the lefts, 7.67 ± 0.12.

Axial triradii present the following percentile occurrences, right and left hands being here combined since no significant

TABLE 1

Terminations of the palmar main lines, stating the percentile occurrence of each position

POSITION	LINE A			LINE B			LINE C			LINE D		
	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
1	0.7	9.4	5.0									
2	0.7	7.2	3.9									
3	34.1	52.2	43.1									
4	10.1	9.4	9.7		0.7	0.3						
5′	49.3	21.7	35.5	2.2	4.3	3.2						
5″	5.1		2.5	31.2	49.3	40.2	5.8	15.9	10.8			
6				9.4	11.6	10.5	2.9	2.9	2.9			
7				50.0	32.6	41.3	18.8	23.2	21.0	5.8	16.7	11.2
8				3.6		1.8				2.2	2.9	2.5
9				3.6		1.8	53.6	31.2	42.4	26.1	34.8	30.4
10							3.6		1.8	8.7	11.6	10.1
11							2.9		1.4	57.2	33.3	45.2
X							5.1	17.4	11.2			
x							0.7	2.2	1.4			
O					1.4	0.7	6.5	7.2	6.8		0.7	0.3

R = right, L = left.

TABLE 2

Percentile occurrences of true patterns and pattern vestiges (not including 'multiplications') of the five palmar areas

PATTERN	RIGHT	LEFT	BOTH
Hypothenar	32.6	29.7	31.1
Thenar/first interdigital	8.7	19.6	14.1
Second interdigital	9.4	3.6	6.5
Third interdigital	68.1	47.8	57.9
Fourth interdigital	47.8	67.4	57.6

bimanual differences are noted: 0, 0.7; t, 71.7; t′, 14.5; t″, 1.1; tt′, 6.9; tt″, 4.0; tt′t″, 0.4; t′t″, 0.7.

Frequencies of the finger-print types, classified by the usual fourfold scheme, are as follows: arches, 2.7%; radial loops, 4.2%; ulnar loops, 50.9%; whorls, 42.2%. The abundance of whorls is noteworthy.

4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

As pointed out by Cummins and Steggerda (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XX, '35), the pattern types may be regarded as variants of 'pattern intensity.' The arch is not a pattern in the strict sense of the term, while loops and whorls may be regarded as levels of successively increasing pattern intensity. For statistical purposes arbitrary values are assigned to the pattern types: arch, 0; loop, 1; whorl, 2. The complement of patterns in an individual is then converted into the 'index of pattern intensity' by summating the values of

TABLE 3

Percentile occurrences of pattern types for each digit

Digit	I			II			III		
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
Whorls	68.1	55.8	61.9	52.2	47.8	50.0	27.5	31.9	29.7
Ulnar loops	29.0	42.8	35.9	22.5	27.5	25.0	66.7	62.3	64.5
Radial loops	1.4	0.7	1.0	18.8	17.4	18.1	1.4	1.4	1.4
Arches	1.4	0.7	1.0	6.5	7.2	6.8	4.3	4.3	4.3
Digit	IV			V					
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both			
Whorls	50.0	44.2	47.1	24.6	20.3	22.4			
Ulnar loops	48.6	55.8	52.2	74.6	79.0	76.8			
Radial loops	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0			
Arches	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.7			

R = right, L = left.

the ten patterns. The indices therefore range from 0, indicating ten arches, to 20, the value for ten whorls. The mean index in the present series is 13.96 ± 0.20. As a matter of record, providing for other statistical determinations such as the dactylodiagram of Poll, the frequencies of pattern types on separate digits are here recorded in table 3.

SUMMARY

Palmar main lines, axial triradii, palmar patterns and fingerprint patterns are analyzed in 138 Mitwali, a Syrian mountain population. It may be noted that the features present a close relationship to another Lebanese series as well as to the Rwala Arabs (unpublished data).

5:Barakat S-5 (no date)1954 MDl Syria MDl

1

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SYRIA

AWAD BARAKAT *

Introduction

433 1. Despite the great potentialities that lie in her fertile soil, the nature of her climate, the energy of her people and her geographical position, Syria is an economically underdeveloped country. Perhaps it would be more accurate to use the term *not fully developed* to describe Syria's present situation, particularly in view of the economic awakening which began after World War II and has continued to grow up to the present day.

000 2. Admitted that the economic development of any country cannot be undertaken without individual as well as governmental effort, we nevertheless intend to restrict our examination of the economic development of Syria to the part played by the government. The reasons for this restriction are: limitations of space do not allow a full analytical treatment of both individual and governmental efforts; statistics on governmental activities are far fuller and more reliable than any as yet available for private concerns; finally we believe that in a country like Syria, where private capital is inadequate and the investment habit not yet deeply rooted, economic development must depend to a very large extent upon the government. Indeed we would go so far as to say that unless the government is able to assume control of economic development and is willing to bear the greater part of the burden, little improvement can take place. Part of the government's job will be to create the conditions, lacking until now which will encourage individual efforts and investment.

3. Underdeveloped countries, generally speaking, have certain conditions in common, the most characteristic being the following: partial exploitation of natural resources and neglect of possibilities of growth: low national production and national income, resulting in weak purchasing power, low national savings and shortage of investment capital; a deficit in the balance of trade

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000 and balance of payments; lack of technical skill; weakness in banking, monetary and financial systems ; and, in general, a primitive economic and financial structure.

4. It is clear to us that, under these conditions, the promotion of economic development must be to a large extent a government affair. Only the state has the authority and control of resources, to create conditions favourable to development, to establish principles, and to put into motion the machinery for its implementation. The state alone can make the changes and undertake the projects that are necessary to the economic well-being of the country. First, new laws must be passed to create legal, technical and organizational conditions favourable to development. For example, property rights must be safeguarded, the ownership and exploitation of land regulated, and a new code introduced into commercial transactions and economic activity generally. An organization must be estabished to formulate a policy of economic development and to carry out its implementation. It must have at its disposal full and accurate statistical information, and technical studies of the country's hidden wealth and neglected resources. The government must undertake large projects like land surveying and settlement, irrigation, drainage, and the construction of roads and bridges, which, though necessary before further development can take place, are beyond the capacity and capital of individuals. Finally, in order to achieve integration of effort, the government must direct the policy of economic development so as to ensure harmony between its several economic, monetary and financial aspects.

121 5. The obstacles that stand in the way of economic development in Syria are fundamentally not different from those we outlined above (paragraph 3) though Syria has already covered considerable ground in these fields. In what follows we shall attempt to analyse Syria's condition at the dawn of her independence. We shall then briefly review the achievements of the country during the 1945-1953 period, so as to deduce from them the problems that at present beset economic development in Syria, and arrive at possible solutions. This paper will therefore be divided into three parts:

Problems of economic development.

A brief review of economic development, 1945-1953.

Current problems and possible solutions.

Part One

Problems of Economic Development

6. At the beginning of independence, when a Syrian Government assumed power, the country's economy was in a relatively primitive state. It was burdened by many restrictions, it faced difficult problems and it needed a great deal of care and order. The government had very little to build on, and it was faced, into the bargain, with a huge legacy of problems left to it by the previous régime. 652

7. We will first examine the problems arising from outside sources. The most important of these lay in the monetary and exchange system, customs policy, and the customs and economic union with Lebanon.

8. The monetary system was governed by a contractual agreement with a foreign bank, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which managed the Issue Department and which took decisions on matters of issue and credit quite independently of the Syrian Government, which thus had no power of direction or control whatsoever. Syrian currency was tied to the French franc and the greater part of the cover was in French francs. These balances were the subject of disagreement between the Syrian and French Governments, both on the question of their guaranteed value in terms of sterling and the question of their free use. Negotiations with the French Government resulted in an agreement [1] which solved the question of the guarantee and granted Syria the right of gradually liquidating the franc balances. The break of the Syrian pound away from the French was agreed to and Syria became free to exercise the right of legislating in monetary matters. Subsequent to the agreement, Syria issued a series of laws that regulated the issue of currency, its circulation and cover, and which provided for the control of the Department of Issue and the direction of the monetary and credit policies. The last of these laws was Legislative Decree No. 87, of March 28, 1953, which covers the basic monetary law and the establishment of the Syrian Central Bank. 652 648

[1] The Agreement of 7 February, 1949, including liquidation, settlement, and payments agreements.

652 9. The exchange system was subject to the control of the
648 Mandatory authority which directed it in accordance with its own interests, and the exchange control was a department administered directly by the High Commissioner's Office. In 1944 the exchange control was transferred to a joint Syro-Lebanese committee, headed by a delegate from the Central Exchange Control Office of the franc area, of which both Syria and Lebanon were members. In 1948 Syria declared its withdrawal from the franc bloc and be-
652 came independent in dealing with exchange questions. The Exchange Office in Syria thus became a purely Syrian institution. Subsequently the Government initiated several reforms that aimed at removing war-time restrictions. The exchange system became gradually freer and adapted itself to the needs of the Syrian economy. The last and most important of these reforms was Legislative Decree No. 208 of April 21st, 1952, which allowed the free entry and transfer of capital and created conditions facilitating commercial transactions ; it also worked towards achieving stability in the foreign exchange rates and bolstering the cover to the currency. In this manner the Decree inspired confidence in the national currency and prepared the right atmosphere for the entry of foreign capital and its investment in the country. [1]

651 10. As to the customs policy, this also was directed by the
648 Mandatory authority. It was formed by financial considerations, the first aim of which was to cover the expenditures of the Mandate and collect revenues for the treasury. When the Syro-Lebanese authorities took over the customs administration, the customs tariff and regulations moved gradually towards facilitating commercial transactions and encouraging national industry by exempting machinery and raw materials, needed by industry and agriculture, from duty. However, the establishment of a customs union between the two contries and the existence of an actual economic union, which took the form of free movement of goods, capital and persons between them, led to disagreements as to the customs and economic policies that each country thought should be followed. The disagreement reached its peak on the questions of import and export policies and the protection of national industry, and as a result of their faillure to agree on a common policy, the two count-

1 *Vide The First Annual Report on the Activities of the Exchange Office in 1952*, Damascus, 1953.

ries separated in 1950, and, in consequence, Syria regained free- 651
dom of action in directing her customs and economic policies and 648
in managing her economy on an independent basis.

11. The new Syrian government also had to face serious internal problems, that the Mandatory power with its "Laissez-faire" policy had not attempted to deal with. No factual study of the country was made nor any determined course of economic action undertaken. The following are the most serious of the defects of the economic system at that time :

First there was a lack of statistics and detailed studies upon 659
which to base a sound economic policy. Nor were there any technical and scientific studies of the country's economic resources, or plans for developing and exploiting them. Secondly, the bank- 453
ing system failed in meeting the country's need for agricultural 652
credit and for medium and long term credit. The majority of the banks were branches of foreign banks that specialized in commercial short-term credit operations, and which, with the exception of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, avoided seasonal agricultural lending. All the banks operated without any control or direction. Furthermore, no bank had up to that date been established to deal with industrial or mortgage credit. There was only the Agricultural Bank, established by the government to deal with medium-term agricultural loans, but its regulations, staffing and limited means did not enable it to play a major role in meeting the needs of agriculture. Thirdly there was no money market that 454
could attract national savings and invest them in development projects. People with savings have always preferred to hoard them in the form of gold, or else they invested them in real estate. In addition, foreign capital avoided entry into the country because of restrictions on exchange, and other reasons.

12. During the period 1945 to 1953 the government made a 656
great effort to regulate the Syrian economy in the fields of trade,[1]

1 Legislative Decree No. 14 of December 18, 1951 and its amendments concern the regulation of the possession of, and trade in, raw materials and products. Legislative Decree No. 151, of March 3, 1952 and its amendments concern company law and the law governing firms established outside Syria. Legislative Decree No. 60, of January 13, 1952 and its amendments regulate foreign trade etc.

industry,[1] and agriculture,[2] and to establish stable principles of economic policy.[3]

To remedy the above mentioned defects and to fill the gaps in the country's economic structure the government established a Directorate of Statistics[4] and directed its attention to the preparation of scientific and technical studies of the country's resources.[5] Finally, the government reformed the country's banking and monetary systems by creating, in accordance with the Basic Monetary Law,[6] the Money and Credit Council with the function of exercising monetary control ; it laid down new monetary regulations inspired by the needs of the country and regulated the operations of bankers and money-changers. Reform included also the expansion of the Agricultural Bank's capital, the strengthening of its financial means and the extension of its operations to meet seasonal credit needs.[7] The question of medium and long-term credit remains however still unsolved.

13. To complete this brief survey of Syria's economic position in 1945, when the new national government came to power, it is necessary to give some account of general economic conditions.

1 Legislative Decree No. 47, of August 7, 1952 and amendments regulating Syrian industry.
Legislative Decree No. 138, of November 6, 1952 regulating industrial, commercial and free professions.
Legislative Decree No. 103, of September 27, 1952 relating to the encouragement of industry.

2 Legislative Decree No. 135, of October 29, 1952 and Regulatory Decree No. 768 of November 3, 1952 concerning the distribution of state lands.
Legislative Decrees No. 50, 51 and 52 dated January 9, 1952 and No. 81, 82 and 83 dated January 23, 1952 and No. 125 and 126, dated January 20, 1952 relating to the planting and export of cotton : Legislative Decrees No. 27, 80 and 106 of 1952 concerning the sale of Agricultural machinery and the combatting of agricultural pests and insects etc.

3 *Vide Syrian Economy 1953* - Government Press, Damascus.

4 Legislative Decrees No. 130 and 35 dated June 11, 1949.

5 Report by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, 1947 ; studies of irrigation projects, the Ghab project, Lattakia port project and the Aleppo water scheme ; Mission of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

6 Legislative Decree No. 87, of March 28, 1953.

7 Law 77, dated June 28, 1951 which provides for the addition of LS 10 million to the capital of the Agricultural Bank ; Law 126 which grants LS 5.5 million to farmers affected by losses ; Legislative Decree No. 9 amending the Agricultural Bank Law ; and Legislative Decree No. 97 which empowers the Agricultural Bank to extend seasonal loans etc.

The Syrian economy in 1945 was distinguished by its relatively low 433
production of a generally poor quality. It lay in a state of decadence and stagnation that could only have been remedied by energetic action by the authorities in power. It was a virgin country waiting for people willing to work hard to develop its resources in the fields of agriculture, industry and commerce.

Agriculture in Syria occupies first place, whether considered 433
from the point of view of production or the number of those who 241
earn a living from it. It produces the largest part of the country's exports and supplies the national industries with raw materials. But, despite its preponderance over other economic activities farmers remained up to 1945 dependent on ancient methods, and were ignorant of such modern techniques as the use of machines and fertilizers. Syrian agriculture suffered helplessly from the crop rotation system, from natural pests, insects and diseases, from rain variations and the unscrupulousness of money lenders.

As to industry, it was in its infancy, still feeling its way and 433
lacking encouragement, protection, adequate studies, knowledge and experience.

Nor was commerce in a better situation than agriculture and in- 439
dustry. During the second world war, Syrian trade lost its relations 457
with many of the belligerent countries, and emerged from the war crippled and hampered by the restrictions of exchange control. In addition, the direction of Syrian commerce was not in the hands of Syrian nationals; the larger part of foreign trade, both exports and imports, was handled through Beirut. As a result Syrian merchants lost direct touch with countries abroad and Syria became in effect an internal market dealing in retail with neighbouring markets. Commercial agencies were in the hands of non-Syrians up to the extent of 95 per cent of the total. To complete the picture we should mention that a large part of banking operations with foreign countries took place in banks situated outside Syria, and that the purchase and sale of foreign exchange accruing to Syria was effected in the Beirut market. To conclude, control of Syrian external trade was in non-Syrian hands and the Syrian economy, in consequence, was forced to lose large sums in the form of expenses, commissions, and profits which were paid abroad for mediation in purchase and sale transactions.

14. During the period under discussion the Syrian Govern- 185
ment exercised great effort with satisfactory results; it made a be-

185 ginning in solving many problems of agriculture, industry, and trade. There is not enough space here to give details of their achievements; it is enough to say that, by continuous and widespread effort, the Syrian government was able to remove external problems and to clear away many of the internal obstacles and restrictions that hampered the country's progress. Thus they prepared the way for the emergence of a policy of economic development, and created many of the essential conditions for its success.

15. Leaving aside particular and secondary problems, we can diagnose Syria's major development problems as follows: National production is still far below capacity; a large part of national resources and wealth are not yet exploited. Many large-scale projects must be undertaken before any increase in productivity can take place. Such projects are: irrigation, the draining of marshes and extension of cultivable land; improvement of agricultural methods, utilization of modern machinery and combatting of plant diseases and pests; exploitation of natural resources such as minerals and mines, and the generation of electric energy and motive power; the improvement and increase of livestock by better water supplies, shelter and pasturage; re-afforestation and the preservation of existing forests; the construction of roads, bridges, ports and airports, and the supplying of means of transport to facilitate communications; the completion of land surveys and settlement operations in all districts; the construction of general warehouses; the supplying of drinking water and electricity to rural areas. But, whereas the country's needs are great, her financial means are not 454 adequate to cover them. National savings are low in themselves, as we noted above; people prefer hoarding gold or investing in 652 real estate. There is as yet no financial market in Syria. State finances are necessarily weak so long as they depend on a weak economy. Thus, neither the state nor private individuals can be expected to finance big development.

16. It follows from the above that the economic development of Syria depends on a solution to the following problem: the Syrian economy needs capital and finance projects that will create conditions favourable to its growth; but, as a result of its weakness and underdevelopment, it lacks the necessary financial means. In other words, the state's financial capacity is small and cannot expand unless national production grows; and national production cannot grow unless the state's financial capacity expands. How

then, are we to get out of this vicious circle? It is worth our while, before we attempt to answer the question to review the development policy that was followed during the period 1945-1953. 652

Part Two

Economic Development During the Period 1945-1953

17. Credits allocated to development projects and approved by the Syrian government from 1945 up to the end of 1952 totalled approximately LS 420 million, of which LS 301 million were actually spent during that period; that is, at an average rate of LS 37.7 million per year.

In what follows we shall briefly describe the projects that have been executed, and the means by which they were financed and administered.

Projects Executed

18. The effort exerted has covered constructional, economic and social aspects. Expenditure was distributed as follows:

Table 1

Expenditure on Development Projects 1945-1952
(in LS Millions)

Government buildings	25,728
Schools	11,500
Hospitals & Clinics	8,500
Irrigation	41,000
Communications (roads, bridges, ports and airports)	39,120
Railway lines	8,287
Automatic telephone	33,000
Electricity	10,000
Agricultural & veterinary schools, centers & nurseries	4,000
Agriculture & agricultural credit	29,300
Cereals Office	40,000
National Industrial companies	16,927
Survey and settlement	6,500
Municipalities (drinking water & electricity)	27,500
Total :	301,362

652 The distribution of this expenditure over the years 1945-1952 gives us the following approximate figures:

Table 2

Expenditure on Development Projects for the years 1945-52
(in LS Millions)

Year	Expenditure
1945	9,300
1946	13,150
1947	26,367
1948	67,750[1]
1949	45,015
1950	40,512
1951	54,820
1952	44,448
Total:	301,362

The Financing of Projects

19. Development projects were financed from three sources. First, from appropriations allocated from the general state budget; secondly, from available treasury funds, most of which consisted of the budgetary surpluses that went to form the reserve fund; and thirdly, from loans from the Bank of Issue. The following Table indicates the relative importance of each of the three sources of finance.

Table 3

Source of funds	LS Millions
From budget appropriations	115,000
From available Treasury funds	59,537
From the Bank of Issue	126,825
Total:	301,362

1 The amount allocated to the Cereals Office ranged between LS 25 and LS 50 million in different years. The sum of LS 40 million appears only in the year 1948 although allocations were made in the following years as well.

Table 4 below gives a division of the funds according to source and year. 652

Table 4

Development Funds According to Source and Year
(in LS Millions)

Year	Budget Appropriations	Drawn from Available Treasury Funds	Taken from Bank of Issue	Total
1945	7,500	1,800	—	9,300
1946	8,250	3,500	1,400	13,150
1947	12,250	7,617	6,500	26,367
1948	17,500	7,500	42,750	67,750
1949	21,500	9,620	13,895	45,015
1950	17,250	11,500	11,762	40,512
1951	15,500	10,500	28,820	54,820
1952	15,250	7,500	21,698	44,448
Total:	115,000	59,537	126,825	301,362

In general, we notice that budget expenditures were made on general projects, such as communications, government buildings and schools, that do not yield direct revenue. On the other hand, financing from treasury funds or from the Bank of Issue took the form of loans given to projects that yield returns and are thus able to repay them. Electricity installations, national industrial companies, the automatic telephone, and loans to municipalities are examples of the second type. Out of the loans made for these purposes the following amounts were repaid during the period under review:

Repaid out of the amounts drawn from the available treasury funds.	LS 12 million
Repaid out of the amounts advanced by the Bank of Issue.	» 12 »
Total:	LS 24 million

20. We have no comment to make on the method of financing from the budget or from available Treasury funds; for these finan-

652 cial sources are derived from national savings and were drawn from taxes that fed both the budget and the reserve fund. Average expenditure per year reached LS 22 million. Since the state budgets ranged between LS 99 million in 1945 and LS 200 million in 1952 this represents about 10 per cent of the total budget.

21. The method of financing from the Bank of Issue requires some clarification and discussion. When the government had recourse to Bank of Issue loans to finance a part of her development projects, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban used to secure the necessary funds in one of two ways: either by placing the loan in the currency cover and issuing new currency paper; or else by utilizing the public deposits in its commercial department. For, besides undertaking normal banking operations, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban was at the same time in charge of currency issue. By virtue of its concessionary position it acted as the financial agent of the government, and was the bank in which were deposited the treasury's funds and those of all public departments and institutions, such as the Waqf, municipalities, railways, and electric-power establishments. These public deposits were placed in the Bank's commercial department and in recent years ranged in amount between LS 100 and LS 120 million. The Banque de Syrie et du Liban often used these public deposits to finance the larger part of the loans on the understanding that, if funds were later drawn from public deposits, it could call on its Issue Department to obtain the funds required and place in the currency cover the loans drawn from the deposits. It can therefore be said that a large part (about 65 per cent) of the Bank of Issue loans originated from public deposits placed with the commercial department. Government borrowing, for this reason, did not necessarily lead to a direct increase in the currency in circulation.

22. The loans from the Bank of Issue that were used during the period under review to finance development projects reached LS 126.8 million, of which LS 40 million were used by the Cereals Office to buy cereals from the farmers which it later sold gradually both in internal and external markets. This operation was not in fact more than a short-term commercial credit operation of seven to ten months duration, and it can therefore be said that the financial operations of the Cereals Office had no inflationary impact on the Syrian economy.

The remaining sum of LS 86.8 million (126.8 - 40) was invested for periods ranging between 5 and 10 years, in projects which are likely to have a quick effect in terms of expanded national production and economic activity. The Bank of Issue loans, which amounted to LS 86.8 million, invested in development projects, did not, considered apart from other loans and inflationary factors, have an inflationary effect upon the Syrian economy, for the following reasons: the sum of LS 86.8 million was spread over eight years at an average rate of LS 11 million per year. This amounted to only 5 per cent of the money in circulation which reached LS 197 million at the beginning of 1945 and LS 239 million at end of 1952. During the same period there appeared several factors that had a deflationary impact, counterbalancing or modifying the effect of the Bank of Issue loans. On the one hand, as we pointed out earlier, LS 24 million out of the funds invested in development projects were repaid within the same period. On the other hand, the Reserve Fund rose from LS 27.9 million at the end of 1944 to LS 45.2 million at the end of 1952, the source of the increase being an excess of budget revenue over expenditure. Thirdly, part of the expenditure was made in foreign exchange, thus leading to a contraction in monetary circulation equal to the amount of foreign exchange drawn for that purpose from the currency cover. Fourthly, the greater part of the loans were financed, as we have seen, by drawing on the public deposits placed in the Commercial Department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. Finally, it is well known that the velocity of monetary circulation in agricultural countries is lower than in industrial countries. In countries that lack developed means of capital transfer, the effects of monetary inflation do not therefore appear as strongly or as fast as with a highly developed banking and deposit currency system.

23. Changes that took place in internal prices and exchange rates during the period under review[1] support this view. Internal prices — except during the Korean war emergency — did not rise, despite the existence of other inflationary factors due to loans spent on nonproductive projects, and despite the lack of any set monetary policy to control credit. This phenomenon can be explained only in terms of a growth of national production during the period under consideration and by appreciable expansion in economic activity. The following Tables support our observations :

1 [1945 - 1952 -- Analyst]

Table 5

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A - Index of wholesale Prices in Damascus [1]

Year	Foodstuffs	Local Raw Materials	Local Manufactures	Building Materials	Fuel
1949 (Average)	100	100	100	100	100
1950 (Dec.)	95	140	108.3	107.3	83.2
1951 »	121.2	128.6	108.5	93.1	88.9
1952 »	120.9	111.1	95.3	96.5	88.3
1953 (Aug.)	101.5	104.5	87.1	87.6	79.4

B - Index of Retail Prices in Damascus

Year	Index No.
1938 (Average)	100
1945 (Dec.)	830.5
1946 »	766.1
1947 »	699.1
1948 »	662.1
1949 »	561.6
1950 »	477.9
1951 »	536.5
1952 »	632.1
1953 »	595.7
1953 (Aug.)	533.5

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C - Dollar Rates in the Damascus Free Market [2]

Year	Dollar Rate (in Syrian Piasters)
1945	(Market not free)
1949	350
1950	370
1951	383
1952	369
1953	357.5

1 Ministry of National Economy, Directorate of statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951 and 1952; Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, October, 1953.

2 Ministry of Finance, Exchange Office, *The First Annual Report on the Activities of the Exchange Office*, tables 1 and 2, Damascus, 1953.

The noticeable rise in the rates during 1951 and 1952 is largely due, we believe, to the conditions arising from the Korean war. 457

Planning and Administration of Projects

24. It is difficult to say that there existed in Syria a development policy with definite aims and worked-out plans during the period 1945-1952. Development projects were studied and approved piece-meal under pressure of need and circumstances, without reference to any general programme, and without being subjected in their administration, execution, or the management of their financial and economic effects, to one single authority that could direct the whole operation and create the conditions for its success. The projects had nothing in common except the great need felt for them and the necessity of finding the required funds. 652

25. Development projects were approved in one of two ways. First, by including them in the body of the state budget and making the necessary appropriations. As most of these projects could not be executed within one financial year, the Budget Law provided for the transfer of such appropriations to a special account outside the budget called the Development Programmes Account. The purpose was to prevent the cancellation of unused appropriations at the end of the financial period, as is normally done in a yearly budget. Secondly, the projects that were financed from available treasury funds or from Bank of Issue loans were approved individually by issuing for each project a special law, which established definite principles for its administration and execution and which authorized the government to borrow the necessary funds either from the available treasury funds or from the Bank of Issue.

26. The method followed up to now in approving, financing, and executing development projects is not free from certain defects and pitfalls. These are the main criticisms we have to make. First, it does not enable the government to have a complete picture of all the projects that the country needs, or of the cost and the period required for their execution, so that it can make a priority list and earmark definite financial sources for each one. Without such over-all comparison, the government cannot give each project the priority it deserves according to its productive value, the speed of its execution and the funds it requires. Moreover, without prior study of the projects, and a stock-taking of its financial

652 capacity, the government cannot establish a clear principle of economic development; nor can it expect to have a long-term, integrated policy, characterized by stability and permanence, and guaranteeing the execution of the projects free from interruption, vacillation and the interference of personal interests. Finally, the government has not evolved a unified policy that can integrate financial and monetary considerations on the one hand, and the requirements of economic policy on the other. If no general development programme is adopted, the authorities concerned will not be able to handle the monetary, financial and economic problems that are bound to be raised by the application of parts of the programme. The prerequisite for the solution of any problems that may arise is a planned integration of ends and means.

Part Three

185 The State of Economic Development at the Present Time

27. By the end of 1953,[1] following an initial period of experimentation that lasted for nine years, Syria had covered a good distance on the road of economic development. In addition to the efforts made to execute a considerable part of the development project, the Syrian government has succeeded in creating many of the conditions necessary for further development. There remains before it the new, critical stage of determining and implementing a complete balanced development policy.

28. The Syrian government managed, in this period, to remove some of the obstacles, both external and internal, that stood in the way of the success of any development policy. It also started to make studies of the country's potentialities and began to organize the collecting of statistics and data concerning the country's condition. It strengthened the mainstays of the national economy and organized it on a firm basis. Then it turned to its monetary and banking system and established a supreme authority to undertake its administration. This authority was given the powers and means necessary for managing monetary, exchange, credit and banking

[1] At the time of writing in the autumn of 1953, the final figures for 1953 were not available. This leaves a gap of one year in the survey of the period 1945-53 made in Part Two of this paper. However, no change in trends appeared in 1953.

affairs, for adapting monetary policy to changes in the economic condition, and for bringing this policy in line with the state's financial and economic policies. 185

29. The idea of setting up a planned development programme extending over several years has been gaining ground and recently obtained support from the government. The broad lines of the state's development policy were defined in Parliament in October 1953 as follows: [1]

"The state's future development policy must be embodied in an economic development programme that includes all the projects of the government and of public institutions. We consider that this programme should cover a period of not less than five years..."

"... It is necessary that the programme should have a special administration directly linked to the Office of the Chief of the State. The Board of Administration should be composed of representatives of the ministries specified by the programme, of delegates from the Monetary and Credit Council and the Council of National Resources, and of technical experts".

"The Administration should undertake the study of projects and estimate their importance, order of priority, probable benefits, the length of time needed to carry them out, and their cost. It should prepare technical specifications and after approving them should supervise their execution..."

"As to the programme's finances, we consider that it should have at its disposal a special budget, independent of the state budget, and subject to the approval of Parliament, and the programme should be financed from appropriations that could be made from the general budget, from the reserve fund, from various loans and from such extraordinary revenues as may be allocated to it".

30. It is not enough to prepare and approve a development programme, or even to set up its administration. It is essential for the success of the programme that the Planning Board should be able to solve these two major problems: ensuring harmony between development policy and financial, monetary and economic policies; securing the funds needed for development projects.

1- Statement of the President of the Republic on the financial and economic conditions of the country - October, 1953.

Ensuring Harmony

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31. The execution of the development programme will have serious financial, monetary and economic effects upon the country. For it diverts a section of productive powers towards projects that do not necessarily lead to an immediate expansion in national production. On the contrary, it deprives production, for the period during which development projects are executed, of some of the factors that would normally be employed in producing consumption goods. Since a development programme leads to the creation of additional purchasing power, as a result of its putting into circulation amounts of money in excess of what the economy is accustomed to, there are bound to be repercussions upon prices and wages. Production of consumption goods falls but purchasing power expands. This situation will demand careful attention from the government, which can counterbalance its inflationary effects in the following ways: by regulation of the amounts that can be spent at each stage on development projects; by attempting to divert certain productive elements (such as the building industry) towards development projects; by directing the additional purchasing power towards investment projects, or by absorbing it back into the national funds through encouraging savings, through taxation, or through imposing rationing on consumption.

32. On the monetary side, a development programme raises several problems, of which the most important are securing foreign exchange and the adaptation of credit policy to the new conditions created by the programme.

As to foreign exchange, the development programme is bound to create extra demand for foreign currencies. If the exchange available is not sufficient to meet the needs of the programme in addition to the other normal needs of the country, then the Planning Board will have to evolve a means of counterbalancing the tendency such a situation will have, to depreciate the national currency. It would be necessary to: limit the importation of luxuries and inessential goods; borrow externally to secure the required exchange; increase the country's exports so as to obtain extra exchange. This is difficult to achieve however, for the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Credit policy can play a major role in leading development policy to success, and in counterbalancing some of its short-term

effects. Thus, credit may be contracted with the aim of fighting inflationary symptoms, or discount rates may be raised so as to encourage investment of private funds. Shortage of investment that may be found in certain consumption industries can be remedied by directing credit towards them, and by advancing the money they need at favourable terms. 652 185

33. As to financial policy, it plays the major role in determining the monetary or economic effects of the development project. It is well known that these monetary and economic effects differ with the different methods used to finance the development programme. It is also clear that the ease with which development policy problems can be solved depends on whether the state budget is in a state of deficit, balance or surplus. This also applies to expansion or contraction in ordinary budget expenditures and to the ways in which appropriations are spent.

34. It is not our purpose here to analyse the interaction and interrelation between each of the budgetary, monetary and economic policies on the one hand, and development policy on the other. We intend only to point out the basic fact, that no development policy should be prepared or implemented unless it harmonizes and co-ordinates with the general economic policy in all its aspects. Each element should have a planned reaction upon the others; thus all will cooperate in securing the maximum general welfare.

Securing the Funds Needed for Development Projects 652

35. Syria's urgent development projects will cost in total some LS 400 million. Their execution will require from five to six years, which will make it necessary to secure annually a sum of LS 66 million.

The following sources of finance may be considered: taxes and reserve funds, internal and external loans, the investment of national and foreign capital.

36. There is no doubt that dependence on taxes and reserve funds is the soundest and safest method of financing development projects. Syria can allocate its available reserve funds for development projects, but cannot depend at present on taxes, since ordinary revenues are only sufficient to meet ordinary expenditure. It is neither possible nor desirable to raise taxation rates or to impose new taxes so long as the national income remains at its

652 present level. The proportion of current taxes (approximately LS
[651] 200 million) to the national income (approximately LS 1250 million) is 16 per cent. This ratio may seem small if compared with that of other countries, but we should not forget that the national income of Syria is in itself small. What the average tax-payer pays in taxes is cut from his essential expenditure, since his income is not appreciably in excess of his essential expenditure. There is little surplus that the government can reasonably take in the form of taxation.

However, though we cannot depend on taxes to finance development projects, we should not neglect the improvement of methods of tax imposition and collection, and the need for strict inspection in applying taxation laws. It is not improbable that such improvements and inspection may lead to a 15 per cent rise in collected taxes, (about LS 30 million). This could very well be used to cover the desired expansion in ordinary government expenditure and to contribute towards development projects.

In any case, development expenditure tends in the long run to increase national income, thus forming in its turn a new source of public revenue that should not be neglected by the government, particularly since a greater taxation effort is essential to absorb the surplus purchasing power created by development projects and to combat inflation.

454 37. As to internal loans, we have seen that there is no financial
652 market in Syria and that individuals do not embark on such a form of investment. Though we realize the difficulty of creating a financial market in a short period of time, yet we believe that it is possible at the present time to establish a money market, and that, with adequate measures, a financial market dealing with medium term loans could be set up in a relatively short time. Considering that private capital invested in national companies since 1944 has amounted to about LS 100 million, and that the capital invested in individual enterprises, whether industrial, commercial or agricultural, was more than twice the funds spent by the government on development projects, it becomes clear that the possibility of creating a financial market is not out of the question.

The creation of a financial market in Syria is an essential condition for the success of any development policy. Without a financial and money market the authorities concerned will not be able to direct credit affairs effectively, nor to manage monetary policy in the country. The benefits that such a market would bring would

justify the government in adopting measures such as the following: 454
encouraging individuals to invest their funds in medium-term 152
loans yielding relatively high interest and carrying certain guarantees and exemption from taxes; requiring establishments such as insurance companies, social institutions and those individuals who are asked to pay reserve deposits (such as accountants and contractors) to hold their funds in the form of government bonds: in addition, the government could impose certain restrictions upon the activities of certain industries such as building, so as to divert capital towards the financial market. It is not our intention to deal with all measures that could be taken to encourage the financial market in Syria, but merely to indicate both the possibility of creating such a market, and the necessity of its creation as a condition for the success of the development policy, through the power it gives to the government to manipulate credit policy.

38. Another source of finance is borrowing from the Bank of 652
Issue. It is an easy method and attractive to governments, but it is fraught with dangers and pitfalls.

We do not believe that all borrowing from the Bank of Issue for the purpose of financing development projects is necessarily unwise; nor do we believe that it leads in all cases to inflation. The consequences that follow from this type of borrowing depend on the manner in which the loan is used, the economic conditions of the country, the position of the balance of payment and on several other factors.

An additional issue of paper currency for financing development projects can follow two channels: it can either flow abroad in payment for imports that are needed to implement the project, or it can be spent internally to meet local expenditure.

In the first case, paper bills are returned to the Bank of Issue to the same extent to which foreign currencies are drawn from it. Official foreign exchange and gold balances will be reduced, but the paper currency issued will have no impact on national income nor will it have any inflationary effect.

In the second case, the issued paper currency will lead to a rise in national income that may exceed the value of the issued paper. For part of the currency paper that reaches the workers and contractors of development projects will be transferred to other producers, thus giving them additional income and purchasing power, and so on continuously. Circulation of the newly issued paper

652 will not however be complete. For part of it will be saved and another part will find its way to the treasury in the form of taxes and dues ; a third part will be used to pay for imports from abroad, in which case it will find its way back to the Bank of Issue and will be withdrawn from circulation. In these three cases no inflationary effects follow from the new issue. But the remaining part, which is used to purchase consumption goods and services, will no doubt create additional demand for the goods and services that form the total national output. If the national economy has unemployed factors of production and is in a conditon to meet the extra demand, then no inflationary effects will appear. If the national economy, on the other hand, fails to increase production so as to meet the additional demand for goods and services, then the economy will move towards inflation.

From another angle, the effect of the extra purchasing power appears in the balance of payments, for the additional demand is not limited to national goods and services, but extends beyond them to foreign goods and services. It is therefore necessary to know whether the country's gold and foreign exchange reserve will allow the satisfaction of the extra demand for foreign currencies, both from the development projects and from the people whose incomes are increased by the new issue. It is also obvious that a rise in the consumption of local products may lead to a reduction in exports, if national production cannot meet all the new demands.

457 652 39. Foreign private capital can be utilized in two ways: in helping to establish or finance private projects ; and in paying in foreign exchange for imported equipment required for government development projects. In this case, foreign banks would give medium-term credit for purchasing equipment from their country and accept repayment by instalments over a period of three to five years. Thus the government can pay for its imports in instalments over five years rather than in one lump. The merit of this method in protecting the foreign exchange value of the national currency and in avoiding inflationary effects is obvious. Having recourse to foreign private capital for the purpose of financing expenditure on development projects undertaken by the government seems to us, however, unlikely to be adopted. For such funds could not be invested in the country except under strict guarantees and difficult conditions.

40. Foreign government loans on the other hand have a po-

litical aspect that we do not intend to deal with here. Limiting the discussion to the economic aspect, we have to distinguish between two situations: the use of foreign loans to finance expenditure abroad that has to be paid for in foreign exchange; the use of foreign loans to finance local expenditure due in local currency. 452 457

In the second case, the borrowed foreign exchange is put in the currency cover and an equal sum in currency bills is issued by the Bank of Issue and put into circulation as the need arises for covering local expenditure in national currency. Despite the fact that the issue of these paper bills is balanced by foreign exchange in the cover, its monetary effects are in no way different from the case of direct borrowing from the Bank of Issue for meeting local expenditure. Thus, what is said of financing development projects by borrowing from the Bank of Issue applies in full to foreign loans that are used to meet local expenditure. For this reason we think it unlikely that recourse would be made to foreign borrowing, because its financial and political conditions are generally more burdensome than those of direct borrowing from the Bank of Issue.

In the first case however, when foreign loans are used only to pay for that part of development expenditure due in foreign exchange, there is no doubt that the method has sound monetary effects; it completely solves the problem of securing foreign exchange needed for development projects, while at the same time saving the country from the dangers of inflation and preventing a fall in the external value of the national currency. Nevertheless, we do not recommend the use of foreign loans except to the extent that the country is in real need of foreign currencies. If the country has a sizeable amount of foreign exchange or if it can secure the necessary exchange through restricting its inessential imports, then there would be no necessity for foreign loans which, besides laying a burden of interest upon the national economy, may give rise to political difficulties.

41. It becomes clear from the above that the effects of a new issue of paper currency depend in the first place upon the proportion of the new issue saved and absorbed by the treasury, to the part that is used to pay for additional imports; secondly, upon the condition of the national economy and its capacity to expand production so as to satisfy the extra demand for goods and services; finally, they are dependent upon the balance of payments position 652

652 and on the volume of the country's foreign exchange reserves.

In the light of these considerations, it can be said that, in an agricultural country such as Syria, whose economy has not reached the stage of development in which currency exchange methods and velocity of circulation are well advanced, and in which all the factors of production are employed, it is feasible to rely on loans from the Bank of Issue to finance development, subject to the following limitations and conditions: that recourse to issuing paper currency is kept within reasonable limits so that it may not lead to an excessive rise in purchasing power compared to the rest of the national income; that it should be used on projects that will lead quickly to an expansion in national production; that it should be accompanied by the control of economic activities to ensure that production for local consumption and production for export do not fall; that it should be accompanied by a monetary policy that directs credit activity so as to limit inflationary effects, and a financial policy that will adjust ordinary budget expenditure to the needs of the development programme; that it should be accompanied by administrative measures to raise the collection of taxes and dues; and finally that it should only be resorted to after the exhaustion of all other methods.

42. At present, Syria has a number of potentialities, all of which must be used wisely if the success of its development programme is to be achieved in full. Its reserve funds must be utilized. Great efforts must be exerted to improve the principles of tax imposition, collection and inspection. All instalments due on previous loans from the Bank of Issue should be allocated to the development programme. These loans have exhausted their impact and have become part of the Syrian economy.

The measures necessary to create a money and financial market should be taken as quickly as possible. Foreign capital should be sought to finance imported equipment, and, if that is called for by the balance of payments position, recourse should be had to foreign government loans. Loans from the Bank of Issue should be applied for within the limits and subject to the conditions set out above.

Summary

000 43. We deduce from the above study of the present and future economic development of Syria certain general principles that

we consider applicable to the conditions of many economically underdeveloped countries. We may summarize them as follows:

a. Economic development in a country which is not fully developed is in the first place a government task. It requires the government to establish its foundations and principles, and to set in motion its execution, thus creating a stimulating atmosphere for the activity and enterprise of private individuals.

b. Economic development is, before anything else, an organizational task that requires a great and sustained effort. It is based in particular on good administration, on the organized collection of data and statistics, on studies, the establishment of technical, banking and monetary apparatus, and the creation of an atmosphere, both internally and externally, favourable to development.

c. Economic development requires the preparation of a studied development programme that will embody its fixed principles and lay before the government clearly what is needed, the way to achieve it and the time and capital that are needed for its full completion.

d. Economic development is not just a question of securing the funds and spending them. Money is only one of the many elements that have to be secured in order to ensure the success of the development policy. One general policy must be evolved that will coordinate the budgetary policy, monetary policy, economic policy and development policy, so as to produce the proper interaction between these policies, improve the national economy and secure the maximum of general welfare.

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
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Distribution of Jazirah tribes with principal towns, roads and rivers.
Shammar
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REPORT ON JAZIRAH

101 Geographically, Jazirah, i.e., "the Island", is that strip of territory lying between the rivers Dijla and Euphrates, but for the purpose of this report, the term Jazirah is understood in its administrative meaning as a Mohafaza of Syria, and will be studied as such.

AREA OF JAZIRAH AND ITS CULTIVABLE LANDS

The "Statistical Abstract of Syria" for 1950 gives the total area of Jazirah as 2,217,000 hectares divided between the Mohafaza center, i.e., Hassakeh, Qamishli, and Dijla, in the following proportion:

Mohafaza Center	1,525,000 hectares
Qada of Qamishli	392,000 hectares
Qada of Dijla	300,000 hectares

311 Of this total area, according to the same source, 444,266 hectares were cultivated in 1948-49, and 1,701,284 hectares were cultivable but uncultivated, while the uncultivable lands were only 71,450 hectares.

This terminology of cultivable and uncultivable is greatly misleading. If by cultivable is meant the lands which are not rocky or mountainous or forested, the terminology is right though it loses its economic meaning. But if by it is meant lands which can be planted and rendered productive to show some profit, then other factors have to be considered, and the productive "cultivable" area of Jazirah is greatly reduced.

122 The first of these factors is the amount of rainfall. It is really astonishing that the Syrian Government has not deemed it necessary to establish agricultural stations in different regions of Jazirah to record at least the amount of rainfall in the different localities. The only such station is at Hassakeh which is not primarily a wheat growing district and the mean annual rainfall over a period of nine years is less than 300 mm. This average is less than the minimum required for successful rain-fed cultivation.

I. The Mohafaza Center

311 Therefore about 80% of the 1,525,000 hectares mentioned as
312 cultivable in the Mohafaza Center are in fact uncultivable unless

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not.

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short.

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah.

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts:

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions.

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating

[179] it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes.
311 The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer.
244 Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed
182 land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

123 The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

244 For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for
311 cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

312 The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

312 Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers
406 from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less than LS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some
312 projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is
244 supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley.
242 But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available.

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers.

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal.

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families.

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
221 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

221 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
6221 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands. 624 425 427

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years. 563 167 661 651

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
861 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.
[291 Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
861 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.
[134 This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
577 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
511 ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

III The Shashans

163 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
463 Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
134 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

1621 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
429 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
452 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
429 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

1624 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
163 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
795 language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages 162
are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur 163
el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. 191
They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflict- 795
ed upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. 795
The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac 779
Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is consti- 162
tuted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following 167
the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from 657
that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League 463
of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. 648
Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the 662
memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all 182

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 182

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conslusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1621 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

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CROPS AND AGRICULTURE IN JAZIRAH

I. Dry Farming

Dry farming is by far the most important activity of Jazirah. 241
The first tractor and combine were introduced in 1936 by Shahine 311
Bey Maluf of Zahleh. Before that time agriculture was the business of the peasants. The town inhabitants of Jazirah took no interest in it. The area cultivated was restricted to a few kilometers south of the railway line in what is called the Old Villages. The political troubles in 1936-37 and the low prices of wheat and barley before the War did not encourage capitalists inside Syria to invest their money in Jazirah. Furthermore, agricultural machinery was new to most people who did not understand its economics or how to run it.

a. Expansion in the Use of Machinery 1936-1952

The War doubled the price of wheat in its second year. The 407
crop of 1940 was sold for LS 50-55 a ton at Aleppo. The French 439
bought it for LS 120 in 1941. The Office des Cereales Panifiables (O. C. P.) fixed the price at LS 350 in 1943. During these years the dollar was available at the official rate of LS 2.20 and importation of machinery from the U. S. was possible. The number of tractors increased to about 60 in the winter of 1943.

The crop of 1943 was exceptionally good and the O. C. P. imported some 50 tractors and a similar number of combines which reached Jazirah during the harvest season. The machines were first rented to the farmers and then sold to them. They represented the first large-scale importation of machinery to Jazirah.

Importation of machinery in the following two years became difficult as a result both of limited availability and of dollar shortage. But by the end of the War dollars became again available at the official rate and large numbers of tractors were imported in 1945 and 1946. The importation of agricultural machinery has become a steady and continuous flow in spite of the sharp rise in the dollar rates and the price of wheat, though below 1943, still makes large-scale exploitation profitable. Recently the Government through 654
the Agricultural Bank has helped the farmers import and buy on [452

installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71. This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300, respectively.

It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS . 90-1.10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusionis that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq.

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbassiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Rin. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers west of Dirbassiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jaziratibn Amr was long neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but 311
which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed [166]
into the region following the opening of the road and began populat- 491
ing it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region.

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" bar- 243
ley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat 433
are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita.

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances 185
which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and 654
planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below:

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the [132]
month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new

185 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i.e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 489 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

operation of world trade in a way that has always worked to the detriment of the farmer. The Government has adopted and persists in the view that the farmers as a class are alone responsible for feeding the town population at reduced prices. The Government and its organizations like the O. C. P. and later the Mira have always forced the farmers to hand over large quantities of wheat at prices below the market level. Even the present Grains Office is doing the same thing in a different way. It stipulates that exporters of wheat should deliver to the Office half the quantity exported at 23 piasters per kilo in Aleppo, i. e., at a rate 25% cheaper than the market price. This reflects in the end on the price paid by the merchant to the farmer. This unjust imposition of the Office is in fact borne by the farmer and not by the merchant. If the Government feels its responsibility for the provision of enough wheat for the population at reduced prices, the burden should be shared by all tax-payers without distinction. The farmer should get the full market price and the deficit should be covered from the general tax receipts. This solution, while freeing the farmer from a chronic injustice, is not the answer to the price problems. Since the Grains Office has become a permanent institution, the farmer needs to know as far in advance as practicable what prices he is to expect for his crops. The major function of the Office should be not to devise means for collecting wheat from the farmer at reduced prices, nor to provide revenue for the Government by creating a monopoly of wheat export, but to stabilize prices and guard the farmer against sharp fluctuations from one year to another. This it must do by announcing its readiness to buy wheat at fixed prices for the next two crops, at least without claiming a monopoly. That is, the farmer should be guaranteed a minimum price for his next two crops and left to profit from free prices if the market situation allows it.

A concrete example of how Government policy is reducing the prices for the farmer, is the new decree authorizing the export of 200,000 tons of wheat against delivery of 100,000 tons to the Grains Office at LS 230 in Aleppo.

The exporter will proceed to do his account, in the following manner. The price paid by Italy is said to be $98 which amounts to LS 350. For three tons of wheat of which two are exported and one delivered to the Grains Office, the merchant will receive LS 930 or an average of LS 310 per ton. In order to make a profit of

425 656 15 percent he must buy his wheat at the port of export for LS 203-5. This means about LS 252 at Aleppo for the farmer of Jazirah. And this is the price at which the market is stabilized at present, while if this imposition did not exist the farmer would have sold his wheat for LS 300-350.

648 489 7. The discussion of prices brings about a consideration of markets for the surplus Syrian wheat. During the French Mandate, and up to March 1949, Syria and Lebanon formed one economic unit. The first independent regime under Shukri Quwatly, which lasted until the first coup d'etat in 1949, preserved this unity though some friction did exist between the two Governments. President Quwatly was emphatic about the necessity of this union. Then politicians mentioned to him the alleged advantages which Lebanon had over Syria in the partnership, he invariably replied that the benefit from the partnership to the national Arab idea transcends in importance any material disadvantage resulting to Syria.

But aside from this political consideration, the union did present specific advantages to the Syrian farmer. Lebanon imports yearly about 80,000 tons of wheat. This is approximately one-third the quantity exported by Syria. Further, Lebanon had a customs duty of 50 per cent on foreign wheat other than Syrian. This meant that the Syrian farmer was assured a market for part of his crop at prices higher than world prices, besides selling Lebanon cheese, samneh, vegetables and fruit.

Whatever the economic advantages according to Syria in its new policy of separation from Lebanon, and they are highly doubtful, the Syrian farmer has lost a sure market.

In fact, the question of economic separation between Syria and Lebanon has never been examined as a purely economic propositon, but has always been mixed with considerations of national prestige and alleged Syrian economic subservience to Lebanon. This highly emotional language was designed to confuse the issue for the benefit of industrial groups, especially textile manufacturers who were crowded by Lebanese competition.

425 439 8. Another misconception shared by the Government and most of the people is that Syrian prices of wheat should be governed by world prices. The fact is that Jazirah wheat can never normally

435 compete on world markets. The cost of production of wheat in the
439 Jazirah by machinery is much higher than the cost of production in the major producing countries of the world, such as Canada, the U. S. A. and Australia. Since the average annual export of wheat in Syria does not exceed 250-300 thousand tons, and it is Jazirah which produces this exportable surplus, the rest of Syria taking care of internal consumption, the costs of Jazirah production become the determining factors. Some causes of the higher cost of production in Jazirah have been mentioned above. Others, such as the difficult transportation will be discussed later. But there is no doubt that unless the different defects controlling Jazirah agriculture are removed, and they can be removed by Government enlightened action, production will drop sharply when world prices decline as they might do if world tension is removed.

e. Two Types of Agriculture in Jazirah

241 It should be stated that two different methods of production prevail in Jazirah, cultivation by peasants using mules and cultivation by machinery.

1. Peasant cultivation accounts for perhaps 50-60 per cent of the crop, and machinery cultivation for the remainder. Both types suffer from some of the obstacles mentioned above, such as bad credit and transportation systems, bad seed, insecurity as to prices, and lack of agricultural guidance. But inspite of all, the peasant farmer will continue to plow his tract of land no matter how circumstances change because farming is his occupation and he knows no other. The crop he produces is enough for him and his family, and the surplus he sells to the Jazirah towns to feed the city people. The drop in prices will simply mean a lower standard of living for him and his family.

2. The cultivator by machinery suffers from causes in addition to those of the peasant. He is a capitalist who has invested his mone in machinery, seeds, fuel and wages and he has to show a profit at the end of the year to pay for his investment and to live at a decent standard. His investment should give him returns comparable to other fields of endeavor, otherwise he will not continue in his presen

job. It is this mechanized farmer-investor who has produced the surplus wheat exportable from Jazirah. Any attempt to reduce his activity by limiting the area of land cultivated by him, or by artificially reducing the prices of his crops for the benefit of the State monopoly, or by ignoring his demands for low production costs, will result in his leaving the job for other occupations. It should be noted also that this type of farmer is in most cases not tied to the land. He usually rents the land he cultivates, and even if he owned land, it is only a small fraction of the area he plants annually. It is always easy for him to rent his lands to peasant farmers and go back to the city. 2441

3. Estimate of a Capitalist Agricultural Enterprise and the Area it needs: A complete outfit of agricultural machinery belonging to a farmer in Jazirah usually consists of the following. A fifty horsepower tractor, a disc plow, a cultivator, a drill, a combine either tractor drawn or self-propelled, a jeep, a truck, and a regular repair shop for immediate repairs in the field. He will have a mechanic and two drivers on an annual basis. The number will rise to about ten during the plowing, seeding, and harvest seasons. This means an outlay of LS 100,000 in capital to which is added LS 25,000 for the price of seed, fuel, and miscellaneous expenses. To meet the depreciation on the machinery, cover the annual expenses and interest, and earn a profit, the farmer must plant as large an area of land as his equipment can handle. It is found that he has to plant some 5,000 dunums annually or better still 6,000 in order to find his occupation remunerative. To do this, he has to own or rent land double this area since all cultivation in Jazirah is on a two year rotation basis. 407 454 2441

II. Irrigated Agriculture

The Encyclopedia Britannica relates that the region of Nisibin, i.e. Qamishli, was up to the eleventh century planted with fruit trees and that it lost its orchards due to forcible conversion to wheat imposed by the Caliph, as well as ravages by the Bedouin tribes. 2441

a. The Region of Deirik

241 In the region of Deirik, the Zarkan river and numerous springs
[491] in the villages make irrigation possible over vast areas. The region
began to be developed recently when the road was partly constructed.
3124 Rice is an old staple, but in the last two years it have given place
to cotton. However, rice may resume its former place since cotton
diseases have become so widespread.

b. The Jarrah

The Jarrah river flows through Kubur el Bid and irrigates the country around it. Its waters were used for rice plantations, and recently for cotton. In winter its waters flow into the Rad.

c. The Jagjag

133 The main river of northern Jazirah is the Jagjag. Its sources are about thirty kilometers north of Kamishli, in a gorge in Turkey. It flows through Nisibin and Kamishli, crosses the Jazirah plain and empties in the Khabur at Hassakeh. Its total length is about 100 kms. and its average flow is 3 cubic meters per second.

3124 In Turkey and Kamishli, the river has several beds. The Turks,
425 unable to exploit it fully in their country because of its short flow
there, follow the practice of changing the river from bed to bed in
the summer months, so that farmers in Jazirah do not know when
the water will be available to them. This uncertainty has lead the
villages which have a right to the water to sell their rights for one
or more years to individuals on good terms with the Turkish auth-
ties. These individuals in their turn bribe the Turks to direct the
waters in the bed which leads to their lands. One family in particu-
lar has obtained a sort of monopoly on the waters of the Jagjag in
Qamishli. The Asfar-Najjars buy the water rights from the villages
for nominal sums and then try to reach an understanding with the
Turks. Since they have one or two competing groups in Qamishli,
the Turks usually get paid by both parties and satisfy none entirely.
The Asfars manage however to get the biggest share.

3124 Such an unstable situation does not lead to steady irrigation
development along the lines of orchard planting. The farmer is
241 lucky if he can grow one crop of rice or cotton with the present

fluctuations in water flow. Up to 1950, all the water of Jagjag was used for growing rice. In 1950-51, more emphasis was given to cotton. This year it is half cotton and half rice. 312 241

The Turks started a project for diverting all the waters of the Jagjag from Syria to Turkey. They began building tunnels to carry one quarter of the waters cast above Kubur el Bid, and the rest to the plains above Amuda and Dirbassiya. The Syrian Government objected and negotiations began in Ankara. The Syrians believe that they have reached an understanding with the Turkish authorities to divide the river waters equally. The Turks did not sign the agreement, claiming that they want a full agreement on water rights covering all common rivers and especially the Orontes. They are afraid that Syria might use all the waters of the Orontes in its irrigation projects. Since Syria holds this arm, the Jagjag dispute will be solved equitably. 312 648

It is difficult to estimate the area irrigated yearly by the Jagjag. The waters are used only for summer crops, and last year about thirty thousand dunums were planted to cotton. When the plantation is rice the area is nearer to ten thousand dunums. There is of course always a certain amount of land devoted to vegetable growing for the needs of the city. 312 241

d. Underground Water

Recently a few enterprising farmers tried to solve the problem of dependency upon Turkey for irrigation water by digging for water on their own lands. An Armenian outfit from Aleppo with a boring machine of local construction dug several wells in the region of Qamishli and Amuda. Three of the wells in the villages of Tal Ahmad and Tal Anbar near Kamishli were successful. Water to run a 4-inch pump was found at a depth of 18 meters. The other holes around Amuda were not so successful. Water was not found at a depth of 70 meters. These experiments are of course inconclusive and sufficient underground water may be found to be abundant in Jazirah. Further studies are needed. 312

a. The Khabur

The largest source of irrigation water in Jazirah is undoubtedly the Khabur. Its average flow is 52 cubic meters per second which 133

133 makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

812 406 The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. [46] The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

241 The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was preferred to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

711 Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he 241 own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join 427 to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

Irrigation by pump started with the rice boom in 1945 and expanded with the cotton boom of 1951. It was hit severly by the crop failure of last year and the flood of this spring, and the future of the Khabur appears dim. This is because as previously mentioned, the original amount of capital used to construct a fair sized project is large, amounting to about LS 150-200 thousand. Such a project can irrigate with two 10-inch pumps or their equivalent about 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and double the area in wheat and barley. The project will have one main canal 1 1/2-3 1/3 meters higher than ground level made entirely of earth or lined with cement to carry the water a distance of 1-3 kilometers depending on the lay of the ground, several subsidisary canals, buildings for the motors, the agricultural machinery, and the laborers. 3121 185

Evidently, in order to get the best returns on the capital invested, the farmer needs to exploit to the utmost the capacity of his pumps, otherwise he will be leaving his capital idle. In this case, he will need to cultivate, on a rotation basis, 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and 5, 000 dunums of wheat and barley. But on most of the irrigation projects of the size mentioned, the area of the lands which can be irrigated is less than 1, 500 dunums in all. The surrounding lands are all higher than the main leading canal and can not be reached except by a much greater outlay of capital. This means that the farmer has to extract from an area of 1, 500 dunums, of which one-third lies fallow every year, enough profit in five to eight years, which is the average duration of the lease, to compensate him for his yearly efforts, to pay interest on the capital and to regain his investment. This should mean a net annual profit of about 45, 000 LS or LS 45 per dunum, and experience has proved that it can not be done. 312 454

The alterntive to pump irrigation on the Khabur is irrigation by gravity in works similar to that of Tal Mughass. And the Khabur lends itself in many places to such project. Mr. Delbes, agricultural advisor to Syria during the French Mandate, knows at least of three projects studied by the French High Commissariat, to build dams and derivation canals between Ras el Ain and Hassakeh. The largest one among them is to carry the water west to the region of Jabal Abdel Aziz and irrigate a very large area. 312 654

Another dam site studied by the French is at Sab'Skour. Further south in the region of Fadghami a site was selected to store the

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flood waters and distribute them in summer. All these studies, and it is not known how detailed they are, are believed to be kept at the French Legation in Beirut.

Such projects cost a lot of money, and Syria may not be able to construct them for many years. A quicker and less expensive policy is to combine elements from the system of irrigation by pumps and the system of gravity irrigation. This is the policy followed in Egypt, to dig canals conveying water from the river to areas ten or more kilometers removed and ten to twenty meters higher than the water level. Such dirt canals can be dug cheaply by modern machinery, and the farmers will then be authorized to install pumps on the canals. Since the greatest cost of an irrigation project is the construction of the main canal above the ground level, the method recommended removes the need for the elevated canals and the farmer can install his pump directly on the land to be irrigated. In this way, the farmer is spared also the loss due to evaporation and absorption on the elevated canal.

This is the quickest method to expand irrigated agriculture along the Khabur, and it may also prove in the long run cheaper to the country and the farmer than the elaborate dams and derivation canals contemplated by the Government. Such a conclusion needs, of course, more detailed engineering studies and comparison of costs before it becomes final.

III. The Problem of Monoculture

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Wheat and barley are by far the main crops of the Jazirah and with the exception of the Khabur valley, they are practically the only crops. What the irrigated lands of Kubur el Bid and Qamishli produce in summer crops does not compare in quantity or in value with the wheat crop.

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For this reason, Jazirah suffers from all the defects of monoculture. When the wheat crop is good and the prices are high land values increase, the farmers are enabled to pay most of their debts and to raise their standard of living by building better residences, buying furniture, making more trips with their families to the interior cities of Syria and Lebanon, sending their children to schools in Aleppo and Beirut, and increasing their welfare in general. But

when the wheat crop fails, as it did last year, there is great hard- 248
ship in all of the Jazirah. Debts remain largely unpaid, the value 511
of land falls off sharply, and interest rates become unbearable

The failure of a crop in Jazirah brings more hardship than is 454
the case in other Mohafazas because Jazirah, with all the money revenue which accrues to it in a good year, has not arrived yet at the stage where it can save a part of this income to use in bad years. All the money revenue is immediately reinvested in machinery and in expansion of the area planted with additonal sums borrowed from the banks or from Aleppo merchants.

The point is reached where further expansion has become difficult, and the situation will become more or less stabilized so that some of the income will be put aside for emergencies in the coming few years. But even when savings reach a high figure, the problem of monoculture is not solved.

Jazirah at present does not produce the necessary vegetables 511
and fruit for its own consumption. It imports them from Aleppo, 241
Homs and Damascus. That is why the cost of living in the town 488
of the Jazirah is one of the highest in Syria. Aside from the price of meat and samneh, everything including room and house rents, is more expensive than in the other big towns of Syria. Even flour is sold to bakers by the town municipalities at the same price for which it is sold in Damascus.

In former times, however, Jazirah produced great amounts of 433
fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Its lands are very well suited 241
to raising cattle and beef, an employment more profitable than 454
wheat growing. A diversification in the use of land will make for a more balanced and prosperous economy in Jazirah. But the Jazirah farmers are not to be blamed entirely for the kind of agriculture prevailing. Circumstances beyond their control, connected primarily with the problems of land ownership and tenure, have largely imposed this type of monoculture upon them. These problems will be discussed in the following section, but it can be said in passing that the farmer cannot be expected to invest money in buildings for cattle raising, or in digging wells to provide irrigation for vegetable growing, or in planting orchards on lands to which he has no title or whose title is subject to constant disputes over boundaries with the neighbors and lately by decree-law 96 with the State.

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LAND OWNERSHIP IN JAZIRAH

At the beginning of the French Mandates, more than 95% of Jazirah lands were public domain, and it is difficult to understand the land situation now without a study of the laws governing the acquisition of public domain as enacted by the Ottomans and partly amended by the French, and which remained in effect till January 31, 1952, when decree-law 96 was issued. 423

I. The Land Laws Prior to January 1952

The law recognized two categories of public domain:

1. Lands registered in the name of the Government in the same way that a private owner has his lands registered in the Department of Tabo, or Land Registration Department. The Government holds deeds for those lands.

2. All unoccupied lands, waste lands called "dead lands," in Syria which are not registered in the name of anybody and for which the Government holds no deeds.

The first category of public domain is very rare in Jazirah. Suffice it to say that ownership of these lands can be acquired by public auction sales, or by renting them from the Government after a price has been fixed, and paying the price in yearly installments while doing the improvements specified in the contract or sale. The operation is known in Syrian law under the same name of "rent with a promise of sale." 423 425

The second category of public domain is by far the larger. And the law provided different methods for acquiring it suited to the small peasant and to the big farmer.

The the small peasant, the law, accorded him five hundred dunums which he could own freely without any payment provided he informed the competent authorities of his intentions and obtained in advance an authorization from the Department of Registration. He could then go ahead and cultivate the area allotted to him, and after 10 years, he could obtain legal title to it, without any payment.

This method did not enjoy great favor with the peasants of Jazirah for several reasons. In the first place, the ignorant peasant, whether Bedouin or Kurd, found difficulty in applying for the advance authorization and in fulfilling the formalities required for receiving it. Secondly, the peasant aspired often to a larger area than that allowed to him by this method. Thirdly, the peasant did not trust the Government, from which he was used only to oppression and corruption during Turkish rule. He was afraid that by the end of the ten years he would not be granted the promised land. Fourthly, the peasant did not trust his neighbors, his Sheik, or his Agha. He was afraid that during these ten years and before he received the deed for his land one of them would manage to drive him away and get the land for himself. 423 425

For all these reasons combined, the peasant wanted a way that enabled him to receive more than 500 dunums of land, that rid him of the necessity of applying to Government officials, and that put in his hands an undisputable title to his land in a reasonably short time.

All these desires were satisfied if the peasant followed the second method of land acquisition described by law. The law provided that, without previous authorization, anyone can acquire title to waste land if he cultivates it and pays to the State so much per dunum. No limit was set on the area which a farmer could acquire in this way. The State was interested in extending agriculture and offered encouragement to those who reclaimed land. The area which a farmer could own in this way was limited only by his ability to cultivate and plant. He could at any moment ask the appropriate officials to make a survey of his cultivated area, ask them to fix a price per dunum, pay the price, and get his deed in the first year of cultivation. In the nineteen forties, the price per dunum was usually set at LS50.

II. Partnership in Land Between the Tribesmen and the Tractor Owner

To avail himself of these advantages, the peasant had recourse to the city dweller owner of a tractor. The usual situation was that a group of peasants have occupied a large area of about 10,000 dunums within the boundaries of their tribe, of which they were able to cultivate only some 2000. They offered the tractor owner half the 10,000 dunums on condition that he brings his tractor to the village 425 427

425 and cultivate all the area. Usually the tractor owner took upon himself
427 also to pay all Government dues and the price of all the land as fixed by the Government, and to hand the deeds for the 5000 dunums to the peasants in one or two years.

In this way, the peasants got 5000 dunums instead of the 2000 they were able to cultivate by their own means, they received their deeds in one or two years instead of in ten, their partner from the city became responsible for helping them resist any encroachments on their land from the Agha, Sheik or neighbors, and they received their deeds free from any dues.

Around 1944, when demand for land increased, peasants began receiving money from their city partners besides all the obligations assumed by him and mentioned above.

428 The French wisely strove to encourage agriculture in Jazirah, and
425 and finding that the procedure used for the acquisition of land was long and complicated, formed a Special Committee and empowered it to grant land and issue valid deeds while abrogating some of the usual processes of law. Some lands were distributed in this manner and the French were accused of using their influence to the benefit of their political sympathizers. But in general, the Committee did a good job of stabilizing and legalizing the ownership of some lands.

The great majority of the land owned by tractor owners in Jazirah was acquired in partnership with the peasants. A few of the inhabitants of Mardin and Nisibin had titles to lands from the Ottoman Government. In rare instances, a few individuals went to the Land Registration Official in Turkey and bought from him forfeited deeds covering very large areas. But in general the titles in the hands of property owners in Jazirah were acquired in the manner described above.

423 Because there was no survey in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman land laws, adopted and amended by the French and applied to Syria, considered that the boundaries mentioned in the deed were the determining factor in case of dispute, and that the area mentioned in dunums was of no importance since the surveying services did not reach all parts of the country. For this reason, all deeds in Syria give the boundaries as exactly as possible, and give an approximate estimate of the area in dunums, except where surveying has remedied the situation.

III. Lands With Title Cover Only 30% of Jazirah

It should not be understood from the above discussion that all the lands of Jazirah are occupied by persons having title to them. Perhaps as much as 70% of the lands are occupied by persons claiming ownership but having no legal title. And here resides the great problem of Jazirah which continues to retard its development and prosperity. 423 185

There is nothing that can stabilize conditions in an agricultural society, increase confidence, improve credit, diversify the types of cultivation, increase property values, and encourage the improvement of land by long-term projects of irrigation and farm construction, like a secure and stable system of land ownership.

It is the misfortune of Jazirah that successive Governments since Syrian independence have not only ignored this basic fact, but have done everything in their power to make the stabilization of the land problem in Jazirah more remote.

Before the beginning of 1952 land registration in Jazirah suffered from all the delays, expenses, corruption, and hindrances prevalent in other parts of Syria. Moreover, as a frontier zone, land registration was subject to an authorization by the Chief of State, and in the last three years registration of land acquired through cultivation for a period of ten years was stopped by decision of the Council of Ministers.

The governing idea behind all these restrictions is that individuals are usurping the public domain illegally. While this may be true in some cases, the measures taken to correct the situation are out of proportion to the problem at hand and are applied not only to usurpers out to land owners of good faith as well. The result is that three-quarters of the lands of Jazirah belonging mostly to peasants and medium owners are unregistered.

IV. Decree-law 96

Decree-law 96 starts with this idea of correcting the usurpations of the public domain, and adds to it the concept of social justice as exemplified by the policy of encouraging small land holdings and dividing the large estates. 423 185 656

A. Contradictory Policies of the Government

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The decree is interesting in its application to Jazirah and It seems that the Government there follows two contradictory policies diametrically opposed and antagonistic to each other. On the one hand, decree No. 510, dated March 23, 1950, and decree No. 80, dated January 23, 1952, facilitate the importation and distribution of powerful agricultural machinery among the farmers in general and those in particular of Jazirah. The use of agricultural machinery goes hand-in-hand with the extensive cultivation of large areas of land to make their employment economic. On the other hand, and surprisingly, only eight days after the promulgation of the decree for the distribution of agricultural machinery, decree-law 90 dated January 31, 1952, prevents the farmer from owning or renting (in its interpretative communique) more than 1500 dunums in Jazirah an acreage which does not lend itself to economic tractor cultivation.

The decree has been in operation now for seven months and its application should have vindicated the two principles on which it depends, viz 1 to correct the usurpations of the public domain, and to divide the big estates among the needy farmers.

Assuming that the policy of the State is to encourage small ownership of land to be tilled by the farmer using cows or mules, and that the importation of heavy agricultural machinery was a mistake not to be repeated, the logical procedure by the Government would have been to establish simplified processes and register in the name of peasants pieces of 1500 dunums each to which they have a right both in the old and the new law. The Government has had ample time during these eight months to enforce its own decree-law and register tens of thousands of 1500 dunum pieces and give their users legal title to them. Had the Government done that, it would have found the problem greatly simplified. The Kurdish and Bedouin family has in general three to four adult members working on the common land. According to decree 96, each member has a right to 1500 dunums. The Government would have to grant them extra land to reach its quota.

B. Size of Land Holdings in Jazirah

The point is that, had the Government proceeded in this manner, the practical result would have been the stabilization and legalization of the present small and medium ownership.

423 185 656 This, according to the following table borrowed from Gib Report, page 20, would have legalized the situation in 57% of the Jazirah lands, leaving 9% as public domain, and only 34% not complying with the terms of the decree.

Small Holdings Less than 10 hectares	Medium Holdings 10-100 hectares	Large Holdings Over 100 hectares	State-Owned Lands
56,000	528,000	343,000	96,000
5%	52%	34%	9%

Instead, the Government's only contribution to the solution of the land problem was to prohibit entirely the registration of any land from January 1952 to the present time.

If the Gibb statistics are correct, and they are presumably taken from Government sources, the land reform in Jazirah contemplated by decree 96 concerns only 34% of the region's entire area.

In dealing with this portion of Jazirah, the Syrian Government has to decide on its agricultural policy. It must make up its mind whether it wants to divide the big estates, with or without compensation, and distribute them in small lots to farmer families using mules, thus increasing the population of Jazirah greatly, so that its production of wheat will not much exceed its local consumption, and depriving Syria of the income derived from its present yearly export. Alternatively it must decide that Syria wants to increase its exports of wheat by extending the use of agricultural machinery whose effective use requires holdings of more than 1,000 hectares.

Coming back to the discussion of the 34% of Jazirah lands in holdings of over 100 hectares, the Government should have proceeded immediately, after the promulgation of the law, to their surveying and delimitation to get a clear picture of the situation. Without venturing into exact statistics, the following description is to the point. It endeavors to show that excessive land ownership is limited to relatively few individuals and that the problem is better solved by the Government by considering each case on its merits. The problem of the Government is further facilitated because the tribal Sheiks claim that they hold the lands for their tribe and not for themselves. The Government should have asked the Sheiks to proceed to the distribution of these lands under its supervision.

423 The large holdings are owned by the Agha of Koshar around
471 Deirik, the Sheiks of Shammar from Tal Koshak to Kubur el Bid and south to the Rad, the Sheik of Tay and several of Tay subdivision chiefs, Asfar-Najjar family of Qamishli, the Aghas of the Kurdish tribes (three in number), and two Sheiks of the Jubur. This list is not exhaustive but it is true that not more than fifty individuals in Jazirah have holdings of more than 5,000 hectares each. And since the great majority of them are tribal chiefs, the logical solution is to ask them to distribute these lands according to the laws in force since the Ottoman rule. No new legislation is necessary to fulfill the two aims of distribution of the public domain to needy peasants and the division of the big estates.

Such a solution will not mean that every estate will be only 1500 dunums but it will mean that perhaps 80% of Jazirah will be in holdings approximating 1500 dunums and some 20% in holdings of 10,000-15,000 dunums for tractor cultivation.

C. Shortcomings of the Decree

423 The basic defect of decree 96 is that it erred in diagnosing
656 the real problem of land ownership in Syria. As the United Nations
433 Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East aptly described the situation (part I page 34). "In the Middle East, most of the population--perhaps as much as 90%--lives virtually on the margin of subsistence. But while maldistribution of income obstructs economic progress in a variety of ways, it is secondary to the basic problem in each country of grossly inadequate output in relation to the total population. This is the central fact of economic life in the Middle East." Thus the real problem facing the Government in Jazirah is not that a few people own large tracts of land (though some of them do and should be controlled), but whether the present type of cultivation is not working for a better national economy than small holdings will be able to do.

This criticism of decree 96 does not mean that land abuses do not exist in Jazirah. Undoubtedly they do. But it is a long way between admitting this and trying to correct it by dividing the land indiscriminately into 1500 dunum lots.

The shortcomings of decree law 96 are numerous and without discussing them in detail since the law is being amended, it is necessary to recognize some of them.

423 In the first place, the law amounts in fact to confiscation of
656 property because it arbitrarily abolishes rights of individuals gained
433 over the land through the normal processes of established law.

Secondly, it allows a uniform area for every farmer whether he uses tractor or mule, and whether he allows dry cultivation in Jazirah or irrigated farming in the Euphrates or the Khabur. It is evident that an irrigated area of 1500 dunums is more than adequate even for a large farmer while the same area is too small for tractor dry farming.

Thirdly, the confiscatory provisions of the law are not limited to lands recently acquired from the public domain, but cover lands for which deeds have been in the hands of the owners for decades. Decree 96 achieves this by reversing the stipulations of the preceding laws and by stating that in unsurveyed lands every title should be limited by the area mentioned in it and not by the boundaries.

Fourthly, if social justice is the aim, why should the law be limited to control of the ownership of land and not extended to control commercial and industrial property as well as real estate in cities and cash money? Further, how can the law treat on the same basis five hundred dunums planted to orchards or olive trees and a neighboring area of the same dimensions planted to wheat?

V. Land Ownership Along the Khabur

171 There is more concentration of land ownership along the Khabur that in theother parts of Jazirah, though the concentration is less apparent because the cultivable lands are smaller.

In the north, around Ras el Ain, the Shashan tribe dominated the country. South of them are the Assyrian holdings. Around Hassakeh, some Christians have bought lands from the Juburs, but south of the town and down to Shaddadah, the Jubur Chiefs of the Milhem family own or control both banks of the river. They own all the naqourahs and work their lands by renting it to the members of their tribe on conditions described in the next chapter. One hardly finds a Jubur who is not of the Milhem, or a stranger from inside Syria, who owns property in the Jubur region of the Khabur.

Lately, the Milhem have begun renting land to irrigation projects by pumps. But unlike the Kurds and Tay people of upper Jazirah, the Milhem have never agreed to enter into partnership for the ownership of land.

471 The land problem along the Khabur is not to distribute land to the Jubur Bedouin who cannot use it because he cannot irrigate it, but to remove the hold of the Milhem family and to facilitate ownership by the entrepreneur who invests money in the land, installs pumps, and irrigates areas formerly arid. Unfortunately, the old laws and decree 96 work for the benefit of the river bank owner who, at the end of the lease, takes possession not only of his original strip of land which he leased, but also of all the new land brought under cultivation and irrigation by the lessee at his own expense.

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VI. Recapitulation

185 To recapitulation, the problem of land ownership in Jazirah is one of stabilizing the existing property rights for 57% of the area of the region, of distributing about 25% by the simple expedient of having the Sheik or Agha share his land with the members of his tribe in whose name he holds it, or passing legislation to enable the investor along the Khabur to gain ownership of the land he irrigates and reclaims, and of simplifying the processes of law so that all these functions can be performed and disputes between property owners settled and deeds granted within a short period. It becomes apparent that the success of such a policy is subject to a prior survey of the region. But this need not necessarily mean long delays because aerial survey at present is a quick operation.

The importance of the stabilization on the regularization of the land problem in Jazirah cannot be overemphasized. Besides all the advantages mentioned on page 27, land will come to have real value on the market and the wealth of the entire Jazirah will be increased tenfold. The famer will be enable to diversify his culture and escape the dangers of monoculture. After surveying the division of land, the farmer, working on his own lot in which he has no partners, will be induced to improve it with buildings, irrigation wells, fertilizers, and tree and vegetable gardens. There is no reason why the plains of Jazirah, wherever water is available, cannot be made to resemble the gardens of Damascus with time and an increase in agricultural knowledge among the population.

LAND TENURE IN JAZIRAH

427 The custom in Jazirah is for the tenant to pay the rent in a percentage of the crop delivered to the owner free of all expense.

I. Land Tenure for the Peasant

427 651 Under Ottoman rule and because land was abundant and peasants scarce, the rent was fixed at 7L. The owner and the tenant were each responsible for the Government taxes on his own share of the produce.

The Ottoman Government collected the tithe and the werko as taxes on the land. The title, as its name implies, was 10% of the produce to which was added later 2-1/2% as special revenue for public instruction.

Because the peasant wanted to be as far away from Government officials as possible he paid the landowner 19-1/2%, including the tithe and the rent, and did not care how much of that the landowner actually paid so long as he remained unmolested by the public officials. This percentage of 19-1/2% is still prevailing and is known by the name of "Hassil and Tabo".

In 1924 the French found the collection of the tithe cumbersome and adopted a modified system. They took the average tax paid by the land in the preceding four years and made the sum obligatory. In practice, this meant light taxation on the land, but the landowner still received from the peasant the same percentage as when the tithe was actually paid. Later, when the tax of 7% on agricultural produce took the place of all land taxes and the peasant had to pay it when he transported his crop for sale, he kept paying the landowner 19-1/2% so that his percentage has come to mean rent to the landowner without the obligation on his part to pay the taxes of the peasant. What made the situation acceptable to the peasant was that the increase in population would have raised the rent anyway. He now pays this rent for the use of land and house. If the house is not included for his, he constructs his own house of sun-baked bricks, but retains the right to remove the wooden roof when he leaves the village.

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II. Land Tenure for the Tractor Owner

The tractor owner gets better advantages when he rents land. 427
He also pays a percentage of the crop. It used to be 5-6% with the obligation to plant a "shkara" for the landowner. The "Shkara" is a certain amount of seed which the landowner provides and which the tenant agrees to plant by his machines and to harvest with his combine free of charge. The "shkara" is proportional to the area of land rented. It varies between 10-20 sacks of wheat. In the last few years when demand for land became great, the rents rose to 10-12% with the habitual "shkara". Usually the rental contracts are for three years. They rarely exceed this period.

III. Land Tenure Along the Khabur

Along the Khabur rents are different in manner. There, the landowner provides not only the land but also the water for irrigation and half the seeds. In return he receives half the crop. The peasant furnishes his labor for plowing, seeding caring for the irrigation canals, irrigation and harvesting.

Rents for pump irrigation were between 7-10% until 1951. The cotton rush increased the rents for strips of land near the river to 15-20%, but the failure of the crop reduced the rush for land and the rent is down again to around 10%.

THE PROBLEM OF CREDIT IN JAZIRAH

The rapid economic advance of Jazirah in the last years is nothing less than amazing. In 1941, in the region of Qamishli, for example, the farthest village cultivated was less than 20 kilometers south of the city. All the land beyond was pasture for the Bedouin. East of Kubur el Bid to Tal Koshak, a distance of 60 kilometers, the land was similarly idle. There was not a single tractor in the region of Ras el Ain, and not a single water pump on the Khabur aside from those of the Assyrians. 311

Qamishli itself, the principal town of Jazirah, had no electric light, no paved roads, no sewage system, and very few acceptable houses to live in. The same was true in a larger measure of the other towns of Jazirah. 361 365

361 At present, agriculture extends in an unbroken line from the
311 Turkish and Iraqi borders south to the Rad and Hassaksh, and west to
265 Ras el Ain and midway to Rakka. Qamishli has all the amenities of a fair-sized city with sewage, electricity, asphalted roads, running water, places of amusement, and modern office buildings and houses. The other towns of Jazirah show similar progress but in a smaller way.

454 All this development could not have been achieved without extensive use of capital. It was stated that the original emigrants to Jazirah whether Christians or Kurds, brought very little capital with them. Whatever they have now was made in Jazirah and not brought from outside.

I. Credit to the Bedouin and Kurd

452 The nearest commercial market to Jazirah where credit was
438 available was Aleppo. Aleppo merchants first provided goods shipped to the towns of Jazirah to be smuggled into Turkey. And Jazirah merchants working on a commission or partnership basis made good profits. Some of them specialized in lending money to the Bedouins and Kurds and for them, also, credit was available at Aleppo. They borrowed at an interest rate of 9% and lent at 35-50%. Most of them, however, did not lend money outright as a general practice, but sold goods and especially textiles, coffee and sugar to the farmer against bills maturing at harvest time. The exorbitant interest was added over the price of the goods, and the peasant accepted it as a somewhat higher price and did not consider it as interest. Theis system still prevails at the present time.

II. Credit to the Machinery Owner

452 With the expansion of agriculture and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, credit in much larger amounts became necessary. The farmer using machinery needed two kinds of credit. He needed credit to pay for his machines, and seasonal credit to cover a part of his expenses for wages, seed, fuel, and general expenditures.

In the first years of the War, dealers in agricultural machinery supplied a part of the need by selling on an installment basis for a period of 20 months. But between 1943 and 1948 they demanded cash payment before delivery. In the last four years, they have renewed their credit facilities.

III. The Role of the Banque de Syrie

The Banque de Syrie in Qamishli provided a part of the need 452
for seasonal capital. The amount of its credit increased yearly with 453
the development of the region until it reached the sum of LS 7,000,-
000 this year out of a total credit of LS 17,000,000.

But the influence of the Banque de Syrie in the economic life of Jazirah is not limited to the sum of LS 7 millions disbursed directly by its branch office in Qamishli to individual borrowers. Most of the remaining credit supplied to Jazirah by Aleppo finds its source in the Banque de Syrie.

In Qamishli the Banque extends two types of credit. Commercial credit in bills signed by the debtor and endorsed by two persons acceptable to the Banque, the last of whom should have a credit in his name free at the moment of discount for a sum at least equal to the sum discounted. The maximum duration of the bill is 90 days. The second type is agricultural credit. It used to be given against bills of the same type discussed above but renewable twice, but in the last five years a new and more elastic system was introduced whereby credit was given for a period of nine months for winter crops and six months for summer crops. The beneficiary has to sign an agreement with the Banque with two other persons as endorsers. During the period of the loan he can draw the amount agreed upon and refund it at the date of expiration.

The average amount allowed to the owner of an agricultural outfit is LS 15-20 000. The Banque does not worry about its loans because it usually accepts only the best signatures and it has always been able to recover its loans even in the worst years. Its interest rates are 9% while they are 7% in the other towns of Syria.

The seven million pounds credit of the Banque de Syrie is not given entirely to farmers and merchants for legitimate use. A good part of it goes to money lenders in Qamishli who lend it in turn to farmers at much higher rates reaching 24-60%.

IV. Credit by Aleppo Merchants

Since the Banque provides only about 45% of the credit needed, 454
and that only to the best signatures, a large field is left to the private money lender. The merchants of Aleppo directly or through their agents in Qamishli provide the remaining percentage of credit. This credit is given in commercial bills for a duration of three

452 months but renewable to the harvest season. Depending on the condition of the crops and the financial situation of the borrower the interest varies from 18-36%. This Aleppo credit does not become available to the farmer however until after the month of March for winter crops when it becomes possible to judge the condition of the crop. In the last three years the firm of Ma'marbashi Bros. has opened an office in Qamishli for commerce and banking. Its loans are no different from the other private money lenders.

Many of the merchants who lend money are also wheat, rice and cotton merchants. They receive the produce of their debtors which they sell for a commission and thus deduct the amount of their loans. In this way they have a sort of collateral besides the bills and they also profit from the commissions.

V. Credit by the Agricultural Bank

452 652 The Agricultural Bank of the Syrian Government does not play effectively the role for which it was designed. Aside from all the excessive formalities required by the Bank regulations which make its operations slow, cumbersome, and onerous to the debtor as explained in the report of July 15 1952 on "The Agricultural Bank," the amounts allotted by the Bank to Jazirah are infinitesimal in proportion to the needs of the area. The amount of credit extended by the Bank for long and short term loans between the years 1944-1949 has averaged LS 150,000 yearly, i.e., 1%, out of the total credit of some LS 15 millions needed by Jazirah. Further, the Bank can grant loans over LS 600 only against mortgage of land, and since 70% of t the lands of Jazirah have no title, the activity of the Bank is accordingly restricted. A new decree, number 9, dated June 26, 1952, permits the Bank to give loans to users of land as well as owners, and puts at the disposal of the Bank the sum of two million pounds for all Syria. The share of Jazirah in this sum will not exceed LS 200,000 which will not change in any degree the credit situation in the region.

VI Credit and its Relation to the Land Problem

452 The problem of credit in Jazirah is tied up to a great extent with the stabilization and legalization of the land problem. The Banque de Syrie and the Aleppo merchant evaluate the borrowing capacity of the farmer by the machines he owns, the area of his

452 plantation and the value of his lands. Lands without title have no commercial value though the farmer may use them without opposition. This is apparent at the present time when lands with title and undisputed boundaries sell at ten times the price of occupied lands without title A survey and cadastration of Jazirah lands with a rapid and form settlement of boundary disputed and the grant of property deeds will expand the borrowing capacities of Jazirah enonously and may tend to reduce the exorbitant rates of interest demanded by the money lenders. On such a trable basis, other banking establishments may be induced to open business in the region and relieve its dependance on the greedy money lender.

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

491 During the French Mandate there was not a single paved or as-
496 phalted road in Jazirah. In winter road communications were out between the different towns and villages and the only means of travel was by train which passed through the more important centers of Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya For the rest of the year road transport became possible but expensive because of the absence of roads For this reason, the whole region of Deirik remained undeveloped until quite recently.

I. Roads Within Jazirah

491 The independent Government in Syria started building a
653 road in 1945 between Qamishli and Hassakeh which served at the same time as the arterial road to Aleppo. Though the distance between the two towns is only 85 kilometers, the funds alloted yearly for the road were so small that now, after seven years, only about 30 kilometers are asphalted and the rest is paved The maintenance does not keep up with the deterioration and the road is going to pieces. However, now at last, communication is assured in all weather while before trucks were stuck for days during the rainy season.

Another asphalted road joins Qamishli with Amuda, a distance of 30 kilometers. Here again deterioration is rapid. This road is to be projected another 30 kilometers to Dirbassiya and from there to Ras el Ain, a distance of 60 kilometers.

491 The road Qamishli-Hassakeh is extended for 50 kilometers south, to Point 47 on the way to Deir Ezzor. This section is also asphalted.

491 It used to be one of the worst roads in Jazirah. At the end of this stretch begins the desert of Deir Ezzor 100 kilometers wide. Some sections of it where rainwater prevents the passage of cars are paved. Nevertheless, the road closes during several weeks in winter.

Another road built crudely by the British Army stretches from Qamishli to Kubur el Bid-Talkoshak-Mossul. It is paved with rough stones and it is only used by cars in winter. Beyond Tel Abu a road branches to Deirik and Ain Diwar.

[487] Aside from these, all Jazirah roads are tracks. There are no roads between Amuda, Derbassiya and Hassakeh, nor between Ras el Ain and Hassekeh, nor between the more important villages clustering around the several towns.

The absence of bridges across the Jagjag renders communication more difficult especially in winter when the waters of the river rise. There is a bridge at Qamishli, another one at Tal Brak 40 kilometers south and a third one at Hassakeh. In the relatively crowded villages near Qamishli along both sides of the river, crossings are effected with great hardship by loaded trucks especially in winter.

II Roads Between Jazirah and Aleppo

361 Aleppo is the nearest commercial center to Jazirah. It is
438 the market for Jazirah grains, wool, samneh and hides. It provides
491 Jazirah with all its needs of cement, textiles and all kinds of imported goods. That is why daily communication between the two regions is vital to Jazirah, but the Government has not judged it yet necessary to construct an all-weather road. Such a road exists in
491 more or less good shape from Qamishli to Hassakeh and to Point 47. From there on, the road to Rakka is closed all during the winter months and travel to Deir Ezzor is interrupted whenever there is heavy rain. The northern and shorter road Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo is also closed in winter for goods and passengers. The shortest road and that which passes through the best developed areas is the one which follows the railway line Qamishli-Amuda-Dirbassiya-Ras el Ain-Tal Abiad-Jarablus-Aleppo. It is 420 kilometers long as contrasted with 465 kilometers for Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo, and 485 kilometers for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Rakka-Aleppo and 565 for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Deir Ezzor-Aleppo which is the usual route followed in winter.

III The Baghdad Railway

The Baghdad Railway which runs 247 kilometers in Syria is 496
the principal means of transport for goods. It handles about 200,000 648
tons of goods every year. The bulk of Jazirah wheat is transported over it. But it has had in recent years keen competition from trucks in spite of the bad roads for several reasons. The Qamishli-Aleppo line passes for 70% of its length through Turkish territory and is under Turkish control. When the Turks choose to irritate the Syrians they restrict the entrance to the stations and in numerous other ways frustrate the Syrians and cause them hardship. Whole trains are unaccountably delayed for days in the Turkish stations.

Already passenger traffic is handled almost entirely by planes, 484
cars and busses, except in winter months when the roads are unsafe. A bus charges LS 10 from Qamishli to Aleppo and makes the trip in 12 hours. A small car charges LS 20 and makes the trip in 8 hours. It takes the "Express" 20-22 hours to reach Aleppo from Qamishli and the fare is LS 30 in second-class "wagon lit" with tips.

For merchandise the train rate is LS 23.5 per ton from Qamishli 489
to Aleppo. It costs the farmer an additional LS 6-12 depending on the distance to transport a ton of wheat from the field to the station. There is also an amount of about LS 4 involved in handling, all of which makes the actual rate by train about LS 35.

The truck charges LS 35 from Qamishli to Aleppo during the wheat season but it carries the wheat directly from the combine in the field to the merchant's store in Aleppo thus reducing the handling expenses to a minimum and transporting the goods in the shortest time. If the farmer is not hard pressed for money, which is rather rare, and can wait until the winter months and spring, he can transport his wheat for a rate as low as LS 10-15 per ton by truck. Inversely, the cost of tranport from Aleppo to Jazirah rises in winter and spring and decreases in summer and autumn.

Though truck transport is more advantageous in many ways than transport by train, the number of trucks available and the condition of the roads make the transport of a whole crop by trucks impossible. To achieve that, a complete road network needs to be constructed, diesel trucks would have to be imported and the discriminatory tariffs against them abolished.

IV. Telephone, Telegraph and Air Communication

206 In 1950 telephone communication became possible with
509 Jazirah for the first time on a commercial basis. Telegraph communication has long been established and an air service connectin Qamishli with Aleppo and Damascus started in 1946, then interrupted by the Palestinian War, has been resumed twice weekly. Fares from Qamishli to Aleppo and Damascus are LS 25 and 50, respectively.

V. Railway Line Projects

165 Railway lines wholly inside Syria from Jazirah to the interior cities have been suggested by the Gibb report and by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. They suggested a line from Tal Koshak to Hassakeh and from there to Rakka and Aleppo. Such a line would by-pass Qamishli which is the more important agricultural and commercial center, and would go in a district only newly developed, sparsely populated and not of the fertility of the Qamishli area. It seems that a line starting from Qamishli itself would be shorter and would service a more fertile and populated district. From Hassakeh the line could follow the Khabur as long as possible before veering to Deir Ezzor. This would be longer than the proposed line from Hassakeh to Rakka directly, but it would have the advantage of servicing the Khabur Valley and collecting its crops, whereas, the line Hassakeh-Rakka is completely desert. From Rakka there is only one route to Aleppo.

It is difficult to choose between a policy of road construction and railway lines without detailed study of the economics of both, but, whatever the result of the study, Jazirah needs cheap and easy means of communication.

COMMERCE OF JAZIRAH

438 It stands to reason that the commerce of Jazirah is mainly in its
441 taple prodcuts and in the goods required for the development of its essential industry which is agriculture.

The main crop being wheat, it forms the largest item both in bulk and in value. But the Jazirah merchant plays a secondary role in the handling of this crop. He is sometimes a partner, but more

often an agent of the Aleppo merchant who furnishes the capital 488
and has the necessary warehouses in Aleppo and the commercial 441
knowledge and connections in the Syrian market and abroad to dispose of the crop at the best terms.

I. The Problem of Storage and Warehouses

The dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo merchants is such that 488
until the present time there is not a single warehouse or silo to store 241
wheat for a few months in all Jazirah belonging to an individual merchant or big farmer. During harvest season, the wheat is stacked in the open near the railway stations and left without cover until it is shipped to Aleppo. The hangers of the stations can only hold a small part of the crop. The Mira built a few depots but it is not known whether they will be put at the disposal of merchants.

The special conditions of cultivation in Jazirah connected with the problem of credit and land ownership make the transport of wheat from the farms to the stations during harvest season a heroic affair. This is caused by two reasons: in the first place, the farmer is always in need of money and has to ship his crop quickly to Aleppo to sell it, and, secondly, even if the big farmer is not in need of money, he does not feel it is safe to keep his crop in the villages. In most cases, he is only a tenant and it does not pay for him to construct a depot on land, he does not own. Even if he owned the land, he would hesitate to keep his crop away from the market until the winter months when he might need money but might find himself unable to transport his crop because of bad roads.

The logical solution would be to construct warehouses in the towns or near the stations, but, here again, the lack of capital prevents the accomplishment of this job.

The Kurd is the only farmer who keeps a part of his crop on the 2141
land. As a good and thrifty peasant, he stores his seeds, the pro- 251
visions for his family and usually an amount of wheat equal to the seeds he planted. If anything remains, he sells to buy clothes and foodstuffs. The Kurd keeps the extra wheat he has in holes dug in the ground called "jifr". The hole is usually two meters in diameter and 2-3 meters deep. It is lined with "tibn" to keep the moisture away and the wheat remains in a good condition in it for several months. The peasant has a number of these jifrs depending on the

241 amount he has to store. The jifrs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifrs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

439 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep. The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer
221 and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

total Syrian cereals. Only Aleppo was ahead of it with 30% of the total production. (Gibb Report, table 16, p. 28) At present, it is probable that Jazirah surpasses Aleppo in cereal production and with an area approaching that of the Mohafazat of Aleppo, it is potentially more productive because of the Jagjag and Khabur Rivers which make possible a more diverse agriculture. 438

The problem of land ownership is bound to be settled in some way and credit is expanding gradually so that the dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo may diminish with time. The lack of lands and the constant increase in population will force the farmer to turn to intensive cultivation which in turn requires more labor and creates jobs for more people. The towns will benefit from increased production and population and will prosper and grow in their turn. It is logical to anticipate that Jazirah merchants will try to dispose of their crops without the help of Aleppo entrepreneurs. This makes for increased profits and more propserity. It is also reasonable to expect that a small industry based on the processing of agricultural products, such as flour mills, vegetable oil, starch, fruit, and vegetable conserves, will be established in the town of Jazirah. When cotton becomes an established crop, it is economical to gin it in the nearest town and save the cost of transport. The seeds will be needed for planting, for the extraction of oil and for cattle feed. 185

Qamishli is the only town of consequence in a fertile area of 700,000 hectares almost all cultivable in one way or another in the Qadas of Qamishli and Dijla. It is the chief town between Mossul and Aleppo, a distance of some 700 kilometers. Nisibin the older town now in Turkey was alwasy an important commercial center in the old times and Qamishli now has taken its place. It would not be surprising if in another 20 years Qamishli attained a population of 80,000. 361

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

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
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MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 744 THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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114 > Mr. Lewis, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

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FIG. 2.—The Salamiya area in its general setting. The hills are frequently given the collective name of Jebel Bilas. Isohyets are from Charles Combier: Apercu sur les climats de la Syrie et du Liban, avec carte au millionième des plaines et vents, Délégation Générale de France au Levant, Beirut, 1945. Spelling of the place names here and in the text in general follows the (British) Permanent Committee on Geographical Names.

of the hills and the Eocene-Oligocene marl of the plain. The limestones are predominantly pervious dolomitic limestones, separated by more or less impervious beds of flint and marl. Winter rainfall runs off in the wadis or soaks into the ground and either is soon discharged at a lower level by temporary springs or seeps slowly toward the plain, assisted by the dip of the strata.

The marl of the plain is in its unaltered state impermeable, but usually it has been affected to a considerable depth by the percolation of water through cracks and fissures. In this way calcium carbonate and silica are deposited to depths of as much as 50 feet, and the whole character of the rock is altered.[1] It becomes crumbly, permeable, and water-bearing. Above this layer of rock a hardpan develops, ranging in thickness from a few inches to four feet, which is due to the concentration by capillary action of calcium carbonate and silica.

The region is one where the desert merges into the sown. The rainfall

[1] L. Dubertret: Lithological Map of the Eastern Border of the Mediterranean, 1:500,000, with notes translated by W. B. Fish [i.e. Fisher], Fighting French Delegation General in the Levant, Geological Section, Beirut, 1943. 113

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THE REGION IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE RAINFALL

regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;* it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub* and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Palmyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

Irrigation

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

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113 *A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Journ. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

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

FIG. 2—Topographic map and cross section of the country east of Selemiya.

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

FIG. 3—The irrigation system of Mouhagar, east of Selemiya (see Fig. 2).

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241 except wheat and barley, and around each village is an area of irrigated land on which vegetables, fruit, cotton, maize, fodder, and grain are grown. The configuration of the ground and the peculiar properties of the marl make possible the use of subsurface water for irrigation, and past and present inhabitants have taken full advantage of these conditions.

312 Water is distributed to irrigation ditches from wells, surface water-
[406 courses, or *foggaras* (foqqaras).[3] It is lifted from wells either by pumps or
379] by chains of buckets geared to an animal-turned wheel. From wadis which have water in part of their course for some or all of the growing season it is taken by a gravity canal. The stream is roughly dammed and the water led, at a gentler angle than that of the watercourse, along the valley side until it reaches a suitable level for watering the ground below. Neither of these methods is of great importance as compared with foggaras, which supply most of the irrigated lands of the area.

A foggara, known elsewhere as *qanat*, *kariz*, or "chain of wells," is an underground conduit. The method has been used since ancient times in many parts of the Middle East. Foggaras are found in several regions of Syria and are especially numerous in the Selemiya region. Figure 4 shows the general principle by which the water-bearing layer is tapped by the gallery or subsurface canal. The most copious supplies of water are provided when the canal is driven back from a spring along the underground "stream" that feeds it. A depression that is a natural gathering ground of water is often utilized, or a wide area may be tapped by the construction of several converging galleries, as in Moufaqqar. The gradient of the gallery is sufficient to induce water flow, but it is less steep than the general slope of the ground, so that water is conducted gradually to the surface, usually to low-lying flat land suitable for irrigation. The vertical shafts, like large wells, which connect the underground canal to the surface, were used during the digging as passages of ingress and egress and serve the same purpose now when the canals are cleaned of mud, debris, and vegetation; hence they are always surrounded with mounds of accumulated spoil. Lower down, as the canal comes to the surface, it flows between steep banks, which gradually become less high, until the water is flowing at ground level. Often the hardpan forms a natural roof to the gallery.

In length, depth, and water flow the foggaras differ greatly. One canal

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[3] Foggaras in North Africa have been described and illustrated in the *Geographical Review*. See
113 Jules Blache: Modes of Life in the Moroccan Countryside, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 477–502, references on pp. 488 and 491; R. H. Forber: The Tunnelmen Conquest, Vol. 33, 1943, pp. 197–213, reference on p. 199—EDIT. NOTE.

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FIG. 4—Vertical section of a foggara. The diagonal shading represents the water-bearing level in the altered marl, below which is unaltered impervious marl. The gallery A to B taps the water-bearing layer at its upper end and in the center. Water in the gallery is represented by the dashed line. The irrigated area extends from B to C. The vertical shading represents the part of the canal between steep banks.

FIG. 5—Upper part of one of the Moufaqqar canals (see Fig. 3). Photograph from a position corresponding to B above, where the canal is formed by steep banks. Parts of natural roof are formed by the hard pan, clearly distinguishable from the bed of crumbly altered marl below. Until 1945 the canal was semi-derelict, filled with mud, vegetation, and flood detritus (see foreground). When the cleaning was completed, the canal was approximately doubled in depth and a strong stream of clear water flowed in the bottom. (Photograph by John Gough.)

was built, probably in the Roman period, to carry water from Selemiya to Apamea, more than 50 miles away. This was an exception, dug to carry drinking water to a city, but some of the canals which capture and supply irrigation water in the Selemiya plain are several miles in length; one, starting in Moufaqqar, was originally seven miles long. Others are only a few hundred yards in length.

The quantity of water delivered by the canals in use today is estimated

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312 locally by the area of land each irrigates. One canal irrigates 136 acres near Selemiya town; many supply between 20 and 60 acres; and the smallest suffices only for 2.4 acres (near Tell et Tout). The larger canals are nearly all in the low-lying basinlike plain around the town of Selemiya; most of the smaller ones lie toward the northeast. A canal which supplies 68 acres of land in Selemiya delivers 8.8 gallons a second (measured at lowest water level, in October, 1945). There are today in the caza 125 such canals which are in working order and an unknown number which are not in use. These 125 canals irrigate a total of 3060 acres. The map of Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) shows typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara.[4]

History

175 312 At Misherfe-Qatna, where a modern village occupies the site of a Hittite fortress-city, 18 miles southwest of Selemiya, a foggara-like canal supplied the town in the second millennium before Christ.[5] Most of those in our region date from a much later period, and probably more were constructed from the second century of our era to the sixth than at any other time. Many can be dated by the details of their construction, or by their close association with ruins, or, occasionally, by inscriptions. During these centuries the Selemiya region was a prosperous agricultural district, well supplied with irrigation water. The Roman legacy was added to in the early period of Arab rule,[6] when Selemiya was well known as a pleasant country town, the public buildings of which, especially the baths, rivaled those in great Arab cities. Descendants of the Abbasid Prince Saleh ibn Ali ibn Abdullah ibn Abbas ibn il Motalib lived in Selemiya, and, according to Ya'qubi, writing in 891, Abdullah, the son of Saleh, "conducted thither a stream of water, and dug wells in the land, whereby the saffron grows plentifully." For a period after 893 the town became a center of the Ismaili sect, a circumstance which brought it importance then, and which was to affect the region powerfully a thousand years later.

Throughout the Arab period the water of Selemiya remained famous. As late as the fourteenth century Ahmed the Secretary praised Selemiya as "a charming and rich town, with abundant water and trees. Water comes

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[4] See the maps of Qdeym for typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara, Plate III and IV in the atlas volume of R. Mouterde and A. Poidebard: Le limes de Chalcis: Organisation de la steppe en Haute Syrie romaine (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 38), 2 vols. (text and atlas), Paris, 1945. See review elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*.

[5] Memil du Buisson: Le site archéologique de Michrife-Qatna, Paris, 1935.

[6] Information on the Arab period is drawn largely from the article "Salamiya" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam and from Guy le Strange: Palestine under the Moslems, Boston and New York, 1890. The quotation from Ya'qubi is from Le Strange, p. 528.

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to it in aqueducts."[7] Today there are 39 foggaras in use on the lands of Selemiya, and there are also some that are unused. Very few of the foggaras are modern, so that we may legitimately suppose about the same area to have been irrigated around the town in the Arab period as at present—1300 acres. The water was renowned for its purity, as it is today, and Hama, 18 miles away on the muddy Orontes, drank Selemiya water brought to the city by a foggara from Ain ez Zerqa. Abu el Fida (1273–1331), geographer and king of Hama, caused this canal to be cleaned, and two centuries later the following inscription from a Hama mosque shows that it was repaired or cleaned again:[8]

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On fifteenth Gumada I 901 [March 2, 1496] was promulgated the princely, august decree of our master, the great emir, the chief, the governor general, Sayfiddin el Asrafi Qansuh as Sarifi as Sami, governor general of the province of Hama (may God glorify his victory!), prohibiting the diversion of moneys to the profit of the exchequer (may it ever prosper!) and of others, from the funds intended for the aqueduct of Selemiya, and ordering that nothing should be taken from this fund except the wages of the workmen laboring on it. Whoever should renew these exactions, let him be accursed, and may both his father and his Prophet testify against him on judgment day.

By this time the prosperous days of Selemiya were nearly over. Scattered references show that the frontier of settlement and regular agriculture in the region was retreating westward. Tamerlane ravaged all Syria in 1400, and in 1516 the country fell to the Turks. During the next four centuries Syria slowly decayed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries several great Bedouin tribes moved north out of Arabia into the Syrian Desert and its peripheral regions. After this the steppe and the desert were almost completely beyond the control of the Turkish government, and the frontiers of law, order, and settled life retreated from the edges of these uncontrolled territories. The valuable journals of some English merchants[9] who traveled through the eastern part of our region at the end of the seventeenth century show that, except for Bedouins, it was then practically deserted. The Ismaili inhabitants, according to their descendants' tradition, had left soon after

[7] See [Maurice] Gaudefroy-Demombynes: La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 3). Paris, 1923, pp. 77–78. 113

[8] This inscription is from the Great Mosque of Hama, where there are a number of Mameluke decrees, dealing particularly with trade and taxation. It is transcribed in French by Jean Sauvaget in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas*, Vol. 3, 1933, p. 6.

[9] "An Extract of the Journals of Two Several Voyages of the English Merchants of the Factory of Aleppo, to Tadmor, Anciently Call'd Palmyra," *Philos. Trans. Royal Soc. of London*, No. 218, Vol. 19, 1695, pp. 129–147. [Also in "Miscellanea Curiosa," Vol. 3, Containing a Collection of Curious Travels, Voyages, and Natural Histories of Countries, As They Have Been Delivered in to the Royal Society, 2nd edit., revised and corrected by W. Derham, London, 1727 (originally edited by Edmund Halley in 1708), pp. 120–159.]

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175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[10] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [10] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

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Malaria and Its Control

Foggaras and surface canals easily become partly blocked by vegetation, 312
and floods and rain wash in mud and silt. The water is then ponded back, depressions near the canal bank fill, the canal may overflow, and, if it is built along the side of a valley, overflow or seepage will maintain swamps along the watercourse. Artificial blockages of foggaras also pond back the water. Near the lower end of most canals are "brick pits" from which earth has been taken to be made into mud bricks, and these also tend to fill with water. Everywhere wadis carry rain and seepage water in winter and spring and the overflow from irrigation canals in early summer and autumn, at which seasons there is a surplus. In other words, except during the peak irrigation and evaporation period of midsummer, they carry slow-moving, half-stagnant water.

All these places are potential, and most of them actual, breeding places 136
of the mosquito *Anopheles sacharovi*, which favors shallow, sunny, warm 164
waters, full of aquatic vegetation. At only one place in the area has another malaria carrier, *A. algeriensis*, been found, and the problem of malaria control in the region is thus essentially that of eliminating the *A. sacharovi* breeding grounds. Full statistics are not available, but such figures as do exist show the great need of such control. About 20 per cent of the patients treated by a mobile clinic in the region in 1942–1945 were suffering from malaria, and the percentage rose at times (especially in late summer) to 80 in some villages. Sometimes practically the whole population of a village was found to be infected. In Tell et Tout (population *c.* 550) about 50 deaths [165]
were due primarily to malaria in 1941, and almost the sole source of infection was the swamp caused by the deliberate blockage of a foggara.

Control work is apparently simple. Canal owners occasionally clean the 312
canals of detritus and vegetation and repair the banks at the lower end. It is important that this work be done well and repeated every few years. Small depressions may be sprayed, filled with earth, or drained by a simple ditch. Broad, sluggish streams may be canalized by a ditch along the thalweg. The more efficient the irrigation, the less likely it is that mosquitoes will breed. Waste of water should be reduced to a minimum and a wide range of crops grown, so that irrigation begins early in the season and ends late. The "waste" water of natural watercourses may be utilized by the construction of a simple dam and gravity canal, or by the repair of the old subparallel foggara if, as is probable, there is one. Extensive stretches of swampy ground may be put to good use by drainage-irrigation schemes, which often include the repair of old foggaras. Malaria control should not stand on its own, an expensive 080

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necessity for health's sake alone, but should be part of a general *mise en valeur* of the region's resources. This is the type of approach which is most likely to succeed, because it is linked with the material interests of the landowners. They will lend their support and active participation if given technical advice, supervision, and material and financial help to defray part of the capital outlay.

Swamps, Floods, and Soil Erosion

Malaria-control measures were taken with a fair degree of success in 20 villages in 1944–1945. Various factors, however, combine to prevent a permanent reduction of the incidence of the disease. Among these are the necessity for constant supervision, the need for repeated cleanings of canals and ditches, and the improvidence of the inhabitants. Most important is the fact that floods will certainly undo much of the work.

Winter floods are frequently heavy enough to destroy or damage seriously the repair and maintenance works, which are of value to agriculture and malaria control alike. Malaria causes debility and apathy among the villagers, and the certainty that floods will recur reinforces this apathy, making everyone disinclined to expend energy and money in work which must be done again in a few years. The canals and watercourses at Moufaggar, for example, have been badly damaged in the past; in fact, damage by floods was the main reason for the modification of the old foggara system. The southern foggara and watercourse are now protected against torrents by a concrete wall at the upper end, but as the system lies in one of the main valleys coming from Jebel Bil'as, it is doubtful whether the device will be a great success. Although the broad, nearly flat valley north of Selemiya has benefited from its wide catchment area—it is built up of alluvium, as much as 10 feet deep—it is partly derelict because floods have created extensive swamps and ruined old foggaras. In 1945–1946 useful drainage work was undertaken here.

The floods are due in part to the occasional sudden and torrential rainstorms, characteristic of this as of other semiarid regions. Wadis are sometimes filled for a few hours with violent, detritus-laden torrents and are then left dry again. The steep slopes and absorptive limestones are contributing factors. English merchants, traveling in 1691, noted[11] that after a heavy rainstorm

> those hollow Gutts which we passed over without the least appearance of Moisture, were, by the Cataracts which descended from the Mountains, become Rivers; . . . the next Morn-

[11] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), p. 144 [Miscellaneous Curiosa, pp. 139–140].

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ing all this great quantity of Water was past away, so that in about two Hour's Riding we could hardly perceive that there had been any Rain at all. 731

That floods are an old phenomenon in Selemiya is suggested by two traditional theories, repeated by the inhabitants today, regarding the derivation of the place name. The first theory makes the essential form Sal-Miah, "a flood of water." The other was recorded by Yaqut in 1225:

Ahmad ibn Yahyā ibn Jābir relates that there was a city in Syria, near Salamiyyah, called Al Mūtafikah [The Overturned], which was overwhelmed with all its inhabitants—all except one hundred souls. These left that place, and came and built one hundred houses, and they called the hamlet where they had made their houses Salīm Miyah (Peace for the Hundred), of which the people made Salamiyyah.[22]

As told today, the story is that the "overwhelming" agent was a flood.

The floods are greatly aggravated by soil erosion. Where the trees have been cut, the bushes torn up for fuel, and the grass overgrazed, and especially where slopes have been plowed, there the soil is eroded, and many slopes are now practically bare of soil and vegetation. In summer, soil is shifted by strong winds; in winter, rain washes it into gullies or wadis with steep, crumbling sides. These are tributary to the main streams which do so much damage when they reach the plain. The runoff from bare slopes is faster and more fully loaded than that from vegetated slopes. 731 134

Past and Present Vegetation Destruction

There is no doubt that the trees of Jebel Bil'as are a remnant of a denser and more extensive growth, though there are no very good grounds for the common assumption that all the Palmyrene ranges were forested in Roman days. The Tablet of Palmyra's fiscal laws of A.D. 137[23] gives reason to suppose that the locality may have furnished considerable quantities of wood and pistachio nuts, and in the same period Jebel Bil'as and neighboring ranges were used as grazing lands for sheep and horses.[24] The location of elaborate Romano-Byzantine foggara systems, as at Moufaqqar, directly in the paths of the floods might seem to indicate that, when the foggaras were constructed, floods were not as serious as they are now. 75 137 [72]

Old stumps and roots are found within and beyond the present wooded

[22] Le Strange, op. cit., p. 510.

[23] See J.-B. Chabot: Choix d'inscriptions de Palmyre, Paris, 1922, pp. 23-32.

[24] A. Poidebard: La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie.—Le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe.—Recherches aériennes (1925-1932) (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 18), Paris, 1934; M. D. Schlumberger: Une campagne de fouilles au Djebel-el-Cheer en 1934, Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1935, pp. 250-256. 113

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho*'s which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[15] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

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Druze MD6

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ORIENTAL STUDIES
Vol. XXVIII

THE ORIGINS OF THE DRUZE PEOPLE AND RELIGION

WITH EXTRACTS FROM THEIR SACRED WRITINGS

BY

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PLATE I.

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

Photostatic reproduction of the first page of Bahā'-al-Dīn's *al-Juz'al-Awwal*, one of the most valuable Druze sacred books by the father of Druze theology. This manuscript copy is in the Robert Garrett collection deposited in the library of Princeton University.

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PLATE II.

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

Photostatic reproduction of the first page of Ḥamzah's *al-Naṣṣ al-Khafī*, the most important production of the founder of the Druze religion. This manuscript copy is in the Robert Garrett collection deposited in the library of Princeton University.

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FOREWORD

114 FOR some nine hundred years, a strange national-religious body has lived in Syria. The Druzes have been the wonder of scholars, and the political opponents of those to whom the country in which they lived belonged. All sorts of theories have been advanced by scholars to account for their peculiar tenets and customs. All sorts of means have been tried by their overlords to put them down. The scholars have been as unsuccessful as have been the overlords; and the Druzes still remain the great mystery of the Lebanon Mountains.

In the following study, a more serious attempt is made to solve the riddle of whom the Druzes are, why they are, and where they are. Professor Hitti is probably better fitted to make this attempt than is any other scholar. Born in the Lebanon Mountains, Arabic is his native tongue. As a boy, and as a young man, he associated with the Druzes. He has had, and still has, access to their literature. It is likely that he knows more about them than they do about themselves. For this reason, I commend the following pages very highly to the attention of all who are concerned about Syria, and who are interested in the history of religion.

RICHARD GOTTHEIL

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PREFACE

THIS study is based on two papers: one presented in the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, held at Rochester, New York, December 30, 1926; and the other in the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society, held at Cincinnati, Ohio, April 20, 1927. The thanks of the author are due to Professor Dana C. Munro, President of the American Historical Association; to Professor James A. Montgomery, President of the American Oriental Society; and to Professor Harold H. Bender, Chairman of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures at Princeton University, for many valuable suggestions and criticisms. He also wishes to acknowledge with thanks the assistance he received from his wife in verifying references, reading the proofs, and sketching the map inserted in this book.

PRINCETON, May, 1928.

P. K. H.

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CHAPTER I

A UNIQUE AND SECRET SECT

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Two Historical Fossils:—The Druzes of Syria and the Samaritans of Palestine are two unique communities not to be found elsewhere in the whole world. Like social fossils in an alien environment, these two peoples have survived for hundreds of years in that land rightly described as a "Babel of tongues" and a "museum of nationalities."

The Samaritans are the remnants of the tribes from Assyria and Persia who were transplanted by Sargon some seven hundred years before Christ to take the place of the "ten tribes" who were carried into captivity.[1] They figured in the life of Christ as is illustrated by the case of the "Samaritan woman" and the story of the "good Samaritan." Today they are represented by about one hundred and eighty persons who intermarry among themselves and are becoming rapidly extinct. Their habitat is modern Nāblus (biblical Shechem), and their religion is ancient Judaism mixed with pagan survivals.

D 174

The Druzes have no such clear record to show regarding their origin as a people and as a sect. Their ethnographical origins, no less than their ritual practices and religious beliefs, are shrouded in mystery. Appearing for the first time on the pages of history at Wādi-al-Taym near Mt. Hermon in anti-Lebanon, as professors of the divinity of the sixth Fāṭimite Caliph in Cairo (996–1020 A.D.), the Druzes have lived their semi-independent lives secluded in their mountain fastnesses of Lebanon, unmindful of the progress of the world around them, and almost entirely forgotten by the outside world.

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[1] *Cf.* James A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans, the Earliest Jewish Sect* (Philadelphia, 1907), pp. 46–57.

175 *Relation to World Events:*—The few occasions throughout their history in which the Druzes attracted international attention were first at the time of the Crusades, when they were entrusted by the Moslems with the military task of guarding the maritime plain against the Franks. They then fought under the banner of Islam and took part in the attacks against the garrisons of Belfort (*Qal'at al-Shaqīf*) and of Montfort (*Qal'at Qurayn*) in Galilee. [643] Secondly, in the early seventeenth century when their great leader, Fakhr-al-Dīn II (1585–1635), under whom the Druze power reached its zenith, appeared as a refugee from the Sultan of Turkey in the court of the Medicis at Florence. Thirdly, when as a result of their civil wars in 1860 with their Christian neighbors to the north—the Maronites—the French landed a contingent of troops to quell the disturbance which resulted in giving the Lebanon a complete autonomy recognized by the great Powers of Europe. And fourthly, in connection with the recent armed uprising against the French mandate in Syria.

621 609 175 *Minor Episodes:*—In the local history of Syria and the Lebanon, the Druzes have always figured as a compact and warlike community contriving to enjoy in the fastnesses of their mountain a comparative degree of security and independence. The Latin Kingdom of the Crusades, which with its extensive fiefs formed an elongated strip of land based on the sea and widening on the north to Edessa and on the south to Moab, narrowed in the vicinity of Mt. Hermon, the home of the Druzes. Throughout the Ottoman period (1516–1918) the Druzes and their fellow mountaineers, the Maronites, constituted a thorn in the side of the Turks. The Lebanon enjoyed most of the time local autonomy. Even the Druzes of Ḥawrān, the Bashan of the Bible, were not subject to conscription, and repeatedly refused to pay taxes to the Sublime Porte. When Napoleon in 1798–1799 invaded Egypt and Syria, he sought the aid of the governor of the Lebanon, al-Amīr Bashīr. The Druze resistance to the invasion of the Egyptian army under Ibrāhīm Pasha (1831–1838) was one of the factors in hastening the withdrawal of that army from Syrian soil.

Other Secret Sects:—The Druze people constitute one of the two leading secret sects found only in Syria, the other being the Nuṣayriyyah inhabiting the mountains north of Tripoli. The Ismā'iliyyah of the Ḥimṣ and Ḥamāh district, another secret sect, are descended from the Assassins,[1] who for two centuries or so struck awe and terror into the hearts of the Crusaders, and are represented today by a few other sectarians in Persia and India. The Yezīdis, so-called devil worshipers, practice their hidden rites in the out-of-the-way hills between Antioch and Aleppo and have coreligionists in Kurdistān and Armenia. SD 745 101

Special Interest of this Study:—But of all these sects Druzism is perhaps the most interesting and important. It is still a living force. Its followers form to the present day a vigorous and flourishing community in the Lebanon. Its learned system has not changed since it was first inaugurated in the early part of the eleventh century. The Islam of the Near East has changed and adapted itself to the requirements of the varying conditions. The Christianity of the Near East has changed. But the Druze system has been and still is the same. SD 745 621

The modernizing influence has in late years brought within its sphere quite a large number of the young and uninitiated Druzes. The report of the American University of Beirūt for last year indicates that there are in that institution alone thirty-six Druze students and five Druze teachers. But no one with first-hand knowledge of the situation would go so far as even to recognize the existence of a "modernist movement" alleged to be aiming at divulging the Druze beliefs, much less to declare "It is understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirūt will be the probable intermediary of communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place."[2] SD 177 873 SD

In fact the outside world knows so little about the contents of this religion that in a recent session of the Permanent Mandates SD 745

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[1] Arabic *Ḥashīshīs* — those addicted to the use of a stupefying weed.

[2] De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1923), p. 244. Dr. Bliss died in 1920.

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Commission of the League of Nations the question was raised as to whether there was anything in the Druze teachings that was inimical to organized government and to state authority.

A study of Druzism is especially valuable and interesting not only because its adherents, unlike the adherents of the other sects, have shown remarkable vitality and thrust themselves repeatedly upon the attention of the world—as in the case of the current events in Syria—but because of its historic connection with Christianity and Oriental Christian sects. In its rise and development from Moslem soil, Druzism held close relationship to Christianity and became heir to a number of Zoroastrian and Judaeo-Christian sects, as well as to a body of Hellenistic and Persian philosophies. Many of those sects and schools of thought have since disappeared, but Druzism is still with us; and, through its medium, their ideas have survived to the present day. The religious and philosophical concepts of many Shi'ite Moslem, and a few semi-Christian, sects have been preserved to us through Druzism, though the original sects and their votaries have long become extinct.

As we shall, therefore, in the following pages analyze and investigate the apparently strange dogmas and tenets of Druze belief, we shall find in addition to Neo-Platonic and Manichaean influences, marked traces of Jewish and Christian influences which have trickled thereto through Moslem strata. The basic fundamentals of Druze theology, as we shall see, are paralleled by corresponding Christian dogmas. One of the founders of Druzism was a renegade Christian, and many of its early leading converts were tribes belonging to some one of the Oriental churches.

There is, after all, nothing mysterious in the "Asian mystery," and the "great enigma" does lend itself to solution.

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Chapter II

SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Feudal Organization:—When we catch our first clear glimpse 101
of the Druze people we find them living—as they are still living 621
today—in small village communities at Wādi-al-Taym and 631
southern Lebanon, organized into a feudal state of society. These 175
village communities were under the control of local sheikhs, themselves subordinate to one or more *amīrs* (princes), and the whole system bound together under a singular form of theocracy. This is still a distinguishing feature of Druze national life.

The early Druze communities flourished at the foot of 175
Mt. Hermon, and in the southern part of Western Lebanon over- 621
looking Beirūt and Sidon. They were in every case agricultural, 181
and subsisted wholly on the produce of the land. Commerce and industry had no attraction to them. These same conditions prevail almost unchanged among the Druzes until the present day. In the lists of the leading merchants of Aleppo, Damascus, Beirūt and Sidon, one would search in vain for a Druze name. Perhaps the greatest merchants that the Druze nation ever produced are Druze immigrants in the United States.

Part Played during the Crusades:—In the early period of the 175
Crusading era, the Druze feudal power was in the hands of two 565
families: the Tanūkhs and the Arislāns. From their fortresses in the Gharb district[1] of southern Lebanon, the Tanūkhs led their incursions into the Phoenician coast and finally succeeded in holding Beirūt and the maritime plain against the Franks.

After the middle of the twelfth century, the Ma'n family superseded the Tanūkhs in Druze leadership. The origin of the

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[1] The district lying to the west of Beirūt. The ruins of one of these fortresses still crown a little hill near Sarāḥmūl.

175 family goes back to a prince Ma'n who made his appearance in
565 the Lebanon in the days of the 'Abbāsid Caliph al-Mustarshid (1118–1135 A.D.), and died in 1149 in the days of Sultan Nūr-al-Dīn of Damascus. The Ma'ns chose for their abode the Shūf district in the southern part of Western Lebanon, overlooking the maritime plain between Beirūt and Sidon, and made their headquarters in Ba'aqlīn, which is still to the present day the leading Druze village. They were invested with feudal jurisdiction by Sultan Nūr-al-Dīn and furnished respectable contingents to the Moslem ranks in their struggle against the Crusaders.

175 Having cleared Syria from the Franks, the Mamlūk Sultans of
798 Egypt turned their attention to the schismatic Moslems of Syria; and in the year 1305, al-Malik al-Nāṣir inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Druzes at Kasrawān[1] and forced outward compliance on their part to orthodox (Sunni) Islam. Later under the Ottoman Turks they were again chastised severely at 'Ayn-Ṣawfar, in 1585, for having attacked and robbed near Tripoli a body of Janizaries on their way to Constantinople carrying to the imperial treasury taxes collected from Egypt and Syria.

175 *The Druze Power at its Height:*—With the advent of the
565 Ottoman Turks and the conquest of Syria by Sultan Selīm I,
631 in 1516, the Ma'ns threw in their lot with the conquering invaders and were immediately acknowledged by the new suzerain as the feudal lords of southern Lebanon. Druze villages spread and prospered in that region, which under Ma'n leadership so flourished that it acquired the generic appellation of Jabal Bayt-Ma'n (the mountain of the Ma'n family) or Jabal al-Durūz. The latter title, however, has since been usurped by the Ḥawrān region which, since the middle of the nineteenth century, has proven a haven of refuge to Druze emigrants from Lebanon and has become the headquarters of Druze power.

Under Fakhr-al-Dīn ibn-Ma'n II (1585–1635) the Druze dominion increased until it included almost all Syria extending from the edge of the Antioch plain in the north to Ṣafad in the south

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[1] This region is today entirely occupied by Christians.

with a part of the Syrian desert dominated by Fakhr-al-Dīn's 175 565 631
castle at Tadmur (Palmyra), the ancient capital of Zenobia. The ruins of this castle still stand on a steep hill overlooking the town and greet the eye of the passer-by.

Fakhr-al-Dīn became too strong for his Turkish sovereign in 175
Constantinople. He went so far in 1608 as to sign a commercial 648 565
treaty with Duke Ferdinand I of Tuscany containing secret military clauses. The Sultan then sent a force against him, and he was compelled, in 1614, to flee the land and seek refuge in the courts of Tuscany and Naples.[1]

Fakhr-al-Dīn was the first ruler in modern Lebanon to open 177
the doors of his country to foreign Western influences. Under 175
his auspices the French established a *khān* (hostel) in Sidon, the 565
Florentines a consulate, and the Christian missionaries were admitted into the country. Beirūt and Sidon, which Fakhr-al-Dīn beautified, still bear traces of his benign rule.

Banu-Shihāb, the Last Feudal Chiefs:—As early as the days of 175
Saladin, and while the Ma'ns were still in complete control over 565
southern Lebanon, the Shihāb tribe, originally Ḥijāz Arabs but 101 564
later domiciled in Ḥawrān, advanced from Ḥawrān, in 1172, and [746]
settled in Wādi-al-Taym at the foot of Mt. Hermon. They soon made an alliance with the Ma'ns and were acknowledged the Druze chiefs in Wādi-al-Taym. At the end of the seventeenth century (1697), the Shihābs succeeded the Ma'ns in the feudal leadership of Druze southern Lebanon, though, unlike them, they professed Sunni Islam. Secretly, they showed sympathy with Druzism, the religion of the majority of their subjects. Because of their blood relationship to the Quraysh, the family of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Shihāb, next to the Quraysh, is the noblest family in the Arabic world.

The Shihāb leadership continued till the middle of the last 175
century and culminated in the illustrious governorship of al-Amīr 566
Bashīr (1788–1840) who, after Fakhr-al-Dīn, was the greatest

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[1] For a biography of Fakhr-al-Dīn, see H. F. Wuestenfeld, *Fachreddin, der Druzenfürst, und seine Zeitgenossen* (Göttingen, 1866).

feudal lord Lebanon produced. Though governor of the Druze mountain, Bashīr was a crypto-Christian, and it was he whose aid Napoleon solicited in 1799 during his campaign against Syria.

Having consolidated his conquests in Syria (1831–1838), Ibrāhim Pasha, son of the viceroy of Egypt, Muḥammad 'Ali Pasha, made the fatal mistake of trying to disarm the Christians and Druzes of the Lebanon and to draft the latter into his army. This was contrary to the principles of the life of independence which these mountaineers had always lived, and resulted in a general uprising against the Egyptian rule. The uprising was encouraged, for political reasons, by the British. The Druzes of Wādi-aḷ-Taym and Ḥawrān, under the leadership of Shibli al-'Aryān, distinguished themselves in their stubborn resistance at their inaccessible headquarters, al-Laja, lying southeast of Damascus. It is in this same place that the Druzes have for the last two years held out, against the French, under Sulṭān Pasha al-Aṭrash.

Druzes and Christians Grouped in Political Rather than Religious Parties:—The conquest of Syria by the Moslem Arabs in the middle of the seventh century introduced into the land two political factions later called the Qaysites and the Yemenites. The Qaysite party represented the Ḥijāz and Bedouin Arabs who were regarded as inferior by the Yemenites who were earlier and more cultured emigrants into Syria from southern Arabia. The party lines in the Lebanon obliterated racial and religious lines and the people grouped themselves regardless of their religious affiliations, into one or the other of these two parties. The sanguinary feuds between these two factions depleted, in course of time, the manhood of the Lebanon and ended in the decisive battle of 'Ayn-Dārah, in 1711, which resulted in the utter defeat of the Yemenite party. Many Yemenite Druzes thereupon emigrated to the Ḥawrān region and thus laid the foundation of Druze power there.

The Civil War of 1860:—The Druzes and their Christian Maronite neighbors, who had thus far lived as religious communities on amicable terms, entered a period of social disturbance

in the year 1840 which culminated in the civil war of 1860. For 785
this disturbance the Sublime Porte in Constantinople was, in 798
a great measure, responsible. The Sultan, realizing that the only 669
way to bring the semi-independent people of the Lebanon under 721
his direct control was to sow the seeds of discord among the people themselves, inaugurated in the mountain a policy long tried and found successful in the Ottoman provinces—the policy of "divide and rule." The civil war of 1860 cost the Christians some ten thousand lives in Damascus, Zaḥlah, Dayr-al-Qamar, Ḥāṣbayya and other towns of the Lebanon. The European powers then determined to interfere and authorized the landing in Beirūt of a body of French troops under General Beaufort d'Hautpoul whose inscription can still be seen on the historic rock at the mouth of the Dog River. Following the recommendations of the powers, the Porte granted Lebanon a local autonomy, guaranteed by the powers, under a Christian governor. This autonomy was maintained until the Great War.

Besides Wādi-al-Taym, the southern part of Western Lebanon 621
and Ḥawrān, the Druzes today occupy a few villages in al-Jabal 634
al-A'la,[1] Mt. Carmel in Palestine, and Ṣafad. Their districts in 161
southern Lebanon are al-Matn and al-Shūf, and their leading villages are: 'Ālayh, Bayṣūr, al-Shuwayfāt, 'Abayh, Ba'aqlīn, and al-Mukhtārah. They number in all Syria and Palestine about 117,000.

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[1] In the vicinity of Aleppo.

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CHAPTER III

RACIAL ORIGINS

131 *Number and Distribution:*—With the present numerical strength
161 of the Druzes, their geographical distribution in southern Lebanon,
166 Wādi-al-Taym, al-Jabal al-A'la (between Aleppo and Antioch), Ṣafad and Mt. Carmel in Palestine, and with their later migrations which determined their present habitat, we are more or less familiar. According to the last census there are about 110,000 Druzes in Lebanon and Syria, and 7,000 in Palestine. The present Druze population of Ḥawrān (44,344) are, according to well authenticated documents and local oral tradition,[1] the descendants of emigrants from south Lebanon who, in 1711, as a result of the defeat of their Yemenite party by its Qaysite enemy, left their home, Kafra,[2] and sought a new abode. The number was later augmented by fresh recruits[3] as a result of the 1860 civil war in the Lebanon. Earlier the Jabal al-A'la Druzes emigrated thither from the south.[4] Those of Palestine are of undoubted Lebanese origin, though some of them may have come directly from the Aleppo region.[5] Lebanon therefore was the distributing center of the Druze people and Wādi-al-Taym was the birthplace of their religion.

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[1] Sulaymān abu-'Izz-al-Dīn, "Tawaṭṭun al-Durūz," *al-Kulliyyah* (Beirūt), May, 1926.

[2] The ruins of this little village can still be seen near 'Aynāb overlooking Beirūt.

[3] Richard F. Burton and Charles F. T. Drake, *Unexplored Syria* (London, 1872), vol. I, 178.

[4] *Cf.* Henri Guys, *La Nation Druze, son histoire, sa religion, ses mœurs, et son état politique* (Paris, 1863), p. 25; Gertrude L. Bell, *Syria, the Desert and the Sown* (New York, 1907), p. 306.

[5] *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (London, 1889), p. 123.

It is also easy to trace the ancestry of the modern Druze emi- 167
grants in Europe and America back to Syria and the Lebanon. In the United States there are about a thousand Druzes, mostly of Lebanese origin, among whom eighty are women.

The few Druze manuscripts which have thus far fallen into our 195
hands represent the Fāṭimite Ḥākim cult as having spread into 771
many lands outside the confines of Syria, and as having found 797
proselytes throughout northern Africa, Egypt, Arabia, 'Irāq, Persia and other parts of the Near East, into which Ḥamzah had sent missionaries of different grades. That this was not an altogether idle boast is illustrated by a reference in al-Dhahabi[1] († 1345 A.D.) to the execution of all those in far-away Khurāsān who believed in the divinity of al-Ḥākim. Following the example, legendary or historical, of the Prophet Muḥammad, al-Muqtana Bahā'-al-Dīn, the right hand of Ḥamzah in the propagation of the cult, addressed epistles eastward as far as India and westward as far as Constantinople, including one to Constantine VIII[2] and one to Emperor Michael the Paphlagonian.[3] But the fact remains that of those Ḥākim followers, none has survived except the Druzes of the Lebanon.[4] In Egypt they were exterminated soon after the appearance of the cult. No matter where the modern Druze, therefore, may be today, he can rightly trace his origin back to that mountain land of Lebanon.

Religious and Racial Boundaries Coterminous:—This is especially 771
true in view of the fact that with the death of Bahā'-al-Dīn in 1031 A.D. "the door of the Unitarian religion was closed"

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[1] *Duwal al-Islām* (Ḥayderābād, 1337 A.H.), vol. I, 189.

[2] "L'Épître à Constantin, traité religieux Druze," publié et annoté par les PP. J. Khalīl and L. Ronzevalle, *Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale* (Beirūt, 1909). See *infra*, Appendix D.

[3] The epistles addressed to "the Arabs," "al-Yemen," "India," &c., are all found in "Part I" (*al-Juz' al-Awwal*, MS.) of the seven parts which constitute the collection of tracts and epistles by Bahā'-al-Dīn.

[4] Amīn Bey Kisbāny, a graduate of the American University of Beirūt and former Secretary of King Feiṣal, tells me that he found in the year 1905 in the mountains east of Miknās, Morocco, a Berber tribe, the banu-'Īsa, which claim religious affiliation with the Druzes of Syria.

771 and no one could be admitted into the Druze fold or permitted exit from it. The Druze religion then ceased to be simply a religion and its followers became a distinct nation.

Bahā'-al-Dīn resorted to this policy as a measure of safety. New pretended converts might betray the cause into the hands of its persecutors. He considered "the day of grace," offered to an unworthy world by the divine al-Ḥākim and the transcendent Ḥamzah, as having passed forever. To a religious body thus reduced to the defensive and desperately striving to conceal its identity, if not its very existence, further proselytism became clearly impossible. The Druze religion thus became wholly hereditary, a sacred privilege, a priceless treasure to be jealously and zealously guarded against the profane. This self-centralization which makes its votaries shun all attempts at increasing their number, coupled with the inviolable secrecy with which they practice their religion, and the readiness with which they ever hold themselves to profess any dominant religion that happens to throw its shadow across their way, has enabled the Druze community to maintain a stable and homogeneous existence for upward of nine centuries. In this it may have had no parallel in the religious history of the world.

774 *Silence of Historians:*—The first historian to mention the rise and spread of the Druze religion was Yaḥya ibn-Sa'īd al-Anṭāki,[1] a Christian contemporary of Darazi,[2] the founder of the religion. In his account he was followed by another Christian historian, Jurjus al-Makīn[3] († 1273 A.D.). But both historians are silent on

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[1] "*Ta'rikh*" in *Corpus Scriptorum Christ. Orient. Scriptores Arabicii Textus*, T. VII (Beirūt, 1909), pp. 180–234.

[2] He is the man who gave his name to the sect. Arabic *Durūz* is the plural of *Durzi*.

[3] *Ta'rīkh al-Muslimīn* with Latin translation, ed. Erpenius (Leyden, 1625), p. 264. Because of the omission of one dot from the Arabic name of "*Darazi*" in this edition, its pronunciation became "*Darari*" and that is probably why the name occurs in that form in the monumental *Modern Part of the Universal History from the Earliest Account of Time* (65 vols., London, 1747–1768), XIV, 253 and 255 and in the later edition (1779–1884), III, 468, XI, 320. The Druzes are referred to throughout this work as "Dararians."

the question of racial origins. Other Arabic sources, written by 114
Moslems, such as ibn-al-Athīr[1] († 1234), abu-al-Fida[2] († 1331), ibn-Taghri-Birdi[3] († 1469) and later Syrian and Egyptian chroniclers like ibn-Khaldūn († 1406), al-Suyūṭi († 1505), al-Isḥāqi († cir. 1650) are equally silent. To these annalists, questions of religious, and not racial, grouping were the ones of paramount and all-absorbing interest.

The Crusading historians of the West and the reports of the pilgrims likewise throw no light on the subject. To them all non-Christian peoples of Syria were included under the generic name "*Sarraceni.*" The pilgrims ordinarily took the coastal route and were therefore not likely to come much in contact with the Druzes. But the Druzes undoubtedly took part in the struggle against the Crusaders and possibly influenced the Templars by their organization and teaching.[4]

Travelers' and Scholars' Accounts:—Travelers and modern writers have almost exhausted all the list of possible theories in their attempt to explain the racial beginnings of the Druze people. Some have even resorted to fantastic and naïve, if not ludicrous, hypotheses.

Benjamin of Tudela, the Jewish traveler who passed through 114
the Lebanon in or about 1165 was one of the first European 101
writers to refer to the Druzes by name. The word Druzes, in an early Hebrew edition of his travels, occurs as "*Dogziyin,*"[5] but, it is clear that this is a scribal error. According to the *Ency-*

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[1] *Al-Kāmil*, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Leyden, 1863), pp. 81 *seq.*, 147 *seq.*

[2] *Ta'rīkh* (Constantinople, 1286 A.H.), II, 138, 158.

[3] *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah*, ed. Popper (Berkeley, the University Press, 1909–1912), II, 69.

[4] C. R. Conder, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1099–1291* (London, 1897), pp. 236 and 233.

[5] *The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela*, translated and edited by A. Asher (London, 1840), I, 29 of Hebrew Text, quoted by J. G. C. Adler, *Monumentum Cuficum Drusorum in Museum Cuficum Borgianum* (Rome, 1782), p. 107. *Cf. The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela*, Critical Text, Translation and Commentary, by M. N. Adler (London, 1907), paragraph 29.

114 *clopaedia of Islam*,[1] Benjamin also states that the Druzes were
101 descended from the Ituraeans (an Aramean or Arabian tribe which Pompey found in Lebanon in 64 B.C.), but I have not been able to find this statement in any version of Benjamin's *Itinerary*.

114 *Criticism of the Arabian Theory*:—Modern travelers like Nie-
144 buhr,[2] and scholars like von Oppenheim,[3] undoubtedly echoing the popular Druze belief regarding their own origin, have classified them as Arabs. The prevailing idea among the Druzes themselves today is that they are of Arab stock. This hypothesis conforms to the general local tradition, but is in contradiction to the results obtained in this study. In his Huxley Memorial Lecture, "The Early Inhabitants of Western Asia," Professor Felix von Luschan, the famous anthropologist of the University of Berlin, states that he measured the skulls of fifty-nine adult male Druzes and "not one single man fell, as regards his cephalic index,
829 within the range of the real Arab."[4] Evidently the Druze claim
186 of Arab descent is the result of their application of the principle
144 of dissimulation (*taqiyyah*) to their racial problem, they being a small minority amidst an Arab majority which has always been in the ascendancy. According to this principle, one is not only ethically justified but is under obligation, when the exigencies of the case require, to conceal the reality of his religion, or race, and feign other religious or racial relationships.

The writer remembers hearing Druzes in Lebanon discussing Japanese victories during the Russo-Japanese War of 1906 and claiming common origin with the yellow Far Easterners. Miss Bell who was then traveling in Ḥawrān (Jabal al-Durūz) observed that the "Druzes believe the Japanese to belong to their own race."[5]

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[1] Article "Druzes" by Baron Carra de Vaux.

[2] *Travels through Arabia and other Countries in the East*, Trans. by R. Heron (Edinburgh, 1792), II, 179.

[3] Max F. von Oppenheim, *Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Golf* (Berlin, 1899), I, 111 *seq.*

[4] *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (London, 1911), p. 232.

[5] *Syria, the Desert and the Sown*, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

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Diverse Hypotheses:—Lamartine[1] discovered in the modern Druzes the remnants of the Samaritans; the Earl of Carnarvon,[2] those of the Cuthites[3] whom Esarhaddon transplanted into Palestine; George Washington Chasseaud,[4] those of the Hivites; and Mrs. Worsley,[5] those of the Hittites. Drawing his conclusions from anthropometric measurements, Professor Luschan makes the Druzes, Maronites, and Nuṣayriyyah of Syria—together with the Armenians, Ṭahtājis, Bektāshis, 'Ali-Ilāhis and Yezīdis of Asia Minor and Persia—"with their enormous high and short heads and narrow and high noses"—the modern representatives of the ancient Hittites.[6] Captain Light describes them on the authority of Pococke "as the remnant of Israel who fled the wrath of Moses after the destruction of the molten calf."[7] Canon Parfit, who lived several years among the Druzes, states in a recent book that they are "the descendants of Arabs, Persians, Hindoos, Jews and Christians."[8]

Supposed Relationship with the French and British and with Freemasonry:—Deceived by superficial and purely accidental phonetic resemblances, certain French scholars once accepted the curious hypothesis, which in the seventeenth century found vogue in Europe, to the effect that the modern Druzes of the Lebanon are the descendants of a Latin colony which owed its origin to a comte de Dreux who, subsequent to the fall of Acre, led his Crusading regiment to the out-of-the-way hills of Lebanon. The

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[1] *Voyage, op. cit.*, II, 109.

[2] *Recollections of the Druses of Lebanon* (London, 1860), pp. 42–43.

[3] II Kings 17:24.

[4] *The Druzes of Lebanon, their Manners, Customs and Religion with a Translation of their Religious Code* (London, 1855), p. 97.

[5] This lady dragged her husband some fifty years ago from a comfortable home in London and established herself in a Druze village, 'Ayn-'Unūb, a few miles from Beirūt in order to prove her theory. See J. T. Parfit, *Among the Druzes of Lebanon and Bashan* (London, 1917), p. 33.

[6] *Journal Royal Anthropological Institute* (London, 1911), *op. cit.*, p. 241.

[7] Henry Light, *Travels in Egypt, Nubia, Holy Land, Mount Libanon and Cyprus in the Year 1814* (London, 1818), p. 225.

[8] Parfit, *Among the Druzes, op. cit.*, p. 33.

114 same myth makes the Druze chief Fakhr-al-Dīn a scion of the
194 house of Lorraine through Godfrey of Bouillon.

This genealogy was apparently fabricated in connection with the visit of that prince Fakhr-al-Dīn to Italy, after he had made an alliance in 1608 with Ferdinand I, Grand Duke of Tuscany, with a view to arousing a crusade against Fakhr-al-Dīn's enemy suzerains, the Turks. In 1763 Puget de Saint-Pierre wrote a book entitled *Histoire des Druses, Peuple du Liban, formé par une colonie de François* (Paris). Articles appeared in learned magazines[1] supporting the idea. More discriminating writers like Volney,[2] Lamartine,[3] Dussaud,[4] were quick to detect the historic impossibility of the hypothesis. English travelers like Maundrell[5] and Pococke[6] seem to have accepted the theory of Druze descent from the remains of some Christian army of Crusading origin.

It was evidently in an analogous sphere of ideas that such lodges as those of "*Druzes Réunis*" and "*Commandeurs du Liban*" were founded in France.[7]

By the same processes of reasoning the Druze name was connected with those of the Druids, and many Freemason lodges have claimed relationship with the Druzes whose "ancestors were none other than the original subjects of King Hiram of Tyre, the builders of Solomon's temple."[8]

The writer remembers more than one occasion on which prominent contemporaneous Druzes claimed common descent for their people with the British. That this claim goes back to the

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[1] "Religion des Druses," *Revue de l'Orient* (Paris, 1846), X, 240.

[2] *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie pendant les années 1783, 1784 et 1785* (*Œuvres de C. F. Volney*, deuxième éd., tome II, Paris, 1825), I, 397.

[3] Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient 1832–1833*, *Œuvres Complètes*, tome 7, II, 104.

[4] R. Dussaud, *Histoire et Religion des Nosairis* (Paris, 1904), p. 8, n. 2.

[5] Henry Maundrell, *A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem on Easter A.D. 1697* (London, 1810), pp. 51–52.

[6] Richard Pococke, *A Description of the East and Some Other Countries* (London, 1745), p. 94.

[7] Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine* (Paris, 1890), p. 513.

[8] B. H. Springett, *Secret Sects of Syria* (London, 1922), Chap. XXV, "The Relation of the Druzes to Freemasonry."

early part of the eighteenth century is shown by a reference in /14 Pococke's *Description*.[1] English agents in Syria, anxious for a "zone /74 of influence" among the Druzes to counteract the French zone among the Maronites, may have acquiesced in the Druze claim to blood relationship with the British.

Other Theories:—Some English scholars[2] of the eighteenth century tried to relate the Druzes to the *Derusaiaioi* mentioned by Herodotus[3] as one of the Median tribes transplanted by Cyrus. In this as in the preceding cases, there seems to be no justification for the theory beyond the apparent similarity in names.

More worthy of consideration is the statement of Hogarth and Gertrude Bell in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*[4] that the Druzes are a mixture of stocks in which the Arab largely predominates "grafted on to an original mountain population of Aramaic blood." A study, however, of the Arabic colloquial used by the modern Druzes of Lebanon reveals no such marked Aramaisms as is revealed by a study of the colloquial of their northern neighbors, the Maronites, who are of mixed Aramaic stock; and there is nothing in the sources at our command to justify the inclusion of the Aramaic blood to such an extent in the Druze veins.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 94.
[2] Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
[3] *Historiae, lib.* I, *cap.* CXXV.
[4] (Eleventh edition), article "Druses."

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CHAPTER IV

THE PERSIAN ORIGIN OF THE DRUZES

121 What then are the racial affinities of that singular people which for the last nine hundred years has grouped itself with marvelous cohesion, solidarity and consciousness of kind, around the divine person of a whimsical Caliph? Or, to reduce our question to its lowest denomination, what were the racial connections of that little community at the foot of Mt. Hermon, in Wādi-al-Taym, which in 407 A.H.[1]/1016 A.D. responded to the mission of Darazi and consequently assumed his name?

621 *The Persian Nucleus at Wādi-al-Taym:*—It is safe for us to
771 make two postulates at the very outset. First, the people who
174 later became known as the "Druzes" must have formed a more or less socially homogeneous community prior to the advent of Darazi. Second, that homogeneous community must have had in it something which predisposed it for the favorable reception of the seemingly strange and peculiar doctrines proclaimed by Darazi, and, having accepted them, to cherish and perpetuate those doctrines. Something in the social and intellectual make-up of that primitive community at Wādi-al-Taym must have made it respond whole-heartedly to Druzism and proved a fertile soil for the germination of its dogmas.

The trustworthy Egyptian historian, ibn-Taghri-Birdi († 1469 A.D.), who is the first authority to give us any explanation as to why al-Ḥākim chose, of all places, Wādi-al-Taym as the scene for his Syrian propaganda, gives that explanation, which he, of course, draws from earlier documents, in the following words:

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[1] Ḥamzah did not proclaim openly the incarnation of the Deity in al-Ḥākim till the following year, 408 A.H., which marks the beginning of the Druze era and from which their manuscripts are dated.

"And al-Ḥākim said to Darazi, 'Proceed into Syria and spread the cause in the mountains because their people are quick to follow.'"[1] This reason may sound strange considering the rightly reputed conservative character of mountaineers, but at least it makes it clear that Darazi proceeded to Wādi-al-Taym according to preconceived plans and he made its population his first objective. And since his new doctrine was at the core an incarnational one of the extreme Shī'ite type which had been previously developed in 'Irāq and Persia, it is logical to assume that the natives of Wādi-al-Taym must have been subjected to 'Irāqizing or Persianizing influence before.

The Founders of Druzism All Persian:—It should also be remembered in this connection that Darazi himself was of Turco-Persian origin.[2] His sect was the Ismā'īliyyah.[3] His theological philosophy was Bāṭiniyyah (Innerite), *i.e.*, the system of giving an esoteric, inner meaning to the scriptures other than the apparent, literal one. Ḥamzah, the teacher of Darazi[4] and the brains of the whole movement, especially after Darazi had fallen into disrepute, was of undoubted Persian origin.[5] Besides, the whole

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[1] *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah, op. cit.*, II, 69.

[2] Al-Makīn, *op. cit.*, calls him Persian; Silvestre de Sacy, *Exposé de la religion des Druzes* (2 vols., Paris, 1838), I, CCLXXXIV, thinks he was a Turk. By many historians he is described *min muwalladi al-atrāk, i.e.*, one of his parents was Turkish, of course, not Ottoman Turkish, but one from Persia or Turkestan. See al-Muḥibbi, *Khulāṣat al-Athar* (Cairo, 1284 A.H.), p. 268.

[3] A Shī'ah sect which believed in seven Imāms of whom the last and greatest was Muḥammad ibn-Ismā'īl, a descendant of 'Ali. For a statement in English on this sect see D. B. Macdonald, *Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* (New York, 1903), pp. 43 *seq.* and E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia from the Earliest Times until Firdawsi* (New York, 1902), pp. 405–415.

[4] In his *Literary History of Persia from the Earliest Times until Firdawsi, op. cit.*, p. 400, and *Literary History of Persia from Firdawsi to Sa'di* (New York, 1906), p. 199, the eminent English scholar, E. G. Browne, confuses Darazi with Ḥamzah making them both one man "Hamzah-al-Duruzi."

[5] Many historians refer to him as "al-Zūzani," *i.e.*, coming from Zūzan in Persia. *The Governors and Judges of Egypt or Kitāb al-Wulāh wa-Kitāb al-Quḍāh of el-Kindi*, together with an appendix derived mostly from *Raf' El-Iṣr* by Ibn-Ḥajar, ed. R. Guest (Beirūt, 1908), p. 612.

Fāṭimite dynasty, whose claim of legitimacy of descent from 'Ali and Fāṭimah has been either suspected or vehemently denied by many judicious Moslem historians, was probably founded by, and descended from, a Persian adventurous ancestor who exploited a 'Alid tradition and a 'Alid fetish for his own personal interest and for the aggrandizement of his progeny.

The Testimony of Religious Vocabulary:—If we, furthermore, investigate the technical terms current in the Druze religious vocabulary, we find many of them, including the word for God, *al-Bār* (from Barkhoda),[1] of clear Persian origin.[2] It is significant that the Druze password as taught in their catechism, formulated after the time of Ḥamzah and al-Muqtana and patterned after the Christian system of questions and answers, consists in the proper answer to the catch question, "Do they plant the seeds of *halālij* [or *iblīlij*, from Persian *halīlah* = *myrobalan citrina*] in your country?"[3] If the man is a Druze his answer would be, "Yes, they are planted in the hearts of the believers."

Names of Feudal Families:—A study, therefore, of the Druze dogmas, their religious vocabulary and the nationality of the missionaries would suggest 'Irāqi and Persian beginnings for the Druze people. This conclusion regarding the Persian racial origins of the Druzes which we have reached is in contradiction to almost all other conclusions reached by travelers and historians.[4] It is

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[1] E. Blochet, *Le Messianisme dans l'hétérodoxie musulmane* (Paris, 1903), p. 94, n. 1; S. de Sacy, *Chrestomathie Arabe* (Paris, 1826), II, 246, n. 72.

[2] This etymology is recognized by Ḥamzah himself in *al-Sīrah al-Mustaqīmah*, MS.

[3] One version of the Druze catechism was translated by Adler, *op. cit.*, see p. 127; another by Guys, *La Nation Druse*, see p. 199. *Cf.* Baron de Bock, *Essai sur l'histoire du Sabéisme auquel on a joint un catéchisme, qui contient les principaux dogmes de la religion des Druzes* (Metz, 1788), pp. 143 *seq.*; "A Catechism of the Druze Religion" in *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (London, 1886), p. 41.

[4] Lieut.-Col. Conder in his *Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 235, makes the categorical statement "Nor were the Druzes of Arab race. They were in great measure of Persian stock; and their women wore the silver horn beneath the veil, projecting forward from the forehead, a costume which was used among tribes of the Oxus and Caspian."

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further corroborated by an investigation of the genealogies of the chief feudal families which we shall now consider.

The leading families among the Druzes have been throughout their history either of full Kurdish and Persian origin or of Persianized and 'Irāqized Arab origin. That is, they have been either Kurdish and Persian families or tribes from the Arabian peninsula who, before their advent into the Lebanon, sojourned for many generations in Mesopotamia where they became fully indoctrinated with the 'Alid ideas and subjected to Gnostic and Manichaean influences.

Wādi-al-Taym, the place where the Druzes first appear in history under that name,[1] is so called after an Arab tribe Taym-Allāh (formerly Taym-Allāt) which, according to the greatest Arab historian, al-Ṭabari,[2] first came from Arabia into the valley of the Euphrates where they were Christianized prior to their migration into the Lebanon. Many of the Druze feudal families whose genealogies have been preserved to us by the two modern Syrian chroniclers: al-Amīr Ḥaydar and al-Shidyāq, seem also to point in the direction of the same origin—Arabian tribes which emigrated *via* the Persian Gulf and stopped in 'Irāq on the route that was later to lead them to Syria. The first feudal Druze family, the banu-Tanūkh, which made for itself a name in fighting the Crusaders under authorization from the Sultan Nūr-al-Dīn of Damascus, was according to Ḥaydar,[3] an Arab tribe from al-Ḥīrah (Mesopotamia) where it occupied the position of a ruling family and was apparently christianized. The Tanūkhs must have left Arabia as early as the second or third century A.D. The Ma'n tribe which superseded the Tanūkhs and produced the greatest Druze hero in history, Fakhr-al-Dīn, had the same traditional origin,[4] although Fakhr-al-Dīn himself is quoted, on the authority

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[1] For *Taymīnah* (coming from, or belonging to, Wādi-al-Taym) as a synonym of "Druzes," see al-Muḥibbi, *Khulāṣat al-Athar* (Cairo, 1284 A.H.), III, 268. *Cf.* Guys, *La Nation Druze*, p. 118.

[2] *Ta'rīkh al-Rusul*, ed. de Goeje (Leyden, 1889), I, 2489–2490, 2031.

[3] *Ta'rīkh* (Cairo, 1900), p. 350.

[4] Ḥaydar, p. 316. See also T. Shidyāq, *Akhbār al-A'yān* (Beirūt, 1859), p. 162.

621 of a grandson of his, as saying that the Ma'ns were Kurds.[1] The
174 banu-Talḥūq[2] and 'Abd-al-Malik[3] who supplied the later Druze
566 leadership have the same record as the Tanūkhs. The banu-'Imād are so-called from al-'Imādiyyah,[4] near al-Mawṣil, and, like the Junblāṭs,[5] are of Kurdish origin. The Arislāns claim descent from the Ḥīrah Arab kings, but the name (*Arslan* = lion) suggests Persian influence if not origin. It was in conformity with the principle of racial dissimulation (*taqiyyah*) that many Druze families of Kurdish and Persian origins claimed Arab descent.

It is interesting to note that most of these Druze Arab tribes trace their origin to southern Arabia, and not to the Ḥijāz tribes which flooded western Asia at the time of the Moslem conquests. This would imply an earlier migration into 'Irāq than the rise of Islam, and a sojourn of many generations in a sphere of Persian influence.

174 *Persian Tribes Transplanted into Syria:*—That the Indo-Iranian
619 elements in the blood of the historic Druzes are varied and multi-
563 plied can be safely assumed, not only on the ground of probable beginning and intermarriages in their earlier home, Mesopotamia, but on the ground of possible admixture in Syria itself where many Persians had been domiciled prior to the rise of Druzism. Al-Balādhuri, the most judicious of the early Arab historians, informs us that Mu'āwiyah (660–680 A.D.), among other Umayyad Caliphs, transplanted on different occasions quite a number of Persian and Mesopotamian tribes into the districts of Ba'labakk, Ḥimṣ, Ṣūr (Tyre) and elsewhere in order, evidently, to take the place of the Byzantines who had evacuated Syria subsequent to its conquest by the Moslem Arabs.[6] In the shuffle to which these

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[1] Al-Muḥibbi, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

[2] Shidyāq, p. 155.

[3] Shidyāq, p. 160.

[4] Shidyāq, p. 160.

[5] Baron Carra de Vaux, *Les Penseurs de l'Islam* (Paris, 1926), V, 69, erroneously makes the Junblāṭs Moslem. They and the Arislāns form the two leading Druze families at the present time.

[6] Philip K. Hitti, *Origins of the Islamic State* (New York, 1916), pp. 180, 260. Ya'qūbi, *Kitāb al-Buldān*, ed. Juynboll (Leyden, 1886), pp. 114–115.

Persian tribes were later subjected in Syria,[1] it is possible that some 174
tribes landed in Wādi-al-Taym, which, according to a passage in 619
ibn-al-Athīr,[2] recorded under the events of 523 A.H./1128 A.D., 563
was included in the district of Ba'labakk. According to the same passage, Wādi-al-Taym was then swarming with diverse heterodoxies, such as the "Nuṣayriyyah, Durziyyah and Majūs" (Magians = Manichaeans or some Zoroastrian sect). The modern Shī'ah of Syria, popularly known as "Matāwilah" may go back to one or more of these transplanted Persian tribes.[3]

Racially, therefore, the Druze people were a mixture of Persians, 174
'Irāqis, and Persianized Arabs, and were thereby admirably fitted 144
for the reception of the Druze dogmas and tenets of belief, which we shall next take up.

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[1] Hitti, *Origins*, p. 228.

[2] *Al-Kāmil*, ed. Tornberg (Leyden, 1863), X, 461–462.

[3] Père Lammens, *Tarīḫ al-Ṣaḥīr* (Beirūt, 1914), II, 48–49. Cf. Lammens, *La Syrie* (Beirūt, 1921), I, 182.

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Chapter V

DRUZE THEOLOGY AND ITS SOURCES

I. THE PROBLEM WITH ITS DIFFICULTIES

174 *Various Hypotheses:*—As in the case of determining the racial
795 origins of the Druze people, so in the case of ascertaining the
114 origin of their religion, all kinds of theories, some curious and amusing, others fantastic and naïve, have been proposed. By different authors at different times the Druze religion was thought to be related to ancient Judaism, Samaritanism and Mandaeism.[1] Madame Blavatsky, the founder of theosophy, traces, in an early issue of *The Theosophist*, the Druze religion back to Tibetan Lamaism.[2] Others have declared the whole thing an "enigma hardly possible to explain."[3]

771 *Period of Concealment:*—The difficulties in the way of reaching a thorough and scientific appreciation of the Druze religion are due to the scarcity of outside sources, to the secrecy with which the Druzes themselves practice their religious rites and mystic ceremonies, to the carefulness with which they guard their sacred writings against the profane, to the allegorical and esoteric character of the Arabic style of the few manuscripts which have fallen into our hands, and to the legitimate practice of *taqiyyah*, or dissimulation (according to which a member of this religion is free to profess publicly any other dogma or creed if therein lies the path of safety)—all these conspire to make the Druze riddle

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[1] Court de Gebelin in *Monde primitif*, t. 8, p. 3, tries to make it a branch of "Sabéisme." *Cf.* Baron de Bock, *Essai sur l'histoire du Sabéisme, auquel on a joint son catéchisme, qui contient les principaux dogmes de la religion des Druses*, *op. cit.*, pp. 136 *seq.*

[2] Springett, *Secret Sects of Syria*, pp. 234–247.

[3] Guys, *La Nation Druse*, pp. 13–15.

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one of the most baffling in the history of religious thought.[1] 771
According to Druze teaching, they are now, pending the "absence" of al-Ḥākim, in a "period of concealment" (*zamān al-sitr*) and nothing of their religion should be divulged or promulgated.

Manuscripts:—Almost the only sources, therefore, consist of 212
the manuscripts of a hundred or so texts, many of which are 795
didactic and polemic treatises, which as a result of local disturbances in the Druze region, particularly the invasion of Ibrāhīm Pasha, 1831–1838, and the civil war of 1860, found their way into the hands of scholars. One of the first manuscripts to be carried into Europe was presented in 1700 to Louis XIV by a Syrian physician, and is now deposited in the Bibliothèque Nationale. Most of these manuscripts are written in a language which from the standpoint of diction, grammar and style is quite far from the language of the Koran and bristles with contradictory and obscure passages, cryptic phrases, and ambiguous words. The present study is based on twenty or more original manuscripts, many of which are in the Robert Garrett collection at Princeton University.

The Historical Setting:—Viewed as a distinct religious phe- 795
nomenon, as an independent sphere of thought detached from its 174
historical setting and background, Druzism does present somewhat of an enigma; but considered as an outgrowth of the Ismā'īliyyah sect, which itself belonged to the ultra group of the Shī'ah heterodoxies of Islam, and properly envisaged in the Moslem *milieu* out of which it arose and in which it developed, the Druze religion yields to analytical treatment and becomes comparatively easy of explanation.

Silvestre de Sacy, the father of Arabic scholarship in Europe, 114
whose monumental work *Exposé de la religion des Druzes* (2 vols., Paris, 1838) has not yet been superseded though it appeared some

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[1] True to the principle of *taqiyyah*, Ṣāliḥ ibn-Yaḥyā, himself probably a Druze, from whose pen we have the best history of Beirūt (*Ta'rīkh*, ed. Cheikho, Beirūt, 1902) written in the fifteenth century, does not even mention the Druzes by name.

114 ninety years ago and before many original sources were brought to light, gives us an excellent internal interpretation of the Druze religion but does not go far in disentangling the different fibers in the intricate and complex web of the system and in tracing them back to the remote origins in the various religions or philosophical and metaphysical schools of thought. And whereas many eminent scholars in recent times, chief among whom stands the late Ignacz Goldziher of the University of Budapest, have addressed themselves to the task of analyzing the component elements that entered into the composition of Sunni (orthodox) and Shī'ite Islam, the Druze sect still remains without an interpreter in the field of the history of religion.

II. THE ḤĀKIM-GOD

776 *Whimsical Character of al-Ḥākim:*—The basic and distinctive
777 dogma of Druze theology is the deification of the young Fāṭimite Caliph (996–1020).

Sunni Moslem historians, such as al-Dhahabi, ibn-al-Athīr, abu-al-Fida, ibn-al-Qalānisi,[1] al-Rūdhrāwari[2] and ibn-Khallikān,[3] remembering him as the heretic who abolished the five pillars of Islam and ordered the names of the early Caliphs associated with a curse in the public prayer, have portrayed him in terms of a medieval Nero, tyrannical and unbalanced to the point of mental derangement. The Christian historians, such as Yaḥya ibn-Sa'īd,[4] al-Makīn[5] and Bar-Hebraeus,[6] associating his memory with the destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem "leaving not one stone upon another"[7] and the revival of the old regulations,

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[1] *Dhayl Ta'rīkh Dimashq*, ed. H. F. Amedroz (Beirūt, 1908), pp. 44–50, 55–71.

[2] *Dhayl Kitāb Tajārib al-Umam*, ed. Amedroz (Oxford, 1921), III, 233 *sq.*, English translation by D. S. Margoliouth, vol. VI, 246–247.

[3] *Wafayāt al-A'yān* (Cairo, 1299 A.H.), III, 4–7, English translation by MacGuckin de Slane (4 vols., Paris, 1842–1871), III, 449 *sq.*

[4] *Op. cit.*

[5] *Op. cit.*

[6] Abu-al-Faraj ibn-al-'Ibri, *Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal* (Beirūt, 1890), pp. 312–313.

[7] Al-Qalānisi, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

first enacted by the 'Abbāsid al-Mutawakkil, which made it incumbent upon all Christians to wear distinctively colored clothes with heavy wooden crosses dangling from their necks, were equally merciless in his condemnation. Through Gibbon,[1] who paints quite a dark picture of al-Ḥākim, the English-speaking world has become acquainted with him as a bizarre and whimsical character. What we have from the pen of these writers is not a portrait but a caricature.

The Druze writers, while not denying some of his excesses, interpret them allegorically and symbolically.[2] His freakishness only serves to intensify the belief in his superhuman character. His extraordinary conduct proves his divine nature.

The fact that al-Ḥākim introduced many reforms regulating weights and measures, fought immorality with police ordinances and succeeded in establishing a religious community that has survived for nine centuries like a fossil—and if ever there was a fossil in history that certainly is the Druze community—amidst a hostile environment indicates that he was not the kind of a maniac or fool whose biography these early writers have left us. (See Appendix B.)

His Deification:—Strange as the apotheosis of al-Ḥākim may seem—especially in view of the black picture left us by his biographies—yet the idea itself was not a novel one in Islam. Prior to the rise of Druzism, different Shī'ah sects have held different shades of the belief that 'Ali and his successor *Imāms* were infallible supernatural beings endowed to some degree with the divine essence. The Ismā'īliyyah sect, from whose bosom Druzism sprang as did also the Assassins of Crusading fame, together with al-Qarāmiṭah, which between the ninth and twelfth centuries swept through Western Asia, had both venerated certain descendants of 'Ali and hailed them as infallible rulers of the world.

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[1] *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. H. H. Milman (a new edition in five volumes, New York, 1845), IV, 173.

[2] Ḥamzah, *Kitāb fihi Ḥaqā'iq Ma*, MS.

776 The step from that position to an incarnational philosophy
779 of theism is not, indeed, a long one; and a few of the extremist (*Ghulāt*) Shī'ah sects had taken it. In the polemic literature of Islam, and particularly in the works of al-Baghdādi[1] († 1037 A.D.), ibn-Ḥazm[2] († 1063) and al-Shahrastāni[3] († 1153), we have preserved for us among the semi-religious, semi-philosophical sects of unorthodox Islam the names of many groups with incarnational theories which may be considered the prototypes of the Druze al-Ḥākim cult. First among these was al-Saba'iyyah, so called after a Jew who declared 'Ali god. Al-Baghdādi[4] devotes a chapter to the incarnational sects (*al-Ḥulūliyyah*) and enumerates ten different ones.

The Nuṣayriyyah, who preceded the Druzes and had early contacts with them, as attested by the Druze manuscripts,[5] and who are represented until the present day by three villages[6] in the Druze district at Wādi-al-Taym, deify 'Ali.[7] 'Ali-God adherents are also to be found today in a sect of Turcoman peasants at Qars (Ardaghān) whose very name "'Ali-Ilāhi"[8] betrays their characteristic belief.

Even in other than Shī'ite circles of Islam, the elevation of a mortal to the ranks of the deity finds not an altogether

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[1] *Mukhtaṣar al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, ed. Philip K. Hitti (Cairo, 1924). Al-Baghdādi, *al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, ed. Badr (Cairo, 1910), partly done into English by Kate Chambers Seelye and entitled *Moslem Schisms and Sects* (New York, 1920).

[2] *Al-Fiṣal fi al-Milal* (Cairo, 1317 A.H.).

[3] *Al-Milal w-al-Niḥal*, on the margin of ibn-Ḥazm. Translated by T. Haarbrücker under the title *Asch-Schahrastāni, Religionspartheien und Philosophen-Schulen* (Halle, 1850).

[4] Ed. Hitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–161.

[5] An early Druze MS. *al-Radd 'ala al-Risālah al-Dāmighah li-al-Fāsiq al-Nuṣayri* was written by Ḥamzah to refute the charges of a Nuṣayri.

[6] These are: 'Aynfit, Za'ūra and Ghajar. They lie not far from Bāniyās, ancient Caesarea Philippi.

[7] R. Dussaud, *Histoire et Religion des Nosairis* (Paris, 1904), p. 53.

[8] Saeed Khan, "The Sect of Ahl-i-Ḥaqq" in *The Moslem World* (New York), Jan., 1927, pp. 31–42.

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uncommon expression. The case of the Ṣūfi al-Ḥallāj,[1] who was crucified in Baghdād in 922 A.D. because he identified himself with God, and his fellow self-deified Ṣūfi, al-Shalmaghāni,[2] who was beheaded also in Baghdād in 934 A.D., may be cited as illustrations. 776 779

Al-Ḥākim as the Messiah:—Having determined the antecedents of the Druze incarnational dogma in the preceding Islamic thought, our next task is to push back our query into the intellectual ancestry of that Islamic idea in the pre-Islamic realm of thinking. The influence of the Christian incarnation precedent must have been too widespread and too apparent to have escaped the attention of the early Moslem thinkers. The great ibn-Khaldūn and before him al-Shahrastāni[3] blame the incarnational Moslem heresy on Judaeo-Christian sects. Among modern Western scholars, de Sacy,[4] van Vloten[5] and Goldziher[6] have laid great stress on the Messianic tendencies in early Islam as the main source of Shī'ism. In the case of the Druzes, Ḥamzah, of course with an eye upon the Copts of Egypt and other Christians, goes so far as to declare al-Ḥākim "the Messiah."[7]

His argument in defense of deification is clever:—"If ye Christians and Jews believe that God spoke to Moses through a dry tree and, on another occasion, through a mountain ..., is it not then meet to believe that our Lord [al-Ḥākim] is a more worthy means through whom God manifests to the world his power and behind whom he conceals himself?"[8]

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[1] Abu-al-Fida, *op. cit.*, II, 75; ibn-Khallikān, *op. cit.*, I, 261 *seq.* = de Slane Translation, I, 423 *seq.*; De Lacy O'Leary, *Arab Thought and its Place in History* (London, 1922), p. 193; L. Massignon, *al-Ḥallāj* (Paris, 1922), vol. I, pp. 292–329.

[2] Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-Udabā'*, ed. Margoliouth (Leyden, 1907), I, 302; Duncan B. Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

[3] *Op. cit.*, II, 10. [4] *Exposé*, I, XXXI *seq.*

[5] *Recherches sur la domination arabe, le chiitisme et les croyances messianiques sous le khalifat des omayyades* (Amsterdam, 1894), pp. 54 *seq.*

[6] *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (2nd ed., Heidelberg, 1925), pp. 3, 17, 120 and Chap. V, "Das Sektenwesen."

[7] Ḥamzah, *Khabar al-Yahūd w-al-Naṣāra*, MS.

[8] *Kashf al-Haqā'iq* in C. Seybold, "Die Drusenschrift," *Kitāb al-Noqaṭ* (Leipzig, 1902), p. 92.

776 In the Druze catechism, al-Ḥākim is repeatedly identified
779 with "the living Messiah."[1] Likewise Bahā'-al-Dīn, in his turn, identifies Ḥamzah with the Messiah.[2] In his many epistles directed to the Christians, Bahā'-al-Dīn often calls the Christians "saints" and "assemblies of saints." (See Appendix D.)

781 *A Series of Divine Incarnations:*—The guiding thought of Druze
776 theogony, as it was with the Ismā'īlīyyah, is the belief in
779 a succession of divine manifestations through a progressive series. Hence with the Druzes, al-Ḥākim is not only the incarnation of God but the final and most perfect manifestation, having been preceded by nine others among whom figure al-Bār (Barkhoda), 'Ali and the ancestors of al-Ḥākim in the Fāṭimite Caliphate.

According to a further development of this idea, the divine humanity of God, though it appears under different names in different countries and times, is essentially one and always the same in its diverse manifestations. The human figure serves only as a veil to hide the divine essence behind.

In contrast to the Druze ten successive incarnations, the Nuṣayriyyah believe in seven only, corresponding to the seven heavens and the seven planets.[3]

To this same sphere of thought should be consigned the recent Bahā'i theory of divine manifestations which is an outgrowth of Bābi and Sheikhite ideas which in turn flourished in the fertile Shī'ah soil of Persia. And as in modern Bahā'ism so in ancient Druzism, resort is had to Pythagorean subtleties and to the occult art of manipulating letters and combinations of letters assigning cabalistic numerical values[4] to them in order to

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[1] Adler, *op. cit.*, pp. 121, 132.

[2] See his epistle entitled *al-Masīḥiyyah* (Christianity), MS., and Appendix E.

[3] Dr. Wolff, "Auszüge aus dem Katechismus der Nossirier," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (1849), III, 303.

[4] This science is represented in Islam by the "Ḥurūfi" school and the Bektāshi order of dervishes. See Goldziher, *Vorlesungen*, pp. 246, 274, 362; E. G. Browne, *Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), pp. 370–375; Browne, "Literature and Doctrine of the Ḥurūfi Sect," *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, Jan., 1898.

determine the periods that elapsed between one manifestation 787
and the other. 776

The Disappearance and Triumphal Return of al-Ḥākim:—Closely 779
allied to the incarnational theory, and working out as a corollary from it, was the belief in the immortal character of the *Imām* in whose case "disappearance" (*ghaybah*) takes the place of death and whose final "return" (*raj'ah*) is expected so that he may lead his people in triumph to a new and happy age. When, therefore, al-Ḥākim, on that fateful day in 1020 A.D., went on his usual promenade to the Muqaṭṭam hill just outside of the city of Cairo never to return—probably because he fell a victim to a plot prearranged by his sister Sitt-al-Mulk[1]—his "admirers refused to believe in his death and began to expect his return."[2] They still hold that he is in a state of temporary occultation. History has preserved for us the names of few who on different occasions tried to impersonate the returned al-Ḥākim. In his dramatic work entitled "The Return of the Druzes," Browning tells the story of one of these impostors.

This "hidden *Imām*" idea was carefully worked out by many of the extreme Shī'ah sects prior to Druzism, and reached its most elaborate expression as a doctrine in the Ismā'īliyyah group. Its psychological basis should surely be sought in the strong but unfulfilled desires and hopes of a persecuted and depressed people (as the Shī'ah were under the Umayyads and 'Abbāsids) with the supreme ambition for a saviour-leader whose coming shall usher in for them a new era of liberty and prosperity.

This Moslem Mahdi idea was subjected to Semitic Judaeo-Christian Messianic influences on the one hand, and, in its later development, to Iranian-Mandaean influences. The case of the prophet Elijah, called throughout the Christian East "the Living One" (*al-Ḥay*), was a prototype of the ever-living *Imām*. The stories of the assumption of Moses and the ascension of Isaiah in the non-canonical literature of the Bible might have served

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[1] Hamzah may have had a hand in the conspiracy. Gaya, *Le Notre Druze*, p. 63.
[2] Al-Qalqashandī, *op. cit.*, 79-80; ibn-Khallikān, *op. cit.*, III, 7; Appendix C.

as stimuli. The expression of the "hidden *Imām*" Shī'ite doctrine[1] was a reflex of Isaiah, chapter XI. The second advent of Christ was paralleled by the "return" of the Mahdi bringing politico-religious restoration.[2]

Indo-Iranian Influences:—The problem of disentangling and sorting the different elements—labelling each Judaeo-Christian, Hellenistic or Zoroastrian—which went into the make-up of the historic Shī'ah schisms is one bristling with difficulties and uncertainties. How much did Shī'ah owe to western Neo-Platonic philosophies on the one hand, and how much to eastern Persian and Indian systems of thought on the other, is not always easy to ascertain at the present stage of research.

Modern European Semitic scholars, led by Ignacz Goldziher, have, however, been inclined to underrate the eastern influence. Certain French Persian scholars, on the other hand, such as E. Blochet and Baron Carra de Vaux[3] have tried to attribute to Persianizing influences a great many of the cardinal Shī'ah beliefs. The former scholar traces the origin of the incarnational and Mahdi idea to Zoroastrian sources, Barham Amavand being the Iranian Messiah.[4]

Further investigation will probably reveal that the Indo-Iranian influence on the rise and the development of the Shī'ah sects was greater than we now realize. That such influence was clearly recognized by early Moslem scholars is evinced by the fact that al-Baghdādi,[5] for instance, goes so far as to exclude the Bāṭiniyyah, including the Qarāmiṭah and Ismā'īliyyah, from the list of Moslem sects and to classify them under *Majūs* (Magians), *i.e.*, Zoroastrians. A tradition (*ḥadīth*) puts in the mouth of the Prophet himself the following words: "The Qadarites are the Magians of my people."[6] Besides, there is no gainsaying the fact

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[1] *Cf. e.g.* the Karbiyyah doctrine in al-Baghdādi, ed. Hitti, pp. 36–37.
[2] See G. van Vloten, "Zur Abbasidengeschichte," *ZDMG*, LII, 218 *seq.*
[3] *Le mahométisme, le génie sémitique et le génie aryen dans l'Islam* (Paris, 1898), p. 112.
[4] E. Blochet, *op. cit.*, pp. 126 *seq.*
[5] Ed. Hitti, pp. 23, 170 *seq.*
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 16; al-Shahrastāni, *op. cit.*, I, 54.

that Shi'ah sprang up on Persian 'Irāqi soil, that its chief protagonists have been mostly Persian, and that until the present day it constitutes the state religion of the kingdom of Persia.

In its further development the "return" doctrine (parousia) gave rise to interesting eschatological ideas to which unbridled human fancies contributed their fantastic share. According to Druze doctrine the "return" of al-Ḥākim will result in the triumph of the Unitarian religion and the worldly reward of its adherents, who will thus become high office-holders, to the discomfiture and affliction of all infidels and apostates who are then metamorphosed into menial servants, swine and dogs.[1] This corresponds in general to the resurrection day.

Unitarians:—The Druze conception of the deity is declared by them to be one of strict and uncompromising unity. In their desire to maintain a rigid confession of unity they stripped from God all attributes (*tanzīh*) which may savor of, or lead into, polytheism (*shirk*). In Allah there are no attributes distinct from his essence. He is wise, mighty, just, &c., not by wisdom, might, justice, &c., but by his own essence. There is neither "how," "when" nor "where" about him: he is incomprehensible.

In this dogma, as in the others, the Druzes were no originators. They had for precedent that interesting semi-philosophical, semi-religious body which flourished under al-Ma'mūn and was known by the name of al-Mu'tazilah[2] and the equally interesting fraternal order of the "Brethren of Purity" (*Ikhwān al-Ṣafa*).

The Druze favorite name for themselves is *Muwaḥḥidūn*[3]—Unitarians—believers in one and only one God. In this they

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[1] See Druze catechism in Adler, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–123; de Bock, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–148; "A Catechism of the Druzes," *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (London, 1886), pp. 39–40.

[2] al-Shahrastāni, I, 55; Mas'ūdi, *Murūj al-Dhahab*, Texte et Traduction par C. Barbier de Meynard (Paris, 1871), VI, 20.

[3] The Moorish dynasty which originated with ibn-Tumart in the 12th century and conquered all northern Africa and Moslem Spain bore the same name corrupted through Spanish into "Almohades." The same name is a favorite one with the modern Wahhābis of Nejd.

776 779 101 follow the precedent of the Mu'tazilah who insisted on calling themselves "The People of Justice and Unity" (*Ahl al-'Adl w-al-Tawḥīd*).

III. FIVE DIVINE MINISTERS AND THREE INFERIOR ONES

776 779 771 *The Process of Emanation*:—Having accepted the Allah of the Mu'tazilah and "Brethren of Purity," already reduced to a flimsy abstraction, the Druze mind could not rest until it had personified God's mind, will, word, &c., and made separate beings out of each of them, constituting the five supreme ministers (*Ḥudūd*, literally, bounds or precepts).

The first one whom the primeval God created, and that by a process of emanation from himself,[1] was the "Universal Mind," Ḥamzah himself, the real founder of the Druze religion and its supreme pontiff who thus becomes the ruler of the universe. Even on the day of judgment he promotes and demotes whomsoever he pleases, a sort of proxy or demiurge for the divine Ḥākim. In the meantime an "Opposer" (*Ḍudd*)[2] is created by the same process of emanation, a kind of antagonist to the "Universal Mind," whose object it is to nullify the work of the Mind. This makes it necessary for God to create, by emanation from the "Universal Mind," a second minister—the "Universal Soul." This "Universal Soul" is in the position of a wife to the "Universal Mind," and from it emanates the "Word." By similar processes the "Right Wing" or "Precedent" and the "Left Wing" or "Follower" are brought into existence, the "Left Wing" being none other than al-Muqtana Bahā'-al-Dīn, the fifth and last supreme minister who stands at the head of a lower hierarchy[3] and whose multitudinous treatises and epistles, together

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[1] For this process of creation, see *Mukhtaṣar al-Bayān fī Majra al-Zamān*, MS. (translated in part by Guys, *Théogonie des Druses*, Paris, 1863, pp. 3–84). The theory was first promulgated by Ḥamzah, *Kashf al-Ḥaqā'iq* and in other MSS.

[2] Differently translated into "Rival" by de Sacy and Guys, and "Contrast" by Friedlaender.

[3] There was a hierarchy of missionaries graded into *Dā'i*, *Ma'dhūn*, and *Mukāsir*.

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with those of Ḥamzah, form the Druze sacred literature. This 996
Bahā'-al-Dīn may have been of Christian origin[1] as his writings 999
reveal unusual familiarity with the New Testament and Christian 771
liturgy. (See Appendix E.)

The Neo-Platonic Source:—We are evidently here in the atmosphere of the "emanation" theory which characterizes both Neo-Platonic[2] and Gnostic schools of philosophy and which must have filtered into the Druze system through Qarāmiṭah and "Brethren of Purity" channels. According to Professor Scott in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*,[3] "The first characteristic feature of Gnosticism is that at the head of the Universe stands a supreme God who is not so much a personal Deity as the abstract ground of all existence. From the supreme God there proceed a number of beings in a descending scale of dignity who are arranged in pairs, male and female."

The third minister, the "Word," is presumably an echo of the Christian Alexandrian *Logos*.

The doctrine of "Opposers," or the simultaneous revelation of the Deity in a good principle and an evil principle, parallels the Zoroastrian dualistic doctrine and reminds us of the Syzygy theory in the pseudo-Clementines.[4] The Zoroastrian influence is further shown by the reference to God as the "light" with the opposing principle as the "darkness."[5] A further working out of this same principle in the Druze system is in the case of the

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[1] De Sacy, *Exposé*, I, 85, n. I. In his Epistle to Emperor Constantine and in the one entitled "Christianity," Bahā'-al-Dīn confuses John the Evangelist with John the Baptist and John Chrysostom. He identifies Ḥamzah with Christ and finds in the "three days" in which Jesus said he could rebuild the temple direct reference to Ḥamzah. He also uses parables that breathe the same atmosphere as those of the New Testament. See one of his parables in de Sacy, *Chrestomathie Arabe* (Paris, 1826), I, 304–309.

[2] See Goldziher, "Neuplatonische und gnostische Elemente im Ḥadīṯ," *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* (1909), XXII, 317 *seq.*

[3] Article "Gnosticism."

[4] *Recognitiones*, III, 59, 61; *Homilies*, II, 15.

[5] *Cf.* Friedlaender, *Journal American Oriental Society*, XXIX, 116.

776 creation of the prophets where many of them have "Opposers."
779 Adam for instance has Ḥārith ibn-Tarmāḥ against him.[1]
771 Like Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism, the Nuṣayriyyah assume an agent of creation, a demiurge, in the person of 'Ali. The Mufawwaḍiyyah[2] (the Believers in Entrusting) taught that God had entrusted Muḥammad with the creation and management of the universe, but Muḥammad in turn entrusted 'Ali with the task. But the "Brethren of Purity" have perhaps contributed more than any one else towards the introduction into and the formulation of the emanation-demiurge idea in Islam, and that because through their religious philosophic works,[3] which were encyclopaedic in their character, they not only gave technical expression in Arabic to the foreign concepts involved but popularized the concepts and gave the expressions currency.

771 *Inferior Ministers:*—Below the five superior ministers and stand-
777 ing in a subordinate position to them are three orders of minor
773 ministers which we may term: "Propagator" (*Dā'i*), "Licensed"
777 (*Ma'dhūn*), and "Pioneer" (*Mukāsir* or *Naqīb*).[4] Their functions are not clearly defined in the Druze manuscripts, but seem to be of the missionary type. This can be ascertained from the meaning of the Arabic names applied to them and from a study of corresponding officials in the Bāṭiniyyah system, which was one of the best and most efficiently organized systems of religious propaganda that Islam ever developed.

The "Propagator" assumes the rôle of the chief agent for the spreading of the faith. The "Licensed" has authority to preach, but is subject to the direction and guidance of the "Propagator." The "Pioneer" assumes responsibility for arousing the doubts of the would-be convert regarding his old beliefs, thus preparing him for the reception of the novel religion as soon as it is

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[1] Ḥamzah, *al-Sīrah al-Mustaqīmah*, MS.

[2] Al-Baghdādī, ed. Hitti, p. 157.

[3] See *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafa*, ed. F. Dieterici (*Die Abhandlungen der Ikhwān es-Ṣafa*, Leipzig, 1883), pp. 3–4.

[4] *Sabab al-Asbāb w-al-Kanz*, MS., also in *Le Monde Oriental* (Uppsala, 1909), vol. III, p. 100.

preached to him by a "Licensed" or a "Propagator." His office, as the Arabic name indicates, is one of breaking up and destroying. 771 779 793 797

Here again the male and female principles are represented in these ministers in their relation one to the other, and to the upper hierarchy. The "Propagator" is in the position of a wife with respect to the "*Ḥujjah*", and of a husband with respect to the "Licensed." The "Licensed" is in the position of a wife to the "Propagator," and a husband to the "Pioneer." The same double status applies to the "Pioneer."[1]

Below these inferior ministers stand the rank and file of Druze believers.

IV. THE PROPHETIC SUCCESSION

Seven Major Prophets:—Next in rank to the divine ministers in the Druze hierarchy stand the prophets. The prophetic succession tallies in general with the preceding Ismā'īliyyah series of seven.[2] Adam heads the list which includes Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus ('Īsa ibn-Yūsuf), Muḥammad, and Muḥammad ibn-Ismā'īl. Each one of these legislating prophets (*Nāṭiq*) has by his side a minor prophet (*Asās*) acting as a lieutenant or substitute and having under him twelve disciples (*Ḥujjah*). The substitute, also called "silent" (*Ṣāmit*), utters no new doctrine but merely teaches and develops that which he has received from his chief, the legislative prophet. The substitute represents the female and the legislator the male principles.[3] The list of substitutes includes Ishmael, Aaron, Simon and 'Ali, and that of disciples, Enoch, Daniel, Plato and other biblical and Greek characters.[4] Each "period" or "cycle" is introduced by a legislative prophet. Between one legislative prophet and the other are seven intervening *Imāms* of whom the first is in each case the trusted and intimate substitute (*Asās*, *Ṣāmit*) of his chief, the legislating prophet (*Nāṭiq*). 771 779 792 801

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[1] Ḥamzah, *Mīthāq al-Nisā'*, MS.
[2] E. Blochet, *Le Messianisme*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
[3] Al-Tamīmi, *Taqūm al-'Ulūm*, MS.; Ḥamzah, *Mīthāq al-Nisā'*, MS.
[4] Ḥamzah, *al-Sīrah al-Mustaqīmah*, MS.

771 *Seven a Sacred Number:*—As in the case of the "periods"
777 between the successive incarnations, so in the case of the pro-
801 phetic successions, the "periods" or "cycles" are all nicely arranged and determined by cabalistic figuring in which the numbers seven and seventy,[1] as is to be expected, take a prominent place. The Pythagorean origin of this system of computation is not difficult to detect. Regarding the mystic nature of the number seven, Bahā'-al-Dīn reasons thus: "Everything when it gets to be seven ends and should be replaced by another. For example the seven days, when they end they begin over again... Also the heavens are seven, the earths are seven, the climates are seven, the height of man by his own span is seven, and the orifices in his face are seven. Likewise the legislative prophets are seven, their substitutes are seven and the intervening *Imāms* between one legislator and the other are seven."[2]

771 Following their spiritual ancestors, the Ismā'īliyyah, the Druzes
779 also believe in seven heavens, seven seas, seven earths and seven
801 hidden *Imāms*. The identification of the *Imāms* with the heavens
772 becomes an easy step and betrays ancient Babylonian and Chaldaean astrological influences. Ismā'īl ibn-Muḥammad is identified with the first heaven; Muḥammad ibn-'Abdullāh, with the fourth; al-Ḥusayn ibn-Muḥammad, with the fifth and 'Abdullāh ibn-al-Mahdi with the seventh.[3]

779 *Excellence of Druze System:*—Each one of the Druze legislator-
771 prophets abrogates in his turn the law of the preceding one.
772 So did the Ismā'īliyyah prophets. The antecedent of this general
671 idea should be sought in the abrogation by Muḥammad of the Jewish law[4] and is in harmony, though not identical, with the Marcionite Gnostic theories. As a corollary to that, the Druzes consider all former religions, including Christianity, Judaism and

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[1] Ḥamzah, *Kashf al-Ḥaqā'iq*, MS.

[2] *Al-Juz' al-Awwal*, MS.

[3] Al-Tamīmi, *Taqsīm al-'Ulūm*, MS.; 'Abd-al-Ghaffār, *Majra al-Zamān*, MS. = Henri Guys, *Théogonie des Druses ou Abrégé de leur Système Religieux*, traduit de l'Arabe (Paris, 1863), pp. 54–55.

[4] Koran 2:286, 4:158, 7:156.

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Islam as forerunners and varied types of Druzism, which supersedes and excels them all.

Adam:—Of special interest to us are Adam and Jesus who seem to stand above the other prophets and share in the divine essence. A number of Jewish Christian sects, such as the Essenes and Nazarenes, adopted this gnostic view, which, combined with Persian and old Babylonian mythology, furnished Mani with the doctrine of the original man. The Adam of the Druze theology, therefore, is not exactly the Adam of Genesis but the "original man"[1] of the Manichaeans, the *Adam Kadmon*[2] of the Jewish cabala.

Certain Moslem sects, like the Muḥammadiyyah, went so far as to declare the divinity of Adam.

Jesus:—The Jesus (Īsa ibn-Yūsuf) of the Druze manuscripts is also somewhat different from the Jesus of the New Testament. He is rather the Moslem Jesus patterned after the conception of him by the ancient heretic sect of the Docetae who held that Christ suffered only in appearance. This doctrine was handed down to the Moslems probably through Manichaean channels.[3] The Manichaean movement, which arose in close connection with Mandaeanism in 'Irāq or southern Babylonia, about the middle of the third century A.D., and which, as *al-Fihrist* declares, was a blend of the old Magian cult with Christianity,[4] was Iranian in its mythology and cosmological beliefs. It exercised a great influence over the Moslem sects in al-'Irāq, which was also rich in Jewish and Christian sects and heresies.

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[1] "*Insān Qadīm*" in *al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel (Leipzig, 1872), p. 329. See also Flügel, *Mani* (Leipzig, 1862), pp. 97, 105.

[2] Louis Ginzberg, article "Adam Kadmon," *Jewish Encyclopaedia*.

[3] F. C. Burkitt, *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge University Press, 1925), pp. 38–40; Flügel, *Mani*, pp. 337–338.

[4] *Al-Fihrist*, p. 328. That Islam knew a great deal about Mani and Manichaeanism is evidenced by the fact that our oldest and most trustworthy sources on that movement are to be found in Arabic-Moslem literature and particularly *al-Fihrist*. A peculiar sect of Manichaeanism, Mazdakiyyah, seems to have exercised tremendous influence over the Moslem sects. Al-Shahrastāni (II, 29) informs us that the Bāṭiniyyah and Qarāmiṭah in al-'Irāq were called "Mazdakites."

V. THE INNER MEANING

779 *The Bāṭiniyyah:*—Having deviated from the letter as well as
771 from the word of Allah as revealed in the Koran, and without seeming to abrogate altogether its legislative precepts, certain schools of thought, designated by orthodox theologians Bāṭiniyyah, found it expedient to resort to a new and ingenious device—that of interpreting the religious facts esoterically or allegorically. Though classified by al-Baghdādi, al-Shahrastāni and ibn-Ḥazm as "sects," the Bāṭiniyyah were rather unorganized philosophical schools of thought. They belonged in the main to the Qarāmiṭah and Ismā'īliyyah sects, from which Druzism sprang, and to certain Ṣūfi fraternities. Truth, according to the cardinal Bāṭiniyyah concept, is to be ascertained by the discovery of an inner meaning (*bāṭin*, hence the appellation Bāṭiniyyah = Innerites) of which the outer form is a mere veil intended to keep the truth from the eyes of the uninitiate.

This device put at once into the hands of the Shī'ah schismatic sects a powerful weapon which dealt deadly blows to the core of Islam leaving only its outside shell. The shadow was there but the substance had gone. Meanwhile it enabled its adepts to appropriate from non-Moslem sources whatever suited their own convenience.

Thus through Ṣūfi and Shī'ah channels, Druzism was made to enter into the inheritance of Philo and early esoteric exegetes.

Darazi, one of the founders of the Druze system—if system it could be called—was a Bāṭini missionary, as we are told by many of his biographers.[1]

779 *The Muḥammadan Law Abrogated:*—Between unbridled al-
771 legorical interpretation of the law and its virtual suspension lies
671 one short step, and that step was actually taken by Ḥamzah, the real founder of the Druze religion. Following the Ismā'īliyyah precedent, Ḥamzah, in his *Kitāb al-Naqḍ al-Khafi*, went so far as to abolish the so-called five pillars of Islam, including fasting,

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[1] Ibn-Taghri-Birdi, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

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pilgrimage and almsgiving, and substituted for them four articles of faith relating to the knowledge of God, of Ḥamzah, the ministers, and the seven moral precepts.[1] These precepts enjoin the love of truth in speech, watching over one another's safety, renouncing other religions, recognizing the existence in all ages of the principle of divine unity in al-Ḥākim and acquiescing in his actions whatever they be.[2]

On account of this, orthodox Islam never hesitated to exclude Druzism from its fold. In fact certain conservative canonists, like the puritan ibn-Taymiyyah (1263–1328 A.D.), whose legal system greatly influenced the rise of the Wahhābi movement in Nejd, went so far as to express a religious opinion (*fatwa*) favoring "warring against the Druzes as a more meritorious duty than warring against the Armenians, because the former are included in the Moslem territory but are not of it."[3]

The Mystic Element:—Akin to the esoteric conception of the scriptures is the principle of mysticism which found its highest expression in Islam in the Ṣūfi movement and traces of which are prominent in the Druze initiate view of life. Ṣūfism began as asceticism, became in succession mystical and theosophical, and finally advanced to extreme pantheism. The four principal sources of Ṣūfism are Christianity, Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism and Buddhism. The Neo-Platonic character of Moslem Ṣūfism has been rendered clear by the contributions of two English scholars, E. G. Browne and R. A. Nicholson. It would, however, be a mistake to ignore entirely the influence of the Buddhist view upon the later development of historic Ṣūfism, especially after Islam had spread eastward to the confines of China and brought Indian thought within its horizon. The encyclopaedic author of *al-Fihrist*[4] († 996) quotes at some length from an archaic version

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[1] See Ḥamzah, *Mīthāq al-Nisā'*, MS.

[2] These precepts occur in many Druze MSS. See *infra*, p. 51. Bahā'-al-Dīn devotes one tract to each one of them. Cf. Guys, *Théogonie*, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–84.

[3] Al-'Umari, *al-Ta'rīf bi-al-Muṣṭalaḥ al-Sharīf* (Cairo, 1312 A.H.); Cf. al-Qalqashandi, *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā* (Cairo, 1918), XIII, 248–249.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 347.

of a Buddhist book. The monumental piece of Arabic literature *al-Aghānī*[1] has left us at least one portrayal of an unmistakable Buddhistic view of life. And the *Zindīq* monks, described by al-Jāḥiẓ,[2] were, according to Goldziher, "Either Indian Sadhus, or Buddhist monks or at least their imitators."[3] Under Indian influence the pantheistic idea in Ṣūfi Islam becomes more apparent.

Sheikhs:—The Druzes share with their intellectual ancestors—the Ṣūfis, Ismā'īliyyah and Qarāmiṭah—both the esoteric interpretation of the law and the mystical outlook on life. Their community is divided into *'Uqqāl*, initiate, intelligent, spiritual; and *Juhhāl*, uninitiate, ignorant, worldly. A course *ṣūf*[4] (wool) outer garment is the distinguishing dress of the former, among whom the most meritorious *Ajāwīd* lead an almost ascetic life.

The *'Uqqāl* are also called "*Sheikhs*,"[5] an Arabic word connoting old age, seniority and respect. This word has in recent years been introduced into the English language and corrupted in both pronunciation and meaning.

To the high rank of enlightened *'Uqqāl*, no one can aspire whose character has not marked him out as one entirely trustworthy and capable of extreme secrecy. Before admission, however, he must be subjected to a rigorous process of long trial and probation. Then follows the ceremonial rite of induction. This secret ceremony has been witnessed and described by only one or two outsiders throughout the whole history of the Druze religion.

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[1] Cairo edition (20 vols.), III, 24—*Sunniyyah* is the term applied to the Indian sects which influenced many Moslems.

[2] *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān* (Cairo, 1323 A.H.), IV, 146–147.

[3] *Vorlesungen*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[4] For the origin of the word "Ṣūfi" from *ṣūf*—wool, see Nöldeke in *ZDMG*, XLVII, 47.

[5] The middle vowel is pronounced long like "i" in "bite," and the final "kh" is guttural, something like the German "ch." *Cf.* "Usi e Credenze dei Drusi" in *Oriente Moderno* (Rome, 1925), V, pp. 469–472.

Once admitted to the favored rank, the Sheikh begins to wear a heavy white turban, and abstains from gaudy colors, swearing and obscene language. His deportment becomes dignified and reserved. Under no condition is he thereafter to touch alcoholic liquor or to smoke. He may even refrain from eating at the table of a wealthy man or government official lest something of the money used in buying the food might have been illegitimately acquired. 779 771 829 564

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Chapter VI

DOGMAS AND PRECEPTS

I. TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS

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The Druze belief in metempsychosis is very popular and strong and, in contrast to their other beliefs, is professed openly by the believers. The writer's impression of stories told him by schoolmates in the Lebanon regarding newly-born children who made utterances involving memories of former incarnations is still vivid and clear in his mind. A story that found great circulation in the local press of Syria in the last few months relates how a Druze leader in one of the recent raids against the French stood on a bridge at Wādi-al-Taym and declared to his men that some fifty years ago he was killed on that same spot where he was this time leading his men.[1]

Method of Operation:—According to the learned Druze doctrine, the principle of transmigration of souls operates only from one human body to another. All souls were created at once from the "light of Ḥamzah" and their actual number is "neither increased by births nor decreased by deaths."[2] The ignorant among them, however, hold popular beliefs involving reincarnation in animal forms, and that probably explains the erroneous statements made by many writers, including the statement in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*,[3] to the effect that they believe that the wicked return in bodies of dogs.

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[1] *Al-Madriq* (Beirūt), June, 1926. For another story see I. J. Nakhlah, *Ḥall al-Rumūz fi Mi'taqad al-Durūz* (Cairo, 1897), p. 38.

[2] Bahā'-al-Dīn, *Tamyīz al-Muwaḥḥidīn al-Ṭā'i'īn*, MS.

[3] Article "Druzes" by Baron Carra de Vaux. The same mistake is made by William Ewing, *Arab and Druze at Home* (London, 1907), p. 88. *Cf.* F. J. Bliss, *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine* (New York, 1912), p. 308; and J. T. Parfit, *Druzes and the Secret Sects of Syria* (Westminster, 1917), p. 26, *Among the Druzes of Lebanon and Bashan* (London, 1917), pp. 235–236; Ḥanna abi-Rāshid, *Jabal al-Durūz* (Cairo, 1925), p. 44.

In his epistle refuting the arguments of the Nuṣayri,[1] Ḥamzah utterly rejects the doctrine of transmigration, stating that "if anyone believes in it as the Nuṣayriyyah do, he loses both this and the next world." The Druze catechism, formulated long after the days of Bahā'-al-Dīn and Ḥamzah, teaches that the infidels and apostates are metamorphosed into dogs and swine[2] as well as menial servants.

Earlier Moslem Sects Believing in Transmigration:—That the Druzes had within the fold of Islam various precursors in the doctrine of metempsychosis is demonstrated by the fact that al-Baghdādi[3] and ibn-al-Jawzi[4] each devote a whole chapter to *Aṣḥāb al-Tanāsukh*, *i.e.*, the believers in transmigration. Ibn-Ḥazm,[5] al-Shahrastāni,[6] and al-Maqrīzi[7] have many references to such sects, chief among which stood al-Kaysāniyyah, and al-Ḥā'iṭiyyah. Stories intended to show the amusing possibilities of return in form of animals are recorded in various books of Arabic literature.

One of the most popular of these stories is that related of al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyari who believed in transmigration. A certain man came and asked him for a loan of money promising to repay it on his (debtor's) return to life. "Well," said al-Sayyid, "but even more than that, you should offer a guarantee that you will return in the form of a man." "How else can I return?" asked the would-be debtor. "I am afraid," retorted the shrewd Sayyid, "that you will return as a dog or pig, and my money will then be lost!"[8]

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[1] *Al-Radd 'Ala al-Risālah al-Dāmighah li-al-Fāsiq*, MS.

[2] See the translation of "A Catechism of the Druze Religion" in *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (London, 1886), pp. 39–40.

[3] Ed. Hitti, pp. 164–165. See also al-Baghdādi, *al-Farq bayn al-Firaq* ed. Badr, pp. 253–259.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 85–86. [5] *Op. cit.*, IV, 182. [6] *Op. cit.*, II, 12.

[7] *Al-Khiṭaṭ* (Cairo, 1853), II, 347, 353, 354.

[8] *Al-Aghāni*, VII, 8; al-Kutubi, *Fawāt al-Wafayāt* (Cairo, 1866), I, 25. See also al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*, VI, 24; ibn-al-Jawzi, p. 86; *Alf Laylah wa-Laylah* (Catholic Press, Beirūt), I, 41; al-Ma'arri, "Risālatu'l-Ghufrān," *Journal Royal Asiatic Society* (1902), XXXIV, 354–355 and 840.

The Manichaean doctrine of the soul, and of its lot hereafter, recognized a division of mankind into three classes: Elect, Hearers and Sinners; the Elect alone being exempt from retribution through rebirth in some lower form.[1]

When carried to its logical conclusion, as in the case of the Druze philosophy, the doctrine of transmigration dispenses altogether with the necessity for paradise and hell and takes the place of a final judgment. The time of the triumphal "return" of al-Ḥākim and the complete victory of his Unitarian religion, resulting in awarding high worldly offices to the faithful and punishing the renegades and unbelievers by assigning them to hard and menial labor, corresponds to the resurrection day.

Relation to China:—Whether this Moslem belief is of Western Pythagorean or of Eastern Indian origin is hard to ascertain, with the balance of evidence in favor of the East. Ibn-al-Jawzi[2] states that it appeared first "in the days of the Pharaoh of Moses," which is correct if taken to mean that it was of ultimate Egyptian origin. Al-Shahrastāni[3] declares that the Moslem heterodoxies received this teaching from the Mazdakian Magians, Brahman Indians, the philosophers, and Mandaeans.[4]

In the case of the Druzes, to whom China seems to be a sort of a heaven, the eastern source has evidently impressed itself strongly upon the popular imagination. When a good Druze is dead in the Lebanon, he is supposed to be reborn in China. The writer remembers hearing more than once at Druze funerals the chorus of a song which ran as this: "Happy are the people of China at the hour of your arrival!" (*Niyyāl ahl al-Ṣīn sa'at waṣltak*). The Druzes have always been conscious of the fact

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[1] A. V. Williams Jackson, "The Doctrine of Metempsychosis in Manichaeism," *Journal American Oriental Society*, Sept., 1925, pp. 247 and 268; Burkitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–65.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

[3] *Op. cit.*, II, 12.

[4] *Al-Ṣābi'ah* in Arabic mentioned in the Koran three times (2:59, 5:73, 22:17) where with the Jews and Christians they were assured religious tolerance. "The philosophers" referred to are undoubtedly the Hellenistic philosophers.

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that people in the Far East hold the same views regarding the transmigration of souls.[1]

It is interesting to note in this connection that Benjamin of Tudela[2] calls the inhabitants of Khandy (Ceylon) by the same name as the people around Sidon—Druzes. He was probably impressed by the similarity of belief in transmigration among the two peoples and concluded that they must have been the same.

II. PREDESTINATION AND DISSIMULATION

In the theory of predestination, the Druzes follow in the footsteps of the Jabriyyah school of Islamic thought as opposed to the Qadariyyah.[3] The problem of reconciling the Almightiness of Allah with the free-will of man was the very first rock over which dogmatic Islam split, these two sects constituting the earliest dogmatic schism in Islam.

The Koran abounds in passages the interpretation of which favors a predestination philosophy of life. Sūrah 3, verses 26–27 reads: "Say, O God, master of the universe, thou bestowest the rule upon whom thou wilt, and thou takest away the rule from whom thou wilt; thou exaltest whomsoever thou wilt, and thou humblest whomsoever thou wilt. In thy hand is all good, for thou art all-powerful. Thou causest the night to succeed the day, and thou causest the day to succeed the night. Thou bringest forth the living out of the dead, and thou bringest forth the dead out of the living. And thou providest sustenance to whom thou wilt, without measure."

Shī'ite Contribution:—The ethical principle of dissimulation (*taqiyyah*), practiced to the present day by the Druzes, was a fundamental tenet of Shī'ah, to which the partisans of 'Ali had resort as a result of the handicaps and persecutions to which they were subjected by orthodox (Sunni) Islam during both the

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[1] Mr. Kisbāny suggests the possibility that the use of "Ṣin" in this connection is an esoteric one of the ancient Babylonian word *sin* for moon.

[2] *Travels* (London, 1848), p. 115.

[3] D. B. Macdonald, *Muslim Theology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–137.

771 Umayyad and 'Abbāsid periods. The theory is an old one in
779 Islam, based upon the Koran, 3:28–29: "Let not the believers
609 choose the infidels for protectors in preference to other believers.
136 He who doth this hath no claim upon Allah, unless he doth it in dissimulation (*taqiyyah*) and for protection... Whether ye conceal what is in your breasts, or whether ye proclaim it, Allah knoweth it, for he knoweth whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on earth." The Khārijites, antedating the Shī'ah, recognized its legitimacy. The Shī'ite contribution to it consisted of the point that when a believer is in a place where his adversaries are in the ascendancy, not only *may* he profess outwardly the form of the prevailing religion but he *must* do so in order to protect himself and his coreligionists.[1]

The historical illustration of this principle, as it worked out in the case of the Druzes, took place in the thirties of the last century when the Egyptian Ibrāhīm Pasha insisted on enforcing his conscription laws and many Druzes, in order to evade the draft, began to patronize the Christian churches of their Maronite neighbors. A few years ago when the great Druze leader, al-Amīr Muṣṭafa Arislān, who had held many high governmental positions under the Turks, died, his funeral services were conducted according to the Sunni Moslem rites.

This principle must have attached itself to more than one of the secret religions in pre-Islamic days. It has its modern applications in the case of the Persian and Syrian Bahā'is, the Domneh Jews of Salonika (of whom the famous Turkish minister Djevid Bey is supposed to have been one), and the Stavriote[2] Greeks of Asia Minor who after the proclamation of the constitution in 1908 put off the Moslem garb and reasserted their Christianity which they had practiced in hiding.

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[1] Goldziher, *Le dogme et la loi*, trans. Félix Arin (Paris, 1920), pp. 169–170. See also *ZDMG*, *op. cit.*, LX, 213 *seq.*

[2] These crypto-Christian Greeks are called in the Levant "Mezzo-Mezzos." Leon Dominian, *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe* (New York, 1917), p. 277.

III. THE CULT OF THE CALF

The Fact:—Persistent local rumor continues to associate "calf worship" with the Druze religion, but the Druzes themselves have with equal persistence and vehemence denied it. No worse curse could even today be levelled against a Druze in the Lebanon than to call him "calf worshiper." Certain travelers like Pococke[1] gave credence to the report; others including Volney[2] rejected it. That there is jealously guarded and hidden from the uninitiate eye, in one of their leading places of seclusion (*khalwah*), of which there are about forty in the Lebanon,[3] some gold figure of a calf or bull inside of a silver box has been almost ascertained beyond doubt. A high Druze sheikh has practically admitted in a recent interview the existence of such a box.[4] Paul Casanova reports in the *Revue archéologique*[5] the discovery of a baked clay figure of a ram or sheep with the name of al-Ḥākim inscribed on it. Passages in the tracts of Ḥamzah[6] and Bahā'-al-Dīn[7] referring in a derogatory manner to the "calf" and the "worshipers of the calf" are not lacking, but one passage in the epistle entitled *al-Asrār* (Secrets or Mysteries) has clear and unmistakable reference to "the box in which is the figure of the incarnation of our Lord."[8]

Its Interpretation:—The question, in view of the secrecy that surrounds the cult and the ambiguity of some of the references, is one of interpretation. De Sacy[9] explains the calf as the emblem of *Iblīs* (devil), the enemy and rival of al-Ḥākim. Colonel

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[1] *A Description of the East*, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[2] Volney, *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie* (Paris, 1825) (*Œuvres*, t. II), p. 409.

[3] Article "Durūz," *Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif*, ed. B. Bustāny (Beirūt, 1876–1900).

[4] W. B. Seabrook, "The Golden Calf of the Druzes," *Asia* (New York), March, 1926. See also *Revue de l'Orient*, X, 238.

[5] Year 1891, "Figurine en terre cuite avec inscription arabe." See also Blochet, *Le Messianisme*, *op. cit.*, p. 98, n. 1.

[6] *Al-Ghāyah w-al-Naṣīḥah*, MS. In *al-Sīrah al-Mustaqīmah*, MS., the statement is made that in Plato's (*Iflāṭūn*) legislation there was no "calf worship."

[7] *Risālat al-Wādi*, MS.

[8] This epistle is printed in part in Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

[9] *Exposé*, *op. cit.*, II, 235.

Churchill states that Ḥamzah, indignant at the treachery of his emissary, Darazi, denounced him as the "calf whom a deluded people had set up as their idol."[1] Lieut.-Col. Conder considers it "a relic of older paganism" which they keep in their solitary meeting places "only to treat with insult and contempt."[2]

If and when the calf cult is proved in the case of the Druze religion, some connection will then be sought with earlier cognate Israelitish and Egyptian cults. Animal worship has greatly figured in Oriental religions, and Christianity bears traces of its survival.

IV. SEVEN PRECEPTS OF ḤAMZAH

Eight Dogmas:—The chief dogmas of Druze belief, which we have hitherto tried to analyze and trace back to Moslem, Christian, Jewish, Neo-Platonic and Manichaean ancestry can be summed up under eight main formulas.

The first dogma is the confession of the unity of God. The second is the belief in successive manifestations of the deity in human fc.m. The third is the acceptance of al-Ḥākim as the last and greatest of these divine incarnations. The fourth is the recognition of the five superior ministers who partake of the divine essence. The fifth is the consideration of Ḥamzah, the first minister, as the supreme ruler of the age (*Wali-al-Zamān*). The sixth is the belief in the philosophic concept of predestination. The seventh is the belief in the transmigration of souls. The eighth is the observance of the seven precepts of Ḥamzah who, on behalf of al-Ḥākim, absolved his followers from the obligations of Islam and instituted these new precepts for them.

The obligations of Islam, the so-called "five pillars," are: the testimony that God is one and that Muḥammad is his apostle, fasting, prayer, pilgrimage, and almsgiving. No one who does not practice these five can have any claim on orthodox Islam.

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[1] Charles H. Churchill, *The Druzes and Maronites under the Turkish Rule* (London, 1862), p. 12.

[2] *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, op. cit., p. 234.

Ḥamzah's Precepts:—The first precept of Ḥamzah enjoins veracity in speech; the second, protection and mutual aid to the brethren in faith; the third, renunciation of all forms of former worship and false belief; the fourth, repudiation of the devil (*Iblīs*) and all forces of evil; the fifth, confession of the unity of the Ḥākim-God; the sixth, acquiescence in his acts no matter what they be; and the seventh, absolute submission and resignation to his divine will in both secret and public.[1] 771 779

Sources and Operation:—The first two precepts enunciated by the founder of Druzism are ethical in their nature and therefore difficult to trace back to their origin. The genealogy of the third and fourth is likewise difficult to ascertain. The fifth is the dogma we treated before, and the rest are corollaries from that dogma. The operation of the first precept is, of course, circumscribed by the already established law of dissimulation.

Of these principles the second has perhaps been the most potent force in the life and history of the Druze people. It has made of the Druze community one compact social body, presenting more the aspects of a religious fraternal order than a sect. This fraternal feature is one of the distinctive characteristics of the Druze people and has, in a large measure, contributed to their survival to the present day. It has enabled them at the time of crisis to act in unison and as one body moved primarily by motives of self-interest and by the instinct of self-preservation.

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[1] These precepts occur in most of their leading religious tracts.

[p.52]

Chapter VII

FOLKLORE

771 769 171 *Animism and Saint Worship:*—With the semi-, or quasi-, religious popular beliefs held by the Druzes of today which do not figure in their books and learned system—if indeed system it be—we are not particularly concerned in this study. Such beliefs represent, in general, animistic, pantheistic and polytheistic remnants of ancient beliefs which those people held before their admission into, and profession of, Islam. Many of them, under some form or other, are shared by their neighbors, Christian and Moslem alike. The belief in magic and in the evil eye is potent and widespread.

A venerable oak-tree in 'Ālayh, Lebanon, by which I passed many times, was ordinarily so bedecked with colorful rags from the clothes of pious Druze passers-by that its fame spread throughout the land under the name of "The Mother-of-Rags Oak-Tree."

769 The sight of Druze men and women walking a distance of miles, barefoot, to visit some *wali* tomb, particularly that of al-Sayyid 'Abdullāh al-Tanūkhi in 'Abayh,[1] is familiar to all those who have lived for any length of time in south Lebanon. This cult of the dead, a form of polytheism, is strong among them as it is among other Eastern peoples.[2]

771 786 *Charges of Licentious Practices:*—Ever since the days of the Nuṣayri, whose charges of immorality against the Druzes solicited a special reply from Ḥamzah,[3] and the days of Benjamin of Tudela

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[1] See Appendix F.

[2] For other illustrations of the folklore, see "Druzes" in *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement*, 1889, pp. 120–126.

[3] *Al-Radd 'ala al-Risālah al-Dāmighah li-al-Fāsiq al-Nuṣayri*, MS.

who visited the Lebanon around 1165 A.D. and wrote that the Druzes "live incestuously" and once every year assemble and "hold promiscuous intercourse,"[1] similar charges have been brought against them, as they are against most secret cults, without much to substantiate them. There is, however, more to justify charges of nocturnal orgies and phallic worship against the Nuṣayriyyah of Syria and the 'Ali-Ilāhis of Lūristān.[2] 771 786

The secrecy with which the Druzes hold their Thursday evening meetings in their secluded *khalwahs*, which meetings are attended also by the initiated women sitting behind a partition, has undoubtedly contributed to the rise of such suspicions. The *khalwahs* usually crown the hilltops, and the meetings consist principally of the perusal and explanation of the sacred writings, some of which are chanted. The writings of Ḥamzah and Bahā'-al-Dīn, together with the commentaries of al-Sayyid 'Abdullāh, constitute the favorite readings. The early part of certain sessions is open for the uninitiated Druzes. The latter part of the evening is usually consumed with political and social discussions.

Ḥamzites versus Darazites:—Nevertheless, it is admitted by the Druzes themselves that Darazi, the disreputed missionary whose name the Druzes reluctantly bear, in order to swell the ranks of his converts did sanction some licentious and libertine principles. But he was later discredited and deposed by his superior Ḥamzah from the position he aspired to maintain as the head of the Druze religion.[3] The liberties introduced by Darazi were evidently too seducing in their appeal to be entirely abandoned and to this day the line of cleavage between the purer 795 771

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[1] *Early Travels in Palestine ... Travels of Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela* (London, 1848), p. 80. This "*fête des bougies*" is described by "St. Ed." in *Revue de l'Orient*, 2e sér. (Paris, 1841), IV, 140.

[2] Sir Henry Layard, *Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, and Babylonia* (London, 1887), I, 217 and II, 318; C. R. Conder, *Syrian Stone-Lore* (London, 1896), p. 423.

[3] Ḥamzah denounces him bitterly in a tract entitled *al-Ghāyah w-al-Naṣīḥah*, MS.

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and more orthodox Ḥamzites and the Darazites is noticeable. In the introduction of his unscrupulous libertinism, Darazi was following the precedent of the Qarāmiṭah,[1] sometimes called the "free-lovers" and the "Bolsheviks of Islam."

Family Organization:—In their family life, the Druzes, under Christian influence, strictly adhere to the monogamous form of organization; but divorce is easy. The *Encyclopaedia of Islam*,[2] probably misled by Volney,[3] erroneously states that they allow polygamy. They intermarry among themselves only.

* * *

Summary and Conclusion:—On the whole it might be said that the immediate origins of the Druze religion should be sought in the multitudinous heterodoxies of the Shī'ah and schools of thought which split early Islam asunder, and the ultimate origins in Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism and Manichaeism. What makes its study especially interesting and valuable[4] is the fact that while most of those systems from which the eclectic Druze founders drew their material have perished and become extinct, the Druze religion is still virile and strong and its followers are today numerous and aggressive enough to attract international attention.

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[1] Al-Baghdādi, ed. Hitti, pp. 175–176, 180. According to the same authority the Khārijite Maymūniyyah (p. 169) sanctioned the marriage of grandchildren to grandparents, and nieces to uncles.

[2] Article "Druzes."

[3] *Op. cit.*, I, 425.

[4] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, *op. cit.*, chap. LVII, n. 68, states with regard to this religion that "The little that is, or deserves to be, known may be seen in the industrious Niebuhr, and the second volume of the recent and instructive *Travels* of M. de Volney."

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APPENDICES

CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM THE DRUZE SACRED WRITINGS

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Appendix A

COVENANT OF INDUCTION INTO THE RELIGION OF THE RULER OF THE AGE

(MĪTHĀQ WALI-AL-ZAMĀN)

My trust I lay in our lord al-Ḥākim, the only one, the unique, the eternal; he who is above duplication and number.

So and so the son of so and so, being sound in mind and body, and out of his own free will and accord, without duress and constraint, confesses, in a way that makes it binding upon himself and can be used as a testimony against his soul, that he has hereby renounced all sects, doctrines, religions and beliefs—no matter what their character may be; that he now recognizes nothing but obedience to our lord al-Ḥākim (may the mention of his name be glorified!), obedience being adoration; that he shall not include in his worship anyone else, past, present or expected; that he has surrendered his soul, his body, his possessions, his children and everything he owns to our lord al-Ḥākim (may the mention of his name be glorified!); and that he has acquiesced in all his decisions—be they for or against him—without objecting to, or disapproving of, any of his [al-Ḥākim's] actions, whether they be pleasing or displeasing to him. In case he forsakes the religion of our lord al-Ḥākim, to which he submits by this writing and which he holds as a witness against his soul, or uses it as a cover for some other religion, or disobeys any of its commandments, then he is no more entitled to the protection of the Creator the adored, and is deprived of all the advantages bestowed by the ministers [of the Unitarian religion], and merits the chastisement meted out by al-Bār[1] the exalted (may the mention of his name be glorified!).

[1] One of the honorific titles of al-Ḥākim. See *supra*, p. 20.

771 Whoso confesses that to him there is no god in heaven worthy
777 of adoration, and no *imām* on earth in a state of existence
782 other than our lord al-Ḥākim (may the mention of his name be glorified!), becomes one of the victorious Unitarians.

Written in such a month of such a year of the era of the servant of our Lord[1] (may the mention of his name be glorified!) and of his slave, Ḥamzah ibn-'Ali ibn-Aḥmad, he who guides those who respond, and wreaks vengeance on the polytheists and apostates by means of the sword of our Lord (may the mention of his name be glorified!) and by the great force of his power alone.

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[1] Al-Ḥākim is the Lord, and Ḥamzah is his servant.

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Appendix B

AL-ḤĀKIM'S ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE USE OF WINE

In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful. 771

Praise be to Allah who has rendered Islam strong and 779
dear through its pious saints, and has entrusted its laws to the 671
imāms of his religion and to his blessed confidants who have 782
preserved them! And may Allah's grace be upon our grandfather Muḥammad, the seal of the prophets and the chief of all messengers—may Allah's grace be upon him and upon all members of his holy family!

The Commander of the Believers, duly authorized by Allah and entrusted by him with the management of the affairs of both religion and state over which his word is supreme, is devoting all his energy, judgment, and deliberations to defend these two institutions, to guard them against any damage that may find its way into them, to promote their interests and welfare, to strengthen the agencies that make firm their foundations, to give preference to whatsoever maintains their organization, and to preserve whatever alterations and modifications have been introduced for their perfection and completion. Allah (may he remain majestic and glorious!) accords his support to the Commander of the Believers in all that conforms to his favor, and enables him to succeed in accomplishing whatever makes him merit his favor and pleasure and deserve his grace and his power.

Verily the measure that will produce the most useful results 771
to Islam and the Moslems, and that will contribute more than 779
any other measure to the maintenance of the fundamentals of 671
our religion, is to declare a general prohibition for everybody 273
against the use of intoxicating liquor, and to deny them the right of insisting upon the drinking of intoxicating liquor which

771 is the center of all sorts of evil and the conductor to all kinds of
779 detestable and abhorrent acts.
671
273 The Commander of the Believers has therefore ordained, expecting from Allah success, that this edict be written so that it be read to the privileged classes as well as to the common people, whether they be high in rank or low, making illegal the use of any kind of intoxicating liquor, no matter what its brand, name, color or taste may be (liquor being used here to include every kind of drink, whether it be intoxicating in large or in small quantities), and prohibiting all resort to the sayings and opinions justifying its use together with all interpretations and excuses which the rabble hold fast to; for the Commander of the Believers has declared all that illegal, after having heard all things connected with it. He has prohibited the use of intoxicating liquor, its purchase, storage, manufacture, and extraction to the end that the whole empire may be purified of its evil effects.

The execution of this edict he has left as a trust in the hands of those of his officials who are ever loyal to him, and as a sign of allegiance in charge of his counsellors and those who are faithful to him, holding them responsible for investigating all cases and submitting full reports regarding their findings. The Commander of the Believers himself has thus become discharged before Allah of all responsibility and evil consequence in this world and in the next.

Let all the godly, the believers, and those included within the fold of true religion know that this is issued by the Commander of the Believers; and let them do accordingly. Let them unhesitatingly obey its command and beware of violating it; for the Commander of the Believers has prepared for the enemies of his ordinance painful punishment and shameful degradation.

And Allah alone is all-sufficient to the Commander of the Believers and the best one to depend upon.

Written in the month of Dhu-al-Qa'dah, 400.

Praise be to Allah alone, and may his grace be upon his Messenger, the seal of the prophets, as well as upon his holy family; and may he give them peace!

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Appendix C

EXCERPT FROM THE CHARTER FOUND POSTED ON THE WALLS OF THE MOSQUES ON THE OCCASION OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF OUR LORD AL-IMĀM AL-ḤĀKIM

The friend of Allah, the Commander of the Believers, has at last abandoned all mortals to themselves wandering in their desert and in their state of blindness which they had preferred to guidance—just as Moses had abandoned his people—until perdition came near attacking them while they were unaware. He made his exit from their midst while they were in a state of doubt regarding him, disagreeing among themselves and faltering between different opinions, neither rendering obedience to truth nor returning to the friend of Allah. Allah has said: "But if they had referred it to Allah, to his Apostle and to those in authority among them, it would have become clear to those of them who fail to understand it."[1]

O you people! The word of Allah (may he remain high!) is the most eloquent preacher, and what is clear from this sermon to you is your poverty and your need for the pardon of Allah (may he remain high!) and the pardon of his friend, the Commander of the Believers, upon whom Allah's peace is more abundant than upon you. Oblivion leads to negligence, negligence leads to rebellion, and rebellion leads to perdition. For Allah (may his name remain blessed and high!) has said: "But if they, having wronged themselves had come to thee asking Allah's forgiveness, and if the Apostle had asked forgiveness for them, they would surely have found Allah a for-

[1] *Cf.* Koran 4:85.

771 giving and merciful one."[1] The greatest of all sayers [Allah]
779 has also said: "Excepting those who shall repent and believe and
776 do righteous works,"[2] "for verily Allah loveth those who seek his indulgence and loveth those who wish to purify themselves."[3] Allah (may he remain blessed and high!) has moreover said: "And when my worshipers ask thee concerning me, [say] I am nigh unto them, ready to answer the supplication of him that calleth, when he calleth unto me."[4]

Hasten, therefore, hasten, O you people! If you stand upon a desolate tract of land, then your eyes shall be directed towards the first road[5] which was pursued by the Commander of the Believers (may Allah's peace be upon him!) when he disappeared. Assemble there, yourselves and your children, purify your hearts and make your intentions sincere toward Allah, the Lord of the universe. Repent before him in a true manner and beseech him by the best methods of supplication leading to pardon and forgiveness, so that he may show mercy to you by according you the return of his friend, and may turn his heart in compassion toward you; for he is mercy unto you and unto all his creation in accordance with what Allah (may he remain blessed and high!) has said to his Messenger [Muḥammad] (may Allah's grace be upon him and upon his kin!): "We have not sent thee other than as mercy unto all creatures."[6]

But beware, beware lest any of you should try to trace the steps of the Commander of the Believers (may Allah's blessing be upon him!), or should attempt to discover any information whatsoever![7] Cease not at the beginning of the road to reiterate

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[1] Koran 4:67.

[2] *Ibid.* 25:70.

[3] *Ibid.* 2:222.

[4] *Ibid.* 2:182.

[5] This is the road leading outside of Cairo toward al-Muqaṭṭam and which al-Ḥākim followed when he took his usual evening promenades including the last one resulting in his disappearance.

[6] Koran 21:107.

[7] This may indicate that Ḥamzah, who was probably the one who drew this Charter, had a hand in the conspiracy that resulted in the murder of al-Ḥākim.

your prayer: "Behold our dwelling place!" And when the time comes for mercy to dawn upon you then shall the friend of Allah [al-Ḥākim] appear before you by his own accord, well satisfied with your conduct, visible in your midst. 771 779 776

Persist in the practice of these exercises, by day and by night, until the last day arrives, and the hour of judgment strikes, and the door of mercy is closed, and vengeance befalls all people of disobedience and disbelief. "He is fully excused who has amply forewarned,"[1] he has nothing to blame upon himself with regard to your case: he has given you full warning.

This is addressed to the people of intelligence among you; it is they who are particularly meant by it. It is the will of Allah (may he remain blessed and high!), and through him all success is achieved.

Peace be upon whomsoever follows guidance, fears the evil results of impiety, and believes in the excellent words of his Lord!

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[1] A common Arabic saying.

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Appendix D

EXCERPT FROM THE EPISTLE ENTITLED AL-QUSṬANṬĪNIYYAH ADDRESSED BY BAHĀ'-AL-DĪN TO THE BYZANTINE EMPEROR CONSTANTINE[1]

771 As for what you say in the special canticle for the Eucharist
779 that "He suffered, was crucified in the time of Fayṭus, son of Qilāṭūs,[2] was buried and arose on the third day," it is all recorded in the Gospel of John, chapter two, where Jesus addressing the Jews said to them: "Destroy the temple and I will raise it up in three days."[3] The Jews refused to believe his word that he would build the temple in three days. But what he meant was the temple of his body. And having mentioned [later] to his disciples what he had said they believed in the book[4] and in the word. Such is the text in the Gospel of John.

You should therefore know, you assembly of saints, that what he meant by the three days of his disappearance is firstly the day in which he declared his mission and called all mankind to the religion of Unity and truth[5] and revealed himself to the nations as a "true God from a true God." By that he meant that the Creator (may his power remain exalted!) is existent in his creatures, and that he manifests himself to them, as he has predetermined, in forms similar to their forms, and that he is

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[1] Constantine VIII (1025–1028 A.D.).

[2] Pontius Pilate.

[3] *Cf.* John 2 : 19–22.

[4] Arabic *kitāb* referring to a book containing a revelation.

[5] Arabic *sidq*, always spelled in the Druze MSS. with a *sīn* instead of a *ṣād* so that the numerical value of the letters composing it may become 164, which is the number of the Druze ministers and missionaries.

not a nonentity so that it becomes necessary to use arguments to prove his existence to all his creation. Contemplate the truths of this assertion and beseech the Lord of guidance and might to accord you success.

As for the second day, that is the day of the appearance of the Paraclete.[1] Jesus has announced the Paraclete and predicted his coming, as Jesus has said in the Gospel of John: "Moses has written about me and predicted the mention of my name."[2] As for the Paraclete, he is Muḥammad, who is one of the legislators by whom I mean: Noah, Abraham, and Moses who appeared prior to the lord Messiah. And behold the saying of Jesus in the fifteenth chapter,[3] when he realized the coming of the Paraclete, *i.e.*, Muḥammad: "If you loved me you would rejoice at my departure to my Father, for my Father has a son who is greater than I. And now I have said this to you before it comes to pass, so when it comes to pass you shall believe in me." He did not say "believe in him." Then follows: "I shall not say many things to you, because the chief of this world shall come, and he has nothing in common with me. But this is so that people may know that I love my father."

The world withal never understood the meaning of his sayings. Jesus said that he [the Paraclete = Muḥammad] is the chief of this world only, and not of the next. This position, he—as well as the other legislators—attained, in fulfillment of the wisdom of the Creator, in order to have the case clear against mankind, one generation after another, and to render them subject to blame and condemnation; for they failed to follow what the Creator (may his power remain exalted!) had commanded them regarding the confession of Unity, which they forsook reverting by tradition to the worship of falsehood.

Referring to the Paraclete, Jesus said: "He has nothing in common with me." This is simply to inform you that he shall

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[1] Arabic *fāraqlīṭ* = Comforter, Holy Ghost.
[2] *Cf.* John 5 : 46.
[3] It is in John 14 : 28–31.

not call mankind to a belief in the adorable Unity, as the Lord [Ḥamzah] shall call you to find the Creator in the Ḥākim-God, worthy of adoration.

As for the third day, it is the rise of al-Mahdi[1] (may Allah's blessing be upon him!) in order to call mankind to the inner interpretation of the four books which show the people of truth the fact of Unity. These four books are: the Psalter, the Torah [Bible], the Evangile and the Koran.

His [al-Mahdi's] epistles and proofs were received in their time by Constantine, the emperor of the Christians, and there is no doubt but that a record thereof is kept by the leading savants of that period, because his message differed from that of the other legislators who are weak; he having called people to the belief in the last day signalized by the appearance of the lord Messiah.

When, then, a man of understanding considers, and when a wise man, wishing to learn, removes the veil from a wide-awake, seeing and knowing heart, he would find out that al-Mahdi (may peace be upon him!) appeared and called to a belief in the inner interpretation of the aforementioned four books in the days of Constantine I, and that the lord Messiah [Ḥamzah] appeared calling to a belief in Unity in the days of Constantine II. People of intelligence would certainly find in this something to restrain them; and anyone possessed with the least notions of the science of truths would find material for reflection.

The third day is the complement of the first, according to the seventh chapter of the Gospel of John.[2] When the brothers of Jesus said to him: "Depart from here, so that your disciples may see the things you are doing, because no one should do a thing in secret, and reveal yourself to the world," the brothers of Jesus had not then believed in him. So Jesus said to them: "As for my time it has not arrived in realization," by which

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[1] Sa'īd al-Mahdī, one of the missionaries preceding al-Ḥākim.

[2] John 7:6.

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he meant that his day was not yet completed. It is completed only when Jesus announces that he is ready to come again [into this world]. 771 777

By his saying, "As for your time it is always ready," he meant to inform them that the time in which he was going to declare the word of Unity was not yet completed and had not yet come, but that their time—that is the time of those who did not know the word of Unity—was always ready. That is the last day which is the completion of the first. In it he [the lord Messiah] has manifested his glory and his praise and has shown himself to his apostles as he had promised them in chapter sixteen,[1] saying: "I have come down from heaven not to do my will, but the will of him who sent me. The will of him who sent me is that whosoever obeys me him will I resurrect on the last day; for this is the pleasure of my Father. For everyone who sees the son and believes in him is entitled to everlasting life which is fixed to the last day."

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Written seven days before the end of Ṣafar, in the eleventh year of the era of the Ruler of the Age [Ḥamzah] at the end of the seventh year from the "disappearance [of al-Ḥākim] for our test."[2] This is the end; and praise be to our lord al-Ḥakim alone, and thanks to the Messiah of the nations [Ḥamzah] and their guide, his servant.

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[1] John 6:38–40 and 47.
[2] Corresponding to March 23, 1028 A.D.

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Appendix E

EXCERPT FROM BAHĀ'-AL-DĪN'S EPISTLE ENTITLED CHRISTIANITY

171 My trust I put in our lord the Ḥākim-God who is above
177 number and child, and my thanks I offer to his servant, the only Messiah [Ḥamzah]. From the eloquent servant,[1] the slave of our lord the guide and Messiah, to all those who seek rapprochement to the deity through the reality of the Eucharist and who, of all people of truth, hold fast to the belief in it [*i.e.*, the Eucharist] be they priest, bishop or patriarch. Peace be upon the people who profess Unity, who walk in the footsteps of the holy apostles, who know the creed of the trusted, truthful saints whose souls are pure, who are steadfast in their loyalty to the Lord according to the covenant they made with him pledging their own souls, and who offer their lives in the love of the loyal one, the high priest, the martyr of martyrs, John the Evangelist, who sustained for the sake of his Lord insult, slaughter and beheadedness![2]

One of the strangest things of the age is how these people have forgotten the fundamentals of their religion, followed what has been forbidden them regarding loyalty to *Iblīs* and Satan, confessed by themselves the practice of what according to their own books of worship is false and untrue, agreed among themselves to follow evil and iniquity, and have become widely known among the people of truth, near and far, for their wicked beliefs.

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[1] *I.e.* Bahā'-al-Dīn, the writer of this epistle.

[2] Bahā'-al-Dīn, who may have been a Christian apostate, confuses here John the Evangelist with John the Baptist, and in another place with John Chrysostom.

9: Hitti 3-5 (ca. 1926) 1928 MD1 Syria
Druze MD6

Where is then your loyalty to the Lord, O you assembly of hypocrites,[1] and where is your acceptance of his commandments, O liars, if you believe in him and trust in his return for the salvation of the people of truth from their sins? Did he not command you in the third chapter of the Gospel of Matthew saying: "Love your enemies, bless them who curse you, do good to them who do evil to you, pray for them who drive you away by force and chase you out haughtily and arrogantly; so that you may become children to your father who is in the heavens, who makes his sun to shine upon the good and the evil, and his rain to fall upon the righteous and the wicked? For if you love those who love you, what reward or credit should be given you? Even the Pharisees may do this very thing itself."[2]

O you stiff-necked and stupid ones, the remnant of idol worshipers! You have neither accepted him who gave you his commandment, recognized and remembered the one who announced to you beforehand his coming and directed his grace toward you, nor heard and obeyed his command.

O liars! You rather have violated the covenant of his command, you assembly of hypocrites, and disobeyed the word of the Lord who forbade you to obey satans. In this, you traitors, you have followed the example of the rebellious Jews who killed and scared the prophets. Likewise you have perpetrated evil and mischief against those who announced the coming of the lord Messiah, and practiced polytheism and real atheism which he forbade. You then persecuted the apostles and among them the learned one—the faithful and truthful sheikh—and in so doing you have deviated from the straight path, and forsaken the laws of the people of reality and of true religion, following the example of the priests and chiefs of the Jews in

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[1] In the preceding Epistle to Constantine, Bahā'-al-Dīn addresses the Christians as "assembly of saints," because he was then still hopeful of winning them to the Druze religion.

[2] *Cf.* Matthew 5 : 44–47.

their dealing with the worshipful and kneeling Christians and in their rise to repel by unbelief and apostasy the word of the Lord after it had appeared.

Your case, you vicious ones, from the standpoint of deafness, imbecility and blindness, is similar to the case of a dumb animal, which, seeing by its side a man sympathizing with it because of some harm that has befallen it, gives him a painful kick that makes it impossible for him to administer the good he meant to administer to it. Such is your case, you who are too deaf to hear the truth and who refuse to accept the parables of the true Messiah.

Look, you heedless, but whence are you to get the right eye? And understand, but how are you to understand these parables extracted from the clear mines of truth? In the sixth chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, he said to the people: "Verily I say to you, the taxgatherers and hypocrites shall get into the kingdom of heaven before you, because John brought you the path of the Lord and of justice, and you did not believe him, although you saw him with your very eyes." You did not repent for what you had done, and did not believe in what you saw. You neither accepted the sermon of this clear wisdom nor respected the right of those who relate themselves to the Christian nation.

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APPENDIX F

EXHORTATIONS AND PRAYERS BY AL-SAYYID 'ABDULLĀH AL-TANŪKHI[1]

I

EXHORTATION TO THE 'ĀQIL[2]

It is incumbent upon the 'Āqil that he should direct his energy 771
only to the next world, preparing for it the provisions of piety, 779
and not trusting this world which is a world of passage and not of settlement. He should begin with training his character, sensing its good qualities and purifying it from whatsoever alienates it from Allah (may he remain high!), such as bodily passion, greed for worldly possessions, anger, revenge, ill-temper, pride over others, and self-regard—all of which stand as a screen between him and the knowledge of his Creator (may he remain high!). And if he is thus screened from the knowledge of his Creator, he then becomes a victim to evil habits.

On the other hand, if the worshiper makes his chief ambition and desire the religion of Allah and the fear of him, holding fast to his commandments, abiding by his laws and turning his back upon what he has forbidden, then shall the Lord (may he remain high!) accord him success, bestow upon him his wisdom, and enlighten his heart rendering it like a polished mirror in which the divine facts are reflected. For wickedness, feebleness, evil whisperings and corruption lie dormant in the innermost part of

---

[1] Al-Sayyid 'Abdullāh, the last great commentator of the Druze religion, died in 1480 A.D.; and his tomb in 'Abayh, Lebanon, is annually visited by thousands of believers.

[2] Singular of 'Uqqāl = enlightened, initiated, wise. See *supra*, p. 42.

771 the souls; and if the light of Unity and gnosis[1] should shine upon
199 it, then all wickedness therein is destroyed, extinguished and exterminated—just as when the light of the sun shines, the light of the planets is eclipsed and entirely put out. Although the planets' light is extinguished in effect, yet it is in heaven in fact; but so long as the light of the sun is shining, the planets can produce no effect whatsoever. When the sun sets, however, then the planets will appear. Such is the case with the soul. As long as the light of reality and the knowledge of Allah (may he remain high!) are shining upon it, its darkness and its wickedness are dormant and have no trace; but in case wisdom and the knowledge of Allah (may he remain high!) set, then will evil qualities appear and reveal themselves in the same way as the stars reveal themselves when the sun sets.

Nothing, therefore, is more incumbent upon the *'Āqil* than to persevere in the religion of Allah, to abide by it day and night, and to bend every effort to keep the company of those who are useful and godly, so that they may add to his enlightenment. He should also imagine that Allah (may he remain high!) is with him, watching over him, and not departing from him for one wink of the eye. At all times should he be mentioning Allah's name, waiting upon him, and not neglecting him for one instant. He should fear no blame in the pursuit of truth, but should rather devote all energy and direct every sound mental power to the acquisition of the favor of the Lord of mankind, and the following of the path of right guidance which leads to victory on the last day.

II

COVENANT BETWEEN ALLAH AND SERVANT.

Said Allah: "O my servant, ten for thee and ten for me:—Be industrious and I shall give thee aid; demand, and I shall bestow; repent, and I shall forgive; thank, and I shall increase; depend, and I shall suffice; strive, and I shall give thee success;

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[1] Arabic *ma'rifah* — knowledge.

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beseech, and I shall respond; be content, and I shall enrich thee; 771 777
ask and I shall give."[1]

III

PRAYER

O my God! Here is thy runaway slave returning to thy door, 771
thy disobedient slave coming back for reconciliation, thy sinning 777
slave bringing to thee his excuse. Pardon me by thy indulgence, 782
accept me through thy bounty, and look unto me with thy mercy. O God! Forgive me my past iniquity, and guard me against committing iniquity in the remaining days of my life; for in thy hand is all good, and unto us thou are compassionate and merciful.

IV

PRAYER TO BE RECITED BEFORE SLEEP

In thy name, my Lord, I lay down my side; and in thy name, 771
I lift it up. Protect me, O my God, against thy punishment on 777
the day in which thou gatherest together thy creatures. In thy 782
name, O Lord, I live and I die; and in thee I seek refuge against the evil of my own self, as well as against the evil of every creeping creature subject to thy control. Thou art the first: so before thee there is naught. Thou art the last: so after thee there is naught. O my Lord! Thou hast made my soul, and thou protectest it; thine is its death, and thine is its life. If thou, therefore, causest it to die, wilt thou pardon it; and if thou permittest it to live, wilt thou preserve it?

O my Lord! I beseech thee for health. I pray thee to awaken me at the hour that is most agreeable to thee, and to use me in the kind of work that is most acceptable to thee. Let thy grace draw me nigh unto thy favor, and alienate me from thy wrath. As I pray thee, grant my request; as I seek thy pardon, forgive me; and as I call upon thee, answer my prayer. "In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate."

---

[1] This extract and the following prayers suggest Moslem Ṣūfi origin.

771 "Allah! There is no god but he, the living, the eternal.
779 Slumber doth not seize him, nor sleep. His is whatsoever is in
782 the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth. Who is he that can intercede with him but by his own permission? He knoweth what hath been before them and what shall be after them; yet naught of his knowledge shall they grasp, save what he willeth. His throne reacheth over the heavens and the earth, and the upholding of both burdeneth him not—and he is the high, the great!"[1]

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[1] Koran 2:256.

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

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SYRIA AND LEBANON

A Political Essay

by

A. H. HOURANI

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DEDICATION

To MY PARENTS and MISS RAY

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria

PREFACE

121 THE course of events during the war, in underlining afresh the importance of the Middle East in international politics and strategy, has drawn attention to the lack of up-to-date studies on this region. The present is the first of several books which Chatham House plans to issue on Middle Eastern countries and problems. In Syria and Lebanon, with their diversities of religious, political, cultural and economic outlook, and the legacy of their status as Mandated Territories, most of the issues which affect the Middle East as a whole are to be seen in their most complex and baffling forms. No authoritative work has appeared in English on these questions during the last twenty years, and Mr. Hourani is, by background, training and recent experience, exceptionally qualified to present a reliable survey of their character and their wider bearings.

ASTOR
Chairman of the Council

Chatham House,
St. James's Square,
London, S.W.1.
July 1945

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS book, like all political works written in war-time, suffers from certain defects. At a time when the face of the world changes so rapidly and the process of publication takes so long it is inevitable that books on current political problems should be partly out of date as soon as they are published. Moreover, there are important and delicate subjects which in normal times would require the fullest treatment but now can only be dealt with tentatively and circumspectly, if at all. Three chapters, in particular, are affected by these reservations. In Chapter VIII, which deals with foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon, I have analyzed those interests as they existed in 1939, leaving it to the reader to estimate how much they and the policies based upon them will have changed when the war comes to an end. In Chapter XII the narrative of events during the war years ends with the assumption of office by nationalist Governments in the middle of 1943; but the controversial happenings of later months are summarized in a postscript. At the same time, Anglo-French relations in the Levant since 1941 have only been treated in outline, without insistence upon painful detail. Finally, the discussion of Arab unity in Chapter XIII should be reviewed in the light of the series of conferences and discussions which began in Alexandria in September, 1944, after the book was substantially completed. In spite of these deficiencies I have decided to allow publication of the book to proceed because of the importance and urgency of some of the problems with which it deals.

At all stages of its growth my book has owed more than I can say to the many friends and colleagues who have helped me to an understanding of Middle Eastern politics, brought relevant information to my notice and read parts of the manuscript. I am particularly conscious of my many-sided debt to Dr. C. Malik, Dr. C. Zurayq, Professor H. A. R. Gibb, Mr. H. Beeley and Commander C. Schaeffer. More perhaps than they know they have influenced my thinking upon Arab questions, and what positive ideas the book contains mostly derive from one or other of them. I owe a debt of another kind, but equally great, to various members of the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and

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the Oxford University Press, who prepared the book for publication during my absence from England. To all who have helped in any way I must express my warmest thanks.

A. H. HOURANI

London, 1945

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INTRODUCTION

1

THIS essay springs from a number of beliefs about Near Eastern affairs, which have been constantly in the author's mind during the writing of it, and to clarify which was the main reason for its being undertaken. They may be summarized as follows :

(i) The spread of Western influences since the beginning of the nineteenth century has caused a fundamental change in the life of Syria and Lebanon, as in that of the other Arabic-speaking countries. The process of change has raised two questions which cannot wholly be separated from one another : first the question of forming a unity out of the two civilizations, their own and that of the West, between which the Arabic-speaking peoples are torn ; and secondly, the question of establishing a 'healthy' relationship, based upon equality and mutual respect, between them and the peoples of the West.

(ii) The solution of these two problems is of great importance not only for the Arabs themselves but also for the West, since the West now possesses living and inescapable relations, both moral and material, with the Arab lands.

(iii) Arab nationalism is the political form of the response which the existence and the consciousness of these problems has aroused among the Arabs. It is an attempt to defend the existence of the Arab community against forces which threaten to disrupt it, and to control and direct the process of Westernization in the light of principles which the Arabs accept as valid.

(iv) Arab nationalism is still an unformed movement and has not yet decided its attitude towards the West. There are two paths which it can follow, which may be called those of 'excommunication' from and of 'communion' with the West. The movement may become primarily one of opposition to the West, borrowing only the technical skill of Europe and America in order the better to resist both the encroachments of Western States and the challenge of the

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121 Western spirit. It may, on the other hand, become a movement for the reconstruction of Arab society through a fundamental assimilation of the best elements in Western life (although not necessarily by imitation of them); in this task the help of Western Governments and peoples will be essential.

For the sake both of the Arabs and of the West, it is essential that the nationalist movement should take the second of these paths. If it takes the first, it will become impossible to establish a 'healthy' relationship with Europe, and nationalism itself will turn into a purposeless movement of hatred and fanaticism. This will distort not only the political development of the Arabs, but their life in all its aspects.

(v) Which of the two paths it will take will depend upon many factors. Among the most important of them are: the attitude of the Western Powers to the Arabs; the changes in Arab social and economic life; and the development of the Arab intellect. But the most important factor, and perhaps the least easy to predict, is the relationship which is established between Islam and a Westernized society, and between Islam and Christianity.

(vi) In the great changes which are remoulding the life of the Arabic-speaking peoples, Syria and Lebanon have a peculiarly important part to play. On account of their geographical situation, their traditions and certain characteristics of their people, they can serve as mediators of Western civilization to Arab Asia. But they can only carry out this function if their political relations with the other Arab regions and with the Western Powers are defined in a satisfactory manner.

It is therefore of particular importance to study the problem of Westernization in Syria and Lebanon, and to make clear the conditions under which a unity or a balance can be established between the traditional and the new elements in the life of the Syrians and Lebanese, and between them and the Western peoples with whom they are in contact.

This essay is an attempt to consider these problems in their

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political aspect. It tries to make clear the effect of changing spiritual, intellectual and social conditions upon political life; the attempts which are being made to establish new political forms adequate to the needs of a new age; and the relations of Syria and Lebanon with one another, with the other Arabic-speaking countries and with the Western Powers.

The first part of the book summarizes the history of Syria and Lebanon, with particular attention to the successive forms of government to which they have been subjected, the relations of those Governments with local communities, and the various influences which have helped to mould the nature of the inhabitants; the process by which French rule was established is described in some detail. Part Two analyzes the general problem which lies at the root of almost all the political difficulties of the present period: the problem of a traditional society changing fundamentally under the impact of Western civilization. The effects of this impact on the economic, social and intellectual life of Syria and Lebanon are sketched; its effects in the political sphere are discussed at length. It is shown how the contact between old and new has given rise to the Arab nationalist movement. The nature and weaknesses, the internal and external difficulties of nationalism are described; and especially the difficulties which spring from the existence of a number of important minorities. This part ends with a summary of the interests of the Western Powers in Syria and Lebanon. Part Three contains a narrative of political history from the beginning of the French occupation to the present day. It deals mainly with the conflict between French policy and the aspirations of the nationalists, and summarizes the steps which have been taken and the statements made since the Allied occupation of 1941. Finally, Part Four sets forth the principles upon which must rest a successful definition of the relations of France with Syria and Lebanon, and of France and Great Britain in Syria and Lebanon. It ends with some general considerations upon the path which the Arab movement might profitably take.

In the course of the book questions are raised too numerous, complex and profound to be disposed of in so slight a work. The author has laid his main emphasis upon certain of them, and in a perhaps arbitrary manner has chosen only to touch the surface of others; for example, the social and economic bases of Arab nationalism are dealt with in a summary fashion.

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128 Other questions which would call for full discussion in a comprehensive treatise have been wholly ignored. The work has been described as an essay in order to indicate these limitations in its scope, no less than to avoid making too high a claim for the studies and experience upon which it is based.

2

121 101 It is important to make clear the way in which the term 'Syria' is used in the title and the text. Confusion has sometimes arisen from its use in several different senses: (i) In the past it has often been used to refer to the whole area stretching from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai Peninsula in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea on the west to the Syrian Desert on the east. This area constitutes in many ways a single geographical unit, and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense a single people. (ii) After the War of 1914-1918 this geographical unit was divided into two political areas; the southern area, which includes the regions now known as Palestine and Transjordan, was placed under a British Mandate, and the northern under a French. The term 'Syria' is sometimes used to refer to the whole northern area. (iii) This northern area was subdivided by the Mandatory Power into several political units, to which was given the collective name of 'Les États du Levant' or 'The Levant States'. From 1925 to 1936 they were four in number: the States of Syria and Greater Lebanon, or, as they are now called, the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and the Governments of Latakia (known at first as the 'State of the Alawis') and Jebel Druze. In 1936 the two Governments were formally annexed to the State of Syria, and were known no longer as 'Governments' but as 'Provinces'. Thus the term 'Syria' is often used in a third sense, to refer to the State of Syria, before 1936 excluding, and since then including, Latakia and Jebel Druze.

The explicit subject of this essay is 'Syria' in the second of the three senses defined above. This area will ordinarily be referred to as 'the French Mandated Territories', 'Syria and Lebanon' or 'the Levant States'. In the historical chapters (I-IV), however, it has been necessary to deal in general with the larger, geographical unit of the first definition. In these chapters, therefore, the term 'Syria' will be used to

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cover the whole of that unit, which will normally be referred to as 'geographical Syria'. Elsewhere in this book the word 'Syria' will only be employed to describe the State of Syria or Syrian Republic: that is, in the third sense. 121 101

All these terms are used simply for convenience and without any desire to prejudice the questions, which will be touched upon in the course of the essay, whether and on what grounds the political separation of the British from the French Mandated Territories, and of Syria from Lebanon, was justified.

PART ONE

I. THE HISTORY OF SYRIA[1]

I

101 EVEN were there no Syrian people a Syrian problem
131 would still exist. Syria owes its political importance less to the qualities of its population than to its geographical position. Before its history can be fully understood, it is necessary to grasp the nature of the land and its relation with the surrounding world.

Syria is part of a larger area which may be treated as a single unit, in the sense that the course of affairs in one part of it has always had a peculiarly close relationship with that in some or
131 all of the other parts. The southern base of this area is the
133 Arabian peninsula, bounded on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the east by the Persian Gulf. The west of the peninsula, the Hejaz and Yemen, is hilly and in parts fertile, and so too is a smaller area in the south-east; but the greater portion of the interior is fit only for pasturage, except in the oases. In the south, it is a sandy waste, in the centre, Nejd, a dry, hilly and often stony steppe. North of Nejd there is another belt of sand; and north of this belt is the dry steppe of the Syrian Desert, growing narrower as it goes northwards. Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the 'Fertile Crescent', a belt of cultivable land bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which run southwards through it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian Gulf; this is Iraq or Mesopotamia. The Fertile Crescent is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south-east by the head-waters of the Persian Gulf. In the north and east it is hemmed in by mountain-ranges: to the north the Taurus Mountains, the southern part of the Anatolian highlands which stretch across Asia Minor, to the north-east the mountains of Kurdistan, and to the east the Persian plateau. Joined to the western part of the Fertile Crescent by the peninsula of Sinai, but separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, is the land of Egypt, the fertile valley of the Nile surrounded by sandy deserts.

[1] In Chapters I–IV the word 'Syria' is used to refer to 'geographical Syria' as defined in the Introduction.

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/13/ Thus the boundaries of Syria may be defined as the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Mediterranean to the west, Sinai and Hejaz to the south, and northern Mesopotamia and the Syrian Desert to the east. Its length is rather more than 500 miles, and the breadth of its cultivable area varies between 100 and 150 miles.

2

133 It is itself split up into several regions clearly marked off from one another by main lines of division running roughly from north to south, with subsidiary lines running from east to west. The first region is the Mediterranean coastal belt, in some places broad enough to be called a plain, for example the plain of Akkar, but in others no more than a narrow strip; [504] in general, it broadens as it goes south. Although it has few good natural harbours, it is studded with famous ports: Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Haifa and Jaffa. East of it is a highland belt: the Amanus in the north, then the Jebel Ansariyah, rising to some 5,000 ft., then Lebanon, of which the peaks reach 10,000 ft., and then the Palestinian hills, bounded on the south by the arid district of the Negeb. This belt is scarred with the valleys of streams flowing westwards to the sea, and cut across by a number of gaps, through some of which rivers flow: the plain of Antioch, the gap between Tripoli and Homs and the plain of Esdraelon. East of these ranges runs a line of comparatively narrow depressions varying in character from north to south. In the north there are the plain of al-Amq, the Orontes valley and the Ghab marshes; south of them lies the Biqa' valley; then the broken country in which lie the sources of the Jordan; then the swampy district of Hulah; then the narrow valley of the Jordan, lying below sea-level, opening out at one point into the Sea of Galilee and ending in the Dead Sea; and finally the Wadi Araba, leading down to the Red Sea at Aqaba. A number of important rivers run for part of their courses along these depressions: the Orontes flowing north and then west, the Litani south and then west, and the Jordan south. Here also lie the important lakes of Syria: those of Homs and Hulah, the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. The line of depressions is interrupted by the ridge of Baalbek, the watershed between the Orontes and Litani; and farther south is linked with the coastal plain by the Esdraelon Gap.

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Farther east there lies another belt of highlands. In the far 133
north it takes the form first of the Kurd Dagh hills, then of a plateau and a series of low ranges, south of which lies the range of Anti-Lebanon, facing Lebanon across the Biqa', and rising some 9,000 ft. above sea-level. South of Anti-Lebanon is Mount Hermon with its many valleys and its three peaks, the highest of which is over 9,000 ft. high. From Hermon the land drops into the Hauran plateau; south of it is the tableland of Transjordan, which itself ends in the steppe country of the northern Hejaz.

The northern plateau slopes eastwards until it reaches the 133
valley of the Euphrates flowing south-east. The eastward 311
slopes are in part cultivable land, but in part semi-desert and steppe, known sometimes as the 'Little Desert' to distinguish it from the Syrian Desert to the south of it. Around and across the Euphrates is a district known as the Jazirah, which is geographically part of Iraq but of which a portion lies within the political frontiers of the Levant States. It is a district of stony hills and plains, but fertile in the river valleys, those of the Euphrates itself and of its tributaries, the Balikh and the Khabur.

East of the Anti-Lebanon the country is somewhat different. There is no plateau sloping gently to a river valley, but the eastern flanks of the mountains lead down to a barren steppe, formed of stone and gravel, with sand-dunes and coarse vegetation: the Syrian Desert. In places the Desert comes up almost to the foot of the inner range; but in others it is held back by areas of cultivable land. One such is the Ghutah, the fertile land around Damascus, well wooded and well watered by its streams. To the south of it, but separated from it by a plain of lava, lies another cultivable region, the Hauran, a large basalt plateau open to rain-clouds coming from the Mediterranean through the Esdraelon Gap. In the east this plain rises into the hilly but fertile district of Jebel Druze, of which the peaks are 6,000 ft. above sea-level. South of the Jebel Druze, the highlands of Transjordan slope eastwards and die away in isolated hills.

While the general climatic régime is similar throughout, 132
there is great variety of temperature and rainfall in consequence of the sharp differences of relief and position. In all parts the rainy season is from October or November to April or May; but the amount of rainfall varies greatly from one

132 region to another. On some mountain heights it is over 40 in., while in the desert areas it sinks almost to nothing. The temperature also varies greatly, in general increasing from west to east and to a lesser extent from north to 132 south. The differences of rainfall and temperature, together 311 with such other factors as the presence or absence of rivers 241 and springs, give rise to great differences in fertility and vegetation. The coastal regions have a Mediterranean climate, and are often well watered both by rainfall and by rivers; they are suitable for cereals, tobacco and many kinds of fruit. The seaward slopes of the maritime ranges have a more temperate climate, and terraces of cultivable soil on which olive trees and vines can grow; but the eastern slopes are more barren. The central depression has a sub-tropical climate. Parts of it are well watered by rivers and are fertile. In the Jordan Valley, fruits can be cultivated, and cereals in the more northern parts of the inner depression. Much of the inner range is dry and barren; but on the plateaux of the north and of Transjordan there is sufficient rainfall to make possible the cultivation of cereals. This is true also of the Hauran and Jebel Druze. The Ghutah is suitable with irrigation for the growing of fruits of many kinds. East of the inner range the rainfall becomes scantier, the heat more intense, and the land less fertile; until finally it becomes too arid to be suitable for anything but pasturage. But across the Euphrates conditions change once more, and it is possible to grow cereals in the river valleys of the Jazirah.

3

131 The nature of Syrian history has been deeply affected by the structure and position of the land. It is largely a history of economic, political and other movements affecting the whole area of which Syria forms a part. To those movements Syria has served at times as a starting-point, at others as a terminus or a bridge.

439 The first of the movements has been that of world trade. Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East; and its own products, oil, grain, textiles and metal work, have at times found a market in the Western world. Another and more specialized trade has been that with

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the nomads of the Syrian and Arabian deserts, who have gone to the great towns of the Syrian interior to sell their products and supply their needs. In the economic as in every other sphere of life, the Arab hinterland has given a special colour to Syrian life.

Trade has tended to follow a limited number of routes, which have not varied much in principle from one generation to another. For the trade with Egypt there was the great route which went along the coast of Palestine by way of Gaza. For that with western Arabia, the route ran on the east of the Dead Sea by way of Maan or Petra, in what is now Transjordan; this was also the path taken by the Pilgrims' caravan which went yearly from Damascus to Mecca. The caravans for central Arabia went down the Wadi Sirhan to the oases of Nejd. In the other direction, routes went north-west from northern Syria through Cilicia into Asia Minor, and north-east through Urfa, Diarbekr and Mosul into Kurdistan, Persia and central Asia. Among the most important routes were those which linked the Mediterranean with India and farther Asia. There were a number of alternative routes. Goods might come by sea to southern Arabia, then by land up the western Arabian route to Damascus or some other centre. They might go up the Persian Gulf, and be landed at or near what is now Basra. From Basra several possibilities lay open: the caravans might make for Aleppo or its equivalent in north Syria, or for Damascus, Homs, or some other town in the centre. If they chose the former route, they could go on the west of the Euphrates and then across the Little Desert; or else up the Tigris to Baghdad or even Mosul, then across Mesopotamia to the Euphrates and on as before. If their destination was Damascus, at first they would take a similar path to that of the Aleppo caravan, and then skirt the southern edge of the Little Desert and pass through Palmyra to the great towns of central Syria. Once arrived in the towns of the Syrian interior, the goods would be carried down to the coast and shipped to the West: in northern Syria they would go by way of Latakia or the Gulf of Alexandretta; in central Syria by way of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon or Tyre.

Not all these routes were in full use at the same time. The noon of one was often the twilight of others. Their rise and decline was determined largely by political conditions both in Syria and in the neighbouring countries; but except in times

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

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abandoned the wandering life, taken to agriculture and mingled /67 with the settled population already established in the country, /74 which was itself largely the product of a similar process at an earlier time.

The immigrants from the Arabian peninsula brought with /74 them their distinctive customs and ideas and one or other of /144 the 'Semitic' family of languages. Together with Mesopotamia on the other side of the Fertile Crescent, Syria has been throughout history the place where what may, by a not very misleading simplification, be called the 'Semitic' stream of population and influences has met and mingled with other streams. She has served also as the limit of the emigration from Arabia. The Semitic peoples and their languages have never taken firm root beyond the Taurus Mountains. Even in Syria they have not been unopposed, but they have always been of great importance. A large proportion of the population of Syria can trace its descent at least in part to earlier or later immigrants from Arabia; and while Mediterranean and other influences have largely affected forms of government and the culture of the cities, the language and the customs of the countryside have always been predominantly Semitic.

The two sets of influences, that from Arabia and that from other directions, have interacted in various ways. There has been conflict at times, and at times peaceful mingling. Often tension of some sort has existed between the more predominantly Mediterranean and the more predominantly Arabian elements in the population, and between successive waves of settlers from the same source. Sometimes that tension has mirrored itself in the individual soul, which has felt itself drawn in two directions, towards the desert and towards the West. It is only very rarely, if at all, that the influences have blended so completely as to remove all tension. It is true that there has always been a tendency to that end. Rulers and settlers from the Mediterranean lands have to some extent adopted Semitic ways and Arabian immigrants have acquired some of the characteristics of a Mediterranean people. But the process has never been allowed to complete itself; further invasions have occurred, a new Government has established itself, or there have been further waves of immigration, and the process of assimilation has had to begin again.

177 Syria has not been merely a passive receptacle for influences
186 coming in from outside. Whether or not the hypothesis of an
184 indigenous population and culture be accepted, it is certain that the geographical structure of the country, and the nature of its inhabitants as modified by that structure, have determined the forms which the incoming streams of influence have taken. For example, the sharp geographical divisions of Syria have helped to perpetuate the differences between various elements in the population, which have come into the country from different directions or from the same direction at different times: racial and tribal divisions have given rise to an intense localism of feeling, which has linked itself in various ways with the prejudices, the hostilities and the exclusiveness generated by the great political and religious conflicts of the past. Localism and particularism have deeply affected the political life of the country. Sometimes, when Syria has formed part of a larger political unit with a strong Government, they have been held in check ; but when the unit has disintegrated, or the Government has grown weak, the country has been partitioned between a number of petty and ephemeral local dynasties, more often than not at variance with one another.

Local and communal feeling is closely linked with the persistence of tradition. Throughout almost the whole of history the Syrians have been subjected to a succession of foreign conquerors. They have been forced at least partially to accept the customs and cultures of their rulers, and in the process they have acquired two arts : the art of rapid and superficial assimilation, and that of preserving, beneath new modes of behaviour and in new forms, their old beliefs and ways of living. 'Bow down to every nation which passes over you, but remember me in your hearts', said one of the founders of the Druze sect. It is a lesson which not only the Druzes have learned.

179 But the role of the Syrian population has not merely been one of assimilating, or resisting, outside influences. It has transformed these influences and spread them to the surrounding world, and it has made its own and original contributions to civilization. From the time of the Phœnicians, Syrian merchants have been scattered throughout western Asia and the Mediterranean world. Syrian officials helped to administer the Roman, the Arab and the Ottoman Empires.

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Syrian writers and thinkers contributed to the culture of the Greek, the Latin and the Arabic languages. Even to-day, after centuries of stagnation, there are large and important Syrian mercantile communities in North and South America, in West Africa and elsewhere; and Syrian teachers, journalists, doctors and officials are to be found in all the countries of the Arabic world.

Above all, Syria is the birthplace of Christianity and Judaism. Ever since Europe became Christian, the principles by which its spiritual and moral life have been guided have come to it clothed in an imagery drawn largely from the beauties and way of life of Syria's countryside; and to the believer her very ground is holy.

5

As far back as our records go, the forces described above can be seen at work. The curtain of history rises on a Syria of which the population is already mainly Semitic, and is continually being reinforced in its Semitic character by fresh waves of immigration. For example, the Canaanites and the Phœnicians entered the country during the third millennium B.C., and the Hebrews and Aramæans in the second. At some time or another all of these peoples established States in different portions of the country. Thus a great part of coastal Syria was for many centuries under the control of the Phœnicians, who established trading centres throughout the Mediterranean and even beyond; and for a time a portion of southern Syria constituted a Hebrew State.

These Semitic States deserved well of mankind. The Phœnicians built up a trading system which covered the whole Mediterranean basin, and established colonies as far away from their homeland as France and Spain. But what they did is of small account compared with the record of the Jews. Their intense and stormy history was the channel through which the world came to knowledge of God; a knowledge which bore fruit among them in an unbending passion for righteousness and a matchless poetry of devotion.

From the earliest times Syria was in touch with Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor and the Ægean world, and usually the greater part of it was under the sway of foreign rulers. The whole or a large portion of the country was subdued successively by the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Persians,

and the Macedonian Greeks under Alexander the Great. Each of them established a Government for a time and left some mark on the life of the country. The Greek conquest in the fourth century B.C. had particularly important effects. Under the protection of the Government established by Alexander the Great and maintained with varying degrees of efficiency by his successors, the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, there grew up a number of Greek cities, centres of Hellenic life and thought in the Syrian countryside. They did not merely reflect the culture of their country of origin, but made their own contribution to it: more than one of the leading writers and thinkers of later Greek civilization lived in the Syrian towns. These cities gave as much to Syria as to Greek civilization: a new way of life and thought of which the power was seen in the complete Hellenization of many Syrians and in the development of a hybrid Greco-Syrian culture, a Greek grafted on to a Semitic stock.

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The Seleucid age was marked by local risings and the appearance of local principalities: for example, the revolt of the Maccabees and the re-establishment of a Jewish kingdom in Palestine. But at length an end was put to the disorder. In the first century B.C. the Syrian possessions of Alexander's successors were conquered by Rome. They remained a Roman and then a Byzantine province for seven hundred years. It was during this period, or at least during the early centuries of it, that the Mediterranean influences in Syrian life attained their greatest strength. The country became an important and integral part of a vast international unit which covered the whole Mediterranean world, and within which men, goods, and ideas could move freely. Both inside and outside their country Syrians found full scope for their talents. Syrian merchants played an important part in the economic life of the Empire, Syrian officials and generals in its political life; in the third century there were even Emperors from Homs and the Hauran.

The Romans' gift to the country was strong efficient rule, a framework within which the arts of peace could flourish. Their chain of frontier posts on the Euphrates and the edge of the Syrian Desert held back the Parthians to the east. The internal order which they established and their vast public

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works encouraged commerce and agriculture. Until the last phase there was little popular resistance to their rule, for they did not interfere with the life of the country. The Hellenistic cities were left to govern themselves and remained Greek in culture. They prospered greatly. Antioch, for example, was for a long time the most important town in the eastern half of the Empire; in it and its fellows the Greek language was cultivated by a succession of great writers, for example the poet Meleager and the satirist Lucian. Beside them, but not in opposition to them, there grew up Roman towns with a Latin culture. Beirut, for instance, became one of the centres for the study of the Roman law and produced jurists as notable as Ulpian and Papinian.

In the first phase of Roman rule, the petty Semitic dynasties which had partitioned the country under the later Seleucids were allowed to continue; later, most of them were suppressed and replaced by direct Roman rule. Even so the stream of Semitic influence remained unchecked. The Arabian trade routes still ended in Syria; the bazaar-towns of the interior, like Damascus, retained their Semitic character and their greatness. The language of the countryside was still Semitic: Aramaic for the most part, with an infiltration of Arabic during the later centuries. Strong government prevented the nomads from pillaging the sown land, but encouraged them to abandon the wandering life for that of the peasant. As ever, the infiltration and settlement of the nomads was largely a gradual and almost unnoticed process, but occasionally it attracted the attention of historians, when whole tribes such as the Tanukhids, Ghassanids and Taghlibids immigrated, or with the rise and fall of Semitic vassal states along the desert routes. One such was the Nabatæan State in Transjordan, which reached its height at the beginning of the first century A.D., and was destroyed by Trajan at the end; another was the Kingdom of Palmyra in the Syrian Desert, which, in the third century A.D., grew powerful enough to attempt to shake off the sovereignty of Rome and brought on itself its own destruction; a third was the Ghassanid state in the Hauran, Aramaic and Arabic in language, Monophysite Christian in religion, and mixed Arab and Greek in culture, which served Byzantium during the sixth century A.D. as a bulwark against the nomads of Arabia.

It was in the Roman period that Syria most deeply influenced

175 the Mediterranean world; for it was in this period that Syrians contributed most to the religious life of the West. Their contribution took many forms. Indigenous or long-established cults—the worship of the Sun, the cult of Adonis—spread throughout the world of the Mediterranean. Greek philosophy and mystery religions were assimilated and developed; for example, Porphyry and others of the leading Neo-Platonists were Syrians. But above all, it was in Syria that the world of pagan culture was closed for ever by the earthly life and Passion of our Lord. There the Gospel was preached, men first called themselves Christians, and the Church found its first saints and its first martyrs. The Syrian desert was the home of the early monks and hermits; the thinkers of the schools of Antioch and Edessa helped to formulate the doctrines of Christianity. There were among them not only great doctors of the Orthodox Church, like Chrysostom, but also great heresiarchs. Then, as always, Syria was fertile ground for theological controversy: the Nestorian and Monophysite doctrines, and much later the Monothelete, found devotees and martyrs. There are still Christian sects in Syria which cling to some of these doctrines, long since condemned and forgotten by the rest of Christendom.

Christianity spread slowly over the greater part of Syria; and as it spread paganism declined, although it lingered on (and perhaps still lingers in disguise) in remote districts. The Jewish community in Syria also dwindled in numbers, with the dispersion of the Jews over the Mediterranean world. This was a gradual process. In one aspect it was a part of the general Syrian dispersion throughout the Roman Empire, and its main motive was trade. But it was intensified and embittered by the revolt of the Jews against the Roman authority and their repression by Titus (A.D. 70). From that time onwards no autonomous Jewish State arose in Palestine; although there never ceased to be a Jewish community there, and the Jews in the outside world continued to remember Zion by the waters of exile.

7

After the third century A.D. the importance and prosperity of Roman Syria began to decline. The once unified Mediterranean world began to disintegrate. Yet even after the western provinces had been detached from the Empire Syria did not

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lose its connexion with western Europe: Syrian traders, for example, were active in Merovingian France. Although Greek culture continued to exist, it was no longer creative. At the same time Byzantine administration decayed and more than in times past was felt to be oppressive. Popular discontent found expression in the spread of doctrines opposed to those of the official Eastern Orthodox Church. The Byzantine rulers also neglected to maintain the defences which their predecessors had established. This was the more dangerous because of the rise of the Sassanid Empire in Persia during the third century. In the series of Perso-Roman wars, Syria was a base and often a battle-ground, and was more than once occupied by Persian armies. But it was always re-occupied by Byzantine forces, and finally it was not to the Persians that Syria fell. While the two Empires had been wasting one another's strength, a new power had arisen in Arabia. The Prophet Muhammad had brought a new force into the history of Asia, with his gospel of monotheism, revelation and the Day of Judgement. In a few years his followers had conquered and united the Arabian peninsula. In 633 they invaded Syria. By 640, Damascus, Jerusalem and the other great cities had fallen to the invaders, the Byzantine armies had been defeated and had withdrawn, and Syria had become part of the Moslem Empire.

The conquest was all the easier since the Arabization of Syria had already begun. There were Arabic-speaking tribes in the country; and although they were Christians, many were Nestorians or Monophysites and therefore hostile to the Byzantine Government and the Orthodox Church. After the conquest the process of Arabization was carried a step farther by the settlement in the country of many of the invading Arab Moslems, and the adoption of Arabic, now the language of the ruling class, by some of the Semitic elements already settled there before the conquest. It was a gradual process; Aramaic lingered on for many centuries, especially in Lebanon, and is not yet completely dead. The parallel process of conversion to Islam was also slow. The establishment of a Moslem Government, and the ties of race existing between the Moslem invaders and settlers and many of the other elements in the population, were inducements to conversion; but neither the conquest nor the early period of Moslem rule was marked by religious persecution, or by proselytization

175 on a large scale, except among the Arab tribes. Christians and Jews, it is true, were regarded as in a sense standing outside the community; they were not allowed to carry weapons, to bear witness against Moslems in courts of law, or to marry Moslem women; and they were subject to special measures of taxation. But they were permitted to retain their beliefs and their property, to worship as they pleased, and to manage the internal affairs of their communities according to their own laws and customs. All Christian sects were treated alike; for the heterodox, the Moslem conquest meant a greater toleration than they had previously known. For several centuries Christianity continued to be the faith of a large proportion of the population; in north Lebanon, in the great towns and elsewhere, large Christian communities have continued to exist until to-day. Christian culture also flourished for a time. In the century or so after the Moslem conquest, Christian Syria gave to the world five Popes, the last of the great theologians of the Eastern Church, John of Damascus, and the greatest Christian Arab poet, Akhtal.

Within a generation of Syria's becoming part of the Moslem Empire, it had become the Empire's centre. In 661 the governor of the country, Muawiya, proclaimed himself Caliph, after the murder of his predecessor and antagonist, the Caliph Ali. From that date until the middle of the eighth century Damascus was the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate, of which the territories were gradually extended until they stretched from Spain and Morocco in the west to central Asia in the east. This Empire was largely administered by Syrians, Christian as well as Moslem; and Syrian soldiers bore the burden of its defence and of its wars with Byzantium.

In spite of its expansion and the growing complexity of its organization, the Caliphate remained in a true sense Moslem and Arab under the Umayyad dynasty. Arabs constituted the ruling class; Arabic soon replaced Greek as the language of administration in those regions which had formerly been Byzantine provinces; and Arabic literature found a home at the Umayyad court. But at the same time Islam and the Arab way of life did not remain unaffected by the Greco-Aramaic civilization of Syria. The Moslem conquerors were themselves conquered, gradually and up to a certain point, by the culture of the intellect and senses, the social organization and the administrative system which they found in Syria. They gained

in technical mastery and maturity of the intellect; they lost 175
the pristine simplicity of their faith and way of life.

Thus the tension between Mediterranean and Semitic influences continued; and by its side other conflicts developed. There was hostility between the stock of the original Arab conquerors and the Arabized and converted Syrians, the 'Mawali', and between both of them and the elements still unassimilated in language and religion. Among the Arabs themselves there were conflicts between tribes and parties, the greatest of them that of the Qaisite and Yemenite factions, which persisted in various disguises until comparatively recent times. Islam itself split up. The struggle between Muawiya and Ali did not end with the latter's death; it was carried on by his sons and by his adherents, the 'Shi'ah' or 'partisans' of Ali; theological dissensions were added to the original political differences; and the Shi'i Moslems have remained distinct from the orthodox Sunnis until to-day.

8

A combination of religious, regional and dynastic conflicts led in the eighth century to the replacement of the Umayyad by the Abbasid Caliphs, and of Damascus by Baghdad as the capital of the Caliphate. Syria was never again the centre of the Moslem world; Syrians no longer filled the great positions in the government. They were indeed oppressed by their new rulers, and more than once revolted against them. This change in the political balance was followed by a shift in the centre of western Asian trade, seen in the growth of the commercial importance of Basra. Because of these changes and the devastation of the wars with Byzantium, the prosperity of Syria began to decline and its population to decrease.

Under the Abbasids certain processes which had begun with the Moslem conquest of Syria came virtually to completion. The Arabic language became practically universal; and Islam became the religion of the majority of the inhabitants, partly through fresh immigration from Arabia and partly because of the many inducements to conversion. Many Christians moved from the interior to the safety of the Lebanese mountains; for example, about the ninth century the Maronites established themselves in northern Lebanon. The absorption of Greco-Aramaic culture and the development of an Islamic culture were carried farther. At the same time,

175 the original Islamic religious impulse was growing weaker; and with its decline and the gradual decay of the Abbasid Caliphate new tendencies began to appear. The Byzantine armies passed from defence to attack, and harassed and at times occupied northern Syria. The country was divided by the rise of local dynasties (both Arab and Turkish) and heterodox Islamic sects. Of the dynasties perhaps the greatest was the Hamdanid, which ruled northern Syria during the tenth century, and was sometimes at war with Byzantium and sometimes tributary to it. At its court or in its domains there flourished some of the greatest figures of Arabic culture—the poets al-Mutanabbi and Abu'l-Ala al-Ma'ari, the anthologist Abu'l-Faraj al-Isfahani and the philosopher al-Farabi. Of more lasting importance were the new Islamic sects which developed out of Shi'ism in the ninth and subsequent centuries[1]: the Alawis, the Druzes, and the obscurely interrelated Carmathian and Isma'ili movements, which were not only movements of belief, of thought and of social reform, but also initiatory secret societies with political aims. These movements first came into Syria from Iraq, and then from Egypt under the leadership of the Fatimid dynasty during the later tenth century. The Fatimids held precarious and unstable sway over the country for a time. Finally, in the eleventh century, the Seljuq Turks from central Asia began to assert themselves in Syria as an independent force, at first in the name of the 'Great Seljuq' Sultans in the East, but later on their own account. With the establishment of their State, Syria virtually ceased to be part of the Abbasid Empire. The Seljuq State itself, however, did not last long; it soon split into two minor dynasties, at Aleppo and Damascus.

9

At the end of the eleventh century a new element was introduced into a country already divided between Seljuq Turks in the north and centre, Fatimids in the south, and petty dynasties like the Tanukhids in Lebanon. The Crusading armies from western Europe invaded Syria and conquered the coastal regions and some portions of the interior. In the conquered areas they established a series of feudal states, Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli and Jerusalem, with a European ruling class, maintained by intermittent reinforcements from

[1] See Chapter VII.

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the West, but tending in course of time to mingle with the indigenous inhabitants and adopt their ways; rulers and soldiers were largely French by origin, the commercial class mainly Italian. The indigenous Christians were encouraged to become Catholics; it was in this period that the Maronites entered into communion with Rome. As for the Moslems, in general they were treated tolerantly. In spite of wars between the Crusaders and the Moslem Governments in the interior, the Crusading States were the source of a fruitful interchange of goods and ideas between Latin Europe and Moslem Asia: the West derived from Syria not only new economic processes and products but new ideas and a stimulus to its imaginative life.

Even at their zenith, during the first half of the twelfth century, the Crusading States never reached as far into the heart of Syria as Damascus. During the second half of that century even their hold upon the coastal regions was challenged, first by Zengi, the Turkish ruler of Mosul, and his son Nur ad-Din, and then by the great Saladin. By origin a Kurd, Saladin was sent by Nur ad-Din to Egypt, and after his master's death gradually extended his sway over the greater part of the eastern Moslem world. His kingdom covered most of Syria, including the Holy Places, his conquest of which occasioned the third Crusade at the end of the twelfth century. To some extent this Crusade revived the fortunes of the Christian States, but only for a short time. Throughout the first half of the thirteenth century Syria was torn by internal dissensions and the rise and fall of petty principalities, both Christian and Moslem. These principalities were powerless to resist the Mongol invaders, who in 1260 swept all before them until they were defeated on the Palestinian coast by Baibars, later the Mamluke Sultan of Egypt. The Mamlukes profited by their victory, and gradually enlarged their control over the country. Acre, the last Crusading fortress, fell to them in 1291.

For the next two centuries Syria remained under Mamluke rule. It was a time of decay and of unrest. Twice more the country was ravaged by Mongol invaders: by the Ilkhans in the late thirteenth century and a hundred years later by Tamerlane, who sacked Aleppo and Damascus and carried away their artisans to Samarqand. Several times there were local risings, which were suppressed by the Mamlukes: for example, the great insurrections of the Druzes and Shi'is in

195 Lebanon at the end of the thirteenth century. The period was one of economic decline, partly because of war and unrest, and partly because of the geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century, which changed the course of the world's great trade routes; but there was still a certain trade with Europe, carried on by Italian merchants. The population decreased alike in wealth and in numbers. To the economic weakness of the country was added the decay of Mamluke rule; and when the Ottoman Turks attacked Syria in 1516 they conquered it without difficulty.

10

From 1516 until 1918 Syria remained under Ottoman rule, and part of an Empire which included at its height the Balkans, much of central Europe, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, part of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. Of the first three centuries of this rule there is little to say. In general they were centuries of stagnation. The Ottoman conquest did not seriously affect the racial composition of the people of Syria, their language or their way of life. Few Turks settled in the country, but the infiltration of nomads from Arabia continued. It was during this period that some of the great tribes, of which the descendants still, as nomads or as peasants, inhabit a large part of the country, first entered it: the Shammar and then various Anazah tribes, who drove the Shammar across the Euphrates and established their ascendancy over the Syrian Desert. Nor did the Ottoman conquest greatly affect the political structure of Syria. The country was divided into several Pashaliks, those of Damascus, Aleppo and Tripoli, and later of Saida; but often the authority of the Pashas was only effective in and around the great towns in which garrisons were stationed. Men gave formal reverence to the Sultan, who had also arrogated to himself the title of Caliph or head of the Islamic community; but the limits of his Government's action were narrow. In practice customary law was supreme, and social power was in the hands of the feudal lords, on whom the Ottoman rulers, like their predecessors, mainly relied for the maintenance of local order and the collection of taxes.

Such being the structure of Ottoman rule, it was possible for local dynasts of ability to extend their domains and become virtually independent. Perhaps the greatest of them was the Druze Amir Fakhr ad-Din, a member of the Maani dynasty

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which governed Lebanon throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the course of the fifty years of his ascendancy (1586–1635) he extended his territories far beyond Lebanon, and increased their prosperity by his encouragement to agriculture and to trade with Europe. He was tolerant in religious matters, protecting Christians and Europeans. He even attempted, with support from some European rulers, completely to throw off the suzerainty of the Sultan. Forced in 1613 to flee to Italy, he returned to Syria after a few years, and continued to dominate a great part of the country until captured and killed by the Turks. 175

His death was followed by the decline of the Maanis, who were succeeded in 1697 by the Shihabis. They ruled throughout the eighteenth century; it was a time of upheaval in the life of Lebanon, marked on the one hand by the gradual spread of the Christian peasantry from northern Lebanon southwards into districts which had previously been wholly inhabited by Druzes, and on the other by intensive conflicts among the Druze nobility. These were conflicts of families and factions, the lineal descendants of the ancient Arabian dispute of Qays and Yemen. Many of the defeated faction emigrated from Lebanon to the hilly district beyond the plain of the Hauran, now known as Jebel Druze. In the remainder of Syria no less than in Lebanon the eighteenth century was marked by conflict and unrest. Finally a great part of the country fell into the hands of the Bosnian Jazzar, Pasha of Acre, who ruled it ruthlessly and cruelly from 1775 until 1804.

In general, the first three centuries of Ottoman rule were a period of economic decline. The population continued to shrink; a harsh system of taxation and the uncertainty of life had their effect upon agriculture; and Syria no longer lay on the main trade route from Europe to further Asia. But commerce was not completely stagnant; trade with many of the surrounding countries was made easier by the incorporation of Syria into the Ottoman Empire, and at times the desert routes were prosperous. Damascus was still in decline, but Aleppo was one of the great centres of the internal trade of the Empire, and also of the trade between the Empire and Europe. Here and in other Syrian towns grew up colonies of French, Italian and other European merchants, through whose hands passed most of the trade between Europe and the Levant. These colonies were granted a special status and privileges by

the Sultans. The first such grant was made to the French communities by the Franco-Ottoman concordat of 1535, which together with subsequent concordats served as the basis not only of the foreign 'Capitulations' in the Ottoman Empire, but also of the French claim to protect the Catholic Christians of the Levant.[1]

It was not only traders who came from the West. From the seventeenth century onwards Catholic missionaries were active, particularly among the indigenous Christian communities: Franciscans (the traditional custodians of the Catholic Holy Places), Jesuits and others. They slowly built up the various Uniate Churches, Eastern in rite but in communion with Rome. They gave the country its first modern schools, although on a very modest scale. More important perhaps than the schools founded in Syria was the Maronite College established at Rome to educate the Maronite clergy and draw closer their links with Western Catholicism. It was this College which had the honour of educating Joseph Assemani, Maronite Archbishop, Librarian of the Vatican and one of the earliest of the great modern orientalists.

II

The beginning of the nineteenth century found Syria a decayed and half-deserted land. After the rule of Jazzar had come to an end, Ottoman administration only functioned effectively in the large towns, where the garrisons of Janissaries were stationed, in a section of the coastal strip and certain portions of the countryside. A large part of the country was governed by local chieftains, ruling by virtue of descent or ability and practically autonomous; they held their fiefs no longer on condition of performing military service, but on that of collecting taxes for the Sultan's Government. Both the local dynasts and the Turkish Pashas were largely uncontrolled in their dealings with their subjects and with one another. Oppressed by rulers, by tax-farmers and by feudal lords, the peasants had neither incentive nor opportunity to scrape more than a bare living from the soil. The Beduin were virtually uncontrolled, and were a perpetual menace to the settled areas. What prosperity the country still possessed came less from agriculture than from the flow of commerce through the principal towns.

[1] See Chapter VIII.

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Mount Lebanon was an oasis of order amid the chaos. It was ruled by the strong and ruthless Amir Bashir of the Shihabi family, who reigned from 1789 to 1840 almost as an independent monarch. He established law and security, preserved the character of Lebanon as an asylum of refuge, extended its boundaries far into the territory of the neighbouring Pashaliks and encouraged the trade of Beirut.

Lebanon was quiet during the first thirty years of the century, but beneath the surface important changes were taking place. There was a change in the relationship between Druzes and Maronites. The northern part of Lebanon was inhabited mainly by Maronites and other Christians, the southern by Druzes. The Christians were numerically preponderant and had for some generations been spreading southwards into districts formerly wholly Druze but now mixed in population. Although the Druzes were in a minority, and their numbers had been diminished by emigration to Jebel Druze in the eighteenth century, their feudal lords had for centuries been the dominant force in Lebanon, thanks to the strength of their communal spirit and organization. In the days of Bashir, the Christian peasants continued to spread southwards and the Druzes to emigrate from Lebanon to Jebel Druze. New difficulties also arose. To fortify his own power, the Amir curbed the power of the Druze notables and encouraged the latent tension between the sects. Within each sect, too, there was unrest. Among the Maronites there was a movement of the peasants against their lords, and a struggle for predominance between the lords and the clergy. The Druzes for their part continued to be torn by the strife of families. To add to these factors, a change for the worse was taking place in the economic position of Lebanon.

12

Into this stagnant world a new force was about to enter: Syria, like the rest of the Ottoman Empire, was drawn into the orbit of Western life during the nineteenth century.

The impact of the West was first apparent in the political sphere. Already in the eighteenth century it had been clear that the Ottoman Empire had passed its zenith; its European frontiers were contracting, and its hold over most of North Africa was precarious. But now it became increasingly probable that the Empire would collapse. Its collapse would alter the

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175 political relationship between the European States. It therefore became expedient for the Great Powers either to hasten or to delay the collapse, according to their conception of their interests, and at all events to secure a position of paramount influence in the Empire. During the earlier part of the century the Powers mainly interested were Great Britain, France and Russia; and in the pursuit of their interests all three attempted not only to secure a paramount influence over the Ottoman Government in Constantinople, but also to establish a special connexion with one or other of the peoples of the Empire, and of Syria among its provinces. The French had for some generations possessed such a connexion with the Maronites and other Catholic Christians; at the end of the eighteenth century the Russians began to claim a special right of protection over the Greek Orthodox Christians in both the European and the Asiatic parts of the Empire; and in the course of the nineteenth century Great Britain tried to cultivate the friendship of the Druzes. Thus motives of high policy impelled the Powers to intervene in the internal life of Syria, which had for so long been almost untouched by influences from the West.

The first great blow to the traditional life came in the last years of the eighteenth century, when Napoleon marched northwards from his newly-won base in Egypt. His advance was resisted by Jazzar as representative of the Ottoman Sultan. In order to weaken this resistance Napoleon tried to stir the Sultan's subjects into revolt. He had some success with the Maronites and Shi'is, none with the Sunnis, who remained hostile to him, nor with the Amir Bashir, who remained cautiously neutral. For a time the French army moved without hindrance up the coastal road; but the resistance of Jazzar in Acre, supported by a British fleet, compelled Napoleon to abandon the campaign (1799).

13

Had Napoleon not been defeated, he might have awakened Syria from its long sleep. The work which he might have done had to wait thirty years. In 1831–2 Syria was occupied by the armies of Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Egypt under the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan. Muhammad Ali wanted Syria partly to make use of its resources in men and wood, and partly as a stepping-stone towards Constantinople and domination of the whole Ottoman Empire.

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In 1833 the Sultan agreed to Muhammad Ali's control of Syria, and for the next few years it was ruled by Ibrahim. These years may be regarded as the beginning of the modern age for the country. For the first time in centuries it was given a centralized Government strong enough to hold separatist tendencies in check, and a system of taxation regular and comparatively rational, although burdensome. The judiciary was reformed, and greater equality than had previously existed was established between Moslems and others. The Government founded schools and permitted foreign missionaries to do so. The improved state of public order encouraged commerce and cultivation.

In spite of these innovations, at first Ibrahim Pasha tried not to break with the traditions of the country but to base his domination upon the local landowning and ruling families, and especially upon the Amir Bashir. For a time his rule was popular with a large part of the inhabitants. Later, however, it became unpopular: with the landowners because he tried to limit their political and social predominance, and with the peasants on account of the forced labour, conscription, compulsory disarmament and heavy taxation to which he found it necessary to resort. At the same time Muhammad Ali's control of Syria was disliked by the Sultan and by Great Britain and Russia. They conceived it to be in their interest to maintain the Ottoman Empire and were not inclined to allow the establishment of a new mushroom kingdom in the eastern Mediterranean, the more so because of the friendly relations between Muhammad Ali and France.

In 1839 the Sultan brought matters to a crisis by ordering his armies to invade Syria. They were met at Nizib by the forces of Ibrahim Pasha, and were decisively defeated. The way to Constantinople now seemed open to Ibrahim. At this point the Powers intervened. With the exception of France they gave their backing to the Sultan's demand that Ibrahim should evacuate Syria north of Acre (1840). At the same time they sent arms to the discontented inhabitants of Syria and particularly to the Druzes and Maronites of Lebanon. When Ibrahim refused to agree to the Sultan's demand, a British expedition was landed on the coast, and Lebanon rose in revolt, although Bashir remained faithful to Ibrahim. Ibrahim was driven from Syria, which was restored to the Sultan; and the Amir was forced to abdicate.

175 Ibrahim went, but something of his work remained. He had opened Syria to Western merchants and travellers as it had not been open for generations, and he had helped to shake the Empire out of its long torpor. The rest of the century saw a determined if erratic effort by the Ottoman Government to reform and modernize its structure; it was initiated by the Sultan Mahmud II and carried further by his successor Abdul-Majid. To some extent this effort took the shape of formal acts designed to create a system of political standards and rights such as the Western Powers possessed. Thus in 1839, under the influence of the British Ambassador, Stratford de Redcliffe, the Sultan Abdul-Majid issued the 'Gulhane' decree, which guaranteed security and public trial to all citizens, established a just system of imposing and collecting taxes, provided for equality of civil rights between members of the different religious communities and extended the obligation of military service to all alike. The next year a penal code was enacted, based upon the principle of equality before the law. In 1856, after the Crimean War (of which the rivalry of France and Russia for control of the Holy Places in Palestine had been a contributory cause), the Powers compelled the Sultan to issue a further edict, the 'Hatti Humayun', defining and guaranteeing the spiritual and temporal privileges of the non-Moslem communities, and granting their members equality of civil rights with Moslems. Finally, in 1876, the Sultan issued a Parliamentary constitution, which was however suspended soon after its first application.

These steps were taken partly at least to appease or to impress the Governments of Europe, and were only very imperfectly carried out. More important, if less obtrusive, was the attempt to replace the old system of decentralized feudal government by a modern centralized and uniform administration. The first step to this was the creation of a professional army with Western training and equipment; this was undertaken with considerable success by the Sultan Mahmud II. Thus it became possible for subsequent Sultans to try to break down the old autonomies and curb the power of the local dynasties: by the abolition of tax-farming and other measures designed to reduce the social power of the landholders and, where necessary, by military expeditions against too powerful subjects. The attempt was successful in some parts of the country, for example

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with the Kurds and Turcomans in the north and the Alawis around Latakia; unsuccessful in others, for example with the Druzes of Jebel Druze, who, in spite of expeditions against them in 1876, 1896 and 1911, and of occasional acts of submission on their part, retained their administrative and judicial autonomy and their exemption from military service. 175

For purposes of administration the country was divided into the Vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo; subsequently a separate Vilayet of Beirut was created. A Sanjaq of Jerusalem and a Mutassarifat of Dair az-Zur, attached directly to the central Government at Constantinople, were also established.

15

In one region the policy of centralization was tried and failed. The social and religious situation in Lebanon at the beginning of the nineteenth century has already been described. The restlessness which existed was increased by the distribution of arms and the rising of 1840, as also by the support given by the French Government to the Maronites and by the British to the Druzes. After the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha and the restoration of Ottoman rule, the Sultan's Government set itself deliberately to foment religious conflict in order to make the traditional autonomy of Lebanon unworkable and so to create an excuse for the establishment of direct Ottoman rule over the Mountain. Its task was all the easier in that Bashir was succeeded by a weak member of the Shihabi family, who was unable to maintain order.

The first disturbances occurred in 1841, when civil war broke out between Maronites and Druzes. The Powers intervened and persuaded the Ottoman Government to promulgate a new constitution for Lebanon, dividing it into two districts, the northern under a Maronite and the southern under a Druze governor. The governors were to be appointed by the central Government, but the administrative privileges of the Mountain were guaranteed. The new system was set up; but a few years later, in 1845, civil war broke out once more. The Government re-imposed order and partially disarmed the population; in this as in other matters, however, it favoured the Druzes at the expense of the Maronites. It also made certain changes in the new administrative system, with the purpose of limiting the power of the feudal landlords and tax-farmers.

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175 During the next years social and religious tension continued to increase; it was encouraged by the weakness of the governors, who proved unable to control the feudal lords. Finally, in 1857, matters came to a head in the purely Maronite districts of north Lebanon, where the peasants revolted against their lords. Led by priests, by younger sons of landowning families and by popular leaders of whom the most notable was Yusuf Karam, they established a peasant Government, put an end to the prerogatives of the nobility and divided up the large estates.

In the districts of central and southern Lebanon, where the population was partly Druze and partly Christian, the final outbreak was later in coming, and took a more complex form: it was both a religious conflict between the Druze and Maronite communities and a social conflict between Maronite peasants and Druze lords. In 1860, great disturbances broke out. Some thousands of Christians were killed in different parts of Lebanon by the Druzes with the connivance of the Turkish authorities, and thousands more in Damascus by the Moslem mob, in spite of the efforts of certain Moslem notables to restrain them. At this point the European Powers intervened. By international agreement, the Emperor Napoleon III sent a military expedition to Lebanon. It remained in occupation of the district for nine months, but had little to do, since the Ottoman Government had already taken steps to restore order and punish some of those held to be responsible. At the same time an international commission was set up to investigate the disturbances, to supervise the punishment of those who had instigated them and the indemnification of those who had suffered, and to make proposals for the future organization of the Mountain.

The Commission, which met first in Beirut and then in Constantinople, drew up a Statute formalizing and defining the autonomy of Lebanon. By the terms of this Statute, which was promulgated in 1861 and finally ratified in 1864, Lebanon was to be administered by a Christian Ottoman governor appointed by the Ottoman Government with the consent of the Powers, and directly responsible to it. He was to have full executive powers and to be assisted by a central administrative Council, on which the more important religious communities were to be equitably represented. They were similarly to be represented in the local administration. Lebanon was to have its own judiciary

and police force. Feudal privileges were abolished, and all were declared equal before the law. 175

Until the First World War Lebanon was ruled in accordance with this Statute. It was on the whole a period of increasing prosperity. It is true that unrest was not immediately stilled. The abolition of feudal privileges raised new social problems, and thus led to renewed agitation among the Maronite peasants, whose leader, Yusuf Karam, was finally sent away from Lebanon; and discontented Druzes continued to emigrate to Jebel Druze. But gradually the traditional state of religious toleration returned. The governors, who were Christians from outside Lebanon, were in general efficient and humane, and defended the autonomy of the Mountain against the attempts of the Sultan to infringe it. Agriculture revived, roads were built, schools were opened, and Western civilization extended its sway.[1]

16

For the rest of the century the Ottoman Empire continued to be the object of European interest and rivalry. The tension between Great Britain and Russia which was temporarily relaxed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 did not directly concern Syria. But the struggle between Russia and France for control of the Holy Places in Palestine, which had been the occasion of the Crimean War, was still not altogether ended. By its side new rivalries grew up. Italy disputed France's rights in regard to the Catholic communities and Holy Places; and towards the end of the century Germany began to stake her claim. In the reign of Abdul-Hamid II (1876–1909) German influence over the Ottoman Government grew continuously and gradually replaced that which Great Britain had once possessed. The Berlin to Baghdad railway, which German enterprise partially constructed, skirted the northern edge of Syria and might well, had not the First World War broken out, have served as a means of German penetration into that and other provinces of the Empire.

17

Western influence thus played an important part in the political life of the country; it played an even more important one in the social and economic changes of the century. Syrian 175 177

[1] The exact boundaries of the sanjaq of Lebanon were never clearly established.

175 life in all its aspects underwent a gradual and still incomplete
177 process of Westernization. The tastes and habits of the population were profoundly influenced by the inflow of goods from the West; their beliefs and way of thinking still more profoundly so by the spread of Western culture.

175 The reception of Western civilization was helped by the
177 emigration of many thousands of Syrians to other countries.
167 In general they came more often from Lebanon than from other regions, and they were more often Christians than Moslems. Their motives for leaving their country were various. Many of the Christians desired to escape from a predominantly Moslem environment, especially after the events of 1860; many among both Christians and Moslems found Otteman rule too oppressive to be borne; young men educated in the mission-schools wished for opportunities and rewards greater than their native land could offer; some were attracted by the legendary promise of the New World, its wealth and its freedom; and others went abroad simply because their relations and friends had already settled there.

167 There were two main roads of emigration. The one led to
175 Egypt and the Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the other Arabic-speaking countries. This road had always been open, but it was rendered more attractive by the establishment of British control over Egypt and the Sudan. The British authorities needed subordinate officials who spoke Arabic and understood the ways of the Near East, but who were also acquainted with Western methods of thought and administration. They found what they needed in the graduates of the Syrian mission-schools, who for half a century loyally and effectively filled a variety of positions in the Governments of Egypt and the Sudan. Thousands of other Syrians went to Egypt as merchants, doctors and journalists. They progressed, and some among them played a considerable part in the cultural life of the country. Being largely an urban middle-class community, partly Christian and suspected of an excessive attachment to Great Britain or at least to the West, the Syrian-Egyptians have not always been liked by the Egyptians; but many of them have become Egyptians in nationality and sentiment, and at least the Moslems among them may become assimilated in a generation or two to the population among whom they are living.

The Syrian-Egyptians are numbered in tens of thousands,

but those who have followed the other road, to North and South America, to Australia and to other of the more distant parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands. The great majority of them started as retail traders on a small scale, but many took to wholesale trade and to the manufacture of textiles and other goods. The process of taking root was harder for them than for those who went to Egypt, since it involved learning new languages and acquiring new ways of life; but they have already been assimilated to a considerable extent, and the large Syrian colonies in the United States, Brazil and the Argentine, with smaller ones in other countries, have become prosperous, loyal and respected elements in the communities in which they are living. Most of them have given up all but a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and there seems to be no obstacle to their ultimate complete assimilation, the more so since the flow of emigrants to the countries of the New World has greatly diminished during the last two decades. It has been partly diverted to British and French West Africa, much of the internal trade of which is now in Syrian hands.

The consequences of the emigration for Syria were both good and bad. They were bad in so far as it was the more talented and enterprising of the country's youth who went abroad, during the period of their greatest energy and often for ever. On the other hand, the level of prosperity was raised by the remittances which successful emigrants sent home to their relatives, and by the savings which they brought back with them. Also, they introduced new ideas, and, what was even more important, the example of a new and in many respects attractive way of life. These ideas, this example and the bare fact that Syrians were prosperous and happy in foreign lands, deeply influenced the attitude of Syria to the West. All this was especially true of Lebanon, since it supplied so large a proportion of the emigrants.

18

Western influences also came by way of education. Students began to go abroad, to seek the new learning in the schools of Europe and America; and Western schools became ever more numerous in the Near East. The greater number of them were established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the

seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

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question of Islam and modern civilization, and a greater caution in accepting ideas and innovations from Europe.

These two groups, and smaller, less important groups in other towns, have laid the foundations of a new Arabic literature. To a great extent their work has been preparatory. The Arabic language has been rendered more adequate and flexible, for example by the adoption or invention of technical terms. Western ideas have been spread through translations and works of popularization. New literary forms have been introduced—the poetic drama, the novel, the romantic autobiography—and at the same time old forms have been revived. In addition to the advances in form, the subject-matter of literature has been extended. Different groups have set themselves to expound subjects not hitherto treated : the relations between religion and secular culture, the position of women, the method of empirical science, and so on. In all this preparatory work, the influence of French and English thought and literature has been great and obvious.

Modern Arabic literature has so far produced nothing of great originality, nothing of much interest to the outer world. But there have been a number of honest, hard-working and courageous writers, who have deserved well of the Arabic-speaking peoples : for example, the religious thinker Muhammad Abdu, the social reformer Qasim Amin, the essayist al-Manfaluti, the poets Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, the playwright and novelist Tawfiq al-Hakim and the scholar Taha Husain.

These names are all those of Egyptians, and Cairo is the unquestioned centre of Arabic literature. But there have been very important Syrian and Lebanese writers, many of whom it is true worked for most of their lives in Egypt, although others remained in their own country. They include the scholars and poets of the Bustani and Yaziji families ; the religious reformer Rashid Rida ; the fathers of Arabic journalism Shidiaq, Nimr, Sarruf, Zaidan and Taqla ; the poet Khalil Mutran ; the best of women writers in Arabic, May Ziadah ; the traveller Amin Rihani ; and the mystic Khalil Jibran. The last two spent many years in the United States and wrote much of their work in English. They are the most distinguished of a group of Syrian-American writers who have planted in the new world a root of Arabic literature which in spite of its qualities can hardly hope to survive a generation.

19

175 At the beginning of the present century Syria had ceased to be the stagnant land of a hundred years before. Lebanon in particular, and the rest of the country to a smaller extent, were in process of becoming Westernized and regaining their prosperity. The long decline in the population had ceased and been replaced by a steady increase, although during the nineteenth century there had been little immigration, apart from that of Zionist Jews towards the end of the century. The standard of living had risen. Commerce with the external world was greater than at any time during the Ottoman period, in spite of the diversion of transit trade to the Suez Canal. The country possessed several thousand kilometres of railways and modern roads, most of them built by French companies. Nowhere was the change so marked as in Beirut. In 1800 it had been a decayed town of a few thousand inhabitants, mainly Moslems. By 1900 it had become one of the main centres of trade and culture in the Ottoman Empire. It had a modern harbour, large colonies of foreign business-men and numerous schools and colleges which attracted students from far beyond Lebanon. The total number of its inhabitants was approaching 100,000. The percentage of Christians among them was constantly increasing; for throughout the century Christians had been settling in the town, attracted by the superior opportunities and comforts of urban life or seeking, after the massacres of 1860, the comparative safety of a coastal city in which European influence was strong.

20

But although the Syria of 1900 was more prosperous than that of 1800, it was also more consciously discontented. The rule of the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II was, indeed, less wholly destructive and regressive in Syria than in other provinces of the Empire, perhaps because some of his principal advisers were Syrians. Public works were built, notably the Pilgrims' Railway from Damascus to Medina, and the area of civil government and cultivation was extended; but his régime, in the greater part of Syria as elsewhere, was one of tyranny and of repression. For this reason, when political consciousness revived, the form which it took was largely one of opposition to the autocratic rule of the Sultan. It is true that he tried to attract the politically conscious Moslems to his side,

by means of the 'Pan-Islamic movement', which aimed at /175 the union of the Islamic peoples under the leadership of the Sultan-Caliph. But Pan-Islamism was a bogy with which to frighten the European Powers rather than a serious political movement.

The revival of political consciousness was late in beginning. The very ideas of political association and public opinion did not filter into the Ottoman Empire until the second half of the nineteenth century; and throughout the century police-measures and an exceedingly strict censorship made political organization practically impossible. But not all Abdul-Hamid's repressive policy could prevent the infiltration in one way or another of Western political concepts: democracy, responsible government, the party system, freedom of expression. Nor could it prevent the development of a daily and periodical press in Arabic, which was not, of course, allowed to print independent comment or very much news, but which raised the level of political knowledge and understanding and served as an intellectual unifying force.

There were two main movements of opposition in Syria. One was the movement, here as throughout the Empire, for the limitation of the Sultan's authority and the restoration of the democratic constitution of 1876, as a first step to the regeneration of the Empire: this was the programme of the so-called 'Young Turks', organized in the 'Committee of Union and Progress'. The other was the movement throughout the Arab provinces of the Empire for Arab national unity and self-government. These two movements were not at first sharply distinguished from one another, partly because both had as their immediate objective the overthrow of Abdul-Hamid's autocracy, and partly because Arab nationalism in its early stages thought rather in terms of autonomy within the Empire than of complete independence. But after the 'Young Turk' revolution of 1908, and the substitution of the rule of the Committee for that of Abdul-Hamid, it soon became clear that the Committee was no more sympathetic to Arab aspirations than the Sultan had been; the movement of unrest in the Arab provinces became more specifically Arab and also more articulate. Before 1908 the Arab nationalist movement, in so far as it had existed at all, had not been organized, except for a few rather ineffective societies, such as the 'Ligue de la Patrie Arabe' founded in Paris in 1904. But from 1908

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175 onwards there began to appear those Arab political societies of which the story has been incomparably told by the late Mr. George Antonius.[1] At first they were public, and aimed not at complete independence for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but at administrative reform and decentralization within the Empire. Such were the 'Arab Ottoman Brotherhood' and the 'Literary Club', both established in Constantinople, and the 'Party of Ottoman Decentralization' founded in Cairo in 1912. But after a time secret societies were formed, with complete independence for the Arab provinces as their aim. The most important of them were 'al-Fatat', which was founded by a group of students in Paris in 1911 and established its headquarters in Syria two years later; and 'al-Ahd', founded in 1914 and consisting almost entirely of Army officers, among them a large number of Iraqis. In the previous year the nationalist movement had first attracted the notice of the outside world by holding its first Congress in Paris. The majority of the delegates were Syrians and Lebanese, and half were Christians. The Congress demanded full rights for the Arabs and decentralization within the Empire; but the Turkish Government made only a few illusory concessions.

By this time, however, few of the convinced nationalists hoped to achieve much by agreement with the Turkish Government. It was clear that the Empire was breaking up. By 1914 it had lost almost all its Balkan provinces and the whole of North Africa, although the Sultan's suzerainty over Egypt was still recognized in form; its territories had shrunk in Europe to a small district round Constantinople, in Asia to Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia and part of western Arabia, with a claim to sovereignty over other parts of Arabia. The nationalists found themselves faced with a question of great moment: what would be the fate of the Arab provinces when the Empire collapsed? Would it be possible for them to constitute an independent State, or must they fall into the hands of new masters?

[1] G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, London, 1938.

II. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

I

THE opening of the First World War in 1914 found a number of Governments and groups with an interest in changing the political status of Syria. First, there were the Arab nationalists, who wanted the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire to become autonomous. They were divided in their political ideas and preferences. Some wished to achieve their aims through the help of Great Britain or France or the United States; others relied only upon their own strength and efforts. Some aimed at establishing an independent Arab State, others a self-governing Arab kingdom within an Ottoman federation, yet others a Syrian State loosely linked with the other Arabic-speaking regions. But all alike were hostile to the Young Turkish Government with its Pan-Turanian policy, and very many were willing, with greater or smaller hesitations and reservations, to throw in their lot with Great Britain should Turkey become involved in the war.

Arab nationalist sentiment was widespread among the army officers, officials, professional men and in general the educated classes. The nationalist societies in Syria like 'al-Fatat' were in touch with Arab nationalists in the other Arabic-speaking regions: with the Iraqi army officers of 'al-Ahd'; with the powerful Syrian colonies in Egypt and the New World; with the Sharif Husain, the ruler, under Turkish suzerainty, of the Moslem Holy Places in the Hejaz; and with Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, the most powerful ruler of central Arabia, and virtually an independent monarch in spite of a shadowy Turkish suzerainty.

Side by side with Arab nationalism there existed a lively particularist movement among the Lebanese Christians. They wished the autonomy of Lebanon to be completed and its frontiers extended; they looked to France for help in achieving their aims and for protection when these should have been realized. Certain of them were not hostile to Arab nationalism, provided it recognized the special position of Lebanon; some indeed worked actively for Syrian or Arab independence.

Of external powers, France was the most interested in Syria. She possessed important interests in the country: investments, Christian missions and schools and a traditional connexion

175 with the Catholics. She desired at all costs to preserve and if possible to extend them. In addition, she believed a foothold in the Levant would strengthen her position both as a Mediterranean and as a Moslem Power; and if the Ottoman Empire were to collapse, she was anxious to take her share of the spoils.

Great Britain wished to secure control of the port of Haifa, and could not permit the establishment of an unfriendly Power on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. But in the northern part of Syria her interests were mainly indirect, arising out of her policy in other parts of Arab Asia. The Indian Government wished to use southern Iraq as an outpost for the defence of India and the Persian oil-fields. Oil was also known to exist in northern Iraq. In June, 1914, the Turkish Petroleum Company had been formed with mainly British capital, and had obtained a concession covering the Vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. Later this would give Great Britain an indirect interest in Syria, as the country through which the oil would flow on its way to the Mediterranean; but in 1914 the importance of the Iraqi oil was not realized. Moreover, as the most influential power in the Arabian peninsula, Great Britain could not be indifferent to the fate of so important a centre of Arab life as Syria.

One other group had interests in Syria: the Zionist movement.[1] The Zionists believed that the Jewish problem in the world could only be solved by the creation of a strong and vigorous Jewish community in Palestine, with an economic and social structure more normal than was possible to the Jews in Europe, and with an autonomous culture and spiritual life. Some, the so-called 'practical Zionists', hoped to create this community by direct means: immigration, the purchase of land, the establishment of agricultural settlements. Many of them laid special emphasis upon the revival of the Hebrew language and the recreation of the spirit of Judaism. By 1914 'practical Zionism' had had a considerable success: many thousands of Jews were living in rural colonies and in the new quarters of the towns, and Hebrew was becoming once more a language of everyday life and of education. But there was another group, the 'political Zionists', which was not indeed opposed to the first, but which argued that the Jewish community in Palestine would not help materially to solve the

[1] For a further treatment of Zionism, see Chapter VI.

Jewish problem unless it possessed a definite political status or guarantee. The founder of organized Zionism, Theodor Herzl, had tried to secure such a status from the Ottoman Government. He had failed, and the eyes of the Zionists turned to the European Powers. Many of them hoped to persuade the German Government to put pressure on the Turks to relax their opposition ; but once the War broke out the most important section pinned their faith upon Great Britain.

2

The entry of Turkey into the war in November, 1914, gave all these parties an opportunity to realize their ambitions. In addition, it gave to Arab nationalism and Zionism a new importance for the British Government, as possible allies in the conflict with the Central Powers. The years of war saw not only practical collaboration between the parties, but also the conclusion of a series of agreements on the ultimate disposal of the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Even before the outbreak of war informal contacts had taken place between British officials in Egypt and prominent Arabs. Shortly after the war began formal relations were established between the British authorities and the Sharif Husain. In his own name and on behalf of the secret Arab nationalist organizations in Syria, he expressed his willingness to organize an Arab revolt against the Turks, provided he were given British assistance and an undertaking to recognize Arab independence should the revolt be successful.

The negotiations which ensued took the form of an exchange of letters between the Sharif Husain and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. In his letter of October 24th, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon defined the limits within which His Majesty's Government was prepared to recognize Arab independence. Replying to the Sharif's request for the recognition of the independence of all the Arabic-speaking countries of Asia, he stated that :

'The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded. . . . As for those regions lying within the proposed frontiers where Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her

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175 ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter :

'Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.'

In his reply, dated November 5th, 1915, Husain denied the British assertion that the Syrian coastlands were not purely Arab. 'The two Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut', he stated, 'and their sea-coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab.' On December 14th, McMahon replied that as the interests of France were involved in both the Vilayets, the question would require careful consideration, and a further communication on the subject would be addressed to Husain in due course. To this Husain responded, on January 1st, 1916, by postponing the question until after the war, but indicating what his attitude would then be.

'We have felt bound', he stated, 'to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities ; yet we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts. . . . It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.'[1]

3

In October 1915 the French Government was informed of these negotiations ; and shortly afterwards conversations took place between Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot, representing the British and French Governments respectively, for the delimitation of the spheres of influence of their Governments in the territories at that time under Ottoman control. On May 16th, 1916, a secret agreement, commonly known as the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement', was concluded and embodied in a number of notes exchanged between the British, French and Russian Governments.

[1] For English translation, see *Parliamentary Papers, 1939*, H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 5932.

THE "SYKES-PICOT" AGREEMENT, 1916

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

THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MANDATED TERRITORIES, 1922

175 This agreement differed greatly in spirit from that which had been concluded with the Sharif Husain. It provided for the division of the Fertile Crescent into a number of zones. In the interior of Syria and the Vilayet of Mosul, Great Britain and France agreed to recognize an independent Arab State, or Confederation of States, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. In part of this region, including what is now Transjordan and a strip of territory in the south of the Vilayet of Mosul, Great Britain was to have the right of priority in enterprises and local loans, and she alone was to supply foreign advisers and officials; in the remainder, France was to possess similar rights. In coastal Syria, from a point between Acre and Sur (Tyre) up to and including Cilicia, France was to be at liberty to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as she might desire or deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation. In the Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, Great Britain was to be in a similar position. In what is now Palestine an international administration was to be established, and the Sharif of Mecca among others was to be consulted on its form; but Great Britain was to be accorded Haifa and Acre.[1]

In letters exchanged at the same time British interests in the oil of Mosul were safeguarded by a French assurance that pre-war concessions in the area under French influence would be recognized; and the British Government made it clear that it accepted the agreement on the understanding that the Arabs should obtain the towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

4

Negotiations had also been proceeding between the Zionist organization and the British Government. They resulted in an agreement which was embodied in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Mr. (later Lord) Balfour, to Lord Rothschild on November 2nd, 1917. This letter, usually known as the 'Balfour Declaration', stated that:

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of

[1] For text, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 428-30.

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existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.' 175

5

The publication of the Balfour Declaration, and still more the revelation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolshevik Government of Russia, caused the Sharif Husain and other Arab leaders to doubt the sincerity of the British Government's undertakings. To allay their doubts, certain additional assurances were given them during the last year of the war. In January, 1918, Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo was sent to Jedda to give Husain (who had been proclaimed King of the Hejaz in November 1916) a verbal explanation of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. Among other things he assured the King that 'Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population.'[1] Again, on February 8th, 1918, the British Government assured the King that they and their allies 'are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an Arab world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice, and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries artificially provoked by the policy of Turkish officials. His Majesty's Government reaffirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples.'

On June 16th, 1918, an officer of the Arab Bureau made to seven Arab leaders in Cairo a declaration which reaffirmed once more the intention of the British Government to work for and to recognize the freedom and independence of the Arabs.

The effect of these assurances was increased by the public statements of peace aims made by Allied statesmen as the war drew to its end. Thus on January 5th, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George stated that 'while we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race . . . Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be, need not here be discussed. . . .'

Three days later, President Wilson included among his 'Fourteen Points' the provision that 'the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1939, Cmd. 5964.

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175 sovereignty, but the other nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured an . . . unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.'

Finally, on November 17th, 1918, a joint Anglo-French Declaration was issued from the General Headquarters of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and circulated in Palestine, in the rest of Syria and in Mesopotamia. It defined the goal of the Allies in the Eastern campaign as the complete and final liberation of the peoples oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national Governments and administrations deriving authority from the free initiative and choice of the populations. Great Britain and France agreed to assist in the setting-up and recognition of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia. They did not wish to impose a system upon the populations of those regions, but to give such help as would ensure the smooth working of the governments elected by the populations of their own free will.[1]

6

It was the British undertakings which induced the Sharif Husain and his sons to throw in their lot with the Allies, and lead the Arab Revolt against the Turks. The story of the Revolt need not be told in detail here; but it must be made clear that, although its events took place largely beyond the borders of Syria, Syrians played a great part in it. Syrian officers and soldiers participated in the campaigns of the Arab army; their number was constantly on the increase as the war went on, largely through desertions from the Turkish ranks. Moreover, British and Arab nationalist agents established contact with the chiefs of the great Beduin tribes of the Syrian Desert, and assured their favourable attitude to the Allied advance northwards. The friendliness of the Syrian population in general, no less than the support of the Arab forces beyond the Jordan, was of great assistance to the Allies in their final campaign.

On the whole, however, Syria's role in the war was one of passive suffering rather than active participation. In the later stages of the war the country was a battleground. In 1917 only the southern portion was directly affected by General Allenby's advance which reached Jerusalem in December. In September, 1918, Allenby moved northwards once more, in October

[1] For text of these messages and declarations, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 431-6.

Damascus was captured, and at the time of the Armistice Allied troops were in occupation of the whole of Syria as far north as Aleppo. But to be a battleground was not the worst which Syria endured. Throughout the war, the population suffered from serious shortage of food, due to bad transport arrangements, profiteering, a corrupt and inefficient administration and a plague of locusts. In the later stages of the war famine set in, with its attendant diseases. It was especially serious in Lebanon, where the Turkish authorities followed a policy of discrimination in the distribution of food as a reprisal for the sympathies of the population with the Allies. Mr. Antonius has estimated that in the whole of Syria 300,000 people died of starvation or malnutrition during the years of war.[1]

To the terrors of famine were added the repressive measures adopted by Jemal Pasha, Governor of Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces there, against those suspected of Arab nationalist activities. These measures were first adopted after the discovery in the French Consulate at Beirut of documents incriminating a number of prominent Syrians in subversive activities aiming at the establishment of an independent Arab state. In 1915 and 1916 a number of those implicated were publicly hanged in Damascus and Beirut. Others were imprisoned and deported to remote parts of the Ottoman Empire. Almost everybody of any eminence lived under suspicion and surveillance, and the whole country went in fear of 'the Butcher' Jemal and his military tribunals. The rigour of Turkish rule naturally increased after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt and the development of a direct threat to the Turkish position in Syria from the British forces in Egypt.

7

When the war ended, the whole of Arab Asia was free from Ottoman rule. Mesopotamia was occupied by British and Imperial troops. The Turkish troops had been cleared out of the Hejaz, and King Husain had been recognized as an Ally. A number of other rulers in the Arabian Peninsula, of whom the most notable was Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud of Nejd, had made treaties with the Government of India and had repudiated Ottoman suzerainty. As for geographical Syria, the whole of it was occupied by Allied troops: British troops throughout

[1] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 241.

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the area, a small French force on the coast and the Arab army of King Husain in the interior. General Allenby was ultimately responsible for the military government of the area; but it was only in Palestine to the west of the Jordan that a British provisional administration was set up. In the coastal regions north of Palestine, and subsequently in Cilicia, the provisional Government was French; in the four cities of Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, and in Transjordan it was Arab, under the Amir Faisal, the third son of King Husain. To the Arab administration a small number of British and French officers was attached; its officials were mainly Syrians who had held posts in the Ottoman army or civil service, but there was also an influential group of Iraqi officers. The attempt of the Arab nationalists in October, 1918, to extend their rule to Beirut and the coast was thwarted by the intervention of General Allenby.

The grounds already existed for a conflict between the Arabs and the French Government. The latter regarded the whole northern half of Syria as lying within its sphere of influence, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It did not consider itself to be bound by the promises which its Ally had given to the Sharif Husain; it was from the beginning sceptical and suspicious of the idea of establishing an independent Arab State; and it was influenced by the attitude of the Lebanese Christians, many of whom had no desire to become subjects of an Arab kingdom governed by a member of the ruling family of the Hejaz. It was also lukewarm in its attitude to Zionism. The Arab nationalists for their part regarded themselves as entitled to complete independence, in virtue both of their participation in the war and of the undertakings given them by the Allied Governments. Their leaders knew of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, and repudiated both of them, although they do not appear at the beginning to have understood the implications of the latter. Though the Maronites as a whole wanted French control or a French mandate, the Arabs of Syria were for the most part hostile to France; if foreign advice and control were necessary, they would have preferred British to French, and American to either. United in their demand for independence, they were divided on the form which it should take. A section among them would have preferred a separate Syrian State to one linked with the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula.

175

With its commitments to both parties, the British Government had a special interest in bringing about a settlement of the problem of Franco-Arab relations in Syria. At its invitation, the Amir Faisal visited Europe in November, 1918. In the course of his discussions with British statesmen and officials it was made plain to him that Great Britain was not prepared to quarrel with France over Syria, however sympathetic she might be to Arab aspirations.

8

The Peace Conference took up the question of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of 1919. On January 30th, it decided that the Arab provinces should be wholly separated from the Empire and the newly-conceived mandate-system applied to them. On February 6th, the Amir Faisal appeared before the Conference. After recalling the efforts of the Arabs during the War, and the Allied promises, he demanded the independence of the whole of Arab Asia, and suggested the establishment of a Confederation. He recognized that the Arabs needed help from outside, but not at the price of independence; they should indicate to the League of Nations the help which they required, and the Mandatory whom they wanted; if their wishes were not clear, an international inquiry should be held. He was prepared to accept the independence of Lebanon, provided that it entered into an economic union with the rest of Arab Asia and that the possibility of its joining the Confederation was kept open. As for Palestine, on account of its universal character he left it on one side for the consideration of all the parties interested. He does not seem at this time to have been unconditionally opposed to Zionism as he then understood it, and in January, 1919, had, indeed, made an informal agreement with Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist leader.

Evidence was also given by a pro-French Syrian delegation, composed mainly of Lebanese Christians and without any representative character, which asked for a Syria independent of Arabia and under French control; by a Lebanese delegation which claimed the autonomy of Lebanon, the extension of its frontiers and the protection of France; and by a Zionist delegation which advocated the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine under a British mandate.

The decision on these various claims was delayed by a violent dispute between Great Britain and France upon the

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future of geographical Syria. At a meeting on March 20th, 1919, the French representative, M. Pichon, claimed that Syria should be treated as a unit and not be divided, and that France should become the Mandatory for it. For Palestine he suggested an international administration: although a private agreement had been reached by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau in December, 1918, by which Mosul and Palestine were to be included in the British sphere of influence, despite the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Reminded by Mr. Lloyd George of the agreement with King Husain, M. Pichon claimed that France was not bound by it. President Wilson suggested that an international commission of inquiry should be appointed to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. This suggestion was at first accepted by Great Britain and France, but afterwards rejected. A purely American Commission, consisting of Dr. H. C. King and Mr. C. R. Crane, was then appointed. It toured Syria, including Palestine, in the summer of 1919, and presented a report to President Wilson, recommending the establishment of a Mandate for Iraq and another for geographical Syria, which should be treated as a single unit. In each of the two countries a constitutional monarchy should be set up, and the Amir Faisal should be King of Syria. In accordance with the wishes of the people, the United States should be asked to accept the Mandate for Syria, while Great Britain should be offered that for Iraq. The Commission was opposed to a French Mandate, and expressed grave doubts about the Zionist experiment in Palestine. The report was ignored at the time and was only published three years later.[1]

9

The Versailles Conference broke up without having come to an agreement about the future of the Arab lands. But even before it ended, Faisal had returned to Syria, with his hopes disappointed. He found the situation there growing daily worse. The Arabs were embittered by the failure of the Conference to recognize their claims, and found much to complain of in the French administration in Lebanon, the attempt to introduce methods of Indian government in Iraq, and the activities of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. The French regarded the installation of Faisal in Damascus as contrary to

[1] For text, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 443-58.

their interests, and were suspicious of the activities of the British officers attached to his Government. In addition, there were local conflicts between Arab bands and French troops in regions on the borders of the French zone of occupation.

Most responsible Arab and French officials doubted the possibility of a peaceful agreement; but Faisal still clung to the belief that Great Britain would use her influence with France in favour of the Arabs. This belief, however, was shaken by the Anglo-French Agreement of September, 1919, which provided for the withdrawal of British troops from Syria (excluding Palestine) and from Cilicia, and their replacement by Arab troops in the interior of Syria and by French troops on the coast and in Cilicia. When Faisal protested against the agreement, the British Government invited him to come once more to Europe and try to reach an understanding with France. Clemenceau at first refused to see him; when they met, however, they came to a provisional agreement, by which the right of the Syrian Arabs to independence and unity was acknowledged, but their State was to be defended, advised and represented abroad by France.

This agreement was never put into practice. The Government of Clemenceau fell, and was succeeded by one more extreme in its Eastern policy. Moreover, the growth of the Kemalist movement in Turkey, which threatened France's position in Cilicia, made it more urgent for her representatives in the East to prevent the outbreak of disorder in Syria and to obtain control of the system of communications in the interior. They were further alarmed by the evidence of military preparations by the Arab Government. The Arabs for their part were apprehensive of similar preparations by the French; their patriotic fervour was stimulated by the example of the growing nationalist movements in Iraq and Turkey; and to their resentment against France had now been added an active hostility to Zionism. They were not disposed to be patient and sit by while their independence was taken from them.

On March 20th, 1920, a Congress of Syrian notables met at Damascus and offered the crown of Syria and Palestine to Faisal, who accepted it. This action was immediately repudiated by the British and French Governments, then engaged in preparing for the Conference at San Remo, at which the fate of the former Ottoman territories was to be decided. When the Conference met it allotted a Mandate of type 'A' for the northern

half of geographical Syria to France, and one for the southern half to Great Britain, with the obligation of carrying out the policy of the Balfour Declaration (April 24th, 1920). In reply, Faisal, who had refused to have anything to do with the Conference, declared that he would not recognize the imposition of foreign rule upon any portion of Syrian territory, including Palestine.

Both sides now prepared for war. The Arab Government attempted to increase its military strength, and the French army in Lebanon was reinforced with Senegalese and other colonial troops. On July 14th, 1920, General Gouraud, who had been appointed French Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon in October of the previous year, sent an ultimatum to Faisal. He demanded the unconditional recognition of the French Mandate, the reduction of the Syrian army, the abolition of conscription, the provision of facilities for the circulation of the new Franco-Syrian currency, French military occupation of the Rayaq-Aleppo railway and of Aleppo itself, and the punishment of those guilty of attacks upon French detachments. Against the wishes of the greater number of his supporters, Faisal accepted the ultimatum; but his answer was unaccountably delayed, and did not reach Gouraud until the time-limit attached to the ultimatum had expired and the French forces had been ordered to advance on Damascus. When Gouraud received the answer he halted his troops, but sent a further ultimatum containing more stringent demands. This Faisal was unable to accept. Once more the French columns moved upon Damascus. After a fight with Arab forces at Maisalun they entered the city on July 25th. Subsequently the rest of the area assigned to France was occupied. Faisal left the scene of his brief, uncertain reign for exile and then for a new and more lasting throne in Baghdad.

He has never been forgotten in Damascus. Too short for positive achievement, his rule had aroused enthusiasm and loyalty throughout the country. His Government had had more solid foundations in the popular consent than any perhaps since Ummayad times; had it received help it might have endured. The generation which remembered Faisal could never forgive the French, nor give to their rule more than a forced acquiescence.

10

Faisal's departure cleared the way for a final settlement by the Allied Powers of the status of Syria. The texts of the Mandates for 'Syria and Lebanon' (that is, the northern part of geographical Syria) and for 'Palestine' (that is, the southern half) were formally approved, along with that for Iraq, by the Council of the League of Nations in July, 1922, and became effective in September, 1923. In 1924 the United States gave her consent to the Mandates by agreements with France and Great Britain.

The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon provided for the gradual establishment of self-government in those countries, and the progressive relaxation of the Mandatory's control.[1] That for Palestine, however, gave the Mandatory full powers of legislation and administration, and laid upon it the positive duty of helping in the construction of a Jewish national home, provided the rights of the rest of the population were not prejudiced. But the text of the Mandate made it clear that the national home was to be confined to those parts of the British area which lay west of the Jordan, that is to Palestine proper, and not to be allowed to spread east of the Jordan. The region east of the Jordan had been administered by Faisal's Government from 1918-1920. The French did not occupy it after the expulsion of Faisal, and by an Anglo-French agreement in December, 1920, it was placed within the British mandatory area. Shortly afterwards Faisal's brother Abdullah moved northwards from Hejaz with a view to attacking the French in Syria; to prevent the attack he was offered and accepted the government, subject to Mandatory control, of the region east of the Jordan, or 'Transjordan'. The arrangement was at first provisional, but in April, 1923, it was announced that His Majesty's Government would recognize the existence of an independent Government in Transjordan under the Amir Abdullah, provided it was constitutional and enabled His Majesty's Government to fulfil its international obligations in respect of the territory.

11

At the San Remo Conference, which allotted the Mandate to France, certain other important decisions were also reached.

[1] The Mandate is summarized in Chapter IX, and its text is given in the Appendix.

175 By an Anglo-French agreement, France renounced the traditional protectorate over the Catholics so far as Palestine and the Holy Places were concerned, in view of British opposition to its continuance and the opinion of the Holy See that the time for it had passed.

By another agreement, the interests of the two Powers in the oilfields of Iraq were defined. The British Government undertook to grant to the French 25 per cent of the crude oil, if the fields were developed by Government action, or else, if a private company were used to develop the fields, 25 per cent of the shares in it; arrangements were also made in regard to the transport of oil from Iraq and Persia through the French sphere of influence to the eastern Mediterranean. It was in consideration of this agreement that France officially recognized the inclusion in Mesopotamia of the district of Mosul, which under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was to have formed part of the French sphere of influence.

The frontiers of the French Mandated Territories were established by a series of agreements in the early years of the mandatory period. The frontiers with Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan were settled by two Anglo-French agreements made in 1920 and 1922. The delimitation was in some ways arbitrary. There was no good reason, economic or ethnic, for the inclusion of the Hulah district in Palestine; for the separation of the Hauran and Jebel Druze from northern Palestine and Transjordan; or for the separation of the Jazirah into Iraqi and Syrian sections.

The frontier with Turkey caused greater difficulty. Under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the sphere of French control was to have included Cilicia and a region to the east of it with a predominantly Turkish-speaking population. These areas were occupied by French trocps after the Armistice; and it was intended to settle in them a large number of Armenian refugees. But the revival of Turkish power under Mustafa Kemal made the French position difficult. Fighting broke out between the occupying army and the Turkish nationalist forces. With a view to avoiding the dangers and expenses of a large-scale campaign and to safeguarding the northern frontier of Syria, and also because the unsettled state of Anglo-French relations in the Near East made France not unwilling to win the friendship of the Turks, the French Government decided to come to an agreement with the

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Turkish Nationalists. By the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 20th, 1921, France agreed to evacuate Cilicia and certain other districts; the region of Alexandretta, with its largely Turkish population, remained under French control, but France undertook to give it a special administrative régime.[1] In spite of this agreement and of the extinction of Turkish rights in Syria by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, tension and unrest continued in the frontier regions between Turkey and Syria, where the population was mixed Arab, Turkish and Kurd. When in 1925 a Mixed Commission met to delimit the frontier, its work was obstructed by Turkish claims to a number of districts which had until then been considered parts of Syria. In February, 1926, a Franco-Turkish agreement was signed which settled the most important points at issue; but it was not until June, 1929, that the controversy was closed for the time. In 1930 the eastern section of the Turco-Syrian frontier was delimited, and there was added to Syria a further district of the Jazirah stretching as far as the Tigris.

12

The Peace Settlement failed to fulfil the hopes with which the Arab nationalists had entered the war. It is true that the whole of Arab Asia had thrown off Ottoman suzerainty, that Hejaz had been recognized as an independent State, and that the Kingdom of Ibn Sa'ud in central Arabia continued to prosper, strong in the alliance and help of the Government of India. But the more advanced Arab communities of the Fertile Crescent had been placed under a Mandatory administration which they found it hard to distinguish from colonial rule. Moreover, they had been divided from one another. Geographical Syria had been separated from Iraq, and had also been partitioned into French and British mandated territories. In a portion of the latter area, there had been initiated an experiment in large-scale Jewish immigration which threatened to make impossible the achievement in that area of nationalist aspirations.

The ghost of the Peace Settlement has haunted Arab politics ever since. It turned into bitterness the enthusiasm which the Arab Revolt had aroused, and seriously damaged the moral influence of Great Britain and France in the Near

[1] For translation of the Agreement see *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1556.

175 East. The bitterness was all the more dangerous because during the war the Arabs had realized for the first time in centuries the strength which might be theirs, and had become conscious that their destiny was in their own hands. The sense of grievance and the sense of power have coloured the nationalist movement in this generation.

Not only the Arabs were disappointed by the settlement. The French were irritated that they had been permitted to establish only a temporary Mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and that only after a bitter and protracted dispute. Their irritation was directed not so much against the nationalists as against the British Government for having, as they alleged, placed and maintained Faisal in Damascus. The Zionists were grateful for the world's recognition of their right to colonize Palestine, but many of them resented the closure of Transjordan, which they considered as part of Palestine, to Jewish immigration. Great Britain had obtained most of what she wanted for herself; but some at least of her statesmen and officials disapproved of French policy in Syria, were uneasy about its effects upon the Arabs elsewhere, and regretted that it had prevented the complete fulfilment of the undertakings given during the war.

It was in this atmosphere of bitterness, suspicion and resentment that French rule in Syria and Lebanon began.

PART TWO

III. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION

1

AT this point it will be convenient to interrupt the narrative and to analyze the problem which first presented itself to the Syrians in the nineteenth century, and which underlies the political difficulties with which they are faced in the present generation. 178

This problem can be stated very briefly. An old way of thought and life, which has gone unchallenged and fundamentally unchanged for some hundreds of years, finds itself in some ways opposed, in others inescapably transformed by the new civilization of the West.

In consequence, the Syrians find themselves no longer living in a united and coherent world, but torn between two worlds, neither of which is altogether their own. How will it be possible for them, by preserving or modifying the old and accepting what is new, once more to form a unified world of thought and life which they can call their own?

2

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Syria formed part of a world which had a civilization of its own: a religion, a culture and a way of life. It was a unified civilization, in which every sphere of life was regulated by a system of generally accepted principles, themselves drawn from religion and from immemorial custom. This civilization may be called 'Arabo-Islamic', because its main characteristics were derived, with much borrowing from outside and with many adaptations to the peculiar conditions of Syria, from two main sources, themselves closely connected with one another: the Islamic religion and the life of the Arabian desert. 181

'Islam' means resignation, and the Moslem, the adherent of Islam, is he who resigns himself to the will of God: not in the sense of passive and fatalistic acceptance of anything which may come, but in that of the complete and voluntary submission of man's will to God's commandments. God is unique, the Creator of the Universe, all-wise and all-powerful; He has revealed His will to man, in a measure sufficient for all the purposes of life, through a long succession of Prophets, who include Moses, Jesus, and finally Muhammad, the Arabian of the seventh century, to whom was given the final revelation 179

which superseded and completed all previous ones. This final revelation is preserved for the use and knowledge of mankind in the Quran, the Moslem Holy Book.

The Quran embodies the principles in accordance with which a man's whole life should be lived; on the basis of those principles Moslem thinkers have erected a moral system covering every form of human activity, however seemingly unimportant. Thus the religious duties of a Moslem are unlimited and all-embracing; but certain of them are prior to others, and fulfilment of them is essential for every true Moslem. The most important of these are summarized in the so-called 'Pillars of Islam'. A true Moslem must testify that 'there is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God'. He must pray five times a day; give alms to the poor; fast during the month of Ramadan; and make the pilgrimage to Mecca, should circumstances permit him, at least once in his lifetime.

Men should perform these and other duties primarily because they emanate from the will of God, but also because on their obeying or disobeying God's will depends the fate of their immortal souls in the next world. God who created the world will some day bring it to an end; on the final Day of Judgement all will be held responsible for their actions. The virtuous will be granted eternal felicity in Paradise, but the vicious everlasting torment in Hell.

The moral system of Islam covers the life not only of individuals but also of human associations, and among them of that association called the State. Islam knows no Church, and therefore no distinction between Church and State, the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of this world. The Islamic State is an association of Moslems for the purpose of living in accordance with the tenets of their religion and of extending its sway throughout the world. The law of the State is the law of Islam; the function of the ruler is to defend the State against unbelievers, to administer Moslem law as defined by those learned in it, and himself to be bound by it in his relations with his subjects. They for their part owe him loyalty as a religious duty. In short, the Islamic community as it has traditionally been conceived is to its members all and more than all that the nation is to the modern Western man. Islam in its great days was a nation, transcending distinctions of race or colour. Although an

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Arabic-speaking Moslem might take a special pride in the peculiar relation of the Arabs to Islam, and in the dimly-remembered splendours of the early Caliphates, it is safe to say that normally he did not distinguish his being an Arab from his being a Moslem, and even when he did so it was the latter which was foremost in his thought and life.

3

For over a thousand years the majority of the population of Syria had been Moslem. There was not, however, complete unanimity in matters of religious belief. On the one hand, besides the Sunni or orthodox Moslems there were several heterodox Islamic and semi-Islamic sects: Shi'is, Druzes, Alawis and Isma'ilis. On the other hand, there still survived a number of Christian sects, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and others, which had come into existence in the early centuries of the Church's history; and there were in addition a comparatively small number of Jews.

Some of these communities were scattered throughout the country, while others possessed a local predominance in certain parts of it. Most of the districts held by these compact minorities were mountainous. The Lebanese mountains in particular were the homes of dissident communities, either because it was easier for the long-established inhabitants of Lebanon than for their neighbours of the plains to resist the pressure of Islamization, or else because sects which had grown up in the plains migrated to the mountains as an asylum where they would not be molested, or if attacked could better defend themselves. These mountain communities were marked by an especially unbending particularism and resistance to influences from outside.

4

Christians and Jews were left to carry on their own communal life without disturbance. For this there were two main reasons. The first was the Islamic doctrine in regard to Christianity and Judaism. Just as the Moslem regulated his life in accordance with the principles of his faith, so he did not deny a similar right to the Christians.

Moslems are not taught by their faith to regard Christians as inherently inferior, since it is in their power to become Moslems, and so enter the community of true believers in

which the only distinction is that of piety; nor as adherents of a false religion, since Islam considers Jesus to have been one of the succession of true prophets. They regard them as having gone astray, first in taking the revelation of Jesus as the final and complete revelation, and secondly in looking upon Jesus not simply as a prophet, a man through whom God's word has come to mankind, but as God incarnate. It is the doctrine of the Incarnation, and therefore also the doctrine of the Trinity, which are for Moslems the stumbling-blocks in Christianity. As 'People of the Book', believers in God, in prophecy and in the Day of Judgement, Christians like Jews are to be tolerated and to be allowed a certain status by the side of the Islamic community. But they cannot be regarded as members of that community. Nor can a Moslem willingly acquiesce in subjection to a non-Moslem Government, although his own weakness may compel a temporary submission.

Such is the attitude towards Christians which Islam enjoins: an attitude of reasoned and well-defined tolerance. But it is not surprising that there should during the thousand years of almost unchallenged Moslem supremacy have been periods of persecution, nor that the ordinary Moslem should have come to feel a certain contempt for the Eastern Christians who were the only Christians he knew: the contempt which he who knows himself to be strong feels for those in his power, and which he who believes himself to possess the truth feels for those who have rejected it.

The other reason for the persistence of the Christian and Jewish communities was the existence of a certain view of the State: a view which was universally accepted in western Asia, and indeed far beyond it, until recent generations. According to this view the Government existed to defend the cultivated lands, to maintain order, to tax their populations, and for nothing more. The laws by which the life of the individual and of society was regulated sprang not from positive enactment of the ruler but from the religious doctrines and ancestral customs to which individual and society adhered. It is true that since the ruling power was Moslem by faith, the Moslem religious law and the courts had a special relation to the Government. But a Moslem would no more have thought of compelling Christians and Jews to conform to Moslem law in matters of personal life and relationships than they of

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abandoning their own religious codes. Law was personal. Not simply was there no concept of equality before the law; there was no idea of sameness.

For these reasons, throughout the period of Arab and Ottoman rule the Christians and Jews were allowed a certain autonomy. Each sect formed a community, or as it was called in Arabic a 'millah' and in Turkish a 'millet', within the State and co-terminous with it. In matters affecting the community, the Government treated with it as a whole through its heads, and not with the members of it individually. Certain civil functions were devolved upon the spiritual heads and representative bodies of the communities. They were allowed to administer the property and institutions of their communities and to decide matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on—in accordance with the tenets of their faith.

This system originated long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It developed gradually and was only formalized in the nineteenth century by a series of Imperial edicts. Throughout the period of Moslem ascendancy it succeeded in preserving self-respect and a sense of community among the religious minorities, although it may also have helped to perpetuate bitterness and suspicion between them.

The heterodox sects which clung to the fringes of Islam were in a more ambiguous position. Officially they were regarded as parts of the general body of Islam; but in fact the cleavage between them and the orthodox was almost as great as that between Moslems and Christians, and they like the Christians were usually left to direct their internal affairs in accordance with customary law and the precepts of their religions.

5

Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belonging to other communities; and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. This was true also of every Christian sect in its relations with the others, for each sect formed a separate 'millet'; and of the orthodox Moslems in their relations with the heterodox. Difference of sect was

778 no less important an element in the common consciousness
186 than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

6

779 Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant
181 creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization.
577 Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

621 The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

8

The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

621 241 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 721 221 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 427 651 423 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 423 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power

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threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

9

Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

369 from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants
621 and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims
184 who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

10

101 The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

175 Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the
101 spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of
177 the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

175 The Turks performed also another function. Their military
177 strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

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Islamic world had been much affected by influences from 175
the Mediterranean countries, from Persia and from India. 177
It had had the power to assimilate the products of other civilizations, and also to extend its dominion over peoples alien to the Arabs in origin and way of life. But later it ceased to develop and either to give out or to receive influences; and although the stream of influences from the West never completely vanished, during the great days of the Ottoman Empire it was smaller and less effective than it had previously been and was again to become.

II

In the past century or more this Arab world has been shaken 177
to its foundations by the impact of the West. Western ideas, 178
learned from schools, from books and latterly from the cinema, have changed at least the externals of social life. The competition of Western goods has broken the old crafts and opened up new economic possibilities. New means of communication are breaking up the closed local community; the life of the Beduin is threatened by the motor-car, the aeroplane and the extension of civil authority. The administrative machinery which the modern Government commands, and the extension of the limits of its action, are making the old feudal and sectarian organization unnecessary and even impossible. New Western rulers have imposed themselves, who have not even so much claim to be obeyed or such deep roots in popular memory and habit as had the Ottoman Sultan. The new social, economic and political life has in its turn shaken the domination of Moslem jurisprudence; and men have begun to raise new questions of the adequacy of religious faith and loyalty as a basis for society, and the place of Islam in the modern world. A new world has revealed itself, which strikes at the very foundations of the old, and is indeed its exact antithesis.

The transformation of the old life has brought with it a 178
number of difficulties and dangers. The Arabs, like other 182
peoples in their position, are torn between two ways of life. Sentiment, tradition and the belief that there is something of value in their tradition make them unwilling to break entirely with the old civilization, even if that were possible. But at the same time the necessities of modern life, and often a conviction that the Western civilization is in some ways

178 better than their own, impel them to accept certainly the
182 economic technique of the West and possibly much more.

This self-division between two ways of life is full of inconveniences. It may produce an abnormal tension of mind and nerve in the individual, and temporarily obscure moral and aesthetic standards. What is more important, it may stifle the creative energies of an individual and a people, and make it difficult for them to speak with their own voice and think their own thoughts. On another level, it is almost inevitable that the process of change should be attended with great economic dislocation, as the old crafts die out; with social unrest, as the introduction of new economic processes brings in its train a new relationship of the social classes; and with political instability, since it takes time to learn the art of constructing and managing a modern Government. Among the educated classes the tension may result in a profound melancholy and a paralysis of the will: the qualities which haunt the world of the Russian novelists of the nineteenth century.

178 The dislocation and difficulties have been particularly great for two reasons. The first is that the change has left no part of life untouched. It is a complete upheaval both of the Arab mind and of Arab society. Secondly, it is not a single change of which the force will sooner or later spend itself. It is the introduction of a dynamic principle by virtue of which one change prepares the way for another, and no end to the series is perceptible. The change is not from one static position to another, but from a static community ruled by custom to a dynamic society, moulded and governed by positive laws and by a conception of individual, social or national welfare.

12

182 It may be that the difficulties will so press upon the Arabs that they will accept self-division as inevitable and give up the attempt to reconcile the new and the old. If that happens, they will become Levantines.

To be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of values of one's own, not

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to be able to create but only able to imitate; and so not even to imitate correctly, since that also needs a certain originality. It is to belong to no community and to possess nothing of one's own. It reveals itself in lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and despair. 182

There have always been Levantines in the ports of the eastern Mediterranean, because they are places where more than one world meets to do business. But the special mark of the present age is the spread of the Levant inland to regions hitherto untouched by it. In a sense every Arab, or at least every educated Arab of the towns, is forced to live in two worlds. Not only his way of thought but his social life is becoming daily more deeply affected by Europe and America; but at heart he is still an Arab and usually a Moslem. A few may be strong enough to face the problem and create a new unity out of discordant elements; but the majority are likely to take the line of least resistance, and passively acquiesce in their division of soul. As the process of Westernization passes from stage to stage the problem becomes ever more acute. Will the few succeed in influencing the many, and showing them the way to a Westernized life which is nevertheless genuinely Arab and Moslem; or will the many submerge the few, and all be drowned in a common Levantinism? That is the crisis of Arab culture in our time.

13

There is only one bulwark against Levantinism: that the Arabs should believe in their own possibilities and their power, given the necessary conditions, of building up once more a world of thought and activity which they can call their own and through which they can make their contribution to the world's civilization. This belief exists, and in consequence there can be seen an active response by the Arabs to the new difficulties by which they are beset. 000

This response expresses itself in a striving towards unity such as the old community possessed: towards the creation of a 'world' unified by the possession of common principles which permeate every aspect of society and which those who live in it recognize as valid. There is a further attempt, closely connected with this, to establish satisfactory relations between that world and the Western world, which it will inevitably resemble in many ways but from which it will

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differ in others; from which it has learned and borrowed much, but to which it may in future once more contribute something.

The creation of a unified world is an ideal to which only an imperfect approximation is possible. At no time is there complete harmony or complete disorder. But at least a nearer approximation than exists at present is possible and is necessary if the present maladies of the Arab community are to be overcome. The form of the new unity is not yet clear, and indeed it cannot become clear so long as it is unachieved, since a problem so vast as this cannot be solved by a synthesis effected in the mind of a single thinker. It will be solved by a multitude of decisions taken by innumerable groups and individuals and each of them leading to changes which themselves involve other changes perhaps unforeseen. The important matter is not that a few thinkers or politicians should plan out in advance the end which is to be achieved and the stages by which it may be reached, but that a large number of people should have a sense of the seriousness of the particular and immediate tasks to which they are called, and be resolved not to rest in confusion and self-division.

The decay of the old, the challenge of the new, self-division and the struggle for unity: such themes, which have been touched upon in this chapter, appear in every aspect of the life of Syria. The following chapters will analyze the process of Westernization in the intellectual, economic, social and political spheres.

IV. THE WESTERNIZATION OF IDEAS

I

THE coming of the West aroused a new process of thought not only in Syria but in all the Arabic-speaking countries; this process originated earliest and has developed furthest in Cairo and Beirut, but exists in some form in the other centres of Arab life, and is a single process which does not admit of sharp regional divisions. Much of this chapter will therefore concern itself with the general movement of thought in Arabic. Moreover, it will be necessary for the sake of exposition to formulate theoretical standpoints more clearly, articulately and abstractly, and in sharper opposition to one another, than they are formulated by contemporary Arabic writers.

The civilization of the West revealed itself in many lights to the Arabs. It came to them asserting, in act if not in word, its own superiority and its contempt for the East; thus it aroused a sense of humiliation, the more bitter because the Arabs had for so long regarded themselves as the source of true religion and civilization. It came to them as a Christian civilization, and thus it compelled them to take a new view of Christianity and of its relationship with Islam. Again, although it was Christian, it was also secular, denying the theocratic idea of life and politics; thus it stimulated thought about the place of religion in society. It preached and practised a new view of human relationships; it was based upon an undreamed-of mechanical power and an unknown economic organization; it was prosperous and unimaginably strong. In these aspects it was to be feared as a force of oppression and destruction; but also perhaps to be imitated, since it held out hopes of an equal prosperity and strength. Above all, it appeared as a revolutionary force, threatening or promising radical change for worse or for better.

Some Arabs, among them many of the religious leaders, averted their gaze from the possibilities of the new world, and regarded it simply as a hostile force to be resisted; except in the remote places of the Arabian peninsula, this school of thought has now practically died out. There were and still are others who are so intoxicated with the splendour of the West that they are prepared to give up not only their own traditions but even their faith in a special destiny for the Arabs and Islam, and to become fully and uncritically

18 Westernized as soon as possible. But the greater number
829 of thoughtful Arabs have since the beginning of the Western
177 penetration refused to go to either extreme. They realize that there is much that is good in Western civilization; that their own civilization is ill; and that its maladies would make it desirable, even did not its weakness make it inevitable, that it should be influenced and transformed by the West. But at the same time they can see clearly the faults in the West and the qualities of their own tradition; more fundamentally, they have faith that the Arab and Islamic peoples have creative gifts of their own and in consequence a special part to play in human history. Therefore their reaction to the impact of the West has been neither uncritical rejection nor uncritical acceptance, but a process of questioning which still continues: What can the Arabs become? What can they do in the world? What form and degree of Westernization will best serve to revive their creative spirit?

000 The paragraphs which follow will summarize some of the answers which different groups of Arabic thinkers give to these questions. It must however be made clear in advance that the explicit views of particular thinkers are only one among several factors which will determine the answer which the Arabs give to these questions. Men brought up in the Arabic language and the Moslem faith, and in unceasing contact with the West in their thoughts and their lives, are forced by the nature of their situation to make judgements and decisions about the acceptance or rejection of Western ideas and ways; these judgements and decisions are influenced or even determined by the Arab and Moslem standards of those who make them; and having been made they involve others which perhaps had not been foreseen. Thus by a process of unformulated and unsystematic thought the structure of society gradually changes. A thinker of genius may alter the direction of that process; but in the absence of genius, the explicit doctrines of the intellectual élite may have only a very limited effect.

2

177 The first task of the Arab thinkers was to understand the
814 West. It was effectively begun in the days of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, has continued ever since and is still far from completion. Its methods are various: schools on the Western

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model or under Western control have been established; students have sought foreign universities, on their own initiative or as members of official missions; European languages have been studied and Western books translated into Arabic. At present the Arabs, at least in the more advanced of the Arab countries, have achieved a certain understanding of Western technology and natural science, and of the polite literature of England and France. But Christianity, European philosophy, music and art, the whole culture of Russia and central Europe and the literature of the ancient world are still very imperfectly known.

The study of the West has itself done something to Westernize the Arab mind. The student cannot be unaffected by the object of his thought. In so far as theories of Westernization have been formulated, they fall into two main categories, which may conveniently be called theories of Islamic revival and of secularization. As expounded below they are 'ideal types'; any particular Arab thinker will probably be found to hold not one of the theories in its pure form, but a distinctive blend of several.

3

The movement of Islamic revival springs from a vision of an Arabo-Islamic society which neither apes the West nor clings blindly to outworn forms: of which the animating spirit and the principles of judgement are derived from Islam, but the ways of life and thought largely approximate or correspond' to those of Western society; and which has a 'healthy' relationship to the Christian world, a relationship of mutual respect and influence, based upon the acknowledgement of equality.

This much would be generally agreed, but there is great difference of opinion about the methods by which such a state of affairs could be brought into existence. There are some who claim that what is necessary is not so much a regeneration of the spirit and thought of Islam as an effort to unify and direct the political efforts of the Islamic peoples in defence of the Islamic world against Western penetration. They wish to accept only the externals of Western civilization, the sources of its economic and military strength. This was the doctrine of the Pan-Islamic movement, originated by Jemal ad-Din al-Afghani in Egypt and elsewhere during the

185 later decades of the nineteenth century, and used by the
177 Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in order to revive the waning prestige and influence of his throne. Its weakness was its failure to recognize the malady in the soul of Islam.

185 There are other movements whose exponents see the necessity not simply for political action but for a revival in the religious life of Islam, and who believe that Islam is capable of producing such a revival out of its own resources. This is the attitude of thinkers who support the Wahabi movement, which aims at returning to the primitive purity and fervour of the apostolic age of Islam, and at removing all those later accretions and distortions which can find no justification in the Quran or the Traditions of the Prophet. Wahabism originated in central Arabia in the eighteenth century, and has had a great influence upon Islamic life during the present generation, largely because of the political success of the Wahabi leader, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, King of Sa'udi Arabia.

Wahabism and similar movements are concerned primarily with religious practice, and regard theology and speculation with suspicion, as unnecessary and possibly dangerous. But there are other movements which, while not belittling the need for a revival of piety and the devotional life, believe also in the necessity for a reconsideration and re-statement of Islamic doctrine and for a revision of Islamic jurisprudence; and they realize that these tasks can only be accomplished with the help of the intellectual methods and achievements of the modern West. The movement originated by Shaikh Muhammad Abdu in Egypt, and sometimes called the 'Islamic Modernist Movement', was in one of its aspects an attempt to respond to the need for a re-statement of Islamic doctrine. The leaders of this movement have been able and sincere men, and their achievement and influence have been great. But as a movement of thought its effectiveness has been limited by two factors. On the one hand, its knowledge and understanding of Western culture are defective; it has been too exclusively concerned with modern science, or at least with nineteenth century 'scientificism'; and it has not attempted to arrive at a profound understanding of the basic elements in Western thought, Greek philosophy and Christian theology. On the other hand, it has at times been much concerned with polemics, with showing that Islam has

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something to offer the world, and that its doctrine is more fully in accordance with the discoveries of modern science than is that of Christianity; it has in consequence lacked the intellectual objectivity which is necessary for constructive thought.

4

Polemics and the study of modern scientific thought are necessary; but only slowly and among a few groups of thinkers in Cairo and Beirut is it being realized that something more fundamental is needed. The whole intellectual life of Islam needs to be re-created, in the same way as Wahabism is trying to re-create its devotional life. The formal precepts and practices into which Islam like all religions has tended to become crystallized need to be broken up, and the principles which lie at the root of them, and which they have attempted to express, to be once more seen naked and in themselves. The vital spirit of affirmation which is at the heart of Islam, and which has long been quiescent although not dead, should be revived; it should be made articulate in a system of thought adequate to meet the intellectual needs and answer the questionings of the modern mind.

The problem of the reconstruction of Islamic philosophy and theology is only beginning to reveal itself; it is too early to expect that anything should have been done to solve it. The method and success of its solution depend largely upon unpredictable factors: upon the emergence of Arab Moslem thinkers with gifts sufficient to their task, and the revival of the spirit of reflection and speculation. But it is possible to point to certain preliminary tasks which can be accomplished even in the absence of such factors.

The first is the study of the great Islamic thinkers of the Middle Ages, who tried to do for Islam what the thinkers of coming generations must attempt once more: to turn the simple creed of a nomadic people into a system of thought, an explanation of the great problems of human destiny, able to satisfy the reflective and inquiring minds of those trained in the philosophical tradition of Plato and Aristotle. To-day a similar problem arises—to construct an Islamic system of thought adequate to meet the intellectual doubts to which the modern world is prone; and those who are attempting to solve it will be helped by analyzing the thought of their

medieval predecessors, since philosophical problems are in a sense always the same, and the answers given by the great thinkers of the past never cease to have value. Just as modern Catholic thinkers base their attempts to build a modern Catholic philosophy upon the great scholastic systems of the Middle Ages, and are constructing a 'Neo-Thomist' system of thought on the basis of Thomism, so it may be that Islamic thinkers will attempt to revive and re-create the elements of unchanging value in the Islamic scholasticism of the medieval Arab thinkers.

The second task is the study and understanding of the most profound Western thought, Christian and other. This is important both because among the greatest of the problems which faces the Islamic East is that of its relations with the West, on every level of thought and life; and because Islam will be helped in defining its attitude to philosophical issues by considering the attitude taken up by another religion, so near to it in some ways, so different in others. It is true that something has been done to this end. For several generations Arab writers have been studying the works of Western thinkers, and translating them into Arabic. But it has been done for the most part without system and uncritically; much that is fundamental to an understanding of Western culture is still practically unknown. It is because of this that many and perhaps most Arab Moslem thinkers of to-day largely fail to understand the spirit of the West. Western civilization, they say, is wholly materialist; it has no spiritual life to compare with that of Asia. Sooner or later, this mythical antithesis between the materialist West and the spiritual East will have to be exploded; and they will be forced to realize that the spiritual life of Europe even to-day is as intense, profound and creative as anything which Asia has to offer.

If both these tasks are to be performed, it is of particular importance that Arab Moslem thinkers should try to understand the works of Plato and Aristotle, although not to the exclusion of other philosophers, and that these works should become, as they are in the West, to some extent the conscious or unconscious possession of every thinker. This is important partly because of all that Plato and Aristotle can do in providing what may be called an intellectual 'attitude': an awareness of problems, a method of analysis and a set of

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fundamental principles. But it is important also for other reasons. Greek thought lies at the root of that Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages of which the significance has already been mentioned : it is therefore part of the intellectual heritage of the Islamic East as well as of the West ; it may serve as that common ground of agreement and understanding which is necessary if a fruitful intellectual contact is to be re-established between the Moslem and the Christian worlds.

5

The Syrian people will have a special part to play in the intellectual reconstruction of Islam, because of certain characteristics which they possess. They are peculiarly aware of the 'tension' between East and West, and between Islam and Christianity. This is partly because their minds are exceptionally subtle, flexible and sensitive ; but partly also because Syria has always been exposed to influences coming in from Mediterranean lands, and tends to be affected by them sooner and more profoundly than the other Arab countries. Through the mission-schools, through emigration and in other ways there has been built up in Syria an educated class Westernized in spirit as well as in externals, but still Arabic in language and for the most part in sympathies and feeling. Thus the conflict between East and West has become a conflict inside their own souls ; as such it raises problems which pose themselves with peculiar urgency.

The factors which make the problems more profoundly felt and more urgent in Syria than elsewhere make them also more likely to find a solution there. It is educated Syrians who are best fitted to see the tension between East and West on the level not of politics or polemics but of doctrine. But if they are to contribute effectively to the revival of the Arab and Islamic mind, they must develop an intellectual life of their own, and not be content to become culturally a province of Egypt.

6

There is one factor which gives Syria a unique position in the Arab world. It possesses a large Christian population, whose intellectual life and Christian consciousness have been reviving in recent years. The impact of the West upon them has been as great as upon the Moslems, although of course it has taken a

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185 different form: the West has meant for them not only the dis-
179 covery of a new way of life but, in the most fundamental things, a rediscovery of their true selves. The result has been an interesting and important revival of Christian culture, expressing itself through Arabic and through French. It began as a revival of literature and language, and as such was a part, and a very important part, of the general Arabic literary renaissance; but gradually it is becoming conscious of the deepest spiritual question which faces it, the question of what it is to be an Arab Christian.

186 This movement of Christian life and thought is important
185 first of all for its own sake, but also for the part it may
182 play in the re-awakening of Islam. The Syrian Christians are, as Christians, particularly fitted to understand the culture of Europe; while as Arabs, speaking the Arabic language and conversant with its literature, they can interpret Europe to the Arab Moslems and, what is more important still, can confront them inescapably with the challenge of Christianity. They do not feel the conflict between the West and the Islamic East in exactly the same form as that in which Moslems feel it. But they feel it in another form, and in one which raises problems of which the solution is both particularly necessary and particularly difficult. For them the problem poses itself as one of political loyalties, and therefore their material well-being and perhaps even their physical safety depend upon their solving it. In the conflict between the European Powers and the forces of nationalism, on which side should they range themselves? Religious affinities, long-standing ties of friendship, gratitude for favours received and fear of Moslem domination draw them to the side of Europe; but ties of language and culture, common feelings of humiliation and pride, and the desire to put an end to the religious dissensions of the past attract them to the nationalist camp. Divided loyalties of this sort are tragic, but they are also a necessary stage in the development of thought, alike for the individual and for whole peoples; it is in the struggle to reunite the divided personality that the intellect becomes mature. The Christians stand to the Syrian people roughly as the latter as a whole to the Arab people: it is in them that the tension which is felt vaguely and in some degree by all goes deepest and may reach its crisis earliest. But if the crisis is to be fruitful, they must try at one and the same time

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to remember that they are Christians, and revive their specific /186
Eastern Christian thought and life, and to remember that /185
they are part of Arab Asia and have a special mission to perform /182
in the East. The attempt has already begun. Among the Catholics and Greek Orthodox of Beirut there are already small groups of thinkers who are trying to understand the nature of Christianity and of their special duty as members of the Eastern Churches; there are other groups which are struggling with the question of the national existence and loyalty of the Arab Christians. There are very few, however, who are trying to hold together in a balance the two aspects of their being, as Christians and as Arabs. The attempt is difficult, some would say impossible; but on its success depends much more than their own fate.

7

The other movement, that of secularization, springs from /185
the belief of many Arab thinkers that the superior strength and stability of Western society is due to the limitations which have been imposed upon the action and influence of religion. (This belief illustrates one of the main characteristics of Arab thought to-day: the conviction that the West has a 'secret', which, if only the Arabs could find it, would confer on them success similar to that of the Western nations.) In Western thought, each 'field' is autonomous in the choice of its principles and methods; and the Western community is a secular community, in which religion is tolerated, but no longer gives the regulative principles for every kind of human activity. Western thought is no longer theocentric, Western society no longer theocratic. In the same way the Arabs, these thinkers argue, should no longer attempt to regulate their society by Islamic doctrine and law; they should curb the pretensions of the religious leaders, and having done so should reorganize each aspect of their community in the light of those principles which Western experience shows to be appropriate to it. Secularism has taken many shapes. It has been one of the factors in the growth of the nationalist movement.[1] It is also giving rise to a movement of philosophical, ethical and social thought.

In the sphere of philosophical thought, this movement has so far made little headway. Books have been written upon

[1] See Chapter VI.

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the scientific spirit and upon freedom of thought, and there have been attacks on particular religious abuses. But the hold of Islamic orthodoxy upon educated and uneducated alike is still too strong for a frontal attack to be made upon its claims to explain the whole Universe and to regulate the whole of human life. Even those who have attempted to defend Islam in modern language have at times been reproached with infidelity and atheism.

Greater changes have taken place in the sphere of ethical and sociological thought. It is possible to see the beginning of a movement of 'Social Secularism', which seeks to make the welfare of the individual in this world the norm of social organization; and which as a corollary of this advocates sweeping reforms in the existing structure of society.

The movement for social reform must be clearly distinguished from the improvements in social conditions which have taken place during the present generation, and some of which are mentioned in another part of this book.[1] Of course the two are connected in the sense that the improvement of standards and ways of living constitutes the ultimate goal of the social welfare movement. But such improvements as have been effected during the past twenty years have been due rather to the action of the Government or to the increased prosperity of the country than to the pressure of any considerable body of opinion; and during that period the immediate concern of the social welfare movement has been not so much with the raising of standards as with an indispensable preliminary task: the creation of a social conscience, a conviction that certain standards are desirable.

In so far as this movement exists at all it is of very recent growth. Under the Ottoman Turks it would have been impossible for such a movement to come into existence without arousing suspicion and perhaps repressive action on the part of the authorities. Moreover, the very concepts of public opinion and voluntary organization are of recent introduction into the Near East. Even now the idea of social reform has not penetrated very deep. It is still largely ignored by most of the organized political parties, which tend to concentrate upon the political issue of independence and to treat all other issues as secondary.

Perhaps the most important social welfare organization is

[1] See Chapter V.

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that which was established some years ago in the American/ 85
University of Beirut. Its summer camps and other activities aim not so much at reforming the social life of the rural districts as at giving University students, who will in future constitute an important element in the ruling class, an awareness and understanding of the problems of rural life. Around the Jesuit University also there is growing up a movement which aims at making the educated Catholic youth of Lebanon more conscious of the social doctrine of their religion.

8

In addition to the problems inherent in the process of 177
Westernization as such, there are others which are due to the 871
particular phase which that process has reached. One such problem is created by the existence of two main streams of Western influence, French and Anglo-Saxon. The study of the French language and its culture has been stimulated by its being one of the official languages throughout the Mandatory period, by the teaching of it in almost all schools, both private and public, and by the long-standing connexion between France and certain elements in the population. The study of the English language is encouraged by commercial connexions with the Anglo-Saxon countries, by the existence of a number of American Protestant mission schools, by the movement of emigration and by the predominance of British influence in the neighbouring Arab countries.

Here as elsewhere, the exponents of French and Anglo-Saxon forms of Western culture have not always shewn so great a solidarity with one another as might be desired; and they have often been estranged from one another, not only because of the conflict of British and French political interests and rivalry between Protestant and Catholic missions in the Levant, but also because of fundamental differences in the French and Anglo-Saxon concepts of culture and education.

The differences between the two are reflected in the two Universities to which they have given rise. The Université de S. Joseph is maintained and largely staffed by Jesuits and is Catholic in spirit; the American University was originally a Protestant college, but is now officially and so far as possible in practice unsectarian. The former has for many years been subsidized, at least in some of its faculties, by the French

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177 Government, while the latter is wholly unconnected with
871 any Western government. The former concentrates, so far as the majority of its students are concerned, upon mastery of the French language; while in the latter, although English is the medium of instruction, an attempt is made to teach Arabic thoroughly. The political spirit of the former is one of attachment to France and distrust of nationalism; while the latter has become in practice, and without the deliberate intention of its authorities, the intellectual centre of Arab nationalism. The former is perhaps a greater centre of research and scholarship, and has had prominent orientalists on its staff; while the latter, although it has an impressive record of scholarly and scientific work, has tended in the Anglo-Saxon manner to exalt character above intellect, and to concentrate upon the training of citizens and public servants.

Ultimately the fact that higher education is largely in the hands of foreign institutions and is given through the medium of foreign languages, and that the two main centres of it differ so widely from one another, may prove not to be a handicap to Arab culture. At present, although it may be unavoidable and in some ways advantageous, it undoubtedly causes difficulties. There is not always sufficient common ground of understanding between the graduates of the two universities; many of them are more at home in a foreign language than in their own; and many in the attempt to master two languages and two cultures fail to master either.

V. THE WESTERNIZATION OF SOCIETY

1

THE first and most obvious sign of social change is the 161
growth in the population of the French Mandated Territories in the last four generations. For some centuries previous to 1800 the population had been steadily declining. In the course of the nineteenth century it began to increase; by 1914 it may have been in the neighbourhood of two and a half millions. Since then it has grown ever faster, because of the abolition of conscription, the decline in emigration, the rise in the standard of living and the improvement in medical and sanitary services. To-day the total population is nearly four millions.

The distribution of the population between the different 162
provinces of the country is as follows:

Syria:	Province of Damascus	581,267
	" " Aleppo	752,196
	" " Homs	182,312
	" " Hama	137,882
	" " the Hauran	108,603
	" " the Euphrates	218,667
	" " the Jazirah	103,514
	" " Latakia	371,880
	" " Jebel Druze	70,706
	Total	2,477,027[1]
Lebanon:	Province of Beirut	232,000
	" " Mount Lebanon	278,000
	" " Northern Lebanon ..	241,000
	" " Southern Lebanon ..	198,000
	" " the Biqa'	167,000
	Total	1,116,000[2]

2

Two-thirds of this population live in villages and are 311
dependent upon agricultural occupations. The total area of the country is some 58,000 square miles; but only about 10–15 per cent of it is cultivated. An equal area could however be brought under cultivation if swamps were drained, barren wastes irrigated, and the margin of agriculture pushed
eastwards into the deserts.

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1938* (Paris, 1939), pp. 220-1. These figures exclude the Beduin population, who number over half a million, and also the population of Alexandretta, which was ceded to Turkey in 1939 (see Chapter XI). They are not to be accepted as more than a rough approximation. An estimate for 1944 gave the population of Syria as 2,800,000 (excluding the Beduin).

[2] Figures for 1942.

000 162 eastwards into the desert. At present the bulk of the population is concentrated in a comparatively small part of the total area of the country; it is mainly in the West and in the river valleys of the Jazirah. The density of population is greatest on the coast and round Damascus and Aleppo.

241 The crops which are grown or could be grown vary greatly from district to district, in accordance with variations in climate and the soil's fertility. The Jazirah, the great plain of Homs and Hama, the Biqa' and the Hauran produce wheat, and to a lesser extent maize, barley and other cereals. Olives, vines and other fruits are grown on the coastal plains and the westward slopes of the coastal ranges; tobacco in Lebanon and around Latakia; cotton also around Latakia, and in the Biqa'. Some districts are well watered by springs, summer streams and perennial rivers, and some, in the north more than in the south and on the coast rather than inland, enjoy an adequate rainfall; but the fertility of almost all parts of the country could be much increased were its water-resources to be properly exploited. The Orontes in the north, the Litani in the south, the Euphrates and its tributaries in the north-east and other rivers could be used to irrigate perhaps half a million more hectares than are irrigated to-day. The rainfall could be more fully utilized, and the agricultural situation improved in various other ways, by systematic reafforestation, to make up for the bad effects of neglect in the past. Under French rule a little has been done to this end, but more remains to be done.

135 The mineral resources of Syria and Lebanon have not yet been thoroughly investigated but are probably not extensive. Salt and some other minerals exist in quantities sufficient to supply the country's own needs; but iron and other requisites of industry are found only in small quantities or else not at all. In recent years there have been reports of the discovery of oil in the Jazirah, but whatever oilfields exist are not yet being exploited.

433 241 In normal years the country's production of food equals and often exceeds its consumption, although the inadequacy of internal communications and other factors make necessary a certain importation of agricultural products from the neighbouring countries. Improvements in the quality of seeds and livestock and the modernization of agricultural methods have already begun, and greatly help in increasing production.

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

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passengers and goods are carried
mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most 489
part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads 491
satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to 452
economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; 434
foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not 436
in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long 433
as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, 437
their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

433 such goods as Syria's few modern factories produce, have
439 between them severely limited the Syrian and Lebanese export trade.

439 According to the official statistics for 1938, the latest year
457 for which detailed figures are available, the main countries to which the French Mandated Territories exported goods were Iraq, Palestine, France, Transjordan, Italy, the United States and Egypt, in that order.[1] Much the most important exports were vegetable products and textile materials and goods. The total value of exports and re-exports (excluding the oil of Iraq) was some 892,232,000 francs (£5,028,000).[2] The chief countries from which goods were imported were Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Germany, Italy and Roumania. The main goods imported were textile materials and goods, metals and metal work, vegetable and mineral products; and the total value of imports was 1,707,696,000 francs (£9,059,000).[2] There was thus an adverse trade balance of 815,464,000 francs (£4,031,000) which was largely offset by the revenue from certain types of invisible export. For example large sums were brought into the country by the many thousands of tourists who visited it, and by the Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and others who spent the summer in the hill-resorts of Lebanon. Again, considerable sums of money were sent home by emigrants in America and elsewhere; this item is now much less important than during the past, but it is still not negligible. A third type of invisible export was the foreign capital invested in the country, and foreign credit granted to merchants. In spite of these invisible exports, however, both the size of Syrian and Lebanese foreign trade and the discrepancy between imports and exports are unsatisfactory. The situation can be improved, first by an increase and diversification in production, and secondly by the discovery of external markets for the goods produced, either in the neighbouring countries or elsewhere.

5

511 Syria and Lebanon are comparatively poor countries, and in spite of the changes which have taken place the standard of living in the countryside and among the poorer classes in

[1] For statistics of foreign trade, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, pp. 199-202.

[2] Calculated at the rate of 177.45 francs, to the pound sterling. This was the average rate for December, 1938.

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the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

6

The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

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565 class of importance nor an organized urban proletariat (although there are the beginnings of a trade-union movement). There does, it is true, exist a large commercial middle class in the towns, but it is not an autonomous class capable of challenging the social power of the landowners. For this there are a number of reasons: many of the merchants are Christians or Jews, and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interest from them.

565 Although the power of the landowners has not yet been
178 challenged, almost certainly the coming generation will see its decline. The conditions which made it possible are ceasing to exist. Land is no longer the only source of wealth, nor is subsistence-agriculture by ignorant peasants the only practicable means of using it. The landlords have lost not only their economic but also their political function: their services as leaders of a feudal army and as tax-collectors have long since been dispensed with. It is not yet clear, however, which class will take their place. The processes which have taken place in parts of Europe—the transfer of power from landowners to capitalists, and the division of large estates into small freeholdings—may occur, but it is not necessary and perhaps not altogether desirable that they should. It is at least arguable for example that it would be better, economically and socially, to revive and develop the village community than to try to create a class of small farmers. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that great changes in the structure of classes are to be expected.

7

Again, the patriarchal family system remains in existence,
178 but its days are probably numbered. The claims of the family
621 are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the ways of modern urban life and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village.

178 The structure of the family is being radically transformed
562 by the change in the status of women. The change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to

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enter an ever-increasing number of occupations, including the liberal professions. But so far only the edge has been touched of the great problem, which like all great problems in this country is closely bound up with religion: how far is it possible in a modern society to retain the traditional Islamic view of women's status—seclusion and the veil, the theory and in a minority of cases the practice of polygamy, the divorce laws and so on? Of all the difficult questions which the process of Westernization raises, this is perhaps the most difficult; and its difficulty and urgency are likely to increase. The process of change is being speeded by one manifestation of Western civilization above all: the film which expresses a way of feminine life, and a conception of the relations between men and women, which are far from those prevalent in the Islamic world.

The local and sectarian loyalties of the past also preserve something of their strength, but on the whole they are declining in force and are likely to continue to do so, with the spread of Western ideas, the introduction of new means of communication and above all the development of schools, in which the adherents of different religions grow up side by side.

8

The growth of education is indeed one of the most important, as it is one of the most obvious, changes of the last few generations. Landowner, merchant and peasant alike are eager to send their sons and daughters to school, as the first and essential step towards entering the free professions or Government service. Syria and Lebanon now possess the framework of a complete educational system, from elementary schools up to technical institutes and three universities: the American University of Beirut, the Jesuit Université de S. Joseph, also in Beirut, and the State University, in Damascus.

The table on page 94 shows the number of schools of different types, and of scholars in them, in 1938.

From these figures it will be clear that education is further advanced in Lebanon than in Syria. It is also further advanced in the mainly Christian districts of Lebanon than in the others; among the Christians of Syria than among the Moslems; and in Syria as a whole than in Jebel Druze and Latakia. The percentage of literacy is probably rather

212 The percentage of literacy is probably higher over 40 per cent among men and under 20 per cent among women in Lebanon; in Syria it is considerably less.

871 There are four main types of school in the country. First there are the official schools maintained by the departments of education of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Secondly, there are a small number of privately-owned 'national' schools, so called because they are inter-sectarian and do not give religious instruction. Thirdly, there are schools maintained by the religious communities indigenous to the country, sectarian in control and in the content of their instruction. They are the most numerous of all; and the majority of them are maintained by the Christian communities. Finally, there are schools controlled and subsidized by foreign organizations. Practically all of them, with the exception of those belonging to the French 'Mission Laïque' and the 'Alliance Israélite', are maintained by Christian missionary societies. The majority of them are controlled by French Catholics of various religious orders; next in importance are those maintained by American Protestant missions. There are also British and other foreign schools. These foreign institutions are of particular importance because they include the two main centres of higher learning in the country, the two Universities in Beirut.

Grade of Education	Institutions or Courses				Scholars			
	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria
Elementary education	1,867	90	194	839	131,512	5,534	15,981	101,056
Secondary and technical education and teachers' training courses ..	104	—	6	42	9,803	—	643	7,398
Higher education ..	28	—	—	5	1,228	—	—	356

(In addition, there were some hundreds of students studying abroad, in Egypt, in France and other European countries and in the United States.)[1]

In 1938 the first type of school accounted for 31 per cent of the total number of scholars; the second and third between them for 49 per cent; and the fourth for 20 per cent. In

[1] For detailed educational statistics, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 214-15.

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Syria the proportion of official to unofficial schools was larger, and in Lebanon it was smaller, than these figures indicate.

This diversity of schools may be a disadvantage in so far as it makes more difficult the creation of a common intellectual ground for the nation as a whole. There are other serious problems too which perplex the Syrian educationalist: the problem of making modern Arabic an adequate language for expressing modern scientific concepts, and of teaching it thoroughly while at the same time teaching European languages to a degree sufficient for professional and other purposes; the problem of widespread peasant illiteracy; and the problem of redirecting the schools to the production of farmers and technicians rather than of superfluous Government officials and lawyers.

VI. ARAB NATIONALISM

I

000 OUT of the changes which have been discussed in the last three chapters, and the problems to which they have given rise, has grown the nationalist movement. Since this movement has for the most part taken an Arab rather than a specific Syrian or Lebanese form, it is necessary at the beginning to ask whether and in what sense the Syrians and Lebanese are Arabs.

143 Racially the Syrians and Lebanese are not of exactly the same stock as the Arabs of the Peninsula. The latter are mainly of the 'Mediterranean' race, with some exceptions. In the Syrian desert and parts of the interior of Syria, the inhabitants are also mainly Mediterranean; but in the mountains the Mediterranean has been united with an 'Alpine' element, to produce a 'Dinaric' or 'Armenoid' type. In most of the interior the population is a mixture of these two types, with the Mediterranean predominating.

186 Racial origin, however, is not of much influence upon
143 popular judgement. When Syrians and Lebanese say that they belong to the Arab people, they mean that they possess the Arab heritage of language, history, literature and customs, and that they are conscious and proud of possessing it. The only exceptions to this are the Kurds, Turcomans, Circassians, Armenians and Assyrians, who together constitute only a small percentage of the population.[1]

143 It would perhaps be more correct to regard the Arab people, of which the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon form a part, as a group of peoples, which resemble one another in certain important respects but are dissimilar in others. The inhabitants of geographical Syria may be considered as constituting a single member of this group. They differ from the people of the Arabian Peninsula in that, while the latter are almost purely Arabic or 'Semitic' in their ways of life and thought, in the Syrians the Arab has been mixed with other influences. They differ on the other hand from the peoples of Iraq, of Egypt and of the other North African countries in that while these too have been partly moulded by other than Arab influences, the latter have not been identical with the influences upon Syrian and Lebanese life.

[1] See Chapter VII.

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In Iraq such influences have been largely Persian and central Asian; in Egypt there was an indigenous civilization which was not entirely submerged by the Arabian influences; in much of the rest of North Africa there is a Berber race which has resisted all attempts to assimilate it. To these differences must be added those which spring from the mere fact of living in different regions possessing varying economic possibilities and subjected at times to very diverse historical processes.

It is possible to observe differences not only between the members of the Arab group of peoples, but also within each people. Physically and culturally alike, various elements within the people of geographical Syria represent varying blends of Arabic, of Aramaic and other Semitic, and of non-Semitic influences. Many such differences which formerly existed have in the course of time been levelled out and forgotten, but some of them still linger on, especially in mountain districts. For example, there are a few villages north of Damascus in which Aramaic is still spoken side by side with Arabic. What is more important, the Maronites and other Christians in northern and central Lebanon have not on the whole the same consciousness of being Arabs as the other inhabitants of the country. This is true also to a great extent of the Arabic-speaking Syrian Orthodox and Catholics and of the Alawis in the district of Latakia.

Thus the answer to the question which was posed above is a complex one. The Syrians and Lebanese are members of the Arab group of peoples; but they differ in some important ways from other members of that group; and they also differ among themselves in certain ways.

2

Although the Syrians and Lebanese have been Arabs in this sense for many centuries, it is only in the last two generations that an explicit nationalist movement has grown up.

Nationalism exists wherever two factors, which are to be found in some form in every society, take a particular shape and have a particular relation to one another. The one is the consciousness of solidarity: the sense that there is between the members of a certain group a special closeness of feeling, a special similarity of reaction, a possibility of understanding based upon the possession of common characteristics—language, customs, memories, real or imagined ancestry.

186 The other is the will to work together for the attainment of a common aim in which all believe and for which all are willing to sacrifice something or everything. When this will derives its content from the consciousness of solidarity, and the members of the group take as their common aim the preservation both of that consciousness and of the characteristics on which it is based, nationalism arises. Political nationalism comes into existence when the attempt is made to achieve the common aim by means of the establishment of a State, which includes all the members of the group and of which the Government is imbued with the nationalist ideal.

000 In Europe, the idea of nationalism became an important political force during the nineteenth century. In one aspect it was a development of the idea that 'the people' can and should be master of its own destiny: that the ordinary citizens of a State have both the right, and if effectively organized, the power to set up and to pull down Governments; and that Governments are only entitled to demand the obedience of the community which they rule if and in so far as they emanate from the will of that community. In another aspect it was the child of Romanticism, which was, among other things, the attempt to discover in Time and History what for the Christian belongs only to eternity: an adequate object of sacrifice and worship, a supreme purpose and consummation of human life. One type of Romanticism found what it sought in the community and the life devoted to the service of the community; and it was especially attracted to that type of community which is based on common memories and a common history.

3

186 Among the Arabs, nationalism in the sense defined above
668 did not emerge until the later part of the nineteenth century. The sense of solidarity and pride in the Arab tradition had long existed; but they did not form the basis of a coherent movement until the West began to impinge upon the Arab world. Its impact had two effects, both of which worked together to produce the Arab movement. On the one hand, the West brought new dangers to the Arabo-Islamic life. On the other hand, far from destroying the Arabs' faith in their having a special part to play in history, it gave them fresh vitality and the promise of new strength. Arab nationalism

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may be defined as the resurgence of the will to live of the Arab people, produced by the action of the West upon it, and with the object of combating the dangers and realizing the benefits of that action.

It is true that the explicit aim of the nationalist movement in its first phase was not to come to terms with the West but to shake off the rule of the Ottoman Turks. But it was not simply a movement of revolt against an oppressor. The Ottoman rule was resented so much more bitterly than in the past, not because it was so much worse, but because it prevented the attainment of that new life of which the Arabs were becoming aware, and made it impossible for them to take what they believed to be their rightful place in the world. The overthrow of the Turkish régime, in the conception at least of the more thoughtful of them, would only be the beginning of their national effort. It would create the conditions in which it would become possible to face the real problems of their community.

What those problems were has already been made clear in Chapters III and IV. Most fundamental of all was the danger of the complete destruction of the principles of loyalty upon which the traditional community had rested: membership of the family, the tribe and the religious community, respect for the past, the habit of obedience to the suzerain. Should they go and nothing take their place, the community might dissolve into a rabble of individuals without loyalties or the consciousness of belonging to a group. It was to avoid this danger that the nationalists endeavoured to arouse a consciousness of the common heritage of language, historical memories and customs shared by the Arabs; and to make that consciousness the basis of political action and ultimately of government.

A more immediate, although less fundamental, problem was raised by the penetration of Western goods and economic processes. This was beneficial in so far as it held out hopes of raising the standard of living of the people; but it dislocated the traditional structure of commerce and industry, and it threatened to place the economic life of the Arabs in the power of Western trading and concessionary companies. A similar process of dislocation was taking place in other aspects of social life. Here again much that was bad in the old order was being swept away, but also what was valuable

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was threatened. The process had a further effect: it emphasized, and made more unbearable, injustices and inadequacies which had formerly been accepted as inevitable or had passed unremarked. Thus there grew up the belief that social and economic Westernization was undoubtedly beneficial, but needed to be controlled and directed, and that a controlling and directing agency could not exist so long as the government was in the hands of foreigners who neither understood the needs of the Arabs nor cared primarily for their welfare.

A further element was added to the movement by the wounded pride which most Arabs felt when they considered the attitude of the West towards them. The Western Powers in act if not in word treated the Arab countries as if the desires and wishes of their inhabitants were matters of minor importance; individual Westerners showed only too often their contempt for a people who dressed, believed and thought so differently from them, and were so backward in the material arts. The contempt was no less wounding when it was concealed beneath a romantic admiration for the primitive or the exotic. It was the more unbearable to the Arabs because of their conviction that in essentials they were not inferior to the West, no less than because of their suspicion that in many other things they were indeed far behind the West and had much to learn from it. It gave rise to a desire to equal the West in those things on which the West set value, and to be recognized by the West as equals. Since the West set value upon the independence and power of the national State, upon economic prosperity and a certain ordering of social life, the Arabs too must be independent and powerful, and modern in their social organization.

4

Such were the factors which produced the nationalist movement. The movement was specifically Arab, aiming at the creation of an Arab nation and State which should include all branches of the Arab people, and not simply at the establishment of Syrian, Iraqi, Hejazi and other separate nations; and this for a number of reasons. The historic imagination of the Arab peoples had taken as its main and almost its only object the memories of the early Islamic period, of the orthodox Caliphs and their successors the Umayyads and

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Abbasids. Thus they were vividly aware that there had been a time when the Arabs had been conscious of themselves as a special community, and as a community had played a leading part in history. The thought of the solitary moment of history when the Arabs had been united in a single Empire, in which they had been the dominant element, overshadowed in their minds the memory of ages before and since. The revival of interest in Arabic literature in the course of the nineteenth century had a similar effect: coming to them through the medium of their own language, it aroused their pride and the sense of their own possibilities in a way which would have been impossible for the Greek culture of Syria or the pre-Islamic culture of Iraq. Then again the vision of a united Arab nation seemed to offer to a people becoming conscious of their weakness, and of the internal divisions which were the partial cause of it, a strength such as a Syrian or an Iraqi nation could never possess.

5

In the light of this analysis, it is possible to summarize the assumptions and aims of the movement.

The basic assumptions of Arab nationalism are: first, that there is or can be created an Arab nation, formed of all who share the Arabic language and cultural heritage; secondly, that this Arab nation ought to form a single independent political unit, both in the interests of the nation itself and in those of the world; and thirdly, that the creation of such a political unit presupposes the development among the members of the Arab nation of a consciousness, not simply that they are members of it, but that their being members is the factor which should determine their political decisions and loyalties.

The ultimate aim of Arab nationalism is to preserve and enrich the Arab heritage: to enable the Arabs to live in the modern world on an equal footing with other peoples, and to contribute to its civilization without being forced to break with their past. The political objectives of the nationalist movement are the independence of all the Arab lands; the establishment of some degree of unity between them; the encouragement of national consciousness; and the reorganization of the social and economic structure of the nation by means of a process of controlled and discriminate Westernization.

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The movement of which these are the assumptions and aims is still at a comparatively early stage of development; and its ideals, although they have found their expression in patriotic rhetoric and poetry, have not yet achieved a reasoned and systematic exposition. But although Arab nationalism is still largely inarticulate and unformed, it does not spring only from passion and prejudice, nor is it confined only to the educated few who are its spokesmen. It is a movement with rational grounds and purposes, which, although they have not yet become fully explicit, exist implicitly and as motive forces alike in the mind of the peasant, who feels nothing but a vague unrest; of the educated townsman, in whom unrest has crystallized into definite emotions, desires and grievances; and of the politician, who expresses the emotions, desires and grievances in speeches and programmes. Although they might not be able to define and defend nationalism, they are all in some degree Arab nationalists.

Like all immature movements, Arab nationalism has not yet found its own authentic voice. It tends to imitate Western nationalism in its programme and its terminology. It is of great importance to make it clear that the spirit of the movement has not yet been definitely or adequately expressed. Its present form is not the only form which it could take. It is possible that if nationalism fails to obtain its explicit objectives, or even if it achieves them and its success is followed by disillusion, the feelings and desires which have given it birth will express themselves in different ways. Instead of a movement for an independent State and a modernized society there might be an outbreak of religious fanaticism, which would not help in the establishment of good relations between the Arabo-Islamic world and the West. Instead of a movement with rational purposes, there might arise one whose only ends were destruction and self-destruction.

6

Which of these paths Arab nationalism will take depends very largely upon the relationship which it establishes, on the one hand with Islam, and on the other with the West.

Although the movements of Arab and of Islamic revival lay emphasis upon different points it is impossible wholly to separate Arab nationalist feeling from Islamic feeling. In most Arabs the two tend to flow together; the movements

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of national and of religious revival are energized by the same complex of desires and emotions within the individuals who have created and who sustain them; and the ordinary Moslem Arab is not conscious of belonging in one aspect of his being to the Arab community, and in another to the Islamic, but rather of belonging to a single integrated 'Arabo-Islamic' community in which he does not clearly distinguish the Arab from the Islamic elements. Even in analysis it is impossible wholly to separate the two. On the one hand there is in Islam no sharp distinction between spiritual and temporal, Church and State; and in consequence a movement of religious reform will have its repercussions in every sphere of social and political life. On the other, many Arab nationalists, especially of the older generation, would define the Arab nation partly in terms of the Islamic religion, which most members of the nation profess, and of which the Holy Book is written in Arabic; and they would therefore regard the preservation and revival of Islam as being among the aims of the nationalist movement.

What has just been said must be qualified in two ways. First, the secular view of life is becoming ever more widespread, especially among the younger generation and among those educated in Europe and America; and it is giving rise to the belief that it is better both for religion and for political activity if the two are kept distinct from one another. Thus it is possible to see the beginning of the idea of a secular nationalism, which rests upon elements of unity other than participation in a common religion; which aims at building a Westernized laic State; and in which therefore Moslems, Christians and atheists alike can join on a footing of equality. This lay nationalism is not consciously hostile to religion, although it is opposed to theocracy; but it is possible that at some time in the future it will come into conflict with Islamic orthodoxy.

Secondly, the connexion between Islam and Arab nationalism is perhaps emphasized less in Syria and Lebanon than in the other parts of Arab Asia. This is so not only because Syrians and Lebanese have assimilated Western thought more deeply than other Arab peoples and are more inclined to adopt modern Western secularism, but also because of the existence of an Arabic-speaking Christian element in the Syrian and Lebanese population. Moslem Arab nationalists

cannot leave the Christians out of account in their plans for the future of Syria and Lebanon, and many of them sincerely desire Christians and Moslems alike to participate in the national community of the future. There are many Christians too who share the ideals of Arab nationalism; and indeed Syrian and Lebanese Christians were among the founders of the national movement, since they saw in the spread of the ideal of national unity the only way of escape from the religious differences which had for so long weakened their country. It is natural that Christian Arab nationalists should define the Arab nation mainly in terms of language, history, and race, and should draw a distinction, perhaps too sharply, between it and the Islamic community.

7

The present attitude of nationalism towards the Western Powers was determined during the years of the First World War and the subsequent peace settlement. Those years were not without their gains. It was then that the Arabs became conscious of their unity and of the strength which might be theirs. They gained collective pride and a memory of things done in common, and also legends and martyrs.

But they were also years of bitterness and disappointment. Freedom and unity seemed for a moment to be within the grasp of the Arabs, but they were snatched away. It has been described in Chapter II how the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided from one another into several States, only the most backward of which was recognized as immediately independent, the others being placed under British or French control. This was all the more disappointing because it was Great Britain which had promised the Arabs independence and unity and had appeared to be the friend of Arab nationalism. Thus the movement took on in those years an anti-British and anti-French, and even in general an anti-Western, complexion; indeed the mere fact that Great Britain and France were now in control of the Arab countries would have been enough to give it such a complexion. The hostility was mingled with disappointment, since politically these two Powers had seemed for a moment to be the friends of the nationalists; but also with gratitude, since culturally the movement was deeply in debt to them. The attitude of Arab nationalists to Great Britain and France has therefore

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been complex during the last twenty years: opposition to their policy; humiliation, anger and lack of confidence, as consequences of having, as they see it, been duped during the last war; and in many cases intellectual attachment. This complex of factors has with some individuals led to downright hostility towards Great Britain and France, or towards the West as such; but in others, and among them the most responsible and influential leaders, it has aroused a desire to reach such a settlement of outstanding issues and grievances as will make possible a relation of friendship and co-operation with the Western Powers.

It is not too much to say that the whole future of the Arabs, as well as of the Western Powers in the Middle East, depends upon the way in which the nationalist movement resolves this tension. It is not a question whether the Arabs will become Westernized; a considerable degree of Westernization, at least in material things, will probably take place whatever the circumstances. It is rather a question whether that Westernization will be used by the Arabs as a means of opposing and driving out the West, or as a means to becoming in the fullest sense part of the West. In other words, the choice is between excommunication from the Western world or communion with it.

The choice will not be confined to the political sphere or determined wholly by political factors. But one of the main factors involved is the political attitude adopted towards the Arabs by the West; it cannot fail to give rise to a corresponding attitude among the Arabs. This is a consideration which should be taken into account by Western Governments in framing their Middle Eastern policy.

8

The movement analyzed in the preceding sections extends throughout the whole of Arab Asia. In Egypt and in the rest of Arab North Africa analogous and closely related movements exist, but the special problems of these regions and the distinctive character of their modern history make it unwise to speak of a single Arab movement which includes all the Arabic-speaking regions.

Even inside Arab Asia, the political divisions introduced after the First World War, acting upon already existing local differences, have led to variations in the different local branches

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of the nationalist movement. Each branch has been concerned to a great extent with its own local problems. But in spite of this, Arab Asia does form a political unity in an important sense. The workers for independence in any one region regard it not as an end in itself, but as a step towards a union of all the Arab regions; a success or a setback in the struggle in one region has its repercussions in all.

9

Of all the factors which have stimulated the sense of Arab unity in the past twenty years, the most important has been the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism. In a previous chapter something has been said about the early history of Zionism. It is necessary here to sketch its nature and its relationship with the Arabs.

The roots of Zionism are in many ways similar to those of Arab nationalism. Although an off-shoot of the age-old Messianism of the Jews, in its modern form it arose from the sense of lostness, of exclusion and of humiliation which haunts the incompletely assimilated Jews of the Dispersion. A few exceptionally gifted or fortunately-placed individuals can escape from this sense and the conflicts to which it gives rise by merging themselves in the surrounding Gentile world; but for the Jewish community as a whole, the Zionists argue, assimilation is neither possible, since if carried out on too large a scale it tends to provoke anti-Semitism, nor desirable, since it would involve the disappearance of the Jews as such and of all which their tradition contains of value to themselves or to the world. For the Zionist, the solution is not for the individual Jew to acquire the characteristics of the individual Gentile, but for the Jewish community to take on the characteristics of a national community: a normal economic and social structure, a national consciousness, a territorial home and political independence.

Zionism emerged at approximately the same time as Arab nationalism. Both movements were stimulated, although not created, by repression: the former by the Russian pogroms, the latter by the policy of the Young Turks. To both, the war of 1914–1918 was the time of crisis and opportunity. The adherents of both believed that they had been promised Palestine by the Allies: the Arabs by the McMahon letters, the Jews by the Balfour Declaration. For that and for other

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deeper reasons both regarded themselves as possessing rights over or at least in the country. Thus after 1918 two movements, each in its dynamic stage and each believing itself to be in the right, found themselves facing one another in a single land.

The history of Palestine since 1918 has been dominated by the struggle between them. The Jewish community has been growing in size, in wealth and in self-confidence; it now numbers over half a million, that is, roughly one-third of the population of Palestine. It has developed distinctive social forms such as the collective farms, and has created cultural institutions, an elaborate system of internal self-government and a highly organized trade-union movement. On the whole, too, as the wave of European anti-Semitism has gathered strength, the claims of the Jews have increased; the old 'cultural' Zionism, which desired to create a religious and cultural centre for Jews throughout the world, has largely been swept aside by a political Zionism which aims at the establishment of a Jewish nation possessing all the political attributes of a nation and self-reliant no less in political than in other matters.

There has been a continuous growth in the strength of Arab opposition to the policy of the Balfour Declaration. They oppose it both because it prevents the achievement of their own national aspirations and because of the danger that the Jews will dominate Palestine politically and the surrounding countries economically. This policy has already in their view retarded the political development of Palestine; the independence conceded to Iraq and in a large measure to Transjordan would also, they believe, have been granted to the Palestinian Arabs but for the existence of the Jewish National Home. Moreover, the Zionists are determined that self-government shall be withheld until the Jewish community has been transformed by further immigration from a minority into an overwhelming majority capable of forming a Jewish State. Jewish rule in Palestine, if it were ever established, would cut the Arab population off from the life of the free Arab countries all around. This would be harmful not only to the Arabs of Palestine, but to those of the surrounding regions as well, for Palestine is the geographical link between Arab Asia and Arab Africa. The Arabs fear, in addition, that the Zionists, once in control of Palestine, would be dissatisfied with its

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existing frontiers and would be compelled by the pressure of immigration and the need for markets to carry out a policy of expansion, of subtle economic and political penetration, and of alliance with those forces, both internal and external, which are hostile to Arab independence.

In short, the Arabs regard Zionism as a force which imperils their national future. Quite apart, however, from the possible evil consequences of the policy of the Balfour Declaration, they object to it on grounds of principle. They see no reason why they should be called upon to bear the whole burden of solving the problem of world Jewry, a problem which they have done perhaps less than other nations to create. They cannot understand by what right they can be forced to become a minority in a land which their ancestors have inhabited for innumerable centuries. Further, they are humiliated by the way in which Zionist immigration has been forced upon them without their consent being asked or given.

Arab opposition has expressed itself in constant unrest and a number of outbreaks, of which those of 1936 and of 1938-1939 were the most important. More serious even than these outbreaks has been the growth of a spirit of extreme distrust and hostility among Arab nationalists and Zionists alike. The states of mind of both parties are in some degree similar. Each movement has framed its programme without taking into serious consideration the claims or even the existence of the other. Now that they have come into contact with one another and can no longer ignore one another's existence, each tends to regard the other basically as an obstacle in the way of its legitimate aspirations, as a nuisance which must be removed by any possible means. With the passing of time, each has tended more and more to identify the other with the main opponents which it is fighting. The Zionists, bringing with them into Palestine the outlook of the Dispersion, regard Arab hostility to them as only another aspect of that blind unreasonable anti-Semitism which they have known in Europe. They think of the Arab nationalists as Fascists, or as mercenary tools of the Fascists. The Arabs on their side see in the Zionists those European characteristics which they particularly resent: the arrogance and the disrespect for tradition. They regard Zionism as an example of that Western penetration which it is essential for them to control and to meet on equal terms, if their whole heritage is not to be destroyed. More

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particularly they regard it as the tool, the partner or even the master of Western Imperialism.

Thus far the parallelism goes; but there are differences no less striking than the similarities. The Arabs are trying to defend what they already have, the Zionists to acquire a land which has not been theirs for two thousand years. The Arabs rest their case upon the right of possession, and the injustice of facing them with the alternatives of living as a minority under Jewish rule or leaving the country they have inhabited so long. The Jews appeal to historical rights, emphasizing their continued love for Palestine and connexion with it even in exile and dispersion; and also to the right which their need creates, since it is only in Palestine that they can hope to build up a normal national life once more. This difference in the nature of the Arab and Jewish claims gives rise to an all-important practical difference: the Arabs are not conscious of needing the Zionists, while the latter can only hope to secure their way through the good will of the Arabs.

The Arabs for the most part do not believe that the presence of the Jews in Palestine can be of more than incidental benefit to them. The economic advantages they believe to be much less than is sometimes claimed by the Zionists themselves. The industrial possibilities of Jewish Palestine are limited by high wage-rates and the absence of raw materials and of stable external markets; and with a few exceptions, the Jews can produce nothing which the Arabs of Palestine and of the surrounding countries could not at least equally well import from elsewhere or, after a certain time-lag, produce for themselves. In agriculture the Arabs can, it is true, learn something from the new methods introduced by the Jews; but in their eyes this advantage is more than offset by the refusal of Jewish landowners or cultivators to employ Arab labour, and the provision that all land bought by the Jewish National Fund is inalienable. Moreover, the very unstable financial structure of the Jewish community may possibly be a source of danger and loss to Arabs as well as Jews. What is more important still, Arabs fear that any economic successes achieved by the Jews may have harmful political consequences to them. The cultural advantages of having a large European community in their midst are smaller than might appear. There can be few cultural contacts between Jews and Arabs so long as the former remain in a self-created 'invisible ghetto' and for the

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most part do not know Arabic; furthermore, Zionism is in a sense a turning-away from Europe and all it stands for.

Among the Zionists there are some who are obsessed by fear of Arab nationalism and regard any agreement with it as impossible. They wish it to be held in check either by British action or through the creation of Jewish defence-forces, and they are resolved to achieve their aims even without Arab consent. At the other extreme, there are some who believe that the strength of Arab opposition is largely illusory, and that in so far as it exists at all it can be easily broken down, if only the Mandatory Power and the Zionists show a determined front. Most Zionists, however, probably understand that they need Arab good will and do not at present possess it, and therefore are eager to find some way of conciliating the Arabs. Some maintain that a strengthening of personal ties between Jews and Arabs will be enough to dispel the clouds of prejudice and give the Arabs a true understanding of the purpose of Zionism, and that once they understand it they will cease to oppose it. Others rely upon the effect which the economic and social benefits of Zionist settlement will have on Arab opinion; and others again wish to help awaken the Arab peasantry and proletariat, in the belief that they will join forces with the Jewish workers and peasants against the Arab landowning class.

In these suggestions of policy there lies a germ of truth: they recognize that the Jews can only win Arab good will by persuading the Arabs that they need Zionist help. Every such policy, however, comes up against an insuperable obstacle: it offers to the Arabs something which the Arabs regard as of secondary importance and asks the Arabs in return to concede something which they regard as vital. In other words, it does nothing to concede the essential demands of the Arabs.

The most important of these demands concern immigration, land-purchase and self-government.

The Arab nationalists are willing to treat the Jews who have already entered Palestine as full citizens of any Palestinian State which may be established, and to accept the validity of the land-purchases which have already taken place. They would respect the cultural autonomy of the Jewish community, would grant to individual Jews adequate guarantees of their civil rights, and perhaps also concede local self-government to

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Jewish communities in those districts of Palestine in which they are in a majority. But they would not be willing to permit further immigration or land-purchase or to recognize Jewish independence in the whole or any part of Palestine. They demand the establishment in the shortest possible delay of a national Government in which the Jews will have a due share, but which will be able to participate fully in any Arab union which may be formed. 000

The Zionists for their part would not be prepared to accept what the Arabs would be willing to offer. The more conciliatory of them would be prepared to consent to temporary restrictions on immigration, as the price of Arab friendship; but none of them would acquiesce in the complete stoppage of it. To stabilize the Jewish community at its present numerical level would be to close the doors of Palestine in the face of the persecuted Jews of eastern Europe. Further, a community of half a million Jews, surrounded by Arabs in whose guarantees and promises they have no faith whatever, would never feel secure; without sufficient strength of its own, it would be forced to rely upon external support, which might at any moment be withdrawn. Above all, to accept the position of a permanent minority, even one whose rights were guaranteed, would be, in Zionist eyes, to betray the Zionist ideal. The whole purpose of Zionism is to escape from the Dispersion and its evils; but to accept minority status in Palestine would be to add another chapter to the history of the Dispersion. It would be, the Zionists claim, to create another Jewish problem, the same in nature as that which already exists in the countries of eastern Europe. Not only would it do nothing to solve the problem in eastern Europe, but it would place the Jews already in Palestine in a position difficult enough in a country where they feel themselves to be exiles, but intolerable in the country which they regard as their own. Thus even the more moderate Zionists demand at the very least a position of parity with the Arabs in Palestine; that is, that they should have at least an equal share in the Government and should not derive their civil and political rights from the good will or sufferance of the Arabs.

10

The British Government has made several attempts to solve the problem of conflicting promises. In 1922 it issued a

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000 White Paper in order to define its commitments and policy, and thus allay the fears of the two sides. The Balfour Declaration, stated the White Paper, did not mean that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but only that such a Home should be founded in Palestine. The establishment of such a Home was defined as 'the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride'. For this purpose, it was essential that the community should know that it was in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. It was also necessary that it should be able to increase its members by immigration; but not to such an extent as to exceed the economic capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals, to be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, or to deprive any section of the present population of employment.[1]

In 1936 a Royal Commission headed by Earl Peel was sent out to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances of that year, and to make recommendations for the removal of legitimate Arab and Jewish grievances in regard to the way in which the Mandate had been carried out. In its Report, a masterly analysis of the whole problem, it suggested the partition of Palestine into a Jewish section to consist roughly of those areas in which Jews had acquired land and settled, together with Galilee, and to be constituted into a Jewish State; and an Arab section to be joined with Transjordan to constitute an Arab State. Each of these States was to be in treaty relations with Great Britain. The Holy Places and a corridor linking them with the sea would remain under mandatory rule; as also would Haifa and other towns with a mixed population, at least for a time. There should be a transfer of the ownership of land and an exchange of population between the two States, which would in the last resort be compulsory.[2]

This scheme was rejected by the Arabs on grounds of principle; one section among the Zionists also rejected it outright, but another was prepared to consider a plan of partition, provided it were more in accord with Jewish

[1] *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd. 1700 (London, 1922).
[2] *Palestine Royal Commission: Report*, Cmd. 5479 (London, 1936).

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aspirations than the Commission's plan. In addition, subsequent inquiries showed the technical difficulties of carrying it out. In May, 1939, after the breakdown of the "Round Table Conference" held in London between representatives of the British Government, the Zionists and the Arabs, a new scheme was propounded in a White Paper. It defined the ultimate objective of the Mandatory Power to be the establishment of an independent State in which the Arabs and Jews should share in the government in such a way as to safeguard the essential interests of each community; it was contemplated that this State should be set up at the end of ten years, provided such relations then existed between Jews and Arabs as would make good government possible; if such relations did not exist the creation of the State would, after consultation with the interested parties, be postponed. During the transitional period of ten years, immigration was to be limited to a total of 75,000 in the first five years (10,000 immigrants a year, and in addition 25,000 refugees, if adequate provision could be made for their maintenance), and was then to cease altogether unless the Arabs were 'prepared to acquiesce in it'; transfers of land were to be prohibited in certain areas and regulated in others; and once peace and order were sufficiently restored, steps were to be taken to increase the participation of the inhabitants in the government of the country.[1]

These proposals were rejected, by all sections of Zionist opinion, as a betrayal of the policy of the Balfour Declaration. The Arabs also rejected them as inadequate and vague, and because they had no confidence in the British Government's intention to carry them out; but later, many Arabs showed their willingness to accept them as a step in the right direction. The White Paper also met with severe criticism in Parliament and from the Permanent Mandates Commission: four out of seven members of the Commission declared that they did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate, while all seven agreed that it was not in accordance with the interpretation previously placed on the Mandate. Nevertheless it continued to be the basis of British policy during the years of war.[2]

[1] *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-9*, Cmd. 6019 (London, 1939).
[2] For the present state of the Palestine problem, see Chapter XIII.

000 The concern of the Arabs in general for the fate of their brothers in Palestine was shown in the help and encouragement which they gave to the insurrections of 1936–1939, and also in the holding of a number of 'Pan-Arab Congresses' at which this and other questions were discussed. One such was held in Jerusalem in December, 1931, in close connexion with the General Islamic Congress held simultaneously. It formulated an 'Arab Covenant' which may be taken as giving a standard definition of the aims of the nationalists:

'(i) The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and the divisions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are not approved or recognized by the Arab nation.

'(ii) All efforts in every Arab country are to be directed towards the single goal of their complete independence, in their entirety and unified; and every idea which aims at limitation to work for local and regional politics must be fought against.

'(iii) Since colonization is, in all its forms and manifestations, wholly incompatible with the dignity and highest aims of the Arab nation, the Arab nation rejects it and will combat it with all its forces.'[1]

The Congress set up an Executive Committee to further the aims embodied in the Covenant. This Committee did not prove very effective, but it took a step in the direction of Arab unity. In 1934, during the war between Sa'udi Arabia and the Yemen, it appointed a peace delegation to mediate between the two contending Arab states. The delegation went to Arabia and took part in the negotiations which ended in the conclusion of a treaty of peace. Three years later, in September, 1937, a Pan-Arab Congress was held at Bludan in Syria in order to consider the Palestinian problem. Organized by the Syrian Committee for the Defence of Palestine, it was attended by over three hundred delegates, all of them unofficial and most of them from Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. It passed a number of resolutions in regard to the solution of the Palestinian problem, and stated that the adoption of the policy embodied in these

[1] Translation in A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), p. 107.

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resolutions would be regarded as a condition of friendly relations between the Arab peoples and the British Empire.[1]

The problem of Palestine was also the reason for the holding of the Inter-Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Moslem countries in Cairo in October, 1938. Summoned by a Committee of Egyptian Senators and Deputies, it was attended by delegations from most of the Arab countries, although not from Sa'udi Arabia or Transjordan, and from several other Moslem countries. The Syrian and Iraqi Chambers were officially represented by delegations headed by the Presidents of the Chambers. The President of the Egyptian Chamber presided over the Congress. It adopted several resolutions concerning the problem of Palestine, and threatened that if its recommendations were not accepted the Arab and Moslem peoples would be compelled to regard the attitude of the British and Jews as inimical to them. The rulers of the Arab and Moslem countries were urged to carry out the resolutions by all possible means, and a Permanent Committee was set up for the same purpose.[2]

Shortly afterwards the interest of the Arab world in the Palestinian question was formally recognized by the British Government, which invited delegations from Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen, as well as from Palestine itself, to the Palestine Conference held in London at the beginning of 1939. This was an important event in the history of Arab nationalism, both because it constituted the first official recognition by the outside world of the reality of Pan-Arab feeling, and because of the opportunity for practical co-operation which it gave to the Arab Governments.[3]

12

The events of Palestine have overshadowed those of the other regions of Arab Asia in the last few years, but the latter also have played their part in creating a united political sentiment. The Iraqi Revolt of 1920 and the Syrian Revolt of 1925 each in its turn stimulated whatever movements of discontent existed in the other Arab countries. The war between King Husain and Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud of Nejd, which ended in the extension of Ibn Sa'ud's rule over Hejaz

[1] Report in *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), October, 1937, pp. 497–9.
[2] Report in *Oriente Moderno*, November, 1938, pp. 587–601.
[3] More recent developments in the movement for Arab unity are referred to in Chapter XIII.

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000 and the creation of the kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia, was followed with close attention throughout Arab Asia; the wisdom and energy of Ibn Sa'ud, no less than his success as a ruler of Beduin, deeply impressed the Arab imagination. The signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1930 and of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936 was also of great importance in stimulating the desire of other regions for independence.

Outside the Arab world the example of Turkey had a great influence on the Arab countries. By her own efforts Turkey had secured her independence and was trying to build up a wholly Westernized society. Arabs might not regard the path which Turkey had taken as one they could follow, but at least they were encouraged by her success.

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668 In none of the countries of Arab Asia is the nationalist movement more influential than in the Levant States. It was by Syrians and Lebanese that the idea of the Arab nation was first expounded; it was they who organized the first nationalist societies. Almost all political thought among the town-population of Syria, and among large sections of that of Lebanon, is Arab nationalist. Syrians and Lebanese have played a leading part in every phase of the movement's evolution. The schools of Beirut helped to revive the Arabic language, and their graduates to give it a modern literature. Syrians and Lebanese were active in the secret societies of the period before 1914. They participated in the Anglo-Arab negotiations during the war of 1914–1918. They gave the movement its martyrs, executed by Jemal Pasha in 1915. They supplied many of the officers and soldiers of the Arab army.

The nationalists claim that Syria and Lebanon are necessary to the Arab State which they desire. An Arab State which did not control the Mediterranean coast-line with its ports would be seriously handicapped in its trade, and strategically it would lie at the mercy of whatever Power controlled them. Culturally also an Arab State which did not include Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut would be at a serious disadvantage in the process of assimilating Western culture.

To the minds of Arab nationalists, the Arab State is as necessary for the Levant States as they for it. The bane of Syria and Lebanon has always been their internal divisions,

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and the separatist spirit to which these have given rise. They can only be overcome or at least be rendered harmless by the development of a consciousness of unity more powerful and more effective than the consciousness of those factors which create division. Such a consciousness of unity cannot be created out of nothing; use must be made of what already exists. At present there is little or no sense of Syrian unity, or even of the existence of geographical Syria as a separate country. But there does exist a consciousness of 'Arabism', with a richness of historical and literary association to which 'Syrianism' could never aspire. It is only, so the Arab nationalists claim, by developing this already existing consciousness that the forces of separatism can be overcome.

There are other advantages for which Syria and Lebanon can hope from Arab unity and independence. They can hope for a remedy for their present military and economic weakness. An independent Syria with four million inhabitants would always lie at the mercy of Turkey; but the danger would be less great if she were supported diplomatically and militarily by an Arab union. Equally, the technical and commercial skill of her inhabitants would be given greater scope if the Levant States were part of a larger economic unit of which the very large economic resources are in need of development.

Not only in the economic but in every sphere of life the Syrians and Lebanese need opportunities such as their land cannot give. There is in them a certain greatness, which has been too long asleep and is now awakening. For two generations the educated youth have sought opportunities in Egypt and in the New World. But both these spheres are now largely closed to them, and the second of them could at the best of times only be entered at a great price: the loss of their language and their native land, and acceptance of the life of a stranger and an exile. It is not strange therefore that the thoughts of young Syrians and Lebanese, especially of those among them who feel responsible for the future of their country, should be turning eastwards and southwards; and that they hope to find in the other regions of Arab Asia opportunities at once for the exercise of their talents and for the fulfilment of their duty to their people.

668 The progress of the nationalist movement in Syria and Lebanon is obstructed both by its own weaknesses and by the existence of certain forces which are hostile to it, or else which place obstacles in the way of a full attainment of its objectives. One weakness is the lack of outstanding political leaders. Even the most distinguished figures have never had a following comparable to that of Zaghlul in Egypt. This may be partly because the Syrian populace is critical and intelligent and not prone to hero-worship, but it is also due to the lack of leaders of an heroic stature. One cause of this is the execution by Jemal Pasha in 1915 of a number of the most prominent members of Arab nationalist organizations. Another is the drain upon energy and ability caused by the movement of emigration. A third is the absence during the last twenty years of opportunities for training in responsibility. The élite of the country, which in Iraq was drawn at least partly into the orbit of government almost from the beginning of the Mandatory régime, has in Syria been for the most part in opposition to the authorities since the end of the war of 1914–1918, and has never lost the defects of an irresponsible and powerless opposition.

Another weakness of the movement is the absence of a long-term social and economic policy. Parties may at times make grandiose promises about the nature of the new world which they propose to build, but there is no evidence that any of them is undertaking a profound and realistic investigation of the country's vast social and economic problems. Nationalists sometimes argue that the political problem is prior to all others, and that it will be time to face other problems when independence has been won. To discuss them now would not only divert attention from the struggle for independence, but would cause a split in the ranks of the nationalist movement, which is united in wanting a free Arab State, but divided on the kind of free Arab State which it wants. The lack of a constructive social policy is due partly to most of the nationalist leaders coming from the landowning class, which is interested in preserving rather than altering the existing social system. This is inevitable at present, because education is still largely confined to a single class, and also because of the absence of any other class strong enough to challenge the power of

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the landowners; but it is a source of weakness now, and may be even more so in the future.

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Opposition to Arab nationalism comes from those who believe that the people of geographical Syria constitute a separate nation and not simply a part of the Arab nation. Geographical Syria, they maintain, must preserve its identity both against the imperialism of the Western Powers and against the ambitions of the Arab nationalists. Its destiny is to be neither wholly European nor wholly Arab. It is a link between the two worlds of which it forms the common frontier. But also it is more than a mere link; it has a spirit and civilization of its own, which it must preserve. Those who hold this belief regard the hopes of the Arab nationalists as no more than dreams, without foundation either in history or in national interest. The basis of a nation, they maintain, is not language or religion or any such characteristic, but the will to live together, and this will can only arise out of a living interest; but the interest of geographical Syria is not to merge with the other Arabic-speaking countries to the point where it loses its own power of independent decision. To do so would be to lose more than it would gain: not only in the economic and political spheres, but also because the other Arab regions are at a lower level of civilization and less inclined to accept the need for a fundamental modernization and reconstruction of society. Thus for Syria to enter an Arab State would be a retrograde step. While she should welcome co-operation with the surrounding countries in matters of common concern, it should be undertaken for a clear and reasonable purpose and not out of sentiment; and it could only be profitably undertaken once a strong efficient Government and centre of political decision had been created in geographical Syria.

For those of this way of thinking, the first essential is therefore to build up a strong Syrian Government, which will take in hand the reform of social and economic life and will conduct the relations of Syria with other countries, Arabic-speaking or not, on a footing of equality. The obstacles to this are both external and internal. The danger from outside comes from the ambitions of the Imperialist Powers. That from inside, which is equally insidious, arises from the strength of sectarian and other divisions, the

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domination of society by religious leaders, the weakness of national sentiment and the fascination of dreams of Arab Empire. These dangers can only be overcome by the activities of a carefully organized and disciplined party.

In its full and articulate form this is the doctrine of the 'Syrian National Party'.[1] But many who do not belong to that party and who indeed think of themselves as Arab nationalists would assent to some at least of these propositions, and insist that Syria has a special destiny inside the Arab world.

The young Socialist and Communist movements are potential opponents of nationalism, but so far no serious conflict between them has arisen. They are of very recent growth and have not yet acquired a large following. Of their adherents many are Armenians and thus not immediately concerned with the question of Arab nationalism; while most of the Arabs who profess Socialist principles are prepared to join forces with the nationalists for the attainment of self-government, either because of patriotic sentiment or else because self-government is a necessary condition for the social reforms they advocate. Once independence were achieved, however, a conflict might arise as it has arisen in other countries; and even now many of the nationalists disapprove of the Socialists and Communists, either because they dislike their social and economic ideas or else because they think it inopportune to raise such issues at the present time.

Other difficulties for the nationalist movement arise out of the existence of large religious and other minorities and of considerable foreign interests. The next two chapters will be given to an analysis of these factors.

[1] See Chapter X.

VII. LEBANON AND THE MINORITIES

I

THE greater part of the population of the Levant States, it was stated in the last chapter, is Arab by language and tradition; in addition the majority is orthodox Moslem by faith. There are, however, a number of communities which are not Arab, others which are heterodox Moslem or not Moslem, and some which are neither Arab nor Moslem.

The religious minorities are more numerous and of greater importance in the country's political life than the national minorities. The following list shows the sectarian composition of Syria and Lebanon:

Community		Syria[1]	Lebanon[2]	Total
A. Moslems, and post-Islamic sects	1. Sunnis	1,737,402	175,925	1,913,327
	2. Shi'is	11,541	154,208	165,749
	3. Druzes	79,428	53,047	132,475
	4. Alawis	274,486	—	274,486
	5. Isma'ilis	24,390	—	24,390
	Total	2,127,247	383,180	2,510,427
B. Christians	1. Maronites	11,800	226,378	238,178
	2. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite ..	4,750	—	4,750
	3. Greek Orthodox ..	115,118	76,522	191,640
	4. Greek Catholics ..	42,427	45,999	88,426
	5. Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) ..	32,892	2,574	35,466
	6. Syrian Catholics ..	14,182	2,675	16,857
	7. Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians) ..	86,742	25,462	112,204
	8. Armenian Catholics	12,137	5,694	17,831
	9. Assyrians and Chaldaean Catholics ..	3,759	528	4,287
	10. Protestants	7,660	6,712	14,372
	Total	331,467	392,544	724,011
C. Jews		26,250	3,518	29,768
D. Miscellaneous		2,063	6,301	8,364
	Total	2,487,027	785,543	3,272,570

Thus some 58 per cent of the total population are orthodox Sunni Moslems, 18 per cent belong to other Moslem communities, and 23 per cent are Christians.

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 220–1.

[2] Census of 1932. See S. B. Himadeh, *Economic Organization of Syria* (Beirut, 1936), pp. 408–9. These figures are now out of date, but are given here because they are more detailed than any published more recently. An official estimate for 1943 gives the following figures:—Sunnis 222,594, Shi'is 200,698, Druzes 71,711, Maronites 318,201, Greek Orthodox 106,658, Greek Catholics 61,956, Armenian Orthodox 58,007, Minorities 6,596—Total 1,046,421.

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Among the Moslem communities the main line of division is that between the Sunnis and the rest:

(i) The Sunni Moslems regard themselves as exponents of the original and unadulterated Islamic orthodoxy, as set forth not only in the Holy Book of Islam, but also in the Traditions of the Prophet and the system of theology and jurisprudence built up by the great Islamic thinkers. They constitute the vast majority of believers not only in the Levant States but in the Islamic world as a whole.

The other sects diverged from the main body of Islam at different times on account of political or theological dissension.

(ii) The Shi'is (known in Lebanon as the Metawila) split off in the seventh century A.D., with the struggle for the Caliphate between Muawiya and Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law. Even after the death of Ali they clung to his cause; their breach with the Sunnis was widened and made permanent by the Battle of Kerbela (681), in which Ali's son Husain was killed after the defeat of his army by that of the Umayyads. The Shi'is regard the succession to the Prophet as having passed, not to the orthodox line of Caliphs whom the Sunnis recognize, but to a hereditary line of Imams who were both the spiritual and the temporal heads of Islam, and of whom the first was Ali. The majority of Shi'is recognize twelve such Imams, the last of whom disappeared during the ninth century but will, it is believed, some day reappear. (the Mahdi)

(iii) The Isma'ilis split off from the majority of Shi'is during the eighth century, over the question of the succession to the Imamate. They recognize the first six only of the Shi'i Imams, and regard as the seventh and last of the Imams the brother of the seventh Imam of the Shi'i line. They introduced into Islam a number of esoteric doctrines, such as the ideas of successive emanations or incarnations of God, and of the transmigration of souls. These esoteric doctrines they regard as placed above human discussion and

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dispensed by the Imam to a chosen body of initiates. They look upon the Imam as infallible, and his followers as therefore owing absolute obedience to him. For a time during the Middle Ages part of Syria was ruled by the 'orthodox' Isma'ili Caliphs of Egypt, the Fatimids, but on their decline a heterodox branch was formed as a political secret society, which under the name of the 'Assassins' terrorized a large part of the Islamic world. To-day they owe religious allegiance to the Aga Khan.

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(iv) The Druze sect originated in the eleventh century, when some of the followers of the Fatimid Caliph Hakim, ruler of Egypt, put forward the claim that he was the last incarnation of the Deity. Forced to flee to Syria, they made converts among the adherents of Isma'ilism there, and in course of time those converts came to form a community distinct from the Isma'ilis. They preserved and in some ways developed the esoteric doctrines of Isma'ilism and the distinction between the initiates and the 'ignorant'. They are characterized by the cohesion of their social organization, the strength of their communal spirit and the rigour of their moral code.

(v) Finally, the Alawis, who are also known as the Nusairis, took over from Shi'ism and developed the cult of Ali, whom they regarded as an incarnation of God. From Isma'ilism they borrowed the idea of an esoteric teaching hidden from the masses; and their liturgy, the possession of which distinguishes them from other Islamic communities, seems to be largely Christian in origin. Their faith also contains elements derived from the pre-Christian worship of nature.

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There are five important groups of Christian sects in the country:

(i) The so-called Greek Orthodox are members of the Eastern Orthodox Church which broke finally with the Western Church in the eleventh century. The two Churches differ on a number of doctrinal points,

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the most important of them that concerning the Procession of the Holy Ghost. There are also divergences in ceremonial and discipline; and the Eastern Church rejects the papal claim to universal supremacy. The Greek Orthodox in Syria and Lebanon are subject to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch, who normally lives in Damascus. In the past the Patriarch and the upper hierarchy were Greek, while the lower clergy and the bulk of the laity were Arabs. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, the whole hierarchy became Arab, and Arabic is to-day the main liturgical language.

(ii) The Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) and the Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians) both adhere to the Monophysite doctrine that Christ has only a Divine and not also a human nature: a doctrine which was condemned by the Council of Chalcedon (451). The Syrian Orthodox Church has a Syriac liturgy; the head of the hierarchy is also entitled Patriarch of Antioch and resides at Homs. The Gregorian Church has an Armenian liturgy, and stands at the very centre of the Armenian national tradition. Of its five Patriarchs, the Catholicos of Eshmiadzin in Armenia is the most exalted.

(iii) The Assyrians are the remnants of the Nestorian Church which originated with the Christological controversies of the fifth century. The Nestorians so overemphasized the distinction between the Logos and the man Jesus that there was a tendency to prejudice the conception of a real union between them. Their doctrine was condemned by the Council of Ephesus (431); subsequently, those who adhered to it formed themselves into an independent Church, which spread eastwards and sent missions as far as China. It was almost entirely destroyed by the Mongols in the fourteenth century. It has a distinctive Syriac liturgy; and its spiritual head is the Mar Shimun, formerly resident in Iraq but now in exile.

(iv) The Roman Catholics are mostly members of the

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Uniate Churches: that is, those Churches whose members formerly belonged to one or other of the non-Catholic Churches, and at some time in the past acknowledged the papal supremacy and gave up doctrines which the Roman Catholic Church regards as heretical, but retained their own liturgies and certain distinctive features of discipline and organization. There are five Uniate Churches with important bodies of adherents in Syria and Lebanon: the Greek Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic and Chaldaean Catholic Churches, which split off from the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Nestorian Churches respectively; and the Maronite Church, which originally held the Monothelete doctrine that Christ has two Natures but one Will, and which returned to Rome finally and as a whole in the twelfth century. The Maronites, like the Syrian Orthodox and Assyrians, have a Syriac liturgy, and a Patriarch of Antioch, resident in Lebanon, as their spiritual head. There are comparatively few Roman Catholics of the Latin or Western rite.

(v) The Protestants are the fruits of the labours of American and other missionaries during the nineteenth and present centuries.

The Jews are mainly Arabic-speaking and long-settled in the country.

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Of these religious communities, the Armenians (Orthodox and Catholic), the Assyrians and some of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics are not Arabic-speaking and have, for the most part, come recently into the Levant States. The Armenians came originally from the Caucasus and have their own language and national traditions. Most of those now resident in Syria and Lebanon have entered the country during the last half-century, in consequence of the great massacres in Asia Minor (1895–1915), and more recently of the annexation of Alexandretta by Turkey.[1]

Most of the Assyrians have been settled in Iraq since the

[1] See Chapter XI.

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S 795 563 last war, when they were dislodged from their original homes in the Kurdish mountains; the Chaldaeans have lived in the Mosul area of Iraq for many centuries. In 1933 a period L 795 563 of tension between a section of the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government ended with the killing of some hundreds of them by Iraqi troops. Several thousands in consequence crossed the frontier into Syria, and although some of them later returned to Iraq, others were settled in the Jazirah with assistance from the League of Nations. Their settlement became an integral part of the Syrian State in 1942.

A large part of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics still speak Syriac. They have been settled since before the coming of Islam in north Syria and south Turkey, in and around the Taurus hills, against which the wave of Arab influence exhausted itself. Thus they have been able to preserve their S Syriac dialect which farther south has been replaced almost L everywhere by Arabic. Many are, however, bilingual in [191] Arabic and Syriac, and others have abandoned Syriac and are now Arabic-speaking.

S There are certain other groups which resemble the L Armenians and Assyrians in not being Arabic-speaking, but 563 unlike them are orthodox Moslems. The most important of them are:

(i) The Kurds, of whom there are perhaps 200,000.[1] They are mountaineers from the high country which links the Anatolian and Persian plateaux, and speak a dialect akin to Persian. Some of them have long been resident in the country, but others have emigrated in the last twenty years from their homes in the mountains of eastern Turkey, in order to escape the repressive measures of the Turkish Government. There are small numbers of Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Alawis and Christians, but most of those who speak Kurdish as their native language are Sunnis.

(ii) The Turcomans, who number perhaps 30,000. They came originally from Central Asia, and their language is a dialect of Turkish. Originally nomads, they have now become semi-sedentary or wholly sedentary cultivators of the soil.

[1] These figures are only rough estimates; there are no official statistics for national and racial minorities.

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(iii) The Circassians, who are by origin Moslems from the Caucasus. They fled from their homes after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, and were settled by the Ottoman Government along the western edge of the Syrian Desert, to prevent the encroachments of the tribes. There are about 20,000 of them.

(iv) There are also a number of Yazidis, adherents of a secret dualistic religion and with a dialect of their own; but they are only a small offshoot of the main community in Iraq.

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With these exceptions the minorities are Arabic-speaking and have lived in Syria and Lebanon for many generations; akin to the majority in many things, their basic difference is one of religious loyalties.

The general nature of the problem which they raise can be stated briefly. It is a product of two factors: first, of certain traditional differences which linger on in a new age; secondly, of the varying relations of the different elements in the population to the process of Westernization.

Serious at any time, religious differences were made more serious in the past by the prevalence of the theocratic view of life; differences of religious belief involved different political loyalties and principles of social conduct. The theocratic view was the basis of the 'millet-system', which, while it allowed a certain autonomy to the minorities, also increased the completeness of their separation from one another and from the majority. This was particularly true of those minorities of which a large proportion lived compactly in a single area; they came to regard themselves, if they had not always regarded themselves, as a 'peculiar people' linked by no moral or political tie with their neighbours. To complete their isolation there was added the memory of injustices, real or imagined, which they had suffered at the hands of the majority.

The persistence of these divergences in the present age adds a new and complicating factor to the problem of Westernization. It is not only that different communities have different paths to tread if they are to Westernize themselves: for example, the problems of social organization

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among the Druzes of Jebel Druze are different from those among the Lebanese Christians. The growth of the Arab nationalist movement has also affected the problem of minorities. It is true that in principle Arab nationalism need not and indeed should not involve a problem of religious minorities. But there are several reasons why at the present day it does involve such a problem. The first reason is to be found in the immaturity of political thinking among the Arabs. Arabism, as the previous chapter made clear, has not yet determined its relationship with Islam; more generally, neither majority nor minorities have yet faced the problem of the connexion between religion and the State. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not their most thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs because they are heterodox Moslems or not Moslems at all; equally there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for unrestrained Sunni ascendancy. Among some of the Christian minorities there is a further tendency to regard the West as their spiritual home, to which they can belong in a way in which they could never belong to the Arabo-Islamic world to whose fringes they have so long clung.

The mutual suspicion has been increased in the last twenty-five years by the bad relations which have existed between the nationalists and the French authorities. In these years Arab nationalism has been largely a movement of opposition to France. Those whose nationalism is still coloured by religion draw from that an additional reason for suspecting the Christians as being of the same religion as the French. But quite apart from religious prejudice, suspicion has inevitably been aroused by the long-standing attachment of certain of the Christian communities to France. Many of the nationalists believe that this attachment has been used by her as an instrument in a policy of dividing, weakening and in other ways opposing the nationalist movement. Those of the minorities who have been used unwittingly in this way they regard as obstacles to the achievement of their aspirations; those who have lent themselves willingly to it they regard as traitors to the national cause.

Even when members of minorities become Arab nationalists, as many of them do, they often wear their nationalism with a difference. It is not only that they tend to emphasize

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points in the nationalist programme other than those which are emphasized by the Moslems; they also sometimes conceive of themselves as having a special duty to perform in the movement. For example, some of the Christian nationalists regard it as their task to mediate Western civilization to the Arabs. This sense of a special duty makes for difference, if not for opposition.

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This much can be said of the whole of Syria and Lebanon. But if a more detailed analysis is to be attempted, Lebanon must be separated from Syria. While in Syria, and in the Levant States taken as a whole, the Sunni Moslems have an overwhelming preponderance, in Lebanon neither they nor any other community forms an absolute majority of the population, and the number of Christians of different sects is slightly greater than that of Moslems, orthodox and heterodox.

Inside Lebanon also a distinction must be made. As will be described later,[1] the Lebanese Republic of to-day was formed after the First World War, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of Lebanon, which consisted mainly of Mount Lebanon itself, of certain towns and outlying districts. In the former, the population is almost entirely Christian (mainly Maronite) and Druze. The additions included the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Saida (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre), and the districts of the Biqa' in the east and Jebel Amil in the south. In the towns the population is largely Sunni Moslem, although there are also numerous Shi'is, Greek Catholics and Orthodox and Armenians (mainly in Beirut). In the Biqa' and Jebel Amil the Shi'i Moslems are predominant, but here again there are large Greek Orthodox and Catholic and other communities.

In Mount Lebanon the majority is Christian, but the Druze community is large and strong enough to have played at least an equal and sometimes a greater part in the history of the Mountain. Thus the sectarian composition of Mount Lebanon is very different from that of the rest of the Mandated Territories. To a great extent also its history has diverged from that of other parts of geographical Syria. This has given rise to a specific Lebanese tradition. It is a tradition of asylum: remnants of sects and tribes, driven for one reason or another

[1] See Chapter IX, p. 172.

162 from the plains of the interior, have found refuge in the
795 previously almost impenetrable valleys of Lebanon, where they could worship and live unmolested from outside. The various communities which have established themselves there
798 have usually respected one another's beliefs and ways. There have been tension and suspicion between them, but in normal times they have lived peaceably together. It is true that for generations Lebanon was torn by internal strife, but it was the strife of factions and families. It was only for a short time during the nineteenth century that it took the form of a religious war, and even then the fundamental causes were social and political rather than religious.

642 The Lebanese tradition was also one of autonomy. Caliphs,
631 Crusading rulers and Ottoman Sultans alike refrained from demanding more from Lebanon than tribute and the formal recognition of their suzerainty. They left the internal affairs of the Mountain to the care of local dynasts, more often than not members of local landowning families. Often Lebanon was partitioned between more than one of these dynasts; but on occasion a ruler succeeded in uniting the whole Mountain and even in extending his sway beyond it. His rule over the Lebanese, however, was never absolute. The social organization was feudal. In principle and sometimes in fact the ruler of the Mountain was elected by the feudal lords; and although this principle was not always observed, and the principate tended to become hereditary in a great family such as the Maanis or Shihabis, even the strongest member of such a dynasty would hesitate before interfering with the estates of the great landowners. As in medieval Europe, when the political power was in weak hands the pretensions and rivalries of feudal lords led to civil war and chaos. It was not until the nineteenth century that this feudal organization began to break up.

This much is true of the whole Mountain. Among the Maronites however the tradition was enriched by several
793 other strands. It was a tradition of clericalism. More even than other Syrian sects they were dominated by their clergy The priests were national leaders, the centre around which turned the struggle of the community to survive and retain its identity; and the Maronite Patriarch, the only Patriarch residing in Lebanon itself, was a temporal as well as a spiritual power in the northern portion of the Mountain.

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Again, there was the traditional attachment of the Maronites 648
to France. This is dealt with elsewhere,[1] and its effects upon 177
French sentiment are discussed. It had equally great effects upon Maronite sentiment. It affected the modern form of their political consciousness; it also gave them the assurance that Western Christendom had not forgotten them, and thus helped them to resist better than other Eastern Christian sects the temptations to despair and to Islamization to which their position laid them open. Some of them went so far as to adopt French as their native language; in Beirut to-day there are a number of interesting Lebanese Christian writers who use French as their medium of expression.

In the last few generations certain new factors have arisen 177
to add their weight to that of tradition. The first of them is the rapid advance which the Lebanese have made in the assimilation of Western culture: Western schools were established earlier in Lebanon than in the interior of Syria, more Lebanese than Syrians emigrated to the New World, and Christians were in general more eager and able to understand the West and to become part of it than the Moslems. In many ways, although perhaps not in all, the Lebanese are the most Westernized of the Arabic-speaking peoples. 186

The growth of Arab nationalism has also affected Lebanese 648
political thought. There were Lebanese, both Christians and Druzes, among the founders of the nationalist movement, and still are among its most enthusiastic supporters. But very many Lebanese, even those who favour Arab unity and independence in principle, cannot help doubting whether Lebanon will gain anything from becoming part of a larger unit, the other parts of which are less advanced. Others, while conscious of themselves as in some sense Arabs and Orientals, also believe that the Lebanese tradition, different from although not necessarily exclusive of the Arab tradition, is worth preserving.

In addition to these developments, the revival of Christian thought which was mentioned in Chapter IV has influenced certain elements among the Lebanese. It has led them to regard Lebanon not primarily as the western frontier of the Arab world but as the eastern frontier of Christendom; and to ask, as the first and most profound of the political questions which face them, what are the conditions which will make

[1] See Chapter VIII.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria
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it possible for the Lebanese most fruitfully to perform their duty to Christendom. 186 648

Finally, the establishment of the French Mandate, and the tension which has existed between the mandatory authorities and the bulk of the population, have placed a number of difficult choices before those communities which have a special connexion with the French. Should they cling to the French connexion even at the cost of a deep estrangement from the rest of the population of Syria and Lebanon? Should they throw in their lot with their fellow-countrymen even at the cost of abandoning their connexion with France? Can a middle way be found between these two difficult paths?

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Thought about these problems, at different levels of profundity, has led the inhabitants of the Mountain to a number of alternative conceptions of the nature of Lebanon. These conceptions are often expressed in the form of historical or ethnological answers to the question whether the Lebanese are or are not Arabs; for example, there is a school of thought which emphasizes their Phœnician origin. At the basis of them, however, there is something more than an assertion of fact; there is a view of the function which Lebanon should perform, an answer to the question what her relations should be with the West and with the Arabs.

There are some who do not regard Lebanon as possessing a special mission. For them the Lebanese are simply a branch of the Arab people, distinguished from the other branches by nothing of political significance; their destiny is indistinguishable from that of the Arab people as a whole. Others do not go quite so far. They admit that history and tradition give Lebanon a slightly different character from the other Arab regions; but they do not regard this difference as forming the basis of a special mission or destiny in the present. It is nothing but a relic of a past age, an obstacle to be overcome before the Lebanese can fulfil their true function, which in the view of this as of the first group is to become a full part of the Arab people.

A third group believes in a special function for Lebanon, but a restricted one. It is to continue to provide an asylum for those whose religious loyalties or racial origins make it difficult for them to live in neighbouring regions. This,

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186 although a noble conception, is also a limited one: first
641 because it can only be actualized under perpetual foreign protection or guarantee, since the hills and valleys of Lebanon no longer render her immune from interference; and secondly, because it offers to the communities who seek refuge in her no ideal except to be left alone and to live on the margin of history, and no common aim except that of defence.

A more positive conception is that of those Christians who realize that Lebanon's being largely Christian and her being more advanced than the surrounding countries impose upon her peculiar and positive duties. There are some who maintain that Lebanon should become fully a part of the Western Christian world and that she should not be politically or in any other way a part of the Arab world, although she must retain close and friendly relations with that world. For them the ideal in the political as in other spheres is that Lebanon should be self-subsistent, but if that is impossible they would wish her to be dependent upon a Christian European State rather than be part of a Moslem Arab State.

Finally there are some who wish Lebanon to remain Christian without at the same time ceasing to be Arab. The specific duty of the Lebanese is a duty at the same time to the Christian West and to the Arabs: it is to serve as a centre from which Christian and in general Western influences can radiate to Arab Asia. If they are to perform this duty, the Lebanese must form an integral part of the Arab world, politically as in other ways, but receive a special position and special treatment inside that world. They also need the help of some Western State or institution which will take in them an interest other than purely political and self-regarding, though they must avoid becoming the clients of a Western State in a way which will alienate them from the rest of the Arab people.

The differences between these five conceptions are not closely related with the differences between the sects. Roughly however, and with considerable reservations, it may be said that the first two views are held by many of the younger generation of the Druzes and Greek Orthodox Christians, but by fewer of the Maronites; the third view by those, to whatever sect they belong, who are deeply suspicious of the Sunni Moslems and at the same time conscious of their own weakness. The fourth and fifth views are of course

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held only by Christians : the fourth by many of the Maronites, 186
the fifth by those who have been moved by the nationalist 648
sentiment without trying to make it a substitute for religious belief.

Probably the majority of French missionaries and officials in the last generation have professed the third or fourth views : that is to say, they have regarded Arabism as primarily an Islamic movement in which the Christians can have no place, and thus they have tried to make Lebanon into a place where the Christians can at least be safe and can perhaps even build up a national life of their own. Their attitude is determined partly by religious belief, partly by a sense of France's historic obligations and partly by a certain conception of French interests. As for the third party to the question, the Arab nationalists in Syria and the other Arab countries, they believe that Lebanon is a part of the Arab world and are afraid of its being used as a centre for foreign intrigues against them ; but the more reasonable and responsible of them recognize the peculiar traditions and needs of Lebanon and are prepared to make special provision for them.

8

The problem of the Shi'is is in some ways similar to that 795
of the Christians and Druzes of the Mountain, since it arises 621
from distinct religious loyalties complicated by a separate tradition and memories of persecution. But there is also another complicating factor : the backwardness of the Shi'is in social organization and their low standard of living. Their first need is for a reformed social organization and improved economic conditions. Once this need has been satisfied, it is possible that their outlook and feeling will be near enough to that of the Sunnis to make special treatment unnecessary.

There is one community which possesses a special relation 563
to all the rest. The Armenians, whether Gregorians, Catholics or Protestants, have two characteristics which distinguish them from the remainder of the population of Lebanon. First, they are not Arabic-speaking, but have their own language, culture and national consciousness. Secondly, they 563
are mainly of recent settlement there. The majority established 169
themselves in and around Beirut in consequence of the measures taken against them by the Turkish authorities

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563 during and after the war of 1914–1918; and a large number
169 entered the country even more recently, in 1939 after the cession to Turkey of the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, where many
563 Armenian refugees from Turkey had settled. Most of the
463 Armenians arrived penniless and were dependent in the beginning upon international relief organizations, but in the last twenty years their economic situation has greatly improved. They are mainly craftsmen and small traders and almost all are now town-dwellers.

563 Foreign in language and appearance and socially half-isolated, they have not always been popular with the inhabitants. Some nationalists disapprove of them because they are still unassimilated and because they have added another minority problem to those already existing. Their competitors accuse them, as minorities in their position are often accused, of depressing the level of wages and of monopolizing the trades and crafts to which they have applied themselves.

These Armenians have several alternative conceptions of their future as a nation. There are some, mainly those who have made good, who are prepared to live permanently in Lebanon as a minority; in order to make this possible they wish the Armenians to learn Arabic, to prove themselves good citizens and to co-operate with the bulk of the population in matters of common interest, but at the same time to retain their Armenian characteristics and loyalty. Probably the majority of the Armenians however regard their residence in Lebanon as a temporary exile, and hope sooner or later to return to their own country. Of these, the Tashnak party wish to see their country once more an independent national state, while the Communists and others accept the incorporation of Armenia in the U.S.S.R. and are eager to return and become Soviet citizens. Both these parties recognize that their exile although temporary may be long and that therefore an interim policy is necessary. Some of the Tashnak have tried to follow the example of the Maronites and throw themselves upon a foreign protector; but very many of their party, and all the Communists, desire to reach a *modus vivendi* with the political forces among the Arabs, either with the Arab nationalists or else with the Arab Socialists and Communists.

In the State of Syria two different types of minority problem exist. First, there are problems in regard to the protection and the rights of the 'scattered' minorities, which are in a minority in all parts of the country. Secondly, there are the problems raised by the existence of a number of 'compact' minorities: communities which, while forming a minority of the population of Syria as a whole, nevertheless possess a local predominance in certain regions of it. Here the question is not simply how to guarantee the security and rights of these communities, but what should be the political status and administrative organization of the regions in which they are predominant. There are two districts, those of Latakia and Jebel Druze, in which this question is important; and there is a third, the Jazirah, in which the position is similar in some respects, although very different in others. It will be convenient in the pages which follow to treat the situation in these three districts separately from that in the remainder of Syria.

Jebel Druze was mainly settled in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Druzes coming from Lebanon as a consequence of internecine disputes, changes in the traditional balance of social power and increased interference by the Turkish Government and the Western Powers. They sought in the Jebel freedom to manage their own affairs without control or interference. They now constitute an overwhelming majority of the population; in 1938 there were approximately 62,000 Druzes out of a total population of 70,000, the remainder being mainly Greek Catholics and Orthodox.[1]

Before the War of 1914–1918 the Druzes were almost completely autonomous; Turkish attempts to subdue them had at most a temporary success, and Turkish suzerainty existed only in name. They held aloof from the Sunni Arabs, and preserved in their isolation certain traits which might otherwise have been modified: suspicion of orthodox Moslems, resentment of all interference and attachment to their feudal organization and customary law. It is the persistence of these traits which has given rise to the political

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 220–1. The figures for Latakia, the Jazirah and the rest of Syria, given in the following sections, are from the same source.

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563 problem of Jebel Druze. What degree of control should the French or Syrian authorities attempt to impose? How is the social system of the Druzes to be adapted to the needs of the present?

One answer to such questions (and it is that given by most French officials during the mandatory period) starts from the premise that the Druzes cannot be treated as ordinary members of the Syrian Arab people. What they need, it is said, is firm and enlightened administration which, while taking into account the strength of their conservatism, will aim at the same time at softening such of their customs as are incompatible with modern civilization. Such administration can best be given by officials drawn from their own great families, fortified by European advisers and modern education; it would be useless and dangerous to attempt prematurely either to assimilate them to the rest of the population or to modernize their social system.

The Arab nationalists start from the opposite assumption, that the Druzes are Arabs who by reason of their history and geographical isolation have developed distinctive customs and a particularist spirit; this spirit will only be strengthened by the grant of autonomy and may become so intense that the Druze resentment of interference will act as a permanent obstacle to unity and good government in Syria. What they need, say the nationalists, is to be given a consciousness of their solidarity with the Arab nation, into which they must be reabsorbed socially and politically. Either their claim to self-government should be denied, or else such administrative privileges as are given them should be limited both in duration and in extent.

Among the Druzes themselves there are parties which adhere to both these schools of thought, some who feel themselves Arabs and support the aspirations of the nationalists for unity and independence, and a smaller number who desire autonomy under European control and protection. But the majority probably have an equal fear of Arab and European interference, since both must ultimately lead to the break-up of their traditional and uncontrolled way of life.

563 The Druzes may be able to defend their isolation against
621 the nationalists and against European powers for a time; but their conservatism has other more formidable enemies. The whole feudal organization of their society is breaking up:

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the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

10

The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a large proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

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795 the standard of living and education among the Alawis and
648 to develop their corporate consciousness; and who believe that if this is to be done the Alawis must be given a separate administration specially adapted to their needs and under benevolent foreign tutelage. There are others who admit the importance of these tasks but who emphasize that it is equally necessary to give the Alawis a consciousness of being part of the Arab nation as an alternative to sectarianism and to a paralysing localism. Among the Alawis themselves, one party adheres to the former school of thought, a second to the latter, but the greater number are suspicious of all interference from outside and wish only to be left alone.

Here, as in Jebel Druze, great social and intellectual processes are beginning of which the results have yet to appear. But it will probably take longer to bring Alawi society to a point where it becomes possible to face the problem of its definitive political status.

II

311 The problem of the Jazirah, the north-eastern province
167 of Syria, is in many ways different from that of Jebel Druze and the Alawi territory. Before the War of 1914–1918 it was largely an empty district, except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was sparsely cultivated where it was cultivated at all; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria they established a considerable measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already possessed by virtue of its fertility. The French authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian and other minorities who had been forced to leave their dwellings in Turkey, or who preferred not to live in the predominantly Moslem parts of Syria. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, together with Assyrians from Iraq after the events of 1933, have moved into the province; and even larger numbers of Kurdish Moslems, dislodged from their homes in Eastern Turkey by the policy of forcible assimilation
361 adopted by the Turkish Government. The new towns of
311 Hassetche and Qamishli and new villages have been created and new crops introduced, and the district has been opened up to regular commerce. The Beduin have been controlled
AND CERTAIN TRIBES AMONG THEM PERSUADED TO SETTLE ON THE LAND.

and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land. 000

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was 162
almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 103,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.[1]

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose 563
native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other 778
part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a 563
conflict between the greater number of French officials/ 86
who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds 563
have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups 619
being the Barazi and Milli; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the 'Hoybun' party. It aims at the

[1] Another estimate for 1937 was as follows: Arab Moslems 41,900; Kurds 81,450; Christians 31,050; others 4,150; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

563 619 formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule ; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

12

162 795 In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter ; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

13

184 The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions ; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual,

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

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social and economic characteristics. For example, the Christians accounted in 1938 for about 32 per cent of the total school population, and for an even larger proportion of pupils in the secondary schools. It is important to notice that 32 per cent of the Christian students attended schools controlled mainly by foreign Christian missions, 61 per cent attended private schools mostly maintained by religious communities, and only 7 per cent attended official schools.[1] Since the education given in the first two types of school is sectarian, Christians are receiving a different kind of education from Moslems, a far larger proportion of whom attend official institutions.

Educational differences are reinforced by social ones. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of interconnected units, of which the relations with the Moslem community are peaceful and correct but not in normal circumstances cordial. This is especially true of the older people brought up under the Ottoman régime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of nationalism are helping to make the young less conscious than their elders of their confessional loyalties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects and religions. Economically, also, the Christians tend to constitute a more predominantly urban community than the Moslems, with all the differences which that involves, but there is a Christian peasantry in certain parts of the country, similar in many ways to the Moslem peasantry.

In spite of incidents like those of 1860, on the whole the history of Syria has not been one of religious persecution on a large scale, and the Christians have enjoyed long periods of toleration, although not of equality with the Moslems. Such toleration has existed partly because of the long residence of Christians in the country, partly because they were not numerous enough to constitute a serious threat to Moslem supremacy, and partly because clergy and laity alike were for the most part Arabic in language and culture.

On the whole the growth of the nationalist movement has not had unfavourable consequences for the Christians. Individual Christians have played an important part in the movement in Syria as elsewhere. Nor is it merely isolated

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 91.

795 186 individuals who are sympathetic to Arab nationalism. Such sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox. (One reason for this may be that since the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Greek Orthodox have had no external 'protector' and so have had to understand the necessity of being on good terms with their neighbours.) Nationalist ideas are particularly strong in the younger generation, who imbibe them in school and elsewhere. The Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab traditions; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missionaries and teachers; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that any relaxation of French control would mean the loss of their privileged position.

The leaders of the nationalist movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians, and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of national feeling have often been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders springs from a genuine desire to create a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; and also from the wish not to alienate Western opinion. While, however, the more moderate and responsible nationalists are tolerant on principle and by sentiment, there is a certain suspicion of Christians among their less enlightened followers.

14

563 The Druzes and Alawis in the six provinces are outlying sections of the larger communities in Jebel Druze and the district of Latakia respectively, and do not require separate discussion here. The Isma'ilis form a compact community in the province of Hama; they keep much to themselves and want only to be left alone. The Circassians are to be found in the Hauran, on the northern frontier and on the Euphrates; they still constitute a separate entity with their own language and customs. During the Syrian revolt of 1925 they were used as irregulars by the French authorities, and this made them more unpopular with the Arabs than before. Some of them have at times demanded local autonomy, but

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without success. Being Sunnis and living in mainly Arab regions, they will probably in time become assimilated. The Turcomans in the province of Aleppo have on occasion caused trouble to the authorities by their turbulence, but do not raise any special political problem. Kurds are also to be found in the province of Aleppo and there is a colony of several thousands in Damascus. From here and Beirut, the Kurdish nationalist movement is directed. Its main weight comes from the Jazirah, but it is strong in other parts of Syria, though by no means all Kurds are nationalists. Some of these scattered Kurds are nomads, others semi-sedentary or sedentary. There are several thousands of Jews in Damascus and Aleppo. They have been treated with tolerance broken by occasional incidents: in 1840, for example, the Jews of Damascus were accused of ritual murder. Like the Arabized Jews in general, they openly repudiate Zionism, and events in Palestine have not gravely affected their position; but in recent years many of them have emigrated to Palestine.

Finally, much of what was said about the Armenians in Lebanon applies to those in Syria. They are of particular importance in Aleppo, where more than 65,000 of them live; a large proportion of these have been settled there for several generations. They are prominent in many branches of trade and industry. Their failure to become Arabized is resented by many Arab nationalists; while the fact that as Christians they help to increase the Christian element in the population of the town arouses the hostility of some Moslems. But Aleppo is not a fanatical town; it is primarily a commercial centre, and much more tolerant of diversity and less liable to be carried away by political euthusiasms or hatreds than is Damascus.

Memories of the past have embittered the feelings of practically all Armenians towards Turkey. At the time of the Alexandretta affair,[1] the rumour that Turkey intended to claim the district of Aleppo caused a great stir among the Armenians of northern Syria. Had Aleppo been ceded to Turkey, this would probably have been followed by the emigration of large numbers of Armenians southwards.

[1] See Chapter XI.

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VIII. FOREIGN INTERESTS

I

648 OTHER difficulties which the nationalist movement has to face arise from the existence of important foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon. This chapter summarizes those interests as they stood at the outbreak of the war of 1939; it is clearly impossible to state with any precision the state of affairs which will come into existence after the war.

648 Before 1939, the interests of France far exceeded those
175 of other States. That the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon should have been conferred upon her rather than any of the other Great Powers was due immediately to the war-time agreement between the Allies for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but more fundamentally to the long-standing French connexions with the Ottoman Empire in general and Syria and Lebanon in particular, and to the sentiment which that connexion had aroused in certain quarters in France. French writers sometimes trace it back to Charlemagne, who conducted obscure negotiations with the Abbasid Caliph, Harun ar-Rashid, and is said to have obtained, after an exchange of letters and presents, the custody of the Christian Holy Places. They are on firmer ground when they emphasize the part played by Frenchmen in the Crusades. It is true that the Crusades were by no means an exclusively French enterprise. But French Kings, priests, nobles and knights were prominent in the organization of the Crusading States in geographical Syria. The ruling-class of the States was largely French in origin and language. They left their mark upon Syria in the castles and churches which they built and of which the ruins still survive; and equally the Crusaders and the land which they had conquered and for a time ruled made a deep impression upon the imagination of France. It is unwise to ignore the historic imagination of peoples, even when its content is partly legend and only partly history.

175 The Crusades were an isolated episode. During the two centuries which succeeded the fall of Acre in 1291, no particularly close connexion existed between France and geographical Syria: commerce between the Levant and Western Europe was largely in the hands of the Italian merchants, while cultural and political relations scarcely existed. The modern French connexion with the countries of the Eastern

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Mediterranean cannot be traced back beyond the first half of 175 the sixteenth century, when the French King Francis I began to cultivate friendly relations with the Ottoman Sultan, in order to secure an ally against his enemy the Emperor Charles V. In 1535 the first Franco-Ottoman agreement was reached; the Sultan issued the first 'capitulation', permitting French citizens resident in his dominions to practise their religion, and granting them certain other privileges. This agreement served as the basis for that protection of Catholic interests in the Levant which the French Government now began to take upon itself. France's friendship with the Ottoman Government enabled her to intervene with it in favour of European Catholic priests and pilgrims, whether or not they were French.

In the course of the seventeenth century the capitulations were more than once renewed, and the French protectorate of the Catholics increased in scope and importance. Under the terms of the renewal of 1673, all ecclesiastics of the Latin rite in Ottoman territory were to be regarded as French subjects. The number of such ecclesiastics was constantly increasing, by reason of the foundation of Jesuit, Franciscan and Carmelite missions, which began the work, which they have carried on until to-day, of educating the Catholics of the Levant and of winning back to Catholicism the adherents of the dissident Eastern Churches. Moreover, the French protectorate began in this century to be extended from the Catholic subjects of Western European States resident in the Ottoman Empire to the Catholic and other Christian subjects of the Empire; this was a development which had no formal basis in the capitulations or any other official act. Thus in 1639 the French Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed by his Government 'to protect and assist the Christians and Catholics of the Levant as far as possible, interposing the name and authority of His Majesty wherever he judges that he can usefully do so'. Ten years later, in 1649, a particularly close connexion was established with one of the Catholic communities: a Maronite bishop went to the French court in order to ask for the protection of the King of France, who issued letters-patent taking the whole Maronite community into his special protection. In the second half of the century a Maronite, a member of the important Khazin family, was appointed French Vice-Consul in Damascus,

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175 and the Catholic missions established schools for the Maronites, one of the most famous of them the Jesuit College of Antourah, which was later transferred to the Lazarists and is still among the great centres of French education in the Levant. Gradually the custom arose of according to the representatives of France liturgical honours in the services of the Uniate Churches.

The tendencies which had first appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued throughout the greater part of the eighteenth. The Franco-Ottoman friendship was maintained; the French Government continued to interest itself in the fate of the Christians of the Levant; French commerce with the Near East grew in volume, and with it there grew up French mercantile communities in the great trading centres of the Ottoman Empire. But towards the end of the century the position of France suffered a decline, with the temporary decrease of French influence in the world, and with the growth of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. In 1774 the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji gave the Russian Government a vague right of protection over the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.

The French Revolution and the Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte caused a temporary and partial breach in the continuity of French policy. The early Revolutionary Governments withdrew their support from the Catholic missions; and in order to facilitate his rule over Egypt, Bonaparte claimed to be the protector of Islam. It is true that in his invasion of Syria (1799) he received certain help from the Maronites and attempted to secure the assistance of the ruler of Lebanon, the Amir Bashir. But by invading Egypt and Syria he broke the other strand of French policy, friendship with the Ottoman Sultan. The latter declared war upon France; but in 1802 a Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed, restoring to French residents in Ottoman territory their capitulatory privileges. Shortly afterwards the reversion to tradition was carried a step further; the help and encouragement of the French Government was once more accorded to the Catholic Missions.

The resumption of continuity was not complete, however. The creation by Muhammad Ali of a virtually independent Egyptian State which threatened to overwhelm the Ottoman Empire confronted the Powers with a new problem. All of them decided that it was in their interests to maintain

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the Empire, with the exception of France, which, forsaking her traditional ally, gave almost uninterrupted support to Muhammad Ali. This was one of the reasons why, after the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha from geographical Syria and its restoration to the Sultan, the Ottoman Government did all it could to weaken the position of the Maronites, the traditional protégés of France. The Druzes were encouraged to attack them; there followed the series of disturbances which culminated in the massacres of 1860. They gave the opportunity for the most spectacular exercise of the French right of protection. With the consent of the other Powers, reluctantly and conditionally given, a French expeditionary force occupied Lebanon and remained there several months, until, in 1861, the international Conference sitting in Beirut finished drawing up the statute of Lebanese autonomy. In the same period, the conflict over the Holy Places between Catholics and Orthodox, supported by France and Russia respectively, was one of the contributory causes of the Crimean War.

In less spectacular ways, too, France's concern for the Christians of the Levant showed itself throughout the nineteenth century. The work of the missions, religious, educational and humanitarian, grew continuously, thanks partly to the annual subsidy given them by the French Government. French diplomatic intervention helped to secure the recognition by the Ottoman Government of one after another of the Uniate Churches, and in many ways to promote the interests of Catholic foundations. The French protectorate over the Catholics in the Holy Places was given formal international recognition in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878; and in the same year the Prefect of Propaganda at the Vatican addressed a circular to the Catholic authorities in the Levant, instructing them that their dealings with the local authorities should be conducted through the diplomatic representatives of France. Similar statements were made again in 1888 and 1898.

The growth of anti-clericalism in France, and the separation of Church from State in 1906, made no difference to the policy of the French Government. It is true that it led to the establishment by the 'Mission Laïque' of non-religious schools for the propagation of French culture in a secular form, and that there was a decline in the number of French missionaries and teachers, and a corresponding increase in

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that of the Italians. But officially French Governments of whatever complexion recognized that anti-clericalism was not for export, and worked to preserve and strengthen their connexion with the Eastern Christians and their protectorate over Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire. It was the existence of the French tradition which led to part of the northern Syrian coastlands being excluded from the scope of the promise of Arab independence made by the British Government to the Sharif Husain, which caused Syria and Lebanon to be assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, helped to form the decision of the peace-makers to confer on France the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, and has largely determined the nature of France's policy in her Mandated Territories until to-day.

2

The existence of this tradition must be taken as a factor which, even if it rests to some extent upon legend, cannot be ignored. But it must be made clear in what the tradition consisted. One aspect of it was the protectorate over the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. It is sometimes forgotten that it had also another aspect, friendship with the ruling power of the Empire. These two aspects, moreover, were not unconnected with one another. It was only because France was the traditional friend of the Sultan that she was able to intervene successfully with him in favour of his Catholic subjects; and it was not an accident that when France temporarily severed her friendship with the Sultan, and gave her assistance to Muhammad Ali, the attitude of the Sultan's Government towards the Eastern Christians became more unfavourable than it had been.

There is no room in this essay to discuss what historical rights are, and whether they exist. What must be emphasized is that the historic connexion summarized above, together with the legends and associations which cling to it, have helped to determine the emotional attitude of the French public to Syria and Lebanon, and thus to mould French policy. It is not only Catholics who attach value to the French tradition in the Levant; it is in some degree all those to whom history and tradition have meaning.

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3

The foremost interest of France was to preserve the sympathy and affection which her long protection of the Christians had won for her among them. The Catholic Christians were the only wholeheartedly pro-French element in the population of the Mandated Territories, and their friendship was an asset too valuable to be given up. It was largely in order to strengthen their position and to reward their fidelity that the State of Greater Lebanon was created at the beginning of the period of French occupation;[1] this may or may not have been a wise method of attaining the desired end, but the considerations which led to its adoption must always have had weight with any French Government, whatever its political complexion and its general policy in regard to the Mandated Territories.

In the years between the two wars, France came to regard herself as having special obligations not only to the Catholic Christians but to all the minorities, and especially to the Druze and Alawi communities and the mixed population of the Jazirah. She had made articulate the corporate consciousness of these groups, where she had not created it; and she had given expression to it in her administrative organization. She could not therefore ignore the effects which her policy might have upon their relations with the remainder of the population. More particularly, she had to take into account that the nationalists suspected her of having fostered particularist feelings both in order to weaken the sentiment of national unity and to use them as an excuse for delaying the grant of independence. Some of the resentment which they felt towards France was directed towards the minorities, and especially those of them who were traditionally attached to France. Frenchmen who realized this feared that should French influence be wholly withdrawn, this might have had serious consequences for some at least of the minorities, and maintained that it was therefore both an interest and an obligation for France so far as possible to ensure the safety of her protégés and friends after the termination of the Mandate no less than while it was still in force.

It must be added that not all these minorities reciprocated the feelings which France had or claimed to have for them;

[1] See Chapter IX.

648 some recognized 'foreign protection' as a gift too dangerous to be accepted.

4

648 Sympathy for France depended not only upon her special
177 links with certain elements in the population, but also upon the hold of French culture over the educated classes. Most educated people of whatever religion speak French; many know it as well as they know Arabic, and there are some, mainly among the Catholics, for whom it has replaced Arabic as their native language. French books are widely read, French social customs copied, and there are many who have travelled or studied in France and have a profound affection for the country, its people and its way of life.

177 It is the Catholic missions, working through schools and
871 other institutions, which have played the largest part in
799 winning Syria and Lebanon for French civilization. The mission-schools and colleges and the Université de S. Joseph in Beirut have always concentrated on imparting to their students a mastery of the French language, even if that should involve neglect of the teaching of Arabic. The majority of those who possess any understanding of European culture have been trained by the Jesuits, the Franciscans or other missionaries; and so long as the Catholic schools continue to provide the best intellectual education which the country can offer, there is no need to fear for the position of French culture. The social work carried out by the missions must also be mentioned; they have borne on their shoulders a great part of the work of alleviating social conditions, and have deserved the gratitude of those who care for social justice. Thus all French Governments, clerical or anti-clerical, regarded it as essential to maintain for the missions their right of unrestricted activity.

177 Long before the beginning of the French occupation, the
649 Governments of France, seeing more clearly than some others the political significance of cultural ties, set themselves to preserve and extend the predominance of French civilization. The institution of the Mandate gave greater freedom for their efforts. In some ways the position of French culture was improved in the years between the two wars. French was one of the official languages and knowledge of it was an indispensable qualification for holding most of the higher

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offices in the administration. The organization and procedure of the law-courts was based upon French models, and the system of laws which they dispensed, although basically Islamic, was deeply influenced by the French codes. French was the main foreign language taught in official schools, and the official system of examinations was adapted from that of France. (This was one of the considerations which led certain sections of French opinion to oppose the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. Although the exchange of letters attached to the Treaty contained guarantees for the preservation of French cultural influences and provided for the recruitment of foreign officials and advisers from France in preference to any other country, the critics regarded the termination of the Mandate as likely to bring to an end the supremacy of French culture in Syria and Lebanon.)

In spite of the efforts of the French Government, however, it is probable that twenty years of French rule harmed rather than helped the position of French culture. The political grievances and discontents of those years, and the almost continuous opposition of the greater part of the Syrian and Lebanese people to their French masters, shook the ascendancy of France over men's spirits. In 1939 there were more who spoke French than there had been in 1918, but perhaps fewer who loved and believed in France.

5

France's economic interests in her Mandated Territories, although not of first-rate importance, nevertheless were not negligible. There were only a few thousand private French citizens resident in the country, and comparatively little landed property was in French hands; Syria and Lebanon had never been looked upon as regions for settlement. The total value of French investments was of the order of magnitude of one milliard francs; it had not increased to any great extent since before the War of 1914–1918. Most of it was invested in public utilities: the railways, the port of Beirut, electric power, waterworks and so on. A French company also held the monopoly for the production of tobacco. In fact, almost all public concessions of importance had been given to companies wholly or mainly French in ownership. About one-tenth of the total investment was sunk in the railways, almost all of which were controlled by the 'Damas-

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698 Hama et Prolongement' (D.H.P.) company. Since 1925 this
471 company had had an agreement with the local Governments by which the latter made good any losses incurred by the company in the working of the railways, and received a progressive share of any profits which were made.

452 There were a number of French financial institutions with interests in the Mandated Territories. The bank of issue, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, had its headquarters in Paris, and of its 25½ million francs of share-capital over 20 millions were in French hands, while twelve out of its sixteen directors were French, the remainder being Syrians
[436] and Lebanese. By an agreement made in 1924 and subsequently renewed, the Banque was given the exclusive right of issuing Syro-Lebanese currency. It also performed the functions of an ordinary commercial bank. In addition, a great deal of commercial banking, mortgage and land-credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie and the Compagnie Algérienne.

439 In 1938 France imported goods of greater value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other county except Palestine; and she exported to them goods of greater value than did any other country except Great Britain. The total value of her imports from them was 105,894,000 francs. The main articles which she imported were vegetables and fruits; she did not obtain from the Levant States any important raw materials for her industries. She exported to them 197,818,000 francs worth of goods, including large quantities of iron and iron goods, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods.[1]

471 The Mandated Territories were also important for French
699 commerce as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions: the civil air-ports were used as stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China. Moreover, one of the two pipelines through which the oil of Iraq is conveyed to the Mediterranean passes through Syria and Lebanon to reach the sea at Tripoli. This was of dual importance to France: first because French interests owned 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and secondly because France obtained between one-third and one-half of her total oil-supply from Iraq, by

[1] For detailed figures, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 203.

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way of Tripoli and Haifa. There was a possibility that Syria might in the future come to be more important still to France; oil-prospecting had been going on in the Jazirah for some years, and in 1940 an agreement was concluded for the exploitation of oil discovered there between the Syrian Government and Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

One more economic factor which could not be left out of account was the immense cost to France of her occupation of Syria and Lebanon. There was first the expense involved in installing herself in Syria and Lebanon: her participation in the Eastern Campaign during the last war and her conflict with Faisal after it. Even more important than these were the expenses of the civil and military administration of the Mandate. According to an official estimate, by 1936 the Mandate had cost France 4,843 million francs, of which the military expenditure accounted for 4,300 millions and the civil for 543.[1] By Article 15 of the Mandate France was entitled, once an organic law had been framed, to ask the national Government to whom she was handing over responsibility for repayment of the expenses she had incurred in performing her duties as Mandatory Power.

6

The primary strategic purposes which France hoped to fulfil by her presence in Syria and Lebanon were the maintenance of her position as a Mediterranean Power, on a level with Great Britain and Italy; the protection of her maritime and air routes to the Far East; and the defence of the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli, through which she derived a large proportion of the oil needed by her armed forces. None of these objects was capable of achievement by France alone, but only by France in conjunction with Great Britain, the dominant foreign Power in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq; the Levant States were only of first-class strategic value to France in so far as the possibility existed of a co-ordinated Franco-British strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus it was an essential French interest to pursue in the Levant a policy similar in the most important respects to that pursued by Great Britain; this was normally recognized by French

[1] G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre D'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939), p. 22.

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Governments, however suspicious their representatives in the East might be of the activities of the British in the neighbouring countries.

The attainment of the strategic objects mentioned above did not necessarily involve the permanent military occupation of the whole of the Mandated Territories. This was recognized by the French Government in the Treaties of 1936, which provided for the unrestricted use of Lebanese territory and waters by French forces, but also for the complete withdrawal of land-forces from Syria after a transitional period, and the retention on Syrian soil of two air-bases alone. Even this was perhaps more than was absolutely essential. It would perhaps have been enough for France to retain control of the naval base of Beirut, the terminus of the pipe-line at Tripoli and an air-base, and to have in addition the assurance of the alliance and co-operation of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should war break out.

7

One other political interest of France must be mentioned. She was the dominant Power in North West Africa, of which the majority of the inhabitants are Arabic-speaking Moslems. One of her motives for occupying Syria had been the desire to control so important a centre of Arab and Moslem opinion; and in framing her policy in Syria and Lebanon, she had always to take into account the repercussions it was likely to have in Morocco, Algeria and Tunis. To repress nationalism in the Levant might have caused unrest in North Africa; but to concede everything to nationalism in the Levant might have strengthened the demand for similar concessions in North Africa, where it would have been more difficult for France to grant them.

8

Thus any French Government which wished to preserve the essential interests of France felt bound to pursue a policy in Syria and Lebanon which would serve: (i) to protect the Catholic and other Christian communities, in accordance with the French tradition in the Levant, and also the other minorities; (ii) to safeguard the work of the missions and the position of French culture in Syria and Lebanon; (iii) to assure her control over at least one naval and one air base, and

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perhaps over other strategic points as well ; (iv) to conform with her general policy in the other Arab and Moslem territories which she controlled ; (v) to conform with British policy in the surrounding Arab countries ; and (vi) to safeguard her investments, her commercial interests, and her access to the oil of Iraq, by means of the pipe-line to Tripoli, and also to the oil of Syria itself if it should prove to be worth exploiting.

9

Great Britain had no direct interests of great significance in Syria and Lebanon. Her trade with those countries was important for them, but only of small value for her ; and her investments were negligible. There were a few British missionary schools, but for the most part British missions had restricted their activities to the British Mandated Territories, leaving Protestant missionary work in the French area to the Americans. The British Government had never in recent times regarded the country as falling within its sphere of interest, although during the Eastern crisis of the 1870's Disraeli had considered the possibility of occupying Alexandretta, but rejected it in favour of Cyprus.

Such interest as Great Britain possessed in Syria and Lebanon sprang from her position first as a Mediterranean Power and secondly as the Western Power having the closest connexion with a great part of the Arab world. An unfriendly Power in possession of naval, military and air bases in Syria or Lebanon would have been able to threaten the key points of the British strategic system in the Eastern Mediterranean : the naval bases at Haifa and Alexandria, the Suez Canal, the air and land routes from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, the oil-wells of Iraq and Persia and the pipe-line from Kirkuk to Haifa. For Great Britain it was therefore necessary either that the strong points in Syria and Lebanon should be under British control or that they should be in the hands of a Government, indigenous or foreign, which was likely to be on the same side as the British Government in any major international issue which might arise.

Her position, both as a Mediterranean sea-power and as paramount Power in India, had led Great Britain to extend her political influence over the greater part of Arab Asia as well as Egypt. She had therefore been brought face to

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face with Arab nationalism, and had been compelled to work out a policy towards it. Thus she could not be indifferent to trends of political opinion and activity in Damascus and Beirut, two of the main centres of Arab nationalism; the more so because of the part which Syrian and Lebanese teachers were playing in moulding the minds of the young and spreading the nationalist gospel in all parts of Arab Asia. Further, Great Britain's interests were affected by the policy adopted towards Arab nationalism by the Government or Governments in control of Syria and Lebanon. If that Government was a national one or if, although foreign, it was favourable to the nationalist aspirations in those respects in which they were at variance with British policy, nationalist discontent in countries under British control might receive encouragement and help from Syria or Lebanon. During the years of the Arab revolt against British policy in Palestine, for example, not only individual Syrians and Lebanese but also the Syrian Government, although not the French authorities, gave support to the insurrection; the leaders of the revolt found a refuge in Beirut and Damascus after they were compelled to leave Palestine, and continued to direct the revolt from there. If on the other hand the controlling Power in Syria and Lebanon showed itself less favourable to Arab nationalism than Great Britain, then there would be discontent and unrest in those countries; and this state of mind might communicate itself to the regions in the British sphere of influence. If the Power in control of Syria and Lebanon were allied to Great Britain, it was possible that the latter would receive part of the blame for the shortcomings of her ally's policy.

Thus Great Britain was concerned to ensure first that the strategic points in Syria and Lebanon should be in friendly hands, and secondly that if those countries should be under foreign control, the policy adopted by the controlling Power in regard to Arab nationalism should be in general conformity with that adopted by Great Britain.

10

Of other Western Powers, the United States had a certain interest in Syria and Lebanon. She wished to safeguard the property and unrestricted activity of the American religious, educational and philanthropic institutions: the missions, the

schools, the University of Beirut and the hospitals. These 648 institutions had been built up by American talent and devotion, and millions of dollars had been sunk in them; they were largely responsible for the respect with which America was regarded in the Levant.

Moreover, there are in the United States some hundreds of thousands of American citizens of Syrian and Lebanese birth and descent, most of whom still have a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and many of whom still possess property there. Apart from such property, American economic interests were not large; the most important of them arose from the American ownership of 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company. An American Government which was concerned to look after the American foreign investments could not be indifferent to the political fate of a country so near to the oil-fields of Iraq, and through which runs the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli.

For many years the Italian Government had been attempting to create interests in Syria and Lebanon, presumably with a view to using them as pretexts for an extension of its political influence in the Levant. At the beginning of the present century an attempt had been made to challenge the French protectorate over the Catholics. Schools and hospitals had been built, which, with the help of subsidies from the Italian Government, continued to function until the entry of Italy into the war. In the last few years before the war, attempts were made to increase Italian trade with Syria and Lebanon. Those attempts were partly successful; and there were also some important Italian economic enterprises in the country, the most important of them the Banco di Roma. But the main object of these measures, as of more obvious and direct measures of propaganda, was not achieved. Apart from a few individuals, there was no section of the population which was Italophil or with which the Italian Government had succeeded in establishing particularly close relations. This was perhaps due to the belief that the Italian Government regarded Syria and Lebanon as possible fields for Italian settlement.

The German Government had no direct interests in Syria and Lebanon, except in so far as it had been able during recent years to use Arab discontent as a means of weakening

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the position of Great Britain and France. The Russian Government had shown no special interest in the area since the Revolution of 1917 ended the traditional connection of Russia with the Greek Orthodox.

11

The Vatican also had an interest in Syria and Lebanon arising out of the existence of large Uniate communities. This interest is looked after by an Apostolic Delegate; the seat of the Delegacy is Beirut, and in the past it has been filled alternately by French and Italian clerics. The Uniate Churches, which cling tenaciously to their privileges and traditions, have direct contact with the Vatican, where there exists a special Eastern Congregation charged with the affairs of the Eastern Uniate communities. The Vatican was concerned to safeguard the position of the Churches and the rights of individual members of them, and thus was interested in the nature of the régime existing in Syria and Lebanon. It was also anxious to protect the interests of the Catholic missions which undertook so many activities in the country and exercised a profound influence upon large sections of its population.

12

The main Turkish interest in Syria sprang from geographical proximity. The southern frontier of Turkey adjoins northern Syria. For the most part it is an arbitrary line, following the Baghdad Railway. On the Turkish side of the frontier there are many thousands of Arabs; on the Syrian side, there are not only a large number of Turks and Turcomans, but also Kurds and Armenians who have emigrated from Turkey for political reasons during the last two generations. In these circumstances, frontier incidents and complications are always to be feared. It was therefore in the interest of Turkey that whatever Government controlled Syria should be strong enough to maintain order in the frontier regions and at the same time should have no desire to embarrass its neighbour by stirring up frontier troubles.

There had always existed among the nationalists in Syria a suspicion that as Turkey grew stronger she would attempt to revive the glories of Ottoman days and to expand southwards. This suspicion was intensified when, after the signature

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of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, Turkey revived her claim to Alexandretta and Antioch. She finally obtained them in 1939[1]; and although in return she gave for the first time a guarantee of the Turco-Syrian frontier, it was widely believed in Syria that Turkey only wanted the Hatay as a first step to the seizure of Aleppo, which before the war of 1914–1918 had been the economic centre of a large region which included much of what is now southern Turkey as well as what is now northern Syria. There has, however, been no indication that this belief was justified, or that Turkey possessed any desire to extend her rule over non-Turkish populations. Turkey was not in principle hostile to Syrian independence, so long as a Syrian or Arab national Government would be neither able nor willing to threaten Turkish security, or to attempt to win back the Hatay. It was possible, however, that at some time in the future she would demand a rectification of the Turco-Syrian frontier, on the ground that the present frontier hampered trade on the railway, which more than once crosses from the Turkish to the Syrian side and back again.

13

Of the other Near Eastern States, Egypt's interest in the fate of Syria and Lebanon sprang partly from the bonds of religion and language which link her people with theirs, partly from her anxiety to see the strategic strong points in friendly hands, whether indigenous or foreign, and partly from her economic connexions with them, actual or potential. In Egypt alone of the Arab countries was it possible to see the beginnings of an indigenous capitalism: the industrial and other enterprises affiliated to the Banque Misr were rapidly expanding, and in the future they and similar groups would probably look more and more to the surrounding Arab countries, and Syria and Lebanon among them, as markets for their products and fields for investment. Already there was a subsidiary of Banque Misr working in the French Mandated Territories, the Banque Misr-Syrie-Liban. About half the share-capital in it was owned by Egyptian interests, the other half by Syrian and Lebanese. So far it had devoted itself to commercial business rather than to the financing of industry.

Iraq shared with Egypt the desire to see the strong points

[1] See Chapter X.

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in Syria and Lebanon in friendly hands. Even more than Egypt she was conscious of the ties of religion and nationality which bind the Iraqis to the Syrians and Lebanese; indeed, the independence of the whole of geographical Syria, as a first step to Arab union, was one of the cardinal points in the foreign policy of Iraq, whose Government had been sympathetic to every movement of Arab unrest or revolt in Syria or Palestine. Its sympathy was due largely to genuine Pan-Arab feeling, which is strong among the ruling elements in Baghdad, but also to Iraq's need for an outlet on the Mediterranean.

PART THREE

IX. THE FRENCH MANDATE

I

THE principle of the Mandate system was formulated in 648 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stated that:

'To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

'The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. . . .

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory . . .

'In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

'The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

'A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.'

648 The preamble of the Mandate recorded the decision of the Principal Allied Powers to entrust Syria and Lebanon to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population in accordance with the provisions of Article 22. France had undertaken to exercise the Mandate on behalf of the League of Nations. Within three years she was to frame an organic law for Syria and Lebanon in agreement with the native authorities and taking into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population. She was further to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent States, and so far as circumstances permitted to encourage local autonomy (Article 1). She was empowered to maintain troops in the territory for its defence; to recruit local forces from the inhabitants for defence and the maintenance of order; and to use the ports and communications for the passage and maintenance of her troops and materials. Once the organic law entered into force, the local forces would be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and control of the Mandatory. Syria and Lebanon might contribute to the cost of maintaining the forces of the Mandatory (Article 2). The Mandatory was entrusted with exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and Lebanon and the protection of their nationals abroad (3). She was to ensure that no part of the territory was ceded, leased or placed under the control of a foreign Power (4). For the duration of the Mandate the privileges and immunities which foreigners had enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire would not be applicable in Syria and Lebanon (5). The Mandatory was to establish a judicial system which should assure to natives as well as foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights (6). Guarantees should be given for the personal status, religious interests and endowments of the various peoples, and for freedom of conscience and worship; and no discrimination of any kind should be made on grounds of differences in race, religion or language (6, 8). The Mandatory was charged to encourage public instruction in the native languages and to safeguard the right of each community to maintain its own schools, teaching in its own language (8). It was to refrain from interfering in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines,

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and to limit its supervision of religious missions to the maintenance of public order and good government. The activity of these missions should not be restricted provided it was confined to the domain of religion; they were also to be entitled to concern themselves with education and relief (9–10). In economic matters there should be no discrimination against the nationals or goods of any state member of the League of Nations, as compared with those of the Mandatory or any other foreign State; subject to this condition, the Mandatory might impose such taxes and duties as it thought necessary. Again subject to this condition, it was empowered to take such steps as it might think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the territory and safeguard the interests of the local population. There should be no distinction of nationality as between state members of the League in the grant of concessions for the development of natural resources. General monopolies should not be granted; those of a purely fiscal nature would however be permitted, provided they did not involve a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor infringe the economic equality guaranteed above (11). Further articles dealt with the régime of extradition; with the adherence of Syria and Lebanon to international agreements in a number of spheres and to measures of common utility adopted by the League for preventing and combating disease; and with the establishment of a law of antiquities (7, 12, 13, 14). Article 15 empowered the Mandatory, once the organic law referred to in Article 1 should come into force, to arrange with the local Governments for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred.

French and Arabic were to be the official languages (16). The Mandatory was obliged to make an annual report to the Council of the League of Nations on the measures taken to carry out the provisions of the Mandate (17). The Council's consent would be required for any modification in the terms of the Mandate (18). On the termination of the Mandate, the Council would use its influence to safeguard the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and Lebanon of financial obligations regularly assumed during the period of the Mandate (19). Finally, the Mandatory agreed that any dispute between it and another member of the League in regard to the interpretation or application of the Mandate should be submitted

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to the Permanent Court of International Justice if it could not be settled by negotiation (20).

3

The Permanent Mandates Commission provided for in Article 22 of the Covenant was duly set up, and met regularly until the outbreak of the present war. It was composed at the beginning of nine members, but in later years the number varied; they were appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, and a majority of them was drawn from countries other than those to which Mandates had been entrusted; the members sat as private individuals and not as representatives of Governments.

Its business was to examine the report on the political, social and economic development of the Mandated Territories submitted annually to the Council of the League of Nations by the French Government; to record its comments, recommendations and criticisms in regard to the matters dealt with in the report; and to receive and examine petitions addressed to the League by inhabitants of the Mandated Territories or other interested parties. In the performance of these tasks it was helped by the presence at its meetings of a representative of the Mandatory Power, and sometimes of the High Commissioner himself, who in statements and in answers to questions endeavoured to explain his Government's policy.

The Commission on the whole performed its functions with great skill and honesty. It was never unwilling to record its frank but responsible criticisms of French policy and to suggest improvements. Its activities were beneficial in so far as they upheld the principle that the Mandatory Power had been given the Mandate as a sacred trust of civilization, and also in so far as they gave publicity to the way in which the Mandate was being exercised. But its usefulness was limited by various factors. Its operations were slow; it had no direct contacts with the population of the territories with which it was dealing; all petitions had to come to it by way of the Mandatory authorities; and it was handicapped, as it occasionally had reason to complain, by the unwillingness of the French Government to provide full information on controversial subjects. Moreover, it had no power except that of sending observations to the Council of the League.

4

That the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon was entrusted to France was due mainly to her claiming special interests in the Levant. It was therefore natural that her policy during the Mandatory period should be determined only partly by her conception of the Mandate, and partly by her conception of her own interests. In so far as her policy was based upon the second factor, it was directed to two ends: firstly to opposing and weakening the growing tide of Arab nationalism, with its claim for complete independence; and secondly to strengthening the traditionally or potentially Francophil elements, the Christians, Alawis, Kurds and other minorities, and especially to strengthening the position of Lebanon *vis à vis* the interior. This second aim was partly a means of achieving the first, but partly an end in itself, arising out of France's traditional friendship with certain of the Christians

The claim to independence was opposed for various reasons. There were some who, while not opposed to Arab nationalism as such, were reluctant to make any concessions which would, as they believed, weaken the position of France in the world; their thought, like that of almost all Frenchmen, was dominated by the fear of a world war and the need to build up the strength of France. Others, in those circles where suspicion of British intentions was current, regarded Arab nationalism as inspired by and allied with Great Britain; or at least its success was regarded as likely to lead to an expansion of British at the expense of French influence in Syria and Lebanon, since if they became part of an Arab union they would also become part of the sterling bloc, and English would tend to replace French as the main foreign language in business and education. By some, Arab nationalism was thought to be essentially a movement against the West, a reaction of Asiatic obscurantism and traditionalism against the forces of light and progress, and therefore an enemy of France's tutelary mission. By many Catholics it was regarded as a movement of Moslem fanaticism and necessarily opposed to Christianity, and more particularly to the work of Christian missions in the Levant and to those Syrian Christians who had for so long relied upon French protection.

Others again, while not opposed to the grant of independence in principle, believed that the time was not ripe for it, since the Arabs had not yet learned to rule themselves

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648 wisely and efficiently, and more particularly to treat their minorities with discretion. This school of thought was critical of Great Britain's premature withdrawal from Iraq, partly because it forced France's hand in Syria and Lebanon, and partly because the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was not thought to provide adequate guarantees for minorities. Its fears were increased by the killing of the Assyrians in 1933. Opposition was strengthened by the tendency of French statesmen, soldiers and officials to look at Syria and Lebanon with North African eyes: not simply to regard the Arabs of the Levant as similar to those of French North Africa, but to frame their policy in the Mandated Territories with an eye to its repercussions in Morocco, Algeria and Tunis.

Nevertheless it must not be thought that French opinion was universally opposed to the independence of the Mandated Territories. There were many on the Left who were opposed to imperialism, who had a guilty conscience about French policy in the Mandated Territories and who wished to make amends for the injustices of the past. There were others who realized that French policy in Syria and Lebanon was bound to keep in line with British policy in the other Arab countries; and if Great Britain chose, wisely or unwisely, to negotiate treaties of independence with those countries, then France could not do otherwise in Syria and Lebanon. There were advocates of an "enlightened imperialism," who started from the assumption that sooner or later nationalism was going to achieve its objectives in some form or other, and that it lay in the power of France only to help to determine the form, and in particular to determine whether nationalism triumphant would be friendly or hostile to France. They hoped to win the friendship of nationalism while there was yet time by concluding a definitive agreement in which France's essential interests would be preserved but everything else freely and sincerely given up. Finally, there were those who believed that France ought to concentrate upon strengthening her position in Europe and not to incur heavy commitments in the outside world.

Perhaps the best statement of the case against orthodox French policy was made by M. Pierre Viénot, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Popular Front Government of 1936, in a lecture in March, 1939. The Mandated Territories, he insisted, could not be regarded as a colony. For one thing,

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there had been practically no French settlement in them, and 648 their economic links with France were only tenuous. What was more important, their population could not be treated as a backward people incapable of governing itself. This had been recognized in the text of the Mandate. According to the conception of the Mandate, " the Mandatory Power commands and governs only to educate. Its role is that of a tutor, its authority provisional and transitory." This idea was not simply a theory. It was accepted by the population of the Mandated Territories, whose desire for independence was strong and of long standing. Unless French policy conformed to that envisaged in the Mandate, there was a danger that French influence in the Levant would decline, to be replaced by that of Italy, of Great Britain or of Turkey.[1]

5

The conception of the Mandate held by the French Government was defined by its accredited representative, M. de Caix, at a session of the Permanent Mandates Commission in February, 1926 :

' The idea which has governed, if not the whole exercise of the Mandate, at any rate all the efforts made to organize it, is the following : the Mandate is a provisional system designed to enable populations which, politically speaking, are still minors to educate themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-government. This presupposes that the Mandatory Power will gradually create native organizations in the mandated territory, such as may, when complete, be able to ensure entirely the government of the country and such as may, if they carry out their duties in a proper manner, render the intervention of the Mandatory unnecessary. It appears from this that there should not be any intervention on the part of the organizations of the Mandatory Power in the internal affairs of the native governments. . . .

' In conformity with this conception, countries like Syria and the Lebanon, which have not one but several governments, must be provided with a native organization, not only for the government of the various States but also for the purpose of internal relations between them.

' Since the populations under mandate are endowed with a

[1] G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939).

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government including the necessary organizations to make them self-supporting, provided that they perform their duties in a normal manner, it is necessary, on the other hand, that the Mandatory Power should be in a position not only to give advice but also to correct the working of the native governments and even to make up for their deficiencies. . . .

'Consequently, the mandate system calls for a complete native organization, but side by side with it an organization of a tutelary nature, possessing the necessary authority to ensure the good government and progress of the country.'[1]

6

It was in the light of this conception that the political organization of the Mandated Territories was framed during the first years of the Mandatory period. It may be described as a dual organization. On the one side stood the High Commissioner, the representative of the Mandatory Power. His was the ultimate responsibility for the administration of Syria and Lebanon; but in principle (which was, however, often contravened in practice) his functions were restricted in normal times to advice and supervision. To assist him he had at his headquarters in Beirut a political and a military 'cabinet', and a number of departments, staffed in the upper ranks by officials from France or the French Empire, and under the control of the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner's principal administrative assistant; they included departments of public security, education, public works, antiquities, etc., and the organization for Beduin affairs. He also had an information service composed of army officers acting under his direct control and charged with the function of keeping him in touch with movements of political feeling, thought and action throughout the country. These officials of the 'Services Spéciaux' were to be found in every district and in practice exercised an almost unlimited influence over the local administration and political life. A special group of them was in charge of the Beduin, whose affairs were thus brought under the direct control of the High Commissioner.

This was the 'organization of a tutelary nature' of which M. de Caix spoke; its expenses were paid from the French Budget. But in addition to it, there were certain other

[1] *Minutes of the eighth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, February-March, 1926*, p. 45.

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departments under the immediate control of the High Commissioner. The most important of them were the customs administration, the posts and telegraphs, and the control of concessionary companies (this was important because the railways, most public utilities, and the production of tobacco were in the hands of such companies). These departments dealt with matters of common interest to all parts of the Mandated Territories, and could not therefore be wholly controlled by the Governments of the different regions into which, as will be shown below, the Territories were divided. When some organization representative of all those Governments should be established, it would take over the control of these departments; but until that should occur, they were provisionally administered by the High Commissioner. Known collectively as the 'Common Interests', they had their own budget, with funds drawn almost wholly from the customs revenues; from it their expenses were defrayed, and the surplus was distributed between the indigenous Governments.

When the High Commissioner was a soldier, he was himself Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Syria and Lebanon, which were mainly French and colonial but included a number of units, the 'Troupes spéciales du Levant', raised from different sections of the population. When he was a civilian, the forces were under a separate Commander-in-Chief, who was himself, however, subordinate to the High Commissioner. A large part of the expenses of the army of occupation was a charge upon the French Budget; but the 'Troupes spéciales' were paid for out of the budget of common services.

7

The High Commissioner, as has been said, exercised general functions of advice and supervision; but in principle the actual work of administration was performed by indigenous Governments, established by the High Commissioner and controlled by him through his Delegates or representatives in the main administrative centres of the country. They were staffed mainly by local officials, when competent ones could be found, but in the earlier years the governors were often French. A number of French administrative 'conseillers' and technical advisers were attached to the various departments; they ranked as officials of the Governments to which

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648 they were attached and not as members of the High Commissioner's staff. These Governments had legislative as well as executive powers, subject to the control of the High Commissioner and his Delegates, and within limits of the 'conseillers': a control which at times deprived the Governments of almost all freedom of action.

648 642 631 That the Mandatory Power decided to establish several indigenous Governments instead of one for the whole territory was officially explained as being due to the separatist feelings of various sections of the population and their different levels of development. The first of them to be set up was the State of Greater Lebanon, which was created in August, 1920, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of the towns and surrounding districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Sur and Saida; the wheat-producing regions of Baalbek and the Biqa'; and the districts of Rashaya and Hasbaya, stretching southwards from the foot of Mount Hermon to the Palestinian frontier. Its independence was proclaimed in September, 1920. In the same month, the Territory of the Alawis was established in the region around Latakia. It was given the name of 'State' in July, 1922. In April, 1922, the independence of Jebel Druze was proclaimed, in consequence of an agreement for the establishment of a Druze national Government, signed in March, 1921, by a number of Druze notables and a representative of the High Commissioner. The remainder of Syria had been divided after the expulsion of Faisal into the two States of Aleppo and Damascus, created in September, 1920. Within the State of Aleppo, the Sanjaq of Alexandretta was given a special régime, in accordance with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. Legislatively the Sanjaq formed part of the State, but administratively it possessed a large degree of autonomy, it had a special budget, and Turkish was recognized as an official language side by side with French and Arabic.

This organization was intended to be provisional only. Although in the first instance the personnel of the Governments was appointed by the High Commissioner and many of the most important posts were filled by French officers and officials. it was anticipated that self-governing institutions would be established as soon as possible, and that some permanent and regular system of co-operation between the governments would be created. In 1922, a Representative Council was established in Lebanon. In June of that year a

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further step was taken with the creation of a Syrian Federation which included the States of Damascus, Aleppo and the Alawis, but not those of Greater Lebanon and Jebel Druze. The Federation was given wide legislative powers, exercised through a Federal Council composed of delegations elected by the Representative Councils which were established in the member-states. At its first meeting the Council elected as its President Subhi Barakat, an Antiochene of Turkish origin.

The Federation did not work satisfactorily. The States of Damascus and Aleppo desired a closer form of union, and certain elements in that of the Alawis one less close. In December, 1924, General Weygand, who had succeeded General Gouraud as High Commissioner in April, 1923, dissolved the Federation. As from January, 1925, the two States of Damascus and Aleppo were combined into a single State of Syria, of which the capital was Damascus and within which the Sanjaq of Alexandretta continued to possess a special régime. The State of the Alawis resumed its separate existence without any direct connexion with the new Syrian State.

Thus from the beginning of 1925 onwards the Mandated Territories were divided into four different political units: the State of Greater Lebanon, known later as the Lebanese Republic; the State of Syria, later called the Syrian Republic and including the partly-autonomous Sanjaq of Alexandretta; the State of the Alawis, known from 1930 as the Government of Latakia; and the Government of Jebel Druze. This organization continued unchanged until 1936, when Latakia and Jebel Druze were formally annexed to Syria; in 1939 they were again given almost complete autonomy, but in 1942 were once more attached to the Syrian State.

The judicial system was complex and not altogether satisfactory. Many although by no means all matters of personal status—for example, marriage and divorce—continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the religious communities. All other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, administering a system of law based partly upon Islamic jurisprudence and partly upon modern European codes. In cases in which only citizens of the Mandated Territories were concerned, the personnel of the courts was almost wholly indigenous. But cases involving citizens of foreign States or their interests were taken before the 'mixed

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courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

8

The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

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of them indeed were better treated than the bulk of the population.) Special regard was paid to their needs and traditions, and opportunities were given for the development of their self-consciousness and self-respect. The effects of generations of inferiority cannot be wholly wiped out in the course of twenty years, but in those years Syria and Lebanon made a certain advance towards individual equality as the democratic countries of the West understand it.

Among the most urgent of the country's social problems is that of the archaic system of land-tenure. No direct assault, it is true, was made on the position of the great semi-feudal landowners. But the first step towards reform was taken by the establishment of a modern system of land-registration and the initiation of a land survey. Also the number of small freeholders was increased by the sale of public domain and the encouragement of the permanent partition of land held communally on the 'musha'' system.[1] In addition something was done to help foreign trade by the extension of harbour and other facilities.

A State system of schools was constructed almost from nothing; it is still very imperfect and not yet able to supply so good an education as is given by the best of the private schools, but at least it includes every grade of school, from primary up to the Syrian University in Damascus, an official institution set up in the early years of French Mandatory rule with the object of providing higher education in Arabic.

The foundations which have been laid are solid, but there is still much to be done before Syria and Lebanon possess even the framework of a modern society. Thus expenditure on public works and social services is still very small; the medical services are inadequate. No adequate census has been taken, although there has been a very elaborate and complete one in the neighbouring territory of Palestine. Labour legislation scarcely exists. Most serious gap of all, only inadequate measures to improve agricultural conditions have so far been adopted. Little provision has been made for agricultural education. Although excellent plans for irrigation have been drawn up, few of them were put into effect until the Allied occupation of 1941. The authorities had done little to provide facilities for agricultural credit, and nothing to encourage the formation of co-operative societies.

[1] See Chapter V.

648 The great failure of French rule was to win the approval
18 and co-operation of the Syrian and the bulk of the Lebanese people. A large part of the population, and especially of the more articulate elements in it, was from the very beginning highly critical of French rule if not irreconcilably opposed to it; and criticism and opposition did not grow less with the passing of time.

To a great extent this attitude was based upon particular grievances, real or imagined. It was complained that France had failed to provide a reasonable standard of administration. The French officials were too often corrupt, avaricious and arbitrary; while the Syrian and Lebanese officials were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of responsibility. In consequence of this, the development of public services, even in spheres far removed from controversy and where the necessity of advance is generally recognized, was unsatisfactory, and Syria and Lebanon fell behind the neighbouring countries in providing amenities of life and opportunities of work.

The French officials, the indictment continues, not only proved themselves inefficient, but adopted a harmful attitude towards those whom they ruled. They did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated the country as if it were a French colony, and the inhabitants as on a level with France's African subjects; and at least in the early part of the Mandatory period they did not hesitate to express their contempt for the Arabs. The use of Sengalese troops first to expel Faisal and then on garrison duty seems to the Syrians and Lebanese to be a sign of this contempt.

It was further alleged that the elementary rights of the individual were denied: there was no freedom of speech, of assembly or of publication; imprisonment without trial was frequent. A particularly widespread complaint was of the activities of the officials of the 'Services Spéciaux', who, it is claimed, far exceeded their duties and often became petty despots in their districts, and even fomented disorder for their own or for France's benefit.

There were also various economic and financial grievances. It was said that the tariff-system did not give adequate protection to local enterprise; and often the extent to which France's hands were tied in this regard by the provisions of

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the Mandate was ignored. The grant of all the more important concessions to French companies was widely resented. The terms of the contracts between the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were criticized as being too favourable to the Banque; and the linking of the currency to the fluctuating franc was resented as introducing into the country a factor of economic instability which might have been avoided. The arrangements by which French military and civil personnel could obtain imported goods duty-free, and the abuses which sprang from it, formed another common grievance. Finally, there was the widely-believed accusation that the French deliberately drained the country of the gold which it possessed in Ottoman times.

The inadequacies of the French administration were resented by almost all in both Syria and Lebanon, whatever their general political views. But there was also a large section of the population which opposes French rule on grounds of principle. The majority of the nationalists always refused to recognize the Mandate, which they regarded as contrary alike to the 'natural right' of nations to independence, to the promises made by the Allies during the first world war, and to the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provides for administrative advice and assistance, but not for semi-colonial rule. Besides opposing the Mandate as such, they resented the way in which it was imposed upon the Syrian people, and still more the way in which it was carried out. Not only was no independent Government established, but no appreciable progress was made towards that end. Only half-hearted attempts were made to set up representative institutions; little was done to create an efficient civil service; what was more important still, the division of the country into a number of States, and the encouragement given to separatism and to the intransigence of the minorities, seriously diminished the possibility of establishing a stable and representative Government. In the light of these facts, the nationalists believed that France never made a sincere attempt to fulfil the obligations imposed upon her by the Mandate in virtue of which she ruled Syria and Lebanon. They believed also that the longer France remained in the Levant, the more she would gradually destroy the possibility of national revival and self-government.

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Underlying all these grievances was resentment at the division of geographical Syria into French and British Mandated Territories: a division which was criticized both on grounds of principle and because of the economic and administrative dislocation which it caused. It is true that France was not wholly to blame for this, but it was an additional reason why the nationalists wished to obtain freedom of action.

10

The ultimate political objectives of Arab nationalists in Syria and Lebanon are the same as those of the nationalists in other parts of Arab Asia: the unity and independence of the Arab people. But in so far as the political fate of Syria and Lebanon has been different from that of the other Arab regions, the immediate objectives of the Arab nationalist movement in the French Mandated Territories have differed from its objectives elsewhere. From 1918 to 1941 these immediate objectives were to bring about a radical change in French policy and to replace Mandatory rule by genuine self-government.

Although Arab nationalists were united in desiring the attainment of these objectives, they differed upon the means by which and the speed with which they hoped to attain them. Some of them did not consider that Syria and Lebanon were yet fit for complete independence, and advocated co-operation with the Mandatory Power, the gradual extension of self-government, the creation of a modern administrative machine and an educated ruling-class and electorate, and thus the achievement of independence by gradual stages. They included some considerable personalities but were never able to organize themselves into an effective political group. Others, who refused to recognize either the Mandate or the administrative partition of the French Mandated Territories, demanded immediate independence and unity.

The adoption of one or other of these attitudes did not necessarily imply friendship or hostility towards France as such. Even among so-called 'extremists' there was a widespread admiration for French culture, and a recognition that without the influence of that culture the Arab literary and political revivals would have been impossible. Those who opposed French policy were not necessarily hostile to France; and those who were Francophil were not necessarily free from

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all distrust of French policy in the Levant. To call the nationalist opposition anti-French or xenophobe would be misleading, although it does contain elements to which those terms could be applied.

Nor would it be correct to regard the 'moderate' and 'extremist' groups as sharply differentiated from one another. They differed not on fundamental questions but on questions of means; they were akin to one another in sympathies, and individuals from the two often worked together. In so far as they were groups at all, they were groups of which the membership was constantly shifting. This was true also of the differences inside the 'extremist' section. There were some who saw no hope of obtaining independence except by the use of force. There were others who hoped to obtain it by the negotiation with France of a treaty similar in its nature and its terms to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which terminated Great Britain's Mandate over Iraq. There might be a few who disapproved of methods of violence on principle, and at the other extreme a few who disapproved of negotiating a treaty which would involve compromise and concession. But the majority would have supported negotiations for a treaty when they seemed likely to be fruitful, and have been willing to resort to violence if that should seem the most hopeful or the only way of attaining their objectives. As Chapters X-XII will show, the history of the years between 1920 and 1941 saw several changes of attitude on the part of the nationalists.

During those years, however, the nationalist movement was always essentially one of opposition. In Iraq, nationalism achieved its first objective, independence, comparatively early, and was brought face to face with practical problems of administration and construction. But in Syria and Lebanon the first objective was not so easily achieved, and in 1941, after more than twenty years of effort, the nationalists were still striving towards self-government, which obsessed them to the exclusion of other aims.[1]

[1] Although the declarations of independence made in 1941 changed the formal nature of French rule in Syria and Lebanon, they did not materially alter the attitude of the population to France. The complaints which were made during the earlier period are still made, and the Syrians and Lebanese are less willing than ever to acquiesce in French predominance. See Chapter XII and Postscript.

X. POLITICAL HISTORY, 1920-1936

1

642 648 THE political organization described in the last chapter remained fundamentally unchanged until 1936. In two out of the four units the years 1920-1936 were on the whole marked by political tranquillity and administrative progress. In Lebanon, constitutional development was more rapid than in the other States. In 1925 the High Commissioner entrusted the Representative Council with the task of drafting a constitution for the State. The constitution was promulgated in May, 1926. It provided for the establishment of normal republican institutions: an elected President, who by convention was always a Christian; a responsible Ministry; an elected Chamber and a nominated Senate, which after a time were combined into a single Chamber, two-thirds elected and one-third nominated. Article 90 reserved the rights and duties of the Mandatory Power, as derived from Article 22 of the Covenant and from the Mandate; while Article 91 stated that where circumstances permitted Lebanon would apply for admission to the League of Nations, and in doing so would have recourse to the good offices of the Mandatory Power.[1] Modified in 1927 and 1929, the Constitution was suspended in 1932 because it had proved too cumbersome and expensive; the administration was carried on directly by the President of the Republic, until in 1934 the High Commissioner issued a decree provisionally re-establishing a small Chamber.

648 Some of the Moslem and other elements in Lebanon were immediately responsive to movements of opinion in the State of Syria and the rest of the Arab world, of which they considered Lebanon to form a part. But to a great extent Lebanese political life developed in its own way; it was dominated by the problems arising from the extension of the 162 frontiers in 1920. Lebanon as it existed before 1914 had 795 contained a large Christian majority; but in the Lebanese Republic established in 1920 Christians formed scarcely more than 50 per cent of the population.[2] Moreover, both Christians and Moslems were subdivided into a number of sects, the largest of which, the Maronite sect, included only 30 per cent

[1] For text of the Constitution, see F. R. and P. Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes* (4th edition, Paris, 1933), Volume V, pp. 706–19.
[2] See Chapter VII.

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of the population. Several of these sects possessed a local predominance in some part of the Republic: the Maronites in the north, the Druzes in the south, the Sunnis in the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli and Saida, and the Shi'is in the Biqa' and the extreme south. The consequences which are likely to flow from such a situation are clear. The political life of the Republic was deeply affected by the struggle for equality or superiority between a number of communities, none of them so strong as to be able to dominate all the rest. Sectarian loyalties and sectarian jealousies thus continued and perhaps strengthened themselves. In addition, the domination of the spiritual leaders over the members of their communities was perpetuated; the Maronite Patriarch in particular wielded an incalculable influence over the political life of the country.

2

The importance of communal differences in Lebanon was recognized by the Mandate. Article 8 stated the necessity of guaranteeing the most complete liberty of conscience and worship; the equal treatment of all inhabitants irrespective of differences of race, religion and language; and the right of communities to maintain their own schools. Article 6 required the Mandatory Power to respect the personal status and religious interests of the different sections of the population. These guarantees were reaffirmed in the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated in 1926, Article 9 of which declared: 'Liberty of conscience is absolute. In rendering homage to the Most High, the State respects all confessions and guarantees and protects the free exercise of them, on condition that no harm is done to public order. It guarantees equally to populations belonging to every rite respect for their personal status and their religious interests.'

These guarantees were respected by the Mandatory Power to a considerable extent. For example, the traditional jurisdictions of the communal courts were maintained in some matters of personal status, although a large proportion of such matters were transferred to the civil courts. An attempt was made in 1936 to define the whole position of the communal jurisdictions. The High Commissioner issued a decree in which the historic communities were given explicit legal recognition. Their statutes were given the force of law, and

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671 the application of them placed under the protection of the law and the control of the public authorities. They were to possess corporate personality, and to be represented in their relations with the public powers by their spiritual heads. Members of the communities would be obliged to conform to the communal statutes in matters of personal status, and to the civil law where the statutes of the communities were silent. Anyone who attained his majority would be at liberty to leave his community and enter a new one; and provision was made for individuals who were not members of any religious community. This decree was opposed by religious authorities, and in 1938 a new one was issued modifying it at certain points; but this also aroused opposition from several sides.

3

641 In the political sphere the relations between the com-
642 munities were defined in the Constitution, which formulated two principles. First, all Lebanese citizens were equal before the law, possessed of the same rights and duties, and equally admissible to all public offices without any distinction (Articles 7 and 12). Secondly, Article 95 laid it down that, at least provisionally, the communities should be equitably represented in public offices and in the Ministry, in so far as that did not detract from the welfare of the State.

642 The whole political organization of the State was permeated by these principles, but by the second more than the first. It has already been mentioned that the President of the Republic was always a Christian, and with the exception of the first President a Maronite. To counter-balance this, the Prime Minister was normally a Sunni Moslem, and the other Ministries were distributed among the different communities as equitably as possible. The Chamber of Deputies was so constituted as to represent the communities roughly in proportion to their numerical strength; every district elected a number of deputies belonging to the different communities living in it, but every deputy was elected not only by his co-religionists but by the whole electorate of the district. The maintenance of the balance between the communities was an important and often the most important consideration in the making of appointments in central and local administration alike.

4

It is doubtful if the system could have worked even as well 649
as it did had it not been for the control and intervention of the Mandatory Power. But this again was a source of trouble. The French authorities were believed to be not altogether impartial in their efforts to hold the balance, and to show excessive favour to the Maronites and other Uniates. Thus the other communities became hostile both to France and to the Maronites. This hostility in its turn cemented the alliance between the two.

The situation just described had the approval of the majority 186
of the Maronites, who chiefly profited by it. Many of the 142
religious and secular notables of the other communities also did not disapprove of the conception of a Lebanon based upon sectarianism, either because they derived advantage from it or else because they could not conceive of any loyalty except that to the religious community. But the more thoughtful members of both the Maronite and the other sects, and especially the younger of them, saw the need for the creation of some sort of corporate consciousness or sense of solidarity. In the Sanjaq of the years before 1914 this had to some extent existed ; it had been based upon a common way of life and a common tradition of autonomy which all alike had valued. In the new Republic this was lacking and would have to be created. On the question of what form it should take, different opinions were held, corresponding in the main to the different conceptions of Lebanon expounded in Chapter VII. Those who regarded Lebanon as an asylum for religious minorities, together with those who regarded the Lebanese as a distinct people, wished to create a specific Lebanese nationalist spirit transcending communal differences ; and they wanted the enlarged Lebanon to be an independent state, protected by or in alliance with a European Power who would take an interest in it which was other than purely political. Those who looked upon Lebanon as a point from which Christian and Western influences could radiate throughout the Arab East, wished to encourage the consciousness of Lebanon as both a distinctive unity and part of a larger unity ; or them, Lebanese autonomism and Arab or Syrian nationalism were not opposed to each other but complementary, and they desired to see Lebanon, with or without the restoration of its

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18 older more restricted frontiers, a self-governing member of a
642 Syrian or an Arab federation. Those who considered Lebanon as simply one Arab province among others wished to stimulate Arab nationalist sentiments among its inhabitants and advocated its integral incorporation in a Syrian or Arab State, with only such administrative privileges as its distinctive history made necessary.

This last conception was particularly strong among the Sunni Moslems of the coast towns, most of whom clamoured either for the inclusion of Lebanon in Syria or at least for its reduction to the frontiers it had possessed before 1914. Some of them desired this because as Moslems they resented living in a State which had a mainly Christian atmosphere; others because they were totally opposed to the Lebanese particularist idea. Yet others, while conceding the claims of the Christians, Druzes and Shi'is to special treatment, did not agree that the coastal towns had any part in the natural or historical unity of Lebanon. This sentiment was strongest in Tripoli, with an almost wholly Moslem population. It was shared by the greater part of the Arab nationalists in the State of Syria. They were willing to accept a certain carefully defined autonomy for the historic Lebanon, provided its rulers would co-operate with the Syrians in matters of common interest. They bitterly resented, however, the inclusion in Lebanon of the coastal towns, especially of Tripoli, partly on grounds of principle because they interpreted it as a move in the supposed French game of dividing and weakening the Arabs, and partly because they did not like to see Tripoli and Beirut, two of the natural ports of Damascus, in any hands except their own.

665 For the most part these differences of opinion did not embody themselves in organized parties. The parties which dominated elections and the life of the Chamber were scarcely more than loose alliances of prominent politicians, based upon common personal interest rather than common doctrine. They were usually so organized as to include representatives of all the leading sects. The most important of them were the 'Unionist' group led by Emile Edde, and the 'Constitutionalists', of whom the leading member was Bishara al-Khuri. The main division between these two groups was the personal rivalry of their leaders; but on the whole the former was more intransigent in its belief in Lebanese

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1 Lebanon MB1

independence, and less disposed to establish close relations with Syria and other Arab countries than the latter.[1]

5

The State of the Alawis also remained tranquil, once the rising of 1919-1921 had been suppressed. The effort of the Mandatory authorities was directed mainly to encouraging the communal consciousness of the inhabitants (often by playing on their fears); and to raising their material and intellectual level through such measures as the creation of educational and medical services and the giving of assistance to agriculture. In these tasks they had considerable success; socially and economically the district progressed. Further, a greater degree of equality than had previously existed was established between the Alawis, Sunnis and Christians. The administration was mainly in French hands, although there was a Representative Council and efforts were made to increase the share of the inhabitants in the government, as trained and suitable administrators became available. In 1930 an Organic Law was promulgated defining the nature and activities of the political institutions of the State, whose name was then changed to 'the Government of Latakia'.

The Alawis and many of the Christians were content to have no direct connection with the State of Syria, and among the former there developed a more conscious particularist spirit than they had previously possessed. But the Sunnis, here as in Lebanon, disapproved of a situation in which from being the dominant class they became a minority, and accused the Mandatory Power of neglecting their interests in favour of those of the Alawis; they, and all those who held Arab nationalist views, saw clearly the dangers in France's policy of encouraging the separatism of the Alawis and teaching them to rely on foreign support. They demanded the reincorporation of the region in the State of Syria, and their demand was supported by the Sunnis and Arab nationalists in Syria.

6

The history of the other two States was not so tranquil. Alike in Syria and Jebel Druze unrest and discontent appeared in the early years of the Mandate, and issued finally in the revolt of 1925-1926.

[1] For recent changes in Lebanese feeling, see Postscript.

648 In the State of Syria the disquiet may be traced back to
669 that opposition to the general policy of the Mandatory Power
668 which has been analyzed in Chapter IX. The opposition was strengthened by the many administrative and economic grievances which have also been dealt with. It found expression in a number of local disturbances and risings at the very beginning of the French occupation, the most notable of them the revolt of Ibrahim Hananu in North Syria and the rising in the Hauran. As time went on the restlessness was increased still further by the instability of French policy: the appointment and recall of a number of High Commissioners; the consequent changes in the higher personnel of the mandatory administration; the creation and then the dissolution of a Federation. These were further causes of disquiet: the repercussion in Syria of the growing hostility of the Palestinian Arabs to Zionism and to British policy, and the activities of Syrian emigrants, particularly of the Syro-Palestinian Committees in Cairo and in Geneva. Of the group in Geneva the leading spirit was the Amir Shakib Arslan, a distinguished writer and publicist, by origin a Lebanese Druze, who had given all his life to the spread first of Pan-Islamic and then of Pan-Arab ideas.

668 All these factors contributed to create a strong opposition
[665] to French rule; it was led and organized by the 'People's
648 Party', which grew rapidly in the years prior to the revolt. The nationalist opposition was to some extent concerned with general Arab problems: the independence and union of the whole Arab world. In local matters, its main purposes were two. First, it advocated the union of the French Mandated Territories. Jebel Druze and the Alawi region, it was claimed, should be wholly incorporated in the State of Syria; Lebanon was to be at most autonomous within a Syrian or Arab State, and was to be shorn of the territories assigned to it in 1920. Secondly, Syria should be given genuine self-government immediately, and complete independence as soon as possible. This would involve on the one hand the relaxation of French control over the administration; on the other a rigid definition of the points at which and the period for which French armed forces could be maintained in Syria, and ultimately their complete withdrawal. It was around these two points that Franco-Syrian relations revolved throughout the period of the Mandate.

7

In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more sud- 648
denly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power 631
so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the 621
agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was 563
established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller landowners against the great families of the Jebel; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables 648
elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He 668
initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

8

In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash. 000

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

609 In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash.

In August they defeated a large French force which had been sent against them. In September they were joined by a number of Damascene nationalists of whom Dr. Shahbandar was the most conspicuous, and who proclaimed a general Syrian rebellion and the formation of a national Government. The rising now spread beyond Jebel Druze to several parts of Syria. The insurgents secured a foothold in Damascus; and in October General Sarrail ordered the bombardment of the city. Parts of it were laid in ruins, and many people were killed. This incident led to the recall of Sarrail, but did not quell the revolt, which spread in November to the Druze portions of Lebanon. Only the French defence of Rashaya prevented the insurgents from dominating a large part of southern Lebanon and even threatening Beirut.

By the end of 1925 the conflict had reached its greatest extension. It covered Jebel Druze, the district of Damascus, part of the district of Homs and part of southern Lebanon; apart from the activities of guerilla bands, it never spread to northern Syria. But in the early months of 1926 the power of the insurgents began to wane. The French forces, which had been considerably strengthened, re-occupied most of the discontented parts of Lebanon, while in the interior the war tended to become a guerilla conflict between the insurgents and the Circassian and Armenian auxiliary forces raised by the French authorities. After an attempt to come to terms with the leaders of the rising had failed, a French army attacked the centre of the revolt in Jebel Druze and captured Suwaida, the capital, in April. In May an attempt was made to clear Damascus of the rebels; for the second time the city was bombarded and great damage was done. By July the pacification of the region of Damascus was complete; and from August onwards the last strongholds of insurrection in Jebel Druze and the districts of Lebanon at the foot of Mount Hermon were gradually reduced. By the end of 1926 the revolt was virtually over, except for scattered bands in remote parts. Even these were finally dispersed in 1927. The more intransigent of the insurgents went into exile, the largest group of these being Druzes who crossed with Sultan al-Atrash into Transjordan. But most of them made their submission; and in February, 1928, a general amnesty was proclaimed, excluding however a number of leaders.

9

The insurrection had many consequences in the Jebel. It prevented any further attempts to interfere with the customs and social structure of the Jebel. Its administration was placed under stricter French control, but its separation from the State of Syria was maintained. The administrative system was formalized by an Organic Law issued in 1930. Under this Law, the region was to be administered by a Governor, appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner, and possessed of considerable legislative and financial as well as executive powers. In practice he was always a Frenchman. He was to be assisted by a Council of Government, composed partly of heads of administrative departments and partly of appointed members chosen from among the notables. All important acts of the Government would require the approval of the High Commissioner, who was also to exercise such sovereign powers as did not belong to the local Government.[1]

The administration of the Jebel followed a policy the effect of which, whether deliberate or not, was to drive a wedge between the Druzes and the Arab nationalists, whose temporary alliance had given the revolt of 1925 its strength. The separatist spirit so deeply grounded in Druze tradition was encouraged, and there was grafted on to it among a certain section a feeling of dependence upon France. There remained, however, another section who wished for union with Syria.

10

In the State of Syria, the process of pacification was accompanied by one of political change, with the aim of improving the state of feeling and removing some of the grievances of the nationalists: grievances which had been partly endorsed by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its special session to investigate the revolt, held at Rome in February-March, 1926. The change was initiated by M. Henri de Jouvenel, who replaced General Sarrail in November, 1925. He took the first steps which were designed to lead ultimately to self-government. In Lebanon he allowed the Representative Council to draft a Constitution for the State; in the State of the Alawis he held elections for a Constituent Council to draft an Organic Law; and in the State of Syria he ordered elections for

[1] For text, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 694–7.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

similar Councils to be held in all parts of the country not under martial law. In spite of a boycott by the nationalists, the Syrian elections were held, but the Representative Councils which resulted from them proved ineffective.

The next step was to form a Government which should be more acceptable to public opinion than that which had been presided over by Subhi Barakat since the creation of the Syrian State, and which resigned in December, 1925. The Presidency of the State was offered to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, the son of one of the most respected religious leaders in Damascus. He laid down certain conditions of his taking office. The High Commissioner could not, however, accept them, and after some delay appointed as provisional President Damad Ahmad Nami, a Circassian by origin. He formed a Ministry which for a short time included members of the 'People's Party'; its programme envisaged the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty and the attainment of Syrian unity by negotiation with the other States included in the French Mandate.

II

In June, 1926, M. de Jouvenel declared to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the French Government intended to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Next month he resigned and was succeeded by M. Ponsot. The new High Commissioner took the first step towards the establishment of the self-government which had been foreseen by his predecessor, by preparing for the elaboration of an Organic Law. A beginning had indeed already been made with this: M. de Jouvenel had consulted various notables on the form which the future political organization of the country should take.

In July, 1927, M. Ponsot made a declaration in which he explicitly identified himself with the policy approved by the French Government and the League of Nations and defined by his predecessors. Regard for the wishes of the people concerned had, he maintained, been the idea which had throughout inspired French policy. In accordance with this idea, the framing of the definitive constitution of the countries under French Mandate was to be the work of those peoples. The Mandatory Power would exert itself to bring about a general agreement and to arbitrate in any differences which

might arise; in default of an agreement, it would take appropriate measures to maintain order and to guarantee peace. The Mandatory Power desired to favour and hasten the political evolution of the States under its protection, and to promote their economic development. As for the 'Common Interests', the High Commissioner would continue to administer them with the active and ever-increasing assistance of the representatives of the States.[1]

A few months later, in February, 1928, M. Ponsot judged that the time had come for the election of a Constituent Assembly. In that month the state of siege declared at the beginning of the revolt was finally raised, the censorship suppressed, the special tribunals established during the revolt abolished, and a general amnesty issued. At the same time Damad Ahmad Nami's Ministry was replaced by a new provisional Government of 'moderate' politicians presided over by Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, with the task of preparing the way for the creation of regular institutions to which it could hand over its functions.

The elections were held in April of the same year. In the towns, most of those elected belonged to the more uncompromising section of the nationalists, the opponents of Shaikh Taj ad-Din's Ministry; in the countryside, however, they were mainly moderates. Of the seventy members of the Assembly, over two-thirds supported the Government, but owing to their lack of cohesion and the decision of the Government not to intervene in the proceedings, it was the so-called 'extreme' nationalists who dominated the discussions. They were the more powerful in that they had recovered from the confusion caused by the collapse of the revolt, and had succeeded once more in organizing themselves in a party, the 'National Bloc'. In so far as it had a founder he was Ibrahim Hananu, an Aleppine and a man respected even by his opponents. The Bloc was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It included leading members of important landowning families, like Jamil Mardam Bey from Damascus, Saadullah al-Jabiri from Aleppo, and Hashim al-Atasi, the President of the Bloc. It included also individuals important rather for character and intellect than for representing large sections of opinion, like Faris al-Khuri, a Protestant lawyer, law-teacher and financier. It

[1] For text, see *Orient Moderne*, September, 1927, pp. 409-11.

665 was supported by several groups which preserved something of their individuality inside the alliance. The most important of them was the 'Istiqeal' group, descended from one of the secret societies of the years before 1914. It advocated the complete independence of the Arab countries and tended to be more uncompromising than the other constituent elements of the Bloc. Its leader was Shukri al-Quwatli. Among its other prominent members were Nabih al-Azmah, the Amir Adil Arslan, and Riyadh as-Sulh, perhaps the most important Arab nationalist leader in Lebanon.

646 One of the most prominent of the members of the Bloc,
642 Hashim al-Atasi, was elected President of the Assembly when it met in Damascus in June, 1928; while Ibrahim Hananu became President of the Commission set up to draft the Constitution. The Commission completed its work by August,
642 and laid its draft before the Assembly. The Constitution which it had drawn up was modelled on those of Western democratic countries, and provided for the exercise of legislative powers by a single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, and of executive powers by an elected President and a responsible Ministry. In addition it contained guarantees for the rights of individuals and communities. Thus Article 6 stipulated that all Syrians should be equal before the law, and there should be no inequality of treatment on grounds of religion, sect, race or language. Article 15 guaranteed liberty of conscience, the free exercise of all forms of worship, and the safeguarding of the religious interests and personal status of every sect. Article 28 guaranteed the rights of the religious communities, including their right to establish schools, teaching in their own language, subject to the principles laid down by law; and Article 37 declared that the electoral law to be issued subsequently would provide for the representation of religious minorities. (This provision was carried out. Each Parliament elected since 1930 has contained a number of representatives of the minorities, roughly proportionate to their size.)

648 In general the draft was acceptable to the High Com-
642 missioner, but there were certain articles to the inclusion of which he objected. Thus Article 2 declared that the Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity, which was unaffected by the divisions which had arisen between the end of the war and the

present time. This was a denial of the separate existence of Jebel Druze, the Alawi district, the Lebanese Republic, Palestine and Transjordan; and M. Ponsot judged it to be irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law. Again, four other Articles asserted the right of the President of the Republic to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad and proclaim martial law (73, 74, 75 and 112); and Article 110 declared that the organization of the army would form the subject of a special law. These five Articles also the High Commissioner thought to be incompatible with the obligations of France. He therefore asked that the Articles concerned should be separated from the general body of the draft. The Assembly refused, and M. Ponsot thereupon adjourned it for three months in August, 1928, and for a further three in November. He made an alternative suggestion, that the Assembly should modify the wording of Article 2 and should retain the other offending articles but add to the draft a general reservation safeguarding France's international obligations. This also proved abortive, since he and the Assembly could not agree upon a text for the reservation.

In February, 1929, the work of the Assembly was prorogued *sine die*. During this period and throughout 1929 the split between the National Bloc and 'moderates' grew ever wider. The former, while remaining tranquil, demanded the negotiation of a Treaty to replace the Mandate; the latter continued to advocate a policy of co-operation with France, and attempted without much success to form an effective political organization. The High Commissioner found it impossible to reach an agreement with the nationalists on the constitutional question, while the 'moderates' were too weak and divided for their support to be of value to him; he therefore felt himself bound to give up the attempt to entrust to the Syrian people the responsibility for the elaboration of their own constitution. Accordingly he dissolved the Constituent Assembly in May, 1930, and on his own initiative issued a Constitution for the State of Syria. It was to come into force after the election of the members of a Chamber of Deputies, at a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner.

This Constitution was virtually the same as that drafted by the Assembly, except for such changes as were necessary to

642 enable the Mandatory Power to carry out its obligations
648 under the Covenant. Thus Article 2 was modified, and stated merely that 'Syria forms an indivisible political unity'; and an additional article (116) was added to the effect that 'the provisions of the present Constitution are not, and cannot be, in opposition to the obligations undertaken by France in regard to Syria, particularly obligations towards the League of Nations. . . . So long as the international obligations of France in regard to Syria remain in force, any provisions of the present Constitution which are of a nature to affect those obligations will be applicable only under conditions to be determined by agreement between the French and Syrian Governments'.

Simultaneously a number of other decrees were promulgated. In addition to the Organic Laws for the Governments of Latakia and Jebel Druze, already mentioned, they included laws for the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and for a Conference of Common Interests composed of Delegations from the States and Governments, and charged with the management of their common financial and economic affairs.[1]

12

646 The elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in January, 1932, and the Chamber met in June. More than three-quarters of its members were 'moderates'. Only a quarter were 'extreme' nationalists demanding full and immediate independence; but as had happened in the Constituent Assembly, the minority soon showed itself to be the dominant element. Its hopes were raised and its case strengthened by the recent conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the termination of the Mandate and the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations (1930-1932).

643 The first task of the Chamber was to choose the President
645 of the Republic. It elected Muhammad Ali al-Abid, son of
648 Izzat Pasha al-Abid who had been secretary to the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. He entrusted the construction of a Cabinet to a prominent moderate, Haqqi al-Azm, who formed a Ministry of which half the members were 'moderates' and half 'extreme' nationalists. Negotiations were opened between the Ministry and the High Commissioner for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

[1] For texts of these documents, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 676–98.

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The negotiations had not gone far before it became clear that there existed divergences of views between the High Commissioner and the nationalists. The latter claimed that the Treaty should provide for the inclusion in Syria of the Governments of Jebel Druze and Latakia; while the High Commissioner asserted that, although there was no question of granting those regions independence, they were still in need of a special régime, and had not yet reached the stage of development at which it would be possible to come to a final decision upon their political destiny. A large proportion of the inhabitants of the two Governments supported the High Commissioner's contention and opposed their incorporation in Syria. Further, there was disagreement whether, as the French authorities demanded, the Treaty should impose no restrictions upon the occupation of Syria by French forces, or whether, as the nationalists desired, the occupation should be limited in space and time. There were also differences of opinion upon the questions of Syro-Lebanese relations and the retention of French control over the administration of the Common Interests. Deadlock having been reached on these issues, the nationalist ministers resigned in April, 1933, and their places were taken by 'moderates'. The reconstructed Government carried to a conclusion the negotiations for the Treaty, which was signed in November of the same year by the Ministry and by the Comte de Martel, who had succeeded M. Ponsot as High Commissioner. The Treaty declared that France and Syria agreed, once the Mandate should be terminated, to consult one another on foreign policy whenever necessary; to collaborate in the peaceful settlement of any quarrel between Syria and a third state and, if need be, in defensive measures. The French Government undertook to maintain forces in Syria; to help in the organization and equipment of the Syrian army and police; to lend such technical advisers and civil servants as might be required; and to facilitate the admission of Syria to the League of Nations. The Syrian Government undertook to guarantee the rights accorded to individuals and communities in the Syrian Constitution, and to respect the rights of racial and religious minorities. The two States further agreed to maintain the economic unity of the Mandated Territory. The Treaty was to be concluded for twenty-five years, the transfer of authority

648 from the Mandatory Power to the Syrian Government being completed within four years.[1]

648 The Treaty was immediately laid before the Chamber. Its
646 reception by the nationalists inside and outside the Chamber was so unfavourable as to make it clear that it had no chance of acceptance. Accordingly the High Commissioner suspended the sittings of the Chamber, withdrew from its cognizance the terms of the Treaty, and authorized the President of the Republic to govern provisionally by means of decree-laws. A year later, in November, 1934, he suspended the Chamber *sine die*. These acts aroused the resentment and indignation of the nationalists, but in general the country remained quiet, apart from local and ephemeral disturbances, throughout 1934 and 1935. In March, 1934, the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, which continued in office for practically two years.

13

665 Perhaps the most important development of the early 1930's
186 was the growth of a number of political parties with a special appeal to the educated youth of the towns, and therefore of great significance in a country whose political circumstances gave peculiar weight to the actions of the young. Very different from one another in their doctrines and their aims, these parties were alike in that they endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older parties had not for the most part possessed; alike, too, in that they tried to base their activities not upon gusts of feeling or some immediate objective, but upon systematic and reasoned doctrines. They expressed and attempted to direct the spirit of the youth of Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and the other towns: a restless youth, discontented both with its foreign masters and with its own older generation, conscious of talents and ideas and cramped by lack of opportunity, drawn simultaneously towards and away from the West, eager and suspicious, hasty and thoughtful. Even when the youth-movements took a paramilitary form, that does not necessarily mean that they were Fascist; they were merely endeavouring to satisfy certain human needs which in more fortunate

[1] For text, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1933* (Paris, 1934), pp. 189–95.

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countries are satisfied by days of national celebration, by military service and voluntary organizations. 665 186

One of these organizations was the 'Syrian National Party', founded by Antun Saadeh, a Lebanese Christian brought up in South America. This Party professed or rather formulated the specific Syrian as distinct from Arab nationalism which has already been mentioned.[1] At first a secret society, it was discovered by the authorities in 1935, and its leading members imprisoned. From that time it grew in size and importance, in spite of the many obstacles in its path. These obstacles were of various types: the hostility of the authorities, who more than once dissolved the party; the opposition of the Arab nationalists, who regarded it as a separatist movement; and the widespread belief that the party was in too close touch with European Fascism. That it was able to hold its own was also due to several factors. First, it made a more determined effort than any other organization to think out the whole national problem in all its aspects, and to formulate a programme in the light of clear and valid political principles. Again, it was rigidly organized on the membership principle, with a hierarchy, a logical division of functions and a strict discipline. Finally, its leader was a man of courage, decision and powerful intellect. 665

The party reached its zenith a year or two before the beginning of the war. It had several thousand adherents, largely but not exclusively Lebanese Christians. With the departure of the leader for South America in 1938 a decline set in, but whether temporary or permanent has still to be seen.

Simultaneously there grew up a number of Arab nationalist youth organizations. The most influential of them was the League of National Action, which tried to weld into a unity the youth of all the Arab countries. Its form was that of a federation of local societies. It stood for the independence and union of the Arab world, and was not prepared to accept any agreement with the Western Powers unless they should completely renounce their imperialist designs. Its programme was formulated at a conference held in Lebanon in 1933, and for some years after that it flourished in the Syrian towns, But it was never important in the other Arab countries, and even in Syria it suffered an irreparable blow by the death of

[1] See Chapter VI.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1 Lebanon 1951

S 665 its first President and most important member, Abdur-Razzaq ad-Dandashi.

One of the principles of the League was to hold itself aloof from established Governments and leaders. In this it differed from the Nationalist Youth. An offshoot of the National Bloc, with a paramilitary organization, the Nationalist Youth rose to prominence in 1935 and 1936. Its doctrines were not greatly different from those of the League, but the two groups wasted much of their strength in conflict with one another.

L 665 In addition to the Syrian and Arab nationalist groups, there arose a Lebanese nationalist party, the 'Phalanges Libanaises'. It was not strictly a political organization, and indeed tried to remain independent of Governments and politicians. Its purpose was to arouse among all sections of Lebanese youth a consciousness of the separate existence and destiny of Lebanon, and of their duty to it; and to give them the discipline and opportunities of service without which they could not fulfil that duty. Although in principle open to members of all religious communities, in practice the majority of its adherents, like its leader, Pierre Jumayyil, were Maronites educated by the Jesuits. Its main rival in Lebanon was a Moslem organization with Pan-Arab doctrines, the 'Najjadah'.

S L 665 Finally, there was the Communist Party, which continued to work steadily and unobtrusively among the young intellectuals and the few groups of organized and class-conscious urban workers. Small in numbers, it had several able leaders and exercised a certain influence through its newspaper and its other publications.

XI. THE TREATIES, 1936-1939

I

AT the end of 1935 nationalist feeling in Syria came once more to a head. This was due not so much to internal events as to the general unrest in the Eastern Mediterranean, arising out of the Italo-Abyssinian War; this unrest appeared also in Palestine and in Egypt, where it led to the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, a measure which stimulated the demand for the conclusion of a similar treaty between Syria and France. The immediate occasion of the outburst was the death at the end of 1935 of Ibrahim Hananu, the leader of the National Bloc. At his funeral, incendiary speeches were made; and in the first days of 1936 a general strike broke out in Damascus in protest against the failure of the French Government to grant Syria her independence. The strike spread rapidly to the other towns, and soon took on an organized character. It was directed by the National Bloc, which issued a 'National Pact', demanding independence, equality of rights between members of all sects, national unity and co-operation with nationalist movements in other Arab countries, and the raising of social, economic, moral and cultural standards among all classes, as well as the abandonment of the policy of the Balfour Declaration in Palestine.

At first the High Commissioner attempted to break the strike by measures of repression; for example, several of the leaders of the disturbances were arrested. But gradually he took up a more conciliatory attitude. In February he replaced Shaikh Taj ad-Din as Prime Minister by Ata al-Ayyubi, a moderate politician who was more acceptable than his predecessor to the nationalists. At the beginning of March he took a further step, by making a provisional agreement with the nationalists: a Syrian delegation was to go to Paris in order to conduct negotiations with the French Government for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

The delegation reached Paris at the end of March. It was composed of six members, four of them, including the President, drawn from the National Bloc, and two of them from the Ayyubi Ministry. At first its negotiations with the French Government did not proceed smoothly, since they came up against the same obstacles as had proved fatal to the Treaty of 1933: first, the question of the inclusion of Jebel Druze

and Latakia in the Syrian State, and secondly that of the degree of control which France should retain. The doubts of the French Government upon the first point were increased by the uneasiness of a large section of the Alawis and Druzes at the prospect of being incorporated in Syria.

In June the situation was changed by the accession to power in France of the first Popular Front Government. MM. Yvon Delbos and Pierre Viénot, respectively Minister and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were more friendly to Syrian aspirations than their predecessors had been. The negotiations were resumed on a new basis and it was not long before agreement was reached. On September 9th, the Franco-Syrian Treaty was initialled.

The news of the initialling of the Treaty had repercussions in Lebanon, where the Maronites and other supporters of Lebanese independence demanded the negotiation of a similar treaty with France, both as a sign of equality with Syria and as an additional guarantee that the placing of relations between France and Syria on a new and more friendly basis would not involve any change in the status of the Lebanese Republic. The French Government was immediately responsive to this demand. Negotiations were opened in Beirut between the High Commissioner and a Lebanese delegation representative of all important elements in the population and headed by Emile Edde, who had been elected President of the Republic at the beginning of 1936. The negotiations met with no serious obstacle, and in November a Franco-Lebanese Treaty was initialled; it was approved by the Lebanese Chamber in the same month.

2

The preamble of the Franco-Syrian Treaty recited the progress towards independent nationhood made by Syria, and the agreement of the two Governments to fulfil the requisite conditions for the admission of Syria into the League of Nations. The Governments had decided to conclude a Treaty of friendship and alliance in order to define the relations which would exist between the two States after the cessation of the Mandate, and to settle, through agreements which would form an integral part of the Treaty, the method of executing it.

The text of the Treaty provided for peace, friendship and

alliance between France and Syria (Article 1). The two 648 Governments were to consult one another in all matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests, and to adopt towards foreign Powers an attitude consistent with their alliance (2). They agreed to take steps to ensure, when the Mandate should cease, the transfer to the Syrian Government of the rights and obligations resulting from agreements concluded by the French Government in the name of Syria (3). The two countries would act together to settle peacefully any difference between either of them and a third state; and if either found itself involved in a conflict, the other would immediately come to its aid. The Syrian Government would give the French Government all requisite assistance and facilities, including the use of communications (4). The Syrian Government was to be responsible for maintaining order and defending its territory and would ensure the permanent maintenance and protection of French air-routes crossing Syrian territory (5).

The Treaty was to last for twenty-five years, with the possibility of renewal should the parties so desire; to be ratified as soon as possible and communicated to the League of Nations; and to enter into force when Syria should be admitted to the League of Nations (6-7). On the Treaty's entry into force, the Syrian Government was to take over from the French all responsibilities and obligations arising out of international decisions or acts of the League (8).

A number of subsidiary agreements and letters defined the military position of France, also her rights and interests, and the relations of the Syrian Government towards Lebanon, the Druzes and Alawis and the minorities in general. The military convention provided for the formation of a Syrian army with the help of a French military mission and with equipment on the French model. It stipulated in addition that two sites for air bases should be put at the disposal of France for the duration of the alliance; until they should be ready she should be accorded the use of the existing airfields near Damascus and Aleppo. Moreover, for five years from the coming into force of the Treaty, France was to maintain troops in the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, but this was not to be regarded as constituting an occupation. The Syrian Government was to give all facilities required

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648 by the French forces; and to permit the use of Syrian waters and ports by French vessels.

Exchanges of letters laid it down that Syria would normally recruit foreign advisers and officials from France; that the French Government would protect Syrian nationals and interests in places where the Syrian Government was not directly represented; that the representative of France was to have the rank of Ambassador and to take precedence over representatives of other powers; that the Syrian Government would respect the rights acquired in the name of or for Syria by French real and corporate persons; and that the existing monetary parity between the two countries would be maintained (Exchanges of letters Nos. 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9). Furthermore, the French Government waived its right to demand repayment of the military and civil expenses of the Mandate (11).

In another exchange of letters the Syrian Government undertook to maintain the existing régime in regard to foreign institutions (7); while a protocol provided for the establishment of a judicial régime which should protect foreign interests and at the same time take into account the progress made by the Syrian Government in judicial organization.

A safeguard for the scattered minorities was contained in Exchange No. 5, in which the Syrian Government undertook to carry out the guarantees for individuals and communities laid down in the Constitution. As for the compact Druze and Alawi minorities, their districts were to be annexed to the Syrian State, but to be granted a special administrative and financial régime (6). The maintenance of French troops in those districts would also in fact constitute another guarantee for them.

The Treaty contained no formal recognition by the Syrian Government of the separate existence of the Lebanese Republic, but such recognition was implied by a protocol which declared the readiness of the Syrian Government to enter into negotiations with Lebanon for the regulation of all outstanding questions; the French Government would transfer the administration of the Common Interests either to whatever new organization the two Governments decided to establish, or, if they decide not to set up such a common organization, to the Governments themselves.

The Treaty and its attached documents, as has already been

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mentioned, were to enter into force when Syria should be admitted to the League of Nations. But there was a long process to be accomplished before that should happen. First the Treaty must be signed by whatever Government issued from the elections shortly to be held in Syria. Then it would need to be ratified by the French and Syrian Parliaments. After ratification would come a transitional period of three years, during which the machinery of an independent State would gradually be constructed. Only when that period had ended would Syria apply for admission to the League of Nations.[1]

The Lebanese Treaty was in principle similar to the Syrian. The only important differences were that it was to be renewed by tacit consent at the end of twenty-five years; that the military convention placed no limits upon the employment of French forces; that the exchanges of letters contained explicit guarantees for equality of civil and political rights between all nationals, and for the equitable representation of the different sections of the population in the Government service; and that the Lebanese Government undertook to carry out a programme of administrative and fiscal reform.[2]

The signature of the Treaty was received with approval by a certain body of opinion in France. The view of the parties forming the Popular Front was expressed by M. Pierre Viénot, who had played a leading part in the negotiations. In a speech made at the ceremony of signing the Treaty, he stated that the new alliance between France and Syria did not represent a fundamental change in policy so much as a new form which the traditional relations between the two countries had taken. The Treaty defined the international position of Syria, and at the same time ensured the maintenance of France's collaboration in the economic and cultural life of the Syrian people. In another statement on the same day, he declared that while the Treaty was modelled on that between Great Britain and Iraq, in one respect France had learned by Britain's mistakes, and had provided for the protection of the minorities.

Nor was approval confined to the Left Wing. *Le Temps*, for example, in a leading article published on September 8th, declared that by the conclusion of the Treaty France had fulfilled her whole duty as Mandatory Power. The solution

[1] For the text of the Treaty, see Appendix A2.
[2] See Appendix A3.

L 648 of the minority problem contained in it was satisfactory. 6 648 When the Treaty was ratified, it would firmly establish on a contractual basis a French influence which the too-long maintenance of an authoritarian régime might in the long run compromise.

3

L 648 In Lebanon the signature of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty 668 was welcomed by the Maronites and some other sections of the population. The Sunnis, however, regarded it as a blow to their aim of reunion with Syria; their anger found expression in communal clashes in Beirut and elsewhere at the end of 1936. In spite of their opposition, however, steps were immediately taken to carry out the policy of the Treaty L [645] by re-establishing self-governing institutions. The Constitution of 1926 was restored in January, 1937; the Chamber met, and Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, a Sunni, formed a Ministry. But it soon became apparent that the signature of the Treaty and the revival of constitutional forms had not affected the essential nature of Lebanese political life, which continued to be dominated by sectarian issues.

L A new electoral law was passed in 1937, replacing the 666 existing Chamber by a new and larger one, two-thirds elected 646 on a sectarian basis and one-third nominated. The elections 645 of November, 1937, were marked by corruption on an extensive scale; and the Chamber which resulted from them, and which remained in being until 1939, was remarkable only for the bitterness and complexity of its internal dissensions. The Ministries of the Amir Khalid Shihab and Abdullah al-Yafi succeeded those of Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, and none of them had any notable legislative or other advance to show.

L The consequence of this was a general loss of interest and 642 faith in the constitutional system as it existed in Lebanon. It was not simply that the established leaders and the parliamentary parties, the Unionists, Constitutionalists and so on, ceased to possess even so limited a hold over public opinion as they had perhaps had; more than that, Lebanese began to ask themselves what purpose was served by the existence of a costly Parliament, filled with landowners and lawyers, wasting its time in internecine quarrels and showing no effective interest in the country's welfare. Had not Lebanon been better ruled under the simple system which had existed

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before 1914; and was it not ridiculous, as well as expensive, L 642
for so small a region to have so grandiose and complex a constitution?

As a further consequence, the movement of discontent with L 642
sectarianism was greatly strengthened, and many Lebanese, 666
especially among the young, began to look for an alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges Libanaises', the party of Lebanese nationalism, received much support. So too did the 'Syrian National Party', with its doctrine of the total separation of Church and State; while the Arab Nationalists pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself.

4

In Syria, the first steps towards the execution of the Treaty S 666
were taken immediately after the return of the Syrian delega- 646
tion from Paris. Arrangements were made for the holding of 645
Parliamentary elections; the Chamber was to consist of 86 members, 16 of them representing the religious minorities and 7 the Beduin tribes. The elections, which took place in November, 1936, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the candidates of the National Bloc; and when the Chamber met, on December 21st, its first important act was to choose Faris al-Khuri as its President, and its second to accept the resignation of Muhammad Ali al-Abid from the Presidency of the Republic and to elect Hashim al-Atasi in his place. The Ayyubi Ministry having resigned, the President entrusted the formation of a new one to Jamil Mardam Bey. All the members of his Ministry were drawn from the National Bloc. S

This Ministry found no difficulty in securing the confidence 648
of the Chamber, which unanimously approved the Treaty in December, 1936. It was formally signed by the High Commissioner and the members of the Ministry on December 22nd. S

In the same month, after consultations with notables of the 631
districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, their annexation to the Syrian State was proclaimed. This proclamation was accompanied by special Statutes granting a measure of administrative autonomy to the two regions. Despite protests from separatist groups against the concept of a unitary Syria, the régime envisaged in these Statutes was inaugurated by the appointment in January, 1937, of two prominent members of the

631 National Bloc, Mazhar Raslan as Governor of Latakia and Nasib al-Bakri as Governor of Jebel Druze.

648 Although the Treaty had not yet been ratified by the French
642 Parliament, it was agreed that the transitional period should be regarded as starting on January 1st, 1937. A beginning was made with the transfer to the Syrian Government of functions hitherto exercised by the French authorities. The Government was given the right freely to prepare and carry out its budget, and a certain control over the police; in principle the High Commissioner ceased to exercise his right to veto legislation, and the 'conseillers' to control ministerial acts. But the Mandatory Power still retained the conduct of foreign relations, the ultimate responsibility for public order and certain administrative services such as the supervision of the Beduin tribes.

665 These events seemed to show that the policy of the Bloc was
186 successful. It was still united; it had an overwhelming majority in the Chamber; its adherents filled the offices of the Government; it commanded a large measure of support in the country, especially among the younger generation.

Opposition to the Bloc existed, but it was so far largely inarticulate and undirected. It consisted of a handful of Deputies; of some extreme Arab nationalist organizations, which refused to recognize the Mandate and regarded co-operation with the French as treason; and of the separatist movements among the Alawis and Druzes and in the Jazirah.

The hopes of Syrian independence reached their climax in the celebrations which marked the return to Syria of the newly-amnestied exiles, Dr. Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash in May, 1937, the Amir Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in June. It seemed as if the country were entering upon a new period of national construction under leaders whose patriotic energy had only been strengthened by disappointment, imprisonment, and long years of exile.

5

648 The next two years saw the collapse of these hopes. The claims of Turkey to Alexandretta, the growth of separatist movements, the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty, the unrest caused by the disturbances in Palestine, the administrative failure of the Nationalist Government and finally the growth of an internal

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opposition: these factors between them brought to an end the experiment in national government which had been initiated in 1936.

The first blow to Syrian hopes came almost immediately. It has been described how the Turkish Government had consented in 1921, under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, to the inclusion of the district of Alexandretta (called in Turkish the 'Hatay') in the French Mandated Territories, on the understanding that it should be granted a special régime.[1] The special régime was set up, and worked on the whole satisfactorily. But the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, which contemplated the establishment of a unitary Syrian State presumably including Alexandretta, impelled the Turks to raise the question once more in September, 1936. The district of Alexandretta, they claimed, contained a Turkish majority, which could not be left to the mercy of an inexperienced Arab nationalist Government in Damascus. They therefore demanded that a separate treaty should be concluded with the Sanjaq. This demand the French Government twice rejected, but it was agreed that the matter should be brought before the League Council in December, 1936. The Council heard both sides of the case but postponed any decision, meanwhile appointing M. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, *rapporteur* on the question and dispatching three neutral observers to Alexandretta.

After a period of considerable tension and prolonged and difficult negotiations between the French, Turkish and other interested Governments, an agreement was reached, and embodied in the report presented to the Council of the League of Nations by M. Sandler. This report was adopted by the Council on January 27th, 1937. Under its terms, the Sanjaq was recognized to be a distinct entity; it was to enjoy full autonomy in its internal affairs; but its foreign relations were to be conducted by the Syrian Government, and it was to have a fiscal and monetary union with Syria. Turkish was to be an official language, and the Council might determine the conditions of employment of another official language. No international agreement entered into by the Syrian Government, and of such a nature as to affect the independence and sovereignty of Syria, was to apply to the Sanjaq except with the formal consent of the League Council. There was to be

[1] See Chapter II.

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648 resident in the Sanjaq a delegate nominated by the Council and of French nationality; he was to have the power to suspend for four months, and to refer to the League Council for its definitive decision, governmental acts contrary to the Statute or Fundamental Law of the Sanjaq. The Turkish and French Governments were to be responsible for enforcing, where necessary, the decisions of the League Council. The Sanjaq was to be demilitarized, except for a local police force. There were to be special rights for Turkey in the port of Alexandretta. The report also envisaged a Franco-Turkish treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Sanjaq; and an agreement between France, Turkey and Syria, guaranteeing the inviolability of the Turco-Syrian frontier and prohibiting, in the territories of Syria and of Turkey respectively, all activities directed against the régimes of the other country.[1]

A committee of experts was set up in February, 1937, to draft a Statute and Fundamental Law for the Sanjaq. It presented its report to the Council in May. Among the various points in the draft Statute and Fundamental Law may be noticed the recommendation that Arabic as well as Turkish should be an official language, and the vesting of legislative power in an Assembly of 40 members, to be elected in two stages by the different communities of the Sanjaq—Turkish, Alawi, Arab,[2] Armenian, Greek Orthodox and Kurdish. The task of devising and controlling the procedure for the registration of electors was to be entrusted to an international commission for the organization and supervision of the first elections.[3]

After some objections on the part of the Turkish Government had been disposed of, the report was accepted by the Council on May 29th, 1937. It was decided that the new régime should come into operation on November 29th. At the same time a Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed guaranteeing the integrity of the Sanjaq, and an Agreement guaranteeing the Turco-Syrian frontier.[4]

The régime duly entered into force on November. 29th Even before that, the international commission appointed by the President of the League Council to supervise the elections had begun its labours. After two months spent in studying

[1] See Appendix A7. [2] i.e. Sunni Moslem Arab.
[3] Texts in *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, May–June, 1937, pp. 580–9.
[4] Text in *Official Journal*, May–June, 1937, pp. 838 ff.

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the situation on the spot, it returned to Geneva at the end of 648
November, 1937, and set about preparing its report.

These events did not pass unnoticed in Syria. The immediate reaction was a series of Turco-Arab conflicts in the Sanjaq, which continued throughout the year, more than once leading to the intervention of French troops and to loss of life. Throughout Syria the affair gave rise to protests and widespread indignation. It was realized that sooner or later Turkey would ask for the cession of the Sanjaq; this, it was claimed, would mean a permanent threat to Aleppo and the whole of North Syria. Again, the loss of Alexandretta was a blow to national pride and self-respect, which had been exalted by the Treaty of 1936. Above all, the Alexandretta question was regarded as a test of the policy of Franco-Syrian co-operation. Nationalists, supporters of the Bloc and its opponents alike, watched eagerly to see how France would deal with Turkish demands and threats. Would she be true to her Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with Syria and reject such demands? Or would she secure the friendship of Turkey, which was so important to her in view of a possible Franco-Italian conflict, by a concession made at Syria's expense? The settlement of 1937 was regarded throughout Syria as a betrayal by France; the mood of enthusiasm and co-operation began to pass into one of disillusionment and suspicion; and the power of the National Bloc began to decline.

The Government had, indeed, done all that it could to defend the rights of the country; but it could do nothing except protest. Speaking in the Chamber on April 19th, the Prime Minister stated that the League settlement of the Alexandretta question was unacceptable to Syria, but at the same time emphasized the importance for Syria of good relations with its northern neighbour, and of the conclusion of a Franco-Turco-Syrian agreement. Turco-Syrian conversations with a view to making such agreement did indeed begin, but had no positive result.

In May, and again in December, the Syrian Chamber formally refused to recognize the new Statute of the Sanjaq. To this, and to other signs of Syrian dissatisfaction, the Turkish Government replied at the beginning of December by denouncing the Turco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Non-Aggression, signed in 1926.

648 Even before the end of 1937 it was obvious that the Turkish Government, having won its first victory by the establishment of a special régime in the Sanjaq, was determined to take a second step and to secure for the Turkish element a dominant position under that régime. Thus on December 15th, and again on the 24th, it protested to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations against the electoral law drafted by the Commission of experts appointed for that purpose, and more especially against the law's provisions for the registration of voters. According to these provisions, an elector was to be registered in one or other of the recognized communities not simply on the ground of his own unsupported declaration but also in accordance with the evidence furnished by the particulars of his language and religion, which he had to provide. The allotment of seats in the Legislative Assembly was to be proportional to the number of voters registered in the different communities. For the Turks to obtain a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly, a majority of the voters would have to be registered as Turks. This would not be possible if the recommendations of the Commission were adopted, since those who could by language, religion, and so on, be registered as Turks only amounted to about 39 per cent according to the 1936 figures of the population of the Sanjaq. But if registration were to be by declaration only, and if the Turks could obtain control of the police and of the electoral machinery, a Turkish majority would be possible.

As a consequence of Turkish protests, the League Council on January 28th, 1938, appointed a Committee to consider the Commission's draft law and the Turkish objections to it. This Committee issued the definitive text of the electoral law on March 19th, 1938. It provided that every elector 'shall be presumed to be a member of the community to which he declares himself to belong'. The provisions against intimidation were also set aside. (The English representative on the Commission resigned immediately in protest.)

In May the international commission began to register electors under the revised electoral law. The process was marked by tension, disturbances and bloodshed. By the end of May the Turks had still not succeeded in obtaining a majority. Direct pressure was then brought to bear by the Turkish Government upon the French Government. The

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latter was in no mood to resist. On June 3rd Franco-Turkish negotiations upon the subject began in Paris, and on the same day martial law was proclaimed in the Sanjaq. b48

The negotiations in Paris soon led to an agreement that Turkish troops should be allowed to enter the Sanjaq to co-operate with the French in maintaining order. The details of this co-operation were fixed in military conversations held at Antioch during June. In the same month, the Turkish Government announced that it could no longer recognize the status of the electoral commission, and on June 26th the commission abandoned work, accusing the French Mandatory authorities of systematic efforts, by means of arrests and other methods of intimidation, to deprive the non-Turkish part of the population of its freedom of election.

Shortly afterwards, on July 3rd, the conversations at Antioch ended in an agreement for the joint policing of the Sanjaq by Turkish and French troops, until the new régime should be working normally. On July 4th a new Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was initialled in Ankara. It provided not only for mutual non-aggression but for active co-operation in the Eastern Mediterranean.[1] It was to be followed by a tripartite agreement between Turkey, France and Syria. Discussions upon this agreement began in Ankara on July 7th, but after a few days were suspended.

On July 5th Turkish troops marched into the Sanjaq, and towards the end of the month preparations for the election were resumed, under joint Franco-Turkish control. The final electoral lists showed the Turks as constituting 63 per cent of the total number of electors. It was accordingly decided that the Turks should have 22 out of the 40 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

The elections were held, and the new Assembly met for the first time on September 2nd. It elected a Turk as its President and another Turk as head of the State. A third Turk became Prime Minister, and formed a Cabinet composed entirely of Turks. The Sanjaq was now known as the 'Hatay'.

The effects of these events upon Syrian opinion were mixed. There were some who deduced from it the necessity of attachment to France, and of France's maintaining her hold upon the country as the only bulwark against a Turkish invasion. But others believed that France, now that she had made

[1] See Appendix A8.

friends with Turkey, would be less desirous of coming to terms with the Syrian nationalists. In internal politics, the effect was to weaken the position of the Bloc. It was criticized both for not making sufficient efforts to defend Syrian rights, and for not resigning when its efforts proved unsuccessful. The disturbances throughout the country which marked the year were directed as much against the Government as against France, and in June an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate the Prime Minister.

7

In 1937 Turkey obtained the establishment of a special régime for Alexandretta. In 1938 she secured a dominant voice for the Turkish element under that régime. In 1939 she took the third and last stage and annexed the Sanjaq.

It was indeed obvious that the Turks would not be satisfied with anything short of annexation; and the French Government was not opposed to it in principle; it merely wanted to delay it until the termination of the Mandate over Syria. Turkey, however, demanded an immediate and final settlement of the question.

The first steps towards such a settlement were taken almost immediately after the opening of the Legislative Assembly. With a Turkish Ministry, a Turkish majority in the Assembly, a Turkish army in occupation of the territory, and Turkish officials holding the key positions in the police and the administration, there was no obstacle to the Hatay's adopting the Turkish criminal and civil codes in January, 1939, and the Turkish fiscal, currency and postal systems in the course of the next few weeks. Many of the Arabs and Armenians preferred to abandon their houses and cross the frontier into Syria rather than live any longer under Turkish rule.

The French Government was now more than ever in need of Turkish support in view of the increasing dangers of the international situation. Consequently, when the Turkish Government hinted that only the Alexandretta question prevented the speedy conclusion of such a pact, it met with no opposition in Paris. Negotiations began in April and continued, despite a certain tension when a large Turkish army was reported to be concentrated on the Syrian frontier, until their successful conclusion on June 23rd. On that day there was signed in Paris a Declaration of Mutual Assistance

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between Turkey and France, including an engagement by France not to alienate her rights in Syria to any third Power. Simultaneously, the agreement for the cession of the Hatay was signed in Ankara, Turkey recognizing the inviolable nature of her frontier with Syria, and promising not to interfere in any way in the affairs of Syria, by propaganda or by any other means.[1]

One month later, the last French troops having left the Hatay, it was finally assimilated to Turkey, becoming Vilayet No. 63 of the Turkish State.

In Syria the cession aroused protests and disturbances. The indignation which these expressed was not so spontaneous as it had been in previous years, because the cession had been so long expected and took no one by surprise; but it was no less real for that.

8

The union of Jebel Druze and the Alawi Territory with Syria, which was agreed upon when the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 was concluded, was effected by decree in December of the same year. Each was to possess a special administrative and financial régime, but otherwise was to be subject to the constitution and laws of the Syrian State. This new system was to come fully into force with the ratification of the Treaty. The statute defining the special régime for each of the districts provided for the appointment of the Governor by the President of the Republic, of other officials in part by the President and in part by the Governor. The latter was to have the power of issuing ordinances, and was to be assisted by an administrative council with an elected majority. Each district was to have its special budget, but was also to make an annual contribution to the State of Syria.[2] Subsequent decrees provided for the representation of the two districts in the Syrian Chamber: Jebel Druze by five Deputies (three Druzes, one Christian and one Beduin), and the Alawi district by 16 (ten representing the Alawis and six the other communities).

In addition to these administrative privileges, a further guarantee for the good treatment of the two districts was contained in the military convention attached to the Treaty of 1936. It provided for the maintenance of French troops in

[1] See Appendix A9. [2] See Appendix A2.

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631 648 both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty.

631 664 186 The Treaty and the new régime were received with approval by a number of the Druzes and Alawis; even former autonomists expressed their loyalty to the Syrian Government. This reaction, however, was transient and deceptive. In Jebel Druze discord began to arise early in 1937, after the appointment of Nasib al-Bakri, a Damascene Moslem, as first Governor of the province. A powerful party demanded the appointment of a Druze notable, Hasan al-Atrash, and also a large measure of autonomy; the nationalists asserted that it was encouraged to go to extremes by local French officials. There were also, however, many Druzes who supported the nationalist Government and the Governor whom it had appointed. Attempts were made with no more than a temporary success to reconcile the advocates of separatism with those of unity. The disturbances were not ended until the Governor resigned and was replaced after an interval by Hasan al-Atrash. By the end of 1937 the Jebel was quiet enough to enable Parliamentary elections to be held. The calm continued throughout 1938, but at the beginning of 1939 [669] disturbances began once more. The separatist group accused the Syrian Government of bad faith, expelled Syrian officials from the province and declared the independence of Jebel Druze under the protection of France.

A similar process had meanwhile been occurring in the Alawi district, which was known under the new régime as the Province of Latakia. Here, as in Jebel Druze, there was tranquillity at first, and Parliamentary elections were held in 1937. But the calm was short-lived. The Alawi notables protested against the appointment of Syrian Moslem officials, and more especially of nationalist Governors, first Mazhar Raslan from Homs and then Ihsan al-Jabiri, a Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. The nationalist policy of assimilation was perhaps carried out hastily and tactlessly, the Governor alienated large sections of the population, and at the beginning of 1939 armed bands rose in revolt under the leadership of the deputy Sulaiman Murshid, a brigand who had proclaimed himself 'God' and had secured considerable local influence with the help of certain French officials. At about the same time the visit of the High Commissioner, M. Puaux, was made the occasion for demonstrations in favour of autonomy. Soon

afterwards the Governor found his position impossible and 631
was compelled to abandon it. He was not replaced, his 644
powers being assumed in July by the High Commissioner's 186
Delegate.

9

The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 effected no formal change in the status of the Jazirah, but its signature was followed by the replacement of the French officials who had ruled it until then, by Syrian administrators. Here as in Jebel Druze and the Alawi region discontent soon showed itself. There were some who felt and expressed loyalty to the new national Government. But there was an important element which demanded that the ties between the Jazirah and the central Government in Damascus should be as loose as possible, or should be severed altogether. Their minimum demand was that the local officials should be chosen from among the local population; their maximum, for complete separation from Syria. Their discontent was increased by the lack of wisdom shown by some of the more irresponsible nationalists, although the Government itself acted on the whole in a conciliatory manner. The autonomists appear to have been encouraged by certain of the local French officials; the nationalists claimed, indeed, that here as among the Alawis and Druzes the minorities would have acquiesced in their rule had it not been for the activities of French agents. The separatists were themselves divided on everything except their dislike of being ruled by the nationalists of Damascus. Some were Kurds, who objected mainly to being ruled by Arabs; others Christians, who objected also to being ruled by Moslems. These two groups sometimes but not always acted together during the years from 1936 to 1939.

Serious trouble first broke out in June, 1937, when the 669
Kurds of Hassetche revolted against the appointment of 563
nationalist officials from outside the Jazirah. The rising was 631
quelled with the aid of the French military authorities, but it was soon taken up in Qamishli and elsewhere by the Christians, who demanded a special statute similar to that of Alexandretta, an administration which would give equal weight to the rights of all sects and races, and the withdrawal from the province of officials who had not been chosen from the local population.

669 563 621 The disturbances reached their height in August, when a number of Christians in Amudah were killed in an altercation with a group of Kurds instigated by a Kurdish chieftain who supported the nationalist Government. The intervention of French troops and the removal of certain unpopular officials restored order for a time. But beneath the surface discontent continued, and the separatists began to form themselves into societies for the defence of their rights, with a central committee to co-ordinate their activities. In December, 1937, some separatists from Hassetche kidnapped the Governor of the Jazirah, Tawfiq Shamiyyah, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus; he was released after a few days, and his kidnappers were arrested.

The Governor was shortly afterwards replaced by a new one, a Moslem, who made a conciliatory statement of policy. It did not, however, appease the separatists. They demanded the release of those who had been arrested for kidnapping the former Governor, and also the dismissal of certain officials. When the new Governor failed to persuade the Syrian Government to yield to these demands, he was chased from the province. The separatists then drove out other nationalist officials, boycotted the administration and reaffirmed their demand for a separate government under French control.

While these events were occurring in the Jazirah, the separatist case was being urged in Paris and Rome by Cardinal Tappouni, the head of the Syrian Catholic Church, who had constituted himself the spokesman of those Christian minorities who were opposed to nationalist rule. In a memorandum submitted to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November, 1937, he spoke of the possibility of a massacre of the Christians in the Jazirah and elsewhere, and made various proposals for avoiding it: that the religious communities should be given complete equality in religious and personal matters; that an equitable number of Christian officials should be appointed; that the Syrian Government should maintain, in districts where the Christians might be menaced, adequate means for their protection; and that a régime of decentralization should be introduced, such as to safeguard the interests of the minorities. The French Government, which was then negotiating with the Syrian Prime Minister in order to obtain more explicit guarantees, replied in a vague and conciliatory fashion.

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The situation remained as it was until the beginning of 1939, when agitation for the release of the kidnappers of the former Governor occurred. In June organized manifestations on a large scale took place in all the towns of the province; but the French authorities intervened and restored order.

10

No sooner had the Franco-Syrian Treaty been signed than criticism of it began to appear in France. In part this criticism came from those who opposed the whole idea of a treaty, believing the Syrians to be still unfit for self-government. Others, while admitting a treaty of some sort to be desirable, were doubtful of the adequacy of the existing Treaty: because it aimed at creating a unitary State in a country so divided as Syria; or because its guarantees for minorities and its provisions for the maintenance of French military forces upon Syrian soil were insufficient; or else because it did not stipulate for the repayment to France of the expenses incurred in the administration of the Mandate.

These doubts were reinforced by the events of 1937: the Alexandretta question, and the growth of the separatist movements in Jebel Druze, the province of Latakia and the Jazirah. It was obvious that the French Chamber and Senate would only ratify the Treaty provided that they were reassured on these and certain other points. The Syrian Prime Minister therefore went to Paris in order to negotiate with the French Government an agreement upon the points at issue. He left Syria in November, 1937, and returned towards the end of December. The result of his visit was an exchange of letters between him and M. de Tessan, Under-Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated December 11th, 1937. The letters included a further guarantee by the Syrian Government of its intention to respect all the rights granted by the Treaty to the minorities living under its sway; and an undertaking by the Government to accept the technical experts recommended to it by the French Government. The letters closed with a statement of the desire of both parties to continue the policy of co-operation.[1]

These undertakings were accepted by nationalist opinion as being inevitable in the circumstances, and ratification of the Treaty was eagerly awaited. In March, 1938, indeed, Mardam

[1] See Appendix A4.

Bey declared to the Chamber that ratification could be expected soon, and received a unanimous vote of confidence in the policy he was pursuing. But as the year grew older, it became more and more obvious that the opposition to the Treaty in France was becoming stronger. Some of the reasons for this were local. The persistence of trouble among the minorities, especially in the Jazirah, aroused the fear of those who were mindful of France's special connexion with the Christians. (Similar fears were expressed on several occasions by members of the Permanent Mandates Commission, who had been deeply affected by the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq, and blamed themselves for having consented to what they now regarded as a premature termination of the Iraqi Mandate.) Again, the possibility that oil would be discovered in the Jazirah influenced the opinion of those groups which had not forgotten the abandonment of the French claim to Mosul and did not wish to see it repeated in Syria. But the main reasons were not local. On the one hand, the Popular Front Government was replaced by one further to the Right, and including members of groups among whom the main enemies of the Treaty were to be found. On the other, the international situation was growing increasingly dangerous, and it was imperative for France not to weaken her military position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The attitude of Turkey in regard to Alexandretta had shown what dangers might fall upon Syria should France's control be at all relaxed.

Once more Jamil Mardam Bey went to Paris, in an endeavour to save the Treaty even at the price of serious emendations. He left Syria in August, 1938, and, after three months spent in Paris and Geneva, finally signed an agreement with M. Bonnet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on November 14th.

The text of the agreement was not revealed at the time, but it was published in full next year by a number of newspapers. It consisted of a 'Protocol' and a 'Joint Declaration'. In the former, the Syrian Government stated the measures by which it proposed to give full effect to the previous agreement of December 11th, 1937. It undertook to guarantee effective liberty of conscience to all, and in particular to recognize the rights of the Christians in matters of personal status. It promised also to safeguard the position of the

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French language in the schools; and declared that it had made satisfactory arrangements in regard to the renewal of the concession of the Banque de Syrie and the investigation and exploitation of the country's oil deposits (two matters in which France had an important economic interest). Steps were to be taken to develop Franco-Syrian commerce, and French financial help to be given to the Syrian Government. In view of the interest of both Governments in putting the Treaty into effect as soon as possible, the French Government was willing to fix the end of the period of transition at September 30th, 1939, and would submit this proposal to Parliament. In the 'Joint Declaration', the two signatories expressed their hope that the Syrian Government would give its approval to the amended Treaty by January 20th, 1939, at the latest; and that the French Chamber and Senate would receive the reports of their Foreign Affairs Commission before December 10th, 1938, and would authorize the ratification of the Treaty before January 31st, 1939.[1] There were also military discussions in which General Huntziger, Commander of the French forces in the Levant, participated.

It was too late to save the Treaty, however. In Syria the concessions made by Jamil Mardam Bey were widely regarded as inacceptable, by his own followers as well as by those of Dr. Shahbandar and Shukri al-Quwatli. In France there were some, like M. Bonnet, who supported the amended Treaty on the ground that France could not afford to throw away Syrian friendship and many on the Left who had not abandoned the original Treaty of 1936. A powerful body of opinion, however, was opposed to ratification. The Syrian and Lebanese Treaties were now submitted to the Foreign Affairs Commissions of Chamber and Senate. On December 9th, 1938, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate received the reports of its two 'rapporteurs' on the Treaty. One of them, M. Bergeon, warned against the dangers of a premature ratification; while the other, M. Henry-Haye, went further and declared that the very basis of the Treaty seemed to him incompatible with the interests of France. He proposed, therefore, that France should denounce the Syrian Treaty (as also the Lebanese) and the later agreements, and assume once more the direct administration of the country, until the bases of a new treaty could be thought out. After discussion the

[1] See Appendix A4.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria/10

Commission decided that a letter should be sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, emphasizing the importance of interrupting the process of transition provided for in the agreements.

Later in the same month M. Gaston Riou, the 'rapporteur' on the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber, made a statement on the Treaties to a Beirut newspaper. He did not, he said, object to the Lebanese Treaty in principle, and such changes in it as were necessary could easily be made; but the whole conception of the Syrian Treaty was wrong. France had tried to make a unitary treaty with the least unitary nation in the world; Syria was a 'League of Nations' and needed a confederation.

In the face of such signs of Parliamentary opposition, M. Bonnet abandoned his intention of submitting the Treaty to Parliament. On December 14th, 1938, he declared to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber that the Government did not intend for the present to ask Parliament to ratify the Syrian Treaty. France, he stated, did not wish to modify the situation in the Mediterranean at the moment. (It was exactly a month since he had signed the 'Joint Declaration' with the Syrian Prime Minister.)

Such statements made it clear that even with the additional undertakings the Treaty had very little chance of ratification in France. On December 31st, 1938, the Syrian Chamber adopted unanimously an order of the day defining its attitude to France. While desirous of an alliance with France, it stood firm by the Treaty of 1936; it regarded as null and void any agreements not submitted to it for ratification; it regretted the failure of the French Government to stand by its commitments and charged the Syrian Government to watch over the rights, independence and unity of Syria, and to take full powers into its hands without delay; it took note of the Prime Minister's declaration that he did not consider himself bound by any agreement that he had signed; it asked the Syrians not to co-operate with any commission which might be sent out by the French Government; and it called upon the Government to deal promptly with the acts of rebellion against law and order that were occurring in the Jebel Druze, Latakia and the Jazirah.[1]

This motion marked the beginning of the political crisis of 1939, which led to the dissolution of the National Bloc, the

[1] For text, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 3–4.

suspension of the Constitution and the complete breakdown 648
of the policy of 1936.

II

The Bloc was the more incapable of weathering such a 665
crisis, because by now there had appeared a strong nationalist opposition to it. Already in 1936 such a potential opposition had existed ready to take shape so soon as, on the one hand, the Bloc disappointed hopes, and on the other an alternative leader or group of leaders appeared. At the time neither of the two conditions was fulfilled. The Bloc was at the height of its success; and the few Deputies who opposed it were neither prominent nor strong enough to become popular leaders.

During the next few years, however, matters changed. The Bloc gradually lost a great part of its popularity, on account of its failure to secure the ratification of the Treaty and its impotence in the face of Turkish designs upon Alexandretta. The natural tendency of Governments in office to disappoint individual hopes and create individual grievances worked in the same direction.

The discontent was increased by the comparative failure of 631
the Government in internal administration. Among the 642
causes of failure were the inadequate powers of the Govern- 648
ment, the widespread belief that it did not enjoy the backing of the French authorities, its own lack of experience and the absence of an efficient civil service; but it was nevertheless discouraging to its supporters and irritating to ordinary citizens. On the whole the departments were no better administered than they had been; and there was a succession of petty acts of discrimination against members of minorities. The relations between the central and local authorities were often difficult, the tendency to excessive centralization conflicting with the innate localism of some of the provinces. This conflict had indeed existed before the nationalists came to power, and in order to end it, the High Commissioner had issued a decree on provincial organization in January, 1936. Besides altering the number and boundaries of the provinces, this decree had defined the scope of the central and local authorities and provided for the establishment of provincial councils. In spite of declarations, this decree was never fully applied.

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648 Another failure, for which however the Syrian Government was by no means exclusively to blame, was the breakdown of negotiations with Lebanon on the future of the customs and other departments known collectively as the 'Common Interests' and at the time administered by the High Commissioner. The Treaties, it will be recalled, anticipated negotiations between the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on the disposal of these interests when the Mandate should come to an end. The Governments might either set up a joint organization to administer them or agree each to retain its liberty of action; and the Mandatory Power bound itself to act in conformity with the decision of the Governments, and transfer the interests either to whatever new organization was set up or to the two Governments.

Syro-Lebanese negotiations on the subject took place in August, 1937. The two Governments agreed on the principle of separate customs administrations, without prejudice to the close economic relations existing between Syria and Lebanon. In later discussions, however, they failed to agree on the method of applying this principle and in particular on the proportion of the customs revenues to be allotted to each of the two Governments. In 1938, as a consequence of this failure to agree, the Syrian Government decided to impose a tax on Lebanese products, and the Lebanese Government retaliated. These measures were much opposed by business interests, and were never effectively carried out; but the disagreement continued until after the outbreak of the war.

To these particular grievances was added the general unrest caused on the one hand by the economic dislocations resulting from successive devaluations of the franc, and on the other by the Arab revolt in Palestine (1936-1939). This revolt aroused great enthusiasm in Syria, and helped to drive the nationalist movement along the path of extremism and violence, both because of the close links between Syria and Palestine and because of the presence in Syria and Lebanon of a large number of Arab nationalist refugees who had found it impossible to remain in Palestine. It was in Syria that the Pan-Arab Conference of 1937 was held. Lebanon became the home of the Mufti of Jerusalem after the suppression of the Arab High Committee in 1938; and to a great extent the revolt in its later stages was directed by Palestinian refugees and Syrian sympathizers through the Committee for

the Defence of Palestine, in Damascus. Nationalists in Syria 648 regarded the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs as their own struggle; and their opposition to French policy was strengthened and sustained by the constant thought of the battle which their fellow-countrymen were waging against Zionism and the policy of the Balfour Declaration.

The conditions for the growth of an opposition now existed. 665 Its leader was found in Dr. Abdur-Rahman Shahbandar. A well-educated, intelligent and masterful Damascene, he had been Foreign Minister under Faisal, and had played an important part in the revolt of 1925-1926. Sentenced to death by the French, he had taken up residence in Egypt. He returned to Syria after the amnesty to the political exiles in May, 1937. This first visit of his lasted only a month, but he found time publicly to declare his opposition to the party of the National Bloc—an opposition due partly perhaps to his disbelief in the policy of co-operation with the French, but partly also, there can be no doubt, to pique at seeing the leadership of the nationalist movement in other hands than his.

He was absent from Syria for the rest of the year 1937, but at the end of the year he came out into the open with a manifesto accusing Jamil Mardam Bey of having made inacceptable concessions to the French Government during his recent visit to Paris, and of having done nothing to defend Syrian rights in Alexandretta. He soon gathered around him a number of those who for one reason or another were dissatisfied with the Government of the Bloc.

In February, 1938, the Government replied to Dr. Shahbandar's memorandum by arresting his leading supporters, on the charge of having distributed a seditious manifesto repeating his accusations. Despite their denial of the charge, they were all sentenced to several months' detention, but the sentences were reduced after a re-trial.

Two months later, the crystallization of Dr. Shahbandar's supporters into a definite political group was marked by the issue of a manifesto, signed by Zaki al-Khatib in the name of the 'Free National Front'. It stated that any interference in the internal affairs of Syria on the pretext of defending minorities would be regarded as an infringement of national sovereignty; that any detachment of Syrian territory in order to transfer it to another State or to retain it under the Mandate would be considered an infraction of the Treaty;

665 that all projects for retaining French preponderance in the Mixed Courts would be equivalent to maintaining the yoke of the Capitulations; that any partial removal of the schools from national control would be incompatible with national unity, and a danger to national culture; that any delay in handing over the control of the army would open Syria to the danger of aggression; and that any linking of the Syrian currency to a foreign currency, or any petroleum concession which did not assure to Syria a fair proportion of the proceeds, would be a menace to the country's prosperity. The manifesto, which was obviously an attack upon the concessions made or supposed to have been made by Jamil Mardam on his recent visit to France, ended by declaring that Syria would not accept any Treaty which gave it fewer rights than those possessed by Iraq.

The Government replied by confining Dr. Shahbandar to his house when he returned once more to Syria in July, 1938; by arresting once more those of his followers who had been arrested in February; and by suspending their newspaper. But the opposition continued and the end of the year saw the formation of a 'Constitutional Bloc' consisting of 27 deputies, including not only the immediate followers of Dr. Shahbandar but also some of the representatives of the Beduin, the Druzes, the Alawis and the inhabitants of the Jazirah.

Very many, however, of those who were discontented with the way in which things were going grouped themselves not around Dr. Shahbandar but around Shukri al-Quwatli, who had been a member of Mardam Bey's Ministry at first, but had resigned from it in March, 1938. From that time onwards he remained not indeed openly hostile to the Ministry, but critical of it, and voiced the opinion of those who would accept no compromise in the struggle for Arab unity and independence. He had the support, among others, of a section of the League of National Action, which had never shown more than an uneasy acquiescence in the rule of the Bloc. Another section of the League, however, held itself aloof from all established politicians and regarded even the unamended Treaty of 1936 as too great a sacrifice of the national interests. This independence of established powers was professed also by a new youth-organization, the 'Arab Club', of which the leaders, although not the rank and file, were suspected of too close a contact with Nazi ideas and agents.

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Against the opposition of these two youth-movements, the 665
Bloc's own organization, the Nationalist Youth, was almost powerless. It had taken a leading part in the disturbances of 1936, but when the leaders of the Bloc came to power it proved more of a nuisance than an asset and was quietly silenced by them.

12

The final crisis was delayed for a time by the arrival of the 668
new French High Commissioner, M. Gabriel Puaux, who had been chosen to succeed M. de Martel in the previous October. M. Puaux left France for Syria at the beginning of January, 1939. The belief that he was coming to bury the Treaty explains why, when M. Puaux landed at Beirut on January 8th, his arrival was marked by some enthusiasm in Lebanon, but by hostility and manifestations in favour of Syrian unity in the cities of the interior. The tension was heightened rather than relieved by a broadcast speech of the High Commissioner on January 11th, in which he reminded the nationalists that France had a mission to maintain order and justice in the Levant, and that 'were she to withdraw or her forces to be weakened, Syrian patriots would see their dearest dreams disappear.'

Shortly afterwards M. Puaux made his first visit to Damascus. It was marked by strikes, and other measures of protest against the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the Treaty. A ministerial crisis seemed imminent; but after heated discussions in the Chamber, it was agreed that the Ministry should remain in office and no steps be taken until M. Puaux had had time to study the situation and form his opinion upon it.

M. Puaux spent the remainder of January visiting the different parts of the country. Disturbances and tension continued, and he had hardly completed his travels when a crisis occurred.

In March, 1936, the High Commissioner had issued a decree determining the rights of the officially recognized religious communities in matters of personal status, and the relations between the communities. It aroused considerable opposition in orthodox Moslem circles, partly because they believed its provisions to be contrary to those of Islamic law, but more fundamentally because it treated the Moslems as one sect

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648 among many, and thus struck at the root of the traditional Moslem conception of the State. Its application was temporarily suspended, pending the issue of a revised law by the Syrian Government. The Government having failed to pass such a law, in November, 1938, the High Commissioner issued a decree modifying and completing the previous one. The new decree, officially published in December, met with no greater favour from the religious leaders.

Throughout the first weeks of 1939 Moslem opposition to the decree grew in intensity. Pressure was put upon the Government to suspend it. This the Government was the more willing to do because it resented the issue of the decree on the High Commissioner's own authority, over the head of the legislative organs of the Syrian State. In February it issued an order to the Courts not to apply the decree. At the same time it sent a memorandum to the High Commissioner, declaring its intention to apply the order of the day passed by the Chamber on December 31st, 1938, and to take over the functions previously exercised by the Mandatory authorities; accusing the French of encouraging the separatist movements; and asserting that since all legislative power belonged to the Chamber, decrees issued by the High Commissioner could have no validity in Syria.

648 On February 18th, the High Commissioner demanded
645 that the Ministry should withdraw its order to the Courts and its memorandum, on the ground that decrees issued by him could not be suspended by any authority other than his own. The Ministry refused and resigned. A number of important officials resigned with it. The National Bloc continued formally in existence, but the resignation of the Mardam Ministry made its temporary decline inevitable. In April a group of prominent members left it.

13

Jamil Mardam Bey was succeeded as Prime Minister by Lutfi al-Haffar, his former colleague; with one exception, all the members of the new Ministry were members of the Bloc; and their policy, like that of their predecessors, was to maintain the Treaty of 1936, and to conclude an agreement with France on the basis of it. This, together with the continued deadlock over the communities question and further troubles among the minorities, did not allow the Ministry

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to last long. It resigned on March 16th, in circumstances 648
somewhat similar to those in which the Mardam Ministry had 646
fallen. Its resignation was accompanied by further disturbances.

The unrest, and the difficulty of finding anybody willing and able to form a new Ministry, impelled the Mandatory authorities to take over, by decree of the High Commissioner, the powers necessary for the maintenance of public order. The disturbances were quelled by the use of French troops; several prominent leaders were arrested, including Nabih al-Azmah. New and severe restrictions were also placed upon the press. But at the same time a concession to popular feeling was made by the decision of the High Commissioner, at the beginning of April, to suspend the application of the Communities Statute to the Sunni Moslem community.

A few days later, on April 6th, the Ministerial crisis was ended by the formation of a non-political Ministry, headed by Nasuhi al-Bukhari. Although its members did not belong to the Bloc, this Ministry was as firmly attached as its predecessors had been to the Treaty of 1936; and it was generally felt that it offered the French Government its last chance of concluding an agreement that could satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Syrians. If it failed to take this opportunity, there would be no alternative for the nationalists except to resort once more to the methods of the first months of 1936.

Shortly after the formation of the Bukhari Ministry, M. 648
Puaux left Syria for France. It was known that he had gone in order to discuss with the French Government the policy to be adopted in Syria. Speculation ranged over the alternatives among which a choice would have to be made: the negotiation of a new Treaty, the return to direct rule by the French, the establishment of a monarchy. This last possibility especially was the subject of much excited controversy and the names of various possible candidates were put forward: the Amir Abdullah, the Amir Abdul Munim, son of the ex-Khedive of Egypt, a Sa'udi or a Tunisian prince. Even the possibility of a personal union of Syria and Iraq under King Faisal II was entertained.

On May 10th, the High Commissioner returned from France and three days later delivered a radio speech, in which he declared that the French Government was determined to

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648 reach an agreement with Syria on the basis of the 1936 Treaty with the amendments of November, 1938, but that due satisfaction must be given to the legitimate aspirations of the minorities. Moreover, the international situation necessitated new military arrangements between Syria and France. He ended with an appeal for the maintenance of law and order.

The nationalists saw in this statement a determination to strengthen France's hold over Syria in preparation for the imminent world war. The last hope of the ratification of the Treaty was now extinguished.

648 On May 15th the Bukhari Ministry resigned. On May
645 23rd the Syrian Chamber voted unanimously an order of the day, affirming Syria's sympathy for French democracy in the hour of its peril, but at the same time emphasizing its attachment to the unamended Treaty of 1936 as the only firm basis for Franco-Syrian co-operation.

This time there was no way out of the deadlock. All attempts to form a new Ministry failed. Finally, the President of the Republic resigned (July 7th). A few days later M. Puaux took the extreme step of dissolving the Chamber, suspending the Constitution, and appointing a non-political Council of Directors to govern by decree-laws under his own direction (July 10th). The Council was composed of permanent officials, with Bahij al-Khatib as its President.

14

631 At the same time the High Commissioner issued decrees
648 re-establishing in Jebel Druze and the Territory of Latakia separate administrations similar to those which had existed until 1936, and providing for the special administration of the Jazirah.

The decree for Latakia stated that the Organic Law promulgated in 1936 was to be replaced by a new one, to come into force immediately. The new law provided for the government of the region by a Governor, assisted by a council of heads of departments and by the Council of the Territory. He was to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the Council of the Territory, was to hold office for five years and might be re-appointed. His powers were executive, financial and within limits legislative. The Council was to consist of at least seventeen elected members, to hold two ordinary sessions a year and to discuss financial and

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other matters, without, however, possessing much power of independent decision. The Territory was to enjoy financial autonomy, apart from a contribution to the expenses of general administration of the State of Syria. It was also to have judicial autonomy, except for the provisions that the Presidents of the High Court and the Court of First Instance at Latakia, both of them French magistrates, were to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the French Government; and that conflicts of competence between the Courts of the Territory and those of other parts of the French Mandated area were to be decided by the Court of Cassation at Damascus.

The provisions of the decree relating to the Jebel Druze were virtually the same, with a few minor variations. That for the Jazirah removed the province from the control of the Syrian Government, and placed it under the direct rule of the High Commissioner's Delegate at Hassetche. (This measure was enough to end the disturbances. By December, 1940, life in the Jazirah had returned to normal, and it was possible for an agreement to be reached between the Mandatory authorities and the Syrian Government, under the terms of which the functions of Governor were once more transferred from the High Commissioner's Delegate to a Syrian official.)[1]

[1] See Appendix A6.

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XII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1943

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THE outbreak of war brought immediate changes in every sphere of life, in Syria and Lebanon as in the other countries involved. For months past reinforcements had been arriving for the French army of occupation. At the beginning of the war the important part for which the forces in the Mandated Territories were cast was shown by the appointment of General Weygand as Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant. Other measures were taken to place the Territories in a state of defence. The urgency of the situation was somewhat eased, however, by the decision of the Italian Government to remain neutral.

Various political measures were also taken to ensure the safety of the country. In Lebanon the High Commissioner dissolved the Chamber, dismissed the Ministry, suspended the Constitution and confided the administration to a Secretary of State directly responsible to the President of the Republic. In Syria, a number of political organizations believed to be favourable to the enemies of France were dissolved, and some of their leading members were arrested. During the next few months many of them were sentenced by military tribunals to terms of imprisonment, in some cases exceedingly long, on charges of subversive action and conspiracy. Those affected were mainly members of uncompromising nationalist organizations or of the Communist Party; no leader either of the National Bloc or of the Shahbandarist group was touched. Most leading personalities indeed gave formal expression to their attachment to France and to democracy, and their unwillingness to do anything which might hinder the victory of the Allied arms.

In spite of formal statements by political leaders, the general attitude of the population towards the war seems to have been one not of enthusiasm but of mingled fear and apathy. There was fear of a repetition of the terrible experiences of the war of 1914-1918: famine, disease and the reign of terror. Except among the Francophil elements, people tended to think that, although the belligerents might invoke the noblest of principles to justify their taking up arms, in reality all were equally moved by self-interest, and that from the point of view of the exploited nations of the East there was nothing to choose

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between the oppression exercised in the name of democracy and that exercised in the name of Fascism. This tendency was encouraged by the efforts of the competing propaganda services, each of which purported to unmask the true face of the other party. Moreover, painful memories remained of the conduct of the Allies during the last war. The Arabs had trusted to Allied promises then and had been, as they saw it, cheated. They were therefore sceptical, and afraid to give their full trust to either side. Still more bitter were the memories of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war: the cession of Alexandretta, the failure to ratify the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties, and above all the Arab revolt in Palestine, which had aroused intense feeling throughout Arab Asia, and had done more than anything else to alienate the Arabs from the Allied Powers. 722 648

These and other currents of political feeling existed beneath the surface, but there was little overt political activity during the first nine months of the war. The High Commissioner and the Syrian and Lebanese authorities confined themselves mainly to measures of administrative reform and economic and financial control; the safeguarding of the food supply against the activities of hoarders and profiteers was their constant preoccupation. In external affairs one source of anxiety was removed by the conclusion in November, 1939, of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact, and in March, 1940, of a Turco-Syrian Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. But a new anxiety grew up, with the German offensive on the Western front in May, 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war in June; it reflected itself in the additional measures of precaution taken in the Mandated Territories.

2

After the capitulation of France there was some doubt about the attitude which the French authorities in the Levant would adopt. It was resolved by the order of the day issued on June 27th by General Mittelhauser, who had succeeded Weygand after the latter had been recalled to take command of the Allied Forces in France. 'According to the terms of the French armistice', he announced, 'there will be no change in the status of the Mandated Territories. Consequently, the cessation of hostilities has been ordered. The French flag 721 648

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will continue to be flown in these territories, and France will carry on her mission in the Levant.'

The cessation of hostilities had the gravest effect upon the Allied position in the Middle East, and occasioned great anxiety to the British Government. At the beginning of July the Foreign Office issued the following statement:

'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand that General Mittelhauser, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant, has stated that hostilities have ceased in Syria. His Majesty's Government assume that this does not mean that if Germany or Italy sought to occupy Syria or the Lebanon and were to try to do so in the face of British command of the sea, no attempt would be made by the French forces to oppose them. In order, however, to set at rest doubts which may be felt in any quarter, His Majesty's Government declare that they could not allow Syria or the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile Power or to be used as a base for attacks upon those countries in the Middle East which they are pledged to defend, or to become the scene of such disorder as to constitute a danger to those countries.

'They therefore hold themselves free to take whatever measures they may in such circumstances consider necessary in their own interests. Any action which they may hereafter be obliged to take in fulfilment of this declaration will be entirely without prejudice to the future status of the territories now under French Mandate.'[1]

Subsequent developments increased the anxiety of the British Government. In August an Italian Armistice Commission arrived in Beirut; in spite of official disclaimers, its object was generally believed to be to prepare the way for the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the Axis Powers. It was generally unpopular and had little success; by the end of the year it had practically faded out of the picture. More important was the unobtrusive extension of German influence throughout the country; and also the gradual replacement of officials believed to have democratic or pro-British sympathies by others thought to be in agreement with the 'New Order' in France and Europe. In November the High Commissioner himself was recalled and replaced first by M. Chiappe and then, after his death when the aeroplane carrying him to the East was shot down in the

[1] *The Times*, July 2nd, 1941.

Mediterranean, by General Dentz. These measures could not, however, prevent the spread of pro-Allied sympathies both in the army and in the civil administration; towards the end of 1940 a number of those suspected of having such sympathies were arrested and interned. 648

While Axis interference was increasing, Franco-British relations in the Levant as elsewhere were becoming ever more strained. The British blockade was extended to Syria and Lebanon, trade between which and the neighbouring Arab countries greatly diminished in consequence. Travel between Palestine and the French Mandated Territories was severely restricted. The French authorities prohibited public listening to British radio programmes. From time to time, moreover, the French authorities issued statements to the effect that the French army of the Levant still existed and was prepared to defend French territory against aggression from whatever direction it might come.

3

Among the population, the effect of the French capitulation and of subsequent events was not so much to bring new tendencies into existence as to encourage those which already existed. The growth of Axis influence and of British determination to oppose it increased the fear that the country would become a battleground. The restriction of trade with Palestine, Iraq and Egypt, and the persistence of hoarding and profiteering in spite of all measures taken to stop them, brought nearer the spectre of famine. The ambiguous position of France after the Armistice made it even more difficult than before for Syrians and Lebanese to take sides in the war. There were, it is true, a small number who approved of the New Order in France, and extreme nationalists who desired a German victory; there were others who, from principle or interest, desired a British occupation of the country. But for the majority of politically conscious Syrians, the collapse of France and her subsequent difficulties served not so much to throw them into the arms of her former ally or her former enemy, as to make them more than ever eager to rid themselves of French and all foreign domination. They felt it a humiliation to be subjected to a defeated and weak nation; and with the withdrawal of France from the League 648 /96

648 of Nations on April 18th, 1941, they regarded the juridical
186 basis of French Mandatory rule as having disappeared.

Political meetings and demonstrations being forbidden, nationalist uneasiness remained for the most part beneath the surface throughout 1940. But it revealed itself in the press of other Arab countries and the activities of their Governments; this was especially true of Iraq. Thus in July, 1940, Nuri as-Said, then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara, Beirut and Damascus in order to discuss with the Turkish and French authorities and with prominent Syrians and Lebanese the future of the French Mandated Territories. At the conclusion of his journey he issued a statement to the effect that both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments thought that Syria should be for the Syrians and that the country should enjoy complete independence.

665 A symptom of the prevalent unrest was the murder of Dr.
662 Shahbandar in Damascus in the same month, while his political influence was at its height. Within a few days his assassins were arrested. After the preliminary investigation had been completed a special tribunal was set up to try them and certain other persons believed to be implicated in the crime. Among the latter were three of the leaders of the National Bloc, Jamil Mardam Bey, Saadullah al-Jabiri and Lutfi al-Haffar. They were accused of deliberate complicity in the assassination. Almost at the same time as the accusation against them was published, all three left Syria for Baghdad.

The trial of the accused persons began in December, 1940. In the course of it the leader of the assassins made a complete confession: their motive in deciding to kill Dr. Shahbandar had been religious, since they regarded him as one of those responsible for the decay of Islam; they had tried to throw the blame for their crime upon the leaders of the Bloc, who in reality had had nothing to do with it. The trial ended at the beginning of January, with the condemnation of six persons to death and several others to imprisonment, and the complete exoneration of Jamil Mardam Bey, Lutfi al-Haffar and Saadullah al-Jabiri. The sentences were carried out immediately.

4

000 At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so

At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so long latent came to a head. Strikes and demonstrations began in the Syrian towns in February, in protest against the dearth of essential foodstuffs and the failure of the authorities to stop profiteering. They very soon turned into political disturbances, directed by a number of nationalist committees and leaders, and above all by Shukri al-Quwatli, who in March issued a manifesto setting forth their objectives. He condemned the existing Government of Bahij al-Khatib as a group of men whose sentiments were not those of the population; he declared that the legal basis of French rule no longer existed since the League of Nations had ceased to function; and he therefore demanded the immediate formation of a national Government. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of the continuation of the disturbances, which indeed spread for a few days from Syria to the towns of the Lebanese coast, the Government of Bahij al-Khatib resigned. There was a temporary cessation of unrest while the High Commissioner negotiated with Shukri al-Quwatli and others for the formation of a more representative Government; but disturbances broke out once more after the failure of the negotiations.

The recrudescence of the troubles appears to have convinced General Dentz of the necessity of making further concessions. At the beginning of April he broadcast a statement to the Syrian people, setting forth the conclusions to which his conversations with Syrian leaders had led him. First, the independence of Syria remained the aim towards which the Syrians were striving; France was in agreement with this, but the present international situation made it impossible to contemplate a definitive settlement of the problem of the form of government in Syria. Secondly, Syrian public opinion was demanding the establishment of a Government endowed with wider powers. Thirdly, there was a need for an economic and social programme which would help to solve the problems of unemployment, the food supply, agriculture and commerce. In the light of these conclusions the High Commissioner had decided upon the following measures: the replacement of the Council of Directors by a 'Head of the Government'; the formation of an Advisory Assembly, to be composed of representatives of the political, cultural and economic life of the country and of the younger generation, and in which the Druzes and Alawis would also be represented

648 while retaining their special Statutes; the establishment of a
668 Council of State to draft legislation; the participation of the Syrian Government in the organization of the food supply for Syria and Lebanon; and the execution of an important programme of public works. 'The day of fulfilment is at hand and existing difficulties will be resolved by the co-operation of all and not by demonstrations in the streets. The Syrian nation wishes to carry on its work in an orderly and peaceful manner. Order and peace shall be safeguarded.'[1]

645 A few days later a prominent business man and member of a leading Damascene family, Khalid al-Azm, was appointed Prime Minister, with a Ministry most of the members of which, like the Prime Minister himself, had not previously taken a prominent part in the political life of Syria. In its programme the new Government promised to reform the administration, to develop external trade, to pay special attention to the problems of education and youth, to ameliorate the lot of the workers and officials, and to preserve strict non-partisanship in all political matters.

Shortly afterwards a similar change took place in Lebanon. The President of the Republic and the Secretary of State resigned their offices, and were replaced by a politically neutral Ministry headed by Alfred Naccache, a Maronite judge who had hitherto played no important part in politics.

5

648 During these uncertain months the true centre of Syrian
668 political life was Baghdad. It has already been made clear how united is political feeling in the different centres of the Fertile Crescent. The Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939 had received encouragement and help from the neighbouring Arab countries; and after it subsided the thought persisted that the sorrows of Palestine, and also the sorrows of Syria, could only be ended by a united effort of the whole Arab people. It was also widely believed that in this effort Iraq would have to play the leading part, since it possessed greater freedom of action than most of the other Arab regions, and also the nucleus of a trained army. The sense that the destiny of their nation depended on them exalted the spirits of a certain group among the Iraqi Arabs; and their enthusiasm was further increased by the teaching of the

[1] See Appendix A10.

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many Syrians and Palestinians, teachers, government officials 698
and political exiles, who thronged Baghdad in the first years 668
of the war. To the general Arab unrest there were added particular Iraqi grievances; and both were encouraged to express themselves violently by the comparative failure of British arms in 1940 and 1941 and the great though temporary influence of German propaganda. Finally, when the general position of the war seemed most propitious, Rashid Ali raised the banner of revolt. He was supported by some, although by no means all, of the nationalists in other Arab countries; in imagination they saw the revolt not as a seizure of power by the Army but as a protest of the Arabs against British policy in Palestine and French in Syria. When the revolt failed, a wave of doubt and self-criticism swept over the nationalist ranks, in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, no less than in Iraq.

6

These events were swiftly followed by others of even greater 648
import. Ever since the French capitulation German agents 926
had been active in Syria and Lebanon. In the first months of 1941 German influence was thought to be increasing rapidly and alarmingly; and it was believed that the completion of her Balkan campaign had brought nearer the possibility of a gradual infiltration of German troops and agents into the French Mandated Territories, until finally Germany would be able to obtain complete control of them. Her forces would then be in a position to threaten the British armies in Palestine and Egypt, and Turkey to the north.

The danger was brought to a head by the outbreak of the Iraqi insurrection in May. German aircraft were permitted by the Government of Vichy to use Syrian air-bases as stages on their journey to Iraq; and it was obvious to those who had studied German methods of infiltration that this was the beginning of a process which would, unless forestalled, soon take on such proportions that to check it would be of the greatest difficulty.

It therefore came as no surprise to the general public when June 8th, 1941, a mixed force of Imperial, Free French and other Allied troops crossed the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon; the whole force was under the command of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and the Free French contingent under that

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of General Catroux. General Dentz's troops put up an unexpectedly strong resistance. It had been generally hoped that it would be nominal or else would be overcome without much difficulty, on account of the supposed bad state of morale among the French troops, the alleged poor condition of their equipment, the repatriation of a large part of the army of the Levant to France after the Armistice, the defection of a number of officers and men to the Free French cause, and the pro-British sympathies of certain elements in the population. This hope was not fulfilled. General Dentz's troops resisted strongly, for a number of reasons: because of hostility to Great Britain and Free France and suspicion of their intentions; from professional pride and the desire to wipe out the shame of the French capitulation of 1940; because the policy of Vichy included the defence of the Empire against all attacks upon it; and because of severe disciplinary measures taken by General Dentz in the weeks preceding the attack.

The Allied advance was made in several columns, some of which entered the country from Palestine and Transjordan in the south, and the others from Iraq in the east. Of the columns advancing from the south, one took the coastal road, with Beirut as its goal; a second went northwards from Metullah into the region beneath the western slopes of Hermon, heading towards the Biqa', the valley between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, in which lies the air-base of Rayaq; a third advanced towards Damascus by way of Quneitra; and others towards Damascus through the Hauran. Of the columns which invaded Syria from Iraq, one struck across the desert towards Palmyra and then towards Homs and the roads and railway which run north and south connecting the great towns of the interior; another moved up the course of the Euphrates towards Dair az-Zor and then south-west to Palmyra; and a third westwards along the northern frontier, towards Aleppo. The northward and westward movements tended to converge as the columns moved forward, pushing the enemy forces before them towards the north-western section of the country. In the first days of the campaign the forces from the south captured Sur, Dera' and Merjayun and advanced beyond them. But the further they went the fiercer the resistance to them grew; they captured Kiswe, a few miles south of Damascus, but there they were halted, while the French forces launched a counter-attack and on June 16th recaptured

SYRIA: the Campaign of 1941 8th June — 12th July

SCALE:— Km. 0 50 100

Roads & Tracks.....

Main Railways.....

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726 648 Quneitra and Merjayun. They were dislodged from the former in a few hours, but from the latter only after more than a week of heavy fighting on June 24th. By that time the other columns had made considerable progress; on June 20th the deciding battle for Damascus was fought. An Indian brigade penetrated after hard fighting into the suburbs of Mezze to the west of Damascus; the Australians following in support took Fort Gouraud. In the face of this threat from the west and pressure from Free French columns to the south and east General Dentz ordered the evacuation of the city. Free French troops under Colonel Collet led the Allied entry of June 21st. In the next few days a rapid advance was made north of Damascus by Allied troops, while those moving westwards through the desert drew nearer to the railway and Aleppo, Homs and Hama; and those on the coastal road continued their approach upon Beirut, in spite of heavy resistance at Damur and elsewhere.

By the beginning of July the end of the campaign was in sight. On July 8th General Dentz was forced to ask for terms; and after several days of negotiations, an Armistice Convention was initialled at Acre on July 12th and signed on the 14th. Allied forces were to occupy Syrian and Lebanese territory; the French forces were to be accorded the full honours of war; all war material was either to be transferred to the British authorities or to be destroyed under their supervision; prisoners of war were to be released; the free choice between rallying to the Allied cause and being repatriated was to be left to individuals on the French side; the rights of French cultural institutions were to be respected; all public services, means of communication, port installations, naval establishments, ships, aircraft, air installations, and equipment and fuel stocks were to be handed over intact; and no reprisals were to be taken by the British authorities against Syrians or Lebanese who had been involved in the recent hostilities in a military or official capacity. The execution of the Convention was to be supervised by a commission of control, of which three members, including the President, were to be nominated by the British authorities and the other two by the Vichy French authorities.[1]

[1] See Appendix A13.

7

In the period which has elapsed between the Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon and the present day, a number of statements have been issued for the purpose of defining the policy which Free France should follow in the Mandated Territories, her attitude to the inhabitants and her relations with Great Britain. 648

The intentions of the Free French towards the Syrians and Lebanese were stated on the day on which the invasion began, in the proclamation issued by General Catroux :

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon !

'At the moment when the forces of Free France, united to the forces of the British Empire, her ally, are entering your territory, I declare that I assume the powers, responsibilities and duties of the representative of France in the Levant. I do this in the name of Free France, which is the traditional and real France, and in the name of her Chief, General de Gaulle. In this capacity I come to put an end to the mandatory régime and to proclaim you free and independent.

'You will therefore be from henceforward sovereign and independent peoples, and you will be able either to form yourselves into separate States or to unite into a single State. In either event, your independent and sovereign status will be guaranteed by a Treaty in which our mutual relations will be defined. This Treaty will be negotiated as soon as possible between your representatives and myself. Pending its conclusion our mutual position will be one of close unity in pursuit of a common ideal and common aims.

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon, you will see from this declaration that if the Free French and British forces cross your frontier, it is not to take away your liberty, it is to ensure it. It is to drive out of Syria the forces of Hitler. It is to prevent the Levant from becoming an enemy base directed against the British and against ourselves.

'We who are fighting for the liberty of peoples cannot allow the enemy to subjugate your country step by step, obtain control of your persons and your belongings, and turn you into slaves. We cannot allow the populations which France has promised to defend to fall into the hands of the

most wanton and pitiless master that history has known. We cannot allow the age-long interests of France in the Levant to be handed over to the enemy.

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon! If, in answer to our appeal, you rally to us, you should know that the British Government in agreement with Free France has promised to grant you all the advantages enjoyed by the free countries which are associated with them. Thus the blockade will be lifted and you will enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous advantages from the point of view of your imports and exports. You will be able to buy and sell freely with all the free countries.

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon! A great hour in your history has struck. France declares you independent by the voice of her sons who are fighting for her life and for the liberty of the world.'[1]

Simultaneously, the British Ambassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson, made the following statement in the name of the British Government:

'General Catroux, on behalf of General de Gaulle, Chief of the Free French, has issued a declaration to the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon before advancing with the object of expelling the Germans. In this he declares the liberty and independence of Syria and Lebanon. He undertakes to negotiate a treaty to ensure these objects.

'I am authorized by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to declare that they support and associate themselves with the assurance of independence given by General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon.

'I am also authorized to give you the assurance that should you support and join the Allies, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom offer you all the advantages enjoyed by free countries who are associated with them. The blockade will be lifted and you may enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous, besides immediate, advantages from the point of view of your exports and imports. You will be able to sell your products and to buy freely in all the free countries.'[2]

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A11. [2] *The Times*, June 9th, 1941.

8

On June 24th, after the capture of Damascus, General de Gaulle issued two decrees, the one nominating General Catroux Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the Levant, and the other appointing him 'Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary' of the Chief of the Free French for the States of the Levant. (This title was to replace that of High Commissioner.) In a letter to General Catroux announcing these appointments, General de Gaulle laid down the main lines of the policy which he was to adopt in regard to Syrian and Lebanese independence. 648

'You are going to exercise your powers and functions in my name and in that of the Council of Defence of the French Empire. Your mission will consist particularly in restoring the economic situation in the Levant as rapidly and completely as the circumstances of the war permit; in negotiating with the qualified representatives of the interested peoples treaties establishing the independence and sovereignty of the Levant States, while guaranteeing their alliance with France and safeguarding the rights and interests of France; in assuring the defence of the territories against the enemy and co-operating with the Allies in the military operations in the East.

'Until the régime resulting from the treaties to be concluded is established—and this ought to take place as soon as possible—you should assume all the powers hitherto exercised by the High Commissioner of France in the Levant and all the responsibilities incumbent upon him.

'Furthermore, your powers will include that of representing France so far as treaties are concerned, and you will be at the same time Commander-in-Chief of our forces.

'You will bring about, whenever it shall be possible, the establishment of assemblies fully representative of the whole of the population and the formation of Governments having the confidence of those assemblies. You will immediately enter into negotiations with these Governments, so as to bring about the conclusion of treaties of alliance. These treaties will be signed by those Governments and by me.

'In spite of the confusion and chaos resulting from the temporary reverses of the French armies and in spite of the intrigues of the invader in our country, the Mandate of

648 France, which was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1923, should be exercised up to the moment when it is effectively ended, and until then the work of France ought to continue.

'In consequence, you will take as the point of departure for the negotiations with the Levant States the treaties of alliance concluded with them in 1936. You will suggest to the Governments of the Levant States the temporary measures which should be taken in common in order to meet the needs of our common defence in this war, and which therefore will form the subject of special conventions.

'I take it upon myself to bring to the knowledge of the League of Nations, at the appropriate time, the replacement of the mandatory régime in the Levant by a new régime which will pursue the aims for which the Mandate was established.'[1]

9

Although since the armistice the Free French have been in territorial control of Syria and Lebanon and responsible for the civil administration, the country has been mainly garrisoned by British and Imperial troops of the Ninth Army, and supreme military authority has been in British hands. Economically and financially it has become part of the bloc of British-controlled Middle Eastern territories. In September, 1941, for example, it was admitted to the sterling area. Thus Free French policy in the Mandated Territories has affected not only Franco-Arab but also Franco-British relations.

The attitude of the British Government towards the future political régime in Syria and Lebanon was made clear from the beginning of the Free French administration. First, it desired to see these States given their independence; but secondly, subject to the fulfilment of that condition, it acknowledged the priority of France's position over that of any other European Power in Syria and Lebanon. This attitude was defined in an interchange of letters between Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, the Minister of State in the Middle East, and General de Gaulle on August 15th, 1941. Mr. Lyttelton wrote:

'At the conclusion of our talk to-day I am happy to repeat to you the assurance that Great Britain has no

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A12.

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interest in Syria or the Lebanon, except to win the war. We have no desire to encroach in any way upon the position of France. Both Free France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. When this essential step has been taken, and without prejudice to it, we freely admit that France should have the predominant position in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power. It is in this spirit that we have always acted. You will have seen recent utterances of the Prime Minister in this sense. I am glad to reaffirm them now to our friends and allies, who have our full sympathy and support.

'On our side, I am happy again to receive your assurances of the determination of Free France, as friend and ally of Great Britain and in accordance with the agreements and declarations which you have already made, to pursue relentlessly to the finish the war against the common enemy. I am happy that we should thus reaffirm our complete understanding and agreement.'

General de Gaulle replied:

'I have received the letter which you have been kind enough to send me following our interview of to-day. I am happy to note your renewed assurances regarding the disinterestedness of Great Britain in Syria and Lebanon, and the fact that Great Britain admits as a basic principle the pre-eminent and privileged position of France when these shall have attained independence in conformity with the undertaking which Free France has taken with regard to them.

'I take this opportunity of repeating that Free France, that is to say, France, is resolved to pursue the war at the side of Great Britain, her friend and ally, until the attainment of complete victory against our common enemies.'[1]

The British guarantees were repeated with even greater authority by the Prime Minister. Speaking in the House of Commons on September 9th, 1941, he said:

'We have no ambitions in Syria. We do not seek to replace or supplant France, or substitute British for French interests in any part of Syria. We are only in Syria in order to win the war. However, I must make it quite clear that our policy, to which our Free French Allies

[1] *Bulletin of International News*, XVIII, No. 17, p. 1,115.

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have subscribed, is that Syria shall be handed back to the Syrians, who will assume at the earliest possible moment their independent sovereign rights. We do not propose that this process of creating an independent Syrian Government or Governments—because it may be that they will not be one Government—shall wait until the end of the war. We contemplate constantly increasing the Syrian share in the administration. There is no question of France maintaining the same position which she exercised in Syria before the war, but which the French Government had realized must come to an end. On the other hand, we recognize that among all the nations of Europe the position of France in Syria is one of special privilege, and that in so far as any European countries have influence in Syria, that of France will be pre-eminent.' (Hon. Members: 'Why?') 'Because that is the policy which we have decided to adopt. We did not go there in order to deprive France of her historic position in Syria, except in so far as is necessary to fulfil our obligations and pledges to the Syrian population. There must be no question, even in wartime, of a mere substitution of Free French interests for Vichy French interests. The Syrian peoples are to come back into their own. This is fully recognized in the documents which have been exchanged between the Minister of State and the representatives of the Free French.

'I was asked a question about our relations with Iraq. They are special; our relations with Egypt are special, and, in the same way, I conceive that France will have special arrangements with Syria. The independence of Syria is a prime feature in our policy.'[1]

10

There followed a period of negotiations and discussions, during which the Government of Khalid al-Azm in Syria and that of Alfred Naccache in Lebanon remained in office. General Catroux, in the letter in which he asked the Syrian Prime Minister to remain in office, stated that the Mandatory régime could not be terminated until the occupation of the country was complete; after that a régime of independence would be inaugurated, to be guaranteed by a treaty negotiated on a footing of equality.

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, Vol. 374, col. 76.

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The decision on the form of political organization to be adopted was reached sooner in Syria than in Lebanon. In September, 1941, there was published a letter from General Catroux to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani. In this letter the General stated that, after having diligently consulted public opinion and having no object in view but the good of the country, he considered Shaikh Taj ad-Din to be better qualified than any one else to organize the new independent and sovereign Syrian State., 'I propose therefore to Your Excellency that you take in hand the destinies of Syria with the title, the prerogatives and the privileges attached to the office of President of the Syrian Republic, and as such set up the government of the State with the shortest possible delay. If, as I hope, you accept this offer, you can be certain of my entire support and full collaboration.'[1]

The new President was the son of a Moslem divine of Damascus, Shaikh Badr ad-Din. He himself had been prominent in Syrian politics in the years between the two wars, as an advocate of collaboration with the Mandatory Power who had at the same time always regarded himself as a nationalist. He had twice been Prime Minister: from 1928 to 1931 and again from 1934 to 1935. Since 1935 he had taken no active part in Syrian political life and his reputation for wisdom and probity was by no means high.

A few days later, on September 28th, 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria:

'Syrians,

'On June 8th last, at the time of the entry into the Levant of the Allied Armies, in a manifesto which I addressed to you in the name of Free France and of her Chief, General de Gaulle, I recognized Syria as a sovereign and independent State, under the promise of a treaty guaranteeing our reciprocal relations.

'The British Government, the Ally of Free France, acting in accord with her, associated itself by a simultaneous declaration with this important political act. On the 16th of this month, I put my declaration of June 8th into effect by translating into established fact the principle there enunciated.

'Thus the era is begun in which independent and sovereign Syria will herself control her destinies.

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne* (Cairo), September 17th, 1941.

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648 'His Excellency Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani has consented to organize the new régime of independence. His experience of affairs and his profound understanding of the country's needs mark him out for this high mission. I assure him as well as the whole Syrian nation of my support and of my loyal collaboration.

'In this collaboration I shall be guided by the following principles:

'The Syrian State will enjoy from now onwards the rights and prerogatives of an independent and sovereign State. These will be subject only to the restrictions imposed by the present state of war and the security of the territory.

'Her position as *de facto* Ally of Free France and of Great Britain necessitates a strict conformity of her policy with that of the Allies.

'With her accession to independent international life, Syria assumes naturally the rights and obligations hitherto undertaken in her name.

'She has the power to appoint diplomatic representatives in countries where she judges that her interests demand such representation. Everywhere else, the authorities of Free France will lend her their good offices in order to ensure the defence of her general rights and interests as well as the protection of her nationals.

'The Syrian State is empowered to organize its national military forces. Free France will lend it all help to this end.

'Great Britain having already committed herself on several occasions to the recognition of the independence of Syria, Free France will intervene without delay with other allied or friendly Powers, so that they also should recognize the independence of the Syrian State.

'Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be

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politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled. 648

'It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.

'Free France undertakes to act as intermediary between Syria and Lebanon for the purpose of seeking and establishing the basis of economic collaboration between the two countries, and of removing the difficulties which this collaboration encounters at present.

'This "entente", necessary between two countries which are both brothers and neighbours, must guarantee the respective rights of the two parties, and establish their relations on the basis of reciprocal confidence.

'To safeguard the independence and sovereignty of Syria and bring the common struggle to a successful issue, the Allies will undertake the defence of the country during the period of war. To this end, the Syrian Government will put the Syrian national forces at the disposal of the Allied Command, in order to co-operate in the defence of the territory. Further, the Allied Command will make use from now onwards, as far as military necessities demand, of the resources and public services of Syria, particularly of means of communication, aerodromes and coastal establishments. The defence of the territory demands also that a strict collaboration should exist at all times between the Commander-in-Chief and Delegate-General, and the gendarmerie, police and security services of the Syrian State. Syria must indeed be defended in time of war not only against her enemies without but also against those within.

'By reason of the inclusion of Syria in the war-zone and in the economic and financial system of the Allies, the strictest collaboration between the Syrian Government and the Allies is also necessary in order to ensure, for the duration of hostilities and in the common interest, the observance of all measures taken to conduct the economic war satisfactorily.

'To this end, for the duration of the war the widest facilities will be accorded to assure the greatest possible freedom of exchange between Syria and the countries of the

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S 648 sterling bloc. Syria, having now entered the sterling bloc, will in the economic and financial sphere and especially in that of exchange take the necessary measures to follow the general policy of the sterling bloc.

'The preceding stipulations reconcile respect for Syrian independence and sovereignty with the necessities of war. They are inspired by a single thought, that of winning the war and by this means assuring to Syria the future of a free people. They give the Franco-Syrian problem a solution which springs from the desire of Free France not to retard, in spite of the war, the accomplishment of Syrian national aspirations and the fulfilment of the undertakings of the Allies. But it is necessary that a final settlement should be substituted for them as soon as possible, in the form of a Franco-Syrian Treaty which will definitively guarantee the independence of the country.

'Long live independent Syria! Long live England! Long live France!'[1]

S 645 648 At the same time the new President of the Syrian Republic took up his duties. In October Shaikh Taj was able to announce the formation of a Government, at the head of which was Hasan al-Hakim, a well-known financial expert and a former collaborator of Dr. Shahbandar. Among the members of the Ministry were an Alawi and a Druze, but none of the leaders of the Bloc.

The declaration of independence and the formation of a Government aroused no enthusiasm among the population. The nationalists preferred to wait before giving their approval, to see what steps Free France would take to render her undertakings effective. They also objected to the appointment of the President instead of his choice by a freely elected Chamber; and in particular they disapproved of the appointment of Shaikh Taj.

II

L 648 The independence of Lebanon was proclaimed two months later, on November 26th, 1941. General Catroux's proclamation ran as follows:

'Lebanese,

'The proclamation which I addressed to you on June 8th in the name of General de Gaulle, Chief of Free France, and

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A14.

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which Great Britain supported by a special simultaneous declaration, recognized Lebanon, under the guarantee of a treaty to be concluded with a view to defining Franco-Lebanese reciprocal relations, as a sovereign and independent State. 648

'As the trustee for the French liberal tradition and anxious to honour the engagements undertaken towards you, Free France, at the moment of entering the Levant, began with an act of emancipation, in spite of the war and the exceptional circumstances which it imposed: she made you free and independent.

'Your aspirations are satisfied. It is now a matter of organizing your independence. As far as I am concerned, I have two tutelary duties. The first is to confide the work of installing and directing the régime to a man fully qualified to accomplish this difficult task in present circumstances. After very extensive consultations both with individuals and with public opinion throughout the whole extent of the territory, I have understood that the hopes of the Lebanese nation are fixed upon His Excellency M. Naccache. I have asked him to remain in power with the title and prerogatives of President of the Republic, and to govern by means of a ministry which will be responsible to him and in which the just representation of all the regions and confessions which form the Lebanese nation will be assured.

'I assure President Naccache, as well as the Lebanese community, of my friendship and entire support.

'The second task is to define the spirit and forms of the collaboration to be established between Lebanon and Free France, while awaiting the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and friendship.

'In recognizing your independence, France is inspired solely by her traditional friendship with Lebanon, by her tutelary mission in this country throughout the centuries, and by the privileged position which she has thus acquired. Her aid remains assured to Lebanon in all things, in the spirit of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of Alliance and Friendship of 1936, which received the unanimous approbation of the Lebanese population. Moreover, the circumstances of war and the occupation of Lebanese territory by the Allied forces place Lebanon temporarily in a special position.

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L 648 There flow from this a certain number of rights and obligations, among them in particular those stipulated below.'

The remainder of the proclamation was substantially the same, with minor and verbal variations, as the proclamation of Syrian independence.[1]

This declaration was received lukewarmly by the greater part of the population. It was open to objection on various grounds. Those who advocated the union of Lebanon with Syria regarded the proclamation as a repudiation of the promise contained in Catroux's statement of June 8th, that the Syrians and Lebanese would be free to form themselves into separate States or to unite into a single State. They objected also to the assertion that Lebanon was politically and territorially an indivisible unit. A similar statement had appeared in the Syrian proclamation and had there been open to no objection; but in the Lebanese proclamation it was taken to imply that any modification of the frontiers between Syria and Lebanon was out of the question.

Furthermore, all those who were opposed to the maintenance of French control, whether they were believers in Lebanese, in Syrian or in Arab nationalism, resented the references to France's 'mission' in the Levant and the statement that the future treaty would be negotiated on the basis of the Treaty of 1936.

L 645 These criticisms were not lessened when it was announced that a Ministry had been formed, with Ahmad ad-Da'uq as Prime Minister, and composed of colourless personalities without any claim to represent the population.

12

S 648 The British Government approved of the Free French policy of proclaiming Syrian and Lebanese independence, and gave its formal recognition to both the newly independent States, in the shape of letters of congratulation sent by His Majesty King George VI, to the Syrian President on October 27th, 1941, and to the Lebanese on December 26th.

In February, 1942, Major-General Sir Edward Spears, who had been connected with the Free French movement since its beginning, and had been in the Levant as head of the 'Spears Mission' since 1941, was appointed first British Minister to the Syrian and Lebanese Republics.

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A15.

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In addition to Great Britain, the independence of Syria 648
and Lebanon was recognized by a number of the Allied Governments in exile. That of Syria, but not of Lebanon, was recognized by Sa'udi Arabia; while Egypt recognized the independence of the Syrian State but not its present form of government. The other Arab Governments, however, withheld their recognition, preferring to make no move until the form of independence should acquire reality through the re-establishment of constitutional government. Turkey, too, gave no recognition, not having official relations with the Free French. Most important of all, the United States Government maintained a reserved attitude. Mr. Cordell Hull, in a statement issued on November 29th, 1941, stressed the sympathy which the American Government and people had always felt for the 'natural and legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Syria and Lebanon'. The convention of 1924, in which the U.S. Government gave its consent to the Mandate, clearly embodied the principle of Syrian and Lebanese independence. It must be regarded as continuing in effect until new instruments of a mutually satisfactory nature could be negotiated and ratified. The U.S. Government was hopeful that as soon as international conditions permitted such negotiations would take place, enabling the Government to extend formal recognition to Syria and Lebanon.[1] In October, 1942, Mr. George Wadsworth was appointed U.S. Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

13

In spite of the declarations of independence, the French 648
authorities showed no eagerness either to restore constitutional 642
life or to transfer powers to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. In August, 1942, indeed, General de Gaulle stated categorically in a speech made during his visit to the Levant that elections could not yet be held. The only progress made was the issue in February, 1942, of decrees once more incorporating Jebel Druze and the Alawi district in the Syrian State, while at the same time endowing them with special administrative and financial régimes similar to those which had existed from 1936 to 1939.[2] Apart from this, the only political events of the years were changes of Ministries. In 000

[1] For text, see P. W. Ireland (ed.), *The Near East, Problems and Prospects* (Chicago, 1942), p. 256. [2] See Chapter XI.

000 Lebanon the Government of Sami as-Sulh succeeded that of
645 Ahmad ad-Da'uq. In Syria, Hasan al-Hakim resigned in April, 1942, and was succeeded by Husni al-Barazi, who himself gave way in January, 1943, to Jamil al-Ulshi. These changes had only a very limited significance.

648 This failure to restore the constitutional Government
126 increased the discontent which had already been caused in both Syria and Lebanon by the way in which their independence had been proclaimed. The administrative methods of the Free French officials were also much criticized; more particularly, a general contempt was felt for the many officials who had served Vichy and had only gone over to Free France after the occupation of the country in 1941. Thus the belief grew up that Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing by their change of masters. It was a belief held not only by the political classes but by ordinary citizens who resented the inefficiency of the French administration; not only by Arab nationalists but even by many of the Lebanese Christians, who could not feel towards the Free French the admiration, gratitude and trust which they had had for France as a great Power. In the circumstances it was natural that Great Britain should be largely blamed for the actions of her ally.

645 One consequence of the discontent was a revival in the
665 power of the National Bloc. The dissensions between its leaders were patched up, and the Bloc united in its demand for the restoration of the Chamber of 1936-1939 or else the holding of fresh elections. Its spokesman was Shukri al-Quwatli, whose reputation had grown steadily throughout the years. In October, 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation, he absented himself from Syria on a visit to Arabia and Iraq; but after his return to Damascus in September, 1942, he became once more the dominant figure of the political scene. Side by side with the revival of the Bloc there went a growth in the size and influence of the Socialist and Communist movements; this was due not so much to the spread of Marxist doctrines as to the universal discontent with the existing order and the eagerness to snatch at any hope of change.

14

722 In Syria and Lebanon alike, the attention of the greater part of the population was concentrated upon the economic problems of the war. Two of them were peculiarly important.

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First, there was the problem of guaranteeing the supply of wheat, guarding against both the fear and the reality of shortage and putting an end to the hoarding of grain which had been going on since the beginning of the war. Shortly after the Allied occupation, a large quantity of wheat was brought into the country by the Allied authorities and sold to the wholesale merchants, for the purpose of making hoarders disgorge their stocks. Since many of the merchants either hoarded the wheat or else sold it to Turkey, this measure did not have the effect which had been hoped. For the harvest of 1942, a different plan was adopted. A Commission was appointed, with English, French, Syrian and Lebanese members, and under the ultimate control of the British and French authorities. Its task was to buy the whole wheat-crop, over and above the needs of the cultivator; it was then to be distributed directly to the population at fixed prices and in limited amounts. This scheme also did not work well at first. The population was unused to such interference by the Government in economic processes and suspicious of its motives; the various authorities concerned did not always agree; there was much hoarding, and not a little corruption. But gradually things improved. In spite of numerous temporary and local difficulties, the situation of the wheat supply is not unsatisfactory.

The other problem was that of the inflationary tendencies which appeared as a consequence of the shortage of supplies, the practice of hoarding, the excessive issue of paper-money, and the general lack of confidence in the future of France and even more of the Free French.

Measures have been taken to keep this tendency within limits; for example, in May, 1943, the restrictions upon the purchase of sterling were removed. But the danger is bound to remain so long as the war lasts. Perhaps the most important of the steps taken to improve the economic situation is the attempt which has been made through the Anglo-American Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo to increase the local production of goods which the Middle Eastern countries need, and to improve their distribution. Established to deal with the situation caused by the shortage of shipping, the Centre has tended more and more to become a planning organization for the economic life of the area which it serves.

Unemployment, too, might have been a danger, had it not

722 been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

15

648 After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to
642 restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

666 In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was
646 decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies,
665 including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

643 On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected
645 Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

In Lebanon the preparations for the elections took longer to complete. The main question at issue was that of the distribution of seats in the new Chamber. It was agreed that the Chamber should consist only of elected members, not as previously of a majority of elected and a minority of nominated ones; but Dr. Tabit's suggestions for allocating seats between the sects were opposed by the Moslems. M. Helleu, who had succeeded General Catroux as Delegate-General in June, was compelled to replace Dr. Tabit by Petro Trad; and finally an agreed settlement was reached by which the Christian sects would have 30 seats and the Moslems 25.

Elections were held at the end of August. As in previous elections, the differences between the candidates were largely personal; but there was also a conflict of principle involved, the more extreme supporters of Lebanese independence, with Emile Edde as their most prominent figure, being opposed by the more moderate advocates of autonomy, led by Bishara al-Khuri, and the Arab nationalists. The former were completely defeated in spite of the support given them by the French authorities. On September 21st the Chamber met and elected Bishara al-Khuri President of the Republic by 44 votes to nil.

The new President asked Riyadh as-Sulh to form a Ministry. A Sunni Moslem, by origin from Southern Lebanon, Riyadh as-Sulh had for long been recognized as one of the leaders of the Arab nationalists in Lebanon, and had been an associate of Shukri al-Quwatli in the 'Istiqlal' group.

The new Ministry was composed as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister of Finance	Riyadh as-Sulh.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Education	Habib Abu Shahla.
Minister of the Interior and of Posts and Telegraphs ..	Camille Shamun.
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Public Works	Salim Taqla.
Minister of Defence and Hygiene	Amir Majid Arslan.
Minister of Food Supply and National Economy	Adil Usayran.

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The members of the Ministry were respectively Sunni Moslem, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Greek Catholic, Druze and Shi'i. Thus the convention which had grown up that the Cabinet should include representatives of all the more important sects was respected. The Ministers, however divided though they might be in religious allegiance, were united in desiring on the one hand a greater measure of self-government for Lebanon, and on the other closer relations between Lebanon and Syria.

17

S 648 L 648

Iraq recognized the independence of Syria in August and of Lebanon in October. In September the Egyptian Government announced its decision to recognize Lebanese independence and to establish legations in Damascus and Beirut. The Sa'udi Arabian Government also declared its intention to set up a legation in Damascus. These three Governments showed in this and in other ways their satisfaction with the restoration of constitutional rule in the Levant States.

These steps made possible a serious attempt by the Syrians and Lebanese to define their relations with each other, with France, with the other Arab countries and with the United Nations.[1]

[1] More recent events are summarized in the Postscript.

PART FOUR

XIII. CONCLUSIONS

1

A SATISFACTORY settlement of the immediate political problems of Syria and Lebanon, as of all the Arabic-speaking countries, should fulfil three conditions. It should be compatible with the requirements of world peace; it should be in the interest of the Arab peoples and make possible the establishment of stable Governments able to administer the Arab countries adequately and willing to work with each other and with other Governments in matters of common interest; and it should safeguard the essential interests of the Western Powers.

These three conditions are closely connected with one another. The peace of the world cannot be secured without an improvement in the relations between the Asiatic peoples and the Western Powers. The establishment of stable Arab Governments is impossible except within a stable world-order, and except with the help of the West. The interests of the Powers cannot be maintained by armed force in opposition to the wishes of the inhabitants of the countries in which those interests lie, but only by an agreement from which both parties benefit. Thus none of the three conditions can be satisfied unless the others are.

2

Some at least of the principles on which a settlement should be based are clear. It would be generally agreed that the military and economic weakness of the Arab countries will make necessary the maintenance of foreign armed forces at certain points in the Arab world for a number of years. Subject to this reservation, it would be desirable to give the greatest measure of satisfaction to the legitimate demands of the Arab people. Those demands can be summed up in a single word: equality. The Arabs will not acquiesce in a settlement in which their desires and interests are treated as of minor importance or of none at all. They insist that in fact as well as in form they should be regarded as equal members of the community of nations. If this demand is not conceded, there is a danger that they will turn away from the community of nations and fall victims of a false nationalism based on hatred and aiming at destruction.

The recognition of equality involves the establishment of a measure of self-government equal to that which other nations possess. There is a tendency to-day to point out the dangers of national independence and to condemn sovereignty as a false ideal. That is justifiable, but those who condemn unrestricted nationalism may ignore the germ of truth in it. National self-government is a training school of political virtue, and also a source of enrichment to mankind in so far as a nation has its own vision of life which it wishes to embody in institutions and laws. It only becomes a danger when the nation falls into the sin of pride and begins to worship itself; but this is a danger for all men's communities, not for the nation alone.

A nation is only worthy of self-government, however, in so far as it is prepared to order its own conduct by the principles of justice and equality in accordance with which it demands that other nations should treat it. An Arab Government, or Governments, should be prepared to accept such limitations upon its action as are necessary for the attainment of world peace and prosperity, and to co-operate actively with other Governments to that end. It should also be prepared to re-organize the internal life of the Arab nation on a more just and equitable basis. This will involve not only the recognition of individual freedom but also sweeping social and economic changes, to raise the standard of living and remove the injustices of the existing archaic social order. Such a re-organization should be undertaken not only for its own sake but also because without it stable Government is impossible.

If the Western Powers are to retain their influence in the Middle East they should be prepared to help actively in the work of rebuilding Arab society; that is to say, to give the Arabs a permanent and positive interest in co-operating with them. They should do so without expecting immediate profits, but with the hope that in the long run their work will bear fruit. In other ways, too, they should take a long view. They should learn to regard the Arab countries as a unity, and a unified policy towards them as therefore necessary. For each Power to pursue a policy of its own, not only separate from but perhaps in opposition to that of the others, may be fatal to all in the end; and in order to preserve their essential interests it may be necessary to give up much which though not essential has been valued as if it were.

3

The experience of the last generation has made clear the truth of some at least of these principles. The statements of policy summarized in the last chapter may be regarded as an attempt, however imperfect, to apply them to the special conditions of Syria and Lebanon. 600

These statements touch both the problem of Franco-British relations in the Middle East and that of Franco-Arab relations. Great Britain has recognized the priority of France's position in Syria and Lebanon over that of other European Powers, subject to the condition that Syria and Lebanon should be given their independence. It follows from this recognition, and from the more general assurances given to Free France in June, 1940, that Great Britain has an obligation not to encroach upon France's position or to use French weakness for her own gain. This does not mean, however, that she can or should wholly ignore what France does with her position. Both her recognition of the French position and her guarantee of the French declarations of 1941 make it inevitable that the Arabs will hold her responsible for the use which Free France makes of her position during the war, and also for what a restored France may do in the future. If during and after the war the French pursue a policy in the Levant States which is inacceptable to their populations, it is Great Britain as much as France which will incur the blame for it. This would have harmful effects upon Great Britain's position and influence in the Arab world.

If it would be impossible to persuade the Syrians and Lebanese to accept a continuation of Mandatory rule (under that name or another), it would be scarcely less difficult to persuade them to conclude treaties with France similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty or the abortive Treaties of 1936. The essence of those agreements was that a weak Arab State made certain military and other concessions to a strong Western State in return for military protection and the guarantee of its independence. Such an agreement would be very difficult to achieve in this case, although there is a strong body of Free French opinion in favour of it. The Syrians and Lebanese would ask what advantage they have to gain from it. France, they say, cannot give them any better guarantee of their independence than the Atlantic Charter or the friendship of the United Nations and the Arab States have already given

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them. Again, the Syrians and Lebanese will not trust France to carry out such a Treaty in the proper spirit; they remember the bitter experiences of the last twenty years.

No doubt after the war the relations of France with Syria and Lebanon will have to be settled by means of a treaty, but it may have to be a treaty of a different sort. The two States would not, in their present mood, concede more than an agreement by which France gave up all her political interests [illegible] essential French interest: her cultural position and the institutions which nourish it. Even this agreement would be difficult to make in view of mutual suspicions and unhappy memories. It will only be possible if Great Britain and the U.S.A. use their influence with both sides. They can make it clear to the Syrians and Lebanese that they are underwriting the French renunciation of political designs; and that in the long run it will be an advantage to the Arabs to have a centre of French culture in Arab Asia. To France they can point out that her cultural influence has been seriously damaged and almost killed by the policy she has followed in the last twenty-five years; and that they are not asking her to sacrifice her interests but only to pursue a new policy which will as a matter of fact be more in her interest than the old. (Whether or not the Syrians, the Lebanese and the French will be disposed to listen to these British and American explanations will, of course, depend largely on the general nature of their relations with Great Britain and America; in particular the Syrian and Lebanese attitude will be much affected by the policy of the Anglo-Saxon Powers towards Zionism.)

4

In these circumstances the question of the defence of Syria and Lebanon would presumably form the subject of a further agreement or treaty; not a treaty with France, however, but with a group of the United Nations, of which France would be one. The details of such an agreement cannot be worked out here; but it may, as has already been stated, be necessary for certain strong points to be occupied by foreign armed forces for a period of years. Whatever arrangement is made to this end will have to fulfil two conditions if it is to be acceptable to the inhabitants. The first is, that the nationalists should not have an opportunity for believing that their

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country is being asked to make concessions which are not demanded of other countries, or which imply a disbelief in its ability to manage its own affairs or a distrust of its intentions. More positively, provision should be made for the co-operation of the Government of the country with the Power or authority in control of the strong points. Secondly, it should be made clear that the arrangements in regard to the holding of strong points are made purely for strategic reasons; that they do not constitute an occupation of the country; and that the controlling Power or authority has neither the right nor the wish to use its position to interfere in the country's domestic affairs and foreign policy.

Two developments of the present war might make a military agreement more acceptable even to the less moderate nationalists than it would otherwise be. First, the lease of naval bases in British territory to the United States provides a precedent which might be followed. If the British Government is willing to lease territory to other Powers, a Syrian or Lebanese Government could not resent being asked to do likewise. Secondly, the present military co-operation between the United Nations may be made the basis for an international security system, under which strong points would be occupied by forces responsible to an international authority. The Syrian or Lebanese State, which might object to handing over strong points to a single Power or group of Powers with political and economic interests of its own to further, could not object to handing them over to an international authority on which it would itself be represented.

5

Another question which is bound to be raised in the next few years is that of the relations between Syria and Lebanon. It is certain that there must be a close connexion between them. Syrians and Lebanese are not foreigners to one another; they are allied by interest, by feeling and by common characteristics. Moreover, the official connexion between the two Republics is very close. They have a single financial and customs system, and there are virtually no restrictions upon the movement of goods and persons between them; and they possess a number of common administrative services, which until recently were controlled on their behalf by the French authorities but have now been handed over in

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principle to joint commissions on which the two Governments are represented.[1] It would be generally agreed that the two States must co-operate at least in some of these matters; but there is much disagreement, in Syria and Lebanon alike, over the form and degree of the connexion between them.

It is possible to distinguish two extreme views and a number of intermediate positions. On the one hand, there is a school of Arab nationalist thought, common among the Moslems in both Syria and Lebanon, which does not recognize the claim of Lebanon to independence, but regards it as a province of Syria or of the Arab world, distinguished, it is true, from the other provinces by tradition and religious loyalty. At most a limited and temporary autonomy should be granted it, and then only after it had been definitely incorporated in a Syrian or Arab State and reduced to the limits it possessed in Turkish days. At the other extreme is the strong Maronite element which desires Lebanon to be wholly independent of the Arab hinterland; its relations with Syria should be those of a good neighbour, and it should co-operate with other Middle Eastern States in economic and other matters of common interest, but fundamentally it should regard itself as part of Europe and not of the Arab world. Its eyes should be turned westwards; and its independence should be guaranteed either by a group of Western States or by a single Western State which would take a special religious and cultural interest in it.

It is probable that the majority of those who think seriously about the question do not believe in either of these two extreme views. There are many Arab nationalists, both Christian and Moslem and in both Syria and Lebanon, who recognize that Lebanon has a special part to play in regard to Syria and to Arab Asia generally. It can be a centre from which Western influences radiate to other Arab countries; a place where Christians and Moslems learn to live together on a footing of equality and mutual respect; and a haven where Christians and heterodox Moslems feel safe, and gradually forget their fears of Pan-Arabism and of Sunni domination. Moreover, there are many Lebanese Christians, Druzes and Shi'is who, although not adhering to Arab nationalism and distrustful of it, understand that they cannot live without the most intimate links with Syria and other countries of Arab

[1] See Postscript.

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Asia, and are eager for the establishment of such links on condition that their position in Lebanon is safeguarded. There is also a Christian group (and this may be the most important of all for the future) which regards the Lebanese and Syrian Christians as having a special mission not only in Syria and Lebanon but in the whole Arab world—to re-state Christianity in Arabic, to interpret and stand for it in the face of the Moslem world; this mission they can only perform if, while being integrally a part of the Arab world, they have one place in that world where they feel completely at home. Even then their position will not be easy, for they will live in a state of tension and will undergo many temptations, including the temptation to despair; but they are willing to endure their difficulties and make them fruitful.

These various 'intermediate positions' rest upon different principles and assumptions, but they all imply the same view of Lebanon's political future. On the one hand, it should have a relation with Syria and the other Arab countries which is much more than the external relation of independent States to one another; on the other, it should have liberty to develop its own life and make its own choices. It should possess a character of its own as a centre of Christian life, of Western culture and of religious toleration; but its life should be for the whole of the Arab world and not for itself alone.

This involves a claim for political equality with other Arab regions. If Syria is independent, Lebanon too should be independent; if a Greater Syrian or Arab federation is formed, Lebanon should enter it as a member-state on a level with the other members. At the very least, it should possess a full and guaranteed autonomy. For it to maintain and secure such a position will not be easy; it will always be drawn towards the false extremes of complete immersion in the Arab world and isolation from it, and there will always be a danger of its precarious inner balance being overturned. Such dangers can only be overcome if certain conditions are fulfilled: first, that the Arab nationalist movement as a whole becomes a movement towards the West and so comes to appreciate the peculiar value of Lebanon to the Arab world; secondly, that the Western Powers take an interest in maintaining the sort of Lebanon defined above; but thirdly that those Western Powers at the same time take an interest in

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the fate of the Arab world as a whole and do not try to use Lebanon as a bastion against the Arabs.

One other condition must be mentioned. Lebanon cannot fulfil its mission if it is dominated by sectarianism. Loyalty to the sect must be held in check by the consciousness of Lebanon as a whole, which itself must be balanced by a healthy Arab national spirit. This will be impossible so long as large portions of the Lebanese population are not reconciled to being parts of Lebanon at all and do not accept the view here stated of the nature of Lebanon. This situation can only be remedied by making certain that the political life of the country is not dominated by a single sect, but rests on a firm union between Christians, orthodox and heterodox Moslems working together in common tasks on a footing of equality.[1]

6

A third problem which must be solved is that of the minorities, especially of the 'compact' minorities, the Druzes and Alawis. It should be clear from previous chapters that the problem in the exacerbated form which it had throughout the Mandatory period (although not, of course, in its essence) was a product of the general problem of Franco-Arab relations. The Arab nationalists objected to the grant of autonomy to minorities because they suspected the motives of France. For this reason, it is of extreme importance to draw a clear distinction between whatever military agreement is made with Syria by France or the United Nations and any arrangements which are made for the protection of the minorities. The killing of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 was due largely to the failure to make this distinction clear. The Iraqi Arabs believed that the British Government planned to make use of the Assyrians to retain its military hold over the country even after the Mandate had been brought to an end by the Treaty of 1931; many of the Assyrians believed that the British Government would intervene in their support should a conflict arise between them and the Arabs. The result was suspicion and fear on the one side, and intransigence on the other. A similar situation might arise in Syria or Lebanon were the minorities to think that in the last resort they could always fall back upon invoking armed intervention from outside, or the Arab nationalists to fear that the minorities

[1] For recent changes in Lebanese feeling, see Postscript.

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were lending themselves as tools to some foreign Power which planned to win back by devious means the political control which it had formally abandoned.

Provided this essential distinction is made clear, there is no reason to believe that there will arise between a nationalist Government and the 'compact' minorities that state of abnormal tension and mutual suspicion which issues in civil war and massacre. There will, it is true, be administrative grievances, petty tyranny and misunderstandings. It is impossible even in the most tranquil times wholly to prevent them; and if the wounds which they cause are left to fester they may prove dangerous. But they can be minimized and the harm which they do remedied by the provision of suitable administrative machinery. The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 laid down, and the Proclamation of Syrian Independence in 1941 re-asserted, the principles which ought to underlie the treatment of the most important of the 'compact' communities, the Druzes and Alawis: on the one hand, their districts should be regarded as integral parts of the Syrian State, but on the other they should be granted within that State tactful and sympathetic administrative treatment adapted to their special needs and traditions. So long as all parties concerned adhere to both these principles and understand the equal importance of both, Druze and Alawi particularism should not present an insoluble problem.

7

In the Jazirah, as in Jebel Druze, the question is one of reconciling two factors: on the one hand, the Christians are frightened of Moslem domination and the Kurds unwilling to accept Arab rule, while the Arabs on their side may tend to underrate the peculiar needs of the region; but on the other, it is almost inconceivable that the Jazirah, geographically situated as it is, should ultimately become anything except a part of Syria or Iraq. It would be extremely dangerous for the inhabitants if a foreign Power were to hold out to them the hope of permanent autonomy or independence under foreign control. But the Arabs on their side could make the process of absorption easier by wise administration and forbearance. The problem is therefore how to give the Jazirah the special administration which it needs without by so doing encouraging a dream of self-sufficiency or foreign protection.

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For the scattered minorities in Syria also there is no possible course except partial assimilation: to learn Arabic if they are not already Arabic-speaking, to perform the duties of ordinary citizens and to share in the communal life of the majority. Equally there is no policy possible for the majority except to make this course easier. Every suggested measure for protecting the minorities is therefore to be judged by whether or not it helps towards assimilation. Protection by a foreign Power is likely to be harmful because it encourages the minorities to believe that assimilation is not necessary. Formal guarantees embodied in constitutions or in international instruments are useful in that they may help to give the minorities a greater feeling of security and to create in the citizens of the State as a whole a consciousness of high standards of toleration and duty. But they are only partially effective. In abnormal times they would be swept aside; while in normal times discrimination against the minorities is likely to result not from bad intentions on the part of the central Government so much as from lack of understanding or from officiousness on the part of particular officials, or else from purely local causes. The immediate problem is therefore how to minimize the effect of local or personal factors and prevent their influence spreading.

8

No agreement upon the future of Syria and Lebanon would be complete unless it took into account their relations with the other Arab countries. There is a general desire and indeed a need for closer relations than exist at present. Precisely what form these relations would take is a difficult question. But two principles on which they should rest can be stated with assurance: the first, that to be successful a scheme of union must spring from the practical necessities of co-operation between the different countries, and must take into account the varying stages of development, the divergent needs and the mutual jealousies and suspicions of different branches of the Arab people; and the second, that such a scheme must be drawn up by the Arabs themselves.

But although Arab union must be achieved by the Arabs in their own way and their own time, Great Britain is in a position to give them assistance in their task. Her Government is indeed committed to doing so, both by the general trend of

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its policy and by specific undertakings. Thus Mr. Eden in his speech at the Mansion House on May 29th, 1941, said:

> 'This country has a long tradition of friendship with the Arabs, a friendship that has been proved by deeds, not words alone. We have countless well-wishers among them, as they have many friends here. Some days ago I said in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had great sympathy with Syrian aspirations for independence. I should like to repeat that now. But I would go further. The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, yes, and the political ties, too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government, for their part, will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.'[1]

He repeated the main points in this statement in answer to a question in the House of Commons on February 24th, 1943.[2] The first result of this encouragement was seen in the middle of 1943, when the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, held a series of discussions on Arab union with representatives of the Iraqi, Transjordanian, Sa'udi Arabian and Syrian Governments. At the end of these discussions it was widely expected that Nahhas Pasha would summon a general Arab conference in order to draw up a practicable and precise scheme.[3]

9

What are the possibilities of a union of geographical Syria: that is, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan? Before any such union could be established, a number of practical problems would have to be solved. They spring mainly from the division of geographical Syria into areas of British and French influence. This division has led to the development of

[1] *The Times*, May 30th, 1941.
[2] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, Vol. 387, col. 139.
[3] For more recent developments in the movement for Arab unity, see Postscript.

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partly different systems of law, administration and education, and to cultural differences, which would cause serious difficulty both in the construction of a unified political system and in the successful working of it. What is more important still, the existence of four separate Governments for the last two decades has combined with the natural centrifugal tendency of Arab society to produce local ambitions and feeling and vested interests which it will not be easy to break down; the rivalry of families and dynasties is only one example of these ambitions and interests. Moreover, it is possible that the French would use their influence against the establishment of a union, from fear that it would mean in practice an extension of British influence in an area which was previously under French control; how deep and important the resultant tension would be would depend upon the future form of Anglo-French relations and upon the future of French influence in the Levant.

The existence of these problems would make it impossible to establish in the first instance any more than a very loose union; or perhaps no more than a number of *ad hoc* agreements and joint commissions. Even this, however, would be worth while, since it would arrest the tendency of the four sections of geographical Syria to fall apart from one another. They still form in a sense a single community; and it would be harmful to all of them if the divisions introduced after the last war continued and led to the break-up of that community.

Even when the effects of artificial division had been wiped out, it would still not be possible to establish a simple unitary State. If the future State of Greater Syria is in principle unitary, it will have to provide for a great measure of administrative decentralization and also for the autonomy of Lebanon. Many thinkers, however, are coming to believe that a unitary State would be less satisfactory than a loose federation, into which Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine would enter as members on an equal footing.

10

To Arab minds, the inclusion of Palestine in such a federation presupposes the solution of the Zionist problem through the virtual stoppage of Jewish immigration and the establishment of a national Government with an Arab majority.

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Although both Jews and Arabs have been quiescent since the outbreak of the war, the problem is no nearer solution now than it was in 1939. The Arabs, not only in Palestine but also in the surrounding countries, are still obsessed by the fear of a Jewish state and of Jewish economic domination, and by resentment against the injustice done to the indigenous people of Palestine. The Jews still refuse, both on principle and because they want security, to live as a minority under Arab rule; and the horror of the Jewish tragedy in Europe has made them less willing than ever to shut the doors of Palestine against their brothers of the Dispersion. Furthermore, there are still particular issues at stake, which would be grave enough even if the spirits of both sides were not inflamed. These issues have narrowed themselves down to one point: does the British Government intend to carry out the policy of the White Paper of 1939? The provisions of the White Paper in regard to the restriction of land sales and of immigration have been carried out at least in principle; but it still remains to be seen whether His Majesty's Government intends to end immigration after the arrival in Palestine of the 75,000 immigrants who, by the provisions of the White Paper, were to be the last unless Arab consent could be obtained, and whether it will take steps to establish a national administration. Both sides are waiting upon the decision; and each is prepared to take active measures should the decision go against it.

The Arabs would probably accept the White Paper, not indeed as a final solution of the problem, since for them there can be no such solution until an Arab Palestine is included in an Arab union, but as putting an end to the immediate and pressing dangers. The Zionists would never accept it on any terms; and the greater part of them appear to have given up the possibility of a settlement by compromise, and to be adopting a maximal programme: large-scale immigration immediately after the war, and the formation of the whole or part of Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth. They hope to achieve their ends either by influencing the Governments and peoples of the United Nations, or else by their own strength. Some of the Zionists, however, still believe that an agreement is possible; and they hope that the establishment of a Greater Syrian or an Arab Federation will help to solve the problem, in that the Arabs would then

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feel secure enough to permit a larger measure of Jewish immigration and self-government. Various schemes based on this idea have been put forward. Some, the more hopeful, think that if the Arab demand for union were satisfied in the rest of the Fertile Crescent, the Arabs would be prepared to permit the establishment of an independent State in the whole of Palestine or else, as the Royal Commission proposed in 1937, in part of it. Others want not an independent State but a Jewish member-state of the Federation or else a bi-national member-state, covering the whole of Palestine, representing the Arabs and Jews equally and permitting further immigration until the Jews come nearer than at present to forming half the population.

Such plans do not estimate rightly the intensity of the Arab fear of Zionism. The Arabs are determined at the very least to limit the danger, as they regard it, to Palestine, and if possible to end it even in Palestine. They are therefore not prepared to discuss the definitive status of the Jews in Palestine, or the relation of Palestine to the surrounding countries, until the questions of immigration and land-purchase have been settled. In other words, they regard the inclusion of Palestine in an Arab Federation not as a substitute for the White Paper, but as only to be considered after the White Paper has been applied.

It would be idle to speculate at the present moment how the deadlock can be ended; much depends on the numbers and situation of the Jews in Eastern Europe after the war, and upon the general settlement of the European problem, much, too, on questions of world-power and world-strategy which cannot now be discussed profitably. But a book on Arab affairs may be pardoned for emphasizing one point which has hitherto been ignored in most discussions of the Palestinian situation: that in addition to a world Jewish problem there is a world Arab problem. It is not simply a question of avoiding injustice or granting compensation to a million peasants in Palestine, it is a question of what form the new unshaped Arab nation is to take, and what part it will play in the world. In Chapter VI the alternatives which lie before the Arabs have been defined: they are those of communion with the West and of excommunication from it. Nothing is so likely to drive the Arabs to make the wrong choice as the continuation of a Zionist policy which they

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regard as unjust. It cannot fail to arouse in the Arabs, as it would in any nation similarly placed, strong hostility both towards the Jews and the Western States.

The Arabs will regard as unjust any policy which has not received their prior consent; and they will not consent to any policy of which the result is likely to be the political or economic domination of any part of the Arab world by the Zionists. If they cannot be persuaded to change their attitude, there are only two possibilities open to Zionism. First, it can try to win the trust of the Arabs by a radical change in its policy; but this would involve abandoning the ideal which is at the heart of political Zionism. Secondly, it can continue to pursue its present aims in the face of Arab enmity: risking the dangers which that involves in its sense of the Jewish need for Palestine and in the hope that sooner or later the hostility of the Arabs will disappear. This is the tragic choice which faces the Zionists to-day.

II

A union between geographical Syria and Iraq is a further possibility. The two countries differ widely in their economic and social systems; and there are local interests and jealousies which have been stimulated if not created by the political divisions of the last twenty years, the existence of several Governments, and the vested interests which are bound up with them. In the first instance, therefore, only a loose federation and not a unitary State would be worth considering. The establishment of a federation would raise difficult constitutional questions, which are not, however, insuperable. It would also raise an even more difficult question. Where would be the centre of power in a Syro-Iraqi State? It would be bound to happen, at least in the early years of the State's existence, that differences of opinion or of interest would arise between the constituent members of the Federation; skilful drafting of the Constitution would minimize, but not altogether remove the possibility of this occurring. This would cause friction between the two partners, which might be fatal to the Federation. Furthermore, a Syro-Iraqi union would raise in an aggravated form the question of the dynastic rivalries, particularly that of the rivalry between the Hashimite family, which rules Transjordan and Iraq and formerly ruled

Hejaz, and the Sa'udi family which is now master of the greater part of Arabia.

These factors would probably make it impossible to establish even the loosest of federations at the present time. This does not mean, however, that nothing can be done to draw closer the bonds between Iraq and geographical Syria. Both would gain from close collaboration in matters of defence, foreign policy and national education, and the establishment of joint institutions to deal with such economic matters as they have in common.

12

Finally, what are the prospects for a wider union, to include not only geographical Syria and Iraq but also Sa'udi Arabia, the Yemen and Egypt? Even the loosest federation could not be established in the near future. It would raise all the problems dealt with above, some of them, such as the dynastic question, in an even more acute form. New difficulties would also arise: the consciousness of unity and solidarity would probably not be intense and effective enough to outweigh local loyalties and prejudices and also the existence of a very strong Egyptian nationalism. Moreover, the present differences in social and cultural standards between the different parts of the Arab world would make it extremely difficult to frame a common policy for the whole area.

A great deal can, however, be done—and it is very important that it should be done—to strengthen the existing ties between the countries of Arab Asia and Egypt. It would be possible to set up a permanent council and subsidiary institutions for mutual consultation and assistance and the elaboration of a common foreign policy. Trade agreements, the adoption of a common tariff-policy and the establishment of a joint planning authority would strengthen the economic interdependence of the Arab countries; the foundations for this already exist in the linking of the local currencies to sterling and the economic co-operation which the exigencies of the present war have compelled. Cultural relations are already close: Iraqi and Arabian students go to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, and Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian teachers to Iraq and Arabia; Egyptian books and periodicals are read, Egyptian films seen and Egyptian broadcasts listened to throughout the Arab world. The unification of educational systems and programmes has

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been discussed and could be carried out up to a certain point.

13

On all these subjects there is much discussion at present between the statesmen and in the journals of the Arab countries; but the most important step which has been taken towards union has come from the British and American Governments, with the establishment of the Middle East Supply Centre. Established as a war-time institution, with the object of limiting imports and exports in view of the limited shipping available, it is gradually becoming a body for co-ordinating the policies of the Middle Eastern Governments over a wide range of economic matters. It has, for example, arranged for conferences on such questions as rationing, the control of locusts and agriculture. It is to be hoped that it will continue in existence even after the war is over, and form a permanent economic planning organization. But if it were to fulfil this function adequately it would have to become more than an Anglo-American institution; it would have to include representatives of all the Arab countries.

14

The settlement of the relations of the Arab countries with the Western Powers and with one another is an essential condition of political stability in the Middle East. Unless it is achieved, it is useless to look for that co-operative spirit among Arab nationalists towards the West to bring which into existence should be one of the main aims of Western policy. Again, it will place the Arabs in a position to think concretely and seriously about their problems, by giving them responsibility for the solution of them. But it will not in itself solve those problems. The Western Powers should not imagine that once they have helped to set up a workable system of Arab government their task in the Middle East is over and their essential interests safeguarded by the forces of Arab gratitude. Political friendship cannot rest upon gratitude for past favours but only upon the consciousness of present and future interest. If the Western Powers wish to preserve both their moral influence and their material interests in the Arab countries, they can only do so on the one hand by helping the Arabs to solve the problems of which they are conscious and

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on the other by convincing the Arabs that their help is essential. The Arabs for their part should be prepared, once their political equality with the West has been firmly established, to welcome Western co-operation in solving their problems.

There will be many such problems in every sphere of action. The whole position of the Arabs in world-politics, and their relations with the Great Powers, may be changed by the growth of Russian influence in the Middle East. There are here the seeds of dislocation, even of conflict, unless all parties act with restraint. In order to prevent the excessive growth of suspicion and hostility it would be desirable for the Government of the U.S.S.R. to be associated on some level with any settlement of the political problem of Arab independence and union which is reached after the war. A smaller but nevertheless urgent problem is that of clarifying Turkey's policy towards the Arabs and removing the distrust which many of them still feel towards her since the Alexandretta affair.

In internal politics the most urgent task to be accomplished is the spread of genuine political education: that is to say, the willingness to take responsibility, and to treat the Government not as an enemy or an instrument of private profit but as a means to the public welfare; the wisdom and knowledge to exercise responsibility fruitfully; and the power of working together and of expressing the national will through political institutions. This task involves a change in the whole spirit of the Arab people.

No less urgent is the change which must be effected in the economic and social structure. It would be out of place here to discuss in detail the question what economic and social system is most suitable to the Arabs, but on the desirability of certain reforms there would be general agreement, except among those whose private interests would be damaged by them. There is a widespread desire for the raising of the standard of public health; for irrigation, improved agricultural methods and education, the establishment of agricultural co-operatives and credit institutions; the reform of the system of land tenure; the foundation of those industries for which the local circumstances are propitious, and the provision of facilities for financing them; the raising of the level of general education, and the creation of an intellectual élite. These are preliminary tasks which must be accomplished before a stable economic and social life can be established.

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Such changes will certainly bring others in their train. As industry develops and agricultural standards are raised, an urban middle class and proletariat and an enlightened peasantry will arise to challenge the at present uncontested power of the landowners. The rivalry of social classes will have political consequences, which may be delayed for a time so long as the nationalists are united in the pursuit of self-government and unity, but will surely arise sooner or later. What form these political consequences will take is still obscure, but it is certain that the near future will see the growth of strong Social Democratic and Communist movements, and the spread of other parties, which propose far-reaching social reforms. (It was mentioned in Chapter XII that the years of war have already seen the beginnings of such a development.) In these circumstances, it would be dangerous if Great Britain or the Western Powers were identified in the mind of the rising classes with the landowners; and if they were regarded as obstacles to a change in the balance of social classes. That might happen in several ways. It might be thought that a Western Power was using its influence in order to maintain in office a Government which was opposed to social change; or again Western business firms might be regarded as hindrances to the creation of an indigenous industry or the raising of the standard of living of the workers. This danger would be lessened if unofficial Western institutions were to take a leading part in social reform movements, but always in response to a felt need and in partnership with Arab institutions.

In another sphere, that of culture, the Western nations have as great a part to play. The task of the next two or three generations of Arab thinkers will be, as was that of their predecessors, to deepen their understanding of European civilization and of their own predicament, and to spread that understanding on one level to an intellectual élite and on another to the common people by means of the educational systems which are being built up. They cannot do this without Western help: teachers in their schools and universities, advisers in their departments of education, scholars and thinkers fertilizing the intellectual movement in Cairo, Beirut and wherever else it may be found. In this age, when the Arab intellect is still unformed, an immense influence may be gained by a few individuals who possess the necessary

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virtues: courage and clearness in their thought, devotion to their task and respect for those whom they are privileged to serve.

15

One other, more fundamental, problem underlies all those mentioned here, as it underlies all which has been written in this book. In the last century the natural order of human relationships has been perverted in the dealings between the Arabs and the West. Instead of mutual respect and understanding and co-operation in tasks of common concern, there have been contempt, hatred, the claim to dominate, the claim to be left alone and a failure of understanding. To impute motives or to ascribe blame would be idle; it is the problem of the future which alone matters. How can a healthy moral relationship be restored between Europe and the Arabs? This in its turn gives rise to a further question: how can a healthy spiritual relationship be established between Islam and Christianity? At this point, where political thought reaches its limit, our essay must come to an end.

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POSTSCRIPT: THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER, 1943, TO APRIL, 1945

I

CHAPTER XII carried the political history of Syria and Lebanon down to the restoration of constitutional forms and the assumption of office by national Governments (in Damascus in August, 1943, and in Beirut in September).[1] From the first it was clear that the nationalists did not regard their accession to power as the end of the national struggle. Syria and Lebanon had been formally recognized as independent in 1941, and the restoration of the constitutions could be regarded as the first step towards making self-government a reality; but there were still other steps to be taken. Some of them could not, it is true, be taken before the end of the war. In his proclamations of independence, General Catroux had explicitly stated that the needs of war required Syria and Lebanon to conduct their policy in accordance with that of the Allies. The Allies must assume responsibility for the defence of the country and its war production, and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should place their armed forces at the Allies' disposal for those purposes, as well as aerodromes, harbours and communications; and the closest collaboration should exist between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Free French Delegate-General on the one hand and the Syrian and Lebanese police and gendarmerie on the other. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments should also collaborate with the Allies in matters concerning the economic war, and should follow the general policy of the sterling bloc in the economic and financial spheres.[2]

Such restrictions were recognized to be necessary by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, which looked on them as a contribution they could make to the Allied war-effort. There were, however, other limitations upon their freedom of action.

First, there were limitations upon the legislative power of the two Governments, imposed on the one hand by the power of the Delegate-General to legislate by summary decree, and on the other by certain general reservations contained in the Syrian and Lebanese Constitutions. Thus Article 116 of the Syrian Constitution stated:—

'Aucune disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et

[1] See pp. 256, 257. [2] See pp. 247, 250.

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S 648 L 648 ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et de la défense du pays, et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront pas applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les gouvernements français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ses responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord. Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux gouvernements.'

Secondly, there were a number of important administrative services which were wholly removed from the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and placed under direct supervision of the Delegate-General, who administered them through a staff which was largely French in the upper ranks, but Syrian and Lebanese in the lower. They included:

S L 652 648 i. The 'Common Interests', a number of departments dealing with matters of concern to both Syria and Lebanon. The most important of them were the customs administration, the control of concessionary companies and certain economic, financial and social services. They were financed out of the 'Funds of Common Interest', consisting almost entirely of customs receipts, which were sufficient not only to pay for these services but to provide a large surplus which was in principle divided between the two Governments.

S L 648 701 ii. The 'Troupes Spéciales', the local Syrian and Lebanese levies. Some thousands strong, they had been in existence throughout the Mandatory period as an integral part of the French Army of the Levant, and until the outbreak of war they had been wholly paid for out of the 'Funds of Common Interest'. They now formed part of the French territorial command.

000 iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for

iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. S L 648 625

iv. The control of the Beduin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.) S L 648 204

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed: S L 648

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions: an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole sources of legislation; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of S L 648 186

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revenue. Control of concessionary companies would give them authority over the railway administration, the ports, the water and electricity companies and the tobacco monopoly, all of them in the hands of French companies and between them covering an important section of the country's economic life. The transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' would make possible the creation of Syrian and Lebanese Armies.

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Faced with these demands the Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (C.F.L.N.) defined its attitude sharply. In the first place, it claimed that it had inherited the Mandate from the French Republic; the Mandate conferred upon France certain obligations which neither she nor the Syrians and Lebanese were entitled to repudiate; they could only be ended or modified by the League of Nations or whatever organization might replace it. No definitive change of a radical kind could therefore be made until the League were revived or a successor to it established.

Secondly, the Committee, while admitting the possibility of a transfer of powers, sought to make it conditional on the willingness of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to conclude with them Treaties guaranteeing on the one hand the independence of the two States and on the other the special position and interests of France. The declarations of independence had foreshadowed the conclusion of such Treaties: and it was therefore claimed that the grant of independence had been conditional upon it.

Subsequently, under the pressure of events, the Committee admitted the right of the two Governments to demand immediate legislative and administrative concessions, but emphasized that the transfer of powers should take place in a correct way. In view of the importance of the issues involved, it should only take place after negotiation and agreement with the representatives of France. Any attempt to modify the present situation by unilateral action, without such formal agreement, could only be regarded as a deliberate insult to France.

To each of these theses the Syrians and Lebanese had an answer. To the first, they replied that they had never recognized the Mandate, which had been imposed upon them against their will and without their consent being asked.

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Furthermore, they did not recognize the Algiers Committee as the legitimate inheritor of the Mandatory obligations of France. Even granting, however, that Free France had inherited the Mandate, General Catroux had proclaimed the independence of the two States, not as something to be granted in the future, but as something to take effect from the moment of his proclamation. It might be that technically Free France had had no authority to end the Mandate, but in practice the Mandate had ceased to exist on the day of his declaration; and unless Free France wished to go back upon the declaration and the proclamations of independence, she was bound henceforth to treat the Mandate as virtually a dead letter.

To the second argument, that the C.F.L.N. could only make the desired concessions in return for the conclusion of treaties, they replied that the declarations of independence, while envisaging the possibility of such treaties, had in no way made the grant of independence conditional upon their being negotiated. Independence had been given unconditionally (except for the limitations made necessary by the state of war); and if Syria and Lebanon were really independent, they had a right to decide for themselves whether or not to make treaties with a foreign State, and could not be forced into it by the threat that powers which were already theirs by right would otherwise be withheld. Furthermore, they had no intention of signing Treaties if at all, until after the war, since they had no reason to believe that France would then necessarily honour treaties concluded in her name by the C.F.L.N.

As for the third argument, that the concessions demanded could only be made by means of agreements, they, too, preferred that the questions at issue should be settled if possible through agreement with the C.F.L.N. But if the Committee were unwilling, as it at first seemed to be, they could not give up their right to take matters into their own hands. What did the independence of a State mean, if it could not unilaterally alter its constitution and establish its own administrative services?

Beneath these arguments and replies there lay an intense mutual distrust and suspicion, which were the real cause of the crisis. The nationalists of Syria and Lebanon had no confidence in the willingness of France ever to grant them genuine self-government. They were afraid that unless they

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exerted pressure nothing would be done; and that after the war, if France's strength revived, she would attempt to re-establish her position by force. It was therefore vital for them, while it was possible, to put themselves in a position in which the opposition of France to their aspirations could no longer harm them. It was particularly important to obtain possession of those administrative services which had always been used as instruments of French policy, and might still be used to obstruct the new Nationalist governments during the war and subsequently to overthrow them: the Sûreté Générale and the Services Spéciaux, the Funds of Common Interest, the Troupes Spéciales.

The French on their side regarded the claims of the Syrians and Lebanese as part of a movement which was primarily and deliberately anti-French, and of which the purpose was to take advantage of France's weakness in order to destroy French influence in the Levant. They would have preferred to make no concessions to Arab nationalism at all; but since they were bound to do so in virtue of promises already made, they would only do so in return for a guarantee of their position and interests. To give up the Common Interests and other services, the one bargaining counter they had, without obtaining such a guarantee would be a severe blow to French national prestige and to the movement of revival which since 1941 had placed a symbolic value upon Syria and Lebanon.

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The neighbouring Arab States were deeply concerned in the struggle of Syria and Lebanon for self-government. They had always been interested in it because of ties of language and sentiment; but in 1943 the matter became even more important because of the current discussions on Arab unity. Reference has already been made to these discussions in Chapters XII and XIII. It has been mentioned that after the re-establishment of constitutional forms in Syria, Nahhas Pasha invited the Syrian Government to send representatives to discuss the Arab question with him. The Syrian delegation visited Cairo in October and held conversations on Arab unity with the Egyptian Premier; its visit aroused much public attention in Egypt, and it was generally expected that a Lebanese delegation would soon follow it to Cairo. Thus the Levant States were drawn into the movement for unity; for

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political, strategic and economic reasons it was impossible to conceive of an Arab union in which they were not included; but it was clear that they could not take an effective part in that movement until they possessed self-government and effective freedom of political action. It was therefore a general Arab interest to see Syria and Lebanon possessed of self-government. More than that, if a crisis should arise over the grant of self-government, it would be vital for the other Arab countries to give what help they could to the Syrians and Lebanese, because such a crisis would be a test of the effective strength of Arab unity. In regard to Lebanon there was a special reason for going to her help: Lebanon was only half-heartedly Arab nationalist, and nothing would strengthen her Arab sentiment so much as a practical demonstration of the concern of the other Arab countries for her welfare and of the benefits she could obtain from their assistance.

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It was in fact the Lebanese Government which first challenged the French on the issue of the transfer of powers. The new Prime Minister, Riyadh as-Sulh, made a statement of policy to the Chamber on October 7th, 1943, announcing the Government's intention to propose a revision of the Constitution. This, he said, would be purged of all provisions inconsistent with the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, so that henceforward no authorities other than the legitimate representatives of the nation would participate in its government. During the following weeks the Government, while preparing its constitutional measure, was also engaged in controversy with the French authorities as to its right to modify the Constitution without previous agreement with the Mandatory Power. The controversy was made public by C.F.L.N. in a communiqué dated November 5th. This stated that the Committee could not recognize the validity of a unilateral revision of the Constitution; but that this decision did not affect the determination of France 'to accord Lebanon complete independence by means of negotiations conducted between the two parties in the spirit of loyal and friendly collaboration which must continue as in the past to inspire the special relations uniting Lebanon and France'. The Lebanese Government proceeded with the arrangements they

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648 had made for submitting their measure to the Chamber, where
642 it was carried by 48 votes to none on the 8th. The amendments affected the following Articles of the Constitution :

Article 1. References to the Mandatory Power and the League of Nations were eliminated, and Lebanon was described as 'a sovereign State'.

Article 11. French was no longer described as an official language.

Article 52. The treaty-making power was no longer to be limited by the reservations laid down in the Mandate.

Articles 90-94. These were annulled. They had provided that the exercise of the constitutional powers of Lebanese authorities should be subject to the maintenance of the Mandatory's rights and obligations; that Lebanon should eventually enter the League of Nations through the good offices of the Mandatory; that good relations would be maintained with 'the neighbouring countries under French Mandate'; that disputes liable to lead to war should be submitted to the Mandatory's arbitration; and that agreements would be reached between Lebanon and France for the representation of the former, in countries where Lebanese residents were numerous, by means of attachés in French diplomatic and consular missions.

Articles 95 and 102. References to the Mandate were omitted.

648 On November 10th, two days after the passage of these
669 amendments through the Chamber, M. Helleu returned from
684 a visit to Algiers. In the early hours of the following morning the Lebanese President and the majority of the Ministers were, by his order, arrested and removed from Beirut. A few hours later the Delegate-General issued decrees declaring the amendments null and void, suspending the Constitution, dissolving the Chamber and appointing Emile Edde—Bishara al-Khuri's unsuccessful opponent in the recent elections—as Head of the State and the Government.

These measures caused immediate and vigorous reactions, both in Lebanon and elsewhere. Throughout the next eleven days there was a general strike in the Lebanese towns; shops were shut, the ordinary newspapers ceased to appear and there were demonstrations in the streets. These led to clashes with

French troops, and to the death or injury of a number of civilians. The two Ministers who had not been arrested, together with a majority of the Deputies, continued to assert their authority from a mountain retreat and began to organize an armed force.

During these critical days the Lebanese people displayed a striking unity. The national cause took precedence over deep-seated sectarian conflicts, and very few even among the Maronites dissociated themselves from the united front. Edde failed to form a political cabinet, and was forced to attempt the expedient of a council of civil servants.

Nevertheless, the country remained outwardly calm. That the Lebanese did not resort to an armed rising was due in large part to the confidence of their leaders in the value of the diplomatic support which they received from the Governments of the independent Arab States, of the United States and of Great Britain. The British attitude was defined by Mr. Law in the House of Commons on November 23rd :

> 'The interest of His Majesty's Government in this dispute is twofold. First of all, we have endorsed the promises of independence given to the Lebanese people by General Catroux in 1941. His Majesty's Government have followed with sympathy and interest the subsequent development of constitutional government in the Lebanon. Secondly, the Lebanon is of vital importance to the war effort both as an operational base and from the point of view of communications. Any threat of a breakdown of law and order is therefore of direct concern to His Majesty's Government.'

Impressed by the gravity of the situation created by M. Helleu's drastic action, the C.F.L.N. sent General Catroux to take charge in Beirut. He arrived there on the 19th and, having examined the situation in all its aspects, recommended the reinstatement of the Lebanese President, the release of the imprisoned Ministers and the recall of M. Helleu. Acceptance of this programme was announced in Algiers on the 21st, and on the following day the Lebanese leaders returned to Beirut in triumph. It was at once apparent that the reinstatement of the Ministers, as well as of the President, was inevitable, and the French authorities agreed to this further concession. Furthermore, M. Chataigneau, who had provisionally taken M. Helleu's place as Delegate-General, cancelled the decrees

L 648 669 of November 11th with the exception of that which declared the constitutional amendments null and void.

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S 648 L 648 The acute crisis was now over, but the problem from which it had sprung was still unsolved. When the Lebanese Chamber re-assembled, the Premier asserted his Government's view that the reforms of November 8th were still in force. Moreover, the Syrian authorities lost no time, once the tension in Lebanon was relaxed, in taking parallel action. At an extraordinary session of the Syrian Chamber on January 24th, 1944, the President of the Republic and the Deputies took an oath of allegiance to a new Constitution which comprised Articles 1-115 of the existing text. The effect of this was to annul Article 116. Earlier, on December 1st, the Syrian Premier had declared that Syria did not recognize the Mandate, and was not willing to conclude a Treaty as a condition of the transfer of powers which properly belonged to her; had demanded the surrender by the French of all the attributes of sovereignty, under those limitations only which were necessitated by the state of war; and had affirmed that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were in agreement on the administration of the common interests.

The C.F.L.N. left these claims and assertions unchallenged, and announced that General Catroux would again go to Beirut, this time for the purpose of negotiating with the two Governments on the transfer of powers. The negotiations resulted in an agreement, concluded on December 22nd, which provided that the powers previously exercised by French authorities in the name of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should be transferred to their control. They would take over the services included in the category of Common Interests as from January 1st, and other powers by specific agreements still to be concluded. Thus, by the beginning of 1944, the two States had survived a sharp test of their will to independence and had extended the range of their autonomous administration.

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S L 645 In the course of the year 1944 there were a number of changes in the political situation in Syria and Lebanon. Some of these changes were of no more than local importance.

Thus, in October the Ministry of Saadullah al-Jabiri in Syria was replaced by that of Faris al-Khuri, who had previously been President of the Chamber; the change was made for internal political reasons, and the new Government was composed largely of the same Ministers and followed the same general policy as its predecessor. In April, 1945, the Ministry was reconstructed. In Lebanon, too, there was a ministerial change: in January, 1945, the Government of Riyadh as-Sulh was replaced by that of Abdul-Hamid al-Karami, a Sunni Moslem deputy from Tripoli.

A change affecting the structure of the Syrian Republic took place in September, with the incorporation of the province of Jebel Druze fully in the Syrian State. It had already been formally incorporated in February, 1942, but had preserved a special administrative and financial régime which was now abolished. This step was taken at the request of the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze. A similar step was not taken in the Alawi province; although there was a party in favour of it, the forces of separatism were still strong, and the situation was complicated by the existence of disorder and unrest fomented by Sulaiman Murshid and his associates.

Other changes of greater importance, because they affected more immediately the problem of Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian relations, were the transfer of power to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and the financial agreement of February, 1944:

(i) In accordance with the agreement made by General Catroux with the two Governments on December 22nd, 1943, a series of particular agreements was negotiated during 1944, and by the end of the year almost all the services in question had been formally handed over, including the Customs Administration, the Financial and Economic Services, the control of the tobacco monopoly and concessionary companies, the Press Censorship, the Beduin control and the 'Sûreté Générale' (although a French 'Sûreté aux Armées' was retained). These transfers gave the two Governments almost all the attributes of independent governments. At the end of 1944 the only important attribute which had not been transferred was the control of the local levies, the 'Troupes Spéciales'.

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L 648 In regard to the 'Services Economiques' and
S 648 certain other departments, the experiment was tried of administering them by joint Syro-Lebanese commissions; but for the most part the transferred services were administered separately by the two Governments. To the more ardent nationalists, this was an unsatisfactory element in a transfer which was otherwise to be welcomed. They complained also that the transfer was more in name than in reality, since for reasons of efficiency the French personnel of the services was retained temporarily.

S (ii) In February, 1944, an Anglo-French financial agree-
648 ment was signed. It named a 'franc area' composed
436 of all territories under the control of the French Committee of National Liberation, and fixed the rate
L of exchange at 200 francs to the pound sterling. With
648 the agreement of the Syrian and Lebanese Govern-
436 ments, a special area fixed the rate of exchange of the Syro-Lebanese pound at 22.65 francs (it had previously been 20 francs), and thus prevented any change in the present rate of 8.83 Syro-Lebanese pounds to the pound sterling. The French Committee also agreed to revalue certain franc assets of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, to restore the gold formerly held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, and, should there be any further modification in the value of the franc, to guarantee the Syro-Lebanese pound against any resulting loss.

The agreement was widely criticized in Syria and Lebanon. It was regarded as contravening the allied declarations of June, 1941, which promised Syria and Lebanon full membership of the sterling bloc. Moreover, by weakening the link between the pound sterling and the currency of the two States, it created barriers between them and the other Arab States at a time when the movement for closer association between the Arab countries was gathering renewed strength. More important still, it was observed that the agreement was only temporary, and could be terminated by either party at three months' notice. When it should come to an end, there was a danger

that the Syro-Lebanese currency would once more share in the precarious fortunes of the franc; and its reserves would be under the control of the French Government, which might be tempted to use this control in order to strike a hard political or financial bargain.

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It has already been mentioned that by the end of 1944 all important services administered by the Delegation-General had been transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, with the exception of the 'Troupes Spéciales'. These troops, whose numbers had been considerably augmented since the allied occupation in 1941, and who now formed a reasonably well-disciplined and well-armed force of several thousands, were under the French territorial command. Throughout the year the two Governments pressed for their formal transfer, while making it clear that for the duration of the war they would, of course, remain at the disposal of the Allied Command. The French Government was unwilling to transfer them until the end of the war, or at least until a later stage in it, and was not prepared to give them up unconditionally but only in exchange for the conclusion of treaties of alliance with France by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the possession of the 'Troupes' was, in fact, their only direct bargaining-counter in their attempt to persuade the two Governments to sign such treaties.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments for their part did not admit that the question of the 'Troupes' had anything to do with the question of the treaties. In their eyes the transfer of the 'Troupes' was a logical consequence of promises and declarations already made by the French: General Catroux, in his declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941, had stated that the two States were at liberty to raise national armies. Moreover, the transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' was a necessary preliminary to any negotiations for a treaty; such negotiations could only take place on a footing of complete equality, and equality could not exist so long as the Syrian and Lebanese Governments did not possess armed forces and so long as the French held over their heads the threat of refusal to transfer the 'Troupes'.

In addition to insisting on their right to control the

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'Troupes,' the two Governments emphasized their need for them. The experience of 1936-1939 had shown what a mockery was self-government so long as the Government had not sufficient forces at its disposal to assert its will. No Government could expect obedience and respect so long as it was not able to curb the pretensions of the overmighty subject; this was particularly true of a country like Syria, where semi-feudal tenures were still to be found, localism was so strong a force, and there existed large Beduin tribes traditionally recalcitrant to civil government and having had full opportunity to arm themselves during the war. Local disorders had already taken place among the Beduin in the Jazirah and in the area dominated by Sulaiman Murshid. It was impossible to rely entirely upon French-controlled forces to prevent disorder, since that would be to admit that France was still the real power in the country and the Government only a façade; loyalty and obedience would only be given where real authority lay.

There was another reason for the attitude of the Syrian Government. They remembered that in 1920 the French had occupied Damascus and overturned the national Government by force; and that in 1925 the national revolt had been suppressed with the help of local levies drawn from the Circassian and other minorities. They were afraid that at some time in the future the French Government might be tempted to repeat its action and to restore its authority in Damascus with the help of the 'Troupes Spéciales', who included a large number of Circassians, Kurds and other minorities organized in separate units. Since the 'Troupes' were the only considerable armed force under French command in the Levant, their transfer to the local Governments would remove this weapon from the hands of the French.

For all these reasons the Syrian and Lebanese Governments demanded the immediate and unconditional transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales', or else, if this were refused, their disbandment. Otherwise they would proceed with the formation of national armies. Both Governments made special appropriations for this purpose in their 1944 and 1945 budgets.

With this fundamental difference of opinion between the French point of view and that of the Syrians and Lebanese, it is not surprising that when discussions on the subject opened in the early months of 1944 they led to little result. A draft

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agreement was, it is true, reached between the Syrian Government and the Delegate-General, General Beynet, but negotiations were then broken off by the French Committee in Algiers. With Lebanon a limited agreement was reached; in June it was arranged that a battalion wholly officered by Lebanese would be placed at the disposal of the Lebanese Government pending the conclusion of a general agreement. By the end of the year no further progress had been made, and the new year opened with demonstrations in Damascus in favour of the formation of an army and against what was believed to be the too indulgent attitude of the Government towards French delays.

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A still more fundamental question, that of the conclusion of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese Treaties, became urgent during 1944.

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The French Government claimed that, in spite of the declarations of independence made in 1941 and the subsequent transfer of powers, legally the Mandate still remained in force and would remain until a restored League of Nations or another international authority should bring it to an end; as in the case of Iraq, a necessary preliminary to its being brought to an end was the conclusion of treaties of alliance and friendship with the Mandatory Power. They pointed out that the declarations of independence had referred to the negotiation of such treaties, and even claimed that independence had not been granted unconditionally but only on condition that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments entered into treaties with France. They referred further to Great Britain's recognition of France's pre-eminent and privileged position in the Levant, and maintained that treaties were necessary in order to define and safeguard her position.

France's insistence on the signature of treaties had several motives. There was first her desire to preserve her political, economic and other interests in the Levant States themselves. Again, there was the fear that a withdrawal from the Levant would lower her prestige in North Africa and encourage the demands of the nationalists there. Moreover, so long as Metropolitan France was not liberated, the Fighting French were naturally reluctant to give up a particle of their position anywhere in the world where they still retained it. The

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liberation of France in the course of 1944 deprived this factor of its importance, and there were signs that those who had worked in the movement of resistance inside France were less interested in the Levant and less insistent on retaining their rights there than those who had been associated with General de Gaulle. (The liberation also worked in the other direction, however; it enormously strengthened the bargaining position of the French Government in their dealings with the Levant States and with the great Powers.)

There was another factor of great importance in determining France's attitude. For more than twenty years a natural process of events had been tending to draw Syria and Lebanon into the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence, economically and culturally, no less than politically. In part this was an aspect of a world-process, the gradual extension of Anglo-Saxon influence everywhere; in part, however, it was due to local conditions, to the fact that Syria and Lebanon were integral parts of the Eastern Arab world in which British influence was dominant. The war had strengthened this tendency: on the one hand, France's power in the world had declined in proportion to that of the Anglo-Saxon powers, and on the other, the movement for Arab unity was drawing close the ties between Syria and Lebanon and their neighbours. It was, therefore, possible that if France withdrew from the Levant States her place would be taken by Great Britain, inevitably and without any deliberate British intention. France would thus have withdrawn, not in favour of Syrian and Lebanese independence, but in favour of another world Power. Even a Frenchman who believed in Anglo-French friendship and had no suspicion of British intentions could not regard this prospect with pleasure.

The treaties which the French Government contemplated were similar in principle to the Anglo-Iraqi agreement, but rather more onerous in some ways. It wanted a military convention giving it the right to use a number of naval, military and air bases, and to send a military mission to organize the Syrian and Lebanese armies; a diplomatic and consular convention giving France's representative in the Levant States precedence over other members of the diplomatic corps, and providing for the care of Syrian and Lebanese interests by France's representatives in those countries in which the States were not directly represented; a cultural agreement

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safeguarding the position of the French language and culture in education; a financial agreement perpetuating the connexion between the Syro-Lebanese currency and the franc; an undertaking by the two Governments to employ French advisers and technicians in preference to nationals of other States; and adequate guarantees for the position of French schools, concessionary companies and other institutions. It is probable, however, that the more far-sighted and moderate members of the French Government did not believe they had any chance of obtaining a settlement so favourable as this, and would have been satisfied with any agreement, however tenuous, which would enable them to save their faces.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments, for their part, were unwilling to bind themselves to France by such comprehensive treaties. They denied the French assertions that the Mandate was still in force, that it could only be extinguished after the conclusion of treaties and that the declarations of independence had been conditional on such treaties being made. Their attitude sprang partly from distrust based upon twenty years' experience of Mandatory rule, the memories of 1920 and 1925, past attempts to negotiate treaties and the cession of Alexandretta. It was due also to the belief that Syria and Lebanon had nothing to gain from such a close alliance with France. Their independence was already recognized by the world and did not need protecting. Moreover, France would not be in a position to protect them effectively, and they had not sufficient common interests with her to justify their linking their fate with hers permanently. The Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iraqi Treaties were 'points of equilibrium', based upon and expressing essential common interests, not creating a new situation so much as formalizing one which already existed. But a Franco-Syrian or Franco-Lebanese treaty on the same model would not be a 'point of equilibrium', but an obstacle in the way of the natural development of the Levant States and could not therefore constitute a definitive settlement.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments were unwilling, therefore, to sign an exclusive military convention with France; to link their currency permanently with the franc; to bind themselves to employ only French officials in their administrations; to give such cultural undertakings as would limit their freedom of action to plan their educational systems as

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S 641 L 648 they thought fit; or in general to enter into any engagements which would place obstacles in the way of their closer association with their neighbours. Nor would they give a privileged position to any other Power. It was clear, however, that they would be willing to negotiate treaties of alliance and friendship with all the major Powers, France among them, and to take their full share in the task of guaranteeing international security, under the supervision of whatever international authority might be established. They would also be willing to recognize the position of French cultural and economic institutions functioning in the Levant States and to give guarantees for their freedom of action; for example, they would give assurances for the position of French concessionary companies and French schools, always provided that they confined themselves to their proper functions and did not use their freedom for political ends. They would also give guarantees to French officials and advisers in their service.

In the course of 1944, tentative discussions but not official negotiations took place with a view to clarifying the position of the two parties. They led, however, to no agreement between the two points of view, and at the end of 1944 the question of the treaty was no nearer settlement than it had been at the beginning.

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S 648 186 The great mass of Syrian political opinion was behind the Government in its attitude towards the Army and the Treaty; if it differed from the Government, it differed in being more intransigent and less inclined to endure delays or make concessions. It was clear that, should a clash come, the French authorities could not fall back upon their old expedient of installing a 'moderate' ministry of puppets. The present governing group indeed was the most moderate that could be expected. It had already lost some of its popular support and had been severely criticized in the Chamber on account of its efforts to restrain the impatience of the people, and was only kept in power by the absence of any alternative and the personal ascendancy of the President.

L 648 186 In Lebanon, too, the attitude defined in the preceding section was held by the greater part of the Government and of the political public, but not so unanimously and unreservedly

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as in Syria; and the external question of relations with France was complicated by various internal questions. 648 136

Before 1943, there had been a reasonably clear division of opinion in Lebanon. On the one side stood the Maronites and other Uniates, with a number of the other Christians and heterodox Moslems; they were in favour of Lebanese independence within its present enlarged frontiers and under French protection. On the other side were the greater part of the Moslems and the non-Catholic Christians, and all, Christians and Moslems alike, who held Arab nationalist views. They were opposed to Lebanese independence under French protection, and in general desired the reduction of Lebanon to its old frontiers and the replacement of independence by autonomy inside the Syrian State.

In November, 1943, the greater part of both groups united in opposition to France: the second group because they had always been opposed to French domination and the first because, while they had wanted French protection, they were not willing to be treated as mere tools and were sincerely attached to their independence. Their resistance was successful, and resulted in the gradual transfer of powers to the Lebanese Government and a partial withdrawal of French influence. (This process had already begun, but was accelerated by the November crisis.) This, in its turn, modified the internal political balance of Lebanon. So long as French influence had been paramount, it had been used in order to maintain the predominance of the Maronite and pro-French element. Now that French influence was diminishing however, this element could no longer retain its dominant position. The Maronites did not constitute a majority of the population, and even inside the Maronite community pro-French feeling was not so strong as it had been. The way was open for other groups to secure power in Lebanon.

This change in the internal situation itself led to further changes in political feeling. The more extreme of the Maronites and Lebanese separatists hoped for the restoration of French influence, and were now willing, if necessary, to accept a reduction in the size of Lebanon which would give it once more a large Christian majority. At the other extreme were some of the Moslems, who were now willing to accept the independence of Greater Lebanon for tactical reasons: either from personal interest or in the hope that in a few years' time, when their

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greater natural increase had given the Moslems a majority in Lebanon, they would be able to destroy the independence of Lebanon and incorporate it in Syria.

Between these two extremes there was a more balanced and moderate group. Although many of its members had opposed the independence and enlargement of Lebanon in the past, they were now willing to accept Lebanese independence within its present frontiers, but only on two conditions: the first that Lebanon followed a policy of real independence and was not subservient to France or any other Power, and the second that she co-operated closely with the other Arab States. This group included both Moslems and Christians. Its policy was based upon a number of considerations. Some of the Christians wanted an independent Arab Lebanon as a centre of Arab Christian civilization, others because they no longer believed in the possibility of French or other foreign protection and wanted an alternative. Some of the Moslems advocated Lebanese independence inside an Arab union as a means of gradually teaching the Christians to forget their fears of Arab nationalism. Others again, both Christians and Moslems, hoped that Lebanon might play a special part in the Arab world, as a centre of Western civilization and lay nationalism.

The possibility of a stable Lebanon depended entirely on this intermediate group. The success of this group, in its turn, depended on its discovering some basis of unity sufficient to neutralize the centrifugal force of sectarianism. The need for such unity led to an attempt to develop a specifically Lebanese Arab nationalism. It was also one of the causes, although by no means the only one, for the spread of Communism which was one of the features of the year in Lebanon, and also to a smaller extent in Syria.

None of these groups was fully organized or articulate, and the Lebanese political scene changed continuously and rapidly. One factor however remained stable: the majority of the population no longer wanted or believed in French protection, and any attempts by France to split Lebanon from Syria on the question of the treaty were bound to fail.

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The question of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations was complicated by its connexion with the question of Anglo-French relations in the Levant. Great Britain's policy

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in the Levant States was based upon two commitments undertaken in 1941: first, her endorsement of General Catroux's declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence, and secondly, the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, by which Great Britain recognized France's privileged and pre-eminent position over any other European power in the Levant, subject to the essential condition that Syria and Lebanon should be given independence. Behind these two undertakings there lay two interests. On the one hand, Great Britain was vitally interested in securing stable, friendly and contented régimes in Syria and Lebanon. The experience of the last decades had shown that any movement of unrest or discontent in the Levant States would have immediate repercussions in other Arab regions in which Great Britain was more directly interested. There was, moreover, a new consideration involved: as the Power which had occupied the Levant in 1941 and restored French rule there, Great Britain would be held responsible for what France did, and her intentions towards the Arab world as a whole would be largely judged by what happened in Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, Great Britain urgently needed the friendship of France in Europe and the world; Anglo-French dissension in the Levant might react upon Anglo-French relations in the world; and such dissension was likely to arise if the French suspected that Great Britain was anxious for them to withdraw from the Levant in order to take their place. It was, therefore, of great importance for Great Britain to avoid giving any ground for this suspicion; this was the more difficult because of that natural tendency to the spread of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Levant which has already been mentioned. Syrian and Lebanese independence would in fact, and even with the severest of self-denying ordinances on the part of Great Britain, mean an extension of Anglo-Saxon influence; it was, therefore, essential for Great Britain to avoid giving the impression that she approved of this tendency and was trying to accelerate it.

It was clear from the beginning that, although it might be possible to reconcile these two interests, it would at least be difficult. From 1941 to the end of 1943, however, the need to try to reconcile them did not arise in an acute form, because the essential condition laid down in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement—the establishment of Syrian and Lebanese independence—had not yet been properly fulfilled. British efforts

were therefore directed to persuading the Free French to make their declarations of independence a reality by the restoration of self-governing institutions. These efforts led to considerable tension between Great Britain and Free France. Many Frenchmen refused to believe that British insistence on the independence of the two States was due only to a desire to fulfil the promises made in 1941. Their suspicions were directed particularly against the British Minister, Sir E. L. Spears, who continued to champion the cause of the Levant States with force and enthusiasm even after he was succeeded as Minister by Mr. T. A. Shone in December, 1944. Apart from the disagreement on general policy, there were other causes of tension: the difficulties arising from the combination of a British supreme command with a French territorial command, the existence of a network of British political and security officers, the inevitable clash of two very different temperaments and administrative systems.

This phase came to an end with the restoration of national government, the Lebanese crisis of November, 1943, and the subsequent agreement for the transfer of powers. In 1944 a new phase opened: the search for a definitive settlement of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations. In this new phase it was no longer possible to delay the attempt to reconcile the two aspects of British policy. Short of denouncing one or other of her undertakings, only one course was possible for her. She must try to persuade both sides to make some sort of definitive agreement on paper. The exact terms of the agreement were secondary, so long as France secured such concessions as might be regarded as constituting a privileged position. What was important was that an agreement of some kind should be made and neither side should feel it had been forced out of its position or had lost prestige. To this end it was important to prevent a conflict or another crisis like that of November, 1943; and an essential means of preventing conflict was to refrain from leading either side to believe that, should a crisis come, it was certain of British support.

A definitive solution could only be reached, if at all, by free agreement; there was no question of forcing the Syrians and Lebanese to make a treaty. Nor, if a treaty was not made, could there be any question of abrogating the declarations of independence or a repetition of what had happened in 1920. On the other hand, should the French fail to secure a guarantee

of their position, there was no question of Great Britain's trying to usurp their place or profit from the wreckage of their hopes.

Finally, in all this complex situation, Great Britain must remember that she was only one of a number of interested Powers, who had their own views on the question and who had not endorsed the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. While trying to secure the fulfilment of that agreement, Great Britain could not allow her policy to drift too far from that of her Allies.

This general line of policy was authoritatively defined by Mr. Churchill in his speech in the House of Commons on February 27th, 1945. Reporting on the Crimea Conference, and his subsequent meetings with Arab leaders in Egypt, he said :

> 'Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri of Syria, in which we did our utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude towards the French and to encourage negotiation for a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but also the Lebanon. I must make clear once and for all the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, and in relation to our French Allies. That position is governed by the statements made in 1941, in which the independence of these Levant States was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time, and ever since, the British Government has made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant States. We are determined also to respect the independence of these States and to use our best endeavours to preserve a special position for France, in view of the many cultural and historic connexions which France has so long established with Syria. We hope it may be possible for the French to preserve that special position. We trust that these States will be firmly established by the authority of the world organization, and that French privilege will also be recognized.
>
> 'However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian and Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both and we do not believe that they are incompatible. Too much must not therefore be placed on the shoulders of Great Britain alone.

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We have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States recognize and favour Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favour any special position for any other foreign country. All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are fitting and necessary subjects for the Peace Conference, at which we must resolutely strive for final settlements of lasting peace between all the States and races comprised in the Middle East and in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean."[1]

II

The last sentence of Mr. Churchill's statement referred to a new factor which had made itself felt in the past year. Since 1941, the United States of America had refrained from recognizing the independence of Syria and Lebanon, and had made it clear that she would not give recognition until the independence of the two States became a reality. By 1944, the transfer of powers had reached a point where the U.S. Government felt itself justified in changing its attitude. In September, it formally recognized the independence of the two States. Mr. George Wadsworth, who had previously been American Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent, was appointed the first U.S. Minister to the two States.

Already, in July, the Government of the U.S.S.R. had accorded its recognition. It appointed M. Solod as its first Minister in October.

Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., at the time of that recognition and subsequently, made it clear that they recognized Syrian and Lebanese independence unconditionally and that they did not accept the privileged and pre-eminent position of France or any other Power in the Levant. In other words, they did not endorse the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement of 1941.

A number of the States also gave their recognition, and by the end of the year the only important Allied or neutral State which had not yet done so was Turkey. A consequence of this change in the international status of the two countries was the appointment of a number of Syrian and Lebanese diplomatic and Consular representatives in foreign countries. The formal sovereignty of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments was further emphasized by their declaration of war on Germany and Japan in February, 1945, their signature of the declaration

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 408, col. 1,290.

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of the United Nations in April and their invitation to the San Francisco Conference.

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Another development which greatly strengthened the position of the two States was the establishment of the Arab League. In the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1944 the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa an-Nahhas Pasha, had held a series of conversations on Arab unity with the representatives of other Arab Governments. On their completion, he decided to summon a preparatory conference or committee to draw a plan of union. The Committee met in Alexandria on September 28th, 1944. It was attended by representatives of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian, Sa'udi-Arabian and Yemeni Governments, and by a representative of the Palestinian-Arab parties. Its work was completed by the publication on October 7th of a 'Protocol', signed by the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq, and later adhered to by Sa'udi-Arabia and Yemen; the Palestinian, as not representing a Government, did not sign it.

The Protocol proclaimed the formation of a League of Arab States, composed of the independent Arab States which agreed to join it. It was to have a Council, on which the States would be represented on an equal footing. Its task would be to supervise the execution of agreements concluded between these States, to organize periodical meetings and to co-ordinate their political policies. The Council's decisions would be applicable to those who accepted them, but would be executory and obligatory in cases where disagreement arose between two members of the League and they sought the Council's intervention for its settlement. It would be forbidden to have recourse to force for the settlement of any dispute between members. Each State would have the right to conclude with other States, members or non-members of the League, treaties which were not in contradiction with the text or spirit of this agreement; no member was to follow a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League or any of its members. The Council would offer its mediation in any conflict that might arise between members of the League or with non-members.

A Commission was to be formed immediately by members of the Preparatory Committee with a view to drawing up the

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statutes of the Council and examining political questions which might form the subject of agreements between the Arab States. Arab States represented on the Committee would co-operate closely on economic, financial, cultural, social and other matters. Commissions of experts for each type of question would be set up to draft plans for co-operation in these matters. When all the commissions should have concluded their work, the Preparatory Committee would meet to examine the results of their studies with a view to convening the general Arab Congress.

The Committee hoped that in the future the Arab countries would consolidate these first results with others, particularly if, after the conclusion of the war, institutions were created which would unite the nations with closer and stronger ties.

The Protocol also contained two special decisions, the one relating to Lebanon and the other to Palestine. The former stated that 'the Arab States represented in the Preparatory Committee affirm unanimously their respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers, which have already been recognized by their Governments after Lebanon had followed a policy of independence as proclaimed by her Government in its ministerial programme, which was unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on October 7th, 1943.'

The decision in regard to Palestine stated that Palestine constituted one of the important elements in the Arab world; the rights of the Arabs could not be touched without danger to the peace and stability of the Arab world. The Committee considered that the engagements entered into by Great Britain, comprising the cessation of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of lands belonging to Arabs and the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence, represented acquired rights of the Arabs and their execution would be a step towards the desired aim. The Committee proclaimed its support for the cause of Palestine. While sympathizing with the sufferings of the Jews, it thought that nothing could be more arbitrary and unjust than to settle the question of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, the victims of which would be the Arabs of Palestine.

The political sub-committee of the Preparatory Committee met in Cairo in February, 1945, to draft the constitution of the Arab League. After its work was completed, the Preparatory

Committee met once more in Cairo on March 17th. It included representations of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian and Sa'udi-Arabian Governments and of the Arabs of Palestine. On March 22nd the representatives of these six Governments signed the 'Pact of the Arab League' at the first meeting of the Plenary Arab Congress. It was not signed by the Palestinian delegate, since he did not represent an Arab Government. A copy was sent to the Imam of Yemen for his adherence.

The Pact, which differed considerably from the Protocol of Alexandria and in general was less binding upon the signatories, stated that the Arab League was composed of the independent Arab States signatory to the Pact; any independent Arab State could join the League on application. The object of the League was to draw closer the relations between member-States, to co-ordinate their political action, safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and interest itself in general in questions concerning the Arab countries; also to ensure that, within the framework of the régime and the conditions prevailing in each State, a close co-operation should exist in economic and financial questions, matters of communications, cultural matters, questions connected with nationality, passports and extradition, social affairs and public health. The League would have a Council on which each member-State would have one vote. The Council would try to realize the objects of the League, supervise the execution of agreements concluded between members, and determine the means by which the League would collaborate with such international organizations as might be formed in future. There would also be special commissions for each of the questions enumerated above; representatives of other Arab States would be able to participate in these commissions on conditions to be determined by the Council.

The Pact forbade the use of force to settle disputes between member-States. Decisions of the Council would be binding in disputes not affecting the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the States and in which the contending parties sought settlement by the Council. The Council would mediate in any dispute likely to lead to war between two member-States or a member-State and a third State. Decisions in cases of arbitration and mediation would be by a majority vote. In the case of aggression or the threat of it, the

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State attacked could demand the immediate summoning of the Council, which would decide on the necessary steps by unanimous vote. Unanimous decisions of the Council would be binding on all members of the League, majority decisions only on those States which accepted them.

Each member-State undertook to respect the system of government of the other members and to abstain from any action tending to change that system. Member-States wishing to establish closer relations than those envisaged in the Pact might conclude agreements to this end.

The permanent seat of the League was to be Cairo, but the Council could decide to meet elsewhere. The Council would meet in ordinary session twice a year, in extraordinary session when necessary. The League would have a permanent Secretariat-General. (An Egyptian, Abdur-Rahman Azzam Bey, was appointed the first Secretary-General.) The expenses of the League would be shared by the member-States. The presidency of the Council would rotate among the representatives of the member-States.

Any member-State might withdraw from the League after a year's notice, and the Council might exclude any member which had not fulfilled its obligations, by unanimous vote. The Pact could be modified by a two-thirds majority of the member-States. The Pact was to come into force after four States had ratified it.

An annex to the Pact declared that the *de jure* international existence and independence of Palestine since her liberation from Ottoman rule could not be questioned. If, for reasons independent of her will, the external attributes of independence had not yet materialized, this could not constitute an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the Council. In these circumstances, and until she should enjoy the attributes of independence, the Council would choose an Arab representative from Palestine to participate in its work.

A further annex dealt with the participation of Arab countries not members of the Council in the work of the commissions to be set up under the Pact. The signatory States recommended the Council to go as far as possible in cooperating with them, and to make all efforts to learn their needs and understand their aspirations, and to use all political means possible to improve their conditions and secure their future.

A week later, on March 31st, the Syrian Chamber ratified the Pact. It was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber on April 7th.

The formation of an Arab League, however loose, had immediate repercussions on the situation in the Levant States and will probably have further repercussions in the future. It made clear that in any conflict which might arise over the independence of Syria and Lebanon, they would have the full support of the Arab world; at the same time it provided another reason why the two States should keep their hands free and not undertake any commitments which might prevent their fulfilling their new obligations as members of the League.

The establishment of the Arab League may have particularly far-reaching consequences for Lebanon. Both at Alexandria and at Cairo the Arab States made it clear that they were prepared to go a long way to allay the fears which the thought of Arab union aroused in the minds of a section of the Lebanese Christians. The Lebanese article of the Alexandria Protocol emphasized that so long as Lebanon was willing to align her policy with that of the other Arab States she need not fear any demands upon her or claims for frontier revision, and could hope (as had been proved in November, 1943) for their support and help in her struggle for independence; while there is reason to believe that the clauses inserted into the Cairo Pact safeguarding sovereignty and freedom of action of the member-States were due to the anxiety of the Arab States to do anything possible to win the adherence of Lebanon. If their efforts should be vain, they would no doubt be forced to reconsider their attitude towards Lebanon.

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APPENDIX A

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS

000 1. The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.
2. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 22nd, 1936.
3. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Lebanon, November 13th, 1936.
4. Exchange of Letters between Jamil Mardam Bey and M. de Tessan, December 11th, 1937.
5. Bonnet-Mardam Declaration and Protocol, November 14th, 1938.
6. Decrees of the High Commissioner in regard to the autonomy of Jebel Druze, the Alawis and the Jazirah, 1939.
7. Fundamental Principles of Future Status of Alexandretta, adopted by the League Council, January 27th, 1937.
8. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, July 4th, 1938.
9. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the cession of Alexandretta, June 23rd, 1939.
10. Proclamation of General Dentz concerning the Syrian Constitution, April 2nd, 1941.
11. General Catroux's Proclamation to the Syrians and Lebanese, June 8th, 1941.
12. General de Gaulle's Letter to General Catroux, June 24th, 1941.
13. Convention on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, July 12th, 1941.
14. General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28th, 1941.
15. General Catroux's Proclamation of Lebanese Independence, November 26th, 1941.
16. Agreement and Protocols on the Transfer of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests, December 22nd, 1943-January 5th, 1944.

S No. 1: *The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.*[1]

648 *The Council of the League of Nations,*

L 648 WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, shall, within such boundaries as may be fixed by the said Powers, be entrusted to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population, in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 (paragraph 4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

[1] Q. Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 607-11.

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WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for the territory referred to above should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it; and

WHEREAS, The terms of this mandate, which are defined in the articles below, have also been accepted by the Government of the French Republic and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

WHEREAS, The Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions; and

WHEREAS, By the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Article 1: The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 2: The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organize such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.

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The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel.

Article 3: The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the Mandatory.

Article 4: The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

Article 5: The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organization provided for in Article 6.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1924, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Article 6: The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the disposition of the founders.

Article 7: Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 8: The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

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The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

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The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 9: The Mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Councils of management (Conseils de fabrique) or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

Article 10: The supervision exercised by the Mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the Mandatory or the local government, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.

Article 11: The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any state member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign state in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships, or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said states; there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the Mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. The Mandatory, or the local governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of contiguity any special customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The Mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

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Concessions for the development of these natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all states members of the League of Nations, but on condition that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local government. Concessions in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the fiscal resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or, in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources either directly by the state or through an organization under its control, provided that this does not involve either directly or indirectly the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preferential treatment which would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.

Article 12: The Mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreements already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and ammunition, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literature, art or industries.

Article 13: The Mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

Article 14: The Mandatory shall draw up and put into force within twelve months from this date a law of antiquities in conformity with the following provisions. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archæological research to the nationals of all states members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent

department, unless this department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity. S 648

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said department. L 648

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archæological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archæological experience. The administration of Syria and the Lebanon shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Article 15: Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in Article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the Mandatory in organizing the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 16: French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 17: The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

Article 18: The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 19: On the termination of the mandate, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of the financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

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S *Article 20:* The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever
648 should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the
L League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application
641 of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London on the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

000 No. 2: *The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 22nd, 1936.*[1]

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne, Vu l'intention exprimée par le Gouvernement français devant la Société des Nations de conclure, en tenant compte de l'évolution déjà accomplie, un traité avec le Gouvernement syrien ;

Considérant les progrès réalisés dans la voie de l'affermissement de la Syrie comme nation indépendante ;

Vu l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour réaliser, suivant un programme bien précisé, toutes conditions propres à assurer l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, dans un délai de trois ans, à dater des formalités de ratification ;

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance, les relations qui subsisteront entre les deux États après la cessation du mandat, et d'en fixer, dans les conventions, protocoles et lettres annexes qui font partie intégrante du traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin, Son Excellence le Président de la République française et Son Excellence le Président de la République syrienne, ont délégué comme leurs plénipotentiaires :

S. E. le Comte de Martel, ambassadeur, Haut-Commissaire ; LL. El Djemil bey Mardam, Président du Conseil, Sadallah bey El Djabri, Ministre de l'Intérieur et des Affaires étrangères, Choucri bey Kouatli, Ministre des Finances et de la Défense ;

qui, s'étant communiqué leurs pouvoirs et les ayant trouvés en due forme, ont conclu ce qui suit :

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères : *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1936* (Paris, 1937), pp. 201-28.

Article premier: Il y aura paix et amitié perpétuelle entre la France et la Syrie. 000

Une alliance est établie entre les deux États indépendants et souverains en consécration de leur amitié et des liens qui les unissent pour la défense de la paix et la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts communs.

Article 2: En toute matière de politique étrangère de nature à affecter leurs communs intérêts, les deux gouvernements conviennent de se consulter pleinement et sans réserve.

Au regard des puissances étrangères, ils s'engagent à adopter une attitude conforme à leur alliance et à éviter toute action de nature à compromettre leurs relations avec les autres puissances.

Chaque gouvernement accréditera auprès de l'autre un représentant diplomatique.

Article 3: Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes prendront toutes mesures utiles pour assurer, au jour de la cessation du mandat, le transfert au seul Gouvernement syrien, des droits et obligations résultant de tous traités, conventions et autres actes internationaux conclus par le Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne la Syrie ou en son nom.

Article 4: Au cas où un différend entre la Syrie et un État tiers engendrerait une situation de nature à créer un risque de rupture avec cet État, les deux Gouvernements se concerteront en vue du règlement du différend par les voies pacifiques, conformément aux stipulations du Pacte de la Société des Nations ou de toute autre convention internationale applicable à un tel cas.

Si, malgré les mesures prévues au paragraphe précédent, l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes se trouvait engagée dans un conflit, l'autre Haute Partie Contractante lui prêterait immédiatement appui en qualité d'alliée. En cas de menace imminente de guerre, les Hautes Parties Contractantes se concerteront immédiatement pour prendre les mesures de défense nécessaires. L'aide du Gouvernement syrien consistera à fournir au Gouvernement français sur territoire syrien toutes facilités et toute assistance en son pouvoir, y compris l'usage des voies ferrées, cours d'eau, ports, aérodromes, plans d'eau et autres moyens de communication.

Article 5: La responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre en Syrie et celle de la défense du territoire incombent au Gouvernement syrien.

Le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire à la Syrie pendant la durée du Traité suivant les prévisions de la convention annexe.

En vue de faciliter au Gouvernement français l'exécution des obligations qui lui incombent aux termes de l'article précédent du présent traité, le Gouvernement syrien reconnaît que le

008 mission permanent et la protection en toutes circonstances des voies de transit aérien du Gouvernement français qui empruntent le territoire syrien, sont dans l'intérêt de l'alliance.

Article 6: Le présent traité est conclu pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans.

Les conventions et accords annexes d'application auront la même durée que le traité lui-même, à moins qu'une durée moindre ne soit stipulée dans l'acte, ou à moins que les Hautes Parties Contractantes ne soient d'accord pour les reviser afin de tenir compte des situations nouvelles.

Les négociations pour le renouvellement ou la modification du traité seront ouvertes, si, à partir de la vingtième année de son application, un des deux Gouvernements le demande.

Article 7: Le présent traité sera ratifié et l'échange des ratifications effectué aussitôt que possible.

Il sera communiqué à la Société des Nations.

Ce traité entrera en vigueur, en même temps que les conventions et accords annexes, au jour de l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.

Article 8: Dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité, le Gouvernement français sera déchargé des responsabilités et obligations qui lui incombent, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, du fait tant de décisions internationales que d'actes de la Société des Nations.

Ces responsabilités et obligations, dans la mesure où elles subsisteraient, seront automatiquement transférées au Gouvernement syrien.

Article 9: Le présent traité est rédigé en français et en arabe, ces deux textes sont officiels, le texte français faisant foi.

Au cas où une contestation s'élèverait au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application de ce traité, et où cette contestation n'aurait pu être réglée définitivement par voie de négociation directe, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de recourir aux procédures de conciliation et d'arbitrage prévues par le Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Fait à Damas, en quadruple exemplaire, le 22 décembre, 1936.

D. de MARTEL.
JAMIL MARDAM BEY.
S. EL DJABRI.
CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

CONVENTION MILITAIRE

Article premier: Le Gouvernement syrien, se substituant aux autorités françaises, prend sous sa responsabilité les forces militaires constituées, avec les charges et les obligations afférentes.

Article 2: Les forces armées syriennes doivent comprendre au minimum une division d'infanterie, une brigade de cavalerie et les services correspondants.

Article 3: Le Gouvernement français s'engage à accorder au Gouvernement de la République syrienne, à sa demande, les facilités ci-après, les dépenses devant en incomber au Gouvernement syrien :

(*a*) Mise à la disposition du Gouvernement syrien d'une mission militaire pour son armée, sa gendarmerie, sa marine ou son aviation militaire.

Le rôle, la composition et le statut de la mission seront déterminés d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité d'alliance.

Étant donné qu'il serait désirable que l'entraînement et l'instruction fussent identiques dans les armées des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à n'engager que des Français en qualité d'instructeurs et de spécialistes.

Les instructeurs ou spécialistes seraient demandés au Gouvernement français et relèveraient au point de vue de l'administration et de la discipline générale du chef de la mission militaire.

Les officiers de la mission militaire française pourront être appelés à exercer temporairement un commandement effectif dans les forces armées syriennes, sur demande adressée au représentant du Gouvernement français et agréé par lui. Dans ce cas, ces officiers relèveront du commandement normal de l'unité à laquelle ils seront affectés pour tout ce qui touche à l'exercice du commandement qui leur est confié.

(*b*) Envoi dans les écoles, centres d'instruction et corps de troupes français et à bord des bâtiments de guerre français de tout le personnel des forces armées syriennes que le Gouvernement syrien aura jugé nécessaire de faire instruire en dehors de la Syrie, étant entendu toutefois que le Gouvernement syrien conserverait sa liberté d'envoyer dans quelque autre pays les membres de ce personnel que les écoles et centres d'instruction français précités ne seraient pas en mesure d'accueillir.

Article 4: Pour faciliter l'exécution des obligations de l'alliance, le Gouvernement syrien adoptera pour ses forces armées un armement, un matériel et, dans la mesure nécessaire, un équipement du même modèle que ceux en usage dans les forces armées françaises.

Le gouvernement français accordera toutes facilités au Gouvernement syrien pour que ce dernier puisse assurer en France la fourniture aux forces armées syriennes, des armes, munitions, navires, avions, matériel et équipement du modèle le plus récent.

Article 5: En vue de répondre aux dispositions du troisième alinéa de l'article 5 du Traité, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage

000 à mettre pour la durée de l'alliance à la disposition du Gouvernement français des emplacements pour deux bases aériennes.

Ces emplacements seront choisis par le Gouvernement français en des points dont l'éloignement des quatre grandes villes ne saurait être inférieur à 40 kilomètres environ.

Provisoirement, le Gouvernement français est autorisé à utiliser comme bases les aérodromes de Nérab et Mezzé. Le transfert aux nouveaux emplacements s'effectuera dès que les nouvelles bases auront été aménagées dans les mêmes conditions de construction et d'équipement que les anciennes qui deviendront le propriété du Gouvernement syrien, à charge pour ce Gouvernement de supporter les frais de cette opération.

Indépendamment de ces bases et en attendant que les forces syriennes soient en mesure d'assumer la charge de l'entretien des terrains d'atterrissage actuellement équipés, le Gouvernement français accepte d'apporter son concours à l'entretien de ces terrains, étant entendu que ce concours ne porte aucune atteinte aux droits de propriété du Gouvernement syrien sur ceux-ci.

Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à fournir à la demande et aux frais du Gouvernement français et aux conditions qui feront l'objet d'un accord entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes, des gardes spéciaux, pris dans ses propres troupes, qui coopéreront avec les forces françaises chargées d'assurer la sécurité; l'équipement et l'entretien des bases aériennes, et avec les spécialistes des forces aériennes françaises provisoirement affectés à l'équipement et à l'entretien des terrains d'atterrissage susvisés.

Le Gouvernement français consent à maintenir des troupes au Djebel Druze et aux Alaouites, pour une durée de cinq années à compter de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité.

Les points de stationnement de ces troupes seront définis par un accord entre les deux Gouvernements.

Le Gouvernement syrien laissera à la disposition du commandement français qui en assumera l'entretien et l'instruction, les unités stationnées dans ces régions ; il facilitera le recrutement des éléments locaux nécessaires pour assurer le maintien de ces effectifs.

Il est spécifié que le maintien des forces françaises en ces divers points ne constitue pas une occupation et ne porte pas atteinte aux droits souverains de la Syrie.

Article 6: Le Gouvernement syrien accordera toutes facilités possibles pour l'entretien, l'instruction, les déplacements, les transports et les communications des forces françaises, soit autour des points où elles stationnent, soit en transit entre ces points, ainsi que pour le transport, l'emmagasinage de tous les approvisionnements et équipements nécessaires à ces forces. Ces facilités

comprennent l'usage des routes, chemins de fer, voies navigables, ports, quais, aérodromes, plans d'eau, le droit de survol et l'utilisation des réseaux télégraphiques, téléphoniques et radiotélégraphiques. En aucun cas, il ne pourra être établi de tarif de discrimination à l'encontre du Gouvernement français.

Les navires de guerre français auront licence générale de pénétrer et de séjourner dans les eaux syriennes et de visiter les ports syriens, étant entendu que le Gouvernement syrien recevra notification préalable des visites aux ports syriens.

Le Gouvernement syrien mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement français tous emplacements et locaux nécessaires aux besoins des forces françaises.

Les modalités d'application de cette disposition, ainsi que des différentes questions relatives tant au domaine militaire français qu'à celui dont il a l'usufruit, feront l'objet d'accords particuliers. L'exécution de ces accords ne devra entraîner pour le Gouvernement français aucune aggravation des charges actuellement existantes.

Article 7 : En exécution de l'article 5 du Traité d'alliance et sous réserve des modifications que les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviendraient d'y apporter par la suite, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à assurer aux forces françaises et aux militaires ou marins français isolés ainsi qu'aux employés civils français et leurs familles se trouvant sur le territoire syrien en vertu de l'alliance, les privilèges et immunités dont ces militaires, marins et civils jouissaient en Syrie lors de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente Convention.

Article 8 : Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à reprendre, à entretenir et à garder les terrains d'aviation crées par l'autorité française en Syrie, à la date d'entrée en vigueur du Traité d'alliance ou ceux dont la création serait jugée nécessaire par les Hautes Parties Contractantes à la sécurité aérienne (en dehors des établissements et terrains mentionnés à l'article 5) ; les conditions de reprise feront l'objet d'accords particuliers.

Les aéronefs des forces françaises auront, d'une façon générale, le droit de survol du territoire syrien, sous réserve de l'observation des mêmes règles de circulation qu'en France, en particulier en ce qui concerne le survol des agglomérations et lieux de réunion fréquentés. Ils auront la jouissance des terrains d'aviation et plans d'eau du territoire syrien. Le Gouvernement français pourra conserver ou créer sur ces terrains des installations dont l'établissement et l'entretien seront à sa charge.

Le Gouvernement français pourra confier les magasins et ateliers conservés ou créés à des spécialistes des forces aériennes détachés à cet effet.

000 Toutes facilités seront accordées par le Gouvernement syrien pour l'entretien de ces établissements et de leur personnel.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 1

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En me référant à l'article 1er de la Convention militaire, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires syriens des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Se référant à l'article 1er de la Convention militaire, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître par une lettre en date de ce jour que le Gouvernement syrien considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires syriens des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

PROTOCOLE No. 1

Se référant à l'article 7 de la Convention militaire, les Hautes Parties-Contractantes sont d'accord pour décider de fixer, avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité et en se conformant aux arrangements intervenus dans des circonstances similaires, les privilèges et immunités auxquels se réfère l'article susvisé.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY. D. de MARTEL.
S. EL DJABRI.
CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 2

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Comme suite au Traité signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence qu'en considération de l'amitié et de l'alliance étroite existant entre nos

deux pays, le Gouvernement syrien recrutera en France les conseillers techniques, magistrats et fonctionnaires étrangers dont il jugera utile la présence en Syrie.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement syrien relativement à l'emploi de fonctionnaires étrangers en Syrie. J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE de LETTRES No. 3

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Me référant à l'article 2 du Traité que nous avons signé à la date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien demande au Gouvernement français de bien vouloir assurer la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts syriens, conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, partout où le Gouvernement syrien ne serait pas directement représenté.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Répondant à la lettre de Votre Excellence, en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de Lui faire savoir que pour accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement syrien et conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, le Gouvernement français acceptera volontiers d'assurer la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts syriens, partout où le Gouvernement syrien ne serait pas directement représenté.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 4

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En me référant à l'article 2 du Traité que nous avons signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de

000 Votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique du Gouvernement de la République française en Syrie aura qualité d'ambassadeur.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En réponse à votre lettre en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien, désireux de marquer sa satisfaction à la suite de la nomination du représentant de la République française en qualité de Premier Ambassadeur en Syrie, décide que son rang de préséance par rapport aux représentants des autres Puissances restera conféré à ses successeurs.

Le Gouvernement syrien tient, à cette occasion, à porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique de la Syrie auprès du Gouvernement de la République française aura rang de Ministre Plénipotentiaire pendant la durée du présent Traité.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 5

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien assurera le maintien des garanties de droit public stipulées dans la constitution syrienne en faveur des individus et des communautés et donnera plein effet à ces garanties.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, vous avez bien voulu me confirmer que le Gouvernement syrien assurera le maintien des garanties de droit public stipulées dans la constitution syrienne en faveur des individus et des communautés et donnera plein effet à ces garanties.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette obligeante communication et de remercier Votre Excellence des assurances qu'elle contient.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 6

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

J'ai l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à Votre Excellence le texte des arrêtés Nos. 265/L.R. du 2 décembre et 274/L.R. du 5 décembre 1936, portant transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté sur les territoires du Djebel Druze et de Lattaquieh et établissant le régime spécial administratif et financier de ces territoires.

Ces textes donnent effet à l'accord intervenu à Paris en ce qui concerne, tant le rattachement de ces deux territoires à l'État de Syrie, que l'opportunité de maintenir à ces deux mêmes territoires un régime spécial administratif et financier conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ARRÊTÉ No. 265/L.R.
PORTANT PROMULGATION DU RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE DU DJEBEL DRUZE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922 ;

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire ;

Vu le décret du 16 juillet 1933 ;

Attendu qu'un accord a été réalisé à Paris entre le Gouvernement français et la délégation qui avait été chargée d'établir les bases d'un traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie ;

Attendu que cet accord comporte le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté dont l'exercice avait été réservé au Haut-Commissaire par l'arrêté No. 3114 du 14 mai 1930 et la définition des modalités du régime spécial en matière administrative et financière que le Gouvernement syrien entend assurer au territoire du Djebel Druze, conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Le territoire du Djebel Druze fait partie de l'État de Syrie.

Article 2 : Ce territoire bénéficie, au sein de l'État de Syrie, d'un régime administratif spécial et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Article 3 : Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le

territoire du Djebel Druze est régi par la constitution, les lois et les règlements généraux de la République syrienne.

Article 4: Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur au lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, dès ratification du traité franco-syrien.

Damas, le 2 décembre 1936.

de MARTEL.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE DU DJEBEL DRUZE

Article premier: Le régime spécial dont est doté, dans la République syrienne, le territoire du Djebel Druze, en matière administrative et financière, est réglé par les articles suivants :

Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, le Mohafez, nommé par le Président de la République, et le Conseil administratif du territoire sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 2: Le Président de la République nomme les magistrats. Il nomme, sur la présentation du Mohafez, les caïmakams et les chefs des services centraux du territoire.

Le Mohafez, en vertu de la délégation permanente du Président de la République syrienne, nomme les autres fonctionnaires. Il nomme également les mudirs.

Le Mohafez exerce le pouvoir réglementaire pour les matières qui sont de sa compétence en vertu du présent règlement.

Article 3: Le conseil administratif est composé de neuf membres élus suivant le mode de scrutin en vigueur dans l'État, et de trois membres nommés. Ces derniers sont choisis par le Président de la République sur une liste de propositions établie par le Mohafez, sur laquelle sont portés les Présidents des Chambres de Commerce et d'Agriculture et d'autres notables du territoire.

Les membres du Conseil sont élus, ou nommés, pour quatre ans. Le Conseil est renouvelable par moitié.

Article 4: Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1. Le produit de tous impôts d'État, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée ;
2. Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus de recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'État de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne ;
3. Des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versées, soit pas des États ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

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Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses : 000

1. Toutes les dépenses des services publics sur son territoire ;
2. Une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État égale à 5 p. 100 du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;
3. Le service des emprunts contractés par le territoire ou à son bénéfice ;
4. Le service des pensions.

Article 5 : Le projet de budget est préparé par le Mohafez, assisté des chefs de service et soumis avant le 1er octobre à l'examen du Ministre des Finances.

Dans un délai d'un mois, celui-ci fait connaître ses observations sur l'application des lois et règlements généraux de l'État et leur répercussion sur les recettes et les dépenses, ainsi que sur toutes mesures propres à assurer l'équilibre des finances du territoire.

Article 6 : Le Mohafez convoque le Conseil administratif au plus tard le 15 novembre, pour examen du projet de budget. La durée de cette session ne dépasse par quinze jours.

Le budget voté par le Conseil administratif est promulgué par le Président de la République avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 7 : Les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire et engageant ses finances sont préparés, présentés, délibérés, conclus et accordés dans les mêmes conditions que le budget.

ARRÊTÉ No. 274 L.R.
PORTANT PROMULGATION DU RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE ALAOUITE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922 ;

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire ;

Vu le décret du 16 juillet 1933 ;

Attendu qu'un accord a été réalisé à Paris entre le Gouvernement français et la délégation qui avait été chargé d'établir les bases d'un traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie ;

Attendu que cet accord comporte le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté dont l'exercice avait été réservé au Haut-Commissaire par l'arrêté No. 3113 du 14 mai 1930 et la définition des modalités du régime spécial en matière administrative et financière que le Gouvernement syrien entend assurer au territoire de Lattaquieh, conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations,

ARRÊTE :

000 *Article premier :* Le territoire de Lattaquieh fait partie de l'État de Syrie.

Article 2 : Ce territoire bénéficie, au sein de l'État de Syrie, d'un régime spécial administratif et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Article 3 : Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le territoire de Lattaquieh est régi par la constitution, les lois et les règlements généraux de la République syrienne.

Article 4 : Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur en lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, dès ratification du traité franco-syrien.

Beyrouth, le 5 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE ALAOUITE

Article premier : Le régime spécial dont est doté, dans la République syrienne, le territoire de Lattaquieh dans ses limites actuelles, en matière administrative et financière, est réglé par les articles suivants :—

Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, le Mohafez, nommé par le Président de la République, et le Conseil administratif du territoire sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 2 : Le Président de la République nomme les magistrats. Il nomme, sur la présentation du Mohafez, les caïmakams et les chefs des services centraux du territoire.

Le Mohafez, en vertu de la délégation permanente du Président de la République syrienne, nomme les autres fonctionnaires. Il nomme également les mudirs.

Le Mohafez exerce le pouvoir réglementaire pour les matières que sont de sa compétence en vertu du présent règlement.

Article 3 : Le Conseil administratif est composé d'au moins treize membres élus suivant le mode du scrutin en vigueur dans l'État, et de quatre membres nommés. Ces derniers sont choisis par le Président sur une liste de propositions établie par le Mohafez, sur laquelle sont portés les Présidents des Chambres de Commerce et d'Agriculture et d'autres notables du territoire.

Les membres du Conseil sont élus ou nommés pour quatre ans. Le Conseil est renouvelable par moitié.

Article 4 : Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1. Le produit de tous impôts d'État, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée ;
2. Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus de recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après

défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'État de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne ;

3. Des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versées, soit par des États ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

1. Toutes les dépenses des services publics sur son territoire ;
2. Une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État égale à 5 p. 100 du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;
3. Le service des emprunts contractés par le territoire ou à son bénéfice ;
4. Le service des pensions.

Article 5 : Le projet de budget est préparé par le Mohafez, assisté des chefs de service, et soumis avant le 1er octobre à l'examen du Ministre des Finances.

Dans le délai d'un mois, celui-ci fait connaître ses observations sur l'application des lois et règlements généraux de l'État et leur répercussion sur les recettes et les dépenses, ainsi que sur toutes mesures propres à assurer l'équilibre des finances du territoire.

Article 6 : Le Mohafez convoque le Conseil administratif au plus tard le 15 novembre pour examen du projet de budget. La durée de cette session ne dépasse pas quinze jours.

Le budget voté par le Conseil administratif est promulgué par le Président de la République avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 7 : Les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire et engageant ses finances sont préparés, présentés, délibérés, conclus et accordés dans les mêmes conditions que le budget.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me communiquer le texte des arrêtés No. 265/L.R. du 2 décembre et No. 274/L.R. du 5 décembre portant transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté sur les territoires du Djebel Druze et de Lattaquieh et établissant le régime spécial administratif et financier de ces territoires.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien après avoir pris connaissance de ces textes, les estime conformes à l'accord intervenu à Paris en ce qui touche ces matières.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

PROTOCOLE No. 2

000 Les Hautes Parties Contractantes constatent leur accord sur les points suivants :

Afin de préparer le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte de la Syrie, en matières économiques et financières, le Gouvernement syrien est prêt à entrer en négociations dès la ratification du traité franco-syrien pour régler les questions pendantes entre la Syrie et le Liban.

Le Gouvernement français pour sa part est prêt à assurer le transfert susvisé conformément à toute règlement résultant de ces négociations.

Au cas où le règlement ne comporterait ni existence d'un organe commun à la Syrie et au Liban, ni modalités de collaboration entre les administrations syriennes et libanaises, le Gouvernement syrien n'établira pas, à l'encontre du Liban, sous condition de réciprocité, de régime discriminatoire par rapport aux autres états détachés de l'ancien empire ottoman.

En cas d'absence d'organe commun, le Gouvernement français transférera directement au Gouvernement syrien les pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte de la Syrie, en matières économiques et financières.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY. D. de MARTEL.
CHOUCRI KOUATLI.
S. EL DJABRI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 7

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien est disposé à conserver aux établissements d'enseignement, d'assistance et de bienfaisance étrangers ainsi qu'aux missions de recherches archéologiques, le bénéfice du régime actuel des œuvres et des antiquités.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement syrien relativement au régime des œuvres et des antiquités en Syrie.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

PROTOCOLE No. 3

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à négocier, dès ratification du traité franco-syrien, une convention universitaire.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY. D. de MARTEL.
S. EL DJABRI.
CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 8

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Au moment où les relations avec la France vont être réglées par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, que sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées, d'accord entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant en Syrie, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'État ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à respecter les droits acquis institués au nom de la Syrie et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que, sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées, d'accord entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant en Syrie, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'État ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à respecter les droits acquis institués au nom de la Syrie et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 9

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Au moment où les relations entre la France et la Syrie vont se trouver définies par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance, j'ai l'honneur de donner l'assurance à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie syrienne et la monnaie française.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner l'assurance que le Gouvernement syrien maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie syrienne et la monnaie française.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 10

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En vue de fixer la situation respective des ressortissants français en Syrie et syriens en France, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français est prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement syrien une Convention d'établissement.

Cette Convention portera confirmation du *modus vivendi* établi par le décret du Président de la République française, en date du 25 avril 1935.

Il sera en outre précisé :—

1. Que les ressortissants de l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes jouiront du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne l'accès auprès des tribunaux de l'autre partie, tant pour réclamer que pour défendre leurs droits à tous les degrés de juridiction établis par les lois.

2. Qu'en ce qui concerne l'accès et le séjour les ressortissants syriens bénéficieront dans les colonies françaises du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le Gouvernement français assurera ce traitement aux ressortissants syriens, personnes physiques ou sociétés qui sont ou seraient admis à s'établir sur le territoire des colonies françaises, sous

réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public ou de sûreté, ainsi que de la législation locale.

Le Gouvernement français recommendera au Gouvernement tunisien de ne pas établir de discrimination à l'encontre des ressortissants syriens, en ce qui concerne leur accès et leur séjour en Tunisie et d'accorder également aux ressortissants syriens, personnes physiques ou sociétés, établies sur le territoire tunisien, le bénéfice des droits commun aux ressortissants des diverses puissances, sous réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public et de sûreté ainsi que de la législation locale.

De même, les ressortissants des colonies et protectorats bénéficieront en Syrie du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la Nation la plus favorisée.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des conditions dans lesquelles le Gouvernement français était prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement syrien une Convention d'établissement.

J'ai l'honneur de faire part à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien, d'accord avec le Gouvernement français sur les termes de cette lettre, prend acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

PROTOCOLE No. 4

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à entrer en négociations après ratification du Traité pour définir, dans le délai fixé pour l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, un régime judiciare s'inspirant de l'accord du 1er mars 1936 et propre à concilier le souci de protection des intérêts étrangers avec les progrès accomplis par le Gouvernement syrien dans l'organisation de la justice.

Le Gouvernement français prêtera son plein appui au Gouvernement syrien pour assurer, dans ce même délai, la mise en application de ce régime.

En attendant la conclusion de cette négociation et dès la ratification du Traité, sera mis en œuvre un programme de réformes comportant :

1. Application du principe de l'unité de juridiction par le groupement des juridictions ;

000 2. Réduction dans le cadre des magistrats français ;

3. Définition de l'intérêt étranger, de manière à rémédier à certains abus tels que la fictivité et le détournement de juridiction par la création d'un intérêt étranger en fraude de la loi ;

4. Suppression de la clause attributive de compétence entre ressortissants syriens.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY. D. de MARTEL.
CHOUCRI KOUATLI.
S. el DJABRI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 11

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En vertu des décisions de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement français était autorisé à demander au Gouvernement syrien de participer aux frais d'entretien de ses forces militaires et fondé à s'entendre avec lui en vue du remboursement de toutes les dépenses encourues par lui pour l'organisation de l'administration, le développement des ressources locales et l'exécution des travaux publics en Syrie.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français, tenant compte de la prochaine accession de la Syrie au statut d'État pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du Traité d'alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles et installations remis au Gouvernement syrien et dont le prix sera évalué par une Commission arbitrale mixte au moment où s'effectuera la remise.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement français en ce qui touche les dépenses civiles et militaires encourues par la France en Syrie.

Le Gouvernement français tenant compte de la prochaine accession de la Syrie au statut d'Etat pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du Traité d'alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles

et installations remis au Gouvernement syrien et dont le prix sera évalué par une Commission arbitrale mixte, au moment où s'effectuera cette remise.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

PROTOCOLE No. 5

Se référant au 4e alinéa du préambule du Traité, les Hautes Parties Contractantes tiennent à préciser que leur intention est de consacrer les deux premières années du délai de trois ans que stipule ce texte à la mise en place de toutes les institutions syriennes destinées à assurer la reprise par le Gouvernement syrien des responsabilités qu'assure actuellement le représentant de la France pour le compte de la Syrie, la troisième année du délai susvisé étant destinée à l'adaptation de ces institutions à l'exercice de ces responsabilités.

Se référant par ailleurs au protocole No. 2, les Hautes Parties Contractantes considèrent que les négociations prévues au 2e alinéa de ce texte doivent aboutir dans un délai d'une année à compter de la date à laquelle elles seront engagées.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes feront toutes diligences pour que ces négociations s'ouvrent à une date aussi proche que possible du 1er janvier 1937.

Au cas où le reglement résultant de ces négociations ne comporterait pas l'existence d'un organe commun, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de limiter à six mois le délai supplémentaire consacré à l'organisation des administrations syriennes auxquelles seront transférées les attributions économiques et financières actuellement exercées pour le compte de la Syrie par le représentant de la France.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY. D. de MARTEL.
CHOUCRI KOUATLI
S. el DJABRI.

No. 3: *Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Lebanon, November 13th, 1936.*[1]

(Only sections differing from Franco-Syrian Treaty)

TEXT OF TREATY

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République Libanaise . . . formalités de ratification ;

[1] S. Heald (ed.). *Documents on International Affairs*, 1937 (London, 1939), pp. 459-64.

000 Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un Traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir les relations qui existeront entre les deux États, après la cessation du Mandat, sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance et d'en fixer, dans les conventions, protocoles et lettres annexes qui feront partie intégrante du Traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin, Son Excellence le Président de la République Française et Son Excellence le Président de la République Libanaise ont convenu ce qui suit :

Article 1 : identical, *mutatis mutandis.*

Article 2 : identical, except for para. 2.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage à ne pas adopter à l'égard des États tiers d'attitude incompatible avec l'alliance et à s'abstenir de tout accord incompatible avec le présent Traité.

Article 3 : identical.

Article 4 : identical, except for phrase in para. 2 :

. . . les deux Gouvernements se *concerteraient* . . .

Article 5 : identical, except for phrases in paras. 2 and 3 :

Le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire, *aérien et naval* au Liban pendant la durée du Traité, suivant les prévisions de la Convention annexe.

. . . des *voies de communication* du Gouvernement français . . .

Article 6 : para. 2, identical, changes in paras. 1 and 3 :

Le présent Traité est conclu pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans, *et renouvelable par tacite reconduction pour une égale durée.* . . .

Les négociations pour *des modifications éventuelles à apporter au Traité seront ouvertes si, au cours de la vingt-quatrième année de son application, un des deux Gouvernements le demande.*

Articles 7 and 8 : identical.

Article 9 : identical, except for one verbal change.

Fait à Beyrouth, en quadruple exemplaire, le 13 novembre 1936, en foi de quoi ont signé :

Pour la France : D. de MARTEL.

Pour le Liban : E. EDDÉ, Emir KHALED, E.-G. TABET, Abdel RAZZAK, H. JIMBLAT, P. TRAD, Becharra KHOURY, OSSERAN, SELEIKIAN.

MILITARY CONVENTION

This is identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with the Military Convention in the Franco-Syrian Treaty, except for the following differences :

Article 2 : Les forces armées libanaises doivent comprendre au minimum *une brigade mixte et ses services.*

Article 3: identical except for omission of last four lines. 000

Article 5: En vue de répondre aux dispositions du deuxième alinéa de l'article 5 du Traité, le Gouvernement français s'engage à maintenir sur le territoire libanais, jusqu'à nouvel accord des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, des éléments des forces françaises de l'armée de terre, de l'air et de la marine, stationnées au Levant.

Les conditions particulières de ce stationnement et la collaboration entre les forces françaises et libanaises feront l'objet d'accords périodiques entre les deux Gouvernements.

Il est spécifié que le stationnement de forces françaises en territoire libanais ne constitue pas une occupation et ne porte pas atteinte aux droits souverains du Liban.

Article 6: identical except for omission of last three paragraphs.

Article 8: omitted.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES AND ANNEXED PROTOCOLS

The texts of these are identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with those annexed to the Franco-Syrian Treaty, except for the following differences:

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 4

Le Président de la République libanaise, au Haut Commissaire de la République française.

En attendant l'entrée en vigueur du présent Traité, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais, désireux d'établir une liaison plus étroite entre les émigrés libanais et la métropole, demande au Gouvernement français son accord sur la création de postes d'attachés libanais auprès des représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la République française dans les villes où les intérêts libanais justifient cette mesure.

Il lui demande également de vouloir bien lui prêter tout son appui pour la défense des intérêts divers des émigrés.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République française, au Président de la République libanaise.

Répondant à la lettre de Votre Excellence en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire savoir que, pour accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement libanais, le Gouvernement français est d'accord pour que des postes d'attachés libanais soient créés auprès des représentants diplomatiques et consulaires français, dans les villes de l'étranger où les intérêts libanais justifient cette mesure.

000 D'une manière générale, le Gouvernement français prêtera tout son appui pour la défense des intérêts divers des émigrés.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 5

This is identical with No. 4 in the Franco-Syrian Treaty.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 6

Le Président de la République libanaise, au Haut Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais est disposé à garantir l'égalité des droits civils et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants, sans distinction aucune.

Il est également disposé à assurer une représentation équitable des différents éléments du pays dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'État.

Le Gouvernement libanais assurera, dans la répartition des dépenses d'utilité publique, une juste proportion entre les différentes régions.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République française, au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que le Gouvernement libanais est disposé à garantir l'égalité des droits civils et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants, sans distinction aucune, à assurer une représentation équitable des différents éléments du pays dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'État et à assurer, dans la répartition des dépenses d'utilité publique, une juste proportion entre les différentes régions.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 6 BIS

Le Président de la République libanaise, au Haut Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à Votre Excellence que, pour donner effet aux stipulations de l'échange de lettres No. 6, le Gouvernement Libanais assurera, le plus tôt possible et en tout cas avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, l'unification du régime fiscal.

Dans le même esprit, le Gouvernement libanais est également disposé à appliquer à l'ensemble du territoire de la République un programme de réformes administratives comportant :

1°. L'octroi aux municipalités d'attributions plus étendues ;

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2°. La création de conseils de districts, habilités à étudier les questions d'intérêt local. 000

Suivant l'importance des matières, lesdits conseils pourront soit donner leur avis, soit se prononcer définitivement.

Leurs décisions définitives seront, suivant des cas à déterminer, soumises ou non à l'approbation du Gouvernement central.

Lesdits conseils seront, notamment, consultés sur les affectations de la part du budget des dépenses intéressant leur district.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République française, au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que, pour donner effet aux stipulations de l'échange de lettres No. 6, le Gouvernement libanais assurera, le plus tôt possible et en tout cas avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, l'unification du régime fiscal et que, dans le même esprit, il est disposé à appliquer à l'ensemble du territoire de la République un programme de réformes administratives.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocols No. 1-3 and 5 are identical with those annexed to the Franco-Syrian Treaty; No. 4 consists of the first two paragraphs only of No. 4 annexed to the Franco-Syrian Treaty.

No. 4: *Exchange of Letters between Jamil Mardam Bey and M. de Tessan, December 11th, 1937.*[1]

le 11 décembre 1937.

Son Excellence Monsieur de Tessan, Sous-Sécretaire d'État aux Affaires Etrangères.

Monsieur le ministre,

Au cours des échanges de vues que mon séjour à Paris m'a permis d'avoir avec Votre Excellence, il nous a été donné d'examiner, dans toute leur ampleur, les diverses questions que, dans l'ordre tant politique et administratif qu'économique, soulève la mise en œuvre de la collaboration franco-syrienne, telle que celle-ci a été définie par le traité du 22 décembre 1936. L'occasion m'a été ainsi offerte de constater notre complet accord sur l'intérêt mutuel de nos deux pays à entretenir et à développer dans une atmosphère d'amitié confiante leurs relations, et sur les moyens les plus propres à les faire fructifier. Parmi les problèmes que nous avons débattus, il en est deux sur lesquels notre attention s'est portée d'une manière toute spéciale.

Le premier concerne le statut des minorités. A cet égard,

[1] *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, 1937 (Paris, 1938), pp. 215-17.

001 il m'est agréable de confirmer à Votre Excellence que, comme je l'ai souligné dans mes récentes déclarations au Parlement, les mesures prises après les regrettables incidents dont la Djezireh a été le théâtre, ont eu d'heureux effets. La situation dans cette région tend à redevenir normale. L'attachement de la Syrie à son existence nationale n'a rien qui ne se concilie avec le plein exercice des droits qui sont garantis aux communautés et aux individus, et auxquels se réfère l'annexe No. 5 au traité du 22 décembre 1936. Animé de ce sentiment, mon Gouvernement se prépare à mettre en application la loi sur les mohafazats, qui est aussi conforme aux intérêts généraux du pays qu'aux intérêts particuliers de chacune des régions qui le composent.

Le second de ces problèmes concerne l'exécution des clauses énoncées à l'annexe No. 2 au traité. La Syrie a conscience des bienfaits que, pour l'organisation de ses services publics, elle peut attendre du concours de la technique française. C'est dans cet esprit qu'au plus tôt, il conviendra de constituer le cadre permanent des fonctions en cause et de recruter les agents qui auront à les occuper. Pour la désignation des titulaires, mon pays souhaiterait vivement qu'il y fût pourvu sur présentation, par le Gouvernement français, de candidatures qualifiées.

Je me félicite d'être en mesure de donner à Votre Excellence les assurances qui précèdent. Je ne doute pas que, si besoin était, elles ne fussent de nature à La convaincre du désir profond et sincère qu'a la Syrie de pratiquer de manière large et confiante la politique que, reprenant et confirmant une tradition séculaire, le traité d'alliance a eu pour objet de définir.

Agréez, Monsieur le ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Signé : DJEMIL MARDAM BEY.

le 11 décembre 1937.

Son Excellence Djemil Mardam Bey, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République syrienne.

Monsieur le président,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à Votre Excellence de la lettre qu'à la date de ce jour Elle a bien voulu me faire parvenir et dont je reproduis ci-après la teneur :

" Au cours des échanges de vues que mon séjour à Paris m'a permis d'avoir avec Votre Excellence, il nous a été donné d'examiner, dans toute leur ampleur, les diverses questions que, dans l'ordre tant politique et administratif qu'économique, soulève la mise en œuvre de la collaboration franco-syrienne, telle que celle-ci a été définie par le traité du 22 décembre 1936. L'occasion m'a été ainsi offerte de constater notre complet accord sur l'intérêt

mutuel de nos deux pays à entretenir et à développer dans une atmosphère d'amitié confiante leurs relations, et sur les moyens les plus propres à les faire fructifier. Parmi les problèmes que nous avons débattus, il en est deux sur lesquels notre attention s'est portée d'une manière toute spéciale. 000

"Le premier concerne le statut des minorités. A cet égard, il m'est agréable de confirmer à Votre Excellence que, comme je l'ai souligné dans mes récentes déclarations au Parlement, les mesures prises après les regrettables incidents dont la Djezireh a été le théâtre, ont eu d'heureux effets. La situation dans cette région tend à redevenir normale. L'attachement de la Syrie à son existence nationale n'a rien qui ne se concilie avec le plein exercice des droits qui sont garantis aux communautés et aux individus, et auxquels se réfère l'annexe No. 5 au traité du 22 décembre 1936. Animé de ce sentiment, mon Gouvernement se prépare à mettre en application la loi sur les mohafazats, qui est aussi conforme aux intérêts généraux du pays qu'aux intérêts particuliers de chacune des régions qui le composent.

"Le second de ces problèmes concerne l'exécution des clauses énoncées à l'annexe No. 2 au traité. La Syrie a conscience des bienfaits que, pour l'organisation de ses services publics, elle peut attendre du concours de la technique française. C'est dans cet esprit qu'au plus tôt, il conviendra de constituer le cadre permanent des fonctions en cause et de recruter les agents qui auront à les occuper. Pour la désignation des titulaires, mon pays souhaiterait vivement qu'il y fût pourvu sur présentation, par le Gouvernement français, de candidatures qualifiées.

"Je me félicite d'être en mesure de donner à Votre Excellence les assurances qui précèdent. Je ne doute pas que, si besoin était, elles ne fussent de nature à La convaincre du désir profond et sincère qu'a la Syrie de pratiquer de manière large et confiante la politique que, reprenant et confirmant une tradition séculaire, le traité d'alliance a eu pour objet de définir."

C'est très volontiers qu'au nom du Gouvernement de la République, je prends acte des éclaircissements et des assurances que, spontanément, Votre Excellence a tenu à me fournir. Je ne doute pas que l'opinion française n'y voie une nouvelle preuve du vif désir de la Syrie de pratiquer dans un esprit large, confiant et sincère la politique d'alliance et de collaboration à laquelle nos deux pays sont également attachés et dont ils attendent, tous deux, le raffermissement des liens qui les unissent. De nos échanges de vues, j'emporte la certitude qu'en accord avec Ses collègues, Votre Excellence aura à cœur de hâter l'entrée en vigueur de toutes les mesures qui nous sont apparues indispensables pour donner aux engagements souscrits de part et d'autre leur plein effet.

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De mon côté, mon Gouvernement, sensible à la valeur de ces apaisements, qui touchent à tous les domaines, et soucieux d'accélérer la mise en œuvre du nouveau régime, s'emploiera à obtenir que la Chambre des Députés entreprenne l'examen du traité du 22 décembre 1936 avant le premier mars prochain. Dans l'intervalle, il s'efforcera de presser la solution des divers problèmes en suspens. Il est de l'intérêt commun des deux pays que l'ensemble du système soit effectivement organisé avant l'expiration des délais qui, ainsi que M. Viénot, mon prédecesseur, vous en a donné l'assurance à la date du 17 février dernier, courent à partir du premier janvier 1937.

Agréez, Monsieur le président, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Signé : TESSAN.

No. 5 : *The Bonnet-Mardam Declaration and Protocol, November 14th, 1938.*[1]

DÉCLARATION COMMUNE

Après la signature du Protocole en date de ce jour, le gouvernement français et le gouvernement syrien ont, d'un commun accord, reconnu qu'il était de l'intérêt des deux parties de hâter le plus possible l'entrée en vigueur du statut défini par le traité du 22 décembre 1936, et par les actes annexés et complémentaires.

Ils estiment en conséquence qu'il serait à souhaiter que le parlement syrien donnât son approbation, au plus tard le 20 janvier 1939, et que le parlement français, saisi, avant le 10 décembre prochain, des rapports des commissions compétentes, autorisât la ratification desdits textes avant le 31 janvier 1939.

Dans ces conditions, la dévolution à l'administration syrienne des attributions encore retenues par l'autorité mandataire, aurait lieu dans le courant du mois de février prochain.

Fait en double en Paris, le 14 novembre 1938.

Signé : JAMIL MARDAM BEY.
GEORGES BONNET.

PROTOCOLE

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne, soucieux de ne rien négliger qui puisse contribuer à rendre plus étroites et plus confiantes l'amitié et la collaboration des deux pays, ont repris l'examen des différentes questions que soulève l'avenir de leurs rapports.

1. Le gouvernement syrien rappelle les mesures par lesquelles il se propose de donner leur plein effet aux engagements énoncés

[1] *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), July, 1939, pp. 355-57.

dans l'échange des notes du 11 décembre 1937. Il souligne qu'il a également prorogé le privilège de l'institut d'émission et stabilisé, dans des conditions conformes aux intérêts permanents du pays, le régime de la recherche et de l'exploitation des gîtes pétrolifères. Il ajoute qu'il est dans son intention de solliciter le plus rapidement possible du Parlement l'approbation dudit accord ainsi que des textes qui en ont procédé.

2. En ce qui concerne le cadre permanent des fonctions à confier à des agents placés à la disposition de la Syrie par la France, le gouvernement syrien confirme que le conseiller affecté au département de l'intérieur sera assisté de deux adjoints, dont l'un sera détaché à demeure dans les confins septentrionaux.

3. Insistant sur la necessité d'apaiser certaines préoccupations auxquelles la France, tenue par la pérennité de ses traditions, ne pourrait, sans déroger, rester indifférente, le gouvernement de la République se réjouit de constater que la Syrie est résolue à garantir efficacement à tous la liberté de conscience ainsi que l'exercice des droits qui en découlent; et en particulier, à reconnaître aux chrétiens, en toute matière, la faculté de récuser les canons et la juridiction coraniques.

4. Encore que la convention scolaire ne doive, en vertu du traité du 22 décembre 1936, être conclue que postérieurement à l'entrée en vigueur de ce dernier, le gouvernement syrien aura, dans ce domaine, à cœur de veiller à ce que le régime des examens n'ait à aucun degré, pour effet de restreindre la place du français dans les programmes, ni, non plus, à porter atteinte à la faveur dont jouit actuellement auprès des élèves l'enseignement de cette langue.

Soucieux, de son côté, de raffermir les liens moraux qui unissent les deux pays, le gouvernement français prendra au bénéfice des étudiants syriens, les mesures propres à leur permettre de parfaire en France leur formation dans les conditions les plus avantageuses.

5. Conscients de leur intérêt mutuel à développer leurs échanges commerciaux, les parties contractantes, chacune en ce qui la concerne, prendront, à cet effet, les mesures appropriées.

En matière financière, le gouvernement français prêtera, de son côté, son concours au gouvernement syrien.

6. Convaincu de l'intérêt mutuel des parties contractantes à mettre le plus promptement possible en vigueur le traité, ainsi que tous les textes qui en dérivent, et désireux de donner à la Syrie une nouvelle preuve d'amitié et de confiance, le gouvernement français ne verrait pas d'inconvénient à ce que le terme du délai prévu par l'article 4 du préambule du traité et par l'alinéa premier du protocole 5 fut fixé au 30 septembre 1939. Il se propose de soumettre aux Chambres cette novation symbolique,

qui acquerrait valeur contractuelle par l'insertion, dans le corps des instruments de ratification, du présent protocole, dûment revêtu de l'approbation du parlement syrien et du parlement français.

7. Dès l'échange des instruments de ratification, la Syrie accréditera un représentant diplomatique à Paris.

Fait en double à Paris, le 14 novembre 1938.

Signé : JAMIL MARDAM BEY.
GEORGES BONNET.

No. 6 : *Decrees of the High Commissioner in regard to the autonomy of the Alawi Territory, Jebel Druze, and the Jazirah, July 1st, 1939.*[1]

I. RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE AUTONOME ALAOUITE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'âcte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 274/LR du 5 décembre 1936,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Le règlement organique du territoire autonome alaouite annexé à l'arrêté 274/LR, du 5 décembre 1936, est remplacé par le règlement organique administratif et financier annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Le règlement organique

Article premier : Le régime spécial dont est doté le territoire autonome alaouite, dans l'État de Syrie, en matière administrative et financière, est fixé par le présent règlement organique.

Article 2: Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, l'administrateur supérieur, assisté d'un conseil des directeurs et chefs de service, et le conseil du territoire sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 3 : Les emplois publics sont répartis équitablement entre les diverses communautés du territoire dans toute la mesure compatible avec les besoins d'une bonne administration.

[1] *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), August, 1939, pp. 449-53.

De l'administrateur supérieur

Article 4 : Le Chef de l'État de Syrie nomme l'administrateur supérieur sur la présentation du conseil du territoire. 000

L'administrateur doit jouir de ses droits civils et politiques. Il est nommé pour 5 ans. Son mandat est renouvelable.

Il y a incompatibilité entre les fonctions d'administrateur et tout mandat électif.

Article 5 : La présentation de l'administrateur est faite par le conseil du territoire suivant un vote au scrutin secret à la majorité des 2/3 des membres composant le Conseil. La majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés suffit au deuxième tour de scrutin et la majorité relative au troisième.

Le conseil du territoire se réunit, à cet effet, un mois avant l'expiration des pouvoirs de l'administrateur ; il est convoqué au plus tôt en cas de vacance du poste par décès, démission, ou pour toute autre cause.

Article 6 : Le directeur ou chef de service de l'intérieur assume l'intérim des fonctions de l'administrateur en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de ce dernier, ou de vacance du poste.

Article 7 : L'administrateur est le chef et la plus haute autorité de l'administration locale. Il est le représentant du pouvoir central sur le territoire.

Il a la charge de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publique.

Il assure l'exécution de la loi et des règlements.

Il administre le territoire avec le concours de directeurs ou chefs de service placés à la tête des services publics.

En vertu de la délégation permanente du Chef de l'État de Syrie, il nomme à tous les emplois.

Il est ordonnateur du budget local.

Il représente en justice le territoire.

Il exerce le pouvoir réglementaire en matière locale, après avis conforme du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service et sous réserve des attributions du conseil du territoire.

Il a qualité pour passer contrat avec des fonctionnaires ou magistrats français.

Article 8 : Il convoque les collèges électoraux, aux dates et dans les conditions fixées par les dispositions législatives.

Il convoque le conseil du territoire en session ordinaire et en session extraordinaire et prononce la clôture des sessions.

Il peut ajourner le conseil pour un mois par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service. Le conseil ne peut être ajourné plus de deux fois consécutives.

Il peut le dissoudre par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service.

000 En cas de dissolution, l'administrateur doit convoquer les collèges électoraux dans un délai de quatre mois.

Du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service

Article 9 : Le conseil des directeurs et chefs de service est composé des directeurs, conseillers et chefs des services généraux de l'administration centrale du territoire.

Il est présidé par l'administrateur et se réunit sur convocation de ce dernier.

Il procède au moyen de délibérations prises à la majorité des voix des membres composant le conseil. La voix de l'administrateur est prépondérante.

Article 10 : Le conseil des directeurs et chefs de service assiste l'administrateur dans l'examen des affaires intéressant l'administration du territoire.

Indépendamment des questions expressément visées dans le présent règlement organique, l'administrateur doit obligatoirement prendre l'accord du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service dans toute affaire présentée au conseil du territoire, ainsi que dans les matières suivantes :

1. nomination et promotion des directeurs, chefs de service et caïmacams ;

2. rectification des prévisions budgétaires en cours d'exercice ;

3. déclarations d'utilité publique et décisions relatives aux concessions ;

Mention de la délibération du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service est portée à tous actes où cette formalité est requise.

Du conseil du territoire

Article 11 : Le conseil du territoire est composé d'au moins 17 membres, ceux-ci sont élus suivant le mode de scrutin fixé par le règlement électoral du 25 février 1930. Le conseil actuellement en exercice conservera son mandat jusqu'à expiration normale de ce dernier.

Le règlement électoral ne pourra être modifié que par un vote du conseil acquis à la majorité des deux tiers des voix composant le conseil.

Les membres du conseil sont élus pour six ans. Le conseil est renouvelable par moitié. Pour le premier renouvellement, les circonscriptions des membres sortants seront désignées par voie de tirage au sort effectué à la diligence du conseil.

Article 12 : Le conseil du territoire se réunit chaque année en deux sessions ordinaires, l'une en novembre, l'autre en avril. La durée de chacune de ces sessions ne peut excéder quinze jours.

Le conseil peut en outre être convoqué en session extraordinaire.

Article 13 : A la première séance de la session de novembre, le

conseil du territoire procède, avant toute discussion, à l'élection de son bureau qui demeure en fonctions jusqu'à la session de novembre de l'année suivante. 000

Le conseil établit son règlement intérieur.

Article 14 : Le conseil du territoire exerce ses attributions par voie de délibération. Le vote est public et ne peut être émis par procuration.

Le conseil ne peut valablement délibérer que si la moitié plus un de ses membres sont présent à la séance. Ses décisions sont prises à la majorité des membres présents. La voix du président est prépondérante en cas de partage, sauf le cas de scrutin secret.

Il est voté au scrutin secret toutes les fois que le tiers des membres présents le réclament, ou qu'il s'agit de procéder à une élection.

Dans ce dernier cas, si la majorité absolue n'a pas été obtenue au premier tour de scrutin, la majorité relative suffit. En cas d'égalité de voix, le plus âgé est déclaré élu.

Article 15 : Le président de séance a la police de l'assemblée. Il est chargé de faire observer par celle-ci son règlement intérieur.

Article 16 : L'administrateur a accès au conseil ; il peut y prendre la parole, mais il n'a pas voix délibérative. Il peut s'y faire assister de conseillers, directeurs ou chefs de service.

Article 17 : L'administrateur peut, avant la clôture de la session, demander qu'une délibération du conseil soit remise en discussion. Si le conseil confirme son premier vote à la majorité des deux tiers, la délibération est acquise.

Article 18 : Le budget, le compte définitif des exercices clos, les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire ou engageant ses finances sont soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire.

Les attributions du conseil en ces matières sont définies par les articles 19 à 25 du présent règlement organique.

Sont également soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire les actes portant modification du nombre et des limites des circonscriptions administratives, la création ou la suppression de municipalités, les règlements concernant le statut des fonctionnaires, les pensions et retraites, l'organisation municipale et plus généralement les actes réglementaires intéressant l'organisation administrative ou les finances du territoire.

Du budget

Article 19 : Le territoire bénéficie de l'autonomie financière.

Article 20 : Le projet de budget est préparé et présenté par l'administrateur, assisté du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service.

Il est communiqué aux membres du conseil du territoire huit

000 jours au moins avant l'ouverture de la session de novembre en même temps que le compte définitif de l'exercice écoulé.

Le budget voté par le conseil du territoire est promulgué par l'administrateur avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 21 : Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1. le produit de tous impôts, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire, et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée ;

2. une quote-part de l'excédent des recettes communes sur les dépenses communes ;

3. des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versés, soit par des États ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

1. toutes les dépenses des services publics sur le territoire ;

2. une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État de Syrie, égale à 5% du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;

3. le service des emprunts contractés par le territoire ;

4. le service des pensions incombant au territoire.

Article 22 : Peuvent faire l'objet d'inscription d'office au budget :

1. les dettes exigibles régulièrement contractées ainsi que les dépenses des exercices clos ;

2. les dépenses de gendarmerie, de police, et celles relatives à la sécurité.

S'il y a lieu, l'inscription d'office est faite par un arrêté de l'administrateur pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service.

Article 23 : La constitution organique des services ne peut être modifiée par voie budgétaire.

Article 24 : Lorsque, dans l'intervalle des sessions, des circonstances imprévues rendent nécessaires des dépenses urgentes, l'administrateur peut, par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service, ouvrir des crédits extraordinaires ou supplémentaires, à charge de les présenter au conseil du territoire au cours de la session suivante.

Article 25 : La session ordinaire du conseil du territoire tenue en novembre est spécialement consacrée au vote du budget, auquel il doit être procédé avant toute autre discussion, l'élection du bureau exceptée.

Si le conseil n'a pas définitivement statué sur le projet du budget avant la fin de la session, l'administrateur pourra le convoquer en session extraordinaire pour en poursuivre la discussion. La durée de cette session est limitée à quinze jours. Ce délai écoulé, s'il n'a pas été statué définitivement sur le budget, l'administrateur, par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service,

rendra le projet de budget obligatoire en tenant compte dans la mesure du possible des votes déjà acquis.

Dispositions diverses

Article 26 : Le drapeau national est celui de l'État syrien ; le territoire autonome alaouite conservera son pavillon spécial.

Article 27 : Les conseillers et inspecteurs français, mis à la disposition du territoire, pourront être délégués dans les fonctions de directeurs ou de chefs de service.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE JUDICIAIRE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 32/LR du 12 février 1937,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire du territoire autonome alaouite est fixée par le règlement organique annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence, et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire en matière civile, commerciale, administrative et pénale du territoire autonome comprend :

Un tribunal supérieur à Lattaquié dont la compétence territoriale s'étend à tout le territoire,

Des tribunaux de 1ère instance, dont un à Lattaquié,

Des justices de paix, en principe une par caza.

Article 2 : Les fonctions de directeur de la justice, chef du service judiciaire, sont exercées par le président du tribunal supérieur qui est un magistrat français.

Le président du tribunal de 1ère instance de Lattaquié est également un magistrat français.

Ces magistrats relèvent de l'inspecteur général français de la justice en Syrie.

Ils sont nommés par le Chef de l'État Syrien sur la proposition du Gouvernement Français.

Article 3 : Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 2, les

000 magistrats du territoire sont nommés par l'administrateur sur proposition du directeur de la justice.

Article 4: Le tribunal supérieur connaît souverainement et sans recours :

des appels des tribunaux de 1ère instance,
des affaires criminelles,
du contentieux administratif,
de tous les conflits de juridiction à l'intérieur du territoire.

Il constitue, en s'adjoignant le président du tribunal de 1ère instance de Lattaquié et un juge de ce tribunal, le conseil supérieur de la magistrature, le conseil de discipline des auxiliares de justice, la commission d'avancement des magistrats et celle des auxiliaires de justice.

Article 5: Les tribunaux de 1ère instance et les justices de paix connaissent des affaires qui leur sont soumises conformément à la loi, sauf ce qui est dit au présent arrêté.

Article 6: En matière civile et commerciale, les justices de paix statuent toujours en premier ressort ; appel est porté pour toutes les justices de paix du territoire devant le tribunal de 1ère instance de Lattaquié qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Dans les mêmes matières, les tribunaux de 1ère instance statuent toujours en premier ressort, sauf ce qui est dit ci-dessus de l'appel des affaires de justice de paix.

En matière pénale les justices de paix connaissent définitivement et sans aucune voie de recours des contraventions. Elle connaissent en premier ressort des délits qui sont de leur compétence aux termes de la loi, à charge d'appel pour toutes les justices de paix du territoire devant le tribunal de 1ère instance de Lattaquié qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Les délits non attribués aux justices de paix sont de la compétence exclusive des tribunaux de 1ère instance qui statuent toujours en premier ressort, sauf ce qui est dit ci-dessus de l'appel des affaires de justices de paix.

Article 7: Il n'est rien modifié à l'organisation actuelle en ce qui concerne les affaires de la compétence des tribunaux S.E.M.E. Toutefois, le service de la justice de paix S.E.M.E. de Lattaquié sera assuré par le président français du tribunal de Lattaquié.

Article 8: Tous les conflits de compétence entre les juridictions du territoire et celles des autres territoires seront soumis, pour règlement de juge, à la Cour de Cassation de Syrie ayant la composition prévue par l'article 2 de l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1820, du 17 février 1928, et ses modifications.

Article 9: Les magistrats français seront recrutés dans les conditions prévues par l'arrêté interministériel français du 10 juillet 1936 et ses modificatifs ; ils seront soumis aux dispositions de

l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 7/PARIC du 18 décembre 1931 et aux arrêtés le modifiant ou le complétant.

II. RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE AUTONOME DU DJEBEL DRUZE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 265/LR du 2 décembre 1936,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Le règlement organique du territoire autonome du Djebel Druze, annexé à l'arrêté 265/LR du 2 décembre 1936, est remplacé par le règlement organique, administratif et financier annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925 le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Le règlement organique

Article premier : Le régime spécial dont est doté le territoire autonome du Djebel Druze dans l'État de Syrie en matière administrative et financière est fixé par le présent règlement organique.

Article 2 : Pour assurer l'application de ce régime l'administrateur supérieur, assisté d'un conseil du territoire, est investi des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 3 : Les emplois publics sont répartis équitablement entre les diverses communautés du territoire dans toute la mesure compatible avec les besoins d'une bonne administration.

De l'administrateur supérieur

Article 4 : Le Chef de l'État de Syrie nomme l'administrateur supérieur sur la présentation du conseil du territoire.

L'administrateur doit jouir de ses droits civils et politiques. Il est nommé pour cinq ans. Son mandat est renouvelable.

Article 5 : La présentation de l'administrateur est faite par le conseil du territoire, suivant un vote au scrutin secret à la majorité des deux tiers des membres composant le conseil. La majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés suffit au deuxième tour de scrutin et la majorité relative au troisième.

000 Le conseil du territoire se réunit à cet effet un mois avant l'expiration des pouvoirs de l'administrateur ; il est convoqué au plus tôt en cas de vacance du poste par décès, démission, ou pour toute autre cause.

Article 6 : Le Vice-Président du conseil du territoire assume l'intérim des fonctions de l'administrateur en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de ce dernier, ou de vacance du poste.

Article 7 : L'administrateur est le chef et la plus haute autorité de l'administration locale. Il est le représentant du pouvoir central sur le territoire. Il préside le conseil du territoire.

Il a la charge de maintenir l'ordre et la securité publique.

Il assure l'exécution de la loi et des règlements.

Il administre le territoire avec le concours de directeurs ou chefs de service placés à la tête des services publics.

En vertu de la délégation permanente du chef de l'État de Syrie, il nomme à tous les emplois.

Il est ordonnateur du budget local.

Il représente en justice le territoire.

Il exerce le pouvoir réglementaire en matières locales, sous réserve des attributions du conseil du territoire.

Il exerce le droit de grâce sur proposition d'une commission de trois membres présidée par le directeur de la Justice.

Il peut accorder des remises de peine dans les mêmes formes.

Il a qualité pour passer contrat avec des fonctionnaires ou magistrats français.

Article 8 : Il convoque les collèges électoraux aux dates et dans les conditions fixées par les dispositions législatives.

Il convoque le conseil du territoire en session ordinaire et en session extraordinaire et prononce la clôture des sessions.

Il peut dissoudre par arrêté motivé le conseil du territoire.

En cas de dissolution, l'administrateur doit convoquer les collèges électoraux dans un délai de quatre mois.

Du conseil du territoire

Article 9 : Le conseil du territoire est composé de 12 membres. Ceux-ci sont élus suivant le mode de scrutin actuellement en vigueur dans l'État. Il est présidé par l'administrateur. Le conseil actuellement en exercice conservera son mandat jusqu'à expiration normale de ce dernier.

Le règlement électoral ne pourra être modifié que par un vote du conseil acquis à la majorité des deux tiers des voix composant le conseil.

Les membres du conseil sont élus pour six ans. Le conseil est renouvelable par moitié. Pour le premier renouvellement, les circonscriptions des membres sortants seront désignées par voie de tirage au sort effectué à la diligence du conseil.

Article 10 : Le conseil du territoire se réunit chaque année en deux sessions ordinaires, l'une en novembre, l'autre en avril. La durée de chacune de ces sessions ne peut excéder quinze jours.

Le conseil peut en outre être convoqué en session extraordinaire.

Article 11 : A la première séance de la session de novembre, le conseil du territoire procède, avant toute discussion, à l'élection de son bureau qui demeure en fonctions jusqu'à la session de novembre de l'année suivante.

Article 12 : Le conseil du territoire exerce ses attributions par voie de délibérations. Le vote ne peut être émis par procuration.

Le conseil ne peut valablement délibérer que si la moitié plus un de ses membres sont présents à la séance. Ses décisions sont prises à la majorité des membres présents. La voix du Président est prépondérante en cas de partage, sauf le cas de scrutin secret.

Il est voté au scrutin secret toutes les fois que le tiers des membres présents le réclament ou qu'il s'agit de procéder à une élection.

Dans ce dernier cas, si la majorité absolue n'a pas été obtenue au premier tour du scrutin, la majorité relative suffit. En cas d'égalité de voix, le plus âgé est déclaré élu.

Article 13 : Le président de la séance a la police de l'Assemblée.

Article 14 : Les conseillers, directeurs et chefs de service du territoire peuvent être invités à assister aux séances du conseil et à y prendre la parole, mais ils n'ont pas voix délibérative.

Article 15 : L'administrateur peut, avant la clôture de la session, demander qu'une délibération du conseil soit remise en discussion. Si le conseil confirme son premier vote à la majorité de deux tiers la délibération est acquise.

Article 16 : Le budget, le compte définitif des exercices clos, les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire ou engageant ses finances, sont soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire.

Les attributions du conseil en ces matières sont définies par les articles 17 à 23 du présent règlement organique.

Sont également soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire les actes portant modification du nombre et des limites des circonscriptions administratives, la création ou la suppression des municipalités, les règlements concernant le statut des fonctionnaires, les pensions et retraites, l'organisation municipale et plus généralement les actes réglementaires intéressant l'organisation administrative ou les finances du territoire.

Du budget

Article 17 : Le territoire bénéficie de l'autonomie financière.

Article 18 : Le projet de budget est préparé par l'administrateur assisté des conseillers, directeurs et chefs de service.

000 Il est communiqué aux membres du conseil du territoire 8 jours au moins avant l'ouverture de la session de novembre, en même temps que le compte définitif de l'exercice écoulé.

Le budget voté par le conseil du territoire est promulgué par l'administrateur avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 19 : Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1°. le produit de tous impôts, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et dont la perception est regulièrement autorisée ;

2°. une quote-part de l'excédent des recettes communes sur les dépenses communes ;

3°. des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versés soit par des États ou des collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

1°. toutes les dépenses des services publics sur le territoire ;

2°. une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État de Syrie, égale à 5% du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;

3°. le service des emprunts contractés sur le territoire ;

4°. éventuellement le service des pensions incombant au territoire.

Article 20 : Peuvent faire l'objet d'inscription d'office au budget :

1°. les dettes exigibles régulièrement contractées ainsi que les dépenses des exercices clos ;

2°. les dépenses de gendarmerie, de police et celles relatives à la sécurité.

S'il y a lieu, l'inscription d'office est faite par un arrêté de l'administrateur.

Article 21 : La constitution organique des services ne peut être modifiée par voie budgétaire.

Article 22 : Lorsque, dans l'intervalle des sessions, des circonstances imprévues rendent nécessaires des dépenses urgentes, l'administrateur peut, par arrêté motivé pris sur la proposition des directeurs ou chefs de services intéressés, ouvrir des crédits extraordinaires ou supplémentaires, à charge de les présenter au conseil du territoire au cours de la session suivante.

Article 23 : La session ordinaire du conseil du territoire tenue en novembre est spécialement consacrée au vote du budget auquel il doit être procédé avant toute autre discussion, l'élection du bureau exceptée.

Si le conseil n'a pas définitivement statué sur le projet de budget avant la fin de la session, l'administrateur pourra le convoquer en session extraordinaire pour en poursuivre la discussion. La durée de cette session est limitée à 15 jours. Ce délai écoulé, s'il n'a

pas été statué définitivement sur le budget, l'administrateur, par arrêté motivé, rendra le projet de budget obligatoire en tenant compte dans la mesure du possible des votes déjà acquis.

Dispositions diverses

Article 24 : Le drapeau national est celui de l'État syrien ; le territoire autonome du Djebel Druze conserve son pavillon spécial.

Article 25 : Les conseillers et inspecteurs français mis à la disposition du territoire pourront être délégués dans les fonctions de directeurs ou de chefs de service.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE JUDICIAIRE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 31/LR du 12 fevrier 1937,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire du territoire autonome du Djebel Druze est fixée par le règlement organique annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut Commissariat.

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire en matière civile, commerciale, administrative et pénale du territoire autonome, comprend :

Un tribunal supérieur à Soueida, dont la compétence territoriale s'étend à tout le territoire,

Un tribunal de 1ère instance à Soueida, dont la compétence territoriale s'étend également à tout le territoire,

Des justices de paix, en principe une par caza.

Article 2 : Les fonctions de directeur de la justice, chef du service judiciaire, sont exercées par le président du tribunal supérieur. Celui-ci est un magistrat ou ancien magistrat français.

Le tribunal de 1ère instance peut être également présidé par un magistrat ou ancien magistrat français.

Ces magistrats relèvent de l'inspecteur général français de la justice en Syrie. Ils sont nommés par le Chef de l'État syrien sur la proposition du gouvernement français.

Article 3: Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 2, les magistrats du territoire sont nommés par l'administrateur sur proposition du directeur de la justice.

Article 4: Le tribunal supérieur connaît souverainement et sans recours :

— des appels des tribunaux de 1ère instance ;
— des affaires criminelles ;
— du contentieux administratif ;
— de tous les conflits de juridiction à l'intérieur du territoire.

Il constitue le conseil supérieur de la magistrature, le conseil de discipline des auxiliaires de justice, la commission d'avancement des magistrats et celle des auxiliaires de justice.

Article 5: Le tribunal de 1ère instance et les justices de paix connaissent des affaires qui leur sont soumises, conformément à la loi, sauf ce qui est dit au présent arrêté.

Article 6: En matière civile et commerciale, les justices de paix statuent toujours en 1er ressort ; l'appel est porté devant le tribunal de 1ère instance qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Dans les mêmes matières, les tribunaux de 1ère instance statuent toujours en 1er ressort, sauf ce qui est dit ci-dessus de l'appel des affaires de justice de paix.

En matière pénale, les justices de paix connaissent définitivement et sans aucune voie de recours des contraventions. Elles connaissent en 1er ressort des délits qui sont de leur compétence aux termes de la loi, à charge d'appel devant le tribunal de 1ère instance qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Les délits non attribués aux justices de paix sont de la compétence exclusive du tribunal de 1ère instance qui statue toujours en 1er ressort, sauf lorsqu'il est juridiction d'appel des justices de paix.

Article 7: Il n'est rien modifié à l'organisation actuelle en ce qui concerne les affaires de la compétence des tribunaux S.E.M.E.

Article 8: Tous les conflits de compétence entre les juridictions du territoire et celles des autres territoires seront soumis, pour règlement de juges, à la Cour de Cassation de Syrie ayant la composition prévue par l'article 2 de l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1820, du 17 février 1928, et ses modificatifs.

Article 9: Les magistrats français seront recrutés dans les conditions prévues par l'arrêté interministériel français du 10 juillet 1936 et ses modificatifs ; ils seront soumis aux dispositions de l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 7/PARIC du 18 décembre 1931 et aux arrêtés le modifiant ou le complétant.

Toutefois, à titre provisoire, il pourra ne pas être créé de poste dans le cadre des magistrats français, le service étant assuré, soit par la délégation d'un magistrat des tribunaux S.E.M.E. de Syrie,

soit par la désignation d'un ancien magistrat des juridictions du Levant, dont la situation sera réglée par contrat spécial.

ARRÊTÉ No. 138/LR DU 1er JUILLET 1939

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu les arrêtés No. 274/LR et 265/LR des 5 et 2 décembre 1936,

Vu les arrêtés No. 132/LR et 133/LR du 1er juillet 1939,

Vu les arrêtés No. 134/LR et 136/LR du 1er juillet 1939,

Considérant qu'il importe d'assurer pendant une période probatoire le fonctionnement régulier du régime instauré par les précédents arrêtés :

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : L'application des arrêtés No. 132/LR, 133/LR et 134/LR du 1er juillet 1939 sera assurée, s'il en est besoin, par le Haut-Commissaire qui pourvoiera éventuellement aux nominations qui n'auraient pas été faites conformément aux textes précités.

Article 2 : Les représentants du Haut-Commissaire dans les territoires soumis au régime spécial prévu par les arrêtés No. 132/LR et 133/LR du 1er juillet 1939 pourront, par décision motivée, s'opposer à l'exécution de toute mesure contraire aux dispositions des règlements organiques annexés aux dits arrêtés.

A cet effet, ils recevront communication des décisions de l'administrateur ainsi que des délibérations du conseil du territoire avant leur mise en vigueur.

Article 3 : Ils assureront le contrôle des engagements de dépenses. Ils pourront en déléguer l'exercice.

Article 4 : Ils assureront le contrôle des services administratifs civils, y compris les municipalités, et celui des services financiers, y compris la Banque agricole ; ils pourront déléguer l'exercice de ce contrôle.

Article 5 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Beyrouth, le 1er juillet 1939.

Le Secrétaire général
S/ EHRHARDT.

P.A. le Chef de section
chargé du bureau d'ordre
G. DUMONT.

Le Haut-Commissaire
S/ PUAUX

Le Conseiller Législatif
S/ A. MAZAS.

III. RÉGIME ADMINISTRATIF DU MOHAFAZAT DE LA DJÉZIREH

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Les pouvoirs et attributions dévolus par les lois et règlements en vigueur à l'administrateur du mohafazat de la Djézireh seront exercés, jusqu'à ce qu'il en soit autrement disposé, par le délégué adjoint du Haut-Commissaire de la République Française à Hassetché.

Il pourra être assisté dans ses fonctions par un administrateur-adjoint syrien.

Article 2 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

No. 7 : *Fundamental Principles to govern the Future Status of the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, submitted by M. Sandler and adopted by the League Council, January 27th, 1937.*[1]

1. The Sanjak shall constitute a separate entity. It shall enjoy full independence in its internal affairs. The State of Syria shall be responsible for the conduct of its foreign affairs, subject to the provisions contained in No. 3 below.

The Sanjak and Syria shall have the same customs and monetary administration.

2. In the Sanjak, Turkish shall be an official language, and the Council shall determine, in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 10, the character and conditions of the use of another language.

3. No international agreement concluded by the State of Syria, which is likely to affect in any way whatever the independence and sovereignty of that State, and no international decision having the same effects may be applied to the Sanjak without the express consent in advance of the Council of the League of Nations.

4. Special officials shall ensure the necessary liaison between the two executive authorities in matters for which responsibility will rest with Syria.

As regards such matters, the legislative assemblies of Syria and the Sanjak shall be entitled to establish inter-parliamentary liaison and to determine the details of such liaison.

5. Supervision by the Council of the League of Nations to

[1] *Official Journal of League of Nations*, February, 1937 (Geneva, 1937), p. 119.

ensure respect for the Statute and Fundamental Law of the Sanjak, such supervision to be exercised in the following conditions:

(*a*) Presence on the spot of a delegate of French nationality appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

(*b*) Power of the delegate to suspend for a maximum period of four months any legislative or governmental act contrary to the provisions of the Statute or of the Fundamental Law. In such case, the delegate shall be bound immediately to refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, with whom the final decision shall rest.

(*c*) The French Government and the Turkish Government declare their willingness to give effect to the recommendations which the Council of the League of Nations may make to them to ensure respect for the decisions taken by the Council.

If, in virtue of the Council's decision, the two Governments have to take joint action, they will previously consult one another regarding the details of such action.

The Council's powers and rights as regards demilitarization shall be determined subsequently.

6. The Sanjak shall have no army. No compulsory military service may be introduced and no military works may be constructed in the Sanjak. Only local police forces not exceeding . . . men may be organized in the Sanjak, and no armaments other than those required for the said police force may be introduced or maintained in the Sanjak. The technical details shall be determined in a subsequent agreement.

7. A Franco-Turkish Treaty shall be concluded. This treaty shall contain stipulations determining the manner in which Turkey and France shall guarantee the territorial integrity of the Sanjak. This guarantee shall operate after consultation between the two parties.

An agreement shall be concluded between France, Turkey and Syria for the purpose of guaranteeing the inviolability of the Turco-Syrian frontier and of prohibiting in Turkish and Syrian territory any organizations or activities directed against the régime in force in the other country and that country's security.

8. The Statute of the Sanjak shall contain a clause specifying the rights and facilities to be enjoyed by Turkey in the port of Alexandretta, in order to enable her to make use to the fullest possible extent of that port for her transit trade.

9. The Statute and the Fundamental Law shall enter into force as soon as the Council has so decided.

10. The Council's decisions and recommendations shall be taken by a two-thirds majority without reckoning the votes of the parties concerned.

DOO No. 8: *Franco-Turkish Agreements on the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, July 4th, 1938.*[1]

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

Le président de la République française et le président de la République turque, animés du désir de raffermir dans l'intérêt commun des deux pays, les liens d'une amitié sincère, ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié et ont désigné pour leur plénipotentiaires à savoir :

Le président de la République turque : M. le docteur Tevfik Rustu Aras, député d'Izmir, ministre des affaires étrangères;

Le président de la République française : M. Henri Ponsot, ambassadeur extraordinaire plénipotentiaire en Turquie ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article premier : Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à n'entrer dans aucune entente d'ordre politique ou économique et dans aucune combinaison dirigée contre l'une d'elles.

Article 2 : Si l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, malgré son attitude pacifique, est attaquée par une ou plusieurs autres puissances, l'autre Partie, pendant toute la durée du conflit, ne prêtera aucune aide ou assistance, de quelque nature que ce soit, à l'agresseur ou aux agresseurs.

Article 3 : Également attachées au maintien de la paix générale et de la sécurité en Méditerranée orientale, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, en présence de toute situation dont le développement apparaîtrait comme pouvant conduire à faire jouer l'engagement de garantie qui résulte pour elles du traité de garantie de l'intégrité territoriale du sandjak du 29 mai 1937, se concerteront en vue d'assurer l'exécution de leurs obligations et de s'accorder mutuellement les facilités nécessaires à cet effet.

Article 4 : L'acte général d'arbitrage, dans toute la mesure où il est en vigueur entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes au moment de la signature du présent traité, continuera pendant toute la durée de celui-ci à fixer entre elles les méthodes de règlement des différends et conflits.

Article 5 : Le présent traité ne dérogera pas aux dispositions par lesquelles, à l'égard de certains différends, une méthode particulière de règlement a été établie entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Article 6 : Le présent traité ne pourra pas être interprété comme restreignant la mission dévolue à la Société des nations ou comme

[1] S. Heald (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs*, 1937 (London, 1939), pp. 515-17.

portant atteinte aux obligations qui découlent pour les Hautes Parties Contractantes du pacte de la Société des nations.

Article 7 : Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront échangées aussitôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur à compter de l'échange de ratifications. Il aura une durée de dix ans et sauf dénonciation, il sera considéré comme renouvelé par tacite reconduction pour une période de cinq années et ainsi de suite.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires sus-nommés ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

JOINT DECLARATION

Le gouvernement français et le gouvernement turc, vu le traité d'amitié signé aujourd'hui et destiné à remplacer le traité d'amitié, de conciliation et d'arbitrage en date du 3 février 1930 entre la France et la Turquie, constatent par la présente déclaration leur accord en vue :

1. De poursuivre sa mise en vigueur en application du statut du sandjak d'Alexandrette et de la loi fondamentale adoptée par le conseil de la Société des nations le 29 mai 1937 dans l'esprit de l'accord d'Ankara du 20 octobre 1921 qui, en reconnaissant la prépondérance des éléments turcs au sandjak, a amené le gouvernement turc à affirmer de son côté que la question du sandjak n'est pas une question territoriale pour la Turquie.

2. De maintenir entre la Turquie, la Syrie et le Liban les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage établies sous le régime du mandat par la convention d'Ankara du 30 mai 1926, et pour éviter toute interruption de ces relations à la suite de la venue à terme de cette convention et des accords qui la complètent, d'en proroger la validité pour une période d'un an, étant toutefois entendu que les dispositions de ces accords relatifs au droit de pacage et de transhumance sont supprimées à dater de ce jour.

3. De maintenir en vigueur pour la même durée la procédure de conciliation et d'arbitrage établie entre la Turquie et les pays placés sous l'autorité de la République française par le protocole joint au traité franco-turc d'amitié, de conciliation et d'arbitrage en date du 3 février 1930.

4. De fixer les dernières modalités en vue du règlement de la question des optants par un nouveau protocole qui se substitue au paragraphe no. 1 de l'échange de lettres du 29 mai 1937 entre le ministre des affaires étrangères de Turquie et l'ambassadeur de France, étant entendu que ce protocole entrera en vigueur le jour même de la signature de la présente déclaration à laquelle il est annexé.

5. D'admettre au bénéfice du traitement de la nation la plus

000 favorisée en ce qui concerne le droit et les conditions d'établissement, et notamment la compétence judiciaire, les ressortissants turcs en Syrie et au Liban et les ressortissants syriens et libanais en Turquie.

6. Les deux gouvernements conviennent, aussitôt que le gouvernement syrien sera en situation de le faire, de transformer et de compléter la convention actuelle de bon voisinage maintenue en vigueur dans les conditions précisées au paragraphe 2 de la présente déclaration, en traité d'amitié entre la Turquie, la Syrie et la France, en l'adaptant aux conditions nouvelles dans l'évolution du mandat.

7. La convention d'amitié et de bon voisinage du 30 mai 1926 ayant été conclue entre le gouvernement turc et le gouvernement de la République française, agissant en vertu des pouvoirs qui lui sont reconnus par les actes internationaux sur la Syrie et le Liban, il est entendu que pour autant que ces dispositions intéressent le Liban, elle fera, le moment venu, l'objet d'un accord spécial.

Il est par ailleurs, convenu que des négociations seront ouvertes aussitôt que possible pour assurer le développement des relations commerciales entre la Turquie, la Syrie et le Liban.

8. Les gouvernements français et turc conviennent enfin de négocier prochainement un traité d'établissement pour fixer la situation des Français en Turquie et des Turcs en France.

No. 9: *Franco-Turkish Agreement on the cession of Alexandretta, June 23rd, 1939.*[1]

DÉCLARATION COMMUNE

1. Le gouvernement français et le gouvernement turc sont entrés en étroite consultation et les discussions dans lesquelles ils se sont engagés et qui sont encore en cours ont révélé leur identité de vue habituelle.

2. Il est convenu que les deux États concluront un accord définitif de longue durée comportant des engagements réciproques dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité nationale.

3. En attendant la conclusion de l'accord définitif, le gouvernement français et le gouvernement turc déclarent que, dans le cas d'un acte d'agression qui conduirait à une guerre dans la région méditerranéenne, ils seraient prêts à coopérer effectivement et à s'accorder mutuellement toute l'aide et l'assistance en leur pouvoir.

4. Cette déclaration, ainsi que l'accord envisagé, n'est dirigée contre aucun pays, mais a pour but d'assurer à la France et à la Turquie une aide et une assistance réciproques dans le cas où celles-ci s'avéreraient nécessaires.

[1] *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), July, 1939, p. 357; August, 1939, pp. 458-59.

5. Il est reconnu par les deux gouvernements que certaines questions, y compris la définition plus précise des diverses conditions dans lesquelles se déclencherait le jeu des engagements réciproques, demanderont un examen plus approfondi avant que l'accord définitif ne puisse être conclu. Cet examen est actuellement en cours.

6. Les deux gouvernements reconnaissent qu'il est également nécessaire d'assurer l'établissement de la sécurité dans les Balkans et sont en consultation afin d'atteindre ce but le plus rapidement possible.

7. Il est entendu que les dispositions ci-dessus énoncées n'empêchent ni l'un ni l'autre gouvernement de conclure, dans l'intérêt général de la consolidation de la paix, des accords avec d'autres pays.

Paris, le 23 juin 1939.

BONNET-SUAD DAVAZ.

ARRANGEMENT PORTANT RÈGLEMENT DÉFINITIF DES QUESTIONS TERRITORIALES ENTRE LA TURQUIE ET LA SYRIE

PRÉAMBULE

Le Président de la République française et le Président de la République turque,

Ayant égard aux dispositions énoncées dans l'art. 7 de l'accord du 20 octobre 1921 et dans la lettre complétant les articles 7 et 8 dudit accord,

Convaincus de l'intérêt que présente un règlement territorial qui, consolidant définitivement la frontière entre la Syrie et la Turquie, ait pour effet d'affranchir de toute équivoque, et par la même d'assainir les rapports mutuels des deux pays,

Ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE :

Son Excellence M. RENÉ MASSIGLI, ambassadeur de France en Turquie, commandeur de la Légion d'honneur,

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TURQUE :

M. SUKRU SARACOGLU, ministre des affaires étrangères, député d'Izmir.

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pouvoirs et les avoir trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants :

Article premier : La France en ce qui la concerne consent à ce que la ligne décrite par les protocoles du 30 mai 1926, du 22 juin 1929 et du 3 mai 1930 soit rectifiée :

000 (*a*) Depuis le point où le Kara-Sou franchit la frontière actuelle jusqu'à la borne portant le n. 230, de manière à coincider avec la limite dont l'abornement sur le terrain se trouve consigné dans le protocole souscrit à Antioche le 19 mai 1939, étant entendu que le village de Guemid, entre les bornes 17 et 20, sera entièrement attribué à la Turquie et que de la borne n. 224 la ligne rejoindra directement la borne n. 230, laissant en territoire turc la route allant de Yeni-Chéhir à Antioche ;

(*b*) Et de la borne portant le n. 419 suivant une ligne se dirigeant vers le Nord-Est jusqu'à un point à environ 1.200 mètres Sud-Ouest d'Anakorane, de ce point passant à l'Est d'Anakorane et de Godja-Qairaq, elle se dirigera vers le Nord jusqu'à un point situé à environ un kilomètre Nord-Est de Godja-Qairaq.

De ce point la ligne se dirigera vers l'Ouest jusqu'à un point situé environ à un kilomètre au Nord du Château ruiné pour gagner ensuite au Sud-Ouest la côte 1010 (Ouest du Château ruiné) ; elle empruntera ensuite en direction du Sud-Ouest le fond du ravin du Nord de Bachourte qui aboutit vers le ruisseau de Kara-Dourane et suivra enfin ce ruisseau jusqu'à la mer.

Dans les trois secteurs ci-dessus énoncés, la commission qui a achevé ses opérations le 19 mai 1939 sera chargée de déterminer sur le terrain la nouvelle ligne.

Les territoires sis au delà de la ligne ainsi définie seront évacués par les forces françaises au plus tard le 23 juillet 1939, date à laquelle sera également achevée la translation par les autorités françaises des attributions restant entre leurs mains.

Article 2 : Les citoyens du Sandjak d'Alexandrette établis sur les territoires visés au dernier alinéa de l'article 1er acquerront de plein droit la nationalité turque.

Article 3 : Les personnes âgées de plus de dix-huit ans acquérant en vertu de l'article 2 la nationalité turque auront la faculté, pendant une période de six mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent arrangement, d'opter pour la nationalité syrienne ou libanaise.

Les personnes désirant faire usage de la faculté prévue ci-dessus remettront une déclaration à cet effet à l'autorité administrative dont relève le lieu de leur résidence. Un récipissé leur sera délivré. Les listes d'optants seront communiquées à intervalles aussi rapprochés que possible à l'autorité consulaire française.

Article 4 : Les personnes ayant exercé le droit d'option conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2, devront, dans les dix-huit mois qui suivront, transporter leur domicile hors de la Turquie.

Elles devront liquider leurs biens immobiliers et elles seront libres d'aliéner ou d'emporter leur biens meubles de toute nature, ainsi que leur cheptel.

Les montants provenant de la liquidation ci-dessus prévue 000
seront versés à un compte bloqué à la Banque centrale de la République de Turquie à Alexandrette, où ils feront, quant au mode de leur transfert, l'objet d'un arrangement spécial entre les gouvernements français et turc.

Les montants en monnaies autre que la monnaie turque se trouvant en la possession des personnes visées à l'alinéa 1er du présent article pourront être exportés suivant les modalités prévues au procès-verbal annexé au présent arrangement.

Article 5 : Les femmes mariées suivront la condition de leurs maris et les enfants âgés de moins de dix-huit ans suivront la condition de leurs parents pour tout ce qui concerne l'application des dispositions énoncées aux articles 2, 3 et 4.

Article 6 : Le Gouvernement français aura le droit de nommer un gardien pour l'entretien et la garde du cimetière français d'Alexandrette, sis sur un terrain appartenant à l'État français, et qui sera maintenu dans sa consistance actuelle.

Article 7 : La Turquie reconnaît comme constituant la limite définitive de son territoire la ligne décrite par la convention du 30 mai 1926, le protocole du 22 juin 1929 et le protocole du 3 mai 1930, telle qu'elle se trouve rectifiée en vertu du présent arrangement.

En conséquence, la Turquie condamne toute action qui serait de nature à porter atteinte à l'integrité territoriale, à mettre en péril ou à compromettre la tranquillité intérieure de la Syrie ou qui tendrait aux mêmes fins et elle s'engage à interdire, et éventuellement à réprimer sur son territoire, toute action de cette nature.

Article 8 : Aucune disposition des traités et accords antérieurs ne pourra être interprétée comme étant contraire aux engagements stipulés à l'article 7.

Article 9 : Les hautes parties contractantes prendront, la France en territoire syrien et la Turquie sur son propre territoire, toutes mesures propres à empêcher la préparation ou la perpétration d'actes dirigés contre la sécurité ou le régime respectifs des deux pays voisins.

Article 10 : En vue de permettre la conclusion d'un nouvel accord, la convention d'amitié et de bon voisinage en date du 30 mai 1926 et les accords complémentaires sont prorogés jusqu'au 15 mars 1940.

Les dispositions de ces actes seront valables pour l'ensemble de la frontière turco-syrienne telle qu'elle résulte des protocoles du 30 mai 1926, du 22 juin 1929 et du 3 mai 1930, ainsi que de la ratification prévue par le présent arrangement.

000 Il est toutefois entendu que les dispositions relatives aux droits de pacage et de transhumance sont tenues pour supprimées.

Article 11 : Le présent arrangement sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échanges à Paris le plus tôt que faire se pourra et au plus tard le 22 juillet 1939. Il entrera en vigueur le jour de l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent arrangement et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.
(S.) MASSIGLI.

PROTOCOLE

Au moment de procéder à la signature de l'arrangement en date de ce jour,

Les plénipotentiaires soussignés se sont également convenus dispositions ci-après :

Article premier : La Turquie décharge les gouvernements syrien et libanais de toute obligation se rapportant au service des pensions militaires et civiles des citoyens du Sandjak qui acquerront la nationalité turque en vertu de l'article 2 de l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie et qui n'exerceront pas le droit d'option prévu à l'article 3 dudit arrangement.

Aucune charge n'incombera à la Turquie pour le service des pensions militaires et civiles de personnes ne remplissant pas les conditions visées à l'alinéa précédent.

Article 2 : I. Les biens, droits et intérêts au Sandjak des personnes morales de nationalité française, ainsi que les biens immobiliers des personnes physiques appartenant à la même nationalité passeront en toute propriété au gouvernement turc moyennant une somme globale de trente-cinq millions de francs français.

Sur cette somme :

(*a*) Trois millions de francs français seront versés, dès la mise en vigueur des actes en date de ce jour, en contrevaleur des biens visés à l'annexe I du présent protocole ;

(*b*) Vingt-cinq millions de francs français seront mis à la disposition du Gouvernement français dans les trente jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent protocole ;

(*c*) le reliquat sera versé le 23 août 1939 au compte de clearing.

II. Les personnes morales visées au présent article pourront disposer de leurs avoirs liquides en monnaies étrangères en se conformant aux stipulations du procès-verbal annexé à l'article 4 de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

Leurs avoirs en monnaie turque seront versés au compte bloqué visé au troisième alinéa dudit article 4. 000

III. Pour le transfert de leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et du produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens meubles, les personnes physiques de nationalité française bénéficieront des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant.

Article 3 : Les mutations foncières prévues au présent protocole ne donneront lieu à la perception d'aucun impôt, ni droit. Elles auront lieu sans frais d'aucune sorte.

Article 4 : La ligne du chemin de fer Payas-Alexandrette sera remise dans un délai de trente jours, à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent protocole, à l'administration des chemins de fer de l'État turc qui en assumera l'exploitation.

Les modalités du transfert seront déterminées entre les deux administrations intéressées.

Article 5 : Sous réserve des règlements prévus dans le présent protocole et dans l'arrangement en date de ce jour, les hautes parties contractantes déclarent renoncer mutuellement à toute revendication financière ultérieure, fondée sur les ajustements résultant dudit arrangement.

Article 6 : Le présent protocole sera ratifié. Les instruments de ratification en seront échangés dans les mêmes conditions que de ceux de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.
(S.) MASSIGLI.

ANNEXE I

Ad. Article 2.

Moyennant le versement entre les mains du caissier-payeur central du Trésor public à Paris, dès la mise en vigueur de l'arrangement en date de ce jour, de la somme de 3 millions de francs français, la France cède à la Turquie en toute propriété les dépendances du domain militaire dans le territoire du Hatay, savoir :

(*a*) L'immeuble sis à Alexandrette dénommé caserne Derigoin et déjà occupé par les troupes turques ;

(*b*) Le réseau téléphonique de l'armée française du Levant.

La cession de la caserne comprends le fonds, les clôtures, les bâtiments dans la consistance et l'état où ils se trouvaient au moment où la garnison turque en a pris possession.

Le réseau cédé comprend les lignes, tant urbaines qu'interurbaines, et tant aériennes que souterraines, les installations et

000 appareils existant, tant dans les postes centraux qu'aux domiciles des abonnés. Reste propriété de l'armée française le matériel appartenant aux éléments des forces françaises qui stationnent actuellement dans le territoire. Les modalités de la remise du réseau seront arrêtées d'un commun accord par les représentants des hautes parties contractantes à Antioche. Toutefois, les troupes françaises n'auront pas à se dessaisir, antérieurement au 23 juillet 1939, des lignes qui leur sont nécessaires.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.
(S.) MASSIGLI.

ANNEXE II

Les deux immeubles de la Banque de Syrie et du Liban à Alexandrette et à Antioche ont été attribués, en toute propriété, à l'État français, et leur contrevaleur (1 million de francs français) a été déduite des montants dont il a été tenu compte pour calculer la somme globale à verser par le Gouvernement turc au Gouvernement français, ainsi qu'il est stipulé à l'article 2 du protocole.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.
(S.) MASSIGLI.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

Se référant à l'article 4 de l'arrangement signé en date de ce jour, les hautes parties contractantes sont convenues de ce qui suit :

Les personnes physiques ayant exercé leur droit d'option en conformité des dispositions des articles 3 et 5 de l'arrangement en date de ce jour, ainsi que les personnes morales sandjakiennes, établies sur les territoires visés à l'article 1er, dernier alinéa, dudit arrangement et désireuses, en liaison avec l'option sus-visée, de cesser leur activité dans le Sandjak, auront la faculté d'emporter avec elles leurs avoirs en devises étrangères à condition qu'elles aient effectué, dans les quinze jours qui suivront l'avis y relatif qui sera publié dans le Sandjak dès la signature du présent arrangement, les dépôts prévus par les dispositions ci-dessous énoncées, le faut d'effectuer ces dépôts ne constituant aucune présomption quant à l'exercice du droit d'option ou à la décision de cesser l'activité.

1. Les personnes morales ci-dessus visées, désireuses de transférer à l'étranger leurs avoirs en devises étrangères sont tenues d'en faire le dépôt à la succursale de la Banque centrale de la République à Alexandrette ou à la Banque agricole à Antioche, agissant pour le compte de la Banque centrale.

Le permis d'exportation y afférant leur sera délivré par l'office

du change sur présentation du certificat de depôt délivré par la Banque centrale ou par la Banque agricole agissant pour le compte de la Banque centrale et sur la preuve que ces montants ont été acquis antérieurement à la mise en vigueur dans le Sandjak de la réglementation sur l'exportation des devises. Il sera, le cas échéant, déduit de ces montants les sommes en devises étrangères, qui, à la date du dépôt, seraient dues par ces personnes morales à toutes personnes ayant acquis et gardé la nationalité turque en vertu des articles 2 et 3 de l'arrangement susmentionné. 000

Les monnaies étrangères détenues par lesdites personnes morales et acquises après la mise en vigueur de la réglementation sous-visée devront être converties en monnaie turque. Elles ne pourront être transférées qu'en conformité des dispositions de l'article 4 (*sic*) de l'alinéa 3 de l'arrangement.

2. Les personnes physiques et morales exerçant le commerce d'exportation devront établir que les sommes déposées ne constituent pas le produit d'une exportation de marchandises faite après la date de la mise en vigueur dans le Sandjak de la réglementation de l'exportation des devises.

Les devises étrangères constituant la contrevaleur des marchandises exportées sous le régime de ladite réglementation ne pouvant faire l'objet du mode de transfert ci-dessus prévu, les engagements assumés par ces exportateurs quant à la rentrée de devises étrangères demeurent valables.

3. Les personnes physiques ne rentrant pas dans la catégorie mentionnée à l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus ne seront pas tenues de prouver la provenance des devises dont elles effectueront le dépôt. Sur présentation des certificats de dépôts, les permis de transfert de devises leur seront immédiatement délivrés.

4. Les pièces de monnaie en or seront pour leur exportation soumises aux mêmes règles que les devises étrangères.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.
(S.) MASSIGLI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

A Son Excellence M. René Massigli,
ambassadeur de France, Ankara.

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

Me référant à l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le gouvernement de la République reconnaît la validité des contrats ci-après énumérés, passés par le haut commissaire de la République

française, au nom de l'administration du Sandjak, en ce qui concerne les fouilles archéologiques à effectuer dans le territoire visé par l'article 1er de l'arrangement susdit.

I. Contrat avec l'université de Princeton et les musées nationaux de la République française (date du contrat : 8 avril 1937 ; durée du contrat : six ans à dater du 1er janvier 1937) ;

II. Contrat avec la mission du musée britannique, sous la direction de Sir Léonard Woolley (date du contrat : 1er octobre 1936 ; durée du contrat : cinq ans) ;

III. Contrat avec la mission de l'institut oriental de Chicago, sous la direction du Dr. Calvin MacEwan (date du contrat : 20 septembre 1935 ; durée du contrat : six ans).

Veuillez agréer, monsieur l'ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

A Son Excellence M. Sükrü Saracoglu,
ministre des affaires étrangères, Ankara.

Monsieur le ministre,

Par sa lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu porter à ma connaissance que le gouvernement de la République reconnaissait la validité des contrats ci-après énumérés et relatifs aux fouilles archéologiques à effectuer dans le territoire visé à l'article 1er de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

I. Contrat avec l'université de Princeton et les musées nationaux de la République française (date du contrat : 8 avril 1937 ; durée du contrat : six ans à dater du 1er janvier 1937) ;

II. Contrat avec la mission du musée britannique, sous la direction de Sir Léonard Woolley (date du contrat : 1er octobre 1936 ; durée du contrat : cinq ans) ;

III. Contrat avec la mission de l'institut oriental de Chicago, sous la direction du Dr. Calvin MacEwan (date du contrat : 20 septembre 1935 ; durée du contrat : six ans).

J'ai l'honneur de vous remercier de cette communication, dont j'ai pris acte.

Veuillez agréer, monsieur le ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

A Son Excellence M. René Massigli,
ambassadeur de France, Ankara.

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

En me référant à l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie, à la date de

ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit. 000

Sans préjudice des dispositions spéciales des accords en date de ce jour, le gouvernement turc est décidé, si la demande lui en est faite par les intéressés, à faire bénéficier des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant les personnes physiques et morales de nationalité étrangère, établies à la date de l'arrangement dans les territoires visés à l'article 1er dudit arrangement et désirant transférer hors du territoire leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et le produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens de toute nature.

Veuillez agréer, monsieur l'ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

A Son Excellence M. Sükrü Saracoglu,
ministre des affaires étrangères, Ankara.

Monsieur le ministre,

Par sa lettre du 23 juin, Votre Excellence a bien voulu, en se référant à l'arrangement en date de ce jour portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie, porter à ma connaissance ce qui suit :

"Sans préjudice des dispositions spéciales des accords en date de ce jour, le gouvernement turc est décidé, si la demande lui en est faite par les intéressés, à faire bénéficier des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant les personnes physiques et morales de nationalité étrangère, établies à la date de l'arrangement dans les territoires visés à l'article 1er dudit arrangement et désirant transférer hors du territoire leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et le produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens de toute nature."

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette communication dont j'ai pris acte.

Veuillez agréer, monsieur le ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

No. 10 : *Proclamation of General Dentz concerning the Syrian Constitution, April 2nd, 1941.*[1]

Peuple Syrien,

Le 31 décembre dernier, quelques jours après mon arrivée à Beyrouth, je me suis adressé à vous pour affirmer que la France entendait poursuivre la mission dont elle assumait la charge et la

[1] *Les Echos de Syrie* (Damascus), April 2nd, 1941.

mener à bien en utilisant toutes les forces spirituelles des deux nations syrienne et libanaise. J'ajoutai que nous aurions à envisager sans délai les modalités politiques et économiques d'une coopération à laquelle les habitants de ces pays ont offert le meilleur d'eux-mêmes.

Nous procédons depuis lors à une série de consultations auprès des principales personnalités syriennes. Ces entretiens font ressortir les conclusions suivantes :

1°. L'indépendance de la Syrie reste la fin à laquelle les Syriens aspirent. La France n'a cessé d'y souscrire. Mais, dans les conditions actuelles et aussi longtemps que la vie internationale ne sera pas rétablie sur des bases stables, chacun reconnaît qu'aucune réforme définitive réglant soit le statut de la Syrie, soit la forme de son gouvernement, ne saurait être envisagée.

2°. L'opinion publique syrienne souhaite un gouvernement composé de personnalités politiques et auxquelles des attributions plus étendues seraient accordées.

3°. Un programme économique et social doit être mis immédiatement en œuvre afin de répondre aux nécessités de l'heure : ravitaillement, résorption du chômage, amélioration de la production agricole, reprise des affaires, exécution de travaux d'intérêt public.

Dans ces conditions et sous le signe d'une plus large collaboration qui doit amener ultérieurement la Syrie à son indépendance, j'ai décidé de procéder à un aménagement du statut syrien.

1°. Le Conseil des Directeurs Syrien sera remplacé par un Ministère qui aura à sa tête un chef de gouvernement.

2°. Le Gouvernement sera assisté d'une Assemblée Consultative composée des principaux représentants de la vie politique, culturelle et économique du pays et des nouvelles générations.

Les Alaouites et les Druzes, tout en conservant leur statut, seront représentés dans cette Assemblée.

3°. Un Conseil d'État sera chargé de l'élaboration des lois.

4°. Le Gouvernement Syrien participera à l'organisation générale du ravitaillement en ce qui concerne les intérêts communs de la Syrie et du Liban et assumera la direction du ravitaillement pour la Syrie.

5°. Le Gouvernement mettra en œuvre un important programme de travaux publics.

L'heure des réalisations est venue.

Les difficultés actuelles seront résolues par la coopération de tous les éléments du Peuple Syrien et non par des manifestations de rue.

La Nation Syrienne entend poursuivre son activité dans l'ordre et la paix. Cette paix et cet ordre seront sauvegardés.

No. 11 : *General Catroux's Proclamation to the Syrians and Lebanese, June 8th, 1941.*[1] 000

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban !

Au moment où les forces de la France Libre, unies aux forces de l'Empire Britannique, son allié, pénètrent sur votre territoire, je déclare que j'assume les pouvoirs, les responsabilités et les devoirs de représentant de la France au Levant.

Je le fais au nom de la France Libre, qui s'identifie avec la France traditionnelle et réelle, et au nom de son chef, le général de Gaulle.

En cette capacité, je viens mettre fin au régime du mandat et vous proclame[2] libres et indépendants.

Vous serez donc désormais des peuples souverains et indépendants et vous pourrez soit vous constituer en États séparés, soit vous unir en un seul État. Dans les deux cas, votre indépendance et votre statut souverain seront garantis par un traité dans lequel seront définies nos relations réciproques. Ce traité sera négocié aussitôt que possible entre vos représentants et moi-même. En attendant sa conclusion, notre situation mutuelle sera une unité étroite en vue de la réalisation d'un idéal et de buts communs.

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban, ma déclaration vous montre que si les Français Libres et les forces britanniques traversent votre frontière, ce n'est pas pour vous enlever votre liberté, c'est pour l'assurer. C'est pour chasser de Syrie les troupes de Hitler. C'est pour empêcher le Levant de devenir une base ennemie dirigée contre les Anglais et contre nous-mêmes.

Nous qui combattons pour la liberté des peuples, nous ne pouvons permettre à l'ennemi d'inonder votre pays pas à pas, de s'assurer de vos personnes et de vos biens et de faire de vous des esclaves. Nous ne pouvons laisser les populations que la France a promis de défendre, tomber aux mains du maître le plus cruel et le plus impitoyable que l'histoire ait connu. Nous ne pouvons permettre que soient livrés à l'ennemi les intérêts séculaires de la France dans le Levant.

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban ! Si, répondant à notre appel, vous vous ralliez à nous, vous saurez que le gouvernement britannique, d'accord avec la France Libre, a promis de vous accorder tous les avantages dont jouissent les pays libres associés à lui. Ainsi, le blocus sera levé et vous entrerez immédiatement en relations avec le bloc sterling, qui ouvrira à vos importations et exportations les plus vastes possibilités. Vous pourrez acheter et vendre librement à tous les pays libres.

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban ! Une grande heure de votre

[1] *France* (London), June 9th, 1941. [2] Some texts read : "proclamer".

histoire a sonné. La France vous déclare indépendants par la voix de ses fils qui luttent pour sa vie et pour la liberté du monde.

No. 12 : *General de Gaulle's Letter to General Catroux, June 24th, 1941.*[1]

Damas, le 24 juin 1941.

Mon cher Général,

Par décrets en date de ce jour, je vous ai nommé Délégué général et plénipotentiaire et Commandant en chef au Levant.

Vous exercerez vos pouvoirs et attributions en mon nom et au nom du Conseil de défense de l'Empire Français. Votre mission consistera essentiellement à diriger le rétablissement au Levant d'une situation intérieure et économique aussi proche de la normale que le permettront les circonstances de la guerre ; à négocier avec les représentants qualifiés des populations des traités instituant l'indépendance et la souveraineté des États du Levant ainsi que l'alliance de ces états avec la France et sauvegardant les droits et intérêts de la France ; à assurer la défense de tout le territoire contre l'ennemi ; à coopérer avec les alliés aux opérations de guerre en Orient.

En attendant que le régime nouveau issu des futurs traités puisse être appliqué, ce qui devra être fait aussitôt que possible, vous assumerez tous les pouvoirs que détenait jusqu'ici le haut-Commissaire de France au Levant et toutes les responsabilités qui lui incombaient. Par la suite, vos attributions seront celles du représentant de la France dans le cadre des traités et de commandant en chef de nos forces.

Il vous appartiendra de provoquer dès que possible la réunion d'assemblées réellement représentatives de l'ensemble des populations et la formation de gouvernements approuvés par ces assemblées, avec lesquels vous entamerez aussitôt des négociations tendant à la conclusion des traités d'alliance. Les traités devront être conclus entre ces gouvernements et moi-même.

Malgré les déchirements et les vicissitudes résultant des revers momentanés des armées françaises et des intrigues de l'envahisseur de notre pays, le mandat confié à la France au Levant par la Société des Nations en 1923 doit être conduit à son terme et l'œuvre de la France doit être continuée.

C'est pourquoi vous prendrez comme point de départ des négociations avec les États du Levant les traités d'alliance conclus en 1936 avec ces états. Vous proposerez aux gouvernements des États du Levant que les dispositions temporaires à prendre en commun pour répondre aux nécessités de notre défense commune dans la guerre actuelle, fassent l'objet de conventions particulières.

[1] *Journal Officiel de la France Combattante* (London), Deuxieme Année, No. 9, August 28th, 1942.

Je me réserve de faire part, le moment venu, à la Société des Nations du remplacement au Levant du régime du mandat par un régime nouveau et répondant aux fins pour lesquelles le mandat avait été institué.

Croyez, mon cher Général, à mes sentiments cordialement dévoués.

C. DE GAULLE.

No. 13: *Text of the Convention Initialled on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, July 12th, 1941.*[1]

1. Hostilities ceased on July 11th, 1941, at 21.01 hrs. Greenwich mean time.

2. The Allied forces will occupy Syro-Lebanese territory: the French forces will be concentrated in certain areas selected by a Committee formed of representatives of both parties. This concentration will be completed by Tuesday, July 15th, 1941, at 12.00 hrs., at which hour Allied forces will move to occupy certain strategic points. Up to the time of their repatriation the French troops will remain under French command, with a restricted establishment which will provide for their maintenance from existing stocks. Special measures are foreseen for the Jebel Druze, where, for security reasons, the French troops will remain in garrison until relieved by British troops.

3. In order to ensure public security, the occupation of the principal localities in Syria and Lebanon will be undertaken in accordance with a programme which will allow immediate replacement of the French by the occupying forces.

4. Minefields, whether on sea or on land, will be disclosed to the occupying authorities.

5. Full honours of war will be granted to the French forces. The latter will retire to the selected areas with all arms, including guns, machine guns, tanks and armoured cars, and their ammunition. All measures will be taken by the French Command to prevent arms and ammunition being left unguarded on the battlefield or elsewhere. The French military authorities will give every assistance in recovering arms which may be in the hands of the population.

6. In consideration of the honours of war, French officers and non-commissioned officers and soldiers are permitted to retain their individual arms (rifles or carbines, revolvers, bayonets, swords or sabres). However, the soldiers will not be allowed to carry ammunition. In each unit for security reasons a small quantity of ammunition will be retained. The Gendarmerie will retain its arms and a limited amount of ammunition.

[1] *The Times* (London), July 16th, 1941.

000 All other war material, including guns, coastal batteries, anti-aircraft guns and military transport will be stocked under British control. The latter will inspect this material and will have the right to take over the material that may be required by them : the remainder will be destroyed by the French authorities under British control.

7. Prisoners of the Allied forces will be forthwith set free, including those who have been transferred to France. As regards the latter, the British authorities reserve the right to hold as Prisoners of War an equal number of French officers as far as possible of similar rank until those prisoners transferred to France have been released. The French prisoners will be released when the whole of the Syro-Lebanese territory has been occupied and the clauses of this Convention fulfilled. They will then be enabled to join their units for repatriation.

8. The alternatives of rallying to the Allied cause or of being repatriated will be left to the free choice of the individual whether military or civil. In the case of civilians who do not rally to the Allied cause individual applications to remain in Syria or Lebanon will be considered by the British authorities.

9. Executive officials, officials of the technical services and Special Service officers will remain at their posts so long as is necessary to ensure the continuance of the administration of the country and until such time as they can be relieved. They can then be repatriated if they so wish. Their services may be dispensed with if their work or attitude is not satisfactory.

10. The British authorities agree to the repatriation by French ships of French troops and of French subjects, with the reservation that this repatriation will be limited to those who have opted therefor. The British authorities reserve the right to control all matters relative to the repatriation of these people.

11. Holdings of French subjects to be repatriated will be transferred in accordance with terms to be arranged. These people will receive treatment not less favourable than that accorded to British subjects who have lately left Syria.

12. French cultural institutions, including hospitals, schools, missions, etc., are assured that their rights will be respected. The rights of these institutions must not be allowed to conflict with Allied military interests.

13. All public services, including railways, tramways, public transport, electricity and water will be maintained in operation and handed over intact.

14. All means of communication, including telephones, telegraphs, wireless and the submarine cable, will be handed over intact to the occupying authorities. The French Command will

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have the use of telegram facilities with France on the same conditions as the general public. 000

15. Port installations, naval establishments and all ships including British in Syrian and Lebanese territorial water will be handed over intact to the occupying authorities.

16. All aircraft and air installations and equipment in Syria or the Lebanon will be handed over intact. On the signature of the present Agreement British aircraft are empowered to use any air base and alighting area in the Lebanon and Syria.

17. Fuel stocks shall be handed over intact. The quantity necessary for military transport will be placed at the disposal of the French Command.

18. Currency and other means of payment in circulation or in reserve, in possession of banks or other public authorities will be safeguarded.

19. The British military authorities reserve the right to take into their service "Troupes Spéciales du Levant" progressively as they are discharged by the French authorities. The arms of these troops will be handed over to the British authorities.

20. The British authorities will not prosecute in any way native Syrians and Lebanese who have been involved in the recent hostilities in a military or official capacity.

21. The carrying into effect of the terms of the Convention will be controlled and regulated by a "Commission of Control" which will sit at Beirut and will be composed of five members. Three of the members, including the President, will be nominated by the British authorities, the remaining two by the French authorities.

This "Commission of Control" is empowered to appoint sub-commissions and to co-opt the services of such experts as may be necessary.

22. This Convention is drawn up in English and in French. In case of dispute the English text will be authoritative.

No. 14: *General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28th, 1941.*[1]

Syriens,

Le 8 juin dernier, lors de l'entrée au Levant des armées alliées, dans un manifeste que je vous ai adressé au nom de la France Libre et de son chef, le Général de Gaulle, j'ai reconnu à la Syrie la qualité d'État souverain et indépendant, sous la garantie d'un traité définissant nos rapports réciproques.

Le Gouvernement britannique, allié de la France Libre, agissant en accord avec elle, s'est, par une déclaration simultanée, associé à cet acte politique important.

[1] *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9th, 1941.

Le 16 de ce mois, j'ai rendu effective ma déclaration du 8 juin, en la faisant passer du plan du principe acquis à celui des institutions et des réalités.

L'ère est donc ouverte où la Syrie indépendante et souveraine régira elle-même ses destinées.

Son Excellence le Cheikh Tageddine el Hassani a accepté d'organiser le nouveau régime d'indépendance. Son expérience des affaires et son sentiment profond des nécessités publiques le désignaient pour cette haute mission. Je l'assure ainsi que toute la nation syrienne de mon appui et de ma loyale collaboration.

J'exercerai cette collaboration en m'inspirant des considérations ci-après :

L'État syrien jouit dès maintenant des droits et prérogatives attachés à la qualité d'état indépendant et souverain. Ces droits et ces prérogatives subiront les seules restrictions qu'imposent l'état actuel de guerre et la sécurité du territoire.

Par ailleurs, sa position d'allié de fait de la France Libre et de la Grande Bretagne requiert une étroite conformité de sa politique avec celle des Alliés.

En accédant à la vie internationale indépendante, la Syrie accède naturellement aux droits et obligations souscrits jusqu'ici en son nom.

Elle a la faculté de désigner des représentants diplomatiques auprès des pays où elle jugera que ses intérêts exigent l'installation d'une pareille représentation. Partout ailleurs, les autorités de la France Libre lui prêteront leurs offices pour assurer la défense des droits et intérêts généraux de la Syrie, ainsi que la protection des ressortissants syriens.

L'État syrien a la faculté de constituer ses forces militaires nationales. La France Libre lui prêtera, à cette fin, tout son concours.

La Grande Bretagne s'étant déjà engagée à plusieurs reprises à reconnaître l'indépendance de la Syrie, la France Libre interviendra, sans délai, auprès des autres puissances alliées ou amies, pour que celles-ci reconnaissent également l'indépendance de l'État syrien.

La France Libre considère que l'État de Syrie constitue politiquement et territorialement une unité indivisible, dont l'intégrité doit être préservée de tout démembrement. Elle favorisera, en conséquence, le resserrement des liens politiques, culturels et économiques qui unissent les différentes fractions de la Syrie. A cette fin, le Délégué Général et Plénipotentiare de la France Libre révisera les textes fixant les statuts particuliers accordés antérieurement à certaines régions, de manière que, tout en conservant l'autonomie financière et administrative à laquelle elles se montrent

fermement attachées, elles soient politiquement subordonnées au pouvoir central syrien. Ainsi se trouvent conciliés le principe de l'unité syrienne et les aspirations particulières de ces régions.

Il demeure en outre entendu que les garanties de droit public inscrites dans les statuts organiques en faveur des individus et des communautés sont maintenues et recevront leur plein effet.

La France Libre s'engage à s'entremettre auprès de la Syrie et du Liban afin que soient recherchées et instituées les bases d'une collaboration économique entre les deux pays et que soient éliminées les difficultés que cette collaboration rencontre dans le présent.

Cette entente, nécessaire entre deux pays frères et voisins, doit garantir les droits légitimes et respectifs des deux parties, et établir leurs rapports sur la base de la confiance réciproque.

En vue de sauvegarder l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Syrie et pour mener à bien la lutte commune, les Alliés assumeront, pendant la période de guerre, la défense du pays. A cette fin, le Gouvernement syrien mettra à la disposition du commandement allié, pour coopérer à la défense du territoire, les forces nationales syriennes. De même, le commandement allié disposera dès maintenant dans la mesure où les nécessités militaires l'exigeront, de l'équipement et des services publics de la Syrie, notamment des voies de communication, des aérodromes et des aménagements côtiers. La défense du territoire exige également qu'une étroite collaboration existe en tous temps entre le Général Commandant en Chef et Délégué Général, et les services de gendarmerie, de police et de sûreté de l'État syrien. La Syrie doit être en effet défendue en temps de guerre, non seulement contre ses ennemis du dehors, mais aussi contre ceux du dedans.

En raison de l'inclusion de la Syrie dans la zone de guerre et dans le système économique et financier des Alliés, la plus étroite collaboration entre le Gouvernement syrien et les Alliés est également nécessaire pour assurer, pendant la durée des hostilités et dans l'intérêt commun, l'obligation et le respect de toutes mesures prises en vue de conduire à bonne fin la guerre économique.

Dans ce but, pendant la durée des hostilités, les plus grandes facilités seront accordées pour assurer dans la plus large mesure, la liberté des échanges entre la Syrie et les pays du bloc sterling. La Syrie, entrée maintenant dans le bloc sterling, adoptera, dans l'ordre économique et financier, et notamment dans le domaine du change, les mesures nécessaires pour rester en harmonie avec la politique générale du bloc sterling.

Les stipulations qui précèdent concilient le respect de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté syriennes avec les nécessités de l'état de guerre. Elles sont inspirées par une pensée unique, qui est celle de gagner la guerre et d'assurer par ce moyen à la Syrie

000 un avenir de peuple libre. Elles apportent au problème franco-syrien une solution qui procède de la volonté de la France Libre de ne pas retarder, malgré la guerre, l'accomplissement des aspirations nationales syriennes et l'exécution des engagements des Alliés. Mais il est nécessaire qu'un règlement définitif y soit substitué au plus tôt, sous la forme du traité franco-syrien qui consacrera définitivement l'indépendance du pays.

Vive la Syrie indépendante !

Vive l'Angleterre !

Vive la France !

No. 15 : *General Catroux's Proclamation of Lebanese Independence, November 26th, 1941.*[1]

Libanais,

La proclamation que je vous ai adressée le 8 juin dernier au nom du Général de Gaulle, chef de la France Libre, et que la Grande-Bretagne a appuyée par une déclaration particulière et simultanée, a reconnu au Liban, sous la garantie d'un traité à conclure en vue de définir les rapports réciproques franco-libanais, la qualité d'État souverain et indépendant.

Dépositaire de la tradition libérale française et soucieuse de faire honneur aux engagements contractés envers vous, la France Libre, en entrant au Levant, a commencé en dépit de la guerre et en dépit de l'état d'exception qu'elle impose, par un acte d'émancipation : elle vous a rendus libres et indépendants.

Vos aspirations sont satisfaites. Il s'agit maintenant d'organiser votre indépendance. En ce qui me concerne, deux devoirs tutélaires m'incombent. Le premier, de remettre le soin d'installer et de diriger le régime à une personnalité hautement qualifiée dans la conjoncture présente pour accomplir cette tâche difficile. Après de très larges consultations qui se sont adressées à la fois aux hommes et aux sentiments publics sur toute l'étendue du territoire, j'ai discerné que les voeux de la nation libanaise désignaient Son Excellence M. Naccache. Je lui ai demandé de conserver le pouvoir avec le titre et les prérogatives de Président de la République et de gouverner par les moyens d'un ministère qui serait responsable devant lui et au sein duquel serait assurée la juste représentation de toutes les régions et de toutes les confessions qui constituent la nation libanaise.

J'assure le Président Naccache, ainsi que la communauté libanaise, de ma sollicitude et de mon entier concours.

Le second devoir consiste à définir dans son esprit et ses formes la collaboration à instituer entre le Liban et la France Libre, en attendant la conclusion d'un traité d'alliance et d'amitié.

[1] *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9th, 1941.

En reconnaissant votre indépendance, la France ne fait que s'inspirer de son amitié traditionnelle pour le Liban, de sa mission tutélaire dans ce pays au cours des siècles et de la situation privilégiée qu'elle a ainsi acquise. Son aide et son assistance demeurent en toutes choses assurées au Liban dans l'esprit du traité franco-libanais d'alliance et d'amitié de 1936 qui a reçu l'approbation unanime de la population libanaise. En outre, les circonstances de guerre et l'occupation par les forces alliées du territoire libanais placent temporairement le Liban dans une situation particulière. Il en découle un certain nombre de droits et d'obligations dont, en particulier, ceux stipulés ci-après :

L'État libanais jouit dès maintenant des droits et prérogatives attachés à la qualité d'état indépendant et souverain. Ces droits et ces prérogatives subissent les restrictions qu'imposent l'état actuel de guerre et la sécurité du territoire et des armées alliées.

Par ailleurs sa position d'allié de fait de la France Libre et de la Grande-Bretagne, requiert une étroite conformité de sa politique avec celle des alliés. En accédant à la vie internationale indépendante, le Liban succède naturellement aux droits et obligations résultant de tous traités, conventions et actes internationaux conclus par la France en ce qui concerne le Liban ou en son nom. Il a la faculté de désigner ses représentants diplomatiques auprès des pays où ses intérêts exigeront une pareille représentation. Partout ailleurs, les autorités de la France lui prêteront leurs offices pour assurer la défense des droits et intérêts libanais, ainsi que la protection des ressortissants libanais. L'État libanais a la faculté de constituer ses forces militaires nationales et la France lui prêtera à cette fin tout son concours.

La Grande-Bretagne s'étant déjà engagée à plusieurs reprises à reconnaître l'indépendance du Liban la France interviendra sans délai auprès des autres puissances alliées ou amies pour que celles-ci reconnaissent également l'indépendance de l'État libanais.

La France considère que l'État du Liban constitue politiquement et territorialement une unité indivisible dont l'intégrité doit être préservée de toute atteinte. Elle favorise en conséquence le resserrement des liens politiques, culturels et économiques qui unissent les différentes parties du Liban. De son côté à même fin, le gouvernement du Liban garantira l'égalité des droits civils, religieux et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants sans distinction aucune. Il assurera la répartition équitable des différents éléments du pays dans les hautes charges et dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'État. Il assurera aussi dans la répartition des dépenses publiques une juste proportion entre les différentes régions. Il procédera le plus tôt possible à l'unification du régime fiscal ainsi qu'aux réformes administratives nécessaires.

000 La France s'engage à s'entremettre entre le Liban et la Syrie afin que soient recherchées et instituées les bases d'une coopération économique entre les deux pays, et que soient éliminées les difficultés que cette collaboration rencontre dans le présent. Cette entente, nécessaire entre les deux pays frères et voisins, doit garantir les droits légitimes et respectifs des deux parties et établir leurs rapports sur une base de confiance réciproque. En vue de sauvegarder l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Liban et de mener à bien la lutte commune, les alliés assumeront pendant la période de guerre la défense du pays. A cette fin, le gouvernement libanais mettra à la disposition du commandement allié, pour coopérer à la défense du territoire, les forces nationales libanaises. De même, le commandement allié disposera dès maintenant, dans la mesure où les nécessités militaires l'exigeront, de l'équipement et des services publics du Liban, notamment des voies de communication, aérodromes et aménagements côtiers. La défense du territoire exige également qu'une étroite collaboration existe en tout temps entre le Général Commandant en Chef et Délégué Général et les services de gendarmerie, de police et de sûreté de l'État du Liban.

Le Liban doit être en état de défense en temps de guerre, non seulement contre ses ennemis du dehors mais aussi contre ses ennemis du dedans. En raison de l'inclusion du Liban dans la zone de guerre et dans le système économique et financier des alliés la plus étroite collaboration entre le gouvernement libanais et les alliés est également nécessaire pour assurer, pendant la durée des hostilités et dans l'intérêt commun, l'obligation et le respect de toutes mesures nécessaires prises en vue de conduire à bonne fin la guerre économique. Dans ce but, pendant la durée des hostilités, les plus grandes facilités seront accordées pour assurer dans la plus large mesure la liberté des échanges entre le Liban et les pays du bloc sterling.

Le Liban, entré maintenant dans le bloc sterling, adoptera dans l'ordre économique et financier et notamment dans le domaine du change, les mesures nécessaires pour rester en harmonie avec la politique du bloc sterling.

Les stipulations qui précèdent concilient le respect de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté du Liban avec la mission séculaire de la France et avec les nécessités de l'état de guerre. Elles sont dominées par la pensée de gagner la guerre et d'assurer par ce moyen au Liban un avenir de peuple libre. Elles apporteront au problème franco-libanais une solution qui procède de la volonté de la France de ne pas retarder, malgré la guerre, l'accomplissement des aspirations nationales du Liban et l'exécution de ses propres engagements, mais il est nécessaire qu'un règlement

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définitif y soit substitué au plus tôt sous la forme du traité franco-libanais qui consacrera définitivement l'indépendance du pays.

Vive le Liban indépendant !

Vive la France !

No. 16 : *Agreement and Protocols on the Transfer of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests, December 22nd, 1943-January 5th, 1944*[1]

CONVENTION

conclue à Damas, le 22 décembre 1943, entre la France, la Syrie et le Liban, concernant le transfert des Services des Intérêts Communs aux États

République Syrienne

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

Le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, s'est entretenu aujourd'hui avec L.L.E.E. Saadallah Djabri, Président du Conseil, Jamil Bey Mardam, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Khaled bey Azem, Ministre des Finances, représentants du Gouvernement syrien, et L.L.E.E. Riad Bey Solh, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Finances, et Sélim Bey Tacla, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, représentants du Gouvernement libanais.

Les échanges de vues se sont poursuivis dans une atmosphère d'entière cordialité et de compréhension réciproque en présence de S.E. Choucri Bey Kouatli, Président de la République syrienne.

Ces conversations avaient été précédées par des pourparlers similaires entre le Général Catroux et les représentants du Gouvernement libanais en présence de S.S. Cheikh Béchara El-Khouri, Président de la République libanaise.

A l'issue de la conférence l'entente est intervenue sur la déclaration suivante :

Un accord est intervenu à la date de ce jour entre S.E. le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les Représentants des deux Gouvernements syrien et libanais, pour la remise à ces Gouvernements des attributions exercées en leur nom par les autorités françaises. Par suite de cet accord, les intérêts communs, avec leur personel, seront transférés aux deux États syrien et libanais, avec droit de législation et de réglementation à la date de 1er janvier prochain.

Les modalités concernant la passation de ces pouvoirs feront l'objet d'accords particuliers.

Fait à Damas, le 22 décembre 1943.

Signé : JAMIL MARDAM BEY, SAADALLAH JABRI,
KHALED EL AZEM, SELIM BEY TACLA,
RIAD SOLH, CATROUX.

[1] *Journal Officiel* of the Lebanese Republic (Beirut), No. 9, 1944.

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PROTOCOLE

du 3 janvier 1944

Concernant le transfert aux deux États de Syrie et du Liban de l'Administration générale des Douanes

République Libanaise
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

Beyrouth, le 3 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 à Damas, entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les représentants des gouvernements syrien et libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et les deux gouvernements intéressés ont procédé le 3 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif aux deux États de Syrie et du Liban de l'administration générale des Douanes.

Le personnel de cette administration est passé à la même date au service des deux gouvernements, compte tenu des termes des deux lettres adressées le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par les Présidents du Conseil Syrien et Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Les accords internationaux conclus par la France en matière douanière et les responsabilités internationales assumées par elle en cette même matière jusqu'à ce jour, du nom de la Syrie et du Liban, sont désormais à la charge des deux États.

Signé : YVES CHATAIGNEAU,
KHALED EL AZEM, RIAD SOLH.

PROTOCOLE

du 3 janvier 1944

Concernant le transfert aux deux États de Syrie et du Liban du contrôle de la régie co-intéressée libano-syrienne des tabacs et tombacs

République Libanaise
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

Beyrouth, le 3 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 à Damas, entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les représentants des gouvernements syrien et libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et les deux gouvernements intéressés ont procédé le 3 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif aux deux

états de Syrie et du Liban du Contrôle de la Régie co-intéressée libano-syrienne des tabacs et tombacs.

Le personnel de ce contrôle est passé à la même date au service des deux gouvernements, compte tenu des termes des deux lettres adressées le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par les Présidents du Conseil Syrien et Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Signé : YVES CHATAIGNEAU,
KHALED EL AZEM, RIAD SOLH.

PROTOCOLE
du 5 janvier 1944
Concernant le transfert à l'État du Liban du contrôle des Sociétés concessionnaires :
Electricité de Beyrouth : Compagnie des Eaux de Beyrouth

Damas, le 5 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les Représentants du Gouvernement Libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et le Gouvernement Libanais ont procédé le 5 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif a l'État du Liban du Contrôle des Sociétés Concessionnaires ci-après :

Electricité de Beyrouth.

Compagnie des Eaux de Beyrouth.

Le personnel du contrôle de ces Sociétés est passé à la même date au service du Gouvernement libanais, compte tenu des termes de la lettre adressée le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par le Président du Conseil Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Signé : YVES CHATAIGNEAU, ABI CHAHLA.

PROTOCOLE
du 5 janvier 1944
Concernant le transfert aux deux États de Syrie et du Liban du contrôle de l'Administration des Phares

République Syrienne
Présidence du Conseil des Ministres Cabinet.

Damas, le 5 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 à Damas entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission,

et les Représentants des Gouvernements Syrien et Libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et les deux Gouvernements intéressés ont procédé le 5 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif aux deux États de Syrie et du Liban du Contrôle de l'Administration des Phares.

Le personnel de ce contrôle est passé à la même date au service des deux Gouvernements, compte tenu des termes de deux lettres adressées le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par les Présidents du Conseil Syrien et Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Signé :

ABI CHAHLA,
KHALED EL AZEM, YVES CHATAIGNEAU.

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APPENDIX B

Recent Statistics of the Population of Syria and Lebanon

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More up-to-date estimates of the population than those given in Chapters V and VII have come to hand since the text of this book was completed. They are as follows:

TABLE I

Population by Provinces ('Muhafazats')

Syria:	
Muhafazat of Damascus	603,889
Aleppo	870,139
Homs	212,424
Hama	157,458
Hauran	112,842
Euphrates	225,023
Jazirah	146,001
Jebel Druze	80,128
Latakia (Alawis)	452,507
Total	2,860,411
Lebanon:	
Muhafazat of Beirut	174,001
Mount Lebanon	335,774
North Lebanon	246,964
South Lebanon	212,848
Biqa'	157,014
Total	1,126,601
Total for Syria and Lebanon	3,987,012

Notes:

(1) The Beduin are not included in the Syrian figures. Their total number has been estimated at about 400,000.

(2) The Syrian figures give the population as it was at the end of 1943, the Lebanese figures are for the end of 1944.

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TABLE II

Population by Religious Communities

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Religious Community	Syria	Lebanon
Sunnis	1,971,053	235,595
Shi'is	12,742	209,338
Druzes	87,184	74,311
Alawis	325,311	—
Isma'ilis	28,527	—
'Latins' (i.e. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite)	5,996	3,117
Maronites	13,349	327,846
Greek Catholics	46,733	64,280
Greek Orthodox	136,957	109,883
Armenian Catholics	16,790	10,048
Armenian Orthodox	101,747	59,749
Syrian Catholics	16,247	4,984
Syrian Orthodox	40,135	3,753
Chaldaean Catholics	4,719	1,330
Nestorians	9,176	—
Protestants	11,187	10,440
Jews	29,770	5,666
Yazidis	2,788	—
Various	—	6,261
Total	2,860,411	1,126,601

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This is neither a complete bibliography nor a list of the sources on which the present work is based. Its only purpose is to offer suggestions to readers who desire to follow up any of the subjects touched on in the text. 113

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END MAP (A)

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

END MAP (B)

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[For information on political Zionism and its activities in Palestine before the Second World War, Arab reaction to it and British policies in this regard, see 11: Hourani, MD1 Syria, category 116, pp. 106-115, 270-273.]

175, 648, 177, 186 Lebanon ME1

[For a survey of the political history of Lebanon before and during the French mandate, and information on westernization, sectarianism, and nationalism in Lebanon, see 11: Hourani, MD1 Syria, category 116, entire source.]

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Report of a Mission organized by
the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development at the request of
the Government of Syria

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p. ii

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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF *Syria*

PUBLISHED FOR The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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p. iii

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THE MISSION

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Alison Turner, Secretary

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[p. iv CONTAINS NO TEXTUAL MATERIAL.]

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121 This is the report of a mission to Syria, organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Syria. The task of the mission was to undertake a general review of Syria's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the government to formulate a long-term development program for increasing Syria's productive resources and raising the standard of living of its people. The recommendations were to concern the approximate rate of public capital expenditure which Syria can appropriately undertake, priorities for such expenditure as among different sectors of the economy and as among types of undertakings within those sectors, measures apart from capital investment for improving and increasing production and raising living standards, and economic, fiscal and administrative policies and measures necessary for the success of the development program.

114 The mission consisted of ten full-time members. The adviser on agricultural production was nominated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; one of the economists is a member of the regular staff of the International Monetary Fund. Five members (the advisers on industry, housing and community planning, water resources and power, and transportation, and the agricultural economist) were recruited by the Bank from outside its staff. The other three members are members of the Bank's regular staff. The mission chief and one of the experts are from the Netherlands; the other mission members are from Switzerland, France, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The mission arrived in Syria early in February 1954 and remained until the latter part of April. During their stay in Syria, members of the mission travelled through all of the country's nine provinces. The mission reassembled at the Bank's headquarters for the purpose of writing this report.

121 The report is in two parts. Part I, the Main Report, contains the mission's recommendations for the organization and financing of a program of government action extending over five full years. Part II contains a series

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121 of Annexes consisting of technical notes on Syria's international economic position, public finance, agriculture, irrigation, agricultural institutions, industry, electric power, transportation and communications, and settlements and social services.

100 The President of the Bank transmitted the report to the President of Syria in March 1955. The letter of transmittal noted that since the Executive Directors and management customarily do not review the recommendations of missions in detail, the report as transmitted represented the views of the mission rather than positive recommendations of the Bank. The letter added, however, that the Bank believed that the findings of the report deserved the most careful consideration and discussion.

Similarly, while the other international agencies which participated in the organization of the mission were given an opportunity to comment on the portions of the report of particular interest to them, responsibility for the recommendations of the report is to be regarded as that of the mission alone.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The mission wishes to express its appreciation for the generous cooperation extended to it in all aspects of its work, both by officials of the government and by the many private citizens with whom it had occasion to consult. Among Syrian officials, the mission wishes particularly to acknowledge the assistance of the liaison committee composed of the Secretaries General of the Ministries of National Economy, Finance, Agriculture and Public Works and Communications, under the chairmanship of the Minister of National Economy.

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*EXCHANGE RATES**

457

1 Syrian £ = $0.28 U.S.
1 million £S = $280,000 U.S.
$1.00 U.S. = £S 3.575
1 million $U.S. = £S 3.575 million

* Free market rate, average for 1954, on which mission's calculations are based.

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PART I *THE MAIN REPORT*

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CHAPTER 1 *STRUCTURE OF THE SYRIAN ECONOMY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT*

Introduction

Syria, although an independent country only since 1945, has had a long and chequered history. It has seen many conquerors and witnessed the rise and fall of many civilizations. Since time immemorial it has been the frontier land where rival civilizations penetrating from the East and the West have contended for supremacy. The Sumerians, Chaldeans, Assyrians and Persians came from the East, and the Greeks and Romans from the West. Still later the Eastern Roman Empire of the early Christian era gave way, successively, to the Arabs and the Turks. Even after Turkish rule became firmly established, Syria remained for a long time the place where the caravans from the West and East met and an active trade in goods took place. Although it became basically eastern in its orientation, it was never wholly without contact with the West, and western influence was again reasserted when Turkish rule was terminated after the first World War.

Thus the culture, economy and political system of Syria are a mixture of East and West. The diverse elements have only been partially fused. The East and West co-exist in rather uneasy balance. Modern technology has invaded Syria in the form of factories, mechanized farms and motor cars, but the craftsmen still ply their trade in crowded bazaars, most of the land is still cultivated by time-hallowed methods and under ancient systems of tenure, and camels and donkeys still play a role—although a diminishing one—in transport. Modern commercial banks have by no means displaced the traditional money lenders and the bazaar banks or *sarafs*, and the wholehearted acceptance of western capitalism is still impeded to a small extent by the Moslem aversion to interest as usury. Democratic, parliamentary institutions have been borrowed from the West, but their stability is periodically threatened by divisive forces and the tradition of autocratic rule inherited from the past. Syrian nationalism, born as a rebellion against foreign domination, is now engaged in the

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101 178 challenging task of fusing the positive elements of both its eastern and its western heritage into a cohesive whole.

Population and Land

161 162 According to official estimates, Syria at the end of 1953 had a population of about 3.65 million, including some 150,000 Bedouins who lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Although demographic statistics are far from adequate, it appears probable that the population has been growing at an annual rate of somewhere between 2% and 3% during the last decade. Most of the population is rural:[1] about 60% live in villages and towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and each of the two largest cities—Damascus, the capital, and Aleppo, the commercial center of the country—has a population close to 400,000. About 86% of the population are Moslem or belong to offshoots of the Moslem religion, and nearly all of the balance are adherents of a considerable number of Christian denominations.

161 311 As a country with an area of 181,337 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), about three-fourths the size of the United Kingdom, Syria cannot be said to be densely populated. While less than a third of the area is cultivable, the proportion of the population to the land already under cultivation compares favorably with that of other countries in the Near and Middle East. In Syria there is one hectare[2] of cultivated land per inhabitant, or about 10% more than in Turkey and Iran, twice as much as in Greece and Iraq and eight to nine times as much as in Egypt.

311 133 There is still plenty of land available in Syria but water severely limits its utilization. The country lies to the leeward of mountain ranges in the west and north which intercept much of the rainfall. Except for the coastal region of Latakia province, Syria is largely cut off from the rain-bearing winds of the Mediterranean by mountains, the Djebel Ansariya (Alaouit mountains) in Latakia, and, farther south, after the intervening Tripoli-Homs gap, by the twin ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon which in turn give way to the Hermon range. Thus the area which can support rain-fed cultivation is confined to a rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier. Fortunately for Syria, its

[1] See Annex C, p. 292.
[2] A hectare = 2.471 acres.

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

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311 rainfall is supplemented by the water brought down from the mountains
133 by its rivers. The principal of these is the Euphrates which has its headwaters in Turkey and flows in a generally southeasterly direction across Syria into Iraq. Together with its most important tributary, the Khabour, which also rises in Turkey, it accounts for 90% of the total annual flow of all Syrian rivers. In the west the largest river is the Orontes which is fed by springs from the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges and flows northward through the marshy area known as the Ghab into Turkey. Farther south the Barada river, rising in the Anti-Lebanon, supplies life-giving water to the fertile Ghouta oasis around Damascus. In the extreme south the Yarmuk river flows along the Jordanian frontier into the Jordan river. Although the flow of these rivers is highly seasonal, it is on the effective utilization of their waters that much of the future development of Syria's agriculture depends.

Principal Regions

631 Administratively Syria is divided into nine *mohafazats* or provinces, each in charge of a *mohafez* or governor; the province is in turn divided into *qadas* or counties headed by a *kaimakam;* and the county is further subdivided into *nahiyes* or townships in charge of a *mudir*.

241 Of greater significance, however, are the principal economic regions.
438 Farthest south are the adjoining regions of the Hauran and Djebel Druze.
311 The Hauran plain, an area of rather high but apparently declining fertility, has long been known as a granary, even in Roman times. Its principal crop is wheat, but barley, maize, sorghum and pulses are also important. To the east rises the Djebel Druze, a basaltic dome, where the Druzes, a proud and independent people, eke a bare living from the pockets of fertile soil in their mountains. Here the pressure of population on the land is acute. Agricultural holdings in the Hauran and Djebel Druze are predominantly small. There is little irrigation, and annual rainfall, averaging less than 12 inches, is barely adequate for dry farming. Sharp fluctuations in rainfall frequently make farming precarious. One of the principal problems of this region is the scant supply of underground water even for drinking.

To the northwest of the Hauran lies the higher, rolling Julani plateau stretching toward the Hermon range. This stony region is suitable only for grazing and, to some extent, for orchards. To the north a narrow band

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

[FOLLOWING P. 6 (A)]

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

[FOLLOWING P. 6(B)]

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241 of cultivation leads to Damascus where semi-desert conditions prevail and
438 rainfall is generally inadequate for dry farming. Thanks to the waters of
311 the Barada river, however, Damascus lies in a fertile oasis, known as the Ghouta. It is pre-eminently an area of orchards and vineyards yielding olives, fruit and nuts. Vegetables, hemp and, more recently, sugar beets are also important crops and extensive dairying is carried on. Damascus, linked with the nearby Lebanese port of Beirut by road and narrow-gauge rail, is one of Syria's two leading industrial centers, the other being Aleppo. Aside from the textile factories which constitute the principal industry, Damascus has plants for the production of cement, glass, vegetable oils, soap, leather and boots and the canning of foodstuffs.

North-northeast of Damascus up to the plains of Homs the country is for the most part rugged and barren, with occasional oases. From Homs to Aleppo stretches an extensive plain which is, along with the Jezireh, the most important agricultural area in Syria. Rainfall is fairly adequate, ranging from an annual average of around 600 mm. (23.6 inches) at Homs to a little less than 400 mm. (15.7 inches) at Hama and Aleppo. The region is the site of the largest completed government irrigation scheme, the Homs-Hama irrigation network, fed from Homs lake; extensive areas are also irrigated by wells, river pumps and water wheels. Northwest of Hama lies the large marshy area known as the Ghab into which the Orontes river pours its water and which the government is just beginning to reclaim. The Homs-Hama-Aleppo area has become the center of cotton and sugar beet cultivation, and it produces roughly one-third of the country's wheat and almost one-half of its barley. West of Aleppo extensive orchards and vineyards produce olives, fruits and nuts. The landholdings of the area are generally large and for the most part cultivated by sharecroppers, who earn a bare living. Around Aleppo mechanized agriculture is developing on some scale.

Aleppo, the principal grain market and commercial center of the country, has also developed considerable industry, featuring cotton ginning and textiles, vegetable oil extraction and soap making, and cement. Homs, with its new sugar factory, a modern textile dyeing plant, several flour mills and a large number of small weaving enterprises, has also achieved some industrial importance.

West of Homs and Hama lies the province of Latakia, facing the Mediterranean. It receives the highest rainfall—up to 1,000 mm. per year—and has a subtropical climate. Its rather narrow coastal plain boasts a

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diversified agriculture yielding tobacco, cotton, legumes, melons, olives and some citrus as well as winter cereals. Its principal city, Latakia, is a rapidly growing port serving as an outlet for the large agricultural output of northern Syria. The coastal plains and the mountains of the province are the country's most densely populated areas.

East of Aleppo lie two distinct agricultural regions, one the belt of rain-fed cultivation stretching along the Turkish frontier and comprising principally the province of the Jezireh, the other, the irrigated Euphrates valley. The Euphrates flows in a southeasterly direction through an arid region but the water taken from the river by hundreds of pumps makes possible extensive cultivation of cereals in the winter and cotton and other crops in the summer. Cultivation is principally by sharecroppers. Deir ez Zor is the largest city in the Euphrates valley. The Jezireh in northeastern Syria has now become the country's principal granary. Once the home of roaming, warlike Bedouins, it was pacified and thrown open to settled agriculture only during the last two decades. Beginning in the second World War, cultivation was rapidly expanded until now the Jezireh produces almost half the country's wheat and a considerable amount of barley as well. Dry farming predominates, with cultivation extending from Hassetche, the capital of the province, where rainfall is marginal, northward to the Turkish border where rainfall is heavy and the region's principal commercial center, the bustling town of Kamichliye, is located. In the valleys of the Khabour and Jagh-Jagh rivers, however, there is some irrigated cultivation, with cotton and rice as the principal crops. In this sparsely settled region, dry farming is carried on in large holdings —in some cases more than 100,000 hectares—and with fleets of tractors and self-propelled combines. The principal problem of the region is transport, for it is served inadequately by a railway running in and out of Turkish territory and by roads and tracks which are impassable for part of the year.

South and southwest of the Euphrates and extending toward Hama, Homs and Damascus lies a large, roughly triangular area, the Syrian desert. This desert or steppe area, although dotted here and there by an oasis, is too arid to support cultivation. Vegetation springs up briefly following the scant winter rains and supports during this time large flocks of sheep and goats tended by Bedouin tribesmen who are also engaged in the breeding of camels. Inadequate water supplies and occasionally severe weather make serious inroads on the flocks from time to time.

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Natural Resources

Land and water are undoubtedly the principal natural resources of Syria. Indications do not point to extensive mineral deposits. Some poor lignite but no coal has been found. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company carried out extensive prospecting and drilling over a considerable area under a concession granted in 1938. After spending about £ 6 million sterling in exploratory work, it surrendered its concession in August 1951. Although the belief persists in Syria that considerable oil will one day be discovered, there is no evidence to support the supposition. Drilling did reveal the presence of natural gas in eastern Syria, southwest of Hassetche, and also of appreciable quantities of rock salt. In theory this gas, if proved in considerable volume, together with salt, could provide the raw materials for the production of fertilizers and alkalis, but other countries—for example Iraq—may well be more favorably situated with respect to the development of similar resources. The natural gas could also be used as a source of energy but it is unfortunately found at a considerable distance from the potential market in western Syria.

There are important deposits of bitumen or asphalt. One of these, in the province of Latakia, is already being mined, but other and far richer deposits uncovered in the Djebel Bichri, west of Deir ez Zor, are being exploited to a minor extent only by the Ministry of Public Works. The latter deposits are expected to assume considerable importance in the extensive roadbuilding program the government is planning to undertake. Iron ore, chromite and lead and iron pyrites are known to exist, but their presence in commercial quantities is still to be proved. While licenses for prospecting of minerals are being issued, on the basis of existing evidence it seems unlikely that mineral resources exist in sufficient quantities to affect the future of Syria significantly.

Agriculture

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65% to 75% of the people derive their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable portion of the balance earn their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities. Agriculture and animal husbandry together probably account for 45% to 50% of the national income. In agriculture, winter crops are most important because rainfall is concen-

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241 trated in the fall and winter seasons. Thus around 70% of the area in
433 crops is usually planted to wheat and barley, and these two cereals contributed £S 59.2 million and £S 70.8 million or approximately 19% of the total value of Syria's exports in 1952 and 1953. Although a considerable number of summer crops are grown, including sorghum, maize, rice, pulses and vegetables, by far the most important of these is cotton. The latter now rivals wheat as the most valuable crop of the country even though the 1953 acreage planted to cotton was only 10% of that sown to
[439] wheat. Exports of cotton and cotton seed amounted in 1952 and 1953 to £S 131.2 million and £S 140.2 million, or 38% and 40% of the value of all exports. Orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits also assume some importance in agricultural production, although they
233 take up less than 10% of the planted area. Animal husbandry, based prin-
439 cipally on sheep and goats, is primarily a pastoral industry without a close link with settled agriculture. Exports of livestock and livestock products including hides and skins, samneh (clarified butter), cheese and eggs, amounted in 1953 to almost £S 48 million or around 13% of the total value of exports. Live animals alone contributed £S 23 million, although such exports were offset by imports, primarily from Iraq, to a value of £S 7.1 million.

241 Much of Syria's agricultural output is consumed on the farm and
433 therefore does not enter the market economy. From the returns of the agricultural production tax, which is levied only on produce brought to market, it may be estimated that only around 40% of the production of wheat, maize and sorghum and less than 30% of the output of lentils is sold.

Industry

438 During the postwar period industry has steadily forged ahead, although
464 its contribution to national income is probably still only between one-fifth and one-fourth that of agriculture and animal husbandry. The number employed in manufacturing is difficult to estimate, since the 1947 census provided no occupational breakdown, and industrial enterprises required to register with the government generally understate the number of workers employed. Fragmentary data collected by the mission indicate that employment in more or less mechanized manufacturing establishments, many of which are very small, may be between 35,000 and 40,000. If

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handicraft workers and artisans are included, the number engaged in some form of manufacturing may approach or perhaps even exceed 100,000. 433 464

The textile industry, including spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing, and the manufacture of garments, is the most developed. It probably employs close to 20,000 people in more or less mechanical establishments and it was able, in 1953, to export goods to a value of about £S 25 million. Among other important industries are flour milling, the extraction of vegetable oils and making of soap, tanning, sugar refining, canning and preserving, and the manufacture of cement, glass, tobacco and matches. The production of utensils, implements, furniture and shoes, although on a considerable scale, is almost completely in the handicraft stage. [288]

Commerce

439

Commerce has always been one of the most profitable occupations in Syria. It has furnished much of the capital for the development of industry and even of agriculture. Aleppo and Damascus are the principal commercial centers of the country, the former being the more important. It handles most of Syria's exports, which emanate largely from the northern part of the country, and with the development of the port of Latakia it is also increasing its share of the import trade.

Foreign commerce is quite important in total trade. Over the three-year period 1951-53 the value of imports has averaged close to 30% of probable national income and exports about 22%. Exports have risen rather steadily in total value, and imports somewhat more slowly. Separate foreign trade figures for Syria have been available only since March 1950, when the economic union with Lebanon was terminated in order to give Syria more freedom in protecting its domestic manufacturing industry. Foreign trade has developed as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Year	Customs figures			Adjusted figures		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
1951	277	304	−27	292	418	−126
1952	320	313	+7	337	444	−117
1953	376	307	+69	408	484	−76

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459 A major adjustment must be made in the customs returns because they value imports on the basis of the official exchange rate, which is £S 2.20 to the dollar, rather than the actual rate, which in the years 1951-53 has fluctuated between £S 3.51 and £S 3.89. Minor adjustments must also be made to compensate for undervaluation and unrecorded shipments. Even the adjusted returns, however, show a gradual improvement in the balance of trade.

The composition of foreign trade, shown for the years 1951-53 in

TABLE 1 Average Annual Foreign Trade, 1951–1953 (Customs Figures)

	Quantity (metric tons)	Value (thousand £S)	Percentage of total value
Exports			
Livestock and animal products	5,242[b]	31,184[b]	9.6[b]
Wheat	94,390	25,555	7.9
Barley	103,526	19,453	6.0
Cotton	38,607	125,173	38.6
Wool	5,168	25,225	7.8
Textiles	—	31,740	9.8
Other	—	65,847	20.3
Total	—	324,177	100.0
Imports[a]			
Livestock and animal products	788	8,183	2.7
Grains, fruits and vegetables	102,640	34,312	11.1
Petroleum and petroleum products	388,684	37,008	12.1
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals	—	15,888	5.2
Wood and cork	—	9,350	3.0
Textile materials and goods	—	63,812	20.7
Precious metals and stones	—	14,640	4.8
Base metals and manufactures	—	23,731	7.7
Iron and steel	46,148	18,086	5.2
Machinery	—	42,897	13.9
Agricultural machinery	—	12,009	3.9
Transportation equipment	—	15,079	4.9
Motor vehicles and cycles	—	13,364	4.3
Other	—	43,204	14.0
Total	—	308,104	100.0

[a] Valued at official exchange rate.
[b] Excluding wool, goat hair and hides and skins.

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Table 1,[3] reflects, of course, the general structure of the economy. As already indicated, raw cotton represents well over a third of Syria's exports, and cereals, livestock and raw wool almost another third. In recent years, however, textiles have accounted for nearly one-tenth of the value of exports. As might be expected, imports are more diverse in character. Textile materials and manufactures, machinery, petroleum products and fruits and vegetables are among the principal imports; iron and steel, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, precious metals, motor vehicles and timber are also important.

Despite the dissolution of the Syrian-Lebanese economic union, Lebanon has remained Syria's principal trading partner, taking almost a quarter of Syria's exports and contributing around 10% of its imports. Three countries—Lebanon, France and the United Kingdom—buy over half of Syria's exports; and five countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Lebanon and Western Germany—supply between 50% and 60% of its imports. In the three years 1951-53 about 41% of Syria's exports was marketed in other Arab countries which, however, supplied only 18% of Syria's imports.

Syria's normal trade deficit is offset, on the current account of the balance of international payments, by local expenditures and oil transit payments made by foreign oil companies, by UNRWA[4] expenditures in Syria and by emigrant remittances. On capital account, there is evidently some continued net foreign investment, particularly by Lebanese, and some repatriation of capital by Syrians returning to their homeland. A considerable volume of bank funds has flowed to Syria partly because there has been a shift in the financing of Syria's foreign trade from Beirut to Aleppo and Damascus and partly because foreign banks have needed more funds to meet the credit needs of an expanding economy. Although the movement of these bank funds shows sharp seasonal fluctuations, there has apparently been a general upward trend in the amount of foreign banking advances in recent years. Total foreign exchange receipts and payments were not far out of balance in 1950, 1951 and 1952, but in 1953 Syrian gold and foreign exchange reserves, valued at the free rate, increased by £S 51 million. Foreign exchange and gold reserves at the free rate rose from £S 114.3 million at the end of 1951 to £S 157 million at

[3] See also Annex A, p. 213 *et seq.*

[4] United Nations Relief and Works Administration, charged with the care of Arab refugees from Palestine.

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457 the end of 1953, even though Syria paid off during these years all but £ 10.2 million of a £S 44.6 million debt to Lebanon and repaid $1,454,123 to the International Monetary Fund.

Transport

489 The transport system which carries the country's commerce reveals many deficiencies. Although Syria is served by three railways, all were built before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and therefore do not adequately serve the needs of an independent Syria. The gauges are not uniform, and there is no direct rail connection between Damascus and Aleppo. The port of Latakia, which handles most of Syria's overseas trade, is served only by roads. The railways in 1953 actually carried slightly less cargo than before the war. All of the substantial increase in traffic since the prewar period has been absorbed by motor transport. The number of all types of motor vehicles rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953, and the number of trucks from 873 to 4,742. Even such bulky commodities as cereals are now transported mostly by road. Yet the road system is also far from adequate and transport costs are very high.

504 Aside from Banias, which ships only oil transmitted by pipeline from Iraq, Syria has only one major port, Latakia. The volume of traffic at this port, which is still in process of development, has grown rapidly and amounted in 1953 to 90% of the overseas export and 46% of the overseas import trade of the country. The Lebanese ports of Beirut and Tripoli accounted for the balance. In the same year, however, almost half of the total volume of Syria's foreign trade went overland, principally to and from Lebanon.

Money and Credit

652 The monetary and banking system of Syria is still in the process of
457 development. Although a new monetary statute enacted March 28, 1953 envisages the establishment of a government central bank within a few years, the note-issuing function meanwhile remains with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL) which first received the right to issue currency during the French mandatory regime. Gold and foreign exchange in the monetary cover is bought through the intermediary of the Exchange Office, an autonomous government agency established in April 1952. This

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Office is responsible for enforcing foreign exchange controls and regulating the foreign exchange market. Although it has no monopoly, the Office is the principal buyer and seller of foreign exchange either via the commercial banks or directly. While recognizing the postwar depreciation of the Syrian pound from the nominal official rate of £S 2.20 to the dollar, it has intervened to smooth out the fluctuations in the *de facto* or free rate arising from the seasonal nature of the country's exports. Its stabilization operations were initiated at the end of 1952 when it began publishing a daily bulletin of the rates at which it was prepared to buy and sell. In 1953 it broadened its stabilization operations by setting rates for forward transactions. In the initial period it succeeded in narrowing the fluctuations, and since July 1953 it has kept the dollar rate at £S 3.575. Its operations were undoubtedly instrumental in preventing the favorable trend in the balance of payments during 1953 from resulting in a marked appreciation of the Syrian pound, which would have adversely affected Syria's exports. The Exchange Office has allowed rates of other currencies to fluctuate more widely, in accordance with their strength relative to the dollar as reflected in free markets. 652 457

Virtually all foreign exchange transactions now take place at the market rate as regulated by the Exchange Office. Foreign oil companies, however, are still required, pending the settlement of a conflict over oil transit payments, to buy Syrian pounds at the official rate for the purpose of meeting their local expenditures; and exchange required for imports of petroleum products is also furnished at the official rate.

Since 1948 foreign exchange restrictions have been progressively abandoned, so that all payments can now be freely made. Although imports are still subject to prior license, exchange is readily made available unless imports are restricted or prohibited for protectionist reasons. No restrictions exist on transfers of capital or payments of invisibles. Most exports are licensed partly to protect domestic consumers and partly to enforce repatriation of foreign exchange for shipments to all destinations except Arab countries. The requirement of repatriating foreign exchange was instituted to provide the Syrian market with a regular supply of foreign exchange.

The Syrian economy is served primarily by foreign banks. Of the 15 commercial banks accredited at the beginning of 1954, 10, including all the larger institutions, were foreign: five were French, two Jordanian, and one each Iraqi, British and Egyptian. The BSL, as the largest commercial 453

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453 bank, the principal depository of government funds and the bank of issue, dominates the banking system. There is only one government banking institution, the Agricultural Bank, which extends a limited amount of credit to agriculture. The banks engage principally in short-term financing of foreign and domestic trade. A few, particularly the BSL, now also grant seasonal credits for agricultural crop production up to a limit of 300 days. Competition among banks is keen. Interest rates on loans and advances have tended to decline and are now generally between 5% and 7%. As much as 2% to 3% is paid even on current deposits, with slightly higher rates on time deposits. Although the BSL, functioning in this respect as a central bank, is able and willing to provide ample rediscount facilities, other banks generally avoid rediscounting their paper with an institution they regard as their principal competitor. Foreign banks prefer to obtain any additional funds they may need from their parent institutions abroad. Thus, to meet the expanding credit needs in Syria, the commercial banks increased their liabilities abroad from £S 62 million at the end of 1952 to £S 98 million at the end of 1953; by June 30, 1954, such liabilities had risen to £S 117.9 million as compared with £S 95 million for the corresponding date of the preceding year. Because of their access to resources abroad most of the banks apparently do not consider it necessary to maintain a high proportion of liquid assets to short-term liabilities in Syria.

453 436 Although the use of checks has grown, internal payments are still predominantly effected in cash. This undoubtedly accounts for the fact that the proportion of private deposits to net note and coin circulation, although steadily growing, was still only 33% by the end of 1953. As of that time, as shown by Table 2, the total money supply[5] amounted to £S 376.3 million of which £S 271.5 million or about 72% represented notes and coins. The relatively small use of checking accounts also explains, at least in part, the high proportion of bank loans, advances and discounts for the private sector to total private deposits. At the end of 1953 the volume of such credit accommodation—£S 226.6 million—represented 247% of total private bank deposits. In most other countries the amount of bank credit to the private sector tends to be considerably less than the total of private deposits.

[5] Of the deposits, only the sight deposits of private persons and public enterprises have been included in money supply. The rate of turnover of deposits of the government and public administration is not very high.

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TABLE 2 Monetary and Banking Data

453

(Million £S) 436

	End of period				
				June	
	1951	1952	1953	1953	1954
Money supply					
1. Notes and coins (net)	236.1	234.7	271.5	249.0	298.5
2. Private and public enterprise deposits	58.9	76.0	104.8	97.8	123.4
3. Private and all public deposits	114.0	181.2	250.3	205.7	215.1
Total (1 and 2)	295.0	310.7	376.3	346.8	421.9
Total (1 and 3)	350.1	415.9	521.8	454.7	513.6
Monetary gold and foreign exchange					
Total at free rate	114.3	107.6	157.0	106.3	144.8
Percent of note issue	46.1	45.0	56.7	n.a.	n.a.
Deposits (sight and time)					
Public	111.9	128.3	188.9	149.4	181.0
Private	60.5	77.8	96.3	n.a.	115.0
Total	172.4	206.1	285.2	n.a.	296.0
Loans, discounts and advances	115.1	146.0	226.6	187.9	309.5

n.a. = not available.
SOURCE: Office des Changes.

In Syria, as in other underdeveloped countries of Asia, a considerable 452 volume of credit is extended outside the banking system by merchants, landowners and professional moneylenders. Some of these, particularly the merchants, rely in turn on regular bank credit. Most of the credit outside the banking system is extended in the agricultural sector of the economy and is a reflection partly of the inadequacy of such institutions as the Agricultural Bank and partly of the poor credit risk of the borrowers. Loans of this type generally carry high, usurious rates of interest.

Another feature of the credit system is the lack of any institution, outside the Agricultural Bank, for financing investment. There is no mortgage-financing institution for building, and no bank to provide investment capital for industry. The BSL has in the past extended investment credits to industry, but only with the guarantee of the government.

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454 Savings institutions are virtually non-existent. There are no special savings banks and the regular commercial banks do not consider it worth while to make a particular effort to attract savings deposits. In fact, total savings deposits in commercial banks at the end of 1953 amounted to only £S 3.5 million. No postal savings system exists, and savings in the form of insurance are negligible. This does not mean that savings do not accrue, but rather that they do not take institutional form and are invested directly, not through the intermediary of institutions or a capital market. Syrians generally prefer types of investments which are tangible and visible, such as land and buildings, and over which they can exercise some personal control. In the past the habit of putting savings into hoards of precious metals or even currency has also been deeply ingrained. There is some evidence, incapable of statistical measurement, that the relative importance of savings in the form of hoards has declined in the postwar period as opportunities for profitable investment have grown. Investment in corporate securities has greatly increased during this period, but only by limited groups of people and under conditions assuring them control over the corporate enterprise. Shares in industrial companies are bought and sold in an unorganized and very limited market.

Economic Growth

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433 One of the most noteworthy features of the Syrian economy has been its rapid growth over the last two decades, as indicated in Table 3. Agriculture and industry have both featured prominently in this development. The availability of idle land combined with the food shortages attributable to the war provided a tremendous incentive to an expansion of agricultural output. The area under cultivation, including fallow land, rose from about 1.75 million hectares in 1938 to 2.3 million in 1945 and has since continued to expand, reaching a total of around 3.65 million in 1953. The area actually planted to crops and orchards accordingly more than doubled during this entire period, rising from 1.16 million hectares to 2.44 million. By far the greatest part of the area put to the plow was dry farming land. According to official estimates, for example, the amount of land planted to winter wheat and barley increased from about 750,000 hectares in 1938 to 1.13 million in 1945 and 1.34 million in 1953, and the output of these cereals about doubled during the whole period. Following the war a considerable expansion of irrigation took place. By 1953 the irrigated area

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was officially estimated at 509,000 hectares as compared with 284,000 in 1946. The resulting rise in the value of agricultural production was particularly marked, since with irrigation more valuable summer crops could

TABLE 3 Indicators of Economic Growth

	Prewar	1945	1947	1950	1953
Agriculture					
Cultivated area (million ha.)	1.76	2.29	—	3.09	3.67
Cropped area (million ha.)	1.16	1.51	—	2.05	2.44
Wheat					
Area (thousand ha.)	473[a]	751	843	992	1,314
Output (thousand MT)	459[a]	415	404	861[b]	962[b]
Barley					
Area (thousand ha.)	275[a]	384	365	416	428
Output (thousand MT)	290[a]	248	169	322	472
Cotton					
Area (thousand ha.)	50[a]	17.5	19.5	78.0	136.6
Output (thousand MT, ginned)	5.4[a]	4.3	5.4	35.5	47.0
Agricultural production tax (million £S)[c]	—	—	9.1	16.2	22.4
Industry—Output					
Cotton and rayon yarn (thousand MT)	1	—	—	—	9–10
Cotton and rayon cloth (million meters)	15	—	—	—	ca.100
Vegetable oils, excluding olive (thousand MT)	(negligible)	—	—	—	ca.10,000
Soap (thousand MT)	3.4	—	—	—	8.9
Fruit and vegetable preserves (thousand MT)	1.8	—	—	—	4
Cement (thousand MT)	less than 75	—	—	—	224
Matches (million boxes)	11	—	—	—	32.2
Cigarettes (MT)	416	—	—	—	1,644
Electricity (million KWH; principal utilities)	25.1	—	—	—	114.2
Financial					
Government receipts (million £S)[d]	11.5	118.3	116.2	138.9	216.7
Notes and coins in circulation (million £S)[d]	19.9	210.7	183.2	224.6	288.4
National income (million £S)	—	—	—	1,380	1,600

[a] 1934–38 average. The production figures for wheat and barley may well be somewhat overestimated.

[b] Official production figures have been revised upward in the light of the amounts marketed as revealed by the agricultural production tax returns.

[c] The proceeds of this tax, levied on produce brought to market, tend to exaggerate the rate of increase in production, but are nonetheless a good indication of trends in output.

[d] Figures are not deflated for price increases. While a reliable price index is lacking, the price level in the period 1950–53 was probably between five and seven times as high as that before the war.

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be grown. Thus with the stimulus originally imparted by the Korean war boom, cotton, which had long been grown in Syria but on a small scale, has developed into one of the country's most valuable crops.

Manufacturing has expanded rapidly in the postwar period. Although the original impulse was given by the wartime shortage of manufactured goods, new factories were not for the most part established until after the war. Among the new modern factories built since then are six spinning and weaving mills, a considerable number of cotton ginneries, a dyeing plant, six vegetable oil mills, a glass factory, a cement plant and a sugar factory. The total amount of paid-up capital of manufacturing enterprises established in corporate form since the end of the war is in the neighborhood of £S 80 million. Since enterprises generally refuse to disclose their output, statistical measurement of the increase in production is extremely difficult. Very rough estimates indicate that about 9,000-10,000 metric tons of cotton and rayon yarn were produced in 1953 as compared with probably less than 1,000 tons in prewar years. The output of cloth was about 14,000 to 16,000 tons, or more than 100 million meters, as compared with perhaps 15 million meters before the war. The production of vegetable oils (other than olive oil), which was negligible before the war, amounted to around 10,000 tons, and the output of soap, at a level of about 9,000 tons, was almost three times the prewar estimate. Cement production, which was less than 75,000 tons before the war, amounted to 223,639 tons in 1953. The output of cigarettes was about four times, and that of matches three times, that of prewar years.

The expansion of agriculture and industry has in turn stimulated commerce, transport and construction. The construction industry in particular has witnessed a postwar boom which lifted the volume of building to a level probably twice as high as that in the years immediately preceding the war. Increasing prosperity, together with the wartime drop in building, generated a large volume of housing construction in all major cities.

The increase in national income since before the war has undoubtedly been very great; in real terms it may well be almost double. Unfortunately the fragmentary nature and unreliability of statistical data make even approximate estimates of national income extremely difficult. For the postwar years an unofficial estimate has been made only for 1950, when national income was put at £S 1,250 million. Some very tentative calculations made by the mission indicate that this estimate may well be too conservative. These calculations point to a rise in national income from

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about £S 1,250 million in 1949 and £S 1,380 million in 1950 to perhaps around £S 1,600 million in 1953. Over the whole period this would indicate an increase of about 28%. Since prices in 1953 were about the same as in 1949, the rise in real terms was apparently about the same. While these estimates, based on very inadequate data, are subject to a rather wide margin of error, it is not unlikely that real national income has been rising on the average at an annual rate of 5% to 6%. 434

Volume of Investment

The expansion of economic activity in the postwar period has entailed a rather high level of investment (see Table 4). While accurate data are not available, the mission has made some rough estimates of gross investment in construction on the basis of building permits and building costs, and of equipment investment on the basis of imports of machinery, equipment and motor trucks. The indicated annual volume of gross private investment has apparently fluctuated between £S 160 million 457

TABLE 4 Gross Investment

(Million £S)

	1950	1951	1952	1953
Private investment				
Construction (housing, industrial, commercial)	122.0	116.0	127.0	138.0
Industrial machinery	20.0	33.0	28.0	30.3
Agricultural machinery	10.7	35.6	17.3	14.3
Truck transport	8.7	11.0	4.4	2.8
Sub-total	161.4	195.6	176.7	185.4
Public investment				
Irrigation	0.8	0.8	0.8	3.1
Transport and communications	8.1	8.7	6.4	10.1
Education and public health	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.9
Municipal services	12.5	17.1	17.3	22.2
Other construction, including administration buildings	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5
Sub-total	25.8	31.0	28.9	39.8
Total gross investment	187.2	226.6	205.6	225.2

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454 and £S 195 million in the four-year period 1950-53. The average has been about £S 180 million. Of this amount about 70% is accounted for by all building and probably 56% by housing construction. That investment in other sectors, notably agriculture, has not been heavier is undoubtedly due to the fact that most of the increase in farm output has been achieved simply by occupying and cultivating idle land which entailed relatively little investment.

454 652 Public investment has been much more modest. On this subject the data obtained by the mission from various government agencies were conflicting. The available information, reconciled as far as possible, points to an annual total ranging from £S 25 million to £S 40 million, with the average about £S 31 million.

454 The total gross investment, which the mission believes has been rather conservatively estimated, is undoubtedly surprisingly high. On the average, it has probably amounted, over the four years 1950-53, to 13-14% of the gross national product. By comparison with other underdeveloped countries in Asia, this rate of investment represents a remarkable record of achievement. There is no evidence either in the balance of international payments or in the price structure that this volume of investment over the four-year period as a whole was financed by inflationary means. It was apparently financed for the most part from genuine savings, supplemented by some inflow of capital from abroad. In the immediate postwar years much of the investment was probably financed from the enforced savings accumulated during the war. Wartime money incomes were high. Commerce profited heavily from the scarcity of goods, and Allied troop expenditures in Syria were substantial. Money circulation increased sharply, but against a French franc counterpart. At the same time the shortage of goods kept down spending. Assets abroad increased, as did savings in the form of gold and precious stones. One source estimates that foreign assets, quite apart from the French franc counterpart of domestic currency circulation and savings in gold and precious stones, rose during the war by £S 325 million.[6] Part of such savings was undoubtedly used for consumption after the war, but a significant portion was probably invested at home. A substantial part of the profits earned in the postwar expansion of agriculture, industry and commerce was evidently reinvested. The business

[6] Mohammed Thome, *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie depuis la première Guerre Mondiale jusqu'à nos Jours* (Madrid, Ediciones Castilla, S.A. 1953), pp. 217-18.

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community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little 454
conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing.

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that 471
it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent 654
changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads.

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the gov- 658
ernment to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which [212]
compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network.

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its develop- 654
ment at which the government must undertake a more important pro- 433
motional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be 311
able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has

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654 severely diminished, and agricultural prices no longer afford such a power-
433 ful stimulus to the expansion of acreage. Extension of the irrigated area
311 must depend increasingly on public investment, particularly since the area which can be economically irrigated by privately installed pumps cannot be greatly expanded.

654 High transport costs and the low quality of grain are becoming serious
433 handicaps to Syria in an increasingly competitive world grain market. In other sectors economic activity seems also to be slackening. The future growth of industry is likely to be less rapid now that the more obvious manufacturing industries have been established. In construction it is also quite possible that the postwar boom has passed or will shortly pass its peak. Thus in the absence of a well-considered government program to stimulate the economy, the rapid increase in production and private investment may well taper off.

654 In agriculture the government now faces the need to make a careful
241 inventory of remaining land resources, to carry out irrigation projects on a greatly increased scale and to initiate settlement schemes for state lands. Steps must be taken to maintain and stimulate Syria's grain exports by providing better and cheaper transport and establishing facilities for the storage, grading and cleaning of cereals, thereby reducing losses and improving quality. In the future more emphasis will need to be placed on raising agricultural and livestock yields. The government will have to stimulate farmers to use better seeds and implements and to improve their crop rotation in the direction of soil-building crops and greater diversification. Livestock yields must be raised by undertaking a program of selection and cross-breeding, by building livestock shelters and providing more water for migrating livestock, and by initiating a more effective campaign against pests and diseases. To achieve these objectives the government must also expand and improve agricultural education, make available extension services at the village level and furnish much more agricultural credit on reasonable terms. Special efforts are required to assist the small peasant proprietor and the tenant who have not in the past fully shared in the rising prosperity. They must be helped to achieve greater economic independence and security and enabled to acquire the means of production with which to increase their incomes.

654 Although further expansion in industry should prove possible, greater
433 emphasis will have to be placed on selective expansion and on increasing efficiency so as to lower prices and broaden the market. Here the govern-

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ment will need to help private enterprise achieve these goals by collaborat- 654
ing, for instance, in the establishment of an institution to furnish technical 435
and financial assistance, revising policies for the protection of industry from foreign competition and working towards the creation of a larger market for manufactured products, particularly through an intensification of economic cooperation among Arab countries.

To service the economy new and better roads and a larger supply of electric power are clearly necessary. Both of these call for a substantial increase in public investment. Transport is the most important bottleneck in the economy today; the acute shortage of power in major centers such as Aleppo and Damascus is already receiving government attention.

While expansion of the production base of the economy is the para- 657
mount task of the future, education, public health and the social services will also make greater claims on the government's resources. A further extension of educational facilities is undoubtedly necessary, but at the same time more stress must be placed on improving the quality and content of education. The condition of public health still leaves much to be desired. While the most urgent deficiencies in hospital accommodations must be remedied, the most pressing need is to concentrate increasingly on the prevention of disease by such measures as an anti-malarial campaign, improvements in sanitation and provision of pure water supplies. A marked and general improvement in housing conditions is likely to result only from a substantial increase in production and improvement of living standards but the government should at least assist the larger municipalities to initiate a program to cope with the worst conditions of housing congestion, a by-product of rapid but uneven economic growth.

A program of this type, which we shall elaborate in subsequent chapters 080
of this report, should lay the foundation for a renewed and continued economic advance. It will serve not simply to compensate for a possible slackening of private investment but above all to create ultimately increased opportunities for greater private investment and enterprise which will expand production and raise standards of living.

The government has become increasingly aware of the task that lies 654
ahead. Its request for an International Bank mission to work out recom- 511
mendations for development testifies in part to its concern. It realizes that despite the economic progress of the past, the country cannot be satisfied with the current state of development and the standard of living it sustains. National income is still only around £S 440 per capita. Moreover,

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654 511 with the wide disparities in income, the great majority of people have an income substantially under this average. The bulk of the rural population remains impoverished and does not share adequately in the fruits of its toil. In the urban areas many people earn only a bare livelihood and live in wretched, overcrowded conditions. In industry the daily wage of unskilled labor is no more than £S 3 to £S 4. In the future, therefore, the aim should be not simply to raise production and national income but to ensure that all elements in the population share equitably in the benefits of economic development.

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CHAPTER 2

ECONOMIC PROGRAMMING AND ECONOMIC DATA

The Mission's Task

Before discussing its recommendations in various fields, the mission considers it advisable to explain briefly its conception of, and its approach to, this task. In broad terms, the mission was charged with working out an economic development program for the consideration of the Syrian government. The object of this program is manifestly to improve the standard of living in such a way that all elements of the population may share in the benefits of an expanding economy. 121

The program we have elaborated is one for government action. Under a free or private enterprise economy production and investment by private individuals cannot, of course, be programmed. At the same time it is obvious that the government's economic efforts must be directed largely toward stimulating output and that the volume of production and private investment in turn affects the resources available to the government for financing its program. There is thus an intimate interrelationship between the government's program and private effort. We have already indicated that there are signs pointing to a decline in the rate at which the private enterprise economy has been growing. Although such a prospective decline is extremely difficult to measure in quantitative terms, we have sought to take it into account both in devising a government program and in assessing the available resources. In our view the trend in private economic activity makes an effective program of government action all the more urgent.

We have not conceived of a development program simply as a series of public investment projects properly related to each other so that they form a consistent whole. Public investment in irrigation, roads, education, public health and other fields undoubtedly plays an important role in stimulating production and improving conditions of life. There is, however, a wide variety of public expenditures which do not take the form of investment but nevertheless significantly influence the level of economic

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121 activity. These range from continuing expenditures on the preservation of public order to current outlays on education and public health and on government services for agriculture. Indeed, few activities of the government are entirely unrelated to development. This does not mean that the mission has taken within its purview virtually the entire scope of government operations. Many of these, for example in the field of public security, manifestly can be taken for granted. In general the mission has concerned itself only with those current expenditures which appeared to require expansion because they would provide a significant stimulus to the economy or because investment projects in turn entailed larger current outlays for operation and maintenance.

It was not the mission's task to work out in detail specific investment projects, whether in agriculture, industry or transport. A number of projects were included in the recommended program on the basis of prima facie evidence that they were likely to prove economically rewarding. Subsequent detailed engineering and economic appraisals may well lead to the modification of some of our recommendations. The mission confined itself to indicating the general lines along which development should take place and the approximate allocation of government resources which appeared appropriate in the light of available facts.

The mission had to frame a development program which would be within Syria's capacity to finance. This in itself imposed certain requirements on us. In proposing any measure it was necessary to appraise at the same time its cost to the government. It will be understood that such cost estimates could be only rough approximations in most cases. When the mission's recommendations are worked out in greater detail by the government, firmer estimates will no doubt become available. It was also essential to take into account all the government's prospective expenditures irrespective of their relationship to economic development. The adequacy of financial resources could not be assessed without considering all the claims that would be made on the use of available funds. Thus, although none of the mission members was a specialist in education and public health, it was necessary to examine the requirements of these services which in recent years have absorbed 36-37% of ordinary budget outlays. Certain expenditures, such as those on defense, obviously fell outside the scope of the mission's inquiry, but even here some assumption as to their future magnitude had to be made.

In estimating the financial resources available to cover projected

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expenditures, the mission has tried to appraise, first of all, the effect of future economic development on tax revenues. In making this estimate the mission assumed, as already indicated, that the economy would not expand as rapidly as in the past. More reliable information on the past rate of economic growth and on the development potential would undoubtedly have facilitated a more accurate prognosis. Secondly, the mission had to explore the possibility of increasing government revenue by more efficient collection of existing taxes and levying new taxes. Finally, it was necessary to adopt a number of assumptions regarding the development of non-tax receipts, including domestic borrowing and foreign financial assistance. It will be appreciated that the projection of government revenues as well as of expenditures over a number of years is beset by many uncertainties. Several crop failures, for example, could easily upset the balance and necessitate a modification of the program.

We have not been concerned exclusively with drawing up a program of government expenditures. Major economic and financial policies related to development have also been considered. Such policies can affect significantly the extent, direction and efficiency of private enterprise.

In working out its recommendations for a program, the mission has thought in terms of a period up to the end of the year 1960. The determination of any given period is always to some extent arbitrary. We felt, however, that any projection beyond 1960 would be attended by excessive uncertainty, and at the same time we considered that any significant accomplishment would require continuous effort over at least five or six years. Throughout this report we refer to our proposals as a six-year program, indicating that 1955 is considered as the program's initial year. Since our report was not submitted informally to the government until the end of 1954, only certain preliminary measures are likely to be taken in 1955. This means that the recommended program actually extends over five full years.

The mission's recommendations are obviously designed to provide only guidance for the government in working out its own development program. Economic programming must be done both on an annual basis and on a longer-term basis. The longer-term program such as the six-year plan we have outlined is needed to determine the goals and the approximate allocation of resources which may be envisaged. It will need to be periodically revised in the light of progress achieved, changes affecting the availability of resources, alterations in world economic conditions and

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121 any new facts which may be brought to light as the result of more thorough investigation of particular projects. Within the general framework of the longer-term plan, an annual program will need to be drawn up in much greater detail, taking into account the exact status of particular projects and the resources in both personnel and funds which are likely to be available during that specific year.

Any program will be conditioned by the availability of personnel as well as of financial resources. The mission's recommendations rest on the assumption that measures will be taken to train people for certain parts of the program, to obtain more technical assistance from abroad and to raise the standards and improve the efficiency of the government service. Even under the best circumstances, however, the execution of the many proposals we have made will place a great burden on the government. Progress may therefore not be as rapid as we have assumed. It should be pointed out, however, that we do not anticipate that the government will begin to implement all our proposals at once. Presumably only a few can be acted on in the first year, and many of our suggestions, particularly in the field of agriculture, relate to projects which would only be begun within the six-year period and which would be carried out in the main after 1960. We judge it important, however, to initiate action along a broad front during the next five or six years so that development thereafter may gain increasing momentum.

In formulating our proposals we have drawn on many sources for suggestions. Many of these proposals have been considered by the government at various times. The fact that some have been incorporated in our proposed program without a discussion of their origins does not mean that the mission claims to have originated them. Similarly, in focusing on those measures which should, in our opinion, be taken in the future, we have not always been able to pay adequate attention to the accomplishments of the past. There is no doubt, however, that Syrian people can be proud of the achievements during the first decade of the country's independence.

000 *Limitations of Data*

The mission wishes to emphasize that the lack of reliable information on many aspects of the economy made its task considerably more difficult. It is essential that a much greater effort be devoted to gathering data

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which will clearly reveal the progress being made by the economy and the types and magnitude of the problems which must be met from time to time.

In the field of agriculture, for example, too little is known about the available land resources. Only a beginning has been made with soil classification, and the extent and quality of idle agricultural land are largely unknown. Topographic and soil surveys which are needed to determine the feasibility of irrigation projects have for the most part not been undertaken. Information on the amount and sources of credit available to agriculture is also lacking. The present methods of compiling estimates on production and acreage are admittedly far from accurate. The mission strongly recommends that an agricultural census be carried out along the lines already proposed by an FAO expert. The information so obtained should be kept up-to-date by annual sampling. It would also be advisable to check the production figures thus gathered against the returns of the agricultural production tax. These tax returns, for example, could be analyzed on a quarterly basis to give the government an approximately accurate indication of the volume of many agricultural products entering the market.

In transport the occasional and rather haphazard checks on road traffic made in the past hardly afford a very good basis for road planning. A more systematic census of traffic should be periodically carried out, during both the seasonal peak and the seasonal low.

In industry the inadequacy of data is even more marked than in agriculture. Almost no information is available on production, investment and employment. The only published figures on output are those relating to alcohol, tobacco manufactures and cement. Industrial enterprises have in the past been unwilling to disclose reliable data on their operations for fear of government intervention and additional taxation or of betraying information to competitors. Any government should, however, have access to periodic statistics on output, employment and investment to permit it to determine the growth of the economy and to formulate policies for stimulating further development. The government should take steps to persuade industry of the importance of this information and to assure it as far as possible that data on individual firms will not be published or utilized in any way for tax purposes. The latter objective might be partially achieved if the present central statistical office were made independent of the Ministry of National Economy and directed to make the

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information collected available to other government agencies only in the form of aggregates which would not disclose the position of individual enterprises.

A regular compilation of national accounts would also help the government to diagnose the developing economic situation and to frame appropriate economic policies. Estimates of the gross national product should reveal the contribution made by each economic sector and the proportion of the total output being devoted to consumption and investment. Figures on national income by distributive shares should also be regularly compiled. At the request of the Syrian government the Economic Research Institute of the American University of Beirut has already made certain proposals for a survey of national income. We can only urge that this work be undertaken as soon as possible and ultimately made a continuing responsibility of the government.

It would be highly desirable also to undertake, by sampling, a number of studies of the consumption pattern of people at different income levels. In this way it should be possible to gauge what effect economic development and rising incomes are likely to have on the demand for various types of products and on the rate of savings and investment. The data thus collected could also be used as the basis on which cost of living indices could be constructed, and these indices in turn would enable the government to determine how various income groups are faring in a changing economic situation.

In the realm of finance much needs to be done to remedy existing deficiencies in data. In the last few years the government has developed comprehensive banking statistics, and this in itself demonstrates what can be done when special efforts are made to improve statistical information. On the other hand, current knowledge of the government's own financial operations is far from satisfactory. The mission, for instance, was unable to get a clear explanation of the Treasury's accounts or of the relationship of its cash position to stated government receipts and payments. It should be noted that the government has taken steps to improve this situation by engaging the services of a foreign treasury expert. Similarly, we were unable to obtain a comprehensive picture of total government expenditures by purpose and accordingly found it impossible in many cases to relate the expenditures we have recommended for the future to those actually undertaken in the past. Thus expenditures under the ordinary budget are grouped by administrative headings rather than by purpose,

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and extrabudgetary expenditures on individual projects are authorized from time to time without being assembled into an annual capital budget accompanied by a comprehensive financing plan. We recommend that in the future all expenditures be included in a comprehensive annual budget and that as far as possible appropriations be classified also by purpose. In addition, the government would find it advantageous to compile periodic and up-to-date information on actual cash disbursements and receipts in order to determine the effect of its financial operations on the economy and to measure whether expenditures on various development schemes are proceeding at a satisfactory pace.

Periodic figures on the balance of government cash outlays and receipts, together with the banking data already being compiled, would be helpful in determining whether development is proceeding without jeopardizing the economic and financial stability of the country, that is, without generating either serious inflation or deflation. For this purpose reliable statistics on prices and on the balance of international trade and payments are also essential. It is generally admitted that the existing wholesale and retail price indices are unreliable indicators of the movement of price levels and that new indices ought to be constructed with the help of expert advice. Foreign trade data are generally satisfactory, although a special attempt should be made to make them available more quickly and in such a form that government officials will be able to ascertain at a glance trends in imports of significant consumer and investment goods and in exports of the most important commodities. Considerable progress has been made in compiling data on the balance of international payments but further efforts are necessary to narrow the margin of error in the adjustments which have to be made with regard to official trade figures, as well as in estimating current "invisible" receipts and payments and capital movements.

Improvement of Statistical Services

A number of government agencies will undoubtedly have to share the responsibility for compiling sufficient information to assist the government in working out and modifying its economic program and measuring the progress of development. Much of the responsibility, however, will devolve on the central statistical office. Its resources and staff will have to be strengthened considerably. We suggest in the first instance that it engage

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at least one adviser from abroad to help it draw up a statistical program. The types of statistics which are of primary relevance to development will have to be determined and the methods of compiling them prescribed. The work on national income which we hope will be undertaken should yield many specific recommendations for the improvement and expansion of existing statistical information. A thorough canvass of the statistical data available in scattered form in many government agencies should also prove useful. We believe that a minimum of £S 1 million should be made available over the next five or six years to strengthen the statistical services.

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CHAPTER 3

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

1 CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES AND PROBLEMS

A development program for Syria must focus primarily on agriculture. 244 Despite the expansion of manufacturing, agriculture will continue to be the country's principal industry. Its potentialities are still large. It not only employs more people than any other occupation, but furnishes most of the raw materials for manufacturing and gives rise to most of the business in commerce.

The mission has drawn up its recommendations in the light of the characteristics of Syrian agriculture and the principal problems which must be met. Its conception of these characteristics and problems, as outlined below, must therefore be clearly understood.

1. *Syrian agriculture is primarily dependent on rainfall which is seasonal, varies considerably from year to year and is frequently scanty.* 244 311

Irrigated land accounts for only 11-12% of perhaps 3.5 million hectares under cultivation. Since there is no rain during the summer, winter crops predominate. Wheat and barley are therefore the principal crops; and the possibilities of diversification are limited. In most of the cultivated area normal rainfall is barely adequate. Periodic droughts such as the one in 1951 tend to make farm income very unstable.

All this points to the need for expanding the area under irrigation as much as possible. The proper conservation and use of the limited water resources is one of the paramount problems of Syrian agriculture. The extension of irrigation in the past has already made possible the introduction of such new crops as cotton and sugar beets which have added substantially to agricultural income.

2. *The great increase in the area under cultivation over the last few decades severely limits the possibility of further expansion without irrigation.*

In the past there was plenty of good idle land available for farming. The rapid extension of cultivation was greatly facilitated by the fact that

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241 311 people could claim title to "empty" land by simply occupying and cultivating it for a period of years. Legislative Decree No. 135, although never applied, was enacted to halt this unregulated expansion by making all unoccupied land state domain and thus subject to exploitation only with a prior permit. This legislation implicitly recognized that the amount of land that could still be put to the plow was steadily shrinking. Nonetheless the mission encountered a widespread impression that agricultural land resources were virtually limitless. Official estimates that there remain somewhat over 3 million hectares of land available for cultivation appear to support this impression. However, such an estimate is at best only a rough guess. It undoubtedly includes much land which is marginal from the standpoint of fertility or rainfall. It should be frankly acknowledged that there is little or no reliable information on this subject. The mission itself gained the impression on its travels that the amount of land still available for cultivation without irrigation is extremely limited. Here and there in the Jezireh, for example, cropping has already pushed forward into marginal land. Even though good yields may be obtained on such lands in seasons of abnormally heavy rainfall, farming would normally be very hazardous.

Certain conclusions must be drawn. The first is that irrigation will need to play an increasingly important role in the expansion of land under cultivation. The second is that a careful inventory and classification of the land still available should be undertaken in order to determine how it may be most effectively utilized and what must be done to make it productive. The final conclusion is that there is need to work out policies and programs for the exploitation and settlement of such good land as remains.

241 423 3. *Ownership of the means of production in agriculture is very unevenly distributed, resulting in wide disparities in income.*

Land ownership is by no means equally distributed. There are many landless peasants, while large landed estates, some exceeding several hundred thousand hectares, predominate in the provinces of Hama, Homs, Aleppo and the Jezireh. One estimate indicates that 38% of the total area of privately owned land was in holdings of over 100 hectares and only 19% in small holdings of 10 hectares and less. Reliable figures on the distribution of land ownership will be available only upon completion of the cadastral survey now in progress. Of the area surveyed by the end of 1952, however, 49% was held in properties of over 100 hectares and 16% in properties of more than 1,000 hectares. These proportions, however, are

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likely to decline somewhat when the survey is completed for the Hauran 244
and Djebel Druze where small peasant ownership predominates. 423

Water for irrigation is supplied chiefly by merchants and wealthy landowners who have the means to install pumps. Similarly, the ownership and operation of modern agricultural machinery are primarily confined to large operators in the Jezireh.

Ownership of the critical factors of production carries with it the ability to demand a large share of the output. In areas where rainfall is inadequate the pump owner, who is frequently not the landowner, can exact from 45% to 60% of the crop simply for the water he supplies. Where labor is plentiful and rainfall adequate, the landowner can get up to half of the crop simply by allowing others to cultivate his land. On the other hand, in the Jezireh land is plentiful by comparison with labor and rents for only a 10-15% share of the crop. Here the owners of tractors and combines control the central factor of production and can command the lion's share of the output.

The small cultivators have no capital or access to capital that would enable them to acquire more land, better machinery and livestock, pumps and other means of production by which to raise their standard of living and make themselves independent. Nor are they organized in cooperatives [834]
to undertake these things collectively. Even the larger farmer frequently has great difficulty in getting necessary capital on reasonable terms.

One of the most important objectives of an agricultural program is therefore to provide an adequate volume of credit on equitable terms in order to make the needed means of production more generally accessible. The organization of cooperatives to facilitate group action among small farmers should be another aim. No single peasant, for example, has enough resources to sink a well or install a pump, but a group of peasants could pool their resources to this end. Finally, it would appear vital to conserve the good land remaining in state domain for the purpose of settling landless peasants and Bedouins and thus gradually increasing proprietorship.

4. *Despite the existence of many large properties, land is predominantly* 244
tilled in small holdings by tenants or peasant-owners who earn a rather 423
precarious livelihood. 427

Large-scale exploitation prevails only in the Jezireh and to some extent in Aleppo where land is farmed in big units with mechanized equipment and paid labor. Even the large estates are for the most part farmed in small units by sharecroppers who are tenants at will, seldom cultivate the same

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244 423 427 [452] piece of land for long and thus have virtually no incentive to improve the land. Many large landowners do little beyond collecting their share of the crop, leaving relations with their tenants in the hands of agents. They often stake their tenants to seed, livestock or implements or tide them over with food and clothing until the harvest comes in; and in the absence of adequate credit institutions they thus serve a useful function. In most cases, however, such assistance in cash or kind is given on terms which conceal extremely high rates of interest. In other cases credit may be furnished without interest by landlords conforming strictly to the Islamic code. It must be recognized also that some and probably a growing number of large landowners take a more active interest in the management of their land and have been instrumental in introducing new crops such as cotton. Progressively minded owners of large estates, when interested in improved crop rotation and methods of production, can become the means for more rapid advancement of agriculture.

244 423 The small peasant-owners and sharecroppers, who carry on most of the agriculture, produce primarily for their own consumption. Their output is little influenced by market prices, for they must produce to eat and with the balance they buy such simple necessities as they can. Most of them wrest a bare living from the soil and are chronically in debt to the merchant, the professional moneylender or the landlord. Unable to bring their produce to the market or to wait for better prices, they must accept the price offered to them locally for whatever they produce in excess of their own needs. They till their land with methods hallowed by time, and their equipment for the most part consists only of a pair of draft animals and a wooden, iron-tipped plow.

Any program of assistance to agriculture must obviously focus largely on these cultivators. It must show them how to improve their methods of production, provide them with better seeds, equipment and animals. Through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of adequate agricultural credit it should help to free them gradually from excessive dependence on the landlord, merchant and moneylender. It must also pay attention to tenancy problems with the objective of establishing greater security of tenure, providing more incentive to cultivators and achieving a more equitable sharing of the produce of the land.

423 5. *The uncertainty and confusion surrounding land titles is another obstacle to land improvement.*

The uncertainty surrounding land titles has been largely inherited

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from the Ottoman Empire. Conflicting land grants have often been made in the past, and many claims to land rest upon grants of dubious validity. Titles frequently have not been perfected or entered into official registers. Even title deeds which are registered often contain conflicting or vague specifications regarding the area and the boundaries of the property. A considerable amount of land is still held in common village ownership and periodically reallocated among the villagers who accordingly have little interest in the permanent improvement of their changing allotments.

Programs to determine and delimit titles through a cadastral survey and to convert village common land into individual peasant holdings have been under way for several decades, but progress has been painfully slow.

6. *Agricultural yields are considerably below potentialities.*

Agricultural yields in Syria generally do not compare unfavorably with those in most other countries. Cereal yields tend to be about 10-20% below the world average and substantially below those achieved in Europe, but cotton yields are well above the world average and now approximate those in the United States. The output per hectare for virtually all crops is better than that in the rest of Asia.

This general picture does not, however, justify complacency. The relatively good yields have no doubt been largely due to the fact that the frontiers of cultivation have been pushed steadily forward into new and virgin lands. Without this rapid expansion of the area under cultivation, productivity would probably have declined. The mission noted evidence of soil depletion and falling yields in certain areas which had been continuously farmed over many years.

With the diminution in the supply of available new land, Syria will in the future have to rely much more on an improvement in yields to maintain the rise in output. The potentialities unquestionably exist. Fallow is still virtually the only method employed to maintain and restore soil fertility. Thus at least a third of the arable land lies idle each year. Animal manure is almost wholly used as fuel. The use of fertilizers is still in its infancy; in 1953 only 11,171 tons were imported. The practice of green manuring is virtually unknown. Insects and diseases still take a heavy toll. Much higher yields can be obtained through better selection of seeds and varieties, improved crop rotation and better soil preparation and cultural practices.

7. *Animal husbandry is not practiced as an integral part of agriculture and is still on a low standard.*

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231 Mixed farming is rare. Except in limited areas adjoining the few large
241 cities, no fodder is grown for livestock. None of the considerable volume of oil cake and meal and beet pulp produced in Syria is used for animal feed. On farms animals feed primarily on grain stubble and cereal straw. Most of the livestock is entrusted to Bedouins who take their flocks of sheep and goats into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing after the rainy season and return them to the cultivated areas after the sparse vegetation of the desert again dries up. Insufficient water, feed and lack of shelter on these migratory routes often combine to inflict a rather high mortality rate on livestock. Inadequate nutrition also increases the susceptibility of livestock to parasites and diseases.

These conditions indicate a need to introduce fodder into the crop rotation scheme, to improve pastures and to provide shelter and wells corresponding to the carrying capacity of the desert. While better nutrition is most essential, an effective campaign against disease and improvement in livestock breeds would also make an important contribution to raising the standards of animal husbandry.

442 8. *The organization and methods of marketing are in many respects*
241 *defective.*

High costs of transport and the weak bargaining position of the farmer depress farm prices; and the cost of distribution combined with inadequate grading and cleaning is beginning to threaten Syria's competitive position on the world cereals market. Lack of credit and high storage prices generally compel farmers to throw their products on the market immediately after harvest. The merchant who has access to credit and often finances the farmer can largely dictate prices to the cultivator who has no reserves.

A number of measures to cope with this problem are indicated. Proper cleaning and storage facilities for grain are needed to enable farmers to get better prices and assist Syria in maintaining its position in a declining cereals market. New and improved roads would help to reduce marketing costs, and the availability of more and cheaper credit would make the farmer less dependent on the merchant.

100 All these problems and indicated measures will now be discussed more fully under the following headings: irrigation and reclamation; land policies and land settlement; improvement in agricultural production; animal husbandry; agricultural credit, cooperatives, marketing and education.

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II IRRIGATION AND RECLAMATION

The extension of irrigated land is of vital importance in a country like Syria, where large potentially fertile areas yield little or nothing because rainfall is inadequate and where nearly all of the cultivable area produces no summer crops because no rain falls from spring to autumn. It has become even more imperative with the shrinkage in the area of good rainfed land which can still be taken under cultivation. Thus irrigation is the principal means for expanding the cultivated area, increasing and stabilizing yields and diversifying agricultural production by developing summer crop cultivation. 311 312

Existing Irrigated Areas

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At present about 400,000 hectares of land are probably already under irrigation. Of these, approximately 250,000 hectares are irrigated by pumps drawing water principally from rivers but also from wells. Most of the river pumps are located in the valley of the Euphrates and its tributary, the Khabour, while by far the greater number of pumps drawing on underground water is in the provinces of Hama and Aleppo. Except for small areas still supplied by animal-driven *norias* (water wheels), the remainder is irrigated by gravity flow from rivers, springs and *foggarahs* (underground ducts). Only 48,000 hectares are covered by government irrigation schemes, including the Homs-Hama scheme providing a rather inadequate supply of water from the Homs lake to 22,000 hectares; the Mzerib project in the Hauran, which irrigates 2,500 hectares from the springs feeding the Yarmuk river; the Tell Maghass scheme on the Khabour, which provides for 8,500 hectares but is not completed; and the Matkh project covering 15,000 hectares south of Aleppo, which receives a wholly inadequate supply of water from the Kouek river during the dry season when most of the water in the upper reaches of the river is taken by Turkey for irrigation.

The possibilities of additional irrigation are by no means limitless. Except for the Euphrates, Syria has no large river with a substantial flow during the summer dry season. In fact the Euphrates accounts for 83% of the aggregate annual flow of Syria's rivers. Thus the available water supply may set a limit of 400,000 to 600,000 hectares on the additional area which can be irrigated. In the last analysis, however, the upper limit will be determined by the division of the Euphrates water with Iraq, which is in the [123]

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

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312 process of expanding considerably the area irrigated from that river.

Government projects based on the use of river water will have to be the principal means of extending irrigation in the future. Private pump irrigation from rivers or wells cannot be expected to increase rapidly. Additional privately operated pumps could in theory put more land under irrigation, but the land still available for such irrigation would for the most part require higher-lift pumps which are much more expensive to operate. In fact, few new pumps have been installed in the last few years. Moreover, the extension of private pump irrigation on terms which are very burdensome to cultivators appears socially undesirable. Nor is the prospect of expanding irrigation with underground water, particularly through wells, very promising. Underground water in the drier areas of the country is quite limited in supply and often contains harmful sodium and magnesium salts. More extensive investigation of underground water is unquestionably needed, but this should focus in the first instance on finding adequate supplies of drinking water in such areas as the Hauran and Djebel Druze where supplies for human consumption are seriously inadequate and in the Syrian desert where water for livestock is sorely needed. The many wells sunk in certain parts of the country have generally been shallow and have, in one district at least, tended to lower the water table; and the extension of wells to deeper water-bearing strata capable of providing a more plentiful and stable supply may well entail such a heavy investment and high operating costs as to be justified only for crops, such as vegetables, having a high return per hectare.

Completion of Projects Under Way

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653 Any program must, of course, provide for the completion of government projects already under way. Tell Maghass remains unfinished even though it has been under construction for 10 years, and it is imperative that the remaining part of the canal system be completed rapidly and that the necessary funds—£S 4 million—be provided. The El Senn project, designed to irrigate 5,000 hectares south of Latakia, is over half finished. In the Roudj, a swamp of about 4,000 hectares in Aleppo province, facilities for drainage have just been completed, but an irrigation system must still be planned and laid out. The completion of the latter two projects will require a further expenditure of about £S 4 million.

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Reclamation of the Ghab[7]

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By far the most ambitious project undertaken by the government is the reclamation of the Ghab. This large marsh, stretching north and south along the borders of Latakia and Aleppo provinces, was created by the Orontes river whose flow has been impeded by the existence of a hard basaltic sill at Kfarie. The plan is to reclaim an area of 35,000 hectares by lowering the sill, deepening the river bed and constructing a network of drainage canals. Two reservoirs to be constructed at Halfaya and Rastane will regulate the flow of the Orontes river and store water sufficient to irrigate not only the Ghab, but also the Acharneh plain—a total area of 65,000 hectares. However, of this area, 22,000 hectares are now irrigated by pump. The permanently submerged part of the Ghab—some 29,000 hectares—belongs in the public domain and will after reclamation be available for distribution among settlers drawn from landless or virtually landless peasants in nearby areas.

The cost of the project was originally estimated at £S 136.5 million including £S 8.5 million for interest during construction, £S 38.2 million for a main road through the Ghab and £S 2.65 million for the construction of a central village. A recent special study sponsored by the International Bank indicates, however, that this estimate will probably have to be increased to about £S 171 million. Because of the numerous works which must be constructed in successive stages, the whole project is unlikely to be completed before 1965. As the drainage works progress, however, new land, totaling 10,000 hectares by 1960, will gradually become available for cultivation. The first stage of the construction work—the lowering of the sill—was begun in the latter part of 1954.

Other Irrigation Projects[8]

In selecting other irrigation projects which might be carried out over the next five or six years, the mission was beset by many difficulties. With one exception, all the projects considered were only in the conceptual stage. Exact data on the areas which might be irrigated by each project, or on the quality of the soils of the irrigable land, were for the most part unavail-

[7] See Annex D, p. 327.
[8] See Annex D, p. 330.

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able. With one exception, detailed planning of the various projects had not been undertaken. 312 653

Nevertheless, the mission believes it necessary to recommend a tentative program subject to alteration upon the completion of more detailed studies. In selecting projects for inclusion in this program the mission has taken into account not only the indicated relationship of cost and benefits, but also the location of the projects and the relative needs of various parts of the country.

1 EUPHRATES VALLEY SCHEME

The Euphrates river undoubtedly offers the greatest possibility of extending the irrigated area in Syria. At present, however, a considerable amount of water is already used for pump irrigation; if much more is to be withdrawn it will be necessary not only to reach an agreement with Iraq regarding the division of the water but also to provide facilities for the storage of water during the flood season. A project for a storage dam at Youssef Pasha has already been worked out; this would increase the minimum flow of the Euphrates during the dry season from about 300 cubic meters per second (m 3/sec) to around 400 m 3/sec. With a long canal starting from the dam it may be possible to irrigate about 185,000 hectares of the so-called Raqqa plateau on the left bank of the river and approximately 54,000 hectares in the Resafe area on the right bank. In addition, the construction of a diversion weir at the Halabiye gorge between Raqqa and Deir ez Zor would probably permit the irrigation of 165,000 hectares farther down in the Euphrates valley. Of the total area thus to be irrigated by projects dependent on the Youssef Pasha dam—404,000 hectares—over one-third or approximately 152,000 hectares are already irrigated by private pumps.

For a number of reasons the mission has reluctantly concluded that this entire group of projects should be deferred until after 1960. First of all, the capital investment required is very large and the benefits will not accrue for a long time. The Youssef Pasha dam itself would cost £S 150 million and the irrigation works would entail an additional outlay of probably £S 560 million. The dam could hardly be completed before 1963, and the construction of all the irrigation works would probably take longer even if it proceeded simultaneously. The financing of the Euphrates and Ghab projects at one and the same time would impose an excessive

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312 653 burden on the resources available to the government; and it would require substantial expenditures over a long period without an attendant increase in production, thus leading to inflationary pressures.

The second reason for deferring the Euphrates projects is the fact that much preparatory work must in any event be undertaken before they can be launched. Estimates of the areas that can feasibly be irrigated must, for example, remain largely conjectural until topographic and soil surveys and land classification can be undertaken. Plans for the irrigation systems should not be drawn up until experiments are carried out to determine the proper irrigation duty (i.e., water to be used per hectare) in the light of soil conditions and projected cropping patterns. While plans for the Youssef Pasha dam have already been drawn up, additional borings to explore the foundation conditions of the dam are still necessary. The mission recommends that all this preparatory work be undertaken over the next few years and it has included £S 3 million in the program for this purpose. Meanwhile the government should also seek to reach an agreement with Iraq regarding the allocation of the Euphrates water.

2 RECOMMENDED PROJECTS

The mission would perhaps be more favorably inclined toward an early start on the Euphrates projects if there were no other possibilities of expanding the irrigated area. But there are a number of small projects which can be undertaken at a lower cost and can be completed more rapidly. After considering the various possibilities, the mission recommends that the following schemes be carried out in the years 1955-60:

Project and location	Estimated cost (in million £S)	Area to be irrigated (in thousand hectares)		
		Total	Newly irrigated	Already irrigated
Mzerib, in the Hauran	8	4.6	4.6	0
Nahr el Kebir, in Latakia	15	4.0	3.5	0.5
Barada, near Damascus	30	15.0	15.0	0
El Taf, on the Khabour	30	ca.20.0	ca.10.0	ca.10.0
Total	83	43.6	33.1	10.5

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The first of these is really an extension of the existing Mzerib project and calls for the irrigation by pump of 4,500 hectares with water from the springs at the headwaters of the Yarmuk. It is the only project ready for immediate execution and has the advantage of extending the irrigated area in a province which suffers from a chronic shortage of water.

The Nahr el Kebir project is included despite its rather high cost because it is a multiple-purpose project with diverse benefits. It involves the construction of a storage dam on the Nahr el Kebir, which will not only serve irrigation but also control periodic floods and supply water and power to the growing port city of Latakia.

The Barada river project entails the construction of two dams—one at Hameh and the other farther upstream near Makaren—to provide water for both power and irrigation. This scheme appears particularly attractive because it would permit the irrigation of 15,000 hectares of good land in the vicinity of Damascus, an area of dense population, and would help to meet the growing power needs of the nation's capital.

The El Taf project requires the construction of an earth fill dam across the Khabour river on the site of an old Roman dam. The water thus diverted might irrigate about 10,000-15,000 hectares on the right bank, and 6,000 hectares on the left bank of El Taf river. The land in this area is rather good but cultivable only if irrigated. While there are other possible projects on the Khabour, the mission considers all of them less promising. Farthest upstream and south of Ras el Ain, some 20,000 hectares could be irrigated, but this is in an area of relatively abundant rainfall where winter crops can be grown without irrigation and where landowners are already installing pumps at their own cost for summer irrigation. The Saba Skour project, 12 kilometers downstream from Hassetche, could irrigate about 15,000 hectares, but the dam which would have to be constructed would flood a considerable area of rich alluvial land now under cultivation. Farther downstream from El Taf, additional irrigation would probably be feasible only if the limited supply of water available in the Khabour during the dry season were supplemented by storage during the flood season. The only possible site for a storage dam appears to be at Markada; but a dam in this location would have to be very long and would provide only a very shallow reservoir with attendant dangers of excessive evaporation and silting. The feasibility of the Markada dam should first be carefully investigated.

If the new projects recommended above are carried out and those now

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312 under way are completed, Syria would have under irrigation an area of
653 89,100 hectares additional to that already irrigated. Certain projects, including the Ghab, Barada and El Taf, will, of course, not be completed in the period 1955-60 covered by the mission's suggested program. Under that program, the total newly irrigated area will have increased by about 40,000 hectares by the end of 1960.

Planning of Irrigation Schemes

312 The planning, construction, maintenance and operation of all irriga-
653 tion projects (except the Ghab for which a special office has been created)
647 is the responsibility of the Hydraulics Branch of the Ministry of Public Works. At present the staffing of this branch is far from adequate to carry out a greatly expanded program. While the technical staff is supposed to number 78, including 19 engineers, the number actually employed is only 36, of which 11 are engineers. Temporary appointees totalling 23 bridge only part of the gap. The staff must ultimately be greatly expanded. It will take time, however, to train additional technicians; and the goal will never be reached unless the present inadequate salary scale is raised so as to attract competent recruits. Meanwhile, the Ministry will be unable to carry out the suggested irrigation program unless it utilizes every opportunity to delegate the planning and execution of projects to properly qualified private firms.

In discussing the Euphrates projects, the mission has already emphasized the importance of adequate planning and recommended the allocation of £S 3 million for the necessary preparatory work. Part of this sum should be used for the construction of a hydraulics laboratory which would be useful in testing models of all proposed irrigation structures. Through model testing it will be possible properly to design such structures as weirs, canal intakes and sluices so as to anticipate subsequent damage and to achieve maximum economies in construction. It would also be highly desirable to experiment with different types of canal linings. The concrete linings used up to the present are expensive and not wholly satisfactory. It may be possible to use the asphalt available in Syria to devise a lining which would neither crack nor be too fluid and would at the same time be more economical. The mission urges that a qualified foreign firm be engaged to make laboratory tests with this material under conditions simulating those in Syria.

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Recovery of Costs

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The capital cost of irrigation and reclamation schemes can and should be recovered from the beneficiaries. In principle it makes little difference how these costs are recovered—whether through sales of government-owned land that is reclaimed or irrigated, through improvement levies on newly irrigated privately owned land, through irrigation dues, or through a combination of any of these. The state should, however, appropriate most of the benefits for the community at large and to this end impose levies on the direct beneficiaries proportionate to the benefits derived. This is not only socially equitable but it enables the government to recover the cost as rapidly as possible and thus acquire the means to undertake additional projects. The direct beneficiaries must, of course, be allowed to retain some of the benefit, but there is no justification for allowing private landowners whose land is irrigated by the government to enjoy a windfall or for settling farmers on newly irrigated or reclaimed land on terms which enable them to live on a standard far exceeding that of their counterparts elsewhere in the country.

In the past the government has sought to recover the cost through irrigation dues. In 1953 the government collected on this account £S 473,000, which left a margin of £S 268,000 over the amount appropriated to maintain existing irrigation schemes. Early in 1954 the government introduced a new scale of charges increasing progressively with the size of the landholding. The prospective yield of these charges is difficult to assess. While the scale takes into account differences in the benefits accruing from various schemes, the mission considers that the fees instituted for the Tell Maghass, Mzerib and El Senn projects, while higher than those in others, are still rather low in proportion to the benefits enjoyed by cultivators and landowners. A review of these charges therefore appears desirable. If and when the government adopts the mission's recommendation for a progressive land tax, the progressive feature of the irrigation charges may also have to be modified. [651]

Maintenance

Adequate provision for maintenance of irrigation schemes after completion is, of course, essential. Current appropriations for maintenance appear rather low. In 1954 they were raised to £S 350,000 from a total of

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312 652 £S 205,000 the year before, but even this amount provides only a little over £S 7 per hectare. The mission suggests that the maintenance allowance be increased gradually to £S 10 per hectare.

Water Conservation

312 While new irrigation schemes must obviously be carried out, it is also important that measures be taken to ensure that the limited supply of water available on existing irrigated areas is used to maximum advantage. Much water is being wasted because of inadequate knowledge of irrigation techniques and of the water requirements of various crops in different parts of the country. The mission has already pointed to the necessity of undertaking certain experiments to determine the appropriate irrigation duty as part of the preparatory work for the Euphrates irrigation projects. Quite apart from this, the Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with the irrigation service should launch a series of experiments to determine the appropriate irrigation duty and irrigation techniques in areas which are already being irrigated. Such experiments, for instance, might well show that furrow irrigation makes better use of the available water supply than the customary basin irrigation. Demonstrations in water conservation might also be usefully undertaken. The mission has noted, for example, that improved levelling of land would produce a much more economical distribution of water. It is also evident that farmers in many places can be assisted in initiating small irrigation schemes of their own by storing runoff water in simply constructed catchment basins. To start work along these lines, the mission recommends a total expenditure of £S 1.2 million in the period 1956-60.

Proposed Outlays

312 652 The commitments already undertaken by the government and the additional recommendations made by the mission would entail a very large increase in expenditures on irrigation and reclamation. The cost of the proposed program is shown in Table 5. The mission firmly believes that the projected outlays are necessary and can easily be justified by the increase in production that will be achieved.

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TABLE 5 Expenditures on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1950–60

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(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Future outlays	
	1950–52 average	1953 estimate	1954 estimate	1955–60 total	Annual average
Projects—total	2,368[a]	3,130[a]	3,380[a]	197,000	32,833
Completion of works	—	—	—	9,000	1,500
Ghab	—	—	—	102,000[b]	17,000
Other new works	—	—	—	83,000	13,833
Euphrates valley studies	—	—	—	3,000	500
Maintenance	113	205	350	3,000	500
Research and demonstration	—	—	—	1,200	200
Grand total	2,481	3,335	3,730	201,200	33,533

[a] Budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures. The 1954 total excludes an £S 5 million authorization for the Ghab of which probably only a negligible portion was spent.
[b] After allowance for receipts from sale of land and water.

III LAND POLICIES AND LAND SETTLEMENT[9]

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A fuller knowledge of the available land resources is essential not only to plan better utilization of land already under exploitation, but also to determine how much land remains for expansion of cultivation and what must be done to make it productive. Even the existing pattern of land utilization is hardly known. Data on the total cultivated area, on the acreage planted to individual crops and on production are at best only rough estimates which are often quite wide of the mark. Little is known as yet about various types of soils, their deficiencies and potentialities. Widely varying opinions are expressed regarding the area which can still be put to the plow or can be irrigated by gravity flow.

Aerial Survey Program

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Aerial photography can be of great assistance in planning land utilization and public works of importance to agriculture. Up to the present it

[9] See Annex E, p. 351.

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311 has been used in Syria to obtain topographic data necessary for certain
654 irrigation projects and, in formulating an accelerated program for a cadastral survey of the Jezireh in 1952, the government provided for a photographic survey of this entire region. An aerial survey of all of Syria except waste desert areas would no doubt be desirable, but the mission realizes that financial considerations make a more limited objective necessary. For the period ending in 1960 the mission suggests accordingly that the following areas be surveyed (see Map 5):

1. An area of about 2,250 square kilometers in the provinces of Latakia and Aleppo.

   The purpose would be to facilitate (1) a delimitation and assessment of the forest area in Latakia which constitutes the most important timber resource of the country, (2) the location of an appropriate dam site on the Nahr el Kebir, and (3) the planning of irrigation for the Roudj.

   For nearly the entire area mapping on a scale of 1:20,000 with 5-meter contours would be sufficient, but for the Roudj and the area of the dam site mapping at 1:5,000 with 1-meter contours would be necessary.

2. An area of approximately 7,000 square kilometers east of the Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus highway.

   Here the object would be to determine what part of this area might be still available for cultivation. At present conflicting opinions are held regarding the potentialities of the area.

   Aerial photography, coupled with the preparation of a controlled photomosaic, would suffice.

3. An area of about 4,600 square kilometers north of Raqqa and extending to the Turkish frontier.

   This area is also claimed to contain much unutilized but cultivable land. Aerial photography would permit a rapid delimitation and analysis of the area in relation to the land already under cultivation.

4. An area of approximately 6,000 square kilometers in the Euphrates valley region, comprising the Raqqa and Resafe plains and extending to the Halibiye-Zalebiye gorge.

   This survey, as already indicated, is an essential part of the planning work for the irrigation system dependent on the projected Youssef Pasha reservoir.

   Mapping at a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours would suffice for

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

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most of the region; a scale of 1:10,000 with 2-meter contours for a narrow band running along the Euphrates; and a scale of 1:5,000 with identical contours for the area immediately around the gorge.

5. An area of about 970 square kilometers in the Khabour river valley upstream from Markada.

Aerial photography is already covered by an existing contract. Mapping is necessary to facilitate irrigation planning and to investigate the possibility of a dam at Markada. Mapping on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours would be sufficient except for the proposed dam site where the scale would need to be 1:5,000.

6. An area of some 3,400 square kilometers on the left banks of the Khabour and Euphrates rivers.

Mapping of this area on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours appears necessary to determine the possibilities of gravity irrigation and to expedite needed soil surveys.

These surveys, which together would cost approximately £S 4 million, would cover most of the land potentially available for cultivation and the greater part of the irrigable area.

Soil Surveys

The aerial reconnaissance the mission has suggested would greatly expedite the soil survey already started under the direction of an FAO specialist. Soils can be classified into broad types on the basis of aerial photographs. With additional work on the ground it is possible to proceed to more detailed agrogeological soil mapping, which is necessary to determine how the land already under cultivation can better be employed and how land still unoccupied can best be utilized. This type of mapping is now being undertaken for the Jezireh as an adjunct to the cadastral survey. While all the detailed soil mapping required can obviously not be completed in a few years, the mission urges that the present soil survey be expedited and broadened. A soils department with a budget of £S 60,000 for 1954 has been established in the Ministry of Agriculture. Its budget will have to be raised to at least £S 100,000. The work on soils should concentrate primarily on areas which will or can be opened to settlement such as the Ghab, the Roudj and certain rainfed regions. From

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time to time, however, spot analysis will also be required to carry out special programs to improve soil fertility. 654 134

Cadastral Survey

Aerial photography should assist considerably in accelerating the cadastral survey work which was first initiated in 1923 but was still only 45% completed by the beginning of 1953. It is clearly in Syria's interest to finish the cadaster as soon as possible so that the uncertainty surrounding private property rights may be ended at long last and the extent of state domain may be clearly determined. Similarly, it is necessary to expedite the lagging program for converting *mucha'a* or village common land to individual peasant ownership. Experience with the accelerated survey for the Jezireh indicates the need for additional measures to speed up the work. This survey, originally scheduled for completion in the spring of 1955, is now unlikely to be finished before the end of 1956. Insufficient funds, shortages of trained personnel and cumbersome procedures have all contributed to delay this vital survey work. The mission urges that all possible measures to expedite the program be taken. Among the measures that might be considered are the contracting of necessary ground surveys to qualified private firms; the delimitation of properties in certain areas solely by means of aerial photographs rather than by ground surveys; and the possibility of shortcuts in the protracted legal procedures involved in the determination of titles. 654

State Domain

The aerial, cadastral and soil surveys outlined above will for the first time provide the government with approximately accurate information on the area and quality of state domain. At present the government claims ownership of 1,417,571 hectares of allegedly cultivable land of which 551,473 are leased for cultivation. This total, however, excludes the unoccupied or "dead" land (*mawat*) which was assimilated to state domain by Legislative Decree No. 135 of October 29, 1952. Nor does it include the land which may be "recaptured" by the state under other provisions of the same decree. For instance, this decree specified that prior occupation of land which had not yet been sanctioned by the acquisition of title would be recognized only up to 200 hectares per member of the occupier's 491 423

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491 immediate family. It also provided that in adjudicating title deeds in
423 which the area derived from the indicated boundaries of the property was greater than the area mentioned in the deed, the boundaries would govern at least to the extent that they gave each member of the titleholder's family a minimum of 200 hectares. The mission urges that these provisions, which have apparently not yet been applied, be enforced as rapidly as possible. Their application would inflict no undue hardship, and would increase significantly the amount of revenue-earning state domain. Above all, it would put at the government's disposal more good land to be retained as a reserve for the ultimate settlement of landless or virtually landless peasants. Much of the land now left to the state is too marginal for successful settlement.

491 Careful management of state domain is necessary to ensure that the
423 state derives from it the maximum revenue and that land not really
427 suitable for cultivation is reserved for pasture or forest. The government is not equipped at present to exercise adequate supervision. Land is often tilled without authorization, thus depriving the government of revenue and often encouraging the cultivation of land which can be expected to produce a satisfactory harvest only in years of exceptionally high rainfall. Until cultivable land is required for settlement, it should be leased, as at present, to private operators who have the necessary machinery to till it. Thus land in the Jezireh which is recaptured under the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 135 might well be leased to those who now cultivate it, so that existing units of exploitation are not disturbed until the land is needed for distribution. However, current rentals for state land, even though they have been rising in recent years, still seem unduly low. Judging from private rental arrangements prevailing in the Jezireh, for example, the state should be able to charge an average rental of at least £S 5·6 per hectare instead of only a little over £S 3 as at present. In this way the government can add to the funds available for financing development.

Forestry and State Domain

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659 The management of state domain should look also to the preservation and improvement of forest areas on government land. Syria has unfortunately been almost entirely denuded of forests. Although some 448,000 hectares are listed officially as "forest", 348,000 hectares consist either of

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wholly barren land or of range land with arboreous shrubs. Of the balance probably only about 60,000 hectares can be characterized as more or less dense forest.

The mission has already recommended an aerial survey of the forest areas in the province of Latakia. This would be a first step in the appraisal of existing resources and the delimitation and protection of forest reserves. An FAO specialist has for some time been advising the government on a forestry program. The mission can only recommend that action along the lines which he has proposed be undertaken as soon as possible. Any program should focus in the first instance on safeguarding forest areas against uncontrolled cutting, shifting cultivation, excessive grazing, fire, insects, erosion and other hazards which have inflicted considerable damage in the past. A more effective forestry law which was drafted by a committee in 1953 should be promptly enacted for this purpose. To protect the forests and supervise their exploitation a field service of four foresters and 42 rangers should be built up by 1960. The necessary forest rangers will have to be trained either at a secondary forestry school which may be established in cooperation with the FAO to serve the countries in the Near East or at a special training school which might be added to the existing Bugua Agricultural School near Latakia. Within the Ministry of Agriculture a staff of five foresters and 10 rangers should be available to direct the necessary survey, research and reforestation work; and two foresters will be necessary to supervise forest nurseries.

Once adequate protection of forests has been established, reforestation can proceed. The three existing nurseries and two new ones recently established should be able to produce about 3 million seedlings yearly. The mission considers it important, however, that government nurseries be also in a position to supply trees for planting in farming areas. Although such trees as poplars are extensively grown as cash crops in certain irrigated regions, most farming areas are virtually treeless. The planting of a belt of trees around new village settlements should be an integral part of any settlement program. Farmers should be assisted to establish their own wood lots and to plant trees along roads. This would help to meet the acute shortage of timber for fuel and building, provide some protection against wind and make settlements more attractive. The mission therefore suggests that five additional small nurseries be established, particularly in the provinces of Jezireh and Euphrates, to supply trees for such purposes.

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137 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the
659 mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available
313 to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

423 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant pro-
166 prietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60% respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in
166 settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experi-
341 mental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

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build up a sufficient fund to finance the actual settlement. The mission did not obtain sufficient information on these plans to appraise their soundness, but suggests that they be reviewed in the light of the considerations that should, in its opinion, govern such settlements.

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The amount of land to be allocated per farm family in any settlement must depend on the yield of the land and the capacity of the cultivator to till it. The prospective yield must be such as to enable the farmer to earn a decent living without, however, being so high as to create inequities. The size of the allotment must not exceed that which the cultivator can manage with the labor of his own family and with the equipment at his disposal. For irrigated areas the appropriate allotment would be 5-10 hectares where land is good to average. In areas adjoining urban markets where intensive cultivation of vegetables is possible, the allotment could be below 5 hectares; and in areas where the soil is rather poor, more than 10 hectares may be necessary. Settlements for Bedouins in dry-farming areas should be organized on the assumption of 50 hectares per family. The mission believes, however, that it would be unwise to allocate all this land at once, since no family could be expected to cultivate such a large parcel. The initial allocation should be about 25-30 hectares, and even of this a part might be put into improved pasture instead of being cropped. The balance might then be put into a reserve which would be used for grazing and be available for allotment to farmers who show themselves especially capable, or to new families in the settlement. Such a pattern will make it easier for the Bedouin to accomplish the transition to settled agriculture, by enabling him to carry on his customary pastoral pursuits as he crops his land.

The land would have to be tilled with draft animals and the necessary supplemental tools, but a special effort must be made to provide the settler with more adequate draft animals and better equipment than are customarily employed. While the use of mechanized equipment would in general be impracticable, the mission does recommend that one dry-farming community be organized on a mechanized basis. Such a community is suggested quite frankly as an experiment to test the possibilities of mechanical cultivation by smallholders. Ideally, the necessary tractors, implements and harvesting machinery should be owned and operated cooperatively. In the beginning, however, the settlers would hardly be prepared for such cooperative action. The mission suggests therefore that the government establish the necessary machinery unit under the direction

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423 166 241 of a manager with experience in the operation and maintenance of mechanical equipment. In the first few years at least the services of this unit should be made available to cultivators at rates high enough to cover cost of amortization and operation. As and when the farmers acquire experience with machinery and develop a community spirit conducive to cooperative action, steps should be taken to transfer the equipment in whole or in part to cooperatives.

The government should utilize the opportunity afforded by such new settlements to raise the standard of agricultural practices above the average. A government agricultural worker or community leader should be assigned to each settlement. It cannot be expected, of course, that optimum farm practices will be adopted, particularly by Bedouin settlers. It is possible, however, to provide guidance and even, perhaps, to prescribe certain crop rotations. In the dry-farming communities wheat will obviously be the principal crop, but winter vetch and such legumes as lentils, chick peas and soya beans should also be part of the cropping scheme. From 5 to 10 hectares might be left fallow each year. Another 5-10 hectares of each farmer's allotment might well be put into approved pasture. Each settler should be provided with about 60 sheep which should give a return nearly equal to that derived from crops. For the irrigated areas much more intensive cultivation, with a minimum of fallow, should of course be envisaged. The emphasis should be on such summer crops as cotton, sugar beets, peanuts, maize, beans and vegetables grown in proper rotation. Here the use of fertilizers and insecticides will have to be especially encouraged. A few cattle should be kept on the basis of the fodder provided by some of the suggested crops.

423 166 241 361 Each settlement should be small enough so that the remotest farm would be no farther than an hour's walk from the village, and large enough to warrant the establishment of minimum community services such as a well, a mosque or church, a school and a community center. The first consideration is important only in determining the size of a dry-farming settlement and would point to a settlement with an area no larger than about 5,500 hectares. On such a dry-farming area 120 families, including 10 non-farming families, could be settled initially; and the total might ultimately be about double if the land first held in reserve as pasture were subsequently allocated to new families. Even a settlement of 120 families, with a total population of 600-720, could support minimum community facilities. For the irrigated areas, where land allotments would

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

DIAGRAM 1
SCHEMATIC RELATIONSHIP OF DRY-FARMING COMMUNITIES



a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMS
c: COMMUNITY LAND FOR GRAZING



DIAGRAM 2
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(20 Hectare Farms)

DIAGRAM 3
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(50 Hectare Farms)

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423 be much smaller, the minimum size of a community might be raised to
164 around 300 families, including some 30 non-farming families. Such a larger
241 community would economize capital invested in common services. Even
361 on irrigated land, however, circumstances might dictate the establishment of a smaller community with a provision for subsequent growth if the potentialities of the land warrant it.

A settlement should be laid out in such a way as to make access to farm land convenient and to fit into adjoining settlements of a similar type. For the dry-farming area settlement units shaped like hexagons would in principle be ideal. (See Diagrams 1-3.) In such a unit the farms could be laid out at an angle to six roads radiating from the center and parallel to the sides of the hexagon. Between the farms radiating from the roads the land initially reserved as common pasture would be located. One of the six roads would link the settlement with other communities. A number of hexagonal settlements would fit well together. It must be recognized, however, that modifications in this basic hexagonal unit will often be necessary, owing to marked variations in the quality of the soil or the topography, the relationship of the area to existing settlements and other factors. (For examples, see Diagrams 4-6.) In the irrigated regions the shape of the settlement will be largely determined by the layout of the irrigation system, so that the hexagon may well have to yield to the square as the more practical form.

In areas where a number of settlements are established the relationship of the new communities to each other and to existing settlements in adjoining areas must be carefully considered. For the Roudj, for example, the mission would suggest the establishment of about five communities, of which four would be purely agricultural and one would serve also as a minor marketing and administrative center and therefore be somewhat larger. (See Map 6.) A major center need not be envisaged in view of the proximity of the towns of Idlib and Jisr ech Chogour. For the more extensive region of the Ghab a similiar pattern can be contemplated; and the planning will need to be based on the assumption that Jisr ech Chogour, situated at the northern end of the area, will become the regional marketing and administrative center.

The mission strongly recommends the village-type of settlement. Any other type which would house the settlers on their own farms would not only be contrary to tradition, but would be destructive of community life and make it difficult to supply the needed community services. The village

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

DIAGRAM 4
ALTERATION OF FARM DIVISIONS IN THE CASE OF VARIATIONS IN THE QUALITIES OF SOIL

a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMING
c: IRRIGATED AREA

DIAGRAM 5
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH STREAM



DIAGRAM-6
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH DIFFERENT TOPOGRAPHIC CONTOURS

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

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should be located in the center of the settlement area and laid out along a rectangular pattern with the community facilities and open public places in the middle. It would be desirable to have the village surrounded by a small garden area and a belt of trees.

The settlement must, of course, be considered "model", but not in the sense that its standards and costs are so high as to render its general adoption prohibitively expensive. The settlers should be expected to contribute their own labor to its initial construction and the subsequent gradual expansion and improvement of its facilities. This will help to reduce costs and give the settlers a sense of pride and achievement in the establishment of the community. For example, the ultimate aim might be to provide a farm family with a 5-room house (3 main rooms, kitchen and laundry-lavatory), enclosed courtyard, storehouse and stables.[10] Initially, however, it would suffice to provide a 2-room unit without some of the elements in the final building. The cost could thus be kept to about £S 1,500, to which the settler might contribute £S 800 in the form of properly supervised self-help. Each farm family will need, however, a minimum sustenance allowance of approximately £S 1,000 to tide it over the first year when the community is in the course of construction and little is produced. Such an allowance should be paid out in the form of compensation for labor services provided by the settlers.

The mission has estimated the cash investment outlay in the different types of settlements as follows (in Syrian pounds):

	Dry farming settlement (120 families)		Irrigated area settlement (310 families)
	Non-mechanized	Mechanized	
Housing for farm families	77,000	77,000	191,100
Housing and shops for non-farm families	20,000	20,000	67,000
Community facilities[a]	71,000	71,000	182,000
Draft power, livestock and implements	318,000	514,000[b]	341,250
Sustenance allowance	110,000	110,000	273,000
Total	596,000	792,000	1,054,350

[a] Including schools, mosques (or churches), community centers, water supply and roads.
[b] Including £S 250,000 for mechanized equipment.

[10] See Annex I, p. 468.

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423 The mission suggests that the state Agricultural Bank finance the housing
166 and means of production (other than mechanized equipment) under
241 loans to be amortized over a 10-year and three- to four-year period respec-
361 tively. The government itself should be responsible for providing the funds necessary for community facilities, mechanized equipment and payment of the sustenance allowance.

423 The mission's calculations indicate that the average farm family should
166 be able to earn a net annual income of around £S 2,000 in the dry-farming
241 communities and of over £S 3,000 in the irrigated-area communities even during the period when loans are being repaid. This should leave a small margin for the payment for land in the dry-farming areas and a substantial margin for the necessary payments for land and water in the irrigated areas. The mission believes it a sound principle to require some payment even for non-irrigated state domain. The price of land, however, should be such that the settler can expect to become a full owner within a reasonable period, e.g., no more than 10 to 15 years.

Certain conditions will need to be enforced in settling peasants on the land. For example, title should not be transferred until all payments have been completed, and in the intervening period the government should reserve the right to remove settlers who prove to be clearly unsuitable or do not till their own land. Even after title has been transferred, the government might well retain for a specified period the right to veto all proposed sales, mortgages or leases, in order to safeguard the fundamental objective of establishing and maintaining independent peasant proprietors.

During the next five years the government will have to undertake the settlement of the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab. For the settlement of Bedouins the mission recommends the establishment of two experimental dry-farming communities, one of which would be mechanized, in the Jezireh. The mission must emphasize, however, that the latter two experiments are bound to fail unless the government allocates to them good land situated in a region with adequate rainfall. Both the Roudj and the Jezireh projects will provide much valuable experience useful in extending the settlement effort. In addition the government might well undertake one project in the Djebel es Smaane northwest of Aleppo and another in the Djebel Druze. The ruins of many once imposing cities testify that the first region flourished from the first to the seventh century of the Christian era, and recent evidence indicates that this prosperity was primarily founded on orchards and vineyards. More recently people have been

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returning to become squatters among the ruins and cultivate patches of stony but fertile soil. Organization of this rather haphazard settlement and the establishment of a planned community based again on orchards and vineyards may prove a worthwhile undertaking. In the Djebel Druze, where living standards are low and emigration is difficult for religious reasons, a similar settlement should be tried, provided a suitable tract of land can be found. Here, too, conditions are favorable for the establishment of orchards and vineyards.

At present responsibility for settlement is dispersed. The Ghab Administration is entrusted with settlement in the Ghab; the Irrigation Service has the task in other newly reclaimed and irrigated areas; and the Ministry of Agriculture has the initiative for the dry-farming areas. The mission strongly recommends that responsibility for planning and coordinating all the work be vested in a single, independent Settlements Administration, which would also discharge certain governmental functions relating to housing, town planning and similar subjects. The settlement program will require a great organizational effort and a staff which only a single agency would be capable of mobilizing. One administration is also much more likely to apply the experience gained in the initial settlement work to subsequent ventures. The mission urges that such an agency be established promptly, so that the necessary planning may be immediately initiated. The assistance of a number of foreign experts will need to be enlisted to carry out the program.

If the four settlements the mission has recommended are established and the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab are settled, the total cost would probably be around £S 10 million. Under the mission's proposals, £S 5.5 million would be financed by the Agricultural Bank, and the balance met directly by the government. With these funds it should be possible to settle some 2,300 families or between 12,000 and 14,000 people.

Land Reform

While the settlement of state domain may gradually increase the number of peasant proprietors, Syria will also have to work out policies relating to land ownership and tenancy in the areas already under cultivation. In this connection it should be noted that Article 22 of the 1950 constitution calls for legislation to determine, without retroactive effect, "the maximum area of land that may be owned, exploited and disposed of, according to

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423 districts"; to provide for the forfeiture of land "neglected for a period of
425 time"; to encourage "small and medium properties"; and "to protect the peasant and raise his standard of living".

In recent years several countries have taken steps to break up large estates and distribute them among landless tenants. Where large estates are farmed in small plots by tenants operating with rather primitive methods, the economic advantages resulting from well-managed large-scale exploitation certainly do not accrue. On the contrary, farming by impoverished tenants may be regarded as a social liability and an actual or potential cause of discontent. In the last analysis only the Syrian people acting through their government are competent to determine what course to pursue regarding large landholdings. The mission would only point out that expropriation on a considerable scale would entail large outlays for compensation and would be more disruptive than constructive unless adequate measures were simultaneously taken to provide new peasant owners with sufficient supplies of seed, draft animals and tools and to guide them in their agricultural practices. Where labor is scarce and land is cultivated on a large scale by machinery, as in the Jezireh, expropriation would manifestly serve no useful purpose and would result, instead, in a substantial reduction in output.

There are, however, certain measures the mission would recommend for serious consideration. One would be to prevent aggravation of the problem by enacting legislation to prohibit individual families who already own a certain amount of land—say, 1,000 hectares—from increasing their holdings still further. Another would be to enforce, as a minimum, the existing legislation, which provides that land not tilled for five years should revert to the state. In cases where land is utilized or exploited in a manner which is not in accordance with the standards prevailing in Syria, the
423 government would be justified in depriving the owner of his land. Finally,
651 the mission suggests that the larger landowners should be more heavily taxed in the interest of raising more money for development and of promoting greater social equity. Income derived from agriculture does not fall at present under any of the existing schedular income taxes. Instead, most agricultural produce brought to market is taxed at 7%. While this tax does not bear heavily on peasants who produce primarily for their own consumption, it is not progressive in its application to landowners or pump owners who sell their share of the output on the market. The mission sug-

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gests, therefore, that this tax be complemented by a new land tax. The rate of such a tax should increase with the size of landholdings, and small holdings should be entirely exempt. The rates must also be in accordance with the yield of the land, but the mission suggests that they be kept rather low (e.g., not more than £S 2-3 per hectare on the average) so that a detailed, complex classification of land in accordance with productivity may be avoided. In another section of this report the mission proposes that the present schedular income taxes be supplemented by a global income tax levied at a moderate rate. In our opinion, income from agriculture should be included in the scope of such a global tax. The ascertainment of income from land is by no means as difficult as is generally supposed.

In addition to taking these steps, the government should pay special attention to the improvement of the lot of tenant farmers. In general, measures should be adopted to increase the tenant's share of the output, to give him greater security of tenure and to make him less dependent on the landlord as a source of credit and supplies.

The economic bargaining power of the landlord vis-à-vis the tenant and of the pump owner vis-à-vis the cultivator is so great that the landlord and pump owner obtain a rather excessive share of the output of the land. It would be desirable to establish a commission to study the various forms of association in the exploitation of agricultural land which prevail in different parts of Syria and to make recommendations designed not only to make these arrangements more equitable but also to put them on a basis which would give the actual cultivator of the land more incentive to improve his agricultural methods. Such a commission could work out the terms of written contracts which would be applicable to various types of association. It could also devise ways of giving greater security of tenure to the tenants. The latter can generally be ousted at will by landlords and the land they receive for cultivation is so frequently reallotted that they acquire no interest in its permanent improvement. Finally, it would be appropriate to consider the establishment of local land tenure commissions to settle, in a manner comparable to settlement of labor conflicts, disputes among the parties sharing in the exploitation of the land.

A number of measures to foster cooperatives, provide more ample credit and establish machinery for assisting the farmer at the village level are recommended elsewhere in this report. It is important that these measures

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474 focus not only on the farmer-owner, but also on the tenant, for only in that way can the latter's economic bargaining power be strengthened and his independence and security enhanced.

IV IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTION

244 433 The mission approaches a discussion of this subject with some diffidence. Generalities are difficult to avoid. It is easy to point out deficiencies in agricultural practices, but much more difficult to suggest a concrete and practicable program to improve them. Effective action is made difficult by the ignorance and inherent conservatism of farmers. It requires a larger, better trained and better organized government service to carry out the necessary trials and experiments and to work with farmers at the village level. Obviously, no miraculous increase in productivity can be expected within a short time.

Nevertheless, the subject is too important to neglect. In too many countries the undeniable difficulty of carrying out a program to raise yields has caused governments to shrink from such an undertaking. We have already indicated why much more attention must be paid to this problem in Syria. Although land in Syria is more plentiful than in many other Asiatic countries, the population pressure on good land is bound to grow. If the country is to support an increasing population on higher living standards, the task of obtaining more output from cultivated land cannot be postponed.

The mission can only point out some of the potentialities and indicate in a rather general way how they might be realized. More detailed programs must be worked out by the Ministry of Agriculture with the help of the FAO or other sources of technical assistance.

Crop Rotation and Diversification

Improvement in existing patterns of crop rotation is one of the most important methods of improving the fertility and structure of the soil and permitting a gradual diminution in the use of fallow. The aim should be to reduce customary fallow in the rainfed areas by at least 50% and to the greatest extent practicable in the irrigated areas. The much more extensive use of leguminous plants for both winter and summer

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cultivation would help to remedy existing deficiencies in nitrogen and supply either nutritious fodder for livestock or material for green manuring to build up the depleted humus in the soil.

At present no legumes other than winter vetch and berseem are grown on a large scale during the winter season. While lentils, beans and peas are cultivated as cash crops in the Hauran and regions around Damascus and Aleppo, the value of legumes for fodder and pasture is not appreciated. A considerable number of leguminous plants which have not been cultivated in Syria, at least on any considerable scale, might well be introduced and tested.[11]

Aside from these legumes, other crops might well be tried out for inclusion in the rotation system so as to provide more diversified production. Among these are oil seeds such as the sunflower, linseed and sesame. The mission also recommends experiments with safflower, a plant which grows well under dry climatic conditions and in soils of moderate fertility.

The mission recommends that experiments be undertaken to determine the best rotation schemes for both irrigated and non-irrigated land in different parts of the country; and it suggests that £S 1 million be made available to defray the cost over the next five or six years. A substantial part of this should be used to finance trials on selected, strategically located farms, especially to provide free seed and instruction to farmers willing and able to try changes in crop rotation which experimentation has indicated as advantageous.

We realize that the adoption of crop rotation plans designed to reduce fallow significantly will by no means be easy. There will be limitations set by the availability of manpower, draft animals and machinery, and water. Legumes, however, can often be interplanted with cereals; and ways and means can probably be found to fit new crops into the rotation scheme at a time when they will not compete with the principal crops for the cultivator's time and equipment, or, in irrigated areas, for the available water. If additional implements or draft power are needed, they may be acquired, provided better credit facilities are established. Since additional resources are no doubt required to keep more land cropped, the economics of new rotation plans will have to be carefully worked out in the course of the proposed experiments and trials.

[11] See Annex C, p. 309, for specific suggestions.

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Fertilizers, Insecticides and Weedicides

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In increasing fertility, the more extensive use of fertilizer can be an important supplement to, but never a complete substitute for, better crop rotation. The most serious deficiency in Syrian soils is nitrogen, and though phosphorous is present the alkalinity of the soil often makes it less available as a plant nutrient. The use of ammonium sulphate, or anhydrous ammonia, and superphosphates could undoubtedly raise yields significantly. At present only modest quantities of fertilizers are applied in the Ghouta and in the cotton-growing regions. It is idle, however, to expect a rapid expansion in the employment of fertilizers; and a program to encourage their promiscuous use might well do more harm than good. The response to fertilizer depends very largely on appropriate timing of its application, the availability of water and other factors. A number of experimental stations in Syria have been carrying out experiments on nitrogen deficiency. The mission suggests that this program be expanded and supplemented by field trials on selected farms in various parts of Syria. The fertilizer for these field trials should be made available free or at nominal cost over a period of years sufficient to permit adequate testing. The mission recommends that a sum of £S 500,000 be made available for this purpose over the next five or six years.

The use of insecticides and pesticides has been almost entirely confined to cotton, and even for cotton they were applied extensively only in 1952 when dusting was made compulsory. Regular spraying and dusting of cotton and orchard crops should particularly be encouraged. A program of education and demonstration, combined with credit facilities for the acquisition of equipment and materials, is clearly necessary. Experiments should also be undertaken with modern weedicides, for there is little doubt that weeds at present greatly detract from yields.

If the use of fertilizers and insecticides is to be promoted, the cost should be reduced as far as possible. At present fertilizers are largely imported in the form of pre-mixed compounds containing a high proportion of carrier material readily found in Syria, and similarly, in the case of insecticides, essential ingredients account for only a small percentage of the volume imported. The mission suggests, therefore, that the possibility of lowering costs by establishing a plant for mixing fertilizers and making insecticides from imported ingredients should be explored.

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Implements and Machinery

In Syria there is an enormous gulf between the employment of modern tractors and combines in certain areas and the use of the traditional peasant plow or *feddan* and hand-harvesting and threshing methods elsewhere. The tractor can undoubtedly do a far better job of cultivation. It breaks the hard soil pan so as to facilitate deeper penetration of roots and moisture, and it promotes seed germination by more effective pulverization of the soil. It is equally obvious that combines produce a cleaner grain with less waste than the traditional process of having animals trample the grain and winnowing the resulting product by hand.

The development of Syria's agriculture, however, hardly depends on the rapid expansion of mechanized farming. The use of mechanized equipment can be recommended only where labor is relatively scarce or where units of exploitation are large, as is the case in the Jezireh. Small farmers cannot afford costly, modern machinery. Cooperative ownership and operation of such machinery may ultimately be undertaken, and the mission does suggest, as indicated previously, that an experiment along this line be carried out. It can hardly be expected, however, that this type of cooperative, which is among the most difficult to manage, will spread rapidly in the future.

Far more important and urgent is the task of improving and supplementing the poor implements which the peasants now have at their disposal. They should not have to rely almost wholly on the *feddan* which barely scratches the soil and leaves perennial weeds to compete with crops for the limited supply of soil nutrients. The farmer should have a better plow, supplemented by a cultivator or spike-tooth harrow; a simple seed drill that might permit him to get better yields by sowing in rows instead of by broadcasting; pedal threshing equipment and a hand-operated winnower that would enable him to produce a cleaner grain with less effort; and a simple leveller that would help him to level his land and avoid waste of rain or irrigation water.

Programs to improve and develop implements for the small farmer have been successfully initiated in a number of countries such as India and Afghanistan. The mission strongly recommends that such a program be undertaken promptly in Syria. It would propose establishment of a small implement center in cooperation with the FAO or other technical assistance agencies. This center should be equipped with a shop in which

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433 241 407 prototypes of useful implements would be made. These prototypes should then be distributed for supervised testing among selected farmers and arrangements would have to be made for the production of those found successful. Such a program need not be expensive. The mission estimates the capital cost at about £S 150,000 and recurring annual expenditures at not more than £S 100,000.

The problems of mechanized cultivation should not, of course, be neglected. Already an estimated total of 750,000 hectares is tilled by mechanical means. Over 1,300 tractors and 500 combines are being used today, primarily in the Jezireh but also, increasingly, around Aleppo. Mechanical farming is handicapped, however, by the high cost of fuel; lack of sufficient skilled labor to operate, maintain and repair machinery; inadequate repair facilities; excessive cost and, sometimes, deficient supplies of spare parts; insufficient knowledge of the suitability and capability of different types of equipment; and the utilization of too many kinds of machinery. Standards of maintenance are extremely low and repairs much too costly. The abuse of machinery greatly shortens its life. In the Jezireh, major repair facilities exist only in Kamichliye, and only two dealers have their own service stations. All these factors make mechanical farming excessively expensive. In the last two years, profits have seriously diminished as cereal prices declined and costs remained fixed. A reduction of costs is particularly necessary since the mechanically operated farms now contribute the bulk of Syria's exports of cereals.

Better transport facilities will do more than anything else to lower fuel costs. To deal with the other cost factors, a number of measures can be recommended. First of all, machinery dealers should be allowed to operate only if they abide by defined limitations on the price mark-up on machinery and spare parts; maintain prescribed minimum supplies of spare parts; and undertake to operate service and repair facilities in such centers as Kamichliye and Aleppo. Certain reputable dealers have declared to the mission their willingness to adhere to such qualifications, which have proved useful also in other countries. Secondly, the mission urges that short-term courses in the selection, operation and maintenance of farm machinery be organized at Kamichliye and Aleppo. Such courses should be conducted in the agricultural "dead season" and separately for owners and operators. The first should be instructed in the performance and capability of different types of equipment, in the supervision of operation and maintenance, and in the simple economics of mechanical farming; and

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the latter should be taught elementary principles of repair and maintenance. The courses for field operators and mechanics might well include some in-service training in repair shops. The cooperation of reputable dealers in organizing such courses should be enlisted. Finally, the mission proposes the establishment of a secondary agricultural school in Kamichliye to specialize in problems of agricultural engineering. Facilities for instruction in this subject should also be provided at the existing school in Aleppo. The mission envisages an expenditure of £S 2 million for such school facilities. The short-term courses could probably be made self-supporting. To initiate and help carry out this program, the mission suggests that the government obtain the services of one or two machinery experts through the FAO.

Cereals

Aside from the measures outlined above, programs to raise the yield of certain crops must be undertaken. For cereals the development of higher yielding and more disease-resistant strains is of paramount importance. Although many varieties of wheat and barley are grown in Syria, little is known about their comparative worth. A large number of the more promising foreign wheat and barley strains have recently been imported for testing, but the funds, staff and facilities for an adequate testing program are largely lacking. The mission accordingly recommends that the Ministry of Agriculture be enabled to carry out a program for testing, selecting and propagating high-yielding and disease-resistant seed.[12] Since the shortage of trained Syrians may continue for some time, it is likely that the program will have to be handled by a foreign staff (FAO; the French Technical Assistance Mission in Syria). The staff should include a director in charge of planning, three plant breeders and a plant pathologist. They should be assisted by a staff of about 30 Syrians who will largely have to be trained for this purpose. The mission estimates the cost of such a program at about £S 4.5 million over the next five or six years.

For wheat and barley the aim should be to develop good varieties which mature early and can therefore be harvested before the extreme heat. For rice, which will undoubtedly be cultivated in larger volume as the irrigated area expands, the aim should rather be to develop slow-

[12] See Annex C, p. 304, for year-by-year recommendations.

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243 433 maturing varieties to replace the praecox strains currently used. The high day and comparatively low night temperatures in Syria are more suitable to slow-maturing rice varieties. For maize it is especially important to test and select appropriate hybrid strains. In Syria maize yields are only about 1.3 tons per hectare while in the United States hybrid maize yields about 4.4 tons. With the introduction of high-yielding hybrid strains, the production of maize should definitely be encouraged since it fits well into the crop rotation scheme, is rather heat resistant and can provide not only grain but also fodder and silage.

Once suitable seed strains have been selected by testing, arrangements should be made with farmers in various parts of Syria for the propagation of such strains under proper supervision. These farms could serve at the same time as demonstration centers. The seed thus propagated should be certified and made available for distribution through licensed dealers, cooperatives and Chambers of Agriculture.

Cotton[13]

248 433 The government already has a praiseworthy program for the improvement of cotton cultivation. The disastrous failure of the cotton harvest in 1951, caused by the rather reckless expansion of cotton acreage and an uncontrolled invasion of destructive insects, brought in its train a number of corrective measures. The government regulated cotton acreage by licensing, and specified the time of planting. Controls over the treatment and distribution of seed were established. Even dusting and spraying were prescribed in 1952. Variety tests have also been conducted, and as a result Coker Wilt, a high-yielding strain, is now predominantly cultivated in Syria. A Cotton Office, staffed largely with Egyptian experts, has been charged with the improvement of cotton production. This entire program should be further expanded as more Syrian technical personnel become available. The mission suggests, for instance, that a special station be established for cotton breeding and insect control. More attention should be paid to cultural practices. Yields can be raised by reducing the danger of pests through rigorous cleaning of cotton fields following the harvest and destruction of host plants; by closer planting to discourage excessive vegetative growth and to promote earlier maturity; and by applying fertilizers at appropriate times.

[13] See Annex C, p. 305.

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Sugar Beet[14]

Sugar beet, though introduced only recently, is becoming an increasingly important crop. The sugar factory established in Homs has brought in seed from the Netherlands and Germany and distributed it to farmers. The reclamation and irrigation of the Roudj and the Ghab will undoubtedly give a great fillip to sugar beet cultivation and raise average yields, for beets do best on irrigated land. At present yields are still disappointingly low compared to those achieved in Western Europe and the United States. The mission suggests that efforts be particularly devoted to selecting a series of varieties with a wide range in maturity, so that the operating season at the Homs factory can be considerably prolonged. In the Euphrates and Khabour river valleys there are areas suitable for beet cultivation which can obviously not be served by the Homs plant. Ultimately the establishment of additional factories in these areas may prove worthwhile. Although the cost of producing beet sugar in Syria is undoubtedly higher than the cost of importing raw sugar (which is principally if not wholly cane sugar), the cultivation of beets has beneficial effects on the soil which appear to warrant its encouragement.

Tobacco

Tobacco is a minor crop, though important as a source of government revenue and of farm income in the province of Latakia, where it is predominantly grown. It is one of the crops, however, which is most in need of improvement. Seed selection, curing and grading all leave much to be desired. The entire plant, rather than selected leaves, is often harvested at one time. The Tobacco Monopoly, which licenses the growers, has paid little attention to the improvement of methods. The mission suggests that the Monopoly devote an additional sum of at least £S 75,000 annually to this purpose. At present three varieties of tobacco are grown: Abou Riha, the so-called "Latakia tobacco," which is bought almost entirely by a single American cigarette manufacturer for blending; Chek-el-Bint, used in the manufacture of Syrian cigarettes; and Tombac, produced for water-pipe smoking. In view of the rather uncertain market for Abou Riha, it would appear wise to develop the production of high-aromatic tobacco of the Turkish or Macedonian type for which a more durable market seems

[14] See Annex C, p. 308.

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249 #33 assured. The possibility of growing Virginia-type tobaccos should also be explored.

Orchards and Vineyards

245 #33 Vineyards and orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits already make an important contribution to agricultural income. Both the quality and the yield could be substantially raised by proper insect control, the use of fertilizers and tracer elements, and better pruning. Many existing orchards need rejuvenation. Heavy frosts in 1949-50 severely damaged olive orchards around Aleppo, so that Syria is now on a net import basis for olive oil. Establishment of vineyards and orchards in the Djebel Druze would help materially to raise the present low level of income in that region. In Latakia province the cultivation of citrus could be significantly increased. The availability of ample long-term credit at low interest rates is especially important for an expansion and rejuvenation of orchards and vineyards.

Vegetables

244 #33 Vegetable growing in wide variety is concentrated in and around the larger population centers. The fact that so little is grown and consumed in the rural areas is due mainly to the fact that neither the small farmer nor the majority of consumers yet knows the value of a balanced diet; on the contrary, both hold vegetable cultivation in low esteem. Education and guidance centered upon the establishment of school gardens might do much to change this attitude.

The significant quantity of vegetables at present used by the local canning industry could easily be doubled though, as the canners explained to the mission, the poor quality of vegetables in general, and of peas and beans in particular, tends to limit the quantity suitable for processing. Better seed, improved cultural practices and adequate insect control measures could contribute greatly to higher quality and quantity. Improved transport, storage and marketing facilities should be included in community and cooperative development schemes, thus opening up possibilities for more exports and a very substantial increase in the activity of the local canning industry which at present produces about 4,000 tons of canned goods.

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In view of the desirability of increasing the role of vegetables in the Syrian diet and of their potential as a domestic and export cash crop, governmental stimulus would be of great benefit. 244 433

v ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 231

The problem of raising the production and quality of livestock has been comparatively neglected. Inadequate nutrition, high incidence of disease and mortality, and poor breeding all depress livestock yields far below what they should be. Livestock now accounts for less than 20% of the total contribution made by agriculture and animal husbandry to national income. This contribution to national income could undoubtedly be raised substantially because the possibilities for improvement in animal husbandry practices are vast and the demand for livestock products both at home and abroad is likely to increase more than proportionately as standards of living rise.

Better nutrition, control of disease and breeding are all necessary. Of the three, improvement in nutrition is by far the most important. Irrespective of breed, an animal will not be productive unless it is well fed. In fact the genetic factors in any breed cannot be fully developed and appraised unless nutrition is adequate. Similarly, low nutritional standards inevitably lower the resistance of livestock to disease and limit the effectiveness of control measures.

Migratory Livestock 233

Over 80% of the livestock other than fowl consist of sheep and goats, and most of these are taken by Bedouins on annual migrations into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing. The available vegetation is sparse and of short duration. As is usual under desert or semi-desert conditions, there is generally overgrazing in the areas close to permanent water supplies, and the poorer the season—in terms of rainfall—the heavier will be the concentration on such areas. During severe winters when winter growth ceases at an early stage and when the herbage may be destroyed by early frosts, there is a high mortality rate from the combined effects of malnutrition, helminthiasis and exposure.

It has been suggested that much of the mortality could be avoided by

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233 the provision at permanent watering points of shelters, together with a reserve of feeding stuffs. The provision of such shelters may, however, involve the authorities in difficulties caused by undue concentration of stock at these watering points in bad seasons, as well as in possible complications arising from competition for the food and shelter. Shelter and rations could not be provided for more than 20-30 days, and the transport of stock feeds for even this short period might be exceedingly difficult. Although shelter and feeding during such a period would no doubt stave off the peak mortality that is likely to occur in spells of unusually severe weather, it would contribute little or nothing toward a solution of the basic problem, to restore to health and good physical condition flocks that have become so debilitated through malnutrition and an increasing worm burden that they are killed off in spectacular fashion by a short spell of severe weather.

The gravest difficulty is the failure of winter grazing, which may be due to a variety of causes: shortage of early winter rains, paucity of growth because of persistent low temperatures, or actual destruction of young herbage by frost. This leads to malnutrition, which in turn allows a rapid build-up of worm burdens—a build-up which is again accelerated by heavy concentration of flocks in the few better areas.

In the circumstances, it seems likely that a more practical approach to the problem would be to provide stocks of feeding stuffs at centers convenient to the farms, where the sheep summer. Flockowners would then be urged to return their sheep to the farms as soon as it became apparent that the grazing had failed, and before the sheep had lost too much condition. Once back on the farms they could be fed on concentrates, supplied by government at favorable rates, supplemented by whatever crop residues may be available as roughage. Straws, dried sugar-beet pulp, bran, coarse grains, cotton seed and cake, can all be made available in an emergency such as is envisaged, and the veterinary service could take in hand mass treatment of flocks to reduce the worm count, and perform whatever immunizations may be necessary.

Elsewhere in this report it is stated that at least a third of the arable land lies fallow each year and that animal manure is almost wholly used as fuel. It is more than possible that the introduction of the practice of returning the sheep in an emergency for winter feeding on the farms may lead eventually to the growing of winter fodder crops, such as berseem, on land that would otherwise be idle. Several cuttings of berseem or lucerne

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could be taken during an average mild winter; if conditions in the desert were good enough to afford adequate keep for the lambing flocks, the berseem crop from the earlier cuttings could be dried, but it would be an advantage to graze off the final crop with stock.

Once farmers become accustomed to a rotation that includes the provision of stock feed and manuring of land through grazing of fodder by sheep (a system particularly suited to maintaining fertility on light wheat and barley lands), then they are well on the way to a balanced system of agriculture, and improvement of livestock types can be pushed ahead rapidly.

To return to the proposal for providing shelters and stocks of reserve foodstuffs in the desert, the mission suggests that the government might experiment by erecting a few such shelters in carefully selected areas, stocking them with food reserves of various kinds. The cost need not be prohibitive. A single shelter sufficient for 300-400 sheep can be built of stone walls shaped like an X, and will cost no more than £S 600. A number of these could be erected in a single location along two quarter circles situated to the left and right of the prevailing wind direction (see Diagram 7). Each group of shelters would be provided with a stock of foodstuffs consisting principally of grain straw mixed with some concentrates. Sheep would be fed for periods of 20-30 days only during exceptionally severe weather. On this basis the feeding and operational costs could probably be kept to £S 2.40 per sheep, of which the flockowner might be called upon to pay at least £S 1 per head.

The mission strongly recommends that both methods be given a thorough trial and that for this purpose up to £S 500,000 per annum be made available during the period 1955-1960.

The provision of additional desert wells at carefully selected sites might be a means of reducing losses in dry seasons. The danger of course is that the provision of permanent water in areas that formerly could be grazed only in particularly favorable seasons may eliminate the very factor that has enabled these areas to retain a reasonable cover of vegetation, and in a few years the result may quite well be a very considerable total reduction in the keep provided. In this matter of utilizing more desert wells a better line may be to investigate the possibility of tapping underground water supplies that seem likely, with the aid of flood or stored surface water, to support small Bedouin settlements, each with a limited acreage of irrigation. Experience in Egypt shows how rapidly the fertility of irrigated

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233 desert land may be built up, starting with groundnuts and going on to vegetables, citrus and grain. But there must be sufficient water, sufficient capital and sufficient determination.

PROPOSED LAYOUT OF DESERT SHELTER

DIAGRAM 7



SEMI-CIRCULAR GROUPING OF SHELTERS



DETAIL OF SINGLE SHELTER

Any considerable increase in the number of wells should be made only after careful study of the grazing areas, and it is essential that there should be a simultaneous acceptance by the Bedouins of controlled grazing, e.g., a complete program of deferred rotational grazing which will allow areas

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to set seed in turn. Such a system of control can be based only upon 233 thorough ecological survey of grazing areas, supported by experiments in grazing management, including the possibility of reseeding with types of perennial herbs and grasses which experience in Australia, South Africa, Morocco and Algeria has shown to be more or less winter-hardy and drought-resistant.[18]

Reseeding would not require plowing, but could be carried out by broadcasting the seed from a light truck or jeep immediately after the rains. During the next two years the yield of selected native and foreign grasses could be tested in small enclosed plots before reseeding operations are undertaken on any considerable scale.

It will be apparent that measures to improve the quality and carrying capacity of desert grazing must be based on actual experiment. The mission recommends that a thorough ecological survey of the desert steppe grazing areas be undertaken as soon as possible, concurrently with experiments on methods of management. It is understood that FAO will probably be assigning a part-time botanical ecologist who will concentrate on the grazing areas; in addition an ecologist will be working in the group of countries to which these problems are common. An FAO sheep specialist with considerable experience of grazing management may also be posted to Syria. It seems that sufficient specialist staff is likely to be available during the next few years to enable a vegetation map to be prepared and to supervise field experiments on the management of the various types of desert grazing. The mission recommends the expenditure of £S 200,000 in support of the program of investigation and in applying the results to selected areas.

The institution of any system of controlled grazing, the establishment of irrigated settlements, and even the protection of reseeded land until the new grass has become well established will present a problem in administrative control. Simple policing measures are likely to be ineffective, and it is essential that the full cooperation of the Bedouins be secured for these measures. A special effort should be made to persuade the leaders and subleaders of the tribes pasturing their flocks in these areas that the control measures are being exercised for the benefit of the Bedouins, and that it is accordingly in their own interest to ensure the success of the experiments. Probably the best method of approach would be the creation of local Bedouin authorities to supervise the measures.

[18] See Annex C, p. 312.

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Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

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In the long run it is the cultivated areas which will have to support more livestock. The expansion of crop land has progressively limited the area of natural grazing land, and increasing numbers of pastoral Bedouins are settling down to agricultural pursuits. Only cultivated land provides a large potential for increasing and improving the feed supply. At present, however, grain stubble and the grass and weeds which spring up on fallow land constitute virtually the only sources of feed for livestock in the cultivated regions. Only a very small area is in improved or "cultivated" pasture, and cropping for forage takes place only in certain limited areas. Hay and silage are not produced.

The objective must be to persuade farmers to grow feed for livestock by intercropping forage crops with cereals, putting part of their fallow into grass and legumes and converting marginal land into improved pasture. The conservation and storage of fodder must also be encouraged. A program with these objectives is, of course, bound to make very slow progress. Its feasibility must be demonstrated, and it will encounter much resistance on the part of farmers who adhere tenaciously to traditional practices.

The mission suggests, however, that a start in this direction be made over the next five or six years. For this reason the mission proposes that the government set aside about £S 500,000 over this period for an experimental demonstration program. Under this program farmers willing to try the establishment of pastures or the production of fodder crops would be given technical and financial assistance by the government. Financial assistance might be given in various forms. The government could supply all or part of the seed, help meet the cost of plowing, pay a small subsidy for the conversion of marginal land to pasture. The digging of trench silos can be performed by hand labor under supervision by the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus a number of experimental and demonstration projects might be established in different parts of Syria. The projects will no doubt reveal in time deficiencies as well as advantages in the light of which the approach and methods would have to be modified from time to time.

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Veterinary Services[18]

Syria is fortunate in being free of the major animal plagues, but such 232
controllable conditions as helminthiasis and the pox diseases are allowed to take a heavy annual toll of sheep and goats, while Newcastle disease in poultry rages almost unchecked over the greater part of the country, in spite of the fact that the laboratory in Damascus can produce an almost unlimited supply of a completely efficacious freeze-dried vaccine at an exceedingly low cost.

It is true that until relatively recently difficulty was experienced in producing locally a satisfactory vaccine for the control of sheep-pox but these difficulties have now been overcome by the loan of FAO personnel; production capacity for sheep-pox vaccine is now sufficient for the annual vaccination of the entire sheep population.

A rising incidence of brucellosis and tuberculosis in cattle, particularly in the urban and suburban dairying herds, may give rise to serious losses unless checked in an early stage. The services of the expert in field diagnosis provided by FAO should be especially valuable in this connection.

The Veterinary Department of the Ministry of Agriculture employs 232
some 16 veterinarians, of whom five have been trained in Europe, four in 654
Turkey, and seven in Egypt. Of the 16, two are at Headquarters in Damascus, four at the school for veterinary assistants, one at the laboratory in Damascus, and nine at field stations. There are said to be about 10 training as veterinarians in Europe, America and Egypt. Experience elsewhere suggests that a fully-qualified professional staff of the present size, strengthened gradually by the accession of young graduates returning from overseas training, ought to provide disease control services adequate for Syria's needs during the next few years, particularly if full use is made of the veterinary assistants trained in the technical school at Damascus.

If the mission's proposals for a program of livestock improvement are adopted, animal diseases will assume a greater importance, since the improved stock is likely to be less tolerant than the low-producing Balady types. More emphasis will then have to be placed on disease control services, and the cadre of veterinarians in government employ will need to be enlarged.

At the present stage, indeed at any stage, quality is undoubtedly much more important than numbers. Professional qualifications of the present

[18] See Annex C, p. 315.

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232 654 staff vary a great deal in standard, and an effort should be made to ensure that staff for replacement and further recruitment is trained to the highest professional standards overseas. The Department should review the position, scrutinize the academic careers of students now abroad, and offer scholarships for short periods, say one year, of postgraduate training in some particular field of activity that will be useful to the government on the candidate's return. This postgraduate training should be entirely practical and the scholar should not be allowed to utilize it mainly for the purpose of obtaining a further degree. Experience in the field, either in government service or in private practice, in some country of similar climatic and stock-raising conditions, but with a much more advanced livestock industry and a highly developed state veterinary service, would be the ideal type of training for such men. FAO would no doubt be able to arrange to place these men in countries suited to the purpose and might even be prepared to offer fellowships, upon condition that the recipient will return to government employment in Syria. The laboratory staff needs relatively little reinforcement at the professional level for the moment. The posting of one additional veterinarian with some overseas laboratory experience would be sufficient; it would be useful if this were done while the FAO experts are at the laboratory to pass on their practical experience.

The technical school for veterinary assistants in Damascus has been giving a two-year course of training in Arabic; it is likely that the course will be lengthened to three years. The school should turn out highly trained assistants whose employment in the Department should enable each government veterinarian considerably to extend his coverage in terms of both numbers of animals and territorial area.

Communications are generally poor and the inadequacy of transport has apparently been one of the greatest handicaps of the field service. It is essential that jeeps or pick-ups should be available in sufficient numbers to enable the veterinarian and his assistants to get round the district, to respond promptly to reports of outbreaks of disease and requests for assistance, and to perform systematic mass-vaccinations where appropriate. Government-owned transport is often unduly costly and inefficiently maintained; if this is true in Syria, consideration might be given to the hiring of transport on a contract basis or to payment of mileage to an officer providing his own transport.

The entire budget allocation for veterinary services in 1954 was £S 188,000, or approximately £S 11,750 for each veterinarian in the

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Department, to cover all charges incidental to his activities, including the salaries of assistants and laborers, the provision of drugs, instruments and laboratory supplies, feed of animals, preparation of vaccines and sera. It is obvious that in relation to the environment the salaries paid to veterinarians are insufficient to attract and hold properly qualified intelligent men, and that the sum available to meet other expenses must be so inadequate that the professional man's abilities cannot be utilized to anything like their full extent. As a consequence in many cases there is a tendency to supplement the government income from commercial sources and eventually to regard the government post as part-time employment.

The mission recommends that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available up to the end of 1960 to defray the cost of a veterinary service, improved and expanded on the lines that are broadly indicated here and in Annex C. It is strongly recommended that a small committee, to which FAO veterinarians should be coopted, be appointed to consider methods of improving the service, with particular attention to salaries, better communications and transport, assistance adequate to permit of the carrying out of mass-vaccination campaigns against Newcastle disease of poultry, sheep-pox, and the control of helminths, etc., along the lines indicated in Annex C. Alternatively, the government might prefer to seek the services of an experienced veterinary administrator to inquire into these matters and make recommendations. Such an inquiry need not take more than perhaps three months. Staff meetings should be arranged and it would be a great advantage to hold at least one joint staff meeting with the services in Lebanon and Jordan. The measures should raise the morale of the service, which at present is regrettably low.

Breeding

The development of higher yielding types of livestock through selection and cross-breeding would be a great boon, assuming that it could be accomplished without sacrificing the hardiness under unfavorable conditions which much of the livestock in Syria has acquired, or that a parallel improvement were made in the environment of the animals. There are certain promising indigenous types which could be used as the starting point of a program to improve breeds. Among these are the Damascus dairy cow, the Julani beef cattle and the Damascus milk goat. Most of the sheep and goats are multi-purpose animals, raised for meat, milk,

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232 wool or hair. Existing poultry breeds are largely nondescript and are
654 characterized by very low productivity.

To carry out experiments in breeding and animal husbandry, the government should push on with its program to establish a central livestock station near Damascus.[17] Within a few years two sub-stations might also be opened at Palmyra and Deir ez Zor, or at Hama, Selemiye or Raqqa There is unfortunately a shortage of Syrians trained in such work, and at the outset it would probably be necessary to employ a foreign farm manager. A minimum of £S 1.2 million will be needed over the next five or six years to meet the necessary costs.

For sheep, the aim should be to develop a more productive animal, and to test the feasibility of breeding more specialized types by successive top-crossing of selected indigenous animals with such imported breeds as Merinos and Merino-Fleisch. For cattle, the task would be to improve the existing Julani and Damascus types by progressive selection and perhaps by a certain amount of crossing with such imported pure breeds as Brown Swiss. In the case of poultry, which is so important to the small farmer, there might be a gradual introduction of exotic blood by the issue to farmers of cockerels of the chosen exotic breeds, raised in the government breeding farm. In this breeding program great care will have to be taken to maintain adequate records on the production and hardiness of successive generations. It will also have to be accompanied by good animal husbandry to bring out the full potentialities of each genetic strain.

VI CREDIT, COOPERATIVES, EDUCATION AND MARKETING

Agricultural Credit

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An adequate volume of credit on reasonable terms is in many respects the key to an improvement in agriculture and animal husbandry. Farmers must have the means to buy better tools, livestock and seed and to introduce new crops. If settled on new land they must be provided with housing and the capital necessary to start production. Both peasant proprietors and tenant farmers must be helped to emancipate themselves gradually from excessive reliance on non-institutional lenders such as landlords and

[17] See Annex C, p. 312.

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merchants who often impose onerous terms and hold the whip hand over their debtors.

The magnitude of the credit problem is not easy to assess. The amount of existing agricultural indebtedness is unknown and future credit needs are correspondingly difficult to estimate. The government would be well advised to carry out a study of the outstanding volume, source and terms of indebtedness in a number of agricultural areas in order to acquire more dependable data as a basis for future action.

Credit at present comes from three sources: the Agricultural Bank, a government institution; the commercial banks; and landlords, merchants and professional money-lenders. The Agricultural Bank provides loans at 6% up to a maximum of £S 7,500 per borrower. At the end of 1953 its outstanding loans amounted to £S 42 million. The average size of loans—£S 264—indicates how the Bank must disperse its limited resources. Since well over half of its assets are represented by long-term and medium-term loans and its lending resources have been increasing rather slowly, the Bank has been able to make new credit available only at an average annual rate of a little over £S 6 million over the four-year period 1950-1953.

A few of the commercial banks, principally the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, have made seasonal production credit available in recent years. Such loans are extended to larger farmers with a good credit standing for a maximum period of 100 days and at an interest rate of 6% to 7½%. The total amount thus made available is probably between £S 10 million and £S 15 million. The banks, however, also finance agriculture indirectly by extending credits to dealers in machinery and irrigation pumps who in turn finance purchasers of such equipment at interest rates of 9% to 12% or even more.

Most farmers can get credit only from non-institutional lenders. Interest rates charged by these vary widely but are often extremely burdensome, ranging as high as 50% to 100%. Even larger farmers often have to rely on such sources and pay as much as 12% to 18% interest. The small peasant proprietors and tenant farmers are generally the poorest credit risk and the most exploited and therefore pay the highest interest rates.

The great need today is for more institutional credit. The regular commercial banks may be expected in time to provide more financing for agriculture. When and if properly supervised grain storage facilities are established in accordance with the mission's recommendations, the banks

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452 will be willing and able to lend to farmers on the security of warehouse
453 receipts. Thus within five or six years we may expect the volume of bank financing to rise to between £S 20 million and £S 25 million. Elsewhere the mission recommends the establishment of a predominantly privately-owned and entirely privately managed Investment Bank. Such a bank would not only invest in industry, but also make loans to farmers for the sinking of wells, the installation of irrigation pumps and the acquisition of machinery. Its lending to agriculture might reach £S 10 million, but its loans would presumably be made to the larger, more creditworthy farmers.

453 It is to the Agricultural Bank that most farmers must look for an expansion of institutional agricultural credit.[18] For this reason the mission strongly recommends that the existing capital and reserves of the Bank, amounting to £S 22.1 million at the end of 1953, be increased to £S 85 million. This should be accomplished by converting the Bank's indebtedness to the government and the government Cereals Office, totaling £S 12.4 million, into a permanent capital contribution and by making an additional government contribution of £S 50 million to the Bank's capital in installments over the next five years. If appropriate facilities for the rediscounting of the Bank's short-term paper are arranged with the projected Central Bank or, in the interim, with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, the Agricultural Bank should be able to increase the volume of its outstanding loans up to between £S 120 million and £S 130 million. If the volume of lending by all institutions expands as indicated, it will then be possible to meet the increasing credit needs of Syrian agriculture and probably relieve at least to some extent the farmers' bondage to non-institutional lenders.

The Agricultural Bank should continue to cater primarily to the small farmers. Some limit on the size of individual loans should therefore be enforced, although the present limit of £S 7,500 might well be raised to around £S 10,000 to £S 15,000, with the proviso that total loans above a certain figure, say £S 5,000, shall be no greater than one-quarter to one-third of all loans outstanding. This limitation would not apply to loans to cooperatives, thus giving farmers an additional incentive to band together for such purposes as the installation of an irrigation pump or the sinking of a well, which might require a larger investment.

[18] See Annex E, p. 340.

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It should be emphasized that when the Agricultural Bank lends to cooperatives for re-lending to their members, it should accept as security the joint and several liability of the cooperative (i.e., the signatures of the Committee of the cooperative on the bond). The Bank should not demand mortgage security from the cooperative as a whole or from its members individually.

It is the mission's considered judgment that the present 6% interest rate charged by the Bank should be raised to 8%. The latter rate is not unreasonably high considering the cost of capital in Syria and particularly the much higher average cost of non-institutional credit. Such a rate would enable the Bank to increase its earnings and thereby its resources for future lending. Certain exceptions to this higher rate should in our opinion be made. As a special incentive, loans to cooperatives might be made at 6%. The mission also suggests a rate of 4% to 5% on certain long-term loans, such as those for the construction of farm dwellings and buildings, and for the establishment of orchards and vineyards where the yield is long deferred and investment might be discouraged by a high interest rate.

It is idle to expect that a substantial increase in the resources of the Bank will of itself solve the problem of agricultural credit. Much depends on the wisdom with which its resources are used and on the effectiveness of the organization and operating methods of the Bank. In the past the procedure for obtaining a loan from the Bank has been so cumbersome that borrowers have often preferred to pay a much higher price for credit from other sources. In the future the Bank's operations must be considerably more flexible. Lending in the past has been governed almost wholly by the availability of formal security in the form of a mortgage or joint guarantee. In the future the purpose of the loan should increasingly become the governing factor. The economic soundness of any loan must be determined primarily in the light of its impact on the production of the borrower. To be sure, some lending will always be needed to tide farmers over temporary difficulties due to harvest failures, physical disabilities or other causes beyond their control. In the long run, however, an increase in agricultural indebtedness will be warranted only if it is instrumental in raising the output of farmers in such a way that they will have an ample margin for repayment of their loans. For instance, institutional credit on reasonable terms can hardly replace non-institutional credit at usurious rates of interest unless the borrowers can at the same

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463 time be made more creditworthy by ensuring that the proceeds of loans are really used to improve production.

Thus the Bank must work out with the farmer in the village the best application of credit.[19] What is needed is a system of supervised credit which will in effect combine lending with agricultural extension or educational work. For this task the Bank will need a staff of credit supervisors properly trained not only in credit techniques and problems, but also in agriculture, methods of cooperative organization and action among farmers, and similar subjects. The mission strongly urges that about 100 selected students at the secondary agricultural school at Kharabo be trained over the next five or six years as credit supervisors by adding another year of specialized instruction to the regular school course. In devising training courses and initiating the supervised government credit program the government might usefully enlist the cooperation of the Near East Foundation, which has acquired valuable experience in working with farmers in a number of villages. Limitations of staff will make it impossible to launch the program on a large scale at once. The work can begin in certain selected areas and then be extended as more staff becomes available and experience is acquired.

The credit supervisor would be an employee of the Bank but would act primarily as a counsellor to farmers. He would advise farmers on a program of improvement which would raise their output and therefore merit a credit. While he would not handle or process a loan application, he would facilitate access to the Bank in meritorious cases, and loans would be made in the area where he is active only on his recommendation. He should never prejudice his relations with the farmers by acting as a collector of loans. His concern would be primarily with the small farmers, particularly with those who organize themselves as cooperatives, or with individuals who are not creditworthy in the sense of being able to offer formal security for loans. In fact, a credit supervisor might usefully be attached to each cooperative to guide it in its early and most difficult years.

In its lending operations the Bank will frequently encounter cases where peasants labor under such a crushing debt burden that they have no hope of emancipation. Under such circumstances additional credits designed to improve the farmer's position become impossible unless the existing

[19] See Annex E, p. 345.

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debt can be reduced to manageable proportions. The mission recommends therefore that Syria enact legislation establishing procedures under which the Bank can obtain an amicable and, if necessary, a compulsory adjustment of past indebtedness as a prerequisite to the extension of fresh credit calculated to set the farmer on his feet. The legislation adopted in Cyprus on this subject is likely to provide valuable guidance.

To carry out this expanded credit program the management of the Bank must be strengthened as much as possible. Competent management can be secured only if salaries comparable with those paid in commercial banks are offered. The board of directors should be carefully chosen from among citizens who have a genuine interest in agricultural credit. The inclusion of a qualified commercial banker would provide the board with valuable experience even though an agricultural credit institution should obviously not be operated just like a commercial bank. For the supervised credit program and the work with cooperatives it will be desirable to obtain the services of an expert foreign adviser. The bank management should be largely autonomous and free to determine its own operating procedures.

Cooperatives[20]

The mission has already indicated its belief that cooperatives should become an important vehicle for the extension of credit to farmers. Unfortunately few cooperatives now exist. Although 28 are officially registered, the great majority of them manifestly exist only on paper. Yet there are instances of successful cooperative organization, such as the olive growers' cooperative at Tartous. Nor is interest wholly lacking among farmers. In the past a considerable number of villages have appealed in vain to the government for assistance in the formation of cooperatives. The work carried on by the Near East Foundation in certain villages indicates that farmers are quick to respond when the advantages of cooperative action are pointed out to them.

In principle cooperatives can become important agencies of self-help. They can stimulate the development of a democratic community spirit and a sense of self-reliance among peasants who now feel helpless and excessively dependent on the landlord, merchant and money-lender.

[20] See Annex E, p. 348.

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474 Farmers are often able to do collectively what they cannot accomplish as individuals. Cooperatively they can bring their products to the nearest market where they will fetch better prices, or sink a well and install a pump to provide irrigation on terms far more attractive than those imposed by a private pump owner. Collectively they can also get access to more credit and to some extent pool equipment such as dusters and sprayers which individual members cannot afford to own. Local roads can be built and other village improvements initiated by cooperative community action.

With the present level of social organization and education in the villages, however, it can hardly be expected that villagers themselves will generally take the initiative in forming cooperatives. Cooperatives must be encouraged, nurtured, guided and supervised by the government. In theory the government is in favor of cooperatives and has even accorded them sweeping tax exemptions. In practice, however, it has taken almost no action to encourage them and has on occasion even displayed a rather negative attitude. Only one officer in the Ministry of Agriculture is concerned full time with cooperatives. The basic statute governing cooperatives is needlessly complicated and must be virtually incomprehensible to farmers. The protracted consideration preceding registration of cooperatives appears to indicate a rather deep-seated distrust of cooperative action on the part of at least some government officials.

The first steps which must be taken are to simplify the cooperative statute and to organize and staff an adequate section in the Ministry of Agriculture to deal with cooperatives. Some of the personnel will no doubt require training abroad. The principal functions of this section would be to organize and guide cooperatives, train their leaders and managers and audit their accounts. The effective discharge of all of these functions is essential to the success of the cooperative movement. In the field work of organization and guidance the cooperative section could obtain considerable assistance from credit supervisors on the staff of the Agricultural Bank. Rapid progress, particularly in the initial years, cannot be expected, but the formation of a hundred cooperatives over the next five years might be set as the target. For this program the mission suggests a government allocation of £S 500,000. The FAO or some other agency should also be invited to provide technical assistance in training and getting the program off to a good start.

The type of cooperative most suitable for Syria is one that would dis-

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charge a number of closely related functions such as the purchase and sale of farm supplies; the procurement and extension of credit and the marketing of farm products. The granting of loans and the sale of farm supplies are closely linked, and cooperative marketing would facilitate the collection of loans. For certain special functions such as irrigation, single-purpose cooperatives would be more appropriate. On balance the mission thinks it best that cooperatives be organized on the basis of unlimited liability, for only in this way will all the members have the greatest incentive to see that all the credit is effectively utilized and repaid. The mission has already indicated its view that cooperatives should be given credit at 6% rather than 8% interest. The cooperative's own lending, however, should be done at 8% to provide a margin for meeting operating costs and building up reserves.

Agricultural Extension and Community Work[21]

In most underdeveloped countries, programs to improve agricultural practices and yields founder because there is no organization and staff to work continuously with farmers, educating and assisting them and demonstrating to them the practical utility of better methods and techniques. In Syria, too, there exists no agricultural extension or educational service in that sense. To be sure, the various departments of the Ministry of Agriculture have representatives in the *mohafazats* or provinces dealing with such subjects as agricultural production, veterinary matters, plant protection and the like. But the time of these men is largely monopolized by various administrative tasks such as the enforcement of government regulations, crop reporting, locust control and similar matters. They do not have the opportunity, and sometimes not even the inclination, to work with individual farmers. Their contacts with villages are brief, sporadic and infrequent.

The mission has given considerable thought to the problem of organizing effective work among the agricultural population in the villages. Our conclusion is that this work would best be entrusted to a special rural community development organization. Other countries faced with a similar problem, like India and Pakistan, have launched such an organization; in India, where one has now been functioning for some years,

[21] See Annex C, p. 322.

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242 encouraging results have been achieved. The justification for a special organization rests primarily on the fact that a properly conceived village improvement program transcends the bounds of agriculture. Its principal task, of course, will always be to raise the standards of agriculture [511] and animal husbandry, the source of livelihood of the villagers. Yet the living conditions of the 2,000,000 people living in villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants must be improved as a whole. Standards of housing, health and sanitation, and adult education must be raised, and better roads and community facilities provided. Moreover, the need for special techniques in approaching this entire problem argues in favor of a special organization. The government has neither the staff nor the funds to carry out all the urgent village improvements itself. Its task must be rather to stimulate and assist the villagers in mobilizing their resources for self-help. Only in this way can a developement program achieve worthwhile results at the village level.

242 The program the mission has in mind calls for the progressive intro- 657 duction of rural community leaders or workers into the villages. One community worker for about 4,000 people should suffice, and if on this basis he must cover a number of villages over an extended area, he should have an assistant, sellected preferably from among the rural school teachers. The community worker, though a government employee, should have no administrative duties. His sole function should be to encourage and crystallize the villagers' desire for improvement. His training should be primarily agricultural, but he should also have sufficient knowledge of the other aspects of village life to suggest what can be done. Most of the things which can or should be done to better living conditions are rather elementary. The knowledge of the community worker, therefore, need not be profound. Moreover, he would be able to call upon the specialized services of the government for advice and assistance in dealing with problems with which he himself cannot cope. For instance, he should know enough to identify and prescribe measures for most of the prevalent diseases and pests which attack crops and livestock, but he may need help from the veterinarian or pathological service to deal with difficult cases or extensive outbreaks of disease. If he can awaken an interest in cooperatives, he will then need to call in a credit supervisor from the Agricultural Bank or an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture to launch one. He may get the villagers to start a program of constructing latrines, but need advice from the sanitation experts of the Ministry of Health on methods of construc-

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tion. Similarly, he may induce the villagers to work on improving village roads, but may have to go to the regional road engineer of the Ministry of Public Works for advice and the temporary loan of a truck. In many respects he will be the intermediary between the villagers and the government services which can assist them. In discharging his task he will obviously have to work closely with the regular local government officials such as the *moukhtar* of the village or the *mudir* of the *nahiye* or township. His success will largely depend on the support of these officials.

Ultimately there should be about 500 such community workers and 200 assistants. The extensive preparatory and organizational work involved in starting the program would be such, however, that only about 12 community workers would be operating at the end of six years. Thereafter, the program would gain momentum, with the number of workers doubling each year so that the target could be attained in another six years. For the first six years the mission envisages a total expenditure of £S 2.7 million, but by the end of 12 years annual expenditures of £S 7 million would be required.

The mission suggests that the rural community improvement organization be headed by a special administrator directly responsible to the prime minister and the council of ministers. He should recruit a number of foreign experts to help with the necessary training and planning and the initial implementation. This group would include persons experienced in general community work, public health, agriculture and housing. The FAO and such organizations as the Near East Foundation and the Ford Foundation might be asked to provide the necessary personnel. The experience of the Near East Foundation, which has been operating a number of pilot community projects along the same lines in the Ghouta around Damascus, would be particularly helpful. The foreign experts would be primarily responsible for planning and training. They should draw up a basic handbook which would be a compendium of practical measures which community workers can apply and would offer them guidance in techniques of stimulating and organizing community action. They would plan the necessary training courses for community workers in the secondary agricultural school and assist in introducing instruction on the elements of community development work in the university, teachers' training colleges and other schools. Their assistance will also be needed in holding regional seminars in which local officials would be acquainted with the objectives and methods of the program.

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244 657 Other government services must be effectively tied in with the community improvement program. At the national level, therefore, the administrator should be assisted by a coordinating and policy-making council on which the Ministries of Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Public Works and National Economy, and the Agricultural Bank would all be represented. Similarly, the work at the provincial or county level should be coordinated by a council representing the cooperating government services and chaired by the *mohafez* or the *kaimakam*. In fact, the community worker might best be attached to the office of the *mohafez* or *kaimakam*.

The inauguration and expansion of this rural community improvement organization will increase rather than diminish the demand for the services of the specialized officers of the Ministry of Agriculture. More agronomists, veterinarians and plant protection experts will be needed to make frequent visits to villages either on their own initiative or on request for the purpose of helping and advising community workers. In the beginning these specialists will serve a dual role, carrying out their present administrative tasks and giving technical supervision and guidance to the village workers. With further expansion of the community development system, however, the services of full-time technical specialists will be required. This will allow for the separation of administrative and regulatory functions from educational and demonstration activities, thus making it possible for the technical specialists to develop a closer personal working relationship with the villagers. The return of people now studying abroad will enable the Ministry to strengthen its staff in the provinces, but more personnel will also have to be recruited from the secondary agricultural school.

Agricultural Education and Staffing[22]

658 874 Repeatedly the mission has emphasized the vital need for more trained staff if the government is to discharge its responsibility for raising the standard of agriculture and animal husbandry. This points to the need for providing much greater facilities for education in agriculture at the secondary school and university levels. The mission has considered a suggestion to establish a faculty at the Syrian University to provide the higher education in agriculture and veterinary science for which students

[22] See Annex C, p. 318.

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must now go abroad. Ultimately such a faculty should be established, but we have concluded that for the time being it would be wiser to concentrate on the expansion of intermediate and secondary education, the more so since excellent facilities for higher education in these fields are available not far from Syria. The mission would recommend, however, that the government increase its stipends for study abroad by a total amount of £S 750,000 in the period up to the end of 1960.

There are at present four agricultural schools of intermediate grade in the provinces and one secondary school at Kharabo, near Damascus. The mission has already recommended the establishment of an additional secondary school at Kamichliye which should provide some specialized training in agricultural engineering. The mission also proposes that the existing intermediate school at Aleppo be raised to secondary rank. Finally, the accommodation at other schools should be expanded. A program of this scope would entail additional capital expenditures of about £S 2 million and recurring operating expenses of £S 750,000 up to the end of 1960.

The Kharabo school will for some time have to be the principal means of training personnel for the various agricultural programs the mission has outlined. It has already been suggested that at least another year of specialized instruction should be added to the regular curriculum at that school for the training of agricultural credit supervisors and community workers.

The curriculum of agricultural schools will need to be reviewed and revised in order to produce graduates who are adequately equipped to enter government service or to engage in farming. The curriculum is too academic at present. It must focus more on the practical problems faced by Syrian agriculture. More emphasis must be put on manual training and shopwork so that students will know something about construction, the making and repair of implements, carpentry and other essential village crafts. More opportunity for specialization should be given in the final year of schooling. Finally, it is important that students be required to do more of the practical manual work on school farms. It is, after all, only by demonstrating their ability and willingness to do practical agricultural work that they can hope to make an impact in the villages.

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Marketing

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The mission now comes to a consideration of the last but by no means the least important agricultural problem, marketing. This subject has many aspects, including transport, storage and grading, quality control and price stabilization. Improved marketing practices can yield the producer better prices and the consumers a higher quality product.

Elsewhere the mission discusses the vital factor of transport, and it has already commented on the role cooperatives could play in the local marketing of agricultural products. Here the mission wishes in the first instance to focus on the great importance of better facilities for the storage, cleaning and fumigating of grain. The lack of these facilities and the consequences for Syria have already been emphasized. The mission found a widespread recognition of their need in Syria, except perhaps among the merchants, who naturally feel that public grain storage and the extension of credit on the basis of warehouse receipts will weaken their control of the market. The mission considers it imperative, however, that Syria proceed with a grain storage program in order to strengthen the farmers and to maintain Syria's position in an increasingly competitive world grain market.

It is estimated that in the next decade some 760,000 tons of grain, principally wheat and barley, will enter commercial channels annually, and that this volume will be distributed among the producing regions approximately as follows: Jezireh, 400,000 tons; Euphrates, 95,000; Aleppo, 95,000; Hauran, 60,000; Homs-Hama, 50,000.

The mission recommends that total storage capacity of about 230,000 tons be established by 1960 at an estimated cost of £S 21 million. In the grain port of Latakia a transit silo with a capacity of 20,000-40,000 tons should be built. In Aleppo new facilities with a capacity of 60,000 tons are needed to supplement existing warehouse space, serve the surrounding grain-producing areas and operate as a reservoir for the rapid replenishment of the Latakia silo. For the Jezireh the mission suggests storage capacity of about 150,000 tons. The Latakia and Aleppo facilities should be mechanized and furnished with cleaning and fumigating equipment. In the Jezireh, however, the mission suggests that provisionally only about a fifth be mechanized. The storage there would consist simply of covered sheds which could be economically built.

The Latakia and Aleppo storage will enable Syria to export clean grain,

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free of infestation, which will better be able to withstand competition on the world market and fetch higher prices. The Jezireh storage will make it unnecessary for farmers to dump their grain on the market immediately after the harvest, enable them to obtain credit on easier terms, and lower the cost of transport. All the facilities together will significantly reduce the substantial losses resulting at present from exposure to weather, infestation and rodents. The mission's estimate of the direct advantages resulting from the reduction of losses and the improvement in prices leads it to conclude that farmers and merchants would have ample incentive to utilize the storage facilities, even after taking into account the storage charges they would have to pay on the basis of operating costs and amortization.

We believe that the storage facilities, even when they have to be built by the government, should be operated by qualified private management under a long-term lease which would specify the maximum permissible storage charges. Farmers and merchants are unlikely to use facilities operated by the government itself.

Measures to improve the marketing of certain other products should also be taken. Large quantities of raw milk are now marketed in major cities without adequate quality control or veterinary inspection of dairy cattle. The UNICEF, concerned over milk supply for children, has apparently offered to provide equipment and assistance for the installation of a pasteurization plant in Damascus, and the mission urges that this project be carried out as promptly as possible. A similiar plant may be feasible for Aleppo. It is important that some control be established also over the source of supply. Periodic tuberculin and blood agglutination tests for the diagnosis of tuberculosis and brucellosis in dairy animals might, for example, be initiated. In Aleppo, where many dairy cows are kept in the city under unsanitary conditions which produce a high incidence of tuberculosis, the removal of dairy cattle to locations outside the city is strongly recommended.

Improvements in public abattoirs would also bring about better prices for producers and provide a better quality meat for the consumer. Existing abattoirs are for the most part old, unhygienic and possess no means for salvaging many of the valuable by-products of slaughtering which could be used for the manufacture of fertilizers, chemicals and drugs. While complete renovation is not feasible in the immediate future, the mission suggests that a start be made by erecting a modern abattoir in Damascus at an estimated cost of £S 600,000.

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656 435 A final comment must be made on price stabilization operations. At times in the past the government has intervened in the marketing of cereals in order to support the price or to protect the home market from the consequences of threatened shortages and excessive prices. Through the Cereals Office and its predecessor agencies it has engaged in buying and selling grain, and occasionally it has resorted to export prohibitions to safeguard domestic supplies. Under emergency conditions when the world supply of cereals is short, as in time of war or threat of war, such measures may be justified. Normally, however, it is better to allow the market forces free play. The history of government intervention in the market demonstrates that the government has often acted on the basis of information which subsequently proved erroneous in whole or in part. Frequently information on impending government measures has leaked out, giving windfall profits to privileged speculators. Above all, it is impossible in the long run to insulate the Syrian grain market from the world market. If there is a shortage in Syria and prices rise, some merchants will quickly seize the opportunity to import grain, and if world market prices decline, Syrian prices will inevitably have to follow if exports are not to be lost. On the whole it would be far better for the government to concentrate on the task of improving its crop statistics and to publish frequent and more reliable information on production and prices for the guidance of farmers and merchants. If emergency conditions arise, it will always be possible to authorize government intervention by special decree.

654 241 231 *Projected Expenditures*

We can now recapitulate the government expenditures in the field of agriculture and animal husbandry which are envisaged over the six years up to the end of 1960. Total projected outlays amount to around £S 336 million, or about £S 56 million per year. This represents a very substantial increase over expenditures in recent years which the mission has found difficult to ascertain but which probably have not averaged much more than £S 11 million a year.

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TABLE 6 Expenditures on Agriculture for the Six-Year Period 1955-60

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(Thousand £S)

		Total	Average annual
Irrigation and reclamation		197,200	32,866
Aerial and soil surveys and mapping		4,500	750
Credit, cooperatives, education and marketing			
Capital for Agricultural Bank	50,000		
Cooperatives	500[a]		
Rural Community Improvement Program	2,700		
Agricultural schools	2,750[a]		
Stipends for foreign study	750[a]		
Grain storage	21,000		
Damascus abattoir	600		
		78,300	13,050
Research and experimentation			
Central direction	1,800[a]		
Seed selection and propagation	2,700[a]		
Crop rotation research and trials	1,000[a]		
Livestock breeding	1,200[a]		
		6,700[a]	1,117
Encouragement of better agricultural practices			
Fertilizer	500		
Forage and green manuring	500		
Improvement and establishment of pastures	500		
		1,500	250
Special livestock program			
Veterinary services	1,200[a]		
Livestock shelters	1,720		
Reseeding of grazing land	200		
Development of desert water supplies	2,250		
		5,370	895
Agricultural settlements		4,500[b]	750
Miscellaneous			
Small implements center	525		
Special instructions on operation and maintenance of agricultural machinery	500		
Forestry service	500[a]		
		1,525	254
Continuing expenditures of Ministry of Agriculture		36,700[c]	6,117
Grand total		336,295	56,049

[a] Additional expenditures beyond levels of recent years.
[b] Other than those financed by the Agricultural Bank.
[c] Excluding special and additional expenditures specified elsewhere, but including about £S 700,000 for extra overhead expenditures.

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CHAPTER 4 *INDUSTRY*

433 Considering its size and general level of development, Syria already has a considerable manufacturing industry.[22] While Syria can hardly be called an "industrialized" country as yet, the growth of manufacturing during the last decade would undoubtedly have outpaced that of agriculture if certain special circumstances, such as the availability of idle land and a great demand for agricultural commodities, had not produced an equally rapid expansion of agricultural output. Most of the industrial production is for the home market, although in 1953 manufactures, particularly those of the textile industry, contributed about 15% of the country's exports.

Modern factory production in Syria is a relatively recent development. While a few textile factories and a cement plant were established before the last war, prewar manufacturing was predominantly handicraft. In certain branches, such as the weaving of brocades and the working of metals, Syrian artisans had established a world-wide reputation. However, methods of production and even volume of output in the handicraft industries had long been rather static and had even deteriorated somewhat under the impact of the competition of foreign machine-made goods.

The scarcity and high prices of foreign manufactures during the war and immediate postwar years greatly favored an expansion of Syrian industrial production. Many new factories were established. The abnormally high profits earned in commerce during these years caused merchants to turn to industry as an investment outlet for their surplus capital. Once the profitability of industry was demonstrated, additional capital was attracted. Many industrial enterprises reinvested a substantial portion of their profits in further expansion. The opportunities for profit also stimulated some influx of foreign capital, particularly from Lebanon.
[473] Nearly all of the new enterprises took the form of joint stock companies. Although in each case a limited number of businessmen took the initiative in founding the company and retained the controlling interest, the fact that at least some of the stock ownership became rather widely dis-

[22] See Annex F, p. 357.

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433 persed testifies to the appeal which industrial investment has made to a growing number of people.

[228] The textile industry has taken the most prominent place in Syria's industrial development. There are 90,000 to 100,000 spindles working on cotton and rayon and well over 5,000 mechanical looms. In cotton cloth Syria is approaching self-sufficiency and in rayon cloth it has already achieved a net export surplus. The woolen industry, dependent on imports of raw wool or yarn, is much less developed. In dyeing and printing, modernization is well under way. Along with the production of yarn and cloth, the output of garments has considerably expanded. Knitted goods, underwear, socks and stockings are now produced on a sufficient scale to permit exports.

The vegetable oil industry and the manufacture of soap have grown substantially in the postwar period, particularly as the increase in cotton cultivation supplied more raw materials. The food canning industry was expanded, and a factory was established to produce refined sugar from domestic beet and imported raw sugar. A second cement plant was installed; the two together expect to reach an annual production capacity of 400,000 tons by 1955. The postwar period also witnessed the establishment of a number of modern flour mills, a glass factory, a metal container plant and factories producing, among other commodities, rubber boots, matches, and beverages.

Present Stage of Development

Since manufacturing is a field for private enterprise in Syria, the mission has concerned itself not with individual projects, but rather with government policies which guide and stimulate private industrial investment. These policies must, of course, be devised in the light of the current stage of industrial development and of the problems which industry faces.

In this connection it should be noted, first of all, that there have been no conspicuous cases of misdirected investment in industry. The glass plant was undoubtedly conceived on too ambitious a scale, and the government participated with private capital in an abortive venture to manufacture certain types of machinery and spare parts. By and large, however, investment has been in fields where Syria should in the long run be able to achieve efficient production capable of withstanding foreign competition. In the main, Syrian industry falls, with some overlapping, in the

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following categories: processing of indigenous agricultural products, including cotton ginning, flour milling, vegetable oil extraction, tanning and food preserving; production of goods which because of transport costs are advantageously produced at or near the centers of consumption, such as cement and other building materials and, to a lesser extent, glass, furniture and other wood manufactures, and beverages; and the manufacture of simple consumer goods which are purchased in considerable volume by the home market, such as textiles, soap, boots and shoes, utensils, matches, sugar and sweets and the like. In all these lines Syria might be said either to enjoy some natural advantage or at least not to suffer any serious disabilities by comparison with other countries.

This does not mean that all Syrian industry is already so efficient as to be able to meet unrestricted foreign competition. Like any other young industrial country, Syria suffers from a number of handicaps which at least in the present stage prevent it from being fully competitive. Labor, management and equipment are deficient in varying degrees. With respect to labor, the mission was told that Syrian workmen have revealed considerable capacity for acquiring industrial techniques and that long-established handicraft skills have been helpful in building up a factory labor force. But a truly skilled labor force can be developed only over a long period of time, and it is evident that real labor costs as reflected by current wage rates and labor productivity are still rather high in some branches of industry. Managerial skills also vary widely, even within a single industry. In general, Syrian industrialists have demonstrated notable initiative and imagination in building up and managing their enterprises. Yet the picture is spotty. In some plants, particularly the larger ones, the quality of management compares favorably with that in western countries. Costs are carefully controlled, the management is acquainted with industrial methods and equipment used in other countries, and competent engineers, frequently recruited abroad, direct the technical aspects of production. In others, primarily small enterprises, management cannot afford to engage qualified engineers and must rely more on its own experience, painfully acquired at the expense of costly mistakes. The same differences were noted by the mission with respect to industrial equipment. Some plants are extremely well equipped, others struggle along with poor second-hand machinery, and still others are only partly mechanized. In Syrian industry, as in other segments of the economy, the most advanced and the most primitive exist side by side. In the textile industry, for example, one finds

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completely integrated plants carrying on spinning, weaving and dyeing; 433 a large number of enterprises each equipped with a small number of mechanical looms; and, finally, perhaps some 6,000 hand looms still operating in part. In the leather industry there are a few modern tanneries but the bulk of the output apparently still comes from small establishments operating without machinery and with primitive techniques. In some branches of manufacturing, such as the production of leather shoes and domestic and other utensils, production is still in the handicraft stage. There is evidence, however, that even small shops are tending to mechanize themselves to some extent by the purchase of one or two machines.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that there are great variations in efficiency even among the larger enterprises. This is reflected in part in great disparities in the profitability of industry. Profits vary widely not only from one branch of industry to another but also within a single industrial branch. In general, competition within Syria has not been sufficiently strong to force out the less efficient producers. Thus one of the central problems of Syrian industry is to bring about a general reduction of costs by assisting the less efficient producers to improve their methods of production, or, alternatively, to help the more efficient to expand their capacity and output more quickly than they could with their own resources.

We believe that the period of rapid industrial expansion has come to a close. Even in the last few years the emphasis has been more on consolidation than on further growth. While many existing plants have continued to expand, especially by installing more modern, efficient machinery, fewer new factories have been established. The more obvious or "natural" industries have been created. In some branches there is even capacity surplus to requirements, particularly considering the limited ability to export. This is true, for instance, of cotton ginning, vegetable oil extraction, glass and matches. We do not mean to imply that industrial investment opportunities have been exhausted. Further diversification of the textile and apparel industry may be possible, and factory production of shoes and the manufacture of paper and paperboard from straw or poplar wood may be undertaken. One or two new cement plants are apparently going to be established. The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried on by many small shops but the quality of output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed

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433 plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements which, in accordance with our proposals, might be developed for use on Syrian farms. It should be emphasized, however, that future industrial expansion will need to be more selective and that projects will require careful technical and economic scrutiny to establish their suitability for Syria.

We conclude, therefore, that improvement in efficiency and more careful, selective expansion are the principal problems which Syrian industry faces. To meet these problems we have a number of recommendations involving (1) increasing exposure of industry to foreign competition, (2) development of a larger market for industrial products, (3) establishment of an investment bank to provide technical and financial assistance to industry and (4) improvement in vocational education.

Protection of Industry

453 654 657 457 Syrian industry today is in many ways shielded against foreign competition. Protection of this type is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating only from 1949. Before that time industry had developed with little or no government assistance. Prewar tariffs were moderate and essentially revenue-producing in character. Virtually the only concessions to industry were lower duties on plant and equipment and raw materials. The rapid expansion of mechanical manufacturing occurred at a time when there was little competition from abroad. During the war imports were largely impossible and in the immediate postwar years the demand for manufactures was such that rising imports were not incompatible with the continued development of domestic output. With the relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions in 1948 and an increasingly abundant supply of manufactures in the world market, Syrian industry finally began to suffer from foreign competition. In 1949 the government came to the rescue by providing industrial establishments with facilities to obtain state-guaranteed loans at low interest rates from the issue department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. Pressure for more effective protection of industry was instrumental in terminating the customs union with Lebanon, which as a trading nation was interested in keeping tariffs moderate. Following the dissolution of this economic union in March 1950, import duties were generally raised and in many cases almost doubled. In 1951 tariffs on such articles as textiles, glass and soap were again sharply increased and the

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first import embargoes were imposed. In 1952 a large number of imports were prohibited and a *de facto* sugar trading and manufacturing monopoly was instituted. The following year, however, the Minister of Economics was deprived of discretionary authority to impose embargoes, and a number of prohibitions were subsequently lifted. Even so, import embargoes are still applied to such consumer goods as cotton hosiery, socks and stockings, "job lot cloth," second-hand cotton and silk clothing, men's shirts, vegetable oils, various soaps, margarine, canned vegetables and fruits, confectionery, glass and glass products, match boxes and match wood, matches, pins, wooden furniture and boots and shoes. These protective measures have been supplemented by controls over exports of certain raw materials designed to give domestic industry preferential access to available supplies. Importation of ginning machines was prohibited to safeguard existing enterprises, and imports of second-hand looms and knitting machines were stopped, to insure the installation of modern machinery. In 1952 the government also initiated licensing of industrial establishments for the purpose of preventing overexpansion and ill-considered ventures. During the same year more positive assistance was provided by enacting a law for the encouragement of industry which extended a number of benefits to new enterprises and extensions of existing plants.

The mission has no doubt that some protection of industry is justified, particularly in underdeveloped countries which need time to raise labor, technical and managerial skills to a level approximating those in the more advanced industrial countries. As we have already pointed out, the types of industry developed in Syria are generally of a character to warrant the expectation that they can ultimately stand on their own feet. This goal, however, will not be reached as long as production is as effectively insulated against outside competition as at present. The present system of exaggerated protection does not provide a sufficient incentive to raise efficiency and productivity. For Syrian consumers it involves excessive sacrifices in the form of higher prices and poorer quality. In recent years, for example, the Syrian government has found it necessary to protect consumers by controlling the prices of such articles as vegetable oils, yarn and cement.

In view of these considerations we recommend in particular that the present import embargoes be abolished. In some cases it may be necessary to substitute import duties higher than those now included in the tariff schedule, but in those instances prohibitive rates should be avoided and

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433 provision made for gradual reduction of the duties. At the same time we
654 suggest that the whole tariff schedule be re-examined. By and large it
651 cannot be said that the general level of tariffs is excessively high, particu-
457 larly since ad valorem rates are levied on imports valued at the official rate of exchange, and this entails an undervaluation of about 40% compared to the actual exchange rate. In fact, we recommend elsewhere that tariff rates be assessed on the basis of actual foreign exchange rates for the purpose of increasing government revenues. This should not be construed, however, as a proposal to raise all tariffs irrespective of their nature. On the contrary, we would suggest that, as part of the general revision of the schedule, those rates which are primarily protective in character should as far as possible be reduced for the purpose of encouraging outside competition and lowering prices. If necessary, such reductions could be graduated over a period of time.

434 *Possibilities of a Larger Market*
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The expansion and, above all, the diversification of industrial output in Syria is restricted by the rather small domestic market. In a country of only 3.6 million people with low purchasing power it is generally possible to manufacture only a limited range of articles which are used widely enough to warrant production on an economic scale. Broader industrial opportunities are likely to emerge only if a larger market is initially available. In the case of Syria it should be possible to establish such a market in cooperation with other Arab countries, all of which suffer from a similar handicap in the development of their industries. Over recent years the Arab countries have increasingly stressed their community of interest and the need for closer cooperation. The field of industrial development offers a particularly challenging opportunity for common endeavor. We do not suggest, of course, that the types of industrial enterprises to be developed by each country should be the subject of joint government decision. There should be consultation in cases where particular ventures are to be launched with special government assistance. In the main, however, the location and development of industry should be decided by the free play of competitive forces operating in a larger, common Arab market.

To a limited extent the Arab countries have already taken steps to develop such a market. Syria has concluded bilateral agreements with Lebanon and Jordan which free certain products from import restrictions

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and provide for a number of reciprocal tariff reductions and even exemptions, and has been considering the renewal in some form of the close economic ties with Lebanon which prevailed before 1950. All the Arab countries joined in 1953 in an Inter-Arab Economic Agreement providing for tariff reductions on a considerable number of industrial products without, however, affecting other barriers to trade.

The establishment of a common Arab market will undoubtedly take time. The history of the Benelux economic union demonstrates that it can only be achieved gradually and then only if there is a full understanding among the partners of each other's problems and a willingness to make concessions and sacrifices. A single market cannot be established simply by a progressive elimination of trade barriers; it entails also a gradual coordination of those economic policies and measures which govern the conditions under which enterprise in the various countries operates. To bring national cost and price structures into line with each other and to equalize the conditions of competition, it will be necessary to harmonize, step by step, fiscal, monetary and exchange policies, the terms governing access to raw materials and equipment and the legislation regulating labor conditions and providing assistance to industry. If this can be accomplished, the possibilities of further industrial development in the Arab world are likely to be significantly greater.

Establishment of an Investment Bank

The mission attaches great importance to the establishment of an institution capable of furnishing both technical and financial assistance to industry. When industrialists have sufficient capital for investment at present, they can turn only to the government; the banks provide only working capital. As already indicated, the government began in 1949 to guarantee loans for this purpose through the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. During the period June 1949-January 1952, 18 such loans totaling £S 23.6 million were made, although by the end of 1953 repayments had reduced the balance to £S 13.4 million. This guaranteed-loan scheme was suspended in 1952 but revived at the beginning of 1954, subject to a limitation of £S 15 million on the entire amount outstanding.

For a number of reasons we believe that this method of financial assistance ought to be abandoned. Although the interest rate of 3%, which has been made possible only because of the government guarantee and the

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454 large government deposits with the BSL, is undoubtedly attractive to the borrower, these loans entail a risk of inflation, unless at the same time there are offsetting deflationary factors operating in the economy. Moreover, the extension of loans to industry calls for judgments on the technical and economic soundness of business enterprises and the exclusion of all political considerations, which is very difficult for any government. It requires close scrutiny and supervision of borrowers, which can hardly be carried out by a government agency because private enterprise strongly resists such government control.

In our opinion, a privately managed and privately owned investment institution would be in a much better position than any government agency to give industry the type of assistance which it needs at its present stage of development. We have already stressed that under present conditions technical assistance is as much needed as financial assistance. On the basis of our consultations with Syrian businessmen we are convinced that the latter would hardly accept technical assistance from the government, not only because they would have no confidence in the government's ability to provide it but also because they would not countenance the detailed government inspection of their methods of doing business which might be involved.

The technical help which the institution we propose might give would take the form both of advising existing factories and shops on improving their methods of operation and of appraising the soundness of proposed new industrial ventures. For this purpose the bank would need a small technical staff, including a cost accountant, an economist and a few engineers who could advise on plant layout, work flow, costing, requirements for new machinery and equipment and the like. The bank's investment activities would be closely related to its technical services. It could finance both new equipment for existing plants where this is demonstrably necessary to improve efficiency and reduce costs, and also new enterprises judged by its expert staff to be economically and technically feasible. The bank should, however, be paid for technical services unrelated to projects which it would assist in financing.

Although the bank's primary function would be to assist manufacturing industries, we envisage that it might also help finance the tourist industry, particularly hotels, and the purchase of machinery, sinking of wells or installation of pumps by agriculturists who might be considered as engaged in commercial-farming operations and who are not among the

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small farmers principally served by the Agricultural Bank. The bank's 454 financing would presumably be largely in the form of loans, although its operations should be flexible enough to permit, in case of need, underwriting or equity participation. The interest rate on loans should be high enough to ensure that private capital will be invested in the bank and will for that reason have to be substantially higher than that of the BSL government-guaranteed loans. Moreover, new industrial investments in Syria should be able to earn a higher return, at least in the long run; and where the short-term return, as distinct from the long-term prospects, is likely to be less favorable, the bank could provide its financial assistance in the form of equity participation. As far as agricultural investment is concerned, most farm operators now pay a higher rate of interest when purchasing machinery on credit.

We suggest that the investment bank be capitalized at £S 15 million, of which £S 10 million might, if necessary, be paid up in installments within a few years. This capital would be subscribed by private individuals and institutions and would be matched by a contribution from the government which might take the form of a long-term advance. We believe it essential that the bank be privately owned and privately managed if it is to inspire confidence in the business community. At the same time, it will need supplemental resources from the government in order to ensure its success. The government contribution should be made on such terms that the net income of the institution would first be used to assure a minimum dividend on the privately-held share capital. Only under such an arrangement could sufficient private capital be attracted. We estimate that the bank should be able to earn an adequate return on its share capital when the amount of its investments approximates £S 15 million. In the first few years of its operations, the Bank might suffer small losses which would, however, be covered out of profits in ensuing years.

It might be argued that this proposal is not advantageous to the government. The real test, however, is whether the institution would make an important contribution to the economic development of the country which the government is anxious to stimulate. We believe that the proposed bank could play an important role in stimulating and directing sound private investment. In addition to mobilizing domestic private capital, it could become the means for attracting foreign capital to Syria. A number of Asiatic countries have perceived the advantage of government-assisted private investment institutions. Thus, India has organized an investment

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454 corporation on a basis similar to the one we recommend, and Pakistan is contemplating the establishment of such an institution.

We have little doubt that the suggested bank would find ample opportunities for investment. While there is no absolute assurance that private capital can be found for the bank, our preliminary exploration in Syria warrants some optimism on this score. Commercial banks might well subscribe a substantial part of this capital, and the balance could probably be obtained from private individuals and business concerns.

While the bank would not make loans for working capital, it might indirectly make it easier for companies to obtain working capital from the regular commercial banks. The mission found that a number of industrial enterprises do have difficulty in obtaining sufficient working capital, particularly to finance heavy seasonal purchases of such agricultural raw materials as cotton, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables for canning. The proposed bank might explore the possibility of financing the construction of bonded warehouses in Damascus and Aleppo where industrial enterprises could store raw materials and even finished goods in such a way as to furnish ample security for additional commercial bank credit.

Vocational Education

874 464 While appropriate technical and financial assistance can do much to raise industrial efficiency, the better training of labor is also important. At present vocational education is seriously inadequate. There is an urgent need to expand and improve vocational schooling so that it will effectively serve the requirements of industry and business and will be properly related to in-plant training. Specific recommendations on this subject are made in a subsequent chapter on education.

Projected Oil Refinery

471 382 With the exception of one ill-starred venture in which it went into partnership with private capital, the government has wisely left the ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises to private initiative. We are strongly convinced that this policy should continue to be followed. During the last few years it has been proposed from time to time that the government depart from this rule by establishing and operating a petro-

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leum refinery. Syria now obtains its petroleum products, of which total consumption in 1953 amounted to around 450,000 metric tons, partly from the Tripoli refinery in Lebanon and partly from more distant sources of supply. By arrangements between the government and the distributing companies, prices in Syria are explicitly or implicitly based on ex-Tripoli prices plus transport costs. It is perhaps natural that Syria should want its own refinery, not only because a large volume of crude oil flows across its territory through the Trans-Arabian pipeline and the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipelines, but also because transport costs substantially increase the price of petroleum products.

A case for a government refinery might be made if there were no alternatives. Private companies, however, are apparently willing to erect such a refinery. The Iraq Petroleum Company, for instance, has offered to carry out its original pledge to construct and operate a refinery serving Syrian requirements. Its offer is apparently conditioned on an agreement with the government regarding pipeline transit dues and on the understanding that the refined products would be sold at the refinery site on the basis of the prices obtaining at the Tripoli refinery. The company has offered to raise the transit dues now paid but the desultory negotiations on this subject carried on over the past years have not produced an agreement. The mission does not necessarily suggest that an agreement for the construction of a refinery be made with the Iraq Petroleum Company but simply that the government avail itself of offers by private enterprise to build a refinery. Such a refinery together with appurtenant facilities would probably cost over £S 30 million, a sum which the government can ill afford to spend at a time when it is hard pressed to find all the resources required for projects for which private capital is not available. At the same time it is evident that the construction of a refinery in Syria would be advantageous to the economy. For example, if a Syrian refinery sold its products on the basis of the price formula proposed by the Iraq Petroleum Company, the cost of transport between Tripoli and Homs, the proposed site of the new refinery, would be saved. At present, the difference between the price of gas oil and fuel oil at Tripoli and Homs, for example, is £S 6.20 and £S 9.25 per metric ton respectively, or about 7% and 15% of the prices at Homs. The construction of the refinery would undoubtedly bring about a significant reduction in the prices of refined products throughout northern Syria, which consumes the bulk of the country's total requirements.

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Other Industrial Policies

433 654 We now come to a consideration of certain other government policies relating to industry. One of these pertains to the special benefits extended to new plants or extensions of existing plants under the law for the encouragement of industry enacted in 1952 and first applied in 1953. Among these benefits are a six-year exemption from the so-called "temettu" or license tax and from the tax on income from real property, and exemption from income tax for profits up to 10% allocated to reserves and used within two years for further expansion. Certain additional assistance is available for industries specially determined to be useful, namely a three-year exemption from all income taxes and exemption from customs duties on required machinery, tools and construction materials.

In general, we consider it appropriate to give such incentives to the establishment or expansion of industrial plants in a country like Syria where industrial development is still subject to considerable risks. We suggest, however, that the government replace the exemptions from the real property and income taxes with a scheme permitting industrial enterprises more rapid depreciation of plant and equipment for tax purposes. Some such scheme, coupled with a provision allowing accounting losses resulting from accelerated depreciation to be charged against taxable income for a limited number of years in the past and the future, would relate the amount of assistance more closely to capital needs than the proposed scheme does. It would provide an incentive for continuing expansion of industrial enterprises. In addition, we believe it would be easier to administer than the present provisions, which require tax authorities to determine what portion of the tax on income from real property and the tax on total profits is to be allocated to new plant and equipment as distinct from the previously existing investment.

The establishment of new industrial plants and the transfer of existing enterprises from congested urban districts might be considerably facilitated by the creation of industrial zones on the outskirts of the major cities. It would be desirable to develop a number of such zones in locations convenient both to labor residing in the city and to workers coming from the country. Normally it should be sufficient to provide land and public utilities in these zones on reasonable terms. To attract the smaller enterprises and shops, however, we suggest that small blocks of suitable workshop buildings might be erected for rent or for sale in at least one zone. This

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would not only provide an incentive to the transfer of small manufacturing shops and enterprises from the center of the city, but might well incidentally stimulate new investment in modernization of their equipment. In this connection it is significant that the removal of tanneries from the center of Damascus to a special industrial zone has in fact been attended by the installation of a considerable amount of new machinery and a substantial improvement in working conditions. While it is possible that private enterprise might become interested in the establishment of such industrial zones and shops in cooperation with the municipalities, we have made allowance in our proposed development program for the expenditure of £S 1.8 million by the central government for this purpose.

In the expansion of new industry the question arises whether the government should exercise any control over the establishment of new enterprises or additions to existing plants. By instituting a licensing system in 1952 the government has in principle already assumed such powers. While they have apparently not been exercised in a restrictive fashion, we strongly doubt that any government under normal economic conditions should even assume such authority. Private enterprise will ordinarily better be able to determine the wisdom of proceeding with a particular venture than civil servants inexperienced in business. There may be special cases where excess capacity is so serious as to warrant government intervention but even then great caution is necessary lest the restriction of competition in the development of industry impair the possibility of attaining greater efficiency.

With respect to working conditions, the mission has a few observations. Syria has a rather liberal labor code for industry, limiting the working week to 48 hours, prohibiting the employment of children under 12 years of age and containing stipulations regarding dismissal and death benefits and maternity and sick leave. Minimum wages are also set by regional wage boards. In the larger factories visited by the mission working conditions appeared for the most part satisfactory. In a number of plants, however, we observed a lack of safety precautions, notably inadequate protection of workers from the danger of moving parts and of dust and humidity. This problem calls for attention. Another deficiency is the lack of thorough enforcement of the labor code. The degree of compliance in the larger factories is not unsatisfactory. In the smaller factories and shops, however, enforcement is inadequate or virtually non-existent. While we do not suggest that the provisions of the labor code could be enforced in all of the small enterprises, we do recommend that some attempt be made

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466 to curb at least the abuse of child labor which exists in most small shops. This might be done by occasional spot checks. One of the difficulties, however, is the inadequacy of the enforcement staff of the Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs in the Ministry of Economics. At the beginning of 1954 there were apparently only eight inspectors assigned to the enforcement of the labor code. We urge that the number be increased and that for this purpose an additional £S 325,000 be made available to the Labor Directorate over the next six years.

The Tourist Industry

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485 In the discussion of the proposed investment bank, we have already indicated that this institution might assist in financing hotels, as well as manufacturing industries and agriculture. Although this chapter focuses on the problem of developing manufacturing, it appears appropriate to mention here also the possibilities of the tourist industry. Syria has much to interest the tourist from the West. On its soil many civilizations and [172] cultures have flourished and left their imprint. There are countless archaeological sites which are still yielding up treasured relics of the past, numerous ancient Greco-Roman and early Christian cities, fascinating ruined Christian churches and imposing mosques, old Crusader castles and Arab forts. Both Aleppo and Damascus, which vie with each other in the claim to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, intrigue the tourist with their blend of the ancient, the picturesque and the modern.

In the postwar period the airplane has greatly extended the orbit of travel for the American and West European, and rising standards of living have enabled many more to travel abroad than before. In Greece, for example, the number of foreign tourists rose from about 33,000 in 1950 to almost 76,000 in 1953, and the per capita expenditure is said to have doubled during this period. Unfortunately, the mission was unable to obtain figures on the total of foreign travellers visiting Syria, but the number has undoubtedly increased significantly. Many travellers to the Holy Land now stop over in Syria. This tourist trade could be greatly expanded if a concerted attempt were made to advertise the attractions of Syria and to improve the inadequate accommodations available to foreigners.

More and better hotels, good communications and adequate preservation and presentation of historical and cultural monuments are all impor-

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tant elements in a program to attract more tourists. At present Damascus is the only Syrian city with first class hotel accommodations and even here there is an acute shortage. Such cities and towns as Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra all urgently require good hotels for tourists and other travellers. Construction and operation of hotels should, of course, be left to private enterprise encouraged by the government and assisted by the projected investment bank. There are, however, a number of places of potential importance to the tourist trade where rest houses and restaurants rather than hotels are needed. Such facilities are not likely to be sufficiently profitable, at least in the beginning, to attract private investment. We suggest, therefore, that the government spend approximately £S 500,000 on the erection and operation of rest houses and restaurants at such locations as Ras Shamra (site of ancient city of Ugarit), Saint Simeon (ruins of old city and monastery-church in Djebel es Smaane), Al Rasafa (Christian monuments and Moslem palace), Doura Europos (ancient city), Krak des Chevaliers (crusaders' castle), Tartous and Soueida. As a UNESCO mission has suggested, some of these could probably be constructed inside existing historical buildings, thus leaving the appearance of the site undisturbed and enhancing their appeal to tourists.

The interest of tourists in the historical and archaeological treasures of Syria also provides a definite economic justification for increasing the expenditures of the Directorate General of Antiquities. This government department has jurisdiction over museums, historical monuments and archaeological excavations. It finances its operations in part from its own receipts, but the government has during the last two years contributed, on the average, £S 763,000 to its annual budget of a little over £S 1 million. In 1954 its total planned investment was about £S 450,000, of which £S 280,000 was devoted to museums, £S 120,000 to the reconstruction of monuments and £S 50,000 to excavations. Damascus possesses a notable museum of which the country can well be proud, but about £S 1 million is still required for its completion. The Aleppo museum, which houses many fine treasures, admittedly needs a new building at a cost of £S 1 million, and appropriate regional and local museums would help the visitor to visualize the cultural heritage and archaelogical finds of particular localities. Although all of this could not be realized within the 1955-60 period, we suggest that £S 2.4 million be provided to complete the Damascus museum, establish a few local museums in such places as Ras Shamra and Palmyra and at least start the new building in Aleppo.

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457 Proper maintenance and repair of monuments is perhaps even more urgent,
658 since there is considerable deterioration at present. We accordingly recom-
172 mend that expenditures for this purpose be raised, on the average, approximately 50% over the next six years. A similar increase might be contemplated for excavation work which, as in the past, will presumably be carried out in cooperation with foreign archaeological missions. All this will require an increase in the subsidies paid to the Directorate of Antiquities out of the government budget to an average annual amount of approximately £S 950,000. The gradual growth in the Directorate's own receipts will probably suffice to cover necessary increases in administrative outlays.

[491] Poor roads now impede access to many interesting historical monuments. In addition to the recommendations on the national road network made elsewhere, we believe Syria would be well advised to spend about £S 1.5 million on the improvement of local roads of importance to the tourist trade. The access roads to the Krak des Chevaliers and Saint Simeon should have the highest priority.

457 Within the not too distant future the government should contemplate the establishment of a special office charged with the promotion of tourism. The cooperation and financial support of business groups interested in the tourist trade might well be enlisted. It should not only seek to interest the foreign tourist in the attractions of Syria, but also to make the Syrian people and Syrian officials more aware of the importance of the tourist trade and of making the tourist genuinely welcome.

Government Expenditures on Industry

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654 Although industry is preeminently a field for private enterprise, we have made in this chapter a number of recommendations entailing additional government expenditures. For the period 1955-60 these would total about £S 20.5 million, allocated as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Manufacturing		
Investment bank	10,500	1,750
Industrial zones and workshops	1,800	300
Enforcement of labor code[a]	325	54

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	Total	Average annual
Tourism		
Rest houses and restaurants[a]	500	83
Directorate of Antiquities[b]	5,700	950
Tourist roads	1,500	250
Tourist office	200	33
Total	20,525	3,420

[a] Additional expenditures beyond present levels.

[b] Including the entire government subvention to the Department of Antiquities as increased under our recommendations.

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CHAPTER 5 *ELECTRIC POWER*

Existing Facilities

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345 Syria is rather poorly supplied with electric power. Out of a population of 3.6 million, only 1.4 million live in towns and villages supplied with electricity and of these only about half actually use it. While public utilities have been increasing their capacity over the last eight years at a mean annual rate of about 17%, their total installed capacity at the end of 1953 amounted to only 34,350 KW or 44,776 KVA.[24] Most of the newer factories have found it necessary to provide their own power facilities. The industrial power plants which the mission was able to record have a total capacity of 20,135 KW. Some of these plants are connected with the public utilities. In 1953 the power supplied by public utilities amounted to 119.8 million KWH; and Damascus and Aleppo together accounted for 81% of this total. In fact, there were only six towns in Syria where the power generated by public utilities in 1953 exceeded a million KWH. It may be roughly estimated that factories consumed about 43 million KWH of the power generated by their own plants. Thus the total supply of electricity during 1953—about 163 million KWH—was equivalent to only 46 KWH per inhabitant, an amount comparable to that in Turkey, but 41% of that in Lebanon and about half that in Algeria and French Morocco.

At present public utilities have great difficulty in meeting their peak load. No reserve capacity exists. In Aleppo and Damascus surcharges discourage power consumption during peak hours. Since many of the large industrial power consumers have their own power plants, the public utilities generate primarily for lighting. The latter accordingly cannot balance power requirements for industry and lighting and thus tend to have an exaggerated peak load, which increases the cost of power generation. Costs are further raised by the fact that generating units are below the capacity required for economical operation. It should also be noted that

[24] See Annex G, p. 410.

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nearly all of the power is produced by diesel units which are comparatively expensive to operate. At the end of 1953 the public utilities had no steam plant and only 14% of their capacity consisted of hydro plant. The geographic dispersion of cities and low power consumption has made anything approaching a national grid impossible. Only the cities of Homs and Hama are interconnected through the Ghajar hydro plant.

Future Requirements

In principle it would be desirable to provide for a considerable acceleration of the rate at which the capacity of public utilities has been growing. The objectives of an expansion program should be to meet increasing power requirements, to permit factories gradually to shift to public utilities as a source of power, and to provide a margin as a reserve against breakdowns. Limitations on available resources, however, make it impossible to undertake a very ambitious program in the years immediately ahead. Capital must be carefully allocated. At this juncture in Syria's development, for example, it is more important to improve the water supply for communities and for agriculture than to provide more electricity for lighting.

In formulating its recommendations on power the mission has assumed in the first instance an expansion in the consumption of power supplied by public utilities at about the same rate as in the period 1949-53, namely an average annual increase of 14%. This would entail a rise in capacity from 44,776 KVA in 1953 to 106,000 KVA at the end of 1960. We consider, however, that a further increase of at least 25,000 KVA is necessary to provide a small reserve against breakdowns. This program does not specifically provide for a transfer of industrial power demand to the public utilities but, with the somewhat slower growth in industrial production which we anticipate, factories should be able to draw a little more on public utilities, at least in the off-peak hours.

Plants scheduled for completion in 1954 account for an additional capacity of 14,610 KVA. Among these are a 12,500 KVA steam plant for Damascus and a 1,350 KVA diesel plant in Homs. To meet the balance of the need, the mission recommends the installation of the following facilities by the end of 1960:

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Type and location of facility	Capacity (KVA)	Estimated cost (millions of £S)
For Damascus		
Deir Makaren and Hameh hydro plants	12,500	6.0
Souk Wadi Barada hydro plant	8,000	4.5
For Aleppo		
Steam plant	31,250	16.5
For Homs-Hama-Ghab area		
Diesel plant at Jisr ech Choghour	2,500	1.5
Diesel plant at Hama	2,500	1.5
Transmission line, Hama-Ghab-Jisr ech Choghour		3.0
For Latakia		
Diesel plant	2,500	1.5
Nahr el Kebir hydro plant	2,500	5.0
For Deir ez Zor		
Diesel plant	2,000	1.0
For small towns		
25 small diesel units	5,500	4.7
Improvements in existing plants and distribution	2,500	1.5
Total	71,750	46.7

If this program is completed, the public utilities will have a total capacity of about 130,000 KVA, of which about 21% will be hydro and approximately 33% steam power. The increase in the proportion of hydro and steam power should make possible some reduction in generating costs. It should be noted that the cost of this program—about £S 47 million—does not represent all of the expenditures on power for the period 1955-60. Some £S 14 million will also have to be found to compensate the foreign stockholders of the Aleppo and Damascus public utilities companies which were nationalized in 1951.

In this program the mission has not provided for the hydro plant that could ultimately be installed at the Youssef Pasha dam or for the hydro plants which might be established in connection with the development of the Ghab. With the installation of 75,000 KW capacity at Youssef Pasha, some 400 million KWH of firm power and 120 million KWH of secondary power could be generated. In the discussion of irrigation, however, the mission has already set forth the reasons for deferring this project, which ultimately should prove desirable. No provision has been made for the Ghab plants since these are due to be installed after 1960. Plans for the

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MAP 7



ELECTRIC POWER IN SYRIA

Area	Present Capacity	Authorized or under Construction	Mission Program	Total KW 1960
DAMASCUS	23,000	7,000	10,000	40,000
ALEPPO	10,400	10,000	15,000	35,400
HOMS-HAMA	5,750		2,000	8,750
JISR ECH CHOGHOUR			2,000	2,000
LATAKIA	800		4,000	4,800
DEIR ES ZOR	840		1,500	2,340
SMALLER TOWNS AND VILLAGES	6,660		6,000	12,660
TOTAL	45,450	17,000	40,500 a	102,950 b

a/ 51,250 KVA. b/ 131,136

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377 development of the Ghab call for the eventual installation of four hydroelectric works with an aggregate capacity of 18,240 KVA. Two of these will be seasonal in their operation. In general the mission would question the advisability of hydro plants which are likely to furnish little firm power in relation to the installed capacity. For this reason, for example, the mission has omitted from the recommended program the project for a 3,125 KVA power plant which would operate for only a small part of the year on the water periodically drained from the Roudj.

Distribution of Additional Capacity

Most of the expansion must obviously take place in Damascus and Aleppo, which are the focal points of rising power demand. With the completion of the steam plant, the public utility in Damascus now has a capacity of 29,000 KVA. The Souk Wadi Barada hydro plant on which construction is beginning will raise this to 37,000 KVA by the end of 1955. While this may be enough to meet the peak load anticipated for 1960, the mission considers it advisable, particularly in view of the condition of the Damascus diesel plant, to provide some reserve capacity by installing hydro plants at the two dams at Hameh and Deir Makaren which the mission proposes should be constructed in any event to provide additional irrigation in the vicinity of Damascus. This appears to the mission a more economical solution than the addition of another unit to the new steam plant. The mission has not taken into account the plan to provide Damascus with power from a hydro plant to be installed on the Yarmuk river on the Syrian-Jordanian border. While a Syrian-Jordanian agreement provides for joint development of the Yarmuk river for power and irrigation, the plans have not yet reached an advanced stage. Moreover, the mission believes that the Yarmuk power may well be too costly in view of the need for transmission over a considerable distance and for a thermal plant to stabilize the power coming from this source.

In Aleppo power requirements have been growing more rapidly than in Damascus, and the power shortage is also more acute. Construction of a new steam plant of 12,500 KVA has just begun and will raise available capacity to around 27,500 KVA. Since the peak load anticipated for 1960 will probably require a capacity of 42,900 KVA, the mission believes it imperative that the new steam plant be expanded in two further stages to provide an additional capacity of 18,750 KVA.

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Latakia, which now has only an old diesel plant with a capacity of 800 KW, must have additional capacity to meet its rapidly growing requirements. The most immediate need can be met by the construction of a 2,500 KVA diesel plant. This can later be supplemented by the installation of a hydroelectric plant at the site of the dam on the Nahr el Kebir which the mission has recommended as part of the irrigation program. 377

Deir ez Zor, the center of the developing Euphrates river valley and the fifth largest city in the country, also urgently needs a new 2,000 KVA diesel plant. The existing plant has a capacity of only 915 KVA.

The reclamation of the Ghab will generate a considerable increase in general activity in that region and an attendant expansion of power requirements. To meet this need the mission suggests the installation of new diesel plants of 2,500 KVA each in both Hama and Jisr ech Choghour. It would be advisable to connect these plants with a transmission line running through the Ghab and capable of supplying power for construction throughout this area and for the villages en route. Jisr ech Choghour in particular will become the center of construction activity. The mission is aware that plans for the Ghab call for the installation of a 6,250 KVA hydroelectric works at this location. The power from this plant, however, will not be firm and is in any event not likely to become available soon. The mission considers therefore that a diesel plant which can be quickly constructed is necessary to meet the immediate requirements.

For the smaller towns and villages the mission has proposed only a modest program involving some improvements in existing plants to raise their capacity, and the installation of 25 small diesel units with an individual capacity of 200 or 250 KVA. The more rapid electrification of villages and small towns should, in our opinion, be postponed for the time being in favor of more urgent programs. 377 365

Government Direction and Supervision

To carry out the recommended expansion program it will be necessary to strengthen the Directorate of Electricity in the Ministry of Public Works. This directorate was established in 1953 to coordinate the development of electricity in Syria and supervise the construction and operation of power plants. The mission recommends that the directorate be provided with a staff of 10 trained engineers to enable it to carry out its functions adequately. Separate sections should be organized for the technical 377 447

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377 and administrative supervision of public utilities. Supervision ought to be
447 concentrated primarily on the utilities of the small towns and villages which are often substandard in their equipment and operation and are most in need of technical guidance in standardizing and improving their equipment. In addition to discharging its supervisory functions, the directorate should work out long-range plans, including a properly phased plan for the establishment of a power network which would be helpful in determining the location and size of power plants to be established in the future.

Electricity Rates[25]

365 As power production increases, there will no doubt be considerable
435 pressure to lower the rates now charged for electricity. The mission
655 encountered much complaint about their present level and structure. The rates charged for lighting in the principal cities do not, however, appear excessive by comparison with other countries. Electricity prices in the small towns and villages, on the other hand, are very high, but the generation of electricity by small diesel units and exclusively for lighting is inevitably rather expensive. The rates charged for electricity used as power are definitely higher than in many other countries. In Syria the power rates are often compared unfavorably with those in Lebanon in particular.

Nevertheless, the mission strongly advises against a general reduction of electricity rates over the next five or six years. An adequate supply of electricity is more important at this time than lower prices for electricity. The profits of the public utilities must be safeguarded so that the needed expansion program can be financed from their own resources. This is particularly true of the nationalized utilities of Damascus and Aleppo which have been earning considerable profits. With the anticipated increase in power generation and some reduction in costs of production, the mission anticipates that the net operating income of these utilities exclusive of depreciation allowances may reach a total of £S 60 million over the six-year period 1955-60. Most of this sum will be needed to finance expansion and pay the indemnities for nationalization. In this way the government will be able to conserve the resources derived from taxation and to borrow for other urgent requirements.

[25] See Annex G, p. 422.

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CHAPTER 6 *TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS*

It is generally recognized that the development of transport and communications is one of the most urgent needs of Syria. Transport facilities have not kept pace with the expansion of production and particularly with shifts in the geographic pattern of agricultural output. Transport is generally costly and subject to interruption, and needs to be made cheaper and more dependable. The railways were all constructed before Syria became independent and are ill-adapted to serve the national economy. The roads are in part badly maintained, and the great majority are dirt roads or tracks, which in the rainy season can be used only with difficulty or not at all. The northeastern part of Syria, particularly the Jezireh, is most poorly provided with roads despite the fact that it has become the country's principal granary and source of exportable cereals. Domestic civil aviation is in its infancy, although Syria is rather well served by international airlines. With respect to telecommunications the country is in a better position. The telephone network has been considerably expanded and, although it has not kept up with the developing needs of certain rapidly growing commercial centers, a program to remedy the principal deficiencies is well in hand.

The transport and communications system must, of course, be developed primarily to facilitate the country's internal and external commerce. Syria, however, also serves as a transit country. In the past, before the opening of the Suez canal, its transit trade was undoubtedly much more important. In Syria, the goods of the East met those coming from Europe. A number of the principal cities, such as Aleppo and Damascus, owe to this trade their early commercial importance. They were the terminal points of the camel caravans from the East and the places where goods were transshipped to donkeys and mules to start the arduous trip across the mountain ranges to the Mediterranean. Even now, Syria has not wholly lost its importance as an avenue of international traffic. The Northern Railway carries traffic for both Turkey and Iraq, and the trans-Syrian desert road from Damascus conveys a considerable number of passengers and

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489 modest quantities of goods between Beirut and Baghdad. Above all, most of the foreign trade of Jordan flows through Syria to and from Beirut.

1 EXISTING TRANSPORT FACILITIES

A brief inventory of the principal transport facilities is an essential preliminary to a discussion of the problems and methods of coping with them.

496 *The Railways*[26]

Three railways operate in Syria—the Northern Railway, the Hedjaz Railway and the DHP (Chemin de Fer Damas, Hama et Prolongements).

The Northern Railway is the Syrian section of that international railway which achieved fame as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Coming from Baghdad and Mosul in Iraq, it traverses a portion of northeastern Syria from Tell Kotchek to Kamichliye, then enters Turkey, proceeding just along the boundary until it turns south to Aleppo and finally once again north to Turkey where one branch runs to the port of Iskenderun and the [665] other to Istanbul. The Syrian sections are owned by the government and managed by a Director of Railways and Council Administration under the Ministry of Public Works. Out of approximately 400,000 tons of cargo carried in 1952, the Northern Railway transported about 101,000 tons for Iraq, mostly in transit, and some 106,000 tons, principally grain and coal, in transit for Turkey. Although the traffic is modest, the development of agricultural production in the Syrian Jezireh and the adjoining portions of Turkey have been instrumental in raising it from about 22 million ton-kilometers in 1938 to 55 million in 1953.

The Northern Railway links at Aleppo with the DHP, operated by a private French company under an 1893 concession and serving both Syria and Lebanon. The DHP system consists of both narrow- and standard-gauge lines. The most important standard-gauge line runs from Aleppo via Hama and Homs to the Lebanese port of Tripoli and thence along the Lebanese coast. Aside from agricultural commodities produced in the Homs-Hama region, it carries the bulk of transit traffic to and from Iraq coming over the Northern Railway. It also carries Syrian cereals and

[26] See Annex H, p. 425.

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other products to Lebanon, imported raw sugar for processing at the Homs refinery, and, to some extent, petroleum products from the oil refinery at Tripoli. At Homs another standard-gauge line runs south into Lebanon to Rayak where it links up with the DHP's narrow-gauge railway connecting Beirut with Damascus. For Syria this narrow-gauge line has little economic importance; it handles transit traffic for Jordan almost exclusively. In 1952 it carried approximately 129,000 tons compared to 385,000 tons for the standard-gauge portion of the system, and of this total weli over 100,000 tons was for Jordanian account. The DHP transports more passengers than either of the other two railways, but most of this is local traffic and in recent postwar years, in terms of passenger-kilometers, it has been only 11% to 17% of prewar levels.

At Damascus the DHP narrow-gauge line joins the narrow-gauge railway of the Hedjaz which runs south to Amman, the Jordanian capital, and some distance beyond. The Hedjaz Railway is a *waqf* or Moslem religious endowment, administered by the Syrian government through the agency of a director-general and a Council of Administration responsible to the Prime Minister. It was built to handle the pilgrim traffic and originally ran over a distance of 3,159 kilometers to Medina in Saudi Arabia. During the first World War most of the line was dismantled and has never been rebuilt. In January 1954, however, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to reconstruct the entire line to Medina, with Saudi Arabia apparently undertaking to finance the greater part of the cost. Despite the disruption of the rail connection with the Moslem Holy Places, pilgrim traffic over the Hedjaz Railway has shown a tendency to revive in recent years, because the Syrian government has come to the rescue of the railway by prohibiting pilgrimages by sea from Latakia, and steps have been taken to organize the transport of pilgrims by sea from the Jordanian port of Aqaba to Jidda. The goods traffic of the railway is, as in the case of the Damascus-Beirut line, almost all transit trade for Jordan. In fact, the volume of Syrian goods transported internally represents less than 10% of the total.

The nadir of traffic on all the Syrian railways combined was reached in 1949 and 1950. In recent years there has been a recovery, but the volume of goods traffic handled in 1953 barely reached prewar levels, while passenger traffic was only about one-third of the prewar volume.[27] It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the railways should be operating at a deficit. The

[27] See Annex H, p. 427.

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496 Syrian government has been sharing the deficit of the DHP Railway with the Lebanese government on a fifty-fifty basis and also defraying the losses of the Hedjaz and Northern Railways. Government outlays on this account have been rising—from an average of £S 641,000 in 1950-52 to an estimated £S 750,000 in 1953 and £S 1.209 million in 1954. Unfortunately a further substantial increase must be anticipated. The Turkish government is expected to complete in 1955 or 1956 a railway shortcut which will make it unnecessary for export grain produced in southern Turkey, as well as other commodities, to transit through Syria on the way to Iskenderun. This will probably mean an annual loss in gross revenues of a little over £S 2 million for the Northern Railway. Even though the loss may be partially offset by a decline in operating expenses and it may prove feasible to recoup some revenue by increasing freight rates for Syrian goods, it is probable that the government will have to meet an additional deficit of at least £S 1 million a year.

Besides these operating subventions to the railways, the government will apparently be spending some £S 5 million for the acquisition of the Syrian portions of the DHP network. Negotiations for the purchase of these lines and a corresponding amount of rolling stock have been in [55] progress for some time and will probably be completed before long. They were dictated partly by the government's desire to own all the railways on Syrian soil and partly by its belief that Syrian operation would result in economies, particularly by reduction of overhead expenses. The latter objective may well be realized for the standard-gauge lines which are to be incorporated into the Northern Railway. It is more doubtful that significant economies will be achieved by taking over the Syrian portion of the narrow-gauge Damascus-Beirut line, which should logically be turned over to the Hedjaz Railway for operation.

In view of the rather low volume of traffic and the deficit character of the railway operation, the mission has considered whether it would not be advisable to abandon certain railway lines, particularly the Beirut-Damascus and Hedjaz Railways. For a number of reasons we have concluded that such a course would be unwise. Abandonment of the Beirut-Damascus line would increase by about 5-10% truck traffic on the parallel road, which is already becoming overburdened. Local passenger traffic would also have to be transferred to the road. It has already been pointed out that the two lines mentioned serve primarily as a transit artery for Jordan; their closing might therefore seriously affect the Jordanian econ-

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omy. True, Jordanians have frequently complained of Syrian government 496
regulations which, in an effort to support the Hedjaz Railway, have prohibited transit traffic by truck of most goods. While some categories of goods, notably perishables and petroleum products, are exempt from this prohibition, there is little doubt that more traffic would move by road if the prohibition were entirely lifted. At the same time, Jordan may be able to import and export some bulky commodities more advantageously by rail; Jordan's own port an the Gulf of Akaba has no rail connection and is by no means as advantageously situated with respect to trade with Europe as Beirut. In the circumstances, we would suggest that the subject of transit and the relationship of the rail lines thereto be fully and frankly discussed by representatives of the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese governments. Their common interest in the maintenance of the railway lines and the possibilities of more efficient and economical operation can then be thoroughly examined. It may be feasible to reduce operating costs by agreed economies and to raise revenues through certain selective increases in freight rates. In some respects, for instance, freight rates on the Hedjaz Railway seem to be lower than those on the DHP line. In the long run it appears unwise to make shippers support the railway by insisting that they use it for transport of certain commodities. If the railway must be maintained owing to considerations which are partly non-economic, it would be better to have the governments concerned share the entire deficit resulting from its continued operation.

Road Transport[28]

With traffic on the railways no greater than prewar, it is apparent that 494
motor transport has captured all of the substantial increase in the amount of goods produced and traded in the Syrian economy over the last decade and a half. The Syrian road network increased from 4,500 kilometers in [491]
1939 to 8,200 in 1952, and the length of hard-surface (macadam and asphalt) from 1,500 to 3,800 kilometers. This includes only so-called "all-weather" roads; with the addition of those not traversable in the wet season the total length is over 10,000 kilometers. The number of motor vehicles of all [493]
kinds on the roads rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953; the number of trucks increased from 873 to 4,742 and of buses from 348 to 1,212. In part the rapid growth of road transport was caused by the lack of adequate

[28] See Annex H, p. 436.

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494 rail facilities on the principal routes along which commodities had to be moved in growing volume, such as from the Jezireh to Aleppo and Latakia. Unquestionably, also, transport over poor roads has been costly, entailing heavy depreciation and not infrequent interruptions of traffic.

II PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES

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For an understanding of the transport problems confronting Syria it is also necessary to outline the principal routes over which traffic must move. One of the main transport lines is the north-south axis connecting Damascus with Homs, Hama and Aleppo to the north and with the Hauran, Djebel Druze and Jordan to the south. Crossing this axis in a west-easterly direction are three principal communication lines running from the three ports serving Syria—Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon and Latakia in northwestern Syria. Of these three ports Tripoli is by far the least important, serving only the region immediately around Homs. Beirut is still an important port of entry for Syrian imports, although the volume handled by Latakia has been rising steadily. Through Latakia, however, goes the bulk of Syria's exports.

The west-east communications lines continue in a generally easterly direction after crossing the north-south axis at Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. Those continuing east of Aleppo and serving the Jezireh and the narrow but fertile irrigated lands of the Euphrates are by far the most important. On the other hand, the road or track running east from Homs through the Syrian desert is of little importance except for serving and patrolling the pipelines conveying oil from Iraq to the port of Banias in Syria and to Tripoli. Of somewhat greater significance is the trans-desert route from Damascus to Baghdad. Although for the most part only a track, it provides an all-weather route over which traffic can move between Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and Iraq and even Iran and Kuwait on the other hand. Over this route the well-known Nairo Transport Company carries on an active international passenger traffic with modern buses and a number of trucking concerns haul high cost products such as fruits and vegetables, machinery and rugs. No special urgency attaches to the improvement of the two routes running eastward from Homs and Damascus, however, and no further consideration will be given to them in this report.

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The First Priority: Latakia-Aleppo-Jezireh

The most urgent transport problem centers around the improvement of communications between Latakia and Aleppo and the Jezireh. The rapid development of northern and particularly northeastern Syria has made the east-west communication lines across this part of the country by far the most important arteries for the movement of bulk commodities. The Jezireh produces most of Syria's wheat export surplus, and the Jezireh, the Euphrates valley, and the Aleppo-Hama-Homs region contribute together nearly all of the country's barley exports. The same areas produce virtually all Syria's cotton, which has attained considerable volume over the last four years. Finally, northern Syria is to some extent, and can become even more, a transit zone between the Mediterranean and Iraq.

Some indication of the importance of the communications lines across northern Syria is given by the volume of goods handled in Latakia. Export traffic through this port rose from 13,700 tons in 1947 to 353,396 tons in 1953; in 1954 it was 630,720 tons. Of the 1953 tonnage, 62% consisted of wheat and barley and 21% of cotton, cottonseeds and cotton meal. The volume of imports has also grown rapidly—from 5,200 tons in 1947 to 176,364 tons in 1953 and to 208,343 tons in 1954.

From the east, principally the Jezireh, the volume of transport is even greater, approximating probably 500,000 tons annually in recent years. In the reverse direction, however, freight movement is much more modest—apparently less than 50,000 tons.

Transport conditions over these vital arteries are far from satisfactory. Latakia and Aleppo are linked by a metalled road over the Alaouit mountains which is much too narrow for the rapidly increasing truck traffic and is occasionally blocked by landslides. The road surface is not adapted to heavy truck traffic and is poorly maintained in many sections. From Aleppo an asphalt road runs eastward to Raqqa on the Euphrates river and continues down the river valley to Deir ez Zor, where it turns into a track leading to Abou Kemal on the Iraqi frontier. From Deir ez Zor there is a road north to Kamichliye via Hassetche, but the surface is for the most part so bad that traffic moves along parallel tracks. The truck route from the Jezireh does not, however, go through Deir ez Zor, but runs more directly from Km. 47 on the Hassetche-Deir ez Zor road along a cross-country track to Raqqa. The feeders to these main routes are also tracks which become impassable during the rainy season.

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As already indicated, the Jezireh is also served by the international railway which criss-crosses the frontier. It is difficult to use because the three railway administrations controlling it do not cooperate effectively, and crucial seasonal shortages of freight cars often hold up grain movements. By and large the railway assists only in the transport of commodities produced in a narrow belt along the frontier. While the railway annually transports between 150,000 and 200,000 tons of the Jezireh's agricultural output, much more moves by road.

The cost of transport across northern Syria is very burdensome and motor transport rates are subject to sharp seasonal fluctuations. In part, of course, this is caused by the unavoidably seasonal nature of the agricultural products traffic and the lack of adequate return cargo to the Jezireh. The very fact, however, that the Jezireh roads are impassable during much of the winter rainy season greatly accentuates the seasonal movement and necessitates a larger investment in trucks. Under such circumstances truck operators charge what the traffic will bear. During the harvest season it costs £S 40-50 per ton to transport grain from Kamichliye or Hassetche to Aleppo and about £S 25-30 from Ras el Ain to Aleppo. During the "dead season," such as the spring, following the rainy season, these rates are almost halved. The high rates are caused in part, of course, by the heavy maintenance and depreciation charges for trucks. On the railway the freight rate for grain from the Jezireh to Aleppo is the same the year around, about £S 25 per ton.

During most of the postwar period agricultural prices have been high, providing sufficient incentive to an expansion of production in areas remote from the port despite high transport costs. With the marked decline in prices during the last few years, however, the burden on the producers has become progressively more severe. Since transport and handling charges remained the same, they received a smaller proportion of the falling export price at the port. In 1953 transport charges of £S 50-60 per ton from the Jezireh to Latakia represented about a third of the f.o.b. export price of barley and somewhat more than a fifth of that of wheat. At the same time transport adds to the cost of production. Thus in the Jezireh gas oil for tractors and irrigation pumps is about 75-100% more expensive than at Homs and gasoline for harvesting combines is 20-25% higher.

The mission has given much thought to the question of how the transport problem in the north of Syria might most effectively be solved. Since the construction of a railway linking the Jezireh with Aleppo and Latakia

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has many proponents and a number of railway projects have been proposed in the past, we carefully considered the advisability of a railway line.[29] Railroads between Aleppo and Latakia on the one hand and Aleppo and the Jezireh on the other hand have generally been independently projected, but the mission believes one should not in the long run be contemplated without the other, for otherwise the maximum advantage of a through line to the port, avoiding costly transshipment at Aleppo, would not be realized.

The volume of traffic moving between the Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia appears to make a railway economically attractive. In the westerly direction toward Aleppo there is an actual or potential flow of around 700,000 tons per year, if Iraqi transit trade is included, and from Aleppo to Latakia probably about 500,000 tons. In the reverse direction the volume might be 150,000 and 250,000 tons respectively. Of course, by no means all of this traffic would necessarily be captured by a new railway line. Some would continue to be carried by the existing railway, and some, particularly the higher cost "import cargo" and the "export cargo" originating at points more or less remote from the railway, would no doubt still be transported by truck. A new railway might count on carrying perhaps two-thirds of the available cargo. On this assumption the traffic handled by a new Jezireh railway, linked with the Iraqi railway at, say, Tell Kotchek, might well be somewhat over 400 million ton-kilometers per year, or about three times as much as the traffic on all railways in Syria during 1935.

The construction of a railway, however, requires a heavy capital investment. To build and equip a railway from Aleppo to Latakia over difficult terrain would probably cost about £S 80 million, and a line from Aleppo to Tell Kotchek might cost approximately £S 90 million, a total of about £S 170 million. On the other hand, the cost of improving and partially realigning the Aleppo-Latakia highway is estimated at £S 7.4 million; a proper road network linking the Jezireh with Aleppo would cost, according to Syrian government estimates, about £S 50 million (including £S 3.4 million for widening the existing Aleppo-Raqqa road); and an investment of £S 40 million would be required to handle by truck the volume of traffic indicated for the railway. Thus the investment in a railway would be about £S 73 million more than would be required for

[29] See Annex H, p. 430.

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corresponding road facilities. Actually, the difference is likely to be greater, for the need to build feeder roads to the railway and to improve the trunk highways would probably make a considerable investment in roads necessary in any event. However, investment in road vehicles which would be required to handle the rail traffic would be saved. Thus the additional investment entailed by the construction of a railway might be in the neighborhood of £S 100 to 110 million.

In terms of depreciation, maintenance and fuel, railway transport would cost the economy substantially less than road transport. On the basis of the anticipated traffic volume, the mission has estimated the annual savings in cost at between £S 15 million and £S 20 million. The additional investment of £S 100 million to £S 110 million might therefore be said to contribute between £S 15 million and £S 20 million to national income annually. A railway could no doubt reduce transport charges below existing levels and still earn some return on the investment.

Nevertheless, the mission is strongly convinced that it would be unwise to undertake the construction of a railway within the next five or six years. Our principal reason is that the government could find the necessary capital only at the expense of other needed investments likely to make a greater contribution to national income. We have sought in this report to recommend a balanced development program within the limits of the financial resources available. If provision is to be made for the construction of a railway, it would be necessary to curtail drastically proposed outlays in other fields of development. For instance, it would probably be necessary to eliminate a considerable amount of the irrigation program we have proposed. The substitution of a railway project for irrigation works could only result in a loss to the Syrian economy. The mission estimates that, on the average, irrigation projects would make almost twice as large a direct contribution to national income as would the proposed railway. Moreover, an increase in primary production through irrigation and reclamation is likely to bring about a larger indirect expansion in national income, particularly in the commercial and transport sectors. A secondary reason for the mission's view is that private enterprise is willing to undertake the necessary investment in road transport, other than for the roads themselves, whereas the government would have to shoulder the entire burden of a railway investment. In a country where it is very difficult for the government to mobilize private capital for the financing of public investments, this is an important consideration. If and when it becomes easier

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to do so, and alternative investment opportunities become less attractive, the question of building a railway might well be reviewed.

The mission would be more favorably disposed to a railway if there were no alternative means of reducing the present high transport rates between the Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia. However, the building of good, all-weather roads, supplemented by the construction of grain storage facilities in the Jezireh, should make it possible to lower transport charges significantly by reducing truck maintenance and depreciation costs and somewhat diminishing seasonal transport peaks. The mission recommends, therefore, that the government undertake this task as a matter of high priority.

To this end the following program should be carried out within the next five or six years:

1. *Improvement and partial realignment of the Aleppo-Latakia road.* The improvement and widening of this road is imperative, and since topographic conditions make widening of certain sections impossible, an entirely new road must be built in part. A new road, for example, will be necessary for a distance of some 30 kilometers west of Jisr ech Choghour. Improvement of the section south of Idlib and crossing the Djebel Zâouiye would also be extremely difficult. The mission recommends strongly that this stretch be replaced by a north-south road running through the Roudj. Such a road would not only avoid most of the mountainous terrain but would simultaneously serve the new agricultural district of the Roudj. The cost of the entire project, including the new road construction, is tentatively estimated at £S 7.37 million.

2. *Improvement and widening of the Aleppo-Raqqa road.* This road, 190 kilometers long and part of the trunk highway to the Jezireh, has an asphalt surface only four to five meters wide. In line with recent proposals made by the Syrian government, the mission suggests its widening to six meters, with a two-meter berth on each side. The government has estimated the cost at £S 3.38 million.

3. *Construction of a new road connecting Raqqa with Kamichliye, via Kantari, Tell Tamer and Tloul Mohammed, and continuing from Kamichliye, via Demir Kapu and Deirik, to Ain Divar on the Syrian-Turkish frontier* (total length: 362 km). Unlike earlier proposals, the road we recommend would not follow the present truck route between Raqqa and Km. 47 on the Hassetche-Deir ez Zor road, but would run north of the Djebel Aabd el Aaziz. In this way it would tap a much larger agricultural

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region, including the dry-farming area south of Ras el Ain and the irrigated area in the Khabour river valley. It would be advisable to start the construction of the Kamichliye-Ain Divar section first, because this rich agricultural region of heavy rainfall is now the most inaccessible part of the Jezireh. To feed the trunk highway the mission also recommends the construction of the following roads: (1) Ras el Ain-Hassetche, crossing the main highway at or near Tell Tamer (73 km); (2) Hassetche-Tloul Mohammed (60 km), thus linking the provincial capital with Kamichliye, the region's commercial center; (3) Derbassiye-main road (30 km); (4) Demir Kapu-Tell Kotchek (30 km); and (5) much farther to the west, Tell Abiad-Kantari (46 km). The first two are considered the more important. In general this proposed road network conforms to the most recently expressed views of the Syrian government, which has tentatively estimated the cost, pending engineering surveys, at about £S 46 million.

North-South Communications

We turn now to a consideration of the other principal transport routes. With respect to the north-south transport axis, improvement of communications between Aleppo and Damascus is most important. A direct standard-gauge railway link between these cities has often been proposed, either by the laying of an additional rail on the narrow-gauge line from Damascus to the junction with the standard-gauge line at Rayak in Lebanon or by the building of a new railway from Damascus to Homs, where it would connect with the DHP line to Aleppo. The mission is convinced, however, that the volume of bulk goods suitable for rail transport moving between Aleppo and Damascus is far too small to justify the large investment required, at least £S 18 million for the former and £S 36 million for the latter project. The solution is rather to improve and widen the Aleppo-Damascus road. The section between Hama and Aleppo urgently demands improvement, and the entire road should be widened by at least one meter to permit easier flow of two-way vehicular traffic. The cost of widening would probably be about £S 10,000 per kilometer or a total of about £S 4 million.

The transport route south from Damascus to Dera'a and the Jordanian frontier is served both by road and the Hedjaz Railway. The problems of the latter have already been discussed. The road, although not as well

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

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

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travelled as the one to Aleppo, is still important for the transport of Syrian agricultural products and petroleum products destined for Jordan. The very bad section between Cheikh Meskine and Dera'a requires early attention, and the entire road should be widened by one meter after the completion of the Damascus-Aleppo road project. The mission estimates the total cost involved at £S 13 million.

Other Road Projects

Together with the Latakia-Aleppo-Jezireh road, the route between Damascus and Beirut is the most important to the Syrian economy. In fact the traffic on the Beirut-Damascus road is denser and steadier than that on the Latakia-Aleppo road. An urgent program to improve the surface of this road should be undertaken by the two countries concerned. For the improvement of the 35-kilometer section in Syrian territory, the mission anticipates that £S 1.05 million will need to be spent. It can be expected, however, that before many years more thorough-going measures will be necessary to accommodate the constantly growing traffic. To meet this longer-term need, proposals have been made to build a new road paralleling the old one and to construct a long tunnel at Hamana to bypass the most dangerous section across the Lebanon range, where traffic is often held up by fog and snow. The total cost has been estimated at £S 29 million, presumably to be shared by Syria and Lebanon. Parallel highways would certainly permit a great increase in traffic and would considerably reduce the prevailing high accident rate, by making possible the accommodation of slow-moving truck traffic and high-speed vehicular traffic on separate roads. Since the problem is not immediately urgent and the best solution remains to be worked out in detail, the mission considers it unnecessary to make specific proposals. It suggests, instead, that over the next five years the two governments jointly finance an engineering survey of the problem in order to prepare definite plans; an expenditure of £S 100,000 by each government should suffice.

The third most important transversal connection with the Mediterranean is that between Homs and Tripoli, served both by the DHP railway and by road. The road is of some importance, but several sections are in bad condition, particularly the 10-15 kilometer section just west of Homs and a shorter section passing through Lebanon before coming to Tell Kalakh. Improvement of this road, however, can probably be handled

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within the framework of the maintenance program proposed below. It is important that the Syrian and Lebanese governments come to an agreement on better maintenance of the section before Tell Kalakh.

Aside from the trunk highways discussed above, the mission has considered certain special road projects, including two which would provide better links between Homs and Hama on the one hand and the Syrian coast and Latakia on the other. Fundamental improvement of the road from Hama to Banias whence a road runs north to Latakia has sometimes been proposed. The mission believes a more economical solution would be to build a link between Hama and the main north-south road running through the Ghab for which provision has already been made in the Ghab project. The Ghab road would in turn connect with the Aleppo-Latakia highway. We have accordingly included £S 1.5 million for the building of this link in the program recommended for the next five or six years. Homs is now linked with the Syrian coast by a poor and rather circuitous road which branches off from the Homs-Tripoli highway at Tell Kalakh and passes through difficult terrain. It has been proposed, instead, to construct a shortcut between Akkari and Hamidiye which would connect with the coastal highway to Latakia and would cost about £S 1.8 million. In the mission's opinion, however, construction of this road is not very urgent, particularly since the Homs area is fairly well served by the port of Tripoli. The mission suggests, therefore, that it be built only toward the end of the program if funds are available.

Elsewhere the mission has pointed to the potential importance of the tourist trade. In order to stimulate this trade some of Syria's principal historical monuments such as the Krak des Chevaliers, the ruins of Saint Simeon, etc., should be made more accessible by road. The mission accordingly suggests that £S 1.5 million be allocated to construct such roads.

Road Maintenance[20]

The construction of new roads will be of little avail if they are allowed to deteriorate quickly. By and large maintenance has been poor in the past, although apparently not because of inadequate appropriations. Over the five-year period 1949-1953 an average of £S 3.3 million annually was allocated for maintenance; in 1954 £S 5.8 million was so allocated. The

[20] See Annex H, p. 439.

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latter amount, supplemented by increasing allowances for maintenance of the new roads recommended, should basically be adequate for the future as well. Poor organization, inadequate supervision and dispersal of effort seem to have been responsible for the past unsatisfactory results. Maintenance work is not the responsibility of the Director of Transport, but falls under that of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Works, who is too preoccupied to give it adequate attention. Supervision in the field is inadequate, partly because of insufficient engineers and partly because engineers are reluctant to leave their desks. Maintenance crews are too small and their work is seldom concentrated in such a way as to effect visible improvement. This aspect of road work certainly demands the urgent attention of the Syrian government, which might well seek foreign technical advice on better organization of maintenance. We urge the establishment of a special highway department in the Ministry of Public Works to look after both maintenance and new construction.

Some increase in the availability of maintenance machinery appears desirable. The machinery park now includes 59 rollers, 62 boilers and 24 mixers, but no graders or bulldozers. Many of the rollers are old and some are defective and too light. The mission has accordingly allowed £S 1 million for new machinery in its recommended program.

Regulation of Road Traffic

Better regulation of road traffic is another requirement for the improvement of motor transport. A comprehensive road code exists, but there is virtually no policing to enforce it. Reckless driving is a common occurrence, and the accident rate appears to be excessive although no record is kept. Above all, chronic overloading of trucks wreaks havoc with road surfaces. As a minimum it is desirable to install a few weighing stations at key traffic centers to enforce loading regulations. Another cause for concern is the restrictive policy, originating with the French mandatory regime, which the government pursues in licensing common carrier trucks. Basically this policy provides that no new truck (other than tank trucks) will be licensed unless an old one is retired. Truck licenses, which are negotiable, therefore sell at a premium of £S 10,000 and more, and the number of commercial or common carrier trucks has tended to remain stationary while the number of private trucks has greatly increased. While the tendency toward even larger trucks has undoubtedly increased over-all

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capacity significantly, the restrictive policy may have contributed to higher trucking charges. Recently there has been some relaxation of the restrictions. The mission concedes that in principle it might be desirable to regulate the number of trucks in order to prevent excessive investment in road transport. The government, however, has little knowledge about the adequacy of the number of trucks to guide it in applying such a regulation, and it would be better to achieve the objective indirectly by charging a high fee for new truck licenses, as is done in the case of tank trucks.

III PORTS

One of the most important transport projects undertaken by the Syrian government in recent years is the construction of the port of Latakia. This is Syria's only real port other than Banias, which handles just the oil coming in over the pipeline from the oilfields in northern Iraq. The decision to create a port at Latakia was formally taken early in 1950 when a company, capitalized at £S 24 million, was formed to establish and operate the port. Nearly all of the capital has been furnished by the government; private capital has subscribed only 10% despite a government guarantee of a 5% dividend.

Natural conditions at Latakia, as indeed along most of the eastern Mediterranean coast, are not particularly favorable to a port. There is no natural harbor and heavy winds from January to March impede port operations. For this reason, the principal feature of the port program is the construction of a breakwater and the deepening of the basin behind it. Other features call for the construction of quays and warehouses with a capacity of 15,000 cubic meters and the installation of cargo-handling equipment. Work on the breakwater and quays is proceeding and plans for the equipment of the port are being perfected. The breakwater and quays should be finished in 1956 and the remainder of the work in the following year. To complete these plans will probably entail a further outlay of £S 38 million over the coming years. Plans at this stage do not provide for the building of a grain silo. The mission's sole recommendation is that this omission be remedied, since in our opinion the installation of mechanized grain handling equipment is imperative in a port where the bulk of the traffic consists of cereals.

Meanwhile, as previously indicated, the volume of cargo handled by

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the port has been increasing rapidly. To some extent this has been promoted by government regulations which direct certain classes of imports and exports via Latakia. It should be noted, however, that these have not seriously interfered with the traditional traffic between Beirut and Damascus and southern Syria. For the most part they buttress a traffic flow which would in any event tend via Latakia as the natural port for northern Syria. At present cargo must still be lightered but, considering this circumstance, cargo handling is fairly rapid. The port company appears to be well managed and in recent years has earned, on its paid-in capital, a modest profit which rose to over 5% in 1953. With the completion of the port, it should prove possible to reduce handling costs substantially. 504

IV CIVIL AVIATION

Supplementing rail and road transport, there is a domestic air service linking Damascus with Aleppo, Kamichliye and Latakia. It is operated with a DC-3 by the Syrian Airways, an autonomous government enterprise dependent on the Ministry of Finance. The financial results of this operation have not been divulged publicly, but it is evidently not self-supporting. The government regards it primarily as a promotional venture and the tariffs are correspondingly low. It must be recognized that occasional rapid air communication between the principal cities is desirable, and the mission accordingly anticipates that a new twin-motor plane, costing perhaps £S 600,000 may soon be needed to maintain this service. 509 655

Damascus is the country's principal airport and is served by a number of international airlines. Considerable amounts have been spent on the improvement and equipment of this airport which has been given a Class B designation by the ICAO. Of the £S 1.075 million provided in the 1954 budget for airport construction, equipment and maintenance, over 70% was destined for Damascus. In view of the many more urgent tasks confronting the government, we see no justification for the proposal to construct an entirely new airport for Damascus. By continuing about the same level of expenditures in the future as in recent years, the government should be able to make the requisite improvements in existing airports, which include, besides Damascus, a Class C airport at Aleppo, a Class G airfield at Kamichliye and an airport as yet unclassified at Deir ez Zor. 508

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v MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT

365 655 Brief mention should be made of the urban transport services in Damascus and Aleppo. In Damascus the tramways are operated by a company nationalized in 1951, whose principal business is the generation and distribution of electric power. The tram service, plagued by low fares and relatively high operating costs, has been running heavy deficits and steadily losing ground to buses, which are operated on a coordinated basis by a large number of owners who pool their receipts for the purpose of meeting certain common expenses. For this reason the company has advanced proposals to buy out the private buses at a cost of about £S 2 million and gradually to substitute new buses at an additional cost of £S 2 million. The mission, however, strongly advises against the use of basically public funds for this purpose, since the buses now appear to be efficiently operated by private enterprise.

In Aleppo the power company, likewise nationalized in 1951, has a monopoly on the operation of both buses and trams. In contrast to the Damascus company, however, it is operating both these services at a modest profit while maintaining moderate fares.

206 VI TELECOMMUNICATIONS

It is, of course, important that not only transport but also communications facilities expand with a growing economy. In Syria a program for the improvement of telecommunications has long been under way. During the eight-year period 1946-1953, almost £S 31 million was invested in telecommunications, particularly in the expansion of the telephone network and the installation of automatic telephones. In fact, the amount invested for this purpose might be said to be disproportionate to most other fields of public investment. The results, however, have been conspicuous. The number of telephone subscribers has risen from 9,000 in 1949 to 21,218 in 1953, the number of telephone offices from 100 to 132, and the number of telephone circuits from 161 to 379. The Syrian telephone system is now substantially better than that of most neighboring countries.

The postal, telegraph and telephone administration plans to spend a sum of £S 14.317 million over the next five years on the further improvement of telecommunications. The mission had no one of special compe-

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tence to appraise this program. In view of the many other claims on public 206
funds, however, it suggests that the program be reviewed to reduce the target expenditures to about £S 10 million. In this review the highest priority might be given to the expansion of the telephone network in cities which are experiencing a rapid growth such as Kamichliye, Aleppo and Latakia, and to the improvement of interurban connections. The contemplated construction and equipment of a new transmitter for international communications might be given a lower priority.

VII PROPOSED EXPENDITURES

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Table 7 provides a projection of government expenditures on transport and communications over the six-year period 1955-1960. This projection takes into account not only the recommendations of the mission but also expenditures, such as those on railways and on road maintenance, which are determined by force of circumstance or the declared intentions of the Syrian government. The heavy increase in expenditures proposed reflects in major part the need to overcome the lag in transport facilities which handicaps the Syrian economy today.

TABLE 7 Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Roads (total)	5,078	5,380	9,278	17,125	102,750
Construction and improvement (total)				11,008	66,050
Latakia-Aleppo				1,228	7,370
Aleppo-Raqqa				580	3,480
Raqqa-Jezireh				7,625	45,750
Hama-Ghab				250	1,500
Aleppo-Damascus				667	4,000
Damascus-Dera'a				217	1,300

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TABLE 7 Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Continued from page 147)

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Damascus-Beirut				192	1,150
Tourist roads				[a]	[a]
Maintenance	3,233	3,600	5,800	6,117	36,700
Latakia port	373	500	10,000[c]	6,333	38,000
Railways (total)	641	750	1,209	2,833	17,000
Subventions	641	750	1,209	2,000	12,000
Purchase of DHP lines				833	5,000
Telecommunications	4,114	2,350[b]	4,700[c]	1,667	10,000
Grand total	10,206	8,980	25,187[c]	28,875	173,250

[a] Included in tourist program.
[b] Actual.
[c] Amounts include authorizations unlikely to be spent and are thus not comparable with preceding years.

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CHAPTER 7

EDUCATION, PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING

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The amount of resources which should be devoted in any development program to education, health, housing and related community services and facilities will always be a matter of controversy. Expenditures in these fields do not necessarily bear a direct or fixed relationship to outlays on agriculture, industry, transport and communications, and power. Their actual or proposed magnitude is largely a reflection of judgment and social philosophy. It is generally conceded, however, that better education, health and housing are not only in themselves objectives of development, but are also important means, however indirect, of raising production and standards of living. It is a truism that an expansion and improvement of educational opportunities is indispensable to economic progress as well as to the development of stable and free political institutions. Similarly, a healthy and vigorous population is better equipped to deal with the task of increasing production. At the same time, the cost of expanding education, health and other social services can be borne only if the production base of the economy is steadily broadened. Thus a reduction in mortality rates may create problems unless productive resources can be developed at a pace sufficient to support a more rapidly growing population, and substantial improvements in housing can be realized only if people can earn enough to afford them.

1 EDUCATION

Syria can view with pride the rapid expansion of education which has taken place during the period of independence since the war. From 1945-46 to 1952-53 the number of children attending primary schools more than doubled and the number of pupils in intermediate and secondary schools almost quadrupled. The proportion of literates in the population—probably around 40%—compares favorably with that of other Arabic countries as well as that in Asia generally, and with the existing school attendance 171

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871 literacy may be expected to improve significantly within the next generation.

There are, however, certain deficiencies in the educational system on which any future program must focus. More attention should be paid to the quality of education and particularly to improving the curriculum and methods of instruction. Better and more extensive facilities for vocational education ought to be provided, and a program of fundamental education for adults should be initiated.

Primary, Intermediate and Secondary Education[21]

The lack of data on the age composition of the population makes it impossible to estimate accurately the proportion of school-age children who actually go to school. One may hazard the guess that a little less than 60% of the children attend primary schools and probably about 10% go to intermediate and secondary schools. While perhaps 80% of the boys go to primary schools, the proportion of girls in such schools is still only about 30%, even though the prejudice against education of girls is being gradually overcome.

It is unlikely that school attendance will continue to increase as quickly as in the past. Prevailing low standards of living will undoubtedly keep many children out of school; economic pressure is probably responsible for the fact that perhaps 30% to 40% of children drop out of primary school before they finish. It will also be difficult to increase school attendance in areas where the population is rather sparse and scattered. Thus school attendance appears to be poorest in the rather thinly populated province of Jezireh.

In projecting expenditures on education the mission has accordingly adopted the assumption that the number of children attending primary, intermediate and secondary schools will increase at an average annual rate of 6% over the next six years. Initially the rate of increase may be higher than 6%, but toward the end of the period it may be expected to be lower. This compares with an average annual rate of 12% from 1945-46 to 1952-53, of 14% from 1950-51 to 1951-52, and of 6% from 1951-52 to 1952-53. On the basis of our assumption, total school attendance would rise from about 399,000 in 1955-56 to approximately 536,000 in 1960-61; and, if the

[21] See Annex I, p. 456 *et seq.*

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proportion of children attending private schools remains the same, public school attendance would increase from 307,000 to 413,000.

The rapid expansion of educational facilities has quite rightly received first priority in the past. In the future, however, further growth in school attendance will be somewhat less important than the task of improving the quality of education and adapting it to the country's needs.

In general the content of education in any developing society must be such as to equip people to cope more effectively with the practical, everyday problems of modern life. These relate not only to the task of earning a better living but also to the need for relating the curriculum of the school more closely to the activities of the community, and for improving its living conditions. According to the testimony of many Syrians there is an urgent need to give education a more practical content. The existing curriculum is too academic and general in character. Methods of teaching must be improved and more emphasis given to the sciences, economics and civics. Pupils must be given more knowledge and understanding about the economic, social and political problems of their environment. Without making education exclusively vocational, it can be given some vocational bias. In rural schools, for example, there can be more stress on agriculture, animal husbandry, sanitation and hygiene. In all schools—primary, intermediate and secondary—more attention might well be devoted to creative manual work, if only to inculcate a greater respect for manual labor. A legal training is still generally considered essential for government service, even though the operations of modern government demand much more technical and economic knowledge.

Current methods of instruction do not appear to stimulate the intellect sufficiently; the principal aim is evidently to impart enough knowledge to enable the student to pass examinations for school certificates or diplomas. There is an excessive emphasis on memorizing. Teaching is rather authoritarian in character: the teacher lectures, and the student is expected to accept what he is taught without challenge or discussion. Even in the University, little discussion and debate is invited. Thus independent inquiry and intellectual curiosity tend to be discouraged, and analytical ability is not sufficiently developed through discussion.

Any fundamental reform in both the curriculum and the methods of teaching will probably have to be effected largely through the teachers' training colleges. The mission can point to these problems but it is not competent to suggest how they might best be solved. It can only recom-

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871 mend that they be studied, perhaps in collaboration with experts supplied by UNESCO.

In one respect this problem has already received growing recognition in Syria. Since 1949, for example, the Ministry of Education has established 111 special rural elementary schools in various parts of the country. In the fourth and fifth grades of such schools, pupils receive some instruction in the basic principles and techniques of agriculture. Each school has a garden in which children can apply their knowledge. Specially trained instructors have been supplied by the Ministry of Education. While the mission had no opportunity to appraise these schools, it considers that they represent a commendable effort to relate education to the problems of rural life. In principle it would seem desirable to establish more schools of this type as educational facilities are expanded.

Vocational Education[22]

874 Vocational education has been comparatively neglected, even though the need for sound practical training in commerce, banking, industry and agriculture has greatly increased. Aside from the agricultural schools, the government operates six vocational schools: two technical schools of intermediate and secondary grade in Damascus and Aleppo; two intermediate technical schools at Hama and Deir ez Zor; and two secondary commercial schools in Damascus and Aleppo. In these and two private institutions, 1,676 students were enrolled in the year 1952-53. The government recently started, on an experimental basis, three apprenticeship schools designed to provide three years of purely vocational training to elementary school graduates. Two of these have been established, respectively for boys and for girls, in Damascus, and the third, for boys, in Aleppo.

Since the mission has dealt with agricultural schools elsewhere, the discussion here will be confined to other vocational schools. In general the vocational school system suffers from inadequate facilities and equipment, a lack of sufficiently trained teachers, and a failure to adapt the training and instruction to the requirements of industry and commerce. There is a tendency to look down on vocational education. Generally only those who for one reason or another cannot attend the regular schools turn to vocational institutions. At the same time the business community takes almost

[22] See Annex I, p. 459.

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

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no interest in vocational schools, from which it has learned to expect very little.

Some improvement in the equipment of existing vocational schools should undoubtedly be undertaken. In recent years the budget has provided only between £S 100,000 and £S 150,000 annually for materials and equipment. The commercial school in Damascus is equipped only with typewriters; there are no other business machines, nor are class books provided. Many of the shops in the technical school at Damascus were found to be poorly equipped with machinery and tools. The acquisition of equipment, tools and textbooks must, however, be selective and accompanied by an improvement in the teaching staff and the type of instruction.

The mission recommends that two new secondary vocational schools be established, one at Homs and the other in Latakia. Both these cities are growing rapidly and are likely to witness a sharp increase in the demand for skilled workers and artisans. The institution at Homs is envisaged as not just another vocational school, but also as a center for training shop instructors and for experimenting in teaching techniques. For this reason the mission suggests that it be placed under a competent foreign director with wide experience in vocational training. Initially the staff of this school should exceed the long-term requirement, so that instructors may be trained for other schools, particularly for the one in Latakia which should open its doors about one year later than the Homs school. Many of the shop instructors in the existing schools might be given a period of training under expert supervision in the Homs school and be enabled to round out their experience in modern European factories. Many of these instructors are good, skilled workers, but they lack pedagogic training and in some cases sufficient experience with modern techniques.

It is important that people already working be enabled to get some vocational schooling at night. No opportunities for such schooling exist at present. We urge therefore that night classes be initiated at all the vocational schools and also, ultimately, at some of the regular schools in cities where vocational institutions are lacking. Facilities might initially be created for about 100 pupils and gradually extended to accommodate some 600 pupils by the sixth year.

Finally, the mission strongly recommends that a vocational education committee drawn largely from industry, commerce and banking be established to help ensure that the training and instruction imparted in the vocational schools really meets the requirements of the business commu-

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nity. No effort is now made to determine what happens to school graduates and how useful their training has been. It is generally recognized that their education simply does not meet the requirements. The law on technical education originally provided for the establishment of a committee consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of National Economy, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and other economic interests. This committee was to determine the types of vocational education needed and generally to facilitate such training and the subsequent employment of school graduates. Unfortunately it met only once and was apparently allowed to die for want of interest on the part of the Ministry of Education. A continuing committee of this type should once more be established. Its functions should be to undertake a critical appraisal of curricula, equipment and teaching staff; to devise means of relating vocational school education to in-service training in factories, banks and commercial houses; to assist in establishing a check on graduates and the usefulness of their training; and to make periodic visits to vocational institutions. This committee should also be asked to review the utility of the apprenticeship schools. In our opinion these schools are unlikely to provide training which would not be better acquired in existing shops and factories.

Adult Education

Aside from the educational work carried on in the army and some literacy courses conducted by private societies, no facilities for adult education exist in Syria. The mission believes that a program of "fundamental" adult education should be started not simply to combat illiteracy, which is still high among adults, but especially to enable people to acquire the practical knowledge which will help them to improve living conditions through their own efforts. A program on a large scale would manifestly be impracticable in the near future. We suggest that it be initiated as part of the program for the gradual introduction of community workers into the villages, recommended elsewhere in this report. Existing school teachers can be used in the adult education program, although they would need special supplementary training, since the subject matter and methods of instruction would obviously be different from those in the regular schools. For this reason it would be necessary to introduce courses on fundamental education into the curriculum of teachers' training colleges. To get the

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873 program off to a good start the services of an expert or a small mission should be requested from UNESCO which has accumulated considerable experience in techniques of fundamental education and which was active in Syria during 1952 and 1953 in the field of vocational training.

Higher Education

Higher education has made substantial progress. The Syrian University, which started in 1919 with schools of medicine and law, now includes also faculties of letters and of sciences, schools of pharmacy, dentistry and engineering and a Higher Teachers' Training College. In 1952-53 the University had 2,580 students. In Aleppo a school of engineering has also been established. Yet a further expansion and improvement of facilities will undoubtedly be necessary since the development program will sharply increase the demand for well-trained teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants and other qualified personnel. The University will need more teachers, equipment, laboratories and libraries. Although many Syrians will inevitably have to go abroad for special types of training, Syria should be able gradually to provide broader opportunities for higher education at home. The mission suggests that the government appoint a special committee to draw up recommendations for improving and expanding the University in line with the requirements of the economic development program that might be adopted. Such recommendations will undoubtedly entail larger expenditures on higher education, which the mission has taken into account.

658 *School Building*

871 In recent years Syria has apparently been spending about £S 2.5 million annually on new schools. Of this amount, approximately £S 1.4 million has come from municipal or local funds. We do not think that the government should spend, on the average, more than this for school building over the next six years. More could be achieved with such an expenditure, however, by economizing on the cost of construction and requiring [346] more local self-help. Secondary schools built by the Ministry of Public Works, for example, have been excessively expensive owing to their monumental character, the use of costly building materials such as carved stone and other features of a luxury nature. The past cost of £S 150-200 per

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square meter could probably be reduced to £S 80 with simpler construction and the use of less costly local materials. More could also be achieved with central government funds allocated to school building if their availability were conditioned on a larger contribution by municipalities. The latter should be expected to provide the land and half the cost of construction either in cash or labor.

In the program priority should be given to (1) the construction and expansion of vocational schools, (2) the building of experimental multipurpose schools which can provide facilities not only for regular education, but also for adult and vocational training and for community activities, and (3) the needs of municipalities which demonstrate their desire for educational facilities by a willingness to contribute substantially to their construction. The construction of additional regular schools might well be preceded by a survey of the distribution of existing schools in relation to needs. Some parts of the country are now much better provided with schools than others.

Expenditures on Education[33]

The program outlined above would entail an increase in government expenditures on education from an estimated annual level of about £S 36.5 million in 1953 and 1954 to an average of a little over £S 45 million in the period 1955-60. The breakdown of the anticipated outlays over the six-year period would be as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
General education[a]	220.50	36.75
Vocational education[b]	3.25	0.54
Fundamental (adult) education	0.50	0.08
Higher education	37.53	6.25
School construction and equipment[c]	10.00	1.67
Total	271.78	45.29

[a] Including primary and secondary education.

[b] Additional expenditures only. Continuing expenditures at past levels are included under "General education."

[c] Excluding local contributions.

[33] See Annex I, p. 461.

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II PUBLIC HEALTH

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The progress in public health has been much less spectacular and less [illegible] than that in education. Expenditures on public health have increased sharply only in recent years. In 1954 the budget of the Ministry of Public Health amounted to £S 8.764 million or 4.2% of the regular budget, as compared with actual expenditures of £S 3.431 million or 3.4% of the total in 1945. Health facilities have been gradually expanding. The number of hospitals has risen from 35 with 1,785 beds at the end of 1945 to 61 with [749] 4,094 beds at the end of 1954. Over the last seven years the government has spent, on an average, £S 1.3 million on public health facilities, so that [759] government hospitals now have a total of 3,000 beds. The number of doctors in Syria has risen from 616 in 1945 to about 880 at present.

Yet it is generally recognized that the state of public health is far from satisfactory. This conclusion rests upon testimony and observation rather than health statistics. The statistics, indeed, are so inadequate as to provide little indication of health conditions. The number of deaths registered, for example, imply a death rate of but seven per thousand, but the record of deaths is evidently very incomplete and the actual death rate rather [164] high. There is still a high incidence of debilitating diseases. Malaria, for example, is prevalent in many parts of Syria. Diseases such as tuberculosis and the many varieties of intestinal infections, which are generally associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding and low standards [165] of living, are quite widespread. Infant mortality is particularly high. Thus 36% of the registered deaths in 1951-53 occurred among children less than five years old, and of these about the same percentage died of diarrhoea and enteritis.

An effective campaign to raise health standards would require resources which Syria will hardly be able to mobilize at its present stage of development. The health program will have to remain rather modest and should attempt primarily to remedy the more glaring deficiencies. These are, principally, the inadequate attention given to preventive medicine and the markedly unequal geographic distribution of existing health facilities.

744 *Preventive Medicine*

The prevention of disease is likely in the long run to be more economical than curative medicine. The mission believes that this aspect of

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public health should receive primary emphasis in the program over the next six years. To this end we recommend a campaign against the malarial mosquito, improvement of drinking water supplies, greater stress on health education and the construction of a number of health centers.

Enough experience has now been gained in many countries to demonstrate that the scourge of malaria can be virtually wiped out by effective spraying with DDT. Such a program is receiving attention in Syria. Two WHO and UNICEF projects dealing exclusively or partially with malaria control (one in Homs and Latakia and one in Kamichliye) were being carried on in 1954; the mission understands they are to be continued until countrywide coverage is achieved. In 1954, spraying operations carried out by the government, with and without assistance by international agencies, were designed to protect some 380,000 persons, more than half the population of the malarial areas. The cost of malarial control in Syria is relatively high, an estimated U. S. $0.35 per person; nation-wide coverage would cost something over £S 810,000 annually. The mission has made provision in its recommended program for expenditure of £S 2.75 million for malarial control, which should be sufficient for three sprayings, of full coverage, during the period of the program.

Polluted drinking water is apparently an important cause of disease. Many communities are without pure water supplies. It is well recognized in Syria that this is one of the central problems which must be tackled. A program for community water supplies will be discussed in the next chapter.

The relationship of personal hygiene and sanitation to disease is a subject which must obviously be constantly stressed not only in schools and in the army, but also among adults generally. Prevention of disease is at least in part a matter of overcoming ignorance. The mission suggests that an effective health education be initiated to emphasize the maintenance of positive health as well as the prevention of diseases, in connection with education programs in elementary and secondary schools and adult education in the rural community improvement programs already recommended.

In this connection, the mission considers it important to establish a number of rural health units in different localities according to the recommendation of the Second Expert Committee on Public Health Administration of the World Health Organization (WHO Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 83). This could probably best be planned in connection with any community development scheme to be initiated in the country. In this case it would be

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744 advisable to initiate a pilot demonstration unit as a part of a community center in a rural district working in close coordination with other social and economic development projects in education, agricultural extension and social welfare. Particular emphasis should be placed on preventive health work, prenatal care and child health. This unit will also serve as a training center for the rural health workers to obtain their practical knowledge and experience in rural health work. One such pilot unit is planned by the government and WHO for 1956, utilizing TA funds.

If the demonstration proves to be successful, the present village dispensaries should gradually be grouped together and expanded to become rural health units. The existing staff in the dispensaries should be sent to the pilot unit to go through a course of training to prepare them for working in the new units.

As a start the mission recommends the construction and operation of one such experimental health unit. About £S 350,000 should suffice for construction of the necessary buildings and equipment, which need not be elaborate.

Hospital Facilities[34]

743 There is unquestionably a need for many more hospitals. The principal aim in the immediate future, however, should be to build hospitals in areas which now have virtually none. For the country as a whole, there are now, in terms of the population at the beginning of 1952, 1.23 hospital beds per thousand inhabitants. The number of beds per thousand varies widely, however, from a high of 2.88 in the city and province of Damascus to 0.9 and 0.92 in the provinces of Aleppo and Homs and a low of 0.25 and 0.44 in the Jezireh and the Euphrates. Out of 44 *qadas* or counties in the country, 28 do not have any hospitals at all. A large part of the rural population is in fact denied hospital service.

An adequate program for equalizing hospital facilities would involve the provision of 3,400 beds. Over the next six years only a start can be made, by providing an additional 1,000 beds at a total cost of £S 7 million. Of this total, we suggest that 250 be allocated to the Jezireh; 300 to the Euphrates; 400 to the province of Aleppo, with perhaps 100 in the town of Jisr ech Choghour, which is likely to grow rapidly with the development of the Ghab; and 50 to Palmyra.

[34] See Annex I, p. 463.

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
MAP 10
0 20 40 60 80 100 MILES
ALEPPO
JISR ECH CHOGHOUR
LATAKIA
HAMA
HOMS
DAMASCUS
HAURAN
DJEBEL DRUZE
RAQQA
DEIR EZ ZOR
PALMYRA
ABOU KEMAL
HASSETCHE
KAMCHLIYE
JEZIREH
EUPHRATES
1000 BEDS
500
0
EXISTING
By province
500 BEDS
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PROPOSED
By city
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743 In addition it would be desirable to build some new village dispensaries, which now number 96, at a cost of about £S 350,000, and to provide a similar sum for the construction of quarantine stations and minor health facilities.

To provide an adequate staff for the recommended additional medical and health facilities, the government must plan a training program. The faculty of medicine in Damascus may have to increase the enrollment of students to provide enough doctors for the new hospitals and health units. Many nurses would be needed for the hospitals, health units and dispensaries; nursing training facilities should therefore be increased. Midwives, laboratory technicians, sanitary inspectors and other medical health auxiliary personnel would also be needed to staff the new health services. The fellowships provided by WHO and the nursing education, maternal and child health and tuberculosis demonstration and training projects assisted by WHO should therefore be coordinated and if necessary expanded to meet the need for technical personnel.

In addition to the cost of the staff training program, some funds will no doubt be needed for reconstruction and expansion of hospitals; we have included £S 1 million in the recommended program for these purposes.

743 657 A revision in the methods of planning and building new health facilities appears necessary. In the past, new hospitals have frequently been built without any consultation with the Ministry of Public Health. Decisions to build have generally been made in response to local requests relayed through the Ministry of Interior, approved by the Ministry of Finance and carried out by the Ministry of Public Works. In the future the Ministry of Public Health should be enabled to plan for the construction of new facilities in accordance with a careful appraisal of the most urgent requirements. The Ministry of Public Works might well continue to do the actual construction, but in accordance with plans approved by the Ministry of Public Health and on a basis which would enable the latter Ministry to make timely preparations for the equipment and staffing of new hospitals.

Proposed Outlays

744 657 In proposing the construction program outlined above, the mission has kept in mind the need for providing additional funds for operation and administration. After taking this into account, it is expected that expendi-

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tures on public health, including new construction, would rise from a total of £S 10.052 million budgeted for 1954 to an average of £S 12.358 million in the six-year period 1955-60. The expenditures envisaged for the entire period 1955-60 would be distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Annual average
Anti-malarial campaign and dispensaries	3,100	517
Establishment of new hospitals and health units	8,350	1,392
Quarantine stations	300	50
Administration and operation of existing and new facilities including training of technical personnel	62,400	10,400
Total	74,150	12,358

III HOUSING

The postwar period has witnessed a considerable housing boom. In recent years construction has been on a scale double that of prewar years. The wartime backlog in housing, the increasing prosperity in the postwar period and the tendency toward a break-up of the larger family units have all contributed to this boom. Aside from a few houses built for civil servants, all of the construction has been private, and it has taken place without the help of a mortgage financing institution. In terms of value, probably over 80% of the new housing has been of the Western or European type, which is too costly for the vast majority of the people.

While the housing of the rural population and the lower classes in the cities is undoubtedly very bad, significant general improvement is likely to come about only as incomes and standards of living rise. It would be impractical for the government to direct substantial resources into housing for the masses which could not be supported by the present productivity of the economy. While the mission firmly believes that the state should take a greater interest in the improvement of housing, for the immediate future the government's role will have to be confined to (1) developing, through experimentation, methods of cheap and durable construction, (2) planning and assisting housing in new rural settlements, (3) constructing

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262 housing in urban centers which are growing rapidly owing to particular development projects, and (4) assisting in urban slum clearance.

To appraise the magnitude of the housing problem and provide a factual basis for a housing program, the mission suggests that a census of houses and buildings be carried out as soon as possible. Such a census could be conducted in cooperation with municipal authorities and would not entail much time or money.

One of the central problems is the enormous gap between the primitive mud and stone huts of the rural areas and the suburban slums on the one hand and the modern housing in the major cities on the other. Urban building codes modeled on Western European standards generally insist on building specifications which make housing much too expensive for the majority of the people. The result is that the poorer classes either are confined to the old quarters of the cities where housing is bad and overcrowded or have to move to the outskirts of the cities where building is unregulated. Rural slums without community services quickly develop and rent gouging and other forms of exploitation prevail. In the rural areas, too, there is an urgent need of developing improved houses which would not be excessively costly.

To meet this problem the mission recommends the establishment of an experimental building station near Damascus. The function of such a station would be to develop inexpensive but durable methods of construction for both rural and urban areas. It would use as a point of departure cheap local materials and traditional building techniques and seek to improve them in the light of modern technology and the experience gained in other countries. The type of housing erected by UNRWA in the refugee settlement at Ramadan, 40 kilometers northeast of Damascus, is indicative of the possibilities. These houses represent an interesting blend of traditional and modern materials used in accordance with modern techniques. While by no means a perfect solution they point the direction along which the experimental work we have in mind should proceed.

Elsewhere the mission has outlined the assistance which the government might provide for the erection of housing in the new rural settlements which would be undertaken. We have suggested, in addition, that the Agricultural Bank make loans for farm houses; and the measures proposed to enhance the security of tenure and independence of tenants should also help to improve rural housing indirectly.

Here we propose to deal only with the government's role in urban

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housing. We urge that the government should in the first instance finance the construction of housing in cities which are undergoing rapid development and are experiencing or will shortly experience great overcrowding. A case in point is Latakia. The development program for the port makes no provision at present for the accommodation of the rapidly growing population, so that slum conditions are steadily aggravating. The mission accordingly recommends that the government earmark £S 3 million to finance housing in this city. A similar sum should be set aside for housing in other rapidly developing urban centers such as Jisr ech Choghour at the northern end of the Ghab and the cities in the provinces of Jezireh and Euphrates.

No attempt has yet been made to deal with the problem of slums in such major cities as Damascus and Aleppo. These two cities and Latakia have been working out some sort of housing plans involving the expropriation of land, the construction of houses and their subsequent sale. Damascus has made the greatest progress with its program and has reached the stage of letting contracts. In all these cases, however, the housing to be constructed will cost from £S 8,000 to £S 12,000 per unit, a price which obviously only the more well-to-do can afford. It seems unwise to devote the limited resources available to such a purpose. We would suggest that these programs in the future be re-oriented as far as possible in the direction of resettling people now crowded together in the old slums of the cities. The program could take the form of making land available on reasonable terms and permitting people to build their own houses in accordance with approved specifications. Assistance could be given in the form of building materials and certain elements of the construction, with the people contributing most of the labor themselves. The types of houses to be built could be developed in the building research station we have proposed. To carry out such a program the municipalities might set aside £S 5 million over the next six years for buying land, and another £S 3.5 million for assistance in building. Additional legislation which would enable municipalities to acquire land for this purpose at reasonable prices may well be necessary, particularly since experience has demonstrated, as in Aleppo, that the price of land may triple or quadruple in price in anticipation of its expropriation.

To carry out the proposed functions relating to housing, the government will require expert assistance. Syria has enough engineers, labor and contractors, but housing experts are lacking. We suggest therefore that a

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small mission of foreign experts be recruited to set up the building research station and advise the government on carrying out the housing program.

The total cost of the program we have recommended for the years 1955-60 would amount to approximately £S 7.5 million, apart from the municipal effort and the cost of housing in the new rural settlements for which provision has been made elsewhere in this report.[38] This sum would be distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Housing census	240	40
Building research station, including administration	1,010	168
Housing construction	6,000	1,000
Technical assistance	250	42
Total	7,500	1,250

[38] See Annex I, p. 469.

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CHAPTER 8

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

In the field of community or municipal development Syria faces a number of challenging problems. Among these are the establishment of new rural settlements; rational planning of the physical development of cities and towns; the improvement of housing; the provision of community services such as water supply, electricity, waste disposal, streets and sidewalks; the location and planning of public buildings serving the community; and the introduction of social welfare services into cities. Elsewhere in this report we have dealt with the new rural settlements and with electricity supply, municipal transport and housing. Here we shall discuss briefly some of the remaining problems.

Town Planning

One of the first steps to be taken in the direction of improving community life is to work out plans according to which towns and cities can develop in an orderly and rational fashion. Town planning is not an expensive luxury, a means of realizing monumental buildings, impressive public squares, broad avenues and large public parks. It is rather an instrument for insuring that the large sums which must inevitably be invested in any human settlements not merely serve the needs of the moment but are conceived with a view to future requirements. The haphazard growth of towns and cities sooner or later leads to communications problems, overcrowding and slums, inadequacies in public services and other conditions which are wasteful of human and material resources.

Few Syrian cities have as yet adequate plans. Damascus has the longest experience in this field, and the development of the modern city, which is in many respects admirable, testifies to the utility of planning. Particularly noteworthy in recent years has been the redevelopment of the western part of the city, including the western entrance to Damascus, the provision of adequate streets and open spaces, and the removal of tanneries from the old city to a special industrial zone on the outskirts. The Damascus

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361 plan has one defect in common with those of other cities: it fails to make adequate provision for the location of housing for the less well-to-do classes within the confines of the city.

Aleppo has expanded in a much less orderly way than Damascus. Although a city plan was drawn up after the second World War, it is not based on an adequate topographic survey and reveals so many deficiencies that its total revision appears to be required. Of the smaller cities, Latakia has the best plan; it takes into account the need not only to reform the old city but to develop neighborhoods for community living. A few other towns such as Deir ez Zor, Hama and Homs have plans, but these for the most part envisage little amelioration except perhaps from the standpoint of communications.

In general most of the plans have been inspired too much by transport requirements and too little by the objective of improving the conditions of urban living. More attention must be paid to the zoning of districts for housing, industry and shops and bazaars, to the interrelationship of living quarters and centers of employment, and to the location of gardens, schools, hospitals and other public buildings in such a way as to make them most accessible to the community they are designed to serve. Within the larger cities it is important to plan community living also around neighborhood units which in certain respects can be self-contained and can help to decentralize the city.

365 *Community Facilities*[36]

Municipal investment in such facilities as streets and sidewalks, water supply, sewers, lighting and libraries has averaged a little over £S 12 million a year during the period 1949-54. In addition the central government has made available almost £S 30 million to enable Aleppo to install an entirely new water supply system, and has spent between £S 200,000 and £S 300,000 annually on the exploration of water for villages in the Hauran and the Djebel Druze.

A program for municipal investment can hardly be drawn up without a careful assessment of the needs of municipalities and their ability to meet them. In view of the limited resources available, however, the volume of investment can increase only gradually, to perhaps £S 16 million in

[36] See Annex I, p. 470.

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1960, or an annual average of around £S 14.3 million over the period 1955-60. 365

The principal task of the central government in this field will be to assist towns and villages in obtaining adequate supplies of pure drinking water. 365 312 Now that the expensive new system for Aleppo is virtually complete, it should be possible to devote more resources to the smaller cities and villages. Some £S 5 million will still need to be spent on expansion and improvement of the distribution network in Aleppo. Aside from this amount, we recommend that the government allocate about £S 8 million over the period 1955-60 for water supplies in towns and villages. The government has recognized that the problem is most acute in the Hauran and the Djebel Druze. Much of the population in these provinces is dependent on rain catchment for its water supply, and supplies in catchment basins quickly become polluted and occasionally dry up. The problem in these regions is complicated by the dearth of underground water, which necessitates expensive geophysical surveys. Elsewhere in the country there are still many villages and towns which urgently require pure water. For example, Hassetche, although the capital of Jezireh, is dependent on water drawn directly from the Khabour river and peddled from carts in the city streets. Because the need is so great, funds for water supply will have to be used with great economy. Extensive distribution systems which are expensive to install and maintain must be avoided. In the smaller villages a centrally located well will generally suffice. For the larger villages and towns the water should be piped to a limited number of public fountains where inhabitants can draw it for their domestic needs.

Waste disposal is also an important problem, especially from the standpoint of public health. 364 Even the larger cities have not fully solved this problem. In Damascus, for instance, the sewers empty into the Barada river, whose water is used farther downstream not only for irrigation but also for drinking. The most immediate need, however, is for proper waste disposal in the villages. The construction of latrines and cesspools appears to be the only feasible solution there, and the community self-improvement program which, in accordance with our earlier proposals, would be initiated by community workers, should focus at least in part on the improvement of village sanitation by this means. To overcome any public inertia, the government might find it advisable to give squatting slabs or some comparable assistance to householders as an incentive to construct and use latrines.

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Urban Social Welfare

368 It seems desirable in the near future to inaugurate some social welfare work in the urban areas as a counterpart of the proposed community work in the rural areas. Initially this will have to be on a modest and experimental scale. We suggest that over the next six years 8 to 10 centers be established to serve as focal points for voluntary community activities. About £S 350,000 might be allocated for investment in such centers, and £S 120,000 for operating expenditures. The centers would provide facilities for reading, radio listening, community meetings, adult education courses and eventually even for community baths. It would be advisable to combine the community hall as far as possible with the traditional school building; we therefore recommend that all new schools be constructed as all-purpose buildings which can serve children during the day and adults at night. The centers might well be put in the charge of selected teachers who would receive some special training in social work.

We would stress particularly that this modest program is experimental in character. Experience with the first centers will demonstrate how useful they can be, what needs they must serve and how they can best meet these needs.

Public Buildings[37]

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361 Public buildings are, of course, prominent features in most settlements of any size. They must be properly planned and fitted into town planning schemes so that they will be of maximum service to the government and the community. Elsewhere in this report we have discussed building requirements for agriculture, education, health and similiar special purposes. Any development program should also take into account the probable outlays on buildings of a general administrative character. The mission, however, had very little basis on which to project investment expenditures on government buildings of this kind. During the period 1949-53 the Ministry of Public Works spent on an average about £S 1 million on the construction of public buildings for purposes other than agriculture, education and health. The mission thought it advisable to assume that such expenditures would rise in the future and has accord-

[37] See Annex I, p. 472.

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ingly allowed for construction amounting to £S 8.5 million during the years 1955-60, or a little over £S 1.4 million annually. 653 361

The mission has one general observation to make regarding the responsibility for planning and constructing government buildings of all types. We believe that the Ministry of Public Works should in the future, as in the past, be responsible for designing and constructing public buildings. On the other hand, the various ministries and government agencies for which the buildings are to be built should be in the position of programming their own requirements. We have already had occasion to stress this in connection with public health facilities but it applies generally. Each ministry or independent government agency which requires a more or less continuous building program should have at least one or two officers charged with the task of anticipating building requirements. Proposals for new construction and appropriate budget allocations should come from the ministries concerned. Once they are approved, it is the task of the Ministry of Public Works to design and construct the building. Final approval of the design should also rest with the initiating ministries or agencies since only they will be able to judge whether the proposed design meets their needs.

A Housing and Settlements Administration

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In this and previous chapters we have envisaged that the government will play an increasingly prominent role with respect to the establishment of new rural settlements, urban housing and town planning. These are in the main new functions for the Syrian government and at present it is hardly equipped to discharge them. A new organization with a specially trained staff will be necessary. An independent agency set up for this purpose would have the task of (1) providing technical assistance to municipalities in town planning and related fields, and (2) planning and coordinating the work in housing and settlement.

The planning must be on two levels: on a broad national and regional scale, keeping in mind population trends and the interaction between economic development and the geographic distribution of population, and on a more detailed local scale, involving particular settlement projects.

Regarding the first of these planning functions, we do not suggest that the agency should be charged with drawing up the economic development program. It must keep under constant study, however, the impact which

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361 privately and publicly generated economic development will have on the
657 distribution of the population and must anticipate what problems it will pose in terms of growth of municipalities and their needs, and in terms of regional transport and other requirements. It would also study comparative population pressures on the land and recommend how these might best be relieved through the development of idle or under-utilized land and the establishment of new settlements. Its findings and recommendations would permit timely revisions in the content and direction of a public development program.

With respect to the second planning function, the proposed agency would prepare in detail the settlement schemes for the Ghab, the Roudj and the dry-farming areas we have proposed. It is important that one organization have the responsibility for planning and coordinating this settlement work. Only in this way will it be possible to economize on the expert staff required and to apply the experience gained in one settlement scheme to subsequent projects. Thus the agency would plan in detail the layout of the settlement, the community facilities to be provided, the type and design of housing and methods of construction, the communications among the new settlements or between new settlements and existing communities, the principles governing the selection of settlers and the terms on which they would be settled, etc. Within the framework of such a plan, the actual carrying out of various phases of the settlement work should be left as far as possible to existing ministries and departments. Thus the Ministry of Interior in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture would select the settlers in accordance with the recommended criteria; the Ministry of Public Works would cooperate with the settlers in the construction of housing, community facilities and roads; and the Agricultural Bank would finance the necessary housing and equipment of the settlers. Even in the planning of the settlements, the proposed agency should consult freely with the ministries concerned. It would, however, retain over-all direction in order to ensure that the work by all interested parties is properly carried out and coordinated.

In the field of housing and town planning, the new agency's functions would be similar in character. It would lay down the general directions along which the proposed building research station would work. The housing funds made available by the government would be distributed among municipalities in accordance with the recommendations and terms and conditions which it would frame. It would provide technical assistance

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to municipalities in drawing up and revising town planning schemes. 341

For this agency we envisage a status comparable to that of the agency 657 in charge of the rural community development program. It should be headed by a competent, well-paid director directly responsible to the prime minister and the cabinet. A part of its top staff of experts initially would have to be recruited abroad. In view of its responsibility for a vital segment of the development program, it should have a budget of around £S 600,000 a year to which the government might contribute £S 500,000 and the municipalities £S 100,000.

Proposed Expenditures

The recommendations which we have made in this chapter would entail a total government outlay of £S 24.95 million over the six-year period 1955-60, distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annua
Water supply	13,000	2,167
Urban social welfare	450	75
Public buildings (general)	8,500	1,417
Housing and Settlements Administration	3,000	500
Total	24,950	4,159

These proposed expenditures are exclusive of those which would be undertaken by the municipalities.

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CHAPTER 9

FINANCING AND EXECUTION OF THE PROGRAM

652. 1 FINANCING

We must now examine how future government expenditures as affected by our recommendations can be financed. First we shall review the total expenditures and then we shall analyze the available financial resources.

Projected Expenditures

Table 8 recapitulates under the heading "Development" the outlays envisaged in preceding chapters. The only additions to those previously discussed are items of £S 10 million for the capital of the proposed central bank and of £S 25 million for a development commission which is mentioned later in this chapter. It should be noted that not all of these expenditures are, strictly speaking, related to development. They include, for example, provision for the compensation of stockholders in nationalized public utilities and for the payment of additional subsidies to the railways. The average annual total of "development" expenditures is undoubtedly large—about double that of previous years.

To this total must be added the non-development outlays. Non-defense expenditures have been included in Table 8 under the heading "General Administration". We have projected these at a level which on the average would be 12% higher than was budgeted in 1953 and 1954 and 36% higher than actual annual expenditures in the three-year period 1950-52. By far the greater part of this increase has been attributed to the Ministry of Finance, whose budget will have to expand significantly to cover larger expenditures on debt service, tax collection and petroleum subsidies.[38]

[38] The cost of subsidizing imports of petroleum products arising out of the provision of foreign exchange for such imports at the official rate is borne by the Ministry's budget. It should be noted that the present subsidy on petroleum products may be abandoned but in that case there may be a corresponding reduction of taxes on petroleum products and therefore an offsetting loss in government revenues.

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TABLE 8 Comparison of Past and Proposed Government Expenditures 652

(Millions £S)

	Past expenditures			Projected expenditures for 1955–60	
	Average 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (budget estimates)	1954	Average annual	Total[a]
Development					
Irrigation and reclamation				33.5	201.2
Other agriculture				23.2	139.1
Industry				2.0	12.0
Tourist trade	[Accurate breakdown of total			1.3	7.9
Electric power	past expenditures not available]			10.1	60.7
Transport or communications				28.9	173.3
Education				45.3	271.8
Public health				12.4	74.2
Community planning and services[c]				4.2	25.0
Housing				1.3	7.5
Miscellaneous[c]				2.3	13.5
Sub-total	76.0	88.3[e]	n.a.	164.3	986.1
General administration[d]	53.7	64.4[e]	66.4	73.2	439.3
Defense	69.0	66.0[f]	75.4	75.5	453.0
Increase in government salaries				4.2	25.0
Grand total	198.7	221.7	n.a.	317.2	1,903.4

[a] Totals do not check because of rounding.

[b] Including public administration buildings.

[c] Included in the six-year total are £S 10 million for capital of the projected central bank, £S 2.5 million for a development commission, and £S 1 million for the expansion of statistical services.

[d] Expenditures of the Presidency of the Council, Parliament, Supreme Court, and the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, and National Economy insofar as they are not included under development outlays.

[e] Actual expenditures under these two headings were apparently £S 11 million lower than the budgeted totals.

[f] Actual expenditures.

We have also envisaged a rise in the "overhead" expenditures of the Ministry of Public Works, which will be responsible for carrying out many of the projects provided for in the development program. For the remaining ministries and agencies, however, little or no increase has been anticipated. The development program can be financed only if the govern-

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652 ment is determined to exercise the strictest economy in its other expenditures, which have already been raised significantly in recent years. At the same time we do recognize that the salaries of government servants will need to be raised and have accordingly provided £S 25 million up to the end of 1960 for this purpose. We shall revert to this subject later in this chapter.

Expenditures on defense have been projected at the level obtaining in the last few years. This should obviously be considered an assumption only and not a judgment or recommendation by the mission as to their actual or desirable future magnitude. However, any substantial increase in such expenditures is likely to be possible only at the expense of development.

Means of Financing

We believe that the total expenditure of around £S 1,900 million for the period 1955-60 can be financed without risking the danger of inflation. Table 9 sets forth the possible sources of financing which include (1) anticipated growth in existing revenues, (2) recommended revisions in taxes and revenues, (3) improved tax collection, (4) public utilities' income, (5) oil transit revenues, (6) domestic borrowing and (7) foreign aid and borrowing. Each of these will now be discussed in turn.

With the normal growth of the economy the yield of present taxes and revenues, other than oil transit receipts, can be expected to rise at an annual rate of 3% to 4%. From 1949 to 1953 government revenues rose by 67% or a little over 13% per year. A considerable part of this increase, however, was undoubtedly due to changes in the tax structure and tax rates. While national income probably went up about 25% during this period, the share absorbed by the central government apparently rose from about 11% in 1949 to approximately 13.5% in 1953. Since we anticipate a decline in the rate at which the economy has been expanding, we have not counted on an increase in the tax base of more than 3% to 4% per year.

It should be possible, however, to raise a modest amount of additional revenue by changes in rates and imposition of new taxes. Before discussing these increases, a decline in certain receipts should be noted. The mission fully endorses the abolition in 1954 of the export tax on cereals but we hope that the government will be able to resist pressure to eliminate the export duty on raw cotton as well. To do so would reduce revenues by

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TABLE 9 Financial Resources, 1955–60

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(Million £S)

Existing revenues, with anticipated growth[a]		1,315–1,360
Additional taxes and revenues		
Change in base for application of ad valorem import duties	20.0	
Excises, import duties and fees	25.0	
Institution of global income tax	24.0	
Tax on large landholdings	10.0	
Additional revenues from state domain	11.0	
		90.0
Improved tax administration		40.0
Income from Aleppo and Damascus public utilities		60.0
Oil transit revenues		73.0
Domestic borrowing		85–120
Foreign aid and foreign borrowing		175–215
Total		1,838–1,958

[a] Annual increase of 3% and 4% respectively. The estimates exclude oil revenues and take into account the repeal of the export tax on cereals and the effect of the proposed adjustment in the livestock tax.

about £S 11 million per year, a loss which Syria can ill afford, and while the tax may well have discouraged the cultivation of cotton on unsuitable land, there is no reason to believe that it has worked undue hardship on efficient cotton producers. We recommend, however, that the existing specific duty be replaced by one levied on a sliding scale graduated according to the price of raw cotton. In addition we suggest that the present head tax on animals, which is difficult to administer, be repealed and that instead the sale of animals, wool, hides and skins be subjected to the regular 7% agricultural production tax. This would probably entail some loss of revenue which, together with the consequences of the elimination of the export levy on cereals, has already been taken into account in the projection of government receipts mentioned above.

Since the proposed tax and revenue increases recommended by the 651
mission are discussed in previous sections of this report and in the Annex 652
on public finance, they will be mentioned only briefly below:

1. *Assessment of import duties at the actual instead of the official exchange rate.* This would increase significantly the yield of existing ad valorem tariffs, many of which are very low in terms of valuations at the

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651 de facto exchange rate. We have already indicated in the chapter on in-
652 dustry, however, that this measure should be accompanied by a review of the entire tariff schedule so that the incidence of all ad valorem duties would not be raised arbitrarily.

2. *Higher excises, customs duties and fees.* Quite apart from the proposal in the preceding paragraph, it should be possible to impose additional excise taxes or, alternatively, customs duties on luxuries and semi-luxuries. The rates at which certain fees are collected on business transactions, including stamp duties, judicial and property transfer fees and the like, could also be raised.

3. *Imposition of a global income tax.* Existing income taxes are schedular in character, that is, levied separately on income derived from business and professions, salaries or wages, circulating capital, and urban real property. These taxes are not sufficiently progressive in their incidence on persons drawing their income from two or more sources. We recommend, therefore, that they be complemented by a global income tax, which would be more closely related to ability to pay. Income from agriculture which is not subject to any of the schedular taxes should in our view be included in this global tax. It has often been argued that taxation of income from agriculture is administratively impracticable. We propose, however, that only the high incomes derived from agriculture be included in the tax, and we do not believe that these are by and large more difficult to estimate than those derived from other sources.

4. *Tax on large landholdings.* The essential features of this proposed tax, which is recommended primarily as a measure of land policy, have already been outlined in Chapter 3.

5. *Additional revenues from state domain.* We have suggested that the income now derived from state domain that is already leased for agricultural purposes can be increased by gradually raising the rentals to a level conforming more closely to that prevailing for private land, for instance in the Jezireh. In addition, the recapture of land under the provisions of Law No. 135 of October 29, 1952, recommended elsewhere, should ultimately make considerable additional state land available for leasing.

The total amount of additional revenue we anticipate from these proposals is only £S 90 million over the six-year period. The eventual annual yield is likely to be much more than £S 15 million, but we have allowed for the probability that the proposed increases will not be fully effective for some time.

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The more efficient collection of taxes is already receiving attention 651
from the government. Syrian officials have estimated that receipts from 652
all sources might be increased by as much as 40% if all liabilities under existing taxes were enforced. To be conservative we have merely assumed that more effective collection could ultimately raise the yield of direct and indirect taxes, now amounting to about £S 160 million per year (average of 1953 and 1954), by about 10%. For the period as a whole we have estimated increased receipts on this account at only £S 40 million.

In the chapter on electric power we have pointed out that the net 652
operating income of the nationalized public utility companies of Aleppo and Damascus, which is already high, is likely to rise still further. If this income is not dissipated by lowering power rates, against which we strongly advise at this time, it should suffice to finance the entire power expansion program and also to pay compensation to the former owners of these companies.

Foreign oil companies now pay certain fees on crude oil passing through Syria by pipeline. Receipts of £S 6.5 million were budgeted on this account in 1954. New and higher transit rates have been periodically under negotiation, and there remains no doubt that new rates will go into effect some time during the next few years. We have conservatively estimated the increased receipts on the basis of the most recent proposals made by the Iraq Petroleum Company, although this does not, of course, imply a judgment on our part as to the merits of the offer.

Prospects of Domestic Borrowing

The possibility of domestic borrowing without serious inflationary consequences must now be examined. As a preliminary it is useful to note how much the government has borrowed in the past. Over the five-year period 1949-53 the government raised a net sum of £S 157.1 million (according to figures on the public debt) by domestic borrowing, all of it from the BSL, which, it will be recalled, has some of the functions of a central bank. In the two-year period 1952-53 funds raised by net borrowing amounted to £S 71.1 million.

This increase was offset by a sharp rise in public deposits, as indicated below (in millions of Syrian pounds):

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	1949-53	1949-51	1952-53
Net new public borrowing*	130.6	85.5	45.1
Less rise in public deposits	151.6	17.2	134.4
Of which public treasury	45.5	4.0	49.5
Difference	−21.0	+68.3	−89.3

* Changes in the public debt, excluding obligations which did not give rise to cash payments or receipts.

Over the entire five-year period, the increase in public deposits exceeded the amount of funds raised through borrowing by £S 21 million. In the first three years of the period, however, borrowing was much greater than the rise in public deposits, thus permitting an excess of public spending over revenues. In the last five years of the period, on the other hand, the increase in public deposits was far greater than the total amount raised by new borrowing.

Excess spending in the initial three-year period may have created some inflationary pressures. Whether deficit financing actually had any inflationary impact is almost impossible to determine in view of the dearth of reliable economic indicators and the additional difficulties of interpretation created by the termination of the Syrian-Lebanese economic union in 1950. It seems probable, however, that the continued expansion of production and trade during this period made it relatively easy to absorb the additional money supply injected into the economy by deficit financing.

The increase in public deposits during the years 1952 and 1953 was apparently not an important factor in the expansion of bank credit to the private sector. Bank credit did almost double during this period, rising from £S 115.1 million at the end of 1951 to £S 226.8 million at the end of 1953, and in 1954 there was a further expansion. The BSL, which held 93% of the public deposits at the end of 1953, accounted, however, for only £S 16.8 million of the increase in bank credit during the two-year period. In part the BSL was prevented from expanding credit by the requirement of the Ministry of Finance that foreign exchange transferred to the Bank by the Office des Changes be put into the monetary cover, thus necessitating a shift of the Bank's holdings of public debt from the issue to the banking department. Despite the over-all expansion in bank credit, which was financed to the extent of £S 51 million by an increase

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in banking advances from abroad, no inflation took place in 1952 and 1953. In fact prices were falling and, after the impact of the bad harvest of 1951 was overcome, the balance of trade and payments became progressively more favorable. Foreign exchange reserves during the whole two-year period rose from £S 73.7 million to £S 97.9 million at official rates and from £S 114.3 million to £S 157 million at free rates. 652

In the future it would obviously be unwise to rely extensively on borrowing from the proposed central bank or, in the interim, from the issue department of the BSL. Such borrowing leads directly to the issue of additional money which, unless offset by either the curtailment of private credit or a corresponding increase in national income, would produce inflationary forces causing a price increase or an unfavorable trend in the balance of international payments. In the first instance, therefore, the government must attempt to borrow in a manner which would be clearly non-inflationary.

This means that the government must be able to issue securities and establish a market for them. In the past, the government has not issued marketable securities either in the form of Treasury bills or government bonds. Some preparations for the issue of Treasury bills are apparently going forward, but no steps have been taken looking toward the marketing of government bonds.

The marketing of government bonds meets with three obstacles: (1) reluctance on the part of the government to offer attractive terms; (2) the lack of a capital market and institutions for the mobilization of savings; and (3) lack of confidence in the government.

Direct borrowing from the central bank (in this case the BSL) is appealing to the government because it is cheap. The interest rate is only 1% and some advances are even non-interest bearing. The dangers of this course of action, however, must be stressed. They are recognized in the Organic Monetary Statute providing for the creation of a central bank, enacted by Legislative Decree No. 87 of March 28, 1953. This legislation, contrary to previous law and practice, placed a limit on government access to the central bank. Under Title II of the law the amount of public debt acceptable as monetary cover was limited to (1) a consolidated advance to the state of £S 220 million; (2) cash facilities during any one budget year and repayable in that year of up to one-tenth of the budget receipts of the preceding year; (3) Treasury bills issued to cover foreign exchange and gold losses as a result of changes in rates or parities and

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652 advances made by the Exchange Office under international payments agreements; (4) Treasury notes that might eventually have to be remitted by the government to cover its subscription to the IMF and IBRD; and (5) Treasury certificates, bills and bonds issued or guaranteed by the state up to a limit of £S 60 million, provided their issuance is authorized by law. The operations contemplated under (1), (2), (3) and (4) would not apparently lead to the creation of additional money, except to the extent that advances might have to be made to the Exchange Office to finance a surplus of local payments under international payments agreements. Syria has, however, no payments agreements at present, and the problem is not likely to assume considerable magnitude in the future. Thus only under (5) could a real new money-creating debt develop, i.e., to a total of £S 60 million.

These provisions, which have already become effective, impress us as a salutary restraint on inflationary deficit financing. We urge, however, that the draft legislation already prepared for the consolidation and appropriate management of the direct and indirect state debt be enacted as promptly as possible.

Government securities must therefore be floated on terms attractive enough to ensure their sale to customers other than the central bank. Just what the terms should be can be only established by a survey of the potential market (commercial banks and individuals) conducted with expert advice. In any event it would be advisable to err on the generous side. Treasury bills would probably have to carry interest rates of at least 2½% and government bonds from 6-7% depending on the relative attractiveness of other investments and the maturity of the issue. Judging from the experience of the Port of Latakia, which sought to market shares with a guaranteed return of 5%, the latter rate is likely to be too low, at least initially. Long-term bonds are almost certainly unmarketable. At the beginning the maximum maturity would probably have to be 3-5 years. This is all the more true because commercial banks would presumably be the principal investors until the public became more accustomed to the idea of investing in government securities.

652 454 In most countries, savings are in large part mobilized by such institutional means as banks, special savings banks, insurance companies, and social insurance or provident funds. These institutionalized savings are then in turn largely invested in government bonds or other bonds. In Syria, as we have already pointed out, there are no institutions other than

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the regular banks which are capable of mobilizing funds in this way. 652 454
Thus one important element in the market for bonds is lacking.

Institutional savings obviously cannot be developed within a short period. For the longer run, however, it is important that steps be taken in the next few years to stimulate such savings. Among the steps that the mission would recommend are the following:

1. The government should start paying its government servants, at least those in the upper half of the civil service grades, by check, so as to familiarize them with the use of banks and thus indirectly encourage them to make deposits in banks. Such a measure, though not of great importance, could at least be quickly implemented.

2. The Council of Money and Credit should canvass with the commercial banks the possibility of stimulating the development of savings and time deposits. Among the measures that might be discussed for adoption are (1) the possibility of establishing a greater differential between interest rates on current deposits on the one hand and those on time and savings deposits on the other without necessarily increasing the over-all interest burden of the banks; (2) the possibility of attaching some lottery feature to time and savings deposits (this is done in some countries such as Japan); and (3) the inauguration of a joint government-bank campaign designed to show how deposits in banks for given periods can "grow."

3. The government should look to the gradual introduction of a postal savings system. Such a system might be inaugurated on a trial basis in one of the larger cities. It would necessitate a publicity campaign in which the cooperation of teachers, religious leaders and the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture should be enlisted.

4. The government should take various measures to encourage savings 652
through insurance. Among these are (1) the drafting, with expert foreign 454
assistance, of a modern insurance law designed to ensure that investors in life insurance are protected to the maximum extent possible and to lay down some stipulations regarding the portion of assets representing Syrian business that must be invested in Syria; (2) conferences with representatives of insurance companies doing business in Syria and neighboring countries, designed to explore the steps which might be taken to increase the volume of Syrian individual life and group insurance business through such measures as better training of agents and subagents, publicity campaigns, etc.; (3) exploration, with the help of ILO, of the possibility of introducing some forms of social insurance, particularly accident and

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652 old age insurance, on a modest scale in Syria; and (4) enlisting the support
456 of Moslem religious leaders for insurance in the form of a pronouncement that the taking out of insurance is not contrary to Koranic teachings. Regarding the latter, it should be noted that such a pronouncement was obtained in Egypt quite some time ago. Egypt is one Moslem country where life insurance has slowly developed. There the face value of life insurance policies has increased from £E 30 million, with premium payments of £E 1.25 million, in 1942, to £E 67.7 million, with premium payments of £E 3 million, in 1951.

652 Since rapid results cannot be expected from measures to foster "insti-
454 tutionalized savings", the question arises whether the government can be expected to find a market for its securities under the conditions to be anticipated over the next six years. We have had occasion to point out that the considerable savings in Syria flow for the most part directly into investments of various kinds without the intermediary of a market, and that tangible investments, particularly in real estate, are generally preferred. At the same time the success of industrial companies in the postwar period and the tendency toward greater dispersion of their shares point to an increasing willingness to invest in securities. Moreover, as we have indicated elsewhere, private investment opportunities may not increase in the future at the same rate as in the past. The provision of additional agricultural credit through such a public institution as the Agricultural Bank may also displace some private funds now devoted to such financing. In theory, therefore, private funds may become available for investment in public securities. It is always possible, of course, that they may go, instead, into hoards or increased consumption. However, there has been a marked tendency in Syria to save and invest, and if savers and investors can be persuaded that government securities offer an attractive return and are safe, they might be expected gradually to venture into public investment.

A rate of return of 6% on government bonds might be attractive, at least to those who have been investing in building, where the return has been comparatively modest and where it might be expected to decline in the future. Lack of confidence in the government, in its determination to repay and in its use of public funds, is no doubt the most important obstacle. Such confidence is likely to be established only gradually. The government may already have contributed somewhat to this confidence in the last two years by stabilizing the value of the Syrian pound in relation to other currencies and by maintaining internal financial equilibrium. Special bond

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issues for specific projects which have impressed the business community as specially worthwhile may be more successful than those intended to raise funds for general government purposes. 652 454

During the period when full confidence in the government is lacking, people may be reluctant to "freeze" their funds in government securities. In the absence of a market where securities can be readily traded, such funds do tend to be frozen until the maturity of the government security. This difficulty might be overcome by providing that government bonds, even though issued for a stated number of years, will in principle be redeemed at stated prices at intervals of six months. If the bonds are originally issued on a discount basis and the redemption prices fixed in such a way that the implied interest rate increases the longer the bond is retained, a definite incentive to longer retention is provided. At the same time the investor has the assurance that he will always be repaid at short notice. Such a bond may also be appealing for bank investment in view of its liquidity. For the government it admittedly has a disadvantage in that the volume of redemption payments cannot be anticipated. In emergencies the government can, however, borrow from the central bank to meet the redemption payments. Such recourse, except for temporary purposes, is not to be recommended, but if the very possibility of prompt repayment strengthens confidence, it may in the longer run make unnecessary net borrowing from the central bank to meet redemption payments. To increase the attractiveness of investment in government bonds, the incorporation of a lottery feature may also be considered.

Any prediction as to the amount of government securities the "public" may be expected to absorb is exceedingly hazardous. It might be noted here that even if only 2% of gross private investment in 1953 (which was about £S 185 million) were to be diverted annually to investment in government securities, this would amount to a total of £S 18.5 million over five years. It may not be unreasonable to expect that over this period public purchases of government securities might range between £S 10 million and £S 20 million. Some underdeveloped countries such as India and Ceylon have been surprised by the unexpectedly favorable response of private investors to issues of government bonds.

In a number of underdeveloped countries commercial banks have been persuaded to finance a substantial amount of public indebtedness. Syrian commercial banks might well become the major buyers of government bonds; this may or may not be economically advisable, depending on the 652

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652 circumstances. It will tend to be inflationary if the banks acquire funds for such investment simply by rediscounting more commercial paper with the central bank, and it will have undesirable consequences for the private sector of the economy if the investment takes place at the expense of private credit. On the other hand, there would be no inflationary effect if foreign banks operating in Syria brought in additional funds from abroad to take care of investment in government paper as well as ordinary private credit needs. We have already noted that commercial banks do call upon their foreign branches or parent institutions for additional funds as credit needs arise. If the new central bank is established in Syria within a few years, as is envisaged, the commercial banks may prefer to obtain additional funds by rediscounting their paper with such a bank rather than by getting advances from abroad. This may not necessarily be the case if they wish to maintain their independence or if they consider investment in government securities attractive both because of the yield and the assurance that capital transfers in and out of Syria are permitted freely. To the extent that the demand for private credit falls off relative to the rise in private deposits, bank investment in government bonds also need not be harmful. With the probable diminution of private investment opportunities, deposits may rise more rapidly than bank credit. The increase in private deposits may then be a reflection of the rise in non-invested savings. Under these circumstances bank investment in government bonds may be a means indirectly of making this idle money available for public investment.

Government deficit financing—that is, borrowing from the central bank or the banking system as a whole in a manner that injects additional money into the economy—is not necessarily harmful under all circumstances. Its consequence depends on the conditions of production and trade and on the balance of international payments. If production and exports remain high and private investment and import of investment goods fall off, some deficit financing may be possible. The same will be true if production and exports continue to expand without an equally rapid rise in imports. If the private economy experiences some deflation, pointing to the existence of idle resources which could be quickly brought into production again, some offsetting inflationary financing by the government may not be out of place. At no time, however, will a rather haphazard approach to inflationary borrowing be justified. The timing and magnitude of such borrowing must be well considered. A careful watch will need to be kept on pertinent economic indicators such as the volume of production and exports, the volume of imports of consumer and investment goods,

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the trend in the over-all balance of international payments and the development of prices. 652

It would be dangerous to consider any extensive government borrowing from the banking system until proper control of money and credit can be assured through a central bank. The BSL is not in a position to exercise such effective control, in part because it is primarily a commercial bank and in part because it does not have the requisite powers. The necessary legislation for establishing a central bank has been enacted and the proposed institution has been endowed with ample powers over the supply of money and credit. Although it is to be established within a few years, as soon as the requisite staff can be trained with help from the BSL, few concrete steps have apparently been taken. If for one reason or another it proves impracticable to establish the central bank within the next two years, it would be well for Syria to consider concluding a transitional agreement with the BSL whereby the bank's issue and commercial departments are clearly divorced, under conditions which give the commercial departments of the BSL and all other commercial banks equal access to the issue department to the extent they can present paper eligible as monetary cover. This does not eliminate, however, the need for as much speed as possible in the establishment of a central bank with the full powers given it by the Organic Monetary Statute. If necessary, the Syrian government should engage the services of foreign central bank experts to assist in the establishment and management of the institution in its early years and to supplement the help in the training of staff already offered by the BSL.

After considering the possibility of new borrowing, it is necessary also to examine the volume of repayments on loans which the government has extended or guaranteed for its own agencies and enterprises or for third parties. These include the following loans by the BSL (in millions of Syrian pounds) outstanding at the end of 1953:

Public administrations and institutions . . .		59.4
Municipalities	12.8	
Aleppo Water Project	20.0	
Agricultural Bank	15.0	
Electric power authorities	10.1	
Railways	1.5	
Cereals Office		46.8
Industrial companies		13.4

In addition the government has made considerable funds available out of its own resources for investment by the PTT[20] with the evident ex-

[20] Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs.

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652 pectation that they would be repaid out of the profits of this enterprise.

Unfortunately the mission does not have much information on the terms of repayment. Loans to the municipalities are apparently for a 10-year period, so that we could expect over the next six years repayment of the amount outstanding at the end of 1949, namely £S 9.9 million. This may well be offset, however, by new municipal borrowing. It is doubtful that repayments on the Aleppo water loan will be significant within the next five years. Of the loans to the power companies, apparently £S 3.6 million will fall due before the end of 1959. We do not expect repayments by the Agricultural Bank since we have assumed, in making provision for additional capital for this institution, that it will retain its existing funds. The Cereals Office does not have sufficient assets to repay its entire debt to the BSL, so that the government will have to assume part of it. The Office should, however, be able to repay £S 10 million to £S 16 million out of its receivables and the liquidation of its inventories, and to this extent the government can safely reborrow from the central bank.[40] The loans to the industrial companies will all have to be repaid within the next five years unless they are again renewed. As for the investment advances to the PTT, it should be noted that the PTT budget for 1954 provides for the repayment of past advances of £S 3 million out of an anticipated excess of receipts on current account. While this may be over-optimistic in view of the past record of the PTT, we should undoubtedly take into account repayments of past advances if we include in the development program all the gross investment needs of the PTT. Perhaps we can anticipate repayments of £S 10 million to £S 15 million which can be credited against gross advances for new investment.

Thus we can anticipate the following non-inflationary sources of revenue or borrowing as the result of the repayments of the loans and advances discussed above (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Power companies	3.6
Cereals Office	10.0–16.0
Industrial companies	10.0
PTT	10.0–15.0
Total	33.6–44.6 (say 35–45)

[40] Repayments could also be made out of its bank deposits, but since the withdrawal of these deposits is not likely to produce a contraction of bank credit, the government could presumably not reborrow and spend an equivalent sum without inflationary consequences.

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Recapitulating, it would appear not unreasonable to expect the following sources of public funds other than ordinary government revenues from taxes, etc., over the next six years (in millions of Syrian pounds): 652

New domestic borrowing	
From the public	10–20
From the banking system	40–55
Reborrowing and repayments of government advances	35–45
Total	85–120

Part of the contemplated borrowing from the banking system may be inflationary in character. Significant unfavorable effects, however, need hardly be expected in view of the magnitude of the borrowing, the probable continued favorable development of the balance of international payments and the prospective diminution of private investment.

One final question calls for discussion: to what extent the government can draw down the balances in existing public deposits to defray its expenditures either in addition to or in lieu of the borrowing contemplated above. In this connection it is well to note first how these public deposits have developed over the last two years; this is shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10 Development of Public Deposits

(Million £S)

	End '51	End '53
Public Treasury	12.5	65.6
Public Administrations	47.7	73.9
(of which Customs)		(52.0)
Public Services (industrial, commercial, agricultural and financial)	7.2	49.2
(of which Cereals Office)		(19.7)
Other		0.2
Total	67.3	188.9

NOTE: Foreign exchange deposits of the Office des Changes are not included.

The largest increase has taken place in Treasury balances, particularly when it is considered that the Customs Administration was holding a very large deposit at the end of 1953 pending the transfer of these funds to the

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652 Treasury.[41] The other type of public deposits which has risen rapidly consists of various autonomous government enterprises and agencies. A breakdown of these, available only for the end of 1953, is given below (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Exchange Office	6.9
Council of Money and Credit	2.0
PTT	4.3
Power, tramway and water companies	4.5
Railways	1.2
Port of Latakia	0.9
Agricultural Bank	2.2
Cereals Office	19.7
Tobacco Monopoly	4.6
Others	2.9
Total	49.2

The drawing down of public deposits is likely to have the same effect as deficit financing, particularly since it is doubtful that a decline in public deposits would be accompanied by a contraction of bank credit to the private sector. The government should regard these Treasury balances as a resource in lieu of, rather than in addition to, borrowing from the banking system; it should approach their use with the same caution it employs in considering deficit financing. The use of the accumulated balances of autonomous public entities should also be carefully watched. Finally, it would be well to require that all public deposits be kept with the Central Bank or, in the interim, with the BSL, so that the government can, if necessary, take effective steps to ensure that they do not have an undue effect on bank credit. Recently there has been a tendency to shift public deposits to other banks where it will be less easy to control their impact on credit.

652 *Foreign Aid and Borrowing*

652 448 457 Our expectation that additional resources of £S 175 million to £S 215 million may be available from abroad rests on the assumption that Syria

[41] The mission was unable to obtain information on the extent to which the Treasury is holding funds for the account of others. The new monetary statute envisages the ultimate establishment of a special Caisse des Depots et Consignations under the central bank to hold such deposits held on behalf of third parties; it is certainly advisable to have a clearcut distinction between the Treasury's own funds and those held in trust for others.

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will be able to borrow for certain development projects and that the Syrian government will accept offers of foreign aid. 652 648 457

Certain projects are likely to merit foreign loans. General economic prospects warrant the expectation that Syria can contract some foreign debt and expect to serve it. At present there is no foreign debt except for the compensation due to the former foreign owners of the nationalized public utilities and a $6 million loan from Saudi-Arabia. Both the immediate and long-term prospects of the balance of international payments appear favorable. While there may be some decline in the price of exported cereals and cottons, continued expansion in the volume of exports, although at a lower rate than in the past, will probably more than offset it. A rapid rise in imports is unlikely to occur as long as monetary stability is maintained. Moreover, foreign exchange policy can be kept sufficiently flexible to enable the government to influence the volume of international payments and receipts.

The Syrian government has so far been reluctant to accept proffers of foreign aid. The United States in 1954 offered to include Syria in its economic aid program, and this offer presumably remains open. We have assumed here that Syria will ultimately consider it advantageous to accept. All other Arab countries have in recent years received such aid apparently without suffering any infringement of their independence. In the last five years the United States has allocated about $111 million in economic and technical assistance to the Arab countries. For 1954-55 alone almost $64 million has been assured to Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. If Syria does decline similar aid, it may well face the need of curtailing the development program we have outlined. 652 648

It might be appropriate to point out also that Syria signed an agreement with UNRWA in October 1952 under which $30 million was to become available for economic development projects that would assist in the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees from Palestine, who in Syria number some 85,000. Less than $2 million of these funds have actually been committed. Because of its insistence that the refugees be repatriated, the government has been reluctant to use the UNRWA development funds. At the same time it might be mentioned that the Director of UNRWA and his Advisory Commission, on which Syria is represented, agreed in a special report to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1954 that UNRWA should pursue its long-term task of "assisting the refugees

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652 to become self-supporting," involving particularly UNRWA participation
648 "in the economic development of the host countries, thus making it possible for the refugees and the countries in which they live to benefit jointly by the combination of available rehabilitation funds and those from other sources."[42] The uncertainties regarding Syria's acceptance of these UNRWA funds are such, however, that we have not assumed that they will actually be used.

Municipal Financing

361 A brief word should be said regarding the financing of development
652 expenditures by the municipalities. In a number of places in this report we have suggested that certain expenditures be shouldered by municipalities. We have envisaged municipal investment expenditures in housing, schools and community facilities totaling about £S 103 million for the six-year period. This implies an annual outlay of around £S 17 million, compared to a probable average of some £S 12 million in recent years (exclusive of expenditures on Aleppo water supply). We have provided for part of this sum by recommending that the central government allocate £S 8 million for community water supplies (exclusive of Aleppo). Thus the municipalities will have to find a net sum of between £S 4 million and £S 5 million per year for additional investment.

Unfortunately no comprehensive information was available in Syria on actual municipal expenditures and receipts. The budgets of all municipalities were reported to have risen from £S 24.4 million in 1949 to £S 29.6 million in 1952 and further to £S 37.6 million in 1953. Data obtained by the mission from a scattering of municipalities indicate that municipal revenues—which are derived both from local taxes and surcharges on certain national taxes—have increased rather rapidly. This lends support to the tentative belief that the municipalities can bear the additional proposed expenditures, although probably only if they are not required to reduce the outstanding amount of existing indebtedness. We strongly recommend, however, that the government undertake a survey of municipal finances with a view to determining whether the municipalities can actually meet their future requirements.

[42] See U.N. General Assembly A/2717/Add. 1, 5 November 1954.

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II ADMINISTRATION

The substantial public investment and development program we have proposed will not only strain the financial resources of the government, but also impose an onerous and challenging task upon administrative resources. In our opinion this task can be accomplished only if there is considerable improvement in the organization, methods and personnel of the government service. It is no disparagement of Syria to conclude that the existing government organization cannot undertake a greatly expanded public investment and development program without a marked increase in the efficiency of its operations. Syria became independent only at the close of the last war and has therefore had only a relatively short period in which to organize an efficient government service. The government has already made significant progress, particularly in the fields of education and public health. To analyze its current shortcomings is not to depreciate its past achievements, but has been done to help work out recommendations which may better equip it for the larger tasks of the future.

These shortcomings may be enumerated as follows: (1) failure to attract sufficient competent people to the government service; (2) deficiencies in methods of operation, exemplified by excessive centralization; (3) inadequate planning and coordination; and (4) distrust and suspicion of the government on the part of the public. Each of these requires some discussion.

Considering its size, Syria has a considerable government apparatus. Excluding the army and gendarmerie, as well as day laborers, about 20,000 government employees were paid out of the regular government budget in 1952. Of these, a little over 15,000 were in the civil service cadre. In addition, various independent or semi-autonomous public agencies employed between 3,000 and 4,000 people. The total number of employees (excluding those of the municipalities) may thus be estimated at approximately 24,000.

Government salaries are very low. Even in the top grade of the civil service—a grade held by only 27 persons—the monthly salary ranged from a minimum of only £S 708 (about $198) to a maximum of £S 819.50 ($229). Only 4.7% of all the employees in the regular civil service enjoyed a minimum monthly salary in excess of £S 378.50 (about $106). Average

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647 annual salaries in the civil service were only £S 2,130 or about $600 per year. The salaries of permanent employees outside the civil service are even lower. Family allowances add somewhat to the compensation, but apparently no more than 10% on the average. At this level the government cannot expect to attract many capable people or to stimulate much zeal on the part of its employees.

High government officials often find some means of supplementing their salaries by serving on various government committees and boards for which extra compensation is given. Many government employees eke out a living by taking outside jobs. Some find it difficult to resist the temptation to use their official position as an opportunity for illicit gain. In recent years the government has recruited some promising younger men, primarily by the device of paying their study abroad in return for an undertaking to serve the government for a period twice as long as the years of subsidized study. Often, however, these people are waiting impatiently for the end of their government service to explore the opportunities for private employment. In many cases, too, they are not placed in positions for which their training and education have especially suited them.

Syria, like many other Middle Eastern countries, suffers from excessive centralization of government responsibilities. This tendency toward centralization is historically deep rooted. There is a great reluctance on the part of senior officials to delegate responsibility; and officials of the middle and lower grades have in turn been unwilling to assume responsibility whenever hesitant steps in the direction of decentralization have been taken. The fact that in Syria, government officials are held personally liable for expenditures, no matter how justifiable, which have not been properly authorized is frequently an additional deterrent to rapid, effective action. The inevitable result is that high government officials are excessively preoccupied with administrative minutiae and have little time for policy formulation and planning. The consummation of any official business generally requires a considerable number of signatures or approvals. Undoubtedly many of these cumbersome procedures were devised to prevent abuses but they certainly tend to inhibit action and their efficacy in accomplishing their original purpose may also be questioned.

Inadequate planning and coordination, as already indicated, are in part a by-product of excessive administrative centralization. In part, how-

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ever, the lack of planning results also from the fact that government officials have not been schooled or accustomed to look ahead and relate what is being done today to what must be undertaken tomorrow. The instability of government in the past has undoubtedly contributed to this tendency, and the fact that the government has been unable to anticipate the financial resources available has also discouraged longer range planning. Every ministry lacks a planning staff which can study the requirements in its field of action and devise a program to meet it. The Ministries of Education and Public Health, for example, were unable to formulate their requirements for consideration by the mission as part of an over-all development program. The Ministry of Agriculture has not had a staff adequate to weld many "ideas for action" into a practical action program. For the government as a whole there is as yet no machinery for planning, coordinating and supervising an investment and development program. Coordination among government ministries and agencies is often defective. Hospitals, for example, are erected by the Ministry of Public Works without consultation with the Ministry of Public Health. The Hydraulics Department of the Ministry of Public Works, which is in charge of irrigation, has inadequate contact with the Ministry of Agriculture.

In carrying out an investment and development program designed to raise living standards and improve public welfare, the government must overcome deep-rooted distrust and suspicion of its activities on the part of the population. Centuries of government neglect, indifference and even exploitation have bred this feeling of distrust which even an independent Syrian government has not yet been able to overcome. People tend generally to regard government as a negative force which taxes, polices and demands compliance with laws and regulations the purpose of which is frequently not understood. Government officials themselves often contribute to this attitude by acting as masters rather than as servants of the people. Officials at the local level, who have most contact with the people, are often indifferent and, where they are well-intentioned and anxious to do something, they are often insufficiently conversant with the problems or inadequately trained to contribute effectively to the welfare of the public. Thus most people are incapable of realizing that the government can and does operate in their interest. Any government effort to assist them in improving their lot is apt to encounter much suspicion and frequently, at least initially, an uncooperative attitude.

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Recommendations for Improvement

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In the light of the above analysis the following recommendations might be considered:

1. A commission should be established to make a thorough study of government organization, personnel practices and procedures. Among its principal functions should be to undertake a reclassification of positions with appropriate salary revisions and conditions of service, and recommend changes in procedures which would promote more expeditious transaction of government business. It should also pay special attention to staffing requirements, particularly since the government appears to be understaffed in the upper ranks of the service and considerably overstaffed in the lower ranks.[43] The personnel of the commission should certainly be partly drawn from outstanding persons in private life, and consideration might be given to enlisting the assistance of a few experienced foreign experts in public administration. Pending the outcome of the commission's work it may well be necessary to grant some interim salary increases, particularly in order to retain the services of government officials in the upper grades.

2. Since any fundamental reform and improvement of the government service will inevitably take a long time, the government will need to resort in certain instances to the establishment of special independent agencies. Such agencies should have their own salary scales and administrative regulations designed to ensure competent personnel and efficient operation. To an increasing extent the government is already utilizing this device as, for example, in setting up the Latakia Port Corporation, the Ghab Administration and the Council of Money and Credit with its Foreign Exchange Office. Even in these agencies, however, the salary limitations in key posts have tended to be too low to attract and keep enough able people.

3. At least as an interim measure, the government should consider contracting out as much work as possible. For certain major public works this is already being done. The Ministry of Public Works still has a tendency, however, to undertake too much itself. In the future, new road construction and even definite projects for road improvement might well be contracted out. If additional irrigation projects are to be undertaken, these works, too, might best be carried out by a private contractor. Even

[43] 80% of government servants appear to be concentrated in the three lowest grades of the service.

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certain programs which do not fall in the category of public works projects 647 might be expedited with the assistance of private enterprise. Thus the government might consider contracting the more technical parts of the cadastral survey, which under government operation is taking far too long to accomplish.

4. A small commission should be established to plan, coordinate and 647 supervise the execution of a development program. A draft law has already 654 been prepared to establish a Permanent Economic Council and a Commission for Economic Development. The Commission would include a chairman and two economic and financial experts, all of whom would devote their full time to its work, and the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of National Economy, Agriculture, Public Works and Finance. Its functions would be to prepare a development program, frame annual or biennial development budgets and supervise and coordinate the carrying out of the program. The Economic Council, which would include the Minister of Economics, a representative of the central bank, members of the Commission and representatives of the business community, would review the Commission's plans and budgets and pass them to the Council of Ministers with its observations, and would also advise the government generally on economic questions. This scheme of organizing the work impresses us as sound and we suggest that a law along these lines be enacted. It brings the business community into the task of economic and development planning; it promises the creation of a professional group to do the actual programming and day-to-day supervision and control; and it enlists the cooperation of the established ministries primarily concerned with development, instead of superseding them.

The Housing and Settlements Administration we have proposed might well be fitted into this organizational scheme. It must be remembered, however, that the proposed development budget should be drawn up in close coordination with the regular government budget, since both must be fitted into the global financial resources available. Moreover, as we have pointed out, the capital or investment projects which would presumably be included in the development budget should in themselves be closely related to recurring expenditures of a developmental character in the ordinary budget.

Great care will need to be taken to ensure adequate supervision of the execution of an approved program in all its phases. The Development Commission, for instance, should be empowered to ask for periodic (at

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least quarterly) progress reports from the agencies charged with the execution of various parts of the program. These reports should contain information on rates of disbursement, physical progress of the work, difficulties experienced, etc. The commission should be enabled to deal directly with the various agencies involved and also to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers regarding the removal of any obstacles to smooth progress which may have been encountered. It should, above all, be responsible for ensuring that coordinate action is taken whenever several agencies are concerned with the carrying out of a project or program.

5. Gaining the confidence and enlisting the cooperation of people is vital to the success of any development program. Government officials must exercise considerable tact and patience in overcoming distrust and persuading the people that the government is really intent on helping them improve their conditions of life. The officials who carry out the programs at the local level, in immediate contact with the people, must have a sympathetic but not patronizing attitude and will have to be selected for their devotion to public service as well as their technical competence. Over the years many young officials will have to be trained to work among the people on such tasks as supervising agricultural credit, organizing cooperatives, providing advice on agricultural methods, etc. In large part, however, their work must be supplemented and aided by existing officials ranging from the village *moukhtar* to the *mohafez*, from the village teacher to the provincial health officer.

The new officials introduced to help carry out certain programs must be able to count on the positive cooperation of the existing officials. The latter in turn could provide more intelligent assistance and undertake more on their own initiative if they could be given a better understanding of local problems and the means of coping with them. In part this could be accomplished by requiring these officials to make more frequent tours and placing adequate transport at their disposal for this purpose. In part it could be achieved also by organizing periodic regional meetings at which problems would be discussed and competent technicians could provide information on measures that could be undertaken to improve village and town sanitation, agriculture, housing, transport and the like. At these meetings local officials could be briefed on what the government is seeking to accomplish and their positive participation in the program could be mobilized. This might help to avoid the tendency, apparent in a number

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of underdeveloped countries, of regarding a development program as 647
simply a series of big projects or as something which the center imposes 654
or confers on both the people and the officials at the local level without enlisting their active participation.

Conclusion

If financial and administrative difficulties can be overcome, successful 654
achievement of the development program we have outlined should lay the basis for another period of economic expansion. The Syrian economy is fundamentally sound. Under the primary stimulus of private enterprise it has grown at a gratifying rate. Development has now reached a stage, however, where a program of government action on a large scale is necessary to provide the opportunities for further economic progress.

With the shrinkage of available new land, the government will have to carry out reclamation and irrigation projects at an accelerated pace and concentrate much more effort on assisting farmers to raise their yields. To increase productivity and enable the small farmers to share more extensively in the advancing prosperity of the country, it is necessary to carry out certain land reforms, organize cooperatives, provide much more agricultural credit and make government services available at the village level. The remaining public domain must be set aside for the progressive settlement of landless peasants in properly organized rural communities.

Storage facilities are required to improve the quality and reduce the cost of handling grain. New roads, improved road maintenance and better port facilities are needed to lower the cost of marketing agricultural commodities, and, to a lesser extent, of industrial products.

In industry, where development in the past has gone forward on a rather wide front, a period of consolidation has set in. The government must now adopt policies calculated to make manufacturing more competitive and must assist private enterprise in becoming more efficient and continuing its expansion on a more selective basis.

In the field of education, the emphasis in the future needs to be less on a further rapid extension of general educational opportunities and more on the adaptation of educational training to modern requirements and on the improvement of facilities for the acquisition of necessary vocational skills. In public health, where progress has been much less satisfactory than in education, the primary stress should be on remedying the uneven geo-

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graphic distribution of hospitals and on preventing disease through better sanitation, anti-malarial measures and the provision of safe water supplies. In urban development, the government faces the need of providing more guidance in municipal planning and assisting some of the rapidly growing cities to make at least a start in relieving slum congestion and anticipating acute housing shortages.

To cope with these tasks, the government must be able to rely on the support and participation of the entire Syrian population. The carrying out of a development program as a truly national effort will be instrumental not only in lifting the standards of living of the nation but also in promoting national unity and strength.

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APPENDIX: *LIST OF MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS*

I AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND FORESTRY

A. *Irrigation and reclamation*

1. Aside from the reclamation of the Ghab and completion of irrigation projects already under way, initiation of four additional projects to irrigate an area of about 44,000 hectares at a cost of £S 82 million.

2. Postponement of the construction of the Youssef Pasha dam and dependent irrigation works on the Euphrates pending necessary topographic and soil surveys and detailed technical planning of the essential works and structures.

3. Experiments to determine appropriate irrigation duties for various crops and devise improved water-saving irrigation methods in order to promote optimum use of water in irrigated areas.

4. Gradual increase in expenditures on maintenance of irrigation systems, and expansion of the technical staff of the irrigation service.

B. *Land use planning*

1. Aerial survey and mapping of six areas covering some 24,000 square kilometers as an aid to delimitation of forest lands and remaining cultivable areas and to planning of irrigation and other public works.

2. Acceleration of the soil survey program, and establishment of a soils department in the Ministry of Agriculture.

3. Reservation of state domain, including state lands which should be recaptured under Law 135 of October 1952, for ultimate distribution among landless peasants and Bedouins; meanwhile, leasing of such land at somewhat higher rentals.

C. *Settlement of land*

1. Immediate initiation of detailed planning for the settlement of the Roudj and the Ghab.

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000 2. Establishment of two new dry-farming communities in the Jezireh, one to experiment with mechanical cultivation and both to combine, for the benefit of Bedouin settlers, agricultural and pastoral pursuits; consideration of similar settlements for Djebel es Smaane and Djebel Druze.

3. Enforcement in these new settlements of certain minimum standards of cultivation, and adoption of safeguards against the alienation of land to absentee owners and against excessive fragmentation.

4. Establishment of a Settlements Administration to plan the settlement program and coordinate the settlement work of various government agencies.

D. *Land reform*

1. Enactment of legislation placing a limit on future land acquisitions by individual families.

2. Imposition of a moderate graduated tax on landholdings above a minimum size; application of a new global income tax to income derived from agriculture as well as from other sources.

3. Establishment of a commission to review various forms of tenancy and make recommendations designed to give the cultivator of the land more effective protection and a greater incentive to improve his land and methods of cultivation.

E. *Improvement of agricultural production*

1. Experiments on both government farms and strategically located private farms with improved crop rotation, with special emphasis on soil-building crops and greater diversification.

2. A modest government program to finance field trials of fertilizers on private farms under proper supervision; consideration of the establishment of a plant for mixing fertilizers and making insecticides from imported ingredients.

3. An accelerated effort for the selection, breeding, propagation and distribution of high-yielding and disease-resistant seed, particularly of cereals.

4. Establishment of a small implements center to devise more effective implements for small farmers, provide for field tests and arrange for eventual manufacture.

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5. Prescription of minimum qualifications for dealers in agricultural machinery pertaining to prices, stocking of spare parts and operation of servicing facilities; inauguration of short-term courses in maintenance and operation of agricultural machinery; and establishment of an agricultural school specializing in agricultural engineering at Kamichliye. 000

F. *Improvement of animal husbandry*

1. Measures to reduce losses of sheep during unfavorable winter seasons through the provision of food reserves and veterinary treatment. Experimental provision of desert shelters.

2. Experimental re-seeding of some desert pasture land to determine the feasibility of a more extensive program.

3. Expansion of veterinary services by affording increased facilities for district work.

4. Inauguration of a livestock breeding program at a central livestock station and, later, several sub-stations.

5. A modest program to provide incentives for farmers to convert marginal land into pasture and to grow and conserve fodder.

G. *Agricultural institutions and extension service*

1. An increase of £S 50 million in the capital resources of the Agricultural Bank and the gradual inauguration of a system of supervised credit to ensure that loans will increase the productivity of farmers; some increase in the interest rate of the Bank, with reductions on loans to cooperatives and on certain long-term loans.

2. An active campaign to promote and assist agricultural cooperatives through a properly staffed section in the Ministry of Agriculture working with the Agricultural Bank and rural community workers.

3. Establishment of a special rural community development organization which would gradually introduce community workers into villages for the purpose of assisting villagers to improve their conditions of life, with special emphasis on agriculture; further expansion of the specialized services of the Ministry of Agriculture to enable them to render assistance to these village workers as well as carry out their regular assignments.

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000 H. *Marketing*

1. Establishment of grain storage facilities at Latakia, Aleppo and in the Jezireh with a view to improving the quality of grain in an increasingly competitive market, reducing losses, easing transport problems and creating additional credit facilities.

2. Marketing of grain free from government intervention except in cases of real emergency.

3. Establishment of better controls over urban milk supplies; construction at Damascus, and possibly Aleppo, of small pasteurization plants with assistance from UNICEF.

4. Improvement of public abattoirs, starting with the construction of a new abattoir in Damascus.

I. *Forestry*

1. Carrying out of a program along lines already recommended by an FAO expert, focussing particularly on better protection of forest areas and closer supervision over their exploitation.

2. Establishment of additional nurseries to supply material not only for reforestation but also for planting in farm areas.

J. *Government agricultural staff*

1. Expansion of agricultural schooling with the primary objective of training more government agricultural workers; increased stipends for agricultural study abroad; establishment of a new secondary school at Kamichliye and raising of the intermediate school at Aleppo to secondary rank; increased accommodation at existing agricultural schools; inauguration of supplementary courses at the secondary school at Kharabo for the training of agricultural credit supervisors and village workers.

2. Recruitment of a considerable number of specialists abroad to assist in carrying out the program pending the training of sufficient numbers of Syrians.

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II INDUSTRY AND ELECTRIC POWER

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1. Relaxation of excessive protection from foreign competition as a spur to increased efficiency, abandonment of import embargoes and a careful review of tariff rates.

2. Establishment of a privately managed investment bank, with half of the capital resources supplied by the government, to provide technical assistance needed for improvement of industrial efficiency and help in financing additional capital investment.

3. Modification of existing legislation according tax concessions to new and expanding enterprises, by replacing exemptions from income and property taxes with provisions permitting accelerated depreciation of new plant and equipment.

4. Establishment of industrial zones on outskirts of major cities, with provision for small blocks of workshops as an incentive to the relocation also of small enterprises.

5. Efforts looking toward establishment of a common market and the attendant harmonizing of economic and financial policies among Arab countries, in order to provide greater scope for industrial enterprise.

6. Stricter enforcement of the labor code, with spot checks to curb the abuse of child labor in small shops.

7. Promotion of the tourist trade by improving accommodations for tourists, providing easier access to certain notable monuments and archaeological sites and increasing government support of the Department of Antiquities.

8. Addition of about 71,750 KVA to power generating capacity in Syria, primarily in the form of steam and hydroelectric power; expansion of the staff of the Directorate of Electricity to provide more adequate technical and administrative supervision, particularly of the utilities in small towns and villages; maintenance, in general, of existing electricity rates to provide expansion resources from the utilities' operating income.

III TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. *Roads*

1. Construction of a new highway system, in preference to a railway, linking the Jezireh with Aleppo and Latakia; attendant widening of the

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600 Raqqa-Aleppo road, and improvement and partial realignment of the Aleppo-Latakia highway.

2. Widening of the Aleppo-Damascus and Damascus-Dera'a roads; construction of a road linking Hama with the projected highway through the Ghab.

3. Improvement of the Damascus-Beirut trunk road; a joint Syrian-Lebanese engineering survey to devise a solution for the growing traffic problem on this road.

4. Improvement in road maintenance through better organization of work, greater concentration of effort, closer field supervision and some increase in road maintenance machinery.

5. Creation of a separate Highway Department in the Ministry of Public Works.

6. Better regulation of road traffic, particularly through enforcement of loading limits; replacement of existing quantitative limitation on common carrier trucks by higher license fees.

B. *Other transport*

1. A joint Syrian-Jordanian-Lebanese review of regulations governing the use of the Hedjaz Railway and of freight rates on this railway.

2. Conversion of Syrian Airways into an autonomous enterprise, with regular publication of its accounts.

3. Continuation of private operation of buses in Damascus.

C. *Ports*

1. Continuation of the present plan for development of Latakia but with definite provision for a port silo.

2. Abandonment of present regulations requiring the use of the port of Latakia as the port development plan approaches completion.

D. *Telecommunications*

1. Endorsement of projected investment plans subject to some reduction in the magnitude of investment in the light of a reconsideration of priorities.

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IV EDUCATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH

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A. *Education*

1. Greater emphasis on the quality and practical content of general education, accompanying a further expansion of primary and secondary education.

2. More emphasis on vocational education, with the opening of additional schools at Homs and Latakia; establishment of closer liaison between the vocational school system and the business community; inauguration of vocational night classes.

3. A modest beginning with adult (fundamental) education.

4. Appointment of a special committee to make recommendations on the improvement and expansion of higher education.

B. *Public health*

1. Greater emphasis on prevention of disease, primarily through an anti-malarial campaign, expansion of health education, provision of pure water supplies and construction of an experimental health unit.

2. Addition of 1,000 beds in the form of expansion of existing and construction of new hospital facilities.

3. Training of technical personnel.

V HOUSING AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

A. *Housing*

1. Establishment of a building research station to develop cheap and durable methods of construction.

2. Initiation of a modest government program to assist (a) rapidly growing municipalities in construction of cheap housing, and (b) major cities in starting a slum clearance program.

3. Modification of building codes to permit construction of cheaper but durable housing within city limits and prevent the further growth of slums on the outskirts of cities.

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B. *Community planning and services*

1. Technical assistance by the government to municipalities in the elaboration of proper town planning schemes.

2. Allocation by the central government of £S 8 million to assist towns and villages in the development of pure water supplies.

3. Inauguration of some experimental urban social welfare or community centers.

VI FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

A. *Finance*

1. Selected tax increases to yield about £S 90 million in additional revenues in the period 1955-60.

2. Efforts to develop gradually a market for government securities by long-term measures to stimulate institutional savings and through the trial flotation, some time during the next five years, of medium-term bonds with attractive features for investors.

3. Exercise of great caution in deficit financing in order to avoid sharp increases in prices and an excessive drain on the country's foreign exchange resources.

4. Acceleration of plans to establish a central bank in order to ensure adequate control over money and credit.

5. A survey of municipal finances to determine to what extent municipalities can in the future meet requirements from their own resources.

B. *Administration*

1. To prepare the government to carry out its additional responsibilities for development, establishment of a commission to make a thorough study of government organization, personnel practices, salary scales and procedures; meanwhile, interim salary increases for government servants, stressing improved compensation of higher officials.

2. Enactment of draft legislation setting up a Permanent Economic Council and a Commission for Economic Development.

3. Special efforts to promote among government officials in the field

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an understanding of development problems and enlist their active participation in the government's attempts to solve them.

C. *Collection of data essential to economic planning*

1. Collection of basic data necessary for development through an agricultural census, a housing census, and a periodic road traffic census.

2. Improvement in crop reporting; insistence on reliable, periodic reporting by industry of information on output, employment and investment; initiation of work on national income, consumption patterns and savings; and elaboration of more reliable price indices.

3. Establishment of an independent central statistical office to plan and coordinate the collection of statistics and act as a repository for statistical information.

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PART II *ANNEXES*

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ANNEX A *INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION*

1 FOREIGN TRADE

Statistical Limitations

439 [443] Until March 13, 1950, Syria and Lebanon were joined in a Customs Union and separate trade data for the two countries were not collected. Statistics for Syrian trade first appeared in 1950 but do not cover the full year. They are also less reliable than those for succeeding years in view of the understandable lack of experience on the part of Syrian customs officers with enforcement of tariffs and recording trade.

Customs statistics record the value of imports at official rates of exchange of the Syrian pound, which differ from the prevailing free market exchange rates at which import transactions are conducted. This in itself necessitates adjustments for every currency used. On the basis of certain broad assumptions, such adjustments have been made by the mission for balance of payments estimates, but could not be made in the foreign trade statistics because of the lack of data on which to base an adjustment of the value of specific items.

The extended land frontiers, particularly in some of the more sparsely inhabited parts of the country, facilitate smuggling. Re-exports of gold were not recorded as such prior to 1954 because gold exports were forbidden.

Finally, there is believed to be a certain amount of both under- and over-estimation of the value of goods as declared to the customs authorities, especially in trade with neighboring countries, and not all these statements can be corrected.

It follows that Syria's pre-1951 foreign trade cannot be properly assessed at all and the analysis of data for the last three years must allow for margins of error due to the many adjustments based largely on estimates.

Foreign Trade of the Customs Union

Table 1 records the total value, in Syrian-Lebanese pounds, of the trade of the Syrian-Lebanese Customs Union since 1945.

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TABLE 1 Total Trade of Syria and Lebanon, 1945-49

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(*Thousand £LS*)

Year	Exports	Imports	Trade deficit
1945	43,842	130,624	86,782
1946	85,560	266,654	181,094
1947	83,640	362,764	279,124
1948	78,501	483,460	404,959
1949	111,104	516,188	405,084

SOURCE: Official statistics of the Customs Union.

The postwar rise in exports, recorded at the actual prevailing exchange rates, was due both to the depreciation of the currency and an increase in the volume of shipments. Imports, valued at the official exchange rate, rose sharply because of postwar re-stocking, a marked increase in prices and the general expansion of economic activity. It will be noted that in 1949 the recorded value of imports was almost quadruple that of exports, and the trade deficit was actually larger than that indicated in the Table because imports were valued at the official exchange rate which, by that time, differed at least 30% from the free market rates at which imports were financed.

The question of the proportions of the Customs Union's total foreign trade originating in or destined for each of the two countries was endlessly disputed but never resolved. For many years the joint customs receipts were shared on the basis of 56% for Syria and 44% for Lebanon. This distribution was frequently contested by both sides. As it was merely an administrative arrangement and was not based on any statistical data, it provides little guidance as to the true origin and destination of trade.

Table 2 shows the foreign trade of Syria and Lebanon in the first three calendar years following the termination of the Customs Union and after eliminating their trade with each other. It indicates that Syria accounted for 75% to 80% of their combined exports and about 50% of their total imports. Syria's share of imports may well have been smaller than during the years of the Customs Union because in the years 1951 to 1953 it was becoming more self-sufficient in manufactures and was prohibiting a considerable number of imports.

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TABLE 2 Foreign Trade of Syria and of Lebanon, 1951–53

(Thousand £S) 439

Year	Syria	Lebanon	Total	% of Syria's share in total[c]
Imports[a]:				
1951	269,863	271,816	541,679	49.8
1952	277,616	283,207	560,823	49.5
1953	273,671	269,967	543,638	50.3
Exports[b]:				
1951	217,681	78,152[d]	295,833	73.2
1952	249,294	52,053[d]	301,347	82.7
1953	285,587	69,699[d]	355,280	80.3

[a] At official exchange rates.
[b] At free market exchange rates.
[c] After elimination of their mutual trade.
[d] Lebanon's exports adjusted by difference between rates of £S and £L (annual averages).

SOURCE: Derived from official trade statistics of Syria and Lebanon.

Composition of Syrian Foreign Trade since 1951

In Chapter 1 of the Main Report global figures of Syrian exports and imports over the period 1951-53 are given. These figures are supplemented here by more detailed information on the composition of Syria's annual foreign trade since 1951. Tables 3 and 4 give a breakdown of Syrian exports and imports in 21 groups taken from the official statistics; Tables 5 and 6 show the composition of foreign trade, export and import, by principal types of commodities, selected by the mission.

Unfortunately 1951 is not a good year for purposes of comparison; the very poor cereal crop allowed only about 31,000 tons of cereals exports, as compared with over 256,000 tons in 1952 and over 383,000 tons in 1953. In 1951 exports of several other commodities, e.g., ginned cotton and wool, consequently rank relatively high. With due allowance for this circumstance the composition of Syrian exports during the last three years has been relatively stable, with ginned cotton representing more than one-third, and cereals representing approximately one-fifth of the total value of exports. Of other agricultural exports, pulses rose somewhat, while oil seeds and vetch remained fairly stable and tobacco declined. Exports of raw wool

TABLE 3 Exports by Groups of Commodities, 1951–53

Commodity	1951 Tons	1951 Value (thousand £S)	1951 % of total value	1952 Tons	1952 Value (thousand £S)	1952 % of total value	1953 Tons	1953 Value (thousand £S)	1953 % of total value
I. Live animals	5,036	30,030	10.8	4,681	28,216	8.8	6,010	35,306	9.4
II. Grains, fruit and vegetables	115,652	28,675	10.3	372,449	89,181	27.9	560,228	117,892	31.4
III. Oils and fats	1,020	1,911	0.7	144	235	0.1	1,918	2,483	0.7
IV. Processed foods and tobacco	21,280	11,379	4.1	19,822	10,095	3.2	28,392	8,982	2.4
V. Mineral products	17,245	513	0.2	36,424	1,798	0.6	46,170	2,982	0.8
VI. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals	1,784	3,534	1.3	1,967	4,063	1.3	2,201	3,244	0.9
VII. Skins, hides, etc.	1,254	4,369	1.6	706	2,508	0.8	1,008	2,983	0.8
VIII. Rubber products	86	100	0.0	42	119	0.0	51	72	0.0
IX. Wood and cork	2,428	1,161	0.4	1,696	964	0.3	1,983	1,007	0.3
X. Paper products	268	594	0.2	341	730	0.2	470	996	0.3
XI. Textile materials and goods	35,787	190,033	68.6	46,267	177,586	55.6	63,936	191,457	50.9
XII. Footwear and fashion articles	31	318	0.1	33	327	0.1	47	339	0.1
XIII. Ceramics and glass	2,053	753	0.3	2,229	739	0.2	2,464	755	0.2
XIV. Precious metals and stones	7	545	0.2	5	258	0.1	3	4,113	1.1
XV. Common metals and manufactures	8,025	2,163	0.8	3,425	1,608	0.5	1,718	1,386	0.4
XVI. Machinery	311	756	0.3	380	773	0.2	370	815	0.2
XVII. Transportation equipment	34	38	0.0	155	182	0.1	697	693	0.2
XVIII. Scientific instruments	4	25	0.0	2	36	0.0	8	191	0.1
XIX. Arms and ammunition	—	1	0.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
XX. Miscellaneous goods	43	235	0.1	50	154	0.0	45	124	0.0
XXI. Works of art	—	1	0.0	—	1	0.0	1	5	0.0
Total	212,348	277,134	100.0	490,818	319,573	100.0	717,720	375,825	100.0

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

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TABLE 4 Imports by Groups of Commodities, 1951–53

Commodity	1951			1952			1953		
	Tons	Value (thousand £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (thousand £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (thousand £S)	% of total value
I. Live animals	675	8,121	2.67	734	8,233	2.63	956	8,195	2.67
II. Grains, fruit and vegetables	129,973	30,608	10.07	168,300	43,516	13.89	112,654	28,516	9.29
III. Oils and fats	4,208	3,648	1.20	8,048	5,146	1.64	8,094	5,126	1.67
IV. Processed foods and tobacco	29,733	12,145	4.00	45,060	16,992	5.42	30,607	10,477	3.41
V. Mineral products	388,262	36,222	11.92	413,822	38,792	12.38	431,679	41,189	13.41
VI. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals	17,859	15,764	5.19	18,978	16,773	5.35	23,925	15,125	4.93
VII. Skins, hides, etc.	2,157	3,919	1.29	2,584	4,707	1.50	2,705	4,135	1.35
VIII. Rubber products	2,942	5,758	1.89	2,677	5,919	1.89	3,461	5,664	1.84
IX. Wood and cork	42,607	8,754	2.88	46,219	10,459	3.34	41,198	8,837	2.88
X. Paper products	5,392	5,411	1.78	5,837	5,578	1.78	8,879	5,539	1.80
XI. Textile materials and goods	16,960	64,433	21.20	19,958	64,340	20.53	28,098	62,662	20.41
XII. Footwear and fashion articles	217	517	0.17	220	721	0.23	39	149	0.05
XIII. Ceramics and glass	7,191	3,805	1.25	5,571	3,214	1.03	7,007	3,853	1.25
XIV. Precious metals and stones	8	12,811	4.22	6	10,186	3.25	9	20,922	6.81
XV. Common metals and manufactures	49,343	22,533	7.41	46,229	25,028	7.99	50,593	23,633	7.70
XVI. Machinery	22,716	52,511	17.28	13,079	36,025	11.50	14,929	40,156	13.08
XVII. Transportation equipment	6,171	13,144	4.32	7,252	13,430	4.29	6,695	18,664	6.08
XVIII. Scientific instruments	163	2,005	0.66	156	2,343	0.75	515	2,529	0.82
XIX. Arms and ammunition	58	214	0.07	36	245	0.08	74	206	0.07
XX. Miscellaneous goods	396	1,588	0.52	362	1,677	0.54	409	1,459	0.48
XXI. Works of art	2	20	0.01	1	8	0.00	2	14	0.00
Total	727,033	303,931	100.00	805,129	313,334	100.00	772,528	307,050	100.00

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

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TABLE 5 Composition of Syria's Export Trade, 1951-53

Commodity	1951			1952			1953		
	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value
Cereals	31,253	8.3	3.0	256,217	62.8	19.7	382,988	81.8	21.8
of which: Wheat	2,748	0.8	0.3	100,227	29.8	9.3	180,185	46.0	12.2
Barley	17,175	4.2	1.5	140,135	29.4	9.2	153,268	24.8	6.6
Other	11,330	3.3	1.2	15,855	3.6	1.1	49,535	11.0	2.9
Vegetables	15,072	1.6	0.6	14,507	2.3	0.7	15,983	1.6	0.4
Pulses	5,952	2.4	0.9	7,241	2.9	0.9	21,244	7.7	2.0
Vetch	4,487	1.3	0.5	3,034	1.0	0.3	6,517	1.5	0.4
Flour	5,494	1.9	0.7	9,347	3.6	1.1	26,207	6.9	1.8
Oilseeds	21,065	6.0	2.2	33,244	7.2	2.3	29,932	6.6	1.8
Tobacco and tombac	3,770	5.6	2.0	2,896	4.6	1.4	1,423	2.4	0.6
Soap	1,540	2.9	1.0	1,790	3.4	1.1	1,919	2.6	0.7
Hides and skins	1,207	4.0	1.4	654	2.3	0.7	983	2.6	0.7
Silk products (artific.)	1,339	13.8	5.0	2,464	15.5	4.9	2,321	17.0	4.5
Cotton (ginned)	24,088	116.5	42.0	37,786	124.4	38.9	53,946	134.7	35.8
Cotton textiles	986	9.1	3.3	1,092	9.8	3.1	950	6.0	1.6
Wool	7,511	39.4	14.2	3,492	14.7	4.6	4,501	21.5	5.7
Animals*	n.a.	19.0	6.9	425	20.9	6.5	404	23.0	6.1
Other	88,584	45.3	16.4	116,629	44.2	13.8	168,402	59.5	15.9
Total	212,348	277.1	100.0	490,818	319.6	100.0	717,720	375.8	100.0

* 1951: 385,815 head; 1952: 480,000 head; 1953: 537,000 head.

SOURCE: Breakdown by types of commodities prepared by mission on the basis of official Syrian statistics.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

TABLE 6 Composition of Syria's Import Trade, 1951–53

Commodity*	1951			1952			1953		
	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value
Textiles (including clothing)	16,960	64.4	21.2	19,959	64.3	20.5	28,098	62.7	20.4
Machinery (excluding motor vehicles)	22,716	52.5	17.3	13,079	36.0	11.5	14,929	40.2	13.1
Minerals	388,212	36.2	11.9	413,822	38.8	12.4	431,679	41.2	13.4
Petroleum products	270,374	29.4	9.7	365,045	35.3	11.3	412,797	39.5	12.9
Other	117,838	6.8	2.2	48,777	3.5	1.1	18,882	1.7	0.6
Metals	49,351	35.4	11.6	45,927	33.4	10.7	50,114	42.5	13.8
Gold and precious metals	8	12.8	4.2	6	10.2	3.3	9	20.9	6.8
Other	49,343	22.6	7.4	45,921	23.2	7.4	50,105	21.6	7.0
Cereals	30,257	10.8	3.6	42,084	15.7	5.0	6,022	3.2	1.0
Fruit	76,702	10.2	3.4	83,417	12.9	4.1	66,850	12.0	3.9
Chemical and pharmaceutical products	4,192	6.6	2.2	10,164	10.8	3.4	7,343	7.3	2.4
Other	138,643	87.8	28.9	176,687	101.4	32.4	167,520	97.9	31.9
Total	727,033	303.9	100.0	805,130	313.3	100.0	772,553	307.0	100.0

* At official exchange rates.

SOURCE: Breakdown by types of commodities prepared by mission on the basis of official Syrian statistics.

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439 and live animals are considerably more important than exports of hides and skins. Syria annually imports considerable quantities of animals, mostly sheep, which are exported after being fattened and sheared. Among exports of industrial goods the largest items are artificial silk products, cotton textiles and soap; together with other unclassified industrial commodities, they represent about 15% of the total value of exports.

Among imports, textiles are still the largest item, accounting regularly for one-fifth of total imports. The steady increase of demand for petroleum products is clearly shown in Table 6. The greater imports of cereals in 1951 and 1952, following the 1951 crop failure, were rather exceptional. Imports of gold increased in 1953, when they amounted to £S 20.1 million at the official rate or almost £S 32.5 million at the free market rate. Of the 5.3 tons of gold imported in that year, 1.6 tons were for monetary purposes. Imports of machinery were particularly heavy in 1951, presumably because potential investors were encouraged by the 1950 boom year.

Table 7 is designed to show how much Syria has been actually spending in terms of foreign exchange on imports of capital goods during the last three years.

Direction of Foreign Trade

As a primarily agricultural country, Syria exports most of its products to the industrialized countries of Western Europe and to the United States, from which in turn come most of Syria's imports. Table 8 shows Syria's trade with three groups of countries: the industrialized western countries; the member countries of the Arab League, with which Syria has entered into a preferential trade agreement; and other countries with which Syria has more or less regular trade relations. The Table reveals that about two-thirds of Syrian imports, by value, are derived from Western Europe and the United States and about half of its exports are directed to this group of countries. About one-fifth of Syria's imports come from the Arab countries, to which about 40% of its exports are destined.

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TABLE 7 Imports of Capital Goods, 1951–53

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(*All figures in thousands*)

	1951		1952		1953	
	£S[a]	$[b]	£S	$	£S	$
Machinery	52,611	14,546	36,025	9,710	40,056	11,204
Agricultural	19,620	5,407	26,183	7,058	33,381	9,335
Other	32,991	9,139	9,842	2,652	6,675	1,869
Transportation equipment	13,144	3,641	13,430	3,620	18,664	5,221
Total	65,755	18,187	49,455	13,330	58,720	16,425

[a] As recorded at special rate.
[b] U.S. dollar equivalent at current market rate.

SOURCES: Etude sur la Syrie Economique 1953, Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes, Damas, Syrie; official Syrian trade statistics.

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TABLE 8 Value of Syria's Foreign Trade by Groups of Countries, 1951–53

(*Million £S*)

	1951				1952				1953			
	Exp.	%	Imp.[a]	%	Exp.	%	Imp.[a]	%	Exp.	%	Imp.[a]	%
Countries included in Table 9	246.2	88.8	280.6	92.2	306.0	95.8	287.7	91.8	366.1	97.4	281.9	91.8
Western countries[b]	129.7	46.8	196.5	64.6	177.3	55.5	191.5	61.1	212.7	56.6	195.2	63.6
Arab countries[c]	110.7	39.9	55.1	18.1	122.7	38.4	59.9	19.1	149.0	39.6	63.3	20.6
Other regular trade partners[d]	5.8	2.1	29.0	9.5	6.0	1.9	36.3	11.6	4.4	1.2	23.4	7.6
Countries not included in Table 9	30.9	11.2	23.3	7.8	13.6	4.2	25.6	8.2	9.7	2.6	25.1	8.2
Total trade	277.1	100.0	303.9	100.0	319.6	100.0	313.3	100.0	375.8	100.0	307.0	100.0

[a] At official exchange rate.
[b] Including France, U. K., Italy, U. S., Western Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Trieste, Austria, Sweden and Czechoslovakia.
[c] Does not include Lebanon's free zone.
[d] Including Iran, Spain, Burma, India, Turkey, Cuba, China and Romania.

SOURCE: Based on official Syrian trade statistics

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Table 9 gives the value of Syria's trade with individual countries for 1953. It shows that Lebanon and France, with which Syria has historically been so closely connected, are still its most important trade partners, although the United Kingdom follows very closely and the United States has become Syria's main supplier. 439

TABLE 9 Value of Syria's Foreign Trade by Countries, 1953

(*Thousand £S*)

	Exports	Imports*	Balance
Lebanon	90,238	33,379	56,859
France	58,513	32,684	25,829
United Kingdom	46,340	33,326	13,014
Italy	31,349	21,604	9,745
West Germany	24,204	29,251	−5,047
United States	20,837	37,675	−16,838
Belgium	18,673	9,985	8,688
Iraq	17,362	8,336	9,026
Jordan	21,702	8,292	13,410
Saudi Arabia	12,188	11,873	315
Iran	237	2,080	−1,843
Netherlands	7,070	11,967	−4,897
Switzerland	4,552	9,338	−4,786
Lebanon (free zone)	3,834	—	3,834
Spain	3,681	1,022	2,659
Egypt	3,428	825	2,603
Kuwait	1,911	100	1,811
Aden	2,075	247	1,828
Burma	—	2	−2
Trieste	1,133	12	1,121
India	—	6,702	−6,702
Turkey	431	6,542	−6,111
Austria	11	3,806	−3,795
Sweden	259	3,164	−2,905
Cuba	—	2,735	−2,735
Czechoslovakia	—	2,457	−2,457
China	—	2,190	−2,190
Romania	—	2,108	−2,108
Others	5,797	25,348	−19,551
Total	375,825	307,050	68,775

* At official exchange rates.

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

439 Table 10 gives a more detailed picture of the respective shares in Syria's 1951-53 total trade of the country's nine principal trade partners.

TABLE 10 Direction of Trade, 1951-53

(Thousand £S)

	1951		1952		1953	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
Exports:						
Lebanon	59,453	21.5	70,279	22.0	90,238	24.0
France	50,353	18.2	49,166	15.4	58,513	15.6
United Kingdom	19,522	7.0	77,161	24.1	46,340	12.3
United States	37,362	13.5	15,945	5.0	20,837	5.5
Italy	14,493	5.2	16,606	5.2	31,349	8.3
Iraq	20,249	7.3	17,176	5.4	17,362	4.6
Jordan	12,348	4.5	16,846	5.3	21,702	5.8
West Germany	2,799	1.0	9,873	3.1	24,204	6.4
Others	60,555	21.9	46,521	14.5	65,280	17.4
Total	277,134	100.0	319,573	100.0	375,825	100.0
Imports:						
United States	55,514	18.3	45,470	14.5	37,675	12.3
United Kingdom	38,945	12.8	39,244	12.5	33,326	10.9
Lebanon	34,088	11.2	35,724	11.4	33,379	10.9
France	31,727	10.4	29,573	9.4	32,684	10.6
West Germany	16,922	5.6	19,098	6.1	29,251	9.5
Italy	21,225	7.0	20,472	6.5	21,604	7.0
Belgium	9,286	3.1	13,777	4.4	9,985	3.3
Netherlands	4,907	1.6	7,519	2.4	11,967	3.9
Others	91,337	30.0	102,463	32.7	97,179	31.6
Total	303,951	100.0	313,340	100.0	307,050	100.0

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

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Table 11 shows the share of the Arab countries in Syria's foreign trade during the last three years. 459

TABLE 11 Share of Arab Countries in Syria's Foreign Trade, 1951-53

	Imports			Exports			Balance, + or − value
	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	
1951							
Arab countries	404,666	55.1	18.1	112,661	110.7	39.9	55.6
Egypt	12,180	3.7	1.2	14,963	7.2	2.6	3.5
Iraq	43,636	8.9	2.9	4,842	20.2	7.3	11.3
Jordan	13,579	4.4	1.4	23,750	12.3	4.5	7.9
Lebanon	306,013	34.1	11.2	64,395	59.5	21.5	25.4
Saudi Arabia	28,955	3.6	1.2	4,074	8.5	3.1	4.9
Other*	303	0.4	0.1	637	3.0	1.1	2.6
Other countries	322,367	248.8	81.9	99,687	166.4	60.1	−82.4
Total trade	727,033	303.9	100.0	212,348	277.1	100.0	−26.8
1952							
Arab countries	465,100	59.9	19.1	211,984	122.7	38.4	62.8
Egypt	6,720	1.4	0.4	10,049	4.5	1.4	3.1
Iraq	35,311	8.5	2.7	4,958	17.2	5.4	8.7
Jordan	24,921	6.0	1.9	27,158	16.8	5.3	10.8
Lebanon	331,824	35.7	11.4	160,939	70.3	22.0	34.6
Saudi Arabia	65,551	7.9	2.5	7,452	10.3	3.2	2.4
Other*	773	0.4	0.1	1,428	3.6	1.1	3.2
Other countries	340,030	253.4	80.9	278,833	196.9	61.6	−56.5
Total trade	805,130	313.3	100.0	490,817	319.6	100.0	6.2
1953							
Arab countries	480,138	63.3	20.6	353,141	149.0	39.6	85.7
Egypt	1,680	0.8	0.3	15,031	3.4	0.9	2.6
Iraq	24,531	8.3	2.7	6,747	17.3	4.6	9.0
Jordan	29,877	8.3	2.7	69,563	21.7	5.8	13.4
Lebanon	322,813	33.4	10.9	249,196	90.2	24.0	56.8
Saudi Arabia	99,148	11.9	3.9	11,508	12.2	3.2	0.3
Other*	2,089	0.6	0.2	1,096	4.2	1.1	3.6
Other countries	292,417	243.7	79.4	364,579	226.8	60.4	−16.9
Total trade	772,555	307.0	100.0	717,720	375.8	100.0	68.8

* Aden, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen.

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439 Tables 12–16 give more detailed figures concerning the value of Syria's trade with Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, indicating the main import and export items.

TABLE 12 Value of Syria's Trade with Lebanon, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Vegetables and fruits	4,439,936	13.0	5,921,936	16.6	8,066,150	24.2
Olive oil	867	0.0	506,570	1.4	800,361	2.4
Tobacco leaves	502,747	1.5	667,448	1.9	375,380	1.1
Cement	3,237,542	9.5	1,035,283	2.9	274,150	0.8
Petroleum products	19,718,325	57.8	19,935,522	55.8	19,085,725	57.2
Skins	764,318	2.2	682,099	1.9	416,776	1.2
Charcoal	1,061,015	3.1	1,302,150	3.6	1,272,965	3.8
Cement bags	61,495	0.2	285,220	0.8	53,800	0.2
Cocoons	119,985	0.4	142,345	0.4	63,750	0.2
Jute sacks	61,495	0.2	285,220	0.8	115,530	0.3
Metal ware	130,622	0.4	137,055	0.4	30,915	0.1
Aluminum	179,730	0.5	230,410	0.6	350,390	1.0
Other items	3,604,820	10.6	4,675,455	13.1	2,473,109	7.4
Total	34,087,502	100.0	35,724,183	100.0	33,379,301	100.0
Exports						
Live animals and poultry	18,925,894	31.8	20,661,936	29.4	22,771,404	25.2
Dairy products	6,766,305	11.4	5,149,066	7.3	10,823,385	12.0
Vegetables and fruits	1,341,516	2.3	5,275,491	7.5	8,140,801	9.0
Wheat and other grains	1,770,862	3.0	15,992,575	22.8	35,092,371	38.9
Oil seeds	3,731,930	6.3	6,852,258	9.8	1,709,291	1.9
Cotton	13,919,315	23.4	6,802,792	9.7	4,599,719	5.1
Wool	6,377,449	10.7	1,327,006	1.9	712,620	0.8
Other items	6,619,935	11.1	8,218,205	11.7	6,388,174	7.1
Total	59,453,206	100.0	70,279,329	100.0	90,237,765	100.0

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TABLE 13 Value of Syria's Trade with Iraq, 1951–53

(£S) 439

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Live animals	3,093,650	34.7	3,656,639	42.9	4,625,624	55.5
Dates	4,911,959	55.0	3,830,099	44.9	2,595,913	31.1
Oil seeds	61,889	0.7	119,297	1.4	—	—
Molasses	188,235	2.1	215,198	2.5	130,606	1.6
Skins	10,991	0.1	242,086	2.8	184,391	2.2
Wool	146,050	1.6	97,833	1.1	81,895	1.0
Other items	516,026	5.8	365,394	4.3	717,606	8.6
Total	8,928,800	100.0	8,526,276	100.0	8,336,035	100.0
Exports						
Soap	2,931,859	14.5	3,291,746	19.2	2,582,834	14.9
Cigarettes	485,283	2.4	492,582	2.9	725,588	4.2
Rayon yarn	1,465,523	7.2	922,308	5.4	1,208,925	7.0
Rayon textiles	9,569,606	47.3	7,531,188	43.8	8,370,418	48.2
Cotton textiles	1,424,540	7.0	847,153	4.9	292,865	1.7
Woolen textiles	246,227	1.2	501,427	2.9	417,718	2.4
Men's socks	651,423	3.2	455,501	2.7	213,150	1.2
Cotton knitted wear	609,762	3.0	591,624	3.4	423,329	2.4
Handkerchiefs	234,404	1.2	313,255	1.8	224,592	1.3
Other items	2,630,700	13.0	2,229,481	13.0	2,902,646	16.7
Total	20,249,327	100.0	17,176,323	100.0	17,362,065	100.0

TABLE 14 Value of Syria's Trade with Jordan, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Fruits and vegetables	1,431,451	32.9	3,094,331	51.6	4,729,174	57.0
Olive oil	77,960	1.8	1,066,830	17.8	1,626,625	19.6
Skins, raw	335,812	7.7	723,207	12.1	847,919	10.2
Wool	2,190,323	50.3	428,364	7.1	415,594	5.0
Other items	318,989	7.3	685,857	11.4	672,420	8.1
Total	4,354,035	100.0	5,998,589	100.0	8,291,732	100.0

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TABLE 14 (CONT.) Value of Syria's Trade with Jordan, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Exports						
Wheat and flour	—	—	—	—	6,319,349	29.1
Fruits and vegetables	321,650	2.6	1,094,633	6.5	1,150,000	5.3
Cement	—	—	938,832	5.6	2,007,405	9.2
Gas oil	150,875	1.2	501,777	3.0	588,151	2.7
Rayon textiles	1,158,553	9.3	3,289,324	19.5	3,367,427	15.5
Cotton threads	420,467	3.4	521,611	3.1	353,952	1.6
Cotton textiles	1,413,066	11.4	4,288,179	25.4	2,323,819	10.7
Ropes	122,299	1.0	312,377	1.8	306,170	1.4
Handkerchiefs	331,520	2.7	925,841	5.5	645,647	3.0
Wearing apparel	614,101	5.0	1,873,412	11.1	699,757	3.2
Other items	7,863,387	63.4	3,129,825	18.5	3,946,537	18.2
Total	12,395,918	100.0	16,875,811	100.0	21,702,214	100.0

TABLE 15 Value of Syria's Trade with Saudi Arabia, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Petroleum products	3,216,030	90.5	7,432,589	93.9	11,084,864	93.4
Skins	196,785	5.5	458,670	5.8	422,880	3.6
Other items	142,529	4.0	20,785	0.3	365,411	3.1
Total	3,555,344	100.0	7,912,044	100.0	11,873,155	100.0
Exports						
Wheat and wheat flour	—	—	574,525	5.6	1,157,798	9.5
Furniture	113,208	1.3	211,995	2.1	365,587	3.0
Rayon textiles	1,156,847	13.6	1,052,241	10.2	1,247,732	10.2
Cotton textiles	1,410,190	16.6	958,917	9.3	364,231	3.0
Woolen textiles	173,296	2.0	339,719	3.3	413,418	3.4
Rayon wearing apparel	144,934	1.7	192,518	1.9	372,130	3.1
Cotton wearing apparel	429,748	5.1	998,444	9.7	811,779	6.7
Handkerchiefs	1,134,642	13.4	1,662,750	16.1	1,732,187	14.2
Brass articles	251,253	3.0	304,755	3.0	374,102	3.1
Other items	3,677,032	43.3	4,037,090	39.1	5,348,570	43.9
Total	8,491,200	100.0	10,332,954	100.0	12,187,534	100.0

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TABLE 16 Value of Syria's Trade with Egypt, 1951–53

(£S) 439

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Rice	2,809,080	75.9	294,006	21.4	—	—
Potatoes	15,813	0.4	132,502	9.7	—	—
Asphalt	330,424	8.9	407,496	29.7	130,950	15.9
Films	152,010	4.1	89,450	6.5	182,600	22.2
Shoes	—	—	130,810	9.6	—	—
Other items	394,213	10.6	316,701	23.1	511,629	62.1
Total	3,701,540	100.0	1,370,965	100.0	825,179	100.0
Exports						
Cattle	736,612	10.2	97,710	2.2	—	—
Tomatoes	—	—	201,000	4.5	—	—
Onions	311,077	4.3	406,522	9.0	525,837	15.3
Nuts	316,494	4.4	205,550	4.6	79,436	2.3
Dried apricots	202,176	2.8	136,252	3.0	—	—
Licorice	240,536	3.3	252,956	5.6	373,548	10.9
Apricot paste	1,987,086	27.6	2,175,607	48.2	880,666	25.7
Tambocs	—	—	161,600	3.6	234,599	6.9
Other items	3,409,079	47.3	872,952	19.4	1,333,909	38.9
Total	7,203,060	100.0	4,510,149	100.0	3,427,995	100.0

Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade

During the last three years, an average of about 80% of Syria's exports to the United States consisted of raw wool and about 10% of tobacco. Among imports from the United States, the largest items are machinery of all types, vehicles, petroleum products, tires and tubes. Syria has an adverse trade balance with the United States.

Syria exports cotton, cereals and wool to the United Kingdom. In 1952 the value of these exports considerably exceeded the value of imports from the United Kingdom, which included a large variety of industrial products and raw materials, among which woolen piece-goods, cotton textiles, rayon and cotton yarn, and machinery were most significant.

The composition of trade with France, Italy, Western Germany and Belgium does not vary greatly from that of the trade with the United King-

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439 dom. France is the only country in this group with which Syria has regular surpluses.

Syria's trade balance with Lebanon has always been favorable. Syria's chief exports are cereals, live animals and dairy products, vegetables and fruits, wool and cotton; imports consist largely of products of the Tripoli oil refinery, citrus fruits and bananas.

Syrian exports to Iraq are mainly textiles and soap; sheep, wool and dates are imported. The trade balance is strongly in favor of Syria.

Exports to Jordan include, apart from wheat, textiles and other manufactured goods; imports consist largely of vegetables, fruits, wool and hides.

The trade balance with Saudi Arabia is also favorable; exports are similar to those for Jordan, but imports include only two larger items, petroleum and cattle hides.

Trade with Egypt is more balanced and includes, among exports, apricot paste, dried fruits and onions; rice, asphalt, shoes and films are the main imports.

In contrast to trade with its neighboring Arab countries, Syria has a very unfavorable trade balance with Turkey, from which it imports large quantities of live animals, as well as hides, tobacco leaves and timber. Syria's 1951-52 wheat deficit was covered by imports from Turkey.

Syria's trade with countries of the Soviet bloc is comparatively insignificant. In 1953 imports from Czechoslovakia (which, because of the nature of its trade, has been listed with Western industrial countries), China and Romania amounted to about £S 6.7 million at official rates and about £S 9.9 million at free market rates. Few exports went to these countries.

Trade Routes

439 487 Table 17 shows the routes along which Syrian foreign trade moves. It indicates that over 50% of export tonnage goes overseas and that 40-50% of imports arrives through Latakia or through Lebanese ports.

In spite of the rapid increase in the absolute tonnage handled by the port of Latakia, which was favored by government regulations limiting the use of other ports, Lebanese ports were able to hold their own in proportion to total Syrian import tonnage. This is explained by the fact that Beirut is the logical port for imports destined for the important Damascus area, while at the same time exports from northern Syria, which have been increasing considerably, have gone mainly through Latakia.

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The large tonnages shown in overland imports from Lebanon are chiefly due to petroleum products from the Tripoli oil refinery. 439 487

TABLE 17 Syria's Trade Routes, 1951–53

(*Thousand metric tons*)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Overseas through						
Latakia						
export	90	43	265	54	353	49
import	163	23	167	21	176	23
Beirut and Tripoli						
export	24	11	30	6	38	5
import	170	23	210	26	205	26
Overland to and from						
Lebanon						
export	64	30	161	33	249	35
import	306	42	332	41	323	42
Jordan						
export	25	12	29	6	69	10
import	14	2	25	3	30	4
Iraq						
export	5	2	5	1	7	1
import	46	6	37	5	25	3
Turkey						
export	4	2	1	—	2	—
import	28	4	34	4	13	2
Total						
exports	212	100	491	100	718	100
imports	727	100	805	100	773	100

SOURCE: Calculated by Syrian government officials.

II TRANSIT TRADE

During various periods in its long history, Syria has played a prominent part both as a transit country and as a country of middlemen in East-West trade. Within the present pattern of world trade and trade routes Syria again has a role to play as a country of transit and perhaps entrepot trade. It has a natural advantage in its location across the shortest route between

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the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard and on the one hand, Iraq, on the other, Jordan, given the boycott of Israel.

In neither of these trade routes has Syria a monopoly. Iraq, which at present is moving about 100,000 tons of goods through northern Syria by way of the Northern Railway and unspecified quantities of goods through the desert road and Damascus, has the choice of directing these commodities to Turkish, Syrian or Lebanese port terminals. If transport to the Mediterranean ports should prove too expensive or cumbersome, Basra (Iraq) will be used even for the northern provinces of Iraq. Jordan can shift more of its trade to Aqaba and there are indications that this may happen.

In these circumstances, it is clearly in the interests of Syria to make transit through Syria attractive and profitable; it would be ill advised to sacrifice the long-term interest in transit trade to doubtful immediate gains. From that standpoint, it seems rather short-sighted to require that most goods to and from Jordan be moved by rail, irrespective of the wishes and interests of the shippers, and that goods moved from Beirut to Iraq across the desert must first be reloaded into Syrian trucks.[1] It is also inconsistent with the efforts to develop free trade zones in Syria and to encourage the use of Latakia for transit.

III FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES

Licensing

Exports. The government may impose restrictions on the exports of specific goods, including a license requirement. As of the beginning of 1954 exports of some 30 items in the tariff schedule, including various types of metals, glycerine, sulphur, fertilizers, jute cloth and sacks, and lambs, were prohibited, and the country's most important exports, (wheat, barley, flour, cotton and cottonseed, wool, sheep and certain types of cattle) were subject to license. Trade with Israel is prohibited.

These export restrictions were instituted for various reasons—to safeguard domestic supplies and to control the re-export of imported items, particularly those of strategic importance. Other regulations are designed

[1] The total volume of Syria's transit trade is presently estimated at 300,000–400,000 tons annually.

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to safeguard quality. Among efforts aiming at improving and standardizing the quality of exported cereals the following may be mentioned: in May 1954 the Ministry of National Economy submitted for study to the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture a proposed order which would require cereal exports to be accompanied by certificates as to their weight, degree of impurity and humidity. To the best of the mission's knowledge, these certificates are to be issued by reputable firms, specializing in this kind of job and cooperating with similar firms in the importing countries. This seems to be an excellent project and we recommend that it be carried out. 439 651 656

Several of the chief export products, such as cotton, wheat, barley, lentils, vetch, wool and hides, can be exported only through Latakia, with exceptions provided for the southern and central provinces.

Imports. Unlike exports, all imports must in principle be licensed. The only exceptions are personal effects of travellers, gifts and commercial samples up to a certain value, gold, certain commercial imports not exceeding £S 200 in value carried by travellers, and some articles imported directly across the frontier into the Jezireh and Euphrates provinces. It should be pointed out, however, that import licenses are freely issued, except with respect to items on the proscribed list.

Certain products, such as sugar, cement, timber, iron and asphalt, can be imported only through the port of Latakia, although the regulations in this respect are rather flexible and in general do not direct through Latakia a significant amount of trade that would not otherwise have gone through this port.

Trade and Payments Agreements

Bilateral. Since its independence, Syria has concluded several trade agreements, about half of which are with the principal countries of the Arab League (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon). Agreements were also concluded with Greece, India, Japan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and a payments agreement has been made with France. Some of the trade agreements simply formalize existing trade relations. The most-favored-nation clause is included in nearly all agreements. In the Japanese agreement, however, it was instead provided that both partners might, when necessary, take measures to protect the production of their local industries. 439

Provisions relating to the volume of exchange are incorporated into the

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439 agreements with Japan and Czechoslovakia. Japan undertook to buy from Syria not less than 5,000 tons of cotton per year, whereas Czechoslovakia agreed to balance at least up to 75% of the value of its exports to Syria by imports of Syrian goods.

Relaxation of restrictions in the way of duties and licensing obligations is particularly to be found in the agreements with Arab countries.

Relations with Lebanon deserve special attention. While the Customs Union was in effect, Syria covered Lebanon's wheat deficit and exported mainly agriculture products for which Lebanon paid with fruits, vegetables, industrial goods, and merchant, banking and tourist services. After dissolution of the Customs Union Syria did its best to reduce, if not to eliminate, the services of Lebanese middlemen; it also restricted travel of Syrians to Lebanon, in varying degree until March 1954. No bilateral trade agreements existed until February 1952 when a provisional agreement was concluded, since then several times renewed and slightly amended. Under this agreement agricultural exports from one country to the other are free of customs duties. Industrial exports are divided into three groups: (a) products regarded by both parties as being of local origin,[2] which are customs free; (b) goods admitted at 50% of the normal tariff;[3] and (c) products mainly based on imported raw materials to which normal tariff rates are applied. Simultaneously with the 1952 agreement other issues outstanding between the two countries were settled, such as compensation by Syria for the £S 44 million withdrawn from circulation in Lebanon for which the Lebanese Government had issued Lebanese currency, the sharing of the deficit of the DHP railway on an equal basis, etc.

While these agreements disposed of some of the current problems many Syrians and Lebanese seem to wonder whether more general principles should not govern economic relations between the two countries. However, economic interests of the predominantly commercial business community in Lebanon, which is highly "allergic" to any government interference and depends on free trade and free market operations as well as on income from foreign visitors, appear to be in some conflict with the interests of Syrian producers, who sought and received government financial aid in the past and continue to rely on trade barriers.

[2] Including, among others, brick, concrete pipes, silk yarn, most of the processed fruit and vegetable products, some glass and a variety of handicraft goods.

[3] Including, e.g., hides and skins, food pastes, chocolates and sweets, some alcoholic beverages, furniture, certain types of hosiery and of silk tissues, etc., altogether over 50 items.

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Differences between the Lebanese and Syrian tariffs on goods not produced in either country are comparatively small but for goods produced locally Syrian protection tends to be higher. For example, on textile cloth there are specific or ad valorem duties (whichever is higher) which work out to at least 50% in Syria and are lower in Lebanon. The Syrian tariff on sugar is higher than Lebanon's and there are embargoes on exports of a considerable number of local products. 439

In certain industries, Lebanon has the advantage of an early start, reflected in better management, design and in accumulated financial reserves. Syrians therefore do not believe it to be in their interest to open the door more widely to trade in industrial goods with Lebanon, unless the competition from Lebanese production can be compensated for by wider markets elsewhere. It is likely that the inter-Arab economic agreements (see below) will actually open such prospects.

Until 1950, trade relations between Syria and Jordan were governed by a 1923 agreement which provided for the exemption from customs duties of agricultural and industrial materials of local origin, except for tobacco and alcoholic beverages. The Palestine war which resulted in the expansion of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made it necessary to revise that agreement and a new treaty was negotiated in 1953. This treaty also exempts agricultural exports from tariffs, but, unlike the agreement with Lebanon, does not extend the exemption to such important items as wheat, barley, pulses and fish. Certain products of local industries are duty free,[4] others pay two-thirds of the normal tariff and still others pay full customs duties. The agreement includes rather complicated transport provisions. In principle, goods exported from one to the other country or in transit are to be railed but there is a rather long list of goods which may also be transported by road. Jordanian wheat passing through Syria must use the railway and the same is true of two-thirds of Jordanian phosphates, provided that the railway is capable of handling these quantities.

An agreement similar to the one between Syria and Lebanon was negotiated with Iraq in 1950. It provides for reciprocal customs concessions, exempting some goods from tariff duties and reducing rates on others. Each country was to provide facilities for the other's trade and industrial activities, and Syria was to be granted a free zone in Basra while Iraq would

[4] Linen, jute and hemp yarn and cords, asphalt, raw and tanned hides, glass products, apricot paste, etc., among Syrian exports and phosphates, marble, potassium, olive oil and cheese among Jordanian exports.

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439 have one in Latakia. This accord, however, was never ratified and has now been discarded, partly because both countries meanwhile have participated in the inter-Arab economic agreement and partly because certain interests in both countries opposed the extensive concessions which were to be made.

Economic relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia and Syria and Egypt are regulated by 1950 trade agreements which aim at promoting commercial relations within the framework of each country's import and export regulations. They do not provide for any preferential treatment.

A provision frequently included either in the text of an agreement or in the accompanying exchange of letters emphasizes the use of Latakia for trade with the partner country. It was included, for example, in the agreements with Greece and Japan.

Currencies and other payments provisions are specified in the agreements with Greece, Czechoslovakia, Japan and Yugoslavia. In the case of Greece, the currency employed is sterling, whereas in most of the others it is U. S. dollars or any convertible exchange; the choice of another currency, even one not convertible, may be agreed upon for individual transactions. A unique provision was included in the exchange of letters accompanying the Yugoslavian agreement: Yugoslavia will be prepared, in certain cases, to accept payments in the form of Syrian exports (cereals and cotton) for services rendered by Yugoslav engineers and contractors.

Multilateral. Syria has left GATT because it preferred to be free in its commercial policy. Syrian exports consist mainly of essential raw materials which by their nature enjoy low tariffs. Moreover, membership in GATT could not readily be reconciled with embargoes.

In September 1953, representatives of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq signed two mutilateral inter-Arab agreements, one on trade and transit, the other on payments and capital transfers. These agreements were ratified by Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt and, in May 1954, by Syria,[5] and have become effective.

The Inter-Arab Agreement on Trade and Transit lists agricultural products which are to be duty free if originating in one of the participating countries, and certain industrial goods which, in similar circumstances, benefit from a 25% reduction in prevailing tariffs. In addition, the participating countries undertake not to impose on such imported goods any internal taxes higher than those imposed by the importing country on similar domestic commodities; they also assure each other preferential treatment

[5] In January 1955 they were also ratified by Iraq.

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as far as import and export licenses are concerned. The new agreement does not invalidate existing bilateral agreements nor does it prevent the conclusion of such agreements at future dates. The contracting parties undertake further to facilitate for each other the transit of goods, personal effects and of animals by all means of transportation foreseen by their respective customs regulations. 439

The Lebanese-Syrian trade agreement and the agreement between Syria and Jordan include certain items not included in the inter-Arab agreement and vice versa. There are also certain differences in the definition of industrial or agricultural goods. By and large, however, the Arab agreement is regarded as more favorable to Syrian trade than are the agreements with Lebanon or with Jordan. It may open the door to more exports of agricultural products and may allow an expansion of industrial exports, even though Syria itself may be faced by an increased inflow of some of Lebanon's industrial production. Both Syria and Lebanon, being comparatively more industrialized countries, are likely to benefit from the opening of Iraq's fairly extensive market.

The Inter-Arab Agreement on Payments and Capital Transfer provides for preferential treatment of transfers for mutual payments on current account and for transfer facilities with regard to capital participation in development projects on which the interested parties may agree. The partners more specifically guarantee each other certain minimum payment facilities which come very close to free convertibility of resident accounts for current transactions within their joint territories. They also guarantee each other freedom from fiscal discriminations with regard to all capital transferred under the provisions of the agreement as well as its free repatriation. Regulations for the prevention of capital flight from the Arab countries are left to the authority of the individual countries.

IV CONDITIONS AFFECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT

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General

Certain features of the Syrian economy should be attractive to foreign investment. The country still has undeveloped resources; profits are high; there is a degree of economic stability; free market rates of the Syrian pound have been stabilized for some time and the country has practically

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457 no foreign exchange restrictions; private ownership and initiative predominate; the country has an influential class of businessmen and entrepreneurs which maintains satisfactory relations with foreign business circles. Yet, apart from the banking sector (and even here most, if not all, the new foreign funds seem to have become available on a short-term basis), the inflow of medium- or long-term private investment from abroad has, so far, apparently not been very large, although accurate estimates are lacking. Part of the explanation may be the lack of political stability within the area and the discouraging effects of frequent changes of political organization and leadership in Syria itself. The question arises, however, whether certain recent Syrian legislative and administrative policies may not also have contributed to discourage potential foreign investors.

Legislation

457 Complaints are sometimes heard against Decree No. 151 of March 1952,
471 relating to companies and commercial firms established outside Syria. Its principal provisions are that all kinds of companies established outside Syria may be represented in Syria only by Syrian nationals or by commercial companies established in Syria under applicable regulations. These regulations require that not less than two-thirds of the capital of such companies must be in Syrian hands and that a majority of the managers (in the case of cooperatives and partnerships) or the members of the board of directors (in the case of joint stock companies) must be Syrian. The law also imposes some fairly elaborate conditions under which branches of companies established abroad may be registered in Syria. Similar provisions apply also to Syrian agencies of companies established outside Syria.

About the same time, in April 1952, Decree No. 189 prohibited foreign ownership of agricultural land. Article 1 provides that "Non-Syrians, whether natural or legal persons, shall be prohibited from establishing, altering or transferring any right concerning real estate or concluding any agreement for rental and exploitation of agricultural land in Syria for a period in excess of three years." Exempted from these provisions are transfers of inherited rights to real estate, provided reciprocity is accorded in the country of the beneficiary, and transfers of real estate located within the limits of larger towns (provincial capitals). The law's preamble declares its purpose to be the retention of Syrian land in Syrian ownership, permitting Syrians alone to exploit it and to benefit from its resources. But

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while the intention of the law is thus apparently to prevent farm land from 457
falling into the hands of foreigners, its terms would also exclude foreign 471
acquisition of, for example, factory sites outside the limits of major towns, and land for oil prospecting and for construction of gasoline and service stations. At the time of this writing the Syrian Council of Ministers was considering a draft bill under which non-Syrians would be permitted through ordinary decree to own property outside city limits.

Government Policies

There is reason to believe that Decree No. 151 has not been inflexibly applied and that practically all requests for exemptions permitted by the law have been granted. Some harm by way of discouragement to foreign investment may have been done, nevertheless, because the harshness of the terms of the law are understandably but unfortunately better known and more widely publicized abroad than the leniency of its application in individual cases.

The nationalization of power and transport companies in January 1951 affected primarily the foreign owned companies in Aleppo and Damascus. In view of the fact that nationalization of public utilities is not limited to Syria, nationalization itself is unobjectionable. Statements issued by the Syrian Government at the time of the nationalization envisaged a just compensation. However, four years elapsed before the first agreement on compensation was reached with one of the two companies and a settlement with the other is still pending. Regardless of the causes of the delay and without in any way passing judgment as to which side may have been at fault, it should be observed that the fact of the long delay in reaching a final settlement has not passed unnoticed in financial circles outside of Syria and may well have had an adverse effect on prospects for foreign investment in the country.

Appraisal

A certain excess of zeal in trying to preclude a sharing of national resources with foreign entrepreneurs is not a unique phenomenon. It is not surprising that the postwar wave of economic nationalism did not by-pass Syria. There were, moreover, certain experiences in Syria's comparatively recent history which explain this reaction. But although the reasons for the adoption of such policies may be clear, their wisdom is open to dis-

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457 471 pute. Syria no longer need prove its determination to stave off unwanted external interference or infiltration. But it does stand to gain by demonstrating that the resourcefulness of its business community is matched by the government's mature understanding of the country's enlightened self-interest.

It is worth emphasizing that policies which discourage foreign investment are inconsistent with Syria's own record in other fields, such as that of foreign exchange. The free transfer out of Syria of capital and profits in itself creates a basic condition for the influx of funds from abroad. That it was obviously intended to have this effect is confirmed by the legislative motivation of Exchange Control Decree No. 637 of April 21, 1952, which explains that the new regulations aim at making it possible for nonresidents to open accounts with authorized Syrian banks in both foreign and local currency, without any restrictions or conditions. They are thus designed to foster, by means of free inflow and outflow of foreign capital, both short- and long-term foreign investment in Syria.

Finally, it can be pointed out that several underdeveloped countries whose position is not basically different from Syria's have been tending to remove all obstacles in the way of the inflow of capital and outside enterprise. This is true of Pakistan, India, Turkey, and Lebanon; particular reference should be made to recent changes in Egypt's legal and administrative treatment of foreign investors.

Syria's ratification of the Inter-Arab Payments and Capital Transfers Agreement was undoubtedly motivated by a very justified desire to facilitate the movement into Syria of investment funds from some of the oil-rich neighboring countries with limited domestic investment possibilities. Yet this capital is not likely to be attracted as long as legislation or practices discriminating against foreigners in Syrian business remain in force.

v FOREIGN DEBT

457 652 Syria's only external debt is an interest-free loan of U. S. $6 million made by Saudi Arabia in 1950, repayable in four equal annual installments beginning in 1955. The loan agreement was combined with a commercial agreement and provides for repayment in the form of Syrian exports.

Syria's debt to Lebanon, arising from the withdrawal by Lebanon in 1948 of £S 44.6 million circulating in Lebanese territory, has been settled

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by the aforementioned 1952 agreement, under which the Syrian Government ceded to Lebanon about 4 billion French francs which constituted part of the Syrian note cover and were held at the French Treasury. In other words, the Lebanese Government took the place of the Syrian Government in receiving French franc installments due from France to Syria according to 1949 financial agreements between the latter countries. 457 652

In 1952 and 1953 Syria repurchased certain amounts of its own currency[8] from the International Monetary Fund in gold and U. S. dollars, thereby adjusting its quota subscription to the IMF.

Obligations for external payments, hitherto unspecified, may arise from compensation to be paid to the former owners of the nationalized power companies.

VI THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION

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History of Exchange Controls

Foreign exchange controls were introduced in Syria in the first months of World War II. After a number of changes, they were gradually relaxed and in April 1952 were completely recodified. A brief review of the main stages of this development follows.

The first stage lasted until August 1948. Although in April 1944 administration of the controls passed from the French mandatory authorities to Lebanese and Syrian offices,[7] the system itself remained largely unchanged. Under it, all foreign exchange transactions were subject to license. Export proceeds as well as foreign exchange receipts from invisibles had to be surrendered at official rates to the Exchange Office, which supplied a certain amount of exchange for licensed imports and other payments. Exports of both foreign exchange and domestic currency required authorization. Regulations for the French franc area continued to be applied even after independent Syrian authorities took over the operation of the system in February 1948.

During the second stage, from August 1948 until September 1949, controls were considerably relaxed and a free foreign exchange market was

[8] £S 916,000 in 1952 and £S 2.271 million in 1953, at official exchange rates.

[7] Which operated jointly until the dissolution in February 1948 of the de facto monetary union between the two states and separately thereafter.

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457 officially recognized. Exporters were obliged to cede only part of their receipts; imports continued to be licensed but were paid for mainly by foreign exchange obtained in the free market. Allocations of foreign exchange at the official rate were largely limited to imports by government agencies and to imports of petroleum products. Transfers of exchange not quoted by the Exchange Office or obtained in the free market could be freely effected. The Exchange Office continued its responsibility for exchange from all transfers of capital from abroad, but of receipts from specified invisibles at first 20% and later only 10% had to be surrendered to the Exchange Office at official rates. Some companies operating under special contract (oil companies, in practice) were obliged, however, to sell to the Exchange Office, at the official rates, 80% of specified currencies.

Beginning in September 1949 export proceeds were freed from restrictions and a newly created Foreign Exchange Fund began to purchase exchange in the free market to supplement the amounts of exchange acquired by the government at official rates.

With the end of the Customs Union with Lebanon in March 1950 an autonomous monetary policy was inaugurated. Experiments were undertaken with a new foreign exchange regime, adapted to the needs of the Syrian national economy. The foreign exchange market was split up into a completely free market and a market for "exportation exchange." The latter was supplied by exchange from the proceeds of certain exports to certain countries to be sold only to importers. Exchange earnings of Syria's most important exports were, in effect, earmarked for this market. Because of the somewhat limited disposability of the "exportation exchange," rates for this exchange were slightly lower than those for completely free exchange. For the first time foreign exchange restrictions were applied between Syria and Lebanon.

Based on the experiences of previous years, the exchange control legislation was recodified in April 1952 and the recodification, with a few subsequent amendments, is still in effect.

The Present System of Exchange Controls and Its Operation

Administration. The final authority on all matters pertaining to exchange policy and controls is the reorganized Exchange Office, which since 1952 has performed the functions of the former separate Government Commissariat, the Control Office and the Exchange Fund. The office is headed

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by a board consisting of a president, designated by the Minister of Finance, and one delegate each from the Ministries of Finance and of National Economy. It has considerable administrative and financial autonomy, making decisions with respect to all transactions; prior to April 1952 not only actual operations but also some of the policy decisions were the responsibility of the BSL. In the absence of a true central bank the Exchange Office also operates in the monetary field to a certain extent; it handles transfers resulting from the country's payments agreements, buys and sells assets for and from the note cover of the Syrian pound and tries to stabilize domestic currency. 457

The responsibility for recording the exchange proceeds of most exports lies with the authorized commercial banks.

Import licenses are issued by the Ministry of National Economy.

Exchange Rates. Syria has, at present, two foreign exchange rates: an official rate and a fluctuating free market rate (the official rate is £S 2.19 for buying and £S 2.21 for selling, per U. S. dollar).[8] Governmental transactions were shifted in July 1953 to the free market rate, so that almost the only foreign exchange transactions to which the official rate now applies are importations of petroleum products and purchases of local currency by an oil company.

With regard to the free market rates, the intervention of the reorganized Exchange Office brought about two important developments: the separate rate for "exportation exchange" has been eliminated and since February 1953 a single rate is applied to all exchanges not transacted at the official rate; the free market rate of the dollar has been de facto stabilized since August 1953 and the fluctuations of other principal exchange rates quoted in Syria have been reduced. Table 18 shows the average free market rates of the dollar since September 1949.

In Syria the exchange rate of the dollar, like the exchange rates of the other major currencies (sterling, French franc, Belgian franc, Swiss franc and Lebanese pound), is influenced seasonally by the greater concentration of exports in the second half of the calendar year. During this period, specifically between August and December, when advances from foreign importers begin to flow in, rates tend to be low. Syrian imports, on the other hand, are spread more evenly throughout the year; hence exchange rates tend to be higher during those months in which demand is not matched by an abundance of exchange from current export proceeds.

[8] Par value announced by the IMF on July 29, 1947 is £S 2.19148 per U. S. dollar.

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TABLE 18 Average Exchange Rates of U. S. Dollar, 1949-54

(Piasters per $)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
January	—	352	364	385	369	357.5
February	—	352	351	387	372	357.5
March	—	357	351	389	371	357.5
April	—	361	350	388	367	357.5
May	—	365	359	375	363	357.5
June	—	368	355	367	359	—
July	—	396	354	359	356.5	—
August	—	400	360	357	357.5	—
September	332	373	359	355	357.5	—
October	347	357	367	360	357.5	—
November	339	365	380	363	357.5	—
December	350	370	383	369	357.5	—

SOURCE: Rapport Officiel de l'Office des Changes (Avril 1953); Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes.

Apart from these internal trends, the Syrian free foreign exchange market of course also reflects international factors to a greater or lesser degree. Between July and October 1950, for instance, the increased demand for foreign exchange following the outbreak of the Korean war more than offset the normal seasonal fluctuations.

The intervention of the Syrian Exchange Office limited maximum annual fluctuations between August 1952 and July 1953 to 17 piasters per dollar (less than 5% of the average annual rate) as against 30 piasters (about 8%) during the preceding 12 months. Since August 1953 the rate has remained stable at 357.5.

Since the Exchange Office has stabilized the dollar rate in the light of the demand and supply situation, its buying and selling rates for other currencies have generally followed the free market rates, reflecting the relative strength of these currencies vis-à-vis the dollar. Official cross-rates are therefore not maintained, as illustrated in Table 19.

Regulations affecting foreign exchange. Although with a few exceptions all imports are still subject to prior license, foreign exchange for settlement of their payments is readily made available by approved banks at free market rates. Import licenses need the formal endorsement of the Exchange Office.

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TABLE 19 Average Exchange Rates of Selected Currencies

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Year	£[a]	Fr.Fr.[b]	Sw.Fr.[a]	B.Fr.[a]	£E[a]	£L[a]
1949						
October	910	901	82.80	6.50	881	109
1950						
January	838	882	82.70	6.83	891	109
April	923	894	84.57	6.82	928	112
July	1,093	1,098	90.81	7.78	982	108
October	936	941	83.08	6.78	977	101
1951						
January	941	959	86.46	6.80	953	106
April	910	946	81.88	6.69	958	105
July	883	933	81.78	6.93	905	102
October	882	860	84.20	6.96	909	101
1952						
January	919	914	88.50	7.50	910	101
April	980	932	89.60	7.72	960	103
July	923	936	84.00	7.05	838	101
October	955	924	85.50	6.90	885	101
1953						
January	1,000	946	86.10	7.18	—	103
April	998	975	85.30	7.14	—	104
July	970	967	83.25	6.85	—	106
October	973	952	83.40	6.92	—	109
1954						
January	—	—	—	—	—	—
April	997	980	83.28	7.08	—	111
July	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a] In piasters per unit of quoted currency.
[b] In piasters per 1,000 units of quoted currency.

SOURCE: Rapport Officiel de l'Office des Changes (Avril 1953); Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes.

Foreign exchange from exports must in principle be repatriated and sold to an approved bank. This is true of Syria's most important export goods, representing about 80% of the value of total exports. Proceeds must be obtained in currencies prescribed by the Exchange Office; in practice the currency of the country to which the goods are exported is usually requested or a stronger currency, at the exporter's choice. Proceeds from exports to Bahrein, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—all countries with which Syria habitually has a favorable trade balance, and to which some of Syria's "unrecorded" exports are directed—are not subject to this regulation.

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457 *Invisibles and capital movements.* No regulations apply at present to the proceeds from invisibles and such exchange may be held, sold in the free market, or otherwise disposed of. Exchange for invisible payments may be readily obtained at free market rates. Imports and exports of capital are free of all restrictions and may be dealt with in the free market without limitations.

Appraisal of the System

The continuation of strict foreign exchange regulations until 1948, three years after the termination of hostilities in the area, probably reflects the desire of the authorities to assist in a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. But actually in both Syria and Lebanon the gradual relaxation of controls seemed to have represented in many cases nothing more than a formal adaptation of the law to existing practices.

Syria developed its exchange regulations and policies on the basis of a realistic analysis of the conditions in which its foreign exchange market operates: the strong link with the neighboring Beirut market; the absence of a developed monetary and banking organization; the absence of adequate statistical information; the inadequacy of foreign exchange reserves.

Beirut is an important center of diverse banking and foreign exchange transactions and served both Lebanon and Syria until the separation of the two economies. It is generally more active than the markets of Aleppo and Damascus, draws its supplies from a greater variety of sources and is more speculative. The requirement that export proceeds be repatriated, reintroduced in Syria shortly after the end of the Customs Union, arose mainly from the desire to strengthen the domestic exchange market by breaking the habit of merchants of carrying out most of their financial operations in the neighboring countries. Although this purpose has apparently been achieved, the possibility of recourse to Beirut has been by no means eliminated and always looms in the background. This somewhat limits the freedom of Syrian policy makers and would undoubtedly act as a deterrent if a stricter currency regime were attempted in Syria. It is also fairly obvious that any attempts to eliminate the existing broken cross-rates in Syria would be of no avail, as long as such cross-rates are maintained in other countries and, in particular, in Lebanon.

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The new monetary and central banking legislation, which more or less paralleled the 1952 reorganization of the Syrian exchange controls and of the Exchange Office, was not fully implemented until 1954. Hence the necessity for the Exchange Office to substitute, in certain respects, for a Central Bank or for a Stabilization Fund. There is also apparently no prospect that private banks in Syria could now absorb seasonal surpluses of foreign exchange without substantial fluctuations of exchange rates. The Exchange Office which now acts, either directly or via banks, as the principal buyer and seller of foreign exchange has thus stepped into the role previously performed by financiers from abroad. Recently introduced forward buying of foreign exchange from exporters aims at a further limitation of the country's dependence on foreign importers and banks. 457

The Exchange Office started with very little experience and almost without any of the current information which normally provides the basis for policy decisions of institutions of this kind. The first somewhat timid interventions in the market are explained by their experimental nature. These difficulties have now been in part overcome, thanks to the successfully developed new system of banking statistics.

Finally, at the time of the reorganization of its exchange control system, Syria had only very limited reserves. The total official holdings of gold and of convertible foreign exchange amounted, as of June 30, 1952, to the equivalent of £S 40.3 million; at the official rate this corresponded to 16% of the currency in circulation and represented the value of approximately five weeks of average imports. The Exchange Office could therefore not be endowed with funds which would constitute a "masse de manoeuvre" sufficient to intervene forcefully and decisively in the market.

In view of all these difficulties, the record of the new Exchange Office and of its policies brings much credit to the combined efforts of Syrian talent and first-rate foreign advice responsible for its operations. The development of the domestic foreign exchange market brought the foreign exchange position and the domestic currency circulation into closer relation with the foreign trade of the country than it was before. The de facto stabilization of the U. S. dollar exchange rate is of immediate importance for the country's economic development, since it is a prerequisite for encouragement of domestic savings as well as for foreign credits and investment. The increase in Syria's foreign exchange reserves is also of special significance.

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Foreign Exchange Reserves

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The Exchange Office has actively intervened in the free exchange market since July 1952. Up to January 1953 it operated at the prevailing free rates apparently without retarding the Syrian pound's trend toward appreciation; since then, the Exchange Office has actually set the rate by announcing daily quotations at which it would be prepared to buy and sell foreign exchange.

While the operations of the Exchange Office in 1952 resulted in an insignificant net sale of foreign exchange (the sales amounting to £S 128 million as compared to purchases to the value of £S 127 million), the Office was in 1953 a net buyer of foreign exchange, as is shown in Table 20.

TABLE 20 Transactions of the Exchange Office in Principal Currencies, 1953

(Million currency units)

Currency	Purchases	Sales	Net purchases or net sales (−)
U.S. dollars	42.1	26.0	16.1
Pounds sterling	4.6	7.3	−2.7
French francs	6,625.9	4,931.7	1,694.2
Belgian francs	2,228.0	1,790.3	437.7
Lebanese pounds	35.8	17.5	18.3
Swiss francs	0.9	1.3	−0.4

SOURCE: Le Commerce du Levant, Beirut, Lebanon, June 28, 1954.

Table 21 indicates the changes in the official holdings of gold and foreign exchange of Syria during the last three years. A comparison of the totals (at the free foreign exchange rate) at the end of 1952 and the end of 1953 shows an increase of £S 49.3 million while an increase of £S 52 million is shown in the balance of payments estimate (see below). This discrepancy is due to the fact that the first figure is calculated on the basis of the foreign exchange rates prevailing at the end of each year while the second figure is derived from the net transactions of the Exchange Office effected through 1953 at current rates.

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TABLE 21 Official Holdings of Gold and Foreign Assets, 1951–53 457

(Million £S)

End of year	Gold	U.S. $	Inconvertible currencies	Total: At official rate	Total: At free rate	% of total in gold & U.S. $
1951	24.7	4.0	44.7	73.4	114.1	39.1
1952	31.7	17.5	15.3	64.5	107.4	76.3
1953	31.7	45.5	20.7	97.9	156.7	78.8

SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit.

VII BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

No balance of payments estimates could be made before 1950, until which time, as already mentioned, not even national trade statistics were available. Since then estimates have been made regularly with an increasing degree of accuracy. Margins of error must be allowed for; they may be particularly large with regard to the adjustments of exports and imports for undervaluation and for smuggling, and on invisible items such as profits from transit trade, tourism, emigrant remittances and private capital movements outside banks.

Yet, the fact that the IMF has found it possible to include estimates of the Syrian balance of payments in its Balance of Payments Yearbook is one more indication that these estimates can be regarded with a certain confidence.

Trade Balance

Table 22 shows merchandise transactions of Syria during the last three years, indicating what adjustments have been made.

The reason for the undervaluation of the declared value of exports is to enable foreign importers to pay lower import duties in their countries, wherever ad valorem duties obtain. Undervaluation of imports arises obviously from the desire to pay lower customs duties under Syria's ad

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TABLE 22 Merchandise Transactions, 1951–53

(Millions £S)

	1951	1952	1953
Exports, f.o.b. in customs returns	277	320	376
Adjustment for undervaluation	15	17	19
Unrecorded exports (net)	—	—	13
Total adjusted exports	292	337	408
Imports, c.i.f. in customs returns	291	303	387
Addition for:			
Exchange rate adjustment	120	131	164
Undervaluation	5	6	12
UNRWA imports	—	—	1
Unrecorded imports (net)	2	4	—
Total adjusted imports	418	444	484
Trade deficit	−126	−117	−76

SOURCE: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook; Syrian Government.

valorem tariffs. In both cases adjustments are based on estimates by Syrian officials.

The same source provided the estimates for unrecorded trade, which are, of course, no more than rough guesses. It is apparently believed that in 1951 and 1952 more was smuggled into the country than out of it. For 1953 it was assumed that unrecorded trade roughly balanced in both directions except for gold. As Syrian customs figures record gold imports but do not reveal gold exports in 1953, when such exports were forbidden, and as all the gold imported during that year for non-monetary purposes (£S 13 million) is believed to have been re-exported, a corresponding amount has been included as unrecorded exports in the 1953 balance of payments estimate.

Recorded imports do not include armaments, on which information is not available. Nor do they include supplies for refugees donated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); in 1953 the value of the latter was recorded separately.

Since customs figures for imports are based on the official exchange rate, adjustments were made by applying the average annual exchange rates to imports from the various currency areas.

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TABLE 23 Syria's Balance of Payments, 1951–53

(Million £S)* 457

	1951		1952		1953	
	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit
A. *Goods and services*						
Merchandise (exports f.o.b.; imports c.i.f.)	292	418	337	444	408	484
Transit trade	5	—	5	—	6	—
Foreign travel	13	13	13	13	15	24
Oil companies	54	—	50	—	49	—
Miscellaneous receipts and expenditures	7	2	10	4	10	4
Total (A)	371	433	415	461	488	512
B. *Private donations and capital movements*						
Emigrant remittances	10	—	10	—	10	—
Private transfers (excluding banks)	15	—	24	—	20	—
Total (B)	25	—	34	—	30	—
C. *Miscellaneous official financing*						
UNRWA	11	—	11	—	10	—
Settlement of Government debt	—	—	—	37[b]	—	—
Total (C)	11	—	11	37	10	—
D. *Errors and omissions*	6	—	26	—	—	6
Total (A–D)	413	433	486	498	528	518
E. *Compensatory financing*						
Banks (net)	14	—	5	—	46	—
Government	15[c]	—	—	2[d]	—	4[d]
Monetary Reserves	—	9	9	—	—	52
Total (E)	29	9	14	2	46	56
Total (A–E)	442	442	500	500	574	574

*At free market rate.

[b] Settlement of debt with Lebanon. The total amount due to Lebanon over the period 1947 to 1954 inclusive was set aside in 1952 in a blocked account with the BSL and subtracted from the monetary reserves.

[c] Drawings on the Saudi Arabian loan.

[d] Repurchases with IMF.

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457 *Balance of Payments Estimates*

Table 23 attempts an analytical presentation of Syria's balance of payments during the last three years. It is based on studies of the Syrian Ministry of Finance.

The following is a more detailed analysis of the calculations underlying the estimates for foreign travel in 1953.

(*Million £S*)

Credit		Debit	
Foreign legations	8	Syrian students abroad	6
Foreign tourists	2	Syrian legations (net)	2
Lebanese visitors	5	Syrian tourists	1
	—	Syrian visitors to Lebanon	15
Total	15	Total	24

Restrictions on Syrian travel to Lebanon were greatly relaxed in 1953[9] which accounts for the large increase in expenditure for this item.

Receipts from oil companies shown in Table 23 include payments to the government under terms of concessions and rates of foreign exchange by the companies to cover local expenditures. The latter decreased with the completion of the new installation for transport of oil (TAP line and IPC pipelines and the oil port of Banias).

Miscellaneous receipts and expenditures include income from investment abroad and transfer of profits from foreign investment in Syria as well as various other non-recurrent receipts and expenditure.

As no data exist with respect to fluctuations of receipts from emigrant remittances, the original estimate is repeated.

What should be shown under UNRWA donations is the total of foreign currency imported into Syria by UNRWA during the calendar year, plus the value of goods imported into Syria and financed by UNRWA from outside funds. From this total should be deducted the value of supplies purchased in Syria with the aforementioned funds, re-exported by UNRWA to neighboring countries and therefore already counted under recorded export proceeds. A detailed investigation of these figures carried out for 1953 gave a result very close to the estimates for previous years.

No data are available on capital movements in the private sector outside banks. This position, being residual, can be considered jointly with

[9] And abolished in the spring of 1954.

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errors and omissions. Capital movements through banks are recorded with increasing accuracy thanks to the recently introduced new system of banking statistics. The remarkable increase of obligations in the banking sector in 1953 is explained by transactions connected with the financing of the crops which are now apparently carried out by Syrian banks, including Syrian branches of foreign banks, to a greater extent than in previous years. 457

Compensatory government financing includes drawings on the Saudi Arabian loan in 1951 and the settlement of a repurchase obligation with regard to the IMF in 1952 and 1953.

In 1951, monetary reserves increased despite a balance of accounts deficit. This was because drawings on the Saudi Arabian loan and a decrease in net foreign deposits with banks more than offset the balance of accounts deficit. In 1952 the balance of accounts deficit and a repurchase of Syrian pounds from the IMF were reflected in a decline in monetary reserves except for a minor increase in net external liabilities of banks. In 1953 the balance of accounts showed a surplus; the monetary reserves increased considerably, despite a further repurchase of Syrian pounds, thanks to a substantial increase in net foreign advances to banks. This importation of banking funds in 1953 was apparently occasioned by the credit needs of the expanding economy and represented, in part at least, a form of prepayment of the larger volume of exports which developed during the following year.

Future Trends

In Syria, not unlike other underdeveloped countries, an adverse balance of trade and a surplus of invisibles on current accounts have been recurrent features during the short period under observation.

If 1950 is disregarded (in view of the abnormal configuration of prices following the outbreak of the Korean war and that year's statistical shortcomings) the Syrian balance of trade shows a steady tendency to improve. This improvement is mainly due to increased exports; there is reason to expect that their growth will continue.

During the last three years, an average of 70-80% of the value of Syria's exports was represented by agricultural and livestock products. Unless present prices of these goods show further substantial decreases, a growth in the volume of exportable quantities should have a more or less direct impact on the value of exports.

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457 On the assumption that the development program recommended by the mission will be adopted, the rising trend in agricultural production may well continue, particularly because of increasing yields. The livestock population has been growing steadily since 1949. The carrying out of the mission's recommendations in this field may lead to an even greater increase in the value of livestock production.

The mission feels justified in anticipating that by 1960 Syria will have sufficient agricultural surpluses not only to close a trade gap of the magnitude estimated for 1953 but even to provide a small favorable balance. Such a balance might be somewhat increased by the growth of the industrial exports, perhaps stimulated by the opening of new markets within the Arab preferential trade area.

On the other hand, imports cannot be expected to remain at their present level at a time when both the population and average incomes are expected to grow. Import restrictions may be relaxed; equipment for development projects will have to be purchased from abroad. To attempt to weigh these possible import increases against the above-mentioned surpluses would be entering into the realm of pure speculation. It can be said, however, that barring any unexpected major unfavorable price movements, and given continued growth of the Syrian economy, exports may, generally speaking, tend to equilibrate with imports.

If Syria's considerable tourist assets can attract increasing numbers of foreign visitors, this would tend to offset expenditures resulting from the desire of Syrians to visit Lebanon. While UNRWA expenditures cannot be expected to continue indefinitely, emigrant remittances will presumably continue and revenues from oil companies will almost certainly increase. There is no reason to believe that invisible transactions on current accounts will cease to show net credit balances.

Thus, the general prospects of Syria's balance of payments on current account seem to be good and modest surpluses would appear to be more likely than deficits.

There is no basis on which to predict capital movements. Given political stability, an influx of funds from abroad could well take place; if so, this would of course accelerate the rhythm of Syria's economic growth.

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ANNEX B *PUBLIC FINANCE*

1 SUMMARY STATISTICS ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE

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It is difficult to obtain from Syrian statistics a clear and complete picture of the government's fiscal operations. Inadequacies in government budgeting and accounting handicapped the mission in making a full appraisal of past accomplishments and tend to make difficult careful planning for the future.[1] This Annex has therefore been written within the limitations of the data available.

TABLE 1 Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945–54[a]

(*Million £S*)

Period[b]	Expenditures			Receipts	Surplus (+) or deficit (−)
	Defense	Other	Total		
1945	16.4	82.7	99.1	118.3	+19.2
1946	27.8	84.7	112.5	120.7	+8.2
1947	20.8	102.4	123.[illegible]	116.2	−7.0
1948	44.8	91.5	136.3	116.1	−20.2
1949	49.3	91.8	141.1	136.1	−5.0
1950–51	102.5	131.6	234.1	208.3	−25.8
Annualized[c]	68.4	87.8	156.1	138.9	−17.2
1951–52	104.6	161.4	266.0	271.7	+5.7
Annualized[c]	69.8	107.7	177.4	181.2	+3.8
1953	66.0	131.0	197.0	216.7	+19.7
1954	75.4	133.7	209.1	202.0	−7.1
1945–54	507.6	1,010.8	1,518.4	1,506.1	−12.3

[a] Closed accounts, 1945, 1946, 1947; provisionally closed accounts, 1948, 1949, 1950–51; preliminary figures, 1951–52 and 1952 budget estimates, 1954.

[b] Calendar years except for two 18-month periods: January 1, 1950–June 30, 1951; and July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.

[c] Arbitrarily.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of additions to, and withdrawals from, reserve fund and loans from Issue Department.

SOURCE: Derived from data provided by Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance.

[1] See p. 263 et seq.

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Central Government Expenditures and Receipts

Over the decade 1945-54 expenditures recorded in the ordinary budget of the central government doubled (Table 1). Receipts also increased and over the period as a whole were almost as large as ordinary budget expenditures. Sizable budget deficits were incurred, however, in the years 1947-51, whereas substantial surpluses were realized in 1945 and again in 1953. The 1954 budget contemplates a deficit, but it may be noted that the 1953 budget also forecast a deficit while, according to preliminary figures, there was a large surplus. Roughly one-half of the growth in ordinary budget expenditures from 1945 to 1954 was attributable to larger spending for national defense and one-half to other programs. The mission has restricted its analysis and comments to the non-defense sector but of course has had to take defense expenditures into consideration in its general appraisal of government finance.

Among non-defense expenditures, outlays for general government functions—combining the Presidency, Parliament, and Supreme Court and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, and Justice—declined from 38% of total non-defense costs in 1945 to 32% in the 1954 budget (Table 2). The functions of the Ministries of Agriculture and National Economy accounted for around 5% of non-defense expenditures at the beginning and end of the decade. On the other hand, expenditures on education, health and public welfare rose spectacularly from 16.7% of total non-defense costs in 1945 to 34.4% in the 1954 budget. Ordinary budget expenditures on public works and pensions and subsidies increased in absolute amount but not so rapidly as expenditures on other non-defense functions and hence constituted a significantly smaller percentage of the total at the end of the period than at the beginning. Somewhat more detailed figures on expenditures appear in Appendix A.[2]

The ordinary budget does not include certain advances to autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies or certain extraordinary defense expenditures and receipts. The extrabudgetary advances have covered a substantial volume of development expenditures in recent years. These outlays were financed from available funds of the Treasury and by government-guaranteed advances from the Issue Department of the privately owned Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL), (Tables 3 and 4).

[2] See p. 289.

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TABLE 2 Non-defense Expenditures in Ordinary Budget of Central Government

(*Thousand £S*)

Item	1945		1948		1951–52[a]		1954[b]	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Presidency, Parliament, and Supreme Court	3,141	3.8	3,146	3.4	3,295	3.1	5,137	3.8
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,520	1.8	2,925	3.2	3,166	2.0	4,303	3.2
Ministry of Finance[c]	4,016	4.9	5,809	6.4	7,600	7.1	8,572	6.4
Ministry of Interior	18,607	22.5	20,035	21.9	18,168	16.9	17,102	12.8
Ministry of Justice	4,022	4.9	5,426	5.9	5,823	5.4	7,422	5.6
Ministry of Education	10,401	12.6	20,536	22.5	31,264	29.1	37,097	27.8
Ministry of Public Health	3,413	4.1	3,444	3.8	4,975	4.6	8,764	6.6
Ministry of National Economy	871[d]	1.1	1,315	1.4	995	.9	1,527	1.1
Ministry of Agriculture	2,929	3.5	3,894	4.3	3,676	3.4	5,781	4.3
Ministry of Public Works	14,667	17.7	16,889	18.5	11,196	10.4	17,243	12.9
Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones	1,507[e]	1.8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pensions, subsidies, and other financial obligations	17,569	21.3	8,028	8.8	17,519	16.3	20,700	15.5
Total	82,663	100.0	91,447	100.0	107,678	100.0	133,648	100.0

[a] Annual rate arbitrarily derived from figures for 18 months July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.

[b] Budget estimates.

[c] Excludes pensions, subsidies, and miscellaneous financial obligations. Includes Office of Printing and Official Gazette.

[d] Excludes bread subsidies, which are included in item "Pensions, subsidies and other financial obligations."

[e] Gross expenditures. Beginning in 1947 these outlays were transferred to an annexed budget.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of additions to reserve fund.

SOURCE: Derived from data provided by Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance.

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TABLE 3 Financing Outside Ordinary Budget, 1945–53

(*Million £S*)

Calendar year	From available Treasury funds	From Issue Department	Total
1945	1.9	—	1.9
1946	4.1	1.0	5.1
1947	8.1	5.4	13.5
1948	7.0	50.7	57.7
1949	9.4	13.9	23.3
1950	10.9	11.7	22.6
1951	13.3	28.7	42.0
1952	7.5	21.6	29.1
1953	10.2	10.5	20.7
Total	72.4	143.5	215.9

SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit.

TABLE 4 Outlays Financed Outside Ordinary Budget, 1945–53

(*Million £S*)

Item	From available Treasury funds	From Issue Department	Total
Automatic telephones	34.5	—	34.5
Major irrigation projects	8.4	—	8.4
Railways	7.0	2.0	9.0
Aleppo water supply	—	20.0	20.0
Electricity corporations	—	10.0	10.0
Port of Latakia	1.6	—	1.6
Fuel storage	.7	—	.7
Ghab Project Administration	1.0	—	1.0
Mira (Wheat Office), capital	—	50.0	50.0
Cereals Office, purchase of insecticides	—	6.0	6.0
Agricultural Bank	9.9	19.4	29.3
Municipalities	4.0	19.2	23.2
Supply deficit	5.2	—	5.2
Loans to guaranteed companies	—	16.9	16.9
Total	72.4	143.5	215.9

SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit.

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In the period 1949-52, defense expenditures outside the ordinary budget totalled £S 89 million. Special receipts for national defense not included in the ordinary budget amounted to £S 18 million. A breakdown of these items year by year is not available. 652

Expenditures and receipts in the ordinary budget, extrabudgetary advances and repayments, and extraordinary defense expenditures and receipts are summarized in Table 5. This Table covers only the advances received by the autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies from the Treasury and the Issue Department and does not include funds derived by these

TABLE 5 Budgetary and Extrabudgetary Expenditures and Receipts of Central Government, 1945-53

(*Million £S*)

Item	1945–48	1949–52	1953[a]	1945–53
Ordinary budget expenditures	471.2	641.3	197.0	1,309.5
Extrabudgetary outlays	78.2	117.0	20.7	215.9
Extraordinary defense expenditures	—	89.0	—	89.0
Total expenditures	549.4	847.3	217.7	1,614.4
Ordinary budget receipts	471.3	616.1	216.7	1,304.1
Extraordinary defense receipts	—	18.0	—	18.0
Repayments of extrabudgetary advances[b]	—	15.2	5.7	20.9
Total receipts	471.3	649.3	222.4	1,343.0
Apparent excess of expenditures	78.1	198.0	−4.7	271.4

[a] Preliminary.

[b] Crude estimates based on year-end figures for major classes of indirect debt of government to Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

SOURCE: Derived from Tables 1 and 3 and data provided by Ministry of Finance and Council on Money and Credit.

agencies from their own operations or expenditures financed from such operating receipts. The figures on repayments of extrabudgetary advances are crude estimates of amounts paid to the BSL by autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies to retire government-guaranteed advances. Neither the original advances nor the repayments involved Treasury cash transactions, but they did involve changes in contingent liabilities of the Treasury and for this reason are here included in extrabudgetary expenditures and receipts of the central government.

The figures, moreover, are unsatisfactory in that it is uncertain to what extent they represent actual expenditures as distinguished from amounts

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652 authorized for expenditure. In general, it appears that recorded "actual expenditures" of the ordinary budget represent sums in fact disbursed, but it is known that in a few instances ordinary budget appropriations which were carried forward to later years were reported as actual expenditures of the year in which the projects were authorized. There are also indications that expenditures by autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies have sometimes lagged behind the receipt of advances from the Treasury and the Issue Department. It would be desirable for purposes of economic analysis and administrative control to have figures that distinguish precisely between plans for the future (authorizations or appropriations) and past accomplishments (actual disbursements).

The figures in Table 5 indicate a substantial excess of government outlays over current receipts in the period 1945-53. Although these figures cannot be considered a precise measure of the deficit, they do show that the government had to borrow and perhaps also to draw down its cash balances in order to finance its expenditures.

Government Debt

The government did borrow substantial amounts beginning in 1948. Inasmuch as the entire internal debt is owed to the BSL, the volume of net borrowing can be ascertained from figures on government indebtedness to that bank (Table 6). The credits were all originally extended by the Issue Department, but the bank has shifted some of the government obligations to its Commercial Department. Approximately one-half of the direct debt, it should be noted, represents obligations incurred by the government without corresponding cash payments to the public or entries in government expenditure accounts.[3] The "indirect debt" is composed of government guarantees of advances made by the Issue Department to autonomous or semi-autonomous public agencies and to certain privately owned industrial companies.[4] The external debt consists of a non-interest-bearing loan of U. S. $6 million from Saudi Arabia.

[3] This category includes: £S 65.8 million to reimburse the bank for losses due to depreciation of French franc assets included in the currency cover; £S 17.2 million of ordinary debt incurred to cover payments to the former mandatory power for buildings and other facilities; and £S 4.1 million for the Syrian subscription to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

[4] The mission's recommendations regarding the government debt will be found in the Main Report and on p. 287 et seq.

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TABLE 6 Government Indebtedness to Banque de Syrie et du Liban, 1948–53

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(Million £S)

Item	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Direct debt	*104.2*	*109.0*	*131.5*	*151.0*	*164.1*	*166.8*
Difference on French franc currency cover[a]	103.0	65.8	65.8	65.8	65.8	65.8
Ordinary debt	—	40.0	57.3	76.8	91.2	92.0
Subscription in IMF and IBRD	—	—	1.5	1.5	2.1	4.1
Advances without interest	1.2	3.2	6.9	6.9	4.9	4.9
Indirect debt	*54.1*	*67.1*	*66.6*	*90.7*	*122.6*	*145.6*
Public administrations and institutions[b]	4.1	5.5	9.9	38.6	51.6	59.4
Cereals Office and MIRA	50.0	49.0	42.1	35.7	46.3	46.8
Guaranteed industrial companies	—	12.6	14.6	16.4	16.2	13.4
Exchange Office	—	—	—	—	8.5	26.0
Total	*158.3*	*176.1*	*198.1*	*241.7*	*286.7*	*312.4*

[a] Obligations issued by the government to reimburse the bank for depreciation of French franc assets held as legal cover for currency.

[b] Includes municipalities, Aleppo water supply, Agricultural Bank, electricity corporations and railways.

NOTE: Figures apply to end of calendar years.
SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit and Ministry of Finance.

Problem of Reconciliation

In order to verify the consistency and completeness of the figures and to lay the basis for further economic analysis, it would be desirable to construct a consolidated statement of government expenditures and sources of finance. To this end a year-to-year comparison would be made between (1) total budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures and (2) total current receipts plus net proceeds of borrowing. Any difference between these two totals should be reflected in an equal change in the government's cash balances. Unfortunately, such a reconciliation is not possible in the case of the Syrian data. The most recent available figures indicate, for example, that, over the period 1949-52, outlays financed by the Treasury[8] exceeded current receipts plus borrowing by £S 13.4 million. Yet in this same period reported cash balances of the Treasury increased by £S 36.6 million. This leaves a discrepancy of £S 50 million. This discrepancy was explained to

[8] Excluding government-guaranteed advances from the Issue Department of the BSL.

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652 the mission as being due to the fact that current receipts and expenditures of the Treasury may be recorded on budget accounts for preceding years, that certain receipts are only provisionally deposited with the Treasury (these being collected by the government for the account of municipalities, special agencies or separate funds to which they are to be later transferred), that certain expenditures are actually advances which will subsequently be repaid or compensated, etc. The difficulty of precisely reconciling the figures indicates, nevertheless, that there is a need for better accounting.

Municipal Finance

Apart from the central government the 175 municipalities are the only units which have taxing and spending power in their own right, the *mohafazats* (provinces) being agencies of the central government without financial independence. In the Main Report[6] we have recommended that the government undertake a survey of municipal finances with a view to supplementing the scanty information currently available.

Information Assembled for the Mission

Unsatisfactory as these data on government finance may be, it is significant that the material summarized in the preceding pages is much more complete and reliable than that which has heretofore been available to responsible Syrian officials and the public. Much information was specially compiled for the mission. For example, published information on ordinary receipts and expenditures of the central government for 1946 and later years had been confined to budget estimates without any indication of the extent to which actual results differed from the budget. In the municipal finance field, the Ministry of the Interior made special tabulations of budget figures for the mission. Although municipal budgets must be approved by the Ministry and copies of all municipal budget documents are filed with it, it has never prepared any analyses of these budgets. Indeed, some idea of the lack of regard for statistical data may be inferred from the fact that prior to the mission's request the simple total of budgeted expenditures of the municipalities had been ascertained for only one year. In the circumstances it is clearly not possible to draw more than very general conclusions from the figures quoted in this report.

[6] See p. 192.

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II BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING

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In common with many other underdeveloped countries, Syria's most urgently needed fiscal reform is improvement of budgeting and government accounting. There is no unified and comprehensive budget or financial plan. Complete and accurate information on receipts, expenditures and cash balances is not available. In many instances cumbersome procedures and excessive centralization appear to cause unnecessary delays and inefficiency.

Types of Budgets and Financial Relations

There are, in principle, three types of budget: (a) the ordinary government budget; (b) the annexed budgets; and (c) the budgets of the independent entities. In addition, an important group of operations consists of extrabudgetary advances from available funds of the Treasury and of advances by the Issue Department of the BSL with government guarantee. Still another arrangement was the extraordinary defense budget of 1949, which provided for certain receipts and expenditures in 1949 and later years.

These financial operations are not brought together in a comprehensive budget or set of accounts. The complexity of financial relations and lack of unified accounts are partial explanations of the incomplete knowledge of government finances to which reference was made in the previous section.

The ordinary budget includes the regular receipts and expenditures of the central government departments. No distinction is made between current and capital items. As submitted, this budget is always nominally in exact balance. Receipts, however, may include expected withdrawals from the reserve fund and expenditures may include expected additions to that fund. On at least one occasion in recent years anticipated proceeds of new borrowing from the Issue Department were included in budget receipts. In view of these practices the nominal balance of the ordinary budget is misleading.

The annexed budgets include those of the Syrian University; Arab Academy; Department of Antiquities; Syrian Broadcasting System; Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones; Tobacco Monopoly; and Customs Bureau.

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652 457 The general budget is supposed to include appropriations for these agencies or the amount contributed by them to the Treasury after deduction of their operating expenses. This practice, however, does not seem to have been rigidly followed. The PTT, for example, has secured large extrabudgetary advances from the Treasury and has apparently used its operating surplus to repay part of these advances. Neither the advances nor the repayments entered the regular budget. Customs receipts, less administrative expenses, are recorded in the regular budget, but the Customs Bureau does not turn over the money to the Treasury until requested to do so. At the end of 1953, reported bank balances of the bureau amounted to well over one year's collections. The semi-autonomous position of the customs administration, which exempts its operations from usual budgetary and civil service rules, is unusual. It apparently is a carryover from the period of customs union with Lebanon.

The financially independent agencies or entities include the Ghab project; Latakia port; Agricultural Bank; Cereals Office; Council on Money and Credit; Exchange Office; electricity corporations; Aleppo water supply; Northern Railway; Hedjaz Railway; and the municipalities. These entities retain any surplus they may realize and they charge any deficit against their capital accounts. Some of the independent agencies have received large sums in the form of advances from the Treasury or government-guaranteed advances from the Issue Department of the BSL. Neither type of advance is entered in the general budget. Government-guaranteed loans to and repayments from private industrial companies also occur without any entry being made in the general budget accounts.

Budget and Accounting Agencies and Procedures

The principal budget and accounting agencies are the Department of Budget and Financial Control, the Department of Financial Affairs, the Treasury Department—all three located in the Ministry of Finance—and the independent General Accounting (Comptroller's) Office.

The Department of Budget and Financial Control is responsible for the preparation and, to some extent, execution of the ordinary budget. Requests for appropriations for the financial year beginning January 1 are supposed to be submitted to the Budget Department by the ministries about September 1 of the preceding year. The budget is expected to be presented to Parliament during December and adopted by it before the end

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of that month. In recent years, however, the budget process has often fallen behind this schedule. The Budget Department has an accountant in each agency who is supposed to preaudit expenditures. The financial control section is responsible for examination of proposed legislation with financial implications and for supervision of government personnel practices.

The Department of Financial Affairs is responsible for supervision of loans not itemized in the budget, including Treasury advances to government entities or government-guaranteed loans to industrial companies.

The Treasury Department handles actual receipts and disbursements. Expenditures and receipts which occur within three months after the end of the financial year to which they are attributable are recorded in the accounts of that year, the books being held open for that purpose.

The General Accounting Office has broad authority with respect to preaudit and postaudit of expenditures and personnel actions. The Office must approve in advance all contracts or purchases in excess of £S 5,000 and all contracts for rental of buildings extending beyond the current year. The examination concerns the legality of the action rather than its advisability. The Office must also give advance approval to hiring of government personnel to assure that there is budgetary provision for the position and that the candidate meets the legal requirements. It also approves increases in salaries and pensions. It is responsible for monthly and annual postaudits of accounts and for the closing of the budget. The annual budget is formally closed by an act of Parliament.

The General Accounting Office asserts that its preaudit functions have been kept up-to-date and that its procedures do not cause delay in making expenditures in conformity with the budget. A long delay is involved, however, in postaudit and final closing of the budget. The 1947 budget is the most recent one which has been formally closed. Accounts for 1948, 1949 and 1950-51 have been examined by the General Accounting Office but have not been passed on by Parliament. The mission was informed that the backlog of postaudit work was being reduced but that the General Accounting Office did not expect to be current in its postauditing until 1955.

The reserve fund is merely a bookkeeping device. The same budget may provide for additions to the reserve fund (recorded as budget expenditures) and for withdrawals from the fund (recorded as budget receipts). Although an increase in the reserve fund usually indicates a surplus in the ordinary budget, one substantial addition in recent years merely

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652 451 reflected a paper profit from the exchange advantage realized in liquidation of a debt to Lebanon for blocked Syrian currency formerly circulating in Lebanon. The fund therefore does not consist entirely of an accumulation of past surpluses. Even if this were true, drawing on the fund to cover a current deficit or an extrabudgetary expenditure would not represent a non-inflationary means of financing. An accounting system which relies on the reserve fund as a balancing item deprives the Parliament and the public of an easily understandable measure of current operations—the budget deficit or surplus—and may be somewhat misleading.

Criticisms

The most serious defect of these arrangements is the lack of a comprehensive budget covering all government receipts and expenditures. The ordinary budget gives an incomplete and misleading impression of the fiscal position of the government because it does not cover certain extraordinary defense expenditures and receipts and transfers of funds between the Treasury and independent agencies. Although it is appropriate for the independent agencies, especially those which are expected to be largely self-supporting, to have independent budgets, sound financial planning requires that the general budget clearly reflect the Treasury's relations with these agencies. The practice of authorizing advances from the available funds of the Treasury and from the Issue Department with Treasury guarantee for a diversity of projects which are not subject to unified review is unwise. Moreover, clear records of the status of outstanding authorizations for advances are lacking.

Provisions for preaudit of expenditures by the Budget Department and the General Accounting Office, together with the involved rules which individual agencies are expected to apply, result in a cumbersome procedure which places great stress on legal niceties but little emphasis on wise and economical use of resources.

Delay in accounting, postauditing and closing the budget means that no clear information on recent trends in receipts and expenditures is available to guide finance officials and the Parliament in preparing and approving the budget for a new year. Part of the difficulty arises out of the practice of attributing certain transactions occurring in the period January-March to the previous year. For purpose of control it is of course essential to match each disbursement with a valid authorization to spend, and it

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must be expected that a large proportion of payments made during the first months of any year will be under authority granted in the previous year. On the other hand, the essential requirements for purposes of treasury management and economic analysis are data on current cash payments, receipts, and balances of the government; from this point of view an exact allocation of all transactions to particular budget years is of secondary importance. In drawing up a new budget, furthermore, information on the recent past is needed in order to check on the rate at which authorized expenditures are going forward. Figures on total cash receipts and expenditures for the government as a whole and for each ministry can be prepared within a few days after the end of any calendar period. Such figures would be a highly useful supplement to information now available.

Partly as a result of lack of current information on resources and claims on them, the Treasury and other government agencies appear to have built up grossly excessive cash balances. Complete records on these balances are not available from government accounts but banking statistics on public deposits reveal the large size of the balances. As of December 31, 1953, public deposits denominated in local currency were as follows:[7]

	(*Million £S*)
Treasury	62.0
Customs service	55.6
Public administrations	21.9
Public services	49.2
Miscellaneous	.2
Total	188.9

Treasury deposits plus deposits of the customs service, which are at the disposal of the Treasury even prior to being transferred to it, were equal to more than half a year's ordinary budget expenditures. Public deposits as a whole have increased sharply since the end of 1951. They were built up at a time when the government was borrowing, directly and indirectly, large amounts from the Issue Department of the BSL. It is not possible fully to evaluate the adequacy of the balances because of lack of information. Treasury deposits, for example, include an unknown amount of third-party funds which do not legally belong to the government. This situation, of course, complicates financial planning. The possibility of an

[7] From data compiled by the Exchange Office. In addition, there were £S 5.3 million of foreign-currency deposits.

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652 457 inflationary situation developing out of an attempt of various government agencies to draw down their deposits at a rapid rate should not be overlooked.

Suggested Reforms

Some of the main lines of reform of the budget and accounting system are implied in the foregoing observations, but for the sake of clarity they will be repeated. No attempt will be made to outline a detailed program; for this, it is suggested that the government obtain the services of a qualified foreign advisor. The mission recommends the following:

1. A comprehensive budget including all receipts and disbursements of the Treasury should be instituted. Items now financed through extraordinary accounts or by drawing on the available funds of the Treasury should be included in the general budget. Annexed budgets may be continued for agencies such as Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the broadcasting system, and the University, but all subventions and loans to these agencies and all contributions or repayments from them should be reflected in the general budget. Loans or capital subscriptions to the port, railway and electricity companies and other independent enterprises, as well as any recoveries of funds from these enterprises, should also be entered in the general budget.

2. The general budget may appropriately be divided into three sections. On the expenditure side these would be: (a) current expenditures; (b) capital outlays; (c) loans and capital subscriptions. On the receipts side the three sections would be: (a) current revenues; (b) proceeds of sales of state property; (c) recoveries of loans and capital subscriptions. Such a classification would be helpful for purposes of economic and financial planning but it should not be assumed that expenditure items of types (b) and (c) should always be financed by borrowing, or type (a) items always by current revenues.

3. Although the independent public administrations and services should remain outside the general budget and should not be required to comply with the detailed budget procedures applicable to regular departments and agencies, each independent agency should be required to submit annually a statement of proposed capital outlays. The proposals should be subject to review by a competent body to assure their consistency with the general economic program of the government in the light of current conditions.

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Capital outlays of municipalities might be subjected to the same kind of examination. 652 451

4. Projects extending over several years should be authorized in advance by law but funds for the whole project should not be transferred to a separate account or otherwise set aside when the project is authorized. Instead, appropriations should be made annually to cover expected disbursements of that year and funds should be released by the Treasury only as needed to make payments to employees and contractors. Appropriations remaining unobligated at the end of any year should lapse. This system would permit the government to exercise continuous control over spending. The Treasury would borrow, under a general authorization, only when necessary to make payments, and an increase in the public debt would be avoided while cash balances were available.

5. The so-called reserve seems to serve no useful purpose and it does complicate and confuse budgeting. It should be eliminated.

6. Two types of accounting records should be maintained. First, for purposes of control, a continuous record should be kept to show at all times the unobligated balance of each outstanding appropriation and the cumulative disbursements made under authority of the appropriation. These accounts would serve as the basis for auditing and closing each budget. Second, accounts showing cash receipts, payments and balances should be maintained. Prompt reports should be prepared from these accounts at monthly intervals; these would supply essential information for improving treasury management and budgeting.

7. Each budget should include (a) estimates of receipts and expenditures for the year under consideration; (b) revised estimates for the year in progress; and (c) actual figures for the preceding year. The budget should also present information on the amount of new spending authority requested, on cash balances, the public debt and other relevant items. It should clearly indicate the proposed means of financing any deficit or the disposition of any surplus.

8. Preaudit of expenditures by the General Accounting Office should be discontinued and this function assumed by the various operating agencies under the general supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Preaudit is an administrative control essential to internal management. Postaudit is concerned solely with verification of the legality of past transactions; it enables the legislature to make sure that the executive agencies have not exceeded their authority. The combination in one agency of preaudit and

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652 451 postaudit functions is likely to lead to overcentralization, cumbersome procedures and operating delays.

9. The delay in postaudit should be reduced as fast as possible, by improving both accounting and auditing procedures, as well as by relieving the General Accounting Office of the preaudit function. Fraud and other crimes revealed by postaudit should be dealt with as provided by law but officials should no longer be held financially liable for procedural irregularities not involving fraud; in such cases attention should be directed to revising applicable procedures with the object of preventing a recurrence of the irregularities.

10. Cash balances of the Treasury and other agencies should be analyzed with a view to segregating public funds from third-party accounts. Excessive cash balances should be applied to reduction of the public debt.

651 III REVENUE SYSTEM

The most serious problems in the field of taxation arise from inefficient and inadequate administration and widespread evasion. The system is regressive and unequal in incidence. Although revenue has increased greatly in recent years—apparently more rapidly than national income—it will not be easy to assure a continuation of this trend. The system does not have a large degree of automatic flexibility of yield which would permit the government to capture a significant part of any increases in national income without changing tax rates.

Revenue Yield in Relation to Income and Population

The proportion of the national income collected in taxes and other government receipts appears to compare favorably with that in many other countries. In 1950 the ordinary budget receipts of the central government plus estimated receipts of all municipalities equalled 12% of estimated national income.[8] By 1953 central and municipal receipts appear to have

[8] In 1950 ordinary receipts of the central government were approximately £S 139 million (annualized estimate from 18-month fiscal period 1950-51). The total of municipal expenditure budgets in 1950 was £S 25.8 million, but the municipalities received Treasury-guaranteed advances of £S 4.8 million from the Issue Department of the BSL. This suggests that municipal budgets provided for approximately £S 21 million of financing from sources other than borrowing. It is not known whether municipalities added to or drew down reserve funds in 1950. The mission estimates the national income of Syria in 1950 at £S 1,380 million.

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increased by almost 60% and to have reached approximately 16% of national income.[9] This ratio is higher than in many other Asian countries, such as India, where the ratio is only about 7%, and compares favorably with that in several of the larger Latin American countries which collect around one-sixth of national income in taxes. On the other hand, the ratio of taxes to national income is substantially higher in most of the industrialized countries of the west.

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After a period of approximate stability from 1945 through 1948, central government revenues have since increased fairly rapidly.[10] In 1953 ordinary receipts were 84% greater than in 1945 (£S 217 million as compared with £S 118 million). During this period the population probably increased no more than 20%.[11] Thus ordinary central receipts increased from roughly £S 40 per head in 1945-46 to more than £S 60 in 1953. Even though 1953 receipts probably included some non-recurrent items, this is an impressive record.

Although the foregoing figures represent revenues in current prices, there is no evidence that, if the statistics could be stated in constant prices, the apparent increase in revenues would be diminished. On the contrary, the scanty evidence available suggests that in the period 1945-53 the trend of prices in Syria was on the whole downward (see Table 7). It may be, therefore, that the increase in the real purchasing power of government revenue was greater than the rise in nominal receipts.

The increase in revenue attained in the past few years appears to be due in large part to revisions of tax rates. It is by no means clear that under existing law, the marginal tax rate applicable to an increment of national income is higher than the average rate. If the additional income accrued in agriculture, the only taxes on the production side would be the 7% agricultural production tax and, on exported raw cotton, an additional tax amounting to roughly 8% of the value (at 1953-54 prices). Moreover, the application of the income tax on non-agricultural incomes is so limited

[9] Ordinary receipts of the central government were £S 216.7 million (preliminary). Total expenditure budgets of municipalities were £S 37.6 million, and Treasury-guaranteed advances to municipalities amounted to only £S 0.5 million. Estimated national income was £S 1,600 million in 1953.

[10] See Table 1, page 255, but note that preliminary figures place actual revenue for 1953 considerably above the budget estimate shown in this Table.

[11] The increase in estimated population from the end of 1946 to the end of 1952 was 14.3% (*Statistical Abstract*, 1951-52, p. 17; *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Nov.-Dec. 1953, p. 2).

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651 and erratic that it seems unlikely that it would claim a large fraction of an increase from this source either. Additional taxes would of course apply on the consumption side, but some of the principal excise taxes are applicable to such commodities as tobacco, for which the demand may not be highly responsive to income changes. As for imported consumption goods, many are subject to customs duties of 15% ad valorem or less.

435 TABLE 7 Price Indices for Damascus and Beirut, 1945–53

(1952 = 100)

Year	Prices in Damascus		Prices in Beirut	
	Retail[a]	Wholesale, local manufacture[b]	Cost of living	Wholesale[c]
1945	140	—	131	156
1946	129	—	119	133
1947	118	—	109	120
1948	112	—	106	116
1949	95	97	100	95
1950	81	90	93	88
1951	94	107	100	110
1952	100	100	100	100
1953 (Jan.–Sept.)	93	85	95	92

[a] 19 foods, soap, kerosene and cigarettes.
[b] 16 locally manufactured commodities.
[c] Prior to 1950 foodstuffs represented about 90% of the total weight, of which wheat and barley alone accounted for 61%. Beginning in 1950, foodstuffs represent 49% of total weight.

SOURCE: Derived from data in *Statistical Abstract of Syria*, 1951–52, pp. 148, 152; *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (Syria), Nov.–Dec. 1953, p. 33; International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, February 1954.

651 Commodities for which it seems plausible to assume that import demand is fairly sensitive to income changes, and which are subject to duties of 15.3% ad valorem or less, include jewelry, watches and clocks, meat, milk, butter, cheese, oleomargarine, photographic films and papers and musical instruments. To be sure, certain other commodities are subject to higher rates, but it seems unlikely that taxes on these items would yield enough to add an important degree of flexibility.

The lack of automatic flexibility of revenue yield is a disadvantage to a country undertaking a program of economic development. Such a pro-

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gram nearly always requires the government to gain command over an increasing fraction of national income, to finance investment and expand current services. In the absence of automatic flexibility, frequent revisions of statutory rates and perhaps the application of new taxes are necessary if the government is to finance its expenditures in a non-inflationary way.

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The Present Revenue System

The principal sources of central government revenue, in order of yield, are customs duties and excise taxes, which together account for about one-half of total revenue, the agricultural production tax, registration fees and income from public services (Table 8). Income and property taxes are

TABLE 8 - Percentage Composition of Ordinary Budget Receipts of Central Government, Selected Years

Source	1945	1948	1951–52[a]	1954[b]
Schedular income taxes	6.7	4.3	5.3	6.6
Tax on non-agricultural real estate	1.8	2.0	2.6	2.7
Business and professional license tax (temettu)	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.5
Miscellaneous direct taxes[c]	1.8	0.9	1.1	1.5
Agricultural production tax	7.8	10.7	12.8	10.9
Livestock tax	7.1	5.5	5.5	4.5
Excise taxes[d]	35.0	29.3	22.0	29.6
Customs duties	7.7	30.0	23.6	18.7[e]
Registration fees	1.3	7.7	10.6	10.4
Proceeds of state property	1.6	1.3	3.0	2.9
Industries	3.2	0.3	0.2	0.4
Income from public services	24.1[f]	5.1	10.4	10.0
All other	0.9	1.5	1.5	0.4
Total[g]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a] July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.
[b] Budget estimates.
[c] Includes payment for guard services.
[d] Includes revenues from tobacco monopoly.
[e] Includes export duties, 7.4% of total revenue.
[f] Includes certain non-recurring items associated with wartime food program.
[g] Figures for the various items have been rounded.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of withdrawals from reserve fund and loans from Issue Department.
SOURCE: Derived from data provided by Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance.

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651 comparatively minor in importance at present, accounting for less than 10% of revenue. Over the past decade customs duties and registration fees have shown the greatest relative increase in yield, owing to increased rates and greater economic activity. For a more detailed statement of receipts, see Appendix B, p. 291.

Income Taxes

Schedular income taxes at varying rates are imposed on (a) income from industrial, commercial and non-commercial trades and professions; (b) salaries and wages; and (c) income from circulating capital. There is no global tax to supplement the schedular taxes. Agricultural income is not subject to net income tax. The tax on non-agricultural real estate is in the form of an income tax, but in actual application it appears to have many of the characteristics ordinarily associated with a property tax. The tax on income from industrial, commercial and non-commercial trades and professions applies to net income from virtually all businesses and professions except agriculture. The first £S 1,500 of income is exempt. Rates range from 6% on income between £S 1,500 and £S 10,000 to a maximum of 36% on income in excess of £S 750,000. Personal exemptions are £S 480 for one wife and £S 480 for the first child. For each additional child after the first the basic exemption increases by £S 20; it is £S 500 for the second child, £S 520 for the third, and so on. The tax is based on net income after deductions for business expenses, depreciation and other Syrian taxes. Net losses may be carried forward five years.

Partnerships, joint stock companies and corporations (*sociétés en nom collectif, sociétés à responsabilité limitée,* and *sociétés par actions*) are taxed at the same rates as individuals, but, in the case of partnerships, personal exemptions are allowed for the partners, subject to a maximum limit for each firm. Corporations with registered shares (*sociétés par actions dont les actions sont nominales*) and whose main office is in Syria are granted a 25% reduction in the tax computed at the regular rates, but it is understood that only two corporations now qualify for this special treatment.

Taxation of industrial enterprises is discussed in Annex F.

In lieu of the regular income tax, business enterprises with gross receipts below £S 25,000 and professional men whose gross compensation for services is less than £S 15,000 pay an annual amount equal to 50%

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of the license tax (temettu).[12] Because of the complexity and variability of the temettu, it is difficult to compare this arrangement with the regular income tax. In a large number of other cases the income tax is assessed on the basis of more or less arbitrary evidence of presumed income. Taxpayers are required by law to file returns but the degree of compliance is low. No official return form is furnished or prescribed by the government. In one of the principal mohafazats, the mission was informed that only about 30% of the cases were assessed on the basis of returns or accounting records.

Salaries and wages in excess of £S 100 per month are subject to tax at rates ranging from 4% on amounts between £S 100 and £S 1,000 per month to 12% on amounts over £S 4,000. No allowance is made for the first two children, but for the third child an exemption of £S 40 per month is granted. The exemption increases by £S 10 for each successive child. The tax is withheld by the employer.

Income from stocks, bonds, notes and other items of circulating capital is subject to a flat rate of 6%. No personal exemption is allowed. The tax does not apply to interest received by banks if subject to the schedular tax on business profits.

Tax on non-agricultural real estate. The annual value (actual or estimated rental value) of buildings and associated sites is subject to tax at rates ranging from 7% on the first £S 2,000 per year to 20% on amounts in excess of £S 20,000. These rates are applied separately to each parcel, that is, the total income of the owner from all real property is not aggregated to determine the applicable rate. A shift to a personal basis of assessment is contemplated, however, after completion of a general reassessment of real estate. Unoccupied non-agricultural land is subject to tax on capital value at rates ranging from 0.5% on the first £S 20,000 to 1% on amounts in excess of £S 100,000. Agricultural land and buildings are exempt.

General reassessments are made only once each 10 years except that it is provided that a property whose value increases or decreases by more than 25% in the interim shall thereupon be reassessed. In practice, it appears that this is not usually done. A general reassessment of property was under way at the time of the mission's visit and was expected to be completed in 1954 or 1955.

New factories, administrative buildings, and residences for employees and workers are exempt for the first six years. Temporary exemptions are

[12] This surcharge is reported in government accounts as part of income tax collections.

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651 also allowed for new construction to encourage tourism, urbanism, settlement of nomadic tribes and other purposes.

Business and professional license tax. A license tax is imposed on industry, commerce and the professions. The rather involved calculation of the tax takes into account such factors as the rental value of the place of business, number of employees and gross receipts, and also includes a fixed element for different trades and professions. In general the tax is heavier in large cities than in small towns. Large tourist hotels and factories established after September 1952 are exempt for the first five years.

Miscellaneous direct taxes and fees. The other principal direct taxes and fees are the fee for guard services (night watchmen), irrigation tax, cadastral registration fee and inheritance tax. Most important of these from the revenue standpoint is the fee for guard service, which takes the form of a surcharge to the tax on non-agricultural real estate. The inheritance tax is rather elaborate in form, being graduated according to the degree of consanguinity and the size of the transfer. It yielded only £S 370,000 in 1953; the budget estimate for 1954 is £S 100,000. The irrigation tax was extensively revised in January 1954 and may in future yield more than the comparatively small sums obtained from other sources in the past (£S 473,000 in 1953).

Registration fees. In addition to fees for registration of real estate titles, judicial fees and stamps on legal documents, this category includes motor vehicle license fees, the army tax on electricity (a stamp tax on electricity bills) and consular and foreign trade fees.

Agricultural taxes. The agricultural production tax is a flat 7% of the wholesale value of marketed agricultural produce other than livestock, which is taxed separately. Commodities consumed at home or in the village are exempt; so are certain other comparatively minor items. Liability accrues when the commodities are moved outside the village, the tax usually being collected at posts along the roads on the basis of price lists prepared for each consumption center by local commissions. An annual head tax is imposed on livestock at the following rates:

Sheep and goats	£S 1.50
Camels	£S 2.20
Water buffaloes	£S 5.20
Hogs	£S 8.20

Sheep, goats and pigs less than one year old and camels less than two

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years old are exempt. Cows, oxen, horses, asses, mules and other animals not listed above are not taxed. 651

Excise taxes. 1. Tobacco and tombac:[18] The production and sale of these products are a state monopoly. In recent years profits of the monopoly have equaled approximately one-half of gross sales, which is equivalent to an excise tax of approximately 100% ad valorem.

2. Petroleum products: Taxes on the consumption of petroleum products are 14.5 piasters per liter on gasoline and 5.0 piasters per liter on fuel oil. In addition there are municipal consumption taxes and customs duties on petroleum products.

3. Refined sugar: This commodity is taxed at a rate of 23.5 piasters per kilo. Products containing sugar are taxed proportionately to their presumed sugar content.

4. Cement: Cement is subject to a tax of £S 15 per ton.

5. Miscellaneous: Specific taxes are levied on various types of alcoholic beverages and on certain minor goods and services.

Import duties. Import duties appear to be about equally divided by yield between ad valorem and specific taxes. A rough estimate for the period 1950-52 suggests that the weighted average of all import duties was equivalent to about 9-10% of the value of imports. Imports subject to ad valorem duties are valued at the official exchange rate (£S 2.19 = U. S. $1.00). In early 1954 this resulted in a valuation about 40% lower than that which would have been obtained by application of the free exchange rate (£S 3.575 = U. S. $1.00) at which payment for most imports except petroleum is made. Ad valorem rates tend to be fairly low even on luxury items. For example, effective rates on distilled spirits range between 18.4% and 36.8%. An effective rate of 24.5% applies to items such as many cosmetics, radios, phonographs and records, and coffee. Effective rates of 15.3% or less apply to items such as tea, most spices, oleomargarine, wines, photographic film and papers, jewelry, electric bulbs, watches and clocks and musical instruments.

Export duties. During the boom in raw materials' prices after the beginning of the Korean war, many countries imposed or increased export duties. Syria joined this movement rather belatedly, adopting export taxes on raw cotton in 1952 and on cereals in 1953. The tax on cotton is still in effect, but the taxes on cereal exports were repealed in mid-1954. The tax on cotton is 9 piasters per kilo on unginned cotton and 20 piasters per kilo

[18] A preparation of tobacco and other materials smoked in a hookah (water pipe).

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651 on ginned cotton. This tax applies in addition to the 7% agricultural production tax. In August-September 1953, the export duty on ginned cotton amounted to about 8% of the wholesale price in Aleppo.

Other revenues. Proceeds of state property are composed mainly of receipts from rent or sale of real and personal property and income from salt mining. The most important items of income from "public services" are petroleum revenues, which arise out of agreements with the pipeline companies, profits of the Exchange Office and receipts in lieu of compulsory military service. Negotiations now under way are expected to result in an increase in petroleum revenues.

Municipal revenues. The municipalities, generally speaking, are allowed to levy taxes within maximum limits specified by central government legislation. Municipal taxes comprise surcharges to national taxes, collected by the central government on behalf of municipalities, and taxes administered entirely by the municipalities themselves. The principal surcharges include those on the schedular income taxes (10% of the national taxes), on the tax on non-agricultural real estate (maximum of 40%) and on the temettu (maximum of 30%). The central government also collects for the benefit of municipalities excises on petroleum consumption (1.5 piasters per liter of fuel oil and 3.5 piasters per liter of gasoline), and a 5% ad valorem tax on imported articles. The latter tax is reduced to 1% on items which are either exempt from import duties or subject to rates not in excess of 1%. Taxes collected by the municipalities themselves include levies on motor vehicles, retailers of alcoholic beverages, places of amusement, the sale and slaughter of animals and public utilities. Cities are also allowed to levy special assessments equal to one-half of the increase in value of property due to the construction of streets and other public works. No details are available regarding the amount of revenue obtained from various sources by the cities. Officials of Damascus and Aleppo, however, estimate that about one-third of the revenue of these cities comes from taxes administered by the central government and about two-thirds from taxes and fees collected by the cities.

General Appraisal

Although Syria's revenue system provides fairly adequately for present functions of government, it needs to be strengthened to meet the demands

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of an expanding economy. The mission believes that the time has come for a re-examination of the system as a whole. 651

The mission's survey has revealed no glaring cases in which it can be shown that the tax system is now seriously interfering with economic development. It is by no means certain, however, that this would continue to be true if rates of existing taxes were appreciably increased and administration tightened.

But, although the present tax system does not interpose major barriers to development, it is open to the criticism that it is not designed to exercise certain desirable influences on economic activity. For example, the absence of a tax on agricultural land makes it easier to hold large blocks of land for speculative purposes than it would be if the land were subject to an annual tax even if the land yielded no current income. In the cities, income from real estate is probably subject in most instances to a lower rate of taxation than income from trade and industry. This tax differential may to some extent reinforce the non-economic preference for investment in real estate rather than in more active enterprises characteristic of most underdeveloped countries. The complete absence of progressive taxes on agricultural income and wealth tends to favor the large landowner over other investors or entrepreneurs who may contribute more to economic development.

Another major consideration in evaluating the tax system is that it appears to be highly regressive in the sense that taxes take a much larger fraction of the incomes of the poor than of the wealthy. This is characteristic of many of the principal excises and import duties, which together account for over two-fifths of total revenue in the 1954 ordinary budget and which come to a large extent from articles of mass consumption. Taxes on agricultural production, livestock and exports, which contributed almost one-fourth of estimated total revenue in 1954, are more difficult to assign to income groups but it seems likely that these taxes are regressive or at best proportional to income for the majority of the agricultural population. To be sure, the fact that neither the production tax nor the export duties applies to articles consumed at home or in the village offers a significant degree of relief to the poorest farmers, provided they grow grain and other crops for local consumption rather than cotton or other commercial crops. This feature, however, is partly offset by the livestock tax, which, being specific in amount and generally applicable, imposes a heavier load

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651 on the owner of low-quality animals than on the owner of the better grades. In the non-agricultural sector, regressivity is to some extent mitigated by the direct taxes on income and non-agricultural real estate but, owing to low rates and ineffective administration, these taxes produce less than one-tenth of total ordinary revenues (1954 budget).

The regressive nature of the Syrian tax system must be considered objectionable in the light of ideals of justice and political principles that have been accepted in many parts of the world. Admittedly, however, there are wide differences of opinion as to the feasibility of dispensing with regressive taxes and concerning the degree to which it is appropriate to impose taxes designed to exact contributions increasing progressively with the taxpayer's income or wealth. An economic objection to steeply progressive taxes is that they are likely to fall with particular severity on savings, because middle and upper income groups account for the greater part of total savings. In a capital-poor country, where productive investment is limited by lack of savings, this consideration is especially important. On the other hand, low taxes on the wealthy allow luxurious consumption and hoarding of gold and foreign exchange, as well as saving for productive investment. Furthermore, regressive taxation is economically harmful if the system presses so heavily on the poor that their consumption is reduced to the point of impairing their health and working efficiency, or if it leaves no margin for a gradual raising of their standard of living. It should also be noted that taxes on non-essential consumption and on net income exhibit more automatic flexibility of yield than do taxes on essentials, and hence claim a larger proportion of national income as production grows, even though tax rates are not altered. The weight to be attached to the various considerations is a matter of judgment on which no general agreement can be expected. The mission is not inclined to urge adoption of rigid standards in this controversial area but it does believe that the regressiveness of the Syrian tax system could be sensibly lessened and even reversed by measures that would interfere little if at all with economic development.

As a final point of general appraisal, informed opinion holds that tax administration in Syria is in many respects ineffective and that tax evasion is widespread. Administration and compliance are especially weak in the case of the schedular income taxes and the inheritance tax. The majority of income tax assessments appears to be made in a rather arbitrary manner on the basis of fragmentary evidence with respect to volume of business,

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living standard of the taxpayer, opinions of others in the business or profession, and other presumed indications of net income. This is unsatisfactory from both the government's and the taxpayer's point of view. The inheritance tax in practice applies mainly to real estate. Even the application of other comparatively simple taxes is hindered by lack of trained personnel and modern procedures and equipment. 651

Suggested Reforms

Administration. The administrative side of the revenue service urgently requires revision. Many of the present defects could be eliminated by wider recruitment and by offering better compensation to revenue officers, while imposing a higher standard of technical competence and personal probity. The adoption of modern office methods, opening the way to prompt and decisive action to collect delinquent taxes, could also have far-reaching effects which would more than justify any small increases in personnel which may be required. Although the attitude of taxpayers cannot be changed overnight, improved administration, together with the strict and impartial punishment of fraud and evasion, can be expected in time to induce voluntary compliance. By these methods considerably more revenue could be collected under the existing tax schedules, with a commensurate increase in equity and without initiating inadvisable experiments with new taxes which the government might be unable to enforce effectively.

Income taxes. With the growth of industry and commerce and improved tax-collecting machinery, income taxes can assume a larger role in the Syrian tax system. Under present conditions, however, it would be unwise to count on a major increase in revenue from such taxes in the near future. The immediate problem is rather to rationalize the structure and improve the administrative procedures. Under the schedular income taxes there are now wide differences in tax liabilities on any given amount of income, depending on the source from which it comes (see Table 9), although the rationale of these differences is frequently obscure.

The mission recommends that Syria follow present world trends by substantially reducing, if not completely eliminating, differences in tax liability based on source of income. This would require—(a) adoption of similar rates and exemptions for the existing schedular taxes; (b) transformation of the tax on non-agricultural real estate into a true schedular

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651 tax on net income; and (c) adoption of a global complementary surtax on large incomes from all sources. It may be considered equitable to tax earned income less heavily than property income. If so, a special credit or reduced rate could be provided for earned income up to a reasonable maximum. A favorable schedule for salaries and wages alone would not be adequate for this purpose since the arguments commonly advanced in

TABLE 9 Comparison of Income Tax Liabilities on Incomes of Selected Amounts from Different Sources[a]

(Tax liability according to source of income[b]) (£S)

Annual[c] net income	Business or profession[d]		Salary or wages[e]		Circulating capital	
	Amount	% of income	Amount	% of income	Amount	%
1,200 . . .	—	—	—	—	72	6
2,500 . . .	31	1	33	1	150	6
5,000 . . .	181	3	133	3	300	6
10,000 . . .	481	5	333	3	600	6
15,000 . . .	931	6	593	4	900	6
20,000 . . .	1,381	7	893	4	1,200	6
50,000 . . .	6,181	12	3,533	7	3,000	6
100,000 . . .	17,431	17	9,533	10	6,000	6
200,000 . . .	44,431	22	21,533	11	12,000	6
500,000 . . .	132,931	27	57,533	12	30,000	6

[a] Not including surcharges for municipalities and schools.
[b] For married man with wife and three dependent children.
[c] After allowing deductions for business expenses and other Syrian taxes.
[d] No account is taken of the provision fixing the income tax liability at one-half of the license tax (temettu) in the case of a business enterprise with gross receipts below £S 25,000 and of a professional man whose gross compensation for services is less than £S 15,000.
[e] Assumed to be received in equal monthly instalments.

support of differentiation apply to income attributable to the personal efforts of business proprietors and professional men as well as to salaries and wages.

Transformation of the tax on non-agricultural real estate would be accomplished by requiring all individual income from taxable real estate to be aggregated in order to determine the applicable tax bracket, having regard to customary personal exemptions. This should be administratively feasible; income from real estate is comparatively easy to detect in view of its association with tangible property and the possibility of using title

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records to verify ownership. A modest beginning has already been made 651 in at least one revenue office in bringing together assessment data for different properties owned by the same person. The tax base should continue to include both receipts from rented property and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied property, but both components should be assessed more frequently than once in 10 years. Ideally, all income should be assessed annually, although this may not be feasible as regards imputed income from owner-occupied real estate. The tax on capital value of vacant urban land should be retained as a separate levy.[14]

It is stated in the Main Report that a global complementary tax applicable to income from all sources is urgently needed to round out the tax system. As long as separate graduated rate schedules apply to income from different sources, a person receiving income from two or more sources will pay less tax than one receiving the same total amount of income from a single source. Even if the rates and exemptions in the various schedules are identical, the person with income from two or more sources will enjoy the benefit of the low first-bracket rates on each type of income and will be subject to a lower top rate than the person who receives all of his income from one source. The global tax should be designed to adapt the income tax more closely to ability to pay and to introduce a greater element of progressivity. It should therefore apply to agricultural income as well as to income subject to schedular income taxes. Initially, this tax should apply only to a small minority of taxpayers. At this stage major reliance would still be placed on graduated schedular taxes, which are easier to administer and more familiar to Syrian taxpayers than a global complementary tax. As administrative efficiency and taxpayer cooperation improve, coverage of the global tax could be broadened. Ultimately, graduation of income tax rates could be accomplished mainly through the global complementary tax, and the schedular taxes would incorporate either a uniform flat rate or only a few brackets. This type of arrangement has been found to be most convenient in many countries.

Application of the same graduated rates to joint stock companies or corporations and to partnerships as well as to sole proprietorships, which

[14] The fee for night watchmen's services (a national revenue) and the surcharge for municipalities might continue to be based on the assessed income or capital value of each parcel of property without allowance for personal exemptions or the application of graduated rates. *In rem* taxes of this nature are levied in many parts of the world to help finance local governments and to pay special costs of property protection.

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651 is now the general rule in Syria, is questionable, because the system makes no allowance for the number of owners of the enterprise. An arrangement more logical than the present practice would be to collect a flat-rate tax on the income of companies and partnerships, to be treated as a withholding tax against the personal tax liabilities of resident shareholders and partners. This arrangement, however, does not appear to be administratively feasible at the present time.

The authorities should prepare and distribute standard income tax forms and every effort should be made to increase the proportion of cases assessed on the basis of systematic records. Steps in this direction might include imposition of a financial penalty on taxpayers who fail to file proper returns[15] and adoption of a policy of setting high presumptive assessments.

Agricultural taxation. The agricultural production tax is by no means an ideal measure, but it is established and yields large amounts of revenue. The tax will probably have to continue for some time as the principal means of taxing agriculture. The desirability of instituting an annual tax on large holdings of agricultural land has already been stressed.

It would not be feasible to subject the mass of small farmers to a schedular income tax and it would be unfair to do so, even if feasible, as long as the agricultural production tax is maintained. But it would be appropriate to apply the global complementary tax to the relatively small number who receive large amounts of income from agriculture and from ownership of agricultural land. It might be desirable, however, in computing the global income tax to allow a deduction or a partial credit for the agricultural production tax. The difficulties of determining net agricultural income of large operators from agriculture, although admittedly great, are probably no greater than those of assessing income tax in many lines of business and the professions. Reliance would probably have to be placed at the outset mainly on indirect evidences of presumed income, such as area and quality of cultivated land, volume of marketed crops, ownership of irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery, and so on. The taxpayer should, however, always be encouraged to furnish adequate accounting records to contest a presumptive assessment.

The mission earlier commented that in view of the fact that the livestock head tax (about 5% of ordinary revenue) is so arbitrary and difficult

[15] An exception to this requirement might appropriately be made for wage earners subject to withholding tax.

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to apply, it seems desirable to abolish it and to subject sales of livestock 651
and wool, hides and skins to the 7% agricultural production tax applied to marketed produce. Milk, butter and cheese might be exempt for social reasons.

Export taxes. The mission believes that at present prices cotton cultivation is still sufficiently profitable to warrant continuation of the existing export tax. We have, however, recommended that the tax should be revised to make its rate responsive to price changes. We are not prepared to formulate a precise schedule of rates, but we do recommend that the principle of the sliding scale be adopted and put into effect at once. Early action is desirable so that cotton growers may make their plans with the assurance that the export tax will be automatically adjusted if prices have fallen by the time the crop is marketed. This revision would introduce a desirable element of flexibility in the tax and would thereby minimize adverse effects on production. In selecting the schedule of rates it would be advisable to bear in mind the revenue needs of the state and to avoid going too far in the direction of flexibility, however desirable that characteristic may be from the point of view of production incentives.

Excises and import duties. Increased taxes on non-essential consumption items should be regarded as one of the principal sources of the additional revenue required to finance an expanded development program. In the absence of an efficient personal income tax, excises and import duties on non-essentials can also help to offset the regressive bias of the tax system.

It has already been stressed that valuations for purposes of ad valorem import duties should be based on the free exchange rate rather than the official rate. Under the present arrangement duties appear to be much higher than they actually are and it is by no means certain that the combination of high nominal rates of duty and artificially low valuations always results in a tax liability which reflects a considered policy. Where the change in valuation method produces a higher effective duty than is desired, nominal rates of duty could be adjusted.

Revenue from state domain. The mission believes that Syria should 651
obtain more revenue from state domain lands. According to figures sup- 427
plied by the Ministry of Agriculture, the government is obtaining £S 1.8 million annually from rental of 551,000 hectares of state land, or approximately £S 3.30 per hectare. We think that rentals should be increased to at least £S 5 per hectare. At current prices of wheat and barley this would equal about 10% of net yield (that is, gross yield less seed). The

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651 increase would add approximately £S 1 million per year to revenues.
427 Existing contracts and administrative problems would doubtless cause some delay in putting this recommendation into effect. Nevertheless, a significant increase in receipts could be obtained over the next few years.

IV PUBLIC DEBT

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Present Situation

The Syrian public debt amounted to £S 312 million at the end of 1953.[18] There is no considered public debt policy. Borrowing is not closely correlated with the government's need for funds, and in the past large amounts have sometimes been borrowed when the Treasury had available to it cash balances far in excess of immediate needs. In addition, no provision is made for regular service or retirement of the debt. The entire internal debt is held at low rates of interest by the BSL and the government has not attempted to develop a market for its securities among private investors. Moreover, the government does not seem to be fully aware that Treasury-guaranteed loans from the Issue Department to government entities and industrial companies are as much a use of the government's credit as direct government borrowing from the Issue Department and that the economic significance of the two types of transaction is the same.

The practice of financing expenditures by borrowing from the Issue Department is always potentially inflationary, but it can be acceptable and helpful when used in moderation and adjusted to economic conditions. It is objectionable if the volume of such financing is not based on a careful appraisal of over-all monetary conditions as well as financial needs of the government. Syria has so far largely escaped the inflationary consequences of resort to the Issue Department mainly because a considerable part of the borrowing in recent years has been offset by increases in cash balances. But borrowing when large cash balances exist is not only unnecessary but dangerous, since there is always the possibility that the various government entities might try to use their balances at a greater rate than the economy could absorb without risking inflation or the depletion of foreign exchange reserves.

[18] See page 261.

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The conscious development of marketable public debt instruments would help stimulate and mobilize private saving in Syria and at the same time establish a channel for future government loans which may be required to finance development projects. Possibilities along these lines will probably be limited for the next few years, but they are sufficiently promising to warrant the necessary effort. The fact that the purchasing power of the Syrian pound has been well maintained in the period since independence should lead to opportunities for borrowing not enjoyed by countries which have been experiencing chronic inflation. This advantage should be maintained and exploited.

Recommendations

The monetary effects of public debt operations are discussed elsewhere in the report.[17] We here summarize our recommendations for improvement of public debt management and for the initiation of a borrowing program designed to tap savings of the public. The main points are as follows:

1. The structure of the outstanding direct and guaranteed debt should be revised, and the debt should be divided into short-term and intermediate maturities, and permanent debt.

2. For the sake of improved budgeting and a clearer understanding of financial operations, direct loans from the Treasury should replace the present practice of government-guaranteed loans to municipalities, independent agencies and industrial companies.

3. Annual provision for payment of interest on the public debt should be made through an appropriation in the regular budget. Budget surpluses and Treasury balances in excess of current needs could be applied to reduction of the principal of the debt. The establishment of a rigid sinking fund is not recommended.

4. Treasury bills should be issued, and the government should require independent agencies to hold surplus funds in them.

5. The possibilities of establishing a wider market for short- and medium-term government securities should be investigated, particularly among banks operating in Syria. Attractive interest rates would have to be offered.

[17] See Main Report, p. 179 et seq.

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652 6. The general public should be encouraged to purchase government securities. Bonds could be issued in small denominations and with varying maturities. It is important that they bear interest at rates approaching yields on alternative uses of capital—say 6%-10%—though to minimize conflict with religious traditions regarding usury the bonds should probably be in discount form. Consideration might be given to a lottery feature as a means of increasing the attractiveness of the securities.

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APPENDIX A Expenditures, Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945-54[a]

(Thousand £S)

Item	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950-51[b]	1951-52[b]	1953	1954
Presidency	291	756	271	241	176	324	391	2,080	429
Council of Ministers									
Presidency of Council of Ministers	873	1,735	2,810	672	645	709	2,248	[illegible]	1,571
Office of Inspection	—	—	—	—	—	—	148	95	128
Disciplinary Council	—	—	—	—	—	73	74	45	56
Directorate of Propaganda & News	—	—	—	—	353	534	254	269	441
Division of "Fatwa" and Religious Instruction	225	223	288	336	338	532	997	410	444
Administrative Council	70	67	73	59	57	70	—	—	—
Legislative bodies									
Chamber of Deputies	1,586	1,479	1,312	1,703	961	2,182	824	499	1,500
Office of Accounts	96	93	120	135	165	261	346	322	400
Supreme Court	—	—	—	—	—	83	58	—	168
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,520	2,518	2,850	2,925	2,486	2,769	4,747	4,097	4,303
Ministry of National Defense	16,444	27,814	20,785	44,839	49,319	102,494	104,587	65,997	73,427
Ministry of Finance									
Ministry proper	3,822	5,013	5,368	5,582	5,466	8,632	10,811	7,765	7,824
Govt. Printing Press and Official Gazette	194	176	205	227	451	462	583	547	748
Public debt[d]	5,329	7,968	6,540	8,028	10,130	16,191	26,265	15,118	20,700
Ministry of the Interior									
Ministry proper	1,992	1,932	1,909	1,836	1,736	2,639	2,509	2,127	2,120
Gendarmerie	11,782	10,670	11,201	12,675	11,608	15,633	16,523	21,339	9,000
Police and public security	3,663	3,564	4,342	5,342	4,381	7,114	8,084	3,882	5,865
Directorate of Tribes	1,170	3,125	2,081	182	161	227	123	107	117
Ministry of Public Health	3,413	2,628	4,220	3,444	3,885	5,291	7,459	6,374	8,764
Ministry of Justice									
Ministry proper	2,739	3,078	3,559	3,753	3,754	5,624	6,205	4,489	4,435
Directorate of Real Estate Registration	1,283	1,303	1,483	1,673	1,535	2,235	2,525	2,737	2,749
Juvenile reformatories	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	238

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APPENDIX A (CONT.) Expenditures, Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945-54[a]

(*Thousand £S*)

Item	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950-51[b]	1951-52[b]	1953	1954
Ministry of National Economy									
Ministry proper	13,111[c]	412	117	1,315	385	804	1,022	726	962
Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs	—	—	—	—	279	323	471	446	565
Ministry of Agriculture									
Ministry proper	2,848	3,561	4,096	3,384	3,086	5,440	5,025	4,208	4,523
Agriculture and veterinary schools	81	145	264	510	585	414	487	894	1,258
Ministry of Public Works									
Ministry proper	14,667	35,718	31,100	16,889	16,429	16,860	16,786	14,500	17,243
PTT	1,507	6,783	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ministry of Education	10,401	11,790	17,797	20,536	22,749	36,224	46,872	35,903	37,097
Total	99,107	112,552	123,232	136,286	141,120	234,144	266,024	196,976	209,075

[a] For 1945, 1946, and 1947, closed accounts; for 1948, 1949 and 1950-51, provisionally closed accounts; for 1951-52 and 1953 preliminary figures available at the General Accounts Section, Department of Budget and Financial Control; for 1954, budget estimates. Items are grouped as they are in the corrected budget of 1954.
[b] Calendar years except for two 18-month periods: January 1, 1950-June 30, 1951; and July 1, 1951-December 31, 1952.
[c] Merged with the Presidency.
[d] Includes pensions, indemnities, subsidies, etc., and in 1954 £S 7,500 thousand to cover exchange differential on petroleum imports at official exchange rate.
[e] Includes losses on distribution of bread at reduced prices as follows: 1948, £S 12,940 thousand.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of additions to reserve fund.
SOURCE: Department of Budget and Control, Ministry of Finance.

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APPENDIX 3 Receipts, Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945-54[a] (Thousand £S)

Item	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950-51[b]	1951-52[b]	1953	1954
Schedular income taxes									
Industrial, commercial, and non-commercial trades and professions	6,374	4,090	3,081	2,948	4,374	6,863	10,172	11,000	9,750
Salaries and wages	1,353	1,339	1,540	1,951	2,264	3,115	4,064	3,235	3,400
Circulating capital	26	76	37	83	70	131	147	157	200
Tax on non-agricultural real estate	2,095	2,170	2,217	2,266	2,621	4,710	6,997	5,626	5,500
Business and professional license tax (temettu)	1,298	1,384	1,434	1,590	1,830	2,921	3,513	2,087	2,975
Miscellaneous direct taxes	2,108	2,259	2,273	1,919	1,149	1,881	3,097	2,837	2,975
Agricultural production tax	9,256	12,983	9,131	12,425	12,901	20,410	34,795	22,336	22,000
Livestock tax	8,441	9,532	7,041	6,428	6,821	6,397	14,877	8,065	9,000
Excise taxes									
Consumption of petroleum products	6,039	7,823	10,256	8,270	11,010	16,500	20,400	14,983	15,000
Sugar	8,985	11,200	6,605	7,857	9,226	14,625	11,044	9,295	8,000
Tobacco monopoly	16,400	14,895	3,814	8,820	13,607	18,147	22,213	19,243	17,000
Other	9,948	13,439	13,437	9,095	4,838	8,214	6,009	19,047	19,750
Customs duties	9,053	25,548	35,834	34,846	41,517	49,634	64,141	41,224	37,832
Registration fees	1,544	2,133	8,841	8,941	9,261	16,756	28,839	24,134	21,000
Proceeds of state property	1,861	1,900	1,620	1,494	1,444	2,696	8,160	6,782	5,000
Industries	3,747	4,638	434	396	293	500	625	711	800
Revenues from public services									
Exchange office	—	—	795	250	100	9,830	8,310	*	4,150
Petroleum revenue	297	305	305	305	1,982	2,451	4,475	12,134	6,500
Other	28,211	6,136	5,362	9,525	10,592	21,825	15,590	10,312	9,501
All other	1,056	922	1,525	1,746	700	1,219	3,993	981	858
Total	118,287	120,732	116,189	116,984	136,097	208,314	271,687	216,651	202,000

[a] For 1945, 1946 and 1947, closed accounts; for 1948 and 1949, provisionally closed accounts; for 1950-51 and 1951-52, and 1953, preliminary figures available at the General Accounts Section, Department of Budget and Financial Control; for 1954, budget estimates.

[b] Calendar years except for two 18-month periods: January 1, 1950-June 30, 1951; and July 1, 1951-December 31, 1952.

[c] Included with "Other revenues from public services."

Source: Figures exclusive of withdrawals from reserve fund and loans from Issue Department.

Source: Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance, and Directorate of National Revenue, Ministry of Finance.

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ANNEX C *NOTES ON AGRICULTURE*

1 POPULATION, REGIONS AND SOILS

Rural Population

162 Syria's agricultural population can be divided into groups differentiated
619 by their social order.

233 *Nomadic tribes.* Bedouin tribespeople form an important unit of the rural population, numbering an estimated 150,000 and living in various stages of settlement from pure pastoral nomadism to almost permanent agricultural communities. Among the larger tribes the Tay and part of the Jubur have become practically sedentary, the Shammar and Shashans remaining nomadic or semi-nomadic. There are also numerous small nomadic tribes roaming the desert between the cultivated belt and the Jordan border. These harvest the scanty desert grass with their flocks of sheep and goats and their herds of camel and a few cattle, and contribute considerably to the country's livestock production. A large part of Syria's meat, wool and dairy products is produced by the Bedouins. Their standards of living and education are quite low.

The increasing exploitation of arable land for crop production during recent decades correspondingly reduced the grazing area and, may, if continued, threaten a considerable reduction in livestock.

162 *Settled villagers.* The nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500
241 compact villages form the most important segment of the agricultural
511 population. They are the true cultivators of the soil whether they own the land or work on it as tenants or laborers. A large number farm entirely for subsistence. Even where there are large community pasture lands, the farms are usually small, frequently too small to give an economic return. Consequently incomes are generally low and many landowners, tenants and sharecroppers are constantly indebted to moneylenders. Although illiteracy among the villagers is on the decrease, education remains at a low standard.

The village people produce most of the crops, raise part of the livestock and supply the country with the bulk of its food and raw materials. Their agricultural activity as a rule is dominated by manual and draft animal

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operation, in striking contrast to large private holdings where the most modern machinery is used. Measures to raise the standard of living of this group must be one of the main objectives of any development program; in the first instance this must be effected through education, improved systems of land tenure, and better credit facilities.

Lessees and landlords. Some city dwellers have interests in agriculture as leasehold operators of tracts of state domain, or as absentee landlords. Although their interests rarely coincide with the demands of sound long-term farming practices, this segment of the population has been instrumental in opening new farm tracts (such as the Jezireh) and in introducing new crops, thereby contributing much to the national economy. The cultivation of the large absentee holdings is generally left to sharecroppers.

Sharecroppers. Each sharecropper is assigned a parcel of land from which, after the apportionment of the crop, he can hope to gain little more than a bare subsistence. In rainfed areas the sharecropper customarily receives rather less than 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor and around 70–75% if he also supplies the working capital; the percentages may be slightly higher in sparsely populated areas, and lower where population pressure is heavier. On irrigated lands the landlord takes 65–75% of the crop if he provides seed and water, and about half if the sharecropper provides the working capital.

In the long run, the position of the sharecropper would be more tolerable if the productivity of the land and his share of it were raised. At present, yearly land assignments may vary, with the result that the cropper has no incentive to improve the land. The restricted area of the assignment and lack of proper equipment, draft animals and money capital contribute to the permanent indebtedness of sharecroppers and their very low standard of living. Measures to improve their lot should include improved tenure status, Agricultural Bank and cooperative assistance in providing working and fixed capital, and resettlement schemes to relieve local land pressure.[1]

Agricultural Regions

In terms of natural conditions and the types of agriculture practiced, Syria can be divided in nine main agricultural regions.

The Hauran and the Djebel Druze. The Hauran and the Djebel Druze includes the mountains of the Djebel Druze and the Julani in the south-

[1] See Chapter 3, Sections III and VI, of the Main Report.

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west corner of Syria. The cultivated soil varies from fertile shallow chestnut in the Djebel Druze to the very fertile deep brown of the plains of Hauran. Part of the shallow, reddish-brown soil extending towards the Anti-Lebanon and the basin of Damascus is uncultivable because of its stony character.

The small to medium-size farm is characteristic of this region. Mules and oxen are the customary draft sources, mechanized agriculture being restricted to the few larger holdings. Wheat and barley are the main winter crops; vetch, lentils and sorghum the summer crops. The acreage under irrigation is insignificant. Although now outstripped by the newly opened Jezireh, the Hauran, famous as a granary in the Greco-Roman period, remains a leading cereal-producing area, and the yields in comparison with other areas are high. Excellent grapes and other fruits are produced in the Djebel Druze, but because of unfavorable market conditions and outlets and the lack of processing facilities and storage, much of each harvest is wasted. In the Julani region, where crop production is uneconomical because of the stony character of the landscape, but where good grazing conditions prevail, double-purpose cattle, for meat and draft, are raised successfully. In this area, land pressure is an urgent problem, especially in the Djebel Druze where many uneconomical small farms hamper progress.

Damascus basin foothills of the Anti-Lebanon. The ample layer of fertile reddish-brown soil of the Damascus basin becomes slightly saline in the Merj and towards the swamps of Lake Ateibe, though under drainage and irrigation these areas would probably be suitable for crops. The bottoms of many of the Anti-Lebanon valleys are covered with more or less deep layers of light brown to dark brown soils of moderate to high fertility, with gravelly alluvium bordering the western foothills. Irrigation water is obtained from the numerous streams, and the basin of Damascus is entirely watered by the Barada river coming from the fertile Zebedani valley. The Barada and many of the small streams offer possibilities of storing winter waters for the future expansion of irrigation.

Numerous orchards and vineyards are found in the Ghouta and in the various valleys, producing considerable quantities of fruits, grapes and nuts. Vegetable, hemp and fodder products, and in recent years cotton and sugar beets,[2] form the main agricultural crops of the Ghouta. Wheat and barley are the traditional regional winter crops and beans and peas the summer ones. As a rule farms are of small to medium size; particularly in the

[2] Sugar beet production in 1955 is expected to be over 30,000 tons.

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Ghouta, dairy farming has been developed. The typical Damascus dairy breed is an excellent milk producer and apparently quite resistant to the heat.

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The basins of Jairout, El Daou and Palmyra. The third region consists of the brown to grey desert soil. Crop and fruit cultivation, possible only under irrigation, is carried out in small depressions and plots along the bordering mountains where deep layers of very fertile soil occur. During the Greco-Roman period and earlier, a great part of these extensive basins, including the oasis of Palmyra, still famous for its fruits, were prominent producing centers. There are indications that moderate quantities of subterranean water exist.

On some of the best terrain, particularly on the watered alluvial soils, the intensive cultivation of sugar beet, cotton and wheat is possible. At Ain el Barde, for example, record yields are now obtained and reseeding of some of the large natural pasture now used by Bedouins appears to be feasible.

The western plains and hills. The gently undulating land northeast and southwest of Aleppo, the plains of Hama and Homs, and the hills east of the Djebel Ansariya may be broadly grouped as a single region. Soil types range widely from the stony and gravelly desert to the terra rossa and chestnut brown. Local productivity varies greatly with soil and rainfall, but taken as a whole this region ranks very high among producing areas.

The main winter crops are wheat and barley; vetch, beans and sorghum are the principal summer crops. Roughly one-third of the country's wheat production and nearly one-half of its barley come from this region. During the last few years, however, sugar beet and cotton have established themselves as cash crops, and in 1953 the region's cotton output accounted for about three-quarters of Syria's total production. Fruit and nuts in substantial quantities are produced in large orchards, sizable vineyards and olive groves in the Homs, Idlib and Aleppo areas. Most of the land holdings are large, cultivated mainly by sharecroppers; small holdings are in the minority and many of these are too small to be economically justified. As a rule, the best land is already cultivated and though large state domains exist, there is very little land available for further crop expansion. Farm machinery is becoming more common, although the area is still cultivated mainly by the *feddan* and other obsolete implements. Dairy farming is practiced around the larger population centers (e.g., Aleppo) but the industry is still in its infancy and pure-bred stock has been imported by only

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241 a few progressive farmers. Mixed farming and pure sheep farming could
438 be successfully pursued in the eastern part of this region, but here, as else-
311 where, the greatest handicap is the land tenure system and unfavorable sharecropper conditions.

The coastal plains of Tartous and Latakia and the foothills of the Djebel Ansariya. Along the Mediterranean seashore up to 80% of the deep light sandy soil lends itself well to tree cultivation, particularly to irrigated citrus cultivation.

In general the region is well suited to highly diversified agriculture; the present system is that of winter cereals and vetch and summer crops such as summer legumes, melons and tobacco. About three-quarters of Syria's tobacco is grown in this agricultural district, Abu Rilsa, Chek el Bint and Tombak being the best known types. The recent cotton boom had its repercussion in this area, particularly as cotton can be grown without irrigation. The region is also well known for its olive groves. Citrus cultivation has gained in importance during the last decade but has only recently begun to receive the governmental attention it deserves.

Manpower is plentiful but land is scarce. The whole region is characterized by small and frequently uneconomic farms of less than 10 hectares. Pressure on the land is particularly evident in the foothills where crops are often farmed on marginal and submarginal land. Manual and animal draft operations are the rule, mechanized farming the exception. Livestock production and dairy farming is insignificant though in many parts of this region they would offer a better yield than does the existing farm system.

The central and northern plains, including the Jezireh. The central and northern plains region follows the line of the "fertile crescent", a strip varying in width from 50 to over 100 kilometers, extending in a semi-circle around the Syrian desert. Shallow reddish-brown type soils prevail, light at the fringe of the sub-desert, deeper, darker and more fertile toward the north. Landholdings are generally large and include great tracts of state domain. The size of individual estates runs from a few hundred hectares in the central plains to several hundred thousand hectares in the Jezireh.

Agriculture is extensive, rather than intensive, and the general manpower shortage has accelerated the introduction of the most modern equipment to cultivate and harvest the region's cereals and small grains. This is particularly true of the Jezireh, which, unlike the central plains, has been only recently opened to organized agriculture, and is now Syria's largest wheat and barley producing area; it accounts for over 40% of total Syrian

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wheat production. While the best soils are practically all in production, large areas of medium quality and marginal land are still available and some of these might be cultivated after an appraisal of their productivity. The recent speculative farming wave is responsible for the neglect of such appraisals and far too much marginal land has been broken up and cultivated. Dry farming in this belt (particularly south, east and west of Hassetche) depends greatly on the amount and distribution of the rains.

Although wheat and barley are the principal crops, mention must be made of the cotton and rice grown in the irrigated Khabour valley. The high cotton prices of recent years encouraged speculative cotton growing with varying degrees of success. Rice cultivation has been rather successful, but as it demands the highest water duty the cultivated area has declined somewhat in favor of cotton.

The northeast corner of the Jezireh. Toward the region of Deirik the brown soils of the steppe give way to chestnut brown, with rich black soil in the extreme corner of Deirik. The well-watered plains and undulating lands are intersected by the Jagh-Jagh, Khabour and Soutane rivers and their numerous tributaries, making possible irrigation over vast areas. Tractor cultivation is developing rapidly in this newly opened area, although in comparison with the western Jezireh and the steppe belt the region is less mechanized and more densely populated.

Practically all crops could be grown even without irrigation but wheat and barley are the leading winter crops and sorghum and sesame the main summer crops. Rice is an old staple but is now giving ground to cotton. In the region of Deirik good grapes, excellent potatoes, tomatoes and other vegetables are successfully grown but inadequate transport and storage facilities make their economical exploitation difficult. Livestock, particularly sheep, has greatly declined, due to the expanded crop area. The land is very well suited to raising cattle and beef. A diversification in land use would result in a more balanced and prosperous economy.

The valleys of the Euphrates and Khabour, and the Ghab depression. Though situated in entirely different regions and consequently showing different physiographical aspects, the large river valleys may be classified together in terms of soil fertility, cultivation methods, land tenure systems, population density and development potential.

In the Euphrates and Khabour valleys, the alluvial soil of deep silt loam has excellent agricultural qualities. The soil in the Ghab marshes, lying astride the Orontes about 40 kilometers east of Latakia, consists mainly of

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241 heavy clay alluvium in the valley proper and terra rossa and some peat soil
458 along the slopes. Whereas drainage is the main problem in the Ghab, the
311 problem in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys is to extend irrigation so as to double the present cultivated area. The farms vary from rather large holdings of absentee landlords, cultivated by sharecroppers, to very small farm units owned and worked by the farmer himself.

Crop rotation followed in the irrigated area of the Ghab generally takes the form of barley, cotton, wheat and cotton, while the rotation in the Euphrates valley is similar to that in dry farming regions: cotton or summer crop, fallow, winter wheat.

Yields are generally higher than in the rainfed regions but full use is not made of the available water and the irrigation methods are backward in many parts. Though better yielding cash crops have been introduced, the farmer as a rule cultivates only the few traditional crops. In these areas agricultural education could do much to further more economic water utilization and wider crop diversification.

The lands in the immediate vicinity of the rivers are fully irrigated but not fully utilized during the entire year. Hundreds of thousands of hectares on the somewhat higher land on both banks of the Euphrates and in the lower Khabour valley form a potential future reserve, though the capital outlay required to bring them under cultivation would probably have to be furnished by the government.

The central plains of the Syrian desert. In the central plains low rainfall and extreme temperatures render agricultural production practically non-existent but the desert is quite important as a natural grazing area (except during the absolutely dry months) for the sheep and camels of nomadic Bedouin tribes. Many parts of the desert, particularly the large depressions, could be better utilized if desert wells were constructed.

134 *Types of Soil*

311 The soils of Syria rank from the world's best to the poorest roughly in the order of (1) alluvial, (2) black, (3) chestnut brown and terra rossa, followed by (4) brown and reddish brown, and (5) grey sub-desert. According to a preliminary survey conducted by an FAO soil specialist the area covered by each of these various types of soil is approximately as follows (in thousand hectares):

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1. alluvial	200
2. black	100
3. chestnut brown and terra rossa	1,500
4. brown and reddish-brown	3,500
5. grey sub-desert	9,000

The remaining 3.7 million hectares is covered by lithasols, eroded rendzina, and saline soils, which for the greater part have no agricultural significance.

Unfortunately, the three best soil types represent no more than about 10% of Syria's total surface area of about 18 million hectares, and it is on these soils only that a wide variety of crops can be grown. Almost all of the brown and reddish-brown soils, covering 20% of the land area, fall in the inner region of the fertile crescent belt where steppe conditions prevail. These soils are most appropriate for the cultivation of cereals and small grains, and are utilized for such purposes in similar regions throughout the world. The grey sub-desert soils (50%) are used primarily for pasture; crop production is possible only under irrigation.

This evaluation serves only as a rough guide to detailed agrogeological soil maps. A more detailed survey of Syrian soils is in progress and it is imperative that it be continued, since soil maps are essential for planning, and, together with data on climate, may be used to determine the types and quantities of crops which may be cultivated to the greatest economic and social advantage. They would also be of the greatest importance for the assessment of taxes on land holdings, should such a tax be instituted.

Soil Fertility and Agricultural Use

Soil fertility and usefulness depend not only on type but also on profile, that is, the layers or horizons (topsoil and subsoils) of soil materials of various colors, on the chemical composition and on the configuration of the terrain and its water supply. 134 242

The depth of profile determines the root rate and the bulk of material available for nutrition, and also indicates the total soil water available—a consideration of importance in view of Syria's semi-arid conditions. Here shallow soils, even the best type, are of limited value only; being more prone to drought than deep ones they are more hazardous as an agricultural base.

Chemical composition of the soil, especially the topsoil, also has an im-

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134 portant bearing on fertility, for soils lacking a balance of the main elements
242 (nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus) or deficient in some of the minor elements (calcium, magnesium, etc.) are worthless for agriculture. Nitrogen, the most essential element in plant growth, is extracted from the soil during the growing period. In Syria, the customary method of restoring nitrogen is to leave the land fallow; for centuries this has been done rather successfully in the Hauran and elsewhere. The period of fallow—one, two or three years or more—depends on the type of crop, and, as far as the soil is concerned, the group, quality, depth and restorative capacity. In addition to the customary fallow, Syrian farmers near populated centers use town refuse to restore soil fertility. Unfortunately cheap manure and compost are generally consumed for fuel, but in recent years the use of commercial fertilizers has increased, particularly for cotton and sugar beet. While the Syrian farmers are aware of the importance of better crop rotation practices, improvement of soils through green manuring and leguminous crops is in its infancy.

During the last two decades huge tracts have been opened up, especially in the Jezireh. This land has been idle for centuries and its reserve of chemical compounds caused by decomposition of the natural vegetation is considerable. Though very good soils do exist, particularly in the northeastern parts, the magnitude of the stored elements has generally been overestimated. The reserves, particularly of nitrogen, are not inexhaustible. The virgin soil of the Jezireh has often been compared with virgin soil types in Russia, the United States and Europe but it must be remembered that in Syria the humus has not been so abundant as in humid climates, so that the nitrogen reserve is very limited. When that reserve falls below a certain level soil productivity decreases rapidly even if other elements are in plenti-
[311] ful supply. In Syria continuous exploitation under a monocultural system has resulted in decreased yields in certain areas, notably the Jezireh, where the danger is not yet fully recognized. Even artificial fertilizers cannot replace organic enrichment and the fallow system in its present form is far from sufficient to maintain fertility. New farm techniques, a changed rotation system and increased use of green manuring and fertilizers are urgent needs.

It is believed that Syrian soils are not generally deficient in phosphorus, important for growth and for the forming of grains and seeds, although chemical analyses indicate the total phosphorus available rather than the amount which can actually be absorbed by the plant. Assimilation depends

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largely on the acidity of the soil, and the p.H.[3] of practically all Syrian soil is between seven and eight. Most of the phosphorus is blocked. Whereas nitrogen and phosphorus deficiencies can be observed in almost all Syrian crops in various stages, very little indication of potassium shortage has been noted.

Besides the three main elements, the tracer elements iron, manganese, zinc, boron, copper and molybdenum are quite significant. A shortage or lack of one or another can result in low yields, even in soils generally classified as very good. The application of tracer elements e.g., the application of zinc and copper to fiber plants, citrus fruits, etc., has shown remarkable yield increases in other parts of the world. Unfortunately, very few studies of soil fertility and plant growth conditions have been conducted in Syria. Those made by Bracken for winter and summer crops and by Ibrahim Boules for cotton have indicated a general shortage of nitrogen, a disputable lack of phosphorus and rather favorable conditions as regards potassium. The excellent studies and surveys conducted by an FAO soil expert during the last few years have not been sufficiently intensive or extensive so far to form the basis of definite conclusions. But the mission is convinced that a thorough soil survey on the lines already begun by these specialists will be of great assistance in increasing the agricultural area and production. The compilation of the information thus gained, together with data on climate and water resources will be of much value in ensuring a sound rational basis for agricultural planning and development. Aerial mapping is a necessary adjunct to ground surveys and the successful coordination of the undertaking will require the development of a cartographic office.

II CEREALS

Wheat and Barley

Syria is fortunate in being able normally to harvest its wheat and barley approximately one month earlier than American and European cereals; consequently they can be brought on to the European market at the time

[3] p.H. values indicate relative acidity or alkalinity. Values run from 0 to 14, 7 indicating neutrality, numbers less than 7 increasing acidity, and numbers greater than 7 increasing alkalinity.

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243 of greatest demand. Climatic conditions favor cultivation of hard and high protein-content wheats, much in demand for blending and for the macaroni industry. Both these factors can greatly influence Syria's wheat export potential.[4] Fostering development of early-maturing and high protein-content wheats should become a main objective of future research, particularly in view of the highly competitive world market in cereals and the rise in home demand created by the population increase.

The experimental and research work in selection and breeding is still in the early stages. Shortages of trained personnel (in 1953 there was only one specialized research agronomist) and lack of organized planning are responsible for the rather poor results thus far. Concentration on a more intensive plant breeding program during the next five years is urgently needed. The staffs of the division of plant breeding and of the experimental division of the Ministry of Agriculture should be increased and additional budget allocations provided. If the recommendations of the mission are carried out, there is no reason why cereals production should not increase by at least 40% by 1960.

Syrian wheat can be divided into two main varieties; soft (*Triticum sativum*) and hard (*Triticum durum*); reliable data on the proportions of each are not available. It is generally assumed that hard wheat varieties are most widespread but as there is no officially controlled seed distribution center, the varieties are often mixed.

The most prominent hard varieties are the Haurani and the imported Senator Capelli (Sicily) and Florence Aurore (Morocco). The Hamari is rather well adapted to various soil types and dry farming practice and is said to be resistant to climatic extremes and to fungus diseases. The Bayyadi variety is tender to semi-hard. Distribution of varieties is shown in Table 1.

In addition to these, the Department of Agriculture, aided by FAO, has introduced a great number of the most promising rust- and disease-resistant wheat varieties and over 60 barley varieties during the last three years. Their adaptability to Syrian climate and soil conditions is now being tested in the regional field stations.

The quantity planted rarely gives the optimum yield. Almost everywhere too much seed (mostly poor quality) is used; amounts vary from 40 kg. per hectare in the grey sub-desert and gravelly soils to over 200 kg. per hectare on irrigated lands. Use of better seeding techniques should result in a saving of at least 25% in the course of the next 10 years. In par-

[4] Wheat and barley exports were worth almost £S 71 million in 1953.

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ticular, wider spacing between rows not only affects yields but permits intercropping (e.g., rows of wheat interplanted with green manure and/or forage crops, and later with cash crops), which may lead to the reclamation of many devitalized soils. This implies a long-term program: row seeding and interplanting must be tried out on a selective basis under the guidance of the agricultural extension service. 243

The mission recommends introduction of a cleaning and grading system to improve the marketability of export wheat, with standardization in at least two types (hard and soft), each with a minimum protein specification.

TABLE 1 Percentage Distribution of Wheat Varieties in Various Districts, 1953

District	Hauranni[a]	Hamari[a]	Bayyadi[b]	Capelli[a]	Florence[a]	Others	Observations
Damascus	40	—	—	40	—	20	Mostly under partial irrigation.
Homs	15	40	25	15	5	—	Partially irrigated.
Hama	5	55	25	15	—	—	Partially irrigated.
Hauran	95	—	—	5	—	—	Dry farming.
Euphrates	—	70	10	10	10	—	Mostly under full irrigation.
Jezireh	—	45	10	15	15	15	Only small areas under irrigation.
Aleppo	—	70	13	10	2	5	Dry farming.
Latakia	—	50	15	10	15	10	Dry farming.
Djebel Druze	—	95	—	5	—	—	Dry farming.

[a] Hard.
[b] Semi-hard.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture.

The use of commercial fertilizers is also recommended, particularly in the Jezireh. Insecticides and fungicides should be tried out on a large scale and the influence of weedicides should be studied at demonstration farms.

Whereas many of the wheat varieties are indigenous, only one of the few barley varieties seems to have originated in Syria, the White Arabian or Syrian. Moderate to early maturing, it is rather adaptable to poor soil. It is used in the manufacture of bread and beer and is the only variety exported. The Black Arabian is preferred for its larger seed and earlier maturity and

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2/13 makes good animal fodder; it is too rough for human consumption. The Prieur, imported to the Damascus Field Station some 15 years ago, and rather well adapted to all soils, has become a high yielder; the hard seed must be ground before being used as animal feed.

Pests and diseases caused quite substantial losses. The most destructive of several sucking insects is the Wheat Shield bug (*Burygaster integriceps*) which is said to cause wheat and barley losses up to 30% in some areas. Planting of early maturing varieties is one of the best means of control, for the insect rarely attacks seed that has begun to harden. Considerable damage can be caused to stored grain by the grain weevil (*Calandra grenaria*). Wheat smuts and wheat rust are responsible for substantial losses, especially in regions with seasons of high temperature and excessive humidity, e.g., Latakia and certain parts of the Jezireh. Remedial measures should include the importation of rust-resistant varieties, the breeding of local resistant varieties and the planting of early maturing strains. Destruction from locust invasions, though still significant in many areas, has been greatly reduced by modern entomological and chemical science and by national and international anti-locust control measures. Windburn and lodging still cause considerable damage. The scale of these losses clearly calls for a careful selection and breeding program.

Recommended Cereals Seed Program

The mission suggests that a seed selection program be carried out as follows:

1st year: Continuation of the selecting and breeding program started some years ago in the experimental station. Comparative tests of foreign and local varieties and selection of those best adapted to each region. Promotion of early-maturing and high protein-content varieties, and selection of disease-resistant strains. Tests of intercropping, and trials of other improved cultural methods and their influence.

2nd year: Purification of superior varieties. Introduction of parental material for hybridization. Seed production. Experimental tests to determine optimum seed quantities for various soils under varying local conditions. Continuation of tests for intercropping.

3rd year: Comparative yield tests of the best local and foreign varieties. Tests of influence of cultural methods. Seed production of the most promis-

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ing types. Release to selected seed producers of promising types tested during at least three years. 249

4th year: Continuation of yield tests. Growing of F. generation hybrids. Retesting of seed released the previous year to seed growers. Seed rejuvenation of older material. Establishment of priority standards.

5th and following years: Comparative yield tests of the best varieties, including hybrids. Evaluation of hybrids.

A committee for seed production composed of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and accredited seed growers should be established to promote a certified seed program. The FAO should be invited to assist this committee. The committee would designate desirable varieties for the various regions, advise on seed imports and designate the standard for certified seed. The Ministry of Agriculture should set up an appropriate organization to certify and distribute seed to accredited traders on a non-profit, non-loss basis, and to grant premiums for the best seed grown. Proper supervision of seed farms through field inspectors will be necessary to safeguard against the admixture of impure or other seed both in the field and in the process of threshing and cleaning.

Following experimental seed testing, the stages would be:

1. Transfer of seed to the extension service for multiplication under its direct supervision and control. Some of the present experimental stations could serve as propagating centers.

2. Allocation of registered seeds among seed-growing districts and seed growers in accordance with their interest in particular strains.

3. Selection by field officers (extension agents) of experienced farmers whose land would serve as demonstration plots for the nucleus seed.

4. Drawing up of contracts by the Ministry of Agriculture with accredited seed growers to harvest the seed and return it at premium rates (establishment of certified seed growers). This seed, having been tested and labelled, would then become certified government stock seed.

III COTTON

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The legislation relating to cotton production is adequate and marked a great step forward. The government should, however, enforce the prohibition against planting in areas where climatic conditions make such planting

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hazardous; apparently many farmers still disregard the legislation and plant in dry-farming areas, frequently with unfortunate results. Effective enforcement requires sufficient enforcement personnel, and, equally important, enough qualified extension agents to convince the farmer that the legislation is to his benefit. Even in other countries well suited to cotton growing, risks have been overcome only through year-long practical education and guidance by field extension agents capable of translating research findings into readily understandable terms.

In addition, the establishment of associations of cotton growers could do much to further the education of their members, help execute the various decrees, and act as liaison between farmers and government. Credits to facilitate seed purchase can be obtained under general rules of the Agricultural Bank. Loans for the acquisition of insecticides (cotton dust) are authorized by law.

The cultivation of cotton has gone a long way by empirical experimentation with native varieties and American and Egyptian strains; annual production is now estimated at over 50,000 tons of cotton fiber and about 100,000 tons of cotton seed or 150,000 tons of seed cotton, worth about £S150 million.[5]

The availability of fertile soil and favorable climatic conditions augurs well for further development of production. With steadily increasing interest on the part of government and private individuals, cotton may well become an even more valuable crop and contribute increasingly to Syria's foreign exchange income. We therefore recommend continuation of serious efforts toward quality and quantity improvement. It is suggested that better hand tools, such as hand drillers, be used, and that technical advice to farmers be extended on an expanded scale.

More specifically, we recommend:

1. *Cultivation.*

a. Seeding. April to May, depending on the weather and region. The seedbed should be thoroughly worked, if done manually, by plowing

[5]Exports of cotton, cotton seed, etc., in 1953, were as follows:

	Tons	Million £S
Raw cotton	53,946	134.703
Cotton waste and lint . .	424	.261
Cotton seed	28,418	5.506
Cotton seed oil	1,223	1.414

SOURCE: Statistical Abstracts.

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two to three times. Seeding of only first class seed; not more than four seeds per hole.

b. Spacing. 25 x 60 cm. or a rate of about 120,000 to 150,000 plants per hectare. This helps early maturity, whereas wide spacing leads to heavier vegetative growth, late maturity and consequent exposure to bollworm.

c. Watering. If irrigated, watering immediately following sowing, repeated every 10-15 days till about 80% of the bolls are formed.

d. Fertilization. Distribution of fertilizers at cost to a selected group of farmers whose farms could serve for demonstration purposes.

2. *Control measures.* The previous year's cotton stalks should be rigorously removed and host plants destroyed. Posters showing the life cycles of the various insects and host plants should be distributed. Plant entomologists should regularly inspect the cotton fields in plague-infested regions in order to direct an effective campaign. Dusting or spraying with more effective, less expensive insecticides or by mechanical equipment on a cooperative basis should be instituted. Progressive farmers should be asked to make large-scale weedicide tests, subject to compensation in case damage is done. Premiums should be introduced for the best cotton growers.

3. *Establishment of a seed propagating station.* At present the government does not have adequate technical staff to direct and operate an effective up-to-date seed propagating station. The mission recommends that existing propagating facilities be greatly expanded, along the following lines:

1st year: Extension of seed propagating efforts under the direction of foreign experts already engaged; training of four Syrian agronomists to continue the seed propagation work in the three typical cotton regions of Aleppo, Jezireh and Euphrates.

2nd year: Continuation of seed propagation and selection of strains best adapted to the various regions; initiation of permanent field experiments; establishment of a demonstration farm in each region to specialize in seed material, insect control and weed control.

3rd year: Continuation of seed propagation with permanent agencies in the three main regions and demonstration farms serving as training centers for extension agents.

4th and 5th years: Establishment of an experimental station for cotton breeding, control of plant diseases and insect and pest control.

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248 4. *Gradual reduction of cotton cultivation in dry-farming areas.* Cotton growing under dry-farming conditions is too hazardous in Syria.

5. *Selection of cotton growing areas and permanent restriction to these regions.*

6. *Rotation plan.* Introduction of rotation without the customary fallow, e.g.:

1st year: cotton, green fodder mixed with barley; or cotton, wheat.

2nd year: maize, sorghum, green manure; or wheat, fodder crops.

3rd year: early peanuts, wheat mixed with leguminous plants or horse-beans; sorghum.

7. *Establishment of cotton grower associations.*

249 IV SUGAR BEET

In 1953-54 the cultivated area, mainly around Homs and Damascus, amounted to 4,200 hectares of irrigated land and about 2,000 hectares of rainfed land, generally divided into small plots of a few hectares and worked manually. The price of £S 60 per ton of beets delivered at the Homs factory makes cultivation very attractive, even to farmers at some distance from the factory and despite high labor costs. Maximum transport cost from producer to factory was, at the time of the mission's visit, £S 9 per ton. Seeds from Holland and Germany were provided without cost by the Sugar and Agricultural Products Company until 1953; since then the farmer has had to meet half of the cost of £S 117 per kg. Some farmers are thus inclined to produce their own seed, although ideally this should be undertaken only by experts.

The mission makes the following recommendations with respect to sugar beet:

1. Expansion of production should be sought mainly in irrigated areas. Careful account should be taken of all planting and climatic conditions since they directly affect sugar content; hot days and cool nights are a favorable influence.

2. The selection and development of an early-maturing type adaptable to Syrian conditions should be considered.

3. Sugar beet growing in rainfed regions with less than 600 mm. rainfall should be transferred to partly or fully irrigated land. It can rely on the abundant late winter and spring rains for partial irrigation.

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4. Mixed farming should be promoted in sugar beet areas. The cash return from sugar beet production is three to six times larger than that from wheat and other crops. Moreover, the leaves from one hectare of sugar beet make an excellent silage fodder, equivalent to about 4.5 tons of good hay. 249

v CROP DIVERSIFICATION

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Practically all temperate and many subtropical crops can be and are grown in Syria. Their distribution, however, is very poor. The mission strongly emphasizes the desirability of a wider diversification to lessen the risks and to ensure a better use of available land and manpower. In nearly all the rainfed zones leguminous fodder crops could be substituted for the customary fallow. These would provide the soil with needed nitrogen, improve its structure and serve as fodder. If livestock were adequately fed for a single season, human food production would probably thereby be increased, indirectly, to a greater extent and sooner than if the land were sown to crops for human consumption. An increase in livestock, particularly in irrigated zones but also in the rainfed area, means fuller employment and higher income for the rural population.

To supplement winter vetch and berseem, the mission suggests the introduction for field trials of the cluster bean (*Cyanopsis sp. sp.*), a grain and forage plant widely cultivated in Sicily; some of the varieties can be grown with sorghum. In addition there is the possibility of goat's rue (*Galega orientalis*), a bushy, erect perennial herb of high nutritive value, and of sulla (*Hedysarum coronarium*), which can be used as green fodder or hay and which ranks with red clover in nutritive value. The latter grows best in deep, rich calcareous soils, but can also be grown in poor soil if it contains lime. Sulla can be sown alone, with cereals, or in mixtures with other legumes; it yields up to 120 tons of green matter per hectare under irrigation, and it may produce from 16-50 tons even on non-irrigated land.[6] Trials to reseed a wild species of alfalfa, reported to grow in the Anti-Lebanon region, should be undertaken in other areas. Cultivated lucerne and alfalfa (*Medicago sp. sp.*) have responded successfully; their more extensive cultivation should be encouraged. Of the 50 or more species the most common is *Medicago sativa* and *M. varia*, of which many strains are

[6] FAO publication, *Legumes in Agriculture*.

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241 311 adapted to drought and to hard winters; they can be grown as either winter or summer crops. The same can be said of the clovers (*Melilotus sp. sp.*) and the fenugreek (*Trigonellis sp.*), good fodder plants which can be mixed with oats or vetches.

Even under an irrigation system the selection of hardy cultural winter crops for Syrian conditions is very restricted and none can replace the winter cereals as cash crops. A greater choice is possible among summer crops, some of which may become quite significant in the future.

Besides the great variety of cow peas (*Vigna sp.*), vetches (*Vicia sp.*), chick peas (*Cicer sp.*), lentils (*Lens sp.*), beans (*Phaseolus sp.*) and peas (*Pisum sp.*), the cultivation of peanuts (*Arachis sp.*) and soya (*Soya max*) is strongly recommended. Both are grown in Syria but current production is negligible, in spite of the fact that these crops are adaptable to both small and large size farming. In the coastal plains, in many parts of the fertile crescent and particularly in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys, there are ideal soils (well drained, fertile sandy loams) and favorable conditions of climate (good rainfall or irrigation possibilities during the growing and seed setting periods, combined with hot weather during the time of seed ripening) for their cultivation. Preferably, the multi-purpose peanut should be grown in rotation with maize, sorghum or hemp. Areas in Syria where peanuts could be grown successfully must run into tens of thousands of hectares.

An even wider range could be found for soya, which could be cultivated for human consumption, concentrates for farm animals, oil and for the manufacture of many other valuable materials (e.g., plastics). The soya plant also makes good hay, silage or pasture. Its increased production would be of great value to Syria, for its flour, when mixed with wheat flour, would improve the national diet. Soya thrives best in somewhat moist loose soil, but is also rather drought-resistant. Numerous varieties and strains exist, adapted to different growing conditions and early maturing from 60 days on.

A departure from the traditional farming system and a shift to greater diversification and mixed farming will take time and can be achieved only through demonstration and education. No radical change can be expected in the next year or two; intercropping of the cereals with leguminous plants would be a good start. Distribution of free seed and some financial help to the owners or sharecroppers of small farms selected for demonstrations could undoubtedly accelerate the recommended changes.

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VI IRRIGATION TECHNIQUES

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Even when the irrigation program gains momentum, water will remain one of the principal limitations on agricultural expansion. Optimum water utilization requires making the most of available supplies and avoiding waste, as well as limiting cultivation in irrigated areas to those crops which need irrigation.

The Use of Water

At present, farming techniques are such that in many areas large quantities of water are wasted, particularly by surface evaporation,[7] and only rarely is the water evenly distributed over the land. Development of the best irrigation techniques (such as furrow irrigation) for the soils of the various regions clearly requires the establishment of research and demonstration sections in the agricultural stations existing or recommended for the various localities, for the farmers will rarely adopt new methods unless they can see the benefits at first hand.

Crop Restriction

Since the quantity of water is limited, it is equally important that irrigated fields be reserved for those crops which will derive most benefit. Conversely, crops such as cotton and rice, whose cultivation is hazardous under dry-farming conditions, should as far as possible be grown only on irrigated areas; sugar beet also requires irrigation in areas where the rainfall is less than 600 mm. A licensing system already exists with regard to cotton cultivation and it is important that it be enforced. In the long run, however, the farmer himself should be able to assess the profitability of crops grown under various conditions. The demonstration stations mentioned above should therefore be equipped to show how different quantities of water affect a variety of crops. To assure year-round utilization of land in irrigated areas (as elsewhere) farmers must also be educated in the use of soil-replenishing crops which will at the same time profitably replace fallow.

[7] Conversely, many farmers do not know how to drain their land when there is too much water.

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VII PASTURE RESEEDING

In the Main Report we specifically recommended the reseeding of the Resafe and Palmyra desert basins where the soil is fertile, the rainfall generally higher than in other desert regions, and the possibilities of storing some of the water and distributing it evenly by means of diversion dams better than elsewhere. In parts of Australia, Morocco, Algeria and South Africa, where climatic conditions are similar to those in the Syrian desert, introduction of the following herbs and grasses has shown good results: salt bushes (*Atriplex semibaccata; Atriplex vesicatum*); blue bushes (*Kochia sp.*); crow foot (*Erodium sp.*); buffalo grass (*Cenchrus ciliaris*); veldt grass (*Ehrharta calycina*); *Lotus maroccanus;* and *Dactylis glomerata,* var. *Hispanica.* These perennials, more or less winter-hardy and drought-resistant, plus the existing flora, would probably make excellent sheep and goat pasture in Syria. The group of FAO experts which has been conducting experiments with respect to improved grazing conditions might help the Ministry of Agriculture to develop a successful program.

Since conditions in Iraq and Jordan are similar it would be advantageous if these countries were to participate in the program.

VIII LIVESTOCK

Livestock Center

We understand that a site for a center near Damascus has already been selected. We urge that stables and shelter, which would be designed to serve as models, should not be so elaborate as to be beyond the reach of the average farmer. We suggest that the main center have three separate divisions for sheep and goats, cattle, and poultry respectively, and that the two principal tasks of the staff should be to initiate a breeding program and to train Syrians in this work.

In the Sheep and Goat Division the sheep breeding program might be conducted along the following lines:

1st year: Assembling a station flock of the best indigenous type; purchase of 200-300 native ewes; and importation of a nucleus of pure-bred flocks—Merino from South Africa, Merino-Fleisch from Germany or

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Turkey, and, if possible, Karakul. For a start there should be three rams, 232 plus at least 12-15 in-lamb ewes of each breed (preferably from the same breeder). The indigenous ewes would be inseminated with semen from the imported stud rams.

The flock of indigenous ewes is to be sent on migration under usual conditions. Careful periodic observations must be made for the purpose of recording such data as birth weights and growth rate of lambs; quality and quantity of wool produced by this and successive crosses; mortality among lambs; resistance to parasites; tolerance of environment as represented mainly by nutritional plane and climate; and general adaptability.

2nd year: The F_1 generation will grow to 12 months. All data concerning this generation must be recorded.

Two of the assistant staff might be sent on post-graduate fellowships abroad, and two recent graduates be added to the staff.

3rd year: Insemination of females of the F_1 generation with semen from stud rams. Observation and recording of the characteristics of the F_1 generation, further recruited by lambing.

4th year: Observations on maturation of the F_2 generation. Recording F_1 and F_2. Establishment of a stud book. Establishment of the sub-stations recommended in the Main Report. Formation of flocks for similar purposes in Palmyra and Deir ez Zor, largely by transfer of surplus animals from the Damascus station.

5th year: Insemination of F_2 and F_1. At the end of this year there should be sufficient indication as to the suitability of the chosen breeds, and it should be possible to extend cross-breeding facilities to selected local flocks through the agency of insemination stations.

6th year: During this year, the F_3 generation will come to maturity. Sufficient data will be available to permit a final comparison of the suitability of the different breeds to Syrian conditions. It should then be possible to decide whether to continue topcrossing to produce virtually pure-bred stock, or whether the objective should be an intermediate type of perhaps three-quarters imported blood.

During the five-year program, the main station should also establish a good flock of the Damascus type of milk goat, and fully record all data. The aim should be to fix desirable characteristics for breed. In general, experimentation and research should be on lines similar to those applied to sheep.

In the Cattle Division the program would be:

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232 *1st year:* Assembling two herds, one of Damascus and one of Julani, by purchase of selected cows, giving preference in the case of the Damascus breed to cattle families known to the breeders as throwing a high proportion of good-yielding cows. Experience suggests that it is from animals of this type, rather than from the occasional freak with an exceptionally high yield, that improvement of indigenous types is most readily effected. The selected herd of Damascus cows should be fed for milk production, and the herd of Julani cattle for meat and draft purposes. Full herd-book and production records should be kept, and the data derived should form the basis for the establishment of Damascus and Julani herd-books within a few years.

Importation of a herd (three bulls and 12 in-calf heifers) of foreign breed; Brown Swiss might best serve the triple purpose of milk, meat and draft. The aim must be to maintain four herds at the main center—a pure-bred Damascus herd, a pure-bred Julani herd, a pure-bred Brown Swiss herd and a grade herd.

From the start fodder should be grown on an adequate scale and fodder production should be regarded as of major importance. Every advantage should be taken of silage and of new or improved crops. Great emphasis should be laid on the provision and preservation of feed during the winter. Concentrates that may become available from local industrial enterprises, e.g., dried sugar beet pulp, oil cakes, etc., should be utilized and their nutrient value evaluated.

2nd year: Recording of milk production. Recording F_1 generation: weight; growth; hemoglobin; blood minerals; adaptibility to environment. Continuation of trials of feeding methods.

3rd year: Continuation of herd records and experiments with fodder plants and feeding. Establishment of a stud-book. Establishment of Breed Association for Damascus cattle. By this year it would be possible to start experimental artificial insemination of local farmers' cattle with selected or imported bulls. More attention should be paid at such schools as the Kharabo Agricultural School and the Damascus Veterinary School to instruction in artificial breeding techniques.

4th and 5th years: Continuation of the development of the selected indigenous and imported herds. There will now be an F_2 generation of the grade herds and all three herds should be well established.

The program should be continued until sufficient data on production, adaptability and feed requirements have been collected to make possible

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a reliable comparative evaluation of the different herds under Syrian conditions. 232

The Poultry Division should import high-producing breeds, e.g., Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Leghorn and Plymouth Rock. Accepted modern practices of elimination, selection and feeding should be followed and quality should be maintained by regular culling and full recording. Failure to maintain the original quality by the two latter methods is the principal defect in many flocks maintained by institutes in countries of the Middle East and Far East, and is usually associated with heavy wastage from preventable disease.

The aim should be to establish a hardy type of dual-purpose bird—for eggs and meat—of special value to the small farmer. Experimental work should be done on control of parasites and construction of cheap but hygienic poultry houses of locally available materials. The land and feed requirements of the poultry unit should receive every consideration when the fodder crops program is being planned, and full use should be made of such by-products as oil cake.

During the second year selected cockerels of high-producing breeds could be distributed to the villagers to improve local strains. These should first be immunized against Newcastle disease and a service should be organized to encourage mass immunization throughout the country.

A few graduates of Kharabo and the Damascus Veterinary School might be encouraged to specialize in poultry improvement and at least two fellowships might be awarded for practical work overseas. Once the main flocks are well established at the central station, similar projects might be developed at additional sub-stations distributed throughout the country. These centers should specialize in establishing the best type for the various regions.

We estimate necessary capital outlay for this program at £S 380,000 and ultimate annual operating cost at about £S 240,000.

Veterinary Service

The headquarters of the Government Veterinary Service is in Damascus where, as the Department of Animal Resources, it forms part of the Ministry of Agriculture. There is a government veterinary laboratory in Damascus, mainly occupied with diagnosis of disease and preparation of biological products, i.e., vaccines and sera. A certain amount of modern

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232 equipment, including centrifugal freeze-drying plant, has been provided in recent years by FAO, which has also assigned specialist personnel to undertake diagnosis to prepare vaccines and sera and to instruct Syrian personnel in this work.

At present the Syrian staff of the laboratory consists of one fully qualified veterinarian (trained in France and Germany) as Director, and four Syrian veterinary assistants trained in the Damascus Veterinary Technical School. One of the assistants has recently been awarded a fellowship (FAO) for training in dairying and is at present in Denmark. Another will be taking up a year's fellowship in July 1955 to study the practical production of veterinary biologics in Denmark and Sweden.

The laboratory is basically well enough equipped to prepare any type of vaccine, and in particular prepares such modern living virus vaccines as those of Newcastle disease, fowl pox and sheep pox. Vaccines of this type are freeze-dried to improve their keeping qualities and to enable them to be standardized by tests and titrations.

In addition to supplying Syria with all the vaccines it requires, the laboratory during the last twelve months has supplied large quantities of anthrax, black quarter, fowl pox, sheep pox, goat pox and Newcastle vaccines to Lebanon and Jordan. In fact the consumption by Jordan and Lebanon of Newcastle vaccine in particular has been considerably greater during this period than that of Syria. This emphasizes the recommendation in the Main Report that transport and all the necessary facilities for performing mass immunizations should at once be made available to the veterinary service.

It is essential to any plans for the improvement of livestock that efficient veterinary services should be available both to the Bedouin stockowners and to the settled farming community, and that the confidence of the stockowners in such services should be built up to the point where they will rely on skilled assistance from the service to help them to meet the day-to-day problems of caring for animals of improved types.

An inventory of modern equipment suitable for district veterinary stations should be prepared and orders should be placed as soon as possible.

It is recommended that meetings of the professional staff be held regularly and that the first of these meetings give consideration to a mass immunization campaign against Newcastle disease. Such a campaign would save the lives of hundreds of thousands of birds during the first year and

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would enable poultry to make a substantial contribution to family incomes in the villages. 232

Very recently the Bedouin shepherds have apparently acquired confidence in the sheep pox vaccine, and the mission was informed that demands for vaccination in 1954 far outstripped the capacity of the field services. Sheep pox is a disease which annually causes considerable losses, but for which an efficient vaccine is available. It would seem incumbent on the government to insure that the service has the facilities for applying vaccination to the flocks.

It is recommended that with the assistance of the district veterinary staff the laboratory carry on seasonal surveys of blood mineral levels of sheep and cattle, and helminth burdens. Young veterinary assistants or science graduates should be trained to collect the blood samples in the one case and the parasitic worms in the other. The blood mineral determination and the determination of parasitic worms would be made at the laboratory. Therapeutic and control measures based upon these findings should be applied by the district veterinary staff in consultation with the laboratory. Some strengthening of laboratory staff at the veterinary assistant level will be required if systematic studies of this nature are to be undertaken.

The increasing incidence of brucellosis and tuberculosis in dairy cattle in the suburban areas to which reference has been made in the Main Report calls for investigation by biological tests and the application of control measures. The introduction or development of more productive types of livestock inevitably brings more problems for the veterinary service; unless the service can cope with these problems and meet increased demands for assistance the improved types of stock will not survive.

Artificial breeding methods, which are likely to be employed on an increasing scale as livestock farming methods advance, should be completely controlled by the service. The method can be as efficient in spreading certain diseases as it is in distributing the sperm of superior sires; the fullest possible measure of veterinary control must be exercised to guard against this danger.

The control of abattoirs and meat inspection is performed by veterinarians and veterinary assistants in the employ of the municipal authorities of such cities as Damascus and Aleppo. The municipal abattoir of Damascus is about 130 years old and is now almost enclosed by the town. It is 232 744

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221 desirable that a modern abattoir be built in a more suitable location; the 714 present problem of drainage disposal would alone warrant this measure. There should be no difficulty about the provision of capital for such a project, since the municipal authority can recoup its expenditures by the collection of fees.

222. The present budget of £S 188,000[8] for personnel and equipment bears no relation to the value of Syrian livestock or to preventable losses. For more effective disease control the mission has recommended that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available during the next six years.

242 IX EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND EXTENSION
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Education

Elementary agricultural education. Since 1949 the rural elementary schools have devoted the two final years (fourth and fifth grades) to theoretical and practical instruction in agriculture and hygiene. At present 111 offering this type of instruction, each with a field of five *donums*[9] for practical field training, are distributed through *mohafazats* as follows:

Damascus	37	Dera'a	13
Aleppo	9	Soueida	11
Latakia	11	Deir ez Zor	9
Hama	5	Hasetche	5
Homs	11		

The pupils (9,000 in 1954) learn the basic principles and techniques of agriculture, practicing them in the school gardens.

Clearly this number of schools cannot provide basic rural education for all the children of Syria's 5,500 villages. Apart from the need to build more schools and enlarge existing ones, a way must be found to train additional agricultural teachers; the teacher training and secondary agricultural schools in Dera'a and Kharabo do not turn out sufficient numbers.

The mission therefore makes the following recommendations:

[8] £S 50,000 for laborers at the Damascus veterinary research center and in the provinces; £S 40,000 for purchase of animals and feed; £S 98,000 for technical requirements (£S 20,000 for the Damascus laboratory; £S 58,000 for the preparation of vaccines and biologics material; and £S 20,000 for medicines in respect of the treatment of parasitical diseases).

[9] A donum = 0.1 hectare.

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1. A number of village school teachers should be given an intensive one-year course in agriculture. 242 871

2. Agricultural courses could be profitably substituted for some of the less essential subjects in the rural curricula, as teachers become available.

3. Night classes in agricultural education should be established in the rural elementary schools.

4. Rural elementary school pupils should be encouraged to organize societies to continue their activities outside school and school gardens.

5. Forest farm crops should be included in school gardens, and tree planting should be encouraged on national holidays. Each pupil could be responsible for a tree planted during his school training.

Secondary agricultural education. There is one agricultural vocational school in each of the provinces of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Latakia and Euphrates but of these four are intermediate schools and only the one at Kharabo (near Damascus) can be classified as a fully-rated secondary school. About 500 students are enrolled in all five schools. Some of the graduates subsequently engage in farming; the great majority apparently become government employees in the agricultural or in other services. 874 242

In the future these schools will be called upon to meet the growing personnel requirements of the government's agricultural, livestock, veterinary and forestry services. At Kharabo particularly, future technicians should be trained to assist in research and extension work. The present four-year curriculum includes all the elements necessary for a general understanding of today's agriculture and its future development, but students should be given an opportunity to specialize, at least during the third and fourth years, in such subjects as rural credit, crop production, livestock and animal husbandry, mechanization and techniques of industrial utilization of agricultural products, e.g., dairy products, fruit preservation, vegetable and meat marketing, tobacco curing, vegetable oil production, meat processing and curing, and the tanning of skins and hides. Better still, two or even three years of training should be added to give the students three or four years of specialization and bring them ultimately to the junior college level.

In the mission's opinion, the curricula of all agricultural schools emphasize theoretical studies too much and practical training too little. Effective farm managers and extension agents must be willing and able to demonstrate with their hands what should be done on the farm. To obtain the respect of the peasants they must be willing to get their hands dirty

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874 and able to do the practical work on the farm themselves. We suggest
242 therefore that the present curricula be reviewed by a committee consisting of representatives of the Ministry and agriculturists, with the object of putting greater stress on manual training and on practical problems.

There is need for a vocational agricultural school in the Djebel Druze and the Hauran. For the time being this need could be met by broadening the curriculum of the Dera'a school, including special courses in agriculture. Stress should be laid on horticulture and fruit processing. In addition, at least one other school, preferably at Aleppo, should be raised to the same standards as Kharabo.

Elsewhere we have recommended that the curriculum include a mechanical training course.

We have also recommended the establishment of a secondary agricultural vocational school in Kamichliye. It should be located on soil most typical of the region and should have grounds adequate for experimental and demonstration plots, including an irrigation area. This school should become the headquarters for all agricultural education and extension work in the Jezireh; its curriculum should include courses on farming systems and the economics of mechanized agriculture. The third and fourth year curriculum should permit a choice between a technical course of study oriented towards machinery, repairs and maintenance, and an administrative course of study emphasizing economics and administration. We would expect enrollment to be 100-150 from 1957 on.

873 *Adult education.* Farmers should have an opportunity for formal in-
242 struction in the principles of good farm management and animal husbandry. Elsewhere we have suggested a pilot fundamental education program which would, among other things, include agriculture in its scope. Quite apart from this we believe that the rural elementary schools which provide instruction in agriculture should offer evening courses in which, with the help of proper visual aids, farmers could learn about improved crop rotation, better cultivation and weed control, means of identifying and combating pests and diseases and the like. Mobile trailers equipped with slide and moving picture projectors might be useful. In addition, we suggest raising the standards of mechanical farming by starting special courses at Kamichliye and probably at Aleppo for machinery owners, operators and mechanics. The first would be taught how to select proper farm machinery, supervise its operation and would learn the economics of mechanical farming. The second would be given practical training in opera-

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tion, maintenance and elementary repair of machinery. These courses could be organized with the help of an FAO expert and in cooperation with farm machinery dealers. They might be given under the aegis of the agricultural school at Aleppo and the proposed school at Kamichliye.

Certificates of competence should be awarded after suitable tests; if employers were to increase the pay of holders of such certificates, this might provide an incentive to workers to take such courses.

University level. Syria has no agricultural college or faculty; all the top staff of the Ministry of Agriculture have been trained abroad. The government and the Ministry send students to Egypt, Europe and the United States; the FAO and other organizations grant fellowships to Syrians. In 1953, 58 agricultural students were studying abroad in various fields—37 in Egypt, 11 in France and 10 in the United States.

Syria will be in great need of agronomists, agriculturists and veterinarians in the coming years. For the time being the total of fellowships should be increased to permit foreign study by 15-20 more students each year. The curriculum of the secondary school should also be expanded, as indicated above, to include one or two years of special work, for immediate and pressing needs.

Research

Syria had 18 experimental stations in 1954. They are well dispersed throughout the provinces and have reasonably good facilities and adequate grounds. Eight of the stations, in the provinces of Damascus, Hauran, Homs, Hama, Euphrates and the Jezireh, are engaged mainly in cereal and field crop research; the rest in horticultural work. Unfortunately, the stations work more or less independently of each other and this lack of coordination, coupled with staff and budgetary deficiencies, greatly impairs their effectiveness.

Despite the government's commendable efforts to offer Syrian personnel courses of study abroad, well-trained agronomists, horticulturists, agricultural engineers, zoological technicians and veterinarians will be lacking for some years to come. This suggests the advisability of limiting the extent of experimentation in the 18 understaffed stations.

Coordinated and central programming for future research is essential; this should be the task of one station, which may become the nucleus of a future Central Research Station. For the time being, we suggest that

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activities be allocated among five departments which might later be incorporated into such a central station: soil; farm crop and horticulture; plant pathology and entomology; agricultural engineering; and rural economics. It has already been indicated that there should be a separate livestock center.

The embryo Central Research Station should assemble and evaluate research work already done in such fields as cereals and cotton; it should engage in intensive rather than extensive research. Existing stations should undertake seed selection and propagation. In the course of time some of these stations might become sub-stations of the C.R.S. with responsibility for carrying out the experimental and demonstration programs to be planned each year by the C.R.S. But this stage cannot be reached until the sub-stations are adequately staffed with competent research and field personnel.

The mission recommends consideration of:

1. the establishment of a Central Research Station, preferably in the Damascus area, with ample experimental grounds for future expansion;

2. the recruiting of foreign experts (with the help of interested international institutions) to head the proposed departments;

3. provision for training abroad of future Syrian staff; and

4. a decision on priorities for the building program in connection with the experimental program.

Extension Service

Annex E refers to the inadequacy of the present extension service in furnishing guidance to the farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture has provided technical information in the form of pamphlets and films and has also arranged training courses for guidance officers, especially in cotton cultivation and the control of pests and diseases. In this regard more can be done and the mission strongly recommends that short training courses, of the kind recommended earlier, should be offered to farmers. The distribution of more posters, particularly relating to livestock, designed to be understood even by those who cannot read, should be encouraged. Extension officers could also be instrumental in furthering the adult education program mentioned above. More guidance could be given by private organizations, such as the Chamber of Agriculture already set up in each mohafazat, and farmers' cooperatives could be instrumental in providing

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 Crop Areas, 1943–53

(*Hectares*)

Kind of crops	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Wheat	503,622	570,725	751,139	810,485	843,472	788,808	987,856	992,240	1,036,693	1,167,150	1,314,422
Barley	242,564	272,650	384,128	370,799	365,040	341,626	347,910	416,445	343,556	396,621	428,010
Lentils	49,558	43,885	46,151	42,593	49,604	46,184	51,407	59,194	65,744	66,216	70,909
Maize	13,790	12,314	23,882	23,665	22,070	33,092	25,863	24,812	16,041	19,246	18,115
Sorghum	78,305	64,075	107,086	94,964	104,012	90,490	92,905	94,042	71,418	106,114	96,456
Rice	1,800	2,086	6,971	7,609	8,165	7,487	7,636	9,350	531	2,818	5,339
Cotton	15,240	16,695	17,525	19,837	19,335	23,998	25,296	77,961	217,352	189,271	127,558
Olives	48,408	59,072	75,701	78,107	79,367	78,571	79,624	80,695	79,911	82,471	85,641
Sugar beet	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	221	2,624	4,264
Total	953,287	1,041,502	1,412,583	1,448,059	1,491,065	1,410,256	1,618,497	1,754,739	1,831,467	2,032,531	2,150,714

SOURCE: Statistical Abstracts.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 2 Crop Production, 1943–53

(Tons)

Kind of crops	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Wheat	525,619	438,767	415,143	577,874	403,826	656,729	909,322	830,025	509,642	900,000	870,000
Barley	314,982	250,268	247,568	284,184	168,813	305,147	357,467	322,012	154,701	466,924	472,457
Lentils	35,310	23,843	27,577	19,453	39,227	33,105	54,807	26,551	30,231	50,597	62,814
Maize	28,540	17,615	23,835	27,516	28,582	37,646	39,102	35,684	21,824	22,555	22,430
Sorghum	91,370	42,315	85,731	58,866	67,586	63,392	57,290	75,725	24,171	106,114	123,692
Rice	3,650	9,767	14,506	12,000	21,569	19,099	20,031	18,005	927	5,779	16,176
Cotton fiber	3,087	3,008	4,342	4,784	5,444	9,110	13,523	35,495	62,924	58,074	46,984
Olives	72,717	11,156	158,940	45,499	80,215	102,998	91,365	18,636	90,547	32,726	48,902
Olive oil	23,107	2,026	16,791	6,242	11,116	10,252	14,436	3,580	8,516	7,241	11,071
Sugar beet	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,715	55,320	49,572
Total	1,098,382	798,765	994,433	1,036,418	826,378	1,237,478	1,557,143	1,365,713	906,198	1,705,330	1,724,098

SOURCE: Statistical Abstracts.

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and financing facilities for the presentation of pertinent information to farmers, and in organizing agricultural exhibitions. 242 654

The Chambers of Agriculture could also participate in regional programs for agricultural guidance, improvement of the care and breeding of sheep, goats and cattle, etc., and promotion of the various cottage industries. Close cooperation with the guidance department of the Ministry of Agriculture would make possible a national program to improve agricultural conditions, establish youth organizations, and stimulate growers' associations for cereals, cotton, sugar beet, tobacco, olive, fruits and other crops.

APPENDIX

TABLE 3 Nurseries and Research Stations

	Specialty	Approximate area (hectares)	Province
Damascus	horticulture	25	Damascus
Ezraa	field crops	200	Hauran
Tell Chehab	horticulture	20	Hauran
Soueida	horticulture	25	Soueida
Homs	horticulture and field crops	45	Homs
Hama	horticulture and field crops	40	Hama
Aleppo	horticulture cotton breeding	40	Aleppo
Latakia	horticulture	30	Latakia
Sin	citrus	48	Latakia
Tartous	horticulture	20	Latakia
Harem	horticulture	20	Aleppo
Madrah	horticulture olives pistachios	20	Aleppo
Deir ez Zor	mixed	27	Euphrates
Hassetche	mixed	100	Jezireh

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APPENDIX

TABLE 4 Agricultural Machines, 1953

District	Tractors	Fertilizer spreaders	Harvesters		Combines		Threshers		Insecticide sprayers		Dusters	
			Animal-drawn	Tractor-drawn	Self-propelled	Tractor-drawn	Manual	Mechanical	Manual	Mechanical	Manual	Mechanical
Damascus	63	1	5	0	3	1	897	3	91	10	98	—
Homs	65	0	0	0	1	4	15	0	70	1	200	12
Hama	65*	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	1,500	22	265	—
Dera'a	26	5	0	1	0	2	12,003	0	10	1	210	—
Deir ez Zor	166	0	0	20	4	74	0	0	70	—	—	—
Hassetche	540	0	20	72	420	0	—	0	22	40	0	—
Aleppo	352	0	0	10	49	10	2,002	0	21	5	92	10
Latakia	53	0	2	0	0	4	21,000	0	51	5	91	6
Soueida	1	0	0	0	0	0	100	1	200	0	200	—
Total	1,331	6	27	105	482	95	36,017	4	2,035	84	1,156	28

* Estimate.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and other sources.

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ANNEX D *NOTES ON IRRIGATION*

1 THE GHAB PROJECT

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The Ghab valley, part of the Orontes river valley, is about 50 kilometers long from south to north and about 10 kilometers wide. There is in the valley a marshy area of about 35,000 hectares, which cannot be cultivated at present, although it consists mostly of good alluvial soil. If drained and irrigated the reclaimed land would probably be suitable for rice, cotton, sugar beet and pulses as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter vetch or clover during the winter. It has the great advantage of being near both the important domestic market of Aleppo and the port of Latakia, permitting ready export of products in excess of local needs.

The marsh would be drained by excavation of a basaltic sill at Kfeir that now prevents the out-flow of water, and by construction of a system of drainage canals. Included in the area to be developed for agricultural use is the Acharneh plain just upstream from the Ghab valley in a bend of the Orontes. The Orontes river is now unable to drain the plain because its bed has been raised by silting. An extensive network of irrigation canals would be constructed for the irrigation of the plain and the valley. Including the reclaimed land, the total irrigated area would be about 65,000 hectares. A reservoir with a storage capacity of about 68 million cubic meters would be constructed behind a dam near Halfaya to control the Orontes flood, and a second dam located near Rastane would provide a reservoir of about 180-265 million cubic meters for irrigation purposes. About 20,000 KW of electric power would eventually be developed in hydroelectric plants at Rastane, Maharda and Jisr ech Choghour. The last two plants, however, could be operated only during the off-season for irrigation.

Of the 65,000 hectares, 43,000 have not previously been irrigated and of these 29,000 hectares are government-owned. The project would further provide for the settlement of a large number of farmers in the latter area.

It is anticipated that completion of the entire project will require about 10 years, proceeding in overlapping stages as follows: (a) drainage of the Orontes valley; (b) the Halfaya flood control dam; (c) a part of the road system; (d) a soil improvement program; (e) about 75% of the irrigation

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network. If an early start is made on (a), (b) and (c), then the soil improvement program and irrigation network might be initiated in 1956 and 1957 respectively.

The later work, mainly in the Acharneh plain, will be done after 1960. It will include drainage of the plain, construction of the Halfaya tunnels, completion of the road system, construction of the irrigation network of the Acharneh plain and Bastane dam, and the relocation of the Amir Ghajar hydro plant. The entire project could be completed by the end of 1963.

In the Ghab area, 41,680 hectares will be irrigated by a system of three main canals, one on each bank of the Orontes, branching from an intake to be constructed near Acharneh, and a third, made from the present bed of the Orontes, originating five kilometers downstream near Ammourine from an intake built in the new Orontes. This will irrigate the lands between the river and the two other main canals. The total area brought under irrigation in the Ghab, taking into account the 13,600 hectares now under partial irrigation, will not exceed 28,000 hectares until about 1963. If temporary limitations on summer irrigation are to be avoided, the work will have to proceed according to a closely coordinated schedule.

Cost

The preliminary cost estimate made in 1952 and later brought up to date at the request of the International Bank forms the basis of the following estimate, which includes engineering and supervision expenses, and which assumes that the major proposed technical revisions of the provisional plans will be adopted. On this basis the total cost of the full program is estimated at £S 130.85 million, exclusive of the cost of local and national roads, or £S 169.85 if these are included.[1] The foreign exchange requirement would be about one-third of these totals. During the term of the mission's program (to December 1960) disbursements are likely to be £S 84.25 million without roads or £S 110.25 million if roads are included. Additional funds required for indirect consequences of the project have not been included in the costs for the main project.

[1] All figures are exclusive of any margin for contingencies.

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Economic Benefits

The mission estimates that the gross value of the produce of the Ghab area will be in the neighborhood of £S 63 million annually, or about £S 47 million after deducting the amount already produced in the area in question. The production of cotton, maize, sorghum, rice and sugar beets is particularly likely to have a marked impact on Syria's balance of trade. It may be assumed that the output of cotton and cottonseed will in effect be added to the country's exportable surplus; the additional rice production may make Syria fully self-sufficient in that commodity; and the sugar beet production should permit a considerable import saving.

In addition to the project's contribution to an increase in national income and an improvement in the balance of payments, the settlement of farmers in the area made possible by the project will assist in relieving the present population pressure in the province of Latakia and particularly in the Alaouit mountains. In Latakia, for example, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% of the average for Syria as a whole. Settlers in the Ghab will be able to earn substantially more than the bare living they have been able to eke from the soil in the past.

Organization

The "Administrative Office of the Drainage and Irrigation Works of the Ghab Lands" was created in 1951, to be attached to the Ministry of Public Works until the technical work is completed. It will be responsible for the design of the works, award of contracts, supervision of construction, payment of expenses and for sale of the land. As parts of the project are completed, the Office will take care of the operation and maintenance of the dams and of the irrigation and drainage networks and will collect water charges. During the planning and construction period the Office should recruit and train staff to carry out the continuing operation and management of the project.

It is important that the policy, and the attendant operating and budget delegations, provide for the establishment and operation of the agricultural research centers and for a long-range educational and farm demonstration program; otherwise, it will be practically impossible to achieve acceptable land use in the area.

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II PROJECTED SCHEMES

185 312 653 The Youssef Pasha project is the most important of those under consideration, but it is still at the planning stage. No decision has been taken with regard to the irrigation of the Euphrates valley as a whole.

Euphrates Valley—Youssef Pasha Dam[2]

In Syria the long narrow Euphrates valley stretches generally northwest to southeast from Djerablous at the Turkish border to Abou Kemal at the Iraqi border. It is about 450 kilometers long; its average width is about 7.5 kilometers, its maximum 16.

The soils of the valley proper are mainly alluvial, varying from silt to sandy loam and clay. With irrigation, they would be suitable for cotton, rice, sugar beet, peanuts, sorghum, etc. as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter legumes as the main winter crops.

Irrigation of the whole Euphrates valley, on the assumption that about 85% of the land can be cultivated, would require about 170 cubic meters per second, more than can be assumed to be Syria's share of the natural flow of the Euphrates. Irrigation could probably profitably be extended to an additional area of about 130,000 hectares on the left bank in the vicinity of Raqqa. All in all, a total supply of about 226 cubic meters per second would be needed, about 75% of the maximum of 300 cubic meters per second utilizable for irrigation from the river's natural flow, which would leave only 25% for Iraq. For this reason, and because of the power potential, it was thought desirable to construct a storage dam on the Euphrates; Youssef Pasha was selected as the site. British engineering consultants recommended a concrete dam of the pierced type, 650 meters long with 52 sluice gates, and a power plant capable of producing about 45,000 KW of firm power or a yearly output of about 400 million KWH, plus about 120 million KWH of secondary power.

The consultant firm originally estimated the project cost, including a transmission line to Aleppo, at about £S 114 million; a revaluation made in 1953 raised the estimate to £S 150 million. The capacity of the reservoir behind the dam would increase the flow of the river utilizable for irriga-

[2] Since studies of the valley have not advanced to the point of a draft project, the figures which follow are only indications of the order of magnitude of possible development.

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tion by about 100 cubic meters per second; this, added to Syria's assumed share of the natural flow, would provide sufficient water to irrigate the valley, including the area on the left bank. 185 312 653

Until recently it was thought that the length of head canal needed to connect Youssef Pasha with the irrigable areas would, because of difficult topography, preclude construction of an economic gravity irrigation system. The mission, taking account of experts' reports, has the following comments:

About 48,000 hectares on the river's right bank, between Youssef Pasha and Halabiye gorge, could be irrigated by pumping, at a cost of about £S 50 million; but this would not be an economic method of irrigating the fertile Ressafe plain. Both the valley and about 6,000 hectares of the plain could be irrigated by constructing a gravity canal branching from Youssef Pasha, at a cost of about £S 100 million. Whether it is worthwhile to spend an additional £S 50 million to irrigate a portion of the plain is a question to be considered.

On the left bank, however, a gravity canal branching from the Euphrates at the foot of Youssef Pasha dam could reach the plateau west of Raqqa, 100,000 hectares of which are now without any possibility of being irrigated, and could provide wide-scale irrigation between Ressafe and Halabiye gorge. About 185,000 hectares of excellent soils could be irrigated, about 155,000 by gravity flow and about 30,000 by pumping from the canal.

The possibilities of such a project should be investigated. We have made provision for such a study in our allocation for Euphrates valley studies; the aerial survey and mapping of the area are allowed for elsewhere. The gravity irrigation portion should cost roughly £S 266 million, of which £S 150 million (55%) represents the cost of the head canal. The pumping facilities would cost about £S 34 million. The construction cost of the project would thus be about £S 1,700 per hectare, less than that of the Ghab project.

Halabiye Project

Halabiye gorge offers an excellent site for a diversion weir: inundations would be restricted to the gorge itself. The weir could feed two irrigation canals, one on each bank of the Euphrates, extending 250 kilometers to Abou Kemal near the Iraqi border, and these could supply gravity irriga-

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185 tion to about 165,000 hectares, leaving about 50,000 to be irrigated by
312 pumps.
653 The cost of such a project would be about £S 165 million, or £S 1,000 per irrigated hectare. But although it would irrigate the fertile Meyadine area and foster development of the Abou Kemal locality, we do not recommend its construction during the next five years. Halabiye is rather far down the Syrian Euphrates valley; much of the area is already under pump irrigation; and for the limited capital expendable the Youssef Pasha site offers wider potentialities, particularly in the generation of hydroelectric power for the Aleppo area.

Khabour Valley

The Khabour valley has possibilities for projects in addition to the Tell Maghass scheme. None has been fully investigated. The soils are generally of good quality, ranging from loamy sand to medium clay, suitable for cultivation of cotton, rice, peanuts and (in the northern parts) sugar beet. All summer crops must be fully irrigated, and although rainfall is more plentiful here than in many parts of Syria, partial irrigation of winter crops is advisable in some areas.

A diversion weir could be constructed across the Khabour downstream from Ras el Ain to feed an irrigation canal on each bank. Areas of 13,300 and 7,400 hectares, on the right and left banks, respectively, could be irrigated. Rainfall in this area is adequate for winter crops and several large estate owners have installed pumps for summer cultivation.

A canal could be excavated on the right bank of the river, from Tell Maghass, but no more than 3,800 hectares would be irrigated; moreover, the soil is not very good, being sometimes excessively salted with gypsum.

About 12 kilometers downstream from Hassetche a dam could be built on the site of the ruined Roman dam of Saba Skour. Although this would permit the irrigation of about 15,000 hectares, it would unfortunately reflood the site of the previous reservoir whose fertile alluvium is now under cultivation.[8]

Sixteen kilometers downstream from Saba Skour another ruined Roman dam formerly supplied two large canals, one on each bank of the Taf river, a tributary of the Khabour. Here could be built an earth-fill dam,

[8] The area of this site is difficult to determine owing to the flatness of the surrounding country.

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about 760 meters long and 15 meters high, to feed a 14-kilometer canal on the right bank, irrigating about 8,000 hectares (a longer canal might irrigate 10,000-15,000 hectares) and a shorter left-bank canal, irrigating about 6,000 hectares. The soil is fairly good, and the mission considers this the best project that could be started in the Khabour area. A rough cost estimate is about £S 30 million, or £S 1,500 to £S 2,000 per hectare, depending on the area irrigated.

All told, these projects would irrigate 62,000-69,000 hectares, including the 8,500 now irrigated by the left bank canal of Tell Maghass. With a duty[4] of 0.6 liters per hectare per second, about 40 cubic meters per second would be needed. Since that is the total discharge of the Khabour utilizable for irrigation, no water would remain for dry season cultivation downstream from the Taf. Accordingly, consideration has been given to storage of the Khabour flood. The downstream portion of the valley is very flat, with the exception of the right bank where it is bordered by an eroded plateau. The plateau is nearest to the river at Markada, and here a dam could be built to form a reservoir. About 800 million cubic meters could be stored behind a dam about 20 meters high; even after loss through evaporation from the large surface area, about 700 million cubic meters would remain, or about 45 cubic meters per second for a six-month irrigation season. This discharge could irrigate about 75,000 hectares out of a possible 250,000 along both banks. The sandy and loamy alluvial soils of this area would be suitable, under irrigation, for the cultivation of rice, cotton, peanuts, pulses, sorghum and maize.

The site's disadvantage is that the gentle slope of the left bank would require construction of a long levee, although there is an easy abutment for the dam on the right bank. Moreover, because the height of the dam would necessarily mean a very shallow reservoir, it would be difficult to prevent siltation. In the circumstances, the government has made no study, survey or cost estimate of the project. The mission recommends that aerial and ground surveys and mapping be undertaken to determine whether the site is satisfactory or whether an alternative must be found. As a first step, the ground survey should be limited to five or six profiles in the area contemplated for the reservoir. This should take about three days, at a cost not in excess of £S 1,000, to be charged to the study of the Euphrates valley, where most of the stored water would be utilized.

[4] The average quantity of irrigation water which must be applied annually to the land to bring the crops to maturity.

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Upper Orontes Valley

312 653 185 In the area of Homs two projects are under consideration to expand cultivation in the upper Orontes valley, where cotton and sugar beet can be grown as summer crops and wheat, barley and clover as winter crops: a canal branching from Homs Lake to irrigate about 3,000 hectares on the left bank of the Orontes, and one branching from a diversion weir to be constructed about 23 kilometers upstream of the south end of Homs Lake. Here the dry season flow of the Orontes is at least 10 cubic meters per second, sufficient to irrigate about 15,000 hectares on the right bank, so that the Ghab project would not be adversely affected. However, the Orontes rises in Lebanon, where a project to irrigate the Kaa area is being considered. This would reduce the available flow at the Syrian border, correspondingly reducing the irrigable area in Syria. Since the project is estimated to cost about £S 15 million, an agreement with Lebanon on the partition of the Orontes should be concluded first. We also recommend a more accurate geological survey of the Rastane reservoir area, to ascertain whether potential capacity has been overestimated. Meantime, the two projects should be deferred.

Barada Valley

Consideration has been given to regulating the flow of the Barada river, to increase the irrigated area of the Ghouta in the vicinity of Damascus where soils toward the valley bottoms are suitable for the growing of vegetables.

Two dams across the Barada river at Hameh and near Makaren, each about 50 meters high, would provide a total storage capacity of about 180 million cubic meters, thus increasing the utilizable irrigation flow from 7 to about 15 cubic meters per second and permitting dry season irrigation of about 15,000 hectares of new fertile land in the vicinity of Damascus. A hydroelectric power plant could be built at the foot of each dam to develop a total power of about 10,000 KW.[5]

Surveys and studies have not progressed to the point of a draft project. A rough cost estimate is about £S 10 million for each dam, plus not more than £S 10 million for the development of the canal system, making a total

[5] These are recommended in Annex G.

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of about £S 30 million for the project (exclusive of the hydroelectric 312-
plants), or about £S 2,000 per hectare. The mission recommends that 653
studies of the two sites be completed and that construction of the dams and 185
hydro plants begin as soon as possible.

Yarmuk Valley

Cultivation on the alluvial and sometimes very fertile soils* of the Mzerib area irrigated from the upper springs of the Yarmuk river could be extended by pumping water to a new area of 4,500 hectares. This second phase of the Mzerib irrigation project has been fully investigated and is ready to be started; the first phase is already in operation. The pumps would be driven by diesel motors unless and until it is decided to build a hydroelectric power plant on the Yarmuk. The cost is estimated at about £S 7 million, approximately £S 1,500 per hectare. In view of the interest in developing irrigation in the Hauran mohafazat, which is in general not well provided with water, the mission recommends that this project be started without delay.

Nahr el Kebir Valley

The Nahr el Kebir, a short river flowing from the mountains bordering on Turkey, empties into the Mediterranean in the vicinity of Latakia. It has heavy floods, but in dry season the flow is no more than 0.5 to 0.6 cubic meters per second. A regulated flow would permit irrigation of about 4,000 hectares in the vicinity of Latakia for vegetable growing, thus making a significant contribution to the general development expected with the improvement of the port.

The construction of a dam of about 60 meters is projected, with sufficient capacity to permit flood control, irrigation, power and water for the port of Latakia. Site surveys are already under way. Additional cost studies must be made, but the cost will probably be of the order of £S 15 million. Although this is rather expensive for a single project, the mission feels that in view of its multi-purpose nature and the great importance of the development of the port of Latakia, studies should promptly be completed and the project constructed during the next five years.

* Suitable for cotton, with peanuts and citrus on the lighter soils.

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The Mission's Program

The new irrigation projects recommended by the mission, together with those under way, call for a total expenditure of £S 193 million over the next five years, to which must be added £S 3 million for maintenance and £S 1.2 million for research and demonstration, giving a grand total of £S 197.2 million. Table 1 shows the allocations among projects, together with an indication of the areas to be irrigated. Appendix Table II sets forth the irrigation schemes.

TABLE 1 Mission's Proposed Irrigation Program, 1955–60

Irrigated area							
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Projects	Functions	Total	Already spent	To be spent in the program
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	103*	1	102
0	0	0	Euphrates valley studies		3	—	3
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB) . .	GI	12	10	2
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	5	2	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	3	2	1
4.6	0	4.6	Mazrib	PI	7	0	7
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	30	0	30
15.0	0	15.0	Banda	HEP + GI	30	0	30
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	15	0	15
89.1	37.5	126.6			208	15	193

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; LB – Left Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

* Including £S 47 million to be spent in a later program.

NOTE: Area figures in thousand hectares; expenditure figure in million £S.

185 312 242

III PLANNING

There are two stages of planning for irrigation projects. The first, the agricultural phase, entails a preliminary study of the soils and the computation of water duties. The technical phase includes planning of the civil engineering works necessary to divert, convey and distribute the water in the selected area. In the Main Report the mission has discussed the second

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planning stage. Here we add a comment with respect to the so-called agricultural phase. 185 312

In the past, soil studies were not very extensive, but projects were being constructed in areas already under cultivation, where the fertility of the soil was well known. Now FAO experts supervise systematic soil analyses, and the results of these studies will be very useful for the development of future projects. Insufficient investigation of the perviousness of the soil, with consequent underestimation of the water duty, has resulted in undercropping in some irrigated areas. A striking example is the Homs Lake project, where the allowance of 0.20 liters per hectare per second does not permit full utilization of the cultivable area. 242

The mission therefore recommends that henceforth more extensive research under the supervision of both irrigation and agricultural engineers precede fixing of the irrigation duty. Since the soils vary little along the alluvial plain of the Euphrates valley, these studies could be confined to plots in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor and Abou Kemal, on the plateau west of Raqqa and in the Resafe plain south of Abou Hareira. These experimental plots could be quite small, water being supplied by small pumping plants or even by tankers. Provision is made in the mission's proposed expenditure on studies of Euphrates valley irrigation for equipment of experimental stations.

IV WATER FEES

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The fees for the various projects, according to the revised schedule for 1954, are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Annual Water Fees per Hectare

(£S)

Project	Size of holdings in hectares				
	0 to 5	5 to 15	15 to 20	20 to 50	over 50
Homs-Hama	6.25	15.40	20.40	23.30	25.80
Tell Maghas	7.50	23.75	28.75	37.50	40.00
Mzerib	7.50	21.25	26.25	32.50	35.00
Senn	7.50	17.50	22.50	27.50	30.00
Makr	2.00	3.50	4.50	6.00	7.00

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312 In the mission's opinion the amortization period of 65-70 years is too
427 long; if the same standards were applied to the new projects requiring large investment Syria's economic development would be hindered. We recommend a further revision of the basis for calculating the fees so that capital cost is amortized in a period of, say, 35-40 years, provided that in no case should the fee exceed the money value of the benefits to the landowner or cultivator. Benefits should be conservatively calculated to allow for variations in prices and yields of crops.

It also appears that although small holders might appropriately be charged a lower rate, the degree of progression in the existing water fees may be excessive.

APPENDIX

311 TABLE I River Flow and Government's Estimate
312 of Irrigated and Irrigable Areas

Origin of utilized water	Annual flow (million cubic meters)	Irrigated area (thousand hectares)	Irrigable area (thousand hectares)
Euphrates	25,000	125.0	340.0
Khabour	1,500	20.0	90.0
Orontes	500	35.0	55.0
Yarmuk	450	3.0	7.5
Barada-Awadj	485	15.0	25.0
Kowek	75	12.0	15.0
Afrin	250	2.5	7.5
Sadjour	90	2.5	3.0
Baligh	150	8.5	10.0
Jagh-Jagh	90	8.0	10.0
Senn	360	0.5	5.0
Nahr el Kebir	150	0.5	2.0
Total	29,100[a]	232.5	570.0
Underground water		75.0	100.0
Miscellaneous		67.5	80.0
Grow total		375.0[b]	750.0[b]

[a] To which should be added approximately 500 million cubic meters from other small rivers and streams.

[b] Underestimated, in the mission's opinion.

SOURCE: Directorate of Irrigation.

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The low fee for the Makt project is justified by the restricted nature of the facilities provided, but the fees assessed for the Tell Maghass, Mzerib and Senn projects appear low in proportion to the money value of the benefits to the landowners or cultivators, and are considerably less than the cost of pumping irrigation provided by private owners. Accordingly, we have recommended review of these fees.

APPENDIX

TABLE II Irrigation Schemes Under Construction or Projected

Irrigated area (thousand hectares)					Expenditures (million £S)		
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Location	Functions	Already spent	To be spent	Total
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	1	170	171*
252.0	152.0	404.0	Youssef Pasha		—	150	150
140.0	45.0	185.0	Raqqa Plateau	GI + PI	—	300	300
85.0	80.0	165.0	Halabiye	GI	—	160	160
27.0	27.0	54.0	Resafe	GI or PI	—	100	100
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	2	3	5
4.6	2.2	6.8	Mzerib	GI + PI	2	7	9
15.6	5.1	20.7	Ras el Ain	GI	—	30	30
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB)	GI	10	2	12
2.8	1.0	3.8	Tell Maghass (RB)	GI	—	6	6
8.0	7.2	15.2	Sabs Skour	GI	—	25	25
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	—	30	30
53.0	22.0	75.0	Markada	GI	—	100	100
8.0	7.0	15.0	Upstream Homs Lake	GI	—	15	15
3.0	—	3.0	Homs Lake (LB)	GI	—	3	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	2	2	4
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	—	15	15
15.0	—	15.0	Barada	HEP + GI	—	30	30
431.5	235.0	665.5			17	1,148	1,165

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; RB – Right Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; LB – Left Bank; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

* Including local and national roads.

NOTE: The figures given above are only rough estimates. Accurate figures are not available because most of these irrigation schemes have not yet reached the draft stage. The purpose of this Table is to give an idea of the order of magnitude of the investment, extending beyond the scope of the mission's program, to be made for the development of irrigation in Syria.

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ANNEX E *NOTES ON AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS*

1 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF SYRIA

General

653 652 Of the estimated £S 100 million–£S 120 million of agricultural credit outstanding in 1953, some 10-15% was furnished by the private commercial banks (including the Commercial Department of the BSL), probably 50% by moneylenders and merchants, and somewhat more than 35% by the Agricultural Bank of Syria. In view of its future role the mission adds the following note on the ABS. The other sources of credit are dealt with in the Main Report.

652 654 The Agricultural Bank operates throughout Syria. In addition to its central Damascus office it has three main branches, in Aleppo, Latakia and Deir ez Zor, and 27 sub-branches in the more important towns. The facilities, however, are not adequate to channel an adequate volume of loans down to the level of the small farmer.

The ABS is a governmental institution, administered by a General Director and a board of nine directors, six representing respectively the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and National Economy, and the Chambers of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and three selected by the Council of Ministers. Since 1950 the functions of the ABS have been considerably broadened. In addition to making loans to farmers, it now performs such extra-banking functions as purchasing and selling seeds, insecticides, and machinery, purchasing land and helping small farmers develop improved farm practices, and importing agricultural equipment. At present, it does not make loans directly to cooperatives. Loans have been granted to individual members with the joint guarantee of other members rather than to a cooperative association itself (the Bank Act, as redrafted (see below), would empower the ABS to lend directly to cooperatives). The limitations on extending loans for agricultural purposes are not to be found so much in the functions of the Bank as in the provisions dealing with the conditions under which loans may be granted. A principal objective should be the removal of burdensome restrictions and the substitution of desirable and sound loan policies.

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Resources for Lending

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The resources of the ABS available for lending are derived from the capital and reserve of the Bank, borrowings and, to a minor extent, deposits. In Table 1 these resources are shown for the period 1947-1953. The capital was derived from the 4% share of the agricultural production tax turned over to ABS until 1950, and the £S 10.2 million which the government gave the Bank on June 30, 1950. The latter amount represented the proceeds of a loan from the BSL, which the government undertook to repay in lieu of turning over a part of the agricultural production tax to the ABS. This transaction, together with earnings, increased the capital and reserve of the Bank to £S 22 million by 1952.

TABLE 1 Sources of Funds Available to the Agricultural Bank of Syria, 1947–1953

(*Million £S*)[a]

End of financial year[b]	Capital and reserve	Borrowing from			Deposits	Total
		Govt.	MIRA	BSL		
1947	9.0	3.9	2.9	—	.1	15.9
1948	9.5	2.9	2.3	—	.1	14.8
1949	10.2	2.3	2.8	—	.1	15.4
1950–1951	10.9	5.6	2.3	1.6	.2	20.6
1951–1952	22.0	3.2	—	8.6	.7	34.5
1953	22.1	10.7	1.7	5.9	.8	41.2

[a] The figures in this and the following tables which deal with the operations of ABS are from official records of the Bank.

[b] Calendar years except for two 18-months periods, viz: January 1, 1950–June 30, 1951, and July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.

The loans from the government agency MIRA (now the Cereals Office) and from the BSL were for the specific purposes indicated in Table 2. For instance, in 1949 seed wheat was secured by MIRA and in 1950 and 1952 agricultural machinery and cotton dust were handled for this agency. In the case of farm machinery the ABS by decree was authorized to take over machinery that MIRA was unable to sell at auction, the value of the machinery being considered an interest-free loan. In its transactions with MIRA the ABS acted as agent, receiving a commission of 4%.

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652 TABLE 2 Loans by Agricultural Bank for Special Programs
654 Authorized by Government, 1950–53

	1950–1951		1951–1952		1953	
	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)
Machinery loans (MIRA)	809	3,710	42	175	4	6
Relief to olive growers	2,757	1,183	3,067	508	—	—
Cotton seed advance	—	—	—	—	233	131
Combating cotton worm	—	—	5,923	2,745	1,115	512
Seasonal loans	—	—	1,394	1,150	6,440	6,123
Relief to drought-stricken areas in South	—	—	13,977	5,287	—	—
Machinery loans (Agricultural Bank)*	—	—	670	5,213	124	544

* These loans are for machinery purchased and sold directly by ABS in contrast to the MIRA machinery loans shown above.

The short-term or seasonal loans from BSL are at 2½% interest, the amount outstanding at the end of 1953 being £S 5.9 million. The BSL functions as a central bank in its transactions with the ABS, there being no national central bank in Syria at the present time.

Machinery loans have been of most aid to large farmers, while the seed, insecticide and relief loans have been helpful to all types of farmers.

Lending Practices and Policies

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The Agricultural Bank may make loans against the security of a real estate mortgage, a joint guarantee of several individuals, a chattel mortgage on crops, Treasury bonds, gold and certain types of commercial paper. In practice, however, loans have been advanced only on real estate mortgages and joint guarantees. This has meant a restricted loan policy. For instance, the ABS has not been in a position to make direct loans on crops or chattels, to finance cooperatives effectively, to extend credit to new land settlers, or adequately to meet the credit needs of the small farmer.

Table 3 shows the loans of the ABS by type of security for the period 1947-1953. It reveals no marked trend in the use of the mortgage or the

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guarantee as security, except that recently the number of joint guarantee loans has increased. These outnumber the real estate mortgages, although the latter are still the predominant form of security from the point of view of amount involved. Emphasis on formal security for loans, rather than on supervision of loans and their devotion to purposes that would improve the economic position and creditworthiness of the farmer, militates against the small owner and tenant farmer, who cannot provide adequate security. This emphasis is inevitable as long as there is no system of supervised credit. 652

TABLE 3 Loans Made by the Agricultural Bank of Syria According to Type of Security, 1947–1953

Year	Real estate mortgage		Joint guarantee	
	Number	Value (thousand £S)	Number	Value (thousand £S)
1947	4,484	3,684	9,000	2,124
1948	2,240	1,664	2,556	473
1949	1,982	1,577	2,216	350
1950–51*	5,057	3,980	7,960	1,347
1951–52*	7,213	6,398	10,344	1,880
1953	4,922	4,149	8,541	1,483

* 18-month periods.

The record of collection on loans is excellent; foreclosures are rare. From 1947-1953, the net profit of the Bank increased from £S 227,986 to £S 1,239,071, and for 1953 it was slightly more than 6% on the outstanding capital and reserve.

The loans of the ABS outstanding at the end of the fiscal year from 1947 to 1953 are shown in Table 4. Long-term loans, from 3 to 15 years, increased by about £S 7 million during this period. These loans were made for land purchases and improvements, building of dwellings and purchase of farm machinery and livestock. Loans for the latter purpose have been provided for a period not exceeding five years and account for a large part of the increase.

Farm machinery loans also account for a considerable increase in medium-term loans, from one to three years. Short-term or seasonal loans,

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up to 12 months, are for seeds, tools, fertilizer and working funds. It was not until after 1950 that the ABS undertook to extend this type of credit.

It is to the small- and medium-sized farmer with good security that most of the loans are granted. No one borrower may receive more than £S 7,500, and for loans in excess of £S 3,000 it is necessary to secure approval from the main office at Damascus—an involved and time-consuming procedure. This often deters large landowners from applying for loans.

ABS credit for the sharecropper and the very small landowner with only moderate security is also difficult. Loans may be made on only 60% of the

TABLE 4 Kind, Number and Value of Agricultural Bank Loans Outstanding at End of Selected Financial Years

Kind of loans	1947	1949	1951	1953
Long-term loans				
Number outstanding	38,642	39,613	21,778	47,642
Amount of loans outstanding	13,378	13,773	12,435	20,453
Medium-term loans				
Number outstanding	16,680	17,847	24,135	35,374
Amount of loans outstanding	3,092	2,931	3,717	4,971
Short-term loans				
Number outstanding	—	—	21,496	29,413
Amount of loans outstanding	—	—	7,630	16,754
All loans				
Number outstanding	55,322	57,460	67,409	112,429
Amount of loans outstanding	16,470	16,704	23,782	42,178

NOTE: All value figures in thousand £S.

value of land (40% if planted to trees). This class of potential borrower cannot afford the loss of time and the cost of spending several days in the city to negotiate a small loan on the low value of his property. It is much more convenient to turn to the moneylender for credit.

Loans to cooperatives are made only with the guarantee of individual members and may not exceed £S 30,000. Such loans as have been granted are for altogether too short a period to be of effective use. However, the ABS hopes to grant much more credit to cooperatives and to enable them over a period of time to take over the bulk of the seasonal and medium-term loans to farmers. It is recognized, however, that cooperatives will develop only slowly.

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Effectiveness of Operations

One of the outstanding weaknesses of the ABS is that an adequate volume of credit is not getting down to the level of the small- and medium-sized farm operators who could profit most by the wise use of credit. Although the difficulties arise in part from restrictions on lending practices and policies, it is also true that the ABS is not set up to service this group of farmers effectively. Remedial action lies largely in a revitalization of the Bank's charter, the active support of farmers' cooperatives and a program of supervised agricultural credit. This calls for an organization closer to the village level.

More of the funds of the ABS should be used for loans which would increase agricultural production and strengthen the position of the small farmer. But loans must be kept on a sound basis and the rate of expansion should not impair this policy. Seasonal or short-term working capital resulting in increasing farm income is a highly desirable phase of a program of supervised agricultural credit. Under the present system the advisability of the plan for using the loan is left to the judgment of the farmer. Under a system of supervised credit, the loan would be granted in relation to a farm and home plan developed jointly with the farmer. The prospect of repayment would be greater than it is when loans are granted merely on collateral or collective guarantee.

The ABS practice of engaging in the purchase and sale of machinery, seed and insecticides should be judged in the light of the situation in Syria. The arguments advanced in favor of these transactions are that private machinery dealers have a very high price mark-up, while the ABS's is much less, and that the practice has insured better seeds and adequate insecticides. On the other hand, these are services which, over a period of time, might better be taken over by private enterprise. The ABS might then concentrate on its main function—the making, servicing and collection of loans.

Recommendations

The mission adds the following to the observations and recommendations in the Main Report.

The basic Agricultural Bank Act should be re-enacted along the lines proposed by the Committee to Redraft the Bank Act. As redrafted, the Act

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152 stresses the establishment of credit cooperative societies or associations, the granting of loans directly through cooperatives, the making of loans against warehouse receipts, the extension of more seasonal loans for productive purposes, and the making of intermediate- and long-term loans for land reclamation and development. Loans could be made without mortgage or joint guarantee security. Another significant proposal is that the Board of Management of the ABS would enjoy, within a legal framework far less restrictive than the present act, the "widest authority in the management of the bank." For instance, the Board would have wide powers in issuing its own by-laws. The mission recommends that the by-laws include procedures for a program of supervised agricultural credit and for the fostering of cooperative agricultural credit. The operational requirements for a sound and dynamic credit program must be clearly set forth, otherwise the hazards of losses would be great.

Loans to a farmer should be based on the size of his farm, the type of farming practices he follows, his personal characteristics and the degree of farm planning as reflected in the income of the farm. In addition, loans should be extended at the appropriate time and with due consideration to outstanding indebtedness. To maintain the farmers' income-producing ability credit must be available when needed, as at the appropriate time during the planting season, to meet recurring needs during the growing season, and to provide emergency funds for unforeseen severe attacks of insects, bad harvests, and other similar emergencies. In the case of supervised loans the time required to prepare farm plans, and to submit loan applications and secure their approval will determine the period that must be devoted to advance planning, so that farmers will receive their loans on time and a schedule of advances may be set up to meet the farmers' needs. For supervised loans a schedule should be prepared of both the amount and time of the receipt of income. The time of repayment should then be set in relation to this schedule. If for good reasons loans become delinquent the repayment schedule may be modified.

With the exception of emergency loans the making of loans to farmers with outstanding indebtedness may result in pyramiding the debt structure on an unsound basis. However, it is sound policy to assure or take over a reasonable amount of outstanding indebtedness, particularly in the case of members of a cooperative association. Not to refund a reasonable amount of old indebtedness of a borrower may well place him at the mercy of moneylenders, and thus undermine his creditworthiness. But the refund-

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ing of old debts in relation to a new loan must be carefully considered. It 652
should be obvious that supervision may be necessary throughout the period of the loan. Furthermore, it may be desirable to extend the repayment of certain old debts over a period of years.

We have emphasized in the Main Report that legislation should be considered to provide for the relief of old agricultural indebtedness. Many capable farmers cannot be made creditworthy under any system of credit until they are in a position to make a new start in life.

Loans should be made in kind only when it is necessary to insure their use for a specific purpose and when the government has found it necessary to monopolize the supply of certain farmers' requisites, e.g., cottonseed. Such loans must be in first-rate products.

In order to carry out the type of credit program envisaged by the government, the ABS will need to bring its services to the farmer. Thus the regional banks should have a number of field credit offices from which, in cooperation with the regional banks, loans will be made, serviced and collected. Part of this task might well be done by opening up temporary field offices in larger villages before the planting season and again during and following the harvest period.

Ultimately the ABS and the village cooperatives should be owned and 652
operated by farmers. These institutions must therefore accumulate their 474
own capital if they are not to remain merely channels for the extension of government credit to farmers. The ABS itself could do much to promote additional savings through credit cooperatives. Over a period of years the development of practices of thrift will lead to substantial capital accumulation for the use of farmers. The capital of a cooperative credit society should be invested in capital expansion or deposited in the ABS. When a credit society is a part of a multi-purpose cooperative, it can use any earnings or savings to best advantage within its own organization. It may be desirable, and in fact necessary, for the ABS to establish some local credit societies as an arm of its organization in the extension of loans to farmers. In the latter case, savings and earnings for use of members would presumably be under the control of the ABS, but should be, insofar as possible, administered by an independent organization.

It is also desirable that cooperative associations retain their earnings and investments by restrictions on declarations of dividends, and by not permitting ready refunding of membership stock. The 2% profit made by cooperatives on loans would be another source of capital and credit.

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II COOPERATIVES

474 *Organization*

A Syrian statute prescribes the manner of organizing cooperatives; by-laws are likewise prescribed. Both are rather involved and somewhat confusing. Without analyzing these laws in detail, we may point out certain of their defects. For example, in regard to reserves there are a number of lengthy provisions dealing with "ordinary reserve", "obligatory reserve" and "exceptional reserve" in terms of percentages. Most technicians would have considerable difficulty construing them and they are impossible for farmers to comprehend. The drawn-out procedure to be followed in the registration of a cooperative appears to indicate some government distrust of cooperative organization. The basic cooperative laws should make it relatively simple for farmers to follow required procedure and to proceed on a sound basis.

In the Main Report the mission has recommended a revision of the legislation pertaining to cooperatives. There is much valuable and useful experience to draw upon from the many countries which have had a considerable measure of success with cooperative societies. The Arab League is giving attention to this matter and is now in process of setting up a permanent training center for cooperative work of the member states. The discussions for the implementation of such a program are promising. The FAO has also sponsored a training program in cooperatives, dealing in part with legislative matters.

In Syria, a cooperative may be organized by seven or more persons to promote mutual interest in marketing agricultural products, extending credit, encouraging savings, purchasing domestic and farm furnishings, and a host of similar purposes. Funds are provided through capital share subscription of members, payment of membership fees, and from loans. Each member has one vote. A cooperative may be organized either on the principle of limited liability or unlimited liability. Cooperatives are registered in the Division of Cooperatives and Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture. This division is intended to supervise the activities of cooperatives but has not been able to do so because it lacks the personnel and an adequate organizational framework for serving and promoting cooperative organizations.

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In organizing a cooperative it is necessary to determine carefully the function to be performed. The greater the number of functions which the cooperative is to perform, the more complex becomes the task of management and the more difficult the financing and accounting. These problems must be met and not be permitted to hinder the successful development of cooperatives.

In the Syrian villages it would seem best to organize cooperatives around a single function when such a function is an end in itself, as for example providing a pump for irrigation. However, needed services are often interrelated, as is the situation when agricultural production credit is an integral part of a cooperative marketing and purchasing program. Several functions should be undertaken if: (1) they do not conflict; (2) they do not make the operations too complex; (3) the accounts of each can be kept quite separate; (4) the members understand clearly what the association or society is doing; and (5) the functions provide a service to most of the members. Under these conditions the multi-purpose cooperative is a superior type of organization since it can coordinate in a single efficient management unit such allied functions as the purchase and sale of farm supplies, marketing of farm products, granting of credit and the performance of other special services.

The recent experience of the Near East Foundation in organizing cooperatives in Syria indicates that farmers are very responsive to pilot cooperative organization when the aims and methods are properly explained to them. In one case, for instance, considerable enthusiasm was engendered by the cooperative sinking of an irrigation well which increased production and quadrupled the value of the land. The Foundation has found that such demonstrations, when preceded by preliminary discussions of the elementary principles of cooperation, caught the farmers' imagination. Under these circumstances, farmers respond readily and show by their willingness to subscribe shares a strong belief and confidence in cooperative association.

Clearly such projects offer a nucleus for expansion. They also have shown that: (1) farmers are interested in joining together to do things for their mutual benefit; (2) organization of a cooperative involves a great deal of educational effort; (3) regular assistance and guidance must be provided; (4) capital is necessary; and (5) the job cannot be done without guidance by the Agricultural Bank and the Division of Cooperatives.

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III RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A SUPERVISED AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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The organization of the agricultural extension service should be such as to permit its ultimate development into the central agricultural agency through which educational activities relative to improved techniques in agriculture and rural living are channeled. In its particular sphere of activity the Extension Service should coordinate the findings of all departments within the Ministry of Agriculture. It should become eventually one of the three or four principal departments of the Ministry of Agriculture, separated from the research control or administrative work of the Ministry. For the present, however, it would seem desirable to retain the Division of Cooperatives and the Extension Service on the joint basis. The Extension Service should not have regulatory or police power functions, for this would involve education in the pleading of special causes or the enforcement of sanctions. Education and extension rather involve training on the basis of voluntary participation by farmers. At the national and regional level the Service should be staffed adequately to serve the village communities. It is recommended that an additional amount of £S 250,000 be provided during the next five years for personnel, travel and general operating expenses of the Extension Service.

There is a shortage of trained agriculturists. Steps should be taken to improve the teaching and research facilities of the four intermediate agricultural schools at Aleppo, Deir ez Zor, Latakia and Selemiye, and also at the secondary agricultural school at Kharabo. The extension worker needs a broad but well-grounded training in the technical aspects of agriculture, a good knowledge of social and economic problems in rural communities, and special training in extension methods and the philosophy underlying good extension work. In addition to pre-service training centers, it is essential that in-service and refresher courses be provided for extension personnel. The Food and Agriculture Organization should be requested to assist in the development of a training center for extension workers. This activity might well be supplemented by a cooperative arrangement between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Near East Foundation for the training of village community workers. The work of this Foundation provides a useful example of an effective method of reaching the small farmer. Scholarships

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for study abroad should be a necessary part of the training of the senior staff. 654 242

The findings of research, experimentation and the experiences of farmers give support to extension programs. Much information is already available and should be transmitted to farmers, but more systematic and better coordinated practical research should be the aim in the future. The two functions of research and extension should be coordinated within the Ministry of Agriculture so that each performs its specialized service, in a manner that supplements and complements the other. Research must focus on the key needs and concerns of farmers and anticipate future problems. For instance, one of the emerging needs is to know more about good crop rotation practices, including better use of land now fallow.

Chart 1 indicates the mission's conception of a desirable organizational framework for the agricultural credit and rural development program it has recommended.

IV LAND TENURE

In Syria, the landowner group is composed of full owners, part owners, debt-encumbered owners, and owners with undetermined title. Owners range from operators of large commercial farms to small subsistence farmers. The tenant group is composed of farmers who rent or make some payment for the use of land, and comprises most of the farmers who live on the land and cultivate it. Most of the large owners do not live permanently on their land but operate through some type of sharecropper system. There are very few cash tenants. The sharecropper usually works under the direction of the landlord or his agent and is dependent upon him for farm supplies and operating capital. Often he contributes toward crop production little but his own and his family's labor. His status is more nearly that of a laborer than of a tenant. A true tenant has rights of occupancy and land use that are protected by law, while the sharecropper is very much subject to the will of the landlord. 423 421

In general, it appears that in the rainfed areas the sharecropper receives about 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor, and around 70% if he provides the working capital. In areas sparsely settled he receives a slightly higher percentage of the crop, and in heavily populated areas he may receive somewhat less. On the irrigated lands the sharecropper receives in

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

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the neighborhood of 20-30% of the crop if he furnishes only his labor, and about one-half of the crop if he provides his own working capital. The distribution of the returns on privately irrigated lands is, however, often much affected by the person who controls the pump.

Land Ownership

As in other countries of the Middle East considerable uncertainty attaches to ownership rights in land. By no means all of the cultivated or cultivable land is listed in the official property registers, and titles which are registered are often imprecise or conflicting in stating the boundaries or the area. The validity of many land grants made in the past is also subject to challenge.

By far the greater part of the land unquestionably belongs to the state, if only because most of the land is uncultivable and therefore unutilized and all unoccupied or "dead land" has always in theory belonged to the state. State land has in the past fallen into two categories: "state domain" proper, which is officially registered as belonging to the state, and unoccupied or "dead land" (*mawat*) to which no title exists.

Land other than state domain is held under various traditional forms of ownership including *mulk*, *waqf*, *matroukah*, *amiri* and *mucha'a*. *Mulk* is the only form of absolute ownership and covers only a small proportion of state land. *Waqf* is property held in the form of a religious trust and is not particularly significant as far as agricultural land is concerned. *Matroukah* is land dedicated to public purposes and also has no significance for agriculture. Most land is *amiri*, a type of hereditary leasehold. Ultimate ownership in theory rests with the state which can legally recover *amiri* land if it is not cultivated for five years in succession. The latter right is, however, never exercised, and *amiri* land can be said to be in virtually unqualified private ownership. *Mucha'a* is village land held in common but cultivated in individual family plots periodically reallotted among the holders. This form of tenure has predominated in certain parts of the country such as the Hauran and obviously gives little or no incentive to permanent improvement of the land.

Recognizing that clear and undisputed private landownership is a prerequisite to land improvement, the government has been seeking over many years to terminate the *mucha'a* form of tenure and end the confusion in land titles. *Mucha'a* land is being gradually distributed and converted to

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private ownership, and a cadastral survey has been proceeding for three decades to delimit and determine titles to land. Inadequate funds, insufficient trained personnel and cumbersome procedures have made progress very slow. For instance, the cadastral survey, which is apparently supposed to cover about 7.82 million hectares, had been completed for only 3.54 million acres by the end of 1952. The work was farthest advanced in the provinces of Aleppo, Hama and Homs and least advanced in those of Hassetche, Deir ez Zor, Dera'a and Soueida. At the end of 1952 the government authorized an expedited 27-months' survey for the mohafazat of Hassetche. For the first time, aerial photography is being used to carry out the program and a soil survey is being conducted at the same time. Even here, however, the work, originally scheduled to be completed by the spring of 1955, has fallen behind schedule and is now unlikely to be finished much before the end of 1956.

Size of Holdings

An official estimate apparently made for Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, who made a developmental study of Syria in 1946-47, indicated that of about 6.1 million hectares of privately held land 38% was in holdings of over 100 hectares and 19% in holdings of 10 hectares and less. In the last analysis only the cadastral survey is likely to give more accurate data on the distribution of land. For the 2.2 million hectares of privately owned land covered by the survey up to the end of 1952, the distribution by size of holdings was as follows:

Classification of holdings (hectares)	Percent of area
Small holdings	
Less than 1	1
2–5	5
5–10	7
Total	13
Medium holdings	
10–25	17
25–50	11
50–100	10
Total	38

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Large holdings	
100–500	24
500–1,000	9
Over 1,000	16
Total	49
Total all groups	100%

This would indicate that 49% of the land area is in holdings of over 100 hectares and 16% in holdings of over 1,000 hectares. These percentages may well be lower when the survey in the mohafazats of Dera'a and Soueida are completed, for these are areas of predominantly small holdings. Large estates are found particularly in the mohafazats of Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Hassetche. Some holdings are known to be in excess of 100,000 hectares. Unfortunately the mission was unable to obtain data on the number of holdings in each of the classifications listed in the above table.

Land Tenure Policy

The objectives of a tenure improvement program in Syria in respect to private lands should be: (1) to prevent the further growth of large holdings and promote generally a wider distribution of ownership, while avoiding at the same time excessive fragmentation of already small holdings; (2) to secure a more equitable distribution of farm income among those associated in the cultivation of the land, including the landlord, the cultivator-tenant, the pump-owner and others who have acquired rights in or power over the returns from land; (3) to promote greater security of tenure for the tenant; and (4) to enable the small owner and tenant to become more prosperous and independent by improved methods of production and the introduction of needed economic institutional reforms.

On public domain lands, the principal objectives should be (1) to establish the extent of state domain, particularly of cultivable lands; (2) to reserve state domain suitable for arable farming for gradual distribution to farmer-operators as and when the need arises; (3) in the meanwhile, to permit the exploitation of state domain under medium-term lease arrangements but at adequate rentals; and (4) to take steps to ensure good public land management on state domain.

In the process of settling state lands suitable for development, an im-

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423 portant step accompanying or following the survey should be classification of the land to determine: (1) the inherent land characteristics; (2) present use; (3) use capability; and (4) recommended use by size of operating unit. This information is necessary to carry out a good settlement policy with respect to land use, involving primarily the size of units to be established and recommendations for cropping and land practices to be followed. A sound settlement program should settle good farmers on good land under conditions that afford a reasonable opportunity for success. This is most important in the distribution of state domain land.

It is also desirable that the price to the settler for the land, buildings and the improvements be in line with the productive capacity of the land, and that payments on this indebtedness be related to the time when farm income may be realized. Any repayment made during the first few years will necessarily be small, and might not begin before the third year of settlement. The total charge against a new land settler should not exceed 2½-3½ times the gross annual returns from land. This is equivalent to the payment of an annual rental of 20-25% of the crop produced for a period of 10 to 15 years. As a prospective landowner a settler should be required to maintain and improve his farm, pay taxes, provide for living expenses and enjoy the inducement of an additional income to enable him and his family to improve their standard of living.

The period of repayment should not exceed 10-15 years. A longer period is more hazardous, discouraging, and does not afford proper incentive to land ownership. A 10-year period is preferable.

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ANNEX F *INDUSTRY*

#33

1 PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES

The structure of Syrian industry as of the end of 1953 is illustrated by Table 1, based on official estimates for 1953.

TABLE 1 Syrian Manufacturing Industry, 1953

Industrial groups	Number of establishments (totally or partly mechanized)	Capital invested (million £S)	Annual production (all figures in thousands)
Cotton ginning	122	10	50 (tons)
Spinning and weaving	586	40	26 (tons)[a]
Socks and stockings	69	5	1,248 (dozens)
Vegetable oils[b]	250	25	10 (tons)
Soap	59	10	18 (tons)
Sugar refining	1	12	23 (tons)
Canned goods	3	4	4 (tons)
Jam and candy	139	10	5 (tons)
Cement	2	15	224 (tons)
Glass	11	10	900 (square meters)
Rubber boots and shoes	3	—	200 (pairs)
Matches	7	2	340 (gros)
Tobacco	3	—	3 (tons)

[a] Includes both yarn and cloth production.
[b] Exclusive of olive oil.

NOTE: The figures in this Table are only illustrative of the general structure of the manufacturing industry; as shown by the text, the mission's investigations have in certain respects revealed different data.
SOURCE: Le Commerce du Levant, June 6, 1954.

Although the Table does not give a complete picture, it shows the main industrial sectors in which modern production methods are being applied. In appraising the present stage of industrial development, however, it should be realized that a large section of industry is still in the handicraft stage or has only partially emerged from it. In the case of textiles, clothing, shoes, furniture, metal ware and many other goods, this section of industry

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433 is still responsible for an important part of, and in some instances for the entire, production. Yet the use of power-driven machines is steadily growing and it is not unusual to find an expensive modern machine in a workshop with only five or six employees. This development will probably be accelerated as more and cheaper electrical power becomes available, but it is equally likely that some Syrian industry, although to a steadily decreasing extent, will remain in the handicraft stage for many years to come. This applies particularly to village industries (dairy products, dried fruits, rugs, etc.), which employ a considerable percentage of those who gain a living from some industrial occupation.[1]

Cotton Ginning

248 Ginning is a relatively new industry which sprang up after local cotton cultivation became prominent, and by 1953 was employing about 4,000 workers. The sharp rise in cotton production after World War II led to a rapid expansion of ginning capacity and, in 1950, to the introduction of some saw gins. There are now over 100 establishments, mostly in Aleppo, which concentrate on cotton ginning during the season commencing in September and ending in April or May.

According to the latest available estimates Syria has a total of about 1,750 roller gins and 64 saw gins with a lint capacity of 45-48 metric tons per hour. A report issued in September 1953 states that of the 1952-53 cotton crop of 176,000 tons of raw cotton, over 90% was roller-ginned and that saw gins were only used in the lower grades. Up to 10,000 tons of ginned cotton were used in Syrian textile mills; the remainder (about 50,000 tons) was exported.

The importation of cotton ginning machinery was prohibited by law in 1952; it is generally agreed that present ginning capacity is sufficient to deal with any anticipated increase in the crop for some time to come.

Textiles

288 *Spinning and weaving.* The manufacture of textiles is Syria's principal industry. Six spinning and weaving factories now produce cotton and

[1] According to a study dated February 24, 1954 by Dr. Abdel Monthleb Boukari, "L'Artisanat Rural Traditionnel," 18% of the Syrian population is engaged in some kind of manufacturing industry of which 9.8% is in town industries and 8.2% in village industries. The mission was not in a position to check these figures.

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rayon yarn and cloth, two in Damascus and four in Aleppo, employing 288
nearly 6,000 workers. Between 90,000 and 100,000 spindles producing cotton and rayon yarn and about 1,400 mechanical looms are in operation in these factories or were in the process of being installed at the time of the mission's visit; it has been estimated that in 1953 between 15-20% of the total number of spindles was engaged in the spinning of rayon. The total yarn production in that year was about 8,000 tons, of which 6,000 was cotton yarn. The factories are well built and most of the machinery is less than 10 years old. The older or less efficient machinery is being replaced and there is a gradual conversion to fully automatic looms.

Syrian cotton has now largely replaced imported raw material; on the other hand, imports of fiber and yarn for making rayon cloth and knitted garments have increased considerably during the past two years. Imports of fiber rose from 1,300 tons in 1951 to nearly 3,000 in 1953. Imports of rayon yarn increased during the same period from 4,160 tons to 6,572 tons. Practically all the cotton yarn produced in Syria is used locally. About 400 tons of cotton cloth, 400 tons of rayon yarn and 1,800 tons of silk and artificial silk cloth were exported in 1953.

Three factories are engaged in the spinning (one in Aleppo with about 3,000 spindles) or weaving (two in Damascus with a total of 38 looms) of woolen yarns and woolen and worsted cloth. While some of the machinery is old, it is in good condition and the buildings are well constructed. In 1953 about 160 workers were employed in these factories. Although Syria exports considerable quantities of raw wool, its modern wool manufacturing industry is based entirely on imported materials.

Four small factories in Damascus produce silk and rayon brocades and brocades with metallic threads on mechanical looms. Brocades are also woven on an unknown number of hand looms.

In addition, there are probably over 700 smaller enterprises in various parts of the country (Aleppo, Damascus and Homs being the main centers) engaged in the manufacture of cotton, rayon or woolen cloth on mechanical looms. In total they have roughly 3,800 looms and about 9,000 workers are employed.

A large number of hand looms are still used for weaving cotton, rayon, [286]
woolen and hair cloth. Although declining in importance, there are probably still over 6,000 hand looms and about 10,000 workers engaged, part or whole time, in their operation.

The total production of woven silk, cotton and rayon cloth is probably

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288 about 14,000-16,000 tons. An estimated 14,000 workers are employed in the mechanical section, making the total, including the hand loom workers, 29,000.

Knitted garments, underwear, socks and stockings. This section of the textile trade has developed considerably in recent years. There are 264 enterprises engaged in the production of knitted garments. Some have only two or three machines; the larger factories are on the whole well built and designed for efficient production with the latest British, American and German machines. The use of rayon rather than cotton or woolen yarn has increased considerably, and they make use of substantial quantities of the imported rayon fiber and yarn. Three of the larger stocking factories concentrate on production of nylon stockings. About 2,500 workers are estimated to be employed in all the sections of the knitting industry, located mainly in the Damascus area. This part of Syria's textile industry is of rapidly growing importance from the point of view of exports.

Textile dyeing, printing and finishing. Many of the textile factories bleach or dye yarn or cloth on their own premises. There are also a number of firms engaged in bleaching, dyeing, finishing and block printing. These are situated mainly in Aleppo and employ a total of about 250 workers. In addition, there are many small enterprises throughout the country which bleach and dye yarn and cloth by traditional handicraft methods and for which no statistics are available.

A large dyeing and printing works, established at Homs in 1946, and unique in Syria, prints textiles by rotary machinery as well as by the block process. When the installation of additional machinery is completed the firm will employ about 400 workers on a three-shift basis.

Table 2 summarizes the scope of the textile industry.

Vegetable Oils

289 Syria has produced vegetable oil for many centuries, mainly from olives, and the traditional methods of crushing and pressing are still to be seen in some areas. The development of mechanical seed crushing and oil extraction in large factories began in Syria in 1945. About 70% of the output is now derived from cottonseed.

There are now seven large factories equipped in total with 48 Rosedown Maxoil expellers and six "French type" expellers to process the

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domestic and imported raw material; four of these also have spirit extraction plants. In addition, there are 10 smaller factories with expellers, hydraulic presses or small spirit extraction plants. Most of the factories are situated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Latakia.

During 1950-53 the average annual volume of cotton seed available for crushing, deducting export and sowing requirements, was about 68,000

TABLE 2 The Textile Industry

Type of enterprise	Number	Capital invested where known (million £S)	Spindles	Looms	Knitting machines	Estimated number of workers
Cotton and rayon spinning and weaving factories . .	6	32.7	90,000	1,400	—	6,000
Woolen spinning and weaving factories	3	2.3	900	40	—	160
Mechanical brocade-weaving factories	3	1.5	—	50	—	140
Small enterprises using mechanical looms	788	3.0	108	3,800	—	8,000
Small enterprises using hand looms	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6,000	—	10,000
Knitting industry	264	9.2	—	—	1,630	2,500
Textile printing and mechanical dyeing and finishing	15	6.5	—	—	—	650
Total	1,079	55.2	91,008	11,290	1,630	28,450

NOTE: Figures in some cases approximate estimates.

tons compared to 10,000 tons in 1947. Probably about 8,000 tons of refined cottonseed oil are now produced annually. This, added to oils from other seeds and nuts, imported[2] and indigenous, indicates a total annual production of about 10,000 tons of vegetable oil (exclusive of olive oil). When the additional equipment now in the process of being installed is in production, the total capacity of the factories will be in the region of 20,000 tons per annum.

Syria exported about 1,200 tons of cotton seed oil in 1953, 24,300 tons of oil cake and other residue from vegetable oil extraction, the highest

[2] Limited amounts of copra and palm seeds are imported.

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figure yet recorded. Very little of the valuable by-products is used for feeding farm stock in Syria; the husks, which constitute about 35% of the weight of the seed, are disposed of mainly as boiler fuel.

In the areas near the olive groves there are about 750 animal or hand-operated mills and presses and about 200 either wholly or mainly mechanically operated. The annual production of olive oil has averaged 10,000 tons over the 10 years 1942 to 1951, five of which were poor seasons. Most of the production is locally consumed, forming an important component of the diet.

The seed crushing factories employ about 1,000 workers, and in the olive growing districts there are probably another 1,500-2,000 who work on the olive mills and presses for short periods each year.

Since August 1, 1952 there has been an embargo on the import of vegetable oils to protect the local market.

Soap

In the past the renowned Syrian soap industry was based entirely on olive oil; now there is a tendency to mix in cheaper oils and fatty acids. The industry has lost much ground both in the home and foreign markets due to the competition of occidental soaps and the failure of Syrian manufacturers to modernize their methods. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners reported in 1947 that by degrees the small "cottage" installations were giving way to larger, though not necessarily modern, factories.

Today according to official figures eight of the 59 soap factories are considered modern; 600 workers are employed.

The total soap production in 1947 was under 4,000 tons. By 1953 it was estimated to have risen to between 8,000-9,000 tons, of which 1,900 tons were exported. Since August 17, 1952 importation of most types of soap has been prohibited.

Sugar Refining

Until the Sugar and Agricultural Products Company started production on a small scale in Homs in 1949, Syria imported all of its sugar requirements. growing only a small amount of cane locally. The company has tried to develop a beet crop that will provide most of domestic sugar requirements. In 1953, 51,500 tons of beet produced 7,058 tons of sugar.

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The company's present capacity is 800 tons of beet per day. The beet pulp 257
is dehydrated for use as animal fodder and about 600 tons were exported in 1953.

Raw sugar is imported from the West Indies, South America and Formosa. In 1952, imports of 16,400 tons produced about 15,000 tons of refined sugar; in 1953 imports rose to 24,000 tons, producing about 22,200 tons of refined sugar.

The total 1952 and 1953 production of refined sugar was 19,200 and 30,000 metric tons respectively. An average yield of about 14% refined sugar is obtained from beet sugar and 91.5% of refined sugar from the raw sugar.

The imported raw sugar is taxed at 27.5 piasters per kg., while the corresponding tax on imported refined sugar is 43.5 piasters. The price of refined sugar at the time of the mission's visit was 85 piasters per kg. Although the law provides for tax rebate on exported goods containing sugar, the net price is still considerably higher than world prices and it was reported to be administratively extremely difficult to obtain a rebate.

The molasses by-product is used for the production of alcohol, of which 477 tons were produced in 1953 by fermentation and distillation.

Vegetable and Fruit Canning and Preserving 255

Damascus is the principal center of the canning and preserving industry, the Ghouta being an important vegetable and fruit growing area. Two large factories and a smaller one, equipped with modern machinery, produce canned vegetables and fruit, dried fruit, fruit paste, fruit juices, jams, pickles, etc., manufacturing their own cans from imported tin plate. In the canning season these three factories employ about 1,200 workers in all. There are also a considerable number of small establishments in Damascus and elsewhere which produce jams, paste, juices, etc. Production varies considerably but recent estimates suggest a total output of about 4,000 tons a year.

The supply of vegetables for canning is limited and their quality could be greatly improved. The industry has suffered from the dissolution of the Customs Union with Lebanon, that country having been an important market.

As the Syrian market for canned goods is limited, the industry is very dependent on exports, but the high price of sugar makes successful compe-

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356 tition difficult. Exports of canned vegetables and fruit products without sugar, as for example dried fruits (apricots), pulp and tomato juice just now seem to offer greater possibilities, but foreign quality competition is still severe.

Cement

334 There are two cement factories in Syria, one near Damascus and one in Aleppo. Their combined capacity in 1953 was 243,000 metric tons. Planned expansions are expected to result in an increase to 403,000 tons by 1955. The two companies have about 500 factory employees, working on a continuous three-shift basis and there are about 300 additional workers in the quarries.

There are ample supplies of limestone in close proximity to each factory. The other constituent materials are readily available and are usually brought in as return loads. Refractory bricks are imported. The rotary kilns are oil fired, about 150 kg. of fuel oil being used for each metric ton of cement produced. The transport costs of fuel oil are heavy, varying from £S 10 to over £S 20 per ton.

Syrian cement now costs about £S 80 per ton ex factory, including the tax (for domestic use) of £S 15 per ton, against prices of from £S 50 to £S 70 per ton for European and Lebanese cement c.i.f. Beirut.

Glass

323 Glassmaking is one of Syria's traditional industries. Until the end of the last war, broken glass constituted its raw material and primitive hand methods were used, but production is now concentrated mainly in one large factory on the outskirts of Damascus. There are also 12 small enterprises, several of them in the Damascus area, engaged in the production of bottles, glass containers, lamp glasses, etc. Machines are used in certain processes, but production is still largely in the hands of glass blowers.

The output of the large Damascus factory, considered to be the most modern factory of its kind in the Middle East, averaged almost 4,000 tons annually during 1950-53. Sand has to be imported from Lebanon, as the local sand is unsuitable; soda ash and silica are imported from Europe and fuel oil from Lebanon. The company sells its standard window glass in

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Syria at about £S 2.85 per square meter. Most of its production is sold 323
locally and there has recently been a marked increase in demand from its export markets in Lebanon and Jordan where Syrian glass is admitted duty free. Since 1952 the importation of sheet glass, many containers and other glass articles has been prohibited.

Tanning and Leather Dressing

The development of the tanning and leather dressing industry from 282
the handicraft to the mechanically-aided stage began about 1929 and has made good progress, particularly since the dissolution of the Customs Union with Lebanon.

The supply of Syrian sheep and goat skins is more than sufficient to meet local demand, but raw cow and buffalo hides were imported to the extent of over 2,000 tons in 1951 and over 2,500 tons in 1953 to supplement the supply of local hides. About 800 tons of untreated hides and skins were exported in 1951 and 600 in 1953, and about 430 tons and 330 tons of processed leather and leather goods in 1951 and 1953 respectively. According to the most recent official figures (end of 1953) the tanneries which the government classes as factories numbered 75, mostly in the Aleppo and Damascus areas. The annual output amounted to 2,700 tons of sole hide and 4.9 million square feet of other leather. The number of workers employed was given as 2,700.

Elsewhere we have mentioned the successful establishment of an industrial zone for tanneries on the outskirts of Damascus. This has provided an opportunity for the introduction of additional modern machinery and a great improvement in working conditions at the new location. The new tanneries vary considerably in size, the number of workers ranging from five or six to about 100.

Boots and Shoes 295

Leather boots and shoes with leather or rubber soles are made by hand or on simple machines in small workshops in most parts of the country, or by the retailer on his own premises. There are no reliable figures of the number of workers or volume of production.

During the last few years four factories have been established near

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295 Damascus to manufacture rubber boots, canvas and rubber shoes, and felt and rubber shoes by the hot molding process, using imported crude rubber, imported and local waste rubber and canvas, and locally made felt. Production is said to be about 300,000 pairs per year and about 200 workers are employed. Other factories in Damascus and Aleppo produce rubber soles and heels. About 1,600 tons of rubber and rubber waste were imported in 1953, but it is not known how much was used in the boots and shoes industry in addition to local scrap rubber. The importation of boots and shoes is prohibited.

Matches

319
372 Syria's first match factory started production in Damascus in 1930. By 1952, six more had been built. Damascus has the three largest, Aleppo the other four. Supplies are drawn mostly from local timber, though some additional wood, as well as chemicals, is imported.

An improved layout of machines and the introduction of small conveyors would increase efficiency and assist in lowering costs.

Together the factories employ about 350 whole or part time workers. The three Damascus factories produced about 25.6 million boxes in 1952 and 32.2 million in 1953. Production figures for the Aleppo factories are not available. The importation of matches is prohibited.

Tobacco

277
655 A number of enterprises grade and prepare tobacco for export, but the manufacture and importation of cigarettes and tobacco has, since 1951, been confined to the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration.

The monopoly operates a cigarette factory in Damascus and one in Aleppo, and a factory in Latakia which manufactures and packs tobacco for retail sale. The tobacco for manufacture is partly Syrian (from the Latakia region) and partly imported. Cigarettes, tobacco and cigars are also imported from Europe and the United States.

The Damascus branch is in a new factory where tobacco is sorted, damped, stripped by hand only, and cut. The cigarettes are made on a number of old German machines and a few new American ones.

The tobacco monopoly employs 2,300 workers; total production of all three factories amounted to 2.7 million kg. in 1953.

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Grain Milling

256

The grain milling industry is spread widely throughout Syria. The Ministry of National Economy records over 360 small enterprises with a total of 311 mills and 257 cylinders, employing about 1,700 workers. Many of these are very small units driven by a diesel engine or by water power. In addition, there are five larger mills in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs fitted with modern machinery and employing a total of about 250 workers.

Other Industries

433

Syria has many minor industries, some of long standing, others new. These include enterprises for the manufacture of paints and colors, biscuits, spaghetti, confectionery, metal containers, furniture, domestic utensils, liquid gas, alcoholic and other beverages, ropes, tiles, cement piping, plastics, cosmetics, cardboard, plywood, pins, nails and springs, and establishments engaged in refrigeration, processing of licorice root, casting of iron, brass and other metals, manufacture of hand and machine tools, repair of motor vehicles and accessories.

Deposits of asphalt near Latakia are being worked by a company which produces raw and processed asphalt and asphalt tiles.

II APPRAISAL OF INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS

Location

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438

The Damascus, Aleppo and Homs-Hama areas are the main centers of manufacturing industry, a logical location in terms of accessibility of raw materials, communications, water and power services, skilled labor and the proximity of markets. These industrial towns, conveniently situated at a distance of less than 150 miles from the nearest seaports, and connected with these by road, rail or both, are the natural market places for agricultural products and the largest centers of consumption for manufactured goods. Latakia, next in importance, is a rapidly growing port town.

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Raw Materials

433 Considering the present structure of Syrian industry, its supply of raw materials is generally speaking not unsatisfactory. In the preceding section we have referred to the import needs, if any, of Syria's principal industries. Most local and imported raw materials are generally available at competitive prices. The principal exception is sugar, the high price of which presents a serious drawback to the fruit canning, jam and candy industries. The prohibition of imports of cotton seed for industrial use hampers the ability of vegetable oil manufacturers to enter the export market at competitive prices. Some branches of the textile industry dependent on imported cotton yarn or cloth, subject to high customs duties, are in a similarly unfortunate position.

On the other hand certain laws or regulations in effect give some Syrian industries a right of first refusal with regard to locally produced raw materials; export of both ginned and non-ginned cotton, cotton seed, raw wool and raw hides, is subject to licensing, while export of timber and raw metals is prohibited. The efficacy and desirability of such measures may be questioned (see Section IV), but they are elements of the prevailing industrial climate.

The transportation of local raw materials to the industrial centers, where they are processed, is not unduly burdensome, thanks to the favorable location of Syrian industries in or near the producing areas. Moreover, the distances between these centers and the seaports are not too great. Nevertheless, transportation in Syria is relatively costly and an improvement in the transport sector would not only facilitate exports of surplus raw materials but would also benefit the processing industries and their competitive position.

Water and Power

433 312 371 The main industrial centers are, generally speaking, well provisioned with water. Damascus has the best water supply among Syrian cities, thanks to the springs of Figeh. Aleppo's water supply, which was so inadequate that some factories had to select sites outside of the town where they could drill their own wells, has now been greatly improved by a link with the Euphrates River. Homs and Hama have more than sufficient water

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resources in Homs Lake. The water rates charged by the municipalities are by no means excessive.

With regard to electricity for light and power the conditions are, however, much less favorable. The capacity of the municipal power plants in the four main industrial cities is far from sufficient to meet total consumption needs. Most of the larger factories have had to install their own power plants, which imposes an additional capital burden on them.[8] Factories which have no power plant of their own often suffer considerable losses resulting from breaks in the power and light supply. Electricity rates of public utilities, although higher in Syria than, for instance, in Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt, compare not unfavorably with those in the main Western industrial centers.

Equipment

The mechanical equipment of the major industries is in general good. Obsolete or inefficient machinery is continuously being replaced by new plant. Nevertheless, there are still many old factories and workshops where equipment is primitive and modernization is much needed.

Some industries, however, seem as a whole to be overequipped in relation to the available raw material supply or the market outlets for their products. A striking example is the installed capacity in the cotton ginning industry, which could handle between two and three times the present cotton crop. This is no doubt due in part to an overestimation at the time of the cotton boom. The government has accordingly prohibited the importation of cotton gins. In the case of the vegetable oil industry the installed capacity might be more fully utilized if cotton seed were freely importable and oil manufacturers could enter the export market for vegetable oils at competitive prices. As a complement to the protection of local cotton seed, the government has also placed an embargo on the importation of vegetable oils. A third instance of overequipment is in the glass industry: the Damascus factory was designed and installed on the basis of the rather ambitious notion that it should serve most of the needs of the Middle East. Some of its machinery, as for instance that for the manufacture of electric bulbs, has never been in operation. Although most of the items it produces may not be imported into Syria and although recently

[8] See Annex G, p. 413.

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433 exports to Lebanon and Jordan, where its glass is admitted duty free, have
402 been increasing, the plant is running much below capacity. A fourth instance is the match industry, which has a capacity much in excess of the requirements of the home market. This industry is also protected by an embargo on imports but prospects for increasing exports are practically non-existent; European matches are of better quality and have captured the Jordan market, Lebanon produces its own and Iraq is putting up a match factory.

Among the industries in which the greatest expansion is taking place, the cement industry ranks first. After completion of proposed extensions, the combined capacities of the Damascus and Aleppo factories will be about 400,000 tons in 1955 as against 240,000 tons in 1953. It is difficult to estimate Syria's cement requirements in the foreseeable future. In 1953 these amounted to 320,000 tons, of which 120,000 tons were imported, but it is probable that even if the present rate of private urban building is not maintained, some increased demand will result from the construction of public buildings, the creation of new settlements, improvements in rural housing materials, the extension of irrigation and improvements in the road system. Since several Middle Eastern countries have their own cement factories (Lebanon has long had a large cement factory, Jordan has just completed one and Turkey has a number under construction), it is doubtful whether Syria will be able to maintain its small export trade.[4] Although the 1955 total production capacity may somewhat exceed the requirements of the local market, the planned extensions do not seem unreasonable and may even contribute to more efficient operation and lower unit costs.

288 The textile industry is expanding capacity by increasing and modernizing equipment. The existing plant is operating at full or almost full
402
439 capacity, three working shifts being general in the spinning and weaving
433 factories.

In 1953 and through 1954 several tens of thousand additional spindles, several hundred new automatic looms and numbers of knitting machines were installed and optimistic opinions were expressed as to the usefulness of considerable further extensions. Their justification depends on the development of the home and adjoining markets. Syria is approaching self-sufficiency in cotton textiles and the prospects for exports appear promising only in certain specific brands. Only cotton yarn of the higher counts is imported; exports are insignificant. Imports of cotton cloth are

[4] 1,000 tons in 1952; 24,000 tons in 1953.

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larger, and exceed exports which have been falling off. On the other hand, exports of knitted, cotton and rayon goods and other articles of clothing, garments, underwear and socks exceed imports by far.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the entire cotton textile industry is well protected. Imports of yarn and cloth are subject to rather high import duties: 45% ad valorem (about 33% at the free rate of the Syrian pound); duties on fine cotton yarns are substantially lower. In contrast, rayon and woolen yarns are duty free. Socks and stockings (except those made from woolen yarns), men's shirts and pyjamas for men and women may not be imported. This protection, though helpful to the home market, hampers the export trade, particularly in finished goods. This is especially so of those goods requiring use of imported materials in their production; no adequate tariff rebate is given on foreign materials in the exported finished goods. Syrian shirt manufacturers, for instance, claim that with existing machinery they could easily double their production and compete in the export market but for these unfavorable conditions. Although most of the surrounding countries heavily protect their own textile industries, some of Syria's finished textile goods seem to be in a position to compete on the international market to the extent that the component materials are not burdened with protective duties.

In the dyeing, printing and finishing industry—which for a long time lagged behind—a considerable expansion is still anticipated and seems fully justified. Additional machinery was being installed to make possible a full three shifts.

The worsted and woolen cloth industry is not as well equipped with modern machinery as the cotton textile industry. Although the existing plant operates little below capacity and imports of cloth are rather significant, the industry shows no great inclination to expand. Despite the fact that imported yarn is duty free and imported cloth is subject to a rather high tariff, there is keen foreign competition by Italian cloth in the cheaper ranges, British cloth in the higher class and by second-hand suits from the United States. Complaints were heard that the transport charges on the bulkier imported yarns weigh heavily on the industry in comparison to the cost of transporting imported cloth. This drawback seems difficult to overcome. Exports of woolen yarns and cloth have been running well under 7‰ by value, of imported yarns and cloth, and in view of the factors mentioned above, no large expansion of exports is to be expected. For recent figures, see Table 1 of the Appendix.

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The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

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first postwar period, ample opportunities outside industry (trade, agriculture and real estate). 464 471

The main source of the capital which founded these new industries was commercial profits accumulated during the war by Syrians in and outside Syria; a certain amount of Lebanese capital seems to have been contributed. Many companies were able to operate with the capital originally subscribed, but in some cases the paid-up capital was mainly or entirely absorbed by land, buildings and equipment, leaving little or nothing for working capital. The mission encountered several instances in which working capital had been supplied by banks on an overdraft basis at a rate of 5% to 7%, but mostly for rather limited amounts only. In a number of cases, however, when larger amounts were required, industrial firms had recourse to a scheme of government-guaranteed industrial credits introduced in 1949. Although it was reserved for industrial corporations and thus did not cover the needs of the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises not organized in that form, it has been very helpful to the companies which were able to benefit from it while passing through a difficult initial period of inadequate financial resources. Such credits were made available by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban for three years (now renewable for an additional five years) at the low rate of 3%. 464

Most Syrian industrialists, hard working and thrifty as they are, prefer to forego paying dividends rather than remain indebted or incur new indebtedness with banks. In most cases loans for working capital are paid off as soon as possible; new machinery is generally purchased with plowed-back earnings and often reserve funds are formed with a view to making further extension or modernization. In several instances the originally subscribed capital has been increased by issuing new stock to the old shareholders. The government-guaranteed loans, on the other hand, are so exceptionally attractive that in the difficult circumstances at the time the plan was initiated there was a great readiness to apply for them and later to have them extended. However, during the last few years the government has become more reluctant to give this scheme a wider application. The total amount which can be guaranteed is now limited to £S 15 million. At the end of 1953 loans outstanding amounted to £S 13.4 million.

On the whole, the development of Syrian industry has been on a sound basis from the financial point of view. True, one frequently finds considerable amounts of loan debts on the balance sheet of industrial corpora- 455 454

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#33 tions; these, however, often represent contributions to working capital by
#34 members of the owner-family or an inner circle of controlling shareholders who for various reasons prefer this technique to accepting additional stock. This may be an unfortunate situation from the legal point of view, although in practice it does not seem substantially to weaken the continuity of the capitalization. The government-guaranteed loans may be subject to criticism, particularly with regard to the applicable interest rate, which is much below that reasonably to be expected in a country where capital is relatively scarce. However, thanks to the provision that in each case these loans may not exceed half the paid-up capital of the borrower, they have not dangerously affected the financial structure of the companies concerned. Yet the mission feels that the entire system of government-guaranteed industrial loans financed by the BSL does not at this stage provide an appropriate and adequate solution to the problem of supplementing the traditional means of financing industrial development.

#33 Although the larger gaps in the main fields in which conditions for modern industrial production are reasonably favorable have either been filled or are rapidly being filled, the industrialization movement is far from being exhausted. All the evidence indicates that it will continue to spread, though probably at a slower rate than in the years immediately preceding 1952 and along more selective lines. With the limits of the home market within reach or already reached, further development of existing industries will depend largely on their success in attaining a higher degree of efficiency and reducing production costs. In view of these trends and requirements the mission is of the opinion that a specialized credit institution is needed to furnish both technical assistance and industrial banking facilities, to the extent that these are presently lacking, and to provide a firmer basis for further investment financing. A more detailed proposal for such an investment bank will be found in the Main Report.

Labor

#64 According to an official estimate, the number of workers employed in Syrian industry (excluding electrical productions, commerce, etc. and enterprises employing only family members) is approximately 70,000. In some industries, particularly in the textile sector, the supply of skilled labor is barely sufficient for present needs, but unskilled labor is generally

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available as required. More women are to be found in modern industry 464
than formerly, especially in the hosiery and other textile factories.

The Syrian workman is on the whole better educated and more adaptable than his counterpart in most of the Middle Eastern countries. The availability of a large force of handicraft workers skilled in the fashioning of metals, wood, stone, textiles and other materials was of great value when the rapid expansion of industry began. As it proceeded, the government and the industrial leaders became increasingly conscious of the need for systematic vocational education and training in schools and factories; this has made considerable progress in recent years.

In Annex I an appraisal is made of the existing vocational (other than agricultural) schools in Syria; our recommendations regarding their extension and improvement are designed better to fit them to the requirements of industry as well as those of commerce and banking.

The private business world, as well as the government, has made its contribution. Most Syrian employers now recognize that successful plant operation demands an adequate supply and a small turnover of skilled labor. Some of the larger factories have instituted training schemes, some providing up to three months specialized training during which the apprentice is paid the full minimum wage. Most of the other factories and workshops have systems under which learners are gradually promoted from the simple to the more skilled operations.

There are nearly 200 industrial unions combined in federations in 467
Syria, with a total of about 25,000 members. The federations and also a large proportion of the trade unions have mutual funds, derived in part from normal subscriptions of members, and partly from government subsidies. They are used for grants to members for medical expenses, hospitalization, extension of the legal periods of sick pay, grants to aged workers, unemployment pay and the like.

The Directorate of Labor and Social Services in the Ministry of 466
National Economy is responsible for ensuring enforcement of the provi- 447
sions of Syria's rather liberal Labor Code, supervising the trade unions, establishing and operating public employment offices and encouraging the foundation of private ones.

Wages are comparatively low. Minimum wages are fixed by local 465
Minimum Wage Boards. A fairly representative sample of daily wages seems to be: boys and women, £S 1; unskilled men, £S 2-5; skilled men,

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445 £S 5-7. For exceptionally heavy work daily wages up to £S 9 are paid. Foremen and managers receive from £S 10 upwards. It is far from certain whether the smallness of the wage offsets the low labor productivity. Employer-employee relations appear to be fair and on a democratic basis.

Management

444 443 Industrial management presents some striking contrasts, as pointed out in the Main Report. It is commendable that, in order to accommodate students who may serve as future industrial managers and top technical staff, the scope of the Engineering College of the Syrian University is being widened. In the past, only civil engineering has been offered but in the near future mechanical, electrical and chemical engineering will be included in the syllabus. In due course this will increase the local supply of trained personnel for industry and thus help overcome one of Syria's greatest deficiencies. Although this will make technical knowledge more readily available at lower cost, it would be very helpful if an institution were established to give technical, economical and financial advice on a consultant basis. This is one of the functions the mission has in mind to be performed by the proposed investment bank.

The mission observed that there are many weaknesses which could be avoided by more careful planning and by a better understanding of the various factors which make for higher efficiency. The proper estimation of the size of the market and the production capacity required to satisfy it, the quantity and quality of the necessary raw, or partly processed, materials and their sources and rate of supply, the utilization of waste products, quality control of the end products, analysis and control of costs and the application of budgeting could in many cases be introduced or greatly improved. Again, the great influence of working conditions on efficient production is often insufficiently recognized.

It was pointed out earlier that the basic industrial factors are, generally speaking, not unfavorable. It is the problem of raising the standard of efficiency generally that should receive primary consideration, preceding, in most cases, the provision of greater capacity. This conclusion stresses the urgent need for more and better qualified managing personnel, trained in modern industrial methods through frequent contacts with the West, and for intensified technical assistance.

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Profitability

The profitability of Syria's industry varies widely from one industry to another and in some cases even within an industry. Differences in the quality of management may produce a marked variation in profits. 433 434

Some indication of profits is given below. Generally the data have been obtained from profit and loss statements which are not always clear. Profits are defined as earnings after taxes but before deductions for assignment to compulsory reserves and allocations to the boards of directors.

The cement industry is by far the most profitable in Syria. Quoted prices of shares of the two cement companies increased by about 100% between 1951 and 1953. The Aleppo company earned 25% on its paid-in capital during 1952, the first full year of operation. Profits earned by the Damascus company amounted to 22% on paid-in capital in 1950, 34% in 1951 and 48% in 1952. In 1953 it was able to increase its capitalization from £S 6 million to £S 9 million out of accumulated profits.

In the textile industry (spinning and weaving), profits have varied widely. One of the more successful firms in Damascus earned 9.3%, 17.7% and 22.9% on its paid-in capital in 1950, 1951 and 1952 respectively. One of the largest Aleppo companies earned about 30% on its paid-in capital in 1950 and 1951 and a little over 12% in 1952. On the other hand, another large Aleppo company suffered consistent losses amounting to a total of £S 1,826,550 in the years 1949-52 inclusive, while a third Aleppo company of more moderate size was liquidated in 1953 after losses totaling £S 911,233 in 1951 and 1952.

The hosiery industry appears to be doing well, one concern having earned about 20% on its paid-in capital in 1953. Little is known, however, about the profitability of this branch of industry in general.

The clothing industry (suitings, underwear, shirts, pyjamas, etc.) appears to be moderately profitable.

Profits data for the canning industry are also largely lacking. One company in Damascus earned 13.8% on its paid-in capital in 1952. Another, also in Damascus, apparently had profits of less than 3% in 1953.

The sugar company at Homs has earned modest profits in recent years. After initial losses in 1949 and 1950, the company earned about 3% and 6% on paid-in capital in 1951 and 1952 respectively. Presumably profits continued to increase substantially in 1953.

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The vegetable oils and soap industries have not generally been very profitable. One of the larger Damascus companies had substantial losses in 1949 and 1952. In 1950 and 1951, however, it earned 20% and 30% on its paid-in capital. One of the more important companies in Aleppo apparently barely broke even in 1951 and 1952 and suffered severe losses in 1953, so that it was reported to have gone into liquidation in 1954. A new Aleppo company which started operating in 1952 apparently has been somewhat more successful to date.

The large glass factory near Damascus earned profits of about £S 200,000 on £S 7 million paid-in capital in both 1952 and 1953. Prior to these years of modest profits it consistently suffered losses except for the year 1950 when it showed a net profit of £S 183,140.

On the profitability of tanneries there is little information, although one evidently earned almost 7% in 1952 and 14% in 1953 on its paid-in capital.

The rubber shoe industry is apparently highly profitable, if one can judge from the data available on one company which earned almost 55% on its paid-in capital in 1952, and approximately 85% in 1953.

The match industry is suffering from overcapacity and, owing to keen competition, seems to have made little profit in recent years.

For other industries, such as milling, beverage, paints, etc., no information is available on profits.

III GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

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The relations between government and industry in Syria will be discussed under the following headings: (1) tariff policy and embargoes, (2) credit facilities, (3) fiscal privileges, and (4) other controls and incentives.

Tariff Policy and Embargoes

Syria achieved customs autonomy for the first time in recent centuries in March 1950, with the termination of the Customs Union with Lebanon. As a natural consequence, each country began to apply its normal tariffs to imports from its former partner. Only a few days later, the Syrian tariff on imports of certain foreign products which competed with local industry

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was increased from 25% ad valorem to 40% or 50%. This was true of canned vegetables and fruits, fruit juices, jams, candy, woolen and mixed cotton cloth and various kinds of glass. In estimating the amount of protection thus provided it should be kept in mind that the tariff duties are based on the import prices at the official rate of exchange, but as the goods are actually paid for at the free rate (with the exception of mineral oil products) the incidence of the duties is less than two-thirds of the apparent rate.

In 1950 also a special customs duty of 5% was introduced, as a so-called "consumption tax" on imported products, substituting for various municipal taxes previously collected. Although largely revenue-producing in character, this measure somewhat increased the protective effect of the tariff.

Shortly after ending the Customs Union the Syrian government enacted legislation bringing import licensing, until then a matter for joint decision, under its control. In view of the favorable development of business conditions following the outbreak of the Korean war, application of licensing was deferred.

By early 1951, however, several factories appeared to be overstocked with raw materials purchased at boom prices and certain weaknesses inherent in the Syrian industrial structure became more apparent. Several industries seemed to be overexpanded in relation to internal consumption and insufficiently prepared to meet foreign competition both at home and in the international market. They requested the government to give them a preferential position with respect to the supply of essential local raw materials, to impose import restrictions on competitive foreign goods and to adjust importation of industrial machinery to the needs and absorptive capacity of the country.

As a result, between March and June 1951 the tariff on a large number of finished textile goods (hosiery, men's and women's clothing, etc.) was raised from 40% to 50%, and an embargo was introduced on "job lots of cloth" (cloth damaged, or of inferior quality or otherwise not suitable for sale through normal channels), imported in considerable quantity and greatly in demand by the poorer groups of the population. Imports of looms and knitting machines were brought under special control. The export of several materials in short supply (e.g., certain metals, fertilizers, jute sacks, paper and paperboard, and glycerine) was forbidden.

Thereafter, the protectionist policy with regard to industry became

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more pronounced and systematic. The regulations regarding the licensing of imports were more strictly applied. The normal tariff on glass was raised to 70% and on various sorts of soap to 40% or 50%. The export of a large number of important raw materials, raw cotton, cotton seed, oil cakes, raw wool, all fruits and vegetables, was subjected to licensing. Shoes and boots were added to the embargo list. Although the embargo on "job lot cloth" was strongly protested, it was not lifted, and instead it was extended to second-hand cotton and silk clothing.

The year 1952 was characterized by a policy of rigorous industrial protectionism. The Minister of National Economy, given almost discretionary power to institute export and import embargoes and licensing requirements, used these powers with little restraint, particularly as to import embargoes, which were imposed on four principal categories of imports: (1) goods locally produced in quantity adequate to meet domestic requirement; (2) goods for which similar local products could be substituted; (3) luxury goods; and (4) machinery which would increase the capacity of an already overequipped industry.

The restrictions and controls on exports were somewhat extended and a de facto monopoly was established with regard to import, export and wholesale trading of sugar.

These measures of extreme protectionism, supplemented by a stricter enforcement of the control on the utilization of foreign exchange by importers and various other measures which will be discussed later, made it possible for many months to charge local customers relatively high prices, compared to those prevailing in the surrounding markets, and to make substantial profits. It also facilitated agreements among manufacturers in defense of their common interests and to reduce internal competition. Complaints from those whose interests were particularly affected and a more general dissatisfaction created by a rise in the cost of living induced the government to take steps to reduce prices. Acting under general legislation enacted in 1951, and specific legislation with respect to sugar and cement, the government fixed lower prices for goods such as cement, yarns and vegetable oils and reduced the tax on sugar.

However, it was thought even in government circles that the import prohibitions had gone too far. Not only was the cost of living increasing but the income from customs duties began to drop, and smuggling and evasion of price-fixing rules became a most profitable activity. In April 1953 action of the Minister of National Economy with respect to imports

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and exports was subjected to the approval of the Council of Ministers. This was followed by the withdrawal of embargoes on various non-competitive imports, higher tariffs being substituted in some cases.

As of autumn 1954 all embargoes on imported goods which directly compete with national products were still in effect, with the exception of the embargo on men's shirts, underwear and pyjamas. Imports of cotton gins are forbidden, to prevent further overexpansion of the ginning industry, and the importation of second-hand looms and knitting machines is prohibited, to ensure the installation of new and modern machinery; importation of almost all items, including machinery, is still subject to licensing. There has been almost no change in the list of prohibited exports or of those which must be licensed. Although the export tax on wheat has been repealed, cotton exports are still taxed; there were certainly good financial reasons for this, but it means in fact a continuation of the element of protection which this duty represents, in favor of the local cotton processing industry. On the other hand, products subject to an embargo or high protective duties are no longer subject to price control. The government is now relying on the effect of internal competition.

Credit Facilities

During the mandate, in 1929, the Syrian Government instructed the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture to establish an industrial bank with a capital of £S 500,000, in which the government was to participate; this was never done.[8]

Not until 20 years later, in June 1949, was the Minister of Finance authorized to guarantee loans to Syrian industrial corporations (*sociétés par actions*) for their first installation or to enable them to continue operations. The amount to be reimbursed under the guarantee could not exceed half the paid-up capital of the corporation and the period of repayment was not to be longer than three years. Eligibility of applicants, their needs and the conditions of both loan and guarantee were to be determined by a special committee; the Minister of Finance was authorized to require a mortgage on the property of the corporation, the mortgage to have preferred position.

Of the 18 loans totalling £S 23.627 million made by January 1952,

[8] *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie*. Moh. Thome, Madrid, 1953, p. 157.

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652 seven were for over £S 1 million to 10 corporations. One large Damascus
133 corporation received two loans totalling £S 7 million. The sectors of industry to which loans were made were, in order of magnitude, textiles, sugar refining, vegetable and fruit canning and glass; a minor amount was loaned for manufacture of liquid gas and mechanical equipment. The terms on which all of these loans were made were considerably easier than those prevailing on the capital market, the rate of interest being only 3%.

By the time repayment was due, the general attitude of the government towards industry had become so favorable that beneficiaries, if they wished it, had little difficulty in securing an extension.* In 1952, extension of the period of repayment for five additional years was authorized, and "guaranteed companies" might thereafter be allowed to distribute dividends out of net profits in stated circumstances. Any guaranteeing of new industrial loans was forbidden.

By legislation in January 1954, the scheme was revived and even extended to include loans for the financing of big hotels, provided, however, that the total amount of the loans outstanding and guaranteed to industry and hotels should not exceed £S 15 million.

Fiscal Privileges

654 Until 1949 fiscal facilities favoring industry were restricted to special
133 customs provision applying to imported tools, machinery, apparatus and materials for industrial requirements; in stated circumstances, they might be subject to a tariff of only 1%.

An act of 1945 exempted new construction, for two years, from the tax on income from real property. In 1950, the exemption was explicitly applied to new factories and workshops, beginning with the financial year following the completion of the projects.

On September 27, 1952, Legislative Decree No. 103 (on the encouragement of industry) granted to all registered industrial establishments, effective with the 1953 fiscal year, the following privileges under certain conditions:

1. exemption from customs duties on machinery, tools and equipment

* It is noteworthy that at that time the large Damascus corporation mentioned above had converted its £S 7 million guaranteed loan in an overdraft of the commercial type with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. As a result, the total guaranteed amount outstanding had dropped to £S 16.627 million.

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imported for the requirements of the enterprises; the industries and the imports as well as the quantities benefitting from this provision are determined by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Ministry of National Economy; 654 433

2. exemption for six years from the tax on income from real property, for new construction in factories, administrative buildings and housing for workers and employees connected with the establishment, and industrial machines and equipment housed in these installations; the existing two-year exemption of new factories and workshops was extended for the same six-year period;

3. exemption from income tax for reserves up to 10% of annual profits, devoted within two years to the further expansion of the industrial establishment;

4. exemption from the "temettu" tax for six years from the beginning of operation; and

5. exemption from the income tax for three years from the beginning of operation in the case of industries needed by Syria or which had not been established there on the specified date.

These privileges are also applicable to additions to existing factories and industrial plants. On the other hand, an industrial establishment which suspends operations for more than a year and a half without an excuse accepted by the Ministry of National Economy loses its exemptions.

Proprietors of beneficiary industrial establishments must, among other things, furnish complete information and accounts of their enterprises, and must use the machines, equipment and construction materials which qualify their enterprises for the exemptions.

The granting of the privileges under (1) and (5) calls for a decision of the government, which can be based on the preceding appraisal of the project as required under the law on the regulation of industry, discussed in the following paragraph. The other privileges are extended automatically.

Other Controls and Incentives

The registration of industry. Following the opening of a general public register of manufacturing enterprises in 1949, a 1951 decree introduced a system of special registers for every local industry. Anyone starting an industrial establishment in Syria must present within one month 656 433

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656 433 after beginning operations to the Directorate of Industry of the Ministry of National Economy or its local representative in the mohafazat, information on (a) the legal status of the establishment, its address and that of its main office; (b) the goods it produces; (c) the nature, number and power of its motors; (d) the nature, number and capacity of its productive equipment; (e) the number of working hours per day and week; (f) the number of workers employed; and (g) all other information which the Ministry may require. All industrial enterprises established at the time were required to register within three months. Every change or modification taking place in the stated data has to be indicated within one month.

The mission was informed that the registration has encountered considerable difficulties because of a wide-spread reluctance to disclose to the authorities the required data, even though they are confidential and for statistical purposes only. As a result the statistics based on the registration are not considered to be fully reliable.

The regulation of industry. The year 1952, when protectionism reached its peak, also brought a thorough regulation of industrial enterprises as such, with a view to orienting industrial activity toward the needs and interest of the country.

The establishment of any form of industrial enterprise is subject to licensing.[7] The applicant is required to submit a detailed report on his project covering (a) the name, nationality and residence of the owner; (b) the type and location of the proposed establishment; (c) the capital to be devoted to the enterprise; (d) the type, number and power of the proposed machines and their capacity; (e) the number of employees and workers; (f) the study made by the applicant underlying his decision to establish the enterprise; and (g) any other information required by the Ministry. Owners of industrial enterprises who wish to expand their establishments either by adding to the machine park or by extending their operations to other lines of production must also obtain a license. Industrial establishments in existence when the decree was issued are considered to be authorized, but have to obtain a certificate of registration from the Ministry of National Economy within six months, or thereafter apply for a license.

No detailed information is available on the manner in which the regulations are applied or as to the principles governing the decisions of the

[7] Corporations (*sociétés anonymes*) require a special authorization by the Ministry of National Economy.

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authorities. The mission was informed, however, that practically every handicraft application for an industrial license is approved. With regard to industry proper, applications have been turned down for various reasons. The main criteria seem to be whether the local market can absorb the additional production and whether the new or expanded industry can be expected to increase exports, especially to the Arab countries.

Facilities with regard to industrial sites. By the decree on the encouragement of industry, the government opened facilities for settlement on state domain land. The proprietor of an industrial establishment who wishes to construct a building for industrial exploitation may rent up to 25,000 square meters with a five-year option to purchase land belonging to state domain, on conditions to be determined by the Directorate of State Domain. The beneficiary is not allowed to sell or utilize this land for non-industrial purposes and the State may recover ownership of land not used for industrial construction or expansion within five years.

These provisions represent a real contribution to a reduction of the cost of establishing new industrial enterprises and to the better siting of existing ones.

Export promotion. The laws on the regulation and the encouragement of industry contain several provisions, already mentioned, which permit the authorities in their discretion to grant certain privileges and other facilities to industrial enterprises in the interest of the national economy. We understand that the authorities have several more specific objectives in mind, including the promotion of industrial exports.

Besides these measures, which have been in existence for only two years, the Syrian Government has for several years been actively engaged in negotiating foreign trade agreements with Arab and other countries[8] with a view to promoting exports generally. Since gaining its independence Syria has made commercial agreements with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon among the Arab countries, and with India, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Japan. Several of these treaties include special privileges for Syrian industrial exports, either assuring them most-favored-nation treatment or exempting specific Syrian products from import restrictions or allowing them tariff reductions or exemptions. Agreements in 1953 with Lebanon and Jordan exempt some local industrial products from customs duties or apply reduced tariffs, and provide

[8] Formerly, under the mandate, commercial treaties could be concluded only with neighboring countries and countries not members of the League of Nations.

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654 for the exchange of other industrial products subject to ordinary duties.
433 The inter-Arab economic agreements of September 9, 1953, between Leba-
439 non, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, list a considerable number of industrial products to which a tariff rate of 25% of the normal tariff of these countries will be applied. But they do not exempt trade among the signatory countries from existing import and export licenses and embargoes, nor do they rule out the institution of new ones. Only in the special commercial agreements between Syria and Jordan, and Syria and Lebanon, are certain industrial products, originating in these countries, exempt from all import restrictions.

IV AN APPRAISAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS INDUSTRY

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A country like Syria, with a preponderantly agrarian economy, no important mineral deposits and little power resources, still rather underdeveloped from the point of view of national income per capita and the dissemination of technical skills, is likely to have a natural advantage in the following branches of mechanized industrial production: (1) the processing—at least up to a certain stage—of indigenous crops which are exported; (2) the production of building materials and other bulky goods for local needs; (3) the manufacture in light industries of commodities for general consumption and some durable goods to meet a more or less special national or regional requirement, even with imported raw materials; (4) the production of simple tools and the repair (eventually the assembly) of locally used machines; and (5) the semi-handicraft production of some luxury goods requiring those special skills for which the country has traditionally been well known. These are in fact the main fields on which modern Syria's industry has concentrated and there is nothing fundamentally unsound about this.

On the other hand, it could not have been expected that the progress made in the period of relative isolation followed by the postwar boom would make Syria proof against the competition of long established and highly efficient foreign concerns, quite apart from the dumping of cheap surplus stocks and large imports of modern machine-made luxury goods with which it was confronted by the end of the forties. The customs tariff of the Syrian-Lebanese Union offered only a modest protection for local

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industry. It is not surprising that the exposure to strong foreign competition created a serious situation for various new industrial enterprises, or that the government began to give industry greater protection and encouragement. It appears, however, that since the middle of 1951 government policy toward industry, particularly—but not only—in the field of foreign trade, has tended more and more toward the aim of national self-sufficiency in products which can be locally manufactured rather than toward development in an international economy. We think that the former opens definitely less perspective both for a rise in the standard of living and for the future of Syrian industry itself. Therefore we recommend a reconsideration of the policy and the measures under discussion.

The priority given to national self-sufficiency has resulted in extensive public control over industry. The Syrian home market is relatively small and it has already been pointed out that several industries have reached a productive capacity which meets or even surpasses the effective domestic demand. The measures of "restriction" and "reservation" tend to make Syrian industry dependent on internal controls which are very difficult to administer and carry the danger of submitting the government to pressure groups. The exclusion of foreign competition which frequently accompanies this policy weakens the stimulus to increased efficiency and lower costs, to the detriment of the consumer and the competitive position of Syrian industry in the outside markets. Internal competition, even if it remains free, can only be a poor substitute, being affected by internal cost factors and their elasticity in a protected economy.

The mission feels that industrial policy should be reoriented toward freer, rather than centrally controlled and protected development, with a view to achieving further progress in an international economy. Only thus will Syrian industry become a supplier of manufactured goods of satisfactory quality at reasonable prices, able to expand beyond the limits set by the internal market and to earn foreign exchange by the value it adds to indigenous and imported materials.

The reorientation which we have in mind does not require the government to withdraw all regulation, protection or other encouragement of industrial enterprise, leaving free competition and international prices to organize and guide Syrian industrial production. Even in more advanced countries, with a much more diversified and stronger economy, such a policy is now rarely applied. Infant industry protection, as a means of assisting well-chosen industries to overcome temporary disadvantages and

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allowing them time to build up an international competitive position, has long been considered a legitimate instrument of economic development. Even well-established industries may require a certain safeguarding against specific forms of internal and foreign competition which do not make for sound and resistant economies with a sufficiently diversified economic and social structure. On the other hand, making due allowance for social and cultural considerations, industrialization should not be an objective in itself to be pursued irrespective of its economic cost to the national community, or without regard to its impact on the subtle balance between economic freedom and economic control.

On the basis of these general considerations the mission makes the following more specific comments on the government's present policy towards industry.

The registration of industry. Up-to-date and reliable information on the structure and operation of industry for statistical purposes is indispensable as a source of instruction and a means of guiding important decisions for the business community itself as well as for the government. In Syria there were until recently no industrial statistics, and the government deserves credit for having tried to remedy this deficiency.

The extensive procedure instituted by the 1951 law, however, is difficult for industrialists to accept, overestimates the capacity of the administration responsible for its execution and seems to fall short of reaching the objective. The relations between government and industry in this regard would be better served and a more fruitful cooperation could probably be expected if the information were to be filed with, elaborated and made available by the Central Bureau of Statistics in a form which does not disclose individual data even to the Ministry of National Economy. The Bureau should enjoy a large amount of autonomy and be so organized and equipped as to win the full confidence of both the government and the business world. Such a system exists and operates very satisfactorily in many other countries and the mission recommends that Syria draw on their experience.

This does not mean that if a particular industry or industrial enterprise requires special government assistance or control, it should not provide the responsible authorities with all the information which they may require.

With regard to the statistics concerning industry, which are particularly necessary, a distinction can be made between those requiring current

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information (e.g., industrial output, raw materials consumed, workers employed, the amounts invested and their sources (internally or externally financed)), and such data as the number and size of establishments, their capacities, their technical and financial structures, and their organization within the framework of existing legislation. It is suggested that it is not equally essential that the latter data should be available annually and it should be sufficient to require their collection and elaboration every few years only. The mission recommends that such a distinction be made, that those statistics which have a direct bearing on policy decisions be given priority and the reliability of statistical information be given more weight than its extensiveness.

The regulation of industry. Although special conditions, such as rapidly changing techniques and market conditions, sometimes necessitate limitations on freedom of industrial establishment and industrial investment, if the benefits accruing from actual achievements are not to be offset by high costs from a social point of view, the mission is of the opinion that under present conditions freedom of enterprise should be the rule and regulation the exception. Before industrial licensing was introduced Syrian industry had, generally speaking, done a reasonably good job and shown a considerable degree of sound initiative, fair judgment and flexibility. It is true that in certain branches there had been overexpansion and mismanagement, but under a system of private enterprise such things cannot altogether be avoided. The danger is great, on the other hand, that the licensing decree will reduce initiative by substituting far-reaching control on establishment and expansion by public officials, devoted and faithful as they may be, for decisions by risk-bearing private entrepreneurs. Moreover, quite apart from the advisability of such a policy, it is doubtful whether the government has experience necessary for judicious control of the entire field of Syrian industrial enterprise and regulation of all industrial investment activities according to the needs and interests of the country.

The mission therefore recommends a return to the principle of freedom of industrial enterprise and that the licensing of new industrial establishments and the control of industrial investments be limited to special cases[9] in which the public interest requires such exceptional provisions. Furthermore, such provisions should be temporary, permitting periodic re-examination of the need to continue them. It is also suggested that before deciding

[9] Such as excessive over-capacity which would perpetuate itself even under free competition.

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656 on the introduction or continuation of these measures with regard to a
433 branch of industry the government take the advice of a standing commission in which, besides various occupational groups, independent economic experts would ensure a well-balanced opinion with due consideration of all the aspects involved. Finally, it seems desirable that decisions on the issuance and cancellation of licenses by the Ministry of National Economy should be governed as much as possible by general and public directives applied without discrimination.

654 *The encouragement of industry.* In many underdeveloped countries
433 it is believed that acceleration of economic progress demands at least a shift in emphasis from primary production in favor of basic and manufacturing industry, to lessen dependence upon the already developed countries. When private initiative seems to be insufficiently vigorous, it sometimes happens that the government takes the lead by establishing publicly financed state factories and other state economic enterprises. This was done in Turkey, for instance.

The Syrian government has, however, taken a different course. Although it nationalized the foreign-owned public utilities it did not, except in one ill-fated case, itself enter the field of industrial operations by establishing factories. Instead, in various ways it encouraged private industrial enterprise, which, after all, had demonstrated its energy in promoting industrialization. Moreover, most of these measures, particularly those aimed at stimulating new industrial establishments and expansion of existing ones, were introduced only when industrial development began to show signs of stagnation during 1952.

The mission takes a favorable view of the basic principle of Legislative Decree No. 103 of 1952. In many countries at an early stage of development, a considerable and often disproportionate part of national savings tends to be invested in residential real estate or to flow into commercial or financial enterprise. Under such circumstances special incentives to induce a larger portion to be invested in industry, where they would probably make a greater contribution to the productivity of the economy, are certainly justified. We have no special comment with regard to the provisions for industrial sites. With respect to the fiscal privileges, however, we have some specific recommendations.

It seems reasonable for an underdeveloped country to exempt from customs duty imports of machinery, tools, equipment and construction materials not locally produced. In Syria decisions as to the industries and

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quantities to be exempted have been made by government officials. The 654
mission suggests that for the system of individual decisions involving 433
political judgment there be substituted in the law itself a general exemption provision on as liberal a basis as possible.

We cannot endorse the temporary exemption from income tax for 654
new firms and for profits on new investment by existing firms. Our chief 433
objection to these provisions is that an income tax exemption leads to 651
rather irrational and sometimes inequitable results. It is obviously most important to the companies realizing the highest profits and it is of no value to those making no profits during the period of exemption. Furthermore, with a graduated tax such as Syria's, large firms benefit more from the exemption than do the small- and medium-sized firms. The exemption of profits derived from expansion of existing businesses, as distinguished from exemption of new firms, presents serious administrative difficulty in connection with the allocation of total profits between the new and the old part of the business. No fully satisfactory solution for this problem can be found even when both administrators and taxpayers are highly skilled and sophisticated in accounting techniques. Yet it would be undesirable to confine the concession to new firms, since additional investment in an established business may often be more productive than the same investment in a new business, especially where, as in Syria, there is a shortage of experienced managers.

The simplest way to achieve most of the benefits of temporary income tax exemption without its disadvantages and difficulties appears to be through liberalization of the depreciation or amortization allowances under the income and profits tax. In other words, the taxpayer should be allowed to write off against taxable income the original cost of plant and equipment in a period shorter than the normal useful life. For any given asset, accelerated depreciation results in a postponement, rather than a complete cancellation, of income tax liability but the investor can extend this postponement indefinitely by acquiring new assets when the first group has been written off for tax purposes.

Accelerated depreciation reduces or eliminates the chance that the income tax will prevent recovery of the capital outlay. For a rapidly growing firm it may offset taxable income and thus be virtually equivalent to exemption. The concession is automatically cancelled if the firm ceases to expand. Accelerated depreciation puts the emphasis on new investment, whereas tax exemption may grant unnecessarily large benefits to highly

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654 profitable firms which do not choose to expand. Furthermore, depreciation
483 raises no great administrative difficulties.

651 Our recommendation would provide a fairly effective substitute for income tax exemption, especially the recommendation that the tax on non-agricultural real estate be transformed into a tax on a true net income is also adopted. We realize, however, that a special problem arises in adapting the accelerated depreciation approach to Syrian conditions. Businesses with gross receipts of less than £S 25,000 per year pay an amount equal to 50% of the temettu tax in lieu of the regular income tax. Since these firms do not compute net income or depreciation allowances they could hardly be brought under the general scheme. It is suggested that these smaller firms be allowed to deduct from their tax liability a credit related to the amount of any new investment in buildings, machinery or other industrial equipment.

The present exemption of reserves up to 10% of annual profits which, within two years, are devoted to expansion of the enterprises would seem to be extremely difficult to administer satisfactorily; proper administration would call for careful supervision to assure compliance. This provision could well be eliminated. The law might provide, however, that if deduction of accelerated depreciation after an investment has actually been made produces an accounting loss, the loss might be carried back against income of the two preceeding years. The present law allows losses to be carried forward against income for five years but does not provide for a carry-back of losses.

652 *Credit facilities.* Our principal objections against the scheme of gov-
433 ernment-guaranteed industrial credits can be summarized as follows: (1) It applies only to corporations, thus excluding the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises, which are not organized in this form, and in effect reserving its benefits to a small group of large companies, although there is no reason to assume that all credit needs outside this group can be met by other means. (2) The limitation of the life of the guaranteed loans to three years (later extended to eight) does not sufficiently allow for adapting the maturity of these loans to the requirements of the projects. As an instrument to facilitate long-term industrial financing the provision may in some cases be too rigid. (3) The 3% interest rate, appreciably below the prevailing market rate, puts the beneficiaries in an exceptionally favorable competitive position as again non-beneficiaries, and may stimu-

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late projects less sound than those which must be financed on a truly competitive basis.

In the Main Report we have set forth the more fundamental objections which point to the desirability of completely abandoning this device rather than merely amending the law. In summary, they are: (1) the inability of a government agency to determine technical and economic soundness of proposed new projects; (2) the inflationary character of the scheme; and (3) the need for an independent institution to provide capital and technical assistance.

Most of the obvious or "natural" industries have been established. What is needed henceforth is (1) expansion of a more selective character, and (2) improvement in the efficiency or a lowering of the production costs in existing industries. There are possibilities for new ventures but they require careful investigation before being initiated. There is accordingly a need for an institution which through its own technical staff or through foreign consulting technicians can investigate such possible new enterprises either on its own initiative or upon request. There are still a number of enterprises, primarily small- or medium-sized, which lag behind in efficiency. It is important that there be a general reduction of costs and prices in order to increase the market at home and abroad. The less efficient enterprises often lack the resources to hire competent engineers and technicians on a permanent basis and they may suffer from deficiencies in machinery and equipment or management. An institution equipped to give or obtain technical advice on the problems of these enterprises could play a useful role. Its technicians might well be able to improve efficiency considerably by analyzing plant layout and working methods, by making time and cost studies and by examining the needs for improved machinery and equipment.

Considering the need of additional facilities to assist the financing of certain investments in agriculture and in modern hotels as well, the mission has recommended in the Main Report the establishment of a predominantly privately owned and independently managed investment bank for industry, agriculture and hotels and for providing technical assistance, primarily to industrial enterprises.

The capitalization of the bank should: (a) bear some relation to the investment possibilities of the institution; (b) permit operations on a scale enabling the earning of sufficient profits; and (c) not exceed the

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652 total which reasonable expectations indicate can be raised. In the Main
433 Report we have suggested capitalization of £S 30 million, and suggested the respective ratio of government and private capital.

The cost of necessary managerial and technical staff might run up to £S 300,000 per year and other costs might rise to the same figure with an increase in the volume of business. Possibly half of the cost of the technical staff might in the long run be recouped from fees for technical services. To economize on operating costs it would be advisable to have the commercial banks act as the bank's agents in receiving applications for loans and disbursing and servicing loans in return for a small commission.

654 *Tariff policy and embargoes.* It is far from clear that the trend toward
439 almost complete protection of industry from the impact of foreign com-
651 petition, qualified to only a limited extent by certain provisions of various commercial agreements, has reached its limits.

We have previously recommended reconsideration of this policy. Protection of many industries has gone too far in the direction of national isolation; the balance should be restored by giving more weight to international integration. Liberalization of external trade should be one of the items on Syria's economic program.

In making this suggestion the mission is mindful of the fact that Syria's balance of payments position is not very strong and that the condition of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves obliges the government to proceed with caution. Yet, as long as internal monetary equilibrium is preserved and the foreign exchange policy remains sound, the significance of these limitations ought not to be exaggerated.

We do not recommend immediate termination of the system of licensing imports since it enables the authorities to register at an early date the expected inflow of foreign goods. This may be considered a legitimate precaution, especially if the restriction of licenses is reserved to times when the balance of payments position is endangered. Under licensing, however, discrimination among imports is unavoidable. It should be realized that the need for such a measure indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the factors which determine external equilibrium; rather than continuously applying the palliative of direct import restrictions, Syria should try to remedy this situation. Even if direct import restrictions are temporarily unavoidable, they should not preclude remedial action; on the contrary, they should as far as possible contribute to bringing about an improvement in the basic conditions.

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656 that the supply of the materials covered by this measure would be seriously
651 endangered if their export were permitted, particularly if the industrialists
439 were given free access to the international raw material markets.

At the time of the termination of the economic union, Syria's tariff structure was rather simple, with little diversification in rates. For most industrial products, excluding primary materials or semi-finished goods essential for local industry, the normal tariff rates (specific and ad valorem) approximated 25%. Since then, even in those instances in which the tariff was raised, the ad valorem duties, at least those expressed in a percentage of free rate prices, are still under 35%, exclusive of the consumption tax on imported goods. Only a few specific duties exceed that level.

Elsewhere in this report the mission recommends that for fiscal reasons the valuation of imported goods at the fictitious official rate prices be replaced by a tariff based on actual free rate prices, and that at the same time the entire schedule of tariff duties, both ad valorem and specific, be subjected to a careful re-examination governed by both revenue and economic considerations. This would undoubtedly result in a more diversified tariff. Certain rates, for instance on some semi-finished and finished goods, would have to be lowered; others could remain as they are. To the extent that duties must remain protective in nature (for infant industries or those subjected to foreign dumping practices), they should not be so high as to safeguard local industries from all foreign competition and thereby weaken the incentive to lowering costs. Moreover, due attention should be given not only to the interests of the producers of the "protected goods", including the industrial workers, but also to the interests of the local consumer, be it a further processing industry or the consuming public. The mission has the definite impression that with respect to the protectionist measures the voice of the industries demanding them has in many cases prevailed over the voice of the other interested groups. It is therefore recommended that in revising the tariff the government should take a broader view than it has done hitherto and pay more attention to keeping the cost of industrial necessities down for the large majority of the population.

We have mentioned that the decisions of the Minister of National Economy to impose a licensing requirement and embargoes on imports and exports now require the approval of the Council of Ministers. If the government follows the mission's recommendations, the administration of

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The licensing of certain local raw material exports in order to give preference to the home market can have several objectives. If its purpose is to permit the local consumer to purchase the raw materials at prices lower than those at which they can be sold in foreign markets, it deprives the suppliers of a price differential; this is difficult to justify. But to a large extent the measure appears to have been inspired by the consideration that many Syrian industrial enterprises lack sufficient working capital and credit facilities to enable them to finance large seasonal raw materials purchases. In that case, the objective would then be to assist local industry in overcoming a competitive handicap, as against financially stronger foreign buyers, by temporarily restricting local raw material exports, without primarily intending to create a preferential price. There may also have been a desire to protect the local raw material suppliers from being forced, for liquidity reasons, to sell out at whatever prices they could obtain at the earliest time, thus endangering steady employment in the local processing industries. If these are the purposes of the licensing measures, provision of adequate storage and credit facilities for both local consumers and suppliers would make such licensing less urgent or even superfluous. Various of our recommendations relate to such facilities, and we suggest that if and when these are adopted the system of export licensing should be discontinued.

The mission has considerable objection to the imposition of embargoes. Import embargoes tend to prevent direct foreign influence on the local prices and qualities of the commodities involved. All the arguments previously advanced against an overstressing of the concept of development in isolation as opposed to development in an international economy apply here. Granted that Syrian industry needs some protection, the mission believes that such stringent measures are not called for, especially since they make it impossible for enterprise and consumers to purchase the particular foreign goods however urgently they may need or want them.

In a limited number of cases the government itself has already substituted higher tariffs for embargoes. Unless such duties are completely prohibitive, this means in principle a reintroduction of international competition, even though in a limited form. The mission considers this a step in the right direction and recommends a total abolition of the remaining import embargoes, even if accompanied by an upward revision of the relevant tariff rates.

With respect to the embargoes on exports the mission does not believe

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industrial protection through measures affecting foreign trade would be 656
largely the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. We therefore suggest 651
some procedure to assure that the Minister of National Economy also has 439
some responsibility in this connection insofar as the interests under his jurisdiction are involved. It would also seem desirable that the Council of Ministers continue to exercise its ultimate control over measures of this character so that possible conflicting considerations may be resolved in terms of the public interest in its broadest sense.

Export promotion. The priority given by the Syrian government to 654
attaining national self-sufficiency with regard to industrial products which 439
can be locally manufactured has been combined with a growing effort 433
to open up additional markets for Syrian industry, particularly in the other Near Eastern countries. Syria's execution of several bilateral trade agreements [illegible]d participation in the inter-Arab economic agreement aiming at liberalizing mutual trade exchange are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. The possibilities for further industrial export promotion, however, are not being fully exploited.

First, the mission recommends that Syrian export industries be given every possible assistance in the procurement of foreign raw and auxiliary materials without fiscal charges, specifically that they be given a full rebate of such charges commensurate with actual exports, and that the system of rebates be so administered that the rebate can be quickly and easily obtained.

Secondly, it is recommended that the policy of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with Syria's main commercial partners be systematically pursued. The considerable increase in recent years in exports of silk and artificial silk cloth, knitwear and other articles of clothing and soap, particularly to the markets of Jordan and Iraq, indicates that there are industrial export possibilities worth while consolidating and expanding.

Thirdly, it is suggested that Syria which, so far as is known, lacks natural oil deposits, has an even greater interest than its oil-producing neighbors in the creation, on a multilateral basis, of a market among the countries of the Arab League; the amount of purchasing power generated by these other countries would contribute far more to the joint total than would Syria's contribution. It therefore seems to be particularly in Syria's interest to promote further inter-Arab economic integration. If this could be achieved, conditions would also become more favorable for the re-establishment of the economic union with Lebanon.

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v INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

The Need for Further Industrialization

433 464 It is generally agreed—and the mission shares this opinion—that with a more rational distribution and better cultivation of the available land, and particularly with a gradual extension of the irrigated area, Syrian agriculture could for a considerable time to come easily absorb the expected natural population increase. With respect to the need for further industrialization, however, the relevant considerations seem rather to be the territorial and occupational distribution of the population and the evolution of this pattern. The principal question is whether—and if so, to what degree and in which direction—Syrian industry needs further expansion to absorb the present and immediately foreseeable effective labor supply.

464 369 166 Although reliable figures are not available there is no clear evidence that Syria is suffering from chronic unemployment. There are, however, some very overpopulated rural areas with considerable underemployment and there is a continuous flow of labor from the villages to the urban centers. During the postwar period of considerable building activity and rapid industrialization, these markets were able to absorb the increased labor supply. But at times, as for instance in 1948 in Aleppo, the urban workers have become alarmed by the influx of villagers competing with them and aggravating already existing unemployment, particularly in the textile industry. There were demonstrations and a request to the local authorities to bar villagers from applying for town employment; this in turn induced the government to encourage certain village industries—the decline of which is again contributing to urban labor pressure.

This illustrates the tensions which are bound to arise as a consequence of the existing imbalance between rural-urban social and economic conditions. Unless the village standard of living is greatly improved, there is little doubt that the trend toward the towns will continue strong and that the numbers seeking employment in industry will greatly exceed the natural increase in the industrial population. This tendency may even become more pronounced when, as is to be anticipated, illiteracy in the villages declines, transport and communications improve and the rural population becomes more aware of its poverty and social insecurity.

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The recommendations of the mission with regard to agriculture and animal husbandry, including those concerning land tenure and irrigation, would, if accepted, open significant new perspectives to the farmer and farm laborers and tend to check the drift from rural areas. If it were possible to spend more on irrigation than has been recommended, the trend could perhaps be reversed. It is not likely, however, that the growing labor supply can be absorbed and unemployment avoided without further industrialization. Even on the highly optimistic assumption that migration towards the towns can be halted, Syria must contend with such factors as the natural increase in the industrial labor population and the gradual shift from handicraft to mechanization with the consequent release of manpower.

Although estimates in this field are particularly hazardous, the mission suggests that under the most favorable circumstances Syria will have to create at least 20,000-25,000 new industrial jobs during the next six years to keep its industrial labor market in reasonable balance.

Limiting Factors

It is often contended in Syrian official and business circles that shortage of local capital rather than lack of confidence is the principal factor limiting further industrialization. Assuming that this is so, it would follow that to advance development Syria should make a strenuous effort to create attractive conditions for foreign capital as a supplementary source of industrial financing. This conclusion does not seem to be generally acknowledged. At least the nationalization of foreign-owned public utilities without settling the matter of indemnification of their proprietors, and the regulations with respect to foreign companies working in Syria, do not indicate its acceptance.

There is, however, room for some doubt whether scarcity of capital should be considered as a major factor limiting development of Syrian industry. During the past eight years, investments in industry have supplied the country with an industrial capacity capable of meeting most of the need for manufactured articles, based on local primary production, which the population can afford; indeed, as already pointed out, in several branches of industry there is excess capacity. Generally speaking, Syrian industry appears to have attracted substantial amounts of capital. Even taking into account the fact that the sources of industrial investment

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434 capital were enriched by accumulated war profits and repatriated capital,
433 it seems likely that under generally favorable economic conditions and with improvement in the mechanism for mobilizing industrial capital, the supply of such capital will be adequate for a reasonable expansion.

The amount of capital required should not be overestimated. Some branches of industry are overequipped and could employ considerably more workers before reaching full capacity. In others, where there is a better balance between equipment and output, internal savings can probably go a long way toward furnishing the necessary capital for improvement and extension of the existing plant. For the near future, with perhaps one or two exceptions, the mission does not see promising prospects for new large industries requiring heavy investment. The best possibilities for expansion may rather be found in the field of light industries which can start on a relatively modest scale. It is for these industries that the proposed investment bank should be particularly useful.

433 The factors limiting further industrial expansion which the mission considers to be of real significance are: (1) Syria's natural resources; (2) the absorptive capacity of the Syrian market; (3) the competitive strength of Syrian industry as a supplier of more and a broader range of manufactured goods both at home and on accessible foreign markets; and (4) the government's contribution to creation of stronger incentives and better possibilities of enlarging foreign outlets.

1. Syria's natural resources are mainly agricultural. Investigations of possible mineral and oil resources have produced unsatisfactory or negative results. Syria has no natural advantages with regard to power and transportation facilities. The country has not achieved a reputation for high quality production except of some limited luxury goods. Some of these limiting factors, particularly the inadequacy of power and transportation and the human qualifications, can certainly be overcome but only by considerable investment in so-called national overhead, the rate of which is limited by the increase of the national income and the share of this income which can be devoted to industrial investment.

2. Syrian industry depends to a very large extent, sometimes exclusively, on the home market. Given the size of the population and the fact that for the bulk of industrial goods imports have already been replaced by local manufactures, the possibilities for expansion of industrial production depend largely on progress made outside the industrial field in raising the volume of purchasing power of the largest number of people. The relative

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importance of the contributions of industry and agriculture to the national income is such that under existing conditions the rate of industrial expansion cannot exceed by very much the rise in income from the land. Allowance should be made for a gradual substitution of industrial products for home-made goods and handicraft manufactures, but this would not increase total purchasing power unless the manpower so released can be made more productive. Income from other sources may also rise, as for instance from construction, foreign trade, transit and tourism, but these are not of such significance as fundamentally to alter the stated relationship between the prospects for industry and for agriculture. This emphasizes the point that at this stage the primary development effort in Syria should be made in the agricultural field, and that industry will automatically benefit thereby through an increase of internal purchasing power.

3. A third limiting factor is efficiency of production and distribution, i.e., its ability to offer its products to the ultimate consumer at prices within the purchasing power of a majority of the population. This applies to existing as well as to possible new industries.

In this connection it is very important that Syrian industry be enabled to procure its raw materials at international prices, that the costs of transportation and storage be reduced, that power facilities be improved, and that the system of commercial credit be better organized both for producers and consumers. Without intending to minimize any of these factors, however, the mission is convinced that primary attention should be directed to reducing production costs by increasing the productivity of both labor and capital and destroying any undue economic power exercised by commercial middlemen in the distribution process.

As has been pointed out, in many industries labor productivity could be increased considerably by better technical education and training, better working conditions and stronger incentives, and by improved capital equipment, with installation and utilization raised to higher standards of efficiency. This would also immediately tend to lower production costs and allow a reduction of factory prices. In the field of distribution, particularly in the villages, the wholesome effect of free competition on consumer prices is often lost because of the poverty and ignorance of the consumers on the one hand and various price-increasing practices of merchants and moneylenders on the other. The institution of buying cooperatives might be helpful; as they are difficult to manage, it is suggested that some carefully controlled experiments be made prior to any attempt

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433 to spread them widely. It also would be worth while to explore the question whether more direct selling by manufacturers to the ultimate consumer might be instrumental in reducing excessive distribution costs, at least with regard to certain articles.

In considering the establishment of new industries, besides modern technological requirements and the limitations of the Syrian market, cost factors in production as well as distribution should be carefully investigated. Ventures requiring relatively high initial outlays which can become profitable only if the volume of production is large will have to be scrutinized with extreme caution. Since it will require a major effort to keep direct costs on a competitive level, there will probably be no margin out of which to service unduly high investment costs and certainly none if the volume of sales keeps production below normal capacity.

As regards possible outlets in foreign markets, one determining factor is the accessibility of such markets; the other is competitive strength. Although there are exceptions, for instance when the foreign market is actually closed or transportation costs are prohibitive, the second factor is the more important and, in the case of Syrian industry, it is of the utmost significance. For the products of Syria's luxury industries with their rather unique character, competition is not a threat, but with regard to so-called international goods Syria has strong rivals, particularly in Western Europe, the United States and Japan, and at least for the near future it is almost inconceivable that Syrian industry would be able to meet their competition in any foreign market, even in the immediately adjoining countries, unless it is given a preferential position there. Among the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, on the other hand, Syria could develop considerable competitive strength by increasing its industrial efficiency. In planning for expansion of existing industries as well as for entering new lines of production, Syrian industrialists should give due consideration to these markets and try to achieve standards of quality and cost which permit their taking advantage of any opportunity.

4. The fourth limiting factor is government policy. We have already pointed out that this policy in recent years has been to make Syria independent of imports of those industrial goods which can be locally manufactured and to increase the exchange of agrarian and industrial products with neighboring countries. These two objectives are not readily reconcilable. Before industrial maturity is achieved it may be justifiable to stress the necessity of first building up the capacity and experience of the local

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market, and therefore to go rather far in restricting imports. But eventually, unless this policy is qualified industrial development is bound to slow down. Then new impetus will come only from a shift in emphasis to the second principle and a corresponding revision in government policies. Syrian industry has reached this stage and we have therefore recommended that the policy of protection be modified.

The trend toward integration of the Arab markets, already referred to, has achieved a more liberal exchange of agrarian than of industrial products. This may be explained by the fact that throughout the Middle East the governments are sponsoring local industrial development along rather parallel lines and each in varying degrees wishes to reserve its local markets for its young industries. On the other hand, none has a sufficiently large population or purchasing power to enable it to develop a fully diversified economy of its own. It seems to be in the interest of all that their development should proceed along lines suited to the specific resources of the various countries. Regular consultations between the authorities promoting industrial development in this area would therefore be desirable.

New Industries and Some Promising Lines of Expansion

The mission has not considered it to be its task to make an extensive survey of specific industrialization projects which might be successfully undertaken in Syria in the near future. We have already pointed out there are still branches of industry in which the establishment of additional plants, either by way of expansion of existing factories or construction of new ones, would be feasible.

Since the 1947 Gibb report on Syria, conditions have changed greatly. In the cotton textile industry, the disparity between the spinning and weaving capacity which existed 10 years ago has largely been overcome, although it exists with regard to rayon yarn. Woven and knitted rayon fabric has taken the place of much cotton and woolen fabric in the Middle East and it is probable that this development will continue. In recent years Syria's imports of rayon yarn and rayon fabric have become significant. Yet, particularly with regard to rayon yarn it would seem ill advised to try to substitute local products for imports which now are duty free, by imposing high protective tariffs. On the other hand, further diversification of the textile and apparel industry may be promising. The increasing volume of exports of knitted goods and other articles of clothing clearly

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433 indicates that in this field Syria has become a competitor in foreign markets.
288 In dyeing, printing and finishing there seems to be need for additional modern plant. It also seems desirable to investigate the possibility of profitable production of jute fabric sacks. Imports of these sacks have rapidly increased in the last few years, reaching a total of nearly 10,000 tons with a value of £S 6 million in 1953. The need for jute sacks would be lessened if bulk transportation and storage facilities were available but even in that event an increase in general agricultural production might make the establishment of a factory for sack production from imported jute fiber or yarn an economic possibility.

433 Further expansion of the cement industry may well be required. In
339 fact, the government has authorized a new plant for Aleppo which may be transferred to the Jezireh to serve the growing requirement of north-eastern Syria. A cement plant for the Homs-Hama region is also under consideration.

433 In the footwear industry modern factory production has been intro-
295 duced only with regard to rubber boots and shoes. An experiment with factory production of leather shoes in Aleppo some years ago met with such opposition from the handicraft trade that it was abandoned. Nevertheless this branch of industry may be one in which the application of modern production methods would be appropriate and generally beneficial.

433 It seems useful to investigate the economic prospects of paper and
218 paperboard manufacture. In 1953 about 8,000 tons of paper with a value of nearly £S 5 million were imported. This total comprises a large variety of different types of paper but some are imported in such quantity as to suggest the feasibility of specialized production. Straw is plentiful as raw material and in a relatively short period more poplar wood could become available if farmers and village communities gave increased attention to tree planting.

433 The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of
402 an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried out by many small shops but the quality of the output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements to be developed for use on farms.

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In the manufacture of plastic materials and domestic utensils factory production has made a beginning. This also seems to be a promising field for further development. 453

The possibility of the establishment of a plant for mixing fertilizers and making insecticides from imported ingredients should also be explored.

In the Main Report the mission has pointed out that the erection of an oil refinery in the Homs area seems to be entirely justified.

Prospects for Village Industries

With development of agricultural and rural community organization, better water and electricity supply in small towns and villages, wider general and vocational education and easier and cheaper transportation, the conditions under which village industries have prospered will undergo a change, not necessarily for the better. Traditional consumption patterns will be modified, techniques will change, factory-made manufactures will enter the village markets and compete with handicraft products and transportation costs will provide less protection. On the other hand, the density of the population and its purchasing power will increase and in certain regions tourist trade may develop. Village industries may find a better market for agricultural and animal products processed into foodstuffs, for the manufacturing and repairing of simple tools and implements used domestically or in the field, for the production of furniture and other articles for house and farm, ornaments, clothing accessories, costume jewelry and other goods of indigenous design. 433 369

We do not recommend that efforts be made to check historical trends by assisting village industries which will inevitably decline and ultimately disappear. Yet it seems very probable that a rather significant part of Syrian industrial enterprise carried on in rural communities will for a long time to come survive and be a determining factor in the economic, social and cultural conditions of many small towns and villages. That part certainly deserves more attention than it has generally received. An improvement of standards of quality and efficiency, commercial and financial techniques and social and sanitary conditions of these establishments would undoubtedly contribute to raising living standards in the rural areas.

It is therefore suggested that the community leaders, recommended elsewhere in this report, with the assistance of specialists representing the

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Ministry of National Economy, carefully investigate the conditions and opportunities which exist in this field. Industrial extension, assistance in the organization of credit cooperatives, particularly with a view to giving protection from usurious middlemen practices, in the marketing of products which might find wider outlets, and eventually in founding tourist attractions could be considered. Even if only limited results can be achieved by such measures they should be encouraged as a means of creating better rural conditions and at the same time reducing the pressure of labor migration toward the crowded towns.

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TABLE I Summary of Industrial Exports and Imports

Items	1951				1953				Remarks
	Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		
	Quantities[a]	Value[b]	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	
Ginned cotton	24,088	116,493	—	—	53,946	134,702	—	—	
Cotton seed	19,476	4,724	not shown separately		28,418	5,506	759	221	
Other oil seeds	1,589	1,268	714	491	1,515	1,122	472	280	
Copra palm kernels, etc.	—	—	650	467	—	—	1,633	776	
Cotton seed oil	891	1,615	—	—	1,223	1,413	—	—	
Olive oil edible	77	187	—	—	440	817	1,361	1,986	
Olive oil industrial	—	—	243	167	—	—	442	472	
Linseed oil	—	—	423	368	—	—	263	223	
Acid and other oils / Fatty acids and greases	—	—	3,110	2,655	—	—	4,375	1,947	
Oil cakes and residues from vegetable oils	13,456	2,564	3,406	231	24,300	4,190	—	—	
Fats and solid residues from treatment of grease	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,162	79	
Soap—ordinary in blocks	1,540	2,946	171	224	1,919	2,614	—	—	
Soap—toilet	—	—	291	277	—	—	33	59	
Sugar beet	—	—	—	—	—	—	5,077	309	
Raw sugar	—	—	11,958	3,680	—	—	23,836	4,950	
Refined sugar	—	—	7,275	2,876	—	—	—	—	

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TABLE I. Summary of Industrial Exports and Imports (cont.)

Items	1951				1953				Remarks
	Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		
	Quantities[a]	Value[b]	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	
Glucose	—	—	2,806	992	—	—	3,029	1,032	
Canned and preserved fruits and vegetables	3,361	2,497	—	—	1,503	1,895	—	—	
Fertilizers	—	—	6,190	1,045	—	—	11,171	1,567	
Glass, glass containers, tumblers, bottles, etc.	985	334	1,668	1,467	364	125	1,134	1,160	
Cement	—	—	101,775	6,123	24,103	2,019	11,964	6,450	
Cement, white or coloured	—	—	2,028	203	—	—	3,074	371	
Asphalt—natural	4,061	161	—	—	3,003	141	896	146	
Asphalt emulsion, pitch etc. for roads	—	—	5,531	523	—	—	5,554	816	
Iron and steel, rods, bars, sections, wires and sheets	—	—	31,244	8,378	—	—	36,217	9,688	
Iron—scrap	7,279	700	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Natural silk and yarn	19	639	15	120	10	221	23	263	
Artificial silk fibre	—	—	1,292	3,357	—	—	2,966	3,845	
Artificial silk yarn	147	1,270	4,160	18,134	3[illegible]	1,515	6,572	15,473	
Silk and artificial silk cloth	1,252	15,065	337	3,744	1,784	13,009	440	3,049	
Wool, raw or in bulk	7,511	39,413	1,107	3,054	4,501	21,539	410	803	
Wool, yarn	30	123	216	2,412	no figure		381	3,093	
Wool, cloth and trimmings	25	141	427	5,656	79	389	691	6,183	

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Blankets, rugs, etc.	—	—	200	1,307	—	—	307	2,060	
Goat hair	—	—	171	137	—	—	335	245	
Cotton yarn	215	11,630	385	1,686	21	157	537	2,276	
Cotton cloth	604	5,569	2,182	12,390	368	2,171	1,962	11,177	
Socks for men	72	980	—	—	72	499	—	—	
Knitted goods and other articles of clothing	478	5,260	172	925	1,075	7,756	57	699	
Jute cloth	—	—	130	274	—	—	169	170	
Jute sacks	—	—	2,449	2,547	—	—	9,735	5,957	
Cotton and other sacks	—	—	—	—	—	—	390	203	
Hides and skins, untreated	788	2,224	2,022	2,726	584	1,456	2,540	3,160	
Leather or skins tanned or processed and leather goods	437	1,961	42	641	334	1,300	117	707	
Tanning extract, bark and materials for tanning	979	298	1,381	909	424	289	1,766	971	Probably other chemicals would bring this up to 2,000 tons of imports.
Rubber-waste	—	—	997	143	—	—	1,491	182	
Rubber in slabs—sheets of paste	—	—	—	—	—	—	92	181	
Papers (all kinds)	—	—	4,842	4,291	—	—	8,202	4,884	
Paper—sacks and paper for cement	—	—	included above		—	—	1,094	464	Also included in Paper (all kinds).
Paper—kraft paper for bags	—	—	included above		—	—	407	192	Also included in Paper (all kinds).

* All quantities are in metric tons.
† Values in thousands of £S.
SOURCE: Syrian Official Trade Statistics.

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ANNEX G *NOTES ON ELECTRIC POWER*

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Energy Resources

Coal, oil and lignite resources are apparently lacking; and the calorific value of the small peat deposits is low and unutilizable. The potentialities of hydroelectric power are limited by the low volume and gradient of the rivers, the almost total absence of falls or rapids and the wide variations in seasonal flow. Only the Youssef Pasha site, on the Euphrates, has considerable possibilities for power generation. It is estimated that at this location there could be developed a firm power of 45,000 KW and a maximum of 90,000 KW. It is doubtful whether power potential on all other rivers together exceeds 60,000 KW, so that Syria's total estimated hydroelectric potential is approximately 150,000 KW—about the same as that of the Lebanese project of Litani alone.

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1 PUBLIC UTILITIES

Installed Capacity

In 1953 the installed power capacity was as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 Installed Power Capacity, 1953

	Installed power		Peak load
	KW	KVA	KW
Damascus	13,000	16,500	13,160
Aleppo	10,400	15,050	10,040
Homs-Hama	2,650	3,510	2,650
Latakia	800	1,000	800
Deir ez Zor	840	915	840
Small towns and villages	6,660	7,801	6,544
Total	34,350	44,776	34,034

These data indicate that the average load factor was 40%.[1]

[1] The load factor is the ratio of the average load in KW supplied during a designated period to the peak or maximum load occurring in that period.

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Power Generated

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The amount of power generated by the public utilities and bought by them from private plants during the last five years is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Power Generated and Purchased by Public Utilities, 1949–53

(*Million KWH*)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Damascus	31.55	35.25	36.91	40.19	47.58
Aleppo	25.74	33.47	36.36	43.05	49.14
Homs-Hama	9.36	10.33	11.07	12.60	13.71
Latakia	1.02	1.21	1.50	1.75	2.25
Deir ez Zor	0.86	0.94	1.06	1.25	1.54
Small towns and villages	1.81	2.81	3.67	4.46	5.63
Total	70.34	84.01	90.57	103.30	119.85

Breakdown of Supply and Consumption 377

The distribution of power consumption by various uses and the total power supply are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Supply and Consumption of Electricity

(*Million KWH*)

Principal public utilities[a]	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Light	17.89	22.27	27.90	33.70	37.82	44.25	52.04
Power	19.30	18.42	22.28	27.64	28.47	31.44	36.43
Traction	4.11	4.16	4.23	4.19	3.99	4.10	4.32
Losses and miscellaneous	9.74	11.31	14.22	15.76	16.52	19.00	21.45
Total	47.04	56.16	68.63	81.28	86.80	98.79	114.24
Private industrial plants[b]	3.6	5.0	7.2	10.0	15.0	n.a.	n.a
Estimated total supply in Syria	57.0	70.0	85.0	95.0	105.0	n.a.	n.a.

[a] Including power purchased from private plants.
[b] Excluding power sold.

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377 Table 4 shows actual increases for the years 1947-52 and 1947-53.

It should be noted that consumption of electricity for lighting has risen more rapidly than that for power. Owing to this factor and the installation of additional equipment, the peak load has risen and the load factor has declined. This is particularly true of the small towns and villages where electricity is consumed almost exclusively for lighting.

TABLE 4 Increases in Power Consumption

(Percent)

	1947 to 1952		1947 to 1953	
	Total	Yearly average	Total	Yearly average
Light	147.3	19.9	190.9	19.5
Power	105.5	15.5	138.1	15.5
Losses and miscellaneous	95.2	14.3	120.5	14.1
Total	110.0	16.0	140.9	15.7

377 655 *Investment in Public Utilities*

No accurate data are available on the sources of financing during the period 1946-54, but it seems that before the Nationalization Law of 1951 the large power companies financed their development projects from their own resources and with foreign capital, whereas the government helped the smaller municipalities and villages with loans. Since 1950 progress has depended exclusively on government financing and the current revenues and accumulated resources of the power companies, but it is difficult to trace in the total loans to municipalities those amounts actually used for power development. The list of loans made by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban with the authorization of the government during the last five years includes a specific loan of £S 10 million allocated to public utilities, and the financial statements of the Damascus and Aleppo public utilities each mention loans to £S 7 million, although in the latter case the loan was for all four of the utilities' operating branches—electric power, water supply, streetcars and buses.

Moreover, although in addition to the equipment purchased abroad, a

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quantity of used and army surplus equipment was utilized in the smaller towns and villages, complete records of these operations are not available. 377 655

The best assessment the mission can make of power investment in Syria is to start with the conservative cost estimate of £S 450 per KVA for diesel-driven sets, and £S 7.5 million for the only steam plant in Syria with transmission lines and transformer stations. On this basis the cost of the 46,000 KVA of the former and 12,500 KVA of the latter, added to £S 1 million for the Amir Ghajar hydro turbine generators and £S 2 million for development of the networks, give a figure of about £S 25 million. This should, however, be taken as an indication of the order of magnitude rather than as an approximation of actual investment.

II INDUSTRIAL POWER 377

A statement of present and expected power consumption in the leading Syrian industries is necessary for an assessment of the anticipated power requirements of the country as a whole. The factories discussed below rely mainly upon their private power supplies, a situation which is likely to change somewhat as additional public utility projects are completed.

Cement

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The two cement factories at Damascus and Aleppo are among the most important industrial power consumers. In 1953 their output was 171,000 and 72,000 tons, respectively; it is expected that output will rise to 253,000 and 150,000 tons by 1955. At an average consumption rate of 90 KWH per ton, this total of 403,000 tons would require about 36 million KWH.

To meet the 1953 demand for about 22 million KWH the two factories had plants of 4,600 and 3,000 KW capacity, respectively. The Damascus factory, unlike that in Aleppo, is connected with the public utilities network, thus permitting the future transfer of cheap hydroelectric power from the projected Barada plant. The Aleppo plant may insure itself against a breakdown of its own equipment through a link with the steam plant now under construction, but as soon as cheap hydro power becomes available from the Youssef Pasha project, it can be assumed that the factory will turn to the public utilities network for at least part of its power requirements.

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Textiles

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The entire output of yarn is spun in the large factories but almost half the cloth produced is woven on hand looms.[2] It is estimated that on a basis of 1.3 KWH per kilogram for spinning and 1.0 KWH per kilogram for weaving, the total power requirements of mechanized textile plants approximate 21.1 million KWH annually.

Most of the large factories (with one important exception) generate their own power from their total installed capacities of 2,200 KW in Damascus and 2,500 KW in Aleppo. This is more than adequate for the demands of the larger spinning and weaving factories, estimated at 15.8 million KWH, though some plants do in fact purchase some power—to the extent of about 2.6 million KWH—from the public utilities network. On the assumption that the power used by the small factories is drawn wholly from municipal supplies, the total power consumption of 21.1 million KWH for textile spinning and weaving is furnished by private plants to the extent of 13.2 million KWH, and by the public utilities to the extent of 7.9 million KWH. The 6.6 thousand tons of cloth at present woven on hand looms may be regarded as a potential power demand for 6.6 million KWH from the public utilities, giving an aggregate potential demand by textiles for a minimum of 27.7 million KWH, of which 14.5 million KWH would be supplied by the public utilities.

It is expected that the textile industry will continue to expand, though possibly at a slower rate, requiring about 2 million additional KWH by 1960.

Ginning

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In 1953 about 50,000 tons of lint were produced and ginned in Syria. With an average power consumption of 100 KWH per ton of cotton ginned and baled, this would require about 5 million KWH.

Four-fifths of the gins are located in Aleppo, the remainder being in Homs, Idlib, Latakia and Damascus. The most important ginning factory in Aleppo has its own power plant with a capacity of 1,500 KW, but the majority of the other plants have recourse to the public network. It can be assumed that about half the total required power is supplied by private plants and half by the public utilities.

[2] 1952 production: yarn, 9,000–10,000 tons; cloth, 14,000–15,000 tons.

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An increase of about 60% in cotton production is expected by 1960, but present power capacity appears adequate to meet this expansion. 377 248

Glass

The Damascus glass factory owns a 600-KW power plant. The total productive capacity of the factory is about 43 tons of glass per day; in 1953 about 3,000 tons of glass were actually produced, representing about 70 days output at full capacity. If a consumption of about 100 KWH per ton of glass is assumed then the generated power in 1953 would have been about 0.3 million KWH. 377 323

Cold Storage

A cold storage plant in Damascus has a 500-KW power plant interconnected with the public utilities network. It can be assumed that about half of the approximately 2 million KWH required annually is supplied by the public utilities and half by the factory's plant. 377 254

Oil Mills

Two Aleppo oil mills have private power plants, the larger with a capacity of 1,200 KW, the smaller with 300 KW. These factories work only about 150 days per year (say six days per week during six months). With one-third of the capacity in reserve and an assumed load factor as low as 10% the power generated per year would be about 1.5 million KWH. 377 388

Flour Mill

A flour mill in Aleppo has a 400-KW plant. With a utilization of two-thirds of the capacity for 6,000 hours the power generated would be about 1.2 million KWH. 377 256

Sugar

In 1953 the Homs sugar factory processed 7,000 tons of sugar from beets and refined 22,000 tons from raw sugar. Power required for the former 377 257

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377 was stated to average 72 KWH per ton (this is very low compared with
257 the 120-150 KWH generally required for this process); power for refining would not exceed 20 KWH per ton. The factory's 2,000 KW steam generators are interconnected with the public utilities network, allowing about 250 KW to be supplied or received according to the relative needs and availabilities in the two systems.

The above figures on beet and raw sugar processing indicate (at 72 and 20 KWH per ton respectively) that some one million KWH were generated for these purposes in 1953, exclusive of power supplied to the Homs-Hama network.

It is anticipated that sugar beet extraction will increase from 7,000 tons to some 20,000 tons by 1960, requiring an additional one million KWH.

Dyeing

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The Hama dyeing plant's 435 KW generators are not connected with the public utilities network. The power generated by this plant in 1953 is estimated at about 0.6 million KWH.

Conclusion

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The power generated by private factory power plants in 1953, equal to about one-third of that generated in the plants of the public utilities, was therefore distributed approximately as follows:

	Million KWH
Cement factories	22.0
Textile factories	13.2
Ginning factories	2.5
Glass factory	0.3
Cold storage plant	1.0
Oil mills	1.5
Flour mills	1.2
Sugar factory	1.0
Dyeing factory	0.6
Total	43.3

Future power requirements will be largely conditioned by the development of the cement, textile and beet industries, for which, as indicated

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above, additional power to the extent of approximately 14.2 and one million KWH respectively will probably be needed. The other industries specified are not expected to need substantial additional amounts of power. 377

On these assumptions the output of the private power plants would need to increase from about 43 million KWH to some 60 million KWH by 1960, but it is more than likely that at least part of the necessary increase will in fact be drawn from the public utilities network.

III THE MISSION'S PROGRAM

The period 1949-53 showed a mean annual increase of 14.2% in the generation of public power. The actual percentage of increase over the preceding years was as follows: 371 377

1950	1951	1952	1953
19.4	7.8	14	16.2

The figure for 1951 reflects the effect on Syrian industry of the cotton crisis. Taking all factors into account, it would not be unreasonable to expect a continued average yearly increase of 14% between 1953 and 1960. On this basis about 300 million KWH would be generated in 1960 and since the load factor is not expected to improve, the peak load would probably be about 85,000 KW, requiring a minimum installed capacity of some 106,000 KVA. This means that some 60,000 KVA must be added to the approximately 45,000 KVA (34,350 KW) presently available plus a reserve of 20-25%.

It is believed that in 1945 there was a total installed capacity of about 13,000 KVA, able to generate 10,400 KW. During the eight succeeding years the increase was about 31,776 KVA, or 23,950 KW—an increase of some 245% or an average rate of 17% per year. Although this has not been sufficient to keep pace with rising consumption demands, it would lead to a total installation of 130,000 KVA if continued until 1960. This would give a margin of 23% over the anticipated minimum peak load for that year, which should be quite satisfactory for a country where there is practically no interconnecting network and where a large number of small generators is the rule (e.g., 18 in Damascus for an installed power of 16,500 KVA, and seven in Aleppo for 15,000 KVA). On the principle that

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each network should have in reserve a capacity equal to that of the largest generator, Syria's present reserve requirements would total about 10,000 KVA, equal to 22% of total installed power. The reserve requirements have not been met in the past, although the situation will be greatly improved by the addition of the 14,610 KVA scheduled to start operating during 1954.

Damascus

In the Damascus area the annual increase in consumption has averaged only 10.8% over the last five years. It seems, therefore, that the peak load is unlikely to exceed 30,000 KW by 1960. This would call for a capacity of about 37,000 KVA, compared with the 16,500 KVA installed at present. The new Hameh steam plant, due to start operating at the end of 1954, would raise present capacity to 29,000 KVA and when the Souk Wadi Barada hydroelectric plant is completed in 1956 total installed power will be 37,000 KVA. In view of the fact that the Damascus diesel plant is 22 years old, the mission recommends that additional capacity of about 12,500 KVA (10,000 KW) be added to provide an adequate reserve.

There are three possible ways to provide the additional capacity. One is to install an extra set of 12,500 KVA in the new Hameh steam plant. Another is to construct new hydroelectric plants; and a third is presented by the possibility that a beginning will shortly be made on the Yarmuk power project by the Jordan Government, in which case, under the terms of an agreement with Jordan, Syria would receive 5,000 KW annually in return for an investment of 5% of the cost of the project. But to supply the balance of 5,000 KW to meet the needs of Damascus would require the installation of an additional set of 5,000 KW in the Hameh steam plant and the laying of a transmission line to the Yarmuk plant. This would cost about £S 15 million and would be the most expensive of the three choices. Of the remaining alternatives, the mission considers construction of hydroelectric plants preferable, since the need is for peak power rather than a large and steady output. Elsewhere the mission has recommended construction of reservoirs for irrigation purposes at Deir Makaren and Hameh, and it recommends that hydroelectric plants with a capacity of 10,000 KW be located at these two points, thus harnessing the power which can be developed on the Barada by construction of the two dams.

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These plants would supplement the Souk Wadi Barada project. They should cost only about £S 6 million. 371 377

Aleppo

Aleppo's consumption has grown far more speedily than that of Damascus. It is estimated that by 1960 the peak load in the Aleppo area will be about 32,175 KW, requiring an installed capacity of about 42,900 KVA.

The present installed capacity of 15,000 KVA is 27,900 KVA short of the 1960 target. Since construction of the Youssef Pasha hydroelectric plant will start as soon as funds become available, making it inadvisable to overequip Aleppo with thermal plants, no provision was made for a reserve.

The mission recommends the installation in the new steam plant not only of the first stage of 12,500 KVA, but of a second stage of 12,500 KVA and eventually a third stage of 6,250 KVA. The total cost of the second and third stages would be around £S 9 million. Some difficulties might arise toward 1960 but conditions should not be worse than at present. If consumption develops in the manner anticipated, profits from the steam plant will be large enough to give the Youssef Pasha project an earlier start.

We have considered the proposal that the additional thermal plant be located at Homs rather than Aleppo and that a transmission line be built to link such a plant with Aleppo. It has been argued that a plant at this location would provide standby and "peaking" capacity for both Aleppo and Damascus when Syria's hydroelectric resources, including those at Youssef Pasha, are developed and a national grid can be constructed. In addition, fuel oil at Homs would be cheaper and a more plentiful and cheaper supply of water would be available. While the arguments in favor of Homs appear persuasive, we have nevertheless recommended that the plant be built at Aleppo. It would be rather risky to erect a power station at a distance of 190 kilometers from the city it is designed to serve. Moreover, the losses in transmission plus the annual charges on the transmission line, which is likely to require an investment of £S 7 million, will probably offset the economies in operating costs resulting from the establishment of the plant at Homs.

Homs-Hama and the Ghab

The Homs-Hama area is important as the nucleus of a future inter-

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371 connecting network which would extend over a large part of Syria. In
377 particular, it is expected that construction of the Ghab irrigation project will soon lead to increased activity in the area of Hama.

In the general area of Homs-Hama and the Ghab, several hydroelectric plants are proposed by the government, but none is scheduled to be begun before 1960. Even the dismantling of Amir Ghajar, which would be flooded by the Rastane dam, and its relocation at the foot of Rastane, is not scheduled to start before 1962. Most of these hydroelectric plants could operate only when water is not needed for irrigation and would therefore need to be supplemented by thermal plants of equal capacity. This is also true of the Roudj hydro plant and the Rastane siphon and hydro plant. Such projects are economical only when they can be connected with a well-developed grid system. The Homs Lake hydroelectric plant would at least have the eight cubic meters per second available to the Rastane plant even in the dry season, but the head is very low and the amount of power generated is therefore not very significant. Moreover, the mission's proposal for the Ghab area would lead to an increase of power for the Homs-Hama area. Accordingly, these projects have not been included in the mission's program.

With respect to the Ghab, the mission has the following comments. The area of Jisr ech Choghour, because of its location at the outlet of the Ghab valley and on the main road from Latakia to the interior of Syria, will probably develop rapidly during the next few years. During the construction of the Ghab project it will be a supply center and a suitable site for repair shops and material storage for the contractors. This development would be facilitated if Jisr ech Choghour were provided with adequate power and the ability to transmit part of it along the Ghab valley to supply the villages and construction contractors. This would entail the installation in Jisr ech Choghour of an adequate power plant and a transmission line along the Ghab valley to Hama, where it would connect with the Homs-Hama transmission network. Further, because of the length of the interconnection, it would be necessary to build in Hama a second power plant of about the same capacity to ensure stability. The construction of the hydroelectric plant of Jisr ech Choghour was postponed for the reason that it would have been unable to provide enough firm power. The mission recommends that diesel plants with a capacity of about 2,000 KVA each be built in Jisr ech Choghour and Hama and that a transmission line be run between these plants via Karkour, Kalaat el Moudiq, Acharneh and

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Maharda. Each of the diesel plants would cost about £S 1.5 million and the transmission line would cost £S 3 million. 371 377

Latakia

The proposed construction of an improved harbor will accelerate the development of Latakia. To meet resultant increased power demands, the mission supports the immediate construction of a diesel power plant in Latakia with an installed capacity of 2,500 KVA as first stage, at a cost of £S 1.5 million. Elsewhere the mission recommends the construction of a multi-purpose reservoir on the Nahr el Kebir for flood control, power, water supply and irrigation. For these reasons, the construction of the Nahr el Kebir power plant is included in the mission's program with an equipment of 2,500 KVA as first stage, at a cost of £S 5 million. These figures are approximate because the studies of this project have not yet been completed and therefore no accurate data are available.

Deir ez Zor

The growth of Deir ez Zor will follow upon the agricultural development of the lower Euphrates valley. In this town the mission supports the immediate construction of a diesel plant with an installed power of 2,000 KVA at a cost of about £S 1 million for the first stage.

Other Areas

It can be assumed that even at a conservative estimate consumption by the 49 smaller towns and villages which now have electricity will increase at the rate of at least 15% per annum, requiring the generation of about 16 million KWH by 1960. In view of the fact that the peak load already utilizes the full power capacity, additional equipment will be needed to meet the demand.

The mission therefore supports the program for the construction in the small towns and villages of 25 new networks, 10 with an installed power of 285 HP each and 15 with 225 HP, aggregating about 5,500 KVA; total cost would be £S 4.7 million. The mission also recommends the installation of about 2,500 KVA at a cost of approximately £S 1.5 million to carry on the program of improving existing utilities.

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IV ELECTRICITY TARIFFS

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As stated in the Main Report, tariffs for electricity used for lighting of houses and shops are not excessive, except in the small towns. They range from about 16 to 25 piasters per KWH, or about 4.5 to 7.0 U. S. cents;[3] in the small towns they are on the high side of the range and are said to be as high as 50 piasters per KWH in some places. Sometimes the tariff takes the form of a uniform charge. In Damascus, however, the tariff was until recently on a downward sliding scale, the charge varying inversely with consumption; since 1953 it has been on a two-step progressive basis, the heavier consumers paying more. The change in tariff structure was made as a protection against an exaggerated peak load but has had the unfortunate effect of discouraging use of electrical appliances by small consumers. While such a policy may be justified as long as demand exceeds supply, as soon as installed power measures up to demand the Damascus tariff policy should be revised to encourage domestic consumption.

Charges for electricity for power vary with the area, the subscribed power and the consumed power. The range is between 4.66 and 18 piasters per KWH, the low rate of 4.66 piasters applying only to high utilization of subscribed power in the area of Homs-Hama where there is a hydroelectric plant. The average rate is between 10 and 12 piasters per KWH. Surcharges are imposed on consumption during peak hours. To all these rates, a municipal tax of 10% is generally added.

These rates are high compared with charges in other countries. Table 5 compares the rates paid by an Aleppo industrial consumer with those paid by comparable consumers elsewhere.[4]

Many Syrian consumers complain about the cost of electricity in comparison to the lower rates applicable in neighboring countries in general and in Lebanon in particular. The mission is not in a position to judge whether the basis on which charges are fixed in Lebanon is sound. However, Lebanon has the advantages of a hydroelectric power output equal to more than half of the total power supply (compared with less than 25%

[3] Prices of electricity (in U. S. cents per KWH) for monthly lighting consumption of 15 KWH (1951): New York, 6.33; Zurich, 8.15; Paris, 4.65; London, 5.80; and Colombo, 8.30. (SOURCE: International Bank's Mission to Ceylon.)

[4] Rates for other countries are at the 1951 level.

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in Syria), proximity of most of the thermal stations to pipeline outlets, and a well-developed consumption pattern operating from an interconnecting national grid. Some of these favorable conditions will be present in Syria in due course, although the handicap of limited natural resources will remain. The fact that many power users are unsatisfactory consumers, in that they provide a very low load factor, also contributes to high power costs in Syria. The most extreme illustration is provided by seasonal industries, such as ginning, which require large investments in power capacity for only a few months' consumption each year. In such cases the return would be very poor if power were sold at specially low rates for so limited a period.

TABLE 5 Comparative Industrial Power Rates

(U.S. cents per KWH)

	30 KW, 200 hours per month	300 KW, 250 hours per month
New York	4.19	2.40
Aleppo	2.53	2.22
Zurich	2.35	1.27
London	1.79	1.59
Colombo	1.80	1.30

According to the profit and loss accounts provided by the public utilities of Damascus and Aleppo, the gross return per KWH sold in 1953 was 13.6 piasters in Damascus and 12.8 piasters in Aleppo. The costs of operation of the power plants, including maintenance and repairs but excluding financial charges, were 3.18 piasters per KWH for Damascus and 4.82 piasters for Aleppo. The lower figure for Damascus is due mainly to the fact that about one-third of all power is generated in hydroelectric plants, but also to the higher efficiency of the diesel equipment. The operating costs in the hydro plants are only about 0.4 piasters per KWH sold, compared with 4.5 piasters in the diesel plants. Moreover, in the diesel plants fuel represented about 66% of the total operating cost in Damascus and 78% in Aleppo. The price of fuel oil and the efficiency of the diesel generator sets are therefore very material factors in the final price of electricity produced in thermal plants.

According to the accounts, the total costs per KWH sold and distributed were 7.25 piasters per KWH for Damascus and 5.35 piasters for

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365 377 Aleppo. This would mean that distribution costs would amount to 4.07 piasters per KWH in Damascus and only 0.53 piasters in Aleppo (excluding financial charges). This large difference can be partly explained by the fact that the personnel expenditures for Aleppo are exclusive of clerical and management personnel, while on the other hand the figure of £S 1.2 million quoted for Damascus is probably too high. One of the difficulties is that clerks and management personnel are common to the several activities of the public utilities—power, streetcars and water supply in Damascus, and power, streetcars, buses and water supply in Aleppo.

According to the accounts, the 1953 gross profit of the Damascus electric utilities was £S 2.4 million and £S 2.75 million for those in Aleppo, although the facts with respect to personnel costs would indicate that the true Damascus figure is higher and that of Aleppo lower. In any case these are large returns for the two public utilities even if the actual value of each were as high as £S 10 million. Not only are these public utilities self-supporting but they are able to finance at least part of the projected development schemes, a factor which has led the mission to recommend no reduction in power tariffs as long as large capital investment is needed.

As the proposed program gets under way, the replacement of diesel by steam plants will reduce the cost of fuel by about one piaster per KWH sold, since the cost of gas oil is about £S 103 per ton, compared with about £S 60 per ton for fuel oil, taking into account the decrease in efficiency. Therefore, pending completion of the Youssef Pasha project, earnings in the Aleppo area would not exceed one piaster per KWH, even when the steam plant is able to generate the bulk of the needed power.

In Damascus the increase in earnings resulting from the power development program would be about the same as in Aleppo. While savings realized by the shift from diesel to steam power would be less because the plant to be displaced in Damascus is more efficient than that in Aleppo, large economies would flow from the shift to hydroelectric power. But a large reduction in the cost of electricity for Syria as a whole can be expected only after completion of the main hydroelectric projects and construction of an interconnecting network based on the line Youssef Pasha-Aleppo.

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ANNEX H

NOTES ON TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

1 RAILWAYS

A RAILWAY SYSTEMS

The Northern Railway consists of 248 km. of trackage, 19 aged locomotives and other rolling stock as shown in Table 1.[1] Traffic is rather light, 55 million ton-kilometers in 1953, including goods in transit.

TABLE 1 Rolling Stock of the Northern Railway

Year built	Locomotives		Passenger luggage		Freight wagons			
	Line	Yard	Cars	Vans	Closed	Open	Special	Total
1901–15	13	2	4	4	345	162	96	603
1916–30	—	—	5	1	—	—	—	—
1931–45	4	—	2	—	—	46	—	46
1946–53	—	—	—	5	17	—	—	17
Total	17	2	11	10	362	208	96	666

Under an agreed system, settlements are made by Turkey for carriage of her goods over the Syrian portions of the line and vice versa. With so much of the route in Turkish territory, Syria's heaviest shipments, between the Jezireh and Aleppo, represent comparatively little revenue for the Northern Railway. For example, the tariff for transporting a ton of grain from Kamichliye to Aleppo is £S 24.50, of which about £S 19 accrues to the Turkish railway administration. While this debit is partially offset by reciprocal credits for Syrian transport of Turkish goods, the exchange rates used in the settlement of accounts between the two railways operate to the disadvantage of Syria, causing the Northern Railway a net loss, for

[1] To handle the peak harvest load, for which its rolling stock is insufficient, the Northern Railway has made a practice of hiring 100 extra wagons seasonally from the Iraqi railways. These are further supplemented by an average of some 200 Turkish wagons borrowed at frontier stations for temporary Syrian service.

497 instance, of £S 462,000 in net operating income during the year 1953.

The DHP railway network has been operating at a loss for some time. In accordance with agreements between the railway company and the Lebanese and Syrian governments, the latter two must cover such losses equally. In 1952 Syrian payments on this account amounted to £S 500,000 or roughly one piaster per ton-kilometer of freight carried.

The Hedjaz Railway now serves mainly to link Amman, the Jordanian capital, with Damascus and, via the DHP line, with Beirut. The Syrian portion, 140 kilometers long, passes through Dera'a, where there are two short lateral branches on Syrian soil. One of these goes eastward to Basra. The other parallels the border westward and once continued to the coast at Haifa, but now ends near the Israeli frontier, where its bridge was destroyed in 1948.

In 1953 the Syrian portion carried 6.742 pilgrims over 951,000 passenger-kilometers, but other passenger traffic brought the total to 15.218 million passenger-kilometers, two-thirds of which was local internal travel. Freight transport during 1953 amounted to 23.406 million ton-kilometers, of which about 93% was in transit internationally and nearly 80% came over the DHP connection.

While many of the rates on all Syrian railways are below cost, those on the Hedjaz line are exceptionally low. This fact, together with a less-than-optimum volume of traffic, has undoubtedly contributed to the growing operating deficit in postwar years. From March 1945 until the beginning of 1954 the Syrian government had met or assumed obligations of this railway aggregating £S 2 million.[2]

Besides taking steps to bolster passenger revenue, the government has tried to support rail freight since 1953 by prohibiting transport by road of a considerable variety of commodities in transit to and from Jordan.[3]

Taken together, the three Syrian railways provide a network of 852

[2] In addition to paying the operating deficits, the government guaranteed a loan from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban to the Hedjaz Railway for reconstruction of its spacious Ain Building in the center of Damascus.

[3] By agreement with Jordan, truck transport must be permitted for: (1) goods from Syria to a third country via Jordan; (2) goods, except wheat and phosphates, from Jordan to a third country via Syria; (3) Syrian imports via Jordan; (4) perishables from Lebanon to Jordan; (5) perishable imports for Jordan through Lebanese ports; (6) machinery and spares in transit via Lebanon; (7) petroleum products; (8) all imports for Jordan via Syrian ports; (9) supplies for refugees; (10) motor vehicles; (11) Syrian exports to Jordan and vice versa; (12) any freight to or from Jordan via Lebanon for which the railway cannot provide proper service; and (13) any other categories on which the customs of both countries may agree.

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route-kilometers, comprising 545 kilometers of standard-gauge line and 307 kilometers of narrow-gauge. Except for the necessity of reloading where the track gauges change, passage is possible from any part of the system to any other, although not without leaving Syrian territory. The combined Syrian rolling stock on this network at the end of 1953 included 147 locomotives and 2,150 cars of all types, distributed as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Rolling Stock of Syrian Railways, 1953

	Standard-gauge			Narrow-gauge		
	DHP	NR	Total	DHP	Hedjaz	Total
Locomotives	66	19	85	36	26	62
Passenger and luggage cars	58	24	82	84	33	117
Goods wagons	518	607	1,125	343	327	670
Tank wagons	15	58	73	4	23	27
Other wagons	5	43	48	3	5	8

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1955. For the Northern Railway figures differ slightly from those of Table 1 because of different inventory dates.

B FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC

The volume of freight traffic handled by the three railways declined from 138.56 million ton-kilometers in 1938 to 86.54 million in 1949, but recovered to 130.44 million by 1953. The composition of the cargo transported in recent years is given in Table 3. The importance of agricultural

TABLE 3 Freight Carried by Syrian Railways, 1951–53

	Tons			% of total		
	1951	1952	1953	1951	1952	1953
Cereals and flour	380,406	460,650	462,295	38.6	45.1	45.7
Livestock	63,922	45,054	56,381	6.5	4.4	5.6
Other agricultural produce	48,653	44,254	53,874	4.9	4.3	5.3
Petroleum products	86,082	95,753	110,588	8.7	9.4	10.9
Cement and other building materials	109,224	66,357	83,422	11.1	6.5	8.2
Other	298,228	308,188	245,495	30.2	30.3	24.3
Total	986,515	1,020,256	1,012,055	100.0	100.0	100.0

NOTE: The total tonnage carried is exaggerated to the extent that a portion of the cargo is handled by several railways.

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#97 commodities is reflected in the seasonal fluctuations of the traffic as shown in Figure 1.

The volume of passenger traffic, after reaching a record low in 1950, has also recovered slightly in recent years, as shown by Table 4. In 1953, however, it was still only a little over one-third of the prewar traffic. All of the losses have been suffered by the DHP system.

TABLE 4 Railway Transport of Passengers

(*Million passenger-kilometers*)

Year	DHP	Hedjaz	Northern	Total
1938	100.8	13.0	4.7	118.5
1947	40.2	7.6	10.1	57.9
1948	38.8	7.5	5.2	51.5
1949	17.0	7.6	5.1	29.7
1950	11.2	5.4	5.3	21.9
1951	12.5	6.0	6.3	24.8
1952	13.4	10.6	5.8	29.8
1953	16.2	15.2	5.6	37.0
1953 as % of 1938	16.0%	116.7%	119.3%	31.2%

C RAILWAY PROPOSALS

#96 *Conversion of Gauges*

Several proposals aimed at unification of the rail network have involved the conversion of narrow-gauge lines to standard width. A 1907 project called for standard-gauge construction from Beirut to Rayak, with a 5,360-meter tunnel near Hammana, at a cost of 61 million gold francs. Rejected because of its expense, this scheme was revived in 1932 in connection with a proposed electrification. A similar scheme, but with a shorter tunnel (3,985 meters), envisaged a standard-gauge line from Beirut to Damascus, whose cost today would be at least £L 140 million.

In 1945 the Syrian government studied the possibility of adding a third rail to the narrow-gauge line from Rayak to Damascus and found the cost to be £S 18 million to £S 23 million. An alternative Damascus-Homs railway through Syrian territory, via Kariatein and Forqloss, was esti-

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

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496 mated to cost about £S 36 million and was preferred, but neither project was carried out. There have also been proposals for converting the Hedjaz Railway to standard gauge as far as the border (£S 11 million) and for building an entirely new line south of Damascus at a cost of about £S 34 million.

It is difficult to justify the cost of any of these projects today on the basis of traffic analysis. At present the most important freight movement over the narrow-gauge lines is between Beirut and Jordan, and for this reason the conversion of any part of the system without the rest would only create an obstacle. For pilgrim traffic the same is true, especially in view of current plans to restore the Hedjaz line to Medina. Indeed, the mission feels that when the government acquires the DHP system it may prove more advantageous to turn its narrow-gauge trackage over to the connecting Hedjaz Railway as a natural extension of that line.

Electrification

On a number of occasions it has been asked whether electrification of the Syrian railroads would help to reduce operating losses. The problem has been studied carefully in the case of the DHP narrow-gauge line, both for its entire length and from Beirut to Rayak. Calculations have shown the cost to be prohibitive.

Electrified railways call for expensive installations and high maintenance costs. Under ordinary circumstances economical operation of such lines requires not only cheap power but a dense traffic pattern. Short hauls and frequent schedules with small units (as in metropolitan suburban service) or high-revenue transport on longer hauls are among the favorable factors sought. Perhaps in time these conditions may develop in appropriate Syrian localities. Within the near future, however, it is unlikely that circumstances in any part of Syria will permit railway electrification on an economic basis.

489 D RAILWAY VS. ROAD DEVELOPMENT

Syria's principal transport problem is how to provide the most efficient and economical method for moving the large volume of goods across northern Syria between Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia. Since at present neither the existing railway nor the highway systems can cope with this

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problem satisfactorily, the question is posed whether a new railway should be built or a new highway network constructed. 439

A comparison of the economic advantages of rail and road transport today, in any part of the world, is valid only for a specific situation. Both transport media have their distinctive merits, whose relative significance in a given case may tip the scales one way or the other. Their costs, likewise, depend upon local conditions. Thus in examining this problem with respect to Syria—and more especially to the movement of goods between the Jezireh and Latakia—the mission stresses that its calculations and conclusions are offered for this particular situation and not as a universal answer to the "rail vs. road" question.

For the same reason we do not include an exhaustive review of the classical arguments favoring one mode of transport over the other. While taking these abstract comparisons into account, we feel that they are generally recognized and in any event adequately presented in the current technical literature. Those which are mentioned here are chosen for their special interest to the Syrian problem.

General Considerations

A railroad requires a large capital investment but is characterized by long amortization and low operating costs. The initial cost of a road may be much less, especially if the simpler types of construction are acceptable, but its maintenance is proportionately more expensive. How these figures compare for northern Syria will be examined in later pages.

Apart from costs a railway offers a somewhat better guarantee of year-around transport regardless of seasons or weather conditions. This is partly inherent in its construction, but a contributing factor is that railway maintenance is necessarily more exacting, is less likely to be entrusted to crews lacking technical skill, and must be performed promptly if schedules are to be maintained. In a railway, the same entity has responsibility for scheduled transport and for maintenance-of-way; in trucking these responsibilities are separate. Thus we might conclude that a railway affords greater security in meeting shipping connections if these are critical.

All of this presupposes, of course, a railroad which tries to and does maintain a high record of scheduled performance. Even with an efficient administration there may be strikes and similar interruptions beyond the administration's control. In highway transport these are less likely to

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occur, or if they do they seldom cause complete stoppages, for trucking is carried on by many independent operators, while railway labor, under a single employer, is apt to be tightly organized. By the same token railway labor may enjoy certain social benefits (wage levels, security, medical care, pensions, etc.) which are not so easily provided for independent truckers. This is partly because of organization and partly because a railroad requires less manpower to move a given tonnage. Viewed another way, however, this means less employment in the transport sector.

Rail freight rates are more easily stabilized and controlled, in contrast to the wide seasonal variations in rates now demanded by Syrian truckers. On the other hand the higher free-market truck rates may, on a year-round average, reflect more closely the actual cost of the service. As long as the Syrian railways operate at heavy losses which must be made up in taxes, their lower rates are misleading.

Ability of the government to control the rates of a railroad (especially of a government-owned one) permits manipulation of transport charges in favor of specific commodities, producing areas or shipping points. This power is often cited as an advantage, and when reasonably employed can be a useful implement to assist economic stability or development. Unfortunately it may just as readily be used for political purposes to stimulate production at economically unsound locations.

A popular general argument for trucks is that they permit continuous "door to door" transport without reloading. Under many circumstances this factor can be decisive but only if transshipment is not otherwise required by reason of trade patterns (as now at Aleppo), customs inspection, or restrictive legislation (see Road Transport). In any event its importance to Jezireh agricultural exports is questionable. In most cases crops must be transported separately from field to collection point, whether the later long-distance hauling be done by rail or road, and either form of transport can deliver as easily to shipside if its line runs to the port.

Roads, of course, are more readily adaptable to changing patterns of production. Countries in transition, especially, must keep in mind that economic planning cannot be omniscient and that development may take place in ways other than expected. There have been instances of costly railway construction, seemingly justified at the time, afterward left without revenue because of some unforeseen new development, shift in productive areas, or depletion of a local natural resource. But usually it is a feeder line that is most vulnerable to such misfortune. Here the question is one

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of a trunk route linking a broad productive region with centers of trade and export shipping; the gamble is smaller. Syria's feeder lines, for some years into the future, will certainly be roads rather than branch railways. 489

One great distinction between railway and highway development lies in the construction schedule. If necessary a workable road can be built quickly as a mere earthen track. Thereafter year by year it can be progressively gravelled, widened, oiled, paved, perhaps widened again, equipped with stronger bridges,[4] and so on as the need arises and resources become available. With a railroad this principle of gradual construction is possible in certain limited respects, such as later double-tracking a single-track line, installing heavier rails or adding to the rolling stock. But to be workable a railway must be installed as a more or less complete unit, with rolling stock and an operating staff, and its construction should be good for at least 50 years of service with normal maintenance.

Special Syrian Conditions

Cargo from the Jezireh being so seasonal, it is sometimes argued that trucks have the advantage of being usable in other regions during the off-season. But this argument ignores the fact that the demand for transport in other parts of Syria is likewise governed by the harvest.

Of greater significance is the prospect of transporting commodities such as grains in bulk rather than in sacks. The cost of imported sacks and the extra labor of filling them cut appreciably into the profit on local produce. Here the advantage lies with railways. Bulk shipment by truck is technically feasible but calls for a higher degree of responsible organization than now exists in most of the Syrian trucking industry. Moreover, bulk transport requires particular types of vehicles, limiting their usefulness for alternative cargo and accentuating the need for a more constant year-round movement of commodities to keep them profitably occupied.

For the transport sector, as for the Syrian economy as a whole, one of the broad aims of development must be to reduce the exaggerated seasonal character of the country's economic life. Neither rail nor road transport can be operated cheaply with costly equipment and facilities idle a large part of the year. Accordingly the mission's recommendations for crop storage facilities in the Jezireh and at Aleppo and Latakia (see the section

[4] In some countries today an initially narrow road is built with wide bridges and culverts, saving costly replacement and traffic interruptions when the road is widened.

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489 on Ports in this Annex) are no less essential to a solution of the east-west transportation problem than they are to improvement of the farmer's marketing position.

Comparative Cost of Rail and Road Transport

497 494 In the specific case of transport across northern Syria, we have tried to determine the comparative cost to the economy of road and rail transport in terms of depreciation of the capital investment, maintenance, fuel and supplies. Depreciation on railway rolling stock has been figured on the basis of 30 years' life, on motor vehicles on the basis of 7 years' life. No allowance has been made for depreciation of the investment in permanent way for the projected railway because the life of the rail roadway may be considered virtually indefinite with normal maintenance and renewals. (The latter are included under "Maintenance" in Table 5.) We have assumed, however, that with the development of heavier and speedier motor vehicles, a highway would be obsolescent within 30 years and require complete reconstruction. As already indicated in the mission's Main Report, we have assumed a freight movement of about 700,000 tons from Jezireh to Aleppo, of 150,000 tons from Aleppo to Jezireh, of 500,000 tons from Aleppo to Latakia and of 250,000 tons from Latakia to Aleppo. Of this total traffic of somewhat over 400 million ton-kilometers annually, a new railway might be expected to carry about two-thirds. The comparative investment would be about £S 170 million, including £S 24 million for rolling stock, for a railway and perhaps £S 97 million, including £S 40 million for some 800 12.5-ton trucks, for road transport.

Table 5 shows the results of our calculations. They leave no doubt that rail transport would be much more economical than road transport. The estimates are, of course, subject to a margin of error; and the annual savings in costs might best be stated within a range of £S 15 to £S 20 million.

The real question, however, is whether this saving, which is equivalent to an increase in real national income, is sufficient to justify the additional capital investment required by a railway. We have previously estimated this difference in capital cost at £S 73 million. The actual difference, however, is likely to be greater. Even if a railway were built, it would still be necessary to undertake some investment in roads, not only for the construction of feeder roads for the railway, but also for the improvement of existing main routes. The alternative is not rail investment or road invest-

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ment but investment in a railway plus some roads or an investment in roads alone. On this basis the first alternative is likely to require a capital outlay of around £S 100 million more than the second. 497 494

An amount of £S 100 million could only be found at the expense of other development projects, and probably, in particular, at the expense of irrigation projects which also require much capital. In our opinion, an equivalent investment in irrigation works is likely to contribute almost

TABLE 5 Annual Cost to the Economy of Rail and Road Transport

(*Thousand £S*)

	Rail	Road
Depreciation		
Roadway	—	1,900
Rolling stock or vehicles	800	5,714
Maintenance		
Rolling stock or vehicles	1,484	8,200[b]
Roadway	2,380[a]	700[c]
Fuel and oil	600	5,590[d]
Total	5,264	22,104

[a] Including renewals.
[b] Calculated at 17 piasters per vehicle-kilometer.
[c] Calculated at £S 1,000 per kilometer.
[d] Calculated at 19 piasters per vehicle-kilometer.

£S 30 million to national income. Moreover, the increase in primary output as the result of this investment would also bring about an expansion of income in the commercial and transport sectors of the economy which might well be between £S 10 and £S 15 million. Thus the total direct and indirect contribution to national income might reach £S 40 to £S 45 million. It seems to us therefore that the capital investment required for a railway would yield much higher returns to the economy if it were employed for irrigation. In other words, the mission could have found place for a railway in the development program it has recommended only by eliminating a substantial part of the proposed outlays on irrigation and reclamation. A program so altered would have made a smaller total contribution to the economy and was rejected for that reason.

There is still another, though secondary, reason for preferring a road

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program to a rail program as a solution of the Jezireh's transport problem. In the case of a railway all the investment funds would have to be furnished by the government, for private capital in such magnitude will simply not be available. On the other hand, private investment is and will be available for truck transport, so that government investment can be confined to road construction. In a country where it is difficult to transfer private savings to public hands this is an important consideration.

The mission has noted a report that a foreign firm would be willing to build a railway on the basis of payments spread over a period of 10 years following completion of construction. It should be pointed out, however, that the contraction of a foreign debt for this purpose might well impair Syria's capacity to borrow for other projects. The mission's proposed development program has already assumed a certain amount of external borrowing. Thus the contraction of foreign credits for railway construction is unlikely to provide Syria with more resources for financing a development program than we have envisaged.

It is sometimes argued that the operation of a railway would require fewer imports on a continuing basis than road transport, and that this would be advantageous for Syria's balance of payments and would also make transport less subject to interruption of foreign supplies in the event of war. There is no doubt that fewer imports would be required for rail transport. However, the savings in foreign exchange thus achieved would be smaller than the foreign exchange earned by the agricultural commodities that could be produced on land which could be irrigated if the additional capital required for a railway were devoted to irrigation projects. Moreover, the fact that a railway would be relatively less dependent on foreign supplies would be an advantage in time of war only if Syria itself were not involved in hostilities; if the war extended to Syrian territory, railway transport would be more susceptible to interruption by bombing than road transport.

II ROAD TRANSPORT

A ROAD SYSTEM AND TRAFFIC DEMANDS

Distribution of Syrian roads by use and type, in 1953, was as shown in Table 6.

The number of motor vehicles in the country has grown about 3½

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TABLE 6 Syrian All-Weather Roads, 1953

(Kilometers)

Type	Asphalted	Metalled	Earthen	Total
International and main highways	1,700	290	1,010	3,000
Others of economic importance	600	640	1,000	2,240
Local roads	300	270	2,390	2,960
Total	2,600	1,200	4,400	8,200

times since just before the war, and has nearly doubled since 1948 (see Table 7). Of special significance are trucks and buses, which not only have become more numerous but are constantly increasing in individual size and weight.

TABLE 7 Motor Vehicles in Circulation, 1937–53

Type	1937	1948	1951	1952	1953	1953 as % of 1937
Trucks	873	3,443	4,557	4,594	4,742	544
Buses	348	1,081	1,126	1,129	1,212	348
Passenger cars	2,515	3,101	5,444	6,065	7,192	285
Total	3,736	7,625	11,127	11,788	13,146	352

Of the 4,742 trucks registered in 1953, 158 were tankers and 623 were diesels. No statistics are available on sizes, but most of the newly imported ones are from 7 to 12 tons capacity. The aggregate capacity of trucks on the road is probably in excess of 33,000 tons. These figures do not indicate the true tonnage in circulation; a census during the month of August 1953 showed only about 30% of the 24,137 motor vehicles passing the frontier between Beirut and Damascus to be of Syrian registration.

Data of this kind, if carefully and systematically collected, can be a most useful guide in determining where road improvement funds should be invested for greatest public benefit. Only a few local traffic census figures were available to the mission, and while they appear to contain a number of serious discrepancies, they do indicate the order of magnitude

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of the traffic load on various routes at certain times of the year. As an aid to sound future development, it will be to the advantage of the Syrian government to place the collection of traffic statistics on an organized scientific basis as soon as possible.

B ROAD CONSTRUCTION

Most of the main surfaced roads in western Syria are of 5.5-meter width; in the east the five-meter type is more common. Neither is sufficient for safety under present or anticipated traffic conditions. More satisfactory specifications for general use would call for not less than six meters of finished surface and a firm shoulder of 1-1.5 meters on each side. The mission strongly recommends that hereafter this basic design be used for all new construction, repair or reconstruction of major roads.

A number of road surface materials and methods have been used or considered. The most common construction is of waterbound macadam, both with and without an asphalt covering.

Except for such purposes as the construction of "Irish bridges",[5] concrete is seldom used as a road surface in Syria, cement being considered too expensive. The local delivered price was said to be £S 90 per ton in 1953, although the mission was informed that in 1954 cement could be obtained for £S 80 per ton.

The cement industry is protected by the government and enjoys substantial profit margins. Moreover, the prices quoted include excise taxes of £S 15 per ton, from which public bodies might reasonably be exempt. But the basis of present prices Syria can hardly afford to make greater use of this superior roadbuilding material in meeting the specifications required for the growing commercial trucking.

Recently the possibility of constructing low-cost mix-in-place bituminous roads, with or without soil stabilization, has attracted much attention. The method has been used successfully in several countries of the Middle East, but to date it has not been tried in Syria, partly because the local asphalts of Kfarie and Djebel Bichri have not proven adaptable to the process but also because of some doubt that roads so constructed can withstand heavy truck traffic.

[5] Actually not a bridge but a type of ford, useful where traffic density is moderate and the small or infrequent water flow does not justify a real bridge. The road dips down to streambed level and is strongly paved with reinforced concrete, providing a firm crossing even when inundated.

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This is one of the best-known types of "low cost" roads.[6] The success of the method depends largely upon the climate and the soil characteristics. A firm, sandy soil which does not require stabilization is best, for when a soil-stabilizing treatment must be applied the construction cost is no longer low. Costs are also affected by the necessity of hauling sand or stone long distances. Syrian conditions in general are less favorable to the method than might be expected, and in the extreme northeast are definitely unsuitable. 499

The mission has studied carefully the question of using low-cost road-building methods in certain parts of Syria. Apart from the factors mentioned, on the main routes it is evident that the traffic wear is too great even for the stone-based macadam with 15 cm. of block, 12 cm. of gravel and three cm. of asphalt pre-mix topping. It must be noted also that in popular usage "low-cost roads" mean low in construction cost only, not necessarily in expense of maintenance. The costs of material, labor, haulage, etc., add to the costs of maintenance as well as road-building. Where provision of adequate maintenance is difficult, it is often better to invest in a better road initially.

Mix-in-place or similar methods may hold promise in raising the standards of the desert roads or *pistes* (tracks). The mission did not find these in as bad a condition as so often reported; it appears that many instances of mired vehicles result from careless driving rather than from unavoidable road hazards. Nevertheless, some improvement of these routes must eventually be considered. At the moment it might best be confined to proper signposting, construction of Irish bridges, and repairs in the very worst places. In view of the limitation on development funds, road-building efforts just now should be focused mainly upon the several projects of greater urgency than these.

C ROAD MAINTENANCE

Close to the capital city, the roads appear to be rather well maintained; elsewhere the difference is at once noticeable. Toward the east many of the 491

[6] See: Landbouwwegen, Reports of a Congress of the Royal (Netherlands) Institute of Engineers, 1953; D. W. Lister, Bituminous Soil Stabilization for Road Foundations (Cairo), 1953; Low Cost Roads and Runways (Cairo), The Shell Company, 1947; Bituminous Products for Roads and Runways (supplement), The Shell Company, 1950; Stabilisation des Sols, Bulletin Intérieur Shell; Wet Sand Mix, Een voordelig procede voor de verharding van wegdekken enz. (Shell); etc.

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441 roads show evidence of neglect and some have been virtually ruined through lack of attention.

Expenditures

Financial provisions for road maintenance in the regular budget (shown in Table 8) during 1948-54 have averaged £S 3.23 million per year, or about as much as the average allowance for new road construction. During 1954 the original provision of £S 3.8 million was increased by a supplementary appropriation of £S 2 million, because of extraordinarily heavy rainfall damage, bringing the 1948-54 average to £S 3.51 million. On the basis of 8,200 kilometers of all-weather roads, this represents a maintenance allowance of £S 428 per kilometer.

TABLE 8 Budgetary Provisions for Syrian Roadbuilding and Maintenance in Recent Years

(*Thousand £S*)

Year	For new construction	For maintenance[a]
1948	7,216	2,300
1949	5,718	3,200
1950	2,907	3,200
1951	875	3,100
1952	1,752	3,400
1953	1,780	3,600
1954	3,478	5,800[b]

[a] Includes £S 300,000 each year for maintenance and depreciation of trucks, rollers and asphalting equipment.

[b] Includes a supplementary appropriation of £S 2 million during the year.

While this compares not unfavorably with that of some other countries[7] in similiar stages of development, only the increased 1954 figure approximates the needs of Syrian roads. The present 2,600 kilometers of asphalted road require, in addition to ordinary upkeep, a new three cm. covering of pre-mix every five years, at an estimated £S 10,000 per kilometer. Including this in a total maintenance estimate of £S 2,260 per kilometer per year

[7] Some comparative annual expenditures per kilometer for maintenance, expressed in Syrian currency, are: Iran, £S 250–440; Egypt, £S 200–400; Surinam, £S 600; French West Africa, about £S 420.

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for the asphalted roads, and allowing £S 500 per kilometer for the macadamized routes and lesser amounts for others, the annual road maintenance budget should actually be around £S 6 million to £S 7 million. 441

This raises the question whether Syria should consider new road investment if existing ones cannot be properly maintained. For every kilometer of new construction the annual burden of upkeep increases. But current deficiencies in road maintenance are not simply a matter of money; the present annual expenditures are sufficient to keep the roads in far better condition than they are. The causes of neglect include several other factors.

Personnel

Some earlier studies[8] have referred to seasonal labor shortages in road maintenance. On this there are differences of opinion. In general, local authorities do not find difficulty on this score, although without question there are shortages of supervisory personnel in the middle rank and foreman grades. A more serious situation is evident at the engineering level, where a wider use of foreign consulting firms and contractors would be helpful. For the whole range of public works, including roads, the government has available about 50 qualified engineers. The detailed knowledge and skill of intensive specialization is difficult to achieve under these circumstances and the mission was therefore not surprised to observe occasional use of overheated asphalt, or of too chalky a sand in mending mixtures. The effectiveness of the small corps of engineers is further reduced by the inordinate burden of paper work and administrative detail, if not by an actual preference of many for office work at the expense of practical field supervision. 441 464

Organization

Road maintenance, as a responsibility of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Works, must compete for attention with all other types of public work activities and often fares poorly. This organizational problem may be partially responsible for a certain maldistribution of maintenance funds among the various districts, which often leaves a number of 441 653

[8] E.g., Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, *The Economic Development of Syria*, 1947.

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491 653 districts without the resources necessary for the most ordinary upkeep.

A wider use of road gangs would achieve far better maintenance, for the same expenditure, than is possible with the prevailing "one-man" system. A team concentrating upon a section at a time can often effect repairs which one man alone cannot do at all; gangs also permit closer technical supervision and more efficient use of equipment—valuable considerations when the supply of both is limited.

Road Maintenance Equipment

491 496 The country as a whole has far too little road-building and maintenance machinery for effective work. Mechanization must of course be introduced gradually where so much of the work is now done by hand. The present stock of equipment cannot meet even current needs. Half the mixers in the Damascus area are unusable, for example. There are no graders or bulldozers for maintenance purposes, although at least ten are needed for the tracks alone.

It is not enough to expect that construction machinery will be assigned to maintenance afterward; much of it will be worn out on the contemplated road-building program. Maintenance machinery should be bought separately. For one or more stone-crushing plants, the necessary bulldozers and graders, new rollers and other equipment needed currently, the mission foresees an expenditure of £S 1 million in the first five-year period and twice this amount in the second five years.

494 D LEGISLATION ON THE USE OF ROADS

Traffic Laws

Syria enacted a modern, comprehensive traffic code in 1953, which contains the usual detailed regulations on vehicle dimensions, maximum wheel loading, weight limits for certain types of roads and bridges, and similiar provisions for protection of the roads. It also provides for periodic inspection of vehicles for mechanical fitness. Rules of the road for safe and courteous driving are prescribed, as well as the knowledge required for obtaining a driver's permit.

The code is essentially a good one, and it is regrettable that most of its provisions are ineffective because of poor enforcement. Apart from the danger to human life, unless better measures are taken to enforce the

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regulations Syria faces a heavy loss of investment in road construction and maintenance. Besides establishment of a number of portable weighing stations, penalties should be imposed against unnecessary driving on the side of the road, which damages the edges, shoulders and adjacent crop land. Farmers should be severely penalized for plowing on the road right-of-way. Heavy traffic should be barred from certain roads and tracks during and just after heavy rains when the ground is soft.

Public Transport

Motor vehicles rendering services for public hire, buses, taxis and certain trucks, are subject to special regulation.

Until 1953, the individual bus owner could operate when, where and under such conditions as he wished. The new law[9] limits his operations to a duly franchised route and permits the government to control the number of buses on a given route, with the aim of preventing uneconomic congestion on popular routes and shortage on others. New bus owners are entitled to be licensed for those routes whose quota is not filled. In this respect the law presupposes a better statistical knowledge of the traffic demand than the government has. There are other valuable provisions, however, and already the legislation has introduced greater cleanliness, uniform rates, and responsibility of the carrier for liability insurance.

Trucks owned and operated by merchants, industrial concerns, farmers and others for the hauling of their own goods are classified as private vehicles. The number of these is not restricted and is increasing rapidly. There were 1,820 licensed private trucks in 1953, compared with 1,556 the year before and only 667 in 1948.

Special regulation of public trucks (those licensed to engage in the public transport business for hire) was introduced during the French mandate to protect the railways from excessive competition. The number of public trucks was limited and, in 1935, the sacrifice of two or more trucks was required as a condition for obtaining a license for a new one. Elsewhere we have mentioned more recent provisions for protection of the railway which prohibit carriage by road of certain classes of goods.

The principle of restricting the total number of public trucks has persisted, although the outmoded original justification has been replaced. The present purpose is to prevent excessive competition among the truckers

[9] Legislative Decree No. 122, October 5, 1953.

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themselves. Possibly it may be helpful to regulate the number of trucks in this way, if only to avoid an overinvestment in them by the public. The matter is debatable. There is at least a basic conflict of purpose if on the one hand the government seeks to lower existing highway freight rates, and on the other restricts competition specifically to prevent them from falling. Again, for the government to adjust the supply of trucks nicely to the demand requires statistical data which is certainly not now available.

The system is open to abuse, whether or not it occurs. In any event the cost of licensing a new truck is greatly increased, for the owner must first purchase from another the license of an old truck to be decommissioned. For this freely negotiable right he may have to pay £S 10,000 or more—a price which in itself suggests that rigid restriction is not entirely in the best public interest.

Since 1953 these restrictions have not applied to tank trucks, any number of which may be licensed upon payment of a fee of £S 1,500 per vehicle. The mission suggests that a similar arrangement for other types of trucks would have a restraining influence, while at the same time adding appreciably to government revenues.

International Truck Transport

Reference has been made to the added costs of transport of Syrian goods, particularly on certain seaward routes,[10] occasioned by one or more border crossings.

This problem cannot be viewed as a difficulty unique to Syria, but must be recognized as an inconvenience which raises transport costs for each of the several countries of the region. One study in 1952 reported that it took a truckload of merchandise seven days to travel the 975 kilometers from Beirut to Teheran. The trip was found to involve six sets of customs formalities and documents, loading and reloading the goods onto four different trucks, and four successive drivers—a Lebanese, a Syrian, an Iraqi and an Iranian. Under these circumstances freight rates are unavoidably high, in addition to the breakage and loss occasioned by repeated handling.

Such a self-imposed handicap can be removed only by supplanting the present narrow protective regulations of the individual countries by reciprocal concessions for mutual economic advantage.

[10] For example, from Damascus to Beirut or from Homs to Tripoli.

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III PORTS

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A MEDITERRANEAN OUTLETS.

The east coast of the Mediterranean is not particularly favored with port sites. Most of the natural bays lie open toward the west and provide poor shelter without artificial breakwaters. There is also a high submarine shelf, comparatively unbroken by estuaries, so that along much of the Syrian-Lebanese coast the shallow waters prevent large ships from anchoring closer than several miles offshore. To add to the difficulties, on the landward side the mountain ranges parallel to the coast afford very few easy routes to the interior, and these generally over fairly high passes.

Conditions are somewhat better to the south, where the Palestine ports of Haifa and Jaffa (Tel Aviv) have been established. But for that length of coast more readily accessible to Syria natural port locations are scarce, and only a few deserve mention here. Even fewer are in Syrian territory, for although western Syria extends over some five degrees of latitude from north to south, its actual seacoast is confined to about 1½ degrees between Turkey and Lebanon.

At the extreme north Syrian goods can reach the Turkish port of Iskenderun, which has been considerably improved since 1921 and is growing in importance. This is connected by road to Aleppo and is also served by the continuation of the Northern Railway. Another Turkish port accessible by road is the once-important Antioch on the river Orontes; in recent times the silting of the river has destroyed its value for shipping.

Below the Turkish border is Syria's own port of Latakia, on which national development efforts are now concentrated and about which more will be said. Farther southward are the Syrian coastal towns of Djeble, Banias and Tartous, all three usable to some extent as ports. Djeble has been put forward at times as a possible future national port, but is of no significance at present. Banias is economically important as the terminus of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, but for other commodities is rather inconveniently situated. Tartous is best known as a fishing port, and is occasionally visited by sailing ships and coasters.

The three Lebanese ports of Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon must be included in the list, although only the first two are important to Syria today. Sidon is chiefly of historic interest, although just south of it tankers now load petroleum from the Trans-Arabian pipeline.

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504 Tripoli, with both rail and road connections to Homs and beyond, handles certain cargo from nearby regions of Syria, including raw sugar imports for the Homs refinery. A free zone was established in 1952. However, the depth of water is only two meters at quayside and six along the jetty. This limits the usefulness of the port, as larger vessels must anchor in the roadstead at least a mile offshore.

Of the ports mentioned, the most important of all in recent times has been Beirut. Historically the outlet for much of the caravan trade, its modern development dates from a concession granted in 1857 for exploitation of a Beirut-Damascus road, and subsequently transferred to the Compagnie Ottomane du Port, des Quais et Entrepots de Beyrouth (a later outgrowth of which was the DHP Railway). By 1924 the company had installed modern port facilities and had obtained a protective monopoly for the construction of all ports along the Syrian coast.

The port introduced free warehousing in 1923 and in 1934 created a free zone. Partially inspired by the competitive development of the port of Haifa, a considerable extension of facilities was undertaken during 1934-38. The port area was enlarged to 19 hectares, with 1,420 meters of quays of which 415 meters offered deep water. Other works were extended to include 12,000 square meters of sheds, 3,000 cubic meters of refrigerated storage and 17,000 square meters of warehouse space.

As far as Syria is concerned, the port of Beirut is convenient to Damascus and the southern region and will probably continue to serve this area to a great extent. It is also the rail connection for Jordanian cargo passing through Syria. It seems probable that the Latakia port will draw more of its cargo volume from the new productive areas than from existing ports, and that the effect upon Beirut will be less than commonly supposed.

B THE NATIONAL PORT OF LATAKIA

Early Background

Latakia, until recently a modest coastal town of 35,000 inhabitants, has long been a fishing port. It has a small shallow natural harbor suitable for light craft, although it suffers heavy winds from January to March. There are some quays and sheds, but the depth of water alongside the quays

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range from 0.70 to five meters, averaging about two, and the depth of the harbor entrance is only six to seven meters. The larger ships must anchor in the roadstead (depth, five to six fathoms) and be served by lighters. 504

Although at various times in the past steps were initiated to improve the port facilities at Latakia, it was not until 1950 that the government decided definitely to proceed with the development of a modern national port. In the mission's opinion the decision was reasonable and realistic, despite the various theoretical arguments in favor of other courses. At all events, the course being chosen, the mission has viewed the present development problem as simply one of integrating Latakia most effectively into the national transport pattern.

New Construction

The new port is designed to handle one million tons of cargo per year, about double the 1953 volume, but is calculated to show a satisfactory investment return at slightly above 800,000 tons. This volume was actually reached in 1954, before completion of the port construction. Recently the dispatch of the lighter service itself has improved considerably and this, together with the growing volume of regular cargo, has recently made it possible for international shipping companies to remove the former Latakia port surcharge of $9.25 per ton.

The mission has recommended construction of a grain silo, not provided for in the plans. A silo capacity of about 20,000-40,000 tons, equipped for mechanized delivery, will be required to regularize the harvest flow of export cereals when combined with the inland storage, cleaning and grading facilities discussed in the Main Report.

Promotion and Regulation

A number of artificial measures have been invoked by the government as part of its effort to encourage the use of Latakia. A 1953 decree, for example, prohibited the importation of brown sugar, cement, asphalt, wood or iron via ports other than Latakia. There are also provisions with regard to exports. Since July 1952, exports of Syria's most important agricultural products are not allowed to use ports other than Latakia. The mission recognizes that such measures can serve a purpose at times, but they also can have serious drawbacks and are seldom the most desirable 654 504

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means of promotion. Indeed, in the first example given it was necessary to exempt certain materials for southern public works, sugar for the Homs refinery (by special license) and various other large imports, so that much of the remaining cargo affected by the decree would have entered through Latakia in any event. It is questionable whether the actual benefit to Latakia is enough to offset the domestic and international resentment engendered.

Favorable adjustment of the various port charges, such as those for anchorage, mooring, cargo handling and storage, offers a more satisfactory means of promotion. In these the Syrian government has already shown a flexible policy, readjusting the rate schedule from time to time; we feel that this policy should be continued. Inducements of this kind, together with constantly improving service to shippers, will in general meet the competition of other ports with greater benefit to the Syrian economy than negative or restrictive measures.

IV CIVIL AVIATION

In a period of a few years Syria has made appreciable progress in the development of her civil aviation. Wisely, at this early stage, she has concentrated on the most-needed domestic services and the educational steps to popularize air transport, while at the same time providing suitable airport facilities to insure good connection with international lines. Domestic air mail service was inaugurated in April 1954.

International Services

By the end of 1953 nine international airlines provided Syria with direct service to all parts of the world. These call primarily at Damascus, although the Class C airport at Aleppo is used internationally to some extent.

The Damascus airport is situated only 10 kilometers southwest of the center of the city on an excellent road, at an altitude of 715 meters. It has a main runway of 2,550 meters and a cross-wind runway of 1,000 meters, both paved. Runways, taxiways and aprons will take aircraft of up to 50 tons. Equipment includes full lighting to ICAO specifications,

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a high-power non-directional radio beacon, VHF direction finder for bad weather, and its own 150 KW diesel power generating plant. Radio communication is maintained with Aleppo, Amsterdam, Athens, Baghdad, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Istanbul, Djeddah, Jerusalem, Karachi, Nicosia, Paris, Rome and Teheran. 508

Both in the interest of international service and for the development of qualified domestic personnel the Syrian government has made good use of international technical assistance. Since 1953 it has had a team of ICAO experts in the country to train Syrian staff for the various ground services. In addition the government has sent a number of young Syrians overseas on fellowships to study aeronautical engineering, radio, air navigation, meteorology and aviation legislation.

Syrian Airways

Syrian Airways operates DC-3 flights between Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Kamichliye, Deir ez Zor and Palmyra, as well as Beirut. 509

At present no attempt is made to operate on an economic basis. Passenger rates range between £S 0.07 and £S 0.18 per kilometer. Freight is carried for as little as £S 0.67 per ton-kilometer on certain routes (against an estimated average cost of at least £S 1.60 and probably much more). Deficits are met by the government, while revenue may be used by the line for development purposes. The objective at this time is mainly to promote air transport by all available means. Landing fees are kept low, the tax on aviation gasoline is only 18 piasters per 100 liters, and Syria imposes no income tax on airline operations.

As accounts are now kept the actual expenditures for civil aviation, and for Syrian Airways in particular, are not easily separated from the national defense budget. The mission feels that the time has come to set up an independent accounting system for Syrian Airways, to enable the government to measure its progress against costs from year to year. Only in this way can the domestic line develop eventually into an economically sound business. Undoubtedly government financial support will be needed for some time, but the government must be in a position to evaluate its effectiveness.

For extensions and replacements it is very likely that more DC-3 airplanes can be acquired at favorable prices. Although this type is no longer

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509 built, many still in service are being retired by larger airlines whose increased traffic requires greater unit capacity. The mission recommends allocating possibly £S 600,000 to be used for this purpose over the next five years.

365 MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT

Both Aleppo and Damascus are served by city tram and bus systems. As in many other parts of the world, the buses are gradually replacing the tramways.

Aleppo

The tramway system of Aleppo was established in 1929 by a French company under a monopoly concession to provide the city with public transport. In 1951 the company was nationalized, continuing operations under the same concession. There was no bus service until 1952, when it was launched by the tramway company itself under a broadened interpretation of the original monopoly.

Both forms of transport are now operated at a small profit. While tramway development is static, new buses are being financed out of reserves set aside earlier for renewals on the tramway system. A gradual replacement will undoubtedly take place until the tramway system finally becomes uneconomical, but no immediate need to accelerate the process or to alter the policy is evident.

Damascus

Although older (1907) the Damascus tramway system has a similar history. Started by a Belgian company, it too was nationalized in 1951. In this case, however, the growth of bus competition has taken a different course.

In 1946 the tramways introduced three buses which they operated experimentally for about eight months. The fare was set at 15 piasters, but private buses made their appearance also, with a 10-piaster fare, and their competition caused the tramways' experiment to show an operating

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loss. Perhaps because of this, the tramway company failed to obtain a 365
broadening of its monopoly concession to include buses.

Without legislative restraint, the private bus business continued to grow in the hands of many individual owner-operators. There are now about 120 private buses, and their operators have combined into an association for the sake of uniform rates, pooled revenues and operating economies. Users apparently prefer the buses to the trams, for despite extremely low tram fares the buses have absorbed most of the business. Today, in contrast to 35,000-45,000 daily tram passengers, the private buses carry 100,000-200,000. The tramway operates at a considerable loss.

Seeking a way out of this dilemma, the nationalized tramway company has proposed that it buy up the buses at a cost of around £S 2 million, investing another £S 2 million in a gradual program of replacement with new buses. This idea has not met with favor among the bus owners, who see no public benefit in shifting from a successful and satisfactory private exploitation to a municipal operation.

The mission feels that such a shift is not justified economically, and that there is no need to use public funds for this purpose. Originally the tramways were installed as consumers of electric power generated by the same company. Under present local conditions the growing demand for electricity for other uses suggests that the simplest course is for the outmoded tramway, with its high overhead costs, to retire from the picture gradually in favor of the more efficient bus system already in operation.

VI TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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Syrian telephone and telegraph facilities have expanded rapidly in recent years, under the stimulus of an exceptionally clear and coordinated program of development. Investment in new and improved installations, including automatic dial system, has totalled £S 30,861,223 since 1946, mainly provided through interest-free loans from the government.

An even more impressive fact is that the operations are self-supporting. Telecommunications revenue has exceeded operating expense by an average amount of about £S 700,000 per year since 1949. In 1953 the total revenue was £S 10,944,684 against expenses of £S 9,573,585, leaving a record surplus of £S 1,371,099. Officials believe that with more efficient

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206 operation of the remote offices and certain other economies this surplus of revenue over expense might be increased by as much as £S 3 million.

Statistically the growth and extent of the system may be seen from Table 9. Direct international telephone connections are now available to Rome, Ankara, Amman, Lebanon and Iraq, while telegraph circuits communicate directly with these as well as New York, London, Egypt, Arabia and Yemen. Radiotelephone is used to a large extent on exterior routes, while most of the internal messages are carried on pole-and-wire land circuits.

TABLE 9 Development of Syrian Telecommunications

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Telephone offices	100	110	116	123	132
Telephone subscribers	9,000	14,000	15,410	20,568	21,218
Telegraph offices	62	61	62	64	65
Kilometers of poles	9,500	12,100	13,200	14,900	15,200
Kilometers of wire circuits	11,650	13,200	15,706	36,200	39,620
No. of circuits	161	173	227	337	379

207 Until recently the system also assumed responsibility for radio broadcasting. This has now become a separate service. With payment of £S 6 million the single transmitter was transferred to the new operating authority, but it is still made available for the use of the telecommunications system during six hours per day.

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ANNEX I

NOTES ON SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

Syria's 3.65 million people dwell in an estimated 8,265 settlements, of which about 61% are towns and villages and the rest farms. Only Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deir ez Zor and Latakia can be said to be preponderantly urban; the remaining communities have fairly evenly balanced urban and rural characteristics or else are clearly agricultural. About 23% of Syria's population lives in Damascus and Aleppo, 17% in 21 other cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, 6% in 31 mixed settlements and over 50% in agricultural settlements. A little less than 3% is nomadic. 361 162

But the character of Syria's settlements is changing and the picture presented above will probably not be accurate for long. People of the mountain regions are slowly moving down to the plains. Both urban and rural settlements are being established in areas newly opened to cultivation, such as the Jezireh, the Ghab and the Roudj. The achievement of political independence started a trend toward urbanization, stimulated by construction of new roads and development of motorized transport.

Despite a considerable postwar building boom, there are probably fewer buildings in relation to the population in Syria than in most other countries. Although the exact number of dwelling units is not known, it probably does not exceed 350,000 or approximately one for every 10 inhabitants. In recent years new construction has been at a high rate. In 1953, for example, the number of housing units probably increased by about 5.15%. While this is substantially in excess of the normal increase in the population, account should be taken of the fact that the newer dwelling units probably do not house on the average more than six people. On this basis, only about 8% of the new construction, or some 1,460 units, were available for replacement of existing housing. In the postwar period the demand for housing has been stimulated by the rise in population, the wartime building lag, the growth of the foreign community, the return of expatriate Syrians, changes in the geographical distribution of population and the tendency of patriarchal families to break up into simple 362

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362 families requiring one dwelling each. While the need for a high and even higher rate of construction in the future is undeniable, it is doubtful that the factors which have operated to create an effective demand for housing will altogether be as effective in the future. Some decline in building over the coming years may well take place.

365 361 Community services have not kept pace with construction. Damascus and Aleppo have been most nearly provided with the essential streets, water supply and sewerage facilities, but the medium-sized and the small communities are very badly serviced. Except for water supply, this is not yet a problem for the small settlements, but it is serious for the medium-sized centers with their motorized transport and denser populations. The social services—education, public health, social welfare and community development—are likewise not yet adequately developed in Syria, but the country is commendably aware of the need and in the field of education, at least, has increased its expenditures impressively in the last few years. A few of the larger municipalities take care of their community services and have undertaken town-planning, but the central government, through the Ministry of Public Works, merely serves as technical advisor to the municipalities. There is no central government department with responsibility for housing. And while there are ministries for education and public health, no government department is responsible for social welfare or community development programs and no such programs exist. The administrative organizations in these fields clearly need strengthening.

Investment in Settlements

657 361 Over 60% of Syria's total annual investment is estimated to go into settlements, for housing, community and social services, and other purposes. During 1949-53 this type of investment averaged £S 138 million annually, of which £S 15 million (almost 11%) was from public funds and £S 123 million (89%) was private investment. On the basis of a 3.65 million population the annual investment in this sector was £S 39.4 per capita, of which £S 35.1 represents private funds.

[362] Perhaps as much as 80% of the private investment and about 72% of the total investment in settlements goes into housing; the balance is divided between industrial and commercial buildings, in that order. Private building activity reached an all-time high in 1953.

Of public investment in settlements, 80% is municipal and only 20%

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governmental, representing 8.7% and 2.2%, respectively, of total investment in settlements. Municipal investment is directed to water supply,[1] roads, power plants and distribution networks and sewerage facilities, in that order; very little goes for housing. Government investment is primarily in buildings, chiefly for education and public health purposes.

The mission has assumed, in preparing its proposed program for settlements and social services, that the estimated 1954 population of 3.65 million will increase over the next five years at a rate of only 1.5% annually, rather than the 2% rate of recent years. If the program is to be properly adjusted to Syria's needs, however, a population census and an improvement in the collection and organization of vital statistics are urgently needed. Better public health conditions, economic development, opening of new areas and new lines of transport and communications, changes in social patterns—all will bring about major changes in size and distribution of the population over the next few years. Any policy developed for the settlements should be planned with an eye not only to the immediate future but also to the longer term economic, social and cultural development of the country.

II EDUCATION

A PROGRESS TO DATE

For centuries, and especially during the years of foreign occupation, the only formal educational facilities were the Koranic schools, which concentrated on religious teaching. A decline in the number of these schools began about 150 years ago, and with it a gradual change in their curriculum; today about one-third of the time is devoted to religion. Meanwhile the number and significance of state primary schools has been increasing. In these, during the French occupation, the pattern of education was influenced by traditional French systems.

Since independence, Syria has started to develop its education at a faster rate and to give it a Syro-Arabic pattern. The effort of these few years and the success achieved is impressive. The budget of the Ministry of Education rose from almost £S 17 million in 1946 to £S 36.8 million in 1953, and its share of the total budget increased from 13.5% to 17.7% (in 1923 it had been only 9.1% and in 1931 9.8%). Between 1946 and 1953 the

[1] Water supplies in Damascus and Aleppo, however, are financed by government funds.

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871 number of primary, intermediate and secondary schools more than doubled.

871 The last five years alone have seen 939 new schools[2] established—an increase of 64% over the previously existing schools and an average increase of 11% per annum. Greatest gains occurred in the primary schools, the number of which rose by 81% or 11.4% per year. The number of children attending primary schools rose from about 150,000 in 1945-46 to 311,000 in 1952-53. Enrollment in intermediate and secondary schools increased even more rapidly—from 12,661 to 47,670. These advances, as well as those in the fields of technical education, teacher-training and higher education, are shown in Table 1.

872 *Primary Education*

In spite of the very large effort of the last few years, the remaining problems are enormous. According to the best available estimates, no more than 30-40% of the population is literate. It is customarily reckoned that, in a population similar in structure to Syria's, the number of children in every year of age from the 6th to the 12th is approximately equal to 2.6% of the total population. Six to eleven being the primary school age in Syria, there would be on this basis 546,000 children ($6 \times 2.6\% = 15.6\%$ of the 1952 population) of primary school age. Actually only 311,033, or presumably 56% of the eligibles, are in school.

The ratio is not the same for boys and girls. Assuming that the school-age population is divided equally between boys and girls—i.e., that there are 273,000 of each sex—then 18% of the boys and 68% of the girls do not attend school (the attendance figures are 222,779 and 88,254, respectively). Furthermore, many children do not remain in school long enough to receive a school certificate. The number who do finish has been increasing rapidly (from 624 in 1928, to 2,993 in 1940, 6,690 in 1946 and 19,850 in 1952) but it is still much lower than it should be.

There is one primary school for every 1,400 persons in Syria, with an average of 128 pupils and 3.6 teachers. Although only 13% of all primary schools are private schools, these have 18% of all primary school pupils and over 23% of the primary school teachers. The provinces of Damascus and Aleppo have the largest number of private schools; the Euphrates, Djebel Druze and Hauran have the fewest.

[2] Not new buildings, but new schools, most of which occupy rented buildings.

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TABLE 1 Recent Educational Progress in Syria

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	1945–46	1950–51	1952–53
Budget of Ministry of Education[a]	16,967[b]	24,266[c]	36,804[d]
Percent of total ordinary budget	13.5	14.6	17.7
Primary education			
Number of schools	1,080	1,794	2,399
Government	737	1,472	2,064
Private	343	322	335
Number of pupils	150,134	261,862	311,033
Government	99,703	206,343	249,399
Private	50,431	55,519	61,634
Number of graduates	6,690	18,104	26,342
Intermediate and secondary education			
Number of schools	73	135	181
Government	28	47	57
Private	45	88	124
Number of pupils	12,661	34,874	47,670
Government	8,276	22,269	27,144
Private	4,385	12,595	20,526
Number of intermediate school graduates	1,039	3,630	4,610
Number of secondary school graduates	1,155	1,243	1,700
Technical schools			
Number of schools	7	15	8[e]
Government	5	11	6
Private	2	4	2
Number of pupils	916	2,277	1,676
Government	881	2,105	1,567
Private	35	172	109
Teacher training			
Number of schools	4	5	8
Number of students	388	955	1,255
Higher education			
Number of students	1,058	2,470	2,598

[a] In thousands of Syrian pounds.
[b] 1946 budget.
[c] Two-thirds of the 18-months budget ended June 30, 1951.
[d] 1953 budget.
[e] Excluding agricultural schools.

Assuming an equal percentage of school age children in the different 872
districts, it appears that the regional distribution of primary schools is very unbalanced. Thus the average number of primary school pupils is 91

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872 per 1,000 of the population, but in the Jezireh it is only 53 while in the Djebel Druze it is 152. The number of schools, which for Syria as a whole averages 0.7 per thousand people, varies regionally from 0.53 in Aleppo to 1.62 in the Djebel Druze. Similarly, while the country has an average of 2.56 teachers per thousand people, Latakia has only 1.94 and the Djebel Druze 4.01. It is apparent that, proportionately, in some areas three times as many are receiving primary education as in other areas.

For 1952-53, there were 8,541 primary school teachers in Syria. The pupil-teacher ratio was 36 for Syria as a whole; it ranged from 26 in the Jezireh to 41 in the Hauran and 43 in Homs.

Many factors have affected the distribution of educational facilities and the extent of school attendance. There is naturally a better provision for schools in the older settled areas than in the Jezireh, which has been developed only in the last decade and a half. School attendance is higher in the more densely populated districts than in areas, like the Jezireh, where the population is sparse and scattered and children may be deterred from attending by the distance from the nearest school. Thus, while the Jezireh has the fewest schools in relation to the population, it also has the highest proportion of teachers to school attendance. Economic pressure also keeps children out of school or causes them to leave before finishing, although in areas where the educational tradition is strong, as is apparently the case in the Djebel Druze, school attendance may be high despite a rather low standard of living.

Intermediate and Secondary Schools

873 There is one secondary school for every 20,400 people, with an average of 276 pupils and 17 teachers per school. Records show that the number of children attending intermediate and secondary schools in 1952-53 was 47,670 out of an estimated 425,000 of school age. In other words, only 11.2% of school age children were attending secondary schools at all. Even if we include those receiving post-primary education in technical, agricultural and intermediate schools, the percentage does not rise above 12%. Thus less than one out of eight children in Syria receives any formal education beyond the primary grades.

Private schools represent 65% of all secondary schools, but they have only 40% of the secondary school pupils. Only in Latakia is the private school enrollment greater than that of governmental schools. On the other

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hand, 54% of all secondary school teachers teach in private schools, whose financial resources for this purpose are greater. 873

Again assuming an equal percentage of school age children in each district, it appears that the secondary schools, like the primary schools, are unequally distributed. At this educational level there is an average of 13.5 pupils per 1,000 of the population; but in the Jezireh, as might be expected, the ratio is only 2.7 in contrast to 18.1 in the Djebel Druze, 19.5 in Damascus and 22.3 in Hama. The number of secondary schools, averaging 0.049 per thousand people, ranges from as low as 0.016 in the Jezireh to 0.068 in Damascus and 0.085 in Hama. The average number of teachers is 0.8 per thousand people; in the Jezireh it is 0.2, in Hama 1.1 and in Damascus 1.6. In 1952-53 the secondary pupil-teacher ratio for the country was 16, but varied from 12.1 in the Jezireh and 12.4 in Damascus to 23.7 in the Djebel Druze. As in the case of primary schools, it is clear that the number of teachers cannot be the only limiting factor on attendance, for some areas most deficient in teachers have more children in school than those better supplied.

Vocational Education

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Syria has six vocational schools for boys, one for girls and one coeducational, as well as six schools for primary teacher training and two colleges for rural teachers, or a total of 16 schools giving some kind of professional education not of university level.[3] All except one in Deir ez Zor are on or west of the line Damascus-Aleppo; thus the entire eastern portion of Syria with a population of over half a million has just one professional school. Together these schools had 3,881 students in 1952-53,[4] a figure to be contrasted with the estimated 60,000 young people who enter the labor market each year.

The principal shortcoming of the present system of vocational education is the great gulf between the training and instruction given and that which is really required for skilled jobs. Unfortunately the Ministry and the schools maintain no liaison with the businessmen and industrialists for whom they are presumably turning out graduates. Nothing is done to place graduates in private employment; the Ministry of Education simply

[3] Agricultural schools above the primary level are discussed separately elsewhere; there are five of these.

[4] Including 1,670 in technical vocational schools and 2,202 in teacher-training.

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874 asks government agencies about job openings. Although the schools are theoretically required to keep a record of their graduates and the positions they have secured, no effort is actually made to determine whether the education they have obtained has met the requirements.

Most of the students at vocational schools are those who, for one reason or another, did not qualify for the general secondary schools. In large part this is due to a tendency to look down on all manual training and to emphasize general education at the expense of technical education. The attitude is reflected in the traditionally low pay scale for manual workers. Although the efficiency of government and business would be greatly increased if there were more skilled typists and secretaries, the low wages and social standing discourage many from this line of work. Many boys apparently are unwilling to go in for vocational training for fear that it will lead them into a blind alley—that they will be denied opportunities to better themselves which they would have as possessors of a regular secondary school certificate. To open up a wider future for technical school graduates the Ministry of Education is now considering a program of five years of primary schooling and five of intermediate education, followed by two years of intensive technical studies, with the object of qualifying graduates either as foremen or as university engineering students.

875 In addition to equipment inadequacies, the calibre of the teaching staff leaves something to be desired. The technical school teachers are of two types: the practically-trained shop instructors who are basically experienced workers but who often lack fully rounded experience and pedagogic training, and the instructors who teach the general education subjects and the more academic and theoretical side of the vocational training. The monthly salary of the first group starts at £S 175-200 and after many years of service may reach a maximum of £S 350. The second group earns the equivalent of a secondary school teacher's salary, starting with £S 260 per month, with the possibility, after 30 years of service, of earning £S 500. It is generally recognized that these salaries are seldom sufficient to attract really good people, but this problem probably cannot be solved without a general revision of government salary scales.

In 1951 Syria invited UNESCO to send a four-man mission to study the problem of professional education. The creation of a department for vocational education in the Ministry of Education was one outgrowth of its recommendations, but much more remains to be done.

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Investment in Educational Facilities

For many centuries only a few school buildings or libraries were built in Syria, and those mainly for the Koranic schools. During the past years, particularly since the war, an effort has been made to provide enough school buildings, but only a small part of the requirements has been met. Although a special tax for school construction was levied by the government for the municipalities, it has not yielded enough for the purpose. Today most schools operate in rented structures which do not meet the physical requirements of a school building.

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According to figures of the Ministry of Education, 416 school buildings were built between 1949 and 1954. These were mostly secondary schools, half of them in the Damascus and Aleppo mohafazats. The Ministry estimates the expenditure for these buildings at £S 8.28 million, averaging around £S 20,000 as the cost of each school of two to five classrooms.

The schools suffer from a lack of the appropriate type of furniture, equipment, books and other facilities such as projectors, slides, radios, etc. The fact that most of this equipment must be imported is largely responsible for its shortage, although the furniture and some other items can in fact be produced locally.

B THE SIX-YEAR PROGRAM IN EDUCATION

Our estimates of the cost of the education program are set out in Table 2.

The item for development of primary and secondary education assumes an average annual increase in attendance of 6%, the continuation of the present ratio between primary and secondary education, the same type of education, the same ratio of government to private schools, and no increase in teachers' salaries.

With respect to vocational training we have assumed an increase in attendance at existing and new schools from 1,676 in 1952-53 to 3,500 by 1960-61. This would necessitate a rise of £S 2.226 million in the operating expenditures of such schools over the six-year period. In addition, about £S 900,000 would be needed to cover the cost of a foreign expert (£S 50,000 a year) and of operating the first school to be used as a training center for teachers (£S 100,000 a year). For the operation of

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TABLE 2 Proposed Six-Year Program for Education

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(Thousand £S)

Purpose of expenditure	Total
1. General program financed by the Ministry of Education—total budget covering primary and secondary education	220,200
2. Additional professional education—operation	2,226
3. Vocational education, foreign expert and training of teachers	900
4. Night schools	125
5. Fundamental education—regular program	99
6. Foreign expert and training program	400
7. Higher education and cultural institutions*	37,526
8. Total for operation	261,776
9. Construction of new schools	7,500
10. Equipment, etc.	2,500
11. Total government expenditure	271,776
12. Investment	10,000
13. Other expenses	261,776
14. Municipal expenditure for school buildings in addition to (9)	7,500
15. Total investment, public sector	17,500
16. Total program, public sector	269,276

* Excluding Department of Antiquities.

vocational night schools it is estimated that every student will cost £S 50 per year; the cost of this program is estimated at £S 5,000 for the first year, rising to £S 30,000 in the sixth year.

The cost of fundamental education has been reckoned at £S 3,000 per operating center annually. To this amount must be added the cost of a foreign expert and teacher-training, for which we have allowed £S 80,000 a year.

For higher education we have made provision for a modest increase in yearly allocations, pending development of future plans. A new type of all-purpose school building must be developed: one which will serve during the day for primary or secondary education, and in the evenings for professional and fundamental schools. We also propose that such buildings might be adapted to serve other community purposes as well.

If the school construction proceeds at the same rate as heretofore, and if the mission's recommendations respecting their construction, set forth in the Main Report, are adopted, five times more schoolrooms for primary

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or secondary education can be built. An expenditure of £S 3 million a 658
year would permit construction of 500 classrooms a year or about 100 new 871
schools, without auditorium and other facilities which can be built later. At such a rate, the country's estimated future requirement of about 4,000 schools (assuming that there are already 1,000) would be fulfilled in about 30 years. Meanwhile a considerable number of schools will undoubtedly have to continue in rented buildings.

The opening of new schools will have to be carefully planned in the light of the geographic distribution of existing facilities, conditions of overcrowding, the demand for schooling as influenced by economic factors, the distance of school-age children from existing schools and the availability of teachers. Now that a considerable portion of school-age children are in fact going to school, the location of new schools must be given more thought in order to ensure that they will meet a real need.

Thought should be given to standardization of desks and equipment and for their manufacture in Syria. There are also future possibilities for local production of some other items now imported, such as slides, maps, etc.

Finally, we recommend a reorganization of the Ministry of Education. In addition to a branch of general services with sections for planning, building, inspection, etc., there may be merit in creating five other branches, to correspond to the five major aspects of the educational program: primary education, secondary education, vocational education, fundamental education and higher education.

III PUBLIC HEALTH

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Hospitals and Dispensaries

The country's 24 public and 37 private hospitals have, as of the end of 1954, a total of 4,094 beds. This means only 1.19 beds[5] for over 1,000 inhabitants, as compared with 5 per 1,000 in England, the U. S. and New Zealand or the 15 per 1,000 which some authorities consider optimum for a really healthy population. Only 1,880 of the beds, or 0.56 per 1,000 inhabitants, are in general public hospitals.

[5] In this and subsequent comparisons the number of beds per 1,000 inhabitants has been calculated on the basis of the 1952 population.

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744 Worse than the low ratio of beds to population is their distribution.
743 Syria is divided into 44 *qadas,* or administrative areas, the average population of which is 75,000. Twenty-eight of these have no hospitals, public or private, whereas others have as many as 4.35 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. The distribution of beds in general governmental hospitals alone is no better: 29 qadas have none at all, but in Damascus and the Hauran center the ratio is 1.67 beds per thousand inhabitants.

Some people, especially in the eastern parts of the country, are as much as 250 kilometers from the nearest hospital. Even by private automobile it would take them at least a day to reach it, and then there would be no assurance of a vacant bed. Among those who must rely on camels or donkeys, as in the rural areas, many people are at least five days' travel time from a hospital. Since a hospital is supposed to serve a population living no more than one hour away, as a practical matter a great many of the people may be said to have no access to a hospital. Thus in the two large provinces in northeastern Syria, the Jezireh and Euphrates, there is only one small public hospital at Hassetche and another at Deir ez Zor.

The inadequacy of the hospitals, especially the general ones for the most part government-owned, which serve the poorest people, is shown by the ratio between number of patients and the population of the provinces. The country-wide average for 1951 and 1952 was 8.8 patients per thousand inhabitants of each province but the proportion ranges from 18.3 for Damascus to 2.2 in the Euphrates. Recent figures for France and the United States indicate that 40-80 persons per thousand are cared for at hospitals.

Another significant factor in many of the hospitals is the small number of patients attended in relation to beds available. In the Euphrates province, for example, there were 6.8 patients per bed compared to 24.6 and 22.6 for the Damascus and Homs provinces, respectively, and a country-wide average of 15.5. If the Damascus bed-patient ratio were country-wide, the 1,880 beds in general government hospitals could serve 46,000 people annually instead of only about 29,000, thus achieving a 58% increase in service with no increase in beds. Where there is both a low ratio of hospital beds to population and a low ratio of patients to beds, as in the Euphrates province, this condition is presumably due not only to the fact that existing hospital facilities are inaccessible to most of the population, but perhaps also to the poor service provided by the hospitals.

Syria has 96 governmental dispensaries or about three per 100,000

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inhabitants.[8] Here again there is unequal distribution, ranging from 5.1 per 100,000 in the Hauran area and 3.6 in Damascus down to 2.0 in the Euphrates province. Present-day standards call for one rural hospital for every 20,000 inhabitants, yet here many areas which should, by that standard, have a hospital, lack even a dispensary.

The average number of visits at dispensaries is 202 for every thousand persons, varying from 372 in the Hauran and 363 in Damascus down to 60 in the Euphrates. Since the dispensaries operate for the most part in areas without doctors, the figures must be taken to include calls which in other circumstances would be made on private doctors. There are about 7,000 visits per year at each dispensary, or an average of 23 visits per working day.

Medical Staff

In all, the country has 880 doctors including 76 foreigners. Thus there is one doctor for every 3,800 persons. In this respect Syria's standing compared with other countries is not strikingly low. The United States, Europe and the USSR have one doctor for every 1,200 persons; Latin America, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have one for every 1,700. But Asia (excluding the USSR and Japan) and Africa (without South Africa) have only one doctor to 12,000 persons and Iraq has one per 7,000.

Yet while Syria may not be handicapped by an actual lack of doctors, their distribution over the country is as unbalanced as that of the hospital and dispensary facilities. There are some areas with populations of 25,000, without a single doctor. As for trained nurses, midwives and other auxiliary personnel, these are in fact scarcer than doctors and constitute a problem of major importance.

The mission's proposed program, as outlined in the Main Report, would place greater stress on the prevention of disease than in the past.

It is difficult to estimate the possible cost of a full disease-prevention program; it might mean an expenditure of £S 2 per person per year or £S 7 million annually, not including the large expenditures for water supply, drainage, sewerage and other major works. Obviously a program of this magnitude cannot be recommended for Syria in the near future. A

[8] In the provinces of Damascus and Homs three touring doctors provide the same type of services at the dispensaries.

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144 more realistic minimum program would call for improvement of the water supply, vaccination against tuberculosis and anti-malaria measures.

The first step in assuring a supply of pure water at minimum cost is a survey of present and potential sources. Thereafter there should be measures for the purification of supplies, storage, transportation of pure water to the settlements, distribution to the settlements and to individual properties, and finally the provision of piped water to every building. But for many Syrian communities the construction of a network to bring water to every property is not the best way to begin, since it slows the rate at which water can be provided to new consumers. The program at first might better be confined to the survey and exploitation of new sources, storage and transportation to settlements, and distribution to key points in the settlements; only thereafter should the next steps be taken in the larger settlements.

Disease-carrying mosquitoes can be combatted either by eliminating their breeding places or by a continuous spraying program. By itself the first is too costly and would take many years, although we recommend elimination of breeding grounds in connection with the irrigation and drainage projects. By spraying, however, it has been demonstrated in many countries that the incidence of malaria can be reduced by more than 95% at a yearly cost of no more than $0.25 per capita. In Syria such a program may cost $0.35 or £S 1.25 per person protected, which means about £S 810,000 annually on the assumption that 650,000 persons must be protected. Greece has effected a saving of $1 million annually in quinine alone. An equally successful program in Syria would mean a very substantial annual saving and this would be but a fraction of the economic gains from the increased labor productivity through freedom from disease.

143 *Additional Hospital Facilities*

Any ambitious hospital building program would overtax the financial resources of the country and the available medical and auxiliary staff. Even a program to build hospitals in areas now without them and to add beds to existing hospitals in such a way as to bring them up to the population-bed ratio of Damascus would cost about £S 24 million and probably result in acute operating difficulties. We have therefore suggested that only about 1,000 beds be added to meet the most urgent requirements. The suggested distribution—250 for the Jezireh, 300 for the Euphrates, 400 for

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the province of Aleppo, and 50 for Palmyra—should be considered tentative. The new facilities should be so distributed as to make them accessible to the population which is in practice not now served by existing facilities. The location of new hospitals in the geographically extensive provinces of the Jezireh and Euphrates must be considered very carefully. Kamichliye should manifestly have a hospital, and other small hospitals might be located in both the eastern and western portions of the Jezireh. In the Euphrates province the needs of Raqqa and Abou Kemal should be considered. In the province of Aleppo a hospital will presumably be needed in Jisr ech Choghour, which will be the center of a rapidly developing region. In the location of all new hospitals the ability to provide staff must be a governing consideration.

Cost of the Six-Year Program

The mission's estimates of the cost of the various parts of the six-year public health program are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Proposed Six-Year Program for Public Health, 1955–60

(*Thousand £S*)

Projects	Total	Annual average
Anti-malaria	2,750	460
Water supply	*	—
Dispensaries	350	58
Total for preventive medicine	3,100	518
Alteration of existing hospitals	1,000	167
1,000 more beds	7,000	1,165
Health centers	350	58
Total for curative medicine	8,350	1,390
Minor health facilities	300	50
TOTAL PROGRAM	11,750	1,960
Total investment	10,250	1,710
Operation of new program	1,500	250
General administrative and operating expenditures, including training	62,400	10,400
TOTAL OPERATION	63,900	10,650
TOTAL OF EXPENDITURES	74,150	12,360

* The amounts necessary for pure water supply are included in the expenditures for the over-all water supply program.

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IV HOUSING

361 The housing program for the next few years should have three main objectives. First, the number of houses should be considerably increased. This can be accomplished most effectively, particularly in the rural areas, by making it easier for people to become landowners and thus providing them with an incentive to build and maintain their houses. Secondly, construction techniques must be improved and self-help must be encouraged, so that better housing can be achieved without expending much more on it than is spent today. In this connection, government advice and assistance in developing types of durable but cheap housing and in land purchases, distribution of materials and encouragement of community efforts is important. Also, through legislation or otherwise, provision must be made for the acquisition of land at non-speculative prices by the low-income groups; this is particularly important in urban areas. The third objective must be timely government planning, and to some extent even financing, of housing in areas which are developing rapidly and becoming more densely populated.

Although in the future the municipal and local authorities should assume a leading role in housing development, at the beginning the government will have to take the initiative. The mission proposes a six-year housing program costing about £S 28 million, including housing in the new rural settlements discussed elsewhere in this report. Of this the municipal contribution, for purchase of land and for slum clearance, would be only £S 8.5 million. The proposed expenditure is shown in Table 4.

The recommended census of houses and buildings should not be postponed until the next population census, but should be organized during 1955 and taken in 1956. The proposed experimental building station should be located where the characteristics of both a desert and an irrigated area can be found, perhaps in the eastern fringe of the irrigated zone of Homs. Its principal task should be to experiment with different types of materials and to develop for different localities dwellings which would be durable and cheap. Building codes should then be modified to permit the erection of such houses within city limits.

The urban housing program we have outlined in the Main Report envisages government financial assistance for municipalities (1) to meet urgent housing requirements stemming from a rapid growth in their

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[illegible] 4. Proposed Six Year Housing Program

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	(Thousand £S) Total
General proposals	
Census*	240
Experimentation	760
Technical assistance	250
Administration	250
Total	1,500
Development projects	
Roudj	1,920
Dry farming communities	1,056
Ghab	600
Urban centers	3,000
Latakia	3,000
Total	9,576
Socio-economic program*	
Buying land	10,000
Slum clearance	7,000
Total	17,000
Total program	28,076
Of which:	
Capital expenditures	13,836
Recurrent expenditures	5,740

* Figures for land purchase and slum clearance include 80% municipal contributions.

population, and (2) to start slum clearance projects for the most congested areas. With respect to the first we suggest that the municipalities concentrate on housing between a range of £S 1,000 to £S 4,000 per unit. The type of house built by the municipality should be only a nucleus which can be expanded by the owner himself. The nucleus dwelling and the lot should be sold to the occupier on easy terms. In slum clearance projects the primary aim of the municipality should be to provide building areas and utilities at reasonable cost. In addition, certain key building components such as windows, doors and roofing materials should be provided to those willing to construct houses with their own labor, and expert building advice should be furnished. It is, above all, important that building lots be reasonable in price and convenient to places of work. In Latakia, for example, it was found that, after land was expropriated and applications

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362 invited for building lots, only one-fourth of the land was taken up because it was too expensive and too inaccessible.

We have given some attention to the possibility of establishing a mortgage bank to assist in financing private building in the cities. We believe that such an institution will ultimately be desirable and necessary, but, owing to limitations of funds, we have not recommended that one be established before 1961. Meanwhile, the project might well be studied. Any mortgage bank that might ultimately be created should be designed primarily to help finance low-cost housing, particularly since the construction of housing for the more well-to-do elements in the population has apparently not been significantly hampered by lack of funds.

The possibility of gradually abandoning existing rent controls should also be studied. The elimination of rent control on new building might be a suitable first step and might have the incidental advantage of discouraging the continuous influx of new people into the urban areas.

361 v COMMUNITY SERVICES

The mission's provision of an average annual investment of £S 14.3 million for community services must be regarded as extremely tentative. In the last analysis, no final program can be recommended until a thorough analysis of municipal finances is completed. At present, comprehensive data on municipal expenditures and anticipated financial resources are lacking. We suggest that a study of this subject be undertaken promptly, so that the magnitude of a program of municipal services can be determined in the light of the municipalities' own resources and the contribution which the central government can make to them either by loans or by grants.

Roads and Streets

363 The construction of roads and streets has been second in importance among municipal programs. Except in the large cities, paving is generally limited to a few central streets because of its cost.

Hereafter the construction and maintenance of all types of roads connecting settlements, including the portions passing through the settlements, should be the financial responsibility of the central government. Municipalities, freed of this burden on their budgets, should take care to spend

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their road funds on types of pavement suitable to the needs of the locality, 343
choosing those methods which make greatest use of local materials and hand labor and depend least on machinery and imported materials. Stone-paved roads, of which there are excellent examples in Syria, probably provide the answer for most of the settlements where stone is readily available, and the government should be able to provide asphalt to most communities. Many of the roads in villages, particularly those which do not carry motor vehicle traffic, could be improved through cooperative community endeavor, and this should be one of the objectives of the community development program we have recommended.

Electricity

345

Electricity is of economic importance to those communities which depend upon it for productive power and not merely for light. The mission recognizes fully the significant developing influence which the availability of electric power can have upon a community. Useful though it is, however, we suggest that a major effort to provide electric power primarily for lighting be deferred until the more urgent problems of water supply and sewerage have received attention.

Landscaping

Syria's broad and nearly waterless steppes have led to cities and villages 341
virtually without trees, a situation to which the devastation of the first World War contributed greatly. Even cities like Damascus, lacking neither greenery nor water, have large areas which remain bare. The planting of trees, especially shade trees for the streets, should be a concern for all Syrian settlements. This, of course, calls for a study of the most suitable types of trees for the different regions, and the establishment of nurseries, as recommended in Chapter 3 of the Main Report.

Local committees should do the planting, once the problem of water supply has been met. Where streets are narrow, there is much to be said in favor of planting trees inside the house plots so that the inhabitants themselves will take care of them; the trees will then shade the streets without taking up needed road space. In recently planned areas where the streets may be unnecessarily wide, a strip on either side might be turned over to the people living on the street on condition that it be planted with

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261 trees and not built upon. Possibly in this way the broad, deserted unpaved streets, swept by the winter winds and burning under the summer sun, can be transformed into long garden avenues without any heavy expenditure by the local authorities.

VI PUBLIC BUILDINGS

658 *Direction of Investment*

Out of a total of about £S 25 million expended on public buildings between 1948 and 1954, £S 9 million was for public health structures while more than £S 7.5 million was invested in schools and a like sum on administrative buildings.[7]

The proportion spent for administrative buildings has been high and is attributable to the organizational needs of the newly independent country. We have assumed that the rate of construction of such buildings is likely to increase, but we suggest that no more than £S 750,000 be expended during 1955-56 while a critical survey of the most urgent requirements in this category is being prepared. In 1957 the expenditure may reach £S 1 million, rising to £S 2.5 million in 1960 and making a total of £S 8.5 million over the six years. The resulting average of £S 1.417 million would in fact be about 50% higher than the average of recent years.

The total expenditure for public buildings, including schools, public health buildings and other types, is likely to average £S 7 million annually, assuming that the municipalities and other authorities share the cost of schools. Compared with the effort of the past few years, which was at a level of £S 4.5 million a year, this would be an increase of about 60% to 70% per year.

Policy

In the Main Report the mission has recommended that in future the Ministry of Public Works be responsible for design and construction of all public buildings, relying on each government agency to specify and draw up its own special requirements. It may be necessary, especially at the beginning of the program, to engage a private firm of Syrian or foreign

[7] Including buildings for the judicial and security services.

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architects to design certain major projects independently or in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Works. A number of standard types of buildings should be developed and studied as a guide for future projects. For example, two or three tested types of classrooms should be available, suited to the differing climatic regions of Syria.

653

Commercial Buildings

653 346

With respect to commercial buildings, the government's problems include provision of town and village markets. For centuries these have been built on a traditional oriental design, with a network of covered passages on which the various shops open. Such construction has permitted market activity under conditions of severe heat or heavy rain, and has lent itself to the prevalence of small shops appropriate to the country's economic standards. Although this form of market is still the most common, new ones of the type are no longer being built. In some settlements of the Jezireh, in Kamichliye and Hassetche, the new *souks* borrow something from the old design, combining it with regular narrow streets covered with temporary roofing. Elsewhere markets are following the western pattern.

As part of the general development program the government might well finance a special study of the type of market that will most economically offer protected shopping, small-size shops, sanitary conditions and better ventilation. Thereafter municipalities should proceed to plan for their own requirements.

Transportation Structures

653 498

Most buildings related to transportation services are the responsibility of the railways and port authorities, and provision has been made for them in the transport program. Yet one category of building usually neglected in planning is that serving bus and truck transportation, which is of greatest importance in a country like Syria with its many small settlements. What is needed is something equivalent to the caravanserai of earlier times—perhaps a combination of a big courtyard, a service garage, a storehouse and a small hostel. Here too, the government might undertake a study of an appropriate prototype, leaving construction to the municipalities and private business.

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Miscellaneous Buildings

653 [340] There are, of course, various other types of public and special-purpose buildings with which the government is concerned. Among these are agricultural structures, workshops, museums, monuments and resthouses, to whatever extent they are not privately financed. The mission has made suitable allowances for these in the six-year program, under the appropriate headings elsewhere in this report.

[341] Although they are financed and constructed entirely by private endeavor, the religious buildings deserve special mention. This is a field in which Syria excels. Some of the mosques, minarets and churches, whether in large towns or small villages, are outstanding illustrations of the way in which architectural design and construction can be adapted to the needs of the people, their economic resources, and the materials and skills available locally.

657 VII COST OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES PROGRAM

Table 5 summarizes the mission's proposed six-year program in the field of settlements and social services.

TABLE 5 Proposed Six-Year Program for Settlements and Social Services Financed by the Public Sector (*Thousand £S*)

Sector	Total	Annual average
Housing	28,076	4,679
Education	271,780	45,297
Public health	74,150	12,358
Social welfare	450	75
Community development	2,687	448
Buildings for other purposes	8,500	1,417
Community services	86,000	14,333
Planning—Administration	3,600	600
Total	475,243	79,207
Share of		
Central government	372,643	62,107
Municipalities	102,600	17,100

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[For recommendations by an International Bank Mission on a program of long-term development of Syrian resources and specific measures to be undertaken by the government, see category 116, pp. 27-209.]

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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SYRIA

With Emphasis on the Constitution of 1950

Majid Khadduri

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SYRIA HAS experienced a number of constitutional vicissitudes since its separation from the Ottoman Empire after World War I. A monarchy for a short period under Faysal, it then passed, against its will, into the position of a mandated territory under French administration. Another eight years elapsed before the struggle between the Mandatory and the Syrian nationalists was sufficiently resolved to permit the formulation of a constitution even remotely agreeable to both parties, and never during the period of the mandate was any constitution consistently in full force. This record might be attributed to the conflict between an unbending French colonial policy and an equally uncompromising Syrian nationalism, but after Syria attained its independence in 1945–46, it still experienced a series of coups and counter-coups. Finally, a completely revised consti-

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642 tution was drafted and promulgated in September 1950 with high
648 hopes that it might prove to be the panacea for all of the country's ills.

This process, however, should not be regarded as evidence of inherent insecurity in Syria's political life, but rather as a transitory stage in its constitutional evolution. In it can be seen the gradual ironing out of doubts and conflicts over the nature of the Syrian state, the proper functions of its government, and its relations with the outside world, social and economic as well as political. Syria has freed itself too recently from foreign influence for it to have adjusted fully to both national and international circumstances.

FROM A NATIONAL MONARCHY TO A MANDATORY ADMINISTRATION

642 Amir Faysal, at the head of an Arab army, entered Damascus in October 1918 with the avowed intention of establishing an Arab government. But before he had time to organize a constitutional regime, he was caught up in the larger issue of the peace settlement regarding the whole Arab world. The Syrians, too impatient to wait for the final decisions of the Peace Conference and suspicious of what these decisions would be, called a Syrian Congress representing "Greater Syria" (including Lebanon and Palestine), on the basis of the old Ottoman Electoral Law.[1] This Congress, functioning as both Legislative Assembly and National Convention, considered all matters related to national and foreign policy as well as the drafting of a constitution. It held three main sessions between June 3, 1919, and July 19, 1920. It prepared, during its last session, a draft constitution of 148 articles which, though no formal final vote was taken, had been accepted in principle.[2] The Congress was still considering the second reading when the crisis with the French authorities

666 [1] Elections were actually held only in the interior of Syria; the deputies from Lebanon and Palestine, owing to the objection of the French and British military authorities to the elections, were chosen on the basis of petitions signed by voters in support of their candidates. See Philippe David, *Un Gouvernement Arabe à Damas: Le Congrès Syrien* (Paris, 1923), pp. 52–63.

[2] Cf. Philippe David, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

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developed and it adjourned on July 19, 1920, never to meet again.[3] 648

The Constitution of 1920 provided for a limited monarchy, a bicameral legislature, and a responsible ministry: provisions for the structure of the central government followed the normal pattern of West-European constitutional monarchies. Syria was to be an indivisible political unit, but its boundaries were left undefined. The Syrian Government was to be an Arab Government, its capital Damascus, and its religion Islam. The Constitution included a Bill of Rights guaranteeing civil liberties and freedom of thought and of religion. The monarchy was to be vested in the Hashimi family, with Faysal the first king. Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies were to be elected bodies; the deputies by secret ballot in two degrees, and the Senators by the Chamber of Deputies of each province. The administration of the country was to be on a "decentralized" basis: each province was to have its own local administration with a single legislative body called the Chamber of Deputies. The judiciary was to be independent, with a High Court appointed by the King as the supreme judicial organ.[4]

The work of the Syrian Congress was cut short by French action. At a meeting of the San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920, the mandate over Syria and Lebanon was given to France. On July 14 General Gouraud sent an ultimatum to Faysal demanding, *inter alia*, the acceptance of the French mandate and dismissal of the Syrian national army.[5] Faysal's reply, accepting the terms of the ultimatum, was sent a few hours before the expiration of the time limit but did not arrive in time.[6] French troops at once proceeded to establish their authority. Faysal's 648

[3] On the work of the Syrian Congress, see Philippe David, *op. cit.*, Chapters 6 and 8; Amin Sa'id, *Al-thawra al-arabiyyah al-kubra* [*The Great Arab Revolt*] (Cairo, 1934), Vol. II, pp. 18-25, 130-52; Sati' al-Husri, *Yawm Maysalun* [*The Day of Maysalun*] (Beirut, 1947), pp. 245-60.

[4] For text of the Constitution, see Appendix to Philippe David, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-53.

[5] For the text of the ultimatum and the events leading to it, see Sati' al-Husri, *op. cit.*, pp. 96ff.; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), pp. 306-309; J. de V. Loder, *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria* (London, 1923), pp. 77-79; Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 167-74.

[6] The Congress was adamant in its opposition, but the Cabinet approved the acceptance of the ultimatum. See Sati' al-Husri, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 114, 121.

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648 meagre forces were shattered at Maysalun (July 24, 1920), and his Arab regime went to pieces.

The elimination of the Arab Government was no difficult problem to France, but its replacement by another proved to be a problem of great complexity since the Syrian nationalists, humiliated by France at Maysalun, now were unprepared to accept anything short of complete independence. They not only refused to cooperate with France in the administration of the mandate, but also began actively to oppose French rule by petitions to the League of Nations, strikes and demonstrations, and eventually armed uprisings. The most serious action was the general Syrian revolt of 1925–27 which came very near to liberating Syria from French rule.

The Syrian revolt taught both France and Syria that a compromise must be sought. In the fall of 1926 the Syrian nationalists submitted to M. Ponsot, the new High Commissioner, a memorandum in which they asked France (1) to "forget the past" and inaugurate a period of cooperation; (2) to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly and promulgate a constitution; (3) to achieve Syrian unity; (4) to organize a national army; (5) to conclude a treaty of alliance between Syria and France which would replace the mandate; (6) to admit Syria to membership in the League of Nations; and (7) to proclaim a general amnesty.[7] On July 26, 1927, M. Ponsot issued a statement in which he conceded certain national demands, such as the preparation of a constitution and eventual transformation of Syria's mandatory status to one of full independence.[8] After further negotiations between M. Ponsot and such leading Syrian nationalists as Hashim al-Atasi and Ibrahim Hananu, it was finally agreed to hold general elections for a Constituent Assembly.

In accordance with Article I of the mandate, France was required to promulgate within three years an organic law for Syria. It had, however, taken no less than six years from the coming into force of the mandate in 1922 to persuade the Syrian nationalists to accept a compromise on a national regime. On February 12, 1928, M. Ponsot appointed Sheikh Taj al-Din al-

[7] Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 522.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 527–31. For French text, see *Le Temps*, July 31, 1927.

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Hasani, Qadi of Damascus and a moderate nationalist, as head of a provisional Government charged with holding general elections and calling a Constituent Assembly. Recent insurgents and political prisoners were released.[9]

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1930

The elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in April 1928 and the Assembly met at Damascus on June 9. M. Ponsot, in his inaugural address, declared that once the Assembly had completed its work the time would have come for placing the relations between France and Syria on the basis of a treaty. Sheikh Taj al-Din declared that the Assembly "will have full freedom in the drafting of the Constitution."[10] The Assembly elected Hashim al-Atasi, leader of the Syrian nationalists, as its president; and appointed a drafting committee of 27 members, with Ibrahim Hananu as its chairman and Fawzi al-Ghazzi as rapporteur.

The drafting of the Constitution was primarily the work of a subcommittee of three, Fawzi al-Ghazzi, Fa'iz al-Khuri, and Zaki al-Khattib, under the chairmanship of al-Ghazzi. Studying in detail the constitutions of Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, France, and Belgium, as well as the old Ottoman Constitution of Midhat Pasha, the committee submitted its draft to the Constituent Assembly for discussion on August 2. As finally accepted in principle, the draft stipulated that Syria within its natural boundaries is an indivisible political unit and an independent sovereign state; its form of government is republican; and the religion of its head is Islam. The capital of the state is the city of Damascus. The Constitution provided, likewise, a Bill of Rights, in which the principles of liberty, equality, private property, etc., are all guaranteed

The form of government is parliamentary, but the head of the executive power is the President of the Republic. He is elected by Parliament for a period of five years, but he is not eligible for re-election until the lapse of five years from the

[9] With the exception of 39 persons whom the High Commissioner refused to set free.
[10] *Jalsat al-majlis al-ta'sisi al-suri* [*Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*] (Damascus, 1928), pp. 1–3.

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642 expiration of his term. The President selects the Prime Minister and appoints the ministers upon the latter's recommendation. He sanctions legislation and signs treaties; but treaties and contracts having to do with the security of the State and its financial policy must be approved by Parliament. The President is not responsible, since every decision or decree made by him should be countersigned by the Minister or Ministers concerned, except the decree for appointing a Prime Minister. The President calls, prorogues, and dissolves Parliament upon the recommendation of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is composed of not more than seven members who are individually, as well as jointly, responsible to Parliament. The Ministers need not be members of Parliament, but they can attend and take part in Parliamentary debate.

Parliament is made up of one House (the *Majlis,* or Chamber of Deputies), which is freely elected every four years and sits in two sessions each year — from mid-March to the end of May, and from mid-October to the end of December. The Chamber of Deputies meets in public as well as in secret session and its members enjoy full parliamentary immunity during the session. Every male Syrian who has attained his twentieth year can vote. Parliament can initiate legislation, except perhaps financial bills, and can ask questions regarding the conduct of any Ministry. The Constitution provided also for the establishment of a High Court composed of 15 members to be chosen from Parliament and from among competent judges. This Court is regarded as the supreme judicial organ of the State. Finally, the Constitution might be amended by two-thirds of the members of Parliament or at the request of the President of the Republic in agreement with the Council of Ministers and with the approval of two-thirds of the Parliament.

642 643 The draft constitution may be regarded as expressing the free will of the Syrian people. It ignored entirely France's obligations as a Mandatory Power toward the League of Nations, since the Constituent Assembly regarded Syria both as fully independent and as an indivisible political unity; that is, to include Lebanon and Palestine. The High Commissioner, placed in an impossible position, informed the Assembly that certain articles in the draft called for express reservations on his part, some be-

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cause they were in formal contradiction with France's international obligations as a Mandatory Power, others because they could not be given practical effect without a previous agreement with France. The following articles were specifically objected to:

Article 73. The President exercises the right of pardon. Amnesties can only be granted by law.

Article 74. The President concludes and signs treaties; but treaties concerning the security of the state or the public finances, treaties of commerce, and, in general, all treaties which cannot be denounced at the expiration of each year do not become definitive until they have been voted by Parliament.

Article 75. The President of the Republic nominates representatives abroad and receives foreign representatives.

Article 110. The organization of the future army will form the subject of a special law.

Article 112. The President of the Republic may, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, proclaim a state of siege in disturbed districts, on condition that he inform Parliament immediately. If Parliament is not in session, the President will proceed to summon it without delay.

Further, Article 2, declaring Syria to be both indivisible and fully sovereign, the High Commissioner stated, was in conflict not only with international agreements, but with a "situation of fact and of law" which could not be modified by a unilateral decision.[11] He suggested that the Assembly should separate (*disjonction*) the foregoing six articles. Sheikh Taj al-Din, the Prime Minister, endorsed the request of the High Commissioner and asked the Assembly to delete these articles until the question of relations with France was settled by a treaty of alliance.[12]

The High Commissioner's message and Sheikh Taj al-Din's statement aroused the indignation of the Assembly. The unanimous opinion of the members was that those six articles were the only ones that mattered and that their separation would virtually "leave nothing significant" in the constitution. The Assembly therefore handed the High Commissioner a formal note of rejection. The High Commissioner retorted by adjourning the Assembly for three months; but the Assembly, meeting for the

[11] *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, p. 16. See also *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, p. 278.

[12] For the Assembly's reactions, see *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, p. 279–308 passim.

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642 last time on August 10, 1928, passed a resolution empowering its
648 President to negotiate on its behalf with the authorities "for the fulfilment of the country's [national] aspirations." But negotiations between the leading Syrian nationalists and the High Commissioner led to no agreement. Following an exchange of a number of proposals and counter-proposals, the High Commissioner, by a decree issued on February 5, 1929, prorogued the Constituent Assembly *sine die*.[12] It was over a year later, on May 14, 1930, that M. Ponsot, after consultations in Paris, surprised the nationalists by promulgating the Constitution. The text included Article 2 as altered by a previous proposal of his to reduce it to "Syria is an indivisible political unity," but the other articles in question remained unchanged. There appeared also a new provision (Article 116) withholding from application all provisions which infringed upon France's international obligations relative to Syria, or dealt with the maintenance of security or with foreign relations. Such provisions would become applicable only after special agreement between Syria and the French Government. The Nationalists somewhat grudgingly decided to take part in the elections on this basis, but another eighteen months
666 elapsed before M. Ponsot issued orders for holding them. The elections were finally completed on March 30, 1932, and resulted in a victory for the moderates rather than the nationalist elements.

643 When Parliament met on June 7, 1932, there was considerable
642 discussion regarding the election of the President. The Nationalists' candidate, Hashim al-Atasi, could muster only 17 votes; nevertheless they declared their intention of withdrawing from Parliament if the Government insisted upon the election of one of its two candidates: Subhi Barakat or Haqqi al-Azm. A compromise was finally reached by electing Muhammad Ali al-Abid, who was *persona grata* to both groups, on the understanding that he would select Haqqi al-Azm, candidate of the moderates,
642 as Prime Minister. In this way the first republican administration was established by the French in cooperation with the Syrian

[12] For these proposals and counter-proposals, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 530-31. For the French version, see *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, pp. 20-22.

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nationalists. And it was thus that the long period of "provisional" administrations, under the direct control of the French High Commissioner, came to an end.

THE FIRST REPUBLIC

Constitutional evolution during the first republic largely involved attempts to formulate treaty relations with France. There were two major efforts in this direction and both were unsuccessful. The main obstacle to successful treaty negotiations in 1933 was France's disregard of Syrian unity.[14] Not only did the French insist that Lebanon be excluded from any future Syrian state — even Jabal Druze and Latakia were to remain semi-independent.[15] The Nationalists also objected to the uncertainty over the abolition of the capitulatory regime, the unlimited rights given to France to maintain forces on Syrian territory, and the creation of a department of common interests for the regulation and control of the economic resources in which France was to have a preponderant position.[16]

A draft treaty was in fact signed on November 16, 1933. Following a brief and inconclusive debate, during which the principal objections raised by the Nationalists were reiterated, the High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Two days later, on November 26, the President of the Syrian Republic withdrew the treaty from Parliament at the High Commissioner's request. Parliament was suspended, and a year later dissolved *sine die,* with the President of the Republic authorized to govern by decrees. In 1934 the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Sheikh Taj al-Din, who remained in office for about two years. Thus the first attempt at solving relations between France and Syria failed, with consequential impairment of the constitutional organization which had just been set up.

France's second attempt to come to an agreement with the

[14] The two Nationalist Cabinet members resigned in protest on April 12. For text of the manifesto giving their reasons, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.,* Vol. III, pp. 575–76.

[15] For a discussion of the policy of division in Syria compared with the unitary policy of Britain in Iraq, see A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), pp. 284–88, 290–96.

[16] For a discussion of the Principal Syrian objections to the treaty and its comparison with the British treaty with Iraq, see George Antonius, "Syria and the French Mandate," *International Affairs,* XIII (1934), pp. 532 ff.

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648 Syrian nationalists took place in 1936 when the international situation had become critical in consequence of Mussolini's occupation of Ethiopia. Prompted by his threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, and inspired by Britain's successful move in the same year to appease the Egyptian nationalists, France once more offered to negotiate a treaty which would give Syria full independence. There was at this time the more liberal Popular Front Government in Paris, with Leon Blum as Prime Minister and Yvon Delbos as Foreign Minister, both of whom were more sympathetic toward Syria's national aspirations than their predecessors. The resulting treaty of September 9, 1936, negotiated by a Syrian Nationalist delegation in Paris, provided for the replacement of the Mandate by a Treaty of Alliance with France on the basis of full independence. While Lebanon was to remain outside of Syria, the autonomous districts (Jabal Druze and Latakia) were to join a unitary Syrian state. France was to receive certain rights regarding its military position in the Levant (as in the case of Britain in Iraq) and the two countries were to consult each other in all matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests. The Treaty was to last for 25 years and to come into force, as in the case of Iraq, when Syria was admitted to membership in the League of Nations as an independent state.

[666] Elections for a new Parliament which was to ratify the Treaty
645 were held in November 1936, and resulted in an overwhelming
648 majority for the Nationalists (Kutla Party). Parliament met on December 21 and elected Hashim al-Atasi, leader of the Kutla, President of the Republic in place of Muhammad Ali al-Abid. Faris al-Khuri, a member of the Kutla, was elected President of the Majlis (Parliament), while Jamil Mardam, another Kutla leader, formed the new Government. All members of the Cabinet were drawn from the Kutla Party. The Treaty with France, regarded as a victory for the Kutla, was approved by Parliament and formally signed by the Government and the High Commissioner on December 22, 1936. But it was never ratified by France owing to criticism leveled against it from military and conservative quarters.[17] In 1938 Jamil Mardam tendered his resignation,

[17] For a discussion of France's failure to ratify the treaty, see Charles-André Julien, "French Difficulties in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (1946), pp. 327 ff.

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which was followed by that of President Hashim al-Atasi, and the French High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Thus the second attempt to come to an understanding with Syria failed.

NATIONAL REGIME: THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The outbreak of World War II brought renewed hopes for independence. Upon France's defeat in 1940 the Syrian Nationalists began to agitate for the immediate formation of a national Government; indeed some of them went so far as to contact secretly the Iraqi nationalists, inviting them to intervene and unite the two countries under the Crown of Iraq. A few urged cooperation with the Axis, but the failure of the Rashid Ali movement in Iraq raised doubts as to the feasibility of achieving Arab national aspirations along this path, and on the whole the moderate elements began to come to the fore.

The joint Anglo-French occupation of Syria and Lebanon in 1941 brought with it a promise of independence. A Provisional Government was appointed, and on September 28, 1941, General Catroux formally proclaimed the independence of Syria. The Constitution, however, was not at once restored, and the Nationalists, led by Shukri al-Quwwatli, revived their activities. They pledged cooperation with the democratic powers, but demanded either the immediate restoration of the Majlis of 1936–39 or the holding of new elections. Finally, in January 1943 M. Helleu, representing General Catroux, French Delegate-General, announced the restoration of the Constitution and initiated arrangements for general elections. These were held on July 26, with the Nationalist Party (al-Kutla) overwhelmingly victorious.

The Majlis met on August 17, 1943, and elected Shukri al-Quwwatli, who had emerged as the unrivaled leader of the Nationalists, President of the Republic, and Faris al-Khuri President of the Majlis. On August 19 the President invited Sa'dullah al-Jabiri to form a new Cabinet, drawn almost wholly from the Kutla, and the Government began immediately afterward to negotiate with the French authorities for the transfer of such controls as the French still exercised.

Syria's struggle against foreign control was thus fully re-

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warded. Not only did it emerge as a sovereign state, but it successfully avoided entering into any such special treaty relations with France as Great Britain had managed to establish with Iraq. The Nationalists' cause was won, the *amour propre* of the Syrian people was gratified. Syria became, of all the Arab states, the first to shape freely its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs.

Independence, however, was not coupled with that full political unity which the Nationalists held almost as dear. Not only did Palestine remain completely beyond the bounds of a possible Syrian state: Lebanon has definitely refused to join Syria in any form of union which would destroy or encroach on its sovereign attributes, and Jordan has accepted union only on its own terms. The dismemberment of Syria after World War I has not been repaired by the mere withdrawal of foreign control, and the "Greater Syria" plan, designed to regroup the various fragments into a sort of federal union has raised the complex problem of adjusting the internal differences and vested interests which were partially submerged in the struggle against foreign control. Thus the question of Syrian unity, whether in the form of a Greater Syria, Syro-Iraqi unity, or Fertile Crescent scheme, remains one of the factors influencing Syria's constitutional evolution.

Probably far more disrupting to the present Syrian state than the question of unity is the lack of cohesion among the various political forces. Stability in government presupposes the development of constitutional traditions. Frequent changes of regime, a prolonged program of noncooperation with, and at times violence against, foreign rule hardly afforded an opportunity of developing the tradition of responsibility necessary for stable government.

It was not until August 1947, when the term of office of President Quwwatli was due to expire, that a formal amendment of the 1930 Constitution was proposed, and not until November that any action was taken. Article 68, which prohibited the eligibility of the President for re-election was to be amended to permit a second term, but a third term was made possible only after the lapse of a period of five years. Articles 85 and 86, dealing with the procedure and time of the election of the President,

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were to be carried out by a special decree. Article 89, which 642
specified that the number of ministers was not to exceed 7, was amended to read 12. Finally, Articles 71 and 115, specifying the procedure of electing the first President of the Republic, were deleted.[18]

THE MILITARY COUPS D'ÉTAT

The Quwwatli regime, which could flatter itself on having 669
achieved full independence for Syria, failed to inaugurate the reforms which were so badly needed. The criticism levelled against the Government — that it was corrupt and permitted the aggrandizement of its Ministers — might have been exaggerated, but it will be noted that the Government's "constitutional reform" merely amended those articles which related to the re-election of Quwwatli to the Presidency and to the Cabinet membership, ignoring many other gaps and defects in the constitutional organization of the State. This fact lent substance to the criticism that the Government paid attention only to matters that served the interests of the ruling oligarchy.[19]

Matters came to a head when the Syrian Government (jointly with the other Arab Governments) failed to forestall the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The Quwwatli regime's attempt to shift the responsibility of defeat to the Army precipitated a reaction. Colonel Husni al-Za'im, secretly encouraged by the opposition parties, raised a military coup d'état on March 30, 1949, which overthrew the Quwwatli regime amidst popular enthusiasm and approval.[20]

Za'im's coup, by eliminating the party which was so avowedly 648
opposed to uniting or even cooperating with the two neighboring 642
Hashimi Kingdoms, at once reopened the question of the future organization of Syria: whether it would be monarchical, by joining a union with Iraq, or maintain a separate republican

[18] For text of the Amendment Law, see the Syrian *Official Gazette*, Vol. 30 (March 25, 1948), p. 756. For further details on the Amendment of the Constitution, see Wajih al-Haffar, *Al-dastur wa al-hukm* [*The Constitution and the Government*] (Damascus, 1948), pp. 129–30.

[19] Wajih al-Haffar, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–54; M. Kurd Ali, *Al-Mudhakarat* [*Memoirs*] (Damascus, 1948), Vol. II, p. 530.

[20] For the background of this movement, see Alford Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949" *Middle East Journal*, IV (Jan. 1950), pp. 2–21.

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regime. Both Iraq and Jordan, arguing that a union with Syria would strengthen their position against Israel, opened negotiations with Za'im. Pressed by an immediate need to strengthen his position in the forthcoming armistice negotiations with Israel, Za'im offered to conclude an immediate military alliance with a pledge to consider the larger scheme of future cooperation with the Hashimi Kingdoms later on. He refused, however, to commit himself on whether he favored a republican or monarchical regime.[21]

Za'im's move toward negotiation with the Hashimi Kingdoms aroused the fear of the Saudi-Egyptian bloc that a rapprochement would lead to an extension of Hashimi rule to Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia therefore countered with promises of recognition and assurances of military and financial aid. This Saudi-Egyptian intervention was so successful that it not only doomed a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy (with possible extension to Jordan) but inspired Za'im to reach for the highest position of his country — an ambition which sowed the seeds of disagreement between him and his supporters, both civil and military, who now argued that Za'im had betrayed the cause for which they had instigated the coup, namely to rid the country of the Quwwatli regime.

In April 1949 Za'im dismissed Parliament and ordered new elections on the basis of universal suffrage, including women — the first to be thus held in an Arab country. After Za'im's election to the Presidency, preparations were made to promulgate a new Constitution into which liberal principles were to be introduced, especially relating to land reform. This Constitution, though completed, was never promulgated; but a new civil code, bearing the stamp of the Egyptian jurist Sanhuri Pasha (who had already started research along this line at the initiation of the Iraqi Government), was issued. Although based on both European models and the principles of Islamic law, this code materially restricted the authority of the latter. It is regarded as one of the permanent contributions of Za'im's short-lived regime.

[21] The relations of the Syrian coups d'état to the schemes of unity with Iraq and Jordan are discussed in detail in a paper by the present writer entitled "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity" contributed to a volume to be published shortly by the Harvard University Press.

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Za'im was overthrown by his opponents on August 14, 1949, having remained in power only four and a half months. Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led this second coup and executed Za'im, reversed the policy of friendly relations with the Saudi-Egyptian bloc and again opened negotiations with Iraq for a Syro-Iraqi union. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in November, but when the Assembly met on December 12 and was about to approve a project for union with Iraq, a third army move on December 14, led by Colonel Adib Shishakli, sealed the fate of unity with Iraq under a dual monarchy. Shishakli declared that the Army would no longer interfere in politics and that government by civilians would be maintained; but it remained clear that the Army would continue to resist any policy which ran counter to its wishes.

The Constituent Assembly elected Rushdi al-Kikhya, leader of the People's Party which won the elections, as its President, and Hashim al-Atasi, an old member of the Nationalist Party, as the temporary head of the State. On January 7, 1950, after a long cabinet crisis attributed to the intervention of the Army in politics, President Atasi took an oath of office and the Constituent Assembly gave temporary legislative and executive powers to the Government, subject to its control, until the promulgation of a Constitution. In the meantime a committee of 33 members, under the chairmanship of Nazim al-Qudsi, was appointed to prepare a draft constitution for the Assembly. The Committee began its meetings on January 4 and completed its work three months later. As its chairman stated in his report to the Assembly, the Committee made use of no less than fifteen European and Asiatic (including Arab) constitutions, and received proposals from individuals and organizations either directly or through the press.[22] The draft Constitution, consisting of 177 articles, was communicated to the President of the Assembly on April 15, 1950, but debate did not get underway until July 7. After prolonged discussion, first on the draft generally and then article by article, the Constitution was approved with considerable changes (including reduction to 166 articles) on September 5,

[22] See text of the Report in the *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (June 22, 1950), Appendix, pp. 1–2.

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642 1950, and was formally promulgated on the same day by the President of the Assembly.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1950

The new Syrian Constitution has made no fundamental changes in the form or structure of the Government as it existed in the Constitution of 1930. The most interesting innovations are to be found rather in the general articles expressing the hopes and aspirations of the Syrian nation, in the detailed Bill of Rights, and in those provisions relating to land resources and education. The Constitution opens with a long preamble stressing principles of justice, fundamental civil liberties, fraternity and social consciousness; the liberation of citizens from the miseries of poverty, disease, ignorance, and fear; the principle of equality, defence of the Republic and the Constitution, and the development of individual responsibility and pride in the State. The preamble pays lip service to Arab unity in deference to the Pan-Arabs, and to Islam as the religion of the majority of the people.[23]

As did the Constitution of 1930, that of 1950 declares Syria to be "an indivisible political unity"; but it adds that it forms "a part of the Arab nation" (Article 1). The draft Constitution stated that Syria is "a representative and sovereign Arab Republic," but to this the Constituent Assembly added that it is also "democratic" and "fully" sovereign.[24] Islam was treated as a state religion in the draft constitution, while the other "heavenly religions" were declared "respected" and "sacred"; but the arguments of Christian and liberal Muslim quarters finally prevailed upon the Assembly and the formula of the Constitution of 1930, declaring merely that "the religion of the President of the Republic is Islam," was reinstated. But it was also asserted, prob-

[23] The deference to Islam in the Preamble did not appear in the original draft, but was added later by the Constituent Assembly, in conjunction with its decision to remove the clause declaring Islam to be a state religion, in order to satisfy the religious-minded section of the Assembly.

[24] For text of the draft Constitution as it was taken up by the Constituent Assembly, see *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (June 22, 1950), Appendix, pp. 12–27. For the final text as approved by the Assembly, see *ibid.*, Vol. 32 (September 7, 1950), pp. 3159–3175. For the debate on the draft Constitution, beginning with the meeting of July 7, see *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, in the *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (1950), pp. 630 ff.

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ably in deference to the feelings of pious Muslims, that "Islamic Law shall be the main source of legislation." (Article 3.) 642

The new Constitution provides that the President, following the pattern of the Constitution of 1930 before its amendment, is elected by Parliament for a term of five years but is not eligible for re-election until an interval of like duration. The President is given certain exclusive powers, such as the right of suspensory veto, the dissolution of Parliament under certain circumstances, the right of appointing the Prime Minister and the other Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and the right to communicate directly with Parliament by messages addressed to its President. He is also held responsible for violation of the Constitution, for high treason, and for ordinary offenses, but he cannot be tried except by the Supreme Court. For other powers which the President exercises in conjunction with the Prime Minister or Minister concerned he is obviously not held responsible. Among such are the powers of appointment of Government officials and judges, sending and receiving diplomats, ratifying treaties with the approval of Parliament, and declaring war and signing peace treaties with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the High Defense Council, and Parliament. If the President is incapacitated from exercising his power for reasons other than death or resignation, the President of the Parliament temporarily exercises these powers. In case of death or resignation, Parliament must meet within ten days to elect another President.

The Cabinet is composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers, the number and functions of whom are to be defined by a special law. The Ministers may or may not be members of Parliament. The Cabinet prepares a platform on the basis of which the Prime Minister asks for a vote of confidence in Parliament; lack of confidence compels the Cabinet to resign. The Cabinet is jointly responsible to Parliament for its general policy, and each Minister is individually responsible for the work of his Ministry. The Ministers are not permitted directly or indirectly to enter into any business transactions with the Government during their terms of office, and they are held liable for indictment and trial 642 646

642 by the Supreme Court on the accusation of such activity at-
645 tributed to them.

642 Parliament is composed of one Chamber of Deputies (Majlis),
646 elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage (including women) for a term of four years. It convenes from October 1 to December 31 and from March 1 to May 15, and each year elects its President on the basis of absolute majority. The Deputies represent the entire nation and not their own constituencies. As in the case of the Ministers, the Deputies are not permitted to exploit their positions in any business transaction with the Government. Legislation, other than financial bills, may be initiated by Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet; but financial bills which involve reduction of taxes or expenditures of funds must be proposed either by 20 members of Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet. Article 59 stipulates that Parliament "shall not cede its legislative powers." This article, it seems, was inserted to ensure that Parliament would not follow the example of the Constituent Assembly in delegating legislative, in addition to executive, powers to the Government and thus pave the way toward the realization of a dictatorial regime. If one-fourth of the members of Parliament object to the constitutionality of a bill before its promulgation, or if the President does so, then it is suspended until the Supreme Court passes a decision regarding its constitutionality. If the Supreme Court decides within 10 days that the bill is unconstitutional, it is returned to Parliament for reconsideration.

642 The judicial system is designed to be free from interference
692 by any other governmental agency. "The honor, conscience, and integrity of the judges are guaranteed for the right and freedom of the people." (Article 105.) The judicial power is exercised by three types of courts: (1) the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Cassation; (3) ordinary tribunals. The Supreme Court is composed of 7 members to be elected by Parliament from a list of 14 nominees chosen from among highly qualified judges. The members of the Supreme Court are elected for 5 years and are eligible for re-election. They are independent and cannot be discharged except by a decision of the Supreme Court itself.

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The functions of the Court are: (1) to consider the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and any administrative decisions; (2) to conduct the trial of the President of the Republic and the Ministers; and (3) to examine the validity of elections.

For the purpose of the appointment, promotion, transfer, and discharge of judges or the various courts other than the Supreme Court, a High Council of Judges is provided, composed of the President of the Supreme Court, two members of the Supreme Court, and the highest ranking four judges of the Court of Cassation. The Council is set up to ensure that the judicial authority is kept independent of the influence of the Government.

The Constitution provides, likewise, detailed provisions for the division of the country into administrative units and for local provincial government and municipal administration. It also provides rules for the preparation of the budget and the procedure of its introduction to Parliament, as well as other measures related to financial policy. An interesting provision related to the economic development of the country is the establishment of a Permanent Economic Council for the purpose of formulating plans for the development and exploitation of the economic potentialities of Syria.

Probably the most interesting innovation of the Constitution is its Bill of Rights comprising 28 articles which define with considerable detail the fundamental principles of freedom and the social and economic rights of the individual citizen. The numerous provisions stressing liberty and equality of the individual and the freedom of the press may seem superfluous, but they are deemed worthy of emphasis in view of the authoritarian tendency in the administration since the establishment of the national regime.

Article 21 marks a radical departure from the principle of the existing social-economic system. In this article, property is defined as both "public" and "private"; and the State like the individual may possess property within the limits of the law. As to private ownership, "the method of its possession and disposal shall be specified by law in such a manner as to make it perform its social function." Further, no individual is to be permitted to "utilize his private ownership in a manner inconsistent

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

642 with public welfare." All subsoil minerals, solid or liquid, are
423 declared the property of the State; and the State, in the general interest, is permitted to expropriate private property in accordance with a law providing for just compensation. But Article 23 ensures that no "general confiscation" shall be permitted.

The Constitution provides in like manner the way of utilizing the land. It stipulates that land "shall be cultivated and not neglected"; and that should it be left unexploited within a certain period to be specified by law, the right of usufruct is alienated. The Constitution provides, likewise, that "a maximum limit for land ownership shall be prescribed by law," and that small and medium ownership is to be encouraged: "The State shall distribute State lands to peasants to whom land is not available sufficient to their living, against small rents to be repaid in installments." (Article 22.)[22]

642 Labor is regarded as "the most basic factor in social life," and
651 is "the right of all citizens." "The State shall provide work to citizens and shall guarantee it by directing and promoting the national economy." (Article 26.) The State undertakes to protect labor and provide legislation for the regulation of wages, hours of labor, allowances, and the improvement of social and health conditions. Trade unions are permitted to be formed within the limits of the law. Forced labor is prohibited except by law aimed at certain specific social and constructional services, and in case of war and emergencies.

642 Education is declared a right of every citizen. Elementary
871 education is compulsory and free in all Government schools. Secondary and professional education, though not compulsory, is also free in all Government schools. "The State shall give priority in the budget for the spread and expansion of elementary, rural, and professional education." The aim of education is defined as "the creation of a generation strong in body and mind, full of faith in God, endowed with moral virtues, proud in the

425 [22] On February 15, 1951, the Minister of Agriculture announced a plan for the distribution of 166,000 dunams (app. 41,500 acres) of State land in the Jazirah area among 554 Bedouin families of the Shammar Zor tribe. Each family will receive 300 dunams (75 acres), and each peasant, after paying the State LS 1.5 annually for 3 years, will own his share of the land. The State land is to be distributed among several villages, each village to receive 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres).

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formulate programs to be applied in the various stages of training. The State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

been long neglected owing to the preoccupation of Syrian nationalists with the more urgent political problem of achieving independence. When independence had been achieved, the Nationalist regime failed to command respect because of its reliance on the oligarchic and feudal groups held over from the old Ottoman period. It was still necessary, once the leaders of the national regime were overthrown, to adopt new social and economic measures before a truly democratic system of government would come into being. These socialistic provisions, however, are not of a Marxist nature, since they maintain almost intact the principles of private property and free enterprise.

One would expect a strong Arab nationalist tinge to the constitution of the country which had been, from the very beginning of the nationalist movement, the hot-bed of Pan-Arabism. Failure to achieve Arab unity following World War I did not quench the ardor for it as a nationalist goal. The establishment of the Arab League was hailed as an important step toward that end; but the League's failure to save Palestine from the Zionists again gave rise to a desire for a closer unity. The establishment of Israel, regarded as a threat to the Arab states, has aggravated this intense Pan-Arab feeling. Loyalty to the Pan-Arab ideal has made it difficult for Syria to make up its mind, in an Arab world divided into two camps, which of the two it should join, or whether it should join either. The new Constitution of 1950 has also been characterized as "spiritual" in that it requires religious teaching of all denominations and stresses ethical and spiritual values in life.[28] Relaxation in Government administration and wartime conditions have brought a noticeable deterioration in public morality not only in Syria but throughout the Arab world. The emphasis on religious and ethical values is partly to repair this decadence but probably more to create confidence in the new regime.

Finally, it is to be noted that the new Constitution is both extremely detailed in its provisions and rigid in the procedure of its amendment. Such provisions reflect the apprehension of the new group in power lest the elder politicians and vested interests

[28] See a lecture by the Rapporteur of the drafting committee, Dr. 'Abd al-Wahhab Hawmad, *Hawl al-dastur al-jadid* [*On the New Constitution*] (Damascus, 1950), pp. 8–9.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

work the administration to their advantage. But such detailed provisions are likely to call for frequent amendment under the rapid changes of modern life, while the procedure of amendment is difficult and discourages change. Certainly Syria needs to avoid further revolutionary change, but the new Constitution, with its detailed provisions and rigidity, has not adequately provided legal means for peaceful evolution.

The rapid changes in Syria's regimes during the last two years since Colonel Husni al-Za'im precipitated the first coup d'état are not an accidental phenomenon when considered in the light of Syria's constitutional development since World War I. These changes, however, have been accelerated and in certain respects rendered dangerous by the introduction of the Army into the play of political forces. The Army's declarations that its interference was merely to rid the country of an undesirable administration and to maintain the republican regime have been taken by the Syrian people only at their face value; and far-sighted Syrians as well as disinterested foreign observers are still gravely concerned about what the future will have in store for Syria if the Army continues to interfere in politics whenever the civilian leaders advocate policies which run contrary to the wishes of the military. Judging by the recent experiences of Iraq with a similar situation, it would seem that either the Army will eventually take full control of political activities or it must be crushed as a political force.

Closely connected with Syria's internal struggle between the Army and the civilian politicians is the division of the Arab world into two rival camps; Syria is inevitably, though perhaps unwillingly, drawn into the resultant conflict. Each of these two camps has aggravated Syria's internal changes by supporting certain influential politicians and parties, hoping to orientate Syria in its direction. This political struggle in the Arab world has raised such issues as that of monarchy and republicanism, and has intensified the struggle among ambitious politicians who advocated such plans as those of Greater Syria, a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy, and general Arab collective security.

Syria's most urgent need, it seems, is a stable government; but this depends now less upon Syria itself than upon external inter-

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ference in its affairs. If left alone, Syria may still be able to solve the Army-civilian struggle for supreme authority which is essential for internal stability. If, however, foreign interference — direct or inspired — continues, the future of Syria will depend accordingly on the larger problem of the stability and social-economic reorganization of the whole Arab world.

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MUSEUMS AND MONUMENTS — VII

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SYRIA

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PROBLEMS OF PRESERVATION AND PRESENTATION OF SITES AND MONUMENTS

REPORT OF THE UNESCO MISSION OF 1953

BY
PAUL COLLART, HEAD OF THE MISSION
SELIM ABDUL-HAK AND ARMANDO DILLON

UNESCO

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
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FOREWORD

658 172 The Minister of Education of the Syrian Republic, drawing attention to the importance of the problem of historical remains in Syria, requested Unesco to send a mission of inquiry to prepare a detailed report on: (a) the general situation and importance of ancient buildings and historical and archaeological sites in Syria; (b) general measures which might be taken to preserve these buildings and sites and make best advantage of them; (c) special measures to be taken to preserve and restore buildings and sites considered particularly important or urgently in need of such preservation or restoration.

Syria is one of the countries richest in historical remains, but her very riches in this respect make heavy demands on her resources. The Syrian Government, well aware of its cultural responsibilities, shows an enlightened interest in its country's past by freely allocating the large sums needed yearly for the upkeep and enhancement of its monuments. In addition to making this financial contribution, the government also shows its interest by extending a generous welcome to expeditions of foreign scholars who wish to carry out excavations in Syria; international co-operation is thus being established and maintained, with good results, on archaeological excavation sites. The Directorate of Antiquities believes that such co-operation might well be extended to the restoration of monuments which, for their artistic value and historical importance, may be considered as belonging to all mankind. It hopes that the results of the first inquiry organised by Unesco may lead to more definite collaboration in this field. This report, marking the first step in this direction, may suggest where such collaboration is called for.

121 In conformity with our instructions, we have endeavoured to describe both the general situation as regards historical monuments and archaeological sites in Syria, and the state of individual sites and monuments. We have tried to indicate the difficulties that must be overcome in order to ensure their preservation, and to suggest certain measures which might help to expand the work already begun with such good results

121 in this field by the Directorate of Antiquities. We have also studied the special conditions in each of the country's great archaeological regions, the particular difficulties to which the presentation and restoration of their monuments give rise, and practical ways of applying the principles already formulated.

114 The mission, consisting of an archaeologist, Mr. Paul Collart, a professor at the universities of Geneva and Lausanne, as head of the mission, an architect, Mr. Armando Dillon, Superintendent of Historical Monuments in Palermo, and Dr. Selim Abdul-Hak, Director-General of Syrian Antiquities, spent 10 weeks, from the end of May to the beginning of August 1953, collecting the necessary information on the spot. Thanks to the facilities accorded to them, Mr. P. Collart and Mr. A. Dillon were able to travel extensively in the country and thus form a well-grounded opinion on the various questions which they had to study.

000 It is our pleasant duty here to express our very sincere gratitude to all those who helped us in our task: at Damascus, to the officials of the Antiquities Service, who gave us assistance and advice on many occasions, and particularly to Mr. Ziki Amir, who accompanied us on our tours of the city; at Aleppo to Mr. Feisal Serafi, Director of Antiquities in northern Syria, and Mr. Soubhi Saouaf, Technical Officer; at Bosra, to Mr. Souleiman Magdad, Superintendent of Antiquities; at Sueida, Palmyra, Raqqa, Qalaat Seman, Hama and the Krak des Chevaliers, to the inspectors and attendants who so kindly welcomed us and acted as our guides. We should also like to thank Mr. Henri Seyrig, who authorized us to take our illustrations for this report from the collection of aerial photographs at the French Archaeological Institute in Beirut, and Mr. Georges Tchalenko, who gave us much useful information.

Lastly, although he was himself a member of the mission, we should like to express our gratitude to Dr. Selim Abdul-Hak for the kind welcome he gave us and all that he did to make our work easier during our stay in Syria.

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GENERAL

SYRIA AND HER HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

481 By geographical position Syria is a corridor and a meeting-
175 place. From east to west and north to south, it is traversed by two natural highways, one winding through the valleys of the Euphrates and Orontes to link the East with the Mediterranean world, and the other carrying the northern peoples southwards to Africa. Through the ages the country has been occupied for short or long periods by Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders and Ottomans. In Syria—at Kadesh and the Yarmuk—some of the great clashes in history have taken place. Today, with her fate in her own hands, Syria's past provides the varied and fertile sources of her culture, and her present, the vigour necessary for the remarkable progress she is now making.

172 Syria's wealth of historical remains is the visible embodiment of her age-long history and, from that point of view, is to be considered as a national heritage. It has a lesson to give the present generation, for such tangible evidence of their country's greatness in the past is a challenge to the young to prove themselves worthy heirs. For that reason alone, these buildings and monuments deserve to be preserved and maintained. Very often, however, they also have an aesthetic or cultural value, being of importance as works of art or bearing witness to the greatest periods of a civilization. As such, they are of importance beyond the national boundaries and their preservation is a matter of concern not only to the country which possesses them, but to all civilised nations.

For Syria, owing to the vast number and diversity of her historical monuments and the particular conditions in which they are situated, their preservation raises complicated problems. The treatment they require varies according to their present state, for only some of them have remained intact and still serve their original purpose, so that their maintenance is a regular, routine matter. Many of them, on the other hand, are used for a different purpose, never contemplated by their builders, for which they have been more or less satisfactorily adapted

172 and transformed. Some have been abandoned and are falling into ruin, while yet others have sunk underground. Only the first group mentioned are still obviously useful and necessary. The others are exposed to dangers which threaten their fabric and their very survival. This must be fully appreciated if they are to be effectively protected.

All historical buildings were originally erected to meet some specific need, so that any given monument's existence is the result of some particular political, social, religious or military situation. Should that situation end or alter, the building may be abandoned or pulled down, having no further use in the eyes of a people aiming at a different kind of life, in which it has no place. The fate of a monument may also be threatened by clashes of economic interests; a building is an asset which may vary in value over the centuries, and some people consider it from that point of view alone; if they feel that it does not give enough return and costs too much to maintain, they will be tempted to let it fall into disuse or to pull it down. Lastly, a monument may be threatened by urban development; there are the quite legitimate needs of town planning to be considered, and a building may suddenly be found to be an obstacle to the execution of a development plan, solely designed to ease the traffic situation and improve the layout of the town.

In all the above cases, it must be shown that efforts to spare historical monuments are not incompatible with the requirements of modern life, and that the continued existence of an old building, even if it does not serve its original purpose or is disused, is nevertheless justifiable; that such a building is not just a "white elephant" but, skilfully restored and set off to proper advantage, still has a part to play in the life of the city and the country.

172 658 That is the task of the Directorate of Antiquities, which is striving to make Syria's artistic and archaeological treasures ever more widely known. A few words must be said at this point about the very useful work the Directorate is doing in the three-fold field of scientific research, the restoration of monuments, and the organization of museums. We shall later have occasion to quote a number of examples.

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STUDY OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

172 658 Syria's wealth of historical remains is enriched each year by the excavation of further treasures.

Since the old exploratory expeditions made by G. Rey, M. de Vogüé, R. Dussaud and others, the excavation of vast numbers of treasures by the two American archaeological expeditions at the beginning of the century, and the more recent aerial surveys carried out by Father Poidebard, a great many sites have been systematically studied and excavated. We shall not attempt to list them here, but shall confine ourselves to drawing attention to the excellent results achieved through Syria's policy of giving scholars from other countries a free hand in this field.

During the past thirty years or so, a great many foreign excavation parties have come to work in Syria. They have unearthed groups of buildings, sometimes covering large areas; discovered ancient cities; and collected much invaluable material. By extending a welcome to them, Syria has not only added to her archaeological and artistic heritage, discovered new facts about her own history and enriched her museums (the exhibition of finds made during 1952 alone shows how numerous and important they may be), but has also inaugurated successful and friendly international collaboration in disinterested research.

Satisfactory regulations governing such collaboration were set forth in Decree No. 89, of 30 June 1947, which provides all the necessary guarantees. At the present time, six archaeological sites in Syria, varying in importance, are being explored by groups of foreign scholars from four different countries: Ras-Shamra (France), Mari (France), Apamea (Belgium), Cyrrhs (France), Resafa (Germany) and Tell es-Salhiyah (Sweden). The Syrian Directorate of Antiquities, for its part, has undertaken excavations at Palmyra, Bosra, Jebla and Raqqa. We shall refer again to these various sites in the later chapters of our report.

At the appropriate point, we shall also have to mention the publications, some of them forming impressive collections, in which the results of excavations, as they proceed, have been presented, described, analysed and commented upon. In addition, there are many studies, relating to archaeology, history, the history of art or the history of religions, for which Syrian historical remains have provided essential data; there are also monographs on particular buildings, cities or regions and, lastly, directories and catalogues. We cannot speak too highly of all these interesting and useful works, without which the monuments would be known only to a few people, and which would never have come into being if the Syrian authorities had not made a point of encouraging such research. Through these works historical remains, many of which are important and some of which may in future undergo alterations or even disappear altogether, are now known far and wide; they are part of the material to which all countries can refer in making general studies. All this gives Syria effective and highly creditable publicity.

Among so many excellent publications, we shall, in this context, refer only to periodicals or series of works dealing principally with Syrian archaeology and monuments, such as the review *Syria* and the fine series of volumes in the *Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique* (hereafter referred to as BAH), published by the French Archaeological Institute in Beirut; the *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* published by the French Institute in Damascus; the *Annales Archéologiques de Syrie* and the various

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publications issued by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities. Here indeed is proof of the general interest in Syria's archaeological and artistic treasures, suggesting that any effort to safeguard the country's wonderful historical remains will be sympathetically received by the rest of the world.

PRESERVATION AND RESTORATION OF MONUMENTS

The Syrian Directorate of Antiquities devotes a large part of its activities and resources to the consolidation and restoration of monuments. In both Damascus and Aleppo, it has excellent technicians whose whole time is devoted to this work. The steady increase in the Directorate's annual budget, which rose from 623,000 Syrian pounds in 1949 to 1,007,000 Syrian pounds in 1952, is sufficient proof of the interest taken in this work by the country's high authorities.

This is a remarkable effort, to which attention must be drawn at the outset. It has made it possible to carry out an impressive list of restorations in all parts of the country during the last few years. The principal work done in Damascus has been on the Citadel, the gates and towers of the city walls, the Roman arch in the "Street called Straight", the mosaics in the Great Mosque, and a large number of other mosques and madrassahs; at Aleppo, on the Citadel, the city walls and the Marbakh el-Ajami; and at Bosra, Palmyra, Qasr el-Heir ez-Charki, Homs, Latakia, St. Simeon-Stylites and the Krak des Chevaliers, on important ancient and medieval monuments.

Needs are such, however, that the responsible services are sometimes faced with very disturbing problems. The vast number of historical remains (in Damascus alone, there are 125 buildings classified as historic monuments), the fact that they are scattered over an enormous stretch of territory, the size of some and, in many cases, the complete failure to maintain them in the past, give rise to many difficulties. Work cannot be started simultaneously on all buildings; the only way is to prepare a long-term programme of work, spread over many years, and to attend to the most urgent cases first.

Other difficulties are due to the legal position. It is obvious that the State cannot bear the whole cost when the buildings to be restored are not its property. In many cases, the owners are too poor to undertake the necessary outlay; in others, the buildings belong to wealthy communities who neglect them quite wittingly because they do not bring in any profit. In the near future, however, the authorities will probably be in a better position to intervene, for we learn with interest of a Bill, embodying the most up-to-date ideas, which is shortly to be submitted for ratification. One of its provisions (Article 5) is that the Wakfs (religious communities) and municipalities shall set aside a certain proportion of their income for the upkeep of monuments belonging to them, and that private owners may be obliged to bear maintenance costs, either by direct payment, or by means of a mortgage loan; the work, in all cases, is carried out by the Directorate of Antiquities.

There is an interesting clause (Article 8) in Decree No. 89 concerning antiquities, under which municipalities must take account of the position of historical monuments when preparing development plans and submit such plans to the Directorate of Antiquities for approval. It is to be hoped that this clause will be more strictly enforced, so as to prevent, in future, such demolition or mutilation as has been suffered by the

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mausoleum of Sefwat el-Molk and the Mosque of Tingiz in Damascus, and the Mathakh el-Ajami and the Khan al-Wazir at Aleppo. 172 658

Measures should also be taken to prevent damage being caused to historic monuments through their conversion into dwellings for refugees and poor people, as is at present the case with many madrasahs and mausolea. This would help to ensure that the excellent and, in other respects, extremely efficient work done by the Directorate of Antiquities to safeguard Syria's historic buildings produces its full effect.

MUSEUMS

In Syria, still less than elsewhere, can museums be considered exclusively as galleries for the housing of permanent exhibitions. The finds from the various excavation sites require the attention of highly skilled, and therefore centralized, technical services. On the other hand, in order to avoid the loss of treasures discovered by chance, and to preserve certain excavated objects near the place where they have been discovered, there must be local museums, or at least archaeological depositories in every region—which means decentralization. 219

The Directorate of Antiquities has endeavoured to meet these contradictory requirements, which, incidentally, must also be taken into account in another connexion. It is a desirable and legitimate aim to have a large, rich national museum in the capital, but it is also necessary to interest other towns in the country in artistic and archaeological problems by helping them to develop their own museums.

The National Museum in Damascus has the somewhat rare advantage of having been built specially for the housing and exhibition of its treasures. In Europe, we are so accustomed to seeing old palaces, not intended for the purpose, converted into museums, that we are inevitably struck with wondering admiration at the setting and atmosphere which the Syrian authorities have managed to create for the reconstruction and presentation of these great structures of different periods and dissimilar character: the hypogeum of Yarhai from Palmyra, with its rich decorative sculpture; the synagogue of Dura-Europos, with its miraculously preserved frescoes; the Omayyad palace of Qasr el-Heir el-Gharbi, with its frescoes and extraordinary variety of stucco decoration in open-work panels and towers. The museum's other ancient and medieval galleries, although less spectacular in arrangement, contain many objects of rare quality and exceptional interest, such as an Aramaean stele from Sfire, a silvered bronze helmet from Homs, frescoes from Dura, white sculptures from Palmyra and black basalt sculptures from the Hauran, mosaics from Chabba, a carved wooden cenotaph from Tojanna, jewellery, intaglios, bronzes and pottery of various periods. Space is already inadequate and a new building, where the collections of Moslem art will be installed, is now nearing completion. When this building is in use, all departments will be less crowded and it will be possible to reserve some space for temporary exhibitions.

All finds earlier than the time of Alexander are, in principle, collected in the Aleppo Museum, which thus has a character and individuality of its own. Upon entering the museum, the visitor is immediately confronted by colossal basalt statues, lions and bulls, and huge bas-reliefs representing hunting and battle scenes; these are Hittite and Assyrian treasures from Tell

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Halaf, Tell Ahmar and Arslan Tash. The wonderful statues 217
from Mari are more nearly life-size. There are also a great many objects from Ras-Shamra (Ugarit) and Mari which well repay examination. The present building is old and ill-fitted for use as a museum as regards both lighting and the size of the rooms. There are plans, however, for the building of a new museum where there will be ample room and the necessary facilities to display the collections to full advantage.

At the present time, there are local museums at Soueida and Palmyra. The former contains an interesting collection of basalt sculpture and mosaics; the latter is scarcely more than a depository crowded with statues and stone inscriptions. The Directorate of Antiquities intends to establish other small museums at Deir-es-Zor, Homs, Hama, and Tartus or Latakia. It is hoped to provide them with a library, where the principal publications relating to the region covered, together with a few general historical and archaeological works, would be available. The existing library at Damascus is extremely useful, but the one at Aleppo would be improved by the acquisition of some additional works.

In conclusion, the following list gives the titles of a few 217
works relating to the collections referred to above: 113

ABDUL-HAK, S., "L'exposition au musée de Damas des découvertes archéologiques de l'année 1952", *Museum*, vol. VII, 1954 (not yet published).

ABDUL-HAK, S. and A., *Catalogue illustré du département des antiquités gréco-romaines au musée de Damas*, Damascus, 1951.

ECOCHARD, M., "Le nouveau musée de Damas", *Museum*, vol. 55-56, 1946, p. 107-44.

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MEANS OF PUBLICIZING MONUMENTS AND PRESENTING THEM TO BEST ADVANTAGE 172 658

The efforts made by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities to promote the study and preservation of historical monuments might yield even better results if they were more widely understood and supported. By means of intelligent propaganda through the three channels of education, tourist development and town planning, it should be possible gradually to arouse general sympathy and interest. The important point is to show clearly that historic monuments are not merely an outdated and costly burden, but have a positive and lively interest for every individual. A publicity campaign on these lines has already been successfully undertaken, but in certain respects it might be amplified and developed.

In the field of education, interest in the country's artistic assets can be aroused by the distribution of illustrated publications and the organization of exhibitions and lectures. There are already some publications of this kind dealing with Damascus, Palmyra, Bosra and Aleppo and more could easily be produced; they should contain fine photographs and be translated into several languages. After organizing a few exhibitions of paintings and a brilliant ceremony to mark the opening of the Qasr el-Heir galleries in the Damascus Museum, the Directorate of Antiquities has recently made a conclusive experiment in this field. It has organized a wonderful exhibition of treasures discovered at archaeological sites in Syria during 1952, which has met with well-deserved success. We ourselves

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have seen the constant stream of visitors, often quite humble people, gazing at the showcases of exhibits from Mari, Ras-Shamra and Hama; while they are there, these visitors also go round the museum and have an opportunity of admiring its treasures. In addition, it would be very helpful if the government, which furthers the training of scientific specialists by providing fellowships for study abroad, and does so much to develop the schools, were to introduce courses on the history of Syrian art and antiquities into the curricula of Syrian secondary schools and higher educational establishments, both in Damascus and Aleppo.

Tourist development could also do much to help in the protection of historic monuments by showing the population that they can provide a steady source of income. From this point of view, Syria's art treasures have, as yet, scarcely been exploited. In the absence of suitable facilities and adequate publicity, there is still very little tourist traffic in Syria. A great deal of extremely useful work could be done in this field by an active organization, supported by the State. In order to attract foreigners to a country so rich both in natural beauties and impressive remains, it should only be necessary to improve certain sections of roads and establish one or two conveniently situated and unpretentious but well-run hotels or rest-houses, where visitors can eat and sleep in pleasant surroundings. It is astonishing that sites as fascinating as Palmyra, St. Simeon or the Krak des Chevaliers should still be so hard to reach when it would be relatively simple to organise tours either by road or air. In this respect, Greece, where the tourist trade has advanced by leaps and bounds in the space of a few years, and is now making a considerable contribution to the country's economic resources, seems to us to provide a particularly good example of what can be done in this way.

We shall have to consider town planning in greater detail

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172 greater detail

in connexion with Damascus and Aleppo. For the moment, we would merely deplore the fact that the authors of excavation and development plans are all too apt to write off ancient monuments as unbearable, instead of considering them as some of the finest and most attractive focus-points around which to replan districts. The preservation and enhancement of these buildings need be no bar to a city's normal development. They merely raise problems which should always be studied in consultation with qualified experts attached to the Directorate of Antiquities. If the work is done, with good taste, it will help not only to interest a few scholars anxious to learn more of the past, but to develop a love of their monuments in the inhabitants themselves, as they come consciously or unconsciously to appreciate their beauty, and, in a short time, take them as an essential and familiar ornament to their daily life.

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DAMASCUS

GROWTH OF THE CITY

Lying on the edge of the desert and encircled by the green Ghutah oasis, watered by the Barada, Damascus owes its existence and development mainly to its geographical position, water supplies and gardens. The different periods of its growth which are bound up with its political history, industries and trade, are reflected in the layout of the various sections of the town, and in the architecture of its houses, monuments and streets.

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The nucleus of the present city was formed at the time of Syria's annexation to Alexander's Empire. The Greek city, rising to the east of the Aramaean town, was built to a regular plan of rectangular blocks about 150 by 330 feet, showing considerable regard for town planning requirements; the layout may, in fact, even today, still be regarded as an ideal one.

Damascus's association with the Roman Empire gave a decisive impetus to the formation and development of the town. Most of the great rebuilding operations were carried out in the reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla. The relative importance of the various streets depended at that time upon their position in relation to the city gates. Bab Charqi is a part of the ancient East Gate, which stood at the end of the "Street called Straight" (*Via Recta*), on the site of which one of the bays of a monumental arch has recently been reconstructed. All round the Great Mosque there are many remains of the temple of Jupiter Damascenus (identified by the Romans with the god Hadad). To the west, in particular, there is the high Corinthian colonnade of one of the propylaea of the peribolos, with beautiful fragments of the arcature and entablature.

Damascus remained a satellite of Rome and then of Byzantium until the arrival of the Arabs, who, under the Omayyad dynasty, made it the capital of a great empire, the political, cultural and religious centre of Islam. The heart of the city was the Great Mosque, built by the Caliph al-Walid on the site of the ancient temple and the church of Saint John the Baptist. The Syrian architects adapted their plan to the whole area, incorporating some parts of the earlier buildings in the new edifice. The immense courtyard and the sanctuary were

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adorned with all the splendour of Constantinople's mosaics and the products of her art industries. The mosque was considered as one of the world's architectural masterpieces, rivalling the mosque of Omar in Jerusalem. 361 175

With the rise of the Abbasid dynasty, Damascus lost its position as the capital; the work of the Omayyads was destroyed and their institutions proscribed. In order to subjugate the population more effectively and prevent any show of hostility, the fortified walls of the city were pulled down. This was a period of anarchy and unrest, which resulted in the formation of cliques and the development of guild life. The city ceased to be a single whole, governed by public authorities responsible for the management of the community's affairs; it was split up into autonomous districts, like dominoes, and often rival, cities, each with its own independent organization, mosque, hammam (baths), souqs, surrounding walls and gates, and its own chief (shaikh) commanding a sort of police battalion.

This situation led to the development of a new system of property and a new type of city life; new bodies were formed to defend the rights of various religious communities or corporations.

AYYUBID PERIOD

The Seljuk Atabegs and the Ayyubids, in their zealous desire to see Sunnite Islam victorious and their hatred of the Fatimites and Crusaders, made Damascus once more an intellectual and religious center, as well as a stronghold. Whereas the town's division into various districts had previously been based on craftsmen's corporations, religious creed was henceforth the determining factor; the Christians drew together and shut themselves away in the south-east of the old town; the Israelites to the south-east; the Moslem section of the population settled in the western part of the town, where many madrasahs and public buildings were then built. These, also, stood the Citadel, for whose building part of the materials and foundations of the Roman walls were used. The city was further

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Damascus

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

Plan of Damascus

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361 175 broken up by the formation of new districts, often at some distance from the original town centre. In isolated parts and on the slopes of the mountain, where nature is conducive to prayer and meditation, many convents and madrasahs were erected; although several of these have been destroyed and others are disused and in ruins, about fifty have survived until the present time, while others again have been converted and incorporated in more recent buildings.

361 344 172 In the Moslem sector of the old town is the Maristan of Nur ad-Din, "one of the most famous hospitals of the Moslem world". It is of great architectural interest, but is unfortunately spoilt by the modern buildings which now surround it. The doorway has a rich and original alveolate decoration, a classical pediment and a beautiful pair of doors. Over the entrance hall is a small ribbed onion dome, surmounted by a sort of truncated conical drum, made up of superimposed alveoles which are visible even from the outside, as in the case of the brick tomb of Zobeide near Baghdad. In the courtyard, with its two beautiful iwans (halls), fragments of inscriptions, lattice-work and marble inlay have been preserved.

361 346 172 The Nuriya Madrasah, to the south of the Great Mosque, has a similar dome above the mausoleum. Its doorway is distinguished by the pendant keystone motif, also to be seen at the Adiliya Madrasah, a "masterpiece of stereotomy and bonding" planned and constructed in the architectural style and by the methods characteristic of northern Syria. This latter madrasah, a fitting building for the headquarters of the Arab Academy, has been very carefully restored and rearranged. This building, together with the Zahiriya Madrasah (now the National Library), the house of Saladin's father, which was converted by the Sultan Beibars into a memorial college, and the Aziziya Madrasah (Saladin's tomb) form a fine architectural group to the north of the Great Mosque; these buildings are still adorned by a wealth of ancient works of art, inscriptions, mosaics, doors and windows.

The twofold influence of Mesopotamia and northern Syria can be seen in the art of the period of Nur ad-Din and Saladin.

Various mausoleums are to be found outside the old town itself and slightly to the north, in the area between the river and the modern thoroughfare called Baghdad Street. That of Zayn ad-Din (Sitt ech-Châm, 1172), is the oldest example of such a building with a sepulchral dome surmounting two drums; the "Sultan Hasan" Mausoleum has a ribbed dome and an interesting decoration of stucco and painting; the Chamiya Madrasah, standing outside the city walls, contains one of the finest examples of plaster moulding in Damascus, beautiful inscriptions and the armatures of the old leaded-glass windows. The Mausoleum of Ibn al-Moqaddam, Emir of Aleppo, is a typical north Syrian structure. Further to the east and of more recent date stands the At-Tawba Mosque, planned and arranged on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque, and interesting on account of its architecture and decoration (doorway, mihrab, leaded-glass windows, etc.).

The suburb of Salihiyah grew up on the mountain side round a fine group of mausoleums, madrasahs and convents, most of which are now abandoned or used for somewhat unsuitable purposes. There, in a picturesque spot on the Nahr Yazid, we find the remains of a colonnaded portico of the oldest convent-madrasah of Salihiyah, together with a whole series of monuments built by eminent persons at the court of Nur ad-Din and Saladin. Most of them are mausoleums with brick domes, some ribbed and others double, surmounting two drums decorated with arcading and lobate or twin niches. Many of them contain beautiful carved wooden tombs, old leaded-glass windows and

361 lintels decorated with graceful inscriptions and coats of arms.
346 The Momffari Mosque, built in 1202, is decorated in a par-
172 ticularly interesting and original manner; it is the oldest Ayyubid Mosque, and its plan is reminiscent of the Omayyad Mosque. Ancient columns, with their capitals, have been used to form the arcades round the courtyard. The carved wooden lintels (with incised geometrical designs) over the seven doors of the prayer hall are well preserved; two of them are still surmounted by plaster lattice-work. Inside, several windows have beautiful old glass panes.

Also worthy of mention is the Atabakiya Madrasah, built to house the tomb of Princess Tarkan-Khatoun, with its fine doorway decorated with alveoles, which today, owing to the concealment of the corner colums by more recent structures, looks as if it were in recess. The arrangement of the alveoles, the bonding of the arch-stones of the arcade and the modelling of the cornices show originality, but are somewhat primitive.

This part of the town subsequently developed and spread very considerably, taking in neighbouring districts such as the Kurd quarter, in Saladin's time, and the Mohadjirine at the end of the nineteenth century. Today, this suburb centres round the Mohiy ad-Din Mosque, built by Sultan Selim in 1518 over the tomb of the famous mystic. This mosque, which also contains the tomb of Abd el-Kader, has a beautiful minaret and very striking faience decorations.

MAMELUKE PERIOD

361 At the beginning of the Mameluke period, Damascus developed
195 and expanded further; its products were highly esteemed and, in order to meet the demands of the time, the city developed its art industries, specializing in luxury articles. Even the Crusades promoted its commercial relations with the Western world; like Aleppo, Damascus traded with southern France, Genoa, Pisa and Venice. Its artistic products, such as silks, bronze ornaments, Damascene blades, enamel-work and glassware were in demand everywhere. As a result of this commercial activity, its suqs spread to the north of the Citadel, in the horse-market area, where the Yelbogha Mosque was built in 1264.

Following the example of the Sultans of Cairo, governors, military leaders and their servants then built a great many madrasahs (schools for the teaching of the Koran) and mausolea. The favourite sites for the latter were along the road to Mecca "so that the founder might benefit from the prayers of passing pilgrims". Thus a new suburb, called the meidan, sprang up along this road, reflecting the special features of the pilgrim traffic and trade. The meidan, about two miles in length, was linked with the city by a new group of suqs (Es-Siouaniyeh) outside the western gate of the wall, between the districts of Chagur and Qasr el-Hajjaj; it absorbed the suburban village of El-Qbeybat ("little domes"), and ended at Bab-Allah (Allah's Gate), whence pilgrims "set out on their journey to the Holy House of God".

361 It would take too long to give a complete list of the Mame-
346 luke monuments existing in these districts; even the directory
172 of the Antiquities Service does not include them all. Very often a minaret, a fountain or a madrasah, although not classified, is of considerable interest, because it adds to the atmosphere of the place, or because it has certain original features, though these are often not very obvious, owing to the conversion of the building for another purpose or to bad restoration.

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361 Here, we shall mention only a few monuments which are
346 particularly unusual or significant. Such, for example, is
172 the Turba Afridoniya ("Jami el-Ajami"), at the city end of the meidan, a Koranic school and mausoleum commemorating the Persian trader, Afridun, who died in 1348. The composition of its façade, with black and white courses of masonry, is perfect, and all the decorative elements hit in harmoniously with it. There are a great many of the latter (cornices, bull's eye windows, doorway with inlaid work and scallops, stalactite ornamentation, inscriptions, interlocking voussoirs and panels of strapwork), and several of them were subsequently repeated, for purely ornamental purposes, in other buildings.

A little further south, there is a small mausoleum to an unknown person, which is commonly called "Weli Chaybani". Its architecture is sober and its composition good. As in the majority of these monuments, the façade, with its skilful bonding, has a doorway decorated with alveoles. The two windows are connected by a single lintel, composed of three rows of stones, the middle one being formed of interlocking voussoirs; there is a bull's eye above the pilaster separating them. The dome, resting on a high drum with 16 windows, is pierced with holes to let in light.

Nearly half-way along the meidan stands the double mausoleum of Azaq, belonging to the same period (1349). The plan of this building is more complicated. Its many-coloured façade has turquoise-blue faience inlay round the doorway, with its ornamentation of stalactites and braid-moulding. Here also, the sloping surfaces are gracefully joined to the vertical by a system of alveoles, and the long fascia of the lintels divides the façade horizontally with its two-coloured arrangement of interlocking voussoirs, repeated right across the building and sloping first one way and then the other. The many radiating voussoirs of the bull's eyes form as it were the rays of a sunburst. The lintels are enriched with geometrical and floral designs, and cyma reversa mouldings give unity to the various parts of the façade.

The architectural and decorative elements used with a very strong sense of balance and harmony in these buildings, were later repeated and multiplied until surfaces became so richly adorned as to give the impression of incoherence and pointlessness, combined with artistic decadence, which is characteristic of the last Mameluke period.

The Yachbak Mausoleum (1377), more ornate, but still well designed and balanced, has domes surmounting sloping roofs composed of alveoles. The central feature of the façade is a doorway decorated with stalactites, and the rosettes of the bull's eyes form a horizontal band, matched, within the embrasure of the doorway, by a panel decorated with marble and faience inlaid work in an interlaced design, surrounding the Mameluke coat of arms.

The same features are to be seen in the Rachidiyé Madrasah, the upper part of whose doorway has recently been cut off to make room for an entirely extraneous small structure; the fine composition of the façade is also partially concealed by modern buildings.

Among the latest buildings of the Mameluke period, the Sabuniya Madrasah, the Sibaiya Madrasah at the western end of the "Street called Straight", and the Al-Muradiya Madrasah deserve mention. Prominently situated, with the curves of their domes and the tall shafts of their beautiful minarets, they add a special and typical note of their own to the street scene.

A few other monuments of the same period are to be found either in the old town or in the districts immediately to the north of it. We have already mentioned the Yelbogha Mosque,

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361 designed on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque; it is re-
346 markable for the beautiful structure of its niches and
172 windows with their alveolate decoration, its magnificent bands of plaster moulding, and its windows, doorways and minaret. This mosque well deserves to be set off to greater advantage.

Tingiz, the Viceroy of Syria, was responsible for the construction of a fine group of buildings. Only the beautiful minaret and two doorways of the mosque which bears his name still remain after the rebuilding of the An-Nasr Avenue, but the double mausoleum of his w . (Turba Kukabaiya) and, a little further on, the Dar al-Hadit, a school where the traditions of the Prophet were expounded, are still to be seen in the "Street called Straight".

The last monuments of this period are the two beautiful tiered minarets in the Bab Jabiya suq, with their rich decoration, and that of the Al-Moallaq Mosque, with an unbroken line of black stones encircling its niches and rose windows.

OTTOMAN PERIOD

361 The end of the Mameluke period was marked by a serious eco-
175 nomic crisis, aggravated by disturbances and devastation (Tamerlane), and also by the Portuguese discoveries, which altered the traditional trade routes. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire, which expanded Damascus's economic and political frontiers, the city again began to develop. Under the capitulations, Turkish ports were opened to European merchants. Moreover, since pilgrims set out from Damascus on their journey to Mecca, the city was expected to supply them with the necessary equipment and provisions for their crossing of the desert.

These circumstances led to the building of many khans, with their porticoed courtyards, shops and stables on the ground floor and accommodation for travellers on the floor above. The city was no longer of any strategic or military importance; the ramparts, already useless on account of the town's extension and the formation of suburbs without the walls, were abandoned; the moats filled in and the Citadel fell into ruins. The pasha (governor), with his entourage of Turkish aristocrats, took up his residence and administered business at the seraglio, outside the ramparts, at a place called Qanawat (the canals), near the Roman aqueduct.

361 In the same neighbourhood were erected the two great
346 imperial madrasahs, the Solaymaniya (1554), constructed by the
172 famous Turkish architect, Sinan, who built the Sulaymaniya in Constantinople, and the Salimiya (1566), designed by a Persian architect. With their great buttressed domes, surrounded by a double row of small domes covering the porticoes and rooms, their slender pencil-like minarets tapering to a cone, and the surrounding gardens with their fountains, trees and flowers, they achieve an architectural unity and a highly characteristic atmosphere of their own, in a style native to Constantinople and readily transplanted to Damascus.

The Solaymaniya has a rich variety of architectural and decorative motifs, characteristic of that period and style, such as marble inlaid work and great overlays of faience tiles on the walls and tympana of the doors and windows; heel arches with alternate black and white arch-stones; abundant use of stalactites, niches ornamented with overlapping shell designs, lintels with many-coloured interlocking voussoirs, forming increasingly ornate and complicated patterns. The capitals

361 consist of clustered tetrahedrons, coloured with blue and red.
346 The astragals of the columns and their tori are of gilt bronze.
172 All the surfaces are composed of alternating courses of different colours.

The same features are to be seen in the buildings put up by the governor, Dervish-Pasha, forming a fine group at the beginning of the Pilgrims' Way, to the west of the old town. The façade of the "Ed-Derwichiyeh" Mosque is composed of alternate black and white courses; the tall polygonal minaret is painted green. The whole building, which is surmounted by a large dome encircled by small cupolas, is architecturally connected with the neighbouring mausoleum by an archway over the road. The arrangement of designs, shapes and colours on the façades shows extraordinary imaginative ingenuity. The pointed bulbous dome of the mausoleum rests on a drum of irregular shape. At a later date, in the same street, but a little further south, Sinan-Pasha built his mosque among the suqs of Bab Jabiya; it has the same characteristics and features (minaret faced with green faience tiles, large dome, inflected arches, geometrical capitals, etc.); above all, it makes the same spectacular impression in the street surrounding, inevitably catching the eye between the suqs and the Mecca road.

361 Within the confines of the old town, between the Great
342 Mosque and the "Street called Straight", a number of khans
172 and two new hammams were built at this period.

Dervish-Pasha built the "Khan Al-Hariz", which is a curious mixture of Syrian and Turkish architectural styles. It is a fine structure, with porticoes surrounding the courtyard and, on the upper floor, two series of rooms connected by a corridor and covered by a triple row of domes.

The Khan Al-Gumrok, in the same locality, has a covered hall instead of a central courtyard, and six large domes supported on pendentives. The Khan Soleyman-Pasha (1732), following a similar but more complicated plan, has a courtyard covered by two large domes. Here, the composition is conceived on broader lines and the architectural volumes are enormous, while the dual colour scheme is still found, not only in the black and white courses of the walls, but also in the bonding of the voussoirs of the arcades and pendentives. Some years later, Asad-Pasha, who was Vali (governor) of Damascus and led the great pilgrimage for 14 years running, built a new khan, and a house for himself between it and the Great Mosque.

The khan has a façade reminiscent of Venetian Renaissance architecture in composition, while the building technique and the choice of decorative motifs and materials are in the best artistic traditions of northern Syria. Asad-Pasha's residence ("Azem Palace", 1749) has the same features, repeated and multiplied; it follows the traditional plan of all large Syrian dwellings, with its two entirely separate groups of rooms (selamlik [men's quarters] and haremlik [women's quarters]), its courtyards, porticoes, iwans, pools and fountains.

Thus Damascus today, as in the earliest periods of its history, is still assimilating and using artistic and cultural themes, borne along the great traffic routes, to converge upon the oasis between the Anti-Lebanon and the desert.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

361 In studying the growth of Damascus and its various districts,
172 we have tried to bring out the character and functions of certain groups of buildings which, if skilfully restored and arranged,

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16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MDI Syria MDI
Damascus

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

Damascus

Fig. 1. Sketch plan of the Damascus region

Damascus in the Ninth century

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361/172 would not only be more beautiful in themselves, but would add to the interest and attraction of the city as a whole. It must be borne in mind that, in old towns, there is more to safeguard than isolated monuments which can be protected by law: there is a whole architectural system, moulded by time, a crystallization, as it were, of the people's history, customs and needs.

A monument always has some positive, intrinsic interest as a work of art, but it is of even greater interest if it forms part of a whole group of buildings, which makes its purpose and history clearer and sets off its volumes and form. In the architectural pattern of a city, each individual building is like a piece in a mosaic; however precious each small stone may be, it is the whole composition which gives it meaning and worth.

It is true, of course, that there are also worthless things in the old parts of towns; there are buildings which are parasitic or unhealthy. Like a living creature, an old city is subject to sickness and infirmity. The correction of such shortcomings, however, calls for infinite care and an exact appreciation of what is to be altered or abolished; and in any case, the work must always be done with the caution which modern critical methods of restoration and excavation require. It is impossible to say, *a priori*, what should be done, or to map out new streets, building lines and squares with ruler and compasses. The demolition of an old quarter may reveal buildings, fragments and works of art which will enrich the nation's archaeological heritage or throw light on historical or artistic problems. All this is of importance to a country's cultural and spiritual life. There are plenty of examples of the difficulties to which ancient monuments give rise when town planning schemes come to be carried out, even when the latter have been prepared with the intention of leaving untouched buildings protected by the law. One has only to think of the mosque of Tingiz, of which only the two doorways and the minaret projecting over the street now remain.

We are glad to find that the new districts also have a character and beauty of their own, which is becoming increasingly marked as new buildings, in the light of past experience, are better adapted to the atmosphere, customs and climate of Damascus. Although the new streets are often too open and the architecture of the buildings sometimes either a little too rigid (the reinforced concrete construction being rather too obvious), or too ornate and showy (due to the excessive and unskilful use of decorative motifs), they will blend better with the rest of the town when the trees have grown up to fill in the over-large spaces with greenery and subdue the light.

We must admit, however, that we are somewhat dismayed by the results of the new development scheme and the new layout of building land in the area between the southern side of the Citadel and the "Street called Straight". There, the labyrinth of suqs and narrow winding alleys, with buildings jutting out into them, has gradually been replaced by a chess-board pattern of small rectangular blocks. The historic monuments are lost and stifled among many-storeyed modern buildings. The domes and minaret of the Dervish-Pasha Mosque are dwarfed by the high block of workmen's flats which has sprung up beside it. The same is true of many mausolea and of the Maristan, the famous hospital of Nur ad-Din, one of the most unusual and interesting monuments in Damascus.

It would certainly not be wise to encourage the proposal (which would, moreover, be extremely costly to carry out) that monuments be pulled down and rebuilt some distance away, as has been suggested in order to isolate the Omayyad Mosque.

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16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1
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The suqs with their khans, the hammams, mosques and madrasahs generally form a coherent and harmonious architectural and functional unit, which should be kept intact. The present system of classifying monuments should be extended to cover architectural groups as well as individual buildings. We would repeat that this does not mean thwarting reasonable attempts to improve or develop a district. Our aim is merely to show that the usual criteria, methods and means employed in the technical departments of municipalities, where individual interests and immediate advantages are alone considered, should not be applied to such architectural groups. It should have been possible, for example, to prevent the erection of a conspicuously tasteless modern house, jarring in both colour and design, close to the southern façade of the Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library). The new buildings in Seleymani Street, near the Khan Al-Gumrok are another instance of the sort of thing that should not be allowed. Before putting up new building in old parts of the town, much thought should be given to their appearance and colour, with the twofold aim of improving the present situation and setting off the monuments, which are dignified and beautiful features of the city as a whole, to their best advantage. The criterion of utility cannot be ruthlessly applied to the products of culture and the mind. For that reason our young town planners should give up their attempts to recover money spent on laying out an open square with streets radiating from it or piercing wide streets, by ill-considered exploitation of building land in old parts of the town, where the present houses give very little return or by the demolition of hammams, madrasahs and gardens, which now bring in no revenue at all, in order to free their sites. 361 172

The old centre of the town would gain greatly, both aesthetically and from the practical point of view, if the Citadel were arranged and used for a different purpose. Its interest as a monument is obvious, with its magnificent façades and towers and the beautiful east gate with its alveolate decoration. At the present time, the Citadel buildings are put to poor use as a barracks and prison. Should it be decided to use them for a different purpose, the open spaces within the walls should be used for public gardens and so brought into the life of the city. They might be some of the most beautiful gardens in Damascus, with gateways leading into the streets outside. An enterprising architect, with the help of an expert advisory committee, could well adapt the fine and imposing architecture of the Citadel to meet the needs of some public institution. It might, for example, be used to house a university faculty, with a "Students' Centre", providing accommodation for students and professors not resident in Damascus, a library, studies, lecture-rooms and exhibition halls. The mosque should again be used for prayer. Premises could also be provided for recreation and entertainment, with a cinema, café, restaurant, etc. If the western façade were cleared, there would be a really splendid and imposing view down the wide An-Nasr Avenue. Thus transformed, the Citadel, instead of hindering the town's development as it does today, would once again become a part of public life and, in its new guise, would be a great social asset to the city and the nation.

The Great Omayyad Mosque is the most interesting monument in Damascus, although unfortunately it has been so seriously damaged in the course of its history by destruction earthquakes and fire that it is now a somewhat confused mixture of unequal artistic and architectural styles. It would be excellent if sufficient funds could be found to complete and extend the work—already happily begun by the Wakfs and the Directorate of Antiquities—of restoring this monument and setting 346 172

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it off to better advantage, so as to enhance its appearance, as its artistic and historical interest, its position as the religious centre of the Syrian capital, deserve.

As it now stands, the older parts (mosaics, columns, stucco work, mihrabs, qubbet, etc.) look lifeless and unattached, as though they were no longer part of the mosque, but rather, in some respects, an encumbrance. The aim of the restoration plan should be to set off this heritage of art and history to the best advantage. The first step must be a careful, critical assessment of the relative value of the different features. Steps must also be taken to make an entity of the buildings and restore their artistic unity. This difficult and complicated task calls for the collaboration of artists and scholars, but the result, if the necessary care is exercised, will be to restore to the city the full splendour of its greatest religious edifice.

We give below for purposes of guidance only a provisional list, based on our first impressions, of the things to be borne in mind when drawing up a plan for restoration and renovation work. The most interesting from the historical point of view are obviously the oldest parts: columns, capitals, cornices, inscriptions, fragments of walls and arcades, etc. These are precious relics of a dead civilization, to be preserved for their documentary and cultural interest. As ruins and fragments, they also have a decorative value, and there can be no justification for restoration which involves their wholesale reconstruction.

All the surviving parts of the original Omayyad building (arcades and capitals, mosaics) are likewise of outstanding historical and archaeological interest; but the question of how to set them off most effectively is here complicated by the fact that they are also component parts of the present building. They are, moreover, of very considerable aesthetic value.

The interior of the prayer-hall, in the central part of the transept, bears traces of the succession of periods, restorations and reconstructions through which it has passed. This is now no longer the centre of interest; it gives rather the impression of a sort of corridor separating the two wings of the naves. The dirty, defaced remains of mosaics on the north wall form dark patches against the white background. A few fine old windows are interspersed with a large number of very ordinary modern ones, with garish coloured glass. The thick marble with which the four central pillars are faced for reinforcement is of no interest. The same aesthetic defects and lack of stylistic unity are to be found on the south wall; the mihrab, with its delicate inlaid work, the Koranic inscriptions in faience, the three finely designed lower windows and the beautiful gilded ceiling, clash with the style of the rest.

We think that the white plaster on the walls, the arcades and the drum of the dome, in this part of the transept, should be removed in order fully to reveal the stone structure beneath. The dressed stone in the naves on either side is already visible. The next stage might be to replace the upper windows, change the colour of the ceiling beams, and instal a new lighting system, dispensing with the lamps at present in use. Syria today has plenty of talented artists and craftsmen; and to give them employment would help to keep alive a glorious tradition, and to encourage crafts which are in danger of being stifled by the advance of mechanization.

The comments made on the sanctuary apply equally to the courtyard, vestibule and doorways. Many unmeaning and uninteresting features, such as the glass-panel doors and modern eaves, the neo-classical marble facings, and the cement slabs forming part of the portico floor, are found side by side with

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311 such artistic treasures as the mosaics, the capitals, the Qubba,
192 the minarets and the doors.

In the west portico, large white patches in the mosaics show how much the restoration work done still leaves to be desired. In the north-east section, as part of the careful work carried out by the Directorate of Antiquities, the spaces between the mosaics have been painted a similar colour, with excellent effect, except that the painted surface looks rather dull beside the brilliant surface of the mosaics. Better results might be obtained by mixing the paint with a little marble powder, which would give a slight variety of tone.

It is of course important in any improvement schemes, to consider the general effect of the whole—a fact appreciated by the technical services, which have made plans for building new roads so as to isolate the Great Mosque. In considering these plans, we must bear in mind that the Great Mosque is not simply a building standing by itself: its history and use create an aura influencing the surrounding atmosphere and [illegible], the imposing ruins of ancient temples and churches madrasahs, khans and suqs form a complex with it.

344 To the north, there are no less than five highly important
192 monuments. The Adiliya Madrasah (Arab Academy), with its fine doorway and pendant hexagons, has been described as "a masterpiece of masonry and bonding". The Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library) opposite, once the house of Saladin's father, was converted into a memorial college by the famous Sultan Beibars. Close by the Great Mosque, the Aziziya Madrasah contains the tomb of Saladin, housed in a mausoleum with the characteristic ribbed dome resting on octagonal and sixteen-sided drums. The recent restoration of this mausoleum has been outstandingly successful, especially as regards the enhancement of the general effect of the surroundings. Opposite the north entrance, the Jaqmaqiya Madrasah and the Turbat Al-Ikhnaiya, stand like propylaea, guiding the eye to the fine vista of the Byzantine colonnade, the doorway and the minaret.

361 The monuments on the other sides of the mosque are inter-
344 esting too, though less obviously so. The artistic interest
192 of some of the khans, suqs and hammams is often apt to pass unnoticed by the casual observer simply because they are still in use, whereas that of the ruins strikes the eye immediately. The architecture of the group of buildings to the south-west of the Great Mosque, however, is extremely good. Passing through the Khan Al-Gumrok with its six large domes supported by pendentives, and the great Khan Al-Hariz, with its triple series of small domes surmounting the first storey, we reach first the rich and delightful Azem Palace, a very suitable setting for the folk museum and tourist offices which are to be installed there; and then, after passing the fine façade of the Khan Azad-Pasha, the Midhat-Pasha suq ("Street called
361 Straight"). The development plan includes the widening of this street. If this is done, we hope that due precautions will be taken to avoid the mistakes mentioned above, and that the present character of this street will be preserved, particularly in the western section, where the suqs are still teeming with life and interest. We might at this point stress how very convenient the suqs are, especially in extremes of weather; they protect the crowd of pedestrians from rain and sun, wind and dust alike. They form a dense network, opening out,

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1/A [OF the mosque -- ANALYSIS]

361 from time to time, onto vistas of monuments—such as the beautiful minarets of the Hisham Mosque and the Madanet el-Qali, and the façades and domes of the Sibaiya Madrasah and the Dervish-Pasha and Sinan-Pasha mosques—which serve as landmarks.

We might well go on to consider the special interest and characteristics of the suburbs of the meidan (with the fine Bab-Saghir cemetery), Suq-Sârouja and Salihiyah, but we dwelt on this subject at some length in describing their history, and there would be no point in repeating our remarks on the importance of preserving the characteristic atmosphere of these places.

Finally, in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, we should like once more to draw the attention of young town planning experts, who lay so much store by wide, straight streets, to the importance of preserving the picturesque, as we have advocated, and of catering for the tourist trade which, for a city with so rich an artistic heritage, is a considerable potential source of income.

There are, in our opinion, few other towns of comparable romantic and picturesque appeal. But we must make it clear that when we use the term "picturesque" we have in mins something which, though apparently haphazard, in fact possesses a beauty and logic of its own, since it has grown up spontaneously and naturally as the outcome of an earlier age and the reflection of a wealth of life and feeling. This explaind why the various parts combine so naturally and necessarily. This quality of the "picturesque", which we believe should be preserved and enhanced, is not to be confused with the results of neglect, carelessness and dirt.

As regards the tourist trade, we do not, of course, advocate sacrificing the life and development of a city and subordinating its whole disposition to the tastes of foreigners in search of the novel and exotic. We simply wish to point out that the desire to attract tourists may provide an incentive to set off to best advantage those features of a town which truly deserve to be generally known, admired and appreciated.

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ALEPPO

ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TOWN

The Citadel of Aleppo, with its deep moat, and steep and grandiose glacis held in place by stone columns, etches a lacy crown around the hill formed by the accumulated ruins of older civilizations, and is truly symbolic of the city which, throughout its long history, has weathered events that brought ruin and death everywhere around it. At its foot spreads out the serried network of thoroughfares converging from desert and sea, turned, as it were, to stone in the rational yet florid architecture of the town. 361

Aleppo has always been considered the key city of communication and trade. From time to time wars have halted its development, but its own peculiar logic, unity and coherence have continued, despite changes in political circumstance. In Seleucid times and later in the Roman and Byzantine period, its contacts and influence grew steadily; it then became the real metropolis of northern Syria. Antioch remained the great centre of culture; Aleppo was the city of trade, industry and manufacturing.

In the art of building too, Aleppo was always the leader, suffering no declines or lapses, able to combine the rational and geometric logic of Greek construction with the monumental design of Rome and the plastic and decorative fantasy of the Mesopotamian Orient. In contrast with the poor building materials of Mesopotamia—where sun-dried brick and mud were used—Aleppo had its rich resources of limestone, which it used generously, as though in passionate pursuit of an idea to create forms and motifs suited to the requirements of architecture. It achieved a relationship between the structure of its buildings and the nature and characteristics of the stone, which was a factor in the artistic conception as a whole, just as water was in Damascus, where pools, streams and tinkling fountains lent life and movement to courts and spaces. 341

It is difficult, in a few words, to describe the various buildings and classify them according to their type and style. J. Sauvaget has made a detailed study of the question in connexion with the town's historical development, and has drawn

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up a list. However, his work has not exhausted all that there is to be said about the character of a city in which works of art and buildings still play a lively part and where every new study, every town planning or restoration scheme, reveals something new. 341

Old buildings have often been adapted to serve a new purpose; more often still, the fabric and decoration of buildings no longer serving their original purpose, have been used for new ones. For example, the Great Mosque, which, as it now appears, belongs to the Mameluke period, preserves, hidden within its structure, many parts dating from earlier times, while the beautiful minaret (A.D. 1090), which, for its shape and decoration, is of the greatest interest in the study of Moslem architecture in Syria, still stands for all to see. The highly original vaulted arches at "Sheikh Mohassin" rest on ancient capitals. The oldest madrasah in Aleppo was originally a church and the old cathedral has been transformed into a Moslem college. The mosque of the Mulberry Tree has a Greek entablature. The Citadel rests on Byzantine buildings, having made use of a few of their rooms and the huge water tank. Even the ramparts, in the size and bonding of their stones, show the influence of various periods, from the Greco-Roman, to which the lower masonry belongs, to the Mameluke, when almost all its magnificent towers were rebuilt.

Motifs, design and methods, and, above all, architectural atmosphere, were retained with the materials, as new themes were worked out to suit new political or religious circumstances or wider trade relations. While the Citadel, ramparts, madrasahs and Sufi convents represent the frontier city in its struggles with the Crusaders and Shiites, the growth of the suburbs and the suqs bears witness to the commercial importance of the town which, after the destruction of Antioch, resumed its traditional role as a centre of trade with Persia and India.

From the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, Aleppo was a flourishing city. Beautiful private houses and monumental khans, combining with the suqs, fountains and mosques to form an intricate architectural pattern, reflect its life during that period. The taste for baroque decoration, copied from Italy, France and Spain, finds expression in the framework of

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3/11 doorways and windows and in the rich ornamentation of the ceilings, whilst motifs drawn from Constantinople are preferred in the El-Adliyeh, Khosrewiya, Othmaniya and Ahmediye mosques and madrasahs and in the high minarets with their tapering cone-shaped tops.

This coherent complex of buildings, with its continuous life, enables us to follow the whole course of development in technique and taste, religious ideas and history, and commercial organization. Together with the buildings of Cairo, it provides an essential basis for any study of Moslem architecture.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

172 The preservation of monuments involves striking a balance between a number of considerations—their purpose, the need to restore them to their original appearance, the practical and commercial ends they serve and the requirements of town planning and modern life. All this raises questions of such complexity as to suggest that, in a town like Aleppo, it would be wise to set up a commission of experts to advise the authorities. Such a commission should include scholars, artists, and representatives of the various bodies concerned, and its task would be to examine the most suitable means of giving the city's architectural treasures a place in its modern life, bringing out their character more clearly and making the most of their beauties.

There is a whole series of monuments which no longer serve any practical end and are accordingly beginning to be counted as archaeological relics. In many cases, the maintenance and restoration they require makes them a heavy financial drain, while their value as a source of income is nil. Nevertheless they ought to be preserved and safeguarded in view of the national, cultural and spiritual values for which they stand. They cannot be classed as things now useless and abandoned to people too poor to pay for modern housing accommodation, or put to some low-yield industrial use. To adopt such criteria would mean renouncing outright all possibility of leaving, in the history of the city and the nation, any permanent memorial of what has been.

Officialdom does not always grasp these requirements; under the constraint of an annual balance sheet it takes the view that the artistic heritage is too rich already, and its preservation and maintenance too difficult and costly. But a monument is like a tree: it has a positive value even if it yields no fruit and if its immediate usefulness is not obvious. When the tree has been reduced to firewood, or the stones of the monument quarried, and its silt used for new buildings, then we realize that it was not only a thing of beauty in itself but an irreplaceable element in our daily lives.

Today as in the past—perhaps even more than in the past—local authorities are at great pains, in development works, to enhance a town's beauties. In our view, the best way of effecting this is to take into account the aesthetic possibilities of ancient architecture. On this point we can but repeat what has already been said, in connexion with Damascus, about the beauty of the old quarters, and the narrow peaceful alleys, about the practical and aesthetic significance of the souqs and khans, about the value of the picturesque in the urban scene and hence the desirability of preserving the atmosphere and integrity of a setting which is the slow growth of centuries.

Aleppo in particular has outstanding possibilities for pro-

172 gressive beautification, because the whole of its history is written in its splendid buildings. All that is needed would be to free the old buildings of the mean parasitic structures which cumber them, built against their walls or in empty spaces at a time when the authorities were negligent. It would only be necessary to restore to a seemly state and put to suitable use the numerous major monuments, such as "Sheikh Mohassin", the Nuri Maristan, the Zahiriya Madrasah—without the walls, the "Khanaqah Faraza" and that marvel of architecture, the hospital (maristan) built in 1354 by the Emir Arghun, which are either deserted or used as tenements for the poor.

764 In the cemetery of "Es-Salihin", which has been holy ground
172 for centuries, with a sacred rock traditionally associated with Abraham, there are many tombs dating back to the end of the twelfth century, some used as dwellings, others abandoned and half buried. The variety of their architecture and the beauty of the inscriptions on them make them of great interest, and it would be enough to rail them in, clear them and plant a few trees to convert a waste land into a formal park rich with monuments of the past.

The same is true of the tombs in the cemetery of the Maqamat, to the east of the Kamiliya Madrasah—without the walls; the madrasah too requires no more, by way of treatment, than the unbricking of the sanctuary door.

361 Other noteworthy structures which need clearing of the
172 parasitic buildings that have grown up in and around them are the lovely city gates (Bab Antakiya, Bab an-Nasr, "Bab el-Hadid") and the façades, entrances and courtyards of the Usdamur, Es-Sabun and Qurd-Beg khans.

A proper layout of the approaches to the ramparts between Bab al-Jinan and Bab Qinnasrin, and the demolition of a few run-down shops, would create one of the finest promenades imaginable, with impressive views of the walls and façades of the Mameluke towers.

In any scheme of reconstruction and beautification, consideration must also be given to fine private houses. At present, the Ghazaleh House is being put to rather unsuitable use as a school and worse still, is threatened with demolition. In our view, a suitable use could be found for one or other of these lovely seventeenth- and eighteenth-century residences, as also, perhaps, for one of the khans, as a club or hotel providing amenities for tourists. Aleppo would thus offer its guests a combination of creature comforts and an incomparable artistic setting.

THE CITY IMPROVEMENT SCHEME

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In 1951, at the request of the municipality of Aleppo, a French architect, Mr. A. Gutton, of the Institut d'Urbanisme in Paris, submitted plans for improvements and new building in the city, with a report setting out the criteria followed.

In their present form, these plans must be regarded as the bare bones of a scheme to meet the requirements of the modern town and the wishes of its authorities. The real key is in the report, where we find the explanation of the ends sought and the means selected to achieve them. One of its more significant passages is that which points out that, while giving the fullest weight to new human and social requirements, it is essential to grasp "the historical value of each quarter or each particular building and, in terms of that, to decide either on its preservation as it stands or on its improvement and clearing"

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Noting the key importance of the suqs, the author advises non-interference with arrangements which are the growth of centuries and still serve a useful purpose today: "The approaches to serve the khans, which supply the suqs and are the normal trading points between wholesaler and retailer, must be planned to link up with the existing internal thoroughfares and approach lanes of each khan and its traditionally satellite suqs."

The author suggests separate streets for motor traffic and foot passengers, and advocates keeping shops off the new main arteries. The various zones are classified as residential, commercial or manufacturing, in the light of the city's life and the nature of the ground, and it is made clear that, "on the plans, the purpose of the notation 'site for public and administrative buildings', without further particulars, is to reserve these sites for public purposes, without making any commitment as to their precise use".

The seraglio is made the focal point of the civic centre, though with numerous reservations and recommendations designed to ensure the blending of the new buildings with the setting of the existing monuments (El-Iabbadiyeh hamman, and mosques of great historical and artistic importance). A point worth noting is the need for avoiding any lofty building in the neighbourhood of the Citadel. New buildings would spoil all the architectonic relationships of this area, as the example of the new seraglio, the demolition of which has been repeatedly suggested, clearly shows. The proposed buildings can be sited more freely and logically in the open spaces behind, though some new structure of limited height might be permissible in the space between the two mosques. The problem to be solved here is an architectural one, consisting in the introduction of new buildings into an existing setting with the aim of enhancing and not destroying its beauty. This consideration is implicit in the report's closing words: "The scheme as a whole must be designed to preserve the work of the past unharmed whilst striving, in the new quarters, to do even better, but in the architectural terms of our own age, not in slavish imitation of the past. Make the most of your 200 mosques and your eight miles of suqs; preserve the successive monuments bearing witness to your greatness . . .".

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We are glad indeed to be able to associate ourselves with the recommendations and reservations in the report accompanying the scheme of improvements adopted by the municipality. A point we wish to stress is the need to add to the staff of the town planning services specialists (or the commission mentioned earlier), able to translate into practical terms what, in the actual plan, is suggested but not set out to the last detail.

The experience gained from the building of the new serraglio, with the ill-advised roadworks involving the destruction of the Matbakh el-Ajami (described by J. Sauvaget as "the only relic of this order existing in the Moslem East") and the mutilation of the Khan Al-Wazir ("a noteworthy collection of buildings, said to be the finest khan in Aleppo") should counsel prudence. Any work involving interference with the old quarters should be preceded by the closest study of the various factors which have gone to make them what they are. We hope it will prove possible to avoid any further disfigurement of the Khan Al-Wazir for the purpose, already announced, of compensating the property owners who have suffered loss through the widening of the street with plots carved out of the courtyard area. Anything of the kind would have the worst effect on the fine architectural balance of the khan and would be in flagrant contradiction to the principles set forth above.

The point to be remembered is that any plan for the expansion of a town must serve to lay down lines of future development which will guarantee harmony, giving due weight to all things of importance to the community. It would be useless and harmful if such a plan were carried out only in part, to serve special interests and for immediate profit.

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THE GREAT RUINS IN THE DESERT

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THE SYRIAN DESERT

311 The Syrian desert is not uniformly barren. There are enormous
361 stretches of steppeland, where life is not impossible, or at least not permanently so. The winter rains, rare though they are, make the pastures green and fill the water-holes. The wandering Bedouins manage to feed their flocks all the year round; and their camps are found here and there in the desert solitudes. In some places indeed, there is sedentary as well as nomadic life; near a well or a spring a group of dwellings may be built, palm trees grow up and crops are cultivated.

The necessary conditions for the transitory development of certain sites, when circumstances are favourable, may thus be found. At certain times in history, irrigation work has been undertaken to assist crop growing and reservoirs have been dug to make permanent settlement possible. Trade has provided means of livelihood for a larger population than the products of the earth would have sufficed to maintain. Military defence requirements have led to the building of forts and castles, and the necessary supplies for those who manned them have had to be found.
489 This accounts for the establishment of the great desert routes,
361 with their chains of halting-places at the only spots where the existence of natural or artificial resources made life possible. The natural route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, via the Euphrates valley to Aleppo and Antioch, was shortened by the short cut across the desert which of necessity passed through Palmyra, either continuing straight to the Homs Gap or turning south towards Damascus and Palestine. Settlements grew up, at each end of the desert route or at oases along it, or again at strategic points such as river crossings or mountain gorges, some places, indeed, fulfilling several of these conditions (e.g. Dura and Palmyra).

PALMYRA

361 Palmyra has a considerable and well-deserved fame, first for its natural beauty—abundant sulphur springs, transparent blue

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PALMYRA

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361 water, fertile gardens and palm groves, and the contrast between the flat, barren wastes of the desert stretching away to the south and the rocky mountain barrier which rises above it immediately to the north. Secondly, its fame is due to its extraordinary destiny and to the romance of its economic and political history, which made this remote oasis in the heart of the desert one of the great trade centres of ancient times and its rulers, Odainath and Zenobia, the acknowledged masters of the East—first the supporters, then the rivals of Rome and ill-fated pretenders to the dignity of empire. Lastly, its fame is due above all to the incomparable grandeur of its ruins.

361 172 The ruins of Palmyra are striking on account both of their size and of their wonderful state of preservation. From the regular chessboard pattern of the streets, still discernible inside the outer wall of the town, rise rows of columns, sanctuary precincts, porticos and steps of public buildings. Round the city lie the vast burial grounds, with their varying types of burial vaults, tombs in the form of houses, hypogea, and sepulchral towers, all of which, though violated from ancient times onwards, still retain their decorations and inscriptions as well as most of the innumerable sculptures they contained. Whole structures still remain to their full height: large sections of the main colonnade are still upright and the entablature is still supported on the pillars with their consoles; the temple of Baal, surrounded by its courtyard wall and porticos is almost intact; the sepulchral towers in which the dead mount guard along the pass leading to Homs and Damascus stand out square and sombre against the hillside, flanking the route. Crowning the mountain with its tours and redans stands the Arab castle, one of the most striking features of the landscape.

As far as the parts of the buildings which lie below the surface are concerned, excavations have shown how little they have suffered from the ravages of time, a fact accounted for by the excellent condition of the subsoil and the dryness of the climate. The freshness of the paintings inside the tombs provides an illustration. Moreover, as the ancient city is almost everywhere covered by a layer of earth 9 to 12 feet thick, even those monuments which are entirely concealed are preserved to a considerable height. Another reason is that the town rapidly fell into decay after its destruction in 273 and never regained

its former importance; buildings were seldom converted to other uses and, except for a few that later served for military purposes (such as the one now known as Diocletian's camp, or the forecourt of the temple of Baal, which was transformed into an Arab fortress in the twelfth century), the buildings were never intentionally demolished or the materials of which they were made plundered. 361 172

Thus Palmyra may be said to present ideal conditions for archaeological research, offering possibilities that will not be exhausted for a long time. After the description of the visible remains given by the German scholars who worked at Palmyra under the direction of Th. Wiegand, after H. Ingholt's systematic exploration of the burial grounds and the penetrating studies of the monuments, cults, institutions and language of the Palmyrians, made by H. Seyrig, R. Amy, D. Schlumberger, J. G. Février, J. Cantineau, J. Starcky and others, the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities worked out an admirable and extensive scheme for uncovering the entire ruins. The clearing of the agora before the war, and that of the theatre, quite recently, have shown what spectacular and instructive results may one day be gained from the scheme. The work is proceeding steadily but the task is immense and there is still plenty of scope for useful and fruitful co-operation.

A few special problems which have already arisen in connexion with the study and exploration of the Palmyra ruins are worth noting here. The monumental arch, the temple of Baal, the great colonnade and innumerable tombs, towers and hypogea required extensive restoration and consolidation. The removal of the decorative sculpture of the Yarhai hypogeum and its reconstruction in the Damascus Museum was a difficult undertaking, successfully accomplished. The bold plan adopted to allow of the uncovering of Baal's sanctuary is also worthy of note. The modern town, whose houses filled the temple precincts, was removed and rebuilt further north, beyond the boundary of the ancient city. Now, after 20 years, the whole population agrees that the step was well justified, for the new village, with its wide airy streets, affords healthier and more convenient living conditions; this may serve as an example. The only remaining inhabited building is the charming house of the Antiquities Service in the south-east corner of the precincts, where visiting archaeologists find a welcome and an atmosphere which they much appreciate.

But Palmyra is not only a city; it is the natural centre of an immense region stretching from the Anti-Lebanon mountains to the Euphrates, a region whose prospects and importance are now beginning to be realized. Along the desert routes which meet and cross within it, and where they reach the rivers, are other sites, marking wayside centres which existed at various times in history. In such places, quite impressive remains have survived to the present day.

THE TWO QASR EL-HEIR

As D. Schlumberger has pointed out in a recent work, Palmyra was once less isolated than is generally believed. Other inhabited centres within the area prospered beside the metropolis. In the plains there were oases made fertile by large-scale irrigation schemes; in the mountains to the north-west, shepherds' villages, made habitable by the construction of reservoirs which provided adequate water supplies for the summer months. These villages did not survive the fall of Palmyra and the region 361 172 344

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was subsequently completely abandoned. However, the dams and aqueducts built during the Roman period were still useful in later times to the Byzantines and Arabs. They made it possible to build the two great castles to the west and east of Palmyra which bear the same name and now stand ruined in the midst of an expanse of desert. They were formerly surrounded by walled gardens and had been designed to serve both as palaces and fortresses. 361 172 344

Built by the Caliph Hisham in 727, Qasr-el-Heir el-Gharbi was a luxurious residence. A tall Byzantine tower marks the site of the ruins from afar. All that remains of the Arab palace is the lower masonry of the walls, which were of freestone; they were uncovered between 1936 and 1938 by D. Schlumberger. His excavations not only laid bare the plan of the palace, which was a square flanked by towers, surrounding a central courtyard with porticos and a single entrance. They also brought to light innumerable remnants of a stucco and fresco decoration which is the most original and complete example of Omayyad art in Syria.

Qasr el-Heir es-Charki, also built by Hisham in 729 near a still older fortification that is now in a very ruined state, has walls and towers standing almost intact up to their full height. The upper part of those on either side of the entrance is decorated with a design of arches supported on small columns; the others have a simpler decoration of ornamental courses of brick. The main doorway has a semi-circular tympanum with machicolations overhead.

Though similar in layout and belonging to the same period, the two Qasr el-Heir presented different problems for the Antiquities Service. With the former, it was a matter of discovering and preserving the precious and fragile decoration, which was picked up in fragments at the foot of the walls; it took several years of patient and highly skilled work to remove it and piece it together in the Damascus Museum, where it is now one of the principal exhibits. In the case of the latter, it was necessary to underpin the walls and towers whose foundations had been undermined by damp and desert winds; the maintenance and supply of a group of workers on an isolated, waterless site such as this was a difficult matter. The work has been successfully begun and is to be continued shortly.

RESAFA

Resafa is another of Caliph Hisham's castles, laid out in the form of a square with a central courtyard, defensive wall and towers; it was located and excavated in 1952, by the German mission under Mrs. K. Otto-Dorn, among the remains of a great Moslem centre. The Caliph died and was buried there.

Up to that time, Resafa had been known chiefly for the Christian monuments that had been built inside its great walls; they are of great interest in the history of art and architecture in northern Syria from the fifth to the seventh century of our era. The largest and best preserved is the basilica of St. Sergius, the plan of which has recently been reconstituted by J. Kollwitz in the light of his excavation work; the structure is said to date from the second half of the fifth century. The remains of the martyry and a second great basilica are still partially hidden; excavation is revealing the beautiful carvings of the semi-domed apses and the capitals and arches. There are also a few smaller buildings and, outside the walls, a funerary

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361 chapel. The peculiar nature of the crystalline stone of these
172 buildings gives them a very distinctive stamp.
344 The rich ornamentation of the northern doorway of the enclosure, with its five arches of different sizes supported on columns is also remarkable; in structure and style it has been compared to certain parts of Diocletian's palace at Split.

The size of the buildings and the extent and isolation of the site make Resafa a difficult place to explore. It is gratifying to know that work has now been resumed and it is to be hoped that it will soon be possible to continue it on a large scale.

THE VALLEY OF THE EUPHRATES

361 The Euphrates route must also be considered while we are
172 speaking of the desert routes; it too is marked at intervals by large fortified enclosures, built at different times at points where the tracks fanning out from Palmyra crossed the river. Dura and Raqqa are among the best known of these fortifications.

Dura-Europos (Es-Salihiyeh) is a Seleucid foundation dating from the end of the fourth century B.C. Occupied by he Parthians and later by the Romans, it was at that time closely dependant upon Palmyra. It was captured and destroyed by the Sassanids in A.D. 256. The town is situated on a plateau above the Euphrates flanked by two narrow ravines. Guarding the river crossing, and at the same time a caravan city and river port, it held a position of great strategic and economic importance. It was not until 1921, with the chance discovery of the paintings from the temple of the Palmyrene gods, now in the Damascus Museum, that attention was drawn to the site. Its investigation was begun by F. Cumont and continued by Yale University under the direction of M. J. Rostovtzeff. On he traditional Greek chessboard street plan of the town, a number of buildings were located and excavated, including 11 temples, two small sanctuaries, a Christian church, a synagogue, he market, several baths and numerous houses. The many treasures found included groups of frescoes from the church and synagogue, now reconstructed and preserved at Yale and Damascus respectively.

Although the Greek and Roman town at Raqqa was of some importance in its time, it is the Moslem remains of the new town, Al-Rafiqa, founded in 772 by the Caliph Al-Mansur which have monopolized attention. The Baghdad gate with its brickwork decoration and the twelfth-century mosque with its arches and round minaret are the most striking monuments. Quite recently the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities began a search for the remains of the palaces which, in the ninth century, were a favourite residence of the Abbasid dynasty. The excavations, carried out by Nassib Saliby, brought to ligh in 1952, at a spot about two miles north of the city wall, a large group of buildings containing many rooms and formerly surrounded by gardens. A Kufic inscription bearing the name

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361 of the Caliph Al-Mutasim has been found there, besides fragments of stucco work, frescoes, glassware and glazed ceramics.
172 This is but a part of a very large built area which will be systematically explored.

A word must also be said of Mari (Tell Hariri), another town on the river, which, 3,000 years before Dura, occupied a comparable position some 25 miles further south; everyone has heard of the extraordinary treasures found there since 1932 by the French mission under A. Parrot, which include statues, jewellery, mother-of-pearl mosaics and inscribed tablets. These are preserved at Aleppo and the Louvre and the most recent finds are at present on view in the exhibition at the Damascus Museum. Other notable sites are the triangular fortifications of Halibiyeh, the ancient Zenobia, built in Roman times, with its serried chain of towers, to guard the narrow pass running along the Euphrates at the foot of a high basalt cliff, and Meskené, the ancient Bc'la, with its high brick minaret, at the junction of the route from Antioch and Aleppo with the river valley.

The Mesopotamian method of building with sun-dried brick, which was more or less generally employed, and the extent and isolation of the sites make it questionable whether it would be worth while to undertake costly maintenance and consolidation work. At Mari, Dura and Raqqa the treasures found are of greater interest than the buildings; once the excavations have been completed, plans drawn and photographs taken, the ruins can be left to their fate. It will then be the task of museums and publications to make them live once more.

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THE COASTAL REGION

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THE VALLEY OF THE ORONTES

The study of the coastal region must be extended to the valley 133
of the Orontes which, geographically and historically, forms 361
its eastern limit. A natural channel between the Alawite chain and the limestone plateau, it forms part of the long depression running from south to north behind the Lebanon. Scattered along the course of the Orontes, too, are the strong citadels by which the Arabs sought, successfully, to stem the advance of the Crusaders—Baalbek, Homs, Hama, Caesaria, Kalat-el-Mudik—all interesting and beautiful, in varying degrees.

Two very different sites must be mentioned. 361

On the vast field of ruins of Apamea, overlooking the marshy 172
plain formed by the river, the scattered fragments of that ancient city's monuments are still to be seen. It is being explored by the Belgian expedition which has been led in turn by P. Mayence and H. Lacoste. The ground is strewn with plinths, entablatures, and the shafts of wreathed columns. The line of the great colonnade and the ground plans of various buildings are still easily recognizable.

The charm of Hama, with its green gardens and high, wailing waterwheels, must not distract us from two interesting monuments, well worthy of close study: the Great Mosque, with its two minarets of different periods, its arcaded courtyard and white domes, still showing signs of what it was at an earlier date, and the Azem Palace, with the graceful arches of its upper courtyard, its ornamented windows, its great domed hall of state (dating from 1778), lavishly although a little too heavily decorated. The atmosphere of the old town is a happy foil to the life on the banks of the river and helps to give Hama great attraction for the visitor.

ANCIENT SITES

However beautiful or famous they may be, the ancient sites 172
of the coastal region need not here be dealt with at length in

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connexion with the particular question with which we are concerned, for their preservation and presentation do not call for any special comments. 172

The excavations at Ras-Shamra are still going forward actively; the site is in the hands of the French mission which, for the last 24 years, has been under the direction of C. Schaeffer. The interest of the ruins is partly due to the sensational finds that have been made there, and only the well-informed visitor to the spot will call to mind the age-old past of Ugarit, the innumerable texts that have been unearthed and are, in some cases, still being deciphered, and the precious objects discovered here, the most recently excavated of which are at present on view in the exhibition at the Damascus Museum.

The great monuments of Amrit and the Cyclopean walls of the island of Ruad, protecting that impregnable refuge from the sea, are still eloquent reminders of the Phoenician mastery of the seas.

Nearer our own time, the great Roman theatre of Jebla, which is being excavated by the Directorate of Antiquities, is emerging as a building of quite spectacular proportions and of very considerable interest for certain of its details (structure of the sloping vaults supporting the tiers, arrangement of the stairs around the orchestra).

Mention must also be made of the great tetrapylon at Latakia, which has just been considerably restored.

CRUSADERS' CASTLES

However, the most striking monuments in the whole region from the coast to the mountainous hinterland are the great buildings raised by the Crusaders. They bear witness to the colossal efforts made by the Western peoples, over two centuries, to gain a foothold on this coast, as do the opposing Arab citadels built on the Orontes in order to hold them in check. Peerless masterpieces of medieval military architecture, they impress us not only by their strong defensive works and the 172 344

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192 technical skill of their builders, but also by the admirable speci-
3144 mens of Gothic art to be found in them.

The three great castles of Sahyun, Marqab and the Krak are most impressive of all, owing to their superb position, massive proportions and historical importance.

Sahyun (Sigon; Safene of the Crusaders) is situated on a narrow ridge between two deep ravines, on which the Phoenicians and the Byzantines had also once established a foothold. It is a large and rather curious group of buildings, to which Byzantines, Crusaders and Arabs all in turn made their contribution. One of the most striking features is the extraordinary way the rock has been hewn out to isolate the castle, while leaving a slender pillar in the middle of the moat to support the drawbridge. Marqab (Margat of the Crusaders), like an eyrie dominating the coastal road above Baniyas, stands on a steep-sided triangular plateau, protected by its immense double sweep of fortifications. The chapel, with its undivided nave, has two beautiful arched doorways. The Krak des Chevaliers, most famous of all these castles, from its lonely vantage-point among the bare mountains, kept watch on the Homs gap. Its strong defensive works, with the double line of fortifications, round towers, curtains, machicolations, underground passages and great sloping glacis, seeming to continue the slopes outside the fortress, contrast not only with the architecture of the great hall and its portico, with their cross-ribbed vaults, pillared doorways, mullioned windows and carved ornamentation, but also with the austerer architecture of the chapel, with its undivided nave and pointed barrel vault. The surrender of the Knights Hospitallers to Beibars, and the fall of the Krak, in 1271, heralded the collapse of the Crusaders.

The same contrast between the exterior and interior architecture strikes the visitor to the stronghold of Safita (Castel-Blanc), around which modern houses have been built in such a way as to preserve the concentric ground plan of the mediaeval town. The great square tower, in whose walls there are only a few tiny apertures barely visible to the eye, contains a massive and beautiful church with an undivided nave and pointed barrel vault, and, on the upper storey, a high room with a groined vault, divided into two by a line of pillars. This contrast is also to be found at Tartus where the remains of two beautiful rooms with cross-ribbed vaulting are still to be seen inside the fortress of the Templars; surrounded by enormous ramparts. At some distance, inside the town, the almost completely preserved cathedral of Our Lady of Tortosa, an interesting example of a fortified church, with its austere and very unusual façade, its corner towers, its three vaulted naves and the curious and as yet unexplained structure of one of its pillars, still remains "one of the most beautiful monuments left on this coast by the Crusaders".

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS

172 The monuments of which we have been speaking call for two
658 observations.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that considerable expenditure is necessary for the upkeep and consolidation of these great groups of buildings, certain parts of which are in constant danger of collapse. The Directorate of Antiquities is doing valiant work, but its resources are limited and it is unable to take action everywhere at the same time. It first turned its attention to the urgent repairs needed by the Krak des Chevs-

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172 659 liers, which, since its restoration in 1936 (involving the removal of the village built within the ramparts and the repairing of the terraces) had suffered considerable damage. The new work of restoration included the rebuilding of walls, the repairing of vaults, the reconstruction of a stairway that had collapsed, and the replacing of the missing parts of the windows and doorways in the portico of the great hall. But other misfortunes are continually occurring: a tower is struck by lightning; plants grow upon the glacis. It is constantly necessary to set to again—and the castle concerned is only one of many.

We are well aware of the great interest which the Directorate of Antiquities is taking in this matter and of its determination to continue its efforts; it is deserving of the highest praise. It would be well, however, if the skilled technicians in charge of the work could have the advice of competent specialists whenever some delicate piece of architecture is in need of repair. The same applies to the present restoration of the minaret of the Great Mosque at Aleppo.

172 We are also of the opinion—and this is our second observation—that this work would be easier and less burdensome if the tourist attraction of these magnificent buildings were taken into account. At present they are almost inaccessible, as is shown by the ridiculously small number of visitors (the average is less than 120 a month at the Krak). The Krak or Marqab can be reached only by jeep and it is impossible to travel the whole distance to Sahyun by road. Nevertheless, there were once tracks leading to these castles and they simply need a few miles of repair and regular upkeep thereafter. If that were done, there is no doubt that there would be a tremendous increase in the number of tourists, and considerable funds for the work of restoration could be derived from admission fees.

From this point of view, the region offers real advantages which it would not be difficult to exploit. It is quite near the sea and, if the road were better, a visit to the Krak could be included in the programme of the numerous cruises calling along this coast, which already visit Baalbek and Damascus. The establishment of a suitable hotel at Tartus would make it possible for travellers with the necessary time at their disposal to make interesting excursions to Ruad, Safita and Marqab, just as they can from Latakia to Jebla, Ras-Shamra and Sahyun. This would also be a good opportunity of restoring the church at Tartus, which is at present being used by the municipality as a storehouse. Moreover, if a rest-house were fitted up inside the Krak it would be easier to visit the castle from Tartus, Tripoli, Homs, Hama or even Damascus.

This would permit the successful development of a region whose natural beauties vie in attraction with its incomparable monuments, to the advantage not only of the local population but of the country as a whole.

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DEAD CITIES IN THE NORTH

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THE LAND OF COUNTLESS RUINS

172

Few regions can rival northern Syria in the number of interesting ruins to be found within a small space. The Marquis de Vogüé, travelling there in 1861, brought back the amazing tale of his discoveries, but the sites of which he told were only a small fraction of the archaeological treasures of this area, and the two American expeditions to Syria that resumed the exploration of the region more systematically and thoroughly 40 years later by no means discovered all the sites. No complete list has even yet been drawn up. There are probably hundreds.

The great period of development in this region, to which the profusion of ruins bears witness, lay between the first and the seventh centuries A.D. Beginning with the organization and pacification of the Roman province of Syria, it came to an end with the Arab conquest.

Among all the valuable material thus discovered, attention was first concentrated on the churches. Numerous works have brought out the important part played by Syria in the development of early Christian architecture, the exceptional interest of certain basilicas, and their historical, artistic and religious significance. But it is arbitrary to dissociate them from the other monuments around them. Today, with a wider knowledge of these sites, we realise that the various types of buildings, civil as well as religious, must be considered as a whole. A church is seldom isolated; it is only one feature in an architectural complex—village or monastery—each part of which is a source of information about the various aspects of life in northern Syria during the first centuries of the Christian era.

Only a close study of social and economic conditions, in relation to geography and history, will enable us to understand these monuments and appreciate the stupendous architectural development which they represent. Such a study has just been completed, and it is thanks to the kindness of the author, Mr. G. Tchalenko, and of Mr. H. Seyrig, that we have been able to refer to the book prior to its publication (it is now in the press). It throws much light on the sites we saw during our visit to northern Syria.

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N THE NORTH

CHARACTERISTICS OF CERTAIN SITES

The region of the limestone plateau, which is bounded on the west by the cleft formed by the valleys of the Orontes and the Afrin, includes a few fertile plains, but taken as a whole, it is simply a vast mountainous tract of bare rock, fissured and worn. The sites are scattered on the ridges and slopes and only by building water-tanks was it possible for the people to maintain life. They can be divided into three groups: to the north, the Jebel Seman; in the centre, the Jebel Barisha and the Jebel el-Ala; to the south, the Jebel Zawiyé or the Jebel Riha. In certain places there are so many ancient centres that their ruins can be seen on all sides. 133 361 172

These towns frequently grew up around a monastery. The monastic life was widely practised in Syria at an early date and huge groups of buildings were put up to meet religious needs. Every convent was also a centre of agricultural work requiring additional buildings, as at Breig and Deir Turmanin. Some were also places of pilgrimage, where inns, bazaars and hostelries were built for the pious who flocked thither, as they did, for instance, to the convents of Qalaat Seman and Deir Seman, hallowed by the memory of the famous Stylite. 361 172

In other cases farms, a church and oil presses, sometimes covering a large area, grew up around an agricultural town; Bamuqqa Qirqbize and Behyo are excellent examples. Elsewhere, there were villages with substantial houses, as at Réfadé and Kafer Nabo, or with more modest dwellings, as at Qatura and Taqlé. Everywhere, the remains of churches can be distinguished amidst the debris of ruined buildings. In the vicinity, the variety of monuments to the dead is no less worthy of note.

Two sites are remarkable for their exceptional size and the variety of buildings found there: Brad, in the north, and El-Bara, in the south. Situated on the denuded plateau which forms the northern part of the Jebel Seman, Brad looks like a small town; in fact, it was the administrative and commercial centre of a very large region; it grew up around the nucleus of an ancient settlement (interesting remains of third-century baths and two large churches dating from 399-402 and 561, respectively) to reach its greatest size in the seventh century. El-Bara,

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361 the main centre of the Jebel Zawiyé, was both an agricultural
172 and an industrial town (large-scale production of oil and wine), and finally covered an area about 2 miles long by 1 1 wide. Among the confused heaps of its ruins, the remains of several churches and rich mausoles of the sixth century, with their pyramidal crowns, are recognisable.

172 G. Tchalenko has drawn attention to the similarity of the
341 architecture throughout the limestone plateau due to the use of the same materials and the same methods of hewing and handling stone. He has also noted the unity and homogeneity of the carved ornamentation, which was gradually adapted to the new forms of the various buildings. This suggests that itinerant groups of craftsmen went from place to place, taking their style and methods with them.

172 Evidence is provided by considerable buildings, varying in
346 nature and importance. We would draw particular attention to two of them, which seem to surpass all the others by their quality and exceptional charm. The first is the cruciform basilica of St. Simeon (Qalaat Semaan) built in the third quarter of the fifth century around the column on which the Stylite spent the last 37 years of his life and which, long after his death, was still a famous place of pilgrimage. The originality of the plan, the masterly structure of the central octagon, with its great semi-circular arches, the harmonious proportions of the chevet and the southern façade, together with the neighbouring baptistery and conventual buildings, make this peerless architectural group "the greatest and grandest Christian ruin in the East". The second of these monuments, lesser known because it is difficult of access, is the basilica of Qalbloze, standing in a temenos, like an ancient temple, on the crest of the Jebel el-Ala. It dates from the end of the fifth century. Its façade flanked by towers, its chevet adorned with columns, the great arches separating the nave from the side aisles, the majestic proportions of the apse, and the quality and sober arrangement of carving, produce that impression of harmony and perfection that only a masterpiece can achieve.

THE POPULATION OF THE LIMESTONE PLATEAU

361 The profusion of ruins over such a large area, not only in the
172 vicinity of fertile plains, but on rocky and waterless plateaux shows that there was once a large population, which later disappeared completely. The construction of water tanks may have helped the people to subsist, but that alone cannot explain their extraordinary prosperity. What, then, were their means of livelihood?

Some have thought the answer to this question to be that the arable land disappeared as a result of complete and unchecked deforestation, which brought about a radical change in the conditions of life. Tchalenko does not agree; in the work already referred to, he gives a simpler and more plausible explanation of this phenomenon.

It has long been established that the ancient inhabitants of the limestone plateau owed their prosperity to the cultivation of the olive and, to a lesser degree, of the vine. The many presses found in all the settlements are proof of this. The cultivation of these crops is perfectly feasible in the soil and climate of the present day. It was a change in political and social circumstances which brought about the decline in the population. Where the soil accumulated in rocky basins and

361 able to benefitness to give a village food by the cultivation of
172 crops, it may be enough to make that village prosperous by the growing of grain. The cultivation of the olive is the only crop however, implies firstly that capital must be invested for a long time, while the trees are growing and, secondly that there must be suitable channels of trade for the produce to be disposed of elsewhere in return for other necessary goods. These conditions presuppose a long period of peace and security. This was once enjoyed by the Pax Romana, and in recent years a stable regime has again been inaugurated. It is clearly producing its first results: people are again beginning to grow trees and to settle on the limestone plateau.

This is a development fraught with consequences for the future fate of the ancient monuments.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS: THE PRESERVATION OF THE MONUMENTS

172 The fact that the limestone plateau is again becoming populated adds a new difficulty to those already arising out of the nature of the ruins and their wide dispersion. The protection of the monuments was already complicated by the fact that they are scattered over a distance of nearly 50 miles, with bad communications, and by the ease to which they have degenerated—monuments and sanctuaries practically impenetrable masses of stone, where buildings, now collapsed, once stood, in the midst of which the churches are generally situated. Now we find, in addition, that the new inhabitants of this region need, for preference, to settle among the ruins, occupying the ancient buildings, repairing the water tanks and taking from the fabric of the old structures the hewn stones they need for building, but lying to conveniently to hand.

It is true that today there is no risk of any great building's being totally destroyed, as happened not so long ago, to the magnificent Tetrapylon church. The most urgent measures have already been taken by the Directorate of Antiquities; certain monuments (particularly those at Qalat Semaan) have been consolidated; regional inspectors keep an eye on the situation, regularly visiting the ruins and drawing up reports. These measures are producing good results, but they could still be taken further, although it is not to be expected that they will ever provide complete safeguards. In fact, it is impossible to preserve all the monuments, provide a keeper for every site, or counteract the effects of the repopulation of the region, which in itself is a very welcome development. In such a situation, the only practicable policy is to consolidate and restore the most interesting buildings, whose architectural value is obvious, and have to their fate the countless ruins which consist only of parts of walls still standing or the rubble-down masonry of houses now collapsed.

Two measures are then called for.

Firstly, attention must be drawn to the very great importance of archaeological publications and the outstanding services rendered by the scholars who produce them. Detailed descriptions of the ruins, accompanied by plans, photographs and architectural drawings, as well as more general studies relating to the monuments, make it possible to preserve an accurate picture of a state of affairs that is bound to change or come to an end. We have only to compare the present situation with that described in Vogüé's or Butler's publications in order to realize this.

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Secondly, we must emphasize how much the development of tourist traffic would help in the upkeep and preservation of the monuments concerned. It would be comparatively easy to organize special tours starting from Aleppo. The churches of St. Simeon and Qalblouz would be the main attractions but stops could be made on the way in order to give visitors the opportunity of seeing the remains of the Roman road from Antioch to Chalcis, the funerary monuments of Dana and Serrmada, the convents of Deir Seman and Berig, and the villa at Bamuqqa. There are already good roads over a large part of the distance that would thus be covered, and it would simply be necessary to improve the section leading to Qalaat Seman, and to lay out a good path to enable tourists to walk up to Qalblouz from the plain of Self. Attractive rest houses could be fitted up in an old hostelry at Deir Seman, and in the villa at Bamuqqa.

To attract attention in this way to the archaeological treasures of this beautiful region would help in its economic development, and at the same time, provide the Antiquities Service with considerable financial resources, derived from admission fees, for the upkeep and restoration of these magnificent buildings.

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16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

DEAD CITIES IN THE SOUTH

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DEAD CITIES

IN THE SOUTH

THE HAURAN AND THE JEBEL DRUZE

133 Black is the dominant colour in the basalt country of southern Syria. The eruptive rocks strewn over the soil give the landscape a highly distinctive character; black are the stones, black the buildings, black the sculptures.

The whole region was formerly known as the Hauran, but today this name is applied only to the western portion, as distinct from the eastern part, the Jebel Druze. The same distinction is to be found in the differing aspects of the two portions. To the west, as far as the eye can see, lies an enormous fertile plain which produces abundant crops of wheat and barley. To the east, rises rugged mountainous country. These mountains have the characteristic contours of extinct volcanoes, but although they are fairly high (from 1,500 to 1,700 metres), they do not appear so, for the ground rises gradually and the altitude of the foothills is always over 1,000 metres.

172 In this part of the country, the building of monuments on a large scale began with the establishment of the Roman Province of Arabia, in A.D. 106, by Trajan's legate, Cornelius Palma, and was encouraged by the Antonines, Septimius Severus and Philip the Arab. It continued during the Christian period, for there were numerous bishoprics from the time of the first councils onwards and many churches and monasteries were then built. After the Islamic conquest (636), only the towns of Bosra and Salkhad remained of any importance, owing to their strategic position; their main buildings (military and religious) date from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The abandonment of the ancient sites, however, rapidly resulted everywhere in the ruin of their monuments. Where there had been most villages, there they were most completely deserted.

SITES AND MONUMENTS IN THE JEBEL DRUZE

361 172 Two of the many sites, Chahba and Qanawat, have fairly large groups of monuments.

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Chahba, formerly Philippopolis, was founded in the third century by the emperor, Philip the Arab, on the square plan of a Roman camp. The gates of the town, the wonderfully preserved pavement of the cardo and the decumanus, a small theatre, thermae and various other monuments are still to be seen on the ancient site, while huge mosaics from it are now preserved at Suweida and Damascus. Qanawat, formerly Kanatha, stands in undulating country, planted with trees, where the still well-preserved ruins make a very striking picture. Among these ruins are to be seen curious tombs, the colonnades (still standing) of several temples and the great group of buildings known as the seraglio, an interesting collection of Roman and Christian structures, where it is possible to distinguish the corbelled columns of a prostyle temple, the portico, atrium and hall of a large fourth-century basilica, and the curiously ornamented façade of a church almost as ancient.

At Chahba, as at Qanawat, the inhabitants are now living in the ruins, having installed themselves in certain buildings and damaged others by taking materials from them. The same situation is found at most of the large number of ancient centres in this region, and particularly at Chakka, where the famous basilica, the palace with its interesting façade and a beautiful house adorned with columns are not only distinctive in themselves, but also provide excellent examples of those stone slab roofs supported on corbels which are a characteristic feature of the local architecture. At Suweida, the busy centre of the Jebel Druze, there is practically nothing left of the ancient monuments. Even a great group of buildings like the temple of Sia has now completely disappeared. Moreover, we have only to compare the present state of the monuments with that described in the publications issued at the beginning of the century to realize how much destruction has taken place during the last 50 years.

We must hasten to add, however, that the necessary measures have been taken to prevent further damage. The Directorate of Antiquities has put in hand the most urgent consolidation work; inspectors keep an eye on the monuments and report any new discoveries, while the museum at Suweida prevents the dispersion and disappearance of the objects found. Nevertheless, the great numbers of ancient remains and the fact

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that they are widely scattered and often difficult of access, make it hard to ensure really effective protection. 361 172

THE CHURCHES OF EZRAA

At least a brief mention must be made of the importance of Ezraa. The churches of St. George and St. Hélie, dating from 324 and 342 respectively, are important in the history of early Christian art. Today, they are in a deplorable state of neglect. The cupola of the church of St. George collapsed in 1912. Ugly repairs have been made to both. The consolidation and intelligent restoration of both these buildings is particularly to be recommended. 346

BOSRA

The old capital of the Roman Province of Arabia is now a humble village. It contains remarkable ancient ruins, both Christian and Islamic, whose architectural beauty and historical importance recall the city's long and brilliant past. 361 172

The topography of the Roman town is still clearly indicated by the straight course of the main thoroughfare, built on the ancient decumanus; several columns of its porticos and one of the gates at the western end of the town are still standing. The visitor will note a great monumental arch with three bays, the ruins of thermae and four large Corinthian columns which may have formed part of a nymphaeum.

Built in 313 under the Archbishop Julianos, the cathedral, now in a very ruinous state, is one of the oldest examples of a large church with a cupola and central plan. From an inscription, we know that Bosra possessed an even older church, dedicated to the Virgin in the third quarter of the fourth century by the Archbishop Antipater; this inscription reminds us of the important part played by the town in early Christian history. Its name is also linked with the early history of Islam, for a large building with an apse and a blind façade is believed to be the remains of the monastery where the monk Bahira taught Mahomet and foretold his prophetic calling. A mosque, Al-Mabrak, was later built on the spot where, according to tradition, the Prophet's camel knelt. 346 172

This is one of the many mosques whose high dark minarets, square-built in the twelfth century, give the town of Bosra its own particular stamp. Although the Great Mosque of Omar is in a better state of preservation and although the minaret of Al-Fatmé has a slenderer grace, the Al-Mabrak mosque and the adjoining madrasah, built in 1136—the oldest Syrian madrasah, according to J. Sauvaget—form a very remarkable architectural group.

The rapid decay of these monuments is most regrettable. A glance at the older publications will show the extent of the damage, which has been made worse by the building of modern

houses among the ancient buildings. These houses should be removed and the monuments should be consolidated and restored. It is not at all certain that the plan adopted by the authorities for the improvement of this site meets all these needs or gives sufficient attention to the appropriate presentation of the principal monuments. 346 172

In conclusion, we must draw attention to the quite outstanding interest of the great group formed by the Roman theatre and the Arab citadel. The two buildings, equal in beauty, are intricately connected. The thirteenth-century ramparts, with their great square towers and rustic work, encircle the caves of the theatre, while a building intended as a storehouse, consisting of three storeys of great vaulted rooms, one above the other, has been built on the orchestra. The Directorate of Antiquities has recently carried out large-scale excavation work to clear the tiered seats and the stage as far as possible. We feel that bolder action is necessary and that the huge block of masonry obstructing the interior of the caves, which is of no great interest in itself, should be demolished. This would restore a splendid ancient monument in its entirety, without serious detriment to the Modern citadel. The Roman theatre at Bosra is one of the largest, most beautiful and most complete of those that still remain. Moreover, it has a number of noteworthy features, in the structure of the sloping arches supporting the tiers, the arrangement of the small stairways leading to the latter, and the wonderful ornamentation of the *frons scaenae*. The towers of the Arab citadel are also a magnificent example of medieval military architecture. If the work we have suggested were done, both buildings, instead of detracting from each other as they do at present, would be seen to greater advantage. Together, they would be an outstanding attraction for tourists. 346 172

The region of Bosra and the Jebel Druze, which can be reached quite easily from Damascus, should be much better known. The establishment of a rest-house inside the citadel of Bosra itself and the improvement of accommodation facilities at Suweida would involve little cost and make visits much easier. 172

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1 [AT BOSRA -- ANALYST]

16: Cellart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

CONCLUSION

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172 The foregoing remarks do not necessarily call for any formal conclusion. Our purpose has not been to demonstrate any theory, but simply to describe as accurately and objectively as possible, in accordance with our instructions, the general situation with regard to historic monuments and archaeological sites in Syria and the particular situation of certain of them. We have, so to speak, taken bearings.

Nevertheless, it would be well to emphasize the variety and complexity of the problems confronting Syria in connexion with the protection and presentation of its monuments, as revealed by our observations; these problems vary according to the region, the age and nature of the buildings, their state of preservation and their environment.

In large and rapidly expanding towns, such as Damascus and Aleppo, attention must be drawn to the interest which historical monuments have for the present generation. Their aesthetic value must be taken into consideration in all town-planning schemes, which should endeavour to preserve or create the most appropriate atmosphere around them, befitting their proportions, character and style. Far from hindering the natural development of a city, they should continue to embellish it, being given their rightful place in the scene so as to do full justice to their cultural significance as well as to the needs of modern life. To that end, efforts should also be made to allow historic monuments to serve their original purpose, or to find a suitable new one for them, so that they are not left aside as useless relics of the past but play a real part in the life of the city.

Outside the towns, difficulties are due to the great numbers, extreme diversity and wide dispersion of the monuments and archaeological sites. Hundreds of miles of desert lie between such great groups of ruins as Palmyra or Dura and the inhabited centres of the country. Elsewhere, as in northern Syria and, to a lesser degree, in the Jebel Druze, there are so many ruins that it has scarcely been possible to draw up a complete list of them. In other cases, such as the Crusaders' castles, the buildings are so huge that their upkeep alone would necessitate constant attention and very considerable expenditure. Moreover, the new discoveries made on excavation sites are

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172 constantly adding, year by year, to the heritage of historic monuments.

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658 We have frequently had occasion to compliment the Directorate of Antiquities on the manner in which it is carrying out its manifold tasks by ensuring the preservation and supervision of monuments and archaeological sites, executing a substantial programme of restoration work each year, organizing museums and promoting investigations and learned publications. By its own efforts as well as by those which it has instigated or encouraged, it is achieving remarkable results over a very wide area. Tribute must also be paid to the understanding and generosity of the Syrian Government which is providing the Directorate with the necessary means for its work.

In proportion to its resources, Syria is devoting very substantial sums to its monuments. The importance of the latter warrants this policy, and also explains the interest they are arousing throughout the world, far beyond the boundaries of the country. It also justifies the desire of the Directorate of Antiquities for a better understanding and fuller support of its efforts. We have indicated a few of the means that we consider most apt to assist it in its efforts.

The importance of learned publications must once again be emphasized. The historic monuments described and commented upon therein can be studied by scholars of all countries and become more truly a part of the cultural treasures of mankind, so that, even if they are afterwards lost, the memory of them remains. It is not enough, however, to bring them to the notice of a small circle of experts in this way; interest can be aroused among a wider public by attractive "popular" works, exhibitions and lectures, by the introduction of special courses in schools, and, in other countries, by intelligent publicity calculated to attract tourists to Syria, thus benefiting the country in various ways. We have already indicated how helpful it would be to set up, at Damascus and Aleppo, local committees of artists and scholars to advise the authorities on all questions of town planning. We also feel that international missions of experts, particularly on architectural restoration, could in suitable cases make detailed studies, in co-operation

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with the Directorate of Antiquities, of the measures to be taken 172
for the better presentation of certain large and important 658
buildings.

If the results of our survey help to make the artistic and archaeological treasures of Syria better known and appreciated

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abroad as well as in the country itself, if they can in any way assist the work so well begun by the Directorate of Antiquities to promote the protection and study of historic monuments, and if they suggest new and useful forms of co-operation for that purpose, we shall feel that our work has been well worth while.

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ILLUSTRATIONS TO THE REPORT

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The large plan of Damascus in the report was prepared by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities.

The plans of "Damascus in the eleventh century" and "Damascus today" are taken from J. Sauvaget's "Esquisse d'une histoire de la ville de Damas", published in the *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, IV, 1934.

Photographs 4, 5 and 7 are from the collection of the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities; the photographs taken from the air —nos. 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42 and 53—have been kindly provided by the French Archaeological Institute, Beirut.

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10. Damascus. Sulaymaniya Madrasah (1554).
11. Damascus. Sulaimiya Madrasah (1566).
12. Damascus. Khan Asad-Pasha (18th century).
13. Damascus. Sulimiye Madrasah (1566).

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



1. Damascus. Great Mosque; North portico.
2. Damascus. Great Mosque; West portico.
3. Damascus. Great Mosque; West portico and mosaics.
4. Damascus. Great Mosque; mosaics.
5. Damascus. Great Mosque; mosaics.

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6. Damascus. Cemetery of Bab Saghir.
7. Damascus. Darwish-Pasha Mosque (1571).
8. Damascus. Sahnaiya Madrasah (1484).
9. Damascus. Rukniya Madrasah (1254).

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14. Damascus. Nuraddin Mosque ("Hanabilah"); 1166-74; minaret.
15. Damascus. Shaikh Mahdy ad-Din (1158); minaret.
16. Damascus. Ab-Mustafiya Mosque; minaret.
17. Damascus. Muqqab Mosque (1368); minaret.
18. Damascus. Madrasa ad-Ghazali (1379); minaret.
19. Damascus. Isami Jubran (14th century); minaret.

following P.35-D

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[illegible] Upper: [illegible] aerial view
[illegible] Upper: [illegible] in the Cor
[illegible] Upper: Vespers

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23. 24.

23. Aleppo. El-Ghazali Mosque.
24. Aleppo. Moorish Arches.
25. Aleppo. Architectural Ornament.
26. Aleppo. Arbor Enclosure.

following p 35-F

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

17. Palmyra. Aerial view.
18. Palmyra. Colonnade of the enclosure of the Temple of Bel.
19. Palmyra. Tomb of Elahbel.

following P 35-G

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



10. Qasr el-Hair el-Gharbi. Aerial view.
11. Qasr el-Hair el-Gharbi. Entrance to the mosque.
12. Qasr el-Hair el-Gharbi. Aerial view.

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



xx. Chase-Lavigne and the Euphrates. Aerial view.
xx. Halabiya. Aerial view.
xx. Rasafa. Aerial view.

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





[illegible]
[illegible] Great Mosque.
[illegible] Tiraz. Interior of the cathedral.
[illegible] Hama. Azem Palace.
[illegible] Kasr ibn Cheraiden. Aerial view.

following P. 35 – J

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

40. Castle of Mamphi. Aerial view.
41. Castle of Mamphi. Internal line of fortifications.
42. Castle of Salou. Aerial view.

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



Qal'at Sim'ān and Dār Sim'ān

Dār Sim'ān

Dār Sim'ān

Qal'at Sim'ān and Dār Sim'ān (plan by G. Tchalenko)

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



7. Dair Seman. Nave.
8. St. Simeon Stylites. Central transept.
9. Qalb'loze. Decoration of the church.
10. Refadé. Portico of a house (1938).
11. Refadé. The same in 1913.

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

32. Qalôun. The church.
33. Hermel. Ancient villa.
34. El-Bass. Tomb.

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

[illegible] Room. Central hall of temple. Parallel view.
[illegible] Room. Interior of the temple.
[illegible] Room. Entrance to the Cella.

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

1. Baalbek. Ancient columns.
2. Qasr-ibrim. Temple of Hathor.
3. Baalbek. Gate of the Palace.
4. Baalbek. Church of St. George.

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116 TEXTS--a full set of pages from each processed source, arranged in page order, as a means of establishing the context for any particular slip. Sets are arranged in the numerical order of the sources. See also:

Literary texts 839

17: Syria G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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SYRIAN REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY
DIRECTORATE OF STATISTICS

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF SYRIA

1953

SIXTH YEAR

Government Press — Damascus
1954

27230

TITLE PAGE

FOREWORD

121 This is the fifth issue of the Statistical Abstract of Syria which contains statistical information up to 1953.

The first two issues of the Abstract were published in Arabic only and the following Abstracts bilingually in Arabic and English. The English language was introduced in the Abstract in order that it provides a wider use of the Abstract by foreign institutions and experts engaged by the Government, it facilitates the answering of questions and inquiries raised by International agencies and foreign institutions as well as it insures the continuation of the present system of free exchange of publications with the International and national statistical offices.

The attention of readers is drawn to the fact that the Ministry of Interior has changed the names of certain mohafazat and qadas, and these changes have been introduced in the various tables of this Abstract. For easy reference, we give herebelow the changes that have taken place :

Hama mohafaza	Dir'a
Al-Jezira mohafaza	Hasakah
Al-Furat mohafaza	Deir-ez-Zor
Al-Jolan Qada	Quneitra
Al-Qalamoun Qada	Nabek
Wadi-el-Ajam Qada	Qatana
Jabal-el-Akrad Qada	I'frin

We have pleasure in taking this opportunity to express, once again, our thanks to the various ministries and public and private institutions for their co-operation in furnishing the basic information of the statistical data presented in this publication. We hope that the field of this co-operation will be extended in the near future, enabling us to place at the disposal of Government as well as members of the public a wider scope of statistical data which may serve to be one of the basis of consultation in the work of developing the Country economically and socially.

Suggestions and observations from our readers towards the improvement of this Abstract will be carefully considered and greatly appreciated.

30th August, 1954. DIRECTORATE OF STATISTICS

PRECEDING P. i

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خلاصة الاحصاءات

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

	Unit	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الوحدة	
Population and Vital Statistics								**السكان والاحوال المدنية**
Population : Total	No.	3,177,751	3,252,687	3,329,235	3,433,626	3,653,904	العدد	السكان : المجموع
males	"	1,618,392	1,656,219	1,696,383	1,751,939	1,868,878	"	ذكور
females	"	1,559,359	1,596,468	1,632,853	1,681,687	1,787,026	"	اناث
Births : Total	"	75,977	72,382	83,091	86,987	89,277	"	المواليد : المجموع
males	"	41,587	39,043	45,364	47,616	48,629	"	ذكور
females	"	34,390	33,339	37,727	39,371	40,648	"	اناث
Deaths : Total	"	26,656	23,623	23,844	23,082	24,912	"	الوفيات : المجموع
males	"	16,196	14,584	14,269	13,621	14,566	"	ذكور
females	"	10,460	9,039	9,575	9,461	10,346	"	اناث
Marriages	"	17,628	24,576	20,944	22,547	25,453	"	عقود الزواج
Divorces	"	2,236	2,409	2,337	2,477	2,718	"	شهادات الطلاق
Public Health and Hygiene								**الصحة والاسعاف العام**
Outgoing Government hospital patients-cured	No.	21,133(1)	25,960	29,008	28,813	29,188	العدد	مجموع المرضى الخارجون من المستشفيات الحكومية بالشفاء
Outgoing Government hospital patients-deceased	"	991(1)	1,017	1,112	1,206	1,242	"	مجموع المرضى الخارجون من المستشفيات الحكومية بالوفاة
Patients at clinical centres	"	923,956	842,036	752,462	687,429	694,084	"	المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية
Education (2)								**التربية والتعليم (٢)**
Education budget	L.S.'000	22,278	28,753(3)	49,769(4)	49,769	36,406	الوف الليرات	موازنة وزارة المعارف
Education budget to general budget	per cent	1,798	17,96	18,78	18,78	17,55	في المئة	نسبة موازنة المعارف للموازنة العامة
Elementary Schools	No.	1,612	1,794	2,184	2,399	...	العدد	المدارس الابتدائية

(1) Excluding figures relating to Hama Hospital not available

(2) Scholastic years beginning with year mentioned.

(3) For the fiscal period 1.I.1950 — 30.VI.1951.

(4) For the fiscal period 1.VII.1951 — 31.XII.1952.

(١) ماعدا الارقام المتعلقة بمستشفى حماه غير متوفرة

(٢) للسنوات الدراسية التي تبتدىء بالعام المذكور

(٣) للمدة ١٩٥٠/١/١ - ١٩٥١/٦/٣٠

(٤) للمدة ١٩٥١/٧/١ - ١٩٥٢/١٢/٣١

خلاصة الإحصاءات (تابع)

STATISTICAL SUMMARY (contd.)

	Unit	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الوحدة	
Education (contd.)								**التربية والتعليم (تتمة)**
Secondary Schools	No.	120	135	164	181	...	العدد	المدارس الثانوية
Technical Schools	"	13	15	13	14	...	"	" المهنية
Pupils of elementary schools — total	"	222,778	261,962	297,168	311,033	...	"	التلاميذ في المدارس الابتدائية ـ المجموع
— males	"	165,781	186,828	214,884	222,779	...	"	ذكور
— females	"	56,997	73,030	82,501	88,954	...	"	اناث
Pupils of Secondary schools — total	"	25,505	34,874	43,851	47,870	...	"	التلاميذ في المدارس الثانوية ـ المجموع
— males	"	21,490	26,403	33,538	36,243	...	"	ذكور
— females	"	7,015	8,471	10,213	11,627	...	"	اناث
Pupils of Technical schools — total	"	1,605	2,277	2,210	2,191	...	"	التلاميذ في المدارس المهنية ـ المجموع
— males	"	1,399	1,945	1,998	1,995	...	"	ذكور
— females	"	206	332	212	196	...	"	اناث
Students of the Teacher's Training Colleges — total	"	616	955	1,233	1,255	...	"	التلاميذ في دور المعلمين ـ المجموع
— females	"	441	643	755	731	...	"	ذكور
— males	"	175	312	448	524	...	"	اناث
Students of the Syrian University	"	2,205	2,470	2,404	2,580	...	"	التلاميذ في الجامعة السورية
«Brevet Certificates issued (1)	"	1,993	3,630	3,893	4,610	...	"	الحاصلون على شهادة البكالوريا (٢)
Baccalaureate Certificates issued (1)	"	749	1,243	1,429	1,700	...	"	الحاصلون على شهادة الثقافة (١)
Graduates of the Syrian University	"	652	588	239	308	...	"	الحاصلون على شهادة البكالوريا (١)
FOREIGN TRADE (4)								**التجارة الخارجية لسوريا ولبنان (٤)**
Imports	L.S.'000	516,188	197,779 (2)	[illegible] (3)	313,340	307,050	الوزنات	الواردات
Exports	"	111,104	207,805 (2)	[illegible] (3)	319,573	375,828	"	الصادرات

(1) Results announced at the beginning of calender year
(2) For Syria only for the period 13.III. — 31.XII.1950
(3) For Syria only
(4) Respectiey Syria and Lebanon in 1949.

(١) حسب النتائج التي ظهرت في اوائل العام
(٢) لسوريا فقط عن المدة ١٣/٣-٣١/١٢/١٩٥٠
(٣) لسوريا فقط منذ عام ١٩٥١ - ١٩٥٣
(٤) من سوريا ولبنان في عام ١٩٤٩

خلاصة الاحصاءات (تتمة)

STATISTICAL SUMMARY (contd.)

	Unit	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الوحدة	
FOREIGN TRADE (contd.)								**التجارة الخارجية (تتمة)**
Re-exports	L.S. ,000	1,097	—	—	—	—	الف الليرات	البضائع المعاد تصديرها
Transit	"	242,838	106,179(2)	203,757(3)	204,530	...	"	الترانزيت
Ratio of exports to imports	per cent	21.5	100.1(2)	91.2	102.0	122.4	في المئة	نسبة الصادرات للواردات
Finance								**المالية**
Government revenue	L.S. ,000	130,710	215,720(4)	205,000(5)	205,000	207,982	الف الليرات	واردات الحكومة حسب تقديرات الموازنة
Government expenditure	"	130,710	215,720(4)	205,000(5)	205,000	207,981	"	نفقات الحكومة حسب تقديرات الموازنة
Currency in circulation (1)	"	243,058	224,558	257,375	250,423	295,432	"	النقد المتداول (1)
Deposits with principal banks (1)	"	96,295	170,823	190,291	241,905	282,478	"	الودائع في المصارف الرئيسية (1)
Advances and bills discounted (1)	"	98,167	101,561	124,552	214,187	218,904	"	السلفات والسندات المخصومة من المصارف الرئيسية (1)
Ratio of advances to deposits	per cent	49.3	45.0	55.0	74.2	49.3	في المئة	نسبة السلفات للودائع
Advances made by the Syrian agricultural bank	L.S. ,000	3,306	[illegible]	10,551	14,237	12,466	الف الليرات	قروض المصرف الزراعي السوري
Transportation and Communications								**النقل والمواصلات**
Length of asphalted roads (1)	kms.	2,405	2,496	2,561	2,583	2,584	كيلو متر	طول الطرق المزفتة (1)
Length of metalled roads (1)	"	1,156	1,159	1,151	1,163	1,262	"	طول الطرق المعبدة (1)
Length of auxiliary roads (1)	"	5,573	6,296	6,415	6,511	6,182	"	طول الطرق التمهيدية (1)
Vehicles registered (1)	No.	8,597	9,047	11,127	11,788	13,146	العدد	السيارات المسجلة (1)
Railway transport - passengers kilometres	'000	29,718	31,979	34,825	29,782	36,982	الف	عدد الركاب الكيلومتري في السكك الحديدية

(1) As at the end of the year
(2) In respect of Syria only, for the period 13.III - 31.XII.950
(3) In respect of Syria only since 1951
(4) For the period 1.I.1950 — 30.VI.1951.
(5) For the period 1.VII.1951 — 31.XII.1952.

(1) كما هي في نهاية السنة
(2) من سوريا فقط للمدة الواقعة بين ١٣ آذار – ٣١ كانون اول ١٩٥٠
(3) من سوريا فقط منذ عام ١٩٥١
(4) من المدة ١ كانون اول ١٩٥٠ لغاية ٣٠ حزيران ١٩٥١
(5) من المدة ١ تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية ٣١ كانون اول ١٩٥٢

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خلاصة الاحصاءات (تابع)

STATISTICAL SUMMARY (contd.)

	Unit	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الوحدة	
Transportation and Communications (contd.)								**النقل والمواصلات (تتمة)**
Railway transport — ton kilometres	'000	86,343	115,768	113,848	124,447	130,440	الف	عدد الاطنان الكيلو متري لسوم النقليات بالسكك الحديدية
Internal telegrams	"	462	175	442	193	139	"	البرقيات الداخلية
External telegrams — despatched	"	123	89	167	133	137	"	البرقيات الخارجية ـ الصادرة
— Received	"	191	92	122	150	164	"	البرقيات الخارجية ـ الواردة
Internal letters —	"	1,227	1,236	1,212	1,430	1,450	"	التحارير الداخلية
External letters — despatched	"	902	1,006	1,081	1,130	1,140	"	التحارير الخارجية ـ صادرة
— Received	"	1,043	1,051	1,124	1,140	1,190	"	التحارير الخارجية ـ واردة
Internal printed matter	"	4,500	4,630	4,917	4,500	4,500	"	المطبوعات الداخلية
External printed matter — despatched	"	449	478	471	425	426	"	المطبوعات الخارجية ـ صادرة
— Received	"	954	963	980	930	982	"	ـ واردة
Agricultural Production (1)								**الانتاج الزراعي (1)**
Wheat	ton	569,222	530,036	569,642	900,000	870,000	الطن	محصول القمح
Barley	"	257,457	222,012	154,701	466,924	472,457	"	" الشعير
Lentils	"	54,897	26,561	30,231	50,597	62,814	"	" العدس
Chick-peas	"	20,265	15,683	8,617	24,244	10,520	"	" الحمص
Broad beans	"	35,128	13,973	25,318	12,050	11,165	"	" الفول
Millet	"	57,200	75,725	24,171	108,114	123,682	"	" الذرة البيضاء
Rice	"	20,031	18,806	927	5,779	16,176	"	" الارز
Olives	"	21,616	19,636	90,547	32,726	46,962	"	" الزيتون
Apricots	"	23,541	20,680	22,694	14,680	23,085	"	" المشمش
Apples	"	5,071	6,422	7,606	6,252	7,639	"	" التفاح
Nuts	"	4,408	3,702	4,981	3,573	5,972	"	" الجوز المجفف
Grapes	"	136,630	245,145	184,200	167,284	245,321	"	" العنب
Strawberries	"	9,500	2,973	...	...	...	"	" التوت
Almonds	"	2,526	3,987	2,371	2,202	2,654	"	" اللوز (مجفف)

(1) For the seasons 1948/49 — 1952/53 respectively.

(1) المواسم الزراعية ١٩٤٨/٤٩-١٩٥٢/٥٣

خلاصة الإحصاءات (تتمة)

STATISTICAL SUMMARY (Contd.)

	Unit	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الوحدة	
Agricultural Production (contd.)								**الإنتاج الزراعي (تتمة)**
Pomegranates	Ton	12,590	7,529	3,674	4,575	4,820	طن	محصول الرمان
Potatoes	"	28,722	34,248	35,615	38,236	33,204	"	" البطاطا
Garlic	"	6,275	4,279	4,548	4,018	4,326	"	" الثوم
Onions	"	45,994	42,266	39,745	33,135	36,830	"	" البصل
Tomatoes	"	105,382	120,282	67,638	66,733	71,038	"	" البندورة
Eggplants	"	83,290	73,184	34,965	34,965	28,408	"	" الباذنجان
Sugar - beet	"	29,674	10,965	2,715	55,230	69,572	"	" الشوندر السكري
Sugar cane	"	2,700	4,900	349	5,033	4,050	"	" قصب السكر
Tobacco	"	1,898	4,280	4,164	3,594	1,080	"	" التبغ
Tobacco (shah-el-bint)	"	1,710	2,822	3,090	2,334	3,530	"	" تبغ شاه البنت
Cotton (fibre)	"	13,323	35,495	62,934	58,074	46,964	"	" القطن (شعر)
Flax (seed)	"	225	235	189	220	505	"	" الكتان (بزر)
Hemp (fibre)	"	3,005	3,868	3,252	4,131	2,172	"	" القنب (الياف)
Industrial Production								**الإنتاج الصناعي**
Alcoholic Spirits	'000 litre	751	1,288	882	1,817	...	الف ليتر	انتاج المشروبات الروحية
Cut tobacco	'000kgs	702	805	899	754	882	الف كيلو	" " الدخان
Cigarettes	"	1,192	1,361	1,449	1,373	1,043	"	" " السجاير
Textiles	"	131	130	132	120	122	"	" " النسيج
Cement	"	57,703	67,049	38,727	180,595	223,638	"	" " الاسمنت
Electricity	'000kwh	68,625	81,279	86,801	98,791	114,238	الف كيلو واط ساعي	" " الكهرباء

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الفصل الاول

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

CHAPTER ONE

PHYSICAL FEATURES

PHYSICAL FEATURES

طول حدود الجمهورية السورية
BOUNDARIES OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

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Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Coasts and Neighbouring Countries	طول الحدود بالكيلو متر Length of boundary kms.	النسبة الى طول الحدود بالمئة per cent of total length %	الشواطئ والبلاد المجاورة
Total	2,274	100.0	المجموع
The Mediterranean Sea	173	7.6	البحر الابيض المتوسط
Turkey	808	35.5	تركيا
Iraq	592	26.1	العراق
Transjordan	353	15.5	شرق الاردن
Palestine	70	3.1	فلسطين
Lebanon	278	12.2	لبنان

Source : Ministry of Public Works — المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

مساحة البحيرات الرئيسية في الجمهورية السورية
AREA OF PRINCIPAL LAKES IN THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

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Table No. 2 — جدول رقم ٢

Name of Lake	Location	المساحة كم٢ Area km2	موقعها الجغرافي	اسم البحيرة
Qattineh	Near Homs	60	قرب حمص	قطينة
El-Ghab	« Jisr-ash-Shugour	300	قرب جسر الشغور	الغاب
Jabbul	« Aleppo	150	قرب حلب	جبول
Otaibeh	« Damascus	64	قرب دمشق	عتيبة
Hijaneh	« Damascus	24	« «	هيجانة
Jeirud	« Damascus	15	« «	جيرود
Mseirib	« Dir'a	1	قرب درعا	مزيريب
Khatuniyeh	« Hassakeh	2	قرب الحسكة	خاتونية

Source : Ministry of Public Works — المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

الجبال والقمم الرئيسية في الجمهورية السورية

PRINCIPAL MOUNTAINS AND PEAKS IN THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

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Table No. 3. جدول رقم ٣

Mountains	Peaks	Height in meters	القمم	الجبال
The Anti-Libanons «Qalamun Sinnir»	Mt Hermon	2,814	جبل الشيخ	سلسلة جبال لبنان الشرقية «قلمون سنير»
	« Muna	2,629	جبل موسى	
	« Halimeh Qara	2,464	جبل حليمة قارة	
	« Shuqeif	2,424	جبل الشقيف	
	« Gharbi	1,850	الجبل الغربي	
	« Mazar	1,634	جبل المزار	
Jabal-ad-Druz	Tal Gheineh	1,900	تل غينه	جبل الدروز
	« Huran	1,765	تل حوران	
	« Queib	1,695	تل قليب	
	« Sha'af	1,624	تل شعف	
	« Al Manih	1,545	تل المنيح	
Mt. An-Nusairiya	Slanfa	1,562	صلنفة	جبل النصيرية
	Al-Wili Khalifa	1,436	الولي خليفة	
Mt. Sharqi «Sharqi Qalamun»	Mt. Qatus	1,404	جبل قاطوس	الجبل الشرقي «شرقي قلمون»
	« Zubeidiya	1,401	جبل زبيدة	
	« Um-Ruwaq	1,188	جبل ام رواق	
Mt. Bal'as	Mt. Hawit-ar-Ras	1,390	جبل حويط الراس	جبل البلعاس
	Tawi al-Bal'as	1,096	طاوي البلعاس	
Mt. Abdul Aziz	Al-Ghurra	920	الغرة	جبل عبد العزيز
	Mt. Beida	631	جبل البيضا	

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

PHYSICAL FEATURES

طول الانهار الواقعة ضمن اراضي الجمهورية السورية مع معدل صبيبها الوسطي

LENGTH OF RIVERS WITHIN SYRIAN TERRITORY, TOGETHER WITH AVERAGE FLOW

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Table No. 4 — جدول رقم ٤

Rivers	Length in kms: Total	Length in kms: Length within Syrian territory	Average flow m3/sec.	Maximum flow m3/sec.	اسم النهر
	طوله بالكيلو متر: الاجمالي	طوله بالكيلو متر: ضمن الاراضي السورية	معدل صبيبه السنوي م٣/ث	صبيبة في ذروة الفيضان م٣/ث	
Euphrates	2,330	675	725.0	5,200	الفرات
Al-Khabur	440	440	52.0	300	الخابور
Aj-Jaghjagh	124*	100	2.0	8	الجغجغ
Al-Balikh	105	105	6.0	12	البليخ
As-Sajour	108	48	3.0	25	الساجور
Al-'Asi	571	325	32.0	400	العاصي
'Afrin	140	85	8.0	750	عفرين
Quaiq	126	110*	0.5	60	قويق
Al-Kabir-ash-Shimali	80	55	2.0	150	نهر الكبير الشمالي
Sinn	6	6	12.0	22	نهر السن
Barada	71	71	7.0	25	بردى
A'waj	66	65	2.5	15	الاعوج
Al-Yarmuk	57	47	7.0	100	اليرموك

Source : Ministry of Public Works
* Corrected figures

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة
(*) ارقام معدلة

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953 132

DAMASCUS دمشق

خط العرض شمالا ٣٣°٢١'؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٦°١٧'؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٧٠٠ متر

Latitude 33°21'N., Longitude 36°17'E Altitude 700 m. above sea - level

Table No. 5 جدول رقم ٥

Years & Months	Temperature (°C) الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية)				Rainfall الامطار				السنوات والشهور
	Normal average range المعدل النظامي	Actual average range المعدل الوسطي	Maxim. average متوسط الحرارة العظمى	Minim. average متوسط الحرارة الصغرى	Amount of rainfall (mm) كمية الامطار بالمتر: Normal النظامية	Actual الفعلية	Days of Rainfall عدد الايام المطرة: Normal النظامي	Actual الفعلي	
	33-53				33-53		47-53		
1947	17.21	17.4	27.4	7.4	230	147	47	46	١٩٤٧
1948	17.21	13.4	21.0	5.9	230	303	47	50	١٩٤٨
1949	17.21	14.4	22.3	6.5	230	287	47	48	١٩٤٩
1950	17.21	17.4	23.7	11.1	230	365	47	56	١٩٥٠
1951	17.21	17.4	24.1	10.7	230	226	47	38	١٩٥١
1952	17.21	17.1	23.9	10.4	230	189	47	38	١٩٥٢
1953	17.21	16.2	23.5	8.9	230	401	47	54	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	7.56	7.6	12.4	2.8	50	135.7	10	9	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	8.91	9.4	14.7	4.2	45	80.0	8	10	شباط
March	11.97	8.2	13.5	3.0	27	84.8	8	17	آذار
April	16.30	15.7	22.0	8.5	15	13.9	5	3	نيسان
May	20.80	19.0	27.4	10.6	9	—	2	—	ايار
June	23.55	22.1	31.1	13.2	—	—	—	—	حزيران
July	25.70	25.7	34.3	17.2	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	25.27	25.2	34.3	16.2	—	—	—	—	آب
September	23.28	24.5	34.6	14.4	—	—	—	—	ايلول
October	19.80	20.2	27.5	13.0	8	—	1	—	تشرين اول
November	13.78	10.4	17.1	3.8	30	38.5	4	4	تشرين ثاني
December	9.63	5.8	11.9	— 0.2	46	48.0	9	11	كانون اول

PHYSICAL FEATURES

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

HOMS

حمص

خط العرض شمالا ٣٤°٤٣' ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٦°٤٠' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٥٠٠ متر

Latitude 34°43' N., Longitude 36°43' E, Altitude 500 m above sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	Temperature (°C) الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية)				Rainfall الامطار				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالملمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53		47-53		
1947	15.56	17.1	27.6	8.0	612	553	58	45	١٩٤٧
1948	15.56	15.1	21.7	8.6	612	673	58	71	١٩٤٨
1949	15.56	14.8	21.6	8.1	612	576	58	45	١٩٤٩
1950	15.56	15.8	22.5	9.2	612	634	58	59	١٩٥٠
1951	15.56	16.3	22.8	9.7	612	586	58	48	١٩٥١
1952	15.56	16.4	23.1	8.8	612	460	58	66	١٩٥٢
1953	15.56	15.1	21.7	8.5	612	747	58	71	١٩٥٣
1952 - January	5.82	7.1	12.0	2.2	153	138.0	10	11	١٩٥٢ — كانون الثاني
February	7.20	8.2	13.5	2.8	115	136.5	10	11	شباط
March	9.84	7.0	12.5	1.6	79	189.0	10	20	آذار
April	12.96	14.2	21.5	7.0	49	64.5	6	6	نيسان
May	18.70	18.8	26.0	10.6	16	—	2	—	ايار
June	22.38	22.4	30.0	14.8	1	—	—	—	حزيران
July	24.01	25.6	32.8	18.4	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	24.70	25.4	31.7	19.1	—	—	—	—	آب
September	22.63	21.8	29.8	13.9	3	4.2	1	1	ايلول
October	18.00	18.5	27.2	9.9	27	—	2	—	تشرين اول
November	12.51	10.4	16.6	4.3	63	84.6	6	10	تشرين الثاني
December	7.17	2.2	7.5	—3.0	107	132.7	11	12	كانون اول

أحوال البلاد الطبيعية

الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953 132

HAMA حماة

خط العرض شمالا ٣٥°٠٨ ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٦°٤٤ ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٣٠٠ متر

Latitude 35°08' N., Longitude 36°44' E., Altitude 300 m. above sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	Temperature (°C) الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية)				Rainfall الامطار				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53				
1947	18.85	20.3	29.4	11.3	371	333	...	...	١٩٤٧
1948	18.85	18.5	28.8	11.5	371	431	...	...	١٩٤٨
1949	18.85	18.2	26.8	10.7	371	304	...	...	١٩٤٩
1950	18.85	16.3	23.4	9.3	371	294	...	67	١٩٥٠
1951	18.85	17.3	24.9	9.6	371	337	...	52	١٩٥١
1952	18.85	17.1	24.8	9.5	371	319	...	62	١٩٥٢
1953	18.85	15.0	22.0	7.1	371	423	...	55	١٩٥٣
1952 - January	7.50	11.9	18.2	5.8	94	95.8	...	12	١٩٥٢ — كانون الثاني
February	9.14	12.8	19.3	6.4	70	88.0	...	11	شباط
March	12.13	11.3	17.8	4.8	43	80.7	...	16	آذار
April	16.63	12.3	20.5	4.2	27	33.2	...	4	نيسان
May	22.66	16.6	26.5	6.8	10	—	...	1	ايار
June	27.11	20.7	30.2	11.3	—	—	...	—	حزيران
July	29.38	24.6	32.5	15.7	—	—	...	—	تموز
August	29.29	24.2	32.5	15.9	—	—	...	—	آب
September	26.10	20.1	29.2	11.0	2	—	...	—	ايلول
October	20.51	15.9	26.0	5.9	16	0.0	...	—	تشرين اول
November	14.40	9.3	18.7	1.9	40	50.0	...	5	تشرين الثاني
December	9.19	6.8	5.7	— 4.2	69	72.2	...	9	كانون اول

PHYSICAL FEATURES

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

ALEPPO حلب

خط العرض شمالا ٣٦°١٢ ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٧°١٠ ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٣٧٥ متر

Latitude 36°12' N., Longitude 37°10' E., Altitude 375 m. above sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالملمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	كمية الامطار بالملمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53		47-53		
1947	17.40	18.0	27.5	8.2	290	292	59	53	١٩٤٧
1948	17.40	17.3	23.1	11.3	390	411	59	75	١٩٤٨
1949	17.40	16.4	22.2	10.6	390	318	59	35	١٩٤٩
1950	17.40	16.9	22.5	11.3	390	346	59	53	١٩٥٠
1951	17.40	17.9	23.6	12.3	390	440	59	53	١٩٥١
1952	17.40	18.2	24.2	1[illegible]	390	342	59	75	١٩٥٢
1953	17.40	17.2	23.4	10.9	390	409	59	65	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	5.40	7.6	11.0	4.2	78	93.0	12	13	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	5.25	9.0	13.6	4.5	67	130.5	9	15	شباط
March	10.30	8.7	13.0	4.4	46	83.0	9	14	آذار
April	16.16	16.2	22.7	9.7	31	65.0	5	6	نيسان
May	20.60	21.4	28.4	14.4	11	—	3	—	ايار
June	25.40	26.2	33.4	19.1	2	—	—	—	حزيران
July	28.03	30.0	37.7	22.3	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	28.11	29.0	35.8	22.4	—	—	—	—	آب
September	25.16	24.7	33.2	16.3	5	5.0	1	1	ايلول
October	19.96	19.8	28.0	11.7	30	14.0	4	3	تشرين اول
November	13.64	10.6	16.8	4.5	43	27.3	7	8	تشرين الثاني
December	8.50	3.0	8.7	—2.6	86	81.0	9	7	كانون اول

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

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DIE'A درعا

خط العرض شمالا ٣٢°٣٨ ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٦°٠٦ ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٥١٥ متر

Latitude 32°38' N., Longitude 36°06' E., Altitude 515 m. over sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53				
1947	18.49	19.3	29.4	9.3	283	166	...	...	١٩٤٧
1948	18.49	19.5	25.6	13.4	283	298	...	...	١٩٤٨
1949	18.49	16.1	23.9	5.4	283	398	...	...	١٩٤٩
1950	18.49	16.9	26.3	8.6	283	267	...	43	١٩٥٠
1951	18.49	16.9	26.2	7.5	283	348	...	41	١٩٥١
1952	18.49	16.1	23.9	5.3	283	234	...	39	١٩٥٢
1953	18.49	17.5	24.7	10.3	283	445	...	56	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	9.61	10.7	17.7	3.7	65	81.0	...	9	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	9.70	9.7	14.0	5.4	62	77.5	...	11	شباط
March	11.58	8.0	11.7	3.4	44	130.0	...	18	آذار
April	16.88	16.0	21.9	10.2	21	35.0	...	3	نيسان
May	21.16	23.6	33.8	13.4	8	—	...	—	ايار
June	23.70	23.1	32.0	14.2	—	—	...	—	حزيران
July	25.87	27.1	34.9	19.3	—	—	...	—	تموز
August	26.66	25.6	33.6	17.7	—	—	...	—	آب
September	22.37	23.1	30.9	15.4	—	—	...	—	ايلول
October	21.16	20.8	29.8	11.9	6	—	...	—	تشرين اول
November	15.78	14.3	21.8	6.8	37	61.0	...	6	تشرين الثاني
December	10.86	8.5	15.0	1.9	40	60.0	...	9	كانون اول

PHYSICAL FEATURES

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

DEIR - EZ - ZOR دير الزور

خط العرض شمالا ٣٥°٢٠' ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٤٠°١١' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٢٠٠ متر

Latitude 35°20' N., Longitude 40°11' E., Lititude 200 m. above sea - level

Table No. 5 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm)		عدد الايام المطرة Days of Rainfall		
					النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53				
1947	19.05	...	...	...	145	167	...	...	١٩٤٧
1948	19.05	...	...	...	145	...	...	...	١٩٤٨
1949	19.05	...	...	...	145	159	...	...	١٩٤٩
1950	19.05	...	...	...	145	146	...	...	١٩٥٠
1951	19.05	20.1	28.8	11.5	145	189	...	42	١٩٥١
1952	19.05	19.0	27.9	10.2	145	153	...	34	١٩٥٢
1953	19.05	18.6	25.9	11.4	145	215	...	40	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	6.58	5.1	9.8	0.5	28	16.9	...	3	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	8.61	8.0	13.8	2.3	21	48.7	...	9	شباط
March	12.14	7.8	13.1	2.5	24	65.0	...	9	آذار
April	18.05	17.7	24.7	10.8	21	19.0	...	8	نيسان
May	22.85	21.8	30.0	13.6	7	—	...	—	ايار
June	28.20	28.5	37.0	20.0	—	—	...	—	حزيران
July	32.32	32.3	40.1	24.5	—	—	...	—	تموز
August	31.34	32.9	40.0	25.8	—	—	...	—	آب
September	27.05	28.2	39.0	19.4	—	—	...	—	ايلول
October	19.80	24.5	35.0	14.0	4	—	...	—	تشرين اول
November	13.63	11.2	18.5	4.0	16	4.8	...	3	تشرين ثاني
December	8.45	4.5	10.0	— 1.0	28	59.9	...	8	كانون اول

أحوال البلاد الطبيعية

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للأعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

LATAKIA اللاذقية

خط العرض شمالاً ٣٥°٣١' ، خط الطول شرقاً ٣٥°٤٧' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٢٠ متر

Latitude 35°31' N., Longitude 35°47' E., Altitude 20 m. over sea-level

Table No. 5 (Concld.) جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمليمتر Amount of rainfall (mm)		عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall		
					النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	47-53				47-53		47-53		
1947	18.62	20.4	23.7	17.1	904	771	69	70	١٩٤٧
1948	18.62	18.7	21.8	15.6	904	978	69	69	١٩٤٨
1949	18.62	18.4	23.0	13.8	904	1,057	69	79	١٩٤٩
1950	18.62	18.7	23.8	13.7	904	805	69	77	١٩٥٠
1951	18.62	18.1	22.4	10.7	904	675	69	50	١٩٥١
1952	18.62	18.4	24.4	12.4	904	985	69	63	١٩٥٢
1953	18.62	17.4	22.8	12.1	904	1024	69	72	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	9.57	11.2	15.6	6.8	188	212.0	14	17	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	11.72	12.2	16.9	7.5	175	217.0	11	12	شباط
March	13.42	10.4	15.9	5.0	94	172.5	10	14	آذار
April	16.91	15.7	20.9	10.5	69	75.5	6	5	نيسان
May	19.90	15.8	24.5	13.0	27	32.0	3	1	ايار
June	23.40	22.2	27.1	17.4	10	13.0	1	3	حزيران
July	25.92	25.7	30.6	20.9	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	26.94	27.0	31.4	22.6	—	—	—	—	آب
September	24.87	23.4	29.7	17.1	13	11.0	2	1	ايلول
October	21.66	20.4	27.4	13.4	49	22.0	5	4	تشرين اول
November	17.31	13.8	19.8	7.8	116	155.0	7	7	تشرين الثاني
December	11.80	8.2	12.8	2.6	173	101.5	11	8	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

17: Syria G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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الفصل الثاني

السكان والاحوال المدنية

CHAPTER TWO

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

p. 13
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POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

تقدير عدد سكان الجمهورية السورية في نهاية عام ١٩٥٣ ونسبتهم لمساحة الاراضي (١)

POPULATION ESTIMATES AS AT THE END OF 1953 AND RATIO TO LAND AREA (1)

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Table No. 1

جدول رقم (١)

MOHAFAZAT	عدد السكان Population	المساحة كم ٢ Area km.2	عدد السكان في كل كيلو متر مربع Population per km.2	المحافظات
TOTAL	3,433,636	184,479	18,613	المجموع
Damascus (2)	739,227	19,528	37,855	دمشق (٢)
Homs	261,904	41,650	6,288	حمص
Hama	196,665	7,322	26,858	حماة
Latakia	540,675	6,080	88,927	اللاذقية
Aleppo	1,025,674	22,919	44,752	حلب
Al-Hasakeh	177,398	22,170	8,001	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	251,548	55,060	4,569	دير الزور
Sweida	98,713	5,590	17,796	السويداء
Dir'a	141,832	4,200	33,770	درعا

(1) Survey estimates, 1953
(2) Including Damascus City

(١) حسب تقدير المساحة عام ١٩٥١
(٢) بما فيها مدينة دمشق المتاخرة

السكان والاحوال المدنية

تقدير عدد سكان مراكز المحافظات ومراكز الاقضية في الجمهورية السورية في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY MOHAFAZAT CENTRES AND QADAS CENTRES AS AT THE END OF 1952

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Table No. 2.

جدول رقم (٢)

CITY	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المدينة
Damascus	372,708	189,252	183,456	مدينة دمشق
Duma	22,007	11,574	10,433	دوما
Zabadani	8,180	4,012	4,168	الزبداني
Katana	6,790	3,848	2,942	قطنا
Qutaifah	3,845	1,686	2,159	القطيفة
Qunaitra	7,155	3,455	3,700	القنيطرة
Al-Nabk	12,591	6,620	5,971	النبك
Homs	125,083	66,512	58,571	مدينة حمص
Hama	91,153	47,512	43,641	مدينة حماة
Salamiya	16,744	9,084	7,660	السلمية
Latakia	47,397	24,030	23,367	مدينة اللاذقية
Banias	4,943	2,140	2,803	بانياس
Tul-Kalakh	3,870	2,013	1,857	تلكلخ
Jableh	10,368	5,183	5,185	جبلة
Al-Haffeh	2,999	1,469	1,530	الحفة
Safita	6,756	3,539	3,217	صافيتا
Tartus	11,803	5,737	6,066	طرطوس
Misiaf	5,166	2,552	2,614	مصياف
Aleppo	380,919	190,103	190,816	مدينة حلب
Idleb	24,626	12,222	12,404	ادلب
I'zaz	11,142	5,007	6,135	اعزاز
Al-Bab	19,769	8,311	11,458	الباب
Jarablus	8,023	3,856	4,167	جرابلس
Jisr-esh Shughour	9,023	4,536	4,497	جسر الشغور
Harem	5,710	2,810	2,900	حارم
Irin	2,981	1,606	1,375	عفرين
Ein-el-Arab	1,605	822	783	عين العرب
Ma'aret en-Nu'man	12,321	6,164	6,157	معرة النعمان
Minbej	5,815	2,747	3,068	منبج
Deir-ez-Zor	71,575	36,537	35,038	مدينة دير الزور
Abu Kamal	5,407	2,545	2,862	ابو كمال
Al-Rikka	11,411	6,079	5,332	الرقة
Al-Mayadine	7,807	4,447	3,360	الميادين
Al-Hasakah	11,911	6,217	5,694	مدينة الحسكة
Dirik	3,442	1,806	1,636	ديرك
Kamishli	20,723	10,846	9,877	مدينة القامشلي
Sweida	11,561	6,132	5,429	مدينة السويداء
Shahba	2,353	1,151	1,202	شهبا
Salkhad	4,239	2,119	2,120	سلخد
Der'a	14,498	7,301	7,197	مدينة درعا
Ibr'a	2,246	1,097	1,149	ازرع
Fezq	1,475	760	715	فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية ،

تقدير عدد السكان حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY MOHAFAZAT, 1947 — 1953

Table No. 2.

جدول رقم (٢)

End of year	مجموع المحافظات All Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق العاصمة Damascus City	MOHAFAZAT دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماه Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نهاية سنة
1947 — Total	3,043,316	310,240	330,587	227,941	170,700	473,754	920,973	151,940	223,212	89,609	125,170	١٩٤٧ — المجموع
— Males	1,543,996	156,937	173,672	120,734	87,835	234,790	459,063	81,760	117,053	47,244	64,710	— ذكور
— Females	1,499,412	153,269	165,915	107,207	82,865	238,964	461,891	70,181	116,209	42,365	60,460	— اناث
1948 — Total	3,092,708	317,251	344,369	232,441	174,491	487,310	932,143	152,962	225,507	90,854	126,009	١٩٤٨ — المجموع
— Males	1,571,310	160,652	176,101	123,087	89,903	243,456	464,929	82,306	118,018	47,790	65,105	— ذكور
— Females	1,521,398	156,598	168,268	109,354	84,588	243,852	467,214	70,656	117,089	42,904	60,900	— اناث
1949 — Total	3,177,751	325,070	359,034	238,635	179,540	501,901	955,075	155,643	246,197	92,303	128,630	١٩٤٩ — المجموع
— Males	1,618,362	164,796	180,733	126,383	92,631	251,302	477,259	83,554	126,185	48,176	66,473	— ذكور
— Females	1,559,389	160,274	172,301	112,246	87,016	250,799	477,816	72,089	120,012	44,027	62,157	— اناث
1950 — Total	3,252,687	335,666	365,980	244,084	183,369	517,750	972,181	159,200	263,138	95,253	131,526	١٩٥٠ — المجموع
— Males	1,656,219	169,658	187,084	129,085	94,533	259,365	495,817	85,222	137,977	50,312	67,977	— ذكور
— Females	1,596,468	165,402	178,896	115,039	88,877	258,371	486,364	73,978	125,061	44,941	63,549	— اناث
1951 — Total	3,339,235	345,237	375,266	250,915	188,890	533,346	995,291	162,145	249,431	96,852	136,940	١٩٥١ — المجموع
— Males	1,696,383	175,003	191,882	132,906	97,471	264,869	497,792	86,803	127,594	51,089	70,994	— ذكور
— Females	1,642,853	170,235	183,384	118,109	91,418	268,479	497,499	75,342	121,847	45,813	65,946	— اناث
1952 — Total	3,433,628	372,708	388,519	261,904	196,085	549,675	1,025,674	177,236	261,546	98,713	141,822	١٩٥٢ — المجموع
— Males	1,751,929	189,252	197,611	138,921	101,540	271,602	514,158	94,609	128,475	52,016	73,695	— ذكور
— Females	1,681,697	183,456	190,908	122,983	95,125	278,073	511,516	82,719	133,073	46,697	68,127	— اناث
1953 — Total	3,528,904	382,239	384,157	382,382	271,048	432,508	1,094,447	222,104	252,882	104,952	147,907	١٩٥٣ — المجموع
— Males	1,808,878	194,681	197,122	187,761	139,164	215,531	561,127	121,836	130,408	55,117	77,136	— ذكور
— Females	1,727,026	188,558	187,020	194,621	131,884	216,975	543,320	110,268	124,182	49,440	70,771	— اناث

Source : Ministry of Interior.

Note : The above figures on the population of the Syrian Republic, have been arrived at by the addition of registered births, new and previously unrecorded, change of residence in counting, and persons acquiring the Syrian citizenship, and registered deaths, new and previously unrecorded, change of residence out going and persons relinquishing the Syrian citizenship

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

ملاحظة : تخضع أرقام نفوس الجمهورية السورية المثبتة اعلاه الى قيم المواليد المسجلة حديثة ومكتومة وتنقل السكن الواردوالاشخاص الذين اكتسبوا الجنسية السورية كماوتخضع الى تنزيل الوفيات المسجلة من حديثه ومكتومة وتنقل السكن الصادر والاشخاص الذين سقطت عنهم الجنسية السورية .

السكان والاحوال المدنية

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تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٢

ESTIMATE OF REGISTERED POPULATION, BY QADAS AS AT THE END OF 1952

Table No. 4.

جدول رقم (٤)

Mohafaza and Qada	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
TOTAL	3,433,626	1,751,939	1,681,687	المجموع العام
Damascus City	372,708	189,252	183,456	مدينة دمشق المعتبرة
Damascus Mohafaza	366,519	187,611	178,908	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta) (*)	78,401	40,704	37,697	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين) (*)
Duma	80,617	41,830	38,787	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	25,820	13,500	12,320	« الزبداني
Qatana	41,479	21,589	19,890	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	29,708	15,198	14,510	« القطيفة
Quneitra	56,747	28,782	29,965	« القنيطرة
Nabek	53,747	28,008	25,739	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	261,904	138,921	122,983	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza Centre	261,904	138,921	122,983	مركز المحافظة
Hama Mohafaza	196,665	101,540	95,125	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	155,671	79,819	75,852	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	40,994	21,721	19,273	قضاء السلمية
Latakia Mohafaza	549,675	271,602	278,073	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	46,481	19,456	27,025	قضاء بانياس
Talkalakh	68,818	37,166	31,652	« تلكلخ
Jableh	74,029	36,609	37,420	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	56,715	29,396	27,319	« الحفة
Safita	78,395	39,863	38,532	« صافيتا
Tartus	59,665	30,502	29,163	« طرطوس
Latakia	105,363	53,540	51,823	« اللاذقية
Mistaf	51,209	25,070	26,139	« مصياف

* It is noted that the figures relating to the population of the Eastern and Western Ghouta for the year 1952 are show less than those published in 1951. This is due to the fact that the villages of Kafar-Susah, Mezzeh and Kadam became a part of Damascus City as from 1949.

* يلاحظ ان الارقام المتعلقة بسكان الغوطتين لعام ١٩٥٢ اقل مما نشر في عام ١٩٥١ وذلك لالحاق قرى كفرسوسة والمزة والقدم بمدينة دمشق المعتبرة واعتبارها ضواحي للمدينة منذ عام ١٩٤٩

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٢

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY QADAS AS AT THE END OF 1952

162 Table No. 4 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٤ (تتمة)

Mohafaza and Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	1,023,674	514,158	511,516	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	380,919	190,103	190,816	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	93,781	49,016	44,765	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	62,623	34,519	34,109	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	56,362	27,468	28,894	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	86,717	43,239	43,478	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	31,646	15,738	15,908	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	43,362	21,406	21,955	« جسر الشغور
Harem	51,692	25,844	25,848	« حارم
Afrin	81,949	41,380	40,569	« عفرين
Ain-al Arab	29,731	15,611	14,120	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	46,717	23,217	23,500	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	54,229	26,394	27,835	« منبج
Hassakeh Mohafaza	177,288	94,569	82,719	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	68,980	37,140	31,840	مركز المحافظة
Dafla	20,518	10,273	10,245	قضاء الدفلة
Qamishli	87,890	47,256	40,634	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	253,348	126,475	122,873	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	118,284	60,205	58,079	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	35,079	16,675	18,404	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Rigga	55,980	30,830	25,150	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	42,205	20,765	21,440	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	86,713	45,918	40,887	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	43,032	22,960	20,072	مركز المحافظة
Shahba	24,263	12,732	11,531	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	31,418	16,226	15,094	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaza	141,322	73,085	68,137	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	61,280	31,080	30,200	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	63,030	32,559	30,471	قضاء ازرع
Fig	15,903	8,437	7,466	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

السكان والاحوال المدنية

تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, BY QADAS, AS AT THE END OF 1953.

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Table No. 5

جدول رقم

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	Males الذكور	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	3,888,904	1,888,878	1,787,026	المجموع العام
Damascus City	389,239	194,681	188,558	مدينة دمشق العتيقة
Damascus Mohafazat	384,122	197,122	187,029	محافظة دمشق
Mohafazat Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	81,529	42,362	39,167	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Douma	82,527	43,030	39,497	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	26,514	13,898	12,616	« الزبداني
Qatana	43,457	22,654	20,803	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	30,494	15,585	14,909	« القطيفة
Kunaitra	64,191	30,905	33,286	« القنيطرة
Nabek	56,100	28,668	28,432	« النبك
Homs Mohafazat	337,262	157,761	184,502	محافظة حمص
Mohafazat Centre	281,502	149,487	132,015	مركز المحافظة
Talkalakh	70,831	38,274	32,577	قضاء تلكلخ
Hama Mohafazat	271,048	139,164	131,884	محافظة حماه
Mohafazat Centre	166,792	85,767	81,026	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	50,581	27,001	23,580	قضاء السلمية
Mayaf	53,674	26,396	27,278	« مصياف
Latakia Mohafazat	432,594	215,581	216,975	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	48,625	20,655	27,970	قضاء بانياس
Jableh	78,796	38,119	39,677	« جبلة
Al-Haffeh	58,872	30,541	28,331	« الحفة
Sudia	81,296	41,389	39,907	« صافيتا
Tartus	60,851	31,059	29,792	« طرطوس
Latakia	105,067	52,769	52,298	« اللاذقية

تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, BY QADAS, AS AT THE END OF 1953.

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Table No. 5 (Concld.) جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	**1,094,447**	**551,127**	**543,320**	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	389,942	194,886	195,024	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	99,054	51,864	47,190	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	69,715	3 5,114	34,601	« اعزاز
Al-bab	69,445	34,354	35,091	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	104,330	53,282	51,048	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	32,070	15,963	16,107	« جرابلس
Jisr-ash-Shughour	44,993	22,362	22,631	« جسر الشغور
Harem	54,743	27,566	27,177	« حارم
Afrin	84,756	42,971	41,785	« عفرين
Ein-el Arab	30,578	16,061	14,517	« عين العرب
Ma'arat-an-Un'man	55,347	27,638	27,709	« معرة النعمان
Mimbij	59,474	29,054	30,420	« منبج
Hasakeh Mohafaza	**232,104**	**121,836**	**110,269**	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	96,913	51,349	45,564	مركز المحافظة
Dejla	27,514	13,602	13,912	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	107,677	56,885	50,792	« القامشلي
Der-ez-zor Mohafaza	**253,585**	**129,403**	**124,182**	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	119,422	60,747	58,675	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	35,254	16,758	18,496	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Ragga	56,303	30,971	25,332	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	42,606	20,927	21,679	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	**104,583**	**55,117**	**49,446**	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	46,963	24,996	21,967	مركز المحافظة
Shahba	25,433	13,352	12,081	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	32,167	16,769	15,398	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaza	**147,907**	**77,126**	**70,781**	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	64,033	32,884	31,149	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	67,617	35,614	32,003	قضاء ازرع
Fik	16,257	8,628	7,629	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior المصدر وزارة الداخلية

تقدير عدد السكان حسب المذاهب ١٩٤٥ – ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY LELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES, 1945 — 1953.

Table No. 6

جدول رقم ٦

COMMUNITY	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	المذهب
Total	2,949,815	2,986,828	3,043,510	3,092,799	3,177,751	3,232,587	3,329,238	3,433,636	3,555,904	المجموع
Sunnites	2,032,734	2,075,093	2,105,193	2,137,602	2,198,015	2,248,569	2,305,328	2,357,436	2,578,810	سنيون
Alawites	325,454	325,449	329,466	341,262	355,468	367,327	374,350	384,331	396,445	علويون
Shi'ite	12,901	13,145	13,201	13,356	13,708	14,007	14,196	14,493	14,837	شيعة
Ismailite	29,806	30,549	31,051	31,813	32,804	33,506	34,529	35,637	36,745	اسماعيليون
Druzes	89,796	95,749	96,641	97,795	100,534	103,150	104,945	107,660	113,318	دروز
Yazidis	2,858	2,883	2,885	2,888	2,889	2,926	2,937	3,064	3,082	يزيديون
Judists	30,309	30,646	30,873	31,005	31,157	31,312	31,488	31,559	31,647	موسويون
Greek Orthodox	140,832	143,038	144,517	149,706	153,886	157,354	160,782	164,150	168,747	روم ارثوذكس
Armenian "	104,331	104,072	104,925	106,298	107,251	108,273	109,005	110,515	110,894	ارمن "
Syrian "	41,719	42,500	43,031	43,652	44,971	46,440	47,805	49,750	51,363	سريان "
Greek Catholics	48,430	48,773	49,543	50,423	51,493	52,497	53,615	54,703	55,860	روم كاثوليك
Armenian "	16,979	17,258	17,493	17,706	18,010	18,631	19,219	19,346	19,492	ارمن "
Syrian "	16,916	17,389	17,613	17,830	18,[illegible]27	18,531	18,893	19,373	19,733	سريان "
Latins	6,063	6,150	6,125	6,323	6,345	6,445	6,555	6,645	6,749	لاتين
Maronites	13,821	13,966	14,133	14,797	15,112	15,430	15,789	16,117	16,530	موارنة
Chaldians	4,854	4,938	4,991	5,022	5,116	5,201	5,295	5,411	5,492	كلدانيون
Protestants	11,639	11,806	11,969	12,[illegible]35	12,661	12,910	13,131	13,433	13,200	بروتستانت
Nastorians	9,323	9,544	9,630	9,633	10,181	10,237	10,369	10,578	11,167	نسطوريون
Assyrians	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4	9	آشوريون

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

السكان والاحوال المدنية

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تقدير عدد سكان الجمهورية السورية حسب المذاهب والمحافظات في نهاية عام ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND MOHAFAZAT AS AT THE END OF 1953

Table No. 7. جدول رقم ٧

Community	مجموع المحافظات Mohafazat Total	مدينة دمشق Damascus City	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	المذهب
Total	3,655,904	383,239	384,152	362,553	271,048	432,586	1,094,447	232,194	252,585	101,563	147,997	المجموع العام
Sunnites	2,578,810	315,648	330,197	204,459	148,293	96,971	924,650	171,058	248,216	1,903	137,386	سنيون
Alawites	398,445	252	4,915	54,929	30,520	272,963	3,590	156	122	97	382	علويون
Shi'ites	14,287	172	338	3,714	210	1	10,067	325	—	56	4	شيعة
Ismailites	36,745	46	18	177	31,606	4,819	40	17	19	—	—	اسماعيليون
Druzes	113,318	937	18,076	6	4	10	2,023	5	37	92,221	9	دروز
Yazidies	3,028	8	1	1	—	—	1,323	1,749	—	—	—	يزيديون
Judists	31,647	14,441	8	—	—	6	14,775	2,350	57	—	10	موسويون
Greek Orthodox	1[illegible],747	13,165	15,787	53,493	6,027	39,777	11,478	466	212	5,721	3,653	روم أرثوذكس
Armenian "	110,591	17,588	66	1,668	915	4,789	73,114	9,966	2,060	410	40	أرمن "
Syrian "	51,363	1,193	121	16,505	837	26	6,535	25,223	578	—	59	سريان "
Greek Catholic	55,880	11,766	11,972	7,146	533	941	13,791	96	26	3,418	6,191	روم كاثوليك
Armenian "	19,492	2,376	93	1,863	96	736	11,044	2,569	742	152	122	أرمن "
Syrian "	19,738	2,835	1,331	3,731	403	—	7,061	3,864	793	—	—	سريان "
Latins	6,749	532	61	539	14	906	4,627	44	27	—	—	لاتين
Maronites	16,530	1,248	315	1,968	1,028	7,515	4,107	75	88	106	4	موارنة
Chaldians	5,492	245	1	36	2	60	2,480	2,374	285	—	—	كلدانيون
Protestants	13,209	1,087	851	2,538	858	3,017	3,708	602	32	479	36	بروتستانت
Nastorians	11,167	—	—	—	1	—	—	11,166	—	—	—	نسطوريون
Assyrians	9	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	4	—	—	آشوريون

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

تقدير عدد سكان الجمهورية السورية حسب المذاهب والمحافظات في نهاية عام ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND MOHAFAZAT AS AT THE END OF 1953.

Table No. 8

جدول رقم ٨

COMMUNITY	مجموع المحافظات Total Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق المنكرة Damascus City	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	المذهب
Total	3,433,626	372,706	368,519	261,904	196,605	548,675	1,025,474	177,386	251,548	96,713	141,522	المجموع العام
Sunnites	2,287,435	306,131	313,702	176,924	128,980	105,121	867,899	118,965	246,283	1,807	131,704	سنيون
Alawites	284,231	229	4,813	28,125	18,113	228,797	3,494	150	122	96	303	علويون
Shi'ites	14,493	106	324	3,896	210	1	9,881	325	...	56	4	شيعة
Ismailites	35,637	44	13	22	26,210	9,271	41	17	19	...	...	اسماعيليون
Druses	107,060	844	17,296	3	4	7	1,915	5	13	88,966	8	دروز
Yazides	3,094	8	...	...	...	...	1,323	1,753	...	...	...	يزيديون
Judists	31,559	14,414	8	...	...	5	14,731	2,336	55	...	10	موسويون
Greek Orthodox	164,150	12,807	15,584	22,533	20,073	72,263	11,267	452	207	5,808	3,456	روم أرثوذكس
Armenian «	110,515	17,536	64	1,641	665	6,101	72,571	9,519	2,023	357	38	أرمن «
Syrian «	49,750	1,159	119	16,200	787	2	6,422	24,055	861	...	89	سريان «
Greek Catholic	34,703	11,439	11,982	4,861	480	3,240	13,697	94	25	3,215	6,014	روم كاثوليك
Armenian «	19,348	2,339	91	1,564	54	989	10,851	2,451	727	180	110	أرمن «
Syrian «	19,373	2,488	1,318	3,660	306	...	6,984	3,760	789	...	...	سريان «
Latins	6,645	509	58	470	13	974	4,582	42	27	...	...	لاتين
Maronites	16,117	1,222	300	687	51	9,543	4,042	75	86	107	4	موارنة
Chaldians	5,411	240	1	36	2	60	2,458	2,337	277	...	...	كلدانيون
Protestants	13,433	1,084	847	1,893	631	4,275	3,646	573	31	421	32	بروتستانت
Nestorians	10,578	...	...	...	1	...	...	10,577	...	...	...	نسطوريون
Assyrians	4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	...	...	آشوريون

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

السكان والأحوال المدنية

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عدد المواليد الحديثة (*) المسجلة حسب المحافظات ١٩٤٦ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS (*) REGISTERED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1946 — 1953

Table No. 9. جدول رقم ٩

YEARS	مجموع المحافظات All Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق المنارة Damascus City	MOHAFAZAT دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	سويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	المحافظات السنوات
1946 — Total	60,451	9,877	7,097	5,102	5,021	4,234	20,063	2,202	1,960	1,571	3,284	١٩٤٦ — المجموع
— Males	32,411	4,961	3,910	2,718	2,680	2,294	10,876	1,234	1,111	835	1,802	— ذكور
— Females	28,040	4,916	3,187	2,384	2,341	1,950	9,207	968	849	736	1,482	— اناث
1947 — Total	44,280	9,318	5,896	4,376	4,129	3,167	12,983	817	1,610	960	1,044	١٩٤٧ — المجموع
— Males	23,810	4,710	3,172	2,298	2,190	1,801	7,208	441	878	557	535	— ذكور
— Females	20,470	4,608	2,714	2,078	1,939	1,366	5,775	376	732	393	489	— اناث
1948 — Total	58,906	11,209	7,577	5,917	5,194	5,566	16,873	1,372	2,403	1,309	1,486	١٩٤٨ — المجموع
— Males	31,290	5,742	4,125	3,133	2,690	3,021	9,065	755	1,367	695	806	— ذكور
— Females	27,507	5,467	3,452	2,784	2,504	2,545	7,808	617	1,036	614	680	— اناث
1949 — Total	75,977	11,526	7,647	5,659	6,992	5,662	28,589	2,546	2,308	1,265	3,753	١٩٤٩ — المجموع
— Males	41,587	6,031	4,088	3,007	3,792	3,201	15,961	1,407	1,307	738	2,058	— ذكور
— Females	34,390	5,495	3,559	2,652	3,200	2,461	12,628	1,139	1,001	527	1,695	— اناث
1950 — Total	72,382	13,123	9,189	5,663	5,160	5,878	23,044	3,458	1,910	1,624	3,333	١٩٥٠ — المجموع
— Males	39,043	6,613	5,000	2,971	2,760	3,274	12,716	1,904	1,034	959	1,812	— ذكور
— Females	33,339	6,510	4,189	2,692	2,400	2,604	10,328	1,554	876	665	1,521	— اناث
1951 — Total	83,091	13,940	9,305	6,270	7,466	6,160	28,698	2,308	1,880	1,718	5,268	١٩٥١ — المجموع
— Males	45,364	7,155	5,149	3,403	4,248	3,390	15,847	1,302	1,036	928	2,906	— ذكور
— Females	37,727	6,785	4,246	2,867	3,218	2,770	12,851	1,006	844	788	2,362	— اناث
1952 — Total	86,987	13,493	9,724	6,001	7,125	7,250	30,241	4,955	2,001	1,156	5,041	١٩٥٢ — المجموع
— Males	47,616	6,940	5,413	3,204	3,829	3,913	16,721	2,773	1,071	685	2,977	— ذكور
— Females	39,371	6,553	4,311	2,797	3,296	3,337	13,520	2,182	930	471	2,064	— اناث
1953 — Total	89,277	14,834	11,212	7,045	7,654	7,005	30,731	4,320	2,118	1,733	2,625	١٩٥٣ — المجموع
— Males	48,629	7,573	6,099	3,868	4,201	3,839	17,015	2,437	1,169	955	1,473	— ذكور
— Females	40,648	7,261	5,113	3,177	3,453	3,166	13,716	1,883	949	778	1,152	— اناث

Source : Ministry of Interior.

* The above figures show the number of births of « recent occurrence » but do not include « undeclared births. »

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

(*) تبين الارقام المثبتة اعلاه المواليد الحديثة فقط ولا تتضمن المواليد المكتومة

السكان والاحوال المدنية

عدد المواليد الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1952

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Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	86,987	47,616	39,371	المجموع العام
Damascus City	12,493	6,940	6,553	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	9,724	5,413	4,311	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	2,514	1,386	1,128	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	1,764	980	784	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	666	380	286	« الزبداني
Katana	1,061	570	491	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	523	339	184	« القطيفة
Al-Quneitra	2,032	1,128	904	« القنيطرة
Al-Nabek	1,164	630	534	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	6,001	3,294	2,707	محافظة حمص
Hama Mohafaza	7,125	3,829	3,296	محافظة حماة
Mihafaza Centre	5,721	3,043	2,678	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	1,404	786	618	قضاء السلمية
Latakia Mohafaza	7,250	3,913	3,337	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	819	465	354	قضاء بانياس
Talkalakh	778	432	346	قضاء تلكلخ
Jableh	1,148	594	554	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	546	303	243	« الحفة
Safita	635	329	306	« صافيتا
Tartus	750	429	321	« طرطوس
Latakia	1,968	1,031	937	« اللاذقية
Misiaf	586	330	256	قضاء مصياف

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عدد المواليد الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1952

Table No. 10 (Concld.) جدول رقم ١٠ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	30,241	16,721	13,520	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	11,527	6,247	5,280	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	3,852	2,174	1,708	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	1,456	808	618	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	1,972	1,105	867	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	2,933	1,663	1,270	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	2,067	1,229	838	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	757	382	375	« جسر الشغور
Harem	1,373	762	611	« حارم
'Ifrin	931	531	400	« عفرين
Ein-al-Arab	524	309	215	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	2,420	1,307	1,113	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	329	204	125	« منبج
Al-Hasakeh Mohafaza	4,955	2,773	2,182	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	634	356	278	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	352	188	164	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	3,969	2,229	1,740	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	2,601	1,671	930	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	1,232	682	550	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	173	86	87	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	292	151	141	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	304	152	152	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	1,156	685	471	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	703	405	298	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	214	134	80	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	239	146	93	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaza	5,041	2,977	2,064	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	2,496	1,487	1,009	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	2,217	1,316	901	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	328	174	154	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior. المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

السكان والاحوال المدنية

عدد المواليد الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1953

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Table No. 11

جدول رقم ١١

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	89,277	49,629	40,648	المجموع العام
Damascus City	14,534	7,573	7,261	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	11,212	6,099	5,113	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	3,154	1,696	1,458	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	1,931	1,095	836	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	1,033	585	448	« الزبداني
Katana	1,215	665	550	« قطنا
Al-Quteifeh	600	337	263	« القطيفة
Al-Qumeitra	1,965	1,061	904	« القنيطرة
Nebk	1,314	660	654	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	7,045	3,868	3,177	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza Centre	6,234	3,401	2,833	مركز المحافظة
Talkalakh	811	467	344	« تلكلخ
Hama Mohafaza	7,654	4,391	3,463	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	5,396	2,963	2,433	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	1,393	759	634	قضاء السلمية
Misiaf	863	479	384	« مصياف
Latakia Mohafaza	7,066	3,839	3,166	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	963	538	425	قضاء بانياس
Jableh	1,284	730	554	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	791	459	332	« الحفة
Safita	820	475	345	« صافيتا
Tartus	1,007	515	492	« طرطوس
Latakia	2,140	1,122	1,018	« اللاذقية

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NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1953

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Table No. 11 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١١ (تتمة)

Mohafazat aldi Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	30,731	17,015	13,716	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	11,011	5,821	5,190	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	4,030	2,229	1,801	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	1,348	792	556	« اعزاز
Al-bab	2,463	1,353	1,110	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	1,449	840	609	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	265	154	111	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shugour	1,944	1,130	814	« جسر الشغور
Harem	1,255	738	517	« حارم
'Ifrin	3,445	1,897	1,548	« عفرين
Ein-al Arab	932	537	395	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	1,988	1,173	815	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	601	351	250	« منبج
Al-Hasakeh Mohafaza	4,339	2,437	1,902	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	753	422	331	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	562	313	249	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	3,009	1,702	1,303	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	2,118	1,169	949	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	1,218	653	565	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	174	104	70	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	337	194	143	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	389	218	171	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	1,723	955	778	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	797	418	379	مركز المحافظة
Shahba	605	335	270	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	331	202	129	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaza	2,635	1,473	1,162	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	1,111	636	475	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	1,203	685	518	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	311	152	159	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

عدد الوفيات الحديثة (*) المسجلة حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٤٦ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW (*) DEATHS REGISTERED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1946 — 1953

Table No. 12

جدول رقم ١٢

YEARS	مجموع المحافظات All Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق المنارة Damascus City	MOHAFAZAT دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-es-Zor	سويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	السنوات
									المحافظات			
1946 — Total	19,144	3,498	2,514	1,289	1,219	1,552	6,912	307	496	375	952	١٩٤٦ — المجموع
— Males	11,091	1,834	1,414	722	643	1,020	4,144	203	335	231	545	— ذكور
— Females	8,053	1,664	1,130	567	576	532	2,768	104	161	144	407	— اناث
1947 — Total	15,212	3,464	2,254	1,276	1,117	1,168	4,609	202	494	186	452	١٩٤٧ — المجموع
— Males	8,581	1,791	1,206	674	547	763	2,736	126	327	117	294	— ذكور
— Females	6,631	1,673	1,048	602	570	405	1,873	76	157	69	158	— اناث
1948 — Total	19,964	4,204	2,709	1,417	1,469	2,454	5,709	356	658	254	674	١٩٤٨ — المجموع
— Males	10,946	2,046	1,525	780	712	1,452	3,221	214	401	184	411	— ذكور
— Females	9,018	2,158	1,244	637	757	1,002	2,488	142	257	70	263	— اناث
1949 — Total	26,656	4,676	2,609	1,770	2,357	2,392	9,976	551	570	426	1,329	١٩٤٩ — المجموع
— Males	16,196	2,433	1,542	976	1,380	1,645	6,290	434	397	273	826	— ذكور
— Females	10,460	2,243	1,067	794	977	747	3,686	117	173	153	503	— اناث
1950 — Total	23,623	4,604	2,270	1,658	1,757	2,320	8,322	691	548	511	942	١٩٥٠ — المجموع
— Males	14,584	2,518	1,294	985	1,002	1,545	5,373	548	385	339	595	— ذكور
— Females	9,039	2,086	976	673	755	775	2,949	143	163	172	347	— اناث
1951 — Total	23,844	4,741	2,531	1,342	2,212	1,742	8,318	518	469	581	1,090	١٩٥١ — المجموع
— Males	14,269	2,425	1,569	719	1,393	1,114	5,253	401	325	393	677	— ذكور
— Females	9,575	2,316	1,262	623	819	628	3,065	117	144	188	413	— اناث
1952 — Total	23,082	4,711	2,841	1,476	1,715	1,703	7,305	586	490	542	1,413	١٩٥٢ — المجموع
— Males	13,621	2,376	1,622	805	1,006	1,099	4,518	369	321	331	874	— ذكور
— Females	9,461	2,335	1,219	671	709	604	2,787	217	169	211	539	— اناث
1953 — Total	24,912	5,033	3,198	1,879	1,693	1,760	7,617	1,093	580	473	1,586	١٩٥٣ — المجموع
— Males	14,568	2,570	1,787	996	975	1,069	4,660	924	380	283	913	— ذكور
— Females	10,346	2,464	1,411	883	718	691	2,957	169	200	190	673	— اناث

Source : Ministry of Interior

(*) The above figures show the number of deaths of «recent occurrence» but do not include «undeclared deaths»

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

(*) ملاحظة : تبين الارقام المثبتة اعلاه الوفيات الحديثة فقط ولا تتضمن الوفيات المكتومة .

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NUMBER OF NEW DEATHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1952

Table No. 13 جدول رقم ١٣

Mohafazat and Qadas	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	22,982	13,521	9,461	المجموع العام
Damascus City	4,711	2,376	2,335	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	2,841	1,622	1,219	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	745*	415	330	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	586	274	312	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	212	123	89	« الزبداني
Katana	278	169	109	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	268	181	87	« القطيفة
Al-Qunaitra	379	261	118	« القنيطرة
Al-Nabek	373	199	174	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	1,476	805	671	محافظة حمص
Hama Mohafaza	1,715	1,006	709	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	1,444	835	609	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	271	171	100	قضاء السلمية
Latakia Mohafaza	1,703	1,009	694	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	184	120	64	قضاء بانياس
Talkalakh	181	116	65	« تلكلخ
Jableh	339	197	142	« جبلة
Al-Haffeh	124	72	52	« الحفة
Safita	128	94	34	« صافيتا
Tartus	256*	194	62	« طرطوس
Latakia	399	235	164	« قضاء اللاذقية
Misiaf	92	71	21	« مصياف

* Corrected figure

* رقم معدل

السكان والاحوال المدنية

عدد الوفيات الحيية المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال عام ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF NEW DEATHS REGISTERED BY QADAS DURING 1952

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Table No. 13 (Con cld.)

جدول رقم ١٣ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة او القضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	7,585	4,818	2,767	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	2,984	1,617	1,367	مركز المحافظة
Idlib	912	565	347	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	267	190	77	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	433	330	103	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	591	461	130	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	636	393	243	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	167	126	41	« جسر الشغور
Harem	383	232	151	« حارم
'Ifrin	219	137	82	« عفرين
Ein-el-Arab	127	97	30	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	449	274	175	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	137	95	42	« منبج
Al-Hasakeh Mohafaza	886	669	217	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	168	110	58	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	75	58	17	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	643	501	142	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	490	321	169	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	283	169	114	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	22	20	2	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	111	78	33	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	74	54	20	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	542	331	211	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	242	152	90	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	129	79	50	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	171	100	71	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaz	1,413	874	539	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	672	427	245	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	688	410	278	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	53	37	16	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

عدد الوفيات المحدثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS DURING 1953

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Table No. 14 جدول رقم ١٤

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	**24,912**	**14,566**	**10,346**	المجموع العام
Damascus City	**5,053**	**2,579**	**2,474**	مدينة دمشق المتاتق
Damascus Mohafaza	**3,198**	**1,787**	**1,411**	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	991	508	483	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	532	292	240	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	339	187	152	« الزبداني
Katana	318	167	151	« قطنا
Al-Qutelfek	210	140	70	« القطيفة
Al-Qneitra	443	302	141	« القنيطرة
Al-Nabek	365	191	174	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	**1,879**	**996**	**883**	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza Centre	1,731	900	831	مركز المحافظة
Talkalakh	148	96	52	قضاء تلكلخ
Hama Mohafaza	**1,693**	**975**	**718**	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	1,311	754	557	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	267	148	119	قضاء السلمية
Misiaf	115	73	42	قضاء مصياف
Latakia Mohafaza	**1,700**	**1,009**	**691**	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	227	143	84	قضاء بانياس
Jableh	365	231	134	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	187	128	59	« الحفة
Safita	113	87	26	« صافيتا
Tartus	348	198	150	« طرطوس
Latakia	520	282	238	« اللاذقية

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عدد الوفيات الحدثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال عام ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1953.

Table No. 16 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١٦ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafazat	7,017	4,060	2,957	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafazat Centre	3,556	1,896	1,660	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	552	232	320	قضاء ادلب
Azaz	228	262	96	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	302	202	100	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	413	273	140	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	56	39	17	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	492	286	206	« جسر الشغور
Harem	252	152	100	« حارم
'Afrin	697	549	148	« عفرين
Ein-el-Arab	115	100	15	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Numan	369	232	137	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	116	86	30	« منبج
Al-Hassakeh Mohafazat	1,058	924	169	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafazat Centre	263	203	60	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	96	84	12	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	734	637	97	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafazat	289	289	200	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafazat Centre	288	178	110	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	43	26	17	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Rigga	178	127	51	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	71	49	22	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafazat	472	283	189	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafazat Centre	202	115	87	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	129	81	48	« شهبا
Salkhad	142	87	55	« صلخد
Der'a Mohafazat	1,085	912	673	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafazat Centre	425	254	171	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	1,070	610	460	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	91	49	42	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

عدد عقود الزواج وشهادات الطلاق المسجلة حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٤٨ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES REGISTERED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1948 — 1953.

Table No. 15 — جدول رقم ١٥

MOHAFAZAT	عدد عقود الزواج المسجلة Number of Marriages Registered						عدد شهادات الطلاق المسجلة Number of Divorces Registered						المحافظات
	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	
All Mohafazat	13,481	17,600	24,376	20,944	22,567	26,482	2,147	2,384	2,608	2,387	2,477	2,718	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus City	2,943	3,597	3,740	4,215	4,297	4,704	772	894	930	793	904	938	مدينة دمشق العتيقة
Damascus Mohafaza	934	1,189	1,903	1,897	1,969	2,306	268	276	297	248	245	285	محافظة دمشق
Homs	1,376	1,397	1,893	1,473	1,819	2,200	169	161	190	195	159	171	" " حمص
Hama	983	1,822	1,289	1,316	1,094	1,731	113	116	140	127	130	143	" " حماة
Latakia	1,205	1,486	2,021	2,276	2,289	2,447	107	97	190	126	136	149	" " اللاذقية
Aleppo	3,085	6,054	7,644	7,385	8,003	7,751	530	583	597	695	656	642	" " حلب
Al-Hassakeh	165	583	621	438	926	796	24	51	5	34	5	130	" " الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	309	342	715	624	854	829	195	2	65	75	47	43	" " دير الزور
Suwaida	139	135	494	436	606	1,080	25	42	60	64	78	208	" " السويداء
Dar'a	146	879	865	850	921	1,393	29	48	53	42	55	95	" " درعا

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

نسبة عقود الزواج وشهادات الطلاق بالألف من السكان ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٢

MARRIAGES AND DIVORCE RATES, 1947 — 1952

Table No. 16 جدول رقم ١٦

MOHAFAZAT	نسبة عقود الزواج بالألف من عدد السكان Marriage rate per thousand of population						نسبة شهادات الطلاق بالألف من عدد السكان Divorce rate per thousand of population						المحافظات
	١٩٤٧ 1947*	١٩٤٨ 1948*	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٨ 1948*	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	
All Mohafazat	4.2	4.4	5.6	7.7	6.46	6.56	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus City	6.2	9.1	11.2	11.3	12.21	11.20	1.6	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.43	مدينة دمشق المختارة
Damascus Mohafaza		2.7	3.3	5.5	4.94	4.56		0.8	0.8	0.7	0.65	0.65	محافظة دمشق
Homs "	5.0	6.0	5.8	6.6	5.87	5.79	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.65	0.5	" حمص
Hama "	5.5	5.1	10.3	6.9	7.05	8.3	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.66	" حماة
Latakia "	2.2	2.6	3.0	11.5	4.29	4.17	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.36	" اللاذقية
Aleppo "	5.3	5.5	6.8	7.9	7.42	7.3	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.66	0.64	" حلب
Al-Hassakah "	1.0	1.1	3.6	4.4	2.63	3.22	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.05	0.18	0.04	" الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor "	2.6	2.5	1.4	2.9	2.54	3.29	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.15	" دير الزور
Suwida "	1.3	1.4	1.4	5.2	4.45	6.04	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.66	0.76	" السويداء
Dir'a "	1.8	1.6	5.3	7.0	6.56	5.78	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.36	" درعا

* Corrected figure

(*) ارقام معدلة

مكتب السكان والاحوال المدنية
سجل 5

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الفصل الثالث

الصحة والاسعاف العام

CHAPTER THREE

HEALTH STATISTICS

P.37
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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat									نوع المرض
	مجموع المحافظات	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	
Total	16,305	6,387	701	1,291	1,071	4,922	206	651	529	547	المجموع
Typhoid	79	28	3	—	—	11	—	13	22	2	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى التيفوس
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	44	7	—	—	—	18	—	4	15	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	36	6	2	1	—	3		—	24	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	34	17	6	4	—	1	—	1	3	1	دفتري (خناق دفتريتي)
Influenza	36	3	—	1	—	21	—	—	3	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	146	38	12	12	1	67	1	9	—	6	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	65	33	7	9	8	14	—	1	—	1	تدرن غير مذاكر
Siphlis	7	3	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	الزهري
Malaria	124	33	5	4	8	58	—	8	6	2	حمى مزلفية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	22	20	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	امراض سارية غير مذاكر

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ١ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total الجملة	Mohafazat المحافظات									نوع المرض
		Damascus دمشق	Homs حمص	Hama حماة	Latakia اللاذقية	Aleppo حلب	Al Hasakeh الحسكة	Deir ez-Zor دير الزور	Suweida السويداء	Dir'a درعا	
Cancer and other malignant tumours	235	90	18	24	6	71	8	3	3	2	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	16	14	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليسا صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetes mellitus	52	30	4	2	1	14	—	1	—	—	البول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	65	32	—	—	—	15	—	—	1	—	التسمم الغولي (الغول) المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	30	27	—	—	—	13	—	—	—	—	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	164	97	2	14	2	45	—	—	1	—	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سفادة شريان او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	193	80	10	15	4	69	1	1	—	2	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	64	41	1	4	1	12	—	1	—	4	
Diseases of the heart	1,239	665	66	71	12	452	3	13	5	12	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	69	42	—	4	2	15	—	1	1	4	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	376	308	10	11	2	124	—	21	30	3	ذات القصبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,129	407	117	113	17	405	1	23	16	30	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	73	30	—	4	11	13	1	4	1	—	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,306	1,105	151	179	76	475	7	71	86	54	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ١ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat									المحافظات	نوع المرض
	المجموع	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a		
Appendicitis	19	4	—	1	—	9	1	4	—	—		التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	185	102	7	5	12	50	1	8	2	1		امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	95	58	—	7	6	14	—	3	—	7		بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	224	102	12	15	8	78	—	—	2	6		التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genetal system	84	64	1	1	1	15	—	—	1	1		بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	20	7	5	5	—	9	1	1	2	—		تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	28	17	1	2	—	5	—	—	2	1		بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissue, bones and organ of movement.	33	16	1	—	—	16	—	—	—	—		امراض الجلد والنسيج الحجري والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	344	155	39	21	2	23	—	—	3	1		ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	807	211	61	54	151	221	17	31	13	25		الشيخوخة
Suicide	16	7	—	1	—	6	—	—	1	1		انتحار
Homicide	68	27	1	5	—	19	5	6	—	2		قتل
Accidental deaths	744	263	5	23	17	109	3	10	5	3		موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,264	2,113	129	875	731	2,437	161	413	266	369		اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الأمراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFARAT, 1953

Table No. 2.

جدول رقم ٢

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafaat									نوع المرض	المجموع	المحافظات								
	مجموع الحالات	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Lattakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hassakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Der'a			دمشق	حمص	حماة	اللاذقية	حلب	الحسكة	دير الزور	السويداء	درعا
Total	37,706	7,118	990	1,416	3,098	4,777	214	477	443	3,093											
Typhoid	26	40	9	4	—	9	—	—	5	1	حمى تيفوئيدية										
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى تيفوس « تيفوس »										
Smallpox	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جدري										
Measles	2	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	الحصبة										
Scarlet fever	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية										
Whooping cough	10	5	—	3	1	—	—	1	—	—	سعال ديكي										
Diphtheria	47	30	9	4	—	2	—	—	2	—	دفتري (خناق دفتيريائي)										
Influenza	30	14	—	—	1	8	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة										
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون										
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	244	186	11	24	1	37	3	7	1	4	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي										
All other forms of tuberculosis	36	9	5	5	—	17	1	—	—	1	تدرن غير ملاكر										
Syphilis	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الزهري										
Malaria	82	21	4	1	10	34	2	10	—	—	حمى مزرية (البرداء)										
Other infectious diseases	5	4	—	—	—	2	—	1	1	—	امراض سارية غير ملاكر										

وزير الصحة والشؤون الاجتماعية

عمر حكيم

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 2 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٢ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Syria سوريا	Mohafazat: Damascus دمشق	Homs حمص	Hama حماة	Latakia اللاذقية	Aleppo حلب	Al Hasakeh الحسكة	Deir ez-Zor دير الزور	Suweida السويداء	Dir'a درعا	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	280	142	22	30	4	80	2	1	—	2	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	19	6	—	—	1	10	—	—	1	1	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليست صفة خبيثة او معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	2	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetes mellitus	24	8	3	2	1	10	—	—	—	—	الذيابيطس السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	22	70	2	—	—	18	—	—	—	2	التسمم المزمن او الحاد بالكحول
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	42	26	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	2	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	220	109	7	22	5	82	—	4	—	—	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام
Meningitis non-meningococcal	270	152	17	20	4	71	1	1	2	2	تريف دماغي سداءة غربالية او تعفن الدم في السحاج
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	50	11	2	19	1	15	—	1	1	—	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,695	841	117	101	45	510	4	18	4	21	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	50	21	1	4	—	21	—	1	—	2	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	906	342	17	20	1	92	1	13	1	2	ذات القصبات
Pneumonia & broncho-pneumonia	800	344	114	79	17	280	2	36	2	35	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	89	48	—	1	1	27	—	7	1	4	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and entritis	2,686	1,329	266	232	145	599	8	50	24	85	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 2 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٢ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafazat المحافظات: Damascus دمشق	Homs حمص	Hama حماة	Latakia اللاذقية	Aleppo حلب	Al Hasakeh الحسكة	Deir ez-Zor دير الزور	Suweida السويداء	Dir'a درعا	نوع المرض
Appendicitis	10	6	1	1	2	2	—	—	—	1	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	818	305	9	18	34	84	1	3	2	14	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of digestive system	101	50	—	11	8	30	1	1	—	—	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	896	113	12	28	19	135	—	3	4	5	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	113	41	8	8	10	43	—	1	1	1	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	36	10	4	4	—	2	—	6	—	1	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	39	18	3	2	—	6	—	—	—	—	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement.	38	18	—	1	1	18	—	—	—	—	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	242	145	41	20	—	34	—	2	—	1	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد الشيخوخة
Senility	1,008	317	133	76	173	208	5	26	16	40	
Suicide	18	10	—	1	—	2	1	1	1	2	انتحار
Homicide	52	18	4	2	11	35	2	4	—	3	قتل
Accidental deaths	416	199	13	44	6	154	—	4	—	2	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,408	2,053	150	605	594	2,171	179	284	372	900	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام
سوريا

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 2.

جدول رقم ٢

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع الوفيات	Mohafaza المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Total	10,403	7,452	913	813	1,200	4,436	208	340	227	736	المجموع
Typhoid	56	36	5	3	—	6	—	2	2	1	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	حمى لمفية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	40	18	2	3	7	10	—	—	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	8	1	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	38	17	6	1	4	7	—	1	—	—	دفتري (خناق دفتريائي)
Influenza	28	4	—	—	16	5	3	—	—	—	انفلونزا وافدة مختلطة
Plague	10	5	—	—	—	4	1	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	109	65	2	7	2	32	2	9	—	—	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	26	2	3	5	—	17	—	—	—	1	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphlis	4	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	الزهري
Malaria	56	4	6	—	14	29	3	—	—	—	حمى مرابية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	12	6	—	1	—	5	—	—	—	1	امراض سارية غير ملاكر

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 3 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع الحالات	Mohafazat المحافظات: Damascus دمشق	Homs حمص	Hama حماة	Latakia اللاذقية	Aleppo حلب	Al Hasakah الحسكة	Deir ez-Zor دير الزور	Suweida السويداء	Der'a درعا	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	299	181	21	14	9	108	6	3	—	1	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	30	3	—	1	3	14	—	—	—	—	اورام غير خبيثة واورام غير معينة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetes mellitus	55	21	3	3	—	13	—	—	—	—	البول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	57	21	0	3	1	32	—	—	—	—	التسمم المزمن او الحاد بالكحول والمخدر
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	148	120	—	5	2	8	—	—	—	1	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	169	86	3	10	2	59	1	4	—	1	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل دماغي ازيف دماغي بسبب نزيف او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	280	153	24	16	32	72	—	—	—	3	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	31	15	1	6	1	28	1	1	—	—	امراض القلب
Diseases of the heart	1,044	949	90	96	57	601	15	23	3	11	
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	35	11	—	3	1	12	—	—	—	—	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	615	423	26	20	22	110	6	2	1	5	ذات الشعبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,107	806	187	36	26	268	13	16	6	20	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	140	82	—	13	15	22	1	3	—	1	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,727	1,668	273	117	59	494	26	50	5	45	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٤

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1954

Table No. 3 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat									نوع المرض
	مجموع المحافظات	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakah	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Suweida	درعا Dir'a	
Appendicitis	82	38	3	—	3	6	2	—	1	—	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	230	144	9	11	5	61	—	—	—	—	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	180	94	1	10	20	32	—	—	—	1	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	302	126	15	14	12	123	2	4	1	3	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	60	13	1	1	9	32	—	—	2	—	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	35	12	13	2	3	3	—	—	—	—	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	41	20	4	1	2	11	1	2	—	—	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissue, bones and organs of movement.	15	12	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام وانسجة الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	325	248	24	9	8	21	1	3	1	—	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد الشيخوخة
Senility	904	295	125	62	121	237	6	35	6	27	
Suicide	23	13	—	1	3	6	—	—	—	—	انتحار
Homicide	103	68	1	6	10	17	6	—	—	—	قتل
Accidental deaths	342	127	8	24	5	144	11	9	11	3	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	5,537	1,881	64	213	779	1,704	97	189	187	612	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1951

Table No. 4.

جدول رقم ٤

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (years) الاعمار (بالسنوات) من ٠ - ١ From 0-1	من ١ - ٤ From 1-4	من ٥ - ١٤ From 5-14	من ١٥ - ٣٠ From 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	المرض
Total	16,305	2223	2,217	1,060	1,973	8,922	المجموع
Typhoid	79	5	25	22	17	12	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى تشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	3	—	3	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	44	15	25	2	1	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	53	21	15	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	24	7	13	7	—	2	دفتري (خناق دفتريائي)
Influenza	26	4	2	4	2	14	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	146	1	8	11	50	76	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	65	5	4	9	23	24	تدرن غير ماذكر
Siphilis	7	—	—	—	1	6	الزهري
Malaria	124	22	25	16	24	37	حمى مرزقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	23	3	5	7	6	2	امراض سارية غير ماذكر
Cancer and other malignant tumours	225	1	1	2	13	209	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	16	—	1	2	2	11	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليسا صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	1	—	—	1	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabitis mellitus	52	—	1	1	2	48	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	46	4	2	—	1	41	التسمم التولي (التول المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	30	8	9	1	2	19	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	164	—	2	3	6	153	اختلاج الحركة التقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سدادة شريان او انتشر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	192	3	7	6	21	155	

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1951

Table No. 4 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٤ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار (بالسنوات) من ٠ – ١ From 0-1	من ١ – ٤ From 1-4	من ٥ – ١٤ From 5-14	من ١٥ – ٣٩ From 15-40	من ٤٠ وما فوق From 40 and over	المرض
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	64	5	6	6	10	37	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,260	11	6	37	84	1,171	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	69	9	4	5	10	41	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	575	229	165	17	24	41	ذات الشعبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,159	462	220	97	65	345	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	73	13	20	7	12	21	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,306	1,179	722	162	40	143	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	19	—	—	1	9	9	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	128	8	8	10	24	138	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	95	20	12	5	16	34	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	227	4	17	15	12	179	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	84	1	1	—	8	74	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	30	—	1	3	12	14	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	28	—	—	—	6	22	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissue, bones and organ of movement.	33	5	2	6	6	14	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	244	223	5	—	1	15	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد الشيخوخة
Senility	897	—	—	—	—	897	
Suicide	18	—	—	—	10	6	انتحار
Homicide	65	1	—	3	38	22	قتل
Accidental deaths	444	88	40	73	109	133	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,284	915	1,028	1,089	1,306	2,946	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

NOTE : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths.As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at beduin centres, to register death occurrences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus supplied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى الارقام المنشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من اطباء الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات التي تحدث في هذه القرى والمراكز لدى هذا الشخص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣
NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

TYPE OF DISEASE	الجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار بالسنوات 0 - 1	1 - 4	5 - 14	15 - 29	From 30 and over من ٣٠ وما فوق	الامراض
Total	17,706	3,700	2,439	1,627	1,367	7,313	المجموع
Typhoid	68	8	12	27	8	13	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نشبية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	1	1	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	3	1	2	—	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	1	—	—	—	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	10	5	4	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	47	17	25	4	—	1	دفتري (خناق دفتريائي)
Influenza	20	5	6	3	1	5	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	244	3	12	13	93	123	التدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	35	—	2	5	11	20	التدرن غير ملاكر
Syphilis	2	—	1	—	—	1	الزهري
Malaria	62	16	14	21	10	21	حمى مرزفية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	8	—	2	3	—	3	امراض سارية غير ملاكر عضية وطفيلية
Cancer and other malignant tumours	280	—	2	4	22	271	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	19	1	—	1	4	13	اورام غير خبيثة او اورام لها صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	2	—	—	—	—	2	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetis mellitus	34	—	—	2	3	29	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	92	1	2	1	2	86	التسمم التولي (التول المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	42	12	3	1	3	23	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	229	2	5	3	15	204	اختلاج الحركة التقدم وشلل عام
Meningitis non-meningococcal	270	5	6	7	15	237	نزيف دماغي سدادة شريانية او تخثر الدم في الدماغ

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Age (in years)					الامراض
	المجموع	٠ - ١ 0 - 1	١ - ٤ 1 - 4	٥ - ١٤ 5 - 14	١٥ - ٢٩ 15 - 29	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	50	1	5	3	4	37	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,658	18	11	50	95	1,484	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	50	2	1	8	5	34	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	508	283	132	27	11	55	ذات القصبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	699	337	238	70	34	22	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	89	14	22	3	5	40	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,036	1,511	782	131	51	211	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	16	2	—	1	3	10	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	518	202	38	21	45	211	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	101	45	6	5	5	39	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	305	5	18	29	44	215	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	113	3	4	3	14	89	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	26	1	—	—	15	10	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	29	1	1	2	16	9	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organ of movement.	38	12	8	2	1	15	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	242	232	2	2	—	6	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	1,003	—	—	—	—	1,003	الشيخوخة
Suicide	18	—	—	2	4	12	انتحار
Homicide	82	1	5	3	34	39	قتل
Accidental deaths	416	19	55	75	132	135	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,408	982	1,075	1,096	1,282	2,971	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

Note : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths. As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at Beddain centres, to register death occurences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus applied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى ارقام المنشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من اطباء الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات التي تحدث في هذه القرى والمراكز ادى هذا النقص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 6

جدول رقم ٦

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار بالسنوات ٠ - ١ 0-1	١ - ٤ 1-4	٥ - ١٤ 5-14	١٥ - ٢٠ 15-20	من ٢٠ وما فوق From 20 and over	المرض
Total	16,403	3,929	2,143	1,436	1,538	7,257	المجموع
Typhoid	56	6	15	12	15	7	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	1	1	—	—	—	—	حمى تشبية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	40	24	14	2	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	—	—	1	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	8	5	2	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	36	15	14	3	3	1	دفتري (خناق دفتريالي)
Influenza	28	12	11	—	—	5	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	10	—	—	1	1	8	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	109	4	9	8	32	56	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	28	3	3	4	3	15	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphlis	4	1	—	—	1	2	الزهري
Malaria	56	21	16	4	3	12	حمى مرزغية (الجرداء)
Other infectious diseases	13	3	3	—	1	6	امراض سارية غير ملاكر
Cancer and other malignant tumours	336	1	3	13	21	298	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	20	1	—	1	3	15	اورام غير خبيثة واورام لها صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	2	—	—	—	—	2	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabitis mellitus	51	—	—	1	3	47	الذبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	57	1	4	1	8	43	التسمم الغولي (الغول المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisonings	142	8	3	3	8	120	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	166	—	1	2	6	157	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام
Meningitis (non-meningococcal)	289	13	3	4	10	259	تزيف دماغي سدادة شريانية او تخثر الدم في الدماغ

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

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Table No. 6 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٦ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	الجموع Total	Age (in years) (الاعمار بالسنوات) ٠ - ١ 0-1	١ - ٤ 1-4	٥ - ١٤ 5-14	١٥ - ٣٠ 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق Form 30 and over	المرض
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	51	7	5	3	15	21	راض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,684	27	17	41	123	1,636	راض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	28	2	1	—	3	22	ية امراض جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	615	305	148	26	9	49	ت القصبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,197	451	262	86	53	258	ت الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than tuberculosis	160	17	12	6	8	97	يةامراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,727	1,782	687	81	39	138	سهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	52	5	2	9	16	120	تهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	230	5	5	20	31	169	راض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	160	22	17	10	26	85	ية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	302	15	22	14	24	227	تهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	60	—	—	3	5	52	ية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	38	1	1	5	18	13	طن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	41	1	—	1	13	27	ية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement	18	2	8	2	1	5	راض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام والاعضاء المحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births and diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	325	325	—	—	—	—	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	904	—	—	—	—	904	شيخوخة
Suicide	23	1	—	3	6	13	نتحار
Homicide	103	2	9	17	33	42	تل
Accidental deaths	342	6	52	84	52	118	وت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	5,337	782	796	961	867	2,331	سباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

Note : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths. As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at bedouin centres, to register death occurences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus supplied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى ارقام المنشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من اطباء الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات التي تحدث في هذه القرى والمراكز ادى هذا النقص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الامراض والمحافظات ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1951.

Table No. 7 — جدول رقم ٧

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total No. of patients	Diseases											الامراض	المحافظات
		العين Optical	القلب والصدر Heart and lungs	الهضم والامعاء Digestive system	العصبي Nervous system	البولية التناسلية Urinary and genital	الجلدية Skin	الجراحية Surgical	الافرنجية Syphilis	الملاريا Malaria	الدرنية Tuberculosis	الثارية Infectious	السائرة Dysentery	
All Mohafazat	753,462	67,354	110,706	117,396	55,049	26,005	68,230	67,129	8,695	113,196	10,905	5,296	81,535	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	267,476	33,902	46,341	51,369	20,361	13,791	28,334	34,016	1,121	30,616	3,179	1,304	2,612	دمشق
Homs	169,082	10,595	10,749	8,416	5,906	1,523	7,284	9,054	491	14,125	3,149	987	27,448	حمص
Hama	30,187	1,542	5,180	6,344	3,761	2,149	1,931	3,194	915	5,347	130	69	375	حماة
Latakia	103,964	7,057	9,902	13,402	7,252	1,583	10,853	5,419	532	19,984	269	267	27,445	اللاذقية
Aleppo	136,388	21,016	22,791	20,710	8,677	4,026	10,005	8,407	4,531	23,033	3,184	1,931	9,368	حلب
Al-Hasakah	15,442	1,795	2,027	1,852	1,336	676	1,822	1,691	137	3,704	56	4	549	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	15,370	2,305	1,822	1,882	678	850	1,017	1,937	614	2,635	210	72	750	دير الزور
Suwida	29,916	3,096	4,869	5,586	4,093	655	2,592	1,136	156	3,986	90	737	1,592	السويداء
Tal'a	44,028	6,376	6,124	7,145	2,881	1,026	4,073	5,275	145	5,771	636	264	1,096	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

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المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الامراض والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1952.

Table No. 8.

جدول رقم ٨

All Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى Total of Patients	Diseases												الامراض	المحافظات
		الربو Asthma	الكلية والمثانة Kidney and Bladder	الحمى والملاريا Malarious fevers	الحمى Fevers	الروماتيزم المفاصل Rheumatism and gout	الملاريا Malaria	الجراحية Surgical	الافرنجية Syphilis	الزهرية Malaria	الدرنية Tuberculosis	الثارية Intestinal	الثائرة Dysentery		
Total	637,420	76,881	109,394	117,341	60,500	20,900	64,397	60,225	6,000	95,706	6,518	3,901	95,708	مجموع المحافظات	
Damascus	300,250	34,954	42,000	50,700	25,000	12,674	26,998	26,703	350	22,843	1,300	1,374	2,308	دمشق	
Homs	78,770	7,724	8,771	6,800	4,743	1,397	5,921	9,334	304	13,080	6	47	20,708	حمص	
Hama	34,521	3,745	6,896	10,300	4,400	2,207	2,042	2,214	530	3,170	17	9	837	حماة	
Latakia	119,770	7,979	16,300	10,900	8,200	2,671	13,827	6,212	760	22,055	473	801	25,622	اللاذقية	
Aleppo	109,000	8,900	18,000	16,011	8,797	5,159	7,696	8,979	3,375	17,799	3,417	1,590	2,81 0	حلب	
Al-Hassakeh	2,897	154	312	416	133	67	178	150	4	790	2	33	438	الحسكة	
Deir-es-Zor	13,740	2,320	1,730	1,770	800	478	1,400	2,165	544	3,362	407	85	1,151	دير الزور	
Sweida	22,504	4,600	3,287	4,700	2,047	542	2,042	1,320	49	1,91[illegible]	115	141	770	السويداء	
Dir'a	54,600	5,900	7,344	9,400	4,883	1,011	4,096	6,032	125	10,661	131	212	1,334	درعا	

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الأمراض والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1953.

Table No. 9

جدول رقم ٩

Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى Total of Patients	Diseases												الامراض	المحافظات
		العين Optical	القلب والصدر Heart and lungs	الهضم والقناة Digestive system	العصبي Nervous system	البولية التناسلية Urinary and genital	الجلدية Skin	الجراحية Surgical	الانزيمية Systemic	الروماتية Rheumatic	الدرنية Tuberculosis	الثارية Infectious	الثارة Contagious		
All Mohafazat	654,034	67,201	109,070	122,717	54,679	25,081	54,863	91,820	2,730	50,958	8,135	7,156	63,555	مجموع المحافظات	
Damascus	202,664	27,039	40,364	51,167	20,219	12,473	21,424	58,114	383	21,189	2,830	3,578	3,447	دمشق	
Homs	81,427	7,310	10,081	7,487	5,717	1,886	5,127	7,368	54	13,513	7	114	22,335	حمص	
Hama	43,311	1,826	8,773	11,576	5,469	2,484	2,718	2,520	655	3,638	38	212	3,102	حماة	
Latakia	84,582	5,845	12,786	13,149	7,210	1,423	8,476	4,450	90	16,395	392	168	23,349	اللاذقية	
Aleppo	105,702	7,221	18,200	20,606	8,201	4,910	7,105	8,890	1,153	18,219	2,974	2,586	6,350	حلب	
Al-Hassakah	11,050	849	1,590	2,301	714	125	747	673	8	2,474	2	78	1,495	الحسكة	
Deir-ez-Zor	22,366	4,081	2,890	3,226	771	877	2,334	3,159	457	2,494	614	301	302	دير الزور	
Swaida	15,123	2,440	2,253	3,987	1,437	470	1,677	201	1	888	17	15	1,677	السويداء	
Dir'a	87,842	10,580	8,734	9,305	4,941	593	5,255	6,436	24	9,118	321	197	1,728	درعا	

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1951

Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	أطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	732,452	204,879	257,055	270,554	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	267,476	65,202	93,460	108,814	دمشق
Homs	109,838	31,769	36,800	41,117	حمص
Hama	30,197	6,269	11,088	12,540	حماة
Latakia	103,964	29,556	33,130	41,314	اللاذقية
Aleppo	136,309	34,441	52,923	49,104	حلب
Al-Hassakeh	15,442	4,912	5,010	5,520	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	15,370	4,966	5,371	5,013	دير الزور
Sweida	28,910	9,747	6,640	12,523	السويداء
Der'a	44,038	17,676	12,723	13,639	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1952

Table No. 11

جدول رقم ١١

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	اطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	687,420	185,769	200,808	265,852	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	209,225	61,223	38,595	109,047	دمشق
Homs	78,776	23,981	27,627	27,172	حمص
Hama	34,631	7,818	15,145	11,670	حماة
Latakia	119,770	30,974	33,314	44,482	اللاذقية
Aleppo	100,033	27,326	37,233	35,424	حلب
Al-Hasakeh	2,607	809	940	858	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	15,740	4,292	4,089	7,359	دير الزور
Sweida	22,504	7,485	6,111	8,928	السويداء
Dir'a	54,059	15,903	17,302	20,854	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

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المرضى المالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1953

Table No. 22

جدول رقم ١٢

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	اطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	694,024	135,424	225,600	232,990	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	262,564	63,703	88,059	110,812	دمشق
Homs	81,427	34,350	20,049	27,028	حمص
Hama	48,211	9,005	15,251	23,954	حماة
Latakia	94,298	34,543	20,328	40,727	اللاذقية
Aleppo	105,708	25,324	42,422	34,007	حلب
Al-Hassakah	11,055	3,900	3,973	4,182	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	22,336	5,527	6,305	10,574	دير الزور
Suwaida	15,123	5,548	5,790	3,780	السويداء
Der'a	57,842	17,569	13,645	21,628	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

حركة المرضى المعالجين في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الامراض ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASE, 1951

Table No. 13 — جدول رقم ١٣

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	Total No. of patients (1)	DISEASES					المحافظات	المستشفيات
			Ordinary (2)	Infectious	Surgical	Optical and ear	Mental and throat		
		مجموع عدد المرضى (١)	الامراض						
			العادية (١)	السارية	الجراحية	البصرية والجلدية	العقلية والعصبية		
Total	—	31,578	12,211	2,196	15,722	843	594	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	12,691	3,451	296	8,770	182	—	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	366	—	—	—	366	—	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	490	—	—	—	—	490	»	» ابن سينا
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	183	—	183	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	»	581	—	—	581	—	—	»	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	165	—	165	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن الوليد
Infectious disease hospital	»	213	—	213	—	—	—	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,372	857	107	408	—	—	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	901	428	116	356	1	—	السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	2,363	1,233	151	977	1	—	حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	3,078	1,446	341	1,271	20	—	اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	1,821	1,337	213	254	17	—	»	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,021	363	4	654	—	—	حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	2,537	2,509	10	—	—	18	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Biqlin Hospital	»	311	—	—	—	311	—	»	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	»	2,119	20	—	2,099	—	—	»	» الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	233	—	233	—	—	—	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	»	230	—	144	—	—	86	»	» الحميات
Al-Bab Hospital	»	65	60	—	5	—	—	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	510	247	—	228	35	—	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al Hasak... Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	429	290	30	129	—	—	الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.

1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.
4) Including optical cases at the Watani Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقون من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، المخلايب والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة
(٤) وتشمل الامراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

الصحة والاسعاف العام

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الامراض ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASES, 1952

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Name of Hospital	Mohafaza	Total No. of patients (1)	DISEASES					المحافظات	المستشفيات
			Gallbladder (2)	Infectious	Surgical	Syphilis and Skin	Mental and Nervous		
		الفروع عدد المرضى (١)	القادة (٤)	الباردة	الجراحية	الزهرية والجلدية	العقلية والعصبية		
Total		31,674	12,668	3,107	14,256	1,971	672	—	المجموع
Wataní Hospital	Damascus	12,778	3,967	315	8,236	260	—	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Sabr Hospital	"	264	—	—	—	264	—	"	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	"	672	—	—	—	—	672	"	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious diseases hospital	"	517	—	517	—	—	—	"	مستشفى الامراض السارية (المحجر الصحي)
Ibn Nafis Sanatori.	"	403	—	403	—	—	—	"	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	"	250	97	—	153	—	—	"	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	"	158	—	158	—	—	—	"	مصح ابن الوليد
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,063	901	333	369	—	—	"	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	336	258	71	195	2	—	درعا	" السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	2,170	980	196	994	—	—	السويداء	" حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	2,744	1,335	219	1,160	30	—	حمص	" اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	"	1,488	1,275	97	118	3	—	اللاذقية	" طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,190	499	38	653	—	—	"	" حماة
Wataní Hospital (3)	Aleppo	2,291	2,291	—	—	—	—	حماة	المستشفى الوطني (٣)
Al-Hamiyat Hospital for infect. diseases	"	417	—	417	—	—	—	حلب	مستشفى الحميات للامراض السارية
Siphlis Hospital	"	480	—	—	—	480	—	"	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Raid Hospital (3)	"	2,050	—	—	2,050	—	—	"	" الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	"	334	—	334	—	—	—	"	" ابن رشد
Al-Bab Hospital	"	43	37	—	6	—	—	"	" الباب
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	952	576	1	176	39	—	"	" دير الزور
Al Hasakah Hospital	Al-Hasakah	620	422	8	146	14	—	دير الزور	" الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.

1) Including patients of the previous year.

2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.

3) Including the surgical section.

4) Including optical cases at the Wataní Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية

(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، المجاذيب والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف ،

(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

(٤) وتشمل الامراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الامراض ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASE, 1953

Table No. 15

جدول رقم ١٥

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	المستشفيات	المحافظات	Total No. of patients (1) مجموع عدد المرضى (١)	DISEASES الامراض				
					Ordinary (4) العادية (٤)	Infectious السارية	Surgical الجراحية	Skin and Venereal الزهرية والجلدية	Mental and Nervous العقلية والعصبية
Total	—	المجموع	—	32,069	11,808	3,410	14,907	1,213	731
Watani Hospital	Damascus	المستشفى الوطني	دمشق	12,199	3,353	179	8,408	250	—
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	مستشفى ابن زهر	»	289	—	—	—	289	—
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	مستشفى ابن سينا	»	615	—	—	—	—	615
Infectious disease hospital	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية	»	508	—	508	—	—	—
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	مصح ابن النفيس	»	360	—	360	—	—	—
The Surgical Hospital	»	المستشفى الجراحي	»	190	39	—	151	—	—
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	مصح ابن الوليد	»	190	—	190	—	—	—
Dir'a Hospital	Dir's	مستشفى درعا	درعا	1,814	951	258	605	—	—
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	مستشفى السويداء	السويداء	626	281	88	258	—	—
Homs Hospital	Homs	» حمص	حمص	2,362	1,238	230	873	—	—
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	» اللاذقية	اللاذقية	3,187	1,696	263	1,305	23	—
Tartus Hospital	»	» طرطوس	»	1,240	1,082	41	115	2	—
Hama Hospital	Hama	» حماة	حماة	1,321	474	81	718	—	—
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	المستشفى الوطني (٢)	حلب	1,753	1,719	7	27	—	—
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	»	مستشفى الحميات	»	930	55	875	—	—	—
Bohlis Hospital	»	مستشفى الزهري	»	607	—	—	—	607	—
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	»	مستشفى الرازي (٣)	»	2,175	14	—	2,161	—	—
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	» ابن رشد	»	373	—	373	—	—	—
Al-Dweirina Hospital	»	» الدويرينا	»	116	—	—	—	—	116
Al-Bab Hospital	»	» قضاء الباب	»	1	1	—	—	—	—
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	» دير الزور	دير الزور	634	369	—	226	39	—
Al Hasakeh Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	» الحسكة	الحسكة	662	485	10	161	3	—

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.
4) Including optical cases at the Watani Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : للامراض العينية ، والمجاذيب ، ولامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة
(٤) وتشمل امراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
743
164

743
144

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥١

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENTS HOSPITALS 1951

Table No. 18

جدول رقم ١٦

Name of Hospital	Mohafaza	مجموع عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: شفاء Cured	وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون لسنة التالية Patients remaining next year	عدد أيام المكث No. of day in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total		1,890	31,578	29,008	1,113	1,458	558,954		المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	435	12,691	11,730	574	387	143,506	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	«	75	266	256	—	10	2,795	«	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	«	250	490	157	19	314	104,137	«	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious disease hospital	«	50	213	198	6	9	2,966	«	مستشفى الأمراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	«	85	183	61	9	113	23,822	«	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	«	50	581	566	1	14	8,001	«	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	«	75	165	64	2	99	35,724	«	مصح ابن الوليد الجغرافي
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	50	1,372	1,291	42	39	18,835	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	50	901	850	36	15	10,416	« السويداء	«
Homs Hospital	Homs	75	2,362	2,237	59	66	25,900	« حمص	«
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	120	3,078	2,890	110	78	32,065	« اللاذقية	«
Tartus Hospital	«	40	1,821	1,778	24	19	11,980	« طرطوس	«
Hama Hospital	Hama	80	1,021	949	27	35	22,415	« حماة	«
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	150	2,537	2,407	46	84	31,180	« حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	«	40	320	198	13	19	5,473	«	مستشفى الحميات
Siphlis Hospital	«	40	211	209	—	2	2,310	«	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	«	100	2,119	1,970	107	42	20,905	«	« الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rashd Hospital	«	40	233	116	13	90	38,977	«	« ابن رشد
Al-Bab Hospital	«	10	65	65	—	—	1,084	«	« قضاء الباب
Deir-es-Zor Hospital	Deir-es-Zor	80	510	493	7	30	8,823	« دير الزور	« دير الزور
Al Hasakeh Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	25	439	413	12	4	3,360	« الحسكة	« الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى الباقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، العقلية والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS 1952

Table No. 17 — جدول رقم ١٧

Name of Hospital	Mohafaat	مجموع عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجون Departing Patients: شفاء Cured	وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون للسنة التالية Patients remaining next year	عدد أيام المكث No. of day in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	3,400	31,674	28,813	1,306	1,499	330,320	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	495	12,778	11,790	641	347	[illegible],037	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	«	20	244	240	—	4	2,543	«	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	«	280	572	193	22	357	120,923	«	« ابن سينا
Infectious disease Ibn Nafis Sanatorium hospital	«	50	517	450	14	17	7,845	«	مستشفى الأمراض السارية (المحجر الصحي)
The Surgical Hospital	«	200	428	258	19	128	28,254	«	مصح ابن النفيس
Ibn-al-Wahd Sanatorium	«	100	350	342	—	—	3,054	«	المستشفى الجراحي
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	100	158	55	2	101	30,037	«	مصح ابن الوليد (الجذام)
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	50	1,600	1,513	86	35	12,503	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Homs Hospital	Homs	100	526	497	12	17	6,369	السويداء	« السويداء
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	100	2,170	2,087	70	63	21,328	حمص	« حمص
Tartus Hospital	«	150	2,744	2,549	109	86	30,811	اللاذقية	« اللاذقية
Hama Hospital	Hama	60	1,464	1,430	11	23	10,176	«	« طرطوس
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	80	1,190	1,130	32	28	14,816	حماة	« حماة
Al-Hamiyat Hospital for infect. diseases	«	120	2,391	2,186	74	81	26,218	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Siphlis Hospital	«	40	417	383	12	22	9,561	«	مستشفى الحميات للأمراض السارية
Ar-Rasi Hospital	«	30	489	486	—	3	2,786	«	مستشفى الرصافي
Ibn Rushd Hospital	«	100	2,030	1,909	97	44	20,977	«	مستشفى الرازي
Al-Bab Hospital	«	120	334	222	17	95	31,934	«	« ابن رشد
Dair-es-Zor Hospital	Dair-es-Zor	10	43	43	—	—	640	«	« الباب
Al Hasakah Hospital	Al-Hasakah	80	582	556	9	17	8,108	دير الزور	« دير الزور
		40	620	601	9	10	3,589	الحسكة	« الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والإسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الأمراض العينية ، العقليه والأمراض الحلق والأذن والأنف

الصحة والإسعاف العام

HERALDE

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS 1953

Table No. 18 — جدول رقم ١٨

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	Number of beds (مجموع عدد الأسرة)	Number of patients (1) (مجموع المرضى (١))	Outgoing Patients: Cured (المرضى الخارجون: شفاء)	Outgoing Patients: Relieved (المرضى الخارجون: راحة)	Patients remaining next year (المرضى الباقون للسنة الثانية)	No. of days in hospital (عدد أيام المكث)	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	2,600	32,069	29,188	1,242	1,639	613,478	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	435	12,190	11,202	632	356	154,199	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	25	289	282	—	7	2,921	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	350	615	240	24	351	127,312	»	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious diseases hospital	»	50	506	476	24	6	5,536	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	200	359	196	18	175	59,810	»	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	»	200	190	165	1	24	3,130	»	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	120	190	76	3	111	37,346	»	مصح ابن الوليد «الجلاء»
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	100	1,814	1,738		30	13,702	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Suweida Hospital	Suweida	80	635	573	15	37	8,805	» السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	100	2,362	2,226	81	56	22,000	» حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	180	3,187	2,990	[illegible]	81	33,306	» اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	60	1,240	1,193	[illegible]	36	8,463	» طرطوس	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	80	1,221	1,150	[illegible]	28	16,277	» حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	120	1,753	1,605	63	85	21,300	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	»	40	990	966	16	6	11,838	»	» الحميات
Siphilis Hospital	»	20	607	601	—	6	3,445	»	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Rasi Hospital (3)	»	100	2,175	2,022	100	53	19,974	»	مستشفى الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	120	373	358	9	106	39,033	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Dweirina Hospital	»	100	116	42	7	67	12,860	»	» الدويرينا
Al-Bab Hospital	»	10	1	1	—	—	8	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-es-Zor Hospital	Deir-es-Zor	80	634	606	9	19	8,182	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al-Hasakeh Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	40	663	639	14	9	4,039	» الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى الباقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، والعقلية ، والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

الامراض السارية التي بلغ عنها حسب الشهور ١٩٥١

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MONTHS, 1951

Table No. 19

جدول رقم ١٩

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان April	أيار May	حزيران June	تموز July	آب Aug.	أيلول Sept.	تشرين ١ Oct.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	كانون ١ Dec.	الامراض
		Months of 1951 شهور سنة ١٩٥١												
Total	2209	816	552	136	265	177	98	126	194	103	200	194	99	المجموع
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	148	63	10	21	20	18	11	3	1	4	1	—	3	جدري مائي (حماق)
Typhus	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	تيفوس
Recurrent fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى راجعة
Measles	524	204	189	67	145	34	34	63	16	—	20	2	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	100	7	3	6	3	5	1	1	2	7	21	30	16	خناق دفتيريائي
Whooping cough	369	19	22	15	50	52	42	*23	26	11	34	17	4	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	157	32	21	8	10	7	7	6	11	4	*16	14	11	ابو كعب (تكاف)
Erysipelas	22	—	—	1	2	6	—	—	2	3	3	*4	1	حمرة
Typhoid fever	640	90	15	21	28	24	11	27	63	74	105	135	56	تيفوئيد واشباهها
Lethargic encephalitis	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	15	3	—	3	—	3	2	—	2	1	—	1	—	التهاب السحايا الدماغ الشوكي
Relapsing	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة واقدة مختلطة
Dysentery	3	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	زحار (زحار عصوي)
Puerperal fever	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر (البهشة)
Anthrax	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	*1	—	جمرة

Source : Ministry of Health.

* Corrected figures

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

* (ارقام معدلة)

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الامراض السارية الكثير منها حسب الشهور ١٩٥٢

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MONTHS, 1952.

Table No. 20 — جدول رقم ٢٠

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Months of 1952												الامراض
	الجموع	كانون٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان April	ايار May	حزيران June	تموز July	آب Aug.	ايلول Sept.	تشرين١ Oct.	تشرين٢ Nov.	كانون١ Dec.	
Total	2,006	128	224	152	262	216	110	184	114	62	76	87	280	الجموع
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	148	8	6	27	40	17	19	10	4	6	—	1	9	جدري مائي (حمالة)
Typhus	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	تيفوس (حمى نمشية)
Recurrent fever	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	حمى راجعة
Measles	87	30	—	2	3	2	7	4	6	4	1	9	18	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	128	14	14	10	6	5	—	10	6	14	22	9	17	خناق دفتيريا
Whooping cough	454	19	70	35	123	77	45	51	20	13	5	3	9	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	274	20	75	27	37	30	7	17	12	7	—	6	20	ابو كعب (تكاف)
Erysipelas	5	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	حمرة
Typhoid fever	770	66	65	65	89	67	32	87	40	37	43	35	120	تيفوئيد والشبيهها
Lethargic encephalitis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	20	2	1	5	5	5	—	3	1	2	—	—	—	التهاب السحايا الدماغي الشوكي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Dysentery	73	—	—	5	52	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	زلتارية (زحار مصوي)
Puerperal fever	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	6	—	—	1	1	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر (الهيضة)

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الامراض السارية الشهر حسب الشهور ١٩٥٣

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MONTHS, 1953

Table No. 21

جدول رقم ٢١

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	اذار Mar.	نيسان April	ايار May	حزيران June	تموز July	آب Aug.	ايلول Sept.	تشرين ١ Oct.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	كانون ١ Dec.	الامراض
		Months of 1953 شهور سنة ١٩٥٣												
Total	2,737	193	275	285	366	168	216	226	73	196	166	300	263	المجموع
Smallpox	3	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	100	4	12	3	15	16	13	11	1	5	3	7	7	جدري مائي
Typhus	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	تيفوس
Recurrent fever	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	—	حمى راجعة
Measles	781	27	50	97	113	78	127	77	34	59	20	25	44	حصبة
Scarlet fever	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	188	18	18	22	8	5	10	4	4	17	24	25	23	خناق
Whooping cough	319	53	2	16	7	21	8	58	6	5	—	54	89	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	411	53	92	56	61	11	7	7	4	7	5	55	53	ابو كعب
Erysipelas	3	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	حمرة
Typhoid fever	904	38	70	88	152	34	47	78	24	101	108	120	48	تيفوئيد
Lethargic encephalitis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	11	1	1	3	3	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	التهاب السحايا الدماغي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Dysentery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	زحار
Puerperal fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر
Anthrax	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	—	حمرة
Infantile Paralysis	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	شلل اطفال

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الامراض السارية التي بلغ عنها حسب المحافظات ١٩٥١

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 22 — جدول رقم ٢٢

TYPE OF DISEASE	مجموع المحافظات Total	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Lattakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakah	دير الزور Dier ez-Zor	السويداء Suwaida	درعا Der'a	الامراض
Total	2,289	857	99	41	222	509	25	57	141	268	المجموع
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	148	41	—	2	10	76	—	—	7	6	جدري مائي (حلاّل)
Typhus	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	تيفوس (حمى نمشية)
Recurrent fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى راجعة
Measles	534	177	—	4	87	216	8	41	10	24	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	150	36	19	12	6	11	12	—	2	2	خناق دفتيريا
Whooping cough	269	204	—	5	53	36	—	10	1	—	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	157	82	—	—	27	5	3	4	32	9	ابو كعب (كاف)
Erysipelas	22	6	—	—	1	2	—	—	13	—	حمرة
Typhoid fever	640	203	70	17	80	139	3	2	74	12	تيفوئيد وشبه تيفوئيد
Lethargic encephalitis	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	15	9	—	1	5	—	1	—	1	—	التهاب السحايا الشوكي الدموي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مخططة
Dysentery	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	زحار (زحار دموي)
Puerperal fever	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر (الهيضة)
Anthrax	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جمرة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الامراض السارية المبلغ عنها حسب المحافظات ١٩٥٤

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MOHAFAZAT, 1954

Table No. 22 — جدول رقم ٢٢

TYPE OF DISEASE	مجموع المحافظات Total	Mohafazat: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Lattakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al hasakah	دير الزور Der ez-zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	الامراض — المحافظات: درعا	السويداء	دير الزور	الحسكة	حلب	اللاذقية	حماة	حمص	دمشق	مجموع المحافظات	الامراض
Total	2,050	1,050	122	37	279	361	28	23	96	156	156	96	23	28	361	279	37	122	1,050	2,050	المجموع
Smallpox	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	146	89	—	—	46	8	—	—	6	3	3	6	—	—	8	46	—	—	89	146	جدري مائي (حماق)
Typhus	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	تيفوس (حمى نشبية)
Recurrent fever	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	حمى راجعة
Measles	57	28	—	—	3	3	—	2	2	44	44	2	2	—	3	3	—	—	28	57	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	128	60	16	6	10	14	5	4	4	7	7	4	4	5	14	10	6	16	60	128	خناق دفتيريالي
Whooping cough	484	351	—	—	60	67	9	—	1	6	6	1	—	9	67	60	—	—	351	484	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	274	160	—	—	21	34	—	9	10	100	100	10	9	—	34	21	—	—	160	274	ابو كعب (نكاف)
Erysipelas	5	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	5	حمرة
Typhoid fever	770	375	110	34	55	204	—	—	24	25	25	24	—	—	204	55	34	110	375	770	تيفوئيد وأشباهها
Lethargic encephalitis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ الوبائي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	30	11	2	1	—	—	1	—	5	—	—	5	—	1	—	—	1	2	11	30	التهاب السحايا الدماغي الشوكي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Dysentery	75	69	2	2	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	2	2	69	75	زحار (زحار عصوي)
Puerperal fever	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	6	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	6	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر (الهيضة)

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الامراض السارية المخبر عنها حسب المحافظات ١٩٥٢

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 26

جدول رقم ٢٦

TYPE OF DISEASES	مجموع المحافظات Total	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Lattakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al hasakah	دير الزور Dier ez-zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	الامراض
Total	2,737	711	60	270	219	923	82	186	77	122	المجموع
Smallpox	3	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	100	35	—	8	30	22	3	—	3	—	جدري مائي
Typhus	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	تيفوس
Recurrent fever	5	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	3	حمى راجعة
Measles	751	181	40	90	101	208	3	20	3	91	حصبة
Scarlet fever	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	128	75	9	5	9	64	4	5	2	13	خناق
Whooping cough	319	141	—	120	21	1	—	30	—	5	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	411	71	—	4	13	41	71	108	42	61	ابو كعب
Erysipelas	3	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	حمرة
Typhoid fever	904	213	41	20	46	540	—	8	23	13	تيفوئيد
Lethargic encephalitis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	11	4	1	—	—	1	1	—	2	2	التهاب السحايا الشوكي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مخططة
Dysentery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	زحار
Puerperal fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	4	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء أصفر
Anthrax	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	جمرة
Infantile Paralysis	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	شلل الاطفال

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الفصل الرابع
التربية والتعليم

CHAPTER FOUR
EDUCATION

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نسبة موازنة المعارف الى الموازنة العامة ، ١٩٢٢ — ١٩٥٢

RATIO OF THE EDUCATION BUDGET TO THE GENERAL BUDGET, 1922 — 1952

Table No. 1

جدول رقم ١

Year	الموازنة العامة بالليرات السورية General Budget L.S.	موازنة المعارف بالليرات السورية Education Budget L.S.	النسبة المئوية Ratio per cent	السنة
1922	1,652,673	177,974	10.76	١٩٢٢
1924	4,206,717	364,620	8.67	١٩٢٤
1925	5,641,140	441,272	7.82	١٩٢٥
1926	8,041,055	663,922	8.26	١٩٢٦
1927	1,508,626	136,959	9.08	١٩٢٧
1928	3,343,806	194,442	5.82	١٩٢٨
1929	11,259,516	986,141	8.76	١٩٢٩
1930	9,449,086	1,064,669	11.27	١٩٣٠
1931	10,168,744	1,053,289	10.36	١٩٣١
1932	9,502,657	1,048,389	11.03	١٩٣٢
1933	8,464,587	1,077,295	12.73	١٩٣٣
1934	6,923,100	949,287	13.69	١٩٣٤
1935	7,232,365	966,346	13.36	١٩٣٥
1936	7,532,276	954,939	12.68	١٩٣٦
1937	8,353,500	1,228,185	14.71	١٩٣٧
1938	10,247,947	1,613,135	15.74	١٩٣٨
1939	11,352,470	1,843,223	16.23	١٩٣٩
1940	11,884,600	1,911,730	16.09	١٩٤٠
1941	12,602,100	2,372,623	18.71	١٩٤١
1942	22,500,000	3,838,591	17.06	١٩٤٢
1943	36,680,500	6,052,178	16.45	١٩٤٣
1944	69,945,846	7,498,823	10.71	١٩٤٤
1945	102,673,000	9,963,568	9.69	١٩٤٥
1946	129,704,000	14,127,268	10.89	١٩٤٦
1947	125,820,250	16,968,450	13.48	١٩٤٧
1948	127,909,000	20,459,400	16.00	١٩٤٨
1949	130,710,000	22,278,260	17.04	١٩٤٩
1950/51 (1)	215,720,000	38,752,000	17.96	(١) ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١
1951/52 (2)	265,000,000	49,759,000	18.78	(٢) ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢
1952	205,000,000	36,604,000	17.86	١٩٥٢

(1) Period 1.1.50 — 30.6.51
(2) Period 1.7.51 — 31.12.52

(١) المدة ١/١/١٩٥٠ — ٣٠/٦/١٩٥١
(٢) المدة ١/٧/١٩٥١ — ٣١/١٢/١٩٥٢

عدد المدارس الرسمية والأهلية والأجنبية ، سنوات ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL, AND FOREIGN SCHOOLS 1950/1951 — 1951/1952 — 1952/1953

Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

TYPE OF SCHOOL	1950/1951				1951/1952				1952/1953				نوع المدارس
	١٩٥٠/١٩٥١				١٩٥١/١٩٥٢				١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣				
	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	مختلطة Mixed	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	مختلطة Mixed	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	مختلطة Mixed	
Elementary Schools													**المدارس الابتدائية**
— Total	1,794	1324	310	160	2184	1635	369	180	2360	1810	304	366	ـ المجموع
— Government	1,472	1205	258	9	1850	1524	313	13	2064	1703	343	213	ـ الرسمية
— National	284	106	42	136	296	96	46	152	308	99	44	165	ـ الأهلية
— Foreign	38	13	10	15	38	13	10	15	27	8	7	12	ـ الأجنبية
Secondary Schools													**المدارس المتوسطة والاعدادية**
— Total	136	77	42	15	184	107	46	9	181	90	57	35	ـ المجموع
— Government	47	27	17	3	57	36	20	2	67	34	30	3	ـ الرسمية
— National	70	43	17	10	80	65	19	6	106	39	27	30	ـ الأهلية
— Foreign	18	7	9	2	18	7	9	2	18	6	10	2	ـ الأجنبية
Technical Schools (1)													**المدارس المهنية (١)**
— Total	15	11	4	—	13	11	2	—	14	12	1	1	ـ المجموع
— Government	11	10	1	—	11	10	1	—	12	11	1	—	ـ الرسمية
— National	3	1	2	—	2	1	1	—	2	1	—	1	ـ الأهلية
— Foreign	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ـ الأجنبية
Teachers Training College (Government) (2)	5	3	2	—	10	6	4	—	8	6	2	—	**دار المعلمين (٢) (الرسمية)**

Source : Ministry of Education.

(1) Including Agricultural Schools.

(2) In 1950 the Rural Teachers Training College was merged with the other Training Colleges

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(١) بما في ذلك المدارس الزراعية

(٢) ابتداء من عام ١٩٥٠ ادخلت دار المعلمين الريفية مع دور المعلمين الاخرى

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عدد الطلاب في عموم المدارس الرسمية والأهلية والأجنبية ، ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF PUPILS IN ALL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SCHOOLS, YEARS 1950/1951 — 1952/1953

Table No. 3 — جدول رقم ٣

TYPE OF SCHOOL	1950 — 1951 ١٩٥١ – ١٩٥٠			1951 — 1952 ١٩٥٢ – ١٩٥١			1952 — 1953 ١٩٥٣ – ١٩٥٢			نوع المدارس
	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	
Elementary Schools										**المدارس الابتدائية**
— Total	281,963	189,923	73,039	297,185	214,654	82,531	311,033	222,779	88,954	— المجموع
— Government	206,243	154,430	51,813	237,775	178,250	59,525	249,360	185,275	64,124	— الرسمية
— National	48,904	30,685	17,219	52,270	32,614	19,656	54,956	30,641	24,315	— الأهلية
— Foreign	6,715	3,808	2,907	7,140	3,820	3,320	6,717	3,360	3,459	— الأجنبية
Secondary Schools										**المدارس الثانوية**
— Total	34,874	26,403	8,471	42,521	32,308	10,213	47,670	36,243	11,427	— المجموع
— Government	22,269	16,539	5,730	26,237	19,314	6,923	27,144	19,990	7,154	— الرسمية
— National	10,378	8,577	1,801	13,602	11,305	2,297	17,801	14,785	3,016	— الأهلية
— Foreign	2,227	1,287	940	2,712	1,719	993	2,725	1,468	1,257	— الأجنبية
Technical Schools (*)										**المدارس المهنية (*)**
— Total	2,277	1,945	332	2,310	1,998	312	2,191	1,995	196	— المجموع
— Government	2,105	1,895	210	2,146	1,942	204	2,082	1,896	186	— الرسمية
— National	92	50	42	64	56	8	109	99	10	— الأهلية
— Foreign	80	—	80	—	—	—	—	—	—	— الأجنبية
Teachers Training College (Government)	965	653	312	1,232	788	444	1,255	721	534	**دور المعلمين — الرسمية**

Source : Ministry of Education.
(*) Including pupils in Agricultural Schools

المصدر : وزارة المعارف
(*) اضيف اليهم طلاب المدارس الزراعية

التربية والتعليم

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عدد الطلاب والاساتذة في المدارس الابتدائية الرسمية والاهلية والاجنبية في المحافظات السورية

لسنة الدراسية ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PUPILS, SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS IN GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, 1952/1953

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

Mohafaat	عدد التلاميذ Number of pupils			عدد المدارس Number of Schools				عدد الاساتذة No. of Teachers	المحافظات
	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	مختلطة Mixed		
Grand total	311,622	222,779	88,354	2,290	1,610	394	286	8,801	المجموع العام
Government Elementary School									الابتدائي الرسمي
— Total	249,399	185,275	64,124	2,064	1,503	342	219	6,528	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	70,259	46,199	24,060	368	229	108	31	1,774	ـ دمشق
— Homs	20,594	14,873	5,721	129	93	22	13	470	ـ حمص
— Hama	19,632	13,433	6,199	111	76	28	7	481	ـ حماة
— Latakia	35,533	27,567	7,966	431	291	48	92	839	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	55,431	43,816	11,635	439	376	59	4	1,557	ـ حلب
— Al-Hasakeh	8,074	6,863	1,211	195	170	11	14	333	ـ الحسكة
— Deir-es-Sur	10,961	8,833	2,128	117	99	17	1	345	ـ دير الزور
— Sweida	14,396	10,722	3,668	153	86	35	32	356	ـ السويداء
— Dir'a	14,905	12,953	1,952	121	83	14	24	341	ـ درعا
National Elementary School — total	54,526	34,215	20,641	308	99	44	165	2,013	الابتدائي الاهلي
— Damascus	17,166	11,239	5,927	96	34	12	50	575	ـ المجموع
— Homs	4,753	3,365	1,388	24	11	5	8	124	ـ دمشق
— Hama	2,374	1,764	610	14	4	1	9	76	ـ حمص
— Latakia	4,266	2,605	1,661	40	16	7	17	183	ـ حماة
— Aleppo	18,103	10,888	8,215	90	28	16	46	786	ـ اللاذقية
— Al-Hasakeh	5,341	3,195	2,146	24	—	—	24	176	ـ حلب
— Deir-es-Sur	675	415	260	7	2	—	5	39	ـ الحسكة
— Sweida	323	167	156	4	1	1	2	18	ـ دير الزور
— Dir'a	855	577	278	9	3	2	4	34	ـ السويداء
									ـ درعا
Foreign Elementary School									الابتدائي الاجنبي
— total	6,775	3,289	3,486	27	8	7	12	260	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	3,287	1,312	1,975	9	2	3	4	106	ـ دمشق
— Homs	433	313	120	5	1	—	4	21	ـ حمص
— Latakia	676	361	315	5	3	2	—	27	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	2,324	1,274	1,050	6	2	2	2	104	ـ حلب
— Dir'a	56	29	29	2	—	—	2	2	ـ درعا

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

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عدد الطلاب والمدرسين والمدرسين في المدارس الثانوية حسب انواع المدارس والمحافظات ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PUPILS, SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952 — 1953

Table No. 5 — جدول رقم ٥

MOHAFAZAT	الطلاب Pupils: المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المدارس Schools: المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	مختلطة Mixed	المدرسون Teachers	المحافظات
Grand total	44,579	33,242	11,337	181	99	57	25	3,150	المجموع العام
Government Schools									المدارس الرسمية
total	27,144	19,990	7,154	57	34	20	3	1,290	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	7,543	5,075	2,468	19	11	8	—	456	ـ دمشق
— Homs	2,145	1,482	663	4	3	1	—	82	ـ حمص
— Hama	2,940	2,233	707	6	4	2	—	128	ـ حماة
— Latakia	4,252	3,017	1,235	7	2	2	3	163	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	5,881	4,263	1,618	11	8	3	—	237	ـ حلب
— Al-Hasakah	567	486	81	3	2	1	—	47	ـ الحسكة
— Deir-ez-Zor	1,232	1,059	173	3	2	1	—	60	ـ دير الزور
— Sweida	1,523	1,398	125	2	1	1	—	56	ـ السويداء
— Dir'a	1,061	1,000	61	2	1	1	—	41	ـ درعا
National Schools —									المدارس الاهلية
total	17,861	14,795	3,016	106	59	37	20	1,827	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	6,468	4,920	1,548	30	17	11	2	677	ـ دمشق
— Homs	1,793	1,537	256	9	6	2	1	146	ـ حمص
— Hama	1,282	1,074	208	10	7	3	—	82	ـ حماة
— Latakia	4,625	3,946	679	22	11	7	15	304	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	2,670	2,389	281	15	10	4	1	232	ـ حلب
— Al-Hasakah	129	91	38	1	—	—	1	9	ـ الحسكة
— Deir-ez-Zor	225	225	—	5	5	—	—	26	ـ دير الزور
— Sweida	224	224	—	1	1	—	—	18	ـ السويداء
— Dir'a	365	389	16	2	2	—	—	34	ـ درعا
Foreign Schools —									المدارس الاجنبية
total	2,724	1,457	1,267	18	6	10	2	033	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	935	467	468	8	2	5	1	145	ـ دمشق
— Homs	95	95	—	1	1	—	—	13	ـ حمص
— Latakia	236	126	110	3	1	2	—	26	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	1,459	580	879	6	2	3	1	149	ـ حلب

Source : Ministry of Education. — المصدر وزارة المعارف

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على الشهادة الإبتدائية (*) ١٩٢٨ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE (*) 1928—1953

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Table No. 6 — جدول رقم ٦

YEAR	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	السنة
1928	624	462	162	١٩٢٨
1929	640	498	142	١٩٢٩
1930	556	453	103	١٩٣٠
1931	721	558	163	١٩٣١
1932	805	669	136	١٩٣٢
1933	996	715	281	١٩٣٣
1934	870	688	182	١٩٣٤
1935	1,036	817	219	١٩٣٥
1936	1,605	1,372	233	١٩٣٦
1937	1,692	1,320	372	١٩٣٧
1938	2,611	1,940	671	١٩٣٨
1939	2,496	1,958	538	١٩٣٩
1940	2,993	2,221	772	١٩٤٠
1941	2,512	1,891	621	١٩٤١
1942	3,661	2,704	957	١٩٤٢
1943	3,743	2,790	953	١٩٤٣
1944	4,829	3,581	1,248	١٩٤٤
1945	4,011	3,188	823	١٩٤٥
1946	6,690	5,279	1,411	١٩٤٦
1947	8,855	6,853	2,002	١٩٤٧
1948	9,196	7,259	1,937	١٩٤٨
1949	10,728	8,407	2,321	١٩٤٩
1950	14,945	11,626	3,319	١٩٥٠
1951	18,104	14,297	3,807	١٩٥١
1952	19,940	15,032	4,908	١٩٥٢
1953	26,342	20,556	5,786	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Education. — المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(*) قبل عام ١٩٢٨ كانت شهادات الدراسة الإبتدائية تعطى من قبل مدير المدرسة ، فاصبحت تمنح بعد ذلك من وزير المعارف

(*) Prior to 1928, this certificate was issued by the principals of schools but was thereafter granted by the Ministry of Education.

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عدد الحاصلين على الشهادة التوسطة حسب مراكز الامتحان ١٩٤٩ – ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE « BREVET » CERTIFICATE BY EXAMINATION CENTRES 1949 — 1952

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

END OF YEAR	مجموع المراكز Total All Centres	Examination Centres									مراكز الامتحان	في نهاية السنة
		دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hassakeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dera'a		
1949 — Total	1,990	713	248	172	321	490	45		—	—		١٩٤٩ – المجموع
— Males	1,626	570	208	144	259	408	42		—	—		– ذكور
— Females	364	139	40	28	62	91	3		—	—		– اناث
1950 — Total	2,406	949	281	234	368	434	96		—	—		١٩٥٠ – المجموع
— Males	1,859	697	228	189	303	366	84		—	—		– ذكور
— Females	549	252	53	45	65	116	11		—	—		– اناث
1951 — Total	3,630	1,429	366	280	574	863	138		—	—		١٩٥١ – المجموع
— Males	2,849	1,091	296	234	460	698	119		—	—		– ذكور
— Females	781	338	70	56	114	165	19		—	—		– اناث
1952 — Total	3,897	1,519	568	369	675	665	106		—	—		١٩٥٢ – المجموع
— Males	3,123	1,169	473	310	523	546	93		—	—		– ذكور
— Females	774	350	95	59	152	119	13		—	—		– اناث
1953 (*) — Total	4,810	1,569	426	367	1,024	818	99	102	125	96		١٩٥٣(*) – المجموع
— Males	3,565	1,171	350	307	811	590	83	91	113	81		– ذكور
— Females	1,245	398	76	60	213	228	16	11	12	15		– اناث

Source : Ministry of Education.

(*) As from 1953 an examination centre had been established for every Mohafazat.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(*) اعتبارا من عام ١٩٥٣ اصبح لكل مركز محافظة مركز امتحان

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على شهادة الدراسة المتوسطة : ١٩٤١ ـ ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE « BREVET » CERTIFICATE 1941 — 1953

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Table No. 8 جدول رقم A

End of Year	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	نهاية السنة
1941	290	243	47	١٩٤١
1942	462	374	88	١٩٤٢
1943	556	394	162	١٩٤٣
1944	677	521	156	١٩٤٤
1945	810	645	165	١٩٤٥
1946	1,039	803	236	١٩٤٦
1947	1,375	1,082	293	١٩٤٧
1948	1,845	1,441	404	١٩٤٨
1949	1,993	1,629	364	١٩٤٩
1950	2,408	1,859	549	١٩٥٠
1951	3,530	2,749	781	١٩٥١
1952	3,883	3,125	758	١٩٥٢
1953	4,610	3,565	1,045	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Education. المصدر : وزارة المعارف

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عدد الحاصلين على شهادة الدراسة الثانوية ، ١٩٢٨ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE SECONDARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE, 1928 — 1953

Table No. 9.

جدول رقم ٩

End of Year	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	نهاية السنة
1928	24	24	—	١٩٢٨
1929	30	30	—	١٩٢٩
1930	40	39	1	١٩٣٠
1931	49	49	—	١٩٣١
1932	46	45	1	١٩٣٢
1933	61	58	3	١٩٣٣
1934	91	85	6	١٩٣٤
1935	81	79	2	١٩٣٥
1936	82	70	12	١٩٣٦
1937	133	126	7	١٩٣٧
1938	136	127	9	١٩٣٨
1939	89	83	6	١٩٣٩
1940	162	142	20	١٩٤٠
1941	143	134	9	١٩٤١
1942	156	144	12	١٩٤٢
1943	125	112	13	١٩٤٣
1944	216	202	14	١٩٤٤
1945	370	333	37	١٩٤٥
1946 (*)	1,155	979	176	(*)١٩٤٦
1947 (*)	666	521	145	(*)١٩٤٧
1948 (*)	750	568	182	(*)١٩٤٨
1949 (*)	748	606	142	(*)١٩٤٩
1950	968	732	236	١٩٥٠
1951	1,343	981	362	١٩٥١
1952	1,429	1,156	273	١٩٥٢
1953	1,700	1,383	317	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(*) Prior to 1946, the Secondary School Certificate was the Baccalaureate 2nd Degree, and its issue continued up to 1949, while the new certificate was issued since 1946, to replace the old one.

(*) قبل عام ١٩٤٦ كانت الشهادة تسمى شهادة التعليم الثانوي القسم الثاني ثم احدثت شهادة الدراسة الثانوية عام ١٩٤٦ حيث حلت محل الشهادة السابقة التي بقيت حتى عام ١٩٤٩

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على الشهادات العلمية السورية منذ احداثها حتى نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

THE ACCUMULATIVE NUMBER OF PERSONS HOLDING SYRIAN CERTIFICATES SINCE THEIR ISSUE UP TO THE END OF 1952

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Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Certificate	مجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	الشهادات
Elementary School Certificate	124,601	97,249	27,352	شهادة الدراسة الابتدائية
The « Brevet » Certificate	18,962	14,964	3,998	« « المتوسطة
The Secondary School Certificate	8,964	7,395	1,569	« « الثانوية
The Elementary Agricultural School Certificate	111	111	—	« الابتدائية الزراعية
The «2Brevet » Agricultural School Certificate	127	127	—	« « المتوسطة الزراعية
The Secondary Agricultural School Certificate	230	230	—	« « الثانوية الزراعية
The « Brevet » Trade School Certificate	797	583	214	« « المتوسطة الصناعية
The Secondary Trade School Certificate	82	82	—	« « الثانوية الصناعية
The «2Brevet » Commercial Certificate	315	315	—	« « المتوسطة التجارية
The Secondary Commercial School Certificate	144	144	—	« « الثانوية التجارية
The Shar'ia School Certificate	116	116	—	« « الشرعية
The Elementary School Teaching Certificate	1,718	1,056	662	« اهلية التعليم الابتدائي
Licence in Law	2,388	2,318	70	« الاجازة في الحقوق
Diploma in Finance and Economics	12	10	2	« الاختصاص في العلوم المالية والاقتصادية
Diploma in Law (Special)	14	11	3	« الاختصاص في الحقوق الخاصة
Diploma in Law (General)	20	12	8	« « في الحقوق العامة
Doctor in Medicine	597	587	10	شهادة دكتور في الطب
Doctor in Dentistry	168	167	1	« « في طب الاسنان
Licence in Pharmacy	221	213	8	« الاجازة في الصيدلة
Diploma in Nursery	72	—	72	« في فن التمريض
Diploma in Midwifery	226	—	226	« « القبالة
Licence in Engineering	32	32	—	« الاجازة في الهندسة
Licence of Natural Sciences	12	9	3	« « « العلوم الطبيعية
Licence in Mathematics	71	65	6	« « « العلوم الرياضية
Licence in Physics	23	12	11	« « « العلوم الفيزيائية
Certificate in Physics, Chemistry and Biology (P.C.B.)	146	131	15	« العلوم الفيزيائية والكيميائية والحيوية
Licence in Arabic Literature	58	46	12	« الاجازة في آداب اللغة العربية
Licence in Philosophy	30	22	15	« « « الفلسفة
Licence in History	79	53	26	« « « التاريخ
Licence in Geography	22	13	9	« « « الجغرافيا
Teacher's Diploma (H.T.T.C.)	266	185	81	« دبلوم في التربية من كلية التربية
Secondary Teachers' Certificate	270	199	71	« اهلية التعليم الثانوي

Source : Ministry of Education, The Syrian University, Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف
الجامعة السورية — وزارة الزراعة

EDUCATION

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عدد طلاب المدارس المهنية وعدد المتخرجين منها والمدرسين فيها ، ١٩٥٢-١٩٥٣

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS — NUMBER OF STUDENTS, GRADUATES AND TEACHERS, 1952/1953

Table No. 11 — جدول رقم ١١

Technical Schools	الطلاب Students	المتخرجين Graduates	المدرسون Teachers	المدارس المهنية
Industrial School for boys, Damascus	262	60	22	مدرسة صناعة البنين في دمشق
Industrial School for Girls, Damascus	186	22	12	« « البنات في دمشق
Industrial School for Boys, Aleppo	360	56	20	« « البنين في حلب
Industrial School for Boys, Hama	220	10	24	« « البنين في حماة
Industrial School for Boys, Deir-es-Zor	140	30	10	« « البنين في دير الزور
Commercial School, Damascus	221	21	—	مدرسة التجارة في دمشق
Secondary Agricultural School, Salamiya	141	22	8	المدرسة الزراعية المتوسطة في السلمية
Agricultural School, Buga	119	29	7	« « في بوقا
Agricultural School, Maskaniya	91	(1) —	7	« « في المسكنية
Secondary Agricultural School, Deir-es-Zor	49	(1) —	3	المدرسة الزراعية المتوسطة في دير الزور
Secondary Agricultural School, Damascus	93	14	9	المدرسة الزراعية الثانوية بدمشق
Secondary Veterinary School, Damascus	21	11	7	المدرسة الثانوية البيطرية بدمشق

Source : Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف ووزارة الزراعة

عدد طلاب دور المعلمين والمتخرجين منها والمدرسين ١٩٥٢ / ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF STUDENTS GRADUTES AND INSTRUCTORS OF THE TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE, 1952 — 1953

Table No. 12 — جدول رقم ١٢

Teachers Training College	الطلاب Students	المتخرجون Graduates	المدرسون Instructors	دور المعلمين
Total				المجموع العام
Damascus College for Males	302	96	22	دار المعلمين بدمشق
Damascus College for Females	306	94	21	دار المعلمات بدمشق
Aleppo College for Males	396	81	20	دار المعلمين بحلب
Aleppo College for Females	216	80	14	دار المعلمات بحلب
Yabrud Rural College for Males	80	26	4	دار المعلمين الريفي بيبرود
Dir's Rural College for Males (2)	28	13	—	دار المعلمين الريفي في درعا (٢)
Special Class for Males at Homs (2)	22	21	—	الصف الخاص لدار المعلمين في حمص (٢)
Special Class for Males at Latakia (2)	23	23	—	الصف الخاص لدار المعلمين في اللاذقية (٢)

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(1) Graduates from Deir-es-Zor and Maskaniya School continue their studies in Salamiya or Buga school.

(2) Included with Teachers of Secondary Schools

(١) ان خريجي مدرستي دير الزور والمسكنية يتابعون دراستهم في احدى مدرستي السلمية وبوقا

(٢) ان عدد الاساتذة المذكورين يدخل في احصاء مدرسي المدارس الثانوية

طلاب الجامعة السورية حسب الجنس والجنسية للسنة الدراسية ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

STUDENTS OF THE SYRIAN UNIVERSITY, BY SEX AND NATIONALITY, 1952/1953.

Table No. 13

جدول رقم ١٣

FACULTY	المجموع Total			Distribution of students by nationality توزيع الطلاب حسب الجنسيات												الكلية
				السورية Syrian		اللبنانية Lebanese		العراقية Iraqi		الاردنية Jordanian		الفلسطينية Palestinian		الاخرى Others		
	المجموع Total	ذكر Males	انثى Female	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	
The Syrian University (*)	2,580	2,062	518	1,789	460	43	22	53	6	59	4	91	21	27	5	الجامعة السورية (*)
The Faculty of Law	734	690	44	589	39	22	2	12	1	31	2	28	—	6	—	كلية الحقوق
The Faculty of Medicine - Total	591	431	160	344	121	17	16	36	3	18	—	11	7	5	3	كلية الطب (المجموع)
— Medicine Department	350	321	29	261	23	14	2	26	2	10	—	7	2	3	—	ـ فرع الطب
— Pharmacy Department	62	50	12	39	11	1	—	—	—	4	—	4	1	2	—	ـ فرع الصيدلة
— Dentistry Department	72	60	12	44	6	2	—	10	1	4	—	—	2	—	3	ـ فرع طب الاسنان
School of Nursing & Midwifery	107	—	107	—	91	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	مدرسة القبالة والتمريض
The Faculty of Engineering	106	102	4	99	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	كلية الهندسة
The Faculty of Science (*)	488	379	69	340	64	1	—	3	1	6	1	22	2	7	1	كلية العلوم (*)
The Faculty of Arts (*)	702	470	232	427	213	1	4	2	1	4	1	29	12	7	1	كلية الاداب (*)
The Faculty of Pedagogy	351	289	62	281	60	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	2	—	—	كلية التربية (*)

Source : Syrian University.

(*) The Faculty of Pedagogy contains 334 students who attend the faculties of Sciences and Arts and whose number is already included under these Faculties. In addition there are 17 Syrian students (8 males and 9 females) who hold the degrees of BA or BSc., whose number is not included elsewhere.

المصدر : الجامعة السورية

(*) ان كلية التربية تضم ٣٣٤ طالبا وطالبة موزعين على كليتي العلوم والآداب وداخلين عدداضمن هاتين الكليتين كما تضم ثمانية طلاب وتسع طالبات من حملة الاجازة من الكليتين المذكورتين لا يدخل عددهم في مكان آخر .

17: Syria G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1
التربية والتعليم
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عدد الطلاب والمتخرجين من الجامعة السورية سنة ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND GRADUATES OF THE SYRIAN UUNIVERSITY, 1952/1953

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

FACULTY	الطلاب Students			المتخرجون Graduates			الكلية
	المجموع Total	ذكر Males	انثى Fem.	المجموع Total	ذكر Males	انثى Fem.	
The Syrian University (1)	2,581	2,072	509	308	255	53	الجامعة السورية (١)
The Faculty of Law	734	690	44	104	100	4	كلية الحقوق
The Faculty of Medicine - Total	591	431	160	86	63	23	كلية الطب (المجموع)
— Medical Department	350	321	29	53	47	6	ـ فرع الطب
— Pharmacy Department	62	50	12	13	10	3	ـ فرع الصيدلة
— Dentistry Department	72	60	12	7	6	1	ـ فرع طب الاسنان
School of Nursing & Midwifery	107	—	107	13	—	13	مدرسة القابلة والتمريض
The Faculty of Engineering	106	102	4	18	16	2	كلية الهندسة
The Faculty of Science (1)	448	379	69	42	36	6	كلية العلوم (١)
The Faculty of Arts (1)	702	470	232	58	40	18	كلية الآداب (١)
The Faculty of Pedagogy (1)	401	328	74	76	54	22	كلية التربية (١)
Secondary Training-New system	17	8	9	9	4	5	اهلية التعليم الثانوي - نظام جديد
Secondary Training-Old system	334	281	53	25	17	8	» » » » » »
Teachers Training - Diploma	50	38	12	42	33	9	دبلوم في التربية

Source : The Syrian University

المصدر : الجامعة السورية

(1) Holders of the Secondary Training «Old System» and of the Diploma are already included under the Faculties of Arts and Sciences and so they are not to be added. While the holders of the Secondary Training — «New System» are to be added, as these are holders of a BA or BSc. degrees.

(١) ان عدد حاملي اهلية التعليم الثانوي « النظام القديم » وحاملي دبلوم في التربية يدخل في عداد طلاب كلية العلوم وكلية الآداب ولذا فلا يجمع . اما عدد حاملي اهلية التعليم الثانوي « النظام الجديد » فلما كانوا حائزين على اجازة من كلية العلوم او من كلية الآداب فيجمع .

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على الشهادات العلمية السورية خلال عام ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE SYRIAN EDUCATIONAL CERTIFICATES DURING 1953

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Table No. 15

جدول رقم ١٥

Certificate	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	الشهادات
Elementary School Certificate	26,342	20,556	5,786	شهادة الدراسة الابتدائية
The « Brevet » Certificate	4,610	3,565	1,045	« « المتوسطة
The Secondary School Certificate	1,700	1,383	317	« « الثانوية
The Elementary Agricultural School Certificate	...	...	...	« « الابتدائية الزراعية
The « Brevet » Agricultural School Certificate	62	62	—	« « المتوسطة الزراعية
The Secondary Agricultural School Certificate	14	14	—	« « الثانوية الزراعية
The « Brevet » Trade School Certificate	146	124	22	« « المتوسطة الصناعية
The Secondary Trade School Certificate	55	55	—	« « الثانوية الصناعية
The « Brevet » Commercial School Certificate	22	22	—	« « المتوسطة التجارية
The Secondary Commercial School Certificate	9	9	—	« « الثانوية التجارية
The Shari'a School Certificate	7	7	—	« « الثانوية الشرعية
The Elementary School Teaching Certificate	432	258	174	« اهلية التعليم الابتدائي
Licence in Law	104	100	4	« الاجازة في الحقوق
Diploma in Finance and Economics	23	23	—	« الاختصاص في العلوم المالية والاقتصادية
Diploma in Law (Special)	26	26	—	« الاختصاص في الحقوق الخاصة
Diploma in Law (General)	55	51	4	« « في الحقوق العامة
Doctor in Medicine	53	47	6	شهادة دكتور في الطب
Doctor in Dentistry	7	6	1	« « في طب الاسنان
Licence in Pharmacy	13	10	3	« الاجازة في الصيدلة
Diploma in Nursery	13	—	13	« في فن التمريض
Diploma in Midwifery	22	—	22	« « القبالة
Licence in Engineering	18	16	2	« الاجازة في الهندسة
Licence in Natural Sciences	8	6	2	« « « العلوم الطبيعية
Licence in Mathematics	7	4	3	« « « العلوم الرياضية
Licence in Physics	9	8	1	« « « العلوم الفيزيائية
Certificate in Physics, Chemistry and Biology (P.C.B.)	92	79	13	« العلوم الفيزيائية والكيميائية والحيوية
Licence in Arabic Literature	19	12	7	« الاجازة في آداب اللغة العربية
Licence in Philosophy	17	9	8	« « « الفلسفة
Licence in History	10	8	2	« « « التاريخ
Licence in Geography	12	11	1	« « « الجغرافيا
Teacher's Diploma (H.T.T.C.)	42	33	9	« دبلوم في التربية من كلية التربية
Secondary Teachers' Certificate (old system)	25	17	8	« « اهلية التعليم الثانوي نظام قديم
Secondary Teachers' Certificate (Specialising Class.)	9	4	5	صف الاختصاص

Source : Ministry of Education — The Syrian University — Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة المعارف
الجامعة السورية ـ وزارة الزراعة

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Notes on Foreign Trade Statistics

The figures published in the section of foreign trade are in respect of the Special imports and exports, defined as follows :

Special Imports : Comprise consumption goods demand as such on direct entry from abroad or following a direct transit entry or upon clearance from the bonded warehouses, or upon acceptance as temporary imports.

The value is based on the amount given on the manifest after checking by the custom authorities, CIF the station of entry, excluding the custom duties.

The conversion into Syrian currency is based on the official rate of exchange, which is below the true value as per the market rate. The total value of imports based on the official rates was 69.6 per cent of the value based on the market rates in 1951 and 68.2 per cent in 1952.

Special Exports : Comprise local goods exported or goods of a foreign origin exported having earlier entered the country exempted of custom duty or, duty paid.

The value is given F.O.B. the Station of clearance.

Country of origin and country of destination : By country of origin is meant the producing country in the case of animal and vegetable products and the country where the last process of manufacture has been completed in the case of industrial products.

By country of destination is meant the country of final destination as known by the exporter and declared on the date of export.

ملاحظات عن احصاءات التجارة الخارجية

ان الاحصاءات الواردة في فصل التجارة الخارجية من هذه النشرة ترجع الى التجارة الخاصة للاستيراد والتصدير حسب التعريف التالي :

تجارة الاستيراد الخاصة : تتضمن البضائع الموضوعة في الاستهلاك سواء لدى ورودها مباشرة من الخارج او على اثر ترانزيت مباشر او عند اخراجها من المستودع او بعد قبولها تحت وضع الاستيراد الموقت .

وقيمة هذه التجارة مستقاة من البيانات التي يقدمها اصحاب العلاقة بعد التحقق من صحتها من قبل المصالح الجمركية المختصة وهي «سيف» اي قيمة البضاعة في محل الارسال مضافاً اليها اجور النقل والضمان وكافة المصاريف الاخرى حتى جمرك التخليص ولا تدخل فيها الرسوم الجمركية .

وقد حولت العملات الاجنبية الى العملة السورية حسب الاسعار الرسمية وبذلك تكون القيم المذكورة دون القيم الفعلية التي اساسها اسعار السوق وقد كانت نسبة قيمة الاستيراد حسب السعر الرسمي للقيمة حسب سعر السوق ٦٩,٦٪ عام ١٩٥١ و ٦٨,٢٪ عام ١٩٥٢ .

تجارة التصدير الخاصة : تتضمن البضائع الوطنية المصدرة والبضائع ذات المنشأ الاجنبي التي عاد الى الخارج بعد ان تكون قد قبلت في الاعفاء او اكتسبت الصفة الوطنية بدفع رسوم الاستيراد . وقيمة هذه التجارة هي «فوب» اي قيمة البضاعة بما فيها المصاريف حتى مكتب الاخراج .

بلدان المنشأ والقصد : يعني بلد المنشأ بلد الانتاج فيما يتعلق بالحاصلات الزراعية والحيوانية والبلد التي تمت فيها مرحلة الصنع الاخير فيما يتعلق بالمنتوجات الصناعية . ويعني بلد القصد بلد القصد النهائي كما يعرفه المصدر ويصرح عنه بتاريخ التصدير .

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17: Syria G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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الفصل الخامس

التجارة الخارجية

CHAPTER FIVE

FOREIGN TRADE

P. 87

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كمية البضائع المستوردة والمصدرة والمعاد تصديرها والترانزيت لسوريا ولبنان ، ١٩٣٨ـ١٣ آذار ١٩٥٠
ولسوريا فقط للمدة الواقعة بين ١٣ آذار ونهاية ١٩٥٠ وللسنوات ١٩٥١ـ١٩٥٣ (بالاطنان)

QUANTITY OF GOODS IMPORTED, EXPORTED RE-EXPORTED AND IN TRANSIT FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON 1938 — 13.3.1950
AND FOR SYRIA ONLY FOR THE PERIOD 13.3.1950—31.12.1950 AND YEARS 1951—1953 (Tons)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Year	الاستيراد Imports	التصدير Exports	البضائع المعاد تصديرها Re-exports	الترانزيت Transit	زيادة الواردات Excess of Imports	نسبة الصادرات الواردات % Exports per cent of Imports	السنة
			SYRIA AND LEBANON		سوريا ولبنان		
1938	561,234	376,201	5,819	2,286,902	185,033	67,0	١٩٣٨
1939	542,234	325,530	5,319	2,149,997	216,404	60,1	١٩٣٩
1940	314,147	121,562	374	968,868	192,585	38.7	١٩٤٠
1941	273,542	29,487	16	37,742	244,055	10.8	١٩٤١
1942	503,465	23,781	—	76,215	479,684	4.7	١٩٤٢
1943	428,483	52,821	—	654,606	375,662	12.3	١٩٤٣
1944	428,968	120,099	1,235	1,436,171	306,869	28.0	١٩٤٤
1945	514,692	139,315	6,866	2,022,789	375,377	27.1	١٩٤٥
1946	369,587	106,521	572	1,996,127	263,066	28.8	١٩٤٦
1947	414,057	148,018	2,428	2,103,986	266,039	35.7	١٩٤٧
1948	757,334	123,708	1,603	2,296,504	633,626	16.3	١٩٤٨
1949	957,416	305,715	2,050	3,006,799	651,701	31.9	١٩٤٩
1.1 — 13.III.1950	238,902	111,780	450	1,254,898	127,122	46.8	١٩٥٠/٣/١٣ـ١/١
			SYRIA ONLY		سوريا فقط		
13.III — 31.XII.1950	458,263	435,116	—	230,152	23,147	94.9	١٩٥٠/١٢/٣١ـ٣/١٣
1951	727,033	212,348	—	332,017	514,685	29.2	١٩٥١
1952	805,130	490,818	—	370,684	314,312	61.0	١٩٥٢
1953	772,555	717,720	—	...	54,835	92.9	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Finance and ex «Common Interest» — المصدر : وزارة المالية والمجلس الاعلى للمصالح المشتركة (سابقا)

قيمة البضائع المستوردة والمصدرة والمعاد تصديرها والترانزيت لسوريا ولبنان ، ١٩٣٨ – ١٣ آذار ١٩٥٠
ولسوريا فقط للمدة الواقعة بين ١٣ آذار ونهاية ١٩٥٠ وللسنوات ١٩٥١ – ١٩٥٣ (بالوف الليرات السورية)

VALUE OF GOODS IMPORTED, EXPORTED, RE-EXPORTED AND IN TRANSIT FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON 1938 — 13.3.1950
AND FOR SYRIA ONLY FOR THE PERIOD 13.3.1950 — 31.12.1950 AND YEARS 1951 — 1953 (L.S.'000)

Table No. 2.

جدول رقم ٢

Year	الاستيراد Imports	التصدير Exports	البضائع المعاد تصديرها Re-exports	الترانزيت Transit	زيادة الواردات Excess of Imports	نسبة الصادرات للواردات % Export per cent of imports	السنة
			SYRIA & LEBANON		سوريا ولبنان		
1938	70,811	39,278	760	36,859	31,533	55,5	١٩٣٨
1939	75,567	36,517	867	37,686	39,050	48,3	١٩٣٩
1940	57,156	19,302	173	26,779	37,854	33,8	١٩٤٠
1941	40,527	11,228	44	37,338	29,299	27,7	١٩٤١
1942	107,084	23,753	—	76,790	83,331	22,2	١٩٤٢
1943	116,137	32,031	—	136,033	78,106	29,1	١٩٤٣
1944	95,644	46,195	759	157,710	47,449	49,3	١٩٤٤
1945	130,624	43,842	1,948	128,439	86,782	33,6	١٩٤٥
1946	266,654	85,580	1,127	101,746	181,094	32,1	١٩٤٦
1947	362,764	83,640	3,467	182,841	279,136	23,1	١٩٤٧
1948	423,460	78,502	1,179	232,521	404,268	18,2	١٩٤٨
1949	516,188	111,104	1,697	342,628	405,084	21,5	١٩٤٩
1.1 — 13.III.1950	116,881	37,689	632	106,731	79,192	32,3	١٩٥٠/٣/١٣-١/١
			SYRIA ONLY		سوريا فقط		
13.III — 13.XII.50	197,779	207,865	—	105,179	-10,086	105,1	١٩٥٠/١٢/١٣-١٣/٣
1951	303,951	277,134	—	303,797	26,817	91,2	١٩٥١
1952	313,340	319,573	—	304,520	-6,233	102,0	١٩٥٢
1953	307,050	275,828	—	...	-68,778	122,4	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Finance and ex «Common Interest»

المصدر : وزارة المالية والمجلس الاعلى للمصالح المشتركة (سابقا)

تحويل للعربية

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FOREIGN TRADE

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 3.

جدول رقم ٣

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		موضوع القسم
	الكمية Quantity	القيمة Value	الكمية Quantity	القيمة Value	
1 Living animals and products of the animal kingdom. Tons ...	6,010	35,306	4,681	28,216	الحيوانات الحية ومنتوجات المملكة الحيوانية
'000 Heads.	537		469		اطنان الوف الرؤوس
2 Products of the vegetable kingdom	500,228	117,892	372,449	89,181	محاصيل المملكة النباتية ..
3 Fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats	1,918	2,483	144	235	الاجسام الدسمة ، الدهون ، الزيوت، ومحاصيل تفكيها ..
4 Products of the food preparing industries, beverages, alcoholic liquids, vinegar and tobacco. ...	28,392	8,982	19,822	10,095	محاصيل الصناعات الغذائية ، الاشربة ، السوائل الكحولية ، الخل ، التبغ .. ..
5 Mineral products	46,170	2,982	36,424	1,798	المحاصيل المعدنية .. ..
6 Chemical and pharmaceutical products, colours, varnishes, perfumery, soap candles, glue, gelatine, explosives and fertilisers	2,201	3,244	1,967	4,063	المحاصيل الكيماوية والصيدلانية الاصباغ والاطلية ، صناعة العطور ، الصابون والشموع الصلال، الغراء، جلود الغراء والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد .. ..
7 Skins, hides, leather, furs, and articles thereof... ...	1,008	2,983	706	2,508	الجلود والحاجات المصنوعة من الجلود .. .. ..
8 Rubber and manufactures thereof	51	72	42	119	
9 Wood, cork, articles thereof and articles made of plaiting materials.	1,983	1,007	1,696	964	الخشب ، الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة منهما .. ..
10 Paper and its applications.	470	996	341	730	الورق واستعمالاته ..
11 Textile materials and textile goods....	63,936	191,457	48,267	177,586	المواد النسيجية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..

التجارة الخارجية

كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

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Table No. 3 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quantity	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quantity	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	موضوع القسم
12 Footwear, hats, umbrellas, parasols, sticks, articles of fashion	47	330	33	327	١٢ الاحذية ، القبعات ، المظلات ، اصناف الازياء .. ..
13 Wares of stone and other mineral materials, pottery, glass and glassware ...	2,464	755	2,229	739	١٣ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاحجار المصنوعات الخزفية ، الزجاج والمواد المعدنية الاخرى ، والمصنوعات الزجاجية ..
14 Precious metals, pearls, precious stones & coins ...	3	1,113	5	238	١٤ اللآلىء الحقيقية ، الاحجار الكريمة المعادن الثمينة والنقود
15 Base metals and manufactures thereof	1,718	1,386	3,425	1,608	١٥ المعادن العادية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..
16 Machinery, & apparatus and electric material ...	370	815	380	773	١٦ الآلات والاجهزة ، الادوات الكهربائية .. .. ..
17 Transport material	697	693	155	182	١٧ معدات النقل .. ..
18 Scientific and precision instruments & apparatus, horiogical ware and musical instruments.	8	191	2	36	١٨ الآلات والاجهزة العلمية ، الآلات والاجهزة الدقيقة ، الساعات آلات الموسيقى ..
19 Arms and ammunition....	—	—	—	—	١٩ الاسلحة والذخائر .. ..
20 Miscellaneous goods and products not elsewhere included	45	124	50	134	٢٠ البضائع والحاصيل غير الداخلة في مكان آخر .. ..
21 Works of art and collectors' pieces	1	5	—	1	٢١ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total — Tons	717,720	375,825	490,818	319,573	المجموع — اطنان
Total — '000 Heads	537		469		المجموع — الوف الرؤوس

تجارة الخارجية

كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣

(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953.

(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		موضوع القسم
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
1 Living animals and products of the animal kingdom. Tons ...	956	8,195	734	8,233	الحيوانات الحية ومنتوجات المملكة الحيوانية
'000 Heads	375		383		اطنان
					الوف الرؤوس
2 Products of the vegetable kingdom	112,654	28,515	168,300	43,516	محاصيل المملكة النباتية ..
3 Fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats	8,094	5,126	8,048	5,146	الاجسام الدسمة ، الدهون ، الزيوت، ومحاصيل تفكيكها ..
4 Products of the food preparing industries, beverages, alcoholic liquids, vinegar and tobacco. ...	30,601	10,475	45,000	16,992	محاصيل الصناعات الغذائية ، الاشربة ، السوائل الكحولية ، الخل ، التبغ .. ..
5 Mineral products	431,679	41,189	413,922	38,792	المحاصيل المعدنية .. ..
6 Chemical and pharmaceutical products, colours, varnishes, perfumery, soap, candles, glue, gelatine, explosives and fertilisers	23,952	15,125	18,978	16,776	المحاصيل الكيماوية والصيدلانية الاصباغ والاطلية ، صناعة العطور ، الصابون والشموع ، الصلال، السبوت، جلود الغراء، والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد .. ..
7 Skins, hides, leather, furs, and articles thereof... ...	2,705	4,135	2,584	4,707	الجلود والحاجات المصنوعة من الجلود .. .. ..
8 Rubber and manufactures thereof	3,461	5,664	2,677	5,919	المطاط والحاجات المصنوعة من المطاط .. .. ..
9 Wood, cork, articles thereof and articles made of plaiting [illegible]	41,199	8,837	46,219	10,459	الخشب ، الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة منهما .. ..
10 Paper and [illegible] ...ections.	8,879	5,539	5,837	5,578	الورق واستعمالاته ..
11 Textile materials and textile goods...	28,088	62,663	19,959	64,344	المواد النسيجية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..

FOREIGN TRADE

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كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣

(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUAN' .TY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953.

(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 4 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٤ (تتمة)

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		موضوع القسم
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
12 Footwear, hats, umbrellas, parasols, sticks, articles of fashion...	39	149	220	720	١٢ الاحذية ، القبعات ، المظلات ، اصناف الازياء .. ..
13 Wares of stone and other mineral materials, pottery, glass and glassware ...	7,007	3,853	3,571	3214	١٣ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاحجار والمواد المعدنية الاخرى ، المصنوعات الخزفية ، الزجاج والمصنوعات الزجاجية ..
14 Precious metals, pearls, precious stones & coins ...	9	20,923	6	10,186	١٤ الآلي الحقيقية ، الاحجار الكريمة المعادن الثمينة والنقود
15 Base metals and manufactures thereof	50,584	23,634	46,229	25,028	١٥ المعادن العادية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..
16 Machinery, & apparatus and electric material ...	14,929	40,156	13,079	36,025	١٦ الآلات والاجهزة ، الادوات الكهربائية .. .. ..
17 Transport material	6,695	18,684	7,252	13,430	١٧ معدات النقل .. ..
18 Scientific and precision instruments & apparatus, horlogical ware and musical instruments.	517	2,329	156	2,343	١٨ الآلات والاجهزة العلمية ، الآلات والاجهزة الدقيقة ، الساعات آلات الموسيقى ..
19 Arms and ammunition...	74	206	36	245	١٩ الاسلحة والذخائر .. ..
20 Miscellaneous goods and products not elsewhere included	409	1,459	362	1,679	٢٠ البضائع والحاصيل غير الداخلة في مكان آخر .. ..
21 Works of art and collectors' pieces	2	14	1	8	٢١ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total — Tons	772,555	307,050	605,130	312,340	المجموع — اطنان
Total — '000 Heads...	373		363		المجموع — الوف الرؤوس

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 — جدول رقم ٥

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
1 Living Animals 1000heads	404 537	23,041	425 469	20,959	١ الحيوانات الحية .. .. الوف رؤوس
2 Meats	50	65	54	84	٢ اللحوم .. ..
3 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs	391	290	371	184	٣ الاسماك والقشريات (ذوات القشور) والرخويات (الحيوانات الرخوة)
4 Milk, dairy products, eggs and honey	4,205	10,038	2,367	5,139	٤ الالبان ومنتوجات صناعة الالبان ، البيض والعسل .. ..
5 Animal raw materials and other products	959	1,872	1,064	1,851	٥ المواد الاولية والمنتوجات الخام الحيوانية المنشأ .. ..
6 Living plants and products of floriculture	107	16	60	15	٦ النباتات الحية ومحاصيل زراعة الازهار .. ..
7 Alimentary vegetables, plants, roots and tubers, straw and forage	36,196	11,269	29,575	6,899	٧ الخضر، النباتات،الجذور والمسابيل الغذائية (الفرنات الغذائية) ..
8 Edible fruits	17,957	3,9..	14,033	3,790	٨ الاثمار الصالحة للاكل .. ..
9 Colonial produce and general grocery	24	17	23	33	٩ البن ، الشاي والابازير (بهارات)
10 Cereals	382,998	81,780	256,217	62,732	١٠ الحبوب .. ..
11 Milling products, malts, starch and fecula	46,730	10,137	31,527	5,873	١١ محاصيل الطواحين، الشعير الناشط (الملت) نشاء الحبوب ، نشاء الجذور
12 Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, various grains, seeds and fruits, industrial & medical plants	62,235	10,311	50,139	9,548	١٢ الحبوب والاثمار الزيتية ، الحبوب البذور ، الاثمار المتنوعة ، النباتات الصناعية والطبية القش والعلف (العلف) .. .. ..
13 Raw materials for dyeing and tanning, gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and juices	747	384	869	214	١٣ المواد الاولية المدالصباغة والدباغة الصموغ الراتنجات وغيرها من العصارات النباتية الاخرى ..
14 Materials for plaiting and carving, & other raw vegetable materials and products ...	234	68	202	75	١٤ المواد المعدة للضفر والنحت وغيرها من المواد الاولية والمحاصيل الخام النباتية المنشأ .. ..
15 Animals and vegetable fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats	1,917	2,484	144	235	١٥ الاجسام الدسمة ، الدهون،الزيوت ومحاصيل تفكيك الدهون الغذائية الجافة ، الشموع النباتية المنشأ
16 Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans and molluscs	1	1	3	7	١٦ مخضرات اللحوم والاسماك ومخضرات القشريات والرخويات ..
17 Sugar and confectionery ...	154	174	133	188	١٧ السكر ومصنوعات السكر ..
18 Cocoa & preparations thereof	2	6	—	—	١٨ الكاكاو ومحضراته .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
19 Preparations from flour or farina	76	63	130	80	١٩ المحضرات التي اساسها الدقيق والنشاء .. .. ..
20 Preparations of fruits, vegetables, pot herbs and other plants	1,576	1,917	2,474	2,673	٢٠ محضرات الخضر والنباتات الصالحة للاكل، محضرات الاثمار محضرات النباتات الاخرى او محضرات اجزائها .. .. ..
21 Miscellaneous preparations...	315	197	400	256	٢١ المحضرات الغذائية على اختلاف انواعها .. .. ..
22 Beverages alcoholic liquids and vinegar	4	2	2	3	٢٢ الاشربة ، الموائع الكحولية ، الخل
23 Residues and wastes of food preparing industries	24,841	4,229	13,783	2,316	٢٣ بقايا الصناعات الغذائية ونفاياها
24 Tobacco	1,423	2,382	2,896	4,575	٢٤ التبغ .. ..
25 Earths, stones, lime and cement	35,048	2,214	26,019	1,110	٢٥ الاتربة(الاحجار) الكلس الاسمنت
26 Ores, slag and ash	4	2	12	5	٢٦ الفلزات ، الخبث ، الرماد ..
27 Mineral fuels and oils, natural bituminous substances and products of their distillation	11,117	766	10,394	683	٢٧ الوقود المعدني ، الزيوت المعدنية المواد الحمرية ومحاصيل تقطيرها
28 Chemical and pharmaceutical products	120	226	41	142	٢٨ المواد الكيماوية والصيدلانية ، العناصر الكيماوية .. ..
29 Prepared chemicals and other products for photography	27	214	4	214	٢٩ المحاصيل الكيماوية المحضرة والمحاصيل الاخرى المستعملة في التصوير الشمسي .. ..
30 Colouring and tanning extracts inks, pencils, colours, lacs, varnishes and putties ...	92	134	71	244	٣٠ الخلاصات الدباغية ، الاصباغ ، الك والاطية (فرنيش) ، المصطكا (المحجون) رصاص الاقلام ، اقلام الرصاص .. ..
31 Essential oils, essences, artificial aromatic materials, perfumery and cosmetics ...	14	23	17	49	٣١ الزيوت العطرية ، العطور ، المواد العطرة الصنعية ، اصناف صناعة العطور .. .. ..
32 Soap, candles and articles from waxes, oils or fats ...	1,927	2,625	1,794	3,381	٣٢ الصابون،شموع الاضاءة والمحضرات الاخرى التي اساسها الزيوت او الشحوم او الشمع والاصناف المماثلة .. .. ..
33 Glass, gelatines and drawings	20	20	33	30	٣٣ الجنين (الزجاج)، الاجن (البوسين) الهلامين (جلاتين) ، القراد ، المواد المستعملة للتهيئة .. ..

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(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
34 Explosives, fireworks, matches and other inflammable articles	1	2	—	—	٣٤ المتفجرات واصناف صناعة الالعاب النارية ، الثقاب والاصناف الاخرى من مواد لهوب (قابلة للالتهاب)
35 Fertilisers	—	—	7	3	٣٥ الاسمدة .. .. ..
36 Skins, hides and leather ...	944	2,683	656	2,276	٣٦ الصلال والسيوت .. ..
37 Articles made of hides, skin and leather...	58	251	48	220	٣٧ الحاجات المصنوعة من السيوت (الجلود الدبوغة) والصلال (الجلود غير الدبوغة) .. .. ..
38 Fur-skins and furs	8	48	1	11	٣٨ جلود الفراء .. .. ..
39 Rubber, gutta-percha, balata, substitutes and manufactures thereof	51	72	42	119	٣٩ المطاط والحاجات المصنوعة من المطاط .. .. ..
40 Wood, articles thereof and furniture	1,944	984	1,6[illegible]	924	٤٠ الخشب والحاجات المصنوعة منه
41 Cork and manufactures thereof	1	1	—	1	٤١ الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة من الفلين
42 Articles made of straw, cane or other vegetable plaiting materials	39	23	85	39	٤٢ الحاجات المصنوعة من القش والاسل وغيرها من المواد النباتية الصالحة للفتل .. ..
43 Materials used for the manufacture of paper	—	—	—	—	٤٣ المواد المستعملة لصناعة الورق
44 Paper, cardboard, articles thereof and binders wares	448	925	318	642	٤٤ الورق والورق المقوى ، الحاجات المصنوعة منهما
45 Booksellers wares & products of the graphic arts	22	72	23	88	٤٥ حاجات المكتبات ومنتوجات فن الرسم والخطوط .. ..
46 Silk, floss-silk and artificial silk	2,339	18,807	1,756	16,495	٤٦ الحرير ومشاقة الحرير ، الحرير الصنعي والالياف النسيجية الصنعية الخيوط المعدنية
47 Wool, horse-hair (crins) and other animals hair (pills)	4,629	22,250	3,585	15,335	٤٧ الصوف والشعر والوبر ..
48 Cotton	55,005	138,571	38,988	132,382	٤٨ القطن .. ..
49 Flax, hemp, jute, ramie and other vegetable textile materials	30	49	170	289	٤٩ الكتان ، القنب ، الجوت ، الرامي وغيرها من المواد النسيجية النباتية
50 Wadding felt, ropes, rope-makers wares, special fabrics and articles for technical purposes	514	1,164	503	1,033	٥٠ قطن الحشو والباد الحبال واصناف صناعة الحبال ، النسج الخاصة والاصناف الفنية .. ..

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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
51 Hosiery	336	2,926	277	3,861	٥١ مصنوعات شغل الصنارة (بوناتري)
52 Clothing, linen and articles of all kinds ready-made ...	982	7,581	921	8,065	٥٢ الالبسة والشمار (اللابس الداخلية) والاصناف الجاهزة من جميع الانواع
53 Rags and scraps of textile materials	109	108	87	128	٥٣ الاسمال (ذرل) والخرق ..
54 Footwear	39	290	28	280	٥٤ الاحذية .. ..
55 Hats, tarbooches and caps ...	8	42	3	28	٥٥ القبعات العادية والقبعات المعروفة بالتسكيت .. .. ..
56 Umbrellas, parasols and sticks	—	1	1	8	٥٦ المظلات (مطريات وشمسيات) العصي (العصي) .. .. ..
57 Feathers, articles of feathers, artificial flowers and other articles for ornament & fans	—	6	—	11	٥٧ الريش المحضر المدلرنة الاصناف المصنوعة من الريش ، الازهار الصنعية الحاجات المصنوعة من الشعر ، المراوح ..
58 Wares of stones and other mineral materials	882	112	833	148	٥٨ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاحجار والمواد المعدنية الاخرى .. ..
59 Pottery	171	29	72	37	٥٩ المصنوعات الخزفية .. ..
60 Glass and Glassware	1,411	614	1,324	554	٦٠ الزجاج والحاجات الزجاجية ..
61 Precious metals, pearls and precious stones (kilo) ...	1,579	239	4,629	254	٦١ الآلي الثمينة الاحجار الكريمة المعادن الثمينة والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد (كيلو) .. .. ..
62 Coins (specie) (kilo) ...	955	3,873	78	4	٦٢ النقود (كيلو) .. .. ..
63 Iron, cast iron and steel ...	1,534	642	3,278	881	٦٣ الحديد ، الحديد الصب ، الفولاذ
64 Copper	148	565	115	485	٦٤ النحاس .. ..
65 Nickel	...	1	—	—	٦٥ النيكل .. ..
66 Aluminium	8	21	15	25	٦٦ الالمنيوم .. ..
67 Lead	2	4	—	—	٦٧ الرصاص .. ..
68 Zinc	10	5	5	16	٦٨ الخوتيار (زرنك) .. .. ..
69 Tin	—	—	—	—	٦٩ القصدير .. ..
70 Other common metals, and alloys thereof	—	—	—	—	٧٠ المعادن العادية الاخرى وخلائطها
71 Cutlery & miscellaneous wares of common metals	16	146	12	200	٧١ الحاجات المختلفة المصنوعة من المعادن غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. .. ..
72 Boilers, machinery, mechanical apparatus appliances and parts	322	652	355	638	٧٢ المراجل ، الآلات الاجهزة الادوات الآلية ، وكذلك قطعها المنفصلة

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
73 Electric machinery, apparatus, articles and parts detached	49	162	25	135	٧٣ الآلات والاجهزة الكهربائية والحاجات المعدة للاستعمالات الفنية الكهربائية وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
74 Railway rolling-stock and railway and tramway material	—	—	1	2	٧٤ وسائط النقل المستعملة في السكك الحديدية والحافلات (ترام)
75 Cycles, automobiles and other vehicles	606	693	114	155	٧٥ السيارات ، الدراجات وغيرها من وسائط النقل .. ..
76 Aviation and navigation means	—	—	40	25	٧٦ وسائط الطيران والملاحة ..
77 Scientific, optical, precision and other instruments and apparatus	8	182	1	13	٧٧ الآلات والاجهزة البصرية ، آلات واجهزة القياس الدقيق ، الآلات والاجهزة الاخرى غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ..
78 Horlogical wares	—	5	—	10	٧٨ اصناف صناعة الساعات ..
79 Musical instruments	—	6	1	13	٧٩ آلات الموسيقى .. ..
80 Arms	—	—	—	—	٨٠ الاسلحة .. .. ..
81 Ammunition	—	—	—	—	٨١ الذخائر .. .. ..
82 Wares of carved or moulded materials or artificial plastic materials	13	65	10	69	٨٢ الحاجات غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من مواد طبيعية او صنعية مصبوبة النحت والسبك .. ..
83 Brush and sieve wares ...	26	29	35	36	٨٣ حاجات صناعة الفراجين (الفرشاة) فراجين الدخان واصناف صناعة المناخل .. .. ..
84 Games, toys, articles for Christmas trees & sporting goods and apparatus	3	19	2	8	٨٤ الالعاب ، اللعب ، الاصناف المعدة لعيد والالعاب الرياضية ..
85 Wares of various materials and other	3	11	3	41	٨٥ الحاجات المصنوعة من مواد مختلفة الاوراق ، وسائط الريش وماسكات اقلام الرصاص ، الاصناف المعدة للتدخين .. ..
86 Works of art and articles for collection	1	5	—	1	٨٦ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total { Tons	717,720	375,825	490,818	319,573	المجموع { اطنان
Total { '000 Heads...	537		469		المجموع { الوف الرؤوس

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كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 جدول رقم ٦

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
1 Living Animals ... ... 1000 heads	375	7,127	363	7,314	١ الحيوانات الحية .. .. .. الوف الرؤوس
2 Meats	9	26	12	33	٢ اللحوم .. .. ..
3 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs	443	230	192	95	٣ الاسماك والقشريات (ذوات القشور) والرخويات (الحيوانات الرخوة)
4 Milk, dairy products, eggs and honey	487	784	491	735	٤ الالبان ومنتوجات صناعة الالبان، البيض والعسل .. ..
5 Animal raw materials and other products	17	38	38	50	٥ المواد الاولية والمنتوجات الخام الحيوانية النشأ .. ..
6 Living plants and products of floriculture	97	35	74	62	٦ النباتات الحية ومحاصيل زراعة الازهار .. .. ..
7 Alimentary vegetables, plants, roots and tubers, straw and forage	25,246	4,327	28,129	4,263	٧ الخضر ، النباتات ، الجذور ، والمسافيل الغذائية (الفرنات الغذائية) .. .. ..
8 British fruits.	66,850	12,009	83,417	12,974	٨ الاثمار الصالحة للاكل ..
9 Colonial produce and general grocery.	2,102	5,112	1,992	4,472	٩ البن ، الشاي ، والابازير (بهارات)
10 Cereals.	6,022	3,153	42,084	15,740	١٠ الحبوب .. .. ..
11 Milling products, malts, starch and farinas	240	108	1,982	606	١١ محاصيل الطواحين (الشعير النائط نشاء الحبوب ، نشاء الجذور
12 Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, various grains, seeds and fruits, industrial & medical plants	10,815	2,767	11,869	4,904	١٢ الحبوب والاثمار الزيتية ، الحبوب البزور ، الاثمار المتنوعة ، النباتات الصناعية ، والطبية القش والكلاء (العلف) .. .. ..
13 Raw materials for dyeing and tanning, gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and juices	1,148	731	687	417	١٣ المواد الاولية للدباغة والصباغة الصموغ ، الراتنجات وغيرها من العصارات النباتية الاخرى ..
14 Materials for plaiting and carving, and other raw vegetable materials and products	74	35	167	116	١٤ المواد المعدة للضفر والحفر وغيرها من المواد الاولية والمحاصيل الخام النباتية النشأ .. ..
15 Animals and vegetable fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats.	8,094	5,126	8,018	5,146	١٥ الاجسام الدهنية ، الدهون ، الزيوت الزيوت ومحاصيل تفكيك الدهون المياة ، الشموع النباتية النشأ
16 Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans and molluscs.	414	622	339	580	١٦ مستحضرات اللحوم والاسماك وحضرات القشريات والرخويات ..
17 Sugar and confectionery ...	27,020	6,675	38,481	12,428	١٧ السكر ومصنوعات السكر ..
18 Cocoa & preparations thereof	172	378	186	367	١٨ الكاكاو ومستحضراته .. ..

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كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 (Contd.)

(جدول رقم ٦ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
19 Preparations from flour or fecula	154	211	173	278	١٩ المحضرات التي اساسها الدقيق والنشاء .. .. ..
20 Preparations of fruits, vegetables, pot herbs and other plants	941	168	2,102	574	٢٠ محضرات الخضر والنباتات الصالحة للاكل، محضرات الاثمار، محضرات النباتات الاخرى او محضرات اجزائها .. .. ..
21 Miscellaneous preparations...	94	86	67	77	٢١ المحضرات الغذائية على اختلاف انواعها .. .. ..
22 Beverages alcoholic liquids and vinegar	342	426	1,225	976	٢٢ الاشربة ، الموائع الكحولية ، الخل
23 Residues and wastes of food preparing industries ...	715	30	2,039	133	٢٣ بقايا الصناعات الغذائية ونفاياتها
24 Tobacco	552	2,484	448	1,570	٢٤ التبغ .. .. ..
25 Earths, stones, lime and cement	18,865	1,655	48,715	3,506	٢٥ الاتربة ، الاحجار، الكلس الاسمنت
26 Ores, slag and ash	17	10	62	12	٢٦ الفلزات ، الخبث ، الرماد ..
27 Mineral fuels and oils, natural illuminous substances and products of their distillation	412,797	39,523	365,045	35,274	٢٧ الوقود المعدني ، الزيوت المعدنية المواد الحمرية ومحاصيل تقطيرها
28 Chemical and pharmaceutical products	7,343	7,287	10,164	10,825	٢٨ المواد الكيماوية والصيدلانية ، العناصر الكيماوية .. ..
29 Prepared chemicals and other products for photography	80	794	42	734	٢٩ المحاصيل الكيماوية المحضرة والمحاصيل الاخرى المستعملة في التصوير الشمسي .. ..
30 Colouring and tanning extracts leads, pencils, colours, lacs, varnishes and potties ...	3,328	3,537	2,599	2,747	٣٠ الخلاصات الدبغية ، الاصباغ ، الفك والاطلية (فرنيش) ، الصمغ (المجون) رصاص الاقلام ، اقلام الرصاص .. .. ..
31 Essential oils, essences, artificial aromatic materials, perfumery and cosmetics ...	155	715	157	700	٣١ الزيوت العطرية ، العطور ، المواد العطرة الصنعية ، اصناف صناعة العطور .. .. ..
32 Soap, candles and articles from waxes, oils or fats ...	1,066	781	800	677	٣٢ الصابون، شموع الاضاءة والمحضرات الاخرى التي اساسها الزيوت او الشحوم او الشمع والاصناف المماثلة .. ..
33 Glues, gelatines and dressings	351	252	159	158	٣٣ الجنين (الزلين) ، الاجين (اليومين) الغلامين (جلاتين) ، الغراء ، المواد المستعملة للتهيئة .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٦ تابع

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
34 Explosives, fireworks, matches and other inflammable articles	80	167	38	37	٣٤ المتفجرات واصناف صناعة الاعلاب النارية، الثقاب والاصناف الاخرى من مواد لهوب (قابلة للالتهاب)
35 Fertilizers	11,340	1,501	5,008	878	٣٥ الاسمدة .. ..
36 Skins, hides and leather ...	2,671	3,951	2,539	1,530	٣٦ الصلال والجلود .. ..
37 Articles made of hides, skin and leather	15	159	9	165	٣٧ الحاجات المصنوعة من الجلود (الجلود الدبوغة) والصلال (الجلود غير الدبوغة) .. .. ..
38 Fur-skins and furs	19	25	16	12	٣٨ جلود الفراء .. .. ..
39 Rubber, gutta-percha, balata, substitutes and manufactures thereof	3,461	5,864	2,677	5,919	٣٩ المطاط والحاجات المصنوعة من المطاط .. ..
40 Wood, articles thereof and furniture	40,792	8,633	16,083	10,297	٤٠ الخشب والحاجات المصنوعة منه
41 Cork and manufactures thereof	23	35	17	21	٤١ الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة من الفلين .. ..
42 Articles made of straw, cane or other vegetable plaiting materials	383	169	118	142	٤٢ الحاجات المصنوعة من القش والاسل وغيرها من المواد النباتية الصالحة للضفر .. ..
43 Materials used for the manufacture of paper	50	7	—	—	٤٣ المواد المستعملة لصناعة الورق
44 Paper, cardboard, articles thereof and binders' waste ...	8,735	5,226	5,731	5,339	٤٤ الورق والورق المقوى ، الحاجات المصنوعة منهما .. ..
45 Bookbinders' waste & products of the graphic arts	91	305	106	250	٤٥ حاجات الكتب ومنتوجات فن الرسم والخطوط .. ...
46 Silk, floss-silk and artificial silk	10,130	23,968	7,158	25,305	٤٦ الحرير وشاشة الحرير ، الحرير الصنعي والالياف النسيجية الصنعية الخيوط المعدنية .. ..
47 Wool, horse-hair (crine) and other animal hair (pelts)	2,501	13,823	2,138	13,795	٤٧ الصوف والشعر والوبر ..
48 Cotton	2,189	12,866	1,991	13,009	٤٨ القطن .. ..
49 Flax, hemp, jute, ramie and other vegetable textile materials	380	544	326	838	٤٩ الكتان ، القنب ، الجوت ، الرامي وغيرها من المواد النسيجية النباتية
50 Wadding, felt, ropes, rope-makers' wares, special fabrics and articles for technical purposes	416	763	256	374	٥٠ قطن الحشو ، اللباد ، الحبال واصناف صناعة الحبال ، النسج الخاصة والاصناف الفنية

FOREIGN TRADE

كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٦ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
51 Hosiery	47	276	33	671	٥١ منسوجات شغل المنسار (الوبرة)
52 Clothing, linen and articles of all kinds ready-made ...	10,387	7,182	5,628	6,161	٥٢ الالبسة، الشعار (اللباس الداخلية) والاصناف الجاهزة من جميع الانواع .. .. ..
53 Rags and scraps of textile materials	1,938	3,238	2,226	3,980	٥٣ الاسمال (دول) والخرق ..
54 Footwear	9	28	175	526	٥٤ الاحذية .. ..
55 Hats, tarbouches and caps ...	4	62	4	72	٥٥ القبعات العادية والقبعات المعروفة بالتكيت .. .. ..
56 Umbrellas, parasols and sticks	24	51	39	98	٥٦ المظلات (مظريات وشمسيات) العكاز (عصي) .. .. ..
57 Feathers, articles of feathers, artificial flowers and other articles for ornament & fans	2	8	3	13	٥٧ الريش العطر المعد للزينة ؛ الاصناف المصنوعة من الريش ؛ الازهار الصنعية والحاجات المصنوعة من الشعر ، المراوح .. ..
58 Wares of stones and other mineral materials	841	326	626	311	٥٨ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاحجار والمواد المعدنية الاخرى ..
59 Pottery	3,534	1,463	2,527	1,263	٥٩ المصنوعات الخزفية .. ..
60 Glass and Glassware	2,622	2,054	2,418	1,640	٦٠ الزجاج والحاجات الزجاجية
61 Precious metals, pearls and precious stones (kilo) ...	9,224	20,358	5,065	10,170	٦١ المعادن الثمينة ، الاحجار الكريمة والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد (كيلو) ..
62 Coins (specie) (kilo)	167	334	4	16	٦٢ النقود (كيلو) .. ..
63 Iron, cast iron and steel ...	48,187	18,020	44,455	19,550	٦٣ الحديد ، الحديد الصب ، الفولاذ
64 Copper	726	1,574	795	2,440	٦٤ النحاس .. .. ..
65 Nickel	—	1	—	1	٦٥ النيكل .. .. ..
66 Aluminium	610	1,114	334	500	٦٦ الالمنيوم .. .. ..
67 Lead	355	182	255	350	٦٧ الرصاص .. .. ..
68 Zink	67	72	40	52	٦٨ الزنك (زنك) .. ..
69 Tin	121	309	38	209	٦٩ القصدير .. .. ..
70 Other common metals, and alloys thereof	28	88	14	38	٧٠ المعادن العادية الاخرى وخلائطها
71 Cutlery & miscellaneous wares of common metal	480	2,606	306	1,790	٧١ الحاجات المختلفة المصنوعة من المعادن غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. ..
72 Boilers, machinery, mechanical apparatus, appliances and parts	11,992	30,186	10,826	27,840	٧٢ الراجل، الآلات، الاجهزة الادوات الآلية ، وكذلك قطعها المنفصلة

التجارة الخارجية

كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

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Table No. 6 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٦ (تتمة)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
73 Electric machinery, apparatus, articles and parts detached	2,937	9,909	2,751	8,186	٧٣ الآلات والاجهزة الكهربائية والحاجات المعدة للاستعمالات الفنية الكهربائية وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
74 Railway rolling-stock and railway and tramway material	368	158	55	84	٧٤ وسائط النقل المستعملة في السكك الحديدية ادوات السكك الحديدية والمترامات (ترام) .. ..
75 Cycles, automobiles and other vehicles	6,282	17 793	5,145	12,782	٧٥ السيارات ، الدرجات وغيرها من وسائط النقل .. ..
76 Aviation and navigation means	45	713	2,052	565	٧٦ وسائط الطيران والملاحة ..
77 Scientific, optical, precision and other instruments and apparatus	132	1,274	83	1,051	٧٧ الآلات والاجهزة البصرية ، آلات واجهزة القياس الدقيق ، الآلات والاجهزة الاخرى غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ..
78 Biological wares	15	947	24	979	٧٨ اصناف صناعة الساعات ..
79 Musical instruments	368	308	49	313	٧٩ آلات الموسيقى .. ..
80 Arms	12	75	4	105	٨٠ الاسلحة .. .. ..
81 Ammunition	62	131	32	141	٨١ الذخائر .. .. ..
82 Wares of carved or moulded materials or artificial plastic materials	178	585	177	745	٨٢ الحاجات غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من مواد طبيعية او صنعية معدة للنحت والسبك .. .. ..
83 Brush and sieve wares... ...	51	145	51	160	٨٣ حاجات صناعة الفراجين (فرشاة) فراجين الدهان واصناف صناعة المناخل .. .. ..
84 Games, toys, articles for Christmas trees & sporting goods and apparatus	118	315	100	332	٨٤ الالعاب ، اللعب ، الاصناف المعدة للهو والالعاب الرياضية ..
85 Wares of various materials and other	62	414	35	421	٨٥ الحاجات المصنوعة من مواد مختلفة الاوزان وماسكات الريش وماسكات اقلام الرصاص ، الاصناف المعدة للمدخنين .. .. ..
86 Works of art and articles for collection	2	14	1	8	٨٦ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total { Tons	772,555	307,050	305,130	313,340	المجموع { اطنان
Total { '000 Heads...	375		363		المجموع { الوف الرؤوس

FOREIGN TRADE

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أهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية) ●

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 — جدول رقم ٧

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1953 Quant.	Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 Quant.	Value		الوضع الجمركي
4b	Rams, ewes, wethers ... '000 Heads	330	6,375	338	6,905	٤/ب	الكباش ، الخرفان ، النعاج (الوف الرؤوس) ..
5b	He-goats and she-goats *	20	303	24	282	٥/ب	التيوس والعنز (الوف الرؤوس)
19a	Fish, sweet water	267	165	157	68	١٩/أ	اسماك الماء العذب ..
31/2	Milk powder, not for industrial purposes	215	340	151	247	٣١/٢	مسحوق الحليب غير المعد للصناعة .. .. ..
36/3	Cheese of all kinds other than gruyer, roquefor, and hashkawal	176	280	196	353	٣٦/ج/٢	الجبن بانواعه المختلفة غير الغروير والروكفور والهشكوال
46b	Olives, salted	195	102	166	88	٤٦/ب	الزيتون والكبر (الخيل) المملحة
47	Tomatoes	6,546	1,086	5,196	730	٤٧	البندورة .. ..
48b	Onions	1,341	136	976	98	٤٨/أ	البصل والكرات .. ..
49	Potatoes	8,471	1,264	10,352	1,506	٤٩	البطاطا .. .. ..
50c	Cabbages	1,086	171	127	17	٥٠/ج	جميع انواع الملفوف (الفرنبيط) الاخرى .. .. ..
50/1	Broad beans and broad beans	1,136	243	1,317	283	٥٠/أ/١	الفاصوليا وفول الرواع
50g	Cucumbers, pumpkins, marrows and similar vegetables	1,716	489	2,303	627	٥٠/د	الخيار ، خيار الخلل ، القرع الكوسا وما يماثلها ..
50h	Other fresh vegetables, n.e.s.	3,610	612	4,131	698	٥٠/ح	الخضر الاخرى الطازجة غير المذكورة .. .. ..
54a/2	Dates, other than in packets of 1 kilo or less	21,827	2,300	32,770	3,522	٥٤/أ/٢	التمور الاخرى غير المعلبة كيلو او اقل .. .. ..
54b	Bananas	4,294	1,454	4,113	1,261	٥٤/ب	الموز .. .. ..
55a	Oranges and mandarines	19,611	3,640	26,290	4,127	٥٥/أ	البرتقال والقدرينة (يوسف افندي) .. .. ..
55b	Lemons	2,040	506	3,351	398	٥٥/ب	الليمون الحامض .. ..
55c	Almonds, hulled	146	328	126	258	٥٥/أ	اللوز بقشره .. ..
55e	Filberts, shelled	41	141	45	167	٥٥/ه	البندق المقشر .. ..
55h	Apples and quinces	2,281	779	1,548	414	٥٥/ح	التفاح والسفرجل ..
55i	Pears	1,855	278	1,480	212	٥٥/ط	الكمثرى (الاجاص) .. ..
55j	Mulberries	957	331	1,236	326	٥٥/ك	الاكاديا .. .. ..
55r	Watermelons	11,151	1,388	9,287	980	٥٥/ق	البطيخ الاحمر (الجبس)
55s	Other fresh fruits, n.e.s.	7,5	120	813	121	٥٥/ل	الاثمار الاخرى الطازجة غير المذكورة
60a	Coffee, not roasted ...	1,049	2,606	1,136	2,785	٦٠/أ	البن غير المحمص ..
61	Tea	831	2,675	617	1,341	٦١	الشاي .. .. ..
65	Pepper and allspice ...	87	115	141	186	٦٥	الفلفل (بهار) والقرفة (شكة) (حتى الفلفل منبه) ..

● الكمية التي زادت قيمتها عن ١٠٠ الف ليرة سورية خلال عام ١٩٥٢

* Commodities whose value exceeded L.S. 100,000 during 1952

التجارة الخارجية

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أهم السلع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

CODE	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
69d	Cardamoms — — — —	10	127	10	105	د/٦٧ القاقلة (حب الهال) ..
70b	Rice, husked — — —	5,812	3,652	8,396	3,600	ب/٧٠ الارز المقشور .. ..
83a	Copra, under seals and bands — — — —	1,623	777	3,386	1,590	أ/٨٣ الكوبرا او حب الخروع وبزور الكتان
83a1	Sesame seeds — — —	372	213	1,087	583	ب/٨٣/١ حب السمسم .. ..
83a2	Cottonseed — — —	750	221	1,384	822	ب/٨٣/٢ بزر القطن .. .. ..
84a	Seeds and fruits for sowing	200	102	127	87	أ/٨٤ الحبوب والاثمار المعدة للبذار
84a1	Melonseeds — — —	755	258	829	283	ب/٨٤/١ بزور البطيخ الاخضر والاصفر
84a2	Seeds for sowing: pumpkin gourd and cucumber —	401	200	468	514	ب/٨٤/٢ بزر اليقطين والقرع والخيار
85	Sugar beet — — —	3,077	300	2,377	100	٨٥ الشوندر السكري .. ..
86c	Liquorice — — — —	905	177	354	56	ج/٨٦ السوس .. .. ..
89	Plants and parts of plants n.e.s. (indoxed, cuttings etc.)	265	294	223	319	٨٩ النباتات واجزاؤها ، البذور والاثمار غير المذكورة او الداخلة في مكان آخر (بذور البلسون والكمون وما يماثلها) ..
92c	Henna (leaves), in leaves and ground — — —	320	257	132	67	ج/٩٢ الحناء ورقا ومسحوقة ..
92d	Other herbs used for tanning or dyeing — —	290	182	140	65	د/٩٢ النباتات واجزاؤها ، الاثمار الاخرى الصالحة للدباغة والصباغة .. .. ..
92e	Other gums — — —	110	1.5	110	100	هـ/٩٢ الصموغ الاخرى .. ..
100g2	Olive oil for soap making	412	472	353	353	أ/١٠٠/ز زيت الزيتون المعد لصناعة الصابون .. .. ..
100g3	Olive oil other than for soap making — — —	1,361	1,005	780	1,250	ب/١٠٠/ز زيت الزيتون غير صناعة الصابون .. .. ..
101d	Palm oil — — — —	3,077	1,402	2,522	1,544	د/١٠٠ زيت ثمرة النخيل .. ..
102a	Linseed oil — — —	120	128	81	97	أ/١٠٧ زيت الكتان المطبوخ او المؤكسد
109	Fatty acids for the soap industry — — — —	1,125	500	1,472	796	١٠٩ الحموض الدسمة المحضرة على ٢٠٪ ونيف من الصفر الحر المعد صراحة لصناعة الصابون

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FOREIGN TRADE

اهم السلع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.) جدول رقم (٧) تابع

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953			الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value		
117b	Other preparations and preserves of meat other than ham	137	237	123	216	١١٧/ب	الانواع الاخرى من مستحضرات اللحوم المحفوظة غير الجبون
120						١٢٠	الاسماك المحضرة المحفوظة والاسماك المحضرة بصورة بسيطة
120	Fish preserved	264	203	197	273		
122a	Sugar, raw	23,836	4,950	21,739	3,367	١/١٢١	السكر الخام ... ...
122b	Glucose	3,050	1,052	4,148	1,520	١٢١/ب	الكلوكوز ... ...
130	Cocoa butter	40	144	29	87	١٣٠	زبدة الكاكاو ... ...
136a	Biscuits, sweetened ...	142	192	133	220	١/١٣٦	البسكوت المحلى بالسكر ..
152b	Beer in bottles	262	211	912	303	١٥٢/ب	البيرة في قناني ... ...
171b	Tobacco leaves	341	2,175	354	1,650	١٧١/ب	التبغ ورقا ... ...
172c	Cigarettes	29	251	36	279	١٧٢/ج	الغلائل الطبية
179	Matches	628	123	632	132	١٧٩	الكبريت ... ...
185a	Marble	1,481	290	1,108	208	١/١٨٥	الرخام خاما او منشورا بصورة بسيطة ... ...
192a	Cement, portland	11,561	645	11,200	2,305	١/١٩٢	الاسمنت الملون او غير الملون الطبيعي او الصناعي
192b	Cement, white or coloured	3,651	371	4,302	806	١٩٢/ب	الاسمنت الملون او غير الملون الابيض او الملون ..
195a	Fit. coal and anthracite...	1,608	116	695	50	١/١٩٥	الفحم الحجري والانتراسيت
195b	Fit. coal and anthracite ...	2,600	219	2,160	203	١٩٥/ب	الفحم الحجري والانتراسيت
201	Coke of coal, lignite and coke of petroleum	1,722	206	666	101	٢٠١	كوك الفحم الحجري والليغنيت كوك النفط ... ...
203a	Asphalt for roads	663	121	1,500	303	١/٢٠٣	الزفت لتزفيت الطرق ..
204	Petroleum, 32° in barrels or tins	7,770	1,160	8,223	1,116	١/١/٢/٢٠٤	النفط في براميل او صفائح درجة ٣٢ ... ...
204/2a1	Petroleum, 32° in other containers	13,016	4,008	30,320	3,742	٢/١/٢/٢٠٤	النفط في [illegible] منطقة درجة ٣٢ ... ...
204/2/1	Benzine in barrels or cases	9,250	1,334	8,354	1,119	١/٢/٢٠٤	البنزين في براميل وصناديق
204/2/2	Benzine in other containers	72,798	9,107	71,195	9,199	٢/٢/٢٠٤	البنزين في اوعية اخرى ..
204/4/1	Mineral oils in barrels ...	4,108	1,111	3,541	1,225	١/٤/٢٠٤	الزيوت المعدنية الثقيلة المستعملة في براميل .. ..
204/4/2	Mineral oils in other containers	2,908	1,308	1,968	657	٢/٤/٢٠٤	الزيوت المعدنية الثقيلة المستعملة في اوعية اخرى
204/5/1	Mineral oil, crude	1,79[illegible]	1,[illegible]	[illegible]	4,[illegible]	١/٥/٢٠٤	الزيوت المعدنية الكثيفة الخام
204/5/2	Mineral oil, distilled ...	1,11254	14,215	118,667	11,318	٢/٥/٢٠٤	الزيوت المقطرة .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) — جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
206/2	Other mineral oils	255	150	334	323	٨/٢٠٦ زيوت النفط الاخرى ..
211a	Asphalt for roads	5,338	638	1,132	470	٢/٢١١ مخاليط الزفت المعدة لتزفيت الطرق .. ..
211b	Mixtures and emulsions of asphalt for other purposes	216	191	12	46	٢١١/ب مخاليط الزفت الاخرى ..
222/b	Naftalic acid, not for pharmaceutical purposes ...	198	222	157	235	٢٢٢/٢/ب حمض الطرطر غير الصيدلاني
224	Sodium hydroxide (Caustic soda)	1,746	317	1,499	353	٢٢٤ مايات الصوديوم (الصودا الكاوي)
224b	Sodium carbonate in all its forms	1,786	208	1,717	271	٢/٢٢٤ فحمات الصوديوم بجميع اشكالها .. ..
235	Active carbon and mineral carbon	160	107	112	86	٢٣٥ الفحوم الفعالة ، فحوم المعادن
281a	Disinfectants for agricultural purposes	233	282	1,089	1,053	٢/٢٨١ محاصيل معدة لمكافحة الحشرات خاصة للاستعمال الزراعي
287/b						٢٨٧/ب المحاصيل الكيماوية والحضرات الكيماوية الاخرى غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. ..
293/b	Chemical products and chemical preparations, n.e.s...	190	300	130	203	
293b1	Streptomycine and penicillin and their derivatives, chloromycetine and terramycine	—	1,381	—	1,325	١/٢/٢٩٣ الستربتومسين والبنسلين ومشتقاتها والكلورمسيتين والاورومسيتين .. ..
293b4	Medical and pharmaceutical preparations, other ...	300	2,918	318	2,674	٤/٢/٢٩٣ المحاصيل الصيدلانية الاخرى
293b5	Cinematographic films, sensitized with emulsions films	24	465	8	350	٣/٢/٢٩٣ الافلام السينمائية الواقية مع افلام صالحة .. ..
294	Films and sensitive plates for photography	11	135	9	160	٢٩٤ الافلام والصفائح الحساسة والمواد المعالجة المعدة للاستعمال في التصوير الشمسي
295	Papers and cards for photography	29	133	23	88	٢٩٦ الاوراق والبطاقات المعدة للتصوير
298	Tanning extracts of vegetable origin	1,516	997	1,227	830	٢٩٨ الخلاصات الدباغية النباتية الاصل .. ..
302	Colouring materials derived from coal-tar	243	1,242	133	700	٣٠٢ المواد الصباغية المشتقة من قطران الفحم الحجري .. ..

FOREIGN TRADE

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تتمة)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value		الوضع الجمركي
309b	Lithopone	326	133	134	74	٢/ب	الصبغ المعروف (بالليثوبون والسيد التوتيا .. ..
310	Prepared colours of all kinds	445	620	417	581	٢	الاصباغ المحضرة بانواعها المختلفة
310	Varnishes, concentrated or otherwise	161	169	76	87	٢	الاطلية (فرنيش) المركزة او غير المركزة .. .. ..
314	Pencils and leads	49	140	32	114	٢	اقلام الرصاص ، ورصاص الاقلام اقلام الرسم الملونة والطباشير
318b	Perfumery	46	206	34	188	٢/ب	الروائح العطرية والكحوليات تنال من الزجاج او البلاستيك استيتيا ليترين او اقل ..
318g	Other perfumes	18	109	—	—	٢/د	الروائح الاخرى
321	Washing powders including soap-free powders	139	155	20	17	٢	المحضرات المعدة لغسيل حتى الخالية من الصابون
323	Greasing materials from oils and fats	659	360	443	244	٢	المواد المزلقة (التشحيم) المجهزة من الزيوت والشحوم ..
324	Waxes, emulsions, creams, paints and shoe preparations, for leather and metal polishing	91	106	69	87	٢	الاطلية الشمعية ، الاطلية المسمة ، المعاجين والمحضرات المماثلة المعدة لتنظيف الجلود والاحذية والمصنوعات المعدنية الخ .. واستعمالها لتبييضها وحفظها
330	Explosives	84	114	—	—	٢	المتفجرات .. .. ..
343	Nitrogenous mineral or chemical fertilisers ...	7,540	1,218	4,088	770	٢	الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيماوية الازوتية .. .. ..
344	Phosphated mineral or chemical fertilisers	2,921	233	718	67	٢	الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيماوية الفسفاتية .. .. ..
348	Mineral fertilisers containing at least two of the following : Nitrates, phosphoric acid and potassium, admixtures of mineral and animal fertilisers or vegetable fertilisers	710	115	7	1	٢	الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيماوية المركبة من مادتين على الاقل من المواد المنصبة التالية : الازوت وحمض الفسفور والبوتاس ، امزجة الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيماوية مع الاسمدة الحيوانية النشا او الاسمدة النباتية النشا ..
348a	Hides, sheep	289	491	565	812	٢/أ	سلال الغنم بصوفها ..
348b	Hides, goats	438	496	221	326	٢/ب	سلال الماعز بشعرها ..
348c	Hides, other	1,814	2,172	1,630	2,416	٢/ج	السلال الغنام الاخرى ..
351	Skins, calves tanned or prepared	63	404	33	448	٢	جلود العجول المدبوغة او المجهزة

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) — جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي	
353	Leather, polished or glazed-silver or bronze	25	211	9	136	الجلود الملمعة او اللامعة او المفضضة او الصفرية ..	٣٥٣
370	Waste, powder and scrap of rubber and gutta-percha	1,491	182	932	104	نفايات ومساحيق وجرار المطاط والغيرغي	٣٧٠
373	Pipes and tubes of rubber	77	157	49	121	الانابيب (الترابيج) والمواسير المصنوعة من المطاط ..	٣٧٣
374	Articles of unhardened rubber for use in machinery	55	302	56	319	اصناف المطاط المعدة للاستعمالات الفنية الصناعية	٣٧٤
375b	Rubber tubes and tyres for automobiles, motor cycles bicycles and other transport vehicles	1,408	4,382	1,479	4 974	اطارات المطاط الداخلية والخارجية	٣٧٥/ب
377	Other articles made of unhardened rubber	292	309	79	184	الحاجات الاخرى المصنوعة من المطاط	٣٧٧
381	Charcoal	6,498	1,326	6,685	1 355	الفحم الخشبي	٣٨١
382b	White deal wood, round and rough	2,318	331	787	110	الخشب المستدير الغام — الشوح	٣٨٢/ب
382c	Pine wood	717	102	396	68	الزان	٣٨٢/ج
382h	Poplar wood, round and rough	3,335	413	4,114	514	خشب الحور المستدير والغام	٣٨٢/ح
384a1	Timber, cut squared «Qatarani»	546	108	—	—	الاخشاب المنشورة قددا القطراني	٣٨٤/أ/١
384b	Poplar wood, sawn lengthwise	13,965	2,060	17,888	3,745	التنوب (الشوح) المنشور قددا	٣٨٤/ب
384c	Pine wood, simply sawn lengthwise	4,139	748	2,836	563	الزان المنشور قددا ..	٣٨٤/ج
384i	Other woods, sawn lengthwise	5,779	1,464	6,220	1,267	الاخشاب الاخرى المنشورة قددا	٣٨٤/ط
392c	Veneering sheets, other...	42	103	28	73	اوراق قلبيس من الاخشاب الاخرى	٣٩٢/ج
393	Plywood	1,026	391	1,023	911	الخشب المعاكس	٣٩٣
398c	Electricity poles of wood	365	109	256	64	اعمدة الكهرباء من الخشب	٣٩٨/ج
417	Cardboard, not worked in rolls or sheets	900	261	709	264	الورق القوى غير المشغول وغير المرين لفائف او طلحيات ..	٤١٧
420a	Packing paper, not decorated nor sulphured nor glazed or glazed on one side.	866	435	509	333	اوراق العر العادية غير المزخرفة ولا المكبرتة ولا الملمعة او الملمعة من وجه واحد	٤٢٠/أ

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
420b	Kraft paper destined to be used exclusively for the making of bags to contain cement, ochre, asphalt, carbon, salts, fertilisers of animal origin and similar products	407	192	10	8	ورق « كرافت » المعد فقط لصنع الاكياس المستعملة لتعبئة الاسمنت والمغرة والاسفلت والفحم والاملاح والاسمدة الحيوانية المنشأ وما يماثلها من المحاصيل
420c	Newsprint	646	308	436	349	ورق الصحف .. ..
420d	Newsprint paper destined to be used for other printed matter or for other purposes. Printed paper other than newsprint.	467	193	134	76	ورق الصحف المعد لمطبوعات اخرى او لاستعمالات اخرى، الورق المعد للطبع غير ورق الصحف .. .. ..
420e	Cigarette paper, not prepared	71	212	188	424	ورق لفائف التبغ (سكاير)
420f	Letter paper and copying paper	223	226	38	70	ورق الرسائل، وورق الاستنساخ
420h	Other paper of natural colour or all of one colour	429	278	450	318	الانواع الاخرى من الورق ذات اللون الطبيعي الابيض او الملونة بكاملها مما لم يذكر ولم يدخل في مكان آخر .. ..
421b	Ruled, lined or checkered paper	301	207	202	173	الورق المجدول والمسطر والمشطرج .. .. ..
421e1	Cellophane and parchment paper, greasy paper ...	142	230	107	237	ورق السلوفان ، وورق البرشمين الورق المشحم .. ..
421e2	Other paper, n.e.a.	1,085	600	532	491	الانواع الاخرى من الورق مما لم يذكر ولم يدخل في مكان آخر .. .. .. ولغيرها
426b	Duplicating paper	141	120	81	111	ورق الاستنساخ ..
427	Cigarette paper	105	214	185	441	ورق لفائف التبغ .. ..
429a1	Cement paper bags ...	1,094	464	731	653	الاكياس من الورق المعد لتعبئة الاسمنت .. ..
431	Exercise-books, registers and note books	67	106	28	49	الدفاتر ، السجلات ، دفاتر الجيب الصغيرة المفكرات التقاويم والاصناف المماثلة
436a	Books	36	120	20	57	الكتب .. .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
466	Silk yarns of fibre or silk waste, for industrial purposes	8	112	5	51	٤٦٦ خيوط مشاقة الحرير وخيوط فضلاتها ، المستوردة صراحة لاستعمالها في الصناعة ..
462	Artificial silk thread, pure or mixed with wool not put for retail sale	6,456	15,148	4,097	15,141	٤٦٢ خيوط الحرير الصنعي صرفا او مخلوطا بالصوف وغير محضر للبيع بالمفرق .. ..
465	Artificial textile fibres ...	2,966	3,815	1,915	3,447	٤٦٥ الياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية حزما او كتلا .. ..
467	Thread of artificial silk waste, pure or mixed with wool not put for retail sale	116	325	64	225	٤٦٧ الخيوط المصنوعة من فضلات الحرير الصنعي صرفا او مخلوطة بالصوف وغير محضرة للبيع بالمفرق .. .. ..
470	Velvet and plushes of pure artificial silk	32	488	36	538	٤٧٠ المخمل العادي والمخمل الطويل الوبر المصنوعان من الحرير الصنعي الصرف .. ..
471a	Crepes of artificial silk, raw	25	292	35	490	٤٧١/أ كريب الحرير الصنعي خاما
471b	Crepes of artificial silk, printed	17	133	6	106	٤٧١/ب كريب الحرير الصنعي مطبوعا
472a2	Other fabrics n.e.s. of pure artificial silk; poplins, muslins, grenadines, voiles, gauze, etamines etc., 75 grs. and less; printed, ornamented of fashioned.	11	195	5	90	٤٧٢/أ/٢ النسج الاخرى من الحرير الصنعي الصرف غير المذكورة في مكان آخر ؛ بوبلين ، موسلين ، غرنادين ، فوال ، غزي ، التمين الخ .. ٧٥ غراما واقل .. .. ..
472b1	Other fabrics of artificial silk, raw over 75 grs. ...	122	218	32	300	٤٧٢/ب/١ النسج الاخرى من الحرير الصنعي اكثر من ٧٥ غراما خاما
472b2	Other fabrics of artificial silk, printed over 75 grs.	25	349	29	402	٤٧٢/ب/٢ النسج من الحرير الصنعي اكثر من ٧٥ غراما مطبوعا ..
474	Velvet and plushes of artificial silk yarn mixed with other textile materials ...	30	183	23	185	٤٧٤ المخمل العادي والمخمل الطويل الوبر من الحرير الصنعي ممزوج بمواد نسيجية اخرى ..
476	Other fabrics n.e.s.; of pure artificial silk; poplins, muslins, grenadines, voiles, gauze, etamines etc. ...	8	165	5	51	٤٧٦ النسج الاخرى من الحرير الصنعي مخلوطا بمواد نسيجية اخرى ؛ غير المذكورة في مكان آخر ؛ بوبلين ، موسلين ، غرنادين ، فوال ، غزي ، التمين الخ .. .. ..

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quantity	القيمة Value	الكمية Quantity	القيمة Value	
480c	Other fabrics of artificial silk waste and pure artificial textile material, 180 grs. n.e.s.	89	556	112	697	٤٨٠/ج النسج الاخرى غير المذكورة المصنوعة من نفايات الحرير الصناعي والياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية التي يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ١٨٠ غراما ..
484c	Other fabrics n.e.s.; of pure artificial silk waste & fibre of artificial textiles mixed with other textile material	11	101	--	—	٤٨٤/ج النسج الاخرى من نفايات الحرير الصناعي والياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية مخلوطة بمواد نسيجية اخرى (يوتين، موصلين ، فرنسلاين ، فوال ، غزي ، التلين الخ .. ..
485a	Tulle and webbed tissues made of artificial silk or of artificial waste or fibre of artificial textile materials.	53	249	3	63	٤٨٥/أ النسج المعروفة بالتول والنسج الشبكية من الحرير الصناعي او من نفاياته ومن الياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية
491a	Metal threads, silver-plated or gold-plated	16	105	10	80	٤٩١/أ الخيوط المعدنية المفضضة او مذهبة
491b	Metal threads combined with textile thread	28	499	16	326	٤٩١/ب الخيوط المعدنية المضمومة الى الخيوط النسيجية .. ..
493	Wool in the mass	410	803	328	646	٤٩٣ الصوف كتلا .. .. ..
495a	Goats hair	335	245	186	147	٤٩٥/أ وبر الماعز .. ..
502	Woollen thread and yarn, combed	371	3,030	(2)	3,503	٥٠٢ خيوط الصوف الممشطة ..
506b	Thread and yarn of wool, for retail sale	11	146	4	25	٥٠٦/ب خيوط الصوف المحضرة للبيع بالمفرق .. ..
507a1	Fabrics of pure wool, 200 grs. and less per m2 ...	22	282	37	380	٥٠٧/أ/١ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بمعاشيتها ٢٠٠ غرام او اقل
507a2	Fabrics of pure wool, 200—300 grs. per m2	330	3,614	343	4,282	٥٠٧/أ/٢ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بمعاشيتها اكثر من ٢٠٠ غرام ولا يزيد عن ٣٥٠ غ ..
507a3	Fabrics of pure wool, 350—500 grs. per m2.	209	1,297	248	2,429	٥٠٧/أ/٣ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بمعاشيتها اكثر من ٣٥٠ غ ولا يزيد عن ٥٠٠ غ ..
507a4	Fabrics of pure wool, over 500 grs. per m2.	29	276	33	258	٥٠٧/أ/٤ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بمعاشيتها اكثر من ٥٠٠ غ

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
507b1	Woollen fabrics mixed with cotton	25	255	27	321	٥٠٧/ب/١ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف المزوج بالقطن . .. ..
507b2	Woollen fabrics mixed with textile material other than cotton	68	460	32	269	٥٠٧/ب/٢ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف المزوج بمواد نسيجية اخرى
508a	Blankets of pure wool ...	33	117	163	1,283	٥٠٩/أ الاغطية (الحرامات) الصوفية
509b	Blankets of mixed wool...	75	197	35	99	٥٠٩/ب الاغطية المصنوعة من الصوف المخلوط .. ..
511a1	Carpets, 350 rows and less	62	406	58	354	٥١١/أ/١ بسط الاقدام ذات الغمائل المعقدة (سجاد) الواقعة من ٣٥٠ صفا واقل من العقد .. ..
511a2	Carpets, 351—450 rows	119	1,023	113	882	٥١١/أ/٢ بسط الاقدام ذات الغمائل المعقدة الواقعة من ٣٥٠ الى ٤٥٠ صفا .. ..
511a3	Carpets, over 450 rows ...	19	307	14	240	٥١١/أ/٣ بسط الاقدام ذات الغمائل المعقدة الواقعة من ٤٥٠ صفا
522a3	Cotton yarn, single counts 24 — 40	24	121	22	128	٥٢٢/أ/٣ خيوط القطن الوحيدة الطاق خاما ما فوق الرقم ٢٤/١ الى الرقم ٤٠/١ .. ..
523/3	Cotton yarn, twisted double or more, over count 24 up to 40	77	374	32	180	٥٢٣/٣ خيوط القطن المفتولة بطاقين او اكثر ما فوق الرقم ٢٤ الى ٤٠
523/4a	Cotton yarn, twisted double or more, over 40 counts...	223	1,232	188	1,125	٥٢٣/٤/أ خيوط القطن المفتولة بطاقين او اكثر ما فوق الرقم ٤٠ ملمعة او مصقولة (موسلينة)
524a	Cables made of cotton ...	151	140	168	181	٥٢٤/أ الامراس المصنوعة من القطن
526	Cotton yarn prepared for retail sale	48	339	48	311	٥٢٦ خيوط القطن المعدة للبيع بالمفرق
527a4	Cotton fabrics, unbleached more than 150 grs. ...	45	130	17	55	٥٢٧/أ/٤ خيوط القطن خاما ، اكثر من ١٥٠ غراما .. ..
527b1	Cotton tissues, bleached not figured 50 grs. and less per m2	24	271	38	1,340	٥٢٧/ب/١ النسج غير المقننة المصنوعة من القطن مقصورة مما يزن المتر المربع منها ٥٠غ واقل ..
527b2	Cotton tissues, bleached not figured 50 — 100 grs. per m2	47	480	61	775	٥٢٧/ب/٢ النسج غير المقننة المصنوعة من القطن مقصورة مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ٥٠ ولا يزيد عن ١٠٠ غرام .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٧ (تتمة)

COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٤ Year 1954		البضائع المستوردة
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
2234 Cotton thread, bleached not figured 100—200 gm. per m2 — — — —	28	315	26	270	٢/٥/٥٣ النسج غير الكتانية المبيضة من الخيوط مشبوكة ما بين الخيوط الربع منها اكثر من ١٠٠ غ و اقل من ١٥٠ غرام --
2234 Cotton thread, bleached not figured over 200 gm. per m2 — — — —	149	426	161	322	٤/٥/٥٣ النسج غير الكتانية المبيضة من الخيوط مشبوكة اكثر من ١٥٠ غ
2235 Cotton thread, dyed other fabrication or made of dyed yarn not figured over 50 gm and not exceeding 100 gm per m2 — — — —	45	239	42	324	٦/٥/٥٣ النسج الكتانية الصبوغة من ٥٠ الى ١٠٠ غ -- --
2235 Cotton thread, dyed other fabrication or made of dyed yarn not figured over 100 gm. and not exceeding 200 gm. per m2 — — — —	139	1,005	110	819	٢/٦/٥٣ النسج الكتانية الصبوغة من (١٠٠) الى (١٥٠) غ
2235d Cotton thread, printed over 200 gm. per m2 — —	395	1,320	283	1,327	٤/٦/٥٣ النسج الكتانية الصبوغة اكثر من (١٥٠) غرام -- --
2235d Cotton thread, printed over 50 gm. and not exceeding 100 gm. — — — —	23	103	30	231	٦/٧/٥٣ النسج الكتانية المطبوعة من (٥٠) الى (١٠٠) غرام
2235d Cotton thread, printed over 100 gm. and not exceeding 200 gm. — — — —	455	2,023	326	2,002	٢/٧/٥٣ النسج الكتانية المطبوعة من (١٠٠) الى (١٥٠) غ --
2235d Cotton thread, printed over 200 gm. per m2 — —	652	2,011	165	300	٤/٧/٥٣ النسج الكتانية المطبوعة اكثر من (١٥٠) غرام --
228 Cotton fabrics, figured —	32	118	14	120	٥/٧ النسج الكتانية المطبوعة من القطن الصرف -- --
222/1b Velvet and plush of dyed cotton — — — —	67	365	39	300	٧/٧/٥٣ أ/ب القطن المخملي والقطن الطويل الوبر المصبوغان من القطن صبغيا -- -- -- --
222/2 Plushes, containing fibre in mixture, with a cotton base, exceeding 20% of the weight of the fabric — — —	22	117	5	45	٧/٧ القطن الطويل الوبر المنسوج المؤلفة التراكيب الخروف بالوبر على سدى من القطن جيلوز مؤلفة ٢٠ ٪ من وزن النسج
224 Cotton carpets — —	45	271	30	167	٨ بسط الأقمشة القطنية --

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
553/1a1	Fabrics of jute not figured 35 threads and less ...	109	170	440	581	٥٥٣/١/١/أ النسج غير المقننة المصنوعة من الجوت الصرف خاما (٣٥) خيطا واقل .. ..
572b	Waxed cloths and fabrics of felts other than that used against insects ...	252	391	146	226	٥٧٢/ب النسج المشمعة غير المعدة لكافحة الحشرات الضارة
590	Handkerchiefs and neckerchiefs	7	143	7	146	٥٩٠ مناديل الجيب مناديل الراس مناديل الرقبة .. ..
593b	Corsets and corset-belts	13	130	11	157	٥٩٣/ب الشدات والحزم المصنوعة من النسج المطاطة ..
594a	Bags or sacks for packing, of jute fabrics	9,735	5,957	5,388	5,054	٥٩٤/أ الاكياس المعدة للعبر المصنوعة من النسج الجوتية (خيش)
594b	Sacks and bags of cotton fabrics	201	118	—	—	٥٩٤/ب الاكياس المعدة للعبر المصنوعة من النسج القطنية ..
595b	Covers, tents, sails for vessels and other similar materials	123	143	118	73	٥٩٥/ب الاغطية ، الخيام ، الاشرعة المعدة للسفن والاصناف المماثلة الاخرى .. .. ..
596a	Worn clothing and underwear	1,853	3,207	2,172	3,953	٥٩٦/أ الملابس والشعار البالية ..
641	Articles made of asbestos	382	133	368	120	٦٤١ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاسمنت الليفي .. .. ..
650	Fireproof bricks	1,381	380	1,230	321	٦٥٠ الاجر وقطع البناء المحملة للحرارة .. .. ..
656	Paving and facing tiles of stoneware	610	207	395	177	٦٥٥ الريشات المستعملة لتبليط وتغطية الجدران المصنوعة من الصلصال الرملي او القيشاني او الفخار الناعم .. ..
657	Fixed appliances for sanitary or hygienic purposes of ceramic material ...	238	157	123	125	٦٥٧ الاجهزة الثابتة المعدة للاستعمالات الصحية من الخزف ..
660a	Wares of faience, n.e.s. ...	164	109	116	101	٦/٦٦٠ الحاجات المصنوعة من القيشاني
662a	Wares of porcelain ...	463	452	319	432	٦/٦٦٢ الحاجات المصنوعة من الصيني
667a2	Glass sheets; drawn up by the Libbey-Owens or Pittsburg methods, polished on both sides	470	390	154	67	٦/٦٦٧ الواح الزجاج المسحوب بطريقة ليبي ـ اونز او تسبورغ والمصقولة على وجهيها ..
673a	Electric tubes and bulbs	68	102	65	105	٦/٦٧٣ المصابيح الكهربائية والعبات

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) — جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
673b	Other illuminating glassware	118	432	60	245	الحاجات الزجاجية في التنوير غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر وغيرها ..
673a	Table and ornamental glassware	791	539	567	408	اصناف صناعة الزجاج ..
684	Silver : unworked ingots, bars, powder & scrap (kg.)	3,714	179	2,215	60	الفضة الخام ، كتلا وسبائك وقضبانا مصبوبة ومسحوقة فضلات الفضة ونفاياتها ورمادها (بالكيلو) .. ..
685	Gold; unworked ingots, bars, powder, waste and scrap (kilos)	5,297	20,100	3,266	9,969	الذهب الخام كتلا وسبائك وقضبانا ومسحوقا فضلات الذهب ونفاياته ورماده (بالكيلو)
693	Gold coins (kilos)	107	534	4	16	النقود الذهبية (بالكيلو)
701a	Iron and steel in bars diametre 4 — 25 mm. ...	22,250	5,189	19,022	3,734	الحديد والفولاذ قضبانا مدورة بقطر من ٤ مم حتى ٢٥ مم (٢٥ مم غير داخلة) ..
701b	Iron and steel in bars in other dimentions	1,142	305	876	290	الحديد والفولاذ بقياسات اخرى .. .. ..
701c	Iron & steel in shape T or I	1,098	269	1,079	346	الحديد والفولاذ قضبانا بشكل التكلين T او I
701d	Iron & steel in other shapes	5,437	1,539	6,083	1,943	الحديد والفولاذ قضبانا باشكال اخرى .. .. ..
702a1	Iron and steel wire, simply drawn in plain threads of diametre 1 mm. and less	632	174	160	70	الحديد والفولاذ ، اسلاكا مسحوبة بصورة بسيطة خيوط واضحة بقطر مليمتر واحد او اقل .. ..
702b1	Iron and steel wire forged or coated with zinc or tin, diametre not exceeding 6mm	494	179	608	244	الحديد والفولاذ اسلاكا محماة او مطلية بالتوتياء (متلفة) او مطلية بالقصدير (مبيضة) بقطر لايتجاوز (٦) مم ..
702b2	Iron and steel wire, copper coated, diametre not exceeding 6 mm.	289	112	145	65	الحديد والفولاذ ، اسلاكا مطلية بالنحاس بقطر لا يتجاوز ٦ مم
703a	Sheet iron or steel, flat unworked, thickness more than 1mm.	2,368	799	1,677	759	الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية السوية وغير المشغولة بسمك يزيد عن مم واحد ..
703b	Sheet iron or steel flat unworked, thickness 1mm. and less	1,175	445	850	450	الصفائح الحديدية الفولاذية وغير المشغولة بسمك (١) مم او اقل .. .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) — جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		الوضع الجمركي
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
706a Iron and steel sheets varnished or lacquered not exceeding 4/10 mm. in thickness	646	251	713	374	٧٠٤/أ الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية المدهونة ومشغولة السطح الطلية بالصدير او بالصدير وورنيش اللكما والتي لا يزيد سماكتها عن ٤/١٠ المتر ولم يلحظ بها اي شغل ..
705/1a Sheet iron or steel, corrugated and galvanized ...	431	271	1,045	797	٧٠٥/١/أ الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية الاخرى الطلية بالزنك والموجة
705/1b Sheet iron or steel, galvanized uncorrugated ...	254	130	179	112	٧٠٥/١/ب الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية الاخرى الطلية بالزنك غير الموجة .. .. ..
708/1 Pipes of cast iron	2,081	667	3,132	946	٧٠٨/١ المواسير المصنوعة من الحديد الصب .. .. ..
708/2a Joints of malleable cast iron diameter more than 5 cm.	345	184	291	183	٧٠٨/٢/أ الوصل المصنوعة من الحديد الصب بقطر يزيد عن (٥)سم
708/2b Joints of malleable cast iron diameter 5 cm. and less.	110	100	83	103	٧٠٨/٢/ب الوصل المصنوعة من الحديد الصب بقطر (٥) سم او اقل
709a Tubes and pipes untarred or slightly covered with tar, diameter 5 cm. and less ...	693	344	482	265	٧٠٩/أ الانابيب او المواسير المستقيمة بقطر (٥)سم او اقل خاما او مقطرة .. .. ..
709b Tubes and pipes, other untarred	365	261	1,280	567	٧٠٩/ب الانابيب او المواسير الاخرى
710a Tubes and pipes; worked galvanized	1,012	541	514	387	٧١٠/أ الانابيب او المواسير من الحديد او الفولاذ مطلية او مدهونة بالزنك .. .. ..
710b Tubes and pipes, worked other	348	156	186	144	٧١٠/ب الانابيب او المواسير الاخرى من الحديد او الفولاذ على شكل خاص او مشغولة
711 Tubes and pipes of sheet iron; bolted studed or clamped	224	184	54	32	٧١١ الانابيب والمواسير المصنوعة من الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية ، مجواة او مسمرة او مثلثة .. .. ..
712 Iron or steel rails for railway tracks, including those drilled or bent	305	303	27	9	٧١٢ القطوط الحديدية او الفولاذية المعدة للسكك الحديدية حتى المثقبة او المقوسة .. ..

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
720b	Tanks, casks, tubs & other large receptacles without mechanical devices; other than tubs used for the disinfection of sheep	149	142	58	45	٧٢٠/ب الخزانات ، الدنان والطسوت وغيرها من الاوعية الكبيرة ، دون اجهزة آلية ، غير مخاطس لتطهير الغنم .. ..
721	Cylindrical tanks for transport, made of steel or iron sheets	703	162	185	43	٧٢١ الدنان ، الاوعية الاسطوانية المعدة للنقل والمصنوعة من الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية
722	Receptacles, iron or steel for compressed or liquified gas	295	206	277	217	٧٢٢ الآنية المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ لحفظ الغازات المضغوطة او المميعة ..
725	Wire netting lattice work and trellis of iron or steel	132	137	60	70	٧٢٥ النسج المعدنية والاقفاص والشبابيك ، المصنوعة من الاسلاك الحديدية او الفولاذية
727/1a...	Wire-nails of iron or steel diameter 2mm. and over	327	117	201	114	٧٢٧/١/أ المسامير الاسطوانية المصنوعة من الاسلاك الحديدية او الفولاذية بقطر ٢ مم او اكثر
727/2c	Conical nails of iron or steel other	174	140	82	67	٧٢٧/٢/ج المسامير المخروطية الاخرى
729	Bolts and screw-makers wares	357	295	263	243	٧٢٩ اصناف صناعتي القلاليق والقوالب المحواة .. ..
733b	Locks other than used for bags	123	249	110	244	٧٣٣/ب الاقفال غير اقفال الحقائب والاكياس .. .. ..
734	Fittings and mountings of iron or steel n.e.s., for furniture, doors and windows	323	482	197	297	٧٣٤ الادوات والقطع غير المذكورة ، المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ او الحديد الصب القابل للتصفيح المعدة للاثاث والابواب والنوافذ وصناعة الصيلات الخ
735	Stoves and heaters ...	159	442	278	329	٧٣٥ المواقد والمدافئ ، غير الكهربائية
735a	Cooking stoves and heaters manout	48	136	—	—	٧٣٥/أ افران الطبخ والمدافئ العاملة بالمازوت .. .. ..
735b	Other cooking stoves and heaters	190	292	—	—	٧٣٥/ب غيرها من الافران والمدافئ والكوانين .. .. ..
736	Boilers, iron or steel ...	168	119	187	114	٧٣٦ المراجل الحديدية والفولاذية المعدة للتدفئة المركزية ..

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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
737	Radiators for central heating and their component parts	290	129	132	79	٧٣٧ الشمعات المدفئة المركزية ومناصرها .. .. ..
738b	Furniture and parts thereof, of cast iron, iron and steel, other than from tubes	138	218	47	71	٧٣٨/ب الاثاث واجزاؤه المصنوعة من الحديد الصب او الحديد او الفولاذ او الحديد الصب القابل التصفيح غير المصنوع من الانابيب
740	Kitchen and other utensils for domestic uses	180	284	193	324	٧٤٠ الاواني والادوات المنزلية والصحية من الفولاذ او الحديد
752b	Casting, n.e.s.	219	152	109	82	٧٥٢/ب الحاجات الاخرى المصنوعة من الحديد الصب غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
755	Articles of iron and steel, n.e.s.	168	133	65	77	٧٥٥ الحاجات المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ او الحديد الصب القابل التصفيح ، غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
756	Copper, unworked	223	172	100	163	٧٥٦ النحاس الخام وغيره من انواع النحاس كتلا او غيره ..
758a1	Copper, sheets	66	136	26	69	١/أ/٧٥٨ الصفائح والالواح والاوراق المصنوعة من النحاس (باستثناء الاوراق الرقيقة)
758a2	Brass sheets, plates and leaves, squared or rectangular	109	211	55	135	٢/أ/٧٥٨ الصفائح والالواح والاوراق المصنوعة من النحاس الربعة او المستطيلة الشكل الصفيحة او المطرقة من النحاس الاصفر
758b1	Brass disks	53	122	32	85	١/ب/٧٥٨ الاقراص المصنوعة من النحاس الاصفر .. .. ..
764	Ropes, cordage and wire, twisted and made of copper not coated with insulating material	49	108	110	268	٧٦٤ الاقراس والحبال والاشرطة المفتولة المصنوعة من الاسلاك النحاسية غير ملبسة بمواد عازلة .. .. ..
768	Kitchen and other utensils for domestic uses, copper	80	430	72	418	٧٦٨ ادوات المطبخ المصنوعة من النحاس غير المذكورة في مكان آخر .. .. ..
774	Aluminium, unworked ...	130	160	148	83	٧٧٤ الالمنيوم الخام .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) — جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
776	Sheets, disks of aluminium	68	122	6	15	٧٧٦ الصفائح والالواح المصنوعة من الالمنيوم .. ..
780	Unworked pieces of aluminium	303	614	127	329	٧٨٠ القطع الخام من الالمنيوم
794	Tin unworked	91	457	31	193	٧٩٤ القصدير الخام المصبوب كتلا او قطعا او الواحا او حبات
8030/2	Razor blades	31	275	17	178	٨٠٣/ب/٢ الشفرات المعدة لآلات الحلاقة تامة الصنع .. ..
8036	Spoon and forks of ordinary metal	48	127	25	85	٨٠٦/٢ اللاعق والشوكات من جميع الاجناس المصنوعة من المعادن العادية ... .
812a	Lighting apparatus, metal	76	298	82	341	٨١٢/٢ اجهزة الانارة، اصناف صناعة المصابيح والثريات واجزاؤها المعدنية .. .. ..
819	Articles of adornment made of ordinary metal or ordinary metal plated with gold silver or other precious metals	165	611	97	680	٨١٩ الاصناف المعدة للزخرفة المصنوعة من المعادن العادية او المعادن العادية المذهبة او المفضضة او المليسة بمعادن ثمينة .. .. ..
820	Steam boilers and economisers	880	1,301	100	332	٨٢٠ المراجل البخارية ، الموفرات
822	Steam engines without their boilers	24	113	40	82	٨٢٢ الآلات البخارية المفصولة من مراجلها : ذوات الكبس او مديمة الكبس واجزاؤها وقطعها
823a	Motors for waterwaffs...	33	631	25	25	٨٢٣/٢ المحركات المعدة للسفن ..
823b	Internal combustion engines for automobiles	68	213	63	181	٨٢٣/ب المحركات ذات الاحتراق الداخلي المعدة للسيارات
823d	Other motors	1,341	3,382	2,496	5,639	٨٢٣/د المحركات الاخرى .. ..
827c	Static pumps run by wind blowers	331	1,022	308	1,151	٨٢٧/ج المضخات الثابتة المعدة لرفع الماء وتوزيعه بدواليب هوائية
832	Presses, n.e.s. and component and detachable part thereof	51	120	195	364	٨٣٢ الكابس غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
833	Machinery and apparatus for handling, lifting, loading and filling and parts thereof	150	319	151	280	٨٣٣ الآلات والاجهزة المعدة للنقل والرفع والتعبئة والتفريغ واجزاؤها .. .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
824 Machinery and apparatus for agricultural purpose, ploughing, preparation and cultivation, together with component and detachable parts	2,906	3,789	2,636	6,944	٨٢٤ الآلات والادوات الزراعية المعدة لفلاحة الارض وتحضيرها وزرعها واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
825 Machines and apparatus for the harvesting, threshing, sorting and picking of agricultural produce, together with component and detachable parts	948	2,647	565	1,619	٨٢٥ الآلات والادوات المعدة لحصاد المحاصيل الزراعية والدراسات وفاصلات الحبوب والنقيات الزراعية الخ .. واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
827 Machinery and apparatus for flour milling and parts thereof	163	217	72	108	٨٢٧ الآلات والادوات المعدة للمطاحن واجزاؤها .. .. ..
82821 Other apparatus for heating and cooling etc.... for industrial purposes	32	229	141	365	٨٢٨/د/١ الاجهزة الاخرى المعدة للتسخين والتبريد الخ .. للاستعمال الصناعي واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
82822 Other apparatus for heating, cooling or cooking etc. other than for soap-making wines and beverages, pastries, water-softeners ...	48	214	0	40	٨٢٨/د/٢ الاجهزة الاخرى المعدة للتسخين والتبريد والطبخ الخ .. عدا عن الاجهزة المعدة لصناعة الصابون والزيوت والجعة والخمر والمعجنات والشكولاته ومطهرات الماء
8296 Machines for the production of cold, other than for industry	374	1,497	289	1,137	٨٢٩/ب الآلات المعدة لاحداث البرودة لغير الاستعمال الصناعي
840 Machinery and apparatus for treating earth & stone	354	232	491	321	٨٤٠ الآلات والاجهزة المعدة لمعالجة الاتربة والاحجار والقطرات واجزاؤها .. .. ..
842 Machinery for the making of paper paste, paper and board; including book binding machines and parts thereof	75	214	25	96	٨٤٢ الآلات المعدة لصنع معجين الورق والشغل الورق والورق القوي بما فيها الآلات لتجليد واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
843	Machinery and apparatus for printing & for graphic arts, including printing presses	84	223	53	151	٨٤٣ الات الطباعة والفنون الغرافية بما فيها مكابس الطبع ..
844	Machinery and apparatus for the preparation of textile material	634	1,592	95	382	٨٤٤ الات المعدة لتحضير المواد النسيجية وصنع الخيوط وغزلها .. ..
845	Looms for weaving and hosiery	1,096	2,992	485	1,854	٨٤٥ انوال النسيج والصنارة والتريكو
845x2	Machines for the washing of textile material, other than for industry	212	776	121	431	٨٤٥/٢/أ الات المعدة لغسل النسج لغير الاستعمال الصناعي
846	Machinery and apparatus for the dressing and finishing of thread, n.e.s. ...	220	852	81	305	٨٤٦ الات والاجهزة المعدة لتهيئة النسج والخيوط غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
847a	Sewing machines, special	12	144	16	162	٨٤٧/أ الات الخياطة من جميع الانواع المعدة للاستعمالات الخاصة
847b	Sewing machines and component parts, n.e.s. ...	204	662	193	710	٨٤٧/ب الات الخياطة الاخرى من جميع الانواع وقطعها المنفصلة
849	Machines for packing goods or opening, riveting, filling, closing, labelling etc. ...	319	928	229	[illegible]	٨٤٩ الات الغلف واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
852	Typewriters and detached parts thereof	13	174	7	107	٨٥٢ الات الكتابة واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
853	Calculating and accounting machines	4	157	4	97	٨٥٣ الات الحساب والمحاسبة
855a	Machinery and apparatus for mineral work and the cement and other building materials industries ...	427	548	235	236	٨٥٥/أ الات والاجهزة المعدة لشغل المعادن وصناعة الاسمنت وغيره من مواد البناء ..
855b	Machinery and appliances for the soap and oils industries, and component and detached parts thereof ...	141	481	98	289	٨٥٥/ب الات والاجهزة لصناعة الصابون والزيوت والجعة والخمر واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
855x2	Machinery and apparatus n.e.s. for industrial purposes	62	257	161	406	٨٥٥/ج/٢ الات والاجهزة الاخرى المعدة للاستعمال الصناعي

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
855b3	Other machinery and apparatus n.e.s.	168	423	165	565	٨٥٥/ح/٣ الالات والاجهزة الاخرى غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. .. ..
856	Taps, cocks and valves ...	77	206	143	324	٨٥٦ اصناف صناعة الحنفيات
857	Bearings of all types ...	23	156	49	172	٨٥٧ المدحرجات على اختلاف انواعها سواء كانت من ذوات الخروق او الحادل والبكرات واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة ..
858	Component and detachable parts, n.e.s. for mechanical machines and tools ...	29	151	65	188	٨٥٨ الاجزاء والقطع المنفصلة غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ، العائدة للالات والاجهزة والادوات الآلية .. ..
859	Electric dynamoes and converters, transformers and choking coils	429	1,345	424	1 446	٨٥٩ المهيجات الكهربائية ومعدلاتها
860a	Battery dry cells, pocket size	147	217	98	163	٨٦٠/أ التابعات الكهربائية الجافة للجيب (بيل) .. .. ..
860b	Battery dry cells, other...	218	292	85	131	٨٦٠/ب التابعات الكهربائية (بيل) وغيرها .. .. ..
861	Electro-mechanical tool and apparatus	220	349	38	64	٨٦١ المدخرات الكهربائية والراحها
862	Electro-mechanical tool and apparatus for domestic purposes weight not exceeding 15 kgs n.e.s.	48	308	35	233	٨٦٢ الادوات الكهربائية الآلية الصغيرة والاجهزة الكهربائية الآلية المعدة للاستعمال المنزلي مما لم يذكر في مكان آخر والتي لا يزيد وزنها عن ١٥ كيلو غرام .. .. ..
863	Electric appliances for starting, lighting and signalling	60	398	164	544	٨٦٣ التجهيزات الكهربائية المعدة للانطلاق او التنوير المستعملة للمركبات ذات المحرك والدراجات
865c	Electrothermic apparatus, excluding medical, other	48	113	58	186	٨٦٥/ج الاجهزة الكهربائية الحرارية الاخرى (باستثناء الاجهزة الكهربائية الطبية) ..
866a1	Lamps not exceeding 50 watts	23	138	14	105	٨٦٦/ب/١/٢ المصابيح ذات الاسلاك الدقيقة للتنوير الكهربائي ولا تزيد عن ٥٠ واطا .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي	
867	Electric apparatus for medical purposes & radiology	30	400	19	232	الاجهزة الكهربائية الطبية واجهزة الاشعة	٨٦
868a	Wireless receiving apparatus	225	2,073	181	1 655	الاجهزة اللاسلكية الاخذة	٨٦/أ
868b	Valves tubes and lamps for telegraph and telephone	2	101	4	157	المصابيح والصمامات والانابيب المعدة للبرق والهاتف	٨٦/ب
868d	Other wireless apparatus	98	187	—	—	الاجهزة اللاسلكية الاخرى	٨٦/د
869	Electric telegraph and telephone apparatus	54	454	22	219	الاجهزة الكهربائية المعدة للبرق والهاتف	٨٦
872	Electric meters	47	364	29	197	العدادات الكهربائية ..	٨٧
874	Insulating cables and wire for electric energy	643	1 155	497	1 013	الاسراس والاسلاك المعزولة المعدة للكهرباء	٨٧
875	Parts made of carbon or graphite for electric use	127	108	111	109	قطع الفحم العادي المعد للكهرباء	٨٧
877	Instalating tubes	223	286	204	312	الانابيب العازلة	٨٧
878	Apparatus & detached parts of electric machinery n.e.s.	161	774	113	523	الاجهزة والقطع الكهربائية الاخرى لتنظيم التيار وقطعه غير المذكورة في مكان آخر	٨٧٨
887	Components and detached parts of railway rolling stock	86	103	43	72	الاجزاء والقطع المنفصلة ؛ من وسائط النقل المعدة للسكك الحديدية غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ..	٨٨٧
890a2	Automobiles, less than 1500 kgs., 7 H.P. less than 15HP.	178	537	148	437	السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من(٧)حتى (١٥) حصانا . (١٥)غير داخل	٢/٢/٨٩٠
890a3	Automobiles, less than 1500 kgs. 15 HP. less than 20 HP.	185	576	220	572	السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من(١٥)حتى (٢٠) حصانا (٢٠) غير داخل	٣/٢/٨٩٠
890a4	Automobiles, less than 1500 kgs. 20 HP. less than 25 HP.	115	325	54	141	السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من (٢٠) حتى (٢٥) حصانا (٢٥) غير داخل	٤/٢/٨٩٠
890a5	Automobiles, less than 1500 kgs. 25 H.P. and over ...	511	1,361	484	1,300	السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من (٢٥) حصانا فاكثر	٥/٢/٨٩٠

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
690b4	Automobiles 1500 kgs. and less than 2000 kgs., over 25 H.P.	397	1,142	304	914	٨٩٠/ب/٤ السيارات المعدة لنقل الركاب التي تزيد عن (١٥٠٠) كيلو غرام واقل من (٢٠٠٠) ومن (٢٥) حصانا فاكثر ..
690c4	Automobiles over 2000 kgs. and over 25 H.P. ...	57	176	20	74	٨٩٠/ج/٤ من ٢٥ حصانا فاكثر ..
690d1	Other vehicles with chassis	543	1,162	1,126	1,664	٨٩٠/د/١ الانواع الاخرى من السيارات المستوردة هياكل مجردة او مرفقة بغرفة السائق ..
691	Chassis for passenger vehicles	2,819	8,184	1,542	4,009	٨٩١ هياكل (شاسي) السيارات المعدة لنقل الركاب ..
692	Coachwork for automobiles	170	438	125	221	٨٩٢ عربات السيارات .. ..
693/1	Components and parts of transmission of steering gear	176	184	37	46	١/٨٩٣ معدل المحركات (طبلات اللاجم، النوابض ، الدواليب عاريات
693/3	Component and parts of vehicles, other	457	2,045	422	1,801	٣/٨٩٣ اجزاء السيارات والعربات وقطعها الاخرى غير المذكورة
694	Motorcycles	74	305	44	212	٨٩٤ الدراجات النارية والدراجات العادية المجهزة بمحركات
695	Cycles without engines ...	167	504	215	617	٨٩٥ الدراجات العادية بدون محرك
696b	Non automobile vehicles for goods transport	60	120	61	112	٨٩٦/ب اجزاء الدراجات العادية واجزاؤها المنفصلة ..
698	Vehicles non automobile for use in the transport of goods and for other purposes ...	139	187	111	141	٨٩٨ المركبات الروادف غير السيارة المعدة لنقل البضائع والاستعمالات الاخرى .. .. ..
903	Component and detached parts of airships n.e.s. balloons and aeroplanes other than engines	39	628	21	366	٩٠٣ اجزاء المناطيد والطيارات وقطعها باستثناء المحركات
918	Gas and water meters ...	48	400	33	291	٩١٨ عدادات الغاز والماء واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
923	Medical and surgical instruments n.e.s.	19	391	11	250	٩٢٣ الالات والاجهزة المستعملة في الطب والجراحة غير المذكورة في مكان آخر .. ..

اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

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Table No. 7 (Concld.) — جدول رقم ٧ (تتمة)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
928c	Watches with cases of base metal, gold plated (kilo)	617	507	1	550	٩٢٨/ج ساعات اليد والجيب المصنوعة من مواد عادية مزخرفة بترونات من الذهب (كيلو) .. ..
928e	Watches, other (kilo) ...	457	213	1	230	٩٢٨/هـ ساعات اليد والجيب المصنوعة من المواد غير المزخرفة بالترونات من الذهب او الفضة (كيلو)
934	Other clocks	13,883	170	21	143	٩٣٤ الميقاتيات الاخرى وساعات الجدران حتى التحرك منها بالكهرباء بما فيها الموقظات (المنبهات) .. ..
943	Gramaphones and similar talking machines and parts thereof	10	113	18	161	٩٤٣ الحاكي (غرامفون) والآلات الناطقة المماثلة وقطعها المنفصلة
956a	Loaded cartrages	50	124	29	134	٩٥٦/أ الخراطيش المشحونة (المذكوكة)
966b	Artificial plastic materials	123	324	105	396	٩٦٦/ب المواد الصنعية الهيكلية التي اساسها الجبتين والبلاستين والنشا وحاجات اخرى مصنوعة من هذه المواد .. ..
976	Other toys, n.e.a.	95	259	72	260	٩٧٦ الالعاب ولعب الاطفال غير الذكر
981	Buttons, ordinary	49	234	22	145	٩٨١ الازرار العادية للثياب والملابس
982	Fountain pens and stylographic pens	8	172	9	249	٩٨٢ اقلام الحبر ذات الخزان وغيرها وماسكات الرصاص وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية) *

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 — جدول رقم ٨

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي	
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value		
1	Horses ... ...(Heads)	718	117	767	176	الخيول والامهار وفحول الخيل	١
3	Cows ... ... «	38,490	2,250	29,726	2 143	والحصن والافراس (رؤوس)	
						نوه البقر (رؤوس) ..	٣
4b	Rams, ewes & wethers «	441,468	18,563	388,202	16,685	الكباش والخرفان والنعاج	٤/ب
5b	He-goats & she-goats «	54,767	1,473	43,937	1,156	(رؤوس)	
8	Poultry	401	540	425	579	التيوس والعنز (رؤوس)	٥/ب
19b	Sea fish	124	173	52	57	الطيور ، الدواجن ..	٨
25b	Butter, melted «Samneh»	1,100	5,382	125	747	اسماك البحر	١٩/ب
26a	Cheese, soft white	1,160	1,970	838	1,702	السمنة	٢٥/ب
27a	Eggs in the shell	1,766	2,513	1,653	2,569	الجبن الابيض	٢/٢٦
						البيض بقشره	٢/٢٧
31a	Guts, bladders & stomachs of animals	77	1,738	65	1,639	مصارين الحيوانات (ومثاناتها) ومعدها الطازجة او المملحة او الجافة وتافح السجول حتى المقلمة والمجففة ..	٢/٣١
46a	Olives, fresh	265	114	91	41	الزيتون والكبر (القبل) الطازجة	٢/٤٦
47	Tomatoes	946	104	264	221	البندورة	٤٧
48a	Onions	12,735	1,129	9,798	1,174	البصل والكراث	٢/٤٨
49	Potatoes	954	191	2,891	789	البطاطا	٤٩
50b	Other vegetables, n.e.s....	1,348	114	1,554	102	الخضر الاخرى غير المذكورة	٥٠/ح
51a	Haricot beans and broad beans, dried	2,964	933	1,715	675	الفاصوليا والفول ـ يابس	٢/٥١
51b	Peas and lentils	18,280	6,747	5,426	2,270	البزلياء والعدس	٥١/ب
51 c	Vetch and lupins	6,517	1,479	3,034	999	الترمس والبيقية (كرسنة)	٥١/ج
55a	Oranges and mandarines	1,241	227	496	111	البرتقال والمندرينة ..	٢/٥٥
57a	Grapes, fresh	4,164	460	2,687	676	العنب الطازج	٢/٥٧
57b	Raisins	341	184	129	121	الزبيب	٥٧/ب
58c	Pistachio, shelled	24	178	11	81	الفستق المقشر	٥٨/ج
58d	Pistachio-nut in the shell	80	133	67	286	الفستق بقشره	٥٨/د
58e	Walnuts, shelled	253	510	174	455	الجوز المقشر	٥٨/هـ
58 f	Walnuts, in the shell ...	704	582	154	152	الجوز بقشره	٥٨/و
58 l	Chestnuts	472	417	664	581	الكستنة	٥٨/ط
59a	Apples	1,572	307	899	257	التفاح	٢/٥٩
61b	Melons	838	105	611	99	البطيخ الاصفر (الشمام)	٦١/ب
61c	Watermelons	6,769	400	6,883	480	البطيخ الاخضر ..	٦١/ج

* البضاعة التي زادت قيمتها عن ١٠٠ الف ليرة سورية خلال عام ١٩٥٣ حسب القيم المصرح عنها بالبيانات الجمركية
* Commodities whose value exceeded L.S. 100,000 during 1953 as declared in the manifest.

FOREIGN TRADE

اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي	
68	Wheat	190,105	[illegible],035	100,227	29,758	الحنطة	٦٨
70a	Rice, unhusked	283	143	—	—	الارز قشره	٧٠/أ
70b	Rice, husked	247	193	...	...	الارز مقشورا	٧٠/ب
71	Barley	153,208	24,793	140,135	29,400	الشعير	٧١
73	Maize	3,482	789	461	114	الذرة الصفراء	٧٣
74a	Buckwheat	500	105	—	—	الحنطة السوداء	٧٤/أ
74b	Millet	43,389	9,388	14,494	3,318	الدخن (الذرة البيضاء)	٧٤/ب
74c	Darnell and other grains	1,372	277	800	126	الزوان والحبوب الاخرى	٧٤/ج
75a1	Flour, wheat hard	22,286	6,311	9,347	3,603	دقيق الحنطة القاسية ..	٧٥/١/أ
75b	Flour, rye	3,921	615	—	—	دقيق الشيلم والشعير والشوفان الخ..	٧٥/ب
76a	Grains; washed and hulled; semolina of wheat & other grains	787	270	238	92	حبوب الفلال المقشورة المغسولة وسميد الحنطة والحبوب الاخرى التام والخشن ..	٧٦/أ
76b	Wheat, crushed	1,694	548	1,028	368	جريش الحنطة	٧٦/ب
77	Bran	17,908	2,327	10,875	1,781	النخالة	٧٧
83b1	Sesame	924	562	243	195	بزر السمسم	٨٣/ب/١
83b2	Cottonseed	28,418	5,506	32 853	6,882	بزر القطن	٨٣/ب/٢
83c	Groundnuts and other seeds	590	560	148	139	فستق العبيد وغيره ..	٨٣/ج
84a	Seeds and fruits for sowing	2,848	784	268	325	الحبوب والاثمار المعدة للبذار	٨٤/أ
84b3	Seeds for sowing, other	463	101	44	31	الحبوب المعدة للبذار غير المذكورة	٨٤/ب/٣
88c	Liquorice, powder & extract	3,008	1,004	1,863	568	جذور السوس والسوس المسحوق وخلاصة السوس	٨٨/ج
89	Plants and parts of plants, n.e.s. (aniseed, cumins etc.)	827	675	712	696	النباتات واجزاؤها ، البذور والاثمار غير المذكورة والداخلة في مكان آخر (بذور الياسون والكمون وما يماثلها) ..	٨٩
90	Straw of cereals	24,421	765	13,197	374	قش الحبوب الخام حتى المنقى منه ومصافاتها	٩٠
92d	Plants, fruits, roots and seeds for dyeing & tanning other than barks and henna	424	289	661	198	النباتات والاثمار والقرون النباتية والبذور الصباغة والدباغة غير القشور والحناء ..	٩٢/د
105d	Cotton seed oil	1,223	1,414	7	9	زيت القطن	١٠٥/د
105gb	Olive oil for use other than for soap making	440	817	25	54	زيت الزيتون غير المعد لصناعة الصابون	١٠٥/ز/ب
125	Sugar manufactures ...	146	167	96	132	مصنوعات السكر ..	١٢٥

التجارة الخارجية

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
142a1	Jams, jellies, pastes, marmalades; without sugar	498	633	15	10	المربيات ، الهلمات المعروتات غير محلاة بالسكر .. ..
142a2	Apricot paste	868	1,104	2,289	2,400	قمر الدين .. ..
150b	Other food preparations n.e.s.	314	196	400	256	المحضرات الغذائية غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
165	Oil cake & other residues from the extraction of vegetable oils	24,303	4,199	13,534	2,291	الكسب وغير من بقايا استخلاص الزيوت النباتية ..
171a	Tumbac	222	547	127	383	التنباك .. .. ..
171b	Tobacco leaves	1,201	1,845	2,769	4,192	التبغ ورق .. ..
192a	Cement uncoloured ...	24,103	2,019	10,213	953	الاسمنت الملون او غير الملون، الطبيعي او الصنعي
203a	Asphalt, natural for roads	3,033	141	3,579	153	الاسفلت الطبيعي المعد لتزفيت الطرق .. .. ..
206/5/1	Mazut fuel	7,811	588	6,576	502	المازوت الخام الكثيف المعد للحرق
293a3	Cinematographic films, synchronised with sonorous films	27	211	4	214	الافلام السينمائية المصورة المتوائمة مع افلام صائتة
220b	Soap, ordinary	1,919	2,614	1,790	3,377	الصابون العادي ..
348a	Hides, sheep	366	1,003	273	806	جلال الغنم بصوفها ..
348b	Hides, goat	219	454	73	169	جلال المعز بشعرها ..
352	Sheep skins and goats skins tanned or prepared ...	298	1,150	308	1,290	جلود الغنم والمعز المدبوغة او المجهزة .. .. ..
360	Articles made of Morocco leather or sheaths, and leather articles for travel ...	36	151	30	133	السخنيان والغلف واصناف صناعة السفر المصنوعة من الجلد .. .. ..
366	Wooden cases for packing, even if in pieces	1,095	145	472	41	الصناديق الخشبية المعدة للتغليف ولو كانت مفككة ..
368a	Doors and windows of wood	181	129	63	50	الابواب والنوافذ الخشبية
402	Furniture, other	359	404	226	297	انواع اخرى من الاثاث واجزاؤه
404a	Mosaic works in wood ...	17	107	14	88	مصنوعات خشب الموزاييك
427	Cigarette paper	401	831	277	579	ورق لفائف التبغ ..
443a	Yarns of raw natural silk	10	221	10	268	خيوط الحرير من الحرير الخام الطبيعي حتى الكبب او المكرد الكبيب .. .. ..

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
449b	Crepes, 50 - 100 grs per m2	6	242	—	—	٤٤٩/ب النسيج المعروف بالكريب مما يزن المتر المربع منه اكثر من ٥٠ غراما حتى ١٠٠ ..
450b	Other tissues of close warp (Foulards, toiles, satins, taffetas, etc. of natural silk	7	461	...	36	٤٥٠/ب النسج الاخرى الموضونة (فولار ، توال ، ساتان ، تافته الخ ..) المصنوعة من الحرير الطبيعي .. ...
462	Yarns of artificial silk, not for retail sale	379	1,515	195	969	٤٦١ خيوط الحرير الصنعي صرفا او مخلوطا بالصوف وغير المخصر للبيع بالمفرق .. ..
471a	Crepes of artificial silk, unbleached or bleached or dyed	303	3,674	420	4,267	٤٧١/أ النسيج المعروفة بالكريب المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف خاما او مقصورة او مصبوغة
471b	Crepes of artificial silk, printed goffered or figured	162	1,456	177	1,935	٤٧١/ب النسيج المعروفة بالكريب المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف مزينة او مفتنة .. ..
472a2	Other fabrics of artificial silk raw over 75 grs. ...	15	125	—	—	٤٧٢/أ/٢ النسيج الاخرى مطبوعة او مزينة او مفتنة .. ..
472b1	Other fabrics of pure, artificial silk; unbleached or bleached or dyed over 75grs per m2	181	1,303	85	747	٤٧٢/ب/١ النسج الموضونة والموتوجة المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ٧٥ غ (خاما اومقصورةاومصبوغة) ..
472b2	Other fabrics of pure artificial silk; printed, goffered or figured over 75 grs per m2	761	6,717	589	5,785	٤٧٢/ب/٢ النسج الموضونة والموتوجة المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ٧٥ غ (مطبوعة او مزينة او مفتنة) ..
476	Other fabrics of pure artificial silk, n.e.a. (poplines, muslins, grenadines and voiles)	238	1,901	170	1,546	٤٧٦ النسج الموضونة والموتوجة المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي مخلوطا بمواد نسيجية اخرى
480b2	Fabrics of artificial silk waste and artificial textile fibres 75—180 grs. per m2, printed, goffred or figured	19	140	16	156	٤٨٠/ب/٢ النسج الموضونة والموتوجة المصنوعة من نفايات الحرير الصنعي ومن الياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية مطبوعة او مزينة او مفتنة ..

اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
487a	Trimmings of artificial silk	18	101	15	134	٤/٤٨٧ اصناف العقادة المصنوعة من الحرير الصناعي او من فضلاته من الياف المواد النسيجية الصناعية صرفة .. ..
491a	Metal threads of base metal or gilt or silvered	27	100	—	—	٤/٤٩١ الخيوط المعدنية العرنسة او الملمعة او المفضضة ..
492b2	Fabrics, ribbons and trimmings of metal thread, mixed with thread other than cotton	12	125	7	123	٤٩٢/ب/٢ النسج والاشرطة واصناف العقادة المصنوعة من الخيوط المعدنية او المعدنية المضمومة الى الخيوط النسيجية والمعدة للالبسة والاثاث ..
493	Wool in the mass	4,501	21,540	3,492	14,723	٤٩٣ الصوف كتلا .. ..
511b	Curtains of wool, pure or mixed	28	108	26	113	٥١١/ب بسط الاقدام المستعملة ستائر ابواب مصنوعة من الصوف الصرف او الممزوج من النوع المسمى كليم او شوساق او قرماني .. .. ..
513	Woollen trimmings ...	51	282	41	241	٥١٣ اصناف العقادة المصنوعة من الصوف .. ..
518	Cotton, raw	53,946	134,703	37,786	121,323	٥١٨ القطن الخام .. ..
519	Cotton waste and lint ...	414	264	197	162	٥١٩ فضلات القطن والقطن المنسول سخانا .. .. ..
526	Cotton thread or yarn put up for retail sale	21	157	18	151	٥٢٦ خيوط القطن المعدة للبيع بالمفرق .. .. ..
527a3	Cotton fabrics, unworked 100—150 grs. per m2	71	387	203	1,394	٥٢٧/أ/٣ النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن (خاما) مما يزن المتر المربع منها ١٠٠ - ١٥٠ غ
527a4	Cotton fabrics, unworked over 150 grs. per m2. ...	167	921	22	147	٥٢٧/أ/٤ النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن (خاما) مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ١٥٠ غرام
527c3	Cotton tissues, dyed after fabrication, or made of dyed yarn not figured, 100—150 grs. per m2.	53	317	319	2,970	٥٢٧/ج/٣ النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن (مصبوغة بعد نسجها) مما يزن المتر المربع منها ١٠٠-١٥٠ غرام .. ..
527c4	Cotton tissues, dyed after fabrication or made of dyed yarn not figured, over 150 grs. per m2	113	746	51	500	٥٢٧/ج/٤ النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن (مصبوغة بعد نسجها) مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ١٥٠ غ .. ..

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ — ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
528	Cotton fabrics, figured ...	36	316	68	743	٥٢٨ النسج المنقشة المصنوعة من القطن الصرف .. ..
586	Cablage twine	484	1,078	478	927	٥٦٦ الامراس والحبال والخيوط الثقيلة ولو كانت مضفورة
581a2a	Stockings & socks of pure artificial silk, and of artificial textile fibres, lenght more than 22 cms	15	211	8	157	٥٨١/٢/أ/٢ الجوارب المعدة للرجال من الحرير الصنعي او من الالياف النسيجية الصنعية الصرفة .. .. ..
582a2	Hosiery of pure wool, other than stockings...	48	707	35	1,237	٥٨٢/أ/٢ مصنوعات شغل الصنارة من الصوف الصرف غير الجوارب
583a3a	Stockings for men, made of pure or mixed cotton, length more than 17 cms	57	500	97	1,164	٥٨٣/أ/٢/٣ الجوارب المعدة للرجال من القطن الصرف او الممزوج يزيد طول قدمها على ١٧ سم ..
583a3b	Stockings for women, made of pure or mixed cotton, length more than 17 cms.	13	125	10	140	٥٨٣/أ/٢/٣ب الجوارب المعدة للنساء من القطن الصرف او الممزوج يزيد طول قدمها على ١٧ سم
553a4a	Other hosiery of cotton or vegetable textile material, n.e.s.	171	1,006	120	1,049	٥٨٣/أ/٤/٢ الالبسة الخارجية والداخلية والالبسة غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من القطن الصرف
584a	Underwear for men, n.e.s. of natural silk	4	112	...	4	٥٨٤/أ الالبسة الداخلية المعدة للرجال ، غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من نسج الحرير الطبيعي .. .. ..
584b	Men's clothing made of artificial silk or other artificial fibre, n.e.s.	66	679	50	592	٥٨٤/ب الالبسة المعدة للرجال غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من نسج الحرير الصنعي او الياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية
584c	Men's clothing made of wool n.e.s.	52	717	63	754	٥٨٤/ج الالبسة المعدة للرجال غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من النسج الصوفية .. ..
584d	Men's clothing made of cotton, n.e.s.	148	1,152	109	1,199	٥٨٤/د الالبسة المعدة للرجال غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من النسج القطنية .. ..
585b	Women's clothing of artificial silk yarns or of other artificial fibre, n.e.s. ...	39	382	15	226	٥٨٥/ب الالبسة النسائية غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من نسج الحرير الصنعي او الياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية .. ..

التجارة الخارجية 439

اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
589b	Table linens and bed covers made of artificial silk yarns and other tissues	75	409	*22	*178	٥٨٩/ب اليافات المعدة للمائدة والفراش والزينة المصنوعة من نسج الحرير الصنعي او الالياف النسجية الصنعية ..
589d	Table linens and bed covers made of cotton	59	335	43	330	٥٨٩/د اليافات المعدة للمائدة والفراش والزينة المصنوعة من النسج القطنية .. .. ..
590	Handkerchiefs and neckerchiefs	343	2,535	321	2,963	٥٩٠ مناديل الجيب ومناديل الرأس ومناديل الرقبة .. ..
591	Shawls and scarves ...	74	629	*67	*671	٥٩١ الشالات والاوشحة ..
597d3	Other wear, sewn and ready-made, n.e.s. of cotton textiles	38	108	29	92	٥٩٧/د/٣ الاصناف الاخرى المخيطة او الجاهزة وغير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من النسج القطنية
602	Shoes of leather uppers and soles of leather or rubber, other than slippers & house shoes.	20	198	17	168	٦٠٢ الاحذية المصنوعة من الجلد وبنعل من الجلد او المطاط غير الاحذية العادية المعروفة بالبرودوكان وغير البوابيج والاحذية البيتية ..
693	Gold coins (kilos) ...	758	3,777	...	...	٦٩٣ النقود الذهبية .. (كيلو)
722	Receptacles : iron or steel not soldered, for compressed or liquified gas ...	227	153	299	236	٧٢٢ الآنية المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ غير الملحومة والمعدة لحفظ الغازات المضغوطة او المميعة .. .. ..
768	Kitchen and other utensils for domestic uses, copper n.e.s.	133	480	94	394	٧٦٨ مجموعة ادوات المطبخ والآنية الخاصة بالاستعمالات المنزلية، المصنوعة من النحاس، غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. .. ..
819b	Articles intended for adornment	10	105	8	176	٨١٩/ب الاصناف المعدة للزخرفة
824d	Explosion motors, other than for cars and motor cycles	51	135	55	123	٨٢٤/د المحركات الانفجارية وقوات الاحتراق الداخلي واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة غير المعدة للطائرات والسيارات والدوجات

* Corrected figure

* رقم معدل

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اهم البضائع الصادرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تتمة)

COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
834 Agricultural machinery & appliances for soil work...	51	151	153	280	٨٣٤ الالات والادوات الزراعية المعدة للفلاحة الارضي وتحضيرها وزرعها واجرائها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
890d1 Other vehicles with chassis	457	359	20	28	١/د/٨٩٠ الانواع الاخرى من السيارات المستوردة .. .. .. ـ هياكل (شاسي) مجردة او مرفقة بغرفة السائق فقط
923 Medical and surgical instruments n.e.s.	6	160	—	—	٩٢٣ الالات والاجهزة المستعملة في الطب والجراحة غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر

17: Syria G-8 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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الفصل السادس

الاسعار

CHAPTER SIX

PRICES

P. 135

PRICES

MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

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Table No. 1

1 — ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
FOODSTUFFS							
Wheat, Commercial	100 kgs.	34	40	37	36	40	42
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	»	46	50	50	48	49	49
Flour, with bran No. 1	»	39	46	45	39	43	41
Barley	»	22	27	26	25	24	23
Maize	»	32	34	34	34	37	37
Lentils, red	»	47	60	54	55	60	53
Chick-peas	»	39	43	39	41	41	39
«Hilbeh»	»	38	55	51	50	45	39
Bitter Vetch	»	31	39	38	38	38	36
Kidney beans, Homs	»	74	75	75	75	73	70
Rice, Jazira commercial	»	108	93	98	105	112	113
Bran	Ton	162	179	175	174	171	164
Apricot pasta, commercial	100 kgs.	114	76	77	94	106	134
Apricot, dried commercial	»	143	85	86	96	106	123
Treacle	»	66	63	64	70	70	70
Raisins	»	104	84	87	89	100	120
Nuts, unshelled	»	318	280	300	300	300	338
Pistachio, Aleppo unshelled	»	845	985	1,015	1,013	975	866
Liquorice, ground	»	29	25	25	25	25	25
Onions	»	18	13	18	21	30	30
Olive oil, local	»	253	247	245	252	248	221
Samneh	»	607	621	621	620	578	595
Eggs, fresh, commercial	C. 1440	133	214	164	142	129	103
Macaroni	100 kgs.						
Broad beans, baladi	»	54	60	59	59	60	59
Broad beans, baladi commerc.	»	33	35	37	33	34	34
Sugar, granulated	»	121	126	125	125	125	121
Coffee beans	»	504	472	464	470	468	470
Tea, golden commercial	»	373	424	409	401	400	(1)375

(1) Second grade.

الاسعار

الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٢
(بالليرات السورية)

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جدول رقم ١

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
١ — المواد الغذائية								
حنطة تجارية	١٠٠ كيلو	33	31	30	30	29	28	33
طحين زيرو نمرو ٢	»	43	42	40	40	46	46	49
طحين راسه بعبه نمرو ١	»	39	39	36	36	37	31	38
شعير ابيض	»	23	21	20	19	19	19	19
ذرة صفراء	»	26	26	25	26	...	...	41
عدس احمر	»	46	44	40	40	41	37	33
حمص تجاري	»	43	44	38	35	34	34	34
حلبة	»	32	31	28	31	30	28	35
جلبانة	»	29	27	26	26	26	24	25
فاصوليا (حمصية)	»	78	79	79	...	...	70	70
ارز جزيرة تجاري	»	112	106	102	113	111	112	112
نخالة	طن	170	165	164	139	130	150	163
قمر الدين تجاري	١٠٠ كيلو	135	130	129	120	121	125	120
تقوع تجاري	»	200	200	200	200	192	125	100
دبس جامد	»	54	65	...	...	70	70	68
زبيب دوبلي مبخر	»	125	120	110	...	...	100	100
جوز قلب	»	309	311	315	303	346	364	350
فستق حلبي قلب	»	835	787	700	727	746	741	754
مرقوس مطحون	»	31	31	30	31	30	33	35
بصل	»	16	15	11	10	12	15	26
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	246	257	275	261	248	250	251
سمن ديري	»	615	610	596	604	608	604	608
بيض طازج تجاري	ص. ١٤٤	136	140	139	107	108	111	108
معكرونة	١٠٠ كيلو	48	51	50	48	50	47	52
فول بلدي للاكل	»	35	35	32	31	32	28	28
فول بلدي تجاري	»	116	116	120	119	119	119	120
سكر ناعم ابيض	»	540	544	586	582	491	482	476
بن اخضر	»	(1)365	(1)331	(1)335	(1)325	(1)368	(1)376	(1)372
شاي ذهبي تجاري								

(١) باب ثاني

PRICES

MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1952
(Syrian Pounds)

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Table No. 1 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
2 — RAW MATERIALS							
Cotton «Texas» ginned	100 kgs	301	414	375	343	290	269
Hemp, raw	»	170	138	139	140	150	167
Hemp, combed 1st grade	»	257	212	213	231	246	240
Cumin	»	127	151	153	144	146	141
Aniseed	»	122	174	171	165	134	120
Sesame	»	102	124	123	110	109	115
Apricot seed	»	30	25	25	26	28	28
Olive oil, commercial	»	189	200	195	200	191	187
Hides, cow, light	»	503	525	522	525	525	525
Skins, sheep light	»	419	438	437	437	437	437
Skins, sheep in wool	»	299	350	...	...	300	282
Skins, goats	»	480	475	450	475	475	475
Skins, sheep	»	199	267	268	243	158	165
Wool fleece, greasy	»	220	274	262	236	183	187
Wool fleece, white washed	»	450	496	475	404	323	353
Wool, pieces	»	329	393	380	324	256	271
Wool, pulled washed	»	311	334	315	273	226	241
Guts, sheep	100 pcs	243	322	337	350	330	219
Guts, goats	»	114	152	168	175	163	109
Tobacco leaves, Abu riha	100 kgs	123	123	123	123	123	123
Tobacco pieces, Abu riha	»	30	30	30	30	30	30

الاسعار 435

الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٢
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ١ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران Jun.
٢ ـ المواد الاولية								
قطن لكساس محلوج	١٠٠ كيلو	232	253	284	294	288	287	285
قشر قنب خلي	»	196	215	203	176	170	176	169
قشر مطيب اول باب مضغط	»	327	311	297	272	251	251	238
كمون	»	112	110	110	110	110	110	132
بانسون	»	89	90	90	95	101	118	118
سمسم	»	76	83	79	72	103	111	120
بزر شمشم حب	»	21	35	36	30	31	31	28
زيت زيتون بحري	»	174	168	181	190	196	199	189
نعل بقر خفيف	»	475	475	475	475	475	515	525
جلد غنم حور	»	347	400	400	406	425	432	437
جلد خاروف بصوفه	»	...	...	...	...	...	...	277
جلد ماعز سختيان	»	500	500	500	475	475	475	475
جلد غنم مطيح	»	180	183	175	164	191	187	184
صوف جز وسخ خلي	»	231	240	228	218	210	196	185
صوف مغسول ابيض	»	475	482	469	435	421	468	352
صوف نثر مغسول	»	372	368	385	304	310	313	271
صوف شلاحي نظيف	»	425	421	402	340	290	228	242
مصران (طاقة غنم)	١٠٠ مصران	155	135	154	200	281	235	192
مصران (طاقة ماعز)	»	47	41	66	95	143	117	97
دخان ابو ريحة ، ورق	١٠٠ كيلو	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
دخان ابو ريحة ، نثر	»	30	30	30	30	30	30	30

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 1 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	أيار May
3 — BUILDING MATERIALS							
Iron rods	Ton	590	670	620	626	623	611
Iron Angles	«	664	720	746	702	692	695
Iron sheets, black 1 mm.	«	1,064	1,270	1,250	1,250	1,215	1,121
Pipes, galvanized ½"	10 Mt.	16	18	18	18	17	17
Tin sheet, white	100 kgs	100	110	108	105	105	97
Zinc sheets, white	«	280	324	308	300	307	294
Cement, local	Ton	97	107	102	102	100	100
Cement, Belgian grade 1	«	230	209	219	221	223	230
Timber, Spruce	M3	219	258	227	223	222	220
Timber squared, «Qatrani»	Pieces	37	39	35	34	39	39
Timber squared, «Rayyani»	«	31	39	28	28	28	28
Timber Canadian red	M3	449	435	475	450	450	475
Timber, Swedish	«	274	285	291	294	290	285
Timber, pine wood	«	371	400	380	382	385	381
Plywood, Bulgarian	«	645	712	694	686	656	662
Plywood, French	«	1,136	1,190	1,175	1,150	1,170	1,150
Plywood, Lebanese	«	568	587	597	556	515	560
Veneer wood, California	10 M2	43	50	49	45	41	45
Veneer wood, «Ajram»	«	74	67	72	75	74	73
Veneer wood, «Walnut»	«	19	25	21	20	20	20
Glass plates, 2 mm.	«	30	30	30	30	30	30
Glass plates, 3 mm.	«	47	49	47	47	47	47
Tin Ingots	100 kgs	942	975	965	906	930	923
Tin rods	«	851	863	950	929	883	923
Copper, round	«	518	625	639	594	575	525
Brass sheets	«	522	625	639	621	625	527
Lead ingot	«	154	190	189	186	179	174
Nails, large size	«	82	84	80	80	80	79
Nails, small size	«	102	104	100	100	100	100

الأسعار

الوسطي الشهري لأسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٢
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ١ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	أيلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
٣ ـ مواد البناء								
حديد مبروم أساس	طن	522	539	545	564	583	582	596
حديد مبسط توسيع زوايا	»	577	577	620	545	687	687	675
مفاتيح سوداء ٣ مم	»	910	875	913	950	1.031	1.060	1.108
أنابيب مزيقة ٢ ½ انش	١٠ متر	13	15	15	14	13	16	16
تنك صفائح أبيض	١٠٠ كيلو	79	102	94	92	99	107	107
تونياه صفائح أبيض	»	191	225	223	271	295	309	300
أسمنت وطني	طن	55	90	95	95	95	95	100
تراب بجبكية نخب أول	»	240	223	235	234	235	237	235
خشب أبنوج	٣م	196	202	206	190	203	215	236
لاط فنيزي	الواحدة	34	...	42	40	38	38	35
رأس بياسي	»	40	35	33	32	29	25	28
خشب كندي أحمر	٣م	443	437	437	428	429	430	475
خشب سويدي	»	249	253	252	257	255	276	282
خشب زان	»	336	338	344	348	363	370	382
خشب معاكس بلغاري	»	620	596	587	597	611	624	658
خشب معاكس الروسي	»	1.050	1.056	1.050	1.113	1.112	1.147	1.150
خشب معاكس لبناني	»	563	568	600	600	600	600	560
قشر تاليورنيا	١٠ م٢	22	35	35	46	50	49	43
قشر عجرم	»	75	75	75	75	75	74	70
قشر جوز	»	15	15	15	19	21	20	20
زجاج ٢ مم	»	29	29	29	29	30	30	30
زجاج ٣ مم	»	45	45	45	46	47	47	47
قصدير سبائك	١٠٠ كيلو	1.013	1.006	978	945	938	948	940
قصدير قضبان	»	894	908	886	855	946	957	953
نحاس أحمر مدور	»	440	433	429	422	502	503	521
نحاس أصفر صفائح	»	420	419	412	406	496	510	541
رصاص سكب	»	132	136	145	153	154	170	167
مسمار لسابكي	»	86	85	85	85	84	79	79
مسمار شمايري	»	103	105	105	105	105	100	100

PRICES

MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1952
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 1 (concld.)

ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
4 — MANUFACTURED							
Matches, «Crown»	10 Gross	32	40	40	40	40	40
Cotton yarn, No. 1 — 12	Bundle	22	24	24	24	23	22
Cotton yarn, No. 1 — 20	»	26	28	25	26	26	25
Cotton Fabrics, «Rabwa»	Roll	26	28	28	27	26	25
Cordage, No. 2	100 kgs.	207	165	165	168	180	185
Cordage, No. 3	»	168	130	138	144	150	164
Twine, No. 1	»	244	194	200	197	208	250
String, No. 1	»	381	329	322	345	358	348
Glue, brown	»	183	176	171	170	170	170
Soap, «Star Ituni»	»	261	214	214	211	200	196
Soap, commercial	»	128	150	150	146	134	128
Starch, wheat pure	»	92	98	96	93	92	90
5 — FUEL MATERIALS							
Coal, in blocks	Tons	146	179	165	150	149	145
Coke of coal	»	286	305	290	280	288	285
Fire wood, olive cut dry	»	70	65	68	68	68	66
Fire wood, apricot cut dry	»	59	60	60	60	60	59
Charcoal, in bulk	»	296	400	340	285	270	290
Mazout in bulk	1000 L	112	112	112	112	112	112
Fuel oil	Ton	69	71	70	69	69	69
Kerosene, in bulk	1000 L	193	200	196	192	192	192
Benzine, in bulk	»	320	325	323	320	320	320

Source : Ministry of National Economy

الأسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لأسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ١ (تتمة)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
٤ ـ المنسوجات الصناعية								
كبريت ماركة تاج	١٠ كروز	22	22	22	22	22	32	26
خيوط قطنية نمرو ١ ـ ١٢	الربطة	21	21	21	22	22	22	22
» » » ١ ـ ٢٠	»	24	24	25	24	24	26	26
خام ويوة دمشق	الثوب	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
حبال مشانة نوع ثاني	١٠٠ كيلو	252	241	232	204	198	202	188
حبال مشانة نوع ثالث	»	216	200	191	175	166	174	157
مرس نوع اول سماكي	»	298	280	280	276	252	247	236
مصيص نوع اول عادي	»	445	453	430	410	395	391	336
غراء اشقر	»	190	190	193	200	208	184	173
صابون نجمة ايتوني	»	192	196	200	200	201	190	190
صابون تجاري	»	112	116	120	120	111	125	125
نشا حنطة خاص	»	90	90	90	90	90	90	94
٥ ـ المواد المنشطة								
فحم حجري قوالب	الطن	125	125	140	148	145	140	144
فحم حجري كوك	»	270	275	280	282	292	289	290
حطب زيتون مكسر ناشف	»	90	93	93	53	50	56	68
حطب شمشمن مكسر ناشف	»	74	75	69	41	37	47	60
فحم حطب سنديانى راسه بعبه	»	280	307	300	285	278	259	287
مازوت سائل	١٠٠٠ لتر	112	112	112	112	112	112	112
فيول اويل	الطن	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
كاز سائل	١٠٠٠ لتر	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
بنزين سائل	»	320	320	320	320	320	320	320

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1952
(Syrian Piastres)

Table No. 2

ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
Wheat, finest quality	Kilo	37	45	42	40	43	46
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	«	49	60	55	53	53	51
Flour, with bran	«	40	45	45	43	43	44
Bread of «Zero» flour	«	45	48	48	45	45	45
Bread off our with bran	«	38	40	40	40	43	40
Burghul	«	52	68	66	59	57	57
Macaroni	«	73	79	76	75	75	75
Mutton, boneless	«	350	356	372	388	362	368
Beef, boneless	«	257	215	275	275	275	287
Camel meat, boneless	«	201	197	213	220	237	237
Milk, fresh	«	44	49	46	45	38	38
Butter	140 gr	78	90	88	83	68	66
Samneh, Deir-es-Zor brand	Kilo	632	651	656	665	609	616
Cheese, white, local	«	248	252	258	229	189	188
Rice, commercial	«	111	100	105	109	111	110(1)
Olives, «Dan» brand	«	101	100	100	98	95	104
Olive, split	«	99	104	109	95	91	94
Margarine	«	159	200	190	183	169	138
Olive oil, local	«	253	262	248	242	243	251
Eggs, fresh	10 eggs	105	168	139	105	95	81
Sugar, granulated American	Kilo	123	130	127	127	126	124
Potatoes	«	31	39	40	41	36	36
Onions, red	«	23	16	20	24	43	37
Coffee beans, green «Rio»	«	529	517	486	490	485	497
Tea, «Golden» commercial	«	464	495	475	481	446	456
Soap, Star «Ituni»	«	213	225	225	223	213	203
Charcoal	«	38	48	46	43	31	30
Kerosene	20 L.	387	400	396	385	385	385
Cigarettes, «Bafra»	20 c.	60	60	60	60	60	60
Lentils, red	Kilo	55	71	70	67	64	64
Broad beans, edible	«	57	78	70	64	57	60
Halawa	«	156	161	165	164	159	164
Treacle	«	72	68	70	75	75	75

Source : Ministry of National Economy
(1) Italians, second grade.
(2) Second grade.

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار المفرق في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٢
(بالقروش السورية)

جدول رقم ٢

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
الحنطة الممتازة	كيلو	34	33	31	31	30	29	35
دقيق زيرو نمرو ٢	»	43	43	42	43	51	48	50
دقيق رأسه بعبه	»	40	40	37	37	37	32	40
خبز زيرو	»	44	43	42	41	...	45	45
خبز رأسه بعبه	»	40	36	35	37	37	33	38
برغل	»	50	45	42	41	42	41	33
معكرونة	»	70	70	70	70	71	75	75
لحم غنم بدون عظم	»	348	356	335	325	319	325	342
لحم عجل بدون عظم	»	275	253	232	225	237	240	300
لحم جمل بدون عظم	»	188	188	175	175	175	175	237
حليب طازج	»	54	54	51	41	40	40	37
الزبدة	الـ١٤٠غ	92	97	83	68	67	66	65
سمن ديري	كيلو	630	628	625	618	627	624	623
جبن ابيض بلدي	»	275	294	293	277	262	219	224
ارز تجاري	»	112	111	115	115	114	115	113(1)
زيتون دان	»	70	94	104	110	110	107	125
زيتون مفتش	»	85	100	104	104	101	108	96
سمن نباتي	»	160	161	144	135	145	143	135
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	266	266	262(1)	244(1)	260	246(2)	250(2)
بيض طازج	الـ١٠	119	114	105	82	84	83	80
سكر نام ابيض اميركي	كيلو	115	120	120	120	122	120	120
بطاطا	»	34	31	27	19	21	22	28
بصل احمر	»	24	19	15	13	17	18	27
بن اخضر ريو	»	575	588	603	603	519	497	492
شاي ذهبي تجاري	»	480	406	485	440	497	505	400
صابون نجمة أيتوني	»	207	211	210	213	210	210	200
فحم حطب	»	42	43	36	34	35	34	30
زيت نفط (بترول)	الـ٢٠ لتر	385	385	385	385	385	385	385
دخان (بافرا)	العلبة	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
عدس احمر	كيلو	56	46	43	46	40	41	48
فول بلدي للاكل	»	50	53	50	48	43	55	54
حلاوة طحينية	»	135	148	147	140	158	164	162
دبس جامد	»	60	70	75	75	75	75	75

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

(١) ايطالي باب ثاني

(٢) نوع ثاني

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3

ITEMS	Unit	وسطي Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
1 — FOOD STUFFS							
Wheat commercial	100 kgs	27	31	29	31	29	28
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	«	37	44	...	42	39	38
Four, with bran No. 1	«	32	38	37	37	35	34
Barley, white	«	18	21	20	21	19	17
Maize	«	24	27	26	28	27	27
Millet	«						
Lentils, red	«	37	45	42	38	35	34
Broad-beans, edible	«	42	46	48	47	48	46
Broad-beans, commercial	«	28	33	29	28	29	28
Chick-peas	«	39	41	40	42	44	41
Hilbeh	«	23	30	28	27	26	23
Bitter Vetch	«	22	28	28	23	22	19
Kidney beans, Homs	«	92	85	93	92	106	...
Rice, Jazira commercial	«	106	115	110	119	114	111
Bran	Ton	145	150	150	160	139	140
Apricot paste	100 kgs	107	135	131	130	149	118
Apricot, dried commercial	«	183	200	170	—	—	—
Treacle	«	32	50	46	46	46	45
Raisins	«	109	125	100	114	133	125
Nuts, unshelled	«	283	298	280	283	285	295
Pistachio, Aleppo unshelled	«	963	811	838	874	1,069	1,026
Liquorice, ground	«	31	31	30	30	23	30
Onions	«	16	14	17	28	22	23
Olive oil, local	«	254	242	243	248	268	275
Samneh	«	476	587	516	485	454	456
Eggs, fresh	1440 eggs	121	133	131	126	115	101
Sugar, granulated	100 kgs	93	103	94	92	92	92
Coffee beans, Rio	«	540	538	540	555	553	545
Tea, golden commercial	«	360	325	316	315	334	328

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ٣

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
١ ـ المواد الغذائية								
حنطة تجاري	١٠٠ كيلو	23	23	22	25	25	29	29
دقيق زيرو نمرو (٢)	»	32	32	31	35	35	39	40
دقيق رأسه بعبه نمرو (١)	»	27	27	26	29	30	33	33
شعير ابيض	»	13	14	14	16	16	17	17
ذرة صفراء	»	21	21	20	20	22	25	24
عدس احمر	»	35	35	35	35	36	36	34
فول بلدي للاكل	»	35	39	40	39	35	42	41
فول بلدي تجاري	»	25	25	25	25	28	29	28
حمص تجاري	»	35	34	35	35	35	40	42
حلبة	»	22	20	20	20	21	21	21
جلبانة	»	21	20	19	20	21	23	20
ارز جزيرة تجاري	»	90	94	91	99	112	112	112
نخالة	الطن	110	125	155	140	120	140	140
قمر الدين تجاري	١٠٠ كيلو	90	85	85	85	87	90	104
تقوع بلدي مبخر	»	140	139	145	142	141	145	—
دبس جامد	»	53	—	—	—	—	49	46
جوز قلب	١٠٠ كيلو	276	271	264	262	282	288	295
فستق حلبي قلب	»	1,025	1,000	988	1,045	1,012	1,080	994
عرقسوس مطحون	»	25	35	35	35	34	34	31
بصل	»	12	12	11	10	10	10	19
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	217	250	258	264	262	261	265
سمن ديري	»	460	459	458	456	451	460	467
بيض طازج	الصندوق ١٤٤٠	144	135	126	119	113	113	102
سكر نامم ابيض انكليزي	١٠٠ كيلو	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
البن الاخضر ريو	»	534	530	533	542	546	532	532
الشاي ذهبي تجاري	»	426	425	421	383	363	338	338

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	وسطي Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
2 — RAW MATERIALS							
Cotton, Texas ginned	100 kgs	242	228	233	247	238	236
Hemp, raw	«	182	155	168	171	179	190
Hemp, combed 1st grade	«	251	316	325	226	231	248
Cumin	«	98	111	119	113	110	110
Aniseed	«	83	85	85	82	85	85
Sesame	«	68	78	74	67	70	66
Apricot seed	«	35	30	35	35	35	35
Olive oil, commercial	«	178	176	173	189	196	186
Hides, cow light	«	489	475	475	475	490	500
Skins, cow dried local	«	276	285	283	282	280	280
Skins, sheep raw	«	338	329	325	325	344	350
Skins, sheep in the wool	«	300	...	300	300	300	300
Skins, goat	«	532	500	500	500	513	525
Skins, sheep in brine	«	191	182	180	179	180	180
Wool, fleece raw greasy	«	252	244	236	242	244	247
Wool, white washed fleece	«	525	495	536	510	519	508
Wool, pieces white washed	«	364	377	—	—	—	—
Wool, pulled washed	«	452	431	435	436	436	469
Guts, sheep	100 pieces	132	162	112	135	75	79
Guts, goats	«	39	53	45	30	25	28
Tobacco leaves, Abu-Riha	100 kgs	123	123	123	123	123	122
Tobacco pieces, Abu-Riha	«	30	30	30	30	30	30
3 — Manufactured products							
Matches, «Crown»	10 gross	22	23	22	22	22	22
Cotton yarn, 1 — 12	Bundle	17	20	17	17	17	17
Cotton yarn, 1 — 20	«	20	23	20	20	20	20
Cotton fabrics, «Rabwa»	Roll	22	23	22	22	22	22
Cotton fabrics, «Rabi'esh-Sham»	«	41	44	41	42	42	41

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ٣ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
٣ ـ المواد الاولية								
قطن تكساس محلوج	١٠٠ كيلو	259	238	241	238	250	253	242
تنبر قنب خامي	«	164	193	186	191	182	198	207
تنبر قنب مطيب اول باب ممشط	«	214	273	238	229	241	222	243
كمون للتصدير	«	85	80	84	86	85	88	105
بابونج للتصدير	«	94	80	80	80	80	78	84
سمسم ديري	«	68	64	69	66	63	63	64
بلو مشمش حب	«	37	40	38	36	33	32	34
زيت زيتون تجاري	«	154	169	168	191	179	180	180
عسل بقر خفيف	«	460	500	500	500	500	500	500
جلد بقر ناشف هندي	«	280	225	280	280	280	280	280
جلد غنم حور خامي	«	325	325	325	333	362	359	350
جلد خاروف بصوفه	«	...	...	...	...	—	300	300
جلد ماعز سختيان	«	550	550	550	550	550	550	550
جلد غنم مملح بشعره	«	202	195	210	210	205	188	180
صوف جز وسخ خامي	«	256	250	251	262	279	256	256
صوف جز مغسول ابيض	«	548	515	519	545	559	513	535
صوف نتر مغسول ابيض	«	363	335	359	380	382	310	387
صوف نتر مغسول ابيض	«	501	440	445	459	456	453	466
مصران (طاقة غنم)	١٠٠ واحدة	214	200	203	153	75	79	92
مصران (طاقة ماعز)	«	50	50	50	45	28	29	34
دخان ابو ريحة ورق	١٠٠ كيلو	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
دخان ابو ريحة نتر	«	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
٣ ـ المنتجات الصناعية								
كبريت ماركة تاج	١٠ كروز	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
خيوط قطنية نمرو ١٢/١	الربطة	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
خيوط قطنية نمرو ٢٠/١	«	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
خام ربوة دمشق	الثوب	22	22	22	21	21	21	21
خام ربيع الشام	«	—	—	40	—	40	40	40

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	Average وسطي	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	أيار May
Cotton fabrics, «Khumasiya»	10 yds	20	22	20	20	20	20
Cordage, No. 2	100 kgs.	232	195	213	217	231	253
Cordage No. 3	«	197	150	173	190	184	222
Twine, No. 1	«	284	284	278	257	279	299
String, No. 1	«	424	421	418	388	426	418
Glue, brown	«	210	195	195	190	205	205
Soap, «Star Itani»	«	192	190	186	191	209	201
Soap Commercial	«	101	110	105	109	110	105
Starch, hard wheat	«	71	90	79	75	71	70
4 — BUILDING MATERIALS							
Iron rods	Tons	437	493	450	435	435	463
Iron Angles	«	472	545	501	486	480	473
Iron sheets, black No. 1	«	697	810	725	760	725	710
Pipes, galvanized ½"	10 m.	12	14	13	13	12	12
Tin sheets, white	100 kgs.	84	83	81	84	81	70
Zinc sheets, white	«	154	168	165	166	168	168
Cement, local	Tons	81	85	81	80	80	80
Cement, white 1st grade	«	232	240	240	228	243	243
Timber, Spruce	m3	199	201	212	204	198	194
Timber squared, «Qatrani»	piece	45	41	44	45	44	45
Timber squared, «Bayasi»	«	35	34	34	35	35	35
Timber, Canadian red fir	m3	456	438	428	465	470	461
Timber, Swedish	«	254	249	266	272	261	263
Timber, pinewood	«	295	239	342	326	312	300
Plywood, Bulgarian	«	606	581	625	623	625	611
Plywood, French	«	978	1,050	1,050	990	981	969
Plywood, Lebanese	«	576	...	...	...	...	575
Veneer wood, California	10 m2	32	30	30	36	34	43
Veneer wood, «Ajram»	»	70	75	75	69	69	65

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ٣ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
دولس خماسية اصلي	١٠ برد	—	—	20	20	19	19	19
حبال مشاقة نوع ثاني	١٠٠ كيلو	234	243	222	237	244	244	255
حبال مشاقة نوع ثالث	»	201	211	189	222	212	209	202
مرس نوع اول سماكي	»	285	296	278	292	280	293	294
مصيص نوع اول عادي	»	444	443	428	437	406	420	435
غراء اشقر	»	240	220	220	220	214	203	200
صابون نجمة ايتوني	»	183	180	188	191	195	196	196
صابون تجاري	»	91	90	90	100	100	100	98
نشا حنطة يابس	»	64	62	67	70	69	70	70
٤ ـ مواد البناء :								
حديد مبروم اساس	الطن	398	410	414	416	420	444	455
حديد مبسط تربيع زوايا	»	438	450	450	449	458	463	475
صفائح سوداء (١) مم	»	630	630	645	665	575	685	700
انابيب مزيقة ٢/١ انش	١٠ متر	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
تنك صفائح ابيض	١٠٠ كيلو	51	50	50	58	50	50	60
توتياء صفائح ابيض	»	140	140	140	140	160	130	158
اسمنت وطني	الطن	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
ترابة بيضاء نخب اول	»	227	225	225	222	222	232	240
خشب شوح	٣م	195	195	195	197	199	196	197
لاط قطراني	الوحدة	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
لاط بياسي	»	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
خشب كندي احمر	٣م	460	465	466	450	460	465	463
خشب سويدي	»	243	238	244	249	250	255	259
خشب زان	»	300	306	234	192	301	290	300
خشب معاكس بلغاري	»	600	595	598	598	600	600	621
خشب معاكس افرنسي	»	938	956	947	960	975	975	950
خشب معاكس لبناني	»	550	563	556	590	600	600	575
قشر كاليفورنيا	١٠م٢	29	28	28	28	28	28	45
قشر عجرم	»	75	75	75	67	65	65	65

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3 (concld.)

ITEMS	Unit	Average وسطي	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
Veneer wood, walnut	10 m2	18	15	18	20	20	20
Glass plates, 2 mm.	«	31	29	30	30	32	32
Glass paltes, 3 mm.	«	50	47	47	45	50	50
Tin ingots	100 kgs.	851	1,006	1,030	1,026	1,018	976
Tin rods	«	851	1,015	1,036	1,022	1,005	966
Copper, rods and plates	«	399	440	440	438	445	450
Brass, sheets	«	378	409	415	418	419	425
Lead ingots	«	109	116	114	107	110	110
Nails, large size	«	70	86	75	70	70	70
Nails, small size	«	92	103	90	90	90	95
5 — FUEL MATERIALS							
Coal in blocks	Tons	111	118	114	110	109	111
Coak of coal	«	205	288	238	244	218	205
Firewood, olive cut dry	«	80	88	82	80	72	71
Firewood, apricot cut dry	«	67	72	69	67	58	59
Mazout, in bulk	1,000 ltr.	109	112	112	112	112	108
Kerosene	«	191	193	193	193	193	191
Fuel oil	Tons	68	69	69	69	69	68
Benzine, in bulk	1,000 ltr.	317	320	320	320	320	316
Charcoal, in bulk	Tons	258	246	220	240	260	260

Source : Ministry of National Economy

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
قشر جوز	١٠ م ٢	20	18	15	15	15	15	20
زجاج ٢ مم	»	31	32	32	32	32	32	32
زجاج ٣ مم	»	50	51	51	51	51	51	51
تصدير سبانك	١٠٠ كيلو	648	640	648	673	—	—	840
تصدير قضبان	»	660	650	665	690	—	—	850
نحاس أحمر مدور والواح	»	360	350	350	355	325	410	416
نحاس اصفر صفائح	»	319	325	325	342	365	390	389
رصاص سبائك	»	102	100	111	113	108	110	110
مسمار شبابيك	»	65	65	65	65	70	73	71
مسمار شعايري	»	90	90	90	90	90	93	94
٥ ـ المواد المشتعلة :								
فحم حجري قوالب انكليزي	الطن	119	113	107	105	106	105	109
فحم حجري كوك	»	174	175	181	176	180	186	200
حطب زيتون مكسر ناشف	»	85	91	92	77	76	76	73
حطب مشمش مكسر ناشف	»	65	71	74	67	67	68	62
مازوت سائل الـ	١٠٠٠ ليتر	107	107	107	107	107	107	107
كاز سائل الـ	»	190	190	190	190	190	190	190
فيول اويل	الطن	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
بنزين سائل الـ	١٠٠٠ ليتر	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
فحم حلبي سنديانى راسه بعبه	الطن	280	265	270	260	250	280	260

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

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MONTHLY AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953

(Syrian Piastres)

435 Table No. 4

ITEMS	Unit	وسطي Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان April	ايار May	حزيران June
Wheat 1st quality	Kilo	29	34	32	32	32	30	29
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	«	40	47	45	43	43	42	43
Flour, with bran	«	32	40	35	37	35	35	33
Bread, «Zero» Flour	«	41	45	43	43	44	41	43
Bread, flour with bran	«	34	38	37	39	38	35	36
Burghol	«	42	51	45	45	45	41	40
Macaroni	«	67	70	70	70	70	67	65
Mutton, boneless	«	335	350	335	350	320	328	310
Milk, fresh	«	40	48	40	40	40	35	33
Butter	140 gr.	74	91	82	84	81	71	66
Samneh	Kilo	503	620	555	523	485	478	460
Cheese, white local	«	196	273	233	203	157	161	160
Rice, commercial	«	117	118	120	124	121	118	115
Beef, boneless	«	255	275	225	175	225	250	250
Olives, «Dun» brand.	«	79	82	79	80	78	75	76
Olives, split	«	85	81	98	88	86	78	75
Margarine, «Khumasiya»	«	190	160	161	185	197	199	194
Olive oil, local	«	267	260	246	258	260	278	274
Eggs, fresh	10 eggs	94	128	103	94	80	80	74
Sugar, refined granulated	Kilo	97	115	95	95	95	95	95
Potatoes	«	28	33	28	28	28	23	25
Onions, red	«	21	20	20	23	27	27	21
Coffee beans, Rio	«	574	585	575	600	585	581	570
Tea, «Golden» commercial	«	437	450	431	406	420	413	419
Soap, «Star Itani»	«	204	206	209	205	210	210	206
Charcoal	«	34	38	35	30	31	31	30
Kerosene	20 l.	282	285	285	285	285	281	280
Cigarettes	20 c.	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
Lentils, red	Kilo	45	58	53	45	50	45	43
Broad beans, edible	«	47	52	54	50	50	49	45
Halawa	«	120	135	125	125	120	120	110
Tresals	«	55	60	60	55	55	55	55

Source : Ministry of National Economy

الاسعار

الوسطي الشهري لاسعار المفرق في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالقروش السورية)

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جدول رقم ٤

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July
الحنطة المنقاة	كيلو	26	25	26	27	26	28
دقيق زيرو نمرو (٢)	»	35	35	36	37	36	40
دقيق راسه بعبه	»	28	27	27	28	31	31
خبز زيرو	»	37	37	38	38	40	42
خبز راسه بعبه	»	28	28	30	32	35	35
برغل	»	40	40	40	40	39	40
معكرونة	»	65	65	65	65	65	65
لحم غنم بدون عظم	»	328	325	325	325	308	304
حليب طازج	»	48	43	39	38	38	35
الوبدة	١٤٠ غرام	70	70	70	68	67	70
سمن ديري	كيلو	494	481	494	478	475	475
جبن ابيض بلدي	»	210	210	210	200	185	175
ارز تجاري	»	110	113	118	116	117	111
لحم عجل بدون عظم	»	265	275	275	261	223	235
زيتون دان	»	70	78	80	89	90	90
زيتون مفقش	»	77	88	85	87	90	87
سمن نباتي خماسية	»	200	200	200	199	195	195
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	258	265	276	277	275	279
بيض طازج	العشرة	113	106	91	85	82	82
سكر ناعم ابيض	كيلو	95	95	95	95	95	95
بطاطا	»	26	26	23	22	20	20
بصل احمر	»	15	15	13	14	14	17
بن اخضر ريو	»	562	585	574	563	575	550
شاي ذهبي تجاري	»	500	484	469	437	410	410
صابون نجمة ايتوني	»	200	196	198	208	205	208
فحم حطب	»	45	38	35	35	30	34
زيت نفط (بترول) الـ	٢٠ ليتر	380	380	381	385	380	380
دخان بافرا الـ	٢٠ سيكارة	60	60	60	60	60	60
عدس احمر	كيلو	45	45	42	37	40	42
فول ناشف	»	48	48	46	43	43	35
حلاوة طحينية	»	111	111	116	120	122	117
دبس جامد	»	50	50	60	60	64	70

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

PRICES

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The method of collecting wholesale and retail prices as well as the method of computing the indices thereof, are as follows :

(1) Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices : The list of items for wholesale prices is divided into five categories :

The first category : comprises 28 food items.
The second category : comprises 23 items of raw materials.
The third category : comprises 16 items of locally manufactured products.
The fourth category : comprises 30 items for buildings and constructions.
The fifth category : comprises 10 items of fuel materials.

The prices for these items are collected weekly, and a monthly average is calculated for each item. This average is compared with that of the previous month and a percentage is given. A geometric average is then computed for each category, indicating the change in price of the category compared with the previous month. By means of the «Chain» method, the index numbers shown on page 165 have been produced, taking the average of 1949 as a base = 100.

The index numbers of each category have been left without combination into one general index of all categories, pending the completion of a special study which will form the basis for an all-category index number.

نورد فيما يلي شرحاً عن كيفية جمع اسعار الجملة والمفرق والطريقة التي اتبعت في استخراج الارقام القياسية منها .

(1) الارقام القياسية لاسعار الجملة

جرى تقسيم مواد اسعار الجملة الى خمسة اقسام :

يتضمن القسم الاول منها (المواد الغذائية) ٢٨ صنفاً ، والقسم الثاني (المواد الاولية) ٢٣ صنفاً ، والقسم الثالث (المنتجات الصناعية) ١٦ صنفاً ، والقسم الرابع (موادالبناء) ٣٠ صنفاً ، والقسم الخامس (المواد المشتعلة) ١٠ اصناف .

وتجمع اسعار هذه المواد اسبوعياً ثم يستخرج الوسطي الشهري عن كل من هذه الاصناف ويقارن مع وسطي السعر لصنف ذاته في الشهر السابق ويعطى نسبة مئوية . ويستخرج الوسطي الهندسي عن هذه النسب ، كل قسم على حدة ، فينتج من ذلك النسبة المئوية لجملة القسم مقارنة بالشهر السابق . وبطريقة « السلاسل المتصلة » توصلنا الى الارقام القياسية الواردة في صفحة ١٦٥ باعتبار وسطي عام ١٩٤٩ يساوي ١٠٠

وقد تركنا هذه الارقام القياسية دون الخروج بها الى مقياس مجمل ريثما تتم دراستنا التي ستتخذها اساساً لتوحيد هذه المقاييس الخمسة .

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الاسعار

(٢) الارقام القياسية لاسعار المفرق

لما كنا نحتاج الى القيام بدراسات وافية عن نفقات العائلة لنبني عليها الارقام القياسية لنفقات المعيشة ، وحيث انه تعذر علينا حتى الان القيام بمثل هذه الدراسات لضيق جهاز مديريتنا ولعدم توفر المال اللازم لهذا الغرض رأينا ان نتصرف في الوقت الحاضر الى تنظيم الرقم القياسي لاسعار المفرق لاهم المواد الغذائية .

ويجب التنويه هنا الى ان الرقم القياسي هذا لا يمثل تكاليف المعيشة كافة المواد الغذائية اذ لا يشمل اسعار الخضار والفواكه بل يستند الى ٢٢ صنفا حسب الجدول على الصفحة ١٦٤ من هذه النشرة وحسب التثقيل المبين في الجدول ذاته .

وتجمع اسعار المفرق هذه اسبوعيا ويستخدم الوسطي الشهري منها للوصول الى الرقم القياسي بطريقة « الوسطي الاجمالي » على الوجه التالي :

اذا اشير الى الاسعار بالاصطلاحات س ١ س ٢ س ٣ الخ .. للاصناف ١ و ٢ و ٣ الخ .. خلال المدة الاساسية واشير الى الكمية ، وهي بمثابة الرقم التثقيلي المعدل ، بالاصطلاحات ك١ ك٢ ك٣ الخ ... والى الاسعار حسب الشهور ب س١ س٢ س٣ للشهر الاول والثاني والثالث الخ .. فتكون المعادلة :

$$\text{الرقم القياسي} = \frac{\text{س}_1\text{ك}_1 + \text{س}_2\text{ك}_2 + \text{س}_3\text{ك}_3 \ldots (\text{الشهر الاول})}{\text{س}_1\text{ك}_1 + \text{س}_2\text{ك}_2 + \text{س}_3\text{ك}_3 \ldots (\text{المدة الاساسية})} \times 100$$

الارقام القياسية لاسعار المفرق لمدينة دمشق لاثنين وعشرين صنفا من اولي الضروريات (وسطي ١٩٣٨ = ١٠٠)

INDEX NUMBER OF RETAIL PRICES FOR 22 ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES IN DAMASCUS
(Base : Average 1935 = 100)

Table No. 5 — جدول رقم ٥

الارقام القياسية حسب السنوات Index Numbers by Years			الارقام القياسية حسب الشهور Index Numbers by Months				
Av. Year	الارقام القياسية Index No.	وسطي السنوات	Month	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الشهور
1939	106,0	١٩٣٩	January	536,0	632,1	595,7	كانون ثاني
1940	157,6	١٩٤٠	February	535,2	626,4	569,8	شباط
1941	261,5	١٩٤١	March	526,4	594,2	572,7	آذار
1942	524,5	١٩٤٢	April	515,4	605,4	553,3	نيسان
1943	669,5	١٩٤٣	May	519,7	596,4	538,0	ايار
1944	741,2	١٩٤٤	June	539,5	580,2	533,3	حزيران
1945	830,5	١٩٤٥	July	531,7	566,7	530,0	تموز
1946	766,1	١٩٤٦	August	545,6	574,7	533,5	آب
1947	699,1	١٩٤٧	September	583,9	572,7	533,5	ايلول
1948	662,1	١٩٤٨	October	607,5	565,0	528,7	تشرين اول
1949	561,6	١٩٤٩	November	613,6	594,4	523,1	تشرين ثاني
1950	677,9	١٩٥٠	December	612,3	604,7	524,5	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

(2) Index Number of Retail Prices : As it is beyond the means of this Department at present to conduct a family budget enquiry, on which to base the compilation of an index number of cost-of-living, we aimed towards preparing an index number of retail prices covering mainly essential food commodities.

The index number of retail prices shown in the following table, is based on 22 items listed on page 164, of which 19 are foodstuffs and 3 are other essential items, namely soap, kerosene and cigarettes. Base retail prices are collected weekly and monthly averages thereof is used in arriving at the index number by the «Aggregate» methods as per the following equation :

Where P1, P2, P3 etc... indicate the prices of items 1, 2, 3 etc... for the base period and Q21, Q3 etc... indicate the quantities involved, and P1 P2 P3 etc... indicate the prices in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. months.

$$\text{Index number} = \frac{P_1Q_1 + P_2Q_2 + P_3Q_3 \ldots (\text{for 1st month})}{P_1Q_1 + P_2Q_2 + P_3Q_3 \ldots (\text{for base period})} \times 100$$

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435 AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES FOR 22 ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES AT DAMASCUS, 1939 — 1952
(Syrian Piastres)

Table No. 6

ITEMS	Unit	Weight	١٩٤١ 1941	١٩٤٢ 1942	١٩٤٣ 1943	١٩٤٤ 1944	١٩٤٥ 1945
Bread	Kilo	70	21.3	37.3	40,0	41,5	42,5
Sugar granulated	«	8	65.8	120,9	217,1	272,1	337
Rice	«	7	35.5	190,8	196,8	258,3	196
Burghul	«	9	27.4	75,1	109,8	85	88
Lentils, red	«	8	13,1	30,0	38,5	32	55
Broad-beans	«	2	14,9	68,5	100,5	54	65
Olive oil	«	5	100,4	183,8	216,3	260,8	401
Samneh	«	1	207,5	480,8	485,8	549,2	731
Mutton, boneless	«	5	108,3	233,3	362,5	441,5	388
Cheese, local	«	3	109,6	217,9	222,5	303,3	357
Treacle	«	2	34,2	66,7	107,0	75	70
Halawa	«	2	51	112	200	220	220
Olives	«	3	32	83,9	99,1	55	68
Eggs	10 eggs	5	47	93	115	114	130
Milk	Kilo	8	20,5	33,2	40,7	53,3	56
Tea	«	1/3	453,8	774,9	682,6	718	1,226
Coffee beans	«	1/2	136,3	144,2	160,4	155,4	313,6
Potatoes	«	7	15,2	39,6	43,4	46,6	53
Onions	«	5	6,5	20,7	31,3	13,3	31
Soap	«	2	78,5	151,6	188,8	234,4	325
Kerosene	20 ltr.	2	605,5	427,4	528,4	543,3	627
Cigarettes	20 cig.	15	15,7	24,0	37,9	45,8	58,0

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

الاسعار

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وسطي اسعار المفرق لاثنين وعشرين صنفا من اولى الضروريات في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٤١ – ١٩٥٣
(بالقروش السورية)

جدول رقم ٦

الصنف	الوحدة	التثقيل	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٦ 1946
خبز	كيلو	٧٠	34	38	32	26	33	45	42.5	42.5
سكر ناعم	»	٨	97	123	129	112	112	122	170	334
أرز	»	٧	117	111	85	63	78	108	168	127
برغل	»	٩	42	52	48	34	44	79	71	78
عدس أحمر	»	٢	45	55	53	31	25	45	42	49
فول ناشف	»	٢	47	57	61	27	29	73	65	54
زيت زيتون	»	٥	257	253	265	220	249	328	374	345
سمن ديري	»	١	503	632	535	490	749	800	743	722
لحم غنم بدون عظم	»	٥	325	350	320	398	355	347	430	351
جبنة بلدية	»	٢	196.5	248	225	216	206	292	288	320
دبس	»	٢	53	72	59	57	64	53	68	65
حلاوة طحينية	»	١	120	156	149	137	150	158	165	167
زيتون	»	٢	85	99	98	97	107	70	65	68
بيض	العشرة	٥	94	105	94	71	90	99	120	130
حليب	كيلو	٨	40	44	39	35	46	55	57	57
شاي	»	١/٢	437	464	533	508	514	587	657	1,315
قهوة (خضراء)	»	١/٢	574	529	511	430	235	250	252	272
بطاطا	»	٧	28	31	34	19	25	50	41	40
بصل	»	٥	21	23	11	12	19	28	16	17
صابون	»	٢	204	213	238	199	240	295	335	312
كاز	٢٠ ليتر	٢	382	387	400	401	457	420	448	590
لفائف التبغ بافرا ،	٢٠ سيكارة	١٥	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

جدول

الارقام القياسية لأسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق حسب الابواب الرئيسية

(وسطي عام ١٩٤٩ = ١٠٠)

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INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN DAMASCUS, BY GROUPS

Table No. 7 (Average 1949 = 100) جدول رقم ٧

Months	المواد الغذائية Food	المواد الاولية المحلية Local raw materials	المنتجات الصناعية المحلية Local manufactures	مواد البناء Building materials	المواد المشعلة Fuel materials	الشهور
1952						١٩٥٢
January	121,4	122,7	109,2	95,4	92,6	كانون ثاني
February	120,3	121,3	108,2	95,4	89,7	شباط
March	121,9	120,3	106,6	94,7	88,3	آذار
April	125,0	117,5	106,4	94,3	86,0	نيسان
May	124,1	112,3	104,5	94,8	85,9	أيار
June	114,8	112,9	104,3	93,4	85,2	حزيران
July	110,4	117,9	104,6	95,9	80,6	تموز
August	112,4	119,2	102,5	92,9	78,5	آب
September	111,5	114,0	99,4	94,7	80,2	أيلول
October	114,2	115,0	97,4	95,5	90,1	تشرين اول
November	119,8	112,2	97,1	95,8	91,9	تشرين ثاني
December	120,9	111,1	95,3	96,5	88,3	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	117,9	110,5	89,6	94,7	85,5	كانون ثاني
February	113,3	109,3	88,3	94,0	82,2	شباط
March	115,0	106,1	88,1	94,9	80,6	آذار
April	113,1	103,5	87,8	93,7	79,9	نيسان
May	110,0	105,0	89,5	93,6	78,9	أيار
June	107,7	107,1	87,5	91,3	78,9	حزيران
July	108,2	102,7	87,4	88,8	79,8	تموز
August	101,5	104,5	87,1	87,6	79,4	آب
September	100,9	110,7	88,4	85,9	79,6	أيلول
October	100,2	118,8	84,9	85,7	82,9	تشرين اول
November	100,1	117,4	85,9	86,5	82,4	تشرين ثاني
December	98,4	115,8	86,2	86,8	81,9	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

17: Syria G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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الفصل السابع
النقل والمواصلات

CHAPTER SEVEN
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

P. 161

TRANSPORTATION

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شبكة الطرق في الجمهورية السورية
(الطول بالكيلومترات)

LENGTH OF ROADS IN THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC
(Length in kilometers)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Type of roads (1) and name of district	As at the end of				في نهاية السنة			نوع الطرق واسم المناطق (١)
	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	
Asphalted Roads Total	2,174	2,431	2,406	2,494	2,501	2,580	2,584	**الطرق الزفتة المجموع**
Southern District	839	980	1,016	1,031	1,067	1,091	1,138	المنطقة الجنوبية
Northern " (2)	1,050	861	715	723	726	715	715	المنطقة الشمالية (٢)
Western "	285	278	305	330	337	371	371	المنطقة الغربية
Eastern " (2)	—	322	369	402	411	416	360	المنطقة الشرقية (٢)
Metalled Roads Total	1,614	1,057	1,156	1,139	1,151	1,164	1,262	**الطرق المعبدة المجموع**
Southern District	414	476	590	570	552	576	616	المنطقة الجنوبية
Northern " (2)	480	285	290	305	317	353	353	المنطقة الشمالية (٢)
Western "	120	108	97	102	90	99	71	المنطقة الغربية
Eastern " (2)	—	188	179	175	192	185	222	المنطقة الشرقية (٢)
Subsidiary Roads Total	3,362	4,349	5,973	6,398	6,415	6,511	6,182	**الطرق التمهيدية المجموع**
Southern District	1,092	1,800	1,865	1,910	1,900	1,969	1,900	المنطقة الجنوبية
Northern " (2)	1,020	152	871	815	833	825	830	المنطقة الشمالية (٢)
Western "	1,250	1,360	1,360	1,388	1,394	1,450	1,150	المنطقة الغربية
Eastern " (2)	—	907	1,757	2,285	2,238	2,247	2,302	المنطقة الشرقية (٢)
Grand Total	6,000	7,837	8,494	10,049	10,127	10,267	10,023	**المجموع العام**

Sources : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

ملاحظة :

(١) تقسم وزارة الاشغال العامة البلاد الى ثلاث مناطق
(١) المنطقة الجنوبية — تشمل محافظات دمشق وحمص وحماة ودرعا والسويداء
(٢) المنطقة الشمالية — « « حلب والحسكة ودير الزور
(٣) المنطقة الغربية — « محافظة اللاذقية
(٢) اعتبارا من اوائل سنة ١٩٤٨ جرى تغيير في المنطقة الشمالية فقط اذ سلخت منها محافظتي الحسكة ودير الزور وسميت المنطقة الشرقية

Note :

(1) The Ministry of Public Works devides the Country into the following districts :
1 - The Southern District – comprising the mohafazat of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Dir'a and Sweida.
2 - The Northern District — comprising the mohafazat of Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, and Deir-es-Zor.
3 - The Western District — comprising the mohafaza of Latakia.

(2) As from the beginning of 1948, the mohafazat of Al-Hasakeh and Deir-es-Zor were excluded from the Northern District to make up the new Eastern District.

النقل والمواصلات

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عدد السيارات المسجلة في سوريا حسب المناطق ونوع السيارة في نهايةعام ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN SYRIA AS AT THE END OF 1952

Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

TYPE OF VEHICLE	الجموع Total	المنطقة الجنوبية Southern Area	المنطقة الشمالية Northern Area	المنطقة الغربية Western Area	نوع السيارة
Trucks — Public	2,584	979	1,475	130	سيارات شحن عمومية
Private	1,556	862	599	95	سيارات شحن خصوصية
Government	454	202	230	22	سيارات شحن حكومية
Buses — Public	1,049	435	558	56	سيارات ركوب كبيرة عمومية (باص)
Private	78	40	29	9	سيارات ركوب كبير خصوصية (باص)
Government	2	2	—	—	سيارات ركوب كبيرة حكومية (باص)
Cars — Public (taxi)	829	278	483	50	سيارات ركوب صغير عمومية (اكسي)
Private	4,840	2,813	1,826	201	سيارات ركوب صغيرة خصوصية
Government	278	81	178	19	سيارات ركوب صغيرة حكومية
Diplomatic corps in Syria	92	92	—	—	سيارات البعثات السياسية الاجنبية في سوريا
Consular corp in Syria	7	7	—	—	سيارات البعثات القنصلية الاجنبية في سوريا
United Nations in Syria	19	19	—	—	سيارات هيئة الامم المتحدة في سوريا
Total	11,788	5,819	5,578	591	الجموع

عدد السيارات المسجلة في سوريا حسب المناطق ونوع السيارة في نهايةعام ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN SYRIA AS AT THE END OF 1953

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

TYPE OF VEHICLE	الجموع Total	المنطقة الجنوبية Southern Area	المنطقة الشمالية Northern Area	المنطقة الغربية Western Area	نوع السيارة
Trucks — Public	2,569	1,041	1,469	59	سيارات شحن عمومية
Private	1,820	931	804	85	سيارات شحن خصوصية
Government	323	246	55	22	سيارات شحن حكومية
Buses — Public	1,102	427	628	47	سيارات ركوب كبيرة عمومية (باص)
Private	108	52	44	12	سيارات ركوب كبير خصوصية (باص)
Government	2	2	—	—	سيارات ركوب كبيرة حكومية (باص)
Cars — Public (taxi)	825	290	479	56	سيارات ركوب صغير عمومية (اكسي)
Private	5,879	3,185	2,464	230	سيارات ركوب صغيرة خصوصية
Government	309	251	38	20	سيارات ركوب صغيرة حكومية
Diplomatic corps in Syria	136	136	—	—	سيارات البعثات السياسية الاجنبية في سوريا
Consular corp in Syria	10	5	5	—	سيارات البعثات القنصلية الاجنبية في سوريا
United Nations in Syria	33	33	—	—	سيارات هيئة الامم المتحدة في سوريا
Total	13,146	6,589	5,956	561	الجموع

TRANSPORTATION

طول خطوط السكك الحديدية المستعملة في نهاية عام ١٩٥٣ (بالكيلو مترات)

LENGTH OF RAILWAY TRACKS IN USE AS AT THE END OF 1955 (In kms)

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

Railway System	الطول الاجمالي Total Length		طول الخط المار بسوريا Length within Syrian territory		شبكة الخطوط الحديدية
	خط ضيق Narrow gauge	خط عادي Ordinary gauge	خط ضيق Narrow gauge	خط عادي Ordinary gauge	
Damascus Hama Railway Line and Extensions (D.H.P.)	149	439	67	297	سكة حديد شام حماة وتمديداتها (ش ح ت)
The Hijaz Railways (C.F.H.)	240	—	240	—	سكة حديد الحجاز (س ح)
The Northern Railways (N.R.)	—	248	—	248	الخطوط الشمالية (خ ش)
Total	389	687	307	545	المجموع

عدد القاطرات والعربات المستعملة في شبكة خطوط السكك الحديدية في نهاية ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF LOCOMOTIVES AND WAGONS USED BY THE RAILWAY SYSTEMS, AS AT THE END OF 1953.

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

Locomotives and Wagons	مجموع الخطوط All lines	النمط الضيق Narrow gauge			النمط العادي Ordinary gauge			القاطرات وانواع العربات
		المجموع Total	ش ح ت D.H.P.	س ح C.F.H.	المجموع Total	ش ح ت D.H.P.	خ ش N.R.	
Locomotives	147	62	26	20	85	66	19	القاطرات
Passenger and luggage wagons	190	117	84	33	82	58	24	عربات الركاب وامتعتهم
Goods wagons	1,795	670	343	327	1,125	518	607	شاحنات بضائع
Fuel wagons	100	27	4	23	73	15	58	شاحنات مهاريع
Other wagons	56	8	3	5	48	5	43	عربات اخرى

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

النقل والمواصلات

نقليات السكك الحديدية للركاب ، ١٩٣٨ ، ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

RAILWAY TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS 1938, 1947 — 1953

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Table No. 6

جدول رقم ٦

Year or month	عدد الركاب الكيلومتري (بالالوف) Passenger — kilometers ('000)				السنة والشهور
	الجموع Total	ش ح (١) D.H.P. (1)	س ح (٢) C.F.P. (2)	ن ش (٣) N.R. (3)	
Year 1938	118,432	100,757	13,037	4,668	سنة ١٩٣٨
« 1947	57,927	40,220	7,560	10,147	« ١٩٤٧
« 1948	51,482	38,777	7,539	5,166	« ١٩٤٨
« 1949	29,715	17,000	7,638	5,067	« ١٩٤٩
« 1950	21,876	11,178	5,399	5,299	« ١٩٥٠
« 1951	24,825	12,504	6,023	6,298	« ١٩٥١
« 1952	29,782	13,391	10,562	5,829	« ١٩٥٢
« 1953	36,982	16,189	15,218	5,575	« ١٩٥٣
Months 1952					شهور ١٩٥٢
January	2,015	834	468	713	كانون ثاني
February	1,906	825	558	523	شباط
March	2,250	893	846	511	آذار
April	2,545	1,185	994	366	نيسان
May	2,022	834	837	351	أيار
June	2,125	1,054	675	396	حزيران
July	2,648	1,363	869	416	تموز
August	3,524	1,551	1,306	667	آب
September	3,608	1,691	1,301	616	أيلول
October	2,779	1,223	1,118	438	تشرين اول
November	1,979	977	745	257	تشرين ثاني
December	2,381	961	845	575	كانون اول
Months 1953					شهور ١٩٥٣
January	2,049	893	685	471	كانون ثاني
February	2,043	799	759	485	شباط
March	3,258	1,086	1,742	413	آذار
April	3,902	1,352	2,110	440	نيسان
May	2,849	1,341	1,122	386	أيار
June	3,084	1,515	1152	417	حزيران
July	3,034	1,067	1,045	312	تموز
August	4,197	2,022	1,546	629	آب
September	4,845	1,727	2,313	805	أيلول
October	3,016	1505	1,032	479	تشرين اول
November	2,357	1,070	896	391	تشرين ثاني
December	2,363	1,200	816	347	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy

(1) Damascus - Hama Railway Lines & Extensions

(2) The Hijaz Railways

(3) The Northern Railways.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

(١) سكة حديد شام — حماة وتمديداتها

(٢) الخط الحديدي الحجازي

(٣) الخط الشمالي

نقليات السكك الحديدية لعموم البضائع ، ١٩٣٨ ، ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

RAILWAY TRANSPORT OF ALL GOODS, 1938, 1947 — 1953

499 Table No. 7 جدول رقم ٧

Year or month	Ton kilometres ('000) — المجموع Total	ش ح ت (١) D.H.F. (1)	س ح (٢) C.F.H. (2)	خ ش (٣) N.R. (3)	السنة والشهور
Year 1938	138,560	102,769	15,769	20,022	سنة ١٩٣٨
" 1947	113,976	80,771	4,764	28,441	" ١٩٤٧
" 1948	117,512	77,731	12,588	27,193	" ١٩٤٨
" 1949	86,543	35,659	16,389	31,492	" ١٩٤٩
" 1950	115,768	52,549	20,364	42,855	" ١٩٥٠
" 1951	113,846	57,999	16,661	39,186	" ١٩٥١
" 1952	124,447	52,981	21,772	49,684	" ١٩٥٢
" 1953	130,440	51,757	23,406	55,277	" ١٩٥٣
Months 1952					شهور ١٩٥٢
January	12,281	3,948	1,807	4,526	كانون ثاني
February	12,699	5,108	2,858	4,733	شباط
March	8,933	3,472	2,578	2,883	آذار
April	5,787	2,721	1,703	1,663	نيسان
May	4,188	1,604	828	1,756	أيار
June	9,681	3,992	849	4,940	حزيران
July	14,338	4,874	1,144	8,320	تموز
August	12,357	4,932	1,564	5,861	آب
Septembre	10,092	5,173	1,467	3,447	أيلول
October	11,285	4,779	2,221	4,285	تشرين اول
November	12,038	5,369	2,536	4,133	تشرين ثاني
December	10,768	5,114	2,157	3,137	كانون اول
Months 1953					شهور ١٩٥٣
January	8,774	3,906	1,841	3,127	كانون ثاني
February	8,677	3,869	1,010	2,798	شباط
March	7,206	3,345	1,406	2,457	آذار
April	9,159	3,797	2,465	2,897	نيسان
May	9,016	4,758	1,841	2,417	أيار
June	11,566	3,505	1,607	6,454	حزيران
July	14,750	4,670	2,234	7,846	تموز
August	14,774	4,689	2,137	7,948	آب
Septembre	13,570	4,350	2,013	7,207	أيلول
October	13,197	5,819	3,200	4,178	تشرين اول
November	10,557	5,418	1,122	4,017	تشرين ثاني
December	9,192	3,731	1,530	3,931	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy
(1) Damascus Hama Railway Lines and Extensions
(2) The Hijaz Railways
(3) Northern Railways

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني
(١) سكة حديد شام ـ حماة وتمديداتها
(٢) الخط الحديدي الحجازي
(٣) الخط الشمالي

كمية البضائع الرئيسية المشحونة بواسطة الخط الحديدي الحجازي ، ١٩٥١–١٩٥٣

(بالأطنان)

QUANTITY OF PRINCIPAL GOODS TRANSPORTED BY THE HIJAZ RAILWAYS (C.F.H.)

1951 — 1953.

(Tons)

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Table No. 8

جدول رقم ٨

ITEMS	١٩٥١ 1951		١٩٥٢ 1952		١٩٥٣ 1953		نوع البضاعة
	مجمل النقليات Total transportation	النقليات الداخلية Internal transportation	مجمل النقليات Total transportation	النقليات الداخلية Internal transportation	مجمل النقليات Total transportation	النقليات الداخلية Internal transportation	
Total	129,313	13,314	172,401	22,446	188,893	20,710	المجموع
Straw	488	211	668	330	3,003	1,759	تبن
Livestocks —	2,269	2,225	141	94	133	120	حيوانات
Grains	25,685	319	55,923	16,193	25,435	12,692	حبوب
Flour	15,085	4	22,650	8	38,772	13	طحين
Chikpeas and lentils	335	312	1,389	548	2,529	1,604	حمص وعدس
Vegetables and fruits	4,248	74	2,202	137	1,296	149	خضار وفاكهة
Military	1,287	1,287	3,231	3,231	2,463	2,463	عسكرية
Phosphate matures	4,910	15	17,039	4	26,712	—	فوسفات
Empties	139	70	1,167	136	835	149	فوارغ
Building Materials	24,963	4	19,730	26	33,586	43	مواد البناء
Colonial goods	—	—	4,900	—	—	—	مال قبان
Rice and sugar	15,256	—	10,236	—	10,144	—	ارز وسكر
Fuel oils	3,483	23	8,331	71	10,204	84	محروقات سائلة
Tools & implements	867	139	1,090	277	706	328	ادوات
Water	7,657	7,657	328	328	241	241	ماء
Miscellaneous	22,561	974	23,402	763	27,400	1,016	بضائع مختلفة
Petroleum Company transport	...	...	...	...	...	...	نقليات شركة البترول
Asphalt	...	...	...	...	4,244	...	اسفلت
Chemical fertilisers	...	...	...	...	1,190	1	سماد كيماوي

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كمية البضائع المنقولة على خط حديد شام ـ حماة وتعديلاتها ، ١٩٥١ ـ ١٩٥٣

(بالاطنان)

QUANTITY OF PRINCIPAL GOODS TRANSPORTED BY THE D.H.P. RAILWAYS 1951 — 1953

(Tons)

Table No. 9 — جدول رقم ٩

ITEMS	الكمية المنقولة على الخطين العادي والضيق Quantity transported over the ordinary and narrow gauges			الكمية المنقولة على الخط الضيق Quantity transported over over the narrow gauge			نوع البضاعة
	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	
Total	557,626	478,136	415,623	131,435	161,794	166,252	المجموع
Cereals and seeds	79,109	111,508	59,113	23,631	52,755	13,114	الحبوب والبذور المختلفة
Flour, bran and burghul	16,012	30,606	36,273	15,579	22,428	31,733	الدقيق والنخالة والبرغل
Onions	11,157	8,808	13,112	1,872	2,819	2,786	البصل
Fresh fruits and vegetables	5,286	4,063	5,357	4,505	1,547	984	الثمار وخضار طازجة
Colonial goods	28,388	51,131	70,786	15,073	11,937	9,365	مال لبان
Fat, grease and dried meat	—	—	—	—	—	—	دهن وشحم ومقددات الخ
Apricot paiste and apricots	—	—	—	—	—	—	قمر الدين وبزور المشمش
Cement and building materials	79,150	38,109	45,342	22,092	17,373	29,877	ترابة وأدوات البناء
Timber for building, boards and square cut	9,053	5,056	8,086	4,305	3,490	4,961	خشب البناء والواح وعواميد
Products of tubes and iron rails	99,848	3,221	12,374	606	851	2,397	منتوجات انابيب وقطع خطوط حديدية
Machines and parts thereof	18,972	12,825	—	606	432	—	ماكينات وقطع ماكينات
Stones, tiles, sand and gravel	60	1,126	—	—	120	—	احجار وبلاط ورمل وبحص
Wool, hides and skins	4,170	5,496	2,947	280	81	2	اصواف وجلود
Cotton	1,528	1,919	978	60	10	256	قطن
Hay and straw	1,096	4,594	10,996	405	511	2,962	تبن وقش
Fuel oils	76,849	77,140	89,089	1,350	970	2,179	محروقات سائلة
Salt	—	—	—	—	—	—	ملح
Dates	22,700	16,896	2,075	2,322	1,535	282	تمر (تمر)
Liquors	123	133	—	5	7	—	مشروبات
Fire wood	—	—	—	—	—	—	حطب
Living animals	36,890	30,915	37,520	4,920	1,020	1,295	حيوانات حية
Other tems, including Army supplies	66,924	74,586	81,645	33,761	43,878	63,723	مواد اخرى وعسكرية

النقل والمواصلات

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كمية البضاعة المنقولة على الخطوط الشمالية ، ١٩٥٠ ـ ١٩٥٣
(بالطن)

QUANTITY OF GOODS TRANSPORTED BY THE NORTHERN RAILWAYS, 1950 —1953
(Tons)

Table No. 10 جدول رقم ١٠

ITEMS	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	نوع البضاعة
Total	351,757	299,576	369,719	407,539	المجموع
Wheat	211,549	121,748	186,087	224,931	حنطة
Barley	29,326	14,441	44,891	72,495	شعير
Flour	852	590	1,032	1,049	طحين
Grains	1,533	7,609	7,641	3,153	حبوب
Rice	1,275	667	312	1,074	ارز
Dates	13,550	57,277	3,651	14,065	تمر
Dried or conserved fruits & vegetables	—	275	1,340	1,514	خضار وفواكه يابسة او محفوظة
Salt	1,271	1,706	2,325	1,292	ملح
Soap	801	1,140	1,190	1,169	صابون
Animals, alive	25,329	24,763	13,998	18,728	حيوانات حية
Wool	4,792	3,008	3,261	1,909	صوف
Cotton	1,155	1,779	1,636	1,603	قطن
Textiles	1,265	2,002	2,277	3,212	منسوجات
Leather	1,330	1,016	1,090	895	جلود
Pipes	1,922	2,038	932	338	انابيب
Building Materials	3,363	2,719	5,066	3,480	مواد بناء
Tools	4,165	4,085	4,387	4,724	ادوات
Agricultural implements	1,604	1,656	3,306	3,113	ادوات زراعية
Cement	2,002	2,323	2,326	1,114	ترابة واسمنت
Coal	21,060	19,358	22,964	30,176	فحم معدني
Charcoal and wood	2,716	2,193	326	214	فحم وحطب
Fuel oil	6,665	5,750	10,282	11,295	محروقات سائلة
Military transport	217	218	1,272	220	نقليات عسكرية
Other items	14,015	20,915	48,127	5,776	« مختلفة

TRANSPORTATION

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SHIPPING ACTIVITIES AT LATAKIA HARBOUR, 1951 — 1953

Table No. 11

Year or month	Steam Vessels — Entered			Steam Vessels — Cleared		
	No. of Vessels	N.R.T.	Weight of cargo in tons	No. of Vessels	N.R.T.	Weight of cargo in tons
1951	328	472,057	146,634	328	445,406	74,886
1952	496	818,258	147,291	497	814,494	246,172
1953	754	1,055,858	167,747	741	1,041,935	325,859
1952						
January	34	53,538	11,179	36	55,785	10,007
February	28	54,819	5,276	28	54,819	8,896
March	28	49,212	10,716	28	49,212	5,772
April	30	51,279	9,528	29	49,516	3,554
May	37	77,380	17,194	35	67,839	3,122
June	39	60,017	13,268	40	65,404	2,326
July	54	82,916	14,066	54	83,344	40,678
August	48	77,991	10,798	47	75,104	60,729
September	58	90,696	19,560	56	91,358	36,796
October	46	76,465	14,532	47	75,165	19,421
November	53	82,273	10,823	47	71,436	38,031
December	41	60,672	10,443	48	72,509	14,827
1953						
January	47	66,418	8,394	40	53,906	17,809
February	43	57,740	8,004	42	53,916	15,839
March	43	62,072	8,499	49	69,812	12,378
April	57	79,171	12,007	57	81,636	7,133
May	68	100,682	22,568	66	94,010	20,480
June	70	89,766	17,171	68	89,394	28,142
July	72	98,827	16,126	73	102,576	40,706
August	66	93,853	14,184	66	92,006	36,071
September	80	110,500	23,806	73	103,441	38,359
October	71	106,348	12,587	74	111,187	39,618
November	66	93,610	11,923	63	88,151	37,620
December	71	102,861	12,478	70	101,920	41,685

* A ton of 100 ft.3 equivalent to 2,83 m3

حركة السفن البخارية والشراعية في ميناء اللاذقية ، ١٩٥١ — ١٩٥٣

جدول رقم ١١

السنة والشهور	السفن الشراعية Sailing Vessels — الخارجة Cleared: عدد السفن No. of Vessels	صافي الحمولة المسجلة طن N.R.T.	وزن البضاعة طن Weight of cargo in tons	الداخلة Entered: عدد السفن No. of Vessels	صافي الحمولة المسجلة طن N.R.T.	وزن البضاعة طن Weight of cargo in tons
١٩٥١	853	24,926	14,791	884	25,033	16,585
١٩٥٢	627	25,025	18,755	618	25,545	19,196
١٩٥٣	404	18,571	16,152	418	20,387	8,650
١٩٥٢						
كانون ثاني	32	1,988	301	32	1,808	2,567
شباط	25	1,563	295	25	1,832	2,573
آذار	41	2,423	713	39	2,370	3,741
نيسان	60	2,606	3,395	63	2,864	1,282
ايار	93	3,612	3,668	85	2,706	1,709
حزيران	85	4,030	3,823	89	4,225	2,154
تموز	71	2,992	3,147	71	3,282	599
آب	87	2,647	1,771	82	2,213	1,695
ايلول	46	1,700	1,010	46	1,616	1,156
تشرين اول	50	833	324	55	1,126	334
تشرين ثاني	25	631	305	16	362	150
كانون اول	12	1,000	13	15	1,141	1,256
١٩٥٣						
كانون ثاني	9	572	—	9	568	516
شباط	12	835	1	10	608	669
آذار	14	669	—	15	770	924
نيسان	39	2,224	2,011	40	2,268	915
ايار	52	2,699	3,442	58	3,742	480
حزيران	55	2,856	3,340	62	3,246	504
تموز	64	2,565	2,808	62	2,300	1,003
آب	36	1,177	—	38	1,313	1,619
ايلول	49	1,128	250	50	1,499	175
تشرين اول	32	1,314	1,170	25	1,705	1,305
تشرين ثاني	26	1,731	2,331	22	1,522	540
كانون اول	16	801	799	17	746	—

(*) ١٠٠ قدم مكعب يعادل ٢,٨٣ متر مكعب

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حركة الطيران المدني في ميناء دمشق الجوي

CIVIL AVIATION TRAFFIC AT DAMASCUS AIRPORT

Table No. 12 — جدول رقم ١٢

Year and month	عدد الطائرات No. of aeroplanes		عدد الركاب No. of Passengers			السنة والشهور
	الهابطة Arrivals	المقلعة Departures	المسافرين Departures	القادمين Arrivals	المسافرين ترانزيت Transit	
1952						**١٩٥٢**
January	172	171	606	534	1,505	كانون ثاني
February	154	153	490	606	1,463	شباط
March	175	177	590	645	1,568	آذار
April	197	195	864	883	1,944	نيسان
May	190	193	769	903	3,135	ايار
June	174	172	624	884	2,280	حزيران
July	212	213	1,090	1,090	2,779	تموز
August	295	294	5,361	719	2,393	آب
September	326	326	818	6,912	2,753	ايلول
October	243	246	1,038	1,441	3,091	تشرين اول
November	206	205	894	781	2,145	تشرين ثاني
December	192	192	932	776	2,374	كانون اول
Total	2,536	2,537	14,085	16,174	27,450	المجموع
1953						**١٩٥٣**
January	173	173	518	410	1,918	كانون ثاني
February	161	160	542	511	1,924	شباط
March	188	191	726	694	2,214	آذار
April	209	206	809	937	2,592	نيسان
May	213	211	800	1,002	2,978	ايار
June	172	171	752	886	2,609	حزيران
July	204	205	1,110	1,031	2,815	تموز
August	215	214	1,481	1,643	2,421	آب
September	234	234	1,135	2,350	2,822	ايلول
October	184	184	1,094	977	2,525	تشرين اول
November	180	179	921	850	1,778	تشرين ثاني
December	167	168	787	744	1,648	كانون اول
Total	2,300	2,296	10,675	12,035	28,244	المجموع

حركة الطيران المدني في مطار النيرب — حلب

CIVIL AVIATION TRAFFIC AT NAIRAB AIRPORT, ALEPPO

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Table No. 12 — جدول رقم ١٢

Year and month	عدد الطائرات No. of aeroplanes: الهابطة Arrivals	المقلعة Departures	عدد الركاب No. of Passengers: المسافرين Departures	القادمين Arrivals	مسافرين ترانزيت Transit	السنة والشهور
1952						**١٩٥٢**
January	36	36	308	333	79	كانون ثاني
February	32	32	342	291	67	شباط
March	39	39	410	387	88	آذار
April	40	40	507	498	88	نيسان
May	39	39	453	470	93	ايار
June	32	32	376	362	156	حزيران
July	35	35	500	512	134	تموز
August	21	21	212	179	66	آب
September	20	20	236	213	—	ايلول
October	34	34	434	463	141	تشرين اول
November	33	33	326	345	105	تشرين ثاني
December	22	22	232	255	58	كانون اول
Total	383	383	4,426	4,308	1,077	المجموع
1953						**١٩٥٣**
January	29	29	108	80	16	كانون ثاني
February	26	26	155	146	16	شباط
March	19	19	125	146	21	آذار
April	29	29	334	314	43	نيسان
May	32	32	288	310	76	ايار
June	30	30	271	330	35	حزيران
July	36	36	391	408	63	تموز
August	21	21	223	191	—	آب
September	35	35	287	299	49	ايلول
October	44	44	360	325	82	تشرين اول
November	45	45	344	318	64	تشرين ثاني
December	41	41	287	293	51	كانون اول
Total	387	387	3,173	3,160	507	المجموع

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عدد مراكز البريد والبرق وعدد الآلات البرقية ، ١٩٤٤ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF POSTS AND TELEGRAPH OFFICES AND NUMBER OF TELEGRAPH SETS, 1944 — 1953

Table No: 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Year	مراكز البريد Post offices: المجموع Total	مراكز دائمة Permanent	شعب البريد المساعدة Auxiliary branches	مراكز البرق والاسلكي Telegraph and Wireless centres: المجموع Total	مراكز برق Telegraph centres	مراكز الاسلكي Wireless centres	شعب برق Telegraph branches	عدد الآلات البرقية No. of Telegsets	السنة
1944	149	43	106	149	43	—	106	118	١٩٤٤
1945	154	57	97	159	57	5	97	144	١٩٤٥
1946	186	57	129	191	57	5	129	180	١٩٤٦
1947	—	—	—	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٧
1948	207	62	145*	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٨
1949	207	62	145	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٩
1950	212	61	151	196	61	5	130	180	١٩٥٠
1951	212	61	151	199	64	5	130	200	١٩٥١
1952	224	64	160	204	64	5	135	215	١٩٥٢
1953	220	64	156	205	65	5	135	217	١٩٥٣

* Corrected figure

(*) ارقام معدلة

عدد البرقيات الداخلية والخارجية ، ١٩٤٤ — ١٩٥٣

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NUMBER OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TELEGRAMS, 1944 — 1953

Table No. 15

جدول رقم ١٥

Year	البرقيات الداخلية Internal telegrams: الصادرة Outgoing: عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	البرقيات الخارجية External telegrams: الصادرة Outgoing: عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	الواردة Incoming: عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	البرقيات الخارجية المتوسطة Intermediary telegr.: عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	السنة
1944	77,760	2,360	26,620	650	31,440	720	22,810	280	١٩٤٤
1945	105,070	1,726	28,000	710	34,100	730	24,260	310	١٩٤٥
1946	163,380	3,448	35,000	922	37,200	818	25,700	398	١٩٤٦
1947	373,700	5,213	92,300	1,312	81,120	1,098	60,000	510	١٩٤٧
1948	394,522	5,701	131,047	1,922	91,141	1,378	71,460	691	١٩٤٨
1949	401,710	5,932	132,978	1,931	100,976	1,473	92,550	771	١٩٤٩
1950	175,224	3,248	89,124	2,045	91,952	1,846	38,460	684	١٩٥٠
1951	242,000	7,000	147,000	2,100	122,000	1,700	110,000	900	١٩٥١
1952	192,330	3,270	132,000	5,300	150,620	2,970	90,000	3,100	١٩٥٢
1953	138,620	1,115	157,560	5,980	163,850	3,215	105,360	3,650	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Puplic Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

حركة المعاملات الداخلية البريدية العادية والمسجلة ، ١٩٤٣ — ١٩٥٣

(العدد بالآلاف)

INTERNAL POSTAL STATISTICS, 1943 — 1953.

(Number in thousands)

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

Year	التحارير Letters	البطاقات البريدية Post cards	اوراق المصالح Service papers	المطبوعات Printed matter	العينات Samples	الصرر الصغيرة Small packets	المراسلات المعفاة من الاجور والتحارير الرسمية Official mail & mail free of stamp duties	المواد المسجلة (من اصل المجموع) Registered post (Included in Previous Column)	السنة
1943	989	41	9	3,883	16	—	814	306	١٩٤٣
1944	1,012	45	26	4,006	20	—	851	313	١٩٤٤
1945	1,139	49	32	4,024	21	—	885	342	١٩٤٥
1946	1,147	64	25	4,105	27	—	893	479	١٩٤٦
1947	1,211	76	32	4,141	31	—	902	482	١٩٤٧
1948	1,276	81	36	4,326	38	—	905	493	١٩٤٨
1949	1,227	79	35	4,500	40	—	1,014	485	١٩٤٩
1950	1,236	81	37	4,630	45	—	1,102	491	١٩٥٠
1951	1,312	77	40	4,917	52	—	1,114	491	١٩٥١
1952	1,430	78	40	4,500	60	90	1,200	550	١٩٥٢
1953	1,450	80	41	4,555	62	95	1,200	560	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Public Works.

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

والرسائل

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حركة المعاملات الخارجية البريدية العادية والمسجلة ، ١٩٤٣ — ١٩٥٣
(العدد بالالوف)

EXTERNAL POSTAL STATISTICS, 1943 — 1953
(Number in thousands)

Table No. 17 — جدول رقم ١٧

Year	التحارير Letters	البطاقات البريدية Post cards	اوراق المصالح Service papers	المطبوعات Printed matter	العينات Samples	الصرر الصغيرة Small packets	المراسلات المعفاة من الاجور والتحارير الرسمية Official mail & mail free of stamp duties	المواد المسجلة (من اصل المجموع) Registered post (included in previous columns)	السنة
1943 — Despatched	489	25	40	257	4	3	5	79	١٩٤٣ — صادر
— Received	562	20	70	495	5	44	6	85	— وارد
1944 — Despatched	594	29	7	306	6	3	8	94	١٩٤٤ — صادر
— Received	684	20	10	562	7	83	10	102	— وارد
1945 — Despatched	637	32	11	321	5	3	11	103	١٩٤٥ — صادر
— Received	879	23	10	627	9	89	12	133	— وارد
1946 — Despatched	746	38	12	401	19	5	11	138	١٩٤٦ — صادر
— Received	913	24	15	834	22	90	10	211	— وارد
1947 — Despatched	812	36	16	412	24	5	10	182	١٩٤٧ — صادر
— Received	944	32	26	882	36	91	11	219	— وارد
1948 — Despatched	851	38	18	451	33	11	12	161	١٩٤٨ — صادر
— Received	1,005	35	26	906	40	86	13	223	— وارد
1949 — Despatched	902	36	21	469	36	13	12	170	١٩٤٩ — صادر
— Received	1,045	40	31	954	52	91	13	249	— وارد
1950 — Despatched	1,006	39	20	478	42	15	14	174	١٩٥٠ — صادر
— Received	1,051	41	32	963	67	99	14	258	— وارد
1951 — Despatched	1,081	46	21	471	51	19	14	179	١٩٥١ — صادر
— Received	1,124	52	30	980	77	86	15	272	— وارد
1952 — Despatched	1,130	48	32	425	57	30	22	190	١٩٥٢ — صادر
— Received	1,140	54	40	980	90	93	24	275	— وارد
1953 — Despatched	1,140	490	33	426	58	32	24	192	١٩٥٣ — صادر
— Received	1,150	560	40	952	91	95	25	276	— وارد

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

النقل والمواصلات

حركة معاملات الطرود البريدية العادية والمؤمنة (الداخلية والخارجية) ١٩٤٥ — ١٩٥٣

(العدد بالالوف)

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PARCEL POST—INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, 1945—1953
(Number in thousands)

Table No. 18 — جدول رقم ١٨

Year	عدد الطرود العادية Ordinary parcels	الطرود المؤمنة Insured parcels		الطرود المشروطة العادية Parcels of conditional delivery		السنة
		العدد No.	القيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	القيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	
Internal parcel post الطرود البريدية الداخلية						
1945	3,840	1,580	1,107,110	470	70,150	١٩٤٥
1946	3,890	1,470	1,596,760	630	387,470	١٩٤٦
1947	3,100	880	105,886	460	77,170	١٩٤٧
1948	3,623	665	3,199,005	375	787,175	١٩٤٨
1949	3,674	1,248	4,067,132	385	941,955	١٩٤٩
1950	3,172	1,502	301,242	391	71,857	١٩٥٠
1951	3,686	1,141	111,532	352	35,120	١٩٥١
1952	3,055	961	241,430	391	31,140	١٩٥٢
1953	3,906	1,057	148,541	445	62,436	١٩٥٣
External parcel post الطرود البريدية الخارجية						
1945 — Despatched	4,000	390	386,570	200	422,360	١٩٤٥ — صادر
— Received	9,720	290	55,060	80	20,660	— وارد
1946 — Despatched	9,400	410	191,660	130	32,200	١٩٤٦ — صادر
— Received	26,200	620	119,700	180	98,000	— وارد
1947 — Despatched	16,350	410	23,450	190	15,050	١٩٤٧ — صادر
— Received	19,160	440	43,610	230	30,450	— وارد
1948 — Despatched	10,250	275	67,520	65	17,210	١٩٤٨ — صادر
— Received	12,735	135	85,230	49	32,210	— وارد
1949 — Despatched	13,333	510	90,210	103	20,030	١٩٤٩ — صادر
— Received	15,510	335	115,470	87	31,150	— وارد
1950 — Despatched	8,291	7	175	—	—	١٩٥٠ — صادر
— Received	31,732	872	8,203	4	931	— وارد
1951 — Despatched	7,464	—	—	—	—	١٩٥١ — صادر
— Received	36,646	823	43,495	2	724	— وارد
1952 — Despatched	10,204	6	3,250	—	—	١٩٥٢ — صادر
— Received	44,160	1,557	75,555	—	—	— وارد
1953 — Despatched	15,659	26	50,250	—	—	١٩٥٣ — صادر
— Received	53,024	1,966	712,463	—	—	— وارد

Source : Ministry of Pupile Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

COMMUNICATIONS

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عدد وقيمة الحوالات البريدية والبرقية (الداخلية والخارجية) ، ١٩٥٢ — ١٩٥٣

(باستثناء الحوالات السورية اللبنانية)

NUMBER AND VALUE OF POSTAL AND TELEGRAPHIC MONEY-ORDER
(Except Syrian Lebanese orders)

Table No. 19 — جدول رقم ١٩

Year	الحوالات البريدية والبرقية الداخلية Internal postal and telegraphic orders				الحوالات البريدية والبرقية الخارجية External postal and telegraphic orders				السنة
	الحوالات المسحوبة Orders drawn		الحوالات المدفوعة Orders paid		الحوالات المسحوبة Orders drawn		الحوالات المدفوعة Orders paid		
	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	
1944	52,377	16,721,816	52,095	16,695,615	1,369	22,991	3,179	140,010	١٩٤٤
1945	54,604	19,033,869	54,351	19,033,074	4,282	83,400	3,180	132,537	١٩٤٥
1946	79,984	25,283,942	77,631	25,209,943	5,255	101,871	3,423	174,536	١٩٤٦
1947	89,856	22,856,088	78,262	22,802,589	5,300	134,547	2,900	128,941	١٩٤٧
1948	94,342	30,480,117	94,108	30,536,095	696	14,137	400	34,503	١٩٤٨
1949	102,997	28,223,387	101,571	28,199,327	—	—	259	1,903,880	١٩٤٩
1951/52 (2)	173,813	49,445,442	166,085	48,962,901	—	—	175	7,865	(١)٥١/١٩٥٠
1950/51 (1)	182,364	52,896,949	181,972	52,827,579	—	—	174	7,600	(٢)٥٢/١٩٥١
1953	140,314	49,158,123	138,548	49,040,153	—	—	84	4,728	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Public Works.

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

(1) Fiscal period 1/1/1950 — 30/6/1951.
(2) Fiscal period 1/7/1951 — 31/12/1952.

(١) في الدورة المالية ١/١/١٩٥٠ — ٣٠/٦/١٩٥١
(٢) في الدورة المالية ١/٧/١٩٥١ — ٣١/١٢/١٩٥٢

17: Syria G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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الفصل الثامن
المالية

CHAPTER EIGHT
FINANCE

p.179

واردات ونفقات الحكومة ١٩٣١ — ١٩٥٤
(بالف الليرات السورية)

GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 1931 — 1954.
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Year	نسبة الواردات الفعلية الى التقديرية Ratio of actual Revenue to estimates	الواردات التقديرية Revenue estimates	الواردات الفعلية Actual revenue	نسبة النفقات الفعلية الى التقديرية ٪ Ratio of actual Expenditure to estimates ٪	النفقات التقديرية Expenditure estimates	النفقات الفعلية Actual Expenditure	الوفر (+) العجز (—) Surplus deficit	السنة
1931	100,1	10,169	10,176	98,4	10,169	10,022	(+) 147	١٩٣١
1932	91,4	9,247	8,454	91.4	9,247	8,453	(+) 1	١٩٣٢
1933	80,2	8,465	6,787	83,9	8,465	7,103	(—) 316	١٩٣٣
1934	95	6,932	6,584	96,4	6,932	6,684	(—) 100	١٩٣٤
1935	95,4	7,232	6,902	94,7	7,232	6,851	(+) 51	١٩٣٥
1936	89,4	7,532	6,661	89,9	7,532	6,773	(—) 112	١٩٣٦
1937 (1)	100,3	9,638	9,665	90,7	9,638	8,747	(+) 918	١٩٣٧ (١)
1938	91,3	12,587	11,490	87,7	12,584	11,041	(+) 450	١٩٣٨
1939	103,8	12,996	13,484	94,8	12,996	21,323	(+) 1,161	١٩٣٩
1940	129,5	13,613	18,880	112,1	13,613	15,287	(+) 3,733	١٩٤٠
1941	106,4	15,614	16,617	90,4	15,614	14,127	(+) 2,490	١٩٤١
1942	116,5	25,786	30,050	98,7	25,786	25,450	(+) 4,591	١٩٤٢
1943	119,4	46,129	55,095	83	46,129	38,301	(+) 16,794	١٩٤٣
1944	119,2	65,584	78,173	89,1	65,584	64,993	(+) 13,180	١٩٤٤
1945	105,5	121,669	128,320	87,9	121,669	106,967	(+) 21,353	١٩٤٥
1946	97,7	132,722	129,666	84,8	132,722	112,545	(+) 17,121	١٩٤٦
1947	99	130,148	128,841	94,7	130,148	123,232	(+) 5,609	١٩٤٧
1948	87	141,837	123,402	96,1	141,837	136,287	(—) 12,885	١٩٤٨
1949	99,6	153,071	152,397	92,3	153,071	141,120	(+) 11,277	١٩٤٩
1950—51	96,9	249,730	246,886	94	249,730	234,841	(+) 12,054	٥١/١٩٥٠
1951—52 (2)	102,1	290,615	296,759	91,4	290,615	265,642	(+) 31,147	(٢)٥٢/١٩٥١
1953 (2)	103,7	207,982	215,725	94,9	207,982	197,390	(+) 18,335	١٩٥٣ (٢)
1954	—	208,000	—	—	208,000	—	—	١٩٥٤

(1) — As from 1937 revenue and expenditure is in respect of the whole Syrian Republic, including the Mohafazat of Sweida and Alawites.

(2) — Approximate actual revenue and expenditure together with the surplus or deficit.

(١) اعتبارا من ١٩٣٧ اصبحت الواردات والنفقات لكافة الجمهورية السورية بما فيها محافظتي السويداء والعلويين .

(٢) تعتبر النفقات والواردات الفعلية والفرق بصورة تقريبية .

المالية

واردات الحكومة ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥٤ ، تقديرات الموازنة

(بالوف الليرات السورية)

GOVERNMENT REVENUE, 1950/51 — 1954

(Budget Estimates)

(L.S. '000)

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Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

Item of Revenue	(1) 1950/51 (١) ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١	(2) 1951/52 (٢) ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٤ 1954	النوع
Total revenue	215,720	265,000	207,992	208,000	مجموع الواردات
Direct taxation and duties	27,312	46,215	37,675	33,800	ضرائب المباشرة والرسوم المماثلة لها
Indirect taxation and duties	125,778	151,338	114,554	119,591	الرسوم والضرائب غير المباشرة
Registration fees	16,800	22,124	18,610	21,000	الرسوم التسجيلية
Income from Government property	6,360	6,490	5,730	5,800	حاصلات املاك الدولة
Income from investments in industries	713	788	375	800	حاصلات الاستثمار الصناعي
Miscellaneous revenue and revenue from public services	31,902	31,048	17,089	20,151	ايرادات مختلفة وواردات المصالح العامة
Receipts in attention to expenditure	975	950	857	857	ايرادات مخصصة للنفقات
Extra-ordinary revenue	4,880	6,047	13,102	6,001	ايرادات استثنائية

Source : Ministry of Finance.

المصدر : وزارة المالية

1 — For the period 1st January 1950 — 30 June 1951

١) للمدة الواقعة بين ١ كانون ثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١

2 — For the period 1st July 1951 — 31 Dec. 1952

٢) للمدة الواقعة بين ١ تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

اهم واردات الحكومة من مختلف الضرائب والرسوم ، ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ - ١٩٥٤
حسب تقديرات الموازنة (بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM TAXES AND FEES, 1950/51 — 1954
Budget Estimates
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 3 — جدول رقم ٣

TAXES AND FEES	(١)١٩٥٠/٥١ 1950/51 (1)	(٢)١٩٥١/٥٢ 1951/52 (2)	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٤ 1954	الضرائب والرسوم
Total	170,890	219,677	160,589	164,924	المجموع
Tax on income from house property	6,000	3,600	4,500	5,000	ضريبة ريع العقارات
Tax on land property	150	500	400	500	ضريبة العرصات والاراضي
Tax on trades and industries	6,500	11,500	15,000	9,750	ضريبة المهن والحرف الصناعية والتجارية وغير التجارية
Tax on salaries and wages	3,450	4,500	3,500	3,400	ضريبة الرواتب والاجور
Tax on capital funds in circulation	165	150	200	200	ضريبة دخل رؤوس الاموال المتداولة
« Tamatu' » tax	3,000	4,080	2,400	2,975	ضريبة التمتع
Animal tax	6,000	13,400	9,000	9,000	ضريبة المواشي
Tithe	75	75	50	50	ضريبة الاعشار
Passage and personal tax	195	265	100	100	ضريبة بدل الطريق والرسم الشخصي
Mineral tax	37	37	25	25	ضريبة المعادن
Security tax	1,312	3,000	1,500	2,000	ضريبة الحراسة
Registration of property tax	75	125	200	200	ضريبة التسجيل العقاري
Fees on lands irrigated by the Government network	113	362	400	500	رسوم على الاراضي المسقاة بشبكات الري الحكومية
Fees on transfer for movable property	200	200	100	100	رسوم انتقال على الاموال المنقولة
Duties on fuel	18,750	20,000	12,500	15,000	ضريبة المواد المشتعلة
Duties on alcoholic drinks	1,200	1,200	1,300	1,300	ضريبة المسكرات
Duties on sugar	15,000	15,000	7,759	8,000	ضريبة حاصلات حصر السكر
Duties on salt	—	—	2,750	2,900	ضريبة حاصلات الملح

1 — Period 1st January, 1950 — 30th June 1951.
2 — Period 1st July, 1951 — 31st December, 1952.

(١) المدة الواقعة بين ١ كانون ثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١
(٢) المدة الواقعة بين ١ تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

اهم واردات الحكومة من مختلف الضرائب والرسوم ، ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ – ١٩٥٤
حسب تقديرات الموازنة (بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM TAXES AND FEES, 1950/51 — 1954.
Budget Estimates
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 3 (concld.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

TAXES AND FEES	١٩٥٠/٥١ (١) 1950/51 (1)	١٩٥١/٥٢ (٢) 1951/52 (2)	1953	1954	الضرائب والرسوم
Duties on tobacco and tombac	22,500	22,000	16,500	19,000	واردات حصر التبغ والتنباك
Duties on cement consumption	1,800	3,600	2,400	3,000	رسم الاستهلاك على الاسمنت
Duties on entertainments	600	750	100	410	رسم الملاهي
Duties on game shooting, fishing and boat sailing	38	38	45	40	رسم الصيد البري والبحري والسفن
Tax on agricultural production	21,300	32,750	23,000	22,000	ضريبة الانتاج الزراعي
Revenue from the «Common Interests» (Customs)	45,500	56,000	37,650	38,465	واردات المصالح المشتركة (الجمارك)
Judicial fees	2,025	2,175	1,710	2,000	الرسوم القضائية
Fees on the Notary Public	375	525	400	400	رسوم كتاب العدل
Fees on sale, transfer and registration of property	4,050	5,000	4,000	4,100	رسوم الفراغ والانتقال والتسجيل العقاري
Stamp duties	6,375	8,449	7,000	7,500	رسوم الطوابع
Receipts from motor vehicle traffic control	1,800	2,750	2,750	2,750	حاصلات مراقبة سير السيارات
Army stamp duty on electricity consumption	975	1,175	1,000	1,200	رسم الجيش على كشوف مقطوعية القوة الكهربائية
Revenue from General Security Offices	375	375	400	500	حاصلات الامن العام
Consular fees	450	1,000	850	1,800	حاصلات القنصليات
Receipts from foreign trade permits	375	675	500	700	حاصلات تصاريح التجارة الخارجية

Source : Ministry of Finance
1 — Period 1st January, 1950 — 30th June, 1951
2 — Period 1st July, 1951 — 31st December, 1952.

المصدر : وزارة المالية
(١) المدة الواقعة بين ١ كانون ثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١
(٢) المدة الواقعة بين ١ تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

FINANCE

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نفقات الحكومة موزعة حسب الابواب الرئيسية ، ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ - ١٩٥٤
(تقديرات الموازنة (بالوف الليرات السورية)

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BY MAIN ITEMS, 1950/1951 — 1954
Budget Estimates
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 4 — جدول رقم ٤

ITEMS OF EXPENDITURE	(٣)١٩٥٠/٥١ 1950/51 (3)	(٤)١٩٥١/٥٢ 1951/52 (4)	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٤ 1954	ابواب النفقات
Total expenditure	215,720	265,000	207,991	208,000	مجموع النفقات
Presidency of the Republic	322	403	(6) 2,997	(6) 2,584	رئاسة الجمهورية
Parliament	(2)2,638	(2)2,400	1,000	1,500	مجلس النواب
Account Office.	—	—	430	400	ديوان المحاسبات
Presidency of the Council of Ministers	1,678	2,502	—	—	رئاسة مجلس الوزراء
Religious edict and teaching	548	624	455	444	الفتوى والتدريس الديني
The Directorate-General of propaganda and News	207	237	392	441	المديرية العامة للدعاية والانباء
Legislative Council	67	—	—	—	مجلس الشورى
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3,716	4,531	4,530	4,303	وزارة الشؤون الخارجية
Ministry of National Defence	91,323	108,076	77,357	*73,540	وزارة الدفاع الوطني
Public debt	15,215	27,343	13,480	20,700	الدين العام
Ministry of Finance	8,113	10,370	9,253	8,572	وزارة المالية
Ministry of the Interior	3,045	3,669	2,705	2,237	وزارة الداخلية
Gendarms (5)	17,426	16,313	9,670	9,387	الدرك (٥)
Police	7,479	8,390	6,900	5,865	الشرطة
Ministry of Health	6,175	8,640	9,376	8,764	وزارة الصحة
Ministry of Justice	5,807	6,363	4,880	4,673	وزارة العدلية
Registration of real estate	2,285	2,669	3,250	2,749	المصالح العقارية
Ministry of National Economy	1,407	1,876	1,660	1,527	وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني
Ministry of Agriculture	5,229	5,567	6,288	5,781	وزارة الزراعة
Ministry of Public Works	17,392	20,974	17,446	17,243	وزارة الاشغال العامة
Ministry of Education	38,783	49,769	36,804	37,097	وزارة المعارف
Reserves	4,116	187		25	اعتمادات احتياطية
Miscellaneous (1)	175	410	—	168	مختلفة (١)
	—	—	—	—	المحكمة العليا

Source : Ministry of Finance.

1 — Including expenditure of the High Court, Civil Service and the Audit Office

2 — Including expenditure of the Accounts Office.

3 — Covering the period January, 1950 — June 1951

4 — Covering the period July, 1951 - December, 1952

5 — As from 1950 the budget of the gendarm force was merged with the budget of the Ministry of National Defence.

6 — As from 1953 the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers has been merged with the budget of the Presidency of the Republic.

المصدر : وزارة المالية

(١) تشمل نفقات المحكمة العليا ومجلس التاديب ومكتب تفتيش الدولة .

(٢) بما فيها نفقات ديوان المحاسبات .

(٣) تشمل المدة الواقعة ما بين كانون ثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١

(٤) تشمل المدة الواقعة ما بين تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

(٥) اعتبارا من سنة ١٩٥٠ ادمجت موازنة الدرك مع موازنة وزارة الدفاع الوطني .

(٦) اعتبارا من سنة ١٩٥٣ ادمجت ميزانية رئاسة الوزراء مع رئاسة الجمهورية

النقد المتداول في الجمهورية السورية
(بالوف الليرات السورية)

CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION (L.S. '000)

Table No. 5

جدول رقم (٥)

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As at the end of	المجموع Total	اوراق النقد المصرفية Bank notes	قطع فضية Silver coins	قطع معدنية Metal coins	الطوابع النقدية (الطوابع) Money stamp	في نهاية
December 1941	48,206	46,350	1,540	316	—	كانون اول ١٩٤١
« 1942	100,486	98,000	1,540	339	607	« ١٩٤٢
« 1943	165,575	161,750	1,540	339	1,946	« ١٩٤٣
« 1944	204,136	197,750	1,540	339	4,507	« ١٩٤٤
« 1945	210,683	205,250	1,540	339	3,554	« ١٩٤٥
« 1946	202,476	198,000	1,540	444	2,492	« ١٩٤٦
« 1947	183,206	179,500	1,540	444	1,722	« ١٩٤٧
« 1948	238,029	232,500	3,950	445	1,134	« ١٩٤٨
« 1949	242,056	236,500	4,040	1,518	—	« ١٩٤٩
« 1950	224,558	215,000	8,040	1,518	—	« ١٩٥٠
« 1951	257,275	248,000	7,790	1,485	—	« ١٩٥١
« 1952	250,422	239,000	9,938	1,484	—	« ١٩٥٢
« 1953	288,432	277,000	9,938	1,485	—	« ١٩٥٣
1952						١٩٥٢
January	258,473	249,000	7,988	1,485	—	كانون الثاني
February	255,773	246,000	8,288	1,485	—	شباط
March	253,073	243,000	8,588	1,485	—	آذار
April	253,079	243,000	8,588	1,485	—	نيسان
May	245,493	235,000	9,008	1,485	—	ايار
June	245,993	235,500	9,008	1,485	—	حزيران
July	242,993	232,000	9,008	1,485	—	تموز
August	237,843	227,000	9,358	1,485	—	آب
September	240,343	229,500	9,358	1,485	—	ايلول
October	240,342	229,500	9,358	1,484	—	تشرين اول
November	245,842	235,000	9,358	1,484	—	تشرين الثاني
December	250,422	239,000	9,358	1,484	—	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	250,423	239,000	9,358	1,485	—	كانون الثاني
February	258,423	247,000	9,358	1,485	—	شباط
March	251,423	240,000	9,358	1,485	—	آذار
April	253,423	242,000	9,358	1,485	—	نيسان
May	263,423	252,000	9,358	1,485	—	ايار
June	263,423	252,000	9,358	1,485	—	حزيران
July	258,423	247,000	9,358	1,485	—	تموز
August	257,423	246,000	9,358	1,485	—	آب
September	257,423	246,000	9,358	1,485	—	ايلول
October	278,423	267,000	9,358	1,485	—	تشرين اول
November	291,423	280,000	9,358	1,485	—	تشرين الثاني
December	288,423	277,000	9,358	1,485	—	كانون اول

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تقلبات اسعار العملة الذهبية في اسواق مدينة دمشق
(بالليرات السورية)

FLUCTUATIONS IN TI E PRICE OF GOLD SOVEREIGNS AT DAMASCUS
(In Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 6 — جدول رقم ٦

Monthly Average	سعر الليرة الانكليزية English Sovereign		سعر الليرة العثمانية الرشادية مكية New Turkish Sovereign		سعر الليرة العثمانية التجارية Old Turkish Sovereign		العدل الشهري
	شراء Purchases	مبيع Sales	شراء Purchases	مبيع Sales	شراء Purchases	مبيع Sales	
1951							**١٩٥١**
January	43,53	43,57	36,69	36,73	32,19	32,23	كانون ثاني
February	42,65	42,69	36,31	36,35	31,54	31,58	شباط
March	42,12	42,17	34,84	34,88	31,23	31,27	آذار
April	42,69	42,72	35,08	35,10	31,18	31,25	نيسان
May	43,16	43,19	35,00	35,06	31,09	31,14	ايار
June	44,14	44,19	34,77	34,82	31,11	31,16	حزيران
July	43,03	43,07	34,66	34,70	30,79	30,83	تموز
August	43,48	43,52	34,35	34,39	30,73	30,77	آب
September	43,76	43,81	35,18	35,25	30,82	30,87	ايلول
October	44,14	44,19	35,57	35,61	30,93	30,97	تشرين اول
November	45,05	45,10	36,45	36,50	31,59	31,64	تشرين ثاني
December	45,14	45,17	36,24	36,29	31,59	31,64	كانون اول
1952							**١٩٥٢**
January	45,33	45,38	36,30	36,34	31,66	31,70	كانون ثاني
February	45,38	45,45	36,37	36,42	31,92	31,97	شباط
March	45,36	45,42	36,29	36,35	31,85	31,90	آذار
April	44,19	44,25	35,43	35,48	31,45	31,50	نيسان
May	44,39	44,45	34,02	34,07	31,16	31,20	ايار
June	43,44	43,50	33,89	33,95	30,96	31,00	حزيران
July	42,12	42,18	33,25	33,30	30,37	30,42	تموز
August	42,28	42,75	33,32	33,37	30,30	30,35	آب
September	41,92	42,00	33,34	33,40	29,86	29,90	ايلول
October	41,08	41,14	33,50	33,55	29,96	30,00	تشرين اول
November	40,66	40,72	33,77	33,82	29,93	29,97	تشرين ثاني
December	40,83	40,90	34,15	34,22	29,88	29,95	كانون اول
1953							**١٩٥٣**
January	40,75	40,76	34,45	34,55	30,17	30,26	كانون ثاني
February	40,03	40,13	34,56	34,66	29,98	30,08	شباط
March	39,52	39,61	34,45	34,58	29,77	29,87	آذار
April	38,59	38,69	33,95	34,06	29,70	29,80	نيسان
May	37,43	37,53	32,97	33,07	29,17	29,25	ايار
June	37,15	37,26	32,30	32,40	29,00	29,10	حزيران
July	35,95	36,20	31,23	31,25	27,53	28,10	تموز
August	35,47	35,65	31,61	31,66	28,02	28,10	آب
September	34,69	34,79	31,28	31,38	27,54	27,64	ايلول
October	33,85	33,95	31,69	31,19	27,38	27,48	تشرين اول
November	33,97	34,05	31,30	31,40	27,36	27,46	تشرين ثاني
December	33,79	33,98	31,43	31,53	27,16	27,26	كانون اول

الودائع (تحت الطلب ولاجل معين) والنقد في الصندوق وفي المصارف الاخرى لاهم المصارف العاملة في الجمهورية السورية
(بالوف الليرات)

DEMAND DEPOSITS AND TIME DEPOSITS CASH IN HAND AND CASH AT BANKERS
FOR THE PRINCIPAL BANKS OPERATING IN SYRIA
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

As at the end of	Deposits الودائع: الجموع Total	تحت الطلب Demand deposits	لاجل معين Time deposits	النقد في الصندوق وفي المصارف الاخرى Cash in hand and at bankers	في نهاية
1951					**١٩٥١**
January	175,002	168,527	6,475	18,976	كانون الثاني
February	169,934	163,265	6,669	21,580	شباط
March	156,469	149,756	6,713	23,123	آذار
April	169,589	153,140	6,448	23,907	نيسان
May	158,845	151,528	7,317	26,674	ايار
June	165,463	157,931	7,532	27,800	حزيران
July	183,573	174,683	8,890	48,465	تموز
August	200,294	190,340	9,954	60,456	آب
September	195,039	184,218	10,821	48,213	ايلول
October	183,889	172,754	11,135	27,181	تشرين اول
November	200,532	187,553	12,979	29,770	تشرين الثاني
December	198,391	185,176	13,215	33,196	كانون اول
1952					**١٩٥٢**
January	202,966	193,670	9,296	28,270	كانون الثاني
February	205,645	175,221	30,424	33,648	شباط
March	220,073	189,914	30,159	40,581	آذار
April	223,991	188,523	35,468	43,514	نيسان
May	201,131	168,646	32,485	36,343	ايار
June	206,303	171,815	34,488	41,930	حزيران
July	215,096	180,511	34,585	37,192	تموز
August	221,809	193,935	27,874	29,081	آب
September	227,194	196,562	30,632	36,430	ايلول
October	223,594	193,012	30,582	34,829	تشرين اول
November	226,951	193,062	33,889	34,782	تشرين الثاني
December	241,955	198,617	43,338	45,017	كانون اول
1953					**١٩٥٣**
January	234,723	200,165	34,558	40,479	كانون الثاني
February	235,884	200,772	35,112	39,624	شباط
March	236,618	204,782	31,836	33,960	آذار
April	238,440	223,835	14,405	39,393	نيسان
May	227,550	211,542	16,008	28,969	ايار
June	231,156	210,916	20,240	34,951	حزيران
July	265,406	251,200	13,606	37,098	تموز
August	276,846	263,543	13,303	41,522	آب
September	278,647	263,787	14,860	36,525	ايلول
October	276,346	245,551	30,795	47,008	تشرين اول
November	289,878	263,260	26,618	37,987	تشرين الثاني
December	292,478	265,244	27,504	43,604	كانون اول

FINANCE

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السلفات (الخاصة بالاستيراد والعامة) والسندات المحسومة لاهم المصارف العاملة في الجمهورية السورية
(بالوف الليرات)

ADVANCES AND BILLS DISCOUNTED FOR THE PRINCIPAL BANKS OPERATING IN SYRIA
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 — جدول رقم ٨

As at the end of	مجموع السندات المحسومة والسلفات Bills discounted and advances	السندات المحسومة Bills discounted	Advances السلفات			في نهاية
			المجموع Total	الخاصة بالاستيراد For imports	العام General	
1951						١٩٥١
January	104,635	30,275	71,360	10,737	63,625	كانون الثاني
February	106,452	33,194	73,258	13,888	59,370	شباط
March	99,403	32,924	66,479	13,501	52,978	آذار
April	101,201	30,512	70,689	11,028	59,661	نيسان
May	104,536	30,491	74,045	10,541	63,504	أيار
June	107,438	29,160	78,278	9,463	68,815	حزيران
July	104,865	24,787	80,078	9,975	70,103	تموز
August	108,600	30,438	78,162	8,059	70,103	آب
September	121,837	30,551	91,286	7,362	83,924	أيلول
October	141,036	34,678	106,358	8,790	97,568	تشرين اول
November	154,711	43,237	111,434	8,349	103,125	تشرين الثاني
December	142,852	33,650	109,202	8,322	100,880	كانون اول
1952						١٩٥٢
January	146,933	31,138	115,795	9,638	106,157	كانون الثاني
February	149,211	32,239	116,972	11,664	105,308	شباط
March	160,571	33,555	127,016	11,932	115,084	آذار
April	162,399	33,884	128,515	10,211	118,304	نيسان
May	146,295	37,003	139,292	7,964	131,328	أيار
June	176,936	37,448	139,488	6,901	132,587	حزيران
July	185,987	34,570	151,417	7,922	143,495	تموز
August	165,550	34,199	134,351	8,031	126,320	آب
September	203,160	33,382	169,778	7,411	162,367	أيلول
October	211,343	34,927	176,416	8,149	168,236	تشرين اول
November	216,436	35,782	180,654	9,655	170,999	تشرين الثاني
December	214,187	34,633	179,554	8,688	170,866	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	223,892	33,600	190,292	10,201	180,091	كانون الثاني
February	217,908	32,929	184,979	11,588	173,391	شباط
March	228,347	35,219	193,128	11,360	181,768	آذار
April	239,126	42,039	197,097	7,082	190,005	نيسان
May	229,147	48,380	180,767	10,285	140,482	أيار
June	248,466	54,250	194,216	7,734	186,482	حزيران
July	197,223	64,751	132,472	—	—	تموز
August	199,526	63,431	136,093	—	—	آب
September	216,037	66,877	149,160	—	—	أيلول
October	234,352	65,873	168,479	—	—	تشرين اول
November	237,193	66,910	170,283	—	—	تشرين الثاني
December	218,994	74,026	144,368	—	—	كانون اول

Source: Credit and Currency Board — المصدر : مجلس النقد والتسليف

الثانية

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نسبة مجموع السندات المحسومة والسلفات الى مجموع الودائع ونسبة مجموع السلفات الى مجموع الودائع

(المبالغ بالوف الليرات السورية)

RATIO OF TOTAL BILLS DISCOUNTED AND ADVANCES TO TOTAL DEPOSITS AND RATIO OF ADVANCES TO DEPOSITS

Table No. 9 (Amounts in L.S. '000) جدول رقم ٩

As at the end of	مجموع السندات المحسومة والسلفات Total bills discounted and advances	مجموع السلفات الخاصة والعامة Advances	مجموع الودائع Total Deposits	السندات المحسومة والسلفات الى الودائع ٪ Advances and b/d to deposits %	مجموع السندات الى الودائع ٪ Ratio of abvances to deposit %	في نهاية
1951						١٩٥١
January	104,636	74,360	175,002	59,8	42,5	كانون الثاني
February	106,452	73,258	169,934	62,6	43,1	شباط
March	99,403	66,479	156,469	63,5	42,5	آذار
April	101,201	70,689	159,589	63,4	44,3	نيسان
May	104,536	74,045	158,845	65,8	46,6	أيار
June	107,438	78,278	165,463	64,9	47,3	حزيران
July	104,865	80,078	183,573	57,1	43,6	تموز
August	108,600	78,162	200,294	54,2	39,0	آب
September	121,837	91,286	195,039	62,5	46,8	أيلول
October	141,036	106,358	183,889	76,7	57,8	تشرين اول
November	154,711	111,474	200,532	77,2	55,6	تشرين الثاني
December	142,852	109,202	198,391	72,0	55,0	كانون اول
1952						١٩٥٢
January	146,933	115,795	202,966	72,4	57,1	كانون الثاني
February	149,211	116,972	205,645	72,6	56,9	شباط
March	160,571	127,016	220,073	73,0	57,7	آذار
April	162,399	128,515	223,991	72,5	57,4	نيسان
May	176,295	139,292	201,131	87,7	69,3	أيار
June	176,936	139,488	206,303	85,8	67,6	حزيران
July	185,987	151,417	215,096	86,5	70,4	تموز
August	168,550	134,351	221,809	76,0	60,6	آب
September	203,160	169,778	227,194	89,4	74,7	أيلول
October	211,343	176,416	223,594	94,6	78,9	تشرين اول
November	216,436	180,654	226,951	95,4	79,6	تشرين الثاني
December	214,187	179,554	241,955	88,5	74,2	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	223,892	190,292	234,723	95,4	81,0	كانون الثاني
February	217,908	184,979	235,884	92,4	78,4	شباط
March	228,347	193,128	236,618	96,5	81,6	آذار
April	239,126	197,087	238,440	100,3	82,7	نيسان
May	229,147	180,767	227,550	100,7	79,4	أيار
June	248,466	194,218	231,156	107,5	84,0	حزيران
July	197,223	132,472	265,406	74,3	49,9	تموز
August	199,526	136,095	276,846	72,0	49,2	آب
September	216,037	149,160	278,647	77,5	53,5	أيلول
October	234,352	168,479	276,346	84,8	61,0	تشرين اول
November	237,193	170,283	289,878	81,8	58,7	تشرين الثاني
December	218,994	144,368	292,748	74,8	49,3	كانون اول

Source : Credit and Currency Board. المصدر : مجلس النقد والتسليف

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عدد وقيمة القروض التي تسلفها المصرف الزراعي السوري ١٩٤٩ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER AND VALUE OF LOANS ADVANCED BY THE AGRICULTURAL BANK, 1949 — 1953.

Table No. 10 — جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat	Year	مجموع القروض Total loans: العدد No.	مجموع القروض Total loans: المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans: العدد No.	قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans: المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans: العدد No.	قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans: المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	السنة	المحافظة
Total	1949	9,398	3,208	9,116	1,818	282	1,390	١٩٤٩	المجموع
	1950	3,930	6,942	—	—	3,930	6,942	١٩٥٠	
	1951	6,456	10,551	—	—	6,456	10,551	١٩٥١	
	1952	24,374	14,327	19,847	10,640	4,527	3,687	١٩٥٢	"
	1953	20,325	12,466	15,403	8,318	4,922	4,148	١٩٥٣	
Damascus	1949	1,326	648	1,254	258	72	390	١٩٤٩	دمشق
	1950	814	1,080	—	—	814	1,080	١٩٥٠	
	1951	936	762	—	—	936	762	١٩٥١	
	1952	33,700	1,447	2,082	689	1,618	758	١٩٥٢	
	1953	2,379	1,449	737	438	1,642	1,011	١٩٥٣	
Homs	1949	546	249	543	234	3	15	١٩٤٩	حمص
	1950	215	501	—	—	215	501	١٩٥٠	
	1951	342	528	—	—	342	528	١٩٥١	
	1952	543	728	317	418	226	310	١٩٥٢	
	1953	755	715	323	381	432	334	١٩٥٣	
Hama	1949	1,324	482	1,294	297	30	185	١٩٤٩	حماة
	1950	190	667	—	—	190	667	١٩٥٠	
	1951	354	525	—	—	354	525	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,595	1,487	2,411	1,289	184	198	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,627	1,222	1,465	995	162	227	١٩٥٣	
Latakia	1949	265	274	234	169	22	105	١٩٤٩	اللاذقية
	1950	615	810	—	—	615	810	١٩٥٠	
	1951	754	793	—	—	754	793	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,690	2,048	1,849	1,193	841	855	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,580	1,759	636	1,041	944	718	١٩٥٣	
Aleppo	1949	3,777	872	3,702	477	75	395	١٩٤٩	حلب
	1950	1,411	1,451	—	—	1,411	1,457	١٩٥٠	
	1951	3,212	1,774	—	—	3,212	1,774	١٩٥١	
	1952	8,224	4,509	6,988	3,369	1,236	1,140	١٩٥٢	
	1953	3,897	2,454	2,939	1,337	958	1,117	١٩٥٣	
Al-Hasakeh	1949	112	144	67	4	45	140	١٩٤٩	الحسكة
	1950	176	1,173	—	—	176	1,173	١٩٥٠	
	1951	147	476	—	—	147	476	١٩٥١	
	1952	1,689	1,721	1,681	1,707	8	14	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,387	1,695	1,352	1,660	35	35	١٩٥٣	

Source : The Syrian Agricultural Bank

المصدر : المصرف الزراعي السوري

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عدد وقيمة القروض التي اسلفها المصرف الزراعي السوري ١٩٤٩ – ١٩٥٣

NUMBERS AND VALUE OF LOANS ADVANCED
BY THE AGRICULTURAL BANK, 1949 — 1953.

Table No. 10 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١٠ (تتمة)

Mohafazat	Year	مجموع القروض Total loans		قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans		قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans		السنة	المحافظة
		العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S.'000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000		
Deir-ez-zor	1949	275	126	275	126	—	—	١٩٤٩	دير الزور
	1950	94	587	—	—	94	587	١٩٥٠	
	1951	73	244	—	—	73	244	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,005	1,217	1,811	1,010	194	207	١٩٥٢	
	1953	2,607	1,570	2,351	1,308	256	262	١٩٥٣	
Sweida	1949	35	22	35	22	—	—	١٩٤٩	السويداء
	1950	62	140	—	—	62	140	١٩٥٠	
	1951	203	1,431	—	—	203	1,431	١٩٥١	
	1952	410	1,367	1,284	1,229	120	138	١٩٥٢	
	1953	196	231	1	21	195	210	١٩٥٣	
Dir'a	1949	1,756	391	1,721	231	35	160	١٩٤٩	درعا
	1950	353	533	—	—	353	533	١٩٥٠	
	1951	435	4,018	—	—	435	4,018	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,518	803	2,424	736	94	67	١٩٥٢	
	1953	5,897	1,371	5,599	1,137	298	234	١٩٥٣	

Source : The Syrian Agricultural Bank.

المصدر المصرف الزراعي السوري

17: Syria G-S (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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الفصل التاسع

الانتاج

CHAPTER NINE

PRODUCTION

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مساحات ومحاصيل اهم انواع الحبوب ، ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥١

(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالاطنان)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CEREALS, 1950/51 — 1952/53

(Area in hectare, produce in tons)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Cereals	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Wheat	1,026,683	509,642	1,167,150	900,000	1,314,422	* 870,000	القمح
Barley	343,556	154,701	396,621	466,924	428,010	472,457	الشعير
Lentils	65,744	30,231	66,216	50,597	70,909	62,814	العدس
Chick-peas	27,360	8,617	28,388	24,244	22,456	10,550	الحمص
Broad beans	20,252	25,518	15,693	12,080	16,928	11,105	الفول
Vetch	3,405	1,800	3,721	2,900	2,543	2,079	بيقية حب
Vetch, spring	15,480	5,860	15,882	11,632	13,333	12,203	كرسنة
Millet	71,418	24,171	114,921	106,114	96,456	123,682	ذرة بيضاء
Maize	16,041	21,824	19,246	22,556	18,115	22,430	ذرة صفراء
Rice	531	927	2,818	5,779	5,339	16,176	ارز
Sesame seed	5,883	3,628	[illegible],776	21,210	22,283	9,687	سمسم
Beans	1,494	972	1,422	1,008	1,507	1,421	فاصوليا حب
Peas	197	159	222	270	223	196	بازيلا حب
Chickling vetch	57,325	26,674	58,306	45,291	59,055	58,628	جلبانة حب

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.

* Figures of the Cereal Office.

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

* ارقام مكتب الحبوب

الانتاج

مساحات اهم الاشجار المثمرة وعددها ومحاصيلها ، ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢

(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

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• AREA OF PRINCIPAL FRUIT TREE PLANTATIONS, NUMBER OF TREES AND PRODUCE THEREOF, 1951 — 52

(Area in hectare, produce in tons)

Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

Tree	المساحة المغروسة Area planted	عدد الاشجار No. of trees: المجموع Total	عدد الاشجار No. of trees: المثمرة منها Fruit bearing	المحصول Produce	النوع
Olives	82,471	8,962,043	4,701,230	32,728	الزيتون
Grapes	68,057	68,473,895	56,797,177	167,294	العنب
Apricots	7,583	2,665,589	2,121,904	14,699	المشمش
Apples	3,389	904,981	644,778	6,252	التفاح
Pears	1,692	564,706	376,695	1,252	الاجاص
Plums	971	315,517	223,110	1,996	الخوخ
Peaches	682	250,455	176,255	1,357	الدراق
Nuts, dry	6,756	423,584	308,469	3,573	الجوز (مجفف)
Pomegranates	1,944	818,030	359,310	4,575	الرمان
Figs	14,574	3,352,625	2,540,583	48,178	التين
Almonds, dry in shell	2,359	664,223	549,732	2,202	اللوز (مجفف بقشره)
Cherries	1,211	239,485	210,945	2,295	الكرز
Quince	621	197,859	163,745	1,196	السفرجل
Pistachio, Aleppo, dry	3,166	526,271	247,485	591	الفستق الحلبي (مجفف)

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

PRODUCTION

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مساحات اهم الاشجار المثمرة وعددها ومحاصيلها ، ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA OF PRINCIPAL FRUIT TREE PLANTATIONS, NUMBER OF TREES AND PRODUCE THEREOF, 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 3 — جدول رقم ٣

Tree	المساحة المغروسة Area planted	عدد الاشجار No. of trees: المجموع Total	عدد الاشجار No. of trees: المثمر منها Fruit bearing	المحصول Produce	النوع
Olives	85,681	9,832,747	4,943,345	42,962	الزيتون
Grapes	70,197	68,433,324	57,415,270	343,321	العنب
Apricots	7,819	2,448,667	2,096,088	23,086	المشمش
Apples	3,605	1,056,161	802,600	7,639	التفاح
Pears	1,817	560,953	351,409	1,907	الاجاص
Plums	1,941	331,891	232,766	2,438	الخوخ
Peaches	741	250,383	180,650	1,422	الدراق
Nuts, dry	6,850	436,269	312,124	5,972	الجوز (مجفف)
Pomegranates	2,037	859,050	417,812	4,820	الرمان
Figs	15,113	3,606,096	2,054,530	51,823	التين
Almonds, dry in shell	2,822	675,458	387,878	2,654	اللوز (مجفف بقشره)
Cherries	1,269	241,436	222,950	2,506	الكرز
Quince	652	202,748	186,186	1,360	السفرجل
Pistachio, Aleppo, dry	3,444	553,573	245,330	482	الفستق الحلبي (مجفف)

Source : Ministry of Agriculture — المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

الانتاج

مساحة وعدد اشجار ومحصول الزيتون ، ١٩٣٧ — ١٩٥٣

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AREA, NUMBER OF TREE AND PRODUCTION OF OLIVE PLANTATIONS, 1937 — 1953

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

Year	المساحة (هكتار) Area (Hectars)		عدد الاشجار Number of trees		المحصول (طن) Production (Ton)		السنة
	المساحة المثمرة Fruitful	المساحة غير المثمرة Non-fruit bearing	المثمرة Fruit-bearing	غير المثمرة Non-fruit bearing	زيتون Olives	زيت الزيتون Olive oil	
1937	29,554.40	26,412.20	2,991,130	2,828,780	21,310	2,557	١٩٣٧
1938	33,880.40	23,909.20	3,236,770	2,923,910	43,242	7,257	١٩٣٨
1939	43,267.00	14,904.70	4,702,775	1,534,025	16,145	1,967	١٩٣٩
1940	44,835.00	15,511.60	4,702,550	1,723,280	35,040	6,305	١٩٤٠
1941	43,298.00	15,339.90	4,687,056	1,723,124	17,656	3,885	١٩٤١
1942	43,411.60	14,955.30	4,709,340	1,744,330	45,865	7,288	١٩٤٢
1943	34,419.60	13,969.30	4,712,865	1,709,175	72,717	23,107	١٩٤٣
1944	43,439.90	15,632.70	4,903,810	1,647,899	11,156	2,026	١٩٤٤
1945	57,319.60	18,382.30	6,558,475	2,243,214	158,940	16,791	١٩٤٥
1946	57,612.00	20,496.00	6,501,955	2,243,084	45,490	6,243	١٩٤٦
1947	61,276.20	18,091.60	6,698,965	1,884,709	80,215	11,116	١٩٤٧
1948	61,832.90	16,738.60	6,170,139	1,929,654	102,998	10,252	١٩٤٨
1949	63,596.30	16,029.60	6,986,255	2,016,817	91,366	14,437	١٩٤٩
1950	64,616.40	16,078.60	7,126,895	1,969,702	18,637	3,581	١٩٥٠
1951	---	---	4,790,026	4,270,104	40,147*	8,516	١٩٥١
1952	---	---	4,701,230	4,282,413	32,726	7,241	١٩٥٢
1953	---	---	4,942,545	4,990,202	48,902	11,071	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

* Corrected figures

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

* ارقام معدلة

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مساحات ومحاصيل اهم انواع الخضار ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ – ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL VEGETABLES, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 5 جدول رقم ٥

Vegetables	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Potatoes	3,687	36,615	3,887	38,226	3,058	32,294	بطاطا
Garlic	1,144	4,548	968	4,018	1,185	4,326	ثوم
Onions	4,043	39,745	4,160	33,135	4,454	36,830	بصل
Onion seeds	226	388	202	52	210	42	بادرون
Onion sets	635	1,136	721	2,299	749	3,667	فرح
Tomatoes	6,338	67,438	7,655	66,733	8,841	71,038	بندورة
Eggplant	2,742	34,995	3,670	34,905	3,728	28,403	باذنجان

مساحات ومحاصيل النباتات الصناعية ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ – ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

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AREA AND PRODUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL CORPS, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 6 جدول رقم ٦

Plantation	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Sugar cane	86	349	119	5,033	138	4,080	قصب السكر
Tobacco	4,026	4,164	3,951	3,894	2,082	1,669	تبغ
Tombac	391	381	385	362	317	253	تنباك
Cotton	217,352	62,924	189,271	58,074	127,558	46,984	قطن (شعر)
Linseed	180	180	220	220	532	533	كتان (بزر)
Hemp	3,330	3,283	4,292	4,131	4,038	2,172	قنب (الياف)
Tobacco (shah-el-bint)	3,936	3,090	3,296	2,334	3,309	2,820	تبغ شاه البنت
Sugar beet	211	2,715	2,624	55,320	4,264	49,572	الشوندر السكري

الانتاج

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مساحة ومحصول القطن الشعر في سوريا حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٠ ـ ١٩٥٣
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF COTTON FIBRE IN SYRIA, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1950 — 1953
(Area in hectare, produce in tons)

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

Mohafazat	١٩٥٠ 1950		١٩٥١ 1951		١٩٥٢ 1952		١٩٥٣ 1953		المحافظات
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Total	**77,561**	**35,496**	**217,382**	**62,994**	**139,771**	**86,974**	**127,556**	**46,984**	الجموع
Damascus	166	84	4,861	693	2,253	288	197	124	دمشق
Homs	2,000	805	8,800	3,201	6,900	2,205	3,180	1.650	حمص
Hama	14,500	7,700	34,635	10,959	42,836	9,573	48,960	10,015	حماة
Latakia	8,091	2,800	27,457	5,462	14,130	3,384	2,438	496	اللاذقية
Aleppo	40,889	16,746	79,357	29,612	90,383	31,693	46,774	11,781	حلب
El-Hasakeh	6,110	3,500	22,934	2,515	20,021	7,432	10,098	5,688	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	6,100	3,815	36,000	9,867	8,537	3,348	14,800	7,965	دير الزور
Suweida	—	—	7	3	400	14	—	—	السويداء
Dar'a	105	45	3,311	612	3,421	137	1,091	285	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

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مساحة ومحصول القطن الزهر في عام ١٩٥٣ ، حسب المحافظات
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF UNGINNED COTTON IN 1953, BY MOHAFAZAT
(Area in hectare and Production in tons)

Table No. 8 — جدول رقم A

Mohafamt	المساحة المزروعة Cultivated Area			المحصول زهر (شعر وبذور) Produce (unginned			المحافظات
	الجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	الجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	
Total	127,558	76,305	51,253	128,026	107,689	18,337	الجموع
Damascus	197	197	—	331	331	—	دمشق
Homs	3,180	2,945	235	4,404	4,287	117	حمص
Hama	48,980	30,740	18,240	50,888	46,352	4,536	حماة
Latakia	2,438	163	2,275	1,373	141	1,232	اللاذقية
Aleppo	46,774	16,371	30,403	31,911	19,529	12,382	حلب
Hasakeh	10,098	10,058	40	15,115	15,087	28	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	14,800	14,800	—	21,240	21,240	—	دير الزور
Sweida	—	—	—	—	—	—	السويداء
Dir'a	1,091	1,031	60	764	722	42	درعا

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عدد الحيوانات والمواشي ، ١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF ANIMALS AND CATTLE, 1950 — 1953

Table No. 9 — جدول رقم ٩

Animals and cattle	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	النوع
Cows, not for milking	109,935	294,425	252,081	253,801	مجموع البقر غير الحلوب
Cows, for milking	121,735				بقر حلوب
Oxen	197,583	153,060	189,997	251,465	ثيران
Horses	97,070	99,650	100,654	98,450	خيل
Mules	58,292	70,425	73,890	77,810	بغال
Asses	271,047	244,270	250,433	259,730	حمير
Sheep	2,930,397	3,065,235	3,559,745	3,746,392	أغنام
Goats	1,229,738	1,433,501	1,571,282	1,613,806	ماعز
Camels	78,051	70,889	96,610	61,706	إبل
Buffalo	6,755	6,030	6,176	6,779	جاموس
Figs	952	421	206	393	خنازير
Beehives	53,255	---	---	---	خلايا نحل

Source : Ministry of Agriculture — المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

عدد الحيوانات والمواشي حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF ANIMALS AND CATTLE BY MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 18

جدول م ١٠

Animals and cattle	المحافظات Mohafazat										النوع
	مجموع المحافظات Total	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماه Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	دير الزور Deir-es-Zor	الحسكة Al-Hasakeh	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	
Cows	252,081	15,540	20,500	17,700	69,291	53,700	8,550	22,500	24,300	19,900	بقر
Oxen	189,907	21,372	15,000	8,300	60,300	31,525	7,800	13,200	23,800	9,600	ثيران
Horses	100,654	6,975	5,500	5,500	5,792	34,537	18,350	5,400	2,450	7,100	خيل
Mules	73,890	4,555	10,000	8,000	4,035	21,750	9,900	9,000	1,200	5,450	بغال
Asses	250,433	24,055	12,000	14,500	40,954	63,274	29,500	11,900	7,850	45,500	حمير
Sheep	2,559,745	222,941	221,196	219,491	138,441	958,960	846,049	590,000	79,565	82,093	غنم
Goats	1,571,582	222,514	104,789	64,879	283,607	360,083	221,181	187,000	89,973	67,577	ماعز
Camels	96,619	2,708	23,084	9,262	1,283	9,402	32,123	12,600	1,018	5,130	جمال
Buffalo	6,178	1,379	15	108	2,621	1,015	—	430	—	707	جاموس
Pigs	208	28	7	2	39	130	—	—	—	—	خنازير

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

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عدد الحيوانات والمواشي حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF ANIMALS AND CATTLE BY MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 11 — جدول رقم ١١

Animals and cattle	Mohafazat										النوع
	مجموع المحافظات Total	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماه Hama	اللاذقية Lattakia	حلب Aleppo	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	الحسكة Al-Hassakeh	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	
Cows	253,801	21,910	28,841	30,150	48,300	58,700	9,100	24,500	14,000	30,200	بقر
Oxen	251,465	29,990	21,000	18,350	60,900	51,025	10,750	19,600	16,500	13,250	ثيران
Horses	98,430	7,042	9,057	10,960	3,221	32,370	17,900	9,200	1,500	7,050	خيل
Mules	77,810	4,830	10,575	9,330	3,032	23,524	10,800	8,900	1,300	4,900	بغال
Asses	299,730	21,206	15,534	17,850	34,960	70,400	32,000	12,800	6,300	48,700	حمير
Sheep	3,746,365	225,357	362,694	353,503	80,110	994,794	867,101	630,000	44,000	88,348	أغنام
Goats	1,613,808	218,319	113,060	123,811	202,644	352,904	263,170	210,000	80,000	74,808	ماعز
Camels	61,706	2,918	3,409	9,894	873	8,936	18,572	12,300	1,100	4,210	جمال
Buffalo	6,779	1,298	217	838	1,228	1,894	20	412	—	804	جاموس
Pigs	303	8	173	15	4	197	—	—	—	—	خنازير

Source : Ministry of Agriculture. — المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

عدد الحيوانات الذبوحة والتي جرت معاينتها في مراكز المسالخ في الجمهورية السورية ، ١٩٤١ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF ANIMALS SLAUGHTERED, AND INSPECTED AT SLAUGHTERING CENTRES, 1941 — 1953

Table No. 12

جدول رقم ١٢

Year	غنم Sheep	خراف Lambs	ماعز Goats	جداء Kids	بقر Cows	عجول Calves	ابل Camels	خنازير Pigs	جاموس Buffalo	السنوات والشهور
1941	254,723	28,473	92,074	1,336	10,976	663	2,902	393	18	١٩٤١
1942	196,907	—	122,829	—	19,309	—	3,946	371	—	١٩٤٢
1943	148,290	55,284	73,272	9,972	6,858	—	4,743	235	—	١٩٤٣
1944	237,109	8,122	76,110	—	5,957	—	5,756	97	1	١٩٤٤
1945	346,536	157,622	87,877	15,126	5,279	104	5,538	22	3	١٩٤٥
1946	287,593	171,816	93,384	9,633	5,311	671	6,208	25	7	١٩٤٦
1947	339,451	202,465	104,534	26,596	8,774	4,867	6,294	48	4	١٩٤٧
1948	349,288	77,188	134,324	13,106	9,015	1,735	7,492	91	3	١٩٤٨
1949	272,838	144,400	77,044	28,464	10,753	947	210	115	—	١٩٤٩
1950	291,885	184,143	77,487	32,035	7,572	3,734	9,222	106	12	١٩٥٠
1951	335,212	306,227	78,184	35,933	11,269	7,371	7,635	160	18	١٩٥١
1952	315,471	181,171	91,587	29,972	10,195	6,671	7,563	101	150	١٩٥٢
1953	296,640	269,062	76,566	60,761	9,002	7,756	7,312	114	113	١٩٥٣
1953										١٩٥٣
January	26,865	1,089	6,699	1,335	1,147	1,229	744	10	20	كانون الثاني
February	22,539	2,649	5,190	403	1,060	924	676	9	7	شباط
March	17,469	18,415	1,380	23	996	746	558	10	—	آذار
April	9,625	64,965	850	200	757	423	415	11	3	نيسان
May	12,449	77,395	630	1,041	443	358	242	8	16	أيار
June	29,093	44,703	3,735	5,454	426	373	346	8	3	حزيران
July	34,197	12,408	11,119	8,238	491	324	453	6	1	تموز
August	30,933	10,493	11,016	11,641	482	537	612	7	7	آب
September	28,865	8,884	9,988	10,434	515	396	772	7	—	أيلول
October	28,747	9,540	10,096	9,016	736	418	918	9	6	تشرين اول
November	28,634	9,730	8,207	8,085	1,000	378	886	9	18	تشرين ثاني
December	25,919	8,571	7,956	4,803	944	1,146	680	20	34	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

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عدد الحيوانات المذبوحة والتي جرت معاينتها في مراكز المسالخ في الجمهورية السورية حسب المحافظات لعام ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF ANIMALS SLAUGHTERED AND INSPECTED AT SLAUGHTERING CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT DURING 1952.

Table No. 13 — جدول رقم ١٣

Mohafazat	غنم Sheep	خراف Lambs	ماعز Goats	جداء Kids	بقر Cows	عجول Calves	ابل Camels	خنازير Pigs	جاموس Buffalo	المحافظات
Total	**315,471**	**131,171**	**91,557**	**29,972**	**10,195**	**6,671**	**7,543**	**181**	**159**	**المجموع العام**
Damascus	112,943	35,959	37,538	9,042	2,012	1,488	1,866	...	120	دمشق
Homs	22,253	19,162	8,876	1,518	1,964	1,594	576	...	...	حمص
Hama	9,398	12,603	2,517	1,690	71	144	1,216	...	...	حماه
Latakia	23,698	1,730	12,260	15	1,191	1,210	...	...	...	اللاذقية
Aleppo	125,049	38,464	15,862	10,933	2,180	40	2,134	101	15	حلب
Al-Hasakah	7,858	13,975	8,275	2,157	1,651	1,084	29	...	15	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	11,711	8,068	4,701	4,335	824	1,040	664	...	...	دير الزور
Sweida	1,460	495	1,169	111	206	45	21	...	...	السويداء
Dir'a	1,101	715	422	171	108	19	75	...	...	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture — المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

عدد الحيوانات المذبوحة والتي جرت معاينتها في مراكز المسالخ في الجمهورية السورية حسب المحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF ANIMALS SLAUGHTERED AND INSPECTED AT SLAUGHTERING CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT DURING 1952.

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Mohafazat	غنم Sheep	خراف Lambs	ماعز Goats	جداء Kids	بقر Cows	عجول Calves	ابل Camels	خنازير Pigs	جاموس Buffalo	المحافظات
Total	234,640	289,062	76,598	60,781	9,062	7,796	7,313	114	113	المجموع
Damascus	103,744	90,868	28,403	25,480	1,866	1,826	2,423	—	96	دمشق
Homs	21,930	24,230	9,530	3,068	1,779	1,533	486	—	—	حمص
Hama	10,592	15,451	2,389	2,747	225	412	910	—	—	حماه
Latakia	25,266	3,600	14,710	—	1,147	1,235	—	6	—	اللاذقية
Aleppo	117,499	94,414	15,000	12,506	2,052	136	2,809	108	5	حلب
Al-Hasakeh	6,080	20,511	4,172	3,162	1,029	1,010	22	—	12	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	10,364	16,900	3,550	9,568	732	1,468	488	—	—	دير الزور
Sweida	367	1,129	457	629	119	58	53	—	—	السويداء
Dir'a	789	1,869	355	572	53	78	49	—	—	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

الرقم
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PRODUCTION

342
347
361

عدد رخص البناء الصادرة من قبل الدائرة الفنية في مدينة دمشق (سنوات ١٩٣٩ - ١٩٥٣)

NUMBER OF BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED BY THE TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT IN DAMASCUS, YEARS 1939 — 1953

Table No. 15 — جدول رقم ١٥

Year and Month	الابنية الحديثة للسكن New Residential Buildings			الابنية الحديثة التجارية والصناعية New Commercial and Industrial Buildings		عدد الرخص للبيوت الخشبية Permits for simple and wooden construction	السنة والشهور
	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	وحدات السكن Number of Residential units	عدد الرخص Number of Permits	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	عدد الرخص Number of Permits		
1939	50,876	287	190	—	—	537	١٩٣٩
1940	40,373	240	119	—	—	471	١٩٤٠
1941	24,300	140	74	—	—	384	١٩٤١
1942	20,703	127	65	—	—	398	١٩٤٢
1943	41,207	230	126	—	—	316	١٩٤٣
1944	79,492	540	254	—	—	346	١٩٤٤
1945	55,971	353	176	—	—	434	١٩٤٥
1946	90,356	680	338	—	—	627	١٩٤٦
1947	177,400	838	369	—	—	580	١٩٤٧
1948	164,849	885	434	—	—	515	١٩٤٨
1949	165,758	903	393	—	—	386	١٩٤٩
1950	174,674	863	407	33,916	92	333	١٩٥٠
1951	133,058	833	332	28,565	62	246	١٩٥١
1952	173,925	1,107	458	30,984	65	224	١٩٥٢
1953	231,733	1,239	463	33,032	63	198	١٩٥٣
1953							**١٩٥٣**
January	19,834	107	42	3,101	4	12	كانون ثاني
February	17,939	114	46	2,143	8	13	شباط
March	11,419	67	30	5,129	8	17	آذار
April	19,617	116	37	2,235	8	6	نيسان
May	25,065	142	45	5,111	9	17	ايار
June	17,335	93	33	925	3	21	حزيران
July	20,468	96	45	—	—	16	تموز
August	26,513	150	44	8,069	8	18	آب
September	23,512	132	40	619	3	21	ايلول
October	10,392	62	36	3,625	3	20	تشرين اول
November	15,747	88	30	687	6	10	تشرين ثاني
December	23,573	74	35	1,387	3	17	كانون اول

الانتاج

انتاج السوائل الكحولية

PRODUCTION OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUIDS

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

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Year and Month	العرق (كيلو) Arak (Kilo)	النبيذ (كيلو) Wine (Kilo)	سيرتو ايثي (كيلو) Ethyl Alcohol (Kilo)	كحول معطل (كغو) Denatured Alcohol (Kilo)	كونياك (ليتر) Cognac (Litre)	منتجات كحولية اخرى (ليتر) Other Alcoholic Liquids (Litre)	السنوات والشهور
1941	673,933	589,175	3,238	955	1,771	6,874	١٩٤١
1942	777,639	136,954	2,878	—	2,339	3,892	١٩٤٢
1943	1,147,651	207,917	37,015	17,391	2,308	3,051	١٩٤٣
1944	679,292	135,805	18,230	10,317	1,560	5,514	١٩٤٤
1945	822,738	165,735	35,259	2,245	1,868	3,051	١٩٤٥
1946	827,535	83,491	7,578	6,810	876	2,528	١٩٤٦
1947	589,228	65,567	76,764	8,074	—	—	١٩٤٧
1948	1,069,852	132,568	36,364	20,417	4,465	1,404	١٩٤٨
1949	542,467	145,422	40,566	20,088	2,359	—	١٩٤٩
1950	819,587	170,326	194,582	100,160	1,443	3,135	١٩٥٠
1951	375,559	122,901	236,028	127,549	1,111	18,645	١٩٥١
1952	1,016,231	299,054	320,347	156,191	2,796	22,405	١٩٥٢
1952							١٩٥٢
January	23,067	850	24,220	10,050	—	2,854	كانون ثاني
February	19,321	—	24,420	10,250	—	923	شباط
March	13,958	4,668	42,097	10,812	—	6,054	آذار
April	28,606	1,850	14,366	4,384	200	1,339	نيسان
May	15,419	120	26,806	10,175	358	1,235	ايار
June	12,180	—	21,860	10,953	—	1,490	حزيران
July	6,574	—	23,530	14,597	—	1,854	تموز
August	8,203	—	40,900	17,775	—	2,390	آب
September	62,599	—	12,258	30,915	—	379	ايلول
October	145,160	84,340	29,992	12,759	90	1,125	تشرين اول
November	75,393	85,838	31,239	12,719	1,475	2,103	تشرين ثاني
December	607,751	121,658	30,619	10,522	648	632	كانون اول

PRODUCTION

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كمية انتاج التبغ المصنوع (بالكيلو)

QUANTITY OF TOBACCO MANUFACTURES

(In kilos)

Table No. 17 — جدول رقم ١٧

Year and Month	التنباك Tombac	التبغ المقروم Tobacco	السجائر Cigarettes	المجموع Total	السنوات والشهور
1939	208,858	799,711	416,035	1,424,604	١٩٣٩
1940	238,523	1,007,741	461,024	1,707,288	١٩٤٠
1941	244,960	716,305	713,218	1,674,444	١٩٤١
1942	215,689	536,902	1,033,005	1,790,606	١٩٤٢
1943	270,223	439,031	1,223,609	1,932,963	١٩٤٣
1944	233,945	605,188	1,221,219	2,161,355	١٩٤٤
1945	224,365	642,881	864,682	1,731,928	١٩٤٥
1946	181,622	583,875	868,226	1,613,723	١٩٤٦
1947	146,479	586,918	833,235	1,566,632	١٩٤٧
1948	161,971	810,411	962,372	1,934,754	١٩٤٨
1949	131,355	701,699	1,192,443	2,025,497	١٩٤٩
1950	129,768	585,100	1,360,550	2,075,418	١٩٥٠
1951	131,588	558,972	1,449,043	2,139,603	١٩٥١
1952	119,994	754,487	1,573,244	2,447,705	١٩٥٢
1953	132,122	852,500	1,642,903	2,658,525	١٩٥٣
1952					١٩٥٢
January	9,210	46,816	122,985	179,011	كانون الثاني
February	9,910	56,079	118,087	184,076	شباط
March	12,275	60,334	138,363	210,972	آذار
April	7,558	66,771	119,646	193,975	نيسان
May	11,382	73,657	128,570	213,609	ايار
June	10,076	62,236	110,161	182,663	حزيران
July	10,313	60,944	152,731	223,988	تموز
August	9,990	71,245	135,000	216,241	آب
September	11,983	64,995	131,345	208,323	ايلول
October	6,963	67,502	159,888	234,253	تشرين اول
November	8,402	56,748	137,516	202,666	تشرين الثاني
December	11,317	57,550	128,051	196,918	كانون اول
1953					١٩٥٣
January	9,271	61,058	131,841	202,170	كانون الثاني
February	9,446	59,504	132,740	201,690	شباط
March	10,020	67,593	127,389	205,002	آذار
April	9,799	79,280	130,320	219,379	نيسان
May	8,968	87,936	145,252	242,156	ايار
June	12,907	81,088	125,013	219,008	حزيران
July	10,564	84,421	128,925	193,910	تموز
August	12,116	79,530	130,042	221,708	آب
September	13,856	88,084	180,512	282,452	ايلول
October	12,533	79,310	174,047	265,890	تشرين اول
November	11,722	68,597	122,198	202,517	تشرين الثاني
December	10,960	76,009	115,584	202,643	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

الانتاج

مقدار القوة الكهربائية المنتجة والمباعة من قبل اهم شركات الكهرباء في الجمهورية السورية (بالوف الكيلووات الساعي)

ELECTRIC ENERGY GENERATED AND SOLD BY THE PRINCIPAL ELECTRICITY COMPANIES ('000 KWH)

Table No. 18

جدول رقم ١٨

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Year and Month	الكمية المنتجة Energy Generated	Energy Sold for الكمية المباعة: Trams	Industry	Lighting	Total	الشهور والسنة
1947	47,029	4,112	15,302	17,890	37,304	١٩٤٧
1948	56,160	4,163	18,420	22,268	44,851	١٩٤٨
1949	68,625	4,234	22,278	27,898	54,410	١٩٤٩
1950	81,279	4,188	27,639	33,096	65,323	١٩٥٠
1951	86,801	3,903	28,465	37,823	70,281	١٩٥١
1952	98,791	4,099	31,442	44,248	79,789	١٩٥٢
1953	114,238	4,218	36,631	52,042	92,791	١٩٥٣
1951						١٩٥١
January	8,076	332	2,791	3,604	6,727	كانون ثاني
February	6,891	304	2,494	3,265	6,063	شباط
March	7,017	343	2,150	2,896	5,389	آذار
April	6,535	327	2,131	3,001	5,459	نيسان
July	6,636	340	2,065	2,875	5,223	ايار
June	6,907	345	2,223	2,980	5,548	حزيران
July	6,808	357	2,218	3,126	5,701	تموز
August	6,911	342	2,346	2,668	5,356	آب
September	6,958	332	2,347	2,970	5,649	ايلول
October	7,416	326	2,455	3,266	6,047	تشرين اول
November	7,906	325	2,456	3,402	6,184	تشرين ثاني
Dgcember	8,740	320	2,851	3,705	6,876	كانون اول
1952						١٩٥٢
January	8,651	319	2,603	4,043	6,965	كانون ثاني
February	7,475	307	2,229	3,720	6,256	شباط
March	7,622	325	2,302	3,512	6,040	آذار
April	7,302	328	2,369	3,404	6,001	نيسان
May	7,820	344	2,542	3,260	6,146	ايار
June	7,709	343	2,585	3,568	6,496	حزيران
July	7,940	354	2,616	3,419	6,389	تموز
August	8,022	359	2,707	3,396	6,462	آب
September	7,981	352	2,676	3,585	6,613	ايلول
October	8,827	362	2,685	3,685	6,712	تشرين اول
November	9,229	336	3,032	4,392	7,761	تشرين ثاني
December	10,393	361	3,194	4,514	8,069	كانون اول

PRODUCTION.

مقدار القوة الكهربائية المنتجة والباعة من قبل أهم شركات الكهرباء في الجمهورية السورية (بألوف الكيلووات الساعي)

ELECTRIC ENERGY GENERATED AND SOLD BY THE PRINCIPAL ELECTRICITY COMPANIES ('000 KWH)

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Table No. 18 (concld.) جدول رقم ١٨ (تتمة)

Year and Month	الكمية المنتجة Energy Generated	Energy sold for الكمية الباعة				الشهور والسنة
		النقلات Trans	الصناعة Industry	الانارة Lighting	المجموع Total	
1953.-						١٩٥٣
January	10,151	351	2,456	4,773	8,580	كانون ثاني
February	8,984	330	2,976	4,608	7,914	شباط
March	9,110	365	2,591	4,060	7,016	آذار
April	8,294	347	2,789	4,110	7,246	نيسان
May	8,902	362	2,616	3,787	6,765	ايار
June	8,608	362	2,699	4,123	7,284	حزيران
July	9,042	369	2,674	4,111	7,154	تموز
August	9,015	368	2,955	3,858	7,181	آب
September	8,882	360	2,729	4,248	7,337	ايلول
October	10,455	364	3,246	4,344	7,954	تشرين اول
November	11,016	359	3,720	4,728	8,807	تشرين ثاني
December	11,812	381	3,780	5,292	9,453	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

الانتاج

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انتاج الاسمنت في معمل دمر - دمشق حسب الشهور خلال شهور ١٩٤٧ - ١٩٥٢
(بالطن)

PRODUCTION OF CEMENT IN DUMMAR FACTORY, DAMASCUS, MONTHS OF 1947 — 1952
(In tons)

Table No. 19 — جدول رقم ١٩

Months	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	الشهور
January	4,676	3,414	3,690	4,621	2,438	4,473	كانون ثاني
February	4,949	1,580	3,295	4,731	1,195	7,446	شباط
March	4,000	1,898	4,265	7,000	2,127	6,939	آذار
April	2,966	4,796	4,893	6,957	1,621	7,977	نيسان
May	4,019	6,278	5,347	3,574	2,506	10,970	ايار
June	5,011	5,720	4,794	6,196	3,099	8,572	حزيران
July	2,459	7,045	5,783	5,715	4,001	10,613	تموز
August	4,115	4,788	5,302	4,943	3,732	12,036	آب
September	4,120	6,987	4,448	6,587	2,825	7,768	ايلول
October	3,291	5,061	4,824	5,677	3,001	7,107	تشرين اول
November	6,185	4,279	5,456	4,790	5,434	11,788	تشرين ثاني
December	4,415	2,537	5,527	6,251	4,758	11,672	كانون اول
Total	48,226	54,404	57,765	67,949	32,737	107,361	المجموع

انتاج الاسمنت في الجمهورية السورية خلال عامي ١٩٥١ - ١٩٥٢
(بالطن)

CEMENT PRODUCTION IN SYRIA DURING 1952, 1953
(In tons)

Table No. 20 — جدول رقم ٢٠

Months	المجموع Total	معمل حلب ١٩٥٢ Aleppo Factory 1952	معمل دمر-دمشق ١٩٥٢ Dummar Factory 1952	المجموع Total	معمل حلب ١٩٥٣ Aleppo Factory 1953	معمل دمر-دمشق ١٩٥٣ Dummar Factory 1953	الشهور
January	4,473	—	4,473	12,566	6,705	5,861	كانون ثاني
February	7,446	—	7,446	14,482	6,516	7,966	شباط
March	6,939	—	6,939	18,708	7,012	11,691	آذار
April	7,977	—	7,977	20,734	6,099	14,635	نيسان
May	17,029	6,059	10,970	24,182	7,344	16,838	ايار
June	13,041	4,469	8,572	18,590	7,160	11,430	حزيران
July	15,019	4,406	10,613	16,137	5,404	10,733	تموز
August	17,900	5,864	12,036	16,617	4,548	12,069	آب
September	14,100	6,332	7,768	21,799	6,409	15,390	ايلول
October	11,067	3,960	7,107	21,734	6,201	15,533	تشرين اول
November	18,442	6,654	11,788	21,908	6,406	15,502	تشرين ثاني
December	17,192	5,520	11,672	16,187	7,391	8,796	كانون اول
Total	150,585	43,224	107,361	223,639	77,295	146,344	المجموع

Source : Ministry of National Economy

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

IN Syria G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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الفصل العاشر

متنوعة

CHAPTER TEN

MISCELLANEOUS

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MISCELLANEOUS

حالة اعمال التحديد والتحرير حسب الاقضية ، في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

EXTENT OF LAND SURVEYED AS AT THE END OF 1952, BY QADAS.

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

MOHAFAZAT AND QADAS	المساحة المحدودة (بالهكتار) Area surveyed (Hectars)	المساحة المتبقية للتحديد (بالهكتار) Area to be surveyed (hectars)	المساحة الغير قابلة للزراعة (بالهكتار) Uncultivable Area (hectars)	المساحة الكلية (بالهكتار) Total Area (Hectars)	المحافظة والقضاء
TOTAL	3,544,883	4,772,985	10,630,306	18,447,986	المجموع العام
DAMASCUS MOHAFAZA					محافظة دمشق
and Damascus city	298,593	802,942	1,101,408	1,802,783	ومدينة دمشق المنارة
Mohafaza centre	44,942	6,500	—	51,342	مركز المحافظة
Quneitra	5,230	124,770	—	130,000	قضاء القنيطرة
Duma	116,792	100,000	989,208	1,206,000	« دوما
Zabadani	—	56,800	8,200	65,000	« الزبداني
Al-Qutaifeh & Nabek	—	250,000	106,000	356,000	قضائي القطيفة والنبك
Qatana	119,639	24,772	—	144,411	قضاء قطنا
HOMS MOHAFAZA	921,008	273,200	2,965,792	4,165,000	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza centre	921,008	273,200	2,965,792	4,165,000	مركز المحافظة
HAMA MOHAFAZA	632,185	100,000	—	732,185	محافظة حماه
Mohafaza centre	280,985	—	—	280,985	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	351,320	100,000	—	451,320	قضاء السلمية
LATAKIA MOHAFAZA	294,164	349,997	33,839	678,000	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	8,342	49,976	14,682	73,000	قضاء بانياس
Talkhalakh	9,701	43,931	368	54,000	« تلكلخ
Jableh	22,989	50,000	5,011	78,000	« جبلة
Al-Haffeh	47,506	26,544	12,950	87,000	« الحفة
Safita	7,334	49,955	3,211	61,000	« صافيتا
Tartus	23,753	29,978	2,269	56,000	« طرطوس
Latakia	65,759	49,813	4,528	100,000	« اللاذقية
Misiaf	41,280	50,000	8,720	100,000	« مصياف

متنوعة

حالة اعمال التحديد والتحرير حسب الاقضية ، في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

EXTENT OF LAND SURVEYED AS AT THE END OF 1952, BY QADAS.

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Table No. 1 (Concld.) جدول رقم ١ (تتمة)

MOHAFAZAT AND QADAS	المساحة المحدودة (بالهكتار) Area surveyed (Hectars)	المساحة المتبقية للتحديد (بالهكتار) Area to be surveyed (hectars)	المساحة الغير قابلة للزراعة (بالهكتار) Unculivable Area (hectars)	المساحة الكلية (بالهكتار) Total Area (Hectars)	المحافظة والقضاء
ALEPPO MOHAFAZA	**1,292,928**	**998,050**	—	**2,291,948**	**محافظة حلب**
Idleb	110,395	60,457	—	170,852	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	—	145,000	—	154,000	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	165,997	—	—	165,997	« الباب
Ifrin	—	205,000	—	205,000	« عفرين
Jabal Sam'an incl. Aleppo	429,249	—	—	429,249	« جبل سمعان بما فيه مدينة حلب
Jarablus	36,557	73,972	—	110,529	قضاء جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	25,732	100,660	—	126,392	« جسر الشغور
Harem	—	82,000	—	82,000	« حارم
Ein-el-Arab	—	273,000	—	273,000	« عين العرب
Ma'arret-an-Na'man	248,520	50,000	—	298,520	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	276,409	—	—	276,409	« منبج
HASAKEH MOHAFAZA	**95,725**	**796,275**	**1,325,000**	**2,217,000**	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza centre	95,725	204,275	1,225,000	1,525,000	مركز المحافظة
Dejla	—	200,000	100,000	300,000	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	—	392,000	—	392,000	« القامشلي
DEIR-EZ-ZOR MOHAFAZA	**8,641**	**500,000**	**4,997,359**	**5,506,000**	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza centre	8,641	100,000	1,251,359	1,360,000	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kemal	—	75,000	276,000	351,000	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Rigga	—	250,000	1,950,000	2,200,000	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	—	75,000	1,520,000	1,595,000	« الميادين
SWEIDA MOHAFAZA	—	**370,000**	**185,000**	**555,000**	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza centre	—	80,000	67,000	147,000	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	—	150,000	51,000	201,000	قضاء الشهباء
Salkhad	—	140,000	67,000	207,000	« صلخد
DER'A MOHAFAZA	**106,798**	**316,202**	—	**420,000**	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza centre	70,172	76,828	—	147,000	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	27,194	186,806	—	214,000	قضاء ازرع
Feeq	6,432	52,568	—	59,000	« فيق

Source : Directorate General of Land Survey.

المصدر : المديرية العامة للمصالح العقارية

MISCELLANEOUS

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AREA OF LAND CULTIVATED AND UNCULTIVATED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1953 AND 1962.
(Area in hectare)

Table No: 2:

MOHAFAZAT	المجموع العام Grand total	اراضي قابلة للزراعة Cultivable lands			غير مستثمرة Uncultivated
		Cultivated مستثمرة			
		الجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	
YEAR 1962					
Damascus	1,962,783	159,170	81,116	78,054	354,430
Homs	4,185,000	299,290	25,290	274,000	460,000
Hama	732,185	503,865	17,114	486,751	16,900
Latakia	608,000	257,846	30,579	227,267	72,272
Aleppo	2,112,870	1,122,823	80,407	1,042,416	489,792
Al-Hasakeh	2,217,000	540,462	44,694	495,768	596,620
Deir-es-Zor	5,506,000	281,682	200,840	80,843	1,082,791
Sweida	555,000	60,690	100	60,590	60,590
Dir'a	427,632	279,432	11,932	267,500	4,200
Total	18,276,470	3,485,251	492,062	2,993,189	3,139,545
YEAR 1963					
Damascus	1,962,783	159,170	81,116	78,054	354,430
Homs	4,219,000(1)	342,430	38,400	304,030	458,900
Hama	832,195(2)	520,975	28,504	511,471	22,790
Latakia	454,000(3)	178,264	9,733	168,531	57,005
Aleppo	2,112,870	1,236,675	89,263	1,147,412	416,736
Al-Hasakeh	2,217,000	541,469	40,000	501,469	694,531
Deir-es-Zor	5,506,000	326,713	206,840	120,873	1,017,761
Sweida	555,000	60,690	200	60,490	60,590
Dir'a	427,632	282,794	15,962	267,862	4,300
Total	18,276,470	3,659,180	508,958	3,160,222	3,087,183

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.

(1) Including Talkhalakh Qada.
(2) Including Misiaf Qada.
(3) Excluding the Qadas of Talkhalakh and Misiaf.

متنوعة

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مساحة الاراضي المزروعة وغير المزروعة حسب المحافظات خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و١٩٥٣

(المساحة بالهكتار)

جدول رقم ٢

المحافظات	اراضي غير قابلة للزراعة Uncultivable lands			
	متنوعة Miscellaneous	المراعي Pastures	الحراج Forests	المجموع Total
عام ١٩٥٢				
دمشق	437,192	952,956	47,965	1,438,113
حمص	1,504,720	1,814,066	86,934	3,405,720
حماه	27,000	95,469	89,051	211,520
اللاذقية	153,212	22,150	102,520	277,882
حلب	367,900	87,645	44,710	500,255
الحسكة	122,258	939,660	16,000	1,077,918
دير الزور	1,696,507	2,461,014	4,005	4,161,526
السويداء	407,806	17,000	8,914	433,720
درعا	130,574	8,900	4,526	144,000
المجموع	4,847,169	6,398,860	404,645	11,651,674
عام ١٩٥٣				
دمشق	437,192	953,956	47,965	1,439,113
حمص	1,595,220	1,811,150	101,300	3,417,670
حماه	50,600	96,469	122,351	269,420
اللاذقية	131,426	18,385	68,830	218,641
حلب	326,202	88,547	44,710	459,459
الحسكة	83,000	862,000	16,000	961,000
دير الزور	1,696,507	2,461,014	4,005	4,161,526
السويداء	405,720	17,000	11,000	433,720
درعا	126,113	8,900	4,526	139,538
المجموع	4,761,979	6,337,421	420,707	11,520,107

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

(١) ضم اليها قضاء تلكلخ
(٢) ضم اليها قضاء مصياف
(٣) سلخ منها قضاء تلكلخ ومصياف

MISCELLANEOUS

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توزيع المساحة المروية حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٣

DISTRIBUTION OF IRRIGATED AREA, BY MOHAFAZAT, IN 1953

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

MOHAFAZAT	المساحة المروية (بالهكتار) : Irrigated Area (in hectares)						المحافظات
	الجموع Total	مياه الانهار By rivers	مياه الاقنية والينابيع By canals and springs	مياه الآبار By underground water		مياه السيول By torrents	
				بالمحركات by pumps	بالغرافات by norias		
Total	866,969	207,232	57,967	222,286	19,944	1,738	الجموع
Damascus	81,116	56,985	17,508	5,974	544	430	دمشق
Homs	32,400	26,802	6,898	4,740	50	—	حمص
Hama	28,594	14,400	5,822	8,282	—	—	حماه
Latakia	9,723	2,962	3,640	3,122	—	—	اللاذقية
Aleppo	98,263	39,620	12,300	11,075	4,900	3,300	حلب
Deir-ez-Zor	40,008	22,888	7,825	30	100	—	الحسكة
Al-Hassakah	205,849	3,600	300	189,159	12,350	—	دير الزور
Suweida	200	11	190	1	—	8	السويداء
Der'a	18,962	11,360	4,330	32	—	—	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

DERMATOGLYPHICS IN PEOPLES OF THE NEAR EAST

I. LEBANESE: MITWALI

HAROLD CUMMINS AND W. M. SHANKLIN
Tulane University and American University of Beirut, Syria

121 This report is presented as a record of data toward an eventual analysis of racial variation in dermatoglyphics. It is to be hoped that a broad comparison of races on this basis may be eventually possible, but it will be necessary to continue the accumulation of records on various populations, perhaps from time to time taking stock of progress as has been done recently by Steggerda, Steggerda and Lane for the palmar features (Middle American Research Series, publication 7, Tulane University, '36).

124 101 795 The material here treated represents a population not hitherto investigated from the standpoint of dermatoglyphics. The Mitwali are a Syrian mountain people, living in the southern Lebanon range. They are Moslems, but adhere to the Shiite sect rather than to the Sunni which is common to the region. There are 138 subjects in the series, males and females being in the proportion of about two to one; in view of the small numbers the sexes are combined. The subjects are mainly children in the government schools, the adult population having proved generally unsuitable for printing—on account of extensive callouses.

141 128 The palmar features, main lines and patterns, are tabulated in tables 1 and 2, their formulations following the methods of Cummins et al. (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XII, '29).

The data on lines A and D have been further analyzed, to determine the main-line index which has been suggested by Cummins (Middle American Research Series, Tulane University, publication 7, '36) as a value denoting the degree of slant of the general palmar configuration. For the 276 hands

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, VOL. XXII, NO. 3
JANUARY–MARCH, 1937

000 and balance of payments; lack of technical skill; weakness in banking, monetary and financial systems ; and, in general, a primitive economic and financial structure.

4. It is clear to us that, under these conditions, the promotion of economic development must be to a large extent a government affair. Only the state has the authority and control of resources, to create conditions favourable to development, to establish principles, and to put into motion the machinery for its implementation. The state alone can make the changes and undertake the projects that are necessary to the economic well-being of the country. First, new laws must be passed to create legal, technical and organizational conditions favourable to development. For example, property rights must be safeguarded, the ownership and exploitation of land regulated, and a new code introduced into commercial transactions and economic activity generally. An organization must be estabished to formulate a policy of economic development and to carry out its implementation. It must have at its disposal full and accurate statistical information, and technical studies of the country's hidden wealth and neglected resources. The government must undertake large projects like land surveying and settlement, irrigation, drainage, and the construction of roads and bridges, which, though necessary before further development can take place, are beyond the capacity and capital of individuals. Finally, in order to achieve integration of effort, the government must direct the policy of economic development so as to ensure harmony between its several economic, monetary and financial aspects.

●121 5. The obstacles that stand in the way of economic development in Syria are fundamentally not different from those we outlined above (paragraph 3) though Syria has already covered considerable ground in these fields. In what follows we shall attempt to analyse Syria's condition at the dawn of her independence. We shall then briefly review the achievements of the country during the 1945-1953 period, so as to deduce from them the problems that at present beset economic development in Syria, and arrive at possible solutions. This paper will therefore be divided into three parts:

Problems of economic development.

A brief review of economic development, 1945-1953.

Current problems and possible solutions.

9: Hitti S-5 (ca. 1926) 1928 MD1 Syria MD1
Druze MD6

S
D
795

Commission of the League of Nations the question was raised as to whether there was anything in the Druze teachings that was inimical to organized government and to state authority.

S
D
124
795

A study of Druzism is especially valuable and interesting not only because its adherents, unlike the adherents of the other sects, have shown remarkable vitality and thrust themselves repeatedly upon the attention of the world—as in the case of the current events in Syria—but because of its historic connection with Christianity and Oriental Christian sects. In its rise and development from Moslem soil, Druzism held close relationship to Christianity and became heir to a number of Zoroastrian and Judaeo-Christian sects, as well as to a body of Hellenistic and Persian philosophies. Many of those sects and schools of thought have since disappeared, but Druzism is still with us; and, through its medium, their ideas have survived to the present day. The religious and philosophical concepts of many Shi'ite Moslem, and a few semi-Christian, sects have been preserved to us through Druzism, though the original sects and their votaries have long become extinct.

As we shall, therefore, in the following pages analyze and investigate the apparently strange dogmas and tenets of Druze belief, we shall find in addition to Neo-Platonic and Manichaean influences, marked traces of Jewish and Christian influences which have trickled thereto through Moslem strata. The basic fundamentals of Druze theology, as we shall see, are paralleled by corresponding Christian dogmas. One of the founders of Druzism was a renegade Christian, and many of its early leading converts were tribes belonging to some one of the Oriental churches.

There is, after all, nothing mysterious in the "Asian mystery," and the "great enigma" does lend itself to solution.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria map

PREFACE

● /21 THE course of events during the war, in underlining afresh the importance of the Middle East in international politics and strategy, has drawn attention to the lack of up-to-date studies on this region. The present is the first of several books which Chatham House plans to issue on Middle Eastern countries and problems. In Syria and Lebanon, with their diversities of religious, political, cultural and economic outlook, and the legacy of their status as Mandated Territories, most of the issues which affect the Middle East as a whole are to be seen in their most complex and baffling forms. No authoritative work has appeared in English on these questions during the last twenty years, and Mr. Hourani is, by background, training and recent experience, exceptionally qualified to present a reliable survey of their character and their wider bearings.

ASTOR
Chairman of the Council

Chatham House,
St. James's Square,
London, S.W.1.
July 1945

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS book, like all political works written in war-time, suffers from certain defects. At a time when the face of the world changes so rapidly and the process of publication takes so long it is inevitable that books on current political problems should be partly out of date as soon as they are published. Moreover, there are important and delicate subjects which in normal times would require the fullest treatment but now can only be dealt with tentatively and circumspectly, if at all. Three chapters, in particular, are affected by these reservations. In Chapter VIII, which deals with foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon, I have analyzed those interests as they existed in 1939, leaving it to the reader to estimate how much they and the policies based upon them will have changed when the war comes to an end. In Chapter XII the narrative of events during the war years ends with the assumption of office by nationalist Governments in the middle of 1943; but the controversial happenings of later months are summarized in a postscript. At the same time, Anglo-French relations in the Levant since 1941 have only been treated in outline, without insistence upon painful detail. Finally, the discussion of Arab unity in Chapter XIII should be reviewed in the light of the series of conferences and discussions which began in Alexandria in September, 1944, after the book was substantially completed. In spite of these deficiencies I have decided to allow publication of the book to proceed because of the importance and urgency of some of the problems with which it deals.

At all stages of its growth my book has owed more than I can say to the many friends and colleagues who have helped me to an understanding of Middle Eastern politics, brought relevant information to my notice and read parts of the manuscript. I am particularly conscious of my many-sided debt to Dr. C. Malik, Dr. C. Zurayq, Professor H. A. R. Gibb, Mr. H. Beeley and Commander C. Schaeffer. More perhaps than they know they have influenced my thinking upon Arab questions, and what positive ideas the book contains mostly derive from one or other of them. I owe a debt of another kind, but equally great, to various members of the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

INTRODUCTION

I

THIS essay springs from a number of beliefs about Near Eastern affairs, which have been constantly in the author's mind during the writing of it, and to clarify which was the main reason for its being undertaken. They may be summarized as follows :

(i) The spread of Western influences since the beginning of the nineteenth century has caused a fundamental change in the life of Syria and Lebanon, as in that of the other Arabic-speaking countries. The process of change has raised two questions which cannot wholly be separated from one another : first the question of forming a unity out of the two civilizations, their own and that of the West, between which the Arabic-speaking peoples are torn ; and secondly, the question of establishing a 'healthy' relationship, based upon equality and mutual respect, between them and the peoples of the West.

(ii) The solution of these two problems is of great importance not only for the Arabs themselves but also for the West, since the West now possesses living and inescapable relations, both moral and material, with the Arab lands.

(iii) Arab nationalism is the political form of the response which the existence and the consciousness of these problems has aroused among the Arabs. It is an attempt to defend the existence of the Arab community against forces which threaten to disrupt it, and to control and direct the process of Westernization in the light of principles which the Arabs accept as valid.

(iv) Arab nationalism is still an unformed movement and has not yet decided its attitude towards the West. There are two paths which it can follow, which may be called those of 'excommunication' from and of 'communion' with the West. The movement may become primarily one of opposition to the West, borrowing only the technical skill of Europe and America in order the better to resist both the encroachments of Western States and the challenge of the

Western spirit. It may, on the other hand, become a movement for the reconstruction of Arab society through a fundamental assimilation of the best elements in Western life (although not necessarily by imitation of them); in this task the help of Western Governments and peoples will be essential.

For the sake both of the Arabs and of the West, it is essential that the nationalist movement should take the second of these paths. If it takes the first, it will become impossible to establish a 'healthy' relationship with Europe, and nationalism itself will turn into a purposeless movement of hatred and fanaticism. This will distort not only the political development of the Arabs, but their life in all its aspects.

(v) Which of the two paths it will take will depend upon many factors. Among the most important of them are: the attitude of the Western Powers to the Arabs; the changes in Arab social and economic life; and the development of the Arab intellect. But the most important factor, and perhaps the least easy to predict, is the relationship which is established between Islam and a Westernized society, and between Islam and Christianity.

(vi) In the great changes which are remoulding the life of the Arabic-speaking peoples, Syria and Lebanon have a peculiarly important part to play. On account of their geographical situation, their traditions and certain characteristics of their people, they can serve as mediators of Western civilization to Arab Asia. But they can only carry out this function if their political relations with the other Arab regions and with the Western Powers are defined in a satisfactory manner.

It is therefore of particular importance to study the problem of Westernization in Syria and Lebanon, and to make clear the conditions under which a unity or a balance can be established between the traditional and the new elements in the life of the Syrians and Lebanese, and between them and the Western peoples with whom they are in contact.

This essay is an attempt to consider these problems in their

11: Houtani S-4 (no date) 1946 MDL Syria MDI

political aspect. It tries to make clear the effect of changing spiritual, intellectual and social conditions upon political life; the attempts which are being made to establish new political forms adequate to the needs of a new age; and the relations of Syria and Lebanon with one another, with the other Arabic-speaking countries and with the Western Powers.

The first part of the book summarizes the history of Syria and Lebanon, with particular attention to the successive forms of government to which they have been subjected, the relations of those Governments with local communities, and the various influences which have helped to mould the nature of the inhabitants; the process by which French rule was established is described in some detail. Part Two analyzes the general problem which lies at the root of almost all the political difficulties of the present period: the problem of a traditional society changing fundamentally under the impact of Western civilization. The effects of this impact on the economic, social and intellectual life of Syria and Lebanon are sketched; its effects in the political sphere are discussed at length. It is shown how the contact between old and new has given rise to the Arab nationalist movement. The nature and weaknesses, the internal and external difficulties of nationalism are described; and especially the difficulties which spring from the existence of a number of important minorities. This part ends with a summary of the interests of the Western Powers in Syria and Lebanon. Part Three contains a narrative of political history from the beginning of the French occupation to the present day. It deals mainly with the conflict between French policy and the aspirations of the nationalists, and summarizes the steps which have been taken and the statements made since the Allied occupation of 1941. Finally, Part Four sets forth the principles upon which must rest a successful definition of the relations of France with Syria and Lebanon, and of France and Great Britain in Syria and Lebanon. It ends with some general considerations upon the path which the Arab movement might profitably take.

In the course of the book questions are raised too numerous, complex and profound to be disposed of in so slight a work. The author has laid his main emphasis upon certain of them, and in a perhaps arbitrary manner has chosen only to touch the surface of others; for example, the social and economic bases of Arab nationalism are dealt with in a summary fashion.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 491

128 Other questions which would call for full discussion in a comprehensive treatise have been wholly ignored. The work has been described as an essay in order to indicate these limitations in its scope, no less than to avoid making too high a claim for the studies and experience upon which it is based.

2

121 101 It is important to make clear the way in which the term 'Syria' is used in the title and the text. Confusion has sometimes arisen from its use in several different senses: (i) In the past it has often been used to refer to the whole area stretching from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai Peninsula in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea on the west to the Syrian Desert on the east. This area constitutes in many ways a single geographical unit, and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense a single people. (ii) After the War of 1914-1918 this geographical unit was divided into two political areas; the southern area, which includes the regions now known as Palestine and Transjordan, was placed under a British Mandate, and the northern under a French. The term 'Syria' is sometimes used to refer to the whole northern area. (iii) This northern area was subdivided by the Mandatory Power into several political units, to which was given the collective name of 'Les États du Levant' or 'The Levant States'. From 1925 to 1936 they were four in number: the States of Syria and Greater Lebanon, or, as they are now called, the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and the Governments of Latakia (known at first as the 'State of the Alawis') and Jebel Druze. In 1936 the two Governments were formally annexed to the State of Syria, and were known no longer as 'Governments' but as 'Provinces'. Thus the term 'Syria' is often used in a third sense, to refer to the State of Syria, before 1936 excluding, and since then including, Latakia and Jebel Druze.

The explicit subject of this essay is 'Syria' in the second of the three senses defined above. This area will ordinarily be referred to as 'the French Mandated Territories', 'Syria and Lebanon' or 'the Levant States'. In the historical chapters (I-IV), however, it has been necessary to deal in general with the larger, geographical unit of the first definition. In these chapters, therefore, the term 'Syria' will be used to

11: Hourani 3-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M01

cover the whole of that unit, which will normally be referred to as 'geographical Syria'. Elsewhere in this book the word 'Syria' will only be employed to describe the State of Syria or Syrian Republic: that is, in the third sense.

All these terms are used simply for convenience and without any desire to prejudice the questions, which will be touched upon in the course of the essay, whether and on what grounds the political separation of the British from the French Mandated Territories, and of Syria from Lebanon, was justified.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

PREFACE

121 This is the report of a mission to Syria, organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Syria. The task of the mission was to undertake a general review of Syria's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the government to formulate a long-term development program for increasing Syria's productive resources and raising the standard of living of its people. The recommendations were to concern the approximate rate of public capital expenditure which Syria can appropriately undertake, priorities for such expenditure as among different sectors of the economy and as among types of undertakings within those sectors, measures apart from capital investment for improving and increasing production and raising living standards, and economic, fiscal and administrative policies and measures necessary for the success of the development program.

114 The mission consisted of ten full-time members. The adviser on agricultural production was nominated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; one of the economists is a member of the regular staff of the International Monetary Fund. Five members (the advisers on industry, housing and community planning, water resources and power, and transportation, and the agricultural economist) were recruited by the Bank from outside its staff. The other three members are members of the Bank's regular staff. The mission chief and one of the experts are from the Netherlands; the other mission members are from Switzerland, France, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The mission arrived in Syria early in February 1954 and remained until the latter part of April. During their stay in Syria, members of the mission travelled through all of the country's nine provinces. The mission reassembled at the Bank's headquarters for the purpose of writing this report.

121 The report is in two parts. Part I, the Main Report, contains the mission's recommendations for the organization and financing of a program of government action extending over five full years. Part II contains a series

[p. vi CONTAINS NO TEXTUAL MATERIAL.]

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121 of Annexes consisting of technical notes on Syria's international economic position, public finance, agriculture, irrigation, agricultural institutions, industry, electric power, transportation and communications, and settlements and social services.

100 The President of the Bank transmitted the report to the President of Syria in March 1955. The letter of transmittal noted that since the Executive Directors and management customarily do not review the recommendations of missions in detail, the report as transmitted represented the views of the mission rather than positive recommendations of the Bank. The letter added, however, that the Bank believed that the findings of the report deserved the most careful consideration and discussion.

Similarly, while the other international agencies which participated in the organization of the mission were given an opportunity to comment on the portions of the report of particular interest to them, responsibility for the recommendations of the report is to be regarded as that of the mission alone.

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CHAPTER 2

ECONOMIC PROGRAMMING AND ECONOMIC DATA

The Mission's Task

Before discussing its recommendations in various fields, the mission considers it advisable to explain briefly its conception of, and its approach to, this task. In broad terms, the mission was charged with working out an economic development program for the consideration of the Syrian government. The object of this program is manifestly to improve the standard of living in such a way that all elements of the population may share in the benefits of an expanding economy.

The program we have elaborated is one for government action. Under a free or private enterprise economy production and investment by private individuals cannot, of course, be programmed. At the same time it is obvious that the government's economic efforts must be directed largely toward stimulating output and that the volume of production and private investment in turn affects the resources available to the government for financing its program. There is thus an intimate interrelationship between the government's program and private effort. We have already indicated that there are signs pointing to a decline in the rate at which the private enterprise economy has been growing. Although such a prospective decline is extremely difficult to measure in quantitative terms, we have sought to take it into account both in devising a government program and in assessing the available resources. In our view the trend in private economic activity makes an effective program of government action all the more urgent.

We have not conceived of a development program simply as a series of public investment projects properly related to each other so that they form a consistent whole. Public investment in irrigation, roads, education, public health and other fields undoubtedly plays an important role in stimulating production and improving conditions of life. There is, however, a wide variety of public expenditures which do not take the form of investment but nevertheless significantly influence the level of economic

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

activity. These range from continuing expenditures on the preservation of public order to current outlays on education and public health and on government services for agriculture. Indeed, few activities of the government are entirely unrelated to development. This does not mean that the mission has taken within its purview virtually the entire scope of government operations. Many of these, for example in the field of public security, manifestly can be taken for granted. In general the mission has concerned itself only with those current expenditures which appeared to require expansion because they would provide a significant stimulus to the economy or because investment projects in turn entailed larger current outlays for operation and maintenance.

It was not the mission's task to work out in detail specific investment projects, whether in agriculture, industry or transport. A number of projects were included in the recommended program on the basis of prima facie evidence that they were likely to prove economically rewarding. Subsequent detailed engineering and economic appraisals may well lead to the modification of some of our recommendations. The mission confined itself to indicating the general lines along which development should take place and the approximate allocation of government resources which appeared appropriate in the light of available facts.

The mission had to frame a development program which would be within Syria's capacity to finance. This in itself imposed certain requirements on us. In proposing any measure it was necessary to appraise at the same time its cost to the government. It will be understood that such cost estimates could be only rough approximations in most cases. When the mission's recommendations are worked out in greater detail by the government, firmer estimates will no doubt become available. It was also essential to take into account all the government's prospective expenditures irrespective of their relationship to economic development. The adequacy of financial resources could not be assessed without considering all the claims that would be made on the use of available funds. Thus, although none of the mission members was a specialist in education and public health, it was necessary to examine the requirements of these services which in recent years have absorbed 36-37% of ordinary budget outlays. Certain expenditures, such as those on defense, obviously fell outside the scope of the mission's inquiry, but even here some assumption as to their future magnitude had to be made.

In estimating the financial resources available to cover projected

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expenditures, the mission has tried to appraise, first of all, the effect of future economic development on tax revenues. In making this estimate the mission assumed, as already indicated, that the economy would not expand as rapidly as in the past. More reliable information on the past rate of economic growth and on the development potential would undoubtedly have facilitated a more accurate prognosis. Secondly, the mission had to explore the possibility of increasing government revenue by more efficient collection of existing taxes and levying new taxes. Finally, it was necessary to adopt a number of assumptions regarding the development of non-tax receipts, including domestic borrowing and foreign financial assistance. It will be appreciated that the projection of government revenues as well as of expenditures over a number of years is beset by many uncertainties. Several crop failures, for example, could easily upset the balance and necessitate a modification of the program.

We have not been concerned exclusively with drawing up a program of government expenditures. Major economic and financial policies related to development have also been considered. Such policies can affect significantly the extent, direction and efficiency of private enterprise.

In working out its recommendations for a program, the mission has thought in terms of a period up to the end of the year 1960. The determination of any given period is always to some extent arbitrary. We felt, however, that any projection beyond 1960 would be attended by excessive uncertainty, and at the same time we considered that any significant accomplishment would require continuous effort over at least five or six years. Throughout this report we refer to our proposals as a six-year program, indicating that 1955 is considered as the program's initial year. Since our report was not submitted informally to the government until the end of 1954, only certain preliminary measures are likely to be taken in 1955. This means that the recommended program actually extends over five full years.

The mission's recommendations are obviously designed to provide only guidance for the government in working out its own development program. Economic programming must be done both on an annual basis and on a longer-term basis. The longer-term program such as the six-year plan we have outlined is needed to determine the goals and the approximate allocation of resources which may be envisaged. It will need to be periodically revised in the light of progress achieved, changes affecting the availability of resources, alterations in world economic conditions and

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121 any new facts which may be brought to light as the result of more thorough investigation of particular projects. Within the general framework of the longer-term plan, an annual program will need to be drawn up in much greater detail, taking into account the exact status of particular projects and the resources in both personnel and funds which are likely to be available during that specific year.

Any program will be conditioned by the availability of personnel as well as of financial resources. The mission's recommendations rest on the assumption that measures will be taken to train people for certain parts of the program, to obtain more technical assistance from abroad and to raise the standards and improve the efficiency of the government service. Even under the best circumstances, however, the execution of the many proposals we have made will place a great burden on the government. Progress may therefore not be as rapid as we have assumed. It should be pointed out, however, that we do not anticipate that the government will begin to implement all our proposals at once. Presumably only a few can be acted on in the first year, and many of our suggestions, particularly in the field of agriculture, relate to projects which would only be begun within the six-year period and which would be carried out in the main after 1960. We judge it important, however, to initiate action along a broad front during the next five or six years so that development thereafter may gain increasing momentum.

In formulating our proposals we have drawn on many sources for suggestions. Many of these proposals have been considered by the government at various times. The fact that some have been incorporated in our proposed program without a discussion of their origins does not mean that the mission claims to have originated them. Similarly, in focusing on those measures which should, in our opinion, be taken in the future, we have not always been able to pay adequate attention to the accomplishments of the past. There is no doubt, however, that Syrian people can be proud of the achievements during the first decade of the country's independence.

160 *Limitations of Data*

The mission wishes to emphasize that the lack of reliable information on many aspects of the economy made its task considerably more difficult. It is essential that a much greater effort be devoted to gathering data

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

FOREWORD

658 172 THE Minister of Education of the Syrian Republic, drawing attention to the importance of the problem of historical remains in Syria, requested Unesco to send a mission of inquiry to prepare a detailed report on: (a) the general situation and importance of ancient buildings and historical and archaeological sites in Syria; (b) general measures which might be taken to preserve these buildings and sites and make best advantage of them; (c) special measures to be taken to preserve and restore buildings and sites considered particularly important or urgently in need of such preservation or restoration.

Syria is one of the countries richest in historical remains, but her very riches in this respect make heavy demands on her resources. The Syrian Government, well aware of its cultural responsibilities, shows an enlightened interest in its country's past by freely allocating the large sums needed yearly for the upkeep and enhancement of its monuments. In addition to making this financial contribution, the government also shows its interest by extending a generous welcome to expeditions of foreign scholars who wish to carry out excavations in Syria; international co-operation is thus being established and maintained, with good results, on archaeological excavation sites. The Directorate of Antiquities believes that such co-operation might well be extended to the restoration of monuments which, for their artistic value and historical importance, may be considered as belonging to all mankind. It hopes that the results of the first inquiry organized by Unesco may lead to more definite collaboration in this field. This report, marking the first step in this direction, may suggest where such collaboration is called for.

121 In conformity with our instructions, we have endeavoured to describe both the general situation as regards historical monuments and archaeological sites in Syria, and the state of individual sites and monuments. We have tried to indicate the difficulties that must be overcome in order to ensure their preservation, and to suggest certain measures which might help to expand the work already begun with such good results

121 in this field by the Directorate of Antiquities. We have also studied the special conditions in each of the country's great archaeological regions, the particular difficulties to which the presentation and restoration of their monuments give rise, and practical ways of applying the principles already formulated.

114 The mission, consisting of an archaeologist, Mr. Paul Collart, a professor at the universities of Geneva and Lausanne, as head of the mission, an architect, Mr. Armando Dillon, Superintendent of Historical Monuments in Palermo, and Dr. Selim Abdul-Hak, Director-General of Syrian Antiquities, spent 10 weeks, from the end of May to the beginning of August 1953, collecting the necessary information on the spot. Thanks to the facilities accorded to them, Mr. P. Collart and Mr. A. Dillon were able to travel extensively in the country and thus form a well-grounded opinion on the various questions which they had to study.

000 It is our pleasant duty here to express our very sincere gratitude to all those who helped us in our task: at Damascus, to the officials of the Antiquities Service, who gave us assistance and advice on many occasions, and particularly to Mr. Ziki Amir, who accompanied us on our tours of the city; at Aleppo to Mr. Feisal Serafi, Director of Antiquities in northern Syria, and Mr. Soubhi Saouaf, Technical Officer; at Bosra, to Mr. Souleiman Magdad, Superintendent of Antiquities; at Sueida, Palmyra, Raqqa, Qalaat Seman, Hama and the Krak des Chevaliers, to the inspectors and attendants who so kindly welcomed us and acted as our guides. We should also like to thank Mr. Henri Seyrig, who authorized us to take our illustrations for this report from the collection of aerial photographs at the French Archaeological Institute in Beirut, and Mr. Georges Tchalenko, who gave us much useful information.

Lastly, although he was himself a member of the mission, we should like to express our gratitude to Dr. Selim Abdul-Hak for the kind welcome he gave us and all that he did to make our work easier during our stay in Syria.

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FOREWORD

121 This is the 20th issue of the Statistical Abstract of Syria which contains statistical information up to 1953.

The first two issues of the Abstract were published in Arabic only and the following Abstracts bilingually in Arabic and English. The English language was introduced in the Abstract in order that it provides a wider use of the Abstract by foreign institutions and experts engaged by the Government, it facilitates the answering of questions and inquiries raised by international agencies and foreign institutions as well as it insures the continuation of the present system of free exchange of publications with the international and national statistical offices.

The attention of readers is drawn to the fact that the Ministry of Interior has changed the names of certain mohafazat and qadas, and these changes have been introduced in the various tables of this Abstract. For easy reference, we give herebelow the changes that have taken place :

Horns mohafaza	Dir'a
Al-Jazira mohafaza	Hasakeh
Al-Furat mohafaza	Deir-es-Ser
Al-Jabal Qada	Quneitra
Al-Qalamoun Qada	Nabek
Wadi-el-Ajam Qada	Qatana
Jabal-el-Akrad Qada	Frin

We have pleasure in taking this opportunity to express, once again, our thanks to the various ministries and public and private institutions for their co-operation in furnishing the basic information of the statistical data presented in this publication. We hope that the field of this co-operation will be extended in the near future, enabling us to place at the disposal of Government as well as members of the public a wider scope of statistical data which may serve to be one of the basis of consultation in the work of developing the Country economically and socially.

Suggestions and observations from our readers towards the improvement of this Abstract will be carefully considered and greatly appreciated.

20th August, 1954. DIRECTORATE OF STATISTICS

PRECEDING P. i

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DERMATOGLYPHICS IN PEOPLES OF THE NEAR EAST

I. LEBANESE: MITWALI

HAROLD CUMMINS AND W. M. SHANKLIN
Tulane University and American University of Beirut, Syria

121 This report is presented as a record of data toward an eventual analysis of racial variation in dermatoglyphics. It is to be hoped that a broad comparison of races on this basis may be eventually possible, but it will be necessary to continue the accumulation of records on various populations, perhaps from time to time taking stock of progress as has been done recently by Steggerda, Steggerda and Lane for the palmar features (Middle American Research Series, publication 7, Tulane University, '36).

124 101 795 The material here treated represents a population not hitherto investigated from the standpoint of dermatoglyphics. The Mitwali are a Syrian mountain people, living in the southern Lebanon range. They are Moslems, but adhere to the Shiite sect rather than to the Sunni which is common to the region. There are 138 subjects in the series, males and females being in the proportion of about two to one; in view of the small numbers the sexes are combined. The subjects are mainly children in the government schools, the adult population having proved generally unsuitable for printing—on account of extensive callouses.

141 128 The palmar features, main lines and patterns, are tabulated in tables 1 and 2, their formulations following the methods of Cummins et al. (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XII, '29).

The data on lines A and D have been further analyzed, to determine the main-line index which has been suggested by Cummins (Middle American Research Series, Tulane University, publication 7, '36) as a value denoting the degree of slant of the general palmar configuration. For the 276 hands

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, VOL. XXII, NO. 2
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4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

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in this collection the mean index is 8.50 ± 0.09. Right hands alone yield a mean of 9.33 ± 0.11, and the lefts, 7.67 ± 0.12.

Axial triradii present the following percentile occurrences, right and left hands being here combined since no significant

TABLE 1

Terminations of the palmar main lines, stating the percentile occurrence of each position

POSITION	LINE A			LINE B			LINE C			LINE D		
	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
1	0.7	9.4	5.0									
2	0.7	7.2	3.9									
3	34.1	52.2	43.1									
4	10.1	9.4	9.7		0.7	0.3						
5′	49.3	21.7	35.5	2.2	4.3	3.2						
5″	5.1		2.5	31.2	49.3	40.2	5.8	15.9	10.8			
6				9.4	11.6	10.5	2.9	2.9	2.9			
7				50.0	32.6	41.3	18.8	23.2	21.0	5.8	16.7	11.2
8				3.6		1.8				2.2	2.9	2.5
9				3.6		1.8	53.6	31.2	42.4	26.1	34.8	30.4
10							3.6		1.8	8.7	11.6	10.1
11							2.9		1.4	57.2	33.3	45.2
X							5.1	17.4	11.2			
x							0.7	2.2	1.4			
O					1.4	0.7	6.5	7.2	6.8		0.7	0.3

R = right, L = left.

TABLE 2

Percentile occurrences of true patterns and pattern vestiges (not including 'multiplications') of the five palmar areas

PATTERN	RIGHT	LEFT	BOTH
Hypothenar	32.6	29.7	31.1
Thenar/first interdigital	8.7	19.6	14.1
Second interdigital	9.4	3.6	6.5
Third interdigital	68.1	47.8	57.9
Fourth interdigital	47.8	67.4	57.6

bimanual differences are noted: 0, 0.7; t, 71.7; t′, 14.5; t″, 1.1; tt′, 6.9; tt″, 4.0; tt′t″, 0.4; t′t″, 0.7.

Frequencies of the finger-print types, classified by the usual fourfold scheme, are as follows: arches, 2.7%; radial loops, 4.2%; ulnar loops, 50.9%; whorls, 42.2%. The abundance of whorls is noteworthy.

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As pointed out by Cummins and Steggerda (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XX, '35), the pattern types may be regarded as variants of 'pattern intensity.' The arch is not a pattern in the strict sense of the term, while loops and whorls may be regarded as levels of successively increasing pattern intensity. For statistical purposes arbitrary values are assigned to the pattern types: arch, 0; loop, 1; whorl, 2. The complement of patterns in an individual is then converted into the 'index of pattern intensity' by summating the values of

TABLE 3

Percentile occurrence of pattern types for each digit

Digit	I			II			III		
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
Whorls	68.1	55.8	61.9	52.2	47.8	50.0	27.5	31.9	29.7
Ulnar loops	29.0	42.8	35.9	22.5	27.5	25.0	66.7	62.3	64.5
Radial loops	1.4	0.7	1.0	18.8	17.4	18.1	1.4	1.4	1.4
Arches	1.4	0.7	1.0	6.5	7.2	6.8	4.3	4.3	4.3

Digit	IV			V		
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
Whorls	50.0	44.2	47.1	24.6	20.3	22.4
Ulnar loops	48.6	55.8	52.2	74.6	79.0	76.8
Radial loops	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Arches	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.7

R = right, L = left.

the ten patterns. The indices therefore range from 0, indicating ten arches, to 20, the value for ten whorls. The mean index in the present series is 13.96 ± 0.20. As a matter of record, providing for other statistical determinations such as the dactylodiagram of Poll, the frequencies of pattern types on separate digits are here recorded in table 3.

SUMMARY

Palmar main lines, axial triradii, palmar patterns and fingerprint patterns are analyzed in 138 Mitwali, a Syrian mountain population. It may be noted that the features present a close relationship to another Lebanese series as well as to the Rwala Arabs (unpublished data).

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS book, like all political works written in war-time, suffers from certain defects. At a time when the face of the world changes so rapidly and the process of publication takes so long it is inevitable that books on current political problems should be partly out of date as soon as they are published. Moreover, there are important and delicate subjects which in normal times would require the fullest treatment but now can only be dealt with tentatively and circumspectly, if at all. Three chapters, in particular, are affected by these reservations. In Chapter VIII, which deals with foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon, I have analyzed those interests as they existed in 1939, leaving it to the reader to estimate how much they and the policies based upon them will have changed when the war comes to an end. In Chapter XII the narrative of events during the war years ends with the assumption of office by nationalist Governments in the middle of 1943; but the controversial happenings of later months are summarized in a postscript. At the same time, Anglo-French relations in the Levant since 1941 have only been treated in outline, without insistence upon painful detail. Finally, the discussion of Arab unity in Chapter XIII should be reviewed in the light of the series of conferences and discussions which began in Alexandria in September, 1944, after the book was substantially completed. In spite of these deficiencies I have decided to allow publication of the book to proceed because of the importance and urgency of some of the problems with which it deals.

At all stages of its growth my book has owed more than I can say to the many friends and colleagues who have helped me to an understanding of Middle Eastern politics, brought relevant information to my notice and read parts of the manuscript. I am particularly conscious of my many-sided debt to Dr. C. Malik, Dr. C. Zurayq, Professor H. A. R. Gibb, Mr. H. Beeley and Commander C. Schaeffer. More perhaps than they know they have influenced my thinking upon Arab questions, and what positive ideas the book contains mostly derive from one or other of them. I owe a debt of another kind, but equally great, to various members of the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MDL Syria MDI

political aspect. It tries to make clear the effect of changing /21 spiritual, intellectual and social conditions upon political life; the attempts which are being made to establish new political forms adequate to the needs of a new age; and the relations of Syria and Lebanon with one another, with the other Arabic-speaking countries and with the Western Powers.

The first part of the book summarizes the history of Syria /28 and Lebanon, with particular attention to the successive forms of government to which they have been subjected, the relations of those Governments with local communities, and the various influences which have helped to mould the nature of the inhabitants; the process by which French rule was established is described in some detail. Part Two analyzes the general problem which lies at the root of almost all the political difficulties of the present period: the problem of a traditional society changing fundamentally under the impact of Western civilization. The effects of this impact on the economic, social and intellectual life of Syria and Lebanon are sketched; its effects in the political sphere are discussed at length. It is shown how the contact between old and new has given rise to the Arab nationalist movement. The nature and weaknesses, the internal and external difficulties of nationalism are described; and especially the difficulties which spring from the existence of a number of important minorities. This part ends with a summary of the interests of the Western Powers in Syria and Lebanon. Part [illegible] contains a narrative of political history from the beginning of the French occupation to the present day. It deals mainly with the conflict between French policy and the aspirations of the nationalists, and summarizes the steps which have been taken and the statements made since the Allied occupation of 1941. Finally, Part Four sets forth the principles upon which must rest a successful definition of the relations of France with Syria and Lebanon, and of France and Great Britain in Syria and Lebanon. It ends with some general considerations upon the path which the Arab movement might profitably take.

In the course of the book questions are raised too numerous, complex and profound to be disposed of in so slight a work. The author has laid his main emphasis upon certain of them, and in a perhaps arbitrary manner has chosen only to touch the surface of others; for example, the social and economic bases of Arab nationalism are dealt with in a summary fashion.

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128 Other questions which would call for full discussion in a comprehensive treatise have been wholly ignored. The work has been described as an essay in order to indicate these limitations in its scope, no less than to avoid making too high a claim for the studies and experience upon which it is based.

2

121 101 It is important to make clear the way in which the term 'Syria' is used in the title and the text. Confusion has sometimes arisen from its use in several different senses: (i) In the past it has often been used to refer to the whole area stretching from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai Peninsula in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea on the west to the Syrian Desert on the east. This area constitutes in many ways a single geographical unit, and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense a single people. (ii) After the War of 1914-1918 this geographical unit was divided into two political areas; the southern area, which includes the regions now known as Palestine and Transjordan, was placed under a British Mandate, and the northern under a French. The term 'Syria' is sometimes used to refer to the whole northern area. (iii) This northern area was subdivided by the Mandatory Power into several political units, to which was given the collective name of 'Les États du Levant' or 'The Levant States'. From 1925 to 1936 they were four in number: the States of Syria and Greater Lebanon, or, as they are now called, the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and the Governments of Latakia (known at first as the 'State of the Alawis') and Jebel Druze. In 1936 the two Governments were formally annexed to the State of Syria, and were known no longer as 'Governments' but as 'Provinces'. Thus the term 'Syria' is often used in a third sense, to refer to the State of Syria, before 1936 excluding, and since then including, Latakia and Jebel Druze.

The explicit subject of this essay is 'Syria' in the second of the three senses defined above. This area will ordinarily be referred to as 'the French Mandated Territories', 'Syria and Lebanon' or 'the Levant States'. In the historical chapters (I-IV), however, it has been necessary to deal in general with the larger, geographical unit of the first definition. In these chapters, therefore, the term 'Syria' will be used to

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Notes on Foreign Trade Statistics

The figures published in the section of foreign trade are in respect of the Special Imports and exports, defined as follows :

Special Imports : Comprise consumption goods cleared as such on direct entry from abroad or following a direct transit entry or upon clearance from the bonded warehouses, or upon acceptance as temporary imports.

The value is based on the amount given on the manifest after checking by the custom authorities, CIF the station of entry, excluding the custom duties.

The conversion into Syrian currency is based on the official rate of exchange, which is below the true value as per the market rate. The total value of imports based on the official rates was 68.6 per cent of the value based on the market rates in 1951 and 68.2 per cent in 1952.

Special Exports : Comprise local goods exported or goods of a foreign origin exported having earlier entered the country exempted of custom duty or, duty paid.

The value is given F.O.B. the Station of clearance.

Country of origin and country of destination : By country of origin is meant the producing country in the case of animal and vegetable products and the country where the last process of manufacture has been completed in the case of industrial products.

By country of destination is meant the country of final destination as known by the exporter and declared on the date of export.

ملاحظات عن احصائات التجارة الخارجية

ان الاحصائات الواردة في فصل التجارة الخارجية من هذه النشرة ترجع الى التجارة الخاصة للاستيراد والتصدير حسب التعريف التالي :

تجارة الاستيراد الخاصة : تتضمن البضائع الموضوعة في الاستهلاك سواء لدى ورودها مباشرة من الخارج او على اثر ترانزيت مباشر او عند اخراجها من المستودع او بعد قبولها تحت وضع الاستيراد الوقتي .

وقيمة هذه التجارة مستقاة من البيانات التي يقدمها اصحاب العلاقة بعد التحقق من صحتها من قبل المصالح الجمركية المختصة وهي المبينة اي قيمة البضاعة في محل الارسال مضافاً اليها اجور النقل والتأمين وكافة المصاريف الاخرى حتى جمرك التخليص ولا تدخل فيها الرسوم الجمركية .

وقد حولت العملات الاجنبية الى العملة السورية حسب الاسعار الرسمية وبذلك تكون القيم المذكورة دون القيم الفعلية التي اساسها اسعار السوق وقد كانت نسبة قيمة الاستيراد حسب السعر الرسمي للقيمة حسب سعر السوق ٦٦,٦٪ عام ١٩٥١ و ٦٨,٢٪ عام ١٩٥٢ .

تجارة التصدير الخاصة : تتضمن البضائع الوطنية المصدرة والبضائع ذات المنشأ الاجنبي التي تعاد الى الخارج بعد ان تكون قد قبلت في الاعفاء او اكتسبت الصفة الوطنية بدفع رسوم الاستيراد . وقيمة هذه التجارة هي «فوب» اي قيمة البضاعة بما فيها المصاريف حتى مكتب الاخراج .

بلدان المنشأ والقصد : يعني بلد المنشأ بلد الانتاج فيما يتعلق بالمعاملات الزراعية والحيوانية والبلد التي تمت فيها مرحلة الصنع الاخير فيما يتعلق بالمنتوجات الصناعية . ويعني بلد القصد بلد القصد النهائي كما يعرفه المصدر ويصرح عنه بتاريخ التصدير .

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PRICES

The method of collecting wholesale and retail prices as well as the method of computing the indices thereof, are as follows :

(1) Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices : The list of items for wholesale prices is divided into five categories :

The first category : comprises 28 food items.
The second category : comprises 22 items of raw materials.
The third category : comprises 16 items of locally manufactured products.
The fourth category : comprises 30 items for buildings and constructions.
The fifth category : comprises 10 items of fuel materials.

The prices for these items are collected weekly, and a monthly average is calculated for each item. This average is compared with that of the previous month and a percentage is given. A geometric average is then computed for each category, indicating the change in price of the category compared with the previous month. By means of the «Chain» method, the index numbers shown on page 165 have been produced, taking the average of 1949 as a base = 100.

The index numbers of each category have been left without combination into one general index of all categories, pending the completion of a special study which will form the basis for a: all-category index number.

نورد فيما يلي شرحاً من كيفية جمع اسعار الجملة والمفرق والطريقة التي اتبعت في استخراج الارقام القياسية منها

(١) الارقام القياسية لاسعار الجملة

جرى تقسيم مواد اسعار الجملة الى خمسة اقسام :

يتضمن القسم الاول منها (المواد الغذائية) ٢٨ صنفاً ، والقسم الثاني (المواد الاولية) ٢٢ صنفاً ، والقسم الثالث (المنتجات الصناعية) ١٦ صنفاً ، والقسم الرابع (موادالبناء) ٣٠ صنفاً ، والقسم الخامس (المواد المشتقة) ١٠ اصناف .

وتجمع اسعار هذه المواد اسبوعياً ثم يستخرج الوسطي الشهري من كل من هذه الاصناف وتقارن مع وسطي السعر للصنف ذاته في الشهر السابق ويعطى نسبة مئوية . ويستخرج الوسطي الهندسي من هذه النسب ، كل قسم على حدة ، فينتج عن ذلك النسبة المئوية لجملة القسم مقارنة بالشهر السابق . وبطريقة « السلاسل المتصلة » توصلنا الى الارقام القياسية الواردة في صفحة ١٦٥ باعتبار وسطي عام ١٩٤٩ يساوي ١٠٠

وقد تركنا هذه الارقام القياسية دون الخروج بها الى مقياس مجمل ريثما تتم دراستالتي ستتخذهاساساً لتوحيد هذه المقاييس العامة .

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الاسعار

(٢) الارقام القياسية لاسعار المفرق

لما كنا نحتاج الى القيام بدراسات وافية عن نفقات المعيشة لنبني عليها الارقام القياسية لنفقات المعيشة ، وحيث انه تعذر علينا حتى الان القيام بمثل هذه الدراسات لضيق جهاز مديريتنا ولعدم توفر المال اللازم لهذا الغرض رأينا ان نتعرف في الوقت الحاضر الى تنظيم الرقم القياسي لاسعار المفرق لاهم المواد الغذائية .

وتجب الاشارة هنا الى ان الرقم القياسي هذا لا يمثل تكاليف المعيشة لكافة المواد الغذائية اذ لا يشمل اسعار الخضار والفواكه بل يستند الى ٢٢ صنفا حسب الجدول على الصفحة ١٦٤ من هذه النشرة وحسب التفصيل المبين في الجدول ذاته .

وتجمع اسعار المفرق هذه اسبوعيا ويستخدم الوسطي الشهري منها للوصول الى الرقم القياسي بطريقة « الوسطي الاجمالي » على الوجه التالي :

اذا اشير الى الاسعار والاصطلاحات س ١ س ٢ س ٣ الخ .. الاصناف ١ و ٢ و ٣ الخ .. خلال المدة الاساسية واشير الى الكمية ، وهي بمثابة الرقم التثقيلي العدل ، بالاصطلاحات ك١ ك٢ ك٣ الخ ... والى الاسعار حسب الشهور بـ س١ س٢ س٣ الشهر الاول والثاني والثالث الخ .. فتكون المعادلة :

$$\text{الرقم القياسي} = \frac{\text{س}_1\text{ك}_1 + \text{س}_2\text{ك}_2 + \text{س}_3\text{ك}_3 \text{ (الشهر الاول)}}{\text{س}_1\text{ك}_1 + \text{س}_2\text{ك}_2 + \text{س}_3\text{ك}_3 \text{ (المدة الاساسية)}} \times 100$$

الارقام القياسية لاسعار المفرق لمدينة دمشق لاثنين وعشرين صنفا من اولي الضروريات (وسطي ١٩٣٨ = ١٠٠)

INDEX NUMBER OF RETAIL PRICES FOR 22 ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES IN DAMASCUS

(Base : Average 1938 = 100)

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

الارقام القياسية حسب السنوات Index Numbers by Years			الارقام القياسية حسب الشهور Index Numbers by Months				
Av. Year	الارقام القياسية Index No.	وسطي السنوات	Month	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الشهور
1939	108,0	١٩٣٩	January	536,0	632,1	585,7	كانون ثاني
1940	157,6	١٩٤٠	February	535,2	626,4	589,8	شباط
1941	281,5	١٩٤١	March	536,4	594,2	572,7	آذار
1942	534,5	١٩٤٢	April	515,4	605,4	553,3	نيسان
1943	609,5	١٩٤٣	May	519,7	596,4	538,0	ايار
1944	741,2	١٩٤٤	June	539,5	580,2	523,3	حزيران
1945	850,5	١٩٤٥	July	521,7	566,7	530,0	تموز
1946	798,1	١٩٤٦	August	545,6	574,7	523,5	آب
1947	690,1	١٩٤٧	September	563,9	572,7	523,5	ايلول
1948	682,1	١٩٤٨	October	607,5	585,0	538,7	تشرين اول
1949	561,6	١٩٤٩	November	613,6	594,4	523,1	تشرين ثاني
1950	477,9	١٩٥٠	December	612,3	609,7	524,5	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

(2) Index Number of Retail Prices : As it is beyond the means of this Department at present to conduct a family budget enquiry, on which to base the compilation of an index number of cost-of-living, we aided towards preparing an index number of retail prices covering mainly essential food commodities.

The index number of retail prices shown in the following table, is based on 22 items listed on page 164, of which 19 are foodstuffs and 3 are other essential items, namely soap, kerosene and cigarettes. Base retail prices are collected weekly and monthly average thereof is used in arriving at the index number by the «Aggregate» methods as per the following equation :

Where P1, P2, P3 etc... indicate the prices of item 1, 2, 3 etc... for the base period and Q1, Q3 etc... indicate the quantities involved, and P1 P2 P3 etc... indicate the prices in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. months.

$$\text{Index number} = \frac{P_1Q_1 + P_2Q_2 + P_3Q_3 \text{ (for 1st month)}}{P_1Q_1 + P_2Q_2 + P_3Q_3 \text{ (for base period)}} \times 100$$

PART ONE

I. THE HISTORY OF SYRIA[1]

1

101 131 EVEN were there no Syrian people a Syrian problem would still exist. Syria owes its political importance less to the qualities of its population than to its geographical position. Before its history can be fully understood, it is necessary to grasp the nature of the land and its relation with the surrounding world.

Syria is part of a larger area which may be treated as a single unit, in the sense that the course of affairs in one part of it has always had a peculiarly close relationship with that in some or 131 all of the other parts. The southern base of this area is the 133 Arabian peninsula, bounded on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the east by the Persian Gulf. The west of the peninsula, the Hejaz and Yemen, is hilly and in parts fertile, and so too is a smaller area in the south-east; but the greater portion of the interior is fit only for pasturage, except in the oases. In the south, it is a sandy waste, in the centre, Nejd, a dry, hilly and often stony steppe. North of Nejd there is another belt of sand; and north of this belt is the dry steppe of the Syrian Desert, growing narrower as it goes northwards. Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the 'Fertile Crescent', a belt of cultivable land bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which run southwards through it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian Gulf; this is Iraq or Mesopotamia. The Fertile Crescent is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south-east by the head-waters of the Persian Gulf. In the north and east it is hemmed in by mountain-ranges: to the north the Taurus Mountains, the southern part of the Anatolian highlands which stretch across Asia Minor, to the north-east the mountains of Kurdistan, and to the east the Persian plateau. Joined to the western part of the Fertile Crescent by the peninsula of Sinai, but separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, is the land of Egypt, the fertile valley of the Nile surrounded by sandy deserts.

[1] In Chapters I–IV the word 'Syria' is used to refer to 'geographical Syria' as defined in the Introduction.

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
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
ANATOLIA
KURDISTAN
MEDITERRANEAN
MESOPOTAMIA
Syrian Desert
EGYPT
NEJD
HADRAMAUT
INDIAN OCEAN
NEAR EAST. Geographical Regions
Land over 1500 metres
High Land under 1500 metres

131 Thus the boundaries of Syria may be defined as the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Mediterranean to the west, Sinai and Hejaz to the south, and northern Mesopotamia and the Syrian Desert to the east. Its length is rather more than 500 miles, and the breadth of its cultivable area varies between 100 and 150 miles.

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133 It is itself split up into several regions clearly marked off from one another by main lines of division running roughly from north to south, with subsidiary lines running from east to west. The first region is the Mediterranean coastal belt, in some places broad enough to be called a plain, for example the plain of Akkar, but in others no more than a narrow strip; [504] in general, it broadens as it goes south. Although it has few good natural harbours, it is studded with famous ports: Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Haifa and Jaffa. East of it is a highland belt: the Amanus in the north, then the Jebel Ansariyah, rising to some 5,000 ft., then Lebanon, of which the peaks reach 10,000 ft., and then the Palestinian hills, bounded on the south by the arid district of the Negeb. This belt is scarred with the valleys of streams flowing westwards to the sea, and cut across by a number of gaps, through some of which rivers flow: the plain of Antioch, the gap between Tripoli and Homs and the plain of Esdraelon. East of these ranges runs a line of comparatively narrow depressions varying in character from north to south. In the north there are the plain of al-Amq, the Orontes valley and the Ghab marshes; south of them lies the Biqa' valley; then the broken country in which lie the sources of the Jordan; then the swampy district of Hulah; then the narrow valley of the Jordan, lying below sea-level, opening out at one point into the Sea of Galilee and ending in the Dead Sea; and finally the Wadi Araba, leading down to the Red Sea at Aqaba. A number of important rivers run for part of their courses along these depressions: the Orontes flowing north and then west, the Litani south and then west, and the Jordan south. Here also lie the important lakes of Syria: those of Homs and Hulah, the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. The line of depressions is interrupted by the ridge of Baalbek, the watershed between the Orontes and Litani; and farther south is linked with the coastal plain by the Esdraelon Gap.

132 region to another. On some mountain heights it is over 40 in., while in the desert areas it sinks almost to nothing. The temperature also varies greatly, in general increasing from west to east and to a lesser extent from north to
132 south. The differences of rainfall and temperature, together
311 with such other factors as the presence or absence of rivers
241 and springs, give rise to great differences in fertility and vegetation. The coastal regions have a Mediterranean climate, and are often well watered both by rainfall and by rivers; they are suitable for cereals, tobacco and many kinds of fruit. The seaward slopes of the maritime ranges have a more temperate climate, and terraces of cultivable soil on which olive trees and vines can grow; but the eastern slopes are more barren. The central depression has a sub-tropical climate. Parts of it are well watered by rivers and are fertile. In the Jordan Valley, fruits can be cultivated, and cereals in the more northern parts of the inner depression. Much of the inner range is dry and barren; but on the plateaux of the north and of Transjordan there is sufficient rainfall to make possible the cultivation of cereals. This is true also of the Hauran and Jebel Druze. The Ghutah is suitable with irrigation for the growing of fruits of many kinds. East of the inner range the rainfall becomes scantier, the heat more intense, and the land less fertile; until finally it becomes too arid to be suitable for anything but pasturage. But across the Euphrates conditions change once more, and it is possible to grow cereals in the river valleys of the Jazirah.

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131 The nature of Syrian history has been deeply affected by the structure and position of the land. It is largely a history of economic, political and other movements affecting the whole area of which Syria forms a part. To those movements Syria has served at times as a starting-point, at others as a terminus or a bridge.

439 The first of the movements has been that of world trade. Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East; and its own products, oil, grain, textiles and metal work, have at times found a market in the Western world. Another and more specialized trade has been that with

THE "SYKES-PICOT" AGREEMENT, 1916

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

THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MANDATED TERRITORIES, 1922

T U R K
HATAY
A L E P P O
E U P H
HAMA
LATAKIA
H O M S
D A M A S C U S
JEBEL DRUZE
PALESTINE
TRANSJORDAN

END MAP (A)

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1 LEBANON ME1

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END MAP (B)

PHYSICAL FEATURES

طول حدود الجمهورية السورية
BOUNDARIES OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

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Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Coasts and Neighbouring Countries	طول الحدود بالكيلو متر Length of boundary kms.	النسبة الى طول الحدود بالمئة per cent of total length %	الشواطئ والبلاد المجاورة
Total	2,274	100.0	المجموع
The Mediterranean Sea	173	7.6	البحر الابيض المتوسط
Turkey	808	35.5	تركيا
Iraq	592	26.1	العراق
Transjordan	353	15.5	شرق الاردن
Palestine	70	3.1	فلسطين
Lebanon	278	12.2	لبنان

Source : Ministry of Public Works — المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

مساحة البحيرات الرئيسية في الجمهورية السورية
AREA OF PRINCIPAL LAKES IN THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

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Table No. 2 — جدول رقم ٢

Name of Lake	Location	المساحة كم٢ Area km2	موقعها الجغرافي	اسم البحيرة
Qattineh	Near Homs	60	قرب حمص	قطينة
El-Ghab	« Jisr-ash-Shugour	300	قرب جسر الشغور	الغاب
Jabbul	« Aleppo	150	قرب حلب	جبول
Otelbeh	« Damascus	64	قرب دمشق	عتيبة
Hijaneh	« Damascus	24	« «	هيجانة
Jeirud	« Damascus	15	« «	جيرود
Mseirib	« Dir'a	1	قرب درعا	مزيريب
Khatuniyeh	« Hassakeh	2	قرب الحسكة	خاتونية

Source : Ministry of Public Works — المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI
LEBANON MEI

Chapter Ten

SYRIA AND LEBANON

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

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THE area of the present Syria and Lebanon lies to the north of Arabia Deserta and is the western horn of the Fertile Crescent. The two republics do not enclose within their boundaries a natural geographic entity and their climate and topography are best studied in relation to the surrounding countries;[1] but within the political boundaries of the two states, the following geographical divisions may roughly be distinguished:

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[241]

(1) *The Coastal Strip*. This is about twenty miles wide near Latakia and rather less just north of Tripoli, but in some places disappears and the mountains meet the sea. Olives, bananas, citrus, and vegetables are cultivated intensively near Beirut.

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(2) *The Mountains*. Starting from the north, the first coastal mountains are the Jebel Ansariya (also known as the Alawi Mountains) which average 4,000 feet and are well populated on the western slopes. To the south is the Homs–Tripoli gap and then starts the Lebanon range with peaks of over 10,000 feet. Even on the upper slopes of this range water is plentiful, there is close cultivation, and the villages and towns are prosperous. Near Beirut are situated the mountain resorts to which most of the city workers move each night when the summer brings its humid heat. The interior ranges of mountains lying parallel to that of the Lebanon are the Anti-Lebanon (between Homs and Zahle) reaching over 7,000 feet and the range of Hermon (between Zahle and the Israel border) which reaches 9,200 feet. Water and cultivation are far less plentiful on these than on the coastal mountains. Farther inland still and to the south of Damascus lie the Leja, a bleak area of igneous rock, and the Jebel Druze, which reaches 5,000–6,000 feet and lies north of the Jordan border.

(3) *Plains and Plateaux*. Hardly any of the territory of Syria and Lebanon lies less than 700 feet above sea-level and south of Hama almost all the land is over 1,600 feet. The richest agricultural land is on fairly high ground and forms part of a

[1] See W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East; a Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (London, Methuen, 1950).

Syria mD1

SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organization.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

63-Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MO1

6

Syria

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

The Republic of Syria was constituted in 1943, when France relinquished control over the mandated territories of Lebanon and Syria. Geographically and ethnically Syria forms an integral part of the eastern Mediterranean region, but politically it has undergone progressive modification since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Considerable confusion in terminology arises from the fact that the entire area was then designated as Syria. It was mandated to France by the League of Nations in 1923 as the separate territories of Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently, for a brief period the region was divided into the autonomous "Levant States" of Lebanon, Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. With the annexation of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz as provincial units in 1936, and the cession of the Alexandretta district to Turkey in 1939, the present boundaries of Syria were established. The country now includes an area of approximately 71,000 square miles. In the west, it has a coastline of about 104 miles on the Mediterranean Sea and, to the south, common frontiers with Lebanon and northern Israel. Inland, it is surrounded by Turkey on the north, Iraq on the east and the southeast, and Jordan on the south.

The interior of the country is essentially a semiarid plateau, sloping to the basins of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and backed by chains of mountains in the north and the west. The highlands on the Turkish border are not well defined, but those in the west differentiate distinct geographic regions. In the north, the Nusairiyeh mountains, with elevations up to 5,000 feet,

p. 135(a)

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132
241
231
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491
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Syria MD1

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

6: Government of Syria-1G-4 (no date) 1952 MD1 Syria MD1

REPORT ON JAZIRAH

101 Geographically, Jazirah, i.e., "the Island", is that strip of territory lying between the rivers Dijla and Euphrates, but for the purpose of this report, the term Jazirah is understood in its administrative meaning as a Mohafaza of Syria, and will be studied as such.

AREA OF JAZIRAH AND ITS CULTIVABLE LANDS

The "Statistical Abstract of Syria" for 1950 gives the total area of Jazirah as 2,217,000 hectares divided between the Mohafaza center, i.e., Hassakeh, Qamishli, and Dijla, in the following proportion:

Mohafaza Center	1,525,000 hectares
Qada of Qamishli	392,000 hectares
Qada of Dijla	300,000 hectares

311 Of this total area, according to the same source, 444,266 hectares were cultivated in 1948-49, and 1,701,284 hectares were cultivable but uncultivated, while the uncultivable lands were only 71,450 hectares.

This terminology of cultivable and uncultivable is greatly misleading. If by cultivable is meant the lands which are not rocky or mountainous or forested, the terminology is right though it loses its economic meaning. But if by it is meant lands which can be planted and rendered productive to show some profit, then other factors have to be considered, and the productive "cultivable" area of Jazirah is greatly reduced.

132 The first of these factors is the amount of rainfall. It is really astonishing that the Syrian Government has not deemed it necessary to establish agricultural stations in different regions of Jazirah to record at least the amount of rainfall in the different localities. The only such station is at Hassakeh which is not primarily a wheat growing district and the mean annual rainfall over a period of nine years is less than 300 mm. This average is less than the minimum required for successful rain-fed cultivation.

I. The Mohafaza Center

311 Therefore about 80% of the 1,525,000 hectares mentioned as
312 cultivable in the Mohafaza Center are in fact uncultivable unless

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not. 311 312

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short. 124 133 [241]

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah. 634 311

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts: 311

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions. 311 [320] 241

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating 311 241 [79] 132

it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes. The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer. Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less thanLS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley. But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but 311
which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed [166]
into the region following the opening of the road and began populat- 491
ing it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region.

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" bar- 243
ley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat 433
are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita.

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances 185
which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and 654
planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below:

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the [132]
month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new

6: Government of Syria--46 G-4 (no date)1962 MD1 Syria MD1

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

THE REGION IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE RAINFALL

regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
●132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;[8] it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub[8] and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Pahnyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

Irrigation

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

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113 [8] A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Journ. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria

Farther east there lies another belt of highlands. In the far north it takes the form first of the Kurd Dagh hills, then of a plateau and a series of low ranges, south of which lies the range of Anti-Lebanon, facing Lebanon across the Biqa', and rising some 9,000 ft. above sea-level. South of Anti-Lebanon is Mount Hermon with its many valleys and its three peaks, the highest of which is over 9,000 ft. high. From Hermon the land drops into the Hauran plateau; south of it is the tableland of Transjordan, which itself ends in the steppe country of the northern Hejaz.

The northern plateau slopes eastwards until it reaches the valley of the Euphrates flowing south-east. The eastward slopes are in part cultivable land, but in part semi-desert and steppe, known sometimes as the 'Little Desert' to distinguish it from the Syrian Desert to the south of it. Around and across the Euphrates is a district known as the Jazirah, which is geographically part of Iraq but of which a portion lies within the political frontiers of the Levant States. It is a district of stony hills and plains, but fertile in the river valleys, those of the Euphrates itself and of its tributaries, the Balikh and the Khabur.

East of the Anti-Lebanon the country is somewhat different. There is no plateau sloping gently to a river valley, but the eastern flanks of the mountains lead down to a barren steppe, formed of stone and gravel, with sand-dunes and coarse vegetation: the Syrian Desert. In places the Desert comes up almost to the foot of the inner range; but in others it is held back by areas of cultivable land. One such is the Ghutah, the fertile land around Damascus, well wooded and well watered by its streams. To the south of it, but separated from it by a plain of lava, lies another cultivable region, the Hauran, a large basalt plateau open to rain-clouds coming from the Mediterranean through the Esdraelon Gap. In the east this plain rises into the hilly but fertile district of Jebel Druze, of which the peaks are 6,000 ft. above sea-level. South of the Jebel Druze, the highlands of Transjordan slope eastwards and die away in isolated hills.

While the general climatic régime is similar throughout, there is great variety of temperature and rainfall in consequence of the sharp differences of relief and position. In all parts the rainy season is from October or November to April or May; but the amount of rainfall varies greatly from one

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

132 region to another. On some mountain heights it is over 40 in., while in the desert areas it sinks almost to nothing. The temperature also varies greatly, in general increasing from west to east and to a lesser extent from north to 132 south. The differences of rainfall and temperature, together 311 with such other factors as the presence or absence of rivers 241 and springs, give rise to great differences in fertility and vegetation. The coastal regions have a Mediterranean climate, and are often well watered both by rainfall and by rivers; they are suitable for cereals, tobacco and many kinds of fruit. The seaward slopes of the maritime ranges have a more temperate climate, and terraces of cultivable soil on which olive trees and vines can grow; but the eastern slopes are more barren. The central depression has a sub-tropical climate. Parts of it are well watered by rivers and are fertile. In the Jordan Valley, fruits can be cultivated, and cereals in the more northern parts of the inner depression. Much of the inner range is dry and barren; but on the plateaux of the north and of Transjordan there is sufficient rainfall to make possible the cultivation of cereals. This is true also of the Hauran and Jebel Druze. The Ghutah is suitable with irrigation for the growing of fruits of many kinds. East of the inner range the rainfall becomes scantier, the heat more intense, and the land less fertile; until finally it becomes too arid to be suitable for anything but pasturage. But across the Euphrates conditions change once more, and it is possible to grow cereals in the river valleys of the Jazirah.

3

131 The nature of Syrian history has been deeply affected by the structure and position of the land. It is largely a history of economic, political and other movements affecting the whole area of which Syria forms a part. To those movements Syria has served at times as a starting-point, at others as a terminus or a bridge.

439 The first of the movements has been that of world trade. Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East; and its own products, oil, grain, textiles and metal work, have at times found a market in the Western world. Another and more specialized trade has been that with

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1



[FOLLOWING P. 6 (A)]

14-International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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

[FOLLOWING P. 6 (B)]

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

132

DAMASCUS دمشق

خط العرض شمالاً ٣٣°٣١' ؛ خط الطول شرقاً ٣٦°١٧' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٧٠٠ متر

Latitude 33°31' N., Longitude 36°17' E Altitude 700 m. above sea - level

Table No. 5 جدول رقم ٥

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm)		عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall		
					النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53		47-53		
1947	17.21	17.6	27.4	7.4	230	147	47	46	١٩٤٧
1948	17.21	13.6	21.0	5.9	230	303	47	50	١٩٤٨
1949	17.21	14.4	22.3	6.5	230	257	47	48	١٩٤٩
1950	17.21	17.4	28.7	11.1	230	355	47	56	١٩٥٠
1951	17.21	17.6	24.1	10.7	230	226	47	38	١٩٥١
1952	17.21	17.1	23.9	10.4	230	180	47	38	١٩٥٢
1953	17.21	16.2	23.5	8.9	230	401	47	54	١٩٥٣
1952 - January	7.56	7.6	12.4	2.8	50	135.7	10	9	١٩٥٢ — كانون الثاني
February	8.91	8.4	14.7	4.2	45	92.0	8	10	شباط
March	11.97	8.2	12.5	3.0	37	84.8	8	17	آذار
April	16.30	15.7	23.0	8.5	15	13.9	5	3	نيسان
May	20.80	19.0	27.4	10.6	9	—	2	—	ايار
June	23.55	22.1	31.1	12.2	—	—	—	—	حزيران
July	25.70	25.7	34.3	17.2	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	25.27	25.2	34.3	16.2	—	—	—	—	آب
September	23.26	24.5	34.6	14.4	—	—	—	—	ايلول
October	19.30	20.2	27.5	13.0	8	—	1	—	تشرين اول
November	13.78	10.4	17.1	3.8	36	38.5	4	4	تشرين الثاني
December	9.63	5.8	11.9	— 0.2	46	48.0	9	11	كانون اول

PHYSICAL FEATURES

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

HOMS

حمص

خط العرض شمالا ٣٤°٤٣' ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٦°٤٢' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٥٠٠ متر

Latitude 34°43' N., Longitude 36°42' E, Altitude 500 m above sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالملمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53		47-53		
1947	15.58	17.1	27.6	8.0	612	583	58	48	١٩٤٧
1948	15.58	15.1	21.7	8.6	612	673	58	71	١٩٤٨
1949	15.58	14.8	21.6	8.1	612	576	58	45	١٩٤٩
1950	15.56	15.8	22.5	9.2	612	634	58	59	١٩٥٠
1951	15.58	16.3	22.8	9.7	612	586	58	48	١٩٥١
1952	15.58	16.4	23.1	9.8	612	489	58	66	١٩٥٢
1953	15.58	15.1	21.7	8.5	612	747	58	71	١٩٥٣
1952 - January	5.82	7.1	12.0	2.2	152	128.0	10	11	١٩٥٢ — كانون الثاني
February	7.20	8.2	13.5	2.8	115	136.5	10	11	شباط
March	9.84	7.0	12.5	1.6	79	189.0	10	20	آذار
April	13.96	14.2	21.5	7.0	49	64.5	6	8	نيسان
May	18.70	18.3	26.0	10.6	16	—	2	—	ايار
June	22.28	22.4	30.0	14.8	1	—	—	—	حزيران
July	24.01	25.6	32.8	15.4	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	24.70	25.4	31.7	19.1	—	—	—	—	آب
September	22.63	21.8	29.8	13.9	3	4.3	1	1	ايلول
October	18.00	18.5	27.2	9.9	27	—	2	—	تشرين اول
November	12.51	10.4	16.6	4.3	68	84.6	6	10	تشرين الثاني
December	7.17	2.2	7.5	—3.0	107	120.7	11	12	كانون اول

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953 132

HAMA حماة

خط العرض شمالا ٣٥°٠٨' ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٦°٤٤' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٣٠٠ متر

Latitude 35°08' N., Longitude 36°44' E., Altitude 300 m. above sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	Temperature (°C) الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية)				Rainfall الامطار				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام المطيرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	عدد الايام المطيرة Days of Rainfall الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53				
1947	18.85	20.3	29.4	11.3	371	333	...	—	١٩٤٧
1948	18.85	18.5	25.5	11.5	371	421	...	...	١٩٤٨
1949	18.85	18.2	25.8	10.7	371	304	...	...	١٩٤٩
1950	18.85	16.3	23.4	9.3	371	294	...	67	١٩٥٠
1951	18.85	17.3	24.9	9.6	371	337	...	52	١٩٥١
1952	18.85	17.1	24.8	9.5	371	319	...	62	١٩٥٢
1953	18.85	18.0	23.0	7.1	371	423	...	58	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	7.50	11.9	18.2	5.6	94	95.8	...	12	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	9.14	12.8	19.3	6.4	70	88.0	...	11	شباط
March	12.13	11.3	17.8	4.8	43	80.7	...	16	آذار
April	16.63	12.3	20.5	4.2	27	33.2	...	4	نيسان
May	22.66	16.6	26.5	6.8	10	—	...	1	ايار
June	27.11	20.7	30.2	11.3	—	—	...	—	حزيران
July	29.38	24.6	33.5	15.7	—	—	...	—	تموز
August	29.29	24.2	32.5	15.9	—	—	...	—	آب
September	26.10	20.1	29.2	11.0	2	—	...	—	ايلول
October	20.81	15.9	26.0	5.9	16	0.0	...	—	تشرين اول
November	14.40	9.3	16.7	1.9	48	50.0	...	5	تشرين ثاني
December	9.19	6.8	5.7	—4.2	69	72.2	...	9	كانون اول

PHYSICAL FEATURES

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

ALEPPO حلب

خط العرض شمالا ٣٦°١٢' ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٧°١٠' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٣٧٥ متر

Latitude 36°12' N., Longitude 37°10' E., Altitude 375 m. above sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53		47-53		
1947	17.40	18.0	27.8	8.2	399	292	59	53	١٩٤٧
1948	17.40	17.2	23.1	11.3	399	411	59	75	١٩٤٨
1949	17.40	16.4	22.2	10.6	399	318	59	38	١٩٤٩
1950	17.40	16.9	22.5	11.3	399	346	59	53	١٩٥٠
1951	17.40	17.9	23.6	12.3	399	440	59	53	١٩٥١
1952	17.40	18.2	24.2	[illegible]	399	342	59	75	١٩٥٢
1953	17.40	17.2	23.4	10.9	399	490	59	68	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	9.40	7.6	11.0	4.2	78	93.0	12	13	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	8.25	9.0	13.6	4.5	67	130.5	9	15	شباط
March	10.30	8.7	13.0	4.4	46	83.0	9	14	آذار
April	16.16	16.2	22.7	9.7	31	65.0	5	6	نيسان
May	20.60	21.4	28.4	14.4	11	—	3	—	ايار
June	25.40	26.2	33.4	19.1	2	—	—	—	حزيران
July	26.03	30.0	37.7	22.3	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	28.11	29.0	35.6	22.4	—	—	—	—	آب
September	25.16	24.7	33.2	16.3	5	5.0	1	1	ايلول
October	19.96	19.8	28.0	11.7	30	14.0	4	2	تشرين اول
November	13.64	10.6	16.8	4.5	43	27.3	7	8	تشرين ثاني
December	8.80	3.0	8.7	— 2.8	86	81.0	9	7	كانون اول

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

DIR'A درعا

خط العرض شمالا ٣٢°٣٨' ؛ خط الطول شرقا ٣٦°٠٦' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٥١٥ متر

Latitude 32°38' N., Longitude 36°06' E., Altitude 515 m. over sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm)		عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall		
					النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53				
1947	18.49	19.3	29.4	9.3	283	166	...	...	١٩٤٧
1948	18.49	19.5	25.6	13.4	283	298	...	...	١٩٤٨
1949	18.49	16.1	23.9	8.4	283	386	...	...	١٩٤٩
1950	18.49	16.9	25.3	8.6	283	267	...	43	١٩٥٠
1951	18.49	16.9	26.2	7.5	283	348	...	41	١٩٥١
1952	18.49	16.1	23.9	8.3	283	234	...	39	١٩٥٢
1953	18.49	17.5	24.7	10.3	283	445	...	56	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	9.61	10.7	17.7	3.7	65	81.0	...	9	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	9.70	9.7	14.0	5.4	62	77.5	...	11	شباط
March	11.58	8.0	11.7	3.4	44	130.0	...	18	آذار
April	16.88	16.0	21.9	10.2	21	35.0	...	3	نيسان
May	21.16	23.6	33.8	13.4	8	—	...	—	ايار
June	23.70	23.1	32.0	14.2	—	—	...	—	حزيران
July	25.87	27.1	34.9	19.3	—	—	...	—	تموز
August	26.66	25.6	33.6	17.7	—	—	...	—	آب
September	22.37	23.1	30.9	15.4	—	—	...	—	ايلول
October	21.16	20.8	29.8	11.9	6	—	...	—	تشرين اول
November	15.78	14.3	21.8	6.8	37	61.0	...	6	تشرين ثاني
December	10.96	8.5	15.0	1.9	40	60.0	...	9	كانون اول

PHYSICAL FEATURES

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

DEIR-EZ-ZOR دير الزور

خط العرض شمالا ٢٠ ٣٥° ؛ خط الطول شرقا : ١٠٥١ ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٢٠٠ متر

Latitude 35°20' N., Longitude 40°11' E., Lititude 200 m. above sea-level

Table No. 5 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	33-53				33-53				
1947	19.05	...	...	...	145	187	...	...	١٩٤٧
1948	19.05	...	...	...	145	...	...	...	١٩٤٨
1949	19.05	...	...	...	145	159	...	...	١٩٤٩
1950	19.05	...	...	...	145	146	...	...	١٩٥٠
1951	19.05	20.1	28.8	11.5	145	189	...	42	١٩٥١
1952	19.05	19.0	27.9	10.2	145	153	...	34	١٩٥٢
1953	19.05	18.6	25.9	11.4	145	215	...	40	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	6.58	5.1	9.8	0.5	26	16.9	...	3	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	8.61	8.0	13.8	2.3	21	49.7	...	9	شباط
March	12.14	7.8	13.1	2.5	24	65.0	...	9	آذار
April	18.05	17.7	24.7	10.8	21	19.0	...	8	نيسان
May	22.85	21.8	30.0	13.6	7	—	...	—	ايار
June	28.20	28.5	37.0	20.0	—	—	...	—	حزيران
July	32.32	32.3	40.1	24.5	—	—	...	—	تموز
August	31.34	32.9	40.0	25.8	—	—	...	—	آب
September	27.05	29.2	39.0	19.4	—	—	...	—	ايلول
October	19.80	24.5	35.0	14.0	4	—	...	—	تشرين اول
November	13.63	11.2	18.5	4.0	16	4.8	...	3	تشرين ثاني
December	8.45	4.5	10.0	—1.0	26	59.9	...	8	كانون اول

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

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الحرارة والامطار في سبعة مراكز زراعية للاعوام ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL IN SEVEN AGRICULTURE STATIONS, 1947 — 1953

LATAKIA اللاذقية

خط العرض شمالا ٣٥°٢١' ، خط الطول شرقا ٣٥°٤٧' ؛ الارتفاع عن سطح البحر ٢٠ متر

Latitude 35°21' N., Longitude 35°47' E., Altitude 20 m. over sea-level

Table No. 5 (Concld.) جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

Years & Months	الحرارة (بالدرجات المئوية) Temperature (°C)				الامطار Rainfall				السنوات والشهور
	المعدل النظامي Normal average range	المعدل الوسطي Actual average range	متوسط الحرارة العظمى average Maxim.	متوسط الحرارة الصغرى average Minim.	كمية الامطار بالمتر Amount of rainfall (mm) النظامية Normal	الفعلية Actual	عدد الايام الممطرة Days of Rainfall النظامي Normal	الفعلي Actual	
	47-53				47-53		47-53		
1947	18.62	20.4	22.7	17.1	904	771	69	70	١٩٤٧
1948	18.62	18.7	21.8	15.6	904	975	69	69	١٩٤٨
1949	18.62	18.4	23.0	13.8	904	1,087	69	79	١٩٤٩
1950	18.62	18.7	23.8	13.7	904	805	69	77	١٩٥٠
1951	18.62	18.1	22.4	10.7	904	675	69	50	١٩٥١
1952	18.62	18.4	24.4	12.4	904	885	69	63	١٩٥٢
1953	18.62	17.4	22.8	12.1	904	1024	69	72	١٩٥٣
1953 - January	9.57	11.2	15.6	6.8	186	212.0	14	17	١٩٥٣ — كانون الثاني
February	11.72	12.2	16.9	7.5	175	217.0	11	12	شباط
March	13.42	10.4	15.9	5.0	94	173.5	10	14	آذار
April	16.91	15.7	20.9	10.6	60	78.5	6	5	نيسان
May	19.90	15.8	24.6	13.0	37	33.0	3	1	ايار
June	23.40	22.2	27.1	17.4	10	13.0	1	3	حزيران
July	25.92	25.7	30.6	20.9	—	—	—	—	تموز
August	26.94	27.0	31.4	22.6	—	—	—	—	آب
September	24.87	23.4	29.7	17.1	13	11.0	3	1	ايلول
October	21.66	20.4	27.4	13.4	49	32.0	5	4	تشرين اول
November	17.21	13.8	19.8	7.8	116	155.0	7	7	تشرين ثاني
December	11.80	8.2	13.8	2.6	173	161.5	11	8	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

of almost 36 square miles to the east and the south of Damascus. Since ancient times the prosperity and the beauty of the city have been influenced by the Barada River, earning for it the name of the "River of Gold."

Governed by the proximity of the Mediterranean and the desert, wide variations in climatic conditions are encountered in different parts of the country. In general, the rainfall decreases in volume toward the interior and from northwest to southeast. Except on the seaward slopes of the northwestern highlands, the annual precipitation falls in the period from November through May, and is usually concentrated within a few days of each month. The average rainfall varies from 30 inches a year in the coastal region to less than 5 inches on the fringes of the desert. In the years 1938-50, the total precipitation recorded annually at Aleppo ranged from 12 to 33 inches, and at Damascus, from 5 to 11 inches. Similarly, while the moderating effects of the Mediterranean are felt along the coast, wide gradations in temperature are common in the interior. The winter temperatures inland normally average above freezing, but frosts and light snows may be encountered during the coldest months, in January and February. The summers are hot and dry, with temperatures approaching 100° F., and often 110° F., toward the east in July and August. The daily range, which approximates 15 to 20° F. in the winter, increases to around 30° F. in the summer. In the northeastern regions and near the desert, the hot, dry, sand-laden *sirocco* blows at irregular intervals, with greatest intensity during the early summer. In 1949, the mean temperature at Damascus was about 59° F.; the mean maximum temperature, 73° F.; and the mean minimum temperature, 44° F. The corresponding temperatures at Aleppo were 63° F., 73° F. and 52° F., respectively. No comparable temperature readings for Deir ez Zor and the towns in the eastern provinces were available.

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p. 137(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

The infant mortality is not known, but 165
local observers believe that it is at least 250 per 1,000 live births. In many rural villages the mortality among children under 5 years of age probably reaches 40 to 50 per cent. Discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated by the fact that certification of birth is not required for infants dying during the first year of life. The official infant mortality rate for 1948 was 47.6 per 1,000 births for the country, but 75 per 1,000 births in the city of Damascus. Among almost 15,500 deaths registered in 1949, over 21 per cent were of infants under 1 year and about 35 per cent of children under 5 years of age.

Social Economy

Agriculture is the basis of Syria's econ- 433
omy. Over two thirds of the people are 244
dependent upon the land, and, in consideration of the paucity of other natural resources, its full utilization is a problem of primary concern to the welfare of the country. Except in limited portions of the north- 132
western and the northeastern provinces, the 244
rainfall is deficient and erratic, and the expansion of agriculture is contingent upon the development of irrigation and more efficient methods of production. Estimates of 311
the amount of cultivable land range from 244
10 to 21 million acres—from less than one quarter to almost one half of the total land area. A similar disparity is noted between the figures quoted for the acreage now under cultivation, but all sources agree that less than one half of the potentially arable lands are planted in crops. Most observers 311
believe that the land suitable for agriculture approximates 12 to 14 million acres, while the area under cultivation is between 5 and 6 million acres. Roughly 10 to 20 per cent of the tilled land is irrigated at present, but it has been shown that the farm acreage could be more than doubled by increased irrigation, associated with controlled settlement, in the Orontes, the Khabour and the Euphrates river valleys.

Foremost among the factors which im- 421
pede the promotion and the modernization

p. 139(B)

Syria mD1

SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organization.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI
LEBANON MEI

twenty degrees of latitude. The desert in Syria is of rock and gravel more than of sand, and there are hills rising above 3,000 feet both north and south of Palmyra; more than a third of the total area of Syria is steppe or desert.

Rivers

The Orontes flows from the northern part of the Biqaa through the lake of Homs (which holds about 260 million cubic yards of water) to Hama and through the Ghab depression to Turkey. The Litani rises not far from the Orontes but flows at first southward and later west through a deep gorge in the Lebanon mountains into the sea between Tyre and Sidon. The Euphrates runs through Syria for about 430 miles and has, as tributaries from the north, the Balikh and the Khabur. It is on the Euphrates and its tributaries that there is the best prospect of developing hydro-electricity and irrigation.

Climate[1]

Over this diverse scene the temperatures vary in the year from below freezing to above 100°F., and on the same day it is possible to ski near the cedars of Lebanon and swim in the sea at Beirut. The rain, which in most places comes between November and February, varies from almost nothing in the desert to about 40 inches a year in the mountains. In the coastal strip the winters are not severe but there is high humidity and small diurnal variation in the summer and this makes the season seem unpleasant and prolonged. In the mountains the snow lies on the topmost peaks for most of the year and the road from Beirut to Damascus is blocked by snow at times in most winters; in the summer the days are hot but the nights are cool enough to draw up to the mountains most of the inhabitants of Beirut. The plateaux and desert have an inland climate with low humidity and higher extremes of heat and cold. Aleppo has greater extremes than Damascus but in both cities there is a distinction between the four seasons: spring from mid-March to mid-May, summer from mid-May to the beginning of October, autumn in October and early November, and winter from November to March.

The People

Official statistics showed that in 1951 the populations of Syria and of Lebanon were 3,329,137, and 1,303,941 respectively. Over half the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, about half a million are nomads, and the rest live in towns. The

[1] See table, below, p. 501.

25: Warriner S-5 no date 1948 M1 Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

better cultivation, if more machinery were available, to reduce the fallow to one year out of two, instead of two out of three in the districts where this is customary; it would also be possible, by machine cultivation, to keep weeds under control. (See Chapter VIII.)

The main possibilities of development, however, depend on irrigation. At present an area of some 500,000 acres is irrigated, and even under the existing scheme much water is wasted. How much additional land could be irrigated is a subject for controversy. Mr Soubhi Mazloum, a Syrian irrigation engineer, suggests that the total area which could be irrigated, including the use of the Euphrates water, may be as large as 1,200,000 hectares (2,960,000 acres):[1] but this figure refers to the area which it is *physically* possible to irrigate, not the area which could be irrigated with any prospect of economic return.

A more exact and detailed estimate was prepared by Professor Addison, the irrigation expert, who surveyed existing schemes in 1943 and considered that the extension of these which was then economically practicable would irrigate some 68,000 hectares (168,000 acres) in addition to the area already irrigated.

The difference between these two estimates indicates how wide a range of opinion there is. A survey is now being prepared by a British irrigation firm on behalf of the Syrian Government, to provide the basis of development projects, and pending its publication it is impossible to quote any more satisfactory estimates.

The Jezira and Euphrates Provinces. In inner Syria, the Jezira area and part of the Euphrates province in the north-eastern corner of the country, there are quite large possibilities of extending cultivation both in the rain-fed zone, and by irrigation. North of a line from Tiyne to Sheikh Saleh there is sufficient rainfall to water the winter crops. In the 'Duck's Bill' and along the Turkish frontier to a depth of about 12 miles to Derbisiye, the rainfall is 50 to 100 centimetres per year (20–40 inches), and south of this there is another belt with rainfall of 25 to 50 centimetres (10–20 inches), about 50 miles wide.[2]

[1] 'Le Problème de l'Eau au Liban et en Syrie', in *L'Agriculture, Richesse Nationale*, (Beirut, 1942).

[2] This information is based on an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. in 1944.

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433
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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not.

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short.

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah.

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts:

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions.

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating

[179] it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes. 311 The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer. 244 Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed 182 land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

• 153 The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

244 For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for 311 cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

312 The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

312 Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers 406 from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less thanLS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some 312 projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is 244 supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley. 242 But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

a. The Region of Deirik

241 In the region of Deirik, the Zarkan river and numerous springs in the villages make irrigation possible over vast areas. The region began to be developed recently when the road was partly constructed. Rice is an old staple, but in the last two years it have given place to cotton. However, rice may resume its former place since cotton diseases have become so widespread.

b. The Jarrah

The Jarrah river flows through Kubur el Bid and irrigates the country around it. Its waters were used for rice plantations, and recently for cotton. In winter its waters flow into the Rad.

c. The Jagjag

133 The main river of northern Jazirah is the Jagjag. Its sources are about thirty kilometers north of Kamishli, in a gorge in Turkey. It flows through Nisibin and Kamishli, crosses the Jazirah plain and empties in the Khabur at Hassakeh. Its total length is about 100 kms. and its average flow is 3 cubic meters per second.

In Turkey and Kamishli, the river has several beds. The Turks, unable to exploit it fully in their country because of its short flow there, follow the practice of changing the river from bed to bed in the summer months, so that farmers in Jazirah do not know when the water will be available to them. This uncertainty has lead the villages which have a right to the water to sell their rights for one or more years to individuals on good terms with the Turkish authorities. These individuals in their turn bribe the Turks to direct the waters in the bed which leads to their lands. One family in particular has obtained a sort of monopoly on the waters of the Jagjag in Qamishli. The Asfar-Najjars buy the water rights from the villages for nominal sums and then try to reach an understanding with the Turks. Since they have one or two competing groups in Qamishli, the Turks usually get paid by both parties and satisfy none entirely. The Asfars manage however to get the biggest share.

Such an unstable situation does not lead to steady irrigation development along the lines of orchard planting. The farmer is lucky if he can grow one crop of rice or cotton with the present

fluctuations in water flow. Up to 1950, all the water of Jagjag was used for growing rice. In 1950-51, more emphasis was given to cotton. This year it is half cotton and half rice. 312 241

The Turks started a project for diverting all the waters of the Jagjag from Syria to Turkey. They began building tunnels to carry one quarter of the waters cast above Kubur el Bid, and the rest to the plains above Amuda and Dirbassiya. The Syrian Government objected and negotiations began in Ankara. The Syrians believe that they have reached an understanding with the Turkish authorities to divide the river waters equally. The Turks did not sign the agreement, claiming that they want a full agreement on water rights covering all common rivers and especially the Orontes. They are afraid that Syria might use all the waters of the Orontes in its irrigation projects. Since Syria holds this arm, the Jagjag dispute will be solved equitably. 312 648

It is difficult to estimate the area irrigated yearly by the Jagjag. The waters are used only for summer crops, and last year about thirty thousand dunums were planted to cotton. When the plantation is rice the area is nearer to ten thousand dunums. There is of course always a certain amount of land devoted to vegetable growing for the needs of the city. 312 241

d. Underground Water

Recently a few enterprising farmers tried to solve the problem of dependency upon Turkey for irrigation water by digging for water on their own lands. An Armenian outfit from Aleppo with a boring machine of local construction dug several wells in the region of Qamishli and Amuda. Three of the wells in the villages of Tal Ahmad and Tal Anbar near Kamishli were successful. Water to run a 4-inch pump was found at a depth of 18 meters. The other holes around Amuda were not so successful. Water was not found at a depth of 70 meters. These experiments are of course inconclusive and sufficient underground water may be found to be abundant in Jazirah. Further studies are needed. 312

a. The Khabur

The largest source of irrigation water in Jazirah is undoubtedly the Khabur. Its average flow is 52 cubic meters per second which 133

133 makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

812 406 The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

241 The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was preferred to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

511 Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he 241 own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join 427 to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

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Amuda
DAKKUAIME
Dirbassiyah
KIKIYA
MILLIM
Ras el Ain
Shashane
Assyrians
Khabur
ABDEL AZIZ
BAGGARET
Nr. River
HASAKEH
Km. 4
Deir Ezzor Road
Khabur Tubua
Shammar
Shammar
Shammar

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (*cazza*) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

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FIG. 1—The Salamiya area in its general setting. The hills are frequently given the collective name of Jebel Bil'as. Isohyets are from Charles Combier: Aperçu sur les climats de la Syrie et du Liban, avec carte au millionième des pluies et vents, Délégation Générale de France au Levant, Beirut, 1945. Spelling of the place names here and in the text in general follows the (British) Permanent Committee on Geographical Names.

of the hills and the Eocene-Oligocene marl of the plain. The limestones are predominantly pervious dolomitic limestones, separated by more or less impervious beds of flint and marl. Winter rainfall runs off in the wadis or soaks into the ground and either is soon discharged at a lower level by temporary springs or seeps slowly toward the plain, assisted by the dip of the strata.

The marl of the plain is in its unaltered state impermeable, but usually it has been affected to a considerable depth by the percolation of water through cracks and fissures. In this way calcium carbonate and silica are deposited to depths of as much as 50 feet, and the whole character of the rock is altered.[2] It becomes crumbly, permeable, and water-bearing. Above this layer of rock a hardpan develops, ranging in thickness from a few inches to four feet, which is due to the concentration by capillary action of calcium carbonate and silica.

The region is one where the desert merges into the sown. The rainfall

[2] L. Dubertret: Lithological Map of the Eastern Border of the Mediterranean, 1:500,000, with notes translated by W. B. Fish [i.e. Fisher], Fighting French Delegation General in the Levant, Geological Section, Beirut, 1943. 113

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

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

Fig. 2—Topographic map and cross section of the country east of Selemiya.

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

Fig. 3—The irrigation system of Moufaqqar, east of Selemiya (see Fig. 2).

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FIG. 4—Vertical section of a foggara. The diagonal shading represents the water-bearing level in the altered marl, below which is unaltered impervious marl. The gallery A to B taps the water-bearing layer at its upper end and in the corner. Water in the gallery is represented by the dotted line. The irrigated area extends from B to C. The vertical shading represents the part of the canal between steep banks.

FIG. 5—Upper part of one of the Moufaqqar canals (see Fig. 3). Photograph from a position corresponding to B above, where the canal is formed by steep banks. Parts of natural roof are formed by the hard pan, clearly distinguishable from the bed of crumbly altered marl below. Until 1945 the canal was semi-derelict, filled with mud, vegetation, and flood detritus (see foreground). When the cleaning was completed, the canal was approximately doubled in depth and a strong stream of clear water flowed in the bottom. (Photograph by John Gough.)

was built, probably in the Roman period, to carry water from Selemiya to Apamea, more than 50 miles away. This was an exception, dug to carry drinking water to a city, but some of the canals which capture and supply irrigation water in the Selemiya plain are several miles in length; one, starting in Moufaqqar, was originally seven miles long. Others are only a few hundred yards in length.

The quantity of water delivered by the canals in use today is estimated

PART ONE

I. THE HISTORY OF SYRIA[1]

I

101 131 EVEN were there no Syrian people a Syrian problem would still exist. Syria owes its political importance less to the qualities of its population than to its geographical position. Before its history can be fully understood, it is necessary to grasp the nature of the land and its relation with the surrounding world.

Syria is part of a larger area which may be treated as a single unit, in the sense that the course of affairs in one part of it has always had a peculiarly close relationship with that in some or 131 all of the other parts. The southern base of this area is the 133 Arabian peninsula, bounded on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the east by the Persian Gulf. The west of the peninsula, the Hejaz and Yemen, is hilly and in parts fertile, and so too is a smaller area in the south-east; but the greater portion of the interior is fit only for pasturage, except in the oases. In the south, it is a sandy waste, in the centre, Nejd, a dry, hilly and often stony steppe. North of Nejd there is another belt of sand; and north of this belt is the dry steppe of the Syrian Desert, growing narrower as it goes northwards. Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the 'Fertile Crescent', a belt of cultivable land bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which run southwards through it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian Gulf; this is Iraq or Mesopotamia. The Fertile Crescent is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south-east by the head-waters of the Persian Gulf. In the north and east it is hemmed in by mountain-ranges: to the north the Taurus Mountains, the southern part of the Anatolian highlands which stretch across Asia Minor, to the north-east the mountains of Kurdistan, and to the east the Persian plateau. Joined to the western part of the Fertile Crescent by the peninsula of Sinai, but separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, is the land of Egypt, the fertile valley of the Nile surrounded by sandy deserts.

[1] In Chapters I–IV the word 'Syria' is used to refer to 'geographical Syria' as defined in the Introduction.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

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

B 7

131 Thus the boundaries of Syria may be defined as the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Mediterranean to the west, Sinai and Hejaz to the south, and northern Mesopotamia and the Syrian Desert to the east. Its length is rather more than 500 miles, and the breadth of its cultivable area varies between 100 and 150 miles.

2

133 It is itself split up into several regions clearly marked off from one another by main lines of division running roughly from north to south, with subsidiary lines running from east to west. The first region is the Mediterranean coastal belt, in some places broad enough to be called a plain, for example the plain of Akkar, but in others no more than a narrow strip; [504] in general, it broadens as it goes south. Although it has few good natural harbours, it is studded with famous ports: Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Haifa and Jaffa. East of it is a highland belt: the Amanus in the north, then the Jebel Ansariyah, rising to some 5,000 ft., then Lebanon, of which the peaks reach 10,000 ft., and then the Palestinian hills, bounded on the south by the arid district of the Negeb. This belt is scarred with the valleys of streams flowing westwards to the sea, and cut across by a number of gaps, through some of which rivers flow: the plain of Antioch, the gap between Tripoli and Homs and the plain of Esdraelon. East of these ranges runs a line of comparatively narrow depressions varying in character from north to south. In the north there are the plain of al-Amq, the Orontes valley and the Ghab marshes; south of them lies the Biqa' valley; then the broken country in which lie the sources of the Jordan; then the swampy district of Hulah; then the narrow valley of the Jordan, lying below sea-level, opening out at one point into the Sea of Galilee and ending in the Dead Sea; and finally the Wadi Araba, leading down to the Red Sea at Aqaba. A number of important rivers run for part of their courses along these depressions: the Orontes flowing north and then west, the Litani south and then west, and the Jordan south. Here also lie the important lakes of Syria: those of Homs and Hulah, the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. The line of depressions is interrupted by the ridge of Baalbek, the watershed between the Orontes and Litani; and farther south is linked with the coastal plain by the Esdraelon Gap.

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Farther east there lies another belt of highlands. In the far 133
north it takes the form first of the Kurd Dagh hills, then of a plateau and a series of low ranges, south of which lies the range of Anti-Lebanon, facing Lebanon across the Biqa', and rising some 9,000 ft. above sea-level. South of Anti-Lebanon is Mount Hermon with its many valleys and its three peaks, the highest of which is over 9,000 ft. high. From Hermon the land drops into the Hauran plateau; south of it is the tableland of Transjordan, which itself ends in the steppe country of the northern Hejaz.

The northern plateau slopes eastwards until it reaches the 133
valley of the Euphrates flowing south-east. The eastward 311
slopes are in part cultivable land, but in part semi-desert and steppe, known sometimes as the 'Little Desert' to distinguish it from the Syrian Desert to the south of it. Around and across the Euphrates is a district known as the Jazirah, which is geographically part of Iraq but of which a portion lies within the political frontiers of the Levant States. It is a district of stony hills and plains, but fertile in the river valleys, those of the Euphrates itself and of its tributaries, the Balikh and the Khabur.

East of the Anti-Lebanon the country is somewhat different. There is no plateau sloping gently to a river valley, but the eastern flanks of the mountains lead down to a barren steppe, formed of stone and gravel, with sand-dunes and coarse vegetation: the Syrian Desert. In places the Desert comes up almost to the foot of the inner range; but in others it is held back by areas of cultivable land. One such is the Ghutah, the fertile land around Damascus, well wooded and well watered by its streams. To the south of it, but separated from it by a plain of lava, lies another cultivable region, the Hauran, a large basalt plateau open to rain-clouds coming from the Mediterranean through the Esdraelon Gap. In the east this plain rises into the hilly but fertile district of Jebel Druze, of which the peaks are 6,000 ft. above sea-level. South of the Jebel Druze, the highlands of Transjordan slope eastwards and die away in isolated hills.

While the general climatic régime is similar throughout, 132
there is great variety of temperature and rainfall in consequence of the sharp differences of relief and position. In all parts the rainy season is from October or November to April or May; but the amount of rainfall varies greatly from one

T U R K
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
HATAY
ALEPPO
EUPH
HAMA
LATAKIA
HOMS
DAMASCUS
HAURAN
JEBEL DRUZE
PALESTINE
TRANSJORD.

END MAP (A)

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

END MAP (B)

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

101 178 challenging task of fusing the positive elements of both its eastern and its western heritage into a cohesive whole.

Population and Land

161 162 According to official estimates, Syria at the end of 1953 had a population of about 3.65 million, including some 150,000 Bedouins who lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Although demographic statistics are far from adequate, it appears probable that the population has been growing at an annual rate of somewhere between 2% and 3% during the last decade. Most of the population is rural:[1] about 60% live in villages and towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and each of the two largest cities—Damascus, the capital, and Aleppo, the commercial center of the country—has a population close to 400,000. About 86% of the population are Moslem or belong to offshoots of the Moslem religion, and nearly all of the balance are adherents of a considerable number of Christian denominations.

161 311 As a country with an area of 181,337 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), about three-fourths the size of the United Kingdom, Syria cannot be said to be densely populated. While less than a third of the area is cultivable, the proportion of the population to the land already under cultivation compares favorably with that of other countries in the Near and Middle East. In Syria there is one hectare[2] of cultivated land per inhabitant, or about 10% more than in Turkey and Iran, twice as much as in Greece and Iraq and eight to nine times as much as in Egypt.

311 133 There is still plenty of land available in Syria but water severely limits its utilization. The country lies to the leeward of mountain ranges in the west and north which intercept much of the rainfall. Except for the coastal region of Latakia province, Syria is largely cut off from the rain-bearing winds of the Mediterranean by mountains, the Djebel Ansariya (Alaouit mountains) in Latakia, and, farther south, after the intervening Tripoli-Homs gap, by the twin ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon which in turn give way to the Hermon range. Thus the area which can support rain-fed cultivation is confined to a rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier. Fortunately for Syria, its

[1] See Annex C, p. 292.
[2] A hectare = 2.471 acres.

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311 rainfall is supplemented by the water brought down from the mountains
133 by its rivers. The principal of these is the Euphrates which has its headwaters in Turkey and flows in a generally southeasterly direction across Syria into Iraq. Together with its most important tributary, the Khabour, which also rises in Turkey, it accounts for 90% of the total annual flow of all Syrian rivers. In the west the largest river is the Orontes which is fed by springs from the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges and flows northward through the marshy area known as the Ghab into Turkey. Farther south the Barada river, rising in the Anti-Lebanon, supplies life-giving water to the fertile Ghouta oasis around Damascus. In the extreme south the Yarmuk river flows along the Jordanian frontier into the Jordan river. Although the flow of these rivers is highly seasonal, it is on the effective utilization of their waters that much of the future development of Syria's agriculture depends.

Principal Regions

631 Administratively Syria is divided into nine *mohafazats* or provinces, each in charge of a *mohafez* or governor; the province is in turn divided into *qadas* or counties headed by a *kaimakam;* and the county is further subdivided into *nahiyes* or townships in charge of a *mudir*.

244 Of greater significance, however, are the principal economic regions.
438 Farthest south are the adjoining regions of the Hauran and Djebel Druze.
311 The Hauran plain, an area of rather high but apparently declining fertility, has long been known as a granary, even in Roman times. Its principal crop is wheat, but barley, maize, sorghum and pulses are also important. To the east rises the Djebel Druze, a basaltic dome, where the Druzes, a proud and independent people, eke a bare living from the pockets of fertile soil in their mountains. Here the pressure of population on the land is acute. Agricultural holdings in the Hauran and Djebel Druze are predominantly small. There is little irrigation, and annual rainfall, averaging less than 12 inches, is barely adequate for dry farming. Sharp fluctuations in rainfall frequently make farming precarious. One of the principal problems of this region is the scant supply of underground water even for drinking.

To the northwest of the Hauran lies the higher, rolling Julani plateau stretching toward the Hermon range. This stony region is suitable only for grazing and, to some extent, for orchards. To the north a narrow band

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

II IRRIGATION AND RECLAMATION

The extension of irrigated land is of vital importance in a country like Syria, where large potentially fertile areas yield little or nothing because rainfall is inadequate and where nearly all of the cultivable area produces no summer crops because no rain falls from spring to autumn. It has become even more imperative with the shrinkage in the area of good rainfed land which can still be taken under cultivation. Thus irrigation is the principal means for expanding the cultivated area, increasing and stabilizing yields and diversifying agricultural production by developing summer crop cultivation. 311 312

Existing Irrigated Areas

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At present about 400,000 hectares of land are probably already under irrigation. Of these, approximately 250,000 hectares are irrigated by pumps drawing water principally from rivers but also from wells. Most of the river pumps are located in the valley of the Euphrates and its tributary, the Khabour, while by far the greater number of pumps drawing on underground water is in the provinces of Hama and Aleppo. Except for small areas still supplied by animal-driven *norias* (water wheels), the remainder is irrigated by gravity flow from rivers, springs and *foggarahs* (underground ducts). Only 48,000 hectares are covered by government irrigation schemes, including the Homs-Hama scheme providing a rather inadequate supply of water from the Homs lake to 22,000 hectares; the Mzerib project in the Hauran, which irrigates 2,500 hectares from the springs feeding the Yarmuk river; the Tell Maghass scheme on the Khabour, which provides for 8,500 hectares but is not completed; and the Matkh project covering 15,000 hectares south of Aleppo, which receives a wholly inadequate supply of water from the Kouek river during the dry season when most of the water in the upper reaches of the river is taken by Turkey for irrigation.

The possibilities of additional irrigation are by no means limitless. Except for the Euphrates, Syria has no large river with a substantial flow during the summer dry season. In fact the Euphrates accounts for 83% of the aggregate annual flow of Syria's rivers. Thus the available water supply may set a limit of 400,000 to 600,000 hectares on the additional area which can be irrigated. In the last analysis, however, the upper limit will be determined by the division of the Euphrates water with Iraq, which is in the [123]

THE VALLEY OF THE ORONTES

The study of the coastal region must be extended to the valley of the Orontes which, geographically and historically, forms its eastern limit. A natural channel between the Alawite chain and the limestone plateau, it forms part of the long depression running from south to north behind the Lebanon. Scattered along the course of the Orontes, too, are the strong citadels by which the Arabs sought, successfully, to stem the advance of the Crusaders—Baalbek, Homs, Hama, Caesaria, Kalat-el-Mudik—all interesting and beautiful, in varying degrees. 133 361

Two very different sites must be mentioned.

On the vast field of ruins of Apamea, overlooking the marshy plain formed by the river, the scattered fragments of that ancient city's monuments are still to be seen. It is being explored by the Belgian expedition which has been led in turn by F. Mayence and H. Lacoste. The ground is strewn with plinths, entablatures, and the shafts of wreathed columns. The line of the great colonnade and the ground plans of various buildings are still easily recognizable. 361 172

The charm of Hama, with its green gardens and high, wailing waterwheels, must not distract us from two interesting monuments, well worthy of close study: the Great Mosque, with its two minarets of different periods, its arcaded courtyard and white domes, still showing signs of what it was at an earlier date, and the Azem Palace, with the graceful arches of its upper courtyard, its ornamented windows, its great domed hall of state (dating from 1778), lavishly although a little too heavily decorated. The atmosphere of the old town is a happy foil to the life on the banks of the river and helps to give Hama great attraction for the visitor.

ANCIENT SITES

However beautiful or famous they may be, the ancient sites of the coastal region need not here be dealt with at length in 172

P.278

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

N THE NORTH

CHARACTERISTICS OF CERTAIN SITES

The region of the limestone plateau, which is bounded on the west by the cleft formed by the valleys of the Orontes and the Afrin, includes a few fertile plains, but taken as a whole, it is simply a vast mountainous tract of bare rock, fissured and worn. The sites are scattered on the ridges and slopes and only by building water-tanks was it possible for the people to maintain life. They can be divided into three groups: to the north, the Jebel Seman; in the centre, the Jebel Barisha and the Jebel el-Ala; to the south, the Jebel Zawiyé or the Jebel Riha. In certain places there are so many ancient centres that their ruins can be seen on all sides. 133 361 172

These towns frequently grew up around a monastery. The monastic life was widely practised in Syria at an early date and huge groups of buildings were put up to meet religious needs. Every convent was also a centre of agricultural work requiring additional buildings, as at Breig and Deir Tumanin. Some were also places of pilgrimage, where inns, bazaars and hostelries were built for the pious who flocked thither, as they did, for instance, to the convents of Qalaat Seman and Deir Seman, hallowed by the memory of the famous Stylite. 361 172

In other cases farms, a church and oil presses, sometimes covering a large area, grew up around an agricultural town; Bamuqqa Qirqbise and Behyo are excellent examples. Elsewhere, there were villages with substantial houses, as at Réfadé and Kafer Nabo, or with more modest dwellings, as at Qatura and Tsqlé. Everywhere, the remains of churches can be distinguished amidst the debris of ruined buildings. In the vicinity, the variety of monuments to the dead is no less worthy of note.

Two sites are remarkable for their exceptional size and the variety of buildings found there: Brad, in the north, and El-Bara, in the south. Situated on the denuded plateau which forms the northern part of the Jebel Seman, Brad looks like a small town; in fact, it was the administrative and commercial centre of a very large region; it grew up around the nucleus of an ancient settlement (interesting remains of third-century baths and two large churches dating from 399-402 and 561, respectively) to reach its greatest size in the seventh century. El-Bara,

P. 29 C

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

DEAD CITIES

IN THE SOUTH

THE HAURAN AND THE JEBEL DRUZE

933 Black is the dominant colour in the basalt country of southern Syria. The eruptive rocks strewn over the soil give the landscape a highly distinctive character; black are the stones, black the buildings, black the sculptures.

The whole region was formerly known as the Hauran, but today this name is applied only to the western portion, as distinct from the eastern part, the Jebel Druze. The same distinction is to be found in the differing aspects of the two portions. To the west, as far as the eye can see, lies an enormous fertile plain which produces abundant crops of wheat and barley. To the east, rises rugged mountainous country. These mountains have the characteristic contours of extinct volcanoes, but although they are fairly high (from 1,500 to 1,700 metres), they do not appear so, for the ground rises gradually and the altitude of the foothills is always over 1,000 metres.

172 In this part of the country, the building of monuments on a large scale began with the establishment of the Roman Province of Arabia, in A.D. 106, by Trajan's legate, Cornelius Palma, and was encouraged by the Antonines, Septimius Severus and Philip the Arab. It continued during the Christian period, for there were numerous bishoprics from the time of the first councils onwards and many churches and monasteries were then built. After the Islamic conquest (636), only the towns of Bosra and Salkhad remained of any importance, owing to their strategic position; their main buildings (military and religious) date from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The abandonment of the ancient sites, however, rapidly resulted everywhere in the ruin of their monuments. Where there had been most villages, there they were most completely deserted.

SITES AND MONUMENTS IN THE JEBEL DRUZE

361 172 Two of the many sites, Chahba and Qanawat, have fairly large groups of monuments.

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PHYSICAL FEATURES

طول حدود الجمهورية السورية
BOUNDARIES OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

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Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Crete and Neighbouring Countries	طول الحدود بالكيلو متر Length of boundary kms.	النسبة الى طول الحدود بالمئة per cent of total length %	الشواطئ والبلاد المجاورة
Total	2,374	100.0	المجموع
The Mediterranean Sea	173	7.6	البحر الابيض المتوسط
Turkey	808	35.5	تركيا
Iraq	822	36.1	العراق
Transjordan	375	16.5	شرق الاردن
Palestine	70	3.1	فلسطين
Lebanon	279	12.3	لبنان

Source : Ministry of Public Works — المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

مساحة البحيرات الرئيسية في الجمهورية السورية
AREA OF PRINCIPAL LAKES IN THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

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Table No. 2 — جدول رقم ٢

Name of Lake	Location	المساحة كم٢ Area km2	موقعها الجغرافي	اسم البحيرة
Qattineh	Near Homs	60	قرب حمص	قطينة
El-Ghab	« Jisr-esh-Shogour	300	قرب جسر الشغور	الغاب
Jabbul	« Aleppo	150	قرب حلب	جبول
Otaibeh	« Damascus	64	قرب دمشق	عتيبة
Hijaneh	« Damascus	24	« «	هيجانة
Jeirud	« Damascus	15	« «	جيرود
Mzeirib	« Dir'a	1	قرب درعا	مزيريب
Khatuniyeh	« Hassakeh	2	قرب الحسكة	خاتونية

Source : Ministry of Public Works — المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

احوال البلاد الطبيعية

الجبال والقمم الرئيسية في الجمهورية السورية

PRINCIPAL MOUNTAINS AND PEAKS IN THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

133

able No. 3. جدول رقم ٣

Mountains	Peaks	Height in meters	القمم	الجبال
The Anti-Lebanon «Qalamun Sector»	Mt. Hermon	2,814	جبل الشيخ	سلسلة جبال لبنان الشرقية «قلمون سكتور»
	« Musa	2,629	جبل موسى	
	« Halimah Qara	2,464	جبل حليمة قارة	
	« 'Straqif	2,424	جبل الشقيف	
	« Gharbi	1,850	الجبل الغربي	
	« Mazar	1,824	جبل الزار	
Jabal-ad-Drus	Tal Ghainah	1,800	تل غينه	جبل الدروز
	« Hurun	1,765	تل حوران	
	« Qalib	1,686	تل قليب	
	« Sha'af	1,624	تل شعف	
	« Al Masih	1,545	تل المسيح	
Mt. An-Nusairiya	Shanfa	1,562	سلنفة	جبل النصيرية
	Al-Wili Khalifa	1,436	الولي خليفة	
Mt. Sharqi «Sharqi Qalamun»	Mt. Qatus	1,404	جبل قاطوس	الجبل الشرقي «شرقي قلمون»
	« Zeheddiya	1,401	جبل زبيدة	
	« Um-Ruwaq	1,186	جبل ام رواق	
Mt. Bal'as	Mt. Hawit-ar-Ras	1,390	جبل حويط الراس	جبل البلعاس
	Tawi al-Bal'as	1,096	طاوي البلعاس	
Mt. Abdel Aziz	Al-Ghurra	920	الغرة	جبل عبد العزيز
	Mt. Beida	631	جبل البيضا	

urce : Ministry of Public Works المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

PHYSICAL FEATURES

طول الانهار الواقعة ضمن اراضي الجمهورية السورية مع معدل صبيبها السنوي

LENGTH OF RIVERS WITHIN SYRIAN TERRITORY, TOGETHER WITH AVERAGE FLOW

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Table No. 4 جدول رقم ٤

Rivers	طوله بالكيلو متر Length in kms		معدل صبيبه السنوي م٣/ث Average flow m3/sec.	صبيبه في ذروة الفيضان م٣/ث Maximum flow m3/sec.	اسم النهر
	الاجمالي Total	ضمن الاراضي السورية Length within Syrian territory			
Euphrates	2,330	675	735.0	5,300	الفرات
Al-Khabur	480	480	82.0	300	الخابور
Aj-Jaghjagh	124*	100	3.0	5	الجغجغ
Al-Balikh	105	105	6.0	25	البليخ
Ao-Sajour	106	45	3.0	30	الساجور
Al-'Asi	571	325	32.0	400	العاصي
'Afrin	140	85	5.0	750	عفرين
Qweiq	136	110*	0.5	60	قويق
Al-Kabir-ash-Shimali	80	58	3.0	150	نهر الكبير الشمالي
Sinn	5	5	12.0	20	نهر السن
Baradi	71	71	7.0	30	بردى
A'waj	66	66	2.5	15	الاعوج
Al-Yarmuk	57	47	7.0	100	اليرموك

Source : Ministry of Public Works
* Corrected figures

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة
(*) ارقام معدلة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Chapter Ten

SYRIA AND LEBANON

The Land and the People

The area of the present Syria and Lebanon lies to the north of Arabia Deserta and is the western horn of the Fertile Crescent. The two republics do not enclose within their boundaries a natural geographic entity and their climate and topography are best studied in relation to the surrounding countries;[1] but within the political boundaries of the two states, the following geographical divisions may roughly be distinguished:

(1) *The Coastal Strip.* This is about twenty miles wide near Latakia and rather less just north of Tripoli, but in some places disappears and the mountains meet the sea. Olives, bananas, citrus, and vegetables are cultivated intensively near Beirut.

(2) *The Mountains.* Starting from the north, the first coastal mountains are the Jebel Ansariya (also known as the Alawi Mountains) which average 4,000 feet and are well populated on the western slopes. To the south is the Homs–Tripoli gap and then starts the Lebanon range with peaks of over 10,000 feet. Even on the upper slopes of this range water is plentiful, there is close cultivation, and the villages and towns are prosperous. Near Beirut are situated the mountain resorts to which most of the city workers move each night when the summer brings its humid heat. The interior ranges of mountains lying parallel to that of the Lebanon are the Anti-Lebanon (between Homs and Zahle) reaching over 7,000 feet and the range of Hermon (between Zahle and the Israel border) which reaches 9,200 feet. Water and cultivation are far less plentiful on these than on the coastal mountains. Farther inland still and to the south of Damascus lie the Leja, a bleak area of igneous rock, and the Jebel Druze, which reaches 5,000–6,000 feet and lies north of the Jordan border.

(3) *Plains and Plateaux.* Hardly any of the territory of Syria and Lebanon lies less than 700 feet above sea-level and south of Hama almost all the land is over 1,600 feet. The richest agricultural land is on fairly high ground and forms part of a

[1] See W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East; a Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (London, Methuen, 1950).

3-Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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crescent which (starting from the Iraqi border) comprises the Jezira, the countryside of Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, and the fertile and beautiful Biqaa valley. The cultivation of cotton and cereals is particularly successful in the north-eastern corner of Syria where there has been great general development in the last five or six years. From Homs one road leads south to the Biqaa valley which continues between the two mountain ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, past Zahle to the southern border of Lebanon. Farther inland is the road to Damascus which passes to the east of the Anti-Lebanon over the Qalamun plateau. This is mostly barren land, reaching over 2,000 feet; the areas of cultivation usually need more water, but suffer occasionally from bad floods. The oasis of Damascus is known as the Ghouta and there every drop of water in the two rivers is made use of, by an ancient system of canals which follow the contours and provide water lavishly as they gradually lose height. Between Damascus and Jordan lies the Hauran plateau much of which is about 2,000 feet above sea-level; here there is cultivation of cereals but few trees are now left and there is insufficient water to ensure good crops each year.

(4) *The Desert.* To the south and to the east of the Fertile Crescent there spreads a desert that extends southward for over

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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twenty degrees of latitude. The desert in Syria is of rock and gravel more than of sand, and there are hills rising above 3,000 feet both north and south of Palmyra; more than a third of the total area of Syria is steppe or desert.

Rivers

The Orontes flows from the northern part of the Biqaa through the lake of Homs (which holds about 260 million cubic yards of water) to Hama and through the Ghab depression to Turkey. The Litani rises not far from the Orontes but flows at first southward and later west through a deep gorge in the Lebanon mountains into the sea between Tyre and Sidon. The Euphrates runs through Syria for about 430 miles and has, as tributaries from the north, the Balikh and the Khabur. It is on the Euphrates and its tributaries that there is the best prospect of developing hydro-electricity and irrigation.

Climate[1]

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Over this diverse scene the temperatures vary in the year from below freezing to above 100°F., and on the same day it is possible to ski near the cedars of Lebanon and swim in the sea at Beirut. The rain, which in most places comes between November and February, varies from almost nothing in the desert to about 40 inches a year in the mountains. In the coastal strip the winters are not severe but there is high humidity and small diurnal variation in the summer and this makes the season seem unpleasant and prolonged. In the mountains the snow lies on the topmost peaks for most of the year and the road from Beirut to Damascus is blocked by snow at times in most winters; in the summer the days are hot but the nights are cool enough to draw up to the mountains most of the inhabitants of Beirut. The plateaux and desert have an inland climate with low humidity and higher extremes of heat and cold. Aleppo has greater extremes than Damascus but in both cities there is a distinction between the four seasons: spring from mid-March to mid-May, summer from mid-May to the beginning of October, autumn in October and early November, and winter from November to March.

The People

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Official statistics showed that in 1951 the populations of Syria and of Lebanon were 3,329,137, and 1,303,941 respectively. Over half the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, about half a million are nomads, and the rest live in towns. The

[1] See table, below, p. 501.

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Syria MD1



SYRIA AND LEBANON: AGRICULTURAL AREAS

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GRAIN PRODUCTION IN SYRIA AND LEBANON, 1934–43

	Tons	Cwts per acre
Wheat		
1934	443,000	6·3
1935	504,000	7·5
1936	427,000	6·3
1937	468,800	6·6
1938	644,300	9·0
1943	624,280	7·3
Barley		
1934	292,100	7·8
1935	347,100	9·5
1936	308,100	8·2
1937	266,900	6·5
1938	383,400	9·0
1943	330,485	8·2

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With a total rural population of about 2·8 million in 1943–4, the production of grain per head amounts to only 3·4 quintals or 6·4 hundredweights. Thus the problem for Syria is to in-

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Syria MDI

CHAPTER II

COTTON IN SYRIA

000 One of the oldest countries in the world with a new-found independence and a new government, fired with ambition and restrained with pride, Syria is struggling against tradition to modernize its practices and remold its economy. A strange contrast of the old and the new is everywhere apparent. The struggle to change is sometimes painful and often frustrating.

Since the country was created only nine years ago, conditions have been hectic and chaotic, marked with military uprisings and three coup d'etats, the last of which brought in the present military dictatorship last year.

Nevertheless, progress has been remarkable. With large profits made during and after the war, the Syrians have done more in modernizing their homes, farms, and factories than had been done in a thousand years before. They have made conspicuous improvement in their roads, irrigation system, schools, and health programs.

Still the standard of living of the people as a whole is miserably low, and their mode of life for the most part is as primitive as it was in the time of Christ.

BACKGROUND

133 311 The resources of Syria are abundant, capable of supporting an economy of a much higher order and a much larger population. This fairly large country with an area of about 72,000 square miles (practically the size of the State of Oklahoma) is located along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.[27]

The eastern half of Syria is desert, broken only by the Euphrates River and its tributaries. In the west, stretching from the two principal mountain ranges, is a series of broad, fertile plains. There is a small coastal plain along the shores of the Mediterranean. The principal limitation is lack of water. Utilization of water for irrigation has increased ten-fold, but the potential from the Euphrates and Orontes River systems is much greater.

162 212 The population is estimated roughly at 3.5 million, of which three-fourths are rural and directly dependent on agriculture.[28] In the time of the ancients these lands supported two or three times as many people. Most of the people today are Moslems. Although more emphasis now is being placed on education, about three-fourths of the people are still illiterate.

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[27] *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1949, p. 1348.

[28] *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission*, United States Department of Agriculture, 1947, p. 7.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

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Syria

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

The Republic of Syria was constituted in 1943, when France relinquished control over the mandated territories of Lebanon and Syria. Geographically and ethnically Syria forms an integral part of the eastern Mediterranean region, but politically it has undergone progressive modification since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Considerable confusion in terminology arises from the fact that the entire area was then designated as Syria. It was mandated to France by the League of Nations in 1923 as the separate territories of Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently, for a brief period the region was divided into the autonomous "Levant States" of Lebanon, Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. With the annexation of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz as provincial units in 1936, and the cession of the Alexandretta district to Turkey in 1939, the present boundaries of Syria were established. The country now includes an area of approximately 71,000 square miles. In the west, it has a coastline of about 104 miles on the Mediterranean Sea and, to the south, common frontiers with Lebanon and northern Israel. Inland, it is surrounded by Turkey on the north, Iraq on the east and the southeast, and Jordan on the south.

The interior of the country is essentially a semiarid plateau, sloping to the basins of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and backed by chains of mountains in the north and the west. The highlands on the Turkish border are not well defined, but those in the west differentiate distinct geographic regions. In the north, the Nusairiyeh mountains, with elevations up to 5,000 feet,

p. 135(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
MI Middle East
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separate the narrow coastal plain from the Orontes river valley and the plateau region of the interior. Farther south, the Anti-Lebanon range rises to peaks of almost 9,000 feet on the Lebanese frontier, and spreads in spurs eastward toward the Syrian Desert. The inland slopes are mainly barren steppe, which merges with the desert, except where oases provide stretches of cultivable land. In the southwest, the lofty peaks of Mount Hermon descend to the fertile Hauran plateau, which receives the moisture-laden winds from the Mediterranean across the gap of the Esdraelon plains. 133

With the exception of the Euphrates, the rivers of Syria are relatively short, but all are vital to the agricultural life of the country. The Euphrates, from its source in the mountains of eastern Turkey, flows diagonally for 420 miles across the northern plateau toward the Iraqi border. The triangular-shaped sector cut off by the river is largely undulating steppe, but extensive [311] areas of irrigable land are found along its banks and those of the tributary systems of the Khabour and the Belikh. The northeast corner, watered by the Khabour River and its tributaries, comprises the region known as the Al Jazira, which was formerly an important granary of the Roman Empire. The Orontes River rises in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon and flows northward across the plains of Hama and Homs and through the Ghab marshes before turning west to the Mediterranean in Turkish territory. The Barada and its tributaries, which are fed by subterranean springs in gorgelike valleys on the eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon mountains, water the Al Ghouta, an oasis

p. 135(B)

68-Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1956
M1 Middle East

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

p. 136

65-Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

of almost 36 square miles to the east and the south of Damascus. Since ancient times the prosperity and the beauty of the city have been influenced by the Barada River, earning for it the name of the "River of Gold."

Governed by the proximity of the Mediterranean and the desert, wide variations in climatic conditions are encountered in different parts of the country. In general, the rainfall decreases in volume toward the interior and from northwest to southeast. Except on the seaward slopes of the northwestern highlands, the annual precipitation falls in the period from November through May, and is usually concentrated within a few days of each month. The average rainfall varies from 30 inches a year in the coastal region to less than 5 inches on the fringes of the desert. In the years 1938-50, the total precipitation recorded annually at Aleppo ranged from 12 to 33 inches, and at Damascus, from 5 to 11 inches. Similarly, while the moderating effects of the Mediterranean are felt along the coast, wide gradations in temperature are common in the interior. The winter temperatures inland normally average above freezing, but frosts and light snows may be encountered during the coldest months, in January and February. The summers are hot and dry, with temperatures approaching 100° F., and often 110° F., toward the east in July and August. The daily range, which approximates 15 to 20° F. in the winter, increases to around 30° F. in the summer. In the northeastern regions and near the desert, the hot, dry, sand-laden *sirocco* blows at irregular intervals, with greatest intensity during the early summer. In 1949, the mean temperature at Damascus was about 59° F.; the mean maximum temperature, 73° F.; and the mean minimum temperature, 44° F. The corresponding temperatures at Aleppo were 63° F., 73° F. and 52° F., respectively. No comparable temperature readings for Deir ez Zor and the towns in the eastern provinces were available.

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563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
361 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.
[291 Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
361 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.
[134 This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
577 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
511 ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

III The Shashans

563 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
463 Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
134 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

1621 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
439 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
452 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
439 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

1621 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
563 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
795 language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE REGION
regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;[2] it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub[2] and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Palmyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

Irrigation

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

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113 [2] A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Jour. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

ing all this great quantity of Water was past away, so that in about two Hour's Riding we could hardly perceive that there had been any Rain at all. 731

That floods are an old phenomenon in Selemiya is suggested by two traditional theories, repeated by the inhabitants today, regarding the derivation of the place name. The first theory makes the essential form Sal-Miah, "a flood of water." The other was recorded by Yaqut in 1225:

Ahmad ibn Yahyâ ibn Jâbir relates that there was a city in Syria, near Salamiyyah, called Al Mûtafikah [The Overturned], which was overwhelmed with all its inhabitants—all except one hundred souls. These left that place, and came and built one hundred houses, and they called the hamlet where they had made their houses Salâm Miyah (Peace for the Hundred), of which the people made Salamiyyah.[12]

As told today, the story is that the "overwhelming" agent was a flood.

The floods are greatly aggravated by soil erosion. Where the trees have been cut, the bushes torn up for fuel, and the grass overgrazed, and especially where slopes have been plowed, there the soil is eroded, and many slopes are now practically bare of soil and vegetation. In summer, soil is shifted by strong winds; in winter, rain washes it into gullies or wadis with steep, crumbling sides. These are tributary to the main streams which do so much damage when they reach the plain. The runoff from bare slopes is faster and more fully loaded than that from vegetated slopes. 731 134

Past and Present Vegetation Destruction

There is no doubt that the trees of Jebel Bil'as are a remnant of a denser and more extensive growth, though there are no very good grounds for the common assumption that all the Palmyrene ranges were forested in Roman days. The Tablet of Palmyra's fiscal laws of A.D. 137[13] gives reason to suppose that the locality may have furnished considerable quantities of wood and pistachio nuts, and in the same period Jebel Bil'as and neighboring ranges were used as grazing lands for sheep and horses.[14] The location of elaborate Romano-Byzantine foggara systems, as at Moufaqqar, directly in the paths of the floods might seem to indicate that, when the foggaras were constructed, floods were not as serious as they are now. 75 137 [72]

Old stumps and roots are found within and beyond the present wooded

[12] Le Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

[13] See J.-B. Chabot: Choix d'inscriptions de Palmyre, Paris, 1922, pp. 23-38.

[14] A. Poidebard: La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie.—Le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe.—Recherches aériennes (1925-1932) (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 18), Paris, 1934; M. D. Schlumberger: Une campagne de fouilles au Djebel-el-Cheer en 1934, *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1935, pp. 250-256. 113

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

311 most of the region; a scale of 1:10,000 with 2-meter contours for a narrow
654 band running along the Euphrates; and a scale of 1:5,000 with identical contours for the area immediately around the gorge.

5. An area of about 970 square kilometers in the Khabour river valley upstream from Markada.

Aerial photography is already covered by an existing contract. Mapping is necessary to facilitate irrigation planning and to investigate the possibility of a dam at Markada. Mapping on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours would be sufficient except for the proposed dam site where the scale would need to be 1:5,000.

6. An area of some 3,400 square kilometers on the left banks of the Khabour and Euphrates rivers.

Mapping of this area on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours appears necessary to determine the possibilities of gravity irrigation and to expedite needed soil surveys.

These surveys, which together would cost approximately £S 4 million, would cover most of the land potentially available for cultivation and the greater part of the irrigable area.

Soil Surveys

654 The aerial reconnaissance the mission has suggested would greatly
134 expedite the soil survey already started under the direction of an FAO specialist. Soils can be classified into broad types on the basis of aerial photographs. With additional work on the ground it is possible to proceed to more detailed agrogeological soil mapping, which is necessary to determine how the land already under cultivation can better be employed and how land still unoccupied can best be utilized. This type of mapping is now being undertaken for the Jezireh as an adjunct to the cadastral survey. While all the detailed soil mapping required can obviously not be completed in a few years, the mission urges that the present soil survey be expedited and broadened. A soils department with a budget of £S 60,000 for 1954 has been established in the Ministry of Agriculture. Its budget will have to be raised to at least £S 100,000. The work on soils should concentrate primarily on areas which will or can be opened to settlement such as the Ghab, the Roudj and certain rainfed regions. From

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time to time, however, spot analysis will also be required to carry out special programs to improve soil fertility. 654 134

Cadastral Survey

Aerial photography should assist considerably in accelerating the cadastral survey work which was first initiated in 1923 but was still only 45% completed by the beginning of 1953. It is clearly in Syria's interest to finish the cadaster as soon as possible so that the uncertainty surrounding private property rights may be ended at long last and the extent of state domain may be clearly determined. Similarly, it is necessary to expedite the lagging program for converting *mucha'a* or village common land to individual peasant ownership. Experience with the accelerated survey for the Jezireh indicates the need for additional measures to speed up the work. This survey, originally scheduled for completion in the spring of 1955, is now unlikely to be finished before the end of 1956. Insufficient funds, shortages of trained personnel and cumbersome procedures have all contributed to delay this vital survey work. The mission urges that all possible measures to expedite the program be taken. Among the measures that might be considered are the contracting of necessary ground surveys to qualified private firms; the delimitation of properties in certain areas solely by means of aerial photographs rather than by ground surveys; and the possibility of shortcuts in the protracted legal procedures involved in the determination of titles. 654

State Domain

The aerial, cadastral and soil surveys outlined above will for the first time provide the government with approximately accurate information on the area and quality of state domain. At present the government claims ownership of 1,417,571 hectares of allegedly cultivable land of which 551,473 are leased for cultivation. This total, however, excludes the unoccupied or "dead" land (*mawat*) which was assimilated to state domain by Legislative Decree No. 135 of October 29, 1952. Nor does it include the land which may be "recaptured" by the state under other provisions of the same decree. For instance, this decree specified that prior occupation of land which had not yet been sanctioned by the acquisition of title would be recognized only up to 200 hectares per member of the occupier's 471 423

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241 heavy clay alluvium in the valley proper and terra rossa and some peat soil
458 along the slopes. Whereas drainage is the main problem in the Ghab, the
311 problem in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys is to extend irrigation so as to double the present cultivated area. The farms vary from rather large holdings of absentee landlords, cultivated by sharecroppers, to very small farm units owned and worked by the farmer himself.

Crop rotation followed in the irrigated area of the Ghab generally takes the form of barley, cotton, wheat and cotton, while the rotation in the Euphrates valley is similar to that in dry farming regions: cotton or summer crop, fallow, winter wheat.

Yields are generally higher than in the rainfed regions but full use is not made of the available water and the irrigation methods are backward in many parts. Though better yielding cash crops have been introduced, the farmer as a rule cultivates only the few traditional crops. In these areas agricultural education could do much to further more economic water utilization and wider crop diversification.

The lands in the immediate vicinity of the rivers are fully irrigated but not fully utilized during the entire year. Hundreds of thousands of hectares on the somewhat higher land on both banks of the Euphrates and in the lower Khabour valley form a potential future reserve, though the capital outlay required to bring them under cultivation would probably have to be furnished by the government.

The central plains of the Syrian desert. In the central plains low rainfall and extreme temperatures render agricultural production practically non-existent but the desert is quite important as a natural grazing area (except during the absolutely dry months) for the sheep and camels of nomadic Bedouin tribes. Many parts of the desert, particularly the large depressions, could be better utilized if desert wells were constructed.

134 *Types of Soil*

311 The soils of Syria rank from the world's best to the poorest roughly in the order of (1) alluvial, (2) black, (3) chestnut brown and terra rossa, followed by (4) brown and reddish brown, and (5) grey sub-desert. According to a preliminary survey conducted by an FAO soil specialist the area covered by each of these various types of soil is approximately as follows (in thousand hectares):

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1. alluvial	200
2. black	100
3. chestnut brown and terra rossa	1,500
4. brown and reddish-brown	3,500
5. grey sub-desert	9,000

The remaining 3.7 million hectares is covered by lithasols, eroded rendzina, and saline soils, which for the greater part have no agricultural significance.

Unfortunately, the three best soil types represent no more than about 10% of Syria's total surface area of about 18 million hectares, and it is on these soils only that a wide variety of crops can be grown. Almost all of the brown and reddish-brown soils, covering 20% of the land area, fall in the inner region of the fertile crescent belt where steppe conditions prevail. These soils are most appropriate for the cultivation of cereals and small grains, and are utilized for such purposes in similar regions throughout the world. The grey sub-desert soils (50%) are used primarily for pasture; crop production is possible only under irrigation.

This evaluation serves only as a rough guide to detailed agrogeological soil maps. A more detailed survey of Syrian soils is in progress and it is imperative that it be continued, since soil maps are essential for planning, and, together with data on climate, may be used to determine the types and quantities of crops which may be cultivated to the greatest economic and social advantage. They would also be of the greatest importance for the assessment of taxes on land holdings, should such a tax be instituted.

Soil Fertility and Agricultural Use

134 242

Soil fertility and usefulness depend not only on type but also on profile, that is, the layers or horizons (topsoil and subsoils) of soil materials of various colors, on the chemical composition and on the configuration of the terrain and its water supply.

The depth of profile determines the root rate and the bulk of material available for nutrition, and also indicates the total soil water available—a consideration of importance in view of Syria's semi-arid conditions. Here shallow soils, even the best type, are of limited value only; being more prone to drought than deep ones they are more hazardous as an agricultural base.

Chemical composition of the soil, especially the topsoil, also has an im-

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134 portant bearing on fertility, for soils lacking a balance of the main elements
242 (nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus) or deficient in some of the minor elements (calcium, magnesium, etc.) are worthless for agriculture. Nitrogen, the most essential element in plant growth, is extracted from the soil during the growing period. In Syria, the customary method of restoring nitrogen is to leave the land fallow; for centuries this has been done rather successfully in the Hauran and elsewhere. The period of fallow—one, two or three years or more—depends on the type of crop, and, as far as the soil is concerned, the group, quality, depth and restorative capacity. In addition to the customary fallow, Syrian farmers near populated centers use town refuse to restore soil fertility. Unfortunately cheap manure and compost are generally consumed for fuel, but in recent years the use of commercial fertilizers has increased, particularly for cotton and sugar beet. While the Syrian farmers are aware of the importance of better crop rotation practices, improvement of soils through green manuring and leguminous crops is in its infancy.

During the last two decades huge tracts have been opened up, especially in the Jezireh. This land has been idle for centuries and its reserve of chemical compounds caused by decomposition of the natural vegetation is considerable. Though very good soils do exist, particularly in the northeastern parts, the magnitude of the stored elements has generally been overestimated. The reserves, particularly of nitrogen, are not inexhaustible. The virgin soil of the Jezireh has often been compared with virgin soil types in Russia, the United States and Europe but it must be remembered that in Syria the humus has not been so abundant as in humid climates, so that the nitrogen reserve is very limited. When that reserve falls below a certain level soil productivity decreases rapidly even if other elements are in plenti-
[311] ful supply. In Syria continuous exploitation under a monocultural system has resulted in decreased yields in certain areas, notably the Jezireh, where the danger is not yet fully recognized. Even artificial fertilizers cannot replace organic enrichment and the fallow system in its present form is far from sufficient to maintain fertility. New farm techniques, a changed rotation system and increased use of green manuring and fertilizers are urgent needs.

It is believed that Syrian soils are not generally deficient in phosphorus, important for growth and for the forming of grains and seeds, although chemical analyses indicate the total phosphorus available rather than the amount which can actually be absorbed by the plant. Assimilation depends

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largely on the acidity of the soil, and the p.H.[3] of practically all Syrian soil is between seven and eight. Most of the phosphorus is blocked. Whereas nitrogen and phosphorus deficiencies can be observed in almost all Syrian crops in various stages, very little indication of potassium shortage has been noted.

Besides the three main elements, the tracer elements iron, manganese, zinc, boron, copper and molybdenum are quite significant. A shortage or lack of one or another can result in low yields, even in soils generally classified as very good. The application of tracer elements e.g., the application of zinc and copper to fiber plants, citrus fruits, etc., has shown remarkable yield increases in other parts of the world. Unfortunately, very few studies of soil fertility and plant growth conditions have been conducted in Syria. Those made by Bracken for winter and summer crops and by Ibrahim Boules for cotton have indicated a general shortage of nitrogen, a disputable lack of phosphorus and rather favorable conditions as regards potassium. The excellent studies and surveys conducted by an FAO soil expert during the last few years have not been sufficiently intensive or extensive so far to form the basis of definite conclusions. But the mission is convinced that a thorough soil survey on the lines already begun by these specialists will be of great assistance in increasing the agricultural area and production. The compilation of the information thus gained, together with data on climate and water resources will be of much value in ensuring a sound rational basis for agricultural planning and development. Aerial mapping is a necessary adjunct to ground surveys and the successful coordination of the undertaking will require the development of a cartographic office.

II CEREALS

Wheat and Barley

Syria is fortunate in being able normally to harvest its wheat and barley approximately one month earlier than American and European cereals; consequently they can be brought on to the European market at the time

[3] p.H. values indicate relative acidity or alkalinity. Values run from 0 to 14, 7 indicating neutrality, numbers less than 7 increasing acidity, and numbers greater than 7 increasing alkalinity.

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

000 162 eastwards into the desert. At present the bulk of the population is concentrated in a comparatively small part of the total area of the country; it is mainly in the West and in the river valleys of the Jazirah. The density of population is greatest on the coast and round Damascus and Aleppo.

241 The crops which are grown or could be grown vary greatly from district to district, in accordance with variations in climate and the soil's fertility. The Jazirah, the great plain of Homs and Hama, the Biqa' and the Hauran produce wheat, and to a lesser extent maize, barley and other cereals. Olives, vines and other fruits are grown on the coastal plains and the westward slopes of the coastal ranges; tobacco in Lebanon and around Latakia; cotton also around Latakia, and in the Biqa'. Some districts are well watered by springs, summer streams and perennial rivers, and some, in the north more than in the south and on the coast rather than inland, enjoy an adequate rainfall; but the fertility of almost all parts of the country could be much increased were its water-resources to be properly exploited. The Orontes in the north, the Litani in the south, the Euphrates and its tributaries in the north-east and other rivers could be used to irrigate perhaps half a million more hectares than are irrigated to-day. The rainfall could be more fully utilized, and the agricultural situation improved in various other ways, by systematic reafforestation, to make up for the bad effects of neglect in the past. Under French rule a little has been done to this end, but more remains to be done.

135 The mineral resources of Syria and Lebanon have not yet been thoroughly investigated but are probably not extensive. Salt and some other minerals exist in quantities sufficient to supply the country's own needs; but iron and other requisites of industry are found only in small quantities or else not at all. In recent years there have been reports of the discovery of oil in the Jazirah, but whatever oilfields exist are not yet being exploited.

433 241 In normal years the country's production of food equals and often exceeds its consumption, although the inadequacy of internal communications and other factors make necessary a certain importation of agricultural products from the neighbouring countries. Improvements in the quality of seeds and livestock and the modernization of agricultural methods have already begun, and greatly help in increasing

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Natural Resources

Land and water are undoubtedly the principal natural resources of Syria. Indications do not point to extensive mineral deposits. Some poor lignite but no coal has been found. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company carried out extensive prospecting and drilling over a considerable area under a concession granted in 1938. After spending about £ 6 million sterling in exploratory work, it surrendered its concession in August 1951. Although the belief persists in Syria that considerable oil will one day be discovered, there is no evidence to support the supposition. Drilling did reveal the presence of natural gas in eastern Syria, southwest of Hassetche, and also of appreciable quantities of rock salt. In theory this gas, if proved in considerable volume, together with salt, could provide the raw materials for the production of fertilizers and alkalis, but other countries—for example Iraq—may well be more favorably situated with respect to the development of similar resources. The natural gas could also be used as a source of energy but it is unfortunately found at a considerable distance from the potential market in western Syria.

There are important deposits of bitumen or asphalt. One of these, in the province of Latakia, is already being mined, but other and far richer deposits uncovered in the Djebel Bichri, west of Deir ez Zor, are being exploited to a minor extent only by the Ministry of Public Works. The latter deposits are expected to assume considerable importance in the extensive roadbuilding program the government is planning to undertake. Iron ore, chromite and lead and iron pyrites are known to exist, but their presence in commercial quantities is still to be proved. While licenses for prospecting of minerals are being issued, on the basis of existing evidence it seems unlikely that mineral resources exist in sufficient quantities to affect the future of Syria significantly.

Agriculture

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65% to 75% of the people derive their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable portion of the balance earn their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities. Agriculture and animal husbandry together probably account for 45% to 50% of the national income. In agriculture, winter crops are most important because rainfall is concen-

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

489 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

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744 the refuse dumps and other breeding sites
136 are sprayed with DDT preparations at in-
511 tervals between May and October.

136 Lice. Infestation with lice is common
511 among the inhabitants in the congested
361 quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

136 Fleas. Numerous species of fleas para-
164 sitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The sticktight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

136 Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

136 Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks,
232 including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and
164 several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

136 The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventri-*
164 *cosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of
752 scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings
[135] are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

136 The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

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Reptiles. Venomous snakes are not common, but at least 4 species of vipers are known to be present. The carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, exists only in the north, while *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, *V. lebetina xanthina* and *V. palaestina* are reported from many parts of the country. 136

Rodents. Rats and mice are numerous. The usual domestic rats are *Rattus rattus rattus* or *R. rattus alexandrinus*. *R. norvegicus* sometimes invades the port towns of Latakia.

Molluscs.* The fresh-water snail, *Bulinus truncatus* (— *B. contortus*), inhabits some of the tributaries of the Belikh and the Khabour rivers, near the Turkish border. It is the intermediate host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, which is reported from several foci in that region. 136 164

Plants. Various trees, weeds and grasses are capable of inducing allergic manifestations in susceptible individuals, but no precise information is available. 137 752

The broad bean, *Vicia fava*, which is grown extensively as a food, may be toxic to young children when it is eaten raw. A few deaths are observed each year, among children in both urban and rural communities. Occasional cases of lathyrism occur when the "Indian pea," *Lathyrus sativus*, a plant widely cultivated for fodder, is used for human consumption. [135]

Food Sanitation

Municipal regulations govern the sanitation of the food supplies in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Latakia. Restaurants, markets and other premises where food is sold are inspected at regular intervals by the municipal sanitary officers, and food handlers are required to register for examination at 6-month intervals. Municipal slaughterhouses are established in towns with populations of 20,000 and over, and are operated under the supervision of the health authorities. The meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter by veterinary officers of the Min- 744

* See footnote, page 10.

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7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

Malaria and Its Control

Foggaras and surface canals easily become partly blocked by vegetation, and floods and rain wash in mud and silt. The water is then ponded back, depressions near the canal bank fill, the canal may overflow, and, if it is built along the side of a valley, overflow or seepage will maintain swamps along the watercourse. Artificial blockages of foggaras also pond back the water. Near the lower end of most canals are "brick pits" from which earth has been taken to be made into mud bricks, and these also tend to fill with water. Everywhere wadis carry rain and seepage water in winter and spring and the overflow from irrigation canals in early summer and autumn, at which seasons there is a surplus. In other words, except during the peak irrigation and evaporation period of midsummer, they carry slow-moving, half-stagnant water. 312

All these places are potential, and most of them actual, breeding places of the mosquito *Anopheles sacharovi*, which favors shallow, sunny, warm waters, full of aquatic vegetation. At only one place in the area has another malaria carrier, *A. algeriensis*, been found, and the problem of malaria control in the region is thus essentially that of eliminating the *A. sacharovi* breeding grounds. Full statistics are not available, but such figures as do exist show the great need of such control. About 20 per cent of the patients treated by a mobile clinic in the region in 1942–1945 were suffering from malaria, and the percentage rose at times (especially in late summer) to 80 in some villages. Sometimes practically the whole population of a village was found to be infected. In Tell et Tout (population *c.* 550) about 50 deaths were due primarily to malaria in 1941, and almost the sole source of infection was the swamp caused by the deliberate blockage of a foggara. 136 164 [165]

Control work is apparently simple. Canal owners occasionally clean the canals of detritus and vegetation and repair the banks at the lower end. It is important that this work be done well and repeated every few years. Small depressions may be sprayed, filled with earth, or drained by a simple ditch. Broad, sluggish streams may be canalized by a ditch along the thalweg. The more efficient the irrigation, the less likely it is that mosquitoes will breed. Waste of water should be reduced to a minimum and a wide range of crops grown, so that irrigation begins early in the season and ends late. The "waste" water of natural watercourses may be utilized by the construction of a simple dam and gravity canal, or by the repair of the old subparallel foggara if, as is probable, there is one. Extensive stretches of swampy ground may be put to good use by drainage-irrigation schemes, which often include the repair of old foggaras. Malaria control should not stand on its own, an expensive 312 080

of the Museirib swamp lands along the 312
headwaters of the Yarmuk River. The resettlement program in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins, which is controlled by a separate governmental organization, calls for the irrigation of extensive areas. Between 20,000 and 30,000 acres had 311
been opened up through irrigation in 1951. 312
Work on the drainage and the irrigation of the Ghab marshes, covering about 100,000 acres in the Orontes river valley northwest of Hama, was started in 1952.

Waste Disposal

Sewerage systems are available in all the 324
larger cities. The sewage is not treated, however, and the effluent is usually discharged into adjacent watercourses or upon the land for irrigation purposes. In unsewered sections, cesspools are employed in connection with the houses. The methods of sewage disposal are universally primitive in the rural districts. In villages near the larger cities, pit or shallow latrines are frequently found in the individual compounds or provided on a community basis. In the more remote areas and in the poorer villages, pollution of the soil is the general practice. The use of night soil for fertilizer is common in the agricultural communities.

Fauna and Flora

Arthropoda. Mosquitoes. Nine species 136
of anopheline mosquitoes have been re- 164
ported from Syria, three of which—*Anopheles superpictus*, *A. sacharovi* (= *A. elutus*) and *A. claviger* (= *A. bifurcatus*)—are of major importance in the transmission of malaria. *A. pulcherrimus*, *A. hyrcanus*, *A. algeriensis* and *A. sergenti* are of minor and local significance, while *A. marteri* and *A. multicolor* are rare.

A. superpictus is widely distributed. It is 136
a prominent vector of malaria in the coastal plains, in the northwestern highland districts and in the river valleys, but is of secondary interest in the Damascus region. It breeds along the margins of the larger rivers and on the edges of mountain streams

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up to 4,000 feet elevation, in sunlit pools in 136
dried stream beds and in irrigation canals and seepages. Except at the higher altitudes, it is abundant from May to October, with peaks of activity between July and September. *A. sacharovi* is also a primary vector in many areas, breeding in swamps, irrigation canals and seepages, neglected water tanks and numerous other artificial collections of water. It is one of the principal vector species on the oasis of Damascus, where the miles of irrigation canals and numerous swampy depressions create favorable conditions for breeding. It is found breeding from March to November, but most prolifically in June and July. *A. claviger* is chiefly restricted to the towns and the surrounding villages, where it breeds in wells, cisterns and seepages, often even during the winter months. With *A. sacharovi*, [164]
it is responsible for the transmission of most of the malaria in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo. *A. sergenti* is a significant vector in the rice-growing areas in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. *A. pulcherrimus* is also plentiful in the river basins of the northeastern provinces, and is regarded primarily as a pest.

Two species of *Aedes* are known to be 136
present—*Aedes aegypti* and *A. mariae*. 164
A. aegypti is widespread in the western provinces, where it is the vector of dengue fever. Numerous species of *Culex* have been identified, but all are pests of no recognized medical importance.

Mosquito control work is carried on by 744
the antimalaria service of the Ministry of Health, and in the cities of Damascus and Aleppo by the municipal authorities. Larvicidal measures, using DDT or oil sprays, are undertaken in the cities and the larger towns; however, residual spraying, with DDT preparations or Gammexane, is the usual means of control in the rural villages. A mosquito control program, based upon the residual spraying of dwellings and other buildings, was initiated in the villages around Damascus in 1949, and in the Hauran region in 1950, by the Ministry, in

144 co-operation with the Near East Foundation and other agencies. Similar operations have also been conducted by the Ministry in the town of Latakia and in the administrative center and the adjacent farms in the Jebel ed Druz area. In 1950, the government program covered a total of 224 villages, with an aggregate population of slightly over 180,000. A shortage of DDT necessitated the curtailment of the program in 1951, but the Ministry proposes to expand its activities to other malarious districts throughout the country as rapidly as possible. A demonstration control program was started in 1952 in the vicinity of Homs under the auspices of the World Health Organization. Anopheline control measures are carried on by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in and around the refugee camps situated in malarious regions.

136 164 FLIES. Flies of the family MUSCIDAE are numerous, including *Musca domestica vicina*, *M. tempestiva*, *M. sorbens*, *M. vitripennis* and *Muscina stabulans*. They are abundant around markets, food shops and dwellings, and are undoubtedly implicated in the spread of intestinal infections. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, is prevalent. The myiasis-producing flies, *Chrysomyia albiceps*, *Calliphora erythrocephala*, *Oestris ovis*, *Lucilia sericata*, *Gasterophilus haemorrhoidalis*, *Wohlfahrtia magnifica* and species of *Sarcophaga* are known to be present, and are probably responsible for occasional cases of infection in man.

At least 6 species of sandflies are found in Syria. *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti* are involved in the transmission of cutaneous leishmaniasis, which is endemic in many parts of the country, particularly in the vicinity of Aleppo. *P. chinensis* and *P. major* occur and are potential vectors of visceral leishmaniasis, although the extent of indigenous infection is uncertain. *P. papatasii* is also the vector of sandfly fever, which is sporadic in this region.

144 136 571 A fly-control campaign was inaugurated in Damascus in 1946. The dwellings in the poorer sections of the city and the tanneries,

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744 the refuse dumps and other breeding sites
136 are sprayed with DDT preparations at in-
511 tervals between May and October.

136 Lice. Infestation with lice is common
511 among the inhabitants in the congested
361 quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

136 Fleas. Numerous species of fleas para-
164 sitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The sticktight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

136 Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

136 Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks,
232 including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and
164 several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

136 The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventri-*
164 *cosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of
752 scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings
[135] are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

136 The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

Reptiles. Venomous snakes are not common, but at least 4 species of vipers are known to be present. The carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, exists only in the north, while *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, *V. lebetina xanthina* and *V. palaestina* are reported from many parts of the country. 136

Rodents. Rats and mice are numerous. The usual domestic rats are *Rattus rattus rattus* or *R. rattus alexandrinus*. *R. norvegicus* sometimes invades the port towns of Latakia.

Mollusks.* The fresh-water snail, *Bulinus truncatus* (— *B. contortus*), inhabits some of the tributaries of the Belikh and the Khabour rivers, near the Turkish border. It is the intermediate host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, which is reported from several foci in that region. 136 164

Plants. Various trees, weeds and grasses are capable of inducing allergic manifestations in susceptible individuals, but no precise information is available. 137 752

The broad bean, *Vicia fava*, which is grown extensively as a food, may be toxic to young children when it is eaten raw. A few deaths are observed each year, among children in both urban and rural communities. Occasional cases of lathyrism occur when the "Indian pea," *Lathyrus sativus*, a plant widely cultivated for fodder, is used for human consumption. [135]

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* See footnote, page 10.

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164 the Qoubour el Bid section of the Al Jazira, along branches of the Khabour River north-
136 east of Hassetché. *Schistosoma haematobium*
164 is the only species identified in confirmed cases, but rectal complications are sometimes recorded. At present, the disease is confined to circumscribed foci, but in view of the irrigation and the agricultural potentialities of the region, its control is of
164 major public health significance. The foci
361 are apparently of recent origin. Whether the
169 infection was introduced by Senegalese
744 troops stationed in the vicinity, as claimed by the local inhabitants, or by nomadic tribes from Iraq is a matter of conjecture. Surveys have been made within recent years, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and co-operating international organizations, and, although some discrepancies are evident in the determination of the infection rates in different villages, all emphasize the seriousness of the problem. Competent local authorities estimated in 1951 that the total incidence in that year approximated 12,000 cases.

659 In surveys undertaken in 1948,[24] the ex-
164 amination of urine samples collected from 545 persons in Qoubour el Bid and neighboring villages on the Gerahi branch of the Khabour River indicated general infection rates of about 62 per cent. They averaged 73 per cent among the men and the boys, and 49 per cent among the women and the girls. Moreover, they were consistently higher, in both sexes, in individuals under 20 years than in the older age groups.
[361] Equally high infection rates were found among the seminomadic peoples in the Tell Abiad area. A system of spot checking suggested probable infection rates of almost 100 per cent among males and of 60 per cent among females in 3 of the 5 villages visited.

164 A more exhaustive investigation in 1950[25]
659 revealed the presence of infection among
361 about 24 per cent of the inhabitants of 58 villages situated along 4 tributary streams in the Qoubour el Bid area. The infection rates ranged from 1 to 88 per cent: the most

highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 744 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[40] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 282 164

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8,9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the malaria problem has been aggravated by the introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages. 659 747 164 261 164 241

The malaria season extends from April to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plasmodium vivax* and *P. falciparum* infections varies according to the season and from place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general, *P. vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered. 161 164 136

Malaria control measures are undertaken by the municipal authorities in Damascus, Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten- 164 744

164
744



Distribution of Malaria in Syria

sive work has been carried on, in co-operation with the Near East Foundation, in the agricultural districts around Damascus where 224 villages with over 180,000 inhabitants were protected in 1949-50. A marked reduction in the number of cases has been noted in all the areas treated. Successive examinations of over 500 children in 16 treated villages near Damascus revealed a decrease in spleen rates of from 78 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1951.[8] A malaria control program was inaugurated in the Homs district in 1952, under the auspices of the World Health Organization. *Anopheles sacharovi* and *A. claviger* are the principal vectors in the Damascus region; *A. sacharovi* and *A. superpictus*, in the river valleys in the northeast. 744 747 136

Rickettsial Infections. Localized outbreaks of louse-borne typhus are recurrent during the winter and the spring months, particularly in the congested quarters of the towns and the cities and among the nomadic tribes. Over 1,600 cases were reported in 1942, when the acute shortages associated with the war created conditions conducive to the spread of the infection. Since that date no more than 30 to 95 sporadic cases have been recorded in any one year. Control measures, including deverminization procedures and the immunization of the exposed populations, are enforced by the health authorities in affected areas. 146 362 361 744 757

No differentiation is made in the official 164

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113, 824, 137.

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[For information on the useful plants of Iran and Iraq, many of which are also used in Syria, see 35: Hooper and Field, MA1 Iran, category 116. --Analyst]

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDl Syria MDl

THE REGION IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE RAINFALL
regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;[2] it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub[2] and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Palmyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

Irrigation

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

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113 [2] A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Journ. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

ing all this great quantity of Water was past away, so that in about two Hour's Riding we could hardly perceive that there had been any Rain at all. 731

That floods are an old phenomenon in Selemiya is suggested by two traditional theories, repeated by the inhabitants today, regarding the derivation of the place name. The first theory makes the essential form Sal-Miah, "a flood of water." The other was recorded by Yaqut in 1225:

Ahmad ibn Yahyâ ibn Jîbir relates that there was a city in Syria, near Salamiyyah, called Al Mûtafikah [The Overturned], which was overwhelmed with all its inhabitants—all except one hundred souls. These left that place, and came and built one hundred houses, and they called the hamlet where they had made their houses Salâm Miyah (Peace for the Hundred), of which the people made Salamiyyah.[22]

As told today, the story is that the "overwhelming" agent was a flood.

The floods are greatly aggravated by soil erosion. Where the trees have been cut, the bushes torn up for fuel, and the grass overgrazed, and especially where slopes have been plowed, there the soil is eroded, and many slopes are now practically bare of soil and vegetation. In summer, soil is shifted by strong winds; in winter, rain washes it into gullies or wadis with steep, crumbling sides. These are tributary to the main streams which do so much damage when they reach the plain. The runoff from bare slopes is faster and more fully loaded than that from vegetated slopes. 731 134

Past and Present Vegetation Destruction

There is no doubt that the trees of Jebel Bil'as are a remnant of a denser and more extensive growth, though there are no very good grounds for the common assumption that all the Palmyrene ranges were forested in Roman days. The Tablet of Palmyra's fiscal laws of A.D. 137[23] gives reason to suppose that the locality may have furnished considerable quantities of wood and pistachio nuts, and in the same period Jebel Bil'as and neighboring ranges were used as grazing lands for sheep and horses.[24] The location of elaborate Romano-Byzantine foggara systems, as at Moufaqqar, directly in the paths of the floods might seem to indicate that, when the foggaras were constructed, floods were not as serious as they are now. 175 137 [172]

Old stumps and roots are found within and beyond the present wooded

[22] Le Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

[23] See J.-B. Chabot: Choix d'inscriptions de Palmyre, Paris, 1922, pp. 23-38.

[24] A. Poidebard: La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie.—Le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe.—Recherches aériennes (1925-1932) (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 18), Paris, 1934; M. D. Schlumberger: Une campagne de fouilles au Djebel-el-Chaar en 1934. *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1935, pp. 250-256. 113

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho*'s which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[15] "An Extract of the Journah" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanes Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

471 immediate family. It also provided that in adjudicating title deeds in
423 which the area derived from the indicated boundaries of the property was greater than the area mentioned in the deed, the boundaries would govern at least to the extent that they gave each member of the titleholder's family a minimum of 200 hectares. The mission urges that these provisions, which have apparently not yet been applied, be enforced as rapidly as possible. Their application would inflict no undue hardship, and would increase significantly the amount of revenue-earning state domain. Above all, it would put at the government's disposal more good land to be retained as a reserve for the ultimate settlement of landless or virtually landless peasants. Much of the land now left to the state is too marginal for successful settlement.

471 Careful management of state domain is necessary to ensure that the
423 state derives from it the maximum revenue and that land not really
427 suitable for cultivation is reserved for pasture or forest. The government is not equipped at present to exercise adequate supervision. Land is often tilled without authorization, thus depriving the government of revenue and often encouraging the cultivation of land which can be expected to produce a satisfactory harvest only in years of exceptionally high rainfall. Until cultivable land is required for settlement, it should be leased, as at present, to private operators who have the necessary machinery to till it. Thus land in the Jezireh which is recaptured under the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 135 might well be leased to those who now cultivate it, so that existing units of exploitation are not disturbed until the land is needed for distribution. However, current rentals for state land, even though they have been rising in recent years, still seem unduly low. Judging from private rental arrangements prevailing in the Jezireh, for example, the state should be able to charge an average rental of at least £S 5-6 per hectare instead of only a little over £S 3 as at present. In this way the government can add to the funds available for financing development.

Forestry and State Domain

137 The management of state domain should look also to the preservation
659 and improvement of forest areas on government land. Syria has unfortunately been almost entirely denuded of forests. Although some 448,000 hectares are listed officially as "forest", 348,000 hectares consist either of

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

wholly barren land or of range land with arboreous shrubs. Of the balance probably only about 60,000 hectares can be characterized as more or less dense forest.

The mission has already recommended an aerial survey of the forest areas in the province of Latakia. This would be a first step in the appraisal of existing resources and the delimitation and protection of forest reserves. An FAO specialist has for some time been advising the government on a forestry program. The mission can only recommend that action along the lines which he has proposed be undertaken as soon as possible. Any program should focus in the first instance on safeguarding forest areas against uncontrolled cutting, shifting cultivation, excessive grazing, fire, insects, erosion and other hazards which have inflicted considerable damage in the past. A more effective forestry law which was drafted by a committee in 1953 should be promptly enacted for this purpose. To protect the forests and supervise their exploitation a field service of four foresters and 42 rangers should be built up by 1960. The necessary forest rangers will have to be trained either at a secondary forestry school which may be established in cooperation with the FAO to serve the countries in the Near East or at a special training school which might be added to the existing Bugua Agricultural School near Latakia. Within the Ministry of Agriculture a staff of five foresters and 10 rangers should be available to direct the necessary survey, research and reforestation work; and two foresters will be necessary to supervise forest nurseries.

Once adequate protection of forests has been established, reforestation can proceed. The three existing nurseries and two new ones recently established should be able to produce about 3 million seedlings yearly. The mission considers it important, however, that government nurseries be also in a position to supply trees for planting in farming areas. Although such trees as poplars are extensively grown as cash crops in certain irrigated regions, most farming areas are virtually treeless. The planting of a belt of trees around new village settlements should be an integral part of any settlement program. Farmers should be assisted to establish their own wood lots and to plant trees along roads. This would help to meet the acute shortage of timber for fuel and building, provide some protection against wind and make settlements more attractive. The mission therefore suggests that five additional small nurseries be established, particularly in the provinces of Jezireh and Euphrates, to supply trees for such purposes.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

137 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the
659 mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available
313 to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

428 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant pro-
166 prietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60%, respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in
166 settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experi-
241 mental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope for widening the area cultivated and raising the yields, as the soil is fertile. In the Jezira the use of machinery could be extended—it is already increasing fast. Better livestock production could be achieved by greater use of fodder crops for which conditions are favourable: in the 'Duck's Bill' good clover grows wild. At present fodder crops are not considered worth cultivating.

In the Euphrates region there is great scope for extension of irrigation. But a large scale scheme would be costly because the river runs between high escarpments, which vary in distance between each other up to about 10 miles. To irrigate much larger areas it would be necessary to lift water over the escarpments. There are large areas of uncultivated land, particularly between Abu Kemal and Deir-ez-Zor. Even on the land already cultivated yields of wheat could be much higher: at present the yield is four to six times the seeding rate, and, according to local farmers, could be raised to ten to fifteen times the seed with better irrigation. The high cost of fuel oil is the limiting factor as it also is for tractor work. On the Khabur river improvement of the ancient barrages would permit an extension of irrigation.

It is in this area that there is real scope for a planned settlement of cultivators, with improved methods and a better system of land tenure. The obvious form for such settlement to take would be on the model of the Jewish co-operative farms, small holdings with collective use of machinery and working to a cropping plan; on the uncultivated land such settlement could be undertaken without incurring high capital costs.

So far as the Euphrates Valley is concerned, similar co-operatives based on communal control of water supplies might be started on a small scale. Large-scale irrigation here would be costly, and would necessarily have to be co-ordinated with the irrigation of Iraq. An immediate step needed is to reduce the price of fuel oil.

While it is easy on paper to see the possibilities of such schemes as these, it is not easy to see where in fact the motive power for them is to come from. They will not bring in quick big returns, which are what local farmers and landowners want: the district is remote and the main object of such investment would be a long period rise in the standard of living, in which the moneyed classes are not interested. Present-day Syria is not

Reptiles. Venomous snakes are not common, but at least 4 species of vipers are known to be present. The carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, exists only in the north, while *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, *V. lebetina xanthina* and *V. palaestina* are reported from many parts of the country. 136

Rodents. Rats and mice are numerous. The usual domestic rats are *Rattus rattus rattus* or *R. rattus alexandrinus*. *R. norvegicus* sometimes invades the port towns of Latakia.

Mollusks.* The fresh-water snail, *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), inhabits some of the tributaries of the Belikh and the Khabour rivers, near the Turkish border. It is the intermediate host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, which is reported from several foci in that region. 136 164

Plants. Various trees, weeds and grasses are capable of inducing allergic manifestations in susceptible individuals, but no precise information is available. 137 752

The broad bean, *Vicia fava*, which is grown extensively as a food, may be toxic to young children when it is eaten raw. A few deaths are observed each year, among children in both urban and rural communities. Occasional cases of lathyrism occur when the "Indian pea," *Lathyrus sativus*, a plant widely cultivated for fodder, is used for human consumption. [135]

Food Sanitation

Municipal regulations govern the sanitation of the food supplies in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Latakia. Restaurants, markets and other premises where food is sold are inspected at regular intervals by the municipal sanitary officers, and food handlers are required to register for examination at 6-month intervals. Municipal slaughterhouses are established in towns with populations of 20,000 and over, and are operated under the supervision of the health authorities. The meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter by veterinary officers of the Min- 744

* See footnote, page 10.

p. 145(A)

4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

DERMATOGLYPHICS IN PEOPLES OF THE NEAR EAST

I. LEBANESE: MITWALI

HAROLD CUMMINS AND W. M. SHANKLIN
Tulane University and American University of Beirut, Syria

121 This report is presented as a record of data toward an eventual analysis of racial variation in dermatoglyphics. It is to be hoped that a broad comparison of races on this basis may be eventually possible, but it will be necessary to continue the accumulation of records on various populations, perhaps from time to time taking stock of progress as has been done recently by Steggerda, Steggerda and Lane for the palmar features (Middle American Research Series, publication 7, Tulane University, '36).

124 101 795 The material here treated represents a population not hitherto investigated from the standpoint of dermatoglyphics. The Mitwali are a Syrian mountain people, living in the southern Lebanon range. They are Moslems, but adhere to the Shiite sect rather than to the Sunni which is common to the region. There are 138 subjects in the series, males and females being in the proportion of about two to one; in view of the small numbers the sexes are combined. The subjects are mainly children in the government schools, the adult population having proved generally unsuitable for printing—on account of extensive callouses.

141 128 The palmar features, main lines and patterns, are tabulated in tables 1 and 2, their formulations following the methods of Cummins et al. (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XII, '29).

The data on lines A and D have been further analyzed, to determine the main-line index which has been suggested by Cummins (Middle American Research Series, Tulane University, publication 7, '36) as a value denoting the degree of slant of the general palmar configuration. For the 276 hands

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4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

141 in this collection the mean index is 8.50 ± 0.09. Right hands
128 alone yield a mean of 9.33 ± 0.11, and the lefts, 7.67 ± 0.12.

Axial triradii present the following percentile occurrences, right and left hands being here combined since no significant

TABLE 1

Terminations of the palmar main lines, stating the percentile occurrence of each position

POSITION	LINE A			LINE B			LINE C			LINE D		
	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
1	0.7	9.4	5.0									
2	0.7	7.2	3.9									
3	34.1	52.2	43.1									
4	10.1	9.4	9.7		0.7	0.3						
5'	49.3	21.7	35.5	2.2	4.3	3.2						
5"	5.1		2.5	31.2	49.3	40.2	5.8	15.9	10.8			
6				9.4	11.6	10.5	2.9	2.9	2.9			
7				50.0	32.6	41.3	18.8	23.2	21.0	5.8	16.7	11.2
8				3.6		1.8				2.2	2.9	2.5
9				3.6		1.8	53.6	31.2	42.4	26.1	34.8	30.4
10							3.6		1.8	8.7	11.6	10.1
11							2.9		1.4	57.2	33.3	45.2
X							5.1	17.4	11.2			
3							0.7	2.2	1.4			
O					1.4	0.7	6.5	7.2	6.8		0.7	0.3

R = right, L = left.

TABLE 2

Percentile occurrences of true patterns and pattern vestiges (not including 'multiplications') of the five palmar areas

PATTERN	RIGHT	LEFT	BOTH
Hypothenar	32.6	29.7	31.1
Thenar/first interdigital	8.7	19.6	14.1
Second interdigital	9.4	3.6	6.5
Third interdigital	68.1	47.8	57.9
Fourth interdigital	47.8	67.4	57.6

bimanual differences are noted: 0, 0.7; t, 71.7; t', 14.5; t", 1.1; tt', 6.9; tt", 4.0; tt't", 0.4; t't", 0.7.

Frequencies of the finger-print types, classified by the usual fourfold scheme, are as follows: arches, 2.7%; radial loops, 4.2%; ulnar loops, 50.9%; whorls, 42.2%. The abundance of whorls is noteworthy.

4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

As pointed out by Cummins and Steggerda (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XX, '35), the pattern types may be regarded as variants of 'pattern intensity.' The arch is not a pattern in the strict sense of the term, while loops and whorls may be regarded as levels of successively increasing pattern intensity. For statistical purposes arbitrary values are assigned to the pattern types: arch, 0; loop, 1; whorl, 2. The complement of patterns in an individual is then converted into the 'index of pattern intensity' by summating the values of

TABLE 3

Percentile occurrences of pattern types for each digit

Digit	I			II			III		
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
Whorls	68.1	55.8	61.9	52.2	47.8	50.0	27.5	31.9	29.7
Ulnar loops	29.0	42.8	35.9	22.5	27.5	25.0	66.7	62.3	64.5
Radial loops	1.4	0.7	1.0	18.8	17.4	18.1	1.4	1.4	1.4
Arches	1.4	0.7	1.0	6.5	7.2	6.8	4.3	4.3	4.3

Digit	IV			V		
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
Whorls	50.0	44.2	47.1	24.6	20.3	22.4
Ulnar loops	48.6	55.8	52.2	74.6	79.0	76.8
Radial loops	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Arches	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.7

R = right, L = left.

the ten patterns. The indices therefore range from 0, indicating ten arches, to 20, the value for ten whorls. The mean index in the present series is 13.96 ± 0.20. As a matter of record, providing for other statistical determinations such as the dactylodiagram of Poll, the frequencies of pattern types on separate digits are here recorded in table 3.

SUMMARY

Palmar main lines, axial triradii, palmar patterns and fingerprint patterns are analyzed in 138 Mitwali, a Syrian mountain population. It may be noted that the features present a close relationship to another Lebanese series as well as to the Rwala Arabs (unpublished data).

Lebanon MEI
Syria MDI

L 174 The Armenians are similar to the Lebanese in many of their characteristics but Professor Coon believes they represent a mixture of Alpine brachycephalics with the long headed Indo-Europeans. It will not be feasible to discuss Armenian racial origins in this paper as that involves the extensive racial movements in Iran, Turkey, Southern Russia and the Caucasus.

It does not appear that the Druzes migrated into Southern Lebanon and the Jebel Druze from outside as many believe. Likewise, the same is true for the Mitwali who are Shiite Moslems. Most likely religious leaders from outside Syria entered these districts and influenced the peoples already living there to accept these doctrines.

The Lebanese are remarkably homogeneous and the Mitwali, the Bekaa mules, and the Druzes are almost identical in their morphology. The scant data at hand suggests the same is true for the Maronites.

S 141 162 The desert border: The anthropology of the desert border inhabitants is as complicated as that of the Lebanese is simple. Six groups have been studied along the desert border — two Christian and four Moslem. The Christians were in Nhardah, near Hama, and in Nafar, north of Damascus. The Moslems were in Hama, Midjanah and surrounding villages some twenty kilometers south of Damascus, in Hama in the center of the Nusrya and Circassians in and around Kunaitra.

S 141 One of the statistical measures used to determine racial likeness is the significance ratio. I will not bother here with the formula, but will only say that if the significance ratio is three or less the inference is that the groups are not demonstrably different. Bear in mind I am not saying this is absolute proof but it is very suggestive.

It is interesting to point out that in every case the average significance ratio between each of the six desert border groups was above three. In other words, each group is strikingly different from the other. One might expect the Christian villagers to be closer to each other than they are to the surrounding Moslems, yet such is not the case. The mean significance ratio for the Nhardah and the Nafar Christians is 3.40. The chief difference between these groups is head form, for the Nhardah men tend to be round headed, mean cephalic index 80%, whereas the Nafar men are long headed men, 76%. In turn, the Nafar Christians when compared with the Hama Moslems have a mean significance ratio of 3.47, and a mean ratio of 3.40 when compared with the Akeydata Bedouin. The Midjanah Moslems are the most divergent. But in spite of these differences we can say in general that the desert border dwellers are intermediate between the mountain dwelling Lebanese and the desert Bedouin. Or putting it another way, they are between the Lebanese Diaspora and the desert Mediterranean.

S 141 144 It is not surprising that the desert border villagers show such a great diversity, for this area has been subjected to numerous invasions. These plains and desert border cities have been ruled within historical times by Babylonians, Assyrians, Aramaens, Amorites, Hebrews, Romans,

Syria MD1
Syrian Bedouin MD6

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144 Nabateans, Arabs and Turks. In the region of Hama, the Hittites also had important cities, for in Hama itself excellent examples of Hittite lions were excavated by Dr. Ingholt.

This racial zone in which the peoples of the different villages are dissimilar is not confined to the Syrian desert border but it also extends across northern Palestine and includes the villagers in Transjordan. Professor Keppers suggests that these peoples are representatives of the old Amorites. Personally, I believe that is an oversimplification of the problem. There may well be representatives of the Amorites but also many other racial groups are represented. It is interesting to point out, however, that hyperbrachycephalic peoples, so far at least, have not been encountered, though they are so prevalent in the Lebanon. This may be connected with habits of infant care.

B
101 In the desert: Five Bedouin tribes have been studied, the Rwala or Sha'alan, the Muwaly and the Ahaydat in the Syrian desert and the Howeitat and Beni Sakhr in the Transjordan. Bear in mind that these
144 Bedouin tribes are most probably the purest members of the Mediterranean race living today. Since the dawn of Near East history, migration has been from the desert to the fertile plains and the cities, from the nomad to the sedentary.

B
141 In my first studies in the Syrian desert, a very interesting point was discovered. Whereas the Ahaydat and the Muwaly Bedouin were very similar in their measurements and indices, mean significance ratio
144 2.21, the Muwaly-Rwala mean significance ratio was 9.84 and the Ahaydat-Rwala 5.45. Later studies in the Transjordan desert on the Howeitat and Beni Sakhr Bedouin showed they were similar to each other, Beni Sakhr-Howeitat mean significance ratio was 2.57 and they in turn were close to the Rwala, the Beni Sakhr-Rwala ratio being 2.27. This marked splitting of these desert tribes suggests that these Bedouin belong to two different varieties of the Mediterranean race.

B
142 In spite of differences in measurements, the observable characteristics of the Bedouin are very similar. The hair form is usually straight or has low waves, the color is black or dark brown, with about 10% light brown. In quantity the facial hair is far below the average. Many Bedouin have a very sparse beard. The eye color is usually dark brown or light brown with eyes of mixed colors rather frequent among some of the tribes. For example: the Rwala have 22% grey-brown and 4% blue-brown eyes. Pure blue eyes were observed twice among the Muwaly, but not among the other Bedouin. The skin color of the Bedouin is brunet, light or dark brown. Fair skins are but rarely seen in the desert. The Bedouin is frequently pictured as having a very convex nose. Certainly that is incorrect for the Rwala and Muwaly have less than 10% of convex noses and the maximum is 29% for the Beni Sakhr. The Bedouin nose is actually large, very high, but straight and relatively thin.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON ME1
SYRIA MD1

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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

S
L
[643]

The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

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So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

History

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Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria and

44: Matthews and Akrawi S. G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI
291
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Class in Arabic at Damascus College, Damascus, Syria

following P. 360 (a)

VI. ARAB NATIONALISM

I

000 OUT of the changes which have been discussed in the last three chapters, and the problems to which they have given rise, has grown the nationalist movement. Since this movement has for the most part taken an Arab rather than a specific Syrian or Lebanese form, it is necessary at the beginning to ask whether and in what sense the Syrians and Lebanese are Arabs.

143 Racially the Syrians and Lebanese are not of exactly the same stock as the Arabs of the Peninsula. The latter are mainly of the 'Mediterranean' race, with some exceptions. In the Syrian desert and parts of the interior of Syria, the inhabitants are also mainly Mediterranean; but in the mountains the Mediterranean has been united with an 'Alpine' element, to produce a 'Dinaric' or 'Armenoid' type. In most of the interior the population is a mixture of these two types, with the Mediterranean predominating.

186 Racial origin, however, is not of much influence upon
143 popular judgement. When Syrians and Lebanese say that they belong to the Arab people, they mean that they possess the Arab heritage of language, history, literature and customs, and that they are conscious and proud of possessing it. The only exceptions to this are the Kurds, Turcomans, Circassians, Armenians and Assyrians, who together constitute only a small percentage of the population.[1]

143 It would perhaps be more correct to regard the Arab people, of which the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon form a part, as a group of peoples, which resemble one another in certain important respects but are dissimilar in others. The inhabitants of geographical Syria may be considered as constituting a single member of this group. They differ from the people of the Arabian Peninsula in that, while the latter are almost purely Arabic or 'Semitic' in their ways of life and thought, in the Syrians the Arab has been mixed with other influences. They differ on the other hand from the peoples of Iraq, of Egypt and of the other North African countries in that while these too have been partly moulded by other than Arab influences, the latter have not been identical with the influences upon Syrian and Lebanese life.

[1] See Chapter VII.

In Iraq such influences have been largely Persian and central Asian; in Egypt there was an indigenous civilization which was not entirely submerged by the Arabian influences; in much of the rest of North Africa there is a Berber race which has resisted all attempts to assimilate it. To these differences must be added those which spring from the mere fact of living in different regions possessing varying economic possibilities and subjected at times to very diverse historical processes.

It is possible to observe differences not only between the members of the Arab group of peoples, but also within each people. Physically and culturally alike, various elements within the people of geographical Syria represent varying blends of Arabic, of Aramaic and other Semitic, and of non-Semitic influences. Many such differences which formerly existed have in the course of time been levelled out and forgotten, but some of them still linger on, especially in mountain districts. For example, there are a few villages north of Damascus in which Aramaic is still spoken side by side with Arabic. What is more important, the Maronites and other Christians in northern and central Lebanon have not on the whole the same consciousness of being Arabs as the other inhabitants of the country. This is true also to a great extent of the Arabic-speaking Syrian Orthodox and Catholics and of the Alawis in the district of Latakia.

Thus the answer to the question which was posed above is a complex one. The Syrians and Lebanese are members of the Arab group of peoples; but they differ in some important ways from other members of that group; and they also differ among themselves in certain ways.

2

Although the Syrians and Lebanese have been Arabs in this sense for many centuries, it is only in the last two generations that an explicit nationalist movement has grown up.

Nationalism exists wherever two factors, which are to be found in some form in every society, take a particular shape and have a particular relation to one another. The one is the consciousness of solidarity: the sense that there is between the members of a certain group a special closeness of feeling, a special similarity of reaction, a possibility of understanding based upon the possession of common characteristics—language, customs, memories, real or imagined ancestry.

ARMENIANS A53
AISSOR MA6
SYRIA MD1

M
A relationship for the Armenians with the Khaldeans or Assyrians, and the
x174 Lebanese, with a possible descent of these three groups from (or with)
x144 the Hittites.

YOUNG has included the several sets of data on Armenians among those which he finds more highly differentiated than he thinks should be the case from a mathematical point of view. We may point out, however, that while Armenia was a small country it had its mountains and its valleys. Prior to the world war with travel much more restricted than at present, its 3,000,000 people were quite segregated. This may have permitted opportunity for the selective influence of inbreeding to operate. The Armenians were scattered by the war deportations but with some regularity. Many of them went to Aleppo in northern Syria and it is this group which ALTOUNYAN [1]) has studied. We have been informed by the Armenians themselves that our Beirut group derived from a different part of Armenia. Other Armenians found their way to France and it was this colony from which KOSSOVITCH [2]) obtained his data. On the other hand the Armenians may well represent a race made up of two (or more) groups. KAPPERS states that the original Armeno-Khaldean or Hurrian stock is chiefly represented by the hyperbrachycephalic or real Armenoid group and that the subbrachycephalic constituent reported as existing amongst them may represent a Caucasian admixture. Certainly it would be most gratifying to the immunologist were this true for alleged discrepancies in Armenian blood type formulae would then have at least two good explanations. One has only to live among the Armenians to realize that there are different physical types among them and it is only reasonable to suppose that there may similarly be slight immunological variations as well. They possess a high degree of racial unity, characterized by social and economical traits, even more typical of them than their physique or blood type.

Khaldeans or Assyrians. $\frac{1}{A}$

M
AN Blood typing tests made on 161 Khaldeans in Beirut strongly support
143 the thesis that these people are closely related to the Armenians and the Lebanese.

Syrians. $\frac{1}{A}$

M
S
● 143 More than 4,000 Arabic-speaking, non-Jewish residents of old Syria
x 144 were typed. In the Near East the Arabic-speaking residents of modern

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[1]) ALTOUNYAN, E. H. R., A Note on Blood Transfusion in Syria with an Analysis of 1149 Blood Groupings. Lancet, 1927, II, 1342; also, Personal communication from Alleppo, Syria, dated Feb. 9, 1928; and Blood Group Percentages for Arabs, Armenians and Jews, Analysis of 1758 Groupings. Brit. Med. Jour., 1928, I, 546.

[2]) KOSSOVITCH, N. Recherches sur la race Arménienne par l'isohemagglutination. Comptes rend. Soc. Biol., 1927, XCVII, 69.

$\frac{1}{A}$ [See category 116, P. 185 -- ANALYST.]

SYRIA MDI
LEBANON MDI

M
S: 143
14qfx

Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordania are strictly divided for social and political purposes according to religious affiliation. In the past it has been suggested that differences among these peoples were more fundamental than this but most observers attributed such differentiation as they observed chiefly to the environmental effect of town dwelling and education as against the village or nomadic life of the little educated. From the blood typing point of view, however, we early discovered (1925) that the Arabs of the large area formerly known as Syria were distinctly to be divided into two groups. One of these comprises the Mohammedans and such members of the several post-Islamic cults as we were able to type. In our data the Druzes are the best represented of these cults and are shown by our results to be almost identical serologically with the Mohammedans. This group which probably corresponds to the Syrian Adnan Arab group of KAPPERS has the same blood type picture as the north African Arabs of HIRSZFELD and HIRSZFELD, called by them Intermediates.

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14qfx

The other group, comprising the Christians of the area (KAPPERS' Lebanese), have blood typing features which place them in the European group of the HIRSZFELDs. Of these Christians most numerous are Greek Orthodox, but other sects are well represented, as Maronites, Greek Catholics, Latins and Protestants. It should be noted that practically all Protestants in Syria or Egypt have been recruited from the Greek Orthodox, Coptic and other churches of the area. Intermarriage with the Crusaders might account for some of the observed blood picture but it is far more reasonable to suppose that the Syrian Christians derive from an earlier Indo-European race.

The Maronites are practically restricted to the Lebanon mountains and are most typically Lebanese. The following data on 404 Maronites in contrast to those for all Christians typed show no striking difference:

	Percentages in groups				Race index	Frequencies		
	O	A	B	AB		p	q	r
All Christian Syrians	37.82	42.37	12.14	7.65	2.53	2.87	.98	6.14
Maronites	35.64	42.07	13.61	8.66	2.27	2.91	1.11	5.95

The Maronites are sufficiently numerous and scattered over the area in which they live that the inbreeding factor does not complicate the picture. The blood type formula for the Christian Arabs certainly suggests their relationship to the Khaldeans and the Armenians and strongly supports KAPPERS' statement: "It thus appears that the Hittites, Khaldeans, Armenians and Lebanese originated from a large group of people once possessing the whole fertile crescent"

4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

As pointed out by Cummins and Steggerda (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XX, '35), the pattern types may be regarded as variants of 'pattern intensity.' The arch is not a pattern in the strict sense of the term, while loops and whorls may be regarded as levels of successively increasing pattern intensity. For statistical purposes arbitrary values are assigned to the pattern types: arch, 0; loop, 1; whorl, 2. The complement of patterns in an individual is then converted into the 'index of pattern intensity' by summating the values of

TABLE 3

Percentile occurrence of pattern types for each digit

Digit	I			II			III		
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
Whorls	68.1	55.8	61.9	52.2	47.8	50.0	27.5	22.9	25.7
Ulnar loops	29.0	42.8	35.9	22.5	27.5	25.0	66.7	62.2	64.5
Radial loops	1.4	0.7	1.0	18.8	17.4	18.1	1.4	1.4	1.4
Arches	1.4	0.7	1.0	6.5	7.2	6.8	4.3	4.3	4.3

Digit	IV			V		
Hand	R	L	Both	R	L	Both
Whorls	50.0	44.2	47.1	24.6	20.3	22.4
Ulnar loops	42.6	55.8	52.2	74.6	79.0	76.8
Radial loops	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Arches	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.7

R = right, L = left.

the ten patterns. The indices therefore range from 0, indicating ten arches, to 20, the value for ten whorls. The mean index in the present series is 13.96 ± 0.20. As a matter of record, providing for other statistical determinations such as the dactylodiagram of Poll, the frequencies of pattern types on separate digits are here recorded in table 3.

SUMMARY

Palmar main lines, axial triradii, palmar patterns and fingerprint patterns are analyzed in 138 Mitwali, a Syrian mountain population. It may be noted that the features present a close relationship to another Lebanese series as well as to the Rwala Arabs (unpublished data).

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

abandoned the wandering life, taken to agriculture and mingled with the settled population already established in the country, which was itself largely the product of a similar process at an earlier time.

The immigrants from the Arabian peninsula brought with them their distinctive customs and ideas and one or other of the 'Semitic' family of languages. Together with Mesopotamia on the other side of the Fertile Crescent, Syria has been throughout history the place where what may, by a not very misleading simplification, be called the 'Semitic' stream of population and influences has met and mingled with other streams. She has served also as the limit of the emigration from Arabia. The Semitic peoples and their languages have never taken firm root beyond the Taurus Mountains. Even in Syria they have not been unopposed, but they have always been of great importance. A large proportion of the population of Syria can trace its descent at least in part to earlier or later immigrants from Arabia; and while Mediterranean and other influences have largely affected forms of government and the culture of the cities, the language and the customs of the countryside have always been predominantly Semitic.

The two sets of influences, that from Arabia and that from other directions, have interacted in various ways. There has been conflict at times, and at times peaceful mingling. Often tension of some sort has existed between the more predominantly Mediterranean and the more predominantly Arabian elements in the population, and between successive waves of settlers from the same source. Sometimes that tension has mirrored itself in the individual soul, which has felt itself drawn in two directions, towards the desert and towards the West. It is only very rarely, if at all, that the influences have blended so completely as to remove all tension. It is true that there has always been a tendency to that end. Rulers and settlers from the Mediterranean lands have to some extent adopted Semitic ways and Arabian immigrants have acquired some of the characteristics of a Mediterranean people. But the process has never been allowed to complete itself; further invasions have occurred, a new Government has established itself, or there have been further waves of immigration, and the process of assimilation has had to begin again.

Lebanon ME1
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L 174 The Armenians are similar to the Lebanese in many of their characteristics but Professor Coon believes they represent a mixture of Alpine brachycephalics with the long headed Indo-Europeans. It will not be feasible to discuss Armenian racial origins in this paper as that involves the extensive racial movements in Iran, Turkey, Southern Russia and the Caucasus.

It does not appear that the Druzes migrated into Southern Lebanon and the Jebel Druze from outside as many believe. Likewise, the same is true for the Nitwali who are Shiite Moslems. Most likely religious leaders from outside Syria entered these districts and influenced the peoples already living there to accept these doctrines.

The Lebanese are remarkably homogeneous and the Nitwali, the Bahai malea, and the Druzes are almost identical in their morphology. The scant data at hand suggests the same is true for the Nusairites.

S 141 162 The desert border: The anthropology of the desert border inhabitants is as complicated as that of the Lebanese is simple. Six groups have been studied along the desert border — two Christian and four Moslem. The Christians were in Mhardah, near Hama, and in Nafar, north of Damascus. The Moslems were in Hama, Hidjanah and surrounding villages some twenty kilometers south of Damascus, in Hama in the center of the Nusairs and Circassians in and around Kunaitra.

S 141 One of the statistical measures used to determine racial likeness is the significance ratio. I will not bother here with the formula, but will only say that if the significance ratio is three or less the inference is that the groups are not demonstrably different. Bear in mind I am not saying this is absolute proof but it is very suggestive.

It is interesting to point out that in every case the average significance ratio between each of the six desert border groups was above three. In other words, each group is strikingly different from the other. One might expect the Christian villagers to be closer to each other than they are to the surrounding Moslems, yet such is not the case. The mean significance ratio for the Mhardah and the Nafar Christians is 3.40. The chief difference between these groups is head form, for the Mhardah men tend to be round headed, mean cephalic index 80%, whereas the Nafar men are long headed men, 76%. In turn, the Nafar Christians when compared with the Hama Moslems have a mean significance ratio of 3.47, and a mean ratio of 3.40 when compared with the Akrydets Bedouin. The Hidjanah Moslems are the most divergent. But in spite of these differences we can say in general that the desert border dwellers are intermediate between the mountain dwelling Lebanese and the desert Bedouin. Or putting it another way, they are between the Lebanese Bizarias and the desert Mediterranean.

S 141 144 It is not surprising that the desert border villagers show such a great diversity, for this area has been subjected to numerous invasions. These plains and desert border cities have been ruled within historical times by Babylonians, Assyrians, Aramaeans, Amorites, Hebrews, Romans,

Syria MD1
Syrian Bedouin MD6

S
141 Nabateans, Arabs and Turks. In the region of Hama, the Hittites also had
144 important cities, for in Hama itself excellent examples of Hittite lions were excavated by Dr. Ingholt.

This racial zone in which the peoples of the different villages are dissimilar is not confined to the Syrian desert border but it also extends across northern Palestine and includes the villagers in Transjordan. Professor Kappers suggests that these peoples are representatives of the old Amorites. Personally, I believe that is an oversimplification of the problem. There may well be representatives of the Amorites but also many other racial groups are represented. It is interesting to point out, however, that hyperbrachycephalic peoples, so far at least, have not been encountered, though they are so prevalent in the Lebanon. This may be connected with habits of infant care.

B
101 In the desert: Five Bedouin tribes have been studied, the Rwala
144 or Sha'alan, the Mawaly and the Abeydat in the Syrian desert and the Howeitat and Beni Sakhr in the Transjordan. Bear in mind that these Bedouin tribes are most probably the purest members of the Mediterranean race living today. Since the dawn of Near East history, migration has been from the desert to the fertile plains and the cities, from the sand to the sesimemad.

B
141 In my first studies in the Syrian desert, a very interesting
144 point was discovered. Whereas the Abeydat and the Mawaly Bedouin were very similar in their measurements and indices, mean significance ratio 2.21, the Mawaly-Rwala mean significance ratio was 9.84 and the Abeydat-Rwala 5.45. Later studies in the Transjordan desert on the Howeitat and Beni Sakhr Bedouin showed they were similar to each other, Beni Sakhr-Howeitat mean significance ratio was 2.87 and they in turn were close to the Rwala, the Beni Sakhr-Rwala ratio being 2.27. This marked splitting of these desert tribes suggests that these Bedouin belong to two different varieties of the Mediterranean race.

B
142 In spite of differences in measurements, the observable characteristics of the Bedouin are very similar. The hair form is usually straight or has low waves, the color is black or dark brown, with about 10% light brown. In quantity the facial hair is far below the average. Many Bedouin have a very sparse beard. The eye color is usually dark brown or light brown with eyes of mixed colors rather frequent among some of the tribes. For example: the Rwala have 22% grey-brown and 6% blue-brown eyes. Pure blue eyes were observed twice among the Mawaly, but not among the other Bedouin. The skin color of the Bedouin is brunet, light or dark brown. Fair skins are but rarely seen in the desert. The Bedouin is frequently pictured as having a very convex nose. Certainly that is incorrect for the Rwala and Mawaly have less than 10% of convex noses and the maximum is 22% for the Beni Sakhr. The Bedouin nose is actually large, very high, but straight and relatively thin.

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

6

The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

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SYRIA AND LEBANON

Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

United States mission estimated that 50 per cent of the land was in fallow 311
during 1948.[21] Increased irrigation and high prices for agricultural com- 241
modities have reduced significantly the fallow in the past few years, and the percentage may be less now.

PRODUCTION

Syria is normally self-sufficient in most foods. In fact, the country 433
exports fresh and dried fruits, lentils and other legumes, tobacco, wool, butter, hides, and meat. Occasional poor harvests make it necessary to import food grains.

The greatest deficiency is in rice, which has been displaced by cotton in recent years to such an extent that almost all of the country's requirements must be imported. Last year's bad cotton crop may prompt farmers to revert to rice and, if so, this will reduce the deficiency.

Government figures indicate that production of food has not kept pace 433
with the expansion in population and that the per capita food supply and 146
individual calorie intake are both declining.[22] These conclusions are based on highly conjectural statistics and are in conflict with opinions of the United States Agricultural Attache and Syrian officials who are intimately acquainted with the country's agricultural problems. These observers believe there has been no real decline in food consumption, except possibly for short periods of time. Certainly there is no shortage now, and the bumper cereal crop in 1952 should enable the country to fill domestic needs and export at least 30 per cent of its wheat and possibly 50 per cent of its barley.

The daily diet consists largely of starches, it is true, but this is due more 262
to habit than anything else. The resources of the country are ample to permit a much more balanced diet.

PRODUCTIVITY

Syrian agriculture often is characterized by the low productivity of the 461
agricultural worker. It is obvious that a great many more people are used on 241
each acre of land than is necessary. The low agricultural income is reflected 511
in the obvious poverty of the people. Yet, comparisons with other countries, and even detailed calculations, are of questionable value due to the unreliability of the statistics.

Government reports on average yields also are open to question. Official 241
figures show that wheat yields have dropped sharply, while cotton yields have tended upward, except for the extremely bad year in 1951-52. They also show very wide fluctuation. Experienced observers point out that the yields are especially questionable because both acreage and production figures are not reliable. On the basis of conversations with producers in various sections, it is apparent that yields are normally fairly high and that they fluctuate, depending on water availability and on insect devastation.

POTENTIALITIES

A number of missions which have studied the possibilities of agricultural development in Syria, especially in the last five or six years, all mention the

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21 *Activities of FAO, 1950-51*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 1952, p. 58.

22 *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, November, 1951.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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bul to Baghdad. A railroad also runs from Beirut to Damascus via Rayak. A second line from Damascus to Amman and Ma'an, in Jordan, forms part of the so-called "pilgrim" railway, opened in 1904-06. Air services are available from Damascus and, to a lesser extent, from Aleppo to Beirut and Baghdad, thence to Europe, Africa and the Far East. 496 509

Food and Nutrition

The nutritional standards of the people vary markedly in different regions, being highest in the vicinity of Damascus and lowest among the Alawites of Latakia province and the peasants of Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Undernutrition is common, but generally it is more widespread in the rural villages than in the urban areas. Due to the lack of adequate storage and transportation facilities, local food shortages are frequent, particularly during poor crop years. Up to the present, there has been little organized effort to promote better nutrition among the different population groups. It is expected that such a program will be initiated by the nutrition division created within the governmental health services in 1952. 146 369 [262] 146 654

Cereals constitute the staple foods, and, with certain root vegetables, contribute 70 to 80 per cent of the caloric content of the average diet. Breads prepared from wheat flour are consumed in all parts of the country. Barley is sometimes employed, while maize and sorghum millet are used in the southeast. Rice is universally popular: it is grown in the Al Jazira region, and large amounts are also imported. Broad beans, chick-peas and lentils are basic food items in most areas. Other vegetables, including onions, potatoes, beets, tomatoes, eggplant and the leafy spinach and French lettuce, are abundant in Damascus and Al Jazira provinces, but scarce in Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Numerous fruits are consumed in season, but the supply is scanty in the Euphrates valley and in the southern provinces. Olives and olive oil are important among most population groups. Milk is 262

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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Distribution of Malaria in Syria

sive work has been carried on, in co-operation with the Near East Foundation, in the agricultural districts around Damascus where 224 villages with over 180,000 inhabitants were protected in 1949-50. A marked reduction in the number of cases has been noted in all the areas treated. Successive examinations of over 500 children in 16 treated villages near Damascus revealed a decrease in spleen rates of from 78 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1951.[8] A malaria control program was inaugurated in the Homs district in 1952, under the auspices of the World Health Organization. *Anopheles sacharovi* and *A. claviger* are the principal vectors in the Damascus region; *A. sacharovi* and *A. superpictus*, in the river valleys in the northeast. 744 747 136

Rickettsial Infections. Localized outbreaks of louse-borne typhus are recurrent during the winter and the spring months, particularly in the congested quarters of the towns and the cities and among the nomadic tribes. Over 1,900 cases were reported in 1942, when the acute shortages associated with the war created conditions conducive to the spread of the infection. Since that date no more than 30 to 95 sporadic cases have been recorded in any one year. Control measures, including deverminization procedures and the immunization of the exposed populations, are enforced by the health authorities in affected areas. 146 362 361 744 757

No differentiation is made in the official 164

p. 155(B)

164 369 October, when the vector sandflies, *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti*, are abundant.

164 Kala-azar is seldom specifically reported from Syria, but occasional suspected cases have been described from the Jebel ed Druz region. A canine reservoir undoubtedly exists: the causative organisms have been demonstrated in a stray dog captured at el Bab, near Aleppo.[38]

Other Infections. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the western provinces where the vector, *Aedes aegypti*, is indigenous. Sandfly fever, transmitted by *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is endemic and sometimes epidemic.

Nutritional Diseases

166 361 511 Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are prevalent, particularly in the rural villages, where poverty and parasitic infections influence the nutritional standards of the people to a greater extent than in the urban areas. Serious nutritional conditions are most obvious among the children of the Bedouin tribes. Minor vitamin C deficiencies are widespread among the inhabitants of the grain-producing areas in the northeastern and the southern provinces. Occasional borderline cases of pellagra are encountered, but beriberi and ariboflavinosis are unusual. Cases of rickets are numerous, especially in the cities and the towns. Protein edema and overt vitamin A deficiencies are relatively rare.

Miscellaneous Conditions

164 232 Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and epidemics are sometimes reported. Q fever is enzootic among the sheep and the goats, but the extent of human infection is not known. In a series of complement fixation tests recently performed on blood serums taken from sheep and goats in different parts of the country, positive reactions were obtained in 13 to 63 per cent.[40]

Silicosis and benign pneumoconiosis are

p. 156 (8)

cept in the vicinity of the principal rivers. 312
Domestic supplies are derived from wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from water holes or rain-water cisterns. Untreated 312 piped water supplies serve all or parts of 364 the larger towns. The municipal supplies of Damascus and Aleppo are controlled for purity, but contamination is frequent in the smaller communities. Sewerage systems are available in the chief cities, but the methods of sewage disposal are generally primitive in towns and villages. The standards of nutrition vary, depending upon the economic 146 and the social conditions in different regions. Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are widespread, but serious deficiency diseases are encountered only among limited population groups.

The most prominent disease problems are 164 malaria, trachoma and dysentery, both amebic and bacillary. Enteric fevers, tuberculosis, helminthiasis and skin infections are prevalent. Venereal diseases are widely distributed, while bejel is endemic among the nomadic and the seminomadic peoples of the northeastern provinces. Hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, and leprosy exist in scattered foci. Localized outbreaks of cholera were reported in 1947-48, the first in 20 years. Vaccination against smallpox is com- 757 pulsory, but sporadic cases and occasional epidemics are recorded. Outbreaks of louse- 164 borne typhus are recurrent, while sporadic cases are reported almost annually. Small outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever have coincided with regional epidemics. Measles and the common respiratory infections are endemic, and frequently epidemic. Cutaneous leishmaniasis, brucellosis, rabies, tetanus, anthrax, dengue fever and sandfly fever are endemic. Meningococcus meningitis, diphtheria, plague, tick-borne relapsing fever and murine typhus are sporadic. Recognized cases of scarlet fever and poliomyelitis are apparently rare. Doubtful cases of tick-borne typhus and kala-azar have been described.

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7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho*'s which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[15] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

V. THE WESTERNIZATION OF SOCIETY

1

THE first and most obvious sign of social change is the 161
growth in the population of the French Mandated Territories in the last four generations. For some centuries previous to 1800 the population had been steadily declining. In the course of the nineteenth century it began to increase; by 1914 it may have been in the neighbourhood of two and a half millions. Since then it has grown ever faster, because of the abolition of conscription, the decline in emigration, the rise in the standard of living and the improvement in medical and sanitary services. To-day the total population is nearly four millions.

The distribution of the population between the different 162
provinces of the country is as follows:

Syria:	Province of Damascus	531,267
	" " Aleppo	752,196
	" " Homs	182,312
	" " Hama	137,882
	" " the Hauran	108,603
	" " the Euphrates	218,667
	" " the Jazirah	103,514
	" " Latakia	371,880
	" " Jebel Druze	70,706
	Total	2,477,027[1]
Lebanon:	Province of Beirut	232,000
	" " Mount Lebanon	278,000
	" " Northern Lebanon ..	241,000
	" " Southern Lebanon ..	198,000
	" " the Biqa'	167,000
	Total	1,116,000[2]

2

Two-thirds of this population live in villages and are 311
dependent upon agricultural occupations. The total area of the country is some 58,000 square miles; but only about 10–15 per cent of it is cultivated. An equal area could however be brought under cultivation if swamps were drained, barren wastes irrigated, and the margin of agriculture pushed eastwards into the deserts.

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1938* (Paris, 1939), pp. 220-1. These figures exclude the Beduin population, who number over half a million, and also the population of Alexandretta, which was ceded to Turkey in 1939 (see Chapter XI). They are not to be accepted as more than a rough approximation. An estimate for 1944 gave the population of Syria as 2,800,000 (excluding the Beduin).

[2] Figures for 1942.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

101 178 challenging task of fusing the positive elements of both its eastern and its western heritage into a cohesive whole.

Population and Land

161 162 According to official estimates, Syria at the end of 1953 had a population of about 3.65 million, including some 150,000 Bedouins who lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Although demographic statistics are far from adequate, it appears probable that the population has been growing at an annual rate of somewhere between 2% and 3% during the last decade. Most of the population is rural:[1] about 60% live in villages and towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and each of the two largest cities—Damascus, the capital, and Aleppo, the commercial center of the country—has a population close to 400,000. About 86% of the population are Moslem or belong to offshoots of the Moslem religion, and nearly all of the balance are adherents of a considerable number of Christian denominations.

161 311 As a country with an area of 181,337 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), about three-fourths the size of the United Kingdom, Syria cannot be said to be densely populated. While less than a third of the area is cultivable, the proportion of the population to the land already under cultivation compares favorably with that of other countries in the Near and Middle East. In Syria there is one hectare[2] of cultivated land per inhabitant, or about 10% more than in Turkey and Iran, twice as much as in Greece and Iraq and eight to nine times as much as in Egypt.

311 133 There is still plenty of land available in Syria but water severely limits its utilization. The country lies to the leeward of mountain ranges in the west and north which intercept much of the rainfall. Except for the coastal region of Latakia province, Syria is largely cut off from the rain-bearing winds of the Mediterranean by mountains, the Djebel Ansariya (Alaouit mountains) in Latakia, and, farther south, after the intervening Tripoli-Homs gap, by the twin ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon which in turn give way to the Hermon range. Thus the area which can support rain-fed cultivation is confined to a rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier. Fortunately for Syria, its

[1] See Annex C, p. 292.
[2] A hectare = 2.471 acres.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

137 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the
659 mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available
313 to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

428 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant pro-
166 prietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60%, respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in
166 settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experi-
241 mental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

governmental, representing 8.7% and 2.2%, respectively, of total investment in settlements. Municipal investment is directed to water supply,[1] roads, power plants and distribution networks and sewerage facilities, in that order; very little goes for housing. Government investment is primarily in buildings, chiefly for education and public health purposes.

The mission has assumed, in preparing its proposed program for settlements and social services, that the estimated 1954 population of 3.65 million will increase over the next five years at a rate of only 1.5% annually, rather than the 2% rate of recent years. If the program is to be properly adjusted to Syria's needs, however, a population census and an improvement in the collection and organization of vital statistics are urgently needed. Better public health conditions, economic development, opening of new areas and new lines of transport and communications, changes in social patterns—all will bring about major changes in size and distribution of the population over the next few years. Any policy developed for the settlements should be planned with an eye not only to the immediate future but also to the longer term economic, social and cultural development of the country.

II EDUCATION

A PROGRESS TO DATE

For centuries, and especially during the years of foreign occupation, the only formal educational facilities were the Koranic schools, which concentrated on religious teaching. A decline in the number of these schools began about 150 years ago, and with it a gradual change in their curriculum; today about one-third of the time is devoted to religion. Meanwhile the number and significance of state primary schools has been increasing. In these, during the French occupation, the pattern of education was influenced by traditional French systems.

Since independence, Syria has started to develop its education at a faster rate and to give it a Syro-Arabic pattern. The effort of these few years and the success achieved is impressive. The budget of the Ministry of Education rose from almost £S 17 million in 1946 to £S 36.8 million in 1953, and its share of the total budget increased from 13.5% to 17.7% (in 1923 it had been only 9.1% and in 1931 9.8%). Between 1946 and 1953 the

[1] Water supplies in Damascus and Aleppo, however, are financed by government funds.

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

تقدير عدد سكان الجمهورية السورية في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢ ونسبتهم لمساحة الاراضي (١)

POPULATION ESTIMATES AS AT THE END OF 1952 AND RATIO TO LAND AREA (1)

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Table No. 1 جدول رقم (١)

MOHAFAZAT	عدد السكان Population	المساحة كم ٢ Area km.2	عدد السكان في كل كيلو متر مربع Population per km.2	المحافظات
TOTAL	3,433,636	184,479	18,613	المجموع
Damascus (2)	730,227	19,528	37,855	دمشق (٢)
Homs	261,904	41,650	6,288	حمص
Hama	196,665	7,322	26,859	حماة
Latakia	540,675	6,080	88,927	اللاذقية
Aleppo	1,025,674	22,919	44,752	حلب
Al-Hasakah	177,388	22,170	8,001	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	251,548	55,090	4,569	دير الزور
Sweida	98,713	5,550	17,786	السويداء
Dir'a	141,832	4,200	33,770	درعا

(1) Survey estimates, 1951
(2) Including Damascus City

(١) حسب تقدير المساحة عام ١٩٥١
(٢) بما فيها مدينة دمشق المنارة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1
LEBANON ME1

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twenty degrees of latitude. The desert in Syria is of rock and gravel more than of sand, and there are hills rising above 3,000 feet both north and south of Palmyra; more than a third of the total area of Syria is steppe or desert.

Rivers

The Orontes flows from the northern part of the Biqaa through the lake of Homs (which holds about 260 million cubic yards of water) to Hama and through the Ghab depression to Turkey. The Litani rises not far from the Orontes but flows at first southward and later west through a deep gorge in the Lebanon mountains into the sea between Tyre and Sidon. The Euphrates runs through Syria for about 430 miles and has, as tributaries from the north, the Balikh and the Khabur. It is on the Euphrates and its tributaries that there is the best prospect of developing hydro-electricity and irrigation.

Climate[1]

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Over this diverse scene the temperatures vary in the year from below freezing to above 100°F., and on the same day it is possible to ski near the cedars of Lebanon and swim in the sea at Beirut. The rain, which in most places comes between November and February, varies from almost nothing in the desert to about 40 inches a year in the mountains. In the coastal strip the winters are not severe but there is high humidity and small diurnal variation in the summer and this makes the season seem unpleasant and prolonged. In the mountains the snow lies on the topmost peaks for most of the year and the road from Beirut to Damascus is blocked by snow at times in most winters; in the summer the days are hot but the nights are cool enough to draw up to the mountains most of the inhabitants of Beirut. The plateaux and desert have an inland climate with low humidity and higher extremes of heat and cold. Aleppo has greater extremes than Damascus but in both cities there is a distinction between the four seasons: spring from mid-March to mid-May, summer from mid-May to the beginning of October, autumn in October and early November, and winter from November to March.

The People

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Official statistics showed that in 1951 the populations of Syria and of Lebanon were 3,329,137, and 1,303,941 respectively. Over half the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, about half a million are nomads, and the rest live in towns. The

[1] See table, below, p. 501.

:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MEI
LEBANON MDI

S L 161 162 chief towns of Syria and their populations are: Aleppo, 339,000 Damascus, the capital, 303,000; Hama, 134,000; Latakia, 90,000; Dair az-Zor, 65,000: of the Lebanon—Beirut, the capital, 247,000; Tripoli, 86,000; Sidon (Saida), 78,800; Zahle, 78,031. The population of each country is increasing by about 2 per cent a year. Between half a million and a million Syrians and Lebanese live abroad, mainly in the Americas and Africa; emigration continues; during 1952 about 100 Lebanese emigrated monthly, most of them to South America.

S L 162 *Religions*

RELIGIOUS SECTS AND PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

	Syria		Lebanon	
	Population in 1947	*Seats in 1947*	*Population in 1951*	*Seats in 1952*
Sunni	2,040,908	100	273,125	9
Shiis (incl. Alawis)	447,993	13	237,107	8
Druze	96,641	3	82,268	3
Maronite	14,133	1	377,544	13
Orthodox Greek	144,517	7	130,858	5
Orthodox Armenian	104,925	2	67,139	2
Orthodox Syrian (Jacobite)	43,081	2	4,562	
Catholic (Latin rite)	6,125		4,127	
Catholic (Greek rite)	49,543	2	81,764	3
Catholic (Syrian rite)	17,613	1	5,911	
Catholic (Armenian rite)	17,493	1	14,218	
Catholic (Chaldean rite)	4,991			
Protestants	11,959		12,641	
Nestorians	9,630			
Jews	30,873	1	5,993	
Others			6,684	
Minorities		3		1
Total:	3,043,310	136	1,303,441	44

S L 197 162 The language of the great majority of Syrians and Lebanese is Arabic, and they think of themselves as Arabs. There are minorities of race, religion, and language:[1] the Kurds number between 100,000 and 200,000 and are mainly in northern Syria; most of them speak Kurdish but are progressively becoming less and less distinct from the Arabs. The Armenians, who live mainly in the three principal cities, now number about 140,000, although some 20,000 emigrated to Soviet Armenia in the 1940's. Most of them came as refugees from the Turks after the First World War. Other racial minorities are the Turkomans, Circassians, and Assyrians. Most of the religious sects

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795 [1] For further details see A. H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1947).

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

SYRIA AND LEBANON

S During the recent war there was an expansion of cultivation
311 in Syria as a result of high prices and mechanization. The previous table shows the cultivable and cultivated land in different provinces and the distribution of these areas in 1943.

S Little is known about the rate of population growth, but it is
L believed to be rapid. According to the most recent estimates the
● 162 total in 1944 was 3,987,012, of which the population of Syria was 2,860,411 and of the Lebanon 1,126,600. The population of
S Syria was divided as follows:
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SYRIA: POPULATION AT END OF 1943

Province	*Total*
Latakia	452,507
Aleppo	870,139
Hama	157,458
Homs	212,424
Hauran	112,842
Damascus	603,889
Euphrates	225,023
Jezira	146,001
Jebel ed Druz	80,128
TOTAL	2,860,411

(This estimate excludes the Beduin, whose number is estimated at 400,000.)

About three-quarters of this total, or about 2·1 million, are
S rural. The amount of cultivated land per head is 2½ acres, but
311 because cultivation is so extensive the area actually cropped is only some 1½ acres.

L Lebanon, by contrast with the dry plains of Syria, is inten-
311 sively cultivated because of the high rainfall on the coast line;
241 yields per acre are higher, and crops are more diversified, in-
489 cluding citrus, olives, bananas; small irrigation schemes have been developed along the coast on the streams from the Moun-
162 tain. The Lebanon depends for part of its grain supply on Syria, and all the cultivated land is cropped. The cultivated area in 1943 amounted to 1·3 million acres. The total population in 1944 was estimated to be 1,126,600; of this probably about 750,000 are rural, and the amount of cultivated land is about 1½ acres per head.

S+L Grain production in Syria and Lebanon together before 1939
241 averaged 800,000 tons and rose to about 1 million tons during the recent war.

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70. The Mission as will be seen, formed a favourable impression of those whom it saw at Nashabeyeh. It was regrettable to learn that not only was the extension of the work hampered by lack of funds but that some local difficulties had arisen which suggested that there might still be some distrust of disinterested outside help in quarters that could not plead ignorance as an excuse. We had not the opportunity of pursuing inquiries to enable us to satisfy ourselves whether, if foreign direction and support were withdrawn, the work undertaken by the Foundation would collapse or become self-supporting, a point which had first been suggested to us in talks in Lebanon (see paragraph 10). We were, however, satisfied that if the venture were to collapse, it would not be due to any lack of a spirit of service or enthusiasm on the part of the Syrian field workers who are employed by the Foundation.

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71. The country is under-populated and the population is so scattered as to make it difficult to provide the usual facilities through community centres. It should be added that there are large tracts of empty but arable land; so that if, as a result of efficient health services, the expectation of life increases and infant mortality decreases, there is no danger of lack of food.

72. Recommendations: In the light of the present cautious attitude of the Syrian Government towards the receipt of technical assistance from external sources, we recommend that the initiative should be left with the Government to seek United Nations aid for the furtherance of any scheme of community organisations for which it may be directly or indirectly responsible.

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III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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73. The "Middle East" is a convenient but misleading description which may be applied to a group of Arab-speaking countries, not all of which were included in our itinerary. Those which we were privileged to visit have many features in common, in spite of differences in characteristics and ways of life and varying stages and patterns of development. The Islamic faith prevails over the greater part of the area, though in some countries there are important non-Moslem minorities. Each country is the inheritor of an ancient culture; each has subscribed to the United Nations Charter, with its emphasis on improved standards of living as a contributing factor to the peace of the world; each is predominantly agricultural; each, in a newfound independence and under conditions of political instability, is reforming its land laws; and each has proclaimed the welfare of the people as a dominating purpose of Government policy.

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74. In progress in community development in this group of countries little uniformity is to be observed. In Egypt, where the establishment of rural social centres became the official policy in 1939, after successful pioneering experiments conducted by the Egyptian Association for Social Studies, a stage has now been reached at which the whole scheme is under review, with the object of increasing its scope and efficiency. A reorganisation involving decentralization and more inter-departmental co-ordination was in progress as we left Egypt.

75. We have found that Egypt is, compared with other Arab countries, well advanced as regards rural social centres since the population, or at least a part of it, understands the value of self-help. These social centres have to be expanded, both as regards numbers and the use made of each one of them. They do not require costly special buildings; provided that attention is paid to cleanliness, the work can be carried out in suitably equipped village houses, always assuming that the staff has the right spirit. To ensure a continuous standard of efficiency, regular supervision

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

162 The people of Syria are predominantly of
186 ancient Semitic stock, modified by centuries of conquest, and Arabic in culture, language and religion. The population, however, includes numerous minority groups, some of which exist as compact communities with distinctive customs and traditions. The official method of enumeration is on the basis
● 161 of religious affiliation. In 1949, the population was estimated at about 3,177,700, exclusive of undetermined numbers of Bedouin, representing less than 10 per cent
162 of the total. Approximately 86 per cent of
185 the inhabitants were adherents of Islam; about 69 per cent belonged to the Sunni sect. The heterodox sects consisted of roughly 355,500 Alawites, 100,600 Druzes, 32,800 Ismailites, 13,700 Shiites and 2,900 Yazides.

Syria, like Lebanon, has important indigenous Christian minorities, which together account for almost 14 per cent of the population. As of 1949, the Greek Orthodox Church claimed about 153,900 members; the Armenian Orthodox, 107,300; the Syrian Orthodox, 44,970; and the Greek Catholic, 51,500. Other church groups, comprising Armenian, Syrian and Roman Catholics, Maronites, Nestorians (Assyrians), Chaldeans and Protestants, each numbered from 5,000 to 18,000. In addition, there were slightly over 31,000 Jews, mainly of Sephardic origin and with a long history of residence in Syria. With the exception of about 125,300 Armenians and 10,200 Assyrians, the members of the Christian minorities are largely Arabic-speaking and closely re-
167 lated to their Moslem compatriots. Most of
162 the Armenians have come to Syria since 1894 as refugees from Turkish territory. The majority reside in the larger towns, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo, but considerable numbers have settled in the Al Jazira region. The Assyrians who fled to Syria from Iraq in 1933 and the Chaldeans

p. 137(B)

162 dwell in the Khabour river basin. The Syrian
167 Orthodox and Catholic churches flourish in the north, where the inhabitants of many
[191] mountain villages employ Syriac dialects, preserved since pre-Islamic times.

795 Prominent among the Moslem minorities are the Alawites and the Druzes. Although both are scattered throughout the country, they are found primarily in the provinces, which, under the Mandate, were semi-autonomous units of the Levant. The Alawites inhabit the province of Latakia, comprising the coastal plain and a large part of the Orontes river valley, where they represent about 70 per cent of the population. The Druzes form a closely knit religious community which migrated to the Jebel ed Druz highlands from Lebanon in the last century.

162 Several racial and linguistic minority groups are contained in the orthodox Moslem majority. About 200,000 Kurds reside in Syria, chiefly in Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces and in the city of Damascus. A large proportion have lived for generations on the fringes of Kurdistan, within the pres-
[167] ent boundaries of Syria, but some are recent colonists from eastern Turkey to the Al Jazira area, where they constitute a considerable part of the population. Smaller non-Arabic-speaking groups include about 30,000 Turkomans, settled around Aleppo and in the Orontes river valley, and almost 20,000 Circassians, found along the northern frontier and in the Euphrates river basin.

Over three quarters of the population live in the western and the northwestern provinces, with the greatest concentration in the coastal region, in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo, and in the Homs and the Hama areas. In the interior, the settled districts are limited to the river valleys, while the steppe and the desert country to the east and the south constitute
161 the home of nomadic Bedouin tribes. In 1948, the density of population in Latakia was estimated at 215 per square mile. In the province of Aleppo it was 113 per square mile; in the province of Damascus, 90 per

161 square mile; in the province of Hauran, 80 per square mile; and in the province of Hama, 77 per square mile. In contrast, the population density of Al Jazira, incorporating the potentially fertile plains of the Khabour river basin, was 18 per square
369 mile. The country is about 70 per cent rural,
162 with the inhabitants living in some 5,000 villages. There are 6 principal cities with populations of over 30,000 — Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Deir ez Zor. Damascus, the capital and a city of commercial and religious significance, had a population of almost 325,100 in 1949. Aleppo, an industrial and trade center, and the largest city in Syria, had a population of about 356,600. It disputes with Damascus the claim of being the oldest city of continued prominence in the world.

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167 In addition to the older refugee communities, as the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Druzes, which have become established minority groups, Syria received an influx in 1948 of about 150,000 Arabs from northern Palestine. Approximately 80,000 located around Damascus; others in Hauran and the northern provinces. Their status and ultimate distribution were still undetermined in 1952, when the number on the roster of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees totaled 84,000. Over one third resided in special camps, but the remainder were living independently in the various towns and villages.

167 During the Ottoman regime, large numbers of Syrians emigrated to the Americas, and to Europe and Africa. Although they probably total almost 60,000, the Syrian colonies abroad are small in comparison with those of the Lebanese, and their influence on the cultural and the economic life of their homeland is proportionately slight.

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185 The educational system has undergone revision since the founding of the republic in 1943, with increased emphasis on its adaptation to the culture and the needs of the
891 people. Elementary education is compul-

p. 138(B)

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 659
Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour 747
and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8,9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged 164
about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh 861
valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the 164
malaria problem has been aggravated by the 241
introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages.

The malaria season extends from April 161
to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plas-* 164
modium vivax and *P. falciparum* infections 136
varies according to the season and from place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general *vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered.

Malaria control measures are undertaken 164
by the municipal authorities in Damascus, 744
Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten-

SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number. 164 463

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda. 164 733 656 208

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent." 643 161 162

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases. 744 743

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex- 342

433, 162, 464, 439

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

2: Belgrave. G-3 (1945) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A VISIT TO SHEIKH SULAIMAN MURSHID, THE ALAWITE "LORD"

By SQUADRON-LEADER RICHARD BELGRAVE

S 648

IN June, 1945, the Alawite province of Syria was in an explosive state. To Major B—— and myself the arrival of H.M. Destroyer *Musketeer* was welcome in the extreme. With half a dozen Signals personnel we had been the only British "forces" in the area. No time was lost in putting her Captain, Commander S——, in the picture, and very swiftly and surely did he grasp the essentials of a highly complex political situation. It was clear that we had to take steps to keep the Alawites quiescent in this quarrel between the Syrian Nationalists and the French, or our efforts to prevent bloodshed could not have been successful for much longer. The story of our doings in this little-known corner of the Levant is recounted as an example of an unusual combined political operation by representatives of all three branches of the Service.

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The Alawites constitute a religious sect of Islam, numbering some 350,000, and inhabiting the mountains just inland of Syria's 100 miles of Mediterranean coast. They are a minority to be reckoned with in Syrian politics, as they amount to roughly 10 per cent. of the population. In the main division of Islam into the two great sects, Sunni and Shiah, the Alawites are nearer to the Shiahs, while the great majority of the population of Syria are Sunni and nearly all the Nationalist leaders belonged to that sect. It was, therefore, inevitable that the Alawites should be somewhat suspicious of the Damascus Government. Alawite social life is still feudal and their religion secret: a curious blend, largely Islamic, but deriving certain characteristics from Christianity—for example, the belief in a Trinity—and from pagan and pre-Christian cults—for example, belief in reincarnation and the use of groves of trees for places of worship. Their prophets include Christ, Muhammad and Ali. Their women are not admitted to religious rites and are not regarded as possessing souls. The Alawites have the mountaineers' fondness for fighting, and have been enabled by their mountain country to preserve their identity through centuries of alien rule. Their standard of living is low and all but their feudal chiefs are poor. Perhaps the most important of these chiefs at the time of Syria's latest struggle for independence was Sulaiman Murshid, often referred to by the Europeans as "god."

A [362 774 721] A 622 [511]

A 622 735 554

Sulaiman Murshid has never to me claimed to be in any sense a "god." On the other hand, it is estimated that some 50,000 people regard him as the incarnation of the divine and can be said to worship him in the sense that he is their absolute master. The Sulaiman Effendi, as he is known locally, is a shrewd man and knew that I had stated on several occasions that it was a "shame" for a man to pretend to any of the attributes of Allah. He later explained to me that he was the "Rabb" or "Lord" in the sense that he was "lord of the manor." I think, however, that he has on occasion found it profitable to be "the Lord" in as omnipotent a

III The Shashans

√63 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
463 Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
134 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

● 1621 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
429 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
452 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
439 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

1621 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
√63 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and
795 living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflicted upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is constituted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 182

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conslusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1624 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

Arabic-speaking Moslem might take a special pride in the peculiar relation of the Arabs to Islam, and in the dimly-remembered splendours of the early Caliphates, it is safe to say that normally he did not distinguish his being an Arab from his being a Moslem, and even when he did so it was the latter which was foremost in his thought and life.

3

For over a thousand years the majority of the population of Syria had been Moslem. There was not, however, complete unanimity in matters of religious belief. On the one hand, besides the Sunni or orthodox Moslems there were several heterodox Islamic and semi-Islamic sects: Shi'is, Druzes, Alawis and Isma'ilis. On the other hand, there still survived a number of Christian sects, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and others, which had come into existence in the early centuries of the Church's history; and there were in addition a comparatively small number of Jews.

Some of these communities were scattered throughout the country, while others possessed a local predominance in certain parts of it. Most of the districts held by these compact minorities were mountainous. The Lebanese mountains in particular were the homes of dissident communities, either because it was easier for the long-established inhabitants of Lebanon than for their neighbours of the plains to resist the pressure of Islamization, or else because sects which had grown up in the plains migrated to the mountains as an asylum where they would not be molested, or if attacked could better defend themselves. These mountain communities were marked by an especially unbending particularism and resistance to influences from outside.

4

Christians and Jews were left to carry on their own communal life without disturbance. For this there were two main reasons. The first was the Islamic doctrine in regard to Christianity and Judaism. Just as the Moslem regulated his life in accordance with the principles of his faith, so he did not deny a similar right to the Christians.

Moslems are not taught by their faith to regard Christians as inherently inferior, since it is in their power to become Moslems, and so enter the community of true believers in

V. THE WESTERNIZATION OF SOCIETY

1

THE first and most obvious sign of social change is the 161
growth in the population of the French Mandated Territories in the last four generations. For some centuries previous to 1800 the population had been steadily declining. In the course of the nineteenth century it began to increase; by 1914 it may have been in the neighbourhood of two and a half millions. Since then it has grown ever faster, because of the abolition of conscription, the decline in emigration, the rise in the standard of living and the improvement in medical and sanitary services. To-day the total population is nearly four millions.

The distribution of the population between the different 162
provinces of the country is as follows:

Syria:	Province of Damascus	531,267
	" " Aleppo	752,196
	" " Homs	182,312
	" " Hama	137,882
	" " the Hauran	108,603
	" " the Euphrates	218,667
	" " the Jazirah	103,514
	" " Latakia	371,880
	" " Jebel Druze	70,706
	Total	2,477,027[1]
Lebanon:	Province of Beirut	232,000
	" " Mount Lebanon	278,000
	" " Northern Lebanon ..	241,000
	" " Southern Lebanon ..	198,000
	" " the Biqa'	167,000
	Total	1,116,000[2]

2

Two-thirds of this population live in villages and are 311
dependent upon agricultural occupations. The total area of the country is some 58,000 square miles; but only about 10–15 per cent of it is cultivated. An equal area could however be brought under cultivation if swamps were drained, barren wastes irrigated, and the margin of agriculture pushed eastwards into the deserts.

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1938* (Paris, 1939), pp. 220–1. These figures exclude the Beduin population, who number over half a million, and also the population of Alexandretta, which was ceded to Turkey in 1939 (see Chapter XI). They are not to be accepted as more than a rough approximation. An estimate for 1944 gave the population of Syria as 2,800,000 (excluding the Beduin).

[2] Figures for 1942.

000 162 eastwards into the desert. At present the bulk of the population is concentrated in a comparatively small part of the total area of the country; it is mainly in the West and in the river valleys of the Jazirah. The density of population is greatest on the coast and round Damascus and Aleppo.

241 The crops which are grown or could be grown vary greatly from district to district, in accordance with variations in climate and the soil's fertility. The Jazirah, the great plain of Homs and Hama, the Biqa' and the Hauran produce wheat, and to a lesser extent maize, barley and other cereals. Olives, vines and other fruits are grown on the coastal plains and the westward slopes of the coastal ranges; tobacco in Lebanon and around Latakia; cotton also around Latakia, and in the Biqa'. Some districts are well watered by springs, summer streams and perennial rivers, and some, in the north more than in the south and on the coast rather than inland, enjoy an adequate rainfall; but the fertility of almost all parts of the country could be much increased were its water-resources to be properly exploited. The Orontes in the north, the Litani in the south, the Euphrates and its tributaries in the north-east and other rivers could be used to irrigate perhaps half a million more hectares than are irrigated to-day. The rainfall could be more fully utilized, and the agricultural situation improved in various other ways, by systematic reafforestation, to make up for the bad effects of neglect in the past. Under French rule a little has been done to this end, but more remains to be done.

135 The mineral resources of Syria and Lebanon have not yet been thoroughly investigated but are probably not extensive. Salt and some other minerals exist in quantities sufficient to supply the country's own needs; but iron and other requisites of industry are found only in small quantities or else not at all. In recent years there have been reports of the discovery of oil in the Jazirah, but whatever oilfields exist are not yet being exploited.

433 241 In normal years the country's production of food equals and often exceeds its consumption, although the inadequacy of internal communications and other factors make necessary a certain importation of agricultural products from the neighbouring countries. Improvements in the quality of seeds and livestock and the modernization of agricultural methods have already begun, and greatly help in increasing production.

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

VII. LEBANON AND THE MINORITIES

I

THE greater part of the population of the Levant States, it was stated in the last chapter, is Arab by language and tradition; in addition the majority is orthodox Moslem by faith. There are, however, a number of communities which are not Arab, others which are heterodox Moslem or not Moslem, and some which are neither Arab nor Moslem.

The religious minorities are more numerous and of greater importance in the country's political life than the national minorities. The following list shows the sectarian composition of Syria and Lebanon:

	Community	Syria[1]	Lebanon[2]	Total
A. Moslems, and post-Islamic sects	1. Sunnis	1,737,402	175,925	1,913,327
	2. Shi'is	11,341	154,208	165,749
	3. Druzes	79,428	53,047	132,475
	4. Alawis	274,486	—	274,486
	5. Isma'ilis	24,390	—	24,390
	Total	2,127,247	383,180	2,510,427
B. Christians	1. Maronites	11,800	226,378	238,178
	2. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite ..	4,750	—	4,750
	3. Greek Orthodox ..	115,118	76,522	191,640
	4. Greek Catholics ..	42,427	45,999	88,426
	5. Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) ..	32,892	2,574	35,466
	6. Syrian Catholics ..	14,182	2,675	16,857
	7. Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians) ..	86,742	25,462	112,204
	8. Armenian Catholics	12,157	5,694	17,851
	9. Assyrians and Chaldaean Catholics ..	3,759	528	4,287
	10. Protestants	7,660	6,712	14,372
	Total	331,467	392,544	724,011
C. Jews	.. ..	26,250	2,518	28,768
D. Miscellaneous	.. ..	2,065	6,301	8,364
	Total	2,487,027	785,543	3,272,570

Thus some 58 per cent of the total population are orthodox Sunni Moslems, 18 per cent belong to other Moslem communities, and 23 per cent are Christians.

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 220–1.

[2] Census of 1932. See S. B. Hanna, *Economic Organization of Syria* (Beirut, 1936), pp. 408–9. These figures are now out of date, but are given here because they are more detailed than any published more recently. An official estimate for 1943 gives the following figures:—Sunnis 222,594, Shi'is 200,698, Druzes 71,711, Maronites 318,201, Greek Orthodox 106,658, Greek Catholics 61,956, Armenian Orthodox 58,007, Minorities 6,356—Total 1,046,421.

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points in the nationalist programme other than those which are emphasized by the Moslems; they also sometimes conceive of themselves as having a special duty to perform in the movement. For example, some of the Christian nationalists regard it as their task to mediate Western civilization to the Arabs. This sense of a special duty makes for difference, if not for opposition.

6

This much can be said of the whole of Syria and Lebanon. But if a more detailed analysis is to be attempted, Lebanon must be separated from Syria. While in Syria, and in the Levant States taken as a whole, the Sunni Moslems have an overwhelming preponderance, in Lebanon neither they nor any other community forms an absolute majority of the population, and the number of Christians of different sects is slightly greater than that of Moslems, orthodox and heterodox.

Inside Lebanon also a distinction must be made. As will be described later,[1] the Lebanese Republic of to-day was formed after the First World War, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of Lebanon, which consisted mainly of Mount Lebanon itself, of certain towns and outlying districts. In the former, the population is almost entirely Christian (mainly Maronite) and Druze. The additions included the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Saida (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre), and the districts of the Biqa' in the east and Jebel Amil in the south. In the towns the population is largely Sunni Moslem, although there are also numerous Shi'is, Greek Catholics and Orthodox and Armenians (mainly in Beirut). In the Biqa' and Jebel Amil the Shi'i Moslems are predominant, but here again there are large Greek Orthodox and Catholic and other communities.

In Mount Lebanon the majority is Christian, but the Druze community is large and strong enough to have played at least an equal and sometimes a greater part in the history of the Mountain. Thus the sectarian composition of Mount Lebanon is very different from that of the rest of the Mandated Territories. To a great extent also its history has diverged from that of other parts of geographical Syria. This has given rise to a specific Lebanese tradition. It is a tradition of asylum: remnants of sects and tribes, driven for one reason or another

[1] See Chapter IX, p. 172.

In the State of Syria two different types of minority 563
problem exist. First, there are problems in regard to the protection and the rights of the 'scattered' minorities, which are in a minority in all parts of the country. Secondly, there are the problems raised by the existence of a number of 'compact' minorities: communities which, while forming a minority of the population of Syria as a whole, nevertheless possess a local predominance in certain regions of it. Here the question is not simply how to guarantee the security and rights of these communities, but what should be the political status and administrative organization of the regions in which they are predominant. There are two districts, those of Latakia and Jebel Druze, in which this question is important; and there is a third, the Jazirah, in which the position is similar in some respects, although very different in others. It will be convenient in the pages which follow to treat the situation in these three districts separately from that in the remainder of Syria.

Jebel Druze was mainly settled in the course of the eighteenth 563
and nineteenth centuries by Druzes coming from Lebanon 162
as a consequence of internecine disputes, changes in the traditional balance of social power and increased interference by the Turkish Government and the Western Powers. They sought in the Jebel freedom to manage their own affairs without control or interference. They now constitute an overwhelming majority of the population; in 1938 there were approximately 62,000 Druzes out of a total population of 70,000, the remainder being mainly Greek Catholics and Orthodox.[1]

Before the War of 1914–1918 the Druzes were almost 563
completely autonomous; Turkish attempts to subdue them had at most a temporary success, and Turkish suzerainty existed only in name. They held aloof from the Sunni Arabs, and preserved in their isolation certain traits which might otherwise have been modified: suspicion of orthodox Moslems, resentment of all interference and attachment to their feudal organization and customary law. It is the persistence of these traits which has given rise to the political

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 220–1. The figures for Latakia, the Jazirah and the rest of Syria, given in the following sections, are from the same source.

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the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, 563
the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but 621
powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

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The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known 162
as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is 795
in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants 795
of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors 631
but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a larger proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said 795
about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the 648
Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land. 000

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was 162
almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 103,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.[1]

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose 563
native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other 798
part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a 563
conflict between the greater number of French officials/ 86
who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds 563
have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups/619
being the Barazi and Milli; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the 'Hoybun' party. It aims at the

[1] Another estimate for 1937 was as follows: Arab Moslems 41,900; Kurds 81,450; Christians 31,050; others 4,150; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

563 619 formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

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162 195 In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

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184 The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

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without success. Being Sunnis and living in mainly Arab regions, they will probably in time become assimilated. The Turcomans in the province of Aleppo have on occasion caused trouble to the authorities by their turbulence, but do not raise any special political problem. Kurds are also to be found in the province of Aleppo and there is a colony of several thousands in Damascus. From here and Beirut, the Kurdish nationalist movement is directed. Its main weight comes from the Jazirah, but it is strong in other parts of Syria, though by no means all Kurds are nationalists. Some of these scattered Kurds are nomads, others semi-sedentary or sedentary. There are several thousands of Jews in Damascus and Aleppo. They have been treated with tolerance broken by occasional incidents: in 1840, for example, the Jews of Damascus were accused of ritual murder. Like the Arabized Jews in general, they openly repudiate Zionism, and events in Palestine have not gravely affected their position; but in recent years many of them have emigrated to Palestine.

Finally, much of what was said about the Armenians in Lebanon applies to those in Syria. They are of particular importance in Aleppo, where more than 65,000 of them live; a large proportion of these have been settled there for several generations. They are prominent in many branches of trade and industry. Their failure to become Arabized is resented by many Arab nationalists; while the fact that as Christians they help to increase the Christian element in the population of the town arouses the hostility of some Moslems. But Aleppo is not a fanatical town; it is primarily a commercial centre, and much more tolerant of diversity and less liable to be carried away by political euthusiasms or hatreds than is Damascus.

Memories of the past have embittered the feelings of practically all Armenians towards Turkey. At the time of the Alexandretta affair,[1] the rumour that Turkey intended to claim the district of Aleppo caused a great stir among the Armenians of northern Syria. Had Aleppo been ceded to Turkey, this would probably have been followed by the emigration of large numbers of Armenians southwards.

[1] See Chapter XI.

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APPENDIX B

Recent Statistics of the Population of Syria and Lebanon

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More up-to-date estimates of the population than those given in Chapters V and VII have come to hand since the text of this book was completed. They are as follows:

TABLE I

Population by Provinces ('Muhafazats')

Syria:	
Muhafazat of Damascus	603,889
Aleppo	870,139
Homs	212,424
Hama	157,458
Hauran	112,842
Euphrates	225,023
Jazirah	146,001
Jebel Druze	80,128
Latakia (Alawis)	452,507
Total	2,860,411
Lebanon:	
Muhafazat of Beirut	174,001
Mount Lebanon	335,774
North Lebanon	246,964
South Lebanon	212,848
Biqa'	157,014
Total	1,126,601
Total for Syria and Lebanon	3,987,012

Notes:

(1) The Beduin are not included in the Syrian figures. Their total number has been estimated at about 400,000.

(2) The Syrian figures give the population as it was at the end of 1943, the Lebanese figures are for the end of 1944.

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TABLE II

Population by Religious Communities

Religious Community	Syria	Lebanon
Sunnis	1,971,053	235,595
Shi'is	12,742	209,338
Druzes	87,184	74,311
Alawis	325,311	—
Isma'ilis	28,527	—
'Latins' (i.e. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite)	5,996	3,117
Maronites	13,349	327,846
Greek Catholics	46,733	64,280
Greek Orthodox	136,957	109,883
Armenian Catholics	16,790	10,048
Armenian Orthodox	101,747	59,749
Syrian Catholics	16,247	4,984
Syrian Orthodox	40,135	3,753
Chaldaean Catholics	4,719	1,330
Nestorians	9,176	—
Protestants	11,187	10,440
Jews	29,770	5,666
Yazidis	2,788	—
Various	—	6,261
Total	2,860,411	1,126,601

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

101 178 challenging task of fusing the positive elements of both its eastern and its western heritage into a cohesive whole.

Population and Land

161 162 According to official estimates, Syria at the end of 1953 had a population of about 3.65 million, including some 150,000 Bedouins who lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Although demographic statistics are far from adequate, it appears probable that the population has been growing at an annual rate of somewhere between 2% and 3% during the last decade. Most of the population is rural:[1] about 60% live in villages and towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and each of the two largest cities—Damascus, the capital, and Aleppo, the commercial center of the country—has a population close to 400,000. About 86% of the population are Moslem or belong to offshoots of the Moslem religion, and nearly all of the balance are adherents of a considerable number of Christian denominations.

161 311 As a country with an area of 181,337 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), about three-fourths the size of the United Kingdom, Syria cannot be said to be densely populated. While less than a third of the area is cultivable, the proportion of the population to the land already under cultivation compares favorably with that of other countries in the Near and Middle East. In Syria there is one hectare[2] of cultivated land per inhabitant, or about 10% more than in Turkey and Iran, twice as much as in Greece and Iraq and eight to nine times as much as in Egypt.

311 133 There is still plenty of land available in Syria but water severely limits its utilization. The country lies to the leeward of mountain ranges in the west and north which intercept much of the rainfall. Except for the coastal region of Latakia province, Syria is largely cut off from the rain-bearing winds of the Mediterranean by mountains, the Djebel Ansariya (Alaouit mountains) in Latakia, and, farther south, after the intervening Tripoli-Homs gap, by the twin ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon which in turn give way to the Hermon range. Thus the area which can support rain-fed cultivation is confined to a rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier. Fortunately for Syria, its

[1] See Annex C, p. 292.
[2] A hectare = 2.471 acres.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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

p. 5

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Natural Resources

Land and water are undoubtedly the principal natural resources of Syria. Indications do not point to extensive mineral deposits. Some poor lignite but no coal has been found. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company carried out extensive prospecting and drilling over a considerable area under a concession granted in 1938. After spending about £ 6 million sterling in exploratory work, it surrendered its concession in August 1951. Although the belief persists in Syria that considerable oil will one day be discovered, there is no evidence to support the supposition. Drilling did reveal the presence of natural gas in eastern Syria, southwest of Hassetche, and also of appreciable quantities of rock salt. In theory this gas, if proved in considerable volume, together with salt, could provide the raw materials for the production of fertilizers and alkalis, but other countries—for example Iraq—may well be more favorably situated with respect to the development of similar resources. The natural gas could also be used as a source of energy but it is unfortunately found at a considerable distance from the potential market in western Syria.

There are important deposits of bitumen or asphalt. One of these, in the province of Latakia, is already being mined, but other and far richer deposits uncovered in the Djebel Bichri, west of Deir ez Zor, are being exploited to a minor extent only by the Ministry of Public Works. The latter deposits are expected to assume considerable importance in the extensive roadbuilding program the government is planning to undertake. Iron ore, chromite and lead and iron pyrites are known to exist, but their presence in commercial quantities is still to be proved. While licenses for prospecting of minerals are being issued, on the basis of existing evidence it seems unlikely that mineral resources exist in sufficient quantities to affect the future of Syria significantly.

Agriculture

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65% to 75% of the people derive their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable portion of the balance earn their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities. Agriculture and animal husbandry together probably account for 45% to 50% of the national income. In agriculture, winter crops are most important because rainfall is concen-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ANNEX C *NOTES ON AGRICULTURE*

1 POPULATION, REGIONS AND SOILS

Rural Population

162 Syria's agricultural population can be divided into groups differentiated
619 by their social order.

233 *Nomadic tribes.* Bedouin tribespeople form an important unit of the rural population, numbering an estimated 150,000 and living in various stages of settlement from pure pastoral nomadism to almost permanent agricultural communities. Among the larger tribes the Tay and part of the Jubur have become practically sedentary, the Shammar and Shashans remaining nomadic or semi-nomadic. There are also numerous small nomadic tribes roaming the desert between the cultivated belt and the Jordan border. These harvest the scanty desert grass with their flocks of sheep and goats and their herds of camel and a few cattle, and contribute considerably to the country's livestock production. A large part of Syria's meat, wool and dairy products is produced by the Bedouins. Their standards of living and education are quite low.

The increasing exploitation of arable land for crop production during recent decades correspondingly reduced the grazing area and, may, if continued, threaten a considerable reduction in livestock.

162 *Settled villagers.* The nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500
241 compact villages form the most important segment of the agricultural
511 population. They are the true cultivators of the soil whether they own the land or work on it as tenants or laborers. A large number farm entirely for subsistence. Even where there are large community pasture lands, the farms are usually small, frequently too small to give an economic return. Consequently incomes are generally low and many landowners, tenants and sharecroppers are constantly indebted to moneylenders. Although illiteracy among the villagers is on the decrease, education remains at a low standard.

The village people produce most of the crops, raise part of the livestock and supply the country with the bulk of its food and raw materials. Their agricultural activity as a rule is dominated by manual and draft animal

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

operation, in striking contrast to large private holdings where the most modern machinery is used. Measures to raise the standard of living of this group must be one of the main objectives of any development program; in the first instance this must be effected through education, improved systems of land tenure, and better credit facilities.

Lessees and landlords. Some city dwellers have interests in agriculture as leasehold operators of tracts of state domain, or as absentee landlords. Although their interests rarely coincide with the demands of sound long-term farming practices, this segment of the population has been instrumental in opening new farm tracts (such as the Jezireh) and in introducing new crops, thereby contributing much to the national economy. The cultivation of the large absentee holdings is generally left to sharecroppers.

Sharecroppers. Each sharecropper is assigned a parcel of land from which, after the apportionment of the crop, he can hope to gain little more than a bare subsistence. In rainfed areas the sharecropper customarily receives rather less than 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor and around 70–75% if he also supplies the working capital; the percentages may be slightly higher in sparsely populated areas, and lower where population pressure is heavier. On irrigated lands the landlord takes 65–75% of the crop if he provides seed and water, and about half if the sharecropper provides the working capital.

In the long run, the position of the sharecropper would be more tolerable if the productivity of the land and his share of it were raised. At present, yearly land assignments may vary, with the result that the cropper has no incentive to improve the land. The restricted area of the assignment and lack of proper equipment, draft animals and money capital contribute to the permanent indebtedness of sharecroppers and their very low standard of living. Measures to improve their lot should include improved tenure status, Agricultural Bank and cooperative assistance in providing working and fixed capital, and resettlement schemes to relieve local land pressure.[1]

Agricultural Regions

In terms of natural conditions and the types of agriculture practiced, Syria can be divided in nine main agricultural regions.

The Hauran and the Djebel Druze. The Hauran and the Djebel Druze includes the mountains of the Djebel Druze and the Julani in the south-

[1] See Chapter 3, Sections III and VI, of the Main Report.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ANNEX I

NOTES ON SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

Syria's 3.65 million people dwell in an estimated 8,265 settlements, of which about 61% are towns and villages and the rest farms. Only Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deir ez Zor and Latakia can be said to be preponderantly urban; the remaining communities have fairly evenly balanced urban and rural characteristics or else are clearly agricultural. About 23% of Syria's population lives in Damascus and Aleppo, 17% in 21 other cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, 6% in 31 mixed settlements and over 50% in agricultural settlements. A little less than 3% is nomadic.

But the character of Syria's settlements is changing and the picture presented above will probably not be accurate for long. People of the mountain regions are slowly moving down to the plains. Both urban and rural settlements are being established in areas newly opened to cultivation, such as the Jezireh, the Ghab and the Roudj. The achievement of political independence started a trend toward urbanization, stimulated by construction of new roads and development of motorized transport.

Despite a considerable postwar building boom, there are probably fewer buildings in relation to the population in Syria than in most other countries. Although the exact number of dwelling units is not known, it probably does not exceed 350,000 or approximately one for every 10 inhabitants. In recent years new construction has been at a high rate. In 1953, for example, the number of housing units probably increased by about 5.15%. While this is substantially in excess of the normal increase in the population, account should be taken of the fact that the newer dwelling units probably do not house on the average more than six people. On this basis, only about 8% of the new construction, or some 1,460 units, were available for replacement of existing housing. In the postwar period the demand for housing has been stimulated by the rise in population, the wartime building lag, the growth of the foreign community, the return of expatriate Syrians, changes in the geographical distribution of population and the tendency of patriarchal families to break up into simple

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

تقدير عدد سكان الجمهورية السورية في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢ ونسبتهم لمساحة الاراضي (١)

POPULATION ESTIMATES AS AT THE END OF 1952 AND RATIO TO LAND AREA (1)

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Table No. 1 — جدول رقم (١)

MOHAFAZAT	عدد السكان Population	المساحة كم ٢ Area km.2	عدد السكان في كل كيلو متر مربع Population per km.2	المحافظات
TOTAL	3,433,638	184,479	18,613	المجموع
Damascus (2)	738,227	19,538	37,835	دمشق (٢)
Homs	261,904	41,030	6,386	حمص
Hama	196,605	7,322	26,866	حماة
Latakia	540,675	6,080	88,927	اللاذقية
Aleppo	1,025,674	22,919	44,732	حلب
Al-Hasakeh	177,398	22,170	8,001	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	251,548	55,060	4,569	دير الزور
Sweida	98,713	5,550	17,786	السويداء
Dir'a	141,832	4,200	33,770	درعا

(1) Survey estimates, 1951
(2) Including Damascus City

(١) حسب تقدير المساحة عام ١٩٥١
(٢) بما فيها مدينة دمشق المنقرة

تقدير عدد سكان مراكز المحافظات ومراكز الاقضية في الجمهورية السورية في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY MOHAFAZAT CENTRES AND QADAS CENTRES AS AT THE END OF 1952

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Table No. 2.

جدول رقم (٢)

CITY	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المدينة
Damascus	372,708	189,252	183,456	مدينة دمشق
Douma	22,007	11,574	10,433	دوما
Zabadani	8,180	4,012	4,168	الزبداني
Katana	6,790	3,848	2,942	قطنا
Qutaifeh	3,865	1,636	2,159	القطيفة
Qunaitra	7,158	3,458	3,700	القنيطرة
Al-Nabk	12,391	6,620	5,971	النبك
Homs	125,083	66,512	58,571	مدينة حمص
Hama	91,153	47,512	43,641	مدينة حماة
Salamiya	16,744	9,084	7,660	السلمية
Latakia	47,397	24,030	23,367	مدينة اللاذقية
Banias	4,943	2,140	2,803	بانياس
Tel-Kalakh	3,870	2,013	1,857	تلكلخ
Jableh	10,368	5,183	5,185	جبلة
Al-Haffeh	2,989	1,469	1,520	الحفة
Safita	6,756	3,539	3,217	صافيتا
Tartus	11,803	5,737	6,066	طرطوس
Misiaf	5,196	2,582	2,614	مصياف
Aleppo	380,919	190,103	190,816	مدينة حلب
Idleb	24,626	12,222	12,404	ادلب
Fuaa	11,142	5,007	6,135	اعزاز
Al-Bab	19,789	8,311	11,478	الباب
Jarabulus	8,023	3,856	4,167	جرابلس
Jisr-esh Shughour	9,033	4,536	4,497	جسر الشغور
Harem	5,710	2,810	2,900	حارم
Afrin	2,981	1,606	1,375	عفرين
Ein-el-Arab	1,605	822	783	عين العرب
Ma'aret en-Nu'man	12,321	6,164	6,157	معرة النعمان
Minbej	5,815	2,747	3,068	منبج
Deir-ez-Zor	71,375	36,537	35,038	مدينة دير الزور
Abu Kemal	5,407	2,545	2,862	ابوكمال
Al-Rikka	11,411	6,079	5,332	الرقة
Al-Mayadine	7,807	4,447	3,360	الميادين
Al-Hasakah	11,911	6,217	5,694	مدينة الحسكة
Derik	3,442	1,806	1,636	ديريك
Kamishli	20,723	10,846	9,877	مدينة القامشلي
Suweida	11,561	6,132	5,429	مدينة السويداء
Shahba	2,353	1,151	1,202	شهبا
Salkhad	4,269	2,119	2,150	سلخد
Der'a	14,498	7,301	7,197	مدينة درعا
Ier'a	2,266	1,097	1,149	ازرع
Faeq	1,475	760	715	فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية ،

تقدير عدد السكان حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٤٧ - ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATIONBY MOHAFAZT, 1947 — 1953

Table No. 3.

جدول رقم (٣)

End of year	مجموع المحافظات All Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق العاصمة Damascus City	MOHAFAZAT دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماه Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hamkeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نهاية سنة
1947 — Total	3,043,310	310,246	339,587	227,941	170,706	473,754	820,973	151,946	233,312	89,609	125,176	١٩٤٧ — المجموع
— Males	1,543,898	156,957	173,672	120,734	87,925	234,756	459,062	81,765	117,053	47,244	64,710	— ذكور
— Females	1,499,412	153,289	165,915	107,207	82,841	238,998	461,891	70,181	116,259	42,365	60,466	— اناث
1948 — Total	3,082,768	317,251	344,289	232,441	174,401	487,310	932,143	152,962	235,087	90,654	126,005	١٩٤٨ — المجموع
— Males	1,571,310	160,652	176,101	123,087	89,903	243,458	464,929	82,306	118,018	47,750	65,105	— ذكور
— Females	1,521,393	156,596	168,288	109,354	84,538	243,852	467,214	70,656	117,039	42,904	60,900	— اناث
1949 — Total	3,177,751	325,070	353,664	238,629	179,649	501,991	955,075	155,643	246,197	93,203	128,630	١٩٤٩ — المجموع
— Males	1,618,382	164,796	180,733	126,383	92,631	251,202	477,259	83,554	126,155	49,176	65,473	— ذكور
— Females	1,559,369	160,274	172,931	112,246	87,018	250,789	477,816	72,089	120,012	44,027	63,157	— اناث
1950 — Total	3,252,687	335,060	365,980	244,094	183,399	517,750	972,181	159,300	248,139	95,253	131,530	١٩٥٠ — المجموع
— Males	1,656,219	169,658	187,094	129,065	94,522	259,380	486,817	85,322	127,077	50,312	67,977	— ذكور
— Females	1,596,468	165,402	178,886	115,029	88,877	258,371	486,364	73,978	121,061	44,941	63,549	— اناث
1951 — Total	3,329,235	345,237	375,260	250,915	188,896	528,245	995,291	162,145	249,431	96,882	136,940	١٩٥١ — المجموع
— Males	1,696,262	175,002	191,992	132,800	97,471	264,869	497,792	86,803	127,584	51,069	70,994	— ذكور
— Females	1,632,853	170,235	183,268	118,109	91,415	263,376	497,499	75,342	121,847	45,813	65,946	— اناث
1952 — Total	3,433,636	372,706	386,519	261,904	196,005	540,675	1,025,674	177,388	251,548	98,713	141,822	١٩٥٢ — المجموع
— Males	1,751,939	189,252	197,611	138,921	101,540	271,602	514,158	94,669	128,475	52,016	73,685	— ذكور
— Females	1,681,697	183,456	178,908	122,983	95,125	269,073	511,516	82,719	123,073	46,697	68,137	— اناث
1953 — Total	3,655,904	383,239	394,153	353,332	271,948	432,506	1,094,447	232,104	253,586	104,563	147,907	١٩٥٣ — المجموع
— Males	1,868,878	194,681	197,132	187,761	139,164	215,531	551,127	121,836	129,403	55,117	77,126	— ذكور
— Females	1,787,026	188,558	187,020	164,592	131,884	216,975	543,320	110,268	124,182	49,446	70,781	— اناث

Source : Ministry of Interior.

Note : The above figures on the population of the Syrian Republic, have been arrived at by the addition of registered Births, new and previously undeclared, change of residence in ocuiage, and persons acquiring the Syrian citizenship, and registered deaths, new and previously undeclared, change of residence out going and persons relinquishing the Syrian citizenship

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

ملاحظة : تخضع ارقام نفوس الجمهورية السورية المثبتة اعلاه الى ضم المواليد المسجلة حديثة ومكتومة ونقل السكن الوارد والاشخاص الذين اكتسبوا الجنسية السورية كما وتخضع الى تنزيل الوفيات المسجلة من حديثه ومكتومة ونقل السكن الصادر والاشخاص الذين سقطت عنهم الجنسية السورية .

السكان والاحوال المدنية

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تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٢

ESTIMATE OF REGISTERED POPULACN, BY QADAS AS AT THE END OF 1952

Table No. 4.

جدول رقم (٤)

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
TOTAL	3,423,226	1,751,939	1,671,287	المجموع العام
Damascus City	372,705	189,252	183,456	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	366,519	187,611	178,908	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta) (*)	78,401	40,704	37,697	مركز المحافظة(الغوطتين(*)
Duma	80,617	41,830	38,787	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	25,820	13,500	12,320	« الزبداني
Qatana	41,479	21,589	19,890	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	29,708	15,198	14,510	« القطيفة
Quneitra	56,747	26,782	29,965	« القنيطرة
Nabek	53,747	28,008	25,739	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	261,904	138,921	122,983	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza Centre	261,904	138,921	122,983	مركز المحافظة
Hama Mohafaza	196,665	101,540	95,125	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	155,671	79,819	75,852	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	40,994	21,721	19,273	قضاء السلمية
Latakia Mohafaza	549,675	271,602	269,073	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	46,481	19,456	27,025	قضاء بانياس
Talkalakh	68,818	37,186	31,632	« تلكلخ
Jableh	74,029	36,609	37,420	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	56,715	29,396	27,319	« الحفة
Safita	78,395	39,863	38,532	« صافيتا
Tartus	59,665	30,502	29,163	« طرطوس
Latakia	105,363	53,540	51,823	« اللاذقية
Misiaf	51,209	25,070	26,139	« مصياف

* It is noted that the figures relating to the population of the Eastern and Western Ghouta for the year 1952 are show less than those published in 1951. This is due to the fact that the villages of Kafar-Susah, Memsh and Kadam became a part of Damascus City as from 1949.

* يلاحظ ان الارقام المتعلقة بسكان الغوطتين لعام ١٩٥٢ اقل مما نشر في عام ١٩٥١ وذلك لالحاق قرى كفرسوسة والمزة والقدم بمدينة دمشق الممتازة واعتبارها ضواحي المدينة منذ عام ١٩٤٩.

تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٢

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY QADAS AS AT THE END OF 1952

162 Table No. 4 (Concld.) جدول رقم ٤ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafazat	**1,025,674**	**514,158**	**511,516**	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafazat Centre	380,919	190,103	190,816	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	93,781	49,016	44,765	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	62,628	34,519	34,109	« اعزاز
Al-bab	56,302	27,468	28,834	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	86,717	43,239	43,478	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	31,646	15,738	15,908	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	43,363	21,408	21,955	« جسر الشغور
Harem	51,692	25,844	25,848	« حارم
Ifrin	81,949	41,599	40,350	« عفرين
Ein-al Arab	29,731	15,611	14,120	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	46,717	23,217	23,500	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	54,229	26,396	27,833	« منبج
Hassakeh Mohafazat	**177,288**	**94,569**	**82,719**	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafazat Centre	68,980	37,140	31,840	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	20,518	10,273	10,245	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	87,890	47,256	40,634	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafazat	**251,548**	**128,475**	**123,073**	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafazat Centre	118,284	60,205	58,079	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	35,079	16,675	18,404	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	55,980	30,830	25,150	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	42,205	20,765	21,440	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafazat	**98,713**	**52,016**	**46,697**	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafazat Centre	43,032	22,960	20,072	مركز المحافظة
Shahba	24,263	12,732	11,531	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	31,418	16,324	15,094	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafazat	**141,332**	**73,095**	**68,137**	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafazat Centre	61,899	31,699	30,200	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	64,030	33,559	30,471	قضاء ازرع
Fig	15,903	8,437	7,466	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior. المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, BY QADAS, AS AT THE END OF 1953.

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Table No. 5

جدول رقم

Mohafazat and Qadas	الجموع Total	Males الذكور	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	3,855,904	1,868,878	1,787,026	المجموع العام
Damascus City	383,239	194,651	188,588	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	384,152	197,132	187,020	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	81,559	42,392	39,167	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	82,837	43,030	39,807	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	26,514	13,898	12,616	« الزبداني
Qatana	43,457	22,654	20,803	« قطنا
Al-Qutelfeh	30,494	15,585	14,909	« القطيفة
Kuneitra	64,191	30,905	33,286	« القنيطرة
Nabek	55,100	28,668	26,432	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	352,353	187,761	164,592	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza Centre	281,502	149,487	132,015	مركز المحافظة
Talkalakh	70,851	38,274	32,577	قضاء تلكلخ
Hama Mohafaza	271,048	139,164	131,884	محافظة حماه
Mohafaza Centre	166,793	85,767	81,026	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	50,581	27,001	23,580	قضاء السلمية
Misyaf	53,674	26,396	27,278	« مصياف
Latakia Mohafaza	432,596	215,531	216,975	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	48,625	20,655	27,970	قضاء بانياس
Jableh	76,796	38,119	38,677	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	58,872	30,541	28,331	« الحفة
Safita	81,295	41,388	39,907	« صافيتا
Tartus	60,851	31,059	29,792	« طرطوس
Latakia	106,067	53,769	52,298	« اللاذقية

تقدير عدد السكان المسجلين حسب الاقضية في نهاية ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, BY QADAS, AS AT THE END OF 1953.

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Table No. 5 (Concld.) جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الإناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	**1,094,447**	**551,127**	**543,320**	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	389,942	194,898	195,044	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	99,054	51,864	47,190	قضاء ادلب
I'naz	69,715	3 5,114	34,601	« اعزاز
Al-bab	69,445	34,354	35,091	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	104,330	53,282	51,048	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	32,070	15,963	16,107	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	44,993	22,362	22,631	« جسر الشغور
Harem	54,743	27,566	27,177	« حارم
Ifrin	84,756	42,971	41,785	« عفرين
Ein-el Arab	30,578	16,061	14,517	« عين العرب
Ma'arat-an-Un'man	55,347	27,638	27,709	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	59,474	29,054	30,420	« منبج
Hasakeh Mohafaza	**232,104**	**121,856**	**110,248**	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	96,913	51,349	45,564	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	27,514	13,602	13,912	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	107,677	56,885	50,792	« القامشلي
Der-es-zor Mohafaza	**253,885**	**129,403**	**124,182**	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	119,422	60,747	58,675	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	35,254	16,758	18,496	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	56,303	30,971	25,332	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	42,606	20,927	21,679	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	**104,563**	**55,117**	**49,446**	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	46,963	24,996	21,967	مركز المحافظة
Shahba	25,433	13,352	12,081	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	32,167	16,769	15,398	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaza	**147,907**	**77,126**	**70,781**	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	64,033	32,884	31,149	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	67,617	35,614	32,003	قضاء ازرع
Fik	16,257	8,628	7,629	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior المصدر وزارة الداخلية

السكان والاحوال المدنية

تقدير عدد السكان حسب المذاهب ١٩٤٥ – ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES, 1945 — 1953.

Table No. 6

جدول رقم ٦

COMMUNITY	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	المذهب
Total	2,949,815	3,006,928	3,043,310	3,092,703	3,177,751	3,253,687	3,329,235	3,433,626	3,655,904	المجموع
Sunnites	2,033,734	2,075,093	2,105,183	2,137,802	2,196,015	2,248,509	2,305,838	2,387,435	2,578,810	سنيون
Alawites	335,454	338,449	339,466	344,362	355,468	367,327	374,850	384,331	398,445	علويون
Shi'ites	12,901	13,145	13,201	13,355	13,708	14,007	14,196	14,493	14,837	شيعة
Ismailits	29,856	30,549	31,051	31,813	32,804	33,503	34,529	35,627	36,745	اسماعيليون
Druses	89,796	95,749	96,641	97,795	100,554	103,150	104,945	107,060	113,318	دروز
Yazides	2,858	2,883	2,885	2,888	2,889	2,926	2,937	3,064	3,082	يزيديون
Judiets	30,309	30,646	30,873	31,005	31,157	31,312	31,458	31,550	31,647	موسويون
Grek Orthodox	140,832	143,038	144,517	149,706	153,886	157,351	160,782	164,150	168,747	روم ارثوذكس
Armenian «	104,331	104,072	104,925	106,298	107,251	108,273	109,005	110,515	110,594	ارمن «
Syrian «	41,719	42,560	43,081	43,652	44,971	46,440	47,805	49,750	51,363	سريان «
Greek Catholics	48,430	48,773	49,543	50,423	51,495	52,497	53,615	54,703	55,880	روم كاثوليك
Armenian «	16,979	17,258	17,493	17,706	18,010	18,631	19,219	19,346	19,492	ارمن «
Syrian «	16,916	17,389	17,613	17,830	18,[illegible]27	18,521	18,893	19,373	19,733	سريان «
Latins	6,063	6,150	6,125	6,323	6,343	6,445	6,555	6,645	6,749	لاتين
Maronites	13,821	13,986	14,133	14,797	15,112	15,439	15,789	16,117	16,530	موارنة
Chaldians	4,854	4,938	4,991	5,022	5,116	5,201	5,295	5,411	5,492	كلدانيون
Protstants	11,630	11,806	11,959	12,[illegible]	12,661	12,910	13,131	13,433	13,209	بروتستانت
Nastorians	9,323	9,544	9,620	9,693	10,181	10,237	10,359	10,578	11,167	نسطوريون
Assyrians	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4	9	آشوريون

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

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تقدير عدد سكان الجمهورية السورية حسب المذاهب والمحافظات في نهاية عام ١٩٥٣

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND MOHAFAZAT AS AT THE END OF 1953

Table No. 7. جدول رقم ٧

Community	مجموع المحافظات Mohafazat Total	مدينة دمشق المنزلة Damascus City	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hassakeh	دير الزور Deir es-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	المذهب
Total	3,635,004	383,239	384,152	352,953	271,048	423,506	1,094,447	232,104	253,535	104,563	147,907	المجموع العام
Sunnites	2,578,810	315,648	330,197	204,450	148,293	96,971	924,650	171,058	248,216	1,903	137,398	سنيون
Alawites	398,445	252	4,915	54,809	30,820	272,963	3,590	156	122	97	382	علويون
Shi'ites	14,387	172	338	3,714	210	1	10,067	325	—	56	4	شيعة
Ismailites	36,745	46	18	177	31,608	4,819	40	17	19	—	—	اسماعيليون
Druzes	113,318	937	18,076	6	4	10	2,023	5	27	92,221	9	دروز
Yazides	3,028	8	1	1	—	—	1,323	1,740	—	—	—	يزيديون
Judists	31,647	14,441	8	—	—	6	14,775	2,350	57	—	10	موسويون
Greek Orthodox	165,747	13,165	15,787	53,493	6,027	39,777	11,478	466	212	5,721	3,652	روم أرثوذكس
Armenian "	110,594	17,588	68	1,668	915	4,759	73,114	9,966	2,060	410	40	ارمن "
Syrian "	51,363	1,193	121	18,505	837	26	6,535	25,222	875	—	59	سريان "
Greek Catholic	55,880	11,766	11,972	7,146	533	941	13,791	96	26	3,418	6,191	روم كاثوليك
Armenian "	19,492	2,376	92	1,563	96	736	11,044	2,569	742	152	122	ارمن "
Syrian "	19,738	2,535	1,331	3,731	403	—	7,081	3,864	795	—	—	سريان "
Latins	6,749	532	61	539	14	905	4,627	44	27	—	—	لاتين
Maronites	16,530	1,248	315	1,963	1,626	7,515	4,107	75	88	106	4	موارنة
Chaldians	5,492	245	1	36	2	60	2,489	2,374	285	—	—	كلدانيون
Protestants	13,209	1,087	851	2,538	858	3,017	3,708	602	32	479	36	بروتستانت
Nastorians	11,167	—	—	—	1	—	—	11,166	—	—	—	نسطوريون
Assyrians	9	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	4	—	—	آشوريون

Source : Ministry of Interior. المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

تقدير عدد سكان الجمهورية السورية حسب المذاهب والمحافظات في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND MOHAFAZAT AS AT THE END OF 1952

Table No. 8

جدول رقم ٨

COMMUNITY	مجموع المحافظات Total Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق المنارة Damascus City	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	المذهب
Total	**3,433,829**	**372,798**	**366,519**	**261,904**	**196,865**	**549,675**	**1,825,474**	**177,388**	**251,548**	**98,712**	**141,822**	**المجموع العام**
Sunnites	2,387,435	306,131	313,702	176,924	128,996	105,121	857,899	118,965	246,283	1,807	131,704	سنيون
Alawites	364,331	228	4,813	28,125	18,113	328,797	3,494	150	122	96	393	علويون
Shi'ites	14,493	166	324	3,898	210	1	9,881	325	...	86	4	شيعا
Ismailites	35,637	44	13	22	26,210	9,271	41	17	19	...	...	اسماعيليون
Druses	107,060	844	17,295	3	4	7	1,915	5	13	88,066	8	دروز
Yazides	3,084	8	...	...	...	...	1,323	1,753	...	...	...	يزيديون
Judists	31,559	14,414	8	...	...	5	14,731	2,336	55	...	10	موسويون
Greek Orthodox	164,150	12,807	15,584	22,533	20,073	72,263	11,267	452	207	5,508	3,456	روم ارثوذكس
Armenian «	110,515	17,536	64	1,641	665	6,101	72,571	9,519	2,023	357	38	ارمن «
Syrian «	49,750	1,159	119	16,260	787	2	6,422	24,055	861	...	59	سريان «
Greek Catholic	54,763	11,459	11,982	4,561	486	3,240	13,597	94	25	3,215	6,014	روم كاثوليك
Armenian «	19,348	2,339	99	1,554	54	980	10,851	2,453	727	180	110	ارمن «
Syrian «	19,373	2,488	1,318	3,669	366	...	6,984	3,760	789	...	...	سريان «
Latins	6,645	509	58	470	13	974	4,552	42	27	...	...	لاتين
Maronites	16,117	1,222	300	687	51	9,543	4,042	75	86	107	4	موارنة
Chaldians	5,411	240	1	36	2	60	2,458	2,337	277	...	...	كلدانيون
Protestants	13,433	1,084	847	1,893	631	4,275	3,646	573	31	421	32	بروتستانت
Nestorians	10,578	...	...	...	1	...	...	10,577	...	...	...	نسطوريون
Assyrians	4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	...	...	آشوريون

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

السكان والاحوال المدنية

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3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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twenty degrees of latitude. The desert in Syria is of rock and gravel more than of sand, and there are hills rising above 3,000 feet both north and south of Palmyra; more than a third of the total area of Syria is steppe or desert.

Rivers

The Orontes flows from the northern part of the Biqaa through the lake of Homs (which holds about 260 million cubic yards of water) to Hama and through the Ghab depression to Turkey. The Litani rises not far from the Orontes but flows at first southward and later west through a deep gorge in the Lebanon mountains into the sea between Tyre and Sidon. The Euphrates runs through Syria for about 430 miles and has, as tributaries from the north, the Balikh and the Khabur. It is on the Euphrates and its tributaries that there is the best prospect of developing hydro-electricity and irrigation.

Climate[1]

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Over this diverse scene the temperatures vary in the year from below freezing to above 100°F., and on the same day it is possible to ski near the cedars of Lebanon and swim in the sea at Beirut. The rain, which in most places comes between November and February, varies from almost nothing in the desert to about 40 inches a year in the mountains. In the coastal strip the winters are not severe but there is high humidity and small diurnal variation in the summer and this makes the season seem unpleasant and prolonged. In the mountains the snow lies on the topmost peaks for most of the year and the road from Beirut to Damascus is blocked by snow at times in most winters; in the summer the days are hot but the nights are cool enough to draw up to the mountains most of the inhabitants of Beirut. The plateaux and desert have an inland climate with low humidity and higher extremes of heat and cold. Aleppo has greater extremes than Damascus but in both cities there is a distinction between the four seasons: spring from mid-March to mid-May, summer from mid-May to the beginning of October, autumn in October and early November, and winter from November to March.

The People

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Official statistics showed that in 1951 the populations of Syria and of Lebanon were 3,329,137, and 1,303,941 respectively. Over half the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, about half a million are nomads, and the rest live in towns. The

[1] See table, below, p. 501.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MEI
LEBANON MDI

S L 161 162 chief towns of Syria and their populations are: Aleppo, 339,000 Damascus, the capital, 303,000; Hama, 134,000; Latakia, 90,000; Dair az-Zor, 65,000: of the Lebanon—Beirut, the capital, 247,000; Tripoli, 86,000; Sidon (Saida), 78,800; Zahle, 78,031. The population of each country is increasing by about 2 per cent a year. Between half a million and a million Syrians and Lebanese live abroad, mainly in the Americas and Africa; emigration continues; during 1952 about 100 Lebanese emigrated monthly, most of them to South America.

S L 162 *Religions*

RELIGIOUS SECTS AND PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

	Syria		Lebanon	
	Population in 1947	*Seats in 1947*	*Population in 1951*	*Seats in 1952*
Sunni	2,040,908	100	273,125	9
Shiis (incl. Alawis)	447,993	13	237,107	8
Druze	96,641	3	82,268	3
Maronite	14,133	1	377,544	13
Orthodox Greek	144,517	7	130,858	5
Orthodox Armenian	104,925	2	67,139	2
Orthodox Syrian (Jacobite)	43,081	2	4,562	
Catholic (Latin rite)	6,125		4,127	
Catholic (Greek rite)	49,543	2	81,764	3
Catholic (Syrian rite)	17,613	1	5,911	
Catholic (Armenian rite)	17,493	1	14,218	
Catholic (Chaldean rite)	4,991			
Protestants	11,959		12,641	
Nestorians	9,630			
Jews	30,873	1	5,993	
Others			6,684	
Minorities		3		1
Total:	3,043,310	136	1,303,441	44

S L 197 162 The language of the great majority of Syrians and Lebanese is Arabic, and they think of themselves as Arabs. There are minorities of race, religion, and language:[1] the Kurds number between 100,000 and 200,000 and are mainly in northern Syria; most of them speak Kurdish but are progressively becoming less and less distinct from the Arabs. The Armenians, who live mainly in the three principal cities, now number about 140,000, although some 20,000 emigrated to Soviet Armenia in the 1940's. Most of them came as refugees from the Turks after the First World War. Other racial minorities are the Turkomans, Circassians, and Assyrians. Most of the religious sects

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795 [1] For further details see A. H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1947).

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

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The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

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So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

History

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Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria an

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	Damascus	Aleppo	Homs	Hama	Hauran	Euphrates	Jazirah	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Total
Yazidis	6	1,307	—	—	—	—	1,475	—	—	2,788
Druzes	15,394	1,601	—	—	—	4	—	70,185	—	87,184
Armenian Catholics	2,170	9,644	1,496	49	107	616	1,863	150	695	16,790
Armenian Orthodox	16,852	67,598	1,523	615	24	1,679	7,925	354	5,177	101,747
Maronites	1,075	3,659	554	38	3	71	56	106	7,787	13,349
Protestants	1,589	3,053	1,746	529	27	27	453	389	3,374	11,187
Chaldaeans	190	2,281	22	1	—	243	1,944	—	38	4,719
Syrian Catholics	3,261	6,127	3,052	259	—	697	2,851	—	—	16,247
Syrian Orthodox	1,014	5,492	14,309	682	59	763	17,793	16	7	40,135
Latins (i.e. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite)	483	3,938	431	12	—	25	29	4	1,074	5,996
Jews	13,673	14,066	—	—	10	72	1,938	10	1	29,770
Greek Catholics	20,552	11,964	3,792	364	4,857	25	70	2,735	2,374	46,733
Greek Orthodox	23,791	9,411	20,297	17,395	2,852	159	336	4,560	58,156	136,957
Alawis	4,022	2,698	22,219	15,083	370	78	93	95	280,653	325,311
Isma'ilis	18	31	13	20,541	—	12	8	—	7,904	28,527
Shi'is	355	9,071	2,725	205	4	—	326	56	—	12,742
Sunnis	499,444	718,198	140,245	101,685	104,529	220,552	99,665	1,468	85,267	1,971,053
Nestorians	—	—	—	—	—	—	9,176	—	—	9,176
* Total	603,889	870,139	212,424	157,458	112,842	225,023	146,001	80,128	452,507	2,860,411

* The total figures do not include the Beduins, who are nominally Moslems and number perhaps 400,000.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

S During the recent war there was an expansion of cultivation
311 in Syria as a result of high prices and mechanization. The previous table shows the cultivable and cultivated land in different provinces and the distribution of these areas in 1943.

S Little is known about the rate of population growth, but it is
L believed to be rapid. According to the most recent estimates the
162 total in 1944 was 3,987,012, of which the population of Syria was 2,860,411 and of the Lebanon 1,126,600. The population of
S Syria was divided as follows:

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SYRIA: POPULATION AT END OF 1943

Province	*Total*
Latakia	452,507
Aleppo	870,139
Hama	157,458
Homs	212,424
Hauran	112,842
Damascus	603,889
Euphrates	225,023
Jezira	146,001
Jebel ed Druz	80,128
TOTAL	2,860,411

(This estimate excludes the Beduin, whose number is estimated at 400,000.)

About three-quarters of this total, or about 2·1 million, are
S rural. The amount of cultivated land per head is 2½ acres, but
311 because cultivation is so extensive the area actually cropped is only some 1½ acres.

L Lebanon, by contrast with the dry plains of Syria, is inten-
311 sively cultivated because of the high rainfall on the coast line;
241 yields per acre are higher, and crops are more diversified, in-
489 cluding citrus, olives, bananas; small irrigation schemes have been developed along the coast on the streams from the Moun-
162 tain. The Lebanon depends for part of its grain supply on Syria, and all the cultivated land is cropped. The cultivated area in 1943 amounted to 1·3 million acres. The total population in 1944 was estimated to be 1,126,600; of this probably about 750,000 are rural, and the amount of cultivated land is about 1½ acres per head.

S+L Grain production in Syria and Lebanon together before 1939
241 averaged 800,000 tons and rose to about 1 million tons during the recent war.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Syria MDI

CHAPTER II

COTTON IN SYRIA

000 One of the oldest countries in the world with a new-found independence and a new government, fired with ambition and restrained with pride, Syria is struggling against tradition to modernize its practices and remold its economy. A strange contrast of the old and the new is everywhere apparent. The struggle to change is sometimes painful and often frustrating.

Since the country was created only nine years ago, conditions have been hectic and chaotic, marked with military uprisings and three coup d'etats, the last of which brought in the present military dictatorship last year.

Nevertheless, progress has been remarkable. With large profits made during and after the war, the Syrians have done more in modernizing their homes, farms, and factories than had been done in a thousand years before. They have made conspicuous improvement in their roads, irrigation system, schools, and health programs.

Still the standard of living of the people as a whole is miserably low, and their mode of life for the most part is as primitive as it was in the time of Christ.

BACKGROUND

133 311 The resources of Syria are abundant, capable of supporting an economy of a much higher order and a much larger population. This fairly large country with an area of about 72,000 square miles (practically the size of the State of Oklahoma) is located along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.[27]

The eastern half of Syria is desert, broken only by the Euphrates River and its tributaries. In the west, stretching from the two principal mountain ranges, is a series of broad, fertile plains. There is a small coastal plain along the shores of the Mediterranean. The principal limitation is lack of water. Utilization of water for irrigation has increased ten-fold, but the potential from the Euphrates and Orontes River systems is much greater.

162 212 The population is estimated roughly at 3.5 million, of which three-fourths are rural and directly dependent on agriculture.[28] In the time of the ancients these lands supported two or three times as many people. Most of the people today are Moslems. Although more emphasis now is being placed on education, about three-fourths of the people are still illiterate.

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27 *Statesman's Yearbook, 1949*, p. 1348.

28 *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission*, United States Department of Agriculture, 1947, p. 7.

Publication D-4 (no date) no date MI Middle East

Lebanon MEI
+ Syria MDI

L 174 The Armenians are similar to the Lebanese in many of their characteristics but Professor Coon believes they represent a mixture of Alpine brachycephalics with the long headed Indo-Europeans. It will not be feasible to discuss Armenian racial origins in this paper as that involves the extensive racial movements in Iran, Turkey, Southern Russia and the Caucasus.

It does not appear that the Druzes migrated into Southern Lebanon and the Jebel Druze from outside as many believe. Likewise, the same is true for the Mitwali who are Shiite Moslems. Most likely religious leaders from outside Syria entered those districts and influenced the peoples already living there to accept these doctrines.

The Lebanese are remarkably homogeneous and the Mitwali, the Bekaa mules, and the Druzes are almost identical in their morphology. The scant data at hand suggests the same is true for the Maronites.

S 141 162 The desert border: The anthropology of the desert border inhabitants is as complicated as that of the Lebanese is simple. Six groups have been studied along the desert border -- two Christian and four Moslem. The Christians were in Nhardah, near Hama, and in Nafar, north of Damascus. The Moslems were in Hama, Nidjaneh and surrounding villages some twenty kilometers south of Damascus, in Hama in the center of the Hauran and Circassians in and around Kunaitra.

S 141 One of the statistical measures used to determine racial likeness is the significance ratio. I will not bother here with the formula, but will only say that if the significance ratio is three or less the inference is that the groups are not demonstrably different. Bear in mind I am not saying this is absolute proof but it is very suggestive.

It is interesting to point out that in every case the average significance ratio between each of the six desert border groups was above three. In other words, each group is strikingly different from the other. One might expect the Christian villagers to be closer to each other than they are to the surrounding Moslems, yet such is not the case. The mean significance ratio for the Nhardah and the Nafar Christians is 3.40. The chief difference between these groups is head form, for the Nhardah men tend to be round headed, mean cephalic index 80%, whereas the Nafar men are long headed men, 76%. In turn, the Nafar Christians when compared with the Hama Moslems have a mean significance ratio of 3.47, and a mean ratio of 3.40 when compared with the Abaydate Bedouin. The Nidjaneh Moslems are the most divergent. But in spite of these differences we can say in general that the desert border dwellers are intermediate between the mountain dwelling Lebanese and the desert Bedouin. Or putting it another way, they are between the Lebanese Dinarics and the desert Mediterranean.

S 141 144 It is not surprising that the desert border villagers show such a great diversity, for this area has been subjected to numerous invasions. These plains and desert border cities have been ruled within historical times by Babylonians, Assyrians, Aramaeans, Amorites, Hebrews, Romans,

Syria mD1

SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organization.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

641 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

63.Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

163 The people of Syria are predominantly of
186 ancient Semitic stock, modified by centuries of conquest, and Arabic in culture, language and religion. The population, however, includes numerous minority groups, some of which exist as compact communities with distinctive customs and traditions. The official method of enumeration is on the basis
161 of religious affiliation. In 1949, the population was estimated at about 3,177,700, exclusive of undetermined numbers of Bedouin, representing less than 10 per cent
163 of the total. Approximately 86 per cent of
185 the inhabitants were adherents of Islam; about 69 per cent belonged to the Sunni sect. The heterodox sects consisted of roughly 355,500 Alawites, 100,600 Druzes, 32,800 Ismailites, 13,700 Shiites and 2,900 Yazides.

Syria, like Lebanon, has important indigenous Christian minorities, which together account for almost 14 per cent of the population. As of 1949, the Greek Orthodox Church claimed about 153,900 members; the Armenian Orthodox, 107,300; the Syrian Orthodox, 44,970; and the Greek Catholic, 51,500. Other church groups, comprising Armenian, Syrian and Roman Catholics, Maronites, Nestorians (Assyrians), Chaldeans and Protestants, each numbered from 5,000 to 18,000. In addition, there were slightly over 31,000 Jews, mainly of Sephardic origin and with a long history of residence in Syria. With the exception of about 125,300 Armenians and 10,200 Assyrians, the members of the Christian minorities are largely Arabic-speaking and closely re-
167 lated to their Moslem compatriots. Most of
162 the Armenians have come to Syria since 1894 as refugees from Turkish territory. The majority reside in the larger towns, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo, but considerable numbers have settled in the Al Jazira region. The Assyrians who fled to Syria from Iraq in 1933 and the Chaldeans

p. 137(B)

63.Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

162 167 dwell in the Khabour river basin. The Syrian Orthodox and Catholic churches flourish in the north, where the inhabitants of many [191] mountain villages employ Syriac dialects, preserved since pre-Islamic times.

795 Prominent among the Moslem minorities are the Alawites and the Druzes. Although both are scattered throughout the country, they are found primarily in the provinces, which, under the Mandate, were semi-autonomous units of the Levant. The Alawites inhabit the province of Latakia, comprising the coastal plain and a large part of the Orontes river valley, where they represent about 70 per cent of the population. The Druzes form a closely knit religious community which migrated to the Jebel ed Druz highlands from Lebanon in the last century.

162 Several racial and linguistic minority groups are contained in the orthodox Moslem majority. About 200,000 Kurds reside in Syria, chiefly in Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces and in the city of Damascus. A large proportion have lived for generations on the fringes of Kurdistan, within the pres- [167] ent boundaries of Syria. but some are recent colonists from eastern Turkey to the Al Jazira area, where they constitute a considerable part of the population. Smaller non-Arabic-speaking groups include about 30,000 Turkomans, settled around Aleppo and in the Orontes river valley, and almost 20,000 Circassians, found along the northern frontier and in the Euphrates river basin.

Over three quarters of the population live in the western and the northwestern provinces, with the greatest concentration in the coastal region, in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo, and in the Homs and the Hama areas. In the interior, the settled districts are limited to the river valleys, while the steppe and the desert country to the east and the south constitute 161 the home of nomadic Bedouin tribes. In 1948, the density of population in Latakia was estimated at 215 per square mile. In the province of Aleppo it was 113 per square mile; in the province of Damascus, 90 per

p. 136(A)

161 square mile; in the province of Hauran, 80 per square mile; and in the province of Hama, 77 per square mile. In contrast, the population density of Al Jazira, incorporating the potentially fertile plains of the Khabour river basin, was 18 per square 369 mile. The country is about 70 per cent rural, 162 with the inhabitants living in some 5,000 villages. There are 6 principal cities with populations of over 30,000 — Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Deir ez Zor. Damascus, the capital and a city of commercial and religious significance, had a population of almost 325,100 in 1949. Aleppo, an industrial and trade center, and the largest city in Syria, had a population of about 356,600. It disputes with Damascus the claim of being the oldest city of continued prominence in the world.

162 167 In addition to the older refugee communities, as the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Druzes, which have become established minority groups, Syria received an influx in 1948 of about 150,000 Arabs from northern Palestine. Approximately 80,000 located around Damascus; others in Hauran and the northern provinces. Their status and ultimate distribution were still undetermined in 1952, when the number on the roster of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees totaled 84,000. Over one third resided in special camps, but the remainder were living independently in the various towns and villages.

167 During the Ottoman regime, large numbers of Syrians emigrated to the Americas, and to Europe and Africa. Although they probably total almost 60,000, the Syrian colonies abroad are small in comparison with those of the Lebanese, and their influence on the cultural and the economic life of their homeland is proportionately slight.

811 185 The educational system has undergone revision since the founding of the republic in 1943, with increased emphasis on its adaptation to the culture and the needs of the 811 people. Elementary education is compul-

p. 138(B)

SYRIA MD1

SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number.

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda.

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Drux. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent."

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases.

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex-

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

CHAPTER V

SYRIA

In Syria, where the idea of Arab independence found some of its earliest protagonists, nationalism has been marked by a special degree of ill-temper, perhaps because the masses of the larger towns—Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, etc.—at an early stage became an object of political manœuvring. 186 668

Anti-foreign feelings had been aroused as early as 1925, when clashes with the French Mandatory régime led to the bombardment of Damascus. After the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936, Syria became a refuge for Palestinian Arab terrorists on the run. Fawzi Kaukji—an Albanian adventurer specialising in gun-running and gang warfare on behalf of Arab extremists—Amin al Husseini—the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem—and many other "wanted" disturbers of the peace found fertile soil for their activities in Syria.

Here the connection between Arab nationalism and Muslim fanaticism was particularly close, and even sermons in the Mosques frequently descended to the level of vicious and inflammatory diatribes against non-believers. As early as October, 1945, the leader of the "Young Muslims' Association," Sheikh Mustafa al-Sibaj, in a violent speech after the Friday midday prayers in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, threatened the Jews in Arab countries with disaster "if the Palestine problem is not solved in favour of the Arabs."

These characteristics of Arab nationalism in Syria have had their effect not only on the Jews but on the Christian minority also. Hence the attractiveness of neighbouring Lebanon, with its security of life for minorities, as a goal for Christian emigration. The same was true as regards the Jews of Syria, a steady stream of whom has been moving to Lebanon for the last 25 years. The early trickle has recently become so great in volume that, by now, it is believed that only a few remnants of the Jewish population are left in the two big towns of Aleppo and Damascus. 568 668

The last census—that of 1943—gave the number of Jews in Syria as 29,770 out of a total population of 2,860,411 (of whom 2,424,817 were Muslims). The majority of the Jews used to live in Aleppo and Damascus, with about 17,000 in Aleppo (compared with 35,000 in 1910) and 11,000 in Damascus. The remainder, rather isolated, dwelt mostly in the north-eastern province of Jezirah, where they had settled in 1924, along with Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians from Turkey and Iraq. 162 167

Of the 29,000 Jews in Syria in 1943, about 15,000 had left the country by 1947. At that time, there still remained about 10,000-11,000 in Aleppo and about 2,500-3,000 in Damascus. Less than 1,000

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

162 were left in the Jezirah district. An additional 5,000-6,000 Jews
167 emigrated at the beginning of 1948, leaving a total of about 9,000, with 4,500 in Aleppo, 4,000 in Damascus, and 500 in the Jezirah district. Further emigration took place that year; and it is estimated that there are now fewer than 6,000 left in the whole country.

This exodus was the culmination of many years of intimidation, material decline, and moral isolation. The smaller community in Damascus had always been poor. About 80 per cent earned their living as labourers and pedlars; approximately 15 per cent were able to maintain a slightly higher standard; while only 5 per cent were able to make a good living, mostly in commerce. The Aleppo community had in bygone days been prosperous and had been an active and important element of the city's once flourishing commerce. The rapid deterioration of conditions, however, made itself felt particularly strongly among the Jews of Aleppo; and since the wealthy were the first to leave the country, the remainder were impoverished even more swiftly.

197 Although knowledge of French is widespread among educated
563 Jews, the every-day language of the majority is either Arabic or Ladino. There are two *Alliance Israélite Universelle* schools, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus. Since the convocation of the first Parliament in December, 1936, there has been one Jewish representative in the Chamber of Deputies. He was, it is true, allowed to retain his seat even when persecution of the Jews reached its height. But, isolated as he was in a sea of feverish hostility, there was little he could do to alleviate the situation.

In 1945, a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Damascus, presided over by the Mufti of Damascus, sent a telegram to the Allied Governments, threatening that a Holy War against the Jews would be declared by all Islamic countries if Jewish immigration into Palestine continued. Within a month, this action and similar incitement from high quarters, coupled as they were with a violent anti-Jewish press campaign, bore fruit.

[579] On the Muslim holiday of Qurban Bairam, on November 18, an
563 infuriated mob, goaded on by a group of students, broke into the Great Synagogue in Aleppo, smashed the candle burning in front of the Ark,
668 battered some old Jews who were praying, and burnt the prayer books.

This was the signal for the outbreak of a general anti-Jewish campaign, made the worse by the incessant agitation carried on by nationalist orators among the Arab masses. There was the ugly murder of Jacques Franco, Assistant Headmaster of the *Alliance* School in Damascus. Suspicion that his death was the result of the prevailing unrest has never been entirely removed, even though there is insufficient evidence to prove it. There was the forcing of Rabbi Moshe Nahum, of the Jewish community of Jezirah, to make a statement protesting against Jewish immigration into Palestine. There was the humiliating spectacle of the heads of all three Jewish communities

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عدد المواليد الحديثة (*) المسجلة حسب المحافظات ١٩٤٦ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS (*) REGISTERED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1946 — 1953

Table No. 9.

جدول رقم ٩

YEARS	مجموع المحافظات All Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق المنارة Damascus City	MOHAFAZAT دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-es-Zor	سويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	المحافظات السنوات
1946 — Total	60,451	9,877	7,097	5,162	5,021	4,234	20,083	2,202	1,980	1,571	2,284	١٩٤٦ — المجموع
— Males	32,411	4,961	3,910	2,718	2,680	2,284	10,876	1,234	1,111	835	1,602	— ذكور
— Females	28,040	4,916	3,187	2,384	2,341	1,950	9,207	968	869	736	1,482	— اناث
1947 — Total	44,280	9,318	5,886	4,376	4,129	3,167	12,983	817	1,610	950	1,044	١٩٤٧ — المجموع
— Males	23,810	4,710	3,172	2,298	2,190	1,801	7,208	441	878	567	555	— ذكور
— Females	20,470	4,608	2,714	2,078	1,939	1,366	5,775	376	732	383	489	— اناث
1948 — Total	58,966	11,209	7,577	5,917	5,194	5,566	16,873	1,372	2,403	1,300	1,486	١٩٤٨ — المجموع
— Males	31,289	5,742	4,125	3,133	2,690	3,021	9,065	755	1,367	695	806	— ذكور
— Females	27,507	5,467	3,452	2,784	2,504	2,545	7,808	617	1,036	614	680	— اناث
1949 — Total	75,977	11,526	7,647	5,689	6,092	5,662	28,589	2,546	2,308	1,365	3,753	١٩٤٩ — المجموع
— Males	41,587	6,031	4,088	3,007	3,792	3,201	15,961	1,407	1,307	738	2,055	— ذكور
— Females	34,390	5,495	3,559	2,682	2,300	2,461	12,628	1,139	1,001	527	1,698	— اناث
1950 — Total	72,382	13,123	9,189	5,665	5,160	5,878	23,044	3,458	1,910	1,624	3,333	١٩٥٠ — المجموع
— Males	39,043	6,613	5,000	2,971	2,760	3,274	12,716	1,904	1,034	959	1,812	— ذكور
— Females	33,339	6,510	4,189	2,692	2,400	2,604	10,328	1,554	876	665	1,521	— اناث
1951 — Total	83,091	13,940	9,205	6,270	7,466	6,160	28,698	2,308	1,850	1,716	5,358	١٩٥١ — المجموع
— Males	45,364	7,155	5,149	3,403	4,248	3,390	15,847	1,302	1,036	928	2,906	— ذكور
— Females	37,727	6,785	4,246	2,867	3,218	2,770	12,851	1,006	844	788	2,352	— اناث
1952 — Total	86,987	13,493	9,724	6,001	7,125	7,250	30,241	4,855	2,001	1,156	5,041	١٩٥٢ — المجموع
— Males	47,616	6,940	5,413	3,204	3,820	3,913	16,721	2,773	1,071	685	2,977	— ذكور
— Females	39,371	6,553	4,311	2,797	3,296	3,337	13,520	2,182	930	471	2,064	— اناث
1953 — Total	89,277	14,834	11,212	7,045	7,054	7,005	30,731	4,320	2,118	1,733	2,625	١٩٥٣ — المجموع
— Males	48,639	7,973	6,090	3,868	4,201	3,839	17,015	2,437	1,169	955	1,473	— ذكور
— Females	40,648	7,261	5,113	3,177	3,453	3,166	13,716	1,883	949	778	1,152	— اناث

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

* The above figures show the number of births of « recent occurence » but do not include « undeclared births. »

(*) تبين الارقام المثبتة اعلاه المواليد الحديثة فقط ولا تتضمن المواليد المكتومة

السكان والاحوال المدنية

عدد المواليد الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1952

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Table No. 10 — جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	86,987	47,616	39,371	المجموع العام
Damascus City	12,493	6,940	6,553	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	9,724	5,413	4,311	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	2,514	1,386	1,128	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	1,764	980	784	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	666	380	286	« الزبداني
Katana	1,061	570	491	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	523	339	184	« القطيفة
Al-Quneitra	2,032	1,128	904	« القنيطرة
Al-Nabek	1,164	630	534	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	6,001	3,294	2,707	محافظة حمص
Hama Mohafaza	7,125	3,829	3,296	محافظة حماة
Mihafaza Centre	5,721	3,043	2,678	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	1,404	786	618	قضاء السلمية
Latakia Mohafaza	7,350	3,913	3,437	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	819	465	354	قضاء بانياس
Talkalakh	778	432	346	قضاء تلكلخ
Jableh	1,148	594	554	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	546	303	243	« الحفة
Safita	635	329	306	« صافيتا
Tartus	750	429	321	« طرطوس
Latakia	1,988	1,031	957	« اللاذقية
Misiaf	586	330	256	قضاء مصياف

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عدد المواليد الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1953

Table No. 10 (Concld.) جدول رقم ١٠ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	الجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	30,241	16,721	13,520	محافظة حلب
Mohafaza Centre	11,627	6,247	5,380	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	3,882	2,174	1,708	قضاء ادلب
I'zaz	1,426	808	618	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	1,972	1,105	867	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	2,933	1,663	1,270	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	2,067	1,229	838	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	757	382	375	« جسر الشغور
Harem	1,373	762	611	« حارم
'Ifrin	931	531	400	« عفرين
Ein-al-Arab	524	309	215	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	2,420	1,307	1,113	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	329	204	125	« منبج
Al-Hasaiseh Mohafaza	4,955	2,773	2,182	محافظة الحسكة
Mohafaza Centre	634	356	278	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	352	188	164	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	3,969	2,229	1,740	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	2,601	1,671	930	محافظة دير الزور
Mohafaza Centre	1,232	682	550	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	173	86	87	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Rigga	292	151	141	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	304	152	152	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	1,156	685	471	محافظة السويداء
Mohafaza Centre	703	405	298	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	214	134	80	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	239	146	93	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaza	5,041	2,977	2,064	محافظة درعا
Mohafaza Centre	2,496	1,487	1,009	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	2,217	1,316	901	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	328	174	154	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior. المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

السكان والاحوال المدنية

عدد المواليد الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1953

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Table No. 11

جدول رقم ١١

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	**88,277**	**48,629**	**40,648**	المجموع العام
Damascus City	**14,834**	**7,573**	**7,261**	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	**11,212**	**6,099**	**5,113**	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	3,154	1,696	1,458	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	1,931	1,095	836	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	1,033	585	448	« الزبداني
Katana	1,215	665	550	« قطنا
Al-Qutteifeh	600	337	263	« القطيفة
Al-Qunaitra	1,965	1,061	904	« القنيطرة
Nebk	1,314	660	654	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	**7,045**	**3,868**	**3,177**	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza Centre	6,234	3,401	2,833	مركز المحافظة
Talkalakh	811	467	344	« تلكلخ
Hama Mohafaza	**7,654**	**4,201**	**3,453**	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	5,398	2,963	2,435	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	1,393	759	634	قضاء السلمية
Misiaf	863	479	384	« مصياف
Latakia Mohafaza	**7,995**	**3,829**	**3,166**	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	963	538	425	قضاء بانياس
Jableh	1,284	730	554	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	791	459	332	« الحفة
Saffita	820	475	345	« صافيتا
Tartus	1,007	515	492	« طرطوس
Latakia	2,140	1,122	1,018	« اللاذقية

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

عدد المواليد الحديثة المسجلة حسب الأقضية خلال ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW BIRTHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1953

● 163

Table No. 11 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١١ (تتمة)

Mohafazat aild Qadas	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	30,731	17,015	13,716	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	11,011	5,821	5,190	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	4,050	2,229	1,801	قضاء ادلب
I'saz	1,348	792	556	« اعزاز
Al-bab	2,463	1,353	1,110	« الباب
Jabel Sam'an	1,449	840	609	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	265	154	111	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shugour	1,944	1,130	814	« جسر الشغور
Harem	1,255	738	517	« حارم
'Ifrin	3,445	1,897	1,548	« عفرين
Ein-al Arab	932	537	395	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	1,988	1,173	815	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	601	351	250	« منبج
Al-Hassakeh Mohafaza	4,320	2,437	1,883	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	753	422	331	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	562	313	249	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	3,009	1,702	1,303	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	2,118	1,169	949	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	1,218	653	565	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	174	104	70	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	337	194	143	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	389	218	171	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	1,733	955	778	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	797	418	379	مركز المحافظة
Shahba	605	335	270	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	331	202	129	« صلخد
Dir'a Mohafaza	2,635	1,473	1,162	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	1,111	636	475	مركز المحافظة
Isra'	1,203	685	518	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	311	152	159	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

sory, according to law, but barely one half 871
of the children are now registered in
schools. Outside of Damascus, the literacy 212
rates probably do not exceed 40 per cent
among the men and 10 to 20 per cent
among the women. Schools are maintained 871
by the government and by private organizations, both national and foreign. The Syrian 873
University, in Damascus, is one of the leading Arab institutions in the Middle East. It
includes faculties of law, science, arts and
medicine, with subordinate departments of
dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, as well as
an advanced school for teacher training.
An engineering school is established at 874
Aleppo, and, in 1952, a new school for the
training of village teachers, with emphasis
on home economics and agriculture, was
under construction near Damascus.

Vital Statistics

Due to lack of demographic data among 659
large segments of the population, few valid
statistics are available. Theoretically, the
registration of births and deaths is compulsory, but in the rural areas, away from
centers of population, reporting is incomplete. Government officials estimate that
the accuracy of the recorded statistics approximates 90 per cent in the cities, but
30 to 60 per cent in the villages, over one
half of which have less than 200 inhabitants.
Considering the country as a whole, probably 50 to 80 per cent of the births are
recorded and, since certificates are required
for burial, a slightly higher percentage of
the deaths. According to published statistics 163
for 1948, the birth rate for the entire coun- 165
try was calculated at 19.1 per 1,000 population; the death rate, at 6.5 per 1,000 population. The birth rates ranged from 35.3
in the city of Damascus to 9.0 in the rural
province of Al Jazira; the death rates, from
13.2 to 2.3, respectively. Evidence derived
from informal surveys in different localities,
however, suggests that the true birth rates
average 30 to 40 per 1,000 population and
the death rates 15 to 30 per 1,000 population.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 ●164 744

THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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114 > MR. LEWIS, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

p. 278

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA AND ITS CONTROL

Foggaras and surface canals easily become partly blocked by vegetation, 312
and floods and rain wash in mud and silt. The water is then ponded back, depressions near the canal bank fill, the canal may overflow, and, if it is built along the side of a valley, overflow or seepage will maintain swamps along the watercourse. Artificial blockages of foggaras also pond back the water. Near the lower end of most canals are "brick pits" from which earth has been taken to be made into mud bricks, and these also tend to fill with water. Everywhere wadis carry rain and seepage water in winter and spring and the overflow from irrigation canals in early summer and autumn, at which seasons there is a surplus. In other words, except during the peak irrigation and evaporation period of midsummer, they carry slow-moving, half-stagnant water.

All these places are potential, and most of them actual, breeding places 136
of the mosquito *Anopheles sacharovi*, which favors shallow, sunny, warm 164
waters, full of aquatic vegetation. At only one place in the area has another malaria carrier, *A. algeriensis*, been found, and the problem of malaria control in the region is thus essentially that of eliminating the *A. sacharovi* breeding grounds. Full statistics are not available, but such figures as do exist show the great need of such control. About 20 per cent of the patients treated by a mobile clinic in the region in 1942–1945 were suffering from malaria, and the percentage rose at times (especially in late summer) to 80 in some villages. Sometimes practically the whole population of a village was found to be infected. In Tell et Tout (population *c.* 550) about 50 deaths [165]
were due primarily to malaria in 1941, and almost the sole source of infection was the swamp caused by the deliberate blockage of a foggara.

Control work is apparently simple. Canal owners occasionally clean the 312
canals of detritus and vegetation and repair the banks at the lower end. It is important that this work be done well and repeated every few years. Small depressions may be sprayed, filled with earth, or drained by a simple ditch. Broad, sluggish streams may be canalized by a ditch along the thalweg. The more efficient the irrigation, the less likely it is that mosquitoes will breed. Waste of water should be reduced to a minimum and a wide range of crops grown, so that irrigation begins early in the season and ends late. The "waste" water of natural watercourses may be utilized by the construction of a simple dam and gravity canal, or by the repair of the old subparallel foggara if, as is probable, there is one. Extensive stretches of swampy ground may be put to good use by drainage-irrigation schemes, which often include the repair of old foggaras. Malaria control should not stand on its own, an expensive 080

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

880 necessity for health's sake alone, but should be part of a general *mise en valeur* of the region's resources. This is the type of approach which is most likely to succeed, because it is linked with the material interests of the landowners. They will lend their support and active participation if given technical advice, supervision, and material and financial help to defray part of the capital outlay.

Swamps, Floods, and Soil Erosion

185 Malaria-control measures were taken with a fair degree of success in 20 villages in 1944–1945. Various factors, however, combine to prevent a permanent reduction of the incidence of the disease. Among these are the necessity for constant supervision, the need for repeated cleanings of canals 735 and ditches, and the improvidence of the inhabitants. Most important is the 312 fact that floods will certainly undo much of the work.

731 Winter floods are frequently heavy enough to destroy or damage seriously the repair and maintenance works, which are of value to agriculture [illegible] and malaria control alike. Malaria causes debility and apathy among the villagers, and the certainty that floods will recur reinforces this apathy, making everyone disinclined to expend energy and money in work which must be done again in a few years. The canals and watercourses at Moufaggar, for example, have been badly damaged in the past; in fact, damage by floods was the main reason for the modification of the old foggara system. The southern foggara and watercourse are now protected against torrents by a concrete wall at the upper end, but as the system lies in one of the main valleys coming from Jebel Ḥil'as, it is doubtful whether the device will be a great success. Although the broad, nearly flat valley north of Selemiya has benefited from its wide catchment area—it is built up of alluvium, as much as 10 feet deep—it is partly derelict because floods have created extensive swamps and ruined old foggaras. In 1945–1946 useful drainage work was undertaken here.

731 The floods are due in part to the occasional sudden and torrential rainstorms, characteristic of this as of other semiarid regions. Wadis are sometimes filled for a few hours with violent, detritus-laden torrents and are then left dry again. The steep slopes and absorptive limestones are contributing factors. English merchants, traveling in 1691, noted[11] that after a heavy rainstorm

> those hollow Gutts which we passed over without the least appearance of Moisture, were, by the Cataracts which descended from the Mountains, become Rivers; . . . the next Morn-

[11] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), p. 244 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 139–140].

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of 1511
the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud- 342
brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest 262
necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a
diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in
season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale 731
since the First World War; but malnutrition is very wide- 146
spread. On account of this and of the abeence of sanitation and
the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of
health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other 164
diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in 511
Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited
greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the
New World.

6

The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause 178
far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the
larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized.
Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of
houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in
use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on;
the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets
of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the
whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until
the old completely disappears. In the small towns and
villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process
of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller
towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in
coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the
way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in 565
changing. The dominant social class is still that of the land-
owners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No
other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand
against them. The cultivators have little effective power of
moving from one estate or region to another; although intel-
ligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective
sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic
combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist
a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened
smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

II PUBLIC HEALTH

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The progress in public health has been much less spectacular and less steady than that in education. Expenditures on public health have increased sharply only in recent years. In 1954 the budget of the Ministry of Public Health amounted to £S 8.764 million or 4.2% of the regular budget, as compared with actual expenditures of £S 3.431 million or 3.4% of the total in 1945. Health facilities have been gradually expanding. The number of hospitals has risen from 35 with 1,785 beds at the end of 1945 to 61 with [749] 4,094 beds at the end of 1954. Over the last seven years the government has spent, on an average, £S 1.3 million on public health facilities, so that [759] government hospitals now have a total of 3,000 beds. The number of doctors in Syria has risen from 616 in 1945 to about 880 at present.

Yet it is generally recognized that the state of public health is far from satisfactory. This conclusion rests upon testimony and observation rather than health statistics. The statistics, indeed, are so inadequate as to provide little indication of health conditions. The number of deaths registered, for example, imply a death rate of but seven per thousand, but the record of deaths is evidently very incomplete and the actual death rate rather [164] high. There is still a high incidence of debilitating diseases. Malaria, for example, is prevalent in many parts of Syria. Diseases such as tuberculosis and the many varieties of intestinal infections, which are generally associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding and low standards [165] of living, are quite widespread. Infant mortality is particularly high. Thus 36% of the registered deaths in 1951-53 occurred among children less than five years old, and of these about the same percentage died of diarrhoea and enteritis.

An effective campaign to raise health standards would require resources which Syria will hardly be able to mobilize at its present stage of development. The health program will have to remain rather modest and should attempt primarily to remedy the more glaring deficiencies. These are, principally, the inadequate attention given to preventive medicine and the markedly unequal geographic distribution of existing health facilities.

744 *Preventive Medicine*

The prevention of disease is likely in the long run to be more economical than curative medicine. The mission believes that this aspect of

سوريا

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat									نوع المرض
	مجموع المحافظات	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	
Total	16,306	6,357	701	1,291	1,071	4,922	206	661	520	547	المجموع
Typhoid	79	28	3	—	—	11	—	13	22	2	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى تيفية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	44	7	—	—	—	18	—	4	15	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	38	3	2	1	—	3		—	24	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	34	17	8	4	—	1	—	1	2	1	دفتري (خناق دفتيريائي)
Influenza	26	2	—	1	—	21	—	—	2	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	146	38	12	12	1	67	1	9	—	6	السل الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	65	33	7	9	8	14	—	1	—	1	السل غير ملاكر
Siphlis	7	3	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	الزهري
Malaria	124	33	8	4	6	68	—	8	6	2	حمى مرزلية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	23	20	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	امراض سارية غير ملاكر

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ١ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	225	96	18	24	6	71	3	3	3	2	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	16	14	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليس صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetes mellitus	52	30	4	2	1	14	—	1	—	—	الدبيتس السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	45	22	—	—	—	18	—	—	1	—	التسمم الغولي (الغول) المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	39	27	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	164	97	2	14	2	48	—	—	1	—	اختلاج الحركة التقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سفادة خربان او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	192	90	10	15	4	69	1	1	—	2	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Other diseases of the nervous, system and sense organs	64	41	1	4	1	13	—	1	—	4	امراض القلب
Diseases of the heart	1,209	665	66	71	12	402	3	13	6	12	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	89	42	—	4	2	15	—	1	1	4	ذات القصبات
Bronchitis	576	366	10	11	2	94	—	21	39	3	ذات الرئة
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,129	407	117	113	17	165	1	28	16	30	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	73	39	—	4	11	8	1	4	1	—	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,206	1,165	151	179	76	470	7	71	86	54	

الصحة والاسعاف العام

165

HEALTH

1954
1955

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 (Concld.) — جدول رقم ١ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat									المحافظات	نوع المرض
		دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Suweida	درعا Dir'a		
Appendicitis	19	4	—	1	—	9	1	4	—	—		التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	188	102	7	5	12	50	1	8	2	1		امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	85	58	—	7	6	14	—	3	—	7		بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	224	102	12	15	8	78	—	—	3	6		التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genetal system	84	64	1	1	1	15	—	—	1	1		بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	30	7	5	5	—	9	1	1	2	—		تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	28	17	1	2	—	5	—	—	2	1		بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissue, bones and organ of movement.	33	16	1	—	—	16	—	—	—	—		امراض الجلد والنسيج الحجري والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	244	155	39	21	2	23	—	—	3	1		ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	807	311	81	54	151	221	17	31	13	28		الشيخوخة
Suicide	16	7	—	1	—	6	—	—	1	1		انتحار
Homicide	68	27	1	8	—	19	5	6	—	2		قتل
Accidental deaths	744	263	8	23	17	109	3	10	8	3		موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,294	2,113	129	575	731	2,427	161	413	266	269		اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 9.

جدول رقم ٩

TYPE OF DISEASE	سوريا Syria	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Total	17,708	7,118	990	1,410	1,096	4,777	214	477	443	1,223	المجموع
Typhoid	68	40	9	4	—	9	—	—	5	1	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى لمشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	3	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	الحصبة
Scarlet fever	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	19	5	—	3	1	—	—	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	47	30	9	4	—	2	—	—	2	—	دفتري (خناق دفتريالي)
Influenza	20	14	—	—	1	5	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory system	244	156	11	24	1	37	3	7	1	4	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	35	9	5	5	—	17	1	—	—	1	تدرن غير مذكور
Syphilis	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الزهري
Malaria	68	21	4	1	10	24	2	10	—	—	حمى مرزقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	8	4	—	—	—	2	—	1	1	—	امراض سارية غير مذكور

الصحة والاسعاف العام

● [illegible]

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 2 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٢ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafazat المحافظات: Damascus دمشق	Homs حمص	Hama حماة	Latakia اللاذقية	Aleppo حلب	Hasakeh الحسكة	Deir ez-Zor دير الزور	Suweida السويداء	Dir'a درعا	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	290	145	23	30	4	89	2	1	—	2	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	15	6	—	—	1	10	—	—	1	1	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليس معلوم خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	3	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetes mellitus	34	8	3	2	1	19	—	—	—	—	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	93	70	2	—	—	18	—	—	—	3	التسمم الغولي الغول بالمزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	42	36	—	—	2	3	—	—	—	2	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	229	109	7	22	6	82	—	4	—	—	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام
Meningitis non-meningococcal	270	129	17	20	4	71	1	1	3	2	تريف دماغي سداءة غريبية او تعفن الدم في الدماغ
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	80	13	3	19	1	15	—	1	1	—	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,658	841	117	101	45	510	4	15	4	21	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	50	21	1	4	—	21	—	1	—	2	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	506	343	17	39	1	23	1	13	1	2	ذات القصبات
Pneumonia & broncho-pneumonia	829	344	114	79	17	280	3	36	3	35	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	50	45	—	1	1	27	—	7	1	4	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and entritis	2,656	1,329	268	232	145	599	8	56	34	85	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 2 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٢ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafazat: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakah	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض (المحافظات)
Appendicitis	16	9	1	1	2	2	—	—	—	1	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	518	365	9	16	24	64	1	3	2	14	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of digestive system	101	59	—	11	9	20	1	1	—	—	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	305	113	12	26	19	125	—	2	4	5	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	113	41	8	8	10	43	—	1	1	1	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	26	10	4	4	—	2	—	5	—	1	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	29	13	2	2	—	6	—	—	—	—	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement.	35	13	—	1	1	13	—	—	—	—	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	242	145	41	29	—	24	—	3	—	1	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	1,003	317	153	78	173	208	5	26	16	49	الشيخوخة
Suicide	16	10	—	1	—	2	1	1	1	2	انتحار
Homicide	52	18	4	2	14	35	2	4	—	3	قتل
Accidental deaths	416	195	13	44	6	154	—	4	—	3	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,406	2,053	189	605	894	2,171	179	284	373	990	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 8.

جدول رقم ٣

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat o المحافظات									نوع المرض
	مجموع	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	
Total	16,403	7,462	915	813	1,260	4,436	206	346	227	736	المجموع
Typhoid	56	30	5	3	—	6	—	2	3	1	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	حمى لمشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	10	18	2	3	7	10	—	—	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	8	1	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	36	17	6	1	4	7	—	1	—	—	دفتري (خناق دفتريالي)
Influenza	25	4	—	—	16	5	3	—	—	—	نزلة والدة مختلطة
Plague	10	5	—	—	—	4	1	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	100	55	2	7	2	32	2	9	—	—	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	28	2	3	5	—	17	—	—	—	1	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphile	4	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	الزهري
Malaria	86	4	6	—	14	29	3	—	—	—	حمى مزرقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	13	6	—	1	—	5	—	—	—	1	امراض سارية غير ملاكر

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 3 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafaat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	326	181	21	14	5	105	6	3	—	1	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	20	2	—	1	3	14	—	—	—	—	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليس صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetis mellitus	21	21	3	2	—	15	—	—	—	—	الذيابيطس السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	37	21	0	2	1	33	—	—	—	—	التسمم الكولي (الغول) المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	148	139	—	3	2	5	—	—	—	1	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	160	86	9	10	3	50	1	4	—	1	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سدادة شريان او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	260	153	34	16	22	72	—	—	—	3	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	31	18	1	6	1	23	1	1	—	—	امراض القلب
Diseases of the heart	1,844	940	99	95	57	601	15	22	3	11	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	38	11	—	3	1	13	—	—	—	—	ذات القصبات
Bronchitis	613	423	26	20	22	110	6	2	1	5	ذات الرئة
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,197	505	187	36	26	286	13	16	6	20	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	140	82	—	13	15	22	1	3	—	1	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,727	1,656	273	117	59	494	26	50	5	45	

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الأمراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 3 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat									المحافظات	نوع المرض
		دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakah	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Suweida	درعا Der'a		
Appendicitis	82	38	3	—	3	6	3	—	1	—		التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	220	144	9	11	8	61	—	—	—	—		امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	160	94	1	10	29	25	—	—	—	1		بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	302	128	15	14	12	132	2	4	1	3		التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	60	15	1	1	9	32	—	—	2	—		بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	35	12	13	2	3	6	—	—	—	—		تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	41	30	4	1	2	11	1	2	—	—		بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement.	18	12	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—		امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	335	248	24	9	6	21	1	3	1	—		ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	904	256	125	62	121	227	6	35	6	27		الشيخوخة
Suicide	23	13	—	1	3	6	—	—	—	—		انتحار
Homicide	108	68	1	6	10	17	6	—	—	—		قتل
Accidental deaths	342	127	8	24	5	144	11	9	11	3		موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of death ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	5,537	1,861	54	313	779	1,754	97	159	137	613		اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1951

Table No. 4.

جدول رقم ٤

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (years) الاعمار (بالسنوات) من ٠ - ٠ From 0-1	من ١ - ٤ From 1-4	من ٥ - ١٤ From 5-14	من ١٥ - ٣٠ From 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	المرض
Total	16,305	2733	2,817	1,580	1,973	6,922	المجموع
Typhoid	70	5	23	22	17	13	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى تيفوس
Smallpox	2	—	2	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	44	18	23	2	1	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	38	21	16	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	34	7	18	7	—	2	دفتري (خناق دفتريالي)
Influenza	26	4	3	4	2	14	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	146	1	8	11	50	76	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	65	5	4	9	23	24	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphlis	7	—	—	—	1	6	الزهري
Malaria	124	22	25	16	24	37	حمى مرزقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	23	3	5	7	6	2	امراض سارية غير ملاكر
Cancer and other malignant tumours	225	1	1	2	12	209	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	16	—	1	2	2	11	اورام غير خبيثة واورام فيها صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	1	—	—	1	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقريس
Diabitis mellitus	52	—	1	1	2	48	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	45	4	2	—	1	41	التسمم التولي (التول المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	39	8	9	1	2	19	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	164	—	2	3	6	153	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سدادة شريان او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	192	3	7	6	21	155	

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1951

Table No. 4 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٤ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار (بالسنوات) من ٠ – ١ From 0-1	من ١ – ٤ From 1-4	من ٥ – ١٤ From 5-14	من ١٥ – ٣٩ From 15-39	من ٤٠ وما فوق From 40 and over	المرض
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	64	5	6	6	10	37	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,290	11	6	27	84	1,171	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	60	9	4	5	10	41	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	576	240	165	17	24	41	ذات الشعب
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,139	402	230	97	95	245	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	73	12	20	7	12	21	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,306	1,179	733	102	49	143	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	19	—	—	1	9	9	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	188	8	6	10	34	128	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	85	28	12	5	16	24	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	227	4	17	15	12	179	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	94	1	1	—	8	74	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	30	—	1	3	13	14	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	28	—	—	—	6	22	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organ of movement.	33	5	2	6	4	16	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	344	323	5	—	1	15	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	807	—	—	—	—	807	الشيخوخة
Suicide	16	—	—	—	10	6	انتحار
Homicide	65	1	—	2	28	32	قتل
Accidental deaths	444	98	40	73	100	133	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,284	915	1,028	1,059	1,336	2,946	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

NOTE : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths.As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at beduin centres, to register death occurrences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus supplied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى الارقام المشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من اطباء الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات فقد حدث في هذه القرى والمراكز لدى هذا النقص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

الصحة والإسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣
NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Age (in years)					الامراض
	المجموع	٠ - ١	١ - ٤	٥ - ١٤	١٥ - ٣٠	من ٣٠ وما فوق	
	Total	0 - 1	1 - 4	5 - 14	15 - 30	From 30 and over	
Total	17,798	3,750	2,439	1,527	1,867	7,213	المجموع
Typhoid	68	8	12	27	8	13	حمى ايبرنيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نمشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	1	1	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	3	1	2	—	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	1	—	—	—	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	10	5	4	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	47	17	25	4	—	1	دفتري (خناق دفتريتي)
Influenza	20	5	6	8	1	5	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	244	3	12	13	93	123	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	35	—	2	5	11	20	تدرن غير ملاكر
Syphilis	2	—	1	—	—	1	الزهري
Malaria	82	16	14	21	10	21	حمى مرزقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	8	—	2	3	—	3	امراض سارية غير ملاكر عفنية وطفيلية
Cancer and other malignant tumours	290	—	2	4	22	271	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	19	1	—	1	4	13	اورام غير خبيثة او اورام لها صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	3	—	—	—	—	3	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetis mellitus	34	—	—	2	3	29	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	92	1	2	1	2	86	التسمم القولي (القول) المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	42	13	3	1	3	22	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	229	3	5	3	15	204	اختلاج الحركة التقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سدادة شريانية او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	270	5	6	7	15	237	

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣
NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار بالسنوات					المرض
		٠ - ١ 0 - 1	١ - ٤ 1 - 4	٥ - ١٤ 5 - 14	١٥ - ٢٠ 15 - 20	من ٢٠ وما فوق From 20 and over	
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	50	1	5	3	4	37	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,658	18	11	50	85	1,454	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	50	2	1	8	5	34	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	508	253	132	27	11	55	ذات الشعبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	860	337	226	70	34	222	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	89	14	22	8	5	40	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and entritis	2,696	1,511	782	131	81	211	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	16	2	—	1	3	10	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	518	203	38	21	45	211	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	101	46	6	5	5	39	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	305	5	18	20	44	218	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	113	3	4	3	14	89	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	26	1	—	—	15	10	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	29	1	1	2	18	9	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organ of movement.	38	13	8	2	1	15	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	242	232	2	2	—	6	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	1,003	—	—	—	—	1,003	الشيخوخة
Suicide	19	—	—	3	4	12	انتحار
Homicide	82	1	5	3	34	39	قتل
Accidental deaths	416	19	55	75	132	135	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,408	982	1,075	1,088	1,282	2,971	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

Note : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths. As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at Beddiin centres, to register death occurences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus applied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى ارقام المنشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من قبل الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات التي تحدث في هذه القرى والمراكز ادى هذا النقص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣

MUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 6

جدول رقم ٦

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Age (in years)					
		٠ - ١ 0-1	١ - ٤ 1-4	٥ - ١٤ 5-14	١٥ - ٣٠ 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	
Total	16,403	3,829	2,143	1,436	1,598	7,297	الجموع
Typhoid	55	6	15	13	15	7	حمى ليفوئيدية
Typhus fever	1	1	—	—	—	—	حمى تشبه « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	40	24	14	2	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	—	—	1	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	8	5	2	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	36	15	14	3	3	1	دفتري (خناق دفتريالي)
Influenza	28	12	11	—	—	5	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	10	—	—	1	1	6	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	109	4	9	8	32	56	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	26	3	3	4	3	15	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphlis	4	1	—	—	1	2	الزهري
Malaria	56	21	18	4	3	12	حمى مرزقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	13	3	3	—	1	6	امراض سارية غير ملاكر
Cancer and other malignant tumours	336	1	3	13	21	298	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	20	1	—	1	3	15	اورام غير خبيثة واورام لها صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	2	—	—	—	—	2	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabitis mellitus	51	—	—	1	3	47	البول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	57	1	4	1	8	43	التسمم الغولي/ الغول المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisonings.	142	8	3	3	8	120	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	166	—	1	2	6	157	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام
Meningitis (non-meningococcal)	289	13	3	4	10	259	نزيف دماغي سداده شريانية او تخثر الدم في الدماغ

HEALTH

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

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Table No. 6 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٦ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	الجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار (بالسنوات) ٠-١ 0-1	١-٤ 1-4	٥-١٤ 5-14	١٥-٣٠ 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق Form 30 and over	الرض
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	51	7	5	3	15	21	راض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,824	27	17	41	133	1,626	راض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	28	2	1	—	3	22	ية لامراض جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	615	325	146	26	9	49	ات الشعبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,107	431	262	86	53	256	ات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than tuberculosis	140	17	12	6	8	97	ية لامراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,727	1,782	687	53	39	166	سهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	52	5	2	9	16	120	هاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	220	5	5	20	31	169	راض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	160	22	17	10	26	85	ية لامراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	302	15	22	14	24	227	هاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	60	—	—	3	5	52	ية لامراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	38	1	1	5	18	13	عفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	41	1	—	1	12	27	ية لامراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement	18	2	8	2	1	5	راض الجلد والنسيج الحجري والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births and diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	325	325	—	—	—	—	عف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد شيخوخة
Senility	904	—	—	—	—	904	
Suicide	23	1	—	3	6	13	انتحار
Homicide	103	2	9	17	23	42	قتل
Accidental deaths	342	6	32	84	82	118	وت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	5,837	782	796	961	967	2,331	سباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

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ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى رقام المنشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من اطباء صحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض رى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات التي دث في هذه القرى والمراكز ادى هذا النقص في التسجيل ، تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة داخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الامراض والمحافظات ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1951.

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

MOHAFAZAT	المجموع عدد المرضى Total No. of patients	Diseases												الامراض
		العين Eyes	الكلية والصدرية Heart and lungs	الهضمية والمعائية Digestive system	العصبية Nervous system	البولية التناسلية Urinary and genital	الجلدية Skin	الجراحية Surgical	الانكيلوستوما Ankylostoma	الزراعية Malaria	الدرنية Tuberculosis	الثانوية Infectious	السارية Contagious	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	732,462	87,264	110,700	117,200	35,049	36,055	65,220	67,129	8,695	112,196	10,903	5,395	81,836	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	267,476	33,503	46,341	51,369	20,861	13,791	28,534	34,016	1,181	30,616	3,179	1,304	2,813	دمشق
Homs	109,686	10,326	18,749	5,616	5,906	1,523	7,294	9,054	491	14,125	3,149	867	37,448	حمص
Hama	30,137	1,942	5,180	6,344	3,761	2,149	1,821	3,194	915	5,347	130	69	375	حماة
Latakia	103,964	7,057	9,962	13,403	7,202	1,383	10,823	5,419	323	19,264	269	257	27,445	اللاذقية
Aleppo	136,366	21,016	22,791	20,710	3,677	4,025	10,025	6,407	4,331	22,033	3,184	1,291	9,368	حلب
Al-Hassakah	15,443	1,795	2,097	1,823	1,330	676	1,522	1,691	137	3,704	56	4	849	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	18,270	2,306	1,822	1,823	675	530	1,017	1,237	614	3,635	210	72	750	دير الزور
Sweida	39,910	3,096	4,588	6,088	4,660	683	2,592	1,126	156	3,986	80	737	1,892	السويداء
Dir'a	44,628	6,276	6,124	7,145	2,581	1,036	4,073	5,275	148	3,771	636	354	1,096	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الأمراض والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1952.

Table No. 8.

جدول رقم ٨

All Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى Total of Patients	Diseases												الأمراض	المحافظات
		العين Eyes	الأذن والحنجرة Ears and Throat	الجهاز التنفسي Respiratory system	الجهاز الهضمي Digestive system	الجهاز البولي التناسلي Urinary and genital	الجلد Skin	الجراحة Surgical	الأمراض الجلدية Syphilis	الملاريا Malaria	الدرن Tuberculosis	الجذام Leprosy	الجدري Smallpox		
Total	697,420	78,881	105,394	117,342	60,520	26,040	64,207	60,525	6,019	95,796	6,518	3,001	95,765	مجموع المحافظات	
Damascus	229,322	34,850	42,600	38,758	25,890	13,474	26,969	36,703	320	22,848	1,950	1,274	2,308	دمشق	
Homs	78,778	7,724	8,771	8,856	4,743	1,397	5,861	9,234	504	13,069	6	47	20,708	حمص	
Hama	54,521	3,742	6,850	10,398	4,620	2,397	2,042	2,214	530	3,170	47	9	827	حماة	
Latakia	128,778	7,879	14,368	10,862	6,820	2,471	13,227	6,212	760	22,055	473	501	25,622	اللاذقية	
Aleppo	109,022	8,969	12,856	16,021	8,797	5,158	7,698	8,978	3,375	17,709	3,417	1,069	2,810	حلب	
Al-Hassakah	2,681	184	312	416	189	67	179	186	4	790	2	22	426	الحسكة	
Deir-ez-Zor	18,795	2,250	1,798	1,779	894	478	1,403	2,185	544	3,252	407	88	1,151	دير الزور	
Sweida	22,594	4,880	2,297	4,798	2,667	542	2,042	1,239	49	1,910	115	141	770	السويداء	
Dir'a	54,888	8,989	7,264	9,420	4,622	1,011	4,696	6,032	125	10,861	121	212	1,324	درعا	

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الأمراض والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1953.

Table No. 9

جدول رقم ٩

Mohafazat	مجموع المرضى Total of Patients	Diseases											
		العين Optical	الهضمية والصدرية Heart and lungs	الهضمية والقنوية Digestive system	العصبية Nervous system	البولية التناسلية Urinary and genital	الجلدية Skin	الجراحية Surgical	الانزيمية Rheumatic	الدودية Malaria	الدرنية Tuberculosis	الثارية Infectious	الثارية Contagious
		الامراض											
All Mohafazat	604,034	67,201	109,070	122,717	54,879	25,051	54,953	91,839	2,720	58,958	8,185	7,156	63,555
مجموع المحافظات													
Damascus	262,664	27,039	49,964	51,157	20,219	13,673	21,434	58,114	263	21,189	2,820	3,575	3,447
دمشق													
Homs	81,427	7,310	10,081	7,487	5,717	1,886	5,127	7,386	54	12,813	7	114	22,338
حمص													
Hama	43,211	1,826	5,772	11,876	5,469	2,684	2,719	2,039	653	3,639	58	212	3,102
حماة													
Latakia	94,083	5,945	13,786	13,149	7,219	3,423	8,470	4,430	50	16,296	602	188	22,349
اللاذقية													
Aleppo	105,703	7,331	18,259	20,035	8,201	4,910	7,195	8,080	1,183	16,219	3,974	2,896	6,360
حلب													
Al-Hasakah	11,030	849	1,890	2,300	714	125	747	673	3	2,474	2	79	1,495
الحسكة													
Deir-ez-Zor	22,300	4,081	3,980	3,226	771	877	2,334	2,159	437	2,494	614	301	302
دير الزور													
Suweida	15,132	2,440	2,293	3,997	1,437	470	1,677	251	1	885	17	15	1,677
السويداء													
Der'a	87,942	10,580	8,734	8,505	4,941	893	5,255	6,496	24	9,118	321	197	1,728
درعا													

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
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HEALTH

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1951

Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	أطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	752,452	204,879	257,095	290,554	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	267,476	65,202	92,460	109,814	دمشق
Homs	109,686	31,769	36,800	41,117	حمص
Hama	30,187	6,580	11,068	12,540	حماة
Latakia	103,964	20,556	22,130	41,314	اللاذقية
Aleppo	136,398	34,441	52,853	49,104	حلب
Al-Hassakeh	15,443	4,913	5,010	5,520	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	15,370	4,986	5,371	5,013	دير الزور
Sweida	29,910	9,747	6,640	13,523	السويداء
Dir'a	44,928	17,676	12,723	13,609	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام
1743
1644

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1953

Table No. 11

جدول رقم ١١

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	اطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	687,439	185,769	235,806	265,863	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	259,225	61,323	88,855	109,047	دمشق
Homs	78,770	23,961	27,637	27,172	حمص
Hama	34,631	7,616	15,145	11,870	حماة
Latakia	119,770	36,974	38,314	44,482	اللاذقية
Aleppo	100,033	37,388	37,223	25,424	حلب
Al-Hasakah	2,697	909	840	948	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	15,740	4,332	4,089	7,309	دير الزور
Sweida	22,504	7,485	6,111	8,908	السويداء
Dir'a	54,059	15,503	17,592	20,664	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

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المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1953

Table No. 13

جدول رقم ١٣

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	اطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	694,034	155,454	328,800	209,780	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	252,964	68,722	85,030	110,512	دمشق
Homs	81,427	24,590	29,969	27,868	حمص
Hama	48,311	9,605	13,351	15,304	حماة
Latakia	94,509	24,548	29,228	40,717	اللاذقية
Aleppo	105,703	29,334	42,422	34,007	حلب
Al-Hasaka	11,055	3,980	3,973	4,002	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	22,536	5,237	6,325	10,974	دير الزور
Swaida	15,132	5,542	6,790	2,799	السويداء
Dir'a	57,842	17,509	18,642	21,692	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

حركة المرضى المعالجين في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الأمراض ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASE, 1951

Table No. 13 — جدول رقم ١٣

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	Total No. of patients (1)	Ordinary (2)	Infectious	Surgical	Optical and Mental Diseases	Throat and Nervous	المحافظات	المستشفيات
		مجموع عدد المرضى (١)	DISEASES الأمراض						
			عادية (٢)	السارية	الجراحية	الرمدية والعقلية	الثانية والعصبية		
Total	—	31,578	12,211	2,198	15,732	843	594	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	12,691	3,431	206	8,770	182	—	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	208	—	—	—	208	—	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	490	—	—	—	—	490	»	» ابن سينا
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	183	—	183	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	»	581	—	—	581	—	—	»	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	165	—	165	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن الوليد
Infectious diseases hospital	»	213	—	213	—	—	—	»	مستشفى الأمراض السارية
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,372	867	107	408	—	—	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	901	428	116	356	1	—	السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	2,362	1,233	151	977	1	—	حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	3,078	1,446	341	1,271	20	—	اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	1,821	1,337	213	254	17	—	»	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,021	383	4	634	—	—	حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	2,537	2,509	10	—	—	18	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Siphilis Hospital	»	311	—	—	—	311	—	»	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	»	2,119	20	—	2,099	—	—	»	» الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	233	—	233	—	—	—	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	»	230	—	144	—	—	86	»	» الحميات
Al-Bab Hospital	»	65	60	—	5	—	—	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	810	247	—	528	35	—	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al Hasak... Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	420	280	20	120	—	—	الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.

1) Including patients of the previous year.

2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.

3) Including the surgical section.

4) Including optical cases at the Watani Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والإسعاف العام

(١) بما في ذلك المرضى الباقين من السنة الماضية

(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الأمراض العينية : المجاذيب والأمراض الحلق والأذن والأنف

(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

(٤) وتشمل الأمراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

وزارة الصحة والإسعاف العام

743
1954

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الامراض ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASES, 1952

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	Total No. of patients (1)	DISEASES: Ordinary (2)	Infectious	Surgical	Syphilis and Skin	Mental and Nervous	المستشفيات	المحافظات	مجموع عدد المرضى (١)	الامراض: قتادية (٢)	السارية	الجراحية	الزهرية والجلدية	العقلية والعصبية
Total		21,474	12,606	3,107	14,256	1,071	872	المجموع	—						
Wataní Hospital	Damascus	12,773	3,867	315	8,256	269	—	المستشفى الوطني	دمشق						
Ibn Sahr Hospital	"	364	—	—	—	364	—	مستشفى ابن زهر	"						
Ibn Sina Hospital	"	872	—	—	—	—	872	مستشفى ابن سينا	"						
Infectious diseases hospital	"	517	—	517	—	—	—	مستشفى الامراض السارية (المعبر الصحي)	"						
Ibn Nafis Sanatori.	"	403	—	403	—	—	—	مصح ابن النفيس	"						
The Surgical Hospital	"	269	97	—	153	—	—	المستشفى الجراحي	"						
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	"	158	—	158	—	—	—	مصح ابن الوليد	"						
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,063	901	333	369	—	—	مستشفى درعا	درعا						
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	535	358	71	105	3	—	" السويداء	السويداء						
Homs Hospital	Homs	2,170	960	196	994	—	—	" حمص	حمص						
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	2,744	1,335	219	1,160	30	—	" اللاذقية	اللاذقية						
Tartus Hospital	"	1,488	1,375	97	118	3	—	" طرطوس	"						
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,190	499	38	653	—	—	" حماة	حماة						
Wataní Hospital (2)	Aleppo	3,291	3,291	—	—	—	—	المستشفى الوطني (٢)	حلب						
Al-Hamiyat Hospital for infect. diseases	"	417	—	417	—	—	—	مستشفى الحميات الامراض السارية	"						
Siphilis Hospital	"	469	—	—	—	469	—	مستشفى الزهري	"						
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	"	2,050	—	—	2,050	—	—	" الرازي (٣)	"						
Ibn Rushd Hospital	"	394	—	394	—	—	—	" ابن رشد	"						
Al-Bab Hospital	"	43	37	—	6	—	—	" الباب	"						
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	862	376	1	176	39	—	" دير الزور	دير الزور						
Al Hasakah Hospital	Al-Hasakah	639	452	3	146	14	—	" الحسكة	الحسكة						

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.
4) Including optical cases at the Wataní Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، المجاليب والامراض العلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة
(٤) وتشمل الامراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الامراض ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASE, 1953

Table No. 15 — جدول رقم ١٥

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	Total No. of patients (1)	DISEASES					المحافظات	المستشفيات
			Ordinary (4)	Infectious	Surgical	Skin and Skin	Mental and Nervous		
		المجموع عدد المرضى (١)	العادية (٤)	السارية	الجراحية	الزهرية والجلدية	العقلية والعصبية		
Total	—	32,049	11,926	3,410	16,907	1,213	731	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	13,190	3,860	279	8,408	239	—	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	239	—	—	—	239	—	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	615	—	—	—	—	615	»	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious diseases hospital	»	506	—	506	—	—	—	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	269	—	269	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	»	190	39	—	151	—	—	»	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	190	—	190	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن الوليد
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,814	961	208	605	—	—	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	625	281	88	256	—	—	» السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	2,342	1,239	209	873	—	—	» حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	3,197	1,696	203	1,205	23	—	» اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	1,340	1,082	41	115	2	—	» طرطوس	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,221	474	31	716	—	—	» حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	1,753	1,719	7	27	—	—	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Haniyat Hospital	»	930	55	875	—	—	—	»	مستشفى العميات
Siphilis Hospital	»	607	—	—	—	607	—	»	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	»	2,175	14	—	2,161	—	—	»	مستشفى الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	373	—	373	—	—	—	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Dweirina Hospital	»	116	—	—	—	—	116	»	» الدويرينا
Al-Bab Hospital	»	1	1	—	—	—	—	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	634	369	—	236	30	—	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al Hasakeh Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	662	485	10	161	3	—	» الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.
4) Including optical cases at the Watani Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : للامراض العينية ، والعقلية ، ولامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة
(٤) وتشمل امراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
1943
1/64

1948
1949

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥١

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENTS HOSPITALS 1951

Table No. 16 — جدول رقم ١٦

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	مجموع عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: شفاء Cured	وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون لسنة الماضية Patients remaining next year	عدد أيام المكث No. of day in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total		1,980	31,578	29,006	1,112	1,458	558,054		المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	435	12,081	11,730	574	327	143,506	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	«	75	266	266	—	10	2,796	«	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	«	250	480	157	10	314	104,127	«	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious disease hospital	«	50	213	198	6	9	2,986	«	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	«	85	183	61	9	113	33,832	«	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	«	50	581	566	1	14	8,001	«	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	«	75	165	94	2	99	25,734	«	مصح ابن الوليد الجلاء
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	50	1,372	1,291	43	39	16,835	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	50	901	860	26	15	10,418	السويداء	« السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	75	2,363	2,237	59	66	22,860	حمص	« حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	150	3,078	2,890	110	78	32,085	اللاذقية	« اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	«	40	1,821	1,778	24	19	11,969	«	« طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	50	1,021	949	37	35	23,415	حماة	« حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	150	2,537	2,407	46	84	31,180	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	«	40	220	196	13	19	5,472	«	مستشفى الحميات
Siphlis Hospital	«	40	311	309	—	2	2,310	«	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	«	100	2,119	1,970	107	42	20,906	«	« الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	«	40	233	116	13	99	26,877	«	« ابن رشد
Al-Bab Hospital	«	10	65	65	—	—	1,094	«	« الباب
Deir-es-Zor Hospital	Deir-es-Zor	50	510	493	7	10	8,523	دير الزور	« دير الزور
Al Hasakeh Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	25	429	413	12	4	3,260	الحسكة	« الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، العجاليب والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS 1952

Table No. 17 — جدول رقم ١٧

Name of Hospital	Mohafaat	مجموع عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: عدد Cured	وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون لسنة التالية Patients remaining next year	عدد أيام المكث No. of days in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	2,400	32,674	30,812	1,250	1,606	590,220	—	المجموع
Wataní Hospital	Damascus	488	12,778	11,790	641	347	171,537	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	«	26	264	260	—	4	2,943	«	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital Infectious diseases	«	320	572	152	28	357	120,923	«	« ابن سينا
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium hospital	«	80	517	456	14	17	7,648	«	مستشفى الامراض السارية (المصح الصحي)
Mesh Ibn Anaiss	«	300	403	258	19	126	38,254	«	مصح ابن انيس
The Surgical Hospital	«	100	250	242	—	—	3,684	«	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	«	120	158	55	2	101	55,087	«	مصح ابن الوليد (الجذام)
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	100	1,503	1,373	85	35	13,503	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	30	526	497	12	17	6,369	السويداء	« السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	180	2,170	2,037	70	63	21,358	حمص	« « حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	160	2,744	2,549	109	86	30,811	اللاذقية	« « اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	«	90	1,493	1,459	11	23	10,176	«	« « طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	80	1,190	1,130	33	28	14,816	حماة	« « حماة
Wataní Hospital (2)	Aleppo	120	2,281	2,186	74	31	26,315	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Hamiyat Hospital for infect. diseases	«	40	417	382	12	23	8,501	«	مستشفى الحميات والامراض السارية
Sqhlo Hospital	«	20	459	456	—	3	2,736	«	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital	«	160	2,090	1,969	97	44	20,977	«	مستشفى الرازي
Ibn Rashid Hospital	«	120	334	222	17	95	31,934	«	« ابن رشد
Al-Bab Hospital	«	10	43	43	—	—	640	«	« قلعة الباب
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	80	582	556	9	17	8,108	دير الزور	« دير الزور
Al Hasakah Hospital	Al-Hasakah	40	620	601	9	10	3,589	الحسكة	« الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.

1) Including patients of the previous year.

2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية

(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، العقلية والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف

مصلحة الاسعاف العام

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS 1953

Table No. 18 — جدول رقم ١٨

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	مجموع عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: شفاء Cured	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون للسنة التالية Patients remaining next year	عدد أيام المكث No. of days in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	2,800	32,069	29,188	1,342	1,639	613,475	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	435	12,190	11,202	632	356	154,190	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	25	289	282	—	7	2,821	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	350	615	340	24	351	127,312	»	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious disease hospital	»	50	506	476	24	6	5,536	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	200	389	196	18	175	88,810	»	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	»	200	190	165	1	24	3,130	»	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	120	190	76	3	111	37,246	»	مصح ابن الوليد «الجذام»
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	100	1,814	1,728		30	13,702	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Suwida Hospital	Suwida	80	625	573	15	37	8,805	السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	100	2,362	2,235	81	56	22,000	حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	100	3,187	2,900	116	81	33,308	اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	60	1,240	1,188	21	26	8,463	»	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	80	1,221	1,150	43	28	16,377	حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	120	1,753	1,606	62	85	21,300	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	»	40	920	906	16	6	11,838	»	» الحميات
Biphlis Hospital	»	20	607	601	—	6	3,445	»	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	»	100	2,175	2,022	100	53	19,974	»	مستشفى الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	120	373	268	9	106	30,033	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Dweirina Hospital	»	100	116	42	7	67	12,880	»	» الدويرينا
Al-Bab Hospital	»	10	1	1	—	—	9	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	80	634	606	9	19	8,182	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al-Hasakah Hospital	Al-Hasakah	40	662	639	14	9	4,029	الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، والمجاليب ، وامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

الامراض السارية التي تقرر منها حسب الشهور ١٩٥١

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MONTHS, 1951

Table No. 19 — جدول رقم ١٩

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Months of 1951												الامراض
	المجموع	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان April	ايار May	حزيران June	تموز July	آب Aug.	ايلول Sept.	تشرين ١ Oct.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	كانون ١ Dec.	
Total	2359	318	282	138	263	177	98	135	134	165	200	194	80	المجموع
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	140	62	10	11	20	13	11	3	1	4	1	—	3	جدري مائي (حماق)
Typhus	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	تيفوس
Recurrent fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى راجعة
Measles	334	204	109	67	145	34	24	63	16	—	20	2	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	100	7	3	6	3	5	1	1	2	7	21	29	16	خناق دفتيريا
Whooping cough	309	19	23	19	50	82	42	*33	26	11	34	17	4	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	157	32	31	8	10	7	7	6	11	4	*16	14	11	ابو كعب (كناف)
Erysipelas	22	—	—	1	2	6	—	—	3	3	3	*4	1	حمرة
Typhoid fever	640	99	15	21	23	24	11	27	63	74	105	125	83	تيفوئيد واشباهها
Lethargic encephalitis	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	15	3	—	3	—	3	2	—	2	1	—	1	—	التهاب السحايا الدماغ الشوكي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	انفلونزا وافدة مختلطة
Dysentery	3	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	زحار (زحار مصوي)
Puerperal fever	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر (الهيضة)
Anthrax	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	*1	—	جمرة

Source : Ministry of Health.

* Corrected figures

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

● (ارقام معدلة)

صحة والاسعاف العام

1951

SYRIA

الامراض السارية التي يجب تبليغها حسب الشهور ١٩٥٢

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MONTHS, 1952.

Table No. 20 — جدول رقم ٢٠

TYPE OF DISEASE	الجموع Total	Months of 1952												الامراض
		كانون٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان April	ايار May	حزيران June	تموز July	آب Aug.	ايلول Sept.	تشرين١ Oct.	تشرين٢ Nov.	كانون١ Dec.	
		شهور سنة ١٩٥٢												
Total	2,006	185	204	152	262	218	110	184	114	82	78	87	200	المجموع
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	146	8	6	27	40	17	19	10	4	5	—	1	9	جدري مائي (جمالي)
Typhus	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	تيفوس (حمى نمشية)
Recurrent fever	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	حمى راجعة
Measles	87	20	—	2	3	2	7	4	6	4	1	3	18	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	120	14	14	10	6	8	—	10	6	14	23	9	17	خناق دفتيريائي
Whooping cough	484	19	70	35	123	77	45	81	36	12	5	3	8	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	274	38	75	27	37	30	7	17	12	7	—	6	20	ابو كعب (كاف)
Erysipelas	5	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	حمرة
Typhoid fever	770	66	65	65	30	67	32	87	49	37	43	36	120	تيفوئيد واشباهها
Lethargic encephalitis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	20	3	1	5	3	3	—	3	1	3	—	—	—	التهاب السحايا الدماغي الشوكي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Dysentery	75	—	—	5	55	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	زحار (زحار عصوي)
Puerperal fever	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	6	—	—	1	1	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر (الهيضة)

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الامراض السارية التي بلغ عنها خلال شهور ١٩٥٣

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MONTHS, 1953

Table No. 21 — جدول رقم ٢١

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Months of 1953 — شهور سنة ١٩٥٣												الامراض
	المجموع	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	اذار Mar.	نيسان April	ايار May	حزيران June	تموز July	آب Aug.	ايلول Sept.	تشرين ١ Oct.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	كانون ١ Dec.	
Total	2,737	193	275	285	365	168	216	230	73	196	166	300	253	المجموع
Smallpox	3	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	100	4	12	3	18	16	13	11	1	5	3	7	7	جدري مائي
Typhus	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	تيفوس
Recurrent fever	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	—	حمى راجعة
Measles	781	27	80	97	113	78	127	77	34	59	30	25	44	حصبة
Scariet fever	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	188	18	18	22	8	5	10	4	4	17	24	35	23	خناق
Whooping cough	319	53	2	16	7	21	8	58	6	5	—	54	89	سعال ديكي
Parotitis	411	53	92	56	61	11	7	7	4	7	5	55	53	ابو كعب
Erysipelas	3	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	حمرة
Typhoid fever	904	36	70	58	152	34	47	78	24	101	108	120	46	تيفوئيد
Lethargic encephalitis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	11	1	1	3	3	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	التهاب السحايا الدماغي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مخططة
Dysentery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	زحار
Puerperal fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء اصفر
Anthrax	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	—	جمرة
Infantile Paralysis	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	شلل اطفال

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الامراض السارية التي بلغ عنها حسب المحافظات ١٩٥١

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 22 — جدول رقم ٢٢

TYPE OF DISEASE	مجموع المحافظات Total	Mohafazat: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakah	دير الزور Der es-Sur	السويداء Sweida	درعا Der'a	المحافظات	الامراض
Total	2,380	857	80	41	222	589	35	87	141	248	المجموع	
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—		جدري
Varicella (water-pox)	148	41	—	2	16	76	—	—	7	6		جدري مائي (حماق)
Typhus	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		تيفوس (حمى نمشية)
Recurrent fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		حمى راجعة
Measles	834	177	—	4	57	316	5	41	10	224		حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		حمى قرمزية
Diphteria	100	36	19	12	6	11	12	—	2	2		خناق دفتيريا
Whooping cough	369	264	—	5	53	36	—	10	1	—		سعال ديكي
Parotitis	157	88	—	—	27	5	3	4	23	3		ابو كعب (تكاف)
Erysipelas	22	6	—	—	1	2	—	—	13	—		حمرة
Typhoid fever	640	263	70	17	50	120	3	2	74	12		تيفوئيد واشباهها
Lethargic encephalitis	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		التهاب الدماغ الوبائي
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	15	9	—	1	3	—	1	—	1	—		التهاب السحايا الشوكي الدماغي
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		نزلة وافدة مخططة
Dysentery	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		زحار (زحار عصوي)
Puerperal fever	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—		حمى نفاسية
Leprosy	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—		جذام
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		طاعون
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		هواء اصفر (الهيضة)
Anthrax	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		جمرة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الامراض السارية التي بلغ عنها حسب المحافظات ١٩٥٢

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 22

جدول رقم ٢٢

TYPE OF DISEASE	مجموع المحافظات Total	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al hasakah	دير الزور Der ez-zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Der'a
الامراض										
Total المجموع	2,006	1,605	122	37	170	261	15	13	88	195
Smallpox جدري	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Varicella (water-pox) جدري مائي (حمالة)	165	80	—	—	46	3	—	—	6	8
Typhus تيفوس (حمى لمفية)	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Recurrent fever حمى راجعة	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Measles حصبة	57	33	—	—	3	3	—	3	2	44
Scarlet fever حمى قرمزية	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Diphteria خناق دفتيريا	129	80	16	6	10	14	5	4	4	7
Whooping cough سعال ديكي	454	321	—	—	60	67	9	—	1	6
Parotitis ابو كعب (كاف)	274	190	—	—	21	24	—	9	10	100
Erysipelas حمرة	6	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
Typhoid fever تيفوئيد وشبهها	770	378	110	34	85	254	—	—	34	35
Lethargic encephalitis التهاب الدماغ النومي	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis التهاب السحايا الشوكي الدموي	20	11	2	1	—	—	1	—	5	—
Influenza نزلة وافدة مختلطة	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dysentery زلطارية (زحار عصوي)	78	60	2	2	—	6	—	—	—	—
Puerperal fever حمى نفاسية	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Leprosy جذام	6	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	1	—
Plague طاعون	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cholera هواء اصفر (الهيضة)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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الامراض السارية التي بلغ عنها حسب المحافظات ١٩٥٣

INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED BY MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 26 — جدول رقم ٢٦

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat: Damascus	Homs	Hama	Lattakia	Aleppo	Al Hassakah	Deir ez-zor	Suweida	Der'a	الامراض	المحافظات: دمشق	حمص	حماة	اللاذقية	حلب	الحسكة	دير الزور	السويداء	درعا	المجموع
Total	3,737	711	60	270	319	922	52	168	77	162	المجموع										
Smallpox	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	جدري										
Varicella (water-pox)	100	30	—	6	26	32	3	—	6	—	جدري مائي										
Typhus	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	تيفوس										
Recurrent fever	5	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	3	حمى راجعة										
Measles	781	161	40	96	101	288	3	20	8	64	حصبة										
Scarlet fever	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية										
Diphteria	188	78	9	5	9	64	4	5	2	12	خناق										
Whooping cough	219	141	—	122	21	1	—	30	—	3	سعال ديكي										
Parotitis	411	71	—	4	13	41	71	108	42	61	أبو كعب										
Erysipelas	3	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	حمرة										
Typhoid fever	904	213	41	35	40	540	—	8	22	10	تيفوئيد										
Lethargic encephalitis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	التهاب الدماغ النومي										
Cerebro-spinal Meningitis	11	4	1	—	—	1	1	—	2	2	التهاب السحايا الشوكي										
Influenza	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مخططة										
Dysentery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	زحار										
Puerperal fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نفاسية										
Leprosy	4	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	جذام										
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون										
Cholera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	هواء أصفر										
Anthrax	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	جمرة										
Infantile Paralysis	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	شلل الاطفال										

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANONMEI
SYRIA MDI

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mainly Christian) those run by foreigners are now finding it difficult to disarm the suspicions of the Government. In Lebanon, there are almost as many private as state schools and the foreign schools still work without difficulty. There are higher schools for teachers and for agriculture and engineering in Syria and for agriculture in Lebanon, but it is usual for a student to pass from a secondary school directly to a university. The following table shows the various types of schools and number of students.

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872
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874

Type	Lebanon, 1951		Syria, 1951–2	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
State:				
Primary	977	83,252	1,850	237,775
Secondary	..	..	57	26,237
Technical	30	2,381	11	2,146
Teachers	2	165	10	1,233
Reformatory	1	106	—	—
Private	601	84,768	387	65,936
Foreign	149	41,402	56	9,852
Total:	1,760	212,094	2,371	343,179

.. = not available.

(Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus, 1952; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1953).

The American University of Beirut is non-sectarian and has students from all over the Middle East. It encourages the use of Arabic as well as English, and its most renowned faculties are those of medicine and social sciences. The University of St Joseph in Beirut is run by the Society of Jesus. Attached to this university are schools of medicine, law, and theology, subsidized by the French Government and administered by the Society, in which teaching is carried on in the French language. A National University has recently been started by the Lebanese Government. The Syrian National University in Damascus teaches in Arabic and its most important faculties are those of law and medicine. A separate body for the study of the Arabic language is the Arab Academy of Damascus.

Health

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Malaria and amoebic dysentery are endemic and, though efforts are being made to drain breeding-grounds, preventive medicine is only in a rudimentary stage. Good hospitals exist in the cities and more are under construction; qualified doctors practise in all the towns, but in the villages there is still a lack

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON ME1
SYRIA MD1

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of clinics and in the cities a shortage of qualified staff to undertake massage, radiotherapy, and orthopædics, and there is special need to combat tuberculosis. Syrians and Lebanese are not addicted to hashish which, however, is grown in the Biqaa and smuggled to Egypt. The Lebanese Government periodically burns many of the plantations, which inflates the price of the surviving crop.

S L 433

Economic Survey

More than half the population of the two countries is engaged in agriculture which is the most important economic activity. Natural resources hardly exist; there is bitumen in Jebel Bishri in Syria but its production would not be economic; about 10,000 tons a year of asphalt is produced from the neighbourhood of Latakia; and salt is extracted in commercial quantities near Aleppo.

S L 315 382

Petroleum

For a number of years, associates of IPC searched for oil in Syria and Lebanon but without finding it in commercial quantities; in consequence, the areas held by these IPC associates have been given up. However, the two Governments are still anxious for further efforts to be made to find oil in commercial quantities. The importance of petroleum in the economy of Syria and Lebanon lies in the situation of the two republics athwart the pipelines from the fields of northern Iraq and Saudi Arabia which have outlets on the Mediterranean.[1] From Iraq a 12-inch and 16-inch line carry oil across Syria by way of Palmyra and Homs to Tripoli in the Lebanon. Together, these two lines can carry about 8 million tons of oil a year (160,000 barrels daily). A third IPC line from Kirkuk to Homs then bears north of the other two and reaches the sea at Banias, and so does not run through Lebanon at all. This new line is 26–30–32-inches in diameter and can deliver oil at about 16 million tons a year (320,000 barrels daily). From the fields of Saudi Arabia a 30–31 inch American pipeline (Tapline) travels over 1,000 miles on its way to Sidon in Lebanon, passing through Jordan and Syria. At present the line is pumping at a rate of about 15 million tons a year (300,000 barrels daily). It should be noted that these four lines all carry crude oil, some of which is refined on the Mediterranean shore for local requirements but the bulk is shipped as crude to the refineries of Europe and elsewhere.

S L 382

The line from Kirkuk to Haifa is not operating and the Haiaf

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

484 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultivation. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by
409 the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashráfie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
427 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

[The estate of Misherfe, near Homs --Analyst]

The Warehouse 3-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Syria MD1

311 Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of 233 means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

162 The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there 423 has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

471 In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently 312 been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into 425 the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

427 The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth 464 of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of 407 machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

464 Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of 511 Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer 164 from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the 146 agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

000 Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

63:Simmons et al G-8 (1941-1951) 1954
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of the Muzeirib swamp lands along the 312
headwaters of the Yarmuk River. The resettlement program in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins, which is controlled by a separate governmental organization, calls for the irrigation of extensive areas. Between 20,000 and 30,000 acres had 311
been opened up through irrigation in 1951. 312
Work on the drainage and the irrigation of the Ghab marshes, covering about 100,000 acres in the Orontes river valley northwest of Hama, was started in 1952.

Waste Disposal

Sewerage systems are available in all the 314
larger cities. The sewage is not treated, however, and the effluent is usually discharged into adjacent watercourses or upon the land for irrigation purposes. In unsewered sections, cesspools are employed in connection with the houses. The methods of sewage disposal are universally primitive in the rural districts. In villages near the larger cities, pit or shallow latrines are frequently found in the individual compounds or provided on a community basis. In the more remote areas and in the poorer villages, pollution of the soil is the general practice. The use of night soil for fertilizer is common in the agricultural communities.

Fauna and Flora

Arthropoda. Mosquitoes. Nine species 136
of anopheline mosquitoes have been re- 144
ported from Syria, three of which—*Anopheles superpictus*, *A. sacharovi* (— *A. elutus*) and *A. claviger* (— *A. bifurcatus*)—are of major importance in the transmission of malaria. *A. pulcherrimus*, *A. kyrcanus*, *A. algeriensis* and *A. sergenti* are of minor and local significance, while *A. marteri* and *A. multicolor* are rare.

A. superpictus is widely distributed. It is 136
a prominent vector of malaria in the coastal plains, in the northwestern highland districts and in the river valleys, but is of secondary interest in the Damascus region. It breeds along the margins of the larger rivers and on the edges of mountain streams

up to 4,000 feet elevation, in sunlit pools in 136
dried stream beds and in irrigation canals and seepages. Except at the higher altitudes, it is abundant from May to October, with peaks of activity between July and September. *A. sacharovi* is also a primary vector in many areas, breeding in swamps, irrigation canals and seepages, neglected water tanks and numerous other artificial collections of water. It is one of the principal vector species on the oasis of Damascus, where the miles of irrigation canals and numerous swampy depressions create favorable conditions for breeding. It is found breeding from March to November, but most prolifically in June and July. *A. claviger* is chiefly restricted to the towns and the surrounding villages, where it breeds in wells, cisterns and seepages, often even during the winter months. With *A. sacharovi*, [164]
it is responsible for the transmission of most of the malaria in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo. *A. sergenti* is a significant vector in the rice-growing areas in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. *A. pulcherrimus* is also plentiful in the river basins of the northeastern provinces, and is regarded primarily as a pest.

Two species of *Aedes* are known to be 136
present—*Aedes aegypti* and *A. mariae*. 164
A. aegypti is widespread in the western provinces, where it is the vector of dengue fever. Numerous species of *Culex* have been identified, but all are pests of no recognized medical importance.

Mosquito control work is carried on by 744
the antimalaria service of the Ministry of Health, and in the cities of Damascus and Aleppo by the municipal authorities. Larvicidal measures, using DDT or oil sprays, are undertaken in the cities and the larger towns; however, residual spraying, with DDT preparations or Gammexane, is the usual means of control in the rural villages. A mosquito control program, based upon the residual spraying of dwellings and other buildings, was initiated in the villages around Damascus in 1949, and in the Hauran region in 1950, by the Ministry, in

144 co-operation with the Near East Foundation and other agencies. Similar operations have also been conducted by the Ministry in the town of Latakia and in the administrative center and the adjacent farms in the Jebel ed Druz area. In 1950, the government program covered a total of 224 villages, with an aggregate population of slightly over 180,000. A shortage of DDT necessitated the curtailment of the program in 1951, but the Ministry proposes to expand its activities to other malarious districts throughout the country as rapidly as possible. A demonstration control program was started in 1952 in the vicinity of Homs under the auspices of the World Health Organization. Anopheline control measures are carried on by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in and around the refugee camps situated in malarious regions.

Flies. Flies of the family MUSCIDAE are numerous, including *Musca domestica vicina*, *M. tempestiva*, *M. sorbens*, *M. vitripennis* and *Muscina stabulans*. They are abundant around markets, food shops and dwellings, and are undoubtedly implicated in the spread of intestinal infections. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, is prevalent. The myiasis-producing flies, *Chrysomyia albiceps*, *Calliphora erythrocephala*, *Oestris ovis*, *Lucilia sericata*, *Gasterophilus haemorrhoidalis*, *Wohlfahrtia magnifica* and species of *Sarcophaga* are known to be present, and are probably responsible for occasional cases of infection in man.

At least 6 species of sandflies are found in Syria. *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti* are involved in the transmission of cutaneous leishmaniasis, which is endemic in many parts of the country, particularly in the vicinity of Aleppo. *P. chinensis* and *P. major* occur and are potential vectors of visceral leishmaniasis, although the extent of indigenous infection is uncertain. *P. papatasii* is also the vector of sandfly fever, which is sporadic in this region.

144 136 511 A fly-control campaign was inaugurated in Damascus in 1946. The dwellings in the poorer sections of the city and the tanneries,

p. 144(A)

744 the refuse dumps and other breeding sites
136 are sprayed with DDT preparations at in-
571 tervals between May and October.

136 Lice. Infestation with lice is common
571 among the inhabitants in the congested
361 quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

136 Fleas. Numerous species of fleas para-
164 sitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The stick-tight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

136 Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

136 Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks,
232 including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and
164 several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

136 The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventri-*
164 *cosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of
752 scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings
[135] are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

136 The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

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Reptiles. Venomous snakes are not common, but at least 4 species of vipers are known to be present. The carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, exists only in the north, while *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, *V. lebetina xanthina* and *V. palaestina* are reported from many parts of the country. 126

Rodents. Rats and mice are numerous. The usual domestic rats are *Rattus rattus rattus* or *R. rattus alexandrinus*. *R. norvegicus* sometimes invades the port towns of Latakia.

Mollusks.* The fresh-water snail, *Bulinus truncatus* (— *B. contortus*), inhabits some of the tributaries of the Belikh and the Khabour rivers, near the Turkish border. It is the intermediate host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, which is reported from several foci in that region. 136 164

Plants. Various trees, weeds and grasses are capable of inducing allergic manifestations in susceptible individuals, but no precise information is available. 137 152

The broad bean, *Vicia fava*, which is grown extensively as a food, may be toxic to young children when it is eaten raw. A few deaths are observed each year, among children in both urban and rural communities. Occasional cases of lathyrism occur when the "Indian pea," *Lathyrus sativus*, a plant widely cultivated for fodder, is used for human consumption. [135]

Food Sanitation

Municipal regulations govern the sanitation of the food supplies in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Latakia. Restaurants, markets and other premises where food is sold are inspected at regular intervals by the municipal sanitary officers, and food handlers are required to register for examination at 6-month intervals. Municipal slaughterhouses are established in towns with populations of 20,000 and over, and are operated under the supervision of the health authorities. The meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter by veterinary officers of the Min- 144

* See footnote, page 10.

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844 parts of the country. The graduate pharmacists totaled 214.

DISEASES

659 Widespread discrepancies in reporting de-
165 tract from the validity of the morbidity and the mortality statistics. Among the two thirds or more of the population living in the rural villages, not only is the reporting of cases of illness and death poor, but the accuracy of diagnosis is often questionable. In a total of 15,457 deaths officially recorded in 1949, almost 35 per cent were listed as due to "ill-defined, unknown or unspecified" causes. Facilities for laboratory confirmation are lacking outside the larger population centers, and confusion is frequently evident in the differentiation of related infections. Reporting is negligible in the more remote areas, and particularly
659 among the Bedouin tribes. Except in the
165 course of special surveys, or when abnor-
758 mal epidemic conditions necessitate the enforcement of preventive measures, medical treatment is seldom accessible to the in-
659 habitants of such regions. Even in cities,
165 where the degree of reporting is considerably higher than in the rural areas, the morbidity statistics reflect a general tendency to evade the reporting of certain infectious diseases for fear of isolation. The records of cases treated in the government hospitals, which cannot be regarded as representative, and the reports of particular investigations or surveys provide the most reliable data for the evaluation of the prevalence and the distribution of specific diseases.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Intestinal or Urinary Tract

164 **Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers.** Enteric fevers are endemic, and, in the opinion of the local authorities, a high degree of immunity resulting from repeated exposure to infection exists among the inhabitants.
164 Cases of typhoid fever occur throughout the
364 year, with the peak of incidence usually between June and December, when the con-

p. 148 (B)

sumption of fly-contaminated foods and of raw vegetables grown in polluted soils provides an important means of transmission. Water-borne outbreaks are frequent in the rural villages, but they have decreased within recent years with the improvement of the drinking water supplies in the larger cities. Reports for 1949 show that 495 cases of typhoid fever were treated in government hospitals throughout the country, 295 cases in institutions in Damascus *mohafazat*. Similarly, 671 cases were recorded in 1950. 164 364

The relative prevalence of the different paratyphoid infections is uncertain. Paratyphoid A fever predominates among the cases in which the differential diagnosis has been established, although paratyphoid B infections are undoubtedly more numerous. Paratyphoid C fever has been diagnosed in Lebanon, but its presence in Syria has not been determined. 164

Immunization with typhoid-paratyphoid A and B vaccine is carried on by the health authorities among the contacts of known cases. Immunization is also widely practiced in the urban areas. 751

Dysenteries. Dysentery is prominent among the causes of illness. The available data give little indication of the proportionate prevalence of amebic and bacillary infections. Amebiasis is widespread, and associated with a high percentage of chronic carriers. Contaminated foods constitute the chief sources of infection, and the maximum incidence is noted in spring and summer, when lettuce and other green, leafy vegetables are consumed in abundance. 164 [262]

Recognized *Shigella dysenteriae* infections are rare, but occasional bacteriologically confirmed cases are recorded. Strains of the Flexner group are probably responsible for the majority of cases of bacillary dysentery. The differentiation of types is made only in Damascus, and, since few cases are hospitalized, the existing records have little significance.

Diarrhea and enteritis are prevalent, especially in infancy and early childhood. Local authorities state that fully 85 per cent

of the babies treated at the maternity and child health center in Damascus suffer from intestinal infections. Epidemics of diarrheal disease often coincide with the ripening of the apricot crop. The ready contamination of this thin-skinned fruit by flies and other insects accounts for the local designation of the early summer diarrheas in the fruit-growing districts as *mish mish* (apricot) disease. 164 164 262

Cholera. Serious outbreaks have accompanied the introduction of cholera in the past, but the disease was absent from Syria from 1928 to 1947, shortly after the epidemic in Egypt. On December 19, 1947, cholera was reported from 2 adjacent villages in the province of Hauran, on the road from Palestine to Damascus. At the same time, cases occurred in 3 villages in the irrigated plain of the Al Ghouta, within 3 or 4 miles of Damascus. Although 45 cases, with 18 deaths, were reported officially, it was generally believed that the actual incidence totaled at least 77 cases. 164

Quarantine measures were promptly imposed in Hauran and Damascus provinces, and all persons entering or leaving those regions were required to possess certificates of immunization against cholera. Over one and one half million individuals were inoculated with cholera vaccine in the vicinity of Damascus, as well as in the affected districts of Hauran and in the city of Aleppo. Supplies and assistance were furnished the Ministry of Health by the World Health Organization, the Near East Foundation and the Egyptian and Lebanese governments. Vaccine was also provided jointly by the Arabian American Oil Company and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. No cases were reported after the initial outbreaks, and on January 17, 1948, Syria was declared free from the disease. The exact origin of the epidemic was never definitely established. 744 164 645 947

Helminthiases. ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Hookworm infection, caused by *Ancylostoma duodenale*, is prevalent among the agricultural workers in foci along the banks of the 164 463 369

p. 149(B)

164 Orontes River and in the irrigated districts
463 of the Euphrates river basin, especially in
369 the Al Jazira region. In a survey of representative population groups in Syria and Lebanon, reported in 1934,[18] hookworm ova were found in fecal specimens from 25 to 36 per cent of the farmers examined in the vicinity of Homs and Hama. Surveys in the Euphrates area suggest comparable infection rates. In the examination of 306 presumably healthy Arabs, from 9 to 60 years of age, who were engaged on excavations near Salihiye on the river about 60 miles south of Deir es Zor in 1933,[18] slightly over 38 per cent were found to harbor hook-
164 worms. The prevalence of infection in the
369 agricultural communities along the Eu-
514 phrates and its tributaries probably aver-
515 ages from 25 to 35 per cent. Promiscuous defecation is widely practiced, and the children, running barefoot around the dwellings and in the fields, are particularly exposed to infection. No data are available regarding the degree of infection, but most observers believe that it is usually moderate. Similar studies undertaken in the areas around Damascus and Aleppo, in an Alawite village on the northern plateau and among Bedouin tribesmen south of the Euphrates yielded no evidence of infection.

164 Schistosomiasis. Schistosomiasis is endemic in two localized areas near the Turkish border—the Tell Abiad district on the upper reaches of the Belikh River and

Distribution of Schistosomiasis in Syria

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164 the Qoubour el Bid section of the Al Jazira, along branches of the Khabour River north-
136 east of Hasetché. *Schistosoma haematobium* is the only species identified in con-
164 firmed cases, but rectal complications are sometimes recorded. At present, the disease is confined to circumscribed foci, but in view of the irrigation and the agricultural potentialities of the region, its control is of
164 major public health significance. The foci
361 are apparently of recent origin. Whether the
167 infection was introduced by Senegalese
144 troops stationed in the vicinity, as claimed by the local inhabitants, or by nomadic tribes from Iraq is a matter of conjecture. Surveys have been made within recent years, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and co-operating international organizations, and, although some discrepancies are evident in the determination of the infection rates in different villages, all emphasize the seriousness of the problem. Competent local authorities estimated in 1951 that the total incidence in that year approximated 12,000 cases.

659 In surveys undertaken in 1948,[24] the ex-
164 amination of urine samples collected from 545 persons in Qoubour el Bid and neighboring villages on the Gerahi branch of the Khabour River indicated general infection rates of about 62 per cent. They averaged 73 per cent among the men and the boys, and 49 per cent among the women and the girls. Moreover, they were consistently higher, in both sexes, in individuals under 20 years than in the older age groups.
[361] Equally high infection rates were found among the seminomadic peoples in the Tell Abiad area. A system of spot checking suggested probable infection rates of almost 100 per cent among males and of 60 per cent among females in 3 of the 5 villages visited.

164 A more exhaustive investigation in 1950[25]
659 revealed the presence of infection among
361 about 24 per cent of the inhabitants of 58 villages situated along 4 tributary streams in the Qoubour el Bid area. The infection rates ranged from 1 to 88 per cent: the most

highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 744 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 244 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[49] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 282 164

versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in 232
the same period, but the consumption of 164
camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population.

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported 164
among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded.

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic 232
among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic 164
cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom 262
used without boiling, but infection may 252
result from the consumption of contaminated 164
cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals.

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis is not compulsory in Syria, and the 164 165
prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in re- 164
porting are exaggerated, however, by the 183
tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of 164
the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population.

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 659
1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 751
10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age.

767 Comparative rates in urban and rural com-
369 munities were determined in a series of tests
164 on unorganized groups in the city and two adjacent farming districts. In Damascus, positive reactions to tuberculin were given by 47.7 of the boys and 40.8 per cent of the girls tested at 15 years of age. At 20 to 25 years of age, positive reactions were obtained in 86.7 per cent and 77.4 per cent, respectively; at 40 to 45 years of age, in 95.6 and 86.6 per cent, respectively. In the rural communities the positive reaction rates were consistently lower, but approached the urban levels in the older age groups. Among individuals at 15 years of age, 51.6 per cent of the boys and 27.2 per cent of the girls reacted to tuberculin in one area, and 18.1 per cent of the boys and 21.2 per cent of the girls, in another. At 40 to 45 years of age, the proportion of positive reactors averaged 80 per cent in the first series and 50 to 100 per cent in the second.[48]

744 Within recent years the Ministry of
751 Health has embarked upon a tuberculosis
747 control program. In January, 1950, a tuberculin testing and BCG inoculation campaign was organized under the auspices of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and associated organizations, which was taken over by the Ministry
659 in September. Surveys have been carried
361 out in most of the provincial capitals and
751 surrounding rural districts, and the Ministry contemplates the gradual extension of the campaign to cover the populations in all parts of the country. In the course of the investigations completed in 7 provinces between January and September, 1950, almost 417,000 persons were tuberculin tested, and over 188,000 were inoculated with BCG vaccine. The majority were schoolchildren, although miscellaneous population groups of all ages were also included. The proportion of positive reactors in the different provinces ranged from 23 per cent in Jebel ed Druz (As Suwaydah) to 42 per cent in Aleppo.

758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
743

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758 743 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 743 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The development of increased medical facilities has recently been undertaken by the Ministry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital near Damascus, to provide a total of 350 beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo were under construction. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed hospital in Latakia province, which would bring the total number of beds available for the isolation and the treatment of tuberculous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 874 A tuberculosis demonstration and training center was established in Damascus in 1952 under the direction of the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Ministry and the Syrian University. It provides a regional headquarters for the training of doctors, nurses and social workers in the public health, the therapeutic and the social aspects of the disease.

164 751 361 Smallpox. Vaccination against smallpox is compulsory, but enforcement is necessarily incomplete in the more remote areas and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks occur from time to time, with sporadic cases reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to 1941 only occasional cases were observed. In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from Iraq, where an epidemic focus had developed in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were recorded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The outbreaks subsided in 1944, and again no more than sporadic cases were noted until 1948, when 894 cases were reported. The known incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influenza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

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age about 5 per cent. Pulmonary complications are generally responsible for a high mortality among the Bedouin children. Mumps, whooping cough and chickenpox are endemic, and often epidemic. 165 164 361

Meningococcus meningitis is sporadic. In the 12 years 1939-50, from 14 to 58 cases were reported annually, except in 1944, when the known incidence totaled 135 cases. 164

Occasional cases of diphtheria are observed, usually among children in the preschool and the school age groups. A high rate of subclinical infection undoubtedly exists, however, as demonstrated by Schick test studies.[88] Scarlet fever is relatively rare, although a few cases are reported each year. Streptococcus infections of the throat are common.

Poliomyelitis is seldom reported. No outbreaks have been recorded, but sporadic cases are sometimes encountered.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Contact

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal disease are present, but little information is available from which to determine their actual prevalence. Syphilis is widely distributed, while gonorrhea occurs primarily in the cities and the towns. Soft chancre is sometimes seen among the poorer inhabitants, but lymphogranuloma inguinale is comparatively rare. [511]

The nonvenereal treponemal infection, usually designated by the Arab term *bejel*, is common among the nomadic and the seminomadic populations in the Euphrates and the Al Jazira regions. The most prominent endemic foci are probably in the vicinity of Deir ez Zor, Raqqa and Meyadin. The disease is associated with low standards of living, and in the majority of cases infection is acquired in early childhood. Surveys have indicated that roughly 60 per cent of the above peoples in Euphrates and Al Jazira provinces are affected, while among some Bedouin tribes the infection rates approach 90 to 100 per cent. In different clinical and serologic studies, made at the mis- 164 361

sion hospital clinic in Deir ez Zor,[14, 18] the prevalence among the Bedouin has been estimated at 50 to 90 per cent and among the seminomadic Arab townsmen at 20 to 35 per cent. 164 361

The facilities for the diagnosis and the treatment of venereal diseases are meager. As of 1951, the Ministry of Health operated special venereal disease hospitals and outpatient clinics in Damascus and Aleppo. It also maintained 2 mobile dispensaries for the treatment of syphilis and bejel in the eastern provinces. A campaign for the mass treatment of bejel and syphilis was initiated in 1952 by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The findings of the various field units should eventually provide a comprehensive picture of the distribution and the prevalence of these diseases in eastern Syria. 738 743

Diseases of the Eyes. Trachoma is a major public health problem in all parts of the country, although it varies in prominence under urban and rural conditions. The infection rates usually average less than 10 per cent in the cities, but approximate 40 to 60 per cent in the rural areas, where over two thirds of the people live. Repeated surveys among school groups in northern Syria[21] indicate that slightly more than 5 per cent of the children in Aleppo are affected, in contrast with 30 to 40 per cent in the environs of the city and 60 per cent in the rural villages. The disease exists at all levels of society, but is less frequent among the nomadic tribes than among the settled communities in the same general region. Differences in prevalence, influenced by local customs, are also noted among the various racial and religious groups. In a survey covering mountainous and coastal areas of Latakia *mukafazat*, reported in 1933,[80] the highest infection rates were found in the predominantly Alawite districts. The index of infection averaged 44 per cent. It ranged from 25 per cent among the Armenians to 61 per cent among the 164 369 164 563

p. 153 (B)

164 Alawites and 68 per cent among the Ismail-
563 ites. Trachoma is one of the principal causes of blindness, in spite of the fact that, in the opinion of many local observers, a large percentage of uncomplicated cases exhibit a tendency to spontaneous cure.

164 Gonococcal and other types of infectious conjunctivitis are common. In a series of 315 conjunctival examinations, reported in 1931,[19] from the mission hospital at Deir ez Zor, *Hemophilus lacunatus* (Morax-Axenfeld bacillus) was identified in 34 per cent, *H. conjunctivitidis* (Koch-Weeks bacillus) in about 10 per cent and *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* in 5 per cent, while different pyogenic cocci were found in the remainder.

164 Diseases of the Skin. As is to be ex-
515 pected, in view of the widespread ignorance
758 of the principles of personal hygiene and the scarcity of water in many areas, skin diseases are prevalent. They represented almost 10 per cent of the total cases treated in government hospitals and clinics in 1949.

164 Mycotic infections are numerous, with ring-
361 worm of the scalp predominating in most
571 localities. Impetigo and scabies are widespread, particularly among children in the rural villages. Pediculosis is almost universal among the inhabitants of the poorer, congested communities, both urban and rural. Occasional cases of human myiasis are encountered. A form of dermatitis, caused by the bite of *Phlebotomus papatasii* and other sandflies, is sometimes encountered among susceptible individuals in the summer months.

164 Leprosy. Endemic foci of leprosy exist in various parts of the country, but primarily in Hauran and Latakia provinces. The extent of infection is not accurately known, and estimates of prevalence range from 90 to 250 cases. A few new cases are
[743] reported each year. Theoretically, isolation is compulsory, and the Ministry of Health maintains a leprosarium at Douma, near Damascus, which has facilities for the care of about 75 lepers.

752 Rabies. Sporadic cases of rabies are re-
164 ported. The majority result from the bites

p. 154(A)

752 164 of rabid dogs, but wolves, hyenas, jackals, rats and other animals are sometimes implicated. Prophylactic treatment is provided 758 753 by the Ministry, and a special division for 164 the preparation of antirabic vaccines is incorporated in the central laboratory in Damascus. From 140 to 250 persons were treated annually in the 4 years 1948-51.

164 **Other Infections.** Tetanus is endemic, 232 and occasional cases are observed. Anthrax is enzootic among the sheep, and human infections sometimes occur in the agricultural areas. Sporadic cases of Weil's disease are reported.

Diseases Spread by Arthropods

164 **Malaria.** Malaria is a disease of major public health and economic importance, since it is endemic or hyperendemic in all populous sections of the country. The prevalence of the disease is directly related not only to the physical geography of the different regions, but to the degree and the type of cultivation. The most seriously affected foci are the plains around Damascus and Aleppo, the Orontes valley from Hama to the Turkish frontier, the irrigated zones bordering the Belikh and the Khabour rivers and their tributaries, and the swampy districts of Hauran province. Universally high infection rates are experienced during epidemic years, even in areas of low endemicity.

659 No large-scale surveys have been at- 164 tempted, but accumulated studies provide 744 rough estimates of the extent of infection in localized areas. Prior to the development of a program for the control of malaria by the Ministry of Health and the Near East Foundation in 1949-50, the spleen index among children under 10 years of age in the villages around Damascus ranged from 40 to 80 per cent, with the highest rates in villages on the periphery of the Outaybeh swamps in the eastern part of the oasis. In the vicinity of Homs, the spleen rates normally average 50 to 70 per cent.

659 In the course of joint surveys made by 747 the malariologists of the United Nations

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 659
Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour 747
and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8, 9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged 164
about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh 361
valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the 164
malaria problem has been aggravated by the 241
introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages.

The malaria season extends from April 161
to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plasmodium vivax* and *P. falciparum* infections 164
varies according to the season and from 136
place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general, *P. vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered.

Malaria control measures are undertaken 164
by the municipal authorities in Damascus, 744
Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten-

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
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

Distribution of Malaria in Syria

sive work has been carried on, in co-operation with the Near East Foundation, in the agricultural districts around Damascus where 224 villages with over 180,000 inhabitants were protected in 1949-50. A marked reduction in the number of cases has been noted in all the areas treated. Successive examinations of over 500 children in 16 treated villages near Damascus revealed a decrease in spleen rates of from 78 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1951.[8] A malaria control program was inaugurated in the Homs district in 1952, under the auspices of the World Health Organization. *Anopheles sacharovi* and *A. claviger* are the principal vectors in the Damascus region; *A. sacharovi* and *A. superpictus*, in the river valleys in the northeast.

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Rickettsial Infections. Localized outbreaks of louse-borne typhus are recurrent during the winter and the spring months, particularly in the congested quarters of the towns and the cities and among the nomadic tribes. Over 1,900 cases were reported in 1942, when the acute shortages associated with the war created conditions conducive to the spread of the infection. Since that date no more than 30 to 95 sporadic cases have been recorded in any one year. Control measures, including deverminization procedures and the immunization of the exposed populations, are enforced by the health authorities in affected areas.

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No differentiation is made in the official

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p. 155(B)

164 reports between louse-borne and flea-borne typhus, but, since small numbers of cases are listed during the summer months, both types of infection are probably included. Murine typhus is endemic throughout this region, and its presence in Greater Syria (including Lebanon) has been confirmed by rickettsial agglutination and guinea pig inoculation tests on blood serums from indigenous cases.[40] Tick-borne typhus is not reported, but cases of fièvre boutonneuse have been observed in the neighboring portions of Lebanon.

Relapsing Fever. Louse-borne relapsing fever is rare, but small outbreaks were reported from Syria and Lebanon in 1945—extensions of the epidemics which spread through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46.

164 Tick-borne relapsing fever is endemic.
361 Occasional cases are seen in the rural villages, usually between May and September. The tick, *Ornithodorus tholozani*, is the vector: specimens collected from a cave near Damascus have been found to be infected with the spirochetes.[42]

Plague. Plague occurs sporadically in the districts along the Turkish and the Iraqi frontiers on the north and on the Israeli border in the south. No severe outbreaks have been recorded within recent years, and no cases since 1946.

164 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis is widely distributed. The presence of a major focus in Aleppo province accounts for the local classification of the disease as "Aleppo boil." The infection rates in the vicinity of Aleppo formerly approximated 70 per cent, but they have declined appreciably with the extension of insect control measures within recent years. Smaller endemic foci exist in Damascus and other
164 centers. The disease is frequently encoun-
369 tered in the rural villages around Damascus, but it has been almost totally absent from the city itself since the inauguration of the municipal fly control campaign in 1946. Cases usually occur between May and

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164 369 October, when the vector sandflies, *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti*, are abundant.

164 Kala-azar is seldom specifically reported from Syria, but occasional suspected cases have been described from the Jebel ed Druz region. A canine reservoir undoubtedly exists: the causative organisms have been demonstrated in a stray dog captured at el Bab, near Aleppo.[38]

Other Infections. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the western provinces where the vector, *Aedes aegypti*, is indigenous. Sandfly fever, transmitted by *Phlebotomus paptasii*, is endemic and sometimes epidemic.

Nutritional Diseases

146 364 511 Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are prevalent, particularly in the rural villages, where poverty and parasitic infections influence the nutritional standards of the people to a greater extent than in the urban areas. Serious nutritional conditions are most obvious among the children of the Bedouin tribes. Minor vitamin C deficiencies are widespread among the inhabitants of the grain-producing areas in the northeastern and the southern provinces. Occasional borderline cases of pellagra are encountered, but beriberi and ariboflavinosis are unusual. Cases of rickets are numerous, especially in the cities and the towns. Protein edema and overt vitamin A deficiencies are relatively rare.

Miscellaneous Conditions

164 232 Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and epidemics are sometimes reported. Q fever is enzootic among the sheep and the goats, but the extent of human infection is not known. In a series of complement fixation tests recently performed on blood serums taken from sheep and goats in different parts of the country, positive reactions were obtained in 13 to 63 per cent.[40]

Silicosis and benign pneumoconiosis are

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SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number. 164 463

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda. 164 733 656 208

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent." 642 161 162

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases. 744 743

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex- 312

cept in the vicinity of the principal rivers. 312
Domestic supplies are derived from wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from water holes or rain-water cisterns. Untreated 312 piped water supplies serve all or parts of 364 the larger towns. The municipal supplies of Damascus and Aleppo are controlled for purity, but contamination is frequent in the smaller communities. Sewerage systems are available in the chief cities, but the methods of sewage disposal are generally primitive in towns and villages. The standards of nutrition vary, depending upon the economic and the social conditions in different regions. Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are widespread, but serious deficiency diseases are encountered only among limited population groups. 146

The most prominent disease problems are 164
malaria, trachoma and dysentery, both amebic and bacillary. Enteric fevers, tuberculosis, helminthiasis and skin infections are prevalent. Venereal diseases are widely distributed, while bejel is endemic among the nomadic and the seminomadic peoples of the northeastern provinces. Hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, and leprosy exist in scattered foci. Localized outbreaks of cholera were reported in 1947-48, the first in 20 years. Vaccination against smallpox is com- 751
pulsory, but sporadic cases and occasional epidemics are recorded. Outbreaks of louse- 164
borne typhus are recurrent, while sporadic cases are reported almost annually. Small outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever have coincided with regional epidemics. Measles and the common respiratory infections are endemic, and frequently epidemic. Cutaneous leishmaniasis, brucellosis, rabies, tetanus, anthrax, dengue fever and sandfly fever are endemic. Meningococcus meningitis, diphtheria, plague, tick-borne relapsing fever and murine typhus are sporadic. Recognized cases of scarlet fever and poliomyelitis are apparently rare. Doubtful cases of tick-borne typhus and kala-azar have been described.

7: Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

Malaria and Its Control

Foggaras and surface canals easily become partly blocked by vegetation, 312
and floods and rain wash in mud and silt. The water is then ponded back, depressions near the canal bank fill, the canal may overflow, and, if it is built along the side of a valley, overflow or seepage will maintain swamps along the watercourse. Artificial blockages of foggaras also pond back the water. Near the lower end of most canals are "brick pits" from which earth has been taken to be made into mud bricks, and these also tend to fill with water. Everywhere wadis carry rain and seepage water in winter and spring and the overflow from irrigation canals in early summer and autumn, at which seasons there is a surplus. In other words, except during the peak irrigation and evaporation period of midsummer, they carry slow-moving, half-stagnant water.

All these places are potential, and most of them actual, breeding places 136
of the mosquito *Anopheles sacharovi*, which favors shallow, sunny, warm 164
waters, full of aquatic vegetation. At only one place in the area has another malaria carrier, *A. algeriensis*, been found, and the problem of malaria control in the region is thus essentially that of eliminating the *A. sacharovi* breeding grounds. Full statistics are not available, but such figures as do exist show the great need of such control. About 20 per cent of the patients treated by a mobile clinic in the region in 1942–1945 were suffering from malaria, and the percentage rose at times (especially in late summer) to 80 in some villages. Sometimes practically the whole population of a village was found to be infected. In Tell et Tout (population *c.* 550) about 50 deaths [165] were due primarily to malaria in 1941, and almost the sole source of infection was the swamp caused by the deliberate blockage of a foggara.

Control work is apparently simple. Canal owners occasionally clean the 312
canals of detritus and vegetation and repair the banks at the lower end. It is important that this work be done well and repeated every few years. Small depressions may be sprayed, filled with earth, or drained by a simple ditch. Broad, sluggish streams may be canalized by a ditch along the thalweg. The more efficient the irrigation, the less likely it is that mosquitoes will breed. Waste of water should be reduced to a minimum and a wide range of crops grown, so that irrigation begins early in the season and ends late. The "waste" water of natural watercourses may be utilized by the construction of a simple dam and gravity canal, or by the repair of the old subparallel foggara if, as is probable, there is one. Extensive stretches of swampy ground may be put to good use by drainage-irrigation schemes, which often include the repair of old foggaras. Malaria control should not stand on its own, an expensive 080

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

11 PUBLIC HEALTH

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The progress in public health has been much less spectacular and less steady than that in education. Expenditures on public health have increased sharply only in recent years. In 1954 the budget of the Ministry of Public Health amounted to £S 8.764 million or 4.2% of the regular budget, as compared with actual expenditures of £S 3.431 million or 3.4% of the total in 1945. Health facilities have been gradually expanding. The number of hospitals has risen from 35 with 1,785 beds at the end of 1945 to 61 with
[749] 4,094 beds at the end of 1954. Over the last seven years the government has spent, on an average, £S 1.3 million on public health facilities, so that
[759] government hospitals now have a total of 3,000 beds. The number of doctors in Syria has risen from 616 in 1945 to about 880 at present.

Yet it is generally recognized that the state of public health is far from satisfactory. This conclusion rests upon testimony and observation rather than health statistics. The statistics, indeed, are so inadequate as to provide little indication of health conditions. The number of deaths registered, for example, imply a death rate of but seven per thousand, but the record of deaths is evidently very incomplete and the actual death rate rather
[164] high. There is still a high incidence of debilitating diseases. Malaria, for example, is prevalent in many parts of Syria. Diseases such as tuberculosis and the many varieties of intestinal infections, which are generally associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding and low standards
[165] of living, are quite widespread. Infant mortality is particularly high. Thus 36% of the registered deaths in 1951-53 occurred among children less than five years old, and of these about the same percentage died of diarrhoea and enteritis.

An effective campaign to raise health standards would require resources which Syria will hardly be able to mobilize at its present stage of development. The health program will have to remain rather modest and should attempt primarily to remedy the more glaring deficiencies. These are, principally, the inadequate attention given to preventive medicine and the markedly unequal geographic distribution of existing health facilities.

744 *Preventive Medicine*

The prevention of disease is likely in the long run to be more economical than curative medicine. The mission believes that this aspect of

عدد الوفيات الحديثة (*) المسجلة حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٤٦ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF NEW (*) DEATHS REGISTERED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1946 — 1953

Table No. 12 — جدول رقم ١٢

YEARS	مجموع المحافظات All Mohafazat	مدينة دمشق المنارة Damascus City	MOHAFAZAT. دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	سويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	السنوات
1946 — Total	19,144	3,498	2,514	1,289	1,219	1,552	6,912	307	496	375	952	١٩٤٦ — المجموع
— Males	11,091	1,834	1,414	722	643	1,030	4,144	203	335	231	545	— ذكور
— Females	8,053	1,664	1,130	567	576	532	2,768	104	161	144	407	— اناث
1947 — Total	15,212	3,464	2,254	1,276	1,117	1,168	4,609	202	484	186	452	١٩٤٧ — المجموع
— Males	8,581	1,791	1,206	674	547	763	2,736	126	327	117	294	— ذكور
— Females	6,631	1,673	1,048	602	570	405	1,873	76	157	69	158	— اناث
1948 — Total	19,964	4,204	2,709	1,417	1,469	2,454	5,709	356	658	254	674	١٩٤٨ — المجموع
— Males	10,946	2,046	1,535	780	712	1,452	3,221	214	401	184	411	— ذكور
— Females	9,018	2,158	1,214	637	757	1,002	2,488	142	257	70	263	— اناث
1949 — Total	25,606	4,676	2,609	1,770	2,387	2,392	9,976	551	570	436	1,329	١٩٤٩ — المجموع
— Males	16,196	2,433	1,542	976	1,380	1,045	6,290	434	397	273	826	— ذكور
— Females	10,460	2,243	1,067	794	977	747	3,686	117	173	153	503	— اناث
1950 — Total	23,623	4,604	2,270	1,658	1,757	2,320	8,322	691	548	511	942	١٩٥٠ — المجموع
— Males	14,584	2,518	1,294	985	1,002	1,545	5,373	548	385	339	595	— ذكور
— Females	9,039	2,086	976	673	755	775	2,949	143	163	172	347	— اناث
1951 — Total	23,944	4,741	*2,831	1,342	2,212	1,742	8,318	518	469	581	1,090	١٩٥١ — المجموع
— Males	14,269	2,425	1,569	719	1,393	1,114	5,253	401	325	393	677	— ذكور
— Females	9,575	2,316	1,262	623	819	628	3,065	117	144	188	413	— اناث
1952 — Total	23,082	4,711	2,841	1,476	1,715	1,703	7,305	586	490	542	1,413	١٩٥٢ — المجموع
— Males	13,621	2,376	1,622	805	1,006	1,099	4,515	669	321	331	874	— ذكور
— Females	9,461	2,335	1,219	671	709	604	2,787	217	169	211	539	— اناث
1953 — Total	24,912	5,033	3,198	1,579	1,693	1,700	7,617	1,093	580	473	1,586	١٩٥٣ — المجموع
— Males	14,886	2,579	1,787	866	975	1,009	4,660	829	380	283	913	— ذكور
— Females	10,346	2,454	1,411	883	718	691	2,957	169	200	190	673	— اناث

Source : Ministry of Interior

(*) The above figures show the number of deaths of «recent occurrence» but do not include «undeclared deaths»

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

(*) ملاحظة : تبين الارقام المثبتة اعلاه الوفيات الحديثة فقط ولا تتضمن الوفيات المكتومة .

السكان والاحوال المدنية

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

●165

عدد الوفيات الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال عام ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF NEW DEATHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1952

Table No. 13 جدول رقم ١٣

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	22,082	13,621	8,461	المجموع العام
Damascus City	4,711	2,376	2,335	مدينة دمشق الممتازة
Damascus Mohafaza	2,841	1,622	1,219	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza Centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	745*	415	330	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Duma	586	374	212	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	212	123	89	« الزبداني
Katana	278	169	109	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	268	181	87	« القطيفة
Al-Quneitra	379	261	118	« القنيطرة
Al-Nabek	373	199	174	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	1,476	805	671	محافظة حمص
Hama Mohafaza	1,715	1,006	709	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	1,444	835	609	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	271	171	100	قضاء السلمية
Latakia Mohafaza	1,703	1,009	694	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	184	120	64	قضاء بانياس
Talkalakh	181	116	65	« تلكلخ
Jableh	339	197	142	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	124	72	52	« الحفة
Safita	128	94	34	« صافيتا
Tartus	256*	194	62	« طرطوس
Latakia	399	235	164	« قضاء اللاذقية
Misiaf	92	71	21	« مصياف

* Corrected figure

● رقم معدل

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عدد الوفيات الحديثة المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال عام ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF NEW DEATHS REGISTERED BY QADAS DURING 1952

Table No. 13 (Con cld.)

جدول رقم ١٣ (التتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة او القضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	7,305	4,518	2,787	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	2,954	1,617	1,307	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	912	565	347	قضاء ادلب
T'az	267	190	77	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	433	330	103	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	591	461	130	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	636	393	243	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	167	126	41	« جسر الشغور
Harem	383	232	151	« حارم
'Ifrin	219	137	82	« عفرين
Ein-el-Arab	127	97	30	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man	449	274	175	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	127	85	42	« منبج
Al-Hasakeh Mohafaza	886	669	217	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	168	110	58	مركز المحافظة
Dejla	75	58	17	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	643	501	142	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	450	321	129	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	253	169	116	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	22	20	2	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Raqqa	111	78	33	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	74	54	20	« الميادين
Sweida Mohafaza	542	331	211	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	242	152	90	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	129	79	50	قضاء شهبا
Salkhad	171	100	71	« سلخد
Dir'a Mohafaz	1,413	874	539	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	672	427	245	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	688	410	278	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	53	37	16	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الاقضية خلال ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS DURING 1953

● 165

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

Mohafazat and Qadas	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Total	24,912	14,566	10,346	المجموع العام
Damascus City	5,023	2,579	2,454	مدينة دمشق البلدية
Damascus Mohafaza	3,198	1,787	1,411	محافظة دمشق
Mohafaza centre (E. & W. Ghouta)	991	508	483	مركز المحافظة (الغوطتين)
Douma	522	282	240	قضاء دوما
Zabadani	339	187	152	« الزبداني
Katana	318	167	151	« قطنا
Al-Qutaifeh	210	140	70	« القطيفة
Al-Qunaitra	443	302	141	« القنيطرة
Al-Nabek	365	191	174	« النبك
Homs Mohafaza	1,679	856	823	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza Centre	1,721	900	821	مركز المحافظة
Tal'alakh	148	96	52	قضاء تلكلخ
Hama Mohafaza	1,098	873	718	محافظة حماة
Mohafaza Centre	1,311	754	557	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	267	148	119	قضاء السلمية
Misiaf	115	73	42	قضاء مصياف
Latakia Mohafaza	1,700	1,019	681	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	227	143	84	قضاء بانياس
Jableh	365	231	134	« جبلة
Al-Haffeh	187	128	59	« الحفة
Safita	113	87	26	« صافيتا
Tartus	348	198	150	« طرطوس
Latakia	520	282	238	« اللاذقية

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الأقضية خلال عام ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED, BY QADAS, DURING 1953.

Table No. 14 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١٤ (تتمة)

Mohafazat and Qadas	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المحافظة والقضاء
Aleppo Mohafaza	7,817	4,960	2,857	**محافظة حلب**
Mohafaza Centre	3,554	1,895	1,659	مركز المحافظة
Idleb	832	503	329	قضاء ادلب
Tanz	328	242	86	« المزار
Al-Bab	392	292	100	« الباب
Jabal Sam'an	413	273	140	« جبل سمعان
Jarablus	56	39	17	« جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	492	286	206	« جسر الشغور
Harem	253	153	100	« حارم
'Afrin	697	549	148	« عفرين
Ein-el-Arab	115	100	15	« عين العرب
Ma'arret-en-Noman	369	232	137	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	136	96	39	« منبج
Al-Hasakeh Mohafaza	1,065	924	140	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza Centre	265	265	00	مركز المحافظة
Dejla	96	84	12	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	704	627	97	« القامشلي
Deir-ez-Zor Mohafaza	500	300	200	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza Centre	295	176	119	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	43	26	17	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Rizqa	178	127	51	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	71	49	22	« الميادين
Suweida Mohafaza	473	283	190	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza Centre	202	115	87	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	129	81	48	« شهبا
Salkhad	142	87	55	« صلخد
Der'a Mohafaza	1,586	913	673	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza Centre	425	254	171	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	1,070	610	460	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	91	49	42	« فيق

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الأمراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	المجموع	Mohafazat					المحافظات				نوع المرض
			Damascus دمشق	Homs حمص	Hama حماة	Latakia اللاذقية	Aleppo حلب	Al Hasakah الحسكة	Deir ez-Zor دير الزور	Suweida السويداء	Der'a درعا	
Total	10,308	6,387	701	1,281	1,071	4,923	206	[illegible]	[illegible]	847		المجموع
Typhoid	79	26	3	—	—	11	—	13	22	3		حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		حمى نمشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—		جدري
Measles	44	7	—	—	—	18	—	4	15	—		الحصبة
Scarlet fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	38	8	2	1	—	3		—	24	—		سعال ديكي
Diphteria	34	17	8	4	—	1	—	1	2	1		دفتري (خناق دفتريائي)
Influenza	26	2	—	1	—	21	—	—	2	—		نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	148	38	12	12	1	67	1	9	—	6		تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	68	22	7	9	8	14	—	1	—	1		التدرن غير ملاكر
Syphilis	7	3	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3		الزهري
Malaria	124	22	5	4	8	68	—	8	6	2		حمى مزمنة (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	22	20	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—		امراض سارية غير ملاكر

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ١ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafazat دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	المحافظات	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	225	96	18	24	5	71	3	3	3	2		سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	16	14	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1		اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليسا صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabitis mellitus	52	30	4	2	1	14	—	1	—	—		التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	45	22	—	—	—	15	—	—	1	—		التسمم الغولي (الغول) المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	39	27	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—		امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	164	97	2	14	2	48	—	—	1	—		اختلاج الحركة التقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سفاطة شريان او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	122	80	10	15	4	69	1	1	—	2		امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	64	41	1	4	1	12	—	1	—	4		
Diseases of the heart	1,200	665	66	71	12	452	3	13	5	12		امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	89	43	—	4	3	15	—	1	1	4		بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	576	366	10	11	2	134	—	21	20	3		ذات القصبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,139	407	117	113	17	405	1	28	16	30		ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	73	39	—	4	11	13	1	4	1	—		بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,306	1,105	151	179	76	475	7	71	88	84		اسهال والتهاب الامعاء

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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HEALTH

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1951

Table No. 1 (Concld.) — جدول رقم ١ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total	Mohafazat									المحافظات	نوع المرض
	المجموع	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a		
Appendicitis	19	4	—	1	—	9	1	4	—	—		التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	188	102	7	5	12	50	1	8	2	1		امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	96	58	—	7	6	14	—	3	—	7		بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	224	102	12	15	8	78	—	—	3	6		التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genetal system	84	64	1	1	1	15	—	—	1	1		بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	30	7	5	5	—	9	1	1	2	—		تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	28	17	1	2	—	5	—	—	2	1		بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement.	33	16	1	—	—	16	-	—	—	—		امراض الجلد والنسيج الحجري والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	244	155	39	21	2	23	—	—	3	1		ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	807	211	61	54	151	221	17	31	13	28		الشيخوخة
Suicide	16	7	—	1	—	6	—	—	1	1		انتحار
Homicide	68	27	1	8	—	19	5	6	—	2		قتل
Accidental deaths	744	263	8	23	17	109	3	10	8	3		موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,284	2,113	129	675	731	2,427	161	413	206	309		اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 2.

جدول رقم ٢

TYPE OF DISEASE	سوريا Syria	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakah	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Total	17,788	7,118	996	1,416	1,093	4,777	214	477	442	1,253	المجموع
Typhoid	68	40	9	4	—	9	—	—	5	1	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى تيفية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	3	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	20	5	—	3	1	—	—	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	47	30	9	4	—	2	—	—	3	—	دفتري (خناق دفتيريالي)
Influenza	20	14	—	—	1	5	—	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مخططة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	244	156	11	24	1	37	3	7	1	4	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	36	9	5	5	—	17	1	—	—	1	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphilis	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الزهري
Malaria	82	21	4	1	10	34	2	10	—	—	حمى مزاقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	8	4	—	—	—	3	—	1	1	—	امراض سارية غير ملاكر

الصحة والاشغال العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 2 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٢ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	TOTAL المجموع	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Suweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	289	148	28	30	4	89	2	1	—	2	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	19	6	—	—	1	10	—	—	1	1	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليس صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	3	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabitis mellitus	34	8	3	3	1	19	—	—	—	—	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	92	70	2	—	—	18	—	—	—	2	التسمم الكولي (الغول) المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	42	36	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	2	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	230	100	7	22	5	82	—	4	—	—	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام
Meningitis non-meningococcal	270	102	17	30	4	71	1	1	2	2	التهاب دماغي سحائية غير بالمية او لغير الدم في السحاق
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	50	11	2	19	1	15	—	1	1	—	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,658	841	117	101	45	510	4	15	4	21	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	50	21	1	4	—	21	—	1	—	2	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	508	342	17	39	1	93	1	13	1	2	ذات القصبات
Pneumonia & broncho-pneumonia	520	244	114	79	17	280	2	35	2	35	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	59	45	—	1	1	27	—	7	1	4	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and entritis	2,606	1,329	268	223	145	559	8	56	24	55	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 2 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٢ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafazat دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasaiteh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Appendicitis	16	9	1	1	2	2	—	—	—	1	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	518	265	9	16	34	84	1	3	2	14	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of digestive system	101	50	—	11	9	20	1	1	—	—	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	305	113	12	25	19	125	—	2	4	5	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genetal system	112	41	8	6	10	43	—	1	1	1	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	26	10	4	4	—	2	—	5	—	1	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	29	18	3	2	—	6	—	—	—	—	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organ of movement.	38	18	—	1	1	18	—	—	—	—	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	242	145	41	29	—	24	—	2	—	1	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	1,003	317	133	76	173	208	5	26	16	49	الشيخوخة
Suicide	18	10	—	1	—	2	1	1	1	2	انتحار
Homicide	32	18	4	2	14	35	2	4	—	3	قتل
Accidental deaths	416	198	13	44	6	154	—	4	—	2	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,408	2,053	189	605	594	2,171	179	284	373	990	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 3.

جدول رقم ٣

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total الجملة	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Total	16,403	7,462	918	813	1,260	4,426	205	346	227	736	المجموع
Typhoid	56	36	5	3	—	6	—	2	3	1	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	حمى تمنشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	10	15	2	3	7	10	—	—	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	3	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	8	1	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	36	17	6	1	4	7	—	1	—	—	دفتري (خناق دفتريالي)
Influenza	25	4	—	—	16	5	3	—	—	—	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	10	5	—	—	—	4	1	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	109	55	2	7	2	32	2	9	—	—	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	28	2	3	5	—	17	—	—	—	1	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphlis	4	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	الزهري
Malaria	56	4	6	—	14	29	3	—	—	—	حمى مرزقية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	13	6	—	1	—	5	—	—	—	1	امراض سارية غير ملاكر

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 3 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تابع)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع الحالات	Mohafazat المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Lattakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Cancer and other malignant tumours	358	181	21	14	5	103	6	3	—	1	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	20	2	—	1	3	14	—	—	—	—	اورام غير خبيثة واورام ليس صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabetis mellitus	51	21	3	2	—	18	—	—	—	—	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	57	21	0	2	1	33	—	—	—	—	التسمم الكولي الفول المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	142	128	—	2	2	8	—	—	—	1	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	166	86	3	10	2	59	1	4	—	1	اختلاج العركة المتقدم وشلل عام
Meningitis non-meningococcal	350	153	34	16	22	72	—	—	—	2	نزيف دماغي سفادة شريان او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	51	18	1	6	1	23	1	1	—	—	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,844	940	99	96	57	601	15	22	3	11	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	28	11	—	3	1	13	—	—	—	—	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	618	433	26	20	22	110	6	2	1	8	ذات القصبات
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,107	505	157	36	26	266	13	16	6	20	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	140	82	—	13	15	22	1	3	—	1	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,727	1,658	273	117	59	494	26	50	5	45	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والمحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 3 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total مجموع المحافظات	Mohafamt المحافظات: دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	نوع المرض
Appendicitis	52	35	3	—	3	6	3	—	1	—	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Disease of the liver and biliary passages	230	144	9	11	5	61	—	—	—	—	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	160	94	1	10	29	25	—	—	—	1	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	302	128	15	14	13	123	3	4	1	3	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	60	15	1	1	9	32	—	—	2	—	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	38	12	13	2	3	8	—	—	—	—	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	41	20	4	1	3	11	1	2	—	—	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organ of movement.	18	12	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	325	248	24	9	8	31	1	3	1	—	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	904	395	125	62	121	227	6	35	6	27	الشيخوخة
Suicide	23	13	—	1	3	6	—	—	—	—	انتحار
Homicide	103	63	1	6	10	17	6	—	—	—	قتل
Accidental deaths	342	127	8	24	5	144	11	9	11	3	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	5,837	1,961	54	313	779	1,754	97	180	187	612	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1951

Table No. 4.

جدول رقم ٤

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (years) الاعمار (بالسنوات) من ٠ - ١ From 0-1	من ١ - ٤ From 1-4	من ٥ - ١٤ From 5-14	من ١٥ - ٣٠ From 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	المرض
Total	16,305	3325	2,317	1,580	1,973	6,922	المجموع
Typhoid	79	5	23	32	17	12	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى نمشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	—	2	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	44	18	23	2	1	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	38	21	16	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	34	7	18	7	—	2	دفتري (خناق دفتيريائي)
Influenza	36	4	2	4	2	14	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	146	1	8	11	50	76	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	65	5	4	9	23	24	تدرن غير مذكور
Siphlis	7	—	—	—	1	6	الزهري
Malaria	124	22	25	16	24	37	الزهري
Other infectious diseases	23	3	5	7	6	2	حمى مرزقية (البرداء)
Cancer and other malignant tumours	225	1	1	2	12	209	امراض سارية غير مذكور
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	16	—	1	2	2	11	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	1	—	—	1	—	—	اورام غير خبيثة واورام لها صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Diabitis mellitus	52	—	1	1	2	48	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Chronic or acute alcoholism	48	4	2	—	1	41	التبول السكري
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	39	8	9	1	2	19	التسمم التولي (التول المزمن والحاد)
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	164	—	2	3	6	153	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Meningitis non-meningococcal	192	3	7	6	21	155	اختلاج الحركة التقدم وشلل عام نزيف دماغي سدادة شريان او تخثر الدم في الدماغ

HEALTH

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ١٩٥١

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1951

Table No. 4 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٤ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار (بالسنوات) من ٠ – ١ From 0-1	من ١ – ٤ From 1-4	من ٥ – ١٤ From 5-14	من ١٥ – ٣٠ From 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق Forty 30 and over	المرض
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	84	5	6	6	10	57	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,389	11	6	27	54	1,371	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	89	9	4	5	10	61	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	576	339	185	17	34	41	ذات الشعب
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,139	422	230	57	85	345	ذات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	73	12	20	7	12	21	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,336	1,179	721	162	69	143	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	19	—	—	1	9	9	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	188	8	8	10	34	128	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	95	28	13	5	16	34	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	227	4	17	15	13	178	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	84	1	1	—	8	74	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	30	—	1	3	12	14	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other disease of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	28	—	—	—	6	22	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement.	22	5	2	6	6	14	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	244	228	5	—	1	10	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	807	—	—	—	—	807	الشيخوخة
Suicide	16	—	—	—	10	6	انتحار
Homicide	66	1	—	3	33	29	قتل
Accidental deaths	444	98	45	78	100	123	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Cause of death ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,304	815	1,028	1,059	1,306	2,048	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health

NOTE : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths. As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at bedouin centres, to register death occurrences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus supplied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

ملاحظة : ارسلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى الارقام المذكورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من اطباء الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات فقد حدث في هذه القرى والمراكز ادى هذا النقص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات التفوس .

الصحة والاستعلام العام

عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

TYPE OF DISEASE	المجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار بالسنوات: ٠ - ١ 0 - 1	١ - ٤ 1 - 4	٥ - ١٤ 5 - 14	١٥ - ٣٠ 15 - 30	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	المرض
Total	17,705	2,780	2,439	1,527	1,967	7,212	المجموع
Typhoid	68	6	12	27	8	12	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	—	—	—	—	—	—	حمى تشبه « تيفوس »
Smallpox	1	1	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	3	1	2	—	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	1	—	—	—	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	10	6	4	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	47	17	25	4	—	1	دفتري (خناق دفتريالي)
Influenza	20	5	6	3	1	5	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	—	—	—	—	—	—	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	364	3	13	13	95	123	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	35	—	2	5	11	20	تدرن غير مذاكر
Syphilis	2	—	1	—	—	1	الزهري
Malaria	62	10	14	21	10	21	حمى مزرفية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	8	—	2	3	—	3	امراض سارية غير مذاكر عضية وطفيلية
Cancer and other malignant tumours	200	—	2	4	22	171	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	19	1	—	1	4	13	اورام غير خبيثة او اورام ليس صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Acute Rheumatism and gout	2	—	—	—	—	2	الرثية الموسمة والنقرس
Diabetes mellitus	34	—	—	2	3	29	السيول السكري
Acute or acute alcoholism	82	1	2	1	2	86	التسمم السيول الاوزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisoning	42	12	3	1	3	23	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	229	2	5	3	15	204	اختلاج الحركة التقدم وشلل عام نزوف دماغي سدادة شريانية او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis non-meningococcal	270	5	6	7	15	237	

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ، ١٩٥٣
NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 5 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	Total المجموع	Age (in years) الاعمار بالسنوات ٠ - ١ 0 - 1	١ - ٤ 1 - 4	٥ - ١٤ 5 - 14	١٥ - ٣٠ 15 - 30	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	الامراض
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	50	1	5	3	4	37	امراض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,658*	18	11	50	95	1,484	امراض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	50	2	1	8	5	34	بقية جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	508	223	132	27	11	55	التهابات الشعب
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	696	237	226	70	34	222	التهابات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than T.B.	89	14	22	8	5	40	بقية امراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhoea and enteritis	2,686	1,511	782	121	51	211	اسهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	16	2	—	1	3	10	التهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	519	302	38	21	45	211	امراض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	101	46	6	5	5	39	بقية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	305	5	18	20	44	218	التهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	113	3	4	3	14	89	بقية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	26	1	—	—	15	10	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	29	1	1	2	16	9	بقية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of the skin, cellular tissues, bones and organs of movement.	38	12	8	2	1	15	امراض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	242	232	2	2	—	6	ضعف ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	1,003	—	—	—	—	1,003	الشيخوخة
Suicide	18	—	—	2	4	12	انتحار
Homicide	82	1	5	3	34	39	قتل
Accidental deaths	416	19	65	73	123	135	موت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	7,408	983	1,075	1,088	1,383	2,971	اسباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

Note : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths. As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at Beddein centres, to register death occurrences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus applied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى ارقام المنشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من قبل الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى النائية ومراكز البدو الرحل الطبيب يسجلون الوفيات التي تحدث في هذه القرى والمراكز لدى هذا الشخص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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عدد الوفيات المسجلة حسب الامراض الرئيسية والاعمار ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 6

جدول رقم ٦

TYPE OF DISEASE	الجموع Total	Age (in years) الاعمار بالسنوات					المرض
		٠ - ١ 0-1	١ - ٤ 1-4	٥ - ١٤ 5-14	١٥ - ٣٠ 15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق From 30 and over	
Total	18,403	3,929	2,143	1,436	1,598	7,297	الجموع
Typhoid	56	6	15	13	15	7	حمى تيفوئيدية
Typhus fever	1	1	—	—	—	—	حمى تمشية « تيفوس »
Smallpox	2	2	—	—	—	—	جدري
Measles	40	24	14	2	—	—	حصبة
Scarlet fever	2	—	—	1	—	1	حمى قرمزية
Whooping cough	8	5	2	1	—	—	سعال ديكي
Diphteria	36	15	14	3	3	1	دفتري (خنق دفتريائي)
Influenza	28	12	11	—	—	5	نزلة وافدة مختلطة
Plague	10	—	—	1	1	8	طاعون
Tuberculosis of the respiratory System	109	4	9	8	22	56	تدرن الجهاز التنفسي
All other forms of tuberculosis	28	3	3	4	3	15	تدرن غير ملاكر
Siphlis	4	1	—	—	1	2	الزهري
Malaria	56	21	18	4	3	12	حمى مرزغية (البرداء)
Other infectious diseases	13	3	3	—	1	6	امراض سارية غير ملاكر
Cancer and other malignant tumours	338	1	3	13	21	298	سرطان والاورام الخبيثة
Non-malignant tumours or tumours of unspecified nature	20	1	—	1	3	15	اورام غير خبيثة واورام لها صفة خبيثة غير معينة
Chronic Rheumatism and gout	2	—	—	—	—	2	الرثية المزمنة والنقرس
Diabtis mellitus	51	—	—	1	3	47	التبول السكري
Chronic or acute alcoholism	57	1	4	1	8	43	التسمم الغولي: الغول المزمن والحاد
Other general diseases and chronic poisonings.	142	8	3	3	8	120	امراض عامة اخرى وتسمم مزمن
Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	166	—	1	2	6	157	اختلاج الحركة المتقدم وشلل عام تزيف دماغي سداده شريانية او تخثر الدم في الدماغ
Meningitis (non-meningococcal)	259	13	3	4	10	229	

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NUMBER OF DEATHS REGISTERED BY MAIN DISEASES AND AGE, 1953

Table No. 6 (Contd.) — جدول رقم ٦ (تتمة)

TYPE OF DISEASE	الجموع Total	Age (in years) — الاعمار (بالسنوات) 0-1	1-4	5-14	15-30	من ٣٠ وما فوق Form 30 and over	الرض
Other diseases of the nervous system and sense organs	51	7	5	3	15	21	راض اخرى في الجهاز العصبي والحواس
Diseases of the heart	1,884	27	17	41	123	1,676	راض القلب
Other diseases of the circulatory system.	28	2	1	—	3	22	ية امراض جهاز الدورة الدموية
Bronchitis	615	205	146	28	9	49	ات الشعب
Pneumonia & bronchopneumonia	1,107	451	262	86	52	256	ات الرئة
Other diseases of the respiratory system other than tuberculosis	140	17	12	6	8	97	يةامراض الجهاز التنفسي ماعدا السل
Diarrhea and enteritis	2,727	1,752	687	83	30	185	سهال والتهاب الامعاء
Appendicitis	52	5	2	9	16	120	تهاب الزائدة الدودية
Diseases of the liver and biliary passages	230	5	5	20	31	169	راض الكبد والمجاري الصفراوية
Other diseases of the digestive system	160	22	17	10	26	85	ية امراض الجهاز الهضمي
Nephritis	302	15	22	14	24	227	تهاب الكلية
Other diseases of the urinary and genital system	60	—	—	3	5	52	ية امراض الجهاز البولي والتناسلي
Puerperal infection	26	1	1	5	12	13	تعفن الدم وحمى النفاس
Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium	41	1	—	1	12	27	ية امراض الحمل والولادة والنفاس
Diseases of skin, cellular tissue, bones and organs of movement	18	2	8	2	1	5	راض الجلد والنسيج الخلوي والعظام واعضاء الحركة
Congenital malformations and debility, premature births and diseases peculiar to the first year of life.	325	325	—	—	—	—	تشوه ولادي ؛ ولادة قبل الميعاد
Senility	904	—	—	—	—	904	شيخوخة
Suicide	23	1	—	3	6	13	انتحار
Homicide	103	2	9	17	23	42	قتل
Accidental deaths	342	6	52	84	82	118	وت قسري بسبب حوادث
Causes of deaths ill-defined, unknown or unspecified	5,527	782	796	961	967	2,321	سباب موت غير معينة

Source : Ministry of Health

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

Note : The above figures have been arrived at from the returns submitted to the Ministry of Health by the Medical Officers in charge of the registration of deaths. As Medical Officers are not available at certain remote areas, and at bedouin centres, to register death occurences, there appeared a discrepancy between the figures thus supplied and those on record with the Ministry of Interior, based on the Population Registers.

ملاحظة : توصلت وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام الى ارقام المنشورة اعلاه بعد جمعها من الكشوف الواردة من اطباء الصحة المختصين بتسجيل الوفيات . ولما لم يكن لدى بعض القرى الثانية ومراكز البدو الرحل اطباء يسجلون الوفيات التي تحدث في هذه القرى والمراكز ادى هذا النقص في التسجيل الى تباين ظهر من مقارنة هذه الارقام بتلك الواردة من وزارة الداخلية والمستندة الى سجلات النفوس .

63.Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1956
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

sory, according to law, but barely one half 871
of the children are now registered in
schools. Outside of Damascus, the literacy 212
rates probably do not exceed 40 per cent
among the men and 10 to 20 per cent
among the women. Schools are maintained 871
by the government and by private organizations, both national and foreign. The Syrian 873
University, in Damascus, is one of the leading Arab institutions in the Middle East. It includes faculties of law, science, arts and medicine, with subordinate departments of dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, as well as an advanced school for teacher training. An engineering school is established at 874
Aleppo, and, in 1952, a new school for the training of village teachers, with emphasis on home economics and agriculture, was under construction near Damascus.

Vital Statistics

Due to lack of demographic data among 659
large segments of the population, few valid statistics are available. Theoretically, the registration of births and deaths is compulsory, but in the rural areas, away from centers of population, reporting is incomplete. Government officials estimate that the accuracy of the recorded statistics approximates 90 per cent in the cities, but 30 to 60 per cent in the villages, over one half of which have less than 200 inhabitants. Considering the country as a whole, probably 50 to 80 per cent of the births are recorded and, since certificates are required for burial, a slightly higher percentage of the deaths. According to published statistics 163
for 1948, the birth rate for the entire coun- 165
try was calculated at 19.1 per 1,000 population; the death rate, at 6.5 per 1,000 population. The birth rates ranged from 35.3 in the city of Damascus to 9.0 in the rural province of Al Jazira; the death rates, from 13.2 to 2.3, respectively. Evidence derived from informal surveys in different localities, however, suggests that the true birth rates average 30 to 40 per 1,000 population and the death rates 15 to 30 per 1,000 population.

The infant mortality is not known, but local observers believe that it is at least 250 per 1,000 live births. In many rural villages the mortality among children under 5 years of age probably reaches 40 to 50 per cent. Discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated by the fact that certification of birth is not required for infants dying during the first year of life. The official infant mortality rate for 1948 was 47.6 per 1,000 births for the country, but 75 per 1,000 births in the city of Damascus. Among almost 15,500 deaths registered in 1949, over 21 per cent were of infants under 1 year and about 35 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 165

Social Economy

Agriculture is the basis of Syria's economy. Over two thirds of the people are dependent upon the land, and, in consideration of the paucity of other natural resources, its full utilization is a problem of primary concern to the welfare of the country. Except in limited portions of the northwestern and the northeastern provinces, the rainfall is deficient and erratic, and the expansion of agriculture is contingent upon the development of irrigation and more efficient methods of production. Estimates of the amount of cultivable land range from 10 to 21 million acres—from less than one quarter to almost one half of the total land area. A similar disparity is noted between the figures quoted for the acreage now under cultivation, but all sources agree that less than one half of the potentially arable lands are planted in crops. Most observers believe that the land suitable for agriculture approximates 12 to 14 million acres, while the area under cultivation is between 5 and 6 million acres. Roughly 10 to 20 per cent of the tilled land is irrigated at present, but it has been shown that the farm acreage could be more than doubled by increased irrigation, associated with controlled settlement, in the Orontes, the Khabour and the Euphrates river valleys. 433 244 132 244 311 244 311

Foremost among the factors which impede the promotion and the modernization 421

p. 139(B)

844 parts of the country. The graduate pharmacists totaled 214.

DISEASES

659 165 Widespread discrepancies in reporting detract from the validity of the morbidity and the mortality statistics. Among the two thirds or more of the population living in the rural villages, not only is the reporting of cases of illness and death poor, but the accuracy of diagnosis is often questionable. In a total of 15,457 deaths officially recorded in 1949, almost 35 per cent were listed as due to "ill-defined, unknown or unspecified" causes. Facilities for laboratory confirmation are lacking outside the larger population centers, and confusion is frequently evident in the differentiation of related infections. Reporting is negligible in the more remote areas, and particularly among the Bedouin tribes. Except in the course of special surveys, or when abnormal epidemic conditions necessitate the enforcement of preventive measures, medical treatment is seldom accessible to the inhabitants of such regions. Even in cities, where the degree of reporting is considerably higher than in the rural areas, the morbidity statistics reflect a general tendency to evade the reporting of certain infectious diseases for fear of isolation. The records of cases treated in the government hospitals, which cannot be regarded as representative, and the reports of particular investigations or surveys provide the most reliable data for the evaluation of the prevalence and the distribution of specific diseases.

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659 165

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Intestinal or Urinary Tract

164 **Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers.** Enteric fevers are endemic, and, in the opinion of the local authorities, a high degree of immunity resulting from repeated exposure to infection exists among the inhabitants. Cases of typhoid fever occur throughout the year, with the peak of incidence usually between June and December, when the con-

164 364

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versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in the same period, but the consumption of camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population. 232 164

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded. 164

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom used without boiling, but infection may result from the consumption of contaminated cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals. 232 164 262 252 164

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis is not compulsory in Syria, and the prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated, however, by the tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population. 164 165 164 183 164

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age. 659 751

758 743 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The de-
743 velopment of increased medical facilities has recently been undertaken by the Ministry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital near Damascus, to provide a total of 350 beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo were under construction. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed hospital in Latakia province, which would bring the total number of beds available for the isolation and the treatment of tuberculous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 A tuberculosis demonstration and training
874 center was established in Damascus in 1952 under the direction of the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Ministry and the Syrian University. It provides a regional headquarters for the training of doctors, nurses and social workers in the public health, the therapeutic and the social aspects of the disease.

164 **Smallpox.** Vaccination against smallpox
751 is compulsory, but enforcement is neces-
361 sarily incomplete in the more remote areas and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks occur from time to time, with sporadic cases reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to 1941 only occasional cases were observed. In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from Iraq, where an epidemic focus had developed in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were recorded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The outbreaks subsided in 1944, and again no more than sporadic cases were noted until 1948, when 894 cases were reported. The known incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influenza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

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age about 5 per cent. Pulmonary complications are generally responsible for a high mortality among the Bedouin children. Mumps, whooping cough and chickenpox are endemic, and often epidemic. 165 164 361

Meningococcus meningitis is sporadic. In the 12 years 1939-50, from 14 to 58 cases were reported annually, except in 1944, when the known incidence totaled 135 cases. 164

Occasional cases of diphtheria are observed, usually among children in the preschool and the school age groups. A high rate of subclinical infection undoubtedly exists, however, as demonstrated by Schick test studies.[83] Scarlet fever is relatively rare, although a few cases are reported each year. Streptococcus infections of the throat are common.

Poliomyelitis is seldom reported. No outbreaks have been recorded, but sporadic cases are sometimes encountered.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Contact

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal disease are present, but little information is available from which to determine their actual prevalence. Syphilis is widely distributed, while gonorrhea occurs primarily in the cities and the towns. Soft chancre is sometimes seen among the poorer inhabitants, but lymphogranuloma inguinale is comparatively rare. [511]

The nonvenereal treponemal infection, usually designated by the Arab term *bejel*, is common among the nomadic and the seminomadic populations in the Euphrates and the Al Jazira regions. The most prominent endemic foci are probably in the vicinity of Deir ez Zor, Raqqa and Meyadin. The disease is associated with low standards of living, and in the majority of cases infection is acquired in early childhood. Surveys have indicated that roughly 60 per cent of the above peoples in Euphrates and Al Jazira provinces are affected, while among some Bedouin tribes the infection rates approach 90 to 100 per cent. In different clinical and serologic studies, made at the mis- 164 361

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but 311
which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed [166]
into the region following the opening of the road and began populat- 491
ing it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region.

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" bar- 242
ley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat 432
are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita.

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances 185
which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and 654
planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below:

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the [132]
month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[10] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 715 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [10] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

137 659 313 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

428 166 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant proprietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60%, respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 166 341 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experimental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

build up a sufficient fund to finance the actual settlement. The mission did not obtain sufficient information on these plans to appraise their soundness, but suggests that they be reviewed in the light of the considerations that should, in its opinion, govern such settlements.

The amount of land to be allocated per farm family in any settlement must depend on the yield of the land and the capacity of the cultivator to till it. The prospective yield must be such as to enable the farmer to earn a decent living without, however, being so high as to create inequities. The size of the allotment must not exceed that which the cultivator can manage with the labor of his own family and with the equipment at his disposal. For irrigated areas the appropriate allotment would be 5-10 hectares where land is good to average. In areas adjoining urban markets where intensive cultivation of vegetables is possible, the allotment could be below 5 hectares; and in areas where the soil is rather poor, more than 10 hectares may be necessary. Settlements for Bedouins in dry-farming areas should be organized on the assumption of 50 hectares per family. The mission believes, however, that it would be unwise to allocate all this land at once, since no family could be expected to cultivate such a large parcel. The initial allocation should be about 25-30 hectares, and even of this a part might be put into improved pasture instead of being cropped. The balance might then be put into a reserve which would be used for grazing and be available for allotment to farmers who show themselves especially capable, or to new families in the settlement. Such a pattern will make it easier for the Bedouin to accomplish the transition to settled agriculture, by enabling him to carry on his customary pastoral pursuits as he crops his land.

The land would have to be tilled with draft animals and the necessary supplemental tools, but a special effort must be made to provide the settler with more adequate draft animals and better equipment than are customarily employed. While the use of mechanized equipment would in general be impracticable, the mission does recommend that one dry-farming community be organized on a mechanized basis. Such a community is suggested quite frankly as an experiment to test the possibilities of mechanical cultivation by smallholders. Ideally, the necessary tractors, implements and harvesting machinery should be owned and operated cooperatively. In the beginning, however, the settlers would hardly be prepared for such cooperative action. The mission suggests therefore that the government establish the necessary machinery unit under the direction

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

423 of a manager with experience in the operation and maintenance of me-
● 166 chanical equipment. In the first few years at least the services of this unit
241 should be made available to cultivators at rates high enough to cover cost of amortization and operation. As and when the farmers acquire experience with machinery and develop a community spirit conducive to cooperative action, steps should be taken to transfer the equipment in whole or in part to cooperatives.

The government should utilize the opportunity afforded by such new settlements to raise the standard of agricultural practices above the average. A government agricultural worker or community leader should be assigned to each settlement. It cannot be expected, of course, that optimum farm practices will be adopted, particularly by Bedouin settlers. It is possible, however, to provide guidance and even, perhaps, to prescribe certain crop rotations. In the dry-farming communities wheat will obviously be the principal crop, but winter vetch and such legumes as lentils, chick peas and soya beans should also be part of the cropping scheme. From 5 to 10 hectares might be left fallow each year. Another 5-10 hectares of each farmer's allotment might well be put into approved pasture. Each settler should be provided with about 60 sheep which should give a return nearly equal to that derived from crops. For the irrigated areas much more intensive cultivation, with a minimum of fallow, should of course be envisaged. The emphasis should be on such summer crops as cotton, sugar beets, peanuts, maize, beans and vegetables grown in proper rotation. Here the use of fertilizers and insecticides will have to be especially encouraged. A few cattle should be kept on the basis of the fodder provided by some of the suggested crops.

423 Each settlement should be small enough so that the remotest farm
166 would be no farther than an hour's walk from the village, and large
241 enough to warrant the establishment of minimum community services
361 such as a well, a mosque or church, a school and a community center. The first consideration is important only in determining the size of a dry-farming settlement and would point to a settlement with an area no larger than about 5,500 hectares. On such a dry-farming area 120 families, including 10 non-farming families, could be settled initially; and the total might ultimately be about double if the land first held in reserve as pasture were subsequently allocated to new families. Even a settlement of 120 families, with a total population of 600-720, could support minimum community facilities. For the irrigated areas, where land allotments would

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

DIAGRAM 1
SCHEMATIC RELATIONSHIP OF DRY-FARMING COMMUNITIES



a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMS
c: COMMUNITY LAND FOR GRAZING



DIAGRAM 2
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(20 Hectare Farms)

DIAGRAM 3
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(50 Hectare Farms)

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423 be much smaller, the minimum size of a community might be raised to
166 around 300 families, including some 30 non-farming families. Such a larger
241 community would economize capital invested in common services. Even
361 on irrigated land, however, circumstances might dictate the establishment of a smaller community with a provision for subsequent growth if the potentialities of the land warrant it.

A settlement should be laid out in such a way as to make access to farm land convenient and to fit into adjoining settlements of a similar type. For the dry-farming area settlement units shaped like hexagons would in principle be ideal. (See Diagrams 1-3.) In such a unit the farms could be laid out at an angle to six roads radiating from the center and parallel to the sides of the hexagon. Between the farms radiating from the roads the land initially reserved as common pasture would be located. One of the six roads would link the settlement with other communities. A number of hexagonal settlements would fit well together. It must be recognized, however, that modifications in this basic hexagonal unit will often be necessary, owing to marked variations in the quality of the soil or the topography, the relationship of the area to existing settlements and other factors. (For examples, see Diagrams 4-6.) In the irrigated regions the shape of the settlement will be largely determined by the layout of the irrigation system, so that the hexagon may well have to yield to the square as the more practical form.

In areas where a number of settlements are established the relationship of the new communities to each other and to existing settlements in adjoining areas must be carefully considered. For the Roudj, for example, the mission would suggest the establishment of about five communities, of which four would be purely agricultural and one would serve also as a minor marketing and administrative center and therefore be somewhat larger. (See Map 6.) A major center need not be envisaged in view of the proximity of the towns of Idlib and Jisr ech Chogour. For the more extensive region of the Ghab a similiar pattern can be contemplated; and the planning will need to be based on the assumption that Jisr ech Chogour, situated at the northern end of the area, will become the regional marketing and administrative center.

The mission strongly recommends the village-type of settlement. Any other type which would house the settlers on their own farms would not only be contrary to tradition, but would be destructive of community life and make it difficult to supply the needed community services. The village

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DIAGRAM 4
ALTERATION OF FARM DIVISIONS IN THE CASE OF VARIATIONS IN THE QUALITIES OF SOIL

a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMING
c: IRRIGATED AREA



DIAGRAM 5
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH STREAM



DIAGRAM 6
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH DIFFERENT TOPOGRAPHIC CONTOURS

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

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

should be located in the center of the settlement area and laid out along a rectangular pattern with the community facilities and open public places in the middle. It would be desirable to have the village surrounded by a small garden area and a belt of trees.

The settlement must, of course, be considered "model", but not in the sense that its standards and costs are so high as to render its general adoption prohibitively expensive. The settlers should be expected to contribute their own labor to its initial construction and the subsequent gradual expansion and improvement of its facilities. This will help to reduce costs and give the settlers a sense of pride and achievement in the establishment of the community. For example, the ultimate aim might be to provide a farm family with a 5-room house (3 main rooms, kitchen and laundry-lavatory), enclosed courtyard, storehouse and stables.[10] Initially, however, it would suffice to provide a 2-room unit without some of the elements in the final building. The cost could thus be kept to about £S 1,500, to which the settler might contribute £S 800 in the form of properly supervised self-help. Each farm family will need, however, a minimum sustenance allowance of approximately £S 1,000 to tide it over the first year when the community is in the course of construction and little is produced. Such an allowance should be paid out in the form of compensation for labor services provided by the settlers.

The mission has estimated the cash investment outlay in the different types of settlements as follows (in Syrian pounds):

	Dry farming settlement (120 families)		Irrigated area settlement (310 families)
	Non-mechanized	Mechanized	
Housing for farm families	77,000	77,000	191,100
Housing and shops for non-farm families	20,000	20,000	67,000
Community facilities[a]	71,000	71,000	182,000
Draft power, livestock and implements	318,000	514,000[b]	341,250
Sustenance allowance	110,000	110,000	273,000
Total	596,000	792,000	1,054,350

[a] Including schools, mosques (or churches), community centers, water supply and roads.
[b] Including £S 250,000 for mechanized equipment.

[10] See Annex I, p. 468.

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423 The mission suggests that the state Agricultural Bank finance the housing
146 and means of production (other than mechanized equipment) under
241 loans to be amortized over a 10-year and three- to four-year period respec-
361 tively. The government itself should be responsible for providing the funds necessary for community facilities, mechanized equipment and payment of the sustenance allowance.

423 The mission's calculations indicate that the average farm family should
146 be able to earn a net annual income of around £S 2,000 in the dry-farming
241 communities and of over £S 3,000 in the irrigated-area communities even during the period when loans are being repaid. This should leave a small margin for the payment for land in the dry-farming areas and a substantial margin for the necessary payments for land and water in the irrigated areas. The mission believes it a sound principle to require some payment even for non-irrigated state domain. The price of land, however, should be such that the settler can expect to become a full owner within a reasonable period, e.g., no more than 10 to 15 years.

Certain conditions will need to be enforced in settling peasants on the land. For example, title should not be transferred until all payments have been completed, and in the intervening period the government should reserve the right to remove settlers who prove to be clearly unsuitable or do not till their own land. Even after title has been transferred, the government might well retain for a specified period the right to veto all proposed sales, mortgages or leases, in order to safeguard the fundamental objective of establishing and maintaining independent peasant proprietors.

During the next five years the government will have to undertake the settlement of the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab. For the settlement of Bedouins the mission recommends the establishment of two experimental dry-farming communities, one of which would be mechanized, in the Jezireh. The mission must emphasize, however, that the latter two experiments are bound to fail unless the government allocates to them good land situated in a region with adequate rainfall. Both the Roudj and the Jezireh projects will provide much valuable experience useful in extending the settlement effort. In addition the government might well undertake one project in the Djebel es Smaane northwest of Aleppo and another in the Djebel Druze. The ruins of many once imposing cities testify that the first region flourished from the first to the seventh century of the Christian era, and recent evidence indicates that this prosperity was primarily founded on orchards and vineyards. More recently people have been

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returning to become squatters among the ruins and cultivate patches of stony but fertile soil. Organization of this rather haphazard settlement and the establishment of a planned community based again on orchards and vineyards may prove a worthwhile undertaking. In the Djebel Druze, where living standards are low and emigration is difficult for religious reasons, a similar settlement should be tried, provided a suitable tract of land can be found. Here, too, conditions are favorable for the establishment of orchards and vineyards.

At present responsibility for settlement is dispersed. The Ghab Administration is entrusted with settlement in the Ghab; the Irrigation Service has the task in other newly reclaimed and irrigated areas; and the Ministry of Agriculture has the initiative for the dry-farming areas. The mission strongly recommends that responsibility for planning and coordinating all the work be vested in a single, independent Settlements Administration, which would also discharge certain governmental functions relating to housing, town planning and similar subjects. The settlement program will require a great organizational effort and a staff which only a single agency would be capable of mobilizing. One administration is also much more likely to apply the experience gained in the initial settlement work to subsequent ventures. The mission urges that such an agency be established promptly, so that the necessary planning may be immediately initiated. The assistance of a number of foreign experts will need to be enlisted to carry out the program.

If the four settlements the mission has recommended are established and the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab are settled, the total cost would probably be around £S 10 million. Under the mission's proposals, £S 5.5 million would be financed by the Agricultural Bank, and the balance met directly by the government. With these funds it should be possible to settle some 2,300 families or between 12,000 and 14,000 people.

Land Reform

While the settlement of state domain may gradually increase the number of peasant proprietors, Syria will also have to work out policies relating to land ownership and tenancy in the areas already under cultivation. In this connection it should be noted that Article 22 of the 1950 constitution calls for legislation to determine, without retroactive effect, "the maximum area of land that may be owned, exploited and disposed of, according to

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Economic Benefits

The mission estimates that the gross value of the produce of the Ghab area will be in the neighborhood of £S 63 million annually, or about £S 47 million after deducting the amount already produced in the area in question. The production of cotton, maize, sorghum, rice and sugar beets is particularly likely to have a marked impact on Syria's balance of trade. It may be assumed that the output of cotton and cottonseed will in effect be added to the country's exportable surplus; the additional rice production may make Syria fully self-sufficient in that commodity; and the sugar beet production should permit a considerable import saving.

In addition to the project's contribution to an increase in national income and an improvement in the balance of payments, the settlement of farmers in the area made possible by the project will assist in relieving the present population pressure in the province of Latakia and particularly in the Alaouit mountains. In Latakia, for example, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% of the average for Syria as a whole. Settlers in the Ghab will be able to earn substantially more than the bare living they have been able to eke from the soil in the past.

Organization

The "Administrative Office of the Drainage and Irrigation Works of the Ghab Lands" was created in 1951, to be attached to the Ministry of Public Works until the technical work is completed. It will be responsible for the design of the works, award of contracts, supervision of construction, payment of expenses and for sale of the land. As parts of the project are completed, the Office will take care of the operation and maintenance of the dams and of the irrigation and drainage networks and will collect water charges. During the planning and construction period the Office should recruit and train staff to carry out the continuing operation and management of the project.

It is important that the policy, and the attendant operating and budget delegations, provide for the establishment and operation of the agricultural research centers and for a long-range educational and farm demonstration program; otherwise, it will be practically impossible to achieve acceptable land use in the area.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

v INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

The Need for Further Industrialization

433 464 It is generally agreed—and the mission shares this opinion—that with a more rational distribution and better cultivation of the available land, and particularly with a gradual extension of the irrigated area, Syrian agriculture could for a considerable time to come easily absorb the expected natural population increase. With respect to the need for further industrialization, however, the relevant considerations seem rather to be the territorial and occupational distribution of the population and the evolution of this pattern. The principal question is whether—and if so, to what degree and in which direction—Syrian industry needs further expansion to absorb the present and immediately foreseeable effective labor supply.

464 369 166 Although reliable figures are not available there is no clear evidence that Syria is suffering from chronic unemployment. There are, however, some very overpopulated rural areas with considerable underemployment and there is a continuous flow of labor from the villages to the urban centers. During the postwar period of considerable building activity and rapid industrialization, these markets were able to absorb the increased labor supply. But at times, as for instance in 1948 in Aleppo, the urban workers have become alarmed by the influx of villagers competing with them and aggravating already existing unemployment, particularly in the textile industry. There were demonstrations and a request to the local authorities to bar villagers from applying for town employment; this in turn induced the government to encourage certain village industries—the decline of which is again contributing to urban labor pressure.

This illustrates the tensions which are bound to arise as a consequence of the existing imbalance between rural-urban social and economic conditions. Unless the village standard of living is greatly improved, there is little doubt that the trend toward the towns will continue strong and that the numbers seeking employment in industry will greatly exceed the natural increase in the industrial population. This tendency may even become more pronounced when, as is to be anticipated, illiteracy in the villages declines, transport and communications improve and the rural population becomes more aware of its poverty and social insecurity.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

The recommendations of the mission with regard to agriculture and animal husbandry, including those concerning land tenure and irrigation, would, if accepted, open significant new perspectives to the farmer and farm laborers and tend to check the drift from rural areas. If it were possible to spend more on irrigation than has been recommended, the trend could perhaps be reversed. It is not likely, however, that the growing labor supply can be absorbed and unemployment avoided without further industrialization. Even on the highly optimistic assumption that migration towards the towns can be halted, Syria must contend with such factors as the natural increase in the industrial labor population and the gradual shift from handicraft to mechanization with the consequent release of manpower.

Although estimates in this field are particularly hazardous, the mission suggests that under the most favorable circumstances Syria will have to create at least 20,000-25,000 new industrial jobs during the next six years to keep its industrial labor market in reasonable balance.

Limiting Factors

It is often contended in Syrian official and business circles that shortage of local capital rather than lack of confidence is the principal factor limiting further industrialization. Assuming that this is so, it would follow that to advance development Syria should make a strenuous effort to create attractive conditions for foreign capital as a supplementary source of industrial financing. This conclusion does not seem to be generally acknowledged. At least the nationalization of foreign-owned public utilities without settling the matter of indemnification of their proprietors, and the regulations with respect to foreign companies working in Syria, do not indicate its acceptance.

There is, however, room for some doubt whether scarcity of capital should be considered as a major factor limiting development of Syrian industry. During the past eight years, investments in industry have supplied the country with an industrial capacity capable of meeting most of the need for manufactured articles, based on local primary production, which the population can afford; indeed, as already pointed out, in several branches of industry there is excess capacity. Generally speaking, Syrian industry appears to have attracted substantial amounts of capital. Even taking into account the fact that the sources of industrial investment

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formulate programs to be applied in the various stages of training. The State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

15: Tannous N,G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
Egypt MR1
Syria MD1
Saudi Arabia MJ1

About two years ago the Government of Saudi Arabia proclaimed its readiness to grant state land to any citizen who undertakes to put it under cultivation. This policy was developed on the basis of the Koranic statement to the effect that land belongs to the one who revives it. It must be remarked in this connection that the religion of Islam is basically for the equitable distribution and utilization of the land resource. Saudi Arabia is an Orthodox Muslim country, regulating its life in accordance with the religious law. This opens the possibility for the development of a form of ownership that is at the same time Islamic and effective. SA 423

In the summer of 1949 Col. Husni Za'im of Syria was liquidated through a coup d'état, but not so the reforms he had initiated. The idea of reforming the land tenure system has been kept alive. The government that followed that of Za'im created a committee representing various agencies to study the problem and recommend possible solutions. This activity bore fruit in the form of Article 22 in the new Syrian constitution, which provides, among other things, for (a) encouragement of small and medium land holdings; (b) setting a maximum limit to the size of holdings, but not retroactively; (c) making it obligatory upon the owner to keep his land under cultivation, otherwise he would lose his claim over it; and (d) distributing state land among landless peasants. There are also indications that the present government intends to take effective action in this respect. There is already a plan for the resettlement of peasants on state land in the Homs-Hama areas. S 185 423 166 M 185 423 166

A promising sign in Egypt is the consciousness of the problem that is now shared by government officials and by people in various walks of life, including the peasants themselves. This consciousness has developed as a result of a rapid increase in population, bringing about a tremendous pressure upon the land resource. As mentioned above, this resource is highly concentrated in the hands of the very few, including the state. The landless or near-landless peasant desires strongly a few acres of the coveted precious land. E 185 471 M 185 471

In response to this tense situation, Egyptian leadership is beginning to take some action. In some cases the government has M 471 427 E 471 427

25: Wanner 5-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Lebanon MEI
Syria MDI

4 irrigated land, and village chiefs can frequently be bribed to
312 leave open irrigation ditches so that their land is better
423 watered. This frequently happens, for example, in the Ghuta of Damascus, where there is no unified plan for the irrigation
9 of the district and no authority which can enforce the custom-
312 ary rights.
423

2. The system under which water is owned collectively, or as *Waqf*, in the northern Beqa.

3. Private ownership by large landowners. This is usual in the Lebanon where there are a number of small private schemes.

These methods of control apply to the smaller schemes. Large-scale schemes have been operated either by:

1. Private concession. Only one relatively large-scale concession is actually in operation, the Nahr Ibrahim (Adonis) scheme.
2. The State. State-controlled works have been carried out by
   (i) authorities directly under the control of the French authorities;
   (ii) authorities directly under the control of the Lebanese Public Works Ministry;
   (iii) Lebanese or Syrian authorities under the control of the Délégation Générale.

There is great need of a central authority to co-ordinate the supply of water. In the south Beqa, for instance, much irrigable land is left unirrigated and much water allowed to run to waste for lack of such an authority.

9 *State Land.* One of the main reasons for the lack of intensive
423 cultivation in central Syria is that the State lands have never
● 166 been systematically settled. Very large areas are State domain, that is, land registered as the property of the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid. Under the mandate, this land became the property of the local government. Under the Turks these lands were used for the 'displaced persons' of the old Empire, who were driven out when Turkish territory was lost, but they were still sparsely settled when the French took over.

9 After the rising of 1925 the French authorities began to settle
166

Wantner S-S (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

S the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares
166 were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating
S much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled.
311 Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

S In several respects the French authorities have modified the
L Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners
656 against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the exten-
423 sive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation conces-
565 sions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

S Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural
L credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the pea-
185 sant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were
565 started, but produced more water than could be used. The edu-
511 cational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

S So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of
L improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessi-
241 tates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and money-lenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[671] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
361 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

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prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands. 624 425 427

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years. 563 167 661 651

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

III The Shashans

The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-ordinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without property or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profitable to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages 1621
are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur 563
el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. 191
They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflict- 795
ed upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. 795
The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac 779
Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is consti- 1621
tuted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following 167
the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from 657
that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League 463
of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. 648
Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the 662
memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all 1821

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 181

abandoned the wandering life, taken to agriculture and mingled with the settled population already established in the country, which was itself largely the product of a similar process at an earlier time.

The immigrants from the Arabian peninsula brought with them their distinctive customs and ideas and one or other of the 'Semitic' family of languages. Together with Mesopotamia on the other side of the Fertile Crescent, Syria has been throughout history the place where what may, by a not very misleading simplification, be called the 'Semitic' stream of population and influences has met and mingled with other streams. She has served also as the limit of the emigration from Arabia. The Semitic peoples and their languages have never taken firm root beyond the Taurus Mountains. Even in Syria they have not been unopposed, but they have always been of great importance. A large proportion of the population of Syria can trace its descent at least in part to earlier or later immigrants from Arabia; and while Mediterranean and other influences have largely affected forms of government and the culture of the cities, the language and the customs of the countryside have always been predominantly Semitic.

The two sets of influences, that from Arabia and that from other directions, have interacted in various ways. There has been conflict at times, and at times peaceful mingling. Often tension of some sort has existed between the more predominantly Mediterranean and the more predominantly Arabian elements in the population, and between successive waves of settlers from the same source. Sometimes that tension has mirrored itself in the individual soul, which has felt itself drawn in two directions, towards the desert and towards the West. It is only very rarely, if at all, that the influences have blended so completely as to remove all tension. It is true that there has always been a tendency to that end. Rulers and settlers from the Mediterranean lands have to some extent adopted Semitic ways and Arabian immigrants have acquired some of the characteristics of a Mediterranean people. But the process has never been allowed to complete itself; further invasions have occurred, a new Government has established itself, or there have been further waves of immigration, and the process of assimilation has had to begin again.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria/MD/

175 177 life in all its aspects underwent a gradual and still incomplete process of Westernization. The tastes and habits of the population were profoundly influenced by the inflow of goods from the West; their beliefs and way of thinking still more profoundly so by the spread of Western culture.

175 177 167 The reception of Western civilization was helped by the emigration of many thousands of Syrians to other countries. In general they came more often from Lebanon than from other regions, and they were more often Christians than Moslems. Their motives for leaving their country were various. Many of the Christians desired to escape from a predominantly Moslem environment, especially after the events of 1860; many among both Christians and Moslems found Ottoman rule too oppressive to be borne; young men educated in the mission-schools wished for opportunities and rewards greater than their native land could offer; some were attracted by the legendary promise of the New World, its wealth and its freedom; and others went abroad simply because their relations and friends had already settled there.

167 175 There were two main roads of emigration. The one led to Egypt and the Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the other Arabic-speaking countries. This road had always been open, but it was rendered more attractive by the establishment of British control over Egypt and the Sudan. The British authorities needed subordinate officials who spoke Arabic and understood the ways of the Near East, but who were also acquainted with Western methods of thought and administration. They found what they needed in the graduates of the Syrian mission-schools, who for half a century loyally and effectively filled a variety of positions in the Governments of Egypt and the Sudan. Thousands of other Syrians went to Egypt as merchants, doctors and journalists. They progressed, and some among them played a considerable part in the cultural life of the country. Being largely an urban middle-class community, partly Christian and suspected of an excessive attachment to Great Britain or at least to the West, the Syrian-Egyptians have not always been liked by the Egyptians; but many of them have become Egyptians in nationality and sentiment, and at least the Moslems among them may become assimilated in a generation or two to the population among whom they are living.

The Syrian-Egyptians are numbered in tens of thousands,

but those who have followed the other road, to North and South America, to Australia and to other of the more distant parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands. The great majority of them started as retail traders on a small scale, but many took to wholesale trade and to the manufacture of textiles and other goods. The process of taking root was harder for them than for those who went to Egypt, since it involved learning new languages and acquiring new ways of life; but they have already been assimilated to a considerable extent, and the large Syrian colonies in the United States, Brazil and the Argentine, with smaller ones in other countries, have become prosperous, loyal and respected elements in the communities in which they are living. Most of them have given up all but a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and there seems to be no obstacle to their ultimate complete assimilation, the more so since the flow of emigrants to the countries of the New World has greatly diminished during the last two decades. It has been partly diverted to British and French West Africa, much of the internal trade of which is now in Syrian hands.

The consequences of the emigration for Syria were both good and bad. They were bad in so far as it was the more talented and enterprising of the country's youth who went abroad, during the period of their greatest energy and often for ever. On the other hand, the level of prosperity was raised by the remittances which successful emigrants sent home to their relatives, and by the savings which they brought back with them. Also, they introduced new ideas, and, what was even more important, the example of a new and in many respects attractive way of life. These ideas, this example and the bare fact that Syrians were prosperous and happy in foreign lands, deeply influenced the attitude of Syria to the West. All this was especially true of Lebanon, since it supplied so large a proportion of the emigrants.

18

Western influences also came by way of education. Students began to go abroad, to seek the new learning in the schools of Europe and America; and Western schools became ever more numerous in the Near East. The greater number of them were established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M01

795 the standard of living and education among the Alawis and
648 to develop their corporate consciousness; and who believe that if this is to be done the Alawis must be given a separate administration specially adapted to their needs and under benevolent foreign tutelage. There are others who admit the importance of these tasks but who emphasize that it is equally necessary to give the Alawis a consciousness of being part of the Arab nation as an alternative to sectarianism and to a paralysing localism. Among the Alawis themselves, one party adheres to the former school of thought, a second to the latter, but the greater number are suspicious of all interference from outside and wish only to be left alone.

Here, as in Jebel Druze, great social and intellectual processes are beginning of which the results have yet to appear. But it will probably take longer to bring Alawi society to a point where it becomes possible to face the problem of its definitive political status.

II

311 The problem of the Jazirah, the north-eastern province
167 of Syria, is in many ways different from that of Jebel Druze and the Alawi territory. Before the War of 1914–1918 it was largely an empty district, except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was sparsely cultivated where it was cultivated at all; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria they established a considerable measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already possessed by virtue of its fertility. The French authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian and other minorities who had been forced to leave their dwellings in Turkey, or who preferred not to live in the predominantly Moslem parts of Syria. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, together with Assyrians from Iraq after the events of 1933, have moved into the province; and even larger numbers of Kurdish Moslems, dislodged from their homes in Eastern Turkey by the policy of forcible assimilation
361 adopted by the Turkish Government. The new towns of
311 Hassetche and Qamishli and new villages have been created and new crops introduced, and the district has been opened up to regular commerce. The Beduin have been controlled
AND CERTAIN TRIBES AMONG THEM PERSUADED TO SETTLE ON THE LAND.

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S 241 311 crease the productivity per acre and also to expand the culti-
vated area per head.

L 311 241 134 In the Lebanon, however, with its steep hillsides under intensive cultivation, there is a definite pressure on land resources. The limits of intensification appear to have been reached, and a large part of the village population supplements its income by work in the towns, and by remittances from abroad. If the land

L S 511 167 tenure system in Syria were less oppressive, room might be found on the land for settlers from the Lebanon, but as things are, the standard of living and status of the Lebanese peasant is higher; compared with the Syrian peasant he is a free man, and there is no inducement to leave the Mountain for the under-populated plains of central or northern Syria.

LAND TENURE

L 471 423 464 Corresponding to these different methods of farming, there are different systems of land tenure.[1] In Lebanon individual small ownership is well established, and the pattern of village life, with its broad class of small peasant owners, few large farmers, and a growing class of landless labourers, resembles that of Europe.

S 471 427 423 In Syria, the greater part of the land is owned by city notables—the ruling class—and cultivated by small share-tenants. Though individual ownership exists in some districts, for instance the Beqa Valley and the oasis of Damascus, the most usual form of landownership in the plain districts of Syria is share-tenancy. The villagers bring their corn to the village threshing floor, and when the grain is threshed the landlord or his agent stands by and takes one-half of the grain. Towards this result he has contributed nothing; all labour, equipment, seeds, livestock, have been supplied by the tenant, so that his share is rent purely for the use of the land. The landlord is almost always an absentee, a city notable who only visits the land to collect rent.

S 427 The share taken by the landlord varies from district to district, and also varies with the condition of the land. According to an inquiry made by the French authorities, the usual division of the crop for non-irrigated cereals is 40–50 per cent to the

[1] The information which follows is mainly based on A. Latron, *La Vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, L'Institut Français de Damas, 1936). The brilliant and profound study by Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient*, is an indispensable authority which unfortunately was received only after going to press.

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CHAPTER V

SYRIA

In Syria, where the idea of Arab independence found some of its earliest protagonists, nationalism has been marked by a special degree of ill-temper, perhaps because the masses of the larger towns—Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, etc.—at an early stage became an object of political manœuvring. 186 669

Anti-foreign feelings had been aroused as early as 1925, when clashes with the French Mandatory régime led to the bombardment of Damascus. After the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936, Syria became a refuge for Palestinian Arab terrorists on the run. Fawzi Kaukji—an Albanian adventurer specialising in gun-running and gang warfare on behalf of Arab extremists—Amin al Husseini—the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem—and many other "wanted" disturbers of the peace found fertile soil for their activities in Syria.

Here the connection between Arab nationalism and Muslim fanaticism was particularly close, and even sermons in the Mosques frequently descended to the level of vicious and inflammatory diatribes against non-believers. As early as October, 1945, the leader of the "Young Muslims' Association," Sheikh Mustafa al-Sibaj, in a violent speech after the Friday midday prayers in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, threatened the Jews in Arab countries with disaster "if the Palestine problem is not solved in favour of the Arabs."

These characteristics of Arab nationalism in Syria have had their effect not only on the Jews but on the Christian minority also. Hence the attractiveness of neighbouring Lebanon, with its security of life for minorities, as a goal for Christian emigration. The same was true as regards the Jews of Syria, a steady stream of whom has been moving to Lebanon for the last 25 years. The early trickle has recently become so great in volume that, by now, it is believed that only a few remnants of the Jewish population are left in the two big towns of Aleppo and Damascus. 568 668

The last census—that of 1943—gave the number of Jews in Syria as 29,770 out of a total population of 2,860,411 (of whom 2,424,817 were Muslims). The majority of the Jews used to live in Aleppo and Damascus, with about 17,000 in Aleppo (compared with 35,000 in 1910) and 11,000 in Damascus. The remainder, rather isolated, dwelt mostly in the north-eastern province of Jezirah, where they had settled in 1924, along with Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians from Turkey and Iraq. 162 167

Of the 29,000 Jews in Syria in 1943, about 15,000 had left the country by 1947. At that time, there still remained about 10,000-11,000 in Aleppo and about 2,500-3,000 in Damascus. Less than 1,000

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162 were left in the Jezirah district. An additional 5,000-6,000 Jews
167 emigrated at the beginning of 1948, leaving a total of about 9,000, with 4,500 in Aleppo, 4,000 in Damascus, and 500 in the Jezirah district. Further emigration took place that year; and it is estimated that there are now fewer than 6,000 left in the whole country.

This exodus was the culmination of many years of intimidation, material decline, and moral isolation. The smaller community in Damascus had always been poor. About 80 per cent earned their living as labourers and pedlars; approximately 15 per cent were able to maintain a slightly higher standard; while only 5 per cent were able to make a good living, mostly in commerce. The Aleppo community had in bygone days been prosperous and had been an active and important element of the city's once flourishing commerce. The rapid deterioration of conditions, however, made itself felt particularly strongly among the Jews of Aleppo; and since the wealthy were the first to leave the country, the remainder were impoverished even more swiftly.

197 Although knowledge of French is widespread among educated
563 Jews, the every-day language of the majority is either Arabic or Ladino. There are two *Alliance Israélite Universelle* schools, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus. Since the convocation of the first Parliament in December, 1936, there has been one Jewish representative in the Chamber of Deputies. He was, it is true, allowed to retain his seat even when persecution of the Jews reached its height. But, isolated as he was in a sea of feverish hostility, there was little he could do to alleviate the situation.

In 1945, a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Damascus, presided over by the Mufti of Damascus, sent a telegram to the Allied Governments, threatening that a Holy War against the Jews would be declared by all Islamic countries if Jewish immigration into Palestine continued. Within a month, this action and similar incitement from high quarters, coupled as they were with a violent anti-Jewish press campaign, bore fruit.

[579] On the Muslim holiday of Qurban Bairam, on November 18, an
563 infuriated mob, goaded on by a group of students, broke into the Great Synagogue in Aleppo, smashed the candle burning in front of the Ark,
668 battered some old Jews who were praying, and burnt the prayer books.

This was the signal for the outbreak of a general anti-Jewish campaign, made the worse by the incessant agitation carried on by nationalist orators among the Arab masses. There was the ugly murder of Jacques Franco, Assistant Headmaster of the *Alliance* School in Damascus. Suspicion that his death was the result of the prevailing unrest has never been entirely removed, even though there is insufficient evidence to prove it. There was the forcing of Rabbi Moshe Nahum, of the Jewish community of Jezirah, to make a statement protesting against Jewish immigration into Palestine. There was the humiliating spectacle of the heads of all three Jewish communities

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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648 14 smaller ones, and destroyed 150 houses. An unknown number of
563 Jews was butchered to death.
579 By the time Palestine was invaded by the Arab States, the Jewish communities in Syria were completely isolated. No Jew dared to have any contacts abroad or, for that matter, with any foreigners resident in the country. Commercial activity came practically to a standstill, since Jews were forbidden to open their shops or to carry on with their employment.

The property of a transport company, owned by an Iraqi Jew, was confiscated, and the entire Jewish staff arrested. Fifteen Jewish girls who worked in the telephone exchanges in Aleppo and Damascus were dismissed. The Chief Engineer of Damascus, who had held this position for 12 years, suffered the same fate, together with five Jewish school teachers. The school building of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* in Damascus was requisitioned for the military. The already impoverished community was forced under threat to donate about £S10,000 (at that time equivalent to £1,100) to the Arab funds.

Throughout the months of fighting, a relentless campaign demanding the confiscation of all Jewish property went on. The Damascus Jews felt themselves fortunate in being spared a repetition of the earlier Aleppo riots, though in August, 1949, 11 were killed when a bomb was thrown into a synagogue.

563 For some time the situation of the Jews in Damascus was extremely grave. Being prevented from earning a living, the community was so impoverished that it was feared that many would die of hunger and disease. Had it not been for the assistance of the Jewish community in Beirut, the Damascus community might well have perished. Later, their straits were further relieved by American help.

563 With the overthrow of the Syrian Government by Husni Zaim in
669 March, 1949, all restrictions on the movements of Jews, as well as on the sale of property, were abolished. The new ruler declared that he would deal severely with any person attempting to discriminate against the Jews. The lifting of the travel ban was immediately followed
[167] by a new wave of Jewish emigration to Lebanon.

The confused situation arising out of Zaim's murder, and the succession of political *coups* which followed, make the prospects of the Jewish community uncertain. But even if the new Government were to abstain from any official discrimination against the Jews of Syria, the atmosphere has been poisoned to such an extent that a return to normal conditions and peaceful relations seems most unlikely. On the face of it, nothing will alter the passionate wish of practically every Jew in Syria to shake the country's dust off his feet.

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

163 186 The people of Syria are predominantly of ancient Semitic stock, modified by centuries of conquest, and Arabic in culture, language and religion. The population, however, includes numerous minority groups, some of which exist as compact communities with distinctive customs and traditions. The official method of enumeration is on the basis 161 of religious affiliation. In 1949, the population was estimated at about 3,177,700, exclusive of undetermined numbers of Bedouin, representing less than 10 per cent 162 of the total. Approximately 86 per cent of 165 the inhabitants were adherents of Islam; about 69 per cent belonged to the Sunni sect. The heterodox sects consisted of roughly 355,500 Alawites, 100,600 Druzes, 32,800 Ismailites, 13,700 Shiites and 2,900 Yazides.

Syria, like Lebanon, has important indigenous Christian minorities, which together account for almost 14 per cent of the population. As of 1949, the Greek Orthodox Church claimed about 153,900 members; the Armenian Orthodox, 107,300; the Syrian Orthodox, 44,970; and the Greek Catholic, 51,500. Other church groups, comprising Armenian, Syrian and Roman Catholics, Maronites, Nestorians (Assyrians), Chaldeans and Protestants, each numbered from 5,000 to 18,000. In addition, there were slightly over 31,000 Jews, mainly of Sephardic origin and with a long history of residence in Syria. With the exception of about 125,300 Armenians and 10,200 Assyrians, the members of the Christian minorities are largely Arabic-speaking and closely re- 169 lated to their Moslem compatriots. Most of 162 the Armenians have come to Syria since 1894 as refugees from Turkish territory. The majority reside in the larger towns, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo, but considerable numbers have settled in the Al Jazira region. The Assyrians who fled to Syria from Iraq in 1933 and the Chaldeans

p. 137(B)

162 dwell in the Khabour river basin. The Syrian
169 Orthodox and Catholic churches flourish in the north, where the inhabitants of many
[191] mountain villages employ Syriac dialects, preserved since pre-Islamic times.

795 Prominent among the Moslem minorities are the Alawites and the Druzes. Although both are scattered throughout the country, they are found primarily in the provinces, which, under the Mandate, were semi-autonomous units of the Levant. The Alawites inhabit the province of Latakia, comprising the coastal plain and a large part of the Orontes river valley, where they represent about 70 per cent of the population. The Druzes form a closely knit religious community which migrated to the Jebel ed Druz highlands from Lebanon in the last century.

162 Several racial and linguistic minority groups are contained in the orthodox Moslem majority. About 200,000 Kurds reside in Syria, chiefly in Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces and in the city of Damascus. A large proportion have lived for generations on the fringes of Kurdistan, within the pres-
[161] ent boundaries of Syria, but some are recent colonists from eastern Turkey to the Al Jazira area, where they constitute a considerable part of the population. Smaller non-Arabic-speaking groups include about 30,000 Turkomans, settled around Aleppo and in the Orontes river valley, and almost 20,000 Circassians, found along the northern frontier and in the Euphrates river basin.

Over three quarters of the population live in the western and the northwestern provinces, with the greatest concentration in the coastal region, in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo, and in the Homs and the Hama areas. In the interior, the settled districts are limited to the river valleys, while the steppe and the desert country to the east and the south constitute
161 the home of nomadic Bedouin tribes. In 1948, the density of population in Latakia was estimated at 215 per square mile. In the province of Aleppo it was 113 per square mile; in the province of Damascus, 90 per

p. 138(A)

164 the Qoubour el Bid section of the Al Jazira, along branches of the Khabour River north-
136 east of Hasetché. *Schistosoma haemato-*
164 *bium* is the only species identified in confirmed cases, but rectal complications are sometimes recorded. At present, the disease is confined to circumscribed foci, but in view of the irrigation and the agricultural potentialities of the region, its control is of
164 major public health significance. The foci
361 are apparently of recent origin. Whether the
167 infection was introduced by Senegalese
944 troops stationed in the vicinity, as claimed by the local inhabitants, or by nomadic tribes from Iraq is a matter of conjecture. Surveys have been made within recent years, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and co-operating international organizations, and, although some discrepancies are evident in the determination of the infection rates in different villages, all emphasize the seriousness of the problem. Competent local authorities estimated in 1951 that the total incidence in that year approximated 12,000 cases.

659 In surveys undertaken in 1948,[34] the ex-
164 amination of urine samples collected from 545 persons in Qoubour el Bid and neighboring villages on the Gerahi branch of the Khabour River indicated general infection rates of about 62 per cent. They averaged 73 per cent among the men and the boys, and 49 per cent among the women and the girls. Moreover, they were consistently higher, in both sexes, in individuals under 20 years than in the older age groups.
[361] Equally high infection rates were found among the seminomadic peoples in the Tell Abiad area. A system of spot checking suggested probable infection rates of almost 100 per cent among males and of 60 per cent among females in 3 of the 5 villages visited.

164 A more exhaustive investigation in 1950[35]
659 revealed the presence of infection among
361 about 24 per cent of the inhabitants of 58 villages situated along 4 tributary streams in the Qoubour el Bid area. The infection rates ranged from 1 to 88 per cent: the most

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

ing all this great quantity of Water was past away, so that in about two Hour's Riding we could hardly perceive that there had been any Rain at all. 131

That floods are an old phenomenon in Selemiya is suggested by two traditional theories, repeated by the inhabitants today, regarding the derivation of the place name. The first theory makes the essential form Sal-Miah, "a flood of water." The other was recorded by Yaqut in 1225:

Ahmad ibn Yahyâ ibn Jâbir relates that there was a city in Syria, near Salamiyyah, called Al Mûtafikah [The Overturned], which was overwhelmed with all its inhabitants—all except one hundred souls. These left that place, and came and built one hundred houses, and they called the hamlet where they had made their houses Salâm Miyah (Peace for the Hundred), of which the people made Salamiyyah.[12]

As told today, the story is that the "overwhelming" agent was a flood.

The floods are greatly aggravated by soil erosion. Where the trees have been cut, the bushes torn up for fuel, and the grass overgrazed, and especially where slopes have been plowed, there the soil is eroded, and many slopes are now practically bare of soil and vegetation. In summer, soil is shifted by strong winds; in winter, rain washes it into gullies or wadis with steep, crumbling sides. These are tributary to the main streams which do so much damage when they reach the plain. The runoff from bare slopes is faster and more fully loaded than that from vegetated slopes. 131 134

Past and Present Vegetation Destruction

There is no doubt that the trees of Jebel Bil'as are a remnant of a denser and more extensive growth, though there are no very good grounds for the common assumption that all the Palmyrene ranges were forested in Roman days. The Tablet of Palmyra's fiscal laws of A.D. 137[13] gives reason to suppose that the locality may have furnished considerable quantities of wood and pistachio nuts, and in the same period Jebel Bil'as and neighboring ranges were used as grazing lands for sheep and horses.[14] The location of elaborate Romano-Byzantine foggara systems, as at Moufaqqar, directly in the paths of the floods might seem to indicate that, when the foggaras were constructed, floods were not as serious as they are now. 175 137 [72]

Old stumps and roots are found within and beyond the present wooded

[12] Le Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

[13] See J.-B. Chabot: Choix d'inscriptions de Palmyre, Paris, 1922, pp. 23-38.

[14] A. Poidebard: La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie.—Le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe.—Recherches aériennes (1925-1932) (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 28), Paris, 1934; M. D. Schlumberger: Une campagne de fouilles au Djebel-el-Chaar en 1934. *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1935, pp. 250-256. 113

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

466 to curb at least the abuse of child labor which exists in most small shops. This might be done by occasional spot checks. One of the difficulties, however, is the inadequacy of the enforcement staff of the Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs in the Ministry of Economics. At the beginning of 1954 there were apparently only eight inspectors assigned to the enforcement of the labor code. We urge that the number be increased and that for this purpose an additional £S 325,000 be made available to the Labor Directorate over the next six years.

The Tourist Industry

457
485 In the discussion of the proposed investment bank, we have already indicated that this institution might assist in financing hotels, as well as manufacturing industries and agriculture. Although this chapter focuses on the problem of developing manufacturing, it appears appropriate to mention here also the possibilities of the tourist industry. Syria has much to interest the tourist from the West. On its soil many civilizations and [172] cultures have flourished and left their imprint. There are countless archaeological sites which are still yielding up treasured relics of the past, numerous ancient Greco-Roman and early Christian cities, fascinating ruined Christian churches and imposing mosques, old Crusader castles and Arab forts. Both Aleppo and Damascus, which vie with each other in the claim to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, intrigue the tourist with their blend of the ancient, the picturesque and the modern.

In the postwar period the airplane has greatly extended the orbit of travel for the American and West European, and rising standards of living have enabled many more to travel abroad than before. In Greece, for example, the number of foreign tourists rose from about 33,000 in 1950 to almost 76,000 in 1953, and the per capita expenditure is said to have doubled during this period. Unfortunately, the mission was unable to obtain figures on the total of foreign travellers visiting Syria, but the number has undoubtedly increased significantly. Many travellers to the Holy Land now stop over in Syria. This tourist trade could be greatly expanded if a concerted attempt were made to advertise the attractions of Syria and to improve the inadequate accommodations available to foreigners.

More and better hotels, good communications and adequate preservation and presentation of historical and cultural monuments are all impor-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

tant elements in a program to attract more tourists. At present Damascus is the only Syrian city with first class hotel accommodations and even here there is an acute shortage. Such cities and towns as Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra all urgently require good hotels for tourists and other travellers. Construction and operation of hotels should, of course, be left to private enterprise encouraged by the government and assisted by the projected investment bank. There are, however, a number of places of potential importance to the tourist trade where rest houses and restaurants rather than hotels are needed. Such facilities are not likely to be sufficiently profitable, at least in the beginning, to attract private investment. We suggest, therefore, that the government spend approximately £S 500,000 on the erection and operation of rest houses and restaurants at such locations as Ras Shamra (site of ancient city of Ugarit), Saint Simeon (ruins of old city and monastery-church in Djebel es Smaane), Al Rasafa (Christian monuments and Moslem palace), Doura Europos (ancient city), Krak des Chevaliers (crusaders' castle), Tartous and Soueida. As a UNESCO mission has suggested, some of these could probably be constructed inside existing historical buildings, thus leaving the appearance of the site undisturbed and enhancing their appeal to tourists.

The interest of tourists in the historical and archaeological treasures of Syria also provides a definite economic justification for increasing the expenditures of the Directorate General of Antiquities. This government department has jurisdiction over museums, historical monuments and archaeological excavations. It finances its operations in part from its own receipts, but the government has during the last two years contributed, on the average, £S 763,000 to its annual budget of a little over £S 1 million. In 1954 its total planned investment was about £S 450,000, of which £S 280,000 was devoted to museums, £S 120,000 to the reconstruction of monuments and £S 50,000 to excavations. Damascus possesses a notable museum of which the country can well be proud, but about £S 1 million is still required for its completion. The Aleppo museum, which houses many fine treasures, admittedly needs a new building at a cost of £S 1 million, and appropriate regional and local museums would help the visitor to visualize the cultural heritage and archaelogical finds of particular localities. Although all of this could not be realized within the 1955-60 period, we suggest that £S 2.4 million be provided to complete the Damascus museum, establish a few local museums in such places as Ras Shamra and Palmyra and at least start the new building in Aleppo.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

457 Proper maintenance and repair of monuments is perhaps even more urgent,
658 since there is considerable deterioration at present. We accordingly recom-
172 mend that expenditures for this purpose be raised, on the average, approximately 50% over the next six years. A similar increase might be contemplated for excavation work which, as in the past, will presumably be carried out in cooperation with foreign archaeological missions. All this will require an increase in the subsidies paid to the Directorate of Antiquities out of the government budget to an average annual amount of approximately £S 950,000. The gradual growth in the Directorate's own receipts will probably suffice to cover necessary increases in administrative outlays.

[491] Poor roads now impede access to many interesting historical monuments. In addition to the recommendations on the national road network made elsewhere, we believe Syria would be well advised to spend about £S 1.5 million on the improvement of local roads of importance to the tourist trade. The access roads to the Krak des Chevaliers and Saint Simeon should have the highest priority.

457 Within the not too distant future the government should contemplate the establishment of a special office charged with the promotion of tourism. The cooperation and financial support of business groups interested in the tourist trade might well be enlisted. It should not only seek to interest the foreign tourist in the attractions of Syria, but also to make the Syrian people and Syrian officials more aware of the importance of the tourist trade and of making the tourist genuinely welcome.

Government Expenditures on Industry

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654 Although industry is preeminently a field for private enterprise, we have made in this chapter a number of recommendations entailing additional government expenditures. For the period 1955-60 these would total about £S 20.5 million, allocated as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Manufacturing		
Investment bank	10,500	1,750
Industrial zones and workshops	1,800	300
Enforcement of labor code[a]	325	54

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

FOREWORD

658 172 THE Minister of Education of the Syrian Republic, drawing attention to the importance of the problem of historical remains in Syria, requested Unesco to send a mission of inquiry to prepare a detailed report on: (a) the general situation and importance of ancient buildings and historical and archaeological sites in Syria; (b) general measures which might be taken to preserve these buildings and sites and make best advantage of them; (c) special measures to be taken to preserve and restore buildings and sites considered particularly important or urgently in need of such preservation or restoration.

Syria is one of the countries richest in historical remains, but her very riches in this respect make heavy demands on her resources. The Syrian Government, well aware of its cultural responsibilities, shows an enlightened interest in its country's past by freely allocating the large sums needed yearly for the upkeep and enhancement of its monuments. In addition to making this financial contribution, the government also shows its interest by extending a generous welcome to expeditions of foreign scholars who wish to carry out excavations in Syria; international co-operation is thus being established and maintained, with good results, on archaeological excavation sites. The Directorate of Antiquities believes that such co-operation might well be extended to the restoration of monuments which, for their artistic value and historical importance, may be considered as belonging to all mankind. It hopes that the results of the first inquiry organized by Unesco may lead to more definite collaboration in this field. This report, marking the first step in this direction, may suggest where such collaboration is called for.

121 In conformity with our instructions, we have endeavoured to describe both the general situation as regards historical monuments and archaeological sites in Syria, and the state of individual sites and monuments. We have tried to indicate the difficulties that must be overcome in order to ensure their preservation, and to suggest certain measures which might help to expand the work alresdy begun with such good results

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GENERAL

SYRIA AND HER HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

488 175 By geographical position Syria is a corridor and a meeting-place. From east to west and north to south, it is traversed by two natural highways, one winding through the valleys of the Euphrates and Orontes to link the East with the Mediterranean world, and the other carrying the northern peoples southwards to Africa. Through the ages the country has been occupied for short or long periods by Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders and Ottomans. In Syria—at Kadesh and the Yarmuk—some of the great clashes in history have taken place. Today, with her fate in her own hands, Syria's past provides the varied and fertile sources of her culture, and her present, the vigour necessary for the remarkable progress she is now making.

172 Syria's wealth of historical remains is the visible embodiment of her age-long history and, from that point of view, is to be considered as a national heritage. It has a lesson to give the present generation, for such tangible evidence of their country's greatness in the past is a challenge to the young to prove themselves worthy heirs. For that reason alone, these buildings and monuments deserve to be preserved and maintained. Very often, however, they also have an aesthetic or cultural value, being of importance as works of art or bearing witness to the greatest periods of a civilization. As such, they are of importance beyond the national boundaries and their preservation is a matter of concern not only to the country which possesses them, but to all civilized nations.

For Syria, owing to the vast number and diversity of her historical monuments and the particular conditions in which they are situated, their preservation raises complicated problems. The treatment they require varies according to their present state, for only some of them have remained intact and still serve their original purpose, so that their maintenance is a regular, routine matter. Many of them, on the other hand, are used for a different purpose, never contemplated by their builders, for which they have been more or less satisfactorily adapted

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

172 and transformed. Some have been abandoned and are falling into ruin, while yet others have sunk underground. Only the first group mentioned are still obviously useful and necessary. The others are exposed to dangers which threaten their fabric and their very survival. This must be fully appreciated if they are to be effectively protected.

All historical buildings were originally erected to meet some specific need, so that any given monument's existence is the result of some particular political, social, religious or military situation. Should that situation end or alter, the building may be abandoned or pulled down, having no further use in the eyes of a people aiming at a different kind of life, in which it has no place. The fate of a monument may also be threatened by clashes of economic interests; a building is an asset which may vary in value over the centuries, and some people consider it from that point of view alone; if they feel that it does not give enough return and costs too much to maintain, they will be tempted to let it fall into disuse or to pull it down. Lastly, a monument may be threatened by urban development; there are the quite legitimate needs of town planning to be considered, and a building may suddenly be found to be an obstacle to the execution of a development plan, solely designed to ease the traffic situation and improve the layout of the town.

In all the above cases, it must be shown that efforts to spare historical monuments are not incompatible with the requirements of modern life, and that the continued existence of an old building, even if it does not serve its original purpose or is disused, is nevertheless justifiable; that such a building is not just a "white elephant" but, skilfully restored and set off to proper advantage, still has a part to play in the life of the city and the country.

172 That is the task of the Directorate of Antiquities, which is
658 striving to make Syria's artistic and archaeological treasures ever more widely known. A few words must be said at this point about the very useful work the Directorate is doing in the three-fold field of scientific research, the restoration of monuments, and the organization of museums. We shall later have occasion to quote a number of examples.

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STUDY OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

172 658 Syria's wealth of historical remains is enriched each year by the excavation of further treasures.

Since the old exploratory expeditions made by G. Rey, M. de Vogüé, R. Dussaud and others, the excavation of vast numbers of treasures by the two American archaeological expeditions at the beginning of the century, and the more recent aerial surveys carried out by Father Poidebard, a great many sites have been systematically studied and excavated. We shall not attempt to list them here, but shall confine ourselves to drawing attention to the excellent results achieved through Syria's policy of giving scholars from other countries a free hand in this field.

During the past thirty years or so, a great many foreign excavation parties have come to work in Syria. They have unearthed groups of buildings, sometimes covering large areas; discovered ancient cities; and collected much invaluable material. By extending a welcome to them, Syria has not only added to her archaeological and artistic heritage, discovered new facts about her own history and enriched her museums (the exhibition of finds made during 1952 alone shows how numerous and important they may be), but has also inaugurated successful and friendly international collaboration in disinterested research.

Satisfactory regulations governing such collaboration were set forth in Decree No. 89, of 30 June 1947, which provides all the necessary guarantees. At the present time, six archaeological sites in Syria, varying in importance, are being explored by groups of foreign scholars from four different countries: Ras-Shamra (France), Mari (France), Apamea (Belgium), Cyrrhus (France), Resafa (Germany) and Tell es-Salhiyah (Sweden). The Syrian Directorate of Antiquities, for its part, has undertaken excavations at Palmyra, Boera, Jebla and Raqqa. We shall refer again to these various sites in the later chapters of our report.

At the appropriate point, we shall also have to mention the publications, some of them forming impressive collections, in which the results of excavations, as they proceed, have been presented, described, analysed and commented upon. In addition, there are many studies, relating to archaeology, history, the history of art or the history of religions, for which Syrian historical remains have provided essential data; there are also monographs on particular buildings, cities or regions and, lastly, directories and catalogues. We cannot speak too highly of all these interesting and useful works, without which the monuments would be known only to a few people, and which would never have come into being if the Syrian authorities had not made a point of encouraging such research. Through these works historical remains, many of which are important and some of which may in future undergo alterations or even disappear altogether, are now known far and wide; they are part of the material to which all countries can refer in making general studies. All this gives Syria effective and highly creditable publicity.

Among so many excellent publications, we shall, in this context, refer only to periodicals or series of works dealing principally with Syrian archaeology and monuments, such as the review *Syria* and the fine series of volumes in the *Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique* (hereafter referred to as BAH), published by the French Archaeological Institute in Beirut; the *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* published by the French Institute in Damascus; the *Annales Archéologiques de Syrie* and the various

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publications issued by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities. Here indeed is proof of the general interest in Syria's archaeological and artistic treasures, suggesting that any effort to safeguard the country's wonderful historical remains will be sympathetically received by the rest of the world.

PRESERVATION AND RESTORATION OF MONUMENTS

The Syrian Directorate of Antiquities devotes a large part of its activities and resources to the consolidation and restoration of monuments. In both Damascus and Aleppo, it has excellent technicians whose whole time is devoted to this work. The steady increase in the Directorate's annual budget, which rose from 625,000 Syrian pounds in 1949 to 1,007,000 Syrian pounds in 1952, is sufficient proof of the interest taken in this work by the country's high authorities.

This is a remarkable effort, to which attention must be drawn at the outset. It has made it possible to carry out an impressive list of restorations in all parts of the country during the last few years. The principal work done in Damascus has been on the Citadel, the gates and towers of the city walls, the Roman arch in the "Street called Straight", the mosaics in the Great Mosque, and a large number of other mosques and madrasahs; at Aleppo, on the Citadel, the city walls and the Matbakh el-Ajami; and at Bosra, Palmyra, Qasr el-Heir es-Charki, Homs, Latakia, St. Simeon-Stylites and the Krak des Chevaliers, on important ancient and medieval monuments.

Needs are such, however, that the responsible services are sometimes faced with very disturbing problems. The vast number of historical remains (in Damascus alone, there are 125 buildings classified as historic monuments), the fact that they are scattered over an enormous stretch of territory, the size of some and, in many cases, the complete failure to maintain them in the past, give rise to many difficulties. Work cannot be started simultaneously on all buildings; the only way is to prepare a long-term programme of work, spread over many years, and to attend to the most urgent cases first.

Other difficulties are due to the legal position. It is obvious that the State cannot bear the whole cost when the buildings to be restored are not its property. In many cases, the owners are too poor to undertake the necessary outlay; in others, the buildings belong to wealthy communities who neglect them quite wittingly because they do not bring in any profit. In the near future, however, the authorities will probably be in a better position to intervene, for we learnt with interest of a Bill, embodying the most up-to-date ideas, which is shortly to be submitted for ratification. One of its provisions (Article 5) is that the Wakfs (religious communities) and municipalities shall set aside a certain proportion of their income for the upkeep of monuments belonging to them, and that private owners may be obliged to bear maintenance costs, either by direct payment, or by means of a mortgage loan; the work, in all cases, is carried out by the Directorate of Antiquities.

There is an interesting clause (Article 8) in Decree No. 89 concerning antiquities, under which municipalities must take account of the position of historical monuments when preparing development plans and submit such plans to the Directorate of Antiquities for approval. It is to be hoped that this clause will be more strictly enforced, so as to prevent, in future, such demolition or mutilation as has been suffered by the

mausoleum of Safwat al-Molk and the Mosque of Tingiz in Damascus, and the Matbakh el-Ajami and the Khan al-Wazir at Aleppo. 172 658

Measures should also be taken to prevent damage being caused to historic monuments through their conversion into dwellings for refugees and poor people, as is at present the case with many madrasahs and mausolea. This would help to ensure that the excellent and, in other respects, extremely efficient work done by the Directorate of Antiquities to safeguard Syria's historic buildings produces its full effect.

MUSEUMS

In Syria, still less than elsewhere, can museums be considered exclusively as galleries for the housing of permanent exhibitions. The finds from the various excavation sites require the attention of highly skilled, and therefore centralized, technical services. On the other hand, in order to avoid the loss of treasures discovered by chance, and to preserve certain excavated objects near the place where they have been discovered, there must be local museums, or at least archaeological depositories in every region—which means decentralization. 217

The Directorate of Antiquities has endeavoured to meet these contradictory requirements, which, incidentally, must also be taken into account in another connexion. It is a desirable and legitimate aim to have a large, rich national museum in the capital, but it is also necessary to interest other towns in the country in artistic and archaeological problems by helping them to develop their own museums.

The National Museum in Damascus has the somewhat rare advantage of having been built specially for the housing and exhibition of its treasures. In Europe, we are so accustomed to seeing old palaces, not intended for the purpose, converted into museums, that we are inevitably struck with wondering admiration at the setting and atmosphere which the Syrian authorities have managed to create for the reconstruction and presentation of three great structures of different periods and dissimilar character: the hypogeum of Yarhai from Palmyra, with its rich decorative sculpture; the synagogue of Dura-Europos, with its miraculously preserved frescoes; the Omayyad palace of Qasr el-Heir el-Gharbi, with its frescoes and extraordinary variety of stucco decoration in open-work panels and towers. The museum's other ancient and medieval galleries, although less spectacular in arrangement, contain many objects of rare quality and exceptional interest, such as an Aramaean stele from Sfira, a silvered bronze helmet from Homs, frescoes from Dura, white sculptures from Palmyra and black basalt sculptures from the Hauran, mosaics from Chahba, a carved wooden cenotaph from Tojanua, jewellery, intaglios, bronzes and pottery of various periods. Space is already inadequate and a new building, where the collections of Moslem art will be installed, is now nearing completion. When this building is in use, all departments will be less crowded and it will be possible to reserve some space for temporary exhibitions.

All finds earlier than the time of Alexander are, in principle, collected in the Aleppo Museum, which thus has a character and individuality of its own. Upon entering the museum, the visitor is immediately confronted by colossal basalt statues, lions and bulls, and huge bas-reliefs representing hunting and battle scenes; these are Hittite and Assyrian treasures from Tell

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Halaf, Tell Ahmar and Arslan Tash. The wonderful statues 217
from Mari are more nearly life-size. There are also a great many objects from Ras-Shamra (Ugarit) and Mari which well repay examination. The present building is old and ill-fitted for use as a museum as regards both lighting and the size of the rooms. There are plans, however, for the building of a new museum where there will be ample room and the necessary facilities to display the collections to full advantage.

At the present time, there are local museums at Sueida and Palmyra. The former contains an interesting collection of basalt sculpture and mosaics; the latter is scarcely more than a depository crowded with statues and stone inscriptions. The Directorate of Antiquities intends to establish other small museums at Deir-es-Zor, Homs, Hama, and Tartus or Latakia. It is hoped to provide them with a library, where the principal publications relating to the region covered, together with a few general historical and archaeological works, would be available. The existing library at Damascus is extremely useful, but the one at Aleppo would be improved by the acquisition of some additional works.

In conclusion, the following list gives the titles of a few 217
works relating to the collections referred to above: 113

ABDUL-HAK, S., "L'exposition au musée de Damas des découvertes archéologiques de l'année 1952", *Museum*, vol. VII, 1954 (not yet published).
ABDUL-HAK, S. and A., *Catalogue illustré du département des antiquités gréco-romaines au musée de Damas*, Damascus, 1951.
ECOCHARD, M., "Le nouveau musée de Damas", *Museum*, vol. 33-36, 1946, p. 107-44.
PEARSON, H. F., *A guide to the synagogue of Doura-Europos*, Beirut, 1939.
PLOUX DE ROYROU, G., *Le musée national d'Alep*, Aleppo, 1932.
SAOUAF, S., *Alep, guide du visiteur*, Aleppo, 1951, p. 26-33.

MEANS OF PUBLICIZING MONUMENTS AND PRESENTING THEM TO BEST ADVANTAGE 172 658

The efforts made by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities to promote the study and preservation of historical monuments might yield even better results if they were more widely understood and supported. By means of intelligent propaganda through the three channels of education, tourist development and town planning, it should be possible gradually to arouse general sympathy and interest. The important point is to show clearly that historic monuments are not merely an outdated and costly burden, but have a positive and lively interest for every individual. A publicity campaign on these lines has already been successfully undertaken, but in certain respects it might be amplified and developed.

In the field of education, interest in the country's artistic assets can be aroused by the distribution of illustrated publications and the organization of exhibitions and lectures. There are already some publications of this kind dealing with Damascus, Palmyra, Bosra and Aleppo and more could easily be produced; they should contain fine photographs and be translated into several languages. After organizing a few exhibitions of paintings and a brilliant ceremony to mark the opening of the Qasr el-Heir galleries in the Damascus Museum, the Directorate of Antiquities has recently made a conclusive experiment in this field. It has organized a wonderful exhibition of treasures discovered at archaeological sites in Syria during 1952, which has met with well-deserved success. We ourselves

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have seen the constant stream of visitors, often quite humble people, gazing at the showcases of exhibits from Mari, Ras-Shamra and Hama; while they are there, these visitors also go round the museum and have an opportunity of admiring its treasures. In addition, it would be very helpful if the government, which furthers the training of scientific specialists by providing fellowships for study abroad, and does so much to develop the schools, were to introduce courses on the history of Syrian art and antiquities into the curricula of Syrian secondary schools and higher educational establishments, both in Damascus and Aleppo.

Tourist development could also do much to help in the protection of historic monuments by showing the population that they can provide a steady source of income. From this point of view, Syria's art treasures have, as yet, scarcely been exploited. In the absence of suitable facilities and adequate publicity, there is still very little tourist traffic in Syria. A great deal of extremely useful work could be done in this field by an active organization, supported by the State. In order to attract foreigners to a country so rich both in natural beauties and impressive remains, it should only be necessary to improve certain sections of roads and establish one or two conveniently situated and unpretentious but well-run hotels or rest-houses, where visitors can eat and sleep in pleasant surroundings. It is astonishing that sites as fascinating as Palmyra, St. Simeon or the Krak des Chevaliers should still be so hard to reach when it would be relatively simple to organize tours either by road or air. In this respect, Greece, where the tourist trade has advanced by leaps and bounds in the space of a few years, and is now making a considerable contribution to the country's economic resources, seems to us to provide a particularly good example of what can be done in this way.

We shall have to consider town planning in greater detail

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

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We shall have to consider town planning in greater detail

in connexion with Damascus and Aleppo. For the moment, we would merely deplore the fact that the authors of extension and development plans are all too apt to write off ancient monuments as undesirable, instead of considering them as some of the finest and most attractive focus-points around which to replan districts. The preservation and enhancement of these buildings need be no bar to a city's normal development. They merely raise problems which should always be studied in consultation with qualified experts such as the Directorate of Antiquities. If the work is done, with good taste, it will help not only to interest a few scholars outdoors to learn more of the past, but to develop a love of their monuments in the inhabitants themselves, as they come consciously or unconsciously to appreciate their beauty, and, in a short time, take them as an essential and familiar ornament to their daily life.

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361 175 broken up by the formation of new districts, often at some distance from the original town centre. In isolated parts and on the slopes of the mountain, where nature is conducive to prayer and meditation, many convents and madrasahs were erected; although several of these have been destroyed and others are disused and in ruins, about fifty have survived until the present time, while others again have been converted and incorporated in more recent buildings.

361 344 172 In the Moslem sector of the old town is the Maristan of Nur ad-Din, "one of the most famous hospitals of the Moslem world". It is of great architectural interest, but is unfortunately spoilt by the modern buildings which now surround it. The doorway has a rich and original alveolate decoration, a classical pediment and a beautiful pair of doors. Over the entrance hall is a small ribbed onion dome, surmounted by a sort of truncated conical drum, made up of superimposed alveoles which are visible even from the outside, as in the case of the brick tomb of Zobeide near Baghdad. In the courtyard, with its two beautiful iwans (halls), fragments of inscriptions, lattice-work and marble inlay have been preserved.

361 346 172 The Nuriya Madrasah, to the south of the Great Mosque, has a similar dome above the mausoleum. Its doorway is distinguished by the pendant keystone motif, also to be seen at the Adiliya Madrasah, a "masterpiece of stereotomy and bonding" planned and constructed in the architectural style and by the methods characteristic of northern Syria. This latter madrasah, a fitting building for the headquarters of the Arab Academy, has been very carefully restored and rearranged. This building, together with the Zahiriya Madrasah (now the National Library), the house of Saladin's father, which was converted by the Sultan Beibars into a memorial college, and the Aziziya Madrasah (Saladin's tomb) form a fine architectural group to the north of the Great Mosque; these buildings are still adorned by a wealth of ancient works of art, inscriptions, mosaics, doors and windows.

The twofold influence of Mesopotamia and northern Syria can be seen in the art of the period of Nur ad-Din and Saladin.

Various mausoles are to be found outside the old town itself and slightly to the north, in the area between the river and the modern thoroughfare called Baghdad Street. That of Zayn ad-Din (Sitt ech-Cham, 1172), is the oldest example of such a building with a sepulchral dome surmounting two drums; the "Sultan Hasan" Mausoleum has a ribbed dome and an interesting decoration of stucco and painting; the Chamiya Madrasah, standing outside the city walls, contains one of the finest examples of plaster moulding in Damascus, beautiful inscriptions and the armatures of the old leaded-glass windows. The Mausoleum of Ibn al-Moqaddam, Emir of Aleppo, is a typical north Syrian structure. Further to the east and of more recent date stands the At-Tawba Mosque, planned and arranged on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque, and interesting on account of its architecture and decoration (doorway, mihrab, leaded-glass windows, etc.).

The suburb of Salihiyah grew up on the mountain side round a fine group of mausoles, madrasahs and convents, most of which are now abandoned or used for somewhat unsuitable purposes. There, in a picturesque spot on the Nahr Yazid, we find the remains of a colonnaded portico of the oldest convent-madrasah of Salihiyah, together with a whole series of monuments built by eminent persons at the court of Nur ad-Din and Saladin. Most of them are mausoles with brick domes, some ribbed and others double, surmounting two drums decorated with arcading and lobate or twin niches. Many of them contain beautiful carved wooden tombs, old leaded-glass windows and

361 lintels decorated with graceful inscriptions and coats of arms.
346 The Mouallaki Mosque, built in 1202, is decorated in a par-
172 ticularly interesting and original manner; it is the oldest Ayyubid Mosque, and its plan is reminiscent of the Omayyad Mosque. Ancient columns, with their capitals, have been used to form the arcades round the courtyard. The carved wooden lintels (with incised geometrical designs) over the seven doors of the prayer hall are well preserved; two of them are still surmounted by plaster lattice-work. Inside, several windows have beautiful old glass panes.

Also worthy of mention is the Atabekiya Madrasah, built to house the tomb of Princess Turkan-Khatoun, with its fine doorway decorated with alveoles, which today, owing to the concealment of the corner colums by more recent structures, looks as if it were in stone. The arrangement of the alveoles, the bonding of the arch-stones of the arcade and the modelling of the cornices show originality, but are somewhat primitive.

This part of the town subsequently developed and spread very considerably, taking in neighbouring districts such as the Kurd quarter, in Saladin's time, and the Mohadjirine at the end of the nineteenth century. Today, this suburb centres round the Mohiy ad-Din Mosque, built by Sultan Selim in 1518 over the tomb of the famous mystic. This mosque, which also contains the tomb of Abd el-Kader, has a beautiful minaret and very striking faience decorations.

MAMELUKE PERIOD

361 At the beginning of the Mameluke period, Damascus developed
195 and expanded further; its products were highly esteemed and, in order to meet the demands of the time, the city developed its art industries, specializing in luxury articles. Even the Crusades promoted its commercial relations with the Western world; like Aleppo, Damascus traded with southern France, Genoa, Pisa and Venice. Its artistic products, such as silks, bronze ornaments, Damascene blades, enamel-work and glassware were in demand everywhere. As a result of this commercial activity, its suqs spread to the north of the Citadel, in the horse-market area, where the Yelbogha Mosque was built in 1264.

Following the example of the Sultans of Cairo, governors, military leaders and their servants then built a great many madrasahs (schools for the teaching of the Koran) and mausolea. The favourite sites for the latter were along the road to Mecca "so that the founder might benefit from the prayers of passing pilgrims". Thus a new suburb, called the meidan, sprang up along this road, reflecting the special features of the pilgrim traffic and trade. The meidan, about two miles in length, was linked with the city by a new group of suqs (Es-Sinaniyeh) outside the western gate of the wall, between the districts of Chagur and Qasr el-Hajjaj; it absorbed the suburban village of El-Qbeybat ("little domes"), and ended at Bab-Allah (Allah's Gate), whence pilgrims "set out on their journey to the Holy House of God".

361 It would take too long to give a complete list of the Mame-
346 luke monuments existing in these districts; even the directory
172 of the Antiquities Service does not include them all. Very often a minaret, a fountain or a madrasah, although not classified, is of considerable interest, because it adds to the atmosphere of the place, or because it has certain original features, though these are often not very obvious, owing to the conversion of the building for another purpose or to bad restoration.

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361 Here, we shall mention only a few monuments which are
346 particularly unusual or significant. Such, for example, is
172 the Turba Afridouniya ("Jami el-Ajami"), at the city end of the meidan, a Koranic school and mausoleum commemorating the Persian trader, Afridun, who died in 1348. The composition of its façade, with black and white courses of masonry, is perfect, and all the decorative elements hit in harmoniously with it. There are a great many of the latter (cornices, bull's eye windows, doorway with inlaid work and scallops, stalactite ornamentation, inscriptions, interlocking voussoirs and panels of strapwork), and several of them were subsequently repeated, for purely ornamental purposes, in other buildings.

A little further south, there is a small mausoleum to an unknown person, which is commonly called "Weli Chaybani". Its architecture is sober and its composition good. As in the majority of these monuments, the façade, with its skilful bonding, has a doorway decorated with alveoles. The two windows are connected by a single lintel, composed of three rows of stones, the middle one being formed of interlocking voussoirs; there is a bull's eye above the pilaster separating them. The dome, resting on a high drum with 16 windows, is pierced with holes to let in light.

Nearly half-way along the meidan stands the double mausoleum of Araq, belonging to the same period (1349). The plan of this building is more complicated. Its many-coloured façade has turquoise-blue faience inlay round the doorway, with its ornamentation of stalactites and braid-moulding. Here also, the sloping surfaces are gracefully joined to the vertical by a system of alveoles, and the long fascia of the lintels divides the façade horizontally with its two-coloured arrangement of interlocking voussoirs, repeated right across the building and sloping first one way and then the other. The many radiating voussoirs of the bull's eyes form as it were the rays of a sunburst. The lintels are enriched with geometrical and floral designs, and cyma reversa mouldings give unity to the various parts of the façade.

The architectural and decorative elements used with a very strong sense of balance and harmony in these buildings, were later repeated and multiplied until surfaces became so richly adorned as to give the impression of incoherence and pointlessness, combined with artistic decadence, which is characteristic of the last Mameluke period.

The Yachbak Mausoleum (1377), more ornate, but still well designed and balanced, has domes surmounting sloping roofs composed of alveoles. The central feature of the façade is a doorway decorated with stalactites, and the rosettes of the bull's eyes form a horizontal band, matched, within the embrasure of the doorway, by a panel decorated with marble and faience inlaid work in an interlaced design, surrounding the Mameluke coat of arms.

The same features are to be seen in the Rachidiyé Madrasah, the upper part of whose doorway has recently been cut off to make room for an entirely extraneous small structure; the fine composition of the façade is also partially concealed by modern buildings.

Among the latest buildings of the Mameluke period, the Sabuniya Madrasah, the Sibaiya Madrasah at the western end of the "Street called Straight", and the Al-Muradiya Madrasah deserve mention. Prominently situated, with the curves of their domes and the tall shafts of their beautiful minarets, they add a special and typical note of their own to the street scene.

A few other monuments of the same period are to be found either in the old town or in the districts immediately to the north of it. We have already mentioned the Yelbogha Mosque,

361 designed on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque; it is re-
346 markable for the beautiful structure of its niches and
windows with their alveolate decoration, its magnificent bands
172 of plaster moulding, and its windows, doorways and minaret.
This mosque well deserves to be set off to greater advantage.

Tingiz, the Viceroy of Syria, was responsible for the construction of a fine group of buildings. Only the beautiful minaret and two doorways of the mosque which bears his name still remain after the rebuilding of the An-Nasr Avenue, but the double mausoleum of his w . (Turba Kukbaiya) and, a little further on, the Dar al-Hadis, a school where the traditions of the Prophet were expounded, are still to be seen in the "Street called Straight".

The last monuments of this period are the two beautiful tiered minarets in the Bab Jabiya suq, with their rich decoration, and that of the Al-Moallaq Mosque, with an unbroken line of black stones encircling its niches and rose windows.

OTTOMAN PERIOD

361 The end of the Mamelukc period was marked by a serious eco-
175 nomic crisis, aggravated by disturbances and devastation
(Tamerlane), and also by the Portuguese discoveries, which altered the traditional trade routes. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire, which expanded Damascus's economic and political frontiers, the city again began to develop. Under the capitulations, Turkish ports were opened to European merchants. Moreover, since pilgrims set out from Damascus on their journey to Mecca, the city was expected to supply them with the necessary equipment and provisions for their crossing of the desert.

These circumstances led to the building of many khans, with their porticoed courtyards, shops and stables on the ground floor and accommodation for travellers on the floor above. The city was no longer of any strategic or military importance; the ramparts, already useless on account of the town's extension and the formation of suburbs without the walls, were abandoned; the moats filled in and the Citadel fell into ruins. The pasha (governor), with his entourage of Turkish aristocrats, took up his residence and administered business at the seraglio, outside the ramparts, at a place called Qanawat (the canals), near the Roman aqueduct.

361 In the same neighbourhood were erected the two great
346 imperial madrasahs, the Solaymaniya (1554), constructed by the
famous Turkish architect, Sinan, who built the Sulaymaniya
172 in Constantinople, and the Salimiya (1566), designed by a Persian architect. With their great buttressed domes, surrounded by a double row of small domes covering the porticoes and rooms, their slender pencil-like minarets tapering to a cone, and the surrounding gardens with their fountains, trees and flowers, they achieve an architectural unity and a highly characteristic atmosphere of their own, in a style native to Constantinople and readily transplanted to Damascus.

The Solaymaniya has a rich variety of architectural and decorative motifs, characteristic of that period and style, such as marble inlaid work and great overlays of faience tiles on the walls and tympana of the doors and windows; keel arches with alternate black and white arch-stones; abundant use of stalactites, niches ornamented with overlapping shell designs, lintels with many-coloured interlocking voussoirs, forming increasingly ornate and complicated patterns. The capitals

361 consist of clustered tetrahedrons, coloured with blue and red.
346 The astragals of the columns and their tori are of gilt bronze.
172 All the surfaces are composed of alternating courses of different colours.

The same features are to be seen in the buildings put up by the governor, Dervish-Pasha, forming a fine group at the beginning of the Pilgrims' Way, to the west of the old town. The façade of the "Ed-Derwichiyeh" Mosque is composed of alternate black and white courses; the tall polygonal minaret is painted green. The whole building, which is surmounted by a large dome encircled by small cupolas, is architecturally connected with the neighbouring mausoleum by an archway over the road. The arrangement of designs, shapes and colours on the façades shows extraordinary imaginative ingenuity. The painted bulbous dome of the mausoleum rests on a drum of irregular shape. At a later date, in the same street, but a little further south, Sinan-Pasha built his mosque among the souqs of Bab Jabiya; it has the same characteristics and features (minaret faced with green faience tiles, large dome, inflected arches, geometrical capitals, etc.); above all, it makes the same spectacular impression in the street surrounding, inevitably catching the eye between the souqs and the Mecca road.

361 Within the confines of the old town, between the Great
342 Mosque and the "Street called Straight", a number of khans
172 and two new hammams were built at this period.

Dervish-Pasha built the "Khan Al-Harir", which is a curious mixture of Syrian and Turkish architectural styles. It is a fine structure, with porticoes surrounding the courtyard and, on the upper floor, two series of rooms connected by a corridor and covered by a triple row of domes.

The Khan Al-Gumrok, in the same locality, has a covered hall instead of a central courtyard, and six large domes supported on pendentives. The Khan Soleyman-Pasha (1732), following a similar but more complicated plan, has a courtyard covered by two large domes. Here, the composition is conceived on broader lines and the architectural volumes are enormous, while the dual colour scheme is still found, not only in the black and white courses of the walls, but also in the bonding of the voussoirs of the arcades and pendentives. Some years later, Asad-Pasha, who was Vali (governor) of Damascus and led the great pilgrimage for 14 years running, built a new khan, and a house for himself between it and the Great Mosque.

The khan has a façade reminiscent of Venetian Renaissance architecture in composition, while the building technique and the choice of decorative motifs and materials are in the best artistic traditions of northern Syria. Asad-Pasha's residence ("Azem Palace", 1749) has the same features, repeated and multiplied; it follows the traditional plan of all large Syrian dwellings, with its two entirely separate groups of rooms (selamlik [men's quarters] and haremlik [women's quarters]), its courtyards, porticoes, iwans, pools and fountains.

Thus Damascus today, as in the earliest periods of its history, is still assimilating and using artistic and cultural themes, borne along the great traffic routes, to converge upon the oasis between the Anti-Lebanon and the desert.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

361 In studying the growth of Damascus and its various districts,
172 we have tried to bring out the character and functions of certain groups of buildings which, if skilfully restored and arranged,

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361 would not only be more beautiful in themselves, but would
172 add to the interest and attraction of the city as a whole. It must be borne in mind that, in old towns, there is more to safeguard than isolated monuments which can be protected by law: there is a whole architectural system, moulded by time, a crystallisation, as it were, of the people's history, customs and needs.

A monument always has some positive, intrinsic interest as a work of art, but it is of even greater interest if it forms part of a whole group of buildings, which makes its purpose and history clearer and sets off its volumes and form. In the architectural pattern of a city, each individual building is like a piece in a mosaic; however precious each small stone may be, it is the whole composition which gives it meaning and worth.

It is true, of course, that there are also worthless things in the old parts of towns; there are buildings which are parasitic or unhealthy. Like a living creature, an old city is subject to sickness and infirmity. The correction of such shortcomings, however, calls for infinite care and an exact appreciation of what is to be altered or abolished; and in any case, the work must always be done with the caution which modern critical methods of restoration and excavation require. It is impossible to say, *a priori*, what should be done, or to map out new streets, building lines and squares with ruler and compasses. The demolition of an old quarter may reveal buildings, fragments and works of art which will enrich the nation's archaeological heritage or throw light on historical or artistic problems. All this is of importance to a country's cultural and spiritual life. There are plenty of examples of the difficulties to which ancient monuments give rise when town planning schemes come to be carried out, even when the latter have been prepared with the intention of leaving untouched buildings protected by the law. One has only to think of the mosque of Tingiz, of which only the two doorways and the minaret projecting over the street now remain.

We are glad to find that the new districts also have a character and beauty of their own, which is becoming increasingly marked as new buildings, in the light of past experience, are better adapted to the atmosphere, customs and climate of Damascus. Although the new streets are often too open and the architecture of the buildings sometimes either a little too rigid (the reinforced concrete construction being rather too obvious), or too ornate and showy (due to the excessive and unskilful use of decorative motifs), they will blend better with the rest of the town when the trees have grown up to fill in the overlarge spaces with greenery and subdue the light.

We must admit, however, that we are somewhat dismayed by the results of the new development scheme and the new layout of building land in the area between the southern side of the Citadel and the "Street called Straight". There, the labyrinth of suqs and narrow winding alleys, with buildings jutting out into them, has gradually been replaced by a chessboard pattern of small rectangular blocks. The historic monuments are lost and stifled among many-storeyed modern buildings. The domes and minaret of the Dervish-Pasha Mosque are dwarfed by the high block of workmen's flats which has sprung up beside it. The same is true of many mausoleums and of the Maristan, the famous hospital of Nur ad-Din, one of the most unusual and interesting monuments in Damascus.

It would certainly not be wise to encourage the proposal (which would, moreover, be extremely costly to carry out) that monuments be pulled down and rebuilt some distance away, as has been suggested in order to isolate the Omayyad Mosque.

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The suqs with their khans, the hammams, mosques and madrasahs generally form a coherent and harmonious architectural and functional unit, which should be kept intact. The present system of classifying monuments should be extended to cover architectural groups as well as individual buildings. We would repeat that this does not mean thwarting reasonable attempts to improve or develop a district. Our aim is merely to show that the usual criteria, methods and means employed in the technical departments of municipalities, where individual interests and immediate advantages are alone considered, should not be applied to such architectural groups. It should have been possible, for example, to prevent the erection of a conspicuously tasteless modern house, jarring in both colour and design, close to the southern façade of the Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library). The new buildings in Seleymani Street, near the Khan Al-Gumrok are another instance of the sort of thing that should not be allowed. Before putting up new building in old parts of the town, much thought should be given to their appearance and colour, with the twofold aim of improving the present situation and setting off the monuments, which are dignified and beautiful features of the city as a whole, to their best advantage. The criterion of utility cannot be ruthlessly applied to the products of culture and the mind. For that reason our young town planners should give up their attempts to recover money spent on laying out an open square with streets radiating from it or piercing wide streets, by ill-considered exploitation of building land in old parts of the town, where the present houses give very little return or by the demolition of hammams, madrasahs and gardens, which now bring in no revenue at all, in order to free their sites. 361/172

The old centre of the town would gain greatly, both aesthetically and from the practical point of view, if the Citadel were arranged and used for a different purpose. Its interest as a monument is obvious, with its magnificent façades and towers and the beautiful east gate with its alveolate decoration. At the present time, the Citadel buildings are put to poor use as a barracks and prison. Should it be decided to use them for a different purpose, the open spaces within the walls should be used for public gardens and so brought into the life of the city. They might be some of the most beautiful gardens in Damascus, with gateways leading into the streets outside. An enterprising architect, with the help of an expert advisory committee, could well adapt the fine and imposing architecture of the Citadel to meet the needs of some public institution. It might, for example, be used to house a university faculty, with a "Students' Centre", providing accommodation for students and professors not resident in Damascus, a library, studies, lecture-rooms and exhibition halls. The mosque should again be used for prayer. Premises could also be provided for recreation and entertainment, with a cinema, café, restaurant, etc. If the western façade were cleared, there would be a really splendid and imposing view down the wide An-Nasr Avenue. Thus transformed, the Citadel, instead of hindering the town's development as it does today, would once again become a part of public life and, in its new guise, would be a great social asset to the city and the nation.

The Great Omayyad Mosque is the most interesting monument in Damascus, although unfortunately it has been so seriously damaged in the course of its history by destruction, earthquakes and fire that it is now a somewhat confused mixture of unequal artistic and architectural styles. It would be excellent if sufficient funds could be found to complete and extend the work—already happily begun by the Wakfs and the Directorate of Antiquities—of restoring this monument and setting 346/172

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1
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172

it off to better advantage, so as to enhance its appearance, as its artistic and historical interest, its position as the religious centre of the Syrian capital, deserve.

As it now stands, the older parts (mosaics, columns, stucco work, mihrabs, qubbet, etc.) look lifeless and unattached, as though they were no longer part of the mosque, but rather, in some respects, an encumbrance. The aim of the restoration plan should be to set off this heritage of art and history to the best advantage. The first step must be a careful, critical assessment of the relative value of the different features. Steps must also be taken to make an entity of the buildings and restore their artistic unity. This difficult and complicated task calls for the collaboration of artists and scholars, but the result, if the necessary care is exercised, will be to restore to the city the full splendour of its greatest religious edifice.

We give below for purposes of guidance only a provisional list, based on our first impressions, of the things to be borne in mind when drawing up a plan for restoration and renovation work. The most interesting from the historical point of view are obviously the oldest parts: columns, capitals, cornices, inscriptions, fragments of walls and arcades, etc. These are precious relics of a dead civilisation, to be preserved for their documentary and cultural interest. As ruins and fragments, they also have a decorative value, and there can be no justification for restoration which involves their wholesale reconstruction.

All the surviving parts of the original Omayyad building (arcades and capitals, mosaics) are likewise of outstanding historical and archaeological interest; but the question of how to set them off most effectively is here complicated by the fact that they are also component parts of the present building. They are, moreover, of very considerable aesthetic value.

The interior of the prayer-hall, in the central part of the transept, bears traces of the succession of periods, restorations and reconstructions through which it has passed. This is now no longer the centre of interest; it gives rather the impression of a sort of corridor separating the two wings of the naves. The dirty, defaced remains of mosaics on the north wall form dark patches against the white background. A few fine old windows are interspersed with a large number of very ordinary modern ones, with garish coloured glass. The thick marble with which the four central pillars are faced for reinforcement is of no interest. The same aesthetic defects and lack of stylistic unity are to be found on the south wall; the mihrab, with its delicate inlaid work, the Koranic inscriptions in faience, the three finely designed lower windows and the beautiful gilded ceiling, clash with the style of the rest.

We think that the white plaster on the walls, the arcades and the drum of the dome, in this part of the transept, should be removed in order fully to reveal the stone structure beneath. The dressed stone in the naves on either side is already visible. The next stage might be to replace the upper windows, change the colour of the ceiling beams, and instal a new lighting system, dispensing with the lamps at present in use. Syria today has plenty of talented artists and craftsmen; and to give them employment would help to keep alive a glorious tradition, and to encourage crafts which are in danger of being stifled by the advance of mechanisation.

The comments made on the sanctuary apply equally to the courtyard, vestibule and doorways. Many unmeaning and uninteresting features, such as the glass-paned doors and modern eaves, the neo-classical marble facings, and the cement slabs forming part of the portico floor, are found side by side with

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361 such artistic treasures as the mosaics, the capitals, the Qubba,
192 the minarets and the doors.

In the west portico, large white patches in the mosaics show how much the restoration work done still leaves to be desired. In the north-east section, as part of the careful work carried out by the Directorate of Antiquities, the spaces between the mosaics have been painted a similar colour, with excellent effect, except that the painted surface looks rather dull beside the brilliant surface of the mosaics. Better results might be obtained by mixing the paint with a little marble powder, which would give a slight variety of tone.

It is of course important in any improvement schemes, to consider the general effect of the whole—a fact appreciated by the technical services, which have made plans for building new roads so as to isolate the Great Mosque. In considering these plans, we must bear in mind that the Great Mosque is not simply a building standing by itself: its history and use create an aura influencing the surrounding atmosphere and architecture; the imposing ruins of ancient temples and churches mausoleo, madrasahs, khans and suqs form a complex with it.

344 To the north, there are no less than five highly important
192 monuments. The Adiliya Madrasah (Arab Academy), with its fine doorway and pendant keystone, has been described as "a masterpiece of symmetry and bonding". The Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library) opposite, once the house of Saladin's father, was converted into a memorial college by the famous Sultan Beibars. Close by the Great Mosque, the Aziziya Madrasah contains the tomb of Saladin, housed in a mausoleum with the characteristic ribbed dome resting on octagonal and sixteen-sided drums. The recent restoration of this mausoleum has been outstandingly successful, especially as regards the enhancement of the general effect of the surroundings. Opposite the north entrance, the Jaqmaqiya Madrasah and the Turbet Al-Ikhsaiya, stand like propylaea, guiding the eye to the fine vista of the Byzantine colonnade, the doorway and the minaret.

361 The monuments on the other sides of the mosque are inter-
344 esting too, though less obviously so. The artistic interest
192 of some of the khans, suqs and hammams is often apt to pass unnoticed by the casual observer simply because they are still in use, whereas that of the ruins strikes the eye immediately. The architecture of the group of buildings to the south-west of the Great Mosque, however, is extremely good. Passing through the Khan Al-Gumrok with its six large domes supported by pendentives, and the great Khan Al-Harir, with its triple series of small domes surmounting the first storey, we reach first the rich and delightful Azem Palace, a very suitable setting for the folk museum and tourist offices which are to be installed there; and then, after passing the fine façade of the Khan Azad-Pasha, the Midhat-Pasha suq ("Street called
361 Straight"). The developement plan includes the widening of this street. If this is done, we hope that due precautions will be taken to avoid the mistakes mentioned above, and that the present character of this street will be preserved, particularly in the western section, where the suqs are still teeming with life and interest. We might at this point stress how very convenient the suqs are, especially in extremes of weather; they protect the crowd of pedestrians from rain and sun, wind and dust alike. They form a dense network, opening out,

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1/A [OF the MOSQUE -- ANALYSE]

341 doorways and windows and in the rich ornamentation of the ceilings, whilst motifs drawn from Constantinople are preferred in the El-Adliyeh, Khosrawiya, Othmaniya and Ahmediye mosques and madrasahs and in the high minarets with their tapering cone-shaped tops.

This coherent complex of buildings, with its continuous life, enables us to follow the whole course of development in technique and taste, religious ideas and history, and commercial organization. Together with the buildings of Cairo, it provides an essential basis for any study of Moslem architecture.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

172 The preservation of monuments involves striking a balance between a number of considerations—their purpose, the need to restore them to their original appearance, the practical and commercial ends they serve and the requirements of town planning and modern life. All this raises questions of such complexity as to suggest that, in a town like Aleppo, it would be wise to set up a commission of experts to advise the authorities. Such a commission should include scholars, artists, and representatives of the various bodies concerned, and its task would be to examine the most suitable means of giving the city's architectural treasures a place in its modern life, bringing out their character more clearly and making the most of their beauties.

There is a whole series of monuments which no longer serve any practical end and are accordingly beginning to be counted as archaeological relics. In many cases, the maintenance and restoration they require makes them a heavy financial drain, while their value as a source of income is nil. Nevertheless they ought to be preserved and safeguarded in view of the national, cultural and spiritual values for which they stand. They cannot be classed as things now useless and abandoned to people too poor to pay for modern housing accommodation, or put to some low-yield industrial use. To adopt such criteria would mean renouncing outright all possibility of leaving, in the history of the city and the nation, any permanent memorial of what has been.

Officialdom does not always grasp these requirements; under the constraint of an annual balance sheet it takes the view that the artistic heritage is too rich already, and its preservation and maintenance too difficult and costly. But a monument is like a tree: it has a positive value even if it yields no fruit and if its immediate usefulness is not obvious. When the tree has been reduced to firewood, or the stones of the monument quarried, and its site used for new buildings, then we realize that it was not only a thing of beauty in itself but an irreplaceable element in our daily lives.

Today as in the past—perhaps even more than in the past—local authorities are at great pains, in development works, to enhance a town's beauties. In our view, the best way of effecting this is to take into account the aesthetic possibilities of ancient architecture. On this point we can but repeat what has already been said, in connexion with Damascus, about the beauty of the old quarters, and the narrow peaceful alleys, about the practical and aesthetic significance of the suqs and khans, about the value of the picturesque in the urban scene and hence the desirability of preserving the atmosphere and integrity of a setting which is the slow growth of centuries.

Aleppo in particular has outstanding possibilities for pro-

172 gressive beautification, because the whole of its history is written in its splendid buildings. All that is needed would be to free the old buildings of the mean parasitic structures which cumber them, built against their walls or in empty spaces at a time when the authorities were negligent. It would only be necessary to restore to a seemly state and put to suitable use the numerous major monuments, such as "Sheikh Mohassin", the Nuri Maristan, the Zahiriya Madrasah—without the walls, the "Khanaqah Faratra" and that marvel of architecture, the hospital (maristan) built in 1354 by the Emir Arghun, which are either deserted or used as tenements for the poor.

764 In the cemetery of "Es-Salihin", which has been holy ground
172 for centuries, with a sacred rock traditionally associated with Abraham, there are many tombs dating back to the end of the twelfth century, some used as dwellings, others abandoned and half buried. The variety of their architecture and the beauty of the inscriptions on them make them of great interest, and it would be enough to rail them in, clear them and plant a few trees to convert a waste land into a formal park rich with monuments of the past.

The same is true of the tombs in the cemetery of the Maqamat, to the east of the Kamiliya Madrasah—without the walls; the madrasah too requires no more, by way of treatment, than the unbricking of the sanctuary door.

361 Other noteworthy structures which need clearing of the
172 parasitic buildings that have grown up in and around them are the lovely city gates (Bab Antakiya, Bab an-Nasr, "Bab el-Hadid") and the façades, entrances and courtyards of the Uzdamur, Es-Sabun and Qurd-Beg khans.

A proper layout of the approaches to the ramparts between Bab al-Jinan and Bab Qinnasrin, and the demolition of a few run-down shops, would create one of the finest promenades imaginable, with impressive views of the walls and façades of the Mameluke towers.

In any scheme of reconstruction and beautification, consideration must also be given to fine private houses. At present, the Ghazzaleh House is being put to rather unsuitable use as a school and worse still, is threatened with demolition. In our view, a suitable use could be found for one or other of these lovely seventeenth- and eighteenth-century residences, as also, perhaps, for one of the khans, as a club or hotel providing amenities for tourists. Aleppo would thus offer its guests a combination of creature comforts and an incomparable artistic setting.

THE CITY IMPROVEMENT SCHEME

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In 1951, at the request of the municipality of Aleppo, a French architect, Mr. A. Gutton, of the Institut d'Urbanisme in Paris, submitted plans for improvements and new building in the city, with a report setting out the criteria followed.

In their present form, these plans must be regarded as the bare bones of a scheme to meet the requirements of the modern town and the wishes of its authorities. The real key is in the report, where we find the explanation of the ends sought and the means selected to achieve them. One of its more significant passages is that which points out that, while giving the fullest weight to new human and social requirements, it is essential to grasp "the historical value of each quarter or each particular building and, in terms of that, to decide either on its preservation as it stands or on its improvement and clearing"

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PALMYRA

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361 water, fertile gardens and palm groves, and the contrast between the flat, barren wastes of the desert stretching away to the south and the rocky mountain barrier which rises above it immediately to the north. Secondly, its fame is due to its extraordinary destiny and to the romance of its economic and political history, which made this remote oasis in the heart of the desert one of the great trade centres of ancient times and its rulers, Odainath and Zenobia, the acknowledged masters of the East—first the supporters, then the rivals of Rome and ill-fated pretenders to the dignity of empire. Lastly, its fame is due above all to the incomparable grandeur of its ruins.

361 172 The ruins of Palmyra are striking on account both of their size and of their wonderful state of preservation. From the regular chessboard pattern of the streets, still discernible inside the outer wall of the town, rise rows of columns, sanctuary precincts, porticos and steps of public buildings. Round the city lie the vast burial grounds, with their varying types of burial vaults, tombs in the form of houses, hypogea, and sepulchral towers, all of which, though violated from ancient times onwards, still retain their decorations and inscriptions as well as most of the innumerable sculptures they contained. Whole structures still remain to their full height: large sections of the main colonnade are still upright and the entablature is still supported on the pillars with their consoles; the temple of Baal, surrounded by its courtyard wall and porticos is almost intact; the sepulchral towers in which the dead mount guard along the pass leading to Homs and Damascus stand out square and sombre against the hillside, flanking the route. Crowning the mountain with its tours and redans stands the Arab castle, one of the most striking features of the landscape.

As far as the parts of the buildings which lie below the surface are concerned, excavations have shown how little they have suffered from the ravages of time, a fact accounted for by the excellent condition of the subsoil and the dryness of the climate. The freshness of the paintings inside the tombs provides an illustration. Moreover, as the ancient city is almost everywhere covered by a layer of earth 9 to 12 feet thick, even those monuments which are entirely concealed are preserved to a considerable height. Another reason is that the town rapidly fell into decay after its destruction in 273 and never regained

its former importance; buildings were seldom converted to other uses and, except for a few that later served for military purposes (such as the one now known as Diocletian's camp, or the forecourt of the temple of Baal, which was transformed into an Arab fortress in the twelfth century), the buildings were never intentionally demolished or the materials of which they were made plundered. 361 172

Thus Palmyra may be said to present ideal conditions for archaeological research, offering possibilities that will not be exhausted for a long time. After the description of the visible remains given by the German scholars who worked at Palmyra under the direction of Th. Wiegand, after H. Ingholt's systematic exploration of the burial grounds and the penetrating studies of the monuments, cults, institutions and language of the Palmyrians, made by H. Seyrig, R. Amy, D. Schlumberger, J. G. Février, J. Cantineau, J. Starcky and others, the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities worked out an admirable and extensive scheme for uncovering the entire ruins. The clearing of the agora before the war, and that of the theatre, quite recently, have shown what spectacular and instructive results may one day be gained from the scheme. The work is proceeding steadily but the task is immense and there is still plenty of scope for useful and fruitful co-operation.

A few special problems which have already arisen in connexion with the study and exploration of the Palmyra ruins are worth noting here. The monumental arch, the temple of Baal, the great colonnade and innumerable tombs, towers and hypogea required extensive restoration and consolidation. The removal of the decorative sculpture of the Yarhai hypogeum and its reconstruction in the Damascus Museum was a difficult undertaking, successfully accomplished. The bold plan adopted to allow of the uncovering of Baal's sanctuary is also worthy of note. The modern town, whose houses filled the temple precincts, was removed and rebuilt further north, beyond the boundary of the ancient city. Now, after 20 years, the whole population agrees that the step was well justified, for the new village, with its wide airy streets, affords healthier and more convenient living conditions; this may serve as an example. The only remaining inhabited building is the charming house of the Antiquities Service in the south-east corner of the precincts, where visiting archaeologists find a welcome and an atmosphere which they much appreciate.

But Palmyra is not only a city; it is the natural centre of an immense region stretching from the Anti-Lebanon mountains to the Euphrates, a region whose prospects and importance are now beginning to be realized. Along the desert routes which meet and cross within it, and where they reach the river, are other sites, marking wayside centres which existed at various times in history. In such places, quite impressive remains have survived to the present day.

THE TWO QASR EL-HEIR

As D. Schlumberger has pointed out in a recent work, Palmyra was once less isolated than is generally believed. Other inhabited centres within the area prospered beside the metropolis. In the plains there were oases made fertile by large-scale irrigation schemes; in the mountains to the north-west, shepherds' villages, made habitable by the construction of reservoirs which provided adequate water supplies for the summer months. These villages did not survive the fall of Palmyra and the region 361 172 344

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was subsequently completely abandoned. However, the dams and aqueducts built during the Roman period were still useful in later times to the Byzantines and Arabs. They made it possible to build the two great castles to the west and east of Palmyra which bear the same name and now stand ruined in the midst of an expanse of desert. They were formerly surrounded by walled gardens and had been designed to serve both as palaces and fortresses. 361 172 344

Built by the Caliph Hisham in 727, Qasr-el-Heir el-Gharbi was a luxurious residence. A tall Byzantine tower marks the site of the ruins from afar. All that remains of the Arab palace is the lower masonry of the walls, which were of freestone; they were uncovered between 1936 and 1938 by D. Schlumberger. His excavations not only laid bare the plan of the palace, which was a square flanked by towers, surrounding a central courtyard with porticos and a single entrance. They also brought to light innumerable remnants of a stucco and fresco decoration which is the most original and complete example of Omayyad art in Syria.

Qasr el-Heir es-Charki, also built by Hisham in 729 near a still older fortification that is now in a very ruined state, has walls and towers standing almost intact up to their full height. The upper part of those on either side of the entrance is decorated with a design of arches supported on small columns; the others have a simpler decoration of ornamental courses of brick. The main doorway has a semi-circular tympanum with machicolations overhead.

Though similar in layout and belonging to the same period, the two Qasr el-Heir presented different problems for the Antiquities Service. With the former, it was a matter of discovering and preserving the precious and fragile decoration, which was picked up in fragments at the foot of the walls; it took several years of patient and highly skilled work to remove it and piece it together in the Damascus Museum, where it is now one of the principal exhibits. In the case of the latter, it was necessary to underpin the walls and towers whose foundations had been undermined by damp and desert winds; the maintenance and supply of a group of workers on an isolated, waterless site such as this was a difficult matter. The work has been successfully begun and is to be continued shortly.

RESAFA

Resafa is another of Caliph Hisham's castles, laid out in the form of a square with a central courtyard, defensive wall and towers; it was located and excavated in 1952, by the German mission under Mrs. K. Otto-Dorn, among the remains of a great Moslem centre. The Caliph died and was buried there.

Up to that time, Resafa had been known chiefly for the Christian monuments that had been built inside its great walls; they are of great interest in the history of art and architecture in northern Syria from the fifth to the seventh century of our era. The largest and best preserved is the basilica of St. Sergius, the plan of which has recently been reconstituted by J. Kollwitz in the light of his excavation work; the structure is said to date from the second half of the fifth century. The remains of the martyry and a second great basilica are still partially hidden; excavation is revealing the beautiful carvings of the semi-domed apses and the capitals and arches. There are also a few smaller buildings and, outside the walls, a funerary

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361 chapel. The peculiar nature of the crystalline stone of these
172 buildings gives them a very distinctive stamp.
344 The rich ornamentation of the northern doorway of the enclosure, with its five arches of different sizes supported on columns is also remarkable; in structure and style it has been compared to certain parts of Diocletian's palace at Split.

The size of the buildings and the extent and isolation of the site make Resafa a difficult place to explore. It is gratifying to know that work has now been resumed and it is to be hoped that it will soon be possible to continue it on a large scale.

THE VALLEY OF THE EUPHRATES

361 The Euphrates route must also be considered while we are
172 speaking of the desert routes; it too is marked at intervals by large fortified enclosures, built at different times at points where the tracks fanning out from Palmyra crossed the river. Dura and Raqqa are among the best known of these fortifications.

Dura-Europos (Es-Salihiyeh) is a Seleucid foundation dating from the end of the fourth century B.C. Occupied by he Parthians and later by the Romans, it was at that time closely dependant upon Palmyra. It was captured and destroyed by the Sassanids in A.D. 256. The town is situated on a plateau above the Euphrates flanked by two narrow ravines. Guarding the river crossing, and at the same time a caravan city and river port, it held a position of great strategic and economic importance. It was not until 1921, with the chance discovery of the paintings from the temple of the Palmyrene gods, now in the Damascus Museum, that attention was drawn to the site. Its investigation was begun by F. Cumont and continued by Yale University under the direction of M. J. Rostovtzeff. On he traditional Greek chessboard street plan of the town, a number of buildings were located and excavated, including 11 temples, two small sanctuaries, a Christian church, a synagogue, he market, several baths and numerous houses. The many treasures found included groups of frescoes from the church and synagogue, now reconstructed and preserved at Yale and Damascus respectively.

Although the Greek and Roman town at Raqqa was of some importance in its time, it is the Moslem remains of the new town, Al-Rafiqa, founded in 772 by the Caliph Al-Mansur which have monopolized attention. The Baghdad gate with its brickwork decoration and the twelfth-century mosque with its arches and round minaret are the most striking monuments. Quite recently the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities began a search for the remains of the palaces which, in the ninth century, were a favourite residence of the Abbassid dynasty. The excavations, carried out by Nassib Saliby, brought to ligh in 1952, at a spot about two miles north of the city wall, a large group of buildings containing many rooms and formerly surrounded by gardens. A Kufic inscription bearing the name

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361 of the Caliph Al-Mutasim has been found there, besides fragments of stucco work, frescoes, glassware and glazed ceramics.
362 This is but a part of a very large built area which will be systematically explored.

A word must also be said of Mari (Tell Hariri), another town on the river, which, 3,000 years before Dura, occupied a comparable position some 25 miles further south; everyone has heard of the extraordinary treasures found there since 1932 by the French mission under A. Parrot, which include statues, jewellery, mother-of-pearl mosaics and inscribed tablets. These are preserved at Aleppo and the Louvre and the most recent finds are at present on view in the exhibition at the Damascus Museum. Other notable sites are the triangular fortifications of Halibiyeh, the ancient Zenobia, built in Roman times, with its serried chain of towers, to guard the narrow pass running along the Euphrates at the foot of a high basalt cliff, and Meskené, the ancient Beli's, with its high brick minaret, at the junction of the route from Antioch and Aleppo with the river valley.

The Mesopotamian method of building with sun-dried brick, which was more or less generally employed, and the extent and isolation of the sites make it questionable whether it would be worth while to undertake costly maintenance and consolidation work. At Mari, Dura and Raqqa the treasures found are of greater interest than the buildings; once the excavations have been completed, plans drawn and photographs taken, the ruins can be left to their fate. It will then be the task of museums and publications to make them live once more.

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THE VALLEY OF THE ORONTES

The study of the coastal region must be extended to the valley 133
of the Orontes which, geographically and historically, forms 361
its eastern limit. A natural channel between the Alawite chain and the limestone plateau, it forms part of the long depression running from south to north behind the Lebanon. Scattered along the course of the Orontes, too, are the strong citadels by which the Arabs sought, successfully, to stem the advance of the Crusaders—Baalbek, Homs, Hama, Caesaria, Kalat-el-Mudik—all interesting and beautiful, in varying degrees.

Two very different sites must be mentioned. 361

On the vast field of ruins of Apamea, overlooking the marshy 172
plain formed by the river, the scattered fragments of that ancient city's monuments are still to be seen. It is being explored by the Belgian expedition which has been led in turn by F. Mayence and H. Lacoste. The ground is strewn with plinths, entablatures, and the shafts of wreathed columns. The line of the great colonnade and the ground plans of various buildings are still easily recognizable.

The charm of Hama, with its green gardens and high, wailing waterwheels, must not distract us from two interesting monuments, well worthy of close study: the Great Mosque, with its two minarets of different periods, its arcaded courtyard and white domes, still showing signs of what it was at an earlier date, and the Azem Palace, with the graceful arches of its upper courtyard, its ornamented windows, its great domed hall of state (dating from 1778), lavishly although a little too heavily decorated. The atmosphere of the old town is a happy foil to the life on the banks of the river and helps to give Hama great attraction for the visitor.

ANCIENT SITES

However beautiful or famous they may be, the ancient sites 172
of the coastal region need not here be dealt with at length in

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connexion with the particular question with which we are concerned, for their preservation and presentation do not call for any special comments. 172

The excavations at Ras-Shamra are still going forward actively; the site is in the hands of the French mission which, for the last 24 years, has been under the direction of C. Schaeffer. The interest of the ruins is partly due to the sensational finds that have been made there, and only the well-informed visitor to the spot will call to mind the age-old past of Ugarit, the innumerable texts that have been unearthed and are, in some cases, still being deciphered, and the precious objects discovered here, the most recently excavated of which are at present on view in the exhibition at the Damascus Museum.

The great monuments of Amrit and the Cyclopean walls of the island of Ruad, protecting that impregnable refuge from the sea, are still eloquent reminders of the Phoenician mastery of the seas.

Nearer our own time, the great Roman theatre of Jebla, which is being excavated by the Directorate of Antiquities, is emerging as a building of quite spectacular proportions and of very considerable interest for certain of its details (structure of the sloping vaults supporting the tiers, arrangement of the stairs around the orchestra).

Mention must also be made of the great tetrapylon at Latakia, which has just been considerably restored.

CRUSADERS' CASTLES

However, the most striking monuments in the whole region from the coast to the mountainous hinterland are the great buildings raised by the Crusaders. They bear witness to the colossal efforts made by the Western peoples, over two centuries, to gain a foothold on this coast, as do the opposing Arab citadels built on the Orontes in order to hold them in check. Peerless masterpieces of medieval military architecture, they impress us not only by their strong defensive works and the 172 344

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technical skill of their builders, but also by the admirable specimens of Gothic art to be found in them.

The three great castles of Sahyun, Marqab and the Krak are most impressive of all, owing to their superb position, massive proportions and historical importance.

Sahyun (Sigon; Saône of the Crusaders) is situated on a narrow ridge between two deep ravines, on which the Phoenicians and the Byzantines had also once established a foothold. It is a large and rather curious group of buildings, to which Byzantines, Crusaders and Arabs all in turn made their contribution. One of the most striking features is the extraordinary way the rock has been hewn out to isolate the castle, while leaving a slender pillar in the middle of the moat to support the drawbridge. Marqab (Margat of the Crusaders), like an eyrie dominating the coastal road above Baniyas, stands on a steep-sided triangular plateau, protected by its immense double sweep of fortifications. The chapel, with its undivided nave, has two beautiful arched doorways. The Krak des Chevaliers, most famous of all these castles, from its lonely vantage-point among the bare mountains, kept watch on the Homs gap. Its strong defensive works, with the double line of fortifications, round towers, curtains, machicolations, underground passages and great sloping glacis, seeming to continue the slopes outside the fortress, contrast not only with the architecture of the great hall and its portico, with their cross-ribbed vaults, pillared doorways, mullioned windows and carved ornamentation, but also with the austerer architecture of the chapel, with its undivided nave and pointed barrel vault. The surrender of the Knights Hospitallers to Beibars, and the fall of the Krak, in 1271, heralded the collapse of the Crusaders.

The same contrast between the exterior and interior architecture strikes the visitor to the stronghold of Safita (Castel-Blanc), around which modern houses have been built in such a way as to preserve the concentric ground plan of the medieval town. The great square tower, in whose walls there are only a few tiny apertures barely visible to the eye, contains a massive and beautiful church with an undivided nave and pointed barrel vault, and, on the upper storey, a high room with a groined vault, divided into two by a line of pillars. This contrast is also to be found at Tartus where the remains of two beautiful rooms with cross-ribbed vaulting are still to be seen inside the fortress of the Templars; surrounded by enormous ramparts. At some distance, inside the town, the almost completely preserved cathedral of Our Lady of Tortosa, an interesting example of a fortified church, with its austere and very unusual façade, its corner towers, its three vaulted naves and the curious and as yet unexplained structure of one of its pillars, still remains "one of the most beautiful monuments left on this coast by the Crusaders".

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS

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The monuments of which we have been speaking call for two observations.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that considerable expenditure is necessary for the upkeep and consolidation of these great groups of buildings, certain parts of which are in constant danger of collapse. The Directorate of Antiquities is doing valiant work, but its resources are limited and it is unable to take action everywhere at the same time. It first turned its attention to the urgent repairs needed by the Krak des Chevs-

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172 658 liers, which, since its restoration in 1936 (involving the removal of the village built within the ramparts and the repairing of the terraces) had suffered considerable damage. The new work of restoration included the rebuilding of walls, the repairing of vaults, the reconstruction of a stairway that had collapsed, and the replacing of the missing parts of the windows and doorways in the portico of the great hall. But other misfortunes are continually occurring: a tower is struck by lightning; plants grow upon the glacis. It is constantly necessary to set to again—and the castle concerned is only one of many.

We are well aware of the great interest which the Directorate of Antiquities is taking in this matter and of its determination to continue its efforts; it is deserving of the highest praise. It would be well, however, if the skilled technicians in charge of the work could have the advice of competent specialists whenever some delicate piece of architecture is in need of repair. The same applies to the present restoration of the minaret of the Great Mosque at Aleppo.

172 We are also of the opinion—and this is our second observation—that this work would be easier and less burdensome if the tourist attraction of these magnificent buildings were taken into account. At present they are almost inaccessible, as is shown by the ridiculously small number of visitors (the average is less than 120 a month at the Krak). The Krak or Marqab can be reached only by jeep and it is impossible to travel the whole distance to Sahyun by road. Nevertheless, there were once tracks leading to these castles and they simply need a few miles of repair and regular upkeep thereafter. If that were done, there is no doubt that there would be a tremendous increase in the number of tourists, and considerable funds for the work of restoration could be derived from admission fees.

From this point of view, the region offers real advantages which it would not be difficult to exploit. It is quite near the sea and, if the road were better, a visit to the Krak could be included in the programme of the numerous cruises calling along this coast, which already visit Baalbek and Damascus. The establishment of a suitable hotel at Tartus would make it possible for travellers with the necessary time at their disposal to make interesting excursions to Ruad, Safita and Marqab, just as they can from Latakia to Jebla, Ras-Shamra and Sahyun. This would also be a good opportunity of restoring the church at Tartus, which is at present being used by the municipality as a storehouse. Moreover, if a rest-house were fitted up inside the Krak it would be easier to visit the castle from Tartus, Tripoli, Homs, Hama or even Damascus.

This would permit the successful development of a region whose natural beauties vie in attraction with its incomparable monuments, to the advantage not only of the local population but of the country as a whole.

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THE LAND OF COUNTLESS RUINS

Few regions can rival northern Syria in the number of interesting ruins to be found within a small space. The Marquis de Vogüé, travelling there in 1861, brought back the amazing tale of his discoveries, but the sites of which he told were only a small fraction of the archaeological treasures of this area, and the two American expeditions to Syria that resumed the exploration of the region more systematically and thoroughly 40 years later by no means discovered all the sites. No complete list has even yet been drawn up. There are probably hundreds. 172

The great period of development in this region, to which the profusion of ruins bears witness, lay between the first and the seventh centuries A.D. Beginning with the organization and pacification of the Roman province of Syria, it came to an end with the Arab conquest.

Among all the valuable material thus discovered, attention was first concentrated on the churches. Numerous works have brought out the important part played by Syria in the development of early Christian architecture, the exceptional interest of certain basilicas, and their historical, artistic and religious significance. But it is arbitrary to dissociate them from the other monuments around them. Today, with a wider knowledge of these sites, we realize that the various types of buildings, civil as well as religious, must be considered as a whole. A church is seldom isolated; it is only one feature in an architectural complex—village or monastery—each part of which is a source of information about the various aspects of life in northern Syria during the first centuries of the Christian era.

Only a close study of social and economic conditions, in relation to geography and history, will enable us to understand these monuments and appreciate the stupendous architectural development which they represent. Such a study has just been completed, and it is thanks to the kindness of the author, Mr. G. Tchalenko, and of Mr. H. Seyrig, that we have been able to refer to the book prior to its publication (it is now in the press). It throws much light on the sites we saw during our visit to northern Syria.

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N THE NORTH

CHARACTERISTICS OF CERTAIN SITES

The region of the limestone plateau, which is bounded on the west by the cleft formed by the valleys of the Orontes and the Afrin, includes a few fertile plains, but taken as a whole, it is simply a vast mountainous tract of bare rock, fissured and worn. The sites are scattered on the ridges and slopes and only by building water-tanks was it possible for the people to maintain life. They can be divided into three groups: to the north, the Jebel Seman; in the centre, the Jebel Barisha and the Jebel el-Ala; to the south, the Jebel Zawiyé or the Jebel Riha. In certain places there are so many ancient centres that their ruins can be seen on all sides. 133 361 172

These towns frequently grew up around a monastery. The monastic life was widely practised in Syria at an early date and huge groups of buildings were put up to meet religious needs. Every convent was also a centre of agricultural work requiring additional buildings, as at Breig and Deir Turmanin. Some were also places of pilgrimage, where inns, bazaars and hostelries were built for the pious who flocked thither, as they did, for instance, to the convents of Qalaat Seman and Deir Semaa, hallowed by the memory of the famous Stylite. 361 172

In other cases farms, a church and oil presses, sometimes covering a large area, grew up around an agricultural town; Banuqqa Qirqbize and Behyo are excellent examples. Elsewhere, there were villages with substantial houses, as at Réfadé and Kafer Nabo, or with more modest dwellings, as at Qutura and Taqlé. Everywhere, the remains of churches can be distinguished amidst the debris of ruined buildings. In the vicinity, the variety of monuments to the dead is no less worthy of note.

Two sites are remarkable for their exceptional size and the variety of buildings found there: Brad, in the north, and El-Bara, in the south. Situated on the denuded plateau which forms the northern part of the Jebel Seman, Brad looks like a small town; in fact, it was the administrative and commercial centre of a very large region; it grew up around the nucleus of an ancient settlement (interesting remains of third-century baths and two large churches dating from 399-401 and 561, respectively) to reach its greatest size in the seventh century. El-Bara,

P. 29 C

361 the main centre of the Jebel Zawiyé, was both an agricultural
172 and an industrial town (large-scale production of oil and wine), and finally covered an area about 2 miles long by 1 ½ wide. Among the confused heaps of its ruins, the remains of several churches and rich mausolea of the sixth century, with their pyramidal crowns, are recognizable.

172 G. Tchalenko has drawn attention to the similarity of the
341 architecture throughout the limestone plateau due to the use of the same materials and the same methods of hewing and bonding stone. He has also noted the unity and homogeneity of the carved ornamentation, which was gradually adapted to the new forms of the various buildings. This suggests that itinerant groups of craftsmen went from place to place, taking their style and methods with them.

172 Evidence is provided by ecclesiastic buildings, varying in
346 nature and importance. We would draw particular attention to two of them, which seem to surpass all the others by their quality and exceptional charm. The first is the cruciform basilica of St. Simeon (Qalaat Semaan) built in the third quarter of the fifth century around the column on which the Stylite spent the last 37 years of his life and which, long after his death, was still a famous place of pilgrimage. The originality of the plan, the masterly structure of the central octagon, with its great semi-circular arches, the harmonious proportions of the chevet and the southern façade, together with the neighbouring baptistery and conventual buildings, make this peerless architectural group "the greatest and grandest Christian ruin in the East". The second of these monuments, lesser known because it is difficult of access, is the basilica of Qalbloze, standing in a temenos, like an ancient temple, on the crest of the Jebel el-Ala. It dates from the end of the fifth century. Its façade flanked by towers, its chevet adorned with columns, the great arches separating the nave from the side aisles, the majestic proportions of the apse, and the quality and sober arrangement of carving, produce that impression of harmony and perfection that only a masterpiece can achieve.

THE POPULATION OF THE LIMESTONE PLATEAU

361 The profusion of ruins over such a large area, not only in the
172 vicinity of fertile plains, but on rocky and waterless plateaux shows that there was once a large population, which later disappeared completely. The construction of water tanks may have helped the people to subsist, but that alone cannot explain their extraordinary prosperity. What, then, were their means of livelihood?

Some have thought the answer to this question to be that the arable land disappeared as a result of complete and unchecked deforestation, which brought about a radical change in the conditions of life. Tchalenko does not agree; in the work already referred to, he gives a simpler and more plausible explanation of this phenomenon.

It has long been established that the ancient inhabitants of the limestone plateau owed their prosperity to the cultivation of the olive and, to a lesser degree, of the vine. The many presses found in all the settlements are proof of this. The cultivation of these crops is perfectly feasible in the soil and climate of the present day. It was a change in political and social circumstances which brought about the decline in the population. Where the soil accumulated in rocky basins and

361 cible to beautification to give a village food by the cultivation of
● 172 cereals, it may be enough to make that village prosperous by the growing of trees. The cultivation of the olive is the only crop however, implies firmly that capital must be immobilized for a long time, while the trees are growing and, secondly that there must be suitable channels of trade for the produce to be disposed of elsewhere in return for other necessary goods. These conditions presuppose a long period of peace and security. This was once secured by the Pax Romana, and in recent years a stable regime has again been inaugurated. It is already producing its first results: people are again beginning to grow trees and to settle on the Hauranian plateau.

This is a development fraught with consequences for the future fate of the ancient monuments.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS: THE PRESERVATION OF THE MONUMENTS

192 The fact that the Hauranian plateau is again becoming populated adds a new difficulty to those already arising out of the nature of the ruins and their wide dispersion. The protection of the monuments was already complicated by the fact that they are scattered over a distance of nearly 50 miles, with bad communications, and by the ease to which they have degenerated—quarries and sanctuaries practically impossible access of stone where buildings, now collapsed, once stood, in the midst of which the churches are generally situated. Now we find, in addition, that the new inhabitants of this region tend, for preference, to settle among the ruins, occupying the ancient buildings, repairing the water tanks and taking from the fields of the old monuments the hewn stones they need for building, here lying so conveniently to hand.

It is true that today there is no risk of any great building's being totally destroyed, as happened not so long ago, to the magnificent Tetrapylon church. The most urgent measures have already been taken by the Directorate of Antiquities; certain monuments (particularly those at Qalat Femath) have been consolidated; regional inspectors keep an eye on the situation, regularly visiting the ruins and drawing up reports. These measures are producing good results, but they could still be taken further, although it is not to be expected that they will ever provide complete safeguards. In fact, it is impossible to preserve all the monuments, provide a keeper for every site, or counteract the effects of the repopulation of the region, which in itself is a very welcome development. In such a situation, the only practicable policy is to consolidate and restore the most interesting buildings, where architectural value is obvious, and leave to their fate the countless ruins which consist only of parts of walls still standing or the rubble-down masonry of houses now collapsed.

Two comments are then called for.

Firstly, attention must be drawn to the very great importance of archaeological publications and the outstanding services rendered by the scholars who produce them. Detailed descriptions of the ruins, accompanied by plans, photographs and architectural drawings, as well as more general studies relating to the monuments, make it possible to preserve an accurate picture of a state of affairs that is bound to change or come to an end. We have only to compare the present situation with that described in Vogüé's or Butler's publications in order to realize this.

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Secondly, we must emphasize how much the development of tourist traffic would help in the upkeep and presentation of the monuments concerned. It would be comparatively easy to organize special tours starting from Aleppo. The churches of St. Simeon and Qalbloze would be the main attractions but stops could be made on the way in order to give visitors the opportunity of seeing the remains of the Roman road from Antioch to Chalcis, the funerary monuments of Dana and Sermada, the convents of Deir Seman and Brig, and the villa at Bamuqqa. There are already good roads over a large part of the distance that would thus be covered, and it would simply be necessary to improve the section leading to Qalaat Seman, and to lay out a good path to enable tourists to walk up to Qalbloze from the plain of Self. Attractive rest houses could be fitted up in an old hostelry at Deir Seman, and in the villa at Bamuqqa.

To attract attention in this way to the archaeological treasures of this beautiful region would help in its economic development, and at the same time, provide the Antiquities Service with considerable financial resources, derived from admission fees, for the upkeep and restoration of these magnificent buildings.

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16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

DEAD CITIES

IN THE SOUTH

THE HAURAN AND THE JEBEL DRUZE

133 Black is the dominant colour in the basalt country of southern Syria. The eruptive rocks strewn over the soil give the landscape a highly distinctive character; black are the stones, black the buildings, black the sculptures.

The whole region was formerly known as the Hauran, but today this name is applied only to the western portion, as distinct from the eastern part, the Jebel Druze. The same distinction is to be found in the differing aspects of the two portions. To the west, as far as the eye can see, lies an enormous fertile plain which produces abundant crops of wheat and barley. To the east, rises rugged mountainous country. These mountains have the characteristic contours of extinct volcanoes, but although they are fairly high (from 1,500 to 1,700 metres), they do not appear so, for the ground rises gradually and the altitude of the foothills is always over 1,000 metres.

●172 In this part of the country, the building of monuments on a large scale began with the establishment of the Roman Province of Arabia, in A.D. 106, by Trajan's legate, Cornelius Palma, and was encouraged by the Antonines, Septimius Severus and Philip the Arab. It continued during the Christian period, for there were numerous bishoprics from the time of the first councils onwards and many churches and monasteries were then built. After the Islamic conquest (636), only the towns of Bosra and Salkhad remained of any importance, owing to their strategic position; their main buildings (military and religious) date from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The abandonment of the ancient sites, however, rapidly resulted everywhere in the ruin of their monuments. Where there had been most villages, there they were most completely deserted.

SITES AND MONUMENTS IN THE JEBEL DRUZE

361 172 Two of the many sites, Chahba and Qanawat, have fairly large groups of monuments.

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Chabba, formerly Philippopolis, was founded in the third century by the emperor, Philip the Arab, on the square plan of a Roman camp. The gates of the town, the wonderfully preserved pavements of the cardo and the decumanus, a small theatre, thermae and various other monuments are still to be seen on the ancient site, while huge mosaics from it are now preserved at Suwaida and Damascus. Qanawat, formerly Kanatha, stands in undulating country, planted with trees, where the still well-preserved ruins make a very striking picture. Among these ruins are to be seen curious tombs, the colonnades (still standing) of several temples and the great group of buildings known as the serraglio, an interesting collection of Roman and Christian structures, where it is possible to distinguish the corbelled columns of a prostyle temple, the portico, atrium and hall of a large fourth-century basilica, and the curiously ornamented façade of a church almost as ancient.

At Chabba, as at Qanawat, the inhabitants are now living in the ruins, having installed themselves in certain buildings and damaged others by taking materials from them. The same situation is found at most of the large number of ancient centres in this region, and particularly at Chabba, where the famous basilica, the palace with its interesting façade and a beautiful house adorned with columns are not only distinctive in themselves, but also provide excellent examples of those stone slab roofs supported on corbels which are a characteristic feature of the local architecture. At Suwaida, the busy centre of the Jebel Druze, there is practically nothing left of the ancient monuments. Even a great group of buildings like the temple of Sia has now completely disappeared. Moreover, we have only to compare the present state of the monuments with that described in the publications issued at the beginning of the century to realize how much destruction has taken place during the last 50 years.

We must hasten to add, however, that the necessary measures have been taken to prevent further damage. The Directorate of Antiquities has put in hand the most urgent consolidation work; inspectors keep an eye on the monuments and report any new discovered, while the museum at Suwaida prevents the dispersion and disappearance of the objects found. Nevertheless, the great numbers of ancient remains and the fact

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that they are widely scattered and often difficult of access, make it hard to ensure really effective protection. 361 172

THE CHURCHES OF EZRAA

At least a brief mention must be made of the importance of Ezraa. The churches of St. George and St. Hélie, dating from 514 and 542 respectively, are important in the history of early Christian art. Today, they are in a deplorable state of neglect. The cupola of the church of St. George collapsed in 1912. Ugly repairs have been made to both. The consolidation and intelligent restoration of both these buildings is particularly to be recommended. 346

BOSRA

The old capital of the Roman Province of Arabia is now a humble village. It contains remarkable ancient ruins, both Christian and Islamic, whose architectural beauty and historical importance recall the city's long and brilliant past. 361 172

The topography of the Roman town is still clearly indicated by the straight course of the main thoroughfare, built on the ancient decumanus; several columns of its porticos and one of the gates at the western end of the town are still standing. The visitor will note a great monumental arch with three bays, the ruins of thermae and four large Corinthian columns which may have formed part of a nymphaeum.

Built in 513 under the Archbishop Julianos, the cathedral, now in a very ruinous state, is one of the oldest examples of a large church with a cupola and central plan. From an inscription, we know that Bosra possessed an even older church, dedicated to the Virgin in the third quarter of the fourth century by the Archbishop Antipater; this inscription reminds us of the important part played by the town in early Christian history. Its name is also linked with the early history of Islam, for a large building with an apse and a blind façade is believed to be the remains of the monastery where the monk Bahira taught Mahomet and foretold his prophetic calling. A mosque, Al-Mabrak, was later built on the spot where, according to tradition, the Prophet's camel knelt. 346 172

This is one of the many mosques whose high dark minarets, square built in the twelfth century, give the town of Bosra its own particular stamp. Although the Great Mosque of Omar is in a better state of preservation and although the minaret of Al-Fatmé has a slenderer grace, the Al-Mabrak mosque and the adjoining madrasah, built in 1136—the oldest Syrian madrasah, according to J. Sauvaget—form a very remarkable architectural group.

The rapid decay of these monuments is most regrettable. A glance at the older publications will show the extent of the damage, which has been made worse by the building of modern

houses among the ancient buildings. These houses should be removed and the monuments should be consolidated and restored. It is not at all certain that the plan adopted by the authorities for the improvement of this site meets all these needs or gives sufficient attention to the appropriate presentation of the principal monuments. 346 172

In conclusion, we must draw attention to the quite outstanding interest of the group formed by the Roman theatre and the Arab citadel. The two buildings, equal in beauty, are intimately connected. The thirteenth-century ramparts, with their great square towers and rustic work, encircle the caves of the theatre, while a building intended as a storehouse, consisting of three storeys of great vaulted rooms, one above the other, has been built on the orchestra. The Directorate of Antiquities has recently carried out large-scale excavation work to clear the tiered seats and the stage as far as possible. We feel that bolder action is necessary and that the huge block of masonry obstructing the interior of the caves, which is of no great interest in itself, should be demolished. This would restore a splendid ancient monument in its entirety, without serious detriment to the Moslem citadel. The Roman theatre at Bosra is one of the largest, most beautiful and most complete of those that still remain. Moreover, it has a number of noteworthy features, in the structure of the sloping arches supporting the tiers, the arrangement of the small stairways leading to the latter, and the wonderful ornamentation of the *frons scaenae*. The towers of the Arab citadel are also a magnificent example of medieval military architecture. If the work we have suggested were done, both buildings, instead of detracting from each other as they do at present, would be seen to greater advantage. Together, they would be an outstanding attraction for tourists. 346 172

The region of Bosra and the Jebel Druze, which can be reached quite easily from Damascus, should be much better known. The establishment of a rest-house inside the citadel of Bosra itself and the improvement of accommodation facilities at Soeida would involve little cost and make visits much easier. 172

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1 A [AT BOSRA -- ANALYST]

CONCLUSION

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172 The foregoing remarks do not necessarily call for any formal conclusion. Our purpose has not been to demonstrate any theory, but simply to describe as accurately and objectively as possible, in accordance with our instructions, the general situation with regard to historic monuments and archaeological sites in Syria and the particular situation of certain of them. We have, so to speak, taken bearings.

Nevertheless, it would be well to emphasize the variety and complexity of the problems confronting Syria in connexion with the protection and presentation of its monuments, as revealed by our observations; these problems vary according to the region, the age and nature of the buildings, their state of preservation and their environment.

In large and rapidly expanding towns, such as Damascus and Aleppo, attention must be drawn to the interest which historical monuments have for the present generation. Their aesthetic value must be taken into consideration in all town-planning schemes, which should endeavour to preserve or create the most appropriate atmosphere around them, befitting their proportions, character and style. Far from hindering the natural development of a city, they should continue to embellish it, being given their rightful place in the scene so as to do full justice to their cultural significance as well as to the needs of modern life. To that end, efforts should also be made to allow historic monuments to serve their original purpose, or to find a suitable new one for them, so that they are not left aside as useless relics of the past but play a real part in the life of the city.

Outside the towns, difficulties are due to the great numbers, extreme diversity and wide dispersion of the monuments and archaeological sites. Hundreds of miles of desert lie between such great groups of ruins as Palmyra or Dura and the inhabited centres of the country. Elsewhere, as in northern Syria and, to a lesser degree, in the Jebel Druze, there are so many ruins that it has scarcely been possible to draw up a complete list of them. In other cases, such as the Crusaders' castles, the buildings are so huge that their upkeep alone would necessitate constant attention and very considerable expenditure. Moreover, the new discoveries made on excavation sites are

172 continually adding, year by year, to the heritage of historic monuments.

172 658 We have frequently had occasion to compliment the Directorate of Antiquities on the manner in which it is carrying out its manifold tasks by ensuring the preservation and supervision of monuments and archaeological sites, executing a substantial programme of restoration work each year, organising museums and promoting investigations and learned publications. By its own efforts as well as by those which it has instigated or encouraged, it is achieving remarkable results over a very wide area. Tribute must also be paid to the understanding and generosity of the Syrian Government which is providing the Directorate with the necessary means for its work.

In proportion to its resources, Syria is devoting very substantial sums to its monuments. The importance of the latter warrants this policy, and also explains the interest they are arousing throughout the world, far beyond the boundaries of the country. It also justifies the desire of the Directorate of Antiquities for a better understanding and fuller support of its efforts. We have indicated a few of the means that we consider most apt to assist it in its efforts.

The importance of learned publications must once again be emphasized. The historic monuments described and commented upon therein can be studied by scholars of all countries and become more truly a part of the cultural treasures of mankind, so that, even if they are afterwards lost, the memory of them remains. It is not enough, however, to bring them to the notice of a small circle of experts in this way; interest can be aroused among a wider public by attractive "popular" works, exhibitions and lectures, by the introduction of special courses in schools, and, in other countries, by intelligent publicity calculated to attract tourists to Syria, thus benefiting the country in various ways. We have already indicated how helpful it would be to set up, at Damascus and Aleppo, local committees of artists and scholars to advise the authorities on all questions of town planning. We also feel that international missions of experts, particularly on architectural restoration, could in suitable cases make detailed studies, in co-operation

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with the Directorate of Antiquities, of the measures to be taken for the better presentation of certain large and important buildings. 172 658

If the results of our survey help to make the artistic and archaeological treasures of Syria better known and appreciated

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abroad as well as in the country itself, if they can in any way assist the work so well begun by the Directorate of Antiquities to promote the protection and study of historic monuments, and if they suggest new and useful forms of co-operation for that purpose, we shall feel that our work has been well worth while.

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

1. Damascus. Great Mosque: North portico.
2. Damascus. Great Mosque: West portico.
3. Damascus. Great Mosque: West portico and minaret.
4. Damascus. Great Mosque: minaret.
5. Damascus. Great Mosque: minaret.

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

6. Damascus. Cemetery of Bab Saghir.
7. Damascus. Darwish-Pasha Mosque (1570).
8. Damascus. Sulaiman Madrasah (1566).
9. Damascus. Rukniya Madrasah (1232).

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n. Damascus Suleymaniye Madrasah (1554)
o. Damascus Sulaiman Madrasah (1558)
p. Damascus Khan Asad-Pasha (18th century)
q. Damascus Sulaiman Madrasah (1558)

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

14. Damascus. Muradiye Mosque ("Muradiye"; 1200-13): minaret.
15. Damascus. Sheik Mohiy ed-Din (1318): minaret.
16. Damascus. Al-Muradiya Mosque: minaret.
17. Damascus. Mamluk Mosque (1368): minaret.
18. Damascus. Madrasa el-Ghali (1470): minaret.
19. Damascus. Ismi Isham (14th century): minaret.

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23. Aleppo. El-Omari Mosque.
24. Aleppo. Museum Antiques.
25. Aleppo. Antikhanh. House.
26. Aleppo. Khan Frankum.

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



m. Palmyra. Aerial view.
n. Palmyra. Colonnade of the enclosure of the Temple of Bel.
o. Palmyra. Tower of Elahbel.

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



[illegible] Quarry of Marsa al-Qasabi. Aerial view.
[illegible] Quarry of Marsa al-Qasabi. Footwalls in the [illegible]
[illegible] Quarry of Marsa al-Qasabi. Aerial view.

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

(a) Dam-Europe and the Euphrates. Aerial view.
(b) Hadiseh. Aerial view.
(c) Deraa. Aerial view.

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

Palmyra. Great Temple.
Palmyra. Interior of the colonnade.
Palmyra. Arches Palace.
Kalat ibn Ma'an. Aerial view.

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



(a) Castle of Nimrod. Partial view.
(b) Castle of Nimrod. Internal view of fortifications.
(c) Castle of Salah. Partial view.

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

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

9. Deir Sonan. Hermitage.
10. St. Simeon Stylites. General ensemble.
11. Qalb Louzeh. Dimensions of the church.
12. Bakirh. Portico of a house (1948).
13. Bakirh. The same in ruins.

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

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

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

1. Baal. Ionian column.
2. Qasr el. Temple of Baal.
3. Qalat. Gate of the Palace.
4. Emesa. Church of St. George.

following P35 - P

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria

abandoned the wandering life, taken to agriculture and mingled with the settled population already established in the country, which was itself largely the product of a similar process at an earlier time.

The immigrants from the Arabian peninsula brought with them their distinctive customs and ideas and one or other of the 'Semitic' family of languages. Together with Mesopotamia on the other side of the Fertile Crescent, Syria has been throughout history the place where what may, by a not very misleading simplification, be called the 'Semitic' stream of population and influences has met and mingled with other streams. She has served also as the limit of the emigration from Arabia. The Semitic peoples and their languages have never taken firm root beyond the Taurus Mountains. Even in Syria they have not been unopposed, but they have always been of great importance. A large proportion of the population of Syria can trace its descent at least in part to earlier or later immigrants from Arabia; and while Mediterranean and other influences have largely affected forms of government and the culture of the cities, the language and the customs of the countryside have always been predominantly Semitic.

The two sets of influences, that from Arabia and that from other directions, have interacted in various ways. There has been conflict at times, and at times peaceful mingling. Often tension of some sort has existed between the more predominantly Mediterranean and the more predominantly Arabian elements in the population, and between successive waves of settlers from the same source. Sometimes that tension has mirrored itself in the individual soul, which has felt itself drawn in two directions, towards the desert and towards the West. It is only very rarely, if at all, that the influences have blended so completely as to remove all tension. It is true that there has always been a tendency to that end. Rulers and settlers from the Mediterranean lands have to some extent adopted Semitic ways and Arabian immigrants have acquired some of the characteristics of a Mediterranean people. But the process has never been allowed to complete itself; further invasions have occurred, a new Government has established itself, or there have been further waves of immigration, and the process of assimilation has had to begin again.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca.1940-45) 1948 MDl Syria MDl

312 locally by the area of land each irrigates. One canal irrigates 136 acres near Selemiya town; many supply between 20 and 60 acres; and the smallest suffices only for 2.4 acres (near Tell et Tout). The larger canals are nearly all in the low-lying basinlike plain around the town of Selemiya; most of the smaller ones lie toward the northeast. A canal which supplies 68 acres of land in Selemiya delivers 8.8 gallons a second (measured at lowest water level, in October, 1945). There are today in the caza 125 such canals which are in working order and an unknown number which are not in use. These 125 canals irrigate a total of 3060 acres. The map of Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) shows typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara.[4]

History

•175 312 At Misherfe-Qatna, where a modern village occupies the site of a Hittite fortress-city, 18 miles southwest of Selemiya, a foggara-like canal supplied the town in the second millennium before Christ.[5] Most of those in our region date from a much later period, and probably more were constructed from the second century of our era to the sixth than at any other time. Many can be dated by the details of their construction, or by their close association with ruins, or, occasionally, by inscriptions. During these centuries the Selemiya region was a prosperous agricultural district, well supplied with irrigation water. The Roman legacy was added to in the early period of Arab rule,[6] when Selemiya was well known as a pleasant country town, the public buildings of which, especially the baths, rivaled those in great Arab cities. Descendants of the Abbasid Prince Saleh ibn Ali ibn Abdullah ibn Abbas ibn il Motalib lived in Selemiya, and, according to Ya'qubi, writing in 891, Abdullah, the son of Saleh, "conducted thither a stream of water, and dug wells in the land, whereby the saffron grows plentifully." For a period after 893 the town became a center of the Ismaili sect, a circumstance which brought it importance then, and which was to affect the region powerfully a thousand years later.

Throughout the Arab period the water of Selemiya remained famous. As late as the fourteenth century Ahmed the Secretary praised Selemiya as "a charming and rich town, with abundant water and trees. Water comes

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[4] See the maps of Qdeym for typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara. Plates III and IV in the atlas volume of R. Mouterde and A. Poidebard: Le limes de Chalcis: Organisation de la steppe en Haute Syrie romaine (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 38), 2 vols. (text and atlas). Paris, 1945. See review elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*.

[5] Memil du Buisson: Le site archéologique de Mishrife-Qatna, Paris, 1935.

[6] Information on the Arab period is drawn largely from the article "Salamiya" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam and from Guy le Strange: Palestine under the Moslems, Boston and New York, 1890. The quotation from Ya'qubi is from Le Strange, p. 528.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

to it in aqueducts."[7] Today there are 39 foggaras in use on the lands of Selemiya, and there are also some that are unused. Very few of the foggaras are modern, so that we may legitimately suppose about the same area to have been irrigated around the town in the Arab period as at present—1300 acres. The water was renowned for its purity, as it is today, and Hama, 18 miles away on the muddy Orontes, drank Selemiya water brought to the city by a foggara from Ain ez Zerqa. Abu el Fida (1273–1331), geographer and king of Hama, caused this canal to be cleaned, and two centuries later the following inscription from a Hama mosque shows that it was repaired or cleaned again:[8]

> On fifteenth Gumada I 901 [March 2, 1496] was promulgated the princely, august decree of our master, the great emir, the chief, the governor general, Sayfeddin el Asrafi Qansuh as Sarifi as Sami, governor general of the province of Hama (may God glorify his victory!), prohibiting the diversion of moneys to the profit of the exchequer (may it ever prosper!) and of others, from the funds intended for the aqueduct of Selemiya, and ordering that nothing should be taken from this fund except the wages of the workmen laboring on it. Whoever should renew these exactions, let him be accursed, and may both his father and his Prophet testify against him on judgment day.

By this time the prosperous days of Selemiya were nearly over. Scattered references show that the frontier of settlement and regular agriculture in the region was retreating westward. Tamerlane ravaged all Syria in 1400, and in 1516 the country fell to the Turks. During the next four centuries Syria slowly decayed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries several great Bedouin tribes moved north out of Arabia into the Syrian Desert and its peripheral regions. After this the steppe and the desert were almost completely beyond the control of the Turkish government, and the frontiers of law, order, and settled life retreated from the edges of these uncontrolled territories. The valuable journals of some English merchants[9] who traveled through the eastern part of our region at the end of the seventeenth century show that, except for Bedouins, it was then practically deserted. The Ismaili inhabitants, according to their descendants' tradition, had left soon after

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[7] See [Maurice] Gaudefroy-Demombynes: La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 3), Paris, 1923, pp. 77–78.

[8] This inscription is from the Great Mosque of Hama, where there are a number of Mameluke decrees, dealing particularly with trade and taxation. It is transcribed in French by Jean Sauvaget in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas*, Vol. 3, 1933, p. 6.

[9] "An Extract of the Journals of Two Several Voyages of the English Merchants of the Factory of Aleppo, to Tadmor, Anciently Call'd Palmyra," *Philos. Trans. Royal Soc. of London*, No. 218, Vol. 19, 1695, pp. 129–147. [Also in "Miscellanea Curiosa," Vol. 3, Containing a Collection of Curious Travels, Voyages, and Natural Histories of Countries, As They Have Been Delivered in to the Royal Society, 2nd edit., revised and corrected by W. Durham, London, 1727 (originally edited by Edmund Halley in 1708), pp. 120–139.]

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[20] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [20] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

7: Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1949 MD1 Syria MD1

ing, all this great quantity of Water was past away, so that in about two Hour's Riding we could hardly perceive that there had been any Rain at all. 731

That floods are an old phenomenon in Selemiya is suggested by two traditional theories, repeated by the inhabitants today, regarding the derivation of the place name. The first theory makes the essential form Sal-Miah, "a flood of water." The other was recorded by Yaqut in 1225:

Ahmad ibn Yahyā ibn Jābir relates that there was a city in Syria, near Salamiyyah, called Al Mūtafikah [The Overturned], which was overwhelmed with all its inhabitants—all except one hundred souls. These left that place, and came and built one hundred houses, and they called the hamlet where they had made their houses Salām Miyah (Peace for the Hundred), of which the people made Salamiyyah.[10]

As told today, the story is that the "overwhelming" agent was a flood.

The floods are greatly aggravated by soil erosion. Where the trees have been cut, the bushes torn up for fuel, and the grass overgrazed, and especially where slopes have been plowed, there the soil is eroded, and many slopes are now practically bare of soil and vegetation. In summer, soil is shifted by strong winds; in winter, rain washes it into gullies or wadis with steep, crumbling sides. These are tributary to the main streams which do so much damage when they reach the plain. The runoff from bare slopes is faster and more fully loaded than that from vegetated slopes. 731 134

Past and Present Vegetation Destruction

There is no doubt that the trees of Jebel Bil'as are a remnant of a denser and more extensive growth, though there are no very good grounds for the common assumption that all the Palmyrene ranges were forested in Roman days. The Tablet of Palmyra's fiscal laws of A.D. 137[11] gives reason to suppose that the locality may have furnished considerable quantities of wood and pistachio nuts, and in the same period Jebel Bil'as and neighboring ranges were used as grazing lands for sheep and horses.[12] The location of elaborate Romano-Byzantine foggara systems, as at Moufaqqar, directly in the paths of the floods might seem to indicate that, when the foggaras were constructed, floods were not as serious as they are now. 175 137 172

Old stumps and roots are found within and beyond the present wooded

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[10] Le Strange, op. cit., p. 510.

[11] See J.-B. Chabot: Choix d'inscriptions de Palmyre, Paris, 1922, pp. 25-38.

[12] A. Poidebard: La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie.—Le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe.—Recherches aériennes (1925-1932) (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 18), Paris, 1934; M. D. Schlumberger: Une campagne de fouilles au Djebel-el-Chaar en 1934, *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1935, pp. 230-236. 113

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho's* which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[15] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

9. Hitti 5-5 (ca. 1926) 1928 MD1 Syria MD1
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Chapter I

A UNIQUE AND SECRET SECT

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Two Historical Fossils:—The Druzes of Syria and the Samaritans of Palestine are two unique communities not to be found elsewhere in the whole world. Like social fossils in an alien environment, these two peoples have survived for hundreds of years in that land rightly described as a "Babel of tongues" and a "museum of nationalities."

The Samaritans are the remnants of the tribes from Assyria and Persia who were transplanted by Sargon some seven hundred years before Christ to take the place of the "ten tribes" who were carried into captivity.[1] They figured in the life of Christ as is illustrated by the case of the "Samaritan woman" and the story of the "good Samaritan." Today they are represented by about one hundred and eighty persons who intermarry among themselves and are becoming rapidly extinct. Their habitat is modern Nāblus (biblical Shechem), and their religion is ancient Judaism mixed with pagan survivals.

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The Druzes have no such clear record to show regarding their origin as a people and as a sect. Their ethnographical origins, no less than their ritual practices and religious beliefs, are shrouded in mystery. Appearing for the first time on the pages of history at Wādi-al-Taym near Mt. Hermon in anti-Lebanon, as professors of the divinity of the sixth Fāṭimite Caliph in Cairo (996–1020 A.D.), the Druzes have lived their semi-independent lives secluded in their mountain fastnesses of Lebanon, unmindful of the progress of the world around them, and almost entirely forgotten by the outside world.

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[1] *Cf.* James A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans, the Earliest Jewish Sect* (Philadelphia, 1907), pp. 46–57.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria

Syrian writers and thinkers contributed to the culture of the Greek, the Latin and the Arabic languages. Even to-day, after centuries of stagnation, there are large and important Syrian mercantile communities in North and South America, in West Africa and elsewhere; and Syrian teachers, journalists, doctors and officials are to be found in all the countries of the Arabic world.

Above all, Syria is the birthplace of Christianity and Judaism. Ever since Europe became Christian, the principles by which its spiritual and moral life have been guided have come to it clothed in an imagery drawn largely from the beauties and way of life of Syria's countryside; and to the believer her very ground is holy.

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As far back as our records go, the forces described above can be seen at work. The curtain of history rises on a Syria of which the population is already mainly Semitic, and is continually being reinforced in its Semitic character by fresh waves of immigration. For example, the Canaanites and the Phœnicians entered the country during the third millennium B.C., and the Hebrews and Aramæans in the second. At some time or another all of these peoples established States in different portions of the country. Thus a great part of coastal Syria was for many centuries under the control of the Phœnicians, who established trading centres throughout the Mediterranean and even beyond; and for a time a portion of southern Syria constituted a Hebrew State.

These Semitic States deserved well of mankind. The Phœnicians built up a trading system which covered the whole Mediterranean basin, and established colonies as far away from their homeland as France and Spain. But what they did is of small account compared with the record of the Jews. Their intense and stormy history was the channel through which the world came to knowledge of God; a knowledge which bore fruit among them in an unbending passion for righteousness and a matchless poetry of devotion.

From the earliest times Syria was in touch with Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor and the Ægean world, and usually the greater part of it was under the sway of foreign rulers. The whole or a large portion of the country was subdued successively by the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Persians,

and the Macedonian Greeks under Alexander the Great. Each of them established a Government for a time and left some mark on the life of the country. The Greek conquest in the fourth century B.C. had particularly important effects. Under the protection of the Government established by Alexander the Great and maintained with varying degrees of efficiency by his successors, the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, there grew up a number of Greek cities, centres of Hellenic life and thought in the Syrian countryside. They did not merely reflect the culture of their country of origin, but made their own contribution to it: more than one of the leading writers and thinkers of later Greek civilization lived in the Syrian towns. These cities gave as much to Syria as to Greek civilization: a new way of life and thought of which the power was seen in the complete Hellenization of many Syrians and in the development of a hybrid Greco-Syrian culture, a Greek grafted on to a Semitic stock.

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The Seleucid age was marked by local risings and the appearance of local principalities: for example, the revolt of the Maccabees and the re-establishment of a Jewish kingdom in Palestine. But at length an end was put to the disorder. In the first century B.C. the Syrian possessions of Alexander's successors were conquered by Rome. They remained a Roman and then a Byzantine province for seven hundred years. It was during this period, or at least during the early centuries of it, that the Mediterranean influences in Syrian life attained their greatest strength. The country became an important and integral part of a vast international unit which covered the whole Mediterranean world, and within which men, goods, and ideas could move freely. Both inside and outside their country Syrians found full scope for their talents. Syrian merchants played an important part in the economic life of the Empire, Syrian officials and generals in its political life; in the third century there were even Emperors from Homs and the Hauran.

The Romans' gift to the country was strong efficient rule, a framework within which the arts of peace could flourish. Their chain of frontier posts on the Euphrates and the edge of the Syrian Desert held back the Parthians to the east. The internal order which they established and their vast public

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria ND1

works encouraged commerce and agriculture. Until the last phase there was little popular resistance to their rule, for they did not interfere with the life of the country. The Hellenistic cities were left to govern themselves and remained Greek in culture. They prospered greatly. Antioch, for example, was for a long time the most important town in the eastern half of the Empire; in it and its fellows the Greek language was cultivated by a succession of great writers, for example the poet Meleager and the satirist Lucian. Beside them, but not in opposition to them, there grew up Roman towns with a Latin culture. Beirut, for instance, became one of the centres for the study of the Roman law and produced jurists as notable as Ulpian and Papinian.

In the first phase of Roman rule, the petty Semitic dynasties which had partitioned the country under the later Seleucids were allowed to continue; later, most of them were suppressed and replaced by direct Roman rule. Even so the stream of Semitic influence remained unchecked. The Arabian trade routes still ended in Syria; the bazaar-towns of the interior, like Damascus, retained their Semitic character and their greatness. The language of the countryside was still Semitic: Aramaic for the most part, with an infiltration of Arabic during the later centuries. Strong government prevented the nomads from pillaging the sown land, but encouraged them to abandon the wandering life for that of the peasant. As ever, the infiltration and settlement of the nomads was largely a gradual and almost unnoticed process, but occasionally it attracted the attention of historians, when whole tribes such as the Tanukhids, Ghassanids and Taghlibids immigrated, or with the rise and fall of Semitic vassal states along the desert routes. One such was the Nabatean State in Transjordan, which reached its height at the beginning of the first century A.D., and was destroyed by Trajan at the end; another was the Kingdom of Palmyra in the Syrian Desert, which, in the third century A.D., grew powerful enough to attempt to shake off the sovereignty of Rome and brought on itself its own destruction; a third was the Ghassanid state in the Hauran, Aramaic and Arabic in language, Monophysite Christian in religion, and mixed Arab and Greek in culture, which served Byzantium during the sixth century A.D. as a bulwark against the nomads of Arabia.

It was in the Roman period that Syria most deeply influenced

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175 the Mediterranean world; for it was in this period that Syrians contributed most to the religious life of the West. Their contribution took many forms. Indigenous or long-established cults—the worship of the Sun, the cult of Adonis—spread throughout the world of the Mediterranean. Greek philosophy and mystery religions were assimilated and developed; for example, Porphyry and others of the leading Neo-Platonists were Syrians. But above all, it was in Syria that the world of pagan culture was closed for ever by the earthly life and Passion of our Lord. There the Gospel was preached, men first called themselves Christians, and the Church found its first saints and its first martyrs. The Syrian desert was the home of the early monks and hermits; the thinkers of the schools of Antioch and Edessa helped to formulate the doctrines of Christianity. There were among them not only great doctors of the Orthodox Church, like Chrysostom, but also great heresiarchs. Then, as always, Syria was fertile ground for theological controversy: the Nestorian and Monophysite doctrines, and much later the Monothelete, found devotees and martyrs. There are still Christian sects in Syria which cling to some of these doctrines, long since condemned and forgotten by the rest of Christendom.

Christianity spread slowly over the greater part of Syria; and as it spread paganism declined, although it lingered on (and perhaps still lingers in disguise) in remote districts. The Jewish community in Syria also dwindled in numbers, with the dispersion of the Jews over the Mediterranean world. This was a gradual process. In one aspect it was a part of the general Syrian dispersion throughout the Roman Empire, and its main motive was trade. But it was intensified and embittered by the revolt of the Jews against the Roman authority and their repression by Titus (A.D. 70). From that time onwards no autonomous Jewish State arose in Palestine; although there never ceased to be a Jewish community there, and the Jews in the outside world continued to remember Zion by the waters of exile.

7

After the third century A.D. the importance and prosperity of Roman Syria began to decline. The once unified Mediterranean world began to disintegrate. Yet even after the western provinces had been detached from the Empire Syria did not

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria M01

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lose its connexion with western Europe: Syrian traders, for example, were active in Merovingian France. Although Greek culture continued to exist, it was no longer creative. At the same time Byzantine administration decayed and more than in times past was felt to be oppressive. Popular discontent found expression in the spread of doctrines opposed to those of the official Eastern Orthodox Church. The Byzantine rulers also neglected to maintain the defences which their predecessors had established. This was the more dangerous because of the rise of the Sassanid Empire in Persia during the third century. In the series of Perso-Roman wars, Syria was a base and often a battle-ground, and was more than once occupied by Persian armies. But it was always re-occupied by Byzantine forces, and finally it was not to the Persians that Syria fell. While the two Empires had been wasting one another's strength, a new power had arisen in Arabia. The Prophet Muhammad had brought a new force into the history of Asia, with his gospel of monotheism, revelation and the Day of Judgement. In a few years his followers had conquered and united the Arabian peninsula. In 633 they invaded Syria. By 640, Damascus, Jerusalem and the other great cities had fallen to the invaders, the Byzantine armies had been defeated and had withdrawn, and Syria had become part of the Moslem Empire.

The conquest was all the easier since the Arabization of Syria had already begun. There were Arabic-speaking tribes in the country; and although they were Christians, many were Nestorians or Monophysites and therefore hostile to the Byzantine Government and the Orthodox Church. After the conquest the process of Arabization was carried a step farther by the settlement in the country of many of the invading Arab Moslems, and the adoption of Arabic, now the language of the ruling class, by some of the Semitic elements already settled there before the conquest. It was a gradual process; Aramaic lingered on for many centuries, especially in Lebanon, and is not yet completely dead. The parallel process of conversion to Islam was also slow. The establishment of a Moslem Government, and the ties of race existing between the Moslem invaders and settlers and many of the other elements in the population, were inducements to conversion; but neither the conquest nor the early period of Moslem rule was marked by religious persecution, or by proselytization

175 on a large scale, except among the Arab tribes. Christians and Jews, it is true, were regarded as in a sense standing outside the community; they were not allowed to carry weapons, to bear witness against Moslems in courts of law, or to marry Moslem women; and they were subject to special measures of taxation. But they were permitted to retain their beliefs and their property, to worship as they pleased, and to manage the internal affairs of their communities according to their own laws and customs. All Christian sects were treated alike; for the heterodox, the Moslem conquest meant a greater toleration than they had previously known. For several centuries Christianity continued to be the faith of a large proportion of the population; in north Lebanon, in the great towns and elsewhere, large Christian communities have continued to exist until to-day. Christian culture also flourished for a time. In the century or so after the Moslem conquest, Christian Syria gave to the world five Popes, the last of the great theologians of the Eastern Church, John of Damascus, and the greatest Christian Arab poet, Akhtal.

Within a generation of Syria's becoming part of the Moslem Empire, it had become the Empire's centre. In 661 the governor of the country, Muawiya, proclaimed himself Caliph, after the murder of his predecessor and antagonist, the Caliph Ali. From that date until the middle of the eighth century Damascus was the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate, of which the territories were gradually extended until they stretched from Spain and Morocco in the west to central Asia in the east. This Empire was largely administered by Syrians, Christian as well as Moslem; and Syrian soldiers bore the burden of its defence and of its wars with Byzantium.

In spite of its expansion and the growing complexity of its organization, the Caliphate remained in a true sense Moslem and Arab under the Umayyad dynasty. Arabs constituted the ruling class; Arabic soon replaced Greek as the language of administration in those regions which had formerly been Byzantine provinces; and Arabic literature found a home at the Umayyad court. But at the same time Islam and the Arab way of life did not remain unaffected by the Greco-Aramaic civilization of Syria. The Moslem conquerors were themselves conquered, gradually and up to a certain point, by the culture of the intellect and senses, the social organization and the administrative system which they found in Syria. They gained

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in technical mastery and maturity of the intellect; they lost the pristine simplicity of their faith and way of life.

Thus the tension between Mediterranean and Semitic influences continued; and by its side other conflicts developed. There was hostility between the stock of the original Arab conquerors and the Arabized and converted Syrians, the 'Mawali', and between both of them and the elements still unassimilated in language and religion. Among the Arabs themselves there were conflicts between tribes and parties, the greatest of them that of the Qaisite and Yemenite factions, which persisted in various disguises until comparatively recent times. Islam itself split up. The struggle between Muawiya and Ali did not end with the latter's death; it was carried on by his sons and by his adherents, the 'Shi'ah' or 'partisans' of Ali; theological dissensions were added to the original political differences; and the Shi'i Moslems have remained distinct from the orthodox Sunnis until to-day.

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A combination of religious, regional and dynastic conflicts led in the eighth century to the replacement of the Umayyad by the Abbasid Caliphs, and of Damascus by Baghdad as the capital of the Caliphate. Syria was never again the centre of the Moslem world; Syrians no longer filled the great positions in the government. They were indeed oppressed by their new rulers, and more than once revolted against them. This change in the political balance was followed by a shift in the centre of western Asian trade, seen in the growth of the commercial importance of Basra. Because of these changes and the devastation of the wars with Byzantium, the prosperity of Syria began to decline and its population to decrease.

Under the Abbasids certain processes which had begun with the Moslem conquest of Syria came virtually to completion. The Arabic language became practically universal; and Islam became the religion of the majority of the inhabitants, partly through fresh immigration from Arabia and partly because of the many inducements to conversion. Many Christians moved from the interior to the safety of the Lebanese mountains; for example, about the ninth century the Maronites established themselves in northern Lebanon. The absorption of Greco-Aramaic culture and the development of an Islamic culture were carried farther. At the same time,

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175 the original Islamic religious impulse was growing weaker; and with its decline and the gradual decay of the Abbasid Caliphate new tendencies began to appear. The Byzantine armies passed from defence to attack, and harassed and at times occupied northern Syria. The country was divided by the rise of local dynasties (both Arab and Turkish) and heterodox Islamic sects. Of the dynasties perhaps the greatest was the Hamdanid, which ruled northern Syria during the tenth century, and was sometimes at war with Byzantium and sometimes tributary to it. At its court or in its domains there flourished some of the greatest figures of Arabic culture—the poets al-Mutanabbi and Abu'l-Ala al-Ma'ari, the anthologist Abu'l-Faraj al-Isfahani and the philosopher al-Farabi. Of more lasting importance were the new Islamic sects which developed out of Shi'ism in the ninth and subsequent centuries[1]: the Alawis, the Druzes, and the obscurely interrelated Carmathian and Isma'ili movements, which were not only movements of belief, of thought and of social reform, but also initiatory secret societies with political aims. These movements first came into Syria from Iraq, and then from Egypt under the leadership of the Fatimid dynasty during the later tenth century. The Fatimids held precarious and unstable sway over the country for a time. Finally, in the eleventh century, the Seljuq Turks from central Asia began to assert themselves in Syria as an independent force, at first in the name of the 'Great Seljuq' Sultans in the East, but later on their own account. With the establishment of their State, Syria virtually ceased to be part of the Abbasid Empire. The Seljuq State itself, however, did not last long; it soon split into two minor dynasties, at Aleppo and Damascus.

9

At the end of the eleventh century a new element was introduced into a country already divided between Seljuq Turks in the north and centre, Fatimids in the south, and petty dynasties like the Tanukhids in Lebanon. The Crusading armies from western Europe invaded Syria and conquered the coastal regions and some portions of the interior. In the conquered areas they established a series of feudal states, Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli and Jerusalem, with a European ruling class, maintained by intermittent reinforcements from

[1] See Chapter VII.

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the West, but tending in course of time to mingle with the indigenous inhabitants and adopt their ways; rulers and soldiers were largely French by origin, the commercial class mainly Italian. The indigenous Christians were encouraged to become Catholics; it was in this period that the Maronites entered into communion with Rome. As for the Moslems, in general they were treated tolerantly. In spite of wars between the Crusaders and the Moslem Governments in the interior, the Crusading States were the source of a fruitful interchange of goods and ideas between Latin Europe and Moslem Asia: the West derived from Syria not only new economic processes and products but new ideas and a stimulus to its imaginative life.

Even at their zenith, during the first half of the twelfth century, the Crusading States never reached as far into the heart of Syria as Damascus. During the second half of that century even their hold upon the coastal regions was challenged, first by Zengi, the Turkish ruler of Mosul, and his son Nur ad-Din, and then by the great Saladin. By origin a Kurd, Saladin was sent by Nur ad-Din to Egypt, and after his master's death gradually extended his sway over the greater part of the eastern Moslem world. His kingdom covered most of Syria, including the Holy Places, his conquest of which occasioned the third Crusade at the end of the twelfth century. To some extent this Crusade revived the fortunes of the Christian States, but only for a short time. Throughout the first half of the thirteenth century Syria was torn by internal dissensions and the rise and fall of petty principalities, both Christian and Moslem. These principalities were powerless to resist the Mongol invaders, who in 1260 swept all before them until they were defeated on the Palestinian coast by Baibars, later the Mamluke Sultan of Egypt. The Mamlukes profited by their victory, and gradually enlarged their control over the country. Acre, the last Crusading fortress, fell to them in 1291.

For the next two centuries Syria remained under Mamluke rule. It was a time of decay and of unrest. Twice more the country was ravaged by Mongol invaders: by the Ilkhans in the late thirteenth century and a hundred years later by Tamerlane, who sacked Aleppo and Damascus and carried away their artisans to Samarqand. Several times there were local risings, which were suppressed by the Mamlukes: for example, the great insurrections of the Druzes and Shi'is in

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175 Lebanon at the end of the thirteenth century. The period was one of economic decline, partly because of war and unrest, and partly because of the geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century, which changed the course of the world's great trade routes; but there was still a certain trade with Europe, carried on by Italian merchants. The population decreased alike in wealth and in numbers. To the economic weakness of the country was added the decay of Mamluke rule; and when the Ottoman Turks attacked Syria in 1516 they conquered it without difficulty.

10

From 1516 until 1918 Syria remained under Ottoman rule, and part of an Empire which included at its height the Balkans, much of central Europe, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, part of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. Of the first three centuries of this rule there is little to say. In general they were centuries of stagnation. The Ottoman conquest did not seriously affect the racial composition of the people of Syria, their language or their way of life. Few Turks settled in the country, but the infiltration of nomads from Arabia continued. It was during this period that some of the great tribes, of which the descendants still, as nomads or as peasants, inhabit a large part of the country, first entered it: the Shammar and then various Anazah tribes, who drove the Shammar across the Euphrates and established their ascendancy over the Syrian Desert. Nor did the Ottoman conquest greatly affect the political structure of Syria. The country was divided into several Pashaliks, those of Damascus, Aleppo and Tripoli, and later of Saida; but often the authority of the Pashas was only effective in and around the great towns in which garrisons were stationed. Men gave formal reverence to the Sultan, who had also arrogated to himself the title of Caliph or head of the Islamic community; but the limits of his Government's action were narrow. In practice customary law was supreme, and social power was in the hands of the feudal lords, on whom the Ottoman rulers, like their predecessors, mainly relied for the maintenance of local order and the collection of taxes.

Such being the structure of Ottoman rule, it was possible for local dynasts of ability to extend their domains and become virtually independent. Perhaps the greatest of them was the Druze Amir Fakhr ad-Din, a member of the Maani dynasty

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which governed Lebanon throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the course of the fifty years of his ascendancy (1586–1635) he extended his territories far beyond Lebanon, and increased their prosperity by his encouragement to agriculture and to trade with Europe. He was tolerant in religious matters, protecting Christians and Europeans. He even attempted, with support from some European rulers, completely to throw off the suzerainty of the Sultan. Forced in 1613 to flee to Italy, he returned to Syria after a few years, and continued to dominate a great part of the country until captured and killed by the Turks.

His death was followed by the decline of the Maanis, who were succeeded in 1697 by the Shihabis. They ruled throughout the eighteenth century; it was a time of upheaval in the life of Lebanon, marked on the one hand by the gradual spread of the Christian peasantry from northern Lebanon southwards into districts which had previously been wholly inhabited by Druzes, and on the other by intensive conflicts among the Druze nobility. These were conflicts of families and factions, the lineal descendants of the ancient Arabian dispute of Qays and Yemen. Many of the defeated faction emigrated from Lebanon to the hilly district beyond the plain of the Hauran, now known as Jebel Druze. In the remainder of Syria no less than in Lebanon the eighteenth century was marked by conflict and unrest. Finally a great part of the country fell into the hands of the Bosnian Jazzar, Pasha of Acre, who ruled it ruthlessly and cruelly from 1775 until 1804.

In general, the first three centuries of Ottoman rule were a period of economic decline. The population continued to shrink; a harsh system of taxation and the uncertainty of life had their effect upon agriculture; and Syria no longer lay on the main trade route from Europe to further Asia. But commerce was not completely stagnant; trade with many of the surrounding countries was made easier by the incorporation of Syria into the Ottoman Empire, and at times the desert routes were prosperous. Damascus was still in decline, but Aleppo was one of the great centres of the internal trade of the Empire, and also of the trade between the Empire and Europe. Here and in other Syrian towns grew up colonies of French, Italian and other European merchants, through whose hands passed most of the trade between Europe and the Levant. These colonies were granted a special status and privileges by

the Sultans. The first such grant was made to the French communities by the Franco-Ottoman concordat of 1535, which together with subsequent concordats served as the basis not only of the foreign 'Capitulations' in the Ottoman Empire, but also of the French claim to protect the Catholic Christians of the Levant.[1]

It was not only traders who came from the West. From the seventeenth century onwards Catholic missionaries were active, particularly among the indigenous Christian communities: Franciscans (the traditional custodians of the Catholic Holy Places), Jesuits and others. They slowly built up the various Uniate Churches, Eastern in rite but in communion with Rome. They gave the country its first modern schools, although on a very modest scale. More important perhaps than the schools founded in Syria was the Maronite College established at Rome to educate the Maronite clergy and draw closer their links with Western Catholicism. It was this College which had the honour of educating Joseph Assemani, Maronite Archbishop, Librarian of the Vatican and one of the earliest of the great modern orientalists.

II

The beginning of the nineteenth century found Syria a decayed and half-deserted land. After the rule of Jazzar had come to an end, Ottoman administration only functioned effectively in the large towns, where the garrisons of Janissaries were stationed, in a section of the coastal strip and certain portions of the countryside. A large part of the country was governed by local chieftains, ruling by virtue of descent or ability and practically autonomous; they held their fiefs no longer on condition of performing military service, but on that of collecting taxes for the Sultan's Government. Both the local dynasts and the Turkish Pashas were largely uncontrolled in their dealings with their subjects and with one another. Oppressed by rulers, by tax-farmers and by feudal lords, the peasants had neither incentive nor opportunity to scrape more than a bare living from the soil. The Beduin were virtually uncontrolled, and were a perpetual menace to the settled areas. What prosperity the country still possessed came less from agriculture than from the flow of commerce through the principal towns.

[1] See Chapter VIII.

Mount Lebanon was an oasis of order amid the chaos. It was ruled by the strong and ruthless Amir Bashir of the Shihabi family, who reigned from 1789 to 1840 almost as an independent monarch. He established law and security, preserved the character of Lebanon as an asylum of refuge, extended its boundaries far into the territory of the neighbouring Pashaliks and encouraged the trade of Beirut.

Lebanon was quiet during the first thirty years of the century, but beneath the surface important changes were taking place. There was a change in the relationship between Druzes and Maronites. The northern part of Lebanon was inhabited mainly by Maronites and other Christians, the southern by Druzes. The Christians were numerically preponderant and had for some generations been spreading southwards into districts formerly wholly Druze but now mixed in population. Although the Druzes were in a minority, and their numbers had been diminished by emigration to Jebel Druze in the eighteenth century, their feudal lords had for centuries been the dominant force in Lebanon, thanks to the strength of their communal spirit and organization. In the days of Bashir, the Christian peasants continued to spread southwards and the Druzes to emigrate from Lebanon to Jebel Druze. New difficulties also arose. To fortify his own power, the Amir curbed the power of the Druze notables and encouraged the latent tension between the sects. Within each sect, too, there was unrest. Among the Maronites there was a movement of the peasants against their lords, and a struggle for predominance between the lords and the clergy. The Druzes for their part continued to be torn by the strife of families. To add to these factors, a change for the worse was taking place in the economic position of Lebanon.

12

Into this stagnant world a new force was about to enter: Syria, like the rest of the Ottoman Empire, was drawn into the orbit of Western life during the nineteenth century.

The impact of the West was first apparent in the political sphere. Already in the eighteenth century it had been clear that the Ottoman Empire had passed its zenith; its European frontiers were contracting, and its hold over most of North Africa was precarious. But now it became increasingly probable that the Empire would collapse. Its collapse would alter the

175 political relationship between the European States. It therefore became expedient for the Great Powers either to hasten or to delay the collapse, according to their conception of their interests, and at all events to secure a position of paramount influence in the Empire. During the earlier part of the century the Powers mainly interested were Great Britain, France and Russia; and in the pursuit of their interests all three attempted not only to secure a paramount influence over the Ottoman Government in Constantinople, but also to establish a special connexion with one or other of the peoples of the Empire, and of Syria among its provinces. The French had for some generations possessed such a connexion with the Maronites and other Catholic Christians; at the end of the eighteenth century the Russians began to claim a special right of protection over the Greek Orthodox Christians in both the European and the Asiatic parts of the Empire; and in the course of the nineteenth century Great Britain tried to cultivate the friendship of the Druzes. Thus motives of high policy impelled the Powers to intervene in the internal life of Syria, which had for so long been almost untouched by influences from the West.

The first great blow to the traditional life came in the last years of the eighteenth century, when Napoleon marched northwards from his newly-won base in Egypt. His advance was resisted by Jazzar as representative of the Ottoman Sultan. In order to weaken this resistance Napoleon tried to stir the Sultan's subjects into revolt. He had some success with the Maronites and Shi'is, none with the Sunnis, who remained hostile to him, nor with the Amir Bashir, who remained cautiously neutral. For a time the French army moved without hindrance up the coastal road; but the resistance of Jazzar in Acre, supported by a British fleet, compelled Napoleon to abandon the campaign (1799).

13

Had Napoleon not been defeated, he might have awakened Syria from its long sleep. The work which he might have done had to wait thirty years. In 1831–2 Syria was occupied by the armies of Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Egypt under the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan. Muhammad Ali wanted Syria partly to make use of its resources in men and wood, and partly as a stepping-stone towards Constantinople and domination of the whole Ottoman Empire.

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In 1833 the Sultan agreed to Muhammad Ali's control of Syria, and for the next few years it was ruled by Ibrahim. These years may be regarded as the beginning of the modern age for the country. For the first time in centuries it was given a centralized Government strong enough to hold separatist tendencies in check, and a system of taxation regular and comparatively rational, although burdensome. The judiciary was reformed, and greater equality than had previously existed was established between Moslems and others. The Government founded schools and permitted foreign missionaries to do so. The improved state of public order encouraged commerce and cultivation.

In spite of these innovations, at first Ibrahim Pasha tried not to break with the traditions of the country but to base his domination upon the local landowning and ruling families, and especially upon the Amir Bashir. For a time his rule was popular with a large part of the inhabitants. Later, however, it became unpopular: with the landowners because he tried to limit their political and social predominance, and with the peasants on account of the forced labour, conscription, compulsory disarmament and heavy taxation to which he found it necessary to resort. At the same time Muhammad Ali's control of Syria was disliked by the Sultan and by Great Britain and Russia. They conceived it to be in their interest to maintain the Ottoman Empire and were not inclined to allow the establishment of a new mushroom kingdom in the eastern Mediterranean, the more so because of the friendly relations between Muhammad Ali and France.

In 1839 the Sultan brought matters to a crisis by ordering his armies to invade Syria. They were met at Nizib by the forces of Ibrahim Pasha, and were decisively defeated. The way to Constantinople now seemed open to Ibrahim. At this point the Powers intervened. With the exception of France they gave their backing to the Sultan's demand that Ibrahim should evacuate Syria north of Acre (1840). At the same time they sent arms to the discontented inhabitants of Syria and particularly to the Druzes and Maronites of Lebanon. When Ibrahim refused to agree to the Sultan's demand, a British expedition was landed on the coast, and Lebanon rose in revolt, although Bashir remained faithful to Ibrahim. Ibrahim was driven from Syria, which was restored to the Sultan; and the Amir was forced to abdicate.

175 Ibrahim went, but something of his work remained. He had opened Syria to Western merchants and travellers as it had not been open for generations, and he had helped to shake the Empire out of its long torpor. The rest of the century saw a determined if crude effort by the Ottoman Government to reform and modernize its structure; it was initiated by the Sultan Mahmud II and carried further by his successor Abdul-Majid. To some extent this effort took the shape of formal acts designed to create a system of political standards and rights such as the Western Powers possessed. Thus in 1839, under the influence of the British Ambassador, Stratford de Redcliffe, the Sultan Abdul-Majid issued the 'Gulhane' decree, which guaranteed security and public trial to all citizens, established a just system of imposing and collecting taxes, provided for equality of civil rights between members of the different religious communities and extended the obligation of military service to all alike. The next year a penal code was enacted, based upon the principle of equality before the law. In 1856, after the Crimean War (of which the rivalry of France and Russia for control of the Holy Places in Palestine had been a contributory cause), the Powers compelled the Sultan to issue a further edict, the 'Hatti Humayun', defining and guaranteeing the spiritual and temporal privileges of the non-Moslem communities, and granting their members equality of civil rights with Moslems. Finally, in 1876, the Sultan issued a Parliamentary constitution, which was however suspended soon after its first application.

These steps were taken partly at least to appease or to impress the Governments of Europe, and were only very imperfectly carried out. More important, if less obtrusive, was the attempt to replace the old system of decentralized feudal government by a modern centralized and uniform administration. The first step to this was the creation of a professional army with Western training and equipment; this was undertaken with considerable success by the Sultan Mahmud II. Thus it became possible for subsequent Sultans to try to break down the old autonomies and curb the power of the local dynasties: by the abolition of tax-farming and other measures designed to reduce the social power of the landholders and, where necessary, by military expeditions against too powerful subjects. The attempt was successful in some parts of the country, for example

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with the Kurds and Turcomans in the north and the Alawis around Latakia; unsuccessful in others, for example with the Druzes of Jebel Druze, who, in spite of expeditions against them in 1876, 1896 and 1911, and of occasional acts of submission on their part, retained their administrative and judicial autonomy and their exemption from military service. 175

For purposes of administration the country was divided into the Vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo; subsequently a separate Vilayet of Beirut was created. A Sanjaq of Jerusalem and a Mutassarifat of Dair az-Zur, attached directly to the central Government at Constantinople, were also established.

15

In one region the policy of centralization was tried and failed. The social and religious situation in Lebanon at the beginning of the nineteenth century has already been described. The restlessness which existed was increased by the distribution of arms and the rising of 1840, as also by the support given by the French Government to the Maronites and by the British to the Druzes. After the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha and the restoration of Ottoman rule, the Sultan's Government set itself deliberately to foment religious conflict in order to make the traditional autonomy of Lebanon unworkable and so to create an excuse for the establishment of direct Ottoman rule over the Mountain. Its task was all the easier in that Bashir was succeeded by a weak member of the Shihabi family, who was unable to maintain order.

The first disturbances occurred in 1841, when civil war broke out between Maronites and Druzes. The Powers intervened and persuaded the Ottoman Government to promulgate a new constitution for Lebanon, dividing it into two districts, the northern under a Maronite and the southern under a Druze governor. The governors were to be appointed by the central Government, but the administrative privileges of the Mountain were guaranteed. The new system was set up; but a few years later, in 1845, civil war broke out once more. The Government re-imposed order and partially disarmed the population; in this as in other matters, however, it favoured the Druzes at the expense of the Maronites. It also made certain changes in the new administrative system, with the purpose of limiting the power of the feudal landlords and tax-farmers.

175 During the next years social and religious tension continued to increase; it was encouraged by the weakness of the governors, who proved unable to control the feudal lords. Finally, in 1857, matters came to a head in the purely Maronite districts of north Lebanon, where the peasants revolted against their lords. Led by priests, by younger sons of landowning families and by popular leaders of whom the most notable was Yusuf Karam, they established a peasant Government, put an end to the prerogatives of the nobility and divided up the large estates.

In the districts of central and southern Lebanon, where the population was partly Druze and partly Christian, the final outbreak was later in coming, and took a more complex form: it was both a religious conflict between the Druze and Maronite communities and a social conflict between Maronite peasants and Druze lords. In 1860, great disturbances broke out. Some thousands of Christians were killed in different parts of Lebanon by the Druzes with the connivance of the Turkish authorities, and thousands more in Damascus by the Moslem mob, in spite of the efforts of certain Moslem notables to restrain them. At this point the European Powers intervened. By international agreement, the Emperor Napoleon III sent a military expedition to Lebanon. It remained in occupation of the district for nine months, but had little to do, since the Ottoman Government had already taken steps to restore order and punish some of those held to be responsible. At the same time an international commission was set up to investigate the disturbances, to supervise the punishment of those who had instigated them and the indemnification of those who had suffered, and to make proposals for the future organization of the Mountain.

The Commission, which met first in Beirut and then in Constantinople, drew up a Statute formalizing and defining the autonomy of Lebanon. By the terms of this Statute, which was promulgated in 1861 and finally ratified in 1864, Lebanon was to be administered by a Christian Ottoman governor appointed by the Ottoman Government with the consent of the Powers, and directly responsible to it. He was to have full executive powers and to be assisted by a central administrative Council, on which the more important religious communities were to be equitably represented. They were similarly to be represented in the local administration. Lebanon was to have its own judiciary

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and police force. Feudal privileges were abolished, and all were declared equal before the law. 175

Until the First World War Lebanon was ruled in accordance with this Statute. It was on the whole a period of increasing prosperity. It is true that unrest was not immediately stilled. The abolition of feudal privileges raised new social problems, and thus led to renewed agitation among the Maronite peasants, whose leader, Yusuf Karam, was finally sent away from Lebanon; and discontented Druzes continued to emigrate to Jebel Druze. But gradually the traditional state of religious toleration returned. The governors, who were Christians from outside Lebanon, were in general efficient and humane, and defended the autonomy of the Mountain against the attempts of the Sultan to infringe it. Agriculture revived, roads were built, schools were opened, and Western civilization extended its sway.[1]

16

For the rest of the century the Ottoman Empire continued to be the object of European interest and rivalry. The tension between Great Britain and Russia which was temporarily relaxed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 did not directly concern Syria. But the struggle between Russia and France for control of the Holy Places in Palestine, which had been the occasion of the Crimean War, was still not altogether ended. By its side new rivalries grew up. Italy disputed France's rights in regard to the Catholic communities and Holy Places; and towards the end of the century Germany began to stake her claim. In the reign of Abdul-Hamid II (1876–1909) German influence over the Ottoman Government grew continuously and gradually replaced that which Great Britain had once possessed. The Berlin to Baghdad railway, which German enterprise partially constructed, skirted the northern edge of Syria and might well, had not the First World War broken out, have served as a means of German penetration into that and other provinces of the Empire.

17

Western influence thus played an important part in the political life of the country; it played an even more important one in the social and economic changes of the century. Syrian 175 177

[1] The exact boundaries of the sanjaq of Lebanon were never clearly established.

175 life in all its aspects underwent a gradual and still incomplete
177 process of Westernization. The tastes and habits of the population were profoundly influenced by the inflow of goods from the West; their beliefs and way of thinking still more profoundly so by the spread of Western culture.

175 The reception of Western civilization was helped by the
177 emigration of many thousands of Syrians to other countries.
167 In general they came more often from Lebanon than from other regions, and they were more often Christians than Moslems. Their motives for leaving their country were various. Many of the Christians desired to escape from a predominantly Moslem environment, especially after the events of 1860; many among both Christians and Moslems found Ottoman rule too oppressive to be borne; young men educated in the mission-schools wished for opportunities and rewards greater than their native land could offer; some were attracted by the legendary promise of the New World, its wealth and its freedom; and others went abroad simply because their relations and friends had already settled there.

167 There were two main roads of emigration. The one led to
175 Egypt and the Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the other Arabic-speaking countries. This road had always been open, but it was rendered more attractive by the establishment of British control over Egypt and the Sudan. The British authorities needed subordinate officials who spoke Arabic and understood the ways of the Near East, but who were also acquainted with Western methods of thought and administration. They found what they needed in the graduates of the Syrian mission-schools, who for half a century loyally and effectively filled a variety of positions in the Governments of Egypt and the Sudan. Thousands of other Syrians went to Egypt as merchants, doctors and journalists. They progressed, and some among them played a considerable part in the cultural life of the country. Being largely an urban middle-class community, partly Christian and suspected of an excessive attachment to Great Britain or at least to the West, the Syrian-Egyptians have not always been liked by the Egyptians; but many of them have become Egyptians in nationality and sentiment, and at least the Moslems among them may become assimilated in a generation or two to the population among whom they are living.

The Syrian-Egyptians are numbered in tens of thousands,

but those who have followed the other road, to North and 167
South America, to Australia and to other of the more distant 195
parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands. The great majority of them started as retail traders on a small scale, but many took to wholesale trade and to the manufacture of textiles and other goods. The process of taking root was harder for them than for those who went to Egypt, since it involved learning new languages and acquiring new ways of life; but they have already been assimilated to a considerable extent, and the large Syrian colonies in the United States, Brazil and the Argentine, with smaller ones in other countries, have become prosperous, loyal and respected elements in the communities in which they are living. Most of them have given up all but a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and there seems to be no obstacle to their ultimate complete assimilation, the more so since the flow of emigrants to the countries of the New World has greatly diminished during the last two decades. It has been partly diverted to British and French West Africa, much of the internal trade of which is now in Syrian hands.

The consequences of the emigration for Syria were both 175
good and bad. They were bad in so far as it was the more 167
talented and enterprising of the country's youth who went 177
abroad, during the period of their greatest energy and often for ever. On the other hand, the level of prosperity was raised by the remittances which successful emigrants sent home to their relatives, and by the savings which they brought back with them. Also, they introduced new ideas, and, what was even more important, the example of a new and in many respects attractive way of life. These ideas, this example and the bare fact that Syrians were prosperous and happy in foreign lands, deeply influenced the attitude of Syria to the West. All this was especially true of Lebanon, since it supplied so large a proportion of the emigrants.

18

Western influences also came by way of education. Students 175
began to go abroad, to seek the new learning in the schools of 177
Europe and America; and Western schools became ever more 171
numerous in the Near East. The greater number of them were 177
established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the

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seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

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question of Islam and modern civilization, and a greater caution in accepting ideas and innovations from Europe.

These two groups, and smaller, less important groups in other towns, have laid the foundations of a new Arabic literature. To a great extent their work has been preparatory. The Arabic language has been rendered more adequate and flexible, for example by the adoption or invention of technical terms. Western ideas have been spread through translations and works of popularization. New literary forms have been introduced—the poetic drama, the novel, the romantic autobiography—and at the same time old forms have been revived. In addition to the advances in form, the subject-matter of literature has been extended. Different groups have set themselves to expound subjects not hitherto treated: the relations between religion and secular culture, the position of women, the method of empirical science, and so on. In all this preparatory work, the influence of French and English thought and literature has been great and obvious.

Modern Arabic literature has so far produced nothing of great originality, nothing of much interest to the outer world. But there have been a number of honest, hard-working and courageous writers, who have deserved well of the Arabic-speaking peoples: for example, the religious thinker Muhammad Abdu, the social reformer Qasim Amin, the essayist al-Manfaluti, the poets Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, the playwright and novelist Tawfiq al-Hakim and the scholar Taha Husain.

These names are all those of Egyptians, and Cairo is the unquestioned centre of Arabic literature. But there have been very important Syrian and Lebanese writers, many of whom it is true worked for most of their lives in Egypt, although others remained in their own country. They include the scholars and poets of the Bustani and Yaziji families; the religious reformer Rashid Rida; the fathers of Arabic journalism Shidiaq, Nimr, Sarruf, Zaidan and Taqla; the poet Khalil Mutran; the best of women writers in Arabic, May Ziadah; the traveller Amin Rihani; and the mystic Khalil Jibran. The last two spent many years in the United States and wrote much of their work in English. They are the most distinguished of a group of Syrian-American writers who have planted in the new world a root of Arabic literature, which in spite of its qualities can hardly hope to survive a generation.

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175 At the beginning of the present century Syria had ceased to be the stagnant land of a hundred years before. Lebanon in particular, and the rest of the country to a smaller extent, were in process of becoming Westernized and regaining their prosperity. The long decline in the population had ceased and been replaced by a steady increase, although during the nineteenth century there had been little immigration, apart from that of Zionist Jews towards the end of the century. The standard of living had risen. Commerce with the external world was greater than at any time during the Ottoman period, in spite of the diversion of transit trade to the Suez Canal. The country possessed several thousand kilometres of railways and modern roads, most of them built by French companies. Nowhere was the change so marked as in Beirut. In 1800 it had been a decayed town of a few thousand inhabitants, mainly Moslems. By 1900 it had become one of the main centres of trade and culture in the Ottoman Empire. It had a modern harbour, large colonies of foreign business-men and numerous schools and colleges which attracted students from far beyond Lebanon. The total number of its inhabitants was approaching 100,000. The percentage of Christians among them was constantly increasing; for throughout the century Christians had been settling in the town, attracted by the superior opportunities and comforts of urban life or seeking, after the massacres of 1860, the comparative safety of a coastal city in which European influence was strong.

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But although the Syria of 1900 was more prosperous than that of 1800, it was also more consciously discontented. The rule of the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II was, indeed, less wholly destructive and regressive in Syria than in other provinces of the Empire, perhaps because some of his principal advisers were Syrians. Public works were built, notably the Pilgrims' Railway from Damascus to Medina, and the area of civil government and cultivation was extended; but his régime, in the greater part of Syria as elsewhere, was one of tyranny and of repression. For this reason, when political consciousness revived, the form which it took was largely one of opposition to the autocratic rule of the Sultan. It is true that he tried to attract the politically conscious Moslems to his side,

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by means of the 'Pan-Islamic movement', which aimed at the union of the Islamic peoples under the leadership of the Sultan-Caliph. But Pan-Islamism was a bogy with which to frighten the European Powers rather than a serious political movement. /75

The revival of political consciousness was late in beginning. The very ideas of political association and public opinion did not filter into the Ottoman Empire until the second half of the nineteenth century; and throughout the century police-measures and an exceedingly strict censorship made political organization practically impossible. But not all Abdul-Hamid's repressive policy could prevent the infiltration in one way or another of Western political concepts: democracy, responsible government, the party system, freedom of expression. Nor could it prevent the development of a daily and periodical press in Arabic, which was not, of course, allowed to print independent comment or very much news, but which raised the level of political knowledge and understanding and served as an intellectual unifying force.

There were two main movements of opposition in Syria. One was the movement, here as throughout the Empire, for the limitation of the Sultan's authority and the restoration of the democratic constitution of 1876, as a first step to the regeneration of the Empire: this was the programme of the so-called 'Young Turks', organized in the 'Committee of Union and Progress'. The other was the movement throughout the Arab provinces of the Empire for Arab national unity and self-government. These two movements were not at first sharply distinguished from one another, partly because both had as their immediate objective the overthrow of Abdul-Hamid's autocracy, and partly because Arab nationalism in its early stages thought rather in terms of autonomy within the Empire than of complete independence. But after the 'Young Turk' revolution of 1908, and the substitution of the rule of the Committee for that of Abdul-Hamid, it soon became clear that the Committee was no more sympathetic to Arab aspirations than the Sultan had been; the movement of unrest in the Arab provinces became more specifically Arab and also more articulate. Before 1908 the Arab nationalist movement, in so far as it had existed at all, had not been organized, except for a few rather ineffective societies, such as the 'Ligue de la Patrie Arabe' founded in Paris in 1904. But from 1908

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175 onwards there began to appear those Arab political societies of which the story has been incomparably told by the late Mr. George Antonius.[1] At first they were public, and aimed not at complete independence for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but at administrative reform and decentralization within the Empire. Such were the 'Arab Ottoman Brotherhood' and the 'Literary Club', both established in Constantinople, and the 'Party of Ottoman Decentralization' founded in Cairo in 1912. But after a time secret societies were formed, with complete independence for the Arab provinces as their aim. The most important of them were 'al-Fatat', which was founded by a group of students in Paris in 1911 and established its headquarters in Syria two years later; and 'al-Ahd', founded in 1914 and consisting almost entirely of Army officers, among them a large number of Iraqis. In the previous year the nationalist movement had first attracted the notice of the outside world by holding its first Congress in Paris. The majority of the delegates were Syrians and Lebanese, and half were Christians. The Congress demanded full rights for the Arabs and decentralization within the Empire; but the Turkish Government made only a few illusory concessions.

By this time, however, few of the convinced nationalists hoped to achieve much by agreement with the Turkish Government. It was clear that the Empire was breaking up. By 1914 it had lost almost all its Balkan provinces and the whole of North Africa, although the Sultan's suzerainty over Egypt was still recognized in form; its territories had shrunk in Europe to a small district round Constantinople, in Asia to Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia and part of western Arabia, with a claim to sovereignty over other parts of Arabia. The nationalists found themselves faced with a question of great moment: what would be the fate of the Arab provinces when the Empire collapsed? Would it be possible for them to constitute an independent State, or must they fall into the hands of new masters?

[1] G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, London, 1938.

II. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

I

THE opening of the First World War in 1914 found a number of Governments and groups with an interest in changing the political status of Syria. First, there were the Arab nationalists, who wanted the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire to become autonomous. They were divided in their political ideas and preferences. Some wished to achieve their aims through the help of Great Britain or France or the United States; others relied only upon their own strength and efforts. Some aimed at establishing an independent Arab State, others a self-governing Arab kingdom within an Ottoman federation, yet others a Syrian State loosely linked with the other Arabic-speaking regions. But all alike were hostile to the Young Turkish Government with its Pan-Turanian policy, and very many were willing, with greater or smaller hesitations and reservations, to throw in their lot with Great Britain should Turkey become involved in the war.

Arab nationalist sentiment was widespread among the army officers, officials, professional men and in general the educated classes. The nationalist societies in Syria like 'al-Fatat' were in touch with Arab nationalists in the other Arabic-speaking regions: with the Iraqi army officers of 'al-Ahd'; with the powerful Syrian colonies in Egypt and the New World; with the Sharif Husain, the ruler, under Turkish suzerainty, of the Moslem Holy Places in the Hejaz; and with Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, the most powerful ruler of central Arabia, and virtually an independent monarch in spite of a shadowy Turkish suzerainty.

Side by side with Arab nationalism there existed a lively particularist movement among the Lebanese Christians. They wished the autonomy of Lebanon to be completed and its frontiers extended; they looked to France for help in achieving their aims and for protection when these should have been realized. Certain of them were not hostile to Arab nationalism, provided it recognized the special position of Lebanon; some indeed worked actively for Syrian or Arab independence.

Of external powers, France was the most interested in Syria. She possessed important interests in the country: investments, Christian missions and schools and a traditional connexion

175 with the Catholics. She desired at all costs to preserve and if possible to extend them. In addition, she believed a foothold in the Levant would strengthen her position both as a Mediterranean and as a Moslem Power; and if the Ottoman Empire were to collapse, she was anxious to take her share of the spoils.

Great Britain wished to secure control of the port of Haifa, and could not permit the establishment of an unfriendly Power on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. But in the northern part of Syria her interests were mainly indirect, arising out of her policy in other parts of Arab Asia. The Indian Government wished to use southern Iraq as an outpost for the defence of India and the Persian oil-fields. Oil was also known to exist in northern Iraq. In June, 1914, the Turkish Petroleum Company had been formed with mainly British capital, and had obtained a concession covering the Vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. Later this would give Great Britain an indirect interest in Syria, as the country through which the oil would flow on its way to the Mediterranean; but in 1914 the importance of the Iraqi oil was not realized. Moreover, as the most influential power in the Arabian peninsula, Great Britain could not be indifferent to the fate of so important a centre of Arab life as Syria.

One other group had interests in Syria: the Zionist movement.[1] The Zionists believed that the Jewish problem in the world could only be solved by the creation of a strong and vigorous Jewish community in Palestine, with an economic and social structure more normal than was possible to the Jews in Europe, and with an autonomous culture and spiritual life. Some, the so-called 'practical Zionists', hoped to create this community by direct means: immigration, the purchase of land, the establishment of agricultural settlements. Many of them laid special emphasis upon the revival of the Hebrew language and the recreation of the spirit of Judaism. By 1914 'practical Zionism' had had a considerable success: many thousands of Jews were living in rural colonies and in the new quarters of the towns, and Hebrew was becoming once more a language of everyday life and of education. But there was another group, the 'political Zionists', which was not indeed opposed to the first, but which argued that the Jewish community in Palestine would not help materially to solve the

[1] For a further treatment of Zionism, see Chapter VI.

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Jewish problem unless it possessed a definite political status or guarantee. The founder of organized Zionism, Theodor Herzl, had tried to secure such a status from the Ottoman Government. He had failed, and the eyes of the Zionists turned to the European Powers. Many of them hoped to persuade the German Government to put pressure on the Turks to relax their opposition ; but once the War broke out the most important section pinned their faith upon Great Britain.

2

The entry of Turkey into the war in November, 1914, gave all these parties an opportunity to realize their ambitions. In addition, it gave to Arab nationalism and Zionism a new importance for the British Government, as possible allies in the conflict with the Central Powers. The years of war saw not only practical collaboration between the parties, but also the conclusion of a series of agreements on the ultimate disposal of the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Even before the outbreak of war informal contacts had taken place between British officials in Egypt and prominent Arabs. Shortly after the war began formal relations were established between the British authorities and the Sharif Husain. In his own name and on behalf of the secret Arab nationalist organizations in Syria, he expressed his willingness to organize an Arab revolt against the Turks, provided he were given British assistance and an undertaking to recognize Arab independence should the revolt be successful.

The negotiations which ensued took the form of an exchange of letters between the Sharif Husain and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. In his letter of October 24th, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon defined the limits within which His Majesty's Government was prepared to recognize Arab independence. Replying to the Sharif's request for the recognition of the independence of all the Arabic-speaking countries of Asia, he stated that :

'The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded. . . . As for those regions lying within the proposed frontiers where Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her

175 ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter :

'Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.'

In his reply, dated November 5th, 1915, Husain denied the British assertion that the Syrian coastlands were not purely Arab. 'The two Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut', he stated, 'and their sea-coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab.' On December 14th, McMahon replied that as the interests of France were involved in both the Vilayets, the question would require careful consideration, and a further communication on the subject would be addressed to Husain in due course. To this Husain responded, on January 1st, 1916, by postponing the question until after the war, but indicating what his attitude would then be.

'We have felt bound', he stated, 'to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts. . . . It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.'[1]

3

In October 1915 the French Government was informed of these negotiations; and shortly afterwards conversations took place between Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot, representing the British and French Governments respectively, for the delimitation of the spheres of influence of their Governments in the territories at that time under Ottoman control. On May 16th, 1916, a secret agreement, commonly known as the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement', was concluded and embodied in a number of notes exchanged between the British, French and Russian Governments.

[1] For English translation, see *Parliamentary Papers, 1939*, H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 5952.

THE "SYKES-PICOT" AGREEMENT, 1916

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



THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MANDATED TERRITORIES, 1922

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175 This agreement differed greatly in spirit from that which had been concluded with the Sharif Husain. It provided for the division of the Fertile Crescent into a number of zones. In the interior of Syria and the Vilayet of Mosul, Great Britain and France agreed to recognize an independent Arab State, or Confederation of States, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. In part of this region, including what is now Transjordan and a strip of territory in the south of the Vilayet of Mosul, Great Britain was to have the right of priority in enterprises and local loans, and she alone was to supply foreign advisers and officials; in the remainder, France was to possess similar rights. In coastal Syria, from a point between Acre and Sur (Tyre) up to and including Cilicia, France was to be at liberty to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as she might desire or deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation. In the Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, Great Britain was to be in a similar position. In what is now Palestine an international administration was to be established, and the Sharif of Mecca among others was to be consulted on its form; but Great Britain was to be accorded Haifa and Acre.[1]

In letters exchanged at the same time British interests in the oil of Mosul were safeguarded by a French assurance that pre-war concessions in the area under French influence would be recognized; and the British Government made it clear that it accepted the agreement on the understanding that the Arabs should obtain the towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

4

Negotiations had also been proceeding between the Zionist organization and the British Government. They resulted in an agreement which was embodied in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Mr. (later Lord) Balfour, to Lord Rothschild on November 2nd, 1917. This letter, usually known as the 'Balfour Declaration', stated that:

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of

[1] For text, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 428-30.

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existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

5

The publication of the Balfour Declaration, and still more the revelation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolshevik Government of Russia, caused the Sharif Husain and other Arab leaders to doubt the sincerity of the British Government's undertakings. To allay their doubts, certain additional assurances were given them during the last year of the war. In January, 1918, Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo was sent to Jedda to give Husain (who had been proclaimed King of the Hejaz in November 1916) a verbal explanation of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. Among other things he assured the King that 'Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population.'[1] Again, on February 8th, 1918, the British Government assured the King that they and their allies 'are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an Arab world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice, and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries artificially provoked by the policy of Turkish officials. His Majesty's Government reaffirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples.'

On June 16th, 1918, an officer of the Arab Bureau made to seven Arab leaders in Cairo a declaration which reaffirmed once more the intention of the British Government to work for and to recognize the freedom and independence of the Arabs.

The effect of these assurances was increased by the public statements of peace aims made by Allied statesmen as the war drew to its end. Thus on January 5th, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George stated that 'while we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race . . . Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be, need not here be discussed. . . .'

Three days later, President Wilson included among his 'Fourteen Points' the provision that 'the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1939, Cmd. 5964.

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175 sovereignty, but the other nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured an . . . unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.'

Finally, on November 17th, 1918, a joint Anglo-French Declaration was issued from the General Headquarters of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and circulated in Palestine, in the rest of Syria and in Mesopotamia. It defined the goal of the Allies in the Eastern campaign as the complete and final liberation of the peoples oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national Governments and administrations deriving authority from the free initiative and choice of the populations. Great Britain and France agreed to assist in the setting-up and recognition of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia. They did not wish to impose a system upon the populations of those regions, but to give such help as would ensure the smooth working of the governments elected by the populations of their own free will.[1]

6

It was the British undertakings which induced the Sharif Husain and his sons to throw in their lot with the Allies, and lead the Arab Revolt against the Turks. The story of the Revolt need not be told in detail here; but it must be made clear that, although its events took place largely beyond the borders of Syria, Syrians played a great part in it. Syrian officers and soldiers participated in the campaigns of the Arab army; their number was constantly on the increase as the war went on, largely through desertions from the Turkish ranks. Moreover, British and Arab nationalist agents established contact with the chiefs of the great Beduin tribes of the Syrian Desert, and assured their favourable attitude to the Allied advance northwards. The friendliness of the Syrian population in general, no less than the support of the Arab forces beyond the Jordan, was of great assistance to the Allies in their final campaign.

On the whole, however, Syria's role in the war was one of passive suffering rather than active participation. In the later stages of the war the country was a battleground. In 1917 only the southern portion was directly affected by General Allenby's advance which reached Jerusalem in December. In September, 1918, Allenby moved northwards once more, in October

[1] For text of these messages and declarations, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 431-6.

Damascus was captured, and at the time of the Armistice Allied troops were in occupation of the whole of Syria as far north as Aleppo. But to be a battleground was not the worst which Syria endured. Throughout the war, the population suffered from serious shortage of food, due to bad transport arrangements, profiteering, a corrupt and inefficient administration and a plague of locusts. In the later stages of the war famine set in, with its attendant diseases. It was especially serious in Lebanon, where the Turkish authorities followed a policy of discrimination in the distribution of food as a reprisal for the sympathies of the population with the Allies. Mr. Antonius has estimated that in the whole of Syria 300,000 people died of starvation or malnutrition during the years of war.[1]

To the terrors of famine were added the repressive measures adopted by Jemal Pasha, Governor of Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces there, against those suspected of Arab nationalist activities. These measures were first adopted after the discovery in the French Consulate at Beirut of documents incriminating a number of prominent Syrians in subversive activities aiming at the establishment of an independent Arab state. In 1915 and 1916 a number of those implicated were publicly hanged in Damascus and Beirut. Others were imprisoned and deported to remote parts of the Ottoman Empire. Almost everybody of any eminence lived under suspicion and surveillance, and the whole country went in fear of 'the Butcher' Jemal and his military tribunals. The rigour of Turkish rule naturally increased after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt and the development of a direct threat to the Turkish position in Syria from the British forces in Egypt.

7

When the war ended, the whole of Arab Asia was free from Ottoman rule. Mesopotamia was occupied by British and Imperial troops. The Turkish troops had been cleared out of the Hejaz, and King Husain had been recognized as an Ally. A number of other rulers in the Arabian Peninsula, of whom the most notable was Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud of Nejd, had made treaties with the Government of India and had repudiated Ottoman suzerainty. As for geographical Syria, the whole of it was occupied by Allied troops: British troops throughout

[1] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 241.

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the area, a small French force on the coast and the Arab army of King Husain in the interior. General Allenby was ultimately responsible for the military government of the area; but it was only in Palestine to the west of the Jordan that a British provisional administration was set up. In the coastal regions north of Palestine, and subsequently in Cilicia, the provisional Government was French; in the four cities of Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, and in Transjordan it was Arab, under the Amir Faisal, the third son of King Husain. To the Arab administration a small number of British and French officers was attached; its officials were mainly Syrians who had held posts in the Ottoman army or civil service, but there was also an influential group of Iraqi officers. The attempt of the Arab nationalists in October, 1918, to extend their rule to Beirut and the coast was thwarted by the intervention of General Allenby.

The grounds already existed for a conflict between the Arabs and the French Government. The latter regarded the whole northern half of Syria as lying within its sphere of influence, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It did not consider itself to be bound by the promises which its Ally had given to the Sharif Husain; it was from the beginning sceptical and suspicious of the idea of establishing an independent Arab State; and it was influenced by the attitude of the Lebanese Christians, many of whom had no desire to become subjects of an Arab kingdom governed by a member of the ruling family of the Hejaz. It was also lukewarm in its attitude to Zionism. The Arab nationalists for their part regarded themselves as entitled to complete independence, in virtue both of their participation in the war and of the undertakings given them by the Allied Governments. Their leaders knew of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, and repudiated both of them, although they do not appear at the beginning to have understood the implications of the latter. Though the Maronites as a whole wanted French control or a French mandate, the Arabs of Syria were for the most part hostile to France; if foreign advice and control were necessary, they would have preferred British to French, and American to either. United in their demand for independence, they were divided on the form which it should take. A section among them would have preferred a separate Syrian State to one linked with the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula.

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With its commitments to both parties, the British Government had a special interest in bringing about a settlement of the problem of Franco-Arab relations in Syria. At its invitation, the Amir Faisal visited Europe in November, 1918. In the course of his discussions with British statesmen and officials it was made plain to him that Great Britain was not prepared to quarrel with France over Syria, however sympathetic she might be to Arab aspirations.

8

The Peace Conference took up the question of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of 1919. On January 30th, it decided that the Arab provinces should be wholly separated from the Empire and the newly-conceived mandate-system applied to them. On February 6th, the Amir Faisal appeared before the Conference. After recalling the efforts of the Arabs during the War, and the Allied promises, he demanded the independence of the whole of Arab Asia, and suggested the establishment of a Confederation. He recognized that the Arabs needed help from outside, but not at the price of independence; they should indicate to the League of Nations the help which they required, and the Mandatory whom they wanted; if their wishes were not clear, an international inquiry should be held. He was prepared to accept the independence of Lebanon, provided that it entered into an economic union with the rest of Arab Asia and that the possibility of its joining the Confederation was kept open. As for Palestine, on account of its universal character he left it on one side for the consideration of all the parties interested. He does not seem at this time to have been unconditionally opposed to Zionism as he then understood it, and in January, 1919, had, indeed, made an informal agreement with Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist leader.

Evidence was also given by a pro-French Syrian delegation, composed mainly of Lebanese Christians and without any representative character, which asked for a Syria independent of Arabia and under French control; by a Lebanese delegation which claimed the autonomy of Lebanon, the extension of its frontiers and the protection of France; and by a Zionist delegation which advocated the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine under a British mandate.

The decision on these various claims was delayed by a violent dispute between Great Britain and France upon the

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/75 future of geographical Syria. At a meeting on March 20th, 1919, the French representative, M. Pichon, claimed that Syria should be treated as a unit and not be divided, and that France should become the Mandatory for it. For Palestine he suggested an international administration: although a private agreement had been reached by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau in December, 1918, by which Mosul and Palestine were to be included in the British sphere of influence, despite the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Reminded by Mr. Lloyd George of the agreement with King Husain, M. Pichon claimed that France was not bound by it. President Wilson suggested that an international commission of inquiry should be appointed to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. This suggestion was at first accepted by Great Britain and France, but afterwards rejected. A purely American Commission, consisting of Dr. H. C. King and Mr. C. R. Crane, was then appointed. It toured Syria, including Palestine, in the summer of 1919, and presented a report to President Wilson, recommending the establishment of a Mandate for Iraq and another for geographical Syria, which should be treated as a single unit. In each of the two countries a constitutional monarchy should be set up, and the Amir Faisal should be King of Syria. In accordance with the wishes of the people, the United States should be asked to accept the Mandate for Syria, while Great Britain should be offered that for Iraq. The Commission was opposed to a French Mandate, and expressed grave doubts about the Zionist experiment in Palestine. The report was ignored at the time and was only published three years later.[1]

9

The Versailles Conference broke up without having come to an agreement about the future of the Arab lands. But even before it ended, Faisal had returned to Syria, with his hopes disappointed. He found the situation there growing daily worse. The Arabs were embittered by the failure of the Conference to recognize their claims, and found much to complain of in the French administration in Lebanon, the attempt to introduce methods of Indian government in Iraq, and the activities of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. The French regarded the installation of Faisal in Damascus as contrary to

[1] For text, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 443-58.

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their interests, and were suspicious of the activities of the British officers attached to his Government. In addition, there were local conflicts between Arab bands and French troops in regions on the borders of the French zone of occupation.

Most responsible Arab and French officials doubted the possibility of a peaceful agreement; but Faisal still clung to the belief that Great Britain would use her influence with France in favour of the Arabs. This belief, however, was shaken by the Anglo-French Agreement of September, 1919, which provided for the withdrawal of British troops from Syria (excluding Palestine) and from Cilicia, and their replacement by Arab troops in the interior of Syria and by French troops on the coast and in Cilicia. When Faisal protested against the agreement, the British Government invited him to come once more to Europe and try to reach an understanding with France. Clemenceau at first refused to see him; when they met, however, they came to a provisional agreement, by which the right of the Syrian Arabs to independence and unity was acknowledged, but their State was to be defended, advised and represented abroad by France.

This agreement was never put into practice. The Government of Clemenceau fell, and was succeeded by one more extreme in its Eastern policy. Moreover, the growth of the Kemalist movement in Turkey, which threatened France's position in Cilicia, made it more urgent for her representatives in the East to prevent the outbreak of disorder in Syria and to obtain control of the system of communications in the interior. They were further alarmed by the evidence of military preparations by the Arab Government. The Arabs for their part were apprehensive of similar preparations by the French; their patriotic fervour was stimulated by the example of the growing nationalist movements in Iraq and Turkey; and to their resentment against France had now been added an active hostility to Zionism. They were not disposed to be patient and sit by while their independence was taken from them.

On March 20th, 1920, a Congress of Syrian notables met at Damascus and offered the crown of Syria and Palestine to Faisal, who accepted it. This action was immediately repudiated by the British and French Governments, then engaged in preparing for the Conference at San Remo, at which the fate of the former Ottoman territories was to be decided. When the Conference met it allotted a Mandate of type 'A' for the northern

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half of geographical Syria to France, and one for the southern half to Great Britain, with the obligation of carrying out the policy of the Balfour Declaration (April 24th, 1920). In reply, Faisal, who had refused to have anything to do with the Conference, declared that he would not recognize the imposition of foreign rule upon any portion of Syrian territory, including Palestine.

Both sides now prepared for war. The Arab Government attempted to increase its military strength, and the French army in Lebanon was reinforced with Senegalese and other colonial troops. On July 14th, 1920, General Gouraud, who had been appointed French Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon in October of the previous year, sent an ultimatum to Faisal. He demanded the unconditional recognition of the French Mandate, the reduction of the Syrian army, the abolition of conscription, the provision of facilities for the circulation of the new Franco-Syrian currency, French military occupation of the Rayaq-Aleppo railway and of Aleppo itself, and the punishment of those guilty of attacks upon French detachments. Against the wishes of the greater number of his supporters, Faisal accepted the ultimatum; but his answer was unaccountably delayed, and did not reach Gouraud until the time-limit attached to the ultimatum had expired and the French forces had been ordered to advance on Damascus. When Gouraud received the answer he halted his troops, but sent a further ultimatum containing more stringent demands. This Faisal was unable to accept. Once more the French columns moved upon Damascus. After a fight with Arab forces at Maisalun they entered the city on July 25th. Subsequently the rest of the area assigned to France was occupied. Faisal left the scene of his brief, uncertain reign for exile and then for a new and more lasting throne in Baghdad.

He has never been forgotten in Damascus. Too short for positive achievement, his rule had aroused enthusiasm and loyalty throughout the country. His Government had had more solid foundations in the popular consent than any perhaps since Ummayad times; had it received help it might have endured. The generation which remembered Faisal could never forgive the French, nor give to their rule more than a forced acquiescence.

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Faisal's departure cleared the way for a final settlement by the Allied Powers of the status of Syria. The texts of the Mandates for 'Syria and Lebanon' (that is, the northern part of geographical Syria) and for 'Palestine' (that is, the southern half) were formally approved, along with that for Iraq, by the Council of the League of Nations in July, 1922, and became effective in September, 1923. In 1924 the United States gave her consent to the Mandates by agreements with France and Great Britain.

The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon provided for the gradual establishment of self-government in those countries, and the progressive relaxation of the Mandatory's control.[1] That for Palestine, however, gave the Mandatory full powers of legislation and administration, and laid upon it the positive duty of helping in the construction of a Jewish national home, provided the rights of the rest of the population were not prejudiced. But the text of the Mandate made it clear that the national home was to be confined to those parts of the British area which lay west of the Jordan, that is to Palestine proper, and not to be allowed to spread east of the Jordan. The region east of the Jordan had been administered by Faisal's Government from 1918-1920. The French did not occupy it after the expulsion of Faisal, and by an Anglo-French agreement in December, 1920, it was placed within the British mandatory area. Shortly afterwards Faisal's brother Abdullah moved northwards from Hejaz with a view to attacking the French in Syria; to prevent the attack he was offered and accepted the government, subject to Mandatory control, of the region east of the Jordan, or 'Transjordan'. The arrangement was at first provisional, but in April, 1923, it was announced that His Majesty's Government would recognize the existence of an independent Government in Transjordan under the Amir Abdullah, provided it was constitutional and enabled His Majesty's Government to fulfil its international obligations in respect of the territory.

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At the San Remo Conference, which allotted the Mandate to France, certain other important decisions were also reached.

[1] The Mandate is summarized in Chapter IX, and its text is given in the Appendix.

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175 By an Anglo-French agreement, France renounced the traditional protectorate over the Catholics so far as Palestine and the Holy Places were concerned, in view of British opposition to its continuance and the opinion of the Holy See that the time for it had passed.

By another agreement, the interests of the two Powers in the oilfields of Iraq were defined. The British Government undertook to grant to the French 25 per cent of the crude oil, if the fields were developed by Government action, or else, if a private company were used to develop the fields, 25 per cent of the shares in it; arrangements were also made in regard to the transport of oil from Iraq and Persia through the French sphere of influence to the eastern Mediterranean. It was in consideration of this agreement that France officially recognized the inclusion in Mesopotamia of the district of Mosul, which under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was to have formed part of the French sphere of influence.

The frontiers of the French Mandated Territories were established by a series of agreements in the early years of the mandatory period. The frontiers with Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan were settled by two Anglo-French agreements made in 1920 and 1922. The delimitation was in some ways arbitrary. There was no good reason, economic or ethnic, for the inclusion of the Hulah district in Palestine; for the separation of the Hauran and Jebel Druze from northern Palestine and Transjordan; or for the separation of the Jazirah into Iraqi and Syrian sections.

The frontier with Turkey caused greater difficulty. Under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the sphere of French control was to have included Cilicia and a region to the east of it with a predominantly Turkish-speaking population. These areas were occupied by French troops after the Armistice; and it was intended to settle in them a large number of Armenian refugees. But the revival of Turkish power under Mustafa Kemal made the French position difficult. Fighting broke out between the occupying army and the Turkish nationalist forces. With a view to avoiding the dangers and expenses of a large-scale campaign and to safeguarding the northern frontier of Syria, and also because the unsettled state of Anglo-French relations in the Near East made France not unwilling to win the friendship of the Turks, the French Government decided to come to an agreement with the

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Turkish Nationalists. By the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 20th, 1921, France agreed to evacuate Cilicia and certain other districts; the region of Alexandretta, with its largely Turkish population, remained under French control, but France undertook to give it a special administrative régime.[1] In spite of this agreement and of the extinction of Turkish rights in Syria by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, tension and unrest continued in the frontier regions between Turkey and Syria, where the population was mixed Arab, Turkish and Kurd. When in 1925 a Mixed Commission met to delimit the frontier, its work was obstructed by Turkish claims to a number of districts which had until then been considered parts of Syria. In February, 1926, a Franco-Turkish agreement was signed which settled the most important points at issue; but it was not until June, 1929, that the controversy was closed for the time. In 1930 the eastern section of the Turco-Syrian frontier was delimited, and there was added to Syria a further district of the Jazirah stretching as far as the Tigris.

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The Peace Settlement failed to fulfil the hopes with which the Arab nationalists had entered the war. It is true that the whole of Arab Asia had thrown off Ottoman suzerainty, that Hejaz had been recognized as an independent State, and that the Kingdom of Ibn Sa'ud in central Arabia continued to prosper, strong in the alliance and help of the Government of India. But the more advanced Arab communities of the Fertile Crescent had been placed under a Mandatory administration which they found it hard to distinguish from colonial rule. Moreover, they had been divided from one another. Geographical Syria had been separated from Iraq, and had also been partitioned into French and British mandated territories. In a portion of the latter area, there had been initiated an experiment in large-scale Jewish immigration which threatened to make impossible the achievement in that area of nationalist aspirations.

The ghost of the Peace Settlement has haunted Arab politics ever since. It turned into bitterness the enthusiasm which the Arab Revolt had aroused, and seriously damaged the moral influence of Great Britain and France in the Near

[1] For translation of the Agreement see *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1556.

175 East. The bitterness was all the more dangerous because during the war the Arabs had realized for the first time in centuries the strength which might be theirs, and had become conscious that their destiny was in their own hands. The sense of grievance and the sense of power have coloured the nationalist movement in this generation.

Not only the Arabs were disappointed by the settlement. The French were irritated that they had been permitted to establish only a temporary Mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and that only after a bitter and protracted dispute. Their irritation was directed not so much against the nationalists as against the British Government for having, as they alleged, placed and maintained Faisal in Damascus. The Zionists were grateful for the world's recognition of their right to colonize Palestine, but many of them resented the closure of Transjordan, which they considered as part of Palestine, to Jewish immigration. Great Britain had obtained most of what she wanted for herself; but some at least of her statesmen and officials disapproved of French policy in Syria, were uneasy about its effects upon the Arabs elsewhere, and regretted that it had prevented the complete fulfilment of the undertakings given during the war.

It was in this atmosphere of bitterness, suspicion and resentment that French rule in Syria and Lebanon began.

369 from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants
62 and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims
184 who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

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101 The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

175 Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the
101 spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of
177 the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

175 The Turks performed also another function. Their military
177 strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

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Islamic world had been much affected by influences from 175
the Mediterranean countries, from Persia and from India. 177
It had had the power to assimilate the products of other civilizations, and also to extend its dominion over peoples alien to the Arabs in origin and way of life. But later it ceased to develop and either to give out or to receive influences; and although the stream of influences from the West never completely vanished, during the great days of the Ottoman Empire it was smaller and less effective than it had previously been and was again to become.

II

In the past century or more this Arab world has been shaken 177
to its foundations by the impact of the West. Western ideas, 178
learned from schools, from books and latterly from the cinema, have changed at least the externals of social life. The competition of Western goods has broken the old crafts and opened up new economic possibilities. New means of communication are breaking up the closed local community; the life of the Beduin is threatened by the motor-car, the aeroplane and the extension of civil authority. The administrative machinery which the modern Government commands, and the extension of the limits of its action, are making the old feudal and sectarian organization unnecessary and even impossible. New Western rulers have imposed themselves, who have not even so much claim to be obeyed or such deep roots in popular memory and habit as had the Ottoman Sultan. The new social, economic and political life has in its turn shaken the domination of Moslem jurisprudence; and men have begun to raise new questions of the adequacy of religious faith and loyalty as a basis for society, and the place of Islam in the modern world. A new world has revealed itself, which strikes at the very foundations of the old, and is indeed its exact antithesis.

The transformation of the old life has brought with it a 178
number of difficulties and dangers. The Arabs, like other 182
peoples in their position, are torn between two ways of life. Sentiment, tradition and the belief that there is something of value in their tradition make them unwilling to break entirely with the old civilization, even if that were possible. But at the same time the necessities of modern life, and often a conviction that the Western civilization is in some way

VIII. FOREIGN INTERESTS

I

648 OTHER difficulties which the nationalist movement has to face arise from the existence of important foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon. This chapter summarizes those interests as they stood at the outbreak of the war of 1939; it is clearly impossible to state with any precision the state of affairs which will come into existence after the war.

648 Before 1939, the interests of France far exceeded those
175 of other States. That the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon should have been conferred upon her rather than any of the other Great Powers was due immediately to the war-time agreement between the Allies for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but more fundamentally to the long-standing French connexions with the Ottoman Empire in general and Syria and Lebanon in particular, and to the sentiment which that connexion had aroused in certain quarters in France. French writers sometimes trace it back to Charlemagne, who conducted obscure negotiations with the Abbasid Caliph, Harun ar-Rashid, and is said to have obtained, after an exchange of letters and presents, the custody of the Christian Holy Places. They are on firmer ground when they emphasize the part played by Frenchmen in the Crusades. It is true that the Crusades were by no means an exclusively French enterprise. But French Kings, priests, nobles and knights were prominent in the organization of the Crusading States in geographical Syria. The ruling-class of the States was largely French in origin and language. They left their mark upon Syria in the castles and churches which they built and of which the ruins still survive; and equally the Crusaders and the land which they had conquered and for a time ruled made a deep impression upon the imagination of France. It is unwise to ignore the historic imagination of peoples, even when its content is partly legend and only partly history.

175 The Crusades were an isolated episode. During the two centuries which succeeded the fall of Acre in 1291, no particularly close connexion existed between France and geographical Syria: commerce between the Levant and Western Europe was largely in the hands of the Italian merchants, while cultural and political relations scarcely existed. The modern French connexion with the countries of the Eastern

Mediterranean cannot be traced back beyond the first half of the sixteenth century, when the French King Francis I began to cultivate friendly relations with the Ottoman Sultan, in order to secure an ally against his enemy the Emperor Charles V. In 1535 the first Franco-Ottoman agreement was reached; the Sultan issued the first 'capitulation', permitting French citizens resident in his dominions to practise their religion, and granting them certain other privileges. This agreement served as the basis for that protection of Catholic interests in the Levant which the French Government now began to take upon itself. France's friendship with the Ottoman Government enabled her to intervene with it in favour of European Catholic priests and pilgrims, whether or not they were French.

In the course of the seventeenth century the capitulations were more than once renewed, and the French protectorate of the Catholics increased in scope and importance. Under the terms of the renewal of 1673, all ecclesiastics of the Latin rite in Ottoman territory were to be regarded as French subjects. The number of such ecclesiastics was constantly increasing, by reason of the foundation of Jesuit, Franciscan and Carmelite missions, which began the work, which they have carried on until to-day, of educating the Catholics of the Levant and of winning back to Catholicism the adherents of the dissident Eastern Churches. Moreover, the French protectorate began in this century to be extended from the Catholic subjects of Western European States resident in the Ottoman Empire to the Catholic and other Christian subjects of the Empire; this was a development which had no formal basis in the capitulations or any other official act. Thus in 1639 the French Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed by his Government 'to protect and assist the Christians and Catholics of the Levant as far as possible, interposing the name and authority of His Majesty wherever he judges that he can usefully do so'. Ten years later, in 1649, a particularly close connexion was established with one of the Catholic communities: a Maronite bishop went to the French court in order to ask for the protection of the King of France, who issued letters-patent taking the whole Maronite community into his special protection. In the second half of the century a Maronite, a member of the important Khazin family, was appointed French Vice-Consul in Damascus,

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175 and the Catholic missions established schools for the Maronites, one of the most famous of them the Jesuit College of Antourah, which was later transferred to the Lazarists and is still among the great centres of French education in the Levant. Gradually the custom arose of according to the representatives of France liturgical honours in the services of the Uniate Churches.

The tendencies which had first appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued throughout the greater part of the eighteenth. The Franco-Ottoman friendship was maintained; the French Government continued to interest itself in the fate of the Christians of the Levant; French commerce with the Near East grew in volume, and with it there grew up French mercantile communities in the great trading centres of the Ottoman Empire. But towards the end of the century the position of France suffered a decline, with the temporary decrease of French influence in the world, and with the growth of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. In 1774 the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji gave the Russian Government a vague right of protection over the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Sultan..

The French Revolution and the Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte caused a temporary and partial breach in the continuity of French policy. The early Revolutionary Governments withdrew their support from the Catholic missions; and in order to facilitate his rule over Egypt, Bonaparte claimed to be the protector of Islam. It is true that in his invasion of Syria (1799) he received certain help from the Maronites and attempted to secure the assistance of the ruler of Lebanon, the Amir Bashir. But by invading Egypt and Syria he broke the other strand of French policy, friendship with the Ottoman Sultan. The latter declared war upon France; but in 1802 a Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed, restoring to French residents in Ottoman territory their capitulatory privileges. Shortly afterwards the reversion to tradition was carried a step further; the help and encouragement of the French Government was once more accorded to the Catholic Missions.

The resumption of continuity was not complete, however. The creation by Muhammad Ali of a virtually independent Egyptian State which threatened to overwhelm the Ottoman Empire confronted the Powers with a new problem. All of them decided that it was in their interests to maintain

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the Empire, with the exception of France, which, forsaking her traditional ally, gave almost uninterrupted support to Muhammad Ali. This was one of the reasons why, after the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha from geographical Syria and its restoration to the Sultan, the Ottoman Government did all it could to weaken the position of the Maronites, the traditional protégés of France. The Druzes were encouraged to attack them; there followed the series of disturbances which culminated in the massacres of 1860. They gave the opportunity for the most spectacular exercise of the French right of protection. With the consent of the other Powers, reluctantly and conditionally given, a French expeditionary force occupied Lebanon and remained there several months, until, in 1861, the international Conference sitting in Beirut finished drawing up the statute of Lebanese autonomy. In the same period, the conflict over the Holy Places between Catholics and Orthodox, supported by France and Russia respectively, was one of the contributory causes of the Crimean War.

In less spectacular ways, too, France's concern for the Christians of the Levant showed itself throughout the nineteenth century. The work of the missions, religious, educational and humanitarian, grew continuously, thanks partly to the annual subsidy given them by the French Government. French diplomatic intervention helped to secure the recognition by the Ottoman Government of one after another of the Uniate Churches, and in many ways to promote the interests of Catholic foundations. The French protectorate over the Catholics in the Holy Places was given formal international recognition in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878; and in the same year the Prefect of Propaganda at the Vatican addressed a circular to the Catholic authorities in the Levant, instructing them that their dealings with the local authorities should be conducted through the diplomatic representatives of France. Similar statements were made again in 1888 and 1898.

The growth of anti-clericalism in France, and the separation of Church from State in 1906, made no difference to the policy of the French Government. It is true that it led to the establishment by the 'Mission Laïque' of non-religious schools for the propagation of French culture in a secular form, and that there was a decline in the number of French missionaries and teachers, and a corresponding increase in

175 that of the Italians. But officially French Governments of whatever complexion recognized that anti-clericalism was not for export, and worked to preserve and strengthen their connexion with the Eastern Christians and their protectorate over Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire. It was the existence of the French tradition which led to part of the northern Syrian coastlands being excluded from the scope of the promise of Arab independence made by the British Government to the Sharif Husain, which caused Syria and Lebanon to be assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, helped to form the decision of the peace-makers to confer on France the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, and has largely determined the nature of France's policy in her Mandated Territories until to-day.

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The existence of this tradition must be taken as a factor which, even if it rests to some extent upon legend, cannot be ignored. But it must be made clear in what the tradition consisted. One aspect of it was the protectorate over the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. It is sometimes forgotten that it had also another aspect, friendship with the ruling power of the Empire. These two aspects, moreover, were not unconnected with one another. It was only because France was the traditional friend of the Sultan that she was able to intervene successfully with him in favour of his Catholic subjects; and it was not an accident that when France temporarily severed her friendship with the Sultan, and gave her assistance to Muhammad Ali, the attitude of the Sultan's Government towards the Eastern Christians became more unfavourable than it had been.

There is no room in this essay to discuss what historical rights are, and whether they exist. What must be emphasized is that the historic connexion summarized above, together with the legends and associations which cling to it, have helped to determine the emotional attitude of the French public to Syria and Lebanon, and thus to mould French policy. It is not only Catholics who attach value to the French tradition in the Levant; it is in some degree all those to whom history and tradition have meaning.

GENERAL

SYRIA AND HER HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

488 By geographical position Syria is a corridor and a meeting-
175 place. From east to west and north to south, it is traversed by two natural highways, one winding through the valleys of the Euphrates and Orontes to link the East with the Mediterranean world, and the other carrying the northern peoples southwards to Africa. Through the ages the country has been occupied for short or long periods by Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders and Ottomans. In Syria—at Kadesh and the Yarmuk—some of the great clashes in history have taken place. Today, with her fate in her own hands, Syria's past provides the varied and fertile sources of her culture, and her present, the vigour necessary for the remarkable progress she is now making.

172 Syria's wealth of historical remains is the visible embodiment of her age-long history and, from that point of view, is to be considered as a national heritage. It has a lesson to give the present generation, for such tangible evidence of their country's greatness in the past is a challenge to the young to prove themselves worthy heirs. For that reason alone, these buildings and monuments deserve to be preserved and maintained. Very often, however, they also have an aesthetic or cultural value, being of importance as works of art or bearing witness to the greatest periods of a civilization. As such, they are of importance beyond the national boundaries and their preservation is a matter of concern not only to the country which possesses them, but to all civilized nations.

For Syria, owing to the vast number and diversity of her historical monuments and the particular conditions in which they are situated, their preservation raises complicated problems. The treatment they require varies according to their present state, for only some of them have remained intact and still serve their original purpose, so that their maintenance is a regular, routine matter. Many of them, on the other hand, are used for a different purpose, never contemplated by their builders, for which they have been more or less satisfactorily adapted

DAMASCUS

GROWTH OF THE CITY

Lying on the edge of the desert and encircled by the green Ghutah oasis, watered by the Barada, Damascus owes its existence and development mainly to its geographical position, water supplies and gardens. The different periods of its growth which are bound up with its political history, industries and trade, are reflected in the layout of the various sections of the town, and in the architecture of its houses, monuments and streets.

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The nucleus of the present city was formed at the time of Syria's annexation to Alexander's Empire. The Greek city, rising to the east of the Aramaean town, was built to a regular plan of rectangular blocks about 150 by 330 feet, showing considerable regard for town planning requirements; the layout may, in fact, even today, still be regarded as an ideal one.

Damascus's association with the Roman Empire gave a decisive impetus to the formation and development of the town. Most of the great rebuilding operations were carried out in the reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla. The relative importance of the various streets depended at that time upon their position in relation to the city gates. Bab Charqi is a part of the ancient East Gate, which stood at the end of the "Street called Straight" (*Via Recta*), on the site of which one of the bays of a monumental arch has recently been reconstructed. All round the Great Mosque there are many remains of the temple of Jupiter Damascenus (identified by the Romans with the god Hadad). To the west, in particular, there is the high Corinthian colonnade of one of the propylaea of the peribolos, with beautiful fragments of the arcature and entablature.

Damascus remained a satellite of Rome and then of Byzantium until the arrival of the Arabs, who, under the Omayyad dynasty, made it the capital of a great empire, the political, cultural and religious centre of Islam. The heart of the city was the Great Mosque, built by the Caliph al-Walid on the site of the ancient temple and the church of Saint John the Baptist. The Syrian architects adapted their plan to the whole area, incorporating some parts of the earlier buildings in the new edifice. The immense courtyard and the sanctuary were

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DAMASCUS
SCUS

adorned with all the splendour of Constantinople's mosaics and the products of her art industries. The mosque was considered as one of the world's architectural masterpieces, rivalling the mosque of Omar in Jerusalem. 361 175

With the rise of the Abbasid dynasty, Damascus lost its position as the capital; the work of the Omayyads was destroyed and their institutions proscribed. In order to subjugate the population more effectively and prevent any show of hostility, the fortified walls of the city were pulled down. This was a period of anarchy and unrest, which resulted in the formation of cliques and the development of guild life. The city ceased to be a single whole, governed by public authorities responsible for the management of the community's assets; it was split up into autonomous districts, like diminutive, and often rival, cities, each with its own independent organization, mosque, hammam (bathe), souq, surrounding walls and gates, and its own chief (sheikh) commanding a sort of police battalion.

This situation led to the development of a new system of property and a new type of city life; new bodies were formed to defend the rights of various religious communities or corporations.

AYYUBID PERIOD

The Seljuk Atabegs and the Ayyubids, in their zealous desire to see Sunnite Islam victorious and their hatred of the Fatimites and Crusaders, made Damascus once more an intellectual and religious center, as well as a stronghold. Whereas the town's division into various districts had previously been based on craftsmen's corporations, religious creed was henceforth the determining factor; the Christians drew together and shut themselves away to the north-east of the old town; the Israelites to the south-east; the Moslem section of the population settled in the western part of the town, where many madrasahs and public buildings were then built. There, also, stood the Citadel, for whose building part of the materials and foundations of the Roman walls were used. The city was further

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361 175 broken up by the formation of new districts, often at some distance from the original town centre. In isolated parts and on the slopes of the mountain, where nature is conducive to prayer and meditation, many convents and madrasahs were erected; although several of these have been destroyed and others are disused and in ruins, about fifty have survived until the present time, while others again have been converted and incorporated in more recent buildings.

361 344 172 In the Moslem sector of the old town is the Maristan of Nur ad-Din, "one of the most famous hospitals of the Moslem world". It is of great architectural interest, but is unfortunately spoilt by the modern buildings which now surround it. The doorway has a rich and original alveolate decoration, a classical pediment and a beautiful pair of doors. Over the entrance hall is a small ribbed onion dome, surmounted by a sort of truncated conical drum, made up of superimposed alveoles which are visible even from the outside, as in the case of the brick tomb of Zo'beide near Baghdad. In the courtyard, with its two beautiful iwans (halls), fragments of inscriptions, lattice-work and marble inlay have been preserved.

361 346 172 The Nuriya Madrasah, to the south of the Great Mosque, has a similar dome above the mausoleum. Its doorway is distinguished by the pendant keystone motif, also to be seen at the Adiliya Madrasah, a "masterpiece of stereotomy and bonding" planned and constructed in the architectural style and by the methods characteristic of northern Syria. This latter madrasah, a fitting building for the headquarters of the Arab Academy, has been very carefully restored and rearranged. This building, together with the Zahiriya Madrasah (now the National Library), the house of Saladin's father, which was converted by the Sultan Beibars into a memorial college, and the Aziziya Madrasah (Saladin's tomb) form a fine architectural group to the north of the Great Mosque; these buildings are still adorned by a wealth of ancient works of art, inscriptions, mosaics, doors and windows.

The twofold influence of Mesopotamia and northern Syria can be seen in the art of the period of Nur ad-Din and Saladin.

Various mausoles are to be found outside the old town itself and slightly to the north, in the area between the river and the modern thoroughfare called Baghdad Street. That of Zayn ad-Din (Sitt ech-Châm, 1172), is the oldest example of such a building with a sepulchral dome surmounting two drums; the "Sultan Hasan" Mausoleum has a ribbed dome and an interesting decoration of stucco and painting; the Chamiya Madrasah, standing outside the city walls, contains one of the finest examples of plaster moulding in Damascus, beautiful inscriptions and the armatures of the old leaded-glass windows. The Mausoleum of Ibn al-Moqaddam, Emir of Aleppo, is a typical north Syrian structure. Further to the east and of more recent date stands the At-Tawba Mosque, planned and arranged on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque, and interesting on account of its architecture and decoration (doorway, mihrab, leaded-glass windows, etc.).

The suburb of Salihiyah grew up on the mountain side round a fine group of mausolea, madrasahs and convents, most of which are now abandoned or used for somewhat unsuitable purposes. There, in a picturesque spot on the Nahr Yazid, we find the remains of a colonnaded portico of the oldest convent-madrasah of Salihiyah, together with a whole series of monuments built by eminent persons at the court of Nur ad-Din and Saladin. Most of them are mausoles with brick domes, some ribbed and others double, surmounting two drums decorated with arcading and lobate or twin niches. Many of them contain beautiful carved wooden tombs, old leaded-glass windows and

361 lintels decorated with graceful inscriptions and coats of arms.
346 The Mozaffari Mosque, built in 1202, is decorated in a par-
172 ticularly interesting and original manner; it is the oldest Ayyubid Mosque, and its plan is reminiscent of the Omayyad Mosque. Ancient columns, with their capitals, have been used to form the arcades round the courtyard. The carved wooden lintels (with incised geometrical designs) over the seven doors of the prayer hall are well preserved; two of them are still surmounted by plaster lattice-work. Inside, several windows have beautiful old glass panes.

Also worthy of mention is the Atabakiya Madrasah, built to house the tomb of Princess Tarkan-Khatoun, with its fine doorway decorated with alveoles, which today, owing to the concealment of the corner colums by more recent structures, looks as if it were in recess. The arrangement of the alveoles, the bonding of the arch-stones of the arcade and the modelling of the cornices show originality, but are somewhat primitive.

This part of the town subsequently developed and spread very considerably, taking in neighbouring districts such as the Kurd quarter, in Saladin's time, and the Mohadjirine at the end of the nineteenth century. Today, this suburb centres round the Mohiy ad-Din Mosque, built by Sultan Selim in 1518 over the tomb of the famous mystic. This mosque, which also contains the tomb of Abd el-Kader, has a beautiful minaret and very striking faience decorations.

MAMELUKE PERIOD

361 At the beginning of the Mameluke period, Damascus developed
175 and expanded further; its products were highly esteemed and, in order to meet the demands of the time, the city developed its art industries, specializing in luxury articles. Even the Crusades promoted its commercial relations with the Western world; like Aleppo, Damascus traded with southern France, Genoa, Pisa and Venice. Its artistic products, such as silks, bronze ornaments, Damascene blades, enamel-work and glassware were in demand everywhere. As a result of this commercial activity, its suqs spread to the north of the Citadel, in the horse-market area, where the Yelbogha Mosque was built in 1264.

Following the example of the Sultans of Cairo, governors, military leaders and their servants then built a great many madrasahs (schools for the teaching of the Koran) and mausolea. The favourite sites for the latter were along the road to Mecca "so that the founder might benefit from the prayers of passing pilgrims". Thus a new suburb, called the meidan, sprang up along this road, reflecting the special features of the pilgrim traffic and trade. The meidan, about two miles in length, was linked with the city by a new group of suqs (Es-Sinaniyeh) outside the western gate of the wall, between the districts of Chagur and Qasr el-Hajjaj; it absorbed the suburban village of El-Qbeybat ("little domes"), and ended at Bab-Allah (Allah's Gate), whence pilgrims "set out on their journey to the Holy House of God".

361 It would take too long to give a complete list of the Mame-
346 luke monuments existing in these districts; even the directory
172 of the Antiquities Service does not include them all. Very often a minaret, a fountain or a madrasah, although not classified, is of considerable interest, because it adds to the atmosphere of the place, or because it has certain original features, though these are often not very obvious, owing to the conversion of the building for another purpose or to bad restoration.

P.15 B

361 designed on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque; it is re-
346 markable for the beautiful structure of its niches and
172 windows with their alveolate decoration, its magnificent bands of plaster moulding, and its windows, doorways and minaret. This mosque well deserves to be set off to greater advantage.

Tingiz, the Viceroy of Syria, was responsible for the construction of a fine group of buildings. Only the beautiful minaret and two doorways of the mosque which bears his name still remain after the rebuilding of the An-Nasr Avenue, but the double mausoleum of his w . (Turba Kukabaiya) and, a little further on, the Dar al-Hadit, a school where the traditions of the Prophet were expounded, are still to be seen in the "Street called Straight".

The last monuments of this period are the two beautiful tiered minarets in the Bab Jabiya suq, with their rich decoration, and that of the Al-Moallaq Mosque, with an unbroken line of black stones encircling its niches and rose windows.

OTTOMAN PERIOD

361 The end of the Mameluke period was marked by a serious eco-
● 175 nomic crisis, aggravated by disturbances and devastation (Tamerlane), and also by the Portuguese discoveries, which altered the traditional trade routes. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire, which expanded Damascus's economic and political frontiers, the city again began to develop. Under the capitulations, Turkish ports were opened to European merchants. Moreover, since pilgrims set out from Damascus on their journey to Mecca, the city was expected to supply them with the necessary equipment and provisions for their crossing of the desert.

These circumstances led to the building of many khans, with their porticoed courtyards, shops and stables on the ground floor and accommodation for travellers on the floor above. The city was no longer of any strategic or military importance; the ramparts, already useless on account of the town's extension and the formation of suburbs without the walls, were abandoned; the moats filled in and the Citadel fell into ruins. The pasha (governor), with his entourage of Turkish aristocrats, took up his residence and administered business at the seraglio, outside the ramparts, at a place called Qanawat (the canals), near the Roman aqueduct.

361 In the same neighbourhood were erected the two great
346 imperial madrasahs, the Solaymaniya (1554), constructed by the
172 famous Turkish architect, Sinan, who built the Sulaymaniya in Constantinople, and the Salimiya (1566), designed by a Persian architect. With their great buttressed domes, surrounded by a double row of small domes covering the porticoes and rooms, their slender pencil-like minarets tapering to a cone, and the surrounding gardens with their fountains, trees and flowers, they achieve an architectural unity and a highly characteristic atmosphere of their own, in a style native to Constantinople and readily transplanted to Damascus.

The Solaymaniya has a rich variety of architectural and decorative motifs, characteristic of that period and style, such as marble inlaid work and great overlays of faience tiles on the walls and tympana of the doors and windows; keel arches with alternate black and white arch-stones; abundant use of stalactites, niches ornamented with overlapping shell designs, lintels with many-coloured interlocking voussoirs, forming increasingly ornate and complicated patterns. The capitals

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MDI Syria MDI

Damascus

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Damascus in the Seventh Century

(From J. Sauvaget, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, IV, 1934)

Damascus today

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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

History

Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria an

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Lebanon were foreigners. Today it is still possible to see near Beirut the traces of the successive conquerors—Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Alexander the Great, and, in the first century B.C., Rome. The Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire was supplanted by the Arab Muslim conquest which took Damascus in A.D. 635. The Arab invaders gave the people of Syria their name, their religion, and their language, but the rulers also learned much from their new subjects, and it was from Damascus that the Umayyad Caliphs ruled Islam from 661 to 750. Many of the chief servants of the Umayyads were Syrian-born and, of these, many were Christians, so that this period might be considered one of Syrian independence; but in 750 the Caliphate passed to the Abbasids who made their capital in Iraq. Syria fell under different foreign rulers as the power passed successively to Abbasids, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Crusaders, and Mamelukes (with Mongol incursions) until, in 1516, the Ottoman Empire took possession of the land.

The Ottoman Empire

Under the rule of the Turks, Syria produced little save taxes for the Porte and emoluments for the pashas. The corrupt rule of most of these governors aimed at personal enrichment and made little attempt to control the land beyond gunshot of the citadels or to advance the social or economic state of those they governed. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century what local prosperity there was occurred when some local leader succeeded in making himself autonomous in defiance of the remote authority of the Ottoman Sultan; the classic case is the reign of the Druze Amir Fakhr ad-Din al-Maani (1536–1635) who encouraged agriculture and trade with Europe. Such autonomy was naturally more easily achieved in the Christian and Druze fastnesses of the Lebanese mountains than in the cities of inner Syria; there the Ottomans maintained their authority by exploiting the rivalry of sects and class, and so contributed to the impermanence and lack of solidarity which persist as a feature of contemporary public life. This fragmentation of society is even more characteristic of Lebanon, since in the mid-nineteenth century a social conflict between the resurgent Maronite peasantry and their Druze overlords was not only exploited by the Ottoman authorities but also became a factor in the struggle between France and Britain to control the Levant. The conflict culminated in a civil war which led the Powers in 1861 to obtain from the Ottoman Sultan the establishment of the autonomous Sanjaq of Lebanon (excluding the then predominantly Muslim cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon)

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under a Christian governor. Already for one generation, after the interruption caused by the Napoleonic Wars, missionaries from Western Christendom had been laying the foundations of an intellectual revival—chiefly among the Lebanese Christians, but also in the Syrian cities; and the foundation in 1866 of the Syrian Protestant College (renamed in 1920 the American University of Beirut) is a landmark in the early history of Arab nationalism. Religious minorities thus acquired the habit of looking to some Western patron for material support and for protection against the majority of their neighbours and their governors; thus the Maronites depended on France, the Orthodox on Imperial Russia, the local Jews on the Alliance Israélite and on Britain, the Protestants on the United States, Britain, or Germany. Emigration to the Americas or Europe further opened the cultural windows of Christian Lebanon and emigrants to Egypt founded there a modern Arabic literature, while the granting of public utility concessions, especially for railways, to French companies and others increased the Western interest in the country.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Young Turks, who were at first supported by the leaders of the early Arab nationalism, rose to power; but it soon became apparent that the Young Turk was to be as much a despot as the Sultan. The Arab intelligentsia of Beirut and Damascus chose, therefore, to look to the Western Powers for support[1]—a decision which they may well now be regretting. The Ottoman Governor of Syria, Jamal Pasha, carried out a drastic 'purge' of the urban nationalist leaders in 1916, but the nationalist cause had been taken up at a safer distance by the Sharif Hussain of Mecca and his sons Faisal and Abdullah, who had been in correspondence with the British authorities in Egypt since before the outbreak of the First World War.[2] Their Arab Revolt was a response to Jamal Pasha's purge and the prospect of similar measures in the Hejaz. Brilliantly organized by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, it effectively harassed the left wing of the Ottoman front on the desert margin while Allenby was breaking the main resistance in the Palestine campaign. When the Ottoman front collapsed after the British victory at Megiddo, a small body of Arabs from the Amir Faisal's army were the first to reach Damascus. Faisal was given authority by General Allenby over all territory east of the Jordan, down to Aqaba, but by the Arabs he was regarded rather as an independent amir on the throne of the Umayyads. However, Faisal had scarcely appoint-

[1] See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, Hamilton, 1946).
[2] For this section see above, pp. 17–18.

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ed a governor for Lebanon before the latter was displaced by the French (whose historic interests in Lebanon had been recognized by the British Government in the correspondence with the Sharif Hussain). While Faisal and Lawrence were presenting the Arab case to the Paris Peace Conference, the French were consolidating their military hold on the Levant. Eventually Faisal and Clemenceau came to a provisional agreement for an autonomous Syrian state under the tutelage of France (as conceded by Britain in the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, which had not been communicated at the time to the Sharif and his sons); but French tutelage was not acceptable to the Damascus politicians who in March 1920 proclaimed Faisal King of an independent Syrian state. In the following month, however, the French obtained Britain's agreement, at the San Remo Conference, to their exercising a Mandate over Syria as well as Lebanon; the new Mandatary defeated Faisal's little army at Maisalun on 25 July 1920 and entered into possession of Damascus, from which Faisal fled into exile.

S L 648

The French Mandate, 1920–45

Since Crusader times, France had been interested in protecting the Christians of the Levant, and the twentieth century gave her the added incentive of creating a counter-balance to Britain's growing influence in the Middle East. The Maronites welcomed the French, and the latter accordingly expanded the small area of the Sanjaq of Lebanon to include the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, as well as the Biqaa, so as to give this 'Greater Lebanon' the largest possible area in which there would be no danger of a Muslim majority. The French applied to Syria the principle of *divide et impera* and four separate states were set up: that of the Alawis (Jebel Ansariya, including Latakia), that of the Jebel Druze, and Damascus and Aleppo (in 1925 combined into a single state of Syria). The French further encouraged separatism in the Jezira, and designated the area of Antioch and Alexandretta (in which the largest linguistic community was the Turkish) as an autonomous sanjaq.

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The majority of Syrians never readily accepted French rule and risings occurred in the Ansariya, near Aleppo, and near Dair az-Zor; these were soon put down but a greater rebellion began in the Jebel Druze in 1925 and spread to Damascus and to Hama. The French bombarded Damascus in October 1925 and in May 1926 but did not succeed in completely quelling the revolt until August 1927. Thereafter negotiations for a treaty stumbled through the years, punctuated by disturbances, broken off from time to time and marked throughout by bitter-

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 Ml Middle East Ml
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during this period. Two other Damascus owner editors, Najib Rayyis of *Al Qubas* and Wajih Hafiar of *Al Insha*, expressed similar views. Nevertheless, according to Asseh, the newspapers kept pressing for still more freedom.

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It probably should be interpolated here that the prestige of the National Bloc was declining toward the end of this period and that criticism of it was on the increase. Its position became very shaky after the middle of 1948, when the Syrian Army in the Palestine War failed to live up to the public's high expectations of it and when this was blamed on corruption among the politicians in power. Asseh said an attempt was made in 1948 to adopt a press law which would have limited freedom greatly, but there were public demonstrations and this cabinet fell. A reference source[1] indicates that factors other than this attempt to adopt a new press law caused the fall of this cabinet on December 1, 1948. It turned out that this marked the start of a period of tremendous instability in government in Syria which endured down at least to the survey and which forms an important part of the background against which Syrian attempts to reform the press through government must be judged. Below is a brief review of these changes:[2]

December 17, 1948-March 30, 1949—After a 17-day crisis, a cabinet headed by Khalid al-Azm is formed and remains in power during this period of less than four months.

March 30-August 14, 1949—Army-supprted coup d'état brings government headed by Brig. Gen. Husni Za'im to power. Chamber is dissolved and constitution of Second Republic of Syria is suspended. Za'im is elected President late in the period in elections held after political parties have been suppressed by decree. Before regime has been in power four months it is overthrown by a second army-supported coup d'état led by Col. Sami Hinnawi.

August 14-December 19, 1949—Hinnawi, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, is an important political figure throughout this period, but the administration of the government is placed in the hands of a provisional civilian cabinet headed by Hashim al-Atasi. This cabinet governs by decree, pending the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Elections are held in November and on December 13 the provisional cabinet resigns, the intention being to permit the recently elected constituent assembly to select a new government. However, before this can be accomplished a third, army-supported coup d'état occurs, this one led by Lt. Col. Adib al-Shishakli.

December 19, 1949-May 29, 1950—Although Shishakli, either as deputy chief of staff and later chief of staff of the Syrian Army, remains an important political figure from this time on, the movement toward restoration of constitutional government is continued. The recently elected constituent assembly is not dissolved. It elects Hashim al-Atasi provisional president of Syria and proceeds with the work of drafting a new constitution. It takes until December

[1] *The Middle East*, op. cit., p. 396.

[2] Names, dates and much of the material taken from Chronology of Events sections of *Middle East Journal*, Vols. 3, 4, 5 and 6 cover this period. This was supplemented to some extent by material collected during the survey.

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 Ml Middle East Ml
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28, nine days after the coup, to put together a provisional cabinet, acceptable both to the Army and the politically divided assembly. This cabinet, headed by Khalid al-Azm, then manages to govern until May 29, when it is forced out after about five months in power.

May 29-September 8, 1950—After a prolonged cabinet crisis, which really began on May 10 when the previous cabinet resigned and then withdrew its resignation for a few more days, a cabinet of caretakers, headed by Nazim al-Qudzi is put together. The understanding is that it will attempt to govern until the new constitution can be ocmpleted. This is accomplished and the constitution of the Third Republic of Syria is adopted on December 5. Provisional President Hashim al-Atasi is elected President on that date, and the constituent assembly becomes the Chamber of Deputies. The provisional cabinet resigns and Nazim al-Qudzi is asked to form a new cabinet, which he does on September 8. This cabinet is dominated by members of the People's Party, which in the elections of the previous year had been assured of control over 40-to-50 votes in the 114-member assembly. It wins a vote of confidence on September 11 of 63 to 5, which gives some indication of the delicate balance with which this and subsequent constitutional governments must attempt to govern.

September 8, 1950-March 10, 1951—With constitutional government now fully restored, the first cabinet headed by Nazim al-Qudzi under the Third Republic manages to stay in power five months before it is forced out.

March 10-July 31, 1951—After the Populist cabinet resigns on March 10, there is a crisis lasting until March 27, before Khalid al-Azm manages to form a coalition cabinet. It wins a vote of confidence of 50-0 on April 7, and attempts to govern with his shaky majority which is not really a majority and with the People's Party bloc in opposition. It lasts until July 31, about four months.

July 31-November 7, 1951—There is a prolonged crisis here, which actually began about July 19 and lasted until August 9, when Hasan al-Hakim, an independent, finally manages to put together a cabinet dominated by members of the People's Party. It lasts less than four months before it resigns as a result of divisions within the cabinet itself.

November 7-November 29—This 3-week period marks the longest cabinet crisis Syria has yet seen. Various leaders try and fail to form a cabinet. On November 28 one appears to be on the verge of being formed. It is scheduled to consist of seven Populists, two independents and one member of the Socialist Front. The head of it is to be Dr. Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, a Populist who has visited Moscow, who is reported to be pro-Russian, and who also is reputed to have Moslem Brotherhood connections. In the negotiations leading up to the formation of his proposed cabinet Dawalibi has held out for and is scheduled to hold the Ministry of Defense portfolio as well as the Prime Ministership. Col. Fawzi al-Silo, a supporter of Shishakli, had been Minister of Defense in the previous four cabinets, whether they were Populist-dominated or coalitions not dominated by the Populists. Before this proposed Dawalibi cabinet can take office, Syria's fourth coup d'état in two years occurs. It is led by Col. Adib al-Shishakli, who led the previous coup of December 19, 1949, largely in an effort to bloc a People's Party project

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for union of Syria with Hashimite Iraq, but who then retired from a position of great public prominence and permitted the effort to restore constitutional government to continue.

November 29, 1951 to ?—For a few days after Shishakli took power in his second coup he made some effort to permit the constitution to continue to function. Dawalibi, most of the members of his proposed cabinet and various People's Party leaders were arrested by Syrian Army forces under Shishakli's command on November 29, but the Chamber was not immediately dissolved. In fact, on December 1 it was announced that President Atasi, who was under house arrest, had asked Hamid al-Khuja to form a cabinet. On December 2 came the announcement that Atasi had resigned, the Chamber had been dissolved, and Shishakli had been proclaimed Chief of State. The following day Col. Fawzi al-Silo was named Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

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Syria's first major experiment at press reform came under the Za'im regime. The power of government, which was ruling by decree, was used to reduce the number of daily papers in Syria to ten, compared to the thirty or more which had been normal for all Syria for some years before and after World War II. The papers which were suspended were compensated for their loss. Syrians disagree as to the fairness with which this reduction in numbers was handled and as to its real purpose.

Asseh said Za'im appreciated the value of propaganda and was setting out to turn the press into a propaganda instrument which could be tightly controlled by the state. The papers which were permitted to live became "official," he said, and unfavorable comment and criticism were prevented and there was virtually no press freedom. Spiro al-'Isa, editor of *Alef Ba*, one of the Damascus papers permitted to live, said that the reduction in numbers was handled fairly and that it did not wipe out an opposition press. The objective, as he and others explained it, was to reduce competition to a point where papers could live on circulation and advertising revenues and stop depending on secret funds.

To a degree this apparently succeeded. Circulations seem to have risen to a point where all of them should have been making money, according to the kind of calculations which were explained in Chapter IV. Sources disagreed on how much circulations rose, but the maximum estimates would put the total collective daily circulation of the Za'im period far under the total which preceded and followed this period.

Za'im was in power less than four months before he was assassinated in the coup which followed his coup, and this is too short a period to indicate much about how any sort of an experiment with the press was going to work out. Its mixed motivations, however, seem to be quite clear. There was probably a sincere desire to reform the press. The effort took the form it did as a result of the widespread belief that there were too many papers,

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Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

Other Secret Sects:—The Druze people constitute one of the two leading secret sects found only in Syria, the other being the Nuṣayriyyah inhabiting the mountains north of Tripoli. The Ismā'iliyyah of the Ḥimṣ and Ḥamāh district, another secret sect, are descended from the Assassins,[1] who for two centuries or so struck awe and terror into the hearts of the Crusaders, and are represented today by a few other sectarians in Persia and India. The Yezīdis, so-called devil worshipers, practice their hidden rites in the out-of-the-way hills between Antioch and Aleppo and have coreligionists in Kurdistān and Armenia. 795 101

Special Interest of this Study:—But of all these sects Druzism is perhaps the most interesting and important. It is still a living force. Its followers form to the present day a vigorous and flourishing community in the Lebanon. Its learned system has not changed since it was first inaugurated in the early part of the eleventh century. The Islam of the Near East has changed and adapted itself to the requirements of the varying conditions. The Christianity of the Near East has changed. But the Druze system has been and still is the same. 795 621

The modernizing influence has in late years brought within its sphere quite a large number of the young and uninitiated Druzes. The report of the American University of Beirūt for last year indicates that there are in that institution alone thirty-six Druze students and five Druze teachers. But no one with first-hand knowledge of the situation would go so far as even to recognize the existence of a "modernist movement" alleged to be aiming at divulging the Druze beliefs, much less to declare "It is understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirūt will be the probable intermediary of communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place."[2] 177 373

In fact the outside world knows so little about the contents of this religion that in a recent session of the Permanent Mandates 795

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[1] Arabic *Ḥashīshīn* — those addicted to the use of a stupefying weed.

[2] De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1923), p. 244. Dr. Bliss died in 1920.

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177 Syria has not been merely a passive receptacle for influences
, 21 coming in from outside. Whether or not the hypothesis of an
184 indigenous population and culture be accepted, it is certain that the geographical structure of the country, and the nature of its inhabitants as modified by that structure, have determined the forms which the incoming streams of influence have taken. For example, the sharp geographical divisions of Syria have helped to perpetuate the differences between various elements in the population, which have come into the country from different directions or from the same direction at different times: racial and tribal divisions have given rise to an intense localism of feeling, which has linked itself in various ways with the prejudices, the hostilities and the exclusiveness generated by the great political and religious conflicts of the past. Localism and particularism have deeply affected the political life of the country. Sometimes, when Syria has formed part of a larger political unit with a strong Government, they have been held in check; but when the unit has disintegrated, or the Government has grown weak, the country has been partitioned between a number of petty and ephemeral local dynasties, more often than not at variance with one another.

Local and communal feeling is closely linked with the persistence of tradition. Throughout almost the whole of history the Syrians have been subjected to a succession of foreign conquerors. They have been forced at least partially to accept the customs and cultures of their rulers, and in the process they have acquired two arts: the art of rapid and superficial assimilation, and that of preserving, beneath new modes of behaviour and in new forms, their old beliefs and ways of living. 'Bow down to every nation which passes over you, but remember me in your hearts', said one of the founders of the Druze sect. It is a lesson which not only the Druzes have learned.

177 But the role of the Syrian population has not merely been one of assimilating, or resisting, outside influences. It has transformed these influences and spread them to the surrounding world, and it has made its own and original contributions to civilization. From the time of the Phœnicians, Syrian merchants have been scattered throughout western Asia and the Mediterranean world. Syrian officials helped to administer the Roman, the Arab and the Ottoman Empires.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD/

Syrian writers and thinkers contributed to the culture of the Greek, the Latin and the Arabic languages. Even to-day, after centuries of stagnation, there are large and important Syrian mercantile communities in North and South America, in West Africa and elsewhere; and Syrian teachers, journalists, doctors and officials are to be found in all the countries of the Arabic world. 177

Above all, Syria is the birthplace of Christianity and Judaism. Ever since Europe became Christian, the principles by which its spiritual and moral life have been guided have come to it clothed in an imagery drawn largely from the beauties and way of life of Syria's countryside; and to the believer her very ground is holy.

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As far back as our records go, the forces described above can be seen at work. The curtain of history rises on a Syria of which the population is already mainly Semitic, and is continually being reinforced in its Semitic character by fresh waves of immigration. For example, the Canaanites and the Phœnicians entered the country during the third millennium B.C., and the Hebrews and Aramæans in the second. At some time or another all of these peoples established States in different portions of the country. Thus a great part of coastal Syria was for many centuries under the control of the Phœnicians, who established trading centres throughout the Mediterranean and even beyond; and for a time a portion of southern Syria constituted a Hebrew State. 175

These Semitic States deserved well of mankind. The Phœnicians built up a trading system which covered the whole Mediterranean basin, and established colonies as far away from their homeland as France and Spain. But what they did is of small account compared with the record of the Jews. Their intense and stormy history was the channel through which the world came to knowledge of God; a knowledge which bore fruit among them in an unbending passion for righteousness and a matchless poetry of devotion.

From the earliest times Syria was in touch with Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor and the Ægean world, and usually the greater part of it was under the sway of foreign rulers. The whole or a large portion of the country was subdued successively by the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Persians,

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD 1

and police force. Feudal privileges were abolished, and all were declared equal before the law. 175

Until the First World War Lebanon was ruled in accordance with this Statute. It was on the whole a period of increasing prosperity. It is true that unrest was not immediately stilled. The abolition of feudal privileges raised new social problems, and thus led to renewed agitation among the Maronite peasants, whose leader, Yusuf Karam, was finally sent away from Lebanon; and discontented Druzes continued to emigrate to Jebel Druze. But gradually the traditional state of religious toleration returned. The governors, who were Christians from outside Lebanon, were in general efficient and humane, and defended the autonomy of the Mountain against the attempts of the Sultan to infringe it. Agriculture revived, roads were built, schools were opened, and Western civilization extended its sway.[1]

16

For the rest of the century the Ottoman Empire continued to be the object of European interest and rivalry. The tension between Great Britain and Russia which was temporarily relaxed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 did not directly concern Syria. But the struggle between Russia and France for control of the Holy Places in Palestine, which had been the occasion of the Crimean War, was still not altogether ended. By its side new rivalries grew up. Italy disputed France's rights in regard to the Catholic communities and Holy Places; and towards the end of the century Germany began to stake her claim. In the reign of Abdul-Hamid II (1876–1909) German influence over the Ottoman Government grew continuously and gradually replaced that which Great Britain had once possessed. The Berlin to Baghdad railway, which German enterprise partially constructed, skirted the northern edge of Syria and might well, had not the First World War broken out, have served as a means of German penetration into that and other provinces of the Empire.

17

Western influence thus played an important part in the political life of the country; it played an even more important one in the social and economic changes of the century. Syrian 175 177

[1] The exact boundaries of the sanjaq of Lebanon were never clearly established.

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175 life in all its aspects underwent a gradual and still incomplete
171 process of Westernization. The tastes and habits of the population were profoundly influenced by the inflow of goods from the West; their beliefs and way of thinking still more profoundly so by the spread of Western culture.

175 The reception of Western civilization was helped by the
171 emigration of many thousands of Syrians to other countries.
167 In general they came more often from Lebanon than from other regions, and they were more often Christians than Moslems. Their motives for leaving their country were various. Many of the Christians desired to escape from a predominantly Moslem environment, especially after the events of 1860; many among both Christians and Moslems found Ottoman rule too oppressive to be borne; young men educated in the mission-schools wished for opportunities and rewards greater than their native land could offer; some were attracted by the legendary promise of the New World, its wealth and its freedom; and others went abroad simply because their relations and friends had already settled there.

167 There were two main roads of emigration. The one led to
175 Egypt and the Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the other Arabic-speaking countries. This road had always been open, but it was rendered more attractive by the establishment of British control over Egypt and the Sudan. The British authorities needed subordinate officials who spoke Arabic and understood the ways of the Near East, but who were also acquainted with Western methods of thought and administration. They found what they needed in the graduates of the Syrian mission-schools, who for half a century loyally and effectively filled a variety of positions in the Governments of Egypt and the Sudan. Thousands of other Syrians went to Egypt as merchants, doctors and journalists. They progressed, and some among them played a considerable part in the cultural life of the country. Being largely an urban middle-class community, partly Christian and suspected of an excessive attachment to Great Britain or at least to the West, the Syrian-Egyptians have not always been liked by the Egyptians; but many of them have become Egyptians in nationality and sentiment, and at least the Moslems among them may become assimilated in a generation or two to the population among whom they are living.

The Syrian-Egyptians are numbered in tens of thousands,

but those who have followed the other road, to North and/67
South America, to Australia and to other of the more distant/75
parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands. The great majority of them started as retail traders on a small scale, but many took to wholesale trade and to the manufacture of textiles and other goods. The process of taking root was harder for them than for those who went to Egypt, since it involved learning new languages and acquiring new ways of life; but they have already been assimilated to a considerable extent, and the large Syrian colonies in the United States, Brazil and the Argentine, with smaller ones in other countries, have become prosperous, loyal and respected elements in the communities in which they are living. Most of them have given up all but a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and there seems to be no obstacle to their ultimate complete assimilation, the more so since the flow of emigrants to the countries of the New World has greatly diminished during the last two decades. It has been partly diverted to British and French West Africa, much of the internal trade of which is now in Syrian hands.

The consequences of the emigration for Syria were both 175
good and bad. They were bad in so far as it was the more 167
talented and enterprising of the country's youth who went 177
abroad, during the period of their greatest energy and often for ever. On the other hand, the level of prosperity was raised by the remittances which successful emigrants sent home to their relatives, and by the savings which they brought back with them. Also, they introduced new ideas, and, what was even more important, the example of a new and in many respects attractive way of life. These ideas, this example and the bare fact that Syrians were prosperous and happy in foreign lands, deeply influenced the attitude of Syria to the West. All this was especially true of Lebanon, since it supplied so large a proportion of the emigrants.

18

Western influences also came by way of education. Students 175
began to go abroad, to seek the new learning in the schools of 177
Europe and America; and Western schools became ever more 171
numerous in the Near East. The greater number of them were 177
established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the

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seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

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question of Islam and modern civilization, and a greater caution in accepting ideas and innovations from Europe.

These two groups, and smaller, less important groups in other towns, have laid the foundations of a new Arabic literature. To a great extent their work has been preparatory. The Arabic language has been rendered more adequate and flexible, for example by the adoption or invention of technical terms. Western ideas have been spread through translations and works of popularization. New literary forms have been introduced—the poetic drama, the novel, the romantic autobiography—and at the same time old forms have been revived. In addition to the advances in form, the subject-matter of literature has been extended. Different groups have set themselves to expound subjects not hitherto treated: the relations between religion and secular culture, the position of women, the method of empirical science, and so on. In all this preparatory work, the influence of French and English thought and literature has been great and obvious.

Modern Arabic literature has so far produced nothing of great originality, nothing of much interest to the outer world. But there have been a number of honest, hard-working and courageous writers, who have deserved well of the Arabic-speaking peoples: for example, the religious thinker Muhammad Abdu, the social reformer Qasim Amin, the essayist al-Manfaluti, the poets Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, the playwright and novelist Tawfiq al-Hakim and the scholar Taha Husain.

These names are all those of Egyptians, and Cairo is the unquestioned centre of Arabic literature. But there have been very important Syrian and Lebanese writers, many of whom it is true worked for most of their lives in Egypt, although others remained in their own country. They include the scholars and poets of the Bustani and Yaziji families; the religious reformer Rashid Rida; the fathers of Arabic journalism Shidiaq, Nimr, Sarruf, Zaidan and Taqla; the poet Khalil Mutran; the best of women writers in Arabic, May Ziadah; the traveller Amin Rihani; and the mystic Khalil Jibran. The last two spent many years in the United States and wrote much of their work in English. They are the most distinguished of a group of Syrian-American writers who have planted in the new world a root of Arabic literature, which in spite of its qualities can hardly hope to survive a generation.

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

8

The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

369 from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants
621 and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims
184 who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

10

101 The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

175 Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the
101 spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of
177 the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

175 The Turks performed also another function. Their military
177 strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

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Islamic world had been much affected by influences from the Mediterranean countries, from Persia and from India. It had had the power to assimilate the products of other civilizations, and also to extend its dominion over peoples alien to the Arabs in origin and way of life. But later it ceased to develop and either to give out or to receive influences; and although the stream of influences from the West never completely vanished, during the great days of the Ottoman Empire it was smaller and less effective than it had previously been and was again to become.

II

In the past century or more this Arab world has been shaken to its foundations by the impact of the West. Western ideas, learned from schools, from books and latterly from the cinema, have changed at least the externals of social life. The competition of Western goods has broken the old crafts and opened up new economic possibilities. New means of communication are breaking up the closed local community; the life of the Beduin is threatened by the motor-car, the aeroplane and the extension of civil authority. The administrative machinery which the modern Government commands, and the extension of the limits of its action, are making the old feudal and sectarian organization unnecessary and even impossible. New Western rulers have imposed themselves, who have not even so much claim to be obeyed or such deep roots in popular memory and habit as had the Ottoman Sultan. The new social, economic and political life has in its turn shaken the domination of Moslem jurisprudence; and men have begun to raise new questions of the adequacy of religious faith and loyalty as a basis for society, and the place of Islam in the modern world. A new world has revealed itself, which strikes at the very foundations of the old, and is indeed its exact antithesis.

The transformation of the old life has brought with it a number of difficulties and dangers. The Arabs, like other peoples in their position, are torn between two ways of life. Sentiment, tradition and the belief that there is something of value in their tradition make them unwilling to break entirely with the old civilization, even if that were possible. But at the same time the necessities of modern life, and often a conviction that the Western civilization is in some ways

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IV. THE WESTERNIZATION OF IDEAS

I

THE coming of the West aroused a new process of thought not only in Syria but in all the Arabic-speaking countries; this process originated earliest and has developed furthest in Cairo and Beirut, but exists in some form in the other centres of Arab life, and is a single process which does not admit of sharp regional divisions. Much of this chapter will therefore concern itself with the general movement of thought in Arabic. Moreover, it will be necessary for the sake of exposition to formulate theoretical standpoints more clearly, articulately and abstractly, and in sharper opposition to one another, than they are formulated by contemporary Arabic writers.

The civilization of the West revealed itself in many lights to the Arabs. It came to them asserting, in act if not in word, its own superiority and its contempt for the East; thus it aroused a sense of humiliation, the more bitter because the Arabs had for so long regarded themselves as the source of true religion and civilization. It came to them as a Christian civilization, and thus it compelled them to take a new view of Christianity and of its relationship with Islam. Again, although it was Christian, it was also secular, denying the theocratic idea of life and politics; thus it stimulated thought about the place of religion in society. It preached and practised a new view of human relationships; it was based upon an undreamed-of mechanical power and an unknown economic organization; it was prosperous and unimaginably strong. In these aspects it was to be feared as a force of oppression and destruction; but also perhaps to be imitated, since it held out hopes of an equal prosperity and strength. Above all, it appeared as a revolutionary force, threatening or promising radical change for worse or for better.

Some Arabs, among them many of the religious leaders, averted their gaze from the possibilities of the new world, and regarded it simply as a hostile force to be resisted; except in the remote places of the Arabian peninsula, this school of thought has now practically died out. There were and still are others who are so intoxicated with the splendour of the West that they are prepared to give up not only their own traditions but even their faith in a special destiny for the Arabs and Islam, and to become fully and uncritically

186 Westernized as soon as possible. But the greater number
829 of thoughtful Arabs have since the beginning of the Western
197 penetration refused to go to either extreme. They realize that there is much that is good in Western civilization; that their own civilization is ill; and that its maladies would make it desirable, even did not its weakness make it inevitable, that it should be influenced and transformed by the West. But at the same time they can see clearly the faults in the West and the qualities of their own tradition; more fundamentally, they have faith that the Arab and Islamic peoples have creative gifts of their own and in consequence a special part to play in human history. Therefore their reaction to the impact of the West has been neither uncritical rejection nor uncritical acceptance, but a process of questioning which still continues: What can the Arabs become? What can they do in the world? What form and degree of Westernization will best serve to revive their creative spirit?

000 The paragraphs which follow will summarize some of the answers which different groups of Arabic thinkers give to these questions. It must however be made clear in advance that the explicit views of particular thinkers are only one among several factors which will determine the answer which the Arabs give to these questions. Men brought up in the Arabic language and the Moslem faith, and in unceasing contact with the West in their thoughts and their lives, are forced by the nature of their situation to make judgements and decisions about the acceptance or rejection of Western ideas and ways; these judgements and decisions are influenced or even determined by the Arab and Moslem standards of those who make them; and having been made they involve others which perhaps had not been foreseen. Thus by a process of unformulated and unsystematic thought the structure of society gradually changes. A thinker of genius may alter the direction of that process; but in the absence of genius, the explicit doctrines of the intellectual élite may have only a very limited effect.

2

177 The first task of the Arab thinkers was to understand the
814 West. It was effectively begun in the days of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, has continued ever since and is still far from completion. Its methods are various: schools on the Western

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model or under Western control have been established; 177 students have sought foreign universities, on their own 814 initiative or as members of official missions; European languages have been studied and Western books translated into Arabic. At present the Arabs, at least in the more advanced of the Arab countries, have achieved a certain understanding of Western technology and natural science, and of the polite literature of England and France. But Christianity, European philosophy, music and art, the whole culture of Russia and central Europe and the literature of the ancient world are still very imperfectly known.

The study of the West has itself done something to Westernize the Arab mind. The student cannot be unaffected by the object of his thought. In so far as theories of Westernization have been formulated, they fall into two main categories, which may conveniently be called theories of Islamic revival and of secularization. As expounded below they are 'ideal types'; any particular Arab thinker will probably be found to hold not one of the theories in its pure form, but a distinctive blend of several.

3

The movement of Islamic revival springs from a vision of 185 an. Arabo-Islamic society which neither apes the West nor 177 clings blindly to outworn forms: of which the animating spirit and the principles of judgement are derived from Islam, but the ways of life and thought largely approximate or 'correspond' to those of Western society; and which has a 'healthy' relationship to the Christian world, a relationship of mutual respect and influence, based upon the acknowledgement of equality.

This much would be generally agreed, but there is great difference of opinion about the methods by which such a state of affairs could be brought into existence. There are some who claim that what is necessary is not so much a regeneration of the spirit and thought of Islam as an effort to unify and direct the political efforts of the Islamic peoples in defence of the Islamic world against Western penetration. They wish to accept only the externals of Western civilization, the sources of its economic and military strength. This was the doctrine of the Pan-Islamic movement, originated by Jemal ad-Din al-Afghani in Egypt and elsewhere during the

later decades of the nineteenth century, and used by the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in order to revive the waning prestige and influence of his throne. Its weakness was its failure to recognize the malady in the soul of Islam.

There are other movements whose exponents see the necessity not simply for political action but for a revival in the religious life of Islam, and who believe that Islam is capable of producing such a revival out of its own resources. This is the attitude of thinkers who support the Wahabi movement, which aims at returning to the primitive purity and fervour of the apostolic age of Islam, and at removing all those later accretions and distortions which can find no justification in the Quran or the Traditions of the Prophet. Wahabism originated in central Arabia in the eighteenth century, and has had a great influence upon Islamic life during the present generation, largely because of the political success of the Wahabi leader, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, King of Sa'udi Arabia.

Wahabism and similar movements are concerned primarily with religious practice, and regard theology and speculation with suspicion, as unnecessary and possibly dangerous. But there are other movements which, while not belittling the need for a revival of piety and the devotional life, believe also in the necessity for a reconsideration and re-statement of Islamic doctrine and for a revision of Islamic jurisprudence; and they realize that these tasks can only be accomplished with the help of the intellectual methods and achievements of the modern West. The movement originated by Shaikh Muhammad Abdu in Egypt, and sometimes called the 'Islamic Modernist Movement', was in one of its aspects an attempt to respond to the need for a re-statement of Islamic doctrine. The leaders of this movement have been able and sincere men, and their achievement and influence have been great. But as a movement of thought its effectiveness has been limited by two factors. On the one hand, its knowledge and understanding of Western culture are defective; it has been too exclusively concerned with modern science, or at least with nineteenth century 'scientificism'; and it has not attempted to arrive at a profound understanding of the basic elements in Western thought, Greek philosophy and Christian theology. On the other hand, it has at times been much concerned with polemics, with showing that Islam has

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fundamental principles. But it is important also for other reasons. Greek thought lies at the root of that Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages of which the significance has already been mentioned: it is therefore part of the intellectual heritage of the Islamic East as well as of the West; it may serve as that common ground of agreement and understanding which is necessary if a fruitful intellectual contact is to be re-established between the Moslem and the Christian worlds.

5

The Syrian people will have a special part to play in the intellectual reconstruction of Islam, because of certain characteristics which they possess. They are peculiarly aware of the 'tension' between East and West, and between Islam and Christianity. This is partly because their minds are exceptionally subtle, flexible and sensitive; but partly also because Syria has always been exposed to influences coming in from Mediterranean lands, and tends to be affected by them sooner and more profoundly than the other Arab countries. Through the mission-schools, through emigration and in other ways there has been built up in Syria an educated class Westernized in spirit as well as in externals, but still Arabic in language and for the most part in sympathies and feeling. Thus the conflict between East and West has become a conflict inside their own souls; as such it raises problems which pose themselves with peculiar urgency.

The factors which make the problems more profoundly felt and more urgent in Syria than elsewhere make them also more likely to find a solution there. It is educated Syrians who are best fitted to see the tension between East and West on the level not of politics or polemics but of doctrine. But if they are to contribute effectively to the revival of the Arab and Islamic mind, they must develop an intellectual life of their own, and not be content to become culturally a province of Egypt.

6

There is one factor which gives Syria a unique position in the Arab world. It possesses a large Christian population, whose intellectual life and Christian consciousness have been reviving in recent years. The impact of the West upon them has been as great as upon the Moslems, although of course it has taken a

185 different form: the West has meant for them not only the dis-
179 covery of a new way of life but, in the most fundamental things, a rediscovery of their true selves. The result has been an interesting and important revival of Christian culture, expressing itself through Arabic and through French. It began as a revival of literature and language, and as such was a part, and a very important part, of the general Arabic literary renaissance; but gradually it is becoming conscious of the deepest spiritual question which faces it, the question of what it is to be an Arab Christian.

186 This movement of Christian life and thought is important
185 first of all for its own sake, but also for the part it may
182 play in the re-awakening of Islam. The Syrian Christians are, as Christians, particularly fitted to understand the culture of Europe; while as Arabs, speaking the Arabic language and conversant with its literature, they can interpret Europe to the Arab Moslems and, what is more important still, can confront them inescapably with the challenge of Christianity. They do not feel the conflict between the West and the Islamic East in exactly the same form as that in which Moslems feel it. But they feel it in another form, and in one which raises problems of which the solution is both particularly necessary and particularly difficult. For them the problem poses itself as one of political loyalties, and therefore their material well-being and perhaps even their physical safety depend upon their solving it. In the conflict between the European Powers and the forces of nationalism, on which side should they range themselves? Religious affinities, long-standing ties of friendship, gratitude for favours received and fear of Moslem domination draw them to the side of Europe; but ties of language and culture, common feelings of humiliation and pride, and the desire to put an end to the religious dissensions of the past attract them to the nationalist camp. Divided loyalties of this sort are tragic, but they are also a necessary stage in the development of thought, alike for the individual and for whole peoples; it is in the struggle to reunite the divided personality that the intellect becomes mature. The Christians stand to the Syrian people roughly as the latter as a whole to the Arab people: it is in them that the tension which is felt vaguely and in some degree by all goes deepest and may reach its crisis earliest. But if the crisis is to be fruitful, they must try at one and the same time

that which was established some years ago in the American University of Beirut. Its summer camps and other activities aim not so much at reforming the social life of the rural districts as at giving University students, who will in future constitute an important element in the ruling class, an awareness and understanding of the problems of rural life. Around the Jesuit University also there is growing up a movement which aims at making the educated Catholic youth of Lebanon more conscious of the social doctrine of their religion.

8

In addition to the problems inherent in the process of Westernization as such, there are others which are due to the particular phase which that process has reached. One such problem is created by the existence of two main streams of Western influence, French and Anglo-Saxon. The study of the French language and its culture has been stimulated by its being one of the official languages throughout the Mandatory period, by the teaching of it in almost all schools, both private and public, and by the long-standing connexion between France and certain elements in the population. The study of the English language is encouraged by commercial connexions with the Anglo-Saxon countries, by the existence of a number of American Protestant mission schools, by the movement of emigration and by the predominance of British influence in the neighbouring Arab countries.

Here as elsewhere, the exponents of French and Anglo-Saxon forms of Western culture have not always shown so great a solidarity with one another as might be desired; and they have often been estranged from one another, not only because of the conflict of British and French political interests and rivalry between Protestant and Catholic missions in the Levant, but also because of fundamental differences in the French and Anglo-Saxon concepts of culture and education.

The differences between the two are reflected in the two Universities to which they have given rise. The Université de S. Joseph is maintained and largely staffed by Jesuits and is Catholic in spirit; the American University was originally a Protestant college, but is now officially and so far as possible in practice unsectarian. The former has for many years been subsidized, at least in some of its faculties, by the French

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177 Government, while the latter is wholly unconnected with
871 any Western government. The former concentrates, so far as the majority of its students are concerned, upon mastery of the French language; while in the latter, although English is the medium of instruction, an attempt is made to teach Arabic thoroughly. The political spirit of the former is one of attachment to France and distrust of nationalism; while the latter has become in practice, and without the deliberate intention of its authorities, the intellectual centre of Arab nationalism. The former is perhaps a greater centre of research and scholarship, and has had prominent orientalists on its staff; while the latter, although it has an impressive record of scholarly and scientific work, has tended in the Anglo-Saxon manner to exalt character above intellect, and to concentrate upon the training of citizens and public servants.

Ultimately the fact that higher education is largely in the hands of foreign institutions and is given through the medium of foreign languages, and that the two main centres of it differ so widely from one another, may prove not to be a handicap to Arab culture. At present, although it may be unavoidable and in some ways advantageous, it undoubtedly causes difficulties. There is not always sufficient common ground of understanding between the graduates of the two universities; many of them are more at home in a foreign language than in their own; and many in the attempt to master two languages and two cultures fail to master either.

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648 some recognized 'foreign protection' as a gift too dangerous to be accepted.

4

648 Sympathy for France depended not only upon her special
177 links with certain elements in the population, but also upon the hold of French culture over the educated classes. Most educated people of whatever religion speak French; many know it as well as they know Arabic, and there are some, mainly among the Catholics, for whom it has replaced Arabic as their native language. French books are widely read, French social customs copied, and there are many who have travelled or studied in France and have a profound affection for the country, its people and its way of life.

177 It is the Catholic missions, working through schools and
871 other institutions, which have played the largest part in
799 winning Syria and Lebanon for French civilization. The mission-schools and colleges and the Université de S. Joseph in Beirut have always concentrated on imparting to their students a mastery of the French language, even if that should involve neglect of the teaching of Arabic. The majority of those who possess any understanding of European culture have been trained by the Jesuits, the Franciscans or other missionaries; and so long as the Catholic schools continue to provide the best intellectual education which the country can offer, there is no need to fear for the position of French culture. The social work carried out by the missions must also be mentioned; they have borne on their shoulders a great part of the work of alleviating social conditions, and have deserved the gratitude of those who care for social justice. Thus all French Governments, clerical or anti-clerical, regarded it as essential to maintain for the missions their right of unrestricted activity.

177 Long before the beginning of the French occupation, the
649 Governments of France, seeing more clearly than some others the political significance of cultural ties, set themselves to preserve and extend the predominance of French civilization. The institution of the Mandate gave greater freedom for their efforts. In some ways the position of French culture was improved in the years between the two wars. French was one of the official languages and knowledge of it was an indispensable qualification for holding most of the higher

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offices in the administration. The organization and procedure of the law-courts was based upon French models, and the system of laws which they dispensed, although basically Islamic, was deeply influenced by the French codes. French was the main foreign language taught in official schools, and the official system of examinations was adapted from that of France. (This was one of the considerations which led certain sections of French opinion to oppose the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. Although the exchange of letters attached to the Treaty contained guarantees for the preservation of French cultural influences and provided for the recruitment of foreign officials and advisers from France in preference to any other country, the critics regarded the termination of the Mandate as likely to bring to an end the supremacy of French culture in Syria and Lebanon.)

In spite of the efforts of the French Government, however, it is probable that twenty years of French rule harmed rather than helped the position of French culture. The political grievances and discontents of those years, and the almost continuous opposition of the greater part of the Syrian and Lebanese people to their French masters, shook the ascendancy of France over men's spirits. In 1939 there were more who spoke French than there had been in 1918, but perhaps fewer who loved and believed in France.

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France's economic interests in her Mandated Territories, although not of first-rate importance, nevertheless were not negligible. There were only a few thousand private French citizens resident in the country, and comparatively little landed property was in French hands; Syria and Lebanon had never been looked upon as regions for settlement. The total value of French investments was of the order of magnitude of one milliard francs; it had not increased to any great extent since before the War of 1914–1918. Most of it was invested in public utilities: the railways, the port of Beirut, electric power, waterworks and so on. A French company also held the monopoly for the production of tobacco. In fact, almost all public concessions of importance had been given to companies wholly or mainly French in ownership. About one-tenth of the total investment was sunk in the railways, almost all of which were controlled by the 'Damas-

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

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The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

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So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

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Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria an

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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It is not simply isolated individuals who feel sympathy with the national movement. Sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox, who are altogether Arab in culture and feeling. This is true of the clergy as well as the laity, and of the higher clergy as well as the lower: the Bishop of Hama was Vice-President of the Pan-Arab Conference of Bludan in 1937. The younger generation, brought up under the influence of nationalistic ideas in school and out of it, tend to be as wholly devoted to the Arab cause as their Moslem contemporaries. 563 668

Roman Catholics and Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab tradition; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missions and schools; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that the relaxation of French control means loss of their privileged position. 563 668 177

The leaders of the national movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of nationalistic feeling have been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders often arises from a genuine desire to build a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; or else from a desire not to alienate Western opinion, which tends to care more for minorities than for majorities. 563 668

Although the more enlightened nationalists are tolerant, among those who are less enlightened there still exists considerable suspicion of the Christians as a whole. It springs not only from ancient prejudice; it is due to the fact that certain of the Christians, not wholly against their will, have been used by the French as instruments of domination and as a pretext for delaying the grant of independence. Once the problem of Franco-Arab relations is definitely settled, the tension between Moslems and Christians will gradually be relaxed.

The Armenians

In general, the Armenians in Syria do not need special attention. Most of what has been said about their fellow-countrymen in Lebanon is true of them also. It is necessary only to call attention to the special situation existing in Aleppo, where the Armenian 563

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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Chapter 20

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

EDUCATION in Syria underwent a process of radical change in the years 1943–46. As Syria was under French mandate prior to World War II, the educational system had been gradually shaped after the French model with a twelve-year ladder of general education involving a primary-certificate examination, an examination for the *brevet*, and examinations for the *Baccalauréat*, First and Second Parts, the former divided into scientific and literary sections, and the latter into mathematics and philosophy sections. While instruction was in Arabic, French occupied a prominent place in the curriculum. The French adviser to the Ministry of Education wielded decisive influence over the educational decisions of the Ministry. Almost all educational missions were sent to France, and French-trained Syrians held the key positions in administration and teaching.

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With the declaration of the independence of Syria in 1941 and the holding of new elections which resulted in a nationalist victory, it was natural that the new Syrian government should wish to pursue a national policy in education, free from French influences, and calculated primarily to develop a Syrian-Arab type of education.

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In order to do this, the Syrian government procured the services of the well-known Arab educator, Sati' al-Husri, a man of outstanding ability who, after making a special study of Swiss, French, and Belgian education, had become the most prominent educator in Turkey prior to 1914. After the separation of the Arab provinces from Turkey he joined the short-lived Arab government of the late King Faysal in Syria as its Minister of Education. Upon the fall of this government he accompanied King Faysal to Iraq where he became Director General of Education, laying the main foundation of the Iraqi educational system and continuing to exercise considerable influence on that system until 1936. He left Iraq in 1941 to reside in Lebanon, and since he was of Syrian origin, he was invited by the Syrian government to study its educational system and report on

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
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*874 About one-third of the student body was from other countries, mainly Arab.

[197] Teaching at the Syrian University is conducted entirely in Arabic. The Faculty of Medicine is the only such faculty in the Arabic world which teaches in Arabic.

Educational Missions

658 Educational missions were sent chiefly to France prior to World War II.
●177 With the French government as mandatary power, with French advisers to the Ministry of Education, and with the Syrian educational system following French educational methods and ideas, this was to be expected. As has already been said, graduates of French universities and institutions were shown a decided preference in appointments to posts in the Ministry of Education. The situation was not different in other departments of the government. It was only natural, therefore, that even students going abroad for study at their own expense usually preferred to go to France.

Even in 1943–44, when the French grip on Syria had loosened, 58 out of a toal of 101 students on educational missions were studying in France; most of them had begun their study in the prewar period. Of the other 43, there were 37 in Egypt and 6 in Beirut.

For the year 1946–47 it was planned to send 120 students abroad. None of these was being sent to France, partly because of the aversion to the French that has developed in Syria, and partly because the new Secondary-School Certificate is no longer recognized in France. Most of the students were being sent by the Ministry of Education. The remainder were being sent by other ministries. The countries to which the students are being sent are Belgium, Switzerland (evidently taking the place of France), Great Britain, the United States, and Egypt. Only a few are destined to study in Great Britain or the United States largely because of the difficulty of securing admission to American and British universities. The subjects to be studied cover a wide range and include the various branches of engineering, architecture, technical education, agriculture, irrigation, mathematics, the sciences, finance, medicine, public and school health, law, archeology, Semitics, history, English, education, commerce, and Arabic literature.

The Education of Teachers

*874 The education of teachers in Syria has gone through a number of stages.
*875 In the latest of these, two kinds of teachers colleges were maintained: the

342 variation exists between the living conditions of the more prosperous farmers and of the peasants, many of the latter possessing little beyond the barest necessities.

487 177 342 The larger cities, as Damascus and Aleppo, have been important junctions on trade routes from India to the Mediterranean for centuries, and reflect the influence of both Eastern and Western civilizations. They are a combination of the old Arab-type city and the modern, with most of the amenities of urban life. The older sections are usually made up of several quarters, dominated by different racial or religious groups. The houses are constructed of stone, brick or reinforced concrete and stucco, with flat or tiled roofs. In Damascus, about one third of the inhabitants live within the limits of the ancient city and a third in the modern residential developments.

342 571 The Bedouin follow essentially the same pattern of life in Syria as in other countries of the Near and Middle East. The nomadic tribes dwell in tents made of goats' hair, usually in close association with their livestock. Their standards of living are primitive, both in the tent encampments and the semipastoral settlements.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

312 Water supplies are deficient in many sections of the country, and acute shortages may be experienced during the dry season. In the rural areas, domestic supplies are obtained from deep or shallow wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from rain-water cisterns. *Korazes*, or wells connected by underground conduits which often extend for several miles, and waterholes, dug in the plains or near watercourses, are used [314] in some districts. The village supplies are frequently polluted and responsible for the spread of intestinal infections.

The water supply of Damascus is taken from an underground reservoir at 'Ain el Fije, which is fed by springs in the Anti-

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

175 area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that
137 Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho*'s which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

233 In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the
311 hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause
[189] much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new
135 danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now
161 prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency
178 of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

000 Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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113 [15] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

PART TWO

III. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION

1

AT this point it will be convenient to interrupt the narrative and to analyze the problem which first presented itself to the Syrians in the nineteenth century, and which underlies the political difficulties with which they are faced in the present generation. 178

This problem can be stated very briefly. An old way of thought and life, which has gone unchallenged and fundamentally unchanged for some hundreds of years, finds itself in some ways opposed, in others inescapably transformed by the new civilization of the West.

In consequence, the Syrians find themselves no longer living in a united and coherent world, but torn between two worlds, neither of which is altogether their own. How will it be possible for them, by preserving or modifying the old and accepting what is new, once more to form a unified world of thought and life which they can call their own?

2

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Syria formed part of a world which had a civilization of its own: a religion, a culture and a way of life. It was a unified civilization, in which every sphere of life was regulated by a system of generally accepted principles, themselves drawn from religion and from immemorial custom. This civilization may be called 'Arabo-Islamic', because its main characteristics were derived, with much borrowing from outside and with many adaptations to the peculiar conditions of Syria, from two main sources, themselves closely connected with one another: the Islamic religion and the life of the Arabian desert. 181

'Islam' means resignation, and the Moslem, the adherent of Islam, is he who resigns himself to the will of God: not in the sense of passive and fatalistic acceptance of anything which may come, but in that of the complete and voluntary submission of man's will to God's commandments. God is unique, the Creator of the Universe, all-wise and all-powerful; He has revealed His will to man, in a measure sufficient for all the purposes of life, through a long succession of Prophets, who include Moses, Jesus, and finally Muhammad, the Arabian of the seventh century, to whom was given the final revelation 179

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

Islamic world had been much affected by influences from the Mediterranean countries, from Persia and from India. It had had the power to assimilate the products of other civilizations, and also to extend its dominion over peoples alien to the Arabs in origin and way of life. But later it ceased to develop and either to give out or to receive influences; and although the stream of influences from the West never completely vanished, during the great days of the Ottoman Empire it was smaller and less effective than it had previously been and was again to become.

II

In the past century or more this Arab world has been shaken to its foundations by the impact of the West. Western ideas, learned from schools, from books and latterly from the cinema, have changed at least the externals of social life. The competition of Western goods has broken the old crafts and opened up new economic possibilities. New means of communication are breaking up the closed local community; the life of the Beduin is threatened by the motor-car, the aeroplane and the extension of civil authority. The administrative machinery which the modern Government commands, and the extension of the limits of its action, are making the old feudal and sectarian organization unnecessary and even impossible. New Western rulers have imposed themselves, who have not even so much claim to be obeyed or such deep roots in popular memory and habit as had the Ottoman Sultan. The new social, economic and political life has in its turn shaken the domination of Moslem jurisprudence; and men have begun to raise new questions of the adequacy of religious faith and loyalty as a basis for society, and the place of Islam in the modern world. A new world has revealed itself, which strikes at the very foundations of the old, and is indeed its exact antithesis.

The transformation of the old life has brought with it a number of difficulties and dangers. The Arabs, like other peoples in their position, are torn between two ways of life. Sentiment, tradition and the belief that there is something of value in their tradition make them unwilling to break entirely with the old civilization, even if that were possible. But at the same time the necessities of modern life, and often a conviction that the Western civilization is in some ways

178 better than their own, impel them to accept certainly the
182 economic technique of the West and possibly much more.

This self-division between two ways of life is full of inconveniences. It may produce an abnormal tension of mind and nerve in the individual, and temporarily obscure moral and aesthetic standards. What is more important, it may stifle the creative energies of an individual and a people, and make it difficult for them to speak with their own voice and think their own thoughts. On another level, it is almost inevitable that the process of change should be attended with great economic dislocation, as the old crafts die out; with social unrest, as the introduction of new economic processes brings in its train a new relationship of the social classes; and with political instability, since it takes time to learn the art of constructing and managing a modern Government. Among the educated classes the tension may result in a profound melancholy and a paralysis of the will: the qualities which haunt the world of the Russian novelists of the nineteenth century.

178 The dislocation and difficulties have been particularly great for two reasons. The first is that the change has left no part of life untouched. It is a complete upheaval both of the Arab mind and of Arab society. Secondly, it is not a single change of which the force will sooner or later spend itself. It is the introduction of a dynamic principle by virtue of which one change prepares the way for another, and no end to the series is perceptible. The change is not from one static position to another, but from a static community ruled by custom to a dynamic society, moulded and governed by positive laws and by a conception of individual, social or national welfare.

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182 It may be that the difficulties will so press upon the Arabs that they will accept self-division as inevitable and give up the attempt to reconcile the new and the old. If that happens, they will become Levantines.

To be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of values of one's own, not

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1940 MD1 Syria MD1

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

6

The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

565 class of importance nor an organized urban proletariat (although there are the beginnings of a trade-union movement). There does, it is true, exist a large commercial middle class in the towns, but it is not an autonomous class capable of challenging the social power of the landowners. For this there are a number of reasons: many of the merchants are Christians or Jews, and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interest from them.

565 Although the power of the landowners has not yet been
178 challenged, almost certainly the coming generation will see its decline. The conditions which made it possible are ceasing to exist. Land is no longer the only source of wealth, nor is subsistence-agriculture by ignorant peasants the only practicable means of using it. The landlords have lost not only their economic but also their political function: their services as leaders of a feudal army and as tax-collectors have long since been dispensed with. It is not yet clear, however, which class will take their place. The processes which have taken place in parts of Europe—the transfer of power from landowners to capitalists, and the division of large estates into small freeholdings—may occur, but it is not necessary and perhaps not altogether desirable that they should. It is at least arguable for example that it would be better, economically and socially, to revive and develop the village community than to try to create a class of small farmers. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that great changes in the structure of classes are to be expected.

7

Again, the patriarchal family system remains in existence,
178 but its days are probably numbered. The claims of the family
621 are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the ways of modern urban life and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village.

178 The structure of the family is being radically transformed
562 by the change in the status of women. The change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria 101

enter an ever-increasing number of occupations, including the liberal professions. But so far only the edge has been touched of the great problem, which like all great problems in this country is closely bound up with religion: how far is it possible in a modern society to retain the traditional Islamic view of women's status—seclusion and the veil, the theory and in a minority of cases the practice of polygamy, the divorce laws and so on? Of all the difficult questions which the process of Westernization raises, this is perhaps the most difficult; and its difficulty and urgency are likely to increase. The process of change is being speeded by one manifestation of Western civilization above all: the film which expresses a way of feminine life, and a conception of the relations between men and women, which are far from those prevalent in the Islamic world.

The local and sectarian loyalties of the past also preserve something of their strength, but on the whole they are declining in force and are likely to continue to do so, with the spread of Western ideas, the introduction of new means of communication and above all the development of schools, in which the adherents of different religions grow up side by side.

8

The growth of education is indeed one of the most important, as it is one of the most obvious, changes of the last few generations. Landowner, merchant and peasant alike are eager to send their sons and daughters to school, as the first and essential step towards entering the free professions or Government service. Syria and Lebanon now possess the framework of a complete educational system, from elementary schools up to technical institutes and three universities: the American University of Beirut, the Jesuit Université de S. Joseph, also in Beirut, and the State University, in Damascus.

The table on page 94 shows the number of schools of different types, and of scholars in them, in 1938.

From these figures it will be clear that education is further advanced in Lebanon than in Syria. It is also further advanced in the mainly Christian districts of Lebanon than in the others; among the Christians of Syria than among the Moslems; and in Syria as a whole than in Jebel Druze and Latakia. The percentage of literacy is probably rather

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

CHAPTER 1 *STRUCTURE OF THE SYRIAN ECONOMY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT*

Introduction

Syria, although an independent country only since 1945, has had a long and chequered history. It has seen many conquerors and witnessed the rise and fall of many civilizations. Since time immemorial it has been the frontier land where rival civilizations penetrating from the East and the West have contended for supremacy. The Sumerians, Chaldeans, Assyrians and Persians came from the East, and the Greeks and Romans from the West. Still later the Eastern Roman Empire of the early Christian era gave way, successively, to the Arabs and the Turks. Even after Turkish rule became firmly established, Syria remained for a long time the place where the caravans from the West and East met and an active trade in goods took place. Although it became basically eastern in its orientation, it was never wholly without contact with the West, and western influence was again reasserted when Turkish rule was terminated after the first World War.

Thus the culture, economy and political system of Syria are a mixture of East and West. The diverse elements have only been partially fused. The East and West co-exist in rather uneasy balance. Modern technology has invaded Syria in the form of factories, mechanized farms and motor cars, but the craftsmen still ply their trade in crowded bazaars, most of the land is still cultivated by time-hallowed methods and under ancient systems of tenure, and camels and donkeys still play a role—although a diminishing one—in transport. Modern commercial banks have by no means displaced the traditional money lenders and the bazaar banks or *sarafs*, and the wholehearted acceptance of western capitalism is still impeded to a small extent by the Moslem aversion to interest as usury. Democratic, parliamentary institutions have been borrowed from the West, but their stability is periodically threatened by divisive forces and the tradition of autocratic rule inherited from the past. Syrian nationalism, born as a rebellion against foreign domination, is now engaged in the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

101 178 challenging task of fusing the positive elements of both its eastern and its western heritage into a cohesive whole.

Population and Land

161 162 According to official estimates, Syria at the end of 1953 had a population of about 3.65 million, including some 150,000 Bedouins who lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Although demographic statistics are far from adequate, it appears probable that the population has been growing at an annual rate of somewhere between 2% and 3% during the last decade. Most of the population is rural:[1] about 60% live in villages and towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and each of the two largest cities—Damascus, the capital, and Aleppo, the commercial center of the country—has a population close to 400,000. About 86% of the population are Moslem or belong to offshoots of the Moslem religion, and nearly all of the balance are adherents of a considerable number of Christian denominations.

161 311 As a country with an area of 181,337 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), about three-fourths the size of the United Kingdom, Syria cannot be said to be densely populated. While less than a third of the area is cultivable, the proportion of the population to the land already under cultivation compares favorably with that of other countries in the Near and Middle East. In Syria there is one hectare[2] of cultivated land per inhabitant, or about 10% more than in Turkey and Iran, twice as much as in Greece and Iraq and eight to nine times as much as in Egypt.

311 133 There is still plenty of land available in Syria but water severely limits its utilization. The country lies to the leeward of mountain ranges in the west and north which intercept much of the rainfall. Except for the coastal region of Latakia province, Syria is largely cut off from the rain-bearing winds of the Mediterranean by mountains, the Djebel Ansariya (Alaouit mountains) in Latakia, and, farther south, after the intervening Tripoli-Homs gap, by the twin ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon which in turn give way to the Hermon range. Thus the area which can support rain-fed cultivation is confined to a rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier. Fortunately for Syria, its

[1] See Annex C, p. 292.
[2] A hectare = 2.471 acres.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formulate programs to be applied in the various stages of training. The State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

been long neglected owing to the preoccupation of Syrian nationalists with the more urgent political problem of achieving independence. When independence had been achieved, the Nationalist regime failed to command respect because of its reliance on the oligarchic and feudal groups held over from the old Ottoman period. It was still necessary, once the leaders of the national regime were overthrown, to adopt new social and economic measures before a truly democratic system of government would come into being. These socialistic provisions, however, are not of a Marxist nature, since they maintain almost intact the principles of private property and free enterprise.

One would expect a strong Arab nationalist tinge to the constitution of the country which had been, from the very beginning of the nationalist movement, the hot-bed of Pan-Arabism. Failure to achieve Arab unity following World War I did not quench the ardor for it as a nationalist goal. The establishment of the Arab League was hailed as an important step toward that end; but the League's failure to save Palestine from the Zionists again gave rise to a desire for a closer unity. The establishment of Israel, regarded as a threat to the Arab states, has aggravated this intense Pan-Arab feeling. Loyalty to the Pan-Arab ideal has made it difficult for Syria to make up its mind, in an Arab world divided into two camps, which of the two it should join, or whether it should join either. The new Constitution of 1950 has also been characterized as "spiritual" in that it requires religious teaching of all denominations and stresses ethical and spiritual values in life.[20] Relaxation in Government administration and wartime conditions have brought a noticeable deterioration in public morality not only in Syria but throughout the Arab world. The emphasis on religious and ethical values is partly to repair this decadence but probably more to create confidence in the new regime.

Finally, it is to be noted that the new Constitution is both extremely detailed in its provisions and rigid in the procedure of its amendment. Such provisions reflect the apprehension of the new group in power lest the elder politicians and vested interests

[20] See a lecture by the Rapporteur of the drafting committee, Dr. 'Abd al-Wahhab Hawmad, *Hawl al-dastur al-jadid* [*On the New Constitution*] (Damascus, 1950), pp. 8-9.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

work the administration to their advantage. But such detailed provisions are likely to call for frequent amendment under the rapid changes of modern life, while the procedure of amendment is difficult and discourages change. Certainly Syria needs to avoid further revolutionary change, but the new Constitution, with its detailed provisions and rigidity, has not adequately provided legal means for peaceful evolution.

The rapid changes in Syria's regimes during the last two years since Colonel Husni al-Za'im precipitated the first coup d'état are not an accidental phenomenon when considered in the light of Syria's constitutional development since World War I. These changes, however, have been accelerated and in certain respects rendered dangerous by the introduction of the Army into the play of political forces. The Army's declarations that its interference was merely to rid the country of an undesirable administration and to maintain the republican regime have been taken by the Syrian people only at their face value; and far-sighted Syrians as well as disinterested foreign observers are still gravely concerned about what the future will have in store for Syria if the Army continues to interfere in politics whenever the civilian leaders advocate policies which run contrary to the wishes of the military. Judging by the recent experiences of Iraq with a similar situation, it would seem that either the Army will eventually take full control of political activities or it must be crushed as a political force.

Closely connected with Syria's internal struggle between the Army and the civilian politicians is the division of the Arab world into two rival camps; Syria is inevitably, though perhaps unwillingly, drawn into the resultant conflict. Each of these two camps has aggravated Syria's internal changes by supporting certain influential politicians and parties, hoping to orientate Syria in its direction. This political struggle in the Arab world has raised such issues as that of monarchy and republicanism, and has intensified the struggle among ambitious politicians who advocated such plans as those of Greater Syria, a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy, and general Arab collective security.

Syria's most urgent need, it seems, is a stable government; but this depends now less upon Syria itself than upon external inter-

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

ference in its affairs. If left alone, Syria may still be able to solve the Army-civilian struggle for supreme authority which is essential for internal stability. If, however, foreign interference — direct or inspired — continues, the future of Syria will depend accordingly on the larger problem of the stability and social-economic reorganization of the whole Arab world.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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—*Photo Courtesy of Cotton Trade Journal*

All the cotton in the Aleppo region is ginned at this modern ginning center in Aleppo. Large gins (some have 10 saw gin stands) are located or are under construction on each corner of the square. Buildings are elaborate and usually cost about twice as much as the machinery. The grounds are landscaped like a campus.

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inhabited for centuries until a few years ago when farmers from the cities began developing them with mechanical equipment. Large landlords from Aleppo spent millions of dollars installing pumps, building roads, and in other ways developing these lands.

Although occupancy rights have been recognized for years, various government officials with whom the matter was discussed were strong in their views that these newcomers are squatters and should be evicted. They want to distribute the land among the landless peasants. The landlords who have made investments here are just as determined that they will not be evicted. The political strength of the landlords is given generally as the reason for the statement recently made by the head of the government to the effect that the new law will be studied for revision.

While the question of eviction is being debated, the government is proceeding to parcel out other public domains in small units to landless peasants. As this program is expanded, the large landowners are becoming more and more concerned for fear their own properties will be expropriated and subdivided, as has been done in neighboring countries.

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This dispute over the use of public land illustrates the struggle for power going on in Syria today between government bureaucrats and wealthy landlords. The government on one hand is attempting to force changes in all phases of the economy through its various control programs. These changes, however, are strongly resisted by the landowners who prefer to be free from regulations and regimentation. The outcome of this struggle may have a material bearing on the trend in agriculture for the next several years.

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 1201 Syria MDI

PART TWO

III. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION

1

AT this point it will be convenient to interrupt the narrative and to analyze the problem which first presented itself to the Syrians in the nineteenth century, and which underlies the political difficulties with which they are faced in the present generation. 178

This problem can be stated very briefly. An old way of thought and life, which has gone unchallenged and fundamentally unchanged for some hundreds of years, finds itself in some ways opposed, in others inescapably transformed by the new civilization of the West.

In consequence, the Syrians find themselves no longer living in a united and coherent world, but torn between two worlds, neither of which is altogether their own. How will it be possible for them, by preserving or modifying the old and accepting what is new, once more to form a unified world of thought and life which they can call their own?

2

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Syria formed part of a world which had a civilization of its own: a religion, a culture and a way of life. It was a unified civilization, in which every sphere of life was regulated by a system of generally accepted principles, themselves drawn from religion and from immemorial custom. This civilization may be called 'Arabo-Islamic', because its main characteristics were derived, with much borrowing from outside and with many adaptations to the peculiar conditions of Syria, from two main sources, themselves closely connected with one another: the Islamic religion and the life of the Arabian desert. 181

'Islam' means resignation, and the Moslem, the adherent of Islam, is he who resigns himself to the will of God: not in the sense of passive and fatalistic acceptance of anything which may come, but in that of the complete and voluntary submission of man's will to God's commandments. God is unique, the Creator of the Universe, all-wise and all-powerful; He has revealed His will to man, in a measure sufficient for all the purposes of life, through a long succession of Prophets, who include Moses, Jesus, and finally Muhammad, the Arabian of the seventh century, to whom was given the final revelation 179

778 no less important an element in the common consciousness
186 than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

6

779 Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant
181 creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization.
577 Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

631 The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

8

The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S L 181

In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trying to create one.

Social Survey

S L 565 463 511

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

The Press

S L 204 656

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

Education

S L 871 [212] 658

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages 1621
are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur 763
el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. 191
They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflict- 795
ed upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. 795
The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac 779
Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is consti- 1621
tuted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following 167
the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from 657
that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League 463
of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. 648
Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the 662
memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all 1821

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 1824

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conslusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1624 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

Islamic world had been much affected by influences from 175
the Mediterranean countries, from Persia and from India. 177
It had had the power to assimilate the products of other civilizations, and also to extend its dominion over peoples alien to the Arabs in origin and way of life. But later it ceased to develop and either to give out or to receive influences; and although the stream of influences from the West never completely vanished, during the great days of the Ottoman Empire it was smaller and less effective than it had previously been and was again to become.

II

In the past century or more this Arab world has been shaken 177
to its foundations by the impact of the West. Western ideas, 178
learned from schools, from books and latterly from the cinema, have changed at least the externals of social life. The competition of Western goods has broken the old crafts and opened up new economic possibilities. New means of communication are breaking up the closed local community; the life of the Beduin is threatened by the motor-car, the aeroplane and the extension of civil authority. The administrative machinery which the modern Government commands, and the extension of the limits of its action, are making the old feudal and sectarian organization unnecessary and even impossible. New Western rulers have imposed themselves, who have not even so much claim to be obeyed or such deep roots in popular memory and habit as had the Ottoman Sultan. The new social, economic and political life has in its turn shaken the domination of Moslem jurisprudence; and men have begun to raise new questions of the adequacy of religious faith and loyalty as a basis for society, and the place of Islam in the modern world. A new world has revealed itself, which strikes at the very foundations of the old, and is indeed its exact antithesis.

The transformation of the old life has brought with it a 178
number of difficulties and dangers. The Arabs, like other 182
peoples in their position, are torn between two ways of life. Sentiment, tradition and the belief that there is something of value in their tradition make them unwilling to break entirely with the old civilization, even if that were possible. But at the same time the necessities of modern life, and often a conviction that the Western civilization is in some ways

178 better than their own, impel them to accept certainly the
182 economic technique of the West and possibly much more.

This self-division between two ways of life is full of inconveniences. It may produce an abnormal tension of mind and nerve in the individual, and temporarily obscure moral and aesthetic standards. What is more important, it may stifle the creative energies of an individual and a people, and make it difficult for them to speak with their own voice and think their own thoughts. On another level, it is almost inevitable that the process of change should be attended with great economic dislocation, as the old crafts die out; with social unrest, as the introduction of new economic processes brings in its train a new relationship of the social classes; and with political instability, since it takes time to learn the art of constructing and managing a modern Government. Among the educated classes the tension may result in a profound melancholy and a paralysis of the will: the qualities which haunt the world of the Russian novelists of the nineteenth century.

178 The dislocation and difficulties have been particularly great for two reasons. The first is that the change has left no part of life untouched. It is a complete upheaval both of the Arab mind and of Arab society. Secondly, it is not a single change of which the force will sooner or later spend itself. It is the introduction of a dynamic principle by virtue of which one change prepares the way for another, and no end to the series is perceptible. The change is not from one static position to another, but from a static community ruled by custom to a dynamic society, moulded and governed by positive laws and by a conception of individual, social or national welfare.

12

182 It may be that the difficulties will so press upon the Arabs that they will accept self-division as inevitable and give up the attempt to reconcile the new and the old. If that happens, they will become Levantines.

To be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of values of one's own, not

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M01

to be able to create but only able to imitate; and so not even to imitate correctly, since that also needs a certain originality. It is to belong to no community and to possess nothing of one's own. It reveals itself in lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and despair. 112

There have always been Levantines in the ports of the eastern Mediterranean, because they are places where more than one world meets to do business. But the special mark of the present age is the spread of the Levant inland to regions hitherto untouched by it. In a sense every Arab, or at least every educated Arab of the towns, is forced to live in two worlds. Not only his way of thought but his social life is becoming daily more deeply affected by Europe and America; but at heart he is still an Arab and usually a Moslem. A few may be strong enough to face the problem and create a new unity out of discordant elements; but the majority are likely to take the line of least resistance, and passively acquiesce in their division of soul. As the process of Westernization passes from stage to stage the problem becomes ever more acute. Will the few succeed in influencing the many, and showing them the way to a Westernized life which is nevertheless genuinely Arab and Moslem; or will the many submerge the few, and all be drowned in a common Levantinism? That is the crisis of Arab culture in our time.

13

There is only one bulwark against Levantinism: that the Arabs should believe in their own possibilities and their power, given the necessary conditions, of building up once more a world of thought and activity which they can call their own and through which they can make their contribution to the world's civilization. This belief exists, and in consequence there can be seen an active response by the Arabs to the new difficulties by which they are beset. 000

This response expresses itself in a striving towards unity such as the old community possessed: towards the creation of a 'world' unified by the possession of common principles which permeate every aspect of society and which those who live in it recognize as valid. There is a further attempt, closely connected with this, to establish satisfactory relations between that world and the Western world, which it will inevitably resemble in many ways but from which it will

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

fundamental principles. But it is important also for other reasons. Greek thought lies at the root of that Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages of which the significance has already been mentioned : it is therefore part of the intellectual heritage of the Islamic East as well as of the West ; it may serve as that common ground of agreement and understanding which is necessary if a fruitful intellectual contact is to be re-established between the Moslem and the Christian worlds.

5

The Syrian people will have a special part to play in the intellectual reconstruction of Islam, because of certain characteristics which they possess. They are peculiarly aware of the 'tension' between East and West, and between Islam and Christianity. This is partly because their minds are exceptionally subtle, flexible and sensitive ; but partly also because Syria has always been exposed to influences coming in from Mediterranean lands, and tends to be affected by them sooner and more profoundly than the other Arab countries. Through the mission-schools, through emigration and in other ways there has been built up in Syria an educated class Westernized in spirit as well as in externals, but still Arabic in language and for the most part in sympathies and feeling. Thus the conflict between East and West has become a conflict inside their own souls ; as such it raises problems which pose themselves with peculiar urgency.

The factors which make the problems more profoundly felt and more urgent in Syria than elsewhere make them also more likely to find a solution there. It is educated Syrians who are best fitted to see the tension between East and West on the level not of politics or polemics but of doctrine. But if they are to contribute effectively to the revival of the Arab and Islamic mind, they must develop an intellectual life of their own, and not be content to become culturally a province of Egypt.

6

There is one factor which gives Syria a unique position in the Arab world. It possesses a large Christian population, whose intellectual life and Christian consciousness have been reviving in recent years. The impact of the West upon them has been as great as upon the Moslems, although of course it has taken a

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 8/01

185 different form: the West has meant for them not only the dis-
177 covery of a new way of life but, in the most fundamental things, a rediscovery of their true selves. The result has been an interesting and important revival of Christian culture, expressing itself through Arabic and through French. It began as a revival of literature and language, and as such was a part, and a very important part, of the general Arabic literary renaissance; but gradually it is becoming conscious of the deepest spiritual question which faces it, the question of what it is to be an Arab Christian.

186 This movement of Christian life and thought is important
185 first of all for its own sake, but also for the part it may
182 play in the re-awakening of Islam. The Syrian Christians are, as Christians, particularly fitted to understand the culture of Europe; while as Arabs, speaking the Arabic language and conversant with its literature, they can interpret Europe to the Arab Moslems and, what is more important still, can confront them inescapably with the challenge of Christianity. They do not feel the conflict between the West and the Islamic East in exactly the same form as that in which Moslems feel it. But they feel it in another form, and in one which raises problems of which the solution is both particularly necessary and particularly difficult. For them the problem poses itself as one of political loyalties, and therefore their material well-being and perhaps even their physical safety depend upon their solving it. In the conflict between the European Powers and the forces of nationalism, on which side should they range themselves? Religious affinities, long-standing ties of friendship, gratitude for favours received and fear of Moslem domination draw them to the side of Europe; but ties of language and culture, common feelings of humiliation and pride, and the desire to put an end to the religious dissensions of the past attract them to the nationalist camp. Divided loyalties of this sort are tragic, but they are also a necessary stage in the development of thought, alike for the individual and for whole peoples; it is in the struggle to reunite the divided personality that the intellect becomes mature. The Christians stand to the Syrian people roughly as the latter as a whole to the Arab people: it is in them that the tension which is felt vaguely and in some degree by all goes deepest and may reach its crisis earliest. But if the crisis is to be fruitful, they must try at one and the same time

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

to remember that they are Christians, and revive their specific Eastern Christian thought and life, and to remember that they are part of Arab Asia and have a special mission to perform in the East. The attempt has already begun. Among the Catholics and Greek Orthodox of Beirut there are already small groups of thinkers who are trying to understand the nature of Christianity and of their special duty as members of the Eastern Churches; there are other groups which are struggling with the question of the national existence and loyalty of the Arab Christians. There are very few, however, who are trying to hold together in a balance the two aspects of their being, as Christians and as Arabs. The attempt is difficult, some would say impossible; but on its success depends much more than their own fate.

7.

The other movement, that of secularization, springs from the belief of many Arab thinkers that the superior strength and stability of Western society is due to the limitations which have been imposed upon the action and influence of religion. (This belief illustrates one of the main characteristics of Arab thought to-day: the conviction that the West has a 'secret', which, if only the Arabs could find it, would confer on them success similar to that of the Western nations.) In Western thought, each 'field' is autonomous in the choice of its principles and methods; and the Western community is a secular community, in which religion is tolerated, but no longer gives the regulative principles for every kind of human activity. Western thought is no longer theocentric, Western society no longer theocratic. In the same way the Arabs, these thinkers argue, should no longer attempt to regulate their society by Islamic doctrine and law; they should curb the pretensions of the religious leaders, and having done so should reorganize each aspect of their community in the light of those principles which Western experience shows to be appropriate to it. Secularism has taken many shapes. It has been one of the factors in the growth of the nationalist movement.[1] It is also giving rise to a movement of philosophical, ethical and social thought.

In the sphere of philosophical thought, this movement has so far made little headway. Books have been written upon

[1] See Chapter VI.

versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in 232
the same period, but the consumption of 164
camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population.

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported 164
among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded.

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic 232
among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic 164
cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom 262
used without boiling, but infection may 252
result from the consumption of contaminated 164
cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals.

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis 164
is not compulsory in Syria, and the 165
prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in re- 164
porting are exaggerated, however, by the 183
tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of 164
the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population.

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 659
1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 751
10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age.

4

177 Syria has not been merely a passive receptacle for influences
186 coming in from outside. Whether or not the hypothesis of an
194 indigenous population and culture be accepted, it is certain that the geographical structure of the country, and the nature of its inhabitants as modified by that structure, have determined the forms which the incoming streams of influence have taken. For example, the sharp geographical divisions of Syria have helped to perpetuate the differences between various elements in the population, which have come into the country from different directions or from the same direction at different times: racial and tribal divisions have given rise to an intense localism of feeling, which has linked itself in various ways with the prejudices, the hostilities and the exclusiveness generated by the great political and religious conflicts of the past. Localism and particularism have deeply affected the political life of the country. Sometimes, when Syria has formed part of a larger political unit with a strong Government, they have been held in check ; but when the unit has disintegrated, or the Government has grown weak, the country has been partitioned between a number of petty and ephemeral local dynasties, more often than not at variance with one another.

Local and communal feeling is closely linked with the persistence of tradition. Throughout almost the whole of history the Syrians have been subjected to a succession of foreign conquerors. They have been forced at least partially to accept the customs and cultures of their rulers, and in the process they have acquired two arts : the art of rapid and superficial assimilation, and that of preserving, beneath new modes of behaviour and in new forms, their old beliefs and ways of living. 'Bow down to every nation which passes over you, but remember me in your hearts', said one of the founders of the Druze sect. It is a lesson which not only the Druzes have learned.

177 But the role of the Syrian population has not merely been one of assimilating, or resisting, outside influences. It has transformed these influences and spread them to the surrounding world, and it has made its own and original contributions to civilization. From the time of the Phœnicians, Syrian merchants have been scattered throughout western Asia and the Mediterranean world. Syrian officials helped to administer the Roman, the Arab and the Ottoman Empires.

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

8

The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

9

Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

369 from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants
621 and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims
184 who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

10

101 The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

175 Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the
101 spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of
177 the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

175 The Turks performed also another function. Their military
177 strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

563 619 formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

12

162 795 In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

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184 The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

11 Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

social and economic characteristics. For example, the Christians accounted in 1938 for about 32 per cent of the total school population, and for an even larger proportion of pupils in the secondary schools. It is important to notice that 32 per cent of the Christian students attended schools controlled mainly by foreign Christian missions, 61 per cent attended private schools mostly maintained by religious communities, and only 7 per cent attended official schools.[1] Since the education given in the first two types of school is sectarian, Christians are receiving a different kind of education from Moslems, a far larger proportion of whom attend official institutions. 184 871

Educational differences are reinforced by social ones. 184 The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of interconnected units, of which the relations with the Moslem community are peaceful and correct but not in normal circumstances cordial. This is especially true of the older people brought up under the Ottoman régime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of nationalism are helping to make the young less conscious than their elders of their confessional loyalties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects and religions. Economically, also, the Christians tend to constitute a more predominantly urban community than the Moslems, with all the differences which that involves, but there is a Christian peasantry in certain parts of the country, similar in many ways to the Moslem peasantry.

In spite of incidents like those of 1860, on the whole the 798 history of Syria has not been one of religious persecution on a large scale, and the Christians have enjoyed long periods of toleration, although not of equality with the Moslems. Such toleration has existed partly because of the long residence of Christians in the country, partly because they were not numerous enough to constitute a serious threat to Moslem supremacy, and partly because clergy and laity alike were for the most part Arabic in language and culture.

On the whole the growth of the nationalist movement 795 has not had unfavourable consequences for the Christians. 196 Individual Christians have played an important part in the movement in Syria as elsewhere. Nor is it merely isolated

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 91.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S.G-3 (1945-1948)1949 Ml Middle East
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make it difficult for the teachers to finish the course and for the students to digest the subjects. To this criticism it is answered that some subjects—philosophy, for example—have been abolished and others reduced. The second foreign language has been abolished for the last three years of the intermediate school and now only begins in the fifth year. It is claimed that formerly a disproportionate amount of time was taken by the examinations at the beginning and the end of the year. Much less time is now taken by the examinations so that somewhere between a half and a full academic year is saved and is available for teaching purposes.

Admission and educational opportunity

Admission to the secondary school was formerly open to holders of the primary-school certificate provided they had passed their examination with a grade of *bien* (good) or *assez bien* (fairly good). In this way admission to the secondary school was limited. Under the reorganization these limitations have been abolished, and the way is open to all who wish to enter, provided they can pay the fees. The fees are not exorbitant, being £S48 ($21.60) in the intermediate, and £S60 ($27.27) in the preparatory schools. Even here, however, there is a wide range of exemptions. Children of teachers or of government employees receiving less than £S50 a month are exempt. Students are also exempt if their marks are high enough in the public examinations. A reduction of 30 percent of the fees is made to children of officials having a monthly salary of £S50–£S100. By order of the Ministry of Education no fees were charged in the two secondary schools of the Jabal Druze. In practice, about one-third of the student body receives exemptions. In addition, brothers pay less. One additional brother pays two-thirds of the fees, two additional brothers pay one-half each, and three additional brothers pay one-fourth each.

Students coming from localities where there is no secondary school, or the local school is incomplete, go usually to Damascus or Aleppo where boarding departments are maintained in both the boys and the girls secondary schools. Here, again, help is given to the deserving poor student through provision for free board or free lunches. In Aleppo, out of 247 boarding students in the public secondary school for boys, 92 received free board; and out of 140 students who ate only lunch at school, 58 received it free. The proportions were even higher in the Aleppo public secondary school for girls, where 24 boarders received their board free as compared with 29 girls who paid. Twenty-two had free lunch as compared with 10 who paid.

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It is clear that an effort is being made to help the underprivileged child

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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to pursue his education further, and to equalize educational opportunity. 184 How far these efforts are effective in the rural communities is another 873 matter. Inquiry at some of the village schools showed that very few pupils from them had gone on to secondary schools.

Teachers, Classes, and School Activities

There were 255 secondary-school teachers in the Syrian public schools in 875 1943–44. The following is a tabulation of their qualifications.[6]

Qualifications	Number of Teachers
Doctorates (of which 7 were in medicine)	17
Licence ès Lettres or *ès Sciences* from France	35
Licence in Letters from Fuad I University, Cairo	5
Master of Arts from the American University of Beirut, or from America	14
Licence in Law	17
Higher School of Letters	11
Teachers College at Istanbul	2
Total	101

The remainder (154 persons) have varied qualifications. It will be noticed that while many teachers of the secondary cadre hold higher degrees, few of them are professionally trained. Many teachers have formerly been in primary schools and were promoted to teach in secondary classes.

The same phenomenon of the decrease in the number of students as they 873 rise in their grades which was noticed in the primary school is noticeable in secondary and vocational schools, as is shown by the figures for 1944–45 (Table 64) which were supplied by the Ministry of Education:

TABLE 64

Distribution of Pupils in Classes in Secondary and Vocational Schools, Syria, 1944–45

Class	Boys	Girls	Total
Preparatory class (vocational)	340	93	433
First year	1,863	604	2,467
Second year	1,103	393	1,496
Third year	742	291	1,033
Fourth year	446	193	639
Fifth year	356	52	408
Sixth year	234	47	281
Philosophy and mathematics	285	16	301
Total	5,369	1,689	7,058

[6] Al-Husri, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-34.

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Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the program of industrialization in countries of the Middle East after World War I up to 1945, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Turkey - pp. 274-284, Egypt - pp. 285-286, Iraq - pp. 287-289, Palestine - 289-290, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 290-291./

The Syrian economy in 1945 was distinguished by its relatively low 433
production of a generally poor quality. It lay in a state of decadence and stagnation that could only have been remedied by energetic action by the authorities in power. It was a virgin country waiting for people willing to work hard to develop its resources in the fields of agriculture, industry and commerce.

Agriculture in Syria occupies first place, whether considered 433
from the point of view of production or the number of those who 241
earn a living from it. It produces the largest part of the country's exports and supplies the national industries with raw materials. But, despite its preponderance over other economic activities farmers remained up to 1945 dependent on ancient methods, and were ignorant of such modern techniques as the use of machines and fertilizers. Syrian agriculture suffered helplessly from the crop rotation system, from natural pests, insects and diseases, from rain variations and the unscrupulousness of money lenders.

As to industry, it was in its infancy, still feeling its way and 433
lacking encouragement, protection, adequate studies, knowledge and experience.

Nor was commerce in a better situation than agriculture and in- 439
dustry. During the second world war, Syrian trade lost its relations 457
with many of the belligerent countries, and emerged from the war crippled and hampered by the restrictions of exchange control. In addition, the direction of Syrian commerce was not in the hands of Syrian nationals; the larger part of foreign trade, both exports and imports, was handled through Beirut. As a result Syrian merchants lost direct touch with countries abroad and Syria became in effect an internal market dealing in retail with neighbouring markets. Commercial agencies were in the hands of non-Syrians up to the extent of 95 per cent of the total. To complete the picture we should mention that a large part of banking operations with foreign countries took place in banks situated outside Syria, and that the purchase and sale of foreign exchange accruing to Syria was effected in the Beirut market. To conclude, control of Syrian external trade was in non-Syrian hands and the Syrian economy, in consequence, was forced to lose large sums in the form of expenses, commissions, and profits which were paid abroad for mediation in purchase and sale transactions.

14. During the period under discussion the Syrian Govern- 185
ment exercised great effort with satisfactory results; it made a be-

185 ginning in solving many problems of agriculture, industry, and trade. There is not enough space here to give details of their achievements; it is enough to say that, by continuous and widespread effort, the Syrian government was able to remove external problems and to clear away many of the internal obstacles and restrictions that hampered the country's progress. Thus they prepared the way for the emergence of a policy of economic development, and created many of the essential conditions for its success.

15. Leaving aside particular and secondary problems, we can diagnose Syria's major development problems as follows : National production is still far below capacity ; a large part of national resources and wealth are not yet exploited. Many large-scale projects must be undertaken before any increase in productivity can take place. Such projects are : irrigation, the draining of marshes and extension of cultivable land ; improvement of agricultural methods, utilization of modern machinery and combatting of plant diseases and pests ; exploitation of natural resources such as minerals and mines, and the generation of electric energy and motive power ; the improvement and increase of livestock by better water supplies, shelter and pasturage ; re-afforestation and the preservation of existing forests ; the construction of roads, bridges, ports and airports, and the supplying of means of transport to facilitate communications ; the completion of land surveys and settlement operations in all districts; the construction of general warehouses; the supplying of drinking water and electricity to rural areas. But, whereas the country's needs are great, her financial means are not
454 adequate to cover them. National savings are low in themselves, as we noted above ; people prefer hoarding gold or investing in
652 real estate. There is as yet no financial market in Syria. State finances are necessarily weak so long as they depend on a weak economy. Thus, neither the state nor private individuals can be expected to finance big development.

16. It follows from the above that the economic development of Syria depends on a solution to the following problem : the Syrian economy needs capital and finance projects that will create conditions favourable to its growth ; but, as a result of its weakness and underdevelopment, it lacks the necessary financial means. In other words, the state's financial capacity is small and cannot expand unless national production grows ; and national production cannot grow unless the state's financial capacity expands. How

652 capacity, the government cannot establish a clear principle of economic development; nor can it expect to have a long-term, integrated policy, characterized by stability and permanence, and guaranteeing the execution of the projects free from interruption, vacillation and the interference of personal interests. Finally, the government has not evolved a unified policy that can integrate financial and monetary considerations on the one hand, and the requirements of economic policy on the other. If no general development programme is adopted, the authorities concerned will not be able to handle the monetary, financial and economic problems that are bound to be raised by the application of parts of the programme. The prerequisite for the solution of any problems that may arise is a planned integration of ends and means.

Part Three

185 The State of Economic Development at the Present Time

27. By the end of 1953,[1] following an initial period of experimentation that lasted for nine years, Syria had covered a good distance on the road of economic development. In addition to the efforts made to execute a considerable part of the development project, the Syrian government has succeeded in creating many of the conditions necessary for further development. There remains before it the new, critical stage of determining and implementing a complete balanced development policy.

28. The Syrian government managed, in this period, to remove some of the obstacles, both external and internal, that stood in the way of the success of any development policy. It also started to make studies of the country's potentialities and began to organize the collecting of statistics and data concerning the country's condition. It strengthened the mainstays of the national economy and organized it on a firm basis. Then it turned to its monetary and banking system and established a supreme authority to undertake its administration. This authority was given the powers and means necessary for managing monetary, exchange, credit and banking

1 At the time of writing in the autumn of 1953, the final figures for 1953 were not available. This leaves a gap of one year in the survey of the period 1945-53 made in Part Two of this paper. However, no change in trends appeared in 1953.

affairs, for adapting monetary policy to changes in the economic condition, and for bringing this policy in line with the state's financial and economic policies. 185

29. The idea of setting up a planned development programme extending over several years has been gaining ground and recently obtained support from the government. The broad lines of the state's development policy were defined in Parliament in October 1953 as follows: [1]

"The state's future development policy must be embodied in an economic development programme that includes all the projects of the government and of public institutions. We consider that this programme should cover a period of not less than five years..."

"... It is necessary that the programme should have a special administration directly linked to the Office of the Chief of the State. The Board of Administration should be composed of representatives of the ministries specified by the programme, of delegates from the Monetary and Credit Council and the Council of National Resources, and of technical experts".

"The Administration should undertake the study of projects and estimate their importance, order of priority, probable benefits, the length of time needed to carry them out, and their cost. It should prepare technical specifications and after approving them should supervise their execution..."

"As to the programme's finances, we consider that it should have at its disposal a special budget, independent of the state budget, and subject to the approval of Parliament, and the programme should be financed from appropriations that could be made from the general budget, from the reserve fund, from various loans and from such extraordinary revenues as may be allocated to it".

30. It is not enough to prepare and approve a development programme, or even to set up its administration. It is essential for the success of the programme that the Planning Board should be able to solve these two major problems: ensuring harmony between development policy and financial, monetary and economic policies; securing the funds needed for development projects.

1. Statement of the President of the Republic on the financial and economic conditions of the country - October, 1953.

Ensuring Harmony

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31. The execution of the development programme will have serious financial, monetary and economic effects upon the country. For it diverts a section of productive powers towards projects that do not necessarily lead to an immediate expansion in national production. On the contrary, it deprives production, for the period during which development projects are executed, of some of the factors that would normally be employed in producing consumption goods. Since a development programme leads to the creation of additional purchasing power, as a result of its putting into circulation amounts of money in excess of what the economy is accustomed to, there are bound to be repercussions upon prices and wages. Production of consumption goods falls but purchasing power expands. This situation will demand careful attention from the government, which can counterbalance its inflationary effects in the following ways: by regulation of the amounts that can be spent at each stage on development projects ; by attempting to divert certain productive elements (such as the building industry) towards development projects ; by directing the additional purchasing power towards investment projects, or by absorbing it back into the national funds through encouraging savings, through taxation, or through imposing rationing on consumption.

32. On the monetary side, a development programme raises several problems, of which the most important are securing foreign exchange and the adaptation of credit policy to the new conditions created by the programme.

As to foreign exchange, the development programme is bound to create extra demand for foreign currencies. If the exchange available is not sufficient to meet the needs of the programme in addition to the other normal needs of the country, then the Planning Board will have to evolve a means of counterbalancing the tendency such a situation will have, to depreciate the national currency. It would be necessary to : limit the importation of luxuries and inessential goods ; borrow externally to secure the required exchange ; increase the country's exports so as to obtain extra exchange. This is difficult to achieve however, for the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Credit policy can play a major role in leading development policy to success, and in counterbalancing some of its short-term

effects. Thus, credit may be contracted with the aim of fighting inflationary symptoms, or discount rates may be raised so as to encourage investment of private funds. Shortage of investment that may be found in certain consumption industries can be remedied by directing credit towards them, and by advancing the money they need at favourable terms. 652 185

33. As to financial policy, it plays the major role in determining the monetary or economic effects of the development project. It is well known that these monetary and economic effects differ with the different methods used to finance the development programme. It is also clear that the ease with which development policy problems can be solved depends on whether the state budget is in a state of deficit, balance or surplus. This also applies to expansion or contraction in ordinary budget expenditures and to the ways in which appropriations are spent.

34. It is not our purpose here to analyse the interaction and interrelation between each of the budgetary, monetary and economic policies on the one hand, and development policy on the other. We intend only to point out the basic fact, that no development policy should be prepared or implemented unless it harmonizes and co-ordinates with the general economic policy in all its aspects. Each element should have a planned reaction upon the others; thus all will cooperate in securing the maximum general welfare.

Securing the Funds Needed for Development Projects 652

35. Syria's urgent development projects will cost in total some LS 400 million. Their execution will require from five to six years, which will make it necessary to secure annually a sum of LS 66 million.

The following sources of finance may be considered: taxes and reserve funds, internal and external loans, the investment of national and foreign capital.

36. There is no doubt that dependence on taxes and reserve funds is the soundest and safest method of financing development projects. Syria can allocate its available reserve funds for development projects, but cannot depend at present on taxes, since ordinary revenues are only sufficient to meet ordinary expenditure. It is neither possible nor desirable to raise taxation rates or to impose new taxes so long as the national income remains at its

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed into the region following the opening of the road and began populating it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region. 311 [166] 491

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" barley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita. 242 433

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below: 185 654

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new [132]

185 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i.e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 469 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

Irrigation by pump started with the rice boom in 1945 and expanded with the cotton boom of 1951. It was hit severly by the crop failure of last year and the flood of this spring, and the future of the Khabur appears dim. This is because as previously mentioned, the original amount of capital used to construct a fair sized project is large, amounting to about LS 150-200 thousand. Such a project can irrigate with two 10-inch pumps or their equivalent about 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and double the area in wheat and barley. The project will have one main canal 1 1/2-3 1/3 meters higher than ground level made entirely of earth or lined with cement to carry the water a distance of 1-3 kilometers depending on the lay of the ground, several subsidisary canals, buildings for the motors, the agricultural machinery, and the laborers. 312 185

Evidently, in order to get the best returns on the capital invested, the farmer needs to exploit to the utmost the capacity of his pumps, otherwise he will be leaving his capital idle. In this case, he will need to cultivate, on a rotation basis, 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and 5, 000 dunums of wheat and barley. But on most of the irrigation projects of the size mentioned, the area of the lands which can be irrigated is less than 1, 500 dunums in all. The surrounding lands are all higher than the main leading canal and can not be reached except by a much greater outlay of capital. This means that the farmer has to extract from an area of 1, 500 dunums, of which one-third lies fallow every year, enough profit in five to eight years, which is the average duration of the lease, to compensate him for his yearly efforts, to pay interest on the capital and to regain his investment. This should mean a net annual profit of about 45, 000 LS or LS 45 per dunum, and experience has proved that it can not be done. 312 454

The alterntive to pump irrigation on the Khabur is irrigation by gravity in works similar to that of Tal Mughass. And the Khabur lends itself in many places to such project. Mr. Delbes agricultural advisor to Syria during the French Mandate, knows at least of three projects studied by the French High Commissariat, to build dams and derivation canals between Ras el Ain and Hassakeh. The largest one among them is to carry the water west to the region of Jabal Abdel Aziz and irrigate a very large area. 312 654

Another dam site studied by the French is at Sab'Skour. Further south in the region of Fadghami a site was selected to store the

III. Lands With Title Cover Only 30% of Jazirah

It should not be understood from the above discussion that all the lands of Jazirah are occupied by persons having title to them. Perhaps as much as 70% of the lands are occupied by persons claiming ownership but having no legal title. And here resides the great problem of Jazirah which continues to retard its development and prosperity. 423 185

There is nothing that can stabilize conditions in an agricultural society, increase confidence, improve credit, diversify the types of cultivation, increase property values, and encourage the improvement of land by long-term projects of irrigation and farm construction, like a secure and stable system of land ownership.

It is the misfortune of Jazirah that successive Governments since Syrian independence have not only ignored this basic fact, but have done everything in their power to make the stabilization of the land problem in Jazirah more remote.

Before the beginning of 1952 land registration in Jazirah suffered from all the delays, expenses, corruption, and hindrances prevalent in other parts of Syria. Moreover, as a frontier zone, land registration was subject to an authorization by the Chief of State, and in the last three years registration of land acquired through cultivation for a period of ten years was stopped by decision of the Council of Ministers.

The governing idea behind all these restrictions is that individuals are usurping the public domain illegally. While this may be true in some cases, the measures taken to correct the situation are out of proportion to the problem at hand and are applied not only to usurpers out to land owners of good faith as well. The result is that three-quarters of the lands of Jazirah belonging mostly to peasants and medium owners are unregistered.

IV. Decree-law 96

Decree-law 96 starts with this idea of correcting the usurpations of the public domain, and adds to it the concept of social justice as exemplified by the policy of encouraging small land holdings and dividing the large estates. 423 185 656

A. Contradictory Policies of the Government

423 •185 656

The decree is interesting in its application to Jazirah and it seems that the Government there follows two contradictory policies diametrically opposed and antagonistic to each other. On the one hand, decree No. 510, dated March 23, 1950, and decree No. 80, dated January 23, 1952, facilitate the importation and distribution of powerful agricultural machinery among the farmers in general and those in particular of Jazirah. The use of agricultural machinery goes hand-in-hand with the extensive cultivation of large areas of land to make their employment economic. On the other hand, and surprisingly, only eight days after the promulgation of the decree for the distribution of agricultural machinery, decree-law 90 dated January 31, 1952, prevents the farmer from owning or renting (in its interpretative communique) more than 1500 dunums in Jazirah an acreage which does not lend itself to economic tractor cultivation.

The decree has been in operation now for seven months and its application should have vindicated the two principles on which it depends, viz 1 to correct the usurpations of the public domain, and to divide the big estates among the needy farmers.

Assuming that the policy of the State is to encourage small ownership of land to be tilled by the farmer using cows or mules, and that the importation of heavy agricultural machinery was a mistake not to be repeated, the logical procedure by the Government would have been to establish simplified processes and register in the name of peasants pieces of 1500 dunums each to which they have a right both in the old and the new law. The Government has had ample time during these eight months to enforce its own decree-law and register tens of thousands of 1500 dunum pieces and give their users legal title to them. Had the Government done that, it would have found the problem greatly simplified. The Kurdish and Bedouin family has in general three to four adult members working on the common land. According to decree 96, each member has a right to 1500 dunums. The Government would have to grant them extra land to reach its quota.

B. Size of Land Holdings in Jazirah

The point is that, had the Government proceeded in this manner, the practical result would have been the stabilization and legalization of the present small and medium ownership.

423 This, according to the following table borrowed from Gib Report, 185 page 20, would have legalized the situation in 57% of the Jazirah 666 lands, leaving 9% as public domain, and only 34% not complying with the terms of the decree.

Small Holdings Less than 10 hectares	Medium Holdings 10-100 hectares	Large Holdings Over 100 hectares	State-Owned Lands
56,000	528,000	343,000	96,000
5%	52%	34%	9%

Instead, the Government's only contribution to the solution of the land problem was to prohibit entirely the registration of any land from January 1952 to the present time.

If the Gibb statistics are correct, and they are presumably taken from Government sources, the land reform in Jazirah contemplated by decree 96 concerns only 34% of the region's entire area.

In dealing with this portion of Jazirah, the Syrian Government has to decide on its agricultural policy. It must make up its mind whether it wants to divide the big estates, with or without compensation, and distribute them in small lots to farmer families using mules, thus increasing the population of Jazirah greatly, so that its production of wheat will not much exceed its local consumption, and depriving Syria of the income derived from its present yearly export. Alternatively it must decide that Syria wants to increase its exports of wheat by extending the use of agricultural machinery whose effective use requires holdings of more than 1,000 hectares.

Coming back to the discussion of the 34% of Jazirah lands in holdings of over 100 hectares, the Government should have proceeded immediately, after the promulgation of the law, to their surveying and delimitation to get a clear picture of the situation. Without venturing into exact statistics, the following description is to the point. It endeavors to show that excessive land ownership is limited to relatively few individuals and that the problem is better solved by the Government by considering each case on its merits. The problem of the Government is further facilitated because the tribal Sheiks claim that they hold the lands for their tribe and not for themselves. The Government should have asked the Sheiks to proceed to the distribution of these lands under its supervision.

471 The land problem along the Khabur is not to distribute land to the Jubur Bedouin who cannot use it because he cannot irrigate it, but to remove the hold of the Milhem family and to facilitate ownership by the entrepreneur who invests money in the land, installs pumps, 471 and irrigates areas formerly arid. Unfortunately, the old laws and 425 decree 96 work for the benefit of the river bank owner who, at the end of the lease, takes possession not only of his original strip of land which he leased, but also of all the new land brought under cultivation and irrigation by the lessee at his own expense.

VI. Recapitulation

185 To recapitulation, the problem of land ownership in Jazirah is one of stabilizing the existing property rights for 57% of the area of the region, of distributing about 25% by the simple expedient of having the Sheik or Agha share his land with the members of his tribe in whose name he holds it, or passing legislation to enable the investor along the Khabur to gain ownership of the land he irrigates and reclaims, and of simplifying the processes of law so that all these functions can be performed and disputes between property owners settled and deeds granted within a short period. It becomes apparent that the success of such a policy is subject to a prior survey of the region. But this need not necessarily mean long delays because aerial survey at present is a quick operation.

The importance of the stabilization on the regularization of the land problem in Jazirah cannot be overemphasized. Besides all the advantages mentioned on page 27, land will come to have real value on the market and the wealth of the entire Jazirah will be increased tenfold. The famer will be enable to diversify his culture and escape the dangers of monoculture. After surveying the division of land, the farmer, working on his own lot in which he has no partners, will be induced to improve it with buildings, irrigation wells, fertilizers, and tree and vegetable gardens. There is no reason why the plains of Jazirah, wherever water is available, cannot be made to resemble the gardens of Damascus with time and an increase in agricultural knowledge among the population.

IV. Telephone, Telegraph and Air Communication

206 In 1950 telephone communication became possible with
509 Jazirah for the first time on a commercial basis. Telegraph communication has long been established and an air service connectin Qamishli with Aleppo and Damascus started in 1946, then interrupted by the Palestinian War, has been resumed twice weekly. Fares from Qamishli to Aleppo and Damascus are LS 25 and 50, respectively.

V. Railway Line Projects

185 Railway lines wholly inside Syria from Jazirah to the interior cities have been suggested by the Gibb report and by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. They suggested a line from Tal Koshak to Hassakeh and from there to Rakka and Aleppo. Such a line would by-pass Qamishli which is the more important agricultural and commercial center, and would go in a district only newly developed, sparsely populated and not of the fertility of the Qamishli area. It seems that a line starting from Qamishli itself would be shorter and would service a more fertile and populated district. From Hassakeh the line could follow the Khabur as long as possible before veering to Deir Ezzor. This would be longer than the proposed line from Hassakeh to Rakka directly, but it would have the advantage of servicing the Khabur Valley and collecting its crops, whereas, the line Hassakeh-Rakka is completely desert. From Rakka there is only one route to Aleppo.

It is difficult to choose between a policy of road construction and railway lines without detailed study of the economics of both, but, whatever the result of the study, Jazirah needs cheap and easy means of communication.

COMMERCE OF JAZIRAH

438 It stands to reason that the commerce of Jazirah is mainly in its
441 staple prodcuts and in the goods required for the development of its essential industry which is agriculture.

The main crop being wheat, it forms the largest item both in bulk and in value. But the Jazirah merchant plays a secondary role in the handling of this crop. He is sometimes a partner, but more

total Syrian cereals. Only Aleppo was ahead of it with 30% of the 438
total production. (Gibb Report, table 16, p. 28) At present, it is probable that Jazirah surpasses Aleppo in cereal production and with an area approaching that of the Mohafazat of Aleppo, it is potentially more productive because of the Jagjag and Khabur Rivers which make possible a more diverse agriculture.

The problem of land ownership is bound to be settled in some way/85
and credit is expanding gradually so that the dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo may diminish with time. The lack of lands and the constant increase in population will force the farmer to turn to intensive cultivation which in turn requires more labor and creates jobs for more people. The towns will benefit from increased production and population and will prosper and grow in their turn. It is logical to anticipate that Jazirah merchants will try to dispose of their crops without the help of Aleppo entrepreneurs. This makes for increased profits and more propserity. It is also reasonable to expect that a small industry based on the processing of agricultural products, such as flour mills, vegetable oil, starch, fruit, and vegetable conserves, will be established in the town of Jazirah. When cotton becomes an established crop, it is economical to gin it in the nearest town and save the cost of transport. The seeds will be needed for planting, for the extraction of oil and for cattle feed.

Qamishli is the only town of consequence in a fertile area of 361
700,000 hectares almost all cultivable in one way or another in the Qadas of Qamishli and Dijla. It is the chief town between Mossul and Aleppo, a distance of some 700 kilometers. Nisibin the older town now in Turkey was alwasy an important commercial center in the old times and Qamishli now has taken its place. It would not be surprising if in another 20 years Qamishli attained a population of 80,000.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

necessity for health's sake alone, but should be part of a general *mise en valeur* of the region's resources. This is the type of approach which is most likely to succeed, because it is linked with the material interests of the landowners. They will lend their support and active participation if given technical advice, supervision, and material and financial help to defray part of the capital outlay.

Swamps, Floods, and Soil Erosion

Malaria-control measures were taken with a fair degree of success in 20 villages in 1944–1945. Various factors, however, combine to prevent a permanent reduction of the incidence of the disease. Among these are the necessity for constant supervision, the need for repeated cleanings of canals and ditches, and the improvidence of the inhabitants. Most important is the fact that floods will certainly undo much of the work.

Winter floods are frequently heavy enough to destroy or damage seriously the repair and maintenance works, which are of value to agriculture and malaria control alike. Malaria causes debility and apathy among the villagers, and the certainty that floods will recur reinforces this apathy, making everyone disinclined to expend energy and money in work which must be done again in a few years. The canals and watercourses at Moufaggar, for example, have been badly damaged in the past; in fact, damage by floods was the main reason for the modification of the old foggara system. The southern foggara and watercourse are now protected against torrents by a concrete wall at the upper end, but as the system lies in one of the main valleys coming from Jebel Bil'as, it is doubtful whether the device will be a great success. Although the broad, nearly flat valley north of Selemiya has benefited from its wide catchment area—it is built up of alluvium, as much as 10 feet deep—it is partly derelict because floods have created extensive swamps and ruined old foggaras. In 1945–1946 useful drainage work was undertaken here.

The floods are due in part to the occasional sudden and torrential rainstorms, characteristic of this as of other semiarid regions. Wadis are sometimes filled for a few hours with violent, detritus-laden torrents and are then left dry again. The steep slopes and absorptive limestones are contributing factors. English merchants, traveling in 1691, noted[11] that after a heavy rainstorm

those hollow Gutts which we passed over without the least appearance of Moisture, were, by the Cataracts which descended from the Mountains, become Rivers; . . . the next Morn-

[11] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), p. 144 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 139–140].

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

model or under Western control have been established; 177 students have sought foreign universities, on their own 814 initiative or as members of official missions; European languages have been studied and Western books translated into Arabic. At present the Arabs, at least in the more advanced of the Arab countries, have achieved a certain understanding of Western technology and natural science, and of the polite literature of England and France. But Christianity, European philosophy, music and art, the whole culture of Russia and central Europe and the literature of the ancient world are still very imperfectly known.

The study of the West has itself done something to Westernize the Arab mind. The student cannot be unaffected by the object of his thought. In so far as theories of Westernization have been formulated, they fall into two main categories, which may conveniently be called theories of Islamic revival and of secularization. As expounded below they are 'ideal types'; any particular Arab thinker will probably be found to hold not one of the theories in its pure form, but a distinctive blend of several.

3

The movement of Islamic revival springs from a vision of 185 an Arabo-Islamic society which neither apes the West nor 177 clings blindly to outworn forms: of which the animating spirit and the principles of judgement are derived from Islam, but the ways of life and thought largely approximate or correspond' to those of Western society; and which has a 'healthy' relationship to the Christian world, a relationship of mutual respect and influence, based upon the acknowledgement of equality.

This much would be generally agreed, but there is great difference of opinion about the methods by which such a state of affairs could be brought into existence. There are some who claim that what is necessary is not so much a regeneration of the spirit and thought of Islam as an effort to unify and direct the political efforts of the Islamic peoples in defence of the Islamic world against Western penetration. They wish to accept only the externals of Western civilization, the sources of its economic and military strength. This was the doctrine of the Pan-Islamic movement, originated by Jemal ad-Din al-Afghani in Egypt and elsewhere during the

later decades of the nineteenth century, and used by the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in order to revive the waning prestige and influence of his throne. Its weakness was its failure to recognize the malady in the soul of Islam.

There are other movements whose exponents see the necessity not simply for political action but for a revival in the religious life of Islam, and who believe that Islam is capable of producing such a revival out of its own resources. This is the attitude of thinkers who support the Wahabi movement, which aims at returning to the primitive purity and fervour of the apostolic age of Islam, and at removing all those later accretions and distortions which can find no justification in the Quran or the Traditions of the Prophet. Wahabism originated in central Arabia in the eighteenth century, and has had a great influence upon Islamic life during the present generation, largely because of the political success of the Wahabi leader, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, King of Sa'udi Arabia.

Wahabism and similar movements are concerned primarily with religious practice, and regard theology and speculation with suspicion, as unnecessary and possibly dangerous. But there are other movements which, while not belittling the need for a revival of piety and the devotional life, believe also in the necessity for a reconsideration and re-statement of Islamic doctrine and for a revision of Islamic jurisprudence; and they realize that these tasks can only be accomplished with the help of the intellectual methods and achievements of the modern West. The movement originated by Shaikh Muhammad Abdu in Egypt, and sometimes called the 'Islamic Modernist Movement', was in one of its aspects an attempt to respond to the need for a re-statement of Islamic doctrine. The leaders of this movement have been able and sincere men, and their achievement and influence have been great. But as a movement of thought its effectiveness has been limited by two factors. On the one hand, its knowledge and understanding of Western culture are defective; it has been too exclusively concerned with modern science, or at least with nineteenth century 'scientificism'; and it has not attempted to arrive at a profound understanding of the basic elements in Western thought, Greek philosophy and Christian theology. On the other hand, it has at times been much concerned with polemics, with showing that Islam has

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something to offer the world, and that its doctrine is more fully in accordance with the discoveries of modern science than is that of Christianity; it has in consequence lacked the intellectual objectivity which is necessary for constructive thought.

4

Polemics and the study of modern scientific thought are necessary; but only slowly and among a few groups of thinkers in Cairo and Beirut is it being realized that something more fundamental is needed. The whole intellectual life of Islam needs to be re-created, in the same way as Wahabism is trying to re-create its devotional life. The formal precepts and practices into which Islam like all religions has tended to become crystallized need to be broken up, and the principles which lie at the root of them, and which they have attempted to express, to be once more seen naked and in themselves. The vital spirit of affirmation which is at the heart of Islam, and which has long been quiescent although not dead, should be revived; it should be made articulate in a system of thought adequate to meet the intellectual needs and answer the questionings of the modern mind.

The problem of the reconstruction of Islamic philosophy and theology is only beginning to reveal itself; it is too early to expect that anything should have been done to solve it. The method and success of its solution depend largely upon unpredictable factors: upon the emergence of Arab Moslem thinkers with gifts sufficient to their task, and the revival of the spirit of reflection and speculation. But it is possible to point to certain preliminary tasks which can be accomplished even in the absence of such factors.

The first is the study of the great Islamic thinkers of the Middle Ages, who tried to do for Islam what the thinkers of coming generations must attempt once more: to turn the simple creed of a nomadic people into a system of thought, an explanation of the great problems of human destiny, able to satisfy the reflective and inquiring minds of those trained in the philosophical tradition of Plato and Aristotle. To-day a similar problem arises—to construct an Islamic system of thought adequate to meet the intellectual doubts to which the modern world is prone; and those who are attempting to solve it will be helped by analyzing the thought of their

11: Hourani 3-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

fundamental principles. But it is important also for other reasons. Greek thought lies at the root of that Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages of which the significance has already been mentioned: it is therefore part of the intellectual heritage of the Islamic East as well as of the West; it may serve as that common ground of agreement and understanding which is necessary if a fruitful intellectual contact is to be re-established between the Moslem and the Christian worlds.

5

The Syrian people will have a special part to play in the intellectual reconstruction of Islam, because of certain characteristics which they possess. They are peculiarly aware of the 'tension' between East and West, and between Islam and Christianity. This is partly because their minds are exceptionally subtle, flexible and sensitive; but partly also because Syria has always been exposed to influences coming in from Mediterranean lands, and tends to be affected by them sooner and more profoundly than the other Arab countries. Through the mission-schools, through emigration and in other ways there has been built up in Syria an educated class Westernized in spirit as well as in externals, but still Arabic in language and for the most part in sympathies and feeling. Thus the conflict between East and West has become a conflict inside their own souls; as such it raises problems which pose themselves with peculiar urgency.

The factors which make the problems more profoundly felt and more urgent in Syria than elsewhere make them also more likely to find a solution there. It is educated Syrians who are best fitted to see the tension between East and West on the level not of politics or polemics but of doctrine. But if they are to contribute effectively to the revival of the Arab and Islamic mind, they must develop an intellectual life of their own, and not be content to become culturally a province of Egypt.

6

There is one factor which gives Syria a unique position in the Arab world. It possesses a large Christian population, whose intellectual life and Christian consciousness have been reviving in recent years. The impact of the West upon them has been as great as upon the Moslems, although of course it has taken a

185 different form : the West has meant for them not only the dis-
177 covery of a new way of life but, in the most fundamental things, a rediscovery of their true selves. The result has been an interesting and important revival of Christian culture, expressing itself through Arabic and through French. It began as a revival of literature and language, and as such was a part, and a very important part, of the general Arabic literary renaissance ; but gradually it is becoming conscious of the deepest spiritual question which faces it, the question of what it is to be an Arab Christian.

186 This movement of Christian life and thought is important
185 first of all for its own sake, but also for the part it may
182 play in the re-awakening of Islam. The Syrian Christians are, as Christians, particularly fitted to understand the culture of Europe ; while as Arabs, speaking the Arabic language and conversant with its literature, they can interpret Europe to the Arab Moslems and, what is more important still, can confront them inescapably with the challenge of Christianity. They do not feel the conflict between the West and the Islamic East in exactly the same form as that in which Moslems feel it. But they feel it in another form, and in one which raises problems of which the solution is both particularly necessary and particularly difficult. For them the problem poses itself as one of political loyalties, and therefore their material well-being and perhaps even their physical safety depend upon their solving it. In the conflict between the European Powers and the forces of nationalism, on which side should they range themselves ? Religious affinities, long-standing ties of friendship, gratitude for favours received and fear of Moslem domination draw them to the side of Europe ; but ties of language and culture, common feelings of humiliation and pride, and the desire to put an end to the religious dissensions of the past attract them to the nationalist camp. Divided loyalties of this sort are tragic, but they are also a necessary stage in the development of thought, alike for the individual and for whole peoples ; it is in the struggle to reunite the divided personality that the intellect becomes mature. The Christians stand to the Syrian people roughly as the latter as a whole to the Arab people : it is in them that the tension which is felt vaguely and in some degree by all goes deepest and may reach its crisis earliest. But if the crisis is to be fruitful, they must try at one and the same time

to remember that they are Christians, and revive their specific Eastern Christian thought and life, and to remember that they are part of Arab Asia and have a special mission to perform in the East. The attempt has already begun. Among the Catholics and Greek Orthodox of Beirut there are already small groups of thinkers who are trying to understand the nature of Christianity and of their special duty as members of the Eastern Churches; there are other groups which are struggling with the question of the national existence and loyalty of the Arab Christians. There are very few, however, who are trying to hold together in a balance the two aspects of their being, as Christians and as Arabs. The attempt is difficult, some would say impossible; but on its success depends much more than their own fate.

7

The other movement, that of secularization, springs from the belief of many Arab thinkers that the superior strength and stability of Western society is due to the limitations which have been imposed upon the action and influence of religion. (This belief illustrates one of the main characteristics of Arab thought to-day: the conviction that the West has a 'secret', which, if only the Arabs could find it, would confer on them success similar to that of the Western nations.) In Western thought, each 'field' is autonomous in the choice of its principles and methods; and the Western community is a secular community, in which religion is tolerated, but no longer gives the regulative principles for every kind of human activity. Western thought is no longer theocentric, Western society no longer theocratic. In the same way the Arabs, these thinkers argue, should no longer attempt to regulate their society by Islamic doctrine and law; they should curb the pretensions of the religious leaders, and having done so should reorganize each aspect of their community in the light of those principles which Western experience shows to be appropriate to it. Secularism has taken many shapes. It has been one of the factors in the growth of the nationalist movement.[1] It is also giving rise to a movement of philosophical, ethical and social thought.

In the sphere of philosophical thought, this movement has so far made little headway. Books have been written upon

[1] See Chapter VI.

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M01

the scientific spirit and upon freedom of thought, and there have been attacks on particular religious abuses. But the hold of Islamic orthodoxy upon educated and uneducated alike is still too strong for a frontal attack to be made upon its claims to explain the whole Universe and to regulate the whole of human life. Even those who have attempted to defend Islam in modern language have at times been reproached with infidelity and atheism.

Greater changes have taken place in the sphere of ethical and sociological thought. It is possible to see the beginning of a movement of 'Social Secularism', which seeks to make the welfare of the individual in this world the norm of social organization; and which as a corollary of this advocates sweeping reforms in the existing structure of society.

The movement for social reform must be clearly distinguished from the improvements in social conditions which have taken place during the present generation, and some of which are mentioned in another part of this book.[1] Of course the two are connected in the sense that the improvement of standards and ways of living constitutes the ultimate goal of the social welfare movement. But such improvements as have been effected during the past twenty years have been due rather to the action of the Government or to the increased prosperity of the country than to the pressure of any considerable body of opinion; and during that period the immediate concern of the social welfare movement has been not so much with the raising of standards as with an indispensable preliminary task: the creation of a social conscience, a conviction that certain standards are desirable.

In so far as this movement exists at all it is of very recent growth. Under the Ottoman Turks it would have been impossible for such a movement to come into existence without arousing suspicion and perhaps repressive action on the part of the authorities. Moreover, the very concepts of public opinion and voluntary organization are of recent introduction into the Near East. Even now the idea of social reform has not penetrated very deep. It is still largely ignored by most of the organized political parties, which tend to concentrate upon the political issue of independence and to treat all other issues as secondary.

Perhaps the most important social welfare organization is

[1] See Chapter V.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

that which was established some years ago in the American University of Beirut. Its summer camps and other activities aim not so much at reforming the social life of the rural districts as at giving University students, who will in future constitute an important element in the ruling class, an awareness and understanding of the problems of rural life. Around the Jesuit University also there is growing up a movement which aims at making the educated Catholic youth of Lebanon more conscious of the social doctrine of their religion.

8

In addition to the problems inherent in the process of Westernization as such, there are others which are due to the particular phase which that process has reached. One such problem is created by the existence of two main streams of Western influence, French and Anglo-Saxon. The study of the French language and its culture has been stimulated by its being one of the official languages throughout the Mandatory period, by the teaching of it in almost all schools, both private and public, and by the long-standing connexion between France and certain elements in the population. The study of the English language is encouraged by commercial connexions with the Anglo-Saxon countries, by the existence of a number of American Protestant mission schools, by the movement of emigration and by the predominance of British influence in the neighbouring Arab countries.

Here as elsewhere, the exponents of French and Anglo-Saxon forms of Western culture have not always shown so great a solidarity with one another as might be desired; and they have often been estranged from one another, not only because of the conflict of British and French political interests and rivalry between Protestant and Catholic missions in the Levant, but also because of fundamental differences in the French and Anglo-Saxon concepts of culture and education.

The differences between the two are reflected in the two Universities to which they have given rise. The Université de S. Joseph is maintained and largely staffed by Jesuits and is Catholic in spirit; the American University was originally a Protestant college, but is now officially and so far as possible in practice unsectarian. The former has for many years been subsidized, at least in some of its faculties, by the French

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

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The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria/MD1

of them indeed were better treated than the bulk of the population.) Special regard was paid to their needs and traditions, and opportunities were given for the development of their self-consciousness and self-respect. The effects of generations of inferiority cannot be wholly wiped out in the course of twenty years, but in those years Syria and Lebanon made a certain advance towards individual equality as the democratic countries of the West understand it.

Among the most urgent of the country's social problems is that of the archaic system of land-tenure. No direct assault, it is true, was made on the position of the great semi-feudal landowners. But the first step towards reform was taken by the establishment of a modern system of land-registration and the initiation of a land survey. Also the number of small freeholders was increased by the sale of public domain and the encouragement of the permanent partition of land held communally on the 'musha'' system.[1] In addition something was done to help foreign trade by the extension of harbour and other facilities.

A State system of schools was constructed almost from nothing; it is still very imperfect and not yet able to supply so good an education as is given by the best of the private schools, but at least it includes every grade of school, from primary up to the Syrian University in Damascus, an official institution set up in the early years of French Mandatory rule with the object of providing higher education in Arabic.

The foundations which have been laid are solid, but there is still much to be done before Syria and Lebanon possess even the framework of a modern society. Thus expenditure on public works and social services is still very small; the medical services are inadequate. No adequate census has been taken, although there has been a very elaborate and complete one in the neighbouring territory of Palestine. Labour legislation scarcely exists. Most serious gap of all, only inadequate measures to improve agricultural conditions have so far been adopted. Little provision has been made for agricultural education. Although excellent plans for irrigation have been drawn up, few of them were put into effect until the Allied occupation of 1941. The authorities had done little to provide facilities for agricultural credit, and nothing to encourage the formation of co-operative societies.

[1] See Chapter V.

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ANNEX D *NOTES ON IRRIGATION*

1 THE GHAB PROJECT

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The Ghab valley, part of the Orontes river valley, is about 50 kilometers long from south to north and about 10 kilometers wide. There is in the valley a marshy area of about 35,000 hectares, which cannot be cultivated at present, although it consists mostly of good alluvial soil. If drained and irrigated the reclaimed land would probably be suitable for rice, cotton, sugar beet and pulses as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter vetch or clover during the winter. It has the great advantage of being near both the important domestic market of Aleppo and the port of Latakia, permitting ready export of products in excess of local needs.

The marsh would be drained by excavation of a basaltic sill at Kfeir that now prevents the out-flow of water, and by construction of a system of drainage canals. Included in the area to be developed for agricultural use is the Acharneh plain just upstream from the Ghab valley in a bend of the Orontes. The Orontes river is now unable to drain the plain because its bed has been raised by silting. An extensive network of irrigation canals would be constructed for the irrigation of the plain and the valley. Including the reclaimed land, the total irrigated area would be about 65,000 hectares. A reservoir with a storage capacity of about 68 million cubic meters would be constructed behind a dam near Halfaya to control the Orontes flood, and a second dam located near Rastane would provide a reservoir of about 180-265 million cubic meters for irrigation purposes. About 20,000 KW of electric power would eventually be developed in hydroelectric plants at Rastane, Maharda and Jisr ech Choghour. The last two plants, however, could be operated only during the off-season for irrigation.

Of the 65,000 hectares, 43,000 have not previously been irrigated and of these 29,000 hectares are government-owned. The project would further provide for the settlement of a large number of farmers in the latter area.

It is anticipated that completion of the entire project will require about 10 years, proceeding in overlapping stages as follows: (a) drainage of the Orontes valley; (b) the Halfaya flood control dam; (c) a part of the road system; (d) a soil improvement program; (e) about 75% of the irrigation

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network. If an early start is made on (a), (b) and (c), then the soil improvement program and irrigation network might be initiated in 1956 and 1957 respectively.

The later work, mainly in the Acharneh plain, will be done after 1960. It will include drainage of the plain, construction of the Halfaya tunnels, completion of the road system, construction of the irrigation network of the Acharneh plain and Rastane dam, and the relocation of the Amir Ghajar hydro plant. The entire project could be completed by the end of 1963.

In the Ghab area, 41,680 hectares will be irrigated by a system of three main canals, one on each bank of the Orontes, branching from an intake to be constructed near Acharneh, and a third, made from the present bed of the Orontes, originating five kilometers downstream near Ammourine from an intake built in the new Orontes. This will irrigate the lands between the river and the two other main canals. The total area brought under irrigation in the Ghab, taking into account the 13,600 hectares now under partial irrigation, will not exceed 28,000 hectares until about 1963. If temporary limitations on summer irrigation are to be avoided, the work will have to proceed according to a closely coordinated schedule.

Cost

The preliminary cost estimate made in 1952 and later brought up to date at the request of the International Bank forms the basis of the following estimate, which includes engineering and supervision expenses, and which assumes that the major proposed technical revisions of the provisional plans will be adopted. On this basis the total cost of the full program is estimated at £S 130.85 million, exclusive of the cost of local and national roads, or £S 169.85 if these are included.[1] The foreign exchange requirement would be about one-third of these totals. During the term of the mission's program (to December 1960) disbursements are likely to be £S 84.25 million without roads or £S 110.25 million if roads are included. Additional funds required for indirect consequences of the project have not been included in the costs for the main project.

[1] All figures are exclusive of any margin for contingencies.

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Economic Benefits

The mission estimates that the gross value of the produce of the Ghab area will be in the neighborhood of £S 63 million annually, or about £S 47 million after deducting the amount already produced in the area in question. The production of cotton, maize, sorghum, rice and sugar beets is particularly likely to have a marked impact on Syria's balance of trade. It may be assumed that the output of cotton and cottonseed will in effect be added to the country's exportable surplus; the additional rice production may make Syria fully self-sufficient in that commodity; and the sugar beet production should permit a considerable import saving.

In addition to the project's contribution to an increase in national income and an improvement in the balance of payments, the settlement of farmers in the area made possible by the project will assist in relieving the present population pressure in the province of Latakia and particularly in the Alaouit mountains. In Latakia, for example, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% of the average for Syria as a whole. Settlers in the Ghab will be able to earn substantially more than the bare living they have been able to eke from the soil in the past.

Organization

The "Administrative Office of the Drainage and Irrigation Works of the Ghab Lands" was created in 1951, to be attached to the Ministry of Public Works until the technical work is completed. It will be responsible for the design of the works, award of contracts, supervision of construction, payment of expenses and for sale of the land. As parts of the project are completed, the Office will take care of the operation and maintenance of the dams and of the irrigation and drainage networks and will collect water charges. During the planning and construction period the Office should recruit and train staff to carry out the continuing operation and management of the project.

It is important that the policy, and the attendant operating and budget delegations, provide for the establishment and operation of the agricultural research centers and for a long-range educational and farm demonstration program; otherwise, it will be practically impossible to achieve acceptable land use in the area.

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II PROJECTED SCHEMES

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The Youssef Pasha project is the most important of those under consideration, but it is still at the planning stage. No decision has been taken with regard to the irrigation of the Euphrates valley as a whole.

Euphrates Valley—Youssef Pasha Dam[2]

In Syria the long narrow Euphrates valley stretches generally northwest to southeast from Djerablous at the Turkish border to Abou Kemal at the Iraqi border. It is about 450 kilometers long; its average width is about 7.5 kilometers, its maximum 16.

The soils of the valley proper are mainly alluvial, varying from silt to sandy loam and clay. With irrigation, they would be suitable for cotton, rice, sugar beet, peanuts, sorghum, etc. as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter legumes as the main winter crops.

Irrigation of the whole Euphrates valley, on the assumption that about 85% of the land can be cultivated, would require about 170 cubic meters per second, more than can be assumed to be Syria's share of the natural flow of the Euphrates. Irrigation could probably profitably be extended to an additional area of about 130,000 hectares on the left bank in the vicinity of Raqqa. All in all, a total supply of about 226 cubic meters per second would be needed, about 75% of the maximum of 300 cubic meters per second utilizable for irrigation from the river's natural flow, which would leave only 25% for Iraq. For this reason, and because of the power potential, it was thought desirable to construct a storage dam on the Euphrates; Youssef Pasha was selected as the site. British engineering consultants recommended a concrete dam of the pierced type, 650 meters long with 52 sluice gates, and a power plant capable of producing about 45,000 KW of firm power or a yearly output of about 400 million KWH, plus about 120 million KWH of secondary power.

The consultant firm originally estimated the project cost, including a transmission line to Aleppo, at about £S 114 million; a revaluation made in 1953 raised the estimate to £S 150 million. The capacity of the reservoir behind the dam would increase the flow of the river utilizable for irriga-

[2] Since studies of the valley have not advanced to the point of a draft project, the figures which follow are only indications of the order of magnitude of possible development.

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tion by about 100 cubic meters per second; this, added to Syria's assumed share of the natural flow, would provide sufficient water to irrigate the valley, including the area on the left bank.

Until recently it was thought that the length of head canal needed to connect Youssef Pasha with the irrigable areas would, because of difficult topography, preclude construction of an economic gravity irrigation system. The mission, taking account of experts' reports, has the following comments:

About 48,000 hectares on the river's right bank, between Youssef Pasha and Halabiye gorge, could be irrigated by pumping, at a cost of about £S 50 million; but this would not be an economic method of irrigating the fertile Ressafe plain. Both the valley and about 6,000 hectares of the plain could be irrigated by constructing a gravity canal branching from Youssef Pasha, at a cost of about £S 100 million. Whether it is worthwhile to spend an additional £S 50 million to irrigate a portion of the plain is a question to be considered.

On the left bank, however, a gravity canal branching from the Euphrates at the foot of Youssef Pasha dam could reach the plateau west of Raqqa, 100,000 hectares of which are now without any possibility of being irrigated, and could provide wide-scale irrigation between Ressafe and Halabiye gorge. About 185,000 hectares of excellent soils could be irrigated, about 155,000 by gravity flow and about 30,000 by pumping from the canal.

The possibilities of such a project should be investigated. We have made provision for such a study in our allocation for Euphrates valley studies; the aerial survey and mapping of the area are allowed for elsewhere. The gravity irrigation portion should cost roughly £S 266 million, of which £S 150 million (55%) represents the cost of the head canal. The pumping facilities would cost about £S 34 million. The construction cost of the project would thus be about £S 1,700 per hectare, less than that of the Ghab project.

Halabiye Project

Halabiye gorge offers an excellent site for a diversion weir: inundations would be restricted to the gorge itself. The weir could feed two irrigation canals, one on each bank of the Euphrates, extending 250 kilometers to Abou Kemal near the Iraqi border, and these could supply gravity irriga-

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185 tion to about 165,000 hectares, leaving about 50,000 to be irrigated by
312 pumps.
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Khabour Valley

The Khabour valley has possibilities for projects in addition to the Tell Maghass scheme. None has been fully investigated. The soils are generally of good quality, ranging from loamy sand to medium clay, suitable for cultivation of cotton, rice, peanuts and (in the northern parts) sugar-beet. All summer crops must be fully irrigated, and although rainfall is more plentiful here than in many parts of Syria, partial irrigation of winter crops is advisable in some areas.

A diversion weir could be constructed across the Khabour downstream from Ras el Ain to feed an irrigation canal on each bank. Areas of 13,300 and 7,400 hectares, on the right and left banks, respectively, could be irrigated. Rainfall in this area is adequate for winter crops and several large estate owners have installed pumps for summer cultivation.

A canal could be excavated on the right bank of the river, from Tell Maghass, but no more than 3,800 hectares would be irrigated; moreover, the soil is not very good, being sometimes excessively salted with gypsum.

About 12 kilometers downstream from Hassetche a dam could be built on the site of the ruined Roman dam of Saba Skour. Although this would permit the irrigation of about 15,000 hectares, it would unfortunately reflood the site of the previous reservoir whose fertile alluvium is now under cultivation.[3]

Sixteen kilometers downstream from Saba Skour another ruined Roman dam formerly supplied two large canals, one on each bank of the Taf river, a tributary of the Khabour. Here could be built an earth-fill dam,

[3] The area of this site is difficult to determine owing to the flatness of the surrounding country.

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about 760 meters long and 15 meters high, to feed a 14-kilometer canal on the right bank, irrigating about 8,000 hectares (a longer canal might irrigate 10,000-15,000 hectares) and a shorter left-bank canal, irrigating about 6,000 hectares. The soil is fairly good, and the mission considers this the best project that could be started in the Khabour area. A rough cost estimate is about £S 30 million, or £S 1,500 to £S 2,000 per hectare, depending on the area irrigated.

All told, these projects would irrigate 62,000-69,000 hectares, including the 8,500 now irrigated by the left bank canal of Tell Maghass. With a duty[4] of 0.6 liters per hectare per second, about 40 cubic meters per second would be needed. Since that is the total discharge of the Khabour utilizable for irrigation, no water would remain for dry season cultivation downstream from the Taf. Accordingly, consideration has been given to storage of the Khabour flood. The downstream portion of the valley is very flat, with the exception of the right bank where it is bordered by an eroded plateau. The plateau is nearest to the river at Markada, and here a dam could be built to form a reservoir. About 800 million cubic meters could be stored behind a dam about 20 meters high; even after loss through evaporation from the large surface area, about 700 million cubic meters would remain, or about 45 cubic meters per second for a six-month irrigation season. This discharge could irrigate about 75,000 hectares out of a possible 250,000 along both banks. The sandy and loamy alluvial soils of this area would be suitable, under irrigation, for the cultivation of rice, cotton, peanuts, pulses, sorghum and maize.

The site's disadvantage is that the gentle slope of the left bank would require construction of a long levee, although there is an easy abutment for the dam on the right bank. Moreover, because the height of the dam would necessarily mean a very shallow reservoir, it would be difficult to prevent siltation. In the circumstances, the government has made no study, survey or cost estimate of the project. The mission recommends that aerial and ground surveys and mapping be undertaken to determine whether the site is satisfactory or whether an alternative must be found. As a first step, the ground survey should be limited to five or six profiles in the area contemplated for the reservoir. This should take about three days, at a cost not in excess of £S 1,000, to be charged to the study of the Euphrates valley, where most of the stored water would be utilized.

[4] The average quantity of irrigation water which must be applied annually to the land to bring the crops to maturity.

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Upper Orontes Valley

In the area of Homs two projects are under consideration to expand cultivation in the upper Orontes valley, where cotton and sugar beet can be grown as summer crops and wheat, barley and clover as winter crops: a canal branching from Homs Lake to irrigate about 3,000 hectares on the left bank of the Orontes, and one branching from a diversion weir to be constructed about 23 kilometers upstream of the south end of Homs Lake. Here the dry season flow of the Orontes is at least 10 cubic meters per second, sufficient to irrigate about 15,000 hectares on the right bank, so that the Ghab project would not be adversely affected. However, the Orontes rises in Lebanon, where a project to irrigate the Kaa area is being considered. This would reduce the available flow at the Syrian border, correspondingly reducing the irrigable area in Syria. Since the project is estimated to cost about £S 15 million, an agreement with Lebanon on the partition of the Orontes should be concluded first. We also recommend a more accurate geological survey of the Rastane reservoir area, to ascertain whether potential capacity has been overestimated. Meantime, the two projects should be deferred.

Barada Valley

Consideration has been given to regulating the flow of the Barada river, to increase the irrigated area of the Ghouta in the vicinity of Damascus where soils toward the valley bottoms are suitable for the growing of vegetables.

Two dams across the Barada river at Hameh and near Makaren, each about 50 meters high, would provide a total storage capacity of about 180 million cubic meters, thus increasing the utilizable irrigation flow from 7 to about 15 cubic meters per second and permitting dry season irrigation of about 15,000 hectares of new fertile land in the vicinity of Damascus. A hydroelectric power plant could be built at the foot of each dam to develop a total power of about 10,000 KW.[5]

Surveys and studies have not progressed to the point of a draft project. A rough cost estimate is about £S 10 million for each dam, plus not more than £S 10 million for the development of the canal system, making a total

[5] These are recommended in Annex G.

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of about £S 30 million for the project (exclusive of the hydroelectric plants), or about £S 2,000 per hectare. The mission recommends that studies of the two sites be completed and that construction of the dams and hydro plants begin as soon as possible.

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Yarmuk Valley

Cultivation on the alluvial and sometimes very fertile soils* of the Mzerib area irrigated from the upper springs of the Yarmuk river could be extended by pumping water to a new area of 4,500 hectares. This second phase of the Mzerib irrigation project has been fully investigated and is ready to be started; the first phase is already in operation. The pumps would be driven by diesel motors unless and until it is decided to build a hydroelectric power plant on the Yarmuk. The cost is estimated at about £S 7 million, approximately £S 1,500 per hectare. In view of the interest in developing irrigation in the Hauran mohafazat, which is in general not well provided with water, the mission recommends that this project be started without delay.

Nahr el Kebir Valley

The Nahr el Kebir, a short river flowing from the mountains bordering on Turkey, empties into the Mediterranean in the vicinity of Latakia. It has heavy floods, but in dry season the flow is no more than 0.5 to 0.6 cubic meters per second. A regulated flow would permit irrigation of about 4,000 hectares in the vicinity of Latakia for vegetable growing, thus making a significant contribution to the general development expected with the improvement of the port.

The construction of a dam of about 60 meters is projected, with sufficient capacity to permit flood control, irrigation, power and water for the port of Latakia. Site surveys are already under way. Additional cost studies must be made, but the cost will probably be of the order of £S 15 million. Although this is rather expensive for a single project, the mission feels that in view of its multi-purpose nature and the great importance of the development of the port of Latakia, studies should promptly be completed and the project constructed during the next five years.

* Suitable for cotton, with peanuts and citrus on the lighter soils.

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The Mission's Program

The new irrigation projects recommended by the mission, together with those under way, call for a total expenditure of £S 193 million over the next five years, to which must be added £S 3 million for maintenance and £S 1.2 million for research and demonstration, giving a grand total of £S 197.2 million. Table 1 shows the allocations among projects, together with an indication of the areas to be irrigated. Appendix Table II sets forth the irrigation schemes.

TABLE 1 Mission's Proposed Irrigation Program, 1955–60

Irrigated area							
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Projects	Functions	Total	Already spent	To be spent in the program
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	103*	1	102
0	0	0	Euphrates valley studies		3	—	3
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB)	GI	12	10	2
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	5	2	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	3	2	1
4.6	0	4.6	Maerib	PI	7	0	7
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	30	0	30
15.0	0	15.0	Bamda	HEP + GI	30	0	30
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	15	0	15
89.1	37.5	126.6			208	15	193

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; LB – Left Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

* Including £8.47 million to be spent in a later program.

NOTE: Area figures in thousand hectares; expenditure figure in million £S.

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III PLANNING

There are two stages of planning for irrigation projects. The first, the agricultural phase, entails a preliminary study of the soils and the computation of water duties. The technical phase includes planning of the civil engineering works necessary to divert, convey and distribute the water in the selected area. In the Main Report the mission has discussed the second

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planning stage. Here we add a comment with respect to the so-called agricultural phase.

In the past, soil studies were not very extensive, but projects were being constructed in areas already under cultivation, where the fertility of the soil was well known. Now FAO experts supervise systematic soil analyses, and the results of these studies will be very useful for the development of future projects. Insufficient investigation of the perviousness of the soil, with consequent underestimation of the water duty, has resulted in undercropping in some irrigated areas. A striking example is the Homs Lake project, where the allowance of 0.20 liters per hectare per second does not permit full utilization of the cultivable area.

The mission therefore recommends that henceforth more extensive research under the supervision of both irrigation and agricultural engineers precede fixing of the irrigation duty. Since the soils vary little along the alluvial plain of the Euphrates valley, these studies could be confined to plots in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor and Abou Kemal, on the plateau west of Raqqa and in the Resafe plain south of Abou Hareira. These experimental plots could be quite small, water being supplied by small pumping plants or even by tankers. Provision is made in the mission's proposed expenditure on studies of Euphrates valley irrigation for equipment of experimental stations.

IV WATER FEES

The fees for the various projects, according to the revised schedule for 1954, are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Annual Water Fees per Hectare

(£S)

Project	Size of holdings in hectares				
	0 to 5	5 to 15	15 to 20	20 to 50	over 50
Homs-Hama	6.25	15.40	20.40	23.30	25.80
Tell Maghass	7.50	23.75	28.75	37.50	40.00
Mzerib	7.50	21.25	26.25	32.50	35.00
Senn	7.50	17.50	22.50	27.50	30.00
Makt	2.00	3.50	4.50	6.00	7.00

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S 648 1952 and he has obvious affinities with General Neguib of Egypt whom he visited later in the year.

The threat of Zionism is considered very real in Syria and Shishakli has declared that Syria has not given up hope of a revision of the present position. Between March and May 1951 a flare-up over Lake Huleh brought an offer of Iraqi aid to Syria, but hostilities between Syria and Israel were localized and stifled without leading to a general outbreak of war. All Syrians wish Israel ill; fear of Israeli expansion remains and is fostered by the Government.

S •185 186 In internal politics, the most progressive measures which have yet been considered are land reform and the partition of state lands. There is little unrest among the people, who generally want to live their lives without undue government interference. Nationalism of two kinds exists: a nascent patriotism that has for the first time the support of the rulers, and a narrow xenophobia that, while less extreme than in Egypt, is more pronounced in Syria than in Lebanon.

(b) Lebanon

L 642 646 643 Lebanon is a republic of which the Chamber of Deputies was till 1953 elected by direct manhood suffrage but in that year women were permitted to vote in the election. By convention, the President of the Republic must be a Christian and is normally a Maronite, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim and the President of the Chamber a Shii Muslim. The table on p. 466 above shows the division of parliamentary seats between the religious sects; a scrupulous observance of these quotas is evident even in the civil service establishments. The existence of a Christian majority is held to be essential for the survival of Lebanon as a separate state and so, in June 1950, it was found convenient to extend the franchise to Lebanese abroad (of whom the majority are Christian) and to increase the number of deputies from 55 to 77, but in November 1952, under a new electoral law, the number was reduced to 44. The Muslim rate of natural increase is higher than that of the Christians and it is probably for this reason that no census has been taken since. In other ways the constitution and administration are similar to those of Syria already described.

Internal Politics

L 665 668 As in Syria, a European type of political party system has not yet evolved and the struggle has been not only between different cliques of ruling families backed by great commercial wealth, but also between these rich groups on the one hand and

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of
234 coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

• 185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at re-afforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2.*

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interest per annum. The Syrian private capitalist expects very large returns and the foreign private capitalist requires more security than is obtainable in the Middle East; thus the development of Syria must be financed either by the Syrian Government or by an international agency. Syria is one of the few countries to have refused American Point Four aid on principle, but she is a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and this organization has been studying some of the development schemes listed below.

1. *Drainage of the Ghab marshes.* Nearly 100,000 acres of land can be irrigated from the excess water of this area to improve agriculture and public health, and plans are well advanced.

2. *Euphrates barrage,* to provide 100,000 kws. of hydro-electric energy for irrigation and industrial needs. With this power it is hoped to irrigate half a million acres.

3. *Yarmuk and Barada rivers.* Hydro-electric schemes to give power to Damascus and the Hauran.[1]

4. *Latakia port.*[2] There have been complications over the award of the tender for this work, and construction had not effectively begun at the beginning of 1953.

5. *Khabur river.* Irrigation scheme for 22,000 acres.

6. Improvement of rail and road communications from Latakia to the hinterland and establishment of a network of all-weather roads in the Jezira.

7. *Rouj marshes.* Drainage to irrigate about 8,700 acres has already commenced.

If agreement can be reached to implement some of these schemes not only will Syria benefit but also the Arab refugees from Palestine may find employment and even homes.

(*b*) Lebanon

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Much that has been said about Syria also applies to Lebanon and, to avoid repetition, only points peculiar to Lebanon are here outlined.

Agriculture

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The table on p. 488 above gives the approximate division of the land in cultivable and uncultivable areas and the estimated acreage; the crop and yield of the main agricultural products are given in the following table.

[1] An agreement with Jordan was signed on 7 July 1953, but work has not yet begun.

[2] See above, p. 487.

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1950–1 amounted to £L215·5 million. Over half this deficit was met from 'invisible' earnings, such as the tourist trade and transportation, and the rest from private donations and capital movements. Indeed, during this period Lebanon's balance of payments showed a small surplus of £L2·7 million.[1] Most of Lebanon's trade (about 40 per cent) is with other Middle Eastern countries, but the foremost country in her trade is the United States (about 20 per cent). Europe and Great Britain are important sources of imports but not such large export markets. Lebanon's main imports are agricultural products, textiles, machinery, and oil, and her chief exports are agricultural products and textiles. The tourist industry is given full encouragement by the Government and, under certain circumstances, tourists' fares to Lebanon are subsidized.

Development

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On 24 February 1951 Lebanon signed a Point Four agreement with the United States and the work to be carried out is based on the report to the United Nations in 1949 by Mr Gordon Clapp.[2] Irrigation projects are under way at Akkar, Yamouna, and Qasmiya, and there is a proposal to use the Litani river to irrigate over 12,000 acres of land. In August 1953 the Lebanese Government announced a four-year development plan; the main projects under consideration concern road and hydro-electric power development.

Conclusion

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The future of Syria and Lebanon will obviously depend to some extent on the past, many aspects of which have not been fully discussed here because the independent political and economic development of the countries began only in 1946. In internal politics events have moved too rapidly for any record to keep pace with them, and there is not yet apparent any stability that would allow one to regard views and information on the political scene as being valid for more than a brief period. As regards their external policy, the two countries have yet to be convinced that there is a community of interest between them and the West. The Western Powers need the use of Syrian and Lebanese territory on which to base a line of defence, but it is not expected that these countries could or should bear a significant part of the burden of defence in men, materials, and money. The Levant wants greater security against Israel than

[1] See table 6, p. 505 below.
[2] UN, Conciliation Commission for Palestine (chairman: Gordon Clapp), *Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* (New York, December 1949).

About two years ago the Government of Saudi Arabia proclaimed its readiness to grant state land to any citizen who undertakes to put it under cultivation. This policy was developed on the basis of the Koranic statement to the effect that land belongs to the one who revives it. It must be remarked in this connection that the religion of Islam is basically for the equitable distribution and utilization of the land resource. Saudi Arabia is an Orthodox Muslim country, regulating its life in accordance with the religious law. This opens the possibility for the development of a form of ownership that is at the same time Islamic and effective. SA 423

In the summer of 1949 Col. Husni Za'im of Syria was liquidated through a coup d'état, but not so the reforms he had initiated. The idea of reforming the land tenure system has been kept alive. The government that followed that of Za'im created a committee representing various agencies to study the problem and recommend possible solutions. This activity bore fruit in the form of Article 22 in the new Syrian constitution, which provides, among other things, for (a) encouragement of small and medium land holdings; (b) setting a maximum limit to the size of holdings, but not retroactively; (c) making it obligatory upon the owner to keep his land under cultivation, otherwise he would lose his claim over it; and (d) distributing state land among landless peasants. There are also indications that the present government intends to take effective action in this respect. There is already a plan for the resettlement of peasants on state land in the Homs-Hama areas. S 185 423 166 M 185 423? 166

A promising sign in Egypt is the consciousness of the problem that is now shared by government officials and by people in various walks of life, including the peasants themselves. This consciousness has developed as a result of a rapid increase in population, bringing about a tremendous pressure upon the land resource. As mentioned above, this resource is highly concentrated in the hands of the very few, including the state. The landless or near-landless peasant desires strongly a few acres of the coveted precious land. E 185 471 M 185 471

In response to this tense situation, Egyptian leadership is beginning to take some action. In some cases the government has M 471 427 E 471 427

25: Wantner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
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the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled. Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

In several respects the French authorities have modified the Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the extensive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation concessions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the peasant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were started, but produced more water than could be used. The educational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessitates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

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Present-day Syria is not

185 a 'welfare State': the conception of the peasants' well-being has not penetrated to political circles. Settlement on these lines might have been promoted by an agency such as the Middle East Council of Agriculture, had that come into being; but for foreign capital as such, and for individual immigrants, the conditions are too uncertain.

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(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

211 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticised on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organisation.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

ill-considered plans and avoid abrupt changes". A separate section in the Labour and Social Affairs Department of the Ministry of National Economy will run and supervise the centres, introduce local industries, study local conditions and implement a programme to raise the standard of living and promote local welfare. The Department will be assisted by an Advisory Committee comprising representatives from all agencies interested. Three bodies participate in the conduct of each model centre: one will consist of the staff members of the centre; the second the advisors to the staff members and the representatives of local administrative authorities; the third will be not one single committee but five committees of local residents, each to be responsible for a particular aspect of the centre. All will work under the supervision of the staff. The Decree defines the several units to be constituted for each centre and their respective responsibilities. 649 657 185

65. It is intended that when the Government has established a model centre in each province, the example will be followed in other districts by villagers who (as in the Egyptian prototype) will contribute to and share with the Government the expenses of maintaining a sufficient number of centres to cover the whole country.

66. The scheme which was inspired by the Cairo Seminar of 1950 had, we were informed, been discussed and agreed with other Ministries concerned and tentative arrangements had been made with the University authorities for their co-operation in providing the necessary personnel for the centres. Unfortunately, however, the project-law had not received the approval of the Ministers and Dr. Joukhadar gave no indication of any date for its operation. 242 185 474

67. On the introduction of Mr. Carroll Deyoe, FAO representative in Syria, members of the mission had the opportunity of meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture Mr. Akram Bakabi, the newly-appointed Secretary-General, who gave an account of agricultural extension work in Syria and of the development of agricultural co-operatives in the country. He foreshadowed a possible eventual use of the profits of these societies for community welfare purposes, but the movement is in its infancy.

68. Thanks also to the courtesy of Mr. Deyoe, the mission was put in touch with the local representatives of the Near East Foundation. In the absence in Beirut of the Programme Director, Mr. Eyer, his Deputy (Mr. Khoury) gave us the statement of the work of the Foundation in Syria which had been prepared for the recent Damascus Seminar which we had hoped to attend. Mr. Khoury accompanied us on his visit to Nashabeyeh one of the four villages in which the Foundation operates demonstration centres in agriculture and sanitation and in home-making, respectively. Mr. Sivasvamy has prepared a detailed account (Appendix V) of his impressions of the work done at Nashabeyeh. 242 185 744

69. The centre has been in existence one year. Its premises are in adobe houses such as are to be found in many villages in these parts. They have been simply adapted for their present purposes and the standard of cleanliness was pleasantly surprising. The staff consists of: (1) a sanitary inspector who looks after general sanitation, including mosquito control by insecticides and by drainage. (He makes a point of talking to the village people about water supply, latrines, etc.); (2) a nurse-midwife, whose duties are: ante- and post-natal care, examination of pregnant women, education of local midwives, regular supervision of the infants in the village. (There is no maternity clinic; the women are delivered in their homes); (3) a doctor, paid by the Foundation, who visits the centre once a week.

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70. The Mission as will be seen, formed a favourable impression of those whom it saw at Mashabeyeh. It was regrettable to learn that not only was the extension of the work hampered by lack of funds but that some local difficulties had arisen which suggested that there might still be some distrust of disinterested outside help in quarters that could not plead ignorance as an excuse. We had not the opportunity of pursuing inquiries to enable us to satisfy ourselves whether, if foreign direction and support were withdrawn, the work undertaken by the Foundation would collapse or become self-supporting, a point which had first been suggested to us in talks in Lebanon (see paragraph 10). We were, however, satisfied that if the venture were to collapse, it would not be due to any lack of a spirit of service or enthusiasm on the part of the Syrian field workers who are employed by the Foundation.

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71. The country is under-populated and the population is so scattered as to make it difficult to provide the usual facilities through community centres. It should be added that there are large tracts of empty but arable land; so that if, as a result of efficient health services, the expectation of life increases and infant mortality decreases, there is no danger of lack of food.

72. Recommendations: In the light of the present cautious attitude of the Syrian Government towards the receipt of technical assistance from external sources, we recommend that the initiative should be left with the Government to seek United Nations aid for the furtherance of any scheme of community organizations for which it may be directly or indirectly responsible.

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III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

73. The "Middle East" is a convenient but misleading description which may be applied to a group of Arab-speaking countries, not all of which were included in our itinerary. Those which we were privileged to visit have many features in common, in spite of differences in characteristics and ways of life and varying stages and patterns of development. The Islamic faith prevails over the greater part of the area, though in some countries there are important non-Muslim minorities. Each country is the inheritor of an ancient culture; each has subscribed to the United Nations Charter, with its emphasis on improved standards of living as a contributing factor to the peace of the world; each is predominantly agricultural; each, in a newfound independence and under conditions of political instability, is reforming its land laws; and each has proclaimed the welfare of the people as a dominating purpose of Government policy.

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74. In progress in community development in this group of countries little uniformity is to be observed. In Egypt, where the establishment of rural social centres became the official policy in 1959, after successful pioneering experiments conducted by the Egyptian Association for Social Studies, a stage has now been reached at which the whole scheme is under review, with the object of increasing its scope and efficiency. A reorganization involving decentralization and more inter-departmental co-ordination was in progress as we left Egypt.

75. We have found that Egypt is, compared with other Arab countries, well advanced as regards rural social centres since the population, or at least a part of it, understands the value of self-help. These social centres have to be expanded, both as regards numbers and the use made of each one of them. They do not require costly special buildings; provided that attention is paid to cleanliness, the work can be carried out in suitably equipped village houses, always assuming that the staff has the right spirit. To ensure a continuous standard of efficiency, regular supervision

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APPENDIX IV

Introduction to Syrian Project Decree
for Establishing Social Centres

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The greatness of a country is measured by the extent of its progress and the level of the standard of living of the majority of its population.

The greatest part of the population in Syria consists of the fallaheen class. They are the workers and producers in the country and they are the victims of poverty, ignorance and disease as a result of deprivation for many decades of essential and necessary services.

The new Syrian Constitution is specially concerned with this class of people and provides that raising the standard of living of the fellah should be regarded and undertaken by the Government as a duty. The Department of Labour and Social Affairs, being the organ of the Government responsible for fulfilling this obligation, it has begun to study rural conditions and the needs and problems of the countryside. It has examined what has been done in other countries (e.g. Egypt, Greece) where similar conditions exist in the field of rural welfare. Practical experiments carried out by local organizations in some of the Syrian villages have also been studied.

In the light of this study the Department of Labour and Social Affairs suggests that the best way to improve the village and to raise standards of living is to care for the fellaheen and to provide in each village in a single institution all requisite economic, agriculture, health, cultural, social and administrative services. A "Social Centre" is the only institution that can undertake all these responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve ill-considered plans and avoids abrupt change.

For these reasons the Ministry of National Economy presents in three Chapters the accompanying Project Decree for the establishment of social centres.

The First Chapter deals with the following:

The establishment of a model social centre in one village of each Governorate.

The subsequent establishment of other (private) social centres in the Governorate similar to the model social centre, with the proviso that in this case the fallaheen contribute to and share the expenses of the establishment of these centres.

The prescription of the several units which comprise the social centre.

The prescription of the responsibilities and services to be undertaken for the locality by the centre.

The establishment in each centre of (1) an administrative committee consisting of the staff members of the centre; (2) an advisory committee consisting of the administrative committee and representatives of the local administrative authorities and (3) the establishment, under the supervision of the staff, of five committees

●185 of local residents, each committee to be responsible for a particular aspect of the work of the centre.

Defines the duties, qualifications required, and methods of recruitment of the staff members of each centre.

Provides for the supervision of the private social centre ultimately to be established, and for technical and financial assistance for these centres.

The Second Chapter deals with:

The establishment of an Advisory Council consisting of representatives of the different Ministries and agencies interested, the function of which is to bring forward and to discuss suggestions, formulate recommendations, and furnish advice in all matters concerning the social centres.

The Third Chapter

This Chapter provides that a division within the ...partment of Labour and Social Affairs shall be created to carry out the responsibilities of establishing social centres, running and supervising them, and taking particular interest in improving or introducing new rural industries, studying the rural conditions and, in general, implementing a programme designed to raise the standard of living and promote rural welfare.

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APPENDIX V

Near East Foundation Activities in Syria

Notes by Mr. K.G. Sivaswamy, member of the Mission

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"The Near East Foundation is working in two centres, each covering four villages. But the contacts of the workers go farther than these villages to about 30 neighbouring villages. The villages are round about Damascus. The average holding is about 10 acres. Land tenure problems due to big landownership are not very acute here. The villages comprise mainly small owner-farmers. The holder of an uneconomic site as two dunams (1/2 acre) supplements his income by labour on other farms. The poorest group are the labourers whose number is estimated as a third of the agricultural labour population. They too have garden plots and a small house.

"The work of the Near East Foundation is mainly among the small farmers. Every centre has generally four workers, one for agriculture, another for sanitation, a third for teaching homekeeping and a fourth for maternity and child-welfare work. In one of the centres we visited, Nashabeyeh, there is a municipal doctor who attends to medical cases.

"The agricultural instructor at Nashabeyeh is a trained and experienced worker who appears to love his work. His popularity spread, we were told, because he prevented the spread of cottonball weevil by using DDT and some other material for dusting. The farmers seeing the advantage, are buying their own dusters for spraying insecticides. He has been able to introduce the cultivation of vegetables. A co-operative society has been started for pumping water and thus raising summer crops. He maintains demonstration farms in the centre. The farmers too have co-operated in making demonstrations in their own farms.

"The activities of the two centres were many, such as distribution of seed and seedlings, spraying of vegetables and fruit trees, spread of fertilisers and insecticides, etc. The centre at Nashabeyeh maintains a workshop and a number of agricultural implements for use and demonstration.

"At another centre, Kaber Emit, the farmers have begun to use more fertilisers, particularly superphosphates and ammonium sulphate. The cost of their transport on donkeys was high. The bulk purchase of fertilisers and its distribution by a lorry has cheapened it for the farmers. There is a co-operative marketing society here from which two wholesale merchants buy the produce, because it is graded. The farmers find that they are not now cheated on grade, weight and price as it was before the society was started.

"It cannot be said that the farmers have reached a stage where they can run the co-operatives by themselves. Loyalty to the society is bound to exist so long as the farmer benefits by its service. But the training of leaders in administration and group action through their committee may take some time.

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"In order to spread improved agricultural practices and better ideas of sanitation, the farmers should be able to read the literature supplied to them. Literacy classes are therefore organized by the agricultural worker. Direct method of teaching by pictures is followed. In a few weeks the illiterate farmer is able to read under supervision.

"The sanitary worker engages himself in anti-malarial work. He co-operates with the activities of the government of Syria in this work. Draining the swamps is one activity. DDT spraying is another. Films on malaria in Arabic are shown. While in agriculture the improvements demonstrated are felt immediately, it takes time for ideas on sanitation, particularly the relation of flies and insects to the spread of diseases to be realized by the farmers.

"The worker also supplies cement slabs free of charge for pit latrines.

"The home-making instructress has a separate building in the village of Rashabeyeh where she teaches nutrition and methods of food preservation. She and the nurse-midwife of the centre have recently started a two-year course for girls in homemaking and midwifery. The object is to prepare some of these girls to attend the University and thus train village leadership.

"Reading and writing, Koran, child care, cooking methods, personal hygiene and sewing and needlework are taught. We saw a class attended by 13 girls. Five village girls attend these classes from surrounding villages. Six girls are in boarding at the centre. Considering the age-long prejudice in the area against the education of girls, this is no small achievement. A Muhtar (village chief) pays £300 a year (£33 sterling) for the education of his daughter. Girls of low income families pay £60 (£7 sterling) in a year for their course of instruction.

"The nurse-midwife, a graduate of the Syrian University, helps in maternity cases. She and the home-making instructress make home visits and she has started a clinic for 25 babies, the object being to educate the women to use the centre not merely when they or their babies are sick but also when they are healthy. Prenatal care is taught to mothers. The nurse-midwife conducts a weekly class in midwifery every Thursday for 20 local midwives who come from a distance of 15 kms., riding donkeys or using public transport buses.

Success and Difficulties

"The centre at Rashabeyeh certainly helps in modernizing the social outlook of the people. It cannot, however, be a community centre run by the people for satisfying their own needs until the people are prepared by a preliminary process of adult education by example and precept. It endeavours to work in full co-operation with the government. It enlists the co-operation of local leaders by working with the aid of an advisory committee comprising the village Muhtar and three members of the municipal committee. It has appointed Syrians as village workers. There are only two foreigners (Americans) who direct the activities. Even so, suspicion about a foreign agency is natural.

"The night meetings held to discuss village problems are attended by about 15 persons out of a population of 400 in the village. And we were told not all the 15 attend every time. Possibly it will take some time before public participation increases.

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"The youths are more responsive. In one village we were told that the son of the Mukhtar influenced his father to start a demonstration farm. The sons of farmers are helpful in spreading agricultural improvements.

"One example of public co-operation indicated to us was that the buildings were given at a nominal rent. These the NEF has remodeled for their own purposes. The agricultural centre is situated in a building built originally by the municipality for a cattle market and left unfinished for want of funds. The home-making and child-welfare centre is in a separate building. The boarding house is in a third.

"Village leadership is being evolved out of the activities of the co-operatives and spread of agricultural improvements. The training of village girls has a great future in supplying new leadership among women.

"The centre has certainly a social value in the adult education of the farmers and the women. But it cannot be copied. No government can afford to provide such centres for all the villages.

"Public co-operation to assume responsibilities will depend to the extent to which the government co-operates with the NEF. Nothing could be done without the full co-operation of the local officer. We were told of an instance in one village where so long as the local officer co-operated, the people gave every assistance, and how they grew lukewarm and even hostile when his successor displayed indifference to the work of the centre.

"The co-operation of the Imam in the Mosque is equally essential. In one village, the Imam censured the conduct of parents who sent their girls to the girls' school and the consequence was that nothing could be done in that village for the education of girls after this incident.

"The inherent defect in the administration of a community centre by a foreign agency is always there. It is but natural that people suspect their bonafides, and government, while fully co-operating, may yet have misgivings. The NEF, however, is doing its best to secure the approval of officials before undertaking new activities.

"Another problem too arises, when the state agencies are not strong enough to provide efficient services, and a non-official agency is able to render steady service to the people. It is but human if an unconscious jealousy arises among those who contrast their own inactivity with the good deeds of strangers.

"Most of the activities of the centres are what a normal state is expected to undertake. The villages need an agricultural demonstrator, a nurse-midwife, a girls' school, and a sanitary inspector. A non-official agency (NEF) is at present undertaking these activities. With an improvement in the administrative organization of the state, the need for the services of the NEF may disappear. A co-ordinated council of the state officers and the directors of the NEF at the top level may help in the maximum use of the services of the NEF. The NEF may assist in the direction of the services through this council. The staff of the NEF may be amalgamated with the state staff. In fact that demonstration centre at Damascus where various improvements are carried on in agricultural practices seems to be a joint project with the Ministry of Agriculture. The same principle may be further extended in regard to rural centres.

185 "Whether communities assume responsibilities for planning and executing their own activities in satisfaction of their common needs in the scheme of the NEP or not the centres of the NEP are certainly effective in liberalizing the farmers' outlook, and training them to take advantage of specialized services of the state as and when they are made available.

"Regarding governmental policies to promote community development, we learned from the Secretary-General to the Ministry of Agriculture that they were engaged at present in settling the excess population in towns in the Gezira area where large cultivable areas are available for land development, and secondly in cadastral surveys for clearing titles to land which at present do not exist.

"They hope to develop an extension and co-operative staff. Much remains to be done in the establishment of essential departments of state for rendering various services to the community. There are a few co-operatives only a year or two old, and it will be too soon to predict the lines on which community development will progress in relation to state services in the State of Syria."

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would contribute the remaining quarter of the cost. About half of the State contribution would take the form of hospitalisation which would be largely financed from public funds, including the maintenance of general hospitals by municipalities.

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Social Security Bill for Lebanon

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A Bill on social security prepared by the Ministry of Labour was receiving consideration by the Lebanese Government in 1950. The purpose of this Bill was to set up an autonomous national social security fund for workers which would eventually pay benefits in respect of employment injury, maternity, sickness, long illness, invalidity, dependants, unemployment and death. Various social charges which the law now imposes on invididual employers would be taken over by this fund.

The proposed scheme would apply on a compulsory basis, in general, to employees of all undertakings in Lebanon except non-mechanised undertakings employing less than five workers and having a capital of less than £L.5,000. Agricultural workers not operating machinery, family workers and domestic servants would be expressly excluded. Employers would contribute to the fund at an initial rate of 7 per cent. of wages and employees would pay a 4 per cent. rate. The additional revenue needed in each year would be provided by a Government subsidy.

The Bill provides for the introduction of the several types of benefit in three different stages. Payment of the first group of benefits would commence on promulgation of the law. These benefits would include employment injury benefits, family allowances, confinement allowances, and old-age and widows' benefits. To facilitate the financing of old-age benefits, employers would pay to the fund, either in a single lump sum or in instalments over a period of five years, certain amounts for which they were previously liable in respect of dismissal and related indemnities. The second group of benefits, including sickness and long-illness benefits and maternity care, would be introduced at the end of five years. The third group, consisting of invalidity and unemployment benefits, would be brought into force after 10 years.

The practicability of adopting the draft measure has been under study. The economic situation in Lebanon raises some difficult problems in this connection at the present time.

Developments in Syria

S 74S 18S

The possibility of introducing certain types of social security legislation and the problems which would be encountered in doing so have

62: I. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 M1 Middle East
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been the subject of some preliminary statistical investigations and other studies in Syria. The General Federation of Syrian Workers' Unions has urged the Government to institute a social insurance system as well as a scheme of free medical care and medicines.

TURKEY

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Turkey has by now largely completed the enactment of its basic social security legislation, and an important part of the scheme is already in operation. Apart from completion of the administrative organisation of the new measures, important problems of planning which lie ahead include the extension of the scope of persons covered, especially to employees in smaller establishments, who are at present not subject to compulsory social insurance, on the one hand, and the refinement of existing measures, on the other. The latter task will include the removal of such anomalies and inequalities as may appear in the actual application of the legislation, and the further extension of benefits as facilities and circumstances permit.

161 square mile; in the province of Hauran, 80 per square mile; and in the province of Hama, 77 per square mile. In contrast, the population density of Al Jazira, incorporating the potentially fertile plains of the Khabour river basin, was 18 per square
369 mile. The country is about 70 per cent rural,
162 with the inhabitants living in some 5,000 villages. There are 6 principal cities with populations of over 30,000 — Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Deir ez Zor. Damascus, the capital and a city of commercial and religious significance, had a population of almost 325,100 in 1949. Aleppo, an industrial and trade center, and the largest city in Syria, had a population of about 356,600. It disputes with Damascus the claim of being the oldest city of continued prominence in the world.

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167 In addition to the older refugee communities, as the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Druzes, which have become established minority groups, Syria received an influx in 1948 of about 150,000 Arabs from northern Palestine. Approximately 80,000 located around Damascus; others in Hauran and the northern provinces. Their status and ultimate distribution were still undetermined in 1952, when the number on the roster of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees totaled 84,000. Over one third resided in special camps, but the remainder were living independently in the various towns and villages.

167 During the Ottoman regime, large numbers of Syrians emigrated to the Americas, and to Europe and Africa. Although they probably total almost 60,000, the Syrian colonies abroad are small in comparison with those of the Lebanese, and their influence on the cultural and the economic life of their homeland is proportionately slight.

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185 The educational system has undergone revision since the founding of the republic in 1943, with increased emphasis on its adaptation to the culture and the needs of the
871 people. Elementary education is compul-

p. 138(B)

186, 728, 648, 668

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

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177 Syria has not been merely a passive receptacle for influences
● 186 coming in from outside. Whether or not the hypothesis of an
184 indigenous population and culture be accepted, it is certain that the geographical structure of the country, and the nature of its inhabitants as modified by that structure, have determined the forms which the incoming streams of influence have taken. For example, the sharp geographical divisions of Syria have helped to perpetuate the differences between various elements in the population, which have come into the country from different directions or from the same direction at different times: racial and tribal divisions have given rise to an intense localism of feeling, which has linked itself in various ways with the prejudices, the hostilities and the exclusiveness generated by the great political and religious conflicts of the past. Localism and particularism have deeply affected the political life of the country. Sometimes, when Syria has formed part of a larger political unit with a strong Government, they have been held in check ; but when the unit has disintegrated, or the Government has grown weak, the country has been partitioned between a number of petty and ephemeral local dynasties, more often than not at variance with one another.

Local and communal feeling is closely linked with the persistence of tradition. Throughout almost the whole of history the Syrians have been subjected to a succession of foreign conquerors. They have been forced at least partially to accept the customs and cultures of their rulers, and in the process they have acquired two arts : the art of rapid and superficial assimilation, and that of preserving, beneath new modes of behaviour and in new forms, their old beliefs and ways of living. 'Bow down to every nation which passes over you, but remember me in your hearts', said one of the founders of the Druze sect. It is a lesson which not only the Druzes have learned.

177 But the role of the Syrian population has not merely been one of assimilating, or resisting, outside influences. It has transformed these influences and spread them to the surrounding world, and it has made its own and original contributions to civilization. From the time of the Phœnicians, Syrian merchants have been scattered throughout western Asia and the Mediterranean world. Syrian officials helped to administer the Roman, the Arab and the Ottoman Empires.

II. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

I

THE opening of the First World War in 1914 found a number of Governments and groups with an interest in changing the political status of Syria. First, there were the Arab nationalists, who wanted the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire to become autonomous. They were divided in their political ideas and preferences. Some wished to achieve their aims through the help of Great Britain or France or the United States; others relied only upon their own strength and efforts. Some aimed at establishing an independent Arab State, others a self-governing Arab kingdom within an Ottoman federation, yet others a Syrian State loosely linked with the other Arabic-speaking regions. But all alike were hostile to the Young Turkish Government with its Pan-Turanian policy, and very many were willing, with greater or smaller hesitations and reservations, to throw in their lot with Great Britain should Turkey become involved in the war. 175 186

Arab nationalist sentiment was widespread among the army officers, officials, professional men and in general the educated classes. The nationalist societies in Syria like 'al-Fatat' were in touch with Arab nationalists in the other Arabic-speaking regions: with the Iraqi army officers of 'al-Ahd'; with the powerful Syrian colonies in Egypt and the New World; with the Sharif Husain, the ruler, under Turkish suzerainty, of the Moslem Holy Places in the Hejaz; and with Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, the most powerful ruler of central Arabia, and virtually an independent monarch in spite of a shadowy Turkish suzerainty.

Side by side with Arab nationalism there existed a lively particularist movement among the Lebanese Christians. They wished the autonomy of Lebanon to be completed and its frontiers extended; they looked to France for help in achieving their aims and for protection when these should have been realized. Certain of them were not hostile to Arab nationalism, provided it recognized the special position of Lebanon; some indeed worked actively for Syrian or Arab independence.

Of external powers, France was the most interested in Syria. 175 She possessed important interests in the country: investments, Christian missions and schools and a traditional connexion

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria #1 D1

abandoning their own religious codes. Law was personal. Not simply was there no concept of equality before the law; there was no idea of sameness.

For these reasons, throughout the period of Arab and Ottoman rule the Christians and Jews were allowed a certain autonomy. Each sect formed a community, or as it was called in Arabic a 'millah' and in Turkish a 'millet', within the State and co-terminous with it. In matters affecting the community, the Government treated with it as a whole through its heads, and not with the members of it individually. Certain civil functions were devolved upon the spiritual heads and representative bodies of the communities. They were allowed to administer the property and institutions of their communities and to decide matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on—in accordance with the tenets of their faith.

This system originated long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It developed gradually and was only formalized in the nineteenth century by a series of Imperial edicts. Throughout the period of Moslem ascendancy it succeeded in preserving self-respect and a sense of community among the religious minorities, although it may also have helped to perpetuate bitterness and suspicion between them.

The heterodox sects which clung to the fringes of Islam were in a more ambiguous position. Officially they were regarded as parts of the general body of Islam; but in fact the cleavage between them and the orthodox was almost as great as that between Moslems and Christians, and they like the Christians were usually left to direct their internal affairs in accordance with customary law and the precepts of their religions.

5

Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belonging to other communities; and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. This was true also of every Christian sect in its relations with the others, for each sect formed a separate 'millet'; and of the orthodox Moslems in their relations with the heterodox. Difference of sect was

no less important an element in the common consciousness than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

6

Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization. Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

11: Houtani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

 621

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

8

The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

9

Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

IV. THE WESTERNIZATION OF IDEAS

I

THE coming of the West aroused a new process of thought 000
not only in Syria but in all the Arabic-speaking countries; this process originated earliest and has developed furthest in Cairo and Beirut, but exists in some form in the other centres of Arab life, and is a single process which does not admit of sharp regional divisions. Much of this chapter will therefore concern itself with the general movement of thought in Arabic. Moreover, it will be necessary for the sake of exposition to formulate theoretical standpoints more clearly, articulately and abstractly, and in sharper opposition to one another, than they are formulated by contemporary Arabic writers.

The civilization of the West revealed itself in many lights 177
to the Arabs. It came to them asserting, in act if not in word, its own superiority and its contempt for the East; thus it aroused a sense of humiliation, the more bitter because the Arabs had for so long regarded themselves as the source of true religion and civilization. It came to them as a Christian civilization, and thus it compelled them to take a new view of Christianity and of its relationship with Islam. Again, although it was Christian, it was also secular, denying the theocratic idea of life and politics; thus it stimulated thought about the place of religion in society. It preached and practised a new view of human relationships; it was based upon an undreamed-of mechanical power and an unknown economic organization; it was prosperous and unimaginably strong. In these aspects it was to be feared as a force of oppression and destruction; but also perhaps to be imitated, since it held out hopes of an equal prosperity and strength. Above all, it appeared as a revolutionary force, threatening or promising radical change for worse or for better.

Some Arabs, among them many of the religious leaders, 186
averted their gaze from the possibilities of the new world, 177
and regarded it simply as a hostile force to be resisted; 829
except in the remote places of the Arabian peninsula, this school of thought has now practically died out. There were and still are others who are so intoxicated with the splendour of the West that they are prepared to give up not only their own traditions but even their faith in a special destiny for the Arabs and Islam, and to become fully and uncritically

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M91

Westernized as soon as possible. But the greater number of thoughtful Arabs have since the beginning of the Western penetration refused to go to either extreme. They realize that there is much that is good in Western civilization; that their own civilization is ill; and that its maladies would make it desirable, even did not its weakness make it inevitable, that it should be influenced and transformed by the West. But at the same time they can see clearly the faults in the West and the qualities of their own tradition; more fundamentally, they have faith that the Arab and Islamic peoples have creative gifts of their own and in consequence a special part to play in human history. Therefore their reaction to the impact of the West has been neither uncritical rejection nor uncritical acceptance, but a process of questioning which still continues: What can the Arabs become? What can they do in the world? What form and degree of Westernization will best serve to revive their creative spirit?

The paragraphs which follow will summarize some of the answers which different groups of Arabic thinkers give to these questions. It must however be made clear in advance that the explicit views of particular thinkers are only one among several factors which will determine the answer which the Arabs give to these questions. Men brought up in the Arabic language and the Moslem faith, and in unceasing contact with the West in their thoughts and their lives, are forced by the nature of their situation to make judgements and decisions about the acceptance or rejection of Western ideas and ways; these judgements and decisions are influenced or even determined by the Arab and Moslem standards of those who make them; and having been made they involve others which perhaps had not been foreseen. Thus by a process of unformulated and unsystematic thought the structure of society gradually changes. A thinker of genius may alter the direction of that process; but in the absence of genius, the explicit doctrines of the intellectual élite may have only a very limited effect.

2

The first task of the Arab thinkers was to understand the West. It was effectively begun in the days of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, has continued ever since and is still far from completion. Its methods are various: schools on the Western

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

fundamental principles. But it is important also for other reasons. Greek thought lies at the root of that Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages of which the significance has already been mentioned: it is therefore part of the intellectual heritage of the Islamic East as well as of the West; it may serve as that common ground of agreement and understanding which is necessary if a fruitful intellectual contact is to be re-established between the Moslem and the Christian worlds.

5

The Syrian people will have a special part to play in the intellectual reconstruction of Islam, because of certain characteristics which they possess. They are peculiarly aware of the 'tension' between East and West, and between Islam and Christianity. This is partly because their minds are exceptionally subtle, flexible and sensitive; but partly also because Syria has always been exposed to influences coming in from Mediterranean lands, and tends to be affected by them sooner and more profoundly than the other Arab countries. Through the mission-schools, through emigration and in other ways there has been built up in Syria an educated class Westernized in spirit as well as in externals, but still Arabic in language and for the most part in sympathies and feeling. Thus the conflict between East and West has become a conflict inside their own souls; as such it raises problems which pose themselves with peculiar urgency.

The factors which make the problems more profoundly felt and more urgent in Syria than elsewhere make them also more likely to find a solution there. It is educated Syrians who are best fitted to see the tension between East and West on the level not of politics or polemics but of doctrine. But if they are to contribute effectively to the revival of the Arab and Islamic mind, they must develop an intellectual life of their own, and not be content to become culturally a province of Egypt.

6

There is one factor which gives Syria a unique position in the Arab world. It possesses a large Christian population, whose intellectual life and Christian consciousness have been reviving in recent years. The impact of the West upon them has been as great as upon the Moslems, although of course it has taken a

185 different form: the West has meant for them not only the dis-
179 covery of a new way of life but, in the most fundamental things, a rediscovery of their true selves. The result has been an interesting and important revival of Christian culture, expressing itself through Arabic and through French. It began as a revival of literature and language, and as such was a part, and a very important part, of the general Arabic literary renaissance; but gradually it is becoming conscious of the deepest spiritual question which faces it, the question of what it is to be an Arab Christian.

186 This movement of Christian life and thought is important
185 first of all for its own sake, but also for the part it may
182 play in the re-awakening of Islam. The Syrian Christians are, as Christians, particularly fitted to understand the culture of Europe; while as Arabs, speaking the Arabic language and conversant with its literature, they can interpret Europe to the Arab Moslems and, what is more important still, can confront them inescapably with the challenge of Christianity. They do not feel the conflict between the West and the Islamic East in exactly the same form as that in which Moslems feel it. But they feel it in another form, and in one which raises problems of which the solution is both particularly necessary and particularly difficult. For them the problem poses itself as one of political loyalties, and therefore their material well-being and perhaps even their physical safety depend upon their solving it. In the conflict between the European Powers and the forces of nationalism, on which side should they range themselves? Religious affinities, long-standing ties of friendship, gratitude for favours received and fear of Moslem domination draw them to the side of Europe; but ties of language and culture, common feelings of humiliation and pride, and the desire to put an end to the religious dissensions of the past attract them to the nationalist camp. Divided loyalties of this sort are tragic, but they are also a necessary stage in the development of thought, alike for the individual and for whole peoples; it is in the struggle to reunite the divided personality that the intellect becomes mature. The Christians stand to the Syrian people roughly as the latter as a whole to the Arab people: it is in them that the tension which is felt vaguely and in some degree by all goes deepest and may reach its crisis earliest. But if the crisis is to be fruitful, they must try at one and the same time

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria MDI

to remember that they are Christians, and revive their specific 186
Eastern Christian thought and life, and to remember that 185
they are part of Arab Asia and have a special mission to perform 182
in the East. The attempt has already begun. Among the Catholics and Greek Orthodox of Beirut there are already small groups of thinkers who are trying to understand the nature of Christianity and of their special duty as members of the Eastern Churches; there are other groups which are struggling with the question of the national existence and loyalty of the Arab Christians. There are very few, however, who are trying to hold together in a balance the two aspects of their being, as Christians and as Arabs. The attempt is difficult, some would say impossible; but on its success depends much more than their own fate.

7

The other movement, that of secularization, springs from 185
the belief of many Arab thinkers that the superior strength and stability of Western society is due to the limitations which have been imposed upon the action and influence of religion. (This belief illustrates one of the main characteristics of Arab thought to-day: the conviction that the West has a 'secret', which, if only the Arabs could find it, would confer on them success similar to that of the Western nations.) In Western thought, each 'field' is autonomous in the choice of its principles and methods; and the Western community is a secular community, in which religion is tolerated, but no longer gives the regulative principles for every kind of human activity. Western thought is no longer theocentric, Western society no longer theocratic. In the same way the Arabs, these thinkers argue, should no longer attempt to regulate their society by Islamic doctrine and law; they should curb the pretensions of the religious leaders, and having done so should reorganize each aspect of their community in the light of those principles which Western experience shows to be appropriate to it. Secularism has taken many shapes. It has been one of the factors in the growth of the nationalist movement.[1] It is also giving rise to a movement of philosophical, ethical and social thought.

In the sphere of philosophical thought, this movement has so far made little headway. Books have been written upon

[1] See Chapter VI.

VI. ARAB NATIONALISM

I

000 OUT of the changes which have been discussed in the last three chapters, and the problems to which they have given rise, has grown the nationalist movement. Since this movement has for the most part taken an Arab rather than a specific Syrian or Lebanese form, it is necessary at the beginning to ask whether and in what sense the Syrians and Lebanese are Arabs.

143 Racially the Syrians and Lebanese are not of exactly the same stock as the Arabs of the Peninsula. The latter are mainly of the 'Mediterranean' race, with some exceptions. In the Syrian desert and parts of the interior of Syria, the inhabitants are also mainly Mediterranean; but in the mountains the Mediterranean has been united with an 'Alpine' element, to produce a 'Dinaric' or 'Armenoid' type. In most of the interior the population is a mixture of these two types, with the Mediterranean predominating.

186 143 Racial origin, however, is not of much influence upon popular judgement. When Syrians and Lebanese say that they belong to the Arab people, they mean that they possess the Arab heritage of language, history, literature and customs, and that they are conscious and proud of possessing it. The only exceptions to this are the Kurds, Turcomans, Circassians, Armenians and Assyrians, who together constitute only a small percentage of the population.[1]

143 It would perhaps be more correct to regard the Arab people, of which the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon form a part, as a group of peoples, which resemble one another in certain important respects but are dissimilar in others. The inhabitants of geographical Syria may be considered as constituting a single member of this group. They differ from the people of the Arabian Peninsula in that, while the latter are almost purely Arabic or 'Semitic' in their ways of life and thought, in the Syrians the Arab has been mixed with other influences. They differ on the other hand from the peoples of Iraq, of Egypt and of the other North African countries in that while these too have been partly moulded by other than Arab influences, the latter have not been identical with the influences upon Syrian and Lebanese life.

[1] See Chapter VII.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

In Iraq such influences have been largely Persian and central Asian; in Egypt there was an indigenous civilization which was not entirely submerged by the Arabian influences; in much of the rest of North Africa there is a Berber race which has resisted all attempts to assimilate it. To these differences must be added those which spring from the mere fact of living in different regions possessing varying economic possibilities and subjected at times to very diverse historical processes.

It is possible to observe differences not only between the members of the Arab group of peoples, but also within each people. Physically and culturally alike, various elements within the people of geographical Syria represent varying blends of Arabic, of Aramaic and other Semitic, and of non-Semitic influences. Many such differences which formerly existed have in the course of time been levelled out and forgotten, but some of them still linger on, especially in mountain districts. For example, there are a few villages north of Damascus in which Aramaic is still spoken side by side with Arabic. What is more important, the Maronites and other Christians in northern and central Lebanon have not on the whole the same consciousness of being Arabs as the other inhabitants of the country. This is true also to a great extent of the Arabic-speaking Syrian Orthodox and Catholics and of the Alawis in the district of Latakia.

Thus the answer to the question which was posed above is a complex one. The Syrians and Lebanese are members of the Arab group of peoples; but they differ in some important ways from other members of that group; and they also differ among themselves in certain ways.

2

Although the Syrians and Lebanese have been Arabs in this sense for many centuries, it is only in the last two generations that an explicit nationalist movement has grown up.

Nationalism exists wherever two factors, which are to be found in some form in every society, take a particular shape and have a particular relation to one another. The one is the consciousness of solidarity: the sense that there is between the members of a certain group a special closeness of feeling, a special similarity of reaction, a possibility of understanding based upon the possession of common characteristics—language, customs, memories, real or imagined ancestry.

186 The other is the will to work together for the attainment of a common aim in which all believe and for which all are willing to sacrifice something or everything. When this will derives its content from the consciousness of solidarity, and the members of the group take as their common aim the preservation both of that consciousness and of the characteristics on which it is based, nationalism arises. Political nationalism comes into existence when the attempt is made to achieve the common aim by means of the establishment of a State, which includes all the members of the group and of which the Government is imbued with the nationalist ideal.

000 In Europe, the idea of nationalism became an important political force during the nineteenth century. In one aspect it was a development of the idea that 'the people' can and should be master of its own destiny: that the ordinary citizens of a State have both the right, and if effectively organized, the power to set up and to pull down Governments; and that Governments are only entitled to demand the obedience of the community which they rule if and in so far as they emanate from the will of that community. In another aspect it was the child of Romanticism, which was, among other things, the attempt to discover in Time and History what for the Christian belongs only to eternity: an adequate object of sacrifice and worship, a supreme purpose and consummation of human life. One type of Romanticism found what it sought in the community and the life devoted to the service of the community; and it was especially attracted to that type of community which is based on common memories and a common history.

3

186 Among the Arabs, nationalism in the sense defined above
668 did not emerge until the later part of the nineteenth century. The sense of solidarity and pride in the Arab tradition had long existed; but they did not form the basis of a coherent movement until the West began to impinge upon the Arab world. Its impact had two effects, both of which worked together to produce the Arab movement. On the one hand, the West brought new dangers to the Arabo-Islamic life. On the other hand, far from destroying the Arabs' faith in their having a special part to play in history, it gave them fresh vitality and the promise of new strength. Arab nationalism

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

may be defined as the resurgence of the will to live of the Arab people, produced by the action of the West upon it, and with the object of combating the dangers and realizing the benefits of that action.

It is true that the explicit aim of the nationalist movement in its first phase was not to come to terms with the West but to shake off the rule of the Ottoman Turks. But it was not simply a movement of revolt against an oppressor. The Ottoman rule was resented so much more bitterly than in the past, not because it was so much worse, but because it prevented the attainment of that new life of which the Arabs were becoming aware, and made it impossible for them to take what they believed to be their rightful place in the world. The overthrow of the Turkish régime, in the conception at least of the more thoughtful of them, would only be the beginning of their national effort. It would create the conditions in which it would become possible to face the real problems of their community.

What those problems were has already been made clear in Chapters III and IV. Most fundamental of all was the danger of the complete destruction of the principles of loyalty upon which the traditional community had rested: membership of the family, the tribe and the religious community, respect for the past, the habit of obedience to the suzerain. Should they go and nothing take their place, the community might dissolve into a rabble of individuals without loyalties or the consciousness of belonging to a group. It was to avoid this danger that the nationalists endeavoured to arouse a consciousness of the common heritage of language, historical memories and customs shared by the Arabs; and to make that consciousness the basis of political action and ultimately of government.

A more immediate, although less fundamental, problem was raised by the penetration of Western goods and economic processes. This was beneficial in so far as it held out hopes of raising the standard of living of the people; but it dislocated the traditional structure of commerce and industry, and it threatened to place the economic life of the Arabs in the power of Western trading and concessionary companies. A similar process of dislocation was taking place in other aspects of social life. Here again much that was bad in the old order was being swept away, but also what was valuable

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Abbasids. Thus they were vividly aware that there had been a time when the Arabs had been conscious of themselves as a special community, and as a community had played a leading part in history. The thought of the solitary moment of history when the Arabs had been united in a single Empire, in which they had been the dominant element, overshadowed in their minds the memory of ages before and since. The revival of interest in Arabic literature in the course of the nineteenth century had a similar effect: coming to them through the medium of their own language, it aroused their pride and the sense of their own possibilities in a way which would have been impossible for the Greek culture of Syria or the pre-Islamic culture of Iraq. Then again the vision of a united Arab nation seemed to offer to a people becoming conscious of their weakness, and of the internal divisions which were the partial cause of it, a strength such as a Syrian or an Iraqi nation could never possess.

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In the light of this analysis, it is possible to summarize the assumptions and aims of the movement.

The basic assumptions of Arab nationalism are: first, that there is or can be created an Arab nation, formed of all who share the Arabic language and cultural heritage; secondly, that this Arab nation ought to form a single independent political unit, both in the interests of the nation itself and in those of the world; and thirdly, that the creation of such a political unit presupposes the development among the members of the Arab nation of a consciousness, not simply that they are members of it, but that their being members is the factor which should determine their political decisions and loyalties.

The ultimate aim of Arab nationalism is to preserve and enrich the Arab heritage: to enable the Arabs to live in the modern world on an equal footing with other peoples, and to contribute to its civilization without being forced to break with their past. The political objectives of the nationalist movement are the independence of all the Arab lands; the establishment of some degree of unity between them; the encouragement of national consciousness; and the reorganization of the social and economic structure of the nation by means of a process of controlled and discriminate Westernization.

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The movement of which these are the assumptions and aims is still at a comparatively early stage of development; and its ideals, although they have found their expression in patriotic rhetoric and poetry, have not yet achieved a reasoned and systematic exposition. But although Arab nationalism is still largely inarticulate and unformed, it does not spring only from passion and prejudice, nor is it confined only to the educated few who are its spokesmen. It is a movement with rational grounds and purposes, which, although they have not yet become fully explicit, exist implicitly and as motive forces alike in the mind of the peasant, who feels nothing but a vague unrest; of the educated townsman, in whom unrest has crystallized into definite emotions, desires and grievances; and of the politician, who expresses the emotions, desires and grievances in speeches and programmes. Although they might not be able to define and defend nationalism, they are all in some degree Arab nationalists.

Like all immature movements, Arab nationalism has not yet found its own authentic voice. It tends to imitate Western nationalism in its programme and its terminology. It is of great importance to make it clear that the spirit of the movement has not yet been definitely or adequately expressed. Its present form is not the only form which it could take. It is possible that if nationalism fails to obtain its explicit objectives, or even if it achieves them and its success is followed by disillusion, the feelings and desires which have given it birth will express themselves in different ways. Instead of a movement for an independent State and a modernized society there might be an outbreak of religious fanaticism, which would not help in the establishment of good relations between the Arabo-Islamic world and the West. Instead of a movement with rational purposes, there might arise one whose only ends were destruction and self-destruction.

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Which of these paths Arab nationalism will take depends very largely upon the relationship which it establishes, on the one hand with Islam, and on the other with the West.

Although the movements of Arab and of Islamic revival lay emphasis upon different points it is impossible wholly to separate Arab nationalist feeling from Islamic feeling. In most Arabs the two tend to flow together; the movements

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of national and of religious revival are energized by the same complex of desires and emotions within the individuals who have created and who sustain them; and the ordinary Moslem Arab is not conscious of belonging in one aspect of his being to the Arab community, and in another to the Islamic, but rather of belonging to a single integrated 'Arabo-Islamic' community in which he does not clearly distinguish the Arab from the Islamic elements. Even in analysis it is impossible wholly to separate the two. On the one hand there is in Islam no sharp distinction between spiritual and temporal, Church and State; and in consequence a movement of religious reform will have its repercussions in every sphere of social and political life. On the other, many Arab nationalists, especially of the older generation, would define the Arab nation partly in terms of the Islamic religion, which most members of the nation profess, and of which the Holy Book is written in Arabic; and they would therefore regard the preservation and revival of Islam as being among the aims of the nationalist movement.

What has just been said must be qualified in two ways. First, the secular view of life is becoming ever more widespread, especially among the younger generation and among those educated in Europe and America; and it is giving rise to the belief that it is better both for religion and for political activity if the two are kept distinct from one another. Thus it is possible to see the beginning of the idea of a secular nationalism, which rests upon elements of unity other than participation in a common religion; which aims at building a Westernized laic State; and in which therefore Moslems, Christians and atheists alike can join on a footing of equality. This lay nationalism is not consciously hostile to religion, although it is opposed to theocracy; but it is possible that at some time in the future it will come into conflict with Islamic orthodoxy.

Secondly, the connexion between Islam and Arab nationalism is perhaps emphasized less in Syria and Lebanon than in the other parts of Arab Asia. This is so not only because Syrians and Lebanese have assimilated Western thought more deeply than other Arab peoples and are more inclined to adopt modern Western secularism, but also because of the existence of an Arabic-speaking Christian element in the Syrian and Lebanese population. Moslem Arab nationalists

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cannot leave the Christians out of account in their plans for the future of Syria and Lebanon, and many of them sincerely desire Christians and Moslems alike to participate in the national community of the future. There are many Christians too who share the ideals of Arab nationalism; and indeed Syrian and Lebanese Christians were among the founders of the national movement, since they saw in the spread of the ideal of national unity the only way of escape from the religious differences which had for so long weakened their country. It is natural that Christian Arab nationalists should define the Arab nation mainly in terms of language, history, and race, and should draw a distinction, perhaps too sharply, between it and the Islamic community.

7

The present attitude of nationalism towards the Western Powers was determined during the years of the First World War and the subsequent peace settlement. Those years were not without their gains. It was then that the Arabs became conscious of their unity and of the strength which might be theirs. They gained collective pride and a memory of things done in common, and also legends and martyrs.

But they were also years of bitterness and disappointment. Freedom and unity seemed for a moment to be within the grasp of the Arabs, but they were snatched away. It has been described in Chapter II how the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided from one another into several States, only the most backward of which was recognized as immediately independent, the others being placed under British or French control. This was all the more disappointing because it was Great Britain which had promised the Arabs independence and unity and had appeared to be the friend of Arab nationalism. Thus the movement took on in those years an anti-British and anti-French, and even in general an anti-Western, complexion; indeed the mere fact that Great Britain and France were now in control of the Arab countries would have been enough to give it such a complexion. The hostility was mingled with disappointment, since politically these two Powers had seemed for a moment to be the friends of the nationalists; but also with gratitude, since culturally the movement was deeply in debt to them. The attitude of Arab nationalists to Great Britain and France has therefore

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among the Druzes of Jebel Druze are different from those among the Lebanese Christians. The growth of the Arab nationalist movement has also affected the problem of minorities. It is true that in principle Arab nationalism need not and indeed should not involve a problem of religious minorities. But there are several reasons why at the present day it does involve such a problem. The first reason is to be found in the immaturity of political thinking among the Arabs. Arabism, as the previous chapter made clear, has not yet determined its relationship with Islam; more generally, neither majority nor minorities have yet faced the problem of the connexion between religion and the State. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not their most thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs because they are heterodox Moslems or not Moslems at all; equally there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for unrestrained Sunni ascendancy. Among some of the Christian minorities there is a further tendency to regard the West as their spiritual home, to which they can belong in a way in which they could never belong to the Arabo-Islamic world to whose fringes they have so long clung.

The mutual suspicion has been increased in the last twenty-five years by the bad relations which have existed between the nationalists and the French authorities. In these years Arab nationalism has been largely a movement of opposition to France. Those whose nationalism is still coloured by religion draw from that an additional reason for suspecting the Christians as being of the same religion as the French. But quite apart from religious prejudice, suspicion has inevitably been aroused by the long-standing attachment of certain of the Christian communities to France. Many of the nationalists believe that this attachment has been used by her as an instrument in a policy of dividing, weakening and in other ways opposing the nationalist movement. Those of the minorities who have been used unwittingly in this way they regard as obstacles to the achievement of their aspirations; those who have lent themselves willingly to it they regard as traitors to the national cause.

Even when members of minorities become Arab nationalists, as many of them do, they often wear their nationalism with a difference. It is not only that they tend to emphasize

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points in the nationalist programme other than those which are emphasized by the Moslems ; they also sometimes conceive of themselves as having a special duty to perform in the movement. For example, some of the Christian nationalists regard it as their task to mediate Western civilization to the Arabs. This sense of a special duty makes for difference, if not for opposition.

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This much can be said of the whole of Syria and Lebanon. But if a more detailed analysis is to be attempted, Lebanon must be separated from Syria. While in Syria, and in the Levant States taken as a whole, the Sunni Moslems have an overwhelming preponderance, in Lebanon neither they nor any other community forms an absolute majority of the population, and the number of Christians of different sects is slightly greater than that of Moslems, orthodox and heterodox.

Inside Lebanon also a distinction must be made. As will be described later,[1] the Lebanese Republic of to-day was formed after the First World War, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of Lebanon, which consisted mainly of Mount Lebanon itself, of certain towns and outlying districts. In the former, the population is almost entirely Christian (mainly Maronite) and Druze. The additions included the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Saida (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre), and the districts of the Biqa' in the east and Jebel Amil in the south. In the towns the population is largely Sunni Moslem, although there are also numerous Shi'is, Greek Catholics and Orthodox and Armenians (mainly in Beirut). In the Biqa' and Jebel Amil the Shi'i Moslems are predominant, but here again there are large Greek Orthodox and Catholic and other communities.

In Mount Lebanon the majority is Christian, but the Druze community is large and strong enough to have played at least an equal and sometimes a greater part in the history of the Mountain. Thus the sectarian composition of Mount Lebanon is very different from that of the rest of the Mandated Territories. To a great extent also its history has diverged from that of other parts of geographical Syria. This has given rise to a specific Lebanese tradition. It is a tradition of asylum : remnants of sects and tribes, driven for one reason or another

[1] See Chapter IX, p. 172.

and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land. 000

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was 162
almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 103,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.[1]

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose 563
native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other 778
part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a 563
conflict between the greater number of French officials/ 86
who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds 563
have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups 619
being the Barazi and Milli; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the 'Hoybun' party. It aims at the

[1] Another estimate for 1937 was as follows: Arab Moslems 41,900; Kurds 81,430; Christians 31,050; others 4,150; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

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social and economic characteristics. For example, the Christians accounted in 1938 for about 32 per cent of the total school population, and for an even larger proportion of pupils in the secondary schools. It is important to notice that 32 per cent of the Christian students attended schools controlled mainly by foreign Christian missions, 61 per cent attended private schools mostly maintained by religious communities, and only 7 per cent attended official schools.[1] Since the education given in the first two types of school is sectarian, Christians are receiving a different kind of education from Moslems, a far larger proportion of whom attend official institutions.

Educational differences are reinforced by social ones. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of interconnected units, of which the relations with the Moslem community are peaceful and correct but not in normal circumstances cordial. This is especially true of the older people brought up under the Ottoman régime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of nationalism are helping to make the young less conscious than their elders of their confessional loyalties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects and religions. Economically, also, the Christians tend to constitute a more predominantly urban community than the Moslems, with all the differences which that involves, but there is a Christian peasantry in certain parts of the country, similar in many ways to the Moslem peasantry.

In spite of incidents like those of 1860, on the whole the history of Syria has not been one of religious persecution on a large scale, and the Christians have enjoyed long periods of toleration, although not of equality with the Moslems. Such toleration has existed partly because of the long residence of Christians in the country, partly because they were not numerous enough to constitute a serious threat to Moslem supremacy, and partly because clergy and laity alike were for the most part Arabic in language and culture.

On the whole the growth of the nationalist movement has not had unfavourable consequences for the Christians. Individual Christians have played an important part in the movement in Syria as elsewhere. Nor is it merely isolated

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 91.

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795 186 individuals who are sympathetic to Arab nationalism. Such sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox. (One reason for this may be that since the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Greek Orthodox have had no external 'protector' and so have had to understand the necessity of being on good terms with their neighbours.) Nationalist ideas are particularly strong in the younger generation, who imbibe them in school and elsewhere. The Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab traditions; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missionaries and teachers; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that any relaxation of French control would mean the loss of their privileged position.

The leaders of the nationalist movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians, and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of national feeling have often been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders springs from a genuine desire to create a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; and also from the wish not to alienate Western opinion. While, however, the more moderate and responsible nationalists are tolerant on principle and by sentiment, there is a certain suspicion of Christians among their less enlightened followers.

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563 The Druzes and Alawis in the six provinces are outlying sections of the larger communities in Jebel Druze and the district of Latakia respectively, and do not require separate discussion here. The Isma'ilis form a compact community in the province of Hama; they keep much to themselves and want only to be left alone. The Circassians are to be found in the Hauran, on the northern frontier and on the Euphrates; they still constitute a separate entity with their own language and customs. During the Syrian revolt of 1925 they were used as irregulars by the French authorities, and this made them more unpopular with the Arabs than before. Some of them have at times demanded local autonomy, but

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648 The great failure of French rule was to win the approval
186 and co-operation of the Syrian and the bulk of the Lebanese people. A large part of the population, and especially of the more articulate elements in it, was from the very beginning highly critical of French rule if not irreconcilably opposed to it; and criticism and opposition did not grow less with the passing of time.

To a great extent this attitude was based upon particular grievances, real or imagined. It was complained that France had failed to provide a reasonable standard of administration. The French officials were too often corrupt, avaricious and arbitrary; while the Syrian and Lebanese officials were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of responsibility. In consequence of this, the development of public services, even in spheres far removed from controversy and where the necessity of advance is generally recognized, was unsatisfactory, and Syria and Lebanon fell behind the neighbouring countries in providing amenities of life and opportunities of work.

The French officials, the indictment continues, not only proved themselves inefficient, but adopted a harmful attitude towards those whom they ruled. They did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated the country as if it were a French colony, and the inhabitants as on a level with France's African subjects; and at least in the early part of the Mandatory period they did not hesitate to express their contempt for the Arabs. The use of Sengalese troops first to expel Faisal and then on garrison duty seems to the Syrians and Lebanese to be a sign of this contempt.

It was further alleged that the elementary rights of the individual were denied: there was no freedom of speech, of assembly or of publication; imprisonment without trial was frequent. A particularly widespread complaint was of the activities of the officials of the 'Services Spéciaux', who, it is claimed, far exceeded their duties and often became petty despots in their districts, and even fomented disorder for their own or for France's benefit.

There were also various economic and financial grievances. It was said that the tariff-system did not give adequate protection to local enterprise; and often the extent to which France's hands were tied in this regard by the provisions of

the Mandate was ignored. The grant of all the more important concessions to French companies was widely resented. The terms of the contracts between the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were criticized as being too favourable to the Banque; and the linking of the currency to the fluctuating franc was resented as introducing into the country a factor of economic instability which might have been avoided. The arrangements by which French military and civil personnel could obtain imported goods duty-free, and the abuses which sprang from it, formed another common grievance. Finally, there was the widely-believed accusation that the French deliberately drained the country of the gold which it possessed in Ottoman times.

The inadequacies of the French administration were resented by almost all in both Syria and Lebanon, whatever their general political views. But there was also a large section of the population which opposes French rule on grounds of principle. The majority of the nationalists always refused to recognize the Mandate, which they regarded as contrary alike to the 'natural right' of nations to independence, to the promises made by the Allies during the first world war, and to the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provides for administrative advice and assistance, but not for semi-colonial rule. Besides opposing the Mandate as such, they resented the way in which it was imposed upon the Syrian people, and still more the way in which it was carried out. Not only was no independent Government established, but no appreciable progress was made towards that end. Only half-hearted attempts were made to set up representative institutions; little was done to create an efficient civil service; what was more important still, the division of the country into a number of States, and the encouragement given to separatism and to the intransigence of the minorities, seriously diminished the possibility of establishing a stable and representative Government. In the light of these facts, the nationalists believed that France never made a sincere attempt to fulfil the obligations imposed upon her by the Mandate in virtue of which she ruled Syria and Lebanon. They believed also that the longer France remained in the Levant, the more she would gradually destroy the possibility of national revival and self-government.

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Underlying all these grievances was resentment at the division of geographical Syria into French and British Mandated Territories: a division which was criticized both on grounds of principle and because of the economic and administrative dislocation which it caused. It is true that France was not wholly to blame for this, but it was an additional reason why the nationalists wished to obtain freedom of action.

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The ultimate political objectives of Arab nationalists in Syria and Lebanon are the same as those of the nationalists in other parts of Arab Asia: the unity and independence of the Arab people. But in so far as the political fate of Syria and Lebanon has been different from that of the other Arab regions, the immediate objectives of the Arab nationalist movement in the French Mandated Territories have differed from its objectives elsewhere. From 1918 to 1941 these immediate objectives were to bring about a radical change in French policy and to replace Mandatory rule by genuine self-government.

Although Arab nationalists were united in desiring the attainment of these objectives, they differed upon the means by which and the speed with which they hoped to attain them. Some of them did not consider that Syria and Lebanon were yet fit for complete independence, and advocated co-operation with the Mandatory Power, the gradual extension of self-government, the creation of a modern administrative machine and an educated ruling-class and electorate, and thus the achievement of independence by gradual stages. They included some considerable personalities but were never able to organize themselves into an effective political group. Others, who refused to recognize either the Mandate or the administrative partition of the French Mandated Territories, demanded immediate independence and unity.

The adoption of one or other of these attitudes did not necessarily imply friendship or hostility towards France as such. Even among so-called 'extremists' there was a widespread admiration for French culture, and a recognition that without the influence of that culture the Arab literary and political revivals would have been impossible. Those who opposed French policy were not necessarily hostile to France; and those who were Francophil were not necessarily free from

all distrust of French policy in the Levant. To call the nationalist opposition anti-French or xenophobe would be misleading, although it does contain elements to which those terms could be applied.

Nor would it be correct to regard the 'moderate' and 'extremist' groups as sharply differentiated from one another. They differed not on fundamental questions but on questions of means; they were akin to one another in sympathies, and individuals from the two often worked together. In so far as they were groups at all, they were groups of which the membership was constantly shifting. This was true also of the differences inside the 'extremist' section. There were some who saw no hope of obtaining independence except by the use of force. There were others who hoped to obtain it by the negotiation with France of a treaty similar in its nature and its terms to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which terminated Great Britain's Mandate over Iraq. There might be a few who disapproved of methods of violence on principle, and at the other extreme a few who disapproved of negotiating a treaty which would involve compromise and concession. But the majority would have supported negotiations for a treaty when they seemed likely to be fruitful, and have been willing to resort to violence if that should seem the most hopeful or the only way of attaining their objectives. As Chapters X-XII will show, the history of the years between 1920 and 1941 saw several changes of attitude on the part of the nationalists.

During those years, however, the nationalist movement was always essentially one of opposition. In Iraq, nationalism achieved its first objective, independence, comparatively early, and was brought face to face with practical problems of administration and construction. But in Syria and Lebanon the first objective was not so easily achieved, and in 1941, after more than twenty years of effort, the nationalists were still striving towards self-government, which obsessed them to the exclusion of other aims.[1]

[1] Although the declarations of independence made in 1941 changed the formal nature of French rule in Syria and Lebanon, they did not materially alter the attitude of the population to France. The complaints which were made during the earlier period are still made, and the Syrians and Lebanese are less willing than ever to acquiesce in French predominance. See Chapter XII and Postscript.

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independence, and less disposed to establish close relations with Syria and other Arab countries than the latter.[1]

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The State of the Alawis also remained tranquil, once the rising of 1919-1921 had been suppressed. The effort of the Mandatory authorities was directed mainly to encouraging the communal consciousness of the inhabitants (often by playing on their fears); and to raising their material and intellectual level through such measures as the creation of educational and medical services and the giving of assistance to agriculture. In these tasks they had considerable success; socially and economically the district progressed. Further, a greater degree of equality than had previously existed was established between the Alawis, Sunnis and Christians. The administration was mainly in French hands, although there was a Representative Council and efforts were made to increase the share of the inhabitants in the government, as trained and suitable administrators became available. In 1930 an Organic Law was promulgated defining the nature and activities of the political institutions of the State, whose name was then changed to 'the Government of Latakia'.

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The Alawis and many of the Christians were content to have no direct connection with the State of Syria, and among the former there developed a more conscious particularist spirit than they had previously possessed. But the Sunnis, here as in Lebanon, disapproved of a situation in which from being the dominant class they became a minority, and accused the Mandatory Power of neglecting their interests in favour of those of the Alawis; they, and all those who held Arab nationalist views, saw clearly the dangers in France's policy of encouraging the separatism of the Alawis and teaching them to rely on foreign support. They demanded the reincorporation of the region in the State of Syria, and their demand was supported by the Sunnis and Arab nationalists in Syria.

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The history of the other two States was not so tranquil. Alike in Syria and Jebel Druze unrest and discontent appeared in the early years of the Mandate, and issued finally in the revolt of 1925-1926.

[1] For recent changes in Lebanese feeling, see Postscript.

648 from the Mandatory Power to the Syrian Government being completed within four years.[1]

648 The Treaty was immediately laid before the Chamber. Its
646 reception by the nationalists inside and outside the Chamber was so unfavourable as to make it clear that it had no chance of acceptance. Accordingly the High Commissioner suspended the sittings of the Chamber, withdrew from its cognizance the terms of the Treaty, and authorized the President of the Republic to govern provisionally by means of decree-laws. A year later, in November, 1934, he suspended the Chamber *sine die*. These acts aroused the resentment and indignation of the nationalists, but in general the country remained quiet, apart from local and ephemeral disturbances, throughout 1934 and 1935. In March, 1934, the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, which continued in office for practically two years.

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665 Perhaps the most important development of the early 1930's
186 was the growth of a number of political parties with a special appeal to the educated youth of the towns, and therefore of great significance in a country whose political circumstances gave peculiar weight to the actions of the young. Very different from one another in their doctrines and their aims, these parties were alike in that they endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older parties had not for the most part possessed ; alike, too, in that they tried to base their activities not upon gusts of feeling or some immediate objective, but upon systematic and reasoned doctrines. They expressed and attempted to direct the spirit of the youth of Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and the other towns : a restless youth, discontented both with its foreign masters and with its own older generation, conscious of talents and ideas and cramped by lack of opportunity, drawn simultaneously towards and away from the West, eager and suspicious, hasty and thoughtful. Even when the youth-movements took a paramilitary form, that does not necessarily mean that they were Fascist ; they were merely endeavouring to satisfy certain human needs which in more fortunate

[1] For text, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1933* (Paris, 1934), pp. 189–95.

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countries are satisfied by days of national celebration, by military service and voluntary organizations. 665 186

One of these organizations was the 'Syrian National Party', founded by Antun Saadeh, a Lebanese Christian brought up in South America. This Party professed or rather formulated the specific Syrian as distinct from Arab nationalism which has already been mentioned.[1] At first a secret society, it was discovered by the authorities in 1935, and its leading members imprisoned. From that time it grew in size and importance, in spite of the many obstacles in its path. These obstacles were of various types: the hostility of the authorities, who more than once dissolved the party; the opposition of the Arab nationalists, who regarded it as a separatist movement; and the widespread belief that the party was in too close touch with European Fascism. That it was able to hold its own was also due to several factors. First, it made a more determined effort than any other organization to think out the whole national problem in all its aspects, and to formulate a programme in the light of clear and valid political principles. Again, it was rigidly organized on the membership principle, with a hierarchy, a logical division of functions and a strict discipline. Finally, its leader was a man of courage, decision and powerful intellect. 665

The party reached its zenith a year or two before the beginning of the war. It had several thousand adherents, largely but not exclusively Lebanese Christians. With the departure of the leader for South America in 1938 a decline set in, but whether temporary or permanent has still to be seen.

Simultaneously there grew up a number of Arab nationalist youth organizations. The most influential of them was the League of National Action, which tried to weld into a unity the youth of all the Arab countries. Its form was that of a federation of local societies. It stood for the independence and union of the Arab world, and was not prepared to accept any agreement with the Western Powers unless they should completely renounce their imperialist designs. Its programme was formulated at a conference held in Lebanon in 1933, and for some years after that it flourished in the Syrian towns, But it was never important in the other Arab countries, and even in Syria it suffered an irreparable blow by the death of

[1] See Chapter VI.

631 National Bloc, Mazhar Raslan as Governor of Latakia and Nasib al-Bakri as Governor of Jebel Druze.

648 Although the Treaty had not yet been ratified by the French
642 Parliament, it was agreed that the transitional period should be regarded as starting on January 1st, 1937. A beginning was made with the transfer to the Syrian Government of functions hitherto exercised by the French authorities. The Government was given the right freely to prepare and carry out its budget, and a certain control over the police; in principle the High Commissioner ceased to exercise his right to veto legislation, and the 'conseillers' to control ministerial acts. But the Mandatory Power still retained the conduct of foreign relations, the ultimate responsibility for public order and certain administrative services such as the supervision of the Beduin tribes.

665 These events seemed to show that the policy of the Bloc was
186 successful. It was still united; it had an overwhelming majority in the Chamber; its adherents filled the offices of the Government; it commanded a large measure of support in the country, especially among the younger generation.

Opposition to the Bloc existed, but it was so far largely inarticulate and undirected. It consisted of a handful of Deputies; of some extreme Arab nationalist organizations, which refused to recognize the Mandate and regarded co-operation with the French as treason; and of the separatist movements among the Alawis and Druzes and in the Jazirah.

The hopes of Syrian independence reached their climax in the celebrations which marked the return to Syria of the newly-amnestied exiles, Dr. Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash in May, 1937, the Amir Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in June. It seemed as if the country were entering upon a new period of national construction under leaders whose patriotic energy had only been strengthened by disappointment, imprisonment, and long years of exile.

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648 The next two years saw the collapse of these hopes. The claims of Turkey to Alexandretta, the growth of separatist movements, the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty, the unrest caused by the disturbances in Palestine, the administrative failure of the Nationalist Government and finally the growth of an internal

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 200

both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty.

The Treaty and the new régime were received with approval by a number of the Druzes and Alawis; even former autonomists expressed their loyalty to the Syrian Government. This reaction, however, was transient and deceptive. In Jebel Druze discord began to arise early in 1937, after the appointment of Nasib al-Bakri, a Damascene Moslem, as first Governor of the province. A powerful party demanded the appointment of a Druze notable, Hasan al-Atrash, and also a large measure of autonomy; the nationalists asserted that it was encouraged to go to extremes by local French officials. There were also, however, many Druzes who supported the nationalist Government and the Governor whom it had appointed. Attempts were made with no more than a temporary success to reconcile the advocates of separatism with those of unity. The disturbances were not ended until the Governor resigned and was replaced after an interval by Hasan al-Atrash. By the end of 1937 the Jebel was quiet enough to enable Parliamentary elections to be held. The calm continued throughout 1938, but at the beginning of 1939 disturbances began once more. The separatist group accused the Syrian Government of bad faith, expelled Syrian officials from the province and declared the independence of Jebel Druze under the protection of France.

A similar process had meanwhile been occurring in the Alawi district, which was known under the new régime as the Province of Latakia. Here, as in Jebel Druze, there was tranquillity at first, and Parliamentary elections were held in 1937. But the calm was short-lived. The Alawi notables protested against the appointment of Syrian Moslem officials, and more especially of nationalist Governors, first Mazhar Raslan from Homs and then Ihsan al-Jabiri, a Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. The nationalist policy of assimilation was perhaps carried out hastily and tactlessly, the Governor alienated large sections of the population, and at the beginning of 1939 armed bands rose in revolt under the leadership of the deputy Sulaiman Murshid, a brigand who had proclaimed himself 'God' and had secured considerable local influence with the help of certain French officials. At about the same time the visit of the High Commissioner, M. Puaux, was made the occasion for demonstrations in favour of autonomy. Soon

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria #01

afterwards the Governor found his position impossible and 631
was compelled to abandon it. He was not replaced, his 664
powers being assumed in July by the High Commissioner's 186
Delegate.

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The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 effected no formal change in the status of the Jazirah, but its signature was followed by the replacement of the French officials who had ruled it until then, by Syrian administrators. Here as in Jebel Druze and the Alawi region discontent soon showed itself. There were some who felt and expressed loyalty to the new/national Government. But there was an important element which demanded that the ties between the Jazirah and the central Government in Damascus should be as loose as possible, or should be severed altogether. Their minimum demand was that the local officials should be chosen from among the local population; their maximum, for complete separation from Syria. Their discontent was increased by the lack of wisdom shown by some of the more irresponsible nationalists, although the Government itself acted on the whole in a conciliatory manner. The autonomists appear to have been encouraged by certain of the local French officials; the nationalists claimed, indeed, that here as among the Alawis and Druzes the minorities would have acquiesced in their rule had it not been for the activities of French agents. The separatists were themselves divided on everything except their dislike of being ruled by the nationalists of Damascus. Some were Kurds, who objected mainly to being ruled by Arabs; others Christians, who objected also to being ruled by Moslems. These two groups sometimes but not always acted together during the years from 1936 to 1939.

Serious trouble first broke out in June, 1937, when the 669
Kurds of Hassetche revolted against the appointment of 563
nationalist officials from outside the Jazirah. The rising was 631
quelled with the aid of the French military authorities, but it was soon taken up in Qamishli and elsewhere by the Christians, who demanded a special statute similar to that of Alexandretta, an administration which would give equal weight to the rights of all sects and races, and the withdrawal from the province of officials who had not been chosen from the local population.

Mediterranean, by General Dentz. These measures could not, however, prevent the spread of pro-Allied sympathies both in the army and in the civil administration; towards the end of 1940 a number of those suspected of having such sympathies were arrested and interned.

While Axis interference was increasing, Franco-British relations in the Levant as elsewhere were becoming ever more strained. The British blockade was extended to Syria and Lebanon, trade between which and the neighbouring Arab countries greatly diminished in consequence. Travel between Palestine and the French Mandated Territories was severely restricted. The French authorities prohibited public listening to British radio programmes. From time to time, moreover, the French authorities issued statements to the effect that the French army of the Levant still existed and was prepared to defend French territory against aggression from whatever direction it might come.

3

Among the population, the effect of the French capitulation and of subsequent events was not so much to bring new tendencies into existence as to encourage those which already existed. The growth of Axis influence and of British determination to oppose it increased the fear that the country would become a battleground. The restriction of trade with Palestine, Iraq and Egypt, and the persistence of hoarding and profiteering in spite of all measures taken to stop them, brought nearer the spectre of famine. The ambiguous position of France after the Armistice made it even more difficult than before for Syrians and Lebanese to take sides in the war. There were, it is true, a small number who approved of the New Order in France, and extreme nationalists who desired a German victory; there were others who, from principle or interest, desired a British occupation of the country. But for the majority of politically conscious Syrians, the collapse of France and her subsequent difficulties served not so much to throw them into the arms of her former ally or her former enemy, as to make them more than ever eager to rid themselves of French and all foreign domination. They felt it a humiliation to be subjected to a defeated and weak nation; and with the withdrawal of France from the League

678 of Nations on April 18th, 1941, they regarded the juridical
186 basis of French Mandatory rule as having disappeared.

Political meetings and demonstrations being forbidden, nationalist uneasiness remained for the most part beneath the surface throughout 1940. But it revealed itself in the press of other Arab countries and the activities of their Governments; this was especially true of Iraq. Thus in July, 1940, Nuri as-Said, then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara, Beirut and Damascus in order to discuss with the Turkish and French authorities and with prominent Syrians and Lebanese the future of the French Mandated Territories. At the conclusion of his journey he issued a statement to the effect that both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments thought that Syria should be for the Syrians and that the country should enjoy complete independence.

665 A symptom of the prevalent unrest was the murder of Dr.
662 Shahbandar in Damascus in the same month, while his political influence was at its height. Within a few days his assassins were arrested. After the preliminary investigation had been completed a special tribunal was set up to try them and certain other persons believed to be implicated in the crime. Among the latter were three of the leaders of the National Bloc, Jamil Mardam Bey, Saadullah al-Jabiri and Lutfi al-Haffar. They were accused of deliberate complicity in the assassination. Almost at the same time as the accusation against them was published, all three left Syria for Baghdad.

The trial of the accused persons began in December, 1940. In the course of it the leader of the assassins made a complete confession: their motive in deciding to kill Dr. Shahbandar had been religious, since they regarded him as one of those responsible for the decay of Islam; they had tried to throw the blame for their crime upon the leaders of the Bloc, who in reality had had nothing to do with it. The trial ended at the beginning of January, with the condemnation of six persons to death and several others to imprisonment, and the complete exoneration of Jamil Mardam Bey, Lutfi al-Haffar and Saadullah al-Jabiri. The sentences were carried out immediately.

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000 At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

000 Lebanon the Government of Sami as-Sulh succeeded that of
645 Ahmad ad-Da'uq. In Syria, Hasan al-Hakim resigned in April, 1942, and was succeeded by Husni al-Barazi, who himself gave way in January, 1943, to Jamil al-Ulshi. These changes had only a very limited significance.

648 This failure to restore the constitutional Government
186 increased the discontent which had already been caused in both Syria and Lebanon by the way in which their independence had been proclaimed. The administrative methods of the Free French officials were also much criticized; more particularly, a general contempt was felt for the many officials who had served Vichy and had only gone over to Free France after the occupation of the country in 1941. Thus the belief grew up that Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing by their change of masters. It was a belief held not only by the political classes but by ordinary citizens who resented the inefficiency of the French administration; not only by Arab nationalists but even by many of the Lebanese Christians, who could not feel towards the Free French the admiration, gratitude and trust which they had had for France as a great Power. In the circumstances it was natural that Great Britain should be largely blamed for the actions of her ally.

645 One consequence of the discontent was a revival in the
665 power of the National Bloc. The dissensions between its leaders were patched up, and the Bloc united in its demand for the restoration of the Chamber of 1936-1939 or else the holding of fresh elections. Its spokesman was Shukri al-Quwatli, whose reputation had grown steadily throughout the years. In October, 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation, he absented himself from Syria on a visit to Arabia and Iraq; but after his return to Damascus in September, 1942, he became once more the dominant figure of the political scene. Side by side with the revival of the Bloc there went a growth in the size and influence of the Socialist and Communist movements; this was due not so much to the spread of Marxist doctrines as to the universal discontent with the existing order and the eagerness to snatch at any hope of change.

14

722 In Syria and Lebanon alike, the attention of the greater part of the population was concentrated upon the economic problems of the war. Two of them were peculiarly important.

iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. S L 648 625

iv. The control of the Beduin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.) S L 648 204

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed : S L 648

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions : an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole sources of legislation ; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments ; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of S L 648 86

S 641 L 648 they thought fit; or in general to enter into any engagements which would place obstacles in the way of their closer association with their neighbours. Nor would they give a privileged position to any other Power. It was clear, however, that they would be willing to negotiate treaties of alliance and friendship with all the major Powers, France among them, and to take their full share in the task of guaranteeing international security, under the supervision of whatever international authority might be established. They would also be willing to recognize the position of French cultural and economic institutions functioning in the Levant States and to give guarantees for their freedom of action; for example, they would give assurances for the position of French concessionary companies and French schools, always provided that they confined themselves to their proper functions and did not use their freedom for political ends. They would also give guarantees to French officials and advisers in their service.

In the course of 1944, tentative discussions but not official negotiations took place with a view to clarifying the position of the two parties. They led, however, to no agreement between the two points of view, and at the end of 1944 the question of the treaty was no nearer settlement than it had been at the beginning.

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S 648 186 The great mass of Syrian political opinion was behind the Government in its attitude towards the Army and the Treaty; if it differed from the Government, it differed in being more intransigent and less inclined to endure delays or make concessions. It was clear that, should a clash come, the French authorities could not fall back upon their old expedient of installing a 'moderate' ministry of puppets. The present governing group indeed was the most moderate that could be expected. It had already lost some of its popular support and had been severely criticized in the Chamber on account of its efforts to restrain the impatience of the people, and was only kept in power by the absence of any alternative and the personal ascendancy of the President.

L 648 186 In Lebanon, too, the attitude defined in the preceding section was held by the greater part of the Government and of the political public, but not so unanimously and unreservedly

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S 648 1952 and he has obvious affinities with General Neguib of Egypt whom he visited later in the year.

The threat of Zionism is considered very real in Syria and Shishakli has declared that Syria has not given up hope of a revision of the present position. Between March and May 1951 a flare-up over Lake Huleh brought an offer of Iraqi aid to Syria, but hostilities between Syria and Israel were localized and stifled without leading to a general outbreak of war. All Syrians wish Israel ill; fear of Israeli expansion remains and is fostered by the Government.

S 185 186 In internal politics, the most progressive measures which have yet been considered are land reform and the partition of state lands. There is little unrest among the people, who generally want to live their lives without undue government interference. Nationalism of two kinds exists: a nascent patriotism that has for the first time the support of the rulers, and a narrow xenophobia that, while less extreme than in Egypt, is more pronounced in Syria than in Lebanon.

(b) Lebanon

L 642 646 643 Lebanon is a republic of which the Chamber of Deputies was till 1953 elected by direct manhood suffrage but in that year women were permitted to vote in the election. By convention, the President of the Republic must be a Christian and is normally a Maronite, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim and the President of the Chamber a Shii Muslim. The table on p. 466 above shows the division of parliamentary seats between the religious sects; a scrupulous observance of these quotas is evident even in the civil service establishments. The existence of a Christian majority is held to be essential for the survival of Lebanon as a separate state and so, in June 1950, it was found convenient to extend the franchise to Lebanese abroad (of whom the majority are Christian) and to increase the number of deputies from 55 to 77, but in November 1952, under a new electoral law, the number was reduced to 44. The Muslim rate of natural increase is higher than that of the Christians and it is probably for this reason that no census has been taken since. In other ways the constitution and administration are similar to those of Syria already described.

Internal Politics

L 665 668 As in Syria, a European type of political party system has not yet evolved and the struggle has been not only between different cliques of ruling families backed by great commercial wealth, but also between these rich groups on the one hand and

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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433 is a modern glass factory for window and mirror glass and for glass containers, with a total estimated annual capacity of over 14,000 tons. This enterprise has suffered from the fact that the sand has to be imported and also from being built before the necessary export market had been secured to keep its three ovens working. Flour mills are plentiful and more are to be constructed; the production of flour is about 400,000 tons a year. In Damascus there are two spaghetti factories and starch is also produced. Tinned fruit, jam, chocolates, and sweets are also produced in Damascus and there are factories for matches (output 45 million boxes in 1952), margarine, soft drinks, and shoes as well as a number of tanneries and workshops in Aleppo and Damascus. A paper mill has recently begun production, with an output of 4 million square metres of corrugated paper and cardboard boxes in 1952.

SYRIAN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY
(Estimates for 1952)

Number of Factories	*Tons Capacity*
2 Cement	200,000
1 Sugar	10,000
1 Asphalt	variable
9 Edible oil*	12,000
68 Raw cotton ginning	600,000
3 Food preserving (major)	5,000
1 Glass (plate and rolled)	7,500
(containers)	8,000
3 Tobacco	2,000

* Olive and cotton seed.

(SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus 1952.)

[186] Industry contributes only about a half as much as agriculture to Syria's gross national product, but the spirit of nationalism has led the Government to give special support to local industries although not all are economically sound. As Syria lacks industrial raw materials, industries based on local agricultural produce should be encouraged rather than those which depend on imported raw materials and foreign markets.

Finance

436 648 The Syrian pound of 100 piastres (reputedly backed as to 60 per cent by gold and foreign currency) is linked to the French franc. Syria is a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a quota of $6½ million. 435 War-time inflation subsided 439 by the end of 1948, but with the Korean boom in primary product prices and the subsequent export surpluses and heavy

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

is a very high figure, representing more than 50 per cent of the total land under cultivation, and the United States Agricultural Attache is inclined to believe that the Ministry's figures include the total area served by irrigation systems, whether or not all the land receives water each year. 241 312

There are no large-scale irrigation works in Syria. State and local governments have constructed and now maintain a number of small dams, diversions, and canals, but the total area served by these public works in 1951 was only 100,000 acres. Several other projects, scheduled for completion within the next three or four years, will increase the area under public works another 100,000 acres. Most of these projects are being financed by the federal government out of its regular budget. 312 653

By far the largest area is served by small diversions operated by individuals. The next largest and fastest growing area under irrigation is that served by mechanical pumps. The number of pumps doubled from 1950 to 1951 and the area irrigated increased three times. These pumps are used mostly for drawing water from streams. 312

In the absence of detailed surveys, accurate estimates as to how much water might be available from all sources are impossible to obtain. Draining the Ghab Swamps on the Orontes River west of Aleppo to bring another 100,000 acres into cultivation is now being studied by a Dutch engineering firm, and a large dam on the Euphrates River to impound water in sufficient volume to serve an additional 750,000 acres is under consideration. Several million acres of land along the Euphrates River probably are suitable for cultivation from the standpoint of soil if water becomes available. At the present time irrigation along the Euphrates is limited to the low-lying land between the banks of the river. Through the centuries the river has cut a bed from a half mile to as much as 10 miles wide through the plain, which is now 30 to 50 feet above the water level. It has proved too expensive for individuals to use pumps to pull the water from the river for irrigation.

The same general condition prevails on the main tributary of the Euphrates, the Kabur. Numerous pumps have been installed along the Kabur, and a gravity system in the north, operated by a small dam and canals, is being extended under a current program. It is possible the water would be adequate to extend the gravity system slightly in the southern reaches of the river.

Water might be diverted also from the Tigris River which runs across the northeastern border of Syria. Extensive use of water from any of these international rivers, however, very likely would involve agreements with neighboring countries. Additional water might be provided also by the other rivers in the country. All of these proposals involve tremendously expensive projects beyond the means of the country to finance without outside help.

CAPITAL AND CREDIT

The highly nationalistic attitude of the Syrians damages the chances of private industry's securing a foreign loan. A recent law requiring all foreign operations to have Syrian managers and at least 50 per cent Syrian capital, together with the questionable security, makes sizable foreign investments unlikely. Under these conditions any foreign loans probably will be made to the government. The Syrian Government has made an obvious point of not obligating itself to another foreign power, and it is unlikely it will accept 471 186 648

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East .
Syria MDI

471 a loan directly from another government. This attitude is illustrated clearly
●186 in the refusal of Syria to sign an agreement with Point Four.
648 A loan from an international body is another matter, and the country is seeking a loan of several million dollars from the International Bank for development of transportation, particularly roads in the Jezira, and port facilities at Latakia.

454 Without a large-scale public works program, only minor improvements
241 can be made to the existing system. However, opportunities exist for increasing production through private investment.

The good crops of 1950, sold at exceptionally high prices, resulted in high profits and the accumulation of considerable capital. The hope of continued high profits caused much of this capital to be re-invested in equipment and farm improvements. The same incentive also brought out new capital which never before had been invested in agriculture. Judging from the number of tractors, combines and accessories, and irrigation pumps purchased during 1950 and 1951, the investment in agricultural equipment in these two years exceeded the total up to that time. Unprecedented expenditures for general farm improvements also were made, an exceptional step in a country without a history of investment in agricultural development beyond the acquisition of land and a few simple facilities. The capital base has been small. Production has about equaled consumption. There has been little surplus for savings. The few families with capital have used their funds in other ways, seldom for agriculture. But the experience of 1951 was not encouraging for long-continued investment in agricultural development. These investments were costly, many farmers paying double the United States prices for equip-

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These farmers are typical of those in northern Syria. All the tenants of one landlord usually live in villages like this one near Aleppo. Villages vary in size from a few hundred to several thousand depending on the size of the farm.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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Chapter 20

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

EDUCATION in Syria underwent a process of radical change in the years 1943–46. As Syria was under French mandate prior to World War II, the educational system had been gradually shaped after the French model with a twelve-year ladder of general education involving a primary-certificate examination, an examination for the *brevet*, and examinations for the *Baccalauréat*, First and Second Parts, the former divided into scientific and literary sections, and the latter into mathematics and philosophy sections. While instruction was in Arabic, French occupied a prominent place in the curriculum. The French adviser to the Ministry of Education wielded decisive influence over the educational decisions of the Ministry. Almost all educational missions were sent to France, and French-trained Syrians held the key positions in administration and teaching.

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With the declaration of the independence of Syria in 1941 and the holding of new elections which resulted in a nationalist victory, it was natural that the new Syrian government should wish to pursue a national policy in education, free from French influences, and calculated primarily to develop a Syrian-Arab type of education.

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In order to do this, the Syrian government procured the services of the well-known Arab educator, Sati' al-Husri, a man of outstanding ability who, after making a special study of Swiss, French, and Belgian education, had become the most prominent educator in Turkey prior to 1914. After the separation of the Arab provinces from Turkey he joined the short-lived Arab government of the late King Faysal in Syria as its Minister of Education. Upon the fall of this government he accompanied King Faysal to Iraq where he became Director General of Education, laying the main foundation of the Iraqi educational system and continuing to exercise considerable influence on that system until 1936. He left Iraq in 1941 to reside in Lebanon, and since he was of Syrian origin, he was invited by the Syrian government to study its educational system and report on

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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possible reforms. He brought to his task a decided nationalist outlook and considerable experience with the problems of education in the Near East. His sixteen reports, written between March and July 1944, have been published in one volume.[1] The recommendations of these reports served with very slight changes as the basis for the new educational organization in Syria, and inspired the laws and regulations which are now in force. The new policies constituted a sharp turn from French educational policies as they had been applied in Syria and caused considerable controversy and some armed conflict as late as 1945.

One of the causes of contention was the new education law (No. 121, "Embodying the Organization of Public Education") which was passed in December 1944. It provided, among other things, that no foreign language was to be taught in elementary schools. This meant the abolition of French from elementary schools, where it had formerly been required. The new law provided that a first foreign language was to be taught beginning with the first secondary year and a second foreign language beginning with the fifth year. Students were given their choice, thus putting French on an equal footing with any other foreign language—notably English, which was becoming increasingly popular.

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The Franco-Syrian clash of May 1945, when the French bombarded Damascus, resulted in the boycotting of French schools by the Syrian population, and they were compelled to close. As the year 1945–46 approached, French schools were told that to be allowed to reopen they would be required to register with the Ministry of Education, submit to supervision by the Ministry, follow the syllabuses of the Ministry in the teaching of the Arabic language, Arab history and geography, and comply with certain other conditions. Almost all French schools failed to do this and, therefore, remained closed. A few schools formerly registered as French now registered as national schools, put a Syrian citizen at the head of the school, and were allowed to open. These were usually schools run by Syrian monks or sisters.

The closing of the French schools, which had an enrollment of 19,503 in 1944–45, created a serious situation for the Ministry of Education. Thousands of students were confronted with the possibility of not being able to attend school, at the same time that the demand for education was increasing rapidly. The government, therefore, took drastic measures. A special budget annex was passed. Six new secondary schools and 52 new

[1] Sati' al-Husri, *Reports on the State of Education in Syria and Recommendations for Its Reform* (Damascus: Ministry of Education, Republic of Syria, Dar al-Hilal Press, 1944) 304 pp. (In Arabic.) Most of the statistical data on education in this chapter come from the al-Husri reports unless otherwise identified.

63:Simmons et al G-8 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

163 186 The people of Syria are predominantly of ancient Semitic stock, modified by centuries of conquest, and Arabic in culture, language and religion. The population, however, includes numerous minority groups, some of which exist as compact communities with distinctive customs and traditions. The official method of enumeration is on the basis 161 of religious affiliation. In 1949, the population was estimated at about 3,177,700, exclusive of undetermined numbers of Bedouin, representing less than 10 per cent 163 of the total. Approximately 86 per cent of 185 the inhabitants were adherents of Islam; about 69 per cent belonged to the Sunni sect. The heterodox sects consisted of roughly 355,500 Alawites, 100,600 Druses, 32,800 Ismailites, 13,700 Shiites and 2,900 Yazides.

Syria, like Lebanon, has important indigenous Christian minorities, which together account for almost 14 per cent of the population. As of 1949, the Greek Orthodox Church claimed about 153,900 members; the Armenian Orthodox, 107,300; the Syrian Orthodox, 44,970; and the Greek Catholic, 51,500. Other church groups, comprising Armenian, Syrian and Roman Catholics, Maronites, Nestorians (Assyrians), Chaldeans and Protestants, each numbered from 5,000 to 18,000. In addition, there were slightly over 31,000 Jews, mainly of Sephardic origin and with a long history of residence in Syria. With the exception of about 125,300 Armenians and 10,200 Assyrians, the members of the Christian minorities are largely Arabic-speaking and closely re- 167 lated to their Moslem compatriots. Most of 162 the Armenians have come to Syria since 1894 as refugees from Turkish territory. The majority reside in the larger towns, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo, but considerable numbers have settled in the Al Jazira region. The Assyrians who fled to Syria from Iraq in 1933 and the Chaldeans

p. 137(B)

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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CHAPTER V

SYRIA

In Syria, where the idea of Arab independence found some of its earliest protagonists, nationalism has been marked by a special degree of ill-temper, perhaps because the masses of the larger towns—Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, etc.—at an early stage became an object of political manœuvring. 186 669

Anti-foreign feelings had been aroused as early as 1925, when clashes with the French Mandatory régime led to the bombardment of Damascus. After the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936, Syria became a refuge for Palestinian Arab terrorists on the run. Fawzi Kaukji—an Albanian adventurer specialising in gun-running and gang warfare on behalf of Arab extremists—Amin al Husseini—the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem—and many other "wanted" disturbers of the peace found fertile soil for their activities in Syria.

Here the connection between Arab nationalism and Muslim fanaticism was particularly close, and even sermons in the Mosques frequently descended to the level of vicious and inflammatory diatribes against non-believers. As early as October, 1945, the leader of the "Young Muslims' Association," Sheikh Mustafa al-Sibaj, in a violent speech after the Friday midday prayers in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, threatened the Jews in Arab countries with disaster "if the Palestine problem is not solved in favour of the Arabs."

These characteristics of Arab nationalism in Syria have had their effect not only on the Jews but on the Christian minority also. Hence the attractiveness of neighbouring Lebanon, with its security of life for minorities, as a goal for Christian emigration. The same was true as regards the Jews of Syria, a steady stream of whom has been moving to Lebanon for the last 25 years. The early trickle has recently become so great in volume that, by now, it is believed that only a few remnants of the Jewish population are left in the two big towns of Aleppo and Damascus. 568 668

The last census—that of 1943—gave the number of Jews in Syria as 29,770 out of a total population of 2,860,411 (of whom 2,424,817 were Muslims). The majority of the Jews used to live in Aleppo and Damascus, with about 17,000 in Aleppo (compared with 35,000 in 1910) and 11,000 in Damascus. The remainder, rather isolated, dwelt mostly in the north-eastern province of Jezirah, where they had settled in 1924, along with Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians from Turkey and Iraq. 162 167

Of the 29,000 Jews in Syria in 1943, about 15,000 had left the country by 1947. At that time, there still remained about 10,000-11,000 in Aleppo and about 2,500-3,000 in Damascus. Less than 1,000

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

III The Shashans

√63 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
463 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with
134 those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

1621 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than
361 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dir-
bassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
167 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
463 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns
439 mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders
and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In
a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas
prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The
tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important com-
modities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurd-
ish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns
ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
463 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission
or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
452 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years
439 many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate
and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning
their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact,
the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its
need for the credit of Aleppo.

1621 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
√63 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and
191 living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
795 language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages 162
are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur 163
el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. 191
They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflict- 795
ed upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. 795
The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac 779
Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is consti- 162
tuted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following 167
the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from 657
that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League 463
of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. 648
Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the 662
memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all 182

seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

S 795 563 L 795 563 last war, when they were dislodged from their original homes in the Kurdish mountains; the Chaldaeans have lived in the Mosul area of Iraq for many centuries. In 1933 a period of tension between a section of the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government ended with the killing of some hundreds of them by Iraqi troops. Several thousands in consequence crossed the frontier into Syria, and although some of them later returned to Iraq, others were settled in the Jazirah with assistance from the League of Nations. Their settlement became an integral part of the Syrian State in 1942.

A large part of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics still speak Syriac. They have been settled since before the coming of Islam in north Syria and south Turkey, in and around the Taurus hills, against which the wave of Arab influence exhausted itself. Thus they have been able to preserve their S L Syriac dialect which farther south has been replaced almost everywhere by Arabic. Many are, however, bilingual in [191] Arabic and Syriac, and others have abandoned Syriac and are now Arabic-speaking.

S L 563 There are certain other groups which resemble the Armenians and Assyrians in not being Arabic-speaking, but unlike them are orthodox Moslems. The most important of them are:

(i) The Kurds, of whom there are perhaps 200,000.[1] They are mountaineers from the high country which links the Anatolian and Persian plateaux, and speak a dialect akin to Persian. Some of them have long been resident in the country, but others have emigrated in the last twenty years from their homes in the mountains of eastern Turkey, in order to escape the repressive measures of the Turkish Government. There are small numbers of Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Alawis and Christians, but most of those who speak Kurdish as their native language are Sunnis.

(ii) The Turcomans, who number perhaps 30,000. They came originally from Central Asia, and their language is a dialect of Turkish. Originally nomads, they have now become semi-sedentary or wholly sedentary cultivators of the soil.

[1] These figures are only rough estimates; there are no official statistics for national and racial minorities.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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of the property, the finances, and the philanthropic and educational activities of the church. A board of five men, all laymen, is chosen by the council to have charge of the schools. These 6 schools make a complete kindergarten, primary, and secondary ladder by themselves, consisting of 2 boys primary schools, 2 girls primary schools (1 of which is topped by an intermediate section), a coeducational primary school, and a complete secondary school for boys. Girls leaving the girls intermediate may join the secondary classes at the boys secondary school, and in 1945–46 there were 5 girls who had done this.

The schools are supported by fees, by income from the church endowment and property, by grants from the government, and by contributions. The buildings are owned by the Greek Orthodox church and community. The student body, though predominately Greek Orthodox, has students from other denominations. The boys secondary school, for example, has about 40 Muslims, 25 Jews, and 20 Catholics. The teaching staff of the school is also mixed: 16 Greek Orthodox, 5 Muslims, 2 Jews, and 3 Catholics. Fees are £S6 to £S90 in the primary schools and £S20 to £S200 in the secondary schools.

All pupils whose families receive help from the welfare society of the Greek Orthodox community are exempt from fees. Other pupils pay according to ability after inquiry by the priests and the committee.

In general, the curriculum follows that of the government, but with two important differences. French is begun in the first primary grade, and English in the first secondary grade. Arabic reading is begun toward the end of the first kindergarten year and continued in the second kindergarten year. By the time the children enter first grade, they know how to read. The first grade is, therefore, in reality equivalent to the second grade of the government schools; and, although the primary school is nominally five years, it is in actual fact six years. The first-grade children appear to be above the average age. This procedure may perhaps have been necessitated by the early teaching of French.

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The problem of teaching a multiplicity of languages in primary schools is found in an extreme form in Armenian schools. The largest Armenian community in Syria is in Aleppo where Armenians took refuge after the Armenian massacres in Turkey during the First World War. Anxious to preserve their national language and to know the language of the country of their adoption, they have had to teach both Arabic and Armenian. At the same time the advantages that accrued to those who knew French under the mandate made them introduce that language into their schools, while the fact that most Armenian youth who wanted to continue their

162 dwell in the Khabour river basin. The Syrian
167 Orthodox and Catholic churches flourish in
the north, where the inhabitants of many
[191] mountain villages employ Syriac dialects,
preserved since pre-Islamic times.

795 Prominent among the Moslem minorities are the Alawites and the Druses. Although both are scattered throughout the country, they are found primarily in the provinces, which, under the Mandate, were semi-autonomous units of the Levant. The Alawites inhabit the province of Latakia, comprising the coastal plain and a large part of the Orontes river valley, where they represent about 70 per cent of the population. The Druses form a closely knit religious community which migrated to the Jebel ed Druz highlands from Lebanon in the last century.

162 Several racial and linguistic minority groups are contained in the orthodox Moslem majority. About 200,000 Kurds reside in Syria, chiefly in Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces and in the city of Damascus. A large proportion have lived for generations on the fringes of Kurdistan, within the pres-
[167] ent boundaries of Syria, but some are recent colonists from eastern Turkey to the Al Jazira area, where they constitute a considerable part of the population. Smaller non-Arabic-speaking groups include about 30,000 Turkomans, settled around Aleppo and in the Orontes river valley, and almost 20,000 Circassians, found along the northern frontier and in the Euphrates river basin.

Over three quarters of the population live in the western and the northwestern provinces, with the greatest concentration in the coastal region, in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo, and in the Homs and the Hama areas. In the interior, the settled districts are limited to the river valleys, while the steppe and the desert country to the east and the south constitute
161 the home of nomadic Bedouin tribes. In 1948, the density of population in Latakia was estimated at 215 per square mile. In the province of Aleppo it was 113 per square mile; in the province of Damascus, 90 per

874 graduates are required to serve an additional year in an approved hospital before they are registered to practice. The instruction in the University is in Arabic, although [191] French and English are employed in technical terms and phraseology.

Schools of dentistry, pharmacy and nursing also function within the Faculty of Medicine. The School of Nursing is associated with the National Hospital, which is operated by the medical faculty. The course of training covers three years, with provision for a fourth year in midwifery. Practical nurses' training programs for girls are carried on in a few private institutions. Courses for the training of male nurses are furnished in all the larger government hospitals.

Personnel

759 Physicians. Between 670 and 726 physicians were practicing in Syria in 1951. The majority were established in the larger towns and cities. Approximately one half of the total were located in the province of Damascus and over one quarter in the province of Aleppo. The medical personnel of the Ministry of Health numbered 135, including 6 doctors on the headquarters administrative staff and 7 or 8 in the government laboratories. Five doctors were connected with the municipal health organization in Damascus, 5 in Aleppo and 1 each in Homs and Hama.

Dentists. From 175 to 209 dentists were registered in the country. About 75 per cent resided in Damascus, the remainder in Aleppo.

Nurses. In 1951, also, there were 352 male and female nurses. About 62 female nurses and an equal number of male nurses were employed by the Ministry of Health.

844 Others. From 148 to 210 graduate midwives, the majority of whom had preliminary nursing training, were practicing in Syria. They were about equally divided between the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo. Large numbers of untrained midwives worked in the rural villages in all

p. 148 (A)

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S L 161 162 chief towns of Syria and their populations are: Aleppo, 339,000 Damascus, the capital, 303,000; Hama, 134,000; Latakia, 90,000; Dair az-Zor, 65,000: of the Lebanon—Beirut, the capital, 247,000; Tripoli, 86,000; Sidon (Saida), 78,800; Zahle, 78,031. The population of each country is increasing by about 2 per cent a year. Between half a million and a million Syrians and Lebanese live abroad, mainly in the Americas and Africa; emigration continues; during 1952 about 100 Lebanese emigrated monthly, most of them to South America.

S L 162 *Religions*

RELIGIOUS SECTS AND PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

	Syria		Lebanon	
	Population in 1947	*Seats in 1947*	*Population in 1951*	*Seats in 1952*
Sunni	2,040,908	100	273,125	9
Shiis (incl. Alawis)	447,993	13	237,107	8
Druze	96,641	3	82,268	3
Maronite	14,133	1	377,544	13
Orthodox Greek	144,517	7	130,858	5
Orthodox Armenian	104,925	2	67,139	2
Orthodox Syrian (Jacobite)	43,081	2	4,562	
Catholic (Latin rite)	6,125		4,127	
Catholic (Greek rite)	49,543	2	81,764	3
Catholic (Syrian rite)	17,613	1	3,911	
Catholic (Armenian rite)	17,493	1	14,218	
Catholic (Chaldean rite)	4,991			
Protestants	11,959		12,641	
Nestorians	9,630			
Jews	30,873	1	5,993	
Others			6,684	
Minorities		3		1
Total:	3,043,310	136	1,303,441	44

S L 197 162 The language of the great majority of Syrians and Lebanese is Arabic, and they think of themselves as Arabs. There are minorities of race, religion, and language:[1] the Kurds number between 100,000 and 200,000 and are mainly in northern Syria; most of them speak Kurdish but are progressively becoming less and less distinct from the Arabs. The Armenians, who live mainly in the three principal cities, now number about 140,000, although some 20,000 emigrated to Soviet Armenia in the 1940's. Most of them came as refugees from the Turks after the First World War. Other racial minorities are the Turkomans, Circassians, and Assyrians. Most of the religious sects

S L 162

795 [1] For further details see A. H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1947).

44:Matthews and Akrawi S,G-S (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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*874 About one-third of the student body was from other countries, mainly Arab.

●[197] Teaching at the Syrian University is conducted entirely in Arabic. The Faculty of Medicine is the only such faculty in the Arabic world which teaches in Arabic.

Educational Missions

658 Educational missions were sent chiefly to France prior to World War II.
177 With the French government as mandatary power, with French advisers to the Ministry of Education, and with the Syrian educational system following French educational methods and ideas, this was to be expected. As has already been said, graduates of French universities and institutions were shown a decided preference in appointments to posts in the Ministry of Education. The situation was not different in other departments of the government. It was only natural, therefore, that even students going abroad for study at their own expense usually preferred to go to France.

Even in 1943–44, when the French grip on Syria had loosened, 58 out of a toal of 101 students on educational missions were studying in France; most of them had begun their study in the prewar period. Of the other 43, there were 37 in Egypt and 6 in Beirut.

For the year 1946–47 it was planned to send 120 students abroad. None of these was being sent to France, partly because of the aversion to the French that has developed in Syria, and partly because the new Secondary-School Certificate is no longer recognized in France. Most of the students were being sent by the Ministry of Education. The remainder were being sent by other ministries. The countries to which the students are being sent are Belgium, Switzerland (evidently taking the place of France), Great Britain, the United States, and Egypt. Only a few are destined to study in Great Britain or the United States largely because of the difficulty of securing admission to American and British universities. The subjects to be studied cover a wide range and include the various branches of engineering, architecture, technical education, agriculture, irrigation, mathematics, the sciences, finance, medicine, public and school health, law, archeology, Semitics, history, English, education, commerce, and Arabic literature.

The Education of Teachers

*874 The education of teachers in Syria has gone through a number of stages.
*875 In the latest of these, two kinds of teachers colleges were maintained: the

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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162 were left in the Jezirah district. An additional 5,000-6,000 Jews
167 emigrated at the beginning of 1948, leaving a total of about 9,000, with 4,500 in Aleppo, 4,000 in Damascus, and 500 in the Jezirah district. Further emigration took place that year; and it is estimated that there are now fewer than 6,000 left in the whole country.

This exodus was the culmination of many years of intimidation, material decline, and moral isolation. The smaller community in Damascus had always been poor. About 80 per cent earned their living as labourers and pedlars; approximately 15 per cent were able to maintain a slightly higher standard; while only 5 per cent were able to make a good living, mostly in commerce. The Aleppo community had in bygone days been prosperous and had been an active and important element of the city's once flourishing commerce. The rapid deterioration of conditions, however, made itself felt particularly strongly among the Jews of Aleppo; and since the wealthy were the first to leave the country, the remainder were impoverished even more swiftly.

197 Although knowledge of French is widespread among educated
563 Jews, the every-day language of the majority is either Arabic or Ladino. There are two *Alliance Israélite Universelle* schools, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus. Since the convocation of the first Parliament in December, 1936, there has been one Jewish representative in the Chamber of Deputies. He was, it is true, allowed to retain his seat even when persecution of the Jews reached its height. But, isolated as he was in a sea of feverish hostility, there was little he could do to alleviate the situation.

In 1945, a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Damascus, presided over by the Mufti of Damascus, sent a telegram to the Allied Governments, threatening that a Holy War against the Jews would be declared by all Islamic countries if Jewish immigration into Palestine continued. Within a month, this action and similar incitement from high quarters, coupled as they were with a violent anti-Jewish press campaign, bore fruit.

[579] On the Muslim holiday of Qurban Bairam, on November 18, an
563 infuriated mob, goaded on by a group of students, broke into the Great
668 Synagogue in Aleppo, smashed the candle burning in front of the Ark, battered some old Jews who were praying, and burnt the prayer books.

This was the signal for the outbreak of a general anti-Jewish campaign, made the worse by the incessant agitation carried on by nationalist orators among the Arab masses. There was the ugly murder of Jacques Franco, Assistant Headmaster of the *Alliance* School in Damascus. Suspicion that his death was the result of the prevailing unrest has never been entirely removed, even though there is insufficient evidence to prove it. There was the forcing of Rabbi Moshe Nahum, of the Jewish community of Jezirah, to make a statement protesting against Jewish immigration into Palestine. There was the humiliating spectacle of the heads of all three Jewish communities

iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. S L 648 635

iv. The control of the Beduin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.) S L 648 204

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed : S L 648

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions : an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole sources of legislation ; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments ; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of S L 648 186

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S L 181

In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trying to create one.

Social Survey

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The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

The Press

S L 204 656

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

Education

S L 871 [212] 658

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 MI Middle East MI
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the papers which could not afford to raise the guarantee. So in this case no freedom was lost, but might not much freedom have been lost if the situation had been reversed?

This same Lebanese law contained another provision, the purpose of which was the laudable one of obtaining fewer but better dailies. Here it is:

Chapter XIII, Article 68. Until the number of political periodicals in all Lebanese territory reaches 15 no new licenses will be given to a daily political periodical unless the person owns two licensed political daily newspapers which will stop being published finally as a condition for granting the new license. After that no new license will be given unless the person owns one political newspaper that will stop being published finally.

Nor was this provision being rigidly enforced. Enforcement of it could gradually cause the number of dailies in Lebanon to decline to fifteen, and thereafter remain at fifteen. Fifteen dailies should provide room for a good deal of diversity of opinion, and if this number were competing for the circulation and advertising revenues in Beirut and Tripoli which more than thirty dailies now have to share, the fifteen could afford to be much less dependent on secret funds than many Lebanese dailies now are. A provision like this is easy to defend, if it stops at this point. But the point also establishes a principle which is susceptible of extension. If the number can be limited by law to fifteen, under other conditions it can be limited by law to one official gazette.

Some of the most interesting experiments of recent years, designed to raise standards and reduce numbers through government intervention, have occurred in Syria. One of the sources who reviewed them in an interview was Ahmad Asseh, who at the time of the survey was director of programs for the Syrian Broadcasting Station and United Press correspondent in Damascus. Asseh participated in drafting the press law which was adopted by ministerial decree in 1949. Like many other Arab sources, Asseh said that the press has been much more free in the years since independence than it was under foreign rule. At first this was maintained by relatively loose administration of the laws which remained on the books after the French mandate ended in 1943 and the wartime French-British military occupation ended in 1945.

Although there were cabinet re-shuffles from time to time Syria had relatively stable government from this time until late in 1948, under the National Bloc of politicians whose prestige was high as a result of their recent triumph over the French. During much of this period Asseh was editor of *An Nasr*, an independent nationalist daily which was founded in 1943 to participate in the struggle against French rule and which at the time of the survey had the highest circulation of any daily in Damascus. He spoke of the freedom to criticize government which he had enjoyed as an editor

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 Ml Middle East Ml
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during this period. Two other Damascus owner editors, Najib Rayyis of *Al Qabas* and Wajih Haffar of *Al Insha*, expressed similar views. Nevertheless, according to Asseh, the newspapers kept pressing for still more freedom.

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It probably should be interpolated here that the prestige of the National Bloc was declining toward the end of this period and that criticism of it was on the increase. Its position became very shaky after the middle of 1948, when the Syrian Army in the Palestine War failed to live up to the public's high expectations of it and when this was blamed on corruption among the politicians in power. Asseh said an attempt was made in 1948 to adopt a press law which would have limited freedom greatly, but there were public demonstrations and this cabinet fell. A reference source[1] indicates that factors other than this attempt to adopt a new press law caused the fall of this cabinet on December 1, 1948. It turned out that this marked the start of a period of tremendous instability in government in Syria which endured down at least to the survey and which forms an important part of the background against which Syrian attempts to reform the press through government must be judged. Below is a brief review of these changes:[2]

December 17, 1948-March 30, 1949—After a 17-day crisis, a cabinet headed by Khalid al-Azm is formed and remains in power during this period of less than four months.

March 30-August 14, 1949—Army-supprted coup d'état brings government headed by Brig. Gen. Husni Za'im to power. Chamber is dissolved and constitution of Second Republic of Syria is suspended. Za'im is elected President late in the period in elections held after political parties have been suppressed by decree. Before regime has been in power four months it is overthrown by a second army-supported coup d'état led by Col. Sami Hinnawi.

August 14-December 19, 1949—Hinnawi, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, is an important political figure throughout this period, but the administration of the government is placed in the hands of a provisional civilian cabinet headed by Hashim al-Atasi. This cabinet governs by decree, pending the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Elections are held in November and on December 13 the provisional cabinet resigns, the intention being to permit the recently elected constituent assembly to select a new government. However, before this can be accomplished a third, army-supported coup d'état occurs, this one led by Lt. Col. Adib al-Shishakli.

December 19, 1949-May 29, 1950—Although Shishakli, either as deputy chief of staff and later chief of staff of the Syrian Army, remains an important political figure from this time on, the movement toward restoration of constitutional government is continued. The recently elected constituent assembly is not dissolved. It elects Hashim al-Atasi provisional president of Syria and proceeds with the work of drafting a new constitution. It takes until December

[1] *The Middle East*, op. cit., p. 396.

[2] Names, dates and much of the material taken from Chronology of Events sections of *Middle East Journal*. Vols. 3, 4, 5 and 6 cover this period. This was supplemented to some extent by material collected during the survey.

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 M1 Middle East M1
SYRIA MDI

28, nine days after the coup, to put together a provisional cabinet, acceptable both to the Army and the politically divided assembly. This cabinet, headed by Khalid al-Azm, then manages to govern until May 29, when it is forced out after about five months in power.

May 29-September 8, 1950—After a prolonged cabinet crisis, which really began on May 10 when the previous cabinet resigned and then withdrew its resignation for a few more days, a cabinet of caretakers, headed by Nazim al-Qudzi is put together. The understanding is that it will attempt to govern until the new constitution can be completed. This is accomplished and the constitution of the Third Republic of Syria is adopted on December 5. Provisional President Hashim al-Atasi is elected President on that date, and the constituent assembly becomes the Chamber of Deputies. The provisional cabinet resigns and Nazim al-Qudzi is asked to form a new cabinet, which he does on September 8. This cabinet is dominated by members of the People's Party, which in the elections of the previous year had been assured of control over 40-to-50 votes in the 114-member assembly. It wins a vote of confidence on September 11 of 63 to 5, which gives some indication of the delicate balance with which this and subsequent constitutional governments must attempt to govern.

September 8, 1950-March 10, 1951—With constitutional government now fully restored, the first cabinet headed by Nazim al-Qudzi under the Third Republic manages to stay in power five months before it is forced out.

March 10-July 31, 1951—After the Populist cabinet resigns on March 10, there is a crisis lasting until March 27, before Khalid al-Azm manages to form a coalition cabinet. It wins a vote of confidence of 50-0 on April 7, and attempts to govern with his shaky majority which is not really a majority and with the People's Party bloc in opposition. It lasts until July 31, about four months.

July 31-November 7, 1951—There is a prolonged crisis here, which actually began about July 19 and lasted until August 9, when Hasan al-Hakim, an independent, finally manages to put together a cabinet dominated by members of the People's Party. It lasts less than four months before it resigns as a result of divisions within the cabinet itself.

November 7-November 29—This 3-week period marks the longest cabinet crisis Syria has yet seen. Various leaders try and fail to form a cabinet. On November 28 one appears to be on the verge of being formed. It is scheduled to consist of seven Populists, two independents and one member of the Socialist Front. The head of it is to be Dr. Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, a Populist who has visited Moscow, who is reported to be pro-Russian, and who also is reputed to have Moslem Brotherhood connections. In the negotiations leading up to the formation of his proposed cabinet Dawalibi has held out for and is scheduled to hold the Ministry of Defense portfolio as well as the Prime Ministership. Col. Fawzi al-Silo, a supporter of Shishakli, had been Minister of Defense in the previous four cabinets, whether they were Populist-dominated or coalitions not dominated by the Populists. Before this proposed Dawalibi cabinet can take office, Syria's fourth coup d'état in two years occurs. It is led by Col. Adib al-Shishakli, who led the previous coup of December 19, 1949, largely in an effort to bloc a People's Party project

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 M1 Middle East M1
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for union of Syria with Hashimite Iraq, but who then retired from a position of great public prominence and permitted the effort to restore constitutional government to continue.

November 29, 1951 to ?—For a few days after Shishakli took power in his second coup he made some effort to permit the constitution to continue to function. Dawalibi, most of the members of his proposed cabinet and various People's Party leaders were arrested by Syrian Army forces under Shishakli's command on November 29, but the Chamber was not immediately dissolved. In fact, on December 1 it was announced that President Atasi, who was under house arrest, had asked Hamid al-Khuja to form a cabinet. On December 2 came the announcement that Atasi had resigned, the Chamber had been dissolved, and Shishakli had been proclaimed Chief of State. The following day Col. Fawzi al-Silo was named Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

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Syria's first major experiment at press reform came under the Za'im regime. The power of government, which was ruling by decree, was used to reduce the number of daily papers in Syria to ten, compared to the thirty or more which had been normal for all Syria for some years before and after World War II. The papers which were suspended were compensated for their loss. Syrians disagree as to the fairness with which this reduction in numbers was handled and as to its real purpose.

Asseh said Za'im appreciated the value of propaganda and was setting out to turn the press into a propaganda instrument which could be tightly controlled by the state. The papers which were permitted to live became "official," he said, and unfavorable comment and criticism were prevented and there was virtually no press freedom. Spiro al-'Isa, editor of *Alef Ba,* one of the Damascus papers permitted to live, said that the reduction in numbers was handled fairly and that it did not wipe out an opposition press. The objective, as he and others explained it, was to reduce competition to a point where papers could live on circulation and advertising revenues and stop depending on secret funds.

To a degree this apparently succeeded. Circulations seem to have risen to a point where all of them should have been making money, according to the kind of calculations which were explained in Chapter IV. Sources disagreed on how much circulations rose, but the maximum estimates would put the total collective daily circulation of the Za'im period far under the total which preceded and followed this period.

Za'im was in power less than four months before he was assassinated in the coup which followed his coup, and this is too short a period to indicate much about how any sort of an experiment with the press was going to work out. Its mixed motivations, however, seem to be quite clear. There was probably a sincere desire to reform the press. The effort took the form it did as a result of the widespread belief that there were too many papers,

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 MI Middle East MI
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that things would be better if there were fewer ones. So government intervened. "Za'im appreciated the value of propaganda as a weapon," Asseh said, "but he did not know how to use it. He tried to control too much." Another source,[8] which devotes very little attention to the press, says Za'im's "behavior deteriorated into arbitrary megalomania which led to his murder."

The succeeding government changed Za'im's press policy, and almost at once the number of dailies in Syria came back up to a point which can be considered normal. The 1949 press law was adopted by decree less than two months after the Hashim al-Atasi cabinet had come to power. The Chamber of Deputies had been dissolved under Za'im. As was noted in the previous chapter, this law abolished the practice of arbitrary administrative suspension. This is a contribution to greater freedom of the press in Syria which had lasted in the letter of the law up at least to the time of the survey.

As originally adopted, the law contained some reform features which deserve analysis. It was an attempt to legislate standards of journalism upward and at the same time encourage the formation of party organs, openly identified as such. This was done by making the conditions for licensing dailies more difficult to meet than they had been previously, and then exempting the party organ from such conditions. In theory, the papers capable of meeting the conditions should have been better papers and it would hardly have been possible in Syria for as many papers to meet the conditions as had existed previously.

A daily was required to appear at least six days a week, in at least six pages, and it had to have at least 1500 circulation for Damascus, 1000 for Aleppo and 800 for other Syrian cities. A Damascus daily had to have at least three assistant editors and one reporter, and elsewhere they had to have two assistant editors and one reporter. Damascus dailies had to subscribe to at least two world news agencies, others to at least one. The security fund to be deposited with the government was put at 2000 Syrian Pounds (about $600) in cash. Educational requirements were defined and, while existing editors and owners were exempted from them, the government rather than the press syndicate was given the right to define who would be recognized as a journalist.

Newspapers were given two months to comply with these and other provisions of the law too numerous to mention here. The law was adopted before the number of papers had completely returned to normal after abandonment of the Za'im policy. Its enforcement would have prevented the reappearance of many papers which were seeking new licenses. They and their political supporters, joined by the existing papers which went on strike for a time and ceased publication in protest against the new law, forced it to be amended by decree. Not all of the provisions described above were

[8] *The Middle East*, p. 396.

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 Ml Middle East Ml
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M *204 removed by the amendments, but informally it was agreed that they would not be enforced and they had not been enforced up to the time of the survey. S 204 Some of them could still be invoked either to reform the press or destroy opposition papers.

The amendments and failure to enforce provisions which were not taken out of the law caused the experiment designed to encourage the formation of openly identified party organs to die aborning. In theory, this kind of reform also sounds like a desirable thing. In effect, it recognizes that some political subsidization of papers is necessary in the Arab world due to the limited business revenues which are available to support the press. It tries to bring this out into the open, so that the sources of such subsidies can be clearly identified, rather than being half secret and half identified as is the case at present. Again, it is the evils which grow out of the operation of secret funds in the press sphere which create pressure and seeming justification for government to intervene here. The question is always this: Is such intervention, potentially dangerous to freedom, justified by the improvement which is likely to come?

M *204 Syrian experience has not provided an answer, but perhaps an answer is available in Iraq. Iraq has a similar provision in its press law, but it is much more limited in scope. Non-party papers can be penalized in Iraq by administrative action of government, whereas party papers can take their cases to courts. The Iraqi law makes no attempt to establish standards for non-party papers which the average paper in Iraq would have difficulty in meeting and which could therefore be destroyed by law. Iraq has accumulated considerable experience under this system. Whether it is due to the law or not, (it could be due to political party development outside the law) the fact is that Iraq has more party papers, openly identified as such, than are commonly found elsewhere in the area.

Some of them are among the leading papers in Baghdad, but there is no evidence that they are as a group any better than the non-party papers. Nor is there any evidence that the non-party papers are any less political or any less active in the realm of secret funds than is the case in Lebanon, Egypt and Syria. The available evidence seems to point to this conclusion. If the law is drawn and administered in a way which does not represent a threat to the freedom of the non-party paper, an attempt to grant the party organ favoritism with a view to encouraging their formation fails to achieve the reform sought in the non-party press.

M *204 Returning to Syria, the amendment of the law and the informal agreement that some provisions would not be enforced brought the Syrian press back to its normal numbers, its normal freedoms, its normal politicalness, S 204 and its normal partial dependence upon secret funds between the end of 1949 and the second Shishakli coup d'etat, on November 29, 1951, followed by Shishakli's assuming dictatorial power on December 1. This was a period

72:McFadden J-5 (1951-52)1953 M1 Middle East M1
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of almost two years, when Syrians once again enjoyed the benefits which can be obtained from a relatively free press and the handicaps which accrue from it under conditions which are normal for Arab journalism.

It is clear that something was operating in Syria during this period and before then which made it impossible to attain even a reasonable degree of stable government. No one can say how much the press contributed to this instability, but a press which is relatively free to criticize government contributes to some degree or the press is failing in a duty which democratic theory assigns to the press. Whatever the press did or did not do and however much value might be assigned to the theory of freedom of the press, no society can long endure the degree of governmental instability which Syria endured during this period. The second Shishakli coup came in an effort to bring some order and some stability into Syrian affairs.

The survey of the Syrian press was made starting on December 3, a few days after Shishakli had assumed power, and extending at different times through January. Immediately after the coup some of the papers which had been supporting the Peoples Party were suppressed. Such actions are normal after almost every change of government in the Arab states, and the timing of the visits[4] to Syria did not then or later permit the collection of information required to discuss normal press policy under Shishakli.

It should be noted in passing that during the first brief period when Shishakli was in power after December 19, 1949, he took the leadership in gradually restoring constitutional government. The elections that fall were said to be as free and as honest as elections normally are in Arab countries and they were accompanied by a normal degree of press freedom. At the time of the survey there was, of course, a great deal of talk as to what the future might bring for the press of Syria, but no one yet knew and few ventured to predict. Journalists talked freely about press problems and political problems, and as might be expected, there was some opposition expressed to Shishakli.

The overwhelming reaction, however, was one of despair that constitutional government had failed, and almost everyone expressed hope that stability might somehow be restored and maintained. There was a "wait and see" attitude as to whether or not Shishakli might prove capable of attaining this aim. All of this left the strong impression that any government, Shishakli's or some other, which could succeed in restoring stability and making at least some progress toward modernization and reform would have no difficulty in remaining in power for quite a long time in Syria.

This same desire for reform and stability was present in Egypt, where the survey was started one week after a mob, which had been infiltrated by Communists, almost succeeded in burning down Cairo, and it was pres-

[4] The first of these began on December 3, 1951 and continued at intervals through January, 1952.

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عدد مراكز البريد والبرق وعدد الآلات البرقية ، ١٩٤٤ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF POSTS AND TELEGRAPH OFFICES AND NUMBER OF TELEGRAPH SETS, 1944 — 1953

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Year	مراكز البريد Post offices			مراكز البرق والاسلكي Telegraph and Wireless centres				عدد الآلات البرقية	السنة
	الجموع Total	مراكز دائمة Permanent	شعب البريد الثانوية Auxiliary branches	الجموع Total	مراكز برق Telegraph centres	مراكز اللاسلكي Wireless centres	شعب برق Telegraph branches	No. of Telegr. sets	
1944	149	43	106	149	43	—	106	116	١٩٤٤
1945	154	57	97	159	57	5	97	144	١٩٤٥
1946	186	57	129	191	57	5	129	180	١٩٤٦
1947	—	—	—	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٧
1948	207	62	145*	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٨
1949	207	62	145	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٩
1950	212	61	151	196	61	5	130	180	١٩٥٠
1951	212	61	151	199	64	5	130	200	١٩٥١
1952	224	64	160	204	64	5	135	215	١٩٥٢
1953	220	64	156	205	65	5	135	217	١٩٥٣

* Corrected figure

(*) ارقام معدلة

عدد البرقيات الداخلية والخارجية ، ١٩٤٤ — ١٩٥٣

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NUMBER OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TELEGRAMS, 1944 — 1953

Table No. 15

جدول رقم ١٥

Year	البرقيات الداخلية Internal telegrams		البرقيات الخارجية External telegrams				البرقيات الخارجية المتوسطة Intermediary telegr.		السنة
	الصادرة Outgoing		الصادرة Outgoing		الواردة Incoming				
	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالألوف No. of words'000	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالألوف No. of words'000	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالألوف No. of words'000	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالألوف No. of words'000	
1944	77,760	2,360	26,620	650	31,440	720	22,810	280	١٩٤٤
1945	105,070	1,726	28,000	730	34,100	730	24,260	310	١٩٤٥
1946	163,390	3,448	35,000	922	37,200	816	25,760	366	١٩٤٦
1947	373,700	5,213	92,300	1,312	81,120	1,096	60,000	510	١٩٤٧
1948	394,522	5,701	131,047	1,922	91,141	1,378	71,460	621	١٩٤٨
1949	401,710	5,932	132,978	1,931	100,976	1,473	92,550	771	١٩٤٩
1950	175,224	3,248	89,124	2,045	91,952	1,946	38,460	684	١٩٥٠
1951	242,000	7,600	147,000	2,100	122,000	1,700	110,000	900	١٩٥١
1952	192,330	3,270	132,000	5,300	150,620	2,970	90,000	3,100	١٩٥٢
1953	138,620	1,115	157,560	5,980	163,850	3,215	105,300	3,650	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Pupile Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

حركة المكاتبات الداخلية البريدية العادية والمسجلة ، ١٩٤٣ — ١٩٥٣

(العدد بالآلاف)

INTERNAL POSTAL STATISTICS, 1943 — 1953.

(Number in Thousands)

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

Year	التحارير Letters	البطاقات البريدية Post cards	اوراق العمل Service papers	المطبوعات Printed matter	الطرود Samples	الصرر الصغيرة Small packets	المراسلات المعفاة من الاجور والتحارير الرسمية Official mail & mail free of stamp duties	الواردالمسجلة (من اصل المجموع) Registered post (Included in Previous Columns)	السنة
1943	969	41	9	3,883	16	—	814	306	١٩٤٣
1944	1,012	45	26	4,006	20	—	851	313	١٩٤٤
1945	1,139	49	22	4,024	21	—	885	342	١٩٤٥
1946	1,147	64	25	4,105	27	—	896	479	١٩٤٦
1947	1,211	76	22	4,141	31	—	902	482	١٩٤٧
1948	1,276	81	36	4,226	38	—	906	498	١٩٤٨
1949	1,227	79	35	4,300	40	—	1,014	488	١٩٤٩
1950	1,286	81	37	4,630	45	—	1,102	491	١٩٥٠
1951	1,312	77	40	4,917	52	—	1,114	491	١٩٥١
1952	1,320	78	40	4,500	60	90	1,200	500	١٩٥٢
1953	1,350	80	41	4,555	62	95	1,200	500	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Public Works.

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

الرسالات
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حركة المخابرات الخارجية البريدية العادية والمسجلة ، ١٩٤٣ — ١٩٥٣
(العدد بالألوف)

EXTERNAL POSTAL STATISTICS, 1943 — 1953
(Number in thousands)

Table No. 17

جدول رقم ١٧

Year	Letters	Post cards	Service papers	Printed matter	Samples	Small packets	Official mail & mail free of stamp duties	Registered post (included in previous column)	السنة
	التحارير	البطاقات البريدية	أوراق المصالح	المطبوعات	العينات	الصرر الصغيرة	المراسلات المعفاة من الأجور والتحارير الرسمية	المواد المسجلة (من ضمن المجموع)	
1943 — Despatched	480	25	60	267	4	3	5	79	١٩٤٣ — صادر
— Received	562	20	70	406	5	44	6	85	— وارد
1944 — Despatched	504	29	7	308	6	3	8	94	١٩٤٤ — صادر
— Received	664	20	10	542	7	83	10	103	— وارد
1945 — Despatched	657	22	11	331	5	3	11	103	١٩٤٥ — صادر
— Received	879	23	10	627	9	39	12	123	— وارد
1946 — Despatched	746	38	12	401	19	5	11	128	١٩٤٦ — صادر
— Received	913	24	18	534	22	90	10	211	— وارد
1947 — Despatched	812	36	16	413	24	8	10	153	١٩٤٧ — صادر
— Received	944	32	26	862	36	91	11	219	— وارد
1948 — Despatched	851	38	18	451	33	11	12	161	١٩٤٨ — صادر
— Received	1,005	35	26	906	40	86	13	223	— وارد
1949 — Despatched	902	36	21	469	36	13	12	170	١٩٤٩ — صادر
— Received	1,045	40	31	954	52	91	13	249	— وارد
1950 — Despatched	1,006	39	20	478	43	15	14	174	١٩٥٠ — صادر
— Received	1,051	41	32	963	67	99	14	258	— وارد
1951 — Despatched	1,081	46	21	471	51	19	14	179	١٩٥١ — صادر
— Received	1,124	52	30	980	77	88	15	272	— وارد
1952 — Despatched	1,130	48	32	425	57	30	22	190	١٩٥٢ — صادر
— Received	1,140	54	46	980	90	93	24	275	— وارد
1953 — Despatched	1,140	480	33	436	58	32	24	192	١٩٥٣ — صادر
— Received	1,150	560	40	852	91	95	25	276	— وارد

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الأشغال العامة

النقل والمواصلات

حركة معاملات الطرود البريدية العادية والمؤمنة (الداخلية والخارجية) ١٩٤٥ — ١٩٥٣

(العدد بالألوف)

PARCEL POST—INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, 1945—1953
(Number in thousands)

Table No. 18

جدول رقم ١٨

Year	عدد الطرود العادية Ordinary parcels	الطرود المؤمنة Insured parcels		الطرود المشروطة التأدية Parcels of conditional delivery		السنة
		العدد No.	القيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	القيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	
Internal parcel post الطرود البريدية الداخلية						
1945	2,840	1,580	1,107,110	470	70,150	١٩٤٥
1946	3,880	1,470	1,596,760	630	387,470	١٩٤٦
1947	3,100	880	105,886	450	77,170	١٩٤٧
1948	3,623	665	3,199,005	375	787,175	١٩٤٨
1949	3,674	1,248	4,067,132	385	941,955	١٩٤٩
1950	3,172	1,502	301,242	391	71,857	١٩٥٠
1951	3,686	1,141	111,832	352	35,120	١٩٥١
1952	3,055	961	241,430	391	31,140	١٩٥٢
1953	3,906	1,057	148,541	445	62,436	١٩٥٣
External parcel post الطرود البريدية الخارجية						
1945 — Despatched	4,000	390	386,570	200	422,360	١٩٤٥ — صادر
— Received	9,720	290	55,080	80	20,660	— وارد
1946 — Despatched	9,400	410	191,660	130	32,200	١٩٤٦ — صادر
— Received	26,200	620	119,700	180	98,000	— وارد
1947 — Despatched	16,350	410	23,450	190	15,050	١٩٤٧ — صادر
— Received	19,160	440	43,610	230	30,450	— وارد
1948 — Despatched	10,250	275	67,520	65	17,210	١٩٤٨ — صادر
— Received	12,735	135	85,230	49	32,210	— وارد
1949 — Despatched	13,333	510	90,210	103	20,030	١٩٤٩ — صادر
— Received	15,810	335	115,470	87	31,150	— وارد
1950 — Despatched	8,291	7	175	—	—	١٩٥٠ — صادر
— Received	31,732	872	8,203	4	931	— وارد
1951 — Despatched	7,464	—	—	—	—	١٩٥١ — صادر
— Received	36,646	823	43,495	2	724	— وارد
1952 — Despatched	10,304	6	3,250	—	—	١٩٥٢ — صادر
— Received	44,160	1,557	75,555	—	—	— وارد
1953 — Despatched	15,659	26	50,250	—	—	١٩٥٣ — صادر
— Received	53,024	1,966	712,463	—	—	— وارد

Source : Ministry of Pupile Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

COMMUNICATION

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عدد وقيمة الحوالات البريدية والبرقية (الداخلية والخارجية) ١٩٥٢ — ١٩٥٣
(باستثناء الحوالات السورية اللبنانية)

NUMBER AND VALUE OF POSTAL AND TELEGRAPHIC MONEY-ORDER
(Except Syrian Lebanon orders)

Table No. 19 — جدول رقم ١٩

Year	الحوالات البريدية والبرقية الداخلية Internal postal and telegraphic orders				الحوالات البريدية والبرقية الخارجية External postal and telegraphic orders				السنة
	الحوالات المسحوبة Orders drawn		الحوالات المدفوعة Orders paid		الحوالات المسحوبة Orders drawn		الحوالات المدفوعة Orders paid		
	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	
1944	52,377	18,721,616	52,095	16,695,615	1,369	22,981	3,179	140,010	١٩٤٤
1945	54,004	19,033,949	54,351	19,032,074	4,282	83,400	3,180	152,537	١٩٤٥
1946	79,984	28,383,943	77,621	25,398,642	5,286	101,871	3,423	174,536	١٩٤٦
1947	80,856	22,858,065	78,383	22,918,398	5,200	124,547	2,990	128,541	١٩٤٧
1948	94,343	30,480,117	94,109	30,536,095	696	14,137	400	34,503	١٩٤٨
1949	192,907	29,223,387	101,571	28,199,327	—	—	259	1,993,880	١٩٤٩
1951/52 (2)	173,813	49,448,442	166,065	48,962,901	—	—	178	7,865	(١)٥١/١٩٥٠
1950/51 (1)	183,364	53,896,949	181,972	53,827,579	—	—	174	7,000	(٢)٥٢/١٩٥١
1953	160,314	48,158,122	158,548	48,040,183	—	—	84	4,728	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Public Works.

المصدر : وزارة الأشغال العامة

(1) Fiscal period 1/1/1950 — 30/6/1951.
(2) Fiscal period 1/7/1951 — 31/12/1952.

(١) في الدورة المالية ١٩٥٠/١/١ — ١٩٥١/٦/٣٠
(٢) في الدورة المالية ١٩٥١/٧/١ — ١٩٥٢/١٢/٣١

IV. Telephone, Telegraph and Air Communication

206 In 1950 telephone communication became possible with
509 Jazirah for the first time on a commercial basis. Telegraph communication has long been established and an air service connectin Qamishli with Aleppo and Damascus started in 1946, then interrupted by the Palestinian War, has been resumed twice weekly. Fares from Qamishli to Aleppo and Damascus are LS 25 and 50, respectively.

V. Railway Line Projects

165 Railway lines wholly inside Syria from Jazirah to the interior cities have been suggested by the Gibb report and by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. They suggested a line from Tal Koshak to Hassakeh and from there to Rakka and Aleppo. Such a line would by-pass Qamishli which is the more important agricultural and commercial center, and would go in a district only newly developed, sparsely populated and not of the fertility of the Qamishli area. It seems that a line starting from Qamishli itself would be shorter and would service a more fertile and populated district. From Hassakeh the line could follow the Khabur as long as possible before veering to Deir Ezzor. This would be longer than the proposed line from Hassakeh to Rakka directly, but it would have the advantage of servicing the Khabur Valley and collecting its crops, whereas, the line Hassakeh-Rakka is completely desert. From Rakka there is only one route to Aleppo.

It is difficult to choose between a policy of road construction and railway lines without detailed study of the economics of both, but, whatever the result of the study, Jazirah needs cheap and easy means of communication.

COMMERCE OF JAZIRAH

438 It stands to reason that the commerce of Jazirah is mainly in its
441 taple prodcuts and in the goods required for the development of its essential industry which is agriculture.

The main crop being wheat, it forms the largest item both in bulk and in value. But the Jazirah merchant plays a secondary role in the handling of this crop. He is sometimes a partner, but more

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

v MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT

365 655 Brief mention should be made of the urban transport services in Damascus and Aleppo. In Damascus the tramways are operated by a company nationalized in 1951, whose principal business is the generation and distribution of electric power. The tram service, plagued by low fares and relatively high operating costs, has been running heavy deficits and steadily losing ground to buses, which are operated on a coordinated basis by a large number of owners who pool their receipts for the purpose of meeting certain common expenses. For this reason the company has advanced proposals to buy out the private buses at a cost of about £S 2 million and gradually to substitute new buses at an additional cost of £S 2 million. The mission, however, strongly advises against the use of basically public funds for this purpose, since the buses now appear to be efficiently operated by private enterprise.

In Aleppo the power company, likewise nationalized in 1951, has a monopoly on the operation of both buses and trams. In contrast to the Damascus company, however, it is operating both these services at a modest profit while maintaining moderate fares.

206 vi TELECOMMUNICATIONS

It is, of course, important that not only transport but also communications facilities expand with a growing economy. In Syria a program for the improvement of telecommunications has long been under way. During the eight-year period 1946-1953, almost £S 31 million was invested in telecommunications, particularly in the expansion of the telephone network and the installation of automatic telephones. In fact, the amount invested for this purpose might be said to be disproportionate to most other fields of public investment. The results, however, have been conspicuous. The number of telephone subscribers has risen from 9,000 in 1949 to 21,218 in 1953, the number of telephone offices from 100 to 132, and the number of telephone circuits from 161 to 379. The Syrian telephone system is now substantially better than that of most neighboring countries.

The postal, telegraph and telephone administration plans to spend a sum of £S 14.317 million over the next five years on the further improvement of telecommunications. The mission had no one of special compe-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

tence to appraise this program. In view of the many other claims on public funds, however, it suggests that the program be reviewed to reduce the target expenditures to about £S 10 million. In this review the highest priority might be given to the expansion of the telephone network in cities which are experiencing a rapid growth such as Kamichliye, Aleppo and Latakia, and to the improvement of interurban connections. The contemplated construction and equipment of a new transmitter for international communications might be given a lower priority.

VII PROPOSED EXPENDITURES

Table 7 provides a projection of government expenditures on transport and communications over the six-year period 1955-1960. This projection takes into account not only the recommendations of the mission but also expenditures, such as those on railways and on road maintenance, which are determined by force of circumstance or the declared intentions of the Syrian government. The heavy increase in expenditures proposed reflects in major part the need to overcome the lag in transport facilities which handicaps the Syrian economy today.

TABLE 7. Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Roads (total)	5,078	5,380	9,278	17,125	102,750
Construction and improvement (total)				11,008	66,050
Latakia-Aleppo				1,228	7,370
Aleppo-Raqqa				580	3,480
Raqqa-Jezireh				7,625	45,750
Hama-Ghab				250	1,500
Aleppo-Damascus				667	4,000
Damascus-Dera'a				217	1,300

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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TABLE 7 Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Continued from page 147)

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Damascus-Beirut				192	1,150
Tourist roads				[a]	[a]
Maintenance	3,233	3,600	5,800	6,117	36,700
Latakia port	373	500	10,000[a]	6,333	38,000
Railways (total)	641	750	1,209	2,833	17,000
Subventions	641	750	1,209	2,000	12,000
Purchase of DHP lines				833	5,000
Telecommunications	4,114	2,350[b]	4,700[a]	1,667	10,000
Grand total	10,206	8,980	25,187[c]	28,875	173,250

[a] Included in tourist program.
[b] Actual.
[c] Amounts include authorizations unlikely to be spent and are thus not comparable with preceding years.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

loss. Perhaps because of this, the tramway company failed to obtain a 365
broadening of its monopoly concession to include buses.

Without legislative restraint, the private bus business continued to grow in the hands of many individual owner-operators. There are now about 120 private buses, and their operators have combined into an association for the sake of uniform rates, pooled revenues and operating economies. Users apparently prefer the buses to the trams, for despite extremely low tram fares the buses have absorbed most of the business. Today, in contrast to 35,000-45,000 daily tram passengers, the private buses carry 100,000-200,000. The tramway operates at a considerable loss.

Seeking a way out of this dilemma, the nationalized tramway company has proposed that it buy up the buses at a cost of around £S 2 million, investing another £S 2 million in a gradual program of replacement with new buses. This idea has not met with favor among the bus owners, who see no public benefit in shifting from a successful and satisfactory private exploitation to a municipal operation.

The mission feels that such a shift is not justified economically, and that there is no need to use public funds for this purpose. Originally the tramways were installed as consumers of electric power generated by the same company. Under present local conditions the growing demand for electricity for other uses suggests that the simplest course is for the outmoded tramway, with its high overhead costs, to retire from the picture gradually in favor of the more efficient bus system already in operation.

VI TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Syrian telephone and telegraph facilities have expanded rapidly in recent years, under the stimulus of an exceptionally clear and coordinated program of development. Investment in new and improved installations, including automatic dial system, has totalled £S 30,861,223 since 1946, mainly provided through interest-free loans from the government.

An even more impressive fact is that the operations are self-supporting. Telecommunications revenue has exceeded operating expense by an average amount of about £S 700,000 per year since 1949. In 1953 the total revenue was £S 10,944,684 against expenses of £S 9,573,585, leaving a record surplus of £S 1,371,099. Officials believe that with more efficient

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

206 operation of the remote offices and certain other economies this surplus of revenue over expense might be increased by as much as £S 3 million.

Statistically the growth and extent of the system may be seen from Table 9. Direct international telephone connections are now available to Rome, Ankara, Amman, Lebanon and Iraq, while telegraph circuits communicate directly with these as well as New York, London, Egypt, Arabia and Yemen. Radiotelephone is used to a large extent on exterior routes, while most of the internal messages are carried on pole-and-wire land circuits.

TABLE 9 Development of Syrian Telecommunications

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Telephone offices	100	110	116	123	132
Telephone subscribers	9,000	14,000	15,410	20,568	21,218
Telegraph offices	62	61	62	64	65
Kilometers of poles	9,500	12,100	13,200	14,900	15,200
Kilometers of wire circuits	11,650	13,200	15,706	36,200	39,620
No. of circuits	161	173	227	337	379

207 Until recently the system also assumed responsibility for radio broadcasting. This has now become a separate service. With payment of £S 6 million the single transmitter was transferred to the new operating authority, but it is still made available for the use of the telecommunications system during six hours per day.

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عدد مراكز البريد والبرق وعدد الآلات البرقية ، ١٩٤٤ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF POSTS AND TELEGRAPH OFFICES AND NUMBER OF TELEGRAPH SETS, 1944 — 1953

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Year	مراكز البريد Post offices			مراكز البرق واللاسلكي Telegraph and Wireless centres				عدد الآلات البرقية	السنة
	المجموع Total	مراكز دائمة Permanent	شعب البريد الثانوية Auxiliary branches	المجموع Total	مراكز برق Telegraph centres	مراكز اللاسلكي Wireless centres	شعب برق Telegraph branches	No. of Teleg. sets	
1944	149	43	106	149	43	—	106	116	١٩٤٤
1945	154	57	97	159	57	5	97	144	١٩٤٥
1946	186	57	129	191	57	5	129	180	١٩٤٦
1947	—	—	—	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٧
1948	207	62	145*	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٨
1949	207	62	145	197	62	5	130	180	١٩٤٩
1950	212	61	151	196	61	5	130	180	١٩٥٠
1951	212	61	151	199	64	5	130	200	١٩٥١
1952	224	64	160	204	64	5	135	215	١٩٥٢
1953	220	64	156	205	65	5	135	217	١٩٥٣

* Corrected figure

(*) ارقام معدلة

عدد البرقيات الداخلية والخارجية ، ١٩٤٤ — ١٩٥٣

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NUMBER OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TELEGRAMS, 1944 — 1953

Table No. 15

جدول رقم ١٥

Year	البرقيات الداخلية Internal telegrams		البرقيات الخارجية External telegrams				البرقيات الخارجية المتوسطة Intermediary telegr.		السنة
	الصادرة Outgoing		الصادرة Outgoing		الواردة Incoming				
	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	عدد البرقيات No. of telegrams	عدد الكلمات بالالوف No. of words'000	
1944	77,760	2,300	26,620	650	31,440	720	22,810	280	١٩٤٤
1945	105,070	1,726	28,000	710	34,100	730	24,200	310	١٩٤٥
1946	163,390	3,448	35,000	922	37,200	816	25,700	396	١٩٤٦
1947	373,700	5,213	92,300	1,312	81,120	1,098	60,000	510	١٩٤٧
1948	394,522	5,701	131,047	1,922	91,141	1,378	71,460	691	١٩٤٨
1949	401,710	5,982	132,978	1,931	100,976	1,473	92,550	771	١٩٤٩
1950	175,224	3,248	89,134	2,045	91,952	1,846	38,460	684	١٩٥٠
1951	242,000	7,000	147,000	2,100	122,000	1,700	110,000	900	١٩٥١
1952	192,330	3,270	132,000	5,300	150,620	2,970	90,000	3,100	١٩٥٢
1953	138,620	1,115	157,560	5,980	163,850	3,215	105,280	3,650	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Puplic Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON MEI
SYRIA MDI

near Aleppo, and at Rayaq and there are many emergency landing fields.

Sea Ports. Since 1950 Beirut has handled over 2 million tonnage of ships a year; an increase of about a quarter of a million over the pre-war figures. The port has a free zone through which goods are shipped to Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. But the Syrian Government hopes to divert some of the transit trade from Beirut and has, with the assistance of a loan of $6 million from Saudi Arabia, formed a company to develop Latakia in order to handle about a million tons of goods a year (in 1952 431,593 tons were handled). Work on the extension of the port was begun by a Yugoslav firm in April 1953. Tripoli, Sidon, and Banias are ports handling the oil from the pipelines[1] and are little used for other purposes.

Wireless and Telephones. An automatic telephone exchange system covers most of Syria and an automatic exchange is planned for Beirut. Telephone links with Europe and America are available through Beirut and normal cable facilities exist. The Syrian state broadcasting authority has two large transmitters and broadcasts in Arabic, French, English, and Hebrew. Near Beirut there is a station which broadcasts in Arabic, French, and English.

The 'Common Interests'

Under the Mandate, Syria and Lebanon formed an economic and customs union, the Higher Council of Common Interests, under the direct control of France, which administered customs and excise and controlled concessionary companies, antiquities, and some other services. On 1 January 1944 the control was transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The currencies were linked and interchangeable, and both the Syrian and Lebanese pounds were largely backed by French francs based on a rate of 8·83 to the pound sterling (then worth $4·03). In order to maintain a good profit on the exchange brought in by oil companies the Lebanese and Syrian pounds were not devalued in 1949 to follow sterling. Exchange was controlled by one department for both countries and the note issue is in the hands of the French Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

But these links were incompatible with the differences that developed in the economic policies of the two countries when they became independent. Syria, in normal years, has a large exportable surplus of agricultural products and little transit trade, whereas the debtor trade balance of Lebanon is com-

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

206 operation of the remote offices and certain other economies this surplus of revenue over expense might be increased by as much as £S 3 million.

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207 Until recently the system also assumed responsibility for radio broadcasting. This has now become a separate service. With payment of £S 6 million the single transmitter was transferred to the new operating authority, but it is still made available for the use of the telecommunications system during six hours per day.

52:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1964
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number.

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda.

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent."

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases.

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex-

p. 157(A)

212 The percentage of literacy is probably rather over 40 per cent among men and under 20 per cent among women in Lebanon; in Syria it is considerably less.

871 There are four main types of school in the country. First there are the official schools maintained by the departments of education of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Secondly, there are a small number of privately-owned 'national' schools, so called because they are inter-sectarian and do not give religious instruction. Thirdly, there are schools maintained by the religious communities indigenous to the country, sectarian in control and in the content of their instruction. They are the most numerous of all; and the majority of them are maintained by the Christian communities. Finally, there are schools controlled and subsidized by foreign organizations. Practically all of them, with the exception of those belonging to the French 'Mission Laïque' and the 'Alliance Israélite', are maintained by Christian missionary societies. The majority of them are controlled by French Catholics of various religious orders; next in importance are those maintained by American Protestant missions. There are also British and other foreign schools. These foreign institutions are of particular importance because they include the two main centres of higher learning in the country, the two Universities in Beirut.

Grade of Education	Institutions or Courses				Scholars			
	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria
Elementary education	1,867	90	194	839	131,515	5,334	15,381	101,056
Secondary and technical education and teachers' training courses ..	104	—	6	42	9,803	—	643	7,398
Higher education ..	28	—	—	5	1,228	—	—	356

(In addition, there were some hundreds of students studying abroad, in Egypt, in France and other European countries and in the United States.)[1]

In 1938 the first type of school accounted for 31 per cent of the total number of scholars; the second and third between them for 49 per cent; and the fourth for 20 per cent. In

[1] For detailed educational statistics, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 214-15.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little 454
conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing.

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that 471
it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent 654
changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads.

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the gov- 658
ernment to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which [212] ●
compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network.

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its develop- 654
ment at which the government must undertake a more important pro- 433
motional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be 311
able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formulate programs to be applied in the various stages of training. The State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Lebanon MEI
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S L 181

In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trying to create one.

S L 565 463 511

Social Survey

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

S L 204 656

The Press

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

S L 871 [212] 658

Education

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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CHAPTER II

COTTON IN SYRIA

000 One of the oldest countries in the world with a new-found independence and a new government, fired with ambition and restrained with pride, Syria is struggling against tradition to modernize its practices and remold its economy. A strange contrast of the old and the new is everywhere apparent. The struggle to change is sometimes painful and often frustrating.

Since the country was created only nine years ago, conditions have been hectic and chaotic, marked with military uprisings and three coup d'etats, the last of which brought in the present military dictatorship last year.

Nevertheless, progress has been remarkable. With large profits made during and after the war, the Syrians have done more in modernizing their homes, farms, and factories than had been done in a thousand years before. They have made conspicuous improvement in their roads, irrigation system, schools, and health programs.

Still the standard of living of the people as a whole is miserably low, and their mode of life for the most part is as primitive as it was in the time of Christ.

BACKGROUND

133 311 The resources of Syria are abundant, capable of supporting an economy of a much higher order and a much larger population. This fairly large country with an area of about 72,000 square miles (practically the size of the State of Oklahoma) is located along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.[27]

The eastern half of Syria is desert, broken only by the Euphrates River and its tributaries. In the west, stretching from the two principal mountain ranges, is a series of broad, fertile plains. There is a small coastal plain along the shores of the Mediterranean. The principal limitation is lack of water. Utilization of water for irrigation has increased ten-fold, but the potential from the Euphrates and Orontes River systems is much greater.

162 212 The population is estimated roughly at 3.5 million, of which three-fourths are rural and directly dependent on agriculture.[28] In the time of the ancients these lands supported two or three times as many people. Most of the people today are Moslems. Although more emphasis now is being placed on education, about three-fourths of the people are still illiterate.

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[27] *Statesman's Yearbook, 1949*, p. 1348.

[28] *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission*, United States Department of Agriculture, 1947, p. 7.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1966
M1 Middle East
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sory, according to law, but barely one half 871
of the children are now registered in
schools. Outside of Damascus, the literacy 212
rates probably do not exceed 40 per cent
among the men and 10 to 20 per cent
among the women. Schools are maintained 871
by the government and by private organiza-
tions, both national and foreign. The Syrian 873
University, in Damascus, is one of the lead-
ing Arab institutions in the Middle East. It
includes faculties of law, science, arts and
medicine, with subordinate departments of
dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, as well as
an advanced school for teacher training.
An engineering school is established at 874
Aleppo, and, in 1952, a new school for the
training of village teachers, with emphasis
on home economics and agriculture, was
under construction near Damascus.

Vital Statistics

Due to lack of demographic data among 659
large segments of the population, few valid
statistics are available. Theoretically, the
registration of births and deaths is compul-
sory, but in the rural areas, away from
centers of population, reporting is incom-
plete. Government officials estimate that
the accuracy of the recorded statistics ap-
proximates 90 per cent in the cities, but
30 to 60 per cent in the villages, over one
half of which have less than 200 inhabitants.
Considering the country as a whole, prob-
ably 50 to 80 per cent of the births are
recorded and, since certificates are required
for burial, a slightly higher percentage of
the deaths. According to published statistics 163
for 1948, the birth rate for the entire coun- 165
try was calculated at 19.1 per 1,000 popu-
lation; the death rate, at 6.5 per 1,000 popu-
lation. The birth rates ranged from 35.3
in the city of Damascus to 9.0 in the rural
province of Al Jazira; the death rates, from
13.2 to 2.3, respectively. Evidence derived
from informal surveys in different localities,
however, suggests that the true birth rates
average 30 to 40 per 1,000 population and
the death rates 15 to 30 per 1,000 popu-
lation.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

tant elements in a program to attract more tourists. At present Damascus is the only Syrian city with first class hotel accommodations and even here there is an acute shortage. Such cities and towns as Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra all urgently require good hotels for tourists and other travellers. Construction and operation of hotels should, of course, be left to private enterprise encouraged by the government and assisted by the projected investment bank. There are, however, a number of places of potential importance to the tourist trade where rest houses and restaurants rather than hotels are needed. Such facilities are not likely to be sufficiently profitable, at least in the beginning, to attract private investment. We suggest, therefore, that the government spend approximately £S 500,000 on the erection and operation of rest houses and restaurants at such locations as Ras Shamra (site of ancient city of Ugarit), Saint Simeon (ruins of old city and monastery-church in Djebel es Smaane), Al Rasafa (Christian monuments and Moslem palace), Doura Europos (ancient city), Krak des Chevaliers (crusaders' castle), Tartous and Soueida. As a UNESCO mission has suggested, some of these could probably be constructed inside existing historical buildings, thus leaving the appearance of the site undisturbed and enhancing their appeal to tourists.

The interest of tourists in the historical and archaeological treasures of Syria also provides a definite economic justification for increasing the expenditures of the Directorate General of Antiquities. This government department has jurisdiction over museums, historical monuments and archaeological excavations. It finances its operations in part from its own receipts, but the government has during the last two years contributed, on the average, £S 763,000 to its annual budget of a little over £S 1 million. In 1954 its total planned investment was about £S 450,000, of which £S 280,000 was devoted to museums, £S 120,000 to the reconstruction of monuments and £S 50,000 to excavations. Damascus possesses a notable museum of which the country can well be proud, but about £S 1 million is still required for its completion. The Aleppo museum, which houses many fine treasures, admittedly needs a new building at a cost of £S 1 million, and appropriate regional and local museums would help the visitor to visualize the cultural heritage and archaelogical finds of particular localities. Although all of this could not be realized within the 1955-60 period, we suggest that £S 2.4 million be provided to complete the Damascus museum, establish a few local museums in such places as Ras Shamra and Palmyra and at least start the new building in Aleppo.

mausoleum of Safwat al-Molk and the Mosque of Tingiz in Damascus, and the Madrakh el-Ajami and the Khan al-Wazir at Aleppo. 172 658

Measures should also be taken to prevent damage being caused to historic monuments through their conversion into dwellings for refugees and poor people, as is at present the case with many madrasahs and mausolea. This would help to ensure that the excellent and, in other respects, extremely efficient work done by the Directorate of Antiquities to safeguard Syria's historic buildings produces its full effect.

MUSEUMS

In Syria, still less than elsewhere, can museums be considered exclusively as galleries for the housing of permanent exhibitions. The finds from the various excavation sites require the attention of highly skilled, and therefore centralized, technical services. On the other hand, in order to avoid the loss of treasures discovered by chance, and to preserve certain excavated objects near the place where they have been discovered, there must be local museums, or at least archaeological depositories in every region—which means decentralization. 219

The Directorate of Antiquities has endeavoured to meet these contradictory requirements, which, incidentally, must also be taken into account in another connexion. It is a desirable and legitimate aim to have a large, rich national museum in the capital, but it is also necessary to interest other towns in the country in artistic and archaeological problems by helping them to develop their own museums.

The National Museum in Damascus has the somewhat rare advantage of having been built specially for the housing and exhibition of its treasures. In Europe, we are so accustomed to seeing old palaces, not intended for the purpose, converted nto museums, that we are inevitably struck with wondering admiration at the setting and atmosphere which the Syrian authorities have managed to create for the reconstruction and presentation of three great structures of different periods and dissimilar character: the hypogeum of Yarhai from Palmyra, with its rich decorative sculpture; the synagogue of Dura-Europos, with its miraculously preserved frescoes; the Omayyad palace of Qasr el-Heir el-Gharbi, with its frescoes and extraordinary variety of stucco decoration in open-work panels and towers. The museum's other ancient and medieval galleries, although less spectacular in arrangement, contain many objects of rare quality and exceptional interest, such as an Armenian stele from Sfire, a silvered bronze helmet from Homs, frescoes from Dura, white sculptures from Palmyra and black basalt sculptures from the Hauran, mosaics from Chabba, a carved wooden cenotaph from Tojanna, jewellery, intaglios, bronzes and pottery of various periods. Space is already inadequate and a new building, where the collections of Moslem art will be installed, is now nearing completion. When this building is in use, all departments will be less crowded and it will be possible to reserve some space for temporary exhibitions.

All finds earlier than the time of Alexander are, in principle, collected in the Aleppo Museum, which thus has a character and individuality of its own. Upon entering the museum, the visitor is immediately confronted by colossal basalt statues, lions and bulls, and huge bas-reliefs representing hunting and battle scenes; these are Hittite and Assyrian treasures from Tell

P. 11A

Halaf, Tell Ahmar and Arslan Tash. The wonderful statues from Mari are more nearly life-size. There are also a great many objects from Ras-Shamra (Ugarit) and Mari which well repay examination. The present building is old and ill-fitted for use as a museum as regards both lighting and the size of the rooms. There are plans, however, for the building of a new museum where there will be ample room and the necessary facilities to display the collections to full advantage. 217

At the present time, there are local museums at Suweida and Palmyra. The former contains an interesting collection of basalt sculpture and mosaics; the latter is scarcely more than a depository crowded with statues and stone inscriptions. The Directorate of Antiquities intends to establish other small museums at Deir-es-Zor, Homs, Hama, and Tartus or Latakia. It is hoped to provide them with a library, where the principal publications relating to the region covered, together with a few general historical and archaeological works, would be available. The existing library at Damascus is extremely useful, but the one at Aleppo would be improved by the acquisition of some additional works.

In conclusion, the following list gives the titles of a few works relating to the collections referred to above: 217 113

ABDUL-HAK, S., "L'exposition au musée de Damas des découvertes archéologiques de l'année 1952", *Museum*, vol. VII, 1954 (not yet published).
ABDUL-HAK, S. and A., *Catalogue illustré du département des antiquités gréco-romaines au musée de Damas*, Damascus, 1951.
ECOCHARD, M., "Le nouveau musée de Damas", *Museum*, vol. 35-36, 1946, p. 107-44.
PEARSON, H. F., *A guide to the synagogue of Dura-Europos*, Beirut, 1939.
PLOIX DE ROTROU, G., *Le musée national d'Alep*, Aleppo, 1932.
SAOUAF, S., *Alep, guide du visiteur*, Aleppo, 1951, p. 26-33.

MEANS OF PUBLICIZING MONUMENTS AND PRESENTING THEM TO BEST ADVANTAGE 172 658

The efforts made by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities to promote the study and preservation of historical monuments might yield even better results if they were more widely understood and supported. By means of intelligent propaganda through the three channels of education, tourist development and town planning, it should be possible gradually to arouse general sympathy and interest. The important point is to show clearly that historic monuments are not merely an outdated and costly burden, but have a positive and lively interest for every individual. A publicity campaign on these lines has already been successfully undertaken, but in certain respects it might be amplified and developed.

In the field of education, interest in the country's artistic assets can be aroused by the distribution of illustrated publications and the organization of exhibitions and lectures. There are already some publications of this kind dealing with Damascus, Palmyra, Bosra and Aleppo and more could easily be produced; they should contain fine photographs and be translated into several languages. After organizing a few exhibitions of paintings and a brilliant ceremony to mark the opening of the Qasr el-Heir galleries in the Damascus Museum, the Directorate of Antiquities has recently made a conclusive experiment in this field. It has organized a wonderful exhibition of treasures discovered at archaeological sites in Syria during 1952, which has met with well-deserved success. We ourselves

P 11 B

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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versity. The committee makes its decisions on the basis of reports submitted to it by the Section of Educational Research of the Committee on Education and Instruction.

The Committee on Purchases is under the chairmanship of the accountant of the Ministry, with two other members appointed by the Director General of Education. It has charge of all buying of equipment, of receiving bids, and of preparing the contracts of the Ministry.

Beside the Directorate General of Education and its branches covering the system of public education for the entire country, three other institutions and agencies are connected directly with the Minister of Education:

1. The Department of Antiquities is headed by a director who is under the jurisdiction of the Minister. It has charge of the museum of antiquities, supervises all excavations, and preserves archeological sites. Its regulations are incorporated in Decree No. 352 (1945) "Embodying the Regulations of the Directorate of Antiquities."

2. The Syrian University, which until 1946 consisted of the Faculties of Medicine and Law, was in the process of reorganization at the time of the visit of the American Council Commission. It is described in chapter 22.

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3. The Arab Academy, which was founded during the Arab government regime following World War I, is a body of learned Arabists, which has its own assembly of members in Syria and corresponding members in other Arabic and Islamic countries as well as among orientalists. It holds public lectures, issues a magazine known as the *Review of the Arab Academy* which appeared first in 1920 and in which are published the researches and studies of its members. It also maintains a public library which contains about 20,000 printed books and more than 4,000 Arabic manuscripts. The Academy has at times attempted to lay down Arabic equivalents to modern scientific terms.

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Educational Finance

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Educational finance in Syria is centralized. The bulk of the expenditure on the schools and their equipment, on the salaries of teachers and janitors, comes from the budget of the Ministry of Education, which is a part of the general budget of the Syrian Republic. The Ottoman Education Laws of 1869 and 1913, which had remained the basic education laws during the French-mandate period, had provided that the expenditures of elementary schools should be borne by the local authorities. This, however, remained more a theoretical than a practical possibility in most of the Ottoman Empire. In Syria, some school buildings were provided—in Turkish, as in French, days—by the central governments, some by the localities or

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

433 indicates that in this field Syria has become a competitor in foreign markets.
288 In dyeing, printing and finishing there seems to be need for additional modern plant. It also seems desirable to investigate the possibility of profitable production of jute fabric sacks. Imports of these sacks have rapidly increased in the last few years, reaching a total of nearly 10,000 tons with a value of £S 6 million in 1953. The need for jute sacks would be lessened if bulk transportation and storage facilities were available but even in that event an increase in general agricultural production might make the establishment of a factory for sack production from imported jute fiber or yarn an economic possibility.

433 Further expansion of the cement industry may well be required. In
339 fact, the government has authorized a new plant for Aleppo which may be transferred to the Jezireh to serve the growing requirement of north-eastern Syria. A cement plant for the Homs-Hama region is also under consideration.

433 In the footwear industry modern factory production has been intro-
295 duced only with regard to rubber boots and shoes. An experiment with factory production of leather shoes in Aleppo some years ago met with such opposition from the handicraft trade that it was abandoned. Nevertheless this branch of industry may be one in which the application of modern production methods would be appropriate and generally beneficial.

433 It seems useful to investigate the economic prospects of paper and
218 paperboard manufacture. In 1953 about 8,000 tons of paper with a value of nearly £S 5 million were imported. This total comprises a large variety of different types of paper but some are imported in such quantity as to suggest the feasibility of specialized production. Straw is plentiful as raw material and in a relatively short period more poplar wood could become available if farmers and village communities gave increased attention to tree planting.

433 The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of
402 an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried out by many small shops but the quality of the output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements to be developed for use on farms.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
2221 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

2221 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
6221 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
627 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

241 amount he has to store. The jifrs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifrs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

439 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep. The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer
231 and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

621/ penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
24/ from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
421 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621
423 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

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Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

widely used, chiefly in the form of *leben*, a 262
fermented milk product, cheese or butter.
About 60 to 70 per cent of the milk is de- 234
rived from sheep; the remainder, from cattle
or goats. The Juliana breed of cattle and a
special breed of "Damascus goat" are raised
in most regions and are noteworthy as milk
producers. Fowl and eggs are usually plenti- 235
ful, but the consumption of meat is normally low, especially in the rural areas.
Mutton is the principal meat, although the 262
flesh of cattle, goats and camels is also utilized. Fish are valuable as a source of pro- 226
tein in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins and along the coast; they are seldom available in other regions.

The Bedouin live chiefly on milk prod- 262
ucts made from the milk of their flocks, aug- 361
mented by cereals and, occasionally, dates. Meat is often more of a luxury among the nomads than among the villagers. The average Bedouin diet is usually sparse and monotonous.

Housing

Life in rural Syria centers in the villages, 342
which are self-contained social units. Structurally, they are compact, with the houses attached, and built in such a manner that a continuous windowless wall faces the street. Mud brick or adobe is the predominating building material, although stone is sometimes employed in the highland areas. The houses may consist of one or several rooms, which almost invariably open into a central compound. Separate shelters for storage and for the livestock may line the sides of the courtyards, but in the poorer villages the domestic animals are frequently housed with the family, at least during the winter months. The roofs are typically flat, made of rolled earth overlaid on poles and reeds or of thatch. Beehive-type houses with domed or conical roofs, however, are a characteristic feature of the treeless plains in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces. Dwellings built partially underground, often simulating caves, are encountered in some mountain villages in Latakia. Considerable

p. 141(B)

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Syria MD1

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available.

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers.

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal.

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families.

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

241 amount he has to store. The jifrs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifrs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

439 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep. The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer
221 and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[10] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [10] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

from the Ottoman Empire. Conflicting land grants have often been made in the past, and many claims to land rest upon grants of dubious validity. Titles frequently have not been perfected or entered into official registers. Even title deeds which are registered often contain conflicting or vague specifications regarding the area and the boundaries of the property. A considerable amount of land is still held in common village ownership and periodically reallocated among the villagers who accordingly have little interest in the permanent improvement of their changing allotments. 423

Programs to determine and delimit titles through a cadastral survey and to convert village common land into individual peasant holdings have been under way for several decades, but progress has been painfully slow.

6. *Agricultural yields are considerably below potentialities.* 241

Agricultural yields in Syria generally do not compare unfavorably with those in most other countries. Cereal yields tend to be about 10-20% below the world average and substantially below those achieved in Europe, but cotton yields are well above the world average and now approximate those in the United States. The output per hectare for virtually all crops is better than that in the rest of Asia. 433

This general picture does not, however, justify complacency. The relatively good yields have no doubt been largely due to the fact that the frontiers of cultivation have been pushed steadily forward into new and virgin lands. Without this rapid expansion of the area under cultivation, productivity would probably have declined. The mission noted evidence of soil depletion and falling yields in certain areas which had been continuously farmed over many years.

With the diminution in the supply of available new land, Syria will in the future have to rely much more on an improvement in yields to maintain the rise in output. The potentialities unquestionably exist. Fallow is still virtually the only method employed to maintain and restore soil fertility. Thus at least a third of the arable land lies idle each year. Animal manure is almost wholly used as fuel. The use of fertilizers is still in its infancy; in 1953 only 11,171 tons were imported. The practice of green manuring is virtually unknown. Insects and diseases still take a heavy toll. Much higher yields can be obtained through better selection of seeds and varieties, improved crop rotation and better soil preparation and cultural practices.

7. *Animal husbandry is not practiced as an integral part of agriculture and is still on a low standard.* 231 241

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231 241 Mixed farming is rare. Except in limited areas adjoining the few large cities, no fodder is grown for livestock. None of the considerable volume of oil cake and meal and beet pulp produced in Syria is used for animal feed. On farms animals feed primarily on grain stubble and cereal straw. Most of the livestock is entrusted to Bedouins who take their flocks of sheep and goats into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing after the rainy season and return them to the cultivated areas after the sparse vegetation of the desert again dries up. Insufficient water, feed and lack of shelter on these migratory routes often combine to inflict a rather high mortality rate on livestock. Inadequate nutrition also increases the susceptibility of livestock to parasites and diseases.

These conditions indicate a need to introduce fodder into the crop rotation scheme, to improve pastures and to provide shelter and wells corresponding to the carrying capacity of the desert. While better nutrition is most essential, an effective campaign against disease and improvement in livestock breeds would also make an important contribution to raising the standards of animal husbandry.

442 241 8. *The organization and methods of marketing are in many respects defective.*

High costs of transport and the weak bargaining position of the farmer depress farm prices; and the cost of distribution combined with inadequate grading and cleaning is beginning to threaten Syria's competitive position on the world cereals market. Lack of credit and high storage prices generally compel farmers to throw their products on the market immediately after harvest. The merchant who has access to credit and often finances the farmer can largely dictate prices to the cultivator who has no reserves.

A number of measures to cope with this problem are indicated. Proper cleaning and storage facilities for grain are needed to enable farmers to get better prices and assist Syria in maintaining its position in a declining cereals market. New and improved roads would help to reduce marketing costs, and the availability of more and cheaper credit would make the farmer less dependent on the merchant.

500 All these problems and indicated measures will now be discussed more fully under the following headings: irrigation and reclamation; land policies and land settlement; improvement in agricultural production; animal husbandry; agricultural credit, cooperatives, marketing and education.

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In view of the desirability of increasing the role of vegetables in the Syrian diet and of their potential as a domestic and export cash crop, governmental stimulus would be of great benefit.

v ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

The problem of raising the production and quality of livestock has been comparatively neglected. Inadequate nutrition, high incidence of disease and mortality, and poor breeding all depress livestock yields far below what they should be. Livestock now accounts for less than 20% of the total contribution made by agriculture and animal husbandry to national income. This contribution to national income could undoubtedly be raised substantially because the possibilities for improvement in animal husbandry practices are vast and the demand for livestock products both at home and abroad is likely to increase more than proportionately as standards of living rise.

Better nutrition, control of disease and breeding are all necessary. Of the three, improvement in nutrition is by far the most important. Irrespective of breed, an animal will not be productive unless it is well fed. In fact the genetic factors in any breed cannot be fully developed and appraised unless nutrition is adequate. Similarly, low nutritional standards inevitably lower the resistance of livestock to disease and limit the effectiveness of control measures.

Migratory Livestock

Over 80% of the livestock other than fowl consist of sheep and goats, and most of these are taken by Bedouins on annual migrations into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing. The available vegetation is sparse and of short duration. As is usual under desert or semi-desert conditions, there is generally overgrazing in the areas close to permanent water supplies, and the poorer the season—in terms of rainfall—the heavier will be the concentration on such areas. During severe winters when winter growth ceases at an early stage and when the herbage may be destroyed by early frosts, there is a high mortality rate from the combined effects of malnutrition, helminthiasis and exposure.

It has been suggested that much of the mortality could be avoided by

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Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

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In the long run it is the cultivated areas which will have to support more livestock. The expansion of crop land has progressively limited the area of natural grazing land, and increasing numbers of pastoral Bedouins are settling down to agricultural pursuits. Only cultivated land provides a large potential for increasing and improving the feed supply. At present, however, grain stubble and the grass and weeds which spring up on fallow land constitute virtually the only sources of feed for livestock in the cultivated regions. Only a very small area is in improved or "cultivated" pasture, and cropping for forage takes place only in certain limited areas. Hay and silage are not produced.

The objective must be to persuade farmers to grow feed for livestock by intercropping forage crops with cereals, putting part of their fallow into grass and legumes and converting marginal land into improved pasture. The conservation and storage of fodder must also be encouraged. A program with these objectives is, of course, bound to make very slow progress. Its feasibility must be demonstrated, and it will encounter much resistance on the part of farmers who adhere tenaciously to traditional practices.

The mission suggests, however, that a start in this direction be made over the next five or six years. For this reason the mission proposes that the government set aside about £S 500,000 over this period for an experimental demonstration program. Under this program farmers willing to try the establishment of pastures or the production of fodder crops would be given technical and financial assistance by the government. Financial assistance might be given in various forms. The government could supply all or part of the seed, help meet the cost of plowing, pay a small subsidy for the conversion of marginal land to pasture. The digging of trench silos can be performed by hand labor under supervision by the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus a number of experimental and demonstration projects might be established in different parts of Syria. The projects will no doubt reveal in time deficiencies as well as advantages in the light of which the approach and methods would have to be modified from time to time.

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656 435 A final comment must be made on price stabilization operations. At times in the past the government has intervened in the marketing of cereals in order to support the price or to protect the home market from the consequences of threatened shortages and excessive prices. Through the Cereals Office and its predecessor agencies it has engaged in buying and selling grain, and occasionally it has resorted to export prohibitions to safeguard domestic supplies. Under emergency conditions when the world supply of cereals is short, as in time of war or threat of war, such measures may be justified. Normally, however, it is better to allow the market forces free play. The history of government intervention in the market demonstrates that the government has often acted on the basis of information which subsequently proved erroneous in whole or in part. Frequently information on impending government measures has leaked out, giving windfall profits to privileged speculators. Above all, it is impossible in the long run to insulate the Syrian grain market from the world market. If there is a shortage in Syria and prices rise, some merchants will quickly seize the opportunity to import grain, and if world market prices decline, Syrian prices will inevitably have to follow if exports are not to be lost. On the whole it would be far better for the government to concentrate on the task of improving its crop statistics and to publish frequent and more reliable information on production and prices for the guidance of farmers and merchants. If emergency conditions arise, it will always be possible to authorize government intervention by special decree.

654 241 231 *Projected Expenditures*

We can now recapitulate the government expenditures in the field of agriculture and animal husbandry which are envisaged over the six years up to the end of 1960. Total projected outlays amount to around £S 336 million, or about £S 56 million per year. This represents a very substantial increase over expenditures in recent years which the mission has found difficult to ascertain but which probably have not averaged much more than £S 11 million a year.

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TABLE 6 Expenditures on Agriculture for the Six-Year Period 1955-60

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(Thousand £S)

		Total	Average annual
Irrigation and reclamation		197,200	32,866
Aerial and soil surveys and mapping		4,500	750
Credit, cooperatives, education and marketing			
Capital for Agricultural Bank	50,000		
Cooperatives	500[a]		
Rural Community Improvement Program	2,700		
Agricultural schools	2,750[a]		
Stipends for foreign study	750[a]		
Grain storage	21,000		
Damascus shamir	600		
		78,300	13,050
Research and experimentation			
Central direction	1,800[a]		
Seed selection and propagation	2,700[a]		
Crop rotation research and trials	1,000[a]		
Livestock breeding	1,200[a]		
		6,700[a]	1,117
Encouragement of better agricultural practices			
Fertilizer	500		
Forage and green manuring	500		
Improvement and establishment of pastures	500		
		1,500	250
Special livestock program			
Veterinary services	1,200[a]		
Livestock shelters	1,720		
Reseeding of grazing land	700		
Development of desert water supplies	2,250		
		5,370	895
Agricultural settlements		4,500[b]	750
Miscellaneous			
Small implements center	525		
Special instructions on operation and maintenance of agricultural machinery	500		
Forestry service	500[a]		
		1,525	254
Continuing expenditures of Ministry of Agriculture		36,700[c]	6,117
Grand total		336,295	56,049

[a] Additional expenditures beyond levels of recent years.
[b] Other than those financed by the Agricultural Bank.
[c] Excluding special and additional expenditures specified elsewhere, but including about £S 700,000 for extra overhead expenditures.

PRODUCTION

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مساحة ومحصول القطن الزهر في عام ١٩٥٣ ، حسب المحافظات
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF UNGINNED COTTON IN 1953, BY MOHAFAZAT
(Area in hectare and Production in tons)

Table No. 8 — جدول رقم ٨

Mohafazat	المساحة المزروعة Cultivated Area			المحصول زهر (شعر وبذور) Product (unginned)			المحافظات
	الجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	الجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	
Total	171,558	70,305	51,253	136,076	107,629	18,337	الجموع
Damascus	197	197	—	321	321	—	دمشق
Homs	3,180	2,945	235	4,404	4,287	117	حمص
Hama	48,880	30,740	18,140	50,938	46,352	4,536	حماة
Latakia	2,438	163	2,275	1,373	141	1,232	اللاذقية
Aleppo	48,774	18,371	30,403	31,911	19,539	12,362	حلب
Hasakah	10,096	10,056	40	15,115	15,087	28	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	14,800	14,800	—	21,240	21,240	—	دير الزور
Suwida	—	—	—	—	—	—	السويداء
Dir'a	1,091	1,031	60	784	722	43	درعا

عدد الحيوانات والمواشي ، ١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٣
NUMBER OF ANIMALS AND CATTLE 1950 — 1953

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Table No. 9 — جدول رقم ٩

Animals and cattle	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	النوع
Cows, not for milking	109,935	294,425	252,081	253,801	مجموع البقر غير الحلوب
Cows, for milking	121,735				بقر حلوب
Ewes	197,583	183,060	189,997	221,485	نعاج
Horses	97,079	98,850	100,654	96,450	خيل
Mules	58,283	70,425	73,880	77,819	بغال
Asses	271,047	244,270	250,433	259,730	حمير
Sheep	2,930,397	3,085,225	3,539,745	3,746,382	غنم
Goats	1,239,738	1,433,501	1,571,262	1,612,906	ماعز
Camels	78,051	70,589	96,610	61,706	جمال
Buffalo	6,755	6,030	6,176	6,779	جاموس
Pigs	952	421	206	303	خنازير
Beehives	53,255	...	...	...	خلايا نحل

Source : Ministry of Agriculture — المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

عدد الحيوانات والمواشي حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF ANIMALS AND CATTLE BY MOHAFAZAT, 1952

Table No. 19

جدول م ١٠

Animals and cattle	المحافظات Mohafazat										النوع
	مجموع المحافظات Total	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماه Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	دير الزور Deir-es-Zor	الحسكة Al-Hasakah	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a	
Cows	252,081	15,540	20,500	17,700	69,391	83,700	8,520	22,500	34,200	19,900	بقر
Oxen	199,597	21,373	15,000	8,300	68,300	31,525	7,800	12,300	23,800	9,600	ثيران
Horses	100,654	6,975	8,500	8,500	5,782	34,587	18,380	8,400	3,450	7,100	خيل
Mules	73,890	4,555	10,000	8,000	4,035	21,700	9,900	9,000	1,200	5,450	بغال
Asses	350,433	24,955	12,000	14,500	40,954	63,274	29,500	11,900	7,500	45,500	حمير
Sheep	3,559,745	222,941	221,196	219,491	138,441	959,969	346,049	500,000	79,565	82,083	غنم
Goats	1,571,582	222,514	104,709	64,579	233,607	360,082	221,181	187,000	59,973	67,577	ماعز
Camels	98,610	2,706	23,084	9,262	1,283	9,402	32,123	12,600	1,818	5,130	جمال
Buffalo	6,178	1,370	15	108	2,621	1,015	—	430	—	707	جاموس
Pigs	206	28	7	2	39	130	—	—	—	—	خنازير

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

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عدد الحيوانات والمواشي حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF ANIMALS AND CATTLE BY MOHAFAZAT, 1953

Table No. 11 — جدول رقم ١١

Animals and cattle	Mohafazat										النوع
	مجموع المحافظات Total	دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماه Hama	اللاذقية Lattakia	حلب Aleppo	دير الزور Deir-es-Zor	الحسكة Al-Hassakah	السويداء Sweida	درعا Der'a	
Cows	202,951	21,910	28,541	30,100	48,300	36,700	9,190	24,500	14,000	20,300	بقر
Oxen	221,405	20,900	21,000	18,300	60,900	61,025	10,790	19,800	16,200	13,200	ثيران
Heifers	96,430	7,042	9,057	10,900	3,321	32,370	17,500	9,300	1,300	7,600	عجول
Calves	77,810	4,630	10,575	9,330	3,032	23,024	10,800	9,900	1,300	4,900	عجول
Asses	230,730	21,300	15,534	17,800	24,900	70,400	32,000	12,800	8,200	48,700	أتان
Sheep	2,746,300	225,957	302,004	302,503	80,110	904,794	967,101	630,000	44,000	89,345	غنم
Goats	1,013,906	213,310	122,080	122,311	202,044	202,904	263,170	230,000	80,000	74,800	ماعز
Camels	61,700	2,918	3,403	9,094	873	8,936	16,572	13,300	1,100	4,810	إبل
Buffalos	6,779	1,306	317	838	1,828	1,894	20	413	—	904	جاموس
Pigs	360	5	172	15	4	197	—	—	—	—	خنازير

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

عدد الحيوانات الذبوحة والتي جرت معاينتها في مراكز المسالخ في الجمهورية السورية ، ١٩٤١ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF ANIMALS SLAUGHTERED, AND INSPECTED AT SLAUGHTERING CENTRES, 1941 — 1953

Table No. 12

جدول رقم ١٢

Year	غنم Sheep	خراف Lambs	ماعز Goats	جداء Kids	بقر Cows	عجول Calves	ابل Camels	خنازير Pigs	جاموس Buffalo	السنوات والشهور
1941	254,723	28,473	92,074	1,836	10,976	683	2,902	393	18	١٩٤١
1942	196,907	—	123,339	—	19,309	—	3,946	371	—	١٩٤٢
1943	148,280	55,284	73,272	9,972	6,858	—	4,743	238	—	١٩٤٣
1944	237,109	8,122	76,110	—	5,957	—	5,756	97	1	١٩٤٤
1945	346,556	157,622	87,677	15,128	5,379	104	5,528	22	3	١٩٤٥
1946	287,503	171,816	93,384	9,633	5,311	671	6,208	25	7	١٩٤٦
1947	339,451	202,465	104,534	26,596	8,774	4,867	6,394	45	4	١٩٤٧
1948	349,288	77,188	134,324	13,106	9,015	1,735	7,492	91	3	١٩٤٨
1949	272,838	144,400	77,044	28,464	10,753	947	210	115	—	١٩٤٩
1950	291,885	184,143	77,487	32,035	7,572	3,734	9,222	106	12	١٩٥٠
1951	335,212	306,227	78,184	35,933	11,269	7,371	7,635	100	18	١٩٥١
1952	315,471	181,171	91,587	29,972	10,195	6,671	7,563	101	150	١٩٥٢
1953	296,640	269,062	76,566	60,761	9,002	7,756	7,312	114	113	١٩٥٣
1953										١٩٥٣
January	26,865	1,089	6,699	1,335	1,147	1,229	744	10	20	كانون الثاني
February	22,839	2,649	5,190	403	1,080	924	676	9	7	شباط
March	17,469	18,415	1,380	23	996	746	558	10	—	آذار
April	9,625	64,985	550	200	757	423	415	11	3	نيسان
May	12,449	77,505	639	1,041	448	356	242	8	16	أيار
June	29,093	44,703	3,738	5,454	426	378	346	8	3	حزيران
July	34,197	12,408	11,119	8,326	491	324	463	6	1	تموز
August	30,933	10,493	11,016	11,641	462	537	612	7	7	آب
September	28,865	8,884	9,958	10,434	515	398	772	7	—	أيلول
October	29,747	9,540	10,096	9,016	736	418	918	9	6	تشرين اول
November	28,634	9,730	8,207	8,085	1,090	878	886	9	16	تشرين الثاني
December	25,919	8,571	7,956	4,803	944	1,146	680	20	34	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

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عدد الحيوانات المذبوحة والتي جرت معاينتها في مراكز المسالخ في الجمهورية السورية حسب المحافظات لعام ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF ANIMALS SLAUGHTERED AND INSPECTED AT SLAUGHTERING CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT DURING 1952.

Table No. 13 — جدول رقم ١٣

Mohafazat	غنم Sheep	خراف Lambs	ماعز Goats	جداء Kids	بقر Cows	مجول Calves	ابل Camels	خنازير Pigs	جاموس Buffalo	المحافظات
Total	318,471	181,171	91,557	29,972	10,195	6,671	7,562	101	159	المجموع العام
Damascus	112,943	35,959	37,536	9,042	2,012	1,456	1,806	...	120	دمشق
Homs	22,253	19,162	8,876	1,518	1,954	1,594	576	...	...	حمص
Hama	9,398	12,603	2,517	1,600	71	144	1,216	...	...	حماه
Latakia	23,698	1,730	12,260	15	1,191	1,210	...	...	...	اللاذقية
Aleppo	125,049	88,464	15,862	10,933	2,180	40	3,134	101	15	حلب
Al-Hasakeh	7,858	13,975	8,275	2,157	1,651	1,084	29	...	18	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	11,711	8,068	4,701	4,335	824	1,049	664	...	...	دير الزور
Sweida	1,460	495	1,109	111	206	45	21	...	...	السويداء
Dir'a	1,101	715	422	171	106	19	75	...	...	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture — المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

عدد الحيوانات المذبوحة والتي جرت معاينتها في مراكز المسالخ في الجمهورية السورية حسب المحافظات ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF ANIMALS SLAUGHTERED AND INSPECTED AT SLAUGHTERING CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT DURING 1953.

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Mohafazat	غنم Sheep	خراف Lambs	ماعز Goats	جداء Kids	بقر Cows	عجول Calves	ابل Camels	خنازير Pigs	جاموس Buffalo	المحافظات
Total	296,649	289,063	76,508	69,761	9,002	7,756	7,312	114	113	المجموع
Damascus	103,744	90,868	26,403	28,489	1,866	1,826	2,423	—	96	دمشق
Homs	21,930	24,230	9,520	3,088	1,779	1,533	488	—	—	حمص
Hama	10,592	15,451	2,389	2,747	225	412	910	—	—	حماه
Latakia	25,266	3,600	14,710	—	1,147	1,235	—	6	—	اللاذقية
Aleppo	117,499	94,414	15,000	12,506	2,052	136	2,899	108	5	حلب
Al-Hasakeh	6,089	20,511	4,172	3,162	1,029	1,010	22	—	12	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	10,364	16,990	3,820	9,568	732	1,468	488	—	—	دير الزور
Suwida	367	1,129	467	629	119	58	53	—	—	السويداء
Dir'a	789	1,869	355	572	53	78	49	—	—	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI

248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of
234 coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at reafforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2.*

25; Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope for widening the area cultivated and raising the yields, as the soil is fertile. In the Jezira the use of machinery could be extended—it is already increasing fast. Better livestock production could be achieved by greater use of fodder crops for which conditions are favourable: in the 'Duck's Bill' good clover grows wild. At present fodder crops are not considered worth cultivating.

In the Euphrates region there is great scope for extension of irrigation. But a large scale scheme would be costly because the river runs between high escarpments, which vary in distance between each other up to about 10 miles. To irrigate much larger areas it would be necessary to lift water over the escarpments. There are large areas of uncultivated land, particularly between Abu Kemal and Deir-ez-Zor. Even on the land already cultivated yields of wheat could be much higher: at present the yield is four to six times the seeding rate, and, according to local farmers, could be raised to ten to fifteen times the seed with better irrigation. The high cost of fuel oil is the limiting factor as it also is for tractor work. On the Khabur river improvement of the ancient barrages would permit an extension of irrigation.

It is in this area that there is real scope for a planned settlement of cultivators, with improved methods and a better system of land tenure. The obvious form for such settlement to take would be on the model of the Jewish co-operative farms, small holdings with collective use of machinery and working to a cropping plan; on the uncultivated land such settlement could be undertaken without incurring high capital costs.

So far as the Euphrates Valley is concerned, similar co-operatives based on communal control of water supplies might be started on a small scale. Large-scale irrigation here would be costly, and would necessarily have to be co-ordinated with the irrigation of Iraq. An immediate step needed is to reduce the price of fuel oil.

While it is easy on paper to see the possibilities of such schemes as these, it is not easy to see where in fact the motive power for them is to come from. They will not bring in quick big returns, which are what local farmers and landowners want: the district is remote and the main object of such investment would be a long period rise in the standard of living, in which the moneyed classes are not interested. Present-day Syria is not

SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticised on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organisation.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

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Veterinary Services[16]

Syria is fortunate in being free of the major animal plagues, but such controllable conditions as helminthiasis and the pox diseases are allowed to take a heavy annual toll of sheep and goats, while Newcastle disease in poultry rages almost unchecked over the greater part of the country, in spite of the fact that the laboratory in Damascus can produce an almost unlimited supply of a completely efficacious freeze-dried vaccine at an exceedingly low cost. 232

It is true that until relatively recently difficulty was experienced in producing locally a satisfactory vaccine for the control of sheep-pox but these difficulties have now been overcome by the loan of FAO personnel; production capacity for sheep-pox vaccine is now sufficient for the annual vaccination of the entire sheep population.

A rising incidence of brucellosis and tuberculosis in cattle, particularly in the urban and suburban dairying herds, may give rise to serious losses unless checked in an early stage. The services of the expert in field diagnosis provided by FAO should be especially valuable in this connection.

The Veterinary Department of the Ministry of Agriculture employs some 16 veterinarians, of whom five have been trained in Europe, four in Turkey, and seven in Egypt. Of the 16, two are at Headquarters in Damascus, four at the school for veterinary assistants, one at the laboratory in Damascus, and nine at field stations. There are said to be about 10 training as veterinarians in Europe, America and Egypt. Experience elsewhere suggests that a fully-qualified professional staff of the present size, strengthened gradually by the accession of young graduates returning from overseas training, ought to provide disease control services adequate for Syria's needs during the next few years, particularly if full use is made of the veterinary assistants trained in the technical school at Damascus. 232 654

If the mission's proposals for a program of livestock improvement are adopted, animal diseases will assume a greater importance, since the improved stock is likely to be less tolerant than the low-producing Balady types. More emphasis will then have to be placed on disease control services, and the cadre of veterinarians in government employ will need to be enlarged.

At the present stage, indeed at any stage, quality is undoubtedly much more important than numbers. Professional qualifications of the present

[16] See Annex C, p. 315.

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232 654 staff vary a great deal in standard, and an effort should be made to ensure that staff for replacement and further recruitment is trained to the highest professional standards overseas. The Department should review the position, scrutinize the academic careers of students now abroad, and offer scholarships for short periods, say one year, of postgraduate training in some particular field of activity that will be useful to the government on the candidate's return. This postgraduate training should be entirely practical and the scholar should not be allowed to utilize it mainly for the purpose of obtaining a further degree. Experience in the field, either in government service or in private practice, in some country of similar climatic and stock-raising conditions, but with a much more advanced livestock industry and a highly developed state veterinary service, would be the ideal type of training for such men. FAO would no doubt be able to arrange to place these men in countries suited to the purpose and might even be prepared to offer fellowships, upon condition that the recipient will return to government employment in Syria. The laboratory staff needs relatively little reinforcement at the professional level for the moment. The posting of one additional veterinarian with some overseas laboratory experience would be sufficient; it would be useful if this were done while the FAO experts are at the laboratory to pass on their practical experience.

The technical school for veterinary assistants in Damascus has been giving a two-year course of training in Arabic; it is likely that the course will be lengthened to three years. The school should turn out highly trained assistants whose employment in the Department should enable each government veterinarian considerably to extend his coverage in terms of both numbers of animals and territorial area.

Communications are generally poor and the inadequacy of transport has apparently been one of the greatest handicaps of the field service. It is essential that jeeps or pick-ups should be available in sufficient numbers to enable the veterinarian and his assistants to get round the district, to respond promptly to reports of outbreaks of disease and requests for assistance, and to perform systematic mass-vaccinations where appropriate. Government-owned transport is often unduly costly and inefficiently maintained; if this is true in Syria, consideration might be given to the hiring of transport on a contract basis or to payment of mileage to an officer providing his own transport.

The entire budget allocation for veterinary services in 1954 was £S 188,000, or approximately £S 11,750 for each veterinarian in the

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Department, to cover all charges incidental to his activities, including the salaries of assistants and laborers, the provision of drugs, instruments and laboratory supplies, feed of animals, preparation of vaccines and sera. It is obvious that in relation to the environment the salaries paid to veterinarians are insufficient to attract and hold properly qualified intelligent men, and that the sum available to meet other expenses must be so inadequate that the professional man's abilities cannot be utilized to anything like their full extent. As a consequence in many cases there is a tendency to supplement the government income from commercial sources and eventually to regard the government post as part-time employment.

The mission recommends that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available up to the end of 1960 to defray the cost of a veterinary service, improved and expanded on the lines that are broadly indicated here and in Annex C. It is strongly recommended that a small committee, to which the FAO veterinarians should be coopted, be appointed to consider methods of improving the service, with particular attention to salaries, better communications and transport, assistance adequate to permit of the carrying out of mass-vaccination campaigns against Newcastle disease of poultry, sheep-pox, and the control of helminths, etc., along the lines indicated in Annex C. Alternatively, the government might prefer to seek the services of an experienced veterinary administrator to inquire into these matters and make recommendations. Such an inquiry need not take more than perhaps three months. Staff meetings should be arranged and it would be a great advantage to hold at least one joint staff meeting with the services in Lebanon and Jordan. The measures should raise the morale of the service which at present is regrettably low.

Breeding

The development of higher yielding types of livestock through selection and cross-breeding would be a great boon, assuming that it could be accomplished without sacrificing the hardiness under unfavorable conditions which much of the livestock in Syria has acquired, or that a parallel improvement were made in the environment of the animals. There are certain promising indigenous types which could be used as the starting point of a program to improve breeds. Among these are the Damascus dairy cow, the Julani beef cattle and the Damascus milk goat. Most of the sheep and goats are multi-purpose animals, raised for meat, milk,

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232 654 wool or hair. Existing poultry breeds are largely nondescript and are characterized by very low productivity.

To carry out experiments in breeding and animal husbandry, the government should push on with its program to establish a central livestock station near Damascus.[17] Within a few years two sub-stations might also be opened at Palmyra and Deir ez Zor, or at Hama, Selemiye or Raqqa. There is unfortunately a shortage of Syrians trained in such work, and at the outset it would probably be necessary to employ a foreign farm manager. A minimum of £S 1.2 million will be needed over the next five or six years to meet the necessary costs.

For sheep, the aim should be to develop a more productive animal, and to test the feasibility of breeding more specialized types by successive top-crossing of selected indigenous animals with such imported breeds as Merinos and Merino-Fleisch. For cattle, the task would be to improve the existing Julani and Damascus types by progressive selection and perhaps by a certain amount of crossing with such imported pure breeds as Brown Swiss. In the case of poultry, which is so important to the small farmer, there might be a gradual introduction of exotic blood by the issue to farmers of cockerels of the chosen exotic breeds, raised in the government breeding farm. In this breeding program great care will have to be taken to maintain adequate records on the production and hardiness of successive generations. It will also have to be accompanied by good animal husbandry to bring out the full potentialities of each genetic strain.

VI CREDIT, COOPERATIVES, EDUCATION AND MARKETING

Agricultural Credit

452 An adequate volume of credit on reasonable terms is in many respects the key to an improvement in agriculture and animal husbandry. Farmers must have the means to buy better tools, livestock and seed and to introduce new crops. If settled on new land they must be provided with housing and the capital necessary to start production. Both peasant proprietors and tenant farmers must be helped to emancipate themselves gradually from excessive reliance on non-institutional lenders such as landlords and

[17] See Annex C, p. 312.

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VII PASTURE RESEEDING

In the Main Report we specifically recommended the reseeding of the Resafe and Palmyra desert basins where the soil is fertile, the rainfall generally higher than in other desert regions, and the possibilities of storing some of the water and distributing it evenly by means of diversion dams better than elsewhere. In parts of Australia, Morocco, Algeria and South Africa, where climatic conditions are similar to those in the Syrian desert, introduction of the following herbs and grasses has shown good results: salt bushes (*Atriplex semibaccata; Atriplex vesicatum*); blue bushes (*Kochia sp.*); crow foot (*Erodium sp.*); buffalo grass (*Cenchrus ciliaris*); veldt grass (*Earharta calcycina*); *Lotus maroccanus;* and *Dactylis glomerata,* var. *Hispanica.* These perennials, more or less winter-hardy and drought-resistant, plus the existing flora, would probably make excellent sheep and goat pasture in Syria. The group of FAO experts which has been conducting experiments with respect to improved grazing conditions might help the Ministry of Agriculture to develop a successful program.

Since conditions in Iraq and Jordan are similar it would be advantageous if these countries were to participate in the program.

VIII LIVESTOCK

Livestock Center

We understand that a site for a center near Damascus has already been selected. We urge that stables and shelter, which would be designed to serve as models, should not be so elaborate as to be beyond the reach of the average farmer. We suggest that the main center have three separate divisions for sheep and goats, cattle, and poultry respectively, and that the two principal tasks of the staff should be to initiate a breeding program and to train Syrians in this work.

In the Sheep and Goat Division the sheep breeding program might be conducted along the following lines:

1st year: Assembling a station flock of the best indigenous type; purchase of 200-300 native ewes; and importation of a nucleus of pure-bred flocks—Merino from South Africa, Merino-Fleisch from Germany or

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Turkey, and, if possible, Karakul. For a start there should be three rams, plus at least 12-15 in-lamb ewes of each breed (preferably from the same breeder). The indigenous ewes would be inseminated with semen from the imported stud rams.

The flock of indigenous ewes is to be sent on migration under usual conditions. Careful periodic observations must be made for the purpose of recording such data as birth weights and growth rate of lambs; quality and quantity of wool produced by this and successive crosses; mortality among lambs; resistance to parasites; tolerance of environment as represented mainly by nutritional plane and climate; and general adaptability.

2nd year: The F_1 generation will grow to 12 months. All data concerning this generation must be recorded.

Two of the assistant staff might be sent on post-graduate fellowships abroad, and two recent graduates be added to the staff.

3rd year: Insemination of females of the F_1 generation with semen from stud rams. Observation and recording of the characteristics of the F_1 generation, further recruited by lambing.

4th year: Observations on maturation of the F_2 generation. Recording F_1 and F_2. Establishment of a stud book. Establishment of the sub-stations recommended in the Main Report. Formation of flocks for similar purposes in Palmyra and Deir ez Zor, largely by transfer of surplus animals from the Damascus station.

5th year: Insemination of F_2 and F_1. At the end of this year there should be sufficient indication as to the suitability of the chosen breeds, and it should be possible to extend cross-breeding facilities to selected local flocks through the agency of insemination stations.

6th year: During this year, the F_3 generation will come to maturity. Sufficient data will be available to permit a final comparison of the suitability of the different breeds to Syrian conditions. It should then be possible to decide whether to continue topcrossing to produce virtually pure-bred stock, or whether the objective should be an intermediate type of perhaps three-quarters imported blood.

During the five-year program, the main station should also establish a good flock of the Damascus type of milk goat, and fully record all data. The aim should be to fix desirable characteristics for breed. In general, experimentation and research should be on lines similar to those applied to sheep.

In the Cattle Division the program would be:

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232 *1st year:* Assembling two herds, one of Damascus and one of Julani, by purchase of selected cows, giving preference in the case of the Damascus breed to cattle families known to the breeders as throwing a high proportion of good-yielding cows. Experience suggests that it is from animals of this type, rather than from the occasional freak with an exceptionally high yield, that improvement of indigenous types is most readily effected. The selected herd of Damascus cows should be fed for milk production, and the herd of Julani cattle for meat and draft purposes. Full herd-book and production records should be kept, and the data derived should form the basis for the establishment of Damascus and Julani herd-books within a few years.

Importation of a herd (three bulls and 12 in-calf heifers) of foreign breed; Brown Swiss might best serve the triple purpose of milk, meat and draft. The aim must be to maintain four herds at the main center—a pure-bred Damascus herd, a pure-bred Julani herd, a pure-bred Brown Swiss herd and a grade herd.

From the start fodder should be grown on an adequate scale and fodder production should be regarded as of major importance. Every advantage should be taken of silage and of new or improved crops. Great emphasis should be laid on the provision and preservation of feed during the winter. Concentrates that may become available from local industrial enterprises, e.g., dried sugar beet pulp, oil cakes, etc., should be utilized and their nutrient value evaluated.

2nd year: Recording of milk production. Recording F_1 generation: weight; growth; hemoglobin; blood minerals; adaptibility to environment. Continuation of trials of feeding methods.

3rd year: Continuation of herd records and experiments with fodder plants and feeding. Establishment of a stud-book. Establishment of Breed Association for Damascus cattle. By this year it would be possible to start experimental artificial insemination of local farmers' cattle with selected or imported bulls. More attention should be paid at such schools as the Kharabo Agricultural School and the Damascus Veterinary School to instruction in artificial breeding techniques.

4th and 5th years: Continuation of the development of the selected indigenous and imported herds. There will now be an F_2 generation of the grade herds and all three herds should be well established.

The program should be continued until sufficient data on production, adaptability and feed requirements have been collected to make possible

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a reliable comparative evaluation of the different herds under Syrian conditions. 232

The Poultry Division should import high-producing breeds, e.g., Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Leghorn and Plymouth Rock. Accepted modern practices of elimination, selection and feeding should be followed and quality should be maintained by regular culling and full recording. Failure to maintain the original quality by the two latter methods is the principal defect in many flocks maintained by institutes in countries of the Middle East and Far East, and is usually associated with heavy wastage from preventable disease.

The aim should be to establish a hardy type of dual-purpose bird—for eggs and meat—of special value to the small farmer. Experimental work should be done on control of parasites and construction of cheap but hygienic poultry houses of locally available materials. The land and feed requirements of the poultry unit should receive every consideration when the fodder crops program is being planned, and full use should be made of such by-products as oil cake.

During the second year selected cockerels of high-producing breeds could be distributed to the villagers to improve local strains. These should first be immunized against Newcastle disease and a service should be organized to encourage mass immunization throughout the country.

A few graduates of Kharabo and the Damascus Veterinary School might be encouraged to specialize in poultry improvement and at least two fellowships might be awarded for practical work overseas. Once the main flocks are well established at the central station, similar projects might be developed at additional sub-stations distributed throughout the country. These centers should specialize in establishing the best type for the various regions.

We estimate necessary capital outlay for this program at £S 380,000 and ultimate annual operating cost at about £S 240,000.

Veterinary Service

The headquarters of the Government Veterinary Service is in Damascus where, as the Department of Animal Resources, it forms part of the Ministry of Agriculture. There is a government veterinary laboratory in Damascus, mainly occupied with diagnosis of disease and preparation of biological products, i.e., vaccines and sera. A certain amount of modern

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232 equipment, including centrifugal freeze-drying plant, has been provided in recent years by FAO, which has also assigned specialist personnel to undertake diagnosis to prepare vaccines and sera and to instruct Syrian personnel in this work.

At present the Syrian staff of the laboratory consists of one fully qualified veterinarian (trained in France and Germany) as Director, and four Syrian veterinary assistants trained in the Damascus Veterinary Technical School. One of the assistants has recently been awarded a fellowship (FAO) for training in dairying and is at present in Denmark. Another will be taking up a year's fellowship in July 1955 to study the practical production of veterinary biologics in Denmark and Sweden.

The laboratory is basically well enough equipped to prepare any type of vaccine, and in particular prepares such modern living virus vaccines as those of Newcastle disease, fowl pox and sheep pox. Vaccines of this type are freeze-dried to improve their keeping qualities and to enable them to be standardized by tests and titrations.

In addition to supplying Syria with all the vaccines it requires, the laboratory during the last twelve months has supplied large quantities of anthrax, black quarter, fowl pox, sheep pox, goat pox and Newcastle vaccines to Lebanon and Jordan. In fact the consumption by Jordan and Lebanon of Newcastle vaccine in particular has been considerably greater during this period than that of Syria. This emphasizes the recommendation in the Main Report that transport and all the necessary facilities for performing mass immunizations should at once be made available to the veterinary service.

It is essential to any plans for the improvement of livestock that efficient veterinary services should be available both to the Bedouin stockowners and to the settled farming community, and that the confidence of the stockowners in such services should be built up to the point where they will rely on skilled assistance from the service to help them to meet the day-to-day problems of caring for animals of improved types.

An inventory of modern equipment suitable for district veterinary stations should be prepared and orders should be placed as soon as possible.

It is recommended that meetings of the professional staff be held regularly and that the first of these meetings give consideration to a mass immunization campaign against Newcastle disease. Such a campaign would save the lives of hundreds of thousands of birds during the first year and

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would enable poultry to make a substantial contribution to family incomes in the villages. 232

Very recently the Bedouin shepherds have apparently acquired confidence in the sheep pox vaccine, and the mission was informed that demands for vaccination in 1954 far outstripped the capacity of the field services. Sheep pox is a disease which annually causes considerable losses, but for which an efficient vaccine is available. It would seem incumbent on the government to insure that the service has the facilities for applying vaccination to the flocks.

It is recommended that with the assistance of the district veterinary staff the laboratory carry on seasonal surveys of blood mineral levels of sheep and cattle, and helminth burdens. Young veterinary assistants or science graduates should be trained to collect the blood samples in the one case and the parasitic worms in the other. The blood mineral determination and the determination of parasitic worms would be made at the laboratory. Therapeutic and control measures based upon these findings should be applied by the district veterinary staff in consultation with the laboratory. Some strengthening of laboratory staff at the veterinary assistant level will be required if systematic studies of this nature are to be undertaken.

The increasing incidence of brucellosis and tuberculosis in dairy cattle in the suburban areas to which reference has been made in the Main Report calls for investigation by biological tests and the application of control measures. The introduction or development of more productive types of livestock inevitably brings more problems for the veterinary service; unless the service can cope with these problems and meet increased demands for assistance the improved types of stock will not survive.

Artificial breeding methods, which are likely to be employed on an increasing scale as livestock farming methods advance, should be completely controlled by the service. The method can be as efficient in spreading certain diseases as it is in distributing the sperm of superior sires; the fullest possible measure of veterinary control must be exercised to guard against this danger.

The control of abattoirs and meat inspection is performed by veterinarians and veterinary assistants in the employ of the municipal authorities of such cities as Damascus and Aleppo. The municipal abattoir of Damascus is about 130 years old and is now almost enclosed by the town. It is 232 744

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desirable that a modern abattoir be built in a more suitable location; the present problem of drainage disposal would alone warrant this measure. There should be no difficulty about the provision of capital for such a project, since the municipal authority can recoup its expenditures by the collection of fees.

The present budget of £S 188,000[8] for personnel and equipment bears no relation to the value of Syrian livestock or to preventable losses. For more effective disease control the mission has recommended that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available during the next six years.

IX EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

Education

Elementary agricultural education. Since 1949 the rural elementary schools have devoted the two final years (fourth and fifth grades) to theoretical and practical instruction in agriculture and hygiene. At present 111 offering this type of instruction, each with a field of five *donums*[9] for practical field training, are distributed through *mohafazats* as follows:

Damascus	37	Dera'a	13
Aleppo	9	Soueida	11
Latakia	11	Deir ez Zor	9
Hama	5	Hasetche	5
Homs	11		

The pupils (9,000 in 1954) learn the basic principles and techniques of agriculture, practicing them in the school gardens.

Clearly this number of schools cannot provide basic rural education for all the children of Syria's 5,500 villages. Apart from the need to build more schools and enlarge existing ones, a way must be found to train additional agricultural teachers; the teacher training and secondary agricultural schools in Dera'a and Kharabo do not turn out sufficient numbers.

The mission therefore makes the following recommendations:

[8] £S 50,000 for laborers at the Damascus veterinary research center and in the provinces; £S 40,000 for purchase of animals and feed; £S 98,000 for technical requirements (£S 20,000 for the Damascus laboratory; £S 58,000 for the preparation of vaccines and biologics material; and £S 20,000 for medicines in respect of the treatment of parasitical diseases).

[9] A donum = 0.1 hectare.

the refuse dumps and other breeding sites are sprayed with DDT preparations at intervals between May and October.

Lice. Infestation with lice is common among the inhabitants in the congested quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

Fleas. Numerous species of fleas parasitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The sticktight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks, including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventricosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

highly infected villages were situated on the 164
Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar 659
surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area 361
showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 944 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[49] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 232 164

p. 151(A)

versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in the same period, but the consumption of camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population. 232 164

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded. 164

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom used without boiling, but infection may result from the consumption of contaminated cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals. 232 164 262 252 164

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis is not compulsory in Syria, and the prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated, however, by the tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population. 164 165 164 183 164

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age. 659 751

p. 151(B)

750 164 of rabid dogs, but wolves, hyenas, jackals, rats and other animals are sometimes implicated. Prophylactic treatment is provided 750 753 by the Ministry, and a special division for 164 the preparation of antirabic vaccines is incorporated in the central laboratory in Damascus. From 140 to 250 persons were treated annually in the 4 years 1948-51.

164 **Other Infections.** Tetanus is endemic, 232 and occasional cases are observed. Anthrax is enzootic among the sheep, and human infections sometimes occur in the agricultural areas. Sporadic cases of Weil's disease are reported.

Diseases Spread by Arthropods

164 **Malaria.** Malaria is a disease of major public health and economic importance, since it is endemic or hyperendemic in all populous sections of the country. The prevalence of the disease is directly related not only to the physical geography of the different regions, but to the degree and the type of cultivation. The most seriously affected foci are the plains around Damascus and Aleppo, the Orontes valley from Hama to the Turkish frontier, the irrigated zones bordering the Belikh and the Khabour rivers and their tributaries, and the swampy districts of Hauran province. Universally high infection rates are experienced during epidemic years, even in areas of low endemicity.

659 No large-scale surveys have been at- 164 tempted, but accumulated studies provide 744 rough estimates of the extent of infection in localized areas. Prior to the development of a program for the control of malaria by the Ministry of Health and the Near East Foundation in 1949-50, the spleen index among children under 10 years of age in the villages around Damascus ranged from 40 to 80 per cent, with the highest rates in villages on the periphery of the Outaybeh swamps in the eastern part of the oasis. In the vicinity of Homs, the spleen rates normally average 50 to 70 per cent.

659 In the course of joint surveys made by 747 the malariologists of the United Nations

164 369 October, when the vector sandflies, *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti*, are abundant.

164 Kala-azar is seldom specifically reported from Syria, but occasional suspected cases have been described from the Jebel-ed Druz region. A canine reservoir undoubtedly exists: the causative organisms have been demonstrated in a stray dog captured at el Bab, near Aleppo.[38]

Other Infections. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the western provinces where the vector, *Aedes aegypti*, is indigenous. Sandfly fever, transmitted by *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is endemic and sometimes epidemic.

Nutritional Diseases

166 364 511 Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are prevalent, particularly in the rural villages, where poverty and parasitic infections influence the nutritional standards of the people to a greater extent than in the urban areas. Serious nutritional conditions are most obvious among the children of the Bedouin tribes. Minor vitamin C deficiencies are widespread among the inhabitants of the grain-producing areas in the northeastern and the southern provinces. Occasional borderline cases of pellagra are encountered, but beriberi and ariboflavinosis are unusual. Cases of rickets are numerous, especially in the cities and the towns. Protein edema and overt vitamin A deficiencies are relatively rare.

Miscellaneous Conditions

164 232 Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and epidemics are sometimes reported. Q fever is enzootic among the sheep and the goats, but the extent of human infection is not known. In a series of complement fixation tests recently performed on blood serums taken from sheep and goats in different parts of the country, positive reactions were obtained in 13 to 63 per cent.[40]

170 Silicosis and benign pneumoconiosis are

p. 156 (B)

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available. 812 241 242

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital. 812 N8

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers. 811

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal. 311 619

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families. 619 281 233 428 423

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

241 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

621 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
621 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

241 amount he has to store. The jifrs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifrs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

439 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep.
221 The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

THE REGION IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE RAINFALL
regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;[2] it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub[2] and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Palmyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

IRRIGATION

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

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113 [2] A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Journ. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDl Syria MDl

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho*'s which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[15] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

241 trated in the fall and winter seasons. Thus around 70% of the area in
433 crops is usually planted to wheat and barley, and these two cereals contributed £S 59.2 million and £S 70.8 million or approximately 19% of the total value of Syria's exports in 1952 and 1953. Although a considerable number of summer crops are grown, including sorghum, maize, rice, pulses and vegetables, by far the most important of these is cotton. The latter now rivals wheat as the most valuable crop of the country even though the 1953 acreage planted to cotton was only 10% of that sown to
[439] wheat. Exports of cotton and cotton seed amounted in 1952 and 1953 to £S 131.2 million and £S 140.2 million, or 38% and 40% of the value of all exports. Orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits also assume some importance in agricultural production, although they
233 take up less than 10% of the planted area. Animal husbandry, based prin-
439 cipally on sheep and goats, is primarily a pastoral industry without a close link with settled agriculture. Exports of livestock and livestock products including hides and skins, samneh (clarified butter), cheese and eggs, amounted in 1953 to almost £S 48 million or around 13% of the total value of exports. Live animals alone contributed £S 23 million, although such exports were offset by imports, primarily from Iraq, to a value of £S 7.1 million.

241 Much of Syria's agricultural output is consumed on the farm and
433 therefore does not enter the market economy. From the returns of the agricultural production tax, which is levied only on produce brought to market, it may be estimated that only around 40% of the production of wheat, maize and sorghum and less than 30% of the output of lentils is sold.

Industry

433 During the postwar period industry has steadily forged ahead, although
464 its contribution to national income is probably still only between one-fifth and one-fourth that of agriculture and animal husbandry. The number employed in manufacturing is difficult to estimate, since the 1947 census provided no occupational breakdown, and industrial enterprises required to register with the government generally understate the number of workers employed. Fragmentary data collected by the mission indicate that employment in more or less mechanized manufacturing establishments, many of which are very small, may be between 35,000 and 40,000. If

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

In view of the desirability of increasing the role of vegetables in the Syrian diet and of their potential as a domestic and export cash crop, governmental stimulus would be of great benefit. 244 433

v ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

231

The problem of raising the production and quality of livestock has been comparatively neglected. Inadequate nutrition, high incidence of disease and mortality, and poor breeding all depress livestock yields far below what they should be. Livestock now accounts for less than 20% of the total contribution made by agriculture and animal husbandry to national income. This contribution to national income could undoubtedly be raised substantially because the possibilities for improvement in animal husbandry practices are vast and the demand for livestock products both at home and abroad is likely to increase more than proportionately as standards of living rise.

Better nutrition, control of disease and breeding are all necessary. Of the three, improvement in nutrition is by far the most important. Irrespective of breed, an animal will not be productive unless it is well fed. In fact the genetic factors in any breed cannot be fully developed and appraised unless nutrition is adequate. Similarly, low nutritional standards inevitably lower the resistance of livestock to disease and limit the effectiveness of control measures.

Migratory Livestock

233

Over 80% of the livestock other than fowl consist of sheep and goats, and most of these are taken by Bedouins on annual migrations into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing. The available vegetation is sparse and of short duration. As is usual under desert or semi-desert conditions, there is generally overgrazing in the areas close to permanent water supplies, and the poorer the season—in terms of rainfall—the heavier will be the concentration on such areas. During severe winters when winter growth ceases at an early stage and when the herbage may be destroyed by early frosts, there is a high mortality rate from the combined effects of malnutrition, helminthiasis and exposure.

It has been suggested that much of the mortality could be avoided by

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233 the provision at permanent watering points of shelters, together with a reserve of feeding stuffs. The provision of such shelters may, however, involve the authorities in difficulties caused by undue concentration of stock at these watering points in bad seasons, as well as in possible complications arising from competition for the food and shelter. Shelter and rations could not be provided for more than 20-30 days, and the transport of stock feeds for even this short period might be exceedingly difficult. Although shelter and feeding during such a period would no doubt stave off the peak mortality that is likely to occur in spells of unusually severe weather, it would contribute little or nothing toward a solution of the basic problem, to restore to health and good physical condition flocks that have become so debilitated through malnutrition and an increasing worm burden that they are killed off in spectacular fashion by a short spell of severe weather.

The gravest difficulty is the failure of winter grazing, which may be due to a variety of causes: shortage of early winter rains, paucity of growth because of persistent low temperatures, or actual destruction of young herbage by frost. This leads to malnutrition, which in turn allows a rapid build-up of worm burdens—a build-up which is again accelerated by heavy concentration of flocks in the few better areas.

In the circumstances, it seems likely that a more practical approach to the problem would be to provide stocks of feeding stuffs at centers convenient to the farms, where the sheep summer. Flockowners would then be urged to return their sheep to the farms as soon as it became apparent that the grazing had failed, and before the sheep had lost too much condition. Once back on the farms they could be fed on concentrates, supplied by government at favorable rates, supplemented by whatever crop residues may be available as roughage. Straws, dried sugar-beet pulp, bran, coarse grains, cotton seed and cake, can all be made available in an emergency such as is envisaged, and the veterinary service could take in hand mass treatment of flocks to reduce the worm count, and perform whatever immunizations may be necessary.

Elsewhere in this report it is stated that at least a third of the arable land lies fallow each year and that animal manure is almost wholly used as fuel. It is more than possible that the introduction of the practice of returning the sheep in an emergency for winter feeding on the farms may lead eventually to the growing of winter fodder crops, such as berseem, on land that would otherwise be idle. Several cuttings of berseem or lucerne

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could be taken during an average mild winter; if conditions in the desert were good enough to afford adequate keep for the lambing flocks, the berseem crop from the earlier cuttings could be dried, but it would be an advantage to graze off the final crop with stock.

Once farmers become accustomed to a rotation that includes the provision of stock feed and manuring of land through grazing of fodder by sheep (a system particularly suited to maintaining fertility on light wheat and barley lands), then they are well on the way to a balanced system of agriculture, and improvement of livestock types can be pushed ahead rapidly.

To return to the proposal for providing shelters and stocks of reserve foodstuffs in the desert, the mission suggests that the government might experiment by erecting a few such shelters in carefully selected areas, stocking them with food reserves of various kinds. The cost need not be prohibitive. A single shelter sufficient for 300-400 sheep can be built of stone walls shaped like an X, and will cost no more than £S 600. A number of these could be erected in a single location along two quarter circles situated to the left and right of the prevailing wind direction (see Diagram 7). Each group of shelters would be provided with a stock of foodstuffs consisting principally of grain straw mixed with some concentrates. Sheep would be fed for periods of 20-30 days only during exceptionally severe weather. On this basis the feeding and operational costs could probably be kept to £S 2.40 per sheep, of which the flockowner might be called upon to pay at least £S 1 per head.

The mission strongly recommends that both methods be given a thorough trial and that for this purpose up to £S 500,000 per annum be made available during the period 1955-1960.

The provision of additional desert wells at carefully selected sites might be a means of reducing losses in dry seasons. The danger of course is that the provision of permanent water in areas that formerly could be grazed only in particularly favorable seasons may eliminate the very factor that has enabled these areas to retain a reasonable cover of vegetation, and in a few years the result may quite well be a very considerable total reduction in the keep provided. In this matter of utilizing more desert wells a better line may be to investigate the possibility of tapping underground water supplies that seem likely, with the aid of flood or stored surface water, to support small Bedouin settlements, each with a limited acreage of irrigation. Experience in Egypt shows how rapidly the fertility of irrigated

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233 desert land may be built up, starting with groundnuts and going on to vegetables, citrus and grain. But there must be sufficient water, sufficient capital and sufficient determination.

PROPOSED LAYOUT OF DESERT SHELTER DIAGRAM 7



SEMI-CIRCULAR GROUPING OF SHELTERS



DETAIL OF SINGLE SHELTER

Any considerable increase in the number of wells should be made only after careful study of the grazing areas, and it is essential that there should be a simultaneous acceptance by the Bedouins of controlled grazing, e.g., a complete program of deferred rotational grazing which will allow areas

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to set seed in turn. Such a system of control can be based only upon a thorough ecological survey of grazing areas, supported by experiments in grazing management, including the possibility of reseeding with types of perennial herbs and grasses which experience in Australia, South Africa, Morocco and Algeria has shown to be more or less winter-hardy and drought-resistant.[18]

Reseeding would not require plowing, but could be carried out by broadcasting the seed from a light truck or jeep immediately after the rains. During the next two years the yield of selected native and foreign grasses could be tested in small enclosed plots before reseeding operations are undertaken on any considerable scale.

It will be apparent that measures to improve the quality and carrying capacity of desert grazing must be based on actual experiment. The mission recommends that a thorough ecological survey of the desert steppe grazing areas be undertaken as soon as possible, concurrently with experiments on methods of management. It is understood that FAO will probably be assigning a part-time botanical ecologist who will concentrate on the grazing areas; in addition an ecologist will be working in the group of countries to which these problems are common. An FAO sheep specialist with considerable experience of grazing management may also be posted to Syria. It seems that sufficient specialist staff is likely to be available during the next few years to enable a vegetation map to be prepared and to supervise field experiments on the management of the various types of desert grazing. The mission recommends the expenditure of £S 200,000 in support of the program of investigation and in applying the results to selected areas.

The institution of any system of controlled grazing, the establishment of irrigated settlements, and even the protection of reseeded land until the new grass has become well established will present a problem in administrative control. Simple policing measures are likely to be ineffective, and it is essential that the full cooperation of the Bedouins be secured for these measures. A special effort should be made to persuade the leaders and subleaders of the tribes pasturing their flocks in these areas that the control measures are being exercised for the benefit of the Bedouins, and that it is accordingly in their own interest to ensure the success of the experiments. Probably the best method of approach would be the creation of local Bedouin authorities to supervise the measures.

[18] See Annex C, p. 312.

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ANNEX C *NOTES ON AGRICULTURE*

1 POPULATION, REGIONS AND SOILS

Rural Population

162 619 Syria's agricultural population can be divided into groups differentiated by their social order.

233 *Nomadic tribes.* Bedouin tribespeople form an important unit of the rural population, numbering an estimated 150,000 and living in various stages of settlement from pure pastoral nomadism to almost permanent agricultural communities. Among the larger tribes the Tay and part of the Jubur have become practically sedentary, the Shammar and Shashans remaining nomadic or semi-nomadic. There are also numerous small nomadic tribes roaming the desert between the cultivated belt and the Jordan border. These harvest the scanty desert grass with their flocks of sheep and goats and their herds of camel and a few cattle, and contribute considerably to the country's livestock production. A large part of Syria's meat, wool and dairy products is produced by the Bedouins. Their standards of living and education are quite low.

The increasing exploitation of arable land for crop production during recent decades correspondingly reduced the grazing area and, may, if continued, threaten a considerable reduction in livestock.

162 241 511 *Settled villagers.* The nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500 compact villages form the most important segment of the agricultural population. They are the true cultivators of the soil whether they own the land or work on it as tenants or laborers. A large number farm entirely for subsistence. Even where there are large community pasture lands, the farms are usually small, frequently too small to give an economic return. Consequently incomes are generally low and many landowners, tenants and sharecroppers are constantly indebted to moneylenders. Although illiteracy among the villagers is on the decrease, education remains at a low standard.

The village people produce most of the crops, raise part of the livestock and supply the country with the bulk of its food and raw materials. Their agricultural activity as a rule is dominated by manual and draft animal

The Wanderer 8-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Syria MDI

Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

free of infestation, which will better be able to withstand competition on the world market and fetch higher prices. The Jezireh storage will make it unnecessary for farmers to dump their grain on the market immediately after the harvest, enable them to obtain credit on easier terms, and lower the cost of transport. All the facilities together will significantly reduce the substantial losses resulting at present from exposure to weather, infestation and rodents. The mission's estimate of the direct advantages resulting from the reduction of losses and the improvement in prices leads it to conclude that farmers and merchants would have ample incentive to utilize the storage facilities, even after taking into account the storage charges they would have to pay on the basis of operating costs and amortization.

We believe that the storage facilities, even when they have to be built by the government, should be operated by qualified private management under a long-term lease which would specify the maximum permissible storage charges. Farmers and merchants are unlikely to use facilities operated by the government itself.

Measures to improve the marketing of certain other products should also be taken. Large quantities of raw milk are now marketed in major cities without adequate quality control or veterinary inspection of dairy cattle. The UNICEF, concerned over milk supply for children, has apparently offered to provide equipment and assistance for the installation of a pasteurization plant in Damascus, and the mission urges that this project be carried out as promptly as possible. A similiar plant may be feasible for Aleppo. It is important that some control be established also over the source of supply. Periodic tuberculin and blood agglutination tests for the diagnosis of tuberculosis and brucellosis in dairy animals might, for example, be initiated. In Aleppo, where many dairy cows are kept in the city under unsanitary conditions which produce a high incidence of tuberculosis, the removal of dairy cattle to locations outside the city is strongly recommended.

Improvements in public abattoirs would also bring about better prices for producers and provide a better quality meat for the consumer. Existing abattoirs are for the most part old, unhygienic and possess no means for salvaging many of the valuable by-products of slaughtering which could be used for the manufacture of fertilizers, chemicals and drugs. While complete renovation is not feasible in the immediate future, the mission suggests that a start be made by erecting a modern abattoir in Damascus at an estimated cost of £S 600,000.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI

248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year
234 suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at re-afforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2*.

widely used, chiefly in the form of *leben*, a 262
fermented milk product, cheese or butter.
About 60 to 70 per cent of the milk is de- 234
rived from sheep; the remainder, from cattle
or goats. The Juliana breed of cattle and a
special breed of "Damascus goat" are raised
in most regions and are noteworthy as milk
producers. Fowl and eggs are usually plenti- 235
ful, but the consumption of meat is nor-
mally low, especially in the rural areas.
Mutton is the principal meat, although the 262
flesh of cattle, goats and camels is also uti-
lized. Fish are valuable as a source of pro- 226
tein in the Euphrates and the Khabour river
basins and along the coast; they are seldom
available in other regions.

The Bedouin live chiefly on milk prod- 262
ucts made from the milk of their flocks, aug- 361
mented by cereals and, occasionally, dates.
Meat is often more of a luxury among the
nomads than among the villagers. The aver-
age Bedouin diet is usually sparse and
monotonous.

Housing

Life in rural Syria centers in the villages, 342
which are self-contained social units. Struc-
turally, they are compact, with the houses
attached, and built in such a manner that
a continuous windowless wall faces the
street. Mud brick or adobe is the predomi-
nating building material, although stone is
sometimes employed in the highland areas.
The houses may consist of one or several
rooms, which almost invariably open into a
central compound. Separate shelters for
storage and for the livestock may line the
sides of the courtyards, but in the poorer
villages the domestic animals are frequently
housed with the family, at least during the
winter months. The roofs are typically flat,
made of rolled earth overlaid on poles and
reeds or of thatch. Beehive-type houses with
domed or conical roofs, however, are a char-
acteristic feature of the treeless plains in
Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces.
Dwellings built partially underground, often
simulating caves, are encountered in some
mountain villages in Latakia. Considerable

p. 141(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD 1

istry of Agriculture, and all meats offered for sale must carry an official stamp of approval. Few controls exist over the production of milk, however, except in some of the larger cities. Cow's or goat's milk is normally sold in bulk and peddled in donkey carts. Herds of goats are frequently driven through the streets, the animals being milked while the customer waits. The dairies and the herds which supply milk to the cities of Damascus and Aleppo are subject to inspection by the municipal veterinarians. Samples collected from restaurants and other food establishments may also be submitted to the food control laboratories of the Ministry of Health for bacteriologic examination. There are no modern facilities for pasteurization. A few dealers in Damascus retail bottled milk which has been pasteurized by submersion in boiling water baths. Little milk is consumed raw, since boiling is the general practice, but butter and cheese are frequent sources of infection. Brucellosis is enzootic among both goats and cattle, tuberculosis among the cattle.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

The present health organization of the Syrian government has evolved since 1943, when the republic was established. The health and the medical services are administered by the Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus. Executive authority resides in the Minister, who is advised on matters of policy by a Supreme Public Health Council. He is assisted by a Director General of Health, who, in turn, is advised by a Public Health Consultation Council made up of experts in representative technical fields. The functions of the Ministry are discharged through 7 constituent departments —public health affairs, public health laboratories, hospitals and clinics, inspections, pharmaceutical affairs, supplies and administration and records.

p. 145(B)

widely used, chiefly in the form of *leben*, a fermented milk product, cheese or butter. About 60 to 70 per cent of the milk is derived from sheep; the remainder, from cattle or goats. The Juliana breed of cattle and a special breed of "Damascus goat" are raised in most regions and are noteworthy as milk producers. Fowl and eggs are usually plentiful, but the consumption of meat is normally low, especially in the rural areas. Mutton is the principal meat, although the flesh of cattle, goats and camels is also utilized. Fish are valuable as a source of protein in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins and along the coast; they are seldom available in other regions.

The Bedouin live chiefly on milk products made from the milk of their flocks, augmented by cereals and, occasionally, dates. Meat is often more of a luxury among the nomads than among the villagers. The average Bedouin diet is usually sparse and monotonous.

Housing

Life in rural Syria centers in the villages, which are self-contained social units. Structurally, they are compact, with the houses attached, and built in such a manner that a continuous windowless wall faces the street. Mud brick or adobe is the predominating building material, although stone is sometimes employed in the highland areas. The houses may consist of one or several rooms, which almost invariably open into a central compound. Separate shelters for storage and for the livestock may line the sides of the courtyards, but in the poorer villages the domestic animals are frequently housed with the family, at least during the winter months. The roofs are typically flat, made of rolled earth overlaid on poles and reeds or of thatch. Beehive-type houses with domed or conical roofs, however, are a characteristic feature of the treeless plains in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces. Dwellings built partially underground, often simulating caves, are encountered in some mountain villages in Latakia. Considerable

423, 241

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the organization of agriculture and forms of land tenure and an historical summary of changes in agricultural systems and methods in the countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 127-129, 192-196, Turkey - pp. 129-130, Iraq - pp. 130-133, 189-192, 202-203, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine - pp. 133-135, 188-189, 203-204. /

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132
● 241
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Syria MD1

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

The Syrian economy in 1945 was distinguished by its relatively low 433
production of a generally poor quality. It lay in a state of decadence and stagnation that could only have been remedied by energetic action by the authorities in power. It was a virgin country waiting for people willing to work hard to develop its resources in the fields of agriculture, industry and commerce.

Agriculture in Syria occupies first place, whether considered 433
from the point of view of production or the number of those who 241
earn a living from it. It produces the largest part of the country's exports and supplies the national industries with raw materials. But, despite its preponderance over other economic activities farmers remained up to 1945 dependent on ancient methods, and were ignorant of such modern techniques as the use of machines and fertilizers. Syrian agriculture suffered helplessly from the crop rotation system, from natural pests, insects and diseases, from rain variations and the unscrupulousness of money lenders.

As to industry, it was in its infancy, still feeling its way and 433
lacking encouragement, protection, adequate studies, knowledge and experience.

Nor was commerce in a better situation than agriculture and in- 439
dustry. During the second world war, Syrian trade lost its relations 457
with many of the belligerent countries, and emerged from the war crippled and hampered by the restrictions of exchange control. In addition, the direction of Syrian commerce was not in the hands of Syrian nationals; the larger part of foreign trade, both exports and imports, was handled through Beirut. As a result Syrian merchants lost direct touch with countries abroad and Syria became in effect an internal market dealing in retail with neighbouring markets. Commercial agencies were in the hands of non-Syrians up to the extent of 95 per cent of the total. To complete the picture we should mention that a large part of banking operations with foreign countries took place in banks situated outside Syria, and that the purchase and sale of foreign exchange accruing to Syria was effected in the Beirut market. To conclude, control of Syrian external trade was in non-Syrian hands and the Syrian economy, in consequence, was forced to lose large sums in the form of expenses, commissions, and profits which were paid abroad for mediation in purchase and sale transactions.

14. During the period under discussion the Syrian Govern- 185
ment exercised great effort with satisfactory results; it made a be-

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not.

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short.

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah.

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts:

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions.

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating

[179] it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes. 311 The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer. 241 Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed 182 land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

123 The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

241 For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for 311 cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

312 The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

312 Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers 406 from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less thanLS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some 312 projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is 241 supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley. 242 But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available. 812 241 242

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital. 812 453

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers. 811

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal. 311 619

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families. 619 231 233 428 423

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
• 241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

241 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

621 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
622 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
361 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.
[291 Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
861 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.
[134] This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
• 241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
577 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
511 ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

CROPS AND AGRICULTURE IN JAZIRAH

I. Dry Farming

Dry farming is by far the most important activity of Jazirah. 241
The first tractor and combine were introduced in 1936 by Shahine 311
Bey Maluf of Zahleh. Before that time agriculture was the business of the peasants. The town inhabitants of Jazirah took no interest in it. The area cultivated was restricted to a few kilometers south of the railway line in what is called the Old Villages. The political troubles in 1936-37 and the low prices of wheat and barley before the War did not encourage capitalists inside Syria to invest their money in Jazirah. Furthermore, agricultural machinery was new to most people who did not understand its economics or how to run it.

a. Expansion in the Use of Machinery 1936-1952

The War doubled the price of wheat in its second year. The 407
crop of 1940 was sold for LS 50-55 a ton at Aleppo. The French 459
bought it for LS 120 in 1941. The Office des Cereales Panifiables (O. C. P.) fixed the price at LS 350 in 1943. During these years the dollar was available at the official rate of LS 2. 20 and importation of machinery from the U. S. was possible. The number of tractors increased to about 60 in the winter of 1943.

The crop of 1943 was exceptionally good and the O. C. P. imported some 50 tractors and a similar number of combines which reached Jazirah during the harvest season. The machines were first rented to the farmers and then sold to them. They repeesented the first large-scale importation of machinery to Jazirah.

Importation of machinery in the following two years became difficult as a result both of limited availability and of dollar shortage. But by the end of the War dollars became again available at the official rate and large numbers of tractors were imported in 1945 and 1946. The importation of agricultural machinery has become a steady and continnous flow in spite of the sharp rise in the dollar rates and the price of wheat, though below 1943, still makes large-scale exploitation profitable. Recently the Government through 654
the Agricultural Bank has helped the farmers import and buy on [452

43 compete on world markets. The cost of production of wheat in the
430 Jazirah by machinery is much higher than the cost of production in the major producing countries of the world, such as Canada, the U. S. A. and Australia. Since the average annual export of wheat in Syria does not exceed 250-300 thousand tons, and it is Jazirah which produces this exportable surplus, the rest of Syria taking care of internal consumption, the costs of Jazirah production become the determining factors. Some causes of the higher cost of production in Jazirah have been mentioned above. Others, such as the difficult transportation will be discussed later. But there is no doubt that unless the different defects controlling Jazirah agriculture are removed, and they can be removed by Government enlightened action, production will drop sharply when world prices decline as they might do if world tension is removed.

e. Two Types of Agriculture in Jazirah

241 It should be stated that two different methods of production prevail in Jazirah, cultivation by peasants using mules and cultivation by machinery.

1. Peasant cultivation accounts for perhaps 50-60 per cent of the crop, and machinery cultivation for the remainder. Both types suffer from some of the obstacles mentioned above, such as bad credit and transportation systems, bad seed, insecurity as to prices, and lack of agricultural guidance. But inspite of all, the peasant farmer will continue to plow his tract of land no matter how circumstances change because farming is his occupation and he knows no other. The crop he produces is enough for him and his family, and the surplus he sells to the Jazirah towns to feed the city people. The drop in prices will simply mean a lower standard of living for him and his family.

2. The cultivator by machinery suffers from causes in addition to those of the peasant. He is a capitalist who has invested his money in machinery, seeds, fuel and wages and he has to show a profit at the end of the year to pay for his investment and to live at a decent standard. His investment should give him returns comparable to other fields of endeavor, otherwise he will not continue in his present

job. It is this mechanized farmer-investor who has produced the surplus wheat exportable from Jazirah. Any attempt to reduce his activity by limiting the area of land cultivated by him, or by artificially reducing the prices of his crops for the benefit of the State monopoly, or by ignoring his demands for low production costs, will result in his leaving the job for other occupations. It should be noted also that this type of farmer is in most cases not tied to the land. He usually rents the land he cultivates, and even if he owned land, it is only a small fraction of the area he plants annually. It is always easy for him to rent his lands to peasant farmers and go back to the city. 2141

3. Estimate of a Capitalist Agricultural Enterprise and the Area it needs: A complete outfit of agricultural machinery belonging to a farmer in Jazirah usually consists of the following. A fifty horsepower tractor, a disc plow, a cultivator, a drill, a combine either tractor drawn or self-propelled, a jeep, a truck, and a regular repair shop for immediate repairs in the field. He will have a mechanic and two drivers on an annual basis. The number will rise to about ten during the plowing, seeding, and harvest seasons. This means an outlay of LS 100,000 in capital to which is added LS 25,000 for the price of seed, fuel, and miscellaneous expenses. To meet the depreciation on the machinery, cover the annual expenses and interest, and earn a profit, the farmer must plant as large an area of land as his equipment can handle. It is found that he has to plant some 5,000 dunums annually or better still 6,000 in order to find his occupation remunerative. To do this, he has to own or rent land double this area since all cultivation in Jazirah is on a two year rotation basis. 407 454 2141

II. Irrigated Agriculture

The Encyclopedia Britannica relates that the region of Nisibin, i.e. Qamishli, was up to the eleventh century planted with fruit trees and that it lost its orchards due to forcible conversion to wheat imposed by the Caliph, as well as ravages by the Bedouin tribes. 2141

6. Government of Syria--19 G-4 (no date) 1952 MDI Syria MDI

a. The Region of Deirik

241 In the region of Deirik, the Zarkan river and numerous springs in the villages make irrigation possible over vast areas. The region began to be developed recently when the road was partly constructed. Rice is an old staple, but in the last two years it have given place to cotton. However, rice may resume its former place since cotton diseases have become so widespread.

b. The Jarrah

The Jarrah river flows through Kubur el Bid and irrigates the country around it. Its waters were used for rice plantations, and recently for cotton. In winter its waters flow into the Rad.

c. The Jagjag

133 The main river of northern Jazirah is the Jagjag. Its sources are about thirty kilometers north of Kamishli, in a gorge in Turkey. It flows through Nisibin and Kamishli, crosses the Jazirah plain and empties in the Khabur at Hassakeh. Its total length is about 100 kms. and its average flow is 3 cubic meters per second.

In Turkey and Kamishli, the river has several beds. The Turks, unable to exploit it fully in their country because of its short flow there, follow the practice of changing the river from bed to bed in the summer months, so that farmers in Jazirah do not know when the water will be available to them. This uncertainty has lead the villages which have a right to the water to sell their rights for one or more years to individuals on good terms with the Turkish authorities. These individuals in their turn bribe the Turks to direct the waters in the bed which leads to their lands. One family in particular has obtained a sort of monopoly on the waters of the Jagjag in Qamishli. The Asfar-Najjars buy the water rights from the villages for nominal sums and then try to reach an understanding with the Turks. Since they have one or two competing groups in Qamishli, the Turks usually get paid by both parties and satisfy none entirely. The Asfars manage however to get the biggest share.

Such an unstable situation does not lead to steady irrigation development along the lines of orchard planting. The farmer is lucky if he can grow one crop of rice or cotton with the present

fluctuations in water flow. Up to 1950, all the water of Jagjag was used for growing rice. In 1950-51, more emphasis was given to cotton. This year it is half cotton and half rice. 312 241

The Turks started a project for diverting all the waters of the Jagjag from Syria to Turkey. They began building tunnels to carry one quarter of the waters cast above Kubur el Bid, and the rest to the plains above Amuda and Dirbassiya. The Syrian Government objected and negotiations began in Ankara. The Syrians believe that they have reached an understanding with the Turkish authorities to divide the river waters equally. The Turks did not sign the agreement, claiming that they want a full agreement on water rights covering all common rivers and especially the Orontes. They are afraid that Syria might use all the waters of the Orontes in its irrigation projects. Since Syria holds this arm, the Jagjag dispute will be solved equitably. 312 648

It is difficult to estimate the area irrigated yearly by the Jagjag. The waters are used only for summer crops, and last year about thirty thousand dunums were planted to cotton. When the plantation is rice the area is nearer to ten thousand dunums. There is of course always a certain amount of land devoted to vegetable growing for the needs of the city. 312 241

d. Underground Water

Recently a few enterprising farmers tried to solve the problem of dependency upon Turkey for irrigation water by digging for water on their own lands. An Armenian outfit from Aleppo with a boring machine of local construction dug several wells in the region of Qamishli and Amuda. Three of the wells in the villages of Tal Ahmad and Tal Anbar near Kamishli were successful. Water to run a 4-inch pump was found at a depth of 18 meters. The other holes around Amuda were not so successful. Water was not found at a depth of 70 meters. These experiments are of course inconclusive and sufficient underground water may be found to be abundant in Jazirah. Further studies are needed. 312

a. The Khabur

The largest source of irrigation water in Jazirah is undoubtedly the Khabur. Its average flow is 52 cubic meters per second which 133

133 makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

812 406 The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. 465 The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

241 The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was preferred to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

511 241 427 Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

when the wheat crop fails, as it did last year, there is great hardship in all of the Jazirah. Debts remain largely unpaid, the value of land falls off sharply, and interest rates become unbearable

The failure of a crop in Jazirah brings more hardship than is the case in other Mohafazas because Jazirah, with all the money revenue which accrues to it in a good year, has not arrived yet at the stage where it can save a part of this income to use in bad years. All the money revenue is immediately reinvested in machinery and in expansion of the area planted with additonal sums borrowed from the banks or from Aleppo merchants.

The point is reached where further expansion has become difficult, and the situation will become more or less stabilized so that some of the income will be put aside for emergencies in the coming few years. But even when savings reach a high figure, the problem of monoculture is not solved.

Jazirah at present does not produce the necessary vegetables and fruit for its own consumption. It imports them from Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. That is why the cost of living in the town of the Jazirah is one of the highest in Syria. Aside from the price of meat and samneh, everything including room and house rents, is more expensive than in the other big towns of Syria. Even flour is sold to bakers by the town municipalities at the same price for which it is sold in Damascus.

In former times, however, Jazirah produced great amounts of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Its lands are very well suited to raising cattle and beef, an employment more profitable than wheat growing. A diversification in the use of land will make for a more balanced and prosperous economy in Jazirah. But the Jazirah farmers are not to be blamed entirely for the kind of agriculture prevailing. Circumstances beyond their control, connected primarily with the problems of land ownership and tenure, have largely imposed this type of monoculture upon them. These problems will be discussed in the following section, but it can be said in passing that the farmer cannot be expected to invest money in buildings for cattle raising, or in digging wells to provide irrigation for vegetable growing, or in planting orchards on lands to which he has no title or whose title is subject to constant disputes over boundaries with the neighbors and lately by decree-law 96 with the State.

often an agent of the Aleppo merchant who furnishes the capital 438
and has the necessary warehouses in Aleppo and the commercial 441
knowledge and connections in the Syrian market and abroad to dispose of the crop at the best terms.

I. The Problem of Storage and Warehouses

The dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo merchants is such that 438
until the present time there is not a single warehouse or silo to store 241
wheat for a few months in all Jazirah belonging to an individual merchant or big farmer. During harvest season, the wheat is stacked in the open near the railway stations and left without cover until it is shipped to Aleppo. The hangers of the stations can only hold a small part of the crop. The Mira built a few depots but it is not known whether they will be put at the disposal of merchants.

The special conditions of cultivation in Jazirah connected with the problem of credit and land ownership make the transport of wheat from the farms to the stations during harvest season a hectic affair. This is caused by two reasons: in the first place, the farmer is always in need of money and has to ship his crop quickly to Aleppo to sell it, and, secondly, even if the big farmer is not in need of money, he does not feel it is safe to keep his crop in the villages. In most cases, he is only a tenant and it does not pay for him to construct a depot on land, he does not own. Even if he owned the land, he would hesitate to keep his crop away from the market until the winter months when he might need money but might find himself unable to transport his crop because of bad roads.

The logical solution would be to construct warehouses in the towns or near the stations, but, here again, the lack of capital prevents the accomplishment of this job.

The Kurd is the only farmer who keeps a part of his crop on the 241
land. As a good and thrifty peasant, he stores his seeds, the pro- 251
visions for his family and usually an amount of wheat equal to the seeds he planted. If anything remains, he sells to buy clothes and foodstuffs. The Kurd keeps the extra wheat he has in holes dug in the ground called "jifr". The hole is usually two meters in diameter and 2-3 meters deep. It is lined with "tibn" to keep the moisture away and the wheat remains in a good condition in it for several months. The peasant has a number of these jifrs depending on the

241 amount he has to store. The jifirs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifirs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

489 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep.
221 The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

6: Government of Syria--46 G-4 (no date)1952 MD1 Syria MD1

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

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDI Syria MDI

IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE REGION

regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;[2] it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub[2] and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Palmyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

Irrigation

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

113 [2] A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Journ. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

7:Lewis 8-3 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDI Syria MDI

244 except wheat and barley, and around each village is an area of irrigated land on which vegetables, fruit, cotton, maize, fodder, and grain are grown. The configuration of the ground and the peculiar properties of the soil make possible the use of subsurface water for irrigation, and past and present inhabitants have taken full advantage of these conditions.

312 [406 379] Water is distributed to irrigation ditches from wells, surface watercourses, or *foggaras* (foggaras).[2] It is lifted from wells either by pumps or by chains of buckets geared to an animal-turned wheel. From wells which have water in part of their course for some or all of the growing season it is taken by a gravity canal. The stream is roughly dammed and the water led, at a gentler angle than that of the watercourse, along the valley side until it reaches a suitable level for watering the ground below. Neither of these methods is of great importance as compared with foggaras, which supply most of the irrigated lands of the area.

A foggara, known elsewhere as *qanat*, *karez*, or "chain of wells," is an underground conduit. The method has been used since ancient times in many parts of the Middle East. Foggaras are found in several regions of Syria and are especially numerous in the Selemiya region. Figure 4 shows the general principle by which the water-bearing layer is tapped by the gallery or subsurface canal. The most copious supplies of water are provided when the canal is driven back from a spring along the underground "stream" that feeds it. A depression that is a natural gathering ground of water is often utilized, or a wide area may be tapped by the construction of several converging galleries, as in Mouhajjar. The gradient of the gallery is sufficient to induce water flow, but it is less steep than the general slope of the ground, so that water is conducted gradually to the surface, usually to low-lying flat land suitable for irrigation. The vertical shafts, like large wells, which connect the underground canal to the surface, were used during the digging as passages of ingress and egress and serve the same purpose now when the canals are cleaned of mud, debris, and vegetation; hence they are always surrounded with mounds of accumulated spoil. Lower down, as the canal comes to the surface, it flows between steep banks, which gradually become less high, until the water is flowing at ground level. Often the hardpan forms a natural roof to the gallery.

In length, depth, and water flow the foggaras differ greatly. One canal

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113 [2] Foggaras in North Africa have been described and illustrated in the *Geographical Review*. See John Blacke: Modes of Life in the Moroccan Countryside, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 477-502, reference on pp. 480 and 491; R. H. Forbes: The Transsaharan Compass, Vol. 33, 1943, pp. 197-213, reference on p. 199—Ed. Note.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[10] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [10] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

132 region to another. On some mountain heights it is over 40 in., while in the desert areas it sinks almost to nothing. The temperature also varies greatly, in general increasing from west to east and to a lesser extent from north to 132 south. The differences of rainfall and temperature, together 311 with such other factors as the presence or absence of rivers 241 and springs, give rise to great differences in fertility and vegetation. The coastal regions have a Mediterranean climate, and are often well watered both by rainfall and by rivers; they are suitable for cereals, tobacco and many kinds of fruit. The seaward slopes of the maritime ranges have a more temperate climate, and terraces of cultivable soil on which olive trees and vines can grow; but the eastern slopes are more barren. The central depression has a sub-tropical climate. Parts of it are well watered by rivers and are fertile. In the Jordan Valley, fruits can be cultivated, and cereals in the more northern parts of the inner depression. Much of the inner range is dry and barren; but on the plateaux of the north and of Transjordan there is sufficient rainfall to make possible the cultivation of cereals. This is true also of the Hauran and Jebel Druze. The Ghutah is suitable with irrigation for the growing of fruits of many kinds. East of the inner range the rainfall becomes scantier, the heat more intense, and the land less fertile; until finally it becomes too arid to be suitable for anything but pasturage. But across the Euphrates conditions change once more, and it is possible to grow cereals in the river valleys of the Jazirah.

3

131 The nature of Syrian history has been deeply affected by the structure and position of the land. It is largely a history of economic, political and other movements affecting the whole area of which Syria forms a part. To those movements Syria has served at times as a starting-point, at others as a terminus or a bridge.

439 The first of the movements has been that of world trade. Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East; and its own products, oil, grain, textiles and metal work, have at times found a market in the Western world. Another and more specialized trade has been that with

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 568 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

8

The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

621 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
241 from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
427 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power
423

000 162 eastwards into the desert. At present the bulk of the population is concentrated in a comparatively small part of the total area of the country; it is mainly in the West and in the river valleys of the Jazirah. The density of population is greatest on the coast and round Damascus and Aleppo.

241 The crops which are grown or could be grown vary greatly from district to district, in accordance with variations in climate and the soil's fertility. The Jazirah, the great plain of Homs and Hama, the Biqa' and the Hauran produce wheat, and to a lesser extent maize, barley and other cereals. Olives, vines and other fruits are grown on the coastal plains and the westward slopes of the coastal ranges; tobacco in Lebanon and around Latakia; cotton also around Latakia, and in the Biqa'. Some districts are well watered by springs, summer streams and perennial rivers, and some, in the north more than in the south and on the coast rather than inland, enjoy an adequate rainfall; but the fertility of almost all parts of the country could be much increased were its water-resources to be properly exploited. The Orontes in the north, the Litani in the south, the Euphrates and its tributaries in the north-east and other rivers could be used to irrigate perhaps half a million more hectares than are irrigated to-day. The rainfall could be more fully utilized, and the agricultural situation improved in various other ways, by systematic reafforestation, to make up for the bad effects of neglect in the past. Under French rule a little has been done to this end, but more remains to be done.

135 The mineral resources of Syria and Lebanon have not yet been thoroughly investigated but are probably not extensive. Salt and some other minerals exist in quantities sufficient to supply the country's own needs; but iron and other requisites of industry are found only in small quantities or else not at all. In recent years there have been reports of the discovery of oil in the Jazirah, but whatever oilfields exist are not yet being exploited.

433 241 In normal years the country's production of food equals and often exceeds its consumption, although the inadequacy of internal communications and other factors make necessary a certain importation of agricultural products from the neighbouring countries. Improvements in the quality of seeds and livestock and the modernization of agricultural methods have already begun, and greatly help in increasing production.

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production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

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311 rainfall is supplemented by the water brought down from the mountains
133 by its rivers. The principal of these is the Euphrates which has its headwaters in Turkey and flows in a generally southeasterly direction across Syria into Iraq. Together with its most important tributary, the Khabour, which also rises in Turkey, it accounts for 90% of the total annual flow of all Syrian rivers. In the west the largest river is the Orontes which is fed by springs from the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges and flows northward through the marshy area known as the Ghab into Turkey. Farther south the Barada river, rising in the Anti-Lebanon, supplies life-giving water to the fertile Ghouta oasis around Damascus. In the extreme south the Yarmuk river flows along the Jordanian frontier into the Jordan river. Although the flow of these rivers is highly seasonal, it is on the effective utilization of their waters that much of the future development of Syria's agriculture depends.

Principal Regions

631 Administratively Syria is divided into nine *mohafazats* or provinces, each in charge of a *mohafez* or governor; the province is in turn divided into *qadas* or counties headed by a *kaimakam;* and the county is further subdivided into *nahiyes* or townships in charge of a *mudir*.

241 Of greater significance, however, are the principal economic regions.
438 Farthest south are the adjoining regions of the Hauran and Djebel Druze.
311 The Hauran plain, an area of rather high but apparently declining fertility, has long been known as a granary, even in Roman times. Its principal crop is wheat, but barley, maize, sorghum and pulses are also important. To the east rises the Djebel Druze, a basaltic dome, where the Druzes, a proud and independent people, eke a bare living from the pockets of fertile soil in their mountains. Here the pressure of population on the land is acute. Agricultural holdings in the Hauran and Djebel Druze are predominantly small. There is little irrigation, and annual rainfall, averaging less than 12 inches, is barely adequate for dry farming. Sharp fluctuations in rainfall frequently make farming precarious. One of the principal problems of this region is the scant supply of underground water even for drinking.

To the northwest of the Hauran lies the higher, rolling Julani plateau stretching toward the Hermon range. This stony region is suitable only for grazing and, to some extent, for orchards. To the north a narrow band

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241 of cultivation leads to Damascus where semi-desert conditions prevail and
438 rainfall is generally inadequate for dry farming. Thanks to the waters of
911 the Barada river, however, Damascus lies in a fertile oasis, known as the Ghouta. It is pre-eminently an area of orchards and vineyards yielding olives, fruit and nuts. Vegetables, hemp and, more recently, sugar beets are also important crops and extensive dairying is carried on. Damascus, linked with the nearby Lebanese port of Beirut by road and narrow-gauge rail, is one of Syria's two leading industrial centers, the other being Aleppo. Aside from the textile factories which constitute the principal industry, Damascus has plants for the production of cement, glass, vegetable oils, soap, leather and boots and the canning of foodstuffs.

North-northeast of Damascus up to the plains of Homs the country is for the most part rugged and barren, with occasional oases. From Homs to Aleppo stretches an extensive plain which is, along with the Jezireh, the most important agricultural area in Syria. Rainfall is fairly adequate, ranging from an annual average of around 600 mm. (23.6 inches) at Homs to a little less than 400 mm. (15.7 inches) at Hama and Aleppo. The region is the site of the largest completed government irrigation scheme, the Homs-Hama irrigation network, fed from Homs lake; extensive areas are also irrigated by wells, river pumps and water wheels. Northwest of Hama lies the large marshy area known as the Ghab into which the Orontes river pours its water and which the government is just beginning to reclaim. The Homs-Hama-Aleppo area has become the center of cotton and sugar beet cultivation, and it produces roughly one-third of the country's wheat and almost one-half of its barley. West of Aleppo extensive orchards and vineyards produce olives, fruits and nuts. The landholdings of the area are generally large and for the most part cultivated by sharecroppers, who earn a bare living. Around Aleppo mechanized agriculture is developing on some scale.

Aleppo, the principal grain market and commercial center of the country, has also developed considerable industry, featuring cotton ginning and textiles, vegetable oil extraction and soap making, and cement. Homs, with its new sugar factory, a modern textile dyeing plant, several flour mills and a large number of small weaving enterprises, has also achieved some industrial importance.

West of Homs and Hama lies the province of Latakia, facing the Mediterranean. It receives the highest rainfall—up to 1,000 mm. per year—and has a subtropical climate. Its rather narrow coastal plain boasts a

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diversified agriculture yielding tobacco, cotton, legumes, melons, olives and some citrus as well as winter cereals. Its principal city, Latakia, is a rapidly growing port serving as an outlet for the large agricultural output of northern Syria. The coastal plains and the mountains of the province are the country's most densely populated areas.

East of Aleppo lie two distinct agricultural regions, one the belt of rain-fed cultivation stretching along the Turkish frontier and comprising principally the province of the Jezireh, the other, the irrigated Euphrates valley. The Euphrates flows in a southeasterly direction through an arid region but the water taken from the river by hundreds of pumps makes possible extensive cultivation of cereals in the winter and cotton and other crops in the summer. Cultivation is principally by sharecroppers. Deir ez Zor is the largest city in the Euphrates valley. The Jezireh in northeastern Syria has now become the country's principal granary. Once the home of roaming, warlike Bedouins, it was pacified and thrown open to settled agriculture only during the last two decades. Beginning in the second World War, cultivation was rapidly expanded until now the Jezireh produces almost half the country's wheat and a considerable amount of barley as well. Dry farming predominates, with cultivation extending from Hassetche, the capital of the province, where rainfall is marginal, northward to the Turkish border where rainfall is heavy and the region's principal commercial center, the bustling town of Kamichliye, is located. In the valleys of the Khabour and Jagh-Jagh rivers, however, there is some irrigated cultivation, with cotton and rice as the principal crops. In this sparsely settled region, dry farming is carried on in large holdings —in some cases more than 100,000 hectares—and with fleets of tractors and self-propelled combines. The principal problem of the region is transport, for it is served inadequately by a railway running in and out of Turkish territory and by roads and tracks which are impassable for part of the year.

South and southwest of the Euphrates and extending toward Hama, Homs and Damascus lies a large, roughly triangular area, the Syrian desert. This desert or steppe area, although dotted here and there by an oasis, is too arid to support cultivation. Vegetation springs up briefly following the scant winter rains and supports during this time large flocks of sheep and goats tended by Bedouin tribesmen who are also engaged in the breeding of camels. Inadequate water supplies and occasionally severe weather make serious inroads on the flocks from time to time.

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Natural Resources

Land and water are undoubtedly the principal natural resources of Syria. Indications do not point to extensive mineral deposits. Some poor lignite but no coal has been found. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company carried out extensive prospecting and drilling over a considerable area under a concession granted in 1938. After spending about £ 6 million sterling in exploratory work, it surrendered its concession in August 1951. Although the belief persists in Syria that considerable oil will one day be discovered, there is no evidence to support the supposition. Drilling did reveal the presence of natural gas in eastern Syria, southwest of Hassetche, and also of appreciable quantities of rock salt. In theory this gas, if proved in considerable volume, together with salt, could provide the raw materials for the production of fertilizers and alkalis, but other countries—for example Iraq—may well be more favorably situated with respect to the development of similar resources. The natural gas could also be used as a source of energy but it is unfortunately found at a considerable distance from the potential market in western Syria.

There are important deposits of bitumen or asphalt. One of these, in the province of Latakia, is already being mined, but other and far richer deposits uncovered in the Djebel Bichri, west of Deir ez Zor, are being exploited to a minor extent only by the Ministry of Public Works. The latter deposits are expected to assume considerable importance in the extensive roadbuilding program the government is planning to undertake. Iron ore, chromite and lead and iron pyrites are known to exist, but their presence in commercial quantities is still to be proved. While licenses for prospecting of minerals are being issued, on the basis of existing evidence it seems unlikely that mineral resources exist in sufficient quantities to affect the future of Syria significantly.

Agriculture

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65% to 75% of the people derive their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable portion of the balance earn their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities. Agriculture and animal husbandry together probably account for 45% to 50% of the national income. In agriculture, winter crops are most important because rainfall is concen-

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241 433 trated in the fall and winter seasons. Thus around 70% of the area in crops is usually planted to wheat and barley, and these two cereals contributed £S 59.2 million and £S 70.8 million or approximately 19% of the total value of Syria's exports in 1952 and 1953. Although a considerable number of summer crops are grown, including sorghum, maize, rice, pulses and vegetables, by far the most important of these is cotton. The latter now rivals wheat as the most valuable crop of the country even though the 1953 acreage planted to cotton was only 10% of that sown to [439] wheat. Exports of cotton and cotton seed amounted in 1952 and 1953 to £S 131.2 million and £S 140.2 million, or 38% and 40% of the value of all exports. Orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits also assume some importance in agricultural production, although they 233 take up less than 10% of the planted area. Animal husbandry, based prin- 439 cipally on sheep and goats, is primarily a pastoral industry without a close link with settled agriculture. Exports of livestock and livestock products including hides and skins, samneh (clarified butter), cheese and eggs, amounted in 1953 to almost £S 48 million or around 13% of the total value of exports. Live animals alone contributed £S 23 million, although such exports were offset by imports, primarily from Iraq, to a value of £S 7.1 million.

241 433 Much of Syria's agricultural output is consumed on the farm and therefore does not enter the market economy. From the returns of the agricultural production tax, which is levied only on produce brought to market, it may be estimated that only around 40% of the production of wheat, maize and sorghum and less than 30% of the output of lentils is sold.

Industry

433 464 During the postwar period industry has steadily forged ahead, although its contribution to national income is probably still only between one-fifth and one-fourth that of agriculture and animal husbandry. The number employed in manufacturing is difficult to estimate, since the 1947 census provided no occupational breakdown, and industrial enterprises required to register with the government generally understate the number of workers employed. Fragmentary data collected by the mission indicate that employment in more or less mechanized manufacturing establishments, many of which are very small, may be between 35,000 and 40,000. If

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454 Savings institutions are virtually non-existent. There are no special savings banks and the regular commercial banks do not consider it worth while to make a particular effort to attract savings deposits. In fact, total savings deposits in commercial banks at the end of 1953 amounted to only £S 3.5 million. No postal savings system exists, and savings in the form of insurance are negligible. This does not mean that savings do not accrue, but rather that they do not take institutional form and are invested directly, not through the intermediary of institutions or a capital market. Syrians generally prefer types of investments which are tangible and visible, such as land and buildings, and over which they can exercise some personal control. In the past the habit of putting savings into hoards of precious metals or even currency has also been deeply ingrained. There is some evidence, incapable of statistical measurement, that the relative importance of savings in the form of hoards has declined in the postwar period as opportunities for profitable investment have grown. Investment in corporate securities has greatly increased during this period, but only by limited groups of people and under conditions assuring them control over the corporate enterprise. Shares in industrial companies are bought and sold in an unorganized and very limited market.

Economic Growth

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483 One of the most noteworthy features of the Syrian economy has been its rapid growth over the last two decades, as indicated in Table 3. Agriculture and industry have both featured prominently in this development. The availability of idle land combined with the food shortages attributable to the war provided a tremendous incentive to an expansion of agricultural output. The area under cultivation, including fallow land, rose from about 1.75 million hectares in 1938 to 2.3 million in 1945 and has since continued to expand, reaching a total of around 3.65 million in 1953. The area actually planted to crops and orchards accordingly more than doubled during this entire period, rising from 1.16 million hectares to 2.44 million. By far the greatest part of the area put to the plow was dry farming land. According to official estimates, for example, the amount of land planted to winter wheat and barley increased from about 750,000 hectares in 1938 to 1.13 million in 1945 and 1.34 million in 1953, and the output of these cereals about doubled during the whole period. Following the war a considerable expansion of irrigation took place. By 1953 the irrigated area

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was officially estimated at 509,000 hectares as compared with 284,000 in 1946. The resulting rise in the value of agricultural production was particularly marked, since with irrigation more valuable summer crops could

TABLE 3 Indicators of Economic Growth

	Prewar	1945	1947	1950	1953
Agriculture					
Cultivated area (million ha.)	1.76	2.29	—	3.09	3.67
Cropped area (million ha.)	1.16	1.51	—	2.05	2.44
Wheat					
Area (thousand ha.)	473[a]	751	843	992	1,314
Output (thousand MT)	459[a]	415	404	861[b]	962[b]
Barley					
Area (thousand ha.)	275[a]	384	365	416	428
Output (thousand MT)	290[a]	248	169	322	472
Cotton					
Area (thousand ha.)	30[a]	17.5	19.3	78.0	136.6
Output (thousand MT, ginned)	5.4[a]	4.3	5.4	35.5	47.0
Agricultural production tax (million £S)[c]	—	—	9.1	16.2	22.4
Industry—Output					
Cotton and rayon yarn (thousand MT)	1	—	—	—	9–10
Cotton and rayon cloth (million meters)	15	—	—	—	ca.100
Vegetable oils, excluding olive (thousand MT)	(negligible)	—	—	—	ca.10,000
Soap (thousand MT)	3.4	—	—	—	8.9
Fruit and vegetable preserves (thousand MT)	1.8	—	—	—	4
Cement (thousand MT)	less than 75	—	—	—	224
Matches (million boxes)	11	—	—	—	32.2
Cigarettes (MT)	416	—	—	—	1,644
Electricity (million KWH: principal utilities)	25.1	—	—	—	114.2
Financial					
Government receipts (million £S)[d]	11.5	118.3	116.2	138.9	216.7
Notes and coins in circulation (million £S)[d]	19.9	210.7	183.2	224.6	288.4
National income (million £S)	—	—	—	1,380	1,600

[a] 1934–38 average. The production figures for wheat and barley may well be somewhat overestimated.

[b] Official production figures have been revised upward in the light of the amounts marketed as revealed by the agricultural production tax returns.

[c] The proceeds of this tax, levied on produce brought to market, tend to exaggerate the rate of increase in production, but are nonetheless a good indication of trends in output.

[d] Figures are not deflated for price increases. While a reliable price index is lacking, the price level in the period 1950–53 was probably between five and seven times as high as that before the war.

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be grown. Thus with the stimulus originally imparted by the Korean war boom, cotton, which had long been grown in Syria but on a small scale, has developed into one of the country's most valuable crops.

Manufacturing has expanded rapidly in the postwar period. Although the original impulse was given by the wartime shortage of manufactured goods, new factories were not for the most part established until after the war. Among the new modern factories built since then are six spinning and weaving mills, a considerable number of cotton ginneries, a dyeing plant, six vegetable oil mills, a glass factory, a cement plant and a sugar factory. The total amount of paid-up capital of manufacturing enterprises established in corporate form since the end of the war is in the neighborhood of £S 80 million. Since enterprises generally refuse to disclose their output, statistical measurement of the increase in production is extremely difficult. Very rough estimates indicate that about 9,000-10,000 metric tons of cotton and rayon yarn were produced in 1953 as compared with probably less than 1,000 tons in prewar years. The output of cloth was about 14,000 to 16,000 tons, or more than 100 million meters, as compared with perhaps 15 million meters before the war. The production of vegetable oils (other than olive oil), which was negligible before the war, amounted to around 10,000 tons, and the output of soap, at a level of about 9,000 tons, was almost three times the prewar estimate. Cement production, which was less than 75,000 tons before the war, amounted to 223,639 tons in 1953. The output of cigarettes was about four times, and that of matches three times, that of prewar years.

The expansion of agriculture and industry has in turn stimulated commerce, transport and construction. The construction industry in particular has witnessed a postwar boom which lifted the volume of building to a level probably twice as high as that in the years immediately preceding the war. Increasing prosperity, together with the wartime drop in building, generated a large volume of housing construction in all major cities.

The increase in national income since before the war has undoubtedly been very great; in real terms it may well be almost double. Unfortunately the fragmentary nature and unreliability of statistical data make even approximate estimates of national income extremely difficult. For the postwar years an unofficial estimate has been made only for 1950, when national income was put at £S 1,250 million. Some very tentative calculations made by the mission indicate that this estimate may well be too conservative. These calculations point to a rise in national income from

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654 severely diminished, and agricultural prices no longer afford such a power-
433 ful stimulus to the expansion of acreage. Extension of the irrigated area
311 must depend increasingly on public investment, particularly since the area which can be economically irrigated by privately installed pumps cannot be greatly expanded.

654 High transport costs and the low quality of grain are becoming serious
433 handicaps to Syria in an increasingly competitive world grain market. In other sectors economic activity seems also to be slackening. The future growth of industry is likely to be less rapid now that the more obvious manufacturing industries have been established. In construction it is also quite possible that the postwar boom has passed or will shortly pass its peak. Thus in the absence of a well-considered government program to stimulate the economy, the rapid increase in production and private investment may well taper off.

654 In agriculture the government now faces the need to make a careful
241 inventory of remaining land resources, to carry out irrigation projects on a greatly increased scale and to initiate settlement schemes for state lands. Steps must be taken to maintain and stimulate Syria's grain exports by providing better and cheaper transport and establishing facilities for the storage, grading and cleaning of cereals, thereby reducing losses and improving quality. In the future more emphasis will need to be placed on raising agricultural and livestock yields. The government will have to stimulate farmers to use better seeds and implements and to improve their crop rotation in the direction of soil-building crops and greater diversification. Livestock yields must be raised by undertaking a program of selection and cross-breeding, by building livestock shelters and providing more water for migrating livestock, and by initiating a more effective campaign against pests and diseases. To achieve these objectives the government must also expand and improve agricultural education, make available extension services at the village level and furnish much more agricultural credit on reasonable terms. Special efforts are required to assist the small peasant proprietor and the tenant who have not in the past fully shared in the rising prosperity. They must be helped to achieve greater economic independence and security and enabled to acquire the means of production with which to increase their incomes.

654 Although further expansion in industry should prove possible, greater
433 emphasis will have to be placed on selective expansion and on increasing efficiency so as to lower prices and broaden the market. Here the govern-

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CHAPTER 3

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

1 CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES AND PROBLEMS

A development program for Syria must focus primarily on agriculture. 244 Despite the expansion of manufacturing, agriculture will continue to be the country's principal industry. Its potentialities are still large. It not only employs more people than any other occupation, but furnishes most of the raw materials for manufacturing and gives rise to most of the business in commerce.

The mission has drawn up its recommendations in the light of the characteristics of Syrian agriculture and the principal problems which must be met. Its conception of these characteristics and problems, as outlined below, must therefore be clearly understood.

1. *Syrian agriculture is primarily dependent on rainfall which is seasonal, varies considerably from year to year and is frequently scanty.* 244 311

Irrigated land accounts for only 11-12% of perhaps 3.5 million hectares under cultivation. Since there is no rain during the summer, winter crops predominate. Wheat and barley are therefore the principal crops; and the possibilities of diversification are limited. In most of the cultivated area normal rainfall is barely adequate. Periodic droughts such as the one in 1951 tend to make farm income very unstable.

All this points to the need for expanding the area under irrigation as much as possible. The proper conservation and use of the limited water resources is one of the paramount problems of Syrian agriculture. The extension of irrigation in the past has already made possible the introduction of such new crops as cotton and sugar beets which have added substantially to agricultural income.

2. *The great increase in the area under cultivation over the last few decades severely limits the possibility of further expansion without irrigation.*

In the past there was plenty of good idle land available for farming. The rapid extension of cultivation was greatly facilitated by the fact that

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241 311 people could claim title to "empty" land by simply occupying and cultivating it for a period of years. Legislative Decree No. 135, although never applied, was enacted to halt this unregulated expansion by making all unoccupied land state domain and thus subject to exploitation only with a prior permit. This legislation implicitly recognized that the amount of land that could still be put to the plow was steadily shrinking. Nonetheless the mission encountered a widespread impression that agricultural land resources were virtually limitless. Official estimates that there remain somewhat over 3 million hectares of land available for cultivation appear to support this impression. However, such an estimate is at best only a rough guess. It undoubtedly includes much land which is marginal from the standpoint of fertility or rainfall. It should be frankly acknowledged that there is little or no reliable information on this subject. The mission itself gained the impression on its travels that the amount of land still available for cultivation without irrigation is extremely limited. Here and there in the Jezireh, for example, cropping has already pushed forward into marginal land. Even though good yields may be obtained on such lands in seasons of abnormally heavy rainfall, farming would normally be very hazardous.

Certain conclusions must be drawn. The first is that irrigation will need to play an increasingly important role in the expansion of land under cultivation. The second is that a careful inventory and classification of the land still available should be undertaken in order to determine how it may be most effectively utilized and what must be done to make it productive. The final conclusion is that there is need to work out policies and programs for the exploitation and settlement of such good land as remains.

241 423 3. *Ownership of the means of production in agriculture is very unevenly distributed, resulting in wide disparities in income.*

Land ownership is by no means equally distributed. There are many landless peasants, while large landed estates, some exceeding several hundred thousand hectares, predominate in the provinces of Hama, Homs, Aleppo and the Jezireh. One estimate indicates that 38% of the total area of privately owned land was in holdings of over 100 hectares and only 19% in small holdings of 10 hectares and less. Reliable figures on the distribution of land ownership will be available only upon completion of the cadastral survey now in progress. Of the area surveyed by the end of 1952, however, 49% was held in properties of over 100 hectares and 16% in properties of more than 1,000 hectares. These proportions, however, are

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likely to decline somewhat when the survey is completed for the Hauran and Djebel Druze where small peasant ownership predominates. 244 423

Water for irrigation is supplied chiefly by merchants and wealthy landowners who have the means to install pumps. Similarly, the ownership and operation of modern agricultural machinery are primarily confined to large operators in the Jezireh.

Ownership of the critical factors of production carries with it the ability to demand a large share of the output. In areas where rainfall is inadequate the pump owner, who is frequently not the landowner, can exact from 45% to 60% of the crop simply for the water he supplies. Where labor is plentiful and rainfall adequate, the landowner can get up to half of the crop simply by allowing others to cultivate his land. On the other hand, in the Jezireh land is plentiful by comparison with labor and rents for only a 10-15% share of the crop. Here the owners of tractors and combines control the central factor of production and can command the lion's share of the output.

The small cultivators have no capital or access to capital that would enable them to acquire more land, better machinery and livestock, pumps and other means of production by which to raise their standard of living and make themselves independent. Nor are they organized in cooperatives to undertake these things collectively. Even the larger farmer frequently has great difficulty in getting necessary capital on reasonable terms. [474]

One of the most important objectives of an agricultural program is therefore to provide an adequate volume of credit on equitable terms in order to make the needed means of production more generally accessible. The organization of cooperatives to facilitate group action among small farmers should be another aim. No single peasant, for example, has enough resources to sink a well or install a pump, but a group of peasants could pool their resources to this end. Finally, it would appear vital to conserve the good land remaining in state domain for the purpose of settling landless peasants and Bedouins and thus gradually increasing proprietorship.

4. *Despite the existence of many large properties, land is predominantly tilled in small holdings by tenants or peasant-owners who earn a rather precarious livelihood.* 244 423 427

Large-scale exploitation prevails only in the Jezireh and to some extent in Aleppo where land is farmed in big units with mechanized equipment and paid labor. Even the large estates are for the most part farmed in small units by sharecroppers who are tenants at will, seldom cultivate the same

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241 piece of land for long and thus have virtually no incentive to improve the
423 land. Many large landowners do little beyond collecting their share of the
427 crop, leaving relations with their tenants in the hands of agents. They
[452] often stake their tenants to seed, livestock or implements or tide them over with food and clothing until the harvest comes in; and in the absence of adequate credit institutions they thus serve a useful function. In most cases, however, such assistance in cash or kind is given on terms which conceal extremely high rates of interest. In other cases credit may be furnished without interest by landlords conforming strictly to the Islamic code. It must be recognized also that some and probably a growing number of large landowners take a more active interest in the management of their land and have been instrumental in introducing new crops such as cotton. Progressively minded owners of large estates, when interested in improved crop rotation and methods of production, can become the means for more rapid advancement of agriculture.

241 The small peasant-owners and sharecroppers, who carry on most of the
423 agriculture, produce primarily for their own consumption. Their output is little influenced by market prices, for they must produce to eat and with the balance they buy such simple necessities as they can. Most of them wrest a bare living from the soil and are chronically in debt to the merchant, the professional moneylender or the landlord. Unable to bring their produce to the market or to wait for better prices, they must accept the price offered to them locally for whatever they produce in excess of their own needs. They till their land with methods hallowed by time, and their equipment for the most part consists only of a pair of draft animals and a wooden, iron-tipped plow.

Any program of assistance to agriculture must obviously focus largely on these cultivators. It must show them how to improve their methods of production, provide them with better seeds, equipment and animals. Through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of adequate agricultural credit it should help to free them gradually from excessive dependence on the landlord, merchant and moneylender. It must also pay attention to tenancy problems with the objective of establishing greater security of tenure, providing more incentive to cultivators and achieving a more equitable sharing of the produce of the land.

423 5. *The uncertainty and confusion surrounding land titles is another obstacle to land improvement.*

The uncertainty surrounding land titles has been largely inherited

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from the Ottoman Empire. Conflicting land grants have often been made in the past, and many claims to land rest upon grants of dubious validity. Titles frequently have not been perfected or entered into official registers. Even title deeds which are registered often contain conflicting or vague specifications regarding the area and the boundaries of the property. A considerable amount of land is still held in common village ownership and periodically reallocated among the villagers who accordingly have little interest in the permanent improvement of their changing allotments.

Programs to determine and delimit titles through a cadastral survey and to convert village common land into individual peasant holdings have been under way for several decades, but progress has been painfully slow.

6. *Agricultural yields are considerably below potentialities.*

Agricultural yields in Syria generally do not compare unfavorably with those in most other countries. Cereal yields tend to be about 10-20% below the world average and substantially below those achieved in Europe, but cotton yields are well above the world average and now approximate those in the United States. The output per hectare for virtually all crops is better than that in the rest of Asia.

This general picture does not, however, justify complacency. The relatively good yields have no doubt been largely due to the fact that the frontiers of cultivation have been pushed steadily forward into new and virgin lands. Without this rapid expansion of the area under cultivation, productivity would probably have declined. The mission noted evidence of soil depletion and falling yields in certain areas which had been continuously farmed over many years.

With the diminution in the supply of available new land, Syria will in the future have to rely much more on an improvement in yields to maintain the rise in output. The potentialities unquestionably exist. Fallow is still virtually the only method employed to maintain and restore soil fertility. Thus at least a third of the arable land lies idle each year. Animal manure is almost wholly used as fuel. The use of fertilizers is still in its infancy; in 1953 only 11,171 tons were imported. The practice of green manuring is virtually unknown. Insects and diseases still take a heavy toll. Much higher yields can be obtained through better selection of seeds and varieties, improved crop rotation and better soil preparation and cultural practices.

7. *Animal husbandry is not practiced as an integral part of agriculture and is still on a low standard.*

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231 241 Mixed farming is rare. Except in limited areas adjoining the few large cities, no fodder is grown for livestock. None of the considerable volume of oil cake and meal and beet pulp produced in Syria is used for animal feed. On farms animals feed primarily on grain stubble and cereal straw. Most of the livestock is entrusted to Bedouins who take their flocks of sheep and goats into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing after the rainy season and return them to the cultivated areas after the sparse vegetation of the desert again dries up. Insufficient water, feed and lack of shelter on these migratory routes often combine to inflict a rather high mortality rate on livestock. Inadequate nutrition also increases the susceptibility of livestock to parasites and diseases.

These conditions indicate a need to introduce fodder into the crop rotation scheme, to improve pastures and to provide shelter and wells corresponding to the carrying capacity of the desert. While better nutrition is most essential, an effective campaign against disease and improvement in livestock breeds would also make an important contribution to raising the standards of animal husbandry.

442 241 8. *The organization and methods of marketing are in many respects defective.*

High costs of transport and the weak bargaining position of the farmer depress farm prices; and the cost of distribution combined with inadequate grading and cleaning is beginning to threaten Syria's competitive position on the world cereals market. Lack of credit and high storage prices generally compel farmers to throw their products on the market immediately after harvest. The merchant who has access to credit and often finances the farmer can largely dictate prices to the cultivator who has no reserves.

A number of measures to cope with this problem are indicated. Proper cleaning and storage facilities for grain are needed to enable farmers to get better prices and assist Syria in maintaining its position in a declining cereals market. New and improved roads would help to reduce marketing costs, and the availability of more and cheaper credit would make the farmer less dependent on the merchant.

580 All these problems and indicated measures will now be discussed more fully under the following headings: irrigation and reclamation; land policies and land settlement; improvement in agricultural production; animal husbandry; agricultural credit, cooperatives, marketing and education.

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137 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the
659 mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available
313 to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

423 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant pro-
166 prietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60%, respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in
166 settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experi-
344 mental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

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build up a sufficient fund to finance the actual settlement. The mission did not obtain sufficient information on these plans to appraise their soundness, but suggests that they be reviewed in the light of the considerations that should, in its opinion, govern such settlements.

The amount of land to be allocated per farm family in any settlement must depend on the yield of the land and the capacity of the cultivator to till it. The prospective yield must be such as to enable the farmer to earn a decent living without, however, being so high as to create inequities. The size of the allotment must not exceed that which the cultivator can manage with the labor of his own family and with the equipment at his disposal. For irrigated areas the appropriate allotment would be 5-10 hectares where land is good to average. In areas adjoining urban markets where intensive cultivation of vegetables is possible, the allotment could be below 5 hectares; and in areas where the soil is rather poor, more than 10 hectares may be necessary. Settlements for Bedouins in dry-farming areas should be organized on the assumption of 50 hectares per family. The mission believes, however, that it would be unwise to allocate all this land at once, since no family could be expected to cultivate such a large parcel. The initial allocation should be about 25-30 hectares, and even of this a part might be put into improved pasture instead of being cropped. The balance might then be put into a reserve which would be used for grazing and be available for allotment to farmers who show themselves especially capable, or to new families in the settlement. Such a pattern will make it easier for the Bedouin to accomplish the transition to settled agriculture, by enabling him to carry on his customary pastoral pursuits as he crops his land.

The land would have to be tilled with draft animals and the necessary supplemental tools, but a special effort must be made to provide the settler with more adequate draft animals and better equipment than are customarily employed. While the use of mechanized equipment would in general be impracticable, the mission does recommend that one dry-farming community be organized on a mechanized basis. Such a community is suggested quite frankly as an experiment to test the possibilities of mechanical cultivation by smallholders. Ideally, the necessary tractors, implements and harvesting machinery should be owned and operated cooperatively. In the beginning, however, the settlers would hardly be prepared for such cooperative action. The mission suggests therefore that the government establish the necessary machinery unit under the direction

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423 166 241 of a manager with experience in the operation and maintenance of mechanical equipment. In the first few years at least the services of this unit should be made available to cultivators at rates high enough to cover cost of amortization and operation. As and when the farmers acquire experience with machinery and develop a community spirit conducive to cooperative action, steps should be taken to transfer the equipment in whole or in part to cooperatives.

The government should utilize the opportunity afforded by such new settlements to raise the standard of agricultural practices above the average. A government agricultural worker or community leader should be assigned to each settlement. It cannot be expected, of course, that optimum farm practices will be adopted, particularly by Bedouin settlers. It is possible, however, to provide guidance and even, perhaps, to prescribe certain crop rotations. In the dry-farming communities wheat will obviously be the principal crop, but winter vetch and such legumes as lentils, chick peas and soya beans should also be part of the cropping scheme. From 5 to 10 hectares might be left fallow each year. Another 5-10 hectares of each farmer's allotment might well be put into approved pasture. Each settler should be provided with about 60 sheep which should give a return nearly equal to that derived from crops. For the irrigated areas much more intensive cultivation, with a minimum of fallow, should of course be envisaged. The emphasis should be on such summer crops as cotton, sugar beets, peanuts, maize, beans and vegetables grown in proper rotation. Here the use of fertilizers and insecticides will have to be especially encouraged. A few cattle should be kept on the basis of the fodder provided by some of the suggested crops.

423 166 241 361 Each settlement should be small enough so that the remotest farm would be no farther than an hour's walk from the village, and large enough to warrant the establishment of minimum community services such as a well, a mosque or church, a school and a community center. The first consideration is important only in determining the size of a dry-farming settlement and would point to a settlement with an area no larger than about 5,500 hectares. On such a dry-farming area 120 families, including 10 non-farming families, could be settled initially; and the total might ultimately be about double if the land first held in reserve as pasture were subsequently allocated to new families. Even a settlement of 120 families, with a total population of 600-720, could support minimum community facilities. For the irrigated areas, where land allotments would

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

DIAGRAM 1
SCHEMATIC RELATIONSHIP OF DRY-FARMING COMMUNITIES



a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMS
c: COMMUNITY LAND FOR GRAZING

DIAGRAM 2
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(20 Hectare Farms)



DIAGRAM 3
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(50 Hectare Farms)

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423 be much smaller, the minimum size of a community might be raised to
166 around 300 families, including some 30 non-farming families. Such a larger
241 community would economize capital invested in common services. Even
361 on irrigated land, however, circumstances might dictate the establishment of a smaller community with a provision for subsequent growth if the potentialities of the land warrant it.

A settlement should be laid out in such a way as to make access to farm land convenient and to fit into adjoining settlements of a similar type. For the dry-farming area settlement units shaped like hexagons would in principle be ideal. (See Diagrams 1-3.) In such a unit the farms could be laid out at an angle to six roads radiating from the center and parallel to the sides of the hexagon. Between the farms radiating from the roads the land initially reserved as common pasture would be located. One of the six roads would link the settlement with other communities. A number of hexagonal settlements would fit well together. It must be recognized, however, that modifications in this basic hexagonal unit will often be necessary, owing to marked variations in the quality of the soil or the topography, the relationship of the area to existing settlements and other factors. (For examples, see Diagrams 4-6.) In the irrigated regions the shape of the settlement will be largely determined by the layout of the irrigation system, so that the hexagon may well have to yield to the square as the more practical form.

In areas where a number of settlements are established the relationship of the new communities to each other and to existing settlements in adjoining areas must be carefully considered. For the Roudj, for example, the mission would suggest the establishment of about five communities, of which four would be purely agricultural and one would serve also as a minor marketing and administrative center and therefore be somewhat larger. (See Map 6.) A major center need not be envisaged in view of the proximity of the towns of Idlib and Jisr ech Chogour. For the more extensive region of the Ghab a similiar pattern can be contemplated; and the planning will need to be based on the assumption that Jisr ech Chogour, situated at the northern end of the area, will become the regional marketing and administrative center.

The mission strongly recommends the village-type of settlement. Any other type which would house the settlers on their own farms would not only be contrary to tradition, but would be destructive of community life and make it difficult to supply the needed community services. The village

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

DIAGRAM 4
ALTERATION OF FARM DIVISIONS IN THE CASE OF VARIATIONS IN THE QUALITIES OF SOIL

a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMING
c: IRRIGATED AREA



DIAGRAM 5
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH STREAM



DIAGRAM 6
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH DIFFERENT TOPOGRAPHIC CONTOURS

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

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should be located in the center of the settlement area and laid out along a rectangular pattern with the community facilities and open public places in the middle. It would be desirable to have the village surrounded by a small garden area and a belt of trees.

The settlement must, of course, be considered "model", but not in the sense that its standards and costs are so high as to render its general adoption prohibitively expensive. The settlers should be expected to contribute their own labor to its initial construction and the subsequent gradual expansion and improvement of its facilities. This will help to reduce costs and give the settlers a sense of pride and achievement in the establishment of the community. For example, the ultimate aim might be to provide a farm family with a 5-room house (3 main rooms, kitchen and laundry-lavatory), enclosed courtyard, storehouse and stables.[10] Initially, however, it would suffice to provide a 2-room unit without some of the elements in the final building. The cost could thus be kept to about £S 1,500, to which the settler might contribute £S 800 in the form of properly supervised self-help. Each farm family will need, however, a minimum sustenance allowance of approximately £S 1,000 to tide it over the first year when the community is in the course of construction and little is produced. Such an allowance should be paid out in the form of compensation for labor services provided by the settlers.

The mission has estimated the cash investment outlay in the different types of settlements as follows (in Syrian pounds):

	Dry farming settlement (120 families)		Irrigated area settlement (310 families)
	Non-mechanized	Mechanized	
Housing for farm families	77,000	77,000	191,100
Housing and shops for non-farm families	20,000	20,000	67,000
Community facilities[a]	71,000	71,000	182,000
Draft power, livestock and implements	318,000	514,000[b]	341,250
Sustenance allowance	110,000	110,000	273,000
Total	596,000	792,000	1,054,350

[a] Including schools, mosques (or churches), community centers, water supply and roads.
[b] Including £S 250,000 for mechanized equipment.

[10] See Annex I, p. 468.

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The mission suggests that the state Agricultural Bank finance the housing and means of production (other than mechanized equipment) under loans to be amortized over a 10-year and three- to four-year period respectively. The government itself should be responsible for providing the funds necessary for community facilities, mechanized equipment and payment of the sustenance allowance.

The mission's calculations indicate that the average farm family should be able to earn a net annual income of around £S 2,000 in the dry-farming communities and of over £S 3,000 in the irrigated-area communities even during the period when loans are being repaid. This should leave a small margin for the payment for land in the dry-farming areas and a substantial margin for the necessary payments for land and water in the irrigated areas. The mission believes it a sound principle to require some payment even for non-irrigated state domain. The price of land, however, should be such that the settler can expect to become a full owner within a reasonable period, e.g., no more than 10 to 15 years.

Certain conditions will need to be enforced in settling peasants on the land. For example, title should not be transferred until all payments have been completed, and in the intervening period the government should reserve the right to remove settlers who prove to be clearly unsuitable or do not till their own land. Even after title has been transferred, the government might well retain for a specified period the right to veto all proposed sales, mortgages or leases, in order to safeguard the fundamental objective of establishing and maintaining independent peasant proprietors.

During the next five years the government will have to undertake the settlement of the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab. For the settlement of Bedouins the mission recommends the establishment of two experimental dry-farming communities, one of which would be mechanized, in the Jezireh. The mission must emphasize, however, that the latter two experiments are bound to fail unless the government allocates to them good land situated in a region with adequate rainfall. Both the Roudj and the Jezireh projects will provide much valuable experience useful in extending the settlement effort. In addition the government might well undertake one project in the Djebel es Smaane northwest of Aleppo and another in the Djebel Druze. The ruins of many once imposing cities testify that the first region flourished from the first to the seventh century of the Christian era, and recent evidence indicates that this prosperity was primarily founded on orchards and vineyards. More recently people have been

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returning to become squatters among the ruins and cultivate patches of stony but fertile soil. Organization of this rather haphazard settlement and the establishment of a planned community based again on orchards and vineyards may prove a worthwhile undertaking. In the Djebel Druze, where living standards are low and emigration is difficult for religious reasons, a similar settlement should be tried, provided a suitable tract of land can be found. Here, too, conditions are favorable for the establishment of orchards and vineyards.

At present responsibility for settlement is dispersed. The Ghab Administration is entrusted with settlement in the Ghab; the Irrigation Service has the task in other newly reclaimed and irrigated areas; and the Ministry of Agriculture has the initiative for the dry-farming areas. The mission strongly recommends that responsibility for planning and coordinating all the work be vested in a single, independent Settlements Administration, which would also discharge certain governmental functions relating to housing, town planning and similar subjects. The settlement program will require a great organizational effort and a staff which only a single agency would be capable of mobilizing. One administration is also much more likely to apply the experience gained in the initial settlement work to subsequent ventures. The mission urges that such an agency be established promptly, so that the necessary planning may be immediately initiated. The assistance of a number of foreign experts will need to be enlisted to carry out the program.

If the four settlements the mission has recommended are established and the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab are settled, the total cost would probably be around £S 10 million. Under the mission's proposals, £S 5.5 million would be financed by the Agricultural Bank, and the balance met directly by the government. With these funds it should be possible to settle some 2,300 families or between 12,000 and 14,000 people.

Land Reform

While the settlement of state domain may gradually increase the number of peasant proprietors, Syria will also have to work out policies relating to land ownership and tenancy in the areas already under cultivation. In this connection it should be noted that Article 22 of the 1950 constitution calls for legislation to determine, without retroactive effect, "the maximum area of land that may be owned, exploited and disposed of, according to

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focus not only on the farmer-owner, but also on the tenant, for only in that way can the latter's economic bargaining power be strengthened and his independence and security enhanced.

IV IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTION

The mission approaches a discussion of this subject with some diffidence. Generalities are difficult to avoid. It is easy to point out deficiencies in agricultural practices, but much more difficult to suggest a concrete and practicable program to improve them. Effective action is made difficult by the ignorance and inherent conservatism of farmers. It requires a larger, better trained and better organized government service to carry out the necessary trials and experiments and to work with farmers at the village level. Obviously, no miraculous increase in productivity can be expected within a short time.

Nevertheless, the subject is too important to neglect. In too many countries the undeniable difficulty of carrying out a program to raise yields has caused governments to shrink from such an undertaking. We have already indicated why much more attention must be paid to this problem in Syria. Although land in Syria is more plentiful than in many other Asiatic countries, the population pressure on good land is bound to grow. If the country is to support an increasing population on higher living standards, the task of obtaining more output from cultivated land cannot be postponed.

The mission can only point out some of the potentialities and indicate in a rather general way how they might be realized. More detailed programs must be worked out by the Ministry of Agriculture with the help of the FAO or other sources of technical assistance.

Crop Rotation and Diversification

Improvement in existing patterns of crop rotation is one of the most important methods of improving the fertility and structure of the soil and permitting a gradual diminution in the use of fallow. The aim should be to reduce customary fallow in the rainfed areas by at least 50% and to the greatest extent practicable in the irrigated areas. The much more extensive use of leguminous plants for both winter and summer

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cultivation would help to remedy existing deficiencies in nitrogen and supply either nutritious fodder for livestock or material for green manuring to build up the depleted humus in the soil.

At present no legumes other than winter vetch and berseem are grown on a large scale during the winter season. While lentils, beans and peas are cultivated as cash crops in the Hauran and regions around Damascus and Aleppo, the value of legumes for fodder and pasture is not appreciated. A considerable number of leguminous plants which have not been cultivated in Syria, at least on any considerable scale, might well be introduced and tested.[11]

Aside from these legumes, other crops might well be tried out for inclusion in the rotation system so as to provide more diversified production. Among these are oil seeds such as the sunflower, linseed and sesame. The mission also recommends experiiments with safflower, a plant which grows well under dry climatic conditions and in soils of moderate fertility.

The mission recommends that experiments be undertaken to determine the best rotation schemes for both irrigated and non-irrigated land in different parts of the country; and it suggests that £S 1 million be made available to defray the cost over the next five or six years. A substantial part of this should be used to finance trials on selected, strategically located farms, especially to provide free seed and instruction to farmers willing and able to try changes in crop rotation which experimentation has indicated as advantageous.

We realize that the adoption of crop rotation plans designed to reduce fallow significantly will by no means be easy. There will be limitations set by the availability of manpower, draft animals and machinery, and water. Legumes, however, can often be interplanted with cereals; and ways and means can probably be found to fit new crops into the rotation scheme at a time when they will not compete with the principal crops for the cultivator's time and equipment, or, in irrigated areas, for the available water. If additional implements or draft power are needed, they may be acquired, provided better credit facilities are established. Since additional resources are no doubt required to keep more land cropped, the economics of new rotation plans will have to be carefully worked out in the course of the proposed experiments and trials.

[11] See Annex C, p. 309, for specific suggestions.

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Fertilizers, Insecticides and Weedicides

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In increasing fertility, the more extensive use of fertilizer can be an important supplement to, but never a complete substitute for, better crop rotation. The most serious deficiency in Syrian soils is nitrogen, and though phosphorous is present the alkalinity of the soil often makes it less available as a plant nutrient. The use of ammonium sulphate, or anhydrous ammonia, and superphosphates could undoubtedly raise yields significantly. At present only modest quantities of fertilizers are applied in the Ghouta and in the cotton-growing regions. It is idle, however, to expect a rapid expansion in the employment of fertilizers; and a program to encourage their promiscuous use might well do more harm than good. The response to fertilizer depends very largely on appropriate timing of its application, the availability of water and other factors. A number of experimental stations in Syria have been carrying out experiments on nitrogen deficiency. The mission suggests that this program be expanded and supplemented by field trials on selected farms in various parts of Syria. The fertilizer for these field trials should be made available free or at nominal cost over a period of years sufficient to permit adequate testing. The mission recommends that a sum of £S 500,000 be made available for this purpose over the next five or six years.

The use of insecticides and pesticides has been almost entirely confined to cotton, and even for cotton they were applied extensively only in 1952 when dusting was made compulsory. Regular spraying and dusting of cotton and orchard crops should particularly be encouraged. A program of education and demonstration, combined with credit facilities for the acquisition of equipment and materials, is clearly necessary. Experiments should also be undertaken with modern weedicides, for there is little doubt that weeds at present greatly detract from yields.

If the use of fertilizers and insecticides is to be promoted, the cost should be reduced as far as possible. At present fertilizers are largely imported in the form of pre-mixed compounds containing a high proportion of carrier material readily found in Syria, and similarly, in the case of insecticides, essential ingredients account for only a small percentage of the volume imported. The mission suggests, therefore, that the possibility of lowering costs by establishing a plant for mixing fertilizers and making insecticides from imported ingredients should be explored.

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Implements and Machinery

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In Syria there is an enormous gulf between the employment of modern tractors and combines in certain areas and the use of the traditional peasant plow or *feddan* and hand-harvesting and threshing methods elsewhere. The tractor can undoubtedly do a far better job of cultivation. It breaks the hard soil pan so as to facilitate deeper penetration of roots and moisture, and it promotes seed germination by more effective pulverization of the soil. It is equally obvious that combines produce a cleaner grain with less waste than the traditional process of having animals trample the grain and winnowing the resulting product by hand.

The development of Syria's agriculture, however, hardly depends on the rapid expansion of mechanized farming. The use of mechanized equipment can be recommended only where labor is relatively scarce or where units of exploitation are large, as is the case in the Jezireh. Small farmers cannot afford costly, modern machinery. Cooperative ownership and operation of such machinery may ultimately be undertaken, and the mission does suggest, as indicated previously, that an experiment along this line be carried out. It can hardly be expected, however, that this type of cooperative, which is among the most difficult to manage, will spread rapidly in the future.

Far more important and urgent is the task of improving and supplementing the poor implements which the peasants now have at their disposal. They should not have to rely almost wholly on the *feddan* which barely scratches the soil and leaves perennial weeds to compete with crops for the limited supply of soil nutrients. The farmer should have a better plow, supplemented by a cultivator or spike-tooth harrow; a simple seed drill that might permit him to get better yields by sowing in rows instead of by broadcasting; pedal threshing equipment and a hand-operated winnower that would enable him to produce a cleaner grain with less effort; and a simple leveller that would help him to level his land and avoid waste of rain or irrigation water.

Programs to improve and develop implements for the small farmer have been successfully initiated in a number of countries such as India and Afghanistan. The mission strongly recommends that such a program be undertaken promptly in Syria. It would propose establishment of a small implement center in cooperation with the FAO or other technical assistance agencies. This center should be equipped with a shop in which

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433 241 407 prototypes of useful implements would be made. These prototypes should then be distributed for supervised testing among selected farmers and arrangements would have to be made for the production of those found successful. Such a program need not be expensive. The mission estimates the capital cost at about £S 150,000 and recurring annual expenditures at not more than £S 100,000.

The problems of mechanized cultivation should not, of course, be neglected. Already an estimated total of 750,000 hectares is tilled by mechanical means. Over 1,300 tractors and 500 combines are being used today, primarily in the Jezireh but also, increasingly, around Aleppo. Mechanical farming is handicapped, however, by the high cost of fuel; lack of sufficient skilled labor to operate, maintain and repair machinery; inadequate repair facilities; excessive cost and, sometimes, deficient supplies of spare parts; insufficient knowledge of the suitability and capability of different types of equipment; and the utilization of too many kinds of machinery. Standards of maintenance are extremely low and repairs much too costly. The abuse of machinery greatly shortens its life. In the Jezireh, major repair facilities exist only in Kamichliye, and only two dealers have their own service stations. All these factors make mechanical farming excessively expensive. In the last two years, profits have seriously diminished as cereal prices declined and costs remained fixed. A reduction of costs is particularly necessary since the mechanically operated farms now contribute the bulk of Syria's exports of cereals.

Better transport facilities will do more than anything else to lower fuel costs. To deal with the other cost factors, a number of measures can be recommended. First of all, machinery dealers should be allowed to operate only if they abide by defined limitations on the price mark-up on machinery and spare parts; maintain prescribed minimum supplies of spare parts; and undertake to operate service and repair facilities in such centers as Kamichliye and Aleppo. Certain reputable dealers have declared to the mission their willingness to adhere to such qualifications, which have proved useful also in other countries. Secondly, the mission urges that short-term courses in the selection, operation and maintenance of farm machinery be organized at Kamichliye and Aleppo. Such courses should be conducted in the agricultural "dead season" and separately for owners and operators. The first should be instructed in the performance and capability of different types of equipment, in the supervision of operation and maintenance, and in the simple economics of mechanical farming; and

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the latter should be taught elementary principles of repair and maintenance. The courses for field operators and mechanics might well include some in-service training in repair shops. The cooperation of reputable dealers in organizing such courses should be enlisted. Finally, the mission proposes the establishment of a secondary agricultural school in Kamichliye to specialize in problems of agricultural engineering. Facilities for instruction in this subject should also be provided at the existing school in Aleppo. The mission envisages an expenditure of £S 2 million for such school facilities. The short-term courses could probably be made self-supporting. To initiate and help carry out this program, the mission suggests that the government obtain the services of one or two machinery experts through the FAO.

Cereals

Aside from the measures outlined above, programs to raise the yield of certain crops must be undertaken. For cereals the development of higher yielding and more disease-resistant strains is of paramount importance. Although many varieties of wheat and barley are grown in Syria, little is known about their comparative worth. A large number of the more promising foreign wheat and barley strains have recently been imported for testing, but the funds, staff and facilities for an adequate testing program are largely lacking. The mission accordingly recommends that the Ministry of Agriculture be enabled to carry out a program for testing, selecting and propagating high-yielding and disease-resistant seed.[12] Since the shortage of trained Syrians may continue for some time, it is likely that the program will have to be handled by a foreign staff (FAO; the French Technical Assistance Mission in Syria). The staff should include a director in charge of planning, three plant breeders and a plant pathologist. They should be assisted by a staff of about 30 Syrians who will largely have to be trained for this purpose. The mission estimates the cost of such a program at about £S 4.5 million over the next five or six years.

For wheat and barley the aim should be to develop good varieties which mature early and can therefore be harvested before the extreme heat. For rice, which will undoubtedly be cultivated in larger volume as the irrigated area expands, the aim should rather be to develop slow-

[12] See Annex C, p. 304, for year-by-year recommendations.

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Marketing

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The mission now comes to a consideration of the last but by no means the least important agricultural problem, marketing. This subject has many aspects, including transport, storage and grading, quality control and price stabilization. Improved marketing practices can yield the producer better prices and the consumers a higher quality product.

Elsewhere the mission discusses the vital factor of transport, and it has already commented on the role cooperatives could play in the local marketing of agricultural products. Here the mission wishes in the first instance to focus on the great importance of better facilities for the storage, cleaning and fumigating of grain. The lack of these facilities and the consequences for Syria have already been emphasized. The mission found a widespread recognition of their need in Syria, except perhaps among the merchants, who naturally feel that public grain storage and the extension of credit on the basis of warehouse receipts will weaken their control of the market. The mission considers it imperative, however, that Syria proceed with a grain storage program in order to strengthen the farmers and to maintain Syria's position in an increasingly competitive world grain market.

It is estimated that in the next decade some 760,000 tons of grain, principally wheat and barley, will enter commercial channels annually, and that this volume will be distributed among the producing regions approximately as follows: Jezireh, 400,000 tons; Euphrates, 95,000; Aleppo, 95,000; Hauran, 60,000; Homs-Hama, 50,000.

The mission recommends that total storage capacity of about 230,000 tons be established by 1960 at an estimated cost of £S 21 million. In the grain port of Latakia a transit silo with a capacity of 20,000-40,000 tons should be built. In Aleppo new facilities with a capacity of 60,000 tons are needed to supplement existing warehouse space, serve the surrounding grain-producing areas and operate as a reservoir for the rapid replenishment of the Latakia silo. For the Jezireh the mission suggests storage capacity of about 150,000 tons. The Latakia and Aleppo facilities should be mechanized and furnished with cleaning and fumigating equipment. In the Jezireh, however, the mission suggests that provisionally only about a fifth be mechanized. The storage there would consist simply of covered sheds which could be economically built.

The Latakia and Aleppo storage will enable Syria to export clean grain,

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free of infestation, which will better be able to withstand competition on the world market and fetch higher prices. The Jezireh storage will make it unnecessary for farmers to dump their grain on the market immediately after the harvest, enable them to obtain credit on easier terms, and lower the cost of transport. All the facilities together will significantly reduce the substantial losses resulting at present from exposure to weather, infestation and rodents. The mission's estimate of the direct advantages resulting from the reduction of losses and the improvement in prices leads it to conclude that farmers and merchants would have ample incentive to utilize the storage facilities, even after taking into account the storage charges they would have to pay on the basis of operating costs and amortization.

We believe that the storage facilities, even when they have to be built by the government, should be operated by qualified private management under a long-term lease which would specify the maximum permissible storage charges. Farmers and merchants are unlikely to use facilities operated by the government itself.

Measures to improve the marketing of certain other products should also be taken. Large quantities of raw milk are now marketed in major cities without adequate quality control or veterinary inspection of dairy cattle. The UNICEF, concerned over milk supply for children, has apparently offered to provide equipment and assistance for the installation of a pasteurization plant in Damascus, and the mission urges that this project be carried out as promptly as possible. A similiar plant may be feasible for Aleppo. It is important that some control be established also over the source of supply. Periodic tuberculin and blood agglutination tests for the diagnosis of tuberculosis and brucellosis in dairy animals might, for example, be initiated. In Aleppo, where many dairy cows are kept in the city under unsanitary conditions which produce a high incidence of tuberculosis, the removal of dairy cattle to locations outside the city is strongly recommended.

Improvements in public abattoirs would also bring about better prices for producers and provide a better quality meat for the consumer. Existing abattoirs are for the most part old, unhygienic and possess no means for salvaging many of the valuable by-products of slaughtering which could be used for the manufacture of fertilizers, chemicals and drugs. While complete renovation is not feasible in the immediate future, the mission suggests that a start be made by erecting a modern abattoir in Damascus at an estimated cost of £S 600,000.

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656 435 A final comment must be made on price stabilization operations. At times in the past the government has intervened in the marketing of cereals in order to support the price or to protect the home market from the consequences of threatened shortages and excessive prices. Through the Cereals Office and its predecessor agencies it has engaged in buying and selling grain, and occasionally it has resorted to export prohibitions to safeguard domestic supplies. Under emergency conditions when the world supply of cereals is short, as in time of war or threat of war, such measures may be justified. Normally, however, it is better to allow the market forces free play. The history of government intervention in the market demonstrates that the government has often acted on the basis of information which subsequently proved erroneous in whole or in part. Frequently information on impending government measures has leaked out, giving windfall profits to privileged speculators. Above all, it is impossible in the long run to insulate the Syrian grain market from the world market. If there is a shortage in Syria and prices rise, some merchants will quickly seize the opportunity to import grain, and if world market prices decline, Syrian prices will inevitably have to follow if exports are not to be lost. On the whole it would be far better for the government to concentrate on the task of improving its crop statistics and to publish frequent and more reliable information on production and prices for the guidance of farmers and merchants. If emergency conditions arise, it will always be possible to authorize government intervention by special decree.

Projected Expenditures

654 241 231 We can now recapitulate the government expenditures in the field of agriculture and animal husbandry which are envisaged over the six years up to the end of 1960. Total projected outlays amount to around £S 336 million, or about £S 56 million per year. This represents a very substantial increase over expenditures in recent years which the mission has found difficult to ascertain but which probably have not averaged much more than £S 11 million a year.

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TABLE 6 Expenditures on Agriculture for the Six-Year Period 1955-60

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(Thousand £S)

		Total	Average annual
Irrigation and reclamation		197,200	32,866
Aerial and soil surveys and mapping		4,500	750
Credit, cooperatives, education and marketing			
Capital for Agricultural Bank	50,000		
Cooperatives	500[a]		
Rural Community Improvement Program	2,700		
Agricultural schools	2,750[a]		
Stipends for foreign study	750[a]		
Grain storage	21,000		
Damascus abattoir	600		
		78,300	13,050
Research and experimentation			
Central direction	1,800[a]		
Seed selection and propagation	2,700[a]		
Crop rotation research and trials	1,000[a]		
Livestock breeding	1,200[a]		
		6,700[a]	1,117
Encouragement of better agricultural practices			
Fertilizer	500		
Forage and green manuring	500		
Improvement and establishment of pastures	500		
		1,500	250
Special livestock program			
Veterinary services	1,200[a]		
Livestock shelters	1,720		
Reseeding of grazing land	200		
Development of desert water supplies	2,250		
		5,370	895
Agricultural settlements		4,500[b]	750
Miscellaneous			
Small implements center	525		
Special instructions on operation and maintenance of agricultural machinery	500		
Forestry service	500[a]		
		1,525	254
Continuing expenditures of Ministry of Agriculture		36,700[c]	6,117
Grand total		336,295	56,049

[a] Additional expenditures beyond levels of recent years.
[b] Other than those financed by the Agricultural Bank.
[c] Excluding special and additional expenditures specified elsewhere, but including about £S 700,000 for extra overhead expenditures.

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ANNEX C *NOTES ON AGRICULTURE*

1 POPULATION, REGIONS AND SOILS

Rural Population

162 619 Syria's agricultural population can be divided into groups differentiated by their social order.

233 *Nomadic tribes.* Bedouin tribespeople form an important unit of the rural population, numbering an estimated 150,000 and living in various stages of settlement from pure pastoral nomadism to almost permanent agricultural communities. Among the larger tribes the Tay and part of the Jubur have become practically sedentary, the Shammar and Shashans remaining nomadic or semi-nomadic. There are also numerous small nomadic tribes roaming the desert between the cultivated belt and the Jordan border. These harvest the scanty desert grass with their flocks of sheep and goats and their herds of camel and a few cattle, and contribute considerably to the country's livestock production. A large part of Syria's meat, wool and dairy products is produced by the Bedouins. Their standards of living and education are quite low.

The increasing exploitation of arable land for crop production during recent decades correspondingly reduced the grazing area and, may, if continued, threaten a considerable reduction in livestock.

162 241 511 *Settled villagers.* The nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500 compact villages form the most important segment of the agricultural population. They are the true cultivators of the soil whether they own the land or work on it as tenants or laborers. A large number farm entirely for subsistence. Even where there are large community pasture lands, the farms are usually small, frequently too small to give an economic return. Consequently incomes are generally low and many landowners, tenants and sharecroppers are constantly indebted to moneylenders. Although illiteracy among the villagers is on the decrease, education remains at a low standard.

The village people produce most of the crops, raise part of the livestock and supply the country with the bulk of its food and raw materials. Their agricultural activity as a rule is dominated by manual and draft animal

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operation, in striking contrast to large private holdings where the most modern machinery is used. Measures to raise the standard of living of this group must be one of the main objectives of any development program; in the first instance this must be effected through education, improved systems of land tenure, and better credit facilities.

Lessees and landlords. Some city dwellers have interests in agriculture as leasehold operators of tracts of state domain, or as absentee landlords. Although their interests rarely coincide with the demands of sound long-term farming practices, this segment of the population has been instrumental in opening new farm tracts (such as the Jezireh) and in introducing new crops, thereby contributing much to the national economy. The cultivation of the large absentee holdings is generally left to sharecroppers.

Sharecroppers. Each sharecropper is assigned a parcel of land from which, after the apportionment of the crop, he can hope to gain little more than a bare subsistence. In rainfed areas the sharecropper customarily receives rather less than 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor and around 70–75% if he also supplies the working capital; the percentages may be slightly higher in sparsely populated areas, and lower where population pressure is heavier. On irrigated lands the landlord takes 65–75% of the crop if he provides seed and water, and about half if the sharecropper provides the working capital.

In the long run, the position of the sharecropper would be more tolerable if the productivity of the land and his share of it were raised. At present, yearly land assignments may vary, with the result that the cropper has no incentive to improve the land. The restricted area of the assignment and lack of proper equipment, draft animals and money capital contribute to the permanent indebtedness of sharecroppers and their very low standard of living. Measures to improve their lot should include improved tenure status, Agricultural Bank and cooperative assistance in providing working and fixed capital, and resettlement schemes to relieve local land pressure.[1]

Agricultural Regions

In terms of natural conditions and the types of agriculture practiced, Syria can be divided in nine main agricultural regions.

The Hauran and the Djebel Druze. The Hauran and the Djebel Druze includes the mountains of the Djebel Druze and the Julani in the south-

[1] See Chapter 3, Sections III and VI, of the Main Report.

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west corner of Syria. The cultivated soil varies from fertile shallow chestnut in the Djebel Druze to the very fertile deep brown of the plains of Hauran. Part of the shallow, reddish-brown soil extending towards the Anti-Lebanon and the basin of Damascus is uncultivable because of its stony character.

The small to medium-size farm is characteristic of this region. Mules and oxen are the customary draft sources, mechanized agriculture being restricted to the few larger holdings. Wheat and barley are the main winter crops; vetch, lentils and sorghum the summer crops. The acreage under irrigation is insignificant. Although now outstripped by the newly opened Jezireh, the Hauran, famous as a granary in the Greco-Roman period, remains a leading cereal-producing area, and the yields in comparison with other areas are high. Excellent grapes and other fruits are produced in the Djebel Druze, but because of unfavorable market conditions and outlets and the lack of processing facilities and storage, much of each harvest is wasted. In the Julani region, where crop production is uneconomical because of the stony character of the landscape, but where good grazing conditions prevail, double-purpose cattle, for meat and draft, are raised successfully. In this area, land pressure is an urgent problem, especially in the Djebel Druze where many uneconomical small farms hamper progress.

Damascus basin foothills of the Anti-Lebanon. The ample layer of fertile reddish-brown soil of the Damascus basin becomes slightly saline in the Merj and towards the swamps of Lake Ateibe, though under drainage and irrigation these areas would probably be suitable for crops. The bottoms of many of the Anti-Lebanon valleys are covered with more or less deep layers of light brown to dark brown soils of moderate to high fertility, with gravelly alluvium bordering the western foothills. Irrigation water is obtained from the numerous streams, and the basin of Damascus is entirely watered by the Barada river coming from the fertile Zebedani valley. The Barada and many of the small streams offer possibilities of storing winter waters for the future expansion of irrigation.

Numerous orchards and vineyards are found in the Ghouta and in the various valleys, producing considerable quantities of fruits, grapes and nuts. Vegetable, hemp and fodder products, and in recent years cotton and sugar beets,[2] form the main agricultural crops of the Ghouta. Wheat and barley are the traditional regional winter crops and beans and peas the summer ones. As a rule farms are of small to medium size; particularly in the

[2] Sugar beet production in 1955 is expected to be over 30,000 tons.

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Ghouta, dairy farming has been developed. The typical Damascus dairy breed is an excellent milk producer and apparently quite resistant to the heat.

The basins of Jairout, El Daou and Palmyra. The third region consists of the brown to grey desert soil. Crop and fruit cultivation, possible only under irrigation, is carried out in small depressions and plots along the bordering mountains where deep layers of very fertile soil occur. During the Greco-Roman period and earlier, a great part of these extensive basins, including the oasis of Palmyra, still famous for its fruits, were prominent producing centers. There are indications that moderate quantities of subterranean water exist.

On some of the best terrain, particularly on the watered alluvial soils, the intensive cultivation of sugar beet, cotton and wheat is possible. At Ain el Barde, for example, record yields are now obtained and reseeding of some of the large natural pasture now used by Bedouins appears to be feasible.

The western plains and hills. The gently undulating land northeast and southwest of Aleppo, the plains of Hama and Homs, and the hills east of the Djebel Ansariya may be broadly grouped as a single region. Soil types range widely from the stony and gravelly desert to the terra rossa and chestnut brown. Local productivity varies greatly with soil and rainfall, but taken as a whole this region ranks very high among producing areas.

The main winter crops are wheat and barley; vetch, beans and sorghum are the principal summer crops. Roughly one-third of the country's wheat production and nearly one-half of its barley come from this region. During the last few years, however, sugar beet and cotton have established themselves as cash crops, and in 1953 the region's cotton output accounted for about three-quarters of Syria's total production. Fruit and nuts in substantial quantities are produced in large orchards, sizable vineyards and olive groves in the Homs, Idlib and Aleppo areas. Most of the land holdings are large, cultivated mainly by sharecroppers; small holdings are in the minority and many of these are too small to be economically justified. As a rule, the best land is already cultivated and though large state domains exist, there is very little land available for further crop expansion. Farm machinery is becoming more common, although the area is still cultivated mainly by the *feddan* and other obsolete implements. Dairy farming is practiced around the larger population centers (e.g., Aleppo) but the industry is still in its infancy and pure-bred stock has been imported by only

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a few progressive farmers. Mixed farming and pure sheep farming could be successfully pursued in the eastern part of this region, but here, as elsewhere, the greatest handicap is the land tenure system and unfavorable sharecropper conditions.

The coastal plains of Tartous and Latakia and the foothills of the Djebel Ansariya. Along the Mediterranean seashore up to 80% of the deep light sandy soil lends itself well to tree cultivation, particularly to irrigated citrus cultivation.

In general the region is well suited to highly diversified agriculture; the present system is that of winter cereals and vetch and summer crops such as summer legumes, melons and tobacco. About three-quarters of Syria's tobacco is grown in this agricultural district, Abu Riha, Chek el Bint and Tombak being the best known types. The recent cotton boom had its repercussion in this area, particularly as cotton can be grown without irrigation. The region is also well known for its olive groves. Citrus cultivation has gained in importance during the last decade but has only recently begun to receive the governmental attention it deserves.

Manpower is plentiful but land is scarce. The whole region is characterized by small and frequently uneconomic farms of less than 10 hectares. Pressure on the land is particularly evident in the foothills where crops are often farmed on marginal and submarginal land. Manual and animal draft operations are the rule, mechanized farming the exception. Livestock production and dairy farming is insignificant though in many parts of this region they would offer a better yield than does the existing farm system.

The central and northern plains, including the Jezireh. The central and northern plains region follows the line of the "fertile crescent", a strip varying in width from 50 to over 100 kilometers, extending in a semi-circle around the Syrian desert. Shallow reddish-brown type soils prevail, light at the fringe of the sub-desert, deeper, darker and more fertile toward the north. Landholdings are generally large and include great tracts of state domain. The size of individual estates runs from a few hundred hectares in the central plains to several hundred thousand hectares in the Jezireh.

Agriculture is extensive, rather than intensive, and the general manpower shortage has accelerated the introduction of the most modern equipment to cultivate and harvest the region's cereals and small grains. This is particularly true of the Jezireh, which, unlike the central plains, has been only recently opened to organized agriculture, and is now Syria's largest wheat and barley producing area; it accounts for over 40% of total Syrian

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wheat production. While the best soils are practically all in production, large areas of medium quality and marginal land are still available and some of these might be cultivated after an appraisal of their productivity. The recent speculative farming wave is responsible for the neglect of such appraisals and far too much marginal land has been broken up and cultivated. Dry farming in this belt (particularly south, east and west of Hassetche) depends greatly on the amount and distribution of the rains.

Although wheat and barley are the principal crops, mention must be made of the cotton and rice grown in the irrigated Khabour valley. The high cotton prices of recent years encouraged speculative cotton growing with varying degrees of success. Rice cultivation has been rather successful, but as it demands the highest water duty the cultivated area has declined somewhat in favor of cotton.

The northeast corner of the Jezireh. Toward the region of Deirik the brown soils of the steppe give way to chestnut brown, with rich black soil in the extreme corner of Deirik. The well-watered plains and undulating lands are intersected by the Jagh-Jagh, Khabour and Soutane rivers and their numerous tributaries, making possible irrigation over vast areas. Tractor cultivation is developing rapidly in this newly opened area, although in comparison with the western Jezireh and the steppe belt the region is less mechanized and more densely populated.

Practically all crops could be grown even without irrigation but wheat and barley are the leading winter crops and sorghum and sesame the main summer crops. Rice is an old staple but is now giving ground to cotton. In the region of Deirik good grapes, excellent potatoes, tomatoes and other vegetables are successfully grown but inadequate transport and storage facilities make their economical exploitation difficult. Livestock, particularly sheep, has greatly declined, due to the expanded crop area. The land is very well suited to raising cattle and beef. A diversification in land use would result in a more balanced and prosperous economy.

The valleys of the Euphrates and Khabour, and the Ghab depression. Though situated in entirely different regions and consequently showing different physiographical aspects, the large river valleys may be classified together in terms of soil fertility, cultivation methods, land tenure systems, population density and development potential.

In the Euphrates and Khabour valleys, the alluvial soil of deep silt loam has excellent agricultural qualities. The soil in the Ghab marshes, lying astride the Orontes about 40 kilometers east of Latakia, consists mainly of

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241 heavy clay alluvium in the valley proper and terra rossa and some peat soil
458 along the slopes. Whereas drainage is the main problem in the Ghab, the
311 problem in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys is to extend irrigation so as to double the present cultivated area. The farms vary from rather large holdings of absentee landlords, cultivated by sharecroppers, to very small farm units owned and worked by the farmer himself.

Crop rotation followed in the irrigated area of the Ghab generally takes the form of barley, cotton, wheat and cotton, while the rotation in the Euphrates valley is similar to that in dry farming regions: cotton or summer crop, fallow, winter wheat.

Yields are generally higher than in the rainfed regions but full use is not made of the available water and the irrigation methods are backward in many parts. Though better yielding cash crops have been introduced, the farmer as a rule cultivates only the few traditional crops. In these areas agricultural education could do much to further more economic water utilization and wider crop diversification.

The lands in the immediate vicinity of the rivers are fully irrigated but not fully utilized during the entire year. Hundreds of thousands of hectares on the somewhat higher land on both banks of the Euphrates and in the lower Khabour valley form a potential future reserve, though the capital outlay required to bring them under cultivation would probably have to be furnished by the government.

The central plains of the Syrian desert. In the central plains low rainfall and extreme temperatures render agricultural production practically non-existent but the desert is quite important as a natural grazing area (except during the absolutely dry months) for the sheep and camels of nomadic Bedouin tribes. Many parts of the desert, particularly the large depressions, could be better utilized if desert wells were constructed.

134 *Types of Soil*

311 The soils of Syria rank from the world's best to the poorest roughly in the order of (1) alluvial, (2) black, (3) chestnut brown and terra rossa, followed by (4) brown and reddish brown, and (5) grey sub-desert. According to a preliminary survey conducted by an FAO soil specialist the area covered by each of these various types of soil is approximately as follows (in thousand hectares):

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4. Mixed farming should be promoted in sugar beet areas. The cash return from sugar beet production is three to six times larger than that from wheat and other crops. Moreover, the leaves from one hectare of sugar beet make an excellent silage fodder, equivalent to about 4.5 tons of good hay. 249

v CROP DIVERSIFICATION

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Practically all temperate and many subtropical crops can be and are grown in Syria. Their distribution, however, is very poor. The mission strongly emphasizes the desirability of a wider diversification to lessen the risks and to ensure a better use of available land and manpower. In nearly all the rainfed zones leguminous fodder crops could be substituted for the customary fallow. These would provide the soil with needed nitrogen, improve its structure and serve as fodder. If livestock were adequately fed for a single season, human food production would probably thereby be increased, indirectly, to a greater extent and sooner than if the land were sown to crops for human consumption. An increase in livestock, particularly in irrigated zones but also in the rainfed area, means fuller employment and higher income for the rural population.

To supplement winter vetch and berseem, the mission suggests the introduction for field trials of the cluster bean (*Cyanopsis sp. sp.*), a grain and forage plant widely cultivated in Sicily; some of the varieties can be grown with sorghum. In addition there is the possibility of goat's rue (*Galega orientalis*), a bushy, erect perennial herb of high nutritive value, and of sulla (*Hedysarum coronarium*), which can be used as green fodder or hay and which ranks with red clover in nutritive value. The latter grows best in deep, rich calcareous soils, but can also be grown in poor soil if it contains lime. Sulla can be sown alone, with cereals, or in mixtures with other legumes; it yields up to 120 tons of green matter per hectare under irrigation, and it may produce from 16-50 tons even on non-irrigated land.* Trials to reseed a wild species of alfalfa, reported to grow in the Anti-Lebanon region, should be undertaken in other areas. Cultivated lucerne and alfalfa (*Medicago sp. sp.*) have responded successfully; their more extensive cultivation should be encouraged. Of the 50 or more species the most common is *Medicago sativa* and *M. varia*, of which many strains are

* FAO publication, *Legumes in Agriculture.*

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adapted to drought and to hard winters; they can be grown as either winter or summer crops. The same can be said of the clovers (*Melilotus sp. sp.*) and the fenugreek (*Trigonellis sp.*), good fodder plants which can be mixed with oats or vetches.

Even under an irrigation system the selection of hardy cultural winter crops for Syrian conditions is very restricted and none can replace the winter cereals as cash crops. A greater choice is possible among summer crops, some of which may become quite significant in the future.

Besides the great variety of cow peas (*Vigna sp.*), vetches (*Vicia sp.*), chick peas (*Cicer sp.*), lentils (*Lens sp.*), beans (*Phaseolus sp.*) and peas (*Pisum sp.*), the cultivation of peanuts (*Arachis sp.*) and soya (*Soya max*) is strongly recommended. Both are grown in Syria but current production is negligible, in spite of the fact that these crops are adaptable to both small and large size farming. In the coastal plains, in many parts of the fertile crescent and particularly in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys, there are ideal soils (well drained, fertile sandy loams) and favorable conditions of climate (good rainfall or irrigation possibilities during the growing and seed setting periods, combined with hot weather during the time of seed ripening) for their cultivation. Preferably, the multi-purpose peanut should be grown in rotation with maize, sorghum or hemp. Areas in Syria where peanuts could be grown successfully must run into tens of thousands of hectares.

An even wider range could be found for soya, which could be cultivated for human consumption, concentrates for farm animals, oil and for the manufacture of many other valuable materials (e.g., plastics). The soya plant also makes good hay, silage or pasture. Its increased production would be of great value to Syria, for its flour, when mixed with wheat flour, would improve the national diet. Soya thrives best in somewhat moist loose soil, but is also rather drought-resistant. Numerous varieties and strains exist, adapted to different growing conditions and early maturing from 60 days on.

A departure from the traditional farming system and a shift to greater diversification and mixed farming will take time and can be achieved only through demonstration and education. No radical change can be expected in the next year or two; intercropping of the cereals with leguminous plants would be a good start. Distribution of free seed and some financial help to the owners or sharecroppers of small farms selected for demonstrations could undoubtedly accelerate the recommended changes.

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VI IRRIGATION TECHNIQUES

Even when the irrigation program gains momentum, water will remain one of the principal limitations on agricultural expansion. Optimum water utilization requires making the most of available supplies and avoiding waste, as well as limiting cultivation in irrigated areas to those crops which need irrigation.

The Use of Water

At present, farming techniques are such that in many areas large quantities of water are wasted, particularly by surface evaporation,[7] and only rarely is the water evenly distributed over the land. Development of the best irrigation techniques (such as furrow irrigation) for the soils of the various regions clearly requires the establishment of research and demonstration sections in the agricultural stations existing or recommended for the various localities, for the farmers will rarely adopt new methods unless they can see the benefits at first hand.

Crop Restriction

Since the quantity of water is limited, it is equally important that irrigated fields be reserved for those crops which will derive most benefit. Conversely, crops such as cotton and rice, whose cultivation is hazardous under dry-farming conditions, should as far as possible be grown only on irrigated areas; sugar beet also requires irrigation in areas where the rainfall is less than 600 mm. A licensing system already exists with regard to cotton cultivation and it is important that it be enforced. In the long run, however, the farmer himself should be able to assess the profitability of crops grown under various conditions. The demonstration stations mentioned above should therefore be equipped to show how different quantities of water affect a variety of crops. To assure year-round utilization of land in irrigated areas (as elsewhere) farmers must also be educated in the use of soil-replenishing crops which will at the same time profitably replace fallow.

[7] Conversely, many farmers do not know how to drain their land when there is too much water.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 Crop Areas, 1943-53

(*Hectares*)

Kind of crops	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Wheat	503,622	570,725	751,139	810,485	843,472	788,808	987,856	992,240	1,036,693	1,167,150	1,314,422
Barley	242,564	272,650	384,128	370,799	365,040	341,626	367,910	416,445	343,556	396,621	428,010
Lentils	49,558	43,885	46,151	42,593	49,604	46,184	51,407	59,194	65,744	66,216	70,909
Maize	13,790	12,314	23,882	23,665	22,070	33,092	25,863	24,812	16,041	19,246	18,115
Sorghum	78,305	64,075	107,086	94,964	104,012	90,490	92,905	94,042	71,418	106,114	96,456
Rice	1,800	2,086	6,971	7,609	8,165	7,487	7,636	9,350	531	2,818	5,339
Cotton	15,240	16,695	17,525	19,837	19,335	23,998	25,296	77,961	217,352	189,271	127,558
Olives	48,408	59,072	75,701	78,107	79,367	78,571	79,624	80,695	79,911	82,471	85,641
Sugar beet	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	221	2,624	4,264
Total	953,287	1,041,502	1,412,583	1,448,059	1,491,065	1,410,256	1,618,497	1,754,739	1,831,467	2,032,531	2,150,714

SOURCE: Statistical Abstracts.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 2 Crop Production, 1943–53

(Tons)

Kind of crops	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Wheat	525,619	438,767	415,143	577,874	403,826	656,729	909,322	830,025	509,642	900,000	870,000
Barley	314,982	250,268	247,568	284,184	168,813	305,147	357,467	322,012	154,701	466,924	472,457
Lentils	35,310	23,843	27,577	19,453	39,227	33,105	54,807	26,531	30,231	50,597	62,814
Maize	28,540	17,615	23,835	27,516	28,582	37,646	39,102	35,684	21,824	22,553	22,430
Sorghum	91,370	42,315	85,731	58,866	67,586	63,392	57,290	75,725	24,171	106,114	123,692
Rice	3,650	9,767	14,506	12,000	21,569	19,099	20,031	18,005	927	5,779	16,176
Cotton fiber	3,087	3,008	4,342	4,784	5,444	9,110	13,323	35,495	62,924	58,074	46,984
Olives	72,717	11,156	158,940	45,499	80,215	102,998	91,365	18,636	50,547	32,726	48,902
Olive oil	23,107	2,026	16,791	6,242	11,116	10,252	14,436	3,580	8,516	7,241	11,071
Sugar beet	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,715	55,320	49,572
Total	1,098,382	798,765	994,433	1,036,418	826,378	1,237,478	1,557,143	1,365,713	906,198	1,705,330	1,724,098

SOURCE: Statistical Abstracts.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 4 Agricultural Machines, 1953

District	Tractors	Fertilizer spreaders	Harvesters		Combines		Threshers		Insecticide sprayers		Dusters	
			Animal-drawn	Tractor-drawn	Self-propelled	Tractor-drawn	Manual	Mechanical	Manual	Mechanical	Manual	Mechanical
Damascus	63	1	5	0	3	1	897	3	91	10	98	—
Homs	65	0	0	0	1	4	15	0	70	1	200	12
Hama	65*	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	1,500	22	265	—
Deir's	26	5	0	1	0	2	12,003	0	10	1	210	—
Deir ez Zor	166	0	0	20	4	74	0	0	70	—	—	—
Hasetche	540	0	20	72	420	0	—	0	22	40	0	—
Aleppo	352	0	0	10	48	10	2,002	0	21	5	92	10
Latakia	53	0	2	0	0	4	21,000	0	51	5	91	6
Soueida	1	0	0	0	0	0	100	1	200	0	200	—
Total	1,331	6	27	105	482	95	36,017	4	2,035	84	1,156	28

* Estimate.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and other sources.

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Economic Benefits

The mission estimates that the gross value of the produce of the Ghab area will be in the neighborhood of £S 63 million annually, or about £S 47 million after deducting the amount already produced in the area in question. The production of cotton, maize, sorghum, rice and sugar beets is particularly likely to have a marked impact on Syria's balance of trade. It may be assumed that the output of cotton and cottonseed will in effect be added to the country's exportable surplus; the additional rice production may make Syria fully self-sufficient in that commodity; and the sugar beet production should permit a considerable import saving.

In addition to the project's contribution to an increase in national income and an improvement in the balance of payments, the settlement of farmers in the area made possible by the project will assist in relieving the present population pressure in the province of Latakia and particularly in the Alaouit mountains. In Latakia, for example, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% of the average for Syria as a whole. Settlers in the Ghab will be able to earn substantially more than the bare living they have been able to eke from the soil in the past.

Organization

The "Administrative Office of the Drainage and Irrigation Works of the Ghab Lands" was created in 1951, to be attached to the Ministry of Public Works until the technical work is completed. It will be responsible for the design of the works, award of contracts, supervision of construction, payment of expenses and for sale of the land. As parts of the project are completed, the Office will take care of the operation and maintenance of the dams and of the irrigation and drainage networks and will collect water charges. During the planning and construction period the Office should recruit and train staff to carry out the continuing operation and management of the project.

It is important that the policy, and the attendant operating and budget delegations, provide for the establishment and operation of the agricultural research centers and for a long-range educational and farm demonstration program; otherwise, it will be practically impossible to achieve acceptable land use in the area.

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Chapter Ten

SYRIA AND LEBANON

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

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THE area of the present Syria and Lebanon lies to the north of Arabia Deserta and is the western horn of the Fertile Crescent. The two republics do not enclose within their boundaries a natural geographic entity and their climate and topography are best studied in relation to the surrounding countries;[1] but within the political boundaries of the two states, the following geographical divisions may roughly be distinguished:

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(1) *The Coastal Strip*. This is about twenty miles wide near Latakia and rather less just north of Tripoli, but in some places disappears and the mountains meet the sea. Olives, bananas, citrus, and vegetables are cultivated intensively near Beirut.

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(2) *The Mountains*. Starting from the north, the first coastal mountains are the Jebel Ansariya (also known as the Alawi Mountains) which average 4,000 feet and are well populated on the western slopes. To the south is the Homs–Tripoli gap and then starts the Lebanon range with peaks of over 10,000 feet. Even on the upper slopes of this range water is plentiful, there is close cultivation, and the villages and towns are prosperous. Near Beirut are situated the mountain resorts to which most of the city workers move each night when the summer brings its humid heat. The interior ranges of mountains lying parallel to that of the Lebanon are the Anti-Lebanon (between Homs and Zahle) reaching over 7,000 feet and the range of Hermon (between Zahle and the Israel border) which reaches 9,200 feet. Water and cultivation are far less plentiful on these than on the coastal mountains. Farther inland still and to the south of Damascus lie the Leja, a bleak area of igneous rock, and the Jebel Druze, which reaches 5,000–6,000 feet and lies north of the Jordan border.

(3) *Plains and Plateaux*. Hardly any of the territory of Syria and Lebanon lies less than 700 feet above sea-level and south of Hama almost all the land is over 1,600 feet. The richest agricultural land is on fairly high ground and forms part of a

[1] See W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East; a Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (London, Methuen, 1950).

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

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crescent which (starting from the Iraqi border) comprises the Jezira, the countryside of Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, and the fertile and beautiful Biqaa valley. The cultivation of cotton and cereals is particularly successful in the north-eastern corner of Syria where there has been great general development in the last five or six years. From Homs one road leads south to the Biqaa valley which continues between the two mountain ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, past Zahle to the southern border of Lebanon. Farther inland is the road to Damascus which passes to the east of the Anti-Lebanon over the Qalamun plateau. This is mostly barren land, reaching over 2,000 feet; the areas of cultivation usually need more water, but suffer occasionally from bad floods. The oasis of Damascus is known as the Ghouta and there every drop of water in the two rivers is made use of, by an ancient system of canals which follow the contours and provide water lavishly as they gradually lose height. Between Damascus and Jordan lies the Hauran plateau much of which is about 2,000 feet above sea-level; here there is cultivation of cereals but few trees are now left and there is insufficient water to ensure good crops each year.

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(4) *The Desert.* To the south and to the east of the Fertile Crescent there spreads a desert that extends southward for over

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pensated partly by her transit trade in goods and partly by her gold and currencies market. Syria wanted a controlled economy with import restrictions, protection of Syrian industries, and independence from French financial policy, but Lebanon's interest was to encourage all trade movements and to rely on franc support: moreover, the two countries could not agree on the division of customs dues. After years of arguments and negotiations the economic partnership was finally terminated on 14 March 1950 and customs posts were established along the common frontier. Since then agreements have been drawn up despite Syrian reluctance, but little has been achieved towards the re-establishment of economic union. It is therefore necessary to consider the economies of the two countries separately.

(a) Syria

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Agriculture

Over half but less than three-quarters of the cultivable area of Syria is, in fact, under cultivation. Since 1946 there has been a great increase in the number of pumps and tractors in use (there were 300 tractors in 1948 and 1,342 in 1951) but, as the following table shows, the cultivated area can still be extended.

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ESTIMATES OF THE USE OF LAND, 1950

	Syria		Lebanon	
	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total
Cultivable				
Cultivated under rainfall	8,400	12	803	20
Cultivated with irrigation	1,400	2	115	3
Potentially cultivable	14,000	20	700	17
Uncultivable				
Forests	1,600	2	285	7
Pasture	21,000	30	27	1
Desert, mountain and marsh	23,600	34	2,085	52
Total Area:	70,000	100	4,015	100

(Sources: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952*; UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2*.)

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Some progress in mechanized farming has been made in recent years, but much of the land is tilled as it was 2,000 years ago. The predominant form of land tenure is share-cropping by tenants on estates of large and medium size. Small holdings under 25 acres prevail in areas of intensive cultivation, and at present are estimated to constitute only 15 per cent of the total

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cultivated area. Holdings of 25–250 acres are estimated to take 423
up 33 per cent of the area and holdings over 250 acres 29 per cent. State land is estimated to represent 23 per cent of the total cultivated area. Decrees for the distribution of state lands were issued in 1952: their implementation, at the time of writing, is still under review. Legislation to prevent the subdivision of plots by succession inheritances is also under consideration; at present a four-acre plot may have thirty-seven owners, and its management is profitable only to lawyers.

The approximate acreage and crop and yield of the main 241
products are shown in the following table. 433

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)			*Production* (000 metric tons)			*Yield* (100 kg. per ha.)	
	1950	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*
Cotton (lint)	78	217	142	35	49	49	4·6	2·3
Wheat	992	1,037	900*	830	510	850*	8·4	4·9
Barley	416	344	400*	322	155	350*	7·7	4·5
Vegetables	68	66	..	47	40	142	..	..
Tobacco†	10	11	..	9	9	..	8·7	..
Rice (paddy)	7	..	..	24	6	6	19·3‡	..

.. = not available.

* The Banque de Syrie et du Liban (*Exercice 1952*) quotes the following figures for 1952 (in thousands):

Wheat: area = 1,180, production = 805.
Barley: area = 396, production = 467.

† Including Lebanon (annual production about 2,000–3,000 tons). ‡ 1949.

(SOURCES: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952* and *Monthly Bulletins of Statistics*, 1953; vegetable figures from Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952*, Paris, 1953.)

Wheat is the traditional staple crop of Syria and in a normal 248
year a quarter of a million tons can be exported. But the poor 439
harvest of 1951 necessitated wheat imports of about 50,000 241
tons. The 1952 wheat crop, however, once more increased to 433
over 800,000 tons. Barley is also grown and exported and, though the acreage has diminished somewhat since 1949, the crop is adequate.

In 1950 fortunes were made from cotton which fetched a high 248
price for the abundant harvest. The acreage sown to cotton 433
trebled between 1949 and 1950 and again in 1951. But while in 1950 the cotton yield was high, the 1951 harvest proved disappointing because of drought and attacks of the boll weevil. Despite a fall in cotton acreage in 1952—due chiefly to the downward trend in cotton prices—that year's output was maintained at the 1951 level, thanks largely to better methods

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year
234 suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at re-afforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2.*

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SYRIA AND LEBANON

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)		Production (000 metric tons)		Yields (100 kg. per ha.)
	1951	1952	1951	1952	1950
Wheat	61	70	43	50	7·5
Barley	15	20	14	27	11·2
Cotton	5	2	1	..	..
Tobacco	..	..	3	2	..
Citrus fruit	..	..	75	90	..
Grapes	21	..	80	..	..

.. = not available.

(Sources: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Enquête 1952* (Paris 1953); except figures for yields, cotton production, and area and production of grapes, all of which have been taken from FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952.)

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There is enough water for land to be used more intensively than in Syria but there is not enough room to grow all that the country needs. Improved methods have increased the yield of cereals per acre, but Lebanon will always have to import wheat. The crop of grapes is nearly double the weight of the wheat harvest and Lebanon exports grapes, wine, and the best quality araq. The citrus exports are high but the growers have not yet established the same name for quality as have the Israelis. Melons, water-melons, apples, onions, and potatoes are also important crops and vegetables are exported as far as the oil towns of Kuwait and Dahran. Cotton and tobacco are also grown in small quantities.

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The land is more evenly parcelled out amongst the people in Lebanon than in Syria but, despite the fact that there are many small holdings, there is a general shift from country to town, and Beirut and its immediate neighbourhood hold nearly half of the population. In the coastal regions of intensive cultivation small holdings predominate, while in the plain regions large estates worked by share-croppers are the most prevalent form of land tenure. Some estates owned by rich men are farmed under modern methods and equipment and there is less room for improvement or for expansion in agriculture than in Syria.

Industry

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Relative to its size, Lebanon is one of the most industrialized countries in the Middle East area. It is probable that nearly 50,000 persons are so employed, of whom over half are factory workers. However, Lebanese industry has only partly recovered from the loss of the Syrian market and some industries had either to move to Syria or to curtail production. The biggest industries are electricity, which produced 130 million kwh. in 1951, and the Cheka cement factory south of Tripoli, which produced 303,000 tons of cement in 1951. Cotton weaving and

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Chapter VI

SYRIA AND LEBANON

LAND AND POPULATION

S ●241 At first sight, the main crop of Syria appears to be thistles, and so it is in fact: about half the land is under fallow every year, and the cultivated land is cropped only one year in two S or even three. There are some districts with intensive cultiva- [312] tion, for instance, the oasis of Damascus, with its brilliant green crops irrigated by 'Abana and Pharphar'; but most of Syria is cultivated very extensively indeed.

S In Syria and Lebanon together the area cultivated before the 311 late war was some 5·8 million acres, but of this total only 243 3,900,000 acres were cropped each year, the remainder being L fallow. The greater part of the cropped area was under cereals, 311 about two-thirds being under wheat and one-third under barley. 243

In Lebanon, the whole of the cultivated area is cropped, and L there is no uncultivated land which could be brought into culti- 311 vation. In Syria however there are large areas of cultivable land which are not at present cultivated, the total cultivable area S being some 12½ million acres, of which only about one-third is 311 under cultivation. Unfortunately this figure is only a rough estimate, and it is not clear how much of the area is cultivable under present conditions, or how much of it is marginal desert grazing. Some of it is undoubtedly cultivable under present conditions, and there is certainly no shortage of land in Syria.

SYRIA: AGRICULTURAL LAND, 1943[1]

Province	*Cultivable*	*Cultivated (including fallow)*
	Acres	*Acres*
Jezira	2,471,000	54[illegible],600
Euphrates	3,212,000	321,900
Aleppo	3,706,000	1,260,000
Homs	420,000	345,900
Hama	1,309,000	1,210,000
Damascus	1,062,000	345,900
Hauran	518,600	518,900
TOTAL	12,698,600	4,545,500

[1] Omitting the provinces of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz for which no figures are available; their cultivated area may be estimated at about half a million acres.

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S During the recent war there was an expansion of cultivation
311 in Syria as a result of high prices and mechanization. The previous table shows the cultivable and cultivated land in different provinces and the distribution of these areas in 1943.

S Little is known about the rate of population growth, but it is
L believed to be rapid. According to the most recent estimates the
162 total in 1944 was 3,987,012, of which the population of Syria was 2,860,411 and of the Lebanon 1,126,600. The population of
S Syria was divided as follows:
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SYRIA: POPULATION AT END OF 1943

Province	*Total*
Latakia	452,507
Aleppo	870,139
Hama	157,458
Homs	212,424
Hauran	112,842
Damascus	603,889
Euphrates	225,023
Jezira	146,001
Jebel ed Druz	80,128
TOTAL	2,860,411

(This estimate excludes the Beduin, whose number is estimated at 400,000.)

About three-quarters of this total, or about 2·1 million, are
S rural. The amount of cultivated land per head is 2½ acres, but
311 because cultivation is so extensive the area actually cropped is only some 1½ acres.

L Lebanon, by contrast with the dry plains of Syria, is inten-
311 sively cultivated because of the high rainfall on the coast line;
241 yields per acre are higher, and crops are more diversified, in-
489 cluding citrus, olives, bananas; small irrigation schemes have been developed along the coast on the streams from the Moun-
162 tain. The Lebanon depends for part of its grain supply on Syria, and all the cultivated land is cropped. The cultivated area in 1943 amounted to 1·3 million acres. The total population in 1944 was estimated to be 1,126,600; of this probably about 750,000 are rural, and the amount of cultivated land is about 1½ acres per head.

S+L Grain production in Syria and Lebanon together before 1939
241 averaged 800,000 tons and rose to about 1 million tons during the recent war.

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

SYRIA AND LEBANON: AGRICULTURAL AREAS

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GRAIN PRODUCTION IN SYRIA AND LEBANON, 1934–43

	Tons	Cwts per acre
Wheat		
1934	443,000	6·3
1935	504,000	7·5
1936	427,000	6·3
1937	468,800	6·6
1938	644,300	9·0
1943	624,280	7·3
Barley		
1934	292,100	7·8
1935	347,100	9·5
1936	308,100	8·2
1937	266,300	6·5
1938	383,400	9·0
1943	330,485	8·2

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With a total rural population of about 2·8 million in 1943–4, the production of grain per head amounts to only 3·4 quintals or 6·4 hundredweights. Thus the problem for Syria is to in-

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S 241 crease the productivity per acre and also to expand the culti-
311 vated area per head.

L 311 In the Lebanon, however, with its steep hillsides under inten-
241 sive cultivation, there is a definite pressure on land resources.
434 The limits of intensification appear to have been reached, and a large part of the village population supplements its income by work in the towns, and by remittances from abroad. If the land
L tenure system in Syria were less oppressive, room might be
S found on the land for settlers from the Lebanon, but as things
571 are, the standard of living and status of the Lebanese peasant is higher; compared with the Syrian peasant he is a free man, and
167 there is no inducement to leave the Mountain for the under-populated plains of central or northern Syria.

LAND TENURE

L Corresponding to these different methods of farming, there
471 are different systems of land tenure.[1] In Lebanon individual small ownership is well established, and the pattern of village
423 life, with its broad class of small peasant owners, few large
464 farmers, and a growing class of landless labourers, resembles that of Europe.

S In Syria, the greater part of the land is owned by city not-
471 ables—the ruling class—and cultivated by small share-tenants. Though individual ownership exists in some districts, for instance
427 the Beqa Valley and the oasis of Damascus, the most usual
428 form of landownership in the plain districts of Syria is share-tenancy. The villagers bring their corn to the village threshing floor, and when the grain is threshed the landlord or his agent stands by and takes one-half of the grain. Towards this result he has contributed nothing; all labour, equipment, seeds, livestock, have been supplied by the tenant, so that his share is rent purely for the use of the land. The landlord is almost always an absentee, a city notable who only visits the land to collect rent.

S The share taken by the landlord varies from district to dis-
427 trict, and also varies with the condition of the land. According to an inquiry made by the French authorities, the usual division of the crop for non-irrigated cereals is 40–50 per cent to the

[1] The information which follows is mainly based on A. Latron, *La Vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, L'Institut Français de Damas, 1936). The brilliant and profound study by Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient*, is an indispensable authority which unfortunately was received only after going to press.

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probably few, of the estates are the properties of old, wealthy families of Ottoman times, which still exist in Lebanon, such as the lands belonging to the families of Arslan, Jumblatt, Chehab, Khazen, but many of these have been broken up by the Moslem laws of inheritance. Other estates have originated from direct grants made by Turkish Sultans to influential politicians, as for example the two very large estates in the Beqa and the Litani valley. Others too were formed at the time of the general registration of property undertaken by the Ottoman Government when chiefs of tribes or villages registered tribal land in their names as their private property. Uncertainty about legal title to land gives the educated classes frequent opportunity for ousting peasant owners, and whole villages have come into the possession of rival groups of city notables, as a result of litigation among the villagers who have sought their assistance in establishing their title.

While the land-tenure system is thus a result of peasant poverty, it also perpetuates poverty by standing in the way of any long-term investment. The high percentage of fallow in Syria suggests a great waste of land resources, and there could certainly be some improvement in yields, even in dry land farming, if green crops were introduced more generally into the rotation. But the share-cropper has little incentive to improve the fertility of the land, since he has no certainty of tenure, and since the landlord will take 50 per cent of any increase. Since the landlords are not as a rule directly interested in farming, they do not themselves undertake long-term improvements in the land.

Three case studies illustrate the ways in which the land-tenure system hinders advance.[1]

One study relates to the large estate of Misherfe, near Homs in central Syria. This is 24,000 acres in extent and includes five villages, with 2,500 inhabitants. It is very extensively cultivated, only one-third of the area, 8,000 acres, being cropped each year. The land is divided into three parts, one with wheat, barley or *qatani* (mixed grain), one ploughed but not sown, and one left fallow. A small area, 200 acres only, is irrigated, though water supplies are sufficient to irrigate much larger areas.

[1] These studies, which were prepared for the M.E.S.C., are not at present available in print.

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441 Wheat yields are lower than the average for Syria, averaging 4 hundredweight to the acre.

Almost the whole of the estate is let to share-tenants who are 427 supervised by an agent, the landowners themselves rarely visiting the estate. The share of the crop taken by the landlord is 25 per cent on non-irrigated land and 42½ per cent on irrigated land. These shares are more favourable to the tenant than is usual, because it is desired to attract more labour to the estate which sixty years ago was quite uncultivated. As elsewhere, the tenants have no leases but live in fear of eviction.

The tenants are divided into five classes:[1]

1. Large tenants cultivating 6 feddans (225 acres) of non-irrigated land: 4 in number.
2. Medium sized tenants cultivating 4½ feddans (168¾ acres): 4 in number.
3. Small tenants cultivating 3 feddans (112½ acres): 60 in number.
4. Small tenants cultivating irrigated land and with an average area of 18 acres: 100 in number.
5. Wage labourers, who form the majority of the villagers. [464]

Of these classes, only the small groups of large and medium-484 sized tenants can live well, in the sense that the output of the 454 farm suffices to cover the essential needs of the family and also 511 provides a small cash surplus. The surplus is used to buy gold pounds and jewellery. But the other groups cannot achieve even a sufficient standard of food consumption. The standard consumption of wheat (barley in the case of the very poor peasants) is 14 kilogrammes of grain per month; to achieve this level it is necessary to crop about 45 acres. Thus with the present system of cultivation, the class of small tenants, who cultivate an area of 112 acres and would appear to have quite sufficient land, cannot attain the minimum because only one-third, 35 acres, can be cultivated owing to shortage of live-stock.

511 These small tenants, who are typical of the farmers in the great plains of Syria, are very poor, living in one- or two-roomed [342] mud huts, and when there is only one room, sharing it with their animals.

[1] It must be said that the feddan in Syria is a variable measure and here is equivalent to 37½ acres.

511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[144] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

434 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
• 241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
409 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie
427 has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

[The estate of Misherfe, near Homs -- Analyst]

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Syria MD1

LAND TENURE

S 471 Of the total 160 families in the village, 100 own some land and 60 own no land. The peasant owners are divided as follows

1. Rich farmers, owning about 10 hectares ..	5	families
2. Medium farmers, owning from 3 to 8 hectares	80	"
3. Poor farmers, owning between 1 and 3 hectares	15	"
4. Share-tenants	10	"
5. Labourers	50	"

S 241 As in Misherfe, two-thirds of the land is uncropped each year. The peasant divides the land into three plots, one sown with a crop, one ploughed but not sown, and one fallow. The wheat yield is slightly higher than the average for Syria, and amounts to 833 kilogrammes per hectare (6¼ hundredweight per acre); barley yields are also slightly higher, being 8 hundredweight to the acre.

S 511 262 As a result of the more equal distribution of land, rather better yields, and more irrigation, the standard of living is better than in Misherfe. The first two classes, including half the families, can reach an adequate standard of consumption of food and other essentials, which is reckoned to be 25 kilogrammes of wheat per month, 1 kilogramme of meat per month (i.e. one sheep a year), 40 kilogrammes of olive oil and 20 kilogrammes of 'samn' per year, 4 tins of kerosene and a small quantity of clothing. The remainder of the village, about one-half of the total, that is the poor peasants, labourers, and share-tenants, are unable to reach this standard and live in great poverty, in one-roomed huts. The majority of these cultivators are heavily indebted, and the burden of indebtedness has doubled during the war years, because debts are usually incurred in gold.

S 426

L 471 The third study relates to Kfer Sa'ab in the north Lebanon, a hill village of small owner-cultivators. Of the total area of 200 hectares, about 30 are owned by the sheikh of the village. The total number of families is 150 (1,200 people), of which 120 own land and 30 are landless. A few peasant owners are rich with 5 hectares of land; 60 are medium owners with 1·5 to 2·5 hectares of land, and 25 own 0·5 to 1·5. Here cultivation is much more intensive than in Syria, and half the land is irrigated.

L 241 [312]

[Ashrafie, near Damascus -- Analyst]

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L 241 irrigated. The whole of the land is cultivated every year, the rotation being wheat followed by potatoes, the potato crop being irrigated. The wheat yield is below the average for Syria, amounting to 6 hundredweight per acre, and the potato yield is 5 hundredweight per acre.

L 511 However, in spite of the greater intensity of cultivation, the shortage of land means that the majority of the peasants are not able to attain an adequate standard of living, measured in terms of a few essential commodities: 20 kilogrammes of wheat and 4 kilogrammes of meat per head per month, 100 kilogrammes of olive oil per annum, and 5 tins of kerosene. To attain this standard a family must own 3 hectares of land, and as only the rich peasants and a few of the medium peasants own so much, the majority of the medium peasants and the poor landless peasants do not achieve it. The majority of these supplement L 434 their income by remittances from their emigrant relations abroad. Those who have no income from abroad leave the village to work as unskilled workers or servants in the towns.

L 511 In this village, therefore, the cause of poverty is the shortage of land, since the land is much more equally distributed than in 342 Syria and the system fairly intensive. Living conditions are far better than in Syria: the majority inhabit stone houses with two 556 or more rooms. The richer peasants are also more sophisticated than those of Syria, preferring to gamble their money away in the neighbouring summer resorts rather than spend it on jewellery.

S L 434 241 From these three studies three conclusions emerge. The first is that a higher income per acre depends on irrigation, since the net income from irrigated land is two or three times as high as from non-irrigated land.

INCOME PER HECTARE ON IRRIGATED AND NON-IRRIGATED LAND (in Syrian Pounds)

	Ashrafie		*Misherfe*		*Kfer Sa'ab*
	Non-Irrigated	*Irrigated*	*Non-Irrigated*	*Irrigated*	*Half-Irrigated*
Gross Income ..	352	887	218	633	879
Costs	118	247	75	96	246
Rent	—	—	59	304	—
Net Income ..	234	640	84	233	633

[Kfer Sa'ab in the north Lebanon -- Analyst]

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the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled. Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

In several respects the French authorities have modified the Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the extensive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation concessions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the peasant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were started, but produced more water than could be used. The educational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessitates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

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better cultivation, if more machinery were available, to reduce the fallow to one year out of two, instead of two out of three in the districts where this is customary; it would also be possible, by machine cultivation, to keep weeds under control. (See Chapter VIII.)

The main possibilities of development, however, depend on irrigation. At present an area of some 500,000 acres is irrigated, and even under the existing scheme much water is wasted. How much additional land could be irrigated is a subject for controversy. Mr Soubhi Mazloum, a Syrian irrigation engineer, suggests that the total area which could be irrigated, including the use of the Euphrates water, may be as large as 1,200,000 hectares (2,960,000 acres):[1] but this figure refers to the area which it is *physically* possible to irrigate, not the area which could be irrigated with any prospect of economic return.

A more exact and detailed estimate was prepared by Professor Addison, the irrigation expert, who surveyed existing schemes in 1943 and considered that the extension of these which was then economically practicable would irrigate some 68,000 hectares (168,000 acres) in addition to the area already irrigated. The difference between these two estimates indicates how wide a range of opinion there is. A survey is now being prepared by a British irrigation firm on behalf of the Syrian Government, to provide the basis of development projects, and pending its publication it is impossible to quote any more satisfactory estimates.

The Jezira and Euphrates Provinces. In inner Syria, the Jezira area and part of the Euphrates province in the north-eastern corner of the country, there are quite large possibilities of extending cultivation both in the rain-fed zone, and by irrigation. North of a line from Tiyne to Sheikh Saleh there is sufficient rainfall to water the winter crops. In the 'Duck's Bill' and along the Turkish frontier to a depth of about 12 miles to Derbisiye, the rainfall is 50 to 100 centimetres per year (20–40 inches), and south of this there is another belt with rainfall of 25 to 50 centimetres (10–20 inches), about 50 miles wide.[2]

[1] 'Le Problème de l'Eau au Liban et en Syrie', in *L'Agriculture, Richesse Nationale*, (Beirut, 1942).

[2] This information is based on an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. in 1944.

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POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope for widening the area cultivated and raising the yields, as the soil is fertile. In the Jezira the use of machinery could be extended—it is already increasing fast. Better livestock production could be achieved by greater use of fodder crops for which conditions are favourable: in the 'Duck's Bill' good clover grows wild. At present fodder crops are not considered worth cultivating.

In the Euphrates region there is great scope for extension of irrigation. But a large scale scheme would be costly because the river runs between high escarpments, which vary in distance between each other up to about 10 miles. To irrigate much larger areas it would be necessary to lift water over the escarpments. There are large areas of uncultivated land, particularly between Abu Kemal and Deir-ez-Zor. Even on the land already cultivated yields of wheat could be much higher: at present the yield is four to six times the seeding rate, and, according to local farmers, could be raised to ten to fifteen times the seed with better irrigation. The high cost of fuel oil is the limiting factor as it also is for tractor work. On the Khabur river improvement of the ancient barrages would permit an extension of irrigation.

It is in this area that there is real scope for a planned settlement of cultivators, with improved methods and a better system of land tenure. The obvious form for such settlement to take would be on the model of the Jewish co-operative farms, small holdings with collective use of machinery and working to a cropping plan; on the uncultivated land such settlement could be undertaken without incurring high capital costs.

So far as the Euphrates Valley is concerned, similar co-operatives based on communal control of water supplies might be started on a small scale. Large-scale irrigation here would be costly, and would necessarily have to be co-ordinated with the irrigation of Iraq. An immediate step needed is to reduce the price of fuel oil.

While it is easy on paper to see the possibilities of such schemes as these, it is not easy to see where in fact the motive power for them is to come from. They will not bring in quick big returns, which are what local farmers and landowners want; the district is remote and the main object of such investment would be a long period rise in the standard of living, in which the moneyed classes are not interested. Present-day Syria is not

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COTTON IN SYRIA

Cotton in the past two years has become Syria's most important export. The country also exports wheat, barley, and other cereals, apricot paste, olive oil, wool, some cotton textiles, licorice root, tobacco, pistachio nuts, and livestock products. 241 439

Many types of manufactured articles are imported—petroleum products, minerals, pharmaceuticals, electric appliances, motor vehicles, machinery, tires, tubes, glassware, and hardware. 439

Table 20

SYRIA: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports
March 12 through December 31, 1950
Value

Item	1950
	Per Cent
Cotton	28.4
Wool and Hair	11.1
Silk, Artificial Silk, and Textile Fibers	6.0
Vegetables and Products	27.5
Animals and Products	6.0
Tobacco	1.3
Hides and Skins	1.1
Others	8.4
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	59

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

Table 21

SYRIA: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports
1951
Value

Country	1951
	Per Cent
Lebanon	21.5
France	18.2
United States	12.5
Lebanon Free Zone	8.2
Iraq	7.3
United Kingdom	7.0
Others	24.3
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

PRODUCTION

Syria is essentially an agricultural country. Its mineral resources have been exploited only slightly despite indications of the existence of phosphate, lead, copper, antimony, nickel, chrome, and gypsum. Manganese ore has been 316

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651 30 per cent; and on garments, from 40 to 50 per cent. Syria, along with many Middle Eastern countries, has retained a war-time regulation assessing double duty on goods from Japan, a former enemy.

AGRICULTURE

311 Accurate figures on the present land use or possible uses are lacking. 241 Government estimates on the area under cultivation and acreage are considered unreliable by the United States Agricultural Attache, and he suggests using them only as general indications of trends.

These rough calculations indicate that about 45 per cent of the country—approximately 20 million acres—is suitable for agricultural purposes, including grasslands. The rest is waste land. About half of the 20 million acres are thought to be suitable for cultivation, out of which between 4 and 5 million acres are estimated to be in crops and orchards at the present time.

At least three-fourths of the crop land appears to be devoted to cereals, primarily wheat and barley. Cotton has been expanded in recent years to about 10 per cent of the planted land. Dry legumes, vegetables and other minor food crops, as well as several less important industrial crops such as tobacco, hemp, and silk cocoons, are also produced.

Orchards and vineyards are significant in Syrian agriculture; and, although they have not been fully developed, occupy possibly 10 per cent of the cultivated land. Olives, citrus, walnuts, and pistachios are commonly grown.

Because of the lack of moisture, inadequate rotation, and insufficient use of fertilizer, a large part of the cultivated land is fallowed each year. A

—Photo Courtesy of Near East Foundation

Near East Foundation officials inspect one of their experimental cotton fields near Damascus which produced over a bale and a half to the acre.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

United States mission estimated that 50 per cent of the land was in fallow 311
during 1948.[31] Increased irrigation and high prices for agricultural com- 241
modities have reduced significantly the fallow in the past few years, and the
percentage may be less now.

PRODUCTION

Syria is normally self-sufficient in most foods. In fact, the country 433
exports fresh and dried fruits, lentils and other legumes, tobacco, wool, butter,
hides, and meat. Occasional poor harvests make it necessary to import food
grains.

The greatest deficiency is in rice, which has been displaced by cotton in
recent years to such an extent that almost all of the country's requirements
must be imported. Last year's bad cotton crop may prompt farmers to revert
to rice and, if so, this will reduce the deficiency.

Government figures indicate that production of food has not kept pace 433
with the expansion in population and that the per capita food supply and 146
individual calorie intake are both declining.[32] These conclusions are based on
highly conjectural statistics and are in conflict with opinions of the United
States Agricultural Attache and Syrian officials who are intimately ac-
quainted with the country's agricultural problems. These observers believe
there has been no real decline in food consumption, except possibly for short
periods of time. Certainly there is no shortage now, and the bumper cereal
crop in 1952 should enable the country to fill domestic needs and export at
least 30 per cent of its wheat and possibly 50 per cent of its barley.

The daily diet consists largely of starches, it is true, but this is due more 262
to habit than anything else. The resources of the country are ample to permit
a much more balanced diet.

PRODUCTIVITY

Syrian agriculture often is characterized by the low productivity of the 461
agricultural worker. It is obvious that a great many more people are used on 241
each acre of land than is necessary. The low agricultural income is reflected 511
in the obvious poverty of the people. Yet, comparisons with other countries,
and even detailed calculations, are of questionable value due to the unreliability
of the statistics.

Government reports on average yields also are open to question. Official 241
figures show that wheat yields have dropped sharply, while cotton yields have
tended upward, except for the extremely bad year in 1951-52. They also show
very wide fluctuation. Experienced observers point out that the yields are
especially questionable because both acreage and production figures are not
reliable. On the basis of conversations with producers in various sections, it
is apparent that yields are normally fairly high and that they fluctuate,
depending on water availability and on insect devastation.

POTENTIALITIES

A number of missions which have studied the possibilities of agricultural
development in Syria, especially in the last five or six years, all mention the

[31] *Activities of FAO, 1950-52*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1952, p. 58.

[32] *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, November, 1951.

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241 possibilities for expanding the total area under cultivation, for improving and increasing irrigation, and for increasing productivity through research and education. They also point to needed improvements in agricultural equipment, in agricultural credit, and in the land tenure system.

241 311 Although estimates vary as to the amount of new land which can be brought into cultivation, all agree that it is possible to double the present planted acreage. Cultivation could be extended in some dry-land areas with improved rotation and fertilization, but in most cases new land can be brought into cultivation only by extending irrigation.

IRRIGATION

241 312 Information which the United States Legation at Damascus has prepared from reports of the Syrian Ministry of Public Works indicates a total of about 2.4 million acres under irrigation at the present time, of which approximately 60 per cent is from gravity flow and the remainder from pumps of various sorts. Some of the Ministry's data are said to be based on actual surveys, some on interviews, and some simply on estimates. This 2.4 million

241 312 406

The most common system of irrigation in the new cotton areas of the Jezira is to draw water like this from streams with pumps powered by diesel engines. The number of pumps in Syria has doubled since 1950.

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is a very high figure, representing more than 50 per cent of the total land under cultivation, and the United States Agricultural Attache is inclined to believe that the Ministry's figures include the total area served by irrigation systems, whether or not all the land receives water each year. 241 312

There are no large-scale irrigation works in Syria. State and local governments have constructed and now maintain a number of small dams, diversions, and canals, but the total area served by these public works in 1951 was only 100,000 acres. Several other projects, scheduled for completion within the next three or four years, will increase the area under public works another 100,000 acres. Most of these projects are being financed by the federal government out of its regular budget. 312 653

By far the largest area is served by small diversions operated by individuals. The next largest and fastest growing area under irrigation is that served by mechanical pumps. The number of pumps doubled from 1950 to 1951 and the area irrigated increased three times. These pumps are used mostly for drawing water from streams. 312

In the absence of detailed surveys, accurate estimates as to how much water might be available from all sources are impossible to obtain. Draining the Ghab Swamps on the Orontes River west of Aleppo to bring another 100,000 acres into cultivation is now being studied by a Dutch engineering firm, and a large dam on the Euphrates River to impound water in sufficient volume to serve an additional 750,000 acres is under consideration. Several million acres of land along the Euphrates River probably are suitable for cultivation from the standpoint of soil if water becomes available. At the present time irrigation along the Euphrates is limited to the low-lying land between the banks of the river. Through the centuries the river has cut a bed from a half mile to as much as 10 miles wide through the plain, which is now 30 to 50 feet above the water level. It has proved too expensive for individuals to use pumps to pull the water from the river for irrigation.

The same general condition prevails on the main tributary of the Euphrates, the Kabur. Numerous pumps have been installed along the Kabur, and a gravity system in the north, operated by a small dam and canals, is being extended under a current program. It is possible the water would be adequate to extend the gravity system slightly in the southern reaches of the river.

Water might be diverted also from the Tigris River which runs across the northeastern border of Syria. Extensive use of water from any of these international rivers, however, very likely would involve agreements with neighboring countries. Additional water might be provided also by the other rivers in the country. All of these proposals involve tremendously expensive projects beyond the means of the country to finance without outside help.

CAPITAL AND CREDIT

The highly nationalistic attitude of the Syrians damages the chances of private industry's securing a foreign loan. A recent law requiring all foreign operations to have Syrian managers and at least 50 per cent Syrian capital, together with the questionable security, makes sizable foreign investments unlikely. Under these conditions any foreign loans probably will be made to the government. The Syrian Government has made an obvious point of not obligating itself to another foreign power, and it is unlikely it will accept 471 186 648

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471 a loan directly from another government. This attitude is illustrated clearly
186 in the refusal of Syria to sign an agreement with Point Four.
648 A loan from an international body is another matter, and the country is seeking a loan of several million dollars from the International Bank for development of transportation, particularly roads in the Jezira, and port facilities at Latakia.

454 Without a large-scale public works program, only minor improvements
241 can be made to the existing system. However, opportunities exist for increasing production through private investment.

The good crops of 1950, sold at exceptionally high prices, resulted in high profits and the accumulation of considerable capital. The hope of continued high profits caused much of this capital to be re-invested in equipment and farm improvements. The same incentive also brought out new capital which never before had been invested in agriculture. Judging from the number of tractors, combines and accessories, and irrigation pumps purchased during 1950 and 1951, the investment in agricultural equipment in these two years exceeded the total up to that time. Unprecedented expenditures for general farm improvements also were made, an exceptional step in a country without a history of investment in agricultural development beyond the acquisition of land and a few simple facilities. The capital base has been small. Production has about equaled consumption. There has been little surplus for savings. The few families with capital have used their funds in other ways, seldom for agriculture. But the experience of 1951 was not encouraging for long-continued investment in agricultural development. These investments were costly, many farmers paying double the United States prices for equip-

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These farmers are typical of those in northern Syria. All the tenants of one landlord usually live in villages like this one near Aleppo. Villages vary in size from a few hundred to several thousand depending on the size of the farm.

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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and money-lenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [466]

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Another significant aspect of the land tenure problem is the financial arrangements between the landlords and tenants. 427 241

Although there are many variations throughout the country, there are three basic contracts.

In the first, where water is available by gravity flow for irrigation and the landowner furnishes only the land, he gets 50 per cent and the tenant gets 50 per cent of the gross yield. In the second type of contract, where the tenant installs pumps and operates them at his own expense and the landlord furnishes the land only, he gets 33⅓ per cent and the tenant gets the rest. In the third case, where the landowner furnishes only the land and the tenant drills artesian wells at his own expense, the landowner gets only 25 per cent of the gross yields. There are variations depending on the crops produced and on who furnishes seed, fertilizer, and equipment. With the growth of mechanization, there is a rising tendency for landowners to prepare the seed beds themselves with large tractors and to take a large share of the produce.

With the advent of mechanization, there is also a noticeable tendency to wage-crop arrangements, particularly in the remote areas like the Jezira where the population is sparse and where the only feasible arrangement for picking cotton is the employment of nomads by the day. 464 241

The greatest concentration of small cultivators who own and operate their own farms is in the older farming areas in the southern part of Syria around Damascus. Around Aleppo the farms are larger in size and owner-operators are fewer in number. 471 241

MECHANIZATION

Mechanization is changing rapidly the primitive practices which still dominate Syrian agriculture. The number of tractors has increased from 200 to almost 2,000 and more than 700 combines are in operation. 241 407

Most of the mechanical equipment is in the Jezira and the agricultural areas around Aleppo. Approximately half the tractors are being used in cotton areas.

To encourage further mechanization the government plans to extend loans to farmers on a five-year basis to finance the purchase of agricultural equipment. So far most of the equipment has been bought privately and for cash. [452]

The first few years have been difficult for the tractor farmers because of the lack of trained operators and the lack of adequate repair facilities, especially spare parts. Now the large manufacturers' agents are establishing modern service stations, repair stations, and mobile repair units. Consideration is even being given to organizing operator training programs.

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

All of the agricultural missions stress the need for improvement in basic research and educational programs. The United States-Syria Agricultural Mission has outlined a complete program for agricultural training, research, and extension. Some of the recommendations already have been adopted, such as the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 654

Syria mD1

SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 59,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and to stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezireh area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organisation.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

The infant mortality is not known, but local observers believe that it is at least 250 per 1,000 live births. In many rural villages the mortality among children under 5 years of age probably reaches 40 to 50 per cent. Discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated by the fact that certification of birth is not required for infants dying during the first year of life. The official infant mortality rate for 1948 was 47.6 per 1,000 births for the country, but 75 per 1,000 births in the city of Damascus. Among almost 15,500 deaths registered in 1949, over 21 per cent were of infants under 1 year and about 35 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 165

Social Economy

Agriculture is the basis of Syria's economy. Over two thirds of the people are dependent upon the land, and, in consideration of the paucity of other natural resources, its full utilization is a problem of primary concern to the welfare of the country. Except in limited portions of the northwestern and the northeastern provinces, the rainfall is deficient and erratic, and the expansion of agriculture is contingent upon the development of irrigation and more efficient methods of production. Estimates of the amount of cultivable land range from 10 to 21 million acres—from less than one quarter to almost one half of the total land area. A similar disparity is noted between the figures quoted for the acreage now under cultivation, but all sources agree that less than one half of the potentially arable lands are planted in crops. Most observers believe that the land suitable for agriculture approximates 12 to 14 million acres, while the area under cultivation is between 5 and 6 million acres. Roughly 10 to 20 per cent of the tilled land is irrigated at present, but it has been shown that the farm acreage could be more than doubled by increased irrigation, associated with controlled settlement, in the Orontes, the Khabour and the Euphrates river valleys. 433 244 132 244 311 244 311

Foremost among the factors which impede the promotion and the modernization 421

p. 139(B)

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
644 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a landowning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[511] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
36 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

244 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

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highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 164 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[49] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 282 164

p. 151 (A)

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8, 9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the malaria problem has been aggravated by the introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages.

The malaria season extends from April to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plasmodium vivax* and *P. falciparum* infections varies according to the season and from place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general, *P. vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered.

Malaria control measures are undertaken by the municipal authorities in Damascus, Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten-

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Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

Agriculture

During the post-war period both agricultural and industrial output increased rapidly, and although population growth was fairly large there seems little doubt that per capita output rose significantly. 1/ Similarly, although data are very scanty, there is evidence of an increase in consumption and an improvement in the standard of living. 2/

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In agriculture, the increase in output was achieved by extending the acreage of cereals and greatly expanding that of cotton; there was also some improvement in methods of cultivation, especially in cotton. The total cultivated area increased from 2,314,000 hectares in 1946/47 to 3,668,000 in 1952/53. 3/ The irrigated area increased more rapidly, from 291,000 hectares 4/ to 400,000 hectares. 5/ The proportion of fallow land seems to have remained unchanged, at one-third of the total. It may therefore be taken that the crop area increased by about 60 per cent.

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The increase in the irrigated area was achieved partly by the irrigation projects discussed below, partly by installation by farmers of pumps drawing on river or underground water. In 1953, there were 7,500 pumps, of which 40 per cent were for river water and 60 per cent for underground water. The extension of rainfed crops was achieved mainly by mechanization. In 1953 there were 1,200 tractors, compared with 860 in 1951 and about 300 in 1948; 1,307 tractor ploughs, compared

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1/ National income is estimated to have risen from 1,250 million Syrian pounds in 1950 to £1,410 million in 1953; during that period, the index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus (1949 = 100) fell from 111 to 110. See Saad Wafa el Dajani, "al dakhl al Qawmi fi Suria", Al Abhath, (Beirut, December 1953); Ministry of Agriculture, A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria, and Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953 (Damascus, 1954). A breakdown for 1950 shows that 44 per cent of the total was contributed by agriculture and animal husbandry, 13 per cent by commerce, 10 per cent by industry, 9 per cent by transport and communications, 7 per cent by government services, 5 per cent by rents and 11 per cent by other activities (Dajani, op.cit.).

2/ Per capita annual consumption of cotton, woollen and rayon fibres is estimated to have risen from 4.2 kilogrammes in 1951 to 4.6 kilogrammes in 1952 and 5.1 in 1953; the figure for Lebanon and Syria combined had previously risen from 3.9 kilogrammes in 1948 to 4.8 kilogrammes in 1950 (Food and Agriculture Organization, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Rome, January 1953). Output of tobacco products increased from an average of 1,638 tons in 1945-47 to 2,075 tons in 1950, 2,448 in 1952 and 2,699 in 1953.

3/ Bureau des documentations Syriennes et Arabes, La Syrie économique, 1953 (Damascus, 1954), mimeographed.

4/ Sir Alexander Gibb, Economic Development of Syria (London, 1947).

5/ Of these, some 250,000 hectares were irrigated by flow and 150,000 hectares by pumps.

241 with 1,082 in 1952; and 547 tractor planters, compared with 471. 1/ There were also, in 1952, 381 combines, 133 threshers and 108 harvesters. 2/

243 As table 50 shows, most of the increase in acreage was in cereals. Wheat and
242 barley yields continued to fluctuate violently, according to the amount of rainfall and weather conditions, but have shown no marked trend and, save in exceptional years such as 1949, have been well below a ton per hectare. Apart from mechanization, little has been done to improve methods of cultivation, apply fertilizers or use improved seed except in El Jezira, where high-yielding improved
433 seeds and fertilizers are sometimes used. Hence, in the post-war period, output
241 of grains has increased in the same proportion as acreage, or only slightly more. The expansion in cotton acreage, though smaller in absolute terms, was proportionately much greater; 3/ the acreage rose to 25,000 hectares in 1949 and 78,000 in 1950; the high prices prevailing in that year and the great profits made by cotton planters sent acreage up to 217,000 hectares, partly at the expense of wheat cultivation. The sharp decline in yields in 1951 and the steep fall in price in 1951 and 1952 caused heavy losses and led to a decline in acreage. Improved cotton prices and greater experience in cultivation once more caused an expansion in 1954.

241 The experience of the past four years has served to point out the potentialities and limitations of cotton cultivation in Syria. During the 1950-51 boom, cotton cultivation spread to most parts of the country, but subsequent events have shown that it is unsuited to many of them. In the Hauran, inadequate moisture has caused farmers to revert to wheat, barley and leguminous crops; in the Latakia region, soil and climate have also proved unfavourable. In the Damascus region, cotton cultivation has been practically discontinued. In the Aleppo region, as a result of the excessive costs of pump irrigation, cultivation is mainly confined to rain-grown cotton. 4/ In many parts of El Jezira, rice has replaced cotton owing to the shortage of labour. At present, cotton is localized chiefly in the Hama and Salamiye districts in central Syria, in the Hasetche district in El Jezira and in the province of Aleppo. About two-thirds of the total area is irrigated. Yields are about twice as high on irrigated as on rain-fed land, and the Syrian average, having almost doubled since the pre-war period, is one of the highest in the world. 5/

1/ Ministry of Finance, Budget Note, 1955 (Damascus, 1955).

2/ Figures obtained from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ Large-scale cultivation of cotton began in 1924, increased rapidly until 1931 and after a sharp fall during the depression reached its pre-war peak of 40,000 hectares in 1936. In this period, American type cotton replaced native varieties. During the Second World War, acreage once more declined, owing to the shift to grains.

4/ Bureau des documentations syriennes et Arabes, Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien (Damascus, 25 November 1952, mimeographed).

5/ Yields per hectare rose from 221 kilogrammes in 1951 to 243 in 1952, 363 in 1953 and 389 in 1954.

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Table 50. Syria: Area and Production of Principal Crops, 1934-38, 1945, 1950 and 1952 to 1954

Crop	1934-38	1945	1950	1952	1953	1954
Area (thousands of hectares):						
Wheat	475	750	992	1,167	1,314	1,334
Barley	275	348	416	357	458	544
Olives a/	b/	9	9	9	10	...
Grapes	42	56	68	68	70	...
Cotton	32	18	78	189	128	187
Rice	1	7	7	3	5	10
Vegetables	...	...	19 c/	21 d/	22 e/	...
Industrial crops f/	...	...	12 c/	15 d/	15 e/	...
Production (thousands of metric tons):						
Wheat	459	415	850	900	870	800
Barley	290	248	322	467	472	561
Olives g/	5	17	4	7	11	...
Grapes	170	169	245	187	243	...
Cotton	6	4	36	45	47	73
Rice	3	15	24	5	16	25

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics (Rome); Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria (Damascus, 1953); Ministry of Finance, Budget Note, 1955.

a/ Millions of trees.

b/ Average of 1937-38.

c/ 1950/51.

d/ 1951/52.

e/ 1952/53

f/ Excluding cotton.

g/ Thousands of metric tons of olive oil.

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The extension of cereal and cotton cultivation has been carried out by private enterprise. Most of the initial capital was provided by landlords, but merchants and banks soon started financing the crops; in 1951 it was estimated that some £S 200 million to £S 300 million had been required to finance the planting and moving of the cotton crop, of which all but £S 50 million came from outside agriculture. In recent years, the volume of advances granted and bills discounted by the principal banks rose by about £S 50 million between the seasonal low of July or August and the peak of the cotton season, in November. But the bulk of the capital needs are still supplied by non-banking sources. Private initiative also set up the 31 saw gins and 1,767 smaller gins which were operating in 1952 and which can handle about 300,000 tons of unginned cotton. It has been responsible for the introduction of the various types of American cotton seeds, of which the most widely used is the Lone Star variety, which produces cotton very similar to Egyptian Ashmuni. Private enterprise also took the lead in utilizing chemical fertilizers, imports of which increased from a negligible amount in 1950 to 5,000 tons in 1952, 11,000 in 1953 and 13,000 tons in the first nine months of 1954.

Another field in which private initiative has taken the lead is that of beet growing. The sugar refining company extended advances to growers, supplied them with free seeds and instruction, sold them fertilizers and offered them high prices for their output. By 1953, as a result, 4,500 hectares had been planted to beets, giving a crop of 60,000 tons; 1/ a crop of 80,000 tons was anticipated for 1954. 2/

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The Government has rendered valuable assistance to agriculture, especially to cotton growers. Following the very poor crop of 1951, when over-extension and pests combined to reduce cotton yields sharply, a Cotton Office was established in January 1952. On its staff it had Egyptian experts recruited directly by the Government or sent by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Several decree laws of 1952 fixed cotton acreage and subjected its cultivation to Government authorization; they limited the number of authorized varieties to six and forbade the mixing of varieties; regulated ginning, in order to disinfect, select and classify seeds; made obligatory the spraying of cotton plants with pesticides, which in case of negligence is to be carried out by the Government at the farmer's expense; set minimum standards and established grades for the classification of cotton. 3/ In 1953, the Government forbade the use of seeds not

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1/ Average yield of irrigated land is two to three tons per hectare, and of non-irrigated, 0.5 to 0.75.

2/ Information supplied by Ministry of National Economy. Output of fruits and vegetables has also increased in recent years, but little progress has been made in livestock breeding. An estimate of agricultural income in 1953 put the value of the wheat crop at £S 305 million (a figure based on an estimated production of 1,355,000 tons against a final estimate of 870,000 tons); of barley at £S 7 million; of cotton at £S 121 million; and of other crops at £S 200 million, giving a total of £S 633 million. Livestock and livestock products were put at £S 240 million (La Syrie économique, 1953).

3/ Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien.

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purchased from the Agricultural Bank. There is no doubt that these measures have helped to raise cotton yields and quality. 654 241

Some help has also been given to growers of cereals, by the importing and sale at half price of seed wheat from France and Italy; 1,300 tons were imported in 1953. The Government has set up five experiment stations, for fruits, cereals and cotton, has expanded agricultural education and has begun extension work among farmers.

The Government has also helped growers financially, by purchasing spraying equipment and pesticides, reselling them to farmers and advancing loans for the purchase of pesticides. The capital of the Agricultural Bank was raised from £S 5.8 million in 1940 to £S 7.2 million in 1945, and £S 21.6 million in 1953. Loans advanced by it increased from £S 268,000 in 1940 to £S 1.6 million in 1945, and £S 12.5 million in 1953. In 1953, the number of borrowers was 20,300 and the recovery rate was 93 per cent. The bank also made loans in kind - cotton and rice seeds, spraying equipment, pesticides, tractors, ploughs and pumps. 1/

On the other hand, some government measures concerning marketing and exports have had adverse effects on growers. The Cereals Office's attempt to collect grain for the use of the urban population, at below market prices during the winter of 1951/52, following a very poor crop, led to hoarding, and wheat had to be imported at high prices. In 1952, the Government ordered growers to deliver to the Cereals Office one ton of wheat, at £S 230, for every two tons exported; this led to a rise in the export price to above the world level, hampering exports. In 1953, this arrangement was replaced by a lower export tax on wheat and barley. It would appear that these taxes were borne by growers, not by merchants or foreign consumers, and hence that they constituted a subsidy from rural areas to the towns. With the fall in world prices of wheat, the Government abolished the taxes in May 1954. Similarly, it would seem as though the tax on cotton exports introduced in 1952 has been shifted to growers. 656

Industry

The rapid post-war industrial growth was chiefly due to private initiative but much government protection and some financial assistance were required by several industries. Most of the new capital was provided by merchants, but there was also an appreciable amount of reinvestment of industrial profits. 433 472

1/ Statistical Abstract and La Syrie économique, 1953. In 1953, the bank was authorized to make loans against warehouse receipts issued by the Cereals Office for barley and wheat delivered to it. A rate of 6 per cent is charged on these and all other loans.

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Development projects

652 During the period 1945 to 1952, inclusive, Government expenditure on development totalled £S 301.4 million. Of this £S 115 million was spent through the budget, £S 59.5 million was provided from the Reserve Fund, and £S 126.8 million came from loans made by the bank of issue. 1/ The 1954 budget provided £S 71.6 million for development, of which £S 17.2 million were to be spent through the ordinary budget and the balance to come from various extra-budgetary sources. The preliminary cost of projects under study was put at £S 400 million. 1/ Budget appropriations have been spent by Government departments, but projects financed by extra-budgetary expenditure have generally been carried out by special boards created for the purpose. 2/ No foreign financial assistance has been received by Syria.

Agriculture, irrigation and power

652 241 312 Budgetary expenditure on agriculture and irrigation from 1945 to 1952 totalled £S 37.9 million, of which £S 23.3 million went to irrigation and the balance to land survey, agricultural schools, model farms, agricultural and veterinary centres and other projects. Extra-budgetary expenditures included £S 5.7 million for irrigation, £S 21.3 million for increasing the capital of the Agricultural Bank, and £S 6.0 million for pest control.

The largest completed irrigation project is that on the Orontes River, in the Homs-Hama region, which irrigates 22,000 hectares. Further works are under study to irrigate an additional 20,000 hectares upstream; their cost has been estimated at about £S 20 million. Other recently completed projects include that on the Quwaiq River, south of Aleppo, which irrigates 15,000 hectares and provides flood control, and the project on the Mnerib, a tributary of the Yarmuk River, which irrigates 2,500 hectares; possibilities for extending both schemes are under study. Irrigation works on the Khabur River, in El Jezira, are very near completion; they have cost £S 9 million and will irrigate 9,000 hectares; considerable further expansion in this scheme is possible and preliminary studies have been made.

Other projects nearing completion include the drainage of the Rouj swamps, near Idlib; the project also provides for the irrigation of 4,000 hectares and the generation of electric power; total costs are put at £S 4 million and completion is scheduled for 1956. The Sinn River project, on the coast south of

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1/ Awad Barakat "Recent Economic Developments in Syria", Middle East Economic Papers, 1954 (Beirut, 1954).

2/ The most important items of expenditure not discussed in this section are £S 33 million for supplying Aleppo with drinking water from the Euphrates, a project which was scheduled for completion in 1954; £S 33 million advanced to municipalities, for water, electricity and public buildings; £S 9.5 million advanced to nationalized electricity companies; £S 26.7 million for Government buildings; £S 8 million for hospitals and clinics, and £S 5.4 million for schools.

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Latakia, is to irrigate 5,000 hectares at a cost of £S 2.6 million; the scheme should be completed by the end of 1955. Projects under study include a scheme on the Barada River, near Damascus, to irrigate 5,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 10,000 kilowatts, at a total estimated cost of £S 12 million; the Yusef Pasha dam, on the Euphrates, which would extend irrigation by 100,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 45,000 kilowatts, at an estimated cost of £S 150 million; and a small multi-purpose project on the Kabir River, north of Latakia. 652 241 312

The most important project under way is that on the Ghab, on the Orontes north of Hama. The objective is to reclaim by drainage some 26,000 hectares of land and to irrigate by gravity a total area of 65,000 hectares, 43,000 of which had not been irrigated before.

The project also includes the building of four hydroelectric stations, with a capacity of 20,600 kilowatts and an estimated annual output of 80 million kilowatt hours; a thermic generator with a capacity of 9,500 kilowatts; and 700 kilometres of roads. Total costs, exclusive of electric installations, are estimated at £S 140 million, of which £S 45 million are for drainage, £S 55 million for irrigation and £S 37 million for roads and bridges. The hydroelectric plants are estimated to cost another £S 17 million and the thermic plant £S 7.6 million. The Government expects to recover its outlay on the scheme by selling, for an estimated £S 150 million, 30,000 hectares of land which it owns in the region and by levying a small irrigation fee. The scheme is expected to raise gross agricultural income by £S 91 million and net income by £S 78 million. Completion is scheduled for 1960. 1/ 652 312 377 241

The Ghab Project Administration was established in 1951, and in 1953 it was authorized to borrow £S 25 million from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, at 2 per cent interest. A firm of Netherlands consultants, hired by the Government to prepare an over-all plan for the Ghab, presented its report in May 1953. In September 1953 a contract was awarded to a Yugoslav firm for the deepening of the Orontes channel, at a cost of £S 3.3 million. It is expected that contracts for other parts of the project will be awarded soon.

The total area of irrigation projects recently completed or approaching completion is 57,000 hectares and that of schemes planned but not yet begun is 278,000. The total irrigable area, including that at present irrigated, is estimated at 750,000 hectares. 2/.

The total cultivable area in Syria is put at 5 million hectares, of which one million are at present not cultivated, while 1.6 million are left fallow each year under the prevailing triennial rotation. Present plans call for intensifying production by using leguminous crops to replace the period of fallow, 311

1/ "The Ghab Project", by Abdel Basit Khatib, Director General of the Ghab Project Administration (mimeographed document, Damascus, October 23, 1954). See also Abdel Basit Khatib Mashru al Ghab (Damascus, October 1953).

2/ Soubhi Kizloum, "Les Irrigations en Syrie", Annual Bulletin of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1955, and "Al mashari al mais fi Suria", Al Hayat, 31 July 1954 (Beirut).

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311 by planting forage crops, and by increasing the use of fertilizers and improved seeds. 1/ The Government is planning to increase its distribution of selected wheat and other seeds, to expand its agricultural schools and its student missions to foreign universities, and to intensify the activity of its experimental stations and its extension services.

654 241 Among the obstacles to expansion of output are high production costs, owing to shortage of labour in certain areas and to high fuel prices and maintenance charges for machinery, and also high transport costs. 2/ Various measures are being taken to improve communications, provide storage and reduce the purchase and operating costs of agricultural machinery. 3/

241 423 Another great obstacle to agricultural development is the system of land tenure. In 1947 it was officially estimated that of 6.1 million hectares of privately owned land, 38 per cent was in holdings of over 100 hectares, 43 per cent in holdings of 10 to 99 hectares and 19 per cent in holdings of under 10 hectares. 4/ The greater part of large holdings is rented on short leases to sharecroppers, whose poverty and insecurity make it difficult for them to improve methods and increase output. The Government is preparing a law regulating relations between landlords and tenants and between farmers and labourers. 5/ In 1952 and 1953 decrees were passed regarding the distribution of lands in the State domain to cultivators with small farms and the expropriation of occupied areas on such land in excess of a certain figure. 6/ This land was to be available for cultivation by farmers, in lots of 10 hectares of irrigated or 50 hectares of non-irrigated land, on very generous terms. A start has been made in distributing land in El Jezira to landless farmers and nomads; by March 1954 some 25,000 hectares had been distributed.

1/ It is estimated that the yield of wheat could be fairly easily raised by 60 to 70 per cent and that of barley by 50 to 60 per cent. The discrepancy between the average yield of olives, 20 kilogrammes per tree, and that of high yielding trees, 50 to 60 kilogrammes, also points to possibilities in that field; it is, moreover, believed that the average oil content of olives could be raised from 11.5 per cent to 15 per cent (unpublished study by the Ministry of National Economy).

2/ In 1953, transport costs of a ton of barley from El Jezira to Latakia were £S 50, a figure equal to the cost of production. High transport costs also greatly raise the price of petroleum products used in agriculture.

3/ Ministry of Agriculture, "A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria" (mimeographed document, Damascus, 1954).

4/ By the end of 1954 half the area of Syria had been surveyed; the corresponding figures within that area were 49 per cent, 38 per cent and 13 per cent. Conditions vary greatly: in Damascus, Latakia, Jebal Druze and Hauran provinces, small and medium properties prevail; in the Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Jezira and Euphrates provinces large properties and State domain account for the greater part of the land.

5/ Ministry of Agriculture, op cit.

6/ This was fixed, in the 1952 decree, at 150 hectares in the Jezira, Euphrates and desert areas and 50 hectares in other parts of Syria. In 1953 the limit was raised to 200 hectares, irrespective of location.

[179] it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes. The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer. Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less than LS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley. But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available. 812 241 242

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital. 812 658

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers. 811

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal. 311 619

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families. 619 231 233 428 423

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

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charge a number of closely related functions such as the purchase and sale of farm supplies, the procurement and extension of credit and the marketing of farm products. The granting of loans and the sale of farm supplies are closely linked, and cooperative marketing would facilitate the collection of loans. For certain special functions such as irrigation, single-purpose cooperatives would be more appropriate. On balance the mission thinks it best that cooperatives be organized on the basis of unlimited liability, for only in this way will all the members have the greatest incentive to see that all the credit is effectively utilized and repaid. The mission has already indicated its view that cooperatives should be given credit at 6% rather than 8% interest. The cooperative's own lending, however, should be done at 8% to provide a margin for meeting operating costs and building up reserves.

Agricultural Extension and Community Work[21]

In most underdeveloped countries, programs to improve agricultural practices and yields founder because there is no organization and staff to work continuously with farmers, educating and assisting them and demonstrating to them the practical utility of better methods and techniques. In Syria, too, there exists no agricultural extension or educational service in that sense. To be sure, the various departments of the Ministry of Agriculture have representatives in the *mohafazats* or provinces dealing with such subjects as agricultural production, veterinary matters, plant protection and the like. But the time of these men is largely monopolized by various administrative tasks such as the enforcement of government regulations, crop reporting, locust control and similar matters. They do not have the opportunity, and sometimes not even the inclination, to work with individual farmers. Their contacts with villages are brief, sporadic and infrequent.

The mission has given considerable thought to the problem of organizing effective work among the agricultural population in the villages. Our conclusion is that this work would best be entrusted to a special rural community development organization. Other countries faced with a similar problem, like India and Pakistan, have launched such an organization; in India, where one has now been functioning for some years,

[21] See Annex C, p. 322.

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242 encouraging results have been achieved. The justification for a special organization rests primarily on the fact that a properly conceived village improvement program transcends the bounds of agriculture. Its principal task, of course, will always be to raise the standards of agriculture [511] and animal husbandry, the source of livelihood of the villagers. Yet the living conditions of the 2,000,000 people living in villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants must be improved as a whole. Standards of housing, health and sanitation, and adult education must be raised, and better roads and community facilities provided. Moreover, the need for special techniques in approaching this entire problem argues in favor of a special organization. The government has neither the staff nor the funds to carry out all the urgent village improvements itself. Its task must be rather to stimulate and assist the villagers in mobilizing their resources for self-help. Only in this way can a development program achieve worthwhile results at the village level.

242 657 The program the mission has in mind calls for the progressive introduction of rural community leaders or workers into the villages. One community worker for about 4,000 people should suffice, and if on this basis he must cover a number of villages over an extended area, he should have an assistant, selected preferably from among the rural school teachers. The community worker, though a government employee, should have no administrative duties. His sole function should be to encourage and crystallize the villagers' desire for improvement. His training should be primarily agricultural, but he should also have sufficient knowledge of the other aspects of village life to suggest what can be done. Most of the things which can or should be done to better living conditions are rather elementary. The knowledge of the community worker, therefore, need not be profound. Moreover, he would be able to call upon the specialized services of the government for advice and assistance in dealing with problems with which he himself cannot cope. For instance, he should know enough to identify and prescribe measures for most of the prevalent diseases and pests which attack crops and livestock, but he may need help from the veterinarian or pathological service to deal with difficult cases or extensive outbreaks of disease. If he can awaken an interest in cooperatives, he will then need to call in a credit supervisor from the Agricultural Bank or an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture to launch one. He may get the villagers to start a program of constructing latrines, but need advice from the sanitation experts of the Ministry of Health on methods of construc-

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tion. Similarly, he may induce the villagers to work on improving village roads, but may have to go to the regional road engineer of the Ministry of Public Works for advice and the temporary loan of a truck. In many respects he will be the intermediary between the villagers and the government services which can assist them. In discharging his task he will obviously have to work closely with the regular local government officials such as the *moukhtar* of the village or the *mudir* of the *nahiye* or township. His success will largely depend on the support of these officials.

Ultimately there should be about 500 such community workers and 200 assistants. The extensive preparatory and organizational work involved in starting the program would be such, however, that only about 12 community workers would be operating at the end of six years. Thereafter, the program would gain momentum, with the number of workers doubling each year so that the target could be attained in another six years. For the first six years the mission envisages a total expenditure of £S 2.7 million, but by the end of 12 years annual expenditures of £S 7 million would be required.

The mission suggests that the rural community improvement organization be headed by a special administrator directly responsible to the prime minister and the council of ministers. He should recruit a number of foreign experts to help with the necessary training and planning and the initial implementation. This group would include persons experienced in general community work, public health, agriculture and housing. The FAO and such organizations as the Near East Foundation and the Ford Foundation might be asked to provide the necessary personnel. The experience of the Near East Foundation, which has been operating a number of pilot community projects along the same lines in the Ghouta around Damascus, would be particularly helpful. The foreign experts would be primarily responsible for planning and training. They should draw up a basic handbook which would be a compendium of practical measures which community workers can apply and would offer them guidance in techniques of stimulating and organizing community action. They would plan the necessary training courses for community workers in the secondary agricultural school and assist in introducing instruction on the elements of community development work in the university, teachers' training colleges and other schools. Their assistance will also be needed in holding regional seminars in which local officials would be acquainted with the objectives and methods of the program.

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242 657 Other government services must be effectively tied in with the community improvement program. At the national level, therefore, the administrator should be assisted by a coordinating and policy-making council on which the Ministries of Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Public Works and National Economy, and the Agricultural Bank would all be represented. Similarly, the work at the provincial or county level should be coordinated by a council representing the cooperating government services and chaired by the *mohafez* or the *kaimakam*. In fact, the community worker might best be attached to the office of the *mohafez* or *kaimakam*.

The inauguration and expansion of this rural community improvement organization will increase rather than diminish the demand for the services of the specialized officers of the Ministry of Agriculture. More agronomists, veterinarians and plant protection experts will be needed to make frequent visits to villages either on their own initiative or on request for the purpose of helping and advising community workers. In the beginning these specialists will serve a dual role, carrying out their present administrative tasks and giving technical supervision and guidance to the village workers. With further expansion of the community development system, however, the services of full-time technical specialists will be required. This will allow for the separation of administrative and regulatory functions from educational and demonstration activities, thus making it possible for the technical specialists to develop a closer personal working relationship with the villagers. The return of people now studying abroad will enable the Ministry to strengthen its staff in the provinces, but more personnel will also have to be recruited from the secondary agricultural school.

Agricultural Education and Staffing[22]

658 874 Repeatedly the mission has emphasized the vital need for more trained staff if the government is to discharge its responsibility for raising the standard of agriculture and animal husbandry. This points to the need for providing much greater facilities for education in agriculture at the secondary school and university levels. The mission has considered a suggestion to establish a faculty at the Syrian University to provide the higher education in agriculture and veterinary science for which students

[22] See Annex C, p. 318.

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1. alluvial	200
2. black	100
3. chestnut brown and terra rossa	1,500
4. brown and reddish-brown	3,500
5. grey sub-desert	9,000

The remaining 3.7 million hectares is covered by lithasols, eroded rendzina, and saline soils, which for the greater part have no agricultural significance.

Unfortunately, the three best soil types represent no more than about 10% of Syria's total surface area of about 18 million hectares, and it is on these soils only that a wide variety of crops can be grown. Almost all of the brown and reddish-brown soils, covering 20% of the land area, fall in the inner region of the fertile crescent belt where steppe conditions prevail. These soils are most appropriate for the cultivation of cereals and small grains, and are utilized for such purposes in similar regions throughout the world. The grey sub-desert soils (50%) are used primarily for pasture; crop production is possible only under irrigation.

This evaluation serves only as a rough guide to detailed agrogeological soil maps. A more detailed survey of Syrian soils is in progress and it is imperative that it be continued, since soil maps are essential for planning, and, together with data on climate, may be used to determine the types and quantities of crops which may be cultivated to the greatest economic and social advantage. They would also be of the greatest importance for the assessment of taxes on land holdings, should such a tax be instituted.

Soil Fertility and Agricultural Use

Soil fertility and usefulness depend not only on type but also on profile, that is, the layers or horizons (topsoil and subsoils) of soil materials of various colors, on the chemical composition and on the configuration of the terrain and its water supply. 134f 242

The depth of profile determines the root rate and the bulk of material available for nutrition, and also indicates the total soil water available—a consideration of importance in view of Syria's semi-arid conditions. Here shallow soils, even the best type, are of limited value only; being more prone to drought than deep ones they are more hazardous as an agricultural base.

Chemical composition of the soil, especially the topsoil, also has an im-

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134 portant bearing on fertility, for soils lacking a balance of the main elements
242 (nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus) or deficient in some of the minor elements (calcium, magnesium, etc.) are worthless for agriculture. Nitrogen, the most essential element in plant growth, is extracted from the soil during the growing period. In Syria, the customary method of restoring nitrogen is to leave the land fallow; for centuries this has been done rather successfully in the Hauran and elsewhere. The period of fallow—one, two or three years or more—depends on the type of crop, and, as far as the soil is concerned, the group, quality, depth and restorative capacity. In addition to the customary fallow, Syrian farmers near populated centers use town refuse to restore soil fertility. Unfortunately cheap manure and compost are generally consumed for fuel, but in recent years the use of commercial fertilizers has increased, particularly for cotton and sugar beet. While the Syrian farmers are aware of the importance of better crop rotation practices, improvement of soils through green manuring and leguminous crops is in its infancy.

During the last two decades huge tracts have been opened up, especially in the Jezireh. This land has been idle for centuries and its reserve of chemical compounds caused by decomposition of the natural vegetation is considerable. Though very good soils do exist, particularly in the northeastern parts, the magnitude of the stored elements has generally been overestimated. The reserves, particularly of nitrogen, are not inexhaustible. The virgin soil of the Jezireh has often been compared with virgin soil types in Russia, the United States and Europe but it must be remembered that in Syria the humus has not been so abundant as in humid climates, so that the nitrogen reserve is very limited. When that reserve falls below a certain level soil productivity decreases rapidly even if other elements are in plenti-
[311] ful supply. In Syria continuous exploitation under a monocultural system has resulted in decreased yields in certain areas, notably the Jezireh, where the danger is not yet fully recognized. Even artificial fertilizers cannot replace organic enrichment and the fallow system in its present form is far from sufficient to maintain fertility. New farm techniques, a changed rotation system and increased use of green manuring and fertilizers are urgent needs.

It is believed that Syrian soils are not generally deficient in phosphorus, important for growth and for the forming of grains and seeds, although chemical analyses indicate the total phosphorus available rather than the amount which can actually be absorbed by the plant. Assimilation depends

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largely on the acidity of the soil, and the p.H.[3] of practically all Syrian soil is between seven and eight. Most of the phosphorus is blocked. Whereas nitrogen and phosphorus deficiencies can be observed in almost all Syrian crops in various stages, very little indication of potassium shortage has been noted.

Besides the three main elements, the tracer elements iron, manganese, zinc, boron, copper and molybdenum are quite significant. A shortage or lack of one or another can result in low yields, even in soils generally classified as very good. The application of tracer elements e.g., the application of zinc and copper to fiber plants, citrus fruits, etc., has shown remarkable yield increases in other parts of the world. Unfortunately, very few studies of soil fertility and plant growth conditions have been conducted in Syria. Those made by Bracken for winter and summer crops and by Ibrahim Boules for cotton have indicated a general shortage of nitrogen, a disputable lack of phosphorus and rather favorable conditions as regards potassium. The excellent studies and surveys conducted by an FAO soil expert during the last few years have not been sufficiently intensive or extensive so far to form the basis of definite conclusions. But the mission is convinced that a thorough soil survey on the lines already begun by these specialists will be of great assistance in increasing the agricultural area and production. The compilation of the information thus gained, together with data on climate and water resources will be of much value in ensuring a sound rational basis for agricultural planning and development. Aerial mapping is a necessary adjunct to ground surveys and the successful coordination of the undertaking will require the development of a cartographic office.

II CEREALS

Wheat and Barley

Syria is fortunate in being able normally to harvest its wheat and barley approximately one month earlier than American and European cereals; consequently they can be brought on to the European market at the time

[3] p.H. values indicate relative acidity or alkalinity. Values run from 0 to 14, 7 indicating neutrality, numbers less than 7 increasing acidity, and numbers greater than 7 increasing alkalinity.

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desirable that a modern abattoir be built in a more suitable location; the present problem of drainage disposal would alone warrant this measure. There should be no difficulty about the provision of capital for such a project, since the municipal authority can recoup its expenditures by the collection of fees.

The present budget of £S 188,000[8] for personnel and equipment bears no relation to the value of Syrian livestock or to preventable losses. For more effective disease control the mission has recommended that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available during the next six years.

IX EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

Education

Elementary agricultural education. Since 1949 the rural elementary schools have devoted the two final years (fourth and fifth grades) to theoretical and practical instruction in agriculture and hygiene. At present 111 offering this type of instruction, each with a field of five *donums*[9] for practical field training, are distributed through *mohafazats* as follows:

Damascus	37	Deir's	13
Aleppo	9	Soueida	11
Latakia	11	Deir ez Zor	9
Hama	5	Hasetche	5
Homs	11		

The pupils (9,000 in 1954) learn the basic principles and techniques of agriculture, practicing them in the school gardens.

Clearly this number of schools cannot provide basic rural education for all the children of Syria's 5,500 villages. Apart from the need to build more schools and enlarge existing ones, a way must be found to train additional agricultural teachers; the teacher training and secondary agricultural schools in Dera'a and Kharabo do not turn out sufficient numbers.

The mission therefore makes the following recommendations:

[8] £S 50,000 for laboeers at the Damascus veterinary research center and in the provinces; £S 40,000 for purchase of animals and feed; £S 98,000 for technical requirements (£S 20,000 for the Damascus laboratory; £S 58,000 for the preparation of vaccines and biologics material; and £S 20,000 for medicines in respect of the treatment of parasitical diseases).

[9] A donum = 0.1 hectare.

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1. A number of village school teachers should be given an intensive one-year course in agriculture. 242 871

2. Agricultural courses could be profitably substituted for some of the less essential subjects in the rural curricula, as teachers become available.

3. Night classes in agricultural education should be established in the rural elementary schools.

4. Rural elementary school pupils should be encouraged to organize societies to continue their activities outside school and school gardens.

5. Forest farm crops should be included in school gardens, and tree planting should be encouraged on national holidays. Each pupil could be responsible for a tree planted during his school training.

Secondary agricultural education. There is one agricultural vocational school in each of the provinces of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Latakia and Euphrates but of these four are intermediate schools and only the one at Kharabo (near Damascus) can be classified as a fully-rated secondary school. About 500 students are enrolled in all five schools. Some of the graduates subsequently engage in farming; the great majority apparently become government employees in the agricultural or in other services. 871 242

In the future these schools will be called upon to meet the growing personnel requirements of the government's agricultural, livestock, veterinary and forestry services. At Kharabo particularly, future technicians should be trained to assist in research and extension work. The present four-year curriculum includes all the elements necessary for a general understanding of today's agriculture and its future development, but students should be given an opportunity to specialize, at least during the third and fourth years, in such subjects as rural credit, crop production, livestock and animal husbandry, mechanization and techniques of industrial utilization of agricultural products, e.g., dairy products, fruit preservation, vegetable and meat marketing, tobacco curing, vegetable oil production, meat processing and curing, and the tanning of skins and hides. Better still, two or even three years of training should be added to give the students three or four years of specialization and bring them ultimately to the junior college level.

In the mission's opinion, the curricula of all agricultural schools emphasize theoretical studies too much and practical training too little. Effective farm managers and extension agents must be willing and able to demonstrate with their hands what should be done on the farm. To obtain the respect of the peasants they must be willing to get their hands dirty

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and able to do the practical work on the farm themselves. We suggest therefore that the present curricula be reviewed by a committee consisting of representatives of the Ministry and agriculturists, with the object of putting greater stress on manual training and on practical problems.

There is need for a vocational agricultural school in the Djebel Druze and the Hauran. For the time being this need could be met by broadening the curriculum of the Dera'a school, including special courses in agriculture. Stress should be laid on horticulture and fruit processing. In addition, at least one other school, preferably at Aleppo, should be raised to the same standards as Kharabo.

Elsewhere we have recommended that the curriculum include a mechanical training course.

We have also recommended the establishment of a secondary agricultural vocational school in Kamichliye. It should be located on soil most typical of the region and should have grounds adequate for experimental and demonstration plots, including an irrigation area. This school should become the headquarters for all agricultural education and extension work in the Jezireh; its curriculum should include courses on farming systems and the economics of mechanized agriculture. The third and fourth year curriculum should permit a choice between a technical course of study oriented towards machinery, repairs and maintenance, and an administrative course of study emphasizing economics and administration. We would expect enrollment to be 100-150 from 1957 on.

Adult education. Farmers should have an opportunity for formal instruction in the principles of good farm management and animal husbandry. Elsewhere we have suggested a pilot fundamental education program which would, among other things, include agriculture in its scope. Quite apart from this we believe that the rural elementary schools which provide instruction in agriculture should offer evening courses in which, with the help of proper visual aids, farmers could learn about improved crop rotation, better cultivation and weed control, means of identifying and combating pests and diseases and the like. Mobile trailers equipped with slide and moving picture projectors might be useful. In addition, we suggest raising the standards of mechanical farming by starting special courses at Kamichliye and probably at Aleppo for machinery owners, operators and mechanics. The first would be taught how to select proper farm machinery, supervise its operation and would learn the economics of mechanical farming. The second would be given practical training in opera-

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tion, maintenance and elementary repair of machinery. These courses could be organized with the help of an FAO expert and in cooperation with farm machinery dealers. They might be given under the aegis of the agricultural school at Aleppo and the proposed school at Kamichliye.

Certificates of competence should be awarded after suitable tests; if employers were to increase the pay of holders of such certificates, this might provide an incentive to workers to take such courses.

University level. Syria has no agricultural college or faculty; all the top staff of the Ministry of Agriculture have been trained abroad. The government and the Ministry send students to Egypt, Europe and the United States; the FAO and other organizations grant fellowships to Syrians. In 1953, 58 agricultural students were studying abroad in various fields—37 in Egypt, 11 in France and 10 in the United States.

Syria will be in great need of agronomists, agriculturists and veterinarians in the coming years. For the time being the total of fellowships should be increased to permit foreign study by 15-20 more students each year. The curriculum of the secondary school should also be expanded, as indicated above, to include one or two years of special work, for immediate and pressing needs.

Research

Syria had 18 experimental stations in 1954. They are well dispersed throughout the provinces and have reasonably good facilities and adequate grounds. Eight of the stations, in the provinces of Damascus, Hauran, Homs, Hama, Euphrates and the Jezireh, are engaged mainly in cereal and field crop research; the rest in horticultural work. Unfortunately, the stations work more or less independently of each other and this lack of coordination, coupled with staff and budgetary deficiencies, greatly impairs their effectiveness.

Despite the government's commendable efforts to offer Syrian personnel courses of study abroad, well-trained agronomists, horticulturists, agricultural engineers, zoological technicians and veterinarians will be lacking for some years to come. This suggests the advisability of limiting the extent of experimentation in the 18 understaffed stations.

Coordinated and central programming for future research is essential; this should be the task of one station, which may become the nucleus of a future Central Research Station. For the time being, we suggest that

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activities be allocated among five departments which might later be incorporated into such a central station: soil; farm crop and horticulture; plant pathology and entomology; agricultural engineering; and rural economics. It has already been indicated that there should be a separate livestock center.

The embryo Central Research Station should assemble and evaluate research work already done in such fields as cereals and cotton; it should engage in intensive rather than extensive research. Existing stations should undertake seed selection and propagation. In the course of time some of these stations might become sub-stations of the C.R.S. with responsibility for carrying out the experimental and demonstration programs to be planned each year by the C.R.S. But this stage cannot be reached until the sub-stations are adequately staffed with competent research and field personnel.

The mission recommends consideration of:

1. the establishment of a Central Research Station, preferably in the Damascus area, with ample experimental grounds for future expansion;
2. the recruiting of foreign experts (with the help of interested international institutions) to head the proposed departments;
3. provision for training abroad of future Syrian staff; and
4. a decision on priorities for the building program in connection with the experimental program.

Extension Service

Annex E refers to the inadequacy of the present extension service in furnishing guidance to the farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture has provided technical information in the form of pamphlets and films and has also arranged training courses for guidance officers, especially in cotton cultivation and the control of pests and diseases. In this regard more can be done and the mission strongly recommends that short training courses, of the kind recommended earlier, should be offered to farmers. The distribution of more posters, particularly relating to livestock, designed to be understood even by those who cannot read, should be encouraged. Extension officers could also be instrumental in furthering the adult education program mentioned above. More guidance could be given by private organizations, such as the Chamber of Agriculture already set up in each mohafazat, and farmers' cooperatives could be instrumental in providing

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and financing facilities for the presentation of pertinent information to farmers, and in organizing agricultural exhibitions. 242 654

The Chambers of Agriculture could also participate in regional programs for agricultural guidance, improvement of the care and breeding of sheep, goats and cattle, etc., and promotion of the various cottage industries. Close cooperation with the guidance department of the Ministry of Agriculture would make possible a national program to improve agricultural conditions, establish youth organizations, and stimulate growers' associations for cereals, cotton, sugar beet, tobacco, olive, fruits and other crops.

APPENDIX

TABLE 3 Nurseries and Research Stations

	Specialty	Approximate area (hectares)	Province
Damascus	horticulture	25	Damascus
Ezraa	field crops	200	Hauran
Tell Chehab	horticulture	20	Hauran
Soueida	horticulture	25	Soueida
Homs	horticulture and field crops	45	Homs
Hama	horticulture and field crops	40	Hama
Aleppo	horticulture cotton breeding	40	Aleppo
Latakia	horticulture	30	Latakia
Sin	citrus	48	Latakia
Tartous	horticulture	20	Latakia
Harem	horticulture	20	Aleppo
Madrah	horticulture olives pistachios	20	Aleppo
Deir ez Zor	mixed	27	Euphrates
Hasetche	mixed	100	Jezireh

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312 653 185 *The Mission's Program*

The new irrigation projects recommended by the mission, together with those under way, call for a total expenditure of £S 193 million over the next five years, to which must be added £S 3 million for maintenance and £S 1.2 million for research and demonstration, giving a grand total of £S 197.2 million. Table 1 shows the allocations among projects, together with an indication of the areas to be irrigated. Appendix Table II sets forth the irrigation schemes.

TABLE 1 Mission's Proposed Irrigation Program, 1955–60

Irrigated area							
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Projects	Functions	Total	Already spent	To be spent in the program
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	103*	1	102
0	0	0	Euphrates valley studies		3	—	3
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB) . .	GI	12	10	2
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	5	2	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	3	2	1
4.6	0	4.6	Mzerib	PI	7	0	7
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	30	0	30
15.0	0	15.0	Barada	HEP + GI	30	0	30
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	15	0	15
89.1	37.5	126.6			208	15	193

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; LB – Left Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

* Including £S 47 million to be spent in a later program.

NOTE: Area figures in thousand hectares; expenditure figure in million £S.

185 312 242 III PLANNING

There are two stages of planning for irrigation projects. The first, the agricultural phase, entails a preliminary study of the soils and the computation of water duties. The technical phase includes planning of the civil engineering works necessary to divert, convey and distribute the water in the selected area. In the Main Report the mission has discussed the second

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planning stage. Here we add a comment with respect to the so-called agricultural phase.

In the past, soil studies were not very extensive, but projects were being constructed in areas already under cultivation, where the fertility of the soil was well known. Now FAO experts supervise systematic soil analyses, and the results of these studies will be very useful for the development of future projects. Insufficient investigation of the perviousness of the soil, with consequent underestimation of the water duty, has resulted in undercropping in some irrigated areas. A striking example is the Homs Lake project, where the allowance of 0.20 liters per hectare per second does not permit full utilization of the cultivable area.

The mission therefore recommends that henceforth more extensive research under the supervision of both irrigation and agricultural engineers precede fixing of the irrigation duty. Since the soils vary little along the alluvial plain of the Euphrates valley, these studies could be confined to plots in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor and Abou Kemal, on the plateau west of Raqqa and in the Resafe plain south of Abou Hareira. These experimental plots could be quite small, water being supplied by small pumping plants or even by tankers. Provision is made in the mission's proposed expenditure on studies of Euphrates valley irrigation for equipment of experimental stations.

IV WATER FEES

The fees for the various projects, according to the revised schedule for 1954, are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Annual Water Fees per Hectare

(£S)

Project	Size of holdings in hectares				
	0 to 5	5 to 15	15 to 20	20 to 50	over 50
Homs-Hama	6.25	15.40	20.40	23.30	25.80
Tell Maghass	7.50	23.75	28.75	37.50	40.00
Mzerib	7.50	21.25	26.25	32.50	35.00
Senn	7.50	17.50	22.50	27.50	30.00
Makt	2.00	3.50	4.50	6.00	7.00

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III RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A SUPERVISED AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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The organization of the agricultural extension service should be such as to permit its ultimate development into the central agricultural agency through which educational activities relative to improved techniques in agriculture and rural living are channeled. In its particular sphere of activity the Extension Service should coordinate the findings of all departments within the Ministry of Agriculture. It should become eventually one of the three or four principal departments of the Ministry of Agriculture, separated from the research control or administrative work of the Ministry. For the present, however, it would seem desirable to retain the Division of Cooperatives and the Extension Service on the joint basis. The Extension Service should not have regulatory or police power functions, for this would involve education in the pleading of special causes or the enforcement of sanctions. Education and extension rather involve training on the basis of voluntary participation by farmers. At the national and regional level the Service should be staffed adequately to serve the village communities. It is recommended that an additional amount of £S 250,000 be provided during the next five years for personnel, travel and general operating expenses of the Extension Service.

There is a shortage of trained agriculturists. Steps should be taken to improve the teaching and research facilities of the four intermediate agricultural schools at Aleppo, Deir ez Zor, Latakia and Seleniye, and also at the secondary agricultural school at Kharabo. The extension worker needs a broad but well-grounded training in the technical aspects of agriculture, a good knowledge of social and economic problems in rural communities, and special training in extension methods and the philosophy underlying good extension work. In addition to pre-service training centers, it is essential that in-service and refresher courses be provided for extension personnel. The Food and Agriculture Organization should be requested to assist in the development of a training center for extension workers. This activity might well be supplemented by a cooperative arrangement between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Near East Foundation for the training of village community workers. The work of this Foundation provides a useful example of an effective method of reaching the small farmer. Scholarships

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for study abroad should be a necessary part of the training of the senior staff. 654 242

The findings of research, experimentation and the experiences of farmers give support to extension programs. Much information is already available and should be transmitted to farmers, but more systematic and better coordinated practical research should be the aim in the future. The two functions of research and extension should be coordinated within the Ministry of Agriculture so that each performs its specialized service, in a manner that supplements and complements the other. Research must focus on the key needs and concerns of farmers and anticipate future problems. For instance, one of the emerging needs is to know more about good crop rotation practices, including better use of land now fallow.

Chart 1 indicates the mission's conception of a desirable organizational framework for the agricultural credit and rural development program it has recommended.

IV LAND TENURE

In Syria, the landowner group is composed of full owners, part owners, debt-encumbered owners, and owners with undetermined title. Owners range from operators of large commercial farms to small subsistence farmers. The tenant group is composed of farmers who rent or make some payment for the use of land, and comprises most of the farmers who live on the land and cultivate it. Most of the large owners do not live permanently on their land but operate through some type of sharecropper system. There are very few cash tenants. The sharecropper usually works under the direction of the landlord or his agent and is dependent upon him for farm supplies and operating capital. Often he contributes toward crop production little but his own and his family's labor. His status is more nearly that of a laborer than of a tenant. A true tenant has rights of occupancy and land use that are protected by law, while the sharecropper is very much subject to the will of the landlord. 423 427

In general, it appears that in the rainfed areas the sharecropper receives about 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor, and around 70% if he provides the working capital. In areas sparsely settled he receives a slightly higher percentage of the crop, and in heavily populated areas he may receive somewhat less. On the irrigated lands the sharecropper receives in

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ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR

A PROPOSED SUPERVISED AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM



(1) See Main Report, Chapter 3, Section VI for a description of the functions and responsibilities of the proposed community development office at various levels of government.

(2) Although the government has indicated a desire to favor loans through cooperative institutions, the small number of cooperatives at the present time means that the majority of the loans must be made directly to individual farmers and accordingly should be supervised as needed from the regional office of the Bank.

(3) The function of the local credit supervisor, a representative of the Agricultural Bank, is primarily to assist officials of cooperatives to build and maintain credit practices of the cooperative, and to assist in establishing and maintaining the credit-worthiness of individual farmers who are members of or may join the cooperatives. In the lower capacity he may advise officers of the cooperatives on the functions of supervising operations found necessary by the cooperative. The degree of responsibility of the local Bank representative in both the regional and village levels will vary with the degree of avail and experience on the part of the local cooperatives. The increased effectiveness of cooperative supervisors necessitated by managers, with the assistance of the village community workers, will result in lessening the course of direct Bank supervision but will be required and permit the local Bank representative time to withdraw from direct and continuing involvement within the villages.

CHART I

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654 training schools have been placed under the department and their budget increased some four to five times. Staffs of the research institutions have been expanded and the over-all program coordinated. It should be emphasized that these programs still are in the early stages of development.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

648 Syria is not eligible for Mutual Security aid and so far has not seen fit
242 to accept Point Four assistance. The United Nations, being international in character, is permitted to operate, and the Food and Agriculture Organization has a fairly large staff and an extensive program concentrated in the fields of cotton, home economics, veterinary science, farm machinery maintenance, and forestry. An FAO pathologist is working on problems of cotton diseases and insect controls.

A special FAO cotton mission, under the direction of an outstanding cotton technician, Dr. M. A. El Kilany Bey, former Under Secretary of State of the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture, last year made a detailed study of cotton production and marketing problems and submitted a list of specific recommendations to the government. The recommendations called for rigid controls over production by areas; sterilization and controlled distribution of planting seed; an improved insect control program, including mandatory use of insecticides and destruction of stalks; tighter control over ginning and distribution of the products; and improved classification. Most of these recommendations have been adopted.

One of the most effective foreign organizations working in the country is the Near East Foundation, a small philanthropic agency with headquarters

Roller gins like these in Aleppo, Syria, are rapidly being replaced by the faster and more efficient saw gins. However, total capacity of all roller gins in Syria is still double that of the saw gins.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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in New York. The Foundation is engaged in research and education along the same general lines as in Iran, Lebanon, and Greece. With a small budget the Foundation has in its research learned many practical and useful ways of improving agricultural production. The methods they have devised in teaching simple home economics, such as canning, and principles of sanitation are exemplary. As a result, many villages in the area in which the Foundation operates have bought sewing machines and pressure cookers either with their own funds or with money given by the landlords. Particularly impressive is the practical nature of the work and the absence of a large administrative budget.

COTTON

Statistics on the area planted to cotton are also of questionable accuracy. For what they are worth, the figures show that cotton acreage declined almost 50 per cent from a prewar average of about 85,000 acres. It increased to about 60,000 acres during the five years after the war, and, with high prices, expanded further to almost 200,000 acres in 1950-51 and to about 450,000 acres in 1951-52. In 1952-53 it is expected acreage will be down, possibly just above the 1950-51 level.

Table 24

SYRIA: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution
Specified Years, 1920-1951

Year Beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales		
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	5,700	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	58,625	82	9,951	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	62,258	116	16,199	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	85,477	157	28,022	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	47,445	152	15,380	NA	NA
Average 1945-49	58,876	254	31,111	23,100[1]	NA
1950	192,642	406	163,089	31,700	125,900
1951	450,000	220	206,681	32,400	139,000[2]

[1] Average for 1947-49.
[2] Exports September 1, 1951, through May 15, 1952.
SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture.

YIELDS

Average yield figures are even more conjectural than acreage. The government's records indicate that the average yield increased from about 160 pounds in 1935-39 to better than half a bale in 1944-49 and to more than 400 pounds per acre in 1949-50 and 1950-51. Because of the large number of inexperienced cultivators, cold weather in the spring, lack of moisture and inadequate irrigation, and heavy insect damage, the 1951-52 yields were poor everywhere and the national average dropped to about 220 pounds per acre. Farmers in the new mechanized area of the Jezira reported losing 90 per cent of their crop. There is no doubt that cotton yields have been erratic.

VARIETIES

Lone Star was the only American Upland variety planted until Coker and Acala seeds were imported in recent years. These have produced good

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248 yields. The local experiment stations are doing a limited amount of work in
242 variety selections and testing but have not been able to distribute any large quantity of certified seed. Most of the seed planted is imported directly from United States breeders or seed distributors.

CULTURAL PRACTICES

248 [407] A high percentage of the cotton land is now prepared with mechanical equipment, although a few primitive ploughs are still found. Some cotton is broadcast but for the most part it is planted in ridges. Planting is largely a hand operation in which the farmer digs a hole with a small hand tool and drops in five to seven seeds which have been soaked overnight to soften the shell and increase germination. The rows usually run east and west with the cotton planted on the south side for greater protection. Cultivation is almost entirely by hand with short-handle hoes or knives. Picking, as everywhere, is a family affair. Outside labor usually is required, especially on the large farms, to weed and harvest the crop.

Irrigation practices vary considerably. In general, farmers try to use as much water as they can. The use of commercial fertilizers, although increasing, is limited. Whenever possible manure mixed with soil is added to the cotton land.

On the Near East Foundation experimental farm, yields of 800 pounds of lint per acre were obtained by applying 30 inches of water to supplement the 12 inches of winter rain and 4 square meters of local manure per acre. The fields were prepared with tractors, but the cotton was planted and cultivated by hand. The rows were standard, about 36 inches wide, and three seeds were planted in the hills 12 inches apart. This is ample proof that cotton will grow well and give high yields with good cultural practices.

The Foundation's work also illustrates the need for research in cultural practices, irrigation, and especially fertilization. The soils generally need nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, but demonstrations reveal that the soil will react to certain of these plant foods but not to others. For instance, no difference in yields has been noticed from the use of super-phosphates. More research is needed, not only to determine optimum rates of application, but also to determine whether the absorption rates can be increased by conditioning the soil.

GINNING

248 Prior to 1950 all the cotton gins were of the roller type, many of which
407 were manufactured locally. One modern American saw gin was installed in 1950 and it proved so successful that 26 more, with 82 stands, have been put into use since. Most of these are located in the Aleppo region. The new gins are, for the most part, equipped with the most modern overhead cleaning units and with standard gin presses. Buildings are unusually lavish. Investment in the average four-stand gin is estimated at $175,000 of which $120,000 is in the land and buildings. Even so, the cost of ginning is fairly moderate, about $9 per bale including bagging and ties.

About 1,700 roller gins are still in operation, three-fourths of them in Aleppo and most of the others in Hama and Latakia with a capacity double that of the saw gins.

The new saw gins still have a number of difficulties to overcome. The opinion persists that saw gins do not give fibers as long as roller gins, cause

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COTTON IN SYRIA

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Table 26

SYRIA: Estimated Cost of Producing Cotton in the Upper Euphrates Valley on a Typical Tenant Cultivator Farm
1950

Cost Items			Cost per Acre
			Dollars
Land preparation and plowing			10.86
Seed			2.07
Irrigation (fuel and amortization of engines and pumps)			19.09
Cultivation			6.22
Supervisor's salary			2.72
Harvesting			10.34
Miscellaneous			3.17
Total tenant's cost at plantation			56.47
Tenant's transportation cost to Aleppo			3.74
Tenant's ginning cost at $9 per bale			7.74
Tenant's cost for the ginned cotton from one acre			67.95
Estimated Yield per acre	616 pounds of lint cotton per acre		
Rent at one-third of crop	205 " " " " " "		
Tenant's share of lint	411 pounds		
Estimated Yield per acre	1,144 pounds of seed		
Rent at one-third of crop	381 " " "		
Tenant's share of seed	763 " " "		
Tenant's cost of ginned cotton		$67.95	
Less credit for tenant's share of seed at $64 per ton		24.42	
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton		$43.53	
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton divided by pounds	or $43.53 / 411 equals 10.59¢ net cost per pound		

NOTE: This is a plantation with 250 acres of cotton grown under irrigation in the Upper Euphrates Valley. The landlord gets one-third of the seed cotton at the plantation for land rent. The tenant pays transportation and ginning cost only on his share of the production. [427]

SOURCE: Trade sources.

COTTONSEED OIL

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Nine crushing mills have a total capacity for approximately 500,000 tons of seed annually. Only four of these are primarily cottonseed oil mills—two in Aleppo, one in Damascus, and one in Hama. Capacity is adequate and prices slightly higher than those in the foreign markets, so most of the seed is now crushed in Syria. However, the extraction rate is low, especially in the older mills, and 1951 cottonseed oil production was given as only 5,000 tons. This represents about 40 per cent of the total vegetable oil produced in the country, the remainder being largely olive oil. Approximately 85 per cent of the cottonseed oil cake is consumed domestically as stock feed, with the other 15 per cent exported.

INSECTS

The principal cotton destroying insects are the spiney bollworm, *Earias insulana* (Boisd.), and the locust. Last year the plant protection department of the Ministry of Agriculture distributed 250 tons of benzine hexachloride and farmers purchased 150 tons directly from dealers. Even so, yields were only half what they were reported to be the previous year and farmers at- 242 248

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

242 tributed a 50 per cent decline in yields to insect damage.

248 In an effort to reduce this damage, the Ministry has employed an Egyptian entomologist and has bought 4,000 tons of insecticides and a large number of tractor-mounted, horse-drawn, and walking dusting units.

[656] The Ministry also has promulgated numerous regulations for controlling insects, calling for mandatory destruction of stalks after harvesting and a host-free period until May 1. All ginning must be completed by the end of April and all the gin trash burned. Planting seed must be sterilized by one of the oil mills through contract with the government. The government also requires all farmers to apply the recommended insecticides. If farmers do not comply, the government applies the poison and charges them for it.

CONTROLS

656 The government has appointed a Cotton Control Board, with headquarters in Aleppo, charged with the broad responsibility of stabilizing pro-
647 duction. The board is responsible for the enforcement of programs in seed
248 distribution, insect control, crop control, ginning and marketing, and new regulations promulgated recently by the Ministry.

Probably the most significant of these many regulations is one limiting the land which may be planted to cotton. In irrigated areas from 40 to 70 per cent of the crop land may be planted to cotton and in dry-land farming areas, only 25 to 33 per cent. The Aleppo area is limited to 50 per cent of the non-irrigated land. The purposes of this regulation, according to the Director General of Agriculture, are to preserve a balance in agricultural

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Syria's largest cotton mill is an ultra modern integrated plant just completed in Deir-ez-Zor. The level of efficiency here is far above the average and as a result this mill is exporting about 20 per cent of its production.

ill-considered plans and avoid abrupt changes". A separate section in the Labour and Social Affairs Department of the Ministry of National Economy will run and supervise the centres, introduce local industries, study local conditions and implement a programme to raise the standard of living and promote local welfare. The Department will be assisted by an Advisory Committee comprising representatives from all agencies interested. Three bodies participate in the conduct of each model centre: one will consist of the staff members of the centre; the second the advisors to the staff members and the representatives of local administrative authorities; the third will be not one single committee but five committees of local residents, each to be responsible for a particular aspect of the centre. All will work under the supervision of the staff. The Decree defines the several units to be constituted for each centre and their respective responsibilities. 647 657 185

65. It is intended that when the Government has established a model centre in each province, the example will be followed in other districts by villagers who (as in the Egyptian prototype) will contribute to and share with the Government the expenses of maintaining a sufficient number of centres to cover the whole country.

66. The scheme which was inspired by the Cairo Seminar of 1950 had, we were informed, been discussed and agreed with other Ministries concerned and tentative arrangements had been made with the University authorities for their co-operation in providing the necessary personnel for the centres. Unfortunately, however, the project-law had not received the approval of the Ministers and Dr. Joukhadar gave no indication of any date for its operation. 242 185 474

67. On the introduction of Mr. Carroll Deyoe, FAO representative in Syria, members of the mission had the opportunity of meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture Mr. Akram Nakabi, the newly-appointed Secretary-General, who gave an account of agricultural extension work in Syria and of the development of agricultural co-operatives in the country. He foreshadowed a possible eventual use of the profits of these societies for community welfare purposes, but the movement is in its infancy.

68. Thanks also to the courtesy of Mr. Deyoe, the mission was put in touch with the local representatives of the Near East Foundation. In the absence in Beirut of the Programme Director, Mr. Eyer, his Deputy (Mr. Khoury) gave us the statement of the work of the Foundation in Syria which had been prepared for the recent Damascus Seminar which we had hoped to attend. Mr. Khoury accompanied us on his visit to Nashabeyeh one of the four villages in which the Foundation operates demonstration centres in agriculture and sanitation and in home-making, respectively. Mr. Sivasvamy has prepared a detailed account (Appendix V) of his impressions of the work done at Nashabeyeh. 242 185 744

69. The centre has been in existence one year. Its premises are in adobe houses such as are to be found in many villages in these parts. They have been simply adapted for their present purposes and the standard of cleanliness was pleasantly surprising. The staff consists of: (1) a sanitary inspector who looks after general sanitation, including mosquito control by insecticides and by drainage. (He makes a point of talking to the village people about water supply, latrines, etc.); (2) a nurse-midwife, whose duties are: ante- and post-natal care, examination of pregnant women, education of local midwives, regular supervision of the infants in the village. (There is no maternity clinic; the women are delivered in their homes); (3) a doctor, paid by the Foundation, who visits the centre once a week.

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70. The Mission as will be seen, formed a favourable impression of those whom it saw at Nashabeyeh. It was regrettable to learn that not only was the extension of the work hampered by lack of funds but that some local difficulties had arisen which suggested that there might still be some distrust of disinterested outside help in quarters that could not plead ignorance as an excuse. We had not the opportunity of pursuing inquiries to enable us to satisfy ourselves whether, if foreign direction and support were withdrawn, the work undertaken by the Foundation would collapse or become self-supporting, a point which had first been suggested to us in talks in Lebanon (see paragraph 10). We were, however, satisfied that if the venture were to collapse, it would not be due to any lack of a spirit of service or enthusiasm on the part of the Syrian field workers who are employed by the Foundation.

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71. The country is under-populated and the population is so scattered as to make it difficult to provide the usual facilities through community centres. It should be added that there are large tracts of empty but arable land; so that if, as a result of efficient health services, the expectation of life increases and infant mortality decreases, there is no danger of lack of food.

72. Recommendations: In the light of the present cautious attitude of the Syrian Government towards the receipt of technical assistance from external sources, we recommend that the initiative should be left with the Government to seek United Nations aid for the furtherance of any scheme of community organizations for which it may be directly or indirectly responsible.

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III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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73. The "Middle East" is a convenient but misleading description which may be applie to a group of Arab-speaking countries, not all of which were included in our itinerary. Those which we were privileged to visit have many features in common, in spite of differences in characteristics and ways of life and varying stages and patterns of development. The Islamic faith prevails over the greater part of the area, though in some countries there are important non-Moslem minorities. Each country is the inheritor of an ancient culture; each has subscribed to the United Nations Charter, with its emphasis on improved standards of living as a contributing factor to the peace of the world; each is predominantly agricultural; each, in a newfound independence and under conditions of political instability, is reforming its land laws; and each has proclaimed the welfare of the people as a dominating purpose of Government policy.

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74. In progress in community development in this group of countries little uniformity is to be observed. In Egypt, where the establishment of rural social centres became the official policy in 1939, after successful pioneering experiments conducted by the Egyptian Association for Social Studies, a stage has now been reached at which the whole scheme is under review, with the object of increasing its scope as efficiency. A reorganization involving decentralization and more inter-departmental co-ordination was in progress as we left Egypt.

75. We have found that Egypt is, compared with other Arab countries, well advanced as regards rural social centres since the population, or at least a part of it, understands the value of self-help. These social centres have to be expanded, both as regards numbers and the use made of each one of them. They do not require costly special buildings; provided that attention is paid to cleanliness, the work can be carried out in suitably equipped village houses, always assuming that the staff has the right spirit. To ensure a continuous standard of efficiency, regular supervision

241 with 1,032 in 1952; and 547 tractor planters, compared with 471. 1/ There were also, in 1952, 381 combines, 133 threshers and 108 harvesters. 2/

243 As table 50 shows, most of the increase in acreage was in cereals. Wheat and
242 barley yields continued to fluctuate violently, according to the amount of rainfall and weather conditions, but have shown no marked trend and, save in exceptional years such as 1949, have been well below a ton per hectare. Apart from mechanization, little has been done to improve methods of cultivation, apply fertilizers or use improved seed except in El Jezira, where high-yielding improved
433 seeds and fertilizers are sometimes used. Hence, in the post-war period, output of grains has increased in the same proportion as acreage, or only slightly more.
241 The expansion in cotton acreage, though smaller in absolute terms, was proportionately much greater; 3/ the acreage rose to 25,000 hectares in 1949 and 78,000 in 1950; the high prices prevailing in that year and the great profits made by cotton planters sent acreage up to 217,000 hectares, partly at the expense of wheat cultivation. The sharp decline in yields in 1951 and the steep fall in price in 1951 and 1952 caused heavy losses and led to a decline in acreage. Improved cotton prices and greater experience in cultivation once more caused an expansion in 1954.

241 The experience of the past four years has served to point out the potentialities and limitations of cotton cultivation in Syria. During the 1950-51 boom, cotton cultivation spread to most parts of the country, but subsequent events have shown that it is unsuited to many of them. In the Hauran, inadequate moisture has caused farmers to revert to wheat, barley and leguminous crops; in the Latakia region, soil and climate have also proved unfavourable. In the Damascus region, cotton cultivation has been practically discontinued. In the Aleppo region, as a result of the excessive costs of pump irrigation, cultivation is mainly confined to rain-grown cotton. 4/ In many parts of El Jezira, rice has replaced cotton owing to the shortage of labour. At present, cotton is localized chiefly in the Hama and Salamiye districts in central Syria, in the Hassetche district in El Jezira and in the province of Aleppo. About two-thirds of the total area is irrigated. Yields are about twice as high on irrigated as on rain-fed land, and the Syrian average, having almost doubled since the pre-war period, is one of the highest in the world. 5/

1/ Ministry of Finance, Budget Note, 1955 (Damascus, 1955).

2/ Figures obtained from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ Large-scale cultivation of cotton began in 1924, increased rapidly until 1931 and after a sharp fall during the depression reached its pre-war peak of 40,000 hectares in 1936. In this period, American type cotton replaced native varieties. During the Second World War, acreage once more declined, owing to the shift to grains.

4/ Bureau des documentations syriennes et Arabes, Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien (Damascus, 25 November 1952, mimeographed).

5/ Yields per hectare rose from 221 kilogrammes in 1951 to 243 in 1952, 363 in 1953 and 389 in 1954.

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but 311
which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed [16]
into the region following the opening of the road and began populat- 491
ing it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region.

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" bar- 243
ley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat 433
are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita.

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances 185
which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and 654
planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below:

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the [132]
month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new

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flood waters and distribute them in summer. All these studies, and it is not known how detailed they are, are believed to be kept at the French Legation in Beirut.

Such projects cost a lot of money, and Syria may not be able to construct them for many years. A quicker and less expensive policy is to combine elements from the system of irrigation by pumps and the system of gravity irrigation. This is the policy followed in Egypt, to dig canals conveying water from the river to areas ten or more kilometers removed and ten to twenty meters higher than the water level. Such dirt canals can be dug cheaply by modern machinery, and the farmers will then be authorized to install pumps on the canals. Since the greatest cost of an irrigation project is the construction of the main canal above the ground level, the method recommended removes the need for the elevated canals and the farmer can install his pump directly on the land to be irrigated. In this way, the farmer is spared also the loss due to evaporation and absorption on the elevated canal.

This is the quickest method to expand irrigated agriculture along the Khabur, and it may also prove in the long run cheaper to the country and the farmer than the elaborate dams and derivation canals contemplated by the Government. Such a conclusion needs, of course, more detailed engineering studies and comparison of costs before it becomes final.

III. The Problem of Monoculture

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Wheat and barley are by far the main crops of the Jazirah and with the exception of the Khabur valley, they are practically the only crops. What the irrigated lands of Kubur el Bid and Qamishli produce in summer crops does not compare in quantity or in value with the wheat crop.

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For this reason, Jazirah suffers from all the defects of monoculture. When the wheat crop is good and the prices are high land values increase, the farmers are enabled to pay most of their debts and to raise their standard of living by building better residences, buying furniture, making more trips with their families to the interior cities of Syria and Lebanon, sending their children to schools in Aleppo and Beirut, and increasing their welfare in general. But

when the wheat crop fails, as it did last year, there is great hardship in all of the Jazirah. Debts remain largely unpaid, the value of land falls off sharply, and interest rates become unbearable

The failure of a crop in Jazirah brings more hardship than is the case in other Mohafazas because Jazirah, with all the money revenue which accrues to it in a good year, has not arrived yet at the stage where it can save a part of this income to use in bad years. All the money revenue is immediately reinvested in machinery and in expansion of the area planted with additonal sums borrowed from the banks or from Aleppo merchants.

The point is reached where further expansion has become difficult, and the situation will become more or less stabilized so that some of the income will be put aside for emergencies in the coming few years. But even when savings reach a high figure, the problem of monoculture is not solved.

Jazirah at present does not produce the necessary vegetables and fruit for its own consumption. It imports them from Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. That is why the cost of living in the town of the Jazirah is one of the highest in Syria. Aside from the price of meat and samneh, everything including room and house rents, is more expensive than in the other big towns of Syria. Even flour is sold to bakers by the town municipalities at the same price for which it is sold in Damascus.

In former times, however, Jazirah produced great amounts of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Its lands are very well suited to raising cattle and beef, an employment more profitable than wheat growing. A diversification in the use of land will make for a more balanced and prosperous economy in Jazirah. But the Jazirah farmers are not to be blamed entirely for the kind of agriculture prevailing. Circumstances beyond their control, connected primarily with the problems of land ownership and tenure, have largely imposed this type of monoculture upon them. These problems will be discussed in the following section, but it can be said in passing that the farmer cannot be expected to invest money in buildings for cattle raising, or in digging wells to provide irrigation for vegetable growing, or in planting orchards on lands to which he has no title or whose title is subject to constant disputes over boundaries with the neighbors and lately by decree-law 96 with the State.

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the latter should be taught elementary principles of repair and maintenance. The courses for field operators and mechanics might well include some in-service training in repair shops. The cooperation of reputable dealers in organizing such courses should be enlisted. Finally, the mission proposes the establishment of a secondary agricultural school in Kamichliye to specialize in problems of agricultural engineering. Facilities for instruction in this subject should also be provided at the existing school in Aleppo. The mission envisages an expenditure of £S 2 million for such school facilities. The short-term courses could probably be made self-supporting. To initiate and help carry out this program, the mission suggests that the government obtain the services of one or two machinery experts through the FAO.

Cereals

Aside from the measures outlined above, programs to raise the yield of certain crops must be undertaken. For cereals the development of higher yielding and more disease-resistant strains is of paramount importance. Although many varieties of wheat and barley are grown in Syria, little is known about their comparative worth. A large number of the more promising foreign wheat and barley strains have recently been imported for testing, but the funds, staff and facilities for an adequate testing program are largely lacking. The mission accordingly recommends that the Ministry of Agriculture be enabled to carry out a program for testing, selecting and propagating high-yielding and disease-resistant seed.[12] Since the shortage of trained Syrians may continue for some time, it is likely that the program will have to be handled by a foreign staff (FAO; the French Technical Assistance Mission in Syria). The staff should include a director in charge of planning, three plant breeders and a plant pathologist. They should be assisted by a staff of about 30 Syrians who will largely have to be trained for this purpose. The mission estimates the cost of such a program at about £S 4.5 million over the next five or six years.

For wheat and barley the aim should be to develop good varieties which mature early and can therefore be harvested before the extreme heat. For rice, which will undoubtedly be cultivated in larger volume as the irrigated area expands, the aim should rather be to develop slow-

[12] See Annex C, p. 304, for year-by-year recommendations.

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243 433 maturing varieties to replace the praecox strains currently used. The high day and comparatively low night temperatures in Syria are more suitable to slow-maturing rice varieties. For maize it is especially important to test and select appropriate hybrid strains. In Syria maize yields are only about 1.3 tons per hectare while in the United States hybrid maize yields about 4.4 tons. With the introduction of high-yielding hybrid strains, the production of maize should definitely be encouraged since it fits well into the crop rotation scheme, is rather heat resistant and can provide not only grain but also fodder and silage.

Once suitable seed strains have been selected by testing, arrangements should be made with farmers in various parts of Syria for the propagation of such strains under proper supervision. These farms could serve at the same time as demonstration centers. The seed thus propagated should be certified and made available for distribution through licensed dealers, cooperatives and Chambers of Agriculture.

Cotton[13]

243 433 The government already has a praiseworthy program for the improvement of cotton cultivation. The disastrous failure of the cotton harvest in 1951, caused by the rather reckless expansion of cotton acreage and an uncontrolled invasion of destructive insects, brought in its train a number of corrective measures. The government regulated cotton acreage by licensing, and specified the time of planting. Controls over the treatment and distribution of seed were established. Even dusting and spraying were prescribed in 1952. Variety tests have also been conducted, and as a result Coker Wilt, a high-yielding strain, is now predominantly cultivated in Syria. A Cotton Office, staffed largely with Egyptian experts, has been charged with the improvement of cotton production. This entire program should be further expanded as more Syrian technical personnel become available. The mission suggests, for instance, that a special station be established for cotton breeding and insect control. More attention should be paid to cultural practices. Yields can be raised by reducing the danger of pests through rigorous cleaning of cotton fields following the harvest and destruction of host plants; by closer planting to discourage excessive vegetative growth and to promote earlier maturity; and by applying fertilizers at appropriate times.

[13] See Annex C, p. 305.

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largely on the acidity of the soil, and the p.H.[3] of practically all Syrian soil is between seven and eight. Most of the phosphorus is blocked. Whereas nitrogen and phosphorus deficiencies can be observed in almost all Syrian crops in various stages, very little indication of potassium shortage has been noted.

Besides the three main elements, the tracer elements iron, manganese, zinc, boron, copper and molybdenum are quite significant. A shortage or lack of one or another can result in low yields, even in soils generally classified as very good. The application of tracer elements e.g., the application of zinc and copper to fiber plants, citrus fruits, etc., has shown remarkable yield increases in other parts of the world. Unfortunately, very few studies of soil fertility and plant growth conditions have been conducted in Syria. Those made by Bracken for winter and summer crops and by Ibrahim Boules for cotton have indicated a general shortage of nitrogen, a disputable lack of phosphorus and rather favorable conditions as regards potassium. The excellent studies and surveys conducted by an FAO soil expert during the last few years have not been sufficiently intensive or extensive so far to form the basis of definite conclusions. But the mission is convinced that a thorough soil survey on the lines already begun by these specialists will be of great assistance in increasing the agricultural area and production. The compilation of the information thus gained, together with data on climate and water resources will be of much value in ensuring a sound rational basis for agricultural planning and development. Aerial mapping is a necessary adjunct to ground surveys and the successful coordination of the undertaking will require the development of a cartographic office.

II CEREALS

Wheat and Barley

Syria is fortunate in being able normally to harvest its wheat and barley approximately one month earlier than American and European cereals; consequently they can be brought on to the European market at the time

[3] p.H. values indicate relative acidity or alkalinity. Values run from 0 to 14, 7 indicating neutrality, numbers less than 7 increasing acidity, and numbers greater than 7 increasing alkalinity.

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243 of greatest demand. Climatic conditions favor cultivation of hard and high protein-content wheats, much in demand for blending and for the macaroni industry. Both these factors can greatly influence Syria's wheat export potential.[4] Fostering development of early-maturing and high protein-content wheats should become a main objective of future research, particularly in view of the highly competitive world market in cereals and the rise in home demand created by the population increase.

The experimental and research work in selection and breeding is still in the early stages. Shortages of trained personnel (in 1953 there was only one specialized research agronomist) and lack of organized planning are responsible for the rather poor results thus far. Concentration on a more intensive plant breeding program during the next five years is urgently needed. The staffs of the division of plant breeding and of the experimental division of the Ministry of Agriculture should be increased and additional budget allocations provided. If the recommendations of the mission are carried out, there is no reason why cereals production should not increase by at least 40% by 1960.

Syrian wheat can be divided into two main varieties; soft (*Triticum sativum*) and hard (*Triticum durum*); reliable data on the proportions of each are not available. It is generally assumed that hard wheat varieties are most widespread but as there is no officially controlled seed distribution center, the varieties are often mixed.

The most prominent hard varieties are the Haurani and the imported Senator Capelli (Sicily) and Florence Aurore (Morocco). The Hamari is rather well adapted to various soil types and dry farming practice and is said to be resistant to climatic extremes and to fungus diseases. The Bayyadi variety is tender to semi-hard. Distribution of varieties is shown in Table 1.

In addition to these, the Department of Agriculture, aided by FAO, has introduced a great number of the most promising rust- and disease-resistant wheat varieties and over 60 barley varieties during the last three years. Their adaptability to Syrian climate and soil conditions is now being tested in the regional field stations.

The quantity planted rarely gives the optimum yield. Almost everywhere too much seed (mostly poor quality) is used; amounts vary from 40 kg. per hectare in the grey sub-desert and gravelly soils to over 200 kg. per hectare on irrigated lands. Use of better seeding techniques should result in a saving of at least 25% in the course of the next 10 years. In par-

[4] Wheat and barley exports were worth almost £S 71 million in 1953.

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ticular, wider spacing between rows not only affects yields but permits intercropping (e.g., rows of wheat interplanted with green manure and/or forage crops, and later with cash crops), which may lead to the reclamation of many devitalized soils. This implies a long-term program: row seeding and interplanting must be tried out on a selective basis under the guidance of the agricultural extension service.

The mission recommends introduction of a cleaning and grading system to improve the marketability of export wheat, with standardization in at least two types (hard and soft), each with a minimum protein specification.

TABLE 1 Percentage Distribution of Wheat Varieties in Various Districts, 1953

District	Hauranie[a]	Hamari[a]	Bayyadi[b]	Capelli[a]	Florence[a]	Others	Observations
Damascus . .	40	—	—	40	—	20	Mostly under partial irrigation.
Homs	15	40	25	15	5	—	Partially irrigated.
Hama	5	55	25	15	—	—	Partially irrigated.
Hauran . . .	95	—	—	5	—	—	Dry farming.
Euphrates . .	—	70	10	10	10	—	Mostly under full irrigation.
Jezireh	—	45	10	15	15	15	Only small areas under irrigation.
Aleppo	—	70	13	10	2	5	Dry farming.
Latakia . . .	—	50	15	10	15	10	Dry farming.
Djebel Druze .	—	95	—	5	—	—	Dry farming.

[a] Hard.
[b] Semi-hard.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture.

The use of commercial fertilizers is also recommended, particularly in the Jezireh. Insecticides and fungicides should be tried out on a large scale and the influence of weedicides should be studied at demonstration farms.

Whereas many of the wheat varieties are indigenous, only one of the few barley varieties seems to have originated in Syria, the White Arabian or Syrian. Moderate to early maturing, it is rather adaptable to poor soil. It is used in the manufacture of bread and beer and is the only variety exported. The Black Arabian is preferred for its larger seed and earlier maturity and

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2N3 makes good animal fodder; it is too rough for human consumption. The Prieur, imported to the Damascus Field Station some 15 years ago, and rather well adapted to all soils, has become a high yielder; the hard seed must be ground before being used as animal feed.

Pests and diseases caused quite substantial losses. The most destructive of several sucking insects is the Wheat Shield bug (*Burygaster integriceps*) which is said to cause wheat and barley losses up to 30% in some areas. Planting of early maturing varieties is one of the best means of control, for the insect rarely attacks seed that has begun to harden. Considerable damage can be caused to stored grain by the grain weevil (*Calandra grenaria*). Wheat smuts and wheat rust are responsible for substantial losses, especially in regions with seasons of high temperature and excessive humidity, e.g., Latakia and certain parts of the Jezireh. Remedial measures should include the importation of rust-resistant varieties, the breeding of local resistant varieties and the planting of early maturing strains. Destruction from locust invasions, though still significant in many areas, has been greatly reduced by modern entomological and chemical science and by national and international anti-locust control measures. Windburn and lodging still cause considerable damage. The scale of these losses clearly calls for a careful selection and breeding program.

Recommended Cereals Seed Program

The mission suggests that a seed selection program be carried out as follows:

1st year: Continuation of the selecting and breeding program started some years ago in the experimental station. Comparative tests of foreign and local varieties and selection of those best adapted to each region. Promotion of early-maturing and high protein-content varieties, and selection of disease-resistant strains. Tests of intercropping, and trials of other improved cultural methods and their influence.

2nd year: Purification of superior varieties. Introduction of parental material for hybridization. Seed production. Experimental tests to determine optimum seed quantities for various soils under varying local conditions. Continuation of tests for intercropping.

3rd year: Comparative yield tests of the best local and foreign varieties. Tests of influence of cultural methods. Seed production of the most promis-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ing types. Release to selected seed producers of promising types tested during at least three years. 243

4th year: Continuation of yield tests. Growing of F. generation hybrids. Retesting of seed released the previous year to seed growers. Seed rejuvenation of older material. Establishment of priority standards.

5th and following years: Comparative yield tests of the best varieties, including hybrids. Evaluation of hybrids.

A committee for seed production composed of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and accredited seed growers should be established to promote a certified seed program. The FAO should be invited to assist this committee. The committee would designate desirable varieties for the various regions, advise on seed imports and designate the standard for certified seed. The Ministry of Agriculture should set up an appropriate organization to certify and distribute seed to accredited traders on a non-profit, non-loss basis, and to grant premiums for the best seed grown. Proper supervision of seed farms through field inspectors will be necessary to safeguard against the admixture of impure or other seed both in the field and in the process of threshing and cleaning.

Following experimental seed testing, the stages would be:

1. Transfer of seed to the extension service for multiplication under its direct supervision and control. Some of the present experimental stations could serve as propagating centers.

2. Allocation of registered seeds among seed-growing districts and seed growers in accordance with their interest in particular strains.

3. Selection by field officers (extension agents) of experienced farmers whose land would serve as demonstration plots for the nucleus seed.

4. Drawing up of contracts by the Ministry of Agriculture with accredited seed growers to harvest the seed and return it at premium rates (establishment of certified seed growers). This seed, having been tested and labelled, would then become certified government stock seed.

III COTTON

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The legislation relating to cotton production is adequate and marked a great step forward. The government should, however, enforce the prohibition against planting in areas where climatic conditions make such planting

PRODUCTION

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مساحات ومحاصيل أهم انواع الحبوب ، ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالاطنان)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CEREALS, 1950/51 — 1952/53
(Area in hectare, produce in tons)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Cereals	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Wheat	1,036,693	509,642	1,167,150	900,000	1,314,422	* 870,000	القمح
Barley	343,556	154,701	396,621	466,924	428,010	472,457	الشعير
Lentils	65,744	30,231	66,216	50,597	70,909	62,814	العدس
Chick-peas	27,360	8,617	28,388	24,244	22,456	10,550	الحمص
Broad beans	20,252	25,518	15,693	12,080	16,928	11,105	الفول
Vetch	3,405	1,899	3,721	2,909	2,543	2,079	بقية حب
Vetch, spring	15,460	5,860	15,882	11,632	13,333	12,203	كرسنة
Millet	71,418	24,171	114,921	106,114	96,456	123,692	ذرة بيضاء
Maize	16,041	21,824	19,246	22,556	18,115	22,430	ذرة صفراء
Rice	531	927	2,818	5,779	5,339	16,176	ارز
Sesame seed	5,893	3,628	[illegible] 776	21,210	22,283	9,687	سمسم
Beans	1,494	972	1,422	1,008	1,507	1,421	فاصوليا حب
Peas	197	159	222	270	223	196	بازيلا حب
Chickling vetch	57,325	26,674	58,306	45,291	59,055	58,628	جلبانة حب

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.
* Figures of the Cereal Office.

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة
* ارقام مكتب الحبوب

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI

cultivated area. Holdings of 25–250 acres are estimated to take 423
up 33 per cent of the area and holdings over 250 acres 29 per cent. State land is estimated to represent 23 per cent of the total cultivated area. Decrees for the distribution of state lands were issued in 1952: their implementation, at the time of writing, is still under review. Legislation to prevent the subdivision of plots by succession inheritances is also under consideration; at present a four-acre plot may have thirty-seven owners, and its management is profitable only to lawyers.

The approximate acreage and crop and yield of the main 241
products are shown in the following table. 433

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)			*Production* (000 metric tons)			*Yield* (100 kg. per ha.)	
	1950	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*
Cotton (lint)	78	217	142	35	49	49	4·6	2·3
Wheat	992	1,037	900*	830	510	850*	8·4	4·9
Barley	416	344	400*	322	155	350*	7·7	4·5
Vegetables	68	66	..	47	40	142	..	..
Tobacco†	10	11	..	9	9	..	8·7	..
Rice (paddy)	7	..	..	24	6	6	19·3‡	..

.. = not available.

* The Banque de Syrie et du Liban (*Exercice 1952*) quotes the following figures for 1952 (in thousands):

Wheat: area = 1,180, production = 805.
Barley: area = 396, production = 467.

† Including Lebanon (annual production about 2,000–3,000 tons). ‡ 1949.

(SOURCES: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952* and *Monthly Bulletins of Statistics*, 1953; vegetable figures from Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952*, Paris, 1953.)

Wheat is the traditional staple crop of Syria and in a normal 243
year a quarter of a million tons can be exported. But the poor 439
harvest of 1951 necessitated wheat imports of about 50,000 241
tons. The 1952 wheat crop, however, once more increased to 433
over 800,000 tons. Barley is also grown and exported and, though the acreage has diminished somewhat since 1949, the crop is adequate.

In 1950 fortunes were made from cotton which fetched a high 248
price for the abundant harvest. The acreage sown to cotton 433
trebled between 1949 and 1950 and again in 1951. But while in 1950 the cotton yield was high, the 1951 harvest proved disappointing because of drought and attacks of the boll weevil. Despite a fall in cotton acreage in 1952—due chiefly to the downward trend in cotton prices—that year's output was maintained at the 1951 level, thanks largely to better methods

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Syria MD1

Chapter VI

SYRIA AND LEBANON

LAND AND POPULATION

S 241 At first sight, the main crop of Syria appears to be thistles, and so it is in fact: about half the land is under fallow every year, and the cultivated land is cropped only one year in two S or even three. There are some districts with intensive cultivation, for instance, the oasis of Damascus, with its brilliant green [312] crops irrigated by 'Abana and Pharphar'; but most of Syria is cultivated very extensively indeed.

S 311 In Syria and Lebanon together the area cultivated before the late war was some 5·8 million acres, but of this total only 243 3,900,000 acres were cropped each year, the remainder being L 311 fallow. The greater part of the cropped area was under cereals, 243 about two-thirds being under wheat and one-third under barley.

In Lebanon, the whole of the cultivated area is cropped, and L there is no uncultivated land which could be brought into culti- 311 vation. In Syria however there are large areas of cultivable land which are not at present cultivated, the total cultivable area S being some 12½ million acres, of which only about one-third is 311 under cultivation. Unfortunately this figure is only a rough estimate, and it is not clear how much of the area is cultivable under present conditions, or how much of it is marginal desert grazing. Some of it is undoubtedly cultivable under present conditions, and there is certainly no shortage of land in Syria.

SYRIA: AGRICULTURAL LAND, 1943[1]

Province	*Cultivable*	*Cultivated* (including fallow)
	Acres	*Acres*
Jezira	2,471,000	543,600
Euphrates	3,212,000	321,200
Aleppo	3,706,000	1,260,000
Homs	420,000	345,900
Hama	1,309,000	1,210,000
Damascus	1,062,000	345,900
Hauran	518,600	518,900
TOTAL	12,698,600	4,545,500

[1] Omitting the provinces of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz for which no figures are available; their cultivated area may be estimated at about half a million acres.

25: Warriner S-5 no date 1948 Ml Middle East
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

SYRIA AND LEBANON: AGRICULTURAL AREAS

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GRAIN PRODUCTION IN SYRIA AND LEBANON, 1934–43

	Tons	Cwts per acre
Wheat		
1934	443,000	6·3
1935	504,000	7·5
1936	427,000	6·3
1937	468,800	6·6
1938	644,300	9·0
1943	624,280	7·3
Barley		
1934	292,100	7·8
1935	347,100	9·5
1936	308,100	8·2
1937	266,300	6·5
1938	383,400	9·0
1943	330,485	8·2

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With a total rural population of about 2·8 million in 1943–4, the production of grain per head amounts to only 3·4 quintals or 6·4 hundredweights. Thus the problem for Syria is to in-

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope for widening the area cultivated and raising the yields, as the soil is fertile. In the Jezira the use of machinery could be extended—it is already increasing fast. Better livestock production could be achieved by greater use of fodder crops for which conditions are favourable: in the 'Duck's Bill' good clover grows wild. At present fodder crops are not considered worth cultivating.

In the Euphrates region there is great scope for extension of irrigation. But a large scale scheme would be costly because the river runs between high escarpments, which vary in distance between each other up to about 10 miles. To irrigate much larger areas it would be necessary to lift water over the escarpments. There are large areas of uncultivated land, particularly between Abu Kemal and Deir-ez-Zor. Even on the land already cultivated yields of wheat could be much higher: at present the yield is four to six times the seeding rate, and, according to local farmers, could be raised to ten to fifteen times the seed with better irrigation. The high cost of fuel oil is the limiting factor as it also is for tractor work. On the Khabur river improvement of the ancient barrages would permit an extension of irrigation.

It is in this area that there is real scope for a planned settlement of cultivators, with improved methods and a better system of land tenure. The obvious form for such settlement to take would be on the model of the Jewish co-operative farms, small holdings with collective use of machinery and working to a cropping plan; on the uncultivated land such settlement could be undertaken without incurring high capital costs.

So far as the Euphrates Valley is concerned, similar co-operatives based on communal control of water supplies might be started on a small scale. Large-scale irrigation here would be costly, and would necessarily have to be co-ordinated with the irrigation of Iraq. An immediate step needed is to reduce the price of fuel oil.

While it is easy on paper to see the possibilities of such schemes as these, it is not easy to see where in fact the motive power for them is to come from. They will not bring in quick big returns, which are what local farmers and landowners want: the district is remote and the main object of such investment would be a long period rise in the standard of living, in which the moneyed classes are not interested. Present-day Syria is not

241 with 1,032 in 1952; and 547 tractor planters, compared with 471. 1/ There were also, in 1952, 381 combines, 133 threshers and 108 harvesters. 2/

243 As table 50 shows, most of the increase in acreage was in cereals. Wheat and
242 barley yields continued to fluctuate violently, according to the amount of rainfall and weather conditions, but have showed no marked trend and, save in exceptional years such as 1949, have been well below a ton per hectare. Apart from mechanization, little has been done to improve methods of cultivation, apply fertilizers or use improved seed except in El Jezira, where high-yielding improved
433 seeds and fertilizers are sometimes used. Hence, in the post-war period, output of grains has increased in the same proportion as acreage, or only slightly more.
241 The expansion in cotton acreage, though smaller in absolute terms, was proportionately much greater; 3/ the acreage rose to 25,000 hectares in 1949 and 78,000 in 1950; the high prices prevailing in that year and the great profits made by cotton planters sent acreage up to 217,000 hectares, partly at the expense of wheat cultivation. The sharp decline in yields in 1951 and the steep fall in price in 1951 and 1952 caused heavy losses and led to a decline in acreage. Improved cotton prices and greater experience in cultivation once more caused an expansion in 1954.

241 The experience of the past four years has served to point out the potentialities and limitations of cotton cultivation in Syria. During the 1950-51 boom, cotton cultivation spread to most parts of the country, but subsequent events have shown that it is unsuited to many of them. In the Hauran, inadequate moisture has caused farmers to revert to wheat, barley and leguminous crops; in the Latakia region, soil and climate have also proved unfavourable. In the Damascus region, cotton cultivation has been practically discontinued. In the Aleppo region, as a result of the excessive costs of pump irrigation, cultivation is mainly confined to rain-grown cotton. 4/ In many parts of El Jezira, rice has replaced cotton owing to the shortage of labour. At present, cotton is localized chiefly in the Hama and Salamiye districts in central Syria, in the Hasetche district in El Jezira and in the province of Aleppo. About two-thirds of the total area is irrigated. Yields are about twice as high on irrigated as on rain-fed land, and the Syrian average, having almost doubled since the pre-war period, is one of the highest in the world. 5/

1/ Ministry of Finance, Budget Note, 1955 (Damascus, 1955).

2/ Figures obtained from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ Large-scale cultivation of cotton began in 1924, increased rapidly until 1931 and after a sharp fall during the depression reached its pre-war peak of 40,000 hectares in 1936. In this period, American type cotton replaced native varieties. During the Second World War, acreage once more declined, owing to the shift to grains.

4/ Bureau des documentations syriennes et Arabes, Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien (Damascus, 25 November 1952, mimeographed).

5/ Yields per hectare rose from 221 kilogrammes in 1951 to 243 in 1952, 363 in 1953 and 389 in 1954.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

2119 #33 assured. The possibility of growing Virginia-type tobaccos should also be explored.

Orchards and Vineyards

2115 #33 Vineyards and orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits already make an important contribution to agricultural income. Both the quality and the yield could be substantially raised by proper insect control, the use of fertilizers and tracer elements, and better pruning. Many existing orchards need rejuvenation. Heavy frosts in 1949-50 severely damaged olive orchards around Aleppo, so that Syria is now on a net import basis for olive oil. Establishment of vineyards and orchards in the Djebel Druze would help materially to raise the present low level of income in that region. In Latakia province the cultivation of citrus could be significantly increased. The availability of ample long-term credit at low interest rates is especially important for an expansion and rejuvenation of orchards and vineyards.

Vegetables

2114 #33 Vegetable growing in wide variety is concentrated in and around the larger population centers. The fact that so little is grown and consumed in the rural areas is due mainly to the fact that neither the small farmer nor the majority of consumers yet knows the value of a balanced diet; on the contrary, both hold vegetable cultivation in low esteem. Education and guidance centered upon the establishment of school gardens might do much to change this attitude.

The significant quantity of vegetables at present used by the local canning industry could easily be doubled though, as the canners explained to the mission, the poor quality of vegetables in general, and of peas and beans in particular, tends to limit the quantity suitable for processing. Better seed, improved cultural practices and adequate insect control measures could contribute greatly to higher quality and quantity. Improved transport, storage and marketing facilities should be included in community and cooperative development schemes, thus opening up possibilities for more exports and a very substantial increase in the activity of the local canning industry which at present produces about 4,000 tons of canned goods.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

In view of the desirability of increasing the role of vegetables in the Syrian diet and of their potential as a domestic and export cash crop, governmental stimulus would be of great benefit. 244 433

v ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 231

The problem of raising the production and quality of livestock has been comparatively neglected. Inadequate nutrition, high incidence of disease and mortality, and poor breeding all depress livestock yields far below what they should be. Livestock now accounts for less than 20% of the total contribution made by agriculture and animal husbandry to national income. This contribution to national income could undoubtedly be raised substantially because the possibilities for improvement in animal husbandry practices are vast and the demand for livestock products both at home and abroad is likely to increase more than proportionately as standards of living rise.

Better nutrition, control of disease and breeding are all necessary. Of the three, improvement in nutrition is by far the most important. Irrespective of breed, an animal will not be productive unless it is well fed. In fact the genetic factors in any breed cannot be fully developed and appraised unless nutrition is adequate. Similarly, low nutritional standards inevitably lower the resistance of livestock to disease and limit the effectiveness of control measures.

Migratory Livestock 233

Over 80% of the livestock other than fowl consist of sheep and goats, and most of these are taken by Bedouins on annual migrations into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing. The available vegetation is sparse and of short duration. As is usual under desert or semi-desert conditions, there is generally overgrazing in the areas close to permanent water supplies, and the poorer the season—in terms of rainfall—the heavier will be the concentration on such areas. During severe winters when winter growth ceases at an early stage and when the herbage may be destroyed by early frosts, there is a high mortality rate from the combined effects of malnutrition, helminthiasis and exposure.

It has been suggested that much of the mortality could be avoided by

PRODUCTION

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مساحات ومحاصيل اهم انواع الخضار ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL VEGETABLES, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 5 — جدول رقم ٥

Vegetables	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Potatoes	3,687	36,615	3,887	38,226	3,058	32,294	بطاطا
Garlic	1,144	4,548	966	4,018	1,185	4,326	ثوم
Onions	4,043	39,745	4,169	33,135	4,454	36,830	بصل
Onion seeds	228	388	202	52	210	42	بذرون
Onion sets	635	1,136	721	2,299	749	3,667	قرع
Tomatoes	6,338	67,438	7,655	66,733	8,841	71,038	بندورة
Eggplant	2,742	34,995	3,670	34,905	3,728	28,403	باذنجان

مساحات ومحاصيل النباتات الصناعية ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

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AREA AND PRODUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL CORPS, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 6 — جدول رقم ٦

Plantation	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Sugar cane	86	349	119	5,033	138	4,080	قصب السكر
Tobacco	4,026	4,164	3,951	3,894	2,082	1,669	تبغ
Tombac	391	381	385	362	317	253	تنباك
Cotton	217,352	62,924	189,271	58,074	127,558	46,984	قطن (شعر)
Linseed	180	180	220	220	532	533	كتان (بزر)
Hemp	3,330	3,383	4,292	4,131	4,038	2,172	قنب (الياف)
Tobacco (shak-el-bint)	3,936	3,090	3,296	2,334	3,309	2,820	تبغ شاك البنت
Sugar beet	211	2,715	2,624	55,320	4,264	49,572	الشوندر السكري

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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433 assured. The possibility of growing Virginia-type tobaccos should also be explored.

Orchards and Vineyards

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433 Vineyards and orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits already make an important contribution to agricultural income. Both the quality and the yield could be substantially raised by proper insect control, the use of fertilizers and tracer elements, and better pruning. Many existing orchards need rejuvenation. Heavy frosts in 1949-50 severely damaged olive orchards around Aleppo, so that Syria is now on a net import basis for olive oil. Establishment of vineyards and orchards in the Djebel Druze would help materially to raise the present low level of income in that region. In Latakia province the cultivation of citrus could be significantly increased. The availability of ample long-term credit at low interest rates is especially important for an expansion and rejuvenation of orchards and vineyards.

Vegetables

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The significant quantity of vegetables at present used by the local canning industry could easily be doubled though, as the canners explained to the mission, the poor quality of vegetables in general, and of peas and beans in particular, tends to limit the quantity suitable for processing. Better seed, improved cultural practices and adequate insect control measures could contribute greatly to higher quality and quantity. Improved transport, storage and marketing facilities should be included in community and cooperative development schemes, thus opening up possibilities for more exports and a very substantial increase in the activity of the local canning industry which at present produces about 4,000 tons of canned goods.

الانتاج

مساحات اهم الاشجار المثمرة وعددها ومحاصيلها ، ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢

(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA OF PRINCIPAL FRUIT TREE PLANTATIONS, NUMBER OF TREES AND PRODUCE THEREOF, 1951 — 52.

(Area in hectare, produce in tons)

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Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

Tree	المساحة المغروسة Area planted	عدد الاشجار No. of trees		المحصول Produce	النوع
		المجموع Total	المثمرة منها Fruit bearing		
Olives	82,471	8,983,643	4,701,230	32,726	الزيتون
Grapes	68,067	68,475,895	58,797,177	167,294	العنب
Apricots	7,583	2,465,569	2,121,904	14,699	المشمش
Apples	3,269	904,991	644,778	6,352	التفاح
Pears	1,682	564,766	376,695	1,352	الاجاص
Plums	971	315,517	223,110	1,996	الخوخ
Peaches	692	250,455	176,285	1,357	الدراق
Nuts, dry	6,756	423,584	308,469	3,573	الجوز (مجفف)
Pomogranates	1,944	818,030	359,310	4,875	الرمان
Figs	14,574	3,552,655	2,540,583	48,178	التين
Almonds, dry in shell	2,350	664,233	549,752	2,202	اللوز (مجفف بقشره)
Cherries	1,211	239,485	210,945	2,295	الكرز
Quince	621	197,859	163,749	1,196	السفرجل
Pistachio, Aleppo, dry	3,166	536,271	247,485	591	الفستق الحلبي (مجفف)

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

PRODUCTION

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مساحات أهم الأشجار المثمرة وعددها ومحاصيلها ، ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA OF PRINCIPAL FRUIT TREE PLANTATIONS, NUMBER OF TREES AND PRODUCE THEREOF, 1952/53.
(Area in hectare, produce in tons)

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

Tree	المساحة المغروسة Area planted	عدد الأشجار No. of trees: المجموع Total	عدد الأشجار No. of trees: المثمر منها Fruit bearing	المحصول Produce	النوع
Olives	85,641	9,832,747	4,942,545	48,902	الزيتون
Grapes	70,197	68,483,324	57,415,270	343,321	العنب
Apricots	7,819	2,446,667	2,086,688	23,085	المشمش
Apples	3,805	1,058,161	803,600	7,639	التفاح
Pears	1,817	580,853	261,409	1,907	الاجاص
Plums	1,041	331,891	232,786	2,438	الخوخ
Peaches	741	250,353	180,030	1,622	الدراق
Nuts, dry	6,350	436,289	312,124	5,972	الجوز (مجفف)
Pomegranates	2,037	859,050	417,812	4,820	الرمان
Figs	15,113	3,606,056	2,054,530	51,823	التين
Almonds, dry in shell	2,422	675,468	397,378	2,554	اللوز (مجفف مجتشره)
Cherries	1,269	341,436	222,950	2,556	الكرز
Quince	652	202,748	166,168	1,300	السفرجل
Pistachio, Aleppo, dry	2,444	553,873	245,230	482	الفستق الحلبي (مجفف)

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

الانتاج

مساحة وعدد اشجار ومحصول الزيتون ، ١٩٣٧ — ١٩٥٣

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AREA, NUMBER OF TREE AND PRODUCTION OF OLIVE PLANTATIONS, 1937 — 1953

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

Year	المساحة (هكتار) Area (Hectares)		عدد الاشجار Number of trees		المحصول (طن) Production (Ton)		السنة
	المثمرة Fruitful	غير المثمرة Non-fruit bearing	المثمرة Fruit-bearing	غير المثمرة Non-fruit bearing	زيتون Olives	زيت الزيتون Olive oil	
1937	29,354.40	26,412.20	2,991,130	2,828,780	21,310	2,557	١٩٣٧
1938	35,880.40	23,909.20	3,236,770	2,923,910	43,242	7,257	١٩٣٨
1939	43,267.00	14,904.70	4,702,775	1,534,025	16,145	1,967	١٩٣٩
1940	44,835.00	15,511.60	4,702,550	1,723,250	35,040	6,305	١٩٤٠
1941	43,298.00	15,339.90	4,687,056	1,723,124	17,656	3,885	١٩٤١
1942	43,411.60	14,955.30	4,709,340	1,744,230	45,865	7,288	١٩٤٢
1943	34,419.80	13,960.30	4,712,865	1,709,175	72,717	23,167	١٩٤٣
1944	43,439.90	15,632.70	4,903,510	1,847,899	11,156	2,026	١٩٤٤
1945	57,319.60	18,382.30	6,556,475	2,243,214	158,940	16,791	١٩٤٥
1946	57,612.00	20,496.00	6,501,855	2,243,084	45,430	6,243	١٩٤٦
1947	61,276.30	18,091.60	6,696,965	1,954,709	80,215	11,116	١٩٤٧
1948	61,832.90	16,736.60	6,170,139	1,829,654	102,966	10,252	١٩٤٨
1949	63,595.30	16,029.60	6,966,355	2,016,817	91,366	14,437	١٩٤٩
1950	64,616.40	16,075.60	7,126,985	1,969,702	18,637	3,581	١٩٥٠
1951	---	---	4,790,026	4,270,104	40,147*	8,516	١٩٥١
1952	---	---	4,701,230	4,262,413	32,726	7,241	١٩٥٢
1953	---	---	4,942,545	4,990,262	45,902	11,071	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Agriculture
* Corrected figures

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة
● ارقام معدلة

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Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

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In the long run it is the cultivated areas which will have to support more livestock. The expansion of crop land has progressively limited the area of natural grazing land, and increasing numbers of pastoral Bedouins are settling down to agricultural pursuits. Only cultivated land provides a large potential for increasing and improving the feed supply. At present, however, grain stubble and the grass and weeds which spring up on fallow land constitute virtually the only sources of feed for livestock in the cultivated regions. Only a very small area is in improved or "cultivated" pasture, and cropping for forage takes place only in certain limited areas. Hay and silage are not produced.

The objective must be to persuade farmers to grow feed for livestock by intercropping forage crops with cereals, putting part of their fallow into grass and legumes and converting marginal land into improved pasture. The conservation and storage of fodder must also be encouraged. A program with these objectives is, of course, bound to make very slow progress. Its feasibility must be demonstrated, and it will encounter much resistance on the part of farmers who adhere tenaciously to traditional practices.

The mission suggests, however, that a start in this direction be made over the next five or six years. For this reason the mission proposes that the government set aside about £S 500,000 over this period for an experimental demonstration program. Under this program farmers willing to try the establishment of pastures or the production of fodder crops would be given technical and financial assistance by the government. Financial assistance might be given in various forms. The government could supply all or part of the seed, help meet the cost of plowing, pay a small subsidy for the conversion of marginal land to pasture. The digging of trench silos can be performed by hand labor under supervision by the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus a number of experimental and demonstration projects might be established in different parts of Syria. The projects will no doubt reveal in time deficiencies as well as advantages in the light of which the approach and methods would have to be modified from time to time.

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VII PASTURE RESEEDING

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In the Main Report we specifically recommended the reseeding of the Resafe and Palmyra desert basins where the soil is fertile, the rainfall generally higher than in other desert regions, and the possibilities of storing some of the water and distributing it evenly by means of diversion dams better than elsewhere. In parts of Australia, Morocco, Algeria and South Africa, where climatic conditions are similar to those in the Syrian desert, introduction of the following herbs and grasses has shown good results: salt bushes (*Atriplex semibaccata; Atriplex vesicatum*); blue bushes (*Kochia sp.*); crow foot (*Erodium sp.*); buffalo grass (*Cenchrus ciliaris*); veldt grass (*Earharta calcycina*); *Lotus maroccanus;* and *Dactylia glomerata,* var. *Hispanica.* These perennials, more or less winter-hardy and drought-resistant, plus the existing flora, would probably make excellent sheep and goat pasture in Syria. The group of FAO experts which has been conducting experiments with respect to improved grazing conditions might help the Ministry of Agriculture to develop a successful program.

Since conditions in Iraq and Jordan are similar it would be advantageous if these countries were to participate in the program.

VIII LIVESTOCK

232 *Livestock Center*

We understand that a site for a center near Damascus has already been selected. We urge that stables and shelter, which would be designed to serve as models, should not be so elaborate as to be beyond the reach of the average farmer. We suggest that the main center have three separate divisions for sheep and goats, cattle, and poultry respectively, and that the two principal tasks of the staff should be to initiate a breeding program and to train Syrians in this work.

In the Sheep and Goat Division the sheep breeding program might be conducted along the following lines:

1st year: Assembling a station flock of the best indigenous type; purchase of 200-300 native ewes; and importation of a nucleus of pure-bred flocks—Merino from South Africa, Merino-Fleisch from Germany or

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243 433 maturing varieties to replace the praecox strains currently used. The high day and comparatively low night temperatures in Syria are more suitable to slow-maturing rice varieties. For maize it is especially important to test and select appropriate hybrid strains. In Syria maize yields are only about 1.3 tons per hectare while in the United States hybrid maize yields about 4.4 tons. With the introduction of high-yielding hybrid strains, the production of maize should definitely be encouraged since it fits well into the crop rotation scheme, is rather heat resistant and can provide not only grain but also fodder and silage.

Once suitable seed strains have been selected by testing, arrangements should be made with farmers in various parts of Syria for the propagation of such strains under proper supervision. These farms could serve at the same time as demonstration centers. The seed thus propagated should be certified and made available for distribution through licensed dealers, cooperatives and Chambers of Agriculture.

Cotton[13]

243 433 The government already has a praiseworthy program for the improvement of cotton cultivation. The disastrous failure of the cotton harvest in 1951, caused by the rather reckless expansion of cotton acreage and an uncontrolled invasion of destructive insects, brought in its train a number of corrective measures. The government regulated cotton acreage by licensing, and specified the time of planting. Controls over the treatment and distribution of seed were established. Even dusting and spraying were prescribed in 1952. Variety tests have also been conducted, and as a result Coker Wilt, a high-yielding strain, is now predominantly cultivated in Syria. A Cotton Office, staffed largely with Egyptian experts, has been charged with the improvement of cotton production. This entire program should be further expanded as more Syrian technical personnel become available. The mission suggests, for instance, that a special station be established for cotton breeding and insect control. More attention should be paid to cultural practices. Yields can be raised by reducing the danger of pests through rigorous cleaning of cotton fields following the harvest and destruction of host plants; by closer planting to discourage excessive vegetative growth and to promote earlier maturity; and by applying fertilizers at appropriate times.

[13] See Annex C, p. 305.

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ing types. Release to selected seed producers of promising types tested during at least three years. 243

4th year: Continuation of yield tests. Growing of F. generation hybrids. Retesting of seed released the previous year to seed growers. Seed rejuvenation of older material. Establishment of priority standards.

5th and following years: Comparative yield tests of the best varieties, including hybrids. Evaluation of hybrids.

A committee for seed production composed of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and accredited seed growers should be established to promote a certified seed program. The FAO should be invited to assist this committee. The committee would designate desirable varieties for the various regions, advise on seed imports and designate the standard for certified seed. The Ministry of Agriculture should set up an appropriate organization to certify and distribute seed to accredited traders on a non-profit, non-loss basis, and to grant premiums for the best seed grown. Proper supervision of seed farms through field inspectors will be necessary to safeguard against the admixture of impure or other seed both in the field and in the process of threshing and cleaning.

Following experimental seed testing, the stages would be:

1. Transfer of seed to the extension service for multiplication under its direct supervision and control. Some of the present experimental stations could serve as propagating centers.

2. Allocation of registered seeds among seed-growing districts and seed growers in accordance with their interest in particular strains.

3. Selection by field officers (extension agents) of experienced farmers whose land would serve as demonstration plots for the nucleus seed.

4. Drawing up of contracts by the Ministry of Agriculture with accredited seed growers to harvest the seed and return it at premium rates (establishment of certified seed growers). This seed, having been tested and labelled, would then become certified government stock seed.

III COTTON

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The legislation relating to cotton production is adequate and marked a great step forward. The government should, however, enforce the prohibition against planting in areas where climatic conditions make such planting

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hazardous; apparently many farmers still disregard the legislation and plant in dry-farming areas, frequently with unfortunate results. Effective enforcement requires sufficient enforcement personnel, and, equally important, enough qualified extension agents to convince the farmer that the legislation is to his benefit. Even in other countries well suited to cotton growing, risks have been overcome only through year-long practical education and guidance by field extension agents capable of translating research findings into readily understandable terms.

In addition, the establishment of associations of cotton growers could do much to further the education of their members, help execute the various decrees, and act as liaison between farmers and government. Credits to facilitate seed purchase can be obtained under general rules of the Agricultural Bank. Loans for the acquisition of insecticides (cotton dust) are authorized by law.

The cultivation of cotton has gone a long way by empirical experimentation with native varieties and American and Egyptian strains; annual production is now estimated at over 50,000 tons of cotton fiber and about 100,000 tons of cotton seed or 150,000 tons of seed cotton, worth about £S 150 million.[5]

The availability of fertile soil and favorable climatic conditions augurs well for further development of production. With steadily increasing interest on the part of government and private individuals, cotton may well become an even more valuable crop and contribute increasingly to Syria's foreign exchange income. We therefore recommend continuation of serious efforts toward quality and quantity improvement. It is suggested that better hand tools, such as hand drillers, be used, and that technical advice to farmers be extended on an expanded scale.

More specifically, we recommend:

1. *Cultivation.*

a. Seeding. April to May, depending on the weather and region. The seedbed should be thoroughly worked, if done manually, by plowing

[5]Exports of cotton, cotton seed, etc., in 1953, were as follows:

	Tons	Million £S
Raw cotton	53,946	134.703
Cotton waste and lint . .	424	.261
Cotton seed	28,418	5.506
Cotton seed oil	1,223	1.414

SOURCE: Statistical Abstracts.

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two to three times. Seeding of only first class seed; not more than four seeds per hole.

b. Spacing. 25 x 60 cm. or a rate of about 120,000 to 150,000 plants per hectare. This helps early maturity, whereas wide spacing leads to heavier vegetative growth, late maturity and consequent exposure to bollworm.

c. Watering. If irrigated, watering immediately following sowing, repeated every 10-15 days till about 80% of the bolls are formed.

d. Fertilization. Distribution of fertilizers at cost to a selected group of farmers whose farms could serve for demonstration purposes.

2. *Control measures.* The previous year's cotton stalks should be rigorously removed and host plants destroyed. Posters showing the life cycles of the various insects and host plants should be distributed. Plant entomologists should regularly inspect the cotton fields in plague-infested regions in order to direct an effective campaign. Dusting or spraying with more effective, less expensive insecticides or by mechanical equipment on a cooperative basis should be instituted. Progressive farmers should be asked to make large-scale weedicide tests, subject to compensation in case damage is done. Premiums should be introduced for the best cotton growers.

3. *Establishment of a seed propagating station.* At present the government does not have adequate technical staff to direct and operate an effective up-to-date seed propagating station. The mission recommends that existing propagating facilities be greatly expanded, along the following lines:

1st year: Extension of seed propagating efforts under the direction of foreign experts already engaged; training of four Syrian agronomists to continue the seed propagation work in the three typical cotton regions of Aleppo, Jezireh and Euphrates.

2nd year: Continuation of seed propagation and selection of strains best adapted to the various regions; initiation of permanent field experiments; establishment of a demonstration farm in each region to specialize in seed material, insect control and weed control.

3rd year: Continuation of seed propagation with permanent agencies in the three main regions and demonstration farms serving as training centers for extension agents.

4th and 5th years: Establishment of an experimental station for cotton breeding, control of plant diseases and insect and pest control.

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248 4. *Gradual reduction of cotton cultivation in dry-farming areas.* Cotton growing under dry-farming conditions is too hazardous in Syria.

5. *Selection of cotton growing areas and permanent restriction to these regions.*

6. *Rotation plan.* Introduction of rotation without the customary fallow, e.g.:

1st year: cotton, green fodder mixed with barley; or cotton, wheat.

2nd year: maize, sorghum, green manure; or wheat, fodder crops.

3rd year: early peanuts, wheat mixed with leguminous plants or horse-beans; sorghum.

7. *Establishment of cotton grower associations.*

249 IV SUGAR BEET

In 1953-54 the cultivated area, mainly around Homs and Damascus, amounted to 4,200 hectares of irrigated land and about 2,000 hectares of rainfed land, generally divided into small plots of a few hectares and worked manually. The price of £S 60 per ton of beets delivered at the Homs factory makes cultivation very attractive, even to farmers at some distance from the factory and despite high labor costs. Maximum transport cost from producer to factory was, at the time of the mission's visit, £S 9 per ton. Seeds from Holland and Germany were provided without cost by the Sugar and Agricultural Products Company until 1953; since then the farmer has had to meet half of the cost of £S 117 per kg. Some farmers are thus inclined to produce their own seed, although ideally this should be undertaken only by experts.

The mission makes the following recommendations with respect to sugar beet:

1. Expansion of production should be sought mainly in irrigated areas. Careful account should be taken of all planting and climatic conditions since they directly affect sugar content; hot days and cool nights are a favorable influence.

2. The selection and development of an early-maturing type adaptable to Syrian conditions should be considered.

3. Sugar beet growing in rainfed regions with less than 600 mm. rainfall should be transferred to partly or fully irrigated land. It can rely on the abundant late winter and spring rains for partial irrigation.

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433 is still responsible for an important part of, and in some instances for the entire, production. Yet the use of power-driven machines is steadily growing and it is not unusual to find an expensive modern machine in a workshop with only five or six employees. This development will probably be accelerated as more and cheaper electrical power becomes available, but it is equally likely that some Syrian industry, although to a steadily decreasing extent, will remain in the handicraft stage for many years to come. This applies particularly to village industries (dairy products, dried fruits, rugs, etc.), which employ a considerable percentage of those who gain a living from some industrial occupation.[1]

Cotton Ginning

248 Ginning is a relatively new industry which sprang up after local cotton cultivation became prominent, and by 1953 was employing about 4,000 workers. The sharp rise in cotton production after World War II led to a rapid expansion of ginning capacity and, in 1950, to the introduction of some saw gins. There are now over 100 establishments, mostly in Aleppo, which concentrate on cotton ginning during the season commencing in September and ending in April or May.

According to the latest available estimates Syria has a total of about 1,750 roller gins and 64 saw gins with a lint capacity of 45-48 metric tons per hour. A report issued in September 1953 states that of the 1952-53 cotton crop of 176,000 tons of raw cotton, over 90% was roller-ginned and that saw gins were only used in the lower grades. Up to 10,000 tons of ginned cotton were used in Syrian textile mills; the remainder (about 50,000 tons) was exported.

The importation of cotton ginning machinery was prohibited by law in 1952; it is generally agreed that present ginning capacity is sufficient to deal with any anticipated increase in the crop for some time to come.

Textiles

258 *Spinning and weaving*. The manufacture of textiles is Syria's principal industry. Six spinning and weaving factories now produce cotton and

[1] According to a study dated February 24, 1954 by Dr. Abdel Monthleb Boukari, "L'Artisanat Rural Traditionnel," 18% of the Syrian population is engaged in some kind of manufacturing industry of which 9.8% is in town industries and 8.2% in village industries. The mission was not in a position to check these figures.

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Textiles

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The entire output of yarn is spun in the large factories but almost half the cloth produced is woven on hand looms.[2] It is estimated that on a basis of 1.3 KWH per kilogram for spinning and 1.0 KWH per kilogram for weaving, the total power requirements of mechanized textile plants approximate 21.1 million KWH annually.

Most of the large factories (with one important exception) generate their own power from their total installed capacities of 2,200 KW in Damascus and 2,500 KW in Aleppo. This is more than adequate for the demands of the larger spinning and weaving factories, estimated at 15.8 million KWH, though some plants do in fact purchase some power—to the extent of about 2.6 million KWH—from the public utilities network. On the assumption that the power used by the small factories is drawn wholly from municipal supplies, the total power consumption of 21.1 million KWH for textile spinning and weaving is furnished by private plants to the extent of 13.2 million KWH, and by the public utilities to the extent of 7.9 million KWH. The 6.6 thousand tons of cloth at present woven on hand looms may be regarded as a potential power demand for 6.6 million KWH from the public utilities, giving an aggregate potential demand by textiles for a minimum of 27.7 million KWH, of which 14.5 million KWH would be supplied by the public utilities.

It is expected that the textile industry will continue to expand, though possibly at a slower rate, requiring about 2 million additional KWH by 1960.

Ginning

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In 1953 about 50,000 tons of lint were produced and ginned in Syria. With an average power consumption of 100 KWH per ton of cotton ginned and baled, this would require about 5 million KWH.

Four-fifths of the gins are located in Aleppo, the remainder being in Homs, Idlib, Latakia and Damascus. The most important ginning factory in Aleppo has its own power plant with a capacity of 1,500 KW, but the majority of the other plants have recourse to the public network. It can be assumed that about half the total required power is supplied by private plants and half by the public utilities.

[2] 1952 production: yarn, 9,000–10,000 tons; cloth, 14,000–15,000 tons.

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An increase of about 60% in cotton production is expected by 1960, but present power capacity appears adequate to meet this expansion. 377 244

Glass

The Damascus glass factory owns a 600-KW power plant. The total productive capacity of the factory is about 43 tons of glass per day; in 1953 about 3,000 tons of glass were actually produced, representing about 70 days output at full capacity. If a consumption of about 100 KWH per ton of glass is assumed then the generated power in 1953 would have been about 0.3 million KWH. 377 323

Cold Storage

A cold storage plant in Damascus has a 500-KW power plant interconnected with the public utilities network. It can be assumed that about half of the approximately 2 million KWH required annually is supplied by the public utilities and half by the factory's plant. 377 254

Oil Mills

Two Aleppo oil mills have private power plants, the larger with a capacity of 1,200 KW, the smaller with 300 KW. These factories work only about 150 days per year (say six days per week during six months). With one-third of the capacity in reserve and an assumed load factor as low as 10% the power generated per year would be about 1.5 million KWH. 377 388

Flour Mill

A flour mill in Aleppo has a 400-KW plant. With a utilization of two-thirds of the capacity for 6,000 hours the power generated would be about 1.2 million KWH. 377 256

Sugar

In 1953 the Homs sugar factory processed 7,000 tons of sugar from beets and refined 22,000 tons from raw sugar. Power required for the former 377 257

PRODUCTION

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مساحات ومحاصيل اهم انواع الخضار ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL VEGETABLES, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 5 — جدول رقم ٥

Vegetables	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Potatoes	3,687	36,615	3,887	38,226	3,058	32,294	بطاطا
Garlic	1,144	4,548	966	4,018	1,185	4,326	ثوم
Onions	4,043	35,745	4,169	33,135	4,454	36,830	بصل
Onion seeds	228	388	202	52	210	42	بادرون
Onion sets	635	1,156	721	2,299	749	3,667	قرع
Tomatoes	6,338	67,438	7,655	66,733	8,841	71,038	بندورة
Eggplant	2,742	34,995	3,670	34,905	3,728	28,403	باذنجان

مساحات ومحاصيل النباتات الصناعية ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

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AREA AND PRODUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL CORPS, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 6 — جدول رقم ٦

Plantation	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Sugar cane	86	349	119	5,033	138	4,080	قصب السكر
Tobacco	4,026	4,164	3,951	3,894	2,062	1,669	تبغ
Tombac	391	381	385	362	317	253	تنباك
Cotton	217,352	62,924	189,271	58,074	127,558	46,984	قطن (شعر)
Linseed	180	180	220	220	532	533	كتان (بزر)
Hemp	3,330	3,383	4,292	4,131	4,038	2,172	قنب (الياف)
Tobacco (shak-el-bint)	3,936	3,090	3,296	2,334	3,309	2,820	تبغ شاك البنت
Sugar beet	211	2,715	2,624	55,320	4,264	49,572	الشوندر السكري

الانتاج

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مساحة ومحصول القطن الشعر في سوريا حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٣
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF COTTON FIBRE IN SYRIA, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1950 — 1953

(Area in hectare, produce in tons)

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

Mohafazat	١٩٥٠ 1950		١٩٥١ 1951		١٩٥٢ 1952		١٩٥٣ 1953		المحافظات
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المساحة Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Total	77,961	35,495	217,352	61,924	189,271	58,074	127,558	46,984	المجموع
Damascus	168	84	4,861	693	2,283	288	197	124	دمشق
Homs	2,000	805	8,800	3,201	6,900	2,205	3,180	1,650	حمص
Hama	14,500	7,700	34,635	10,959	42,856	9,573	45,960	10,015	حماة
Latakia	8,091	2,800	27,457	5,462	14,150	3,384	2,438	496	اللاذقية
Aleppo	40,889	16,746	79,357	29,612	90,393	31,693	46,774	11,781	حلب
Al-Hassakeh	6,110	3,500	22,924	2,515	20,031	7,432	19,098	5,658	الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor	6,100	3,815	36,000	9,867	8,837	3,348	14,800	7,965	دير الزور
Sweida	—	—	7	3	400	14	—	—	السويداء
Dar'a	105	45	3,311	612	3,421	137	1,091	285	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

PRODUCTION

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مساحة ومحصول القطن الزهر في عام ١٩٥٣ ، حسب المحافظات
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF UNGINNED COTTON IN 1953, BY MOHAFAZAT
(Area in hectars and Production in tons)

Table No. 8 — جدول رقم ٨

Mohafazat	المساحة المزروعة Cultivated Area			المحصول زهر (شعر وبذور) Produce (unginned)			المحافظات
	المجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	المجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	
Total	127,558	76,305	51,253	198,026	197,689	18,337	المجموع
Damascus	197	197	—	331	331	—	دمشق
Homs	3,180	2,945	235	4,404	4,287	117	حمص
Hama	48,980	30,740	18,240	50,888	46,352	4,536	حماة
Latakia	2,438	163	2,275	1,373	141	1,232	اللاذقية
Aleppo	46,774	16,371	30,403	31,911	19,529	12,382	حلب
Hasakeh	10,098	10,058	40	15,115	15,087	28	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	14,800	14,800	—	21,240	21,240	—	دير الزور
Sweida	—	—	—	—	—	—	السويداء
Dir'a	1,091	1,031	60	764	722	42	درعا

عدد الحيوانات والمواشي ، ١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٣
NUMBER OF ANIMALS AND CATTLE, 1950 — 1953

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Table No. 9 — جدول رقم ٩

Animals and cattle	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	النوع
Cows, not for milking	109,935	294,425	252,081	253,801	مجموع البقر غير الحلوب
Cows, for milking	121,735				بقر حلوب
Oxen	197,583	183,080	189,997	251,485	ثيران
Horses	97,070	99,650	100,854	98,450	خيل
Mules	58,292	70,425	73,890	77,810	بغال
Asses	271,047	244,270	250,433	259,730	حمير
Sheep	2,930,397	3,085,235	3,559,748	3,746,392	غنم
Goats	1,229,738	1,433,501	1,571,282	1,613,806	ماعز
Camels	78,051	70,889	96,610	61,706	إبل
Buffalo	6,755	6,030	6,176	6,779	جاموس
Pigs	962	421	206	398	خنازير
Beehives	53,255	...	...	...	خلايا نحل

Source : Ministry of Agriculture — المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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cultivated area. Holdings of 25–250 acres are estimated to take 423
up 33 per cent of the area and holdings over 250 acres 29 per cent. State land is estimated to represent 23 per cent of the total cultivated area. Decrees for the distribution of state lands were issued in 1952: their implementation, at the time of writing, is still under review. Legislation to prevent the subdivision of plots by succession inheritances is also under consideration; at present a four-acre plot may have thirty-seven owners, and its management is profitable only to lawyers.

The approximate acreage and crop and yield of the main 241
products are shown in the following table. 433

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)			*Production* (000 metric tons)			*Yield* (100 kg. per ha.)	
	1950	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*
Cotton (lint)	78	217	142	35	49	49	4·6	2·3
Wheat	992	1,037	900*	830	510	850*	8·4	4·9
Barley	416	344	400*	322	155	350*	7·7	4·5
Vegetables	68	66	..	47	40	142	..	..
Tobacco†	10	11	..	9	9	..	8·7	..
Rice (paddy)	7	..	..	24	6	6	19·3‡	..

.. = not available.

* The Banque de Syrie et du Liban (*Exercice 1952*) quotes the following figures for 1952 (in thousands):

Wheat: area = 1,180, production = 805.
Barley: area = 396, production = 467.

† Including Lebanon (annual production about 2,000–3,000 tons). ‡ 1949.

(SOURCES: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952* and *Monthly Bulletins of Statistics*, 1953; vegetable figures from Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952*, Paris, 1953.)

Wheat is the traditional staple crop of Syria and in a normal 243
year a quarter of a million tons can be exported. But the poor 439
harvest of 1951 necessitated wheat imports of about 50,000 241
tons. The 1952 wheat crop, however, once more increased to 433
over 800,000 tons. Barley is also grown and exported and, though the acreage has diminished somewhat since 1949, the crop is adequate.

In 1950 fortunes were made from cotton which fetched a high 248
price for the abundant harvest. The acreage sown to cotton 433
trebled between 1949 and 1950 and again in 1951. But while in 1950 the cotton yield was high, the 1951 harvest proved disappointing because of drought and attacks of the boll weevil. Despite a fall in cotton acreage in 1952—due chiefly to the downward trend in cotton prices—that year's output was maintained at the 1951 level, thanks largely to better methods

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year
234 suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at re-afforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2.*

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COTTON IN SYRIA

in New York. The Foundation is engaged in research and education along the same general lines as in Iran, Lebanon, and Greece. With a small budget the Foundation has in its research learned many practical and useful ways of improving agricultural production. The methods they have devised in teaching simple home economics, such as canning, and principles of sanitation are exemplary. As a result, many villages in the area in which the Foundation operates have bought sewing machines and pressure cookers either with their own funds or with money given by the landlords. Particularly impressive is the practical nature of the work and the absence of a large administrative budget. 248 242

COTTON

Statistics on the area planted to cotton are also of questionable accuracy. For what they are worth, the figures show that cotton acreage declined almost 50 per cent from a prewar average of about 85,000 acres. It increased to about 60,000 acres during the five years after the war, and, with high prices, expanded further to almost 200,000 acres in 1950-51 and to about 450,000 acres in 1951-52. In 1952-53 it is expected acreage will be down, possibly just above the 1950-51 level. 248

Table 24

SYRIA: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution
Specified Years, 1920-1951

Year Beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales		
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	5,700	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	58,625	82	9,951	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	42,250	116	10,199	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	85,477	157	28,022	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	47,445	152	15,390	NA	NA
Average 1945-49	58,876	254	31,111	23,100[1]	NA
1950	192,642	406	163,039	31,700	135,000
1951	450,000	220	206,661	33,400	139,000[2]

[1] Average for 1947-49.
[2] Exports September 1, 1951, through May 15, 1952.
SOURCE: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture.

YIELDS

Average yield figures are even more conjectural than acreage. The government's records indicate that the average yield increased from about 160 pounds in 1935-39 to better than half a bale in 1944-49 and to more than 400 pounds per acre in 1949-50 and 1950-51. Because of the large number of inexperienced cultivators, cold weather in the spring, lack of moisture and inadequate irrigation, and heavy insect damage, the 1951-52 yields were poor everywhere and the national average dropped to about 220 pounds per acre. Farmers in the new mechanized area of the Jezira reported losing 90 per cent of their crop. There is no doubt that cotton yields have been erratic.

VARIETIES

Lone Star was the only American Upland variety planted until Coker and Acala seeds were imported in recent years. These have produced good 248 242

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248 yields. The local experiment stations are doing a limited amount of work in
242 variety selections and testing but have not been able to distribute any large quantity of certified seed. Most of the seed planted is imported directly from United States breeders or seed distributors.

CULTURAL PRACTICES

248 A high percentage of the cotton land is now prepared with mechanical
[407] equipment, although a few primitive ploughs are still found. Some cotton is broadcast but for the most part it is planted in ridges. Planting is largely a hand operation in which the farmer digs a hole with a small hand tool and drops in five to seven seeds which have been soaked overnight to soften the shell and increase germination. The rows usually run east and west with the cotton planted on the south side for greater protection. Cultivation is almost entirely by hand with short-handle hoes or knives. Picking, as everywhere, is a family affair. Outside labor usually is required, especially on the large farms, to weed and harvest the crop.

Irrigation practices vary considerably. In general, farmers try to use as much water as they can. The use of commercial fertilizers, although increasing, is limited. Whenever possible manure mixed with soil is added to the cotton land.

On the Near East Foundation experimental farm, yields of 800 pounds of lint per acre were obtained by applying 30 inches of water to supplement the 12 inches of winter rain and 4 square meters of local manure per acre. The fields were prepared with tractors, but the cotton was planted and cultivated by hand. The rows were standard, about 36 inches wide, and three seeds were planted in the hills 12 inches apart. This is ample proof that cotton will grow well and give high yields with good cultural practices.

The Foundation's work also illustrates the need for research in cultural practices, irrigation, and especially fertilization. The soils generally need nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, but demonstrations reveal that the soil will react to certain of these plant foods but not to others. For instance, no difference in yields has been noticed from the use of super-phosphates. More research is needed, not only to determine optimum rates of application, but also to determine whether the absorption rates can be increased by conditioning the soil.

GINNING

248 Prior to 1950 all the cotton gins were of the roller type, many of which
407 were manufactured locally. One modern American saw gin was installed in 1950 and it proved so successful that 26 more, with 82 stands, have been put into use since. Most of these are located in the Aleppo region. The new gins are, for the most part, equipped with the most modern overhead cleaning units and with standard gin presses. Buildings are unusually lavish. Investment in the average four-stand gin is estimated at $175,000 of which $120,000 is in the land and buildings. Even so, the cost of ginning is fairly moderate, about $9 per bale including bagging and ties.

About 1,700 roller gins are still in operation, three-fourths of them in Aleppo and most of the others in Hama and Latakia with a capacity double that of the saw gins.

The new saw gins still have a number of difficulties to overcome. The opinion persists that saw gins do not give fibers as long as roller gins, cause

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COTTON IN SYRIA

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Cotton bought in small lots from many farmers in various sections is thoroughly mixed in seed cotton storage bins in Aleppo, Syria, before ginning to get uniformity in the bale.

more neps, and often damage the fibers. Also, farmers have not been able to secure any higher price for their saw ginned cotton with less trash, but several dealers in Aleppo reported sales of saw ginned cotton at a premium, indicating that the market situation may be changing. 248 407

Whereas formerly ginners took the seed to cover the cost of ginning, with the increased value of the seed, ginners now are required to operate on a service basis for a fixed charge.

MARKETING

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The concentration of ginning equipment in a few large towns creates a difficult and expensive transportation problem for the farmers in remote areas. Because of the distance to the gins, many farmers are forced to sell cotton in the seed to merchants or middlemen in the local communities. Merchants gin the cotton for their own account and then dispose of the lint and the seed. Most of the gins are owned by merchants, but by no means do all merchants own gins.

Aleppo is the cotton merchandising center, with 47 exporters operating in this market in 1951. About half a dozen merchants, of whom two or three do a small export business, operate in Damascus. More than half of all the exports are sold through the three leading firms; the others do a small volume of business largely as a sideline. [366]

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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CLASSIFICATION

Seed cotton is bought on three grades: good, medium, and low. On taking delivery the ginner inspects the seed cotton for grade and staple and directs it to storage houses adjoining the gins where an attempt is made to sort into grades and to mix the lots thoroughly before ginning.

Lint cotton normally is sold on a basis of four grades: No. 1, corresponding roughly to good middling; No. 2, strict middling; No. 3, middling; and No. 4, low middling. In normal seasons, three-fourths of the crop grades middling and above. Export sales usually are made on the basis of sealed samples or types, and some exporters will have as many as eight different types.

439

Table 25

SYRIA: Cotton Exports by Principal Destinations
September 1, 1951, through May 31, 1952

Country of Destination	Exports	Per Cent of Total
	Bales	Per Cent
France	66,900	46.1
United Kingdom	12,900	8.9
Italy	9,095	6.3
Spain	4,400	3.2
Poland	2,825	1.9
Germany	2,330	1.6
Belgium	650	.5
Sweden	610	.4
Netherlands	311	.2
Others	35	
Total	139,184	100.0

SOURCE: Trade Reports.

435

PRICES

During the period of world scarcity in 1950-51, prices of Syrian cotton on the local market advanced steadily to a high of slightly over 70 cents per pound. Export quotations were even higher. Prices declined during the 1951-52 season from approximately 50 cents a pound to 33 cents in the spring. Subsequently, the price firmed somewhat and during the summer cotton was selling in Europe for approximately the price of United States cotton on a dollar exchange basis. Syrian cottons, however, have been sold for soft currencies, and the discount must be taken into consideration.

Prices between grade 1 and grade 4 vary about 12 per cent.

Various producers expressed the view that a world price of about 30 cents a pound would be attractive to Syrian farmers and probably would stimulate further expansion. A world price much below this level, on the other hand, likely would discourage production.

A series of studies made by a large foreign firm interested in investing capital in cotton production and processing in Syria found that cost of production was below 20 cents per pound when normal yields were obtained but was much higher in poor years, such as 1951-52.

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Table 26

SYRIA: Estimated Cost of Producing Cotton in the Upper Euphrates Valley on a Typical Tenant Cultivator Farm
1950

Cost Items			Cost per Acre
			Dollars
Land preparation and planting			10.00
Seed			2.07
Irrigation (fuel and amortization of engines and pumps)			10.00
Cultivation			4.22
Supervisor's salary			2.72
Harvesting			10.24
Miscellaneous			5.17
Total tenant's cost at plantation			34.47
Tenant's transportation cost to Aleppo			2.76
Tenant's ginning cost at $9 per bale			7.74
Tenant's cost for the ginned cotton from one acre			$47.95
Estimated Yield per acre	616 pounds of lint cotton per acre		
Rent at one-third of crop	205 " " " " " "		
Tenant's share of lint	411 pounds		
Estimated Yield per acre	1,144 pounds of seed		
Rent at one-third of crop	381 " " "		
Tenant's share of seed	763 " " "		
Tenant's cost of ginned cotton		$47.95	
Less credit for tenant's share of seed at $44 per ton		24.42	
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton		$43.53	
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton divided by pounds	or $43.53 / 411 equals 10.59¢ net cost per pound		

Note: This is a plantation with 250 acres of cotton grown under irrigation in the Upper Euphrates Valley. The landlord gets one-third of the lint cotton at the plantation for land rent. The tenant pays transportation and ginning cost only on his share of the production. [427]

Source: Trade sources.

COTTONSEED OIL

388

Nine crushing mills have a total capacity for approximately 500,000 tons of seed annually. Only four of these are primarily cottonseed oil mills—two in Aleppo, one in Damascus, and one in Hama. Capacity is adequate and prices slightly higher than those in the foreign markets, so most of the seed is now crushed in Syria. However, the extraction rate is low, especially in the older mills, and 1951 cottonseed oil production was given as only 5,000 tons. This represents about 40 per cent of the total vegetable oil produced in the country, the remainder being largely olive oil. Approximately 85 per cent of the cottonseed oil cake is consumed domestically as stock feed, with the other 15 per cent exported.

INSECTS

The principal cotton destroying insects are the spiney bollworm, *Earias insulana* (Boisd.), and the locust. Last year the plant protection department of the Ministry of Agriculture distributed 250 tons of benzine hexachloride and farmers purchased 150 tons directly from dealers. Even so, yields were only half what they were reported to be the previous year and farmers at- 242 248

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242 tributed a 50 per cent decline in yields to insect damage.

248 In an effort to reduce this damage, the Ministry has employed an Egyptian entomologist and has bought 4,000 tons of insecticides and a large number of tractor-mounted, horse-drawn, and walking dusting units.

[656] The Ministry also has promulgated numerous regulations for controlling insects, calling for mandatory destruction of stalks after harvesting and a host-free period until May 1. All ginning must be completed by the end of April and all the gin trash burned. Planting seed must be sterilized by one of the oil mills through contract with the government. The government also requires all farmers to apply the recommended insecticides. If farmers do not comply, the government applies the poison and charges them for it.

CONTROLS

656 The government has appointed a Cotton Control Board, with headquarters in Aleppo, charged with the broad responsibility of stabilizing production. The board is responsible for the enforcement of programs in seed
647 distribution, insect control, crop control, ginning and marketing, and new
248 regulations promulgated recently by the Ministry.

Probably the most significant of these many regulations is one limiting the land which may be planted to cotton. In irrigated areas from 40 to 70 per cent of the crop land may be planted to cotton and in dry-land farming areas, only 25 to 33 per cent. The Aleppo area is limited to 50 per cent of the non-irrigated land. The purposes of this regulation, according to the Director General of Agriculture, are to preserve a balance in agricultural

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Syria's newest cotton mill is an ultra modern integrated plant just completed in Damascus. The level of efficiency here is far above the average and as a result this mill is exporting about 20 per cent of its production.

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production, conserve water, concentrate cotton so as to facilitate insect control, and protect the cotton industry against the high costs and low prices that might result from over-extension of production. Farmers are required also to receive licenses to plant cotton from the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cotton Board. 656 647 248

The only marketing regulations issued to date require that all bales show the name of the ginner, the identity, and especially the moisture content of the cotton, which cannot be more than 9 per cent. If false claims are made, the government can take 30 per cent of the cotton as a penalty. [442]

It is obvious that the enforcement of so many scientific regulations and controls over a large area is going to be difficult without a large force of trained technicians and police.

The Director General appreciates that without adequate trained personnel it is not possible to make the regulations completely effective overnight, but he hopes, through education, to obtain the compliance of the producers.

Ambitious research and education programs, another responsibility of the board, are still in the planning stage. [654]

PROSPECTS

It appears unlikely to expect any significant expansion in production in Syria until yields can be stabilized. A start has been made, but a more intensive research and education program is required on cultural practices (particularly irrigation practices), mechanization, and especially insect control, before much improvement can be expected. Such efforts naturally take considerable time, even when funds and technical assistance are available. Both money and know-how are limited in Syria. 248

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

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Cotton acreage may actually decline from the peak until these improvements are made. But production may hold at recent levels or even expand slightly under a more intensive farming system.

Unless prices soar again a crop of more than 250,000 to 300,000 bales does not appear to be likely for several years.

On the basis of land and water resources, the goal of 1 million bales of which some Syrian agriculturists dream may be attained in time, but not soon. The time and cost of building the large new irrigation facilities that would be required provide severe limitations to quick expansion.



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Sugar Beet[14]

Sugar beet, though introduced only recently, is becoming an increasingly important crop. The sugar factory established in Homs has brought in seed from the Netherlands and Germany and distributed it to farmers. The reclamation and irrigation of the Roudj and the Ghab will undoubtedly give a great fillip to sugar beet cultivation and raise average yields, for beets do best on irrigated land. At present yields are still disappointingly low compared to those achieved in Western Europe and the United States. The mission suggests that efforts be particularly devoted to selecting a series of varieties with a wide range in maturity, so that the operating season at the Homs factory can be considerably prolonged. In the Euphrates and Khabour river valleys there are areas suitable for beet cultivation which can obviously not be served by the Homs plant. Ultimately the establishment of additional factories in these areas may prove worthwhile. Although the cost of producing beet sugar in Syria is undoubtedly higher than the cost of importing raw sugar (which is principally if not wholly cane sugar), the cultivation of beets has beneficial effects on the soil which appear to warrant its encouragement.

Tobacco

Tobacco is a minor crop, though important as a source of government revenue and of farm income in the province of Latakia, where it is predominantly grown. It is one of the crops, however, which is most in need of improvement. Seed selection, curing and grading all leave much to be desired. The entire plant, rather than selected leaves, is often harvested at one time. The Tobacco Monopoly, which licenses the growers, has paid little attention to the improvement of methods. The mission suggests that the Monopoly devote an additional sum of at least £S 75,000 annually to this purpose. At present three varieties of tobacco are grown: Abou Riha, the so-called "Latakia tobacco," which is bought almost entirely by a single American cigarette manufacturer for blending; Chek-el-Bint, used in the manufacture of Syrian cigarettes; and Tombac, produced for water-pipe smoking. In view of the rather uncertain market for Abou Riha, it would appear wise to develop the production of high-aromatic tobacco of the Turkish or Macedonian type for which a more durable market seems

[14] See Annex C, p. 308.

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2149 433 assured. The possibility of growing Virginia-type tobaccos should also be explored.

Orchards and Vineyards

2145 433 Vineyards and orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits already make an important contribution to agricultural income. Both the quality and the yield could be substantially raised by proper insect control, the use of fertilizers and tracer elements, and better pruning. Many existing orchards need rejuvenation. Heavy frosts in 1949-50 severely damaged olive orchards around Aleppo, so that Syria is now on a net import basis for olive oil. Establishment of vineyards and orchards in the Djebel Druze would help materially to raise the present low level of income in that region. In Latakia province the cultivation of citrus could be significantly increased. The availability of ample long-term credit at low interest rates is especially important for an expansion and rejuvenation of orchards and vineyards.

Vegetables

2144 433 Vegetable growing in wide variety is concentrated in and around the larger population centers. The fact that so little is grown and consumed in the rural areas is due mainly to the fact that neither the small farmer nor the majority of consumers yet knows the value of a balanced diet; on the contrary, both hold vegetable cultivation in low esteem. Education and guidance centered upon the establishment of school gardens might do much to change this attitude.

The significant quantity of vegetables at present used by the local canning industry could easily be doubled though, as the canners explained to the mission, the poor quality of vegetables in general, and of peas and beans in particular, tends to limit the quantity suitable for processing. Better seed, improved cultural practices and adequate insect control measures could contribute greatly to higher quality and quantity. Improved transport, storage and marketing facilities should be included in community and cooperative development schemes, thus opening up possibilities for more exports and a very substantial increase in the activity of the local canning industry which at present produces about 4,000 tons of canned goods.

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248 4. *Gradual reduction of cotton cultivation in dry-farming areas.* Cotton growing under dry-farming conditions is too hazardous in Syria.

5. *Selection of cotton growing areas and permanent restriction to these regions.*

6. *Rotation plan.* Introduction of rotation without the customary fallow, e.g.:

1st year: cotton, green fodder mixed with barley; or cotton, wheat.

2nd year: maize, sorghum, green manure; or wheat, fodder crops.

3rd year: early peanuts, wheat mixed with leguminous plants or horse-beans; sorghum.

7. *Establishment of cotton grower associations.*

249 IV SUGAR BEET

In 1953-54 the cultivated area, mainly around Homs and Damascus, amounted to 4,200 hectares of irrigated land and about 2,000 hectares of rainfed land, generally divided into small plots of a few hectares and worked manually. The price of £S 60 per ton of beets delivered at the Homs factory makes cultivation very attractive, even to farmers at some distance from the factory and despite high labor costs. Maximum transport cost from producer to factory was, at the time of the mission's visit, £S 9 per ton. Seeds from Holland and Germany were provided without cost by the Sugar and Agricultural Products Company until 1953; since then the farmer has had to meet half of the cost of £S 117 per kg. Some farmers are thus inclined to produce their own seed, although ideally this should be undertaken only by experts.

The mission makes the following recommendations with respect to sugar beet:

1. Expansion of production should be sought mainly in irrigated areas. Careful account should be taken of all planting and climatic conditions since they directly affect sugar content; hot days and cool nights are a favorable influence.

2. The selection and development of an early-maturing type adaptable to Syrian conditions should be considered.

3. Sugar beet growing in rainfed regions with less than 600 mm. rainfall should be transferred to partly or fully irrigated land. It can rely on the abundant late winter and spring rains for partial irrigation.

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4. Mixed farming should be promoted in sugar beet areas. The cash return from sugar beet production is three to six times larger than that from wheat and other crops. Moreover, the leaves from one hectare of sugar beet make an excellent silage fodder, equivalent to about 4.5 tons of good hay. 249

v CROP DIVERSIFICATION

241 311

Practically all temperate and many subtropical crops can be and are grown in Syria. Their distribution, however, is very poor. The mission strongly emphasizes the desirability of a wider diversification to lessen the risks and to ensure a better use of available land and manpower. In nearly all the rainfed zones leguminous fodder crops could be substituted for the customary fallow. These would provide the soil with needed nitrogen, improve its structure and serve as fodder. If livestock were adequately fed for a single season, human food production would probably thereby be increased, indirectly, to a greater extent and sooner than if the land were sown to crops for human consumption. An increase in livestock, particularly in irrigated zones but also in the rainfed area, means fuller employment and higher income for the rural population.

To supplement winter vetch and berseem, the mission suggests the introduction for field trials of the cluster bean (*Cyanopsia sp. sp.*), a grain and forage plant widely cultivated in Sicily; some of the varieties can be grown with sorghum. In addition there is the possibility of goat's rue (*Galega orientalis*), a bushy, erect perennial herb of high nutritive value, and of sulla (*Hedysarum coronarium*), which can be used as green fodder or hay and which ranks with red clover in nutritive value. The latter grows best in deep, rich calcareous soils, but can also be grown in poor soil if it contains lime. Sulla can be sown alone, with cereals, or in mixtures with other legumes; it yields up to 120 tons of green matter per hectare under irrigation, and it may produce from 16-50 tons even on non-irrigated land.[6] Trials to reseed a wild species of alfalfa, reported to grow in the Anti-Lebanon region, should be undertaken in other areas. Cultivated lucerne and alfalfa (*Medicago sp. sp.*) have responded successfully; their more extensive cultivation should be encouraged. Of the 50 or more species the most common is *Medicago sativa* and *M. varia*, of which many strains are

[6] FAO publication, *Legumes in Agriculture*.

PRODUCTION

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مساحات ومحاصيل اهم انواع الخضار ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL VEGETABLES, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 5 — جدول رقم ٥

Vegetables	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Potatoes	3,687	36,615	3,887	38,226	3,058	32,294	بطاطا
Garlic	1,144	4,548	906	4,018	1,185	4,326	ثوم
Onions	4,043	39,745	4,169	33,135	4,454	36,830	بصل
Onion seeds	228	388	202	52	210	42	بادرون
Onion sets	635	1,136	721	2,299	749	3,667	قزح
Tomatoes	6,338	67,438	7,655	66,733	8,841	71,038	بندورة
Eggplant	2,742	34,995	3,670	34,905	3,728	28,403	باذنجان

مساحات ومحاصيل النباتات الصناعية ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢
(المساحة بالهكتار والمحصول بالطن)

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AREA AND PRODUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL CORPS, 1950/51 — 1952/53.
(Area in hectars, produce in tons)

Table No. 6 — جدول رقم ٦

Plantation	١٩٥١/١٩٥٠ 1950/1951		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١ 1951/1952		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢ 1952/1953		النوع
	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	المساحة Area	المحصول Produce	
Sugar cane	86	349	119	5,033	138	4,080	قصب السكر
Tobacco	4,026	4,164	3,951	3,894	2,082	1,669	تبغ
Tombac	391	381	385	362	317	253	تنباك
Cotton	217,352	62,924	189,271	58,074	127,558	46,964	قطن (شعر)
Linseed	180	180	220	220	532	533	كتان (بزر)
Hemp	3,330	3,383	4,292	4,131	4,038	2,172	قنب (الياف)
Tobacco (shak-el-bint)	3,956	3,090	3,296	2,234	3,309	2,820	تبغ شاك البنت
Sugar beet	211	2,715	2,624	55,320	4,264	49,572	الشوندر السكري

often an agent of the Aleppo merchant who furnishes the capital 438
and has the necessary warehouses in Aleppo and the commercial 441
knowledge and connections in the Syrian market and abroad to dispose of the crop at the best terms.

I. The Problem of Storage and Warehouses

The dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo merchants is such that 438
until the present time there is not a single warehouse or silo to store 241
wheat for a few months in all Jazirah belonging to an individual merchant or big farmer. During harvest season, the wheat is stacked in the open near the railway stations and left without cover until it is shipped to Aleppo. The hangers of the stations can only hold a small part of the crop. The Mira built a few depots but it is not known whether they will be put at the disposal of merchants.

The special conditions of cultivation in Jazirah connected with the problem of credit and land ownership make the transport of wheat from the farms to the stations during harvest season a hectic affair. This is caused by two reasons: in the first place, the farmer is always in need of money and has to ship his crop quickly to Aleppo to sell it, and, secondly, even if the big farmer is not in need of money, he does not feel it is safe to keep his crop in the villages. In most cases, he is only a tenant and it does not pay for him to construct a depot on land, he does not own. Even if he owned the land, he would hesitate to keep his crop away from the market until the winter months when he might need money but might find himself unable to transport his crop because of bad roads.

The logical solution would be to construct warehouses in the towns or near the stations, but, here again, the lack of capital prevents the accomplishment of this job.

The Kurd is the only farmer who keeps a part of his crop on the 241
land. As a good and thrifty peasant, he stores his seeds, the pro- 251
visions for his family and usually an amount of wheat equal to the seeds he planted. If anything remains, he sells to buy clothes and foodstuffs. The Kurd keeps the extra wheat he has in holes dug in the ground called "jifr". The hole is usually two meters in diameter and 2-3 meters deep. It is lined with "tibn" to keep the moisture away and the wheat remains in a good condition in it for several months. The peasant has a number of these jifrs depending on the

241 amount he has to store. The jifrs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifrs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

439 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep. The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer
221 and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

[For information pertaining to Syrian recipes and food preparation see 70: Rowland, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 200-231.]

62:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
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istry of Agriculture, and all meats offered for sale must carry an official stamp of approval. Few controls exist over the production of milk, however, except in some of the larger cities. Cow's or goat's milk is normally sold in bulk and peddled in donkey carts. Herds of goats are frequently driven through the streets, the animals being milked while the customer waits. The dairies and the herds which supply milk to the cities of Damascus and Aleppo are subject to inspection by the municipal veterinarians. Samples collected from restaurants and other food establishments may also be submitted to the food control laboratories of the Ministry of Health for bacteriologic examination. There are no modern facilities for pasteurization. A few dealers in Damascus retail bottled milk which has been pasteurized by submersion in boiling water baths. Little milk is consumed raw, since boiling is the general practice, but butter and cheese are frequent sources of infection. Brucellosis is enzootic among both goats and cattle, tuberculosis among the cattle.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

The present health organization of the Syrian government has evolved since 1943, when the republic was established. The health and the medical services are administered by the Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus. Executive authority resides in the Minister, who is advised on matters of policy by a Supreme Public Health Council. He is assisted by a Director General of Health, who, in turn, is advised by a Public Health Consultation Council made up of experts in representative technical fields. The functions of the Ministry are discharged through 7 constituent departments —public health affairs, public health laboratories, hospitals and clinics, inspections, pharmaceutical affairs, supplies and administration and records.

p. 145(B)

highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 944 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[60] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 282 164

p. 151(A)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
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versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in the same period, but the consumption of camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population. 232 164

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded. 164

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom used without boiling, but infection may result from the consumption of contaminated cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals. 232 164 262 252 164

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis is not compulsory in Syria, and the prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated, however, by the tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population. 164 165 164 183 164

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age. 659 751

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

An increase of about 60% in cotton production is expected by 1960, but present power capacity appears adequate to meet this expansion. 377 248

Glass

The Damascus glass factory owns a 600-KW power plant. The total productive capacity of the factory is about 43 tons of glass per day; in 1953 about 3,000 tons of glass were actually produced, representing about 70 days output at full capacity. If a consumption of about 100 KWH per ton of glass is assumed then the generated power in 1953 would have been about 0.3 million KWH. 377 323

Cold Storage

A cold storage plant in Damascus has a 500-KW power plant interconnected with the public utilities network. It can be assumed that about half of the approximately 2 million KWH required annually is supplied by the public utilities and half by the factory's plant. 377 254

Oil Mills

Two Aleppo oil mills have private power plants, the larger with a capacity of 1,200 KW, the smaller with 300 KW. These factories work only about 150 days per year (say six days per week during six months). With one-third of the capacity in reserve and an assumed load factor as low as 10% the power generated per year would be about 1.5 million KWH. 377 388

Flour Mill

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Sugar

In 1953 the Homs sugar factory processed 7,000 tons of sugar from beets and refined 22,000 tons from raw sugar. Power required for the former 377 257

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The company's present capacity is 800 tons of beet per day. The beet pulp 257
is dehydrated for use as animal fodder and about 600 tons were exported in 1953.

Raw sugar is imported from the West Indies, South America and Formosa. In 1952, imports of 16,400 tons produced about 15,000 tons of refined sugar; in 1953 imports rose to 24,000 tons, producing about 22,200 tons of refined sugar.

The total 1952 and 1953 production of refined sugar was 19,200 and 30,000 metric tons respectively. An average yield of about 14% refined sugar is obtained from beet sugar and 91.5% of refined sugar from the raw sugar.

The imported raw sugar is taxed at 27.5 piasters per kg., while the corresponding tax on imported refined sugar is 43.5 piasters. The price of refined sugar at the time of the mission's visit was 85 piasters per kg. Although the law provides for tax rebate on exported goods containing sugar, the net price is still considerably higher than world prices and it was reported to be administratively extremely difficult to obtain a rebate.

The molasses by-product is used for the production of alcohol, of which 477 tons were produced in 1953 by fermentation and distillation.

Vegetable and Fruit Canning and Preserving 255

Damascus is the principal center of the canning and preserving industry, the Ghouta being an important vegetable and fruit growing area. Two large factories and a smaller one, equipped with modern machinery, produce canned vegetables and fruit, dried fruit, fruit paste, fruit juices, jams, pickles, etc., manufacturing their own cans from imported tin plate. In the canning season these three factories employ about 1,200 workers in all. There are also a considerable number of small establishments in Damascus and elsewhere which produce jams, paste, juices, etc. Production varies considerably but recent estimates suggest a total output of about 4,000 tons a year.

The supply of vegetables for canning is limited and their quality could be greatly improved. The industry has suffered from the dissolution of the Customs Union with Lebanon, that country having been an important market.

As the Syrian market for canned goods is limited, the industry is very dependent on exports, but the high price of sugar makes successful compe-

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328 tition difficult. Exports of canned vegetables and fruit products without sugar, as for example dried fruits (apricots), pulp and tomato juice just now seem to offer greater possibilities, but foreign quality competition is still severe.

Cement

329 There are two cement factories in Syria, one near Damascus and one in Aleppo. Their combined capacity in 1953 was 243,000 metric tons. Planned expansions are expected to result in an increase to 403,000 tons by 1955. The two companies have about 500 factory employees, working on a continuous three-shift basis and there are about 300 additional workers in the quarries.

There are ample supplies of limestone in close proximity to each factory. The other constituent materials are readily available and are usually brought in as return loads. Refractory bricks are imported. The rotary kilns are oil fired, about 150 kg. of fuel oil being used for each metric ton of cement produced. The transport costs of fuel oil are heavy, varying from £S 10 to over £S 20 per ton.

Syrian cement now costs about £S 80 per ton ex factory, including the tax (for domestic use) of £S 15 per ton, against prices of from £S 50 to £S 70 per ton for European and Lebanese cement c.i.f. Beirut.

Glass

323 Glassmaking is one of Syria's traditional industries. Until the end of the last war, broken glass constituted its raw material and primitive hand methods were used, but production is now concentrated mainly in one large factory on the outskirts of Damascus. There are also 12 small enterprises, several of them in the Damascus area, engaged in the production of bottles, glass containers, lamp glasses, etc. Machines are used in certain processes, but production is still largely in the hands of glass blowers.

The output of the large Damascus factory, considered to be the most modern factory of its kind in the Middle East, averaged almost 4,000 tons annually during 1950-53. Sand has to be imported from Lebanon, as the local sand is unsuitable; soda ash and silica are imported from Europe and fuel oil from Lebanon. The company sells its standard window glass in

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Grain Milling

The grain milling industry is spread widely throughout Syria. The Ministry of National Economy records over 360 small enterprises with a total of 311 mills and 257 cylinders, employing about 1,700 workers. Many of these are very small units driven by a diesel engine or by water power. In addition, there are five larger mills in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs fitted with modern machinery and employing a total of about 250 workers.

Other Industries

Syria has many minor industries, some of long standing, others new. These include enterprises for the manufacture of paints and colors, biscuits, spaghetti, confectionery, metal containers, furniture, domestic utensils, liquid gas, alcoholic and other beverages, ropes, tiles, cement piping, plastics, cosmetics, cardboard, plywood, pins, nails and springs, and establishments engaged in refrigeration, processing of licorice root, casting of iron, brass and other metals, manufacture of hand and machine tools, repair of motor vehicles and accessories.

Deposits of asphalt near Latakia are being worked by a company which produces raw and processed asphalt and asphalt tiles.

II APPRAISAL OF INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS

Location

The Damascus, Aleppo and Homs-Hama areas are the main centers of manufacturing industry, a logical location in terms of accessibility of raw materials, communications, water and power services, skilled labor and the proximity of markets. These industrial towns, conveniently situated at a distance of less than 150 miles from the nearest seaports, and connected with these by road, rail or both, are the natural market places for agricultural products and the largest centers of consumption for manufactured goods. Latakia, next in importance, is a rapidly growing port town.

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figure yet recorded. Very little of the valuable by-products is used for feeding farm stock in Syria; the husks, which constitute about 35% of the weight of the seed, are disposed of mainly as boiler fuel.

In the areas near the olive groves there are about 750 animal or hand-operated mills and presses and about 200 either wholly or mainly mechanically operated. The annual production of olive oil has averaged 10,000 tons over the 10 years 1942 to 1951, five of which were poor seasons. Most of the production is locally consumed, forming an important component of the diet.

The seed crushing factories employ about 1,000 workers, and in the olive growing districts there are probably another 1,500-2,000 who work on the olive mills and presses for short periods each year.

Since August 1, 1952 there has been an embargo on the import of vegetable oils to protect the local market.

Soap

In the past the renowned Syrian soap industry was based entirely on olive oil; now there is a tendency to mix in cheaper oils and fatty acids. The industry has lost much ground both in the home and foreign markets due to the competition of occidental soaps and the failure of Syrian manufacturers to modernize their methods. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners reported in 1947 that by degrees the small "cottage" installations were giving way to larger, though not necessarily modern, factories.

Today according to official figures eight of the 59 soap factories are considered modern; 600 workers are employed.

The total soap production in 1947 was under 4,000 tons. By 1953 it was estimated to have risen to between 8,000-9,000 tons, of which 1,900 tons were exported. Since August 17, 1952 importation of most types of soap has been prohibited.

Sugar Refining

Until the Sugar and Agricultural Products Company started production on a small scale in Homs in 1949, Syria imported all of its sugar requirements. growing only a small amount of cane locally. The company has tried to develop a beet crop that will provide most of domestic sugar requirements. In 1953, 51,500 tons of beet produced 7,058 tons of sugar.

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The company's present capacity is 800 tons of beet per day. The beet pulp is dehydrated for use as animal fodder and about 600 tons were exported in 1953. 257

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377 was stated to average 72 KWH per ton (this is very low compared with
257 the 120-150 KWH generally required for this process); power for refining would not exceed 20 KWH per ton. The factory's 2,000 KW steam generators are interconnected with the public utilities network, allowing about 250 KW to be supplied or received according to the relative needs and availabilities in the two systems.

The above figures on beet and raw sugar processing indicate (at 72 and 20 KWH per ton respectively) that some one million KWH were generated for these purposes in 1953, exclusive of power supplied to the Homs-Hama network.

It is anticipated that sugar beet extraction will increase from 7,000 tons to some 20,000 tons by 1960, requiring an additional one million KWH.

Dyeing

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The Hama dyeing plant's 435 KW generators are not connected with the public utilities network. The power generated by this plant in 1953 is estimated at about 0.6 million KWH.

Conclusion

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The power generated by private factory power plants in 1953, equal to about one-third of that generated in the plants of the public utilities, was therefore distributed approximately as follows:

	Million KWH
Cement factories	22.0
Textile factories	13.2
Ginning factories	2.5
Glass factory	0.3
Cold storage plant	1.0
Oil mills	1.5
Flour mills	1.2
Sugar factory	1.0
Dyeing factory	0.6
Total	43.3

Future power requirements will be largely conditioned by the development of the cement, textile and beet industries, for which, as indicated

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433 No over-all figures on the increase of capital, output or employment are available, but the following data are indicative. Between 1945 and 1953,
472 inclusive, a total of £S 70.7 million was invested in thirty-seven industrial joint-stock companies; of this £S 53.1 million was invested in 1945 and 1946. 1/
454 A considerable amount was also invested in unincorporated enterprises. Sales of electricity to industry increased from 15 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 28 million in 1951, 36 million in 1953 and 19 million during the first half of 1954. Imports of industrial machinery and equipment amounted to 9,100 tons in 1950, 19,500 in 1951, 10,800 in 1952 and 12,000 tons in 1953, with an aggregate value of £S 200 million. 2/ Table 51 shows available information on the principal Syrian industries.

433 The textile industry is by far the most important, as regards capital invested, employment and value of output. The rapid expansion of cotton growing
288 led to an increase in the number of cotton ginneries, from thirty in 1945 to 110 in 1953. Cotton spinning began in 1953; by 1953 there were 10,000 spindles and by 1954 some 92,000 with a capacity of 12,000 tons of cotton and rayon yarn. Output of cotton yarn rose from 1,700 tons in 1944 to 5,500 in 1950 and 6,600 tons in 1953; that of rayon yarn from 800 in 1950 to 1,200 in 1953; there was a further increase in 1954. Small factories also produce 40 tons of woollen yarn and 16 tons of silk yarn. Mechanical looms increased from 1,500 in 1939 to 3,500 in 1953; there are also 6,000 hand looms. Output of cloth, knitted goods and hosiery is shown in table 51. Dyeing and printing are done in well equipped factories established after the Second World War. The textile industry meets local requirements in most branches and provides an export surplus.

433 Food processing industries form the next most important group. A large-scale sugar refinery started production in 1950, on imported raw sugar; its output rose
258 to 30,000 tons in 1953, of which 23,000 were from imported raw sugar and 7,000 from locally grown beets; output in 1954 was about 38,000 tons. It also produces 1,000 tons of alcohol and some starch glucose as a by-product. The refinery, which fully meets Syria's demand, has not yet reached its full capacity. The vegetable oil industry produces, by means of modern presses established after the war as well as older hand presses, some 7,000 to 12,000 tons of olive oil, about 6,000 to 8,000 tons of cotton-seed oil and some 2,000 to 4,000 tons of other oils. Other important food and beverage industries include the making of biscuits
655 and macaroni, oleomargarine, confectionery and chocolates, and also brewing and canning. The tobacco industry is a State monopoly. 3/

1/ Of the total, £S 23 million was accounted for by six textile companies, 13.4 million by four food processing companies, 10.5 million by three vegetable oil and soap companies, 9.0 million by a cement and building materials company, 8.0 million by a glass and porcelain company, 3.3 million by seventeen electric power companies and 3.5 million by five other companies.

2/ Data from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ The Government took over the tobacco monopoly from a concessionary company in 1951, paying £S 2.5 million as compensation.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

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The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

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The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

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So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

History

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Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria an

25: Wanner S-5 (no date) 1948 Ml Middle East
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511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

434 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
409 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigaton goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie
421 has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

i [The estate of Misherfe, near Homs --Analyst]

LAND TENURE

8 471 Of the total 160 families in the village, 100 own some land and 60 own no land. The peasant owners are divided as follows

1. Rich farmers, owning about 10 hectares ..	5	families
2. Medium farmers, owning from 3 to 8 hectares	80	"
3. Poor farmers, owning between 1 and 3 hectares	15	"
4. Share-tenants	10	"
5. Labourers	50	"

S 241 As in Misherfe, two-thirds of the land is uncropped each year. The peasant divides the land into three plots, one sown with a crop, one ploughed but not sown, and one fallow. The wheat yield is slightly higher than the average for Syria, and amounts to 833 kilogrammes per hectare (6½ hundredweight per acre); barley yields are also slightly higher, being 8 hundredweight to the acre.

S 571 As a result of the more equal distribution of land, rather better yields, and more irrigation, the standard of living is better than in Misherfe. The first two classes, including half the 262 families, can reach an adequate standard of consumption of food and other essentials, which is reckoned to be 25 kilogrammes of wheat per month, 1 kilogramme of meat per month (i.e. one sheep a year), 40 kilogrammes of olive oil and 20 kilogrammes of 'samn' per year, 4 tins of kerosene and a small quantity of clothing. The remainder of the village, about one-half of the total, that is the poor peasants, labourers, and share-tenants, are unable to reach this standard and live in great S 426 poverty, in one-roomed huts. The majority of these cultivators are heavily indebted, and the burden of indebtedness has doubled during the war years, because debts are usually incurred in gold.

L 471 The third study relates to Kfer Sa'ab in the north Lebanon, a hill village of small owner-cultivators. Of the total area of 200 hectares, about 30 are owned by the sheikh of the village. The total number of families is 150 (1,200 people), of which 120 own land and 30 are landless. A few peasant owners are rich with 5 hectares of land; 60 are medium owners with 1·5 to 2·5 L 242 hectares of land, and 25 own 0·5 to 1·5. Here cultivation [S.2] is much more intensive than in Syria, and half the land is irrigated.

[Ashrafie, near Damascus -- Analyst]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

United States mission estimated that 50 per cent of the land was in fallow during 1948.[31] Increased irrigation and high prices for agricultural commodities have reduced significantly the fallow in the past few years, and the percentage may be less now. 311 241

PRODUCTION

Syria is normally self-sufficient in most foods. In fact, the country exports fresh and dried fruits, lentils and other legumes, tobacco, wool, butter, hides, and meat. Occasional poor harvests make it necessary to import food grains. 433

The greatest deficiency is in rice, which has been displaced by cotton in recent years to such an extent that almost all of the country's requirements must be imported. Last year's bad cotton crop may prompt farmers to revert to rice and, if so, this will reduce the deficiency.

Government figures indicate that production of food has not kept pace with the expansion in population and that the per capita food supply and individual calorie intake are both declining.[32] These conclusions are based on highly conjectural statistics and are in conflict with opinions of the United States Agricultural Attache and Syrian officials who are intimately acquainted with the country's agricultural problems. These observers believe there has been no real decline in food consumption, except possibly for short periods of time. Certainly there is no shortage now, and the bumper cereal crop in 1952 should enable the country to fill domestic needs and export at least 30 per cent of its wheat and possibly 50 per cent of its barley. 433 146

The daily diet consists largely of starches, it is true, but this is due more to habit than anything else. The resources of the country are ample to permit a much more balanced diet. 262

PRODUCTIVITY

Syrian agriculture often is characterized by the low productivity of the agricultural worker. It is obvious that a great many more people are used on each acre of land than is necessary. The low agricultural income is reflected in the obvious poverty of the people. Yet, comparisons with other countries, and even detailed calculations, are of questionable value due to the unreliability of the statistics. 461 241 511

Government reports on average yields also are open to question. Official figures show that wheat yields have dropped sharply, while cotton yields have tended upward, except for the extremely bad year in 1951-52. They also show very wide fluctuation. Experienced observers point out that the yields are especially questionable because both acreage and production figures are not reliable. On the basis of conversations with producers in various sections, it is apparent that yields are normally fairly high and that they fluctuate, depending on water availability and on insect devastation. 241

POTENTIALITIES

A number of missions which have studied the possibilities of agricultural development in Syria, especially in the last five or six years, all mention the

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[31] *Activities of FAO, 1950-52*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1952, p. 58.

[32] *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, November, 1951.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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bul to Baghdad. A railroad also runs from Beirut to Damascus via Rayak. A second line from Damascus to Amman and Ma'an, in Jordan, forms part of the so-called "pilgrim" railway, opened in 1904-06. Air services are available from Damascus and, to a lesser extent, from Aleppo to Beirut and Baghdad, thence to Europe, Africa and the Far East. 496 509

Food and Nutrition

The nutritional standards of the people vary markedly in different regions, being highest in the vicinity of Damascus and lowest among the Alawites of Latakia province and the peasants of Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Undernutrition is common, but generally it is more widespread in the rural villages than in the urban areas. Due to the lack of adequate storage and transportation facilities, local food shortages are frequent, particularly during poor crop years. Up to the present, there has been little organized effort to promote better nutrition among the different population groups. It is expected that such a program will be initiated by the nutrition division created within the governmental health services in 1952. 146 369 [262] 146 654

Cereals constitute the staple foods, and, with certain root vegetables, contribute 70 to 80 per cent of the caloric content of the average diet. Breads prepared from wheat flour are consumed in all parts of the country. Barley is sometimes employed, while maize and sorghum millet are used in the southeast. Rice is universally popular: it is grown in the Al Jazira region, and large amounts are also imported. Broad beans, chick-peas and lentils are basic food items in most areas. Other vegetables, including onions, potatoes, beets, tomatoes, eggplant and the leafy spinach and French lettuce, are abundant in Damascus and Al Jazira provinces, but scarce in Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Numerous fruits are consumed in season, but the supply is scanty in the Euphrates valley and in the southern provinces. Olives and olive oil are important among most population groups. Milk is 262

widely used, chiefly in the form of *leben*, a 262
fermented milk product, cheese or butter.
About 60 to 70 per cent of the milk is de- 234
rived from sheep; the remainder, from cattle
or goats. The Juliana breed of cattle and a
special breed of "Damascus goat" are raised
in most regions and are noteworthy as milk
producers. Fowl and eggs are usually plenti- 235
ful, but the consumption of meat is nor-
mally low, especially in the rural areas.
Mutton is the principal meat, although the 262
flesh of cattle, goats and camels is also uti-
lized. Fish are valuable as a source of pro- 226
tein in the Euphrates and the Khabour river
basins and along the coast; they are seldom
available in other regions.

The Bedouin live chiefly on milk prod- 262
ucts made from the milk of their flocks, aug- 361
mented by cereals and, occasionally, dates.
Meat is often more of a luxury among the
nomads than among the villagers. The aver-
age Bedouin diet is usually sparse and
monotonous.

Housing

Life in rural Syria centers in the villages, 342
which are self-contained social units. Struc-
turally, they are compact, with the houses
attached, and built in such a manner that
a continuous windowless wall faces the
street. Mud brick or adobe is the predomi-
nating building material, although stone is
sometimes employed in the highland areas.
The houses may consist of one or several
rooms, which almost invariably open into a
central compound. Separate shelters for
storage and for the livestock may line the
sides of the courtyards, but in the poorer
villages the domestic animals are frequently
housed with the family, at least during the
winter months. The roofs are typically flat,
made of rolled earth overlaid on poles and
reeds or of thatch. Beehive-type houses with
domed or conical roofs, however, are a char-
acteristic feature of the treeless plains in
Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces.
Dwellings built partially underground, often
simulating caves, are encountered in some
mountain villages in Latakia. Considerable

sumption of fly-contaminated foods and of raw vegetables grown in polluted soils provides an important means of transmission. Water-borne outbreaks are frequent in the rural villages, but they have decreased within recent years with the improvement of the drinking water supplies in the larger cities. Reports for 1949 show that 495 cases of typhoid fever were treated in government hospitals throughout the country, 295 cases in institutions in Damascus *muhafazat*. Similarly, 671 cases were recorded in 1950. 164 364

The relative prevalence of the different paratyphoid infections is uncertain. Paratyphoid A fever predominates among the cases in which the differential diagnosis has been established, although paratyphoid B infections are undoubtedly more numerous. Paratyphoid C fever has been diagnosed in Lebanon, but its presence in Syria has not been determined. 164

Immunization with typhoid-paratyphoid A and B vaccine is carried on by the health authorities among the contacts of known cases. Immunization is also widely practiced in the urban areas. 751

Dysenteries. Dysentery is prominent among the causes of illness. The available data give little indication of the proportionate prevalence of amebic and bacillary infections. Amebiasis is widespread, and associated with a high percentage of chronic carriers. Contaminated foods constitute the chief sources of infection, and the maximum incidence is noted in spring and summer, when lettuce and other green, leafy vegetables are consumed in abundance. 164 [262]

Recognized *Shigella dysenteriae* infections are rare, but occasional bacteriologically confirmed cases are recorded. Strains of the Flexner group are probably responsible for the majority of cases of bacillary dysentery. The differentiation of types is made only in Damascus, and, since few cases are hospitalized, the existing records have little significance.

Diarrhea and enteritis are prevalent, especially in infancy and early childhood. Local authorities state that fully 85 per cent

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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of the babies treated at the maternity and child health center in Damascus suffer from intestinal infections. Epidemics of diarrheal disease often coincide with the ripening of the apricot crop. The ready contamination of this thin-skinned fruit by flies and other insects accounts for the local designation of the early summer diarrheas in the fruit-growing districts as *mish mish* (apricot) disease. 164 164 262

Cholera. Serious outbreaks have accompanied the introduction of cholera in the past, but the disease was absent from Syria from 1928 to 1947, shortly after the epidemic in Egypt. On December 19, 1947, cholera was reported from 2 adjacent villages in the province of Hauran, on the road from Palestine to Damascus. At the same time, cases occurred in 3 villages in the irrigated plain of the Al Ghouta, within 3 or 4 miles of Damascus. Although 45 cases, with 18 deaths, were reported officially, it was generally believed that the actual incidence totaled at least 77 cases. 164

Quarantine measures were promptly imposed in Hauran and Damascus provinces, and all persons entering or leaving those regions were required to possess certificates of immunization against cholera. Over one and one half million individuals were inoculated with cholera vaccine in the vicinity of Damascus, as well as in the affected districts of Hauran and in the city of Aleppo. Supplies and assistance were furnished the Ministry of Health by the World Health Organization, the Near East Foundation and the Egyptian and Lebanese governments. Vaccine was also provided jointly by the Arabian American Oil Company and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. No cases were reported after the initial outbreaks, and on January 17, 1948, Syria was declared free from the disease. The exact origin of the epidemic was never definitely established. 744 164 645 747

Helminthiases. ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Hookworm infection, caused by *Ancylostoma duodenale*, is prevalent among the agricultural workers in foci along the banks of the 164 463 369

versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in the same period, but the consumption of camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population. 232 164

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded. 164

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom used without boiling, but infection may result from the consumption of contaminated cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals. 232 164 262 252 164

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis is not compulsory in Syria, and the prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated, however, by the tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population. 164 165 164 183 164

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age. 659 751

الانتاج

انتاج السوائل الكحولية

PRODUCTION OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUIDS

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

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Year and Month	العرق (كغ) Arak (Kilo)	الخمر (كيلو) Wine (Kilo)	سيرتو ايثيل (كيلو) Ethyl Alcohol (Kilo)	كحول معقم (كغ) Denatured Alcohol (Kilo)	كونياك (ليتر) Cognac (Litre)	منتجات كحولية اخرى (ليتر) Other Alcoholic Liquids (Litre)	السنوات والشهور
1941	673,933	589,178	3,238	955	1,771	6,871	١٩٤١
1942	777,659	186,954	2,878	—	2,339	3,892	١٩٤٢
1943	1,147,651	207,917	37,015	17,391	2,208	3,061	١٩٤٣
1944	679,292	135,805	18,230	10,317	1,550	5,514	١٩٤٤
1945	822,738	161,735	35,259	2,245	1,868	3,051	١٩٤٥
1946	827,535	88,491	7,578	6,810	876	2,528	١٩٤٦
1947	589,928	65,567	76,764	8,074	—	—	١٩٤٧
1948	1,060,852	132,568	36,364	20,417	4,465	1,404	١٩٤٨
1949	542,467	145,422	40,586	20,068	2,359	—	١٩٤٩
1950	819,567	170,326	194,582	100,180	1,443	2,125	١٩٥٠
1951	375,559	122,901	236,025	127,549	1,111	15,645	١٩٥١
1952	1,016,231	299,054	320,347	156,191	2,766	22,408	١٩٥٢
1952							١٩٥٢
January	23,067	550	24,220	10,080	—	2,854	كانون الثاني
February	19,321	—	24,420	10,250	—	923	شباط
March	13,958	4,668	42,097	10,812	—	6,084	آذار
April	25,606	1,830	14,366	4,384	200	1,329	نيسان
May	15,419	120	26,806	10,175	356	1,235	ايار
June	12,180	—	21,860	10,953	—	1,490	حزيران
July	6,574	—	23,530	14,597	—	1,854	تموز
August	6,203	—	40,900	17,775	—	2,390	آب
September	62,509	—	12,258	30,915	—	379	ايلول
October	145,160	84,340	29,992	12,759	90	1,125	تشرين اول
November	75,393	85,538	31,239	12,719	1,475	2,108	تشرين ثاني
December	607,751	121,658	30,619	10,322	645	632	كانون اول

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S L 164 744 276

of clinics and in the cities a shortage of qualified staff to undertake massage, radiotherapy, and orthopædics, and there is special need to combat tuberculosis. Syrians and Lebanese are not addicted to hashish which, however, is grown in the Biqaa and smuggled to Egypt. The Lebanese Government periodically burns many of the plantations, which inflates the price of the surviving crop.

S L 433

Economic Survey

More than half the population of the two countries is engaged in agriculture which is the most important economic activity. Natural resources hardly exist; there is bitumen in Jebel Bishri in Syria but its production would not be economic; about 10,000 tons a year of asphalt is produced from the neighbourhood of Latakia; and salt is extracted in commercial quantities near Aleppo.

S L 315 382

Petroleum

For a number of years, associates of IPC searched for oil in Syria and Lebanon but without finding it in commercial quantities; in consequence, the areas held by these IPC associates have been given up. However, the two Governments are still anxious for further efforts to be made to find oil in commercial quantities. The importance of petroleum in the economy of Syria and Lebanon lies in the situation of the two republics athwart the pipelines from the fields of northern Iraq and Saudi Arabia which have outlets on the Mediterranean.[1] From Iraq a 12-inch and 16-inch line carry oil across Syria by way of Palmyra and Homs to Tripoli in the Lebanon. Together, these two lines can carry about 8 million tons of oil a year (160,000 barrels daily). A third IPC line from Kirkuk to Homs then bears north of the other two and reaches the sea at Banias, and so does not run through Lebanon at all. This new line is 26–30–32-inches in diameter and can deliver oil at about 16 million tons a year (320,000 barrels daily). From the fields of Saudi Arabia a 30–31 inch American pipeline (Tapline) travels over 1,000 miles on its way to Sidon in Lebanon, passing through Jordan and Syria. At present the line is pumping at a rate of about 15 million tons a year (300,000 barrels daily). It should be noted that these four lines all carry crude oil, some of which is refined on the Mediterranean shore for local requirements but the bulk is shipped as crude to the refineries of Europe and elsewhere.

S L 382

The line from Kirkuk to Haifa is not operating and the Haiaf

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

295 Damascus to manufacture rubber boots, canvas and rubber shoes, and felt and rubber shoes by the hot molding process, using imported crude rubber, imported and local waste rubber and canvas, and locally made felt. Production is said to be about 300,000 pairs per year and about 200 workers are employed. Other factories in Damascus and Aleppo produce rubber soles and heels. About 1,600 tons of rubber and rubber waste were imported in 1953, but it is not known how much was used in the boots and shoes industry in addition to local scrap rubber. The importation of boots and shoes is prohibited.

Matches

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372 Syria's first match factory started production in Damascus in 1930. By 1952, six more had been built. Damascus has the three largest, Aleppo the other four. Supplies are drawn mostly from local timber, though some additional wood, as well as chemicals, is imported.

An improved layout of machines and the introduction of small conveyors would increase efficiency and assist in lowering costs.

Together the factories employ about 350 whole or part time workers. The three Damascus factories produced about 25.6 million boxes in 1952 and 32.2 million in 1953. Production figures for the Aleppo factories are not available. The importation of matches is prohibited.

Tobacco

277
655 A number of enterprises grade and prepare tobacco for export, but the manufacture and importation of cigarettes and tobacco has, since 1951, been confined to the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration.

The monopoly operates a cigarette factory in Damascus and one in Aleppo, and a factory in Latakia which manufactures and packs tobacco for retail sale. The tobacco for manufacture is partly Syrian (from the Latakia region) and partly imported. Cigarettes, tobacco and cigars are also imported from Europe and the United States.

The Damascus branch is in a new factory where tobacco is sorted, damped, stripped by hand only, and cut. The cigarettes are made on a number of old German machines and a few new American ones.

The tobacco monopoly employs 2,300 workers; total production of all three factories amounted to 2.7 million kg. in 1953.

PRODUCTION

277

كمية انتاج التبغ المصنوع (بالكيلو)

QUANTITY OF TOBACCO MANUFACTURES

(In kilos)

Table No. 17 — جدول رقم ١٧

Year and Month	التنباك Tombac	التبغ المفروم Tobacco	السجائر Cigarettes	المجموع Total	السنوات والشهور
1939	208,853	799,711	416,035	1,424,604	١٩٣٩
1940	238,523	1,007,741	461,024	1,707,288	١٩٤٠
1941	244,860	716,368	713,216	1,674,444	١٩٤١
1942	215,689	536,902	1,038,005	1,790,606	١٩٤٢
1943	270,223	439,031	1,223,609	1,932,863	١٩٤٣
1944	233,948	606,188	1,321,219	2,163,355	١٩٤٤
1945	224,365	642,881	864,692	1,731,938	١٩٤٥
1946	161,632	585,875	865,226	1,613,733	١٩٤٦
1947	146,479	586,918	833,235	1,566,632	١٩٤٧
1948	161,971	810,411	962,372	1,934,754	١٩٤٨
1949	131,355	701,699	1,192,443	2,025,497	١٩٤٩
1950	129,766	585,100	1,360,550	2,075,416	١٩٥٠
1951	131,588	558,972	1,449,043	2,139,603	١٩٥١
1952	119,994	754,467	1,573,244	2,447,705	١٩٥٢
1953	132,122	882,500	1,643,903	2,658,525	١٩٥٣
1952					١٩٥٢
January	9,310	46,816	122,885	179,011	كانون ثاني
February	9,910	56,079	118,087	184,076	شباط
March	12,275	69,334	129,363	210,972	آذار
April	7,558	66,771	119,646	193,975	نيسان
May	11,382	73,657	128,570	213,609	ايار
June	10,676	62,826	110,161	183,663	حزيران
July	10,313	60,944	152,731	223,988	تموز
August	9,990	71,245	135,000	216,241	آب
September	11,993	64,995	131,345	208,333	ايلول
October	6,983	67,502	159,888	234,253	تشرين اول
November	8,402	56,748	137,516	202,666	تشرين ثاني
December	11,317	57,550	128,051	196,918	كانون اول
1953					١٩٥٣
January	9,271	61,058	131,841	202,170	كانون ثاني
February	9,446	59,504	132,740	201,690	شباط
March	10,020	67,593	127,389	205,002	آذار
April	9,769	79,280	130,330	219,379	نيسان
May	8,968	87,936	145,282	242,186	ايار
June	12,907	81,068	125,013	219,008	حزيران
July	10,564	54,421	128,925	193,910	تموز
August	12,116	79,550	130,042	221,708	آب
September	13,856	88,064	180,513	282,433	ايلول
October	12,523	79,310	174,047	265,880	تشرين اول
November	11,722	68,597	122,198	202,517	تشرين ثاني
December	10,960	76,099	115,584	202,643	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

انتاج السوائل الكحولية

PRODUCTION OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUIDS

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

274
278

Year and Month	العرق (كيلو) Arak (Kilo)	النبيذ (كيلو) Wine (Kilo)	سيتو ايثيل (كيلو) Ethyl Alcohol (Kilo)	كحول معتق (كيلو) Denatured Alcohol (Kilo)	كونياك (ليتر) Cognac (Litre)	منتجات كحولية اخرى (ليتر) Other Alcoholic Liquids (Litre)	السنوات والشهور
1941	673,933	589,178	3,238	955	1,771	6,874	١٩٤١
1942	777,659	196,954	2,878	—	2,339	3,892	١٩٤٢
1943	1,147,651	207,917	37,015	17,391	2,208	3,061	١٩٤٣
1944	679,293	135,808	16,230	10,317	1,530	5,614	١٩٤٤
1945	822,738	165,735	35,259	2,245	1,868	3,061	١٩٤٥
1946	827,535	88,491	7,578	6,810	876	2,528	١٩٤٦
1947	589,928	65,567	78,764	5,074	—	—	١٩٤٧
1948	1,069,852	132,568	36,364	20,417	4,465	1,404	١٩٤٨
1949	542,467	145,422	40,566	20,069	2,359	—	١٩٤٩
1950	819,587	170,326	194,582	100,180	1,443	2,125	١٩٥٠
1951	375,559	122,901	256,025	127,549	1,111	18,645	١٩٥١
1952	1,016,231	299,054	330,347	156,191	2,766	22,408	١٩٥٢
1952							١٩٥٢
January	22,067	850	24,220	10,030	—	2,854	كانون ثاني
February	19,321	—	34,430	10,250	—	923	شباط
March	13,958	4,668	42,097	10,812	—	6,084	آذار
April	28,606	1,880	14,366	4,384	200	1,339	نيسان
May	15,419	120	26,806	10,175	356	1,235	ايار
June	12,190	—	21,360	10,953	—	1,490	حزيران
July	6,574	—	23,530	14,597	—	1,854	تموز
August	6,203	—	40,900	17,775	—	2,390	آب
September	62,599	—	12,258	30,915	—	379	ايلول
October	145,160	84,340	29,992	12,759	90	1,125	تشرين اول
November	75,393	85,838	31,239	12,719	1,475	2,103	تشرين ثاني
December	607,751	121,658	30,619	10,922	645	622	كانون اول

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Syria at about £S 2.85 per square meter. Most of its production is sold 323
locally and there has recently been a marked increase in demand from its export markets in Lebanon and Jordan where Syrian glass is admitted duty free. Since 1952 the importation of sheet glass, many containers and other glass articles has been prohibited.

Tanning and Leather Dressing

The development of the tanning and leather dressing industry from 282
the handicraft to the mechanically-aided stage began about 1929 and has made good progress, particularly since the dissolution of the Customs Union with Lebanon.

The supply of Syrian sheep and goat skins is more than sufficient to meet local demand, but raw cow and buffalo hides were imported to the extent of over 2,000 tons in 1951 and over 2,500 tons in 1953 to supplement the supply of local hides. About 800 tons of untreated hides and skins were exported in 1951 and 600 in 1953, and about 430 tons and 330 tons of processed leather and leather goods in 1951 and 1953 respectively. According to the most recent official figures (end of 1953) the tanneries which the government classes as factories numbered 75, mostly in the Aleppo and Damascus areas. The annual output amounted to 2,700 tons of sole hide and 4.9 million square feet of other leather. The number of workers employed was given as 2,700.

Elsewhere we have mentioned the successful establishment of an industrial zone for tanneries on the outskirts of Damascus. This has provided an opportunity for the introduction of additional modern machinery and a great improvement in working conditions at the new location. The new tanneries vary considerably in size, the number of workers ranging from five or six to about 100.

Boots and Shoes 295

Leather boots and shoes with leather or rubber soles are made by hand or on simple machines in small workshops in most parts of the country, or by the retailer on his own premises. There are no reliable figures of the number of workers or volume of production.

During the last few years four factories have been established near

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rayon yarn and cloth, two in Damascus and four in Aleppo, employing 288
nearly 6,000 workers. Between 90,000 and 100,000 spindles producing cotton and rayon yarn and about 1,400 mechanical looms are in operation in these factories or were in the process of being installed at the time of the mission's visit; it has been estimated that in 1953 between 15-20% of the total number of spindles was engaged in the spinning of rayon. The total yarn production in that year was about 8,000 tons, of which 6,000 was cotton yarn. The factories are well built and most of the machinery is less than 10 years old. The older or less efficient machinery is being replaced and there is a gradual conversion to fully automatic looms.

Syrian cotton has now largely replaced imported raw material; on the other hand, imports of fiber and yarn for making rayon cloth and knitted garments have increased considerably during the past two years. Imports of fiber rose from 1,300 tons in 1951 to nearly 3,000 in 1953. Imports of rayon yarn increased during the same period from 4,160 tons to 6,572 tons. Practically all the cotton yarn produced in Syria is used locally. About 400 tons of cotton cloth, 400 tons of rayon yarn and 1,800 tons of silk and artificial silk cloth were exported in 1953.

Three factories are engaged in the spinning (one in Aleppo with about 3,000 spindles) or weaving (two in Damascus with a total of 38 looms) of woolen yarns and woolen and worsted cloth. While some of the machinery is old, it is in good condition and the buildings are well constructed. In 1953 about 160 workers were employed in these factories. Although Syria exports considerable quantities of raw wool, its modern wool manufacturing industry is based entirely on imported materials.

Four small factories in Damascus produce silk and rayon brocades and brocades with metallic threads on mechanical looms. Brocades are also woven on an unknown number of hand looms.

In addition, there are probably over 700 smaller enterprises in various parts of the country (Aleppo, Damascus and Homs being the main centers) engaged in the manufacture of cotton, rayon or woolen cloth on mechanical looms. In total they have roughly 3,800 looms and about 9,000 workers are employed.

A large number of hand looms are still used for weaving cotton, rayon, [282]
woolen and hair cloth. Although declining in importance, there are probably still over 6,000 hand looms and about 10,000 workers engaged, part or whole time, in their operation.

The total production of woven silk, cotton and rayon cloth is probably

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handicraft workers and artisans are included, the number engaged in some form of manufacturing may approach or perhaps even exceed 100,000. 433 464

The textile industry, including spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing, and the manufacture of garments, is the most developed. It probably employs close to 20,000 people in more or less mechanical establishments and it was able, in 1953, to export goods to a value of about £S 25 million. Among other important industries are flour milling, the extraction of vegetable oils and making of soap, tanning, sugar refining, canning and preserving, and the manufacture of cement, glass, tobacco and matches. The production of utensils, implements, furniture and shoes, although on a considerable scale, is almost completely in the handicraft stage. [288]

Commerce

439

Commerce has always been one of the most profitable occupations in Syria. It has furnished much of the capital for the development of industry and even of agriculture. Aleppo and Damascus are the principal commercial centers of the country, the former being the more important. It handles most of Syria's exports, which emanate largely from the northern part of the country, and with the development of the port of Latakia it is also increasing its share of the import trade.

Foreign commerce is quite important in total trade. Over the three-year period 1951-53 the value of imports has averaged close to 30% of probable national income and exports about 22%. Exports have risen rather steadily in total value, and imports somewhat more slowly. Separate foreign trade figures for Syria have been available only since March 1950, when the economic union with Lebanon was terminated in order to give Syria more freedom in protecting its domestic manufacturing industry. Foreign trade has developed as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Year	Customs figures			Adjusted figures		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
1951	277	304	−27	292	418	−126
1952	320	313	+7	337	444	−117
1953	376	307	+69	408	484	−76

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433 persed testifies to the appeal which industrial investment has made to a growing number of people.

[222] The textile industry has taken the most prominent place in Syria's industrial development. There are 90,000 to 100,000 spindles working on cotton and rayon and well over 5,000 mechanical looms. In cotton cloth Syria is approaching self-sufficiency and in rayon cloth it has already achieved a net export surplus. The woolen industry, dependent on imports of raw wool or yarn, is much less developed. In dyeing and printing, modernization is well under way. Along with the production of yarn and cloth, the output of garments has considerably expanded. Knitted goods, underwear, socks and stockings are now produced on a sufficient scale to permit exports.

The vegetable oil industry and the manufacture of soap have grown substantially in the postwar period, particularly as the increase in cotton cultivation supplied more raw materials. The food canning industry was expanded, and a factory was established to produce refined sugar from domestic beet and imported raw sugar. A second cement plant was installed; the two together expect to reach an annual production capacity of 400,000 tons by 1955. The postwar period also witnessed the establishment of a number of modern flour mills, a glass factory, a metal container plant and factories producing, among other commodities, rubber boots, matches, and beverages.

Present Stage of Development

Since manufacturing is a field for private enterprise in Syria, the mission has concerned itself not with individual projects, but rather with government policies which guide and stimulate private industrial investment. These policies must, of course, be devised in the light of the current stage of industrial development and of the problems which industry faces.

In this connection it should be noted, first of all, that there have been no conspicuous cases of misdirected investment in industry. The glass plant was undoubtedly conceived on too ambitious a scale, and the government participated with private capital in an abortive venture to manufacture certain types of machinery and spare parts. By and large, however, investment has been in fields where Syria should in the long run be able to achieve efficient production capable of withstanding foreign competition. In the main, Syrian industry falls, with some overlapping, in the

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433 is still responsible for an important part of, and in some instances for the entire, production. Yet the use of power-driven machines is steadily growing and it is not unusual to find an expensive modern machine in a workshop with only five or six employees. This development will probably be accelerated as more and cheaper electrical power becomes available, but it is equally likely that some Syrian industry, although to a steadily decreasing extent, will remain in the handicraft stage for many years to come. This applies particularly to village industries (dairy products, dried fruits, rugs, etc.), which employ a considerable percentage of those who gain a living from some industrial occupation.[1]

Cotton Ginning

248 Ginning is a relatively new industry which sprang up after local cotton cultivation became prominent, and by 1953 was employing about 4,000 workers. The sharp rise in cotton production after World War II led to a rapid expansion of ginning capacity and, in 1950, to the introduction of some saw gins. There are now over 100 establishments, mostly in Aleppo, which concentrate on cotton ginning during the season commencing in September and ending in April or May.

According to the latest available estimates Syria has a total of about 1,750 roller gins and 64 saw gins with a lint capacity of 45-48 metric tons per hour. A report issued in September 1953 states that of the 1952-53 cotton crop of 176,000 tons of raw cotton, over 90% was roller-ginned and that saw gins were only used in the lower grades. Up to 10,000 tons of ginned cotton were used in Syrian textile mills; the remainder (about 50,000 tons) was exported.

The importation of cotton ginning machinery was prohibited by law in 1952; it is generally agreed that present ginning capacity is sufficient to deal with any anticipated increase in the crop for some time to come.

Textiles

288 *Spinning and weaving.* The manufacture of textiles is Syria's principal industry. Six spinning and weaving factories now produce cotton and

[1] According to a study dated February 24, 1954 by Dr. Abdel Monthleb Boukari, "L'Artisanat Rural Traditionnel," 18% of the Syrian population is engaged in some kind of manufacturing industry of which 9.8% is in town industries and 8.2% in village industries. The mission was not in a position to check these figures.

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rayon yarn and cloth, two in Damascus and four in Aleppo, employing 288
nearly 6,000 workers. Between 90,000 and 100,000 spindles producing cotton and rayon yarn and about 1,400 mechanical looms are in operation in these factories or were in the process of being installed at the time of the mission's visit; it has been estimated that in 1953 between 15-20% of the total number of spindles was engaged in the spinning of rayon. The total yarn production in that year was about 8,000 tons, of which 6,000 was cotton yarn. The factories are well built and most of the machinery is less than 10 years old. The older or less efficient machinery is being replaced and there is a gradual conversion to fully automatic looms.

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Three factories are engaged in the spinning (one in Aleppo with about 3,000 spindles) or weaving (two in Damascus with a total of 38 looms) of woolen yarns and woolen and worsted cloth. While some of the machinery is old, it is in good condition and the buildings are well constructed. In 1953 about 160 workers were employed in these factories. Although Syria exports considerable quantities of raw wool, its modern wool manufacturing industry is based entirely on imported materials.

Four small factories in Damascus produce silk and rayon brocades and brocades with metallic threads on mechanical looms. Brocades are also woven on an unknown number of hand looms.

In addition, there are probably over 700 smaller enterprises in various parts of the country (Aleppo, Damascus and Homs being the main centers) engaged in the manufacture of cotton, rayon or woolen cloth on mechanical looms. In total they have roughly 3,800 looms and about 9,000 workers are employed.

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woolen and hair cloth. Although declining in importance, there are probably still over 6,000 hand looms and about 10,000 workers engaged, part or whole time, in their operation.

The total production of woven silk, cotton and rayon cloth is probably

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288 about 14,000-16,000 tons. An estimated 14,000 workers are employed in the mechanical section, making the total, including the hand loom workers, 29,000.

Knitted garments, underwear, socks and stockings. This section of the textile trade has developed considerably in recent years. There are 264 enterprises engaged in the production of knitted garments. Some have only two or three machines; the larger factories are on the whole well built and designed for efficient production with the latest British, American and German machines. The use of rayon rather than cotton or woolen yarn has increased considerably, and they make use of substantial quantities of the imported rayon fiber and yarn. Three of the larger stocking factories concentrate on production of nylon stockings. About 2,500 workers are estimated to be employed in all the sections of the knitting industry, located mainly in the Damascus area. This part of Syria's textile industry is of rapidly growing importance from the point of view of exports.

Textile dyeing, printing and finishing. Many of the textile factories bleach or dye yarn or cloth on their own premises. There are also a number of firms engaged in bleaching, dyeing, finishing and block printing. These are situated mainly in Aleppo and employ a total of about 250 workers. In addition, there are many small enterprises throughout the country which bleach and dye yarn and cloth by traditional handicraft methods and for which no statistics are available.

A large dyeing and printing works, established at Homs in 1946, and unique in Syria, prints textiles by rotary machinery as well as by the block process. When the installation of additional machinery is completed the firm will employ about 400 workers on a three-shift basis.

Table 2 summarizes the scope of the textile industry.

Vegetable Oils

381

Syria has produced vegetable oil for many centuries, mainly from olives, and the traditional methods of crushing and pressing are still to be seen in some areas. The development of mechanical seed crushing and oil extraction in large factories began in Syria in 1945. About 70% of the output is now derived from cottonseed.

There are now seven large factories equipped in total with 48 Rosedown Maxoil expellers and six "French type" expellers to process the

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domestic and imported raw material; four of these also have spirit extraction plants. In addition, there are 10 smaller factories with expellers, hydraulic presses or small spirit extraction plants. Most of the factories are situated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Latakia.

During 1950-53 the average annual volume of cotton seed available for crushing, deducting export and sowing requirements, was about 68,000

TABLE 2 The Textile Industry

Type of enterprise	Number	Capital invested where known (million £S)	Spindles	Looms	Knitting machines	Estimated number of workers
Cotton and rayon spinning and weaving factories . .	6	32.7	90,000	1,400	—	6,000
Woolen spinning and weaving factories	3	2.3	900	40	—	160
Mechanical brocade-weaving factories	3	1.5	—	50	—	140
Small enterprises using mechanical looms	788	3.0	108	3,800	—	8,000
Small enterprises using hand looms	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6,000	—	10,000
Knitting industry	264	9.2	—	—	1,630	2,500
Textile printing and mechanical dyeing and finishing	15	6.5	—	—	—	650
Total	1,079	55.2	91,008	11,290	1,630	28,450

NOTE: Figures in some cases approximate estimates.

tons compared to 10,000 tons in 1947. Probably about 8,000 tons of refined cottonseed oil are now produced annually. This, added to oils from other seeds and nuts, imported[2] and indigenous, indicates a total annual production of about 10,000 tons of vegetable oil (exclusive of olive oil). When the additional equipment now in the process of being installed is in production, the total capacity of the factories will be in the region of 20,000 tons per annum.

Syria exported about 1,200 tons of cotton seed oil in 1953, 24,300 tons of oil cake and other residue from vegetable oil extraction, the highest

[2] Limited amounts of copra and palm seeds are imported.

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433 exports to Lebanon and Jordan, where its glass is admitted duty free, have
402 been increasing, the plant is running much below capacity. A fourth instance is the match industry, which has a capacity much in excess of the requirements of the home market. This industry is also protected by an embargo on imports but prospects for increasing exports are practically non-existent; European matches are of better quality and have captured the Jordan market, Lebanon produces its own and Iraq is putting up a match factory.

Among the industries in which the greatest expansion is taking place, the cement industry ranks first. After completion of proposed extensions, the combined capacities of the Damascus and Aleppo factories will be about 400,000 tons in 1955 as against 240,000 tons in 1953. It is difficult to estimate Syria's cement requirements in the foreseeable future. In 1953 these amounted to 320,000 tons, of which 120,000 tons were imported, but it is probable that even if the present rate of private urban building is not maintained, some increased demand will result from the construction of public buildings, the creation of new settlements, improvements in rural housing materials, the extension of irrigation and improvements in the road system. Since several Middle Eastern countries have their own cement factories (Lebanon has long had a large cement factory, Jordan has just completed one and Turkey has a number under construction), it is doubtful whether Syria will be able to maintain its small export trade.[4] Although the 1955 total production capacity may somewhat exceed the requirements of the local market, the planned extensions do not seem unreasonable and may even contribute to more efficient operation and lower unit costs.

288 The textile industry is expanding capacity by increasing and modernizing equipment. The existing plant is operating at full or almost full
402
439 capacity, three working shifts being general in the spinning and weaving
433 factories.

In 1953 and through 1954 several tens of thousand additional spindles, several hundred new automatic looms and numbers of knitting machines were installed and optimistic opinions were expressed as to the usefulness of considerable further extensions. Their justification depends on the development of the home and adjoining markets. Syria is approaching self-sufficiency in cotton textiles and the prospects for exports appear promising only in certain specific brands. Only cotton yarn of the higher counts is imported; exports are insignificant. Imports of cotton cloth are

[4] 1,000 tons in 1952; 24,000 tons in 1953.

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larger, and exceed exports which have been falling off. On the other hand, exports of knitted, cotton and rayon goods and other articles of clothing, garments, underwear and socks exceed imports by far.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the entire cotton textile industry is well protected. Imports of yarn and cloth are subject to rather high import duties: 45% ad valorem (about 33% at the free rate of the Syrian pound); duties on fine cotton yarns are substantially lower. In contrast, rayon and woolen yarns are duty free. Socks and stockings (except those made from woolen yarns), men's shirts and pyjamas for men and women may not be imported. This protection, though helpful to the home market, hampers the export trade, particularly in finished goods. This is especially so of those goods requiring use of imported materials in their production; no adequate tariff rebate is given on foreign materials in the exported finished goods. Syrian shirt manufacturers, for instance, claim that with existing machinery they could easily double their production and compete in the export market but for these unfavorable conditions. Although most of the surrounding countries heavily protect their own textile industries, some of Syria's finished textile goods seem to be in a position to compete on the international market to the extent that the component materials are not burdened with protective duties.

In the dyeing, printing and finishing industry—which for a long time lagged behind—a considerable expansion is still anticipated and seems fully justified. Additional machinery was being installed to make possible a full three shifts.

The worsted and woolen cloth industry is not as well equipped with modern machinery as the cotton textile industry. Although the existing plant operates little below capacity and imports of cloth are rather significant, the industry shows no great inclination to expand. Despite the fact that imported yarn is duty free and imported cloth is subject to a rather high tariff, there is keen foreign competition by Italian cloth in the cheaper ranges, British cloth in the higher class and by second-hand suits from the United States. Complaints were heard that the transport charges on the bulkier imported yarns weigh heavily on the industry in comparison to the cost of transporting imported cloth. This drawback seems difficult to overcome. Exports of woolen yarns and cloth have been running well under 7% by value, of imported yarns and cloth, and in view of the factors mentioned above, no large expansion of exports is to be expected. For recent figures, see Table 1 of the Appendix.

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258 The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury
402 export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the
433 majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

265 For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber
402 boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and
433 sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

472 The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises
454 was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

454 This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority
471 of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

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market, and therefore to go rather far in restricting imports. But eventually, unless this policy is qualified industrial development is bound to slow down. Then new impetus will come only from a shift in emphasis to the second principle and a corresponding revision in government policies. Syrian industry has reached this stage and we have therefore recommended that the policy of protection be modified. 433

The trend toward integration of the Arab markets, already referred to, has achieved a more liberal exchange of agrarian than of industrial products. This may be explained by the fact that throughout the Middle East the governments are sponsoring local industrial development along rather parallel lines and each in varying degrees wishes to reserve its local markets for its young industries. On the other hand, none has a sufficiently large population or purchasing power to enable it to develop a fully diversified economy of its own. It seems to be in the interest of all that their development should proceed along lines suited to the specific resources of the various countries. Regular consultations between the authorities promoting industrial development in this area would therefore be desirable.

New Industries and Some Promising Lines of Expansion

The mission has not considered it to be its task to make an extensive survey of specific industrialization projects which might be successfully undertaken in Syria in the near future. We have already pointed out there are still branches of industry in which the establishment of additional plants, either by way of expansion of existing factories or construction of new ones, would be feasible.

Since the 1947 Gibb report on Syria, conditions have changed greatly. 433 In the cotton textile industry, the disparity between the spinning and 288 weaving capacity which existed 10 years ago has largely been overcome, although it exists with regard to rayon yarn. Woven and knitted rayon fabric has taken the place of much cotton and woolen fabric in the Middle East and it is probable that this development will continue. In recent years Syria's imports of rayon yarn and rayon fabric have become significant. Yet, particularly with regard to rayon yarn it would seem ill advised to try to substitute local products for imports which now are duty free, by imposing high protective tariffs. On the other hand, further diversification of the textile and apparel industry may be promising. The increasing volume of exports of knitted goods and other articles of clothing clearly

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

433 indicates that in this field Syria has become a competitor in foreign markets.
288 In dyeing, printing and finishing there seems to be need for additional modern plant. It also seems desirable to investigate the possibility of profitable production of jute fabric sacks. Imports of these sacks have rapidly increased in the last few years, reaching a total of nearly 10,000 tons with a value of £S 6 million in 1953. The need for jute sacks would be lessened if bulk transportation and storage facilities were available but even in that event an increase in general agricultural production might make the establishment of a factory for sack production from imported jute fiber or yarn an economic possibility.

433 Further expansion of the cement industry may well be required. In
339 fact, the government has authorized a new plant for Aleppo which may be transferred to the Jezireh to serve the growing requirement of northeastern Syria. A cement plant for the Homs-Hama region is also under consideration.

433 In the footwear industry modern factory production has been intro-
295 duced only with regard to rubber boots and shoes. An experiment with factory production of leather shoes in Aleppo some years ago met with such opposition from the handicraft trade that it was abandoned. Nevertheless this branch of industry may be one in which the application of modern production methods would be appropriate and generally beneficial.

433 It seems useful to investigate the economic prospects of paper and
218 paperboard manufacture. In 1953 about 8,000 tons of paper with a value of nearly £S 5 million were imported. This total comprises a large variety of different types of paper but some are imported in such quantity as to suggest the feasibility of specialized production. Straw is plentiful as raw material and in a relatively short period more poplar wood could become available if farmers and village communities gave increased attention to tree planting.

433 The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of
402 an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried out by many small shops but the quality of the output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements to be developed for use on farms.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Textiles

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The entire output of yarn is spun in the large factories but almost half the cloth produced is woven on hand looms.[2] It is estimated that on a basis of 1.3 KWH per kilogram for spinning and 1.0 KWH per kilogram for weaving, the total power requirements of mechanized textile plants approximate 21.1 million KWH annually.

Most of the large factories (with one important exception) generate their own power from their total installed capacities of 2,200 KW in Damascus and 2,500 KW in Aleppo. This is more than adequate for the demands of the larger spinning and weaving factories, estimated at 15.8 million KWH, though some plants do in fact purchase some power—to the extent of about 2.6 million KWH—from the public utilities network. On the assumption that the power used by the small factories is drawn wholly from municipal supplies, the total power consumption of 21.1 million KWH for textile spinning and weaving is furnished by private plants to the extent of 13.2 million KWH, and by the public utilities to the extent of 7.9 million KWH. The 6.6 thousand tons of cloth at present woven on hand looms may be regarded as a potential power demand for 6.6 million KWH from the public utilities, giving an aggregate potential demand by textiles for a minimum of 27.7 million KWH, of which 14.5 million KWH would be supplied by the public utilities.

It is expected that the textile industry will continue to expand, though possibly at a slower rate, requiring about 2 million additional KWH by 1960.

Ginning

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In 1953 about 50,000 tons of lint were produced and ginned in Syria. With an average power consumption of 100 KWH per ton of cotton ginned and baled, this would require about 5 million KWH.

Four-fifths of the gins are located in Aleppo, the remainder being in Homs, Idlib, Latakia and Damascus. The most important ginning factory in Aleppo has its own power plant with a capacity of 1,500 KW, but the majority of the other plants have recourse to the public network. It can be assumed that about half the total required power is supplied by private plants and half by the public utilities.

[2] 1952 production: yarn, 9,000–10,000 tons; cloth, 14,000–15,000 tons.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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generators and new hydro-electric schemes are planned to increase the output. The Belgian company operating the tramways and electricity in Damascus and the French electricity company of Aleppo were nationalized in 1951. Consumption of industrial fuel oils has increased greatly since the war and the continuance of this increase shows that Syrian industry is still growing. Under the French Mandate, Syria did not attempt to produce goods for export, but since 1945 some Syrian financiers have tried to build up industries depending for success on overseas sales that have not, however, materialized. Industries based on local needs are likely to be the most successful because the cost of materials and labour are too high for Syria to sell competitively finished goods for which she has to import the raw materials.

The textile industry is the most important, despite a setback in 1950 and 1951 when faced with foreign competition; the industry is well managed and well equipped and employs 20,000 people in Aleppo and Damascus. In 1950 there were about 65,000 spindles for cotton in these two cities, as well as 12,000 handlooms and 3,600 power looms, with an output of 5,000 tons of yarn and 21 million metres of fabric.[1] Silk is woven on hand looms (about 60,000 metres of cloth), but there are mechanical looms for rayon (about 27 million metres) and nylon knitting-machines. Large dye-houses and many small establishments in Damascus and Homs serve the local textile industry. Production of woollen cloth rose to about 542,000 metres in 1948, since when it has declined, although it meets all local needs.

In Homs a Syrian firm has a group of modern plants including a sugar refinery (output 10,000 tons in 1951), an alcohol distillery (363 tons in 1951), and an oil extraction plant. But the refinery depends on imported raw sugar and only protection and a high retail price maintain it, nor is it yet certain that the Homs sugar will compete in price with imported refined sugar even if local beet production, which is being expanded, is used for refining. The cement factory near Damascus was extended in 1951 and now produces about 60,000 tons a year, and a new plant in Aleppo is on the way to producing 70,000 tons a year. There are many oil and soap factories of which the biggest, in Aleppo, can produce thirty tons a day. About 20,000 tons of asphalt, 1,449 million cigarettes, and 69,000 tons of tobacco are also produced near Latakia. Near Damascus

[1] Many of the statistics in this section have been obtained from UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2* and other recent UN Surveys of the Middle East.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

COTTON TEXTILES

Syria has nine small cotton textile mills centered around Aleppo and Damascus, with a total of 55,000 spindles and 2,000 looms and a number of knitting mills and garment factories. A large home industry, which not only weaves but also spins cotton yarn, has, according to trade representatives, a capacity almost as great as that of the commercial mills.

Until a few years ago the industry of Syria was complementary to that of Lebanon. Syria bought yarns from Lebanon and sold cloth there. The two countries together were able to produce about two-thirds of their total needs.[30] Acceding to nationalistic pressure, Syria dissolved the customs union in 1950 and set about not only to install more spindles to balance the weaving capacity, but actually to become self-sufficient in all cotton textiles. A number of mills have bought new equipment for rehabilitation and integration.

Outstanding in this field is the new mill built at Damascus by a group of industrialists known as the "big five." The mill is small in size—only 10,000 spindles and 350 fully automatic looms—but it is a showplace, modern in every detail. The management is especially proud of the modern clinic which provides the workers with free medical attention—a new idea in this part of the world.

This mill has a well-trained engineering and administrative staff and good machinery. To increase efficiency, the management hopes to abandon the range of goods now made and concentrate on the production of only two or three constructions. The level of efficiency is high enough, based on the wage scale of roughly $1.25 per day, to permit the mill to compete on the world market. Approximately 20 per cent of the cloth production is exported.

The other industries are less efficient and are not in a position to compete on the export market.

COTTON CONSUMPTION

In Syria production of yarns was estimated by the government at 5,500 tons in 1951, double what it had been four years earlier and seven times the output ten years ago. Industry and government figures vary considerably, especially on output of the home industry, but they agree on the same sharp rise in production.

Cotton consumption, computed on the basis of yarn production estimates, is placed at approximately 33,000 bales and is in line with the sharp increase in yarn production.

PROTECTION

As in other Middle East countries, the cotton textile industry receives substantial tariff protection from imports. Syria is a free-money market, and foreign exchange can be bought for any purpose on any street corner. As a result, prices are reported to be going down, as they did in Lebanon when foreign exchange was freed several years ago.

Duties on cotton textiles were changed in 1949 from a specific rate base to an ad valorem base. The duties on most yarns in which the local industry is deficient average about 20 per cent ad valorem; on cotton textiles, about

[30] *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission*, op. cit., p. 3.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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—Photo Courtesy of Cotton Trade Journal

All the cotton in the Aleppo region is ginned at this modern ginning center in Aleppo. Large gins (some have 10 saw gin stands) are located or are under construction on each corner of the square. Buildings are elaborate and usually cost about twice as much as the machinery. The grounds are landscaped like a campus.

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inhabited for centuries until a few years ago when farmers from the cities began developing them with mechanical equipment. Large landlords from Aleppo spent millions of dollars installing pumps, building roads, and in other ways developing these lands.

Although occupancy rights have been recognized for years, various government officials with whom the matter was discussed were strong in their views that these newcomers are squatters and should be evicted. They want to distribute the land among the landless peasants. The landlords who have made investments here are just as determined that they will not be evicted. The political strength of the landlords is given generally as the reason for the statement recently made by the head of the government to the effect that the new law will be studied for revision.

While the question of eviction is being debated, the government is proceeding to parcel out other public domains in small units to landless peasants. As this program is expanded, the large landowners are becoming more and more concerned for fear their own properties will be expropriated and subdivided, as has been done in neighboring countries.

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This dispute over the use of public land illustrates the struggle for power going on in Syria today between government bureaucrats and wealthy landlords. The government on one hand is attempting to force changes in all phases of the economy through its various control programs. These changes, however, are strongly resisted by the landowners who prefer to be free from regulations and regimentation. The outcome of this struggle may have a material bearing on the trend in agriculture for the next several years.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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242 tributed a 50 per cent decline in yields to insect damage.

248 In an effort to reduce this damage, the Ministry has employed an Egyptian entomologist and has bought 4,000 tons of insecticides and a large number of tractor-mounted, horse-drawn, and walking dusting units.

[656] The Ministry also has promulgated numerous regulations for controlling insects, calling for mandatory destruction of stalks after harvesting and a host-free period until May 1. All ginning must be completed by the end of April and all the gin trash burned. Planting seed must be sterilized by one of the oil mills through contract with the government. The government also requires all farmers to apply the recommended insecticides. If farmers do not comply, the government applies the poison and charges them for it.

CONTROLS

656 The government has appointed a Cotton Control Board, with headquarters in Aleppo, charged with the broad responsibility of stabilizing production. The board is responsible for the enforcement of programs in seed distribution, insect control, crop control, ginning and marketing, and new regulations promulgated recently by the Ministry.

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Probably the most significant of these many regulations is one limiting the land which may be planted to cotton. In irrigated areas from 40 to 70 per cent of the crop land may be planted to cotton and in dry-land farming areas, only 25 to 33 per cent. The Aleppo area is limited to 50 per cent of the non-irrigated land. The purposes of this regulation, according to the Director General of Agriculture, are to preserve a balance in agricultural

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Syria's newest cotton mill is an ultra modern integrated plant just completed in Damascus. The level of efficiency here is far above the average and as a result this mill is exporting about 20 per cent of its production.

433 No over-all figures on the increase of capital, output or employment are available, but the following data are indicative. Between 1945 and 1953,
472 inclusive, a total of £S 70.7 million was invested in thirty-seven industrial joint-stock companies; of this £S 53.1 million was invested in 1945 and 1946. 1/
454 A considerable amount was also invested in unincorporated enterprises. Sales of electricity to industry increased from 15 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 28 million in 1951, 36 million in 1953 and 19 million during the first half of 1954. Imports of industrial machinery and equipment amounted to 9,100 tons in 1950, 19,500 in 1951, 10,800 in 1952 and 12,000 tons in 1953, with an aggregate value of £S 200 million. 2/ Table 51 shows available information on the principal Syrian industries.

433 The textile industry is by far the most important, as regards capital invested, employment and value of output. The rapid expansion of cotton growing
288 led to an increase in the number of cotton gineries, from thirty in 1945 to 110 in 1953. Cotton spinning began in 1933; by 1950 there were 10,000 spindles and by 1954 some 92,000 with a capacity of 12,000 tons of cotton and rayon yarn. Output of cotton yarn rose from 1,700 tons in 1944 to 5,500 in 1950 and 6,600 tons in 1953; that of rayon yarn from 800 in 1950 to 1,200 in 1953; there was a further increase in 1954. Small factories also produce 40 tons of woollen yarn and 16 tons of silk yarn. Mechanical looms increased from 1,500 in 1939 to 5,500 in 1953; there are also 6,000 hand looms. Output of cloth, knitted goods and hosiery is shown in table 51. Dyeing and printing are done in well equipped factories established after the Second World War. The textile industry meets local requirements in most branches and provides an export surplus.

433 Food processing industries form the next most important group. A large-scale sugar refinery started production in 1950, on imported raw sugar; its output rose
258 to 30,000 tons in 1953, of which 23,000 were from imported raw sugar and 7,000 from locally grown beets; output in 1954 was about 38,000 tons. It also produces 1,000 tons of alcohol and some starch glucose as a by-product. The refinery, which fully meets Syria's demand, has not yet reached its full capacity. The vegetable oil industry produces, by means of modern presses established after the war as well as older hand presses, some 7,000 to 12,000 tons of olive oil, about 6,000 to 8,000 tons of cotton-seed oil and some 2,000 to 4,000 tons of other oils. Other important food and beverage industries include the making of biscuits
655 and macaroni, oleomargarine, confectionery and chocolates, and also brewing and canning. The tobacco industry is a State monopoly. 3/

1/ Of the total, £S 23 million was accounted for by six textile companies, 13.4 million by four food processing companies, 10.5 million by three vegetable oil and soap companies, 9.0 million by a cement and building materials company, 8.0 million by a glass and porcelain company, 3.3 million by seventeen electric power companies and 3.5 million by five other companies.

2/ Data from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ The Government took over the tobacco monopoly from a concessionary company in 1951, paying £S 2.5 million as compensation.

563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
361 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.
[291 Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
361 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.
[134 This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
577 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
511 ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

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The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

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So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

History

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Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria an

44: Matthews and Akrawi S. G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
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CLASS IN ARABIC AT DAMASCUS COLLEGE, DAMASCUS, SYRIA

following P. 360 (a)

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Above: Teacher (at right) and part of the top class of the primary school for girls, Sarmada, Syria
Below: A former French army barracks now used for a government school for boys, Sarmada

following p. 360 (B)

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Syria at about £S 2.85 per square meter. Most of its production is sold 323
locally and there has recently been a marked increase in demand from its export markets in Lebanon and Jordan where Syrian glass is admitted duty free. Since 1952 the importation of sheet glass, many containers and other glass articles has been prohibited.

Tanning and Leather Dressing

The development of the tanning and leather dressing industry from 282
the handicraft to the mechanically-aided stage began about 1929 and has made good progress, particularly since the dissolution of the Customs Union with Lebanon.

The supply of Syrian sheep and goat skins is more than sufficient to meet local demand, but raw cow and buffalo hides were imported to the extent of over 2,000 tons in 1951 and over 2,500 tons in 1953 to supplement the supply of local hides. About 800 tons of untreated hides and skins were exported in 1951 and 600 in 1953, and about 430 tons and 330 tons of processed leather and leather goods in 1951 and 1953 respectively. According to the most recent official figures (end of 1953) the tanneries which the government classes as factories numbered 75, mostly in the Aleppo and Damascus areas. The annual output amounted to 2,700 tons of sole hide and 4.9 million square feet of other leather. The number of workers employed was given as 2,700.

Elsewhere we have mentioned the successful establishment of an industrial zone for tanneries on the outskirts of Damascus. This has provided an opportunity for the introduction of additional modern machinery and a great improvement in working conditions at the new location. The new tanneries vary considerably in size, the number of workers ranging from five or six to about 100.

Boots and Shoes 295

Leather boots and shoes with leather or rubber soles are made by hand or on simple machines in small workshops in most parts of the country, or by the retailer on his own premises. There are no reliable figures of the number of workers or volume of production.

During the last few years four factories have been established near

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

295 Damascus to manufacture rubber boots, canvas and rubber shoes, and felt and rubber shoes by the hot molding process, using imported crude rubber, imported and local waste rubber and canvas, and locally made felt. Production is said to be about 300,000 pairs per year and about 200 workers are employed. Other factories in Damascus and Aleppo produce rubber soles and heels. About 1,600 tons of rubber and rubber waste were imported in 1953, but it is not known how much was used in the boots and shoes industry in addition to local scrap rubber. The importation of boots and shoes is prohibited.

Matches

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372 Syria's first match factory started production in Damascus in 1930. By 1952, six more had been built. Damascus has the three largest, Aleppo the other four. Supplies are drawn mostly from local timber, though some additional wood, as well as chemicals, is imported.

An improved layout of machines and the introduction of small conveyors would increase efficiency and assist in lowering costs.

Together the factories employ about 350 whole or part time workers. The three Damascus factories produced about 25.6 million boxes in 1952 and 32.2 million in 1953. Production figures for the Aleppo factories are not available. The importation of matches is prohibited.

Tobacco

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655 A number of enterprises grade and prepare tobacco for export, but the manufacture and importation of cigarettes and tobacco has, since 1951, been confined to the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration.

The monopoly operates a cigarette factory in Damascus and one in Aleppo, and a factory in Latakia which manufactures and packs tobacco for retail sale. The tobacco for manufacture is partly Syrian (from the Latakia region) and partly imported. Cigarettes, tobacco and cigars are also imported from Europe and the United States.

The Damascus branch is in a new factory where tobacco is sorted, damped, stripped by hand only, and cut. The cigarettes are made on a number of old German machines and a few new American ones.

The tobacco monopoly employs 2,300 workers; total production of all three factories amounted to 2.7 million kg. in 1953.

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288 402 433 The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

295 402 433 For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

472 454 The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

454 471 This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

433 indicates that in this field Syria has become a competitor in foreign markets.
288 In dyeing, printing and finishing there seems to be need for additional modern plant. It also seems desirable to investigate the possibility of profitable production of jute fabric sacks. Imports of these sacks have rapidly increased in the last few years, reaching a total of nearly 10,000 tons with a value of £S 6 million in 1953. The need for jute sacks would be lessened if bulk transportation and storage facilities were available but even in that event an increase in general agricultural production might make the establishment of a factory for sack production from imported jute fiber or yarn an economic possibility.

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433 It seems useful to investigate the economic prospects of paper and
218 paperboard manufacture. In 1953 about 8,000 tons of paper with a value of nearly £S 5 million were imported. This total comprises a large variety of different types of paper but some are imported in such quantity as to suggest the feasibility of specialized production. Straw is plentiful as raw material and in a relatively short period more poplar wood could become available if farmers and village communities gave increased attention to tree planting.

433 The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of
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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

REPORT ON JAZIRAH

101 Geographically, Jazirah, i. e., "the Island", is that strip of territory lying between the rivers Dijla and Euphrates, but for the purpose of this report, the term Jazirah is understood in its administrative meaning as a Mohafaza of Syria, and will be studied as such.

AREA OF JAZIRAH AND ITS CULTIVABLE LANDS

The "Statistical Abstract of Syria" for 1950 gives the total area of Jazirah as 2,217,000 hectares divided between the Mohafaza center, i.e., Hassakeh, Qamishli, and Dijla, in the following proportion:

Mohafaza Center	1,525,000 hectares
Qada of Qamishli	392,000 hectares
Qada of Dijla	300,000 hectares

311 Of this total area, according to the same source, 444,266 hectares were cultivated in 1948-49, and 1,701,284 hectares were cultivable but uncultivated, while the uncultivable lands were only 71,450 hectares.

This terminology of cultivable and uncultivable is greatly misleading. If by cultivable is meant the lands which are not rocky or mountainous or forested, the terminology is right though it loses its economic meaning. But if by it is meant lands which can be planted and rendered productive to show some profit, then other factors have to be considered, and the productive "cultivable" area of Jazirah is greatly reduced.

132 The first of these factors is the amount of rainfall. It is really astonishing that the Syrian Government has not deemed it necessary to establish agricultural stations in different regions of Jazirah to record at least the amount of rainfall in the different localities. The only such station is at Hassakeh which is not primarily a wheat growing district and the mean annual rainfall over a period of nine years is less than 300 mm. This average is less than the minimum required for successful rain-fed cultivation.

I. The Mohafaza Center

311 Therefore about 80% of the 1,525,000 hectares mentioned as
312 cultivable in the Mohafaza Center are in fact uncultivable unless

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not.

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short.

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah.

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts:

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions.

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating

[179] it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes.
311 The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer.
244 Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed
182 land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

123 The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

244 For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for
311 cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

312 The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

312 Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers
406 from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less than LS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some
312 projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is
244 supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley.
242 But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available.

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers.

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal.

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families.

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

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CROPS AND AGRICULTURE IN JAZIRAH

I. Dry Farming

Dry farming is by far the most important activity of Jazirah. 241
The first tractor and combine were introduced in 1936 by Shahine 311
Bey Maluf of Zahleh. Before that time agriculture was the business of the peasants. The town inhabitants of Jazirah took no interest in it. The area cultivated was restricted to a few kilometers south of the railway line in what is called the Old Villages. The political troubles in 1936-37 and the low prices of wheat and barley before the War did not encourage capitalists inside Syria to invest their money in Jazirah. Furthermore, agricultural machinery was new to most people who did not understand its economics or how to run it.

a. Expansion in the Use of Machinery 1936-1952

The War doubled the price of wheat in its second year. The 407
crop of 1940 was sold for LS 50-55 a ton at Aleppo. The French 439
bought it for LS 120 in 1941. The Office des Cereales Panifiables (O. C. P.) fixed the price at LS 350 in 1943. During these years the dollar was available at the official rate of LS 2.20 and importation of machinery from the U. S. was possible. The number of tractors increased to about 60 in the winter of 1943.

The crop of 1943 was exceptionally good and the O. C. P. imported some 50 tractors and a similar number of combines which reached Jazirah during the harvest season. [illegible] machines were first rented to the farmers and then sold to them. They represented the first large-scale importation of machinery to Jazirah.

Importation of machinery in the following two years became difficult as a result both of limited availability and of dollar shortage. But by the end of the War dollars became again available at the official rate and large numbers of tractors were imported in 1945 and 1946. The importation of agricultural machinery has become a steady and continuous flow in spite of the sharp rise in the dollar rates and the price of wheat, though below 1943, still makes large-scale exploitation profitable. Recently the Government through 654
the Agricultural Bank has helped the farmers import and buy on [452

407 installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71.
439 This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300,
654 respectively.
452

It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is
407 opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent
427 of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS . 90-1. 10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusionis that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

311 The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq.

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbassiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Rin. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers west of Dirbassiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

311 The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jasiratibn Amr was long
491 neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but 311
which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed [166]
into the region following the opening of the road and began populat- 491
ing it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region.

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" bar- 24 2/3
ley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat 43 2/3
are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita.

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances 185
which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and 654
planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below:

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the [132]
month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new

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II. Land Tenure for the Tractor Owner

The tractor owner gets better advantages when he rents land. 427
He also pays a percentage of the crop. It used to be 5-6% with the obligation to plant a "shkara" for the landowner. The "Shkara" is a certain amount of seed which the landowner provides and which the tenant agrees to plant by his machines and to harvest with his combine free of charge. The "shkara" is proportional to the area of land rented. It varies between 10-20 sacks of wheat. In the last few years when demand for land became great the rents rose to 10-12% with the habitual "shkara". Usually the rental contracts are for three years. They rarely exceed this period.

III. Land Tenure Along the Khabur

Along the Khabur rents are different in manner. There, the landowner provides not only the land but also the water for irrigation and half the seeds. In return he receives half the crop. The peasant furnishes his labor for plowing, seeding caring for the irrigation canals, irrigation and harvesting.

Rents for pump irrigation were between 7-10% until 1951. The cotton rush increased the rents for strips of land near the river to 15-20%, but the failure of the crop reduced the rush for land and the rent is down again to around 10%.

THE PROBLEM OF CREDIT IN JAZIRAH

The rapid economic advance of Jazirah in the last years is nothing less than amazing. In 1941, in the region of Qamishli, for example, the farthest village cultivated was less than 20 kilometers south of the city. All the land beyond was pasture for the Bedouin. East of Kubur el Bid to Tal Koshak, a distance of 60 kilometers, the land was similarly idle. There was not a single tractor in the region of Ras el Ain, and not a single water pump on the Khabur aside from those of the Assyrians. 311

Qamishli itself, the principal town of Jazirah, had no electric light, no paved roads, no sewage system, and very few acceptable houses to live in. The same was true in a larger measure of the other towns of Jazirah. 361 365

361 At present, agriculture extends in an unbroken line from the
811 Turkish and Iraqi borders south to the Rad and Hassakah, and west to
365 Ras el Ain and midway to Rakka. Qamishli has all the amenities of a fair-sized city with sewage, electricity, asphalted roads, running water, places of amusement, and modern office buildings and houses. The other towns of Jazirah show similar progress but in a smaller way.

454 All this development could not have been achieved without extensive use of capital. It was stated that the original emigrants to Jazirah whether Christians or Kurds, brought very little capital with them. Whatever they have now was made in Jazirah and not brought from outside.

I. Credit to the Bedouin and Kurd

452 The nearest commercial market to Jazirah where credit was
438 available was Aleppo. Aleppo merchants first provided goods shipped to the towns of Jazirah to be smuggled into Turkey. And Jazirah merchants working on a commission or partnership basis made good profits. Some of them specialized in lending money to the Bedouins and Kurds and for them, also, credit was available at Aleppo. They borrowed at an interest rate of 9% and lent at 35-50%. Most of them, however, did not lend money outright as a general practice, but sold goods and especially textiles, coffee and sugar to the farmer against bills maturing at harvest time. The exorbitant interest was added over the price of the goods, and the peasant accepted it as a somewhat higher price and did not consider it as interest. Theis system still prevails at the present time.

II. Credit to the Machinery Owner

452 With the expansion of agriculture and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, credit in much larger amounts became necessary. The farmer using machinery needed two kinds of credit. He needed credit to pay for his machines, and seasonal credit to cover a part of his expenses for wages, seed, fuel, and general expenditures.

In the first years of the War, dealers in agricultural machinery supplied a part of the need by selling on an installment basis for a period of 20 months. But between 1943 and 1948 they demanded cash payment before delivery. In the last four years, they have renewed their credit facilities.

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RAINFALL AND CROP MAP OF JAZIRAH
RAINFALL AND CROP
WHEAT
Qamishli
Ras el Ain
Hasakeh
Tel Kocheck
Qamishli
Ras el Ain
Hasakeh
Tel Kocheck
BARLEY-WHEAT
BARLEY
Qamishli
Ras el Ain
Hasakeh
Tel Kocheck

7: Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

133
[311]



FIG. 1—The Salamiya area in its general setting. The hills are frequently given the collective name of Jebel Bil'as. Isohyets after Jean Charles Combier: Aperçu sur les climats de la Syrie et du Liban, avec carte au millionième des pluies et vents, Délégation Générale de France au Levant, Beirut, 1945. Spelling of the place names here and in the text in general follows the (British) Permanent Committee on Geographical Names.

of the hills and the Eocene-Oligocene marl of the plain. The limestones are predominantly pervious dolomitic limestones, separated by more or less impervious beds of flint and marl. Winter rainfall runs off in the wadis or soaks into the ground and either is soon discharged at a lower level by temporary springs or seeps slowly toward the plain, assisted by the dip of the strata.

The marl of the plain is in its unaltered state impermeable, but usually it has been affected to a considerable depth by the percolation of water through cracks and fissures. In this way calcium carbonate and silica are deposited to depths of as much as 50 feet, and the whole character of the rock is altered.[1] It becomes crumbly, permeable, and water-bearing. Above this layer of rock a hardpan develops, ranging in thickness from a few inches to four feet, which is due to the concentration by capillary action of calcium carbonate and silica.

The region is one where the desert merges into the sown. The rainfall

[1] L. Dubertret: Lithological Map of the Eastern Border of the Mediterranean, 1:500,000, with notes translated by W. B. Fisk [i.e. Fisher], Fighting French Delegation General in the Levant, Geological Section, Beirut, 1943.

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7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

THE REGION IS ONE WHERE DESERT MERGES INTO THE SOWN. THE RAINFALL

regimen is Mediterranean in type, practically all the precipitation falling in
132 winter, the summer being characterized by drought and great heat. In the east the rainfall is sporadic and unreliable and in most years is less in total quantity than in the west. Selemiya has a mean annual rainfall of 344 millimeters (13.5 inches). On the west-facing slopes of Jebel Bil'as rainfall is relatively heavy, though highly variable, and it permits tree growth. The
311 present eastern limit of close agricultural settlement and of permanent unirrigated cultivation is near the 200-millimeter isohyet;[2] it was approximately the same in Romano-Byzantine times. Any further extension of agriculture to the east would mean great risk of crop failure and of increased soil erosion by wind and water.

134 In the cultivated west the soil is heavy and clayey, but farther to the east it is light and friable, with a high sand content and practically no humus. In Jebel Bil'as the soil is intermediate between these two types, liable to erosion by wind in summer and water in winter.

137 Over the greater part of the region the two main elements in the natural
132 vegetation are low xerophilous scrub[2] and ephemeral grasses which appear
[233] in early spring and wither away in summer. The roots and rootlets of both the permanent scrub and the annual vegetation help hold the soil in place. In Jebel Bil'as these types of vegetation are well developed, and the hills are favorite spring pasture grounds for the sheep of peasants and Bedouins. Isolated trees grow in the Palmyrene ranges far to the east throughout the area within the 200-millimeter isohyet, and even just to the east of it, in country believed to have a mean annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters (7.9 inches). On the northwestern slopes of Jebel Bil'as tree growth is more abundant. Nothing demonstrates better the positive rainfall anomaly of the hills as compared with the arid plains to the north and south.

137 At the present time the landscape of Jebel Bil'as is at the best parklike, the trees being scattered, except in the valleys, where clumps of three or four grow together. Few trees are taller than 20 feet. The *Pistacia* genus is represented by *P. terebinthus* (probably *P. palaestina*) and *P. vera* (the pistachio tree). The wood of these two trees, hard and slow-burning, is much valued as a fuel. Scrub oak also occurs, and in wadi bottoms thick-leaved evergreens. Shrubs and herbaceous plants are scattered everywhere.

Irrigation

241 The long summer drought makes irrigation necessary for most crops

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113 [2] A full account is given by M. Zohary: Geobotanical Analysis of the Syrian Desert, *Palestine Journ. of Botany*, Jerusalem Ser., Vol. 2, 1940, pp. 46-96.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho*'s which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[15] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanes Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

Farther east there lies another belt of highlands. In the far 133
north it takes the form first of the Kurd Dagh hills, then of a plateau and a series of low ranges, south of which lies the range of Anti-Lebanon, facing Lebanon across the Biqa', and rising some 9,000 ft. above sea-level. South of Anti-Lebanon is Mount Hermon with its many valleys and its three peaks, the highest of which is over 9,000 ft. high. From Hermon the land drops into the Hauran plateau ; south of it is the tableland of Transjordan, which itself ends in the steppe country of the northern Hejaz.

The northern plateau slopes eastwards until it reaches the 133
valley of the Euphrates flowing south-east. The eastward 311
slopes are in part cultivable land, but in part semi-desert and steppe, known sometimes as the 'Little Desert' to distinguish it from the Syrian Desert to the south of it. Around and across the Euphrates is a district known as the Jazirah, which is geographically part of Iraq but of which a portion lies within the political frontiers of the Levant States. It is a district of stony hills and plains, but fertile in the river valleys, those of the Euphrates itself and of its tributaries, the Balikh and the Khabur.

East of the Anti-Lebanon the country is somewhat different. There is no plateau sloping gently to a river valley, but the eastern flanks of the mountains lead down to a barren steppe, formed of stone and gravel, with sand-dunes and coarse vegetation : the Syrian Desert. In places the Desert comes up almost to the foot of the inner range ; but in others it is held back by areas of cultivable land. One such is the Ghutah, the fertile land around Damascus, well wooded and well watered by its streams. To the south of it, but separated from it by a plain of lava, lies another cultivable region, the Hauran, a large basalt plateau open to rain-clouds coming from the Mediterranean through the Esdraelon Gap. In the east this plain rises into the hilly but fertile district of Jebel Druze, of which the peaks are 6,000 ft. above sea-level. South of the Jebel Druze, the highlands of Transjordan slope eastwards and die away in isolated hills.

While the general climatic régime is similar throughout, 132
there is great variety of temperature and rainfall in consequence of the sharp differences of relief and position. In all parts the rainy season is from October or November to April or May ; but the amount of rainfall varies greatly from one

132 region to another. On some mountain heights it is over 40 in., while in the desert areas it sinks almost to nothing. The temperature also varies greatly, in general increasing from west to east and to a lesser extent from north to 132 south. The differences of rainfall and temperature, together ●311 with such other factors as the presence or absence of rivers 241 and springs, give rise to great differences in fertility and vegetation. The coastal regions have a Mediterranean climate, and are often well watered both by rainfall and by rivers; they are suitable for cereals, tobacco and many kinds of fruit. The seaward slopes of the maritime ranges have a more temperate climate, and terraces of cultivable soil on which olive trees and vines can grow; but the eastern slopes are more barren. The central depression has a sub-tropical climate. Parts of it are well watered by rivers and are fertile. In the Jordan Valley, fruits can be cultivated, and cereals in the more northern parts of the inner depression. Much of the inner range is dry and barren; but on the plateaux of the north and of Transjordan there is sufficient rainfall to make possible the cultivation of cereals. This is true also of the Hauran and Jebel Druze. The Ghutah is suitable with irrigation for the growing of fruits of many kinds. East of the inner range the rainfall becomes scantier, the heat more intense, and the land less fertile; until finally it becomes too arid to be suitable for anything but pasturage. But across the Euphrates conditions change once more, and it is possible to grow cereals in the river valleys of the Jazirah.

3

131 The nature of Syrian history has been deeply affected by the structure and position of the land. It is largely a history of economic, political and other movements affecting the whole area of which Syria forms a part. To those movements Syria has served at times as a starting-point, at others as a terminus or a bridge.

139 The first of the movements has been that of world trade. Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East; and its own products, oil, grain, textiles and metal work, have at times found a market in the Western world. Another and more specialized trade has been that with

V. THE WESTERNIZATION OF SOCIETY

1

THE first and most obvious sign of social change is the 161
growth in the population of the French Mandated Territories in the last four generations. For some centuries previous to 1800 the population had been steadily declining. In the course of the nineteenth century it began to increase; by 1914 it may have been in the neighbourhood of two and a half millions. Since then it has grown ever faster, because of the abolition of conscription, the decline in emigration, the rise in the standard of living and the improvement in medical and sanitary services. To-day the total population is nearly four millions.

The distribution of the population between the different 162
provinces of the country is as follows:

Syria:	Province of Damascus	531,267
	" " Aleppo	752,196
	" " Homs	182,312
	" " Hama	137,882
	" " the Hauran	108,603
	" " the Euphrates	218,667
	" " the Jazirah	103,514
	" " Latakia	371,880
	" " Jebel Druze	70,706
	Total	2,477,027[1]
Lebanon:	Province of Beirut	232,000
	" " Mount Lebanon	278,000
	" " Northern Lebanon ..	241,000
	" " Southern Lebanon ..	198,000
	" " the Biqa'	167,000
	Total	1,116,000[2]

2

Two-thirds of this population live in villages and are 311
dependent upon agricultural occupations. The total area of the country is some 58,000 square miles; but only about 10–15 per cent of it is cultivated. An equal area could however be brought under cultivation if swamps were drained, barren wastes irrigated, and the margin of agriculture pushed eastwards into the deserts.

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1938* (Paris, 1939), pp. 220-1. These figures exclude the Beduin population, who number over half a million, and also the population of Alexandretta, which was ceded to Turkey in 1939 (see Chapter XI). They are not to be accepted as more than a rough approximation. An estimate for 1944 gave the population of Syria as 2,800,000 (excluding the Beduin).

[2] Figures for 1942.

795 the standard of living and education among the Alawis and
648 to develop their corporate consciousness; and who believe that if this is to be done the Alawis must be given a separate administration specially adapted to their needs and under benevolent foreign tutelage. There are others who admit the importance of these tasks but who emphasize that it is equally necessary to give the Alawis a consciousness of being part of the Arab nation as an alternative to sectarianism and to a paralysing localism. Among the Alawis themselves, one party adheres to the former school of thought, a second to the latter, but the greater number are suspicious of all interference from outside and wish only to be left alone.

Here, as in Jebel Druze, great social and intellectual processes are beginning of which the results have yet to appear. But it will probably take longer to bring Alawi society to a point where it becomes possible to face the problem of its definitive political status.

II

311 The problem of the Jazirah, the north-eastern province
167 of Syria, is in many ways different from that of Jebel Druze and the Alawi territory. Before the War of 1914–1918 it was largely an empty district, except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was sparsely cultivated where it was cultivated at all; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria they established a considerable measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already possessed by virtue of its fertility. The French authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian and other minorities who had been forced to leave their dwellings in Turkey, or who preferred not to live in the predominantly Moslem parts of Syria. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, together with Assyrians from Iraq after the events of 1933, have moved into the province; and even larger numbers of Kurdish Moslems, dislodged from their homes in Eastern Turkey by the policy of forcible assimilation
361 adopted by the Turkish Government. The new towns of
311 Hassetche and Qamishli and new villages have been created and new crops introduced, and the district has been opened up to regular commerce. The Beduin have been controlled
AND CERTAIN TRIBES AMONG THEM PERSUADED TO SETTLE ON THE LAND.

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101 178 challenging task of fusing the positive elements of both its eastern and its western heritage into a cohesive whole.

Population and Land

161 162 According to official estimates, Syria at the end of 1953 had a population of about 3.65 million, including some 150,000 Bedouins who lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Although demographic statistics are far from adequate, it appears probable that the population has been growing at an annual rate of somewhere between 2% and 3% during the last decade. Most of the population is rural:[1] about 60% live in villages and towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and each of the two largest cities—Damascus, the capital, and Aleppo, the commercial center of the country—has a population close to 400,000. About 86% of the population are Moslem or belong to offshoots of the Moslem religion, and nearly all of the balance are adherents of a considerable number of Christian denominations.

161 311 As a country with an area of 181,337 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), about three-fourths the size of the United Kingdom, Syria cannot be said to be densely populated. While less than a third of the area is cultivable, the proportion of the population to the land already under cultivation compares favorably with that of other countries in the Near and Middle East. In Syria there is one hectare[2] of cultivated land per inhabitant, or about 10% more than in Turkey and Iran, twice as much as in Greece and Iraq and eight to nine times as much as in Egypt.

311 133 There is still plenty of land available in Syria but water severely limits its utilization. The country lies to the leeward of mountain ranges in the west and north which intercept much of the rainfall. Except for the coastal region of Latakia province, Syria is largely cut off from the rain-bearing winds of the Mediterranean by mountains, the Djebel Ansariya (Alaouit mountains) in Latakia, and, farther south, after the intervening Tripoli-Homs gap, by the twin ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon which in turn give way to the Hermon range. Thus the area which can support rain-fed cultivation is confined to a rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier. Fortunately for Syria, its

[1] See Annex C, p. 292.
[2] A hectare = 2.471 acres.

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311 rainfall is supplemented by the water brought down from the mountains
133 by its rivers. The principal of these is the Euphrates which has its headwaters in Turkey and flows in a generally southeasterly direction across Syria into Iraq. Together with its most important tributary, the Khabour, which also rises in Turkey, it accounts for 90% of the total annual flow of all Syrian rivers. In the west the largest river is the Orontes which is fed by springs from the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges and flows northward through the marshy area known as the Ghab into Turkey. Farther south the Barada river, rising in the Anti-Lebanon, supplies life-giving water to the fertile Ghouta oasis around Damascus. In the extreme south the Yarmuk river flows along the Jordanian frontier into the Jordan river. Although the flow of these rivers is highly seasonal, it is on the effective utilization of their waters that much of the future development of Syria's agriculture depends.

Principal Regions

631 Administratively Syria is divided into nine *mohafazats* or provinces, each in charge of a *mohafez* or governor; the province is in turn divided into *qadas* or counties headed by a *kaimakam;* and the county is further subdivided into *nahiyes* or townships in charge of a *mudir*.

244 Of greater significance, however, are the principal economic regions.
438 Farthest south are the adjoining regions of the Hauran and Djebel Druze.
311 The Hauran plain, an area of rather high but apparently declining fertility, has long been known as a granary, even in Roman times. Its principal crop is wheat, but barley, maize, sorghum and pulses are also important. To the east rises the Djebel Druze, a basaltic dome, where the Druzes, a proud and independent people, eke a bare living from the pockets of fertile soil in their mountains. Here the pressure of population on the land is acute. Agricultural holdings in the Hauran and Djebel Druze are predominantly small. There is little irrigation, and annual rainfall, averaging less than 12 inches, is barely adequate for dry farming. Sharp fluctuations in rainfall frequently make farming precarious. One of the principal problems of this region is the scant supply of underground water even for drinking.

To the northwest of the Hauran lies the higher, rolling Julani plateau stretching toward the Hermon range. This stony region is suitable only for grazing and, to some extent, for orchards. To the north a narrow band

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241 of cultivation leads to Damascus where semi-desert conditions prevail and 438 rainfall is generally inadequate for dry farming. Thanks to the waters of 311 the Barada river, however, Damascus lies in a fertile oasis, known as the Ghouta. It is pre-eminently an area of orchards and vineyards yielding olives, fruit and nuts. Vegetables, hemp and, more recently, sugar beets are also important crops and extensive dairying is carried on. Damascus, linked with the nearby Lebanese port of Beirut by road and narrow-gauge rail, is one of Syria's two leading industrial centers, the other being Aleppo. Aside from the textile factories which constitute the principal industry, Damascus has plants for the production of cement, glass, vegetable oils, soap, leather and boots and the canning of foodstuffs.

North-northeast of Damascus up to the plains of Homs the country is for the most part rugged and barren, with occasional oases. From Homs to Aleppo stretches an extensive plain which is, along with the Jezireh, the most important agricultural area in Syria. Rainfall is fairly adequate, ranging from an annual average of around 600 mm. (23.6 inches) at Homs to a little less than 400 mm. (15.7 inches) at Hama and Aleppo. The region is the site of the largest completed government irrigation scheme, the Homs-Hama irrigation network, fed from Homs lake; extensive areas are also irrigated by wells, river pumps and water wheels. Northwest of Hama lies the large marshy area known as the Ghab into which the Orontes river pours its water and which the government is just beginning to reclaim. The Homs-Hama-Aleppo area has become the center of cotton and sugar beet cultivation, and it produces roughly one-third of the country's wheat and almost one-half of its barley. West of Aleppo extensive orchards and vineyards produce olives, fruits and nuts. The landholdings of the area are generally large and for the most part cultivated by sharecroppers, who earn a bare living. Around Aleppo mechanized agriculture is developing on some scale.

Aleppo, the principal grain market and commercial center of the country, has also developed considerable industry, featuring cotton ginning and textiles, vegetable oil extraction and soap making, and cement. Homs, with its new sugar factory, a modern textile dyeing plant, several flour mills and a large number of small weaving enterprises, has also achieved some industrial importance.

West of Homs and Hama lies the province of Latakia, facing the Mediterranean. It receives the highest rainfall—up to 1,000 mm. per year—and has a subtropical climate. Its rather narrow coastal plain boasts a

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diversified agriculture yielding tobacco, cotton, legumes, melons, olives and some citrus as well as winter cereals. Its principal city, Latakia, is a rapidly growing port serving as an outlet for the large agricultural output of northern Syria. The coastal plains and the mountains of the province are the country's most densely populated areas.

East of Aleppo lie two distinct agricultural regions, one the belt of rain-fed cultivation stretching along the Turkish frontier and comprising principally the province of the Jezireh, the other, the irrigated Euphrates valley. The Euphrates flows in a southeasterly direction through an arid region but the water taken from the river by hundreds of pumps makes possible extensive cultivation of cereals in the winter and cotton and other crops in the summer. Cultivation is principally by sharecroppers. Deir ez Zor is the largest city in the Euphrates valley. The Jezireh in northeastern Syria has now become the country's principal granary. Once the home of roaming, warlike Bedouins, it was pacified and thrown open to settled agriculture only during the last two decades. Beginning in the second World War, cultivation was rapidly expanded until now the Jezireh produces almost half the country's wheat and a considerable amount of barley as well. Dry farming predominates, with cultivation extending from Hassetche, the capital of the province, where rainfall is marginal, northward to the Turkish border where rainfall is heavy and the region's principal commercial center, the bustling town of Kamichliye, is located. In the valleys of the Khabour and Jagh-Jagh rivers, however, there is some irrigated cultivation, with cotton and rice as the principal crops. In this sparsely settled region, dry farming is carried on in large holdings —in some cases more than 100,000 hectares—and with fleets of tractors and self-propelled combines. The principal problem of the region is transport, for it is served inadequately by a railway running in and out of Turkish territory and by roads and tracks which are impassable for part of the year.

South and southwest of the Euphrates and extending toward Hama, Homs and Damascus lies a large, roughly triangular area, the Syrian desert. This desert or steppe area, although dotted here and there by an oasis, is too arid to support cultivation. Vegetation springs up briefly following the scant winter rains and supports during this time large flocks of sheep and goats tended by Bedouin tribesmen who are also engaged in the breeding of camels. Inadequate water supplies and occasionally severe weather make serious inroads on the flocks from time to time.

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454 Savings institutions are virtually non-existent. There are no special savings banks and the regular commercial banks do not consider it worth while to make a particular effort to attract savings deposits. In fact, total savings deposits in commercial banks at the end of 1953 amounted to only £S 3.5 million. No postal savings system exists, and savings in the form of insurance are negligible. This does not mean that savings do not accrue, but rather that they do not take institutional form and are invested directly, not through the intermediary of institutions or a capital market. Syrians generally prefer types of investments which are tangible and visible, such as land and buildings, and over which they can exercise some personal control. In the past the habit of putting savings into hoards of precious metals or even currency has also been deeply ingrained. There is some evidence, incapable of statistical measurement, that the relative importance of savings in the form of hoards has declined in the postwar period as opportunities for profitable investment have grown. Investment in corporate securities has greatly increased during this period, but only by limited groups of people and under conditions assuring them control over the corporate enterprise. Shares in industrial companies are bought and sold in an unorganized and very limited market.

Economic Growth

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483 One of the most noteworthy features of the Syrian economy has been its rapid growth over the last two decades, as indicated in Table 3. Agriculture and industry have both featured prominently in this development. The availability of idle land combined with the food shortages attributable to the war provided a tremendous incentive to an expansion of agricultural output. The area under cultivation, including fallow land, rose from about 1.75 million hectares in 1938 to 2.3 million in 1945 and has since continued to expand, reaching a total of around 3.65 million in 1953. The area actually planted to crops and orchards accordingly more than doubled during this entire period, rising from 1.16 million hectares to 2.44 million. By far the greatest part of the area put to the plow was dry farming land. According to official estimates, for example, the amount of land planted to winter wheat and barley increased from about 750,000 hectares in 1938 to 1.13 million in 1945 and 1.34 million in 1953, and the output of these cereals about doubled during the whole period. Following the war a considerable expansion of irrigation took place. By 1953 the irrigated area

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was officially estimated at 509,000 hectares as compared with 284,000 in 1946. The resulting rise in the value of agricultural production was particularly marked, since with irrigation more valuable summer crops could

TABLE 3 Indicators of Economic Growth

	Prewar	1945	1947	1950	1953
Agriculture					
Cultivated area (million ha.)	1.76	2.29	—	3.09	3.67
Cropped area (million ha.)	1.16	1.51	—	2.05	2.44
Wheat					
Area (thousand ha.)	473[a]	751	843	992	1,314
Output (thousand MT)	459[a]	415	404	861[b]	962[b]
Barley					
Area (thousand ha.)	275[a]	384	365	416	428
Output (thousand MT)	290[a]	248	169	322	472
Cotton					
Area (thousand ha.)	30[a]	17.5	19.3	78.0	136.6
Output (thousand MT, ginned)	5.4[a]	4.3	5.4	35.5	47.0
Agricultural production tax (million £S)[c]	—	—	9.1	16.2	22.4
Industry—Output					
Cotton and rayon yarn (thousand MT)	1	—	—	—	9–10
Cotton and rayon cloth (million meters)	15	—	—	—	ca.100
Vegetable oils, excluding olive (thousand MT)	(negligible)	—	—	—	ca.10,000
Soap (thousand MT)	3.4	—	—	—	8.9
Fruit and vegetable preserves (thousand MT)	1.8	—	—	—	4
Cement (thousand MT)	less than 75	—	—	—	224
Matches (million boxes)	11	—	—	—	32.2
Cigarettes (MT)	416	—	—	—	1,644
Electricity (million KWH; principal utilities)	25.1	—	—	—	114.2
Financial					
Government receipts (million £S)[d]	11.5	118.3	116.2	138.9	216.7
Notes and coins in circulation (million £S)[d]	19.9	210.7	183.2	224.6	288.4
National income (million £S)	—	—	—	1,380	1,600

[a] 1934–38 average. The production figures for wheat and barley may well be somewhat overestimated.

[b] Official production figures have been revised upward in the light of the amounts marketed as revealed by the agricultural production tax returns.

[c] The proceeds of this tax, levied on produce brought to market, tend to exaggerate the rate of increase in production, but are nonetheless a good indication of trends in output.

[d] Figures are not deflated for price increases. While a reliable price index is lacking, the price level in the period 1950–53 was probably between five and seven times as high as that before the war.

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be grown. Thus with the stimulus originally imparted by the Korean war boom, cotton, which had long been grown in Syria but on a small scale, has developed into one of the country's most valuable crops.

Manufacturing has expanded rapidly in the postwar period. Although the original impulse was given by the wartime shortage of manufactured goods, new factories were not for the most part established until after the war. Among the new modern factories built since then are six spinning and weaving mills, a considerable number of cotton ginneries, a dyeing plant, six vegetable oil mills, a glass factory, a cement plant and a sugar factory. The total amount of paid-up capital of manufacturing enterprises established in corporate form since the end of the war is in the neighborhood of £S 80 million. Since enterprises generally refuse to disclose their output, statistical measurement of the increase in production is extremely difficult. Very rough estimates indicate that about 9,000-10,000 metric tons of cotton and rayon yarn were produced in 1953 as compared with probably less than 1,000 tons in prewar years. The output of cloth was about 14,000 to 16,000 tons, or more than 100 million meters, as compared with perhaps 15 million meters before the war. The production of vegetable oils (other than olive oil), which was negligible before the war, amounted to around 10,000 tons, and the output of soap, at a level of about 9,000 tons, was almost three times the prewar estimate. Cement production, which was less than 75,000 tons before the war, amounted to 223,639 tons in 1953. The output of cigarettes was about four times, and that of matches three times, that of prewar years.

The expansion of agriculture and industry has in turn stimulated commerce, transport and construction. The construction industry in particular has witnessed a postwar boom which lifted the volume of building to a level probably twice as high as that in the years immediately preceding the war. Increasing prosperity, together with the wartime drop in building, generated a large volume of housing construction in all major cities.

The increase in national income since before the war has undoubtedly been very great; in real terms it may well be almost double. Unfortunately the fragmentary nature and unreliability of statistical data make even approximate estimates of national income extremely difficult. For the postwar years an unofficial estimate has been made only for 1950, when national income was put at £S 1,250 million. Some very tentative calculations made by the mission indicate that this estimate may well be too conservative. These calculations point to a rise in national income from

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community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing. 454

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads. 471 654

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the government to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network. 658 [212]

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its development at which the government must undertake a more important promotional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has 654 433 311

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654 severely diminished, and agricultural prices no longer afford such a power-
433 ful stimulus to the expansion of acreage. Extension of the irrigated area
311 must depend increasingly on public investment, particularly since the area which can be economically irrigated by privately installed pumps cannot be greatly expanded.

654 High transport costs and the low quality of grain are becoming serious
433 handicaps to Syria in an increasingly competitive world grain market. In other sectors economic activity seems also to be slackening. The future growth of industry is likely to be less rapid now that the more obvious manufacturing industries have been established. In construction it is also quite possible that the postwar boom has passed or will shortly pass its peak. Thus in the absence of a well-considered government program to stimulate the economy, the rapid increase in production and private investment may well taper off.

654 In agriculture the government now faces the need to make a careful
241 inventory of remaining land resources, to carry out irrigation projects on a greatly increased scale and to initiate settlement schemes for state lands. Steps must be taken to maintain and stimulate Syria's grain exports by providing better and cheaper transport and establishing facilities for the storage, grading and cleaning of cereals, thereby reducing losses and improving quality. In the future more emphasis will need to be placed on raising agricultural and livestock yields. The government will have to stimulate farmers to use better seeds and implements and to improve their crop rotation in the direction of soil-building crops and greater diversification. Livestock yields must be raised by undertaking a program of selection and cross-breeding, by building livestock shelters and providing more water for migrating livestock, and by initiating a more effective campaign against pests and diseases. To achieve these objectives the government must also expand and improve agricultural education, make available extension services at the village level and furnish much more agricultural credit on reasonable terms. Special efforts are required to assist the small peasant proprietor and the tenant who have not in the past fully shared in the rising prosperity. They must be helped to achieve greater economic independence and security and enabled to acquire the means of production with which to increase their incomes.

654 Although further expansion in industry should prove possible, greater
433 emphasis will have to be placed on selective expansion and on increasing efficiency so as to lower prices and broaden the market. Here the govern-

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CHAPTER 3

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

1 CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES AND PROBLEMS

A development program for Syria must focus primarily on agriculture. 244 Despite the expansion of manufacturing, agriculture will continue to be the country's principal industry. Its potentialities are still large. It not only employs more people than any other occupation, but furnishes most of the raw materials for manufacturing and gives rise to most of the business in commerce.

The mission has drawn up its recommendations in the light of the characteristics of Syrian agriculture and the principal problems which must be met. Its conception of these characteristics and problems, as outlined below, must therefore be clearly understood.

1. *Syrian agriculture is primarily dependent on rainfall which is* 244 *seasonal, varies considerably from year to year and is frequently scanty.* 311

Irrigated land accounts for only 11-12% of perhaps 3.5 million hectares under cultivation. Since there is no rain during the summer, winter crops predominate. Wheat and barley are therefore the principal crops; and the possibilities of diversification are limited. In most of the cultivated area normal rainfall is barely adequate. Periodic droughts such as the one in 1951 tend to make farm income very unstable.

All this points to the need for expanding the area under irrigation as much as possible. The proper conservation and use of the limited water resources is one of the paramount problems of Syrian agriculture. The extension of irrigation in the past has already made possible the introduction of such new crops as cotton and sugar beets which have added substantially to agricultural income.

2. *The great increase in the area under cultivation over the last few decades severely limits the possibility of further expansion without irrigation.*

In the past there was plenty of good idle land available for farming. The rapid extension of cultivation was greatly facilitated by the fact that

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241 311 people could claim title to "empty" land by simply occupying and cultivating it for a period of years. Legislative Decree No. 135, although never applied, was enacted to halt this unregulated expansion by making all unoccupied land state domain and thus subject to exploitation only with a prior permit. This legislation implicitly recognized that the amount of land that could still be put to the plow was steadily shrinking. Nonetheless the mission encountered a widespread impression that agricultural land resources were virtually limitless. Official estimates that there remain somewhat over 3 million hectares of land available for cultivation appear to support this impression. However, such an estimate is at best only a rough guess. It undoubtedly includes much land which is marginal from the standpoint of fertility or rainfall. It should be frankly acknowledged that there is little or no reliable information on this subject. The mission itself gained the impression on its travels that the amount of land still available for cultivation without irrigation is extremely limited. Here and there in the Jezireh, for example, cropping has already pushed forward into marginal land. Even though good yields may be obtained on such lands in seasons of abnormally heavy rainfall, farming would normally be very hazardous.

Certain conclusions must be drawn. The first is that irrigation will need to play an increasingly important role in the expansion of land under cultivation. The second is that a careful inventory and classification of the land still available should be undertaken in order to determine how it may be most effectively utilized and what must be done to make it productive. The final conclusion is that there is need to work out policies and programs for the exploitation and settlement of such good land as remains.

241 423 3. *Ownership of the means of production in agriculture is very unevenly distributed, resulting in wide disparities in income.*

Land ownership is by no means equally distributed. There are many landless peasants, while large landed estates, some exceeding several hundred thousand hectares, predominate in the provinces of Hama, Homs, Aleppo and the Jezireh. One estimate indicates that 38% of the total area of privately owned land was in holdings of over 100 hectares and only 19% in small holdings of 10 hectares and less. Reliable figures on the distribution of land ownership will be available only upon completion of the cadastral survey now in progress. Of the area surveyed by the end of 1952, however, 49% was held in properties of over 100 hectares and 16% in properties of more than 1,000 hectares. These proportions, however, are

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II IRRIGATION AND RECLAMATION

The extension of irrigated land is of vital importance in a country like Syria, where large potentially fertile areas yield little or nothing because rainfall is inadequate and where nearly all of the cultivable area produces no summer crops because no rain falls from spring to autumn. It has become even more imperative with the shrinkage in the area of good rainfed land which can still be taken under cultivation. Thus irrigation is the principal means for expanding the cultivated area, increasing and stabilizing yields and diversifying agricultural production by developing summer crop cultivation. 311 312

Existing Irrigated Areas

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At present about 400,000 hectares of land are probably already under irrigation. Of these, approximately 250,000 hectares are irrigated by pumps drawing water principally from rivers but also from wells. Most of the river pumps are located in the valley of the Euphrates and its tributary, the Khabour, while by far the greater number of pumps drawing on underground water is in the provinces of Hama and Aleppo. Except for small areas still supplied by animal-driven *norias* (water wheels), the remainder is irrigated by gravity flow from rivers, springs and *foggarahs* (underground ducts). Only 48,000 hectares are covered by government irrigation schemes, including the Homs-Hama scheme providing a rather inadequate supply of water from the Homs lake to 22,000 hectares; the Mzerib project in the Hauran, which irrigates 2,500 hectares from the springs feeding the Yarmuk river; the Tell Maghass scheme on the Khabour, which provides for 8,500 hectares but is not completed; and the Matkh project covering 15,000 hectares south of Aleppo, which receives a wholly inadequate supply of water from the Kouek river during the dry season when most of the water in the upper reaches of the river is taken by Turkey for irrigation.

The possibilities of additional irrigation are by no means limitless. Except for the Euphrates, Syria has no large river with a substantial flow during the summer dry season. In fact the Euphrates accounts for 83% of the aggregate annual flow of Syria's rivers. Thus the available water supply may set a limit of 400,000 to 600,000 hectares on the additional area which can be irrigated. In the last analysis, however, the upper limit will be determined by the division of the Euphrates water with Iraq, which is in the [123]

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TABLE 5 Expenditures on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1950–60

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(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Future outlays	
	1950–52 average	1953 estimate	1954 estimate	1955–60 total	Annual average
Projects—total	2,3[illegible]	3,130[a]	3,380[a]	197,000	32,833
Completion of works	—	—	—	9,000	1,500
Ghab	—	—	—	102,000[b]	17,000
Other new works	—	—	—	83,000	13,833
Euphrates valley studies	—	—	—	3,000	500
Maintenance	113	205	350	3,000	500
Research and demonstration	—	—	—	1,200	200
Grand total	2,481	3,335	3,730	201,200	33,533

[a] Budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures. The 1954 total excludes an £S 5 million authorization for the Ghab of which probably only a negligible portion was spent.
[b] After allowance for receipts from sale of land and water.

III LAND POLICIES AND LAND SETTLEMENT[9]

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A fuller knowledge of the available land resources is essential not only to plan better utilization of land already under exploitation, but also to determine how much land remains for expansion of cultivation and what must be done to make it productive. Even the existing pattern of land utilization is hardly known. Data on the total cultivated area, on the acreage planted to individual crops and on production are at best only rough estimates which are often quite wide of the mark. Little is known as yet about various types of soils, their deficiencies and potentialities. Widely varying opinions are expressed regarding the area which can still be put to the plow or can be irrigated by gravity flow.

Aerial Survey Program

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Aerial photography can be of great assistance in planning land utilization and public works of importance to agriculture. Up to the present it

[9] See Annex E, p. 351.

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311 has been used in Syria to obtain topographic data necessary for certain
634 irrigation projects and, in formulating an accelerated program for a cadastral survey of the Jezireh in 1952, the government provided for a photographic survey of this entire region. An aerial survey of all of Syria except waste desert areas would no doubt be desirable, but the mission realizes that financial considerations make a more limited objective necessary. For the period ending in 1960 the mission suggests accordingly that the following areas be surveyed (see Map 5):

1. An area of about 2,250 square kilometers in the provinces of Latakia and Aleppo.

The purpose would be to facilitate (1) a delimitation and assessment of the forest area in Latakia which constitutes the most important timber resource of the country, (2) the location of an appropriate dam site on the Nahr el Kebir, and (3) the planning of irrigation for the Roudj.

For nearly the entire area mapping on a scale of 1:20,000 with 5-meter contours would be sufficient, but for the Roudj and the area of the dam site mapping at 1:5,000 with 1-meter contours would be necessary.

2. An area of approximately 7,000 square kilometers east of the Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus highway.

Here the object would be to determine what part of this area might be still available for cultivation. At present conflicting opinions are held regarding the potentialities of the area.

Aerial photography, coupled with the preparation of a controlled photomosaic, would suffice.

3. An area of about 4,600 square kilometers north of Raqqa and extending to the Turkish frontier.

This area is also claimed to contain much unutilized but cultivable land. Aerial photography would permit a rapid delimitation and analysis of the area in relation to the land already under cultivation.

4. An area of approximately 6,000 square kilometers in the Euphrates valley region, comprising the Raqqa and Resafe plains and extending to the Halibiye-Zalebiye gorge.

This survey, as already indicated, is an essential part of the planning work for the irrigation system dependent on the projected Youssef Pasha reservoir.

Mapping at a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours would suffice for

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

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most of the region; a scale of 1:10,000 with 2-meter contours for a narrow band running along the Euphrates; and a scale of 1:5,000 with identical contours for the area immediately around the gorge.

5. An area of about 970 square kilometers in the Khabour river valley upstream from Markada.

Aerial photography is already covered by an existing contract. Mapping is necessary to facilitate irrigation planning and to investigate the possibility of a dam at Markada. Mapping on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours would be sufficient except for the proposed dam site where the scale would need to be 1:5,000.

6. An area of some 3,400 square kilometers on the left banks of the Khabour and Euphrates rivers.

Mapping of this area on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours appears necessary to determine the possibilities of gravity irrigation and to expedite needed soil surveys.

These surveys, which together would cost approximately £S 4 million, would cover most of the land potentially available for cultivation and the greater part of the irrigable area.

Soil Surveys

The aerial reconnaissance the mission has suggested would greatly expedite the soil survey already started under the direction of an FAO specialist. Soils can be classified into broad types on the basis of aerial photographs. With additional work on the ground it is possible to proceed to more detailed agrogeological soil mapping, which is necessary to determine how the land already under cultivation can better be employed and how land still unoccupied can best be utilized. This type of mapping is now being undertaken for the Jezireh as an adjunct to the cadastral survey. While all the detailed soil mapping required can obviously not be completed in a few years, the mission urges that the present soil survey be expedited and broadened. A soils department with a budget of £S 60,000 for 1954 has been established in the Ministry of Agriculture. Its budget will have to be raised to at least £S 100,000. The work on soils should concentrate primarily on areas which will or can be opened to settlement such as the Ghab, the Roudj and certain rainfed regions. From

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operation, in striking contrast to large private holdings where the most modern machinery is used. Measures to raise the standard of living of this group must be one of the main objectives of any development program; in the first instance this must be effected through education, improved systems of land tenure, and better credit facilities. 162 244 511

Lessees and landlords. Some city dwellers have interests in agriculture as leasehold operators of tracts of state domain, or as absentee landlords. Although their interests rarely coincide with the demands of sound long-term farming practices, this segment of the population has been instrumental in opening new farm tracts (such as the Jezireh) and in introducing new crops, thereby contributing much to the national economy. The cultivation of the large absentee holdings is generally left to sharecroppers. 241 427

Sharecroppers. Each sharecropper is assigned a parcel of land from which, after the apportionment of the crop, he can hope to gain little more than a bare subsistence. In rainfed areas the sharecropper customarily receives rather less than 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor and around 70–75% if he also supplies the working capital; the percentages may be slightly higher in sparsely populated areas, and lower where population pressure is heavier. On irrigated lands the landlord takes 65–75% of the crop if he provides seed and water, and about half if the sharecropper provides the working capital.

In the long run, the position of the sharecropper would be more tolerable if the productivity of the land and his share of it were raised. At present, yearly land assignments may vary, with the result that the cropper has no incentive to improve the land. The restricted area of the assignment and lack of proper equipment, draft animals and money capital contribute to the permanent indebtedness of sharecroppers and their very low standard of living. Measures to improve their lot should include improved tenure status, Agricultural Bank and cooperative assistance in providing working and fixed capital, and resettlement schemes to relieve local land pressure.[1]

Agricultural Regions

In terms of natural conditions and the types of agriculture practiced, Syria can be divided in nine main agricultural regions. 241 438 311

The Hauran and the Djebel Druze. The Hauran and the Djebel Druze includes the mountains of the Djebel Druze and the Julani in the south-

[1] See Chapter 3, Sections III and VI, of the Main Report.

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244 west corner of Syria. The cultivated soil varies from fertile shallow chest-
458 nut in the Djebel Druze to the very fertile deep brown of the plains of
311 Hauran. Part of the shallow, reddish-brown soil extending towards the Anti-Lebanon and the basin of Damascus is uncultivable because of its stony character.

The small to medium-size farm is characteristic of this region. Mules and oxen are the customary draft sources, mechanized agriculture being restricted to the few larger holdings. Wheat and barley are the main winter crops; vetch, lentils and sorghum the summer crops. The acreage under irrigation is insignificant. Although now outstripped by the newly opened Jezireh, the Hauran, famous as a granary in the Greco-Roman period, remains a leading cereal-producing area, and the yields in comparison with other areas are high. Excellent grapes and other fruits are produced in the Djebel Druze, but because of unfavorable market conditions and outlets and the lack of processing facilities and storage, much of each harvest is wasted. In the Julani region, where crop production is uneconomical because of the stony character of the landscape, but where good grazing conditions prevail, double-purpose cattle, for meat and draft, are raised successfully. In this area, land pressure is an urgent problem, especially in the Djebel Druze where many uneconomical small farms hamper progress.

Damascus basin foothills of the Anti-Lebanon. The ample layer of fertile reddish-brown soil of the Damascus basin becomes slightly saline in the Merj and towards the swamps of Lake Ateibe, though under drainage and irrigation these areas would probably be suitable for crops. The bottoms of many of the Anti-Lebanon valleys are covered with more or less deep layers of light brown to dark brown soils of moderate to high fertility, with gravelly alluvium bordering the western foothills. Irrigation water is obtained from the numerous streams, and the basin of Damascus is entirely watered by the Barada river coming from the fertile Zebedani valley. The Barada and many of the small streams offer possibilities of storing winter waters for the future expansion of irrigation.

Numerous orchards and vineyards are found in the Ghouta and in the various valleys, producing considerable quantities of fruits, grapes and nuts. Vegetable, hemp and fodder products, and in recent years cotton and sugar beets,[2] form the main agricultural crops of the Ghouta. Wheat and barley are the traditional regional winter crops and beans and peas the summer ones. As a rule farms are of small to medium size; particularly in the

[2] Sugar beet production in 1955 is expected to be over 30,000 tons.

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Ghouta, dairy farming has been developed. The typical Damascus dairy breed is an excellent milk producer and apparently quite resistant to the heat.

The basins of Jairout, El Daou and Palmyra. The third region consists of the brown to grey desert soil. Crop and fruit cultivation, possible only under irrigation, is carried out in small depressions and plots along the bordering mountains where deep layers of very fertile soil occur. During the Greco-Roman period and earlier, a great part of these extensive basins, including the oasis of Palmyra, still famous for its fruits, were prominent producing centers. There are indications that moderate quantities of subterranean water exist.

On some of the best terrain, particularly on the watered alluvial soils, the intensive cultivation of sugar beet, cotton and wheat is possible. At Ain el Barde, for example, record yields are now obtained and reseeding of some of the large natural pasture now used by Bedouins appears to be feasible.

The western plains and hills. The gently undulating land northeast and southwest of Aleppo, the plains of Hama and Homs, and the hills east of the Djebel Ansariya may be broadly grouped as a single region. Soil types range widely from the stony and gravelly desert to the terra rossa and chestnut brown. Local productivity varies greatly with soil and rainfall, but taken as a whole this region ranks very high among producing areas.

The main winter crops are wheat and barley; vetch, beans and sorghum are the principal summer crops. Roughly one-third of the country's wheat production and nearly one-half of its barley come from this region. During the last few years, however, sugar beet and cotton have established themselves as cash crops, and in 1953 the region's cotton output accounted for about three-quarters of Syria's total production. Fruit and nuts in substantial quantities are produced in large orchards, sizable vineyards and olive groves in the Homs, Idlib and Aleppo areas. Most of the land holdings are large, cultivated mainly by sharecroppers; small holdings are in the minority and many of these are too small to be economically justified. As a rule, the best land is already cultivated and though large state domains exist, there is very little land available for further crop expansion. Farm machinery is becoming more common, although the area is still cultivated mainly by the *feddan* and other obsolete implements. Dairy farming is practiced around the larger population centers (e.g., Aleppo) but the industry is still in its infancy and pure-bred stock has been imported by only

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a few progressive farmers. Mixed farming and pure sheep farming could be successfully pursued in the eastern part of this region, but here, as elsewhere, the greatest handicap is the land tenure system and unfavorable sharecropper conditions.

The coastal plains of Tartous and Latakia and the foothills of the Djebel Ansariya. Along the Mediterranean seashore up to 80% of the deep light sandy soil lends itself well to tree cultivation, particularly to irrigated citrus cultivation.

In general the region is well suited to highly diversified agriculture; the present system is that of winter cereals and vetch and summer crops such as summer legumes, melons and tobacco. About three-quarters of Syria's tobacco is grown in this agricultural district, Abu Riha, Chek el Bint and Tombak being the best known types. The recent cotton boom had its repercussion in this area, particularly as cotton can be grown without irrigation. The region is also well known for its olive groves. Citrus cultivation has gained in importance during the last decade but has only recently begun to receive the governmental attention it deserves.

Manpower is plentiful but land is scarce. The whole region is characterized by small and frequently uneconomic farms of less than 10 hectares. Pressure on the land is particularly evident in the foothills where crops are often farmed on marginal and submarginal land. Manual and animal draft operations are the rule, mechanized farming the exception. Livestock production and dairy farming is insignificant though in many parts of this region they would offer a better yield than does the existing farm system.

The central and northern plains, including the Jezireh. The central and northern plains region follows the line of the "fertile crescent", a strip varying in width from 50 to over 100 kilometers, extending in a semi-circle around the Syrian desert. Shallow reddish-brown type soils prevail, light at the fringe of the sub-desert, deeper, darker and more fertile toward the north. Landholdings are generally large and include great tracts of state domain. The size of individual estates runs from a few hundred hectares in the central plains to several hundred thousand hectares in the Jezireh.

Agriculture is extensive, rather than intensive, and the general manpower shortage has accelerated the introduction of the most modern equipment to cultivate and harvest the region's cereals and small grains. This is particularly true of the Jezireh, which, unlike the central plains, has been only recently opened to organized agriculture, and is now Syria's largest wheat and barley producing area; it accounts for over 40% of total Syrian

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wheat production. While the best soils are practically all in production, large areas of medium quality and marginal land are still available and some of these might be cultivated after an appraisal of their productivity. The recent speculative farming wave is responsible for the neglect of such appraisals and far too much marginal land has been broken up and cultivated. Dry farming in this belt (particularly south, east and west of Hassetche) depends greatly on the amount and distribution of the rains.

Although wheat and barley are the principal crops, mention must be made of the cotton and rice grown in the irrigated Khabour valley. The high cotton prices of recent years encouraged speculative cotton growing with varying degrees of success. Rice cultivation has been rather successful, but as it demands the highest water duty the cultivated area has declined somewhat in favor of cotton.

The northeast corner of the Jezireh. Toward the region of Deirik the brown soils of the steppe give way to chestnut brown, with rich black soil in the extreme corner of Deirik. The well-watered plains and undulating lands are intersected by the Jagh-Jagh, Khabour and Soutane rivers and their numerous tributaries, making possible irrigation over vast areas. Tractor cultivation is developing rapidly in this newly opened area, although in comparison with the western Jezireh and the steppe belt the region is less mechanized and more densely populated.

Practically all crops could be grown even without irrigation but wheat and barley are the leading winter crops and sorghum and sesame the main summer crops. Rice is an old staple but is now giving ground to cotton. In the region of Deirik good grapes, excellent potatoes, tomatoes and other vegetables are successfully grown but inadequate transport and storage facilities make their economical exploitation difficult. Livestock, particularly sheep, has greatly declined, due to the expanded crop area. The land is very well suited to raising cattle and beef. A diversification in land use would result in a more balanced and prosperous economy.

The valleys of the Euphrates and Khabour, and the Ghab depression. Though situated in entirely different regions and consequently showing different physiographical aspects, the large river valleys may be classified together in terms of soil fertility, cultivation methods, land tenure systems, population density and development potential.

In the Euphrates and Khabour valleys, the alluvial soil of deep silt loam has excellent agricultural qualities. The soil in the Ghab marshes, lying astride the Orontes about 40 kilometers east of Latakia, consists mainly of

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241 heavy clay alluvium in the valley proper and terra rossa and some peat soil along the slopes. Whereas drainage is the main problem in the Ghab, the problem in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys is to extend irrigation so as to double the present cultivated area. The farms vary from rather large holdings of absentee landlords, cultivated by sharecroppers, to very small farm units owned and worked by the farmer himself.

Crop rotation followed in the irrigated area of the Ghab generally takes the form of barley, cotton, wheat and cotton, while the rotation in the Euphrates valley is similar to that in dry farming regions: cotton or summer crop, fallow, winter wheat.

Yields are generally higher than in the rainfed regions but full use is not made of the available water and the irrigation methods are backward in many parts. Though better yielding cash crops have been introduced, the farmer as a rule cultivates only the few traditional crops. In these areas agricultural education could do much to further more economic water utilization and wider crop diversification.

The lands in the immediate vicinity of the rivers are fully irrigated but not fully utilized during the entire year. Hundreds of thousands of hectares on the somewhat higher land on both banks of the Euphrates and in the lower Khabour valley form a potential future reserve, though the capital outlay required to bring them under cultivation would probably have to be furnished by the government.

The central plains of the Syrian desert. In the central plains low rainfall and extreme temperatures render agricultural production practically non-existent but the desert is quite important as a natural grazing area (except during the absolutely dry months) for the sheep and camels of nomadic Bedouin tribes. Many parts of the desert, particularly the large depressions, could be better utilized if desert wells were constructed.

134 *Types of Soil*

311 The soils of Syria rank from the world's best to the poorest roughly in the order of (1) alluvial, (2) black, (3) chestnut brown and terra rossa, followed by (4) brown and reddish brown, and (5) grey sub-desert. According to a preliminary survey conducted by an FAO soil specialist the area covered by each of these various types of soil is approximately as follows (in thousand hectares):

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1. alluvial	200
2. black	100
3. chestnut brown and terra rossa	1,500
4. brown and reddish-brown	3,500
5. grey sub-desert	9,000

The remaining 3.7 million hectares is covered by lithasols, eroded rendzina, and saline soils, which for the greater part have no agricultural significance.

Unfortunately, the three best soil types represent no more than about 10% of Syria's total surface area of about 18 million hectares, and it is on these soils only that a wide variety of crops can be grown. Almost all of the brown and reddish-brown soils, covering 20% of the land area, fall in the inner region of the fertile crescent belt where steppe conditions prevail. These soils are most appropriate for the cultivation of cereals and small grains, and are utilized for such purposes in similar regions throughout the world. The grey sub-desert soils (50%) are used primarily for pasture; crop production is possible only under irrigation.

This evaluation serves only as a rough guide to detailed agrogeological soil maps. A more detailed survey of Syrian soils is in progress and it is imperative that it be continued, since soil maps are essential for planning, and, together with data on climate, may be used to determine the types and quantities of crops which may be cultivated to the greatest economic and social advantage. They would also be of the greatest importance for the assessment of taxes on land holdings, should such a tax be instituted.

Soil Fertility and Agricultural Use

Soil fertility and usefulness depend not only on type but also on profile, that is, the layers or horizons (topsoil and subsoils) of soil materials of various colors, on the chemical composition and on the configuration of the terrain and its water supply. 134 242

The depth of profile determines the root rate and the bulk of material available for nutrition, and also indicates the total soil water available—a consideration of importance in view of Syria's semi-arid conditions. Here shallow soils, even the best type, are of limited value only; being more prone to drought than deep ones they are more hazardous as an agricultural base.

Chemical composition of the soil, especially the topsoil, also has an im-

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134 portant bearing on fertility, for soils lacking a balance of the main elements
242 (nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus) or deficient in some of the minor elements (calcium, magnesium, etc.) are worthless for agriculture. Nitrogen, the most essential element in plant growth, is extracted from the soil during the growing period. In Syria, the customary method of restoring nitrogen is to leave the land fallow; for centuries this has been done rather successfully in the Hauran and elsewhere. The period of fallow—one, two or three years or more—depends on the type of crop, and, as far as the soil is concerned, the group, quality, depth and restorative capacity. In addition to the customary fallow, Syrian farmers near populated centers use town refuse to restore soil fertility. Unfortunately cheap manure and compost are generally consumed for fuel, but in recent years the use of commercial fertilizers has increased, particularly for cotton and sugar beet. While the Syrian farmers are aware of the importance of better crop rotation practices, improvement of soils through green manuring and leguminous crops is in its infancy.

During the last two decades huge tracts have been opened up, especially in the Jezireh. This land has been idle for centuries and its reserve of chemical compounds caused by decomposition of the natural vegetation is considerable. Though very good soils do exist, particularly in the northeastern parts, the magnitude of the stored elements has generally been overestimated. The reserves, particularly of nitrogen, are not inexhaustible. The virgin soil of the Jezireh has often been compared with virgin soil types in Russia, the United States and Europe but it must be remembered that in Syria the humus has not been so abundant as in humid climates, so that the nitrogen reserve is very limited. When that reserve falls below a certain level soil productivity decreases rapidly even if other elements are in plenti-
[311] ful supply. In Syria continuous exploitation under a monocultural system has resulted in decreased yields in certain areas, notably the Jezireh, where the danger is not yet fully recognized. Even artificial fertilizers cannot replace organic enrichment and the fallow system in its present form is far from sufficient to maintain fertility. New farm techniques, a changed rotation system and increased use of green manuring and fertilizers are urgent needs.

It is believed that Syrian soils are not generally deficient in phosphorus, important for growth and for the forming of grains and seeds, although chemical analyses indicate the total phosphorus available rather than the amount which can actually be absorbed by the plant. Assimilation depends

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4. Mixed farming should be promoted in sugar beet areas. The cash return from sugar beet production is three to six times larger than that from wheat and other crops. Moreover, the leaves from one hectare of sugar beet make an excellent silage fodder, equivalent to about 4.5 tons of good hay.

v CROP DIVERSIFICATION

Practically all temperate and many subtropical crops can be and are grown in Syria. Their distribution, however, is very poor. The mission strongly emphasizes the desirability of a wider diversification to lessen the risks and to ensure a better use of available land and manpower. In nearly all the rainfed zones leguminous fodder crops could be substituted for the customary fallow. These would provide the soil with needed nitrogen, improve its structure and serve as fodder. If livestock were adequately fed for a single season, human food production would probably thereby be increased, indirectly, to a greater extent and sooner than if the land were sown to crops for human consumption. An increase in livestock, particularly in irrigated zones but also in the rainfed area, means fuller employment and higher income for the rural population.

To supplement winter vetch and berseem, the mission suggests the introduction for field trials of the cluster bean (*Cyanopsia sp. sp.*), a grain and forage plant widely cultivated in Sicily; some of the varieties can be grown with sorghum. In addition there is the possibility of goat's rue (*Galega orientalis*), a bushy, erect perennial herb of high nutritive value, and of sulla (*Hedysarum coronarium*), which can be used as green fodder or hay and which ranks with red clover in nutritive value. The latter grows best in deep, rich calcareous soils, but can also be grown in poor soil if it contains lime. Sulla can be sown alone, with cereals, or in mixtures with other legumes; it yields up to 120 tons of green matter per hectare under irrigation, and it may produce from 16-50 tons even on non-irrigated land.[6] Trials to reseed a wild species of alfalfa, reported to grow in the Anti-Lebanon region, should be undertaken in other areas. Cultivated lucerne and alfalfa (*Medicago sp. sp.*) have responded successfully; their more extensive cultivation should be encouraged. Of the 50 or more species the most common is *Medicago sativa* and *M. varia*, of which many strains are

[6] FAO publication, *Legumes in Agriculture*.

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adapted to drought and to hard winters; they can be grown as either winter or summer crops. The same can be said of the clovers (*Melilotus sp. sp.*) and the fenugreek (*Trigonellia sp.*), good fodder plants which can be mixed with oats or vetches.

Even under an irrigation system the selection of hardy cultural winter crops for Syrian conditions is very restricted and none can replace the winter cereals as cash crops. A greater choice is possible among summer crops, some of which may become quite significant in the future.

Besides the great variety of cow peas (*Vigna sp.*), vetches (*Vicia sp.*), chick peas (*Cicer sp.*), lentils (*Lens sp.*), beans (*Phaseolus sp.*) and peas (*Pisum sp.*), the cultivation of peanuts (*Arachis sp.*) and soya (*Soya max*) is strongly recommended. Both are grown in Syria but current production is negligible, in spite of the fact that these crops are adaptable to both small and large size farming. In the coastal plains, in many parts of the fertile crescent and particularly in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys, there are ideal soils (well drained, fertile sandy loams) and favorable conditions of climate (good rainfall or irrigation possibilities during the growing and seed setting periods, combined with hot weather during the time of seed ripening) for their cultivation. Preferably, the multi-purpose peanut should be grown in rotation with maize, sorghum or hemp. Areas in Syria where peanuts could be grown successfully must run into tens of thousands of hectares.

An even wider range could be found for soya, which could be cultivated for human consumption, concentrates for farm animals, oil and for the manufacture of many other valuable materials (e.g., plastics). The soya plant also makes good hay, silage or pasture. Its increased production would be of great value to Syria, for its flour, when mixed with wheat flour, would improve the national diet. Soya thrives best in somewhat moist loose soil, but is also rather drought-resistant. Numerous varieties and strains exist, adapted to different growing conditions and early maturing from 60 days on.

A departure from the traditional farming system and a shift to greater diversification and mixed farming will take time and can be achieved only through demonstration and education. No radical change can be expected in the next year or two; intercropping of the cereals with leguminous plants would be a good start. Distribution of free seed and some financial help to the owners or sharecroppers of small farms selected for demonstrations could undoubtedly accelerate the recommended changes.

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VII PASTURE RESEEDING

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In the Main Report we specifically recommended the reseeding of the Resafe and Palmyra desert basins where the soil is fertile, the rainfall generally higher than in other desert regions, and the possibilities of storing some of the water and distributing it evenly by means of diversion dams better than elsewhere. In parts of Australia, Morocco, Algeria and South Africa, where climatic conditions are similar to those in the Syrian desert, introduction of the following herbs and grasses has shown good results: salt bushes (*Atriplex semibaccata; Atriplex vesicatum*); blue bushes (*Kochia sp.*); crow foot (*Erodium sp.*); buffalo grass (*Cenchrus ciliaris*); veldt grass (*Earharta calcycina*); *Lotus maroccanus;* and *Dactylis glomerata,* var. *Hispanica.* These perennials, more or less winter-hardy and drought-resistant, plus the existing flora, would probably make excellent sheep and goat pasture in Syria. The group of FAO experts which has been conducting experiments with respect to improved grazing conditions might help the Ministry of Agriculture to develop a successful program.

Since conditions in Iraq and Jordan are similar it would be advantageous if these countries were to participate in the program.

VIII LIVESTOCK

232 *Livestock Center*

We understand that a site for a center near Damascus has already been selected. We urge that stables and shelter, which would be designed to serve as models, should not be so elaborate as to be beyond the reach of the average farmer. We suggest that the main center have three separate divisions for sheep and goats, cattle, and poultry respectively, and that the two principal tasks of the staff should be to initiate a breeding program and to train Syrians in this work.

In the Sheep and Goat Division the sheep breeding program might be conducted along the following lines:

1st year: Assembling a station flock of the best indigenous type; purchase of 200-300 native ewes; and importation of a nucleus of pure-bred flocks—Merino from South Africa, Merino-Fleisch from Germany or

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312 427 In the mission's opinion the amortization period of 65-70 years is too long; if the same standards were applied to the new projects requiring large investment Syria's economic development would be hindered. We recommend a further revision of the basis for calculating the fees so that capital cost is amortized in a period of, say, 35-40 years, provided that in no case should the fee exceed the money value of the benefits to the landowner or cultivator. Benefits should be conservatively calculated to allow for variations in prices and yields of crops.

It also appears that although small holders might appropriately be charged a lower rate, the degree of progression in the existing water fees may be excessive.

APPENDIX

311 312 TABLE I River Flow and Government's Estimate of Irrigated and Irrigable Areas

Origin of utilized water	Annual flow (million cubic meters)	Irrigated area (thousand hectares)	Irrigable area (thousand hectares)
Euphrates	25,000	125.0	340.0
Khabour	1,500	20.0	90.0
Orontes	500	35.0	55.0
Yarmuk	450	3.0	7.5
Barada-Awadj	485	15.0	25.0
Kowek	75	12.0	15.0
Afrin	250	2.5	7.5
Sadjour	90	2.5	3.0
Baligh	150	8.5	10.0
Jagh-Jagh	90	8.0	10.0
Senn	360	0.5	5.0
Nahr el Kebir	150	0.5	2.0
Total	29,100[a]	232.5	570.0
Underground water		75.0	100.0
Miscellaneous		67.5	80.0
Gross total		375.0[b]	750.0[b]

[a] To which should be added approximately 500 million cubic meters from other small rivers and streams.

[b] Underestimated, in the mission's opinion.

SOURCE: Directorate of Irrigation.

THE SYRIAN DESERT

311 361 The Syrian desert is not uniformly barren. There are enormous stretches of steppeland, where life is not impossible, or at least not permanently so. The winter rains, rare though they are, make the pastures green and fill the water-holes. The wandering Bedouins manage to feed their flocks all the year round; and their camps are found here and there in the desert solitudes. In some places indeed, there is sedentary as well as nomadic life; near a well or a spring a group of dwellings may be built, palm trees grow up and crops are cultivated.

The necessary conditions for the transitory development of certain sites, when circumstances are favourable, may thus be found. At certain times in history, irrigation work has been undertaken to assist crop growing and reservoirs have been dug to make permanent settlement possible. Trade has provided means of livelihood for a larger population than the products of the earth would have sufficed to maintain. Military defence requirements have led to the building of forts and castles, and the necessary supplies for those who manned them have had to be found.

489 361 This accounts for the establishment of the great desert routes, with their chains of halting-places at the only spots where the existence of natural or artificial resources made life possible. The natural route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, via the Euphrates valley to Aleppo and Antioch, was shortened by the short cut across the desert which of necessity passed through Palmyra, either continuing straight to the Homs Gap or turning south towards Damascus and Palestine. Settlements grew up, at each end of the desert route or at oases along it, or again at strategic points such as river crossings or mountain gorges, some places, indeed, fulfilling several of these conditions (e.g. Dura and Palmyra).

PALMYRA

361 Palmyra has a considerable and well-deserved fame, first for its natural beauty—abundant sulphur springs, transparent blue

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MISCELLANEOUS

حالة اعمال التحديد والتحرير حسب الاقضية ، في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

EXTENT OF LAND SURVEYED AS AT THE END OF 1952, BY QADAS.

Table No. 1

جدول رقم ١

MOHAFAZAT AND QADAS	المساحة المحدودة (بالهكتار) Area surveyed (Hectars)	المساحة المتبقية للتحديد (بالهكتار) Area to be surveyed (hectars)	المساحة الغير قابلة للزراعة (بالهكتار) Uncultivable Area (hectars)	المساحة الكلية (بالهكتار) Total Area (Hectars)	المحافظة والقضاء
TOTAL	3,544,983	4,372,905	10,630,298	18,447,886	المجموع العام
DAMASCUS MOHAFAZA					محافظة دمشق
and Damascus city	286,593	562,842	1,103,468	1,952,753	ومدينة دمشق المنارة
Mohafaza centre	44,842	6,500	—	51,342	مركز المحافظة
Qunetira	5,230	124,770	—	130,000	قضاء القنيطرة
Duma	116,792	100,000	989,208	1,206,000	« دوما
Zabadani	—	56,800	8,200	65,000	« الزبداني
Al-Qutaifeh & Nabek	—	250,000	106,000	356,000	قضائي القطيفة والنبك
Qatana	119,639	24,772	—	144,411	قضاء قطنا
HOMS MOHAFAZA	921,008	278,200	2,965,792	4,165,000	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza centre	921.008	278,200	2,965,792	4,165,000	مركز المحافظة
HAMA MOHAFAZA	632,185	100,000	—	732,185	محافظة حماه
Mohafaza centre	280,865	—	—	280,865	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	351,320	100,000	—	451,320	قضاء السلمية
LATAKIA MOHAFAZA	394,164	349,997	53,839	798,000	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	5,342	49,976	16,682	72,000	قضاء بانياس
Talkhalakh	9,701	43,931	368	54,000	« تلكلخ
Jableh	22,989	50,000	5,011	78,000	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	47,506	26,544	12,950	87,000	« الحفة
Safita	7,334	49,955	3,211	61,000	« صافيتا
Tartus	23,753	29,978	2,269	56,000	« طرطوس
Latakia	45,759	49,613	4,628	100,000	« اللاذقية
Misiaf	41,280	50,000	8,720	100,000	« مصياف

متتومة

حالة أعمال التحديد والتحرير حسب الاقضية ، في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

EXTENT OF LAND SURVEYED AS AT THE END OF 1952, BY QADAS.

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Table No. 1 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١ (تتمة)

MOHAFAZAT AND QADAS	المساحة المحدودة (بالهكتار) Area surveyed (Hectars)	المساحة المتبقية للتحديد (بالهكتار) Area to be surveyed (hectars)	المساحة الغير قابلة للزراعة (بالهكتار) Uncultivable Area (hectars)	المساحة الكلية (بالهكتار) Total Area (Hectars)	المحافظة والقضاء
ALEPPO MOHAFAZA	**1,292,859**	**969,089**	—	**2,291,948**	محافظة حلب
Idleb	110,395	60,457	—	170,852	قضاء ادلب
I'naz	—	145,000	—	154,000	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	165,997	—	—	165,997	« الباب
Ifrin	—	205,000	—	205,000	« عفرين
Jabal Sam'an incl. Aleppo	429,249	—	—	429,249	« جبل سمعان بما فيه مدينة حلب
Jarablus	36,557	73,972	—	110,529	قضاء جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	25,732	100,660	—	126,392	« جسر الشغور
Harem	—	82,000	—	82,000	« حارم
Ein-al-Arab	—	273,000	—	273,000	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Na'man	248,520	50,000	—	298,520	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	276,409	—	—	276,409	« منبج
HASAKEH MOHAFAZA	**95,725**	**796,275**	**1,325,000**	**2,217,000**	محافظة الحسكة
Mohafaza centre	95,725	204,275	1,225,000	1,525,000	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	—	200,000	100,000	300,000	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	—	392,000	—	392,000	« القامشلي
DEIR-EZ-ZOR MOHAFAZA	**8,641**	**500,000**	**4,997,359**	**5,506,000**	محافظة دير الزور
Mohafaza centre	8,641	100,000	1,251,359	1,360,000	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	—	75,000	276,000	351,000	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	—	250,000	1,950,000	2,200,000	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	—	75,000	1,520,000	1,595,000	« الميادين
SWEIDA MOHAFAZA	—	**370,000**	**185,000**	**555,000**	محافظة السويداء
Mohafaza centre	—	80,000	67,000	147,000	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	—	150,000	51,000	201,000	قضاء الشهباء
Salkhad	—	140,000	67,000	207,000	« صلخد
DER'A MOHAFAZA	**105,798**	**318,202**	—	**420,000**	محافظة درعا
Mohafaza centre	70,172	76,828	—	147,000	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	27,194	186,806	—	214,000	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	6,432	52,568	—	59,000	« فيق

Source : Directorate General of Land Survey.

المصدر : المديرية العامة لمصالح العقارية

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AREA OF LAND CULTIVATED AND UNCULTIVATED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1953 AND 1962
(Area in hectare)

Table No. 2:

MOHAFAZAT	المجموع العام Grand total	اراضي قابلة للزراعة Cultivable lands			غير مستثمرة Uncultivated
		Cultivated		مستثمرة	
		المجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	
YEAR 1953					
Damascus	1,962,783	159,170	81,116	78,054	354,480
Homs	4,185,000	290,280	25,280	274,000	460,000
Hama	732,185	503,965	17,114	486,751	16,300
Latakia	606,000	257,846	30,579	227,267	72,272
Aleppo	2,112,870	1,122,523	80,407	1,042,416	439,792
Al-Hasakeh	2,217,000	540,462	44,694	495,768	596,630
Deir-ez-Zor	5,506,000	261,668	200,540	60,943	1,082,791
Sweida	555,000	60,690	100	60,590	60,590
Dir'a	427,632	279,432	11,932	267,500	4,200
Total	18,276,470	3,485,251	492,062	2,993,189	3,136,565
YEAR 1962					
Damascus	1,962,783	159,170	81,116	78,054	354,480
Homs	4,219,000 (1)	342,430	38,400	304,030	458,900
Hama	832,195 (2)	530,975	28,504	511,471	22,790
Latakia	454,000 (3)	178,264	9,733	168,531	57,095
Aleppo	2,112,870	1,236,675	89,263	1,147,412	416,736
Al-Hasakeh	2,217,000	541,469	40,000	501,469	694,531
Deir-ez-Zor	5,506,000	326,713	206,340	120,373	1,017,761
Sweida	555,000	60,690	200	60,490	60,590
Dir'a	427,632	288,794	18,902	267,892	4,300
Total	18,276,470	3,689,180	508,958	3,180,222	3,087,183

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.

(1) Including Talkhalakh Qada.
(2) Including Mistaf Qada.
(3) Excluding the Qadas of Talkhalakh and Mistaf.

متنوعة

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مساحة الاراضي المزروعة وغير المزروعة حسب المحافظات خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و١٩٥٣

(المساحة بالهكتار)

جدول رقم ٢

المحافظات	اراضي غير قابلة للزراعة Uncultivable lands			
	متنوعة Miscellaneous	المراعي Pastures	الحراج Forests	المجموع Total
عام ١٩٥٢				
دمشق	437,192	953,956	47,965	1,439,133
حمص	1,304,720	1,514,066	86,934	3,405,720
حماه	27,000	95,469	89,051	211,520
اللاذقية	153,212	22,150	102,520	277,882
حلب	367,900	87,645	44,710	500,255
الحسكة	122,258	939,660	16,000	1,077,918
دير الزور	1,696,507	2,461,014	4,005	4,161,526
السويداء	407,806	17,000	8,914	433,720
درعا	130,574	8,900	4,536	144,000
المجموع	4,847,169	6,299,860	404,645	11,651,674
عام ١٩٥٣				
دمشق	437,192	953,956	47,965	1,439,133
حمص	1,505,220	1,811,150	101,300	3,417,670
حماه	50,600	96,469	122,351	269,420
اللاذقية	131,426	18,385	68,830	218,641
حلب	326,202	88,547	44,710	459,459
الحسكة	83,000	862,000	16,000	961,000
دير الزور	1,696,507	2,461,014	4,005	4,161,526
السويداء	405,720	17,000	11,000	433,720
درعا	126,112	8,900	4,536	139,538
المجموع	4,761,979	6,327,421	420,707	11,510,107

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

(١) ضم اليها قضاء تكلخ
(٢) ضم اليها قضاء مصياف
(٣) سلخ منها قضاء تكلخ ومصياف

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توزيع المساحة المروية حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٣

DISTRIBUTION OF IRRIGATED AREA, BY MOHAFAZAT, IN 1953

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

MOHAFAZAT	المساحة المروية (بالهكتار) : Irrigated Area (in hectares)						المحافظات
	الجموع Total	مياه الانهار By rivers	مياه الاقنية والينابيع By canals and springs	مياه الآبار By underground water: بالمحركات by pumps	مياه الآبار By underground water: بالنواعير by norias	مياه السيول By torrents	
Total	368,968	267,222	57,367	222,386	19,844	1,728	الجموع
Damascus	81,116	56,885	17,503	5,974	544	430	دمشق
Homs	38,400	26,802	6,898	4,740	50	—	حمص
Hama	26,504	14,400	5,822	8,282	—	—	حماه
Latakia	9,722	2,962	3,640	3,122	—	—	اللاذقية
Aleppo	89,263	59,626	12,300	11,075	4,900	1,360	حلب
Deir-ez-Zor	40,080	32,555	7,025	20	100	—	الحسكة
Al-Hassakah	205,840	3,000	300	189,150	13,290	—	دير الزور
Suwida	200	11	180	1	—	8	السويداء
Der'a	15,902	11,500	4,280	22	—	—	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1
LEBANON ME1

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pensated partly by her transit trade in goods and partly by her gold and currencies market. Syria wanted a controlled economy with import restrictions, protection of Syrian industries, and interest was to encourage all trade movements and to rely on franc support: moreover, the two countries could not agree on the division of customs dues. After years of arguments and negotiations the economic partnership was finally terminated on 14 March 1950 and customs posts were established along the common frontier. Since then agreements have been drawn up despite Syrian reluctance, but little has been achieved towards the re-establishment of economic union. It is therefore necessary to consider the economies of the two countries separately.

(a) Syria

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Agriculture

Over half but less than three-quarters of the cultivable area of Syria is, in fact, under cultivation. Since 1946 there has been a great increase in the number of pumps and tractors in use (there were 300 tractors in 1948 and 1,342 in 1951) but, as the following table shows, the cultivated area can still be extended.

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ESTIMATES OF THE USE OF LAND, 1950

	Syria		Lebanon	
	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total
Cultivable				
Cultivated under rainfall	8,400	12	805	20
Cultivated with irrigation	1,400	2	115	3
Potentially cultivable	14,000	20	700	17
Uncultivable				
Forests	1,600	2	285	7
Pasture	21,000	30	27	1
Desert, mountain and marsh	23,600	34	2,085	52
Total Area:	70,000	100	4,015	100

(Sources: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952*; UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2*.)

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Some progress in mechanized farming has been made in recent years, but much of the land is tilled as it was 2,000 years ago. The predominant form of land tenure is share-cropping by tenants on estates of large and medium size. Small holdings under 25 acres prevail in areas of intensive cultivation, and at present are estimated to constitute only 15 per cent of the total

18: Tamzon N.G-S (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
IRAQ 1941
Syria MD1

equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots it will [illegible] ness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
Syria MD1
Lebanon ME1

most in their minds. Furthermore, they put the new land under cultivation through an understanding with the local tribal chief. He guarantees them "protection" of the crop in return for a portion of the produce. Nowhere does the peasant figure in this deal other than as a laborer or a sharecropper. Nowhere do we see signs of the emergence of that badly needed class of small, independent, cultivator-owners.

The situation in Lebanon presents a glaring and enlightening contrast between two systems. In the mountain area, the heart of the country, a strong tradition of private ownership by small independent farmers prevails. In most cases, the family farm averages about 10 acres. The soil is scanty and the terrain difficult; but the people have their hearts in what they own. They have blasted the rocks and built extensive terraces to prevent erosion; they have made the mountainsides produce abundantly of olives, grapes, figs, and apples. On the narrow coastal strips they have grown luxuriant orchards of citrus and bananas. More significant than all of this, we observe that the village folk in this area enjoy much higher standards of living. This is clearly manifested in their diet, health, housing, and a literacy rate of some 90 percent.

True, they have other sources of income, especially from emigrants residing abroad. Yet the independence they have gained through ownership of the land has endowed them with the initiative and the possibility to seek these other sources and better their living conditions. Unlike the sharecropper, who is doomed to his status, the small independent owner is free to move up the ladder.

Our argument in this respect gains support from the situation that prevails in the rest of Lebanon — in the Akkar plain of the north, in the Bika valley of the interior, and in the mountain area of the south. Here we witness the predominance of the same feudal-absentee-sharecropping system that exists in Syria and Iraq. Here also we witness the same conditions of deprivation, lack of development and low levels of living. Our argument gains further support from a consideration of living conditions in those village communities of northern Iraq, of some sections of Syria and Jordan, where the people are independent and own

Wartime S-S (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

Chapter VI

SYRIA AND LEBANON

LAND AND POPULATION

S 241 At first sight, the main crop of Syria appears to be thistles, and so it is in fact: about half the land is under fallow every year, and the cultivated land is cropped only one year in two S or even three. There are some districts with intensive cultivation, for instance, the oasis of Damascus, with its brilliant green [312] crops irrigated by 'Abana and Pharphar'; but most of Syria is cultivated very extensively indeed.

S 311 In Syria and Lebanon together the area cultivated before the 243 late war was some 5·8 million acres, but of this total only L 3,900,000 acres were cropped each year, the remainder being 311 fallow. The greater part of the cropped area was under cereals, 243 about two-thirds being under wheat and one-third under barley.

In Lebanon, the whole of the cultivated area is cropped, and L there is no uncultivated land which could be brought into culti- 311 vation. In Syria however there are large areas of cultivable land which are not at present cultivated, the total cultivable area S being some 12½ million acres, of which only about one-third is 311 under cultivation. Unfortunately this figure is only a rough estimate, and it is not clear how much of the area is cultivable under present conditions, or how much of it is marginal desert grazing. Some of it is undoubtedly cultivable under present conditions, and there is certainly no shortage of land in Syria.

SYRIA: AGRICULTURAL LAND, 1943[1]

Province	*Cultivable*	*Cultivated (including fallow)*
	Acres	*Acres*
Jezira	2,471,000	543,600
Euphrates	3,212,000	321,900
Aleppo	3,706,000	1,260,000
Homs	420,000	345,900
Hama	1,309,000	1,210,000
Damascus	1,062,000	345,900
Hauran	518,600	518,900
TOTAL	12,698,600	4,545,500

[1] Omitting the provinces of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz for which no figures are available; their cultivated area may be estimated at about half a million acres.

25: Warriner 8-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East Lebanon ME1 Syria MD1

S 311 During the recent war there was an expansion of cultivation in Syria as a result of high prices and mechanization. The previous table shows the cultivable and cultivated land in different provinces and the distribution of these areas in 1943.

S L 162 Little is known about the rate of population growth, but it is believed to be rapid. According to the most recent estimates the total in 1944 was 3,997,012, of which the population of Syria was 2,860,411 and of the Lebanon 1,126,600. The population of Syria was divided as follows:

S 162

SYRIA: POPULATION AT END OF 1943

Province	*Total*
Latakia	452,507
Aleppo	870,139
Hama	157,458
Homs	212,424
Hauran	112,842
Damascus	603,889
Euphrates	225,023
Jezira	146,001
Jebel ed Druz	80,128
TOTAL	2,860,411

(This estimate excludes the Beduin, whose number is estimated at 400,000.)

About three-quarters of this total, or about 2·1 million, are rural. The amount of cultivated land per head is 2½ acres, but because cultivation is so extensive the area actually cropped is only some 1½ acres.

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L 311 241 439 162 Lebanon, by contrast with the dry plains of Syria, is intensively cultivated because of the high rainfall on the coast line; yields per acre are higher, and crops are more diversified, including citrus, olives, bananas; small irrigation schemes have been developed along the coast on the streams from the Mountain. The Lebanon depends for part of its grain supply on Syria, and all the cultivated land is cropped. The cultivated area in 1943 amounted to 1·3 million acres. The total population in 1944 was estimated to be 1,126,600; of this probably about 750,000 are rural, and the amount of cultivated land is about 1½ acres per head.

S+L 241 Grain production in Syria and Lebanon together before 1939 averaged 800,000 tons and rose to about 1 million tons during the recent war.

25c Warriner S-5 no date 1943 M1 Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

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

SYRIA AND LEBANON: AGRICULTURAL AREAS

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GRAIN PRODUCTION IN SYRIA AND LEBANON, 1934–43

	Tons	Cwts per acre
Wheat		
1934	443,000	6·3
1935	504,000	7·5
1936	427,000	6·3
1937	468,800	6·6
1938	644,300	9·0
1943	624,280	7·3
Barley		
1934	292,100	7·8
1935	347,100	9·5
1936	308,100	8·2
1937	266,300	6·5
1938	383,400	9·0
1943	330,485	8·2

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With a total rural population of about 2·8 million in 1943–4, the production of grain per head amounts to only 3·4 quintals or 6·4 hundredweights. Thus the problem for Syria is to in-

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Lebanon M51
Syria MD1

S 241 crease the productivity per acre and also to expand the culti-
311 vated area per head.

L 311 In the Lebanon, however, with its steep hillsides under inten-
241 sive cultivation, there is a definite pressure on land resources.
434 The limits of intensification appear to have been reached, and a
large part of the village population supplements its income by
work in the towns, and by remittances from abroad. If the land
L tenure system in Syria were less oppressive, room might be
S 511 found on the land for settlers from the Lebanon, but as things
are, the standard of living and status of the Lebanese peasant is
167 higher; compared with the Syrian peasant he is a free man, and
there is no inducement to leave the Mountain for the under-
populated plains of central or northern Syria.

LAND TENURE

L 471 Corresponding to these different methods of farming, there
are different systems of land tenure.[1] In Lebanon individual
423 small ownership is well established, and the pattern of village
464 life, with its broad class of small peasant owners, few large
farmers, and a growing class of landless labourers, resembles
that of Europe.

S 471 In Syria, the greater part of the land is owned by city not-
ables—the ruling class—and cultivated by small share-tenants.
427 Though individual ownership exists in some districts, for instance
423 the Beqa Valley and the oasis of Damascus, the most usual
form of landownership in the plain districts of Syria is share-
tenancy. The villagers bring their corn to the village threshing
floor, and when the grain is threshed the landlord or his agent
stands by and takes one-half of the grain. Towards this result he
has contributed nothing; all labour, equipment, seeds, livestock,
have been supplied by the tenant, so that his share is rent
purely for the use of the land. The landlord is almost always an
absentee, a city notable who only visits the land to collect rent.

S 427 The share taken by the landlord varies from district to dis-
trict, and also varies with the condition of the land. According
to an inquiry made by the French authorities, the usual division
of the crop for non-irrigated cereals is 40–50 per cent to the

[1] The information which follows is mainly based on A. Latron, *La Vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, L'Institut Français de Damas, 1936). The brilliant and profound study by Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient*, is an indispensable authority which unfortunately was received only after going to press.

511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

484 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
241 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by
409 the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

812 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
421 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

[The estate of Misherfe, near Homs --Analysis]

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

S the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares
166 were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating
S much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled.
311 Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

S In several respects the French authorities have modified the
L Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners
656 against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the exten-
423 sive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation conces-
565 sions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

S Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural
H credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the pea-
185 sant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were
565 started, but produced more water than could be used. The edu-
511 cational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

S So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of
L improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessi-
244 tates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

25: Wantner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
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better cultivation, if more machinery were available, to reduce the fallow to one year out of two, instead of two out of three in the districts where this is customary; it would also be possible, by machine cultivation, to keep weeds under control. (See Chapter VIII.)

The main possibilities of development, however, depend on irrigation. At present an area of some 500,000 acres is irrigated, and even under the existing scheme much water is wasted. How much additional land could be irrigated is a subject for controversy. Mr Soubhi Mazloum, a Syrian irrigation engineer, suggests that the total area which could be irrigated, including the use of the Euphrates water, may be as large as 1,200,000 hectares (2,960,000 acres):[1] but this figure refers to the area which it is *physically* possible to irrigate, not the area which could be irrigated with any prospect of economic return.

A more exact and detailed estimate was prepared by Professor Addison, the irrigation expert, who surveyed existing schemes in 1943 and considered that the extension of these which was then economically practicable would irrigate some 68,000 hectares (168,000 acres) in addition to the area already irrigated.

The difference between these two estimates indicates how wide a range of opinion there is. A survey is now being prepared by a British irrigation firm on behalf of the Syrian Government, to provide the basis of development projects, and pending its publication it is impossible to quote any more satisfactory estimates.

The Jezira and Euphrates Provinces. In inner Syria, the Jezira area and part of the Euphrates province in the north-eastern corner of the country, there are quite large possibilities of extending cultivation both in the rain-fed zone, and by irrigation. North of a line from Tiyne to Sheikh Saleh there is sufficient rainfall to water the winter crops. In the 'Duck's Bill' and along the Turkish frontier to a depth of about 12 miles to Derbisiye, the rainfall is 50 to 100 centimetres per year (20–40 inches), and south of this there is another belt with rainfall of 25 to 50 centimetres (10–20 inches), about 50 miles wide.[2]

[1] 'Le Problème de l'Eau au Liban et en Syrie', in *L'Agriculture, Richesse Nationale*, (Beirut, 1942).

[2] This information is based on an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. in 1944.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

311 Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of
233 means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

162 The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there
423 has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

471 In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently
312 been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into
425 the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

427 The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth
464 of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of
[407] machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

464 Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricul-
511 tural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer
164 from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from
146 malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

000 Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

scope Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is
241 for widening the area cultivated and raising the yields, as the soil
231 is fertile. In the Jezira the use of machinery could be extended—
137 it is already increasing fast. Better livestock production could be achieved by greater use of fodder crops for which conditions are favourable: in the 'Duck's Bill' good clover grows wild. At present fodder crops are not considered worth cultivating.

312 In the Euphrates region there is great scope for extension of irrigation. But a large scale scheme would be costly because the river runs between high escarpments, which vary in distance between each other up to about 10 miles. To irrigate much larger areas it would be necessary to lift water over the escarp-
311 ments. There are large areas of uncultivated land, particularly
312 between Abu Kemal and Deir-ez-Zor. Even on the land already
243 cultivated yields of wheat could be much higher: at present the yield is four to six times the seeding rate, and, according to local farmers, could be raised to ten to fifteen times the seed with
[43.5] better irrigation. The high cost of fuel oil is the limiting factor as it also is for tractor work. On the Khabur river improvement of the ancient barrages would permit an extension of irrigation.

000 It is in this area that there is real scope for a planned settlement of cultivators, with improved methods and a better system of land tenure. The obvious form for such settlement to take would be on the model of the Jewish co-operative farms, small holdings with collective use of machinery and working to a cropping plan; on the uncultivated land such settlement could be undertaken without incurring high capital costs.

So far as the Euphrates Valley is concerned, similar co-operatives based on communal control of water supplies might be started on a small scale. Large-scale irrigation here would be costly, and would necessarily have to be co-ordinated with the irrigation of Iraq. An immediate step needed is to reduce the price of fuel oil.

While it is easy on paper to see the possibilities of such schemes as these, it is not easy to see where in fact the motive power for them is to come from. They will not bring in quick big returns, which are what local farmers and landowners want: the district is remote and the main object of such investment would be a long period rise in the standard of living, in which the moneyed classes are not interested. Present-day Syria is not

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CHAPTER II

COTTON IN SYRIA

000 One of the oldest countries in the world with a new-found independence and a new government, fired with ambition and restrained with pride, Syria is struggling against tradition to modernize its practices and remold its economy. A strange contrast of the old and the new is everywhere apparent. The struggle to change is sometimes painful and often frustrating.

Since the country was created only nine years ago, conditions have been hectic and chaotic, marked with military uprisings and three coup d'etats, the last of which brought in the present military dictatorship last year.

Nevertheless, progress has been remarkable. With large profits made during and after the war, the Syrians have done more in modernizing their homes, farms, and factories than had been done in a thousand years before. They have made conspicuous improvement in their roads, irrigation system, schools, and health programs.

Still the standard of living of the people as a whole is miserably low, and their mode of life for the most part is as primitive as it was in the time of Christ.

BACKGROUND

133 311 The resources of Syria are abundant, capable of supporting an economy of a much higher order and a much larger population. This fairly large country with an area of about 72,000 square miles (practically the size of the State of Oklahoma) is located along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.[27]

The eastern half of Syria is desert, broken only by the Euphrates River and its tributaries. In the west, stretching from the two principal mountain ranges, is a series of broad, fertile plains. There is a small coastal plain along the shores of the Mediterranean. The principal limitation is lack of water. Utilization of water for irrigation has increased ten-fold, but the potential from the Euphrates and Orontes River systems is much greater.

162 212 The population is estimated roughly at 3.5 million, of which three-fourths are rural and directly dependent on agriculture.[28] In the time of the ancients these lands supported two or three times as many people. Most of the people today are Moslems. Although more emphasis now is being placed on education, about three-fourths of the people are still illiterate.

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[27] *Statesman's Yearbook, 1949*, p. 1348.

[28] *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission*, United States Department of Agriculture, 1947, p. 7.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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651 30 per cent; and on garments, from 40 to 50 per cent. Syria, along with many Middle Eastern countries, has retained a war-time regulation assessing double duty on goods from Japan, a former enemy.

AGRICULTURE

311 241 Accurate figures on the present land use or possible uses are lacking. Government estimates on the area under cultivation and acreage are considered unreliable by the United States Agricultural Attache, and he suggests using them only as general indications of trends.

These rough calculations indicate that about 45 per cent of the country—approximately 20 million acres—is suitable for agricultural purposes, including grasslands. The rest is waste land. About half of the 20 million acres are thought to be suitable for cultivation, out of which between 4 and 5 million acres are estimated to be in crops and orchards at the present time.

At least three-fourths of the crop land appears to be devoted to cereals, primarily wheat and barley. Cotton has been expanded in recent years to about 10 per cent of the planted land. Dry legumes, vegetables and other minor food crops, as well as several less important industrial crops such as tobacco, hemp, and silk cocoons, are also produced.

Orchards and vineyards are significant in Syrian agriculture; and, although they have not been fully developed, occupy possibly 10 per cent of the cultivated land. Olives, citrus, walnuts, and pistachios are commonly grown.

Because of the lack of moisture, inadequate rotation, and insufficient use of fertilizer, a large part of the cultivated land is fallowed each year. A

—Photo Courtesy of Near East Foundation

Near East Foundation officials inspect one of their experimental cotton fields near Damascus which produced over a bale and a half to the acre.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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United States mission estimated that 50 per cent of the land was in fallow 311
during 1948.[31] Increased irrigation and high prices for agricultural com- 241
modities have reduced significantly the fallow in the past few years, and the
percentage may be less now.

PRODUCTION

Syria is normally self-sufficient in most foods. In fact, the country 433
exports fresh and dried fruits, lentils and other legumes, tobacco, wool, butter,
hides, and meat. Occasional poor harvests make it necessary to import food
grains.

The greatest deficiency is in rice, which has been displaced by cotton in recent years to such an extent that almost all of the country's requirements must be imported. Last year's bad cotton crop may prompt farmers to revert to rice and, if so, this will reduce the deficiency.

Government figures indicate that production of food has not kept pace 433
with the expansion in population and that the per capita food supply and 146
individual calorie intake are both declining.[32] These conclusions are based on highly conjectural statistics and are in conflict with opinions of the United States Agricultural Attache and Syrian officials who are intimately acquainted with the country's agricultural problems. These observers believe there has been no real decline in food consumption, except possibly for short periods of time. Certainly there is no shortage now, and the bumper cereal crop in 1952 should enable the country to fill domestic needs and export at least 30 per cent of its wheat and possibly 50 per cent of its barley.

The daily diet consists largely of starches, it is true, but this is due more 262
to habit than anything else. The resources of the country are ample to permit a much more balanced diet.

PRODUCTIVITY

Syrian agriculture often is characterized by the low productivity of the 461
agricultural worker. It is obvious that a great many more people are used on 241
each acre of land than is necessary. The low agricultural income is reflected 511
in the obvious poverty of the people. Yet, comparisons with other countries, and even detailed calculations, are of questionable value due to the unreliability of the statistics.

Government reports on average yields also are open to question. Official 241
figures show that wheat yields have dropped sharply, while cotton yields have tended upward, except for the extremely bad year in 1951-52. They also show very wide fluctuation. Experienced observers point out that the yields are especially questionable because both acreage and production figures are not reliable. On the basis of conversations with producers in various sections, it is apparent that yields are normally fairly high and that they fluctuate, depending on water availability and on insect devastation.

POTENTIALITIES

A number of missions which have studied the possibilities of agricultural development in Syria, especially in the last five or six years, all mention the

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31 *Activities of FAO, 1950-52*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1952, p. 58.

32 *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, November, 1951.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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241 possibilities for expanding the total area under cultivation, for improving and increasing irrigation, and for increasing productivity through research and education. They also point to needed improvements in agricultural equipment, in agricultural credit, and in the land tenure system.

241 311 Although estimates vary as to the amount of new land which can be brought into cultivation, all agree that it is possible to double the present planted acreage. Cultivation could be extended in some dry-land areas with improved rotation and fertilization, but in most cases new land can be brought into cultivation only by extending irrigation.

IRRIGATION

241 312 Information which the United States Legation at Damascus has prepared from reports of the Syrian Ministry of Public Works indicates a total of about 2.4 million acres under irrigation at the present time, of which approximately 60 per cent is from gravity flow and the remainder from pumps of various sorts. Some of the Ministry's data are said to be based on actual surveys, some on interviews, and some simply on estimates. This 2.4 million

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The most common system of irrigation in the new cotton areas of the Jezira is to draw water like this from streams with pumps powered by diesel engines. The number of pumps in Syria has doubled since 1950.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and money-lenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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—Photo Courtesy of Cotton Trade Journal

All the cotton in the Aleppo region is ginned at this modern ginning center in Aleppo. Large gins (some have 10 saw gin stands) are located or are under construction on each corner of the square. Buildings are elaborate and usually cost about twice as much as the machinery. The grounds are landscaped like a campus.

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inhabited for centuries until a few years ago when farmers from the cities began developing them with mechanical equipment. Large landlords from Aleppo spent millions of dollars installing pumps, building roads, and in other ways developing these lands.

Although occupancy rights have been recognized for years, various government officials with whom the matter was discussed were strong in their views that these newcomers are squatters and should be evicted. They want to distribute the land among the landless peasants. The landlords who have made investments here are just as determined that they will not be evicted. The political strength of the landlords is given generally as the reason for the statement recently made by the head of the government to the effect that the new law will be studied for revision.

While the question of eviction is being debated, the government is proceeding to parcel out other public domains in small units to landless peasants. As this program is expanded, the large landowners are becoming more and more concerned for fear their own properties will be expropriated and subdivided, as has been done in neighboring countries.

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This dispute over the use of public land illustrates the struggle for power going on in Syria today between government bureaucrats and wealthy landlords. The government on one hand is attempting to force changes in all phases of the economy through its various control programs. These changes, however, are strongly resisted by the landowners who prefer to be free from regulations and regimentation. The outcome of this struggle may have a material bearing on the trend in agriculture for the next several years.

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SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

428 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organization.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

617 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

63-Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1964
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separate the narrow coastal plain from the Orontes river valley and the plateau region of the interior. Farther south, the Anti-Lebanon range rises to peaks of almost 9,000 feet on the Lebanese frontier, and spreads in spurs eastward toward the Syrian Desert. The inland slopes are mainly barren steppe, which merges with the desert, except where oases provide stretches of cultivable land. In the southwest, the lofty peaks of Mount Hermon descend to the fertile Hauran plateau, which receives the moisture-laden winds from the Mediterranean across the gap of the Esdraelon plains. 133

With the exception of the Euphrates, the rivers of Syria are relatively short, but all are vital to the agricultural life of the country. The Euphrates, from its source in the mountains of eastern Turkey, flows diagonally for 420 miles across the northern plateau toward the Iraqi border. The triangular-shaped sector cut off by the river is largely undulating steppe, but extensive areas of irrigable land are found along its banks and those of the tributary systems of the Khabour and the Belikh. The northeast corner, watered by the Khabour River and its tributaries, comprises the region known as the Al Jazira, which was formerly an important granary of the Roman Empire. The Orontes River rises in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon and flows northward across the plains of Hama and Homs and through the Ghab marshes before turning west to the Mediterranean in Turkish territory. The Barada and its tributaries, which are fed by subterranean springs in gorgelike valleys on the eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon mountains, water the Al Ghouta, an oasis [311]

p. 135(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1964
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The infant mortality is not known, but local observers believe that it is at least 250 per 1,000 live births. In many rural villages the mortality among children under 5 years of age probably reaches 40 to 50 per cent. Discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated by the fact that certification of birth is not required for infants dying during the first year of life. The official infant mortality rate for 1948 was 47.6 per 1,000 births for the country, but 75 per 1,000 births in the city of Damascus. Among almost 15,500 deaths registered in 1949, over 21 per cent were of infants under 1 year and about 35 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 165

Social Economy

Agriculture is the basis of Syria's economy. Over two thirds of the people are dependent upon the land, and, in consideration of the paucity of other natural resources, its full utilization is a problem of primary concern to the welfare of the country. Except in limited portions of the northwestern and the northeastern provinces, the rainfall is deficient and erratic, and the expansion of agriculture is contingent upon the development of irrigation and more efficient methods of production. Estimates of the amount of cultivable land range from 10 to 21 million acres—from less than one quarter to almost one half of the total land area. A similar disparity is noted between the figures quoted for the acreage now under cultivation, but all sources agree that less than one half of the potentially arable lands are planted in crops. Most observers believe that the land suitable for agriculture approximates 12 to 14 million acres, while the area under cultivation is between 5 and 6 million acres. Roughly 10 to 20 per cent of the tilled land is irrigated at present, but it has been shown that the farm acreage could be more than doubled by increased irrigation, associated with controlled settlement, in the Orontes, the Khabour and the Euphrates river valleys. 433 244 132 244 311 244 311

Foremost among the factors which impede the promotion and the modernization 421

p. 139(B)

of the Muzeirib swamp lands along the headwaters of the Yarmuk River. The resettlement program in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins, which is controlled by a separate governmental organization, calls for the irrigation of extensive areas. Between 20,000 and 30,000 acres had been opened up through irrigation in 1951. Work on the drainage and the irrigation of the Ghab marshes, covering about 100,000 acres in the Orontes river valley northwest of Hama, was started in 1952. 312 311 312

Waste Disposal

Sewerage systems are available in all the larger cities. The sewage is not treated, however, and the effluent is usually discharged into adjacent watercourses or upon the land for irrigation purposes. In unsewered sections, cesspools are employed in connection with the houses. The methods of sewage disposal are universally primitive in the rural districts. In villages near the larger cities, pit or shallow latrines are frequently found in the individual compounds or provided on a community basis. In the more remote areas and in the poorer villages, pollution of the soil is the general practice. The use of night soil for fertilizer is common in the agricultural communities. 164

Fauna and Flora

Arthropoda. Mosquitoes. Nine species of anopheline mosquitoes have been reported from Syria, three of which—*Anopheles superpictus, A. sacharovi* (= *A. elutus*) and *A. claviger* (= *A. bifurcatus*)—are of major importance in the transmission of malaria. *A. pulcherrimus, A. hyrcanus, A. algeriensis* and *A. sergenti* are of minor and local significance, while *A. marteri* and *A. multicolor* are rare. 136 164

A. superpictus is widely distributed. It is a prominent vector of malaria in the coastal plains, in the northwestern highland districts and in the river valleys, but is of secondary interest in the Damascus region. It breeds along the margins of the larger rivers and on the edges of mountain streams 136

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The banking system was developed, but this improvement was partly offset by the shocks caused by successive devaluations of the franc, to which the Syrian pound was linked on an exchange standard. Slight reforms were introduced in the fiscal system, and steps were taken to protect industry. Until 1924, the Ottoman tariff of 11 per cent on almost all goods had remained in force. In 1924, a distinction was made between members of the League of Nations and the United States, goods from which were subjected to the "normal" tariff of 15 per cent, and other countries, 1/ which paid the "maximum" of 30 per cent; industrial machinery was exempted from customs duties. In 1926, the normal rate was raised to 25 per cent and the maximum to 50 per cent. In 1928, duties on raw materials and fuels were reduced. In the nineteen thirties, the general level of the tariff was lowered, but protection to Syrian industry was increased. As a result, several modern factories were established, and there was also some modernization of the handicrafts, by the installation of improved tools and power driven machinery. 2/

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During the Second World War the large-scale expenditure of Allied troops raised incomes and prices, 3/ thus stimulating agricultural and industrial production, and the reduction of imports also aided local production. Owing to some mechanization, and to the fact that cultivation of marginal land became profitable, the area sown to major field crops increased by about 40 per cent between 1938 and 1945. This extension of acreage was, in some years, offset by a decline in yields, but the grain crop at the end of the war was distinctly greater than before the war. Industry expanded considerably, and communications were improved. The forced saving, due to inflation and the shift to profits, took the form of franc and sterling balances held by Syrian individuals and institutions.

1/ Owing to special arrangements, trade between Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan was exempt from duties on either side.

2/ Both the decline in handicrafts and the rise of modern industry are reflected in the following figures, covering Syria and Lebanon, presented by the Mandatory Government to the League of Nations in 1937: in 1913, there were 310,000 handicraft workers; by 1937, the number had declined to 171,000, most of whom were in Syria; on the other hand, there were 33,000 workers in "modern industries", of whom a little over 40 per cent were in Syria and the rest in Lebanon.

3/ From 1940 to 1944 inclusive, Allied expenditure in Lebanon and Syria totalled £76 million (sterling). In 1939 to 1945, inclusive, Lebanon and Syria had a surplus of 637 million Lebanese-Syrian pounds on current account. The index number of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus rose from 100 in 1938 to 831 in 1945.

SYRIA MDI

Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

Agriculture

During the post-war period both agricultural and industrial output increased rapidly, and although population growth was fairly large there seems little doubt that per capita output rose significantly. 1/ Similarly, although data are very scanty, there is evidence of an increase in consumption and an improvement in the standard of living. 2/

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In agriculture, the increase in output was achieved by extending the acreage of cereals and greatly expanding that of cotton; there was also some improvement in methods of cultivation, especially in cotton. The total cultivated area increased from 2,314,000 hectares in 1946/47 to 3,668,000 in 1952/53. 3/ the irrigated area increased more rapidly, from 237,000 hectares 4/ to 400,000 hectares. 5/ The proportion of fallow land seems to have remained unchanged, at one-third of the total. It may therefore be taken that the crop area increased by about 60 per cent.

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The increase in the irrigated area was achieved partly by the irrigation projects discussed below, partly by installation by farmers of pumps drawing on river or underground water. In 1953, there were 7,500 pumps, of which 40 per cent were for river water and 60 per cent for underground water. The extension of rainfed crops was achieved mainly by mechanization. In 1953 there were 1,200 tractors, compared with 860 in 1951 and about 300 in 1948; 1,387 tractor ploughs, compared

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1/ National income is estimated to have risen from 1,250 million Syrian pounds in 1950 to £1,410 million in 1953; during that period, the index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus (1949 = 100) fell from 111 to 110. See Sami Hafa el Dajani, "al Dakhl al Qawmi fi Suria", Al Abhath, (Beirut, December 1953); Ministry of Agriculture, A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria, and Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1952 (Damascus, 1954). A breakdown for 1950 shows that 44 per cent of the total was contributed by agriculture and animal husbandry, 13 per cent by commerce, 10 per cent by industry, 9 per cent by transport and communications, 7 per cent by government services, 5 per cent by rents and 11 per cent by other activities (Dajani, op.cit.).

2/ Per capita annual consumption of cotton, woollen and rayon fibres is estimated to have risen from 4.2 kilogrammes in 1951 to 4.6 kilogrammes in 1952 and 5.1 in 1953; the figure for Lebanon and Syria combined had previously risen from 3.9 kilogrammes in 1948 to 4.8 kilogrammes in 1950 (Food and Agriculture Organization, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Rome, January 1953). Output of tobacco products increased from an average of 1,638 tons in 1945-47 to 2,075 tons in 1950, 2,448 in 1952 and 2,639 in 1953.

3/ Bureau des documentations Syriennes et Arabes, La Syrie économique, 1953 (Damascus, 1954), mimeographed.

4/ Sir Alexander Gibb, Economic Development of Syria (London, 1947).

5/ Of these, some 250,000 hectares were irrigated by flow and 150,000 hectares by pumps.

SYRIA MDI

Latakia, is to irrigate 5,000 hectares at a cost of £S 2.6 million; the scheme should be completed by the end of 1955. Projects under study include a scheme on the Barada River, near Damascus, to irrigate 5,000 hectares and provide a capacity of [illegible],000 kilowatts, at a total estimated cost of £S 12 million; the Yusef Pasha dam, on the Euphrates, which would extend irrigation by 100,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 45,000 kilowatts, at an estimated cost of £S 150 million; and a small multi-purpose project on the Kabir River, north of Latakia.

The most important project under way is that on the Ghab, on the Orontes north of Hama. The objective is to reclaim by drainage some 26,000 hectares of land and to irrigate by gravity a total area of 65,000 hectares, 43,000 of which had not been irrigated before.

The project also includes the building of four hydroelectric stations, with a capacity of 20,600 kilowatts and an estimated annual output of 80 million kilowatt hours; a thermic generator with a capacity of 9,500 kilowatts; and 700 kilometres of roads. Total costs, exclusive of electric installations, are estimated at £S 140 million, of which £S 45 million are for drainage, £S 55 million for irrigation and £S 37 million for roads and bridges. The hydroelectric plants are estimated to cost another £S 17 million and the thermic plant £S 7.6 million. The Government expects to recover its outlay on the scheme by selling, for an estimated £S 150 million, 30,000 hectares of land which it owns in the region and by levying a small irrigation fee. The scheme is expected to raise gross agricultural income by £S 91 million and net income by £S 78 million. Completion is scheduled for 1960. 1/

The Ghab Project Administration was established in 1951, and in 1953 it was authorized to borrow £S 25 million from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, at 2 per cent interest. A firm of Netherlands consultants, hired by the Government to prepare an over-all plan for the Ghab, presented its report in May 1953. In September 1953 a contract was awarded to a Dutch firm for the deepening of the Orontes channel, at a cost of £S 3.3 million. It is expected that contracts for other parts of the project will be awarded soon.

The total area of irrigation projects recently completed or approaching completion is 57,000 hectares and that of schemes planned but not yet begun is 278,000. The total irrigable area, including that at present irrigated, is estimated at 750,000 hectares. 2/

The total cultivable area in Syria is put at 5 million hectares, of which one million are at present not cultivated, while 1.6 million are left fallow each year under the prevailing triennial rotation. Present plans call for intensifying production by using leguminous crops to replace the period of fallow,

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1/ "The Ghab Project", by Abdel Razik Khatib, Director General of the Ghab Project Administration (mimeographed document, Damascus, October 25, 1954). See also Abdel Razik Khatib Machru al Ghab (Damascus, October 1953).

2/ Sadiki Kizilova, "Les Irrigations en Syrie", Annual Bulletin of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1953, and "Al mashari al mais fi Suria", Al Hayat, 31 July 1954 (Beirut).

311 by planting forage crops, and by increasing the use of fertilizers and improved seeds. 1/ The Government is planning to increase its distribution of selected wheat and other seeds, to expand its agricultural schools and its student missions to foreign universities, and to intensify the activity of its experimental stations and its extension services.

654 241 Among the obstacles to expansion of output are high production costs, owing to shortage of labour in certain areas and to high fuel prices and maintenance charges for machinery, and also high transport costs. 2/ Various measures are being taken to improve communications, provide storage and reduce the purchase and operating costs of agricultural machinery. 3/

241 422 Another great obstacle to agricultural development is the system of land tenure. In 1947 it was officially estimated that of 6.1 million hectares of privately owned land, 38 per cent was in holdings of over 100 hectares, 43 per cent in holdings of 10 to 99 hectares and 19 per cent in holdings of under 10 hectares. 4/ The greater part of large holdings is rented on short leases to sharecroppers, whose poverty and insecurity make it difficult for them to improve methods and increase output. The Government is preparing a law regulating relations between landlords and tenants and between farmers and labourers. 5/ In 1952 and 1953 decrees were passed regarding the distribution of lands in the State domain to cultivators with small farms and the expropriation of occupied areas on such land in excess of a certain figure. 6/ This land was to be available for cultivation by farmers, in lots of 10 hectares of irrigated or 50 hectares of non-irrigated land, on very generous terms. A start has been made in distributing land in El Jezira to landless farmers and nomads; by March 1954 some 25,000 hectares had been distributed.

1/ It is estimated that the yield of wheat could be fairly easily raised by 60 to 70 per cent and that of barley by 50 to 60 per cent. The discrepancy between the average yield of olives, 20 kilogrammes per tree, and that of high yielding trees, 50 to 60 kilogrammes, also points to possibilities in that field; it is, moreover, believed that the average oil content of olives could be raised from 11.5 per cent to 15 per cent (unpublished study by the Ministry of National Economy).

2/ In 1953, transport costs of a ton of barley from El Jezira to Latakia were £S 50, a figure equal to the cost of production. High transport costs also greatly raise the price of petroleum products used in agriculture.

3/ Ministry of Agriculture, "A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria" (mimeographed document, Damascus, 1954).

4/ By the end of 1954 half the area of Syria had been surveyed; the corresponding figures within that area were 49 per cent, 38 per cent and 13 per cent. Conditions vary greatly: in Damascus, Latakia, Jebal Druse and Hauran provinces, small and medium properties prevail; in the Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Jezira and Euphrates provinces large properties and State domain account for the greater part of the land.

5/ Ministry of Agriculture, op cit.

6/ This was fixed, in the 1952 decree, at 150 hectares in the Jezira, Euphrates and desert areas and 50 hectares in other parts of Syria. In 1953 the limit was raised to 200 hectares, irrespective of location.

REPORT ON JAZIRAH

101 Geographically, Jazirah, i.e., "the Island", is that strip of territory lying between the rivers Dijla and Euphrates, but for the purpose of this report, the term Jazirah is understood in its administrative meaning as a Mohafaza of Syria, and will be studied as such.

AREA OF JAZIRAH AND ITS CULTIVABLE LANDS

The "Statistical Abstract of Syria" for 1950 gives the total area of Jazirah as 2,217,000 hectares divided between the Mohafaza center, i.e., Hassakeh, Qamishli, and Dijla, in the following proportion:

Mohafaza Center	1,525,000 hectares
Qada of Qamishli	392,000 hectares
Qada of Dijla	300,000 hectares

311 Of this total area, according to the same source, 444,266 hectares were cultivated in 1948-49, and 1,701,284 hectares were cultivable but uncultivated, while the uncultivable lands were only 71,450 hectares.

This terminology of cultivable and uncultivable is greatly misleading. If by cultivable is meant the lands which are not rocky or mountainous or forested, the terminology is right though it loses its economic meaning. But if by it is meant lands which can be planted and rendered productive to show some profit, then other factors have to be considered, and the productive "cultivable" area of Jazirah is greatly reduced.

132 The first of these factors is the amount of rainfall. It is really astonishing that the Syrian Government has not deemed it necessary to establish agricultural stations in different regions of Jazirah to record at least the amount of rainfall in the different localities. The only such station is at Hassakeh which is not primarily a wheat growing district and the mean annual rainfall over a period of nine years is less than 300 mm. This average is less than the minimum required for successful rain-fed cultivation.

I. The Mohafaza Center

311 Therefore about 80% of the 1,525,000 hectares mentioned as
312 cultivable in the Mohafaza Center are in fact uncultivable unless

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not. 311 812

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short. 1024 138 [241]

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah. 634 311

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts: 311

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions. 311 [321] 241

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating 311 241 [79] 132

it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes. The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer. Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less than LS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley. But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available. 812 241 242

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital. 812 658

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers. 811

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal. 811 619

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families. 619 231 233 428 423

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

a. The Region of Deirik

241 In the region of Deirik, the Zarkan river and numerous springs
[illegible] in the villages make irrigation possible over vast areas. The region
began to be developed recently when the road was partly constructed.
312 Rice is an old staple, but in the last two years it have given place
to cotton. However, rice may resume its former place since cotton
diseases have become so widespread.

b. The Jarrah

The Jarrah river flows through Kubur el Bid and irrigates the country around it. Its waters were used for rice plantations, and recently for cotton. In winter its waters flow into the Rad.

c. The Jagjag

133 The main river of northern Jazirah is the Jagjag. Its sources are about thirty kilometers north of Kamishli, in a gorge in Turkey. It flows through Nisibin and Kamishli, crosses the Jazirah plain and empties in the Khabur at Hassakeh. Its total length is about 100 kms. and its average flow is 3 cubic meters per second.

3121 In Turkey and Kamishli, the river has several beds. The Turks,
425 unable to exploit it fully in their country because of its short flow there, follow the practice of changing the river from bed to bed in the summer months, so that farmers in Jazirah do not know when the water will be available to them. This uncertainty has lead the villages which have a right to the water to sell their rights for one or more years to individuals on good terms with the Turkish authorities. These individuals in their turn bribe the Turks to direct the waters in the bed which leads to their lands. One family in particular has obtained a sort of monopoly on the waters of the Jagjag in Qamishli. The Asfar-Najjars buy the water rights from the villages for nominal sums and then try to reach an understanding with the Turks. Since they have one or two competing groups in Qamishli, the Turks usually get paid by both parties and satisfy none entirely. The Asfars manage however to get the biggest share.

3121 Such an unstable situation does not lead to steady irrigation
development along the lines of orchard planting. The farmer is
241 lucky if he can grow one crop of rice or cotton with the present

fluctuations in water flow. Up to 1950, all the water of Jagjag was used for growing rice. In 1950-51, more emphasis was given to cotton. This year it is half cotton and half rice. 312 241

The Turks started a project for diverting all the waters of the Jagjag from Syria to Turkey. They began building tunnels to carry one quarter of the waters east above Kubur el Bid, and the rest to the plains above Amuda and Dirbassiya. The Syrian Government objected and negotiations began in Ankara. The Syrians believe that they have reached an understanding with the Turkish authorities to divide the river waters equally. The Turks did not sign the agreement, claiming that they want a full agreement on water rights covering all common rivers and especially the Orontes. They are afraid that Syria might use all the waters of the Orontes in its irrigation projects. Since Syria holds this arm, the Jagjag dispute will be solved equitably. 312 648

It is difficult to estimate the area irrigated yearly by the Jagjag. The waters are used only for summer crops, and last year about thirty thousand dunums were planted to cotton. When the plantation is rice the area is nearer to ten thousand dunums. There is of course always a certain amount of land devoted to vegetable growing for the needs of the city. 312 241

d. Underground Water

Recently a few enterprising farmers tried to solve the problem of dependency upon Turkey for irrigation water by digging for water on their own lands. An Armenian outfit from Aleppo with a boring machine of local construction dug several wells in the region of Qamishli and Amuda. Three of the wells in the villages of Tal Ahmad and Tal Anbar near Kamishli were successful. Water to run a 4-inch pump was found at a depth of 18 meters. The other holes around Amuda were not so successful. Water was not found at a depth of 70 meters. These experiments are of course inconclusive and sufficient underground water may be found to be abundant in Jazirah. Further studies are needed. 312

a. The Khabur

The largest source of irrigation water in Jazirah is undoubtedly the Khabur. Its average flow is 52 cubic meters per second which /33

133 makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

812 406 The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

241 The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was preferred to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

511 Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he 241 own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join 427 to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

Irrigation by pump started with the rice boom in 1945 and expanded with the cotton boom of 1951. It was hit severly by the crop failure of last year and the flood of this spring, and the future of the Khabur appears dim. This is because as previously mentioned, the original amount of capital used to construct a fair sized project is large, amounting to about LS 150-200 thousand. Such a project can irrigate with two 10-inch pumps or their equivalent about 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and double the area in wheat and barley. The project will have one main canal 1 1/2-3 1/3 meters higher than ground level made entirely of earth or lined with cement to carry the water a distance of 1-3 kilometers depending on the lay of the ground, several subsidisary canals, buildings for the motors, the agricultural machinery, and the laborers. 312 185

Evidently, in order to get the best returns on the capital invested, the farmer needs to exploit to the utmost the capacity of his pumps, otherwise he will be leaving his capital idle. In this case, he will need to cultivate, on a rotation basis, 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and 5, 000 dunums of wheat and barley. But on most of the irrigation projects of the size mentioned, the area of the lands which can be irrigated is less than 1, 500 dunums in all. The surrounding lands are all higher than the main leading canal and can not be reached except by a much greater outlay of capital. This means that the farmer has to extract from an area of 1, 500 dunums, of which one-third lies fallow every year, enough profit in five to eight years, which is the average duration of the lease, to compensate him for his yearly efforts, to pay interest on the capital and to regain his investment. This should mean a net annual profit of about 45, 000 LS or LS 45 per dunum, and experience has proved that it can not be done. 312 454

The alterntive to pump irrigation on the Khabur is irrigation by gravity in works similar to that of Tal Mughass. And the Khabur lends itself in many places to such project. Mr. Delbes, agricultural advisor to Syria during the French Mandate, knows at least of three projects studied by the French High Commissariat, to build dams and derivation canals between Ras el Ain and Hassakeh. The largest one among them is to carry the water west to the region of Jabal Abdel Aziz and irrigate a very large area. 312 654

Another dam site studied by the French is at Sab'Skour. Further south in the region of Fadghami a site was selected to store the

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flood waters and distribute them in summer. All these studies, and it is not known how detailed they are, are believed to be kept at the French Legation in Beirut.

Such projects cost a lot of money, and Syria may not be able to construct them for many years. A quicker and less expensive policy is to combine elements from the system of irrigation by pumps and the system of gravity irrigation. This is the policy followed in Egypt, to dig canals conveying water from the river to areas ten or more kilometers removed and ten to twenty meters higher than the water level. Such dirt canals can be dug cheaply by modern machinery, and the farmers will then be authorized to install pumps on the canals. Since the greatest cost of an irrigation project is the construction of the main canal above the ground level, the method recommended removes the need for the elevated canals and the farmer can install his pump directly on the land to be irrigated. In this way, the farmer is spared also the loss due to evaporation and absorption on the elevated canal.

This is the quickest method to expand irrigated agriculture along the Khabur, and it may also prove in the long run cheaper to the country and the farmer than the elaborate dams and derivation canals contemplated by the Government. Such a conclusion needs, of course, more detailed engineering studies and comparison of costs before it becomes final.

III. The Problem of Monoculture

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Wheat and barley are by far the main crops of the Jazirah and with the exception of the Khabur valley, they are practically the only crops. What the irrigated lands of Kubur el Bid and Qamishli produce in summer crops does not compare in quantity or in value with the wheat crop.

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For this reason, Jazirah suffers from all the defects of monoculture. When the wheat crop is good and the prices are high land values increase, the farmers are enabled to pay most of their debts and to raise their standard of living by building better residences, buying furniture, making more trips with their families to the interior cities of Syria and Lebanon, sending their children to schools in Aleppo and Beirut, and increasing their welfare in general. But

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 744 THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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114 > MR. LEWIS, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

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

FIG. 2—Topographic map and cross section of the country east of Selemiya.

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

FIG. 3—The irrigation system of Moufaqqar, east of Selemiya (see Fig. 2).

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244 except wheat and barley, and around each village is an area of irrigated land on which vegetables, fruit, cotton, maize, fodder, and grain are grown. The configuration of the ground and the peculiar properties of the marl make possible the use of subsurface water for irrigation, and past and present inhabitants have taken full advantage of these conditions.

312 [406 374] Water is distributed to irrigation ditches from wells, surface watercourses, or *foggaras* (foqqaras).[2] It is lifted from wells either by pumps or by chains of buckets geared to an animal-turned wheel. From wadis which have water in part of their course for some or all of the growing season it is taken by a gravity canal. The stream is roughly dammed and the water led, at a gentler angle than that of the watercourse, along the valley side until it reaches a suitable level for watering the ground below. Neither of these methods is of great importance as compared with foggaras, which supply most of the irrigated lands of the area.

A foggara, known elsewhere as *qanat*, *hariz*, or "chain of wells," is an underground conduit. The method has been used since ancient times in many parts of the Middle East. Foggaras are found in several regions of Syria and are especially numerous in the Sekmiya region. Figure 4 shows the general principle by which the water-bearing layer is tapped by the gallery or subsurface canal. The most copious supplies of water are provided when the canal is driven back from a spring along the underground "stream" that feeds it. A depression that is a natural gathering ground of water is often utilized, or a wide area may be tapped by the construction of several converging galleries, as in Mouseqqar. The gradient of the gallery is sufficient to induce water flow, but it is less steep than the general slope of the ground, so that water is conducted gradually to the surface, usually to low-lying flat land suitable for irrigation. The vertical shafts, like large wells, which connect the underground canal to the surface, were used during the digging as passages of ingress and egress and serve the same purpose now when the canals are cleaned of mud, debris, and vegetation; hence they are always surrounded with mounds of accumulated spoil. Lower down, as the canal comes to the surface, it flows between steep banks, which gradually become less high, until the water is flowing at ground level. Often the hardpan forms a natural roof to the gallery.

In length, depth, and water flow the foggaras differ greatly. One canal

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113 [2] Foggaras in North Africa have been described and illustrated in the *Geographical Review*. See John Blacke: Modes of Life in the Moroccan Countryside, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 477-502, references on pp. 488 and 491; R. H. Forbes: The Transsaharan Conquest, Vol. 33, 1943, pp. 197-213, reference on p. 199—Edit. Note.

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

FIG. 4—Vertical section of a foggara. The diagonal shading represents the water-bearing level in the altered marl, below which is unaltered impervious marl. The gallery A to B tops the water-bearing layer at its upper end and in the center. Water in the gallery is represented by the dashed line. The irrigated area extends from B to C. The vertical shading represents the part of the canal between steep banks.

FIG. 5—Upper part of one of the Moufaqqar canals (see Fig. 3). Photograph from a position corresponding to B above, where the canal is formed by steep banks. Parts of natural roof are formed by the hard pan, clearly distinguishable from the bed of crumbly altered marl below. Until 1945 the canal was semi-derelict, filled with mud, vegetation, and flood detritus (see foreground). When the cleaning was completed, the canal was approximately doubled in depth and a strong stream of clear water flowed in the bottom. (Photograph by John Gough.)

was built, probably in the Roman period, to carry water from Selemiya to Apamea, more than 50 miles away. This was an exception, dug to carry drinking water to a city, but some of the canals which capture and supply irrigation water in the Selemiya plain are several miles in length; one, starting in Moufaqqar, was originally seven miles long. Others are only a few hundred yards in length.

The quantity of water delivered by the canals in use today is estimated

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312 locally by the area of land each irrigates. One canal irrigates 136 acres near Selemiya town; many supply between 20 and 60 acres; and the smallest suffices only for 2.4 acres (near Tell et Tout). The larger canals are nearly all in the low-lying basinlike plain around the town of Selemiya; most of the smaller ones lie toward the northeast. A canal which supplies 68 acres of land in Selemiya delivers 8.8 gallons a second (measured at lowest water level, in October, 1945). There are today in the caza 125 such canals which are in working order and an unknown number which are not in use. These 125 canals irrigate a total of 3060 acres. The map of Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) shows typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara.[4]

History

175 312 At Misherfe-Qatna, where a modern village occupies the site of a Hittite fortress-city, 18 miles southwest of Selemiya, a foggara-like canal supplied the town in the second millennium before Christ.[5] Most of those in our region date from a much later period, and probably more were constructed from the second century of our era to the sixth than at any other time. Many can be dated by the details of their construction, or by their close association with ruins, or, occasionally, by inscriptions. During these centuries the Selemiya region was a prosperous agricultural district, well supplied with irrigation water. The Roman legacy was added to in the early period of Arab rule,[6] when Selemiya was well known as a pleasant country town, the public buildings of which, especially the baths, rivaled those in great Arab cities. Descendants of the Abbasid Prince Saleh ibn Ali ibn Abdullah ibn Abbas ibn il Motalib lived in Selemiya, and, according to Ya'qubi, writing in 891, Abdullah, the son of Saleh, "conducted thither a stream of water, and dug wells in the land, whereby the saffron grows plentifully." For a period after 893 the town became a center of the Ismaili sect, a circumstance which brought it importance then, and which was to affect the region powerfully a thousand years later.

Throughout the Arab period the water of Selemiya remained famous. As late as the fourteenth century Ahmed the Secretary praised Selemiya as "a charming and rich town, with abundant water and trees. Water comes

113 [4] See the maps of Qdeym for typical modifications and elaborations of the foggara, Plans III and IV in the atlas volume of R. Mouterde and A. Poidebard: Le limes de Chalcis: Organisation de la steppe en Haute Syrie romaine (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 38), 2 vols. (text and atlas), Paris, 1945. See review elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*.

[5] Menil du Buisson: Le site archéologique de Michrife-Qatna, Paris, 1935.

[6] Information on the Arab period is drawn largely from the article "Salamiya" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam and from Guy le Strange: Palestine under the Moslems, Boston and New York, 1890. The quotation from Ya'qubi is from Le Strange, p. 528.

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to it in aqueducts."[7] Today there are 39 foggaras in use on the lands of Selemiya, and there are also some that are unused. Very few of the foggaras are modern, so that we may legitimately suppose about the same area to have been irrigated around the town in the Arab period as at present—1300 acres. The water was renowned for its purity, as it is today, and Hama, 18 miles away on the muddy Orontes, drank Selemiya water brought to the city by a foggara from Ain ez Zerqa. Abu el Fida (1273–1331), geographer and king of Hama, caused this canal to be cleaned, and two centuries later the following inscription from a Hama mosque shows that it was repaired or cleaned again:[8]

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On fifteenth Gumada I 901 [March 2, 1496] was promulgated the princely, august decree of our master, the great emir, the chief, the governor general, Sayfaddin el Asrafi Qansuh as Sarifi as Sami, governor general of the province of Hama (may God glorify his victory!), prohibiting the diversion of moneys to the profit of the exchequer (may it ever prosper!) and of others, from the funds intended for the aqueduct of Selemiya, and ordering that nothing should be taken from this fund except the wages of the workmen laboring on it. Whoever should renew these exactions, let him be accursed, and may both his father and his Prophet testify against him on judgment day.

By this time the prosperous days of Selemiya were nearly over. Scattered references show that the frontier of settlement and regular agriculture in the region was retreating westward. Tamerlane ravaged all Syria in 1400, and in 1516 the country fell to the Turks. During the next four centuries Syria slowly decayed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries several great Bedouin tribes moved north out of Arabia into the Syrian Desert and its peripheral regions. After this the steppe and the desert were almost completely beyond the control of the Turkish government, and the frontiers of law, order, and settled life retreated from the edges of these uncontrolled territories. The valuable journals of some English merchants[9] who traveled through the eastern part of our region at the end of the seventeenth century show that, except for Bedouins, it was then practically deserted. The Ismaili inhabitants, according to their descendants' tradition, had left soon after

[7] See [Maurice] Gaudefroy-Demombynes: La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 3), Paris, 1923, pp. 77–78. 113

[8] This inscription is from the Great Mosque of Hama, where there are a number of Mameluke decrees, dealing particularly with trade and taxation. It is transcribed in French by Jean Sauvaget in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas*, Vol. 3, 1933, p. 6.

[9] "An Extract of the Journals of Two Several Voyages of the English Merchants of the Factory of Aleppo, to Tadmor, Anciently Call'd Palmyra," *Philos. Trans. Royal Soc. of London*, No. 218, Vol. 19, 1695, pp. 129–147. [Also in "Miscellanea Curiosa," Vol. 3, Containing a Collection of Curious Travels, Voyages, and Natural Histories of Countries, As They Have Been Delivered in to the Royal Society, 2nd edit., revised and corrected by W. Derham, London, 1727 (originally edited by Edmund Halley in 1708), pp. 120–159.]

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175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[10] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The ● 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [10] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

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Malaria and Its Control

Foggaras and surface canals easily become partly blocked by vegetation, 312
and floods and rain wash in mud and silt. The water is then ponded back, depressions near the canal bank fill, the canal may overflow, and, if it is built along the side of a valley, overflow or seepage will maintain swamps along the watercourse. Artificial blockages of foggaras also pond back the water. Near the lower end of most canals are "brick pits" from which earth has been taken to be made into mud bricks, and these also tend to fill with water. Everywhere wadis carry rain and seepage water in winter and spring and the overflow from irrigation canals in early summer and autumn, at which seasons there is a surplus. In other words, except during the peak irrigation and evaporation period of midsummer, they carry slow-moving, half-stagnant water.

All these places are potential, and most of them actual, breeding places 136
of the mosquito *Anopheles sacharovi*, which favors shallow, sunny, warm 164
waters, full of aquatic vegetation. At only one place in the area has another malaria carrier, *A. algeriensis*, been found, and the problem of malaria control in the region is thus essentially that of eliminating the *A. sacharovi* breeding grounds. Full statistics are not available, but such figures as do exist show the great need of such control. About 20 per cent of the patients treated by a mobile clinic in the region in 1942–1945 were suffering from malaria, and the percentage rose at times (especially in late summer) to 80 in some villages. Sometimes practically the whole population of a village was found to be infected. In Tell et Tout (population *c.* 550) about 50 deaths [165]
were due primarily to malaria in 1941, and almost the sole source of infection was the swamp caused by the deliberate blockage of a foggara.

Control work is apparently simple. Canal owners occasionally clean the 312
canals of detritus and vegetation and repair the banks at the lower end. It is important that this work be done well and repeated every few years. Small depressions may be sprayed, filled with earth, or drained by a simple ditch. Broad, sluggish streams may be canalized by a ditch along the thalweg. The more efficient the irrigation, the less likely it is that mosquitoes will breed. Waste of water should be reduced to a minimum and a wide range of crops grown, so that irrigation begins early in the season and ends late. The "waste" water of natural watercourses may be utilized by the construction of a simple dam and gravity canal, or by the repair of the old subparallel foggara if, as is probable, there is one. Extensive stretches of swampy ground may be put to good use by drainage-irrigation schemes, which often include the repair of old foggaras. Malaria control should not stand on its own, an expensive 000

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necessity for health's sake alone, but should be part of a general *mise en valeur* of the region's resources. This is the type of approach which is most likely to succeed, because it is linked with the material interests of the landowners. They will lend their support and active participation if given technical advice, supervision, and material and financial help to defray part of the capital outlay.

Swamps, Floods, and Soil Erosion

Malaria-control measures were taken with a fair degree of success in 20 villages in 1944–1945. Various factors, however, combine to prevent a permanent reduction of the incidence of the disease. Among these are the necessity for constant supervision, the need for repeated cleanings of canals and ditches, and the improvidence of the inhabitants. Most important is the fact that floods will certainly undo much of the work.

Winter floods are frequently heavy enough to destroy or damage seriously the repair and maintenance works, which are of value to agriculture and malaria control alike. Malaria causes debility and apathy among the villagers, and the certainty that floods will recur reinforces this apathy, making everyone disinclined to expend energy and money in work which must be done again in a few years. The canals and watercourses at Moufaggar, for example, have been badly damaged in the past; in fact, damage by floods was the main reason for the modification of the old foggara system. The southern foggara and watercourse are now protected against torrents by a concrete wall at the upper end, but as the system lies in one of the main valleys coming from Jebel Bil'as, it is doubtful whether the device will be a great success. Although the broad, nearly flat valley north of Selemiya has benefited from its wide catchment area—it is built up of alluvium, as much as 10 feet deep—it is partly derelict because floods have created extensive swamps and ruined old foggaras. In 1945–1946 useful drainage work was undertaken here.

The floods are due in part to the occasional sudden and torrential rainstorms, characteristic of this as of other semiarid regions. Wadis are sometimes filled for a few hours with violent, detritus-laden torrents and are then left dry again. The steep slopes and absorptive limestones are contributing factors. English merchants, traveling in 1691, noted[11] that after a heavy rainstorm

those hollow Gutts which we passed over without the least appearance of Moisture, were, by the Cataracts which descended from the Mountains, become Rivers; . . . the next Morn-

[11] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), p. 144 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 139–140].

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II IRRIGATION AND RECLAMATION

The extension of irrigated land is of vital importance in a country like Syria, where large potentially fertile areas yield little or nothing because rainfall is inadequate and where nearly all of the cultivable area produces no summer crops because no rain falls from spring to autumn. It has become even more imperative with the shrinkage in the area of good rainfed land which can still be taken under cultivation. Thus irrigation is the principal means for expanding the cultivated area, increasing and stabilizing yields and diversifying agricultural production by developing summer crop cultivation. 311 312

Existing Irrigated Areas

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At present about 400,000 hectares of land are probably already under irrigation. Of these, approximately 250,000 hectares are irrigated by pumps drawing water principally from rivers but also from wells. Most of the river pumps are located in the valley of the Euphrates and its tributary, the Khabour, while by far the greater number of pumps drawing on underground water is in the provinces of Hama and Aleppo. Except for small areas still supplied by animal-driven *norias* (water wheels), the remainder is irrigated by gravity flow from rivers, springs and *foggarahs* (underground ducts). Only 48,000 hectares are covered by government irrigation schemes, including the Homs-Hama scheme providing a rather inadequate supply of water from the Homs lake to 22,000 hectares; the Mzerib project in the Hauran, which irrigates 2,500 hectares from the springs feeding the Yarmuk river; the Tell Maghass scheme on the Khabour, which provides for 8,500 hectares but is not completed; and the Matkh project covering 15,000 hectares south of Aleppo, which receives a wholly inadequate supply of water from the Kouek river during the dry season when most of the water in the upper reaches of the river is taken by Turkey for irrigation.

The possibilities of additional irrigation are by no means limitless. Except for the Euphrates, Syria has no large river with a substantial flow during the summer dry season. In fact the Euphrates accounts for 83% of the aggregate annual flow of Syria's rivers. Thus the available water supply may set a limit of 400,000 to 600,000 hectares on the additional area which can be irrigated. In the last analysis, however, the upper limit will be determined by the division of the Euphrates water with Iraq, which is in the [123]

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

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312 process of expanding considerably the area irrigated from that river.

Government projects based on the use of river water will have to be the principal means of extending irrigation in the future. Private pump irrigation from rivers or wells cannot be expected to increase rapidly. Additional privately operated pumps could in theory put more land under irrigation, but the land still available for such irrigation would for the most part require higher-lift pumps which are much more expensive to operate. In fact, few new pumps have been installed in the last few years. Moreover, the extension of private pump irrigation on terms which are very burdensome to cultivators appears socially undesirable. Nor is the prospect of expanding irrigation with underground water, particularly through wells, very promising. Underground water in the drier areas of the country is quite limited in supply and often contains harmful sodium and magnesium salts. More extensive investigation of underground water is unquestionably needed, but this should focus in the first instance on finding adequate supplies of drinking water in such areas as the Hauran and Djebel Druze where supplies for human consumption are seriously inadequate and in the Syrian desert where water for livestock is sorely needed. The many wells sunk in certain parts of the country have generally been shallow and have, in one district at least, tended to lower the water table; and the extension of wells to deeper water-bearing strata capable of providing a more plentiful and stable supply may well entail such a heavy investment and high operating costs as to be justified only for crops, such as vegetables, having a high return per hectare.

Completion of Projects Under Way

312 653 Any program must, of course, provide for the completion of government projects already under way. Tell Maghass remains unfinished even though it has been under construction for 10 years, and it is imperative that the remaining part of the canal system be completed rapidly and that the necessary funds—£S 4 million—be provided. The El Senn project, designed to irrigate 5,000 hectares south of Latakia, is over half finished. In the Roudj, a swamp of about 4,000 hectares in Aleppo province, facilities for drainage have just been completed, but an irrigation system must still be planned and laid out. The completion of the latter two projects will require a further expenditure of about £S 4 million.

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Reclamation of the Ghab[7]

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By far the most ambitious project undertaken by the government is the reclamation of the Ghab. This large marsh, stretching north and south along the borders of Latakia and Aleppo provinces, was created by the Orontes river whose flow has been impeded by the existence of a hard basaltic sill at Kfarie. The plan is to reclaim an area of 35,000 hectares by lowering the sill, deepening the river bed and constructing a network of drainage canals. Two reservoirs to be constructed at Halfaya and Rastane will regulate the flow of the Orontes river and store water sufficient to irrigate not only the Ghab, but also the Acharneh plain—a total area of 65,000 hectares. However, of this area, 22,000 hectares are now irrigated by pump. The permanently submerged part of the Ghab—some 29,000 hectares—belongs in the public domain and will after reclamation be available for distribution among settlers drawn from landless or virtually landless peasants in nearby areas.

The cost of the project was originally estimated at £S 136.5 million including £S 8.5 million for interest during construction, £S 38.2 million for a main road through the Ghab and £S 2.65 million for the construction of a central village. A recent special study sponsored by the International Bank indicates, however, that this estimate will probably have to be increased to about £S 171 million. Because of the numerous works which must be constructed in successive stages, the whole project is unlikely to be completed before 1965. As the drainage works progress, however, new land, totaling 10,000 hectares by 1960, will gradually become available for cultivation. The first stage of the construction work—the lowering of the sill—was begun in the latter part of 1954.

Other Irrigation Projects[8]

In selecting other irrigation projects which might be carried out over the next five or six years, the mission was beset by many difficulties. With one exception, all the projects considered were only in the conceptual stage. Exact data on the areas which might be irrigated by each project, or on the quality of the soils of the irrigable land, were for the most part unavail-

[7] See Annex D, p. 327.
[8] See Annex D, p. 330.

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able. With one exception, detailed planning of the various projects had not been undertaken.

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Nevertheless, the mission believes it necessary to recommend a tentative program subject to alteration upon the completion of more detailed studies. In selecting projects for inclusion in this program the mission has taken into account not only the indicated relationship of cost and benefits, but also the location of the projects and the relative needs of various parts of the country.

1 EUPHRATES VALLEY SCHEME

The Euphrates river undoubtedly offers the greatest possibility of extending the irrigated area in Syria. At present, however, a considerable amount of water is already used for pump irrigation; if much more is to be withdrawn it will be necessary not only to reach an agreement with Iraq regarding the division of the water but also to provide facilities for the storage of water during the flood season. A project for a storage dam at Youssef Pasha has already been worked out; this would increase the minimum flow of the Euphrates during the dry season from about 300 cubic meters per second (m 3/sec) to around 400 m 3/sec. With a long canal starting from the dam it may be possible to irrigate about 185,000 hectares of the so-called Raqqa plateau on the left bank of the river and approximately 54,000 hectares in the Resafe area on the right bank. In addition, the construction of a diversion weir at the Halabiye gorge between Raqqa and Deir ez Zor would probably permit the irrigation of 165,000 hectares farther down in the Euphrates valley. Of the total area thus to be irrigated by projects dependent on the Youssef Pasha dam—404,000 hectares—over one-third or approximately 152,000 hectares are already irrigated by private pumps.

For a number of reasons the mission has reluctantly concluded that this entire group of projects should be deferred until after 1960. First of all, the capital investment required is very large and the benefits will not accrue for a long time. The Youssef Pasha dam itself would cost £S 150 million and the irrigation works would entail an additional outlay of probably £S 560 million. The dam could hardly be completed before 1963, and the construction of all the irrigation works would probably take longer even if it proceeded simultaneously. The financing of the Euphrates and Ghab projects at one and the same time would impose an excessive

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burden on the resources available to the government; and it would require substantial expenditures over a long period without an attendant increase in production, thus leading to inflationary pressures.

The second reason for deferring the Euphrates projects is the fact that much preparatory work must in any event be undertaken before they can be launched. Estimates of the areas that can feasibly be irrigated must, for example, remain largely conjectural until topographic and soil surveys and land classification can be undertaken. Plans for the irrigation systems should not be drawn up until experiments are carried out to determine the proper irrigation duty (i.e., water to be used per hectare) in the light of soil conditions and projected cropping patterns. While plans for the Youssef Pasha dam have already been drawn up, additional borings to explore the foundation conditions of the dam are still necessary. The mission recommends that all this preparatory work be undertaken over the next few years and it has included £S 3 million in the program for this purpose. Meanwhile the government should also seek to reach an agreement with Iraq regarding the allocation of the Euphrates water.

2 RECOMMENDED PROJECTS

The mission would perhaps be more favorably inclined toward an early start on the Euphrates projects if there were no other possibilities of expanding the irrigated area. But there are a number of small projects which can be undertaken at a lower cost and can be completed more rapidly. After considering the various possibilities, the mission recommends that the following schemes be carried out in the years 1955-60:

Project and location	Estimated cost (in million £S)	Area to be irrigated (in thousand hectares)		
		Total	Newly irrigated	Already irrigated
Mzerib, in the Hauran	8	4.6	4.6	0
Nahr el Kebir, in Latakia	15	4.0	3.5	0.5
Barada, near Damascus	30	15.0	15.0	0
El Taf, on the Khabour	30	ca.20.0	ca.10.0	ca.10.0
Total	83	43.6	33.1	10.5

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The first of these is really an extension of the existing Mzerib project and calls for the irrigation by pump of 4,500 hectares with water from the springs at the headwaters of the Yarmuk. It is the only project ready for immediate execution and has the advantage of extending the irrigated area in a province which suffers from a chronic shortage of water.

The Nahr el Kebir project is included despite its rather high cost because it is a multiple-purpose project with diverse benefits. It involves the construction of a storage dam on the Nahr el Kebir, which will not only serve irrigation but also control periodic floods and supply water and power to the growing port city of Latakia.

The Barada river project entails the construction of two dams—one at Hameh and the other farther upstream near Makaren—to provide water for both power and irrigation. This scheme appears particularly attractive because it would permit the irrigation of 15,000 hectares of good land in the vicinity of Damascus, an area of dense population, and would help to meet the growing power needs of the nation's capital.

The El Taf project requires the construction of an earth fill dam across the Khabour river on the site of an old Roman dam. The water thus diverted might irrigate about 10,000-15,000 hectares on the right bank, and 6,000 hectares on the left bank of El Taf river. The land in this area is rather good but cultivable only if irrigated. While there are other possible projects on the Khabour, the mission considers all of them less promising. Farthest upstream and south of Ras el Ain, some 20,000 hectares could be irrigated, but this is in an area of relatively abundant rainfall where winter crops can be grown without irrigation and where landowners are already installing pumps at their own cost for summer irrigation. The Saba Skour project, 12 kilometers downstream from Hassetche, could irrigate about 15,000 hectares, but the dam which would have to be constructed would flood a considerable area of rich alluvial land now under cultivation. Farther downstream from El Taf, additional irrigation would probably be feasible only if the limited supply of water available in the Khabour during the dry season were supplemented by storage during the flood season. The only possible site for a storage dam appears to be at Markada; but a dam in this location would have to be very long and would provide only a very shallow reservoir with attendant dangers of excessive evaporation and silting. The feasibility of the Markada dam should first be carefully investigated.

If the new projects recommended above are carried out and those now

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312 653 under way are completed, Syria would have under irrigation an area of 89,100 hectares additional to that already irrigated. Certain projects, including the Ghab, Barada and El Taf, will, of course, not be completed in the period 1955-60 covered by the mission's suggested program. Under that program, the total newly irrigated area will have increased by about 40,000 hectares by the end of 1960.

Planning of Irrigation Schemes

312 653 47 The planning, construction, maintenance and operation of all irrigation projects (except the Ghab for which a special office has been created) is the responsibility of the Hydraulics Branch of the Ministry of Public Works. At present the staffing of this branch is far from adequate to carry out a greatly expanded program. While the technical staff is supposed to number 78, including 19 engineers, the number actually employed is only 36, of which 11 are engineers. Temporary appointees totalling 23 bridge only part of the gap. The staff must ultimately be greatly expanded. It will take time, however, to train additional technicians; and the goal will never be reached unless the present inadequate salary scale is raised so as to attract competent recruits. Meanwhile, the Ministry will be unable to carry out the suggested irrigation program unless it utilizes every opportunity to delegate the planning and execution of projects to properly qualified private firms.

In discussing the Euphrates projects, the mission has already emphasized the importance of adequate planning and recommended the allocation of £S 3 million for the necessary preparatory work. Part of this sum should be used for the construction of a hydraulics laboratory which would be useful in testing models of all proposed irrigation structures. Through model testing it will be possible properly to design such structures as weirs, canal intakes and sluices so as to anticipate subsequent damage and to achieve maximum economies in construction. It would also be highly desirable to experiment with different types of canal linings. The concrete linings used up to the present are expensive and not wholly satisfactory. It may be possible to use the asphalt available in Syria to devise a lining which would neither crack nor be too fluid and would at the same time be more economical. The mission urges that a qualified foreign firm be engaged to make laboratory tests with this material under conditions simulating those in Syria.

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Recovery of Costs

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The capital cost of irrigation and reclamation schemes can and should be recovered from the beneficiaries. In principle it makes little difference how these costs are recovered—whether through sales of government-owned land that is reclaimed or irrigated, through improvement levies on newly irrigated privately owned land, through irrigation dues, or through a combination of any of these. The state should, however, appropriate most of the benefits for the community at large and to this end impose levies on the direct beneficiaries proportionate to the benefits derived. This is not only socially equitable but it enables the government to recover the cost as rapidly as possible and thus acquire the means to undertake additional projects. The direct beneficiaries must, of course, be allowed to retain some of the benefit, but there is no justification for allowing private landowners whose land is irrigated by the government to enjoy a windfall or for settling farmers on newly irrigated or reclaimed land on terms which enable them to live on a standard far exceeding that of their counterparts elsewhere in the country.

In the past the government has sought to recover the cost through irrigation dues. In 1953 the government collected on this account £S 473,000, which left a margin of £S 268,000 over the amount appropriated to maintain existing irrigation schemes. Early in 1954 the government introduced a new scale of charges increasing progressively with the size of the landholding. The prospective yield of these charges is difficult to assess. While the scale takes into account differences in the benefits accruing from various schemes, the mission considers that the fees instituted for the Tell Maghass, Mzerib and El Senn projects, while higher than those in others, are still rather low in proportion to the benefits enjoyed by cultivators and landowners. A review of these charges therefore appears desirable. If and when the government adopts the mission's recommendation for a progressive land tax, the progressive feature of the irrigation charges may also have to be modified. [£51]

Maintenance

Adequate provision for maintenance of irrigation schemes after completion is, of course, essential. Current appropriations for maintenance appear rather low. In 1954 they were raised to £S 350,000 from a total of

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312 652 £S 205,000 the year before, but even this amount provides only a little over £S 7 per hectare. The mission suggests that the maintenance allowance be increased gradually to £S 10 per hectare.

Water Conservation

312 While new irrigation schemes must obviously be carried out, it is also important that measures be taken to ensure that the limited supply of water available on existing irrigated areas is used to maximum advantage. Much water is being wasted because of inadequate knowledge of irrigation techniques and of the water requirements of various crops in different parts of the country. The mission has already pointed to the necessity of undertaking certain experiments to determine the appropriate irrigation duty as part of the preparatory work for the Euphrates irrigation projects. Quite apart from this, the Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with the irrigation service should launch a series of experiments to determine the appropriate irrigation duty and irrigation techniques in areas which are already being irrigated. Such experiments, for instance, might well show that furrow irrigation makes better use of the available water supply than the customary basin irrigation. Demonstrations in water conservation might also be usefully undertaken. The mission has noted, for example, that improved levelling of land would produce a much more economical distribution of water. It is also evident that farmers in many places can be assisted in initiating small irrigation schemes of their own by storing runoff water in simply constructed catchment basins. To start work along these lines, the mission recommends a total expenditure of £S 1.2 million in the period 1956-60.

Proposed Outlays

312 652 The commitments already undertaken by the government and the additional recommendations made by the mission would entail a very large increase in expenditures on irrigation and reclamation. The cost of the proposed program is shown in Table 5. The mission firmly believes that the projected outlays are necessary and can easily be justified by the increase in production that will be achieved.

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TABLE 5 Expenditures on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1950–60 312 652

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Future outlays	
	1950–52 average	1953 estimate	1954 estimate	1955–60 total	Annual average
Projects—total	2,368[a]	3,130[a]	3,380[a]	197,000	32,833
Completion of works	—	—	—	9,000	1,500
Ghab	—	—	—	102,000[b]	17,000
Other new works	—	—	—	83,000	13,833
Euphrates valley studies	—	—	—	3,000	500
Maintenance	113	205	350	3,000	500
Research and demonstration	—	—	—	1,200	200
Grand total	2,481	3,335	3,730	201,200	33,533

[a] Budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures. The 1954 total excludes an £S 5 million authorization for the Ghab of which probably only a negligible portion was spent.
[b] After allowance for receipts from sale of land and water.

III LAND POLICIES AND LAND SETTLEMENT[9] 311

A fuller knowledge of the available land resources is essential not only to plan better utilization of land already under exploitation, but also to determine how much land remains for expansion of cultivation and what must be done to make it productive. Even the existing pattern of land utilization is hardly known. Data on the total cultivated area, on the acreage planted to individual crops and on production are at best only rough estimates which are often quite wide of the mark. Little is known as yet about various types of soils, their deficiencies and potentialities. Widely varying opinions are expressed regarding the area which can still be put to the plow or can be irrigated by gravity flow.

Aerial Survey Program

Aerial photography can be of great assistance in planning land utilization and public works of importance to agriculture. Up to the present it 311 654

[9] See Annex E, p. 351.

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1960, or an annual average of around £S 14.3 million over the period 1955-60. 365

The principal task of the central government in this field will be to assist towns and villages in obtaining adequate supplies of pure drinking water. 365 312 Now that the expensive new system for Aleppo is virtually complete, it should be possible to devote more resources to the smaller cities and villages. Some £S 5 million will still need to be spent on expansion and improvement of the distribution network in Aleppo. Aside from this amount, we recommend that the government allocate about £S 8 million over the period 1955-60 for water supplies in towns and villages. The government has recognized that the problem is most acute in the Hauran and the Djebel Druze. Much of the population in these provinces is dependent on rain catchment for its water supply, and supplies in catchment basins quickly become polluted and occasionally dry up. The problem in these regions is complicated by the dearth of underground water, which necessitates expensive geophysical surveys. Elsewhere in the country there are still many villages and towns which urgently require pure water. For example, Hassetche, although the capital of Jezireh, is dependent on water drawn directly from the Khabour river and peddled from carts in the city streets. Because the need is so great, funds for water supply will have to be used with great economy. Extensive distribution systems which are expensive to install and maintain must be avoided. In the smaller villages a centrally located well will generally suffice. For the larger villages and towns the water should be piped to a limited number of public fountains where inhabitants can draw it for their domestic needs.

Waste disposal is also an important problem, especially from the standpoint of public health. Even the larger cities have not fully solved this problem. In Damascus, for instance, the sewers empty into the Barada river, whose water is used farther downstream not only for irrigation but also for drinking. The most immediate need, however, is for proper waste disposal in the villages. The construction of latrines and cesspools appears to be the only feasible solution there, and the community self-improvement program which, in accordance with our earlier proposals, would be initiated by community workers, should focus at least in part on the improvement of village sanitation by this means. To overcome any public inertia, the government might find it advisable to give squatting slabs or some comparable assistance to householders as an incentive to construct and use latrines. 364

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VI IRRIGATION TECHNIQUES

Even when the irrigation program gains momentum, water will remain one of the principal limitations on agricultural expansion. Optimum water utilization requires making the most of available supplies and avoiding waste, as well as limiting cultivation in irrigated areas to those crops which need irrigation.

The Use of Water

At present, farming techniques are such that in many areas large quantities of water are wasted, particularly by surface evaporation,[7] and only rarely is the water evenly distributed over the land. Development of the best irrigation techniques (such as furrow irrigation) for the soils of the various regions clearly requires the establishment of research and demonstration sections in the agricultural stations existing or recommended for the various localities, for the farmers will rarely adopt new methods unless they can see the benefits at first hand.

Crop Restriction

Since the quantity of water is limited, it is equally important that irrigated fields be reserved for those crops which will derive most benefit. Conversely, crops such as cotton and rice, whose cultivation is hazardous under dry-farming conditions, should as far as possible be grown only on irrigated areas; sugar beet also requires irrigation in areas where the rainfall is less than 600 mm. A licensing system already exists with regard to cotton cultivation and it is important that it be enforced. In the long run, however, the farmer himself should be able to assess the profitability of crops grown under various conditions. The demonstration stations mentioned above should therefore be equipped to show how different quantities of water affect a variety of crops. To assure year-round utilization of land in irrigated areas (as elsewhere) farmers must also be educated in the use of soil-replenishing crops which will at the same time profitably replace fallow.

[7] Conversely, many farmers do not know how to drain their land when there is too much water.

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ANNEX D *NOTES ON IRRIGATION*

1 THE GHAB PROJECT

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The Ghab valley, part of the Orontes river valley, is about 50 kilometers long from south to north and about 10 kilometers wide. There is in the valley a marshy area of about 35,000 hectares, which cannot be cultivated at present, although it consists mostly of good alluvial soil. If drained and irrigated the reclaimed land would probably be suitable for rice, cotton, sugar beet and pulses as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter vetch or clover during the winter. It has the great advantage of being near both the important domestic market of Aleppo and the port of Latakia, permitting ready export of products in excess of local needs.

The marsh would be drained by excavation of a basaltic sill at Kfeir that now prevents the out-flow of water, and by construction of a system of drainage canals. Included in the area to be developed for agricultural use is the Acharneh plain just upstream from the Ghab valley in a bend of the Orontes. The Orontes river is now unable to drain the plain because its bed has been raised by silting. An extensive network of irrigation canals would be constructed for the irrigation of the plain and the valley. Including the reclaimed land, the total irrigated area would be about 65,000 hectares. A reservoir with a storage capacity of about 68 million cubic meters would be constructed behind a dam near Halfaya to control the Orontes flood, and a second dam located near Rastane would provide a reservoir of about 180-265 million cubic meters for irrigation purposes. About 20,000 KW of electric power would eventually be developed in hydroelectric plants at Rastane, Maharda and Jisr ech Choghour. The last two plants, however, could be operated only during the off-season for irrigation.

Of the 65,000 hectares, 43,000 have not previously been irrigated and of these 29,000 hectares are government-owned. The project would further provide for the settlement of a large number of farmers in the latter area.

It is anticipated that completion of the entire project will require about 10 years, proceeding in overlapping stages as follows: (a) drainage of the Orontes valley; (b) the Halfaya flood control dam; (c) a part of the road system; (d) a soil improvement program; (e) about 75% of the irrigation

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312 network. If an early start is made on (a), (b) and (c), then the soil im-
653 provement program and irrigation network might be initiated in 1956 and
185 1957 respectively.

The later work, mainly in the Acharneh plain, will be done after 1960. It will include drainage of the plain, construction of the Halfaya tunnels, completion of the road system, construction of the irrigation network of the Acharneh plain and Rastane dam, and the relocation of the Amir Ghajar hydro plant. The entire project could be completed by the end of 1963.

In the Ghab area, 41,680 hectares will be irrigated by a system of three main canals, one on each bank of the Orontes, branching from an intake to be constructed near Acharneh, and a third, made from the present bed of the Orontes, originating five kilometers downstream near Ammourine from an intake built in the new Orontes. This will irrigate the lands between the river and the two other main canals. The total area brought under irrigation in the Ghab, taking into account the 13,600 hectares now under partial irrigation, will not exceed 28,000 hectares until about 1963. If temporary limitations on summer irrigation are to be avoided, the work will have to proceed according to a closely coordinated schedule.

Cost

The preliminary cost estimate made in 1952 and later brought up to date at the request of the International Bank forms the basis of the following estimate, which includes engineering and supervision expenses, and which assumes that the major proposed technical revisions of the provisional plans will be adopted. On this basis the total cost of the full program is estimated at £S 130.85 million, exclusive of the cost of local and national roads, or £S 169.85 if these are included.[1] The foreign exchange requirement would be about one-third of these totals. During the term of the mission's program (to December 1960) disbursements are likely to be £S 84.25 million without roads or £S 110.25 million if roads are included. Additional funds required for indirect consequences of the project have not been included in the costs for the main project.

[1] All figures are exclusive of any margin for contingencies.

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Economic Benefits

The mission estimates that the gross value of the produce of the Ghab area will be in the neighborhood of £S 63 million annually, or about £S 47 million after deducting the amount already produced in the area in question. The production of cotton, maize, sorghum, rice and sugar beets is particularly likely to have a marked impact on Syria's balance of trade. It may be assumed that the output of cotton and cottonseed will in effect be added to the country's exportable surplus; the additional rice production may make Syria fully self-sufficient in that commodity; and the sugar beet production should permit a considerable import saving.

In addition to the project's contribution to an increase in national income and an improvement in the balance of payments, the settlement of farmers in the area made possible by the project will assist in relieving the present population pressure in the province of Latakia and particularly in the Alaouit mountains. In Latakia, for example, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% of the average for Syria as a whole. Settlers in the Ghab will be able to earn substantially more than the bare living they have been able to eke from the soil in the past.

Organization

The "Administrative Office of the Drainage and Irrigation Works of the Ghab Lands" was created in 1951, to be attached to the Ministry of Public Works until the technical work is completed. It will be responsible for the design of the works, award of contracts, supervision of construction, payment of expenses and for sale of the land. As parts of the project are completed, the Office will take care of the operation and maintenance of the dams and of the irrigation and drainage networks and will collect water charges. During the planning and construction period the Office should recruit and train staff to carry out the continuing operation and management of the project.

It is important that the policy, and the attendant operating and budget delegations, provide for the establishment and operation of the agricultural research centers and for a long-range educational and farm demonstration program; otherwise, it will be practically impossible to achieve acceptable land use in the area.

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II PROJECTED SCHEMES

185 The Youssef Pasha project is the most important of those under con-
● 312 sideration, but it is still at the planning stage. No decision has been taken
653 with regard to the irrigation of the Euphrates valley as a whole.

Euphrates Valley—Youssef Pasha Dam[2]

In Syria the long narrow Euphrates valley stretches generally northwest to southeast from Djerablous at the Turkish border to Abou Kemal at the Iraqi border. It is about 450 kilometers long; its average width is about 7.5 kilometers, its maximum 16.

The soils of the valley proper are mainly alluvial, varying from silt to sandy loam and clay. With irrigation, they would be suitable for cotton, rice, sugar beet, peanuts, sorghum, etc. as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter legumes as the main winter crops.

Irrigation of the whole Euphrates valley, on the assumption that about 85% of the land can be cultivated, would require about 170 cubic meters per second, more than can be assumed to be Syria's share of the natural flow of the Euphrates. Irrigation could probably profitably be extended to an additional area of about 130,000 hectares on the left bank in the vicinity of Raqqa. All in all, a total supply of about 226 cubic meters per second would be needed, about 75% of the maximum of 300 cubic meters per second utilizable for irrigation from the river's natural flow, which would leave only 25% for Iraq. For this reason, and because of the power potential, it was thought desirable to construct a storage dam on the Euphrates; Youssef Pasha was selected as the site. British engineering consultants recommended a concrete dam of the pierced type, 650 meters long with 52 sluice gates, and a power plant capable of producing about 45,000 KW of firm power or a yearly output of about 400 million KWH, plus about 120 million KWH of secondary power.

The consultant firm originally estimated the project cost, including a transmission line to Aleppo, at about £S 114 million; a revaluation made in 1953 raised the estimate to £S 150 million. The capacity of the reservoir behind the dam would increase the flow of the river utilizable for irriga-

[2] Since studies of the valley have not advanced to the point of a draft project, the figures which follow are only indications of the order of magnitude of possible development.

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tion by about 100 cubic meters per second; this, added to Syria's assumed share of the natural flow, would provide sufficient water to irrigate the valley, including the area on the left bank.

Until recently it was thought that the length of head canal needed to connect Youssef Pasha with the irrigable areas would, because of difficult topography, preclude construction of an economic gravity irrigation system. The mission, taking account of experts' reports, has the following comments:

About 48,000 hectares on the river's right bank, between Youssef Pasha and Halabiye gorge, could be irrigated by pumping, at a cost of about £S 50 million; but this would not be an economic method of irrigating the fertile Ressafe plain. Both the valley and about 6,000 hectares of the plain could be irrigated by constructing a gravity canal branching from Youssef Pasha, at a cost of about £S 100 million. Whether it is worthwhile to spend an additional £S 50 million to irrigate a portion of the plain is a question to be considered.

On the left bank, however, a gravity canal branching from the Euphrates at the foot of Youssef Pasha dam could reach the plateau west of Raqqa, 100,000 hectares of which are now without any possibility of being irrigated, and could provide wide-scale irrigation between Ressafe and Halabiye gorge. About 185,000 hectares of excellent soils could be irrigated, about 155,000 by gravity flow and about 30,000 by pumping from the canal.

The possibilities of such a project should be investigated. We have made provision for such a study in our allocation for Euphrates valley studies; the aerial survey and mapping of the area are allowed for elsewhere. The gravity irrigation portion should cost roughly £S 266 million, of which £S 150 million (55%) represents the cost of the head canal. The pumping facilities would cost about £S 34 million. The construction cost of the project would thus be about £S 1,700 per hectare, less than that of the Ghab project.

Halabiye Project

Halabiye gorge offers an excellent site for a diversion weir: inundations would be restricted to the gorge itself. The weir could feed two irrigation canals, one on each bank of the Euphrates, extending 250 kilometers to Abou Kemal near the Iraqi border, and these could supply gravity irriga-

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185 tion to about 165,000 hectares, leaving about 50,000 to be irrigated by
312 pumps.
653 The cost of such a project would be about £S 165 million, or £S 1,000 per irrigated hectare. But although it would irrigate the fertile Meyadine area and foster development of the Abou Kemal locality, we do not recommend its construction during the next five years. Halabiye is rather far down the Syrian Euphrates valley; much of the area is already under pump irrigation; and for the limited capital expendable the Youssef Pasha site offers wider potentialities, particularly in the generation of hydroelectric power for the Aleppo area.

Khabour Valley

The Khabour valley has possibilities for projects in addition to the Tell Maghass scheme. None has been fully investigated. The soils are generally of good quality, ranging from loamy sand to medium clay, suitable for cultivation of cotton, rice, peanuts and (in the northern parts) sugar-beet. All summer crops must be fully irrigated, and although rainfall is more plentiful here than in many parts of Syria, partial irrigation of winter crops is advisable in some areas.

A diversion weir could be constructed across the Khabour downstream from Ras el Ain to feed an irrigation canal on each bank. Areas of 13,300 and 7,400 hectares, on the right and left banks, respectively, could be irrigated. Rainfall in this area is adequate for winter crops and several large estate owners have installed pumps for summer cultivation.

A canal could be excavated on the right bank of the river, from Tell Maghass, but no more than 3,800 hectares would be irrigated; moreover, the soil is not very good, being sometimes excessively salted with gypsum.

About 12 kilometers downstream from Hassetche a dam could be built on the site of the ruined Roman dam of Saba Skour. Although this would permit the irrigation of about 15,000 hectares, it would unfortunately reflood the site of the previous reservoir whose fertile alluvium is now under cultivation.[3]

Sixteen kilometers downstream from Saba Skour another ruined Roman dam formerly supplied two large canals, one on each bank of the Taf river, a tributary of the Khabour. Here could be built an earth-fill dam,

[3] The area of this site is difficult to determine owing to the flatness of the surrounding country.

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about 760 meters long and 15 meters high, to feed a 14-kilometer canal on the right bank, irrigating about 8,000 hectares (a longer canal might irrigate 10,000-15,000 hectares) and a shorter left-bank canal, irrigating about 6,000 hectares. The soil is fairly good, and the mission considers this the best project that could be started in the Khabour area. A rough cost estimate is about £S 30 million, or £S 1,500 to £S 2,000 per hectare, depending on the area irrigated.

All told, these projects would irrigate 62,000-69,000 hectares, including the 8,500 now irrigated by the left bank canal of Tell Maghass. With a duty[4] of 0.6 liters per hectare per second, about 40 cubic meters per second would be needed. Since that is the total discharge of the Khabour utilizable for irrigation, no water would remain for dry season cultivation downstream from the Taf. Accordingly, consideration has been given to storage of the Khabour flood. The downstream portion of the valley is very flat, with the exception of the right bank where it is bordered by an eroded plateau. The plateau is nearest to the river at Markada, and here a dam could be built to form a reservoir. About 800 million cubic meters could be stored behind a dam about 20 meters high; even after loss through evaporation from the large surface area, about 700 million cubic meters would remain, or about 45 cubic meters per second for a six-month irrigation season. This discharge could irrigate about 75,000 hectares out of a possible 250,000 along both banks. The sandy and loamy alluvial soils of this area would be suitable, under irrigation, for the cultivation of rice, cotton, peanuts, pulses, sorghum and maize.

The site's disadvantage is that the gentle slope of the left bank would require construction of a long levee, although there is an easy abutment for the dam on the right bank. Moreover, because the height of the dam would necessarily mean a very shallow reservoir, it would be difficult to prevent siltation. In the circumstances, the government has made no study, survey or cost estimate of the project. The mission recommends that aerial and ground surveys and mapping be undertaken to determine whether the site is satisfactory or whether an alternative must be found. As a first step, the ground survey should be limited to five or six profiles in the area contemplated for the reservoir. This should take about three days, at a cost not in excess of £S 1,000, to be charged to the study of the Euphrates valley, where most of the stored water would be utilized.

[4] The average quantity of irrigation water which must be applied annually to the land to bring the crops to maturity.

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Upper Orontes Valley

312 653 185 In the area of Homs two projects are under consideration to expand cultivation in the upper Orontes valley, where cotton and sugar beet can be grown as summer crops and wheat, barley and clover as winter crops: a canal branching from Homs Lake to irrigate about 3,000 hectares on the left bank of the Orontes, and one branching from a diversion weir to be constructed about 23 kilometers upstream of the south end of Homs Lake. Here the dry season flow of the Orontes is at least 10 cubic meters per second, sufficient to irrigate about 15,000 hectares on the right bank, so that the Ghab project would not be adversely affected. However, the Orontes rises in Lebanon, where a project to irrigate the Kaa area is being considered. This would reduce the available flow at the Syrian border, correspondingly reducing the irrigable area in Syria. Since the project is estimated to cost about £S 15 million, an agreement with Lebanon on the partition of the Orontes should be concluded first. We also recommend a more accurate geological survey of the Rastane reservoir area, to ascertain whether potential capacity has been overestimated. Meantime, the two projects should be deferred.

Barada Valley

Consideration has been given to regulating the flow of the Barada river, to increase the irrigated area of the Ghouta in the vicinity of Damascus where soils toward the valley bottoms are suitable for the growing of vegetables.

Two dams across the Barada river at Hameh and near Makaren, each about 50 meters high, would provide a total storage capacity of about 180 million cubic meters, thus increasing the utilizable irrigation flow from 7 to about 15 cubic meters per second and permitting dry season irrigation of about 15,000 hectares of new fertile land in the vicinity of Damascus. A hydroelectric power plant could be built at the foot of each dam to develop a total power of about 10,000 KW.[5]

Surveys and studies have not progressed to the point of a draft project. A rough cost estimate is about £S 10 million for each dam, plus not more than £S 10 million for the development of the canal system, making a total

[5] These are recommended in Annex G.

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of about £S 30 million for the project (exclusive of the hydroelectric plants), or about £S 2,000 per hectare. The mission recommends that studies of the two sites be completed and that construction of the dams and hydro plants begin as soon as possible.

Yarmuk Valley

Cultivation on the alluvial and sometimes very fertile soils* of the Mzerib area irrigated from the upper springs of the Yarmuk river could be extended by pumping water to a new area of 4,500 hectares. This second phase of the Mzerib irrigation project has been fully investigated and is ready to be started; the first phase is already in operation. The pumps would be driven by diesel motors unless and until it is decided to build a hydroelectric power plant on the Yarmuk. The cost is estimated at about £S 7 million, approximately £S 1,500 per hectare. In view of the interest in developing irrigation in the Hauran mohafazat, which is in general not well provided with water, the mission recommends that this project be started without delay.

Nahr el Kebir Valley

The Nahr el Kebir, a short river flowing from the mountains bordering on Turkey, empties into the Mediterranean in the vicinity of Latakia. It has heavy floods, but in dry season the flow is no more than 0.5 to 0.6 cubic meters per second. A regulated flow would permit irrigation of about 4,000 hectares in the vicinity of Latakia for vegetable growing, thus making a significant contribution to the general development expected with the improvement of the port.

The construction of a dam of about 60 meters is projected, with sufficient capacity to permit flood control, irrigation, power and water for the port of Latakia. Site surveys are already under way. Additional cost studies must be made, but the cost will probably be of the order of £S 15 million. Although this is rather expensive for a single project, the mission feels that in view of its multi-purpose nature and the great importance of the development of the port of Latakia, studies should promptly be completed and the project constructed during the next five years.

* Suitable for cotton, with peanuts and citrus on the lighter soils.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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The Mission's Program

The new irrigation projects recommended by the mission, together with those under way, call for a total expenditure of £S 193 million over the next five years, to which must be added £S 3 million for maintenance and £S 1.2 million for research and demonstration, giving a grand total of £S 197.2 million. Table 1 shows the allocations among projects, together with an indication of the areas to be irrigated. Appendix Table II sets forth the irrigation schemes.

TABLE 1 Mission's Proposed Irrigation Program, 1955–60

Irrigated area							
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Projects	Functions	Total	Already spent	To be spent in the program
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	103*	1	102
0	0	0	Euphrates valley studies		3	—	3
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB) . .	GI	12	10	2
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	5	2	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	3	2	1
4.6	0	4.6	Mzerib	PI	7	0	7
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	30	0	30
15.0	0	15.0	Banda	HEP + GI	30	0	30
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	15	0	15
89.1	37.5	126.6			208	15	193

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; LB – Left Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

* Including £S 47 million to be spent in a later program.

NOTE: Area figures in thousand hectares; expenditure figure in million £S.

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III PLANNING

There are two stages of planning for irrigation projects. The first, the agricultural phase, entails a preliminary study of the soils and the computation of water duties. The technical phase includes planning of the civil engineering works necessary to divert, convey and distribute the water in the selected area. In the Main Report the mission has discussed the second

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

planning stage. Here we add a comment with respect to the so-called agricultural phase. 185 312 242

In the past, soil studies were not very extensive, but projects were being constructed in areas already under cultivation, where the fertility of the soil was well known. Now FAO experts supervise systematic soil analyses, and the results of these studies will be very useful for the development of future projects. Insufficient investigation of the perviousness of the soil, with consequent underestimation of the water duty, has resulted in undercropping in some irrigated areas. A striking example is the Homs Lake project, where the allowance of 0.20 liters per hectare per second does not permit full utilization of the cultivable area.

The mission therefore recommends that henceforth more extensive research under the supervision of both irrigation and agricultural engineers precede fixing of the irrigation duty. Since the soils vary little along the alluvial plain of the Euphrates valley, these studies could be confined to plots in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor and Abou Kemal, on the plateau west of Raqqa and in the Resafe plain south of Abou Hareira. These experimental plots could be quite small, water being supplied by small pumping plants or even by tankers. Provision is made in the mission's proposed expenditure on studies of Euphrates valley irrigation for equipment of experimental stations.

IV WATER FEES

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The fees for the various projects, according to the revised schedule for 1954, are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Annual Water Fees per Hectare

(£S)

Project	Size of holdings in hectares				
	0 to 5	5 to 15	15 to 20	20 to 50	over 50
Homs-Hama	6.25	15.40	20.40	23.30	25.80
Tell Maghass	7.50	23.75	28.75	37.50	40.00
Marrib	7.50	21.25	26.25	32.50	35.00
Senn	7.50	17.50	22.50	27.50	30.00
Makt	2.00	3.50	4.50	6.00	7.00

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

312 427 In the mission's opinion the amortization period of 65-70 years is too long; if the same standards were applied to the new projects requiring large investment Syria's economic development would be hindered. We recommend a further revision of the basis for calculating the fees so that capital cost is amortized in a period of, say, 35-40 years, provided that in no case should the fee exceed the money value of the benefits to the landowner or cultivator. Benefits should be conservatively calculated to allow for variations in prices and yields of crops.

It also appears that although small holders might appropriately be charged a lower rate, the degree of progression in the existing water fees may be excessive.

APPENDIX

311 312 TABLE I River Flow and Government's Estimate of Irrigated and Irrigable Areas

Origin of utilized water	Annual flow (million cubic meters)	Irrigated area (thousand hectares)	Irrigable area (thousand hectares)
Euphrates	25,000	125.0	340.0
Khabour	1,500	20.0	90.0
Orontes	500	35.0	55.0
Yarmuk	450	3.0	7.5
Barada-Awadj	485	15.0	25.0
Kowek	75	12.0	15.0
Afrin	250	2.5	7.5
Sadjour	90	2.5	3.0
Baligh	150	8.5	10.0
Jagh-Jagh	90	8.0	10.0
Senn	360	0.5	5.0
Nahr el Kebir	150	0.5	2.0
Total	29,100[a]	232.5	570.0
Underground water		75.0	100.0
Miscellaneous		67.5	80.0
Gross total		375.0[b]	750.0[b]

[a] To which should be added approximately 500 million cubic meters from other small rivers and streams.

[b] Underestimated, in the mission's opinion.

SOURCE: Directorate of Irrigation.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

The low fee for the Makt project is justified by the restricted nat[illegible] the facilities provided, but the fees assessed for the Tell Maghass, M[illegible] and Senn projects appear low in proportion to the money value of the benefits to the landowners or cultivators, and are considerably less than the cost of pumping irrigation provided by private owners. Accordingly, we have recommended review of these fees.

APPENDIX

TABLE II Irrigation Schemes Under Construction or Projected

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Irrigated area (thousand hectares)					Expenditures (million £S)		
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Location	Functions	Already spent	To be spent	Total
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	1	170	171*
252.0	152.0	404.0	Youssef Pasha		—	150	150
140.0	45.0	185.0	Raqqa Plateau	GI + PI	—	300	300
85.0	80.0	165.0	Halabiye	GI	—	160	160
27.0	27.0	54.0	Resafe	GI or PI	—	100	100
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	2	3	5
4.6	2.2	6.8	Mzerib	GI + PI	2	7	9
15.6	5.1	20.7	Ras el Ain	GI	—	30	30
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB)	GI	10	2	12
2.8	1.0	3.8	Tell Maghass (RB)	GI	—	6	6
8.0	7.2	15.2	Saba Skour	GI	—	25	25
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	—	30	30
53.0	22.0	75.0	Markada	GI	—	100	100
8.0	7.0	15.0	Upstream Homs Lake	GI	—	15	15
3.0	—	3.0	Homs Lake (LB)	GI	—	3	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	2	2	4
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	—	15	15
15.0	—	15.0	Barada	HEP + GI	—	30	30
431.5	235.0	665.5			17	1,148	1,165

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; RB – Right Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; LB – Left Bank; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

* Including local and national roads.

NOTE: The figures given above are only rough estimates. Accurate figures are not available because most of these irrigation schemes have not yet reached the draft stage. The purpose of this Table is to give an idea of the order of magnitude of the investment, extending beyond the scope of the mission's program, to be made for the development of irrigation in Syria.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Raw Materials

433 Considering the present structure of Syrian industry, its supply of raw materials is generally speaking not unsatisfactory. In the preceding section we have referred to the import needs, if any, of Syria's principal industries. Most local and imported raw materials are generally available at competitive prices. The principal exception is sugar, the high price of which presents a serious drawback to the fruit canning, jam and candy industries. The prohibition of imports of cotton seed for industrial use hampers the ability of vegetable oil manufacturers to enter the export market at competitive prices. Some branches of the textile industry dependent on imported cotton yarn or cloth, subject to high customs duties, are in a similarly unfortunate position.

On the other hand certain laws or regulations in effect give some Syrian industries a right of first refusal with regard to locally produced raw materials; export of both ginned and non-ginned cotton, cotton seed, raw wool and raw hides, is subject to licensing, while export of timber and raw metals is prohibited. The efficacy and desirability of such measures may be questioned (see Section IV), but they are elements of the prevailing industrial climate.

The transportation of local raw materials to the industrial centers, where they are processed, is not unduly burdensome, thanks to the favorable location of Syrian industries in or near the producing areas. Moreover, the distances between these centers and the seaports are not too great. Nevertheless, transportation in Syria is relatively costly and an improvement in the transport sector would not only facilitate exports of surplus raw materials but would also benefit the processing industries and their competitive position.

Water and Power

433 312 371 The main industrial centers are, generally speaking, well provisioned with water. Damascus has the best water supply among Syrian cities, thanks to the springs of Figeh. Aleppo's water supply, which was so inadequate that some factories had to select sites outside of the town where they could drill their own wells, has now been greatly improved by a link with the Euphrates River. Homs and Hama have more than sufficient water

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

resources in Homs Lake. The water rates charged by the municipalities are by no means excessive.

With regard to electricity for light and power the conditions are, however, much less favorable. The capacity of the municipal power plants in the four main industrial cities is far from sufficient to meet total consumption needs. Most of the larger factories have had to install their own power plants, which imposes an additional capital burden on them.[3] Factories which have no power plant of their own often suffer considerable losses resulting from breaks in the power and light supply. Electricity rates of public utilities, although higher in Syria than, for instance, in Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt, compare not unfavorably with those in the main Western industrial centers.

Equipment

The mechanical equipment of the major industries is in general good. Obsolete or inefficient machinery is continuously being replaced by new plant. Nevertheless, there are still many old factories and workshops where equipment is primitive and modernization is much needed.

Some industries, however, seem as a whole to be overequipped in relation to the available raw material supply or the market outlets for their products. A striking example is the installed capacity in the cotton ginning industry, which could handle between two and three times the present cotton crop. This is no doubt due in part to an overestimation at the time of the cotton boom. The government has accordingly prohibited the importation of cotton gins. In the case of the vegetable oil industry the installed capacity might be more fully utilized if cotton seed were freely importable and oil manufacturers could enter the export market for vegetable oils at competitive prices. As a complement to the protection of local cotton seed, the government has also placed an embargo on the importation of vegetable oils. A third instance of overequipment is in the glass industry: the Damascus factory was designed and installed on the basis of the rather ambitious notion that it should serve most of the needs of the Middle East. Some of its machinery, as for instance that for the manufacture of electric bulbs, has never been in operation. Although most of the items it produces may not be imported into Syria and although recently

[3] See Annex G, p. 413.

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AREA OF LAND CULTIVATED AND UNCULTIVATED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1952 AND 1953.
(Area in hectare)

Table No. 2

MOHAFAZAT	المجموع العام Grand total	اراضي قابلة الزراعة Cultivable lands			غير مستثمرة Uncultivated
		Cultivated		مستثمرة	
		المجموع Total	سقي Irrigated	بعل Non-irrigated	
YEAR 1952					
Damascus	1,962,783	159,170	81,116	78,054	354,450
Homs	4,195,000	299,290	25,290	274,000	480,000
Hama	732,185	503,965	17,114	486,751	16,800
Latakia	608,000	257,946	30,579	227,367	72,272
Aleppo	2,112,879	1,122,823	80,407	1,042,416	489,792
Al-Hasakeh	2,217,000	540,452	44,694	495,708	598,620
Deir-ez-Zor	5,306,000	261,683	200,840	60,843	1,082,791
Sweida	555,000	60,690	100	60,590	60,890
Dir'a	427,632	279,432	11,932	267,500	4,200
Total	18,276,470	3,485,251	492,068	2,993,183	3,139,545
YEAR 1953					
Damascus	1,962,783	159,170	81,116	78,054	354,450
Homs	4,219,000(1)	342,430	38,400	304,030	458,900
Hama	832,135(2)	539,975	28,504	511,471	22,790
Latakia	454,000(3)	178,264	9,733	168,531	57,095
Aleppo	2,112,879	1,236,675	89,263	1,147,412	416,736
Al-Hasakeh	2,217,000	541,469	40,000	501,469	694,531
Deir-ez-Zor	5,906,000	326,713	205,840	120,873	1,017,761
Sweida	555,000	60,690	200	60,490	60,390
Dir'a	427,632	283,794	18,962	267,832	4,300
Total	18,276,470	3,669,180	508,958	3,160,222	3,087,183

Source : Ministry of Agriculture.

(1) Including Talkhalakh Qada.
(2) Including Misiaf Qada.
(3) Excluding the Qadas of Talkhalakh and Misiaf.

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توزيع المساحة المروية حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٥٣

DISTRIBUTION OF IRRIGATED AREA, BY MOHAFAZAT, IN 1953

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

MOHAFAZAT	المساحة المروية (بالهكتار) : Irrigated Area (in hectares)						المحافظات
	المجموع Total	مياه الانهار By rivers	مياه الاقنية والينابيع By canals and springs	مياه الآبار By underground water: بالمحركات by pumps	مياه الآبار By underground water: بالنزافات by norias	مياه السيول By torrents	
Total	866,968	267,223	57,967	222,386	19,044	1,738	المجموع
Damascus	81,118	58,665	17,508	5,974	544	430	دمشق
Homs	38,400	26,902	6,808	4,740	50	—	حمص
Hama	28,504	14,400	5,822	8,282	—	—	حماه
Latakia	9,723	2,962	3,649	3,122	—	—	اللاذقية
Aleppo	89,263	59,628	12,300	11,675	4,960	3,200	حلب
Deir-es-Zor	40,000	32,825	7,025	20	100	—	الحسكة
Al-Hasakah	265,940	3,000	300	189,150	13,290	—	دير الزور
Sweida	300	11	180	1	—	8	السويداء
Der'a	15,902	11,500	4,380	22	—	—	درعا

Source : Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة الزراعة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Chapter Ten

SYRIA AND LEBANON

The Land and the People

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The area of the present Syria and Lebanon lies to the north of Arabia Deserta and is the western horn of the Fertile Crescent. The two republics do not enclose within their boundaries a natural geographic entity and their climate and topography are best studied in relation to the surrounding countries;[1] but within the political boundaries of the two states, the following geographical divisions may roughly be distinguished:

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(1) *The Coastal Strip.* This is about twenty miles wide near Latakia and rather less just north of Tripoli, but in some places disappears and the mountains meet the sea. Olives, bananas, citrus, and vegetables are cultivated intensively near Beirut.

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(2) *The Mountains.* Starting from the north, the first coastal mountains are the Jebel Ansariya (also known as the Alawi Mountains) which average 4,000 feet and are well populated on the western slopes. To the south is the Homs–Tripoli gap and then starts the Lebanon range with peaks of over 10,000 feet. Even on the upper slopes of this range water is plentiful, there is close cultivation, and the villages and towns are prosperous. Near Beirut are situated the mountain resorts to which most of the city workers move each night when the summer brings its humid heat. The interior ranges of mountains lying parallel to that of the Lebanon are the Anti-Lebanon (between Homs and Zahle) reaching over 7,000 feet and the range of Hermon (between Zahle and the Israel border) which reaches 9,200 feet. Water and cultivation are far less plentiful on these than on the coastal mountains. Farther inland still and to the south of Damascus lie the Leja, a bleak area of igneous rock, and the Jebel Druze, which reaches 5,000–6,000 feet and lies north of the Jordan border.

(3) *Plains and Plateaux.* Hardly any of the territory of Syria and Lebanon lies less than 700 feet above sea-level and south of Hama almost all the land is over 1,600 feet. The richest agricultural land is on fairly high ground and forms part of a

[1] See W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East; a Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (London, Methuen, 1950).

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)		Production (000 metric tons)		Yields (100 kg. per ha.)
	1951	1952	1951	1952	1950
Wheat	61	70	43	50	7·5
Barley	15	20	14	27	11·2
Cotton	5	2	1	..	..
Tobacco	..	..	3	2	..
Citrus fruit	..	..	75	90	..
Grapes	21	..	80	..	..

.. = not available.

(Sources: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952* (Paris 1953); except figures for yields, cotton production, and area and production of grapes, all of which have been taken from FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952.)

312 241 439 There is enough water for land to be used more intensively than in Syria but there is not enough room to grow all that the country needs. Improved methods have increased the yield of cereals per acre, but Lebanon will always have to import wheat. The crop of grapes is nearly double the weight of the wheat harvest and Lebanon exports grapes, wine, and the best quality araq. The citrus exports are high but the growers have not yet established the same name for quality as have the Israelis. Melons, water-melons, apples, onions, and potatoes are also important crops and vegetables are exported as far as the oil towns of Kuwait and Dahran. Cotton and tobacco are also grown in small quantities.

423 369 The land is more evenly parcelled out amongst the people in Lebanon than in Syria but, despite the fact that there are many small holdings, there is a general shift from country to town, and Beirut and its immediate neighbourhood hold nearly half of the population. In the coastal regions of intensive cultivation small holdings predominate, while in the plain regions large estates worked by share-croppers are the most prevalent form of land tenure. Some estates owned by rich men are farmed under modern methods and equipment and there is less room for improvement or for expansion in agriculture than in Syria.

Industry

493 Relative to its size, Lebanon is one of the most industrialized countries in the Middle East area. It is probable that nearly 50,000 persons are so employed, of whom over half are factory workers. However, Lebanese industry has only partly recovered from the loss of the Syrian market and some industries had either to move to Syria or to curtail production. The biggest industries are electricity, which produced 130 million kwh. in 1951, and the Chekka cement factory south of Tripoli, which produced 303,000 tons of cement in 1951. Cotton weaving and

3Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1964 M1 Middle East
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1950–1 amounted to £L215·5 million. Over half this deficit was met from 'invisible' earnings, such as the tourist trade and transportation, and the rest from private donations and capital movements. Indeed, during this period Lebanon's balance of payments showed a small surplus of £L2·7 million.[1] Most of Lebanon's trade (about 40 per cent) is with other Middle Eastern countries, but the foremost country in her trade is the United States (about 20 per cent). Europe and Great Britain are important sources of imports but not such large export markets. Lebanon's main imports are agricultural products, textiles, machinery, and oil, and her chief exports are agricultural products and textiles. The tourist industry is given full encouragement by the Government and, under certain circumstances, tourists' fares to Lebanon are subsidized.

Development

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On 24 February 1951 Lebanon signed a Point Four agreement with the United States and the work to be carried out is based on the report to the United Nations in 1949 by Mr Gordon Clapp.[2] Irrigation projects are under way at Akkar, Yamouna, and Qasmiya, and there is a proposal to use the Litani river to irrigate over 12,000 acres of land. In August 1953 the Lebanese Government announced a four-year development plan; the main projects under consideration concern road and hydro-electric power development.

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Conclusion

The future of Syria and Lebanon will obviously depend to some extent on the past, many aspects of which have not been fully discussed here because the independent political and economic development of the countries began only in 1946. In internal politics events have moved too rapidly for any record to keep pace with them, and there is not yet apparent any stability that would allow one to regard views and information on the political scene as being valid for more than a brief period. As regards their external policy, the two countries have yet to be convinced that there is a community of interest between them and the West. The Western Powers need the use of Syrian and Lebanese territory on which to base a line of defence, but it is not expected that these countries could or should bear a significant part of the burden of defence in men, materials, and money. The Levant wants greater security against Israel than

[1] See table 6, p. 505 below.

[2] UN, Conciliation Commission for Palestine (chairman: Gordon Clapp), *Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* (New York, December 1949).

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Chapter VI

SYRIA AND LEBANON

LAND AND POPULATION

S 241 At first sight, the main crop of Syria appears to be thistles, and so it is in fact: about half the land is under fallow every year, and the cultivated land is cropped only one year in two S or even three. There are some districts with intensive cultivation, for instance, the oasis of Damascus, with its brilliant green [312] crops irrigated by 'Abana and Pharphar'; but most of Syria is cultivated very extensively indeed.

S In Syria and Lebanon together the area cultivated before the 311 late war was some 5·8 million acres, but of this total only 242 3,900,000 acres were cropped each year, the remainder being L fallow. The greater part of the cropped area was under cereals, 311 about two-thirds being under wheat and one-third under barley. 242

In Lebanon, the whole of the cultivated area is cropped, and L there is no uncultivated land which could be brought into culti- 311 vation. In Syria however there are large areas of cultivable land which are not at present cultivated, the total cultivable area S being some 12½ million acres, of which only about one-third is 311 under cultivation. Unfortunately this figure is only a rough estimate, and it is not clear how much of the area is cultivable under present conditions, or how much of it is marginal desert grazing. Some of it is undoubtedly cultivable under present conditions, and there is certainly no shortage of land in Syria.

SYRIA: AGRICULTURAL LAND, 1943[1]

Province	*Cultivable*	*Cultivated (including fallow)*
	Acres	*Acres*
Jezira	2,471,000	543,600
Euphrates	3,212,000	321,200
Aleppo	3,706,000	1,260,000
Homs	420,000	345,900
Hama	1,909,000	1,210,000
Damascus	1,062,000	345,900
Hauran	518,600	518,900
TOTAL	12,698,600	4,545,500

[1] Omitting the provinces of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz for which no figures are available; their cultivated area may be estimated at about half a million acres.

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probably few, of the estates are the properties of old, wealthy families of Ottoman times, which still exist in Lebanon, such as the lands belonging to the families of Arslan, Jumblatt, Chehab, Khazen, but many of these have been broken up by the Moslem laws of inheritance. Other estates have originated from direct grants made by Turkish Sultans to influential politicians, as for example the two very large estates in the Beqa and the Litani valley. Others too were formed at the time of the general registration of property undertaken by the Ottoman Government when chiefs of tribes or villages registered tribal land in their names as their private property. Uncertainty about legal title to land gives the educated classes frequent opportunity for ousting peasant owners, and whole villages have come into the possession of rival groups of city notables, as a result of litigation among the villagers who have sought their assistance in establishing their title.

While the land-tenure system is thus a result of peasant poverty, it also perpetuates poverty by standing in the way of any long-term investment. The high percentage of fallow in Syria suggests a great waste of land resources, and there could certainly be some improvement in yields, even in dry land farming, if green crops were introduced more generally into the rotation. But the share-cropper has little incentive to improve the fertility of the land, since he has no certainty of tenure, and since the landlord will take 50 per cent of any increase. Since the landlords are not as a rule directly interested in farming, they do not themselves undertake long-term improvements in the land.

Three case studies illustrate the ways in which the land-tenure system hinders advance.[1]

One study relates to the large estate of Misherfe, near Homs in central Syria. This is 24,000 acres in extent and includes five villages, with 2,500 inhabitants. It is very extensively cultivated, only one-third of the area, 8,000 acres, being cropped each year. The land is divided into three parts, one with wheat, barley or *qatani* (mixed grain), one ploughed but not sown, and one left fallow. A small area, 200 acres only, is irrigated, though water supplies are sufficient to irrigate much larger areas.

[1] These studies, which were prepared for the M.E.S.C., are not at present available in print.

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511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

434 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
409 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
427 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis, with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

i [The estate of Misherfe, near Homs -- Analysis]

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into single units, to form individual farms; but shortage of money limited this process to about 50,000 acres.

About half the area of Syria has been surveyed and title registered by the Bureau de Cadastre. As in Palestine, political unrest made it impossible to survey and register some districts, in particular the Hauran and the Jezira. With this limitation the work of the department appears to have been successful.

Water-Rights. One of the great obstacles to carrying out large-scale irrigation schemes is the confusion which prevails about water-rights. According to an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. in 1943 by Professor Addison, one important scheme, the Yamunne project, could not be initiated, because the complicated question of water-rights had not been settled. Since any big advance in agriculture really depends on irrigation, a settlement of water-rights is essential.

The French authorities have apparently been no more successful in dealing with this question than the British authorities in Palestine and Transjordan. A decree was issued by the High Commissioner in June 1925 nationalizing the water supply, and making all sources of water and water-courses public property; but a further decree in 1926 weakened this wise measure, permitting temporary occupation of water-rights for forty years, so that the result of the legislation has been to increase the confusion.

Control of Irrigation. There is no uniformity of procedure in controlling irrigation schemes, and no central authority controlling irrigation. There are three chief methods of control quite unrelated to each other. These are:

1. The village community in which water-rights are regulated by custom. This appears to be the prevalent method of control in all the village irrigation schemes, of which there are a very large number. Several villages may share in these schemes, and the distribution of water is established between them by custom, and administered by the village authorities. Each owner of land can claim a share in the total water supply measured as a unit of time, for example, one hour every seven days. This method is beginning to prove unsatisfactory. The big owners almost always control the best

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4 irrigated land, and village chiefs can frequently be bribed to
312 leave open irrigation ditches so that their land is better
423 watered. This frequently happens, for example, in the Ghuta of Damascus, where there is no unified plan for the irrigation
9 of the district and no authority which can enforce the custom-
312 ary rights.
423

2. The system under which water is owned collectively, or as *Waqf*, in the northern Beqa.

3. Private ownership by large landowners. This is usual in the Lebanon where there are a number of small private schemes.

These methods of control apply to the smaller schemes. Large-scale schemes have been operated either by:

1. Private concession. Only one relatively large-scale concession is actually in operation, the Nahr Ibrahim (Adonis) scheme.
2. The State. State-controlled works have been carried out by
   (i) authorities directly under the control of the French authorities;
   (ii) authorities directly under the control of the Lebanese Public Works Ministry;
   (iii) Lebanese or Syrian authorities under the control of the Délégation Générale.

There is great need of a central authority to co-ordinate the supply of water. In the south Beqa, for instance, much irrigable land is left unirrigated and much water allowed to run to waste for lack of such an authority.

9 *State Land.* One of the main reasons for the lack of intensive
423 cultivation in central Syria is that the State lands have never
166 been systematically settled. Very large areas are State domain, that is, land registered as the property of the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid. Under the mandate, this land became the property of the local government. Under the Turks these lands were used for the 'displaced persons' of the old Empire, who were driven out when Turkish territory was lost, but they were still sparsely settled when the French took over.

9 After the rising of 1925 the French authorities began to settle
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better cultivation, if more machinery were available, to reduce the fallow to one year out of two, instead of two out of three in the districts where this is customary; it would also be possible, by machine cultivation, to keep weeds under control. (See Chapter VIII.)

The main possibilities of development, however, depend on irrigation. At present an area of some 500,000 acres is irrigated, and even under the existing scheme much water is wasted. How much additional land could be irrigated is a subject for controversy. Mr Soubhi Mazloum, a Syrian irrigation engineer, suggests that the total area which could be irrigated, including the use of the Euphrates water, may be as large as 1,200,000 hectares (2,960,000 acres):[1] but this figure refers to the area which it is *physically* possible to irrigate, not the area which could be irrigated with any prospect of economic return.

A more exact and detailed estimate was prepared by Professor Addison, the irrigation expert, who surveyed existing schemes in 1943 and considered that the extension of these which was then economically practicable would irrigate some 68,000 hectares (168,000 acres) in addition to the area already irrigated.

The difference between these two estimates indicates how wide a range of opinion there is. A survey is now being prepared by a British irrigation firm on behalf of the Syrian Government, to provide the basis of development projects, and pending its publication it is impossible to quote any more satisfactory estimates.

The Jezira and Euphrates Provinces. In inner Syria, the Jezira area and part of the Euphrates province in the north-eastern corner of the country, there are quite large possibilities of extending cultivation both in the rain-fed zone, and by irrigation. North of a line from Tiyne to Sheikh Saleh there is sufficient rainfall to water the winter crops. In the 'Duck's Bill' and along the Turkish frontier to a depth of about 12 miles to Derbisiye, the rainfall is 50 to 100 centimetres per year (20–40 inches), and south of this there is another belt with rainfall of 25 to 50 centimetres (10–20 inches), about 50 miles wide.[2]

[1] 'Le Problème de l'Eau au Liban et en Syrie', in *L'Agriculture, Richesse Nationale*, (Beirut, 1942).

[2] This information is based on an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. in 1944.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

311 Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of 233 means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

162 The population at present numbers 111,900, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there 423 has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

471 In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently 312 been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into 425 the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

427 The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth 464 of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of [407] machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

464 Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricul- 511 tural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer 164 from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the 146 agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

000 Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

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POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope for widening the area cultivated and raising the yields, as the soil is fertile. In the Jezira the use of machinery could be extended—it is already increasing fast. Better livestock production could be achieved by greater use of fodder crops for which conditions are favourable: in the 'Duck's Bill' good clover grows wild. At present fodder crops are not considered worth cultivating.

In the Euphrates region there is great scope for extension of irrigation. But a large scale scheme would be costly because the river runs between high escarpments, which vary in distance between each other up to about 10 miles. To irrigate much larger areas it would be necessary to lift water over the escarpments. There are large areas of uncultivated land, particularly between Abu Kemal and Deir-ez-Zor. Even on the land already cultivated yields of wheat could be much higher: at present the yield is four to six times the seeding rate, and, according to local farmers, could be raised to ten to fifteen times the seed with better irrigation. The high cost of fuel oil is the limiting factor as it also is for tractor work. On the Khabur river improvement of the ancient barrages would permit an extension of irrigation.

It is in this area that there is real scope for a planned settlement of cultivators, with improved methods and a better system of land tenure. The obvious form for such settlement to take would be on the model of the Jewish co-operative farms, small holdings with collective use of machinery and working to a cropping plan; on the uncultivated land such settlement could be undertaken without incurring high capital costs.

So far as the Euphrates Valley is concerned, similar co-operatives based on communal control of water supplies might be started on a small scale. Large-scale irrigation here would be costly, and would necessarily have to be co-ordinated with the irrigation of Iraq. An immediate step needed is to reduce the price of fuel oil.

While it is easy on paper to see the possibilities of such schemes as these, it is not easy to see where in fact the motive power for them is to come from. They will not bring in quick big returns, which are what local farmers and landowners want: the district is remote and the main object of such investment would be a long period rise in the standard of living, in which the moneyed classes are not interested. Present-day Syria is not

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241 possibilities for expanding the total area under cultivation, for improving and increasing irrigation, and for increasing productivity through research and education. They also point to needed improvements in agricultural equipment, in agricultural credit, and in the land tenure system.

241 311 Although estimates vary as to the amount of new land which can be brought into cultivation, all agree that it is possible to double the present planted acreage. Cultivation could be extended in some dry-land areas with improved rotation and fertilization, but in most cases new land can be brought into cultivation only by extending irrigation.

IRRIGATION

241 312 Information which the United States Legation at Damascus has prepared from reports of the Syrian Ministry of Public Works indicates a total of about 2.4 million acres under irrigation at the present time, of which approximately 60 per cent is from gravity flow and the remainder from pumps of various sorts. Some of the Ministry's data are said to be based on actual surveys, some on interviews, and some simply on estimates. This 2.4 million

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The most common system of irrigation in the new cotton areas of the Jezira is to draw water like this from streams with pumps powered by diesel engines. The number of pumps in Syria has doubled since 1950.

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is a very high figure, representing more than 50 per cent of the total land under cultivation, and the United States Agricultural Attache is inclined to believe that the Ministry's figures include the total area served by irrigation systems, whether or not all the land receives water each year. 241 312

There are no large-scale irrigation works in Syria. State and local governments have constructed and now maintain a number of small dams, diversions, and canals, but the total area served by these public works in 1951 was only 100,000 acres. Several other projects, scheduled for completion within the next three or four years, will increase the area under public works another 100,000 acres. Most of these projects are being financed by the federal government out of its regular budget. 312 653

By far the largest area is served by small diversions operated by individuals. The next largest and fastest growing area under irrigation is that served by mechanical pumps. The number of pumps doubled from 1950 to 1951 and the area irrigated increased three times. These pumps are used mostly for drawing water from streams. 312

In the absence of detailed surveys, accurate estimates as to how much water might be available from all sources are impossible to obtain. Draining the Ghab Swamps on the Orontes River west of Aleppo to bring another 100,000 acres into cultivation is now being studied by a Dutch engineering firm, and a large dam on the Euphrates River to impound water in sufficient volume to serve an additional 750,000 acres is under consideration. Several million acres of land along the Euphrates River probably are suitable for cultivation from the standpoint of soil if water becomes available. At the present time irrigation along the Euphrates is limited to the low-lying land between the banks of the river. Through the centuries the river has cut a bed from a half mile to as much as 10 miles wide through the plain, which is now 30 to 50 feet above the water level. It has proved too expensive for individuals to use pumps to pull the water from the river for irrigation.

The same general condition prevails on the main tributary of the Euphrates, the Kabur. Numerous pumps have been installed along the Kabur, and a gravity system in the north, operated by a small dam and canals, is being extended under a current program. It is possible the water could be adequate to extend the gravity system slightly in the southern reaches of the river.

Water might be diverted also from the Tigris River which runs across the northeastern border of Syria. Extensive use of water from any of these international rivers, however, very likely would involve agreements with neighboring countries. Additional water might be provided also by the other rivers in the country. All of these proposals involve tremendously expensive projects beyond the means of the country to finance without outside help.

CAPITAL AND CREDIT

The highly nationalistic attitude of the Syrians damages the chances of private industry's securing a foreign loan. A recent law requiring all foreign operations to have Syrian managers and at least 50 per cent Syrian capital, together with the questionable security, makes sizable foreign investments unlikely. Under these conditions any foreign loans probably will be made to the government. The Syrian Government has made an obvious point of not obligating itself to another foreign power, and it is unlikely it will accept 471 186 648

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COTTON IN SYRIA

production, conserve water, concentrate cotton so as to facilitate insect control, and protect the cotton industry against the high costs and low prices that might result from over-extension of production. Farmers are required also to receive licenses to plant cotton from the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cotton Board. 656 647 248

The only marketing regulations issued to date require that all bales show the name of the ginner, the identity, and especially the moisture content of the cotton, which cannot be more than 9 per cent. If false claims are made, the government can take 30 per cent of the cotton as a penalty. [442]

It is obvious that the enforcement of so many scientific regulations and controls over a large area is going to be difficult without a large force of trained technicians and police.

The Director General appreciates that without adequate trained personnel it is not possible to make the regulations completely effective overnight, but he hopes, through education, to obtain the compliance of the producers.

Ambitious research and education programs, another responsibility of the board, are still in the planning stage. [654]

PROSPECTS

It appears unlikely to expect any significant expansion in production in Syria until yields can be stabilized. A start has been made, but a more intensive research and education program is required on cultural practices (particularly irrigation practices), mechanization, and especially insect control, before much improvement can be expected. Such efforts naturally take considerable time, even when funds and technical assistance are available. Both money and know-how are limited in Syria. 248

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

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SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organization.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

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Wells

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Wells may belong to private individuals or they may be the property of the tribe. Ownership is based on the construction of the wells. The custom varies from place to place but, generally speaking, the person or tribe who has dug the well has primary rights over it. Should he not be using it, other people may do so.

Natural and Artificial Basins

Natural basins are freely used by all. Artificial basins are owned by a person or tribe. Persons other than the owners may be authorised to use these basins against the payment of a fee.

SYRIA

Water Rights

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Water generally belongs to the owner of the land on which it is located. In areas where water is scarce, however, land and water can be sold and rented separately.

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In Soukhne, along the Euphrates, water sellers may be paid in money or in goods. The owners of small hydraulic enterprises (motor pumps, etc.) on the Euphrates are often paid by the farmers with half of their harvest for the water they furnish even though the cost of irrigation amounts to no more than 8 to 10 percent of the yield.

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According to custom, important personalities have water rights superior to those of the common people. Such rights, sometimes taken by force, are often no more than usage rights which do not imply the real ownership of a spring or a river.

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Ownership of water can be private or collective. Private ownership is rare and applies only to springs or wells of no great importance. It is to be found in densely-populated districts of the Mediterranean slope or in the cultivated steppes. Small gardens irrigated in this way are often individually set up by farmers or wealthy citizens as an investment of their capital. Such gardens are called <u>boustins</u>.

Collective property belongs to the state, to a village or a community. The present legislation provides that all water be owned by the state. Villages, however, also possess hydraulic resources. Occasionally a community is the sole owner of a spring or a water course, while in other cases such ownership is divided among neighboring communities. Old local customs which vary according to regions and communities regulate the distribution of such waters. 312 421

Water Distribution

Among Members of the Same Community

If water is abundant with respect to the surface to be irrigated, each user takes what he needs with little consideration for his neighbor. The only limit set up by custom is that the water level on the irrigated surface may not exceed ankle height.

If the flow of water is insufficient with respect to the size of the land to be irrigated, the regulation becomes more complicated. In the rare case where custom does not apply, everyone protects his crops against drought as well as he can. Generally, however, custom guarantees every plot of land a portion of that quantity of water used by the community and which may vary during the year. This portion consists of water taken from a spring or a canal and supplied during a certain period of time (every week, every fortnight, etc.) according to the duration of the rotation period (addâne) which varies, according to the localities, between seven and 32 days.

Time Calculations

The methods of calculating time vary from region to region. Watches, sun dials and hour glasses (keilé) are used. At Kariattein the rotation period (addâne) lasts 15 days, and water agreements are concluded in "Roman hours." These correspond to three hours and are divided into 40 nisariyes. The nisariyé corresponds to four minutes and thirty seconds. 312 805

In Nabeck Ghouta there are two water turns, one during the day and the other at night. The entire rotation period lasts twelve days. Water portions are calculated in "local"

312 805 hours, that is the twelfth part of an addîna. During the equinox, the local day hour is equal to the local night hour and corresponds to a 60 minute flow of water. In winter, however, the local hour is equivalent to more than three and one-half night hours and to less than two and one-half day hours.

In Damascus Ghouta water distribution is particularly complicated.

Water Policy

312 A very strict discipline generally rules water diversions for gardens. The communities elect a "water master," generally the moukhar who has administrative functions in the village and who is assisted by water guards called chaouis. These latter supervise the draining system, control the barrages and make certain that no owner abuses his water rights.

Among Different Villages

312 621 Such distribution is accomplished in numerous ways. Occasionally each village uses the water according to its own wishes without considering the damage possibly caused to the villages downstream. Such is the case with the water of the El-Awadj (Wadi el-Ajam) near Damascus. Here an enormous amount of water is lost to the villages downstream because of the intense evaporation in summer and the infiltrations into the basaltic regions upstream. The same thing occurs in the villages of Khazrajié and Makroussa.

In other cases, custom assigns the whole or part of the water to each village during a certain period only. In such cases a rotation period is set up between the villages similar to that within the communities. Thus, the water of the Mnîn is assigned for four days to Mnîn, six days to Tell, one day to Hourné and four days to Barzé.

Modern Water Distribution

312 804 Water is distributed with mathematical precisioness only in those regions which are being irrigated according to modern irrigation plans. Territories thus irrigated with the water of the Orontes are those in the communities north of Homs such as Douaïr, Deir Bâlbé, etc.

Since water supplies are precisely known and are constant throughout the year due to the regulating barrage of Homs Lake, it is possible to calculate exactly the quantity of water each hectare shall receive. This quantity is established at 0 liters 20 seconds per hectare. 312 804

The total rotation period consists of seven days, and each hectare of irrigated land receives every week about 01.20 x 60 x 60 x 24 x 7 or 121 m^3. More detailed sub-divisions are foreseen. The irrigation service determines the duration of the water turns. The official time is that shown by the town hall clock of Homs. This system, however, is complex and needs a qualified staff of engineers, controllers and canal guards. It is still the exception in Syria.

Water Rights in Palmyra

The district of Palmyra receives its water from deep thermal and surface springs. The water is transported by underground canals (*fogarra*) which have existed since Roman times and which are necessary to prevent evaporation due to the dryness of the air at Palmyra. They vary from two to six kilometers in length. 312

Water Distribution

This is on a time basis, rotation turns depending on the supply, the number of gardens which are to be watered and the number of persons entitled to water. In Palmyra the turns vary from 12 days in the summer to 18 days in the winter. 312 805

Water Rights

These may be sold. The origin of the water titles is lost in history due to the antiquity of the hydraulic works. 312 423

Since there was no effective government during the last century, water became the property of third parties independently of land ownership. Toward the end of the century the government received no taxes from Palmyra and ceded the main thermal spring to a certain El-Hassan of the Saad family who lived at Homs and to whom persons drawing water paid 80 piasters per hour of watering. For a long time, water rights were the only type of communal property and

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measured the financial well-being of the community.

The number of owners of water rights increased in the course of time as the conveyance of titles and the inheritance of rights increased. By 1922, two-thirds of the village owned water rights, with the remaining one-third having to purchase such rights.

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In 1923, according to G. Carle, 1/ the time turns were calculated by means of an hour glass which required almost one hour (actually 52 minutes) to empty, a special person being appointed to calculate the time of the turns.

TUNISIA

Water Rights at Tozeur 2/

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This oasis derives its water from one wadi and two springs. The water is first divided by a horizontally-placed trunk of a palm tree laid perpendicular to the current and notched with markings equal in number to the desired divisions of water. Further subdivisions are made for secondary redistribution. These vary greatly in number because they can be changed by arrangements made between the persons entitled to water rights following the sale, exchange or inheritance thereof. Only the main divisions of the wadi water turns, up to the twenty-first turn, are fixed, and they are the basis of the entire water distribution system.

Water Distribution

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The system here is based on a time schedule. The unit of time for the distribution (*saiola*) corresponds to the time required for a vase full of water, pierced with holes at the bottom, to be emptied (five minutes or one-twelfth of an hour). The hour is also often calculated from the length of a man's shadow which is measured in feet.

1/Carle, G., L'Hydraulique Agricole et Industrielle en Syrie.
2/Masselot, F. "Les Battiers des Oasis du Djerid." Bulletin de la Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, du Commerce, et de la Colonisation de la Régence de Tunis, pp. 137-142.

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The Aqueduct Construction Agency in Italian East Africa

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This agency was set up by the law of 1939 to construct, maintain and use water conduits and to set up other operations relating to the water supply and sanitation facilities of population centers. Several banks were members of this body, and an annual government contribution of 20,000,000 lire was provided. Another decree of the same date approved the constitution of this organization.

SYRIA

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Syrian water legislation has followed the same evolution as that of Lebanon. During the period of the Ottoman Empire, the articles of the Mejelle Code governed waters. Under the period of the French mandate, the two orders concerning public domain - No. 144/S dated 10 June 1925 and No. 320/S dated 26 May 1926, as well as Legislative Decree No. 288 dated 28 November 1942 which amended Article 25 of No. 320/S - both applied to Syria and Lebanon. These two decrees are still in force in Syria and have already been analyzed in the section of this paper relating to Lebanon. Since Syria became completely independent, however, two new legislative decrees have partially amended or repealed a few articles of the preceding rules concerning water.

New Code of Liabilities

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This new code of liabilities, enacted by Legislative Decree No. 148 dated 22 June 1949, stipulates, in Articles 731 to 735, penalties for infraction of clauses on water and has supplemented the above-mentioned order No. 144/S. These articles state:

"Imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine up to 250 Syrian pounds, or both, is inflicted upon any person who, without special authorization, commits the following:

1. "the exploitation of underground water or artesian wells, unless it is intended to dig new wells on private property to a depth less than 150 meters;

2. "the execution of any excavations near water canal borders or any drainage systems at a distance less than

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the depth of those excavations, in any case at a distance less than three meters;

3. "the taking of any stones, earth, sand, trees, shrubs or plants from river banks, from permanent or temporary canals or from lakes, ponds or swamps;

4. "the planting of trees or seeds or the placing of anything on the shores of lakes, ponds or swamps, on permanent or temporary canal banks, on passages in between, on any drainage systems or on any authorized, constructed public utility pipes;

5. "the infraction of any sort on the shore of any water source, on permanent or temporary river canals, on swamps, ponds or lakes, on the river canal borders or on public utility drainage pipes;

6. "the prevention of the free flowing of public water;

7. "any permanent or temporary action affecting the quantity and flowing capacity of water (Article 731).

"Any person who, without authorization, organizes new permanent or temporary water canals, or deepens or fills in those already in existence shall be fined according to the provisions or the previous article (Article 732).

"Two years in prison and a fine of 250 Syrian pounds are imposed on any person who destroys or converts all or any of the permanent water establishments with the intent of benefiting from these public waters (Article 733).

"The same fine is imposed on any person who:

1. "throws into any authorized water canal any liquids or materials harmful to public health or the free flowing of the water;

2. "spreads animal manure on any of the land situated within the area delimited by the government for the safeguarding of any water source;

3. "causes any destructive action such as dirtying water sources used for drinking (Article 734).

"Anyone who intentionally dirties any drinking water source is to be imprisoned for from one to three years and shall pay a fine of from 25 to 300 Syrian pounds" (Article 735). 671 312 681

New Taxation on Irrigated Lands

A new legislative decree, No. 34 dated 30 December 1951, amends Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of law No. 467 dated 21 February 1949 which imposed an annual tax on land irrigated by state irrigation systems. The new decree reads as follows: 312 651

"This tax is applied per hectare in the following manner:

Area of Irrigated Land	Khabour Hadrib and Senn Irrigation System	Kasa and Hama Irrigation System	Hathh Irrigation System
	L.S.	L.S.	L.S.
Up to 5 hectares	20	15	5
From 5 to 25 hectares	25	20	7.5
From 25 to 50 hectares	40	30	10
Over 50 hectares	50	40	15

"Such tax shall be reduced by half after a lapse of ten years from its first year of application.

"It should be calculated on the whole area held by the taxpayer, whether individually or in partnership with others, with reference to the land irrigated by one and the same irrigation system. The tax on a fraction of a hectare shall be proportionate to the tax on a whole hectare.

"The tax shall take effect on the first day of the year following the year in which the water is brought to the land subject to the tax, even though such water has not been used.

"The term 'Engineer-in-Chief of the region' in Article 8 of Law No. 467 shall be replaced by 'Engineer-in-chief of the hydraulics service of the region' (Article 2).

"The following paragraph is added to Article 6 of Law 467:

61: Capsules 3-4 (no date) 1964 M1 Middle East
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'In regions where there has been neither delimitations nor survey, the areas to be taxed shall be determined on the basis of the taxpayers' declarations and the investigations by such services. Investigation expenses shall be fixed, where necessary, by decision of the Ministry of Finance." (Article 3).

"The provisions of this legislative decree shall come into force on 1 January 1952 and shall have effect as of that date with respect to land exempted by previous legislation (Article 4).

"This legislative decree shall be published and communicated as and where necessary" (Article 5).

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The basic Tunisian legislation actually in force on water is the following:

1. The decree of 24 September 1885 defining public domain.

2. The decree of 24 May 1920 setting up a special water service with an agricultural and industrial hydraulic fund and a water committee.

3. The decree of 5 August 1933 definitely codifying the conservation and utilisation of waters of the public domain and its succeeding amendments (the decrees of 11 May 1935 and 26 November 1936).

4. Other provisions concerning the fees due for the utilisation of public domain waters (the orders of 5 June 1935 and 21 February 1938) and concerning the organization of hydraulic associations (the decrees of 30 July 1936 and 17 March 1939).

According to the decree of 24 September 1885, the public domain consists of:

1. watercourses of all types and the lands included in their embankments;

2. springs of all kinds;

variation exists between the living conditions of the more prosperous farmers and of the peasants, many of the latter possessing little beyond the barest necessities.

The larger cities, as Damascus and Aleppo, have been important junctions on trade routes from India to the Mediterranean for centuries, and reflect the influence of both Eastern and Western civilizations. They are a combination of the old Arab-type city and the modern, with most of the amenities of urban life. The older sections are usually made up of several quarters, dominated by different racial or religious groups. The houses are constructed of stone, brick or reinforced concrete and stucco, with flat or tiled roofs. In Damascus, about one third of the inhabitants live within the limits of the ancient city and a third in the modern residential developments.

The Bedouin follow essentially the same pattern of life in Syria as in other countries of the Near and Middle East. The nomadic tribes dwell in tents made of goats' hair, usually in close association with their livestock. Their standards of living are primitive, both in the tent encampments and the semipastoral settlements.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

Water supplies are deficient in many sections of the country, and acute shortages may be experienced during the dry season. In the rural areas, domestic supplies are obtained from deep or shallow wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from rain-water cisterns. *Korazes,* or wells connected by underground conduits which often extend for several miles, and waterholes, dug in the plains or near watercourses, are used in some districts. The village supplies are frequently polluted and responsible for the spread of intestinal infections.

The water supply of Damascus is taken from an underground reservoir at 'Ain el Fije, which is fed by springs in the Anti-

312 Lebanon mountains. It flows by gravity through tunnels to the waterworks in the city, from which it is distributed to the individual houses or, in the more congested districts, to public fountains. The overflow
312 is discharged into the Barada River. The
364 supply is not treated, but its purity is checked daily at 'Ain el Fije, and samples are submitted twice a week to the government laboratories for bacteriologic and chemical examination. The water of the Barada River is no longer used for domestic purposes, being reserved for other municipal requirements.

Untreated water from a spring-fed reservoir supplies the city of Aleppo. The present supply is inadequate, and plans have been projected to conduct water from the Euphrates River to a plant near Aleppo, where it will be treated by sedimentation and
312 chlorination before distribution. Hama obtains most of its supply from wells linked by tunnels, but part of the town depends upon an ancient system in which the water
312 is lifted from the Orontes River by means
406 of huge water wheels and distributed in open overhead aqueducts. These wheels, or *na'ouras*, are operated by the force of the current and collect the water in buckets attached at intervals around their circumference. They are often utilized in small irrigation works, where the river is situated below the level of the surrounding plain.

312 Simple methods of irrigation are practiced in many districts bordering the larger rivers. The Al Ghouta, or oasis of Damascus, has been irrigated by the Barada River and its tributaries for centuries: some of the canals have undoubtedly existed since
312 Roman times. Pumps are sometimes em-
406 ployed in the Al Jazira region, while *na'ouras* are common in certain sections along the banks of the Orontes, the Eu-
312 phrates and the Khabour rivers. Several large irrigation projects have recently been undertaken under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture. These include the irrigation of over 35,000 acres in the Homs-Hama region and the drainage of portions

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of the Muzeirib swamp lands along the headwaters of the Yarmuk River. The resettlement program in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins, which is controlled by a separate governmental organization, calls for the irrigation of extensive areas. Between 20,000 and 30,000 acres had been opened up through irrigation in 1951. Work on the drainage and the irrigation of the Ghab marshes, covering about 100,000 acres in the Orontes river valley northwest of Hama, was started in 1952. 312 311 312

Waste Disposal

Sewerage systems are available in all the larger cities. The sewage is not treated, however, and the effluent is usually discharged into adjacent watercourses or upon the land for irrigation purposes. In unsewered sections, cesspools are employed in connection with the houses. The methods of sewage disposal are universally primitive in the rural districts. In villages near the larger cities, pit or shallow latrines are frequently found in the individual compounds or provided on a community basis. In the more remote areas and in the poorer villages, pollution of the soil is the general practice. The use of night soil for fertilizer is common in the agricultural communities. 314

Fauna and Flora

Arthropods. Mosquitoes. Nine species of anopheline mosquitoes have been reported from Syria, three of which—*Anopheles superpictus*, *A. sacharovi* (— *A. elutus*) and *A. claviger* (— *A. bifurcatus*)—are of major importance in the transmission of malaria. *A. pulcherrimus*, *A. hyrcanus*, *A. algeriensis* and *A. sergenti* are of minor and local significance, while *A. marteri* and *A. multicolor* are rare. 136 164

A. superpictus is widely distributed. It is a prominent vector of malaria in the coastal plains, in the northwestern highland districts and in the river valleys, but is of secondary interest in the Damascus region. It breeds along the margins of the larger rivers and on the edges of mountain streams 136

highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 744 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[40] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 232 164

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SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number.

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda.

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent."

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases.

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex-

cept in the vicinity of the principal rivers. 312
Domestic supplies are derived from wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from water holes or rain-water cisterns. Untreated 312
piped water supplies serve all or parts of 364
the larger towns. The municipal supplies of Damascus and Aleppo are controlled for purity, but contamination is frequent in the smaller communities. Sewerage systems are available in the chief cities, but the methods of sewage disposal are generally primitive in towns and villages. The standards of nutrition vary, depending upon the economic 146
and the social conditions in different regions. Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are widespread, but serious deficiency diseases are encountered only among limited population groups.

The most prominent disease problems are 164
malaria, trachoma and dysentery, both amebic and bacillary. Enteric fevers, tuberculosis, helminthiasis and skin infections are prevalent. Venereal diseases are widely distributed, while bejel is endemic among the nomadic and the seminomadic peoples of the northeastern provinces. Hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, and leprosy exist in scattered foci. Localized outbreaks of cholera were reported in 1947-48, the first in 20 years. Vaccination against smallpox is com- 751
pulsory, but sporadic cases and occasional epidemics are recorded. Outbreaks of louse- 164
borne typhus are recurrent, while sporadic cases are reported almost annually. Small outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever have coincided with regional epidemics. Measles and the common respiratory infections are endemic, and frequently epidemic. Cutaneous leishmaniasis, brucellosis, rabies, tetanus, anthrax, dengue fever and sandfly fever are endemic. Meningococcus meningitis, diphtheria, plague, tick-borne relapsing fever and murine typhus are sporadic. Recognized cases of scarlet fever and poliomyelitis are apparently rare. Doubtful cases of tick-borne typhus and kala-azar have been described.

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Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

Agriculture

During the post-war period both agricultural and industrial output increased rapidly, and although population growth was fairly large there seems little doubt that per capita output rose significantly. 1/ Similarly, although data are very scanty, there is evidence of an increase in consumption and an improvement in the standard of living. 2/ 433 511

In agriculture, the increase in output was achieved by extending the acreage of cereals and greatly expanding that of cotton; there was also some improvement in methods of cultivation, especially in cotton. The total cultivated area increased from 2,314,000 hectares in 1946/47 to 3,668,000 in 1952/53. 3/ the irrigated area increased more rapidly, from 257,000 hectares 4/ to 400,000 hectares. 5/ The proportion of fallow land seems to have remained unchanged, at one-third of the total. It may therefore be taken that the crop area increased by about 60 per cent. 241 311

The increase in the irrigated area was achieved partly by the irrigation projects discussed below, partly by installation by farmers of pumps drawing on river or underground water. In 1953, there were 7,500 pumps, of which 40 per cent were for river water and 60 per cent for underground water. The extension of rainfed crops was achieved mainly by mechanization. In 1953 there were 1,200 tractors, compared with 860 in 1951 and about 300 in 1948; 1,307 tractor ploughs, compared 312 241

1/ National income is estimated to have risen from 1,250 million Syrian pounds in 1950 to £1,410 million in 1953; during that period, the index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus (1949 = 100) fell from 111 to 110. See Sami Wafa el Dajani, "al dakhl al Qauni fi Suria", Al Abhath, (Beirut, December 1953); Ministry of Agriculture, A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria, and Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953 (Damascus, 1954). A breakdown for 1950 shows that 44 per cent of the total was contributed by agriculture and animal husbandry, 13 per cent by commerce, 10 per cent by industry, 9 per cent by transport and communications, 17 per cent by government services, 5 per cent by rents and 11 per cent by other activities (Dajani, op.cit.).

2/ Per capita annual consumption of cotton, woollen and rayon fibres is estimated to have risen from 4.2 kilogrammes in 1951 to 4.6 kilogrammes in 1952 and 5.1 in 1953; the figure for Lebanon and Syria combined had previously risen from 3.9 kilogrammes in 1948 to 4.8 kilogrammes in 1950 (Food and Agriculture Organization, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Rome, January 1955). Output of tobacco products increased from an average of 1,638 tons in 1945-47 to 2,075 tons in 1950, 2,448 in 1952 and 2,659 in 1953.

3/ Bureau des documentations Syriennes et Arabes, La Syrie économique, 1953 (Damascus, 1954), mimeographed.

4/ Sir Alexander Gibb, Economic Development of Syria (London, 1947).

5/ Of these, some 250,000 hectares were irrigated by flow and 150,000 hectares by pumps.

Development projects

652 During the period 1945 to 1952, inclusive, Government expenditure on development totalled £S 301.4 million. Of this £S 115 million was spent through the budget, £S 59.5 million was provided from the Reserve Fund, and £S 126.8 million came from loans made by the bank of issue. 1/ The 1954 budget provided £S 71.6 million for development, of which £S 17.2 million were to be spent through the ordinary budget and the balance to come from various extra-budgetary sources. The preliminary cost of projects under study was put at £S 400 million. 1/ Budget appropriations have been spent by Government departments, but projects financed by extra-budgetary expenditure have generally been carried out by special boards created for the purpose. 2/ No foreign financial assistance has been received by Syria.

Agriculture, irrigation and power

652 241 312 Budgetary expenditure on agriculture and irrigation from 1945 to 1952 totalled £S 37.9 million, of which £S 25.3 million went to irrigation and the balance to land survey, agricultural schools, model farms, agricultural and veterinary centres and other projects. Extra-budgetary expenditures included £S 5.7 million for irrigation, £S 21.3 million for increasing the capital of the Agricultural Bank, and £S 6.0 million for pest control.

The largest completed irrigation project is that on the Orontes River, in the Homs-Hama region, which irrigates 22,000 hectares. Further works are under study to irrigate an additional 20,000 hectares upstream; their cost has been estimated at about £S 20 million. Other recently completed projects include that on the Quweiq River, south of Aleppo, which irrigates 15,000 hectares and provides flood control, and the project on the Mzerib, a tributary of the Yarmuk River, which irrigates 2,500 hectares; possibilities for extending both schemes are under study. Irrigation works on the Khabur River, in El Jezira, are very near completion; they have cost £S 9 million and will irrigate 9,000 hectares; considerable further expansion in this scheme is possible and preliminary studies have been made.

Other projects nearing completion include the drainage of the Rouj swamps, near Idlib; the project also provides for the irrigation of 4,000 hectares and the generation of electric power; total costs are put at £S 4 million and completion is scheduled for 1956. The Sinn River project, on the coast south of

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1/ Awad Barakat "Recent Economic Developments in Syria", Middle East Economic Papers, 1954 (Beirut, 1954).

2/ The most important items of expenditure not discussed in this section are £S 33 million for supplying Aleppo with drinking water from the Euphrates, a project which was scheduled for completion in 1954; £S 33 million advanced to municipalities, for water, electricity and public buildings; £S 9.5 million advanced to nationalized electricity companies; £S 26.7 million for Government buildings; £S 8 million for hospitals and clinics, and £S 5.4 million for schools.

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Latakia, is to irrigate 5,000 hectares at a cost of £S 2.6 million; the scheme should be completed by the end of 1955. Projects under study include a scheme on the Barada River, near Damascus, to irrigate 5,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 1[illegible],000 kilowatts, at a total estimated cost of £S 12 million; the Yusef Pasha dam, on the Euphrates, which would extend irrigation by 100,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 45,000 kilowatts, at an estimated cost of £S 150 million; and a small multi-purpose project on the Kabir River, north of Latakia.

The most important project under way is that on the Ghab, on the Orontes north of Hama. The objective is to reclaim by drainage some 26,000 hectares of land and to irrigate by gravity a total area of 65,000 hectares, 43,000 of which had not been irrigated before.

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The project also includes the building of four hydroelectric stations, with a capacity of 20,600 kilowatts and an estimated annual output of 80 million kilowatt hours; a thermic generator with a capacity of 9,500 kilowatts; and 700 kilometres of roads. Total costs, exclusive of electric installations, are estimated at £S 140 million, of which £S 45 million are for drainage, £S 55 million for irrigation and £S 37 million for roads and bridges. The hydroelectric plants are estimated to cost another £S 17 million and the thermic plant £S 7.6 million. The Government expects to recover its outlay on the scheme by selling, for an estimated £S 150 million, 30,000 hectares of land which it owns in the region and by levying a small irrigation fee. The scheme is expected to raise gross agricultural income by £S 91 million and net income by £S 78 million. Completion is scheduled for 1960. 1/

The Ghab Project Administration was established in 1951, and in 1953 it was authorized to borrow £S 25 million from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, at 2 per cent interest. A firm of Netherlands consultants, hired by the Government to prepare an over-all plan for the Ghab, presented its report in May 1953. In September 1953 a contract was awarded to a Yugoslav firm for the deepening of the Orontes channel, at a cost of £S 3.3 million. It is expected that contracts for other parts of the project will be awarded soon.

The total area of irrigation projects recently completed or approaching completion is 57,000 hectares and that of schemes planned but not yet begun is 278,000. The total irrigable area, including that at present irrigated, is estimated at 750,000 hectares. 2/.

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The total cultivable area in Syria is put at 5 million hectares, of which one million are at present not cultivated, while 1.6 million are left fallow each year under the prevailing triennial rotation. Present plans call for intensifying production by using leguminous crops to replace the period of fallow,

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1/ "The Ghab Project", by Abdel Basit Khatib, Director General of the Ghab Project Administration (mimeographed document, Damascus, October 23, 1954). See also Abdel Basit Khatib Mashru al Ghab (Damascus, October 1953).

2/ Souhbi Mazloum, "Les Irrigations en Syrie", Annual Bulletin of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1953, and "Al mashari al mais fi Suria", Al Hayat, 31 July 1954 (Beirut).

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

wholly barren land or of range land with arboreous shrubs. Of the balance probably only about 60,000 hectares can be characterized as more or less dense forest.

The mission has already recommended an aerial survey of the forest areas in the province of Latakia. This would be a first step in the appraisal of existing resources and the delimitation and protection of forest reserves. An FAO specialist has for some time been advising the government on a forestry program. The mission can only recommend that action along the lines which he has proposed be undertaken as soon as possible. Any program should focus in the first instance on safeguarding forest areas against uncontrolled cutting, shifting cultivation, excessive grazing, fire, insects, erosion and other hazards which have inflicted considerable damage in the past. A more effective forestry law which was drafted by a committee in 1953 should be promptly enacted for this purpose. To protect the forests and supervise their exploitation a field service of four foresters and 42 rangers should be built up by 1960. The necessary forest rangers will have to be trained either at a secondary forestry school which may be established in cooperation with the FAO to serve the countries in the Near East or at a special training school which might be added to the existing Bugua Agricultural School near Latakia. Within the Ministry of Agriculture a staff of five foresters and 10 rangers should be available to direct the necessary survey, research and reforestation work; and two foresters will be necessary to supervise forest nurseries.

Once adequate protection of forests has been established, reforestation can proceed. The three existing nurseries and two new ones recently established should be able to produce about 3 million seedlings yearly. The mission considers it important, however, that government nurseries be also in a position to supply trees for planting in farming areas. Although such trees as poplars are extensively grown as cash crops in certain irrigated regions, most farming areas are virtually treeless. The planting of a belt of trees around new village settlements should be an integral part of any settlement program. Farmers should be assisted to establish their own wood lots and to plant trees along roads. This would help to meet the acute shortage of timber for fuel and building, provide some protection against wind and make settlements more attractive. The mission therefore suggests that five additional small nurseries be established, particularly in the provinces of Jezireh and Euphrates, to supply trees for such purposes.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

139 659 313 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

428 166 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant proprietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60% respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 166 241 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experimental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

way of Tripoli and Haifa. There was a possibility that Syria might in the future come to be more important still to France; oil-prospecting had been going on in the Jazirah for some years, and in 1940 an agreement was concluded for the exploitation of oil discovered there between the Syrian Government and Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company. 471 648 [315]

One more economic factor which could not be left out of account was the immense cost to France of her occupation of Syria and Lebanon. There was first the expense involved in installing herself in Syria and Lebanon: her participation in the Eastern Campaign during the last war and her conflict with Faisal after it. Even more important than these were the expenses of the civil and military administration of the Mandate. According to an official estimate, by 1936 the Mandate had cost France 4,843 million francs, of which the military expenditure accounted for 4,300 millions and the civil for 543.[1] By Article 15 of the Mandate France was entitled, once an organic law had been framed, to ask the national Government to whom she was handing over responsibility for repayment of the expenses she had incurred in performing her duties as Mandatory Power. 648

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The primary strategic purposes which France hoped to fulfil by her presence in Syria and Lebanon were the maintenance of her position as a Mediterranean Power, on a level with Great Britain and Italy; the protection of her maritime and air routes to the Far East; and the defence of the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli, through which she derived a large proportion of the oil needed by her armed forces. None of these objects was capable of achievement by France alone, but only by France in conjunction with Great Britain, the dominant foreign Power in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq; the Levant States were only of first-class strategic value to France in so far as the possibility existed of a co-ordinated Franco-British strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus it was an essential French interest to pursue in the Levant a policy similar in the most important respects to that pursued by Great Britain; this was normally recognized by French

[1] G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre D'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939), p. 22.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Natural Resources

Land and water are undoubtedly the principal natural resources of Syria. Indications do not point to extensive mineral deposits. Some poor lignite but no coal has been found. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company carried out extensive prospecting and drilling over a considerable area under a concession granted in 1938. After spending about £ 6 million sterling in exploratory work, it surrendered its concession in August 1951. Although the belief persists in Syria that considerable oil will one day be discovered, there is no evidence to support the supposition. Drilling did reveal the presence of natural gas in eastern Syria, southwest of Hassetche, and also of appreciable quantities of rock salt. In theory this gas, if proved in considerable volume, together with salt, could provide the raw materials for the production of fertilizers and alkalis, but other countries—for example Iraq—may well be more favorably situated with respect to the development of similar resources. The natural gas could also be used as a source of energy but it is unfortunately found at a considerable distance from the potential market in western Syria.

There are important deposits of bitumen or asphalt. One of these, in the province of Latakia, is already being mined, but other and far richer deposits uncovered in the Djebel Bichri, west of Deir ez Zor, are being exploited to a minor extent only by the Ministry of Public Works. The latter deposits are expected to assume considerable importance in the extensive roadbuilding program the government is planning to undertake. Iron ore, chromite and lead and iron pyrites are known to exist, but their presence in commercial quantities is still to be proved. While licenses for prospecting of [illegible] are being issued, on the basis of existing evidence it seems unlikely [illegible] mineral resources exist in sufficient quantities to affect the future of Syria significantly.

Agriculture

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65% to 75% of the people derive their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable portion of the balance earn their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities. Agriculture and animal husbandry together probably account for 45% to 50% of the national income. In agriculture, winter crops are most important because rainfall is concen-

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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of clinics and in the cities a shortage of qualified staff to undertake massage, radiotherapy, and orthopædics, and there is special need to combat tuberculosis. Syrians and Lebanese are not addicted to hashish which, however, is grown in the Biqaa and smuggled to Egypt. The Lebanese Government periodically burns many of the plantations, which inflates the price of the surviving crop.

Economic Survey

S L 433

More than half the population of the two countries is engaged in agriculture which is the most important economic activity. Natural resources hardly exist; there is bitumen in Jebel Bishri in Syria but its production would not be economic; about 10,000 tons a year of asphalt is produced from the neighbourhood of Latakia; and salt is extracted in commercial quantities near Aleppo.

Petroleum

S L 315 382

For a number of years, associates of IPC searched for oil in Syria and Lebanon but without finding it in commercial quantities; in consequence, the areas held by these IPC associates have been given up. However, the two Governments are still anxious for further efforts to be made to find oil in commercial quantities. The importance of petroleum in the economy of Syria and Lebanon lies in the situation of the two republics athwart the pipelines from the fields of northern Iraq and Saudi Arabia which have outlets on the Mediterranean.[1] From Iraq a 12-inch and 16-inch line carry oil across Syria by way of Palmyra and Homs to Tripoli in the Lebanon. Together, these two lines can carry about 8 million tons of oil a year (160,000 barrels daily). A third IPC line from Kirkuk to Homs then bears north of the other two and reaches the sea at Banias, and so does not run through Lebanon at all. This new line is 26–30–32-inches in diameter and can deliver oil at about 16 million tons a year (320,000 barrels daily). From the fields of Saudi Arabia a 30–31 inch American pipeline (Tapline) travels over 1,000 miles on its way to Sidon in Lebanon, passing through Jordan and Syria. At present the line is pumping at a rate of about 15 million tons a year (300,000 barrels daily). It should be noted that these four lines all carry crude oil, some of which is refined on the Mediterranean shore for local requirements but the bulk is shipped as crude to the refineries of Europe and elsewhere.

S L 382

The line from Kirkuk to Haifa is not operating and the Haiaf

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

316 mined since 1914, and sodium chloride and bitumen deposits also are being worked. There is an abundance of good calcareous building stone and basalt.[29]

433 The most important industries produce flour, olive oil, soap, tanned hides, tobacco products, glass, alcohol, glucose, and textiles. New factories recently constructed include two cottonseed oil mills, two cotton spinning and weaving mills, porcelain and glass factories, and a beet sugar mill. Textiles is the most important single industry from the standpoint of employment and value of production.

315 Unlike many of the other countries in the Middle East, Syria has no oil in commercial quantities. A number of wells have been drilled, but without notable success. A pipeline from Iraq and the Persian Gulf crosses Syria to the Mediterranean, and a new line is being completed to Baniyas on the coast from Iraq. The pipelines provide a source of employment, but they do not produce a large amount of revenue for the government.

Table 22

439

SYRIA: Specified Imports as Per Cent of Total Imports
March 13 through December 31, 1950
Value

Item	1950
	Per Cent
Textile Materials	29.1
Combustible Minerals	18.2
Electric Machinery and Apparatus	18.7
Common Metals	6.3
Precious Stones and Metals	5.8
Animals and Products	5.7
Others	21.8
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	90

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

Table 23

SYRIA: Imports from Specified Sources as Per Cent of Total Imports
1951
Value

Source	1951
	Per Cent
United States	18.2
United Kingdom	12.5
France	18.4
Lebanon	18.3
Italy	7.0
Germany	5.5
Others	25.8
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	128

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

[29] *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1951, p. 32.

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

499 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Natural Resources

Land and water are undoubtedly the principal natural resources of Syria. Indications do not point to extensive mineral deposits. Some poor lignite but no coal has been found. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company carried out extensive prospecting and drilling over a considerable area under a concession granted in 1938. After spending about £ 6 million sterling in exploratory work, it surrendered its concession in August 1951. Although the belief persists in Syria that considerable oil will one day be discovered, there is no evidence to support the supposition. Drilling did reveal the presence of natural gas in eastern Syria, southwest of Hassetche, and also of appreciable quantities of rock salt. In theory this gas, if proved in considerable volume, together with salt, could provide the raw materials for the production of fertilizers and alkalis, but other countries—for example Iraq—may well be more favorably situated with respect to the development of similar resources. The natural gas could also be used as a source of energy but it is unfortunately found at a considerable distance from the potential market in western Syria.

There are important deposits of bitumen or asphalt. One of these, in the province of Latakia, is already being mined, but other and far richer deposits uncovered in the Djebel Bichri, west of Deir ez Zor, are being exploited to a minor extent only by the Ministry of Public Works. The latter deposits are expected to assume considerable importance in the extensive roadbuilding program the government is planning to undertake. Iron ore, chromite and lead and iron pyrites are known to exist, but their presence in commercial quantities is still to be proved. While licenses for prospecting of minerals are being issued, on the basis of existing evidence it seems unlikely that mineral resources exist in sufficient quantities to affect the future of Syria significantly.

Agriculture

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65% to 75% of the people derive their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable portion of the balance earn their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities. Agriculture and animal husbandry together probably account for 45% to 50% of the national income. In agriculture, winter crops are most important because rainfall is concen-

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

COTTON IN SYRIA

Cotton in the past two years has become Syria's most important export. The country also exports wheat, barley, and other cereals, apricot paste, olive oil, wool, some cotton textiles, licorice root, tobacco, pistachio nuts, and livestock products. 241 439

Many types of manufactured articles are imported—petroleum products, minerals, pharmaceuticals, electric appliances, motor vehicles, machinery, tires, tubes, glassware, and hardware. 439

Table 20

SYRIA: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports
March 13 through December 31, 1950
Value

Item	1950
	Per Cent
Cotton	28.6
Wool and Hair	11.1
Silk, Artificial Silk, and Textile Fibers	6.0
Vegetables and Products	37.5
Animals and Products	6.0
Tobacco	1.3
Hides and Skins	1.1
Others	8.4
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	59

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

Table 21

SYRIA: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports
1951
Value

Country	1951
	Per Cent
Lebanon	21.5
France	18.2
United States	13.5
Lebanon Free Zone	8.2
Iraq	7.3
United Kingdom	7.0
Others	24.3
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

PRODUCTION

Syria is essentially an agricultural country. Its mineral resources have been exploited only slightly despite indications of the existence of phosphate, lead, copper, antimony, nickel, chrome, and gypsum. Manganese ore has been 316

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Syria MDI

316 mined since 1914, and sodium chloride and bitumen deposits also are being worked. There is an abundance of good calcareous building stone and basalt.[29]

433 The most important industries produce flour, olive oil, soap, tanned hides, tobacco products, glass, alcohol, glucose, and textiles. New factories recently constructed include two cottonseed oil mills, two cotton spinning and weaving mills, porcelain and glass factories, and a beet sugar mill. Textiles is the most important single industry from the standpoint of employment and value of production.

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Table 22

439

SYRIA: Specified Imports as Per Cent of Total Imports
March 15 through December 31, 1950
Value

Item	1950
	Per Cent
Textile Materials	29.1
Combustible Minerals	10.2
Electric Machinery and Apparatus	10.7
Common Metals	6.8
Precious Stones and Metals	5.8
Animals and Products	5.7
Others	21.8
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	90

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

Table 23

SYRIA: Imports from Specified Sources as Per Cent of Total Imports
1951
Value

Source	1951
	Per Cent
United States	18.2
United Kingdom	12.5
France	10.4
Lebanon	10.2
Italy	7.0
Germany	5.5
Others	35.8
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	135

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

[29] *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1951, p. 92.

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328 tition difficult. Exports of canned vegetables and fruit products without sugar, as for example dried fruits (apricots), pulp and tomato juice just now seem to offer greater possibilities, but foreign quality competition is still severe.

Cement

329 There are two cement factories in Syria, one near Damascus and one in Aleppo. Their combined capacity in 1953 was 243,000 metric tons. Planned expansions are expected to result in an increase to 403,000 tons by 1955. The two companies have about 500 factory employees, working on a continuous three-shift basis and there are about 300 additional workers in the quarries.

There are ample supplies of limestone in close proximity to each factory. The other constituent materials are readily available and are usually brought in as return loads. Refractory bricks are imported. The rotary kilns are oil fired, about 150 kg. of fuel oil being used for each metric ton of cement produced. The transport costs of fuel oil are heavy, varying from £S 10 to over £S 20 per ton.

Syrian cement now costs about £S 80 per ton ex factory, including the tax (for domestic use) of £S 15 per ton, against prices of from £S 50 to £S 70 per ton for European and Lebanese cement c.i.f. Beirut.

Glass

330 Glassmaking is one of Syria's traditional industries. Until the end of the last war, broken glass constituted its raw material and primitive hand methods were used, but production is now concentrated mainly in one large factory on the outskirts of Damascus. There are also 12 small enterprises, several of them in the Damascus area, engaged in the production of bottles, glass containers, lamp glasses, etc. Machines are used in certain processes, but production is still largely in the hands of glass blowers.

The output of the large Damascus factory, considered to be the most modern factory of its kind in the Middle East, averaged almost 4,000 tons annually during 1950-53. Sand has to be imported from Lebanon, as the local sand is unsuitable; soda ash and silica are imported from Europe and fuel oil from Lebanon. The company sells its standard window glass in

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Syria at about £S 2.85 per square meter. Most of its production is sold 323
locally and there has recently been a marked increase in demand from its export markets in Lebanon and Jordan where Syrian glass is admitted duty free. Since 1952 the importation of sheet glass, many containers and other glass articles has been prohibited.

Tanning and Leather Dressing

The development of the tanning and leather dressing industry from 282
the handicraft to the mechanically-aided stage began about 1929 and has made good progress, particularly since the dissolution of the Customs Union with Lebanon.

The supply of Syrian sheep and goat skins is more than sufficient to meet local demand, but raw cow and buffalo hides were imported to the extent of over 2,000 tons in 1951 and over 2,500 tons in 1953 to supplement the supply of local hides. About 800 tons of untreated hides and skins were exported in 1951 and 600 in 1953, and about 430 tons and 330 tons of processed leather and leather goods in 1951 and 1953 respectively. According to the most recent official figures (end of 1953) the tanneries which the government classes as factories numbered 75, mostly in the Aleppo and Damascus areas. The annual output amounted to 2,700 tons of sole hide and 4.9 million square feet of other leather. The number of workers employed was given as 2,700.

Elsewhere we have mentioned the successful establishment of an industrial zone for tanneries on the outskirts of Damascus. This has provided an opportunity for the introduction of additional modern machinery and a great improvement in working conditions at the new location. The new tanneries vary considerably in size, the number of workers ranging from five or six to about 100.

Boots and Shoes 295

Leather boots and shoes with leather or rubber soles are made by hand or on simple machines in small workshops in most parts of the country, or by the retailer on his own premises. There are no reliable figures of the number of workers or volume of production.

During the last few years four factories have been established near

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An increase of about 60% in cotton production is expected by 1960, but present power capacity appears adequate to meet this expansion. 377 248

Glass

The Damascus glass factory owns a 600-KW power plant. The total productive capacity of the factory is about 43 tons of glass per day; in 1953 about 3,000 tons of glass were actually produced, representing about 70 days output at full capacity. If a consumption of about 100 KWH per ton of glass is assumed then the generated power in 1953 would have been about 0.3 million KWH. 377 323

Cold Storage

A cold storage plant in Damascus has a 500-KW power plant interconnected with the public utilities network. It can be assumed that about half of the approximately 2 million KWH required annually is supplied by the public utilities and half by the factory's plant. 377 254

Oil Mills

Two Aleppo oil mills have private power plants, the larger with a capacity of 1,200 KW, the smaller with 300 KW. These factories work only about 150 days per year (say six days per week during six months). With one-third of the capacity in reserve and an assumed load factor as low as 10% the power generated per year would be about 1.5 million KWH. 377 388

Flour Mill

A flour mill in Aleppo has a 400-KW plant. With a utilization of two-thirds of the capacity for 6,000 hours the power generated would be about 1.2 million KWH. 377 256

Sugar

In 1953 the Homs sugar factory processed 7,000 tons of sugar from beets and refined 22,000 tons from raw sugar. Power required for the former 377 257

433 The building industry expanded considerably during the post-war period.
339 Authorized floor space in new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945, to 209,000 in 1950 and 265,000 in 1953. Output of cement rose
323 correspondingly, from 35,000 tons in 1945 to 68,000 in 1950, 224,000 in 1953 and 114,000 tons during the first half of 1954. This fully meets local demand. A glass factory, with a capacity of 10,000 tons, established in the post-war period, reached a maximum production of 5,500 tons in 1954; it exports small amounts to neighbouring countries.

377 Output of electricity showed little increase during the war, but after the war demand rose rapidly. The inability of the foreign concessionary companies
471 operating in Damascus and Aleppo to expand capacity sufficiently fast led the Government, in 1951, to nationalize them, for compensation, and to instal
433 additional equipment; 1/ in 1954, the Homs-Banias electricity company was also nationalized. Output by public utilities has risen considerably in recent years, from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 81 million in 1950, 114 million in 1953 and 80 million in the first eight months of 1954; output by industrial power plants is probably over 40 million kilowatt-hours per annum.

433 Other important industries include tanning, and the making of matches, cardboard, soap, nails, pins and plastics.

433 Government assistance to industry has taken four main forms: tariff protection, tax exemption, financial aid and regulation of standards and prices.
656 In the early post-war years foreign competition weighed heavily on the Syrian market. The ending of the customs union with Lebanon in 1950 (see below) led to a decrease in competition in some industries, notably spinning; but other industries, such as weaving and canning, which marketed a substantial proportion of their output in Lebanon, suffered. In recent years, protection has been greatly increased by the raising of customs duties on competing goods 2/ or by prohibiting the importing of such goods: among the prohibited articles were matches, soap, shoes, socks and stockings, glass products, canned fruits and vegetables, wooden furniture and alcoholic drinks. These measures seem to have greatly decreased foreign competition; nevertheless, in recent years, prices of local manufactures have tended to decline. 3/

1/ Between the autumn of 1951 and the end of 1953, a total capacity of 6,450 kilowatts was installed in Damascus (Al Manar, special issue on Syrian industry, Damascus 1954); a total of £S 9.5 million was advanced by the Government to the nationalized firms for expansion and improvements. At the end of 1953, the total capacity of public utilities was 34,000 kilowatts and that of industrial power plants was over 20,000 kilowatts. Two plants with a capacity of 17,000 kilowatts were scheduled for completion at the end of 1954.

2/ For example, in 1952, duties on several types of woollen and cotton goods were raised by 25 to 50 per cent.

3/ The index of wholesale prices of domestic industrial products rose from 93 in 1950 (1949 = 100) to 111 in 1951, but declined to 103 in 1952, 88 in 1953 and 79 in the first nine months of 1954.

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be grown. Thus with the stimulus originally imparted by the Korean war boom, cotton, which had long been grown in Syria but on a small scale, has developed into one of the country's most valuable crops.

Manufacturing has expanded rapidly in the postwar period. Although the original impulse was given by the wartime shortage of manufactured goods, new factories were not for the most part established until after the war. Among the new modern factories built since then are six spinning and weaving mills, a considerable number of cotton ginneries, a dyeing plant, six vegetable oil mills, a glass factory, a cement plant and a sugar factory. The total amount of paid-up capital of manufacturing enterprises established in corporate form since the end of the war is in the neighborhood of £S 80 million. Since enterprises generally refuse to disclose their output, statistical measurement of the increase in production is extremely difficult. Very rough estimates indicate that about 9,000-10,000 metric tons of cotton and rayon yarn were produced in 1953 as compared with probably less than 1,000 tons in prewar years. The output of cloth was about 14,000 to 16,000 tons, or more than 100 million meters, as compared with perhaps 15 million meters before the war. The production of vegetable oils (other than olive oil), which was negligible before the war, amounted to around 10,000 tons, and the output of soap, at a level of about 9,000 tons, was almost three times the prewar estimate. Cement production, which was less than 75,000 tons before the war, amounted to 223,639 tons in 1953. The output of cigarettes was about four times, and that of matches three times, that of prewar years.

The expansion of agriculture and industry has in turn stimulated commerce, transport and construction. The construction industry in particular has witnessed a postwar boom which lifted the volume of building to a level probably twice as high as that in the years immediately preceding the war. Increasing prosperity, together with the wartime drop in building, generated a large volume of housing construction in all major cities.

The increase in national income since before the war has undoubtedly been very great; in real terms it may well be almost double. Unfortunately the fragmentary nature and unreliability of statistical data make even approximate estimates of national income extremely difficult. For the postwar years an unofficial estimate has been made only for 1950, when national income was put at £S 1,250 million. Some very tentative calculations made by the mission indicate that this estimate may well be too conservative. These calculations point to a rise in national income from

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tition difficult. Exports of canned vegetables and fruit products without sugar, as for example dried fruits (apricots), pulp and tomato juice just now seem to offer greater possibilities, but foreign quality competition is still severe.

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433 indicates that in this field Syria has become a competitor in foreign markets.
288 In dyeing, printing and finishing there seems to be need for additional modern plant. It also seems desirable to investigate the possibility of profitable production of jute fabric sacks. Imports of these sacks have rapidly increased in the last few years, reaching a total of nearly 10,000 tons with a value of £S 6 million in 1953. The need for jute sacks would be lessened if bulk transportation and storage facilities were available but even in that event an increase in general agricultural production might make the establishment of a factory for sack production from imported jute fiber or yarn an economic possibility.

433 Further expansion of the cement industry may well be required. In
● 339 fact, the government has authorized a new plant for Aleppo which may be transferred to the Jezireh to serve the growing requirement of north-eastern Syria. A cement plant for the Homs-Hama region is also under consideration.

433 In the footwear industry modern factory production has been intro-
295 duced only with regard to rubber boots and shoes. An experiment with factory production of leather shoes in Aleppo some years ago met with such opposition from the handicraft trade that it was abandoned. Nevertheless this branch of industry may be one in which the application of modern production methods would be appropriate and generally beneficial.

433 It seems useful to investigate the economic prospects of paper and
218 paperboard manufacture. In 1953 about 8,000 tons of paper with a value of nearly £S 5 million were imported. This total comprises a large variety of different types of paper but some are imported in such quantity as to suggest the feasibility of specialized production. Straw is plentiful as raw material and in a relatively short period more poplar wood could become available if farmers and village communities gave increased attention to tree planting.

433 The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of
402 an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried out by many small shops but the quality of the output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements to be developed for use on farms.

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quantity of used and army surplus equipment was utilized in the smaller towns and villages, complete records of these operations are not available. 377 655

The best assessment the mission can make of power investment in Syria is to start with the conservative cost estimate of £S 450 per KVA for diesel-driven sets, and £S 7.5 million for the only steam plant in Syria with transmission lines and transformer stations. On this basis the cost of the 46,000 KVA of the former and 12,500 KVA of the latter, added to £S 1 million for the Amir Ghajar hydro turbine generators and £S 2 million for development of the networks, give a figure of about £S 25 million. This should, however, be taken as an indication of the order of magnitude rather than as an approximation of actual investment.

II INDUSTRIAL POWER 377

A statement of present and expected power consumption in the leading Syrian industries is necessary for an assessment of the anticipated power requirements of the country as a whole. The factories discussed below rely mainly upon their private power supplies, a situation which is likely to change somewhat as additional public utility projects are completed.

Cement

377 339

The two cement factories at Damascus and Aleppo are among the most important industrial power consumers. In 1953 their output was 171,000 and 72,000 tons, respectively; it is expected that output will rise to 253,000 and 150,000 tons by 1955. At an average consumption rate of 90 KWH per ton, this total of 403,000 tons would require about 36 million KWH.

To meet the 1953 demand for about 22 million KWH the two factories had plants of 4,600 and 3,000 KW capacity, respectively. The Damascus factory, unlike that in Aleppo, is connected with the public utilities network, thus permitting the future transfer of cheap hydroelectric power from the projected Barada plant. The Aleppo plant may insure itself against a breakdown of its own equipment through a link with the steam plant now under construction, but as soon as cheap hydro power becomes available from the Youssef Pasha project, it can be assumed that the factory will turn to the public utilities network for at least part of its power requirements.

الانتاج

339

انتاج الاسمنت في معمل دمر - دمشق حسب الشهور خلال شهور ١٩٤٧ - ١٩٥٢
(بالطن)

PRODUCTION OF CEMENT IN DUMMAR FACTORY, DAMASCUS, MONTHS OF 1947 — 1952
(In tons)

Table No. 19

جدول رقم ١٩

Months	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	الشهور
January	4.676	3,414	3,699	4,621	3,438	4,473	كانون ثاني
February	4,949	1,599	3,385	4,751	1,195	7,446	شباط
March	4,000	1,898	4,265	7,600	2,127	6,939	آذار
April	2,986	4,798	4,883	6,957	1,621	7,977	نيسان
May	4,019	6,278	5,347	3,574	2,506	10,970	ايار
June	5,011	5,720	4,784	6,184	3,099	8,572	حزيران
July	2,459	7,045	5,783	5,715	4,001	10,613	تموز
August	4,115	4,788	5,302	4,942	3,732	12,036	آب
September	4,120	6,987	4,448	6,587	3,825	7,768	ايلول
October	3,291	5,061	4,824	5,677	3,001	7,107	تشرين اول
November	4,185	4,279	5,456	4,790	5,434	11,768	تشرين ثاني
December	4,415	2,537	5,527	6,251	4,758	11,672	كانون اول
Total	48,226	54,404	57,703	67,649	38,737	107,341	المجموع

انتاج الاسمنت في الجمهورية السورية خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ - ١٩٥٣
(بالطن)

CEMENT PRODUCTION IN SYRIA DURING 1952, 1953
(in tons)

Table No. 20

جدول رقم ٢٠

Months	الجموع Total	معمل حلب ١٩٥٢ Aleppo Factory 1952	معمل دمر-دمشق ١٩٥٢ Dummar Factory 1952	الجموع Total	معمل حلب ١٩٥٣ Aleppo Factory 1953	معمل دمر-دمشق ١٩٥٣ Dummar Factory 1953	الشهور
January	4,473	—	4,473	12,566	6,705	5,861	كانون ثاني
February	7,446	—	7,446	14,482	6,616	7,866	شباط
March	6,939	—	6,939	18,703	7,012	11,691	آذار
April	7,977	—	7,977	20,734	6,099	14,635	نيسان
May	17,029	6,059	10,970	24,182	7,344	16,838	ايار
June	13,041	4,469	8,572	18,590	7,160	11,430	حزيران
July	15,019	4,406	10,613	16,137	5,404	10,733	تموز
August	17,900	5,864	12,036	16,617	4,548	12,069	آب
September	14,100	6,332	7,768	21,799	6,409	15,390	ايلول
October	11,067	3,960	7,107	21,734	6,201	15,533	تشرين اول
November	18,442	6,674	11,768	21,906	6,406	15,502	تشرين ثاني
December	17,192	5,520	11,672	16,187	7,391	8,796	كانون اول
Total	150,595	43,254	107,341	223,639	77,295	146,344	المجموع

Source : Ministry of National Economy

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

SYRIA MDI

433 The building industry expanded considerably during the post-war period. Authorized floor space in new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square
339 metres in 1945, to 209,000 in 1950 and 265,000 in 1953. Output of cement rose correspondingly, from 35,000 tons in 1945 to 68,000 in 1950, 224,000 in 1953 and
323 114,000 tons during the first half of 1954. This fully meets local demand. A glass factory, with a capacity of 10,000 tons, established in the post-war period, reached a maximum production of 5,500 tons in 1954; it exports small amounts to neighbouring countries.

377 Output of electricity showed little increase during the war, but after the war demand rose rapidly. The inability of the foreign concessionary companies
471 operating in Damascus and Aleppo to expand capacity sufficiently fast led the Government, in 1951, to nationalize them, for compensation, and to instal
433 additional equipment; 1/ in 1954, the Homs-Hama electricity company was also nationalized. Output by public utilities has risen considerably in recent years, from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 81 million in 1950, 114 million in 1953 and 80 million in the first eight months of 1954; output by industrial power plants is probably over 40 million kilowatt-hours per annum.

433 Other important industries include tanning, and the making of matches, cardboard, soap, nails, pins and plastics.

433 Government assistance to industry has taken four main forms: tariff protection, tax exemption, financial aid and regulation of standards and prices.
656 In the early post-war years foreign competition weighed heavily on the Syrian market. The ending of the customs union with Lebanon in 1950 (see below) led to a decrease in competition in some industries, notably spinning; but other industries, such as weaving and canning, which marketed a substantial proportion of their output in Lebanon, suffered. In recent years, protection has been greatly increased by the raising of customs duties on competing goods 2/ or by prohibiting the importing of such goods: among the prohibited articles were matches, soap, shoes, socks and stockings, glass products, canned fruits and vegetables, wooden furniture and alcoholic drinks. These measures seem to have greatly decreased foreign competition; nevertheless, in recent years, prices of local manufactures have tended to decline. 3/

1/ Between the autumn of 1951 and the end of 1953, a total capacity of 6,450 kilowatts was installed in Damascus (Al Manar, special issue on Syrian industry, Damascus 1954); a total of £S 9.5 million was advanced by the Government to the nationalized firms for expansion and improvements. At the end of 1953, the total capacity of public utilities was 34,000 kilowatts and that of industrial power plants was over 20,000 kilowatts. Two plants with a capacity of 17,000 kilowatts were scheduled for completion at the end of 1954.

2/ For example, in 1952, duties on several types of woollen and cotton goods were raised by 25 to 50 per cent.

3/ The index of wholesale prices of domestic industrial products rose from 93 in 1950 (1949 = 100) to 111 in 1951, but declined to 103 in 1952, 88 in 1953 and 79 in the first nine months of 1954.

16: Collart et al - G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

ALEPPO

ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TOWN

The Citadel of Aleppo, with its deep moat, and steep and grandiose glacis held in place by stone columns, etches a lacy crown around the hill formed by the accumulated ruins of older civilizations, and is truly symbolic of the city which, throughout its long history, has weathered events that brought ruin and death everywhere around it. At its foot spreads out the serried network of thoroughfares converging from desert and sea, turned, as it were, to stone in the rational yet florid architecture of the town. 361

Aleppo has always been considered the key city of communication and trade. From time to time wars have halted its development, but its own peculiar logic, unity and coherence have continued, despite changes in political circumstance. In Seleucid times and later in the Roman and Byzantine period, its contacts and influence grew steadily; it then became the real metropolis of northern Syria. Antioch remained the great centre of culture; Aleppo was the city of trade, industry and manufacturing.

In the art of building too, Aleppo was always the leader, suffering no declines or lapses, able to combine the rational and geometric logic of Greek construction with the monumental design of Rome and the plastic and decorative fantasy of the Mesopotamian Orient. In contrast with the poor building materials of Mesopotamia—where sun-dried brick and mud were used—Aleppo had its rich resources of limestone, which it used generously, as though in passionate pursuit of an idea to create forms and motifs suited to the requirements of architecture. It achieved a relationship between the structure of its buildings and the nature and characteristics of the stone, which was a factor in the artistic conception as a whole, just as water was in Damascus, where pools, streams and tinkling fountains lent life and movement to courts and spaces. 341

It is difficult, in a few words, to describe the various buildings and classify them according to their type and style. J. Sauvaget has made a detailed study of the question in connexion with the town's historical development, and has drawn

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ALEPPO

up a list. However, his work has not exhausted all that there is to be said about the character of a city in which works of art and buildings still play a lively part and where every new study, every town planning or restoration scheme, reveals something new. 341

Old buildings have often been adapted to serve a new purpose; more often still, the fabric and decoration of buildings no longer serving their original purpose, have been used for new ones. For example, the Great Mosque, which, as it now appears, belongs to the Mameluke period, preserves, hidden within its structure, many parts dating from earlier times, while the beautiful minaret (A.D. 1090), which, for its shape and decoration, is of the greatest interest in the study of Moslem architecture in Syria, still stands for all to see. The highly original vaulted arches at "Sheikh Mohassin" rest on ancient capitals. The oldest madrasah in Aleppo was originally a church and the old cathedral has been transformed into a Moslem college. The mosque of the Mulberry Tree has a Greek entablature. The Citadel rests on Byzantine buildings, having made use of a few of their rooms and the huge water tank. Even the ramparts, in the size and bonding of their stones, show the influence of various periods, from the Greco-Roman, to which the lower masonry belongs, to the Mameluke, when almost all its magnificent towers were rebuilt.

Motifs, design and methods, and, above all, architectural atmosphere, were retained with the materials, as new themes were worked out to suit new political or religious circumstances or wider trade relations. Whilst the Citadel, ramparts, madrasahs and Sufi convents represent the frontier city in its struggles with the Crusaders and Shiism, the growth of the suburbs and the suqs bears witness to the commercial importance of the town which, after the destruction of Antioch, resumed its traditional role as a centre of trade with Persia and India.

From the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, Aleppo was a flourishing city. Beautiful private houses and monumental khans, combining with the suqs, fountains and mosques to form an intricate architectural pattern, reflect its life during that period. The taste for baroque decoration, copied from Italy, France and Spain, finds expression in the framework of

p. 21B

341 doorways and windows and in the rich ornamentation of the ceilings, whilst motifs drawn from Constantinople are preferred in the El-Adliyeh, Khosrawiya, Othmaniya and Ahmediye mosques and madrasahs and in the high minarets with their tapering cone-shaped tops.

This coherent complex of buildings, with its continuous life, enables us to follow the whole course of development in technique and taste, religious ideas and history, and commercial organisation. Together with the buildings of Cairo, it provides an essential basis for any study of Moslem architecture.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

172 The preservation of monuments involves striking a balance between a number of considerations—their purpose, the need to restore them to their original appearance, the practical and commercial ends they serve and the requirements of town planning and modern life. All this raises questions of such complexity as to suggest that, in a town like Aleppo, it would be wise to set up a commission of experts to advise the authorities. Such a commission should include scholars, artists, and representatives of the various bodies concerned, and its task would be to examine the most suitable means of giving the city's architectural treasures a place in its modern life, bringing out their character more clearly and making the most of their beauties.

There is a whole series of monuments which no longer serve any practical end and are accordingly beginning to be counted as archaeological relics. In many cases, the maintenance and restoration they require makes them a heavy financial drain, while their value as a source of income is nil. Nevertheless they ought to be preserved and safeguarded in view of the national, cultural and spiritual values for which they stand. They cannot be classed as things now useless and abandoned to people too poor to pay for modern housing accommodation, or put to some low-yield industrial use. To adopt such criteria would mean renouncing outright all possibility of leaving, in the history of the city and the nation, any permanent memorial of what has been.

Officialdom does not always grasp these requirements; under the constraint of an annual balance sheet it takes the view that the artistic heritage is too rich already, and its preservation and maintenance too difficult and costly. But a monument is like a tree: it has a positive value even if it yields no fruit and if its immediate usefulness is not obvious. When the tree has been reduced to firewood, or the stones of the monument quarried, and its site used for new buildings, then we realize that it was not only a thing of beauty in itself but an irreplaceable element in our daily lives.

Today as in the past—perhaps even more than in the past—local authorities are at great pains, in development works, to enhance a town's beauties. In our view, the best way of effecting this is to take into account the aesthetic possibilities of ancient architecture. On this point we can but repeat what has already been said, in connexion with Damascus, about the beauty of the old quarters, and the narrow peaceful alleys, about the practical and aesthetic significance of the suqs and khans, about the value of the picturesque in the urban scene and hence the desirability of preserving the atmosphere and integrity of a setting which is the slow growth of centuries.

Aleppo in particular has outstanding possibilities for pro-

361 the main centre of the Jebel Zawiyé, was both an agricultural
172 and an industrial town (large-scale production of oil and wine), and finally covered an area about 2 miles long by 1 1 wide. Among the confused heaps of its ruins, the remains of several churches and rich mausolea of the sixth century, with their pyramidal crowns, are recognizable.

172 G. Tchalenko has drawn attention to the similarity of the
341 architecture throughout the limestone plateau, due to the use of the same materials and the same methods of hewing and bonding stone. He has also noted the unity and homogeneity of the carved ornamentation, which was gradually adapted to the new forms of the various buildings. This suggests that itinerant groups of craftsmen went from place to place, taking their style and methods with them.

172 Evidence is provided by churches buildings, varying in
346 nature and importance. We would draw particular attention to two of them, which seem to surpass all the others by their quality and exceptional charm. The first is the cruciform basilica of St. Simeon (Qalaat Semaan) built in the third quarter of the fifth century around the column on which the Stylite spent the last 37 years of his life and which, long after his death, was still a famous place of pilgrimage. The originality of the plan, the masterly structure of the central octagon, with its great semi-circular arches, the harmonious proportions of the chevet and the southern façade, together with the neighbouring baptistery and conventual buildings, make this peerless architectural group "the greatest and grandest Christian ruin in the East". The second of these monuments, lesser known because it is difficult of access, is the basilica of Qalbloze, standing in a temenos, like an ancient temple, on the crest of the Jebel el-Ala. It dates from the end of the fifth century. Its façade flanked by towers, its chevet adorned with columns, the great arches separating the nave from the side aisles, the majestic proportions of the apse, and the quality and sober arrangement of carving, produce that impression of harmony and perfection that only a masterpiece can achieve.

THE POPULATION OF THE LIMESTONE PLATEAU

361 The profusion of ruins over such a large area, not only in the
172 vicinity of fertile plains, but on rocky and waterless plateaux shows that there was once a large population, which later disappeared completely. The construction of water tanks may have helped the people to subsist, but that alone cannot explain their extraordinary prosperity. What, then, were their means of livelihood?

Some have thought the answer to this question to be that the arable land disappeared as a result of complete and unchecked deforestation, which brought about a radical change in the conditions of life. Tchalenko does not agree; in the work already referred to, he gives a simpler and more plausible explanation of this phenomenon.

It has long been established that the ancient inhabitants of the limestone plateau owed their prosperity to the cultivation of the olive and, to a lesser degree, of the vine. The many presses found in all the settlements are proof of this. The cultivation of these crops is perfectly feasible in the soil and climate of the present day. It was a change in political and social circumstances which brought about the decline in the population. Where the soil accumulated in rocky basins and

LAND TENURE IN JAZIRAH

427 The custom in Jazirah is for the tenant to pay the rent in a percentage of the crop delivered to the owner free of all expense.

I. Land Tenure for the Peasant

427 651 Under Ottoman rule and because land was abundant and peasants scarce, the rent was fixed at 7L. The owner and the tenant were each responsible for the Government taxes on his own share of the produce.

The Ottoman Government collected the tithe and the werko as taxes on the land. The title, as its name implies, was 10% of the produce to which was added later 2-1/2% as special revenue for public instruction.

Because the peasant wanted to be as far away from Government officials as possible he paid the landowner 19-1/2%, including the tithe and the rent, and did not care how much of that the landowner actually paid so long as he remained unmolested by the public officials. This percentage of 19-1/2% is still prevailing and is known by the name of "Hassil and Tabo".

In 1924 the French found the collection of the tithe cumbersome and adopted a modified system. They took the average tax paid by the land in the preceding four years and made the sum obligatory. In practice, this meant light taxation on the land, but the landowner still received from the peasant the same percentage as when the tithe was actually paid. Later, when the tax of 7% on agricultural produce took the place of all land taxes and the peasant had to pay it when he transported his crop for sale, he kept paying the landowner 19-1/2% so that his percentage has come to mean rent to the landowner without the obligation on his part to pay the taxes of the peasant. What made the situation acceptable to the peasant was that the increase in population would have raised the rent anyway. He now pays this rent for the use of land and house. If the house is not included for his, he constructs his own house of sun-baked bricks, but retains the right to remove the wooden roof when he leaves the village.

[342]

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

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The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

361 consist of clustered tetrahedrons, coloured with blue and red.
346 The astragals of the columns and their tori are of gilt bronze.
172 All the surfaces are composed of alternating courses of different colours.

The same features are to be seen in the buildings put up by the governor, Dervish-Pasha, forming a fine group at the beginning of the Pilgrims' Way, to the west of the old town. The façade of the "Ed-Derwichiyeh" Mosque is composed of alternate black and white courses; the tall polygonal minaret is painted green. The whole building, which is surmounted by a large dome encircled by small cupolas, is architecturally connected with the neighbouring mausoleum by an archway over the road. The arrangement of designs, shapes and colours on the façades shows extraordinary imaginative ingenuity. The pointed bulbous dome of the mausoleum rests on a drum of irregular shape. At a later date, in the same street, but a little further south, Sinan-Pasha built his mosque among the suqs of Bab Jabiya; it has the same characteristics and features (minaret faced with green faience tiles, large dome, inflected arches, geometrical capitals, etc.); above all, it makes the same spectacular impression in the street surrounding, inevitably catching the eye between the suqs and the Mecca road.

361 Within the confines of the old town, between the Great
342 Mosque and the "Street called Straight", a number of khans
172 and two new hammams were built at this period.

Dervish-Pasha built the "Khan Al-Harir", which is a curious mixture of Syrian and Turkish architectural styles. It is a fine structure, with porticoes surrounding the courtyard and, on the upper floor, two series of rooms connected by a corridor and covered by a triple row of domes.

The Khan Al-Gumrok, in the same locality, has a covered hall instead of a central courtyard, and six large domes supported on pendentives. The Khan Soleyman-Pasha (1732), following a similar but more complicated plan, has a courtyard covered by two large domes. Here, the composition is conceived on broader lines and the architectural volumes are enormous, while the dual colour scheme is still found, not only in the black and white courses of the walls, but also in the bonding of the voussoirs of the arcades and pendentives. Some years later, Asad-Pasha, who was Vali (governor) of Damascus and led the great pilgrimage for 14 years running, built a new khan, and a house for himself between it and the Great Mosque.

The khan has a façade reminiscent of Venetian Renaissance architecture in composition, while the building technique and the choice of decorative motifs and materials are in the best artistic traditions of northern Syria. Asad-Pasha's residence ("Azem Palace", 1749) has the same features, repeated and multiplied; it follows the traditional plan of all large Syrian dwellings, with its two entirely separate groups of rooms (selamlik [men's quarters] and haremlik [women's quarters]), its courtyards, porticoes, iwans, pools and fountains.

Thus Damascus today, as in the earliest periods of its history, is still assimilating and using artistic and cultural themes, borne along the great traffic routes, to converge upon the oasis between the Anti-Lebanon and the desert.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

361 In studying the growth of Damascus and its various districts,
172 we have tried to bring out the character and functions of certain groups of buildings which, if skilfully restored and arranged,

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23. Aleppo. El-Omari Mosque.
24. Aleppo. Mariam Anghun.
25. Aleppo. Antikhanh: Hosne.
26. Aleppo. Khan Fadhoun.

following p 35-F

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





7. Deir Semaan. Hemisphere.
8. St. Simeon Stylites. Central octagon.
9. Qalb Louze. Dimensions of the church.
10. Rehab. Facades of a house (1938).
11. Rehab. The same in 1953.

following 35 - M

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

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32. Qalb-loze. The church.
33. Bamuqa. Ancient villa.
34. El-Bara. Tomb.

following p. 35 - N

PRODUCTION

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عدد رخص البناء المعطاة من قبل الدائرة الفنية في مدينة دمشق (سنوات ١٩٣٩ - ١٩٥٣)

NUMBER OF BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED BY THE TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT IN DAMASCUS, YEARS 1939 — 1953

Table No. 15 — جدول رقم ١٥

Year and Month	الابنية الجديدة المعدة للسكن New Residential Buildings			الابنية الجديدة التجارية والصناعية New Commercial and Industrial Buildings		عدد الرخص للبناء الخشبية Permits for simple and wooden construc-tions	السنة والشهور
	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	وحدات السكن Number of Residential units	عدد الرخص Number of Permits	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	عدد الرخص Number of Permits		
1939	50,876	287	190	—	—	537	١٩٣٩
1940	40,373	240	119	—	—	471	١٩٤٠
1941	24,300	140	74	—	—	384	١٩٤١
1942	20,703	127	65	—	—	288	١٩٤٢
1943	41,207	230	126	—	—	316	١٩٤٣
1944	79,492	540	254	—	—	346	١٩٤٤
1945	55,971	353	176	—	—	434	١٩٤٥
1946	90,356	680	326	—	—	627	١٩٤٦
1947	177,400	838	369	—	—	580	١٩٤٧
1948	164,849	865	434	—	—	515	١٩٤٨
1949	165,758	905	393	—	—	386	١٩٤٩
1950	174,674	863	407	33,916	92	333	١٩٥٠
1951	133,058	833	332	28,565	62	246	١٩٥١
1952	178,925	1,107	458	30,984	65	224	١٩٥٢
1953	231,732	1,239	463	33,032	63	188	١٩٥٣
1953							**١٩٥٣**
January	19,834	107	42	3,101	4	12	كانون ثاني
February	17,939	114	46	2,143	8	13	شباط
March	11,419	67	30	5,129	8	17	آذار
April	19,617	118	37	2,235	8	6	نيسان
May	25,085	142	45	5,111	9	17	ايار
June	17,335	93	33	925	3	21	حزيران
July	20,468	96	45	—	—	16	تموز
August	26,513	150	44	8,069	8	18	آب
September	23,512	132	40	619	3	21	ايلول
October	10,392	62	36	3,625	3	20	تشرين اول
November	15,747	88	30	687	6	10	تشرين ثاني
December	23,873	74	35	1,287	3	17	كانون اول

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

241 Wheat yields are lower than the average for Syria, averaging 4 hundredweight to the acre.

Almost the whole of the estate is let to share-tenants who are 427 supervised by an agent, the landowners themselves rarely visiting the estate. The share of the crop taken by the landlord is 25 per cent on non-irrigated land and 42½ per cent on irrigated land. These shares are more favourable to the tenant than is usual, because it is desired to attract more labour to the estate which sixty years ago was quite uncultivated. As elsewhere, the tenants have no leases but live in fear of eviction.

The tenants are divided into five classes:[1]

1. Large tenants cultivating 6 feddans (225 acres) of non-irrigated land: 4 in number.
2. Medium sized tenants cultivating 4½ feddans (168¾ acres): 4 in number.
3. Small tenants cultivating 3 feddans (112½ acres): 60 in number.
4. Small tenants cultivating irrigated land and with an average area of 18 acres: 100 in number.
5. Wage labourers, who form the majority of the villagers. [464]

Of these classes, only the small groups of large and medium-434 sized tenants can live well, in the sense that the output of the 454 farm suffices to cover the essential needs of the family and also √11 provides a small cash surplus. The surplus is used to buy gold pounds and jewellery. But the other groups cannot achieve even a sufficient standard of food consumption. The standard consumption of wheat (barley in the case of the very poor peasants) is 14 kilogrammes of grain per month; to achieve this level it is necessary to crop about 45 acres. Thus with the present system of cultivation, the class of small tenants, who cultivate an area of 112 acres and would appear to have quite sufficient land, cannot attain the minimum because only one-third, 35 acres, can be cultivated owing to shortage of live-stock.

√11 These small tenants, who are typical of the farmers in the great plains of Syria, are very poor, living in one- or two-roomed [342] mud huts, and when there is only one room, sharing it with their animals.

[1] It must be said that the feddan in Syria is a variable measure and here is equivalent to 37½ acres.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD 1

widely used, chiefly in the form of *leben*, a fermented milk product, cheese or butter. About 60 to 70 per cent of the milk is derived from sheep; the remainder, from cattle or goats. The Juliana breed of cattle and a special breed of "Damascus goat" are raised in most regions and are noteworthy as milk producers. Fowl and eggs are usually plentiful, but the consumption of meat is normally low, especially in the rural areas. Mutton is the principal meat, although the flesh of cattle, goats and camels is also utilized. Fish are valuable as a source of protein in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins and along the coast; they are seldom available in other regions.

The Bedouin live chiefly on milk products made from the milk of their flocks, augmented by cereals and, occasionally, dates. Meat is often more of a luxury among the nomads than among the villagers. The average Bedouin diet is usually sparse and monotonous.

Housing

Life in rural Syria centers in the villages, which are self-contained social units. Structurally, they are compact, with the houses attached, and built in such a manner that a continuous windowless wall faces the street. Mud brick or adobe is the predominating building material, although stone is sometimes employed in the highland areas. The houses may consist of one or several rooms, which almost invariably open into a central compound. Separate shelters for storage and for the livestock may line the sides of the courtyards, but in the poorer villages the domestic animals are frequently housed with the family, at least during the winter months. The roofs are typically flat, made of rolled earth overlaid on poles and reeds or of thatch. Beehive-type houses with domed or conical roofs, however, are a characteristic feature of the treeless plains in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces. Dwellings built partially underground, often simulating caves, are encountered in some mountain villages in Latakia. Considerable

314 variation exists between the living conditions of the more prosperous farmers and of the peasants, many of the latter possessing little beyond the barest necessities.

487 177 342 The larger cities, as Damascus and Aleppo, have been important junctions on trade routes from India to the Mediterranean for centuries, and reflect the influence of both Eastern and Western civilizations. They are a combination of the old Arab-type city and the modern, with most of the amenities of urban life. The older sections are usually made up of several quarters, dominated by different racial or religious groups. The houses are constructed of stone, brick or reinforced concrete and stucco, with flat or tiled roofs. In Damascus, about one third of the inhabitants live within the limits of the ancient city and a third in the modern residential developments.

342 571 The Bedouin follow essentially the same pattern of life in Syria as in other countries of the Near and Middle East. The nomadic tribes dwell in tents made of goats' hair, usually in close association with their livestock. Their standards of living are primitive, both in the tent encampments and the semipastoral settlements.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

312 Water supplies are deficient in many sections of the country, and acute shortages may be experienced during the dry season. In the rural areas, domestic supplies are obtained from deep or shallow wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from rain-water cisterns. *Korazes,* or wells connected by underground conduits which often extend for several miles, and waterholes, dug in the plains or near watercourses, are used [314] in some districts. The village supplies are frequently polluted and responsible for the spread of intestinal infections.

The water supply of Damascus is taken from an underground reservoir at 'Ain el Fije, which is fed by springs in the Anti-

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361 175 broken up by the formation of new districts, often at some distance from the original town centre. In isolated parts and on the slopes of the mountain, where nature is conducive to prayer and meditation, many convents and madrasahs were erected; although several of these have been destroyed and others are disused and in ruins, about fifty have survived until the present time, while others again have been converted and incorporated in more recent buildings.

361 In the Moslem sector of the old town is the Maristan of ●344 Nur ad-Din, "one of the most famous hospitals of the Moslem 172 world". It is of great architectural interest, but is unfortunately spoilt by the modern buildings which now surround it. The doorway has a rich and original alveolate decoration, a classical pediment and a beautiful pair of doors. Over the entrance hall is a small ribbed onion dome, surmounted by a sort of truncated conical drum, made up of superimposed alveoles which are visible even from the outside, as in the case of the brick tomb of Zobeide near Baghdad. In the courtyard, with its two beautiful iwans (halls), fragments of inscriptions, lattice-work and marble inlay have been preserved.

361 The Nuriya Madrasah, to the south of the Great Mosque, 346 has a similar dome above the mausoleum. Its doorway is 172 distinguished by the pendant keystone motif, also to be seen at the Adiliya Madrasah, a "masterpiece of stereotomy and bonding" planned and constructed in the architectural style and by the methods characteristic of northern Syria. This latter madrasah, a fitting building for the headquarters of the Arab Academy, has been very carefully restored and rearranged. This building, together with the Zahiriya Madrasah (now the National Library), the house of Saladin's father, which was converted by the Sultan Beibars into a memorial college, and the Aziziya Madrasah (Saladin's tomb) form a fine architectural group to the north of the Great Mosque; these buildings are still adorned by a wealth of ancient works of art, inscriptions, mosaics, doors and windows.

The twofold influence of Mesopotamia and northern Syria can be seen in the art of the period of Nur ad-Din and Saladin.

Various mausolea are to be found outside the old town itself and slightly to the north, in the area between the river and the modern thoroughfare called Baghdad Street. That of Zayn ad-Din (Sitt ech-Châm, 1172), is the oldest example of such a building with a sepulchral dome surmounting two drums; the "Sultan Hasan" Mausoleum has a ribbed dome and an interesting decoration of stucco and painting; the Chamiya Madrasah, standing outside the city walls, contains one of the finest examples of plaster moulding in Damascus, beautiful inscriptions and the armatures of the old leaded-glass windows. The Mausoleum of Ibn al-Moqaddam, Emir of Aleppo, is a typical north Syrian structure. Further to the east and of more recent date stands the At-Tawba Mosque, planned and arranged on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque, and interesting on account of its architecture and decoration (doorway, mihrab, leaded-glass windows, etc.).

The suburb of Salihiyah grew up on the mountain side round a fine group of mausolea, madrasahs and convents, most of which are now abandoned or used for somewhat unsuitable purposes. There, in a picturesque spot on the Nahr Yazid, we find the remains of a colonnaded portico of the oldest convent-madrasah of Salihiyah, together with a whole series of monuments built by eminent persons at the court of Nur ad-Din and Saladin. Most of them are mausolea with brick domes, some ribbed and others double, surmounting two drums decorated with arcading and lobate or twin niches. Many of them contain beautiful carved wooden tombs, old leaded-glass windows and

361 such artistic treasures as the mosaics, the capitals, the Qubba,
172 the minarets and the doors.

In the west portico, large white patches in the mosaics show how much the restoration work done still leaves to be desired. In the north-east section, as part of the careful work carried out by the Directorate of Antiquities, the spaces between the mosaics have been painted a similar colour, with excellent effect, except that the painted surface looks rather dull beside the brilliant surface of the mosaics. Better results might be obtained by mixing the paint with a little marble powder, which would give a slight variety of tone.

It is of course important in any improvement schemes, to consider the general effect of the whole—a fact appreciated by the technical services, which have made plans for building new roads so as to isolate the Great Mosque. In considering these plans, we must bear in mind that the Great Mosque is not simply a building standing by itself: its history and use create an aura influencing the surrounding atmosphere and architecture; the imposing ruins of ancient temples and churches mausolea, madrasahs, khans and suqs form a complex with it.

344 To the north there are no less than five highly important
172 monuments. The Adiliya Madrasah (Arab Academy), with its fine doorway and pendent keystone, has been described as "a masterpiece of masonry and boarding". The Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library) opposite, once the house of Saladin's father, was converted into a memorial college by the famous Sultan Beibars. Close by the Great Mosque, the Aziziya Madrasah contains the tomb of Saladin, housed in a mausoleum with the characteristic ribbed dome resting on octagonal and sixteen-sided drums. The recent restoration of this mausoleum has been outstandingly successful, especially as regards the enhancement of the general effect of the surroundings. Opposite the north entrance, the Jaqmaqiya Madrasah and the Turbat Al-Ikhnaiya, stand like propylaea, guiding the eye to the fine vista of the Byzantine colonnade, the doorway and the minaret.

361 The monuments on the other sides of the mosque are inter-
344 esting too, though less obviously so. The artistic interest
172 of some of the khans, suqs and hammams is often apt to pass unnoticed by the casual observer simply because they are still in use, whereas that of the ruins strikes the eye immediately. The architecture of the group of buildings to the south-west of the Great Mosque, however, is extremely good. Passing through the Khan Al-Gumrok with its six large domes supported by pendentives, and the great Khan Al-Harir, with its triple series of small domes surmounting the first storey, we reach first the rich and delightful Azem Palace, a very suitable setting for the folk museum and tourist offices which are to be installed there; and then, after passing the fine façade of the Khan Azad-Pasha, the Midhat-Pasha suq ("Street called
361 Straight"). The development plan includes the widening of this street. If this is done, we hope that due precautions will be taken to avoid the mistakes mentioned above, and that the present character of this street will be preserved, particularly in the western section, where the suqs are still teeming with life and interest. We might at this point stress how very convenient the suqs are, especially in extremes of weather; they protect the crowd of pedestrians from rain and sun, wind and dust alike. They form a dense network, opening out,

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2/A [Of the mosque -- ANALYSE]

its former importance; buildings were seldom converted to other uses and, except for a few that later served for military purposes (such as the one now known as Diocletian's camp, or the forecourt of the temple of Baal, which was transformed into an Arab fortress in the twelfth century), the buildings were never intentionally demolished or the materials of which they were made plundered. 361 172

Thus Palmyra may be said to present ideal conditions for archaeological research, offering possibilities that will not be exhausted for a long time. After the description of the visible remains given by the German scholars who worked at Palmyra under the direction of Th. Wiegand, after H. Ingholt's systematic exploration of the burial grounds and the penetrating studies of the monuments, cults, institutions and language of the Palmyrians, made by H. Seyrig, R. Amy, D. Schlumberger, J. G. Février, J. Cantineau, J. Starcky and others, the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities worked out an admirable and extensive scheme for uncovering the entire ruins. The clearing of the agora before the war, and that of the theatre, quite recently, have shown what spectacular and instructive results may one day be gained from the scheme. The work is proceeding steadily but the task is immense and there is still plenty of scope for useful and fruitful co-operation.

A few special problems which have already arisen in connexion with the study and exploration of the Palmyra ruins are worth noting here. The monumental arch, the temple of Baal, the great colonnade and innumerable tombs, towers and hypogea required extensive restoration and consolidation. The removal of the decorative sculpture of the Yarhai hypogeum and its reconstruction in the Damascus Museum was a difficult undertaking, successfully accomplished. The bold plan adopted to allow of the uncovering of Baal's sanctuary is also worthy of note. The modern town, whose houses filled the temple precincts, was removed and rebuilt further north, beyond the boundary of the ancient city. Now, after 20 years, the whole population agrees that the step was well justified, for the new village, with its wide airy streets, affords healthier and more convenient living conditions; this may serve as an example. The only remaining inhabited building is the charming house of the Antiquities Service in the south-east corner of the precincts, where visiting archaeologists find a welcome and an atmosphere which they much appreciate.

But Palmyra is not only a city; it is the natural centre of an immense region stretching from the Anti-Lebanon mountains to the Euphrates, a region whose prospects and importance are now beginning to be realized. Along the desert routes which meet and cross within it, and where they reach the rivers, are other sites, marking wayside centres which existed at various times in history. In such places, quite impressive remains have survived to the present day.

THE TWO QASR EL-HEIR

As D. Schlumberger has pointed out in a recent work, Palmyra was once less isolated than is generally believed. Other inhabited centres within the area prospered beside the metropolis. In the plains there were oases made fertile by large-scale irrigation schemes; in the mountains to the north-west, shepherds' villages, made habitable by the construction of reservoirs which provided adequate water supplies for the summer months. These villages did not survive the fall of Palmyra and the region 361 172 344

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was subsequently completely abandoned. However, the dams and aqueducts built during the Roman period were still useful in later times to the Byzantines and Arabs. They made it possible to build the two great castles to the west and east of Palmyra which bear the same name and now stand ruined in the midst of an expanse of desert. They were formerly surrounded by walled gardens and had been designed to serve both as palaces and fortresses. 361 172 344

Built by the Caliph Hisham in 727, Qasr-el-Heir el-Gharbi was a luxurious residence. A tall Byzantine tower marks the site of the ruins from afar. All that remains of the Arab palace is the lower masonry of the walls, which were of freestone; they were uncovered between 1936 and 1938 by D. Schlumberger. His excavations not only laid bare the plan of the palace, which was a square flanked by towers, surrounding a central courtyard with porticos and a single entrance. They also brought to light innumerable remnants of a stucco and fresco decoration which is the most original and complete example of Omayyad art in Syria.

Qasr el-Heir es-Charki, also built by Hisham in 729 near a still older fortification that is now in a very ruined state, has walls and towers standing almost intact up to their full height. The upper part of those on either side of the entrance is decorated with a design of arches supported on small columns; the others have a simpler decoration of ornamental courses of brick. The main doorway has a semi-circular tympanum with machicolations overhead.

Though similar in layout and belonging to the same period, the two Qasr el-Heir presented different problems for the Antiquities Service. With the former, it was a matter of discovering and preserving the precious and fragile decoration, which was picked up in fragments at the foot of the walls; it took several years of patient and highly skilled work to remove it and piece it together in the Damascus Museum, where it is now one of the principal exhibits. In the case of the latter, it was necessary to underpin the walls and towers whose foundations had been undermined by damp and desert winds; the maintenance and supply of a group of workers on an isolated, waterless site such as this was a difficult matter. The work has been successfully begun and is to be continued shortly.

RESAFA

Resafa is another of Caliph Hisham's castles, laid out in the form of a square with a central courtyard, defensive wall and towers; it was located and excavated in 1952, by the German mission under Mrs. K. Otto-Dorn, among the remains of a great Moslem centre. The Caliph died and was buried there.

Up to that time, Resafa had been known chiefly for the Christian monuments that had been built inside its great walls; they are of great interest in the history of art and architecture in northern Syria from the fifth to the seventh century of our era. The largest and best preserved is the basilica of St. Sergius, the plan of which has recently been reconstituted by J. Kollwitz in the light of his excavation work; the structure is said to date from the second half of the fifth century. The remains of the martyry and a second great basilica are still partially hidden; excavation is revealing the beautiful carvings of the semi-domed apses and the capitals and arches. There are also a few smaller buildings and, outside the walls, a funerary

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361 chapel. The peculiar nature of the crystalline stone of these
172 buildings gives them a very distinctive stamp.
0344 The rich ornamentation of the northern doorway of the enclosure, with its five arches of different sizes supported on columns is also remarkable; in structure and style it has been compared to certain parts of Diocletian's palace at Split.

The size of the buildings and the extent and isolation of the site make Resafa a difficult place to explore. It is gratifying to know that work has now been resumed and it is to be hoped that it will soon be possible to continue it on a large scale.

THE VALLEY OF THE EUPHRATES

361 The Euphrates route must also be considered while we are
172 speaking of the desert routes; it too is marked at intervals by large fortified enclosures, built at different times at points where the tracks fanning out from Palmyra crossed the river. Dura and Raqqa are among the best known of these fortifications.

Dura-Europos (Es-Salihiyeh) is a Seleucid foundation dating from the end of the fourth century B.C. Occupied by he Parthians and later by the Romans, it was at that time closely dependant upon Palmyra. It was captured and destroyed by the Sassanids in A.D. 256. The town is situated on a plateau above the Euphrates flanked by two narrow ravines. Guarding the river crossing, and at the same time a caravan city and river port, it held a position of great strategic and economic importance. It was not until 1921, with the chance discovery of the paintings from the temple of the Palmyrene gods, now in the Damascus Museum, that attention was drawn to the site. Its investigation was begun by F. Cumont and continued by Yale University under the direction of M. J. Rostovtzeff. On he traditional Greek chessboard street plan of the town, a number of buildings were located and excavated, including 11 temples, two small sanctuaries, a Christian church, a synagogue, he market, several baths and numerous houses. The many treasures found included groups of frescoes from the church and synagogue, now reconstructed and preserved at Yale and Damascus respectively.

Although the Greek and Roman town at Raqqa was of some importance in its time, it is the Moslem remains of the new town, Al-Rafiqa, founded in 772 by the Caliph Al-Mansur which have monopolized attention. The Baghdad gate with its brickwork decoration and the twelfth-century mosque with its arches and round minaret are the most striking monuments. Quite recently the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities began a search for the remains of the palaces which, in the ninth century, were a favourite residence of the Abbassid dynasty. The excavations, carried out by Nassib Saliby, brought to ligh in 1952, at a spot about two miles north of the city wall, a large group of buildings containing many rooms and formerly surrounded by gardens. A Kufic inscription bearing the name

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connexion with the particular question with which we are concerned, for their preservation and presentation do not call for any special comments. 172

The excavations at Ras-Shamra are still going forward actively; the site is in the hands of the French mission which, for the last 24 years, has been under the direction of C. Schaeffer. The interest of the ruins is partly due to the sensational finds that have been made there, and only the well-informed visitor to the spot will call to mind the age-old past of Ugarit, the innumerable texts that have been unearthed and are, in some cases, still being deciphered, and the precious objects discovered here, the most recently excavated of which are at present on view in the exhibition at the Damascus Museum.

The great monuments of Amrit and the Cyclopean walls of the island of Ruad, protecting that impregnable refuge from the sea, are still eloquent reminders of the Phoenician mastery of the seas.

Nearer our own time, the great Roman theatre of Jebla, which is being excavated by the Directorate of Antiquities, is emerging as a building of quite spectacular proportions and of very considerable interest for certain of its details (structure of the sloping vaults supporting the tiers, arrangement of the stairs around the orchestra).

Mention must also be made of the great tetrapylon at Latakia, which has just been considerably restored.

CRUSADERS' CASTLES

However, the most striking monuments in the whole region from the coast to the mountainous hinterland are the great buildings raised by the Crusaders. They bear witness to the colossal efforts made by the Western peoples, over two centuries, to gain a foothold on this coast, as do the opposing Arab citadels built on the Orontes in order to hold them in check. Peerless masterpieces of medieval military architecture, they impress us not only by their strong defensive works and the 172 344

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172 technical skill of their builders, but also by the admirable specimens of Gothic art to be found in them.
344

The three great castles of Sahyun, Marqab and the Krak are most impressive of all, owing to their superb position, massive proportions and historical importance.

Sahyun (Sigon; Saône of the Crusaders) is situated on a narrow ridge between two deep ravines, on which the Phoenicians and the Byzantines had also once established a foothold. It is a large and rather curious group of buildings, to which Byzantines, Crusaders and Arabs all in turn made their contribution. One of the most striking features is the extraordinary way the rock has been hewn out to isolate the castle, while leaving a slender pillar in the middle of the moat to support the drawbridge. Marqab (Margat of the Crusaders), like an eyrie dominating the coastal road above Baniyas, stands on a steep-sided triangular plateau, protected by its immense double sweep of fortifications. The chapel, with its undivided nave, has two beautiful arched doorways. The Krak des Chevaliers, most famous of all these castles, from its lonely vantage-point among the bare mountains, kept watch on the Homs gap. Its strong defensive works, with the double line of fortifications, round towers, curtains, machicolations, underground passages and great sloping glacis, seeming to continue the slopes outside the fortress, contrast not only with the architecture of the great hall and its portico, with their cross-ribbed vaults, pillared doorways, mullioned windows and carved ornamentation, but also with the austerer architecture of the chapel, with its undivided nave and pointed barrel vault. The surrender of the Knights Hospitallers to Beibars, and the fall of the Krak, in 1271, heralded the collapse of the Crusaders.

The same contrast between the exterior and interior architecture strikes the visitor to the stronghold of Safita (Castel-Blanc), around which modern houses have been built in such a way as to preserve the concentric ground plan of the medieval town. The great square tower, in whose walls there are only a few tiny apertures barely visible to the eye, contains a massive and beautiful church with an undivided nave and pointed barrel vault, and, on the upper storey, a high room with a groined vault, divided into two by a line of pillars. This contrast is also to be found at Tartus where the remains of two beautiful rooms with cross-ribbed vaulting are still to be seen inside the fortress of the Templars; surrounded by enormous ramparts. At some distance, inside the town, the almost completely preserved cathedral of Our Lady of Tortosa, an interesting example of a fortified church, with its austere and very unusual façade, its corner towers, its three vaulted naves and the curious and as yet unexplained structure of one of its pillars, still remains "one of the most beautiful monuments left on this coast by the Crusaders".

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS

172 The monuments of which we have been speaking call for two
658 observations.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that considerable expenditure is necessary for the upkeep and consolidation of these great groups of buildings, certain parts of which are in constant danger of collapse. The Directorate of Antiquities is doing valiant work, but its resources are limited and it is unable to take action everywhere at the same time. It first turned its attention to the urgent repairs needed by the Krak des Chevaliers

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



90. Qasr el-Hair el-Gharbi. Aerial view.
91. Qasr el-Hair ez-Cherki. Entrance to the castle
92. Qasr el-Hair ez-Cherki. Aerial view.

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40. Castle of Mayadin. Aerial view.
41. Castle of Mayadin. Second line of fortifications.
42. Castle of Salon. Aerial view.

following P35 -K

houses among the ancient buildings. These houses should be removed and the pavements should be consolidated and restored. It is not at all certain that the plan adopted by the authorities for the improvement of this site meets all these needs or gives sufficient attention to the appropriate presentation of the principal monuments. 346 172

In conclusion, we must draw attention to the quite outstanding interest of the great group formed by the Roman theatre and the Arab citadel. The two buildings, equal in beauty, are intimately connected. The thirteenth-century ramparts, with their great square towers and rustic work, encircle the crown of the theatre, while a building intended as a storehouse, consisting of three storeys of great vaulted rooms, one above the other, has been built on the orchestra. The Directorate of Antiquities has recently carried out large-scale excavation work to clear the tiered seats and the stage as far as possible. We feel that bolder action is necessary and that the huge block of masonry obstructing the interior of the crown, which is of no great interest in itself, should be demolished. This would restore a splendid ancient monument in its entirety, without serious detriment to the Moslem citadel. The Roman theatre at Bosra is one of the largest, most beautiful and most complete of those that still remain. Moreover, it has a number of noteworthy features, in the structure of the sloping arches supporting the tiers, the arrangement of the small stairways leading to the latter, and the wonderful ornamentation of the *frons scaenae*. The towers of the Arab citadel are also a magnificent example of medieval military architecture. If the work we have suggested were done, both buildings, instead of detracting from each other as they do at present, would be seen to greater advantage. Together, they would be an outstanding attraction for tourists. 346 172

The region of Bosra and the Jebel Druze, which can be reached quite easily from Damascus, should be much better known. The establishment of a rest-house inside the citadel of Bosra itself and the improvement of accommodation facilities at Suweida would involve little cost and make visits much easier. 172

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1/A [AT BOSRA -- ANALYST]

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14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

873 program off to a good start the services of an expert or a small mission should be requested from UNESCO which has accumulated considerable experience in techniques of fundamental education and which was active in Syria during 1952 and 1953 in the field of vocational training.

Higher Education

Higher education has made substantial progress. The Syrian University, which started in 1919 with schools of medicine and law, now includes also faculties of letters and of sciences, schools of pharmacy, dentistry and engineering and a Higher Teachers' Training College. In 1952-53 the University had 2,580 students. In Aleppo a school of engineering has also been established. Yet a further expansion and improvement of facilities will undoubtedly be necessary since the development program will sharply increase the demand for well-trained teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants and other qualified personnel. The University will need more teachers, equipment, laboratories and libraries. Although many Syrians will inevitably have to go abroad for special types of training, Syria should be able gradually to provide broader opportunities for higher education at home. The mission suggests that the government appoint a special committee to draw up recommendations for improving and expanding the University in line with the requirements of the economic development program that might be adopted. Such recommendations will undoubtedly entail larger expenditures on higher education, which the mission has taken into account.

658 *School Building*
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In recent years Syria has apparently been spending about £S 2.5 million annually on new schools. Of this amount, approximately £S 1.4 million has come from municipal or local funds. We do not think that the government should spend, on the average, more than this for school building over the next six years. More could be achieved with such an expenditure, however, by economizing on the cost of construction and requiring more local self-help. Secondary schools built by the Ministry of Public [346] Works, for example, have been excessively expensive owing to their monumental character, the use of costly building materials such as carved stone and other features of a luxury nature. The past cost of £S 150-200 per

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Miscellaneous Buildings

653 [341] There are, of course, various other types of public and special-purpose buildings with which the government is concerned. Among these are agricultural structures, workshops, museums, monuments and resthouses, to whatever extent they are not privately financed. The mission has made suitable allowances for these in the six-year program, under the appropriate headings elsewhere in this report.

[341] Although they are financed and constructed entirely by private endeavor, the religious buildings deserve special mention. This is a field in which Syria excels. Some of the mosques, minarets and churches, whether in large towns or small villages, are outstanding illustrations of the way in which architectural design and construction can be adapted to the needs of the people, their economic resources, and the materials and skills available locally.

657 VII COST OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES PROGRAM

Table 5 summarizes the mission's proposed six-year program in the field of settlements and social services.

TABLE 5 Proposed Six-Year Program for Settlements and Social Services Financed by the Public Sector (*Thousand £S*)

Sector	Total	Annual average
Housing	28,076	4,679
Education	271,780	45,297
Public health	74,150	12,358
Social welfare	450	75
Community development	2,687	448
Buildings for other purposes	8,500	1,417
Community services	86,000	14,333
Planning—Administration	3,600	600
Total	475,243	79,207
Share of		
Central government	372,643	62,107
Municipalities	102,600	17,100

361 175 broken up by the formation of new districts, often at some distance from the original town centre. In isolated parts and on the slopes of the mountain, where nature is conducive to prayer and meditation, many convents and madrasahs were erected; although several of these have been destroyed and others are disused and in ruins, about fifty have survived until the present time, while others again have been converted and incorporated in more recent buildings.

361 344 172 In the Moslem sector of the old town is the Maristan of Nur ad-Din, "one of the most famous hospitals of the Moslem world". It is of great architectural interest, but is unfortunately spoilt by the modern buildings which now surround it. The doorway has a rich and original alveolate decoration, a classical pediment and a beautiful pair of doors. Over the entrance hall is a small ribbed onion dome, surmounted by a sort of truncated conical drum, made up of superimposed alveoles which are visible even from the outside, as in the case of the brick tomb of Zobeide near Baghdad. In the courtyard, with its two beautiful iwans (halls), fragments of inscriptions, lattice-work and marble inlay have been preserved.

361 346 172 The Nuriya Madrasah, to the south of the Great Mosque, has a similar dome above the mausoleum. Its doorway is distinguished by the pendant keystone motif, also to be seen at the Adiliya Madrasah, a "masterpiece of stereotomy and bonding" planned and constructed in the architectural style and by the methods characteristic of northern Syria. This latter madrasah, a fitting building for the headquarters of the Arab Academy, has been very carefully restored and rearranged. This building, together with the Zahiriya Madrasah (now the National Library), the house of Saladin's father, which was converted by the Sultan Beibars into a memorial college, and the Aziziya Madrasah (Saladin's tomb) form a fine architectural group to the north of the Great Mosque; these buildings are still adorned by a wealth of ancient works of art, inscriptions, mosaics, doors and windows.

The twofold influence of Mesopotamia and northern Syria can be seen in the art of the period of Nur ad-Din and Saladin.

Various mausolea are to be found outside the old town itself and slightly to the north, in the area between the river and the modern thoroughfare called Baghdad Street. That of Zayn ad-Din (Sitt ech-Cham, 1172), is the oldest example of such a building with a sepulchral dome surmounting two drums; the "Sultan Hasan" Mausoleum has a ribbed dome and an interesting decoration of stucco and painting; the Chamiya Madrasah, standing outside the city walls, contains one of the finest examples of plaster moulding in Damascus, beautiful inscriptions and the armatures of the old leaded-glass windows. The Mausoleum of Ibn al-Moqaddam, Emir of Aleppo, is a typical north Syrian structure. Further to the east and of more recent date stands the At-Tawba Mosque, planned and arranged on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque, and interesting on account of its architecture and decoration (doorway, mihrab, leaded-glass windows, etc.).

The suburb of Salihiyah grew up on the mountain side round a fine group of mausolea, madrasahs and convents, most of which are now abandoned or used for somewhat unsuitable purposes. There, in a picturesque spot on the Nahr Yazid, we find the remains of a colonnaded portico of the oldest convent-madrasah of Salihiyah, together with a whole series of monuments built by eminent persons at the court of Nur ad-Din and Saladin. Most of them are mausolea with brick domes, some ribbed and others double, surmounting two drums decorated with arcading and lobate or twin niches. Many of them contain beautiful carved wooden tombs, old leaded-glass windows and

361 lintels decorated with graceful inscriptions and coats of arms.

346 The Mouaffari Mosque, built in 1202, is decorated in a par-
172 ticularly interesting and original manner; it is the oldest Ayyubid Mosque, and its plan is reminiscent of the Omayyad Mosque. Ancient columns, with their capitals, have been used to form the arcades round the courtyard. The carved wooden lintels (with incised geometrical designs) over the seven doors of the prayer hall are well preserved; two of them are still surmounted by plaster lattice-work. Inside, several windows have beautiful old glass panes.

Also worthy of mention is the Atabakiya Madrasah, built to house the tomb of Princess Tarkan-Khatoun, with its fine doorway decorated with alveoles, which today, owing to the concealment of the corner colums by more recent structures, looks as if it were in recess. The arrangement of the alveoles, the bonding of the arch-stones of the arcade and the modelling of the cornices show originality, but are somewhat primitive.

This part of the town subsequently developed and spread very considerably, taking in neighbouring districts such as the Kurd quarter, in Saladin's time, and the Mohadjirine at the end of the nineteenth century. Today, this suburb centres round the Mohiy ad-Din Mosque, built by Sultan Selim in 1518 over the tomb of the famous mystic. This mosque, which also contains the tomb of Abd el-Kader, has a beautiful minaret and very striking faience decorations.

MAMELUKE PERIOD

361 At the beginning of the Mameluke period, Damascus developed
175 and expanded further; its products were highly esteemed and, in order to meet the demands of the time, the city developed its art industries, specializing in luxury articles. Even the Crusades promoted its commercial relations with the Western world; like Aleppo, Damascus traded with southern France, Genoa, Pisa and Venice. Its artistic products, such as silks, bronze ornaments, Damascene blades, enamel-work and glassware were in demand everywhere. As a result of this commercial activity, its suqs spread to the north of the Citadel, in the horse-market area, where the Yelbogha Mosque was built in 1264.

Following the example of the Sultans of Cairo, governors, military leaders and their servants then built a great many madrasahs (schools for the teaching of the Koran) and mausolea. The favourite sites for the latter were along the road to Mecca "so that the founder might benefit from the prayers of passing pilgrims". Thus a new suburb, called the meidan, sprang up along this road, reflecting the special features of the pilgrim traffic and trade. The meidan, about two miles in length, was linked with the city by a new group of suqs (Es-Sinaniyeh) outside the western gate of the wall, between the districts of Chagur and Qasr el-Hajjaj; it absorbed the suburban village of El-Qbeybat ("little domes"), and ended at Bab-Allah (Allah's Gate), whence pilgrims "set out on their journey to the Holy House of God".

361 It would take too long to give a complete list of the Mame-
346 luke monuments existing in these districts; even the directory
172 of the Antiquities Service does not include them all. Very often a minaret, a fountain or a madrasah, although not classified, is of considerable interest, because it adds to the atmosphere of the place, or because it has certain original features, though these are often not very obvious, owing to the conversion of the building for another purpose or to bad restoration.

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361 Here, we shall mention only a few monuments which are
346 particularly unusual or significant. Such, for example, is
172 the Turba Afridunîya ("Jami el-Ajami"), at the city end of the meidan, a Koranic school and mausoleum commemorating the Persian trader, Afridun, who died in 1348. The composition of its façade, with black and white courses of masonry, is perfect, and all the decorative elements fit in harmoniously with it. There are a great many of the latter (cornices, bull's eye windows, doorway with inlaid work and scallops, stalactite ornamentation, inscriptions, interlocking voussoirs and panels of strapwork), and several of them were subsequently repeated, for purely ornamental purposes, in other buildings.

A little further south, there is a small mausoleum to an unknown person, which is commonly called "Weli Cheyhani". Its architecture is sober and its composition good. As in the majority of these monuments, the façade, with its skilful bonding, has a doorway decorated with alveoles. The two windows are connected by a single lintel, composed of three rows of stones, the middle one being formed of interlocking voussoirs; there is a bull's eye above the pilaster separating them. The dome, resting on a high drum with 16 windows, is pierced with holes to let in light.

Nearly half-way along the meidan stands the double mausoleum of Araq, belonging to the same period (1349). The plan of this building is more complicated. Its many-coloured façade has turquoise-blue faience inlay round the doorway, with its ornamentation of stalactites and braid-moulding. Here also, the sloping surfaces are gracefully joined to the vertical by a system of alveoles, and the long fascia of the lintels divides the façade horizontally with its two-coloured arrangement of interlocking voussoirs, repeated right across the building and sloping first one way and then the other. The many radiating voussoirs of the bull's eyes form as it were the rays of a sunburst. The lintels are enriched with geometrical and floral designs, and cyma reversa mouldings give unity to the various parts of the façade.

The architectural and decorative elements used with a very strong sense of balance and harmony in these buildings, were later repeated and multiplied until surfaces became so richly adorned as to give the impression of incoherence and pointlessness, combined with artistic decadence, which is characteristic of the last Mameluke period.

The Yachbak Mausoleum (1377), more ornate, but still well designed and balanced, has domes surmounting sloping roofs composed of alveoles. The central feature of the façade is a doorway decorated with stalactites, and the rosettes of the bull's eyes form a horizontal band, matched, within the embrasure of the doorway, by a panel decorated with marble and faience inlaid work in an interlaced design, surrounding the Mameluke coat of arms.

The same features are to be seen in the Rachidiyé Madrasah, the upper part of whose doorway has recently been cut off to make room for an entirely extraneous small structure; the fine composition of the façade is also partially concealed by modern buildings.

Among the latest buildings of the Mameluke period, the Sabuniya Madrasah, the Sibaiya Madrasah at the western end of the "Street called Straight", and the Al-Muradiya Madrasah deserve mention. Prominently situated, with the curves of their domes and the tall shafts of their beautiful minarets, they add a special and typical note of their own to the street scene.

A few other monuments of the same period are to be found either in the old town or in the districts immediately to the north of it. We have already mentioned the Yelbogha Mosque,

361 designed on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque; it is re-
346 markable for the beautiful structure of its niches and
172 windows with their alveolate decoration, its magnificent bands of plaster moulding, and its windows, doorways and minaret. This mosque well deserves to be set off to greater advantage.

Tingiz, the Viceroy of Syria, was responsible for the construction of a fine group of buildings. Only the beautiful minaret and two doorways of the mosque which bears his name still remain after the rebuilding of the An-Nasir Avenue, but the double mausoleum of his w . (Turba Kukabaiya) and, a little further on, the Dar al-Hadir, a school where the traditions of the Prophet were expounded, are still to be seen in the "Street called Straight".

The last monuments of this period are the two beautiful tiered minarets in the Bab Jabiya suq, with their rich decoration, and that of the Al-Moallaq Mosque, with an unbroken line of black stones encircling its niches and rose windows.

OTTOMAN PERIOD

361 The end of the Mameluke period was marked by a serious eco-
175 nomic crisis, aggravated by disturbances and devastation (Tamerlane), and also by the Portuguese discoveries, which altered the traditional trade routes. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire, which expanded Damascus's economic and political frontiers, the city again began to develop. Under the capitulations, Turkish ports were opened to European merchants. Moreover, since pilgrims set out from Damascus on their journey to Mecca, the city was expected to supply them with the necessary equipment and provisions for their crossing of the desert.

These circumstances led to the building of many khans, with their porticoed courtyards, shops and stables on the ground floor and accommodation for travellers on the floor above. The city was no longer of any strategic or military importance; the ramparts, already useless on account of the town's extension and the formation of suburbs without the walls, were abandoned; the moats filled in and the Citadel fell into ruins. The pasha (governor), with his entourage of Turkish aristocrats, took up his residence and administered business at the seraglio, outside the ramparts, at a place called Qanawat (the canals), near the Roman aqueduct.

361 In the same neighbourhood were erected the two great
346 imperial madrasahs, the Solaymaniya (1554), constructed by the
172 famous Turkish architect, Sinan, who built the Sulaymaniya in Constantinople, and the Salimiya (1566), designed by a Persian architect. With their great buttressed domes, surrounded by a double row of small domes covering the porticoes and rooms, their slender pencil-like minarets tapering to a cone, and the surrounding gardens with their fountains, trees and flowers, they achieve an architectural unity and a highly characteristic atmosphere of their own, in a style native to Constantinople and readily transplanted to Damascus.

The Solaymaniya has a rich variety of architectural and decorative motifs, characteristic of that period and style, such as marble inlaid work and great overlays of faience tiles on the walls and tympana of the doors and windows; keel arches with alternate black and white arch-stones; abundant use of stalactites, niches ornamented with overlapping shell designs, lintels with many-coloured interlocking voussoirs, forming increasingly ornate and complicated patterns. The capitals

361 consist of clustered tetrahedrons, coloured with blue and red.
346 The astragals of the columns and their tori are of gilt bronze.
172 All the surfaces are composed of alternating courses of different colours.

The same features are to be seen in the buildings put up by the governor, Dervish-Pasha, forming a fine group at the beginning of the Pilgrims' Way, to the west of the old town. The façade of the "Ed-Derwichiyeh" Mosque is composed of alternate black and white courses; the tall polygonal minaret is painted green. The whole building, which is surmounted by a large dome encircled by small cupolas, is architecturally connected with the neighbouring mausoleum by an archway over the road. The arrangement of designs, shapes and colours on the façades shows extraordinary imaginative ingenuity. The pointed bulbous dome of the mausoleum rests on a drum of irregular shape. At a later date, in the same street, but a little further south, Sinan-Pasha built his mosque among the suqs of Bab Jabiya; it has the same characteristics and features (minaret faced with green faience tiles, large dome, inflected arches, geometrical capitals, etc.); above all, it makes the same spectacular impression in the street surrounding, inevitably catching the eye between the suqs and the Mecca road.

361 Within the confines of the old town, between the Great
342 Mosque and the "Street called Straight", a number of khans
172 and two new hammams were built at this period.

Dervish-Pasha built the "Khan Al-Harir", which is a curious mixture of Syrian and Turkish architectural styles. It is a fine structure, with porticoes surrounding the courtyard and, on the upper floor, two series of rooms connected by a corridor and covered by a triple row of domes.

The Khan Al-Gumrok, in the same locality, has a covered hall instead of a central courtyard, and six large domes supported on pendentives. The Khan Soleyman-Pasha (1732), following a similar but more complicated plan, has a courtyard covered by two large domes. Here, the composition is conceived on broader lines and the architectural volumes are enormous, while the dual colour scheme is still found, not only in the black and white courses of the walls, but also in the bonding of the voussoirs of the arcades and pendentives. Some years later, Asad-Pasha, who was Vali (governor) of Damascus and led the great pilgrimage for 14 years running, built a new khan, and a house for himself between it and the Great Mosque.

The khan has a façade reminiscent of Venetian Renaissance architecture in composition, while the building technique and the choice of decorative motifs and materials are in the best artistic traditions of northern Syria. Asad-Pasha's residence ("Azem Palace", 1749) has the same features, repeated and multiplied; it follows the traditional plan of all large Syrian dwellings, with its two entirely separate groups of rooms (selamlik [men's quarters] and haremlik [women's quarters]), its courtyards, porticoes, iwans, pools and fountains.

Thus Damascus today, as in the earliest periods of its history, is still assimilating and using artistic and cultural themes, borne along the great traffic routes, to converge upon the oasis between the Anti-Lebanon and the desert.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

361 In studying the growth of Damascus and its various districts,
172 we have tried to bring out the character and functions of certain groups of buildings which, if skilfully restored and arranged,

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16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1
DAMASCUS

The suqs with their khans, the hammams, mosques and madrasahs generally form a coherent and harmonious architectural and functional unit, which should be kept intact. The present system of classifying monuments should be extended to cover architectural groups as well as individual buildings. We would repeat that this does not mean thwarting reasonable attempts to improve or develop a district. Our aim is merely to show that the usual criteria, methods and means employed in the technical departments of municipalities, where individual interests and immediate advantages are alone considered, should not be applied to such architectural groups. It should have been possible, for example, to prevent the erection of a conspicuously tasteless modern house, jarring in both colour and design, close to the southern façade of the Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library). The new buildings in Seleymani Street, near the Khan Al-Gumrok are another instance of the sort of thing that should not be allowed. Before putting up new building in old parts of the town, much thought should be given to their appearance and colour, with the twofold aim of improving the present situation and setting off the monuments, which are dignified and beautiful features of the city as a whole, to their best advantage. The criterion of utility cannot be ruthlessly applied to the products of culture and the mind. For that reason our young town planners should give up their attempts to recover money spent on laying out an open square with streets radiating from it or piercing wide streets, by ill-considered exploitation of building land in old parts of the town, where the present houses give very little return or by the demolition of hammams, madrasahs and gardens, which now bring in no revenue at all, in order to free their sites. 361 172

The old centre of the town would gain greatly, both aesthetically and from the practical point of view, if the Citadel were arranged and used for a different purpose. Its interest as a monument is obvious, with its magnificent façades and towers and the beautiful east gate with its alveolate decoration. At the present time, the Citadel buildings are put to poor use as a barracks and prison. Should it be decided to use them for a different purpose, the open spaces within the walls should be used for public gardens and so brought into the life of the city. They might be some of the most beautiful gardens in Damascus, with gateways leading into the streets outside. An enterprising architect, with the help of an expert advisory committee, could well adapt the fine and imposing architecture of the Citadel to meet the needs of some public institution. It might, for example, be used to house a university faculty, with a "Students' Centre", providing accommodation for students and professors not resident in Damascus, a library, studies, lecture-rooms and exhibition halls. The mosque should again be used for prayer. Premises could also be provided for recreation and entertainment, with a cinema, café, restaurant, etc. If the western façade were cleared, there would be a really splendid and imposing view down the wide An-Nassr Avenue. Thus transformed, the Citadel, instead of hindering the town's development as it does today, would once again become a part of public life and, in its new guise, would be a great social asset to the city and the nation.

The Great Omayyad Mosque is the most interesting monument in Damascus, although unfortunately it has been so seriously damaged in the course of its history by destruction earthquakes and fire that it is now a somewhat confused mixture of unequal artistic and architectural styles. It would be excellent if sufficient funds could be found to complete and extend the work—already happily begun by the Wakfs and the Directorate of Antiquities—of restoring this monument and setting 346 172

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Damascus
346
172

it off to better advantage, so as to enhance its appearance, as its artistic and historical interest, its position as the religious centre of the Syrian capital, deserve.

As it now stands, the older parts (mosaics, columns, stucco work, mihrabs, qubbet, etc.) look lifeless and unattached, as though they were no longer part of the mosque, but rather, in some respects, an encumbrance. The aim of the restoration plan should be to set off this heritage of art and history to the best advantage. The first step must be a careful, critical assessment of the relative value of the different features. Steps must also be taken to make an entity of the buildings and restore their artistic unity. This difficult and complicated task calls for the collaboration of artists and scholars, but the result, if the necessary care is exercised, will be to restore to the city the full splendour of its greatest religious edifice.

We give below for purposes of guidance only a provisional list, based on our first impressions, of the things to be borne in mind when drawing up a plan for restoration and renovation work. The most interesting from the historical point of view are obviously the oldest parts: columns, capitals, cornices, inscriptions, fragments of walls and arcades, etc. These are precious relics of a dead civilization, to be preserved for their documentary and cultural interest. As ruins and fragments, they also have a decorative value, and there can be no justification for restoration which involves their wholesale reconstruction.

All the surviving parts of the original Omayyad building (arcades and capitals, mosaics) are likewise of outstanding historical and archaeological interest; but the question of how to set them off most effectively is here complicated by the fact that they are also component parts of the present building. They are, moreover, of very considerable aesthetic value.

The interior of the prayer-hall, in the central part of the transept, bears traces of the succession of periods, restorations and reconstructions through which it has passed. This is now no longer the centre of interest; it gives rather the impression of a sort of corridor separating the two wings of the naves. The dirty, defaced remains of mosaics on the north wall form dark patches against the white background. A few fine old windows are interspersed with a large number of very ordinary modern ones, with garish coloured glass. The thick marble with which the four central pillars are faced for reinforcement is of no interest. The same aesthetic defects and lack of stylistic unity are to be found on the south wall; the mihrab, with its delicate inlaid work, the Koranic inscriptions in faience, the three finely designed lower windows and the beautiful gilded ceiling, clash with the style of the rest.

We think that the white plaster on the walls, the arcades and the drum of the dome, in this part of the transept, should be removed in order fully to reveal the stone structure beneath. The dressed stone in the naves on either side is already visible. The next stage might be to replace the upper windows, change the colour of the ceiling beams, and instal a new lighting system, dispensing with the lamps at present in use. Syria today has plenty of talented artists and craftsmen; and to give them employment would help to keep alive a glorious tradition, and to encourage crafts which are in danger of being stifled by the advance of mechanization.

The comments made on the sanctuary apply equally to the courtyard, vestibule and doorways. Many unmeaning and uninteresting features, such as the glass-paned doors and modern eaves, the neo-classical marble facings, and the cement slabs forming part of the portico floor, are found side by side with

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361 the main centre of the Jebel Zawiyé, was both an agricultural
172 and an industrial town (large-scale production of oil and wine), and finally covered an area about 2 miles long by 1 I wide. Among the confused heaps of its ruins, the remains of several churches and rich mausolea of the sixth century, with their pyramidal crowns, are recognizable.

172 G. Tchalenko has drawn attention to the similarity of the
341 architecture throughout the limestone plateau due to the use of the same materials and the same methods of hewing and bonding stone. He has also noted the unity and homogeneity of the carved ornamentation, which was gradually adapted to the new forms of the various buildings. This suggests that itinerant groups of craftsmen went from place to place, taking their style and methods with them.

172 Evidence is provided by [illegible] buildings, varying in
346 nature and importance. We would draw particular attention to two of them, which seem to surpass all the others by their quality and exceptional charm. The first is the cruciform basilica of St. Simeon (Qalaat Semaan) built in the third quarter of the fifth century around the column on which the Stylite spent the last 37 years of his life and which, long after his death, was still a famous place of pilgrimage. The originality of the plan, the masterly structure of the central octagon, with its great semi-circular arches, the harmonious proportions of the chevet and the southern façade, together with the neighbouring baptistery and conventual buildings, make this peerless architectural group "the greatest and grandest Christian ruin in the East". The second of these monuments, lesser known because it is difficult of access, is the basilica of Qalblouz, standing in a temenos, like an ancient temple, on the crest of the Jebel el-Ala. It dates from the end of the fifth century. Its façade flanked by towers, its chevet adorned with columns, the great arches separating the nave from the side aisles, the majestic proportions of the apse, and the quality and sober arrangement of carving, produce that impression of harmony and perfection that only a masterpiece can achieve.

THE POPULATION OF THE LIMESTONE PLATEAU

361 The profusion of ruins over such a large area, not only in the
172 vicinity of fertile plains, but on rocky and waterless plateaux shows that there was once a large population, which later disappeared completely. The construction of water tanks may have helped the people to subsist, but that alone cannot explain their extraordinary prosperity. What, then, were their means of livelihood?

Some have thought the answer to this question to be that the arable land disappeared as a result of complete and unchecked deforestation, which brought about a radical change in the conditions of life. Tchalenko does not agree; in the work already referred to, he gives a simpler and more plausible explanation of this phenomenon.

It has long been established that the ancient inhabitants of the limestone plateau owed their prosperity to the cultivation of the olive and, to a lesser degree, of the vine. The many presses found in all the settlements are proof of this. The cultivation of these crops is perfectly feasible in the soil and climate of the present day. It was a change in political and social circumstances which brought about the decline in the population. Where the soil accumulated in rocky basins and

that they are widely scattered and often difficult of access, make it hard to ensure really effective protection. 361 172

THE CHURCHES OF EZRAA

At least a brief mention must be made of the importance of Ezraa. The churches of St. George and St. Hélie, dating from 514 and 542 respectively, are important in the history of early Christian art. Today, they are in a deplorable state of neglect. The cupola of the church of St. George collapsed in 1912. Ugly repairs have been made to both. The consolidation and intelligent restoration of both these buildings is particularly to be recommended. 346

BOSRA

The old capital of the Roman Province of Arabia is now a humble village. It contains remarkable ancient ruins, both Christian and Islamic, whose architectural beauty and historical importance recall the city's long and brilliant past. 361 172

The topography of the Roman town is still clearly indicated by the straight course of the main thoroughfare, built on the ancient decumanus; several columns of its porticos and one of the gates at the western end of the town are still standing. The visitor will note a great monumental arch with three bays, the ruins of thermae and four large Corinthian columns which may have formed part of a nymphaeum.

Built in 513 under the Archbishop Julianos, the cathedral, now in a very ruinous state, is one of the oldest examples of a large church with a cupola and central plan. From an inscription, we know that Bosra possessed an even older church, dedicated to the Virgin in the third quarter of the fourth century by the Archbishop Antipater; this inscription reminds us of the important part played by the town in early Christian history. Its name is also linked with the early history of Islam, for a large building with an apse and a blind façade is believed to be the remains of the monastery where the monk Bahira taught Mahomet and foretold his prophetic calling. A mosque, Al-Mabrak, was later built on the spot where, according to tradition, the Prophet's camel knelt. 346 172

This is one of the many mosques whose high dark minarets, square-built in the twelfth century, give the town of Bosra its own particular stamp. Although the Great Mosque of Omar is in a better state of preservation and although the minaret of Al-Fatmé has a slenderer grace, the Al-Mabrak mosque and the adjoining madrassh, built in 1136—the oldest Syrian madrassh, according to J. Sauvaget—form a very remarkable architectural group.

The rapid decay of these monuments is most regrettable. A glance at the older publications will show the extent of the damage, which has been made worse by the building of modern

houses among the ancient buildings. These houses should be removed and the monuments should be consolidated and restored. It is not at all certain that the plan adopted by the authorities for the improvement of this site meets all these needs or gives sufficient attention to the appropriate presentation of the principal monuments. 346 172

In conclusion, we must draw attention to the quite outstanding interest of the group formed by the Roman theatre and the Arab citadel. The two buildings, equal in beauty, are intimately connected. The thirteenth-century ramparts, with their great square towers and rustic work, encircle the crown of the theatre, while a building intended as a storehouse, consisting of three storeys of great vaulted rooms, one above the other, has been built on the orchestra. The Directorate of Antiquities has recently carried out large-scale excavation work to clear the tiered seats and the stage as far as possible. We feel that bolder action is necessary and that the huge block of masonry obstructing the interior of the caves, which is of no great interest in itself, should be demolished. This would restore a splendid ancient monument in its entirety, without serious detriment to the Moslem citadel. The Roman theatre at Bosra is one of the largest, most beautiful and most complete of those that still remain. Moreover, it has a number of noteworthy features, in the structure of the sloping arches supporting the tiers, the arrangement of the small stairways leading to the latter, and the wonderful ornamentation of the *frons scaenae*. The towers of the Arab citadel are also a magnificent example of medieval military architecture. If the work we have suggested were done, both buildings, instead of detracting from each other as they do at present, would be seen to greater advantage. Together, they would be an outstanding attraction for tourists. 346 172

The region of Bosra and the Jebel Druse, which can be reached quite easily from Damascus, should be much better known. The establishment of a rest-house inside the citadel of Bosra itself and the improvement of accommodation facilities at Suceida would involve little cost and make visits much easier. 172

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



1. Damascus. Great Mosque; North portico.
2. Damascus. Great Mosque; West portico.
3. Damascus. Great Mosque; West portico and mosaics.
4. Damascus. Great Mosque; mosaics.
5. Damascus. Great Mosque; mosaics.

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



6. Damascus. Cemetery of Bab Saghir.
7. Damascus. Darwish-Pasha Mosque (1571).
8. Damascus. Sulemiya Madrasah (1464).
9. Damascus. Rukniya Madrasah (1324).

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10. Damascus. Sahyrdiniya Madrasah (1134).
11. Damascus. Salihiya Madrasah (1168).
12. Damascus. Khan Asad-Pasha (18th century).
13. Damascus. Sulaiman Madrasah (1558).

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16. Damascus. Nouraddin Mosque ("Hanabilah"; 1202-13); minaret.
17. Damascus. Sheikh Mohiddy ad-Din (1318); minaret.
18. Damascus. Al-Muzaffiya Mosque; minaret.
19. Damascus. Yanjuk Mosque (1368); minaret.
20. Damascus. Madrasa al-Qadi (1470); minaret.
21. Damascus. Tomb Jaban (16th century); minaret.

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In: Cultural et al G-S (1983) 1984 MDI Syria MDI

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23. Aleppo. El-Omari Mosque.
24. Aleppo. Mariam Anduni.
25. Aleppo. Archbishop's House.
26. Aleppo. Khan Fesdekan.

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





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



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

7. Dire Sutton, Hamidiy.
8. St. Simeon Stylites. General viewpoint.
9. Qalb'loze. Dimensions of the church.
10. Rehab. Facades of a house (1938).
11. Rehab. The same in 1953.

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

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

19. Baalbek. Acanthus columns.
19. Qasr-ibrim. Temple of Hathor.
62. Qalibia. Gate of the Palace.
62. Rome. Church of St. George.

following P35 - P

SYRIA MDI

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Above: Teacher (at right) and part of the top class of the primary school for girls, Suweyda, Syria
Below: A former French army barracks now used for a government school for boys, Suweyda

following p. 360 (B)

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
SYRIA MDI

875*

Type of School	Number of Schools
Schools with one teacher	345
Schools with two teachers	90
Schools with three teachers	40
Schools with four teachers	17
Schools with five teachers	42
Schools with six teachers	38
Schools with seven teachers	24
Schools with eight teachers	16
Schools with nine teachers	10
Schools with ten teachers	6
Schools with more than ten teachers	30
Total	658

More than half of the schools (52.4 percent) are one-teacher schools, while the number of schools with a full complement of teachers (five or more) is 166, or 25.2 percent.

Light may also be shed upon primary education by an examination of the qualifications of primary-school teachers. The following data are for 1943–44:[4]

Qualification	Number of Teachers
Graduates of teachers colleges or holders of teaching diploma	820
Law College graduates	10
Agricultural School (Salamiyah)	13
Higher School of Literature	18
Baccalauréat, Second Part	93
Baccalauréat, First Part	225
Brevet (General, Technical, or Commercial)	159
Total	1,338

As the number of teachers was 1,856 in 1943, this leaves 518 teachers unaccounted for, presumably because their qualifications were even lower than the *brevet* (roughly equivalent to a junior-high-school certificate).

Buildings and Equipment

A large number of primary schools, particularly in the cities, are in rented buildings. Most of these are houses built to accommodate families, although some of the old-style houses are spacious and have large courtyards. Ordinarily the rooms planned as lodging quarters are too small for 872* 346

[4] Sati' al-Husri, *Reports on the State of Education in Syria and Recommendations for Its Reform* (Damascus: 1944), p. 132.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
SYRIA MDI

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a class of thirty or forty, and classes either become crowded or have to be adjusted to the rooms. Rented buildings range from the large houses that may be found in Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, to the small village houses which are little more than huts. Primary-school buildings may be owned by the government, but the number of these is comparatively small. Many schools in cities and in villages are owned by municipalities or are rented by the municipalities as their contribution to the maintenance of the schools. Sanitary conditions, lighting, and ventilation may be fair in government-owned buildings and in some of the rented ones, but they are often inadequate.

K872

The usual classroom desk is built with seats attached to accommodate two children, and is frequently a local product. The seats may or may not have backs, and in the latter case the children rest their backs either against the wall or against the desk immediately behind them. In a crowded school a desk for two may be occupied by three or even four pupils. The desks are in various degrees of preservation, some being new, while others appear to have been in use a long time.

Some of the larger primary schools in the cities are well stocked with instructional materials and equipment such as maps in French or Arabic, natural-history charts imported from Egypt, story pictures. In some schools there is a variety of instructional materials made by the teachers. The village schools are not so well supplied.

Libraries, when they exist, are very small and little used by the children. Very little money is given by the Ministry of Education for the purchase of library books. Occasionally books are sent to the schools by the Ministry.

The schools are run on the most economical lines. Very little money is allowed for the everyday running of the schools. The principal or head teacher has to spend out of his own pocket or borrow from the welfare society's fund. Only after receipts for the expenditure are presented and approved by higher authority is the money refunded by the Treasury.

Secondary Education

K873

As has already been stated, secondary education was shortened from seven to six years under the new plan of organization. In the earlier course the first four years led to the examination for the *brevet* certificate, and were followed by two years in the scientific or literary section, which ended in the first *baccalauréat* examination. The new plan calls simply for an intermediate stage of four years leading to the intermediate examination, and a preparatory stage of two years divided into a scientific and a literary

44:Matthews and Akrawi S,G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
SYRIA MDI

*873 While there were 2,467 students in the first year, there were only 301 in the seventh year. Most classes have between 30 and 40 pupils, but classes with as low as 11 students and as high as 70 students were seen by the American Council Commission. Crowded classes, however, are rare in the secondary schools.

Attendance is quite regular, but it tends to drop sharply toward the end of the year, the students preferring to prepare for their final examinations at home.

School activities are on the whole encouraged, although schools differ in this respect. In addition to the regular athletic classes and the compulsory *Futuwah* (military training), schools engage in a number of organized games, mainly football, basketball, volleyball, and in some cases tennis. A number of schools have Scout troops. School groups also conduct picnics and excursions. Student clubs are more numerous in larger schools than in the smaller ones. The most common is the cooperative welfare society, which gathers contributions from students, teachers, and occasionally from the general public, for the help of poorer students. There are also clubs for Arabic, music, dramatics, and other such activities. Some schools and their clubs issue student magazines. The teachers usually play a leading role in these activities, serving as sponsors and in some schools as chairmen.

Perhaps a word regarding the opportunities open to the secondary-school graduate will be in order. In Syria proper a graduate may go to the Syrian University or to the two-year course in teacher training. The latter is the course most of the girls follow. However, a number of opportunities exist outside Syria where the second *baccalauréat* was considered to be of a high standard. Previously it was accepted in France and students holding it were permitted to enter French higher institutions. Whether the new certificate, with one less year of schooling, will be considered of the same level remains to be seen, although it is hardly likely under the circumstances. Both the American University and the Université St. Joseph in Beirut accepted it; the former required an examination in English but admitted students to the sophomore and even to the junior year. The latter accepted it for the purposes of entrance to its Faculties of Medicine, Law, and Engineering. The Egyptian Ministry of Education also recognized it for entrance to the Universities of Fuad I and Faruq I and other higher institutions.

Buildings and Equipment

*873
346 Secondary schools are more fortunate than primary schools with regard to their buildings. The boys schools are usually more favored as to build-

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
Syria Mdl

ings than are the girls schools. Of 14 secondary schools visited by the American Council Commission, 7 were government-owned, including 2 confiscated French barracks at Suwayda in Jabal Druze; 2 belonged to local municipalities; and 5 were rented. Undoubtedly, the best secondary-school buildings seen by the Commission in Syria were those of the Damascus and Aleppo boys schools. A fine new building for the boys secondary school at Homs was in the process of construction. 873* 346

In libraries, also, the secondary schools are more favored. There is a wide range, however, in the number of books—from about 25 or 30 books in the library of the intermediate school for boys at Suwayda to about 7,000 volumes in the library of the secondary school for boys in Damascus. The books are almost entirely in French and Arabic. Large collections of French literary works and French textbooks exist at both Damascus and Aleppo boys schools. A number of Arabic magazines are subscribed to, and formerly a number of French magazines as well. The British Council recently gave small collections of English books to the libraries of some of the schools. The Damascus school for boys has a full-time librarian. Usually there is little space for reading in the libraries, and students borrow books at specified times, sometimes paying deposits for the books borrowed. More freedom in the system of borrowing, more space for reading in the libraries, and more encouragement by teachers and all concerned seem to be necessary for making the school library play a more important part in the educational programs of the schools. 873*

The situation with regard to desks and furniture is much the same as that in primary school except that the quality of the desks is better, and few, if any, desks accommodate more than two pupils.

Vocational Schools

There were 6 public vocational schools in Syria at the time of the visit of the American Council Commission: the Technical (trade) School for boys, the Technical School for girls, and the Commercial School for boys, all in Damascus; the Technical School for boys, and the Commercial School for boys, both in Aleppo, and the Agricultural School at Salamiyah, east of Hama. The last named is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Economy. Four of the six schools were visited by the Commission —the Technical School for boys and the Commercial School for boys at Damascus were not visited. 874*

All of the vocational schools (except the school of agriculture) give a course of four years above the primary-school certificate. Formerly they

SYRIA MDI

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Mt Middle East

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

ALEPPO COLLEGE, ALEPPO, SYRIA
This view shows the Arabic arched façade of the main classroom building

following p. 392 (a)

SYRIA MDI
44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1948)1949 M1 Middle East
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



Above: One of the classroom buildings of the secondary school for boys, Homs, Syria
Below: A village primary school with a school garden, near Homs

Following p·392 (B)

PRODUCTION

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عدد رخص البناء الصادرة من قبل الدائرة الفنية في مدينة دمشق (سنوات ١٩٣٩ - ١٩٥٣)

NUMBER OF BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED BY THE TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT IN DAMASCUS, YEARS 1939 — 1953

Table No. 15

جدول رقم ١٥

Year and Month	الابنية الحديثة للسكن New Residential Buildings			الابنية الحديثة التجارية والصناعية New Commercial and Industrial Buildings		عدد الرخص البسيطة والخشبية Permits for simple and wooden constructions	السنة والشهور
	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	وحدات السكن Number of Residential units	عدد الرخص Number of Permits	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	عدد الرخص Number of Permits		
1939	50,876	287	190	—	—	537	١٩٣٩
1940	40,373	240	119	—	—	471	١٩٤٠
1941	24,300	140	74	—	—	384	١٩٤١
1942	20,703	127	65	—	—	288	١٩٤٢
1943	41,207	230	126	—	—	316	١٩٤٣
1944	79,492	540	254	—	—	346	١٩٤٤
1945	53,971	353	176	—	—	434	١٩٤٥
1946	90,356	680	326	—	—	627	١٩٤٦
1947	177,400	838	369	—	—	580	١٩٤٧
1948	164,849	865	434	—	—	515	١٩٤٨
1949	165,758	903	393	—	—	386	١٩٤٩
1950	174,674	863	407	33,916	92	333	١٩٥٠
1951	133,058	833	332	28,565	62	246	١٩٥١
1952	178,925	1,107	458	30,964	65	224	١٩٥٢
1953	231,733	1,239	463	33,032	63	188	١٩٥٣
1953							١٩٥٣
January	19,834	107	42	3,101	4	12	كانون ثاني
February	17,939	114	46	2,143	8	13	شباط
March	11,419	67	30	5,129	8	17	آذار
April	19,617	116	37	2,235	8	6	نيسان
May	25,085	142	45	5,111	9	17	ايار
June	17,235	93	33	825	3	21	حزيران
July	20,468	96	45	—	—	18	تموز
August	26,513	150	44	8,069	8	18	آب
September	23,512	122	40	619	3	21	ايلول
October	10,392	62	36	3,625	3	20	تشرين اول
November	15,747	88	30	687	6	10	تشرين ثاني
December	22,872	74	35	1,337	3	17	كانون اول

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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

—*Photo Courtesy of Cotton Trade Journal*

All the cotton in the Aleppo region is ginned at this modern ginning center in Aleppo. Large gins (some have 10 saw gin stands) are located or are under construction on each corner of the square. Buildings are elaborate and usually cost about twice as much as the machinery. The grounds are landscaped like a campus.

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inhabited for centuries until a few years ago when farmers from the cities began developing them with mechanical equipment. Large landlords from Aleppo spent millions of dollars installing pumps, building roads, and in other ways developing these lands.

Although occupancy rights have been recognized for years, various government officials with whom the matter was discussed were strong in their views that these newcomers are squatters and should be evicted. They want to distribute the land among the landless peasants. The landlords who have made investments here are just as determined that they will not be evicted. The political strength of the landlords is given generally as the reason for the statement recently made by the head of the government to the effect that the new law will be studied for revision.

While the question of eviction is being debated, the government is proceeding to parcel out other public domains in small units to landless peasants. As this program is expanded, the large landowners are becoming more and more concerned for fear their own properties will be expropriated and subdivided, as has been done in neighboring countries.

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This dispute over the use of public land illustrates the struggle for power going on in Syria today between government bureaucrats and wealthy landlords. The government on one hand is attempting to force changes in all phases of the economy through its various control programs. These changes, however, are strongly resisted by the landowners who prefer to be free from regulations and regimentation. The outcome of this struggle may have a material bearing on the trend in agriculture for the next several years.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Miscellaneous Buildings

653 [347] There are, of course, various other types of public and special-purpose buildings with which the government is concerned. Among these are agricultural structures, workshops, museums, monuments and resthouses, to whatever extent they are not privately financed. The mission has made suitable allowances for these in the six-year program, under the appropriate headings elsewhere in this report.

[348] Although they are financed and constructed entirely by private endeavor, the religious buildings deserve special mention. This is a field in which Syria excels. Some of the mosques, minarets and churches, whether in large towns or small villages, are outstanding illustrations of the way in which architectural design and construction can be adapted to the needs of the people, their economic resources, and the materials and skills available locally.

657 VII COST OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES PROGRAM

Table 5 summarizes the mission's proposed six-year program in the field of settlements and social services.

TABLE 5 Proposed Six-Year Program for Settlements and Social Services Financed by the Public Sector (*Thousand £S*)

Sector	Total	Annual average
Housing	28,076	4,679
Education	271,780	45,297
Public health	74,150	12,358
Social welfare	450	75
Community development	2,687	448
Buildings for other purposes	8,500	1,417
Community services	86,000	14,333
Planning—Administration	3,600	600
Total	475,243	79,207
Share of		
Central government	372,643	62,107
Municipalities	102,600	17,100

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21:Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

III The Shashans

√63 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
463 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with
134 those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

162 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than
80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dir-
bassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
429 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns
mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders
and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In
a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas
prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The
tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important com-
modities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurd-
ish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns
ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission
452 or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
439 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years
many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate
and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning
their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact,
the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its
need for the credit of Aleppo.

162 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
√63 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and
living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
795 language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 182

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conslusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1621 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

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II. Land Tenure for the Tractor Owner

The tractor owner gets better advantages when he rents land. 427
He also pays a percentage of the crop. It used to be 5-6% with the obligation to plant a "shkara" for the landowner. The "Shkara" is a certain amount of seed which the landowner provides and which the tenant agrees to plant by his machines and to harvest with his combine free of charge. The "shkara" is proportional to the area of land rented. It varies between 10-20 sacks of wheat. In the last few years when demand for land became great, the rents rose to 10-12% with the habitual "shkara". Usually the rental contracts are for three years. They rarely exceed this period.

III. Land Tenure Along the Khabur

Along the Khabur rents are different in manner. There, the landowner provides not only the land but also the water for irrigation and half the seeds. In return he receives half the crop. The peasant furnishes his labor for plowing, seeding caring for the irrigation canals, irrigation and harvesting.

Rents for pump irrigation were between 7-10% until 1951. The cotton rush increased the rents for strips of land near the river to 15-20%, but the failure of the crop reduced the rush for land and the rent is down again to around 10%.

THE PROBLEM OF CREDIT IN JAZIRAH

The rapid economic advance of Jazirah in the last years is nothing less than amazing. In 1941, in the region of Qamishli, for example, the farthest village cultivated was less than 20 kilometers south of the city. All the land beyond was pasture for the Bedouin. East of Kubur el Bid to Tal Koshak, a distance of 60 kilometers, the land was similarly idle. There was not a single tractor in the region of Ras el Ain, and not a single water pump on the Khabur aside from those of the Assyrians. 311

Qamishli itself, the principal town of Jazirah, had no electric light, no paved roads, no sewage system, and very few acceptable houses to live in. The same was true in a larger measure of the other towns of Jazirah. 361 365

361 At present, agriculture extends in an unbroken line from the
311 Turkish and Iraqi borders south to the Rad and Hassakh, and west to
365 Ras el Ain and midway to Rakka. Qamishli has all the amenities of a fair-sized city with sewage, electricity, asphalted roads, running water, places of amusement, and modern office buildings and houses. The other towns of Jazirah show similar progress but in a smaller way.

454 All this development could not have been achieved without extensive use of capital. It was stated that the original emigrants to Jazirah whether Christians or Kurds, brought very little capital with them. Whatever they have now was made in Jazirah and not brought from outside.

I. Credit to the Bedouin and Kurd

452 The nearest commercial market to Jazirah where credit was
438 available was Aleppo. Aleppo merchants first provided goods shipped to the towns of Jazirah to be smuggled into Turkey. And Jazirah merchants working on a commission or partnership basis made good profits. Some of them specialized in lending money to the Bedouins and Kurds and for them, also, credit was available at Aleppo. They borrowed at an interest rate of 9% and lent at 35-50%. Most of them, however, did not lend money outright as a general practice, but sold goods and especially textiles, coffee and sugar to the farmer against bills maturing at harvest time. The exorbitant interest was added over the price of the goods, and the peasant accepted it as a somewhat higher price and did not consider it as interest. Theis system still prevails at the present time.

II. Credit to the Machinery Owner

452 With the expansion of agriculture and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, credit in much larger amounts became necessary. The farmer using machinery needed two kinds of credit. He needed credit to pay for his machines, and seasonal credit to cover a part of his expenses for wages, seed, fuel, and general expenditures.

In the first years of the War, dealers in agricultural machinery supplied a part of the need by selling on an installment basis for a period of 20 months. But between 1943 and 1948 they demanded cash payment before delivery. In the last four years, they have renewed their credit facilities.

441 It used to be one of the worst roads in Jazirah. At the end of this stretch begins the desert of Deir Ezzor 100 kilometers wide. Some sections of it where rainwater prevents the passage of cars are paved. Nevertheless, the road closes during several weeks in winter.

Another road built crudely by the British Army stretches from Qamishli to Kubur el Bid-Talkoebak-Mossul. It is paved with rough stones and it is only used by cars in winter. Beyond Tel Abu a road branches to Deirik and Ain Diwar.

[487] Aside from these, all Jazirah roads are tracks. There are no roads between Amuda, Derbassiya and Hassakeh, nor between Ras el Ain and Hassekeh, nor between the more important villages clustering around the several towns.

The absence of bridges across the Jagjag renders communication more difficult especially in winter when the waters of the river rise. There is a bridge at Qamishli, another one at Tal Brak 40 kilometers south and a third one at Hassakeh. In the relatively crowded villages near Qamishli along both sides of the river, crossings are effected with great hardship by loaded trucks especially in winter.

II Roads Between Jazirah and Aleppo

361 Aleppo is the nearest commercial center to Jazirah. It is
438 the market for Jazirah grains, wool, samneh and hides. It provides
491 Jazirah with all its needs of cement, textiles and all kinds of imported goods. That is why daily communication between the two regions is vital to Jazirah, but the Government has not judged it yet necessary to construct an all-weather road. Such a road exists in
491 more or less good shape from Qamishli to Hassakeh and to Point 47. From there on, the road to Rakka is closed all during the winter months and travel to Deir Ezzor is interrupted whenever there is heavy rain. The northern and shorter road Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo is also closed in winter for goods and passengers. The shortest road and that which passes through the best developed areas is the one which follows the railway line Qamishli-Amuda-Dirbassiya-Ras el Ain-Tal Abiad-Jarablus-Aleppo. It is 420 kilometers long as contrasted with 465 kilometers for Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo, and 485 kilometers for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Rakka-Aleppo and 565 for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Deir Ezzor-Aleppo which is the usual route followed in winter.

total Syrian cereals. Only Aleppo was ahead of it with 30% of the 438
total production. (Gibb Report, table 16, p. 28) At present, it is probable that Jazirah surpasses Aleppo in cereal production and with an area approaching that of the Mohafazat of Aleppo, it is potentially more productive because of the Jagjag and Khabur Rivers which make possible a more diverse agriculture.

The problem of land ownership is bound to be settled in some way/185
and credit is expanding gradually so that the dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo may diminish with time. The lack of lands and the constant increase in population will force the farmer to turn to intensive cultivation which in turn requires more labor and creates jobs for more people. The towns will benefit from increased production and population and will prosper and grow in their turn. It is logical to anticipate that Jazirah merchants will try to dispose of their crops without the help of Aleppo entrepreneurs. This makes for increased profits and more propserity. It is also reasonable to expect that a small industry based on the processing of agricultural products, such as flour mills, vegetable oil, starch, fruit, and vegetable conserves, will be established in the town of Jazirah. When cotton becomes an established crop, it is economical to gin it in the nearest town and save the cost of transport. The seeds will be needed for planting, for the extraction of oil and for cattle feed.

Qamishli is the only town of consequence in a fertile area of 361
700,000 hectares almost all cultivable in one way or another in the Qadas of Qamishli and Dijla. It is the chief town between Mossul and Aleppo, a distance of some 700 kilometers. Nisibin the older town now in Turkey was alwasy an important commercial center in the old times and Qamishli now has taken its place. It would not be surprising if in another 20 years Qamishli attained a population of 80,000.

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

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MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 744 THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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114 > MR. LEWIS, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

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175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[20] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [20] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

619 that process which has been going on since the beginning of
221 history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing
621 is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

162 Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns.
361 There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

433 The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

504 Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-
496 works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand
487 kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

795 the standard of living and education among the Alawis and
648 to develop their corporate consciousness; and who believe that if this is to be done the Alawis must be given a separate administration specially adapted to their needs and under benevolent foreign tutelage. There are others who admit the importance of these tasks but who emphasize that it is equally necessary to give the Alawis a consciousness of being part of the Arab nation as an alternative to sectarianism and to a paralysing localism. Among the Alawis themselves, one party adheres to the former school of thought, a second to the latter, but the greater number are suspicious of all interference from outside and wish only to be left alone.

Here, as in Jebel Druze, great social and intellectual processes are beginning of which the results have yet to appear. But it will probably take longer to bring Alawi society to a point where it becomes possible to face the problem of its definitive political status.

II

311 The problem of the Jazirah, the north-eastern province
167 of Syria, is in many ways different from that of Jebel Druze and the Alawi territory. Before the War of 1914–1918 it was largely an empty district, except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was sparsely cultivated where it was cultivated at all; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria they established a considerable measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already possessed by virtue of its fertility. The French authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian and other minorities who had been forced to leave their dwellings in Turkey, or who preferred not to live in the predominantly Moslem parts of Syria. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, together with Assyrians from Iraq after the events of 1933, have moved into the province; and even larger numbers of Kurdish Moslems, dislodged from their homes in Eastern Turkey by the policy of forcible assimilation
361 adopted by the Turkish Government. The new towns of
311 Hassetche and Qamishli and new villages have been created and new crops introduced, and the district has been opened up to regular commerce. The Beduin have been controlled
AND CERTAIN TRIBES AMONG THEM PERSUADED TO SETTLE ON THE LAND.

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

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423 166 241 of a manager with experience in the operation and maintenance of mechanical equipment. In the first few years at least the services of this unit should be made available to cultivators at rates high enough to cover cost of amortization and operation. As and when the farmers acquire experience with machinery and develop a community spirit conducive to cooperative action, steps should be taken to transfer the equipment in whole or in part to cooperatives.

The government should utilize the opportunity afforded by such new settlements to raise the standard of agricultural practices above the average. A government agricultural worker or community leader should be assigned to each settlement. It cannot be expected, of course, that optimum farm practices will be adopted, particularly by Bedouin settlers. It is possible, however, to provide guidance and even, perhaps, to prescribe certain crop rotations. In the dry-farming communities wheat will obviously be the principal crop, but winter vetch and such legumes as lentils, chick peas and soya beans should also be part of the cropping scheme. From 5 to 10 hectares might be left fallow each year. Another 5-10 hectares of each farmer's allotment might well be put into approved pasture. Each settler should be provided with about 60 sheep which should give a return nearly equal to that derived from crops. For the irrigated areas much more intensive cultivation, with a minimum of fallow, should of course be envisaged. The emphasis should be on such summer crops as cotton, sugar beets, peanuts, maize, beans and vegetables grown in proper rotation. Here the use of fertilizers and insecticides will have to be especially encouraged. A few cattle should be kept on the basis of the fodder provided by some of the suggested crops.

423 166 241 361 Each settlement should be small enough so that the remotest farm would be no farther than an hour's walk from the village, and large enough to warrant the establishment of minimum community services such as a well, a mosque or church, a school and a community center. The first consideration is important only in determining the size of a dry-farming settlement and would point to a settlement with an area no larger than about 5,500 hectares. On such a dry-farming area 120 families, including 10 non-farming families, could be settled initially; and the total might ultimately be about double if the land first held in reserve as pasture were subsequently allocated to new families. Even a settlement of 120 families, with a total population of 600-720, could support minimum community facilities. For the irrigated areas, where land allotments would

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

DIAGRAM 1
SCHEMATIC RELATIONSHIP OF DRY-FARMING COMMUNITIES



DIAGRAM 2
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(20 Hectare Farms)



DIAGRAM 3
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(50 Hectare Farms)

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423 be much smaller, the minimum size of a community might be raised to
166 around 300 families, including some 30 non-farming families. Such a larger
241 community would economize capital invested in common services. Even
361 on irrigated land, however, circumstances might dictate the establishment of a smaller community with a provision for subsequent growth if the potentialities of the land warrant it.

A settlement should be laid out in such a way as to make access to farm land convenient and to fit into adjoining settlements of a similar type. For the dry-farming area settlement units shaped like hexagons would in principle be ideal. (See Diagrams 1-3.) In such a unit the farms could be laid out at an angle to six roads radiating from the center and parallel to the sides of the hexagon. Between the farms radiating from the roads the land initially reserved as common pasture would be located. One of the six roads would link the settlement with other communities. A number of hexagonal settlements would fit well together. It must be recognized, however, that modifications in this basic hexagonal unit will often be necessary, owing to marked variations in the quality of the soil or the topography, the relationship of the area to existing settlements and other factors. (For examples, see Diagrams 4-6.) In the irrigated regions the shape of the settlement will be largely determined by the layout of the irrigation system, so that the hexagon may well have to yield to the square as the more practical form.

In areas where a number of settlements are established the relationship of the new communities to each other and to existing settlements in adjoining areas must be carefully considered. For the Roudj, for example, the mission would suggest the establishment of about five communities, of which four would be purely agricultural and one would serve also as a minor marketing and administrative center and therefore be somewhat larger. (See Map 6.) A major center need not be envisaged in view of the proximity of the towns of Idlib and Jisr ech Chogour. For the more extensive region of the Ghab a similiar pattern can be contemplated; and the planning will need to be based on the assumption that Jisr ech Chogour, situated at the northern end of the area, will become the regional marketing and administrative center.

The mission strongly recommends the village-type of settlement. Any other type which would house the settlers on their own farms would not only be contrary to tradition, but would be destructive of community life and make it difficult to supply the needed community services. The village

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DIAGRAM 4
ALTERATION OF FARM DIVISIONS IN THE CASE OF VARIATIONS IN THE QUALITIES OF SOIL

a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMING
c: IRRIGATED AREA



DIAGRAM 5
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH STREAM



DIAGRAM 6
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH DIFFERENT TOPOGRAPHIC CONTOURS

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

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should be located in the center of the settlement area and laid out along a rectangular pattern with the community facilities and open public places in the middle. It would be desirable to have the village surrounded by a small garden area and a belt of trees.

The settlement must, of course, be considered "model", but not in the sense that its standards and costs are so high as to render its general adoption prohibitively expensive. The settlers should be expected to contribute their own labor to its initial construction and the subsequent gradual expansion and improvement of its facilities. This will help to reduce costs and give the settlers a sense of pride and achievement in the establishment of the community. For example, the ultimate aim might be to provide a farm family with a 5-room house (3 main rooms, kitchen and laundry-lavatory), enclosed courtyard, storehouse and stables.[10] Initially, however, it would suffice to provide a 2-room unit without some of the elements in the final building. The cost could thus be kept to about £S 1,500, to which the settler might contribute £S 800 in the form of properly supervised self-help. Each farm family will need, however, a minimum sustenance allowance of approximately £S 1,000 to tide it over the first year when the community is in the course of construction and little is produced. Such an allowance should be paid out in the form of compensation for labor services provided by the settlers.

The mission has estimated the cash investment outlay in the different types of settlements as follows (in Syrian pounds):

	Dry farming settlement (120 families)		Irrigated area settlement (310 families)
	Non-mechanized	Mechanized	
Housing for farm families	77,000	77,000	191,100
Housing and shops for non-farm families	20,000	20,000	67,000
Community facilities[a]	71,000	71,000	182,000
Draft power, livestock and implements	318,000	514,000[b]	341,250
Sustenance allowance	110,000	110,000	273,000
Total	596,000	792,000	1,054,350

[a] Including schools, mosques (or churches), community centers, water supply and roads.
[b] Including £S 250,000 for mechanized equipment.

[10] See Annex I, p. 468.

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423 The mission suggests that the state Agricultural Bank finance the housing
166 and means of production (other than mechanized equipment) under
241 loans to be amortized over a 10-year and three- to four-year period respec-
361 tively. The government itself should be responsible for providing the funds necessary for community facilities, mechanized equipment and payment of the sustenance allowance.

423 The mission's calculations indicate that the average farm family should
166 be able to earn a net annual income of around £S 2,000 in the dry-farming
241 communities and of over £S 3,000 in the irrigated-area communities even during the period when loans are being repaid. This should leave a small margin for the payment for land in the dry-farming areas and a substantial margin for the necessary payments for land and water in the irrigated areas. The mission believes it a sound principle to require some payment even for non-irrigated state domain. The price of land, however, should be such that the settler can expect to become a full owner within a reasonable period, e.g., no more than 10 to 15 years.

Certain conditions will need to be enforced in settling peasants on the land. For example, title should not be transferred until all payments have been completed, and in the intervening period the government should reserve the right to remove settlers who prove to be clearly unsuitable or do not till their own land. Even after title has been transferred, the government might well retain for a specified period the right to veto all proposed sales, mortgages or leases, in order to safeguard the fundamental objective of establishing and maintaining independent peasant proprietors.

During the next five years the government will have to undertake the settlement of the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab. For the settlement of Bedouins the mission recommends the establishment of two experimental dry-farming communities, one of which would be mechanized, in the Jezireh. The mission must emphasize, however, that the latter two experiments are bound to fail unless the government allocates to them good land situated in a region with adequate rainfall. Both the Roudj and the Jezireh projects will provide much valuable experience useful in extending the settlement effort. In addition the government might well undertake one project in the Djebel es Smaane northwest of Aleppo and another in the Djebel Druze. The ruins of many once imposing cities testify that the first region flourished from the first to the seventh century of the Christian era, and recent evidence indicates that this prosperity was primarily founded on orchards and vineyards. More recently people have been

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CHAPTER 8

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

In the field of community or municipal development Syria faces a number of challenging problems. Among these are the establishment of new rural settlements; rational planning of the physical development of cities and towns; the improvement of housing; the provision of community services such as water supply, electricity, waste disposal, streets and sidewalks; the location and planning of public buildings serving the community; and the introduction of social welfare services into cities. Elsewhere in this report we have dealt with the new rural settlements and with electricity supply, municipal transport and housing. Here we shall discuss briefly some of the remaining problems.

Town Planning

One of the first steps to be taken in the direction of improving community life is to work out plans according to which towns and cities can develop in an orderly and rational fashion. Town planning is not an expensive luxury, a means of realizing monumental buildings, impressive public squares, broad avenues and large public parks. It is rather an instrument for insuring that the large sums which must inevitably be invested in any human settlements not merely serve the needs of the moment but are conceived with a view to future requirements. The haphazard growth of towns and cities sooner or later leads to communications problems, overcrowding and slums, inadequacies in public services and other conditions which are wasteful of human and material resources.

Few Syrian cities have as yet adequate plans. Damascus has the longest experience in this field, and the development of the modern city, which is in many respects admirable, testifies to the utility of planning. Particularly noteworthy in recent years has been the redevelopment of the western part of the city, including the western entrance to Damascus, the provision of adequate streets and open spaces, and the removal of tanneries from the old city to a special industrial zone on the outskirts. The Damascus

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361 plan has one defect in common with those of other cities: it fails to make adequate provision for the location of housing for the less well-to-do classes within the confines of the city.

Aleppo has expanded in a much less orderly way than Damascus. Although a city plan was drawn up after the second World War, it is not based on an adequate topographic survey and reveals so many deficiencies that its total revision appears to be required. Of the smaller cities, Latakia has the best plan; it takes into account the need not only to reform the old city but to develop neighborhoods for community living. A few other towns such as Deir ez Zor, Hama and Homs have plans, but these for the most part envisage little amelioration except perhaps from the standpoint of communications.

In general most of the plans have been inspired too much by transport requirements and too little by the objective of improving the conditions of urban living. More attention must be paid to the zoning of districts for housing, industry and shops and bazaars, to the interrelationship of living quarters and centers of employment, and to the location of gardens, schools, hospitals and other public buildings in such a way as to make them most accessible to the community they are designed to serve. Within the larger cities it is important to plan community living also around neighborhood units which in certain respects can be self-contained and can help to decentralize the city.

365 *Community Facilities*[36]

Municipal investment in such facilities as streets and sidewalks, water supply, sewers, lighting and libraries has averaged a little over £S 12 million a year during the period 1949-54. In addition the central government has made available almost £S 30 million to enable Aleppo to install an entirely new water supply system, and has spent between £S 200,000 and £S 300,000 annually on the exploration of water for villages in the Hauran and the Djebel Druze.

A program for municipal investment can hardly be drawn up without a careful assessment of the needs of municipalities and their ability to meet them. In view of the limited resources available, however, the volume of investment can increase only gradually, to perhaps £S 16 million in

[36] See Annex I, p. 470.

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Urban Social Welfare

368 It seems desirable in the near future to inaugurate some social welfare work in the urban areas as a counterpart of the proposed community work in the rural areas. Initially this will have to be on a modest and experimental scale. We suggest that over the next six years 8 to 10 centers be established to serve as focal points for voluntary community activities. About £S 350,000 might be allocated for investment in such centers, and £S 120,000 for operating expenditures. The centers would provide facilities for reading, radio listening, community meetings, adult education courses and eventually even for community baths. It would be advisable to combine the community hall as far as possible with the traditional school building; we therefore recommend that all new schools be constructed as all-purpose buildings which can serve children during the day and adults at night. The centers might well be put in the charge of selected teachers who would receive some special training in social work.

We would stress particularly that this modest program is experimental in character. Experience with the first centers will demonstrate how useful they can be, what needs they must serve and how they can best meet these needs.

Public Buildings[37]

653 361 Public buildings are, of course, prominent features in most settlements of any size. They must be properly planned and fitted into town planning schemes so that they will be of maximum service to the government and the community. Elsewhere in this report we have discussed building requirements for agriculture, education, health and similiar special purposes. Any development program should also take into account the probable outlays on buildings of a general administrative character. The mission, however, had very little basis on which to project investment expenditures on government buildings of this kind. During the period 1949-53 the Ministry of Public Works spent on an average about £S 1 million on the construction of public buildings for purposes other than agriculture, education and health. The mission thought it advisable to assume that such expenditures would rise in the future and has accord-

[37] See Annex I, p. 472.

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ingly allowed for construction amounting to £S 8.5 million during the years 1955-60, or a little over £S 1.4 million annually. 653 361

The mission has one general observation to make regarding the responsibility for planning and constructing government buildings of all types. We believe that the Ministry of Public Works should in the future, as in the past, be responsible for designing and constructing public buildings. On the other hand, the various ministries and government agencies for which the buildings are to be built should be in the position of programming their own requirements. We have already had occasion to stress this in connection with public health facilities but it applies generally. Each ministry or independent government agency which requires a more or less continuous building program should have at least one or two officers charged with the task of anticipating building requirements. Proposals for new construction and appropriate budget allocations should come from the ministries concerned. Once they are approved, it is the task of the Ministry of Public Works to design and construct the building. Final approval of the design should also rest with the initiating ministries or agencies since only they will be able to judge whether the proposed design meets their needs.

A Housing and Settlements Administration

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In this and previous chapters we have envisaged that the government will play an increasingly prominent role with respect to the establishment of new rural settlements, urban housing and town planning. These are in the main new functions for the Syrian government and at present it is hardly equipped to discharge them. A new organization with a specially trained staff will be necessary. An independent agency set up for this purpose would have the task of (1) providing technical assistance to municipalities in town planning and related fields, and (2) planning and coordinating the work in housing and settlement.

The planning must be on two levels: on a broad national and regional scale, keeping in mind population trends and the interaction between economic development and the geographic distribution of population, and on a more detailed local scale, involving particular settlement projects.

Regarding the first of these planning functions, we do not suggest that the agency should be charged with drawing up the economic development program. It must keep under constant study, however, the impact which

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361 privately and publicly generated economic development will have on the
657 distribution of the population and must anticipate what problems it will pose in terms of growth of municipalities and their needs, and in terms of regional transport and other requirements. It would also study comparative population pressures on the land and recommend how these might best be relieved through the development of idle or under-utilized land and the establishment of new settlements. Its findings and recommendations would permit timely revisions in the content and direction of a public development program.

With respect to the second planning function, the proposed agency would prepare in detail the settlement schemes for the Ghab, the Roudj and the dry-farming areas we have proposed. It is important that one organization have the responsibility for planning and coordinating this settlement work. Only in this way will it be possible to economize on the expert staff required and to apply the experience gained in one settlement scheme to subsequent projects. Thus the agency would plan in detail the layout of the settlement, the community facilities to be provided, the type and design of housing and methods of construction, the communications among the new settlements or between new settlements and existing communities, the principles governing the selection of settlers and the terms on which they would be settled, etc. Within the framework of such a plan, the actual carrying out of various phases of the settlement work should be left as far as possible to existing ministries and departments. Thus the Ministry of Interior in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture would select the settlers in accordance with the recommended criteria; the Ministry of Public Works would cooperate with the settlers in the construction of housing, community facilities and roads; and the Agricultural Bank would finance the necessary housing and equipment of the settlers. Even in the planning of the settlements, the proposed agency should consult freely with the ministries concerned. It would, however, retain over-all direction in order to ensure that the work by all interested parties is properly carried out and coordinated.

In the field of housing and town planning, the new agency's functions would be similar in character. It would lay down the general directions along which the proposed building research station would work. The housing funds made available by the government would be distributed among municipalities in accordance with the recommendations and terms and conditions which it would frame. It would provide technical assistance

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to municipalities in drawing up and revising town planning schemes.

For this agency we envisage a status comparable to that of the agency in charge of the rural community development program. It should be headed by a competent, well-paid director directly responsible to the prime minister and the cabinet. A part of its top staff of experts initially would have to be recruited abroad. In view of its responsibility for a vital segment of the development program, it should have a budget of around £S 600,000 a year to which the government might contribute £S 500,000 and the municipalities £S 100,000.

Proposed Expenditures

The recommendations which we have made in this chapter would entail a total government outlay of £S 24.95 million over the six-year period 1955-60, distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annua
Water supply	13,000	2,167
Urban social welfare	450	75
Public buildings (general)	8,500	1,417
Housing and Settlements Administration	3,000	500
Total	24,950	4,159

These proposed expenditures are exclusive of those which would be undertaken by the municipalities.

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652 648 to become self-supporting," involving particularly UNRWA participation "in the economic development of the host countries, thus making it possible for the refugees and the countries in which they live to benefit jointly by the combination of available rehabilitation funds and those from other sources."[42] The uncertainties regarding Syria's acceptance of these UNRWA funds are such, however, that we have not assumed that they will actually be used.

Municipal Financing

361 652 A brief word should be said regarding the financing of development expenditures by the municipalities. In a number of places in this report we have suggested that certain expenditures be shouldered by municipalities. We have envisaged municipal investment expenditures in housing, schools and community facilities totaling about £S 103 million for the six-year period. This implies an annual outlay of around £S 17 million, compared to a probable average of some £S 12 million in recent years (exclusive of expenditures on Aleppo water supply). We have provided for part of this sum by recommending that the central government allocate £S 8 million for community water supplies (exclusive of Aleppo). Thus the municipalities will have to find a net sum of between £S 4 million and £S 5 million per year for additional investment.

Unfortunately no comprehensive information was available in Syria on actual municipal expenditures and receipts. The budgets of all municipalities were reported to have risen from £S 24.4 million in 1949 to £S 29.6 million in 1952 and further to £S 37.6 million in 1953. Data obtained by the mission from a scattering of municipalities indicate that municipal revenues—which are derived both from local taxes and surcharges on certain national taxes—have increased rather rapidly. This lends support to the tentative belief that the municipalities can bear the additional proposed expenditures, although probably only if they are not required to reduce the outstanding amount of existing indebtedness. We strongly recommend, however, that the government undertake a survey of municipal finances with a view to determining whether the municipalities can actually meet their future requirements.

[42] See U.N. General Assembly A/2717/Add. 1, 5 November 1954.

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ANNEX I

NOTES ON SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

Syria's 3.65 million people dwell in an estimated 8,265 settlements, of which about 61% are towns and villages and the rest farms. Only Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deir ez Zor and Latakia can be said to be preponderantly urban; the remaining communities have fairly evenly balanced urban and rural characteristics or else are clearly agricultural. About 23% of Syria's population lives in Damascus and Aleppo, 17% in 21 other cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, 6% in 31 mixed settlements and over 50% in agricultural settlements. A little less than 3% is nomadic.

But the character of Syria's settlements is changing and the picture presented above will probably not be accurate for long. People of the mountain regions are slowly moving down to the plains. Both urban and rural settlements are being established in areas newly opened to cultivation, such as the Jezireh, the Ghab and the Roudj. The achievement of political independence started a trend toward urbanization, stimulated by construction of new roads and development of motorized transport.

Despite a considerable postwar building boom, there are probably fewer buildings in relation to the population in Syria than in most other countries. Although the exact number of dwelling units is not known, it probably does not exceed 350,000 or approximately one for every 10 inhabitants. In recent years new construction has been at a high rate. In 1953, for example, the number of housing units probably increased by about 5.15%. While this is substantially in excess of the normal increase in the population, account should be taken of the fact that the newer dwelling units probably do not house on the average more than six people. On this basis, only about 8% of the new construction, or some 1,460 units, were available for replacement of existing housing. In the postwar period the demand for housing has been stimulated by the rise in population, the wartime building lag, the growth of the foreign community, the return of expatriate Syrians, changes in the geographical distribution of population and the tendency of patriarchal families to break up into simple

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362 families requiring one dwelling each. While the need for a high and even higher rate of construction in the future is undeniable, it is doubtful that the factors which have operated to create an effective demand for housing will altogether be as effective in the future. Some decline in building over the coming years may well take place.

365 361 Community services have not kept pace with construction. Damascus and Aleppo have been most nearly provided with the essential streets, water supply and sewerage facilities, but the medium-sized and the small communities are very badly serviced. Except for water supply, this is not yet a problem for the small settlements, but it is serious for the medium-sized centers with their motorized transport and denser populations. The social services—education, public health, social welfare and community development—are likewise not yet adequately developed in Syria, but the country is commendably aware of the need and in the field of education, at least, has increased its expenditures impressively in the last few years. A few of the larger municipalities take care of their community services and have undertaken town-planning, but the central government, through the Ministry of Public Works, merely serves as technical advisor to the municipalities. There is no central government department with responsibility for housing. And while there are ministries for education and public health, no government department is responsible for social welfare or community development programs and no such programs exist. The administrative organizations in these fields clearly need strengthening.

Investment in Settlements

657 361 Over 60% of Syria's total annual investment is estimated to go into settlements, for housing, community and social services, and other purposes. During 1949-53 this type of investment averaged £S 138 million annually, of which £S 15 million (almost 11%) was from public funds and £S 123 million (89%) was private investment. On the basis of a 3.65 million population the annual investment in this sector was £S 39.4 per capita, of which £S 35.1 represents private funds.

[362] Perhaps as much as 80% of the private investment and about 72% of the total investment in settlements goes into housing; the balance is divided between industrial and commercial buildings, in that order. Private building activity reached an all-time high in 1953.

Of public investment in settlements, 80% is municipal and only 20%

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governmental, representing 8.7% and 2.2%, respectively, of total investment in settlements. Municipal investment is directed to water supply,[1] roads, power plants and distribution networks and sewerage facilities, in that order; very little goes for housing. Government investment is primarily in buildings, chiefly for education and public health purposes.

The mission has assumed, in preparing its proposed program for settlements and social services, that the estimated 1954 population of 3.65 million will increase over the next five years at a rate of only 1.5% annually, rather than the 2% rate of recent years. If the program is to be properly adjusted to Syria's needs, however, a population census and an improvement in the collection and organization of vital statistics are urgently needed. Better public health conditions, economic development, opening of new areas and new lines of transport and communications, changes in social patterns—all will bring about major changes in size and distribution of the population over the next few years. Any policy developed for the settlements should be planned with an eye not only to the immediate future but also to the longer term economic, social and cultural development of the country.

II EDUCATION

A PROGRESS TO DATE

For centuries, and especially during the years of foreign occupation, the only formal educational facilities were the Koranic schools, which concentrated on religious teaching. A decline in the number of these schools began about 150 years ago, and with it a gradual change in their curriculum; today about one-third of the time is devoted to religion. Meanwhile the number and significance of state primary schools has been increasing. In these, during the French occupation, the pattern of education was influenced by traditional French systems.

Since independence, Syria has started to develop its education at a faster rate and to give it a Syro-Arabic pattern. The effort of these few years and the success achieved is impressive. The budget of the Ministry of Education rose from almost £S 17 million in 1946 to £S 36.8 million in 1953, and its share of the total budget increased from 13.5% to 17.7% (in 1923 it had been only 9.1% and in 1931 9.8%). Between 1946 and 1953 the

[1] Water supplies in Damascus and Aleppo, however, are financed by government funds.

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362 invited for building lots, only one-fourth of the land was taken up because it was too expensive and too inaccessible.

We have given some attention to the possibility of establishing a mortgage bank to assist in financing private building in the cities. We believe that such an institution will ultimately be desirable and necessary, but, owing to limitations of funds, we have not recommended that one be established before 1961. Meanwhile, the project might well be studied. Any mortgage bank that might ultimately be created should be designed primarily to help finance low-cost housing, particularly since the construction of housing for the more well-to-do elements in the population has apparently not been significantly hampered by lack of funds.

The possibility of gradually abandoning existing rent controls should also be studied. The elimination of rent control on new building might be a suitable first step and might have the incidental advantage of discouraging the continuous influx of new people into the urban areas.

361 v COMMUNITY SERVICES

The mission's provision of an average annual investment of £S 14.3 million for community services must be regarded as extremely tentative. In the last analysis, no final program can be recommended until a thorough analysis of municipal finances is completed. At present, comprehensive data on municipal expenditures and anticipated financial resources are lacking. We suggest that a study of this subject be undertaken promptly, so that the magnitude of a program of municipal services can be determined in the light of the municipalities' own resources and the contribution which the central government can make to them either by loans or by grants.

Roads and Streets

363 The construction of roads and streets has been second in importance among municipal programs. Except in the large cities, paving is generally limited to a few central streets because of its cost.

Hereafter the construction and maintenance of all types of roads connecting settlements, including the portions passing through the settlements, should be the financial responsibility of the central government. Municipalities, freed of this burden on their budgets, should take care to spend

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their road funds on types of pavement suitable to the needs of the locality, choosing those methods which make greatest use of local materials and hand labor and depend least on machinery and imported materials. Stone-paved roads, of which there are excellent examples in Syria, probably provide the answer for most of the settlements where stone is readily available, and the government should be able to provide asphalt to most communities. Many of the roads in villages, particularly those which do not carry motor vehicle traffic, could be improved through cooperative community endeavor, and this should be one of the objectives of the community development program we have recommended.

Electricity

Electricity is of economic importance to those communities which depend upon it for productive power and not merely for light. The mission recognizes fully the significant developing influence which the availability of electric power can have upon a community. Useful though it is, however, we suggest that a major effort to provide electric power primarily for lighting be deferred until the more urgent problems of water supply and sewerage have received attention.

Landscaping

Syria's broad and nearly waterless steppes have led to cities and villages virtually without trees, a situation to which the devastation of the first World War contributed greatly. Even cities like Damascus, lacking neither greenery nor water, have large areas which remain bare. The planting of trees, especially shade trees for the streets, should be a concern for all Syrian settlements. This, of course, calls for a study of the most suitable types of trees for the different regions, and the establishment of nurseries, as recommended in Chapter 3 of the Main Report.

Local committees should do the planting, once the problem of water supply has been met. Where streets are narrow, there is much to be said in favor of planting trees inside the house plots so that the inhabitants themselves will take care of them; the trees will then shade the streets without taking up needed road space. In recently planned areas where the streets may be unnecessarily wide, a strip on either side might be turned over to the people living on the street on condition that it be planted with

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861 trees and not built upon. Possibly in this way the broad, deserted unpaved streets, swept by the winter winds and burning under the summer sun, can be transformed into long garden avenues without any heavy expenditure by the local authorities.

VI PUBLIC BUILDINGS

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Direction of Investment

Out of a total of about £S 25 million expended on public buildings between 1948 and 1954, £S 9 million was for public health structures while more than £S 7.5 million was invested in schools and a like sum on administrative buildings.[7]

The proportion spent for administrative buildings has been high and is attributable to the organizational needs of the newly independent country. We have assumed that the rate of construction of such buildings is likely to increase, but we suggest that no more than £S 750,000 be expended during 1955-56 while a critical survey of the most urgent requirements in this category is being prepared. In 1957 the expenditure may reach £S 1 million, rising to £S 2.5 million in 1960 and making a total of £S 8.5 million over the six years. The resulting average of £S 1.417 million would in fact be about 50% higher than the average of recent years.

The total expenditure for public buildings, including schools, public health buildings and other types, is likely to average £S 7 million annually, assuming that the municipalities and other authorities share the cost of schools. Compared with the effort of the past few years, which was at a level of £S 4.5 million a year, this would be an increase of about 60% to 70% per year.

Policy

In the Main Report the mission has recommended that in future the Ministry of Public Works be responsible for design and construction of all public buildings, relying on each government agency to specify and draw up its own special requirements. It may be necessary, especially at the beginning of the program, to engage a private firm of Syrian or foreign

[7] Including buildings for the judicial and security services.

361 We shall have to consider town planning in
172 greater detail

in connection with Damascus and Aleppo. For the moment, we would merely deplore the fact that the authors of extension and development plans are all too apt to write off ancient monuments as undesirable, instead of considering them as some of the finest and most attractive focus-points around which to replan districts. The preservation and enhancement of these buildings need be no bar to a city's normal development. They merely raise problems which should always be studied in consultation with qualified experts attached to the Directorate of Antiquities. If the work is done, with good taste, it will help not only to interest a few scholars anxious to learn more of the past, but to develop a love of their monuments in the inhabitants themselves, as they come consciously or unconsciously to appreciate their beauty, and, in a short time, take them as an essential and familiar ornament to their daily life.

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DAMASCUS

GROWTH OF THE CITY

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Lying on the edge of the desert and encircled by the green Ghutah oasis, watered by the Barada, Damascus owes its existence and development mainly to its geographical position, water supplies and gardens. The different periods of its growth which are bound up with its political history, industries and trade, are reflected in the layout of the various sections of the town, and in the architecture of its houses, monuments and streets.

The nucleus of the present city was formed at the time of Syria's annexation to Alexander's Empire. The Greek city, rising to the east of the Aramaean town, was built to a regular plan of rectangular blocks about 150 by 330 feet, showing considerable regard for town planning requirements; the layout may, in fact, even today, still be regarded as an ideal one.

Damascus's association with the Roman Empire gave a decisive impetus to the formation and development of the town. Most of the great rebuilding operations were carried out in the reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla. The relative importance of the various streets depended at that time upon their position in relation to the city gates. Bab Charqi is a part of the ancient East Gate, which stood at the end of the "Street called Straight" (*Via Recta*), on the site of which one of the bays of a monumental arch has recently been reconstructed. All round the Great Mosque there are many remains of the temple of Jupiter Damascenus (identified by the Romans with the god Hadad). To the west, in particular, there is the high Corinthian colonnade of one of the propylaea of the peribolos, with beautiful fragments of the arcature and entablature.

Damascus remained a satellite of Rome and then of Byzantium until the arrival of the Arabs, who, under the Omayyad dynasty, made it the capital of a great empire, the political, cultural and religious centre of Islam. The heart of the city was the Great Mosque, built by the Caliph al-Walid on the site of the ancient temple and the church of Saint John the Baptist. The Syrian architects adapted their plan to the whole area, incorporating some parts of the earlier buildings in the new edifice. The immense courtyard and the sanctuary were

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DAMASCUS
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adorned with all the splendour of Constantinople's mosaics and the products of her art industries. The mosque was considered as one of the world's architectural masterpieces, rivalling the mosque of Omar in Jerusalem. 361 175

With the rise of the Abbasid dynasty, Damascus lost its position as the capital; the work of the Omayyads was destroyed and their institutions proscribed. In order to subjugate the population more effectively and prevent any show of hostility, the fortified walls of the city were pulled down. This was a period of anarchy and unrest, which resulted in the formation of cliques and the development of guild life. The city ceased to be a single whole, governed by public authorities responsible for the management of the community's assets; it was split up into autonomous districts, like diminutive, and often rival, cities, each with its own independent organization, mosque, hammam (baths), souq, surrounding walls and gates, and its own chief (sheikh) commanding a sort of police battalion.

This situation led to the development of a new system of property and a new type of city life; new bodies were formed to defend the rights of various religious communities or corporations.

AYYUBID PERIOD

The Seljuk Atabegs and the Ayyubids, in their zealous desire to see Sunnite Islam victorious and their hatred of the Fatimites and Crusaders, made Damascus once more an intellectual and religious center, as well as a stronghold. Whereas the town's division into various districts had previously been based on craftsmen's corporations, religious creed was henceforth the determining factor; the Christians drew together and shut themselves away to the south-east of the old town; the Israelites to the south-east; the Moslem section of the population settled in the western part of the town, where many mosques and public buildings were then built. There, also, stood the Citadel, for whose building part of the materials and foundations of the Roman walls were used. The city was further

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Damascus



Plan of Damascus

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361 175 broken up by the formation of new districts, often at some distance from the original town centre. In isolated parts and on the slopes of the mountain, where nature is conducive to prayer and meditation, many convents and madrasahs were erected; although several of these have been destroyed and others are disused and in ruins, about fifty have survived until the present time, while others again have been converted and incorporated in more recent buildings.

361 344 172 In the Moslem sector of the old town is the Maristan of Nur ad-Din, "one of the most famous hospitals of the Moslem world". It is of great architectural interest, but is unfortunately spoilt by the modern buildings which now surround it. The doorway has a rich and original alveolate decoration, a classical pediment and a beautiful pair of doors. Over the entrance hall is a small ribbed ogion dome, surmounted by a sort of truncated conical drum, made up of superimposed alveoles which are visible even from the outside, as in the case of the brick tomb of Zobeide near Baghdad. In the courtyard, with its two beautiful iwans (halls), fragments of inscriptions, lattice-work and marble inlay have been preserved.

361 346 172 The Nuriya Madrasah, to the south of the Great Mosque, has a similar dome above the mausoleum. Its doorway is distinguished by the pendant keystone motif, also to be seen at the Adiliya Madrasah, a "masterpiece of stereotomy and bonding" planned and constructed in the architectural style and by the methods characteristic of northern Syria. This latter madrasah, a fitting building for the headquarters of the Arab Academy, has been very carefully restored and rearranged. This building, together with the Zahiriya Madrasah (now the National Library), the house of Saladin's father, which was converted by the Sultan Beibars into a memorial college, and the Aziziya Madrasah (Saladin's tomb) form a fine architectural group to the north of the Great Mosque; these buildings are still adorned by a wealth of ancient works of art, inscriptions, mosaics, doors and windows.

The twofold influence of Mesopotamia and northern Syria can be seen in the art of the period of Nur ad-Din and Saladin.

Various mausolea are to be found outside the old town itself and slightly to the north, in the area between the river and the modern thoroughfare called Baghdad Street. That of Zayn ad-Din (Sitt ech-Châm, 1172), is the oldest example of such a building with a sepulchral dome surmounting two drums; the "Sultan Hasan" Mausoleum has a ribbed dome and an interesting decoration of stucco and painting; the Chamiya Madrasah, standing outside the city walls, contains one of the finest examples of plaster moulding in Damascus, beautiful inscriptions and the armatures of the old leaded-glass windows. The Mausoleum of Ibn al-Moqaddam, Emir of Aleppo, is a typical north Syrian structure. Further to the east and of more recent date stands the As-Tawba Mosque, planned and arranged on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque, and interesting on account of its architecture and decoration (doorway, mihrab, leaded-glass windows, etc.).

The suburb of Salihiyah grew up on the mountain side round a fine group of mausolea, madrasahs and convents, most of which are now abandoned or used for somewhat unsuitable purposes. There, in a picturesque spot on the Nahr Yazid, we find the remains of a colonnaded portico of the oldest convent-madrasah of Salihiyah, together with a whole series of monuments built by eminent persons at the court of Nur ad-Din and Saladin. Most of them are mausolea with brick domes, some ribbed and others double, surmounting two drums decorated with arcading and lobate or twin niches. Many of them contain beautiful carved wooden tombs, old leaded-glass windows and

361 lintels decorated with graceful inscriptions and coats of arms.
346 The Mozaffari Mosque, built in 1202, is decorated in a par-
172 ticularly interesting and original manner; it is the oldest Ayyubid Mosque, and its plan is reminiscent of the Omayyad Mosque. Ancient columns, with their capitals, have been used to form the arcades round the courtyard. The carved wooden lintels (with incised geometrical designs) over the seven doors of the prayer hall are well preserved; two of them are still surmounted by plaster lattice-work. Inside, several windows have beautiful old glass panes.

Also worthy of mention is the Atabakiya Madrasah, built to house the tomb of Princess Tarkan-Khatoun, with its fine doorway decorated with alveoles, which today, owing to the concealment of the corner colums by more recent structures, looks as if it were in recess. The arrangement of the alveoles, the bonding of the arch-stones of the arcade and the modelling of the cornices show originality, but are somewhat primitive.

This part of the town subsequently developed and spread very considerably, taking in neighbouring districts such as the Kurd quarter, in Saladin's time, and the Mohadjirine at the end of the nineteenth century. Today, this suburb centres round the Mohiy ad-Din Mosque, built by Sultan Selim in 1518 over the tomb of the famous mystic. This mosque, which also contains the tomb of Abd el-Kader, has a beautiful minaret and very striking faience decorations.

MAMELUKE PERIOD

361 At the beginning of the Mameluke period, Damascus developed
195 and expanded further; its products were highly esteemed and, in order to meet the demands of the time, the city developed its art industries, specializing in luxury articles. Even the Crusades promoted its commercial relations with the Western world; like Aleppo, Damascus traded with southern France, Genoa, Pisa and Venice. Its artistic products, such as silks, bronze ornaments, Damascene blades, enamel-work and glassware were in demand everywhere. As a result of this commercial activity, its suqs spread to the north of the Citadel, in the horse-market area, where the Yelbogha Mosque was built in 1264.

Following the example of the Sultans of Cairo, governors, military leaders and their servants then built a great many madrasahs (schools for the teaching of the Koran) and mausolea. The favourite sites for the latter were along the road to Mecca "so that the founder might benefit from the prayers of passing pilgrims". Thus a new suburb, called the meidan, sprang up along this road, reflecting the special features of the pilgrim traffic and trade. The meidan, about two miles in length, was linked with the city by a new group of suqs (Es-Sinaniyeh) outside the western gate of the wall, between the districts of Chagur and Qasr el-Hajjaj; it absorbed the suburban village of El-Qbeybat ("little domes"), and ended at Bab-Allah (Allah's Gate), whence pilgrims "set out on their journey to the Holy House of God".

361 It would take too long to give a complete list of the Mame-
346 luke monuments existing in these districts; even the directory
172 of the Antiquities Service does not include them all. Very often a minaret, a fountain or a madrasah, although not classified, is of considerable interest, because it adds to the atmosphere of the place, or because it has certain original features, though these are often not very obvious, owing to the conversion of the building for another purpose or to bad restoration.

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●341 346 172 Here, we shall mention only a few monuments which are particularly unusual or significant. Such, for example, is the Turba Afridunîya ("Jami el-Ajami"), at the city end of the meidan, a Koranic school and mausoleum commemorating the Persian trader, Afridun, who died in 1348. The composition of its façade, with black and white courses of masonry, is perfect, and all the decorative elements hit in harmoniously with it. There are a great many of the latter (cornices, bull's eye windows, doorway with inlaid work and scallops, stalactite ornamentation, inscriptions, interlocking voussoirs and panels of strapwork), and several of them were subsequently repeated, for purely ornamental purposes, in other buildings.

A little further south, there is a small mausoleum to an unknown person, which is commonly called "Weli Chaybani". Its architecture is sober and its composition good. As in the majority of these monuments, the façade, with its skilful bonding, has a doorway decorated with alveoles. The two windows are connected by a single lintel, composed of three rows of stones, the middle one being formed of interlocking voussoirs; there is a bull's eye above the pilaster separating them. The dome, resting on a high drum with 16 windows, is pierced with holes to let in light.

Nearly half-way along the meidan stands the double mausoleum of Araq, belonging to the same period (1349). The plan of this building is more complicated. Its many-coloured façade has turquoise-blue faience inlay round the doorway, with its ornamentation of stalactites and braid-moulding. Here also, the sloping surfaces are gracefully joined to the vertical by a system of alveoles, and the long fascia of the lintels divides the façade horizontally with its two-coloured arrangement of interlocking voussoirs, repeated right across the building and sloping first one way and then the other. The many radiating voussoirs of the bull's eyes form as it were the rays of a sunburst. The lintels are enriched with geometrical and floral designs, and cyma reversa mouldings give unity to the various parts of the façade.

The architectural and decorative elements used with a very strong sense of balance and harmony in these buildings, were later repeated and multiplied until surfaces became so richly adorned as to give the impression of incoherence and pointlessness, combined with artistic decadence, which is characteristic of the last Mameluke period.

The Yachbak Mausoleum (1377), more ornate, but still well designed and balanced, has domes surmounting sloping roofs composed of alveoles. The central feature of the façade is a doorway decorated with stalactites, and the rosettes of the bull's eyes form a horizontal band, matched, within the embrasure of the doorway, by a panel decorated with marble and faience inlaid work in an interlaced design, surrounding the Mameluke coat of arms.

The same features are to be seen in the Rachidiyé Madrasah, the upper part of whose doorway has recently been cut off to make room for an entirely extraneous small structure; the fine composition of the façade is also partially concealed by modern buildings.

Among the latest buildings of the Mameluke period, the Sabuniya Madrasah, the Sibaiya Madrasah at the western end of the "Street called Straight", and the Al-Muradiya Madrasah deserve mention. Prominently situated, with the curves of their domes and the tall shafts of their beautiful minarets, they add a special and typical note of their own to the street scene.

A few other monuments of the same period are to be found either in the old town or in the districts immediately to the north of it. We have already mentioned the Yelbogha Mosque,

361 designed on the same lines as the Omayyad Mosque; it is re-
346 markable for the beautiful structure of its niches and
172 windows with their alveolate decoration, its magnificent bands of plaster moulding, and its windows, doorways and minaret. This mosque well deserves to be set off to greater advantage.

Tingiz, the Viceroy of Syria, was responsible for the construction of a fine group of buildings. Only the beautiful minaret and two doorways of the mosque which bears his name still remain after the rebuilding of the An-Nasr Avenue, but the double mausoleum of his w[illegible] (Turba Kukabaiya) and, a little further on, the Dar al-Hadir, a school where the traditions of the Prophet were expounded, are still to be seen in the "Street called Straight".

The last monuments of this period are the two beautiful tiered minarets in the Bab Jabiya suq, with their rich decoration, and that of the Al-Moallaq Mosque, with an unbroken line of black stones encircling its niches and rose windows.

OTTOMAN PERIOD

361 The end of the Mameluke period was marked by a serious eco-
175 nomic crisis, aggravated by disturbances and devastation (Tamerlane), and also by the Portuguese discoveries, which altered the traditional trade routes. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire, which expanded Damascus's economic and political frontiers, the city again began to develop. Under the capitulations, Turkish ports were opened to European merchants. Moreover, since pilgrims set out from Damascus on their journey to Mecca, the city was expected to supply them with the necessary equipment and provisions for their crossing of the desert.

These circumstances led to the building of many khans, with their porticoed courtyards, shops and stables on the ground floor and accommodation for travellers on the floor above. The city was no longer of any strategic or military importance; the ramparts, already useless on account of the town's extension and the formation of suburbs without the walls, were abandoned; the moats filled in and the Citadel fell into ruins. The pasha (governor), with his entourage of Turkish aristocrats, took up his residence and administered business at the seraglio, outside the ramparts, at a place called Qanawat (the canals), near the Roman aqueduct.

361 In the same neighbourhood were erected the two great
346 imperial madrasahs, the Solaymaniya (1554), constructed by the
172 famous Turkish architect, Sinan, who built the Sulaymaniya in Constantinople, and the Salimiya (1566), designed by a Persian architect. With their great buttressed domes, surrounded by a double row of small domes covering the porticoes and rooms, their slender pencil-like minarets tapering to a cone, and the surrounding gardens with their fountains, trees and flowers, they achieve an architectural unity and a highly characteristic atmosphere of their own, in a style native to Constantinople and readily transplanted to Damascus.

The Solaymaniya has a rich variety of architectural and decorative motifs, characteristic of that period and style, such as marble inlaid work and great overlays of faience tiles on the walls and tympana of the doors and windows; keel arches with alternate black and white arch-stones; abundant use of stalactites, niches ornamented with overlapping shell designs, lintels with many-coloured interlocking voussoirs, forming increasingly ornate and complicated patterns. The capitals

Damascus

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Damascus in the fourteenth century. (From J. Sauvaget, Revue des études islamiques, IV, 1934.) Damascus today.

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361 consist of clustered tetrahedrons, coloured with blue and red.
346 The astragals of the columns and their tori are of gilt bronze.
172 All the surfaces are composed of alternating courses of different colours.

The same features are to be seen in the buildings put up by the governor, Dervish-Pasha, forming a fine group at the beginning of the Pilgrims' Way, to the west of the old town. The façade of the "Ed-Derwichiyeh" Mosque is composed of alternate black and white courses; the tall polygonal minaret is painted green. The whole building, which is surmounted by a large dome encircled by small cupolas, is architecturally connected with the neighbouring mausoleum by an archway over the road. The arrangement of designs, shapes and colours on the façades shows extraordinary imaginative ingenuity. The pointed bulbous dome of the mausoleum rests on a drum of irregular shape. At a later date, in the same street, but a little further south, Sinan-Pasha built his mosque among the suqs of Bab Jabiya; it has the same characteristics and features (minaret faced with green faience tiles, large dome, inflected arches, geometrical capitals, etc.); above all, it makes the same spectacular impression in the street surrounding, inevitably catching the eye between the suqs and the Mecca road.

361 Within the confines of the old town, between the Great
342 Mosque and the "Street called Straight", a number of khans
172 and two new hammams were built at this period.

Dervish-Pasha built the "Khan Al-Harir", which is a curious mixture of Syrian and Turkish architectural styles. It is a fine structure, with porticoes surrounding the courtyard and, on the upper floor, two series of rooms connected by a corridor and covered by a triple row of domes.

The Khan Al-Gumrok, in the same locality, has a covered hall instead of a central courtyard, and six large domes supported on pendentives. The Khan Soleyman-Pasha (1732), following a similar but more complicated plan, has a courtyard covered by two large domes. Here, the composition is conceived on broader lines and the architectural volumes are enormous, while the dual colour scheme is still found, not only in the black and white courses of the walls, but also in the bonding of the voussoirs of the arcades and pendentives. Some years later, Azad-Pasha, who was Vali (governor) of Damascus and led the great pilgrimage for 14 years running, built a new khan, and a house for himself between it and the Great Mosque.

The khan has a façade reminiscent of Venetian Renaissance architecture in composition, while the building technique and the choice of decorative motifs and materials are in the best artistic traditions of northern Syria. Azad-Pasha's residence ("Azem Palace", 1749) has the same features, repeated and multiplied; it follows the traditional plan of all large Syrian dwellings, with its two entirely separate groups of rooms (selamlik [men's quarters] and haremlik [women's quarters]), its courtyards, porticoes, iwans, pools and fountains.

Thus Damascus today, as in the earliest periods of its history, is still assimilating and using artistic and cultural themes, borne along the great traffic routes, to converge upon the oasis between the Anti-Lebanon and the desert.

PRESENTATION OF MONUMENTS

361 In studying the growth of Damascus and its various districts,
172 we have tried to bring out the character and functions of certain groups of buildings which, if skilfully restored and arranged,

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would not only be more beautiful in themselves, but would add to the interest and attraction of the city as a whole. It must be borne in mind that, in old towns, there is more to safeguard than isolated monuments which can be protected by law: there is a whole architectural system, moulded by time, a crystallization, as it were, of the people's history, customs and needs.

A monument always has some positive, intrinsic interest as a work of art, but it is of even greater interest if it forms part of a whole group of buildings, which makes its purpose and history clearer and sets off its volumes and form. In the architectural pattern of a city, each individual building is like a piece in a mosaic; however precious each small stone may be, it is the whole composition which gives it meaning and worth.

It is true, of course, that there are also worthless things in the old parts of towns; there are buildings which are parasitic or unhealthy. Like a living creature, an old city is subject to sickness and infirmity. The correction of such shortcomings, however, calls for infinite care and an exact appreciation of what is to be altered or abolished; and in any case, the work must always be done with the caution which modern critical methods of restoration and excavation require. It is impossible to say, *a priori*, what should be done, or to map out new streets, building lines and squares with ruler and compasses. The demolition of an old quarter may reveal buildings, fragments and works of art which will enrich the nation's archaeological heritage or throw light on historical or artistic problems. All this is of importance to a country's cultural and spiritual life. There are plenty of examples of the difficulties to which ancient monuments give rise when town planning schemes come to be carried out, even when the latter have been prepared with the intention of leaving untouched buildings protected by the law. One has only to think of the mosque of Tingiz, of which only the two doorways and the minaret projecting over the street now remain.

We are glad to find that the new districts also have a character and beauty of their own, which is becoming increasingly marked as new buildings, in the light of past experience, are better adapted to the atmosphere, customs and climate of Damascus. Although the new streets are often too open and the architecture of the buildings sometimes either a little too rigid (the reinforced concrete construction being rather too obvious), or too ornate and showy (due to the excessive and unskilful use of decorative motifs), they will blend better with the rest of the town when the trees have grown up to fill in the over-large spaces with greenery and subdue the light.

We must admit, however, that we are somewhat dismayed by the results of the new development scheme and the new layout of building land in the area between the southern side of the Citadel and the "Street called Straight". There, the labyrinth of suqs and narrow winding alleys, with buildings jutting out into them, has gradually been replaced by a chessboard pattern of small rectangular blocks. The historic monuments are lost and stifled among many-storeyed modern buildings. The domes and minaret of the Dervish-Pasha Mosque are dwarfed by the high block of workmen's flats which has sprung up beside it. The same is true of many mausoles and of the Maristan, the famous hospital of Nur ad-Din, one of the most unusual and interesting monuments in Damascus.

It would certainly not be wise to encourage the proposal (which would, moreover, be extremely costly to carry out) that monuments be pulled down and rebuilt some distance away, as has been suggested in order to isolate the Omayyad Mosque.

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The suqs with their khans, the hammams, mosques and madrasahs generally form a coherent and harmonious architectural and functional unit, which should be kept intact. The present system of classifying monuments should be extended to cover architectural groups as well as individual buildings. We would repeat that this does not mean thwarting reasonable attempts to improve or develop a district. Our aim is merely to show that the usual criteria, methods and means employed in the technical departments of municipalities, where individual interests and immediate advantages are alone considered, should not be applied to such architectural groups. It should have been possible, for example, to prevent the erection of a conspicuously tasteless modern house, jarring in both colour and design, close to the southern façade of the Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library). The new buildings in Sèleymani Street, near the Khan Al-Gumrok are another instance of the sort of thing that should not be allowed. Before putting up new building in old parts of the town, much thought should be given to their appearance and colour, with the twofold aim of improving the present situation and setting off the monuments, which are dignified and beautiful features of the city as a whole, to their best advantage. The criterion of utility cannot be ruthlessly applied to the products of culture and the mind. For that reason our young town planners should give up their attempts to recover money spent on laying out an open square with streets radiating from it or piercing wide streets, by ill-considered exploitation of building land in old parts of the town, where the present houses give very little return or by the demolition of hammams, madrasahs and gardens, which now bring in no revenue at all, in order to free their sites. 361 172

The old centre of the town would gain greatly, both aesthetically and from the practical point of view, if the Citadel were arranged and used for a different purpose. Its interest as a monument is obvious, with its magnificent façades and towers and the beautiful east gate with its alveolate decoration. At the present time, the Citadel buildings are put to poor use as a barracks and prison. Should it be decided to use them for a different purpose, the open spaces within the walls should be used for public gardens and so brought into the life of the city. They might be some of the most beautiful gardens in Damascus, with gateways leading into the streets outside. An enterprising architect, with the help of an expert advisory committee, could well adapt the fine and imposing architecture of the Citadel to meet the needs of some public institution. It might, for example, be used to house a university faculty, with a "Students' Centre", providing accommodation for students and professors not resident in Damascus, a library, studies, lecture-rooms and exhibition halls. The mosque should again be used for prayer. Premises could also be provided for recreation and entertainment, with a cinema, café, restaurant, etc. If the western façade were cleared, there would be a really splendid and imposing view down the wide An-Nasr Avenue. Thus transformed, the Citadel, instead of hindering the town's development as it does today, would once again become a part of public life and, in its new guise, would be a great social asset to the city and the nation.

The Great Omayyad Mosque is the most interesting monument in Damascus, although unfortunately it has been so seriously damaged in the course of its history by destruction earthquakes and fire that it is now a somewhat confused mixture of unequal artistic and architectural styles. It would be excellent if sufficient funds could be found to complete and extend the work—already happily begun by the Wakfs and the Directorate of Antiquities—of restoring this monument and setting 346 172

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361 such artistic treasures as the mosaics, the capitals, the Qubba,
192 the minarets and the doors.

In the west portico, large white patches in the mosaics show how much the restoration work done still leaves to be desired. In the north-east section, as part of the careful work carried out by the Directorate of Antiquities, the spaces between the mosaics have been painted a similar colour, with excellent effect, except that the painted surface looks rather dull beside the brilliant surface of the mosaics. Better results might be obtained by mixing the paint with a little marble powder, which would give a slight variety of tone.

It is of course important in any improvement schemes, to consider the general effect of the whole—a fact appreciated by the technical services, which have made plans for building new roads so as to isolate the Great Mosque. In considering these plans, we must bear in mind that the Great Mosque is not simply a building standing by itself: its history and use create an aura influencing the surrounding atmosphere and architecture; the imposing ruins of ancient temples and churches mausoles, madrasahs, khans and suqs form a complex with it.

344 To the north there are no less than five highly important
192 monuments. The Adiliya Madrasah (Arab Academy), with its fine doorway and pendant hepitiae, has been described as "a masterpiece of masonry and bonding". The Zahiriya Madrasah (National Library) opposite, once the house of Saladin's father, was converted into a memorial college by the famous Sultan Beibars. Close by the Great Mosque, the Aziziya Madrasah contains the tomb of Saladin, housed in a mausoleum with the characteristic ribbed dome resting on octagonal and sixteen-sided drums. The recent restoration of this mausoleum has been outstandingly successful, especially as regards the enhancement of the general effect of the surroundings. Opposite the north entrance, the Jaqmaqiya Madrasah and the Turbat Al-Ikhsaiya, stand like propylaea, guiding the eye to the fine vista of the Byzantine colonnade, the doorway and the minaret.

361 The monuments on the other sides of the mosque are inter-
344 esting too, though less obviously so. The artistic interest
192 of some of the khans, suqs and hammams is often apt to pass unnoticed by the casual observer simply because they are still in use, whereas that of the ruins strikes the eye immediately. The architecture of the group of buildings to the south-west of the Great Mosque, however, is extremely good. Passing through the Khan Al-Gumrok with its six large domes supported by pendentives, and the great Khan Al-Harir, with its triple series of small domes surmounting the first storey, we reach first the rich and delightful Azem Palace, a very suitable setting for the folk museum and tourist offices which are to be installed there; and then, after passing the fine façade of the Khan Azad-Pasha, the Midhat-Pasha suq ("Street called
361 Straight"). The development plan includes the widening of this street. If this is done, we hope that due precautions will be taken to avoid the mistakes mentioned above, and that the present character of this street will be preserved, particularly in the western section, where the suqs are still teeming with life and interest. We might at this point stress how very convenient the suqs are, especially in extremes of weather; they protect the crowd of pedestrians from rain and sun, wind and dust alike. They form a dense network, opening out,

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1/A [Of the mosque -- ANALYSE]

361 from time to time, onto vistas of monuments—such as the beautiful minarets of the Hisham Mosque and the Madanet el-Qali, and the façades and domes of the Sibaiya Madrasah and the Derviah-Pasha and Sinan-Pasha mosques—which serve as landmarks.

We might well go on to consider the special interest and characteristics of the suburbs of the meidan (with the fine Bab-Saghir cemetery), Suq-Sârouja and Salihiyah, but we dwelt on this subject at some length in describ ng their history, and there would be no point in repeating our remarks on the importance of preserving the characteristic atmosphere of these places.

Finally, in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, we should like once more to draw the attention of young town planning experts, who lay so much store by wide, straight streets, to the importance of preserving the picturesque, as we have advocated, and of catering for the tourist trade which, for a city with so rich an artistic heritage, is a considerable potential source of income.

There are, in our opinion, few other towns of comparable romantic and picturesque appeal. But we must make it clear that when we use the term "picturesque" we have in mins something which, though apparently haphazard, in fact possesses a beauty and logic of its own, since it has grown up spontaneously and naturally as the outcome of an earlier age and the reflection of a wealth of life and feeling. This explaind why the various parts combine so naturally and necessarily. This quality of the "picturesque", which we believe should be preserved and enhanced, is not to be confused with the results of neglect, carelessness and dirt.

As regards the tourist trade, we do not, of course, advocate sacrificing the life and development of a city and subordinating its whole disposition to the tastes of foreigners in search of the novel and exotic. We simply wish to point out that the desire to attract tourists may provide an incentive to set off to best advantage those features of a town which truly deserve to be generally known, admired and appreciated.

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16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

ALEPPO

ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TOWN

The Citadel of Aleppo, with its deep moat, and steep and grandiose glacis held in place by stone columns, etches a lacy crown around the hill formed by the accumulated ruins of older civilisations, and is truly symbolic of the city which, throughout its long history, has weathered events that brought ruin and death everywhere around it. At its foot spreads out the serried network of thoroughfares converging from desert and sea, turned, as it were, to stone in the rational yet florid architecture of the town. 361

Aleppo has always been considered the key city of communication and trade. From time to time wars have halted its development, but its own peculiar logic, unity and coherence have continued, despite changes in political circumstance. In Seleucid times and later in the Roman and Byzantine period, its contacts and influence grew steadily; it then became the real metropolis of northern Syria. Antioch remained the great centre of culture; Aleppo was the city of trade, industry and manufacturing.

In the art of building too, Aleppo was always the leader, suffering no declines or lapses, able to combine the rational and geometric logic of Greek construction with the monumental design of Rome and the plastic and decorative fantasy of the Mesopotamian Orient. In contrast with the poor building materials of Mesopotamia—where sun-dried brick and mud were used—Aleppo had its rich resources of limestone, which it used generously, as though in passionate pursuit of an idea to create forms and motifs suited to the requirements of architecture. It achieved a relationship between the structure of its buildings and the nature and characteristics of the stone, which was a factor in the artistic conception as a whole, just as water was in Damascus, where pools, streams and tinkling fountains lent life and movement to courts and spaces. 341

It is difficult, in a few words, to describe the various buildings and classify them according to their type and style. J. Sauvaget has made a detailed study of the question in connexion with the town's historical development, and has drawn

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172 gressive beautification, because the whole of its history is written in its splendid buildings. All that is needed would be to free the old buildings of the mean parasitic structures which cumber them, built against their walls or in empty spaces at a time when the authorities were negligent. It would only be necessary to restore to a seemly state and put to suitable use the numerous major monuments, such as "Sheikh Mohassin", the Nuri Maristan, the Zahiriya Madrasah—without the walls, the "Khanaqah Faraim" and that marvel of architecture, the hospital (maristan) built in 1354 by the Emir Arghun, which are either deserted or used as tenements for the poor.

764 In the cemetery of "Es-Salihin", which has been holy ground
172 for centuries, with a sacred rock traditionally associated with Abraham, there are many tombs dating back to the end of the twelfth century, some used as dwellings, others abandoned and half buried. The variety of their architecture and the beauty of the inscriptions on them make them of great interest, and it would be enough to rail them in, clear them and plant a few trees to convert a waste land into a formal park rich with monuments of the past.

The same is true of the tombs in the cemetery of the Maqamat, to the east of the Kamiliya Madrasah—without the walls; the madrasah too requires no more, by way of treatment, than the unbricking of the sanctuary door.

● 361 Other noteworthy structures which need clearing of the
172 parasitic buildings that have grown up in and around them are the lovely city gates (Bab Antakiya, Bab an-Nasr, "Bab el-Hadid") and the façades, entrances and courtyards of the Urdumur, Es-Sabun and Qurd-Beg khans.

A proper layout of the approaches to the ramparts between Bab al-Jinan and Bab Qinnasrin, and the demolition of a few run-down shops, would create one of the finest promenades imaginable, with impressive views of the walls and façades of the Mameluke towers.

In any scheme of reconstruction and beautification, consideration must also be given to fine private houses. At present, the Ghazzaleh House is being put to rather unsuitable use as a school and worse still, is threatened with demolition. In our view, a suitable use could be found for one or other of these lovely seventeenth- and eighteenth-century residences, as also, perhaps, for one of the khans, as a club or hotel providing amenities for tourists. Aleppo would thus offer its guests a combination of creature comforts and an incomparable artistic setting.

THE CITY IMPROVEMENT SCHEME

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In 1951, at the request of the municipality of Aleppo, a French architect, Mr. A. Gutton, of the Institut d'Urbanisme in Paris, submitted plans for improvements and new building in the city, with a report setting out the criteria followed.

In their present form, these plans must be regarded as the bare bones of a scheme to meet the requirements of the modern town and the wishes of its authorities. The real key is in the report, where we find the explanation of the ends sought and the means selected to achieve them. One of its more significant passages is that which points out that, while giving the fullest weight to new human and social requirements, it is essential to grasp "the historical value of each quarter or each particular building and, in terms of that, to decide either on its preservation as it stands or on its improvement and clearing"

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Noting the key importance of the suqs, the author advises non-interference with arrangements which are the growth of centuries and still serve a useful purpose today: "The approaches to serve the khans, which supply the suqs and are the normal staging points between wholesaler and retailer, must be planned to link up with the existing internal thoroughfares and approach lanes of each khan and its traditionally satellite suqs."

The author suggests separate streets for motor traffic and foot passengers, and advocates keeping shops off the new main arteries. The various zones are classified as residential, commercial or manufacturing, in the light of the city's life and the nature of the ground, and it is made clear that, "on the plans, the purpose of the notation 'site for public and administrative buildings', without further particulars, is to reserve these sites for public purposes, without making any commitment as to their precise use".

The serraglio is made the focal point of the civic centre, though with numerous reservations and recommendations designed to ensure the blending of the new buildings with the setting of the existing monuments (El-Iabbadiyeh hamman, and mosques of great historical and artistic importance). A point worth noting is the need for avoiding any lofty building in the neighbourhood of the Citadel. New buildings would spoil all the architectonic relationships of this area, as the example of the new serraglio, the demolition of which has been repeatedly suggested, clearly shows. The proposed buildings can be sited more freely and logically in the open spaces behind, though some new structure of limited height might be permissible in the space between the two mosques. The problem to be solved here is an architectural one, consisting in the introduction of new buildings into an existing setting with the aim of enhancing and not destroying its beauty. This consideration is implicit in the report's closing words: "The scheme as a whole must be designed to preserve the work of the past unharmed whilst striving, in the new quarters, to do even better, but in the architectural terms of our own age, not in slavish imitation of the past. Make the most of your 200 mosques and your eight miles of suqs; preserve the successive monuments bearing witness to your greatness . . .".

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We are glad indeed to be able to associate ourselves with the recommendations and reservations in the report accompanying the scheme of improvements adopted by the municipality. A point we wish to stress is the need to add to the staff of the town planning services specialists (or the commission mentioned earlier), able to translate into practical terms what, in the actual plan, is suggested but not set out to the last detail.

The experience gained from the building of the new seraglio, with the ill-advised roadworks involving the destruction of the Matbakh el-Ajami (described by J. Sauvaget as "the only relic of this order existing in the Moslem East") and the mutilation of the Khan Al-Wazir ("a noteworthy collection of buildings, said to be the finest khan in Aleppo") should counsel prudence. Any work involving interference with the old quarters should be preceded by the closest study of the various factors which have gone to make them what they are. We hope it will prove possible to avoid any further disfigurement of the Khan Al-Wazir for the purpose, already announced, of compensating the property owners who have suffered loss through the widening of the street with plots carved out of the courtyard area. Anything of the kind would have the worst effect on the fine architectural balance of the khan and would be in flagrant contradiction to the principles set forth above.

The point to be remembered is that any plan for the expansion of a town must serve to lay down lines of future development which will guarantee harmony, giving due weight to all things of importance to the community. It would be useless and harmful if such a plan were carried out only in part, to serve special interests and for immediate profit.

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THE SYRIAN DESERT

311 361 The Syrian desert is not uniformly barren. There are enormous stretches of steppeland, where life is not impossible, or at least not permanently so. The winter rains, rare though they are, make the pastures green and fill the water-holes. The wandering Bedouins manage to feed their flocks all the year round; and their camps are found here and there in the desert solitudes. In some places indeed, there is sedentary as well as nomadic life; near a well or a spring a group of dwellings may be built, palm trees grow up and crops are cultivated.

The necessary conditions for the transitory developement of certain sites, when circumstances are favourable, may thus be found. At certain times in history, irrigation work has been undertaken to assist crop growing and reservoirs have been dug to make permanent settlement possible. Trade has provided means of livelihood for a larger population than the products of the earth would have sufficed to maintain. Military defence requirements have led to the building of forts and castles, and the necessary supplies for those who manned them have had to be found.

487 361 This accounts for the establishment of the great desert routes, with their chains of halting-places at the only spots where the existence of natural or artificial resources made life possible. The natural route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, via the Euphrates valley to Aleppo and Antioch, was shortened by the short cut across the desert which of necessity passed through Palmyra, either continuing straight to the Homs Gap or turning south towards Damascus and Palestine. Settlements grew up, at each end of the desert route or at oases along it, or again at strategic points such as river crossings or mountain gorges, some places, indeed, fulfilling several of these conditions (e.g. Dura and Palmyra).

PALMYRA

361 Palmyra has a considerable and well-deserved fame, first for its natural beauty—abundant sulphur springs, transparent blue

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PALMYRA

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361 water, fertile gardens and palm groves, and the contrast between the flat, barren wastes of the desert stretching away to the south and the rocky mountain barrier which rises above it immediately to the north. Secondly, its fame is due to its extraordinary destiny and to the romance of its economic and political history, which made this remote oasis in the heart of the desert one of the great trade centres of ancient times and its rulers, Odainath and Zenobia, the acknowledged masters of the East—first the supporters, then the rivals of Rome and ill-fated pretenders to the dignity of empire. Lastly, its fame is due above all to the incomparable grandeur of its ruins.

361 172 The ruins of Palmyra are striking on account both of their size and of their wonderful state of preservation. From the regular chessboard pattern of the streets, still discernible inside the outer wall of the town, rise rows of columns, sanctuary precincts, porticos and steps of public buildings. Round the city lie the vast burial grounds, with their varying types of burial vaults, tombs in the form of houses, hypogea, and sepulchral towers, all of which, though violated from ancient times onwards, still retain their decorations and inscriptions as well as most of the innumerable sculptures they contained. Whole structures still remain to their full height: large sections of the main colonnade are still upright and the entablature is still supported on the pillars with their consoles; the temple of Baal, surrounded by its courtyard wall and porticos is almost intact; the sepulchral towers in which the dead mount guard along the pass leading to Homs and Damascus stand out square and sombre against the hillside, flanking the route. Crowning the mountain with its tours and redans stands the Arab castle, one of the most striking features of the landscape.

As far as the parts of the buildings which lie below the surface are concerned, excavations have shown how little they have suffered from the ravages of time, a fact accounted for by the excellent condition of the subsoil and the dryness of the climate. The freshness of the paintings inside the tombs provides an illustration. Moreover, as the ancient city is almost everywhere covered by a layer of earth 9 to 12 feet thick, even those monuments which are entirely concealed are preserved to a considerable height. Another reason is that the town rapidly fell into decay after its destruction in 273 and never regained

its former importance; buildings were seldom converted to other uses and, except for a few that later served for military purposes (such as the one now known as Diocletian's camp, or the forecourt of the temple of Baal, which was transformed into an Arab fortress in the twelfth century), the buildings were never intentionally demolished or the materials of which they were made plundered. 361 172

Thus Palmyra may be said to present ideal conditions for archaeological research, offering possibilities that will not be exhausted for a long time. After the description of the visible remains given by the German scholars who worked at Palmyra under the direction of Th. Wiegand, after H. Inghoit's systematic exploration of the burial grounds and the penetrating studies of the monuments, cults, institutions and language of the Palmyrians, made by H. Seyrig, R. Amy, D. Schlumberger, J. G. Février, J. Cantineau, J. Starcky and others, the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities worked out an admirable and extensive scheme for uncovering the entire ruins. The clearing of the agora before the war, and that of the theatre, quite recently, have shown what spectacular and instructive results may one day be gained from the scheme. The work is proceeding steadily but the task is immense and there is still plenty of scope for useful and fruitful co-operation.

A few special problems which have already arisen in connexion with the study and exploration of the Palmyra ruins are worth noting here. The monumental arch, the temple of Baal, the great colonnade and innumerable tombs, towers and hypogea required extensive restoration and consolidation. The removal of the decorative sculpture of the Yarhai hypogeum and its reconstruction in the Damascus Museum was a difficult undertaking, successfully accomplished. The bold plan adopted to allow of the uncovering of Baal's sanctuary is also worthy of note. The modern town, whose houses filled the temple precincts, was removed and rebuilt further north, beyond the boundary of the ancient city. Now, after 20 years, the whole population agrees that the step was well justified, for the new village, with its wide airy streets, affords healthier and more convenient living conditions; this may serve as an example. The only remaining inhabited building is the charming house of the Antiquities Service in the south-east corner of the precincts, where visiting archaeologists find a welcome and an atmosphere which they much appreciate.

But Palmyra is not only a city; it is the natural centre of an immense region stretching from the Anti-Lebanon mountains to the Euphrates, a region whose prospects and importance are now beginning to be realized. Along the desert routes which meet and cross within it, and where they reach the rivers, are other sites, marking wayside centres which existed at various times in history. In such places, quite impressive remains have survived to the present day.

THE TWO QASR EL-HEIR

As D. Schlumberger has pointed out in a recent work, Palmyra was once less isolated than is generally believed. Other inhabited centres within the area prospered beside the metropolis. In the plains there were oases made fertile by large-scale irrigation schemes; in the mountains to the north-west, shepherds' villages, made habitable by the construction of reservoirs which provided adequate water supplies for the summer months. These villages did not survive the fall of Palmyra and the region 361 172 344

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was subsequently completely abandoned. However, the dams and aqueducts built during the Roman period were still useful in later times to the Byzantines and Arabs. They made it possible to build the two great castles to the west and east of Palmyra which bear the same name and now stand ruined in the midst of an expanse of desert. They were formerly surrounded by walled gardens and had been designed to serve both as palaces and fortresses.

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Built by the Caliph Hisham in 727, Qsar-el-Heir el-Gharbi was a luxurious residence. A tall Byzantine tower marks the site of the ruins from afar. All that remains of the Arab palace is the lower masonry of the walls, which were of freestone; they were uncovered between 1936 and 1938 by D. Schlumberger. His excavations not only laid bare the plan of the palace, which was a square flanked by towers, surrounding a central courtyard with porticos and a single entrance. They also brought to light innumerable remnants of a stucco and fresco decoration which is the most original and complete example of Omayyad art in Syria.

Qsar el-Heir es-Charki, also built by Hisham in 729 near a still older fortification that is now in a very ruined state, has walls and towers standing almost intact up to their full height. The upper part of those on either side of the entrance is decorated with a design of arches supported on small columns; the others have a simpler decoration of ornamental courses of brick. The main doorway has a semi-circular tympanum with machicolations overhead.

Though similar in layout and belonging to the same period, the two Qsar el-Heir presented different problems for the Antiquities Service. With the former, it was a matter of discovering and preserving the precious and fragile decoration, which was picked up in fragments at the foot of the walls; it took several years of patient and highly skilled work to remove it and piece it together in the Damascus Museum, where it is now one of the principal exhibits. In the case of the latter, it was necessary to underpin the walls and towers whose foundations had been undermined by damp and desert winds; the maintenance and supply of a group of workers on an isolated, waterless site such as this was a difficult matter. The work has been successfully begun and is to be continued shortly.

RESAFA

Resafa is another of Caliph Hisham's castles, laid out in the form of a square with a central courtyard, defensive wall and towers; it was located and excavated in 1952, by the German mission under Mrs. K. Otto-Dorn, among the remains of a great Moslem centre. The Caliph died and was buried there.

Up to that time, Resafa had been known chiefly for the Christian monuments that had been built inside its great walls; they are of great interest in the history of art and architecture in northern Syria from the fifth to the seventh century of our era. The largest and best preserved is the basilica of St. Sergius, the plan of which has recently been reconstituted by J. Kollwitz in the light of his excavation work; the structure is said to date from the second half of the fifth century. The remains of the martyry and a second great basilica are still partially hidden; excavation is revealing the beautiful carvings of the semi-domed apses and the capitals and arches. There are also a few smaller buildings and, outside the walls, a funerary

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361 172 344 chapel. The peculiar nature of the crystalline stone of these buildings gives them a very distinctive stamp.

The rich ornamentation of the northern doorway of the enclosure, with its five arches of different sizes supported on columns is also remarkable; in structure and style it has been compared to certain parts of Diocletian's palace at Split.

The size of the buildings and the extent and isolation of the site make Resafa a difficult place to explore. It is gratifying to know that work has now been resumed and it is to be hoped that it will soon be possible to continue it on a large scale.

THE VALLEY OF THE EUPHRATES

361 172 The Euphrates route must also be considered while we are speaking of the desert routes; it too is marked at intervals by large fortified enclosures, built at different times at points where the tracks fanning out from Palmyra crossed the river. Dura and Raqqa are among the best known of these fortifications.

Dura-Europos (Es-Salihiyeh) is a Seleucid foundation dating from the end of the fourth century B.C. Occupied by he Parthians and later by the Romans, it was at that time closely dependant upon Palmyra. It was captured and destroyed by the Sassanids in A.D. 256. The town is situated on a plateau above the Euphrates flanked by two narrow ravines. Guarding the river crossing, and at the same time a caravan city and rivers port, it held a position of great strategic and economic importance. It was not until 1921, with the chance discovery of the paintings from the temple of the Palmyrene gods, now in the Damascus Museum, that attention was drawn to the site. Its investigation was begun by F. Cumont and continued by Yale University under the direction of M. J. Rostovtzeff. On he traditional Greek chessboard street plan of the town, a number of buildings were located and excavated, including 11 temples, two small sanctuaries, a Christian church, a synagogue, he market, several baths and numerous houses. The many treasures found included groups of frescoes from the church and synagogue, now reconstructed and preserved at Yale and Damascus respectively.

Although the Greek and Roman town at Raqqa was of some importance in its time, it is the Moslem remains of the new town, Al-Rafiqa, founded in 772 by the Caliph Al-Mansur which have monopolized attention. The Baghdad gate with its brickwork decoration and the twelfth-century mosque with its arches and round minaret are the most striking monuments. Quite recently the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities began a search for the remains of the palaces which, in the ninth century, were a favourite residence of the Abbassid dynasty. The excavations, carried out by Nassib Saliby, brought to ligh in 1952, at a spot about two miles north of the city wall, a large group of buildings containing many rooms and formerly surrounded by gardens. A Kufic inscription bearing the name

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●361 172 of the Caliph Al-Mutasim has been found there, besides fragments of stucco work, frescoes, glassware and glazed ceramics. This is but a part of a very large built area which will be systematically explored.

A word must also be said of Mari (Tell Hariri), another town on the river, which, 3,000 years before Dura, occupied a comparable position some 25 miles further south; everyone has heard of the extraordinary treasures found there since 1932 by the French mission under A. Parrot, which include statues, jewellery, mother-of-pearl mosaics and inscribed tablets. These are preserved at Aleppo and the Louvre and the most recent finds are at present on view in the exhibition at the Damascus Museum. Other notable sites are the triangular fortifications of Halibiyeh, the ancient Zenobia, built in Roman times, with its serried chain of towers, to guard the narrow pass running along the Euphrates at the foot of a high basalt cliff, and Meskené, the ancient Beïs, with its high brick minaret, at the junction of the route from Antioch and Aleppo with the river valley.

The Mesopotamian method of building with sun-dried brick, which was more or less generally employed, and the extent and isolation of the sites make it questionable whether it would be worth while to undertake costly maintenance and consolidation work. At Mari, Dura and Raqqa the treasures found are of greater interest than the buildings; once the excavations have been completed, plans drawn and photographs taken, the ruins can be left to their fate. It will then be the task of museums and publications to make them live once more.

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THE VALLEY OF THE ORONTES

The study of the coastal region must be extended to the valley 133
of the Orontes which, geographically and historically, forms 361
its eastern limit. A natural channel between the Alawite chain and the limestone plateau, it forms part of the long depression running from south to north behind the Lebanon. Scattered along the course of the Orontes, too, are the strong citadels by which the Arabs sought, successfully, to stem the advance of the Crusaders—Baalbek, Homs, Hama, Caesaria, Kalat-el-Mudik—all interesting and beautiful, in varying degrees.

Two very different sites must be mentioned. 361

On the vast field of ruins of Apamea, overlooking the marshy 172
plain formed by the river, the scattered fragments of that ancient city's monuments are still to be seen. It is being explored by the Belgian expedition which has been led in turn by F. Mayence and H. Lacoste. The ground is strewn with plinths, entablatures, and the shafts of wreathed columns. The line of the great colonnade and the ground plans of various buildings are still easily recognizable.

The charm of Hama, with its green gardens and high, wailing waterwheels, must not distract us from two interesting monuments, well worthy of close study: the Great Mosque, with its two minarets of different periods, its arcaded courtyard and white domes, still showing signs of what it was at an earlier date, and the Azem Palace, with the graceful arches of its upper courtyard, its ornamented windows, its great domed hall of state (dating from 1778), lavishly although a little too heavily decorated. The atmosphere of the old town is a happy foil to the life on the banks of the river and helps to give Hama great attraction for the visitor.

ANCIENT SITES

However beautiful or famous they may be, the ancient sites 172
of the coastal region need not here be dealt with at length in

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N THE NORTH

CHARACTERISTICS OF CERTAIN SITES

The region of the limestone plateau, which is bounded on the west by the cleft formed by the valleys of the Orontes and the Afrin, includes a few fertile plains, but taken as a whole, it is simply a vast mountainous tract of bare rock, fissured and worn. The sites are scattered on the ridges and slopes and only by building water-tanks was it possible for the people to maintain life. They can be divided into three groups: to the north, the Jebel Seman; in the centre, the Jebel Barisha and the Jebel el-Ala; to the south, the Jebel Zawiyé or the Jebel Riha. In certain places there are so many ancient centres that their ruins can be seen on all sides. 133 361 172

These towns frequently grew up around a monastery. The monastic life was widely practised in Syria at an early date and huge groups of buildings were put up to meet religious needs. Every convent was also a centre of agricultural work requiring additional buildings, as at Breig and Deir Turmanin. Some were also places of pilgrimage, where inns, bazaars and hostelries were built for the pious who flocked thither, as they did, for instance, to the convents of Qalaat Seman and Deir Seman, hallowed by the memory of the famous Stylite. 361 172

In other cases farms, a church and oil presses, sometimes covering a large area, grew up around an agricultural town; Bamuqqa Qirqbize and Behyo are excellent examples. Elsewhere, there were villages with substantial houses, as at Réfadé and Kafer Nabo, or with more modest dwellings, as at Qatura and Taqlé. Everywhere, the remains of churches can be distinguished amidst the debris of ruined buildings. In the vicinity, the variety of monuments to the dead is no less worthy of note.

Two sites are remarkable for their exceptional size and the variety of buildings found there: Brad, in the north, and El-Bara, in the south. Situated on the denuded plateau which forms the northern part of the Jebel Seman, Brad looks like a small town; in fact, it was the administrative and commercial centre of a very large region; it grew up around the nucleus of an ancient settlement (interesting remains of third-century baths and two large churches dating from 399-402 and 561, respectively) to reach its greatest size in the seventh century. El-Bara,

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361 172 the main centre of the Jebel Zawiyé, was both an agricultural and an industrial town (large-scale production of oil and wine), and finally covered an area about 2 miles long by 1 I wide. Among the confused heaps of its ruins, the remains of several churches and rich mausoles of the sixth century, with their pyramidal crowns, are recognizable.

172 341 G. Tchalenko has drawn attention to the similarity of the architecture throughout the limestone plateau due to the use of the same materials and the same methods of hewing and bonding stone. He has also noted the unity and homogeneity of the carved ornamentation, which was gradually adapted to the new forms of the various buildings. This suggests that itinerant groups of craftsmen went from place to place, taking their style and methods with them.

172 346 Evidence is provided by countless buildings, varying in nature and importance. We would draw particular attention to two of them, which seem to surpass all the others by their quality and exceptional charm. The first is the cruciform basilica of St. Simeon (Qalaat Semaa) built in the third quarter of the fifth century around the column on which the Stylite spent the last 37 years of his life and which, long after his death, was still a famous place of pilgrimage. The originality of the plan, the masterly structure of the central octagon, with its great semi-circular arches, the harmonious proportions of the chevet and the southern façade, together with the neighbouring baptistery and conventual buildings, make this peerless architectural group "the greatest and grandest Christian ruin in the East". The second of these monuments, lesser known because it is difficult of access, is the basilica of Qalbloze, standing in a temenos, like an ancient temple, on the crest of the Jebel el-Ala. It dates from the end of the fifth century. Its façade flanked by towers, its chevet adorned with columns, the great arches separating the nave from the side aisles, the majestic proportions of the apse, and the quality and sober arrangement of carving, produce that impression of harmony and perfection that only a masterpiece can achieve.

THE POPULATION OF THE LIMESTONE PLATEAU

361 172 The profusion of ruins over such a large area, not only in the vicinity of fertile plains, but on rocky and waterless plateaux shows that there was once a large population, which later disappeared completely. The construction of water tanks may have helped the people to subsist, but that alone cannot explain their extraordinary prosperity. What, then, were their means of livelihood?

Some have thought the answer to this question to be that the arable land disappeared as a result of complete and unchecked deforestation, which brought about a radical change in the conditions of life. Tchalenko does not agree; in the work already referred to, he gives a simpler and more plausible explanation of this phenomenon.

It has long been established that the ancient inhabitants of the limestone plateau owed their prosperity to the cultivation of the olive and, to a lesser degree, of the vine. The many presses found in all the settlements are proof of this. The cultivation of these crops is perfectly feasible in the soil and climate of the present day. It was a change in political and social circumstances which brought about the decline in the population. Where the soil accumulated in rocky basins and

361 172 clude is beneficiary to give a village food by the cultivation of cereals, it may be enough to make that village prosperous by the growing of trees. The cultivation of the olive as the only crop however, implies firstly that capital must be immobilized for a long time, while the trees are growing and, secondly that there must be reliable channels of trade for the produce to be disposed of therefrom in return for other necessary goods. These conditions presupposed a long period of peace and security. This was once secured by the Pax Romana, and in recent years a stable regime has again been inaugurated. It is already producing its first results: people are again beginning to grow trees and to settle on the limestone plateau.

This is a development fraught with consequences for the future fate of the ancient monuments.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS: THE PRESERVATION OF THE MONUMENTS

172 The fact that the limestone plateau is again becoming populated adds a new difficulty to those already arising out of the nature of the ruins and their wide dispersion. The protection of the monuments was already complicated by the fact that they are scattered over a distance of nearly 50 miles, with bad communications, and by the state to which they have degenerated—enormous and sometimes practically impenetrable masses of stone where buildings, now collapsed, once stood, in the midst of which the churches are generally situated. Now we find, in addition, that the new inhabitants of this region tend, for preference, to settle among the ruins, occupying the ancient buildings, repairing the water tanks and taking from the fabric of the old structures the hewn stones they need for building, here lying so conveniently to hand.

It is true that today there is no risk of any great building's being totally destroyed, as happened not so long ago, to the magnificent Tetrapylon church. The most urgent measures have already been taken by the Directorate of Antiquities; certain monuments (particularly those at Qalat Semaan) have been consolidated; regional inspectors keep an eye on the situation, regularly visiting the ruins and drawing up reports. These measures are producing good results, but they could still be taken further, although it is not to be expected that they will ever provide complete safeguards. In fact, it is impossible to preserve all the monuments, provide a keeper for every site, or counteract the effects of the repopulation of the region, which in itself is a very welcome development. In such a situation, the only practicable policy is to consolidate and restore the most interesting buildings, whose architectural value is obvious, and leave to their fate the countless ruins which consist only of parts of walls still standing or the tumble-down masonry of houses now collapsed.

Two comments are thus called for.

Firstly, attention must be drawn to the very great importance of archaeological publications and the outstanding services rendered by the scholars who produce them. Detailed descriptions of the ruins, accompanied by plans, photographs and architectural drawings, as well as more general studies relating to the monuments, make it possible to preserve an accurate picture of a state of affairs that is bound to change or come to an end. We have only to compare the present situation with that described in Vogüé's or Butler's publications in order to realize this.

p.30 B

16: Collart et al G-5 (1953) 1954 MD1 Syria MD1

DEAD CITIES

IN THE SOUTH

THE HAURAN AND THE JEBEL DRUZE

133 Black is the dominant colour in the basalt country of southern Syria. The eruptive rocks strewn over the soil give the landscape a highly distinctive character; black are the stones, black the buildings, black the sculptures.

The whole region was formerly known as the Hauran, but today this name is applied only to the western portion, as distinct from the eastern part, the Jebel Druze. The same distinction is to be found in the differing aspects of the two portions. To the west, as far as the eye can see, lies an enormous fertile plain which produces abundant crops of wheat and barley. To the east, rises rugged mountainous country. These mountains have the characteristic contours of extinct volcanoes, but although they are fairly high (from 1,500 to 1,700 metres), they do not appear so, for the ground rises gradually and the altitude of the foothills is always over 1,000 metres.

172 In this part of the country, the building of monuments on a large scale began with the establishment of the Roman Province of Arabia, in A.D. 106, by Trajan's legate, Cornelius Palma, and was encouraged by the Antonines, Septimius Severus and Philip the Arab. It continued during the Christian period, for there were numerous bishoprics from the time of the first councils onwards and many churches and monasteries were then built. After the Islamic conquest (636), only the towns of Bosra and Salkhad remained of any importance, owing to their strategic position; their main buildings (military and religious) date from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The abandonment of the ancient sites, however, rapidly resulted everywhere in the ruin of their monuments. Where there had been most villages, there they were most completely deserted.

SITES AND MONUMENTS IN THE JEBEL DRUZE

361 172 Two of the many sites, Chahba and Qanawat, have fairly large groups of monuments.

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Chabba, formerly Philippopolis, was founded in the third century by the emperor, Philip the Arab, on the square plan of a Roman camp. The gates of the town, the wonderfully preserved pavement of the cardo and the decumanus, a small theatre, thermae and various other monuments are still to be seen on the ancient site, while huge mosaics from it are now preserved at Sueida and Damascus. Qanawat, formerly Kanatha, stands in undulating country, planted with trees, where the still well-preserved ruins make a very striking picture. Among these ruins are to be seen curious tombs, the colonnades (still standing) of several temples and the great group of buildings known as the seraglio, an interesting collection of Roman and Christian structures, where it is possible to distinguish the corbelled columns of a prostyle temple, the portico, atrium and hall of a large fourth-century basilica, and the curiously ornamented façade of a church almost as ancient.

At Chabba, as at Qanawat, the inhabitants are now living in the ruins, having installed themselves in certain buildings and damaged others by taking materials from them. The same situation is found at most of the large number of ancient centres in this region, and particularly at Chakka, where the famous basilica, the palace with its interesting façade and a beautiful house adorned with columns are not only distinctive in themselves, but also provide excellent examples of those stone slab roofs supported on corbels which are a characteristic feature of the local architecture. At Sueida, the busy centre of the Jebel Druze, there is practically nothing left of the ancient monuments. Even a great group of buildings like the temple of Sia has now completely disappeared. Moreover, we have only to compare the present state of the monuments with that described in the publications issued at the beginning of the century to realize how much destruction has taken place during the last 30 years.

We must hasten to add, however, that the necessary measures have been taken to prevent further damage. The Directorate of Antiquities has put in hand the most urgent consolidation work; inspectors keep an eye on the monuments and report any new discoveries, while the museum at Sueida prevents the dispersion and disappearance of the objects found. Nevertheless, the great numbers of ancient remains and the fact

P.32 C

that they are widely scattered and often difficult of access, make it hard to ensure really effective protection. 361 172

THE CHURCHES OF EZRAA

At least a brief mention must be made of the importance of Ezraa. The churches of St. George and St. Hélie, dating from 514 and 542 respectively, are important in the history of early Christian art. Today, they are in a deplorable state of neglect. The cupola of the church of St. George collapsed in 1912. Ugly repairs have been made to both. The consolidation and intelligent restoration of both these buildings is particularly to be recommended. 346

BOSRA

The old capital of the Roman Province of Arabia is now a humble village. It contains remarkable ancient ruins, both Christian and Islamic, whose architectural beauty and historical importance recall the city's long and brilliant past. 361 172

The topography of the Roman town is still clearly indicated by the straight course of the main thoroughfare, built on the ancient decumanus; several columns of its porticos and one of the gates at the western end of the town are still standing. The visitor will note a great monumental arch with three bays, the ruins of thermae and four large Corinthian columns which may have formed part of a nymphaeum.

Built in 513 under the Archbishop Julianos, the cathedral, now in a very ruinous state, is one of the oldest examples of a large church with a cupola and central plan. From an inscription, we know that Bosra possessed an even older church, dedicated to the Virgin in the third quarter of the fourth century by the Archbishop Antipater; this inscription reminds us of the important part played by the town in early Christian history. Its name is also linked with the early history of Islam, for a large building with an apse and a blind façade is believed to be the remains of the monastery where the monk Bahira taught Mahomet and foretold his prophetic calling. A mosque, Al-Mabrak, was later built on the spot where, according to tradition, the Prophet's camel knelt. 346 172

This is one of the many mosques whose high dark minarets, square-built in the twelfth century, give the town of Bosra its own particular stamp. Although the Great Mosque of Omar is in a better state of preservation and although the minaret of Al-Fatmé has a slenderer grace, the Al-Mabrak mosque and the adjoining madrasah, built in 1136—the oldest Syrian madrasah, according to J. Sauvaget—form a very remarkable architectural group.

The rapid decay of these monuments is most regrettable. A glance at the older publications will show the extent of the damage, which has been made worse by the building of modern

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

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

27. Palmyra. Aerial view.
28. Palmyra. Colonnade of the courtyard of the Temple of Bel.
29. Palmyra. Tomb of Elahbel.

following P 35-G

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



80. Qasr el-Hair el-Gharbi. Aerial view.
81. Qasr el-Hair el-Gharbi. Entrance to the mosque.
82. Qasr el-Hair el-Gharbi. Aerial view.

following P. 35 - H

PRODUCTION

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عدد رخص البناء المعطاة من قبل الدائرة الفنية في مدينة دمشق (سنوات ١٩٣٩ - ١٩٥٣)

NUMBER OF BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED BY THE TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT IN DAMASCUS, YEARS 1939 — 1953

Table No. 15 جدول رقم ١٥

Year and Month	الابنية الحديثة للسكن New Residential Buildings			الابنية الحديثة التجارية والصناعية New Commercial and Industrial Buildings		عدد الرخص للبناء الخشبية Permits for simple and wooden constructions	السنة والشهور
	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	وحدات السكن Number of Residential units	عدد الرخص Number of Permits	المساحة بالمتر م٢ Floor Area M2	عدد الرخص Number of Permits		
1939	50,876	287	190	—	—	537	١٩٣٩
1940	40,373	240	119	—	—	471	١٩٤٠
1941	24,300	140	74	—	—	384	١٩٤١
1942	20,708	127	65	—	—	288	١٩٤٢
1943	41,207	230	126	—	—	316	١٩٤٣
1944	79,492	540	254	—	—	346	١٩٤٤
1945	55,971	353	176	—	—	434	١٩٤٥
1946	90,356	680	326	—	—	627	١٩٤٦
1947	177,400	838	369	—	—	580	١٩٤٧
1948	164,849	865	434	—	—	515	١٩٤٨
1949	165,758	903	303	—	—	386	١٩٤٩
1950	174,674	863	407	33,916	92	333	١٩٥٠
1951	133,058	833	332	28,565	62	246	١٩٥١
1952	178,925	1,107	456	30,984	65	224	١٩٥٢
1953	231,733	1,239	463	33,032	63	188	١٩٥٣
1953							١٩٥٣
January	19,834	107	42	3,101	4	12	كانون ثاني
February	17,929	114	46	2,143	8	13	شباط
March	11,419	67	30	5,129	8	17	آذار
April	19,617	116	37	2,235	8	6	نيسان
May	25,065	143	45	5,111	9	17	ايار
June	17,335	98	33	925	3	21	حزيران
July	20,468	96	45	—	—	18	تموز
August	26,513	150	44	8,069	8	18	آب
September	23,512	132	40	619	3	21	ايلول
October	10,392	62	36	3,625	3	20	تشرين اول
November	15,747	86	30	687	6	10	تشرين ثاني
December	23,872	74	35	1,387	3	17	كانون اول

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI
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Chapter Ten

SYRIA AND LEBANON

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

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THE area of the present Syria and Lebanon lies to the north of Arabia Deserta and is the western horn of the Fertile Crescent. The two republics do not enclose within their boundaries a natural geographic entity and their climate and topography are best studied in relation to the surrounding countries;[1] but within the political boundaries of the two states, the following geographical divisions may roughly be distinguished:

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(1) *The Coastal Strip*. This is about twenty miles wide near Latakia and rather less just north of Tripoli, but in some places disappears and the mountains meet the sea. Olives, bananas, citrus, and vegetables are cultivated intensively near Beirut.

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(2) *The Mountains*. Starting from the north, the first coastal mountains are the Jebel Ansariya (also known as the Alawi Mountains) which average 4,000 feet and are well populated on the western slopes. To the south is the Homs–Tripoli gap and then starts the Lebanon range with peaks of over 10,000 feet. Even on the upper slopes of this range water is plentiful, there is close cultivation, and the villages and towns are prosperous. Near Beirut are situated the mountain resorts to which most of the city wor[illegible] [illegible]ove each night when the summer brings its humid heat. T[illegible] [illegible]nterior ranges of mountains lying parallel to that of the Lebanon are the Anti-Lebanon (between Homs and Zahle) reaching over 7,000 feet and the range of Hermon (between Zahle and the Israel border) which reaches 9,200 feet. Water and cultivation are far less plentiful on these than on the coastal mountains. Farther inland still and to the south of Damascus lie the Leja, a bleak area of igneous rock, and the Jebel Druze, which reaches 5,000–6,000 feet and lies north of the Jordan border.

(3) *Plains and Plateaux*. Hardly any of the territory of Syria and Lebanon lies less than 700 feet above sea-level and south of Hama almost all the land is over 1,600 feet. The richest agricultural land is on fairly high ground and forms part of a

[1] See W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East; a Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (London, Methuen, 1950).

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Syria MDI

471 a loan directly from another government. This attitude is illustrated clearly
186 in the refusal of Syria to sign an agreement with Point Four.
648 A loan from an international body is another matter, and the country is seeking a loan of several million dollars from the International Bank for development of transportation, particularly roads in the Jezira, and port facilities at Latakia.

454 Without a large-scale public works program, only minor improvements
241 can be made to the existing system. However, opportunities exist for increasing production through private investment.

The good crops of 1950, sold at exceptionally high prices, resulted in high profits and the accumulation of considerable capital. The hope of continued high profits caused much of this capital to be re-invested in equipment and farm improvements. The same incentive also brought out new capital which never before had been invested in agriculture. Judging from the number of tractors, combines and accessories, and irrigation pumps purchased during 1950 and 1951, the investment in agricultural equipment in these two years exceeded the total up to that time. Unprecedented expenditures for general farm improvements also were made, an exceptional step in a country without a history of investment in agricultural development beyond the acquisition of land and a few simple facilities. The capital base has been small. Production has about equaled consumption. There has been little surplus for savings. The few families with capital have used their funds in other ways, seldom for agriculture. But the experience of 1951 was not encouraging for long-continued investment in agricultural development. These investments were costly, many farmers paying double the United States prices for equip-

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These farmers are typical of those in northern Syria. All the tenants of one landlord usually live in villages like this one near Aleppo. Villages vary in size from a few hundred to several thousand depending on the size of the farm.

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[511] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
361 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

widely used, chiefly in the form of *leben*, a 262
fermented milk product, cheese or butter.
About 60 to 70 per cent of the milk is de- 234
rived from sheep; the remainder, from cattle
or goats. The Juliana breed of cattle and a
special breed of "Damascus goat" are raised
in most regions and are noteworthy as milk
producers. Fowl and eggs are usually plenti- 235
ful, but the consumption of meat is nor-
mally low, especially in the rural areas.
Mutton is the principal meat, although the 262
flesh of cattle, goats and camels is also uti-
lized. Fish are valuable as a source of pro- 226
tein in the Euphrates and the Khabour river
basins and along the coast; they are seldom
available in other regions.

The Bedouin live chiefly on milk prod- 262
ucts made from the milk of their flocks, aug- 361
mented by cereals and, occasionally, dates.
Meat is often more of a luxury among the
nomads than among the villagers. The aver-
age Bedouin diet is usually sparse and
monotonous.

Housing

Life in rural Syria centers in the villages, 342
which are self-contained social units. Struc-
turally, they are compact, with the houses
attached, and built in such a manner that
a continuous windowless wall faces the
street. Mud brick or adobe is the predomi-
nating building material, although stone is
sometimes employed in the highland areas.
The houses may consist of one or several
rooms, which almost invariably open into a
central compound. Separate shelters for
storage and for the livestock may line the
sides of the courtyards, but in the poorer
villages the domestic animals are frequently
housed with the family, at least during the
winter months. The roofs are typically flat,
made of rolled earth overlaid on poles and
reeds or of thatch. Beehive-type houses with
domed or conical roofs, however, are a char-
acteristic feature of the treeless plains in
Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces.
Dwellings built partially underground, often
simulating caves, are encountered in some
mountain villages in Latakia. Considerable

p. 141(B)

164 the refuse dumps and other breeding sites
136 are sprayed with DDT preparations at in-
511 tervals between May and October.

136 Lice. Infestation with lice is common
511 among the inhabitants in the congested
361 quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

136 Fleas. Numerous species of fleas para-
164 sitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The sticktight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

136 Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

136 Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks,
232 including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and
164 several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

136 The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventri-*
164 *cosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of
752 scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings
[135] are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

136 The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

p. 144(B)

164 the Qoubour el Bid section of the Al Jazira, along branches of the Khabour River north-
136 east of Hassetché. *Schistosoma haemato-*
164 *bium* is the only species identified in confirmed cases, but rectal complications are sometimes recorded. At present, the disease is confined to circumscribed foci, but in view of the irrigation and the agricultural potentialities of the region, its control is of
164 major public health significance. The foci
361 are apparently of recent origin. Whether the
167 infection was introduced by Senegalese
144 troops stationed in the vicinity, as claimed by the local inhabitants, or by nomadic tribes from Iraq is a matter of conjecture. Surveys have been made within recent years, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and co-operating international organizations, and, although some discrepancies are evident in the determination of the infection rates in different villages, all emphasize the seriousness of the problem. Competent local authorities estimated in 1951 that the total incidence in that year approximated 12,000 cases.

659 In surveys undertaken in 1948,[34] the ex-
164 amination of urine samples collected from 545 persons in Qoubour el Bid and neighboring villages on the Gerahi branch of the Khabour River indicated general infection rates of about 62 per cent. They averaged 73 per cent among the men and the boys, and 49 per cent among the women and the girls. Moreover, they were consistently higher, in both sexes, in individuals under 20 years than in the older age groups.
[361] Equally high infection rates were found among the seminomadic peoples in the Tell Abiad area. A system of spot checking suggested probable infection rates of almost 100 per cent among males and of 60 per cent among females in 3 of the 5 villages visited.

164 A more exhaustive investigation in 1950[35]
659 revealed the presence of infection among
361 about 24 per cent of the inhabitants of 58 villages situated along 4 tributary streams in the Qoubour el Bid area. The infection rates ranged from 1 to 88 per cent: the most

highly infected villages were situated on the 164
Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar 659
surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area 361
showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 744 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[40] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 222 164

761 Comparative rates in urban and rural com-
369 munities were determined in a series of tests
164 on unorganized groups in the city and two adjacent farming districts. In Damascus, positive reactions to tuberculin were given by 47.7 of the boys and 40.8 per cent of the girls tested at 15 years of age. At 20 to 25 years of age, positive reactions were obtained in 86.7 per cent and 77.4 per cent, respectively; at 40 to 45 years of age, in 95.6 and 86.6 per cent, respectively. In the rural communities the positive reaction rates were consistently lower, but approached the urban levels in the older age groups. Among individuals at 15 years of age, 51.6 per cent of the boys and 27.2 per cent of the girls reacted to tuberculin in one area, and 18.1 per cent of the boys and 21.2 per cent of the girls, in another. At 40 to 45 years of age, the proportion of positive reactors averaged 80 per cent in the first series and 50 to 100 per cent in the second.[48]

744 Within recent years the Ministry of
761 Health has embarked upon a tuberculosis
747 control program. In January, 1950, a tuberculin testing and BCG inoculation campaign was organized under the auspices of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and associated organizations, which was taken over by the Ministry
659 in September. Surveys have been carried
361 out in most of the provincial capitals and
751 surrounding rural districts, and the Ministry contemplates the gradual extension of the campaign to cover the populations in all parts of the country. In the course of the investigations completed in 7 provinces between January and September, 1950, almost 417,000 persons were tuberculin tested, and over 188,000 were inoculated with BCG vaccine. The majority were schoolchildren, although miscellaneous population groups of all ages were also included. The proportion of positive reactors in the different provinces ranged from 23 per cent in Jebel ed Druz (As Suwaydah) to 42 per cent in Aleppo.

758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
743

758 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural
743 areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The de-
743 velopment of increased medical facilities has recently been undertaken by the Ministry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital near Damascus, to provide a total of 350 beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo were under construction. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed hospital in Latakia province, which would bring the total number of beds available for the isolation and the treatment of tuberculous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 A tuberculosis demonstration and training
874 center was established in Damascus in 1952 under the direction of the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Ministry and the Syrian University. It provides a regional headquarters for the training of doctors, nurses and social workers in the public health, the therapeutic and the social aspects of the disease.

164 Smallpox. Vaccination against smallpox
751 is compulsory, but enforcement is neces-
● 361 sarily incomplete in the more remote areas and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks occur from time to time, with sporadic cases reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to 1941 only occasional cases were observed. In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from Iraq, where an epidemic focus had developed in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were recorded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The outbreaks subsided in 1944, and again no more than sporadic cases were noted until 1948, when 894 cases were reported. The known incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influenza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

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age about 5 per cent. Pulmonary complications are generally responsible for a high mortality among the Bedouin children. Mumps, whooping cough and chickenpox are endemic, and often epidemic. 165 164 361

Meningococcus meningitis is sporadic. In the 12 years 1939-50, from 14 to 58 cases were reported annually, except in 1944, when the known incidence totaled 135 cases. 164

Occasional cases of diphtheria are observed, usually among children in the preschool and the school age groups. A high rate of subclinical infection undoubtedly exists, however, as demonstrated by Schick test studies.[48] Scarlet fever is relatively rare, although a few cases are reported each year. Streptococcus infections of the throat are common.

Poliomyelitis is seldom reported. No outbreaks have been recorded, but sporadic cases are sometimes encountered.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Contact

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal disease are present, but little information is available from which to determine their actual prevalence. Syphilis is widely distributed, while gonorrhea occurs primarily in the cities and the towns. Soft chancre is sometimes seen among the poorer inhabitants, but lymphogranuloma inguinale is comparatively rare. [511]

The nonvenereal treponemal infection, usually designated by the Arab term *bejel*, is common among the nomadic and the seminomadic populations in the Euphrates and the Al Jazira regions. The most prominent endemic foci are probably in the vicinity of Deir ez Zor, Raqqa and Meyadin. The disease is associated with low standards of living, and in the majority of cases infection is acquired in early childhood. Surveys have indicated that roughly 60 per cent of the above peoples in Euphrates and Al Jazira provinces are affected, while among some Bedouin tribes the infection rates approach 90 to 100 per cent. In different clinical and serologic studies, made at the mis- 164 361

sion hospital clinic in Deir ez Zor,[24, 18] the prevalence among the Bedouin has been estimated at 50 to 90 per cent and among the seminomadic Arab townsmen at 20 to 35 per cent. 164 361

The facilities for the diagnosis and the treatment of venereal diseases are meager. As of 1951, the Ministry of Health operated special venereal disease hospitals and outpatient clinics in Damascus and Aleppo. It also maintained 2 mobile dispensaries for the treatment of syphilis and bejel in the eastern provinces. A campaign for the mass treatment of bejel and syphilis was initiated in 1952 by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The findings of the various field units should eventually provide a comprehensive picture of the distribution and the prevalence of these diseases in eastern Syria. 738 743

Diseases of the Eyes. Trachoma is a major public health problem in all parts of the country, although it varies in prominence under urban and rural conditions. The infection rates usually average less than 10 per cent in the cities, but approximate 40 to 60 per cent in the rural areas, where over two thirds of the people live. Repeated surveys among school groups in northern Syria[21] indicate that slightly more than 5 per cent of the children in Aleppo are affected, in contrast with 30 to 40 per cent in the environs of the city and 60 per cent in the rural villages. The disease exists at all levels of society, but is less frequent among the nomadic tribes than among the settled communities in the same general region. Differences in prevalence, influenced by local customs, are also noted among the various racial and religious groups. In a survey covering mountainous and coastal areas of Latakia *muhafazat*, reported in 1933,[20] the highest infection rates were found in the predominantly Alawite districts. The index of infection averaged 44 per cent. It ranged from 25 per cent among the Armenians to 61 per cent among the 164 369 164 563

p. 153 (B)

164 Alawites and 68 per cent among the Ismail-
563 ites. Trachoma is one of the principal causes of blindness, in spite of the fact that, in the opinion of many local observers, a large percentage of uncomplicated cases exhibit a tendency to spontaneous cure.

164 Gonococcal and other types of infectious conjunctivitis are common. In a series of 315 conjunctival examinations, reported in 1931,[10] from the mission hospital at Deir ez Zor, *Hemophilus lacunatus* (Morax-Axenfeld bacillus) was identified in 34 per cent, *H. conjunctivitidis* (Koch-Weeks bacillus) in about 10 per cent and *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* in 5 per cent, while different pyogenic cocci were found in the remainder.

164 Diseases of the Skin. As is to be ex-
515 pected, in view of the widespread ignorance
758 of the principles of personal hygiene and the scarcity of water in many areas, skin diseases are prevalent. They represented almost 10 per cent of the total cases treated in government hospitals and clinics in 1949.

164 Mycotic infections are numerous, with ring-
361 worm of the scalp predominating in most
511 localities. Impetigo and scabies are widespread, particularly among children in the rural villages. Pediculosis is almost universal among the inhabitants of the poorer, congested communities, both urban and rural. Occasional cases of human myiasis are encountered. A form of dermatitis, caused by the bite of *Phlebotomus papatasii* and other sandflies, is sometimes encountered among susceptible individuals in the summer months.

164 Leprosy. Endemic foci of leprosy exist in various parts of the country, but primarily in Hauran and Latakia provinces. The extent of infection is not accurately known, and estimates of prevalence range from 90 to 250 cases. A few new cases are
[743] reported each year. Theoretically, isolation is compulsory, and the Ministry of Health maintains a leprosarium at Douma, near Damascus, which has facilities for the care of about 75 lepers.

752 Rabies. Sporadic cases of rabies are re-
164 ported. The majority result from the bites

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Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8, 9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the malaria problem has been aggravated by the introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages.

The malaria season extends from April to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plasmodium vivax* and *P. falciparum* infections varies according to the season and from place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general, *P. vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered.

Malaria control measures are undertaken by the municipal authorities in Damascus, Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten-

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

Distribution of Malaria in Syria

sive work has been carried on, in co-operation with the Near East Foundation, in the agricultural districts around Damascus, where 224 villages with over 180,000 inhabitants were protected in 1949-50. A marked reduction in the number of cases has been noted in all the areas treated. Successive examinations of over 500 children in 16 treated villages near Damascus revealed a decrease in spleen rates of from 78 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1951.[8] A malaria control program was inaugurated in the Homs district in 1952, under the auspices of the World Health Organization. *Anopheles sacharovi* and *A. claviger* are the principal vectors in the Damascus region; *A. sacharovi* and *A. superpictus*, in the river valleys in the northeast.

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Rickettsial Infections. Localized outbreaks of louse-borne typhus are recurrent during the winter and the spring months, particularly in the congested quarters of the towns and the cities and among the nomadic tribes. Over 1,900 cases were reported in 1942, when the acute shortages associated with the war created conditions conducive to the spread of the infection. Since that date no more than 30 to 95 sporadic cases have been recorded in any one year. Control measures, including deverminization procedures and the immunization of the exposed populations, are enforced by the health authorities in affected areas.

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No differentiation is made in the official

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p. 155(B)

164 reports between louse-borne and flea-borne typhus, but, since small numbers of cases are listed during the summer months, both types of infection are probably included. Murine typhus is endemic throughout this region, and its presence in Greater Syria (including Lebanon) has been confirmed by rickettsial agglutination and guinea pig inoculation tests on blood serums from indigenous cases.[38] Tick-borne typhus is not reported, but cases of fièvre boutonneuse have been observed in the neighboring portions of Lebanon.

Relapsing Fever. Louse-borne relapsing fever is rare, but small outbreaks were reported from Syria and Lebanon in 1945—extensions of the epidemics which spread through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46.

164 Tick-borne relapsing fever is endemic.
341 Occasional cases are seen in the rural villages, usually between May and September. The tick, *Ornithodorus tholozani*, is the vector: specimens collected from a cave near Damascus have been found to be infected with the spirochetes.[42]

Plague. Plague occurs sporadically in the districts along the Turkish and the Iraqi frontiers on the north and on the Israeli border in the south. No severe outbreaks have been recorded within recent years, and no cases since 1946.

164 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis is widely distributed. The presence of a major focus in Aleppo province accounts for the local classification of the disease as "Aleppo boil." The infection rates in the vicinity of Aleppo formerly approximated 70 per cent, but they have declined appreciably with the extension of insect control measures within recent years. Smaller endemic foci exist in Damascus and other
164 centers. The disease is frequently encoun-
369 tered in the rural villages around Damascus, but it has been almost totally absent from the city itself since the inauguration of the municipal fly control campaign in 1946. Cases usually occur between May and

p. 156 (A)

164 369 October, when the vector sandflies, *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti*, are abundant.

164 Kala-azar is seldom specifically reported from Syria, but occasional suspected cases have been described from the Jebel ed Druz region. A canine reservoir undoubtedly exists: the causative organisms have been demonstrated in a stray dog captured at el Bab, near Aleppo.[38]

Other Infections. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the western provinces where the vector, *Aedes aegypti*, is indigenous. Sandfly fever, transmitted by *Phlebotomus paptasii*, is endemic and sometimes epidemic.

Nutritional Diseases

166 361 511 Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are prevalent, particularly in the rural villages, where poverty and parasitic infections influence the nutritional standards of the people to a greater extent than in the urban areas. Serious nutritional conditions are most obvious among the children of the Bedouin tribes. Minor vitamin C deficiencies are widespread among the inhabitants of the grain-producing areas in the northeastern and the southern provinces. Occasional borderline cases of pellagra are encountered, but beriberi and ariboflavinosis are unusual. Cases of rickets are numerous, especially in the cities and the towns. Protein edema and overt vitamin A deficiencies are relatively rare.

Miscellaneous Conditions

164 232 Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and epidemics are sometimes reported. Q fever is enzootic among the sheep and the goats, but the extent of human infection is not known. In a series of complement fixation tests recently performed on blood serums taken from sheep and goats in different parts of the country, positive reactions were obtained in 13 to 63 per cent.[49]

Silicosis and benign pneumoconiosis are

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tures on public health, including new construction, would rise from a total of £S 10.052 million budgeted for 1954 to an average of £S 12.358 million in the six-year period 1955-60. The expenditures envisaged for the entire period 1955-60 would be distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Annual average
Anti-malarial campaign and dispensaries	3,100	517
Establishment of new hospitals and health units	8,350	1,392
Quarantine stations	300	50
Administration and operation of existing and new facilities including training of technical personnel	62,400	10,400
Total	74,150	12,358

III HOUSING

The postwar period has witnessed a considerable housing boom. In recent years construction has been on a scale double that of prewar years. The wartime backlog in housing, the increasing prosperity in the postwar period and the tendency toward a break-up of the larger family units have all contributed to this boom. Aside from a few houses built for civil servants, all of the construction has been private, and it has taken place without the help of a mortgage financing institution. In terms of value, probably over 80% of the new housing has been of the Western or European type, which is too costly for the vast majority of the people.

While the housing of the rural population and the lower classes in the cities is undoubtedly very bad, significant general improvement is likely to come about only as incomes and standards of living rise. It would be impractical for the government to direct substantial resources into housing for the masses which could not be supported by the present productivity of the economy. While the mission firmly believes that the state should take a greater interest in the improvement of housing, for the immediate future the government's role will have to be confined to (1) developing, through experimentation, methods of cheap and durable construction, (2) planning and assisting housing in new rural settlements, (3) constructing

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362 housing in urban centers which are growing rapidly owing to particular development projects, and (4) assisting in urban slum clearance.

To appraise the magnitude of the housing problem and provide a factual basis for a housing program, the mission suggests that a census of houses and buildings be carried out as soon as possible. Such a census could be conducted in cooperation with municipal authorities and would not entail much time or money.

One of the central problems is the enormous gap between the primitive mud and stone huts of the rural areas and the suburban slums on the one hand and the modern housing in the major cities on the other. Urban building codes modeled on Western European standards generally insist on building specifications which make housing much too expensive for the majority of the people. The result is that the poorer classes either are confined to the old quarters of the cities where housing is bad and overcrowded or have to move to the outskirts of the cities where building is unregulated. Rural slums without community services quickly develop and rent gouging and other forms of exploitation prevail. In the rural areas, too, there is an urgent need of developing improved houses which would not be excessively costly.

To meet this problem the mission recommends the establishment of an experimental building station near Damascus. The function of such a station would be to develop inexpensive but durable methods of construction for both rural and urban areas. It would use as a point of departure cheap local materials and traditional building techniques and seek to improve them in the light of modern technology and the experience gained in other countries. The type of housing erected by UNRWA in the refugee settlement at Ramadan, 40 kilometers northeast of Damascus, is indicative of the possibilities. These houses represent an interesting blend of traditional and modern materials used in accordance with modern techniques. While by no means a perfect solution they point the direction along which the experimental work we have in mind should proceed.

Elsewhere the mission has outlined the assistance which the government might provide for the erection of housing in the new rural settlements which would be undertaken. We have suggested, in addition, that the Agricultural Bank make loans for farm houses; and the measures proposed to enhance the security of tenure and independence of tenants should also help to improve rural housing indirectly.

Here we propose to deal only with the government's role in urban

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housing. We urge that the government should in the first instance finance the construction of housing in cities which are undergoing rapid development and are experiencing or will shortly experience great overcrowding. A case in point is Latakia. The development program for the port makes no provision at present for the accommodation of the rapidly growing population, so that slum conditions are steadily aggravating. The mission accordingly recommends that the government earmark £S 3 million to finance housing in this city. A similar sum should be set aside for housing in other rapidly developing urban centers such as Jisr ech Choghour at the northern end of the Ghab and the cities in the provinces of Jezireh and Euphrates.

No attempt has yet been made to deal with the problem of slums in such major cities as Damascus and Aleppo. These two cities and Latakia have been working out some sort of housing plans involving the expropriation of land, the construction of houses and their subsequent sale. Damascus has made the greatest progress with its program and has reached the stage of letting contracts. In all these cases, however, the housing to be constructed will cost from £S 8,000 to £S 12,000 per unit, a price which obviously only the more well-to-do can afford. It seems unwise to devote the limited resources available to such a purpose. We would suggest that these programs in the future be re-oriented as far as possible in the direction of resettling people now crowded together in the old slums of the cities. The program could take the form of making land available on reasonable terms and permitting people to build their own houses in accordance with approved specifications. Assistance could be given in the form of building materials and certain elements of the construction, with the people contributing most of the labor themselves. The types of houses to be built could be developed in the building research station we have proposed. To carry out such a program the municipalities might set aside £S 5 million over the next six years for buying land, and another £S 3.5 million for assistance in building. Additional legislation which would enable municipalities to acquire land for this purpose at reasonable prices may well be necessary, particularly since experience has demonstrated, as in Aleppo, that the price of land may triple or quadruple in price in anticipation of its expropriation.

To carry out the proposed functions relating to housing, the government will require expert assistance. Syria has enough engineers, labor and contractors, but housing experts are lacking. We suggest therefore that a

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small mission of foreign experts be recruited to set up the building research station and advise the government on carrying out the housing program.

The total cost of the program we have recommended for the years 1955-60 would amount to approximately £S 7.5 million, apart from the municipal effort and the cost of housing in the new rural settlements for which provision has been made elsewhere in this report.[25] This sum would be distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Housing census	240	40
Building research station, including administration	1,010	168
Housing construction	6,000	1,000
Technical assistance	250	42
Total	7,500	1,250

[25] See Annex I, p. 469.

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ANNEX I

NOTES ON SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

Syria's 3.65 million people dwell in an estimated 8,265 settlements, of 361
which about 61% are towns and villages and the rest farms. Only Damas- 162
cus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deir ez Zor and Latakia can be said to be preponderantly urban; the remaining communities have fairly evenly balanced urban and rural characteristics or else are clearly agricultural. About 23% of Syria's population lives in Damascus and Aleppo, 17% in 21 other cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, 6% in 31 mixed settlements and over 50% in agricultural settlements. A little less than 3% is nomadic.

But the character of Syria's settlements is changing and the picture presented above will probably not be accurate for long. People of the mountain regions are slowly moving down to the plains. Both urban and rural settlements are being established in areas newly opened to cultivation, such as the Jezireh, the Ghab and the Roudj. The achievement of political independence started a trend toward urbanization, stimulated by construction of new roads and development of motorized transport.

Despite a considerable postwar building boom, there are probably 362
fewer buildings in relation to the population in Syria than in most other countries. Although the exact number of dwelling units is not known, it probably does not exceed 350,000 or approximately one for every 10 inhabitants. In recent years new construction has been at a high rate. In 1953, for example, the number of housing units probably increased by about 5.15%. While this is substantially in excess of the normal increase in the population, account should be taken of the fact that the newer dwelling units probably do not house on the average more than six people. On this basis, only about 8% of the new construction, or some 1,460 units, were available for replacement of existing housing. In the postwar period the demand for housing has been stimulated by the rise in population, the wartime building lag, the growth of the foreign community, the return of expatriate Syrians, changes in the geographical distribution of population and the tendency of patriarchal families to break up into simple

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362 families requiring one dwelling each. While the need for a high and even higher rate of construction in the future is undeniable, it is doubtful that the factors which have operated to create an effective demand for housing will altogether be as effective in the future. Some decline in building over the coming years may well take place.

365 361 Community services have not kept pace with construction. Damascus and Aleppo have been most nearly provided with the essential streets, water supply and sewerage facilities, but the medium-sized and the small communities are very badly serviced. Except for water supply, this is not yet a problem for the small settlements, but it is serious for the medium-sized centers with their motorized transport and denser populations. The social services—education, public health, social welfare and community development—are likewise not yet adequately developed in Syria, but the country is commendably aware of the need and in the field of education, at least, has increased its expenditures impressively in the last few years. A few of the larger municipalities take care of their community services and have undertaken town-planning, but the central government, through the Ministry of Public Works, merely serves as technical advisor to the municipalities. There is no central government department with responsibility for housing. And while there are ministries for education and public health, no government department is responsible for social welfare or community development programs and no such programs exist. The administrative organizations in these fields clearly need strengthening.

Investment in Settlements

657 361 Over 60% of Syria's total annual investment is estimated to go into settlements, for housing, community and social services, and other purposes. During 1949-53 this type of investment averaged £S 138 million annually, of which £S 15 million (almost 11%) was from public funds and £S 123 million (89%) was private investment. On the basis of a 3.65 million population the annual investment in this sector was £S 39.4 per capita, of which £S 35.1 represents private funds.

[362] Perhaps as much as 80% of the private investment and about 72% of the total investment in settlements goes into housing; the balance is divided between industrial and commercial buildings, in that order. Private building activity reached an all-time high in 1953.

Of public investment in settlements, 80% is municipal and only 20%

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IV HOUSING

361 The housing program for the next few years should have three main objectives. First, the number of houses should be considerably increased. This can be accomplished most effectively, particularly in the rural areas, by making it easier for people to become landowners and thus providing them with an incentive to build and maintain their houses. Secondly, construction techniques must be improved and self-help must be encouraged, so that better housing can be achieved without expending much more on it than is spent today. In this connection, government advice and assistance in developing types of durable but cheap housing and in land purchases, distribution of materials and encouragement of community efforts is important. Also, through legislation or otherwise, provision must be made for the acquisition of land at non-speculative prices by the low-income groups; this is particularly important in urban areas. The third objective must be timely government planning, and to some extent even financing, of housing in areas which are developing rapidly and becoming more densely populated.

Although in the future the municipal and local authorities should assume a leading role in housing development, at the beginning the government will have to take the initiative. The mission proposes a six-year housing program costing about £S 28 million, including housing in the new rural settlements discussed elsewhere in this report. Of this the municipal contribution, for purchase of land and for slum clearance, would be only £S 8.5 million. The proposed expenditure is shown in Table 4.

The recommended census of houses and buildings should not be postponed until the next population census, but should be organized during 1955 and taken in 1956. The proposed experimental building station should be located where the characteristics of both a desert and an irrigated area can be found, perhaps in the eastern fringe of the irrigated zone of Homs. Its principal task should be to experiment with different types of materials and to develop for different localities dwellings which would be durable and cheap. Building codes should then be modified to permit the erection of such houses within city limits.

The urban housing program we have outlined in the Main Report envisages government financial assistance for municipalities (1) to meet urgent housing requirements stemming from a rapid growth in their

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TABLE 4 Proposed Six-Year Housing Program

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(Thousand £S)

	Total
General proposals	
Census*	240
Experimentation	760
Technical assistance	250
Administration	250
Total	1,500
Development projects	
Roudj	1,920
Dry farming communities	1,056
Ghab	600
Urban centers	3,000
Latakia	3,000
Total	9,576
Socio-economic program*	
Buying land	10,000
Slum clearance	7,000
Total	17,000
Total program	28,076
Of which:	
Capital expenditures	13,836
Recurrent expenditures	5,740

* Figures for land purchase and slum clearance include 50% municipal contributions.

population, and (2) to start slum clearance projects for the most congested areas. With respect to the first we suggest that the municipalities concentrate on housing between a range of £S 1,000 to £S 4,000 per unit. The type of house built by the municipality should be only a nucleus which can be expanded by the owner himself. The nucleus dwelling and the lot should be sold to the occupier on easy terms. In slum clearance projects the primary aim of the municipality should be to provide building areas and utilities at reasonable cost. In addition, certain key building components such as windows, doors and roofing materials should be provided to those willing to construct houses with their own labor, and expert building advice should be furnished. It is, above all, important that building lots be reasonable in price and convenient to places of work. In Latakia, for example, it was found that, after land was expropriated and applications

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362 invited for building lots, only one-fourth of the land was taken up because it was too expensive and too inaccessible.

We have given some attention to the possibility of establishing a mortgage bank to assist in financing private building in the cities. We believe that such an institution will ultimately be desirable and necessary, but, owing to limitations of funds, we have not recommended that one be established before 1961. Meanwhile, the project might well be studied. Any mortgage bank that might ultimately be created should be designed primarily to help finance low-cost housing, particularly since the construction of housing for the more well-to-do elements in the population has apparently not been significantly hampered by lack of funds.

The possibility of gradually abandoning existing rent controls should also be studied. The elimination of rent control on new building might be a suitable first step and might have the incidental advantage of discouraging the continuous influx of new people into the urban areas.

361 v COMMUNITY SERVICES

The mission's provision of an average annual investment of £S 14.3 million for community services must be regarded as extremely tentative. In the last analysis, no final program can be recommended until a thorough analysis of municipal finances is completed. At present, comprehensive data on municipal expenditures and anticipated financial resources are lacking. We suggest that a study of this subject be undertaken promptly, so that the magnitude of a program of municipal services can be determined in the light of the municipalities' own resources and the contribution which the central government can make to them either by loans or by grants.

Roads and Streets

363 The construction of roads and streets has been second in importance among municipal programs. Except in the large cities, paving is generally limited to a few central streets because of its cost.

Hereafter the construction and maintenance of all types of roads connecting settlements, including the portions passing through the settlements, should be the financial responsibility of the central government. Municipalities, freed of this burden on their budgets, should take care to spend



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Distribution of Malaria in Syria

sive work has been carried on, in co-operation with the Near East Foundation, in the agricultural districts around Damascus where 224 villages with over 180,000 inhabitants were protected in 1949-50. A marked reduction in the number of cases has been noted in all the areas treated. Successive examinations of over 500 children in 16 treated villages near Damascus revealed a decrease in spleen rates of from 78 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1951.[8] A malaria control program was inaugurated in the Homs district in 1952, under the auspices of the World Health Organization. *Anopheles sacharovi* and *A. claviger* are the principal vectors in the Damascus region; *A. sacharovi* and *A. superpictus*, in the river valleys in the northeast.

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Rickettsial Infections. Localized outbreaks of louse-borne typhus are recurrent during the winter and the spring months, particularly in the congested quarters of the towns and the cities and among the nomadic tribes. Over 1,000 cases were reported in 1942, when the acute shortages associated with the war created conditions conducive to the spread of the infection. Since that date no more than 30 to 95 sporadic cases have been recorded in any one year. Control measures, including deverminization procedures and the immunization of the exposed populations, are enforced by the health authorities in affected areas.

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No differentiation is made in the official

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362 invited for building lots, only one-fourth of the land was taken up because it was too expensive and too inaccessible.

We have given some attention to the possibility of establishing a mortgage bank to assist in financing private building in the cities. We believe that such an institution will ultimately be desirable and necessary, but, owing to limitations of funds, we have not recommended that one be established before 1961. Meanwhile, the project might well be studied. Any mortgage bank that might ultimately be created should be designed primarily to help finance low-cost housing, particularly since the construction of housing for the more well-to-do elements in the population has apparently not been significantly hampered by lack of funds.

The possibility of gradually abandoning existing rent controls should also be studied. The elimination of rent control on new building might be a suitable first step and might have the incidental advantage of discouraging the continuous influx of new people into the urban areas.

361 v COMMUNITY SERVICES

The mission's provision of an average annual investment of £S 14.3 million for community services must be regarded as extremely tentative. In the last analysis, no final program can be recommended until a thorough analysis of municipal finances is completed. At present, comprehensive data on municipal expenditures and anticipated financial resources are lacking. We suggest that a study of this subject be undertaken promptly, so that the magnitude of a program of municipal services can be determined in the light of the municipalities' own resources and the contribution which the central government can make to them either by loans or by grants.

363 *Roads and Streets*

The construction of roads and streets has been second in importance among municipal programs. Except in the large cities, paving is generally limited to a few central streets because of its cost.

Hereafter the construction and maintenance of all types of roads connecting settlements, including the portions passing through the settlements, should be the financial responsibility of the central government. Municipalities, freed of this burden on their budgets, should take care to spend

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their road funds on types of pavement suitable to the needs of the locality, choosing those methods which make greatest use of local materials and hand labor and depend least on machinery and imported materials. Stone-paved roads, of which there are excellent examples in Syria, probably provide the answer for most of the settlements where stone is readily available, and the government should be able to provide asphalt to most communities. Many of the roads in villages, particularly those which do not carry motor vehicle traffic, could be improved through cooperative community endeavor, and this should be one of the objectives of the community development program we have recommended.

Electricity

Electricity is of economic importance to those communities which depend upon it for productive power and not merely for light. The mission recognizes fully the significant developing influence which the availability of electric power can have upon a community. Useful though it is, however, we suggest that a major effort to provide electric power primarily for lighting be deferred until the more urgent problems of water supply and sewerage have received attention.

Landscaping

Syria's broad and nearly waterless steppes have led to cities and villages virtually without trees, a situation to which the devastation of the first World War contributed greatly. Even cities like Damascus, lacking neither greenery nor water, have large areas which remain bare. The planting of trees, especially shade trees for the streets, should be a concern for all Syrian settlements. This, of course, calls for a study of the most suitable types of trees for the different regions, and the establishment of nurseries, as recommended in Chapter 3 of the Main Report.

Local committees should do the planting, once the problem of water supply has been met. Where streets are narrow, there is much to be said in favor of planting trees inside the house plots so that the inhabitants themselves will take care of them; the trees will then shade the streets without taking up needed road space. In recently planned areas where the streets may be unnecessarily wide, a strip on either side might be turned over to the people living on the street on condition that it be planted with

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1960, or an annual average of around £S 14.3 million over the period 1955-60. 365

The principal task of the central government in this field will be to assist towns and villages in obtaining adequate supplies of pure drinking water. 365 312 Now that the expensive new system for Aleppo is virtually complete, it should be possible to devote more resources to the smaller cities and villages. Some £S 5 million will still need to be spent on expansion and improvement of the distribution network in Aleppo. Aside from this amount, we recommend that the government allocate about £S 8 million over the period 1955-60 for water supplies in towns and villages. The government has recognized that the problem is most acute in the Hauran and the Djebel Druze. Much of the population in these provinces is dependent on rain catchment for its water supply, and supplies in catchment basins quickly become polluted and occasionally dry up. The problem in these regions is complicated by the dearth of underground water, which necessitates expensive geophysical surveys. Elsewhere in the country there are still many villages and towns which urgently require pure water. For example, Hassetche, although the capital of Jezireh, is dependent on water drawn directly from the Khabour river and peddled from carts in the city streets. Because the need is so great, funds for water supply will have to be used with great economy. Extensive distribution systems which are expensive to install and maintain must be avoided. In the smaller villages a centrally located well will generally suffice. For the larger villages and towns the water should be piped to a limited number of public fountains where inhabitants can draw it for their domestic needs.

Waste disposal is also an important problem, especially from the standpoint of public health. Even the larger cities have not fully solved this problem. In Damascus, for instance, the sewers empty into the Barada river, whose water is used farther downstream not only for irrigation but also for drinking. The most immediate need, however, is for proper waste disposal in the villages. The construction of latrines and cesspools appears to be the only feasible solution there, and the community self-improvement program which, in accordance with our earlier proposals, would be initiated by community workers, should focus at least in part on the improvement of village sanitation by this means. To overcome any public inertia, the government might find it advisable to give squatting slabs or some comparable assistance to householders as an incentive to construct and use latrines. 364

342 variation exists between the living conditions of the more prosperous farmers and of the peasants, many of the latter possessing little beyond the barest necessities.

487 177 342 The larger cities, as Damascus and Aleppo, have been important junctions on trade routes from India to the Mediterranean for centuries, and reflect the influence of both Eastern and Western civilizations. They are a combination of the old Arab-type city and the modern, with most of the amenities of urban life. The older sections are usually made up of several quarters, dominated by different racial or religious groups. The houses are constructed of stone, brick or reinforced concrete and stucco, with flat or tiled roofs. In Damascus, about one third of the inhabitants live within the limits of the ancient city and a third in the modern residential developments.

342 511 The Bedouin follow essentially the same pattern of life in Syria as in other countries of the Near and Middle East. The nomadic tribes dwell in tents made of goats' hair, usually in close association with their livestock. Their standards of living are primitive, both in the tent encampments and the semipastoral settlements.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

312 Water supplies are deficient in many sections of the country, and acute shortages may be experienced during the dry season. In the rural areas, domestic supplies are obtained from deep or shallow wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from rain-water cisterns. *Korazes*, or wells connected by underground conduits which often extend for several miles, and waterholes, dug in the plains or near watercourses, are used [314] in some districts. The village supplies are frequently polluted and responsible for the spread of intestinal infections.

The water supply of Damascus is taken from an underground reservoir at 'Ain el Fije, which is fed by springs in the Anti-

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63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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312 Lebanon mountains. It flows by gravity through tunnels to the waterworks in the city, from which it is distributed to the individual houses or, in the more congested districts, to public fountains. The overflow
312 is discharged into the Barada River. The
● 364 supply is not treated, but its purity is checked daily at 'Ain el Fije, and samples are submitted twice a week to the government laboratories for bacteriologic and chemical examination. The water of the Barada River is no longer used for domestic purposes, being reserved for other municipal requirements.

Untreated water from a spring-fed reservoir supplies the city of Aleppo. The present supply is inadequate, and plans have been projected to conduct water from the Euphrates River to a plant near Aleppo, where it will be treated by sedimentation and
312 chlorination before distribution. Hama obtains most of its supply from wells linked by tunnels, but part of the town depends upon an ancient system in which the water
312 is lifted from the Orontes River by means
406 of huge water wheels and distributed in open overhead aqueducts. These wheels, or *na'ouras*, are operated by the force of the current and collect the water in buckets attached at intervals around their circumference. They are often utilized in small irrigation works, where the river is situated below the level of the surrounding plain.

312 Simple methods of irrigation are practiced in many districts bordering the larger rivers. The Al Ghouta, or oasis of Damascus, has been irrigated by the Barada River and its tributaries for centuries: some of the canals have undoubtedly existed since
312 Roman times. Pumps are sometimes em-
406 ployed in the Al Jazira region, while *na'ouras* are common in certain sections along the banks of the Orontes, the Eu-
312 phrates and the Khabour rivers. Several large irrigation projects have recently been undertaken under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture. These include the irrigation of over 35,000 acres in the Homs-Hama region and the drainage of portions

of the Muzeirib swamp lands along the 312
headwaters of the Yarmuk River. The resettlement program in the Euphrates and the Khabour river basins, which is controlled by a separate governmental organization, calls for the irrigation of extensive areas. Between 20,000 and 30,000 acres had 311
been opened up through irrigation in 1951. 312
Work on the drainage and the irrigation of the Ghab marshes, covering about 100,000 acres in the Orontes river valley northwest of Hama, was started in 1952.

Waste Disposal

Sewerage systems are available in all the 314
larger cities. The sewage is not treated, however, and the effluent is usually discharged into adjacent watercourses or upon the land for irrigation purposes. In unsewered sections, cesspools are employed in connection with the houses. The methods of sewage disposal are universally primitive in the rural districts. In villages near the larger cities, pit or shallow latrines are frequently found in the individual compounds or provided on a community basis. In the more remote areas and in the poorer villages, pollution of the soil is the general practice. The use of night soil for fertilizer is common in the agricultural communities.

Fauna and Flora

Arthropoda. Mosquitoes. Nine species 136
of anopheline mosquitoes have been re- 164
ported from Syria, three of which—*Anopheles superpictus*, *A. sacharovi* (— *A. elutus*) and *A. claviger* (— *A. bifurcatus*)—are of major importance in the transmission of malaria. *A. pulcherrimus*, *A. hyrcanus*, *A. algeriensis* and *A. sergenti* are of minor and local significance, while *A. marteri* and *A. multicolor* are rare.

A. superpictus is widely distributed. It is 136
a prominent vector of malaria in the coastal plains, in the northwestern highland districts and in the river valleys, but is of secondary interest in the Damascus region. It breeds along the margins of the larger rivers and on the edges of mountain streams

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844 parts of the country. The graduate pharmacists totaled 214.

DISEASES

659 Widespread discrepancies in reporting de-
165 tract from the validity of the morbidity and the mortality statistics. Among the two thirds or more of the population living in the rural villages, not only is the reporting of cases of illness and death poor, but the accuracy of diagnosis is often questionable. In a total of 15,457 deaths officially recorded in 1949, almost 35 per cent were listed as due to "ill-defined, unknown or unspecified" causes. Facilities for laboratory confirmation are lacking outside the larger population centers, and confusion is frequently evident in the differentiation of related infections. Reporting is negligible in the more remote areas, and particularly
659 among the Bedouin tribes. Except in the
165 course of special surveys, or when abnor-
758 mal epidemic conditions necessitate the enforcement of preventive measures, medical treatment is seldom accessible to the in-
659 habitants of such regions. Even in cities,
165 where the degree of reporting is considerably higher than in the rural areas, the morbidity statistics reflect a general tendency to evade the reporting of certain infectious diseases for fear of isolation. The records of cases treated in the government hospitals, which cannot be regarded as representative, and the reports of particular investigations or surveys provide the most reliable data for the evaluation of the prevalence and the distribution of specific diseases.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Intestinal or Urinary Tract

164 **Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers.** Enteric fevers are endemic, and, in the opinion of the local authorities, a high degree of immunity resulting from repeated exposure to infection exists among the inhabitants.
164 Cases of typhoid fever occur throughout the
364 year, with the peak of incidence usually between June and December, when the con-

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sumption of fly-contaminated foods and of raw vegetables grown in polluted soils provides an important means of transmission. Water-borne outbreaks are frequent in the rural villages, but they have decreased within recent years with the improvement of the drinking water supplies in the larger cities. Reports for 1949 show that 495 cases of typhoid fever were treated in government hospitals throughout the country, 295 cases in institutions in Damascus *muhafazat*. Similarly, 671 cases were recorded in 1950. 164 364

The relative prevalence of the different paratyphoid infections is uncertain. Paratyphoid A fever predominates among the cases in which the differential diagnosis has been established, although paratyphoid B infections are undoubtedly more numerous. Paratyphoid C fever has been diagnosed in Lebanon, but its presence in Syria has not been determined. 164

Immunization with typhoid-paratyphoid A and B vaccine is carried on by the health authorities among the contacts of known cases. Immunization is also widely practiced in the urban areas. 751

Dysenteries. Dysentery is prominent among the causes of illness. The available data give little indication of the proportionate prevalence of amebic and bacillary infections. Amebiasis is widespread, and associated with a high percentage of chronic carriers. Contaminated foods constitute the chief sources of infection, and the maximum incidence is noted in spring and summer, when lettuce and other green, leafy vegetables are consumed in abundance. 164 [262]

Recognized *Shigella dysenteriae* infections are rare, but occasional bacteriologically confirmed cases are recorded. Strains of the Flexner group are probably responsible for the majority of cases of bacillary dysentery. The differentiation of types is made only in Damascus, and, since few cases are hospitalized, the existing records have little significance.

Diarrhea and enteritis are prevalent, especially in infancy and early childhood. Local authorities state that fully 85 per cent

cept in the vicinity of the principal rivers. 312
Domestic supplies are derived from wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from water holes or rain-water cisterns. Untreated 312, piped water supplies serve all or parts of 364 the larger towns. The municipal supplies of Damascus and Aleppo are controlled for purity, but contamination is frequent in the smaller communities. Sewerage systems are available in the chief cities, but the methods of sewage disposal are generally primitive in towns and villages. The standards of nutrition vary, depending upon the economic 146 and the social conditions in different regions. Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are widespread, but serious deficiency diseases are encountered only among limited population groups.

The most prominent disease problems are 164 malaria, trachoma and dysentery, both amebic and bacillary. Enteric fevers, tuberculosis, helminthiasis and skin infections are prevalent. Venereal diseases are widely distributed, while bejel is endemic among the nomadic and the seminomadic peoples of the northeastern provinces. Hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, and leprosy exist in scattered foci. Localized outbreaks of cholera were reported in 1947-48, the first in 20 years. Vaccination against smallpox is com- 951 pulsory, but sporadic cases and occasional epidemics are recorded. Outbreaks of louse- 164 borne typhus are recurrent, while sporadic cases are reported almost annually. Small outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever have coincided with regional epidemics. Measles and the common respiratory infections are endemic, and frequently epidemic. Cutaneous leishmaniasis, brucellosis, rabies, tetanus, anthrax, dengue fever and sandfly fever are endemic. Meningococcus meningitis, diphtheria, plague, tick-borne relapsing fever and murine typhus are sporadic. Recognized cases of scarlet fever and poliomyelitis are apparently rare. Doubtful cases of tick-borne typhus and kala-azar have been described.

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II. Land Tenure for the Tractor Owner

The tractor owner gets better advantages when he rents land. 427
He also pays a percentage of the crop. It used to be 5-6% with the obligation to plant a "shkara" for the landowner. The "Shkara" is a certain amount of seed which the landowner provides and which the tenant agrees to plant by his machines and to harvest with his combine free of charge. The "shkara" is proportional to the area of land rented. It varies between 10-20 sacks of wheat. In the last few years when demand for land became great, the rents rose to 10-12% with the habitual "shkara". Usually the rental contracts are for three years. They rarely exceed this period.

III. Land Tenure Along the Khabur

Along the Khabur rents are different in manner. There, the landowner provides not only the land but also the water for irrigation and half the seeds. In return he receives half the crop. The peasant furnishes his labor for plowing, seeding caring for the irrigation canals, irrigation and harvesting.

Rents for pump irrigation were between 7-10% until 1951. The cotton rush increased the rents for strips of land near the river to 15-20%, but the failure of the crop reduced the rush for land and the rent is down again to around 10%.

THE PROBLEM OF CREDIT IN JAZIRAH

The rapid economic advance of Jazirah in the last years is nothing less than amazing. In 1941, in the region of Qamishli, for example, the farthest village cultivated was less than 20 kilometers south of the city. All the land beyond was pasture for the Bedouin. East of Kubur el Bid to Tal Koshak, a distance of 60 kilometers, the land was similarly idle. There was not a single tractor in the region of Ras el Ain, and not a single water pump on the Khabur aside from those of the Assyrians. 311

Qamishli itself, the principal town of Jazirah, had no electric light, no paved roads, no sewage system, and very few acceptable houses to live in. The same was true in a larger measure of the other towns of Jazirah. 361 365

361 At present, agriculture extends in an unbroken line from the
311 Turkish and Iraqi borders south to the Rad and Hassaksh, and west to
365 Ras el Ain and midway to Rakka. Qamishli has all the amenities of a fair-sized city with sewage, electricity, asphalted roads, running water, places of amusement, and modern office buildings and houses. The other towns of Jazirah show similar progress but in a smaller way.

454 All this development could not have been achieved without extensive use of capital. It was stated that the original emigrants to Jazirah whether Christians or Kurds, brought very little capital with them. Whatever they have now was made in Jazirah and not brought from outside.

I. Credit to the Bedouin and Kurd

4521 The nearest commercial market to Jazirah where credit was
438 available was Aleppo. Aleppo merchants first provided goods shipped to the towns of Jazirah to be smuggled into Turkey. And Jazirah merchants working on a commission or partnership basis made good profits. Some of them specialized in lending money to the Bedouins and Kurds and for them, also, credit was available at Aleppo. They borrowed at an interest rate of 9% and lent at 35-50%. Most of them, however, did not lend money outright as a general practice, but sold goods and especially textiles, coffee and sugar to the farmer against bills maturing at harvest time. The exorbitant interest was added over the price of the goods, and the peasant accepted it as a somewhat higher price and did not consider it as interest. Theis system still prevails at the present time.

II. Credit to the Machinery Owner

4521 With the expansion of agriculture and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, credit in much larger amounts became necessary. The farmer using machinery needed two kinds of credit. He needed credit to pay for his machines, and seasonal credit to cover a part of his expenses for wages, seed, fuel, and general expenditures.

In the first years of the War, dealers in agricultural machinery supplied a part of the need by selling on an installment basis for a period of 20 months. But between 1943 and 1948 they demanded cash payment before delivery. In the last four years, they have renewed their credit facilities.

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CHAPTER 5 *ELECTRIC POWER*

Existing Facilities

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Syria is rather poorly supplied with electric power. Out of a population of 3.6 million, only 1.4 million live in towns and villages supplied with electricity and of these only about half actually use it. While public utilities have been increasing their capacity over the last eight years at a mean annual rate of about 17%, their total installed capacity at the end of 1953 amounted to only 34,350 KW or 44,776 KVA.[24] Most of the newer factories have found it necessary to provide their own power facilities. The industrial power plants which the mission was able to record have a total capacity of 20,135 KW. Some of these plants are connected with the public utilities. In 1953 the power supplied by public utilities amounted to 119.8 million KWH; and Damascus and Aleppo together accounted for 81% of this total. In fact, there were only six towns in Syria where the power generated by public utilities in 1953 exceeded a million KWH. It may be roughly estimated that factories consumed about 43 million KWH of the power generated by their own plants. Thus the total supply of electricity during 1953—about 163 million KWH—was equivalent to only 46 KWH per inhabitant, an amount comparable to that in Turkey, but 41% of that in Lebanon and about half that in Algeria and French Morocco.

At present public utilities have great difficulty in meeting their peak load. No reserve capacity exists. In Aleppo and Damascus surcharges discourage power consumption during peak hours. Since many of the large industrial power consumers have their own power plants, the public utilities generate primarily for lighting. The latter accordingly cannot balance power requirements for industry and lighting and thus tend to have an exaggerated peak load, which increases the cost of power generation. Costs are further raised by the fact that generating units are below the capacity required for economical operation. It should also be noted that

[24] See Annex G, p. 410.

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nearly all of the power is produced by diesel units which are comparatively 377 expensive to operate. At the end of 1953 the public utilities had no steam 365 plant and only 14% of their capacity consisted of hydro plant. The geographic dispersion of cities and low power consumption has made anything approaching a national grid impossible. Only the cities of Homs and Hama are interconnected through the Ghajar hydro plant.

Future Requirements

In principle it would be desirable to provide for a considerable accelera- 377 tion of the rate at which the capacity of public utilities has been growing. The objectives of an expansion program should be to meet increasing power requirements, to permit factories gradually to shift to public utilities as a source of power, and to provide a margin as a reserve against breakdowns. Limitations on available resources, however, make it impossible to undertake a very ambitious program in the years immediately ahead. Capital must be carefully allocated. At this juncture in Syria's development, for example, it is more important to improve the water supply for communities and for agriculture than to provide more electricity for lighting.

In formulating its recommendations on power the mission has assumed in the first instance an expansion in the consumption of power supplied by public utilities at about the same rate as in the period 1949-53, namely an average annual increase of 14%. This would entail a rise in capacity from 44,776 KVA in 1953 to 106,000 KVA at the end of 1960. We consider, however, that a further increase of at least 25,000 KVA is necessary to provide a small reserve against breakdowns. This program does not specifically provide for a transfer of industrial power demand to the public utilities but, with the somewhat slower growth in industrial production which we anticipate, factories should be able to draw a little more on public utilities, at least in the off-peak hours.

Plants scheduled for completion in 1954 account for an additional capacity of 14,610 KVA. Among these are a 12,500 KVA steam plant for Damascus and a 1,350 KVA diesel plant in Homs. To meet the balance of the need, the mission recommends the installation of the following facilities by the end of 1960:

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MAP 7



ELECTRIC POWER IN SYRIA

Area	Present Capacity	Authorized or under Construction	Mission Program	Total KW 1960
DAMASCUS	23,000	7,000	10,000	40,000
ALEPPO	10,400	10,000	15,000	35,400
HOMS-HAMA	3,750		2,000	5,750
JISR ECH CHOGHOUR			2,000	2,000
LATAKIA	800		4,000	4,800
DEIR ES ZOR	840		1,500	2,340
SMALLER TOWNS AND VILLAGES	6,660		6,000	12,660
TOTAL	45,450	17,000	40,500[a]	102,950[b]

[a] 51,550 KVA. [b] 131,136

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Latakia, which now has only an old diesel plant with a capacity of 800 KW, must have additional capacity to meet its rapidly growing requirements. The most immediate need can be met by the construction of a 2,500 KVA diesel plant. This can later be supplemented by the installation of a hydroelectric plant at the site of the dam on the Nahr el Kebir which the mission has recommended as part of the irrigation program. 377

Deir ez Zor, the center of the developing Euphrates river valley and the fifth largest city in the country, also urgently needs a new 2,000 KVA diesel plant. The existing plant has a capacity of only 915 KVA.

The reclamation of the Ghab will generate a considerable increase in general activity in that region and an attendant expansion of power requirements. To meet this need the mission suggests the installation of new diesel plants of 2,500 KVA each in both Hama and Jisr ech Choghour. It would be advisable to connect these plants with a transmission line running through the Ghab and capable of supplying power for construction throughout this area and for the villages en route. Jisr ech Choghour in particular will become the center of construction activity. The mission is aware that plans for the Ghab call for the installation of a 6,250 KVA hydroelectric works at this location. The power from this plant, however, will not be firm and is in any event not likely to become available soon. The mission considers therefore that a diesel plant which can be quickly constructed is necessary to meet the immediate requirements.

For the smaller towns and villages the mission has proposed only a modest program involving some improvements in existing plants to raise their capacity, and the installation of 25 small diesel units with an individual capacity of 200 or 250 KVA. The more rapid electrification of villages and small towns should, in our opinion, be postponed for the time being in favor of more urgent programs. 377 365

Government Direction and Supervision

To carry out the recommended expansion program it will be necessary to strengthen the Directorate of Electricity in the Ministry of Public Works. This directorate was established in 1953 to coordinate the development of electricity in Syria and supervise the construction and operation of power plants. The mission recommends that the directorate be provided with a staff of 10 trained engineers to enable it to carry out its functions adequately. Separate sections should be organized for the technical 377 447

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377 and administrative supervision of public utilities. Supervision ought to be
447 concentrated primarily on the utilities of the small towns and villages which are often substandard in their equipment and operation and are most in need of technical guidance in standardizing and improving their equipment. In addition to discharging its supervisory functions, the directorate should work out long-range plans, including a properly phased plan for the establishment of a power network which would be helpful in determining the location and size of power plants to be established in the future.

Electricity Rates[25]

365 As power production increases, there will no doubt be considerable
435 pressure to lower the rates now charged for electricity. The mission
655 encountered much complaint about their present level and structure. The rates charged for lighting in the principal cities do not, however, appear excessive by comparison with other countries. Electricity prices in the small towns and villages, on the other hand, are very high, but the generation of electricity by small diesel units and exclusively for lighting is inevitably rather expensive. The rates charged for electricity used as power are definitely higher than in many other countries. In Syria the power rates are often compared unfavorably with those in Lebanon in particular.

Nevertheless, the mission strongly advises against a general reduction of electricity rates over the next five or six years. An adequate supply of electricity is more important at this time than lower prices for electricity. The profits of the public utilities must be safeguarded so that the needed expansion program can be financed from their own resources. This is particularly true of the nationalized utilities of Damascus and Aleppo which have been earning considerable profits. With the anticipated increase in power generation and some reduction in costs of production, the mission anticipates that the net operating income of these utilities exclusive of depreciation allowances may reach a total of £S 60 million over the six-year period 1955-60. Most of this sum will be needed to finance expansion and pay the indemnities for nationalization. In this way the government will be able to conserve the resources derived from taxation and to borrow for other urgent requirements.

[25] See Annex G, p. 422.

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v MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT

365 655 Brief mention should be made of the urban transport services in Damascus and Aleppo. In Damascus the tramways are operated by a company nationalized in 1951, whose principal business is the generation and distribution of electric power. The tram service, plagued by low fares and relatively high operating costs, has been running heavy deficits and steadily losing ground to buses, which are operated on a coordinated basis by a large number of owners who pool their receipts for the purpose of meeting certain common expenses. For this reason the company has advanced proposals to buy out the private buses at a cost of about £S 2 million and gradually to substitute new buses at an additional cost of £S 2 million. The mission, however, strongly advises against the use of basically public funds for this purpose, since the buses now appear to be efficiently operated by private enterprise.

In Aleppo the power company, likewise nationalized in 1951, has a monopoly on the operation of both buses and trams. In contrast to the Damascus company, however, it is operating both these services at a modest profit while maintaining moderate fares.

vi TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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It is, of course, important that not only transport but also communications facilities expand with a growing economy. In Syria a program for the improvement of telecommunications has long been under way. During the eight-year period 1946-1953, almost £S 31 million was invested in telecommunications, particularly in the expansion of the telephone network and the installation of automatic telephones. In fact, the amount invested for this purpose might be said to be disproportionate to most other fields of public investment. The results, however, have been conspicuous. The number of telephone subscribers has risen from 9,000 in 1949 to 21,218 in 1953, the number of telephone offices from 100 to 132, and the number of telephone circuits from 161 to 379. The Syrian telephone system is now substantially better than that of most neighboring countries.

The postal, telegraph and telephone administration plans to spend a sum of £S 14.317 million over the next five years on the further improvement of telecommunications. The mission had no one of special compe-

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plan has one defect in common with those of other cities: it fails to make adequate provision for the location of housing for the less well-to-do classes within the confines of the city.

Aleppo has expanded in a much less orderly way than Damascus. Although a city plan was drawn up after the second World War, it is not based on an adequate topographic survey and reveals so many deficiencies that its total revision appears to be required. Of the smaller cities, Latakia has the best plan; it takes into account the need not only to reform the old city but to develop neighborhoods for community living. A few other towns such as Deir ez Zor, Hama and Homs have plans, but these for the most part envisage little amelioration except perhaps from the standpoint of communications.

In general most of the plans have been inspired too much by transport requirements and too little by the objective of improving the conditions of urban living. More attention must be paid to the zoning of districts for housing, industry and shops and bazaars, to the interrelationship of living quarters and centers of employment, and to the location of gardens, schools, hospitals and other public buildings in such a way as to make them most accessible to the community they are designed to serve. Within the larger cities it is important to plan community living also around neighborhood units which in certain respects can be self-contained and can help to decentralize the city.

Community Facilities[38]

Municipal investment in such facilities as streets and sidewalks, water supply, sewers, lighting and libraries has averaged a little over £S 12 million a year during the period 1949-54. In addition the central government has made available almost £S 30 million to enable Aleppo to install an entirely new water supply system, and has spent between £S 200,000 and £S 300,000 annually on the exploration of water for villages in the Hauran and the Djebel Druze.

A program for municipal investment can hardly be drawn up without a careful assessment of the needs of municipalities and their ability to meet them. In view of the limited resources available, however, the volume of investment can increase only gradually, to perhaps £S 16 million in

[38] See Annex I, p. 470.

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1960, or an annual average of around £S 14.3 million over the period 1955-60. 365

The principal task of the central government in this field will be to assist towns and villages in obtaining adequate supplies of pure drinking water. 365 312 Now that the expensive new system for Aleppo is virtually complete, it should be possible to devote more resources to the smaller cities and villages. Some £S 5 million will still need to be spent on expansion and improvement of the distribution network in Aleppo. Aside from this amount, we recommend that the government allocate about £S 8 million over the period 1955-60 for water supplies in towns and villages. The government has recognized that the problem is most acute in the Hauran and the Djebel Druze. Much of the population in these provinces is dependent on rain catchment for its water supply, and supplies in catchment basins quickly become polluted and occasionally dry up. The problem in these regions is complicated by the dearth of underground water, which necessitates expensive geophysical surveys. Elsewhere in the country there are still many villages and towns which urgently require pure water. For example, Hassetche, although the capital of Jezireh, is dependent on water drawn directly from the Khabour river and peddled from carts in the city streets. Because the need is so great, funds for water supply will have to be used with great economy. Extensive distribution systems which are expensive to install and maintain must be avoided. In the smaller villages a centrally located well will generally suffice. For the larger villages and towns the water should be piped to a limited number of public fountains where inhabitants can draw it for their domestic needs.

Waste disposal is also an important problem, especially from the standpoint of public health. 364 Even the larger cities have not fully solved this problem. In Damascus, for instance, the sewers empty into the Barada river, whose water is used farther downstream not only for irrigation but also for drinking. The most immediate need, however, is for proper waste disposal in the villages. The construction of latrines and cesspools appears to be the only feasible solution there, and the community self-improvement program which, in accordance with our earlier proposals, would be initiated by community workers, should focus at least in part on the improvement of village sanitation by this means. To overcome any public inertia, the government might find it advisable to give squatting slabs or some comparable assistance to householders as an incentive to construct and use latrines.

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ANNEX G *NOTES ON ELECTRIC POWER*

Energy Resources

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Coal, oil and lignite resources are apparently lacking; and the calorific value of the small peat deposits is low and unutilizable. The potentialities of hydroelectric power are limited by the low volume and gradient of the rivers, the almost total absence of falls or rapids and the wide variations in seasonal flow. Only the Youssef Pasha site, on the Euphrates, has considerable possibilities for power generation. It is estimated that at this location there could be developed a firm power of 45,000 KW and a maximum of 90,000 KW. It is doubtful whether power potential on all other rivers together exceeds 60,000 KW, so that Syria's total estimated hydroelectric potential is approximately 150,000 KW—about the same as that of the Lebanese project of Litani alone.

377 365

1 PUBLIC UTILITIES

Installed Capacity

In 1953 the installed power capacity was as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 Installed Power Capacity, 1953

	Installed power		Peak load
	KW	KVA	KW
Damascus	13,000	16,500	13,160
Aleppo	10,400	15,050	10,040
Homs-Hama	2,650	3,510	2,650
Latakia	800	1,000	800
Deir ez Zor	840	915	840
Small towns and villages	6,660	7,801	6,544
Total	34,350	44,776	34,034

These data indicate that the average load factor was 40%.[1]

[1] The load factor is the ratio of the average load in KW supplied during a designated period to the peak or maximum load occurring in that period.

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Power Generated

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The amount of power generated by the public utilities and bought by them from private plants during the last five years is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Power Generated and Purchased by Public Utilities, 1949–53

(*Million KWH*)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Damascus	31.55	35.25	36.91	40.19	47.58
Aleppo	25.74	33.47	36.36	43.05	49.14
Homs-Hama	9.36	10.33	11.07	12.60	13.71
Latakia	1.02	1.21	1.50	1.75	2.25
Deir ez Zor	0.86	0.94	1.06	1.25	1.54
Small towns and villages	1.81	2.81	3.67	4.46	5.63
Total	70.34	84.01	90.57	103.30	119.85

Breakdown of Supply and Consumption 377

The distribution of power consumption by various uses and the total power supply are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Supply and Consumption of Electricity

(*Million KWH*)

Principal public utilities[a]	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Light	17.89	22.27	27.90	33.70	37.82	44.25	52.04
Power	15.30	18.42	22.28	27.64	28.47	31.44	36.43
Traction	4.11	4.16	4.23	4.19	3.99	4.10	4.32
Losses and miscellaneous	9.74	11.31	14.22	15.76	16.52	19.00	21.45
Total	47.04	56.16	68.63	81.28	86.80	98.79	114.24
Private industrial plants[b]	3.6	5.0	7.2	10.0	15.0	n.a.	n.a
Estimated total supply in Syria	57.0	70.0	85.0	95.0	105.0	n.a.	n.a.

[a] Including power purchased from private plants.
[b] Excluding power sold.

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IV ELECTRICITY TARIFFS

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As stated in the Main Report, tariffs for electricity used for lighting of houses and shops are not excessive, except in the small towns. They range from about 16 to 25 piasters per KWH, or about 4.5 to 7.0 U. S. cents;[3] in the small towns they are on the high side of the range and are said to be as high as 50 piasters per KWH in some places. Sometimes the tariff takes the form of a uniform charge. In Damascus, however, the tariff was until recently on a downward sliding scale, the charge varying inversely with consumption; since 1953 it has been on a two-step progressive basis, the heavier consumers paying more. The change in tariff structure was made as a protection against an exaggerated peak load but has had the unfortunate effect of discouraging use of electrical appliances by small consumers. While such a policy may be justified as long as demand exceeds supply, as soon as installed power measures up to demand the Damascus tariff policy should be revised to encourage domestic consumption.

Charges for electricity for power vary with the area, the subscribed power and the consumed power. The range is between 4.66 and 18 piasters per KWH, the low rate of 4.66 piasters applying only to high utilization of subscribed power in the area of Homs-Hama where there is a hydroelectric plant. The average rate is between 10 and 12 piasters per KWH. Surcharges are imposed on consumption during peak hours. To all these rates, a municipal tax of 10% is generally added.

These rates are high compared with charges in other countries. Table 5 compares the rates paid by an Aleppo industrial consumer with those paid by comparable consumers elsewhere.[4]

Many Syrian consumers complain about the cost of electricity in comparison to the lower rates applicable in neighboring countries in general and in Lebanon in particular. The mission is not in a position to judge whether the basis on which charges are fixed in Lebanon is sound. However, Lebanon has the advantages of a hydroelectric power output equal to more than half of the total power supply (compared with less than 25%

[3] Prices of electricity (in U. S. cents per KWH) for monthly lighting consumption of 15 KWH (1951): New York, 6.33; Zurich, 8.15; Paris, 4.65; London, 5.80; and Colombo, 8.30. (Source: International Bank's Mission to Ceylon.)

[4] Rates for other countries are at the 1951 level.

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in Syria), proximity of most of the thermal stations to pipeline outlets, and a well-developed consumption pattern operating from an interconnecting national grid. Some of these favorable conditions will be present in Syria in due course, although the handicap of limited natural resources will remain. The fact that many power users are unsatisfactory consumers, in that they provide a very low load factor, also contributes to high power costs in Syria. The most extreme illustration is provided by seasonal industries, such as ginning, which require large investments in power capacity for only a few months' consumption each year. In such cases the return would be very poor if power were sold at specially low rates for so limited a period.

TABLE 5 Comparative Industrial Power Rates

(*U.S. cents per KWH*)

	30 KW, 200 hours per month	300 KW, 250 hours per month
New York	4.19	2.40
Aleppo	2.53	2.22
Zurich	2.35	1.27
London	1.79	1.59
Colombo	1.80	1.30

According to the profit and loss accounts provided by the public utilities of Damascus and Aleppo, the gross return per KWH sold in 1953 was 13.6 piasters in Damascus and 12.8 piasters in Aleppo. The costs of operation of the power plants, including maintenance and repairs but excluding financial charges, were 3.18 piasters per KWH for Damascus and 4.82 piasters for Aleppo. The lower figure for Damascus is due mainly to the fact that about one-third of all power is generated in hydroelectric plants, but also to the higher efficiency of the diesel equipment. The operating costs in the hydro plants are only about 0.4 piasters per KWH sold, compared with 4.5 piasters in the diesel plants. Moreover, in the diesel plants fuel represented about 66% of the total operating cost in Damascus and 78% in Aleppo. The price of fuel oil and the efficiency of the diesel generator sets are therefore very material factors in the final price of electricity produced in thermal plants.

According to the accounts, the total costs per KWH sold and distributed were 7.25 piasters per KWH for Damascus and 5.35 piasters for

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365 377 Aleppo. This would mean that distribution costs would amount to 4.07 piasters per KWH in Damascus and only 0.53 piasters in Aleppo (excluding financial charges). This large difference can be partly explained by the fact that the personnel expenditures for Aleppo are exclusive of clerical and management personnel, while on the other hand the figure of £S 1.2 million quoted for Damascus is probably too high. One of the difficulties is that clerks and management personnel are common to the several activities of the public utilities—power, streetcars and water supply in Damascus, and power, streetcars, buses and water supply in Aleppo.

According to the accounts, the 1953 gross profit of the Damascus electric utilities was £S 2.4 million and £S 2.75 million for those in Aleppo, although the facts with respect to personnel costs would indicate that the true Damascus figure is higher and that of Aleppo lower. In any case these are large returns for the two public utilities even if the actual value of each were as high as £S 10 million. Not only are these public utilities self-supporting but they are able to finance at least part of the projected development schemes, a factor which has led the mission to recommend no reduction in power tariffs as long as large capital investment is needed.

As the proposed program gets under way, the replacement of diesel by steam plants will reduce the cost of fuel by about one piaster per KWH sold, since the cost of gas oil is about £S 103 per ton, compared with about £S 60 per ton for fuel oil, taking into account the decrease in efficiency. Therefore, pending completion of the Youssef Pasha project, earnings in the Aleppo area would not exceed one piaster per KWH, even when the steam plant is able to generate the bulk of the needed power.

In Damascus the increase in earnings resulting from the power development program would be about the same as in Aleppo. While savings realized by the shift from diesel to steam power would be less because the plant to be displaced in Damascus is more efficient than that in Aleppo, large economies would flow from the shift to hydroelectric power. But a large reduction in the cost of electricity for Syria as a whole can be expected only after completion of the main hydroelectric projects and construction of an interconnecting network based on the line Youssef Pasha-Aleppo.

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509 built, many still in service are being retired by larger airlines whose increased traffic requires greater unit capacity. The mission recommends allocating possibly £S 600,000 to be used for this purpose over the next five years.

365 MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT

Both Aleppo and Damascus are served by city tram and bus systems. As in many other parts of the world, the buses are gradually replacing the tramways.

Aleppo

The tramway system of Aleppo was established in 1929 by a French company under a monopoly concession to provide the city with public transport. In 1951 the company was nationalized, continuing operations under the same concession. There was no bus service until 1952, when it was launched by the tramway company itself under a broadened interpretation of the original monopoly.

Both forms of transport are now operated at a small profit. While tramway development is static, new buses are being financed out of reserves set aside earlier for renewals on the tramway system. A gradual replacement will undoubtedly take place until the tramway system finally becomes uneconomical, but no immediate need to accelerate the process or to alter the policy is evident.

Damascus

Although older (1907) the Damascus tramway system has a similar history. Started by a Belgian company, it too was nationalized in 1951. In this case, however, the growth of bus competition has taken a different course.

In 1946 the tramways introduced three buses which they operated experimentally for about eight months. The fare was set at 15 piasters, but private buses made their appearance also, with a 10-piaster fare, and their competition caused the tramways' experiment to show an operating

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loss. Perhaps because of this, the tramway company failed to obtain a 365 broadening of its monopoly concession to include buses.

Without legislative restraint, the private bus business continued to grow in the hands of many individual owner-operators. There are now about 120 private buses, and their operators have combined into an association for the sake of uniform rates, pooled revenues and operating economies. Users apparently prefer the buses to the trams, for despite extremely low tram fares the buses have absorbed most of the business. Today, in contrast to 35,000-45,000 daily tram passengers, the private buses carry 100,000-200,000. The tramway operates at a considerable loss.

Seeking a way out of this dilemma, the nationalized tramway company has proposed that it buy up the buses at a cost of around £S 2 million, investing another £S 2 million in a gradual program of replacement with new buses. This idea has not met with favor among the bus owners, who see no public benefit in shifting from a successful and satisfactory private exploitation to a municipal operation.

The mission feels that such a shift is not justified economically, and that there is no need to use public funds for this purpose. Originally the tramways were installed as consumers of electric power generated by the same company. Under present local conditions the growing demand for electricity for other uses suggests that the simplest course is for the outmoded tramway, with its high overhead costs, to retire from the picture gradually in favor of the more efficient bus system already in operation.

VI TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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Syrian telephone and telegraph facilities have expanded rapidly in recent years, under the stimulus of an exceptionally clear and coordinated program of development. Investment in new and improved installations, including automatic dial system, has totalled £S 30,861,223 since 1946, mainly provided through interest-free loans from the government.

An even more impressive fact is that the operations are self-supporting. Telecommunications revenue has exceeded operating expense by an average amount of about £S 700,000 per year since 1949. In 1953 the total revenue was £S 10,944,684 against expenses of £S 9,573,585, leaving a record surplus of £S 1,371,099. Officials believe that with more efficient

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362 families requiring one dwelling each. While the need for a high and even higher rate of construction in the future is undeniable, it is doubtful that the factors which have operated to create an effective demand for housing will altogether be as effective in the future. Some decline in building over the coming years may well take place.

365 361 Community services have not kept pace with construction. Damascus and Aleppo have been most nearly provided with the essential streets, water supply and sewerage facilities, but the medium-sized and the small communities are very badly serviced. Except for water supply, this is not yet a problem for the small settlements, but it is serious for the medium-sized centers with their motorized transport and denser populations. The social services—education, public health, social welfare and community development—are likewise not yet adequately developed in Syria, but the country is commendably aware of the need and in the field of education, at least, has increased its expenditures impressively in the last few years. A few of the larger municipalities take care of their community services and have undertaken town-planning, but the central government, through the Ministry of Public Works, merely serves as technical advisor to the municipalities. There is no central government department with responsibility for housing. And while there are ministries for education and public health, no government department is responsible for social welfare or community development programs and no such programs exist. The administrative organizations in these fields clearly need strengthening.

Investment in Settlements

657 361 Over 60% of Syria's total annual investment is estimated to go into settlements, for housing, community and social services, and other purposes. During 1949-53 this type of investment averaged £S 138 million annually, of which £S 15 million (almost 11%) was from public funds and £S 123 million (89%) was private investment. On the basis of a 3.65 million population the annual investment in this sector was £S 39.4 per capita, of which £S 35.1 represents private funds.

[362] Perhaps as much as 80% of the private investment and about 72% of the total investment in settlements goes into housing; the balance is divided between industrial and commercial buildings, in that order. Private building activity reached an all-time high in 1953.

Of public investment in settlements, 80% is municipal and only 20%

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their road funds on types of pavement suitable to the needs of the locality, 343
choosing those methods which make greatest use of local materials and hand labor and depend least on machinery and imported materials. Stone-paved roads, of which there are excellent examples in Syria, probably provide the answer for most of the settlements where stone is readily available, and the government should be able to provide asphalt to most communities. Many of the roads in villages, particularly those which do not carry motor vehicle traffic, could be improved through cooperative community endeavor, and this should be one of the objectives of the community development program we have recommended.

Electricity

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Electricity is of economic importance to those communities which depend upon it for productive power and not merely for light. The mission recognizes fully the significant developing influence which the availability of electric power can have upon a community. Useful though it is, however, we suggest that a major effort to provide electric power primarily for lighting be deferred until the more urgent problems of water supply and sewerage have received attention.

Landscaping

Syria's broad and nearly waterless steppes have led to cities and villages 341
virtually without trees, a situation to which the devastation of the first World War contributed greatly. Even cities like Damascus, lacking neither greenery nor water, have large areas which remain bare. The planting of trees, especially shade trees for the streets, should be a concern for all Syrian settlements. This, of course, calls for a study of the most suitable types of trees for the different regions, and the establishment of nurseries, as recommended in Chapter 3 of the Main Report.

Local committees should do the planting, once the problem of water supply has been met. Where streets are narrow, there is much to be said in favor of planting trees inside the house plots so that the inhabitants themselves will take care of them; the trees will then shade the streets without taking up needed road space. In recently planned areas where the streets may be unnecessarily wide, a strip on either side might be turned over to the people living on the street on condition that it be planted with

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architects to design certain major projects independently or in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Works. A number of standard types of buildings should be developed and studied as a guide for future projects. For example, two or three tested types of classrooms should be available, suited to the differing climatic regions of Syria. 653

Commercial Buildings

With respect to commercial buildings, the government's problems include provision of town and village markets. For centuries these have been built on a traditional oriental design, with a network of covered passages on which the various shops open. Such construction has permitted market activity under conditions of severe heat or heavy rain, and has lent itself to the prevalence of small shops appropriate to the country's economic standards. Although this form of market is still the most common, new ones of the type are no longer being built. In some settlements of the Jezireh, in Kamichliye and Hassetche, the new *souks* borrow something from the old design, combining it with regular narrow streets covered with temporary roofing. Elsewhere markets are following the western pattern. 653 366

As part of the general development program the government might well finance a special study of the type of market that will most economically offer protected shopping, small-size shops, sanitary conditions and better ventilation. Thereafter municipalities should proceed to plan for their own requirements.

Transportation Structures

Most buildings related to transportation services are the responsibility of the railways and port authorities, and provision has been made for them in the transport program. Yet one category of building usually neglected in planning is that serving bus and truck transportation, which is of greatest importance in a country like Syria with its many small settlements. What is needed is something equivalent to the caravanserai of earlier times—perhaps a combination of a big courtyard, a service garage, a storehouse and a small hostel. Here too, the government might undertake a study of an appropriate prototype, leaving construction to the municipalities and private business. 653 498

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COTTON IN SYRIA



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Cotton bought in small lots from many farmers in various sections is thoroughly mixed in seed cotton storage bins in Aleppo, Syria, before ginning to get uniformity in the bale.

more neps, and often damage the fibers. Also, farmers have not been able to secure any higher price for their saw ginned cotton with less trash, but several dealers in Aleppo reported sales of saw ginned cotton at a premium, indicating that the market situation may be changing. 248 407

Whereas formerly ginners took the seed to cover the cost of ginning, with the increased value of the seed, ginners now are required to operate on a service basis for a fixed charge.

MARKETING

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The concentration of ginning equipment in a few large towns creates a difficult and expensive transportation problem for the farmers in remote areas. Because of the distance to the gins, many farmers are forced to sell cotton in the seed to merchants or middlemen in the local communities. Merchants gin the cotton for their own account and then dispose of the lint and the seed. Most of the gins are owned by merchants, but by no means do all merchants own gins.

Aleppo is the cotton merchandising center, with 47 exporters operating in this market in 1951. About half a dozen merchants, of whom two or three do a small export business, operate in Damascus. More than half of all the exports are sold through the three leading firms; the others do a small volume of business largely as a sideline. [366]

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Urban Social Welfare

368 It seems desirable in the near future to inaugurate some social welfare work in the urban areas as a counterpart of the proposed community work in the rural areas. Initially this will have to be on a modest and experimental scale. We suggest that over the next six years 8 to 10 centers be established to serve as focal points for voluntary community activities. About £S 350,000 might be allocated for investment in such centers, and £S 120,000 for operating expenditures. The centers would provide facilities for reading, radio listening, community meetings, adult education courses and eventually even for community baths. It would be advisable to combine the community hall as far as possible with the traditional school building; we therefore recommend that all new schools be constructed as all-purpose buildings which can serve children during the day and adults at night. The centers might well be put in the charge of selected teachers who would receive some special training in social work.

We would stress particularly that this modest program is experimental in character. Experience with the first centers will demonstrate how useful they can be, what needs they must serve and how they can best meet these needs.

Public Buildings[37]

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361 Public buildings are, of course, prominent features in most settlements of any size. They must be properly planned and fitted into town planning schemes so that they will be of maximum service to the government and the community. Elsewhere in this report we have discussed building requirements for agriculture, education, health and similiar special purposes. Any development program should also take into account the probable outlays on buildings of a general administrative character. The mission, however, had very little basis on which to project investment expenditures on government buildings of this kind. During the period 1949-53 the Ministry of Public Works spent on an average about £S 1 million on the construction of public buildings for purposes other than agriculture, education and health. The mission thought it advisable to assume that such expenditures would rise in the future and has accord-

[37] See Annex I, p. 472.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

9

Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

369 from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants
621 and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims
184 who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

10

101 The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

175 Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the
101 spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of
177 the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

175 The Turks performed also another function. Their military
177 strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

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v INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

The Need for Further Industrialization

433 464 It is generally agreed—and the mission shares this opinion—that with a more rational distribution and better cultivation of the available land, and particularly with a gradual extension of the irrigated area, Syrian agriculture could for a considerable time to come easily absorb the expected natural population increase. With respect to the need for further industrialization, however, the relevant considerations seem rather to be the territorial and occupational distribution of the population and the evolution of this pattern. The principal question is whether—and if so, to what degree and in which direction—Syrian industry needs further expansion to absorb the present and immediately foreseeable effective labor supply.

464 369 166 Although reliable figures are not available there is no clear evidence that Syria is suffering from chronic unemployment. There are, however, some very overpopulated rural areas with considerable underemployment and there is a continuous flow of labor from the villages to the urban centers. During the postwar period of considerable building activity and rapid industrialization, these markets were able to absorb the increased labor supply. But at times, as for instance in 1948 in Aleppo, the urban workers have become alarmed by the influx of villagers competing with them and aggravating already existing unemployment, particularly in the textile industry. There were demonstrations and a request to the local authorities to bar villagers from applying for town employment; this in turn induced the government to encourage certain village industries—the decline of which is again contributing to urban labor pressure.

This illustrates the tensions which are bound to arise as a consequence of the existing imbalance between rural-urban social and economic conditions. Unless the village standard of living is greatly improved, there is little doubt that the trend toward the towns will continue strong and that the numbers seeking employment in industry will greatly exceed the natural increase in the industrial population. This tendency may even become more pronounced when, as is to be anticipated, illiteracy in the villages declines, transport and communications improve and the rural population becomes more aware of its poverty and social insecurity.

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The recommendations of the mission with regard to agriculture and animal husbandry, including those concerning land tenure and irrigation, would, if accepted, open significant new perspectives to the farmer and farm laborers and tend to check the drift from rural areas. If it were possible to spend more on irrigation than has been recommended, the trend could perhaps be reversed. It is not likely, however, that the growing labor supply can be absorbed and unemployment avoided without further industrialization. Even on the highly optimistic assumption that migration towards the towns can be halted, Syria must contend with such factors as the natural increase in the industrial labor population and the gradual shift from handicraft to mechanization with the consequent release of manpower.

Although estimates in this field are particularly hazardous, the mission suggests that under the most favorable circumstances Syria will have to create at least 20,000-25,000 new industrial jobs during the next six years to keep its industrial labor market in reasonable balance.

Limiting Factors

It is often contended in Syrian official and business circles that shortage of local capital rather than lack of confidence is the principal factor limiting further industrialization. Assuming that this is so, it would follow that to advance development Syria should make a strenuous effort to create attractive conditions for foreign capital as a supplementary source of industrial financing. This conclusion does not seem to be generally acknowledged. At least the nationalization of foreign-owned public utilities without settling the matter of indemnification of their proprietors, and the regulations with respect to foreign companies working in Syria, do not indicate its acceptance.

There is, however, room for some doubt whether scarcity of capital should be considered as a major factor limiting development of Syrian industry. During the past eight years, investments in industry have supplied the country with an industrial capacity capable of meeting most of the need for manufactured articles, based on local primary production, which the population can afford; indeed, as already pointed out, in several branches of industry there is excess capacity. Generally speaking, Syrian industry appears to have attracted substantial amounts of capital. Even taking into account the fact that the sources of industrial investment

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In the manufacture of plastic materials and domestic utensils factory production has made a beginning. This also seems to be a promising field for further development. #33

The possibility of the establishment of a plant for mixing fertilizers and making insecticides from imported ingredients should also be explored.

In the Main Report the mission has pointed out that the erection of an oil refinery in the Homs area seems to be entirely justified.

Prospects for Village Industries

With development of agricultural and rural community organization, better water and electricity supply in small towns and villages, wider general and vocational education and easier and cheaper transportation, the conditions under which village industries have prospered will undergo a change, not necessarily for the better. Traditional consumption patterns will be modified, techniques will change, factory-made manufactures will enter the village markets and compete with handicraft products and transportation costs will provide less protection. On the other hand, the density of the population and its purchasing power will increase and in certain regions tourist trade may develop. Village industries may find a better market for agricultural and animal products processed into foodstuffs, for the manufacturing and repairing of simple tools and implements used domestically or in the field, for the production of furniture and other articles for house and farm, ornaments, clothing accessories, costume jewelry and other goods of indigenous design. #33 369

We do not recommend that efforts be made to check historical trends by assisting village industries which will inevitably decline and ultimately disappear. Yet it seems very probable that a rather significant part of Syrian industrial enterprise carried on in rural communities will for a long time to come survive and be a determining factor in the economic, social and cultural conditions of many small towns and villages. That part certainly deserves more attention than it has generally received. An improvement of standards of quality and efficiency, commercial and financial techniques and social and sanitary conditions of these establishments would undoubtedly contribute to raising living standards in the rural areas.

It is therefore suggested that the community leaders, recommended elsewhere in this report, with the assistance of specialists representing the

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433 369 Ministry of National Economy, carefully investigate the conditions and opportunities which exist in this field. Industrial extension, assistance in the organization of credit cooperatives, particularly with a view to giving protection from usurious middlemen practices, in the marketing of products which might find wider outlets, and eventually in founding tourist attractions could be considered. Even if only limited results can be achieved by such measures they should be encouraged as a means of creating better rural conditions and at the same time reducing the pressure of labor migration toward the crowded towns.

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SYRIA AND LEBANON

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)		Production (000 metric tons)		Yields (100 kg. per ha.)
	1951	1952	1951	1952	1950
Wheat	61	70	43	50	7·5
Barley	15	20	14	27	11·2
Cotton	5	2	1	..	..
Tobacco	..	..	3	2	..
Citrus fruit	..	..	75	90	..
Grapes	21	..	60	..	..

.. = not available.

(SOURCES: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Enquête 1952* (Paris 1953); except figures for yields, cotton production, and area and production of grapes, all of which have been taken from FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952.)

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There is enough water for land to be used more intensively than in Syria but there is not enough room to grow all that the country needs. Improved methods have increased the yield of cereals per acre, but Lebanon will always have to import wheat. The crop of grapes is nearly double the weight of the wheat harvest and Lebanon exports grapes, wine, and the best quality araq. The citrus exports are high but the growers have not yet established the same name for quality as have the Israelis. Melons, water-melons, apples, onions, and potatoes are also important crops and vegetables are exported as far as the oil towns of Kuwait and Dahran. Cotton and tobacco are also grown in small quantities.

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The land is more evenly parcelled out amongst the people in Lebanon than in Syria but, despite the fact that there are many small holdings, there is a general shift from country to town, and Beirut and its immediate neighbourhood hold nearly half of the population. In the coastal regions of intensive cultivation small holdings predominate, while in the plain regions large estates worked by share-croppers are the most prevalent form of land tenure. Some estates owned by rich men are farmed under modern methods and equipment and there is less room for improvement or for expansion in agriculture than in Syria.

Industry

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Relative to its size, Lebanon is one of the most industrialized countries in the Middle East area. It is probable that nearly 50,000 persons are so employed, of whom over half are factory workers. However, Lebanese industry has only partly recovered from the loss of the Syrian market and some industries had either to move to Syria or to curtail production. The biggest industries are electricity, which produced 190 million kwh. in 1951, and the Cheks cement factory south of Tripoli, which produced 303,000 tons of cement in 1951. Cotton weaving and

161 square mile; in the province of Hauran, 80 per square mile; and in the province of Hama, 77 per square mile. In contrast, the population density of Al Jazira, incorporating the potentially fertile plains of the Khabour river basin, was 18 per square 369 mile. The country is about 70 per cent rural, 162 with the inhabitants living in some 5,000 villages. There are 6 principal cities with populations of over 30,000 — Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Deir ez Zor. Damascus, the capital and a city of commercial and religious significance, had a population of almost 325,100 in 1949. Aleppo, an industrial and trade center, and the largest city in Syria, had a population of about 356,600. It disputes with Damascus the claim of being the oldest city of continued prominence in the world.

162 167 In addition to the older refugee communities, as the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Druzes, which have become established minority groups, Syria received an influx in 1948 of about 150,000 Arabs from northern Palestine. Approximately 80,000 located around Damascus; others in Hauran and the northern provinces. Their status and ultimate distribution were still undetermined in 1952, when the number on the roster of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees totaled 84,000. Over one third resided in special camps, but the remainder were living independently in the various towns and villages.

167 During the Ottoman regime, large numbers of Syrians emigrated to the Americas, and to Europe and Africa. Although they probably total almost 60,000, the Syrian colonies abroad are small in comparison with those of the Lebanese, and their influence on the cultural and the economic life of their homeland is proportionately slight.

811 185 The educational system has undergone revision since the founding of the republic in 1943, with increased emphasis on its adaptation to the culture and the needs of the 811 people. Elementary education is compul-

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bul to Baghdad. A railroad also runs from Beirut to Damascus via Rayak. A second line from Damascus to Amman and Ma'an, in Jordan, forms part of the so-called "pilgrim" railway, opened in 1904-06. Air services are available from Damascus and, to a lesser extent, from Aleppo to Beirut and Baghdad, thence to Europe, Africa and the Far East. 496 509

Food and Nutrition

The nutritional standards of the people vary markedly in different regions, being highest in the vicinity of Damascus and lowest among the Alawites of Latakia province and the peasants of Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Undernutrition is common, but generally it is more widespread in the rural villages than in the urban areas. Due to the lack of adequate storage and transportation facilities, local food shortages are frequent, particularly during poor crop years. Up to the present, there has been little organized effort to promote better nutrition among the different population groups. It is expected that such a program will be initiated by the nutrition division created within the governmental health services in 1952. 146 369 [262] 146 654

Cereals constitute the staple food, and, with certain root vegetables, contribute 70 to 80 per cent of the caloric content of the average diet. Breads prepared from wheat flour are consumed in all parts of the country. Barley is sometimes employed, while maize and sorghum millet are used in the southeast. Rice is universally popular: it is grown in the Al Jazira region, and large amounts are also imported. Broad beans, chick-peas and lentils are basic food items in most areas. Other vegetables, including onions, potatoes, beets, tomatoes, eggplant and the leafy spinach and French lettuce, are abundant in Damascus and Al Jazira provinces, but scarce in Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Numerous fruits are consumed in season, but the supply is scanty in the Euphrates valley and in the southern provinces. Olives and olive oil are important among most population groups. Milk is 262

of the babies treated at the maternity and child health center in Damascus suffer from intestinal infections. Epidemics of diarrheal disease often coincide with the ripening of the apricot crop. The ready contamination of this thin-skinned fruit by flies and other insects accounts for the local designation of the early summer diarrheas in the fruit-growing districts as *mish mish* (apricot) disease. 164 164 262

Cholera. Serious outbreaks have accompanied the introduction of cholera in the past, but the disease was absent from Syria from 1928 to 1947, shortly after the epidemic in Egypt. On December 19, 1947, cholera was reported from 2 adjacent villages in the province of Hauran, on the road from Palestine to Damascus. At the same time, cases occurred in 3 villages in the irrigated plain of the Al Ghouta, within 3 or 4 miles of Damascus. Although 45 cases, with 18 deaths, were reported officially, it was generally believed that the actual incidence totaled at least 77 cases. 164

Quarantine measures were promptly imposed in Hauran and Damascus provinces, and all persons entering or leaving those regions were required to possess certificates of immunization against cholera. Over one and one half million individuals were inoculated with cholera vaccine in the vicinity of Damascus, as well as in the affected districts of Hauran and in the city of Aleppo. Supplies and assistance were furnished the Ministry of Health by the World Health Organization, the Near East Foundation and the Egyptian and Lebanese governments. Vaccine was also provided jointly by the Arabian American Oil Company and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. No cases were reported after the initial outbreaks, and on January 17, 1948, Syria was declared free from the disease. The exact origin of the epidemic was never definitely established. 744 164 648 747

Helminthiases. ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Hookworm infection, caused by *Ancylostoma duodenale*, is prevalent among the agricultural workers in foci along the banks of the 164 463 369

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164 Orontes River and in the irrigated districts
463 of the Euphrates river basin, especially in
369 the Al Jazira region. In a survey of representative population groups in Syria and Lebanon, reported in 1934,[88] hookworm ova were found in fecal specimens from 25 to 36 per cent of the farmers examined in the vicinity of Homs and Hama. Surveys in the Euphrates area suggest comparable infection rates. In the examination of 306 presumably healthy Arabs, from 9 to 60 years of age, who were engaged on excavations near Salihiye on the river about 60 miles south of Deir ez Zor in 1933,[28] slightly over 38 per cent were found to harbor hook-
164 worms. The prevalence of infection in the
369 agricultural communities along the Eu-
514 phrates and its tributaries probably aver-
515 ages from 25 to 35 per cent. Promiscuous defecation is widely practiced, and the children, running barefoot around the dwellings and in the fields, are particularly exposed to infection. No data are available regarding the degree of infection, but most observers believe that it is usually moderate. Similar studies undertaken in the areas around Damascus and Aleppo, in an Alawite village on the northern plateau and among Bedouin tribesmen south of the Euphrates yielded no evidence of infection.

164 SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis is endemic in two localized areas near the Turkish border—the Tell Abiad district on the upper reaches of the Belikh River and

Distribution of Schistosomiasis in Syria

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761 Comparative rates in urban and rural com-
369 munities were determined in a series of tests
164 on unorganized groups in the city and two adjacent farming districts. In Damascus, positive reactions to tuberculin were given by 47.7 of the boys and 40.8 per cent of the girls tested at 15 years of age. At 20 to 25 years of age, positive reactions were obtained in 86.7 per cent and 77.4 per cent, respectively; at 40 to 45 years of age, in 95.6 and 86.6 per cent, respectively. In the rural communities the positive reaction rates were consistently lower, but approached the urban levels in the older age groups. Among individuals at 15 years of age, 51.6 per cent of the boys and 27.2 per cent of the girls reacted to tuberculin in one area, and 18.1 per cent of the boys and 21.2 per cent of the girls, in another. At 40 to 45 years of age, the proportion of positive reactors averaged 80 per cent in the first series and 50 to 100 per cent in the second.[48]

744 Within recent years the Ministry of
751 Health has embarked upon a tuberculosis
747 control program. In January, 1950, a tuberculin testing and BCG inoculation campaign was organized under the auspices of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and associated organizations, which was taken over by the Ministry
659 in September. Surveys have been carried
361 out in most of the provincial capitals and
751 surrounding rural districts, and the Ministry contemplates the gradual extension of the campaign to cover the populations in all parts of the country. In the course of the investigations completed in 7 provinces between January and September, 1950, almost 417,000 persons were tuberculin tested, and over 188,000 were inoculated with BCG vaccine. The majority were schoolchildren, although miscellaneous population groups of all ages were also included. The proportion of positive reactors in the different provinces ranged from 23 per cent in Jebel ed Druz (As Suwaydah) to 42 per cent in Aleppo.

758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
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sion hospital clinic in Deir ez Zor,[14, 18] the prevalence among the Bedouin has been estimated at 50 to 90 per cent and among the seminomadic Arab townsmen at 20 to 35 per cent. 164 361

The facilities for the diagnosis and the treatment of venereal diseases are meager. As of 1951, the Ministry of Health operated special venereal disease hospitals and outpatient clinics in Damascus and Aleppo. It also maintained 2 mobile dispensaries for the treatment of syphilis and bejel in the eastern provinces. A campaign for the mass treatment of bejel and syphilis was initiated in 1952 by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The findings of the various field units should eventually provide a comprehensive picture of the distribution and the prevalence of these diseases in eastern Syria. 758 743

Diseases of the Eyes. Trachoma is a major public health problem in all parts of the country, although it varies in prominence under urban and rural conditions. The infection rates usually average less than 10 per cent in the cities, but approximate 40 to 60 per cent in the rural areas, where over two thirds of the people live. Repeated surveys among school groups in northern Syria[21] indicate that slightly more than 5 per cent of the children in Aleppo are affected, in contrast with 30 to 40 per cent in the environs of the city and 60 per cent in the rural villages. The disease exists at all levels of society, but is less frequent among the nomadic tribes than among the settled communities in the same general region. Differences in prevalence, influenced by local customs, are also noted among the various racial and religious groups. In a survey covering mountainous and coastal areas of Latakia *muhafazat*, reported in 1933,[22] the highest infection rates were found in the predominantly Alawite districts. The index of infection averaged 44 per cent. It ranged from 25 per cent among the Armenians to 61 per cent among the 164 369 164 563

p. 153 (b)

164 reports between louse-borne and flea-borne typhus, but, since small numbers of cases are listed during the summer months, both types of infection are probably included. Murine typhus is endemic throughout this region, and its presence in Greater Syria (including Lebanon) has been confirmed by rickettsial agglutination and guinea pig inoculation tests on blood serums from indigenous cases.[42] Tick-borne typhus is not reported, but cases of fièvre boutonneuse have been observed in the neighboring portions of Lebanon.

Relapsing Fever. Louse-borne relapsing fever is rare, but small outbreaks were reported from Syria and Lebanon in 1945—extensions of the epidemics which spread through the eastern Mediterranean countries in 1942-46.

164 Tick-borne relapsing fever is endemic.
341 Occasional cases are seen in the rural villages, usually between May and September. The tick, *Ornithodorus tholozani*, is the vector: specimens collected from a cave near Damascus have been found to be infected with the spirochetes.[43]

Plague. Plague occurs sporadically in the districts along the Turkish and the Iraqi frontiers on the north and on the Israeli border in the south. No severe outbreaks have been recorded within recent years, and no cases since 1946.

164 **Leishmaniasis.** Cutaneous leishmaniasis is widely distributed. The presence of a major focus in Aleppo province accounts for the local classification of the disease as "Aleppo boil." The infection rates in the vicinity of Aleppo formerly approximated 70 per cent, but they have declined appreciably with the extension of insect control measures within recent years. Smaller endemic foci exist in Damascus and other
164 centers. The disease is frequently encoun-
369 tered in the rural villages around Damascus, but it has been almost totally absent from the city itself since the inauguration of the municipal fly control campaign in 1946. Cases usually occur between May and

164 369 October, when the vector sandflies, *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti*, are abundant.

164 Kala-azar is seldom specifically reported from Syria, but occasional suspected cases have been described from the Jebel ed Druz region. A canine reservoir undoubtedly exists: the causative organisms have been demonstrated in a stray dog captured at el Bab, near Aleppo.[38]

Other Infections. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the western provinces where the vector, *Aedes aegypti*, is indigenous. Sandfly fever, transmitted by *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is endemic and sometimes epidemic.

Nutritional Diseases

166 364 511 Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are prevalent, particularly in the rural villages, where poverty and parasitic infections influence the nutritional standards of the people to a greater extent than in the urban areas. Serious nutritional conditions are most obvious among the children of the Bedouin tribes. Minor vitamin C deficiencies are widespread among the inhabitants of the grain-producing areas in the northeastern and the southern provinces. Occasional borderline cases of pellagra are encountered, but beriberi and ariboflavinosis are unusual. Cases of rickets are numerous, especially in the cities and the towns. Protein edema and overt vitamin A deficiencies are relatively rare.

Miscellaneous Conditions

164 232 Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and epidemics are sometimes reported. Q fever is enzootic among the sheep and the goats, but the extent of human infection is not known. In a series of complement fixation tests recently performed on blood serums taken from sheep and goats in different parts of the country, positive reactions were obtained in 13 to 63 per cent.[40]

Silicosis and benign pneumoconiosis are

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Raw Materials

433 Considering the present structure of Syrian industry, its supply of raw materials is generally speaking not unsatisfactory. In the preceding section we have referred to the import needs, if any, of Syria's principal industries. Most local and imported raw materials are generally available at competitive prices. The principal exception is sugar, the high price of which presents a serious drawback to the fruit canning, jam and candy industries. The prohibition of imports of cotton seed for industrial use hampers the ability of vegetable oil manufacturers to enter the export market at competitive prices. Some branches of the textile industry dependent on imported cotton yarn or cloth, subject to high customs duties, are in a similarly unfortunate position.

On the other hand certain laws or regulations in effect give some Syrian industries a right of first refusal with regard to locally produced raw materials; export of both ginned and non-ginned cotton, cotton seed, raw wool and raw hides, is subject to licensing, while export of timber and raw metals is prohibited. The efficacy and desirability of such measures may be questioned (see Section IV), but they are elements of the prevailing industrial climate.

The transportation of local raw materials to the industrial centers, where they are processed, is not unduly burdensome, thanks to the favorable location of Syrian industries in or near the producing areas. Moreover, the distances between these centers and the seaports are not too great. Nevertheless, transportation in Syria is relatively costly and an improvement in the transport sector would not only facilitate exports of surplus raw materials but would also benefit the processing industries and their competitive position.

Water and Power

433 312 371 The main industrial centers are, generally speaking, well provisioned with water. Damascus has the best water supply among Syrian cities, thanks to the springs of Figeh. Aleppo's water supply, which was so inadequate that some factories had to select sites outside of the town where they could drill their own wells, has now been greatly improved by a link with the Euphrates River. Homs and Hama have more than sufficient water

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resources in Homs Lake. The water rates charged by the municipalities are by no means excessive.

With regard to electricity for light and power the conditions are, however, much less favorable. The capacity of the municipal power plants in the four main industrial cities is far from sufficient to meet total consumption needs. Most of the larger factories have had to install their own power plants, which imposes an additional capital burden on them.[8] Factories which have no power plant of their own often suffer considerable losses resulting from breaks in the power and light supply. Electricity rates of public utilities, although higher in Syria than, for instance, in Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt, compare not unfavorably with those in the main Western industrial centers.

Equipment

The mechanical equipment of the major industries is in general good. Obsolete or inefficient machinery is continuously being replaced by new plant. Nevertheless, there are still many old factories and workshops where equipment is primitive and modernization is much needed.

Some industries, however, seem as a whole to be overequipped in relation to the available raw material supply or the market outlets for their products. A striking example is the installed capacity in the cotton ginning industry, which could handle between two and three times the present cotton crop. This is no doubt due in part to an overestimation at the time of the cotton boom. The government has accordingly prohibited the importation of cotton gins. In the case of the vegetable oil industry the installed capacity might be more fully utilized if cotton seed were freely importable and oil manufacturers could enter the export market for vegetable oils at competitive prices. As a complement to the protection of local cotton seed, the government has also placed an embargo on the importation of vegetable oils. A third instance of overequipment is in the glass industry: the Damascus factory was designed and installed on the basis of the rather ambitious notion that it should serve most of the needs of the Middle East. Some of its machinery, as for instance that for the manufacture of electric bulbs, has never been in operation. Although most of the items it produces may not be imported into Syria and although recently

[8] See Annex G, p. 413.

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ANNEX G *NOTES ON ELECTRIC POWER*

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Energy Resources

Coal, oil and lignite resources are apparently lacking; and the calorific value of the small peat deposits is low and unutilizable. The potentialities of hydroelectric power are limited by the low volume and gradient of the rivers, the almost total absence of falls or rapids and the wide variations in seasonal flow. Only the Youssef Pasha site, on the Euphrates, has considerable possibilities for power generation. It is estimated that at this location there could be developed a firm power of 45,000 KW and a maximum of 90,000 KW. It is doubtful whether power potential on all other rivers together exceeds 60,000 KW, so that Syria's total estimated hydroelectric potential is approximately 150,000 KW—about the same as that of the Lebanese project of Litani alone.

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1 PUBLIC UTILITIES

Installed Capacity

In 1953 the installed power capacity was as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 Installed Power Capacity, 1953

	Installed power		Peak load
	KW	KVA	KW
Damascus	13,000	16,500	13,160
Aleppo	10,400	15,050	10,040
Homs-Hama	2,650	3,510	2,650
Latakia	800	1,000	800
Deir ez Zor	840	915	840
Small towns and villages	6,660	7,801	6,544
Total	34,350	44,776	34,034

These data indicate that the average load factor was 40%.[1]

[1] The load factor is the ratio of the average load in KW supplied during a designated period to the peak or maximum load occurring in that period.

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above, additional power to the extent of approximately 14.2 and one million KWH respectively will probably be needed. The other industries specified are not expected to need substantial additional amounts of power. 377

On these assumptions the output of the private power plants would need to increase from about 43 million KWH to some 60 million KWH by 1960, but it is more than likely that at least part of the necessary increase will in fact be drawn from the public utilities network.

III THE MISSION'S PROGRAM

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The period 1949-53 showed a mean annual increase of 14.2% in the generation of public power. The actual percentage of increase over the preceding years was as follows:

1950	1951	1952	1953
19.4	7.8	14	16.2

The figure for 1951 reflects the effect on Syrian industry of the cotton crisis. Taking all factors into account, it would not be unreasonable to expect a continued average yearly increase of 14% between 1953 and 1960. On this basis about 300 million KWH would be generated in 1960 and since the load factor is not expected to improve, the peak load would probably be about 85,000 KW, requiring a minimum installed capacity of some 106,000 KVA. This means that some 60,000 KVA must be added to the approximately 45,000 KVA (34,350 KW) presently available plus a reserve of 20-25%.

It is believed that in 1945 there was a total installed capacity of about 13,000 KVA, able to generate 10,400 KW. During the eight succeeding years the increase was about 31,776 KVA, or 23,950 KW—an increase of some 245% or an average rate of 17% per year. Although this has not been sufficient to keep pace with rising consumption demands, it would lead to a total installation of 130,000 KVA if continued until 1960. This would give a margin of 23% over the anticipated minimum peak load for that year, which should be quite satisfactory for a country where there is practically no interconnecting network and where a large number of small generators is the rule (e.g., 18 in Damascus for an installed power of 16,500 KVA, and seven in Aleppo for 15,000 KVA). On the principle that

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371 each network should have in reserve a capacity equal to that of the largest
377 generator, Syria's present reserve requirements would total about 10,000 KVA, equal to 22% of total installed power. The reserve requirements have not been met in the past, although the situation will be greatly improved by the addition of the 14,610 KVA scheduled to start operating during 1954.

Damascus

In the Damascus area the annual increase in consumption has averaged only 10.8% over the last five years. It seems, therefore, that the peak load is unlikely to exceed 30,000 KW by 1960. This would call for a capacity of about 37,000 KVA, compared with the 16,500 KVA installed at present. The new Hameh steam plant, due to start operating at the end of 1954, would raise present capacity to 29,000 KVA and when the Souk Wadi Barada hydroelectric plant is completed in 1956 total installed power will be 37,000 KVA. In view of the fact that the Damascus diesel plant is 22 years old, the mission recommends that additional capacity of about 12,500 KVA (10,000 KW) be added to provide an adequate reserve.

There are three possible ways to provide the additional capacity. One is to install an extra set of 12,500 KVA in the new Hameh steam plant. Another is to construct new hydroelectric plants; and a third is presented by the possibility that a beginning will shortly be made on the Yarmuk power project by the Jordan Government, in which case, under the terms of an agreement with Jordan, Syria would receive 5,000 KW annually in return for an investment of 5% of the cost of the project. But to supply the balance of 5,000 KW to meet the needs of Damascus would require the installation of an additional set of 5,000 KW in the Hameh steam plant and the laying of a transmission line to the Yarmuk plant. This would cost about £S 15 million and would be the most expensive of the three choices. Of the remaining alternatives, the mission considers construction of hydroelectric plants preferable, since the need is for peak power rather than a large and steady output. Elsewhere the mission has recommended construction of reservoirs for irrigation purposes at Deir Makaren and Hameh, and it recommends that hydroelectric plants with a capacity of 10,000 KW be located at these two points, thus harnessing the power which can be developed on the Barada by construction of the two dams.

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These plants would supplement the Souk Wadi Barada project. They should cost only about £S 6 million. 371 377

Aleppo

Aleppo's consumption has grown far more speedily than that of Damascus. It is estimated that by 1960 the peak load in the Aleppo area will be about 32,175 KW, requiring an installed capacity of about 42,900 KVA.

The present installed capacity of 15,000 KVA is 27,900 KVA short of the 1960 target. Since construction of the Youssef Pasha hydroelectric plant will start as soon as funds become available, making it inadvisable to overequip Aleppo with thermal plants, no provision was made for a reserve.

The mission recommends the installation in the new steam plant not only of the first stage of 12,500 KVA, but of a second stage of 12,500 KVA and eventually a third stage of 6,250 KVA. The total cost of the second and third stages would be around £S 9 million. Some difficulties might arise toward 1960 but conditions should not be worse than at present. If consumption develops in the manner anticipated, profits from the steam plant will be large enough to give the Youssef Pasha project an earlier start.

We have considered the proposal that the additional thermal plant be located at Homs rather than Aleppo and that a transmission line be built to link such a plant with Aleppo. It has been argued that a plant at this location would provide standby and "peaking" capacity for both Aleppo and Damascus when Syria's hydroelectric resources, including those at Youssef Pasha, are developed and a national grid can be constructed. In addition, fuel oil at Homs would be cheaper and a more plentiful and cheaper supply of water would be available. While the arguments in favor of Homs appear persuasive, we have nevertheless recommended that the plant be built at Aleppo. It would be rather risky to erect a power station at a distance of 190 kilometers from the city it is designed to serve. Moreover, the losses in transmission plus the annual charges on the transmission line, which is likely to require an investment of £S 7 million, will probably offset the economies in operating costs resulting from the establishment of the plant at Homs.

Homs-Hama and the Ghab

The Homs-Hama area is important as the nucleus of a future inter-

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371 377 connecting network which would extend over a large part of Syria. In particular, it is expected that construction of the Ghab irrigation project will soon lead to increased activity in the area of Hama.

In the general area of Homs-Hama and the Ghab, several hydroelectric plants are proposed by the government, but none is scheduled to be begun before 1960. Even the dismantling of Amir Ghajar, which would be flooded by the Rastane dam, and its relocation at the foot of Rastane, is not scheduled to start before 1962. Most of these hydroelectric plants could operate only when water is not needed for irrigation and would therefore need to be supplemented by thermal plants of equal capacity. This is also true of the Roudj hydro plant and the Rastane siphon and hydro plant. Such projects are economical only when they can be connected with a well-developed grid system. The Homs Lake hydroelectric plant would at least have the eight cubic meters per second available to the Rastane plant even in the dry season, but the head is very low and the amount of power generated is therefore not very significant. Moreover, the mission's proposal for the Ghab area would lead to an increase of power for the Homs-Hama area. Accordingly, these projects have not been included in the mission's program.

With respect to the Ghab, the mission has the following comments. The area of Jisr ech Choghour, because of its location at the outlet of the Ghab valley and on the main road from Latakia to the interior of Syria, will probably develop rapidly during the next few years. During the construction of the Ghab project it will be a supply center and a suitable site for repair shops and material storage for the contractors. This development would be facilitated if Jisr ech Choghour were provided with adequate power and the ability to transmit part of it along the Ghab valley to supply the villages and construction contractors. This would entail the installation in Jisr ech Choghour of an adequate power plant and a transmission line along the Ghab valley to Hama, where it would connect with the Homs-Hama transmission network. Further, because of the length of the interconnection, it would be necessary to build in Hama a second power plant of about the same capacity to ensure stability. The construction of the hydroelectric plant of Jisr ech Choghour was postponed for the reason that it would have been unable to provide enough firm power. The mission recommends that diesel plants with a capacity of about 2,000 KVA each be built in Jisr ech Choghour and Hama and that a transmission line be run between these plants via Karkour, Kalaat el Moudiq, Acharneh and

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Maharda. Each of the diesel plants would cost about £S 1.5 million and the transmission line would cost £S 3 million. 371 377

Latakia

The proposed construction of an improved harbor will accelerate the development of Latakia. To meet resultant increased power demands, the mission supports the immediate construction of a diesel power plant in Latakia with an installed capacity of 2,500 KVA as first stage, at a cost of £S 1.5 million. Elsewhere the mission recommends the construction of a multi-purpose reservoir on the Nahr el Kebir for flood control, power, water supply and irrigation. For these reasons, the construction of the Nahr el Kebir power plant is included in the mission's program with an equipment of 2,500 KVA as first stage, at a cost of £S 5 million. These figures are approximate because the studies of this project have not yet been completed and therefore no accurate data are available.

Deir ez Zor

The growth of Deir ez Zor will follow upon the agricultural development of the lower Euphrates valley. In this town the mission supports the immediate construction of a diesel plant with an installed power of 2,000 KVA at a cost of about £S 1 million for the first stage.

Other Areas

It can be assumed that even at a conservative estimate consumption by the 49 smaller towns and villages which now have electricity will increase at the rate of at least 15% per annum, requiring the generation of about 16 million KWH by 1960. In view of the fact that the peak load already utilizes the full power capacity, additional equipment will be needed to meet the demand.

The mission therefore supports the program for the construction in the small towns and villages of 25 new networks, 10 with an installed power of 285 HP each and 15 with 225 HP, aggregating about 5,500 KVA; total cost would be £S 4.7 million. The mission also recommends the installation of about 2,500 KVA at a cost of approximately £S 1.5 million to carry on the program of improving existing utilities.

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295 Damascus to manufacture rubber boots, canvas and rubber shoes, and felt and rubber shoes by the hot molding process, using imported crude rubber, imported and local waste rubber and canvas, and locally made felt. Production is said to be about 300,000 pairs per year and about 200 workers are employed. Other factories in Damascus and Aleppo produce rubber soles and heels. About 1,600 tons of rubber and rubber waste were imported in 1953, but it is not known how much was used in the boots and shoes industry in addition to local scrap rubber. The importation of boots and shoes is prohibited.

Matches

319 372 Syria's first match factory started production in Damascus in 1930. By 1952, six more had been built. Damascus has the three largest, Aleppo the other four. Supplies are drawn mostly from local timber, though some additional wood, as well as chemicals, is imported.

An improved layout of machines and the introduction of small conveyors would increase efficiency and assist in lowering costs.

Together the factories employ about 350 whole or part time workers. The three Damascus factories produced about 25.6 million boxes in 1952 and 32.2 million in 1953. Production figures for the Aleppo factories are not available. The importation of matches is prohibited.

Tobacco

277 655 A number of enterprises grade and prepare tobacco for export, but the manufacture and importation of cigarettes and tobacco has, since 1951, been confined to the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration.

The monopoly operates a cigarette factory in Damascus and one in Aleppo, and a factory in Latakia which manufactures and packs tobacco for retail sale. The tobacco for manufacture is partly Syrian (from the Latakia region) and partly imported. Cigarettes, tobacco and cigars are also imported from Europe and the United States.

The Damascus branch is in a new factory where tobacco is sorted, damped, stripped by hand only, and cut. The cigarettes are made on a number of old German machines and a few new American ones.

The tobacco monopoly employs 2,300 workers; total production of all three factories amounted to 2.7 million kg. in 1953.

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CHAPTER 5 *ELECTRIC POWER*

Existing Facilities

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Syria is rather poorly supplied with electric power. Out of a population of 3.6 million, only 1.4 million live in towns and villages supplied with electricity and of these only about half actually use it. While public utilities have been increasing their capacity over the last eight years at a mean annual rate of about 17%, their total installed capacity at the end of 1953 amounted to only 34,350 KW or 44,776 KVA.[24] Most of the newer factories have found it necessary to provide their own power facilities. The industrial power plants which the mission was able to record have a total capacity of 20,135 KW. Some of these plants are connected with the public utilities. In 1953 the power supplied by public utilities amounted to 119.8 million KWH; and Damascus and Aleppo together accounted for 81% of this total. In fact, there were only six towns in Syria where the power generated by public utilities in 1953 exceeded a million KWH. It may be roughly estimated that factories consumed about 43 million KWH of the power generated by their own plants. Thus the total supply of electricity during 1953—about 163 million KWH—was equivalent to only 46 KWH per inhabitant, an amount comparable to that in Turkey, but 41% of that in Lebanon and about half that in Algeria and French Morocco.

At present public utilities have great difficulty in meeting their peak load. No reserve capacity exists. In Aleppo and Damascus surcharges discourage power consumption during peak hours. Since many of the large industrial power consumers have their own power plants, the public utilities generate primarily for lighting. The latter accordingly cannot balance power requirements for industry and lighting and thus tend to have an exaggerated peak load, which increases the cost of power generation. Costs are further raised by the fact that generating units are below the capacity required for economical operation. It should also be noted that

[24] See Annex G, p. 410.

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nearly all of the power is produced by diesel units which are comparatively 377
expensive to operate. At the end of 1953 the public utilities had no steam 365
plant and only 14% of their capacity consisted of hydro plant. The geographic dispersion of cities and low power consumption has made anything approaching a national grid impossible. Only the cities of Homs and Hama are interconnected through the Ghajar hydro plant.

Future Requirements

In principle it would be desirable to provide for a considerable accelera- 377
tion of the rate at which the capacity of public utilities has been growing. The objectives of an expansion program should be to meet increasing power requirements, to permit factories gradually to shift to public utilities as a source of power, and to provide a margin as a reserve against breakdowns. Limitations on available resources, however, make it impossible to undertake a very ambitious program in the years immediately ahead. Capital must be carefully allocated. At this juncture in Syria's development, for example, it is more important to improve the water supply for communities and for agriculture than to provide more electricity for lighting.

In formulating its recommendations on power the mission has assumed in the first instance an expansion in the consumption of power supplied by public utilities at about the same rate as in the period 1949-53, namely an average annual increase of 14%. This would entail a rise in capacity from 44,776 KVA in 1953 to 106,000 KVA at the end of 1960. We consider, however, that a further increase of at least 25,000 KVA is necessary to provide a small reserve against breakdowns. This program does not specifically provide for a transfer of industrial power demand to the public utilities but, with the somewhat slower growth in industrial production which we anticipate, factories should be able to draw a little more on public utilities, at least in the off-peak hours.

Plants scheduled for completion in 1954 account for an additional capacity of 14,610 KVA. Among these are a 12,500 KVA steam plant for Damascus and a 1,350 KVA diesel plant in Homs. To meet the balance of the need, the mission recommends the installation of the following facilities by the end of 1960:

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Type and location of facility	Capacity (KVA)	Estimated cost (millions of £S)
For Damascus		
Deir Makaren and Hamch hydro plants	12,500	6.0
Souk Wadi Barada hydro plant	8,000	4.5
For Aleppo		
Steam plant	31,250	16.5
For Homs-Hama-Ghab area		
Diesel plant at Jisr ech Choghour	2,500	1.5
Diesel plant at Hama	2,500	1.5
Transmission line, Hama-Ghab-Jisr ech Choghour		3.0
For Latakia		
Diesel plant	2,500	1.5
Nahr el Kebir hydro plant	2,500	5.0
For Deir ez Zor		
Diesel plant	2,000	1.0
For small towns		
25 small diesel units	5,500	4.7
Improvements in existing plants and distribution	2,500	1.5
Total	71,750	46.7

If this program is completed, the public utilities will have a total capacity of about 130,000 KVA, of which about 21% will be hydro and approximately 33% steam power. The increase in the proportion of hydro and steam power should make possible some reduction in generating costs. It should be noted that the cost of this program—about £S 47 million—does not represent all of the expenditures on power for the period 1955-60. Some £S 14 million will also have to be found to compensate the foreign stockholders of the Aleppo and Damascus public utilities companies which were nationalized in 1951.

In this program the mission has not provided for the hydro plant that could ultimately be installed at the Youssef Pasha dam or for the hydro plants which might be established in connection with the development of the Ghab. With the installation of 75,000 KW capacity at Youssef Pasha, some 400 million KWH of firm power and 120 million KWH of secondary power could be generated. In the discussion of irrigation, however, the mission has already set forth the reasons for deferring this project, which ultimately should prove desirable. No provision has been made for the Ghab plants since these are due to be installed after 1960. Plans for the

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

ELECTRIC POWER IN SYRIA

Area	Present Capacity	Authorized or under Construction	Mission Program	Total KW 1960
DAMASCUS	23,000	7,000	10,000	40,000
ALEPPO	10,400	10,000	15,000	35,400
HOMS-HAMA	3,750		2,000	5,750
JISR ECH CHOGHOUR			2,000	2,000
LATAKIA	500		4,000	4,500
DEIR ES ZOR	840		1,500	2,340
SMALLER TOWNS AND VILLAGES	6,860		6,000	12,860
TOTAL	45,450	17,000	40,500 a/	102,950 b/

a/ 51,250 KVA. b/ 131,138

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377 development of the Ghab call for the eventual installation of four hydroelectric works with an aggregate capacity of 18,240 KVA. Two of these will be seasonal in their operation. In general the mission would question the advisability of hydro plants which are likely to furnish little firm power in relation to the installed capacity. For this reason, for example, the mission has omitted from the recommended program the project for a 3,125 KVA power plant which would operate for only a small part of the year on the water periodically drained from the Roudj.

Distribution of Additional Capacity

Most of the expansion must obviously take place in Damascus and Aleppo, which are the focal points of rising power demand. With the completion of the steam plant, the public utility in Damascus now has a capacity of 29,000 KVA. The Souk Wadi Barada hydro plant on which construction is beginning will raise this to 37,000 KVA by the end of 1955. While this may be enough to meet the peak load anticipated for 1960, the mission considers it advisable, particularly in view of the condition of the Damascus diesel plant, to provide some reserve capacity by installing hydro plants at the two dams at Hameh and Deir Makaren which the mission proposes should be constructed in any event to provide additional irrigation in the vicinity of Damascus. This appears to the mission a more economical solution than the addition of another unit to the new steam plant. The mission has not taken into account the plan to provide Damascus with power from a hydro plant to be installed on the Yarmuk river on the Syrian-Jordanian border. While a Syrian-Jordanian agreement provides for joint development of the Yarmuk river for power and irrigation, the plans have not yet reached an advanced stage. Moreover, the mission believes that the Yarmuk power may well be too costly in view of the need for transmission over a considerable distance and for a thermal plant to stabilize the power coming from this source.

In Aleppo power requirements have been growing more rapidly than in Damascus, and the power shortage is also more acute. Construction of a new steam plant of 12,500 KVA has just begun and will raise available capacity to around 27,500 KVA. Since the peak load anticipated for 1960 will probably require a capacity of 42,900 KVA, the mission believes it imperative that the new steam plant be expanded in two further stages to provide an additional capacity of 18,750 KVA.

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Latakia, which now has only an old diesel plant with a capacity of 800 KW, must have additional capacity to meet its rapidly growing requirements. The most immediate need can be met by the construction of a 2,500 KVA diesel plant. This can later be supplemented by the installation of a hydroelectric plant at the site of the dam on the Nahr el Kebir which the mission has recommended as part of the irrigation program. 377

Deir ez Zor, the center of the developing Euphrates river valley and the fifth largest city in the country, also urgently needs a new 2,000 KVA diesel plant. The existing plant has a capacity of only 915 KVA.

The reclamation of the Ghab will generate a considerable increase in general activity in that region and an attendant expansion of power requirements. To meet this need the mission suggests the installation of new diesel plants of 2,500 KVA each in both Hama and Jisr ech Choghour. It would be advisable to connect these plants with a transmission line running through the Ghab and capable of supplying power for construction throughout this area and for the villages en route. Jisr ech Choghour in particular will become the center of construction activity. The mission is aware that plans for the Ghab call for the installation of a 6,250 KVA hydroelectric works at this location. The power from this plant, however, will not be firm and is in any event not likely to become available soon. The mission considers therefore that a diesel plant which can be quickly constructed is necessary to meet the immediate requirements.

For the smaller towns and villages the mission has proposed only a modest program involving some improvements in existing plants to raise their capacity, and the installation of 25 small diesel units with an individual capacity of 200 or 250 KVA. The more rapid electrification of villages and small towns should, in our opinion, be postponed for the time being in favor of more urgent programs. 377 365

Government Direction and Supervision

To carry out the recommended expansion program it will be necessary to strengthen the Directorate of Electricity in the Ministry of Public Works. This directorate was established in 1953 to coordinate the development of electricity in Syria and supervise the construction and operation of power plants. The mission recommends that the directorate be provided with a staff of 10 trained engineers to enable it to carry out its functions adequately. Separate sections should be organized for the technical 377 447

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377 and administrative supervision of public utilities. Supervision ought to be
447 concentrated primarily on the utilities of the small towns and villages which are often substandard in their equipment and operation and are most in need of technical guidance in standardizing and improving their equipment. In addition to discharging its supervisory functions, the directorate should work out long-range plans, including a properly phased plan for the establishment of a power network which would be helpful in determining the location and size of power plants to be established in the future.

Electricity Rates[25]

365 As power production increases, there will no doubt be considerable
435 pressure to lower the rates now charged for electricity. The mission
655 encountered much complaint about their present level and structure. The rates charged for lighting in the principal cities do not, however, appear excessive by comparison with other countries. Electricity prices in the small towns and villages, on the other hand, are very high, but the generation of electricity by small diesel units and exclusively for lighting is inevitably rather expensive. The rates charged for electricity used as power are definitely higher than in many other countries. In Syria the power rates are often compared unfavorably with those in Lebanon in particular.

Nevertheless, the mission strongly advises against a general reduction of electricity rates over the next five or six years. An adequate supply of electricity is more important at this time than lower prices for electricity. The profits of the public utilities must be safeguarded so that the needed expansion program can be financed from their own resources. This is particularly true of the nationalized utilities of Damascus and Aleppo which have been earning considerable profits. With the anticipated increase in power generation and some reduction in costs of production, the mission anticipates that the net operating income of these utilities exclusive of depreciation allowances may reach a total of £S 60 million over the six-year period 1955-60. Most of this sum will be needed to finance expansion and pay the indemnities for nationalization. In this way the government will be able to conserve the resources derived from taxation and to borrow for other urgent requirements.

[25] See Annex G, p. 422.

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ANNEX G *NOTES ON ELECTRIC POWER*

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Energy Resources

Coal, oil and lignite resources are apparently lacking; and the calorific value of the small peat deposits is low and unutilizable. The potentialities of hydroelectric power are limited by the low volume and gradient of the rivers, the almost total absence of falls or rapids and the wide variations in seasonal flow. Only the Youssef Pasha site, on the Euphrates, has considerable possibilities for power generation. It is estimated that at this location there could be developed a firm power of 45,000 KW and a maximum of 90,000 KW. It is doubtful whether power potential on all other rivers together exceeds 60,000 KW, so that Syria's total estimated hydroelectric potential is approximately 150,000 KW—about the same as that of the Lebanese project of Litani alone.

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1 PUBLIC UTILITIES

Installed Capacity

In 1953 the installed power capacity was as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 Installed Power Capacity, 1953

	Installed power		Peak load
	KW	KVA	KW
Damascus	13,000	16,500	13,160
Aleppo	10,400	15,050	10,040
Homs-Hama	2,650	3,510	2,650
Latakia	800	1,000	800
Deir ez Zor	840	915	840
Small towns and villages	6,660	7,801	6,544
Total	34,350	44,776	34,034

These data indicate that the average load factor was 40%.[1]

[1] The load factor is the ratio of the average load in KW supplied during a designated period to the peak or maximum load occurring in that period.

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Power Generated

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The amount of power generated by the public utilities and bought by them from private plants during the last five years is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Power Generated and Purchased by Public Utilities, 1949–53

(*Million KWH*)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Damascus	31.55	35.25	36.91	40.19	47.58
Aleppo	25.74	33.47	36.36	43.05	49.14
Homs-Hama	9.36	10.33	11.07	12.60	13.71
Latakia	1.02	1.21	1.50	1.75	2.25
Deir ez Zor	0.86	0.94	1.06	1.25	1.54
Small towns and villages	1.81	2.81	3.67	4.46	5.63
Total	70.34	84.01	90.57	103.30	119.85

Breakdown of Supply and Consumption 377

The distribution of power consumption by various uses and the total power supply are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Supply and Consumption of Electricity

(*Million KWH*)

Principal public utilities[a]	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Light	17.89	22.27	27.90	33.70	37.82	44.25	52.04
Power	15.30	18.42	22.28	27.64	28.47	31.44	36.43
Traction	4.11	4.16	4.23	4.19	3.99	4.10	4.32
Losses and miscellaneous	9.74	11.31	14.22	15.76	16.52	19.00	21.45
Total	47.04	56.16	68.63	81.28	86.80	98.79	114.24
Private industrial plants[b]	3.6	5.0	7.2	10.0	15.0	n.a.	n.a
Estimated total supply in Syria	57.0	70.0	85.0	95.0	105.0	n.a.	n.a.

[a] Including power purchased from private plants.
[b] Excluding power sold.

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377 Table 4 shows actual increases for the years 1947-52 and 1947-53.

It should be noted that consumption of electricity for lighting has risen more rapidly than that for power. Owing to this factor and the installation of additional equipment, the peak load has risen and the load factor has declined. This is particularly true of the small towns and villages where electricity is consumed almost exclusively for lighting.

TABLE 4 Increases in Power Consumption

(*Percent*)

	1947 to 1952		1947 to 1953	
	Total	Yearly average	Total	Yearly average
Light	147.3	19.9	190.9	19.5
Power	105.5	15.5	138.1	15.5
Losses and miscellaneous	95.2	14.3	120.5	14.1
Total	110.0	16.0	140.9	15.7

377 655 *Investment in Public Utilities*

No accurate data are available on the sources of financing during the period 1946-54, but it seems that before the Nationalization Law of 1951 the large power companies financed their development projects from their own resources and with foreign capital, whereas the government helped the smaller municipalities and villages with loans. Since 1950 progress has depended exclusively on government financing and the current revenues and accumulated resources of the power companies, but it is difficult to trace in the total loans to municipalities those amounts actually used for power development. The list of loans made by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban with the authorization of the government during the last five years includes a specific loan of £S 10 million allocated to public utilities, and the financial statements of the Damascus and Aleppo public utilities each mention loans to £S 7 million, although in the latter case the loan was for all four of the utilities' operating branches—electric power, water supply, streetcars and buses.

Moreover, although in addition to the equipment purchased abroad, a

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quantity of used and army surplus equipment was utilized in the smaller towns and villages, complete records of these operations are not available. 377 655

The best assessment the mission can make of power investment in Syria is to start with the conservative cost estimate of £S 450 per KVA for diesel-driven sets, and £S 7.5 million for the only steam plant in Syria with transmission lines and transformer stations. On this basis the cost of the 46,000 KVA of the former and 12,500 KVA of the latter, added to £S 1 million for the Amir Ghajar hydro turbine generators and £S 2 million for development of the networks, give a figure of about £S 25 million. This should, however, be taken as an indication of the order of magnitude rather than as an approximation of actual investment.

II INDUSTRIAL POWER 377

A statement of present and expected power consumption in the leading Syrian industries is necessary for an assessment of the anticipated power requirements of the country as a whole. The factories discussed below rely mainly upon their private power supplies, a situation which is likely to change somewhat as additional public utility projects are completed.

Cement

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The two cement factories at Damascus and Aleppo are among the most important industrial power consumers. In 1953 their output was 171,000 and 72,000 tons, respectively; it is expected that output will rise to 253,000 and 150,000 tons by 1955. At an average consumption rate of 90 KWH per ton, this total of 403,000 tons would require about 36 million KWH.

To meet the 1953 demand for about 22 million KWH the two factories had plants of 4,600 and 3,000 KW capacity, respectively. The Damascus factory, unlike that in Aleppo, is connected with the public utilities network, thus permitting the future transfer of cheap hydroelectric power from the projected Barada plant. The Aleppo plant may insure itself against a breakdown of its own equipment through a link with the steam plant now under construction, but as soon as cheap hydro power becomes available from the Youssef Pasha project, it can be assumed that the factory will turn to the public utilities network for at least part of its power requirements.

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Textiles

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The entire output of yarn is spun in the large factories but almost half the cloth produced is woven on hand looms.[2] It is estimated that on a basis of 1.3 KWH per kilogram for spinning and 1.0 KWH per kilogram for weaving, the total power requirements of mechanized textile plants approximate 21.1 million KWH annually.

Most of the large factories (with one important exception) generate their own power from their total installed capacities of 2,200 KW in Damascus and 2,500 KW in Aleppo. This is more than adequate for the demands of the larger spinning and weaving factories, estimated at 15.8 million KWH, though some plants do in fact purchase some power—to the extent of about 2.6 million KWH—from the public utilities network. On the assumption that the power used by the small factories is drawn wholly from municipal supplies, the total power consumption of 21.1 million KWH for textile spinning and weaving is furnished by private plants to the extent of 13.2 million KWH, and by the public utilities to the extent of 7.9 million KWH. The 6.6 thousand tons of cloth at present woven on hand looms may be regarded as a potential power demand for 6.6 million KWH from the public utilities, giving an aggregate potential demand by textiles for a minimum of 27.7 million KWH, of which 14.5 million KWH would be supplied by the public utilities.

It is expected that the textile industry will continue to expand, though possibly at a slower rate, requiring about 2 million additional KWH by 1960.

Ginning

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In 1953 about 50,000 tons of lint were produced and ginned in Syria. With an average power consumption of 100 KWH per ton of cotton ginned and baled, this would require about 5 million KWH.

Four-fifths of the gins are located in Aleppo, the remainder being in Homs, Idlib, Latakia and Damascus. The most important ginning factory in Aleppo has its own power plant with a capacity of 1,500 KW, but the majority of the other plants have recourse to the public network. It can be assumed that about half the total required power is supplied by private plants and half by the public utilities.

[2] 1952 production: yarn, 9,000–10,000 tons; cloth, 14,000–15,000 tons.

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An increase of about 60% in cotton production is expected by 1960, but present power capacity appears adequate to meet this expansion. 377 248

Glass

The Damascus glass factory owns a 600-KW power plant. The total productive capacity of the factory is about 43 tons of glass per day; in 1953 about 3,000 tons of glass were actually produced, representing about 70 days output at full capacity. If a consumption of about 100 KWH per ton of glass is assumed then the generated power in 1953 would have been about 0.3 million KWH. 377 323

Cold Storage

A cold storage plant in Damascus has a 500-KW power plant interconnected with the public utilities network. It can be assumed that about half of the approximately 2 million KWH required annually is supplied by the public utilities and half by the factory's plant. 377 254

Oil Mills

Two Aleppo oil mills have private power plants, the larger with a capacity of 1,200 KW, the smaller with 300 KW. These factories work only about 150 days per year (say six days per week during six months). With one-third of the capacity in reserve and an assumed load factor as low as 10% the power generated per year would be about 1.5 million KWH. 377 388

Flour Mill

A flour mill in Aleppo has a 400-KW plant. With a utilization of two-thirds of the capacity for 6,000 hours the power generated would be about 1.2 million KWH. 377 256

Sugar

In 1953 the Homs sugar factory processed 7,000 tons of sugar from beets and refined 22,000 tons from raw sugar. Power required for the former 377 257

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377 was stated to average 72 KWH per ton (this is very low compared with 257 the 120-150 KWH generally required for this process); power for refining would not exceed 20 KWH per ton. The factory's 2,000 KW steam generators are interconnected with the public utilities network, allowing about 250 KW to be supplied or received according to the relative needs and availabilities in the two systems.

The above figures on beet and raw sugar processing indicate (at 72 and 20 KWH per ton respectively) that some one million KWH were generated for these purposes in 1953, exclusive of power supplied to the Homs-Hama network.

It is anticipated that sugar beet extraction will increase from 7,000 tons to some 20,000 tons by 1960, requiring an additional one million KWH.

Dyeing

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The Hama dyeing plant's 435 KW generators are not connected with the public utilities network. The power generated by this plant in 1953 is estimated at about 0.6 million KWH.

Conclusion

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The power generated by private factory power plants in 1953, equal to about one-third of that generated in the plants of the public utilities, was therefore distributed approximately as follows:

	Million KWH
Cement factories	22.0
Textile factories	13.2
Ginning factories	2.5
Glass factory	0.3
Cold storage plant	1.0
Oil mills	1.5
Flour mills	1.2
Sugar factory	1.0
Dyeing factory	0.6
Total	43.3

Future power requirements will be largely conditioned by the development of the cement, textile and beet industries, for which, as indicated

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above, additional power to the extent of approximately 14.2 and one million KWH respectively will probably be needed. The other industries specified are not expected to need substantial additional amounts of power. 377

On these assumptions the output of the private power plants would need to increase from about 43 million KWH to some 60 million KWH by 1960, but it is more than likely that at least part of the necessary increase will in fact be drawn from the public utilities network.

III THE MISSION'S PROGRAM

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The period 1949-53 showed a mean annual increase of 14.2% in the generation of public power. The actual percentage of increase over the preceding years was as follows:

1950	1951	1952	1953
19.4	7.8	14	16.2

The figure for 1951 reflects the effec on Syrian industry of the cotton crisis. Taking all factors into account, it would not be unreasonable to expect a continued average yearly increase of 14% between 1953 and 1960. On this basis about 300 million KWH would be generated in 1960 and since the load factor is not expected to improve, the peak load would probably be about 85,000 KW, requiring a minimum installed capacity of some 106,000 KVA. This means that some 60,000 KVA must be added to the approximately 45,000 KVA (34350 KW) presently available plus a reserve of 20-25%.

It is believed that in 1945 there was a total installed capacity of about 13,000 KVA, able to generate 10,400 KW, During the eight succeeding years the increase was about 31,776 KVA, or 23,950 KW—an increase of some 245% or an average rate of 17% per year. Although this has not been sufficient to keep pace with rising consumption demands, it would lead to a total installation of 130,000 KVA if continued until 1960. This would give a margin of 23% over the anticipated minimum peak load for that year, which should be quite satisfactory for a country where there is practically no interconnecting network and where a large number of small generators is the rule (e.g., 18 in Damascus for an installed power of 16,500 KVA, and seven in Aleppo for 15,000 KVA). On the principle that

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371 each network should have in reserve a capacity equal to that of the largest
377 generator, Syria's present reserve requirements would total about 10,000 KVA, equal to 22% of total installed power. The reserve requirements have not been met in the past, although the situation will be greatly improved by the addition of the 14,610 KVA scheduled to start operating during 1954.

Damascus

In the Damascus area the annual increase in consumption has averaged only 10.8% over the last five years. It seems, therefore, that the peak load is unlikely to exceed 30,000 KW by 1960. This would call for a capacity of about 37,000 KVA, compared with the 16,500 KVA installed at present. The new Hameh steam plant, due to start operating at the end of 1954, would raise present capacity to 29,000 KVA and when the Souk Wadi Barada hydroelectric plant is completed in 1956 total installed power will be 37,000 KVA. In view of the fact that the Damascus diesel plant is 22 years old, the mission recommends that additional capacity of about 12,500 KVA (10,000 KW) be added to provide an adequate reserve.

There are three possible ways to provide the additional capacity. One is to install an extra set of 12,500 KVA in the new Hameh steam plant. Another is to construct new hydroelectric plants; and a third is presented by the possibility that a beginning will shortly be made on the Yarmuk power project by the Jordan Government, in which case, under the terms of an agreement with Jordan, Syria would receive 5,000 KW annually in return for an investment of 5% of the cost of the project. But to supply the balance of 5,000 KW to meet the needs of Damascus would require the installation of an additional set of 5,000 KW in the Hameh steam plant and the laying of a transmission line to the Yarmuk plant. This would cost about £S 15 million and would be the most expensive of the three choices. Of the remaining alternatives, the mission considers construction of hydroelectric plants preferable, since the need is for peak power rather than a large and steady output. Elsewhere the mission has recommended construction of reservoirs for irrigation purposes at Deir Makaren and Hameh, and it recommends that hydroelectric plants with a capacity of 10,000 KW be located at these two points, thus harnessing the power which can be developed on the Barada by construction of the two dams.

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These plants would supplement the Souk Wadi Barada project. They should cost only about £S 6 million. 371 377

Aleppo

Aleppo's consumption has grown far more speedily than that of Damascus. It is estimated that by 1960 the peak load in the Aleppo area will be about 32,175 KW, requiring an installed capacity of about 42,900 KVA.

The present installed capacity of 15,000 KVA is 27,900 KVA short of the 1960 target. Since construction of the Youssef Pasha hydroelectric plant will start as soon as funds become available, making it inadvisable to over-equip Aleppo with thermal plants, no provision was made for a reserve.

The mission recommends the installation in the new steam plant not only of the first stage of 12,500 KVA, but of a second stage of 12,500 KVA and eventually a third stage of 6,250 KVA. The total cost of the second and third stages would be around £S 9 million. Some difficulties might arise toward 1960 but conditions should not be worse than at present. If consumption develops in the manner anticipated, profits from the steam plant will be large enough to give the Youssef Pasha project an earlier start.

We have considered the proposal that the additional thermal plant be located at Homs rather than Aleppo and that a transmission line be built to link such a plant with Aleppo. It has been argued that a plant at this location would provide standby and "peaking" capacity for both Aleppo and Damascus when Syria's hydroelectric resources, including those at Youssef Pasha, are developed and a national grid can be constructed. In addition, fuel oil at Homs would be cheaper and a more plentiful and cheaper supply of water would be available. While the arguments in favor of Homs appear persuasive, we have nevertheless recommended that the plant be built at Aleppo. It would be rather risky to erect a power station at a distance of 190 kilometers from the city it is designed to serve. Moreover, the losses in transmission plus the annual charges on the transmission line, which is likely to require an investment of £S 7 million, will probably offset the economies in operating costs resulting from the establishment of the plant at Homs.

Homs-Hama and the Ghab

The Homs-Hama area is important as the nucleus of a future inter-

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371 377 connecting network which would extend over a large part of Syria. In particular, it is expected that construction of the Ghab irrigation project will soon lead to increased activity in the area of Hama.

In the general area of Homs-Hama and the Ghab, several hydroelectric plants are proposed by the government, but none is scheduled to be begun before 1960. Even the dismantling of Amir Ghajar, which would be flooded by the Rastane dam, and its relocation at the foot of Rastane, is not scheduled to start before 1962. Most of these hydroelectric plants could operate only when water is not needed for irrigation and would therefore need to be supplemented by thermal plants of equal capacity. This is also true of the Roudj hydro plant and the Rastane siphon and hydro plant. Such projects are economical only when they can be connected with a well-developed grid system. The Homs Lake hydroelectric plant would at least have the eight cubic meters per second available to the Rastane plant even in the dry season, but the head is very low and the amount of power generated is therefore not very significant. Moreover, the mission's proposal for the Ghab area would lead to an increase of power for the Homs-Hama area. Accordingly, these projects have not been included in the mission's program.

With respect to the Ghab, the mission has the following comments. The area of Jisr ech Choghour, because of its location at the outlet of the Ghab valley and on the main road from Latakia to the interior of Syria, will probably develop rapidly during the next few years. During the construction of the Ghab project it will be a supply center and a suitable site for repair shops and material storage for the contractors. This development would be facilitated if Jisr ech Choghour were provided with adequate power and the ability to transmit part of it along the Ghab valley to supply the villages and construction contractors. This would entail the installation in Jisr ech Choghour of an adequate power plant and a transmission line along the Ghab valley to Hama, where it would connect with the Homs-Hama transmission network. Further, because of the length of the interconnection, it would be necessary to build in Hama a second power plant of about the same capacity to ensure stability. The construction of the hydroelectric plant of Jisr ech Choghour was postponed for the reason that it would have been unable to provide enough firm power. The mission recommends that diesel plants with a capacity of about 2,000 KVA each be built in Jisr ech Choghour and Hama and that a transmission line be run between these plants via Karkour, Kalaat el Moudiq, Acharneh and

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Maharda. Each of the diesel plants would cost about £S 1.5 million and the transmission line would cost £S 3 million. 371 377

Latakia

The proposed construction of an improved harbor will accelerate the development of Latakia. To meet resultant increased power demands, the mission supports the immediate construction of a diesel power plant in Latakia with an installed capacity of 2,500 KVA as first stage, at a cost of £S 1.5 million. Elsewhere the mission recommends the construction of a multi-purpose reservoir on the Nahr el Kebir for flood control, power, water supply and irrigation. For these reasons, the construction of the Nahr el Kebir power plant is included in the mission's program with an equipment of 2,500 KVA as first stage, at a cost of £S 5 million. These figures are approximate because the studies of this project have not yet been completed and therefore no accurate data are available.

Deir ez Zor

The growth of Deir ez Zor will follow upon the agricultural development of the lower Euphrates valley. In this town the mission supports the immediate construction of a diesel plant with an installed power of 2,000 KVA at a cost of about £S 1 million for the first stage.

Other Areas

It can be assumed that even at a conservative estimate consumption by the 49 smaller towns and villages which now have electricity will increase at the rate of at least 15% per annum, requiring the generation of about 16 million KWH by 1960. In view of the fact that the peak load already utilizes the full power capacity, additional equipment will be needed to meet the demand.

The mission therefore supports the program for the construction in the small towns and villages of 25 new networks, 10 with an installed power of 285 HP each and 15 with 225 HP, aggregating about 5,500 KVA; total cost would be £S 4.7 million. The mission also recommends the installation of about 2,500 KVA at a cost of approximately £S 1.5 million to carry on the program of improving existing utilities.

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IV ELECTRICITY TARIFFS

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As stated in the Main Report, tariffs for electricity used for lighting of houses and shops are not excessive, except in the small towns. They range from about 16 to 25 piasters per KWH, *or* about 4.5 to 7.0 U. S. cents;[3] in the small towns they are on the high side of the range and are said to be as high as 50 piasters per KWH in some places. Sometimes the tariff takes the form of a uniform charge. In Damascus, however, the tariff was until recently on a downward sliding scale, the charge varying inversely with consumption; since 1953 it has been on a two-step progressive basis, the heavier consumers paying more. The change in tariff structure was made as a protection against an exaggerated peak load but has had the unfortunate effect of discouraging use of electrical appliances by small consumers. While such a policy may be justified as long as demand exceeds supply, as soon as installed power measures up to demand the Damascus tariff policy should be revised to encourage domestic consumption.

Charges for electricity for power vary with the area, the subscribed power and the consumed power. The range is between 4.66 and 18 piasters per KWH, the low rate of 4.66 piasters applying only to high utilization of subscribed power in the area of Homs-Hama where there is a hydroelectric plant. The average rate is between 10 and 12 piasters per KWH. Surcharges are imposed on consumption during peak hours. To all these rates, a municipal tax of 10% is generally added.

These rates are high compared with charges in other countries. Table 5 compares the rates paid by an Aleppo industrial consumer with those paid by comparable consumers elsewhere.[4]

Many Syrian consumers complain about the cost of electricity in comparison to the lower rates applicable in neighboring countries in general and in Lebanon in particular. The mission is not in a position to judge whether the basis on which charges are fixed in Lebanon is sound. However, Lebanon has the advantages of a hydroelectric power output equal to more than half of the total power supply (compared with less than 25%

[3] Prices of electricity (in U. S. cents per KWH) for monthly lighting consumption of 15 KWH (1951): New York, 6.33; Zurich, 8.15; Paris, 4.65; London, 5.80; and Colombo, 8.30. (SOURCE: International Bank's Mission to Ceylon.)

[4] Rates for other countries are at the 1951 level.

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in Syria), proximity of most of the thermal stations to pipeline outlets, and a well-developed consumption pattern operating from an interconnecting national grid. Some of these favorable conditions will be present in Syria in due course, although the handicap of limited natural resources will remain. The fact that many power users are unsatisfactory consumers, in that they provide a very low load factor, also contributes to high power costs in Syria. The most extreme illustration is provided by seasonal industries, such as ginning, which require large investments in power capacity for only a few months' consumption each year. In such cases the return would be very poor if power were sold at specially low rates for so limited a period.

TABLE 5 Comparative Industrial Power Rates

(*U.S. cents per KWH*)

	30 KW, 200 hours per month	300 KW, 250 hours per month
New York	4.19	2.40
Aleppo	2.53	2.22
Zurich	2.35	1.27
London	1.79	1.59
Colombo	1.80	1.30

According to the profit and loss accounts provided by the public utilities of Damascus and Aleppo, the gross return per KWH sold in 1953 was 13.6 piasters in Damascus and 12.8 piasters in Aleppo. The costs of operation of the power plants, including maintenance and repairs but excluding financial charges, were 3.18 piasters per KWH for Damascus and 4.82 piasters for Aleppo. The lower figure for Damascus is due mainly to the fact that about one-third of all power is generated in hydroelectric plants, but also to the higher efficiency of the diesel equipment. The operating costs in the hydro plants are only about 0.4 piasters per KWH sold, compared with 4.5 piasters in the diesel plants. Moreover, in the diesel plants fuel represented about 66% of the total operating cost in Damascus and 78% in Aleppo. The price of fuel oil and the efficiency of the diesel generator sets are therefore very material factors in the final price of electricity produced in thermal plants.

According to the accounts, the total costs per KWH sold and distributed were 7.25 piasters per KWH for Damascus and 5.35 piasters for

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365 377 Aleppo. This would mean that distribution costs would amount to 4.07 piasters per KWH in Damascus and only 0.53 piasters in Aleppo (excluding financial charges). This large difference can be partly explained by the fact that the personnel expenditures for Aleppo are exclusive of clerical and management personnel, while on the other hand the figure of £S 1.2 million quoted for Damascus is probably too high. One of the difficulties is that clerks and management personnel are common to the several activities of the public utilities—power, streetcars and water supply in Damascus, and power, streetcars, buses and water supply in Aleppo.

According to the accounts, the 1953 gross profit of the Damascus electric utilities was £S 2.4 million and £S 2.75 million for those in Aleppo, although the facts with respect to personnel costs would indicate that the true Damascus figure is higher and that of Aleppo lower. In any case these are large returns for the two public utilities even if the actual value of each were as high as £S 10 million. Not only are these public utilities self-supporting but they are able to finance at least part of the projected development schemes, a factor which has led the mission to recommend no reduction in power tariffs as long as large capital investment is needed.

As the proposed program gets under way, the replacement of diesel by steam plants will reduce the cost of fuel by about one piaster per KWH sold, since the cost of gas oil is about £S 103 per ton, compared with about £S 60 per ton for fuel oil, taking into account the decrease in efficiency. Therefore, pending completion of the Youssef Pasha project, earnings in the Aleppo area would not exceed one piaster per KWH, even when the steam plant is able to generate the bulk of the needed power.

In Damascus the increase in earnings resulting from the power development program would be about the same as in Aleppo. While savings realized by the shift from diesel to steam power would be less because the plant to be displaced in Damascus is more efficient than that in Aleppo, large economies would flow from the shift to hydroelectric power. But a large reduction in the cost of electricity for Syria as a whole can be expected only after completion of the main hydroelectric projects and construction of an interconnecting network based on the line Youssef Pasha-Aleppo.

الانتاج

مقدار القوة الكهربائية المنتجة والباعة من قبل اهم شركات الكهرباء في الجمهورية السورية (بالوف الكيلووات الساعي)

ELECTRIC ENERGY GENERATED AND SOLD BY THE PRINCIPAL ELECTRICITY COMPANIES ('000 KWH)

Table No. 18 — جدول رقم ١٨

Year and Month	الكمية المنتجة Energy Generated	Energy Sold for الكمية الباعة: Traction	Industry	Lighting	Total	الشهور والسنة
1947	47,039	4,112	15,302	17,890	37,304	١٩٤٧
1948	56,180	4,163	18,420	22,268	44,851	١٩٤٨
1949	66,625	4,234	22,278	27,898	54,410	١٩٤٩
1950	81,279	4,188	27,639	33,696	65,523	١٩٥٠
1951	86,801	3,903	28,465	37,823	70,291	١٩٥١
1952	96,781	4,089	31,442	44,248	79,780	١٩٥٢
1953	114,238	4,318	36,431	52,042	92,781	١٩٥٣
1951						١٩٥١
January	8,076	332	2,791	3,604	6,727	كانون ثاني
February	6,891	304	2,494	3,265	6,063	شباط
March	7,017	343	2,150	2,896	5,390	آذار
April	6,535	327	2,131	3,001	5,459	نيسان
July	6,636	340	2,005	2,878	5,223	ايار
June	6,907	345	2,223	2,980	5,548	حزيران
July	6,808	357	2,216	3,128	5,701	تموز
August	6,911	343	2,346	2,668	5,356	آب
September	6,956	332	2,347	2,970	5,649	ايلول
October	7,416	326	2,455	3,266	6,047	تشرين اول
November	7,906	325	2,456	3,402	6,184	تشرين ثاني
December	8,740	320	2,851	3,765	6,936	كانون اول
1952						١٩٥٢
January	8,651	319	2,603	4,043	6,965	كانون ثاني
February	7,475	307	2,329	3,720	6,356	شباط
March	7,622	335	2,202	3,512	6,049	آذار
April	7,302	328	2,269	3,404	6,001	نيسان
May	7,820	344	2,542	3,260	6,146	ايار
June	7,709	342	2,586	3,568	6,496	حزيران
July	7,940	354	2,616	3,419	6,389	تموز
August	8,032	359	2,707	3,396	6,462	آب
September	7,981	352	2,676	3,585	6,613	ايلول
October	8,827	362	2,685	3,665	6,712	تشرين اول
November	9,229	336	3,033	4,162	7,531	تشرين ثاني
December	10,395	361	3,194	4,514	8,069	كانون اول

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PRODUCTION.

مقدار القوة الكهربائية المنتجة والمباعة من قبل اهم شركات الكهرباء في الجمهورية السورية (بالوف الكيلووات الساعي)

ELECTRIC ENERGY GENERATED AND SOLD BY THE PRINCIPAL ELECTRICITY COMPANIES ('000 KWH)

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Table No. 18 (concld.) جدول رقم ١٨ (التتمة)

Year and Month	الكمية المنتجة Energy Generated	Energy sold for الكمية المباعة				الشهور والسنة
		المواصلات Trans	الصناعة Industry	الانارة Lighting	المجموع Total	
1953						١٩٥٣
January	10,151	351	3,456	4,773	8,580	كانون ثاني
February	8,594	330	2,976	4,608	7,914	شباط
March	9,110	365	2,591	4,060	7,016	آذار
April	8,294	347	2,789	4,110	7,246	نيسان
May	8,902	362	2,616	3,787	6,765	ايار
June	8,605	362	2,899	4,123	7,384	حزيران
July	9,042	369	2,674	4,111	7,154	تموز
August	9,015	368	2,955	3,858	7,181	آب
September	8,852	360	2,729	4,248	7,337	ايلول
October	10,485	364	3,246	4,344	7,954	تشرين اول
November	11,016	359	3,720	4,728	8,807	تشرين ثاني
December	11,852	381	3,780	5,292	9,453	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of
234 coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at re-afforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2*.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI

generators and new hydro-electric schemes are planned to increase the output. The Belgian company operating the tramways and electricity in Damascus and the French electricity company of Aleppo were nationalized in 1951. Consumption of industrial fuel oils has increased greatly since the war and the continuance of this increase shows that Syrian industry is still growing. Under the French Mandate, Syria did not attempt to produce goods for export, but since 1945 some Syrian financiers have tried to build up industries depending for success on overseas sales that have not, however, materialized. Industries based on local needs are likely to be the most successful because the cost of materials and labour are too high for Syria to sell competitively finished goods for which she has to import the raw materials.

The textile industry is the most important, despite a setback in 1950 and 1951 when faced with foreign competition; the industry is well managed and well equipped and employs 20,000 people in Aleppo and Damascus. In 1950 there were about 65,000 spindles for cotton in these two cities, as well as 12,000 handlooms and 3,600 power looms, with an output of 5,000 tons of yarn and 21 million metres of fabric.[1] Silk is woven on hand looms (about 60,000 metres of cloth), but there are mechanical looms for rayon (about 27 million metres) and nylon knitting-machines. Large dye-houses and many small establishments in Damascus and Homs serve the local textile industry. Production of woollen cloth rose to about 542,000 metres in 1948, since when it has declined, although it meets all local needs.

In Homs a Syrian firm has a group of modern plants including a sugar refinery (output 10,000 tons in 1951), an alcohol distillery (363 tons in 1951), and an oil extraction plant. But the refinery depends on imported raw sugar and only protection and a high retail price maintain it, nor is it yet certain that the Homs sugar will compete in price with imported refined sugar even if local beet production, which is being expanded, is used for refining. The cement factory near Damascus was extended in 1951 and now produces about 60,000 tons a year, and a new plant in Aleppo is on the way to producing 70,000 tons a year. There are many oil and soap factories of which the biggest, in Aleppo, can produce thirty tons a day. About 20,000 tons of asphalt, 1,449 million cigarettes, and 69,000 tons of tobacco are also produced near Latakia. Near Damascus

[1] Many of the statistics in this section have been obtained from UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2* and other recent UN Surveys of the Middle East.

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433 The building industry expanded considerably during the post-war period.
339 Authorized floor space in new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945, to 209,000 in 1950 and 265,000 in 1953. Output of cement rose
323 correspondingly, from 35,000 tons in 1945 to 68,000 in 1950, 224,000 in 1953 and 114,000 tons during the first half of 1954. This fully meets local demand. A glass factory, with a capacity of 10,000 tons, established in the post-war period, reached a maximum production of 5,500 tons in 1954; it exports small amounts to neighbouring countries.

377 Output of electricity showed little increase during the war, but after the
471 war demand rose rapidly. The inability of the foreign concessionary companies operating in Damascus and Aleppo to expand capacity sufficiently fast led the Government, in 1951, to nationalize them, for compensation, and to instal
433 additional equipment; 1/ in 1954, the Homs-Hama electricity company was also nationalized. Output by public utilities has risen considerably in recent years, from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 81 million in 1950, 114 million in 1953 and 80 million in the first eight months of 1954; output by industrial power plants is probably over 40 million kilowatt-hours per annum.

433 Other important industries include tanning, and the making of matches, cardboard, soap, nails, pins and plastics.

433 Government assistance to industry has taken four main forms: tariff protection, tax exemption, financial aid and regulation of standards and prices.
656 In the early post-war years foreign competition weighed heavily on the Syrian market. The ending of the customs union with Lebanon in 1950 (see below) led to a decrease in competition in some industries, notably spinning; but other industries, such as weaving and canning, which marketed a substantial proportion of their output in Lebanon, suffered. In recent years, protection has been greatly increased by the raising of customs duties on competing goods 2/ or by prohibiting the importing of such goods: among the prohibited articles were matches, soap, shoes, socks and stockings, glass products, canned fruits and vegetables, wooden furniture and alcoholic drinks. These measures seem to have greatly decreased foreign competition; nevertheless, in recent years, prices of local manufactures have tended to decline. 3/

1/ Between the autumn of 1951 and the end of 1953, a total capacity of 6,450 kilowatts was installed in Damascus (Al Manar, special issue on Syrian industry, Damascus 1954); a total of £S 9.5 million was advanced by the Government to the nationalized firms for expansion and improvements. At the end of 1953, the total capacity of public utilities was 34,000 kilowatts and that of industrial power plants was over 20,000 kilowatts. Two plants with a capacity of 17,000 kilowatts were scheduled for completion at the end of 1954.

2/ For example, in 1952, duties on several types of woollen and cotton goods were raised by 25 to 50 per cent.

3/ The index of wholesale prices of domestic industrial products rose from 93 in 1950 (1949 = 100) to 111 in 1951, but declined to 103 in 1952, 88 in 1953 and 79 in the first nine months of 1954.

SYRIA MDI

Latakia, is to irrigate 5,000 hectares at a cost of £S 2.6 million; the scheme should be completed by the end of 1955. Projects under study include a scheme on the Barada River, near Damascus, to irrigate 5,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 1[illegible],000 kilowatts, at a total estimated cost of £S 12 million; the Yusif Pasha dam, on the Euphrates, which would extend irrigation by 100,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 45,000 kilowatts, at an estimated cost of £S 150 million; and a small multi-purpose project on the Nahir River, north of Latakia. 652 241 312

The most important project under way is that on the Ghab, on the Orontes north of Hama. The objective is to reclaim by drainage some 26,000 hectares of land and to irrigate by gravity a total area of 65,000 hectares, 43,000 of which had not been irrigated before.

The project also includes the building of four hydroelectric stations, with a capacity of 20,600 kilowatts and an estimated annual output of 80 million kilowatt hours; a thermic generator with a capacity of 9,500 kilowatts; and 700 kilometres of roads. Total costs, exclusive of electric installations, are estimated at £S 140 million, of which £S 45 million are for drainage, £S 55 million for irrigation and £S 37 million for roads and bridges. The hydroelectric plants are estimated to cost another £S 17 million and the thermic plant £S 7.6 million. The Government expects to recover its outlay on the scheme by selling, for an estimated £S 150 million, 30,000 hectares of land which it owns in the region and by levying a small irrigation fee. The scheme is expected to raise gross agricultural income by £S 91 million and net income by £S 78 million. Completion is scheduled for 1960. 1/ 652 312 3770 241

The Ghab Project Administration was established in 1951, and in 1953 it was authorized to borrow £S 25 million from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, at 2 per cent interest. A firm of Netherlands consultants, hired by the Government to prepare an over-all plan for the Ghab, presented its report in May 1953. In September 1953 a contract was awarded to a Yugoslav firm for the deepening of the Orontes channel, at a cost of £S 3.3 million. It is expected that contracts for other parts of the project will be awarded soon.

The total area of irrigation projects recently completed or approaching completion is 57,000 hectares and that of schemes planned but not yet begun is 278,000. The total irrigable area, including that at present irrigated, is estimated at 750,000 hectares. 2/.

The total cultivable area in Syria is put at 5 million hectares, of which one million are at present not cultivated, while 1.6 million are left fallow each year under the prevailing triennial rotation. Present plans call for intensifying production by using leguminous crops to replace the period of fallow, 311

1/ "The Ghab Project", by Abdel Basit Khatib, Director General of the Ghab Project Administration (mimeographed document, Damascus, October 25, 1954). See also Abdel Basit Khatib Mashru al Ghab (Damascus, October 1953).

2/ Soubhi Wasloum, "Les Irrigations en Syrie", Annual Bulletin of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1953, and "Al mashari al mia fi Suria", Al Hayat, 31 July 1954 (Beirut).

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

241 except wheat and barley, and around each village is an area of irrigated land on which vegetables, fruit, cotton, maize, fodder, and grain are grown. The configuration of the ground and the peculiar properties of the marl make possible the use of subsurface water for irrigation, and past and present inhabitants have taken full advantage of these conditions.

312 [406 379] Water is distributed to irrigation ditches from wells, surface watercourses, or *foggaras* (foqqaras).[3] It is lifted from wells either by pumps or by chains of buckets geared to an animal-turned wheel. From wadis which have water in part of their course for some or all of the growing season it is taken by a gravity canal. The stream is roughly dammed and the water led, at a gentler angle than that of the watercourse, along the valley side until it reaches a suitable level for watering the ground below. Neither of these methods is of great importance as compared with foggaras, which supply most of the irrigated lands of the area.

A foggara, known elsewhere as *qanat*, *kariz*, or "chain of wells," is an underground conduit. The method has been used since ancient times in many parts of the Middle East. Foggaras are found in several regions of Syria and are especially numerous in the Selemiya region. Figure 4 shows the general principle by which the water-bearing layer is tapped by the gallery or subsurface canal. The most copious supplies of water are provided when the canal is driven back from a spring along the underground "stream" that feeds it. A depression that is a natural gathering ground of water is often utilized, or a wide area may be tapped by the construction of several converging galleries, as in Moufaqqar. The gradient of the gallery is sufficient to induce water flow, but it is less steep than the general slope of the ground, so that water is conducted gradually to the surface, usually to low-lying flat land suitable for irrigation. The vertical shafts, like large wells, which connect the underground canal to the surface, were used during the digging as passages of ingress and egress and serve the same purpose now when the canals are cleaned of mud, debris, and vegetation; hence they are always surrounded with mounds of accumulated spoil. Lower down, as the canal comes to the surface, it flows between steep banks, which gradually become less high, until the water is flowing at ground level. Often the hardpan forms a natural roof to the gallery.

In length, depth, and water flow the foggaras differ greatly. One canal

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[3] Foggaras in North Africa have been described and illustrated in the *Geographical Review*. See 113 Jules Blache: Modes of Life in the Moroccan Countryside, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 477-502, references on pp. 488 and 491; R. H. Forbes: The Transsaharan Conquest, Vol. 33, 1943, pp. 197-213, reference on p. 199—Edit. Note.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

454 corporation on a basis similar to the one we recommend, and Pakistan is contemplating the establishment of such an institution.

We have little doubt that the suggested bank would find ample opportunities for investment. While there is no absolute assurance that private capital can be found for the bank, our preliminary exploration in Syria warrants some optimism on this score. Commercial banks might well subscribe a substantial part of this capital, and the balance could probably be obtained from private individuals and business concerns.

While the bank would not make loans for working capital, it might indirectly make it easier for companies to obtain working capital from the regular commercial banks. The mission found that a number of industrial enterprises do have difficulty in obtaining sufficient working capital, particularly to finance heavy seasonal purchases of such agricultural raw materials as cotton, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables for canning. The proposed bank might explore the possibility of financing the construction of bonded warehouses in Damascus and Aleppo where industrial enterprises could store raw materials and even finished goods in such a way as to furnish ample security for additional commercial bank credit.

Vocational Education

874 464 While appropriate technical and financial assistance can do much to raise industrial efficiency, the better training of labor is also important. At present vocational education is seriously inadequate. There is an urgent need to expand and improve vocational schooling so that it will effectively serve the requirements of industry and business and will be properly related to in-plant training. Specific recommendations on this subject are made in a subsequent chapter on education.

Projected Oil Refinery

471 382 With the exception of one ill-starred venture in which it went into partnership with private capital, the government has wisely left the ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises to private initiative. We are strongly convinced that this policy should continue to be followed. During the last few years it has been proposed from time to time that the government depart from this rule by establishing and operating a petro-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

leum refinery. Syria now obtains its petroleum products, of which total consumption in 1953 amounted to around 450,000 metric tons, partly from the Tripoli refinery in Lebanon and partly from more distant sources of supply. By arrangements between the government and the distributing companies, prices in Syria are explicitly or implicitly based on ex-Tripoli prices plus transport costs. It is perhaps natural that Syria should want its own refinery, not only because a large volume of crude oil flows across its territory through the Trans-Arabian pipeline and the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipelines, but also because transport costs substantially increase the price of petroleum products.

A case for a government refinery might be made if there were no alternatives. Private companies, however, are apparently willing to erect such a refinery. The Iraq Petroleum Company, for instance, has offered to carry out its original pledge to construct and operate a refinery serving Syrian requirements. Its offer is apparently conditioned on an agreement with the government regarding pipeline transit dues and on the understanding that the refined products would be sold at the refinery site on the basis of the prices obtaining at the Tripoli refinery. The company has offered to raise the transit dues now paid but the desultory negotiations on this subject carried on over the past years have not produced an agreement. The mission does not necessarily suggest that an agreement for the construction of a refinery be made with the Iraq Petroleum Company but simply that the government avail itself of offers by private enterprise to build a refinery. Such a refinery together with appurtenant facilities would probably cost over £S 30 million, a sum which the government can ill afford to spend at a time when it is hard pressed to find all the resources required for projects for which private capital is not available. At the same time it is evident that the construction of a refinery in Syria would be advantageous to the economy. For example, if a Syrian refinery sold its products on the basis of the price formula proposed by the Iraq Petroleum Company, the cost of transport between Tripoli and Homs, the proposed site of the new refinery, would be saved. At present, the difference between the price of gas oil and fuel oil at Tripoli and Homs, for example, is £S 6.20 and £S 9.25 per metric ton respectively, or about 7% and 15% of the prices at Homs. The construction of the refinery would undoubtedly bring about a significant reduction in the prices of refined products throughout northern Syria, which consumes the bulk of the country's total requirements.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S L 164 744 277

of clinics and in the cities a shortage of qualified staff to undertake massage, radiotherapy, and orthopædics, and there is special need to combat tuberculosis. Syrians and Lebanese are not addicted to hashish which, however, is grown in the Biqaa and smuggled to Egypt. The Lebanese Government periodically burns many of the plantations, which inflates the price of the surviving crop.

Economic Survey

S L 433

More than half the population of the two countries is engaged in agriculture which is the most important economic activity. Natural resources hardly exist; there is bitumen in Jebel Bishri in Syria but its production would not be economic; about 10,000 tons a year of asphalt is produced from the neighbourhood of Latakia; and salt is extracted in commercial quantities near Aleppo.

Petroleum

S L 315 382

For a number of years, associates of IPC searched for oil in Syria and Lebanon but without finding it in commercial quantities; in consequence, the areas held by these IPC associates have been given up. However, the two Governments are still anxious for further efforts to be made to find oil in commercial quantities. The importance of petroleum in the economy of Syria and Lebanon lies in the situation of the two republics athwart the pipelines from the fields of northern Iraq and Saudi Arabia which have outlets on the Mediterranean.[1] From Iraq a 12-inch and 16-inch line carry oil across Syria by way of Palmyra and Homs to Tripoli in the Lebanon. Together, these two lines can carry about 8 million tons of oil a year (160,000 barrels daily). A third IPC line from Kirkuk to Homs then bears north of the other two and reaches the sea at Banias, and so does not run through Lebanon at all. This new line is 26–30–32-inches in diameter and can deliver oil at about 16 million tons a year (320,000 barrels daily). From the fields of Saudi Arabia a 30–31 inch American pipeline (Tapline) travels over 1,000 miles on its way to Sidon in Lebanon, passing through Jordan and Syria. At present the line is pumping at a rate of about 15 million tons a year (300,000 barrels daily). It should be noted that these four lines all carry crude oil, some of which is refined on the Mediterranean shore for local requirements but the bulk is shipped as crude to the refineries of Europe and elsewhere.

S L 382

The line from Kirkuk to Haifa is not operating and the Haiaf

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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refinery is running on imported crude oil at about a quarter of its capacity. There exists an IPC refinery at Tripoli which treats over half a million tons of crude a year (10,000 barrels a day) for the needs of Syria and Lebanon which it cannot fully supply; accordingly, its extension has been under discussion. Construction has begun on a refinery for 7,000 barrels a day at Sidon for Mediterranean Refining Company (California Texas Corporation), but while the Syrian market is still too small to justify the erection of a refinery, the Syrian Government nevertheless wishes to have a refinery established in the country to meet its own needs, and negotiations to this end with IPC and with the World Bank have recently taken place.[1]

Under the Barcelona Convention of 1921 dues are not leviable on transit trade, but the two countries draw, under their agreements with the pipeline companies, a sizable revenue from petroleum apart from the indirect benefits caused by employment by the oil companies. At the time of writing the agreements between the two Governments and the two oil companies are under review but no precise details are available, though the two Governments began by demanding that they should receive jointly a half share of the saving which the companies made by using the pipelines instead of having to transport their oil to the Mediterranean by tanker. Even if this principle were accepted, the difficulty would remain of establishing a satisfactory formula for calculating the saving. The agreement with Tapline is believed to provide Lebanon with about £L4½ million a year. The oil companies bring foreign exchange into Syria and the Lebanon and the currency is surrendered to the Governments at the official rate but can thereafter be resold at the rate applying to the free market which may bring to the Governments a profit of a third. The problem is that Syria and Lebanon are, in fact, not oil-producing states and, although their needs and desires for foreign money may be as great as Iraq's, it is difficult to see how they can expect to obtain from petroleum the same revenue as do the states where it is produced.

Communications

In general, roads provide a cheaper and quicker means of transport than the railways which are mostly running at a loss. The railway lines are:

The Hejaz Railway. A narrow (3 ft 5 in.) gauge track runs from the centre of Damascus to Deraa (88 miles) and thence

[1] See *Petroleum Press Service*, February 1953, p. 53.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 MI Middle East
Syria MD1
Lebanon ME1

S 471 [382] 651

interfered with operations, which were resumed in 1947. The Company gave up its concession in August, 1951.[22]

In 1954 it was reported in Damascus that the annual internal consumption of petroleum was about 350,000 tons and that the Government was negotiating with Tapline and I.P.C. to build two refineries near Damascus, the cost of which was to be deducted from the Government's revenue from the two companies.

So far Syria has failed to discover oil in her territory, but the Tapline and I.P.C. pipelines have become important sources of income to the Government and the cause of constant friction between it and the oil companies. From 1947 to 1952 the increase in the income from pipelines was considerable, but the local agitation for higher royalties has been continuous and, in the spirit of the prevailing practice in the area, a demand for a 50 per cent profit-sharing arrangement is constantly being echoed.

Lebanon

L 471 651

Lebanon signed an agreement with I.P.C. in 1931 under the same conditions as the other countries. The first pipeline ran through her territory for only seventeen miles. The northern branch of the line terminated at Tripoli where a farm of fifteen 93,000-barrel tanks was built. The loading fee at Tripoli was 2 pennies per ton.

In 1947 Lebanon signed the agreement with Tapline mentioned above, and that same year I.P.C. agreed to pay Lebanon transit fees amounting to £45,000 annually. A new agreement with I.P.C. was signed in 1952, raising the transit fees to about £450,000 annually. A new agreement was also signed with Tapline in 1952; it provided for a basic increase in transit fees, for $3 per ton up to 200,000 tons for petroleum products consumed in the country; an increase in the loading fee at Sidon; and annual contributions of $21,000 for the maintenance of the public highways used by the Company's vehicles and $17,000 to the municipalities of Beirut and Sidon in consideration of services.[23]

[22] A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1946), 155; Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 91-93.

[23] United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52*, 58, henceforth cited U. N. *Review* or

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

377 was stated to average 72 KWH per ton (this is very low compared with
257 the 120-150 KWH generally required for this process); power for refining would not exceed 20 KWH per ton. The factory's 2,000 KW steam generators are interconnected with the public utilities network, allowing about 250 KW to be supplied or received according to the relative needs and availabilities in the two systems.

The above figures on beet and raw sugar processing indicate (at 72 and 20 KWH per ton respectively) that some one million KWH were generated for these purposes in 1953, exclusive of power supplied to the Homs-Hama network.

It is anticipated that sugar beet extraction will increase from 7,000 tons to some 20,000 tons by 1960, requiring an additional one million KWH.

Dyeing

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The Hama dyeing plant's 435 KW generators are not connected with the public utilities network. The power generated by this plant in 1953 is estimated at about 0.6 million KWH.

Conclusion

377

The power generated by private factory power plants in 1953, equal to about one-third of that generated in the plants of the public utilities, was therefore distributed approximately as follows:

	Million KWH
Cement factories	22.0
Textile factories	13.2
Ginning factories	2.5
Glass factory	0.3
Cold storage plant	1.0
Oil mills	1.5
Flour mills	1.2
Sugar factory	1.0
Dyeing factory	0.6
Total	43.3

Future power requirements will be largely conditioned by the development of the cement, textile and beet industries, for which, as indicated

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

288 about 14,000-16,000 tons. An estimated 14,000 workers are employed in the mechanical section, making the total, including the hand loom workers, 29,000.

Knitted garments, underwear, socks and stockings. This section of the textile trade has developed considerably in recent years. There are 264 enterprises engaged in the production of knitted garments. Some have only two or three machines; the larger factories are on the whole well built and designed for efficient production with the latest British, American and German machines. The use of rayon rather than cotton or woolen yarn has increased considerably, and they make use of substantial quantities of the imported rayon fiber and yarn. Three of the larger stocking factories concentrate on production of nylon stockings. About 2,500 workers are estimated to be employed in all the sections of the knitting industry, located mainly in the Damascus area. This part of Syria's textile industry is of rapidly growing importance from the point of view of exports.

Textile dyeing, printing and finishing. Many of the textile factories bleach or dye yarn or cloth on their own premises. There are also a number of firms engaged in bleaching, dyeing, finishing and block printing. These are situated mainly in Aleppo and employ a total of about 250 workers. In addition, there are many small enterprises throughout the country which bleach and dye yarn and cloth by traditional handicraft methods and for which no statistics are available.

A large dyeing and printing works, established at Homs in 1946, and unique in Syria, prints textiles by rotary machinery as well as by the block process. When the installation of additional machinery is completed the firm will employ about 400 workers on a three-shift basis.

Table 2 summarizes the scope of the textile industry.

Vegetable Oils

289 Syria has produced vegetable oil for many centuries, mainly from olives, and the traditional methods of crushing and pressing are still to be seen in some areas. The development of mechanical seed crushing and oil extraction in large factories began in Syria in 1945. About 70% of the output is now derived from cottonseed.

There are now seven large factories equipped in total with 48 Rosedown Maxoil expellers and six "French type" expellers to process the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

domestic and imported raw material; four of these also have spirit extraction plants. In addition, there are 10 smaller factories with expellers, hydraulic presses or small spirit extraction plants. Most of the factories are situated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Latakia.

During 1950-53 the average annual volume of cotton seed available for crushing, deducting export and sowing requirements, was about 68,000

TABLE 2 The Textile Industry

Type of enterprise	Number	Capital invested where known (million £S)	Spindles	Looms	Knitting machines	Estimated number of workers
Cotton and rayon spinning and weaving factories	6	32.7	90,000	1,400	—	6,000
Woolen spinning and weaving factories	3	2.3	900	40	—	160
Mechanical brocade-weaving factories	3	1.5	—	50	—	140
Small enterprises using mechanical looms	788	3.0	108	3,800	—	8,000
Small enterprises using hand looms	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6,000	—	10,000
Knitting industry	264	9.2	—	—	1,630	2,500
Textile printing and mechanical dyeing and finishing	15	6.5	—	—	—	650
Total	1,079	55.2	91,008	11,290	1,630	28,450

NOTE: Figures in some cases approximate estimates.

tons compared to 10,000 tons in 1947. Probably about 8,000 tons of refined cottonseed oil are now produced annually. This, added to oils from other seeds and nuts, imported[2] and indigenous, indicates a total annual production of about 10,000 tons of vegetable oil (exclusive of olive oil). When the additional equipment now in the process of being installed is in production, the total capacity of the factories will be in the region of 20,000 tons per annum.

Syria exported about 1,200 tons of cotton seed oil in 1953, 24,300 tons of oil cake and other residue from vegetable oil extraction, the highest

[2] Limited amounts of copra and palm seeds are imported.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

288 figure yet recorded. Very little of the valuable by-products is used for feeding farm stock in Syria; the husks, which constitute about 35% of the weight of the seed, are disposed of mainly as boiler fuel.

In the areas near the olive groves there are about 750 animal or hand-operated mills and presses and about 200 either wholly or mainly mechanically operated. The annual production of olive oil has averaged 10,000 tons over the 10 years 1942 to 1951, five of which were poor seasons. Most of the production is locally consumed, forming an important component of the diet.

The seed crushing factories employ about 1,000 workers, and in the olive growing districts there are probably another 1,500-2,000 who work on the olive mills and presses for short periods each year.

Since August 1, 1952 there has been an embargo on the import of vegetable oils to protect the local market.

Soap

In the past the renowned Syrian soap industry was based entirely on olive oil; now there is a tendency to mix in cheaper oils and fatty acids. The industry has lost much ground both in the home and foreign markets due to the competition of occidental soaps and the failure of Syrian manufacturers to modernize their methods. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners reported in 1947 that by degrees the small "cottage" installations were giving way to larger, though not necessarily modern, factories.

Today according to official figures eight of the 59 soap factories are considered modern; 600 workers are employed.

The total soap production in 1947 was under 4,000 tons. By 1953 it was estimated to have risen to between 8,000-9,000 tons, of which 1,900 tons were exported. Since August 17, 1952 importation of most types of soap has been prohibited.

Sugar Refining

257 Until the Sugar and Agricultural Products Company started production on a small scale in Homs in 1949, Syria imported all of its sugar requirements. growing only a small amount of cane locally. The company has tried to develop a beet crop that will provide most of domestic sugar requirements. In 1953, 51,500 tons of beet produced 7,058 tons of sugar.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

An increase of about 60% in cotton production is expected by 1960, but present power capacity appears adequate to meet this expansion. 377 248

Glass

The Damascus glass factory owns a 600-KW power plant. The total productive capacity of the factory is about 43 tons of glass per day; in 1953 about 3,000 tons of glass were actually produced, representing about 70 days output at full capacity. If a consumption of about 100 KWH per ton of glass is assumed then the generated power in 1953 would have been about 0.3 million KWH. 377 323

Cold Storage

A cold storage plant in Damascus has a 500-KW power plant interconnected with the public utilities network. It can be assumed that about half of the approximately 2 million KWH required annually is supplied by the public utilities and half by the factory's plant. 377 254

Oil Mills

Two Aleppo oil mills have private power plants, the larger with a capacity of 1,200 KW, the smaller with 300 KW. These factories work only about 150 days per year (say six days per week during six months). With one-third of the capacity in reserve and an assumed load factor as low as 10% the power generated per year would be about 1.5 million KWH. 377 388

Flour Mill

A flour mill in Aleppo has a 400-KW plant. With a utilization of two-thirds of the capacity for 6,000 hours the power generated would be about 1.2 million KWH. 377 256

Sugar

In 1953 the Homs sugar factory processed 7,000 tons of sugar from beets and refined 22,000 tons from raw sugar. Power required for the former 377 257

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

COTTON IN SYRIA

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Table 26

SYRIA: Estimated Cost of Producing Cotton in the Upper Euphrates Valley on a Typical Tenant Cultivator Farm
1950

Cost Items			Cost per Acre
			Dollars
Land preparation and planting			10.86
Seed			2.07
Irrigation (fuel and amortization of engines and pumps)			10.09
Cultivation			6.22
Supervisor's salary			3.72
Harvesting			10.34
Miscellaneous			5.17
Total tenant's cost at plantation			56.47
Tenant's transportation cost to Aleppo			3.74
Tenant's ginning cost at $9 per bale			7.74
Tenant's cost for the ginned cotton from one acre			67.95
Estimated Yield per acre	616 pounds of lint cotton per acre		
Rent at one-third of crop	205 " " " " " "		
Tenant's share of lint	411 pounds		
Estimated Yield per acre	1,144 pounds of seed		
Rent at one-third of crop	381 " " "		
Tenant's share of seed	763 " " "		
Tenant's cost of ginned cotton		$67.95	
Less credit for tenant's share of seed at $64 per ton		24.42	
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton		$43.53	
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton divided by pounds	or $43.53 / 411	equals 10.59¢ net cost per pound	

NOTE: This is a plantation with 250 acres of cotton grown under irrigation in the Upper Euphrates Valley. The landlord gets one-third of the seed cotton at the plantation for land rent. The tenant pays transportation and ginning cost only on his share of the production. [427]

SOURCE: Trade sources.

COTTONSEED OIL

388

Nine crushing mills have a total capacity for approximately 500,000 tons of seed annually. Only four of these are primarily cottonseed oil mills—two in Aleppo, one in Damascus, and one in Hama. Capacity is adequate and prices slightly higher than those in the foreign markets, so most of the seed is now crushed in Syria. However, the extraction rate is low, especially in the older mills, and 1951 cottonseed oil production was given as only 5,000 tons. This represents about 40 per cent of the total vegetable oil produced in the country, the remainder being largely olive oil. Approximately 85 per cent of the cottonseed oil cake is consumed domestically as stock feed, with the other 15 per cent exported.

INSECTS

The principal cotton destroying insects are the spiney bollworm, *Earias insulana* (Boisd.), and the locust. Last year the plant protection department of the Ministry of Agriculture distributed 250 tons of benzine hexachloride and farmers purchased 150 tons directly from dealers. Even so, yields were only half what they were reported to be the previous year and farmers at- 242 248

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

295 Damascus to manufacture rubber boots, canvas and rubber shoes, and felt and rubber shoes by the hot molding process, using imported crude rubber, imported and local waste rubber and canvas, and locally made felt. Production is said to be about 300,000 pairs per year and about 200 workers are employed. Other factories in Damascus and Aleppo produce rubber soles and heels. About 1,600 tons of rubber and rubber waste were imported in 1953, but it is not known how much was used in the boots and shoes industry in addition to local scrap rubber. The importation of boots and shoes is prohibited.

Matches

389
372 Syria's first match factory started production in Damascus in 1930. By 1952, six more had been built. Damascus has the three largest, Aleppo the other four. Supplies are drawn mostly from local timber, though some additional wood, as well as chemicals, is imported.

An improved layout of machines and the introduction of small conveyors would increase efficiency and assist in lowering costs.

Together the factories employ about 350 whole or part time workers. The three Damascus factories produced about 25.6 million boxes in 1952 and 32.2 million in 1953. Production figures for the Aleppo factories are not available. The importation of matches is prohibited.

Tobacco

297
655 A number of enterprises grade and prepare tobacco for export, but the manufacture and importation of cigarettes and tobacco has, since 1951, been confined to the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration.

The monopoly operates a cigarette factory in Damascus and one in Aleppo, and a factory in Latakia which manufactures and packs tobacco for retail sale. The tobacco for manufacture is partly Syrian (from the Latakia region) and partly imported. Cigarettes, tobacco and cigars are also imported from Europe and the United States.

The Damascus branch is in a new factory where tobacco is sorted, damped, stripped by hand only, and cut. The cigarettes are made on a number of old German machines and a few new American ones.

The tobacco monopoly employs 2,300 workers; total production of all three factories amounted to 2.7 million kg. in 1953.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

resources in Homs Lake. The water rates charged by the municipalities are by no means excessive.

With regard to electricity for light and power the conditions are, however, much less favorable. The capacity of the municipal power plants in the four main industrial cities is far from sufficient to meet total consumption needs. Most of the larger factories have had to install their own power plants, which imposes an additional capital burden on them.[8] Factories which have no power plant of their own often suffer considerable losses resulting from breaks in the power and light supply. Electricity rates of public utilities, although higher in Syria than, for instance, in Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt, compare not unfavorably with those in the main Western industrial centers.

Equipment

The mechanical equipment of the major industries is in general good. Obsolete or inefficient machinery is continuously being replaced by new plant. Nevertheless, there are still many old factories and workshops where equipment is primitive and modernization is much needed.

Some industries, however, seem as a whole to be overequipped in relation to the available raw material supply or the market outlets for their products. A striking example is the installed capacity in the cotton ginning industry, which could handle between two and three times the present cotton crop. This is no doubt due in part to an overestimation at the time of the cotton boom. The government has accordingly prohibited the importation of cotton gins. In the case of the vegetable oil industry the installed capacity might be more fully utilized if cotton seed were freely importable and oil manufacturers could enter the export market for vegetable oils at competitive prices. As a complement to the protection of local cotton seed, the government has also placed an embargo on the importation of vegetable oils. A third instance of overequipment is in the glass industry: the Damascus factory was designed and installed on the basis of the rather ambitious notion that it should serve most of the needs of the Middle East. Some of its machinery, as for instance that for the manufacture of electric bulbs, has never been in operation. Although most of the items it produces may not be imported into Syria and although recently

[8] See Annex G, p. 413.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

433 exports to Lebanon and Jordan, where its glass is admitted duty free, have
402 been increasing, the plant is running much below capacity. A fourth instance is the match industry, which has a capacity much in excess of the requirements of the home market. This industry is also protected by an embargo on imports but prospects for increasing exports are practically non-existent; European matches are of better quality and have captured the Jordan market, Lebanon produces its own and Iraq is putting up a match factory.

Among the industries in which the greatest expansion is taking place, the cement industry ranks first. After completion of proposed extensions, the combined capacities of the Damascus and Aleppo factories will be about 400,000 tons in 1955 as against 240,000 tons in 1953. It is difficult to estimate Syria's cement requirements in the foreseeable future. In 1953 these amounted to 320,000 tons, of which 120,000 tons were imported, but it is probable that even if the present rate of private urban building is not maintained, some increased demand will result from the construction of public buildings, the creation of new settlements, improvements in rural housing materials, the extension of irrigation and improvements in the road system. Since several Middle Eastern countries have their own cement factories (Lebanon has long had a large cement factory, Jordan has just completed one and Turkey has a number under construction), it is doubtful whether Syria will be able to maintain its small export trade.[4] Although the 1955 total production capacity may somewhat exceed the requirements of the local market, the planned extensions do not seem unreasonable and may even contribute to more efficient operation and lower unit costs.

288 The textile industry is expanding capacity by increasing and modernizing equipment. The existing plant is operating at full or almost full
402 capacity, three working shifts being general in the spinning and weaving
439 factories.
433

In 1953 and through 1954 several tens of thousand additional spindles, several hundred new automatic looms and numbers of knitting machines were installed and optimistic opinions were expressed as to the usefulness of considerable further extensions. Their justification depends on the development of the home and adjoining markets. Syria is approaching self-sufficiency in cotton textiles and the prospects for exports appear promising only in certain specific brands. Only cotton yarn of the higher counts is imported; exports are insignificant. Imports of cotton cloth are

[4] 1,000 tons in 1952; 24,000 tons in 1953.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 LiD1 Syria MD1

larger, and exceed exports which have been falling off. On the other hand, exports of knitted, cotton and rayon goods and other articles of clothing, garments, underwear and socks exceed imports by far.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the entire cotton textile industry is well protected. Imports of yarn and cloth are subject to rather high import duties: 45% ad valorem (about 33% at the free rate of the Syrian pound); duties on fine cotton yarns are substantially lower. In contrast, rayon and woolen yarns are duty free. Socks and stockings (except those made from woolen yarns), men's shirts and pyjamas for men and women may not be imported. This protection, though helpful to the home market, hampers the export trade, particularly in finished goods. This is especially so of those goods requiring use of imported materials in their production; no adequate tariff rebate is given on foreign materials in the exported finished goods. Syrian shirt manufacturers, for instance, claim that with existing machinery they could easily double their production and compete in the export market but for these unfavorable conditions. Although most of the surrounding countries heavily protect their own textile industries, some of Syria's finished textile goods seem to be in a position to compete on the international market to the extent that the component materials are not burdened with protective duties.

In the dyeing, printing and finishing industry—which for a long time lagged behind—a considerable expansion is still anticipated and seems fully justified. Additional machinery was being installed to make possible a full three shifts.

The worsted and woolen cloth industry is not as well equipped with modern machinery as the cotton textile industry. Although the existing plant operates little below capacity and imports of cloth are rather significant, the industry shows no great inclination to expand. Despite the fact that imported yarn is duty free and imported cloth is subject to a rather high tariff, there is keen foreign competition by Italian cloth in the cheaper ranges, British cloth in the higher class and by second-hand suits from the United States. Complaints were heard that the transport charges on the bulkier imported yarns weigh heavily on the industry in comparison to the cost of transporting imported cloth. This drawback seems difficult to overcome. Exports of woolen yarns and cloth have been running well under 7‰ by value, of imported yarns and cloth, and in view of the factors mentioned above, no large expansion of exports is to be expected. For recent figures, see Table 1 of the Appendix.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

433 indicates that in this field Syria has become a competitor in foreign markets.
288 In dyeing, printing and finishing there seems to be need for additional modern plant. It also seems desirable to investigate the possibility of profitable production of jute fabric sacks. Imports of these sacks have rapidly increased in the last few years, reaching a total of nearly 10,000 tons with a value of £S 6 million in 1953. The need for jute sacks would be lessened if bulk transportation and storage facilities were available but even in that event an increase in general agricultural production might make the establishment of a factory for sack production from imported jute fiber or yarn an economic possibility.

433 Further expansion of the cement industry may well be required. In
339 fact, the government has authorized a new plant for Aleppo which may be transferred to the Jezireh to serve the growing requirement of northeastern Syria. A cement plant for the Homs-Hama region is also under consideration.

433 In the footwear industry modern factory production has been intro-
295 duced only with regard to rubber boots and shoes. An experiment with factory production of leather shoes in Aleppo some years ago met with such opposition from the handicraft trade that it was abandoned. Nevertheless this branch of industry may be one in which the application of modern production methods would be appropriate and generally beneficial.

433 It seems useful to investigate the economic prospects of paper and
218 paperboard manufacture. In 1953 about 8,000 tons of paper with a value of nearly £S 5 million were imported. This total comprises a large variety of different types of paper but some are imported in such quantity as to suggest the feasibility of specialized production. Straw is plentiful as raw material and in a relatively short period more poplar wood could become available if farmers and village communities gave increased attention to tree planting.

433 The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of
402 an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried out by many small shops but the quality of the output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements to be developed for use on farms.

[079] it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes. 311 The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer. 241 Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed 182 land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

123 The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

241 For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for 311 cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

312 The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

312 Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers 406 from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less than LS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some 312 projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is 241 supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley. 242 But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

183 makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

812 406 The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

241 The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was prefeered to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

711 241 427 Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDl Syria MDl

241 except wheat and barley, and around each village is an area of irrigated land on which vegetables, fruit, cotton, maize, fodder, and grain are grown. The configuration of the ground and the peculiar properties of the marl make possible the use of subsurface water for irrigation, and past and present inhabitants have taken full advantage of these conditions.

312 Water is distributed to irrigation ditches from wells, surface water-
[406 courses, or *foggaras* (foqqaras).[2] It is lifted from wells either by pumps or
379] by chains of buckets geared to an animal-turned wheel. From wadis which have water in part of their course for some or all of the growing season it is taken by a gravity canal. The stream is roughly dammed and the water led, at a gentler angle than that of the watercourse, along the valley side until it reaches a suitable level for watering the ground below. Neither of these methods is of great importance as compared with foggaras, which supply most of the irrigated lands of the area.

A foggara, known elsewhere as *qanat*, *kariz*, or "chain of wells," is an underground conduit. The method has been used since ancient times in many parts of the Middle East. Foggaras are found in several regions of Syria and are especially numerous in the Selemiya region. Figure 4 shows the general principle by which the water-bearing layer is tapped by the gallery or subsurface canal. The most copious supplies of water are provided when the canal is driven back from a spring along the underground "stream" that feeds it. A depression that is a natural gathering ground of water is often utilized, or a wide area may be tapped by the construction of several converging galleries, as in Moufaqqar. The gradient of the gallery is sufficient to induce water flow, but it is less steep than the general slope of the ground, so that water is conducted gradually to the surface, usually to low-lying flat land suitable for irrigation. The vertical shafts, like large wells, which connect the underground canal to the surface, were used during the digging as passages of ingress and egress and serve the same purpose now when the canals are cleaned of mud, debris, and vegetation; hence they are always surrounded with mounds of accumulated spoil. Lower down, as the canal comes to the surface, it flows between steep banks, which gradually become less high, until the water is flowing at ground level. Often the hardpan forms a natural roof to the gallery.

In length, depth, and water flow the foggaras differ greatly. One canal

[2] Foggaras in North Africa have been described and illustrated in the *Geographical Review*. See
113 Jules Blache: Modes of Life in the Moroccan Countryside, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 477–502, references on pp. 488 and 491; R. H. Forber: The Tunnelmen Conquest, Vol. 33, 1943, pp. 197–213, reference on p. 199.—Edit. Note.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

491 663 districts without the resources necessary for the most ordinary upkeep.

A wider use of road gangs would achieve far better maintenance, for the same expenditure, than is possible with the prevailing "one-man" system. A team concentrating upon a section at a time can often effect repairs which one man alone cannot do at all; gangs also permit closer technical supervision and more efficient use of equipment—valuable considerations when the supply of both is limited.

Road Maintenance Equipment

491 494 The country as a whole has far too little road-building and maintenance machinery for effective work. Mechanization must of course be introduced gradually where so much of the work is now done by hand. The present stock of equipment cannot meet even current needs. Half the mixers in the Damascus area are unusable, for example. There are no graders or bulldozers for maintenance purposes, although at least ten are needed for the tracks alone.

It is not enough to expect that construction machinery will be assigned to maintenance afterward; much of it will be worn out on the contemplated road-building program. Maintenance machinery should be bought separately. For one or more stone-crushing plants, the necessary bulldozers and graders, new rollers and other equipment needed currently, the mission foresees an expenditure of £S 1 million in the first five-year period and twice this amount in the second five years.

D LEGISLATION ON THE USE OF ROADS

494

Traffic Laws

Syria enacted a modern, comprehensive traffic code in 1953, which contains the usual detailed regulations on vehicle dimensions, maximum wheel loading, weight limits for certain types of roads and bridges, and similiar provisions for protection of the roads. It also provides for periodic inspection of vehicles for mechanical fitness. Rules of the road for safe and courteous driving are prescribed, as well as the knowledge required for obtaining a driver's permit.

The code is essentially a good one, and it is regrettable that most of its provisions are ineffective because of poor enforcement. Apart from the danger to human life, unless better measures are taken to enforce the

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

241 possibilities for expanding the total area under cultivation, for improving and increasing irrigation, and for increasing productivity through research and education. They also point to needed improvements in agricultural equipment, in agricultural credit, and in the land tenure system.

241 311 Although estimates vary as to the amount of new land which can be brought into cultivation, all agree that it is possible to double the present planted acreage. Cultivation could be extended in some dry-land areas with improved rotation and fertilization, but in most cases new land can be brought into cultivation only by extending irrigation.

IRRIGATION

241 312 Information which the United States Legation at Damascus has prepared from reports of the Syrian Ministry of Public Works indicates a total of about 2.4 million acres under irrigation at the present time, of which approximately 60 per cent is from gravity flow and the remainder from pumps of various sorts. Some of the Ministry's data are said to be based on actual surveys, some on interviews, and some simply on estimates. This 2.4 million

241 312 406

The most common system of irrigation in the new cotton areas of the Jezira is to draw water like this from streams with pumps powered by diesel engines. The number of pumps in Syria has doubled since 1950.

312 Lebanon mountains. It flows by gravity through tunnels to the waterworks in the city, from which it is distributed to the individual houses or, in the more congested districts, to public fountains. The overflow
312 is discharged into the Barada River. The
364 supply is not treated, but its purity is checked daily at 'Ain el Fije, and samples are submitted twice a week to the government laboratories for bacteriologic and chemical examination. The water of the Barada River is no longer used for domestic purposes, being reserved for other municipal requirements.

Untreated water from a spring-fed reservoir supplies the city of Aleppo. The present supply is inadequate, and plans have been projected to conduct water from the Euphrates River to a plant near Aleppo, where it will be treated by sedimentation and
312 chlorination before distribution. Hama obtains most of its supply from wells linked by tunnels, but part of the town depends upon an ancient system in which the water
312 is lifted from the Orontes River by means
406 of huge water wheels and distributed in open overhead aqueducts. These wheels, or *na'ourat*, are operated by the force of the current and collect the water in buckets attached at intervals around their circumference. They are often utilized in small irrigation works, where the river is situated below the level of the surrounding plain.

312 Simple methods of irrigation are practiced in many districts bordering the larger rivers. The Al Ghouta, or oasis of Damascus, has been irrigated by the Barada River and its tributaries for centuries: some of the canals have undoubtedly existed since
312 Roman times. Pumps are sometimes em-
406 ployed in the Al Jazira region, while *na'ourat* are common in certain sections along the banks of the Orontes, the Eu-
312 phrates and the Khabour rivers. Several large irrigation projects have recently been undertaken under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture. These include the irrigation of over 35,000 acres in the Homs-Hama region and the drainage of portions

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6: Government of Syria--11 G-4 (no date) 1952 MD1 Syria MD1

CROPS AND AGRICULTURE IN JAZIRAH

I. Dry Farming

Dry farming is by far the most important activity of Jazirah. 241
The first tractor and combine were introduced in 1936 by Shahine 311
Bey Ma'uf of Zahleh. Before that time agriculture was the business of the peasants. The town inhabitants of Jazirah took no interest in it. The area cultivated was restricted to a few kilometers south of the railway line in what is called the Old Villages. The political troubles in 1936-37 and the low prices of wheat and barley before the War did not encourage capitalists inside Syria to invest their money in Jazirah. Furthermore, agricultural machinery was new to most people who did not understand its economics or how to run it.

a. Expansion in the Use of Machinery 1936-1952

The War doubled the price of wheat in its second year. The 407 ●
crop of 1940 was sold for LS 50-55 a ton at Aleppo. The French 439
bought it for LS 120 in 1941. The Office des Cereales Panifiables (O. C. P.) fixed the price at LS 350 in 1943. During these years the dollar was available at the official rate of LS 2.20 and importation of machinery from the U. S. was possible. The number of tractors increased to about 60 in the winter of 1943.

The crop of 1943 was exceptionally good and the O. C. P. imported some 50 tractors and a similar number of combines which reached Jazirah during the harvest season. The machines were first rented to the farmers and then sold to them. They represented the first large-scale importation of machinery to Jazirah.

Importation of machinery in the following two years became difficult as a result both of limited availability and of dollar shortage. But by the end of the War dollars became again available at the official rate and large numbers of tractors were imported in 1945 and 1946. The importation of agricultural machinery has become a steady and continuous flow in spite of the sharp rise in the dollar rates and the price of wheat, though below 1943, still makes large-scale exploitation profitable. Recently the Government through 654
the Agricultural Bank has helped the farmers import and buy on [452

installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71. This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300, respectively.

It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS . 90-1.10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli Amuda and Dirbassiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbassiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Rin. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers west of Dirbassiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jasiratibn Amr was long neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

185 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i.e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 489 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

job. It is this mechanized farmer-investor who has produced the surplus wheat exportable from Jazirah. Any attempt to reduce his activity by limiting the area of land cultivated by him, or by artificially reducing the prices of his crops for the benefit of the State monopoly, or by ignoring his demands for low production costs, will result in his leaving the job for other occupations. It should be noted also that this type of farmer is in most cases not tied to the land. He usually rents the land he cultivates, and even if he owned land, it is only a small fraction of the area he plants annually. It is always easy for him to rent his lands to peasant farmers and go back to the city. 241

3. Estimate of a Capitalist Agricultural Enterprise and the Area it needs: A complete outfit of agricultural machinery belonging to a farmer in Jazirah usually consists of the following. A fifty horsepower tractor, a disc plow, a cultivator, a drill, a combine either tractor drawn or self-propelled, a jeep, a truck, and a regular repair shop for immediate repairs in the field. He will have a mechanic and two drivers on an annual basis. The number will rise to about ten during the plowing, seeding, and harvest seasons. This means an outlay of LS 100,000 in capital to which is added LS 25,000 for the price of seed, fuel, and miscellaneous expenses. To meet the depreciation on the machinery, cover the annual expenses and interest, and earn a profit, the farmer must plant as large an area of land as his equipment can handle. It is found that he has to plant some 5,000 dunums annually or better still 6,000 in order to find his occupation remunerative. To do this, he has to own or rent land double this area since all cultivation in Jazirah is on a two year rotation basis. 407 454 241

II. Irrigated Agriculture

The Encyclopedia Britannica relates that the region of Nisibin, i.e. Qamishli, was up to the eleventh century planted with fruit trees and that it lost its orchards due to forcible conversion to wheat imposed by the Caliph, as well as ravages by the Bedouin tribes. 241

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Implements and Machinery

In Syria there is an enormous gulf between the employment of modern tractors and combines in certain areas and the use of the traditional peasant plow or *feddan* and hand-harvesting and threshing methods elsewhere. The tractor can undoubtedly do a far better job of cultivation. It breaks the hard soil pan so as to facilitate deeper penetration of roots and moisture, and it promotes seed germination by more effective pulverization of the soil. It is equally obvious that combines produce a cleaner grain with less waste than the traditional process of having animals trample the grain and winnowing the resulting product by hand.

The development of Syria's agriculture, however, hardly depends on the rapid expansion of mechanized farming. The use of mechanized equipment can be recommended only where labor is relatively scarce or where units of exploitation are large, as is the case in the Jezireh. Small farmers cannot afford costly, modern machinery. Cooperative ownership and operation of such machinery may ultimately be undertaken, and the mission does suggest, as indicated previously, that an experiment along this line be carried out. It can hardly be expected, however, that this type of cooperative, which is among the most difficult to manage, will spread rapidly in the future.

Far more important and urgent is the task of improving and supplementing the poor implements which the peasants now have at their disposal. They should not have to rely almost wholly on the *feddan* which barely scratches the soil and leaves perennial weeds to compete with crops for the limited supply of soil nutrients. The farmer should have a better plow, supplemented by a cultivator or spike-tooth harrow; a simple seed drill that might permit him to get better yields by sowing in rows instead of by broadcasting; pedal threshing equipment and a hand-operated winnower that would enable him to produce a cleaner grain with less effort; and a simple leveller that would help him to level his land and avoid waste of rain or irrigation water.

Programs to improve and develop implements for the small farmer have been successfully initiated in a number of countries such as India and Afghanistan. The mission strongly recommends that such a program be undertaken promptly in Syria. It would propose establishment of a small implement center in cooperation with the FAO or other technical assistance agencies. This center should be equipped with a shop in which

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

433 241 407 prototypes of useful implements would be made. These prototypes should then be distributed for supervised testing among selected farmers and arrangements would have to be made for the production of those found successful. Such a program need not be expensive. The mission estimates the capital cost at about £S 150,000 and recurring annual expenditures at not more than £S 100,000.

The problems of mechanized cultivation should not, of course, be neglected. Already an estimated total of 750,000 hectares is tilled by mechanical means. Over 1,300 tractors and 500 combines are being used today, primarily in the Jezireh but also, increasingly, around Aleppo. Mechanical farming is handicapped, however, by the high cost of fuel; lack of sufficient skilled labor to operate, maintain and repair machinery; inadequate repair facilities; excessive cost and, sometimes, deficient supplies of spare parts; insufficient knowledge of the suitability and capability of different types of equipment; and the utilization of too many kinds of machinery. Standards of maintenance are extremely low and repairs much too costly. The abuse of machinery greatly shortens its life. In the Jezireh, major repair facilities exist only in Kamichliye, and only two dealers have their own service stations. All these factors make mechanical farming excessively expensive. In the last two years, profits have seriously diminished as cereal prices declined and costs remained fixed. A reduction of costs is particularly necessary since the mechanically operated farms now contribute the bulk of Syria's exports of cereals.

Better transport facilities will do more than anything else to lower fuel costs. To deal with the other cost factors, a number of measures can be recommended. First of all, machinery dealers should be allowed to operate only if they abide by defined limitations on the price mark-up on machinery and spare parts; maintain prescribed minimum supplies of spare parts; and undertake to operate service and repair facilities in such centers as Kamichliye and Aleppo. Certain reputable dealers have declared to the mission their willingness to adhere to such qualifications, which have proved useful also in other countries. Secondly, the mission urges that short-term courses in the selection, operation and maintenance of farm machinery be organized at Kamichliye and Aleppo. Such courses should be conducted in the agricultural "dead season" and separately for owners and operators. The first should be instructed in the performance and capability of different types of equipment, in the supervision of operation and maintenance, and in the simple economics of mechanical farming; and

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

the latter should be taught elementary principles of repair and maintenance. The courses for field operators and mechanics might well include some in-service training in repair shops. The cooperation of reputable dealers in organizing such courses should be enlisted. Finally, the mission proposes the establishment of a secondary agricultural school in Kamichliye to specialize in problems of agricultural engineering. Facilities for instruction in this subject should also be provided at the existing school in Aleppo. The mission envisages an expenditure of £S 2 million for such school facilities. The short-term courses could probably be made self-supporting. To initiate and help carry out this program, the mission suggests that the government obtain the services of one or two machinery experts through the FAO.

Cereals

Aside from the measures outlined above, programs to raise the yield of certain crops must be undertaken. For cereals the development of higher yielding and more disease-resistant strains is of paramount importance. Although many varieties of wheat and barley are grown in Syria, little is known about their comparative worth. A large number of the more promising foreign wheat and barley strains have recently been imported for testing, but the funds, staff and facilities for an adequate testing program are largely lacking. The mission accordingly recommends that the Ministry of Agriculture be enabled to carry out a program for testing, selecting and propagating high-yielding and disease-resistant seed.[12] Since the shortage of trained Syrians may continue for some time, it is likely that the program will have to be handled by a foreign staff (FAO; the French Technical Assistance Mission in Syria). The staff should include a director in charge of planning, three plant breeders and a plant pathologist. They should be assisted by a staff of about 30 Syrians who will largely have to be trained for this purpose. The mission estimates the cost of such a program at about £S 4.5 million over the next five or six years.

For wheat and barley the aim should be to develop good varieties which mature early and can therefore be harvested before the extreme heat. For rice, which will undoubtedly be cultivated in larger volume as the irrigated area expands, the aim should rather be to develop slow-

[12] See Annex C, p. 304, for year-by-year recommendations.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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APPENDIX

TABLE 4 Agricultural Machines, 1953

District	Tractors	Fertilizer spreaders	Harvesters		Combines		Threshers		Insecticide sprayers		Dusters	
			Animal-drawn	Tractor-drawn	Self-propelled	Tractor-drawn	Manual	Mechanical	Manual	Mechanical	Manual	Mechanical
Damascus	63	1	5	0	3	1	897	3	91	10	98	—
Homs	65	0	0	0	1	4	15	0	70	1	200	12
Hama	65*	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	1,500	22	265	—
Dera'a	26	5	0	1	0	2	12,003	0	10	1	210	—
Deir ez Zor	166	0	0	20	4	74	0	0	70	—	—	—
Hasetche	540	0	20	72	420	0	—	0	22	40	0	—
Aleppo	352	0	0	10	49	10	2,002	0	21	5	92	10
Latakia	53	0	2	0	0	4	21,000	0	51	5	91	6
Soueida	1	0	0	0	0	0	100	1	200	0	200	—
Total	1,331	6	27	105	482	95	36,017	4	2,035	84	1,156	28

* Estimate.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and other sources.

511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

484 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
241 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by
409 the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
427 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

i [The estate of Misherfe, near Homs --Analyst]

Dr. Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Syria MD1

311 Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of 233 means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

162 The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there 423 has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

471 In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently 312 been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into 425 the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

427 The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth 464 of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of • [407] machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

464 Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of 511 Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer 164 from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the 146 agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

000 Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

COTTON IN SYRIA

Another significant aspect of the land tenure problem is the financial arrangements between the landlords and tenants. 427 241

Although there are many variations throughout the country, there are three basic contracts.

In the first, where water is available by gravity flow for irrigation and the landowner furnishes only the land, he gets 50 per cent and the tenant gets 50 per cent of the gross yield. In the second type of contract, where the tenant installs pumps and operates them at his own expense and the landlord furnishes the land only, he gets 33⅓ per cent and the tenant gets the rest. In the third case, where the landowner furnishes only the land and the tenant drills artesian wells at his own expense, the landowner gets only 25 per cent of the gross yields. There are variations depending on the crops produced and on who furnishes seed, fertilizer, and equipment. With the growth of mechanization, there is a rising tendency for landowners to prepare the seed beds themselves with large tractors and to take a large share of the produce.

With the advent of mechanization, there is also a noticeable tendency to wage-crop arrangements, particularly in the remote areas like the Jezira where the population is sparse and where the only feasible arrangement for picking cotton is the employment of nomads by the day. 464 241

The greatest concentration of small cultivators who own and operate their own farms is in the older farming areas in the southern part of Syria around Damascus. Around Aleppo the farms are larger in size and owner-operators are fewer in number. 471 241

MECHANIZATION

Mechanization is changing rapidly the primitive practices which still dominate Syrian agriculture. The number of tractors has increased from 200 to almost 2,000 and more than 700 combines are in operation. 241 407

Most of the mechanical equipment is in the Jezira and the agricultural areas around Aleppo. Approximately half the tractors are being used in cotton areas.

To encourage further mechanization the government plans to extend loans to farmers on a five-year basis to finance the purchase of agricultural equipment. So far most of the equipment has been bought privately and for cash. [452]

The first few years have been difficult for the tractor farmers because of the lack of trained operators and the lack of adequate repair facilities, especially spare parts. Now the large manufacturers' agents are establishing modern service stations, repair stations, and mobile repair units. Consideration is even being given to organizing operator training programs.

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

All of the agricultural missions stress the need for improvement in basic research and educational programs. The United States-Syria Agricultural Mission has outlined a complete program for agricultural training, research, and extension. Some of the recommendations already have been adopted, such as the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 654

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

248 yields. The local experiment stations are doing a limited amount of work in
242 variety selections and testing but have not been able to distribute any large quantity of certified seed. Most of the seed planted is imported directly from United States breeders or seed distributors.

CULTURAL PRACTICES

248 A high percentage of the cotton land is now prepared with mechanical
[407] equipment, although a few primitive ploughs are still found. Some cotton is broadcast but for the most part it is planted in ridges. Planting is largely a hand operation in which the farmer digs a hole with a small hand tool and drops in five to seven seeds which have been soaked overnight to soften the shell and increase germination. The rows usually run east and west with the cotton planted on the south side for greater protection. Cultivation is almost entirely by hand with short-handle hoes or knives. Picking, as everywhere, is a family affair. Outside labor usually is required, especially on the large farms, to weed and harvest the crop.

Irrigation practices vary considerably. In general, farmers try to use as much water as they can. The use of commercial fertilizers, although increasing, is limited. Whenever possible manure mixed with soil is added to the cotton land.

On the Near East Foundation experimental farm, yields of 800 pounds of lint per acre were obtained by applying 30 inches of water to supplement the 12 inches of winter rain and 4 square meters of local manure per acre. The fields were prepared with tractors, but the cotton was planted and cultivated by hand. The rows were standard, about 36 inches wide, and three seeds were planted in the hills 12 inches apart. This is ample proof that cotton will grow well and give high yields with good cultural practices.

The Foundation's work also illustrates the need for research in cultural practices, irrigation, and especially fertilization. The soils generally need nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, but demonstrations reveal that the soil will react to certain of these plant foods but not to others. For instance, no difference in yields has been noticed from the use of super-phosphates. More research is needed, not only to determine optimum rates of application, but also to determine whether the absorption rates can be increased by conditioning the soil.

GINNING

248 Prior to 1950 all the cotton gins were of the roller type, many of which
407 were manufactured locally. One modern American saw gin was installed in 1950 and proved so successful that 26 more, with 82 stands, have been put into use since. Most of these are located in the Aleppo region. The new gins are, for the most part, equipped with the most modern overhead cleaning units and with standard gin presses. Buildings are unusually lavish. Investment in the average four-stand gin is estimated at $175,000 of which $120,000 is in the land and buildings. Even so, the cost of ginning is fairly moderate, about $9 per bale including bagging and ties.

About 1,700 roller gins are still in operation, three-fourths of them in Aleppo and most of the others in Hama and Latakia with a capacity double that of the saw gins.

The new saw gins still have a number of difficulties to overcome. The opinion persists that saw gins do not give fibers as long as roller gins, cause

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MD1

COTTON IN SYRIA

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Cotton bought in small lots from many farmers in various sections is thoroughly mixed in seed cotton storage bins in Aleppo, Syria, before ginning to get uniformity in the bale.

more neps, and often damage the fibers. Also, farmers have not been able to secure any higher price for their saw ginned cotton with less trash, but several dealers in Aleppo reported sales of saw ginned cotton at a premium, indicating that the market situation may be changing. 248 407

Whereas formerly ginners took the seed to cover the cost of ginning, with the increased value of the seed, ginners now are required to operate on a service basis for a fixed charge.

MARKETING

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The concentration of ginning equipment in a few large towns creates a difficult and expensive transportation problem for the farmers in remote areas. Because of the distance to the gins, many farmers are forced to sell cotton in the seed to merchants or middlemen in the local communities. Merchants gin the cotton for their own account and then dispose of the lint and the seed. Most of the gins are owned by merchants, but by no means do all merchants own gins.

Aleppo is the cotton merchandising center, with 47 exporters operating in this market in 1951. About half a dozen merchants, of whom two or three do a small export business, operate in Damascus. More than half of all the exports are sold through the three leading firms; the others do a small volume of business largely as a sideline. [366]

SOMALILAND MDI
SYRIA MDI

Wells

SD 312

Wells may belong to private individuals or they may be the property of the tribe. Ownership is based on the construction of the wells. The custom varies from place to place but, generally speaking the person or tribe who has dug the well has primary rights over it. Should he not be using it, other people may do so.

Natural and Artificial Basins

Natural basins are freely used by all. Artificial basins are owned by a person or tribe. Persons other than the owners may be authorised to use these basins against the payment of a fee.

SYRIA

Water Rights

SY 312 421

Water generally belongs to the owner of the land on which it is located. In areas where water is scarce, however, land and water can be sold and rented separately.

SY 312 437

In Soukhne, along the Euphrates, water sellers may be paid in money or in goods. The owners of small hydraulic enterprises (motor pumps, etc.) on the Euphrates are often paid by the farmers with half of their harvest for the water they furnish even though the cost of irrigation amounts to no more than 8 to 10 percent of the yield.

SY 312 554

According to custom, important personalities have water rights superior to those of the common people. Such rights, sometimes taken by force, are often no more than usage rights which do not imply the real ownership of a spring or a river.

SY 312 421

Ownership of water can be private or collective. Private ownership is rare and applies only to springs or wells of no great importance. It is to be found in densely-populated districts of the Mediterranean slope or in the cultivated steppes. Small gardens irrigated in this way are often individually set up by farmers or wealthy citizens as an investment of their capital. Such gardens are called <u>boustins</u>.

Collective property belongs to the state, to a village or a community. The present legislation provides that all water be owned by the state. Villages, however, also possess hydraulic resources. Occasionally a community is the sole owner of a spring or a water course, while in other cases such ownership is divided among neighboring communities. Old local customs which vary according to regions and communities regulate the distribution of such water. 312 421

Water Distribution

Among Members of the Same Community

If water is abundant with respect to the surface to be irrigated, each user takes what he needs with little consideration for his neighbor. The only limit set up by custom is that the water level on the irrigated surface may not exceed ankle height.

If the flow of water is insufficient with respect to the size of the land to be irrigated, the regulation becomes more complicated. In the rare case where custom does not apply, everyone protects his crops against drought as well as he can. Generally, however, custom guarantees every plot of land a portion of that quantity of water used by the community and which may vary during the year. This portion consists of water taken from a spring or a canal and supplied during a certain period of time (every week, every fortnight, etc.) according to the duration of the rotation period (addâne) which varies, according to the localities, between seven and 32 days.

Time Calculations

The methods of calculating time vary from region to region. Watches, sun dials and hour glasses (keilé) are used. At Kariatteïn the rotation period (addâne) lasts 15 days, and water agreements are concluded in "Roman hours." These correspond to three hours and are divided into 40 misariyes. The misariyé corresponds to four minutes and thirty seconds. 312 805

In Nabeck Ghouta there are two water turns, one during the day and the other at night. The entire rotation period lasts twelve days. Water portions are calculated in "local"

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

The infant mortality is not known, but 165
local observers believe that it is at least 250 per 1,000 live births. In many rural villages the mortality among children under 5 years of age probably reaches 40 to 50 per cent. Discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated by the fact that certification of birth is not required for infants dying during the first year of life. The official infant mortality rate for 1948 was 47.6 per 1,000 births for the country, but 75 per 1,000 births in the city of Damascus. Among almost 15,500 deaths registered in 1949, over 21 per cent were of infants under 1 year and about 35 per cent of children under 5 years of age.

Social Economy

Agriculture is the basis of Syria's econ- 433
omy. Over two thirds of the people are 244
dependent upon the land, and, in consideration of the paucity of other natural resources, its full utilization is a problem of primary concern to the welfare of the country. Except in limited portions of the north- 132
western and the northeastern provinces, the 244
rainfall is deficient and erratic, and the expansion of agriculture is contingent upon the development of irrigation and more efficient methods of production. Estimates of 311
the amount of cultivable land range from 244
10 to 21 million acres—from less than one quarter to almost one half of the total land area. A similar disparity is noted between the figures quoted for the acreage now under cultivation, but all sources agree that less than one half of the potentially arable lands are planted in crops. Most observers 311
believe that the land suitable for agriculture approximates 12 to 14 million acres, while the area under cultivation is between 5 and 6 million acres. Roughly 10 to 20 per cent of the tilled land is irrigated at present, but it has been shown that the farm acreage could be more than doubled by increased irrigation, associated with controlled settlement, in the Orontes, the Khabour and the Euphrates river valleys.

Foremost among the factors which im- 421
pede the promotion and the modernization

p. 139(B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a landowning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[511] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
30 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

423, 241

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the organization of agriculture and forms of land tenure and an historical summary of changes in agricultural systems and methods in the countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 127-129, 192-196, Turkey - pp. 129-130, Iraq - pp. 130-133, 189-192, 202-203, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine - pp. 133-135, 188-189, 203-204./

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available.

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers.

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal.

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families.

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

6: Government of Syria--25 G-4 (no date)1952 MD1 Syria MD1

LAND OWNERSHIP IN JAZIRAH

At the beginning of the French Mandates, more than 95% of Jazirah lands were public domain, and it is difficult to understand the land situation now without a study of the laws governing the acquisition of public domain as enacted by the Ottomans and partly amended by the French, and which remained in effect till January 31, 1952, when decree-law 96 was issued. 423

I. The Land Laws Prior to January 1952

The law recognized two categories of public domain:

1. Lands registered in the name of the Government in the same way that a private owner has his lands registered in the Department of Tabo, or Land Registration Department. The Government holds deeds for those lands.

2. All unoccupied lands, waste lands called "dead lands," in Syria which are not registered in the name of anybody and for which the Government holds no deeds.

The first category of public domain is very rare in Jazirah. Suffice it to say that ownership of these lands can be acquired by public auction sales, or by renting them from the Government after a price has been fixed, and paying the price in yearly installments while doing the improvements specified in the contract or sale. The operation is known in Syrian law under the same name of "rent with a promise of sale." 423 425

The second category of public domain is by far the larger. And the law provided different methods for acquiring it suited to the small peasant and to the big farmer.

The the small peasant, the law, accorded him five hundred dunums which he could own freely without any payment provided he informed the competent authorities of his intentions and obtained in advance an authorization from the Department of Registration. He could then go ahead and cultivate the area allotted to him, and after 10 years, he could obtain legal title to it, without any payment.

This method did not enjoy great favor with the peasants of Jaz- 423
irah for several reasons. In the first place, the ignorant peasant, 425
whether Bedouin or Kurd, found difficulty in applying for the advance authorization and in fulfilling the formalities required for receiving it. Secondly, the peasant aspired often to a larger area than that allowed to him by this method. Thirdly, the peasant did not trust the Government, from which he was used only to oppression and corruption during Turkish rule. He was afraid that by the end of the ten years he would not be granted the promised land. Fourthly, the peasant did not trust his neighbors, his Sheik, or his Agha. He was afraid that during these ten years and before he received the deed for his land one of them would manage to drive him away and get the land for himself.

For all these reasons combined, the peasant wanted a way that enabled him to receive more than 500 dunums of land, that rid him of the necessity of applying to Government officials, and that put in his hands an undisputable title to his land in a reasonably short time.

All these desires were satisfied if the peasant followed the second method of land acquisition described by law. The law provided that, without previous authorization, anyone can acquire title to waste land if he cultivates it and pays to the State so much per dunum. No limit was set on the area which a farmer could acquire in this way. The State was interested in extending agriculture and offered encouragement to those who reclaimed land. The area which a farmer could own in this way was limited only by his ability to cultivate and plant. He could at any moment ask the appropriate officials to make a survey of his cultivated area, ask them to fix a price per dunum, pay the price, and get his deed in the first year of cultivation. In the nineteen forties, the price per dunum was usually set at LS50.

II. Partnership in Land Between the Tribesmen and the Tractor Owner

To avail himself of these advantages, the peasant had recourse 425
to the city dweller owner of a tractor. The usual situation was that 427
a group of peasants have occupied a large area of about 10,000 dunums within the boundaries of their tribe, of which they were able to cultivate only some 2000. They offered the tractor owner half the 10,000 dunums on condition that he brings his tractor to the village

425 and cultivate all the area. Usually the tractor owner took upon himself
427 also to pay all Government dues and the price of all the land as fixed by the Government, and to hand the deeds for the 5000 dunums to the peasants in one or two years.

In this way, the peasants got 5000 dunums instead of the 2000 they were able to cultivate by their own means, they received their deeds in one or two years instead of in ten, their partner from the city became responsible for helping them resist any encroachments on their land from the Agha, Sheik or neighbors, and they received their deeds free from any dues.

Around 1944, when demand for land increased, peasants began receiving money from their city partners besides all the obligations assumed by him and mentioned above.

428 The French wisely strove to encourage agriculture in Jazirah, and
429 and finding that the procedure used for the acquisition of land was long and complicated, formed a Special Committee and empowered it to grant land and issue valid deeds while abrogating some of the usual processes of law. Some lands were distributed in this manner and the French were accused of using their influence to the benefit of their political sympathizers. But in general, the Committee did a good job of stabilizing and legalizing the ownership of some lands.

The great majority of the land owned by tractor owners in Jazirah was acquired in partnership with the peasants. A few of the inhabitants of Mardin and Nisibin had titles to lands from the Ottoman Government. In rare instances, a few individuals went to the Land Registration Official in Turkey and bought from him forfeited deeds covering very large areas. But in general the titles in the hands of property owners in Jazirah were acquired in the manner described above.

423 Because there was no survey in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman land laws, adopted and amended by the French and applied to Syria, considered that the boundaries mentioned in the deed were the determining factor in case of dispute, and that the area mentioned in dunums was of no importance since the surveying services did not reach all parts of the country. For this reason, all deeds in Syria give the boundaries as exactly as possible, and give an approximate estimate of the area in dunums, except where surveying has remedied the situation.

III. Lands With Title Cover Only 30% of Jazirah

It should not be understood from the above discussion that all the lands of Jazirah are occupied by persons having title to them. Perhaps as much as 70% of the lands are occupied by persons claiming ownership but having no legal title. And here resides the great problem of Jazirah which continues to retard its development and prosperity. 423 185

There is nothing that can stabilize conditions in an agricultural society, increase confidence, improve credit, diversify the types of cultivation, increase property values, and encourage the improvement of land by long-term projects of irrigation and farm construction, like a secure and stable system of land ownership.

It is the misfortune of Jazirah that successive Governments since Syrian independence have not only ignored this basic fact, but have done everything in their power to make the stabilization of the land problem in Jazirah more remote.

Before the beginning of 1952 land registration in Jazirah suffered from all the delays, expenses, corruption, and hindrances prevalent in other parts of Syria. Moreover, as a frontier zone, land registration was subject to an authorization by the Chief of State, and in the last three years registration of land acquired through cultivation for a period of ten years was stopped by decision of the Council of Ministers.

The governing idea behind all these restrictions is that individuals are usurping the public domain illegally. While this may be true in some cases, the measures taken to correct the situation are out of proportion to the problem at hand and are applied not only to usurpers out to land owners of good faith as well. The result is that three-quarters of the lands of Jazirah belonging mostly to peasants and medium owners are unregistered.

IV. Decree-law 96

Decree-law 96 starts with this idea of correcting the usurpations of the public domain, and adds to it the concept of social justice as exemplified by the policy of encouraging small land holdings and dividing the large estates. 423 185 656

A. Contradictory Policies of the Government

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The decree is interesting in its application to Jazirah and It seems that the Government there follows two contradictory policies diametrically opposed and antagonistic to each other. On the one hand, decree No. 510, dated March 23, 1950, and decree No. 80, dated January 23, 1952, facilitate the importation and distribution of powerful agricultural machinery among the farmers in general and those in particular of Jazirah. The use of agricultural machinery goes hand-in-hand with the extensive cultivation of large areas of land to make their employment economic. On the other hand, and surprisingly, only eight days after the promulgation of the decree for the distribution of agricultural machinery, decree-law 90 dated January 31, 1952, prevents the farmer from owning or renting (in its interpretative communique) more than 1500 dunums in Jazirah an acreage which does not lend itself to economic tractor cultivation.

The decree has been in operation now for seven months and its application should have vindicated the two principles on which it depends, viz. 1 to correct the usurpations of the public domain, and to divide the big estates among the needy farmers.

Assuming that the policy of the State is to encourage small ownership of land to be tilled by the farmer using cows or mules, and that the importation of heavy agricultural machinery was a mistake not to be repeated, the logical procedure by the Government would have been to establish simplified processes and register in the name of peasants pieces of 1500 dunums each to which they have a right both in the old and the new law. The Government has had ample time during these eight months to enforce its own decree-law and register tens of thousands of 1500 dunum pieces and give their users legal title to them. Had the Government done that, it would have found the problem greatly simplified. The Kurdish and Bedouin family has in general three to four adult members working on the common land. According to decree 96, each member has a right to 1500 dunums. The Government would have to grant them extra land to reach its quota.

B. Size of Land Holdings in Jazirah

The point is that, had the Government proceeded in this manner, the practical result would have been the stabilization and legalization of the present small and medium ownership.

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This, according to the following table borrowed from Gib Report, page 20, would have legalized the situation in 57% of the Jazirah lands, leaving 9% as public domain, and only 34% not complying with the terms of the decree.

Small Holdings Less than 10 hectares	Medium Holdings 10-100 hectares	Large Holdings Over 100 hectares	State-Owned Lands
56,000	528,000	343,000	96,000
5%	52%	34%	9%

Instead, the Government's only contribution to the solution of the land problem was to prohibit entirely the registration of any land from January 1952 to the present time.

If the Gibb statistics are correct, and they are presumably taken from Government sources, the land reform in Jazirah contemplated by decree 96 concerns only 34% of the region's entire area.

In dealing with this portion of Jazirah, the Syrian Government has to decide on its agricultural policy. It must make up its mind whether it wants to divide the big estates, with or without compensation, and distribute them in small lots to farmer families using mules, thus increasing the population of Jazirah greatly, so that its production of wheat will not much exceed its local consumption, and depriving Syria of the income derived from its present yearly export. Alternatively it must decide that Syria wants to increase its exports of wheat by extending the use of agricultural machinery whose effective use requires holdings of more than 1,000 hectares.

Coming back to the discussion of the 34% of Jazirah lands in holdings of over 100 hectares, the Government should have proceeded immediately, after the promulgation of the law, to their surveying and delimitation to get a clear picture of the situation. Without venturing into exact statistics, the following description is to the point. It endeavors to show that excessive land ownership is limited to relatively few individuals and that the problem is better solved by the Government by considering each case on its merits. The problem of the Government is further facilitated because the tribal Sheiks claim that they hold the lands for their tribe and not for themselves. The Government should have asked the Sheiks to proceed to the distribution of these lands under its supervision.

423 The large holdings are owned by the Agha of Koshar around
47A Deirik, the Sheiks of Shammar from Tal Koshak to Kubur el Bid and south to the Rad, the Sheik of Tay and several of Tay subdivision chiefs, Asfar-Najjar family of Qamishli, the Aghas of the Kurdish tribes (three in number), and two Sheiks of the Jubur. This list is not exhaustive but it is true that not more than fifty individuals in Jazirah have holdings of more than 5,000 hectares each. And since the great majority of them are tribal chiefs, the logical solution is to ask them to distribute these lands according to the laws in force since the Ottoman rule. No new legislation is necessary to fulfill the two aims of distribution of the public domain to needy peasants and the division of the big estates.

Such a solution will not mean that every estate will be only 1500 dunums but it will mean that perhaps 80% of Jazirah will be in holdings approximating 1500 dunums and some 20% in holdings of 10,000-15,000 dunums for tractor cultivation.

C. Shortcomings of the Decree

423 The basic defect of decree 96 is that it erred in diagnosing
656 the real problem of land ownership in Syria. As the United Nations
433 Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East aptly described the situation (part I page 34), "In the Middle East, most of the population--perhaps as much as 90%--lives virtually on the margin of subsistence. But while maldistribution of income obstructs economic progress in a variety of ways, it is secondary to the basic problem in each country of grossly inadequate output in relation to the total population. This is the central fact of economic life in the Middle East." Thus the real problem facing the Government in Jazirah is not that a few people own large tracts of land (though some of them do and should be controlled), but whether the present type of cultivation is not working for a better national economy than small holdings will be able to do.

This criticism of decree 96 does not mean that land abuses do not exist in Jazirah. Undoubtedly they do. But it is a long way between admitting this and trying to correct it by dividing the land indiscriminately into 1500 dunum lots.

The shortcomings of decree law 96 are numerous and without discussing them in detail since the law is being amended, it is necessary to recognize some of them.

423 In the first place, the law amounts in fact to confiscation of
676 property because it arbitrarily abolishes rights of individuals gained
433 over the land through the normal processes of established law.

Secondly, it allows a uniform area for every farmer whether he uses tractor or mule, and whether he allows dry cultivation in Jazirah or irrigated farming in the Euphrates or the Khabur. It is evident that an irrigated area of 1500 dunums is more than adequate even for a large farmer while the same area is too small for tractor dry farming.

Thirdly, the confiscatory provisions of the law are not limited to lands recently acquired from the public domain, but cover lands for which deeds have been in the hands of the owners for decades. Decree 96 achieves this by reversing the stipulations of the preceding laws and by stating that in unsurveyed lands every title should be limited by the area mentioned in it and not by the boundaries.

Fourthly, if social justice is the aim, why should the law be limited to control of the ownership of land and not extended to control commercial and industrial property as well as real estate in cities and cash money? Further, how can the law treat on the same basis five hundred dunums planted to orchards or olive trees and a neighboring area of the same dimensions planted to wheat?

V. Land Ownership Along the Khabur

471 There is more concentration of land ownership along the Khabur that in theother parts of Jazirah, though the concentration is less apparent because the cultivable lands are smaller.

In the north, around Ras el Ain, the Shashan tribe dominated the country. South of them are the Assyrian holdings. Around Hassakeh, some Christians have bought lands from the Juburs, but south of the town and down to Shaddadah, the Jubur Chiefs of the Milhem family own or control both banks of the river. They own all the naqourahs and work their lands by renting it to the members of their tribe on conditions described in the next chapter. One hardly finds a Jubur who is not of the Milhem, or a stranger from inside Syria, who owns property in the Jubur region of the Khabur.

Lately, the Milhem have begun renting land to irrigation projects by pumps. But unlike the Kurds and Tay people of upper Jazirah, the Milhem have never agreed to enter into partnership for the ownership of land.

621 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
241 from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
427 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power
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threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

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Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

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production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

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of them indeed were better treated than the bulk of the population.) Special regard was paid to their needs and traditions, and opportunities were given for the development of their self-consciousness and self-respect. The effects of generations of inferiority cannot be wholly wiped out in the course of twenty years, but in those years Syria and Lebanon made a certain advance towards individual equality as the democratic countries of the West understand it.

Among the most urgent of the country's social problems is that of the archaic system of land-tenure. No direct assault, it is true, was made on the position of the great semi-feudal landowners. But the first step towards reform was taken by the establishment of a modern system of land-registration and the initiation of a land survey. Also the number of small freeholders was increased by the sale of public domain and the encouragement of the permanent partition of land held communally on the 'musha'' system.[1] In addition something was done to help foreign trade by the extension of harbour and other facilities.

A State system of schools was constructed almost from nothing; it is still very imperfect and not yet able to supply so good an education as is given by the best of the private schools, but at least it includes every grade of school, from primary up to the Syrian University in Damascus, an official institution set up in the early years of French Mandatory rule with the object of providing higher education in Arabic.

The foundations which have been laid are solid, but there is still much to be done before Syria and Lebanon possess even the framework of a modern society. Thus expenditure on public works and social services is still very small; the medical services are inadequate. No adequate census has been taken, although there has been a very elaborate and complete one in the neighbouring territory of Palestine. Labour legislation scarcely exists. Most serious gap of all, only inadequate measures to improve agricultural conditions have so far been adopted. Little provision has been made for agricultural education. Although excellent plans for irrigation have been drawn up, few of them were put into effect until the Allied occupation of 1941. The authorities had done little to provide facilities for agricultural credit, and nothing to encourage the formation of co-operative societies.

[1] See Chapter V.

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241 311 people could claim title to "empty" land by simply occupying and cultivating it for a period of years. Legislative Decree No. 135, although never applied, was enacted to halt this unregulated expansion by making all unoccupied land state domain and thus subject to exploitation only with a prior permit. This legislation implicitly recognized that the amount of land that could still be put to the plow was steadily shrinking. Nonetheless the mission encountered a widespread impression that agricultural land resources were virtually limitless. Official estimates that there remain somewhat over 3 million hectares of land available for cultivation appear to support this impression. However, such an estimate is at best only a rough guess. It undoubtedly includes much land which is marginal from the standpoint of fertility or rainfall. It should be frankly acknowledged that there is little or no reliable information on this subject. The mission itself gained the impression on its travels that the amount of land still available for cultivation without irrigation is extremely limited. Here and there in the Jezireh, for example, cropping has already pushed forward into marginal land. Even though good yields may be obtained on such lands in seasons of abnormally heavy rainfall, farming would normally be very hazardous.

Certain conclusions must be drawn. The first is that irrigation will need to play an increasingly important role in the expansion of land under cultivation. The second is that a careful inventory and classification of the land still available should be undertaken in order to determine how it may be most effectively utilized and what must be done to make it productive. The final conclusion is that there is need to work out policies and programs for the exploitation and settlement of such good land as remains.

241 423 3. *Ownership of the means of production in agriculture is very unevenly distributed, resulting in wide disparities in income.*

Land ownership is by no means equally distributed. There are many landless peasants, while large landed estates, some exceeding several hundred thousand hectares, predominate in the provinces of Hama, Homs, Aleppo and the Jezireh. One estimate indicates that 38% of the total area of privately owned land was in holdings of over 100 hectares and only 19% in small holdings of 10 hectares and less. Reliable figures on the distribution of land ownership will be available only upon completion of the cadastral survey now in progress. Of the area surveyed by the end of 1952, however, 49% was held in properties of over 100 hectares and 16% in properties of more than 1,000 hectares. These proportions, however, are

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likely to decline somewhat when the survey is completed for the Hauran and Djebel Druze where small peasant ownership predominates. 244 423

Water for irrigation is supplied chiefly by merchants and wealthy landowners who have the means to install pumps. Similarly, the ownership and operation of modern agricultural machinery are primarily confined to large operators in the Jezireh.

Ownership of the critical factors of production carries with it the ability to demand a large share of the output. In areas where rainfall is inadequate the pump owner, who is frequently not the landowner, can exact from 45% to 60% of the crop simply for the water he supplies. Where labor is plentiful and rainfall adequate, the landowner can get up to half of the crop simply by allowing others to cultivate his land. On the other hand, in the Jezireh land is plentiful by comparison with labor and rents for only a 10-15% share of the crop. Here the owners of tractors and combines control the central factor of production and can command the lion's share of the output.

The small cultivators have no capital or access to capital that would enable them to acquire more land, better machinery and livestock, pumps and other means of production by which to raise their standard of living and make themselves independent. Nor are they organized in cooperatives to undertake these things collectively. Even the larger farmer frequently has great difficulty in getting necessary capital on reasonable terms. [424]

One of the most important objectives of an agricultural program is therefore to provide an adequate volume of credit on equitable terms in order to make the needed means of production more generally accessible. The organization of cooperatives to facilitate group action among small farmers should be another aim. No single peasant, for example, has enough resources to sink a well or install a pump, but a group of peasants could pool their resources to this end. Finally, it would appear vital to conserve the good land remaining in state domain for the purpose of settling landless peasants and Bedouins and thus gradually increasing proprietorship.

4. *Despite the existence of many large properties, land is predominantly tilled in small holdings by tenants or peasant-owners who earn a rather precarious livelihood.* 244 423 427

Large-scale exploitation prevails only in the Jezireh and to some extent in Aleppo where land is farmed in big units with mechanized equipment and paid labor. Even the large estates are for the most part farmed in small units by sharecroppers who are tenants at will, seldom cultivate the same

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244 piece of land for long and thus have virtually no incentive to improve the
423 land. Many large landowners do little beyond collecting their share of the
427 crop, leaving relations with their tenants in the hands of agents. They
[452] often stake their tenants to seed, livestock or implements or tide them over with food and clothing until the harvest comes in; and in the absence of adequate credit institutions they thus serve a useful function. In most cases, however, such assistance in cash or kind is given on terms which conceal extremely high rates of interest. In other cases credit may be furnished without interest by landlords conforming strictly to the Islamic code. It must be recognized also that some and probably a growing number of large landowners take a more active interest in the management of their land and have been instrumental in introducing new crops such as cotton. Progressively minded owners of large estates, when interested in improved crop rotation and methods of production, can become the means for more rapid advancement of agriculture.

244 The small peasant-owners and sharecroppers, who carry on most of the
423 agriculture, produce primarily for their own consumption. Their output is little influenced by market prices, for they must produce to eat and with the balance they buy such simple necessities as they can. Most of them wrest a bare living from the soil and are chronically in debt to the merchant, the professional moneylender or the landlord. Unable to bring their produce to the market or to wait for better prices, they must accept the price offered to them locally for whatever they produce in excess of their own needs. They till their land with methods hallowed by time, and their equipment for the most part consists only of a pair of draft animals and a wooden, iron-tipped plow.

Any program of assistance to agriculture must obviously focus largely on these cultivators. It must show them how to improve their methods of production, provide them with better seeds, equipment and animals. Through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of adequate agricultural credit it should help to free them gradually from excessive dependence on the landlord, merchant and moneylender. It must also pay attention to tenancy problems with the objective of establishing greater security of tenure, providing more incentive to cultivators and achieving a more equitable sharing of the produce of the land.

423 5. *The uncertainty and confusion surrounding land titles is another obstacle to land improvement.*

The uncertainty surrounding land titles has been largely inherited

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from the Ottoman Empire. Conflicting land grants have often been made in the past, and many claims to land rest upon grants of dubious validity. Titles frequently have not been perfected or entered into official registers. Even title deeds which are registered often contain conflicting or vague specifications regarding the area and the boundaries of the property. A considerable amount of land is still held in common village ownership and periodically reallocated among the villagers who accordingly have little interest in the permanent improvement of their changing allotments.

Programs to determine and delimit titles through a cadastral survey and to convert village common land into individual peasant holdings have been under way for several decades, but progress has been painfully slow.

6. *Agricultural yields are considerably below potentialities.*

Agricultural yields in Syria generally do not compare unfavorably with those in most other countries. Cereal yields tend to be about 10-20% below the world average and substantially below those achieved in Europe, but cotton yields are well above the world average and now approximate those in the United States. The output per hectare for virtually all crops is better than that in the rest of Asia.

This general picture does not, however, justify complacency. The relatively good yields have no doubt been largely due to the fact that the frontiers of cultivation have been pushed steadily forward into new and virgin lands. Without this rapid expansion of the area under cultivation, productivity would probably have declined. The mission noted evidence of soil depletion and falling yields in certain areas which had been continuously farmed over many years.

With the diminution in the supply of available new land, Syria will in the future have to rely much more on an improvement in yields to maintain the rise in output. The potentialities unquestionably exist. Fallow is still virtually the only method employed to maintain and restore soil fertility. Thus at least a third of the arable land lies idle each year. Animal manure is almost wholly used as fuel. The use of fertilizers is still in its infancy; in 1953 only 11,171 tons were imported. The practice of green manuring is virtually unknown. Insects and diseases still take a heavy toll. Much higher yields can be obtained through better selection of seeds and varieties, improved crop rotation and better soil preparation and cultural practices.

7. *Animal husbandry is not practiced as an integral part of agriculture and is still on a low standard.*

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time to time, however, spot analysis will also be required to carry out special programs to improve soil fertility. 654 134

Cadastral Survey

Aerial photography should assist considerably in accelerating the cadastral survey work which was first initiated in 1923 but was still only 45% completed by the beginning of 1953. It is clearly in Syria's interest to finish the cadaster as soon as possible so that the uncertainty surrounding private property rights may be ended at long last and the extent of state domain may be clearly determined. Similarly, it is necessary to expedite the lagging program for converting *mucha'a* or village common land to individual peasant ownership. Experience with the accelerated survey for the Jezireh indicates the need for additional measures to speed up the work. This survey, originally scheduled for completion in the spring of 1955, is now unlikely to be finished before the end of 1956. Insufficient funds, shortages of trained personnel and cumbersome procedures have all contributed to delay this vital survey work. The mission urges that all possible measures to expedite the program be taken. Among the measures that might be considered are the contracting of necessary ground surveys to qualified private firms; the delimitation of properties in certain areas solely by means of aerial photographs rather than by ground surveys; and the possibility of shortcuts in the protracted legal procedures involved in the determination of titles. 654

State Domain

The aerial, cadastral and soil surveys outlined above will for the first time provide the government with approximately accurate information on the area and quality of state domain. At present the government claims ownership of 1,417,571 hectares of allegedly cultivable land of which 551,473 are leased for cultivation. This total, however, excludes the unoccupied or "dead" land (*mawat*) which was assimilated to state domain by Legislative Decree No. 135 of October 29, 1952. Nor does it include the land which may be "recaptured" by the state under other provisions of the same decree. For instance, this decree specified that prior occupation of land which had not yet been sanctioned by the acquisition of title would be recognized only up to 200 hectares per member of the occupier's 491 423

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471 immediate family. It also provided that in adjudicating title deeds in
423 which the area derived from the indicated boundaries of the property was greater than the area mentioned in the deed, the boundaries would govern at least to the extent that they gave each member of the titleholder's family a minimum of 200 hectares. The mission urges that these provisions, which have apparently not yet been applied, be enforced as rapidly as possible. Their application would inflict no undue hardship, and would increase significantly the amount of revenue-earning state domain. Above all, it would put at the government's disposal more good land to be retained as a reserve for the ultimate settlement of landless or virtually landless peasants. Much of the land now left to the state is too marginal for successful settlement.

471 Careful management of state domain is necessary to ensure that the
423 state derives from it the maximum revenue and that land not really
427 suitable for cultivation is reserved for pasture or forest. The government is not equipped at present to exercise adequate supervision. Land is often tilled without authorization, thus depriving the government of revenue and often encouraging the cultivation of land which can be expected to produce a satisfactory harvest only in years of exceptionally high rainfall. Until cultivable land is required for settlement, it should be leased, as at present, to private operators who have the necessary machinery to till it. Thus land in the Jezireh which is recaptured under the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 135 might well be leased to those who now cultivate it, so that existing units of exploitation are not disturbed until the land is needed for distribution. However, current rentals for state land, even though they have been rising in recent years, still seem unduly low. Judging from private rental arrangements prevailing in the Jezireh, for example, the state should be able to charge an average rental of at least £S 5-6 per hectare instead of only a little over £S 3 as at present. In this way the government can add to the funds available for financing development.

Forestry and State Domain

137 The management of state domain should look also to the preservation
459 and improvement of forest areas on government land. Syria has unfortunately been almost entirely denuded of forests. Although some 448,000 hectares are listed officially as "forest", 348,000 hectares consist either of

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137 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the
659 mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available
313 to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

428 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant pro-
166 prietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60%, respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in
166 settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experi-
341 mental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

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build up a sufficient fund to finance the actual settlement. The mission did not obtain sufficient information on these plans to appraise their soundness, but suggests that they be reviewed in the light of the considerations that should, in its opinion, govern such settlements.

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The amount of land to be allocated per farm family in any settlement must depend on the yield of the land and the capacity of the cultivator to till it. The prospective yield must be such as to enable the farmer to earn a decent living without, however, being so high as to create inequities. The size of the allotment must not exceed that which the cultivator can manage with the labor of his own family and with the equipment at his disposal. For irrigated areas the appropriate allotment would be 5-10 hectares where land is good to average. In areas adjoining urban markets where intensive cultivation of vegetables is possible, the allotment could be below 5 hectares; and in areas where the soil is rather poor, more than 10 hectares may be necessary. Settlements for Bedouins in dry-farming areas should be organized on the assumption of 50 hectares per family. The mission believes, however, that it would be unwise to allocate all this land at once, since no family could be expected to cultivate such a large parcel. The initial allocation should be about 25-30 hectares, and even of this a part might be put into improved pasture instead of being cropped. The balance might then be put into a reserve which would be used for grazing and be available for allotment to farmers who show themselves especially capable, or to new families in the settlement. Such a pattern will make it easier for the Bedouin to accomplish the transition to settled agriculture, by enabling him to carry on his customary pastoral pursuits as he crops his land.

The land would have to be tilled with draft animals and the necessary supplemental tools, but a special effort must be made to provide the settler with more adequate draft animals and better equipment than are customarily employed. While the use of mechanized equipment would in general be impracticable, the mission does recommend that one dry-farming community be organized on a mechanized basis. Such a community is suggested quite frankly as an experiment to test the possibilities of mechanical cultivation by smallholders. Ideally, the necessary tractors, implements and harvesting machinery should be owned and operated cooperatively. In the beginning, however, the settlers would hardly be prepared for such cooperative action. The mission suggests therefore that the government establish the necessary machinery unit under the direction

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423 166 241 of a manager with experience in the operation and maintenance of mechanical equipment. In the first few years at least the services of this unit should be made available to cultivators at rates high enough to cover cost of amortization and operation. As and when the farmers acquire experience with machinery and develop a community spirit conducive to cooperative action, steps should be taken to transfer the equipment in whole or in part to cooperatives.

The government should utilize the opportunity afforded by such new settlements to raise the standard of agricultural practices above the average. A government agricultural worker or community leader should be assigned to each settlement. It cannot be expected, of course, that optimum farm practices will be adopted, particularly by Bedouin settlers. It is possible, however, to provide guidance and even, perhaps, to prescribe certain crop rotations. In the dry-farming communities wheat will obviously be the principal crop, but winter vetch and such legumes as lentils, chick peas and soya beans should also be part of the cropping scheme. From 5 to 10 hectares might be left fallow each year. Another 5-10 hectares of each farmer's allotment might well be put into approved pasture. Each settler should be provided with about 60 sheep which should give a return nearly equal to that derived from crops. For the irrigated areas much more intensive cultivation, with a minimum of fallow, should of course be envisaged. The emphasis should be on such summer crops as cotton, sugar beets, peanuts, maize, beans and vegetables grown in proper rotation. Here the use of fertilizers and insecticides will have to be especially encouraged. A few cattle should be kept on the basis of the fodder provided by some of the suggested crops.

423 166 241 361 Each settlement should be small enough so that the remotest farm would be no farther than an hour's walk from the village, and large enough to warrant the establishment of minimum community services such as a well, a mosque or church, a school and a community center. The first consideration is important only in determining the size of a dry-farming settlement and would point to a settlement with an area no larger than about 5,500 hectares. On such a dry-farming area 120 families, including 10 non-farming families, could be settled initially; and the total might ultimately be about double if the land first held in reserve as pasture were subsequently allocated to new families. Even a settlement of 120 families, with a total population of 600-720, could support minimum community facilities. For the irrigated areas, where land allotments would

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

DIAGRAM 1
SCHEMATIC RELATIONSHIP OF DRY-FARMING COMMUNITIES



a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMS
c: COMMUNITY LAND FOR GRAZING



DIAGRAM 2
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(20 Hectare Farms)

DIAGRAM 3
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY "B"
(50 Hectare Farms)

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423 be much smaller, the minimum size of a community might be raised to
166 around 300 families, including some 30 non-farming families. Such a larger
241 community would economize capital invested in common services. Even
361 on irrigated land, however, circumstances might dictate the establishment of a smaller community with a provision for subsequent growth if the potentialities of the land warrant it.

A settlement should be laid out in such a way as to make access to farm land convenient and to fit into adjoining settlements of a similar type. For the dry-farming area settlement units shaped like hexagons would in principle be ideal. (See Diagrams 1-3.) In such a unit the farms could be laid out at an angle to six roads radiating from the center and parallel to the sides of the hexagon. Between the farms radiating from the roads the land initially reserved as common pasture would be located. One of the six roads would link the settlement with other communities. A number of hexagonal settlements would fit well together. It must be recognized, however, that modifications in this basic hexagonal unit will often be necessary, owing to marked variations in the quality of the soil or the topography, the relationship of the area to existing settlements and other factors. (For examples, see Diagrams 4-6.) In the irrigated regions the shape of the settlement will be largely determined by the layout of the irrigation system, so that the hexagon may well have to yield to the square as the more practical form.

In areas where a number of settlements are established the relationship of the new communities to each other and to existing settlements in adjoining areas must be carefully considered. For the Roudj, for example, the mission would suggest the establishment of about five communities, of which four would be purely agricultural and one would serve also as a minor marketing and administrative center and therefore be somewhat larger. (See Map 6.) A major center need not be envisaged in view of the proximity of the towns of Idlib and Jisr ech Chogour. For the more extensive region of the Ghab a similiar pattern can be contemplated; and the planning will need to be based on the assumption that Jisr ech Chogour, situated at the northern end of the area, will become the regional marketing and administrative center.

The mission strongly recommends the village-type of settlement. Any other type which would house the settlers on their own farms would not only be contrary to tradition, but would be destructive of community life and make it difficult to supply the needed community services. The village

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DIAGRAM 4
ALTERATION OF FARM DIVISIONS IN THE CASE
OF VARIATIONS IN THE QUALITIES OF SOIL

a: VILLAGE
b: INDIVIDUAL FARMING
c: IRRIGATED AREA



DIAGRAM 5
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY
WITH STREAM



DIAGRAM 6
LAYOUT OF COMMUNITY WITH
DIFFERENT TOPOGRAPHIC CONTOURS

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MAP 6



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should be located in the center of the settlement area and laid out along a rectangular pattern with the community facilities and open public places in the middle. It would be desirable to have the village surrounded by a small garden area and a belt of trees.

The settlement must, of course, be considered "model", but not in the sense that its standards and costs are so high as to render its general adoption prohibitively expensive. The settlers should be expected to contribute their own labor to its initial construction and the subsequent gradual expansion and improvement of its facilities. This will help to reduce costs and give the settlers a sense of pride and achievement in the establishment of the community. For example, the ultimate aim might be to provide a farm family with a 5-room house (3 main rooms, kitchen and laundry-lavatory), enclosed courtyard, storehouse and stables.[10] Initially, however, it would suffice to provide a 2-room unit without some of the elements in the final building. The cost could thus be kept to about £S 1,500, to which the settler might contribute £S 800 in the form of properly supervised self-help. Each farm family will need, however, a minimum sustenance allowance of approximately £S 1,000 to tide it over the first year when the community is in the course of construction and little is produced. Such an allowance should be paid out in the form of compensation for labor services provided by the settlers.

The mission has estimated the cash investment outlay in the different types of settlements as follows (in Syrian pounds):

	Dry farming settlement (120 families)		Irrigated area settlement (310 families)
	Non-mechanized	Mechanized	
Housing for farm families	77,000	77,000	191,100
Housing and shops for non-farm families	20,000	20,000	67,000
Community facilities[a]	71,000	71,000	182,000
Draft power, livestock and implements	318,000	514,000[b]	341,250
Sustenance allowance	110,000	110,000	273,000
Total	596,000	792,000	1,054,350

[a] Including schools, mosques (or churches), community centers, water supply and roads.
[b] Including £S 250,000 for mechanized equipment.

[10] See Annex I, p. 468.

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423 166 241 361 The mission suggests that the state Agricultural Bank finance the housing and means of production (other than mechanized equipment) under loans to be amortized over a 10-year and three- to four-year period respectively. The government itself should be responsible for providing the funds necessary for community facilities, mechanized equipment and payment of the sustenance allowance.

423 166 241 The mission's calculations indicate that the average farm family should be able to earn a net annual income of around £S 2,000 in the dry-farming communities and of over £S 3,000 in the irrigated-area communities even during the period when loans are being repaid. This should leave a small margin for the payment for land in the dry-farming areas and a substantial margin for the necessary payments for land and water in the irrigated areas. The mission believes it a sound principle to require some payment even for non-irrigated state domain. The price of land, however, should be such that the settler can expect to become a full owner within a reasonable period, e.g., no more than 10 to 15 years.

Certain conditions will need to be enforced in settling peasants on the land. For example, title should not be transferred until all payments have been completed, and in the intervening period the government should reserve the right to remove settlers who prove to be clearly unsuitable or do not till their own land. Even after title has been transferred, the government might well retain for a specified period the right to veto all proposed sales, mortgages or leases, in order to safeguard the fundamental objective of establishing and maintaining independent peasant proprietors.

During the next five years the government will have to undertake the settlement of the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab. For the settlement of Bedouins the mission recommends the establishment of two experimental dry-farming communities, one of which would be mechanized, in the Jezireh. The mission must emphasize, however, that the latter two experiments are bound to fail unless the government allocates to them good land situated in a region with adequate rainfall. Both the Roudj and the Jezireh projects will provide much valuable experience useful in extending the settlement effort. In addition the government might well undertake one project in the Djebel es Smaane northwest of Aleppo and another in the Djebel Druze. The ruins of many once imposing cities testify that the first region flourished from the first to the seventh century of the Christian era, and recent evidence indicates that this prosperity was primarily founded on orchards and vineyards. More recently people have been

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returning to become squatters among the ruins and cultivate patches of stony but fertile soil. Organization of this rather haphazard settlement and the establishment of a planned community based again on orchards and vineyards may prove a worthwhile undertaking. In the Djebel Druze, where living standards are low and emigration is difficult for religious reasons, a similar settlement should be tried, provided a suitable tract of land can be found. Here, too, conditions are favorable for the establishment of orchards and vineyards.

At present responsibility for settlement is dispersed. The Ghab Administration is entrusted with settlement in the Ghab; the Irrigation Service has the task in other newly reclaimed and irrigated areas; and the Ministry of Agriculture has the initiative for the dry-farming areas. The mission strongly recommends that responsibility for planning and coordinating all the work be vested in a single, independent Settlements Administration, which would also discharge certain governmental functions relating to housing, town planning and similar subjects. The settlement program will require a great organizational effort and a staff which only a single agency would be capable of mobilizing. One administration is also much more likely to apply the experience gained in the initial settlement work to subsequent ventures. The mission urges that such an agency be established promptly, so that the necessary planning may be immediately initiated. The assistance of a number of foreign experts will need to be enlisted to carry out the program.

If the four settlements the mission has recommended are established and the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab are settled, the total cost would probably be around £S 10 million. Under the mission's proposals, £S 5.5 million would be financed by the Agricultural Bank, and the balance met directly by the government. With these funds it should be possible to settle some 2,300 families or between 12,000 and 14,000 people.

Land Reform

While the settlement of state domain may gradually increase the number of peasant proprietors, Syria will also have to work out policies relating to land ownership and tenancy in the areas already under cultivation. In this connection it should be noted that Article 22 of the 1950 constitution calls for legislation to determine, without retroactive effect, "the maximum area of land that may be owned, exploited and disposed of, according to

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423 districts"; to provide for the forfeiture of land "neglected for a period of
425 time"; to encourage "small and medium properties"; and "to protect the peasant and raise his standard of living".

In recent years several countries have taken steps to break up large estates and distribute them among landless tenants. Where large estates are farmed in small plots by tenants operating with rather primitive methods, the economic advantages resulting from well-managed large-scale exploitation certainly do not accrue. On the contrary, farming by impoverished tenants may be regarded as a social liability and an actual or potential cause of discontent. In the last analysis only the Syrian people acting through their government are competent to determine what course to pursue regarding large landholdings. The mission would only point out that expropriation on a considerable scale would entail large outlays for compensation and would be more disruptive than constructive, unless adequate measures were simultaneously taken to provide new peasant owners with sufficient supplies of seed, draft animals and tools and to guide them in their agricultural practices. Where labor is scarce and land is cultivated on a large scale by machinery, as in the Jezireh, expropriation would manifestly serve no useful purpose and would result, instead, in a substantial reduction in output.

There are, however, certain measures the mission would recommend for serious consideration. One would be to prevent aggravation of the problem by enacting legislation to prohibit individual families who already own a certain amount of land—say, 1,000 hectares—from increasing their holdings still further. Another would be to enforce, as a minimum, the existing legislation, which provides that land not tilled for five years should revert to the state. In cases where land is utilized or exploited in a manner which is not in accordance with the standards prevailing in Syria, the
423 government would be justified in depriving the owner of his land. Finally,
651 the mission suggests that the larger landowners should be more heavily taxed in the interest of raising more money for development and of promoting greater social equity. Income derived from agriculture does not fall at present under any of the existing schedular income taxes. Instead, most agricultural produce brought to market is taxed at 7%. While this tax does not bear heavily on peasants who produce primarily for their own consumption, it is not progressive in its application to landowners or pump owners who sell their share of the output on the market. The mission sug-

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gests, therefore, that this tax be complemented by a new land tax. The rate of such a tax should increase with the size of landholdings, and small holdings should be entirely exempt. The rates must also be in accordance with the yield of the land, but the mission suggests that they be kept rather low (e.g., not more than £S 2-3 per hectare on the average) so that a detailed, complex classification of land in accordance with productivity may be avoided. In another section of this report the mission proposes that the present schedular income taxes be supplemented by a global income tax levied at a moderate rate. In our opinion, income from agriculture should be included in the scope of such a global tax. The ascertainment of income from land is by no means as difficult as is generally supposed.

In addition to taking these steps, the government should pay special attention to the improvement of the lot of tenant farmers. In general, measures should be adopted to increase the tenant's share of the output, to give him greater security of tenure and to make him less dependent on the landlord as a source of credit and supplies.

The economic bargaining power of the landlord vis-à-vis the tenant and of the pump owner vis-à-vis the cultivator is so great that the landlord and pump owner obtain a rather excessive share of the output of the land. It would be desirable to establish a commission to study the various forms of association in the exploitation of agricultural land which prevail in different parts of Syria and to make recommendations designed not only to make these arrangements more equitable but also to put them on a basis which would give the actual cultivator of the land more incentive to improve his agricultural methods. Such a commission could work out the terms of written contracts which would be applicable to various types of association. It could also devise ways of giving greater security of tenure to the tenants. The latter can generally be ousted at will by landlords and the land they receive for cultivation is so frequently reallotted that they acquire no interest in its permanent improvement. Finally, it would be appropriate to consider the establishment of local land tenure commissions to settle, in a manner comparable to settlement of labor conflicts, disputes among the parties sharing in the exploitation of the land.

A number of measures to foster cooperatives, provide more ample credit and establish machinery for assisting the farmer at the village level are recommended elsewhere in this report. It is important that these measures

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for study abroad should be a necessary part of the training of the senior staff. 654 242

The findings of research, experimentation and the experiences of farmers give support to extension programs. Much information is already available and should be transmitted to farmers, but more systematic and better coordinated practical research should be the aim in the future. The two functions of research and extension should be coordinated within the Ministry of Agriculture so that each performs its specialized service, in a manner that supplements and complements the other. Research must focus on the key needs and concerns of farmers and anticipate future problems. For instance, one of the emerging needs is to know more about good crop rotation practices, including better use of land now fallow.

Chart 1 indicates the mission's conception of a desirable organizational framework for the agricultural credit and rural development program it has recommended.

IV LAND TENURE

In Syria, the landowner group is composed of full owners, part owners, debt-encumbered owners, and owners with undetermined title. Owners range from operators of large commercial farms to small subsistence farmers. The tenant group is composed of farmers who rent or make some payment for the use of land, and comprises most of the farmers who live on the land and cultivate it. Most of the large owners do not live permanently on their land but operate through some type of sharecropper system. There are very few cash tenants. The sharecropper usually works under the direction of the landlord or his agent and is dependent upon him for farm supplies and operating capital. Often he contributes toward crop production little but his own and his family's labor. His status is more nearly that of a laborer than of a tenant. A true tenant has rights of occupancy and land use that are protected by law, while the sharecropper is very much subject to the will of the landlord. 423 427

In general, it appears that in the rainfed areas the sharecropper receives about 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor, and around 70% if he provides the working capital. In areas sparsely settled he receives a slightly higher percentage of the crop, and in heavily populated areas he may receive somewhat less. On the irrigated lands the sharecropper receives in

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423 the neighborhood of 20-30% of the crop if he furnishes only his labor, and
427 about one-half of the crop if he provides his own working capital. The distribution of the returns on privately irrigated lands is, however, often much affected by the person who controls the pump.

Land Ownership

423 As in other countries of the Middle East considerable uncertainty attaches to ownership rights in land. By no means all of the cultivated or cultivable land is listed in the official property registers, and titles which are registered are often imprecise or conflicting in stating the boundaries or the area. The validity of many land grants made in the past is also subject to challenge.

[471] By far the greater part of the land unquestionably belongs to the state, if only because most of the land is uncultivable and therefore unutilized and all unoccupied or "dead land" has always in theory belonged to the state. State land has in the past fallen into two categories: "state domain" proper, which is officially registered as belonging to the state, and unoccupied or "dead land" (*mawat*) to which no title exists.

Land other than state domain is held under various traditional forms of ownership including *mulk, waqf, matroukah, amiri* and *mucha'a*. *Mulk* is the only form of absolute ownership and covers only a small proportion of state land. *Waqf* is property held in the form of a religious trust and is not particularly significant as far as agricultural land is concerned. *Matroukah* is land dedicated to public purposes and also has no significance for agriculture. Most land is *amiri*, a type of hereditary leasehold. Ultimate ownership in theory rests with the state which can legally recover *amiri* land if it is not cultivated for five years in succession. The latter right is, however, never exercised, and *amiri* land can be said to be in virtually unqualified private ownership. *Mucha'a* is village land held in common but cultivated in individual family plots periodically reallotted among the holders. This form of tenure has predominated in certain parts of the country such as the Hauran and obviously gives little or no incentive to permanent improvement of the land.

Recognizing that clear and undisputed private landownership is a prerequisite to land improvement, the government has been seeking over many years to terminate the *mucha'a* form of tenure and end the confusion in land titles. *Mucha'a* land is being gradually distributed and converted to

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•423 private ownership, and a cadastral survey has been proceeding for three decades to delimit and determine titles to land. Inadequate funds, insufficient trained personnel and cumbersome procedures have made progress very slow. For instance, the cadastral survey, which is apparently supposed to cover about 7.82 million hectares, had been completed for only 3.54 million acres by the end of 1952. The work was farthest advanced in the provinces of Aleppo, Hama and Homs and least advanced in those of Hassetche, Deir ez Zor, Dera'a and Soueida. At the end of 1952 the government authorized an expedited 27-months' survey for the mohafazat of Hassetche. For the first time, aerial photography is being used to carry out the program and a soil survey is being conducted at the same time. Even here, however, the work, originally scheduled to be completed by the spring of 1955, has fallen behind schedule and is now unlikely to be finished much before the end of 1956.

Size of Holdings

An official estimate apparently made for Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, who made a developmental study of Syria in 1946-47, indicated that of about 6.1 million hectares of privately held land 38% was in holdings of over 100 hectares and 19% in holdings of 10 hectares and less. In the last analysis only the cadastral survey is likely to give more accurate data on the distribution of land. For the 2.2 million hectares of privately owned land covered by the survey up to the end of 1952, the distribution by size of holdings was as follows:

Classification of holdings (hectares)	Percent of area
Small holdings	
Less than 1	1
2–5	5
5–10	7
Total	13
Medium holdings	
10–25	17
25–50	11
50–100	10
Total	38

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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Large holdings	
100–500	24
500–1,000	9
Over 1,000	16
Total	49
Total all groups	100%

This would indicate that 49% of the land area is in holdings of over 100 hectares and 16% in holdings of over 1,000 hectares. These percentages may well be lower when the survey in the mohafazats of Dera'a and Soueida are completed, for these are areas of predominantly small holdings. Large estates are found particularly in the mohafazats of Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Hassetche. Some holdings are known to be in excess of 100,000 hectares. Unfortunately the mission was unable to obtain data on the number of holdings in each of the classifications listed in the above table.

Land Tenure Policy

The objectives of a tenure improvement program in Syria in respect to private lands should be: (1) to prevent the further growth of large holdings and promote generally a wider distribution of ownership, while avoiding at the same time excessive fragmentation of already small holdings; (2) to secure a more equitable distribution of farm income among those associated in the cultivation of the land, including the landlord, the cultivator-tenant, the pump-owner and others who have acquired rights in or power over the returns from land; (3) to promote greater security of tenure for the tenant; and (4) to enable the small owner and tenant to become more prosperous and independent by improved methods of production and the introduction of needed economic institutional reforms.

On public domain lands, the principal objectives should be (1) to establish the extent of state domain, particularly of cultivable lands; (2) to reserve state domain suitable for arable farming for gradual distribution to farmer-operators as and when the need arises; (3) in the meanwhile, to permit the exploitation of state domain under medium-term lease arrangements but at adequate rentals; and (4) to take steps to ensure good public land management on state domain.

In the process of settling state lands suitable for development, an im-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

423 portant step accompanying or following the survey should be classification of the land to determine: (1) the inherent land characteristics; (2) present use; (3) use capability; and (4) recommended use by size of operating unit. This information is necessary to carry out a good settlement policy with respect to land use, involving primarily the size of units to be established and recommendations for cropping and land practices to be followed. A sound settlement program should settle good farmers on good land under conditions that afford a reasonable opportunity for success. This is most important in the distribution of state domain land.

It is also desirable that the price to the settler for the land, buildings and the improvements be in line with the productive capacity of the land, and that payments on this indebtedness be related to the time when farm income may be realized. Any repayment made during the first few years will necessarily be small, and might not begin before the third year of settlement. The total charge against a new land settler should not exceed 2½-3½ times the gross annual returns from land. This is equivalent to the payment of an annual rental of 20-25% of the crop produced for a period of 10 to 15 years. As a prospective landowner a settler should be required to maintain and improve his farm, pay taxes, provide for living expenses and enjoy the inducement of an additional income to enable him and his family to improve their standard of living.

The period of repayment should not exceed 10-15 years. A longer period is more hazardous, discouraging, and does not afford proper incentive to land ownership. A 10-year period is preferable.

The functions of the Court are: (1) to consider the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and any administrative decisions; (2) to conduct the trial of the President of the Republic and the Ministers; and (3) to examine the validity of elections.

For the purpose of the appointment, promotion, transfer, and discharge of judges or the various courts other than the Supreme Court, a High Council of Judges is provided, composed of the President of the Supreme Court, two members of the Supreme Court, and the highest ranking four judges of the Court of Cassation. The Council is set up to ensure that the judicial authority is kept independent of the influence of the Government.

The Constitution provides, likewise, detailed provisions for the division of the country into administrative units and for local provincial government and municipal administration. It also provides rules for the preparation of the budget and the procedure of its introduction to Parliament, as well as other measures related to financial policy. An interesting provision related to the economic development of the country is the establishment of a Permanent Economic Council for the purpose of formulating plans for the development and exploitation of the economic potentialities of Syria.

Probably the most interesting innovation of the Constitution is its Bill of Rights comprising 28 articles which define with considerable detail the fundamental principles of freedom and the social and economic rights of the individual citizen. The numerous provisions stressing liberty and equality of the individual and the freedom of the press may seem superfluous, but they are deemed worthy of emphasis in view of the authoritarian tendency in the administration since the establishment of the national regime.

Article 21 marks a radical departure from the principle of the existing social-economic system. In this article, property is defined as both "public" and "private"; and the State like the individual may possess property within the limits of the law. As to private ownership, "the method of its possession and disposal shall be specified by law in such a manner as to make it perform its social function." Further, no individual is to be permitted to "utilize his private ownership in a manner inconsistent

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDI Syria MDI

642 with public welfare." All subsoil minerals, solid or liquid, are
423 declared the property of the State; and the State, in the general interest, is permitted to expropriate private property in accordance with a law providing for just compensation. But Article 23 ensures that no "general confiscation" shall be permitted.

The Constitution provides in like manner the way of utilizing the land. It stipulates that land "shall be cultivated and not neglected"; and that should it be left unexploited within a certain period to be specified by law, the right of usufruct is alienated. The Constitution provides, likewise, that "a maximum limit for land ownership shall be prescribed by law," and that small and medium ownership is to be encouraged: "The State shall distribute State lands to peasants to whom land is not available sufficient to their living, against small rents to be repaid in installments." (Article 22.)[22]

642 Labor is regarded as "the most basic factor in social life," and
659 is "the right of all citizens." "The State shall provide work to citizens and shall guarantee it by directing and promoting the national economy." (Article 26.) The State undertakes to protect labor and provide legislation for the regulation of wages, hours of labor, allowances, and the improvement of social and health conditions. Trade unions are permitted to be formed within the limits of the law. Forced labor is prohibited except by law aimed at certain specific social and constructional services, and in case of war and emergencies.

642 Education is declared a right of every citizen. Elementary
871 education is compulsory and free in all Government schools. Secondary and professional education, though not compulsory, is also free in all Government schools. "The State shall give priority in the budget for the spread and expansion of elementary, rural, and professional education." The aim of education is defined as "the creation of a generation strong in body and mind, full of faith in God, endowed with moral virtues, proud in the

425 [22] On February 15, 1951, the Minister of Agriculture announced a plan for the distribution of 166,000 dunams (app. 41,500 acres) of State land in the Jazirah area among 554 Bedouin families of the Shammar Zor tribe. Each family will receive 300 dunams (75 acres), and each peasant, after paying the State LS 1.5 annually for 3 years, will own his share of the land. The State land is to be distributed among several villages, each village to receive 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres).

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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pensated partly by her transit trade in goods and partly by her gold and currencies market. Syria wanted a controlled economy with import restrictions, protection of Syrian industries, and independence from French financial policy, but Lebanon's interest was to encourage all trade movements and to rely on franc support: moreover, the two countries could not agree on the division of customs dues. After years of arguments and negotiations the economic partnership was finally terminated on 14 March 1950 and customs posts were established along the common frontier. Since then agreements have been drawn up despite Syrian reluctance, but little has been achieved towards the re-establishment of economic union. It is therefore necessary to consider the economies of the two countries separately.

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Agriculture

Over half but less than three-quarters of the cultivable area of Syria is, in fact, under cultivation. Since 1946 there has been a great increase in the number of pumps and tractors in use (there were 300 tractors in 1948 and 1,342 in 1951) but, as the following table shows, the cultivated area can still be extended.

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ESTIMATES OF THE USE OF LAND, 1950

	Syria		Lebanon	
	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total
Cultivable				
Cultivated under rainfall	8,400	12	803	20
Cultivated with irrigation	1,400	2	115	3
Potentially cultivable	14,000	20	700	17
Uncultivable				
Forests	1,600	2	285	7
Pasture	21,000	30	27	1
Desert, mountain and marsh	23,600	34	2,085	52
Total Area:	70,000	100	4,015	100

(Sources: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952*; UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2*.)

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Some progress in mechanized farming has been made in recent years, but much of the land is tilled as it was 2,000 years ago. The predominant form of land tenure is share-cropping by tenants on estates of large and medium size. Small holdings under 25 acres prevail in areas of intensive cultivation, and at present are estimated to constitute only 15 per cent of the total

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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cultivated area. Holdings of 25–250 acres are estimated to take 423
up 33 per cent of the area and holdings over 250 acres 29 per cent. State land is estimated to represent 23 per cent of the total cultivated area. Decrees for the distribution of state lands were issued in 1952: their implementation, at the time of writing, is still under review. Legislation to prevent the subdivision of plots by succession inheritances is also under consideration; at present a four-acre plot may have thirty-seven owners, and its management is profitable only to lawyers.

The approximate acreage and crop and yield of the main 241
products are shown in the following table. 433

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)			*Production* (000 metric tons)			*Yield* (100 kg. per ha.)	
	1950	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*
Cotton (lint)	78	217	142	35	49	49	4·6	2·3
Wheat	992	1,037	900*	890	510	850*	8·4	4·9
Barley	416	344	400*	322	155	350*	7·7	4·5
Vegetables	68	66	..	47	40	142	..	..
Tobacco†	10	11	..	9	9	..	8·7	..
Rice (paddy)	7	..	..	24	6	6	19·3‡	..

.. = not available.

* The Banque de Syrie et du Liban (*Exercice 1952*) quotes the following figures for 1952 (in thousands):

Wheat: area = 1,180, production = 805.
Barley: area = 396, production = 467.

† Including Lebanon (annual production about 2,000–3,000 tons). ‡ 1949.

(SOURCES: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952* and *Monthly Bulletins of Statistics*, 1953; vegetable figures from Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952*, Paris, 1953.)

Wheat is the traditional staple crop of Syria and in a normal 248
year a quarter of a million tons can be exported. But the poor 439
harvest of 1951 necessitated wheat imports of about 50,000 241
tons. The 1952 wheat crop, however, once more increased to 433
over 800,000 tons. Barley is also grown and exported and, though the acreage has diminished somewhat since 1949, the crop is adequate.

In 1950 fortunes were made from cotton which fetched a high 248
price for the abundant harvest. The acreage sown to cotton 433
trebled between 1949 and 1950 and again in 1951. But while in 1950 the cotton yield was high, the 1951 harvest proved disappointing because of drought and attacks of the boll weevil. Despite a fall in cotton acreage in 1952—due chiefly to the downward trend in cotton prices—that year's output was maintained at the 1951 level, thanks largely to better methods

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MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)		Production (000 metric tons)		Yields (100 kg. per ha.)
	1951	1952	1951	1952	1950
Wheat	61	70	43	50	7·5
Barley	15	20	14	27	11·2
Cotton	5	2	1	..	..
Tobacco	..	..	3	2	..
Citrus fruit	..	..	78	90	..
Grapes	21	..	80	..	..

.. = not available.

(Sources: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Enquête 1952* (Paris 1953); except figures for yields, cotton production, and area and production of grapes, all of which have been taken from FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952.)

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There is enough water for land to be used more intensively than in Syria but there is not enough room to grow all that the country needs. Improved methods have increased the yield of cereals per acre, but Lebanon will always have to import wheat. The crop of grapes is nearly double the weight of the wheat harvest and Lebanon exports grapes, wine, and the best quality araq. The citrus exports are high but the growers have not yet established the same name for quality as have the Israelis. Melons, water-melons, apples, onions, and potatoes are also important crops and vegetables are exported as far as the oil towns of Kuwait and Dahran. Cotton and tobacco are also grown in small quantities.

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The land is more evenly parcelled out amongst the people in Lebanon than in Syria but, despite the fact that there are many small holdings, there is a general shift from country to town, and Beirut and its immediate neighbourhood hold nearly half of the population. In the coastal regions of intensive cultivation small holdings predominate, while in the plain regions large estates worked by share-croppers are the most prevalent form of land tenure. Some estates owned by rich men are farmed under modern methods and equipment and there is less room for improvement or for expansion in agriculture than in Syria.

Industry

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Relative to its size, Lebanon is one of the most industrialized countries in the Middle East area. It is probable that nearly 50,000 persons are so employed, of whom over half are factory workers. However, Lebanese industry has only partly recovered from the loss of the Syrian market and some industries had either to move to Syria or to curtail production. The biggest industries are electricity, which produced 130 million kwh. in 1951, and the Chekka cement factory south of Tripoli, which produced 303,000 tons of cement in 1951. Cotton weaving and

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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About two years ago the Government of Saudi Arabia proclaimed its readiness to grant state land to any citizen who undertakes to put it under cultivation. This policy was developed on the basis of the Koranic statement to the effect that land belongs to the one who revives it. It must be remarked in this connection that the religion of Islam is basically for the equitable distribution and utilization of the land resource. Saudi Arabia is an Orthodox Muslim country, regulating its life in accordance with the religious law. This opens the possibility for the development of a form of ownership that is at the same time Islamic and effective. SA 423

In the summer of 1949 Col. Husni Za'im of Syria was liquidated through a coup d'état, but not so the reforms he had initiated. The idea of reforming the land tenure system has been kept alive. The government that followed that of Za'im created a committee representing various agencies to study the problem and recommend possible solutions. This activity bore fruit in the form of Article 22 in the new Syrian constitution, which provides, among other things, for (a) encouragement of small and medium land holdings; (b) setting a maximum limit to the size of holdings, but not retroactively; (c) making it obligatory upon the owner to keep his land under cultivation, otherwise he would lose his claim over it; and (d) distributing state land among landless peasants. There are also indications that the present government intends to take effective action in this respect. There is already a plan for the resettlement of peasants on state land in the Homs-Hama areas. S 185 423 166 M 185 423 166

A promising sign in Egypt is the consciousness of the problem that is now shared by government officials and by people in various walks of life, including the peasants themselves. This consciousness has developed as a result of a rapid increase in population, bringing about a tremendous pressure upon the land resource. As mentioned above, this resource is highly concentrated in the hands of the very few, including the state. The landless or near-landless peasant desires strongly a few acres of the coveted precious land. E 185 471 M 185 471

In response to this tense situation, Egyptian leadership is beginning to take some action. In some cases the government has M 471 427 E 471 427

25c Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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S 241 311 crease the productivity per acre and also to expand the culti-
vated area per head.

L 311 241 434 In the Lebanon, however, with its steep hillsides under intensive cultivation, there is a definite pressure on land resources. The limits of intensification appear to have been reached, and a large part of the village population supplements its income by work in the towns, and by remittances from abroad. If the land L S 511 167 tenure system in Syria were less oppressive, room might be found on the land for settlers from the Lebanon, but as things are, the standard of living and status of the Lebanese peasant is higher; compared with the Syrian peasant he is a free man, and there is no inducement to leave the Mountain for the underpopulated plains of central or northern Syria.

LAND TENURE

L 471 423 464 Corresponding to these different methods of farming, there are different systems of land tenure.[1] In Lebanon individual small ownership is well established, and the pattern of village life, with its broad class of small peasant owners, few large farmers, and a growing class of landless labourers, resembles that of Europe.

S 471 427 428 In Syria, the greater part of the land is owned by city notables—the ruling class—and cultivated by small share-tenants. Though individual ownership exists in some districts, for instance the Beqa Valley and the oasis of Damascus, the most usual form of landownership in the plain districts of Syria is share-tenancy. The villagers bring their corn to the village threshing floor, and when the grain is threshed the landlord or his agent stands by and takes one-half of the grain. Towards this result he has contributed nothing; all labour, equipment, seeds, livestock, have been supplied by the tenant, so that his share is rent purely for the use of the land. The landlord is almost always an absentee, a city notable who only visits the land to collect rent.

S 427 The share taken by the landlord varies from district to district, and also varies with the condition of the land. According to an inquiry made by the French authorities, the usual division of the crop for non-irrigated cereals is 40–50 per cent to the

[1] The information which follows is mainly based on A. Latron, *La Vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, L'Institut Français de Damas, 1936). The brilliant and profound study by Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient*, is an indispensable authority which unfortunately was received only after going to press.

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probably few, of the estates are the properties of old, wealthy families of Ottoman times, which still exist in Lebanon, such as the lands belonging to the families of Arslan, Jumblatt, Chehab, Khazen, but many of these have been broken up by the Moslem laws of inheritance. Other estates have originated from direct grants made by Turkish Sultans to influential politicians, as for example the two very large estates in the Beqa and the Litani valley. Others too were formed at the time of the general registration of property undertaken by the Ottoman Government when chiefs of tribes or villages registered tribal land in their names as their private property. Uncertainty about legal title to land gives the educated classes frequent opportunity for ousting peasant owners, and whole villages have come into the possession of rival groups of city notables, as a result of litigation among the villagers who have sought their assistance in establishing their title.

While the land-tenure system is thus a result of peasant poverty, it also perpetuates poverty by standing in the way of any long-term investment. The high percentage of fallow in Syria suggests a great waste of land resources, and there could certainly be some improvement in yields, even in dry land farming, if green crops were introduced more generally into the rotation. But the share-cropper has little incentive to improve the fertility of the land, since he has no certainty of tenure, and since the landlord will take 50 per cent of any increase. Since the landlords are not as a rule directly interested in farming, they do not themselves undertake long-term improvements in the land.

Three case studies illustrate the ways in which the land-tenure system hinders advance.[1]

One study relates to the large estate of Misherfe, near Homs in central Syria. This is 24,000 acres in extent and includes five villages, with 2,500 inhabitants. It is very extensively cultivated, only one-third of the area, 8,000 acres, being cropped each year. The land is divided into three parts, one with wheat, barley or *qatani* (mixed grain), one ploughed but not sown, and one left fallow. A small area, 200 acres only, is irrigated, though water supplies are sufficient to irrigate much larger areas.

[1] These studies, which were prepared for the M.E.S.C., are not at present available in print.

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There are some possibilities of raising yields in dry farming, but they are limited, and the main hope for increasing farm incomes is a better use of water supplies.

The second conclusion is that in every district half or more than half of the population live in extreme poverty, due to the low proportion of land cultivated, low yields, and the unequal distribution of land. In Lebanon, surplus rural population is the major cause of poverty. There is no motive-power making for progress: even richer peasants do not invest, but spend unproductively: the landlords are pure rent-receivers: and the poorer peasants are entangled in a network of debt without hope of escape.

FRENCH LAND POLICY

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In regard to the *mushaa* system, which was widely prevalent at the time the French took over, the French authorities have hastened the process of disintegration. By decrees passed in 1925 and 1926 the periodical re-allotment of holdings (i.e., the *mushaa* custom) was forbidden. Since the work of survey and settlement did not keep pace with the legislative enactment, this law meant an abrupt interference with village custom which contributed to agrarian unrest, particularly in the Hauran, where the *mushaa* custom was general. It appears to have been largely disregarded, and not to have been put into force by the Bureau de Cadastre (the French Survey Office, which is a private concession and not a government department), which undertook the work of land settlement.

M. Duraffourd, the Director of the Bureau de Cadastre, considered that the *mushaa* custom had a real basis in the social life of the country and should not be abolished. Moreover it had often happened in Turkish times that title to land had been granted in divided holdings, but the titles were disregarded by the occupiers of the land, who continued to exchange their shares as before. The Bureau de Cadastre, therefore, when establishing title to land in a *mushaa* village have followed the practice of registering each villager's share in the land as a fraction of the total area, without attaching the title to any specific piece of land. This method tends to preserve the *mushaa* system. When title is registered to definite pieces of land, the Bureau de Cadastre have attempted in some cases to re-group the holdings

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into single units, to form individual farms; but shortage of money limited this process to about 50,000 acres.

About half the area of Syria has been surveyed and title registered by the Bureau de Cadastre. As in Palestine, political unrest made it impossible to survey and register some districts, in particular the Hauran and the Jezira. With this limitation the work of the department appears to have been successful.

Water-Rights. One of the great obstacles to carrying out large-scale irrigation schemes is the confusion which prevails about water-rights. According to an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. in 1943 by Professor Addison, one important scheme, the Yamunne project, could not be initiated, because the complicated question of water-rights had not been settled. Since any big advance in agriculture really depends on irrigation, a settlement of water-rights is essential.

The French authorities have apparently been no more successful in dealing with this question than the British authorities in Palestine and Transjordan. A decree was issued by the High Commissioner in June 1925 nationalizing the water supply, and making all sources of water and water-courses public property; but a further decree in 1926 weakened this wise measure, permitting temporary occupation of water-rights for forty years, so that the result of the legislation has been to increase the confusion.

Control of Irrigation. There is no uniformity of procedure in controlling irrigation schemes, and no central authority controlling irrigation. There are three chief methods of control quite unrelated to each other. These are:

1. The village community in which water-rights are regulated by custom. This appears to be the prevalent method of control in all the village irrigation schemes, of which there are a very large number. Several villages may share in these schemes, and the distribution of water is established between them by custom, and administered by the village authorities. Each owner of land can claim a share in the total water supply measured as a unit of time, for example, one hour every seven days. This method is beginning to prove unsatisfactory. The big owners almost always control the best

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irrigated land, and village chiefs can frequently be bribed to leave open irrigation ditches so that their land is better watered. This frequently happens, for example, in the Ghuta of Damascus, where there is no unified plan for the irrigation of the district and no authority which can enforce the customary rights.

2. The system under which water is owned collectively, or as *Waqf*, in the northern Beqa.

3. Private ownership by large landowners. This is usual in the Lebanon where there are a number of small private schemes.

These methods of control apply to the smaller schemes. Large-scale schemes have been operated either by:

1. Private concession. Only one relatively large-scale concession is actually in operation, the Nahr Ibrahim (Adonis) scheme.
2. The State. State-controlled works have been carried out by
   (i) authorities directly under the control of the French authorities;
   (ii) authorities directly under the control of the Lebanese Public Works Ministry;
   (iii) Lebanese or Syrian authorities under the control of the Délégation Générale.

There is great need of a central authority to co-ordinate the supply of water. In the south Beqa, for instance, much irrigable land is left unirrigated and much water allowed to run to waste for lack of such an authority.

State Land. One of the main reasons for the lack of intensive cultivation in central Syria is that the State lands have never been systematically settled. Very large areas are State domain, that is, land registered as the property of the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid. Under the mandate, this land became the property of the local government. Under the Turks these lands were used for the 'displaced persons' of the old Empire, who were driven out when Turkish territory was lost, but they were still sparsely settled when the French took over.

After the rising of 1925 the French authorities began to settle

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the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled. Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

In several respects the French authorities have modified the Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the extensive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation concessions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the peasant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were started, but produced more water than could be used. The educational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessitates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

25. Wartime 5-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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311 Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of 233 means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

162 The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there 423 has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

471 In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently 312 been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into 425 the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

427 The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth 464 of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of [407] machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

464 Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricul- 511 tural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer 164 from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from 146 malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

000 Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and moneylenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

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SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organization.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

Since water supplies are precisely known and are constant throughout the year due to the regulating barrage of Homs Lake, it is possible to calculate exactly the quantity of water each hectare shall receive. This quantity is established at 0 liters 20 seconds per hectare. 312 804

The total rotation period consists of seven days, and each hectare of irrigated land receives every week about 01.20 x 60 x 60 x 24 x 7 or 121 m^3. More detailed sub-divisions are foreseen. The irrigation service determines the duration of the water turns. The official time is that shown by the town hall clock of Homs. This system, however, is complex and needs a qualified staff of engineers, controllers and canal guards. It is still the exception in Syria.

Water Rights in Palmyra

The district of Palmyra receives its water from deep thermal and surface springs. The water is transported by underground canals (fogarras) which have existed since Roman times and which are necessary to prevent evaporation due to the dryness of the air at Palmyra. They vary from two to six kilometers in length. 312

Water Distribution

This is on a time basis, rotation turns depending on the supply, the number of gardens which are to be watered and the number of persons entitled to water. In Palmyra the turns vary from 12 days in the summer to 18 days in the winter. 312 805

Water Rights

These may be sold. The origin of the water titles is lost in history due to the antiquity of the hydraulic works. 312 423

Since there was no effective government during the last century, water became the property of third parties independently of land ownership. Toward the end of the century the government received no taxes from Palmyra and ceded the main thermal spring to a certain El-Hissuan of the Sued family who lived at Homs and to whom persons drawing water paid 80 piasters per hour of watering. For a long time, water rights were the only type of communal property and

S
312 measured the financial well-being of the community.
MB3

The number of owners of water rights increased in the course of time as the conveyance of titles and the inheritance of rights increased. By 1922, two-thirds of the village owned water rights, with the remaining one-third having to purchase such rights.

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312 In 1923, according to G. Carle, 1/ the time turns were cal-
805 culated by means of an hour glass which required almost one hour (actually 52 minutes) to empty, a special person being appointed to calculate the time of the turns.

TUNISIA

Water Rights at Tozeur 2/

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312 This oasis derives its water from one wadi and two springs. The water is first divided by a horizontally-placed trunk of a palm tree laid perpendicular to the current and notched with markings equal in number to the desired divisions of water. Further subdivisions are made for secondary redistribution. These vary greatly in number because they can be changed by arrangements made between the persons entitled to water rights following the sale, exchange or inheritance thereof. Only the main divisions of the wadi water turns, up to the twenty-first turn, are fixed, and they are the basis of the entire water distribution system.

Water Distribution

T
312 The system used is based on a time schedule. The unit of
805 time for the distribution (*gadods*) corresponds to the time required for a vase full of water, pierced with holes at the bottom, to be emptied (five minutes or one-twelfth of an hour). The hour is also often calculated from the length of a man's shadow which is measured in feet.

1/Carle, G., L'Hydraulique Agricole et Industrielle en Syrie.
2/Kasselot, F. "Les Dattiers des Oasis du Djerid." Bulletin de la Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, du Commerce, et de la Colonisation de la Régence de Tunis, pp. 137-142.

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[511] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
361 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

311 by planting forage crops, and by increasing the use of fertilisers and improved seeds. 1/ The Government is planning to increase its distribution of selected wheat and other seeds, to expand its agricultural schools and its student missions to foreign universities, and to intensify the activity of its experimental stations and its extension services.

654 Among the obstacles to expansion of output are high production costs,
241 owing to shortage of labour in certain areas and to high fuel prices and maintenance charges for machinery, and also high transport costs. 2/ Various measures are being taken to improve communications, provide storage and reduce the purchase and operating costs of agricultural machinery. 3/

241 Another great obstacle to agricultural development is the system of land
423 tenure. In 1947 it was officially estimated that of 6.1 million hectares of privately owned land, 38 per cent was in holdings of over 100 hectares, 43 per cent in holdings of 10 to 99 hectares and 19 per cent in holdings of under 10 hectares. 4/ The greater part of large holdings is rented on short leases to sharecroppers, whose poverty and insecurity make it difficult for them to improve methods and increase output. The Government is preparing a law regulating relations between landlords and tenants and between farmers and labourers. 5/ In 1952 and 1953 decrees were passed regarding the distribution of lands in the State domain to cultivators with small farms and the expropriation of occupied areas on such land in excess of a certain figure. 6/ This land was to be available for cultivation by farmers, in lots of 10 hectares of irrigated or 50 hectares of non-irrigated land, on very generous terms. A start has been made in distributing land in El Jezira to landless farmers and nomads; by March 1954 some 25,000 hectares had been distributed.

1/ It is estimated that the yield of wheat could be fairly easily raised by 60 to 70 per cent and that of barley by 50 to 60 per cent. The discrepancy between the average yield of olives, 20 kilogrammes per tree, and that of high yielding trees, 50 to 60 kilogrammes, also points to possibilities in that field; it is, moreover, believed that the average oil content of olives could be raised from 11.5 per cent to 15 per cent (unpublished study by the Ministry of National Economy).

2/ In 1953, transport costs of a ton of barley from El Jezira to Latakia were £S 50, a figure equal to the cost of production. High transport costs also greatly raise the price of petroleum products used in agriculture.

3/ Ministry of Agriculture, "A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria" (mimeographed document, Damascus, 1954).

4/ By the end of 1954 half the area of Syria had been surveyed; the corresponding figures within that area were 49 per cent, 38 per cent and 13 per cent. Conditions vary greatly: in Damascus, Latakia, Jebal Druze and Hauran provinces, small and medium properties prevail; in the Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Jezira and Euphrates provinces large properties and State domain account for the greater part of the land.

5/ Ministry of Agriculture, op cit.

6/ This was fixed, in the 1952 decree, at 150 hectares in the Jezira, Euphrates and desert areas and 50 hectares in other parts of Syria. In 1953 the limit was raised to 200 hectares, irrespective of location.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hamakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hamakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the summer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in
721 Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

241 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

621 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
622 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands.

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years.

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

a. The Region of Deirik

2441 In the region of Deirik, the Zarkan river and numerous springs
[H9U] in the villages make irrigation possible over vast areas. The region
began to be developed recently when the road was partly constructed.
3124 Rice is an old staple, but in the last two years it have given place
to cotton. However, rice may resume its former place since cotton
diseases have become so widespread.

b. The Jarrah

The Jarrah river flows through Kubur el Bid and irrigates the country around it. Its waters were used for rice plantations, and recently for cotton. In winter its waters flow into the Rad.

c. The Jagjag

133 The main river of northern Jazirah is the Jagjag. Its sources are about thirty kilometers north of Kamishli, in a gorge in Turkey. It flows through Mizibin and Kamishli, crosses the Jazirah plain and empties in the Khabur at Hassakeh. Its total length is about 100 kms. and its average flow is 3 cubic meters per second.

3121 In Turkey and Kamishli, the river has several beds. The Turks,
425 unable to exploit it fully in their country because of its short flow
there, follow the practice of changing the river from bed to bed in
the summer months, so that farmers in Jazirah do not know when
the water will be available to them. This uncertainty has lead the
villages which have a right to the water to sell their rights for one
or more years to individuals on good terms with the Turkish authorities. These individuals in their turn bribe the Turks to direct the
waters in the bed which leads to their lands. One family in particular has obtained a sort of monopoly on the waters of the Jagjag in
Qamishli. The Asfar-Najjars buy the water rights from the villages
for nominal sums and then try to reach an understanding with the
Turks. Since they have one or two competing groups in Qamishli,
the Turks usually get paid by both parties and satisfy none entirely.
The Asfars manage however to get the biggest share.

Such an unstable situation does not lead to steady irrigation
3124 development along the lines of orchard planting. The farmer is
2441 lucky if he can grow one crop of rice or cotton with the present

6: Government of Syria--25 G-4 (no date)1952 MD1 Syria MD1

LAND OWNERSHIP IN JAZIRAH

At the beginning of the French Mandates, more than 95% of Jazirah lands were public domain, and it is difficult to understand the land situation now without a study of the laws governing the acquisition of public domain as enacted by the Ottomans and partly amended by the French, and which remained in effect till January 31, 1952, when decree-law 96 was issued. 423

I. The Land Laws Prior to January 1952

The law recognized two categories of public domain:

1. Lands registered in the name of the Government in the same way that a private owner has his lands registered in the Department of Tabo, or Land Registration Department. The Government holds deeds for those lands.

2. All unoccupied lands, waste lands called "dead lands," in Syria which are not registered in the name of anybody and for which the Government holds no deeds.

The first category of public domain is very rare in Jazirah. Suffice it to say that ownership of these lands can be acquired by public auction sales, or by renting them from the Government after a price has been fixed, and paying the price in yearly installments while doing the improvements specified in the contract or sale. The operation is known in Syrian law under the same name of "rent with a promise of sale." 423 425

The second category of public domain is by far the larger. And the law provided different methods for acquiring it suited to the small peasant and to the big farmer.

The the small peasant, the law, accorded him five hundred dunums which he could own freely without any payment provided he informed the competent authorities of his intentions and obtained in advance an authorization from the Department of Registration. He could then go ahead and cultivate the area allotted to him, and after 10 years, he could obtain legal title to it, without any payment.

This method did not enjoy great favor with the peasants of Jazirah for several reasons. In the first place, the ignorant peasant, whether Bedouin or Kurd, found difficulty in applying for the advance authorization and in fulfilling the formalities required for receiving it. Secondly, the peasant aspired often to a larger area than that allowed to him by this method. Thirdly, the peasant did not trust the Government, from which he was used only to oppression and corruption during Turkish rule. He was afraid that by the end of the ten years he would not be granted the promised land. Fourthly, the peasant did not trust his neighbors, his Sheik, or his Agha. He was afraid that during these ten years and before he received the deed for his land one of them would manage to drive him away and get the land for himself. 423 425

For all these reasons combined, the peasant wanted a way that enabled him to receive more than 500 dunums of land, that rid him of the necessity of applying to Government officials, and that put in his hands an undisputable title to his land in a reasonably short time.

All these desires were satisfied if the peasant followed the second method of land acquisition described by law. The law provided that, without previous authorization, anyone can acquire title to waste land if he cultivates it and pays to the State so much per dunum. No limit was set on the area which a farmer could acquire in this way. The State was interested in extending agriculture and offered encouragement to those who reclaimed land. The area which a farmer could own in this way was limited only by his ability to cultivate and plant. He could at any moment ask the appropriate officials to make a survey of his cultivated area, ask them to fix a price per dunum, pay the price, and get his deed in the first year of cultivation. In the nineteen forties, the price per dunum was usually set at LS50.

II. Partnership in Land Between the Tribesmen and the Tractor Owner

To avail himself of these advantages, the peasant had recourse to the city dweller owner of a tractor. The usual situation was that a group of peasants have occupied a large area of about 10,000 dunums within the boundaries of their tribe, of which they were able to cultivate only some 2000. They offered the tractor owner half the 10,000 dunums on condition that he brings his tractor to the village 425 427

425 and cultivate all the area. Usually the tractor owner took upon himself
427 also to pay all Government dues and the price of all the land as fixed by the Government, and to hand the deeds for the 5000 dunums to the peasants in one or two years.

In this way, the peasants got 5000 dunums instead of the 2000 they were able to cultivate by their own means, they received their deeds in one or two years instead of in ten, their partner from the city became responsible for helping them resist any encroachments on their land from the Agha, Sheik or neighbors, and they received their deeds free from any dues.

Around 1944, when demand for land increased, peasants began receiving money from their city partners besides all the obligations assumed by him and mentioned above.

428 The French wisely strove to encourage agriculture in Jazirah, and
425 and finding that the procedure used for the acquisition of land was long and complicated, formed a Special Committee and empowered it to grant land and issue valid deeds while abrogating some of the usual processes of law. Some lands were distributed in this manner and the French were accused of using their influence to the benefit of their political sympathizers. But in general, the Committee did a good job of stabilizing and legalizing the ownership of some lands.

The great majority of the land owned by tractor owners in Jazirah was acquired in partnership with the peasants. A few of the inhabitants of Mardin and Nisibin had titles to lands from the Ottoman Government. In rare instances, a few individuals went to the Land Registration Official in Turkey and bought from him forfeited deeds covering very large areas. But in general the titles in the hands of property owners in Jazirah were acquired in the manner described above.

423 Because there was no survey in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman land laws, adopted and amended by the French and applied to Syria, considered that the boundaries mentioned in the deed were the determining factor in case of dispute, and that the area mentioned in dunums was of no importance since the surveying services did not reach all parts of the country. For this reason, all deeds in Syria give the boundaries as exactly as possible, and give an approximate estimate of the area in dunums, except where surveying has remedied the situation.

471 The land problem along the Khabur is not to distribute land to the Jubur Bedouin who cannot use it because he cannot irrigate it, but to remove the hold of the Milhem family and to facilitate ownership by the entrepreneur who invests money in the land, installs pumps, and irrigates areas formerly arid. Unfortunately, the old laws and decree 96 work for the benefit of the river bank owner who, at the end of the lease, takes possession not only of his original strip of land which he leased, but also of all the new land brought under cultivation and irrigation by the lessee at his own expense.

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VI. Recapitulation

185 To recapitulation, the problem of land ownership in Jazirah is one of stabilizing the existing property rights for 57% of the area of the region, of distributing about 25% by the simple expedient of having the Sheik or Agha share his land with the members of his tribe in whose name he holds it, or passing legislation to enable the investor along the Khabur to gain ownership of the land he irrigates and reclaims, and of simplifying the processes of law so that all these functions can be performed and disputes between property owners settled and deeds granted within a short period. It becomes apparent that the success of such a policy is subject to a prior survey of the region. But this need not necessarily mean long delays because aerial survey at present is a quick operation.

The importance of the stabilization on the regularization of the land problem in Jazirah cannot be overemphasized. Besides all the advantages mentioned on page 27, land will come to have real value on the market and the wealth of the entire Jazirah will be increased tenfold. The famer will be enable to diversify his culture and escape the dangers of monoculture. After surveying the division of land, the farmer, working on his own lot in which he has no partners, will be induced to improve it with buildings, irrigation wells, fertilizers, and tree and vegetable gardens. There is no reason why the plains of Jazirah, wherever water is available, cannot be made to resemble the gardens of Damascus with time and an increase in agricultural knowledge among the population.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

returning to become squatters among the ruins and cultivate patches of stony but fertile soil. Organization of this rather haphazard settlement and the establishment of a planned community based again on orchards and vineyards may prove a worthwhile undertaking. In the Djebel Druze, where living standards are low and emigration is difficult for religious reasons, a similar settlement should be tried, provided a suitable tract of land can be found. Here, too, conditions are favorable for the establishment of orchards and vineyards.

At present responsibility for settlement is dispersed. The Ghab Administration is entrusted with settlement in the Ghab; the Irrigation Service has the task in other newly reclaimed and irrigated areas; and the Ministry of Agriculture has the initiative for the dry-farming areas. The mission strongly recommends that responsibility for planning and coordinating all the work be vested in a single, independent Settlements Administration, which would also discharge certain governmental functions relating to housing, town planning and similar subjects. The settlement program will require a great organizational effort and a staff which only a single agency would be capable of mobilizing. One administration is also much more likely to apply the experience gained in the initial settlement work to subsequent ventures. The mission urges that such an agency be established promptly, so that the necessary planning may be immediately initiated. The assistance of a number of foreign experts will need to be enlisted to carry out the program.

If the four settlements the mission has recommended are established and the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab are settled, the total cost would probably be around £S 10 million. Under the mission's proposals, £S 5.5 million would be financed by the Agricultural Bank, and the balance met directly by the government. With these funds it should be possible to settle some 2,300 families or between 12,000 and 14,000 people.

Land Reform

While the settlement of state domain may gradually increase the number of peasant proprietors, Syria will also have to work out policies relating to land ownership and tenancy in the areas already under cultivation. In this connection it should be noted that Article 22 of the 1950 constitution calls for legislation to determine, without retroactive effect, "the maximum area of land that may be owned, exploited and disposed of, according to

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

423 districts"; to provide for the forfeiture of land "neglected for a period of
425 ti[illegible]; to encourage "small and medium properties"; and "to protect the peasant and raise his standard of living".

In recent years several countries have taken steps to break up large estates and distribute them among landless tenants. Where large estates are farmed in small plots by tenants operating with rather primitive methods, the economic advantages resulting from well-managed large-scale exploitation certainly do not accrue. On the contrary, farming by impoverished tenants may be regarded as a social liability and an actual or potential cause of discontent. In the last analysis only the Syrian people acting through their government are competent to determine what course to pursue regarding large landholdings. The mission would only point out that expropriation on a considerable scale would entail large outlays for compensation and would be more disruptive than constructive, unless adequate measures were simultaneously taken to provide new peasant owners with sufficient supplies of seed, draft animals and tools and to guide them in their agricultural practices. Where labor is scarce and land is cultivated on a large scale by machinery, as in the Jezireh, expropriation would manifestly serve no useful purpose and would result, instead, in a substantial reduction in output.

There are, however, certain measures the mission would recommend for serious consideration. One would be to prevent aggravation of the problem by enacting legislation to prohibit individual families who already own a certain amount of land—say, 1,000 hectares—from increasing their holdings still further. Another would be to enforce, as a minimum, the existing legislation, which provides that land not tilled for five years should revert to the state. In cases where land is utilized or exploited in a manner which is not in accordance with the standards prevailing in Syria, the
423 government would be justified in depriving the owner of his land. Finally,
651 the mission suggests that the larger landowners should be more heavily taxed in the interest of raising more money for development and of promoting greater social equity. Income derived from agriculture does not fall at present under any of the existing schedular income taxes. Instead, most agricultural produce brought to market is taxed at 7%. While this tax does not bear heavily on peasants who produce primarily for their own consumption, it is not progressive in its application to landowners or pump owners who sell their share of the output on the market. The mission sug-

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

642 with public welfare." All subsoil minerals, solid or liquid, are
423 declared the property of the State; and the State, in the general interest, is permitted to expropriate private property in accordance with a law providing for just compensation. But Article 23 ensures that no "general confiscation" shall be permitted.

The Constitution provides in like manner the way of utilizing the land. It stipulates that land "shall be cultivated and not neglected"; and that should it be left unexploited within a certain period to be specified by law, the right of usufruct is alienated. The Constitution provides, likewise, that "a maximum limit for land ownership shall be prescribed by law," and that small and medium ownership is to be encouraged: "The State shall distribute State lands to peasants to whom land is not available sufficient to their living, against small rents to be repaid in installments." (Article 22.)[25]

642 Labor is regarded as "the most basic factor in social life," and
651 is "the right of all citizens." "The State shall provide work to citizens and shall guarantee it by directing and promoting the national economy." (Article 26.) The State undertakes to protect labor and provide legislation for the regulation of wages, hours of labor, allowances, and the improvement of social and health conditions. Trade unions are permitted to be formed within the limits of the law. Forced labor is prohibited except by law aimed at certain specific social and constructional services, and in case of war and emergencies.

642 Education is declared a right of every citizen. Elementary
871 education is compulsory and free in all Government schools. Secondary and professional education, though not compulsory, is also free in all Government schools. "The State shall give priority in the budget for the spread and expansion of elementary, rural, and professional education." The aim of education is defined as "the creation of a generation strong in body and mind, full of faith in God, endowed with moral virtues, proud in the

425 [25] On February 15, 1951, the Minister of Agriculture announced a plan for the distribution of 166,000 dunams (app. 41,500 acres) of State land in the Jazirah area among 554 Bedouin families of the Shammar Zor tribe. Each family will receive 300 dunams (75 acres), and each peasant, after paying the State LS 1.5 annually for 3 years, will own his share of the land. The State land is to be distributed among several villages, each village to receive 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres).

25: Warriner S-5 no date 1948 MI Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

probably few, of the estates are the properties of old, wealthy families of Ottoman times, which still exist in Lebanon, such as the lands belonging to the families of Arslan, Jumblatt, Chehab, Khazen, but many of these have been broken up by the Moslem laws of inheritance. Other estates have originated from direct grants made by Turkish Sultans to influential politicians, as for example the two very large estates in the Beqa and the Litani valley. Others too were formed at the time of the general registration of property undertaken by the Ottoman Government when chiefs of tribes or villages registered tribal land in their names as their private property. Uncertainty about legal title to land gives the educated classes frequent opportunity for ousting peasant owners, and whole villages have come into the possession of rival groups of city notables, as a result of litigation among the villagers who have sought their assistance in establishing their title.

While the land-tenure system is thus a result of peasant poverty, it also perpetuates poverty by standing in the way of any long-term investment. The high percentage of fallow in Syria suggests a great waste of land resources, and there could certainly be some improvement in yields, even in dry land farming, if green crops were introduced more generally into the rotation. But the share-cropper has little incentive to improve the fertility of the land, since he has no certainty of tenure, and since the landlord will take 50 per cent of any increase. Since the landlords are not as a rule directly interested in farming, they do not themselves undertake long-term improvements in the land.

Three case studies illustrate the ways in which the land-tenure system hinders advance.[1]

One study relates to the large estate of Misherfe, near Homs in central Syria. This is 24,000 acres in extent and includes five villages, with 2,500 inhabitants. It is very extensively cultivated, only one-third of the area, 8,000 acres, being cropped each year. The land is divided into three parts, one with wheat, barley or *qatani* (mixed grain), one ploughed but not sown, and one left fallow. A small area, 200 acres only, is irrigated, though water supplies are sufficient to irrigate much larger areas.

[1] These studies, which were prepared for the M.E.S.C., are not at present available in print.

Mr. Wantner 3-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
Syria MD1

SYRIA AND LEBANON

311 Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still
238 uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

162 The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half
423 are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

471 In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators.
312 In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into
425 the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

427 The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the
464 Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of
[407] machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

464 Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricul-
511 tural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer
164 from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from
146 malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

000 Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and moneylenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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

—*Photo Courtesy of Cotton Trade Journal*

All the cotton in the Aleppo region is ginned at this modern ginning center in Aleppo. Large gins (some have 10 saw gin stands) are located or are under construction on each corner of the square. Buildings are elaborate and usually cost about twice as much as the machinery. The grounds are landscaped like a campus.

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inhabited for centuries until a few years ago when farmers from the cities began developing them with mechanical equipment. Large landlords from Aleppo spent millions of dollars installing pumps, building roads, and in other ways developing these lands.

Although occupancy rights have been recognized for years, various government officials with whom the matter was discussed were strong in their views that these newcomers are squatters and should be evicted. They want to distribute the land among the landless peasants. The landlords who have made investments here are just as determined that they will not be evicted. The political strength of the landlords is given generally as the reason for the statement recently made by the head of the government to the effect that the new law will be studied for revision.

While the question of eviction is being debated, the government is proceeding to parcel out other public domains in small units to landless peasants. As this program is expanded, the large landowners are becoming more and more concerned for fear their own properties will be expropriated and subdivided, as has been done in neighboring countries.

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This dispute over the use of public land illustrates the struggle for power going on in Syria today between government bureaucrats and wealthy landlords. The government on one hand is attempting to force changes in all phases of the economy through its various control programs. These changes, however, are strongly resisted by the landowners who prefer to be free from regulations and regimentation. The outcome of this struggle may have a material bearing on the trend in agriculture for the next several years.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

457 panies. It was replaced by a fixed rate to approximate closely to the prevailing free rate.

International Trade

439 In 1951 Syria had an adverse balance of trade of £S28 million but this was probably counterbalanced by the income from certain invisible exports which do not come within the knowledge of the official statisticians. The year 1951, however, was a particularly bad one for agriculture. In normal years Syria can expect to have a favourable balance of international trade; in 1950, for example, the country had a considerable trade surplus and by 1952 the large deficit of the previous year had been wiped out. Syria's best customers are usually Lebanon and Iraq (Lebanon's inter-Middle Eastern trade is higher still) but there is also reciprocal trade with Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. Trade with Western Germany has recovered and is now quite important although it is threatened by Syria's attitude to the German reparations to Israel.[1] Syria's main exports are agricultural; raw cotton has recently become the most important. Her chief imports are machinery, oil, and textiles.[2]

Up to 1947 almost all the external trade of Syria was done not only through Beirut but also by Lebanese firms; however, since then, Syrian merchants have set out to show that they can deal directly with the outside world. The Government are encouraging importers and exporters to use Latakia rather than Beirut and legislation aims at preventing foreign businesses from being represented in Syria by foreigners. This has the effect of cutting out the middleman in Beirut, but it also makes it very difficult for British, American, and French firms to have sufficient control over their affairs to encourage the investment in Syria of foreign skill and foreign capital. In 1951 some Belgian and French companies were nationalized and the commercial climate was unfavourable to foreign investment; but during 1952 Colonel Shishakli declared that the Government would welcome foreign capital and enterprise provided that they did not encroach on Syria's national sovereignty and interests, and towards this end exchange regulations were to be simplified and greater freedom was to be given in the transfer of capital.

Development Schemes

426 Interest rates in Syria and Lebanon are very high and even
454 a sound borrower may have to pay from 25 to 50 per cent

[1] See table 4, p. 503 below. [2] See ibid.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON ME1
SYRIA MD1

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interest per annum. The Syrian private capitalist expects very large returns and the foreign private capitalist requires more security than is obtainable in the Middle East; thus the development of Syria must be financed either by the Syrian Government or by an international agency. Syria is one of the few countries to have refused American Point Four aid on principle, but she is a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and this organization has been studying some of the development schemes listed below.

1. *Drainage of the Ghab marshes.* Nearly 100,000 acres of land can be irrigated from the excess water of this area to improve agriculture and public health, and plans are well advanced.

2. *Euphrates barrage*, to provide 100,000 kws. of hydro-electric energy for irrigation and industrial needs. With this power it is hoped to irrigate half a million acres.

3. *Yarmuk and Barada rivers.* Hydro-electric schemes to give power to Damascus and the Hauran.[1]

4. *Latakia port.*[2] There have been complications over the award of the tender for this work, and construction had not effectively begun at the beginning of 1953.

5. *Khabur river.* Irrigation scheme for 22,000 acres.

6. Improvement of rail and road communications from Latakia to the hinterland and establishment of a network of all-weather roads in the Jezira.

7. *Rouj marshes.* Drainage to irrigate about 8,700 acres has already commenced.

If agreement can be reached to implement some of these schemes not only will Syria benefit but also the Arab refugees from Palestine may find employment and even homes.

(*b*) Lebanon

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Much that has been said about Syria also applies to Lebanon and, to avoid repetition, only points peculiar to Lebanon are here outlined.

Agriculture

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The table on p. 488 above gives the approximate division of the land in cultivable and uncultivable areas and the estimated acreage; the crop and yield of the main agricultural products are given in the following table.

[1] An agreement with Jordan was signed on 7 July 1953, but work has not yet begun.

[2] See above, p. 487.

Zi: Warriner S-5 (w dele) 1948 M1 Middle East
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S landlord, and 60–50 per cent to the peasant. The landlord's
427 only charge is taxes. If, as in some districts, the tenant provides labour only, and the landowner bears other costs, the landowner's share may rise to 80 per cent. For irrigated cereals, the landlord's duty is to provide water, and his share of the crop is then 60 per cent. Other irrigated crops are usually farmed by the landowner direct.

The tenant has no protection against eviction because these tenancy agreements have no legal basis, and are not covered by the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code. The tenant may be evicted by the landlord without notice, and no compensation is paid him for improvements made or for losses incurred when he is evicted.

S How much of the land is owned by large proprietors in Syria
471 is not exactly known. Roughly one-half of the grain sold in the market comes from large proprietors, and it is believed that about 60 per cent of the land is owned by them. In northern Syria, big landowners own 70–80 per cent of the land, and in the Damascus region 60–75 per cent. In the district of Hama, out of 114 villages, 110 belong to landlords, and 4 landowners between them own 86 villages. Generally there is a great desire on the part of the peasants for individual ownership, but it is only where there is some form of intensive cultivation that it can be successfully maintained. In the village of Kesruwan, for example, banana growing has brought prosperity to the peasants and enabled them to purchase land.

S Thus the custom of share-cropping reflects the instability of
471 grain growing in arid climates with uncertain rainfall and great variations in yields. It is peasant indebtedness which supports
427 the large landowners. Two bad harvests in succession will mean
426 that the peasants become so much indebted that they will actually reduce the area sown for lack of seed, and will therefore be obliged to sell to a money-lender or city merchant. The majority of the big Christian merchants in the town have become rural landowners in this way, particularly in Latakia and round Homs and Hama. In the Syrian plain districts, entire villages have passed into the hands of merchants through indebtedness.

S Most of these large landowners are city families, who take no
L interest whatsoever in actual methods of cultivation. Some,
471

S Of the total 160 families in the village, 100 own some land
471 and 60 own no land. The peasant owners are divided as follows

1. Rich farmers, owning about 10 hectares ..	5	families
2. Medium farmers, owning from 3 to 8 hectares	80	"
3. Poor farmers, owning between 1 and 3 hectares	15	"
4. Share-tenants	10	"
5. Labourers	50	"

S As in Misherfe, two-thirds of the land is uncropped each
241 year. The peasant divides the land into three plots, one sown with a crop, one ploughed but not sown, and one fallow. The wheat yield is slightly higher than the average for Syria, and amounts to 833 kilogrammes per hectare (6½ hundredweight per acre); barley yields are also slightly higher, being 8 hundredweight to the acre.

S As a result of the more equal distribution of land, rather
571 better yields, and more irrigation, the standard of living is better than in Misherfe. The first two classes, including half the
262 families, can reach an adequate standard of consumption of food and other essentials, which is reckoned to be 25 kilogrammes of wheat per month, 1 kilogramme of meat per month (i.e. one sheep a year), 40 kilogrammes of olive oil and 20 kilogrammes of 'samn' per year, 4 tins of kerosene and a small quantity of clothing. The remainder of the village, about one-half of the total, that is the poor peasants, labourers, and share-tenants, are unable to reach this standard and live in great
S poverty, in one-roomed huts. The majority of these cultivators
● 426 are heavily indebted, and the burden of indebtedness has doubled during the war years, because debts are usually incurred in gold.

L The third study relates to Kfer Sa'ab in the north Lebanon, a
471 hill village of small owner-cultivators. Of the total area of 200 hectares, about 30 are owned by the sheikh of the village. The total number of families is 150 (1,200 people), of which 120 own land and 30 are landless. A few peasant owners are rich with 5 hectares of land; 60 are medium owners with 1·5 to 2·5
L hectares of land, and 25 own 0·5 to 1·5. Here cultivation
247 [S.2] is much more intensive than in Syria, and half the land is irrigated.

S [Ashrafie, near Damascus -- Analyst]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

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LAND TENURE

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619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
2441 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
2421 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
2433 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the summer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in
721 Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

221 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
622 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands. 624 425 427

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years. 563 167 661 657

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

407 installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71.
439 This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300,
[654 respectively.
402] It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is
407 opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent
427 of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS. 90-1.10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

311 The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq.

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbassiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Rin. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers west of Dirbassiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

311 The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jasiratibn Amr was long
491 neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was preferred to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

This method did not enjoy great favor with the peasants of Jazirah for several reasons. In the first place, the ignorant peasant, whether Bedouin or Kurd, found difficulty in applying for the advance authorization and in fulfilling the formalities required for receiving it. Secondly, the peasant aspired often to a larger area than that allowed to him by this method. Thirdly, the peasant did not trust the Government, from which he was used only to oppression and corruption during Turkish rule. He was afraid that by the end of the ten years he would not be granted the promised land. Fourthly, the peasant did not trust his neighbors, his Sheik, or his Agha. He was afraid that during these ten years and before he received the deed for his land one of them would manage to drive him away and get the land for himself. 423 425

For all these reasons combined, the peasant wanted a way that enabled him to receive more than 500 dunums of land, that rid him of the necessity of applying to Government officials, and that put in his hands an undisputable title to his land in a reasonably short time.

All these desires were satisfied if the peasant followed the second method of land acquisition described by law. The law provided that, without previous authorization, anyone can acquire title to waste land if he cultivates it and pays to the State so much per dunum. No limit was set on the area which a farmer could acquire in this way. The State was interested in extending agriculture and offered encouragement to those who reclaimed land. The area which a farmer could own in this way was limited only by his ability to cultivate and plant. He could at any moment ask the appropriate officials to make a survey of his cultivated area, ask them to fix a price per dunum, pay the price, and get his deed in the first year of cultivation. In the nineteen forties, the price per dunum was usually set at LS50.

II. Partnership in Land Between the Tribesmen and the Tractor Owner

To avail himself of these advantages, the peasant had recourse to the city dweller owner of a tractor. The usual situation was that a group of peasants have occupied a large area of about 10,000 dunums within the boundaries of their tribe, of which they were able to cultivate only some 2000. They offered the tractor owner half the 10,000 dunums on condition that he brings his tractor to the village 425 427

425 and cultivate all the area. Usually the tractor owner took upon himself
427 also to pay all Government dues and the price of all the land as fixed by the Government, and to hand the deeds for the 5000 dunums to the peasants in one or two years.

In this way, the peasants got 5000 dunums instead of the 2000 they were able to cultivate by their own means, they received their deeds in one or two years instead of in ten, their partner from the city became responsible for helping them resist any encroachments on their land from the Agha, Sheik or neighbors, and they received their deeds free from any dues.

Around 1944, when demand for land increased, peasants began receiving money from their city partners besides all the obligations assumed by him and mentioned above.

428 The French wisely strove to encourage agriculture in Jazirah, and
425 and finding that the procedure used for the acquisition of land was long and complicated, formed a Special Committee and empowered it to grant land and issue valid deeds while abrogating some of the usual processes of law. Some lands were distributed in this manner and the French were accused of using their influence to the benefit of their political sympathizers. But in general, the Committee did a good job of stabilizing and legalizing the ownership of some lands.

The great majority of the land owned by tractor owners in Jazirah was acquired in partnership with the peasants. A few of the inhabitants of Mardin and Nisibin had titles to lands from the Ottoman Government. In rare instances, a few individuals went to the Land Registration Official in Turkey and bought from him forfeited deeds covering very large areas. But in general the titles in the hands of property owners in Jazirah were acquired in the manner described above.

422 Because there was no survey in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman land laws, adopted and amended by the French and applied to Syria, considered that the boundaries mentioned in the deed were the determining factor in case of dispute, and that the area mentioned in dunums was of no importance since the surveying services did not reach all parts of the country. For this reason, all deeds in Syria give the boundaries as exactly as possible, and give an approximate estimate of the area in dunums, except where surveying has remedied the situation.

LAND TENURE IN JAZIRAH

•427 The custom in Jazirah is for the tenant to pay the rent in a percentage of the crop delivered to the owner free of all expense.

1. Land Tenure for the Peasant

427 651 Under Ottoman rule and because land was abundant and peasants scarce, the rent was fixed at 7L. The owner and the tenant were each responsible for the Government taxes on his own share of the produce.

The Ottoman Government collected the tithe and the werko as taxes on the land. The title, as its name implies, was 10% of the produce to which was added later 2-1/2% as special revenue for public instruction.

Because the peasant wanted to be as far away from Government officials as possible he paid the landowner 19-1/2%, including the tithe and the rent, and did not care how much of that the landowner actually paid so long as he remained unmolested by the public officials. This percentage of 19-1/2% is still prevailing and is known by the name of "Hassil and Tabo".

In 1924 the French found the collection of the tithe cumbersome and adopted a modified system. They took the average tax paid by the land in the preceding four years and made the sum obligatory. In practice, this meant light taxation on the land, but the landowner still received from the peasant the same percentage as when the tithe was actually paid. Later, when the tax of 7% on agricultural produce took the place of all land taxes and the peasant had to pay it when he transported his crop for sale, he kept paying the landowner 19-1/2% so that his percentage has come to mean rent to the landowner without the obligation on his part to pay the taxes of the peasant. What made the situation acceptable to the peasant was that the increase in population would have raised the rent anyway. He now pays this rent for the use of land and house. If the house is not in-
[342] cluded for his, he constructs his own house of sun-baked bricks, but retains the right to remove the wooden roof when he leaves the village.

6: Government of Syria--35 G-4 (no date)1952 MD1 Syria MD1

II. Land Tenure for the Tractor Owner

The tractor owner gets better advantages when he rents land. He also pays a percentage of the crop. It used to be 5-6% with the obligation to plant a "shkara" for the landowner. The "Shkara" is a certain amount of seed which the landowner provides and which the tenant agrees to plant by his machines and to harvest with his combine free of charge. The "shkara" is proportional to the area of land rented. It varies between 10-20 sacks of wheat. In the last few years when demand for land became great the rents rose to 10-12% with the habitual "shkara". Usually the rental contracts are for three years. They rarely exceed this period. 427

III. Land Tenure Along the Khabur

Along the Khabur rents are different in manner. There, the landowner provides not only the land but also the water for irrigation and half the seeds. In return he receives half the crop. The peasant furnishes his labor for plowing, seeding caring for the irrigation canals, irrigation and harvesting.

Rents for pump irrigation were between 7-10% until 1951. The cotton rush increased the rents for strips of land near the river to 15-20%, but the failure of the crop reduced the rush for land and the rent is down again to around 10%.

THE PROBLEM OF CREDIT IN JAZIRAH

The rapid economic advance of Jazirah in the last years is nothing less than amazing. In 1941, in the region of Qamishli, for example, the farthest village cultivated was less than 20 kilometers south of the city. All the land beyond was pasture for the Bedouin. East of Kubur el Bid to Tal Koshak, a distance of 60 kilometers, the land was similarly idle. There was not a single tractor in the region of Ras el Ain, and not a single water pump on the Khabur aside from those of the Assyrians. 311

Qamishli itself, the principal town of Jazirah, had no electric light, no paved roads, no sewage system, and very few acceptable houses to live in. The same was true in a larger measure of the other towns of Jazirah. 361 365

621 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
241 from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
● 427 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power
423

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

9

Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

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likely to decline somewhat when the survey is completed for the Hauran and Djebel Druze where small peasant ownership predominates. 244 423

Water for irrigation is supplied chiefly by merchants and wealthy landowners who have the means to install pumps. Similarly, the ownership and operation of modern agricultural machinery are primarily confined to large operators in the Jezireh.

Ownership of the critical factors of production carries with it the ability to demand a large share of the output. In areas where rainfall is inadequate the pump owner, who is frequently not the landowner, can exact from 45% to 60% of the crop simply for the water he supplies. Where labor is plentiful and rainfall adequate, the landowner can get up to half of the crop simply by allowing others to cultivate his land. On the other hand, in the Jezireh land is plentiful by comparison with labor and rents for only a 10-15% share of the crop. Here the owners of tractors and combines control the central factor of production and can command the lion's share of the output.

The small cultivators have no capital or access to capital that would enable them to acquire more land, better machinery and livestock, pumps and other means of production by which to raise their standard of living and make themselves independent. Nor are they organized in cooperatives to undertake these things collectively. Even the larger farmer frequently has great difficulty in getting necessary capital on reasonable terms.

One of the most important objectives of an agricultural program is therefore to provide an adequate volume of credit on equitable terms in order to make the needed means of production more generally accessible. The organization of cooperatives to facilitate group action among small farmers should be another aim. No single peasant, for example, has enough resources to sink a well or install a pump, but a group of peasants could pool their resources to this end. Finally, it would appear vital to conserve the good land remaining in state domain for the purpose of settling landless peasants and Bedouins and thus gradually increasing proprietorship.

4. *Despite the existence of many large properties, land is predominantly tilled in small holdings by tenants or peasant-owners who earn a rather precarious livelihood.* 244 423 427

Large-scale exploitation prevails only in the Jezireh and to some extent in Aleppo where land is farmed in big units with mechanized equipment and paid labor. Even the large estates are for the most part farmed in small units by sharecroppers who are tenants at will, seldom cultivate the same

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241 piece of land for long and thus have virtually no incentive to improve the
423 land. Many large landowners do little beyond collecting their share of the
427 crop, leaving relations with their tenants in the hands of agents. They
[452] often stake their tenants to seed, livestock or implements or tide them over with food and clothing until the harvest comes in; and in the absence of adequate credit institutions they thus serve a useful function. In most cases, however, such assistance in cash or kind is given on terms which conceal extremely high rates of interest. In other cases credit may be furnished without interest by landlords conforming strictly to the Islamic code. It must be recognized also that some and probably a growing number of large landowners take a more active interest in the management of their land and have been instrumental in introducing new crops such as cotton. Progressively minded owners of large estates, when interested in improved crop rotation and methods of production, can become the means for more rapid advancement of agriculture.

241 The small peasant-owners and sharecroppers, who carry on most of the
423 agriculture, produce primarily for their own consumption. Their output is little influenced by market prices, for they must produce to eat and with the balance they buy such simple necessities as they can. Most of them wrest a bare living from the soil and are chronically in debt to the merchant, the professional moneylender or the landlord. Unable to bring their produce to the market or to wait for better prices, they must accept the price offered to them locally for whatever they produce in excess of their own needs. They till their land with methods hallowed by time, and their equipment for the most part consists only of a pair of draft animals and a wooden, iron-tipped plow.

Any program of assistance to agriculture must obviously focus largely on these cultivators. It must show them how to improve their methods of production, provide them with better seeds, equipment and animals. Through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of adequate agricultural credit it should help to free them gradually from excessive dependence on the landlord, merchant and moneylender. It must also pay attention to tenancy problems with the objective of establishing greater security of tenure, providing more incentive to cultivators and achieving a more equitable sharing of the produce of the land.

423 5. *The uncertainty and confusion surrounding land titles is another obstacle to land improvement.*

The uncertainty surrounding land titles has been largely inherited

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471 immediate family. It also provided that in adjudicating title deeds in
423 which the area derived from the indicated boundaries of the property was greater than the area mentioned in the deed, the boundaries would govern at least to the extent that they gave each member of the titleholder's family a minimum of 200 hectares. The mission urges that these provisions, which have apparently not yet been applied, be enforced as rapidly as possible. Their application would inflict no undue hardship, and would increase significantly the amount of revenue-earning state domain. Above all, it would put at the government's disposal more good land to be retained as a reserve for the ultimate settlement of landless or virtually landless peasants. Much of the land now left to the state is too marginal for successful settlement.

471 Careful management of state domain is necessary to ensure that the
423 state derives from it the maximum revenue and that land not really
427 suitable for cultivation is reserved for pasture or forest. The government is not equipped at present to exercise adequate supervision. Land is often tilled without authorization, thus depriving the government of revenue and often encouraging the cultivation of land which can be expected to produce a satisfactory harvest only in years of exceptionally high rainfall. Until cultivable land is required for settlement, it should be leased, as at present, to private operators who have the necessary machinery to till it. Thus land in the Jezireh which is recaptured under the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 135 might well be leased to those who now cultivate it, so that existing units of exploitation are not disturbed until the land is needed for distribution. However, current rentals for state land, even though they have been rising in recent years, still seem unduly low. Judging from private rental arrangements prevailing in the Jezireh, for example, the state should be able to charge an average rental of at least £S 5·6 per hectare instead of only a little over £S 3 as at present. In this way the government can add to the funds available for financing development.

Forestry and State Domain

137 The management of state domain should look also to the preservation
659 and improvement of forest areas on government land. Syria has unfortunately been almost entirely denuded of forests. Although some 448,000 hectares are listed officially as "forest", 348,000 hectares consist either of

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gests, therefore, that this tax be complemented by a new land tax. The rate of such a tax should increase with the size of landholdings, and small holdings should be entirely exempt. The rates must also be in accordance with the yield of the land; but the mission suggests that they be kept rather low (e.g., not more than £S 2-3 per hectare on the average) so that a detailed, complex classification of land in accordance with productivity may be avoided. In another section of this report the mission proposes that the present schedular income taxes be supplemented by a global income tax levied at a moderate rate. In our opinion, income from agriculture should be included in the scope of such a global tax. The ascertainment of income from land is by no means as difficult as is generally supposed.

In addition to taking these steps, the government should pay special attention to the improvement of the lot of tenant farmers. In general, measures should be adopted to increase the tenant's share of the output, to give him greater security of tenure and to make him less dependent on the landlord as a source of credit and supplies.

The economic bargaining power of the landlord vis-à-vis the tenant and of the pump owner vis-à-vis the cultivator is so great that the landlord and pump owner obtain a rather excessive share of the output of the land. It would be desirable to establish a commission to study the various forms of association in the exploitation of agricultural land which prevail in different parts of Syria and to make recommendations designed not only to make these arrangements more equitable but also to put them on a basis which would give the actual cultivator of the land more incentive to improve his agricultural methods. Such a commission could work out the terms of written contracts which would be applicable to various types of association. It could also devise ways of giving greater security of tenure to the tenants. The latter can generally be ousted at will by landlords and the land they receive for cultivation is so frequently reallotted that they acquire no interest in its permanent improvement. Finally, it would be appropriate to consider the establishment of local land tenure commissions to settle, in a manner comparable to settlement of labor conflicts, disputes among the parties sharing in the exploitation of the land.

A number of measures to foster cooperatives, provide more ample credit and establish machinery for assisting the farmer at the village level are recommended elsewhere in this report. It is important that these measures

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to apply, it seems desirable to abolish it and to subject sales of livestock 651
and wool, hides and skins to the 7% agricultural production tax applied to marketed produce. Milk, butter and cheese might be exempt for social reasons.

Export taxes. The mission believes that at present prices cotton cultivation is still sufficiently profitable to warrant continuation of the existing export tax. We have, however, recommended that the tax should be revised to make its rate responsive to price changes. We are not prepared to formulate a precise schedule of rates, but we do recommend that the principle of the sliding scale be adopted and put into effect at once. Early action is desirable so that cotton growers may make their plans with the assurance that the export tax will be automatically adjusted if prices have fallen by the time the crop is marketed. This revision would introduce a desirable element of flexibility in the tax and would thereby minimize adverse effects on production. In selecting the schedule of rates it would be advisable to bear in mind the revenue needs of the state and to avoid going too far in the direction of flexibility, however desirable that characteristic may be from the point of view of production incentives.

Excises and import duties. Increased taxes on non-essential consumption items should be regarded as one of the principal sources of the additional revenue required to finance an expanded development program. In the absence of an efficient personal income tax, excises and import duties on non-essentials can also help to offset the regressive bias of the tax system.

It has already been stressed that valuations for purposes of ad valorem import duties should be based on the free exchange rate rather than the official rate. Under the present arrangement duties appear to be much higher than they actually are and it is by no means certain that the combination of high nominal rates of duty and artificially low valuations always results in a tax liability which reflects a considered policy. Where the change in valuation method produces a higher effective duty than is desired, nominal rates of duty could be adjusted.

Revenue from state domain. The mission believes that Syria should 651
obtain more revenue from state domain lands. According to figures sup- 429
plied by the Ministry of Agriculture, the government is obtaining £S 1.8 million annually from rental of 551,000 hectares of state land, or approximately £S 3.30 per hectare. We think that rentals should be increased to at least £S 5 per hectare. At current prices of wheat and barley this would equal about 10% of net yield (that is, gross yield less seed). The

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651 increase would add approximately £S 1 million per year to revenues.
427 Existing contracts and administrative problems would doubtless cause some delay in putting this recommendation into effect. Nevertheless, a significant increase in receipts could be obtained over the next few years.

IV PUBLIC DEBT

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Present Situation

The Syrian public debt amounted to £S 312 million at the end of 1953.[18] There is no considered public debt policy. Borrowing is not closely correlated with the government's need for funds, and in the past large amounts have sometimes been borrowed when the Treasury had available to it cash balances far in excess of immediate needs. In addition, no provision is made for regular service or retirement of the debt. The entire internal debt is held at low rates of interest by the BSL and the government has not attempted to develop a market for its securities among private investors. Moreover, the government does not seem to be fully aware that Treasury-guaranteed loans from the Issue Department to government entities and industrial companies are as much a use of the government's credit as direct government borrowing from the Issue Department and that the economic significance of the two types of transaction is the same.

The practice of financing expenditures by borrowing from the Issue Department is always potentially inflationary, but it can be acceptable and helpful when used in moderation and adjusted to economic conditions. It is objectionable if the volume of such financing is not based on a careful appraisal of over-all monetary conditions as well as financial needs of the government. Syria has so far largely escaped the inflationary consequences of resort to the Issue Department mainly because a considerable part of the borrowing in recent years has been offset by increases in cash balances. But borrowing when large cash balances exist is not only unnecessary but dangerous, since there is always the possibility that the various government entities might try to use their balances at a greater rate than the economy could absorb without risking inflation or the depletion of foreign exchange reserves.

[18] See page 261.

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operation, in striking contrast to large private holdings where the most modern machinery is used. Measures to raise the standard of living of this group must be one of the main objectives of any development program; in the first instance this must be effected through education, improved systems of land tenure, and better credit facilities.

Lessees and landlords. Some city dwellers have interests in agriculture as leasehold operators of tracts of state domain, or as absentee landlords. Although their interests rarely coincide with the demands of sound long-term farming practices, this segment of the population has been instrumental in opening new farm tracts (such as the Jezireh) and in introducing new crops, thereby contributing much to the national economy. The cultivation of the large absentee holdings is generally left to sharecroppers.

Sharecroppers. Each sharecropper is assigned a parcel of land from which, after the apportionment of the crop, he can hope to gain little more than a bare subsistence. In rainfed areas the sharecropper customarily receives rather less than 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor and around 70–75% if he also supplies the working capital; the percentages may be slightly higher in sparsely populated areas, and lower where population pressure is heavier. On irrigated lands the landlord takes 65–75% of the crop if he provides seed and water, and about half if the sharecropper provides the working capital.

In the long run, the position of the sharecropper would be more tolerable if the productivity of the land and his share of it were raised. At present, yearly land assignments may vary, with the result that the cropper has no incentive to improve the land. The restricted area of the assignment and lack of proper equipment, draft animals and money capital contribute to the permanent indebtedness of sharecroppers and their very low standard of living. Measures to improve their lot should include improved tenure status, Agricultural Bank and cooperative assistance in providing working and fixed capital, and resettlement schemes to relieve local land pressure.[1]

Agricultural Regions

In terms of natural conditions and the types of agriculture practiced, Syria can be divided in nine main agricultural regions.

The Hauran and the Djebel Druze. The Hauran and the Djebel Druze includes the mountains of the Djebel Druze and the Julani in the south-

[1] See Chapter 3, Sections III and VI, of the Main Report.

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planning stage. Here we add a comment with respect to the so-called agricultural phase. 185 312 242

In the past, soil studies were not very extensive, but projects were being constructed in areas already under cultivation, where the fertility of the soil was well known. Now FAO experts supervise systematic soil analyses, and the results of these studies will be very useful for the development of future projects. Insufficient investigation of the perviousness of the soil, with consequent underestimation of the water duty, has resulted in undercropping in some irrigated areas. A striking example is the Homs Lake project, where the allowance of 0.20 liters per hectare per second does not permit full utilization of the cultivable area.

The mission therefore recommends that henceforth more extensive research under the supervision of both irrigation and agricultural engineers precede fixing of the irrigation duty. Since the soils vary little along the alluvial plain of the Euphrates valley, these studies could be confined to plots in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor and Abou Kemal, on the plateau west of Raqqa and in the Resafe plain south of Abou Hareira. These experimental plots could be quite small, water being supplied by small pumping plants or even by tankers. Provision is made in the mission's proposed expenditure on studies of Euphrates valley irrigation for equipment of experimental stations.

IV WATER FEES

312 427

The fees for the various projects, according to the revised schedule for 1954, are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Annual Water Fees per Hectare

(£S)

Project	Size of holdings in hectares				
	0 to 5	5 to 15	15 to 20	20 to 50	over 50
Homs-Hama	6.25	15.40	20.40	23.30	25.80
Tell Magham	7.50	23.75	28.75	37.50	40.00
Mzerib	7.50	21.25	26.25	32.50	35.00
Senn	7.50	17.50	22.50	27.50	30.00
Makt	2.00	3.50	4.50	6.00	7.00

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312 427 In the mission's opinion the amortization period of 65-70 years is too long; if the same standards were applied to the new projects requiring large investment Syria's economic development would be hindered. We recommend a further revision of the basis for calculating the fees so that capital cost is amortized in a period of, say, 35-40 years, provided that in no case should the fee exceed the money value of the benefits to the landowner or cultivator. Benefits should be conservatively calculated to allow for variations in prices and yields of crops.

It also appears that although small holders might appropriately be charged a lower rate, the degree of progression in the existing water fees may be excessive.

APPENDIX

311 312 TABLE I River Flow and Government's Estimate of Irrigated and Irrigable Areas

Origin of utilized water	Annual flow (million cubic meters)	Irrigated area (thousand hectares)	Irrigable area (thousand hectares)
Euphrates	25,000	125.0	340.0
Khabour	1,500	20.0	90.0
Orontes	500	35.0	55.0
Yarmuk	450	3.0	7.5
Barada-Awadj	485	15.0	25.0
Kowek	75	12.0	15.0
Afrin	250	2.5	7.5
Sadjour	90	2.5	3.0
Baligh	150	8.5	10.0
Jagh-Jagh	90	8.0	10.0
Senn	360	0.5	5.0
Nahr el Kebir	150	0.5	2.0
Total	29,100[a]	232.5	570.0
Underground water		75.0	100.0
Miscellaneous		67.5	80.0
Gross total		375.0[b]	750.0[b]

[a] To which should be added approximately 500 million cubic meters from other small rivers and streams.

[b] Underestimated, in the mission's opinion.

SOURCE: Directorate of Irrigation.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

The low fee for the Makt project is justified by the restricted nature of the facilities provided, but the fees assessed for the Tell Maghass, Mzerib and Senn projects appear low in proportion to the money value of the benefits to the landowners or cultivators, and are considerably less than the cost of pumping irrigation provided by private owners. Accordingly, we have recommended review of these fees.

APPENDIX

TABLE II Irrigation Schemes Under Construction or Projected

Irrigated area (thousand hectares)					Expenditures (million £S)		
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Location	Functions	Already spent	To be spent	Total
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	1	170	171*
252.0	152.0	404.0	Youssef Pasha		—	150	150
140.0	45.0	185.0	Raqqa Plateau	GI + PI	—	300	300
85.0	80.0	165.0	Halabiye	GI	—	160	160
27.0	27.0	54.0	Rezafe	GI or PI	—	100	100
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	2	3	5
4.6	2.2	6.8	Mzerib	GI + PI	2	7	9
15.6	5.1	20.7	Ras el Ain	GI	—	30	30
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB)	GI	10	2	12
2.8	1.0	3.8	Tell Maghass (RB)	GI	—	6	6
8.0	7.2	15.2	Saba Skour	GI	—	25	25
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	—	30	30
53.0	22.0	75.0	Markada	GI	—	100	100
8.0	7.0	15.0	Upstream Homs Lake	GI	—	15	15
3.0	—	3.0	Homs Lake (LB)	GI	—	3	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	2	2	4
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	—	15	15
15.0	—	15.0	Barada	HEP + GI	—	30	30
431.5	235.0	665.5			17	1,148	1,165

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; RB – Right Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; LB – Left Bank; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

* Including local and national roads.

NOTE: The figures given above are only rough estimates. Accurate figures are not available because most of these irrigation schemes have not yet reached the draft stage. The purpose of this Table is to give an idea of the order of magnitude of the investment, extending beyond the scope of the mission's program, to be made for the development of irrigation in Syria.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

for study abroad should be a necessary part of the training of the senior staff. 654 242

The findings of research, experimentation and the experiences of farmers give support to extension programs. Much information is already available and should be transmitted to farmers, but more systematic and better coordinated practical research should be the aim in the future. The two functions of research and extension should be coordinated within the Ministry of Agriculture so that each performs its specialized service, in a manner that supplements and complements the other. Research must focus on the key needs and concerns of farmers and anticipate future problems. For instance, one of the emerging needs is to know more about good crop rotation practices, including better use of land now fallow.

Chart 1 indicates the mission's conception of a desirable organizational framework for the agricultural credit and rural development program it has recommended.

IV LAND TENURE

In Syria, the landowner group is composed of full owners, part owners, debt-encumbered owners, and owners with undetermined title. Owners range from operators of large commercial farms to small subsistence farmers. The tenant group is composed of farmers who rent or make some payment for the use of land, and comprises most of the farmers who live on the land and cultivate it. Most of the large owners do not live permanently on their land but operate through some type of sharecropper system. There are very few cash tenants. The sharecropper usually works under the direction of the landlord or his agent and is dependent upon him for farm supplies and operating capital. Often he contributes toward crop production little but his own and his family's labor. His status is more nearly that of a laborer than of a tenant. A true tenant has rights of occupancy and land use that are protected by law, while the sharecropper is very much subject to the will of the landlord. 423 427

In general, it appears that in the rainfed areas the sharecropper receives about 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor, and around 70% if he provides the working capital. In areas sparsely settled he receives a slightly higher percentage of the crop, and in heavily populated areas he may receive somewhat less. On the irrigated lands the sharecropper receives in

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

4/23 the neighborhood of 20-30% of the crop if he furnishes only his labor, and
4/27 about one-half of the crop if he provides his own working capital. The distribution of the returns on privately irrigated lands is, however, often much affected by the person who controls the pump.

Land Ownership

4/23 As in other countries of the Middle East considerable uncertainty attaches to ownership rights in land. By no means all of the cultivated or cultivable land is listed in the official property registers, and titles which are registered are often imprecise or conflicting in stating the boundaries or the area. The validity of many land grants made in the past is also subject to challenge.

[4/71] By far the greater part of the land unquestionably belongs to the state, if only because most of the land is uncultivable and therefore unutilized and all unoccupied or "dead land" has always in theory belonged to the state. State land has in the past fallen into two categories: "state domain" proper, which is officially registered as belonging to the state, and unoccupied or "dead land" (*mawat*) to which no title exists.

Land other than state domain is held under various traditional forms of ownership including *mulk*, *waqf*, *matroukah*, *amiri* and *mucha'a*. *Mulk* is the only form of absolute ownership and covers only a small proportion of state land. *Waqf* is property held in the form of a religious trust and is not particularly significant as far as agricultural land is concerned. *Matroukah* is land dedicated to public purposes and also has no significance for agriculture. Most land is *amiri*, a type of hereditary leasehold. Ultimate ownership in theory rests with the state which can legally recover *amiri* land if it is not cultivated for five years in succession. The latter right is, however, never exercised, and *amiri* land can be said to be in virtually unqualified private ownership. *Mucha'a* is village land held in common but cultivated in individual family plots periodically reallotted among the holders. This form of tenure has predominated in certain parts of the country such as the Hauran and obviously gives little or no incentive to permanent improvement of the land.

Recognizing that clear and undisputed private landownership is a prerequisite to land improvement, the government has been seeking over many years to terminate the *mucha'a* form of tenure and end the confusion in land titles. *Mucha'a* land is being gradually distributed and converted to

15: Tamous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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most in their minds. Furthermore, they put the new land under cultivation through an understanding with the local tribal chief. He guarantees them "protection" of the crop in return for a portion of the produce. Nowhere does the peasant figure in this deal other than as a laborer or a sharecropper. Nowhere do we see signs of the emergence of that badly needed class of small, independent, cultivator-owners.

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The situation in Lebanon presents a glaring and enlightening contrast between two systems. In the mountain area, the heart of the country, a strong tradition of private ownership by small independent farmers prevails. In most cases, the family farm averages about 10 acres. The soil is scanty and the terrain difficult; but the people have their hearts in what they own. They have blasted the rocks and built extensive terraces to prevent erosion; they have made the mountainsides produce abundantly of olives, grapes, figs, and apples. On the narrow coastal strips they have grown luxuriant orchards of citrus and bananas. More significant than all of this, we observe that the village folk in this area enjoy much higher standards of living. This is clearly manifested in their diet, health, housing, and a literacy rate of some 90 percent.

True, they have other sources of income, especially from emigrants residing abroad. Yet the independence they have gained through ownership of the land has endowed them with the initiative and the possibility to seek these other sources and better their living conditions. Unlike the sharecropper, who is doomed to his status, the small independent owner is free to move up the ladder.

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Our argument in this respect gains support from the situation that prevails in the rest of Lebanon — in the Akkar plain of the north, in the Bika valley of the interior, and in the mountain area of the south. Here we witness the predominance of the same feudal-absentee-sharecropping system that exists in Syria and Iraq. Here also we witness the same conditions of deprivation, lack of development and low levels of living. Our argument gains further support from a consideration of living conditions in those village communities of northern Iraq, of some sections of Syria and Jordan, where the people are independent and own

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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S 244 crease the productivity per acre and also to expand the culti-
311 vated area per head.

L 311 In the Lebanon, however, with its steep hillsides under inten-
241 sive cultivation, there is a definite pressure on land resources.
434 The limits of intensification appear to have been reached, and a
large part of the village population supplements its income by
work in the towns, and by remittances from abroad. If the land
L tenure system in Syria were less oppressive, room might be
S found on the land for settlers from the Lebanon, but as things
511 are, the standard of living and status of the Lebanese peasant is
167 higher; compared with the Syrian peasant he is a free man, and
there is no inducement to leave the Mountain for the under-
populated plains of central or northern Syria.

LAND TENURE

L Corresponding to these different methods of farming, there
471 are different systems of land tenure.[1] In Lebanon individual
small ownership is well established, and the pattern of village
423 life, with its broad class of small peasant owners, few large
464 farmers, and a growing class of landless labourers, resembles
that of Europe.

S In Syria, the greater part of the land is owned by city not-
471 ables—the ruling class—and cultivated by small share-tenants.
Though individual ownership exists in some districts, for instance
427 the Beqa Valley and the oasis of Damascus, the most usual
428 form of landownership in the plain districts of Syria is share-
tenancy. The villagers bring their corn to the village threshing
floor, and when the grain is threshed the landlord or his agent
stands by and takes one-half of the grain. Towards this result he
has contributed nothing; all labour, equipment, seeds, livestock,
have been supplied by the tenant, so that his share is rent
purely for the use of the land. The landlord is almost always an
absentee, a city notable who only visits the land to collect rent.

S The share taken by the landlord varies from district to dis-
427 trict, and also varies with the condition of the land. According
to an inquiry made by the French authorities, the usual division
of the crop for non-irrigated cereals is 40–50 per cent to the

[1] The information which follows is mainly based on A. Latron, *La Vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, L'Institut Français de Damas, 1936). The brilliant and profound study by Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient*, is an indispensable authority which unfortunately was received only after going to press.

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S landlord, and 60–50 per cent to the peasant. The landlord's
● 427 only charge is taxes. If, as in some districts, the tenant provides labour only, and the landowner bears other costs, the landowner's share may rise to 80 per cent. For irrigated cereals, the landlord's duty is to provide water, and his share of the crop is then 60 per cent. Other irrigated crops are usually farmed by the landowner direct.

The tenant has no protection against eviction because these tenancy agreements have no legal basis, and are not covered by the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code. The tenant may be evicted by the landlord without notice, and no compensation is paid him for improvements made or for losses incurred when he is evicted.

S How much of the land is owned by large proprietors in Syria
471 is not exactly known. Roughly one-half of the grain sold in the market comes from large proprietors, and it is believed that about 60 per cent of the land is owned by them. In northern Syria, big landowners own 70–80 per cent of the land, and in the Damascus region 60–75 per cent. In the district of Hama, out of 114 villages, 110 belong to landlords, and 4 landowners between them own 86 villages. Generally there is a great desire on the part of the peasants for individual ownership, but it is only where there is some form of intensive cultivation that it can be successfully maintained. In the village of Kesruwan, for example, banana growing has brought prosperity to the peasants and enabled them to purchase land.

S Thus the custom of share-cropping reflects the instability of
471 grain growing in arid climates with uncertain rainfall and great variations in yields. It is peasant indebtedness which supports
427 the large landowners. Two bad harvests in succession will mean
426 that the peasants become so much indebted that they will actually reduce the area sown for lack of seed, and will therefore be obliged to sell to a money-lender or city merchant. The majority of the big Christian merchants in the town have become rural landowners in this way, particularly in Latakia and round Homs and Hama. In the Syrian plain districts, entire villages have passed into the hands of merchants through indebtedness.

S Most of these large landowners are city families, who take no
L interest whatsoever in actual methods of cultivation. Some,
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probably few, of the estates are the properties of old, wealthy families of Ottoman times, which still exist in Lebanon, such as the lands belonging to the families of Arslan, Jumblatt, Chehab, Khazen, but many of these have been broken up by the Moslem laws of inheritance. Other estates have originated from direct grants made by Turkish Sultans to influential politicians, as for example the two very large estates in the Beqa and the Litani valley. Others too were formed at the time of the general registration of property undertaken by the Ottoman Government when chiefs of tribes or villages registered tribal land in their names as their private property. Uncertainty about legal title to land gives the educated classes frequent opportunity for ousting peasant owners, and whole villages have come into the possession of rival groups of city notables, as a result of litigation among the villagers who have sought their assistance in establishing their title.

While the land-tenure system is thus a result of peasant poverty, it also perpetuates poverty by standing in the way of any long-term investment. The high percentage of fallow in Syria suggests a great waste of land resources, and there could certainly be some improvement in yields, even in dry land farming, if green crops were introduced more generally into the rotation. But the share-cropper has little incentive to improve the fertility of the land, since he has no certainty of tenure, and since the landlord will take 50 per cent of any increase. Since the landlords are not as a rule directly interested in farming, they do not themselves undertake long-term improvements in the land.

Three case studies illustrate the ways in which the land-tenure system hinders advance.[1]

One study relates to the large estate of Misherfe, near Homs in central Syria. This is 24,000 acres in extent and includes five villages, with 2,500 inhabitants. It is very extensively cultivated, only one-third of the area, 8,000 acres, being cropped each year. The land is divided into three parts, one with wheat, barley or *qatani* (mixed grain), one ploughed but not sown, and one left fallow. A small area, 200 acres only, is irrigated, though water supplies are sufficient to irrigate much larger areas.

[1] These studies, which were prepared for the M.E.S.C., are not at present available in print.

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241 Wheat yields are lower than the average for Syria, averaging 4 hundredweight to the acre.

Almost the whole of the estate is let to share-tenants who are
●427 supervised by an agent, the landowners themselves rarely visiting the estate. The share of the crop taken by the landlord is 25 per cent on non-irrigated land and 42½ per cent on irrigated land. These shares are more favourable to the tenant than is usual, because it is desired to attract more labour to the estate which sixty years ago was quite uncultivated. As elsewhere, the tenants have no leases but live in fear of eviction.

The tenants are divided into five classes:[1]

1. Large tenants cultivating 6 feddans (225 acres) of non-irrigated land: 4 in number.

2. Medium sized tenants cultivating 4½ feddans (168¾ acres): 4 in number.

3. Small tenants cultivating 3 feddans (112½ acres): 60 in number.

4. Small tenants cultivating irrigated land and with an average area of 18 acres: 100 in number.

[464] 5. Wage labourers, who form the majority of the villagers.

484 Of these classes, only the small groups of large and medium-
454 sized tenants can live well, in the sense that the output of the
√11 farm suffices to cover the essential needs of the family and also provides a small cash surplus. The surplus is used to buy gold pounds and jewellery. But the other groups cannot achieve even a sufficient standard of food consumption. The standard consumption of wheat (barley in the case of the very poor peasants) is 14 kilogrammes of grain per month; to achieve this level it is necessary to crop about 45 acres. Thus with the present system of cultivation, the class of small tenants, who cultivate an area of 112 acres and would appear to have quite sufficient land, cannot attain the minimum because only one-third, 35 acres, can be cultivated owing to shortage of live-stock.

√11 These small tenants, who are typical of the farmers in the
[342] great plains of Syria, are very poor, living in one- or two-roomed mud huts, and when there is only one room, sharing it with their animals.

[1] It must be said that the feddan in Syria is a variable measure and here is equivalent to 37½ acres.

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511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

484 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultivation. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by
409 the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
427 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis, with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

[The estate of Misherfe, near Homs -- Analysis]

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Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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471 a loan directly from another government. This attitude is illustrated clearly
186 in the refusal of Syria to sign an agreement with Point Four.
648 A loan from an international body is another matter, and the country is seeking a loan of several million dollars from the International Bank for development of transportation, particularly roads in the Jezira, and port facilities at Latakia.

454 Without a large-scale public works program, only minor improvements
241 can be made to the existing system. However, opportunities exist for increasing production through private investment.

The good crops of 1950, sold at exceptionally high prices, resulted in high profits and the accumulation of considerable capital. The hope of continued high profits caused much of this capital to be re-invested in equipment and farm improvements. The same incentive also brought out new capital which never before had been invested in agriculture. Judging from the number of tractors, combines and accessories, and irrigation pumps purchased during 1950 and 1951, the investment in agricultural equipment in these two years exceeded the total up to that time. Unprecedented expenditures for general farm improvements also were made, an exceptional step in a country without a history of investment in agricultural development beyond the acquisition of land and a few simple facilities. The capital base has been small. Production has about equaled consumption. There has been little surplus for savings. The few families with capital have used their funds in other ways, seldom for agriculture. But the experience of 1951 was not encouraging for long-continued investment in agricultural development. These investments were costly, many farmers paying double the United States prices for equip-

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These farmers are typical of those in northern Syria. All the tenants of one landlord usually live in villages like this one near Aleppo. Villages vary in size from a few hundred to several thousand depending on the size of the farm.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and money-lenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

Another significant aspect of the land tenure problem is the financial arrangements between the landlords and tenants. 427

Although there are many variations throughout the country, there are three basic contracts. 241

In the first, where water is available by gravity flow for irrigation and the landowner furnishes only the land, he gets 50 per cent and the tenant gets 50 per cent of the gross yield. In the second type of contract, where the tenant installs pumps and operates them at his own expense and the landlord furnishes the land only, he gets 33⅓ per cent and the tenant gets the rest. In the third case, where the landowner furnishes only the land and the tenant drills artesian wells at his own expense, the landowner gets only 25 per cent of the gross yields. There are variations depending on the crops produced and on who furnishes seed, fertilizer, and equipment. With the growth of mechanization, there is a rising tendency for landowners to prepare the seed beds themselves with large tractors and to take a large share of the produce.

With the advent of mechanization, there is also a noticeable tendency to wage-crop arrangements, particularly in the remote areas like the Jezira where the population is sparse and where the only feasible arrangement for picking cotton is the employment of nomads by the day. 464 241

The greatest concentration of small cultivators who own and operate their own farms is in the older farming areas in the southern part of Syria around Damascus. Around Aleppo the farms are larger in size and owner-operators are fewer in number. 471 241

MECHANIZATION

Mechanization is changing rapidly the primitive practices which still dominate Syrian agriculture. The number of tractors has increased from 200 to almost 2,000 and more than 700 combines are in operation. 241 407

Most of the mechanical equipment is in the Jezira and the agricultural areas around Aleppo. Approximately half the tractors are being used in cotton areas.

To encourage further mechanization the government plans to extend loans to farmers on a five-year basis to finance the purchase of agricultural equipment. So far most of the equipment has been bought privately and for cash. [452]

The first few years have been difficult for the tractor farmers because of the lack of trained operators and the lack of adequate repair facilities, especially spare parts. Now the large manufacturers' agents are establishing modern service stations, repair stations, and mobile repair units. Consideration is even being given to organizing operator training programs.

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

All of the agricultural missions stress the need for improvement in basic research and educational programs. The United States-Syria Agricultural Mission has outlined a complete program for agricultural training, research, and extension. Some of the recommendations already have been adopted, such as the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 654

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

COTTON IN SYRIA

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Table 26

SYRIA: Estimated Cost of Producing Cotton in the Upper Euphrates Valley on a Typical Tenant Cultivator Farm
1950

Cost Items		Cost per Acre
		Dollars
Land preparation and planting		19.86
Seed		2.07
Irrigation (fuel and amortization of engines and pumps)		18.09
Cultivation		6.22
Supervisor's salary		3.72
Harvesting		10.34
Miscellaneous		5.17
Total tenant's cost at plantation		56.47
Tenant's transportation cost to Aleppo		2.74
Tenant's ginning cost at $9 per bale		7.74
Tenant's cost for the ginned cotton from one acre		67.95
Estimated Yield per acre	616 pounds of lint cotton per acre	
Rent at one-third of crop	205 " " " " " "	
Tenant's share of lint	411 pounds	
Estimated Yield per acre	1,144 pounds of seed	
Rent at one-third of crop	381 " " "	
Tenant's share of seed	763 " " "	
Tenant's cost of ginned cotton		$67.95
Less credit for tenant's share of seed at $64 per ton		24.42
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton		$43.53
Tenant's net cost of ginned cotton divided by pounds	or $43.53 / 411 equals 10.59¢ net cost per pound	

NOTE: This is a plantation with 250 acres of cotton grown under irrigation in the Upper Euphrates Valley. The landlord gets one-third of the seed cotton at the plantation for land rent. The tenant pays transportation and ginning cost only on his share of the production. [427]

SOURCE: Trade sources.

388

COTTONSEED OIL

Nine crushing mills have a total capacity for approximately 500,000 tons of seed annually. Only four of these are primarily cottonseed oil mills—two in Aleppo, one in Damascus, and one in Hama. Capacity is adequate and prices slightly higher than those in the foreign markets, so most of the seed is now crushed in Syria. However, the extraction rate is low, especially in the older mills, and 1951 cottonseed oil production was given as only 5,000 tons. This represents about 40 per cent of the total vegetable oil produced in the country, the remainder being largely olive oil. Approximately 85 per cent of the cottonseed oil cake is consumed domestically as stock feed, with the other 15 per cent exported.

INSECTS

The principal cotton destroying insects are the spiney bollworm, *Earias insulana* (Boisd.), and the locust. Last year the plant protection department of the Ministry of Agriculture distributed 250 tons of benzine hexachloride and farmers purchased 150 tons directly from dealers. Even so, yields were only half what they were reported to be the previous year and farmers at- 242 248

433, 162, 464, 439
●

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
● Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

185, 433, 654

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the program of industrialization in countries of the Middle East after World War I up to 1945, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Turkey - pp. 274-284, Egypt - pp. 285-286, Iraq - pp. 287-289, Palestine - 289-290, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 290-291./

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Syria MD1

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

4

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SYRIA

AWAD BARAKAT *

Introduction

433 1. Despite the great potentialities that lie in her fertile soil, the nature of her climate, the energy of her people and her geographical position, Syria is an economically underdeveloped country. Perhaps it would be more accurate to use the term *not fully developed* to describe Syria's present situation, particularly in view of the economic awakening which began after World War II and has continued to grow up to the present day.

000 2. Admitted that the economic development of any country cannot be undertaken without individual as well as governmental effort, we nevertheless intend to restrict our examination of the economic development of Syria to the part played by the government. The reasons for this restriction are: limitations of space do not allow a full analytical treatment of both individual and governmental efforts; statistics on governmental activities are far fuller and more reliable than any as yet available for private concerns; finally we believe that in a country like Syria, where private capital is inadequate and the investment habit not yet deeply rooted, economic development must depend to a very large extent upon the government. Indeed we would go so far as to say that unless the government is able to assume control of economic development and is willing to bear the greater part of the burden, little improvement can take place. Part of the government's job will be to create the conditions, lacking until now which will encourage individual efforts and investment.

3. Underdeveloped countries, generally speaking, have certain conditions in common, the most characteristic being the following: partial exploitation of natural resources and neglect of possibilities of growth: low national production and national income, resulting in weak purchasing power, low national savings and shortage of investment capital; a deficit in the balance of trade

114 * Dr. Awad Barakat is Secretary of the Currency and Credit Council of Syria.

The Syrian economy in 1945 was distinguished by its relatively low 433 ●
production of a generally poor quality. It lay in a state of decadence and stagnation that could only have been remedied by energetic action by the authorities in power. It was a virgin country waiting for people willing to work hard to develop its resources in the fields of agriculture, industry and commerce.

Agriculture in Syria occupies first place, whether considered 433
from the point of view of production or the number of those who 241
earn a living from it. It produces the largest part of the country's exports and supplies the national industries with raw materials. But, despite its preponderance over other economic activities farmers remained up to 1945 dependent on ancient methods, and were ignorant of such modern techniques as the use of machines and fertilizers. Syrian agriculture suffered helplessly from the crop rotation system, from natural pests, insects and diseases, from rain variations and the unscrupulousness of money lenders.

As to industry, it was in its infancy, still feeling its way and 433
lacking encouragement, protection, adequate studies, knowledge and experience.

Nor was commerce in a better situation than agriculture and in- 439
dustry. During the second world war, Syrian trade lost its relations 457
with many of the belligerent countries, and emerged from the war crippled and hampered by the restrictions of exchange control. In addition, the direction of Syrian commerce was not in the hands of Syrian nationals; the larger part of foreign trade, both exports and imports, was handled through Beirut. As a result Syrian merchants lost direct touch with countries abroad and Syria became in effect an internal market dealing in retail with neighbouring markets. Commercial agencies were in the hands of non-Syrians up to the extent of 95 per cent of the total. To complete the picture we should mention that a large part of banking operations with foreign countries took place in banks situated outside Syria, and that the purchase and sale of foreign exchange accruing to Syria was effected in the Beirut market. To conclude, control of Syrian external trade was in non-Syrian hands and the Syrian economy, in consequence, was forced to lose large sums in the form of expenses, commissions, and profits which were paid abroad for mediation in purchase and sale transactions.

14. During the period under discussion the Syrian Govern- 185
ment exercised great effort with satisfactory results; it made a be-

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but 311
which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed [162]
into the region following the opening of the road and began popular- 491
ing it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region.

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" bar- 24⅔
ley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat 43⅔
are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita.

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances 185
which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and 654
planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below:

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the [132]
month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new

when the wheat crop fails, as it did last year, there is great hardship in all of the Jazirah. Debts remain largely unpaid, the value of land falls off sharply, and interest rates become unbearable 248 511

The failure of a crop in Jazirah brings more hardship than is the case in other Mohafazas because Jazirah, with all the money revenue which accrues to it in a good year, has not arrived yet at the stage where it can save a part of this income to use in bad years. All the money revenue is immediately reinvested in machinery and in expansion of the area planted with additonal sums borrowed from the banks or from Aleppo merchants. 454

The point is reached where further expansion has become difficult, and the situation will become more or less stabilized so that some of the income will be put aside for emergencies in the coming few years. But even when savings reach a high figure, the problem of monoculture is not solved.

Jazirah at present does not produce the necessary vegetables and fruit for its own consumption. It imports them from Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. That is why the cost of living in the town of the Jazirah is one of the highest in Syria. Aside from the price of meat and samneh, everything including room and house rents, is more expensive than in the other big towns of Syria. Even flour is sold to bakers by the town municipalities at the same price for which it is sold in Damascus. 511 241 488

In former times, however, Jazirah produced great amounts of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Its lands are very well suited to raising cattle and beef, an employment more profitable than wheat growing. A diversification in the use of land will make for a more balanced and prosperous economy in Jazirah. But the Jazirah farmers are not to be blamed entirely for the kind of agriculture prevailing. Circumstances beyond their control, connected primarily with the problems of land ownership and tenure, have largely imposed this type of monoculture upon them. These problems will be discussed in the following section, but it can be said in passing that the farmer cannot be expected to invest money in buildings for cattle raising, or in digging wells to provide irrigation for vegetable growing, or in planting orchards on lands to which he has no title or whose title is subject to constant disputes over boundaries with the neighbors and lately by decree-law 96 with the State. 433 241 454

423 The large holdings are owned by the Agha of Koshar around
47b Deirik, the Sheiks of Shammar from Tal Koshak to Kubur el Bid and south to the Rad, the Sheik of Tay and several of Tay subdivision chiefs, Asfar-Najjar family of Qamishli, the Aghas of the Kurdish tribes (three in number), and two Sheiks of the Jubur. This list is not exhaustive but it is true that not more than fifty individuals in Jazirah have holdings of more than 5,000 hectares each. And since the great majority of them are tribal chiefs, the logical solution is to ask them to distribute these lands according to the laws in force since the Ottoman rule. No new legislation is necessary to fulfill the two aims of distribution of the public domain to needy peasants and the division of the big estates.

Such a solution will not mean that every estate will be only 1500 dunums but it will mean that perhaps 80% of Jazirah will be in holdings approximating 1500 dunums and some 20% in holdings of 10,000-15,000 dunums for tractor cultivation.

C. Shortcomings of the Decree

423 The basic defect of decree 96 is that it erred in diagnosing
65b the real problem of land ownership in Syria. As the United Nations
433 Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East aptly described the situation (part I page 34), "In the Middle East, most of the population--perhaps as much as 90%--lives virtually on the margin of subsistence. But while maldistribution of income obstructs economic progress in a variety of ways, it is secondary to the basic problem in each country of grossly inadequate output in relation to the total population. This is the central fact of economic life in the Middle East." Thus the real problem facing the Government in Jazirah is not that a few people own large tracts of land (though some of them do and should be controlled), but whether the present type of cultivation is not working for a better national economy than small holdings will be able to do.

This criticism of decree 96 does not mean that land abuses do not exist in Jazirah. Undoubtedly they do. But it is a long way between admitting this and trying to correct it by dividing the land indiscriminately into 1500 dunum lots.

The shortcomings of decree law 96 are numerous and without discussing them in detail since the law is being amended, it is necessary to recognize some of them.

423 In the first place, the law amounts in fact to confiscation of
676 property because it arbitrarily abolishes rights of individuals gained
433 over the land through the normal processes of established law.

Secondly, it allows a uniform area for every farmer whether he uses tractor or mule, and whether he allows dry cultivation in Jazirah or irrigated farming in the Euphrates or the Khabur. It is evident that an irrigated area of 1500 dunums is more than adequate even for a large farmer while the same area is too small for tractor dry farming.

Thirdly, the confiscatory provisions of the law are not limited to lands recently acquired from the public domain, but cover lands for which deeds have been in the hands of the owners for decades. Decree 96 achieves this by reversing the stipulations of the preceding laws and by stating that in unsurveyed lands every title should be limited by the area mentioned in it and not by the boundaries.

Fourthly, if social justice is the aim, why should the law be limited to control of the ownership of land and not extended to control commercial and industrial property as well as real estate in cities and cash money? Further, how can the law treat on the same basis five hundred dunums planted to orchards or olive trees and a neighboring area of the same dimensions planted to wheat?

V. Land Ownership Along the Khabur

471 There is more concentration of land ownership along the Khabur that in theother parts of Jazirah, though the concentration is less apparent because the cultivable lands are smaller.

In the north, around Ras el Ain, the Shashan tribe dominated the country. South of them are the Assyrian holdings. Around Hassakeh, some Christians have bought lands from the Juburs, but south of the town and down to Shaddadah, the Jubur Chiefs of the Milhem family own or control both banks of the river. They own all the naqourahs and work their lands by renting it to the members of their tribe on conditions described in the next chapter. One hardly finds a Jubur who is not of the Milhem, or a stranger from inside Syria, who owns property in the Jubur region of the Khabur.

Lately, the Milhem have begun renting land to irrigation projects by pumps. But unlike the Kurds and Tay people of upper Jazirah, the Milhem have never agreed to enter into partnership for the ownership of land.

000 162 eastwards into the desert. At present the bulk of the population is concentrated in a comparatively small part of the total area of the country; it is mainly in the West and in the river valleys of the Jazirah. The density of population is greatest on the coast and round Damascus and Aleppo.

241 The crops which are grown or could be grown vary greatly from district to district, in accordance with variations in climate and the soil's fertility. The Jazirah, the great plain of Homs and Hama, the Biqa' and the Hauran produce wheat, and to a lesser extent maize, barley and other cereals. Olives, vines and other fruits are grown on the coastal plains and the westward slopes of the coastal ranges; tobacco in Lebanon and around Latakia; cotton also around Latakia, and in the Biqa'. Some districts are well watered by springs, summer streams and perennial rivers, and some, in the north more than in the south and on the coast rather than inland, enjoy an adequate rainfall; but the fertility of almost all parts of the country could be much increased were its water-resources to be properly exploited. The Orontes in the north, the Litani in the south, the Euphrates and its tributaries in the north-east and other rivers could be used to irrigate perhaps half a million more hectares than are irrigated to-day. The rainfall could be more fully utilized, and the agricultural situation improved in various other ways, by systematic reafforestation, to make up for the bad effects of neglect in the past. Under French rule a little has been done to this end, but more remains to be done.

135 The mineral resources of Syria and Lebanon have not yet been thoroughly investigated but are probably not extensive. Salt and some other minerals exist in quantities sufficient to supply the country's own needs; but iron and other requisites of industry are found only in small quantities or else not at all. In recent years there have been reports of the discovery of oil in the Jazirah, but whatever oilfields exist are not yet being exploited.

433 241 In normal years the country's production of food equals and often exceeds its consumption, although the inadequacy of internal communications and other factors make necessary a certain importation of agricultural products from the neighbouring countries. Improvements in the quality of seeds and livestock and the modernization of agricultural methods have already begun, and greatly help in increasing production.

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

433 such goods as Syria's few modern factories produce, have
439 between them severely limited the Syrian and Lebanese export trade.

439 According to the official statistics for 1938, the latest year
487 for which detailed figures are available, the main countries to which the French Mandated Territories exported goods were Iraq, Palestine, France, Transjordan, Italy, the United States and Egypt, in that order.[1] Much the most important exports were vegetable products and textile materials and goods. The total value of exports and re-exports (excluding the oil of Iraq) was some 892,232,000 francs (£5,028,000).[2] The chief countries from which goods were imported were Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Germany, Italy and Roumania. The main goods imported were textile materials and goods, metals and metal work, vegetable and mineral products; and the total value of imports was 1,707,696,000 francs (£9,059,000).[2] There was thus an adverse trade balance of 815,464,000 francs (£4,031,000) which was largely offset by the revenue from certain types of invisible export. For example large sums were brought into the country by the many thousands of tourists who visited it, and by the Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and others who spent the summer in the hill-resorts of Lebanon. Again, considerable sums of money were sent home by emigrants in America and elsewhere; this item is now much less important than during the past, but it is still not negligible. A third type of invisible export was the foreign capital invested in the country, and foreign credit granted to merchants. In spite of these invisible exports, however, both the size of Syrian and Lebanese foreign trade and the discrepancy between imports and exports are unsatisfactory. The situation can be improved, first by an increase and diversification in production, and secondly by the discovery of external markets for the goods produced, either in the neighbouring countries or elsewhere.

5

511 Syria and Lebanon are comparatively poor countries, and in spite of the changes which have taken place the standard of living in the countryside and among the poorer classes in

[1] For statistics of foreign trade, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 199-202.

[2] Calculated at the rate of 177.45 francs, to the pound sterling. This was the average rate for December, 1938.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Natural Resources

Land and water are undoubtedly the principal natural resources of Syria. Indications do not point to extensive mineral deposits. Some poor lignite but no coal has been found. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company carried out extensive prospecting and drilling over a considerable area under a concession granted in 1938. After spending about £ 6 million sterling in exploratory work, it surrendered its concession in August 1951. Although the belief persists in Syria that considerable oil will one day be discovered, there is no evidence to support the supposition. Drilling did reveal the presence of natural gas in eastern Syria, southwest of Hassetche, and also of appreciable quantities of rock salt. In theory this gas, if proved in considerable volume, together with salt, could provide the raw materials for the production of fertilizers and alkalis, but other countries—for example Iraq—may well be more favorably situated with respect to the development of similar resources. The natural gas could also be used as a source of energy but it is unfortunately found at a considerable distance from the potential market in western Syria.

There are important deposits of bitumen or asphalt. One of these, in the province of Latakia, is already being mined, but other and far richer deposits uncovered in the Djebel Bichri, west of Deir ez Zor, are being exploited to a minor extent only by the Ministry of Public Works. The latter deposits are expected to assume considerable importance in the extensive roadbuilding program the government is planning to undertake. Iron ore, chromite and lead and iron pyrites are known to exist, but their presence in commercial quantities is still to be proved. While licenses for prospecting of minerals are being issued, on the basis of existing evidence it seems unlikely that mineral resources exist in sufficient quantities to affect the future of Syria significantly.

Agriculture

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65% to 75% of the people derive their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable portion of the balance earn their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities. Agriculture and animal husbandry together probably account for 45% to 50% of the national income. In agriculture, winter crops are most important because rainfall is concen-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

241 433 trated in the fall and winter seasons. Thus around 70% of the area in crops is usually planted to wheat and barley, and these two cereals contributed £S 59.2 million and £S 70.8 million or approximately 19% of the total value of Syria's exports in 1952 and 1953. Although a considerable number of summer crops are grown, including sorghum, maize, rice, pulses and vegetables, by far the most important of these is cotton. The latter now rivals wheat as the most valuable crop of the country even though the 1953 acreage planted to cotton was only 10% of that sown to [439] wheat. Exports of cotton and cotton seed amounted in 1952 and 1953 to £S 131.2 million and £S 140.2 million, or 38% and 40% of the value of all exports. Orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits also assume some importance in agricultural production, although they 233 take up less than 10% of the planted area. Animal husbandry, based prin- 439 cipally on sheep and goats, is primarily a pastoral industry without a close link with settled agriculture. Exports of livestock and livestock products including hides and skins, samneh (clarified butter), cheese and eggs, amounted in 1953 to almost £S 48 million or around 13% of the total value of exports. Live animals alone contributed £S 23 million, although such exports were offset by imports, primarily from Iraq, to a value of £S 7.1 million.

241 433 Much of Syria's agricultural output is consumed on the farm and therefore does not enter the market economy. From the returns of the agricultural production tax, which is levied only on produce brought to market, it may be estimated that only around 40% of the production of wheat, maize and sorghum and less than 30% of the output of lentils is sold.

Industry

433 464 During the postwar period industry has steadily forged ahead, although its contribution to national income is probably still only between one-fifth and one-fourth that of agriculture and animal husbandry. The number employed in manufacturing is difficult to estimate, since the 1947 census provided no occupational breakdown, and industrial enterprises required to register with the government generally understate the number of workers employed. Fragmentary data collected by the mission indicate that employment in more or less mechanized manufacturing establishments, many of which are very small, may be between 35,000 and 40,000. If

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handicraft workers and artisans are included, the number engaged in some form of manufacturing may approach or perhaps even exceed 100,000. 433 464

The textile industry, including spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing, and the manufacture of garments, is the most developed. [288] It probably employs close to 20,000 people in more or less mechanical establishments and it was able, in 1953, to export goods to a value of about £S 25 million. Among other important industries are flour milling, the extraction of vegetable oils and making of soap, tanning, sugar refining, canning and preserving, and the manufacture of cement, glass, tobacco and matches. The production of utensils, implements, furniture and shoes, although on a considerable scale, is almost completely in the handicraft stage.

Commerce

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Commerce has always been one of the most profitable occupations in Syria. It has furnished much of the capital for the development of industry and even of agriculture. Aleppo and Damascus are the principal commercial centers of the country, the former being the more important. It handles most of Syria's exports, which emanate largely from the northern part of the country, and with the development of the port of Latakia it is also increasing its share of the import trade.

Foreign commerce is quite important in total trade. Over the three-year period 1951-53 the value of imports has averaged close to 30% of probable national income and exports about 22%. Exports have risen rather steadily in total value, and imports somewhat more slowly. Separate foreign trade figures for Syria have been available only since March 1950, when the economic union with Lebanon was terminated in order to give Syria more freedom in protecting its domestic manufacturing industry. Foreign trade has developed as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Year	Customs figures			Adjusted figures		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
1951	277	304	−27	292	418	−126
1952	320	313	+7	337	444	−117
1953	376	307	+69	408	484	−76

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454 Savings institutions are virtually non-existent. There are no special savings banks and the regular commercial banks do not consider it worth while to make a particular effort to attract savings deposits. In fact, total savings deposits in commercial banks at the end of 1953 amounted to only £S 3.5 million. No postal savings system exists, and savings in the form of insurance are negligible. This does not mean that savings do not accrue, but rather that they do not take institutional form and are invested directly, not through the intermediary of institutions or a capital market. Syrians generally prefer types of investments which are tangible and visible, such as land and buildings, and over which they can exercise some personal control. In the past the habit of putting savings into hoards of precious metals or even currency has also been deeply ingrained. There is some evidence, incapable of statistical measurement, that the relative importance of savings in the form of hoards has declined in the postwar period as opportunities for profitable investment have grown. Investment in corporate securities has greatly increased during this period, but only by limited groups of people and under conditions assuring them control over the corporate enterprise. Shares in industrial companies are bought and sold in an unorganized and very limited market.

Economic Growth

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One of the most noteworthy features of the Syrian economy has been its rapid growth over the last two decades, as indicated in Table 3. Agriculture and industry have both featured prominently in this development. The availability of idle land combined with the food shortages attributable to the war provided a tremendous incentive to an expansion of agricultural output. The area under cultivation, including fallow land, rose from about 1.75 million hectares in 1938 to 2.3 million in 1945 and has since continued to expand, reaching a total of around 3.65 million in 1953. The area actually planted to crops and orchards accordingly more than doubled during this entire period, rising from 1.16 million hectares to 2.44 million. By far the greatest part of the area put to the plow was dry farming land. According to official estimates, for example, the amount of land planted to winter wheat and barley increased from about 750,000 hectares in 1938 to 1.13 million in 1945 and 1.34 million in 1953, and the output of these cereals about doubled during the whole period. Following the war a considerable expansion of irrigation took place. By 1953 the irrigated area

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was officially estimated at 509,000 hectares as compared with 284,000 in 1946. The resulting rise in the value of agricultural production was particularly marked, since with irrigation more valuable summer crops could

TABLE 3 Indicators of Economic Growth

	Prewar	1945	1947	1950	1953
Agriculture					
Cultivated area (million ha.)	1.76	2.29	—	3.09	3.67
Cropped area (million ha.)	1.16	1.51	—	2.05	2.44
Wheat					
Area (thousand ha.)	473[a]	751	843	992	1,314
Output (thousand MT)	459[a]	415	404	861[b]	962[b]
Barley					
Area (thousand ha.)	275[a]	384	365	416	428
Output (thousand MT)	290[a]	248	169	322	472
Cotton					
Area (thousand ha.)	30[a]	17.5	19.3	78.0	136.6
Output (thousand MT, ginned)	5.4[a]	4.3	5.4	35.5	47.0
Agricultural production tax (million £S)[c]	—	—	9.1	16.2	22.4
Industry—Output					
Cotton and rayon yarn (thousand MT)	1	—	—	—	9–10
Cotton and rayon cloth (million meters)	15	—	—	—	ca.100
Vegetable oils, excluding olive (thousand MT)	(negligible)	—	—	—	ca.10,000
Soap (thousand MT)	3.4	—	—	—	8.9
Fruit and vegetable preserves (thousand MT)	1.8	—	—	—	4
Cement (thousand MT)	less than 75	—	—	—	224
Matches (million boxes)	11	—	—	—	32.2
Cigarettes (MT)	416	—	—	—	1,644
Electricity (million KWH: principal utilities)	25.1	—	—	—	114.2
Financial					
Government receipts (million £S)[d]	11.5	118.3	116.2	138.9	216.7
Notes and coins in circulation (million £S)[d]	19.9	210.7	183.2	224.6	288.4
National income (million £S)	—	—	—	1,380	1,600

[a] 1934–38 average. The production figures for wheat and barley may well be somewhat overestimated.

[b] Official production figures have been revised upward in the light of the amounts marketed as revealed by the agricultural production tax returns.

[c] The proceeds of this tax, levied on produce brought to market, tend to exaggerate the rate of increase in production, but are nonetheless a good indication of trends in output.

[d] Figures are not deflated for price increases. While a reliable price index is lacking, the price level in the period 1950–53 was probably between five and seven times as high as that before the war.

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be grown. Thus with the stimulus originally imparted by the Korean war boom, cotton, which had long been grown in Syria but on a small scale, has developed into one of the country's most valuable crops.

Manufacturing has expanded rapidly in the postwar period. Although the original impulse was given by the wartime shortage of manufactured goods, new factories were not for the most part established until after the war. Among the new modern factories built since then are six spinning and weaving mills, a considerable number of cotton ginneries, a dyeing plant, six vegetable oil mills, a glass factory, a cement plant and a sugar factory. The total amount of paid-up capital of manufacturing enterprises established in corporate form since the end of the war is in the neighborhood of £S 80 million. Since enterprises generally refuse to disclose their output, statistical measurement of the increase in production is extremely difficult. Very rough estimates indicate that about 9,000-10,000 metric tons of cotton and rayon yarn were produced in 1953 as compared with probably less than 1,000 tons in prewar years. The output of cloth was about 14,000 to 16,000 tons, or more than 100 million meters, as compared with perhaps 15 million meters before the war. The production of vegetable oils (other than olive oil), which was negligible before the war, amounted to around 10,000 tons, and the output of soap, at a level of about 9,000 tons, was almost three times the prewar estimate. Cement production, which was less than 75,000 tons before the war, amounted to 223,639 tons in 1953. The output of cigarettes was about four times, and that of matches three times, that of prewar years.

The expansion of agriculture and industry has in turn stimulated commerce, transport and construction. The construction industry in particular has witnessed a postwar boom which lifted the volume of building to a level probably twice as high as that in the years immediately preceding the war. Increasing prosperity, together with the wartime drop in building, generated a large volume of housing construction in all major cities.

The increase in national income since before the war has undoubtedly been very great; in real terms it may well be almost double. Unfortunately the fragmentary nature and unreliability of statistical data make even approximate estimates of national income extremely difficult. For the postwar years an unofficial estimate has been made only for 1950, when national income was put at £S 1,250 million. Some very tentative calculations made by the mission indicate that this estimate may well be too conservative. These calculations point to a rise in national income from

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community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing.

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads.

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the government to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network.

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its development at which the government must undertake a more important promotional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has

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654 severely diminished, and agricultural prices no longer afford such a power-
433 ful stimulus to the expansion of acreage. Extension of the irrigated area
311 must depend increasingly on public investment, particularly since the area which can be economically irrigated by privately installed pumps cannot be greatly expanded.

654 High transport costs and the low quality of grain are becoming serious
433 handicaps to Syria in an increasingly competitive world grain market. In other sectors economic activity seems also to be slackening. The future growth of industry is likely to be less rapid now that the more obvious manufacturing industries have been established. In construction it is also quite possible that the postwar boom has passed or will shortly pass its peak. Thus in the absence of a well-considered government program to stimulate the economy, the rapid increase in production and private investment may well taper off.

654 In agriculture the government now faces the need to make a careful
241 inventory of remaining land resources, to carry out irrigation projects on a greatly increased scale and to initiate settlement schemes for state lands. Steps must be taken to maintain and stimulate Syria's grain exports by providing better and cheaper transport and establishing facilities for the storage, grading and cleaning of cereals, thereby reducing losses and improving quality. In the future more emphasis will need to be placed on raising agricultural and livestock yields. The government will have to stimulate farmers to use better seeds and implements and to improve their crop rotation in the direction of soil-building crops and greater diversification. Livestock yields must be raised by undertaking a program of selection and cross-breeding, by building livestock shelters and providing more water for migrating livestock, and by initiating a more effective campaign against pests and diseases. To achieve these objectives the government must also expand and improve agricultural education, make available extension services at the village level and furnish much more agricultural credit on reasonable terms. Special efforts are required to assist the small peasant proprietor and the tenant who have not in the past fully shared in the rising prosperity. They must be helped to achieve greater economic independence and security and enabled to acquire the means of production with which to increase their incomes.

654 Although further expansion in industry should prove possible, greater
433 emphasis will have to be placed on selective expansion and on increasing efficiency so as to lower prices and broaden the market. Here the govern-

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ment will need to help private enterprise achieve these goals by collaborating, for instance, in the establishment of an institution to furnish technical and financial assistance, revising policies for the protection of industry from foreign competition and working towards the creation of a larger market for manufactured products, particularly through an intensification of economic cooperation among Arab countries.

To service the economy new and better roads and a larger supply of electric power are clearly necessary. Both of these call for a substantial increase in public investment. Transport is the most important bottleneck in the economy today; the acute shortage of power in major centers such as Aleppo and Damascus is already receiving government attention.

While expansion of the production base of the economy is the paramount task of the future, education, public health and the social services will also make greater claims on the government's resources. A further extension of educational facilities is undoubtedly necessary, but at the same time more stress must be placed on improving the quality and content of education. The condition of public health still leaves much to be desired. While the most urgent deficiencies in hospital accommodations must be remedied, the most pressing need is to concentrate increasingly on the prevention of disease by such measures as an anti-malarial campaign, improvements in sanitation and provision of pure water supplies. A marked and general improvement in housing conditions is likely to result only from a substantial increase in production and improvement of living standards but the government should at least assist the larger municipalities to initiate a program to cope with the worst conditions of housing congestion, a by-product of rapid but uneven economic growth.

A program of this type, which we shall elaborate in subsequent chapters of this report, should lay the foundation for a renewed and continued economic advance. It will serve not simply to compensate for a possible slackening of private investment but above all to create ultimately increased opportunities for greater private investment and enterprise which will expand production and raise standards of living.

The government has become increasingly aware of the task that lies ahead. Its request for an International Bank mission to work out recommendations for development testifies in part to its concern. It realizes that despite the economic progress of the past, the country cannot be satisfied with the current state of development and the standard of living it sustains. National income is still only around £S 440 per capita. Moreover,

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from the Ottoman Empire. Conflicting land grants have often been made in the past, and many claims to land rest upon grants of dubious validity. Titles frequently have not been perfected or entered into official registers. Even title deeds which are registered often contain conflicting or vague specifications regarding the area and the boundaries of the property. A considerable amount of land is still held in common village ownership and periodically reallocated among the villagers who accordingly have little interest in the permanent improvement of their changing allotments.

Programs to dettermine and delimit titles through a cadastral survey and to convert village common land into individual peasant holdings have been under way for several decades, but progress has been painfully slow.

6. *Agricultural yields are considerably below potentialities.*

Agricultural yields in Syria generally do not compare unfavorably with those in most other countries. Cereal yields tend to be about 10-20% below the world average and substantially below those achieved in Europe, but cotton yields are welll above the world average and now approximate those in the United States. The output per hectare for virtually all crops is better than that in the rest of Asia.

This general picture does not, however, justify complacency. The relatively good yields have no doubt been largely due to the fact that the frontiers of cultivation have been pushed steadily forward into new and virgin lands. Without this rapid expansion of the area under cultivation, productivity would probably have declined. The mission noted evidence of soil depletion and falling yields in certain areas which had been continuously farmed over many years.

With the diminution in the supply of available new land, Syria will in the future have to rely much more on an improvement in yields to maintain the rise in output. The potentialities unquestionably exist. Fallow is still virtually the only method employed to maintain and restore soil fertility. Thus at least a third of the arable land lies idle each year. Animal manure is almost wholly used as fuel. The use of fertilizers is still in its infancy; in 1953 onlly 11,171 tons were imported. The practice of green manuring is virtually unknown. Insects and diseases still take a heavy toll. Much higher yields can be obtained through better selection of seeds and varieties, improved crop rotation and better soil preparation and cultural practices.

7. *Animal husbandry is not practiced as an integral part of agriculture and is still on a low standard.*

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focus not only on the farmer-owner, but also on the tenant, for only in that way can the latter's economic bargaining power be strengthened and his independence and security enhanced.

IV IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTION

The mission approaches a discussion of this subject with some diffidence. Generalities are difficult to avoid. It is easy to point out deficiencies in agricultural practices, but much more difficult to suggest a concrete and practicable program to improve them. Effective action is made difficult by the ignorance and inherent conservatism of farmers. It requires a larger, better trained and better organized government service to carry out the necessary trials and experiments and to work with farmers at the village level. Obviously, no miraculous increase in productivity can be expected within a short time.

Nevertheless, the subject is too important to neglect. In too many countries the undeniable difficulty of carrying out a program to raise yields has caused governments to shrink from such an undertaking. We have already indicated why much more attention must be paid to this problem in Syria. Although land in Syria is more plentiful than in many other Asiatic countries, the population pressure on good land is bound to grow. If the country is to support an increasing population on higher living standards, the task of obtaining more output from cultivated land cannot be postponed.

The mission can only point out some of the potentialities and indicate in a rather general way how they might be realized. More detailed programs must be worked out by the Ministry of Agriculture with the help of the FAO or other sources of technical assistance.

Crop Rotation and Diversification

Improvement in existing patterns of crop rotation is one of the most important methods of improving the fertility and structure of the soil and permitting a gradual diminution in the use of fallow. The aim should be to reduce customary fallow in the rainfed areas by at least 50% and to the greatest extent practicable in the irrigated areas. The much more extensive use of leguminous plants for both winter and summer

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cultivation would help to remedy existing deficiencies in nitrogen and supply either nutritious fodder for livestock or material for green manuring to build up the depleted humus in the soil.

At present no legumes other than winter vetch and berseem are grown on a large scale during the winter season. While lentils, beans and peas are cultivated as cash crops in the Hauran and regions around Damascus and Aleppo, the value of legumes for fodder and pasture is not appreciated. A considerable number of leguminous plants which have not been cultivated in Syria, at least on any considerable scale, might well be introduced and tested.[11]

Aside from these legumes, other crops might well be tried out for inclusion in the rotation system so as to provide more diversified production. Among these are oil seeds such as the sunflower, linseed and sesame. The mission also recommends experiments with safflower, a plant which grows well under dry climatic conditions and in soils of moderate fertility.

The mission recommends that experiments be undertaken to determine the best rotation schemes for both irrigated and non-irrigated land in different parts of the country; and it suggests that £S 1 million be made available to defray the cost over the next five or six years. A substantial part of this should be used to finance trials on selected, strategically located farms, especially to provide free seed and instruction to farmers willing and able to try changes in crop rotation which experimentation has indicated as advantageous.

We realize that the adoption of crop rotation plans designed to reduce fallow significantly will by no means be easy. There will be limitations set by the availability of manpower, draft animals and machinery, and water. Legumes, however, can often be interplanted with cereals; and ways and means can probably be found to fit new crops into the rotation scheme at a time when they will not compete with the principal crops for the cultivator's time and equipment, or, in irrigated areas, for the available water. If additional implements or draft power are needed, they may be acquired, provided better credit facilities are established. Since additional resources are no doubt required to keep more land cropped, the economics of new rotation plans will have to be carefully worked out in the course of the proposed experiments and trials.

[11] See Annex C, p. 309, for specific suggestions.

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Fertilizers, Insecticides and Weedicides

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In increasing fertility, the more extensive use of fertilizer can be an important supplement to, but never a complete substitute for, better crop rotation. The most serious deficiency in Syrian soils is nitrogen, and though phosphorous is present the alkalinity of the soil often makes it less available as a plant nutrient. The use of ammonium sulphate, or anhydrous ammonia, and superphosphates could undoubtedly raise yields significantly. At present only modest quantities of fertilizers are applied in the Ghouta and in the cotton-growing regions. It is idle, however, to expect a rapid expansion in the employment of fertilizers; and a program to encourage their promiscuous use might well do more harm than good. The response to fertilizer depends very largely on appropriate timing of its application, the availability of water and other factors. A number of experimental stations in Syria have been carrying out experiments on nitrogen deficiency. The mission suggests that this program be expanded and supplemented by field trials on selected farms in various parts of Syria. The fertilizer for these field trials should be made available free or at nominal cost over a period of years sufficient to permit adequate testing. The mission recommends that a sum of £S 500,000 be made available for this purpose over the next five or six years.

The use of insecticides and pesticides has been almost entirely confined to cotton, and even for cotton they were applied extensively only in 1952 when dusting was made compulsory. Regular spraying and dusting of cotton and orchard crops should particularly be encouraged. A program of education and demonstration, combined with credit facilities for the acquisition of equipment and materials, is clearly necessary. Experiments should also be undertaken with modern weedicides, for there is little doubt that weeds at present greatly detract from yields.

If the use of fertilizers and insecticides is to be promoted, the cost should be reduced as far as possible. At present fertilizers are largely imported in the form of pre-mixed compounds containing a high proportion of carrier material readily found in Syria, and similarly, in the case of insecticides, essential ingredients account for only a small percentage of the volume imported. The mission suggests, therefore, that the possibility of lowering costs by establishing a plant for mixing fertilizers and making insecticides from imported ingredients should be explored.

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Implements and Machinery

In Syria there is an enormous gulf between the employment of modern tractors and combines in certain areas and the use of the traditional peasant plow or *feddan* and hand-harvesting and threshing methods elsewhere. The tractor can undoubtedly do a far better job of cultivation. It breaks the hard soil pan so as to facilitate deeper penetration of roots and moisture, and it promotes seed germination by more effective pulverization of the soil. It is equally obvious that combines produce a cleaner grain with less waste than the traditional process of having animals trample the grain and winnowing the resulting product by hand.

The development of Syria's agriculture, however, hardly depends on the rapid expansion of mechanized farming. The use of mechanized equipment can be recommended only where labor is relatively scarce or where units of exploitation are large, as is the case in the Jezireh. Small farmers cannot afford costly, modern machinery. Cooperative ownership and operation of such machinery may ultimately be undertaken, and the mission does suggest, as indicated previously, that an experiment along this line be carried out. It can hardly be expected, however, that this type of cooperative, which is among the most difficult to manage, will spread rapidly in the future.

Far more important and urgent is the task of improving and supplementing the poor implements which the peasants now have at their disposal. They should not have to rely almost wholly on the *feddan* which barely scratches the soil and leaves perennial weeds to compete with crops for the limited supply of soil nutrients. The farmer should have a better plow, supplemented by a cultivator or spike-tooth harrow; a simple seed drill that might permit him to get better yields by sowing in rows instead of by broadcasting; pedal threshing equipment and a hand-operated winnower that would enable him to produce a cleaner grain with less effort; and a simple leveller that would help him to level his land and avoid waste of rain or irrigation water.

Programs to improve and develop implements for the small farmer have been successfully initiated in a number of countries such as India and Afghanistan. The mission strongly recommends that such a program be undertaken promptly in Syria. It would propose establishment of a small implement center in cooperation with the FAO or other technical assistance agencies. This center should be equipped with a shop in which

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prototypes of useful implements would be made. These prototypes should then be distributed for supervised testing among selected farmers and arrangements would have to be made for the production of those found successful. Such a program need not be expensive. The mission estimates the capital cost at about £S 150,000 and recurring annual expenditures at not more than £S 100,000.

The problems of mechanized cultivation should not, of course, be neglected. Already an estimated total of 750,000 hectares is tilled by mechanical means. Over 1,300 tractors and 500 combines are being used today, primarily in the Jezireh but also, increasingly, around Aleppo. Mechanical farming is handicapped, however, by the high cost of fuel; lack of sufficient skilled labor to operate, maintain and repair machinery; inadequate repair facilities; excessive cost and, sometimes, deficient supplies of spare parts; insufficient knowledge of the suitability and capability of different types of equipment; and the utilization of too many kinds of machinery. Standards of maintenance are extremely low and repairs much too costly. The abuse of machinery greatly shortens its life. In the Jezireh, major repair facilities exist only in Kamichliye, and only two dealers have their own service stations. All these factors make mechanical farming excessively expensive. In the last two years, profits have seriously diminished as cereal prices declined and costs remained fixed. A reduction of costs is particularly necessary since the mechanically operated farms now contribute the bulk of Syria's exports of cereals.

Better transport facilities will do more than anything else to lower fuel costs. To deal with the other cost factors, a number of measures can be recommended. First of all, machinery dealers should be allowed to operate only if they abide by defined limitations on the price mark-up on machinery and spare parts; maintain prescribed minimum supplies of spare parts; and undertake to operate service and repair facilities in such centers as Kamichliye and Aleppo. Certain reputable dealers have declared to the mission their willingness to adhere to such qualifications, which have proved useful also in other countries. Secondly, the mission urges that short-term courses in the selection, operation and maintenance of farm machinery be organized at Kamichliye and Aleppo. Such courses should be conducted in the agricultural "dead season" and separately for owners and operators. The first should be instructed in the performance and capability of different types of equipment, in the supervision of operation and maintenance, and in the simple economics of mechanical farming; and

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the latter should be taught elementary principles of repair and maintenance. The courses for field operators and mechanics might well include some in-service training in repair shops. The cooperation of reputable dealers in organizing such courses should be enlisted. Finally, the mission proposes the establishment of a secondary agricultural school in Kamichliye to specialize in problems of agricultural engineering. Facilities for instruction in this subject should also be provided at the existing school in Aleppo. The mission envisages an expenditure of £S 2 million for such school facilities. The short-term courses could probably be made self-supporting. To initiate and help carry out this program, the mission suggests that the government obtain the services of one or two machinery experts through the FAO.

Cereals

Aside from the measures outlined above, programs to raise the yield of certain crops must be undertaken. For cereals the development of higher yielding and more disease-resistant strains is of paramount importance. Although many varieties of wheat and barley are grown in Syria, little is known about their comparative worth. A large number of the more promising foreign wheat and barley strains have recently been imported for testing, but the funds, staff and facilities for an adequate testing program are largely lacking. The mission accordingly recommends that the Ministry of Agriculture be enabled to carry out a program for testing, selecting and propagating high-yielding and disease-resistant seed.[12] Since the shortage of trained Syrians may continue for some time, it is likely that the program will have to be handled by a foreign staff (FAO; the French Technical Assistance Mission in Syria). The staff should include a director in charge of planning, three plant breeders and a plant pathologist. They should be assisted by a staff of about 30 Syrians who will largely have to be trained for this purpose. The mission estimates the cost of such a program at about £S 4.5 million over the next five or six years.

For wheat and barley the aim should be to develop good varieties which mature early and can therefore be harvested before the extreme heat. For rice, which will undoubtedly be cultivated in larger volume as the irrigated area expands, the aim should rather be to develop slow-

[12] See Annex C, p. 304, for year-by-year recommendations.

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248 433 maturing varieties to replace the praecox strains currently used. The high day and comparatively low night temperatures in Syria are more suitable to slow-maturing rice varieties. For maize it is especially important to test and select appropriate hybrid strains. In Syria maize yields are only about 1.3 tons per hectare while in the United States hybrid maize yields about 4.4 tons. With the introduction of high-yielding hybrid strains, the production of maize should definitely be encouraged since it fits well into the crop rotation scheme, is rather heat resistant and can provide not only grain but also fodder and silage.

Once suitable seed strains have been selected by testing, arrangements should be made with farmers in various parts of Syria for the propagation of such strains under proper supervision. These farms could serve at the same time as demonstration centers. The seed thus propagated should be certified and made available for distribution through licensed dealers, cooperatives and Chambers of Agriculture.

Cotton[13]

248 433 The government already has a praiseworthy program for the improvement of cotton cultivation. The disastrous failure of the cotton harvest in 1951, caused by the rather reckless expansion of cotton acreage and an uncontrolled invasion of destructive insects, brought in its train a number of corrective measures. The government regulated cotton acreage by licensing, and specified the time of planting. Controls over the treatment and distribution of seed were established. Even dusting and spraying were prescribed in 1952. Variety tests have also been conducted, and as a result Coker Wilt, a high-yielding strain, is now predominantly cultivated in Syria. A Cotton Office, staffed largely with Egyptian experts, has been charged with the improvement of cotton production. This entire program should be further expanded as more Syrian technical personnel become available. The mission suggests, for instance, that a special station be established for cotton breeding and insect control. More attention should be paid to cultural practices. Yields can be raised by reducing the danger of pests through rigorous cleaning of cotton fields following the harvest and destruction of host plants; by closer planting to discourage excessive vegetative growth and to promote earlier maturity; and by applying fertilizers at appropriate times.

[13] See Annex C, p. 305.

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Sugar Beet[14]

Sugar beet, though introduced only recently, is becoming an increasingly important crop. The sugar factory established in Homs has brought in seed from the Netherlands and Germany and distributed it to farmers. The reclamation and irrigation of the Roudj and the Ghab will undoubtedly give a great fillip to sugar beet cultivation and raise average yields, for beets do best on irrigated land. At present yields are still disappointingly low compared to those achieved in Western Europe and the United States. The mission suggests that efforts be particularly devoted to selecting a series of varieties with a wide range in maturity, so that the operating season at the Homs factory can be considerably prolonged. In the Euphrates and Khabour river valleys there are areas suitable for beet cultivation which can obviously not be served by the Homs plant. Ultimately the establishment of additional factories in these areas may prove worthwhile. Although the cost of producing beet sugar in Syria is undoubtedly higher than the cost of importing raw sugar (which is principally if not wholly cane sugar), the cultivation of beets has beneficial effects on the soil which appear to warrant its encouragement.

Tobacco

Tobacco is a minor crop, though important as a source of government revenue and of farm income in the province of Latakia, where it is predominantly grown. It is one of the crops, however, which is most in need of improvement. Seed selection, curing and grading all leave much to be desired. The entire plant, rather than selected leaves, is often harvested at one time. The Tobacco Monopoly, which licenses the growers, has paid little attention to the improvement of methods. The mission suggests that the Monopoly devote an additional sum of at least £S 75,000 annually to this purpose. At present three varieties of tobacco are grown: Abou Riha, the so-called "Latakia tobacco," which is bought almost entirely by a single American cigarette manufacturer for blending; Chek-el-Bint, used in the manufacture of Syrian cigarettes; and Tombac, produced for water-pipe smoking. In view of the rather uncertain market for Abou Riha, it would appear wise to develop the production of high-aromatic tobacco of the Turkish or Macedonian type for which a more durable market seems

[14] See Annex C, p. 308.

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249 433 assured. The possibility of growing Virginia-type tobaccos should also be explored.

Orchards and Vineyards

245 433 Vineyards and orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits already make an important contribution to agricultural income. Both the quality and the yield could be substantially raised by proper insect control, the use of fertilizers and tracer elements, and better pruning. Many existing orchards need rejuvenation. Heavy frosts in 1949-50 severely damaged olive orchards around Aleppo, so that Syria is now on a net import basis for olive oil. Establishment of vineyards and orchards in the Djebel Druze would help materially to raise the present low level of income in that region. In Latakia province the cultivation of citrus could be significantly increased. The availability of ample long-term credit at low interest rates is especially important for an expansion and rejuvenation of orchards and vineyards.

Vegetables

244 433 Vegetable growing in wide variety is concentrated in and around the larger population centers. The fact that so little is grown and consumed in the rural areas is due mainly to the fact that neither the small farmer nor the majority of consumers yet knows the value of a balanced diet; on the contrary, both hold vegetable cultivation in low esteem. Education and guidance centered upon the establishment of school gardens might do much to change this attitude.

The significant quantity of vegetables at present used by the local canning industry could easily be doubled though, as the canners explained to the mission, the poor quality of vegetables in general, and of peas and beans in particular, tends to limit the quantity suitable for processing. Better seed, improved cultural practices and adequate insect control measures could contribute greatly to higher quality and quantity. Improved transport, storage and marketing facilities should be included in community and cooperative development schemes, thus opening up possibilities for more exports and a very substantial increase in the activity of the local canning industry which at present produces about 4,000 tons of canned goods.

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In view of the desirability of increasing the role of vegetables in the Syrian diet and of their potential as a domestic and export cash crop, governmental stimulus would be of great benefit. 244 433

v ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 231

The problem of raising the production and quality of livestock has been comparatively neglected. Inadequate nutrition, high incidence of disease and mortality, and poor breeding all depress livestock yields far below what they should be. Livestock now accounts for less than 20% of the total contribution made by agriculture and animal husbandry to national income. This contribution to national income could undoubtedly be raised substantially because the possibilities for improvement in animal husbandry practices are vast and the demand for livestock products both at home and abroad is likely to increase more than proportionately as standards of living rise.

Better nutrition, control of disease and breeding are all necessary. Of the three, improvement in nutrition is by far the most important. Irrespective of breed, an animal will not be productive unless it is well fed. In fact the genetic factors in any breed cannot be fully developed and appraised unless nutrition is adequate. Similarly, low nutritional standards inevitably lower the resistance of livestock to disease and limit the effectiveness of control measures.

Migratory Livestock 233

Over 80% of the livestock other than fowl consist of sheep and goats, and most of these are taken by Bedouins on annual migrations into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing. The available vegetation is sparse and of short duration. As is usual under desert or semi-desert conditions, there is generally overgrazing in the areas close to permanent water supplies, and the poorer the season—in terms of rainfall—the heavier will be the concentration on such areas. During severe winters when winter growth ceases at an early stage and when the herbage may be destroyed by early frosts, there is a high mortality rate from the combined effects of malnutrition, helminthiasis and exposure.

It has been suggested that much of the mortality could be avoided by

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CHAPTER 4 *INDUSTRY*

433 Considering its size and general level of development, Syria already has a considerable manufacturing industry.[23] While Syria can hardly be called an "industrialized" country as yet, the growth of manufacturing during the last decade would undoubtedly have outpaced that of agriculture if certain special circumstances, such as the availability of idle land and a great demand for agricultural commodities, had not produced an equally rapid expansion of agricultural output. Most of the industrial production is for the home market, although in 1953 manufactures, particularly those of the textile industry, contributed about 15% of the country's exports.

Modern factory production in Syria is a relatively recent development. While a few textile factories and a cement plant were established before the last war, prewar manufacturing was predominantly handicraft. In certain branches, such as the weaving of brocades and the working of metals, Syrian artisans had established a world-wide reputation. However, methods of production and even volume of output in the handicraft industries had long been rather static and had even deteriorated somewhat under the impact of the competition of foreign machine-made goods.

The scarcity and high prices of foreign manufactures during the war and immediate postwar years greatly favored an expansion of Syrian industrial production. Many new factories were established. The abnormally high profits earned in commerce during these years caused merchants to turn to industry as an investment outlet for their surplus capital. Once the profitability of industry was demonstrated, additional capital was attracted. Many industrial enterprises reinvested a substantial portion of their profits in further expansion. The opportunities for profit also stimulated some influx of foreign capital, particularly from Lebanon.
[473] Nearly all of the new enterprises took the form of joint stock companies. Although in each case a limited number of businessmen took the initiative in founding the company and retained the controlling interest, the fact that at least some of the stock ownership became rather widely dis-

[23] See Annex F, p. 357.

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433 persed testifies to the appeal which industrial investment has made to a growing number of people.

[228] The textile industry has taken the most prominent place in Syria's industrial development. There are 90,000 to 100,000 spindles working on cotton and rayon and well over 5,000 mechanical looms. In cotton cloth Syria is approaching self-sufficiency and in rayon cloth it has already achieved a net export surplus. The woolen industry, dependent on imports of raw wool or yarn, is much less developed. In dyeing and printing, modernization is well under way. Along with the production of yarn and cloth, the output of garments has considerably expanded. Knitted goods, underwear, socks and stockings are now produced on a sufficient scale to permit exports.

The vegetable oil industry and the manufacture of soap have grown substantially in the postwar period, particularly as the increase in cotton cultivation supplied more raw materials. The food canning industry was expanded, and a factory was established to produce refined sugar from domestic beet and imported raw sugar. A second cement plant was installed; the two together expect to reach an annual production capacity of 400,000 tons by 1955. The postwar period also witnessed the establishment of a number of modern flour mills, a glass factory, a metal container plant and factories producing, among other commodities, rubber boots, matches, and beverages.

Present Stage of Development

Since manufacturing is a field for private enterprise in Syria, the mission has concerned itself not with individual projects, but rather with government policies which guide and stimulate private industrial investment. These policies must, of course, be devised in the light of the current stage of industrial development and of the problems which industry faces.

In this connection it should be noted, first of all, that there have been no conspicuous cases of misdirected investment in industry. The glass plant was undoubtedly conceived on too ambitious a scale, and the government participated with private capital in an abortive venture to manufacture certain types of machinery and spare parts. By and large, however, investment has been in fields where Syria should in the long run be able to achieve efficient production capable of withstanding foreign competition. In the main, Syrian industry falls, with some overlapping, in the

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433 following categories: processing of indigenous agricultural products, including cotton ginning, flour milling, vegetable oil extraction, tanning and food preserving; production of goods which because of transport costs are advantageously produced at or near the centers of consumption, such as cement and other building materials and, to a lesser extent, glass, furniture and other wood manufactures, and beverages; and the manufacture of simple consumer goods which are purchased in considerable volume by the home market, such as textiles, soap, boots and shoes, utensils, matches, sugar and sweets and the like. In all these lines Syria might be said either to enjoy some natural advantage or at least not to suffer any serious disabilities by comparison with other countries.

This does not mean that all Syrian industry is already so efficient as to be able to meet unrestricted foreign competition. Like any other young industrial country, Syria suffers from a number of handicaps which at least in the present stage prevent it from being fully competitive. Labor, management and equipment are deficient in varying degrees. With respect to labor, the mission was told that Syrian workmen have revealed considerable capacity for acquiring industrial techniques and that long-established handicraft skills have been helpful in building up a factory labor force. But a truly skilled labor force can be developed only over a long period of time, and it is evident that real labor costs as reflected by current wage rates and labor productivity are still rather high in some branches of industry. Managerial skills also vary widely, even within a single industry. In general, Syrian industrialists have demonstrated notable initiative and imagination in building up and managing their enterprises. Yet the picture is spotty. In some plants, particularly the larger ones, the quality of management compares favorably with that in western countries. Costs are carefully controlled, the management is acquainted with industrial methods and equipment used in other countries, and competent engineers, frequently recruited abroad, direct the technical aspects of production. In others, primarily small enterprises, management cannot afford to engage qualified engineers and must rely more on its own experience, painfully acquired at the expense of costly mistakes. The same differences were noted by the mission with respect to industrial equipment. Some plants are extremely well equipped, others struggle along with poor second-hand machinery, and still others are only partly mechanized. In Syrian industry, as in other segments of the economy, the most advanced and the most primitive exist side by side. In the textile industry, for example, one finds

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completely integrated plants carrying on spinning, weaving and dyeing; a large number of enterprises each equipped with a small number of mechanical looms; and, finally, perhaps some 6,000 hand looms still operating in part. In the leather industry there are a few modern tanneries but the bulk of the output apparently still comes from small establishments operating without machinery and with primitive techniques. In some branches of manufacturing, such as the production of leather shoes and domestic and other utensils, production is still in the handicraft stage. There is evidence, however, that even small shops are tending to mechanize themselves to some extent by the purchase of one or two machines.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that there are great variations in efficiency even among the larger enterprises. This is reflected in part in great disparities in the profitability of industry. Profits vary widely not only from one branch of industry to another but also within a single industrial branch. In general, competition within Syria has not been sufficiently strong to force out the less efficient producers. Thus one of the central problems of Syrian industry is to bring about a general reduction of costs by assisting the less efficient producers to improve their methods of production, or, alternatively, to help the more efficient to expand their capacity and output more quickly than they could with their own resources.

We believe that the period of rapid industrial expansion has come to a close. Even in the last few years the emphasis has been more on consolidation than on further growth. While many existing plants have continued to expand, especially by installing more modern, efficient machinery, fewer new factories have been established. The more obvious or "natural" industries have been created. In some branches there is even capacity surplus to requirements, particularly considering the limited ability to export. This is true, for instance, of cotton ginning, vegetable oil extraction, glass and matches. We do not mean to imply that industrial investment opportunities have been exhausted. Further diversification of the textile and apparel industry may be possible, and factory production of shoes and the manufacture of paper and paperboard from straw or poplar wood may be undertaken. One or two new cement plants are apparently going to be established. The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried on by many small shops but the quality of output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed

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433 plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements which, in accordance with our proposals, might be developed for use on Syrian farms. It should be emphasized, however, that future industrial expansion will need to be more selective and that projects will require careful technical and economic scrutiny to establish their suitability for Syria.

We conclude, therefore, that improvement in efficiency and more careful, selective expansion are the principal problems which Syrian industry faces. To meet these problems we have a number of recommendations involving (1) increasing exposure of industry to foreign competition, (2) development of a larger market for industrial products, (3) establishment of an investment bank to provide technical and financial assistance to industry and (4) improvement in vocational education.

Protection of Industry

433 Syrian industry today is in many ways shielded against foreign compe-
654 tition. Protection of this type is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating
651 only from 1949. Before that time industry had developed with little or no
457 government assistance. Prewar tariffs were moderate and essentially revenue-producing in character. Virtually the only concessions to industry were lower duties on plant and equipment and raw materials. The rapid expansion of mechanical manufacturing occurred at a time when there was little competition from abroad. During the war imports were largely impossible and in the immediate postwar years the demand for manufactures was such that rising imports were not incompatible with the continued development of domestic output. With the relaxation of foreign exchang[illegible]ctions in 1948 and an increasingly abundant supply of manufactu[illegible]n the world market, Syrian industry finally began to suffer from foreign competition. In 1949 the government came to the rescue by providing industrial establishments with facilities to obtain state-guaranteed loans at low interest rates from the issue department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. Pressure for more effective protection of industry was instrumental in terminating the customs union with Lebanon, which as a trading nation was interested in keeping tariffs moderate. Following the dissolution of this economic union in March 1950, import duties were generally raised and in many cases almost doubled. In 1951 tariffs on such articles as textiles, glass and soap were again sharply increased and the

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first import embargoes were imposed. In 1952 a large number of imports were prohibited and a *de facto* sugar trading and manufacturing monopoly was instituted. The following year, however, the Minister of Economics was deprived of discretionary authority to impose embargoes, and a number of prohibitions were subsequently lifted. Even so, import embargoes are still applied to such consumer goods as cotton hosiery, socks and stockings, "job lot cloth," second-hand cotton and silk clothing, men's shirts, vegetable oils, various soaps, margarine, canned vegetables and fruits, confectionery, glass and glass products, match boxes and match wood, matches, pins, wooden furniture and boots and shoes. These protective measures have been supplemented by controls over exports of certain raw materials designed to give domestic industry preferential access to available supplies. Importation of ginning machines was prohibited to safeguard existing enterprises, and imports of second-hand looms and knitting machines were stopped, to insure the installation of modern machinery. In 1952 the government also initiated licensing of industrial establishments for the purpose of preventing overexpansion and ill-considered ventures. During the same year more positive assistance was provided by enacting a law for the encouragement of industry which extended a number of benefits to new enterprises and extensions of existing plants.

The mission has no doubt that some protection of industry is justified, particularly in underdeveloped countries which need time to raise labor, technical and managerial skills to a level approximating those in the more advanced industrial countries. As we have already pointed out, the types of industry developed in Syria are generally of a character to warrant the expectation that they can ultimately stand on their own feet. This goal, however, will not be reached as long as production is as effectively insulated against outside competition as at present. The present system of exaggerated protection does not provide a sufficient incentive to raise efficiency and productivity. For Syrian consumers it involves excessive sacrifices in the form of higher prices and poorer quality. In recent years, for example, the Syrian government has found it necessary to protect consumers by controlling the prices of such articles as vegetable oils, yarn and cement.

In view of these considerations we recommend in particular that the present import embargoes be abolished. In some cases it may be necessary to substitute import duties higher than those now included in the tariff schedule, but in those instances prohibitive rates should be avoided and

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433 provision made for gradual reduction of the duties. At the same time we
654 suggest that the whole tariff schedule be re-examined. By and large it
651 cannot be said that the general level of tariffs is excessively high, particu-
457 larly since ad valorem rates are levied on imports valued at the official rate of exchange, and this entails an undervaluation of about 40% compared to the actual exchange rate. In fact, we recommend elsewhere that tariff rates be assessed on the basis of actual foreign exchange rates for the purpose of increasing government revenues. This should not be construed, however, as a proposal to raise all tariffs irrespective of their nature. On the contrary, we would suggest that, as part of the general revision of the schedule, those rates which are primarily protective in character should as far as possible be reduced for the purpose of encouraging outside competition and lowering prices. If necessary, such reductions could be graduated over a period of time.

434 *Possibilities of a Larger Market*
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The expansion and, above all, the diversification of industrial output in Syria is restricted by the rather small domestic market. In a country of only 3.6 million people with low purchasing power it is generally possible to manufacture only a limited range of articles which are used widely enough to warrant production on an economic scale. Broader industrial opportunities are likely to emerge only if a larger market is initially available. In the case of Syria it should be possible to establish such a market in cooperation with other Arab countries, all of which suffer from a similar handicap in the development of their industries. Over recent years the Arab countries have increasingly stressed their community of interest and the need for closer cooperation. The field of industrial development offers a particularly challenging opportunity for common endeavor. We do not suggest, of course, that the types of industrial enterprises to be developed by each country should be the subject of joint government decision. There should be consultation in cases where particular ventures are to be launched with special government assistance. In the main, however, the location and development of industry should be decided by the free play of competitive forces operating in a larger, common Arab market.

To a limited extent the Arab countries have already taken steps to develop such a market. Syria has concluded bilateral agreements with Lebanon and Jordan which free certain products from import restrictions

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Other Industrial Policies

433 654 We now come to a consideration of certain other government policies relating to industry. One of these pertains to the special benefits extended to new plants or extensions of existing plants under the law for the encouragement of industry enacted in 1952 and first applied in 1953. Among these benefits are a six-year exemption from the so-called "temettu" or license tax and from the tax on income from real property, and exemption from income tax for profits up to 10% allocated to reserves and used within two years for further expansion. Certain additional assistance is available for industries specially determined to be useful, namely a three-year exemption from all income taxes and exemption from customs duties on required machinery, tools and construction materials.

In general, we consider it appropriate to give such incentives to the establishment or expansion of industrial plants in a country like Syria where industrial development is still subject to considerable risks. We suggest, however, that the government replace the exemptions from the real property and income taxes with a scheme permitting industrial enterprises more rapid depreciation of plant and equipment for tax purposes. Some such scheme, coupled with a provision allowing accounting losses resulting from accelerated depreciation to be charged against taxable income for a limited number of years in the past and the future, would relate the amount of assistance more closely to capital needs than the proposed scheme does. It would provide an incentive for continuing expansion of industrial enterprises. In addition, we believe it would be easier to administer than the present provisions, which require tax authorities to determine what portion of the tax on income from real property and the tax on total profits is to be allocated to new plant and equipment as distinct from the previously existing investment.

The establishment of new industrial plants and the transfer of existing enterprises from congested urban districts might be considerably facilitated by the creation of industrial zones on the outskirts of the major cities. It would be desirable to develop a number of such zones in locations convenient both to labor residing in the city and to workers coming from the country. Normally it should be sufficient to provide land and public utilities in these zones on reasonable terms. To attract the smaller enterprises and shops, however, we suggest that small blocks of suitable workshop buildings might be erected for rent or for sale in at least one zone. This

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would not only provide an incentive to the transfer of small manufacturing shops and enterprises from the center of the city, but might well incidentally stimulate new investment in modernization of their equipment. In this connection it is significant that the removal of tanneries from the center of Damascus to a special industrial zone has in fact been attended by the installation of a considerable amount of new machinery and a substantial improvement in working conditions. While it is possible that private enterprise might become interested in the establishment of such industrial zones and shops in cooperation with the municipalities, we have made allowance in our proposed development program for the expenditure of £S 1.8 million by the central government for this purpose.

In the expansion of new industry the question arises whether the government should exercise any control over the establishment of new enterprises or additions to existing plants. By instituting a licensing system in 1952 the government has in principle already assumed such powers. While they have apparently not been exercised in a restrictive fashion, we strongly doubt that any government under normal economic conditions should even assume such authority. Private enterprise will ordinarily better be able to determine the wisdom of proceeding with a particular venture than civil servants inexperienced in business. There may be special cases where excess capacity is so serious as to warrant government intervention but even then great caution is necessary lest the restriction of competition in the development of industry impair the possibility of attaining greater efficiency.

With respect to working conditions, the mission has a few observations. Syria has a rather liberal labor code for industry, limiting the working week to 48 hours, prohibiting the employment of children under 12 years of age and containing stipulations regarding dismissal and death benefits and maternity and sick leave. Minimum wages are also set by regional wage boards. In the larger factories visited by the mission working conditions appeared for the most part satisfactory. In a number of plants, however, we observed a lack of safety precautions, notably inadequate protection of workers from the danger of moving parts and of dust and humidity. This problem calls for attention. Another deficiency is the lack of thorough enforcement of the labor code. The degree of compliance in the larger factories is not unsatisfactory. In the smaller factories and shops, however, enforcement is inadequate or virtually non-existent. While we do not suggest that the provisions of the labor code could be enforced in all of the small enterprises, we do recommend that some attempt be made

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457 Proper maintenance and repair of monuments is perhaps even more urgent,
658 since there is considerable deterioration at present. We accordingly recom-
172 mend that expenditures for this purpose be raised, on the average, approximately 50% over the next six years. A similar increase might be contemplated for excavation work which, as in the past, will presumably be carried out in cooperation with foreign archaeological missions. All this will require an increase in the subsidies paid to the Directorate of Antiquities out of the government budget to an average annual amount of approximately £S 950,000. The gradual growth in the Directorate's own receipts will probably suffice to cover necessary increases in administrative outlays.

[491] Poor roads now impede access to many interesting historical monuments. In addition to the recommendations on the national road network made elsewhere, we believe Syria would be well advised to spend about £S 1.5 million on the improvement of local roads of importance to the tourist trade. The access roads to the Krak des Chevaliers and Saint Simeon should have the highest priority.

457 Within the not too distant future the government should contemplate the establishment of a special office charged with the promotion of tourism. The cooperation and financial support of business groups interested in the tourist trade might well be enlisted. It should not only seek to interest the foreign tourist in the attractions of Syria, but also to make the Syrian people and Syrian officials more aware of the importance of the tourist trade and of making the tourist genuinely welcome.

Government Expenditures on Industry

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654 Although industry is preeminently a field for private enterprise, we have made in this chapter a number of recommendations entailing additional government expenditures. For the period 1955-60 these would total about £S 20.5 million, allocated as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Manufacturing		
Investment bank	10,500	1,750
Industrial zones and workshops	1,800	300
Enforcement of labor code[a]	325	54

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	Total	Average annual
Tourism		
Rest houses and restaurants[a]	500	83
Directorate of Antiquities[b]	5,700	950
Tourist roads	1,500	250
Tourist office	200	33
Total	20,525	3,420

[a] Additional expenditures beyond present levels.

[b] Including the entire government subvention to the Department of Antiquities as increased under our recommendations.

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433 is still responsible for an important part of, and in some instances for the entire, production. Yet the use of power-driven machines is steadily growing and it is not unusual to find an expensive modern machine in a workshop with only five or six employees. This development will probably be accelerated as more and cheaper electrical power becomes available, but it is equally likely that some Syrian industry, although to a steadily decreasing extent, will remain in the handicraft stage for many years to come. This applies particularly to village industries (dairy products, dried fruits, rugs, etc.), which employ a considerable percentage of those who gain a living from some industrial occupation.[1]

Cotton Ginning

248 Ginning is a relatively new industry which sprang up after local cotton cultivation became prominent, and by 1953 was employing about 4,000 workers. The sharp rise in cotton production after World War II led to a rapid expansion of ginning capacity and, in 1950, to the introduction of some saw gins. There are now over 100 establishments, mostly in Aleppo, which concentrate on cotton ginning during the season commencing in September and ending in April or May.

According to the latest available estimates Syria has a total of about 1,750 roller gins and 64 saw gins with a lint capacity of 45-48 metric tons per hour. A report issued in September 1953 states that of the 1952-53 cotton crop of 176,000 tons of raw cotton, over 90% was roller-ginned and that saw gins were only used in the lower grades. Up to 10,000 tons of ginned cotton were used in Syrian textile mills; the remainder (about 50,000 tons) was exported.

The importation of cotton ginning machinery was prohibited by law in 1952; it is generally agreed that present ginning capacity is sufficient to deal with any anticipated increase in the crop for some time to come.

Textiles

288 *Spinning and weaving.* The manufacture of textiles is Syria's principal industry. Six spinning and weaving factories now produce cotton and

[1] According to a study dated February 24, 1954 by Dr. Abdel Monthleb Boukari, "L'Artisanat Rural Traditionnel," 18% of the Syrian population is engaged in some kind of manufacturing industry of which 9.8% is in town industries and 8.2% in village industries. The mission was not in a position to check these figures.

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Grain Milling

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The grain milling industry is spread widely throughout Syria. The Ministry of National Economy records over 360 small enterprises with a total of 311 mills and 257 cylinders, employing about 1,700 workers. Many of these are very small units driven by a diesel engine or by water power. In addition, there are five larger mills in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs fitted with modern machinery and employing a total of about 250 workers.

Other Industries

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Syria has many minor industries, some of long standing, others new. These include enterprises for the manufacture of paints and colors, biscuits, spaghetti, confectionery, metal containers, furniture, domestic utensils, liquid gas, alcoholic and other beverages, ropes, tiles, cement piping, plastics, cosmetics, cardboard, plywood, pins, nails and springs, and establishments engaged in refrigeration, processing of licorice root, casting of iron, brass and other metals, manufacture of hand and machine tools, repair of motor vehicles and accessories.

Deposits of asphalt near Latakia are being worked by a company which produces raw and processed asphalt and asphalt tiles.

II APPRAISAL OF INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS

Location

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The Damascus, Aleppo and Homs-Hama areas are the main centers of manufacturing industry, a logical location in terms of accessibility of raw materials, communications, water and power services, skilled labor and the proximity of markets. These industrial towns, conveniently situated at a distance of less than 150 miles from the nearest seaports, and connected with these by road, rail or both, are the natural market places for agricultural products and the largest centers of consumption for manufactured goods. Latakia, next in importance, is a rapidly growing port town.

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Raw Materials

433 Considering the present structure of Syrian industry, its supply of raw materials is generally speaking not unsatisfactory. In the preceding section we have referred to the import needs, if any, of Syria's principal industries. Most local and imported raw materials are generally available at competitive prices. The principal exception is sugar, the high price of which presents a serious drawback to the fruit canning, jam and candy industries. The prohibition of imports of cotton seed for industrial use hampers the ability of vegetable oil manufacturers to enter the export market at competitive prices. Some branches of the textile industry dependent on imported cotton yarn or cloth, subject to high customs duties, are in a similarly unfortunate position.

On the other hand certain laws or regulations in effect give some Syrian industries a right of first refusal with regard to locally produced raw materials; export of both ginned and non-ginned cotton, cotton seed, raw wool and raw hides, is subject to licensing, while export of timber and raw metals is prohibited. The efficacy and desirability of such measures may be questioned (see Section IV), but they are elements of the prevailing industrial climate.

The transportation of local raw materials to the industrial centers, where they are processed, is not unduly burdensome, thanks to the favorable location of Syrian industries in or near the producing areas. Moreover, the distances between these centers and the seaports are not too great. Nevertheless, transportation in Syria is relatively costly and an improvement in the transport sector would not only facilitate exports of surplus raw materials but would also benefit the processing industries and their competitive position.

Water and Power

433 312 371 The main industrial centers are, generally speaking, well provisioned with water. Damascus has the best water supply among Syrian cities, thanks to the springs of Figeh. Aleppo's water supply, which was so inadequate that some factories had to select sites outside of the town where they could drill their own wells, has now been greatly improved by a link with the Euphrates River. Homs and Hama have more than sufficient water

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resources in Homs Lake. The water rates charged by the municipalities are by no means excessive.

With regard to electricity for light and power the conditions are, however, much less favorable. The capacity of the municipal power plants in the four main industrial cities is far from sufficient to meet total consumption needs. Most of the larger factories have had to install their own power plants, which imposes an additional capital burden on them.[3] Factories which have no power plant of their own often suffer considerable losses resulting from breaks in the power and light supply. Electricity rates of public utilities, although higher in Syria than, for instance, in Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt, compare not unfavorably with those in the main Western industrial centers.

Equipment

The mechanical equipment of the major industries is in general good. Obsolete or inefficient machinery is continuously being replaced by new plant. Nevertheless, there are still many old factories and workshops where equipment is primitive and modernization is much needed.

Some industries, however, seem as a whole to be overequipped in relation to the available raw material supply or the market outlets for their products. A striking example is the installed capacity in the cotton ginning industry, which could handle between two and three times the present cotton crop. This is no doubt due in part to an overestimation at the time of the cotton boom. The government has accordingly prohibited the importation of cotton gins. In the case of the vegetable oil industry the installed capacity might be more fully utilized if cotton seed were freely importable and oil manufacturers could enter the export market for vegetable oils at competitive prices. As a complement to the protection of local cotton seed, the government has also placed an embargo on the importation of vegetable oils. A third instance of overequipment is in the glass industry: the Damascus factory was designed and installed on the basis of the rather ambitious notion that it should serve most of the needs of the Middle East. Some of its machinery, as for instance that for the manufacture of electric bulbs, has never been in operation. Although most of the items it produces may not be imported into Syria and although recently

[3] See Annex G, p. 413.

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433 exports to Lebanon and Jordan, where its glass is admitted duty free, have
402 been increasing, the plant is running much below capacity. A fourth instance is the match industry, which has a capacity much in excess of the requirements of the home market. This industry is also protected by an embargo on imports but prospects for increasing exports are practically non-existent; European matches are of better quality and have captured the Jordan market, Lebanon produces its own and Iraq is putting up a match factory.

Among the industries in which the greatest expansion is taking place, the cement industry ranks first. After completion of proposed extensions, the combined capacities of the Damascus and Aleppo factories will be about 400,000 tons in 1955 as against 240,000 tons in 1953. It is difficult to estimate Syria's cement requirements in the foreseeable future. In 1953 these amounted to 320,000 tons, of which 120,000 tons were imported, but it is probable that even if the present rate of private urban building is not maintained, some increased demand will result from the construction of public buildings, the creation of new settlements, improvements in rural housing materials, the extension of irrigation and improvements in the road system. Since several Middle Eastern countries have their own cement factories (Lebanon has long had a large cement factory, Jordan has just completed one and Turkey has a number under construction), it is doubtful whether Syria will be able to maintain its small export trade.[4] Although the 1955 total production capacity may somewhat exceed the requirements of the local market, the planned extensions do not seem unreasonable and may even contribute to more efficient operation and lower unit costs.

288 The textile industry is expanding capacity by increasing and modernizing equipment. The existing plant is operating at full or almost full
402
439 capacity, three working shifts being general in the spinning and weaving
433 factories.

In 1953 and through 1954 several tens of thousand additional spindles, several hundred new automatic looms and numbers of knitting machines were installed and optimistic opinions were expressed as to the usefulness of considerable further extensions. Their justification depends on the development of the home and adjoining markets. Syria is approaching self-sufficiency in cotton textiles and the prospects for exports appear promising only in certain specific brands. Only cotton yarn of the higher counts is imported; exports are insignificant. Imports of cotton cloth are

[4] 1,000 tons in 1952; 24,000 tons in 1953.

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larger, and exceed exports which have been falling off. On the other hand, exports of knitted, cotton and rayon goods and other articles of clothing, garments, underwear and socks exceed imports by far.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the entire cotton textile industry is well protected. Imports of yarn and cloth are subject to rather high import duties: 45% ad valorem (about 33% at the free rate of the Syrian pound); duties on fine cotton yarns are substantially lower. In contrast, rayon and woolen yarns are duty free. Socks and stockings (except those made from woolen yarns), men's shirts and pyjamas for men and women may not be imported. This protection, though helpful to the home market, hampers the export trade, particularly in finished goods. This is especially so of those goods requiring use of imported materials in their production; no adequate tariff rebate is given on foreign materials in the exported finished goods. Syrian shirt manufacturers, for instance, claim that with existing machinery they could easily double their production and compete in the export market but for these unfavorable conditions. Although most of the surrounding countries heavily protect their own textile industries, some of Syria's finished textile goods seem to be in a position to compete on the international market to the extent that the component materials are not burdened with protective duties.

In the dyeing, printing and finishing industry—which for a long time lagged behind—a considerable expansion is still anticipated and seems fully justified. Additional machinery was being installed to make possible a full three shifts.

The worsted and woolen cloth industry is not as well equipped with modern machinery as the cotton textile industry. Although the existing plant operates little below capacity and imports of cloth are rather significant, the industry shows no great inclination to expand. Despite the fact that imported yarn is duty free and imported cloth is subject to a rather high tariff, there is keen foreign competition by Italian cloth in the cheaper ranges, British cloth in the higher class and by second-hand suits from the United States. Complaints were heard that the transport charges on the bulkier imported yarns weigh heavily on the industry in comparison to the cost of transporting imported cloth. This drawback seems difficult to overcome. Exports of woolen yarns and cloth have been running well under 7% by value, of imported yarns and cloth, and in view of the factors mentioned above, no large expansion of exports is to be expected. For recent figures, see Table 1 of the Appendix.

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The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

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first postwar period, ample opportunities outside industry (trade, agriculture and real estate). 464 471

The main source of the capital which founded these new industries was commercial profits accumulated during the war by Syrians in and outside Syria; a certain amount of Lebanese capital seems to have been contributed. Many companies were able to operate with the capital originally subscribed, but in some cases the paid-up capital was mainly or entirely absorbed by land, buildings and equipment, leaving little or nothing for working capital. The mission encountered several instances in which working capital had been supplied by banks on an overdraft basis at a rate of 5% to 7%, but mostly for rather limited amounts only. In a number of cases, however, when larger amounts were required, industrial firms had recourse to a scheme of government-guaranteed industrial credits introduced in 1949. Although it was reserved for industrial corporations and thus did not cover the needs of the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises not organized in that form, it has been very helpful to the companies which were able to benefit from it while passing through a difficult initial period of inadequate financial resources. Such credits were made available by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban for three years (now renewable for an additional five years) at the low rate of 3%. 464

Most Syrian industrialists, hard working and thrifty as they are, prefer to forego paying dividends rather than remain indebted or incur new indebtedness with banks. In most cases loans for working capital are paid off as soon as possible; new machinery is generally purchased with plowed-back earnings and often reserve funds are formed with a view to making further extension or modernization. In several instances the originally subscribed capital has been increased by issuing new stock to the old shareholders. The government-guaranteed loans, on the other hand, are so exceptionally attractive that in the difficult circumstances at the time the plan was initiated there was a great readiness to apply for them and later to have them extended. However, during the last few years the government has become more reluctant to give this scheme a wider application. The total amount which can be guaranteed is now limited to £S 15 million. At the end of 1953 loans outstanding amounted to £S 13.4 million.

On the whole, the development of Syrian industry has been on a sound basis from the financial point of view. True, one frequently finds considerable amounts of loan debts on the balance sheet of industrial corpora- 455 454

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133 tions; these, however, often represent contributions to working capital by
134 members of the owner-family or an inner circle of controlling shareholders who for various reasons prefer this technique to accepting additional stock. This may be an unfortunate situation from the legal point of view, although in practice it does not seem substantially to weaken the continuity of the capitalization. The government-guaranteed loans may be subject to criticism, particularly with regard to the applicable interest rate, which is much below that reasonably to be expected in a country where capital is relatively scarce. However, thanks to the provision that in each case these loans may not exceed half the paid-up capital of the borrower, they have not dangerously affected the financial structure of the companies concerned. Yet the mission feels that the entire system of government-guaranteed industrial loans financed by the BSL does not at this stage provide an appropriate and adequate solution to the problem of supplementing the traditional means of financing industrial development.

133 Although the larger gaps in the main fields in which conditions for modern industrial production are reasonably favorable have either been filled or are rapidly being filled, the industrialization movement is far from being exhausted. All the evidence indicates that it will continue to spread, though probably at a slower rate than in the years immediately preceding 1952 and along more selective lines. With the limits of the home market within reach or already reached, further development of existing industries will depend largely on their success in attaining a higher degree of efficiency and reducing production costs. In view of these trends and requirements the mission is of the opinion that a specialized credit institution is needed to furnish both technical assistance and industrial banking facilities, to the extent that these are presently lacking, and to provide a firmer basis for further investment financing. A more detailed proposal for such an investment bank will be found in the Main Report.

Labor

144 According to an official estimate, the number of workers employed in Syrian industry (excluding electrical productions, commerce, etc. and enterprises employing only family members) is approximately 70,000. In some industries, particularly in the textile sector, the supply of skilled labor is barely sufficient for present needs, but unskilled labor is generally

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465 £S 5-7. For exceptionally heavy work daily wages up to £S 9 are paid. Foremen and managers receive from £S 10 upwards. It is far from certain whether the smallness of the wage offsets the low labor productivity. Employer-employee relations appear to be fair and on a democratic basis.

Management

464 Industrial management presents some striking contrasts, as pointed
463 out in the Main Report. It is commendable that, in order to accommodate students who may serve as future industrial managers and top technical staff, the scope of the Engineering College of the Syrian University is being widened. In the past, only civil engineering has been offered but in the near future mechanical, electrical and chemical engineering will be included in the syllabus. In due course this will increase the local supply of trained personnel for industry and thus help overcome one of Syria's greatest deficiencies. Although this will make technical knowledge more readily available at lower cost, it would be very helpful if an institution were established to give technical, economical and financial advice on a consultant basis. This is one of the functions the mission has in mind to be performed by the proposed investment bank.

The mission observed that there are many weaknesses which could be avoided by more careful planning and by a better understanding of the various factors which make for higher efficiency. The proper estimation of the size of the market and the production capacity required to satisfy it, the quantity and quality of the necessary raw, or partly processed, materials and their sources and rate of supply, the utilization of waste products, quality control of the end products, analysis and control of costs and the application of budgeting could in many cases be introduced or greatly improved. Again, the great influence of working conditions on efficient production is often insufficiently recognized.

It was pointed out earlier that the basic industrial factors are, generally speaking, not unfavorable. It is the problem of raising the standard of efficiency generally that should receive primary consideration, preceding, in most cases, the provision of greater capacity. This conclusion stresses the urgent need for more and better qualified managing personnel, trained in modern industrial methods through frequent contacts with the West, and for intensified technical assistance.

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Profitability

The profitability of Syria's industry varies widely from one industry to another and in some cases even within an industry. Differences in the quality of management may produce a marked variation in profits. 433 434

Some indication of profits is given below. Generally the data have been obtained from profit and loss statements which are not always clear. Profits are defined as earnings after taxes but before deductions for assignment to compulsory reserves and allocations to the boards of directors.

The cement industry is by far the most profitable in Syria. Quoted prices of shares of the two cement companies increased by about 100% between 1951 and 1953. The Aleppo company earned 25% on its paid-in capital during 1952, the first full year of operation. Profits earned by the Damascus company amounted to 22% on paid-in capital in 1950, 34% in 1951 and 48% in 1952. In 1953 it was able to increase its capitalization from £S 6 million to £S 9 million out of accumulated profits.

In the textile industry (spinning and weaving), profits have varied widely. One of the more successful firms in Damascus earned 9.3%, 17.7% and 22.9% on its paid-in capital in 1950, 1951 and 1952 respectively. One of the largest Aleppo companies earned about 30% on its paid-in capital in 1950 and 1951 and a little over 12% in 1952. On the other hand, another large Aleppo company suffered consistent losses amounting to a total of £S 1,826,550 in the years 1949-52 inclusive, while a third Aleppo company of more moderate size was liquidated in 1953 after losses totaling £S 911,233 in 1951 and 1952.

The hosiery industry appears to be doing well, one concern having earned about 20% on its paid-in capital in 1953. Little is known, however, about the profitability of this branch of industry in general.

The clothing industry (suitings, underwear, shirts, pyjamas, etc.) appears to be moderately profitable.

Profits data for the canning industry are also largely lacking. One company in Damascus earned 13.8% on its paid-in capital in 1952. Another, also in Damascus, apparently had profits of less than 3% in 1953.

The sugar company at Homs has earned modest profits in recent years. After initial losses in 1949 and 1950, the company earned about 3% and 6% on paid-in capital in 1951 and 1952 respectively. Presumably profits continued to increase substantially in 1953.

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The vegetable oils and soap industries have not generally been very profitable. One of the larger Damascus companies had substantial losses in 1949 and 1952. In 1950 and 1951, however, it earned 20% and 30% on its paid-in capital. One of the more important companies in Aleppo apparently barely broke even in 1951 and 1952 and suffered severe losses in 1953, so that it was reported to have gone into liquidation in 1954. A new Aleppo company which started operating in 1952 apparently has been somewhat more successful to date.

The large glass factory near Damascus earned profits of about £S 200,000 on £S 7 million paid-in capital in both 1952 and 1953. Prior to these years of modest profits it consistently suffered losses except for the year 1950 when it showed a net profit of £S 183,140.

On the profitability of tanneries there is little information, although one evidently earned almost 7% in 1952 and 14% in 1953 on its paid-in capital.

The rubber shoe industry is apparently highly profitable, if one can judge from the data available on one company which earned almost 55% on its paid-in capital in 1952, and approximately 85% in 1953.

The match industry is suffering from overcapacity and, owing to keen competition, seems to have made little profit in recent years.

For other industries, such as milling, beverage, paints, etc., no information is available on profits.

III GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

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The relations between government and industry in Syria will be discussed under the following headings: (1) tariff policy and embargoes, (2) credit facilities, (3) fiscal privileges, and (4) other controls and incentives.

Tariff Policy and Embargoes

Syria achieved customs autonomy for the first time in recent centuries in March 1950, with the termination of the Customs Union with Lebanon. As a natural consequence, each country began to apply its normal tariffs to imports from its former partner. Only a few days later, the Syrian tariff on imports of certain foreign products which competed with local industry

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and exports was subjected to the approval of the Council of Ministers. This was followed by the withdrawal of embargoes on various non-competitive imports, higher tariffs being substituted in some cases. 651 652 439

As of autumn 1954 all embargoes on imported goods which directly compete with national products were still in effect, with the exception of the embargo on men's shirts, underwear and pyjamas. Imports of cotton gins are forbidden, to prevent further overexpansion of the ginning industry, and the importation of second-hand looms and knitting machines is prohibited, to ensure the installation of new and modern machinery; importation of almost all items, including machinery, is still subject to licensing. There has been almost no change in the list of prohibited exports or of those which must be licensed. Although the export tax on wheat has been repealed, cotton exports are still taxed; there were certainly good financial reasons for this, but it means in fact a continuation of the element of protection which this duty represents, in favor of the local cotton processing industry. On the other hand, products subject to an embargo or high protective duties are no longer subject to price control. The government is now relying on the effect of internal competition.

Credit Facilities

During the mandate, in 1929, the Syrian Government instructed the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture to establish an industrial bank with a capital of £S 500,000, in which the government was to participate; this was never done.[8] 652 433

Not until 20 years later, in June 1949, was the Minister of Finance authorized to guarantee loans to Syrian industrial corporations (*sociétés par actions*) for their first installation or to enable them to continue operations. The amount to be reimbursed under the guarantee could not exceed half the paid-up capital of the corporation and the period of repayment was not to be longer than three years. Eligibility of applicants, their needs and the conditions of both loan and guarantee were to be determined by a special committee; the Minister of Finance was authorized to require a mortgage on the property of the corporation, the mortgage to have preferred position.

Of the 18 loans totalling £S 23.627 million made by January 1952,

[8] *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie*. Moh. Thome, Madrid, 1953, p. 157.

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652 133 seven were for over £S 1 million to 10 corporations. One large Damascus corporation received two loans totalling £S 7 million. The sectors of industry to which loans were made were, in order of magnitude, textiles, sugar refining, vegetable and fruit canning and glass; a minor amount was loaned for manufacture of liquid gas and mechanical equipment. The terms on which all of these loans were made were considerably easier than those prevailing on the capital market, the rate of interest being only 3%.

By the time repayment was due, the general attitude of the government towards industry had become so favorable that beneficiaries, if they wished it, had little difficulty in securing an extension.[6] In 1952, extension of the period of repayment for five additional years was authorized, and "guaranteed companies" might thereafter be allowed to distribute dividends out of net profits in stated circumstances. Any guaranteeing of new industrial loans was forbidden.

By legislation in January 1954, the scheme was revived and even extended to include loans for the financing of big hotels, provided, however, that the total amount of the loans outstanding and guaranteed to industry and hotels should not exceed £S 15 million.

Fiscal Privileges

654 133 Until 1949 fiscal facilities favoring industry were restricted to special customs provision applying to imported tools, machinery, apparatus and materials for industrial requirements; in stated circumstances, they might be subject to a tariff of only 1%.

An act of 1945 exempted new construction, for two years, from the tax on income from real property. In 1950, the exemption was explicitly applied to new factories and workshops, beginning with the financial year following the completion of the projects.

On September 27, 1952, Legislative Decree No. 103 (on the encouragement of industry) granted to all registered industrial establishments, effective with the 1953 fiscal year, the following privileges under certain conditions:

1. exemption from customs duties on machinery, tools and equipment

[6] It is noteworthy that at that time the large Damascus corporation mentioned above had converted its £S 7 million guaranteed loan in an overdraft of the commercial type with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. As a result, the total guaranteed amount outstanding had dropped to £S 16.627 million.

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imported for the requirements of the enterprises; the industries and the imports as well as the quantities benefitting from this provision are determined by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Ministry of National Economy; 654 433

2. exemption for six years from the tax on income from real property, for new construction in factories, administrative buildings and housing for workers and employees connected with the establishment, and industrial machines and equipment housed in these installations; the existing two-year exemption of new factories and workshops was extended for the same six-year period;

3. exemption from income tax for reserves up to 10% of annual profits, devoted within two years to the further expansion of the industrial establishment;

4. exemption from the "temettu" tax for six years from the beginning of operation; and

5. exemption from the income tax for three years from the beginning of operation in the case of industries needed by Syria or which had not been established there on the specified date.

These privileges are also applicable to additions to existing factories and industrial plants. On the other hand, an industrial establishment which suspends operations for more than a year and a half without an excuse accepted by the Ministry of National Economy loses its exemptions.

Proprietors of beneficiary industrial establishments must, among other things, furnish complete information and accounts of their enterprises, and must use the machines, equipment and construction materials which qualify their enterprises for the exemptions.

The granting of the privileges under (1) and (5) calls for a decision of the government, which can be based on the preceding appraisal of the project as required under the law on the regulation of industry, discussed in the following paragraph. The other privileges are extended automatically.

Other Controls and Incentives

The registration of industry. Following the opening of a general public register of manufacturing enterprises in 1949, a 1951 decree introduced a system of special registers for every local industry. Anyone starting an industrial establishment in Syria must present within one month 656 433

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after beginning operations to the Directorate of Industry of the Ministry of National Economy or its local representative in the mohafazat, information on (a) the legal status of the establishment, its address and that of its main office; (b) the goods it produces; (c) the nature, number and power of its motors; (d) the nature, number and capacity of its productive equipment; (e) the number of working hours per day and week; (f) the number of workers employed; and (g) all other information which the Ministry may require. All industrial enterprises established at the time were required to register within three months. Every change or modification taking place in the stated data has to be indicated within one month.

The mission was informed that the registration has encountered considerable difficulties because of a wide-spread reluctance to disclose to the authorities the required data, even though they are confidential and for statistical purposes only. As a result the statistics based on the registration are not considered to be fully reliable.

The regulation of industry. The year 1952, when protectionism reached its peak, also brought a thorough regulation of industrial enterprises as such, with a view to orienting industrial activity toward the needs and interest of the country.

The establishment of any form of industrial enterprise is subject to licensing.[7] The applicant is required to submit a detailed report on his project covering (a) the name, nationality and residence of the owner; (b) the type and location of the proposed establishment; (c) the capital to be devoted to the enterprise; (d) the type, number and power of the proposed machines and their capacity; (e) the number of employees and workers; (f) the study made by the applicant underlying his decision to establish the enterprise; and (g) any other information required by the Ministry. Owners of industrial enterprises who wish to expand their establishments either by adding to the machine park or by extending their operations to other lines of production must also obtain a license. Industrial establishments in existence when the decree was issued are considered to be authorized, but have to obtain a certificate of registration from the Ministry of National Economy within six months, or thereafter apply for a license.

No detailed information is available on the manner in which the regulations are applied or as to the principles governing the decisions of the

[7] Corporations (*sociétés anonymes*) require a special authorization by the Ministry of National Economy.

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authorities. The mission was informed, however, that practically every 656
handicraft application for an industrial license is approved. With regard 433
to industry proper, applications have been turned down for various reasons. The main criteria seem to be whether the local market can absorb the additional production and whether the new or expanded industry can be expected to increase exports, especially to the Arab countries.

Facilities with regard to industrial sites. By the decree on the encouragement of industry, the government opened facilities for settlement on state domain land. The proprietor of an industrial establishment who wishes to construct a building for industrial exploitation may rent up to 25,000 square meters with a five-year option to purchase land belonging to state domain, on conditions to be determined by the Directorate of State Domain. The beneficiary is not allowed to sell or utilize this land for non-industrial purposes and the State may recover ownership of land not used for industrial construction or expansion within five years.

These provisions represent a real contribution to a reduction of the cost of establishing new industrial enterprises and to the better siting of existing ones.

Export promotion. The laws on the regulation and the encouragement 654
of industry contain several provisions, already mentioned, which permit 423
the authorities in their discretion to grant certain privileges and other 439
facilities to industrial enterprises in the interest of the national economy. We understand that the authorities have several more specific objectives in mind, including the promotion of industrial exports.

Besides these measures, which have been in existence for only two years, the Syrian Government has for several years been actively engaged in negotiating foreign trade agreements with Arab and other countries[8] with a view to promoting exports generally. Since gaining its independence Syria has made commercial agreements with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon among the Arab countries, and with India, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Japan. Several of these treaties include special privileges for Syrian industrial exports, either assuring them most-favored-nation treatment or exempting specific Syrian products from import restrictions or allowing them tariff reductions or exemptions. Agreements in 1953 with Lebanon and Jordan exempt some local industrial products from customs duties or apply reduced tariffs, and provide

[8] Formerly, under the mandate, commercial treaties could be concluded only with neighboring countries and countries not members of the League of Nations.

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industry. It is not surprising that the exposure to strong foreign competition created a serious situation for various new industrial enterprises, or that the government began to give industry greater protection and encouragement. It appears, however, that since the middle of 1951 government policy toward industry, particularly—but not only—in the field of foreign trade, has tended more and more toward the aim of national self-sufficiency in products which can be locally manufactured rather than toward development in an international economy. We think that the former opens definitely less perspective both for a rise in the standard of living and for the future of Syrian industry itself. Therefore we recommend a reconsideration of the policy and the measures under discussion.

The priority given to national self-sufficiency has resulted in extensive public control over industry. The Syrian home market is relatively small and it has already been pointed out that several industries have reached a productive capacity which meets or even surpasses the effective domestic demand. The measures of "restriction" and "reservation" tend to make Syrian industry dependent on internal controls which are very difficult to administer and carry the danger of submitting the government to pressure groups. The exclusion of foreign competition which frequently accompanies this policy weakens the stimulus to increased efficiency and lower costs, to the detriment of the consumer and the competitive position of Syrian industry in the outside markets. Internal competition, even if it remains free, can only be a poor substitute, being affected by internal cost factors and their elasticity in a protected economy.

The mission feels that industrial policy should be reoriented toward freer, rather than centrally controlled and protected development, with a view to achieving further progress in an international economy. Only thus will Syrian industry become a supplier of manufactured goods of satisfactory quality at reasonable prices, able to expand beyond the limits set by the internal market and to earn foreign exchange by the value it adds to indigenous and imported materials.

The reorientation which we have in mind does not require the government to withdraw all regulation, protection or other encouragement of industrial enterprise, leaving free competition and international prices to organize and guide Syrian industrial production. Even in more advanced countries, with a much more diversified and stronger economy, such a policy is now rarely applied. Infant industry protection, as a means of assisting well-chosen industries to overcome temporary disadvantages and

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allowing them time to build up an international competitive position, has long been considered a legitimate instrument of economic development. Even well-established industries may require a certain safeguarding against specific forms of internal and foreign competition which do not make for sound and resistant economies with a sufficiently diversified economic and social structure. On the other hand, making due allowance for social and cultural considerations, industrialization should not be an objective in itself to be pursued irrespective of its economic cost to the national community, or without regard to its impact on the subtle balance between economic freedom and economic control.

On the basis of these general considerations the mission makes the following more specific comments on the government's present policy towards industry,

The registration of industry. Up-to-date and reliable information on the structure and operation of industry for statistical purposes is indispensable as a source of instruction and a means of guiding important decisions for the business community itself as well as for the government. In Syria there were until recently no industrial statistics, and the government deserves credit for having tried to remedy this deficiency.

The extensive procedure instituted by the 1951 law, however, is difficult for industrialists to accept, overestimates the capacity of the administration responsible for its execution and seems to fall short of reaching the objective. The relations between government and industry in this regard would be better served and a more fruitful cooperation could probably be expected if the information were to be filed with, elaborated and made available by the Central Bureau of Statistics in a form which does not disclose individual data even to the Ministry of National Economy. The Bureau should enjoy a large amount of autonomy and be so organized and equipped as to win the full confidence of both the government and the business world. Such a system exists and operates very satisfactorily in many other countries and the mission recommends that Syria draw on their experience.

This does not mean that if a particular industry or industrial enterprise requires special government assistance or control, it should not provide the responsible authorities with all the information which they may require.

With regard to the statistics concerning industry, which are particularly necessary, a distinction can be made between those requiring current

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information (e.g., industrial output, raw materials consumed, workers employed, the amounts invested and their sources (internally or externally financed)), and such data as the number and size of establishments, their capacities, their technical and financial structures, and their organization within the framework of existing legislation. It is suggested that it is not equally essential that the latter data should be available annually and it should be sufficient to require their collection and elaboration every few years only. The mission recommends that such a distinction be made, that those statistics which have a direct bearing on policy decisions be given priority and the reliability of statistical information be given more weight than its extensiveness.

The regulation of industry. Although special conditions, such as rapidly changing techniques and market conditions, sometimes necessitate limitations on freedom of industrial establishment and industrial investment, if the benefits accruing from actual achievements are not to be offset by high costs from a social point of view, the mission is of the opinion that under present conditions freedom of enterprise should be the rule and regulation the exception. Before industrial licensing was introduced Syrian industry had, generally speaking, done a reasonably good job and shown a considerable degree of sound initiative, fair judgment and flexibility. It is true that in certain branches there had been overexpansion and mismanagement, but under a system of private enterprise such things cannot altogether be avoided. The danger is great, on the other hand, that the licensing decree will reduce initiative by substituting far-reaching control on establishment and expansion by public officials, devoted and faithful as they may be, for decisions by risk-bearing private entrepreneurs. Moreover, quite apart from the advisability of such a policy, it is doubtful whether the government has experience necessary for judicious control of the entire field of Syrian industrial enterprise and regulation of all industrial investment activities according to the needs and interests of the country.

The mission therefore recommends a return to the principle of freedom of industrial enterprise and that the licensing of new industrial establishments and the control of industrial investments be limited to special cases[9] in which the public interest requires such exceptional provisions. Furthermore, such provisions should be temporary, permitting periodic re-examination of the need to continue them. It is also suggested that before deciding

[9] Such as excessive over-capacity which would perpetuate itself even under free competition.

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656 433 on the introduction or continuation of these measures with regard to a branch of industry the government take the advice of a standing commission in which, besides various occupational groups, independent economic experts would ensure a well-balanced opinion with due consideration of all the aspects involved. Finally, it seems desirable that decisions on the issuance and cancellation of licenses by the Ministry of National Economy should be governed as much as possible by general and public directives applied without discrimination.

654 433 *The encouragement of industry.* In many underdeveloped countries it is believed that acceleration of economic progress demands at least a shift in emphasis from primary production in favor of basic and manufacturing industry, to lessen dependence upon the already developed countries. When private initiative seems to be insufficiently vigorous, it sometimes happens that the government takes the lead by establishing publicly financed state factories and other state economic enterprises. This was done in Turkey, for instance.

The Syrian government has, however, taken a different course. Although it nationalized the foreign-owned public utilities it did not, except in one ill-fated case, itself enter the field of industrial operations by establishing factories. Instead, in various ways it encouraged private industrial enterprise, which, after all, had demonstrated its energy in promoting industrialization. Moreover, most of these measures, particularly those aimed at stimulating new industrial establishments and expansion of existing ones, were introduced only when industrial development began to show signs of stagnation during 1952.

The mission takes a favorable view of the basic principle of Legislative Decree No. 103 of 1952. In many countries at an early stage of development, a considerable and often disproportionate part of national savings tends to be invested in residential real estate or to flow into commercial or financial enterprise. Under such circumstances special incentives to induce a larger portion to be invested in industry, where they would probably make a greater contribution to the productivity of the economy, are certainly justified. We have no special comment with regard to the provisions for industrial sites. With respect to the fiscal privileges, however, we have some specific recommendations.

It seems reasonable for an underdeveloped country to exempt from customs duty imports of machinery, tools, equipment and construction materials not locally produced. In Syria decisions as to the industries and

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quantities to be exempted have been made by government officials. The mission suggests that for the system of individual decisions involving political judgment there be substituted in the law itself a general exemption provision on as liberal a basis as possible.

We cannot endorse the temporary exemption from income tax for new firms and for profits on new investment by existing firms. Our chief objection to these provisions is that an income tax exemption leads to rather irrational and sometimes inequitable results. It is obviously most important to the companies realizing the highest profits and it is of no value to those making no profits during the period of exemption. Furthermore, with a graduated tax such as Syria's, large firms benefit more from the exemption than do the small- and medium-sized firms. The exemption of profits derived from expansion of existing businesses, as distinguished from exemption of new firms, presents serious administrative difficulty in connection with the allocation of total profits between the new and the old part of the business. No fully satisfactory solution for this problem can be found even when both administrators and taxpayers are highly skilled and sophisticated in accounting techniques. Yet it would be undesirable to confine the concession to new firms, since additional investment in an established business may often be more productive than the same investment in a new business, especially where, as in Syria, there is a shortage of experienced managers.

The simplest way to achieve most of the benefits of temporary income tax exemption without its disadvantages and difficulties appears to be through liberalization of the depreciation or amortization allowances under the income and profits tax. In other words, the taxpayer should be allowed to write off against taxable income the original cost of plant and equipment in a period shorter than the normal useful life. For any given asset, accelerated depreciation results in a postponement, rather than a complete cancellation, of income tax liability but the investor can extend this postponement indefinitely by acquiring new assets when the first group has been written off for tax purposes.

Accelerated depreciation reduces or eliminates the chance that the income tax will prevent recovery of the capital outlay. For a rapidly growing firm it may offset taxable income and thus be virtually equivalent to exemption. The concession is automatically cancelled if the firm ceases to expand. Accelerated depreciation puts the emphasis on new investment, whereas tax exemption may grant unnecessarily large benefits to highly

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654 profitable firms which do not choose to expand. Furthermore, depreciation
433 raises no great administrative difficulties.

651 Our recommendation would provide a fairly effective substitute for income tax exemption, especially the recommendation that the tax on non-agricultural real estate be transformed into a tax on a true net income is also adopted. We realize, however, that a special problem arises in adapting the accelerated depreciation approach to Syrian conditions. Businesses with gross receipts of less than £S 25,000 per year pay an amount equal to 50% of the temettu tax in lieu of the regular income tax. Since these firms do not compute net income or depreciation allowances they could hardly be brought under the general scheme. It is suggested that these smaller firms be allowed to deduct from their tax liability a credit related to the amount of any new investment in buildings, machinery or other industrial equipment.

The present exemption of reserves up to 10% of annual profits which, within two years, are devoted to expansion of the enterprises would seem to be extremely difficult to administer satisfactorily; proper administration would call for careful supervision to assure compliance. This provision could well be eliminated. The law might provide, however, that if deduction of accelerated depreciation after an investment has actually been made produces an accounting loss, the loss might be carried back against income of the two preceeding years. The present law allows losses to be carried forward against income for five years but does not provide for a carry-back of losses.

652 *Credit facilities.* Our principal objections against the scheme of gov-
433 ernment-guaranteed industrial credits can be summarized as follows: (1) It applies only to corporations, thus excluding the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises, which are not organized in this form, and in effect reserving its benefits to a small group of large companies, although there is no reason to assume that all credit needs outside this group can be met by other means. (2) The limitation of the life of the guaranteed loans to three years (later extended to eight) does not sufficiently allow for adapting the maturity of these loans to the requirements of the projects. As an instrument to facilitate long-term industrial financing the provision may in some cases be too rigid. (3) The 3% interest rate, appreciably below the prevailing market rate, puts the beneficiaries in an exceptionally favorable competitive position as again non-beneficiaries, and may stimu-

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late projects less sound than those which must be financed on a truly competitive basis.

In the Main Report we have set forth the more fundamental objections which point to the desirability of completely abandoning this device rather than merely amending the law. In summary, they are: (1) the inability of a government agency to determine technical and economic soundness of proposed new projects; (2) the inflationary character of the scheme; and (3) the need for an independent institution to provide capital and technical assistance.

Most of the obvious or "natural" industries have been established. What is needed henceforth is (1) expansion of a more selective character, and (2) improvement in the efficiency or a lowering of the production costs in existing industries. There are possibilities for new ventures but they require careful investigation before being initiated. There is accordingly a need for an institution which through its own technical staff or through foreign consulting technicians can investigate such possible new enterprises either on its own initiative or upon request. There are still a number of enterprises, primarily small- or medium-sized, which lag behind in efficiency. It is important that there be a general reduction of costs and prices in order to increase the market at home and abroad. The less efficient enterprises often lack the resources to hire competent engineers and technicians on a permanent basis and they may suffer from deficiencies in machinery and equipment or management. An institution equipped to give or obtain technical advice on the problems of these enterprises could play a useful role. Its technicians might well be able to improve efficiency considerably by analyzing plant layout and working methods, by making time and cost studies and by examining the needs for improved machinery and equipment.

Considering the need of additional facilities to assist the financing of certain investments in agriculture and in modern hotels as well, the mission has recommended in the Main Report the establishment of a predominantly privately owned and independently managed investment bank for industry, agriculture and hotels and for providing technical assistance, primarily to industrial enterprises.

The capitalization of the bank should: (a) bear some relation to the investment possibilities of the institution; (b) permit operations on a scale enabling the earning of sufficient profits; and (c) not exceed the

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652 total which reasonable expectations indicate can be raised. In the Main
433 Report we have suggested capitalization of £S 30 million, and suggested the respective ratio of government and private capital.

The cost of necessary managerial and technical staff might run up to £S 300,000 per year and other costs might rise to the same figure with an increase in the volume of business. Possibly half of the cost of the technical staff might in the long run be recouped from fees for technical services. To economize on operating costs it would be advisable to have the commercial banks act as the bank's agents in receiving applications for loans and disbursing and servicing loans in return for a small commission.

656 *Tariff policy and embargoes.* It is far from clear that the trend toward
439 almost complete protection of industry from the impact of foreign com-
651 petition, qualified to only a limited extent by certain provisions of various commercial agreements, has reached its limits.

We have previously recommended reconsideration of this policy. Protection of many industries has gone too far in the direction of national isolation; the balance should be restored by giving more weight to international integration. Liberalization of external trade should be one of the items on Syria's economic program.

In making this suggestion the mission is mindful of the fact that Syria's balance of payments position is not very strong and that the condition of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves obliges the government to proceed with caution. Yet, as long as internal monetary equilibrium is preserved and the foreign exchange policy remains sound, the significance of these limitations ought not to be exaggerated.

We do not recommend immediate termination of the system of licensing imports since it enables the authorities to register at an early date the expected inflow of foreign goods. This may be considered a legitimate precaution, especially if the restriction of licenses is reserved to times when the balance of payments position is endangered. Under licensing, however, discrimination among imports is unavoidable. It should be realized that the need for such a measure indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the factors which determine external equilibrium; rather than continuously applying the palliative of direct import restrictions, Syria should try to remedy this situation. Even if direct import restrictions are temporarily unavoidable, they should not preclude remedial action; on the contrary, they should as far as possible contribute to bringing about an improvement in the basic conditions.

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industrial protection through measures affecting foreign trade would be largely the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. We therefore suggest some procedure to assure that the Minister of National Economy also has some responsibility in this connection insofar as the interests under his jurisdiction are involved. It would also seem desirable that the Council of Ministers continue to exercise its ultimate control over measures of this character so that possible conflicting considerations may be resolved in terms of the public interest in its broadest sense.

Export promotion. The priority given by the Syrian government to attaining national self-sufficiency with regard to industrial products which can be locally manufactured has been combined with a growing effort to open up additional markets for Syrian industry, particularly in the other Near Eastern countries. Syria's execution of several bilateral trade agreements and participation in the inter-Arab economic agreement aiming at liberalizing mutual trade exchange are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. The possibilities for further industrial export promotion, however, are not being fully exploited.

First, the mission recommends that Syrian export industries be given every possible assistance in the procurement of foreign raw and auxiliary materials without fiscal charges, specifically that they be given a full rebate of such charges commensurate with actual exports, and that the system of rebates be so administered that the rebate can be quickly and easily obtained.

Secondly, it is recommended that the policy of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with Syria's main commercial partners be systematically pursued. The considerable increase in recent years in exports of silk and artificial silk cloth, knitwear and other articles of clothing and soap, particularly to the markets of Jordan and Iraq, indicates that there are industrial export possibilities worth while consolidating and expanding.

Thirdly, it is suggested that Syria which, so far as is known, lacks natural oil deposits, has an even greater interest than its oil-producing neighbors in the creation, on a multilateral basis, of a market among the countries of the Arab League; the amount of purchasing power generated by these other countries would contribute far more to the joint total than would Syria's contribution. It therefore seems to be particularly in Syria's interest to promote further inter-Arab economic integration. If this could be achieved, conditions would also become more favorable for the re-establishment of the economic union with Lebanon.

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v INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

The Need for Further Industrialization

433 464 It is generally agreed—and the mission shares this opinion—that with a more rational distribution and better cultivation of the available land, and particularly with a gradual extension of the irrigated area, Syrian agriculture could for a considerable time to come easily absorb the expected natural population increase. With respect to the need for further industrialization, however, the relevant considerations seem rather to be the territorial and occupational distribution of the population and the evolution of this pattern. The principal question is whether—and if so, to what degree and in which direction—Syrian industry needs further expansion to absorb the present and immediately foreseeable effective labor supply.

464 369 166 Although reliable figures are not available there is no clear evidence that Syria is suffering from chronic unemployment. There are, however, some very overpopulated rural areas with considerable underemployment and there is a continuous flow of labor from the villages to the urban centers. During the postwar period of considerable building activity and rapid industrialization, these markets were able to absorb the increased labor supply. But at times, as for instance in 1948 in Aleppo, the urban workers have become alarmed by the influx of villagers competing with them and aggravating already existing unemployment, particularly in the textile industry. There were demonstrations and a request to the local authorities to bar villagers from applying for town employment; this in turn induced the government to encourage certain village industries—the decline of which is again contributing to urban labor pressure.

This illustrates the tensions which are bound to arise as a consequence of the existing imbalance between rural-urban social and economic conditions. Unless the village standard of living is greatly improved, there is little doubt that the trend toward the towns will continue strong and that the numbers seeking employment in industry will greatly exceed the natural increase in the industrial population. This tendency may even become more pronounced when, as is to be anticipated, illiteracy in the villages declines, transport and communications improve and the rural population becomes more aware of its poverty and social insecurity.

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The recommendations of the mission with regard to agriculture and animal husbandry, including those concerning land tenure and irrigation, would, if accepted, open significant new perspectives to the farmer and farm laborers and tend to check the drift from rural areas. If it were possible to spend more on irrigation than has been recommended, the trend could perhaps be reversed. It is not likely, however, that the growing labor supply can be absorbed and unemployment avoided without further industrialization. Even on the highly optimistic assumption that migration towards the towns can be halted, Syria must contend with such factors as the natural increase in the industrial labor population and the gradual shift from handicraft to mechanization with the consequent release of manpower.

Although estimates in this field are particularly hazardous, the mission suggests that under the most favorable circumstances Syria will have to create at least 20,000-25,000 new industrial jobs during the next six years to keep its industrial labor market in reasonable balance.

Limiting Factors

It is often contended in Syrian official and business circles that shortage of local capital rather than lack of confidence is the principal factor limiting further industrialization. Assuming that this is so, it would follow that to advance development Syria should make a strenuous effort to create attractive conditions for foreign capital as a supplementary source of industrial financing. This conclusion does not seem to be generally acknowledged. At least the nationalization of foreign-owned public utilities without settling the matter of indemnification of their proprietors, and the regulations with respect to foreign companies working in Syria, do not indicate its acceptance.

There is, however, room for some doubt whether scarcity of capital should be considered as a major factor limiting development of Syrian industry. During the past eight years, investments in industry have supplied the country with an industrial capacity capable of meeting most of the need for manufactured articles, based on local primary production, which the population can afford; indeed, as already pointed out, in several branches of industry there is excess capacity. Generally speaking, Syrian industry appears to have attracted substantial amounts of capital. Even taking into account the fact that the sources of industrial investment

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434 capital were enriched by accumulated war profits and repatriated capital,
433 it seems likely that under generally favorable economic conditions and with improvement in the mechanism for mobilizing industrial capital, the supply of such capital will be adequate for a reasonable expansion.

The amount of capital required should not be overestimated. Some branches of industry are overequipped and could employ considerably more workers before reaching full capacity. In others, where there is a better balance between equipment and output, internal savings can probably go a long way toward furnishing the necessary capital for improvement and extension of the existing plant. For the near future, with perhaps one or two exceptions, the mission does not see promising prospects for new large industries requiring heavy investment. The best possibilities for expansion may rather be found in the field of light industries which can start on a relatively modest scale. It is for these industries that the proposed investment bank should be particularly useful.

433 The factors limiting further industrial expansion which the mission considers to be of real significance are: (1) Syria's natural resources; (2) the absorptive capacity of the Syrian market; (3) the competitive strength of Syrian industry as a supplier of more and a broader range of manufactured goods both at home and on accessible foreign markets; and (4) the government's contribution to creation of stronger incentives and better possibilities of enlarging foreign outlets.

1. Syria's natural resources are mainly agricultural. Investigations of possible mineral and oil resources have produced unsatisfactory or negative results. Syria has no natural advantages with regard to power and transportation facilities. The country has not achieved a reputation for high quality production except of some limited luxury goods. Some of these limiting factors, particularly the inadequacy of power and transportation and the human qualifications, can certainly be overcome but only by considerable investment in so-called national overhead, the rate of which is limited by the increase of the national income and the share of this income which can be devoted to industrial investment.

2. Syrian industry depends to a very large extent, sometimes exclusively, on the home market. Given the size of the population and the fact that for the bulk of industrial goods imports have already been replaced by local manufactures, the possibilities for expansion of industrial production depend largely on progress made outside the industrial field in raising the volume of purchasing power of the largest number of people. The relative

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importance of the contributions of industry and agriculture to the national income is such that under existing conditions the rate of industrial expansion cannot exceed by very much the rise in income from the land. Allowance should be made for a gradual substitution of industrial products for home-made goods and handicraft manufactures, but this would not increase total purchasing power unless the manpower so released can be made more productive. Income from other sources may also rise, as for instance from construction, foreign trade, transit and tourism, but these are not of such significance as fundamentally to alter the stated relationship between the prospects for industry and for agriculture. This emphasizes the point that at this stage the primary development effort in Syria should be made in the agricultural field, and that industry will automatically benefit thereby through an increase of internal purchasing power.

3. A third limiting factor is efficiency of production and distribution, i.e., its ability to offer its products to the ultimate consumer at prices within the purchasing power of a majority of the population. This applies to existing as well as to possible new industries.

In this connection it is very important that Syrian industry be enabled to procure its raw materials at international prices, that the costs of transportation and storage be reduced, that power facilities be improved, and that the system of commercial credit be better organized both for producers and consumers. Without intending to minimize any of these factors, however, the mission is convinced that primary attention should be directed to reducing production costs by increasing the productivity of both labor and capital and destroying any undue economic power exercised by commercial middlemen in the distribution process.

As has been pointed out, in many industries labor productivity could be increased considerably by better technical education and training, better working conditions and stronger incentives, and by improved capital equipment, with installation and utilization raised to higher standards of efficiency. This would also immediately tend to lower production costs and allow a reduction of factory prices. In the field of distribution, particularly in the villages, the wholesome effect of free competition on consumer prices is often lost because of the poverty and ignorance of the consumers on the one hand and various price-increasing practices of merchants and moneylenders on the other. The institution of buying cooperatives might be helpful; as they are difficult to manage, it is suggested that some carefully controlled experiments be made prior to any attempt

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433 to spread them widely. It also would be worth while to explore the question whether more direct selling by manufacturers to the ultimate consumer might be instrumental in reducing excessive distribution costs, at least with regard to certain articles.

In considering the establishment of new industries, besides modern technological requirements and the limitations of the Syrian market, cost factors in production as well as distribution should be carefully investigated. Ventures requiring relatively high initial outlays which can become profitable only if the volume of production is large will have to be scrutinized with extreme caution. Since it will require a major effort to keep direct costs on a competitive level, there will probably be no margin out of which to service unduly high investment costs and certainly none if the volume of sales keeps production below normal capacity.

As regards possible outlets in foreign markets, one determining factor is the accessibility of such markets; the other is competitive strength. Although there are exceptions, for instance when the foreign market is actually closed or transportation costs are prohibitive, the second factor is the more important and, in the case of Syrian industry, it is of the utmost significance. For the products of Syria's luxury industries with their rather unique character, competition is not a threat, but with regard to so-called international goods Syria has strong rivals, particularly in Western Europe, the United States and Japan, and at least for the near future it is almost inconceivable that Syrian industry would be able to meet their competition in any foreign market, even in the immediately adjoining countries, unless it is given a preferential position there. Among the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, on the other hand, Syria could develop considerable competitive strength by increasing its industrial efficiency. In planning for expansion of existing industries as well as for entering new lines of production, Syrian industrialists should give due consideration to these markets and try to achieve standards of quality and cost which permit their taking advantage of any opportunity.

4. The fourth limiting factor is government policy. We have already pointed out that this policy in recent years has been to make Syria independent of imports of those industrial goods which can be locally manufactured and to increase the exchange of agrarian and industrial products with neighboring countries. These two objectives are not readily reconcilable. Before industrial maturity is achieved it may be justifiable to stress the necessity of first building up the capacity and experience of the local

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market, and therefore to go rather far in restricting imports. But eventually, unless this policy is qualified industrial development is bound to slow down. Then new impetus will come only from a shift in emphasis to the second principle and a corresponding revision in government policies. Syrian industry has reached this stage and we have therefore recommended that the policy of protection be modified. 433

The trend toward integration of the Arab markets, already referred to, has achieved a more liberal exchange of agrarian than of industrial products. This may be explained by the fact that throughout the Middle East the governments are sponsoring local industrial development along rather parallel lines and each in varying degrees wishes to reserve its local markets for its young industries. On the other hand, none has a sufficiently large population or purchasing power to enable it to develop a fully diversified economy of its own. It seems to be in the interest of all that their development should proceed along lines suited to the specific resources of the various countries. Regular consultations between the authorities promoting industrial development in this area would therefore be desirable.

New Industries and Some Promising Lines of Expansion

The mission has not considered it to be its task to make an extensive survey of specific industrialization projects which might be successfully undertaken in Syria in the near future. We have already pointed out there are still branches of industry in which the establishment of additional plants, either by way of expansion of existing factories or construction of new ones, would be feasible.

Since the 1947 Gibb report on Syria, conditions have changed greatly. 433 In the cotton textile industry, the disparity between the spinning and 288 weaving capacity which existed 10 years ago has largely been overcome, although it exists with regard to rayon yarn. Woven and knitted rayon fabric has taken the place of much cotton and woolen fabric in the Middle East and it is probable that this development will continue. In recent years Syria's imports of rayon yarn and rayon fabric have become significant. Yet, particularly with regard to rayon yarn it would seem ill advised to try to substitute local products for imports which now are duty free, by imposing high protective tariffs. On the other hand, further diversification of the textile and apparel industry may be promising. The increasing volume of exports of knitted goods and other articles of clothing clearly

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433 indicates that in this field Syria has become a competitor in foreign markets.
288 In dyeing, printing and finishing there seems to be need for additional modern plant. It also seems desirable to investigate the possibility of profitable production of jute fabric sacks. Imports of these sacks have rapidly increased in the last few years, reaching a total of nearly 10,000 tons with a value of £S 6 million in 1953. The need for jute sacks would be lessened if bulk transportation and storage facilities were available but even in that event an increase in general agricultural production might make the establishment of a factory for sack production from imported jute fiber or yarn an economic possibility.

433 Further expansion of the cement industry may well be required. In
339 fact, the government has authorized a new plant for Aleppo which may be transferred to the Jezireh to serve the growing requirement of north-eastern Syria. A cement plant for the Homs-Hama region is also under consideration.

433 In the footwear industry modern factory production has been intro-
295 duced only with regard to rubber boots and shoes. An experiment with factory production of leather shoes in Aleppo some years ago met with such opposition from the handicraft trade that it was abandoned. Nevertheless this branch of industry may be one in which the application of modern production methods would be appropriate and generally beneficial.

433 It seems useful to investigate the economic prospects of paper and
218 paperboard manufacture. In 1953 about 8,000 tons of paper with a value of nearly £S 5 million were imported. This total comprises a large variety of different types of paper but some are imported in such quantity as to suggest the feasibility of specialized production. Straw is plentiful as raw material and in a relatively short period more poplar wood could become available if farmers and village communities gave increased attention to tree planting.

433 The production of metal from scrap and the gradual development of
402 an engineering industry may also be contemplated. The manufacture of simple pumps and engines as well as spare parts is already being carried out by many small shops but the quality of the output suffers from inadequate technical supervision. An adequately equipped and staffed plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements to be developed for use on farms.

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In the manufacture of plastic materials and domestic utensils factory production has made a beginning. This also seems to be a promising field for further development. 433

The possibility of the establishment of a plant for mixing fertilizers and making insecticides from imported ingredients should also be explored.

In the Main Report the mission has pointed out that the erection of an oil refinery in the Homs area seems to be entirely justified.

Prospects for Village Industries

With development of agricultural and rural community organization, better water and electricity supply in small towns and villages, wider general and vocational education and easier and cheaper transportation, the conditions under which village industries have prospered will undergo a change, not necessarily for the better. Traditional consumption patterns will be modified, techniques will change, factory-made manufactures will enter the village markets and compete with handicraft products and transportation costs will provide less protection. On the other hand, the density of the population and its purchasing power will increase and in certain regions tourist trade may develop. Village industries may find a better market for agricultural and animal products processed into foodstuffs, for the manufacturing and repairing of simple tools and implements used domestically or in the field, for the production of furniture and other articles for house and farm, ornaments, clothing accessories, costume jewelry and other goods of indigenous design. 433 369

We do not recommend that efforts be made to check historical trends by assisting village industries which will inevitably decline and ultimately disappear. Yet it seems very probable that a rather significant part of Syrian industrial enterprise carried on in rural communities will for a long time to come survive and be a determining factor in the economic, social and cultural conditions of many small towns and villages. That part certainly deserves more attention than it has generally received. An improvement of standards of quality and efficiency, commercial and financial techniques and social and sanitary conditions of these establishments would undoubtedly contribute to raising living standards in the rural areas.

It is therefore suggested that the community leaders, recommended elsewhere in this report, with the assistance of specialists representing the

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Ministry of National Economy, carefully investigate the conditions and opportunities which exist in this field. Industrial extension, assistance in the organization of credit cooperatives, particularly with a view to giving protection from usurious middlemen practices, in the marketing of products which might find wider outlets, and eventually in founding tourist attractions could be considered. Even if only limited results can be achieved by such measures they should be encouraged as a means of creating better rural conditions and at the same time reducing the pressure of labor migration toward the crowded towns.

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of clinics and in the cities a shortage of qualified staff to undertake massage, radiotherapy, and orthopædics, and there is special need to combat tuberculosis. Syrians and Lebanese are not addicted to hashish which, however, is grown in the Biqaa and smuggled to Egypt. The Lebanese Government periodically burns many of the plantations, which inflates the price of the surviving crop.

S L 433

Economic Survey

More than half the population of the two countries is engaged in agriculture which is the most important economic activity. Natural resources hardly exist; there is bitumen in Jebel Bishri in Syria but its production would not be economic; about 10,000 tons a year of asphalt is produced from the neighbourhood of Latakia; and salt is extracted in commercial quantities near Aleppo.

S L 315 382

Petroleum

For a number of years, associates of IPC searched for oil in Syria and Lebanon but without finding it in commercial quantities; in consequence, the areas held by these IPC associates have been given up. However, the two Governments are still anxious for further efforts to be made to find oil in commercial quantities. The importance of petroleum in the economy of Syria and Lebanon lies in the situation of the two republics athwart the pipelines from the fields of northern Iraq and Saudi Arabia which have outlets on the Mediterranean.[1] From Iraq a 12-inch and 16-inch line carry oil across Syria by way of Palmyra and Homs to Tripoli in the Lebanon. Together, these two lines can carry about 8 million tons of oil a year (160,000 barrels daily). A third IPC line from Kirkuk to Homs then bears north of the other two and reaches the sea at Banias, and so does not run through Lebanon at all. This new line is 26–30–32-inches in diameter and can deliver oil at about 16 million tons a year (320,000 barrels daily). From the fields of Saudi Arabia a 30–31 inch American pipeline (Tapline) travels over 1,000 miles on its way to Sidon in Lebanon, passing through Jordan and Syria. At present the line is pumping at a rate of about 15 million tons a year (300,000 barrels daily). It should be noted that these four lines all carry crude oil, some of which is refined on the Mediterranean shore for local requirements but the bulk is shipped as crude to the refineries of Europe and elsewhere.

S L 382

The line from Kirkuk to Haifa is not operating and the Haiaf

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

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cultivated area. Holdings of 25–250 acres are estimated to take 423
up 33 per cent of the area and holdings over 250 acres 29 per cent. State land is estimated to represent 23 per cent of the total cultivated area. Decrees for the distribution of state lands were issued in 1952: their implementation, at the time of writing, is still under review. Legislation to prevent the subdivision of plots by succession inheritances is also under consideration; at present a four-acre plot may have thirty-seven owners, and its management is profitable only to lawyers.

The approximate acreage and crop and yield of the main 241
products are shown in the following table. 433

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)			*Production* (000 metric tons)			*Yield* (100 kg. per ha.)	
	1950	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*
Cotton (lint)	78	217	142	35	49	49	4·6	2·3
Wheat	992	1,037	900*	830	510	850*	8·4	4·9
Barley	416	344	400*	322	155	350*	7·7	4·5
Vegetables	68	66	..	47	40	142	..	..
Tobacco†	10	11	..	9	9	..	8·7	..
Rice (paddy)	7	..	..	24	6	6	19·3‡	..

.. = not available.

* The Banque de Syrie et du Liban (*Exercice 1952*) quotes the following figures for 1952 (in thousands):

Wheat: area = 1,180, production = 805.
Barley: area = 396, production = 467.

† Including Lebanon (annual production about 2,000–3,000 tons). ‡ 1949.

(SOURCES: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952* and *Monthly Bulletins of Statistics*, 1953; vegetable figures from Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952*, Paris, 1953.)

Wheat is the traditional staple crop of Syria and in a normal 248
year a quarter of a million tons can be exported. But the poor 439
harvest of 1951 necessitated wheat imports of about 50,000 241
tons. The 1952 wheat crop, however, once more increased to 433
over 800,000 tons. Barley is also grown and exported and, though the acreage has diminished somewhat since 1949, the crop is adequate.

In 1950 fortunes were made from cotton which fetched a high 248
price for the abundant harvest. The acreage sown to cotton 433
trebled between 1949 and 1950 and again in 1951. But while in 1950 the cotton yield was high, the 1951 harvest proved disappointing because of drought and attacks of the boll weevil. Despite a fall in cotton acreage in 1952—due chiefly to the downward trend in cotton prices—that year's output was maintained at the 1951 level, thanks largely to better methods

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of
234 coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at reafforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2*.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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generators and new hydro-electric schemes are planned to increase the output. The Belgian company operating the tramways and electricity in Damascus and the French electricity company of Aleppo were nationalized in 1951. Consumption of industrial fuel oils has increased greatly since the war and the continuance of this increase shows that Syrian industry is still growing. Under the French Mandate, Syria did not attempt to produce goods for export, but since 1945 some Syrian financiers have tried to build up industries depending for success on overseas sales that have not, however, materialized. Industries based on local needs are likely to be the most successful because the cost of materials and labour are too high for Syria to sell competitively finished goods for which she has to import the raw materials.

The textile industry is the most important, despite a setback in 1950 and 1951 when faced with foreign competition; the industry is well managed and well equipped and employs 20,000 people in Aleppo and Damascus. In 1950 there were about 65,000 spindles for cotton in these two cities, as well as 12,000 handlooms and 3,600 power looms, with an output of 5,000 tons of yarn and 21 million metres of fabric.[1] Silk is woven on hand looms (about 60,000 metres of cloth), but there are mechanical looms for rayon (about 27 million metres) and nylon knitting-machines. Large dye-houses and many small establishments in Damascus and Homs serve the local textile industry. Production of woollen cloth rose to about 542,000 metres in 1948, since when it has declined, although it meets all local needs.

In Homs a Syrian firm has a group of modern plants including a sugar refinery (output 10,000 tons in 1951), an alcohol distillery (363 tons in 1951), and an oil extraction plant. But the refinery depends on imported raw sugar and only protection and a high retail price maintain it, nor is it yet certain that the Homs sugar will compete in price with imported refined sugar even if local beet production, which is being expanded, is used for refining. The cement factory near Damascus was extended in 1951 and now produces about 60,000 tons a year, and a new plant in Aleppo is on the way to producing 70,000 tons a year. There are many oil and soap factories of which the biggest, in Aleppo, can produce thirty tons a day. About 20,000 tons of asphalt, 1,449 million cigarettes, and 69,000 tons of tobacco are also produced near Latakia. Near Damascus

[1] Many of the statistics in this section have been obtained from UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2* and other recent UN Surveys of the Middle East.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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433 is a modern glass factory for window and mirror glass and for glass containers, with a total estimated annual capacity of over 14,000 tons. This enterprise has suffered from the fact that the sand has to be imported and also from being built before the necessary export market had been secured to keep its three ovens working. Flour mills are plentiful and more are to be constructed; the production of flour is about 400,000 tons a year. In Damascus there are two spaghetti factories and starch is also produced. Tinned fruit, jam, chocolates, and sweets are also produced in Damascus and there are factories for matches (output 45 million boxes in 1952), margarine, soft drinks, and shoes as well as a number of tanneries and workshops in Aleppo and Damascus. A paper mill has recently begun production, with an output of 4 million square metres of corrugated paper and cardboard boxes in 1952.

SYRIAN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

(Estimates for 1952)

Number of Factories	*Tons Capacity*
2 Cement	200,000
1 Sugar	10,000
1 Asphalt	variable
9 Edible oil*	12,000
68 Raw cotton ginning	600,000
3 Food preserving (major)	5,000
1 Glass (plate and rolled)	7,500
(containers)	8,000
3 Tobacco	2,000

* Olive and cotton seed.

(SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus 1952.)

Industry contributes only about a half as much as agriculture [186] to Syria's gross national product, but the spirit of nationalism has led the Government to give special support to local industries although not all are economically sound. As Syria lacks industrial raw materials, industries based on local agricultural produce should be encouraged rather than those which depend on imported raw materials and foreign markets.

Finance

436 648 The Syrian pound of 100 piastres (reputedly backed as to 60 per cent by gold and foreign currency) is linked to the French franc. Syria is a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a quota of $6½ million. War-time inflation subsided 435 439 by the end of 1948, but with the Korean boom in primary product prices and the subsequent export surpluses and heavy

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MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)		Production (000 metric tons)		Yields (100 kg. per ha.)
	1951	1952	1951	1952	1950
Wheat	61	70	43	50	7·5
Barley	15	20	14	27	11·2
Cotton	5	2	1	..	..
Tobacco	..	..	3	2	..
Citrus fruit	..	..	75	90	..
Grapes	21	..	80	..	..

.. = not available.

(Sources: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952* (Paris 1953); except figures for yields, cotton production, and area and production of grapes, all of which have been taken from FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952.)

312 241 439 There is enough water for land to be used more intensively than in Syria but there is not enough room to grow all that the country needs. Improved methods have increased the yield of cereals per acre, but Lebanon will always have to import wheat. The crop of grapes is nearly double the weight of the wheat harvest and Lebanon exports grapes, wine, and the best quality araq. The citrus exports are high but the growers have not yet established the same name for quality as have the Israelis. Melons, water-melons, apples, onions, and potatoes are also important crops and vegetables are exported as far as the oil towns of Kuwait and Dahran. Cotton and tobacco are also grown in small quantities.

423 369 The land is more evenly parcelled out amongst the people in Lebanon than in Syria but, despite the fact that there are many small holdings, there is a general shift from country to town, and Beirut and its immediate neighbourhood hold nearly half of the population. In the coastal regions of intensive cultivation small holdings predominate, while in the plain regions large estates worked by share-croppers are the most prevalent form of land tenure. Some estates owned by rich men are farmed under modern methods and equipment and there is less room for improvement or for expansion in agriculture than in Syria.

Industry

433 Relative to its size, Lebanon is one of the most industrialized countries in the Middle East area. It is probable that nearly 50,000 persons are so employed, of whom over half are factory workers. However, Lebanese industry has only partly recovered from the loss of the Syrian market and some industries had either to move to Syria or to curtail production. The biggest industries are electricity, which produced 190 million kwh. in 1951, and the Chekka cement factory south of Tripoli, which produced 303,000 tons of cement in 1951. Cotton weaving and

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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316 mined since 1914, and sodium chloride and bitumen deposits also are being worked. There is an abundance of good calcareous building stone and basalt.[29]

433 The most important industries produce flour, olive oil, soap, tanned hides, tobacco products, glass, alcohol, glucose, and textiles. New factories recently constructed include two cottonseed oil mills, two cotton spinning and weaving mills, porcelain and glass factories, and a beet sugar mill. Textiles is the most important single industry from the standpoint of employment and value of production.

315 Unlike many of the other countries in the Middle East, Syria has no oil in commercial quantities. A number of wells have been drilled, but without notable success. A pipeline from Iraq and the Persian Gulf crosses Syria to the Mediterranean, and a new line is being completed to Baniyas on the coast from Iraq. The pipelines provide a source of employment, but they do not produce a large amount of revenue for the government.

Table 22

439 SYRIA: Specified Imports as Per Cent of Total Imports
March 15 through December 31, 1950
Value

Item	1950
	Per Cent
Textile Materials	29.1
Combustible Minerals	18.2
Electric Machinery and Apparatus	16.7
Common Metals	8.8
Precious Stones and Metals	5.8
Animals and Products	5.7
Others	31.6
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	90

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

Table 23

SYRIA: Imports from Specified Sources as Per Cent of Total Imports
1951
Value

Source	1951
	Per Cent
United States	18.2
United Kingdom	12.8
France	10.4
Lebanon	10.2
Italy	7.0
Germany	5.5
Others	35.9
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	138

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

[29] *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1951, p. 92.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

United States mission estimated that 50 per cent of the land was in fallow 311
during 1948.[21] Increased irrigation and high prices for agricultural com- 241
modities have reduced significantly the fallow in the past few years, and the percentage may be less now.

PRODUCTION

Syria is normally self-sufficient in most foods. In fact, the country 433
exports fresh and dried fruits, lentils and other legumes, tobacco, wool, butter, hides, and meat. Occasional poor harvests make it necessary to import food grains.

The greatest deficiency is in rice, which has been displaced by cotton in recent years to such an extent that almost all of the country's requirements must be imported. Last year's bad cotton crop may prompt farmers to revert to rice and, if so, this will reduce the deficiency.

Government figures indicate that production of food has not kept pace 433
with the expansion in population and that the per capita food supply and 146
individual calorie intake are both declining.[22] These conclusions are based on highly conjectural statistics and are in conflict with opinions of the United States Agricultural Attache and Syrian officials who are intimately acquainted with the country's agricultural problems. These observers believe there has been no real decline in food consumption, except possibly for short periods of time. Certainly there is no shortage now, and the bumper cereal crop in 1952 should enable the country to fill domestic needs and export at least 30 per cent of its wheat and possibly 50 per cent of its barley.

The daily diet consists largely of starches, it is true, but this is due more 262
to habit than anything else. The resources of the country are ample to permit a much more balanced diet.

PRODUCTIVITY

Syrian agriculture often is characterized by the low productivity of the 461
agricultural worker. It is obvious that a great many more people are used on 241
each acre of land than is necessary. The low agricultural income is reflected 511
in the obvious poverty of the people. Yet, comparisons with other countries, and even detailed calculations, are of questionable value due to the unreliability of the statistics.

Government reports on average yields also are open to question. Official 241
figures show that wheat yields have dropped sharply, while cotton yields have tended upward, except for the extremely bad year in 1951-52. They also show very wide fluctuation. Experienced observers point out that the yields are especially questionable because both acreage and production figures are not reliable. On the basis of conversations with producers in various sections, it is apparent that yields are normally fairly high and that they fluctuate, depending on water availability and on insect devastation.

POTENTIALITIES

A number of missions which have studied the possibilities of agricultural development in Syria, especially in the last five or six years, all mention the

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21 *Activities of FAO, 1948-52*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1952, p. 58.

22 *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, November, 1951.

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70. The Mission as will be seen, formed a favourable impression of those whom it saw at Mashabeyeh. It was regrettable to learn that not only was the extension of the work hampered by lack of funds but that some local difficulties had arisen which suggested that there might still be some distrust of disinterested outside help in quarters that could not plead ignorance as an excuse. We had not the opportunity of pursuing inquiries to enable us to satisfy ourselves whether, if foreign direction and support were withdrawn, the work undertaken by the Foundation would collapse or become self-supporting, a point which had first been suggested to us in talks in Lebanon (see paragraph 10). We were, however, satisfied that if the venture were to collapse, it would not be due to any lack of a spirit of service or enthusiasm on [illegible]

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71. The country is under-populated and the population is so scattered as to make it difficult to provide the usual facilities through community centres. It should be added that there are large tracts of empty but arable land; so that if, as a result of efficient health services, the expectation of life increases and infant mortality decreases, there is no danger of lack of food.

72. Recommendations: In the light of the present cautious attitude of the Syrian Government towards the receipt of technical assistance from external sources, we recommend that the initiative should be left with the Government to seek United Nations aid for the furtherance of any scheme of community organizations for which it may be directly or indirectly responsible.

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III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

73. The "Middle East" is a convenient but misleading description which may be applied to a group of Arab-speaking countries, not all of which were included in our itinerary. Those which we were privileged to visit have many features in common, in spite of differences in characteristics and ways of life and varying stages and patterns of development. The Islamic faith prevails over the greater part of the area, though in some countries there are important non-Moslem minorities. Each country is the inheritor of an ancient culture; each has subscribed to the United Nations Charter, with its emphasis on improved standards of living as a contributing factor to the peace of the world; each is predominantly agricultural; each, in a newfound independence and under conditions of political instability, is reforming its land laws; and each has proclaimed the welfare of the people as a dominating purpose of Government policy.

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74. In progress in community development in this group of countries little uniformity is to be observed. In Egypt, where the establishment of rural social centres became the official policy in 1939, after successful pioneering experiments conducted by the Egyptian Association for Social Studies, a stage has now been reached at which the whole scheme is under review, with the object of increasing its scope as efficiency. A reorganization involving decentralization and more inter-departmental co-ordination was in progress as we left Egypt.

75. We have found that Egypt is, compared with other Arab countries, well advanced as regards rural social centres since the population, or at least a part of it, understands the value of self-help. These social centres have to be expanded, both as regards numbers and the use made of each one of them. They do not require costly special buildings; provided that attention is paid to cleanliness, the work can be carried out in suitably equipped village houses, always assuming that the staff has the right spirit. To ensure a continuous standard of efficiency, regular supervision

63-Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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The infant mortality is not known, but local observers believe that it is at least 250 per 1,000 live births. In many rural villages the mortality among children under 5 years of age probably reaches 40 to 50 per cent. Discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated by the fact that certification of birth is not required for infants dying during the first year of life. The official infant mortality rate for 1948 was 47.6 per 1,000 births for the country, but 75 per 1,000 births in the city of Damascus. Among almost 15,500 deaths registered in 1949, over 21 per cent were of infants under 1 year and about 35 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 165

Social Economy

Agriculture is the basis of Syria's economy. Over two thirds of the people are dependent upon the land, and, in consideration of the paucity of other natural resources, its full utilization is a problem of primary concern to the welfare of the country. Except in limited portions of the northwestern and the northeastern provinces, the rainfall is deficient and erratic, and the expansion of agriculture is contingent upon the development of irrigation and more efficient methods of production. Estimates of the amount of cultivable land range from 10 to 21 million acres—from less than one quarter to almost one half of the total land area. A similar disparity is noted between the figures quoted for the acreage now under cultivation, but all sources agree that less than one half of the potentially arable lands are planted in crops. Most observers believe that the land suitable for agriculture approximates 12 to 14 million acres, while the area under cultivation is between 5 and 6 million acres. Roughly 10 to 20 per cent of the tilled land is irrigated at present, but it has been shown that the farm acreage could be more than doubled by increased irrigation, associated with controlled settlement, in the Orontes, the Khabour and the Euphrates river valleys. 433 241 132 241 311 241 311

Foremost among the factors which impede the promotion and the modernization 421

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

439 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

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Chapter 7

SYRIA

Developments to the End of the Second World War

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Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Syrian economy rested on agriculture, handicrafts and commerce. Then, as now, most of the land was planted to wheat and barley, whose yield was low, owing to the primitive methods employed and the inadequacy of the rainfall, but whose output usually left a small export surplus. Cultivation of fruits and tobacco was more intensive, and an appreciable amount was exported. Syrian handicrafts, such as cotton, silk and wool weaving, leather tanning and soap making, enjoyed a high reputation and supplied the Egyptian, Anatolian, Mesopotamian, North Arabian and Palestinian markets, as well as most of Syria and Lebanon. Commerce was a leading activity, Syria being the distributing centre for most of Arab Asia as well as southern Anatolia. 1/

In the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries some important changes took place. Owing to greater security, the margin of cultivation shifted eastwards and the sown area expanded. Handicrafts, on the other hand, began to decline owing to the competition of foreign machine-made goods. This decline was, however, more than offset by the rapid growth of commerce, which was stimulated by the building of railways and ports by foreign capital.

The First World War was a period of intense disorganization. Mobilization reduced manpower in agriculture, and the handicrafts and commerce were paralysed by the loss of supplies and markets. In the post-war years, the handicrafts declined rapidly, owing to a shift in taste to foreign goods, a general decline in purchasing power and intensified competition of foreign goods, against which the tariff gave little protection. Commerce was crippled by the breakup of the Ottoman Empire into several States with different tariffs, currencies and economic policies. Agriculture was handicapped by the very unsettled conditions prevailing until 1927, after which it was affected by the world depression; at the outbreak of the Second World War the area planted to cereals was not appreciably greater than it had been before the First World War.

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Nevertheless, in this period, part of the groundwork of future progress was laid. Communications were improved by the construction of a good network of roads and by the building or enlarging of ports. Some irrigation schemes were carried out. Property rights in land were settled over a large area, thus removing a major obstacle to development.

1/ The French High Commission's report, La Syrie et le Liban en 1922, stated that until the First World War "Syria lived on its trade; it has lived almost exclusively on it; it has lived on it for many centuries" (quoted in S.B. Himadeh (editor), The Economic Organization of Syria (Beirut, 1936) page 119).

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The banking system was developed, but this improvement was partly offset by the shocks caused by successive devaluations of the franc, to which the Syrian pound was linked on an exchange standard. Slight reforms were introduced in the fiscal system, and steps were taken to protect industry. Until 1924, the Ottoman tariff of 11 per cent on almost all goods had remained in force. In 1924, a distinction was made between members of the League of Nations and the United States, goods from which were subjected to the "normal" tariff of 15 per cent, and other countries, 1/ which paid the "maximum" of 30 per cent; industrial machinery was exempted from customs duties. In 1926, the normal rate was raised to 25 per cent and the maximum to 50 per cent. In 1928, duties on raw materials and fuels were reduced. In the nineteen thirties, the general level of the tariff was lowered, but protection to Syrian industry was increased. As a result, several modern factories were established, and there was also some modernization of the handicrafts, by the installation of improved tools and power driven machinery. 2/

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During the Second World War the large-scale expenditure of Allied troops raised incomes and prices, 3/ thus stimulating agricultural and industrial production, and the reduction of imports also aided local production. Owing to some mechanization, and to the fact that cultivation of marginal land became profitable, the area sown to major field crops increased by about 40 per cent between 1938 and 1945. This extension of acreage was, in some years, offset by a decline in yields, but the grain crop at the end of the war was distinctly greater than before the war. Industry expanded considerably, and communications were improved. The forced saving, due to inflation and the shift to profits, took the form of franc and sterling balances held by Syrian individuals and institutions.

1/ Owing to special arrangements, trade between Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan was exempt from duties on either side.

2/ Both the decline in handicrafts and the rise of modern industry are reflected in the following figures, covering Syria and Lebanon, presented by the Mandatory Government to the League of Nations in 1937: in 1913, there were 310,000 handicraft workers; by 1937, the number had declined to 171,000, most of whom were in Syria; on the other hand, there were 33,000 workers in "modern industries", of whom a little over 40 per cent were in Syria and the rest in Lebanon.

3/ From 1940 to 1944 inclusive, Allied expenditure in Lebanon and Syria totalled £76 million (sterling). In 1939 to 1945, inclusive, Lebanon and Syria had a surplus of 607 million Lebanese-Syrian pounds on current account. The index number of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus rose from 100 in 1938 to 831 in 1945.

Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

Agriculture

During the post-war period both agricultural and industrial output increased rapidly, and although population growth was fairly large there seems little doubt that per capita output rose significantly. 1/ Similarly, although data are very scanty, there is evidence of an increase in consumption and an improvement in the standard of living. 2/ 433 511

In agriculture, the increase in output was achieved by extending the acreage of cereals and greatly expanding that of cotton; there was also some improvement in methods of cultivation, especially in cotton. The total cultivated area increased from 2,314,000 hectares in 1946/47 to 3,668,000 in 1952/53. 3/ the irrigated area increased more rapidly, from 237,000 hectares 4/ to 400,000 hectares. 5/ The proportion of fallow land seems to have remained unchanged, at one-third of the total. It may therefore be taken that the crop area increased by about 60 per cent. 241 311

The increase in the irrigated area was achieved partly by the irrigation projects discussed below, partly by installation by farmers of pumps drawing on river or underground water. In 1953, there were 7,500 pumps, of which 40 per cent were for river water and 60 per cent for underground water. The extension of rainfed crops was achieved mainly by mechanization. In 1953 there were 1,200 tractors, compared with 860 in 1951 and about 300 in 1948; 1,307 tractor ploughs, compared 312 241

1/ National income is estimated to have risen from 1,250 million Syrian pounds in 1950 to £1,410 million in 1953; during that period, the index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus (1949 = 100) fell from 111 to 110. See Sami Wafa el Dajani, "al dakhl al Qaumi fi Suria", Al Abhath, (Beirut, December 1953); Ministry of Agriculture, A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria, and Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953 (Damascus, 1954). A breakdown for 1950 shows that 44 per cent of the total was contributed by agriculture and animal husbandry, 13 per cent by commerce, 10 per cent by industry, 9 per cent by transport and communications, 7 per cent by government services, 5 per cent by rents and 11 per cent by other activities (Dajani, op.cit.).

2/ Per capita annual consumption of cotton, woollen and rayon fibres is estimated to have risen from 4.2 kilogrammes in 1951 to 4.6 kilogrammes in 1952 and 5.1 in 1953; the figure for Lebanon and Syria combined had previously risen from 3.9 kilogrammes in 1948 to 4.8 kilogrammes in 1950 (Food and Agriculture Organization, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Rome, January 1955). Output of tobacco products increased from an average of 1,638 tons in 1945-47 to 2,075 tons in 1950, 2,448 in 1952 and 2,659 in 1953.

3/ Bureau des documentations Syriennes et Arabes, La Syrie économique, 1953 (Damascus, 1954), mimeographed.

4/ Sir Alexander Gibb, Economic Development of Syria (London, 1947).

5/ Of these, some 250,000 hectares were irrigated by flow and 150,000 hectares by pumps.

241 with 1,032 in 1952; and 547 tractor planters, compared with 471. 1/ There were also, in 1952, 361 combines, 133 threshers and 108 harvesters. 2/

243 As table 50 shows, most of the increase in acreage was in cereals. Wheat and
242 barley yields continued to fluctuate violently, according to the amount of rainfall and weather conditions, but have showed no marked trend and, save in exceptional years such as 1949, have been well below a ton per hectare. Apart from mechanization, little has been done to improve methods of cultivation, apply fertilizers or use improved seed except in El Jezira, where high-yielding improved
433 seeds and fertilizers are sometimes used. Hence, in the post-war period, output of grains has increased in the same proportion as acreage, or only slightly more.
241 The expansion in cotton acreage, though smaller in absolute terms, was proportionately much greater; 3/ the acreage rose to 25,000 hectares in 1949 and 78,000 in 1950; the high prices prevailing in that year and the great profits made by cotton planters sent acreage up to 217,000 hectares, partly at the expense of wheat cultivation. The sharp decline in yields in 1951 and the steep fall in price in 1951 and 1952 caused heavy losses and led to a decline in acreage. Improved cotton prices and greater experience in cultivation once more caused an expansion in 1954.

241 The experience of the past four years has served to point out the potentialities and limitations of cotton cultivation in Syria. During the 1950-51 boom, cotton cultivation spread to most parts of the country, but subsequent events have shown that it is unsuited to many of them. In the Hauran, inadequate moisture has caused farmers to revert to wheat, barley and leguminous crops; in the Latakia region, soil and climate have also proved unfavourable. In the Damascus region, cotton cultivation has been practically discontinued. In the Aleppo region, as a result of the excessive costs of pump irrigation, cultivation is mainly confined to rain-grown cotton. 4/ In many parts of El Jezira, rice has replaced cotton owing to the shortage of labour. At present, cotton is localized chiefly in the Hama and Salamiye districts in central Syria, in the Hasetche district in El Jezira and in the province of Aleppo. About two-thirds of the total area is irrigated. Yields are about twice as high on irrigated as on rain-fed land, and the Syrian average, having almost doubled since the pre-war period, is one of the highest in the world. 5/

1/ Ministry of Finance, Budget Note, 1955 (Damascus, 1955).

2/ Figures obtained from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ Large-scale cultivation of cotton began in 1924, increased rapidly until 1931 and after a sharp fall during the depression reached its pre-war peak of 40,000 hectares in 1936. In this period, American type cotton replaced native varieties. During the Second World War, acreage once more declined, owing to the shift to grains.

4/ Bureau des documentations syriennes et Arabes, Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien (Damascus, 25 November 1952, mimeographed).

5/ Yields per hectare rose from 221 kilogrammes in 1951 to 243 in 1952, 363 in 1953 and 389 in 1954.

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Table 50. Syria: Area and Production of Principal Crops, 1934-38, 1945, 1950 and 1952 to 1954

Crop	1934-38	1945	1950	1952	1953	1954
Area (thousands of hectares):						
Wheat	473	750	952	1,167	1,314	1,334
Barley	275	348	416	357	438	544
Olives a/	6 b/	9	9	9	10	...
Grapes	42	56	68	68	70	...
Cotton	32	18	78	189	128	187
Rice	1	7	7	3	5	10
Vegetables	...	...	19 c/	21 d/	22 e/	...
Industrial crops f/	...	...	12 c/	15 d/	15 e/	...
Production (thousands of metric tons):						
Wheat	459	415	830	900	870	800
Barley	290	248	322	467	472	561
Olives g/	5	17	4	7	11	...
Grapes	170	169	245	167	243	...
Cotton	6	4	36	45	47	73
Rice	3	15	24	5	16	25

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics (Rome); Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria (Damascus, 1953); Ministry of Finance, Budget Note, 1955.

a/ Millions of trees.

b/ Average of 1937-38.

c/ 1950/51.

d/ 1951/52.

e/ 1952/53

f/ Excluding cotton.

g/ Thousands of metric tons of olive oil.

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472 241 433 The extension of cereal and cotton cultivation has been carried out by private enterprise. Most of the initial capital was provided by landlords, but merchants and banks soon started financing the crops; in 1951 it was estimated that some £S 200 million to £S 300 million had been required to finance the planting and moving of the cotton crop, of which all but £S 50 million came from outside agriculture. In recent years, the volume of advances granted and bills discounted by the principal banks rose by about £S 50 million between the seasonal low of July or August and the peak of the cotton season, in November. But the bulk of the capital needs are still supplied by non-banking sources. Private initiative also set up the 31 saw gins and 1,767 smaller gins which were operating in 1952 and which can handle about 300,000 tons of unginned cotton. It has been responsible for the introduction of the various types of American cotton seeds, of which the most widely used is the Lone Star variety, which produces cotton very similar to Egyptian Ashmuni. Private enterprise also took the lead in utilizing chemical fertilizers, imports of which increased from a negligible amount in 1950 to 5,000 tons in 1952, 11,000 in 1953 and 13,000 tons in the first nine months of 1954.

Another field in which private initiative has taken the lead is that of beet growing. The sugar refining company extended advances to growers, supplied them with free seeds and instruction, sold them fertilizers and offered them high prices for their output. By 1953, as a result, 4,500 hectares had been planted to beets, giving a crop of 60,000 tons; 1/ a crop of 80,000 tons was anticipated for 1954. 2/

654 241 The Government has rendered valuable assistance to agriculture, especially to cotton growers. Following the very poor crop of 1951, when over-extension and pests combined to reduce cotton yields sharply, a Cotton Office was established in January 1952. On its staff it had Egyptian experts recruited directly by the Government or sent by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Several decree laws of 1952 fixed cotton acreage and subjected its cultivation to Government authorization; they limited the number of authorized varieties to six and forbade the mixing of varieties; regulated ginning, in order to disinfect, select and classify seeds; made obligatory the spraying of cotton plants with pesticides, which in case of negligence is to be carried out by the Government at the farmer's expense; set minimum standards and established grades for the classification of cotton. 3/ In 1953, the Government forbade the use of seeds not

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1/ Average yield of irrigated land is two to three tons per hectare, and of non-irrigated, 0.5 to 0.75.

2/ Information supplied by Ministry of National Economy. Output of fruits and vegetables has also increased in recent years, but little progress has been made in livestock breeding. An estimate of agricultural income in 1953 put the value of the wheat crop at £S 305 million (a figure based on an estimated production of 1,355,000 tons against a final estimate of 870,000 tons); of barley at £S 7 million; of cotton at £S 121 million; and of other crops at £S 200 million, giving a total of £S 633 million. Livestock and livestock products were put at £S 240 million (La Syrie économique, 1953).

3/ Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien.

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purchased from the Agricultural Bank. There is no doubt that these measures have helped to raise cotton yields and quality. 654 241

Some help has also been given to growers of cereals, by the importing and sale at half price of seed wheat from France and Italy; 1,300 tons were imported in 1953. The Government has set up five experiment stations, for fruits, cereals and cotton, has expanded agricultural education and has begun extension work among farmers.

The Government has also helped growers financially, by purchasing spraying equipment and pesticides, reselling them to farmers and advancing loans for the purchase of pesticides. The capital of the Agricultural Bank was raised from £S 5.8 million in 1940 to £S 7.2 million in 1945, and £S 21.6 million in 1953. Loans advanced by it increased from £S 268,000 in 1940 to £S 1.6 million in 1945, and £S 12.5 million in 1953. In 1953, the number of borrowers was 20,300 and the recovery rate was 93 per cent. The bank also made loans in kind - cotton and rice seeds, spraying equipment, pesticides, tractors, ploughs and pumps. 1/

On the other hand, some government measures concerning marketing and exports have had adverse effects on growers. The Cereals Office's attempt to collect grain for the use of the urban population, at below market prices during the winter of 1951/52, following a very poor crop, led to hoarding, and wheat had to be imported at high prices. In 1952, the Government ordered growers to deliver to the Cereals Office one ton of wheat, at £S 250, for every two tons exported; this led to a rise in the export price to above the world level, hampering exports. In 1953, this arrangement was replaced by a lower export tax on wheat and barley. It would appear that these taxes were borne by growers, not by merchants or foreign consumers, and hence that they constituted a subsidy from rural areas to the towns. With the fall in world prices of wheat, the Government abolished the taxes in May 1954. Similarly, it would seem as though the tax on cotton exports introduced in 1952 has been shifted to growers. 656

Industry

The rapid post-war industrial growth was chiefly due to private initiative but much government protection and some financial assistance were required by several industries. Most of the new capital was provided by merchants, but there was also an appreciable amount of reinvestment of industrial profits. 433 472

1/ Statistical Abstract and La Syrie économique, 1953. In 1953, the bank was authorized to make loans against warehouse receipts issued by the Cereals Office for barley and wheat delivered to it. A rate of 6 per cent is charged on these and all other loans.

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433 No over-all figures on the increase of capital, output or employment are available, but the following data are indicative. Between 1945 and 1953,
472 inclusive, a total of £S 70.7 million was invested in thirty-seven industrial joint-stock companies; of this £S 53.1 million was invested in 1945 and 1946. 1/
454 A considerable amount was also invested in unincorporated enterprises. Sales of electricity to industry increased from 15 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 28 million in 1951, 36 million in 1953 and 19 million during the first half of 1954. Imports of industrial machinery and equipment amounted to 9,100 tons in 1950, 19,500 in 1951, 10,800 in 1952 and 12,000 tons in 1953, with an aggregate value of £S 200 million. 2/ Table 51 shows available information on the principal Syrian industries.

433 The textile industry is by far the most important, as regards capital
288 invested, employment and value of output. The rapid expansion of cotton growing led to an increase in the number of cotton ginneries, from thirty in 1945 to 110 in 1953. Cotton spinning began in 1933; by 1939 there were 10,000 spindles and by 1954 some 92,000 with a capacity of 12,000 tons of cotton and rayon yarn. Output of cotton yarn rose from 1,700 tons in 1944 to 5,500 in 1950 and 6,600 tons in 1953; that of rayon yarn from 800 in 1950 to 1,200 in 1953; there was a further increase in 1954. Small factories also produce 40 tons of woollen yarn and 16 tons of silk yarn. Mechanical looms increased from 1,500 in 1939 to 5,500 in 1953; there are also 6,000 hand looms. Output of cloth, knitted goods and hosiery is shown in table 51. Dyeing and printing are done in well equipped factories established after the Second World War. The textile industry meets local requirements in most branches and provides an export surplus.

433 Food processing industries form the next most important group. A large-scale
258 sugar refinery started production in 1950, on imported raw sugar; its output rose to 30,000 tons in 1953, of which 23,000 were from imported raw sugar and 7,000 from locally grown beets; output in 1954 was about 38,000 tons. It also produces 1,000 tons of alcohol and some starch glucose as a by-product. The refinery, which fully meets Syria's demand, has not yet reached its full capacity. The vegetable oil industry produces, by means of modern presses established after the war as well as older hand presses, some 7,000 to 12,000 tons of olive oil, about 6,000 to 8,000 tons of cotton-seed oil and some 2,000 to 4,000 tons of other oils. Other important food and beverage industries include the making of biscuits
655 and macaroni, oleomargarine, confectionery and chocolates, and also brewing and canning. The tobacco industry is a State monopoly. 3/

1/ Of the total, £S 23 million was accounted for by six textile companies, 13.4 million by four food processing companies, 10.5 million by three vegetable oil and soap companies, 9.0 million by a cement and building materials company, 8.0 million by a glass and porcelain company, 3.3 million by seventeen electric power companies and 3.5 million by five other companies.

2/ Data from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ The Government took over the tobacco monopoly from a concessionary company in 1951, paying £S 2.5 million as compensation.

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Table 51. Syria: Number of Establishments, Capital, Employment and Output in Principal Industries, 1953

Industry or product	Number of establishments	Capital (millions of Syrian pounds)	Number employed	Output (thousands of tons, unless otherwise stated)
Cotton ginning	110	15	2,600	48.0
Cotton and silk spinning and weaving	586 a/	46 a/	7,700 a/	7.8 yarn 16.0 cloth
Wool spinning and weaving	3	2	100	100.0 b/
Knit goods	150	2 c/	1,000	3.0 d/
Hosiery	70	5	900	15.0 e/
Vegetable oils	407	25	2,800	10.0
Sugar milling and refining	1	12	800	30.0
Confectionery	140	2	800	0.9
Food canning	3	4	300	3.0
Macaroni	4	1	...	0.5
Biscuits	11	1	...	0.5
Tobacco	1	2.5 f/	1,900	2.7
Soap	59	10	600	10.0
Tanning	75	2	2,700	2.7 4.9 g/
Rubber shoes	4	1	300	300.0 h/
Glass	13 i/	8	400	5.5
Cement	2	15	650	224.0
Matches	7	2	300	340.0 j/
Electric power	60	...	1,100	114.0 k/
Total	1,706 l/	155.5 m/	24,950 n/	

Source: Ministry of Finance, Al iqtisad al Suri (Damascus, 1953); Etude sur la Syrie économique (Damascus, 1953); Ministry of National Economy.

a/ 1951; excluding 6,000 hand-weaving establishments.
b/ Thousands of metres.
c/ Damascus province only.
d/ Millions of pieces.
e/ Millions of units.
f/ Compensation paid by Government to concessionary company.
g/ Millions of square feet of leather.
h/ Thousands of pairs.
i/ One mechanical factory and twelve hand workshops.
j/ Thousands of gross.
k/ Millions of kilowatt-hours.
l/ Excluding hand-weaving.
m/ Excluding hand-weaving and electricity.
n/ Excluding hand-weaving and making of biscuits and macaroni.

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433 The building industry expanded considerably during the post-war period.
339 Authorized floor space in new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square
323 metres in 1945, to 209,000 in 1950 and 265,000 in 1953. Output of cement rose correspondingly, from 35,000 tons in 1945 to 68,000 in 1950, 224,000 in 1953 and 114,000 tons during the first half of 1954. This fully meets local demand. A glass factory, with a capacity of 10,000 tons, established in the post-war period, reached a maximum production of 5,500 tons in 1954; it exports small amounts to neighbouring countries.

377 Output of electricity showed little increase during the war, but after the
471 war demand rose rapidly. The inability of the foreign concessionary companies operating in Damascus and Aleppo to expand capacity sufficiently fast led the
433 Government, in 1951, to nationalize them, for compensation, and to instal additional equipment; 1/ in 1954, the Homs-Hama electricity company was also nationalized. Output by public utilities has risen considerably in recent years, from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 81 million in 1950, 114 million in 1953 and 80 million in the first eight months of 1954; output by industrial power plants is probably over 40 million kilowatt-hours per annum.

433 Other important industries include tanning, and the making of matches, cardboard, soap, nails, pins and plastics.

433 Government assistance to industry has taken four main forms: tariff
656 protection, tax exemption, financial aid and regulation of standards and prices. In the early post-war years foreign competition weighed heavily on the Syrian market. The ending of the customs union with Lebanon in 1950 (see below) led to a decrease in competition in some industries, notably spinning; but other industries, such as weaving and canning, which marketed a substantial proportion of their output in Lebanon, suffered. In recent years, protection has been greatly increased by the raising of customs duties on competing goods 2/ or by prohibiting the importing of such goods: among the prohibited articles were matches, soap, shoes, socks and stockings, glass products, canned fruits and vegetables, wooden furniture and alcoholic drinks. These measures seem to have greatly decreased foreign competition; nevertheless, in recent years, prices of local manufactures have tended to decline. 3/

1/ Between the autumn of 1951 and the end of 1953, a total capacity of 6,450 kilowatts was installed in Damascus (Al Manar, special issue on Syrian industry, Damascus 1954); a total of £S 9.5 million was advanced by the Government to the nationalized firms for expansion and improvements. At the end of 1953, the total capacity of public utilities was 34,000 kilowatts and that of industrial power plants was over 20,000 kilowatts. Two plants with a capacity of 17,000 kilowatts were scheduled for completion at the end of 1954.

2/ For example, in 1952, duties on several types of woollen and cotton goods were raised by 25 to 50 per cent.

3/ The index of wholesale prices of domestic industrial products rose from 93 in 1950 (1949 = 100) to 111 in 1951, but declined to 103 in 1952, 88 in 1953 and 79 in the first nine months of 1954.

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Other measures for the protection and encouragement of industry were taken in September 1952, when new enterprises were exempted from customs duties on machinery and building materials; from property taxes on factory, offices and workers' houses for six years; from income tax on 10 per cent of reinvested profits; and from "tamattu" tax for six years. More direct assistance was provided through loans. In 1949, the Government advanced £S 16.9 million, for a period of three years, to nine industrial companies. In 1952, the loans were extended for another five years, and at the end of 1953 all but £S 220,000 were still outstanding. 1/ Another loan of £S 10 million was advanced to an electricity company.

As a counterpart to the assistance given by it, the Government has increasingly sought to regulate industrial activity. In 1952, the establishment of new factories, or expansion of existing ones, was made conditional on authorization from the Ministry of Economics, which was to be given only if the project were judged both viable and useful to the country's economy. All existing enterprises were also required to register with the Ministry. In 1953, minimum standards were set in the mechanical weaving, underwear, tile, confectionery, tanning, shoe, hosiery and match industries. The Government also intervened in the cotton spinning industry in 1951 and in the vegetable oil and cement industries in 1953 in order to prevent disproportionate rises in prices.

These various measures have been responsible for the survival of some of the newly established industries. Another important factor has been the rise in consumer purchasing power due to the increase in agricultural income. 2 It is unlikely that Syrian industry will be able to dispense with government assistance in the near future, and its further growth will continue to depend on agricultural development.

Foreign trade and balance of payments

The outstanding event in the field of foreign trade during the post-war period was the dissolution of the customs union between Lebanon and Syria. Termination of the French Mandate had not loosened the economic ties binding Lebanon and Syria. The customs union between them continued in force. Notes issued by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban circulated freely, at par, in both

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1/ Etude sur la Syrie économique, 1953.

2 The poor grain crops and low cotton prices of 1951 had very unfavourable effects on industry.

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Other projects

Industrial development is being left to private enterprise, but since August 1952 the establishment of new factories or expansion of existing ones has been subject to authorization by the Government. Between 7 August 1952 and the end of June 1954, applications were made for establishing 158 new factories and enlarging 332 existing factories; these projects represented an estimated capital investment of £S 66.4 million and the employment of 6,314 workers. Textiles were by far the most important group, with an investment of £S 42.7 million, followed by paper and cardboard with £S 6.5 million and cement £S 5.2 million. 1/

Mention may be made of the most important achievements and projects in the field of transport. Between 1945 and 1952, inclusive, £S 45.4 million were spent on roads and bridges, £S 7.3 million on railways, £S 4.8 million on airports and £S 33 million on installing an automatic telephone system. The total length of roads increased from 6,694 kilometres in 1944 to 10,028 in 1953, while that of asphalted roads increased from 1,498 to 2,584 kilometres. 2/ The number of telephones rose from 3,000 in 1945 to 33,000 in 1954. 3/ The most important project under way is the enlargement of Latakia harbour. Between 1945 and 1952, £S 9 million were spent on minor improvements, and in 1952 a contract for £S 26.8 million was awarded to a Yugoslav firm for the building of a large harbour; completion is scheduled for 1956. 4/ It is estimated that an additional investment of £S 16 million will be required for warehouses, equipment, tugboats and other items. The volume of merchandise through Latakia has greatly increased, from 11,000 tons in 1945 to 837,000 in 1954. Other projects under study include 600 kilometres of roads in El Jezira, at an approximate cost of £S 45 million, a 200-kilometre railway from Aleppo to Latakia, and improvement of the Hejaz railway, in co-operation with the Governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

1/ Ministry of National Economy.

2/ Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953.

3/ Le Commerce du Levant, 15 August 1954.

4/ The Latakia project is being carried out by a corporation which was established in 1950, 90 per cent of the capital of which was subscribed by the Government. In December 1954 its capital was raised from £S 24 million to £S 54 million (Le Commerce du Levant, 18 December 1954).

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M O 1

mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

was officially estimated at 509,000 hectares as compared with 284,000 in 1946. The resulting rise in the value of agricultural production was particularly marked, since with irrigation more valuable summer crops could

TABLE 3 Indicators of Economic Growth

	Prewar	1945	1947	1950	1953
Agriculture					
Cultivated area (million ha.)	1.76	2.29	—	3.09	3.67
Cropped area (million ha.)	1.16	1.51	—	2.05	2.44
Wheat					
Area (thousand ha.)	473[a]	751	843	992	1,314
Output (thousand MT)	459[a]	415	404	861[b]	962[b]
Barley					
Area (thousand ha.)	279[a]	384	365	416	428
Output (thousand MT)	290[a]	248	169	322	472
Cotton					
Area (thousand ha.)	30[a]	17.5	19.3	78.0	136.6
Output (thousand MT, ginned)	5.4[a]	4.3	5.4	35.5	47.0
Agricultural production tax (million £S)[c]	—	—	9.1	16.2	22.4
Industry—Output					
Cotton and rayon yarn (thousand MT)	1	—	—	—	9–10
Cotton and rayon cloth (million meters)	15	—	—	—	ca.100
Vegetable oils, excluding olive (thousand MT)	(negligible)	—	—	—	ca.10,000
Soap (thousand MT)	3.4	—	—	—	8.9
Fruit and vegetable preserves (thousand MT)	1.8	—	—	—	4
Cement (thousand MT)	less than 75	—	—	—	224
Matches (million boxes)	11	—	—	—	32.2
Cigarettes (MT)	416	—	—	—	1,644
Electricity (million KWH; principal utilities)	25.1	—	—	—	114.2
Financial					
Government receipts (million £S)[d]	11.5	118.3	116.2	138.9	216.7
Notes and coins in circulation (million £S)[d]	19.9	210.7	183.2	224.6	288.4
National income (million £S)	—	—	—	1,380	1,600

[a] 1934–38 average. The production figures for wheat and barley may well be somewhat overestimated.

[b] Official production figures have been revised upward in the light of the amounts marketed as revealed by the agricultural production tax returns.

[c] The proceeds of this tax, levied on produce brought to market, tend to exaggerate the rate of increase in production, but are nonetheless a good indication of trends in output.

[d] Figures are not deflated for price increases. While a reliable price index is lacking, the price level in the period 1950–53 was probably between five and seven times as high as that before the war.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

be grown. Thus with the stimulus originally imparted by the Korean war boom, cotton, which had long been grown in Syria but on a small scale, has developed into one of the country's most valuable crops.

Manufacturing has expanded rapidly in the postwar period. Although the original impulse was given by the wartime shortage of manufactured goods, new factories were not for the most part established until after the war. Among the new modern factories built since then are six spinning and weaving mills, a considerable number of cotton ginneries, a dyeing plant, six vegetable oil mills, a glass factory, a cement plant and a sugar factory. The total amount of paid-up capital of manufacturing enterprises established in corporate form since the end of the war is in the neighborhood of £S 80 million. Since enterprises generally refuse to disclose their output, statistical measurement of the increase in production is extremely difficult. Very rough estimates indicate that about 9,000-10,000 metric tons of cotton and rayon yarn were produced in 1953 as compared with probably less than 1,000 tons in prewar years. The output of cloth was about 14,000 to 16,000 tons, or more than 100 million meters, as compared with perhaps 15 million meters before the war. The production of vegetable oils (other than olive oil), which was negligible before the war, amounted to around 10,000 tons, and the output of soap, at a level of about 9,000 tons, was almost three times the prewar estimate. Cement production, which was less than 75,000 tons before the war, amounted to 223,639 tons in 1953. The output of cigarettes was about four times, and that of matches three times, that of prewar years.

The expansion of agriculture and industry has in turn stimulated commerce, transport and construction. The construction industry in particular has witnessed a postwar boom which lifted the volume of building to a level probably twice as high as that in the years immediately preceding the war. Increasing prosperity, together with the wartime drop in building, generated a large volume of housing construction in all major cities.

The increase in national income since before the war has undoubtedly been very great; in real terms it may well be almost double. Unfortunately the fragmentary nature and unreliability of statistical data make even approximate estimates of national income extremely difficult. For the postwar years an unofficial estimate has been made only for 1950, when national income was put at £S 1,250 million. Some very tentative calculations made by the mission indicate that this estimate may well be too conservative. These calculations point to a rise in national income from

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD I

about £S 1,250 million in 1949 and £S 1,380 million in 1950 to perhaps around £S 1,600 million in 1953. Over the whole period this would indicate an increase of about 28%. Since prices in 1953 were about the same as in 1949, the rise in real terms was apparently about the same. While these estimates, based on very inadequate data, are subject to a rather wide margin of error, it is not unlikely that real national income has been rising on the average at an annual rate of 5% to 6%.

Volume of Investment

The expansion of economic activity in the postwar period has entailed a rather high level of investment (see Table 4). While accurate data are not available, the mission has made some rough estimates of gross investment in construction on the basis of building permits and building costs, and of equipment investment on the basis of imports of machinery, equipment and motor trucks. The indicated annual volume of gross private investment has apparently fluctuated between £S 160 million

TABLE 4 Gross Investment

(Million £S)

	1950	1951	1952	1953
Private investment				
Construction (housing, industrial, commercial)	122.0	116.0	127.0	138.0
Industrial machinery	20.0	33.0	28.0	30.3
Agricultural machinery	10.7	35.6	17.3	14.3
Truck transport	8.7	11.0	4.4	2.8
Sub-total	161.4	195.6	176.7	185.4
Public investment				
Irrigation	0.8	0.8	0.8	3.1
Transport and communications	8.1	8.7	6.4	10.1
Education and public health	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.9
Municipal services	12.5	17.1	17.3	22.2
Other construction, including administration buildings	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5
Sub-total	25.8	31.0	28.9	39.8
Total gross investment	187.2	226.6	205.6	225.2

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

433 provision made for gradual reduction of the duties. At the same time we
654 suggest that the whole tariff schedule be re-examined. By and large it
651 cannot be said that the general level of tariffs is excessively high, particu-
457 larly since ad valorem rates are levied on imports valued at the official rate of exchange, and this entails an undervaluation of about 40% compared to the actual exchange rate. In fact, we recommend elsewhere that tariff rates be assessed on the basis of actual foreign exchange rates for the purpose of increasing government revenues. This should not be construed, however, as a proposal to raise all tariffs irrespective of their nature. On the contrary, we would suggest that, as part of the general revision of the schedule, those rates which are primarily protective in character should as far as possible be reduced for the purpose of encouraging outside competition and lowering prices. If necessary, such reductions could be graduated over a period of time.

434 *Possibilities of a Larger Market*
1.49

The expansion and, above all, the diversification of industrial output in Syria is restricted by the rather small domestic market. In a country of only 3.6 million people with low purchasing power it is generally possible to manufacture only a limited range of articles which are used widely enough to warrant production on an economic scale. Broader industrial opportunities are likely to emerge only if a larger market is initially available. In the case of Syria it should be possible to establish such a market in cooperation with other Arab countries, all of which suffer from a similar handicap in the development of their industries. Over recent years the Arab countries have increasingly stressed their community of interest and the need for closer cooperation. The field of industrial development offers a particularly challenging opportunity for common endeavor. We do not suggest, of course, that the types of industrial enterprises to be developed by each country should be the subject of joint government decision. There should be consultation in cases where particular ventures are to be launched with special government assistance. In the main, however, the location and development of industry should be decided by the free play of competitive forces operating in a larger, common Arab market.

To a limited extent the Arab countries have already taken steps to develop such a market. Syria has concluded bilateral agreements with Lebanon and Jordan which free certain products from import restrictions

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and provide for a number of reciprocal tariff reductions and even exemptions, and has been considering the renewal in some form of the close economic ties with Lebanon which prevailed before 1950. All the Arab countries joined in 1953 in an Inter-Arab Economic Agreement providing for tariff reductions on a considerable number of industrial products without, however, affecting other barriers to trade.

The establishment of a common Arab market will undoubtedly take time. The history of the Benelux economic union demonstrates that it can only be achieved gradually and then only if there is a full understanding among the partners of each other's problems and a willingness to make concessions and sacrifices. A single market cannot be established simply by a progressive elimination of trade barriers; it entails also a gradual coordination of those economic policies and measures which govern the conditions under which enterprise in the various countries operates. To bring national cost and price structures into line with each other and to equalize the conditions of competition, it will be necessary to harmonize, step by step, fiscal, monetary and exchange policies, the terms governing access to raw materials and equipment and the legislation regulating labor conditions and providing assistance to industry. If this can be accomplished, the possibilities of further industrial development in the Arab world are likely to be significantly greater.

Establishment of an Investment Bank

The mission attaches great importance to the establishment of an institution capable of furnishing both technical and financial assistance to industry. When industrialists have insufficient capital for investment at present, they can turn only to the government; the banks provide only working capital. As already indicated, the government began in 1949 to guarantee loans for this purpose through the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. During the period June 1949-January 1952, 18 such loans totaling £S 23.6 million were made, although by the end of 1953 repayments had reduced the balance to £S 13.4 million. This guaranteed-loan scheme was suspended in 1952 but revived at the beginning of 1954, subject to a limitation of £S 15 million on the entire amount outstanding.

For a number of reasons we believe that this method of financial assistance ought to be abandoned. Although the interest rate of 3% which has been made possible only because of the government guarantee and the

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Profitability

The profitability of Syria's industry varies widely from one industry to another and in some cases even within an industry. Differences in the quality of management may produce a marked variation in profits. 433 434

Some indication of profits is given below. Generally the data have been obtained from profit and loss statements which are not always clear. Profits are defined as earnings after taxes but before deductions for assignment to compulsory reserves and allocations to the boards of directors.

The cement industry is by far the most profitable in Syria. Quoted prices of shares of the two cement companies increased by about 100% between 1951 and 1953. The Aleppo company earned 25% on its paid-in capital during 1952, the first full year of operation. Profits earned by the Damascus company amounted to 22% on paid-in capital in 1950, 34% in 1951 and 48% in 1952. In 1953 it was able to increase its capitalization from £S 6 million to £S 9 million out of accumulated profits.

In the textile industry (spinning and weaving), profits have varied widely. One of the more successful firms in Damascus earned 9.3%, 17.7% and 22.9% on its paid-in capital in 1950, 1951 and 1952 respectively. One of the largest Aleppo companies earned about 30% on its paid-in capital in 1950 and 1951 and a little over 12% in 1952. On the other hand, another large Aleppo company suffered consistent losses amounting to a total of £S 1,826,550 in the years 1949-52 inclusive, while a third Aleppo company of more moderate size was liquidated in 1953 after losses totaling £S 911,233 in 1951 and 1952.

The hosiery industry appears to be doing well, one concern having earned about 20% on its paid-in capital in 1953. Little is known, however, about the profitability of this branch of industry in general.

The clothing industry (suitings, underwear, shirts, pyjamas, etc.) appears to be moderately profitable.

Profits data for the canning industry are also largely lacking. One company in Damascus earned 13.8% on its paid-in capital in 1952. Another, also in Damascus, apparently had profits of less than 3% in 1953.

The sugar company at Homs has earned modest profits in recent years. After initial losses in 1949 and 1950, the company earned about 3% and 6% on paid-in capital in 1951 and 1952 respectively. Presumably profits continued to increase substantially in 1953.

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The vegetable oils and soap industries have not generally been very profitable. One of the larger Damascus companies had substantial losses in 1949 and 1952. In 1950 and 1951, however, it earned 20% and 30% on its paid-in capital. One of the more important companies in Aleppo apparently barely broke even in 1951 and 1952 and suffered severe losses in 1953, so that it was reported to have gone into liquidation in 1954. A new Aleppo company which started operating in 1952 apparently has been somewhat more successful to date.

The large glass factory near Damascus earned profits of about £S 200,000 on £S 7 million paid-in capital in both 1952 and 1953. Prior to these years of modest profits it consistently suffered losses except for the year 1950 when it showed a net profit of £S 183,140.

On the profitability of tanneries there is little information, although one evidently earned almost 7% in 1952 and 14% in 1953 on its paid-in capital.

The rubber shoe industry is apparently highly profitable, if one can judge from the data available on one company which earned almost 55% on its paid-in capital in 1952, and approximately 85% in 1953.

The match industry is suffering from overcapacity and, owing to keen competition, seems to have made little profit in recent years.

For other industries, such as milling, beverage, paints, etc., no information is available on profits.

III GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

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The relations between government and industry in Syria will be discussed under the following headings: (1) tariff policy and embargoes, (2) credit facilities, (3) fiscal privileges, and (4) other controls and incentives.

Tariff Policy and Embargoes

Syria achieved customs autonomy for the first time in recent centuries in March 1950, with the termination of the Customs Union with Lebanon. As a natural consequence, each country began to apply its normal tariffs to imports from its former partner. Only a few days later, the Syrian tariff on imports of certain foreign products which competed with local industry

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
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241 Wheat yields are lower than the average for Syria, averaging 4 hundredweight to the acre.

Almost the whole of the estate is let to share-tenants who are
427 supervised by an agent, the landowners themselves rarely visiting the estate. The share of the crop taken by the landlord is 25 per cent on non-irrigated land and 42½ per cent on irrigated land. These shares are more favourable to the tenant than is usual, because it is desired to attract more labour to the estate which sixty years ago was quite uncultivated. As elsewhere, the tenants have no leases but live in fear of eviction.

The tenants are divided into five classes:[1]

1. Large tenants cultivating 6 feddans (225 acres) of non-irrigated land: 4 in number.

2. Medium sized tenants cultivating 4½ feddans (168¾ acres): 4 in number.

3. Small tenants cultivating 3 feddans (112½ acres): 60 in number.

4. Small tenants cultivating irrigated land and with an average area of 18 acres: 100 in number.

[464] 5. Wage labourers, who form the majority of the villagers.

434 Of these classes, only the small groups of large and medium-
454 sized tenants can live well, in the sense that the output of the
√11 farm suffices to cover the essential needs of the family and also provides a small cash surplus. The surplus is used to buy gold pounds and jewellery. But the other groups cannot achieve even a sufficient standard of food consumption. The standard consumption of wheat (barley in the case of the very poor peasants) is 14 kilogrammes of grain per month; to achieve this level it is necessary to crop about 45 acres. Thus with the present system of cultivation, the class of small tenants, who cultivate an area of 112 acres and would appear to have quite sufficient land, cannot attain the minimum because only one-third, 35 acres, can be cultivated owing to shortage of live-stock.

√11 These small tenants, who are typical of the farmers in the
[342] great plains of Syria, are very poor, living in one- or two-roomed mud huts, and when there is only one room, sharing it with their animals.

[1] It must be said that the feddan in Syria is a variable measure and here is equivalent to 37½ acres.

511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

484 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
409 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie
427 has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis, with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

i [The estate of Misherfe, near Homs -- Analyst]

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
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L 241 irrigated. The whole of the land is cultivated every year, the rotation being wheat followed by potatoes, the potato crop being irrigated. The wheat yield is below the average for Syria, amounting to 6 hundredweight per acre, and the potato yield is 5 hundredweight per acre.

L 511 However, in spite of the greater intensity of cultivation, the shortage of land means that the majority of the peasants are not able to attain an adequate standard of living, measured in terms of a few essential commodities: 20 kilogrammes of wheat and 4 kilogrammes of meat per head per month, 100 kilogrammes of olive oil per annum, and 5 tins of kerosene. To attain this standard a family must own 3 hectares of land, and as only the rich peasants and a few of the medium peasants own so much, the majority of the medium peasants and the poor landless peasants do not achieve it. The majority of these supplement L 434 their income by remittances from their emigrant relations abroad. Those who have no income from abroad leave the village to work as unskilled workers or servants in the towns.

L 511 In this village, therefore, the cause of poverty is the shortage of land, since the land is much more equally distributed than in 342 Syria and the system fairly intensive. Living conditions are far better than in Syria: the majority inhabit stone houses with two 556 or more rooms. The richer peasants are also more sophisticated than those of Syria, preferring to gamble their money away in the neighbouring summer resorts rather than spend it on jewellery.

S L 434 241 From these three studies three conclusions emerge. The first is that a higher income per acre depends on irrigation, since the net income from irrigated land is two or three times as high as from non-irrigated land.

INCOME PER HECTARE ON IRRIGATED AND NON-IRRIGATED LAND (in Syrian Pounds)

	Ashrafie		*Misherfe*		*Kfer Sa'ab*
	Non-Irrigated	*Irrigated*	*Non-Irrigated*	*Irrigated*	*Half-Irrigated*
Gross Income ..	352	887	218	633	879
Costs	118	247	75	96	246
Rent	—	—	59	304	—
Net Income ..	234	640	84	233	633

[Kfer Sa'ab in the north Lebanon -- Analyst]

SYRIA MDI

Finance and public finance

453 652 454 The post-war period witnessed some important changes in Syria's monetary and banking system, in its foreign exchange system and in its public finances. The large increase in production, investment and commerce noted above had its counterpart in the development of the banking system 1/ and expansion of the money supply (see table 10), most of which has taken the form of bank deposits.

This expansion of the money supply in the post-war period has not been matched by a rise in prices. Between 1945 and 1949 the trend was downward. The discontinuance of Allied military expenditure, together with a sharp increase in the import of surplus, led to a sizable deficit on current account. 2/ Moreover, the 1945 and 1946 budgets showed a surplus, and although the 1947 and 1948 budgets closed with a deficit the amount involved was small. Investment remained at a low level. The Arab-Israeli war led to a large budget deficit in 1949; this was, however, offset by the very low level of investment and the huge import surplus. The index of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus fell from its peak of 831 in 1945 (1938 = 100) to 478 in 1949. 3/

435 [454 455] 434 During the period 1950 to 1954, on the other hand, prices rose. The large-scale investment in cotton, and the sharp increase in the quantity and value of exports of cotton and cereals, which led to a position approaching equilibrium in the balance of payments (see table 53), raised incomes. Subsidiary factors were pipeline construction, high building activity, 4/ and small budget deficits. The rise in import prices, aggravated by hoarding and speculation in 1950 and 1951, also played a part. The rise in prices remained, however, small in scale. The index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus, in which cotton has a heavy weight, rose from 100 in 1949 to 111 in 1950 and 136 in 1951; the fall in cotton prices led to a drop to 119 in 1952 and 110 in 1953. Improved cotton

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1/ Foreign banks account for the greater part of banking activities in Syria; in recent years several banks have opened branches in Syria and existing banks have set up new offices in the smaller towns. In the first half of 1954 seven new banks, mostly Syrian or Lebanese, were established, bringing the total to seventeen. The country is still, however, inadequately provided with long-term credit for agricultural and industrial development, a gap that has been only partly filled by the Government-owned Agricultural Bank and Government loans to industry (see above).

2/ It is difficult to distinguish between Syria's and Lebanon's shares in the trade of the customs union, but there is no doubt that Syria had a large import surplus. This was not covered by such receipts as revenue from petroleum companies and remittances sent by emigrants.

3/ Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract, 1953. There was no index of wholesale prices in Syria prior to 1949; the wholesale price index in Beirut fell from its peak of 1,038 in 1945 (1939 = 100) to 641 in 1949.

4/ Authorized floor space for new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945 to 166,000 in 1949, 209,000 in 1950, 162,000 in 1951, 210,000 in 1952 and 265,000 in 1953.

435 prices and greatly increased exports of grain in the first half of 1954, however,
434 once more raised incomes and prices and at the end of October the index stood at 129. 1/

Currency

457 Syria remained in the franc area until 1949. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, two important measures affecting both Lebanon and Syria were taken by the Mandatory Authorities. First, an Exchange Control was established, to which all foreign exchange earned by residents of both countries was to be paid; this included the sterling and other payments made by the Allied troops stationed in Lebanon and Syria. Secondly, the proportion of franc bills and bonds held as cover against the notes issued by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban and its deposits increased sharply until, by the end of the war, it came to constitute over 95 per cent of their combined total 2/ However, from May 1943 until March 1946 sterling was made available in unlimited quantities to residents of both countries; and in 1944 the value of the franc holdings of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban was guaranteed against any depreciation of the franc in terms of sterling.

In the post-war period the inability of France to supply more than a small fraction of the non-franc foreign exchange requirements of Lebanon and Syria, together with its repudiation of its guarantee of the sterling value of their franc balances, 3/ caused the Syrian Government to take steps to establish an independent currency.

In February 1949 it left the franc area, and simultaneously an agreement was reached with France regarding the Syrian franc reserves held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. These holdings, which amounted to 10,204 million francs on 24 January 1948, were divided into two parts. The first, consisting of 7,015 million francs, used as cover for the note issue, was guaranteed in terms of sterling by the French Government for a period of ten years, starting in January 1948. Provision was also made for releasing this sum to Syria, in fourteen semi-annual instalments, by 1955. The balance of Syria's holdings, consisting of 3,189 million francs, was not guaranteed in terms of any other currency. After deduction of French claims on Syria, aggregating £S 23.2 million for property left in that country, the balance was to be deposited in a special temporary account, to be used for purchase of European currencies other than the franc, at the French official rates.

1/ United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. The retail price index shows the same general movement, with a lag. It remained unchanged at 1950, at 478, rose to 556 and 594 in 1951 and 1952, respectively, fell to 544 in 1953, and continued to decline during the first half of 1954, standing at 482 in June.

2/ Said Himadeh, "Tatawurat al naqd al suri al lubnani", Al Abhath, September 1945 (Beirut).

3/ Said Himadeh, "Bawl nashru al ittifaqia al malia al jadida", Al Abhath, March 1948 (Beirut). The French Government did, however, pay to Lebanon and Syria the difference resulting from the depreciation of the franc in December 1945.

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Table 5

A - Index of wholesale Prices in Damascus [1]

Year	Foodstuffs	Local Raw Materials	Local Manufactures	Building Materials	Fuel
1949 (Average)	100	100	100	100	100
1950 (Dec.)	95	140	108.3	107.3	83.2
1951 »	121.2	128.6	108.5	93.1	88.9
1952 »	120.9	111.1	95.3	96.5	88.3
1953 (Aug.)	101.5	104.5	87.1	87.6	79.4

B - Index of Retail Prices in Damascus

Year	Index No.
1938 (Average)	100
1945 (Dec.)	830.5
1946 »	766.1
1947 »	699.1
1948 »	662.1
1949 »	561.6
1950 »	477.9
1951 »	536.5
1952 »	632.1
1953 »	595.7
1953 (Aug.)	533.5

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C - Dollar Rates in the Damascus Free Market [2]

Year	Dollar Rate (in Syrian Piasters)
1945	(Market not free)
1949	350
1950	370
1951	383
1952	369
1953	357.5

1 Ministry of National Economy, Directorate of statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951 and 1952; Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, October, 1953.

2 Ministry of Finance, Exchange Office, *The First Annual Report on the Activities of the Exchange Office*, tables 1 and 2, Damascus, 1953.

165 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i. e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 469 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

operation of world trade in a way that has always worked to the detriment of the farmer. The Government has adopted and persists in the view that the farmers as a class are alone responsible for feeding the town population at reduced prices. The Government and its organizations like the O. C. P. and later the Mira have always forced the farmers to hand over large quantities of wheat at prices below the market level. Even the present Grains Office is doing the same thing in a different way. It stipulates that exporters of wheat should deliver to the Office half the quantity exported at 23 piasters per kilo in Aleppo, i. e., at a rate 25% cheaper than the market price. This reflects in the end on the price paid by the merchant to the farmer. This unjust imposition of the Office is in fact borne by the farmer and not by the merchant. If the Government feels its responsibility for the provision of enough wheat for the population at reduced prices, the burden should be shared by all tax-payers without distinction. The farmer should get the full market price and the deficit should be covered from the general tax receipts. This solution, while freeing the farmer from a chronic injustice, is not the answer to the price problems. Since the Grains Office has become a permanent institution, the farmer needs to know as far in advance as practicable what prices he is to expect for his crops. The major function of the Office should be not to devise means for collecting wheat from the farmer at reduced prices, nor to provide revenue for the Government by creating a monopoly of wheat export, but to stabilize prices and guard the farmer against sharp fluctuations from one year to another. This it must do by announcing its readiness to buy wheat at fixed prices for the next two crops, at least without claiming a monopoly. That is, the farmer should be guaranteed a minimum price for his next two crops and left to profit from free prices if the market situation allows it.

A concrete example of how Government policy is reducing the prices for the farmer, is the new decree authorizing the export of 200,000 tons of wheat against delivery of 100,000 tons to the Grains Office at LS 230 in Aleppo.

The exporter will proceed to do his account, in the following manner. The price paid by Italy is said to be $98 which amounts to LS 350. For three tons of wheat of which two are exported and one delivered to the Grains Office, the merchant will receive LS 930 or an average of LS 310 per ton. In order to make a profit of

435 15 percent he must buy his wheat at the port of export for LS 203-5.
656 This means about LS 252 at Aleppo for the farmer of Jazirah. And this is the price at which the market is stabilized at present, while if this imposition did not exist the farmer would have sold his wheat for LS 300-350.

648 7. The discussion of prices brings about a consideration of mar-
489 kets for the surplus Syrian wheat. During the French Mandate, and up to March 1949, Syria and Lebanon formed one economic unit. The first independent regime under Shukri Quwatly, which lasted until the first coup d'etat in 1949, preserved this unity though some friction did exist between the two Governments. President Quwatly was emphatic about the necessity of this union. Then politicians mentioned tohim the alleged advantages which Lebanon had over Syria in the partnership, he invariably replied that the benefit from the partnership to the national Arab idea transcends in importance any material disadvantage resulting to Syria.

But aside from this political consideration, the union did present specific advantages to the Syrian farmer. Lebanon imports yearly about 80,000 tons of wheat. This is approximately one-third the quantity exported by Syria. Further, Lebanon had a customs duty of 50 per cent on foreign wheat other than Syrian. This meant that the Syrian farmer was assured a market for part of his crop at prices higher than world prices, besides selling Lebanon cheese, samneh, vegetables and fruit.

Whatever the economic advantages according to Syria in its new policy of separation from Lebanon, and they are highly doubtful, the Syrian farmer has lost a sure market.

In fact, the question of economic separation between Syria and Lebanon has never been examined as a purely economic propositon, but has always been mixed with considerations of national prestige and alleged Syrian economic subservience to Lebanon. This highly emotional language was designed to confuse the issue for the benefit of industrial groups, especially textile manufacturers who were crowded by Lebanese competition.

435 8. Another misconception shared by the Government and most
439 of the people is that Syrian prices of wheat should be governed by world prices. The fact is that Jazirah wheat can never normally

435 compete on world markets. The cost of production of wheat in the
439 Jazirah by machinery is much higher than the cost of production in the major producing countries of the world, such as Canada, the U. S. A. and Australia. Since the average annual export of wheat in Syria does not exceed 250-300 thousand tons, and it is Jazirah which produces this exportable surplus, the rest of Syria taking care of internal consumption, the costs of Jazirah production become the determining factors. Some causes of the higher cost of production in Jazirah have been mentioned above. . Others, such as the difficult transportation will be discussed later. But there is no doubt that unless the different defects controlling Jazirah agriculture are removed, and they can be removed by Government enlightened action, production will drop sharply when world prices decline as they might do if world tension is removed.

e. Two Types of Agriculture in Jazirah

241 It should be stated that two different methods of production prevail in Jazirah, cultivation by peasants using mules and cultivation by machinery.

1. Peasant cultivation accounts for perhaps 50-60 per cent of the crop, and machinery cultivation for the remainder. Both types suffer from some of the obstacles mentioned above, such as bad credit and transportation systems, bad seed, insecurity as to prices, and lack of agricultural guidance. But inspite of all, the peasant farmer will continue to plow his tract of land no matter how circumstances change because farming is his occupation and he knows no other. The crop he produces is enough for him and his family, and the surplus he sells to the Jazirah towns to feed the city people. The drop in prices will simply mean a lower standard of living for him and his family.

2. The cultivator by machinery suffers from causes in addition to those of the peasant. He is a capitalist who has invested his money in machinery, seeds, fuel and wages and he has to show a profit at the end of the year to pay for his investment and to live at a decent standard. His investment should give him returns comparable to other fields of endeavor, otherwise he will not continue in his present

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

area. The English merchants who passed through the hills in 1678 noted that Jebel Bil'as was "covered with Trees, which, for the most Part, were the small *Pistacho*'s which the *Arabs* pickle with Salt; but eaten green, are good to quench Thirst"; and in 1691 they ascended a ridge to the east of Jebel Bil'as where the tree cover is now sparse and found it "cover'd on both Sides with great plenty of Turpentine-Trees," which grew "very thick and shady," several of them "loaded with a vast Abundance of a small round Nut."[15]

In spring, when surface water is available and the pasture is excellent, the hills are full of flocks; and several hundred thousand sheep, together with some goats and camels, pasturing each year for about three months cause much damage. Bedouin and peasant shepherd families burn vegetation on the spot, and woodcutters from Selemiya and the villages cut large amounts of the valued slow-burning pistachio wood. Vegetation has been destroyed in these ways since prehistoric times, but at certain periods the process has been quickened. Between 1914 and 1918 the Turkish authorities took great quantities of wood as fuel for the railroads. Local notables say that within living memory trees extended beyond Aquerbat; that is, several miles into the country now cultivated and treeless. The westernmost range, Jebel Shomariye, has lost all its woods, and a ridge to the east, which was "overgrown in some places" with terebinth trees in 1908,[16] is today bare. A new danger to the soil of the hills has resulted from the high grain prices now prevailing, the growing population pressure in the region, and the tendency of Arab tribes to settle down to agriculture; for now increasing areas of land on the western fringe of the hills are being plowed.

Malaria control on the plain must clearly be accompanied by soil conservation in the hills, and, ideally, both should be part of a larger scheme of regional rehabilitation. Such a scheme would cover, among other matters, irrigation, malaria control, vegetation conservation, farming practices, and grazing rights. It would mean radical changes in the region; it would require a large capital outlay; and it would necessitate government action of a scale and vigor practically unknown in Syria. It is impossible to discuss here whether such a scheme would be economically justifiable, or possible within the present social and political framework. One can only emphasize that some such comprehensive action must eventually be taken if the problems of the region are to be solved.

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[15] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), pp. 132 and 143 [Miscellanea Curiosa, pp. 123 and 137–138].
[16] Alois Musil: Palmyrena, *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 4*, 1928, p. 44.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

656 435 A final comment must be made on price stabilization operations. At times in the past the government has intervened in the marketing of cereals in order to support the price or to protect the home market from the consequences of threatened shortages and excessive prices. Through the Cereals Office and its predecessor agencies it has engaged in buying and selling grain, and occasionally it has resorted to export prohibitions to safeguard domestic supplies. Under emergency conditions when the world supply of cereals is short, as in time of war or threat of war, such measures may be justified. Normally, however, it is better to allow the market forces free play. The history of government intervention in the market demonstrates that the government has often acted on the basis of information which subsequently proved erroneous in whole or in part. Frequently information on impending government measures has leaked out, giving windfall profits to privileged speculators. Above all, it is impossible in the long run to insulate the Syrian grain market from the world market. If there is a shortage in Syria and prices rise, some merchants will quickly seize the opportunity to import grain, and if world market prices decline, Syrian prices will inevitably have to follow if exports are not to be lost. On the whole it would be far better for the government to concentrate on the task of improving its crop statistics and to publish frequent and more reliable information on production and prices for the guidance of farmers and merchants. If emergency conditions arise, it will always be possible to authorize government intervention by special decree.

654 241 231 *Projected Expenditures*

We can now recapitulate the government expenditures in the field of agriculture and animal husbandry which are envisaged over the six years up to the end of 1960. Total projected outlays amount to around £S 336 million, or about £S 56 million per year. This represents a very substantial increase over expenditures in recent years which the mission has found difficult to ascertain but which probably have not averaged much more than £S 11 million a year.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

377 and administrative supervision of public utilities. Supervision ought to be
447 concentrated primarily on the utilities of the small towns and villages which are often substandard in their equipment and operation and are most in need of technical guidance in standardizing and improving their equipment. In addition to discharging its supervisory functions, the directorate should work out long-range plans, including a properly phased plan for the establishment of a power network which would be helpful in determining the location and size of power plants to be established in the future.

Electricity Rates[28]

365 As power production increases, there will no doubt be considerable
435 pressure to lower the rates now charged for electricity. The mission
655 encountered much complaint about their present level and structure. The rates charged for lighting in the principal cities do not, however, appear excessive by comparison with other countries. Electricity prices in the small towns and villages, on the other hand, are very high, but the generation of electricity by small diesel units and exclusively for lighting is inevitably rather expensive. The rates charged for electricity used as power are definitely higher than in many other countries. In Syria the power rates are often compared unfavorably with those in Lebanon in particular.

Nevertheless, the mission strongly advises against a general reduction of electricity rates over the next five or six years. An adequate supply of electricity is more important at this time than lower prices for electricity. The profits of the public utilities must be safeguarded so that the needed expansion program can be financed from their own resources. This is particularly true of the nationalized utilities of Damascus and Aleppo which have been earning considerable profits. With the anticipated increase in power generation and some reduction in costs of production, the mission anticipates that the net operating income of these utilities exclusive of depreciation allowances may reach a total of £S 60 million over the six-year period 1955-60. Most of this sum will be needed to finance expansion and pay the indemnities for nationalization. In this way the government will be able to conserve the resources derived from taxation and to borrow for other urgent requirements.

[28] See Annex G, p. 422.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

651 and erratic that it seems unlikely that it would claim a large fraction of an increase from this source either. Additional taxes would of course apply on the consumption side, but some of the principal excise taxes are applicable to such commodities as tobacco, for which the demand may not be highly responsive to income changes. As for imported consumption goods, many are subject to customs duties of 15% ad valorem or less.

435 TABLE 7 Price Indices for Damascus and Beirut, 1945–53

(1952 = 100)

Year	Prices in Damascus		Prices in Beirut	
	Retail[a]	Wholesale, local manufactures[b]	Cost of living	Wholesale[c]
1945	140	—	131	156
1946	129	—	119	133
1947	118	—	109	120
1948	112	—	106	116
1949	95	97	100	95
1950	81	90	93	88
1951	94	107	100	110
1952	100	100	100	100
1953 (Jan.–Sept.)	93	85	95	92

[a] 19 foods, soap, kerosene and cigarettes.
[b] 16 locally manufactured commodities.
[c] Prior to 1950 foodstuffs represented about 96% of the total weight, of which wheat and barley alone accounted for 61%. Beginning in 1950, foodstuffs represent 48% of total weight.

SOURCE: Derived from data in *Statistical Abstract of Syria*, 1951–52, pp. 149, 152; *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (Syria), Nov.–Dec. 1953, p. 33; International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, February 1954.

651 Commodities for which it seems plausible to assume that import demand is fairly sensitive to income changes, and which are subject to duties of 15.3% ad valorem or less, include jewelry, watches and clocks, meat, milk, butter, cheese, oleomargarine, photographic films and papers and musical instruments. To be sure, certain other commodities are subject to higher rates, but it seems unlikely that taxes on these items would yield enough to add an important degree of flexibility.

The lack of automatic flexibility of revenue yield is a disadvantage to a country undertaking a program of economic development. Such a pro-

PRICES

MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

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Table No. 1

1 — ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
FOODSTUFFS							
Wheat, Commercial	100 kgs.	34	40	37	36	40	43
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	»	46	50	50	48	49	49
Flour, with bran No. 1	»	39	46	48	39	43	41
Barley	»	22	27	28	25	24	23
Maize	»	32	34	34	34	37	37
Lentils, red	»	47	60	54	55	60	58
Chick-peas	»	39	43	39	41	41	39
«Hilbeh»	»	38	55	51	50	45	39
Bitter Vetch	»	31	39	38	38	38	36
Kidney beans, Homs	»	74	75	75	75	73	70
Rice, Jazira commercial	»	106	98	98	106	113	11[illegible]
Bran	Ton	162	179	175	174	171	[illegible]
Apricot paste, commercial	100 kgs.	114	76	77	94	106	124
Apricot, dried commercial	»	143	85	86	96	108	123
Treacle	»	66	63	64	70	70	70
Raisins	»	104	84	87	89	100	130
Nuts, unshelled	»	318	280	300	300	300	328
Pistachio, Aleppo unshelled	»	845	965	1,015	1,013	975	868
Liquorice, ground	»	29	25	25	25	25	25
Onions	»	18	13	18	21	30	30
Olive oil, local	»	253	247	245	252	268	281
Samneh	»	607	621	621	620	573	595
Eggs, fresh, commercial	C. 1440	133	214	184	142	129	108
Macaroni	100 kgs.						
Broad beans, baladi	»	54	60	59	50	50	50
Broad beans, baladi commerc.	»	33	35	37	33	34	34
Sugar, granulated	»	121	126	125	125	125	121
Coffee beans	»	504	472	464	470	468	470
Tea golden commercial	»	373	424	409	401	400	(1)375

(1) Second grade.

الاسعار

الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٢
(بالليرات السورية)

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جدول رقم ١

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
١ — المواد الغذائية								
حنطة تجارية	١٠٠ كيلو	33	31	30	30	29	29	33
طحين زيرو نمرو ٢	»	43	42	40	40	46	46	49
طحين رسه بعبه نمرو ١	»	39	39	36	36	37	31	38
شعير ابيض	»	23	21	20	19	19	19	19
ذرة صفراء	»	26	26	25	26	—	—	41
عدس احمر	»	46	44	40	40	41	37	33
حمص تجاري	»	43	44	38	35	34	34	34
حلبة	»	22	21	28	31	30	28	35
جلبانة	»	29	27	26	26	26	24	25
فاصوليا (حمصية)	»	78	79	79	—	—	70	70
ارز جزيرة تجاري	»	112	106	102	113	111	113	112
نخالة	طن	170	165	164	139	130	130	163
قمر الدين تجاري	١٠٠ كيلو	135	130	129	120	121	125	120
تمر تجاري	»	200	200	200	200	192	125	100
دبس جامد	»	54	65	—	—	70	70	68
زبيب درلي مبخر	»	125	120	110	—	—	100	100
جوز قشر	»	309	311	315	303	346	364	350
فستق حلبي قشر	»	835	787	700	727	746	741	734
عرقسوس مطحون	»	31	31	30	31	30	33	35
بصل	»	16	15	11	10	12	15	26
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	245	237	275	261	248	250	251
سمن ديري	»	615	610	596	604	606	604	606
بيض طازج تجاري	١٤٤ ص.	136	140	139	107	106	111	108
معكرونة	١٠٠ كيلو	45	51	50	48	50	47	52
فول بلدي للاكل	»	35	35	32	31	32	26	28
فول بلدي تجاري	»	116	116	120	119	119	119	120
سكر ناعم ابيض	»	540	504	486	582	481	482	476
بن اخضر	»	(1)365	(1)331	(1)335	(1)325	(1)368	(1)376	(1)372
شاي ذهبي تجاري	»							

(1) باب لقي

PRICES

MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1952
(Syrian Pounds)

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Table No. 1 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	أيار May
2 — RAW MATERIALS							
Cotton «Texas» ginned	100 kgs	301	414	375	343	290	289
Hemp, raw	»	170	138	139	140	150	167
Hemp, combed 1st grade	»	257	212	213	231	246	240
Cumin	»	127	151	153	144	146	141
Aniseed	»	122	174	171	165	134	120
Sesame	»	102	124	123	110	109	115
Apricot seed	»	30	25	25	26	28	28
Olive oil, commercial	»	189	200	195	200	191	187
Hides, cow, light	»	503	525	522	525	525	525
Skins, sheep light	»	419	438	437	437	437	437
Skins, sheep in wool	»	299	350	...	...	300	282
Skins, goats	»	480	475	459	475	475	475
Skins, sheep	»	199	267	268	243	158	165
Wool fleece, greasy	»	220	274	262	226	183	187
Wool fleece, white washed	»	430	498	475	404	323	353
Wool, pieces	»	329	393	380	324	258	271
Wool, pulled washed	»	311	334	315	273	226	241
Guts, sheep	100 pcs	243	322	337	350	330	219
Guts, goats	»	114	152	168	175	163	109
Tobacco leaves, Abu riha	100 kgs	123	123	123	123	123	123
Tobacco pieces, Abu riha	»	30	30	30	30	30	30

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٢
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ١ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران Jun.
٢ ـ المواد الاولية								
قطن لكساس محلوج	١٠٠ كيلو	232	233	284	294	288	287	285
نشر قنب خلي	»	196	215	203	178	170	176	169
نشر مطيب اول باب مضغط	»	227	311	297	272	251	251	238
	»	112	110	110	110	110	110	122
كمون	»	89	90	90	95	101	118	118
بلشون	»	78	83	79	72	103	111	120
سمسم	»	31	35	36	30	31	31	28
بزر شمس حب	»	174	168	181	190	196	199	189
زيت زيتون بحري	»	475	475	475	475	475	515	525
نعل بقر خفيف	»	347	400	400	406	426	432	437
جلد غنم حور	»	...	...	...	...	...	285	277
جلد خاروف بصوفه	»	500	500	500	475	475	475	475
جلد ماعز سختيان	»	180	183	175	184	191	187	184
جلد غنم مملح	»	231	240	228	218	210	198	185
صوف جز وسخ خلي	»	475	482	469	435	421	468	352
صوف مغسول ابيض	»	372	368	385	304	310	313	271
صوف نثر مغسول	»	425	421	402	340	290	228	242
صوف شلاحي نظيف	١٠٠ مرال	155	135	154	200	281	235	192
مصران (طاقة غنم)	»	47	41	66	95	143	117	97
مصران (طاقة ماعز)	١٠٠ كيلو	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
دخان ابو ريحة ، ورق	»	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
دخان ابو ريحة ، نثر								

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 1 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
3 — BUILDING MATERIALS							
Iron rods	Ton	590	670	659	636	622	611
Iron Angles	«	664	750	746	702	692	695
Iron sheets, black 1 mm.	«	1,084	1,270	1,250	1,250	1,215	1,131
Pipes, galvanized ½"	10 Mt.	16	18	18	18	17	17
Tin sheet, white	100 kgs	100	110	108	105	100	97
Zinc sheets, white	«	280	324	308	300	307	294
Cement, local	Ton	97	107	102	102	100	100
Cement, Belgian grade 1	«	230	209	219	221	223	230
Timber, Spruce	M3	219	256	237	233	232	230
Timber squared, «Qatrani»	Pieces	37	29	35	38	39	39
Timber squared, «Bayyasi»	«	31	29	28	28	28	28
Timber Canadian red	M3	449	455	475	450	450	475
Timber, Swedish	«	274	295	291	294	290	285
Timber, pine wood	«	371	400	389	392	386	381
Plywood, Bulgarian	«	645	712	694	686	686	662
Plywood, French	«	1,126	1,190	1,175	1,150	1,170	1,150
Plywood, Lebanese	«	568	597	597	556	515	500
Veneer wood, California	10 M2	43	50	49	45	41	45
Veneer wood, «Ajram»	«	74	67	72	75	74	73
Veneer wood, «Walnut»	«	19	25	21	20	20	20
Glass plates, 2 mm.	«	30	30	30	30	30	30
Glass plates, 3 mm.	«	47	48	47	47	47	47
Tin Ingots	100 kgs	942	878	905	906	920	922
Tin rods	«	951	903	930	929	933	923
Copper, round	«	518	625	639	594	575	525
Brass sheets	«	522	625	639	631	625	537
Lead ingot	«	164	199	189	186	179	174
Nails, large size	«	82	84	80	80	80	79
Nails, small size	«	102	104	100	100	100	100

الأسعار

الوسطي الشهري لأسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٤
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ١ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	أيلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
٣ ـ مواد البناء								
حلايب مبروم أسلاس	طن	522	529	539	545	564	583	596
حديد مبسوط تربيع أوتايا	»	577	577	596	626	645	687	675
صفائح سوداء ١ مم	»	910	875	913	950	1.031	1.090	1.108
انابيب مزيبقة ٢/١ انش	١٠ متر	13	15	15	14	15	16	16
تنك صفائح أبيض	١٠٠ كيلو	79	102	94	92	99	107	107
توتياء صفائح أبيض	»	191	225	335	271	294	309	300
إسمنت وطني	طن	55	90	95	95	95	95	100
زيادة بلجيكية نصف ليف	»	240	233	235	234	235	237	238
خشب شوح	م٣	196	202	200	190	203	215	226
لاط قفراني	الواحدة	34	...	42	40	36	38	38
لاط بياسي	»	40	35	33	33	29	28	28
خشب كندي أحمر	م٣	445	437	437	423	428	450	475
خشب سويدي	»	249	253	253	257	255	276	282
خشب زان	»	356	338	344	348	363	370	382
خشب معاكس نمساوي	»	620	596	587	587	611	634	656
خشب معاكس أوروبي	»	1.050	1.056	1.050	1.113	1.112	1.147	1.150
خشب معاكس لبناني	»	563	588	600	660	600	600	500
قشر كالبتوس	١٠ م٢	32	35	35	46	50	49	43
قشر عجرم	»	75	73	75	75	75	74	70
قشر جوز	»	15	15	15	19	21	20	20
زجاج ٢ مم	»	29	29	29	29	30	30	30
زجاج ٣ مم	»	45	45	45	46	47	47	47
تصدير سبائك	١٠٠ كيلو	1,013	1.006	978	945	938	948	940
تصدير نفايات	»	994	998	986	955	946	957	953
نحاس أحمر مدور	»	440	433	439	422	502	503	521
نحاس أصفر صفائح	»	420	419	412	406	499	510	541
رصاص سكب	»	132	136	145	153	154	170	167
مسمار شبابيك	»	86	85	85	85	84	79	79
مسمار شعايري	»	103	105	105	105	105	100	100

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1952
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 1 (concld.)

ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	أيار May
4 — MANUFACTURED							
Matches. «Crown»	10 Gross	32	40	40	40	40	40
Cotton yarn. No. 1 — 12	Bundle	22	24	24	24	23	22
Cotton yarn. No. 1 — 20	»	26	28	28	26	28	25
Cotton Fabrics. «Rabwa»	Roll	26	28	28	27	26	25
Cordage. No. 2	100 kgs.	207	165	165	168	180	185
Cordage. No. 3	»	168	130	138	144	150	164
Twine. No. 1	»	244	194	200	197	203	250
String. No. 1	»	381	329	322	345	355	346
Glue. brown	»	182	176	171	170	170	170
Soap. «Star Ituni»	»	201	214	214	211	200	198
Soap. commercial	»	128	150	150	146	134	128
Starch. wheat pure	»	92	98	96	93	92	90
5 — FUEL MATERIALS							
Coal. in blocks	Tons	146	179	165	150	149	145
Coke of coal	»	286	305	290	290	288	285
Fire wood. olive cut dry	»	70	65	68	68	68	66
Fire wood. apricot cut dry	»	59	60	60	60	60	59
Charcoal. in bulk	»	296	400	340	285	270	290
Mazout in bulk	1000 L	112	112	112	112	112	112
Fuel oil	Ton	69	71	70	69	69	69
Kerosene. in bulk	1000 L	193	200	196	192	192	192
Benzine. in bulk	»	320	325	323	320	320	320

Source : Ministry of National Economy

الأسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق، ١٩٥٢
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ١ التتمة

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
٤ ـ المنسوجات الصناعية								
كيريت ماركة تاج	١٠ كروز	22	22	22	22	22	32	38
خيوط قطنية نمرو ١ ـ ١٢	الربطة	21	21	21	22	22	22	22
» » » ١ ـ ٢٠	»	24	24	25	24	24	26	26
خام ربوة دمشق	الثوب	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
حبال مشاقة نوع ثاني	١٠٠ كيلو	252	241	232	204	196	202	188
حبال مشاقة نوع ثالث	»	216	200	191	175	165	174	157
مرس نوع اول سماكي	»	298	289	289	276	252	247	236
مصيص نوع اول عداوي	»	445	453	439	419	395	391	336
فراء اشقر	»	190	190	193	200	208	184	173
صابون نجمة ابتوني	»	192	196	200	200	201	199	190
صابون تجاري	»	112	116	120	120	111	125	125
نسا حنطة خلفي	»	90	90	90	90	90	90	94
٥ ـ المواد المستخلصة								
فحم حجري قوالب	الطن	125	125	140	148	145	140	144
فحم حجري كوك	»	270	275	290	292	292	289	290
حطب زيتون مكسر ناشف	»	90	93	93	53	50	56	68
حطب مشمش مكسر ناشف	»	74	75	69	41	37	47	60
فحم حطبي سنديانى راسه بعبه	»	280	307	300	285	278	259	287
مازوت سائل	١٠٠٠ لتر	112	112	112	112	112	112	112
فيول اويل	الطن	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
كاز سائل	١٠٠٠ لتر	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
بنزين سائل	»	320	320	320	320	320	320	320

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Piastres)

Table No. 2

ITEMS	Unit	المعدل السنوي Annual Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
Wheat, finest quality	Kilo	37	45	42	40	43	46
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	«	49	60	55	52	52	51
Flour, with bran	«	40	45	45	43	43	44
Bread of «Zero» flour	«	45	48	48	45	45	45
Bread off our with bran	«	38	40	40	40	43	40
Burghul	«	52	68	66	59	57	57
Macaroni	«	73	79	76	75	75	75
Mutton, boneless	«	350	356	372	388	362	388
Beef, boneless	«	237	215	275	275	275	287
Camel meat, boneless	«	201	197	213	220	237	237
Milk, fresh	«	44	49	46	45	38	38
Butter	140 gr	78	90	88	83	68	68
Samneh, Deir-ez-Zor brand	Kilo	622	651	656	665	600	618
Cheese, white, local	«	248	252	266	229	189	188
Rice, commercial	«	111	100	106	109	111	110(1)
Olives, «Dan» brand	«	101	100	100	98	95	104
Olive, split	«	96	104	109	95	91	94
Margarine	«	159	200	190	183	169	138
Olive oil, local	«	253	262	248	242	243	251
Eggs, fresh	10 eggs	105	168	128	105	95	81
Sugar, granulated American	Kilo	123	130	127	127	126	124
Potatoes	«	31	39	40	41	36	36
Onions, red	«	23	15	20	24	43	37
Coffee beans, green «Rio»	«	529	517	496	490	485	497
Tea, «Golden» commercial	«	464	495	475	481	446	456
Soap, Star «Ituni»	«	213	225	225	223	213	203
Charcoal	«	38	48	46	43	31	30
Kerosene	20 L.	387	400	396	385	385	385
Cigarettes, «Bafra»	20 c.	60	60	60	60	60	60
Lentils, red	Kilo	55	71	70	67	64	64
Broad beans, «ilhle»	«	57	78	70	64	57	60
Halawa	«	156	161	165	164	159	164
Treacle	«	72	68	70	75	75	75

Source : Ministry of National Economy
(1) Italiana, second grade.
(2) Second grade.

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار المفرق في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٢
(بالقروش السورية)

جدول رقم ٢

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
الحنطة الممتازة	كيلو	34	33	31	31	30	29	38
دقيق ذيرو نمرو ٢	»	42	43	42	43	51	48	50
دقيق رأسه بعبه	»	40	40	37	37	37	32	40
خبز ذيرو	»	44	43	42	41	...	45	45
خبز رأسه بعبه	»	40	36	35	37	37	33	38
برغل	»	50	45	42	41	42	41	53
معكرونة	»	70	70	70	70	71	75	75
لحم غنم بدون عظم	»	348	356	335	325	319	325	342
لحم عجل بدون عظم	»	275	253	232	225	237	240	300
لحم جمل بدون عظم	»	188	188	175	175	175	175	237
حليب طازج	»	54	54	51	41	40	40	37
الزبدة	الـ ١٤٠ غ	92	97	93	68	67	68	65
سمن ديري	كيلو	630	628	625	618	627	624	623
جبن ابيض بلدي	»	275	294	293	277	262	219	224
ارز انجاري	»	112	111	115	115	114	115	113(1)
زيتون دان	»	70	94	104	110	110	107	125
زيتون منقش	»	85	100	104	104	101	106	96
سمن نباتي	»	160	161	144	[illegible]	145	143	135
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	266	265	262(1)	244(1)	260	246(2)	250(2)
بيض طازج	الـ ١٠	119	114	105	82	84	83	80
سكر ناعم ابيض اميركي	كيلو	115	120	120	120	122	120	120
بطاطا	»	34	31	27	19	21	22	26
بصل احمر	»	24	19	15	13	17	18	27
بن اخضر ريو	»	575	568	603	603	519	497	482
شاي ذهبي انجاري	»	480	406	435	440	497	505	400
صابون نجمة ايتوني	»	207	211	210	213	210	210	200
فحم حطب	»	42	43	36	34	35	34	30
زيت نفط (بترول)	الـ ٢٠٠ لتر	385	385	385	385	385	385	385
دخان (بافرا)	العلبة	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
عدس احمر	كيلو	56	46	43	45	40	41	48
فول بلدي للاكل	»	50	53	50	48	43	55	54
حلاوة طحينية	»	135	148	147	140	158	164	162
دبس جامد	»	60	70	75	75	75	75	75

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

(١) ايطالي باب ثاني

(٢) نوع ثاني

PRICES

● 435

MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3

ITEMS	Unit	وسطي Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
1 — FOOD STUFFS							
Wheat commercial	100 kgs	27	31	29	31	29	28
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	«	37	44	...	42	39	38
Four, with bran No. 1	«	32	38	37	37	35	34
Barley, white	«	18	21	20	21	19	17
Maize	«	24	27	26	26	27	27
Millet	«						
Lentils, red	«	37	45	42	38	35	34
Broad-beans, edible	«	42	46	48	47	46	46
Broad-beans, commercial	«	28	33	29	28	29	28
Chick-peas	«	39	41	40	42	44	41
Hilbeh	«	23	30	28	27	26	23
Bitter Vetch	«	23	28	28	23	22	19
Kidney beans, Homs	«	92	85	93	92	104	...
Rice, Jazira commercial	«	106	115	110	119	114	111
Bran	Ton	145	180	180	160	139	140
Apricot paste	100 kgs	107	135	131	130	149	118
Apricot, dried commercial	«	153	200	170	—	—	—
Treacle	«	32	50	46	46	46	45
Raisins	«	109	125	100	114	123	125
Nuts, unshelled	«	283	298	289	283	295	296
Pistachio, Aleppo unshelled	«	983	811	838	874	1,069	1,026
Liquorice, ground	«	31	31	30	30	23	30
Onions	«	16	14	17	28	22	23
Olive oil, local	«	254	242	243	248	268	275
Samneh	«	476	587	516	455	454	456
Eggs, fresh	1440 eggs	121	133	131	126	115	101
Sugar, granulated	100 kgs	93	103	94	92	92	92
Coffee beans, Rio	«	540	538	540	555	553	545
Tea, golden commercial	«	360	325	316	315	334	338

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ٣

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
١ ـ المواد الغذائية								
حنطة تجاري	١٠٠ كيلو	23	23	28	25	25	29	29
دقيق زيرو نمرو (٢)	»	32	32	31	35	35	39	40
دقيق رأسه بعبه نمرو (١)	»	27	27	26	29	30	33	33
شعير ابيض	»	13	14	14	16	16	17	17
ذرة صفراء	»	21	21	20	20	22	25	24
عدس احمر	»	35	35	35	35	36	36	34
فول بلدي للاكل	»	35	39	40	39	35	42	41
فول بلدي تجاري	»	25	25	25	25	28	29	28
حمص تجاري	»	35	34	35	35	35	40	42
حلبة	»	22	20	20	20	21	21	21
جلبانة	»	21	20	19	20	21	23	20
ارز جزيرة تجاري	»	90	94	91	99	112	112	112
نخالة	الطن	110	125	155	140	120	140	140
قمر الدين تجاري	١٠٠ كيلو	90	85	85	85	87	90	104
تقوع بلدي مبخر	»	140	139	145	142	141	145	—
دبس جامد	»	53	—	—	—	—	49	46
جوز قلب	١٠٠ كيلو	276	271	264	262	262	288	296
فستق حلبي قلب	»	1,025	1,000	988	1,045	1,013	1,080	994
مرقسوس مطحون	»	25	35	35	35	34	34	31
بصل	»	12	12	11	10	10	10	19
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	217	250	256	264	262	261	265
سمن ديري	»	460	459	458	456	451	460	467
بيض طازج	الصندوق ١٤٤٠	144	135	126	119	113	113	102
سكر نامم ابيض انكليزي	١٠٠ كيلو	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
البن الاخضر ريو	»	534	530	533	542	546	532	532
الشاي ذهبي تجاري	»	426	425	421	383	363	338	338

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	وسطي Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
2 — RAW MATERIALS							
Cotton, Texas ginned	100 kgs	242	228	233	247	238	236
Hemp, raw	«	182	155	168	171	179	190
Hemp, combed 1st grade	«	251	316	325	226	231	248
Cumin	«	98	111	119	113	110	110
Aniseed	«	83	85	85	82	85	85
Sesame	«	68	78	74	67	70	66
Apricot seed	«	35	30	35	35	35	35
Olive oil, commercial	«	178	176	173	189	196	186
Hides, cow light	«	480	475	475	475	490	500
Skins, cow dried local	«	276	285	283	282	280	280
Skins, sheep raw	«	338	328	325	325	344	350
Skins, sheep in the wool	«	300	...	300	300	300	300
Skins, goat	«	532	500	500	500	513	525
Skins, sheep in brine	«	191	182	180	179	180	180
Wool, fleece raw greasy	«	252	244	236	242	244	247
Wool, white washed fleece	«	525	495	536	510	519	508
Wool, pieces white washed	«	364	377	—	—	—	—
Wool, pulled washed	«	452	431	435	436	436	469
Guts, sheep	100 pieces	132	162	112	135	75	79
Guts, goats	«	39	53	45	30	25	28
Tobacco leaves, Abu-Riha	100 kgs	123	123	123	123	123	122
Tobacco pieces, Abu-Riha	«	30	30	30	30	30	30
3 — Manufactured products							
Matches, «Crown»	10 gross	22	23	22	22	22	22
Cotton yarn, 1 — 12	Bundle	17	20	17	17	17	17
Cotton yarn, 1 — 20	«	20	23	20	20	20	20
Cotton fabrics, «Rabwa»	Roll	22	23	22	22	22	22
Cotton fabrics, «Rabi'esh-Sham»	«	41	44	41	42	42	41

الاسعار

الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

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جدول رقم ٣ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
٢ ـ المواد الاولية								
قطن كساس محلوج	١٠٠ كيلو	259	238	241	238	250	253	242
تنر تنب خامي	«	164	193	186	191	182	198	207
تنر تنب مطيب اول باب ممشط	«	214	273	238	229	241	233	243
كمون التصدير	«	85	80	84	86	85	88	105
يانسون التصدير	«	94	80	80	80	80	78	84
سمسم ديري	«	68	64	69	66	63	63	64
بذر مشمش حب	«	37	40	38	36	33	32	34
زيت زيتون تجاري	«	154	169	168	191	179	180	180
عسل بقر خفيف	«	460	500	500	500	500	500	500
جلد بقر ناشف عادي	«	280	225	280	280	280	280	280
جلد غنم حور خامي	«	325	325	325	333	362	359	350
جلد خاروف بصوفه	«	...	...	...	...	—	300	300
جلد ماعز سختيان	«	550	550	550	550	550	550	550
جلد غنم مطح بشعره	«	202	195	210	210	205	188	180
صوف جز وسخ خامي	«	256	250	251	262	279	256	256
صوف جز مغسول ابيض	«	548	515	519	545	559	513	535
صوف نتر مغسول ابيض	«	363	355	359	380	382	310	387
صوف شلاحي نظيف	«	501	440	445	459	456	453	466
مصران (طاقة غنم)	١٠٠ واحدة	214	200	208	153	75	79	92
مصران (طاقة ماعز)	«	50	50	50	45	28	29	34
دخان ابو ريحة ورق	١٠٠ كيلو	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
دخان ابو ريحة نتر	«	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
٣ ـ المنتجات الصناعية								
كبريت ماركة تاج	١٠ كروز	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
خيوط قطنية نمرو ١٢/١	الربطة	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
خيوط قطنية نمرو ٢٠/١	«	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
خام ربوة دمشق	الثوب	22	22	22	21	21	21	21
خام ربيع الشام	«	—	—	40	—	40	40	40

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3 (contd.)

ITEMS	Unit	Average وسطي	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
Cotton fabrics, «Khumasiya»	10 yds	20	22	20	20	20	20
Cordage, No. 2	100 kgs.	232	196	218	217	231	253
Cordage No. 3	«	197	150	173	190	184	223
Twine, No. 1	«	284	284	278	257	279	299
String, No. 1	«	424	421	416	388	426	418
Glue, brown	«	210	195	195	190	205	205
Soap, «Star Itumi»	«	192	190	186	191	200	201
Soap Commercial	«	101	110	105	109	110	106
Starch, hard wheat	«	71	90	79	75	71	70
4 — BUILDING MATERIALS							
Iron rods	Tons	437	493	459	435	435	463
Iron Angles	«	472	545	501	486	480	473
Iron sheets, black No. 1	«	697	810	725	760	725	710
Pipes, galvanised ½"	10 m.	12	14	13	13	12	12
Tin sheets, white	100 kgs.	64	83	81	84	81	70
Zinc sheets, white	«	154	168	165	166	168	168
Cement, local	Tons	81	85	81	80	80	80
Cement, white 1st grade	«	232	240	240	223	243	243
Timber, Spruce	m3	199	201	212	204	198	194
Timber squared, «Qatrani»	piece	45	41	44	45	44	45
Timber squared, «Bayasi»	«	35	34	34	35	35	35
Timber, Canadian red fir	m3	458	438	438	465	470	461
Timber, Swedish	«	254	249	266	272	261	263
Timber, pinewood	«	295	339	342	326	312	300
Plywood, Bulgarian	«	606	581	625	623	625	611
Plywood, French	«	978	1,050	1,050	990	981	969
Plywood, Lebanese	«	576	...	...	...	...	575
Veneer wood, California	10 m2	32	30	30	36	34	43
Veneer wood, «Ajram»	»	70	75	75	69	69	65

الاسعار

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الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ٢ (تابع)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
دولس خماسية اصلي	١٠ يرد	—	—	20	20	19	19	19
حبال مشاقة نوع ثاني	١٠٠ كيلو	234	243	211	222	237	244	255
حبال مشاقة نوع ثالث	»	201	211	189	222	212	209	202
مرس نوع اول سماكي	»	285	286	278	292	290	293	294
مصيص نوع اول عادي	»	444	443	428	437	406	420	435
غراء اشقر	»	240	220	220	220	214	203	200
صابون نجمة اينوني	»	183	180	188	191	195	196	198
صابون تجاري	»	91	90	90	100	100	100	98
نشا حنطة يابس	»	64	62	67	70	69	70	70
٤ ـ مواد البناء :								
حديد مبروم اساس	الطن	398	410	414	416	420	444	455
حديد مبسط تربيع زوايا	»	436	450	450	449	456	463	475
صفائح سوداء (١) مم	»	630	630	645	665	675	685	700
انابيب مزمقة ١/٢ انش	١٠ متر	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
تنك صفائح ابيض	١٠٠ كيلو	51	50	50	58	50	50	50
توليام صفائح ابيض	»	140	140	140	140	160	130	156
اسمنت وطني	الطن	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
ترابة بيضاء نخب اول	»	227	225	225	222	222	232	240
خشب شوح	م٣	195	195	195	197	199	198	197
لاط قطراني	الوحدة	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
لاط بياسي	»	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
خشب كندي احمر	م٣	460	465	466	450	460	465	463
خشب سويدي	»	243	238	244	249	250	255	259
خشب زان	»	300	306	234	192	301	290	300
خشب معاكس بلغاري	»	600	595	596	596	600	600	621
خشب معاكس افرنسي	»	938	956	947	960	975	975	980
خشب معاكس لبناني	»	550	563	556	590	600	600	575
قشر كاليفورنيا	١٠م٢	29	28	25	28	25	25	45
قشر مجرم	»	75	75	75	67	65	65	65

PRICES

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MONTHLY AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953
(Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 3 (concld.)

ITEMS	Unit	Average وسطي	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان Apr.	ايار May
Veneer wood, walnut	10 m2	18	15	18	20	20	20
Glass plates, 2 mm.	«	31	29	30	30	32	32
Glass paltes, 3 mm.	«	50	47	47	48	50	50
Tin ingots	100 kgs.	851	1.006	1.030	1,026	1,018	976
Tin rods	«	851	1,015	1.036	1,032	1,008	966
Copper, rods and plates	«	399	440	440	438	443	457
Brass, sheets	«	378	409	413	418	419	425
Lead ingots	«	109	118	114	107	110	110
Nails, large size	«	70	86	75	70	70	70
Nails, small size	«	92	103	90	90	90	95
5 — FUEL MATERIALS							
Coal in blocks	Tons	111	118	114	110	109	111
Coak of coal	«	205	288	235	244	218	205
Firewood, olive cut dry	«	80	88	82	80	72	71
Firewood, apricot cut dry	«	67	72	69	67	58	59
Mazout, in bulk	1,000 ltr.	109	112	112	112	112	108
Kerosene	«	191	193	193	193	193	191
Fuel oil	Tons	68	69	69	69	69	68
Benzine, in bulk	1,000 ltr.	317	320	320	320	320	316
Charcoal, in bulk	Tons	258	246	220	240	260	260

Source : Ministry of National Economy

الاسعار

الوسطي الشهري لاسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالليرات السورية)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July	حزيران June
قشر جوز	١٠ م ٢	20	18	15	15	15	15	20
زجاج ٢ مم	»	31	32	32	32	32	32	32
زجاج ٣ مم	»	50	51	51	51	51	51	51
قصدير سبائك	١٠٠ كيلو	648	640	648	673	—	—	840
قصدير قضبان	»	660	650	665	690	—	—	850
نحاس أحمر مفرود والواح	»	369	350	350	355	325	410	416
نحاس اصفر صفائح	»	319	325	335	342	365	390	389
رصاص سبائك	»	102	100	111	113	108	110	110
مسمار شبابيك	»	65	65	65	65	70	73	71
مسمار شحايري	»	90	90	90	90	90	83	94
٥ ـ المواد المشتعلة :								
فحم حجري قوالب انكليزي	الطن	119	113	107	105	106	105	109
فحم حجري كوك	»	174	175	181	176	180	156	200
حطب زيتون مكسر ناشف	»	85	91	92	77	76	76	73
حطب مشمش مكسر ناشف	»	65	71	74	67	67	68	62
مازوت سائل الـ	١٠٠٠ ليتر	107	107	107	107	107	107	107
كاز سائل الـ	»	190	190	190	190	190	190	190
فيول اويل	الطن	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
بنزين سائل الـ	١٠٠٠ ليتر	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
فحم حطبي ستديتي راسه بعبه	الطن	280	255	270	260	250	280	260

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

PRICES

MONTHLY AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES AT DAMASCUS, 1953

(Syrian Piastres)

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Table No. 4

ITEMS	Unit	وسطي Average	كانون ٢ Jan.	شباط Feb.	آذار Mar.	نيسان April	ايار May	حزيران June
Wheat 1st quality	Kilo	29	34	32	32	33	30	29
Flour, «Zero» No. 2	«	40	47	45	43	43	42	43
Flour, with bran	«	32	40	35	35	35	35	33
Bread, «Zero» Flour	«	41	45	43	43	44	41	42
Bread, flour with bran	«	34	38	37	39	38	35	36
Burghol	«	42	51	45	45	45	41	40
Macaroni	«	67	70	70	70	70	67	65
Mutton, boneless	«	325	350	325	350	320	325	310
Milk, fresh	«	40	48	40	40	40	33	33
Butter	140 gr.	74	91	82	84	81	71	66
Samneh	Kilo	506	620	505	533	485	475	450
Cheese, white local	«	196	273	233	203	157	161	160
Rice, commercial	«	117	116	120	124	121	118	115
Beef, boneless	«	255	275	225	175	225	300	250
Olives, «Dan» brand.	«	79	82	79	80	78	75	76
Olives, split	«	85	81	96	88	86	79	75
Margarine, «Khumasiya»	«	190	160	161	185	197	199	194
Olive oil, local	«	267	260	246	256	260	278	274
Eggs, fresh	10 eggs	94	125	108	94	89	80	74
Sugar, refined granulated	Kilo	97	115	95	95	95	95	95
Potatoes	«	28	33	28	28	28	22	25
Onions, red	«	21	30	20	23	27	27	21
Coffee beans, Rio	«	574	585	575	600	585	581	570
Tea, «Golden» commercial	«	437	450	431	406	420	412	419
Soap, «Star Itrni»	«	204	206	200	205	210	210	208
Charcoal	«	34	38	35	30	31	31	30
Kerosene	20 l.	382	385	385	385	385	381	380
Cigarettes	20 c.	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
Lentils, red	Kilo	45	52	52	45	50	45	43
Broad beans, edible	«	47	52	54	50	50	46	45
Halawa	«	120	135	125	128	120	120	119
Tranda	«	58	60	60	56	56	55	55

Source : Ministry of National Economy

الاسعار

الوسطي الشهري لاسعار المفرق في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٥٣
(بالقروش السورية)

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جدول رقم ٤

الصنف	الوحدة	كانون ١ Dec.	تشرين ٢ Nov.	تشرين ١ Oct.	ايلول Sep.	آب Aug.	تموز July
الحنطة المنقاوة	كيلو	26	25	26	27	26	28
دقيق زيرو نمرو (٢)	»	35	35	36	37	36	40
دقيق راسه بعبه	»	28	27	27	26	31	31
خبز زيرو	»	37	37	36	28	40	42
خبز راسه بعبه	»	28	28	30	32	36	35
برغل	»	40	40	40	40	39	40
معكرونة	»	65	65	65	65	65	65
لحم غنم بدون عظم	»	320	325	325	325	308	304
حليب طازج	»	48	43	39	38	38	35
الزبدة	١٤٠ غرام	70	70	70	68	67	70
سمن ديري	كيلو	484	481	484	478	475	475
جبن ابيض بلدي	»	210	210	210	200	185	175
ارز الجاري	»	110	113	118	116	117	111
لحم عجل بدون عظم	»	285	275	275	261	223	225
زيتون ثان	»	70	78	80	89	90	90
زيتون منقش	»	77	88	88	87	90	87
سمن نباتي خمسية	»	200	200	200	190	195	195
زيت زيتون بلدي	»	258	265	276	277	275	279
بيض طازج	العشرة	112	106	91	85	82	82
سكر ناعم ابيض	كيلو	95	95	95	95	95	95
بطاطا	»	28	26	23	22	20	20
بصل احمر	»	15	15	13	14	14	17
بن اخضر ريو	»	582	565	574	563	575	580
شاي ذهبي الجاري	»	500	494	469	437	410	610
صابون نجمة ايتوني	»	200	196	196	203	205	208
لحم حطب	»	45	38	35	35	30	34
زيت نفط (بترول) ال	٢٠ ليتر	380	380	387	386	380	380
دخان بافرا ال	٢٠ سيكارة	60	60	60	60	60	60
عدس احمر	كيلو	45	45	43	37	40	42
فول ناشف	»	46	48	46	43	43	35
حلاوة طحينية	»	111	111	116	120	122	117
دبس جامد	»	50	50	60	60	64	70

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

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PRICES

The method of collecting wholesale and retail prices as well as the method of computing the indices thereof, are as follows :

(1) Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices : The list of items for wholesale prices is divided into five categories :

The first category : comprises 28 food items.
The second category : comprises 23 items of raw materials.
The third category : comprises 18 items of locally manufactured products.
The fourth category : comprises 30 items for buildings and constructions.
The fifth category : comprises 10 items of fuel materials.

The prices for these items are collected weekly, and a monthly average is calculated for each item. This average is compared with that of the previous month and a percentage is given. A geometric average is then computed for each category, indicating the change in price of the category compared with the previous month. By means of the «Chain» method, the index numbers shown on page 165 have been produced, taking the average of 1949 as a base = 100.

The index numbers of each category have been left without combination into one general index of all categories, pending the completion of a special study which will form the basis for an all-category index number.

نورد فيما يلي شرحاً عن كيفية جمع اسعار الجملة والمفرق والطريقة التي اتبعت في استخراج الارقام القياسية عنها

(1) الارقام القياسية لاسعار الجملة

جرى تقسيم مواد اسعار الجملة الى خمسة اقسام :

يتضمن القسم الاول منها (المواد الغذائية) ٢٨ صنفاً ، والقسم الثاني (المواد الاولية) ٢٣ صنفاً ، والقسم الثالث (المنتجات الصناعية) ١٦ صنفاً ، والقسم الرابع (مواد البناء) ٣٠ صنفاً ، والقسم الخامس (المواد المشتعلة) ١٠ اصناف .

وتجمع اسعار هذه المواد اسبوعياً ثم يستخرج الوسطي الشهري من كل من هذه الاصناف ويقارن مع وسطي السعر لصنف ذاته في الشهر السابق ويعطى نسبة مئوية . ويستخرج الوسطي الهندسي من هذه النسب ، كل قسم على حدة ، فينتج من ذلك النسبة المئوية لجملة القسم مقارنة بالشهر السابق . وبطريقة « السلاسل المتصلة » توصلنا الى الارقام القياسية الواردة في صفحة ١٦٥ باعتبار وسطي عام ١٩٤٩ يساوي ١٠٠

وقد تركنا هذه الارقام القياسية دون الخروج بها الى مقياس مجمل ريثما تتم دراستنا التي ستتخذها اساساً لتوحيد هذه المقاييس الخمسة .

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الاسعار

(٢) الارقام القياسية لاسعار المفرق

لما كنا نحتاج الى القيام بدراسات وافية من نفقات العائلة لنبني عليها الارقام القياسية لنفقات المعيشة ، وحيث انه تعذر علينا حتى الآن القيام بمثل هذه الدراسات الضيق جهاز مديريتنا ولعدم توفر المال اللازم لهذا الغرض رأينا ان نتصرف في الوقت الحاضر الى تنظيم الرقم القياسي لاسعار المفرق لاهم المواد الغذائية .

ويجب التنويه هنا الى ان الرقم القياسي هذا لا يمثل تكاليف المعيشة لكافة المواد الغذائية اذ لا يشمل اسعار الخضار والفواكه بل يستند الى ٢٢ صنفا حسب الجدول على الصفحة ١٦١ من هذه النشرة وحسب التفصيل المبين في الجدول ذاته .

وتجمع اسعار المفرق هذه اسبوعيا ويستخدم الوسطي الشهري منها للوصول الى الرقم القياسي بطريقة « الوسطي الاجمالي » على الوجه التالي :

اذا اشير الى الاسعار بالاصطلاحات س ١ س ٢ س ٣ الخ .. للاصناف ١ و ٢ و ٣ الخ .. خلال المدة الاساسية واشير الى الكمية ، وهي بمثابة الرقم التثقيلي المستعمل ، بالاصطلاحات ك١ ك٢ ك٣ الخ ... والى الاسعار حسب الشهور بـ س١ س٢ س٣ للشهر الاول والثاني والثالث الخ .. فتكون المعادلة :

$$\text{الرقم القياسي} = \frac{\text{س}_1^1\text{ك}_1 + \text{س}_2^1\text{ك}_2 + \text{س}_3^1\text{ك}_3 \ldots \text{(الشهر الاول)}}{\text{س}_1^0\text{ك}_1 + \text{س}_2^0\text{ك}_2 + \text{س}_3^0\text{ك}_3 \ldots \text{(المدة الاساسية)}} \times 100$$

(2) Index Number of Retail Prices : As it is beyond the means of this Department at present to conduct a family budget enquiry, on which to base the compilation of an index number of cost-of-living, we tended towards preparing an index number of retail prices covering mainly essential food commodities.

The index number of retail prices shown in the following table, is based on 22 items listed on page 161, of which 19 are foodstuffs and 3 are other essential items, namely soap, kerosene and cigarettes. Base retail prices are collected weekly and monthly averages thereof is used in arriving at the Index number by the «Aggregate» methods as per the following equation :

Where P1, P2, P3 etc... indicate the prices of items 1, 2, 3 etc... for the base period and Q21, Q3 etc... indicate the quantities involved, and P1 P2 P3 etc... indicate the prices in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. months.

$$\text{Index number} = \frac{\text{P.1Q.+P.1Q.+P 1Q...(for 1st month)}}{\text{P. Q.+P. Q.+P. Q...(for base period)}} \times 100$$

الارقام القياسية لاسعار المفرق لمدينة دمشق لاثنين وعشرين صنفا من اولي الضروريات (وسطي ١٩٣٨ = ١٠٠)

INDEX NUMBER OF RETAIL PRICES FOR 22 ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES IN DAMASCUS

(Base : Average 1938 = 100)

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

الارقام القياسية حسب السنوات Index Numbers by Years			الارقام القياسية حسب الشهور Index Numbers by Months				
Av. Year	الارقام القياسية Index No.	وسطي السنوات	Month	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	الشهور
1939	108.0	١٩٣٩	January	536.0	622.1	595.7	كانون ثاني
1940	157.6	١٩٤٠	February	535.2	626.4	589.8	شباط
1941	261.5	١٩٤١	March	526.4	594.2	572.7	آذار
1942	534.5	١٩٤٢	April	515.4	605.4	553.3	نيسان
1943	669.5	١٩٤٣	May	519.7	596.4	538.0	ايار
1944	741.2	١٩٤٤	June	539.5	590.2	533.3	حزيران
1945	830.5	١٩٤٥	July	551.7	586.7	536.0	تموز
1946	766.1	١٩٤٦	August	545.6	574.7	533.5	آب
1947	690.1	١٩٤٧	September	583.9	572.7	533.5	ايلول
1948	662.1	١٩٤٨	October	607.5	585.0	528.7	تشرين اول
1949	561.6	١٩٤٩	November	613.6	594.4	523.1	تشرين ثاني
1950	477.9	١٩٥٠	December	612.3	604.7	524.5	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

PRICES

435 AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES FOR 22 ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES AT DAMASCUS 1939 — 1953.
(Syrian Piastres)

Table No. 6

ITEMS	Unit	Weight	١٩٤١ 1941	١٩٤٢ 1942	١٩٤٣ 1943	١٩٤٤ 1944	١٩٤٥ 1945
Bread	Kilo	70	21,3	37,3	40,0	41,5	42,5
Sugar granulated	«	8	65,8	120,9	217,1	272,1	337
Rice	«	7	35,5	190,8	196,6	258,3	196
Burghul	«	9	27,4	78,1	109,8	95	88
Lentils, red	«	3	13,1	30,0	38,5	32	55
Broad-beans	«	2	14,9	68,5	100,5	54	65
Olive oil	«	5	100,4	183,8	216,3	260,8	401
Samneh	«	1	307,5	480,8	485,8	549,2	731
Mutton, boneless	«	5	103,3	233,3	362,5	441,5	388
Cheese, local	«	3	109,6	217,9	222,5	303,3	357
Treacle	«	2	24,2	66,7	107,0	75	70
Halawa	«	2	51	112	200	230	220
Olives	«	3	32	83,9	90,1	55	68
Eggs	10 eggs	5	47	95	115	114	120
Milk	Kilo	8	20,5	33,2	40,7	53,3	56
Tea	«	1/2	453,8	774,9	682,6	715	1,220
Coffee beans	«	1/2	136,3	144,2	160,4	155,4	313,5
Potatoes	«	7	15,2	39,6	43,4	46,6	33
Onions	«	5	6,5	20,7	21,3	13,3	31
Soap	«	2	78,5	151,5	188,8	234,4	328
Kerosene	20 kr.	2	665,5	427,4	528,4	543,3	627
Cigarettes	20 cig.	15	15,7	24,0	37,9	45,8	58,0

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

الأسعار

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وسطي اسعار المفرق لاثنين وعشرين صنفا من اولى الضروريات في مدينة دمشق ، ١٩٤١ - ١٩٥٣
(بالقروش السورية)

جدول رقم ٦

الصنف	الوحدة	التثقيل	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٦ 1946
خبز	كيلو	٧٠	34	39	32	26	33	45	42.5	42.5
سكر ناعم	»	٨	97	123	129	112	112	122	170	334
ارز	»	٧	117	111	85	63	78	108	166	127
برغل	»	٩	42	52	48	34	44	79	71	78
عدس احمر	»	٢	45	55	53	31	28	45	42	49
فول نابت	»	٢	47	57	61	27	29	73	66	54
زيت زيتون	»	٥	267	283	265	220	249	328	374	345
سمن ديري	»	١	503	632	535	490	749	800	743	722
لحم غنم بدون عظم	»	٥	325	350	320	398	355	347	430	351
جبنة بلدية	»	٢	196.5	248	225	218	266	282	298	320
دبس	»	٢	58	72	59	57	64	53	68	65
حلاوة طحينية	»	١	120	156	149	137	150	158	165	167
زيتون	»	٢	85	99	98	97	107	70	65	68
بيض	العشرة	٥	84	105	94	71	90	99	120	130
حليب	كيلو	٨	40	44	39	35	46	55	57	57
شاي	»	١/٣	437	464	533	508	514	587	687	1,315
قهوة (خضراء)	»	١/٢	574	529	511	430	235	250	252	272
بطاطا	»	٧	28	31	34	19	25	50	41	40
بصل	»	٥	21	23	11	12	19	28	16	17
صابون	»	٢	204	213	238	199	240	296	335	312
كاز	٢٠ ليتر	٢	382	387	400	401	457	430	448	590
لفائف التبغ بافرا ء	٢٠ سيكارة	١٥	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

الاسعار

الارقام القياسية لأسعار الجملة في مدينة دمشق حسب الابواب الرئيسية

(وسطي عام ١٩٤٩ = ١٠٠)

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Table No. 7

INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN DAMASCUS, BY GROUPS

(Average 1949 = 100)

جدول رقم ٧

Months	المواد الغذائية Food	المواد الاولية المحلية Local raw materials	المنتجات الصناعية المحلية Local manufactures	مواد البناء Building materials	المواد المشتعلة Fuel materials	الشهور
1952						١٩٥٢
January	121,4	132,7	109,2	95,4	92,6	كانون ثاني
February	120,3	131,3	108,2	95,4	89,7	شباط
March	121,9	128,3	106,6	94,7	86,3	آذار
April	125,0	117,5	106,4	94,3	86,0	نيسان
May	124,1	113,3	104,5	94,8	85,9	أيار
June	114,8	112,9	104,3	93,4	86,2	حزيران
July	110,4	117,9	104,6	93,9	80,6	تموز
August	112,4	119,2	102,5	92,9	78,5	آب
September	111,5	114,0	99,4	94,7	80,2	أيلول
October	114,2	115,0	97,4	95,6	90,1	تشرين اول
November	119,6	112,2	97,1	95,8	91,9	تشرين ثاني
December	120,9	111,1	95,3	96,5	88,3	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	117,9	110,5	89,6	94,7	86,5	كانون ثاني
February	113,2	109,3	86,3	94,0	82,2	شباط
March	115,0	108,1	88,1	94,2	82,6	آذار
April	113,1	103,5	87,8	93,7	79,9	نيسان
May	110,0	105,0	89,5	93,6	78,9	أيار
June	107,7	107,1	87,5	91,3	78,9	حزيران
July	106,2	102,7	87,4	88,6	79,8	تموز
August	101,5	104,5	87,1	87,6	79,4	آب
September	100,9	110,7	88,4	85,9	79,6	أيلول
October	100,2	118,8	84,9	85,7	82,9	تشرين اول
November	100,1	117,4	85,9	86,5	82,4	تشرين ثاني
December	98,4	118,8	86,2	86,8	81,9	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIAMD1

433 is a modern glass factory for window and mirror glass and for glass containers, with a total estimated annual capacity of over 14,000 tons. This enterprise has suffered from the fact that the sand has to be imported and also from being built before the necessary export market had been secured to keep its three ovens working. Flour mills are plentiful and more are to be constructed; the production of flour is about 400,000 tons a year. In Damascus there are two spaghetti factories and starch is also produced. Tinned fruit, jam, chocolates, and sweets are also produced in Damascus and there are factories for matches (output 45 million boxes in 1952), margarine, soft drinks, and shoes as well as a number of tanneries and workshops in Aleppo and Damascus. A paper mill has recently begun production, with an output of 4 million square metres of corrugated paper and cardboard boxes in 1952.

SYRIAN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

(Estimates for 1952)

Number of Factories	*Tons Capacity*
2 Cement	200,000
1 Sugar	10,000
1 Asphalt	variable
9 Edible oil*	12,000
68 Raw cotton ginning	600,000
3 Food preserving (major)	5,000
1 Glass (plate and rolled)	7,500
(containers)	8,000
3 Tobacco	2,000

* Olive and cotton seed.

(SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus 1952.)

Industry contributes only about a half as much as agriculture [186] to Syria's gross national product, but the spirit of nationalism has led the Government to give special support to local industries although not all are economically sound. As Syria lacks industrial raw materials, industries based on local agricultural produce should be encouraged rather than those which depend on imported raw materials and foreign markets.

Finance

436 648 The Syrian pound of 100 piastres (reputedly backed as to 60 per cent by gold and foreign currency) is linked to the French franc. Syria is a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a quota of $6½ million. War-time inflation subsided 435 439 by the end of 1948, but with the Korean boom in primary product prices and the subsequent export surpluses and heavy

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

investment in cotton growing, prices began to rise once more. 435
At the end of 1951 rising import prices, coupled with the poor 439
grain crop, were reflected in local retail prices, and prices continued to rise until mid-1952, when governmental action and steadier import prices had a salutary effect. Thus, generally speaking, the retail price of household goods has risen five or six times since before the war, and the currency in circulation has also risen despite the fact that the official credit policy has been restrictive; although the note issue is now only £S46 million higher than in 1946 (at 31 December 1951 it was £S248 million), bank deposits have increased from £S96·2 million at the end of 1949 to £S198·3 million at the end of 1951. At that date the currency was covered, as to gold 9·9 per cent, foreign exchange 6 per cent, commercial bonds 1·4 per cent, treasury bills 33·5 per cent, and state loans or guarantees 48·9 per cent.

Direct taxation on income and the land accounts for only 651
about a quarter of the Syrian budget;[1] this is less than before 652
the war, for the proportionate amount from the land has fallen from 30 per cent to about 14 per cent in 1950; the estimate for 1952 was 18 per cent. Receipts from customs duties have increased considerably and these, with other indirect taxes, have helped to make the burden less 'fairly' distributed. Indirect taxes are levied on sugar, petroleum, and other essential commodities. Budgetary expenditure since before the war has increased seventeenfold, and since 1949 the total annual expenditure has increased by more than a quarter; but whereas expenditure on health, education, and public works has increased only slightly, that on defence has trebled and accounts for over a third of total expenditure. Agriculture, with only 2 per cent of the budget, is insufficiently provided for and it is hoped that its share will be increased.

Banking is largely but not exclusively in the hands of foreign 453
banks; La Banque de Syrie et du Liban (French) has the concession for the note issue, but there is talk of starting a Syrian National Bank; among other commercial banks are La Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (French) and the British Bank of the Middle East. The foreign-exchange market 457
has always been less influential than that of Beirut, but in this respect Aleppo is growing in importance. There is a recognized free market for exchange[2] in which merchants and Government alike deal. The official rate of £S6·19 = £1, used mainly for Government transactions, was abolished in June 1953 for all purposes except Government transactions with petroleum com-

[1] See table 2, p. 502 below. [2] See table 3, p. 503 below.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope for widening the area cultivated and raising the yields, as the soil is fertile. In the Jezira the use of machinery could be extended—it is already increasing fast. Better livestock production could be achieved by greater use of fodder crops for which conditions are favourable: in the 'Duck's Bill' good clover grows wild. At present fodder crops are not considered worth cultivating.

In the Euphrates region there is great scope for extension of irrigation. But a large scale scheme would be costly because the river runs between high escarpments, which vary in distance between each other up to about 10 miles. To irrigate much larger areas it would be necessary to lift water over the escarpments. There are large areas of uncultivated land, particularly between Abu Kemal and Deir-ez-Zor. Even on the land already cultivated yields of wheat could be much higher: at present the yield is four to six times the seeding rate, and, according to local farmers, could be raised to ten to fifteen times the seed with better irrigation. The high cost of fuel oil is the limiting factor as it also is for tractor work. On the Khabur river improvement of the ancient barrages would permit an extension of irrigation.

It is in this area that there is real scope for a planned settlement of cultivators, with improved methods and a better system of land tenure. The obvious form for such settlement to take would be on the model of the Jewish co-operative farms, small holdings with collective use of machinery and working to a cropping plan; on the uncultivated land such settlement could be undertaken without incurring high capital costs.

So far as the Euphrates Valley is concerned, similar co-operatives based on communal control of water supplies might be started on a small scale. Large-scale irrigation here would be costly, and would necessarily have to be co-ordinated with the irrigation of Iraq. An immediate step needed is to reduce the price of fuel oil.

While it is easy on paper to see the possibilities of such schemes as these, it is not easy to see where in fact the motive power for them is to come from. They will not bring in quick big returns, which are what local farmers and landowners want: the district is remote and the main object of such investment would be a long period rise in the standard of living, in which the moneyed classes are not interested. Present-day Syria is not

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MD1

COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

248 442 **CLASSIFICATION**

Seed cotton is bought on three grades: good, medium, and low. On taking delivery the ginner inspects the seed cotton for grade and staple and directs it to storage houses adjoining the gins where an attempt is made to sort into grades and to mix the lots thoroughly before ginning.

Lint cotton normally is sold on a basis of four grades: No. 1, corresponding roughly to good middling; No. 2, strict middling; No. 3, middling; and No. 4, low middling. In normal seasons, three-fourths of the crop grades middling and above. Export sales usually are made on the basis of sealed samples or types, and some exporters will have as many as eight different types.

439

Table 25

SYRIA: Cotton Exports by Principal Destinations
September 1, 1951, through May 15, 1952

Country of Destination	Exports	Per Cent of Total
	Bales	Per Cent
France	66,900	48.1
United Kingdom	52,200	37.6
Italy	9,005	6.5
Spain	4,460	3.2
Poland	2,625	1.9
Germany	2,220	1.6
Belgium	658	.5
Sweden	610	.4
Netherlands	311	.2
Others	85	
Total	139,184	100.0

SOURCE: Trade Reports.

435 **PRICES**

During the period of world scarcity in 1950-51, prices of Syrian cotton on the local market advanced steadily to a high of slightly over 70 cents per pound. Export quotations were even higher. Prices declined during the 1951-52 season from approximately 50 cents a pound to 33 cents in the spring. Subsequently, the price firmed somewhat and during the summer cotton was selling in Europe for approximately the price of United States cotton on a dollar exchange basis. Syrian cottons, however, have been sold for soft currencies, and the discount must be taken into consideration.

Prices between grade 1 and grade 4 vary about 12 per cent.

Various producers expressed the view that a world price of about 30 cents a pound would be attractive to Syrian farmers and probably would stimulate further expansion. A world price much below this level, on the other hand, likely would discourage production.

A series of studies made by a large foreign firm interested in investing capital in cotton production and processing in Syria found that cost of production was below 20 cents per pound when normal yields were obtained but was much higher in poor years, such as 1951-52.

SYRIA MDI

Finance and public finance

453 652 454 The post-war period witnessed some important changes in Syria's monetary and banking system, in its foreign exchange system and in its public finances. The large increase in production, investment and commerce noted above had its counterpart in the development of the banking system 1/ and expansion of the money supply (see table 10), most of which has taken the form of bank deposits.

This expansion of the money supply in the post-war period has not been matched by a rise in prices. Between 1945 and 1949 the trend was downward. The discontinuance of Allied military expenditure, together with a sharp increase in the import of surplus, led to a sizable deficit on current account. 2/ Moreover, the 1945 and 1946 budgets showed a surplus, and although the 1947 and 1948 budgets closed with a deficit the amount involved was small. Investment remained at a low level. The Arab-Israeli war led to a large budget deficit in 1949; this was, however, offset by the very low level of investment and the huge import surplus. The index of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus fell from its peak of 831 in 1945 (1938 = 100) to 478 in 1949. 3/

•435 During the period 1950 to 1954, on the other hand, prices rose. The large-[454 scale investment in cotton, and the sharp increase in the quantity and value of exports of cotton and cereals, which led to a position approaching equilibrium 455] in the balance of payments (see table 53), raised incomes. Subsidiary factors 434 were pipeline construction, high building activity, 4/ and small budget deficits. The rise in import prices, aggravated by hoarding and speculation in 1950 and 1951, also played a part. The rise in prices remained, however, small in scale. The index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus, in which cotton has a heavy weight, rose from 100 in 1949 to 111 in 1950 and 136 in 1951; the fall in cotton prices led to a drop to 119 in 1952 and 110 in 1953. Improved cotton

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1/ Foreign banks account for the greater part of banking activities in Syria; in recent years several banks have opened branches in Syria and existing banks have set up new offices in the smaller towns. In the first half of 1954 seven new banks, mostly Syrian or Lebanese, were established, bringing the total to seventeen. The country is still, however, inadequately provided with long-term credit for agricultural and industrial development, a gap that has been only partly filled by the Government-owned Agricultural Bank and Government loans to industry (see above).

2/ It is difficult to distinguish between Syria's and Lebanon's shares in the trade of the customs union, but there is no doubt that Syria had a large import surplus. This was not covered by such receipts as revenue from petroleum companies and remittances sent by emigrants.

3/ Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract, 1953. There was no index of wholesale prices in Syria prior to 1949; the wholesale price index in Beirut fell from its peak of 1,038 in 1945 (1939 = 100) to 641 in 1949.

4/ Authorized floor space for new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945 to 166,000 in 1949, 209,000 in 1950, 162,000 in 1951, 210,000 in 1952 and 265,000 in 1953.

435 prices and greatly increased exports of grain in the first half of 1954, however,
434 once more raised incomes and prices and at the end of October the index stood at 129. 1/

Currency

457 Syria remained in the franc area until 1949. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, two important measures affecting both Lebanon and Syria were taken by the Mandatory Authorities. First, an Exchange Control was established, to which all foreign exchange earned by residents of both countries was to be paid; this included the sterling and other payments made by the Allied troops stationed in Lebanon and Syria. Secondly, the proportion of franc bills and bonds held as cover against the notes issued by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban and its deposits increased sharply until, by the end of the war, it came to constitute over 95 per cent of their combined total 2/ However, from May 1943 until March 1946 sterling was made available in unlimited quantities to residents of both countries; and in 1944 the value of the franc holdings of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban was guaranteed against any depreciation of the franc in terms of sterling.

In the post-war period the inability of France to supply more than a small fraction of the non-franc foreign exchange requirements of Lebanon and Syria, together with its repudiation of its guarantee of the sterling value of their franc balances, 3/ caused the Syrian Government to take steps to establish an independent currency.

In February 1949 it left the franc area, and simultaneously an agreement was reached with France regarding the Syrian franc reserves held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. These holdings, which amounted to 10,204 million francs on 24 January 1948, were divided into two parts. The first, consisting of 7,015 million francs, used as cover for the note issue, was guaranteed in terms of sterling by the French Government for a period of ten years, starting in January 1948. Provision was also made for releasing this sum to Syria, in fourteen semi-annual instalments, by 1955. The balance of Syria's holdings, consisting of 3,189 million francs, was not guaranteed in terms of any other currency. After deduction of French claims on Syria, aggregating £S 23.2 million for property left in that country, the balance was to be deposited in a special temporary account, to be used for purchase of European currencies other than the franc, at the French official rates.

1/ United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. The retail price index shows the same general movement, with a lag. It remained unchanged in 1950, at 478, rose to 556 and 594 in 1951 and 1952, respectively, fell to 544 in 1953, and continued to decline during the first half of 1954, standing at 482 in June.

2/ Said Himadeh, "Tatawurat al naqd al suri al lubnani", Al Abhath, September 1945 (Beirut).

3/ Said Himadeh, "Hawl mashru al itifaqia al malia al jadida", Al Abhath, March 1948 (Beirut). The French Government did, however, pay to Lebanon and Syria the difference resulting from the depreciation of the franc in December 1945.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

648 Hama et Prolongement' (D.H.P.) company. Since 1925 this
471 company had had an agreement with the local Governments by which the latter made good any losses incurred by the company in the working of the railways, and received a progressive share of any profits which were made.

452 There were a number of French financial institutions with interests in the Mandated Territories. The bank of issue, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, had its headquarters in Paris, and of its 25½ million francs of share-capital over 20 millions were in French hands, while twelve out of its sixteen directors were French, the remainder being Syrians
[436] and Lebanese. By an agreement made in 1924 and subsequently renewed, the Banque was given the exclusive right of issuing Syro-Lebanese currency. It also performed the functions of an ordinary commercial bank. In addition, a great deal of commercial banking, mortgage and land-credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie and the Compagnie Algérienne.

439 In 1938 France imported goods of greater value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other country except Palestine; and she exported to them goods of greater value than did any other country except Great Britain. The total value of her imports from them was 105,894,000 francs. The main articles which she imported were vegetables and fruits; she did not obtain from the Levant States any important raw materials for her industries. She exported to them 197,818,000 francs worth of goods, including large quantities of iron and iron goods, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods.[1]

471 The Mandated Territories were also important for French
649 commerce as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions: the civil air-ports were used as stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China. Moreover, one of the two pipe-lines through which the oil of Iraq is conveyed to the Mediterranean passes through Syria and Lebanon to reach the sea at Tripoli. This was of dual importance to France: first because French interests owned 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and secondly because France obtained between one-third and one-half of her total oil-supply from Iraq, by

[1] For detailed figures, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, p. 203.

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria

L 648 In regard to the 'Services Economiques' and certain other departments, the experiment was tried S 648 of administering them by joint Syro-Lebanese commissions; but for the most part the transferred services were administered separately by the two Governments. To the more ardent nationalists, this was an unsatisfactory element in a transfer which was otherwise to be welcomed. They complained also that the transfer was more in name than in reality, since for reasons of efficiency the French personnel of the services was retained temporarily.

S (ii) In February, 1944, an Anglo-French financial agreement was signed. It named a 'franc area' composed 648 of all territories under the control of the French 436 Committee of National Liberation, and fixed the rate of exchange at 200 francs to the pound sterling. With L 648 the agreement of the Syrian and Lebanese Govern- 436 ments, a special area fixed the rate of exchange of the Syro-Lebanese pound at 22.65 francs (it had previously been 20 francs), and thus prevented any change in the present rate of 8.83 Syro-Lebanese pounds to the pound sterling. The French Committee also agreed to revalue certain franc assets of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, to restore the gold formerly held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, and, should there be any further modification in the value of the franc, to guarantee the Syro-Lebanese pound against any resulting loss.

The agreement was widely criticized in Syria and Lebanon. It was regarded as contravening the allied declarations of June, 1941, which promised Syria and Lebanon full membership of the sterling bloc. Moreover, by weakening the link between the pound sterling and the currency of the two States, it created barriers between them and the other Arab States at a time when the movement for closer association between the Arab countries was gathering renewed strength. More important still, it was observed that the agreement was only temporary, and could be terminated by either party at three months' notice. When it should come to an end, there was a danger

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

453 bank, the principal depository of government funds and the bank of issue, dominates the banking system. There is only one government banking institution, the Agricultural Bank, which extends a limited amount of credit to agriculture. The banks engage principally in short-term financing of foreign and domestic trade. A few, particularly the BSL, now also grant seasonal credits for agricultural crop production up to a limit of 300 days. Competition among banks is keen. Interest rates on loans and advances have tended to decline and are now generally between 5% and 7%. As much as 2% to 3% is paid even on current deposits, with slightly higher rates on time deposits. Although the BSL, functioning in this respect as a central bank, is able and willing to provide ample rediscount facilities, other banks generally avoid rediscounting their paper with an institution they regard as their principal competitor. Foreign banks prefer to obtain any additional funds they may need from their parent institutions abroad. Thus, to meet the expanding credit needs in Syria, the commercial banks increased their liabilities abroad from £S 62 million at the end of 1952 to £S 98 million at the end of 1953; by June 30, 1954, such liabilities had risen to £S 117.9 million as compared with £S 95 million for the corresponding date of the preceding year. Because of their access to resources abroad most of the banks apparently do not consider it necessary to maintain a high proportion of liquid assets to short-term liabilities in Syria.

453 436 Although the use of checks has grown, internal payments are still predominantly effected in cash. This undoubtedly accounts for the fact that the proportion of private deposits to net note and coin circulation, although steadily growing, was still only 33% by the end of 1953. As of that time, as shown by Table 2, the total money supply[8] amounted to £S 376.3 million of which £S 271.5 million or about 72% represented notes and coins. The relatively small use of checking accounts also explains, at least in part, the high proportion of bank loans, advances and discounts for the private sector to total private deposits. At the end of 1953 the volume of such credit accommodation—£S 226.6 million—represented 247% of total private bank deposits. In most other countries the amount of bank credit to the private sector tends to be considerably less than the total of private deposits.

[8] Of the deposits, only the sight deposits of private persons and public enterprises have been included in money supply. The rate of turnover of deposits of the government and public administration is not very high.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

TABLE 2 Monetary and Banking Data

453

(Million £S) 436

	End of period				
				June	
	1951	1952	1953	1953	1954
Money supply					
1. Notes and coins (net)	236.1	234.7	271.5	249.0	298.5
2. Private and public enterprise deposits	58.9	76.0	104.8	97.8	123.4
3. Private and all public deposits	114.0	181.2	250.3	205.7	215.1
Total (1 and 2)	295.0	310.7	376.3	346.8	421.9
Total (1 and 3)	350.1	415.9	521.8	454.7	513.6
Monetary gold and foreign exchange					
Total at free rate	114.3	107.6	157.0	106.3	144.8
Percent of note issue	46.1	45.0	56.7	n.a.	n.a.
Deposits (sight and time)					
Public	111.9	128.3	188.9	149.4	181.0
Private	60.5	77.8	96.3	n.a.	115.0
Total	172.4	206.1	285.2	n.a.	296.0
Loans, discounts and advances	115.1	146.0	226.6	187.9	309.5

n.a. = not available.
SOURCE: Office des Changes.

In Syria, as in other underdeveloped countries of Asia, a considerable 452 volume of credit is extended outside the banking system by merchants, landowners and professional moneylenders. Some of these, particularly the merchants, rely in turn on regular bank credit. Most of the credit outside the banking system is extended in the agricultural sector of the economy and is a reflection partly of the inadequacy of such institutions as the Agricultural Bank and partly of the poor credit risk of the borrowers. Loans of this type generally carry high, usurious rates of interest.

Another feature of the credit system is the lack of any institution, outside the Agricultural Bank, for financing investment. There is no mortgage-financing institution for building, and no bank to provide investment capital for industry. The BSL has in the past extended investment credits to industry, but only with the guarantee of the government.

COMMUNICATION

205
436

عدد وقيمة الحوالات البريدية والبرقية (الداخلية والخارجية) ١٩٥٢ — ١٩٥٣

(باستثناء الحوالات السورية اللبنانية)

NUMBER AND VALUE OF POSTAL AND TELEGRAPHIC MONEY-ORDER
(Except Syrian Lebanon orders)

Table No. 19 — جدول رقم ١٩

Year	الحوالات البريدية والبرقية الداخلية Internal postal and telegraphic orders				الحوالات البريدية والبرقية الخارجية External postal and telegraphic orders				السنة
	الحوالات المسحوبة Orders drawn		الحوالات المدفوعة Orders paid		الحوالات المسحوبة Orders drawn		الحوالات المدفوعة Orders paid		
	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	العدد No.	قيمة ل.س. Value L.S.	
1944	52,377	16,721,616	52,095	16,682,615	1,369	22,991	3,179	140,010	١٩٤٤
1945	54,004	19,032,989	54,551	19,033,074	4,383	83,400	3,186	152,537	١٩٤٥
1946	78,994	25,383,943	77,631	25,399,643	5,255	101,871	3,423	174,536	١٩٤٦
1947	80,856	22,858,065	78,363	22,803,589	5,200	124,547	2,900	128,841	١٩٤٧
1948	94,343	30,480,117	94,108	30,536,095	696	14,137	400	34,503	١٩٤٨
1949	192,907	28,223,387	101,571	28,199,327	—	—	259	1,981,880	١٩٤٩
1951/52 (2)	172,513	49,448,443	166,065	48,982,901	—	—	178	7,885	(١)٥١/١٩٥٠
1950/51 (1)	183,364	63,896,949	181,972	63,827,579	—	—	174	7,800	(٢)٥٢/١٩٥١
1953	140,314	49,158,122	138,548	49,040,183	—	—	84	4,738	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Public Works.

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

(1) Fiscal period 1/1/1950 — 30/6/1951.
(2) Fiscal period 1/7/1951 — 31/12/1952.

(١) في السورة المالية ١٩٥٠/١/١ — ١٩٥١/٦/٣٠
(٢) في السورة المالية ١٩٥١/٧/١ — ١٩٥٢/١٢/٣١

النقد المتداول في الجمهورية السورية
(بالوف الليرات السورية)

CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION (L.S. '000)

Table No. 5

جدول رقم (٥)

436

As at the end of	المجموع Total	اوراق النقد المصرفية Bank notes	قطع فضية Silver coins	قطع معدنية Metal coins	الطوابع (الطوابع) Money stamp	في نهاية
December 1941	48,206	46,350	1,540	316	—	كانون اول ١٩٤١
« 1942	100,486	98,000	1,540	339	607	« ١٩٤٢
« 1943	165,575	161,750	1,540	339	3,946	« ١٩٤٣
« 1944	204,136	197,750	1,540	339	4,507	« ١٩٤٤
« 1945	210,683	205,250	1,540	339	3,554	« ١٩٤٥
« 1946	202,476	198,000	1,540	444	2,492	« ١٩٤٦
« 1947	183,206	179,500	1,540	444	1,722	« ١٩٤٧
« 1948	238,029	232,500	3,950	445	1,134	« ١٩٤٨
« 1949	242,058	236,500	4,040	1,518	—	« ١٩٤٩
« 1950	224,558	215,000	8,040	1,518	—	« ١٩٥٠
« 1951	257,275	248,000	7,790	1,485	—	« ١٩٥١
« 1952	250,422	239,000	9,938	1,484	—	« ١٩٥٢
« 1953	288,432	277,000	9,938	1,485	—	« ١٩٥٣
1952						١٩٥٢
January	258,473	249,000	7,988	1,485	—	كانون الثاني
February	255,773	246,000	8,288	1,485	—	شباط
March	253,073	243,000	8,588	1,485	—	آذار
April	253,079	243,000	8,588	1,485	—	نيسان
May	245,493	235,000	9,008	1,485	—	ايار
June	245,993	235,500	9,008	1,485	—	حزيران
July	242,993	232,000	9,008	1,485	—	تموز
August	237,843	227,000	9,358	1,485	—	آب
September	240,343	229,500	9,358	1,485	—	ايلول
October	240,342	229,500	9,358	1,484	—	تشرين اول
November	245,842	235,000	9,358	1,484	—	تشرين الثاني
December	250,422	239,000	9,358	1,484	—	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	250,423	239,000	9,358	1,485	—	كانون الثاني
February	258,423	247,000	9,358	1,485	—	شباط
March	251,423	240,000	9,358	1,485	—	آذار
April	253,423	242,000	9,358	1,485	—	نيسان
May	263,423	252,000	9,358	1,485	—	ايار
June	263,423	252,000	9,358	1,485	—	حزيران
July	258,423	247,000	9,358	1,485	—	تموز
August	257,423	246,000	9,358	1,485	—	آب
September	257,423	246,000	9,358	1,485	—	ايلول
October	278,423	267,000	9,358	1,485	—	تشرين اول
November	291,423	280,000	9,358	1,485	—	تشرين الثاني
December	288,423	277,000	9,358	1,485	—	كانون اول

FINANCE

436

تقلبات اسعار العملة الذهبية في اسواق مدينة دمشق
(بالليرات السورية)

FLUCTUATIONS IN THE PRICE OF GOLD SOVEREIGNS AT DAMASCUS
(In Syrian Pounds)

Table No. 6 — جدول رقم ٦

Monthly Average	سعر الليرة الانكليزية English Sovereign		سعر الليرة العثمانية الرشادية مكية New Turkish Sovereign		سعر الليرة العثمانية التجارية Old Turkish Sovereign		العدل الشهري
	شراء Purchases	بيع Sales	شراء Purchases	بيع Sales	شراء Purchases	بيع Sales	
1951							**١٩٥١**
January	43,53	43,57	36,69	36,73	32,19	32,23	كانون ثاني
February	42,65	42,69	36,31	36,35	31,54	31,58	شباط
March	42,12	42,17	34,84	34,86	31,23	31,27	آذار
April	42,69	42,72	35,08	35,10	31,18	31,25	نيسان
May	43,18	43,19	35,00	35,06	31,09	31,14	ايار
June	44,14	44,19	34,77	34,82	31,11	31,16	حزيران
July	43,03	43,07	34,66	34,70	30,79	30,83	تموز
August	43,48	43,52	34,35	34,39	30,73	30,77	آب
September	43,78	43,81	35,18	35,25	30,82	30,87	ايلول
October	44,14	44,19	35,57	35,61	30,93	30,97	تشرين اول
November	45,05	45,10	36,45	36,50	31,59	31,64	تشرين ثاني
December	45,14	45,17	36,34	36,39	31,59	31,64	كانون اول
1952							**١٩٥٢**
January	45,33	45,38	36,30	36,34	31,66	31,70	كانون ثاني
February	45,38	45,45	36,37	36,42	31,92	31,97	شباط
March	45,36	45,42	36,20	36,25	31,85	31,90	آذار
April	44,19	44,25	35,43	35,48	31,45	31,50	نيسان
May	44,39	44,45	34,02	34,07	31,16	31,20	ايار
June	43,44	43,50	33,89	33,95	30,96	31,00	حزيران
July	42,12	42,18	33,25	33,30	30,37	30,42	تموز
August	42,28	42,75	33,32	33,37	30,30	30,35	آب
September	41,92	42,00	33,34	33,40	29,86	29,90	ايلول
October	41,08	41,14	33,50	33,55	29,96	30,00	تشرين اول
November	40,66	40,72	33,77	33,82	29,93	29,97	تشرين ثاني
December	40,83	40,90	34,15	34,22	29,88	29,95	كانون اول
1953							**١٩٥٣**
January	40,75	40,78	34,45	34,55	30,17	30,26	كانون ثاني
February	40,03	40,13	34,56	34,66	29,96	30,06	شباط
March	39,52	39,61	34,45	34,58	29,77	29,87	آذار
April	38,59	38,69	33,95	34,05	29,70	29,80	نيسان
May	37,43	37,53	32,97	33,07	29,17	29,25	ايار
June	37,15	37,26	32,30	32,40	29,00	29,10	حزيران
July	35,95	36,20	31,23	31,25	27,83	28,10	تموز
August	35,47	35,65	31,61	31,66	28,02	28,10	آب
September	34,69	34,79	31,28	31,38	27,54	27,64	ايلول
October	33,85	33,96	31,09	31,19	27,38	27,48	تشرين اول
November	33,87	34,05	31,30	31,40	27,36	27,46	تشرين ثاني
December	33,79	33,98	31,43	31,53	27,18	27,28	كانون اول

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIAMDI

433 is a modern glass factory for window and mirror glass and for glass containers, with a total estimated annual capacity of over 14,000 tons. This enterprise has suffered from the fact that the sand has to be imported and also from being built before the necessary export market had been secured to keep its three ovens working. Flour mills are plentiful and more are to be constructed; the production of flour is about 400,000 tons a year. In Damascus there are two spaghetti factories and starch is also produced. Tinned fruit, jam, chocolates, and sweets are also produced in Damascus and there are factories for matches (output 45 million boxes in 1952), margarine, soft drinks, and shoes as well as a number of tanneries and workshops in Aleppo and Damascus. A paper mill has recently begun production, with an output of 4 million square metres of corrugated paper and cardboard boxes in 1952.

SYRIAN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

(Estimates for 1952)

Number of Factories	*Tons Capacity*
2 Cement	200,000
1 Sugar	10,000
1 Asphalt	variable
9 Edible oil*	12,000
68 Raw cotton ginning	600,000
3 Food preserving (major)	5,000
1 Glass (plate and rolled)	7,500
(containers)	8,000
3 Tobacco	2,000

* Olive and cotton seed.

(SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus 1952.)

Industry contributes only about a half as much as agriculture [186] to Syria's gross national product, but the spirit of nationalism has led the Government to give special support to local industries although not all are economically sound. As Syria lacks industrial raw materials, industries based on local agricultural produce should be encouraged rather than those which depend on imported raw materials and foreign markets.

Finance

436 The Syrian pound of 100 piastres (reputedly backed as to
648 60 per cent by gold and foreign currency) is linked to the French franc. Syria is a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a quota of $6½ million. War-time inflation subsided
435 by the end of 1948, but with the Korean boom in primary
439 product prices and the subsequent export surpluses and heavy

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436 In May 1949 the Government decreed that the unit of currency would henceforth be the Syrian pound, equivalent to 405.512 milligrammes of fine gold, and began depositing gold and foreign exchange as note issue cover.

652 In July 1949 agreement was reached with Lebanon regarding Syria's debt
436 on account of the Lebanese bank-notes, previously circulating in Syria and now withdrawn by the Syrian Government. The amount was fixed at LL 44 million and it was agreed that settlement would be made by payment of 4,078 million francs to Lebanon; most of this was paid in 1952.

On 28 March 1953 a legislative decree was promulgated, regulating the monetary system of Syria. A Money and Credit Board was established to co-ordinate and direct the activity of monetary and credit institutions. A Central Bank is also to be established; it will be administered by the Money and Credit Board, which is also charged with supervising and orienting the private banks 1/.

The law is being applied in stages. The Money and Credit Board was established in May 1953, and negotiations were started with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which at present issues the currency and enjoys several of the prerogatives of a central bank, regarding eventual transfer to the proposed Central Bank of the government deposits held by it and the assets and liabilities of its Issue Department. The concession of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban lapses in 1964, but the Government has declared that it will not necessarily wait until then to establish the Central Bank. In the meantime, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban continues to perform its previous functions.

The legislative decree provided that the cover of the note issue may consist of gold, foreign exchange, government bills and bonds, and advances made by the Central Bank; the percentage of gold and foreign exchange is not to fall below 30 per cent. On 31 December 1953, the gold and foreign exchange cover of the note issue amounted to £S 97.9 million at the official exchange rate - £S 156.7 million at free market rates; the latter figure represented 56.6 per cent of the value of the note issue; 79 per cent of the gold and foreign exchange cover consisted of gold, United States dollars or Swiss francs 2/.

Foreign exchange

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439 Concurrently with these developments in the monetary system, steps were taken to relax restrictions on foreign exchange, to stabilize exchange rates, and to organize the exchange market. The exchange control system established in

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1/ Ministry of Finance, Statut organique de la monnaie et creation de la banque centrale de Syrie (Damascus, March 1953).

2/ Bulletin issued by the Money and Credit Board, 5 January 1954. The total amount of reserves of gold and of currencies convertible into gold rose from £S 3.0 million at the end of 1948 to £S 8.2 million in 1949, £S 17.9 million in 1950, £S 29.1 million in 1951, £S 49.2 million in 1952, and £S 77.2 million at the end of 1953 François Crocco and Awad Barakat, La reforme du marché des changes en Syrie, (Damascus, 1954).

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Wells

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Wells may belong to private individuals, or they may be the property of the tribe. Ownership is based on the construction of the wells. The custom varies from place to place but, generally speaking, the person or tribe who has dug the well has primary rights over it. Should he not be using it, other people may do so.

Natural and Artificial Basins

Natural basins are freely used by all. Artificial basins are owned by a person or tribe. Persons other than the owners may be authorized to use these basins against the payment of a fee.

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Water Rights

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Water generally belongs to the owner of the land on which it is located. In areas where water is scarce, however, land and water can be sold and rented separately.

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In Soukhne, along the Euphrates, water sellers may be paid in money or in goods. The owners of small hydraulic enterprises (motor pumps, etc.) on the Euphrates are often paid by the farmers with half of their harvest for the water they furnish even though the cost of irrigation amounts to no more than 8 to 10 percent of the yield.

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According to custom, important personalities have water rights superior to those of the common people. Such rights, sometimes taken by force, are often no more than usage rights which do not imply the real ownership of a spring or a river.

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Ownership of water can be private or collective. Private ownership is rare and applies only to springs or wells of no great importance. It is to be found in densely-populated districts of the Mediterranean slope or in the cultivated steppes. Small gardens irrigated in this way are often individually set up by farmers or wealthy citizens as an investment of their capital. Such gardens are called <u>boustins</u>.

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available.

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers.

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal.

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families.

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

III The Shashans

163 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
463 Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
134 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

1621 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
439 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
452 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
439 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

164 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
163 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
195 language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

when the wheat crop fails, as it did last year, there is great hardship in all of the Jazirah. Debts remain largely unpaid, the value of land falls off sharply, and interest rates become unbearable

The failure of a crop in Jazirah brings more hardship than is the case in other Mohafazas because Jazirah, with all the money revenue which accrues to it in a good year, has not arrived yet at the stage where it can save a part of this income to use in bad years. All the money revenue is immediately reinvested in machinery and in expansion of the area planted with additonal sums borrowed from the banks or from Aleppo merchants.

The point is reached where further expansion has become difficult, and the situation will become more or less stabilized so that some of the income will be put aside for emergencies in the coming few years. But even when savings reach a high figure, the problem of monoculture is not solved.

Jazirah at present does not produce the necessary vegetables and fruit for its own consumption. It imports them from Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. That is why the cost of living in the town of the Jazirah is one of the highest in Syria. Aside from the price of meat and samneh, everything including room and house rents, is more expensive than in the other big towns of Syria. Even flour is sold to bakers by the town municipalities at the same price for which it is sold in Damascus.

In former times, however, Jazirah produced great amounts of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Its lands are very well suited to raising cattle and beef, an employment more profitable than wheat growing. A diversification in the use of land will make for a more balanced and prosperous economy in Jazirah. But the Jazirah farmers are not to be blamed entirely for the kind of agriculture prevailing. Circumstances beyond their control, connected primarily with the problems of land ownership and tenure, have largely imposed this type of monoculture upon them. These problems will be discussed in the following section, but it can be said in passing that the farmer cannot be expected to invest money in buildings for cattle raising, or in digging wells to provide irrigation for vegetable growing, or in planting orchards on lands to which he has no title or whose title is subject to constant disputes over boundaries with the neighbors and lately by decree-law 96 with the State.

361 At present, agriculture extends in an unbroken line from the
311 Turkish and Iraqi borders south to the Rad and Hassaksh, and west to
365 Ras el Ain and midway to Rakka. Qamishli has all the amenities of a fair-sized city with sewage, electricity, asphalted roads, running water, places of amusement, and modern office buildings and houses. The other towns of Jazirah show similar progress but in a smaller way.

454 All this development could not have been achieved without extensive use of capital. It was stated that the original emigrants to Jazirah whether Christians or Kurds, brought very little capital with them. Whatever they have now was made in Jazirah and not brought from outside.

I. Credit to the Bedouin and Kurd

4521 The nearest commercial market to Jazirah where credit was
438 available was Aleppo. Aleppo merchants first provided goods shipped to the towns of Jazirah to be smuggled into Turkey. And Jazirah merchants working on a commission or partnership basis made good profits. Some of them specialized in lending money to the Bedouins and Kurds and for them, also, credit was available at Aleppo. They borrowed at an interest rate of 9% and lent at 35-50%. Most of them, however, did not lend money outright as a general practice, but sold goods and especially textiles, coffee and sugar to the farmer against bills maturing at harvest time. The exorbitant interest was added over the price of the goods, and the peasant accepted it as a somewhat higher price and did not consider it as interest. Theis system still prevails at the present time.

II. Credit to the Machinery Owner

4521 With the expansion of agriculture and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, credit in much larger amounts became necessary. The farmer using machinery needed two kinds of credit. He needed credit to pay for his machines, and seasonal credit to cover a part of his expenses for wages, seed, fuel, and general expenditures.

In the first years of the War, dealers in agricultural machinery supplied a part of the need by selling on an installment basis for a period of 20 months. But between 1943 and 1948 they demanded cash payment before delivery. In the last four years, they have renewed their credit facilities.

441 It used to be one of the worst roads in Jazirah. At the end of this stretch begins the desert of Deir Ezzor 100 kilometers wide. Some sections of it where rainwater prevents the passage of cars are paved. Nevertheless, the road closes during several weeks in winter.

Another road built crudely by the British Army stretches from Qamishli to Kubur el Bid-Talkoshak-Mossul. It is paved with rough stones and it is only used by cars in winter. Beyond Tel Abu a road branches to Deirik and Ain Diwar.

[487] Aside from these, all Jazirah roads are tracks. There are no roads between Amuda, Derbassiya and Hassakeh, nor between Ras el Ain and Hassekeh, nor between the more important villages clustering around the several towns.

The absence of bridges across the Jagjag renders communication more difficult especially in winter when the waters of the river rise. There is a bridge at Qamishli, another one at Tal Brak 40 kilometers south and a third one at Hassakeh. In the relatively crowded villages near Qamishli along both sides of the river, crossings are effected with great hardship by loaded trucks especially in winter.

II Roads Between Jazirah and Aleppo

361 Aleppo is the nearest commercial center to Jazirah. It is
438 the market for Jazirah grains, wool, samneh and hides. It provides
491 Jazirah with all its needs of cement, textiles and all kinds of imported goods. That is why daily communication between the two regions is vital to Jazirah, but the Government has not judged it yet necessary to construct an all-weather road. Such a road exists in
491 more or less good shape from Qamishli to Hassakeh and to Point 47. From there on, the road to Rakka is closed all during the winter months and travel to Deir Ezzor is interrupted whenever there is heavy rain. The northern and shorter road Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo is also closed in winter for goods and passengers. The shortest road and that which passes through the best developed areas is the one which follows the railway line Qamishli-Amuda-Dirbassiya-Ras el Ain-Tal Abiad-Jarablus-Aleppo. It is 420 kilometers long as contrasted with 465 kilometers for Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo, and 485 kilometers for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Rakka-Aleppo and 565 for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Deir Ezzor-Aleppo which is the usual route followed in winter.

IV. Telephone, Telegraph and Air Communication

206 In 1950 telephone communication became possible with
509 Jazirah for the first time on a commercial basis. Telegraph communication has long been established and an air service connectin Qamishli with Aleppo and Damascus started in 1946, then interrupted by the Palestinian War, has been resumed twice weekly. Fares from Qamishli to Aleppo and Damascus are LS 25 and 50, respectively.

V. Railway Line Projects

185 Railway lines wholly inside Syria from Jazirah to the interior cities have been suggested by the Gibb report and by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. They suggested a line from Tal Koshak to Hassakeh and from there to Rakka and Aleppo. Such a line would by-pass Qamishli which is the more important agricultural and commercial center, and would go in a district only newly developed, sparsely populated and not of the fertility of the Qamishli area. It seems that a line starting from Qamishli itself would be shorter and would service a more fertile and populated district. From Hassakeh the line could follow the Khabur as long as possible before veering to Deir Ezzor. This would be longer than the proposed line from Hassakeh to Rakka directly, but it would have the advantage of servicing the Khabur Valley and collecting its crops, whereas, the line Hassakeh-Rakka is completely desert. From Rakka there is only one route to Aleppo.

It is difficult to choose between a policy of road construction and railway lines without detailed study of the economics of both, but, whatever the result of the study, Jazirah needs cheap and easy means of communication.

COMMERCE OF JAZIRAH

438 It stands to reason that the commerce of Jazirah is mainly in its
441 taple prodcuts and in the goods required for the development of its essential industry which is agriculture.

The main crop being wheat, it forms the largest item both in bulk and in value. But the Jazirah merchant plays a secondary role in the handling of this crop. He is sometimes a partner, but more

often an agent of the Aleppo merchant who furnishes the capital 438
and has the necessary warehouses in Aleppo and the commercial 441
knowledge and connections in the Syrian market and abroad to dispose of the crop at the best terms.

I. The Problem of Storage and Warehouses

The dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo merchants is such that 438
until the present time there is not a single warehouse or silo to store 241
wheat for a few months in all Jazirah belonging to an individual merchant or big farmer. During harvest season, the wheat is stacked in the open near the railway stations and left without cover until it is shipped to Aleppo. The hangers of the stations can only hold a small part of the crop. The Mira built a few depots but it is not known whether they will be put at the disposal of merchants.

The special conditions of cultivation in Jazirah connected with the problem of credit and land ownership make the transport of wheat from the farms to the stations during harvest season a hectic affair. This is caused by two reasons: in the first place, the farmer is always in need of money and has to ship his crop quickly to Aleppo to sell it, and, secondly, even if the big farmer is not in need of money, he does not feel it is safe to keep his crop in the villages. In most cases, he is only a tenant and it does not pay for him to construct a depot on land, he does not own. Even if he owned the land, he would hesitate to keep his crop away from the market until the winter months when he might need money but might find himself unable to transport his crop because of bad roads.

The logical solution would be to construct warehouses in the towns or near the stations, but, here again, the lack of capital prevents the accomplishment of this job.

The Kurd is the only farmer who keeps a part of his crop on the 241
land. As a good and thrifty peasant, he stores his seeds, the pro- 251
visions for his family and usually an amount of wheat equal to the seeds he planted. If anything remains, he sells to buy clothes and foodstuffs. The Kurd keeps the extra wheat he has in holes dug in the ground called "jifr". The hole is usually two meters in diameter and 2-3 meters deep. It is lined with "tibn" to keep the moisture away and the wheat remains in a good condition in it for several months. The peasant has a number of these jifrs depending on the

241 amount he has to store. The jifrs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifrs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

439 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep. The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer
221 and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

total Syrian cereals. Only Aleppo was ahead of it with 30% of the total production. (Gibb Report, table 16, p. 28) At present, it is probable that Jazirah surpasses Aleppo in cereal production and with an area approaching that of the Mohafazat of Aleppo, it is potentially more productive because of the Jagjag and Khabur Rivers which make possible a more diverse agriculture. 438

The problem of land ownership is bound to be settled in some way and credit is expanding gradually so that the dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo may diminish with time. The lack of lands and the constant increase in population will force the farmer to turn to intensive cultivation which in turn requires more labor and creates jobs for more people. The towns will benefit from increased production and population and will prosper and grow in their turn. It is logical to anticipate that Jazirah merchants will try to dispose of their crops without the help of Aleppo entrepreneurs. This makes for increased profits and more propserity. It is also reasonable to expect that a small industry based on the processing of agricultural products, such as flour mills, vegetable oil, starch, fruit, and vegetable conserves, will be established in the town of Jazirah. When cotton becomes an established crop, it is economical to gin it in the nearest town and save the cost of transport. The seeds will be needed for planting, for the extraction of oil and for cattle feed. 185

Qamishli is the only town of consequence in a fertile area of 700,000 hectares almost all cultivable in one way or another in the Qadas of Qamishli and Dijla. It is the chief town between Mossul and Aleppo, a distance of some 700 kilometers. Nisibin the older town now in Turkey was alwasy an important commercial center in the old times and Qamishli now has taken its place. It would not be surprising if in another 20 years Qamishli attained a population of 80,000. 361

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

311 rainfall is supplemented by the water brought down from the mountains
133 by its rivers. The principal of these is the Euphrates which has its headwaters in Turkey and flows in a generally southeasterly direction across Syria into Iraq. Together with its most important tributary, the Khabour, which also rises in Turkey, it accounts for 90% of the total annual flow of all Syrian rivers. In the west the largest river is the Orontes which is fed by springs from the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges and flows northward through the marshy area known as the Ghab into Turkey. Farther south the Barada river, rising in the Anti-Lebanon, supplies life-giving water to the fertile Ghouta oasis around Damascus. In the extreme south the Yarmuk river flows along the Jordanian frontier into the Jordan river. Although the flow of these rivers is highly seasonal, it is on the effective utilization of their waters that much of the future development of Syria's agriculture depends.

Principal Regions

631 Administratively Syria is divided into nine *mohafazats* or provinces, each in charge of a *mohafez* or governor; the province is in turn divided into *qadas* or counties headed by a *kaimakam;* and the county is further subdivided into *nahiyes* or townships in charge of a *mudir*.

244 Of greater significance, however, are the principal economic regions.
438 Farthest south are the adjoining regions of the Hauran and Djebel Druze.
311 The Hauran plain, an area of rather high but apparently declining fertility, has long been known as a granary, even in Roman times. Its principal crop is wheat, but barley, maize, sorghum and pulses are also important. To the east rises the Djebel Druze, a basaltic dome, where the Druzes, a proud and independent people, eke a bare living from the pockets of fertile soil in their mountains. Here the pressure of population on the land is acute. Agricultural holdings in the Hauran and Djebel Druze are predominantly small. There is little irrigation, and annual rainfall, averaging less than 12 inches, is barely adequate for dry farming. Sharp fluctuations in rainfall frequently make farming precarious. One of the principal problems of this region is the scant supply of underground water even for drinking.

To the northwest of the Hauran lies the higher, rolling Julani plateau stretching toward the Hermon range. This stony region is suitable only for grazing and, to some extent, for orchards. To the north a narrow band

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

of cultivation leads to Damascus where semi-desert conditions prevail and rainfall is generally inadequate for dry farming. Thanks to the waters of the Barada river, however, Damascus lies in a fertile oasis, known as the Ghouta. It is pre-eminently an area of orchards and vineyards yielding olives, fruit and nuts. Vegetables, hemp and, more recently, sugar beets are also important crops and extensive dairying is carried on. Damascus, linked with the nearby Lebanese port of Beirut by road and narrow-gauge rail, is one of Syria's two leading industrial centers, the other being Aleppo. Aside from the textile factories which constitute the principal industry, Damascus has plants for the production of cement, glass, vegetable oils, soap, leather and boots and the canning of foodstuffs.

North-northeast of Damascus up to the plains of Homs the country is for the most part rugged and barren, with occasional oases. From Homs to Aleppo stretches an extensive plain which is, along with the Jezireh, the most important agricultural area in Syria. Rainfall is fairly adequate, ranging from an annual average of around 600 mm. (23.6 inches) at Homs to a little less than 400 mm. (15.7 inches) at Hama and Aleppo. The region is the site of the largest completed government irrigation scheme, the Homs-Hama irrigation network, fed from Homs lake; extensive areas are also irrigated by wells, river pumps and water wheels. Northwest of Hama lies the large marshy area known as the Ghab into which the Orontes river pours its water and which the government is just beginning to reclaim. The Homs-Hama-Aleppo area has become the center of cotton and sugar beet cultivation, and it produces roughly one-third of the country's wheat and almost one-half of its barley. West of Aleppo extensive orchards and vineyards produce olives, fruits and nuts. The landholdings of the area are generally large and for the most part cultivated by sharecroppers, who earn a bare living. Around Aleppo mechanized agriculture is developing on some scale.

Aleppo, the principal grain market and commercial center of the country, has also developed considerable industry, featuring cotton ginning and textiles, vegetable oil extraction and soap making, and cement. Homs, with its new sugar factory, a modern textile dyeing plant, several flour mills and a large number of small weaving enterprises, has also achieved some industrial importance.

West of Homs and Hama lies the province of Latakia, facing the Mediterranean. It receives the highest rainfall—up to 1,000 mm. per year—and has a subtropical climate. Its rather narrow coastal plain boasts a

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diversified agriculture yielding tobacco, cotton, legumes, melons, olives and some citrus as well as winter cereals. Its principal city, Latakia, is a rapidly growing port serving as an outlet for the large agricultural output of northern Syria. The coastal plains and the mountains of the province are the country's most densely populated areas.

East of Aleppo lie two distinct agricultural regions, one the belt of rain-fed cultivation stretching along the Turkish frontier and comprising principally the province of the Jezireh, the other, the irrigated Euphrates valley. The Euphrates flows in a southeasterly direction through an arid region but the water taken from the river by hundreds of pumps makes possible extensive cultivation of cereals in the winter and cotton and other crops in the summer. Cultivation is principally by sharecroppers. Deir ez Zor is the largest city in the Euphrates valley. The Jezireh in northeastern Syria has now become the country's principal granary. Once the home of roaming, warlike Bedouins, it was pacified and thrown open to settled agriculture only during the last two decades. Beginning in the second World War, cultivation was rapidly expanded until now the Jezireh produces almost half the country's wheat and a considerable amount of barley as well. Dry farming predominates, with cultivation extending from Hassetche, the capital of the province, where rainfall is marginal, northward to the Turkish border where rainfall is heavy and the region's principal commercial center, the bustling town of Kamichliye, is located. In the valleys of the Khabour and Jagh-Jagh rivers, however, there is some irrigated cultivation, with cotton and rice as the principal crops. In this sparsely settled region, dry farming is carried on in large holdings —in some cases more than 100,000 hectares—and with fleets of tractors and self-propelled combines. The principal problem of the region is transport, for it is served inadequately by a railway running in and out of Turkish territory and by roads and tracks which are impassable for part of the year.

South and southwest of the Euphrates and extending toward Hama, Homs and Damascus lies a large, rough, triangular area, the Syrian desert. This desert or steppe area, although dotted here and there by an oasis, is too arid to support cultivation. Vegetation springs up briefly following the scant winter rains and supports during this time large flocks of sheep and goats tended by Bedouin tribesmen who are also engaged in the breeding of camels. Inadequate water supplies and occasionally severe weather make serious inroads on the flocks from time to time.

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operation, in striking contrast to large private holdings where the most modern machinery is used. Measures to raise the standard of living of this group must be one of the main objectives of any development program; in the first instance this must be effected through education, improved systems of land tenure, and better credit facilities.

Lessees and landlords. Some city dwellers have interests in agriculture as leasehold operators of tracts of state domain, or as absentee landlords. Although their interests rarely coincide with the demands of sound long-term farming practices, this segment of the population has been instrumental in opening new farm tracts (such as the Jezireh) and in introducing new crops, thereby contributing much to the national economy. The cultivation of the large absentee holdings is generally left to sharecroppers.

Sharecroppers. Each sharecropper is assigned a parcel of land from which, after the apportionment of the crop, he can hope to gain little more than a bare subsistence. In rainfed areas the sharecropper customarily receives rather less than 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor and around 70–75% if he also supplies the working capital; the percentages may be slightly higher in sparsely populated areas, and lower where population pressure is heavier. On irrigated lands the landlord takes 65–75% of the crop if he provides seed and water, and about half if the sharecropper provides the working capital.

In the long run, the position of the sharecropper would be more tolerable if the productivity of the land and his share of it were raised. At present, yearly land assignments may vary, with the result that the cropper has no incentive to improve the land. The restricted area of the assignment and lack of proper equipment, draft animals and money capital contribute to the permanent indebtedness of sharecroppers and their very low standard of living. Measures to improve their lot should include improved tenure status, Agricultural Bank and cooperative assistance in providing working and fixed capital, and resettlement schemes to relieve local land pressure.[1]

Agricultural Regions

In terms of natural conditions and the types of agriculture practiced, Syria can be divided in nine main agricultural regions.

The Hauran and the Djebel Druze. The Hauran and the Djebel Druze includes the mountains of the Djebel Druze and the Julani in the south-

[1] See Chapter 3, Sections III and VI, of the Main Report.

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244 west corner of Syria. The cultivated soil varies from fertile shallow chest-
458 nut in the Djebel Druze to the very fertile deep brown of the plains of
311 Hauran. Part of the shallow, reddish-brown soil extending towards the Anti-Lebanon and the basin of Damascus is uncultivable because of its stony character.

The small to medium-size farm is characteristic of this region. Mules and oxen are the customary draft sources, mechanized agriculture being restricted to the few larger holdings. Wheat and barley are the main winter crops; vetch, lentils and sorghum the summer crops. The acreage under irrigation is insignificant. Although now outstripped by the newly opened Jezireh, the Hauran, famous as a granary in the Greco-Roman period, remains a leading cereal-producing area, and the yields in comparison with other areas are high. Excellent grapes and other fruits are produced in the Djebel Druze, but because of unfavorable market conditions and outlets and the lack of processing facilities and storage, much of each harvest is wasted. In the Julani region, where crop production is uneconomical because of the stony character of the landscape, but where good grazing-conditions prevail, double-purpose cattle, for meat and draft, are raised successfully. In this area, land pressure is an urgent problem, especially in the Djebel Druze where many uneconomical small farms hamper progress.

Damascus basin foothills of the Anti-Lebanon. The ample layer of fertile reddish-brown soil of the Damascus basin becomes slightly saline in the Merj and towards the swamps of Lake Ateibe, though under drainage and irrigation these areas would probably be suitable for crops. The bottoms of many of the Anti-Lebanon valleys are covered with more or less deep layers of light brown to dark brown soils of moderate to high fertility, with gravelly alluvium bordering the western foothills. Irrigation water is obtained from the numerous streams, and the basin of Damascus is entirely watered by the Barada river coming from the fertile Zebedani valley. The Barada and many of the small streams offer possibilities of storing winter waters for the future expansion of irrigation.

Numerous orchards and vineyards are found in the Ghouta and in the various valleys, producing considerable quantities of fruits, grapes and nuts. Vegetable, hemp and fodder products, and in recent years cotton and sugar beets,[2] form the main agricultural crops of the Ghouta. Wheat and barley are the traditional regional winter crops and beans and peas the summer ones. As a rule farms are of small to medium size; particularly in the

[2] Sugar beet production in 1955 is expected to be over 30,000 tons.

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Ghouta, dairy farming has been developed. The typical Damascus dairy breed is an excellent milk producer and apparently quite resistant to the heat.

The basins of Jairout, El Daou and Palmyra. The third region consists of the brown to grey desert soil. Crop and fruit cultivation, possible only under irrigation, is carried out in small depressions and plots along the bordering mountains where deep layers of very fertile soil occur. During the Greco-Roman period and earlier, a great part of these extensive basins, including the oasis of Palmyra, still famous for its fruits, were prominent producing centers. There are indications that moderate quantities of subterranean water exist.

On some of the best terrain, particularly on the watered alluvial soils, the intensive cultivation of sugar beet, cotton and wheat is possible. At Ain el Barde, for example, record yields are now obtained and reseeding of some of the large natural pasture now used by Bedouins appears to be feasible.

The western plains and hills. The gently undulating land northeast and southwest of Aleppo, the plains of Hama and Homs, and the hills east of the Djebel Ansariya may be broadly grouped as a single region. Soil types range widely from the stony and gravelly desert to the terra rossa and chestnut brown. Local productivity varies greatly with soil and rainfall, but taken as a whole this region ranks very high among producing areas.

The main winter crops are wheat and barley; vetch, beans and sorghum are the principal summer crops. Roughly one-third of the country's wheat production and nearly one-half of its barley come from this region. During the last few years, however, sugar beet and cotton have established themselves as cash crops, and in 1953 the region's cotton output accounted for about three-quarters of Syria's total production. Fruit and nuts in substantial quantities are produced in large orchards, sizable vineyards and olive groves in the Homs, Idlib and Aleppo areas. Most of the land holdings are large, cultivated mainly by sharecroppers; small holdings are in the minority and many of these are too small to be economically justified. As a rule, the best land is already cultivated and though large state domains exist, there is very little land available for further crop expansion. Farm machinery is becoming more common, although the area is still cultivated mainly by the *feddan* and other obsolete implements. Dairy farming is practiced around the larger population centers (e.g., Aleppo) but the industry is still in its infancy and pure-bred stock has been imported by only

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241 a few progressive farmers. Mixed farming and pure sheep farming could
● 438 be successfully pursued in the eastern part of this region, but here, as else-
311 where, the greatest handicap is the land tenure system and unfavorable sharecropper conditions.

The coastal plains of Tartous and Latakia and the foothills of the Djebel Ansariya. Along the Mediterranean seashore up to 80% of the deep light sandy soil lends itself well to tree cultivation, particularly to irrigated citrus cultivation.

In general the region is well suited to highly diversified agriculture; the present system is that of winter cereals and vetch and summer crops such as summer legumes, melons and tobacco. About three-quarters of Syria's tobacco is grown in this agricultural district, Abu Riha, Chek el Bint and Tombak being the best known types. The recent cotton boom had its repercussion in this area, particularly as cotton can be grown without irrigation. The region is also well known for its olive groves. Citrus cultivation has gained in importance during the last decade but has only recently begun to receive the governmental attention it deserves.

Manpower is plentiful but land is scarce. The whole region is characterized by small and frequently uneconomic farms of less than 10 hectares. Pressure on the land is particularly evident in the foothills where crops are often farmed on marginal and submarginal land. Manual and animal draft operations are the rule, mechanized farming the exception. Livestock production and dairy farming is insignificant though in many parts of this region they would offer a better yield than does the existing farm system.

The central and northern plains, including the Jezireh. The central and northern plains region follows the line of the "fertile crescent", a strip varying in width from 50 to over 100 kilometers, extending in a semi-circle around the Syrian desert. Shallow reddish-brown type soils prevail, light at the fringe of the sub-desert, deeper, darker and more fertile toward the north. Landholdings are generally large and include great tracts of state domain. The size of individual estates runs from a few hundred hectares in the centrall plains to several hundred thousand hectares in the Jezireh.

Agriculture is extensive, rather than intensive, and the general manpower shortage has accelerated the introduction of the most modern equipment to cultivate and harvest the region's cereals and small grains. This is particularly true of the Jezireh, which, unlike the central plains, has been only recently opened to organized agriculture, and is now Syria's largest wheat and barley producing area; it accounts for over 40% of total Syrian

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wheat production. While the best soils are practically all in production, large areas of medium quality and marginal land are still available and some of these might be cultivated after an appraisal of their productivity. The recent speculative farming wave is responsible for the neglect of such appraisals and far too much marginal land has been broken up and cultivated. Dry farming in this belt (particularly south, east and west of Hassetche) depends greatly on the amount and distribution of the rains.

Although wheat and barley are the principal crops, mention must be made of the cotton and rice grown in the irrigated Khabour valley. The high cotton prices of recent years encouraged speculative cotton growing with varying degrees of success. Rice cultivation has been rather successful, but as it demands the highest water duty the cultivated area has declined somewhat in favor of cotton.

The northeast corner of the Jezireh. Toward the region of Deirik the brown soils of the steppe give way to chestnut brown, with rich black soil in the extreme corner of Deirik. The well-watered plains and undulating lands are intersected by the Jagh-Jagh, Khabour and Soutane rivers and their numerous tributaries, making possible irrigation over vast areas. Tractor cultivation is developing rapidly in this newly opened area, although in comparison with the western Jezireh and the steppe belt the region is less mechanized and more densely populated.

Practically all crops could be grown even without irrigation but wheat and barley are the leading winter crops and sorghum and sesame the main summer crops. Rice is an old staple but is now giving ground to cotton. In the region of Deirik good grapes, excellent potatoes, tomatoes and other vegetables are successfully grown but inadequate transport and storage facilities make their economical exploitation difficult. Livestock, particularly sheep, has greatly declined, due to the expanded crop area. The land is very well suited to raising cattle and beef. A diversification in land use would result in a more balanced and prosperous economy.

The valleys of the Euphrates and Khabour, and the Ghab depression. Though situated in entirely different regions and consequently showing different physiographical aspects, the large river valleys may be classified together in terms of soil fertility, cultivation methods, land tenure systems, population density and development potential.

In the Euphrates and Khabour valleys, the alluvial soil of deep silt loam has excellent agricultural qualities. The soil in the Ghab marshes, lying astride the Orontes about 40 kilometers east of Latakia, consists mainly of

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241 heavy clay alluvium in the valley proper and terra rossa and some peat soil
458 along the slopes. Whereas drainage is the main problem in the Ghab, the
311 problem in the Euphrates and Khabour valleys is to extend irrigation so as to double the present cultivated area. The farms vary from rather large holdings of absentee landlords, cultivated by sharecroppers, to very small farm units owned and worked by the farmer himself.

Crop rotation followed in the irrigated area of the Ghab generally takes the form of barley, cotton, wheat and cotton, while the rotation in the Euphrates valley is similar to that in dry farming regions: cotton or summer crop, fallow, winter wheat.

Yields are generally higher than in the rainfed regions but full use is not made of the available water and the irrigation methods are backward in many parts. Though better yielding cash crops have been introduced, the farmer as a rule cultivates only the few traditional crops. In these areas agricultural education could do much to further more economic water utilization and wider crop diversification.

The lands in the immediate vicinity of the rivers are fully irrigated but not fully utilized during the entire year. Hundreds of thousands of hectares on the somewhat higher land on both banks of the Euphrates and in the lower Khabour valley form a potential future reserve, though the capital outlay required to bring them under cultivation would probably have to be furnished by the government.

The central plains of the Syrian desert. In the central plains low rainfall and extreme temperatures render agricultural production practically non-existent but the desert is quite important as a natural grazing area (except during the absolutely dry months) for the sheep and camels of nomadic Bedouin tribes. Many parts of the desert, particularly the large depressions, could be better utilized if desert wells were constructed.

134 *Types of Soil*

311 The soils of Syria rank from the world's best to the poorest roughly in the order of (1) alluvial, (2) black, (3) chestnut brown and terra rossa, followed by (4) brown and reddish brown, and (5) grey sub-desert. According to a preliminary survey conducted by an FAO soil specialist the area covered by each of these various types of soil is approximately as follows (in thousand hectares):

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Grain Milling

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The grain milling industry is spread widely throughout Syria. The Ministry of National Economy records over 360 small enterprises with a total of 311 mills and 257 cylinders, employing about 1,700 workers. Many of these are very small units driven by a diesel engine or by water power. In addition, there are five larger mills in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs fitted with modern machinery and employing a total of about 250 workers.

Other Industries

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Syria has many minor industries, some of long standing, others new. These include enterprises for the manufacture of paints and colors, biscuits, spaghetti, confectionery, metal containers, furniture, domestic utensils, liquid gas, alcoholic and other beverages, ropes, tiles, cement piping, plastics, cosmetics, cardboard, plywood, pins, nails and springs, and establishments engaged in refrigeration, processing of licorice root, casting of iron, brass and other metals, manufacture of hand and machine tools, repair of motor vehicles and accessories.

Deposits of asphalt near Latakia are being worked by a company which produces raw and processed asphalt and asphalt tiles.

II APPRAISAL OF INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS

Location

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The Damascus, Aleppo and Homs-Hama areas are the main centers of manufacturing industry, a logical location in terms of accessibility of raw materials, communications, water and power services, skilled labor and the proximity of markets. These industrial towns, conveniently situated at a distance of less than 150 miles from the nearest seaports, and connected with these by road, rail or both, are the natural market places for agricultural products and the largest centers of consumption for manufactured goods. Latakia, next in importance, is a rapidly growing port town.

433, 162, 464, 439

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

The Syrian economy in 1945 was distinguished by its relatively low 433
production of a generally poor quality. It lay in a state of decadence and stagnation that could only have been remedied by energetic action by the authorities in power. It was a virgin country waiting for people willing to work hard to develop its resources in the fields of agriculture, industry and commerce.

Agriculture in Syria occupies first place, whether considered 433
from the point of view of production or the number of those who 241
earn a living from it. It produces the largest part of the country's exports and supplies the national industries with raw materials. But, despite its preponderance over other economic activities farmers remained up to 1945 dependent on ancient methods, and were ignorant of such modern techniques as the use of machines and fertilizers. Syrian agriculture suffered helplessly from the crop rotation system, from natural pests, insects and diseases, from rain variations and the unscrupulousness of money lenders.

As to industry, it was in its infancy, still feeling its way and 433
lacking encouragement, protection, adequate studies, knowledge and experience.

Nor was commerce in a better situation than agriculture and in- 439
dustry. During the second world war, Syrian trade lost its relations 457
with many of the belligerent countries, and emerged from the war crippled and hampered by the restrictions of exchange control. In addition, the direction of Syrian commerce was not in the hands of Syrian nationals; the larger part of foreign trade, both exports and imports, was handled through Beirut. As a result Syrian merchants lost direct touch with countries abroad and Syria became in effect an internal market dealing in retail with neighbouring markets. Commercial agencies were in the hands of non-Syrians up to the extent of 95 per cent of the total. To complete the picture we should mention that a large part of banking operations with foreign countries took place in banks situated outside Syria, and that the purchase and sale of foreign exchange accruing to Syria was effected in the Beirut market. To conclude, control of Syrian external trade was in non-Syrian hands and the Syrian economy, in consequence, was forced to lose large sums in the form of expenses, commissions, and profits which were paid abroad for mediation in purchase and sale transactions.

14. During the period under discussion the Syrian Govern- 185
ment exercised great effort with satisfactory results; it made a be-

III The Shashans

The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-ordinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without property or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profitable to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

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CROPS AND AGRICULTURE IN JAZIRAH

I. Dry Farming

Dry farming is by far the most important activity of Jazirah. 241
The first tractor and combine were introduced in 1936 by Shahine 311
Bey Maluf of Zahleh. Before that time agriculture was the business of the peasants. The town inhabitants of Jazirah took no interest in it. The area cultivated was restricted to a few kilometers south of the railway line in what is called the Old Villages. The political troubles in 1936-37 and the low prices of wheat and barley before the War did not encourage capitalists inside Syria to invest their money in Jazirah. Furthermore, agricultural machinery was new to most people who did not understand its economics or how to run it.

a. Expansion in the Use of Machinery 1936-1952

The War doubled the price of wheat in its second year. The 407
crop of 1940 was sold for LS 50-55 a ton at Aleppo. The French 439
bought it for LS 120 in 1941. The Office des Cereales Panifiables (O. C. P.) fixed the price at LS 350 in 1943. During these years the dollar was available at the official rate of LS 2.20 and importation of machinery from the U. S. was possible. The number of tractors increased to about 60 in the winter of 1943.

The crop of 1943 was exceptionally good and the O. C. P. imported some 50 tractors and a similar number of combines which reached Jazirah during the harvest season. The machines were first rented to the farmers and then sold to them. They represented the first large-scale importation of machinery to Jazirah.

Importation of machinery in the following two years became difficult as a result both of limited availability and of dollar shortage. But by the end of the War dollars became again available at the official rate and large numbers of tractors were imported in 1945 and 1946. The importation of agricultural machinery has become a steady and continuous flow in spite of the sharp rise in the dollar rates and the price of wheat, though below 1943, still makes large-scale exploitation profitable. Recently the Government through 654
the Agricultural Bank has helped the farmers import and buy on [452

407 439 [654 452] installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71. This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300 respectively.

It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is 407 427 opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS . 90-1.10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

311 The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli Amuda and Dirbassiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbassiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Rin. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers west of Dirbassiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

311 The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jasiratibn Amr was long 491 neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

435 656 15 percent he must buy his wheat at the port of export for LS 203-5. This means about LS 252 at Aleppo for the farmer of Jazirah. And this is the price at which the market is stabilized at present, while if this imposition did not exist the farmer would have sold his wheat for LS 300-350.

648 489 7. The discussion of prices brings about a consideration of markets for the surplus Syrian wheat. During the French Mandate, and up to March 1949, Syria and Lebanon formed one economic unit. The first independent regime under Shukri Quwatly, which lasted until the first coup d'etat in 1949, preserved this unity though some friction did exist between the two Governments. President Quwatly was emphatic about the necessity of this union. Then politicians mentioned to him the alleged advantages which Lebanon had over Syria in the partnership, he invariably replied that the benefit from the partnership to the national Arab idea transcends in importance any material disadvantage resulting to Syria.

But aside from this political consideration, the union did present specific advantages to the Syrian farmer. Lebanon imports yearly about 80,000 tons of wheat. This is approximately one-third the quantity exported by Syria. Further, Lebanon had a customs duty of 50 per cent on foreign wheat other than Syrian. This meant that the Syrian farmer was assured a market for part of his crop at prices higher than world prices, besides selling Lebanon cheese, samneh, vegetables and fruit.

Whatever the economic advantages according to Syria in its new policy of separation from Lebanon, and they are highly doubtful, the Syrian farmer has lost a sure market.

In fact, the question of economic separation between Syria and Lebanon has never been examined as a purely economic propositon, but has always been mixed with considerations of national prestige and alleged Syrian economic subservience to Lebanon. This highly emotional language was designed to confuse the issue for the benefit of industrial groups, especially textile manufacturers who were crowded by Lebanese competition.

435 439 8. Another misconception shared by the Government and most of the people is that Syrian prices of wheat should be governed by world prices. The fact is that Jazirah wheat can never normally

43 compete on world markets. The cost of production of wheat in the
439 Jazirah by machinery is much higher than the cost of production in the major producing countries of the world, such as Canada, the U. S. A. and Australia. Since the average annual export of wheat in Syria does not exceed 250-300 thousand tons, and it is Jazirah which produces this exportable surplus, the rest of Syria taking care of internal consumption, the costs of Jazirah production become the determining factors. Some causes of the higher cost of production in Jazirah have been mentioned above. . Others, such as the difficult transportation will be discussed later. But there is no doubt that unless the different defects controlling Jazirah agriculture are removed, and they can be removed by Government enlightened action, production will drop sharply when world prices decline as they might do if world tension is removed.

e. Two Types of Agriculture in Jazirah

241 It should be stated that two different methods of production prevail in Jazirah, cultivation by peasants using mules and cultivation by machinery.

1. Peasant cultivation accounts for perhaps 50-60 per cent of the crop, and machinery cultivation for the remainder. Both types suffer from some of the obstacles mentioned above, such as bad credit and transportation systems, bad seed, insecurity as to prices, and lack of agricultural guidance. But inspite of all, the peasant farmer will continue to plow his tract of land no matter how circumstances change because farming is his occupation and he knows no other. The crop he produces is enough for him and his family, and the surplus he sells to the Jazirah towns to feed the city people. The drop in prices will simply mean a lower standard of living for him and his family.

2. The cultivator by machinery suffers from causes in addition to those of the peasant. He is a capitalist who has invested his money in machinery, seeds, fuel and wages and he has to show a profit at the end of the year to pay for his investment and to live at a decent standard. His investment should give him returns comparable to other fields of endeavor, otherwise he will not continue in his present

241 amount he has to store. The jifrs are usually dug around the village
251 to guard them from theft. The condition of the future wheat crop in Jazirah becomes known by the end of March. At that time, if the forcast is favorable, the surplus wheat stored in the jifrs is brought to the market, but if the future crop is considered in a bad condition the wheat remains stored to be planted in the fall.

The second most important item of Jazirah commerce is the summer crops of rice, cotton, sorghum and sesame. They follow the same pattern of wheat and barley.

II. Cattle and Sheep

439 Jazirah has an active trade in transit shipment of cattle and
231 sheep. Before the last few years, it was itself a provider of sheep. The Bedouin tilled a part of the land and grazed his sheep in summer
221 and fall on the land around the village. In winter and spring he be-
233 came a nomad again and migrated with his flocks to the south and east. It was customary to pass scores of villages in winter which were completely deserted and the mud houses sealed with one guarding left for the whole village. The expansion of mechanical agriculture reduced the grazing lands considerably and the number of sheep dwindled.

At present, sheep and cattle are imported from Turkey and Iraq. They cross the border on foot and are either smuggled in or pay customs duties. They rest in Jazirah and are fed, then transported to Aleppo by train, or, in springtime, on foot.

III. Imported Goods

438 The main imports of Jazirah are agricultural machinery and spare parts, textiles, fuel wood and building materials. Foodstuff which is not grown in Jazirah is also imported. Because no statistics are available, it is worthwhile to make a study of the volume and value of Jazirah commerce for the next few years as an indication of the development of the region.

IV. Commercial Future of Jazirah Towns

The commercial future of Jazirah towns and especially of Qamishli is assured. Jazirah already produced in 1946 17% of the

132 region to another. On some mountain heights it is over 40 in., while in the desert areas it sinks almost to nothing. The temperature also varies greatly, in general increasing from west to east and to a lesser extent from north to 132 south. The differences of rainfall and temperature, together 311 with such other factors as the presence or absence of rivers 241 and springs, give rise to great differences in fertility and vegetation. The coastal regions have a Mediterranean climate, and are often well watered both by rainfall and by rivers; they are suitable for cereals, tobacco and many kinds of fruit. The seaward slopes of the maritime ranges have a more temperate climate, and terraces of cultivable soil on which olive trees and vines can grow; but the eastern slopes are more barren. The central depression has a sub-tropical climate. Parts of it are well watered by rivers and are fertile. In the Jordan Valley, fruits can be cultivated, and cereals in the more northern parts of the inner depression. Much of the inner range is dry and barren; but on the plateaux of the north and of Transjordan there is sufficient rainfall to make possible the cultivation of cereals. This is true also of the Hauran and Jebel Druze. The Ghutah is suitable with irrigation for the growing of fruits of many kinds. East of the inner range the rainfall becomes scantier, the heat more intense, and the land less fertile; until finally it becomes too arid to be suitable for anything but pasturage. But across the Euphrates conditions change once more, and it is possible to grow cereals in the river valleys of the Jazirah.

3

131 The nature of Syrian history has been deeply affected by the structure and position of the land. It is largely a history of economic, political and other movements affecting the whole area of which Syria forms a part. To those movements Syria has served at times as a starting-point, at others as a terminus or a bridge.

439 The first of the movements has been that of world trade. Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East; and its own products, oil, grain, textiles and metal work, have at times found a market in the Western world. Another and more specialized trade has been that with

the nomads of the Syrian and Arabian deserts, who have gone 439
to the great towns of the Syrian interior to sell their products and supply their needs. In the economic as in every other sphere of life, the Arab hinterland has given a special colour to Syrian life.

Trade has tended to follow a limited number of routes, 439
which have not varied much in principle from one generation 917
to another. For the trade with Egypt there was the great route which went along the coast of Palestine by way of Gaza. For that with western Arabia, the route ran on the east of the Dead Sea by way of Maan or Petra, in what is now Transjordan ; this was also the path taken by the Pilgrims' caravan which went yearly from Damascus to Mecca. The caravans for central Arabia went down the Wadi Sirhan to the oases of Nejd. In the other direction, routes went north-west from northern Syria through Cilicia into Asia Minor, and north-east through Urfa, Diarbekr and Mosul into Kurdistan, Persia and central Asia. Among the most important routes were those which linked the Mediterranean with India and farther Asia. There were a number of alternative routes. Goods might come by sea to southern Arabia, then by land up the western Arabian route to Damascus or some other centre. They might go up the Persian Gulf, and be landed at or near what is now Basra. From Basra several possibilities lay open : the caravans might make for Aleppo or its equivalent in north Syria, or for Damascus, Homs, or some other town in the centre. If they chose the former route, they could go on the west of the Euphrates and then across the Little Desert ; or else up the Tigris to Baghdad or even Mosul, then across Mesopotamia to the Euphrates and on as before. If their destination was Damascus, at first they would take a similar path to that of the Aleppo caravan, and then skirt the southern edge of the Little Desert and pass through Palmyra to the great towns of central Syria. Once arrived in the towns of the Syrian interior, the goods would be carried down to the coast and shipped to the West : in northern Syria they would go by way of Latakia or the Gulf of Alexandretta ; in central Syria by way of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon or Tyre.

Not all these routes were in full use at the same time. The noon of one was often the twilight of others. Their rise and decline was determined largely by political conditions both in Syria and in the neighbouring countries ; but except in times

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

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threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

9

Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

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mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

such goods as Syria's few modern factories produce, have between them severely limited the Syrian and Lebanese export trade.

According to the official statistics for 1938, the latest year for which detailed figures are available, the main countries to which the French Mandated Territories exported goods were Iraq, Palestine, France, Transjordan, Italy, the United States and Egypt, in that order.[1] Much the most important exports were vegetable products and textile materials and goods. The total value of exports and re-exports (excluding the oil of Iraq) was some 892,232,000 francs (£5,028,000).[1] The chief countries from which goods were imported were Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Germany, Italy and Roumania. The main goods imported were textile materials and goods, metals and metal work, vegetable and mineral products; and the total value of imports was 1,707,696,000 francs (£9,059,000).[2] There was thus an adverse trade balance of 815,464,000 francs (£4,031,000) which was largely offset by the revenue from certain types of invisible export. For example large sums were brought into the country by the many thousands of tourists who visited it, and by the Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and others who spent the summer in the hill-resorts of Lebanon. Again, considerable sums of money were sent home by emigrants in America and elsewhere; this item is now much less important than during the past, but it is still not negligible. A third type of invisible export was the foreign capital invested in the country, and foreign credit granted to merchants. In spite of these invisible exports, however, both the size of Syrian and Lebanese foreign trade and the discrepancy between imports and exports are unsatisfactory. The situation can be improved, first by an increase and diversification in production, and secondly by the discovery of external markets for the goods produced, either in the neighbouring countries or elsewhere.

5

Syria and Lebanon are comparatively poor countries, and in spite of the changes which have taken place the standard of living in the countryside and among the poorer classes in

[1] For statistics of foreign trade, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, pp. 199-202.

[2] Calculated at the rate of 177.45 francs, to the pound sterling. This was the average rate for December, 1938.

648 Hama et Prolongement' (D.H.P.) company. Since 1925 this
471 company had had an agreement with the local Governments by which the latter made good any losses incurred by the company in the working of the railways, and received a progressive share of any profits which were made.

452 There were a number of French financial institutions with interests in the Mandated Territories. The bank of issue, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, had its headquarters in Paris, and of its 25½ million francs of share-capital over 20 millions were in French hands, while twelve out of its sixteen directors were French, the remainder being Syrians
[436] and Lebanese. By an agreement made in 1924 and subsequently renewed, the Banque was given the exclusive right of issuing Syro-Lebanese currency. It also performed the functions of an ordinary commercial bank. In addition, a great deal of commercial banking, mortgage and land-credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie and the Compagnie Algérienne.

439 In 1938 France imported goods of greater value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other country except Palestine; and she exported to them goods of greater value than did any other country except Great Britain. The total value of her imports from them was 105,894,000 francs. The main articles which she imported were vegetables and fruits; she did not obtain from the Levant States any important raw materials for her industries. She exported to them 197,818,000 francs worth of goods, including large quantities of iron and iron goods, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods.[1]

471 The Mandated Territories were also important for French
649 commerce as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions: the civil air-ports were used as stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China. Moreover, one of the two pipe-lines through which the oil of Iraq is conveyed to the Mediterranean passes through Syria and Lebanon to reach the sea at Tripoli. This was of dual importance to France: first because French interests owned 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and secondly because France obtained between one-third and one-half of her total oil-supply from Iraq, by

[1] For detailed figures, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, p. 203.

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241 433 trated in the fall and winter seasons. Thus around 70% of the area in crops is usually planted to wheat and barley, and these two cereals contributed £S 59.2 million and £S 70.8 million or approximately 19% of the total value of Syria's exports in 1952 and 1953. Although a considerable number of summer crops are grown, including sorghum, maize, rice, pulses and vegetables, by far the most important of these is cotton. The latter now rivals wheat as the most valuable crop of the country even though the 1953 acreage planted to cotton was only 10% of that sown to wheat. Exports of cotton and cotton seed amounted in 1952 and 1953 to £S 131.2 million and £S 140.2 million, or 38% and 40% of the value of all exports. Orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits also assume some importance in agricultural production, although they take up less than 10% of the planted area. Animal husbandry, based principally on sheep and goats, is primarily a pastoral industry without a close link with settled agriculture. Exports of livestock and livestock products including hides and skins, samneh (clarified butter), cheese and eggs, amounted in 1953 to almost £S 48 million or around 13% of the total value of exports. Live animals alone contributed £S 23 million, although such exports were offset by imports, primarily from Iraq, to a value of £S 7.1 million.

[439] 233 439

241 433 Much of Syria's agricultural output is consumed on the farm and therefore does not enter the market economy. From the returns of the agricultural production tax, which is levied only on produce brought to market, it may be estimated that only around 40% of the production of wheat, maize and sorghum and less than 30% of the output of lentils is sold.

Industry

433 464 During the postwar period industry has steadily forged ahead, although its contribution to national income is probably still only between one-fifth and one-fourth that of agriculture and animal husbandry. The number employed in manufacturing is difficult to estimate, since the 1947 census provided no occupational breakdown, and industrial enterprises required to register with the government generally understate the number of workers employed. Fragmentary data collected by the mission indicate that employment in more or less mechanized manufacturing establishments, many of which are very small, may be between 35,000 and 40,000. If

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handicraft workers and artisans are included, the number engaged in some form of manufacturing may approach or perhaps even exceed 100,000.

The textile industry, including spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing, and the manufacture of garments, is the most developed. It probably employs close to 20,000 people in more or less mechanical establishments and it was able, in 1953, to export goods to a value of about £S 25 million. Among other important industries are flour milling, the extraction of vegetable oils and making of soap, tanning, sugar refining, canning and preserving, and the manufacture of cement, glass, tobacco and matches. The production of utensils, implements, furniture and shoes, although on a considerable scale, is almost completely in the handicraft stage.

Commerce

Commerce has always been one of the most profitable occupations in Syria. It has furnished much of the capital for the development of industry and even of agriculture. Aleppo and Damascus are the principal commercial centers of the country, the former being the more important. It handles most of Syria's exports, which emanate largely from the northern part of the country, and with the development of the port of Latakia it is also increasing its share of the import trade.

Foreign commerce is quite important in total trade. Over the three-year period 1951-53 the value of imports has averaged close to 30% of probable national income and exports about 22%. Exports have risen rather steadily in total value, and imports somewhat more slowly. Separate foreign trade figures for Syria have been available only since March 1950, when the economic union with Lebanon was terminated in order to give Syria more freedom in protecting its domestic manufacturing industry. Foreign trade has developed as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Year	Customs figures			Adjusted figures		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
1951	277	304	−27	292	418	−126
1952	320	313	+7	337	444	−117
1953	376	307	+69	408	484	−76

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459 A major adjustment must be made in the customs returns because they value imports on the basis of the official exchange rate, which is £S 2.20 to the dollar, rather than the actual rate, which in the years 1951-53 has fluctuated between £S 3.51 and £S 3.89. Minor adjustments must also be made to compensate for undervaluation and unrecorded shipments. Even the adjusted returns, however, show a gradual improvement in the balance of trade.

The composition of foreign trade, shown for the years 1951-53 in

TABLE 1 Average Annual Foreign Trade, 1951-1953 (Customs Figures)

	Quantity (metric tons)	Value (thousand £S)	Percentage of total value
Exports			
Livestock and animal products	5,242[b]	31,164[b]	9.6[b]
Wheat	94,390	25,555	7.9
Barley	103,526	19,453	6.0
Cotton	38,607	125,173	38.6
Wool	5,168	25,225	7.8
Textiles	—	31,740	9.8
Other	—	65,847	20.3
Total	—	324,177	100.0
Imports[a]			
Livestock and animal products	788	8,183	2.7
Grains, fruits and vegetables	102,640	34,312	11.1
Petroleum and petroleum products	388,684	37,008	12.1
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals	—	15,888	5.2
Wood and cork	—	9,350	3.0
Textile materials and goods	—	63,812	20.7
Precious metals and stones	—	14,640	4.8
Base metals and manufactures	—	23,731	7.7
Iron and steel	46,148	18,086	5.2
Machinery	—	42,897	13.9
Agricultural machinery	—	12,009	3.9
Transportation equipment	—	15,079	4.9
Motor vehicles and cycles	—	13,364	4.3
Other	—	43,204	14.0
Total	—	308,104	100.0

[a] Valued at official exchange rate.
[b] Excluding wool, goat hair and hides and skins.

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Table 1,[3] reflects, of course, the general structure of the economy. As already indicated, raw cotton represents well over a third of Syria's exports, and cereals, livestock and raw wool almost another third. In recent years, however, textiles have accounted for nearly one-tenth of the value of exports. As might be expected, imports are more diverse in character. Textile materials and manufactures, machinery, petroleum products and fruits and vegetables are among the principal imports; iron and steel, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, precious metals, motor vehicles and timber are also important. 439

Despite the dissolution of the Syrian-Lebanese economic union, Lebanon has remained Syria's principal trading partner, taking almost a quarter of Syria's exports and contributing around 10% of its imports. Three countries—Lebanon, France and the United Kingdom—buy over half of Syria's exports; and five countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Lebanon and Western Germany—supply between 50% and 60% of its imports. In the three years 1951-53 about 41% of Syria's exports was marketed in other Arab countries which, however, supplied only 18% of Syria's imports. [448]

Syria's normal trade deficit is offset, on the current account of the balance of international payments, by local expenditures and oil transit payments made by foreign oil companies, by UNRWA[4] expenditures in Syria and by emigrant remittances. On capital account, there is evidently some continued net foreign investment, particularly by Lebanese, and some repatriation of capital by Syrians returning to their homeland. A considerable volume of bank funds has flowed to Syria partly because there has been a shift in the financing of Syria's foreign trade from Beirut to Aleppo and Damascus and partly because foreign banks have needed more funds to meet the credit needs of an expanding economy. Although the movement of these bank funds shows sharp seasonal fluctuations, there has apparently been a general upward trend in the amount of foreign banking advances in recent years. Total foreign exchange receipts and payments were not far out of balance in 1950, 1951 and 1952, but in 1953 Syrian gold and foreign exchange reserves, valued at the free rate, increased by £S 51 million. Foreign exchange and gold reserves at the free rate rose from £S 114.3 million at the end of 1951 to £S 157 million at 457

[3] See also Annex A, p. 213 *et seq.*

[4] United Nations Relief and Works Administration, charged with the care of Arab refugees from Palestine.

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leum refinery. Syria now obtains its petroleum products, of which total consumption in 1953 amounted to around 450,000 metric tons, partly from the Tripoli refinery in Lebanon and partly from more distant sources of supply. By arrangements between the government and the distributing companies, prices in Syria are explicitly or implicitly based on ex-Tripoli prices plus transport costs. It is perhaps natural that Syria should want its own refinery, not only because a large volume of crude oil flows across its territory through the Trans-Arabian pipeline and the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipelines, but also because transport costs substantially increase the price of petroleum products.

A case for a government refinery might be made if there were no alternatives. Private companies, however, are apparently willing to erect such a refinery. The Iraq Petroleum Company, for instance, has offered to carry out its original pledge to construct and operate a refinery serving Syrian requirements. Its offer is apparently conditioned on an agreement with the government regarding pipeline transit dues and on the understanding that the refined products would be sold at the refinery site on the basis of the prices obtaining at the Tripoli refinery. The company has offered to raise the transit dues now paid but the desultory negotiations on this subject carried on over the past years have not produced an agreement. The mission does not necessarily suggest that an agreement for the construction of a refinery be made with the Iraq Petroleum Company but simply that the government avail itself of offers by private enterprise to build a refinery. Such a refinery together with appurtenant facilities would probably cost over £S 30 million, a sum which the government can ill afford to spend at a time when it is hard pressed to find all the resources required for projects for which private capital is not available. At the same time it is evident that the construction of a refinery in Syria would be advantageous to the economy. For example, if a Syrian refinery sold its products on the basis of the price formula proposed by the Iraq Petroleum Company, the cost of transport between Tripoli and Homs, the proposed site of the new refinery, would be saved. At present, the difference between the price of gas oil and fuel oil at Tripoli and Homs, for example, is £S 6.20 and £S 9.25 per metric ton respectively, or about 7% and 15% of the prices at Homs. The construction of the refinery would undoubtedly bring about a significant reduction in the prices of refined products throughout northern Syria, which consumes the bulk of the country's total requirements.

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ANNEX A *INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION*

1 FOREIGN TRADE

Statistical Limitations

439 [448] Until March 13, 1950, Syria and Lebanon were joined in a Customs Union and separate trade data for the two countries were not collected. Statistics for Syrian trade first appeared in 1950 but do not cover the full year. They are also less reliable than those for succeeding years in view of the understandable lack of experience on the part of Syrian customs officers with enforcement of tariffs and recording trade.

Customs statistics record the value of imports at official rates of exchange of the Syrian pound, which differ from the prevailing free market exchange rates at which import transactions are conducted. This in itself necessitates adjustments for every currency used. On the basis of certain broad assumptions, such adjustments have been made by the mission for balance of payments estimates, but could not be made in the foreign trade statistics because of the lack of data on which to base an adjustment of the value of specific items.

The extended land frontiers, particularly in some of the more sparsely inhabited parts of the country, facilitate smuggling. Re-exports of gold were not recorded as such prior to 1954 because gold exports were forbidden.

Finally, there is believed to be a certain amount of both under- and over-estimation of the value of goods as declared to the customs authorities, especially in trade with neighboring countries, and not all these statements can be corrected.

It follows that Syria's pre-1951 foreign trade cannot be properly assessed at all and the analysis of data for the last three years must allow for margins of error due to the many adjustments based largely on estimates.

Foreign Trade of the Customs Union

Table 1 records the total value, in Syrian-Lebanese pounds, of the trade of the Syrian-Lebanese Customs Union since 1945.

[p. 212 CONTAINS NO TEXTUAL MATERIAL]

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TABLE 1 Total Trade of Syria and Lebanon, 1945-49

• 439

(*Thousand £LS*)

Year	Exports	Imports	Trade deficit
1945	43,842	130,624	86,782
1946	85,560	266,654	181,094
1947	83,640	362,764	279,124
1948	78,501	483,460	404,959
1949	111,104	516,188	405,084

SOURCE: Official statistics of the Customs Union.

The postwar rise in exports, recorded at the actual prevailing exchange rates, was due both to the depreciation of the currency and an increase in the volume of shipments. Imports, valued at the official exchange rate, rose sharply because of postwar re-stocking, a marked increase in prices and the general expansion of economic activity. It will be noted that in 1949 the recorded value of imports was almost quadruple that of exports, and the trade deficit was actually larger than that indicated in the Table because imports were valued at the official exchange rate which, by that time, differed at least 30% from the free market rates at which imports were financed.

The question of the proportions of the Customs Union's total foreign trade originating in or destined for each of the two countries was endlessly disputed but never resolved. For many years the joint customs receipts were shared on the basis of 56% for Syria and 44% for Lebanon. This distribution was frequently contested by both sides. As it was merely an administrative arrangement and was not based on any statistical data, it provides little guidance as to the true origin and destination of trade.

Table 2 shows the foreign trade of Syria and Lebanon in the first three calendar years following the termination of the Customs Union and after eliminating their trade with each other. It indicates that Syria accounted for 75% to 80% of their combined exports and about 50% of their total imports. Syria's share of imports may well have been smaller than during the years of the Customs Union because in the years 1951 to 1953 it was becoming more self-sufficient in manufactures and was prohibiting a considerable number of imports.

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TABLE 2 Foreign Trade of Syria and of Lebanon, 1951–53

(Thousand £S) 439

Year	Syria	Lebanon	Total	% of Syria's share in total[c]
Imports[a]:				
1951	269,863	271,816	541,679	49.8
1952	277,616	283,207	560,823	49.5
1953	273,671	269,967	543,638	50.3
Exports[b]:				
1951	217,681	78,152[d]	295,833	73.2
1952	249,294	52,053[d]	301,347	82.7
1953	285,587	69,699[d]	355,280	80.3

[a] At official exchange rates.
[b] At free market exchange rates.
[c] After elimination of their mutual trade.
[d] Lebanon's exports adjusted by difference between rates of £S and £L (annual averages).

SOURCE: Derived from official trade statistics of Syria and Lebanon.

Composition of Syrian Foreign Trade since 1951

In Chapter 1 of the Main Report global figures of Syrian exports and imports over the period 1951-53 are given. These figures are supplemented here by more detailed information on the composition of Syria's annual foreign trade since 1951. Tables 3 and 4 give a breakdown of Syrian exports and imports in 21 groups taken from the official statistics; Tables 5 and 6 show the composition of foreign trade, export and import, by principal types of commodities, selected by the mission.

Unfortunately 1951 is not a good year for purposes of comparison; the very poor cereal crop allowed only about 31,000 tons of cereals exports, as compared with over 256,000 tons in 1952 and over 383,000 tons in 1953. In 1951 exports of several other commodities, e.g., ginned cotton and wool, consequently rank relatively high. With due allowance for this circumstance the composition of Syrian exports during the last three years has been relatively stable, with ginned cotton representing more than one-third, and cereals representing approximately one-fifth of the total value of exports. Of other agricultural exports, pulses rose somewhat, while oil seeds and vetch remained fairly stable and tobacco declined. Exports of raw wool

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TABLE 3 Exports by Groups of Commodities, 1951–53

Commodity	1951 Tons	1951 Value (thousand £S)	1951 % of total value	1952 Tons	1952 Value (thousand £S)	1952 % of total value	1953 Tons	1953 Value (thousand £S)	1953 % of total value
I. Live animals	5,036	30,030	10.8	4,681	28,216	8.8	6,010	35,306	9.4
II. Grains, fruit and vegetables	115,652	28,675	10.3	372,449	89,181	27.9	560,228	117,892	31.4
III. Oils and fats	1,020	1,911	0.7	144	235	0.1	1,918	2,483	0.7
IV. Processed foods and tobacco	21,280	11,379	4.1	19,822	10,095	3.2	28,392	8,982	2.4
V. Mineral products	17,245	513	0.2	36,424	1,798	0.6	46,170	2,982	0.8
VI. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals	1,784	3,534	1.3	1,967	4,063	1.3	2,201	3,244	0.9
VII. Skins, hides, etc.	1,254	4,369	1.6	706	2,508	0.8	1,008	2,983	0.8
VIII. Rubber products	86	100	0.0	42	119	0.0	51	72	0.0
IX. Wood and cork	2,428	1,161	0.4	1,696	964	0.3	1,983	1,007	0.3
X. Paper products	268	594	0.2	341	730	0.2	470	996	0.3
XI. Textile materials and goods	35,787	190,033	68.6	46,267	177,586	55.6	63,936	191,457	50.9
XII. Footwear and fashion articles	31	318	0.1	33	327	0.1	47	339	0.1
XIII. Ceramics and glass	2,053	753	0.3	2,229	739	0.2	2,464	755	0.2
XIV. Precious metals and stones	7	545	0.2	5	258	0.1	3	4,113	1.1
XV. Common metals and manufactures	8,025	2,163	0.8	3,425	1,608	0.5	1,718	1,386	0.4
XVI. Machinery	311	756	0.3	380	773	0.2	370	815	0.2
XVII. Transportation equipment	34	38	0.0	155	182	0.1	697	693	0.2
XVIII. Scientific instruments	4	25	0.0	2	36	0.0	8	191	0.1
XIX. Arms and ammunition	—	1	0.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
XX. Miscellaneous goods	43	235	0.1	50	154	0.0	45	124	0.0
XXI. Works of art	—	1	0.0	—	1	0.0	1	5	0.0
Total	212,348	277,134	100.0	490,818	319,573	100.0	717,720	375,825	100.0

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

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TABLE 4 Imports by Groups of Commodities, 1951–53

Commodity	1951			1952			1953		
	Tons	Value (thousand £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (thousand £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (thousand £S)	% of total value
I. Live animals	675	8,121	2.67	734	8,233	2.63	956	8,195	2.67
II. Grains, fruit and vegetables	129,973	30,608	10.07	168,300	43,516	13.89	112,654	28,516	9.29
III. Oils and fats	4,208	3,648	1.20	8,048	5,146	1.64	8,094	5,126	1.67
IV. Processed foods and tobacco	29,733	12,145	4.00	45,060	16,992	5.42	30,607	10,477	3.41
V. Mineral products	388,262	36,222	11.92	413,822	38,792	12.38	431,679	41,189	13.41
VI. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals	17,859	15,764	5.19	18,978	16,775	5.35	23,925	15,125	4.93
VII. Skins, hides, etc.	2,157	3,919	1.29	2,584	4,707	1.50	2,705	4,135	1.35
VIII. Rubber products	2,942	5,758	1.89	2,677	5,919	1.89	3,461	5,664	1.84
IX. Wood and cork	42,607	8,754	2.88	46,219	10,459	3.34	41,198	8,837	2.88
X. Paper products	5,392	5,411	1.78	5,837	5,578	1.78	8,879	5,539	1.80
XI. Textile materials and goods	16,960	64,433	21.20	19,958	64,340	20.53	28,098	62,662	20.41
XII. Footwear and fashion articles	217	517	0.17	220	721	0.23	39	149	0.05
XIII. Ceramics and glass	7,191	3,805	1.25	5,571	3,214	1.03	7,007	3,853	1.25
XIV. Precious metals and stones	8	12,811	4.22	6	10,186	3.25	9	20,922	6.81
XV. Common metals and manufactures	49,343	22,533	7.41	46,229	25,028	7.99	50,593	23,633	7.70
XVI. Machinery	22,716	52,511	17.28	13,079	36,025	11.50	14,929	40,156	13.08
XVII. Transportation equipment	6,171	13,144	4.32	7,252	13,430	4.29	6,695	18,664	6.08
XVIII. Scientific instruments	163	2,005	0.66	156	2,343	0.75	515	2,529	0.82
XIX. Arms and ammunition	58	214	0.07	36	245	0.08	74	206	0.07
XX. Miscellaneous goods	396	1,588	0.52	362	1,677	0.54	409	1,459	0.48
XXI. Works of art	2	20	0.01	1	8	0.00	2	14	0.00
Total	727,033	303,931	100.00	805,129	313,334	100.00	772,528	307,050	100.00

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

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TABLE 5 Composition of Syria's Export Trade, 1951–53

Commodity	1951			1952			1953		
	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value
Cereals	31,253	8.3	3.0	256,217	62.8	19.7	382,988	81.8	21.8
of which: Wheat	2,748	0.8	0.3	100,227	29.8	9.3	180,185	46.0	12.2
Barley	17,175	4.2	1.5	140,135	29.4	9.2	153,268	24.8	6.6
Other	11,330	3.3	1.2	15,855	3.6	1.1	49,535	11.0	2.9
Vegetables	15,072	1.6	0.6	14,507	2.3	0.7	15,983	1.6	0.4
Pulses	5,952	2.4	0.9	7,241	2.9	0.9	21,244	7.7	2.0
Vetch	4,487	1.3	0.5	3,034	1.0	0.3	6,517	1.5	0.4
Flour	5,494	1.9	0.7	9,347	3.6	1.1	26,207	6.9	1.8
Oilseeds	21,065	6.0	2.2	33,244	7.2	2.3	29,932	6.6	1.8
Tobacco and tombac	3,770	5.6	2.0	2,896	4.6	1.4	1,423	2.4	0.6
Soap	1,540	2.9	1.0	1,790	3.4	1.1	1,919	2.6	0.7
Hides and skins	1,207	4.0	1.4	654	2.3	0.7	983	2.6	0.7
Silk products (artific.)	1,339	13.8	5.0	2,464	15.5	4.9	2,321	17.0	4.5
Cotton (ginned)	24,088	116.5	42.0	37,786	124.4	38.9	53,946	134.7	35.8
Cotton textiles	986	9.1	3.3	1,092	9.8	3.1	950	6.0	1.6
Wool	7,511	39.4	14.2	3,492	14.7	4.6	4,501	21.5	5.7
Animals[a]	n.a.	19.0	6.9	425	20.9	6.5	404	23.0	6.1
Other	88,584	45.3	16.4	116,629	44.2	13.8	168,402	59.5	15.9
Total	212,348	277.1	100.0	490,818	319.6	100.0	717,720	375.8	100.0

[a] 1951: 385,815 head; 1952: 469,000 head; 1953: 537,000 head.

SOURCE: Breakdown by types of commodities prepared by mission on the basis of official Syrian statistics.

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TABLE 6 Composition of Syria's Import Trade, 1951–53

Commodity*	1951			1952			1953		
	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value
Textiles (including clothing)	16,960	64.4	21.2	19,959	64.3	20.5	28,098	62.7	20.4
Machinery (excluding motor vehicles)	22,716	52.5	17.3	13,079	36.0	11.5	14,929	40.2	13.1
Minerals	388,212	36.2	11.9	413,822	38.8	12.4	431,679	41.2	13.4
Petroleum products	270,374	29.4	9.7	365,045	35.3	11.3	412,797	39.5	12.9
Other	117,838	6.8	2.2	48,777	3.5	1.1	18,882	1.7	0.6
Metals	49,351	35.4	11.6	45,927	33.4	10.7	50,114	42.5	13.8
Gold and precious metals	8	12.8	4.2	6	10.2	3.3	9	20.9	6.8
Other	49,343	22.6	7.4	45,921	23.2	7.4	50,105	21.6	7.0
Cereals	30,257	10.8	3.6	42,084	15.7	5.0	6,022	3.2	1.0
Fruit	76,702	10.2	3.4	83,417	12.9	4.1	66,850	12.0	3.9
Chemical and pharmaceutical products	4,192	6.6	2.2	10,164	10.8	3.4	7,343	7.3	2.4
Other	138,643	87.8	28.9	176,687	101.4	32.4	167,520	97.9	31.9
Total	727,033	303.9	100.0	805,130	313.3	100.0	772,555	307.0	100.0

* At official exchange rates.

SOURCE: Breakdown by types of commodities prepared by mission on the basis of official Syrian statistics.

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439 and live animals are considerably more important than exports of hides and skins. Syria annually imports considerable quantities of animals, mostly sheep, which are exported after being fattened and sheared. Among exports of industrial goods the largest items are artificial silk products, cotton textiles and soap; together with other unclassified industrial commodities, they represent about 15% of the total value of exports.

Among imports, textiles are still the largest item, accounting regularly for one-fifth of total imports. The steady increase of demand for petroleum products is clearly shown in Table 6. The greater imports of cereals in 1951 and 1952, following the 1951 crop failure, were rather exceptional. Imports of gold increased in 1953, when they amounted to £S 20.1 million at the official rate or almost £S 32.5 million at the free market rate. Of the 5.3 tons of gold imported in that year, 1.6 tons were for monetary purposes. Imports of machinery were particularly heavy in 1951, presumably because potential investors were encouraged by the 1950 boom year.

Table 7 is designed to show how much Syria has been actually spending in terms of foreign exchange on imports of capital goods during the last three years.

Direction of Foreign Trade

As a primarily agricultural country, Syria exports most of its products to the industrialized countries of Western Europe and to the United States, from which in turn come most of Syria's imports. Table 8 shows Syria's trade with three groups of countries: the industrialized western countries; the member countries of the Arab League, with which Syria has entered into a preferential trade agreement; and other countries with which Syria has more or less regular trade relations. The Table reveals that about two-thirds of Syrian imports, by value, are derived from Western Europe and the United States and about half of its exports are directed to this group of countries. About one-fifth of Syria's imports come from the Arab countries, to which about 40% of its exports are destined.

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TABLE 7 Imports of Capital Goods, 1951–53

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(All figures in thousands)

	1951		1952		1953	
	£S[a]	$[b]	£S	$	£S	$
Machinery	52,611	14,546	36,025	9,710	40,056	11,204
Agricultural	19,620	5,407	26,183	7,058	33,381	9,335
Other	32,991	9,139	9,842	2,652	6,675	1,869
Transportation equipment	13,144	3,641	13,430	3,620	18,664	5,221
Total	65,755	18,187	49,455	13,330	58,720	16,425

[a] As recorded at special rate.
[b] U.S. dollar equivalent at current market rate.

SOURCES: Etude sur la Syrie Economique 1953, Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes, Damas, Syria; official Syrian trade statistics.

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TABLE 8 Value of Syria's Foreign Trade by Groups of Countries, 1951–53

(*Million £S*)

	1951				1952				1953			
	Exp.	%	Imp.[a]	%	Exp.	%	Imp.[a]	%	Exp.	%	Imp[a]	%
Countries included in Table 9	246.2	88.8	280.6	92.2	306.0	95.8	287.7	91.8	366.1	97.4	281.9	91.8
Western countries[b]	129.7	46.8	196.5	64.6	177.3	55.5	191.5	61.1	212.7	56.6	195.2	63.6
Arab countries[c]	110.7	39.9	55.1	18.1	122.7	38.4	59.9	19.1	149.0	39.6	63.3	20.6
Other regular trade partners[d]	5.8	2.1	29.0	9.5	6.0	1.9	36.3	11.6	4.4	1.2	23.4	7.6
Countries not included in Table 9	30.9	11.2	23.3	7.8	13.6	4.2	25.6	8.2	9.7	2.6	25.1	8.2
Total trade	277.1	100.0	303.9	100.0	319.6	100.0	313.3	100.0	375.8	100.0	307.0	100.0

[a] At official exchange rate.
[b] Including France, U. K., Italy, U. S., Western Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Trieste, Austria, Sweden and Czechoslovakia.
[c] Does not include Lebanon's free zone.
[d] Including Iran, Spain, Burma, India, Turkey, Cuba, China and Romania.

SOURCE: Based on official Syrian trade statistics

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Table 9 gives the value of Syria's trade with individual countries for 1953. It shows that Lebanon and France, with which Syria has historically been so closely connected, are still its most important trade partners, although the United Kingdom follows very closely and the United States has become Syria's main supplier. 439

TABLE 9 Value of Syria's Foreign Trade by Countries, 1953

(*Thousand £S*)

	Exports	Imports[a]	Balance
Lebanon	90,238	33,379	56,859
France	58,513	32,684	25,829
United Kingdom	46,340	33,326	13,014
Italy	31,349	21,604	9,745
West Germany	24,204	29,251	−5,047
United States	20,837	37,675	−16,838
Belgium	18,673	9,985	8,688
Iraq	17,362	8,336	9,026
Jordan	21,702	8,292	13,410
Saudi Arabia	12,188	11,873	315
Iran	237	2,080	−1,843
Netherlands	7,070	11,967	−4,897
Switzerland	4,552	9,338	−4,786
Lebanon (free zone)	3,834	—	3,834
Spain	3,681	1,022	2,659
Egypt	3,428	825	2,603
Kuwait	1,911	100	1,811
Aden	2,075	247	1,828
Burma	—	2	−2
Trieste	1,133	12	1,121
India	—	6,702	−6,702
Turkey	431	6,542	−6,111
Austria	11	3,806	−3,795
Sweden	259	3,164	−2,905
Cuba	—	2,735	−2,735
Czechoslovakia	—	2,457	−2,457
China	—	2,190	−2,190
Romania	—	2,108	−2,108
Others	5,797	25,348	−19,551
Total	375,825	307,050	68,775

[a] At official exchange rates.

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

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439 Table 10 gives a more detailed picture of the respective shares in Syria's 1951-53 total trade of the country's nine principal trade partners.

TABLE 10 Direction of Trade, 1951-53

(Thousand £S)

	1951		1952		1953	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
Exports:						
Lebanon	59,453	21.5	70,279	22.0	90,238	24.0
France	50,353	18.2	49,166	15.4	58,513	15.6
United Kingdom	19,522	7.0	77,161	24.1	46,348	12.3
United States	37,362	13.5	15,945	5.0	20,837	5.5
Italy	14,493	5.2	16,606	5.2	31,349	8.3
Iraq	20,249	7.3	17,[illegible]	5.4	17,362	4.6
Jordan	12,348	4.5	16,846	5.3	21,702	5.8
West Germany	2,799	1.0	9,873	3.1	24,204	6.4
Others	60,555	21.9	46,521	14.5	65,280	17.4
Total	277,134	100.0	319,573	100.0	375,825	100.0
Imports:						
United States	55,514	18.3	45,470	14.5	37,675	12.3
United Kingdom	38,945	12.8	39,244	12.5	33,326	10.9
Lebanon	34,088	11.2	35,724	11.4	33,379	10.9
France	31,727	10.4	29,573	9.4	32,684	10.6
West Germany	16,922	5.6	19,098	6.1	29,251	9.5
Italy	21,225	7.0	20,472	6.5	21,604	7.0
Belgium	9,286	3.1	13,777	4.4	9,985	3.3
Netherlands	4,907	1.6	7,519	2.4	11,967	3.9
Others	91,337	30.0	102,463	32.7	97,179	31.6
Total	303,951	100.0	313,340	100.0	307,050	100.0

SOURCE: Official Syrian trade statistics.

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Table 11 shows the share of the Arab countries in Syria's foreign trade during the last three years. 439

TABLE 11 Share of Arab Countries in Syria's Foreign Trade, 1951–53

	Imports			Exports			Balance, + or − value
	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	Tons	Value (million £S)	% of total value	
1951							
Arab countries	404,666	55.1	18.1	112,661	110.7	39.9	55.6
Egypt	12,180	3.7	1.2	14,963	7.2	2.6	3.5
Iraq	43,636	8.9	2.9	4,842	20.2	7.3	11.3
Jordan	13,579	4.4	1.4	23,750	12.3	4.5	7.9
Lebanon	306,013	34.1	11.2	64,395	59.5	21.5	25.4
Saudi Arabia	28,955	3.6	1.2	4,074	8.5	3.1	4.9
Other*	303	0.4	0.1	637	3.0	1.1	2.6
Other countries	322,367	248.8	81.9	99,687	166.4	60.1	−82.4
Total trade	727,033	303.9	100.0	212,348	277.1	100.0	−26.8
1952							
Arab countries	465,100	59.9	19.1	211,984	122.7	38.4	62.8
Egypt	6,720	1.4	0.4	10,049	4.5	1.4	3.1
Iraq	35,311	8.5	2.7	4,958	17.2	5.4	8.7
Jordan	24,921	6.0	1.9	27,158	16.8	5.3	10.8
Lebanon	331,824	35.7	11.4	160,939	70.3	22.0	34.6
Saudi Arabia	65,551	7.9	2.5	7,452	10.3	3.2	2.4
Other*	773	0.4	0.1	1,428	3.6	1.1	3.2
Other countries	340,030	253.4	80.9	278,833	196.9	61.6	−56.5
Total trade	805,130	313.3	100.0	490,817	319.6	100.0	6.2
1953							
Arab countries	480,138	63.3	20.6	353,141	149.0	39.6	85.7
Egypt	1,680	0.8	0.3	15,031	3.4	0.9	2.6
Iraq	24,531	8.3	2.7	6,747	17.3	4.6	9.0
Jordan	29,877	8.3	2.7	69,563	21.7	5.8	13.4
Lebanon	322,813	33.4	10.9	249,196	90.2	24.0	56.8
Saudi Arabia	99,148	11.9	3.9	11,508	12.2	3.2	0.3
Other*	2,089	0.6	0.2	1,096	4.2	1.1	3.6
Other countries	292,417	243.7	79.4	364,579	226.8	60.4	−16.9
Total trade	772,555	307.0	100.0	717,720	375.8	100.0	68.8

* Aden, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen.

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439 Tables 12–16 give more detailed figures concerning the value of Syria's trade with Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, indicating the main import and export items.

TABLE 12 Value of Syria's Trade with Lebanon, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Vegetables and fruits	4,439,936	13.0	5,921,936	16.6	8,066,150	24.2
Olive oil	867	0.0	506,570	1.4	800,361	2.4
Tobacco leaves	502,747	1.5	667,448	1.9	375,280	1.1
Cement	3,237,542	9.5	1,035,283	2.9	274,150	0.8
Petroleum products	19,718,325	57.8	19,935,522	55.8	19,085,725	57.2
Skins	764,318	2.2	682,099	1.9	416,776	1.2
Charcoal	1,061,015	3.1	1,302,150	3.6	1,272,965	3.8
Cement bags	61,495	0.2	285,220	0.8	53,800	0.2
Cocoons	119,985	0.4	142,345	0.4	63,750	0.2
Jute sacks	61,495	0.2	285,220	0.8	115,530	0.3
Metal ware	130,622	0.4	137,055	0.4	30,915	0.1
Aluminum	179,730	0.5	230,410	0.6	350,390	1.0
Other items	3,604,820	10.6	4,675,455	13.1	2,473,109	7.4
Total	34,087,502	100.0	35,724,183	100.0	33,379,301	100.0
Exports						
Live animals and poultry	18,925,894	31.8	20,661,936	29.4	22,771,404	25.2
Dairy products	6,766,305	11.4	5,149,066	7.3	10,823,385	12.0
Vegetables and fruits	1,341,516	2.3	5,275,491	7.5	8,140,801	9.0
Wheat and other grains	1,770,862	3.0	15,992,575	22.8	35,092,371	38.9
Oil seeds	3,731,930	6.3	6,852,258	9.8	1,709,291	1.9
Cotton	13,919,315	23.4	6,802,792	9.7	4,599,719	5.1
Wool	6,377,449	10.7	1,327,006	1.9	712,620	0.8
Other items	6,619,935	11.1	8,218,205	11.7	6,388,174	7.1
Total	59,453,206	100.0	70,279,329	100.0	90,237,765	100.0

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TABLE 13 Value of Syria's Trade with Iraq, 1951–53

(£S) 439

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Live animals	3,093,650	34.7	3,656,639	42.9	4,625,624	55.5
Dates	4,911,959	55.0	3,830,099	44.9	2,595,913	31.1
Oil seeds	61,889	0.7	119,297	1.4	—	—
Molasses	188,235	2.1	215,198	2.5	130,606	1.6
Skins	10,991	0.1	242,086	2.8	184,391	2.2
Wool	146,050	1.6	97,833	1.1	81,895	1.0
Other items	516,026	5.8	365,394	4.3	717,606	8.6
Total	8,928,800	100.0	8,526,276	100.0	8,336,035	100.0
Exports						
Soap	2,931,859	14.5	3,291,746	19.2	2,582,834	14.9
Cigarettes	485,283	2.4	492,582	2.9	725,588	4.2
Rayon yarn	1,465,523	7.2	922,308	5.4	1,208,925	7.0
Rayon textiles	9,569,606	47.3	7,531,188	43.8	8,370,418	48.2
Cotton textiles	1,424,540	7.0	847,153	4.9	292,865	1.7
Woolen textiles	246,227	1.2	501,427	2.9	417,718	2.4
Men's socks	651,423	3.2	455,568	2.7	213,150	1.2
Cotton knitted wear	609,762	3.0	591,624	3.4	423,329	2.4
Handkerchiefs	234,404	1.2	313,255	1.8	224,592	1.3
Other items	2,630,700	13.0	2,229,481	13.0	2,902,646	16.7
Total	20,249,327	100.0	17,176,323	100.0	17,362,065	100.0

TABLE 14 Value of Syria's Trade with Jordan, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Fruits and vegetables	1,431,451	32.9	3,094,331	51.6	4,729,174	57.0
Olive oil	77,960	1.8	1,066,830	17.8	1,626,625	19.6
Skins, raw	335,812	7.7	723,207	12.1	847,919	10.2
Wool	2,190,323	50.3	428,364	7.1	415,594	5.0
Other items	318,989	7.3	685,857	11.4	672,420	8.1
Total	4,354,035	100.0	5,998,589	100.0	8,291,732	100.0

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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TABLE 14 (CONT.) Value of Syria's Trade with Jordan, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Exports						
Wheat and flour	—	—	—	—	6,319,349	29.1
Fruits and vegetables	321,650	2.6	1,094,633	6.5	1,150,000	5.3
Cement	—	—	938,832	5.6	2,007,405	9.2
Gas oil	150,875	1.2	501,777	3.0	588,151	2.7
Rayon textiles	1,158,553	9.3	3,289,324	19.5	3,367,427	15.5
Cotton threads	420,467	3.4	521,611	3.1	353,952	1.6
Cotton textiles	1,413,066	11.4	4,288,179	25.4	2,323,819	10.7
Ropes	122,299	1.0	312,377	1.8	306,170	1.4
Handkerchiefs	331,520	2.7	925,841	5.5	645,647	3.0
Wearing apparel	614,101	5.0	1,873,412	11.1	699,757	3.2
Other items	7,863,387	63.4	3,129,825	18.5	3,946,537	18.2
Total	12,395,918	100.0	16,875,811	100.0	21,702,214	100.0

TABLE 15 Value of Syria's Trade with Saudi Arabia, 1951–53

(£S)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Petroleum products	3,216,030	90.5	7,432,589	93.9	11,084,864	93.4
Skins	196,785	5.5	458,670	5.8	422,880	3.6
Other items	142,529	4.0	20,785	0.3	365,411	3.1
Total	3,555,344	100.0	7,912,044	100.0	11,873,155	100.0
Exports						
Wheat and wheat flour	—	—	574,525	5.6	1,157,798	9.5
Furniture	113,208	1.3	211,995	2.1	365,587	3.0
Rayon textiles	1,156,847	13.6	1,052,241	10.2	1,247,732	10.2
Cotton textiles	1,410,190	16.6	958,917	9.3	364,231	3.0
Woolen textiles	173,296	2.0	339,719	3.3	413,418	3.4
Rayon wearing apparel	144,934	1.7	192,518	1.9	372,130	3.1
Cotton wearing apparel	429,748	5.1	998,444	9.7	811,779	6.7
Handkerchiefs	1,134,642	13.4	1,662,750	16.1	1,732,187	14.2
Brass articles	251,253	3.0	304,755	3.0	374,102	3.1
Other items	3,677,032	43.3	4,037,090	39.1	5,348,570	43.9
Total	8,491,200	100.0	10,332,954	100.0	12,187,534	100.0

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TABLE 16 Value of Syria's Trade with Egypt, 1951–53

(£S) 439

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Selected imports						
Rice	2,809,080	75.9	294,006	21.4	—	—
Potatoes	15,813	0.4	132,502	9.7	—	—
Asphalt	330,424	8.9	407,496	29.7	130,950	15.9
Films	152,010	4.1	89,450	6.5	182,600	22.2
Shoes	—	—	130,810	9.6	—	—
Other items	394,213	10.6	316,701	23.1	511,629	62.1
Total	3,701,540	100.0	1,370,965	100.0	825,179	100.0
Exports						
Cattle	736,612	10.2	97,710	2.2	—	—
Tomatoes	—	—	201,000	4.5	—	—
Onions	311,077	4.3	406,522	9.0	525,837	15.3
Nuts	316,494	4.4	205,550	4.6	79,436	2.3
Dried apricots	202,176	2.8	136,252	3.0	—	—
Licorice	240,536	3.3	252,956	5.6	373,548	10.9
Apricot paste	1,987,086	27.6	2,175,607	48.2	880,666	25.7
Tambucs	—	—	161,600	3.6	234,599	6.9
Other items	3,409,079	47.3	872,952	19.4	1,333,909	38.9
Total	7,203,060	100.0	4,510,149	100.0	3,427,995	100.0

Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade

During the last three years, an average of about 80% of Syria's exports to the United States consisted of raw wool and about 10% of tobacco. Among imports from the United States, the largest items are machinery of all types, vehicles, petroleum products, tires and tubes. Syria has an adverse trade balance with the United States.

Syria exports cotton, cereals and wool to the United Kingdom. In 1952 the value of these exports considerably exceeded the value of imports from the United Kingdom, which included a large variety of industrial products and raw materials, among which woolen piece-goods, cotton textiles, rayon and cotton yarn, and machinery were most significant.

The composition of trade with France, Italy, Western Germany and Belgium does not vary greatly from that of the trade with the United King-

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439 dom. France is the only country in this group with which Syria has regular surpluses.

Syria's trade balance with Lebanon has always been favorable. Syria's chief exports are cereals, live animals and dairy products, vegetables and fruits, wool and cotton; imports consist largely of products of the Tripoli oil refinery, citrus fruits and bananas.

Syrian exports to Iraq are mainly textiles and soap; sheep, wool and dates are imported. The trade balance is strongly in favor of Syria.

Exports to Jordan include, apart from wheat, textiles and other manufactured goods; imports consist largely of vegetables, fruits, wool and hides.

The trade balance with Saudi Arabia is also favorable; exports are similar to those for Jordan, but imports include only two larger items, petroleum and cattle hides.

Trade with Egypt is more balanced and includes, among exports, apricot paste, dried fruits and onions; rice, asphalt, shoes and films are the main imports.

In contrast to trade with its neighboring Arab countries, Syria has a very unfavorable trade balance with Turkey, from which it imports large quantities of live animals, as well as hides, tobacco leaves and timber. Syria's 1951-52 wheat deficit was covered by imports from Turkey.

Syria's trade with countries of the Soviet bloc is comparatively insignificant. In 1953 imports from Czechoslovakia (which, because of the nature of its trade, has been listed with Western industrial countries), China and Romania amounted to about £S 6.7 million at official rates and about £S 9.9 million at free market rates. Few exports went to these countries.

Trade Routes

439 487 Table 17 shows the routes along which Syrian foreign trade moves. It indicates that over 50% of export tonnage goes overseas and that 40-50% of imports arrives through Latakia or through Lebanese ports.

In spite of the rapid increase in the absolute tonnage handled by the port of Latakia, which was favored by government regulations limiting the use of other ports, Lebanese ports were able to hold their own in proportion to total Syrian import tonnage. This is explained by the fact that Beirut is the logical port for imports destined for the important Damascus area, while at the same time exports from northern Syria, which have been increasing considerably, have gone mainly through Latakia.

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The large tonnages shown in overland imports from Lebanon are chiefly due to petroleum products from the Tripoli oil refinery. 439 487

TABLE 17 Syria's Trade Routes, 1951–53

(*Thousand metric tons*)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Overseas through						
Latakia						
export	90	43	265	54	353	49
import	163	23	167	21	176	23
Beirut and Tripoli						
export	24	11	30	6	38	5
import	170	23	210	26	205	26
Overland to and from						
Lebanon						
export	64	30	161	33	249	35
import	306	42	332	41	323	42
Jordan						
export	25	12	29	6	69	10
import	14	2	25	3	30	4
Iraq						
export	5	2	5	1	7	1
import	46	6	37	5	25	3
Turkey						
export	4	2	1	—	2	—
import	28	4	34	4	13	2
Total						
exports	212	100	491	100	718	100
imports	727	100	805	100	773	100

SOURCE: Calculated by Syrian government officials.

II TRANSIT TRADE

During various periods in its long history, Syria has played a prominent part both as a transit country and as a country of middlemen in East-West trade. Within the present pattern of world trade and trade routes Syria again has a role to play as a country of transit and perhaps entrepot trade. It has a natural advantage in its location across the shortest route between

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439 the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard and on the one hand, Iraq, on the
487 other, Jordan, given the boycott of Israel.

In neither of these trade routes has Syria a monopoly. Iraq, which at present is moving about 100,000 tons of goods through northern Syria by way of the Northern Railway and unspecified quantities of goods through the desert road and Damascus, has the choice of directing these commodities to Turkish, Syrian or Lebanese port terminals. If transport to the Mediterranean ports should prove too expensive or cumbersome, Basra (Iraq) will be used even for the northern provinces of Iraq. Jordan can shift more of its trade to Aqaba and there are indications that this may happen.

In these circumstances, it is clearly in the interests of Syria to make transit through Syria attractive and profitable; it would be ill advised to sacrifice the long-term interest in transit trade to doubtful immediate gains. From that standpoint, it seems rather short-sighted to require that most goods to and from Jordan be moved by rail, irrespective of the wishes and interests of the shippers, and that goods moved from Beirut to Iraq across the desert must first be reloaded into Syrian trucks.[1] It is also inconsistent with the efforts to develop free trade zones in Syria and to encourage the use of Latakia for transit.

III FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES

439
651 *Licensing*
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Exports. The government may impose restrictions on the exports of specific goods, including a license requirement. As of the beginning of 1954 exports of some 30 items in the tariff schedule, including various types of metals, glycerine, sulphur, fertilizers, jute cloth and sacks, and lambs, were prohibited, and the country's most important exports, (wheat, barley, flour, cotton and cottonseed, wool, sheep and certain types of cattle) were subject to license. Trade with Israel is prohibited.

These export restrictions were instituted for various reasons—to safeguard domestic supplies and to control the re-export of imported items, particularly those of strategic importance. Other regulations are designed

[1] The total volume of Syria's transit trade is presently estimated at 300,000–400,000 tons annually.

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to safeguard quality. Among efforts aiming at improving and standardizing the quality of exported cereals the following may be mentioned: in May 1954 the Ministry of National Economy submitted for study to the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture a proposed order which would require cereal exports to be accompanied by certificates as to their weight, degree of impurity and humidity. To the best of the mission's knowledge, these certificates are to be issued by reputable firms, specializing in this kind of job and cooperating with similar firms in the importing countries. This seems to be an excellent project and we recommend that it be carried out. 439 651 656

Several of the chief export products, such as cotton, wheat, barley, lentils, vetch, wool and hides, can be exported only through Latakia, with exceptions provided for the southern and central provinces.

Imports. Unlike exports, all imports must in principle be licensed. The only exceptions are personal effects of travellers, gifts and commercial samples up to a certain value, gold, certain commercial imports not exceeding £S 200 in value carried by travellers, and some articles imported directly across the frontier into the Jezireh and Euphrates provinces. It should be pointed out, however, that import licenses are freely issued, except with respect to items on the proscribed list.

Certain products, such as sugar, cement, timber, iron and asphalt, can be imported only through the port of Latakia, although the regulations in this respect are rather flexible and in general do not direct through Latakia a significant amount of trade that would not otherwise have gone through this port.

Trade and Payments Agreements

Bilateral. Since its independence, Syria has concluded several trade agreements, about half of which are with the principal countries of the Arab League (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon). Agreements were also concluded with Greece, India, Japan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and a payments agreement has been made with France. Some of the trade agreements simply formalize existing trade relations. The most-favored-nation clause is included in nearly all agreements. In the Japanese agreement, however, it was instead provided that both partners might, when necessary, take measures to protect the production of their local industries. 439

Provisions relating to the volume of exchange are incorporated into the

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439 agreements with Japan and Czechoslovakia. Japan undertook to buy from Syria not less than 5,000 tons of cotton per year, whereas Czechoslovakia agreed to balance at least up to 75% of the value of its exports to Syria by imports of Syrian goods.

Relaxation of restrictions in the way of duties and licensing obligations is particularly to be found in the agreements with Arab countries.

Relations with Lebanon deserve special attention. While the Customs Union was in effect, Syria covered Lebanon's wheat deficit and exported mainly agriculture products for which Lebanon paid with fruits, vegetables, industrial goods, and merchant, banking and tourist services. After dissolution of the Customs Union Syria did its best to reduce, if not to eliminate, the services of Lebanese middlemen; it also restricted travel of Syrians to Lebanon, in varying degree until March 1954. No bilateral trade agreements existed until February 1952 when a provisional agreement was concluded, since then several times renewed and slightly amended. Under this agreement agricultural exports from one country to the other are free of customs duties. Industrial exports are divided into three groups: (a) products regarded by both parties as being of local origin,[2] which are customs free; (b) goods admitted at 50% of the normal tariff;[3] and (c) products mainly based on imported raw materials to which normal tariff rates are applied. Simultaneously with the 1952 agreement other issues outstanding between the two countries were settled, such as compensation by Syria for the £S 44 million withdrawn from circulation in Lebanon for which the Lebanese Government had issued Lebanese currency, the sharing of the deficit of the DHP railway on an equal basis, etc.

While these agreements disposed of some of the current problems many Syrians and Lebanese seem to wonder whether more general principles should not govern economic relations between the two countries. However, economic interests of the predominantly commercial business community in Lebanon, which is highly "allergic" to any government interference and depends on free trade and free market operations as well as on income from foreign visitors, appear to be in some conflict with the interests of Syrian producers, who sought and received government financial aid in the past and continue to rely on trade barriers.

[2] Including, among others, brick, concrete pipes, silk yarn, most of the processed fruit and vegetable products, some glass and a variety of handicraft goods.

[3] Including, e.g., hides and skins, food pastes, chocolates and sweets, some alcoholic beverages, furniture, certain types of hosiery and of silk tissues, etc., altogether over 50 items.

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Differences between the Lebanese and Syrian tariffs on goods not produced in either country are comparatively small but for goods produced locally Syrian protection tends to be higher. For example, on textile cloth there are specific or ad valorem duties (whichever is higher) which work out to at least 50% in Syria and are lower in Lebanon. The Syrian tariff on sugar is higher than Lebanon's and there are embargoes on exports of a considerable number of local products. 439

In certain industries, Lebanon has the advantage of an early start, reflected in better management, design and in accumulated financial reserves. Syrians therefore do not believe it to be in their interest to open the door more widely to trade in industrial goods with Lebanon, unless the competition from Lebanese production can be compensated for by wider markets elsewhere. It is likely that the inter-Arab economic agreements (see below) will actually open such prospects.

Until 1950, trade relations between Syria and Jordan were governed by a 1923 agreement which provided for the exemption from customs duties of agricultural and industrial materials of local origin, except for tobacco and alcoholic beverages. The Palestine war which resulted in the expansion of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made it necessary to revise that agreement and a new treaty was negotiated in 1953. This treaty also exempts agricultural exports from tariffs, but, unlike the agreement with Lebanon, does not extend the exemption to such important items as wheat, barley, pulses and fish. Certain products of local industries are duty free,[4] others pay two-thirds of the normal tariff and still others pay full customs duties. The agreement includes rather complicated transport provisions. In principle, goods exported from one to the other country or in transit are to be railed but there is a rather long list of goods which may also be transported by road. Jordanian wheat passing through Syria must use the railway and the same is true of two-thirds of Jordanian phosphates, provided that the railway is capable of handling these quantities.

An agreement similar to the one between Syria and Lebanon was negotiated with Iraq in 1950. It provides for reciprocal customs concessions, exempting some goods from tariff duties and reducing rates on others. Each country was to provide facilities for the other's trade and industrial activities, and Syria was to be granted a free zone in Basra while Iraq would

[4] Linen, jute and hemp yarn and cords, asphalt, raw and tanned hides, glass products, apricot paste, etc., among Syrian exports and phosphates, marble, potassium, olive oil and cheese among Jordanian exports.

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439 have one in Latakia. This accord, however, was never ratified and has now been discarded, partly because both countries meanwhile have participated in the inter-Arab economic agreement and partly because certain interests in both countries opposed the extensive concessions which were to be made.

Economic relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia and Syria and Egypt are regulated by 1950 trade agreements which aim at promoting commercial relations within the framework of each country's import and export regulations. They do not provide for any preferential treatment.

A provision frequently included either in the text of an agreement or in the accompanying exchange of letters emphasizes the use of Latakia for trade with the partner country. It was included, for example, in the agreements with Greece and Japan.

Currencies and other payments provisions are specified in the agreements with Greece, Czechoslovakia, Japan and Yugoslavia. In the case of Greece, the currency employed is sterling, whereas in most of the others it is U. S. dollars or any convertible exchange; the choice of another currency, even one not convertible, may be agreed upon for individual transactions. A unique provision was included in the exchange of letters accompanying the Yugoslavian agreement: Yugoslavia will be prepared, in certain cases, to accept payments in the form of Syrian exports (cereals and cotton) for services rendered by Yugoslav engineers and contractors.

Multilateral. Syria has left GATT because it preferred to be free in its commercial policy. Syrian exports consist mainly of essential raw materials which by their nature enjoy low tariffs. Moreover, membership in GATT could not readily be reconciled with embargoes.

In September 1953, representatives of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq signed two mutilateral inter-Arab agreements, one on trade and transit, the other on payments and capital transfers. These agreements were ratified by Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt and, in May 1954, by Syria,[8] and have become effective.

The Inter-Arab Agreement on Trade and Transit lists agricultural products which are to be duty free if originating in one of the participating countries, and certain industrial goods which, in similar circumstances, benefit from a 25% reduction in prevailing tariffs. In addition, the participating countries undertake not to impose on such imported goods any internal taxes higher than those imposed by the importing country on similar domestic commodities; they also assure each other preferential treatment

[8] In January 1955 they were also ratified by Iraq.

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as far as import and export licenses are concerned. The new agreement does not invalidate existing bilateral agreements nor does it prevent the conclusion of such agreements at future dates. The contracting parties undertake further to facilitate for each other the transit of goods, personal effects and of animals by all means of transportation foreseen by their respective customs regulations. 439

The Lebanese-Syrian trade agreement and the agreement between Syria and Jordan include certain items not included in the inter-Arab agreement and vice versa. There are also certain differences in the definition of industrial or agricultural goods. By and large, however, the Arab agreement is regarded as more favorable to Syrian trade than are the agreements with Lebanon or with Jordan. It may open the door to more exports of agricultural products and may allow an expansion of industrial exports, even though Syria itself may be faced by an increased inflow of some of Lebanon's industrial production. Both Syria and Lebanon, being comparatively more industrialized countries, are likely to benefit from the opening of Iraq's fairly extensive market.

The Inter-Arab Agreement on Payments and Capital Transfer provides for preferential treatment of transfers for mutual payments on current account and for transfer facilities with regard to capital participation in development projects on which the interested parties may agree. The partners more specifically guarantee each other certain minimum payment facilities which come very close to free convertibility of resident accounts for current transactions within their joint territories. They also guarantee each other freedom from fiscal discriminations with regard to all capital transferred under the provisions of the agreement as well as its free repatriation. Regulations for the prevention of capital flight from the Arab countries are left to the authority of the individual countries.

IV CONDITIONS AFFECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT

457

General

Certain features of the Syrian economy should be attractive to foreign investment. The country still has undeveloped resources; profits are high; there is a degree of economic stability; free market rates of the Syrian pound have been stabilized for some time and the country has practically

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433 exports to Lebanon and Jordan, where its glass is admitted duty free, have
402 been increasing, the plant is running much below capacity. A fourth instance is the match industry, which has a capacity much in excess of the requirements of the home market. This industry is also protected by an embargo on imports but prospects for increasing exports are practically non-existent; European matches are of better quality and have captured the Jordan market, Lebanon produces its own and Iraq is putting up a match factory.

Among the industries in which the greatest expansion is taking place, the cement industry ranks first. After completion of proposed extensions, the combined capacities of the Damascus and Aleppo factories will be about 400,000 tons in 1955 as against 240,000 tons in 1953. It is difficult to estimate Syria's cement requirements in the foreseeable future. In 1953 these amounted to 320,000 tons, of which 120,000 tons were imported, but it is probable that even if the present rate of private urban building is not maintained, some increased demand will result from the construction of public buildings, the creation of new settlements, improvements in rural housing materials, the extension of irrigation and improvements in the road system. Since several Middle Eastern countries have their own cement factories (Lebanon has long had a large cement factory, Jordan has just completed one and Turkey has a number under construction), it is doubtful whether Syria will be able to maintain its small export trade.[4] Although the 1955 total production capacity may somewhat exceed the requirements of the local market, the planned extensions do not seem unreasonable and may even contribute to more efficient operation and lower unit costs.

288 The textile industry is expanding capacity by increasing and moderniz-
402 ing equipment. The existing plant is operating at full or almost full
● 439 capacity, three working shifts being general in the spinning and weaving
433 factories.

In 1953 and through 1954 several tens of thousand additional spindles, several hundred new automatic looms and numbers of knitting machines were installed and optimistic opinions were expressed as to the usefulness of considerable further extensions. Their justification depends on the development of the home and adjoining markets. Syria is approaching self-sufficiency in cotton textiles and the prospects for exports appear promising only in certain specific brands. Only cotton yarn of the higher counts is imported; exports are insignificant. Imports of cotton cloth are

[4] 1,000 tons in 1952; 24,000 tons in 1953.

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larger, and exceed exports which have been falling off. On the other hand, exports of knitted, cotton and rayon goods and other articles of clothing, garments, underwear and socks exceed imports by far.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the entire cotton textile industry is well protected. Imports of yarn and cloth are subject to rather high import duties: 45% ad valorem (about 33% at the free rate of the Syrian pound); duties on fine cotton yarns are substantially lower. In contrast, rayon and woolen yarns are duty free. Socks and stockings (except those made from woolen yarns), men's shirts and pyjamas for men and women may not be imported. This protection, though helpful to the home market, hampers the export trade, particularly in finished goods. This is especially so of those goods requiring use of imported materials in their production; no adequate tariff rebate is given on foreign materials in the exported finished goods. Syrian shirt manufacturers, for instance, claim that with existing machinery they could easily double their production and compete in the export market but for these unfavorable conditions. Although most of the surrounding countries heavily protect their own textile industries, some of Syria's finished textile goods seem to be in a position to compete on the international market to the extent that the component materials are not burdened with protective duties.

In the dyeing, printing and finishing industry—which for a long time lagged behind—a considerable expansion is still anticipated and seems fully justified. Additional machinery was being installed to make possible a full three shifts.

The worsted and woolen cloth industry is not as well equipped with modern machinery as the cotton textile industry. Although the existing plant operates little below capacity and imports of cloth are rather significant, the industry shows no great inclination to expand. Despite the fact that imported yarn is duty free and imported cloth is subject to a rather high tariff, there is keen foreign competition by Italian cloth in the cheaper ranges, British cloth in the higher class and by second-hand suits from the United States. Complaints were heard that the transport charges on the bulkier imported yarns weigh heavily on the industry in comparison to the cost of transporting imported cloth. This drawback seems difficult to overcome. Exports of woolen yarns and cloth have been running well under 7%, by value, of imported yarns and cloth, and in view of the factors mentioned above, no large expansion of exports is to be expected. For recent figures, see Table 1 of the Appendix.

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651 more pronounced and systematic. The regulations regarding the licensing of imports were more strictly applied. The normal tariff on glass was raised to 70% and on various sorts of soap to 40% or 50%. The export of a large number of important raw materials, raw cotton, cotton seed, oil cakes, raw wool, all fruits and vegetables, was subjected to licensing. Shoes and boots were added to the embargo list. Although the embargo on "job lot cloth" was strongly protested, it was not lifted, and instead it was extended to second-hand cotton and silk clothing.

651 652 439 The year 1952 was characterized by a policy of rigorous industrial protectionism. The Minister of National Economy, given almost discretionary power to institute export and import embargoes and licensing requirements, used these powers with little restraint, particularly as to import embargoes, which were imposed on four principal categories of imports: (1) goods locally produced in quantity adequate to meet domestic requirement; (2) goods for which similar local products could be substituted; (3) luxury goods; and (4) machinery which would increase the capacity of an already overequipped industry.

The restrictions and controls on exports were somewhat extended and a de facto monopoly was established with regard to import, export and wholesale trading of sugar.

These measures of extreme protectionism, supplemented by a stricter enforcement of the control on the utilization of foreign exchange by importers and various other measures which will be discussed later, made it possible for many months to charge local customers relatively high prices, compared to those prevailing in the surrounding markets, and to make substantial profits. It also facilitated agreements among manufacturers in defense of their common interests and to reduce internal competition. Complaints from those whose interests were particularly affected and a more general dissatisfaction created by a rise in the cost of living induced the government to take steps to reduce prices. Acting under general legislation enacted in 1951, and specific legislation with respect to sugar and cement, the government fixed lower prices for goods such as cement, yarns and vegetable oils and reduced the tax on sugar.

However, it was thought even in government circles that the import prohibitions had gone too far. Not only was the cost of living increasing but the income from customs duties began to drop, and smuggling and evasion of price-fixing rules became a most profitable activity. In April 1953 action of the Minister of National Economy with respect to imports

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and exports was subjected to the approval of the Council of Ministers. This was followed by the withdrawal of embargoes on various non-competitive imports, higher tariffs being substituted in some cases.

As of autumn 1954 all embargoes on imported goods which directly compete with national products were still in effect, with the exception of the embargo on men's shirts, underwear and pyjamas. Imports of cotton gins are forbidden, to prevent further overexpansion of the ginning industry, and the importation of second-hand looms and knitting machines is prohibited, to ensure the installation of new and modern machinery; importation of almost all items, including machinery, is still subject to licensing. There has been almost no change in the list of prohibited exports or of those which must be licensed. Although the export tax on wheat has been repealed, cotton exports are still taxed; there were certainly good financial reasons for this, but it means in fact a continuation of the element of protection which this duty represents, in favor of the local cotton processing industry. On the other hand, products subject to an embargo or high protective duties are no longer subject to price control. The government is now relying on the effect of internal competition.

Credit Facilities

During the mandate, in 1929, the Syrian Government instructed the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture to establish an industrial bank with a capital of £S 500,000, in which the government was to participate; this was never done.[5]

Not until 20 years later, in June 1949, was the Minister of Finance authorized to guarantee loans to Syrian industrial corporations (*sociétés par actions*) for their first installation or to enable them to continue operations. The amount to be reimbursed under the guarantee could not exceed half the paid-up capital of the corporation and the period of repayment was not to be longer than three years. Eligibility of applicants, their needs and the conditions of both loan and guarantee were to be determined by a special committee; the Minister of Finance was authorized to require a mortgage on the property of the corporation, the mortgage to have preferred position.

Of the 18 loans totalling £S 23.627 million made by January 1952,

[5] *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie*. Moh. Thome, Madrid, 1953, p. 157.

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authorities. The mission was informed, however, that practically every 656
handicraft application for an industrial license is approved. With regard 433
to industry proper, applications have been turned down for various reasons. The main criteria seem to be whether the local market can absorb the additional production and whether the new or expanded industry can be expected to increase exports, especially to the Arab countries.

Facilities with regard to industrial sites. By the decree on the encouragement of industry, the government opened facilities for settlement on state domain land. The proprietor of an industrial establishment who wishes to construct a building for industrial exploitation may rent up to 25,000 square meters with a five-year option to purchase land belonging to state domain, on conditions to be determined by the Directorate of State Domain. The beneficiary is not allowed to sell or utilize this land for non-industrial purposes and the State may recover ownership of land not used for industrial construction or expansion within five years.

These provisions represent a real contribution to a reduction of the cost of establishing new industrial enterprises and to the better siting of existing ones.

Export promotion. The laws on the regulation and the encouragement 654
of industry contain several provisions, already mentioned, which permit 433
the authorities in their discretion to grant certain privileges and other 439
facilities to industrial enterprises in the interest of the national economy. We understand that the authorities have several more specific objectives in mind, including the promotion of industrial exports.

Besides these measures, which have been in existence for only two years, the Syrian Government has for several years been actively engaged in negotiating foreign trade agreements with Arab and other countries[8] with a view to promoting exports generally. Since gaining its independence Syria has made commercial agreements with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon among the Arab countries, and with India, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Japan. Several of these treaties include special privileges for Syrian industrial exports, either assuring them most-favored-nation treatment or exempting specific Syrian products from import restrictions or allowing them tariff reductions or exemptions. Agreements in 1953 with Lebanon and Jordan exempt some local industrial products from customs duties or apply reduced tariffs, and provide

[8] Formerly, under the mandate, commercial treaties could be concluded only with neighboring countries and countries not members of the League of Nations.

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654 for the exchange of other industrial products subject to ordinary duties.
433 The inter-Arab economic agreements of September 9, 1953, between Leba-
439 non, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, list a considerable number of industrial products to which a tariff rate of 25% of the normal tariff of these countries will be applied. But they do not exempt trade among the signatory countries from existing import and export licenses and embargoes, nor do they rule out the institution of new ones. Only in the special commercial agreements between Syria and Jordan, and Syria and Lebanon, are certain industrial products, originating in these countries, exempt from all import restrictions.

IV AN APPRAISAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS INDUSTRY

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A country like Syria, with a preponderantly agrarian economy, no important mineral deposits and little power resources, still rather underdeveloped from the point of view of national income per capita and the dissemination of technical skills, is likely to have a natural advantage in the following branches of mechanized industrial production: (1) the processing—at least up to a certain stage—of indigenous crops which are exported; (2) the production of building materials and other bulky goods for local needs; (3) the manufacture in light industries of commodities for general consumption and some durable goods to meet a more or less special national or regional requirement, even with imported raw materials; (4) the production of simple tools and the repair (eventually the assembly) of locally used machines; and (5) the semi-handicraft production of some luxury goods requiring those special skills for which the country has traditionally been well known. These are in fact the main fields on which modern Syria's industry has concentrated and there is nothing fundamentally unsound about this.

On the other hand, it could not have been expected that the progress made in the period of relative isolation followed by the postwar boom would make Syria proof against the competition of long established and highly efficient foreign concerns, quite apart from the dumping of cheap surplus stocks and large imports of modern machine-made luxury goods with which it was confronted by the end of the forties. The customs tariff of the Syrian-Lebanese Union offered only a modest protection for local

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652 total which reasonable expectations indicate can be raised. In the Main
433 Report we have suggested capitalization of £S 30 million, and suggested the respective ratio of government and private capital.

The cost of necessary managerial and technical staff might run up to £S 300,000 per year and other costs might rise to the same figure with an increase in the volume of business. Possibly half of the cost of the technical staff might in the long run be recouped from fees for technical services. To economize on operating costs it would be advisable to have the commercial banks act as the bank's agents in receiving applications for loans and disbursing and servicing loans in return for a small commission.

652 *Tariff policy and embargoes.* It is far from clear that the trend toward
433 almost complete protection of industry from the impact of foreign com-
651 petition, qualified to only a limited extent by certain provisions of various commercial agreements, has reached its limits.

We have previously recommended reconsideration of this policy. Protection of many industries has gone too far in the direction of national isolation; the balance should be restored by giving more weight to international integration. Liberalization of external trade should be one of the items on Syria's economic program.

In making this suggestion the mission is mindful of the fact that Syria's balance of payments position is not very strong and that the condition of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves obliges the government to proceed with caution. Yet, as long as internal monetary equilibrium is preserved and the foreign exchange policy remains sound, the significance of these limitations ought not to be exaggerated.

We do not recommend immediate termination of the system of licensing imports since it enables the authorities to register at an early date the expected inflow of foreign goods. This may be considered a legitimate precaution, especially if the restriction of licenses is reserved to times when the balance of payments position is endangered. Under licensing, however, discrimination among imports is unavoidable. It should be realized that the need for such a measure indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the factors which determine external equilibrium; rather than continuously applying the palliative of direct import restrictions, Syria should try to remedy this situation. Even if direct import restrictions are temporarily unavoidable, they should not preclude remedial action; on the contrary, they should as far as possible contribute to bringing about an improvement in the basic conditions.

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The licensing of certain local raw material exports in order to give preference to the home market can have several objectives. If its purpose is to permit the local consumer to purchase the raw materials at prices lower than those at which they can be sold in foreign markets, it deprives the suppliers of a price differential; this is difficult to justify. But to a large extent the measure appears to have been inspired by the consideration that many Syrian industrial enterprises lack sufficient working capital and credit facilities to enable them to finance large seasonal raw materials purchases. In that case, the objective would then be to assist local industry in overcoming a competitive handicap, as against financially stronger foreign buyers, by temporarily restricting local raw material exports, without primarily intending to create a preferential price. There may also have been a desire to protect the local raw material suppliers from being forced, for liquidity reasons, to sell out at whatever prices they could obtain at the earliest time, thus endangering steady employment in the local processing industries. If these are the purposes of the licensing measures, provision of adequate storage and credit facilities for both local consumers and suppliers would make such licensing less urgent or even superfluous. Various of our recommendations relate to such facilities, and we suggest that if and when these are adopted the system of export licensing should be discontinued.

The mission has considerable objection to the imposition of embargoes. Import embargoes tend to prevent direct foreign influence on the local prices and qualities of the commodities involved. All the arguments previously advanced against an overstressing of the concept of development in isolation as opposed to development in an international economy apply here. Granted that Syrian industry needs some protection, the mission believes that such stringent measures are not called for, especially since they make it impossible for enterprise and consumers to purchase the particular foreign goods however urgently they may need or want them.

In a limited number of cases the government itself has already substituted higher tariffs for embargoes. Unless such duties are completely prohibitive, this means in principle a reintroduction of international competition, even though in a limited form. The mission considers this a step in the right direction and recommends a total abolition of the remaining import embargoes, even if accompanied by an upward revision of the relevant tariff rates.

With respect to the embargoes on exports the mission does not believe

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656 that the supply of the materials covered by this measure would be seriously
651 endangered if their export were permitted, particularly if the industrialists
439 were given free access to the international raw material markets.

At the time of the termination of the economic union, Syria's tariff structure was rather simple, with little diversification in rates. For most industrial products, excluding primary materials or semi-finished goods essential for local industry, the normal tariff rates (specific and ad valorem) approximated 25%. Since then, even in those instances in which the tariff was raised, the ad valorem duties, at least those expressed in a percentage of free rate prices, are still under 35%, exclusive of the consumption tax on imported goods. Only a few specific duties exceed that level.

Elsewhere in this report the mission recommends that for fiscal reasons the valuation of imported goods at the fictitious official rate prices be replaced by a tariff based on actual free rate prices, and that at the same time the entire schedule of tariff duties, both ad valorem and specific, be subjected to a careful re-examination governed by both revenue and economic considerations. This would undoubtedly result in a more diversified tariff. Certain rates, for instance on some semi-finished and finished goods, would have to be lowered; others could remain as they are. To the extent that duties must remain protective in nature (for infant industries or those subjected to foreign dumping practices), they should not be so high as to safeguard local industries from all foreign competition and thereby weaken the incentive to lowering costs. Moreover, due attention should be given not only to the interests of the producers of the "protected goods", including the industrial workers, but also to the interests of the local consumer, be it a further processing industry or the consuming public. The mission has the definite impression that with respect to the protectionist measures the voice of the industries demanding them has in many cases prevailed over the voice of the other interested groups. It is therefore recommended that in revising the tariff the government should take a broader view than it has done hitherto and pay more attention to keeping the cost of industrial necessities down for the large majority of the population.

We have mentioned that the decisions of the Minister of National Economy to impose a licensing requirement and embargoes on imports and exports now require the approval of the Council of Ministers. If the government follows the mission's recommendations, the administration of

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industrial protection through measures affecting foreign trade would be largely the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. We therefore suggest some procedure to assure that the Minister of National Economy also has some responsibility in this connection insofar as the interests under his jurisdiction are involved. It would also seem desirable that the Council of Ministers continue to exercise its ultimate control over measures of this character so that possible conflicting considerations may be resolved in terms of the public interest in its broadest sense.

Export promotion. The priority given by the Syrian government to attaining national self-sufficiency with regard to industrial products which can be locally manufactured has been combined with a growing effort to open up additional markets for Syrian industry, particularly in the other Near Eastern countries. Syria's execution of several bilateral trade agreements and participation in the inter-Arab economic agreement aiming at liberalizing mutual trade exchange are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. The possibilities for further industrial export promotion, however, are not being fully exploited.

First, the mission recommends that Syrian export industries be given every possible assistance in the procurement of foreign raw and auxiliary materials without fiscal charges, specifically that they be given a full rebate of such charges commensurate with actual exports, and that the system of rebates be so administered that the rebate can be quickly and easily obtained.

Secondly, it is recommended that the policy of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with Syria's main commercial partners be systematically pursued. The considerable increase in recent years in exports of silk and artificial silk cloth, knitwear and other articles of clothing and soap, particularly to the markets of Jordan and Iraq, indicates that there are industrial export possibilities worth while consolidating and expanding.

Thirdly, it is suggested that Syria which, so far as is known, lacks natural oil deposits, has an even greater interest than its oil-producing neighbors in the creation, on a multilateral basis, of a market among the countries of the Arab League; the amount of purchasing power generated by these other countries would contribute far more to the joint total than would Syria's contribution. It therefore seems to be particularly in Syria's interest to promote further inter-Arab economic integration. If this could be achieved, conditions would also become more favorable for the re-establishment of the economic union with Lebanon.

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APPENDIX

TABLE I Summary of Industrial Exports and Imports

Items	1951				1953				Remarks
	Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		
	Quantities[a]	Value[b]	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	
Cotton seed	19,476	4,724	not shown separately		28,418	5,506	759	221	
Other oil seeds	1,589	1,268	714	491	1,515	1,122	472	280	
Copra palm kernels, etc.	—	—	650	467	—	—	1,633	776	
Cotton seed oil	891	1,615	—	—	1,223	1,413	—	—	
Olive oil edible	77	187	—	—	440	817	1,361	1,986	
Olive oil industrial	—	—	243	167	—	—	442	472	
Linseed oil	—	—	423	368	—	—	263	223	
Acid and other oils / Fatty acids and greases	—	—	3,110	2,655	—	—	4,375	1,947	
Oil cakes and residues from vegetable oils	13,456	2,564	3,406	231	24,300	4,190	—	—	
Fats and solid residues from treatment of grease	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,162	79	
Soap—ordinary in blocks	1,540	2,946	171	224	1,919	2,614	—	—	
Soap—toilet	—	—	291	277	—	—	33	59	
Sugar beet	—	—	—	—	—	—	5,077	309	
Raw sugar	—	—	11,958	3,680	—	—	23,836	4,930	
Refined sugar	—	—	7,275	2,876	—	—	—	—	

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TABLE I Summary of Industrial Exports and Imports (cont.)

Items	1951				1953				Remarks
	Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		
	Quantities[a]	Value[b]	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	Quantities	Value	
Glucose	—	—	2,806	992	—	—	3,029	1,032	
Canned and preserved fruits and vegetables	3,361	2,497	—	—	1,503	1,895	—	—	
Fertilizers	—	—	6,190	1,045	—	—	11,171	1,567	
Glass, glass containers, tumblers, bottles, etc.	985	334	1,668	1,467	364	125	1,134	1,160	
Cement	—	—	101,775	6,123	24,103	2,019	11,964	6,450	
Cement, white or colored	—	—	2,028	203	—	—	3,074	371	
Asphalt—natural	4,061	161	—	—	3,003	141	896	146	
Asphalt emulsion, pitch etc. for roads	—	—	5,531	523	—	—	5,554	816	
Iron and steel, rods, bars, sections, wires and sheets	—	—	31,244	8,378	—	—	36,217	9,688	
Iron—scrap	7,279	700	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Natural silk and yarn	19	639	15	120	10	221	23	263	
Artificial silk fibre	—	—	1,292	3,357	—	—	2,966	3,845	
Artificial silk yarn	147	1,270	4,160	18,134	379	1,515	6,572	15,473	
Silk and artificial silk cloth	1,252	15,065	337	3,744	1,784	13,009	440	3,049	
Wool, raw or in bulk	7,511	39,413	1,107	3,054	4,501	21,539	410	803	
Wool, yarn	30	123	216	2,412	no figure		381	3,093	
Wool, cloth and trimmings	25	141	427	5,656	79	389	691	6,183	

Blankets, rugs, etc.	—	—	200	1,307	—	—	307	2,060	
Goat hair	—	—	171	137	—	—	335	245	
Cotton yarn	215	11,630	385	1,686	21	157	537	2,276	
Cotton cloth	604	5,569	2,182	12,390	368	2,171	1,962	11,177	
Socks for men	72	980	—	—	72	499	—	—	
Knitted goods and other articles of clothing	478	5,260	172	925	1,075	7,756	57	699	
Jute cloth	—	—	130	274	—	—	169	170	
Jute sacks	—	—	2,449	2,547	—	—	9,735	5,957	
Cotton and other sacks	—	—	—	—	—	—	390	203	
Hides and skins, untreated	788	2,224	2,022	2,726	584	1,456	2,540	3,160	
Leather or skins tanned or processed and leather goods	437	1,961	42	641	334	1,300	117	707	
Tanning extract, bark and materials for tanning	979	298	1,381	909	424	289	1,766	971	Probably other chemicals would bring this up to 2,000 tons of imports.
Rubber-waste	—	—	997	143	—	—	1,491	182	
Rubber in slabs—sheets of paste	—	—	—	—	—	—	92	181	
Papers (all kinds)	—	—	4,842	4,291	—	—	8,202	4,884	
Paper—sacks and paper for cement	—	—	included above		—	—	1,094	464	Also included in Paper (all kinds).
Paper—kraft paper for bags	—	—	included above		—	—	407	192	Also included in Paper (all kinds).

* All quantities are in metric tons.
† Values in thousands of £S.

SOURCE: Syrian Official Trade Statistics.

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Notes on Foreign Trade Statistics

The figures published in the section of foreign trade are in respect of the Special imports and exports, defined as follows :

Special Imports : Comprise consumption goods deemed as such on direct entry from abroad or following a direct transit entry or upon clearance from the bonded warehouses, or upon acceptance as temporary imports.

The value is based on the amount given on the manifest after checking by the custom authorities, CIF the station of entry, excluding the custom duties.

The conversion into Syrian currency is based on the official rate of exchange, which is below the true value as per the market rate. The total value of imports based on the official rates was 69.6 per cent of the value based on the market rates in 1951 and 68.2 per cent in 1952.

Special Exports : Comprise local goods exported or goods of a foreign origin exported having earlier entered the country exempted of custom duty or, duty paid.

The value is given F.O.B. the Station of clearance.

Country of origin and country of destination : By country of origin is meant the producing country in the case of animal and vegetable products and the country where the last process of manufacture has been completed in the case of industrial products.

By country of destination is meant the country of final destination as known by the exporter and declared on the date of export.

ملاحظات عن احصاءات التجارة الخارجية

ان الاحصاءات الواردة في فصل التجارة الخارجية من هذه النشرة ترجع الى التجارة الخاصة للاستيراد والتصدير حسب التعريف التالي :

تجارة الاستيراد الخاصة : تتضمن البضائع الموضوعة في الاستهلاك سواء لدى ورودها مباشرة من الخارج او على اثر ترانزيت مباشر او عند اخراجها من المستودع او بعد قبولها تحت وضع الاستيراد المؤقت .

وقيمة هذه التجارة مستقاة من البيانات التي يقدمها اصحاب العلاقة بعد التحقق من صحتها من قبل المصالح الجمركية المختصة وهي «سيف» اي قيمة البضاعة في محل الارسال مضافا اليها اجور النقل والضمان وكافة المصاريف الاخرى حتى جمرك التخليص ولا تدخل فيها الرسوم الجمركية .

وقد حولت العملات الاجنبية الى العملة السورية حسب الاسعار الرسمية وبذلك تكون القيم المذكورة دون القيم الفعلية التي اساسها اسعار السوق وقد كانت نسبة قيمة الاستيراد حسب السعر الرسمي للقيمة حسب سعر السوق ٦٩,٦٪ عام ١٩٥١ و ٦٨,٢٪ عام ١٩٥٢ .

تجارة التصدير الخاصة : تتضمن البضائع الوطنية المصدرة والبضائع ذات المنشأ الاجنبي التي عادت الى الخارج بعد ان تكون قد قبلت في الاعفاء او اكتسبت الصفة الوطنية بدفع رسوم الاستيراد . وقيمة هذه التجارة هي «فوب» اي قيمة البضاعة بما فيها المصاريف حتى مكتب الاخراج .

بلدان المنشأ والقصد : يعني بلد المنشأ بلد الانتاج فيما يتعلق بالحاصلات الزراعية والحيوانية والبلد التي تمت فيها مرحلة الصنع الاخير فيما يتعلق بالمنتوجات الصناعية . ويعني بلد القصد بلد القصد النهائي كما يعرفه المصدر ويصرح عنه بتاريخ التصدير .

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كمية البضائع المستوردة والمصدرة والمعاد تصديرها والترانزيت لسوريا ولبنان ، ١٩٣٨ـ١٣ آذار ١٩٥٠
ولسوريا فقط للمدة الواقعة بين ١٣ آذار ونهاية ١٩٥٠ والسنوات ١٩٥١ـ١٩٥٣ (بالأطنان)

QUANTITY OF GOODS IMPORTED, EXPORTED RE-EXPORTED AND IN TRANSIT FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON 1938 — 12.3.1950
AND FOR SYRIA ONLY FOR THE PERIOD 13.3.1950—31.12.1950 AND YEARS 1951—1953 (Tons)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Year	الاستيراد Imports	التصدير Exports	البضائع المعاد تصديرها Re-exports	الترانزيت Transit	زيادة الواردات Excess of Imports	نسبة الصادرات للواردات % Exports per cent of Imports	السنة
			SYRIA AND LEBANON		سوريا ولبنان		
1938	561,234	376,201	5,619	2,286,902	185,033	67.0	١٩٣٨
1939	542,234	325,830	5,319	2,149,997	216,404	60.1	١٩٣٩
1940	314,147	121,562	374	968,868	192,585	38.7	١٩٤٠
1941	273,542	29,487	16	37,742	244,055	10.8	١٩٤١
1942	503,465	23,781	—	76,215	479,684	4.7	١٩٤٢
1943	428,483	52,821	—	654,608	375,662	12.3	١٩٤٣
1944	428,968	120,099	1,235	1,436,171	306,869	28.0	١٩٤٤
1945	514,692	139,315	6,866	2,022,789	375,377	27.1	١٩٤٥
1946	369,587	106,521	572	1,999,127	263,066	28.8	١٩٤٦
1947	414,057	148,018	2,428	2,103,986	266,039	35.7	١٩٤٧
1948	757,334	123,708	1,603	2,295,504	633,626	16.3	١٩٤٨
1949	957,416	305,715	2,050	3,006,799	651,701	31.9	١٩٤٩
1.1 — 13.III.1950	238,902	111,780	450	1,254,898	127,122	46.8	١٩٥٠/٣/١٣-١/١
			SYRIA ONLY		سوريا فقط		
13.III — 31.XII.1950	458,263	435,116	—	230,152	23,147	94.9	١٩٥٠/١٢/٣١-٣/١٣
1951	727,033	212,348	—	332,017	514,685	29.2	١٩٥١
1952	505,130	490,818	—	370,684	314,312	61.0	١٩٥٢
1953	772,555	717,720	—	...	54,835	92.9	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Finance and ex «Common Interest»

المصدر : وزارة المالية والمجلس الاعلى للمصالح المشتركة (سابقا)

قيمة البضائع المستوردة والمصدرة واعادة تصديرها والترانزيت لسوريا ولبنان ، ١٩٣٨ – ١٣ آذار ١٩٥٠
ولسوريا فقط للمدة الواقعة بين ١٣ آذار ونهاية ١٩٥٠ وللسنوات ١٩٥١ – ١٩٥٣ (بالوف الليرات السورية)

VALUE OF GOODS IMPORTED, EXPORTED, RE-EXPORTED AND IN TRANSIT FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON 1938 — 13.3.1950
AND FOR SYRIA ONLY FOR THE PERIOD 13.3.1950 — 31.12.1950 AND YEARS 1951 — 1953 (L.S.'000)

Table No. 2.

جدول رقم ٢

Year	الاستيراد Imports	التصدير Exports	البضائع المعاد تصديرها Re-exports	الترانزيت Transit	زيادة الواردات Excess of Imports	نسبة الصادرات الواردات % Export per cent of Imports	السنة
SYRIA & LEBANON							سوريا ولبنان
1938	70,511	39,278	760	36,609	31,533	55.5	١٩٣٨
1939	75,567	36,517	867	37,086	39,050	48.3	١٩٣٩
1940	57,136	19,302	173	36,779	37,854	33.8	١٩٤٠
1941	40,527	11,228	44	37,336	29,299	27.7	١٩٤١
1942	107,684	23,753	—	76,790	83,931	22.2	١٩٤٢
1943	110,137	32,031	—	136,083	78,106	29.1	١٩٤٣
1944	93,644	46,195	759	157,710	47,449	49.3	١٩٤٤
1945	130,634	43,842	1,945	128,438	86,782	33.6	١٩٤٥
1946	266,654	85,580	1,127	161,746	181,094	32.1	١٩٤٦
1947	363,764	83,640	3,467	182,841	279,124	23.1	١٩٤٧
1948	483,460	78,502	1,179	232,521	404,958	16.2	١٩٤٨
1949	516,186	111,104	1,697	342,638	405,094	21.5	١٩٤٩
1.1 — 13.III.1950	116,861	37,889	632	106,731	79,192	32.3	١٩٥٠/٣/١٣–١/١
SYRIA ONLY							سوريا فقط
13.III — 13.XII.50	197,779	207,865	—	108,179	-10,086	105.1	١٩٥٠ ١٢ – ١٣ – ٣/١٣
1951	303,951	277,134	—	203,797	26,817	91.2	١٩٥١
1952	313,240	319,573	—	304,530	-6,333	102.0	١٩٥٢
1953	307,050	375,828	—	...	-68,778	122.4	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Finance and ex «Common Interest»

المصدر : وزارة المالية والمجلس الاعلى للمصالح المشتركة (سابقا)

جمهورية سورية

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FOREIGN TRADE

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 3. جدول رقم ٣

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		موضوع القسم
	الكمية Quantity	القيمة Value	الكمية Quantity	القيمة Value	
1 Living animals and products of the animal kingdom. Tons ...	6,010	35,306	4,681	28,216	الحيوانات الحية ومنتوجات المملكة الحيوانية اطنان
'000 Heads.	537		469		الوف الرؤوس
2 Products of the vegetable kingdom	560,228	117,892	372,449	89,181	محاصيل المملكة النباتية ..
3 Fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats	1,918	2,483	144	235	الاجسام الدسمة ، الدهون ، الزيوت، ومحاصيل تفكيها ..
4 Products of the food preparing industries, beverages, alcoholic liquids, vinegar and tobacco. ...	28,392	8,982	19,822	10,095	محاصيل الصناعات الغذائية ، الادمية ، السوائل الكحولية ، الخل ، التبغ .. ..
5 Mineral products	46,170	2,982	36,424	1,798	المحاصيل المعدنية .. ..
6 Chemical and pharmaceutical products, colours, varnishes, perfumery, soap candles, glue, gelatine, explosives and fertilisers	2,201	3,244	1,967	4,063	المحاصيل الكيماوية والصيدلانية الاصباغ والاطلية ، صناعة العطور ، الصابون والشموع الصلال، الغيوت، جلوداللراء والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد .. ..
7 Skins, hides, leather, furs, and articles thereof... ...	1,008	2,983	706	2,508	
8 Rubber and manufactures thereof	51	72	42	119	المطاط والحاجات المصنوعة من المطاط .. .. ..
9 Wood, cork, articles thereof and articles made of plaiting materials.	1,983	1,007	1,696	964	الخشب ، الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة منهما .. ..
10 Paper and its applications.	470	996	341	730	الورق واستعمالاته ..
11 Textile materials and textile goods....	63,936	191,457	48,267	177,586	المواد النسيجية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..

التجارة الخارجية

كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

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Table No. 3 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quantity	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Yaer 1952 الكمية Quantity	عام ١٩٥٢ Yaer 1952 القيمة Value	موضوع القسم
12 Footwear, hats, umbrellas, parasols, sticks, articles of fashion...	47	339	33	327	١٢ الاحذية ، القبعات ، المظلات ، اصناف الازياء .. ..
13 Wares of stone and other mineral materials, pottery, glass and glassware ...	2,464	755	2,229	739	١٣ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاحجار المصنوعات الخزفية ، الزجاج والمواد المعدنية الاخرى ، والمصنوعات الزجاجية ..
14 Precious metals, pearls, precious stones & coins ...	3	1,113	5	238	١٤ اللآلىء الحقيقية ، الاحجار الكريمة المعادن الثمينة والنقود
15 Base metals and manufactures thereof	1,718	1,386	3,425	1,608	١٥ المعادن العادية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..
16 Machinery, & apparatus and electric material ...	370	815	380	773	١٦ الآلات والاجهزة ، الادوات الكهربائية .. .. ..
17 Transport material	697	693	155	182	١٧ معدات النقل .. ..
18 Scientific and precision instruments & apparatus, horiogical ware and musical instruments.	8	191	2	36	١٨ الآلات والاجهزة العلمية ، الآلات والاجهزة الدقيقة ، الساعات آلات الموسيقى ..
19 Arms and ammunition....	—	—	—	—	١٩ الاسلحة والذخائر .. ..
20 Miscellaneous goods and products not elsewhere included	45	121	50	154	٢٠ البضائع والحاصيل غير الداخلة في مكان آخر .. ..
21 Works of art and collectors' pieces	1	5	—	1	٢١ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total { Tons	717,720	375,825	490,815	319,573	المجموع { اطنان
Total { '000 Heads	537		469		الوف الرؤوس

تجارة الخارجية

كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣

(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953.

(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		موضوع القسم
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
1 Living animals and products of the animal kingdom. Tons ...	956	8,195	734	8,233	الحيوانات الحية ومنتوجات المملكة الحيوانية اطنان
'000 Heads	375		363		الوف الرؤوس
2 Products of the vegetable kingdom	112,654	28,515	168,500	43,516	محاصيل المملكة النباتية ..
3 Fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats	8,094	5,126	8,048	5,146	الاجسام الدسمة ، الدهون ، الزيوت، ومحاصيل تفككها ..
4 Products of the food preparing industries, beverages, alcoholic liquids, vinegar and tobacco. ...	30,601	10,475	45,000	16,992	محاصيل الصناعات الغذائية ، الاشربة ، السوائل الكحولية ، الخل ، التبغ .. ..
5 Mineral products	431,679	41,189	413,822	38,792	المحاصيل المعدنية .. ..
6 Chemical and pharmaceutical products, colours, varnishes, perfumery, soap, candles, glue, gelatine, explosives and fertilisers	23,952	15,125	18,978	16,776	المحاصيل الكيماوية والصيدلانية الاصباغ والاطلية ، صناعة العطور ، الصابون والشموع الصلال، السبوت، جلود الغراء والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد .. ..
7 Skins, hides, leather, furs, and articles thereof... ...	2,705	4,135	2,584	4,707	الجلود والحاجات المصنوعة من الجلود .. .. ..
8 Rubber and manufactures thereof	3,461	5,664	2,677	5,919	المطاط والحاجات المصنوعة من المطاط .. .. ..
9 Wood, cork, articles thereof and articles made of plaiting materials.	41,199	8,837	46,219	10,459	الخشب ، الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة منهما .. ..
10 Paper and its applications.	8,878	5,539	5,837	5,578	الورق واستعمالاته ..
11 Textile materials and textile goods....	28,098	62,663	19,959	64,344	المواد النسيجية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..

FOREIGN TRADE

كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الاقسام خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣

(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUAN .TY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY SECTIONS, 1952 AND 1953.

(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 4 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ٤ (تتمة)

SECTIONS	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		موضوع القسم
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
12 Footwear, hats, umbrellas, parasols, sticks, articles of fashion...	39	149	220	720	١٢ الاحذية ، القبعات ، المظلات ، اصناف الازياء .. ..
13 Wares of stone and other mineral materials, pottery, glass and glassware ...	7,007	3,853	5,571	3214	١٣ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاحجار والمواد المعدنية الاخرى ، المصنوعات الخزفية ، الزجاج والمصنوعات الزجاجية ..
14 Precious metals, pearls, precious stones & coins ...	9	20,923	6	10,186	١٤ اللآلىء الحقيقية ، الاحجار الكريمة، المعادن الثمينة،النقود
15 Base metals and manufactures thereof	50,504	23,634	46,229	25,028	١٥ المعادن العادية والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد ..
16 Machinery, & apparatus and electric material ...	14,929	40,156	13,079	36,025	١٦ الآلات والاجهزة ، الادوات الكهربائية .. .. ..
17 Transport material	6,005	18,664	7,252	13,430	١٧ معدات النقل .. .. ..
18 Scientific and precision instruments & apparatus, horlogical ware and musical instruments.	517	2,529	156	2,343	١٨ الآلات والاجهزة العلمية ، الآلات والاجهزة الدقيقة ، الساعات آلات الموسيقى ..
19 Arms and ammunition...	74	206	38	245	١٩ الاسلحة والذخائر .. ..
20 Miscellaneous goods and products not elsewhere included	409	1,459	362	1,679	٢٠ البضائع والحاصيل غير الداخلة في مكان آخر .. ..
21 Works of art and collectors' pieces	2	14	1	8	٢١ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total — Tons	772,555	307,050	805,130	313,340	المجموع — اطنان
Total — '000 Heads...	375		363		المجموع — الوف الرؤوس

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 — جدول رقم ٥

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
1 Living Animals	404		425		١ الحيوانات الحية .. ..
1000heads	537	23,041	469	20,959	الوف رؤوس
2 Meats	50	65	54	84	٢ اللحوم .. ..
3 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs	391	290	371	184	٣ الاسماك والقشريات (ذوات القشور) والرخويات (الحيوانات الرخوة)
4 Milk, dairy products, eggs and honey	4,205	10,038	2,767	5,139	٤ الالبان ومنتوجات صناعة الالبان ، البيض والعسل .. ..
5 Animal raw materials and other products	959	1,872	1,064	1.851	٥ المواد الاولية والمنتوجات الخام الحيوانية المنشأ .. ..
6 Living plants and products of floriculture	107	16	60	15	٦ النباتات الحية ومحاصيل زراعة الازهار .. ..
7 Alimentary vegetables, plants, roots and tubers, straw and forage	46,196	11,288	29,575	6,899	٧ الخضر، النباتات، الجذور والسنابل الغذائية (الدرنات الغذائية) ..
8 Edible fruits	17,957	3,9..	14,038	3,790	٨ الاثمار الصالحة للاكل .. ..
9 Colonial produce and general grocery	24	17	23	33	٩ البن ، الشاي والابازير (بهارات)
10 Cereals	382,998	81,780	256,217	62,732	١٠ الحبوب .. .. ..
11 Milling products, malts, starch and fecula	46,730	10,137	21,527	5,873	١١ محاصيل الطواحين، الشعير النابت (المشت) نشاء الحبوب ، نشاء الجذور
12 Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, various grains, seeds and fruits, industrial & medical plants	62,235	10,311	50,139	9,548	١٢ الحبوب والاثمار الزيتية ، الحبوب البذور ، الاثمار المتنوعة ، النباتات الصناعية والطبية القش والكلأ (العلف) .. .. ..
13 Raw materials for dyeing and tanning, gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and juices	747	364	669	214	١٣ المواد الاولية المعدة للصباغة والدباغة، الصموغ الراتنجات وغيرها من العصارات النباتية الاخرى ..
14 Materials for plaiting and carving, & other raw vegetable materials and products ...	234	68	202	75	١٤ المواد المعدة للضفر والحفر وغيرها من المواد الاولية والمحاصيل الخام النباتية المنشأ .. ..
15 Animals and vegetable fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats.	1,917	2,484	144	235	١٥ الاجسام الدسمة ، الدهون والزيوت ومحاصيل تفكيها الدهون الغذائية الجيلة ، الشموع النباتية المنشأ
16 Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans and molluscs	1	1	3	7	١٦ عطرات اللحوم والاسماك ومحضرات القشريات والرخويات ..
17 Sugar and confectionery ...	154	174	133	186	١٧ السكر ومصنوعات السكر ..
18 Cocoa & preparations thereof	2	6	—	—	١٨ الكاكاو ومحضراته .. ..

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الفصل
	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
19 Preparations from flour or farina	76	63	130	80	١٩ المحضرات التي اساسها الدقيق والنشاء .. .. ..
20 Preparations of fruits, vegetables, pot herbs and other plants	1,576	1,917	2,474	2,673	٢٠ محضرات الخضر والنباتات الصالحة للاكل، محضرات الاثمار، محضرات النباتات الاخرى او محضرات اجزائها .. .. ..
21 Miscellaneous preparations...	315	197	400	256	٢١ المحضرات الغذائية على اختلاف انواعها .. .. ..
22 Beverages alcoholic liquids and vinegar	4	2	2	3	٢٢ الاشربة ، المواقع الكحولية ، الخل
23 Residues and wastes of food preparing industries	24,841	4,229	13,783	2,316	٢٣ بقايا الصناعات الغذائية ونفاياتها
24 Tobacco	1,423	2,362	2,896	4,575	٢٤ التبغ .. ..
25 Earths, stones, lime and cement	35,048	2,214	26,019	1,110	٢٥ الاتربة،الاحجار، الكلس،الاسمنت
26 Ores, slag and ash	4	2	12	5	٢٦ الفلزات ، الخبث ، الرماد ..
27 Mineral fuels and oils, natural illuminous substances and products of their distillation	11,117	766	10,394	663	٢٧ الوقود المعدني ، الزيوت المعدنية المواد المنيرة ومحاصيل تقطيرها
28 Chemical and pharmaceutical products	120	226	41	142	٢٨ المواد الكيماوية والصيدلانية ، العناصر الكيماوية .. ..
29 Prepared chemicals and other products for photography	27	214	4	214	٢٩ المحاصيل الكيماوية المحضرة والمحاصيل الاخرى المستعملة في التصوير الشمسي .. ..
30 Colouring and tanning extracts leads, pencils, colours, lacs, varnishes and putties ...	92	134	71	244	٣٠ الخلاصات الدبغية ، الاصباغ ، اللك والاطلية (فرنيش) ، المصطكا (المنجون) رصاص الاقلام ، اقلام الرصاص .. .. ..
31 Essential oils, essences, artificial aromatic materials, perfumery and cosmetics ...	14	23	17	49	٣١ الزيوت العطرية ، العطور ، المواد العطرة الصنعية ، اصناف صناعة العطور .. .. ..
32 Soap, candles and articles from waxes, oils or fats ...	1,927	2,625	1,794	3,381	٣٢ الصابون،شموع الاضاءة والمحضرات الاخرى التي اساسها الزيوت او الشحوم او الشمع والاصناف المماثلة .. .. ..
33 Glues, gelatines and dressings	20	20	33	30	٣٣ الجبنين (كازين)، الاجين (البومين) الهلامين (جلاتين) ، الغراء ، المواد المستعملة للتهيئة .. ..

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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
34 Explosives, fireworks, matches and other inflammable articles	1	2	—	—	٣٤ المتفجرات واصناف صناعة الالعاب النارية ، الثقاب والاصناف الاخرى من مواد لهوب (قابلة للالتهاب)
35 Fertilisers	—	—	7	3	٣٥ الاسمدة .. .. ..
36 Skins, hides and leather ...	944	2,683	656	2,276	٣٦ الصلال والبيوت .. ..
37 Articles made of hides, skin and leather...	58	251	48	220	٣٧ الحاجيات المصنوعة من البيوت (الجلود المدبوغة) والصلال (الجلود غير المدبوغة) .. .. ..
38 Fur-skins and furs	8	48	1	11	٣٨ جلود الفراء .. .. ..
39 Rubber, gutta-percha, balata, substitutes and manufactures thereof	51	72	42	119	٣٩ المطاط والحاجيات المصنوعة من المطاط .. .. ..
40 Wood, articles thereof and furniture	1,944	984	1,611	924	٤٠ الخشب والحاجات المصنوعة منه
41 Cork and manufactures thereof	1	1	—	1	٤١ الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة من الفلين
42 Articles made of straw, cane or other vegetable plaiting materials	39	23	85	39	٤٢ الحاجات المصنوعة من القش والاسل وغيرها من المواد النباتية الصالحة للقش .. ..
43 Materials used for the manufacture of paper	—	—	—	--	٤٣ المواد المستعملة لصناعة الورق
44 Paper, cardboard, articles thereof and binders wares	448	925	318	642	٤٤ الورق والورق المقوى ، الحاجيات المصنوعة منهما
45 Booksellers wares & products of the graphic arts	22	72	23	88	٤٥ حاجات المكتبات ومنتوجات فن الرسم والخطوط .. ..
46 Silk, floss-silk and artificial silk	2,329	18,807	1,756	16,495	٤٦ الحرير ومشاقة الحرير ، الحرير الصنعي والالياف النسيجية الصنعية الخيوط المدنية
47 Wool, horse-hair (crins) and other animals hair (pòils)	4,629	22,250	3,585	15,335	٤٧ الصوف والشعر والوبر ..
48 Cotton	55.005	138,571	38,968	132,382	٤٨ القطن .. ..
49 Flax, hemp, jute, ramie and other vegetable textile materials	30	49	170	289	٤٩ الكتان ، القنب ، الجوت ، الرامي وغيرها من المواد النسيجية النباتية
50 Wadding felt, ropes, rope-makers wares, special fabrics and articles for technical purposes	314	1,164	503	1,033	٥٠ قطن الحشو، اللباد، الحبال واصناف صناعة الحبال ، النسج الخاصة والاصناف الفنية .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
51 Hosiery	338	2,928	277	3,861	٥١ مصنوعات شغل الصنارة (بونارتي)
52 Clothing, linen and articles of all kinds ready-made ...	982	7,581	921	8,065	٥٢ الالبسة والشعار (الملابس الداخلية) والاصناف الجاهزة من جميع الانواع
53 Rags and scraps of textile materials	109	108	87	128	٥٣ الاسمال (ندول) والخرق ..
54 Footwear	39	290	28	280	٥٤ الاحذية .. ..
55 Hats, tarbooches and caps ...	8	42	3	28	٥٥ القبعات العادية والقبعات المعروفة بالكسكيت .. .. ..
56 Umbrellas, parasols and sticks	—	1	1	8	٥٦ المظلات (مطريات وشمسيات) العكاز (العصي) .. ..
57 Feathers, articles of feathers, artificial flowers and other articles for ornament & fans	—	6	—	11	٥٧ الريش الحفر المدلزونة، الاصناف المصنوعة من الريش ، الازهار الصنعية الحاجات المصنوعة من الشعر ، المراوح .. ..
58 Wares of stones and other mineral materials	882	112	833	148	٥٨ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاحجار والمواد المعدنية الاخرى .. ..
59 Pottery	171	29	72	37	٥٩ المصنوعات الخزفية .. ..
60 Glass and Glassware	1,411	614	1,324	354	٦٠ الزجاج والحاجات الزجاجية ..
61 Precious metals, pearls and precious stones (kilo) ...	1,579	239	4,629	254	٦١ الآلية الحقيقية، الاحجار الكريمة، المعادن الثمينة والحاجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد (كيلو) .. ..
62 Coins (specie) (kilo) ...	955	3,873	78	4	٦٢ النقود (كيلو) .. .. ..
63 Iron, cast iron and steel ...	1,534	642	3,278	881	٦٣ الحديد ، الحديد الصب ، الفولاذ
64 Copper	148	565	115	485	٦٤ النحاس .. .. ..
65 Nickel	...	1	—	—	٦٥ النيكل .. .. ..
66 Aluminium	8	21	15	25	٦٦ الالمنيوم .. .. ..
67 Lead	2	4	—	—	٦٧ الرصاص .. .. ..
68 Zinc	10	5	5	16	٦٨ التوتياء (زينك) .. ..
69 Tin	...	...	—	—	٦٩ القصدير .. .. ..
70 Other common metals, and alloys thereof	—	—	—	—	٧٠ المعادن العادية الاخرى وخلائطها
71 Cutlery & miscellaneous wares of common metals	16	146	12	200	٧١ الحاجات المختلفة المصنوعة من المعادن غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. ..
72 Boilers, machinery, mechanical apparatus appliances and parts	322	652	355	638	٧٢ المراجل ، الآلات، الاجهزة، الادوات الآلية ، وكذلك قطعها المنفصلة

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كمية وقيمة التصدير حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953.
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 5 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٥ (تتمة)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الفصل
73 Electric machinery, apparatus, articles and parts detached	49	182	25	135	٧٣ الآلات والاجهزة الكهربائية والحاجات المعدة للاستعمالات الكهربائية وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
74 Railway rolling-stock and railway and tramway material	—	—	1	2	٧٤ وسائط النقل المستعملة في السكك الحديدية والعاقات (ترام)
75 Cycles, automobiles and other vehicles	898	660	114	155	٧٥ السيكلات ، العراجات وغيرها من وسائط النقل .. ..
76 Aviation and navigation means	—	—	40	25	٧٦ وسائط الطيران والملاحة ..
77 Scientific, optical, precision and other instruments and apparatus	8	182	1	13	٧٧ الآلات والاجهزة البصرية ، الآلات واجهزة القياس الدقيق ، الآلات والاجهزة الاخرى غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ..
78 Horological wares	—	5	—	10	٧٨ اصناف صناعة الساعات ..
79 Musical instruments	—	6	1	13	٧٩ الآلات الموسيقى .. ..
80 Arms	—	—	—	—	٨٠ الاسلحة .. .. ..
81 Ammunition	—	—	—	—	٨١ الذخائر .. .. ..
82 Wares of carved or moulded materials or artificial plastic materials	13	65	10	69	٨٢ الحاجات في المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من مواد طبيعية او صنعية معدة للنحت والسبك .. .. ..
83 Brush and sieve wares ...	26	29	35	36	٨٣ حاجات صناعة الفراجين (فرشاة) فراجين الغسل واصناف صناعة المناخل .. .. ..
84 Games, toys, articles for Christmas trees & sporting goods and apparatus	3	19	2	8	٨٤ الالعاب ، اللعب ، الاصناف المعدة لعيد والالعاب الرياضية ..
85 Wares of various materials and other	3	11	3	41	٨٥ الحاجات المصنوعة من مواد مختلفة (الاوبار) وماسكات الريش وماسكات اقلام الرصاص ، الاصناف المعدة للمخزن .. .. ..
86 Works of art and articles for collection	1	5	—	1	٨٦ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total — Tons	717,720	375,825	490,818	319,573	المجموع — اطنان
Total — '000 Heads...	557		489		المجموع — الوف الرؤوس

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كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 — جدول رقم ٦

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
1 Living Animals ... ... 1000 heads	—	—	—	—	١ الحيوانات الحية .. ..
2 Meats	375	7,127	363	7,314	الوف الرؤوس
3 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs	9	26	12	33	٢ اللحوم .. .. ..
4 Milk, dairy products, eggs and honey	443	239	192	95	٣ الاسماك والقشريات (ذوات القشور) والرخويات (الحيوانات الرخوة)
5 Animal raw materials and other products	487	784	491	735	٤ الالبان ومنتوجات صناعة الالبان، البيض والعسل .. ..
6 Living plants and products of floriculture	17	38	38	56	٥ المواد الاولية والمنتوجات الخام الحيوانية النشأ .. ..
7 Alimentary vegetables, plants, roots and tubers, straw and forage	97	55	74	62	٦ النباتات الحية ومحاصيل زراعة الازهار .. .. ..
8 Edible fruits.	25,346	4,327	26,129	4,242	٧ الخضر ، النباتات ، الجذور ، والمسانيل الغذائية (الدرنات الغذائية) .. .. ..
9 Colonial produce and general grocery.	18,956	12,880	15,417	12,974	٨ الاثمار الصالحة للاكل ..
10 Cereals.	2,162	5,112	1,992	4,472	٩ البن ، الشاي ، والاباريز (بهارات)
11 Milling products, malts, starch and farinas	6,022	3,153	42,084	15,740	١٠ الحبوب .. .. ..
12 Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, various grains, seeds and fruits, industrial & medical plants	240	108	1,882	696	١١ محاصيل الطواحين، الشعير الناشف نشاء الحبوب ، نشاء الجذور
13 Raw materials for dyeing and tanning, gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and juices	10,815	2,767	11,869	4,804	١٢ الحبوب والاثمار الزيتية الحبوب البزور ، الاثمار المتنوعة ، النباتات الصناعية ، والطبية القش والكلاء (العلف) .. .. ..
14 Materials for plaiting and carving, and other raw vegetable materials and products	1,148	731	687	417	١٣ المواد الاولية للدباغة والصباغة والدبغة الصموغ والراتنجات وغيرها من العصارات النباتية الاخرى ..
15 Animals and vegetable fatty substances, greases, oils, waxes and alimentary fats.	74	35	167	116	١٤ المواد المعدة للضفر والحفر وغيرها من المواد الاولية والمحاصيل الخام النباتية النشأ .. ..
16 Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans and molluscs.	8,094	5,126	8,048	5,146	١٥ الاجسام الدسمة ، الدهون والزيوت الزيوت ومحاصيل تفكيها الدهون المياة ، الشموع النباتية النشأ
17 Sugar and confectionery ...	414	622	339	580	١٦ مخضرات اللحوم والاسماك ومخضرات القشريات والرخويات ..
18 Cocoa & preparations thereof	27,020	6,075	38,481	12,428	١٧ السكر ومصنوعات السكر ..
	172	376	186	367	١٨ الكاكاو ومخضراته .. ..

FOREIGN TRADE

كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٦ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الفصل
19 Preparations from flour or fecula	154	214	173	278	١٩ المحضرات التي أساسها الدقيق والنشاء .. .. ..
20 Preparations of fruits, vegetables, pot herbs and other plants	941	166	2,102	574	٢٠ محضرات الخضر والنباتات الصالحة للاكل، محضرات الاثمار، محضرات النباتات الاخرى او محضرات اجزائها .. .. ..
21 Miscellaneous preparations...	94	86	67	77	٢١ المحضرات الغذائية على اختلاف انواعها .. .. ..
22 Beverages alcoholic liquids and vinegar	342	426	1,225	976	٢٢ الاشربة، الموائع الكحولية، الخل
23 Residues and wastes of food preparing industries ...	715	30	2,039	133	٢٣ بقايا الصناعات الغذائية ونفاياتها
24 Tobacco	332	2,484	446	1,370	٢٤ التبغ .. ..
25 Earths, stones, lime and cement	18,865	1,655	48,715	3,506	٢٥ الاتربة، الاحجار، الكلس، الاسمنت
26 Ores, slag and ash	17	10	62	12	٢٦ الفلزات، الخبث، الرماد ..
27 Mineral fuels and oils, natural illuminous substances and products of their distillation	412,797	39,523	363,045	35,274	٢٧ الوقود المعدني، الزيوت المعدنية المواد الحمرية ومحاصيل تقطيرها
28 Chemical and pharmaceutical products	7,343	7,287	10,164	10,825	٢٨ المواد الكيماوية والصيدلانية، العناصر الكيماوية .. ..
29 Prepared chemicals and other products for photography	80	794	42	734	٢٩ المحاصيل الكيماوية المحضرة والمحاصيل الاخرى المستعملة في التصوير الشمسي .. ..
30 Colouring and tanning extracts inks, pencils, colours, inks, varnishes and putties ...	3,328	3,537	2,309	2,747	٣٠ الخلاصات الدباغية، الاصباغ، الالك والاطية (فرنيش)، المصطكا (المستجون) ورصاص الاقلام، اقلام الرصاص .. .. ..
31 Essential oils, essences, artificial aromatic materials, perfumery and cosmetics ...	155	715	157	700	٣١ الزيوت العطرية، العطور، المواد العطرة الصنعية، اصناف صناعة العطور .. .. ..
32 Soap, candles and articles from waxes, oils or fats ...	1,066	781	800	677	٣٢ الصابون، شموع الاضاءة والمحضرات الاخرى التي اساسها الزيوت او الشحوم او الشمع والاصناف المماثلة .. ..
33 Glues, gelatines and dressings	351	252	159	158	٣٣ الجبنين (الكرتين)، الاجين (اليوسين) الهلامين (جلاتين)، القراء، المواد المستعملة التهيئة .. ..

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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٦ تابع

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الفصل
34 Explosives, fireworks, matches and other inflammable articles	89	167	38	37	٣٤ المتفجرات وأصناف صناعة الألعاب النارية، الثقاب والأصناف الأخرى من مواد ليوب (قابلة للالتهاب)
35 Fertilizers	11,310	1,591	3,008	878	٣٥ الأسمدة .. .. ..
36 Skins, hides and leather ...	2,671	3,951	2,339	1,530	٣٦ الصلال والسيوت .. ..
37 Articles made of hides, skin and leather	13	130	9	165	٣٧ الحاجات المصنوعة من السيوت (الجلود المدبوغة) والصلال (الجلود غير المدبوغة) .. ..
38 Fur-skins and furs	19	25	16	12	٣٨ جلود الفراء .. .. ..
39 Rubber, gutta-percha, balata, substitutes and manufactures thereof	3,401	5,864	2,677	5,919	٣٩ المطاط والحاجات المصنوعة من المطاط .. ..
40 Wood, articles thereof and furniture	40,792	8,633	46,083	10,297	٤٠ الخشب والحاجات المصنوعة منه
41 Cork and manufactures thereof	23	35	17	21	٤١ الفلين والحاجات المصنوعة من الفلين .. ..
42 Articles made of straw, cane or other vegetable plaiting materials.	382	169	118	142	٤٢ الحاجات المصنوعة من القش والأسل وغيرها من المواد النباتية الصالحة للضفر .. ..
43 Materials used for the manufacture of paper	30	7	-	-	٤٣ المواد المستعملة لصناعة الورق
44 Paper; cardboard, articles thereof and binding waves ...	8,735	5,326	5,731	5,328	٤٤ الورق والورق المقوى ؛ الحاجات المصنوعة منهما .. ..
45 Bookbinders waves & products of the graphic arts	91	305	106	250	٤٥ حاجات الكتب ومنتوجات فن الرسم والخطوط .. ...
46 Silk, floss-silk and artificial silk	10,130	23,908	7,158	23,305	٤٦ الحرير ومشاقة الحرير ؛ الحرير الصنعي والألياف الصنعية المشابهة الخيوط المدنية .. ..
47 Wool, horse-hair (crine) and other animal hair (pelts)	2,591	13,823	2,138	15,795	٤٧ الصوف والشعر والوبر ..
48 Cotton	2,189	12,846	1,991	13,089	٤٨ القطن .. ..
49 Flax, hemp, jute, ramie and other vegetable textile materials	380	544	326	836	٤٩ الكتان ، القنب ، الجوت ، الرامي وغيرها من المواد النسيجية النباتية
50 Wadding, felt, ropes, rope-makers waves, special fabrics and articles for (industrial) purposes	419	765	256	374	٥٠ قطن الحشو ، اللباد ، الحبال وأصناف صناعة الحبال ، النسج الخاصة والأصناف النسجية الخاصة

FOREIGN TRADE

كمية وقيمة المستورد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 6 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٦ (تابع)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الفصل
51 Hosiery	47	276	33	272	٥١ مستوردات فصل المنسوجات الجوربية
52 Clothing, linen and articles of all kinds readymade ...	10,287	7,152	5,028	6,301	٥٢ الالبسة الجاهزة (الملابس الداخلية) والاصناف المجلوبة من جميع الانواع .. .. ..
53 Rags and scraps of textile materials	1,559	3,333	2,238	3,560	٥٣ الاسمال (دول) والخرق ..
54 Footwear	9	28	175	326	٥٤ الاحذية .. ..
55 Hides, turbentine and wax ...	4	62	4	72	٥٥ الجلود الخامية والجلود المدبوغة والتربنتين .. .. ..
56 Underfine, parcels and sticks	26	31	39	98	٥٦ الفلات (مطريات وخشبات) الفلات (مسي) .. .. ..
57 Feathers, articles of feathers, artificial flowers and other articles for ornament & fans	2	8	3	12	٥٧ الريش العطر الشد الورقية ، الاصناف المصنوعة من الريش ، الازهار الصنعية المنسوجات المصنوعة من الشعر ، الرواح .. ..
58 Wares of stones and other mineral materials	841	226	628	211	٥٨ المنسوجات المصنوعة من الاحجار والمواد المعدنية الاخرى ..
59 Pottery	3,534	1,488	2,537	1,263	٥٩ المصنوعات الفخارية .. ..
60 Glass and Glassware	2,682	2,654	2,418	1,840	٦٠ الزجاج والمنسوجات الزجاجية
61 Precious metals, pearls and precious stones (bits) ...	9,224	20,528	5,885	10,170	٦١ المعادن الثمينة الاحجار الكريمة المعادن الثمينة والمنسوجات المصنوعة من هذه المواد (كيلو) ..
62 Coins (specie) (bits)	167	334	4	16	٦٢ النقود (كيلو) .. ..
63 Iron, cast iron and steel ...	48,187	18,020	44,455	19,550	٦٣ الحديد ، الحديد الصب ، الفولاذ
64 Copper	726	1,574	785	2,440	٦٤ النحاس .. .. ..
65 Nickel	—	1	—	1	٦٥ النيكل .. .. ..
66 Aluminium	610	1,116	324	590	٦٦ الالمنيوم .. ..
67 Lead	325	182	255	330	٦٧ الرصاص .. .. ..
68 Zink	67	72	46	32	٦٨ الزنك (زنك) .. ..
69 Tin	121	340	38	260	٦٩ القصدير .. .. ..
70 Other common metals, and alloys thereof	28	88	14	28	٧٠ المعادن العادية الاخرى ومخاليطها
71 Cutlery & miscellaneous wares of common metal	400	2,038	368	1,790	٧١ المنسوجات المختلفة المصنوعة من المعادن المذكورة ولا المحافظة في مكان آخر .. ..
72 Boilers, machinery, mechanical apparatus, appliances and parts	11,582	30,166	10,938	27,840	٧٢ الراجل الالات الاجهزة الادوات الالية ، وكذلك قطعها المنفصلة

التجارة الخارجية

كمية وقيمة الاستيراد حسب الفصول خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالف الليرات السورية)

QUANTITY AND VALUE OF IMPORTS BY GROUPS, 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

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Table No. 6 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٦ (تتمة)

GROUP	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الفصل
73 Electric machinery, apparatus, articles and parts detached	2,937	9,969	2,751	8,186	٧٣ الالات والاجهزة الكهربائية والحاجات المعدة لاستعمالات الفنية الكهربائية وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
74 Railway rolling-stock and railway and tramway material	308	158	55	84	٧٤ وسائط النقل المتصلة في السكك الحديدية ادوات السكك الحديدية والمترامات (ترام) .. ..
75 Cycles, automobiles and other vehicles	6,382	17 783	5,145	12,782	٧٥ السيارات ، العربات وغيرها من وسائط النقل .. ..
76 Aviation and navigation means	40	713	2,652	566	٧٦ وسائط الطيران والملاحة ..
77 Scientific, optical, precision and other instruments and apparatus	132	1,274	83	1,051	٧٧ الالات والاجهزة البصرية ، الات واجهزة القياس الدقيق ، الالات والاجهزة الاخرى غير المذكورة والداخلة في مكان آخر ..
78 Medical wares	15	947	31	979	٧٨ اصناف صناعة الصحة ..
79 Musical instruments	368	308	40	313	٧٩ الات الموسيقى .. ..
80 Arms	12	75	4	106	٨٠ الاسلحة .. .. ..
81 Ammunition	62	131	32	141	٨١ الذخائر .. .. ..
82 Wares of carved or moulded materials or artificial plastic materials	178	585	177	745	٨٢ الحاجات غير المذكورة والداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من مواد طبيعية او صنعية مصفة النحت والسبك .. .. ..
83 Brush and shoe wares... ...	51	145	51	189	٨٣ حاجات صناعة الفراجين (الرشاش) فراجين الدهان واصناف صناعة الداخل .. .. ..
84 Games, toys, articles for Christmas trees & sporting goods and apparatus	118	315	103	332	٨٤ الالعاب ، اللعب ، الاصناف المعدة للعيد والالعاب الرياضية ..
85 Wares of various materials and other	62	414	35	421	٨٥ الحاجات المصنوعة من مواد مختلفة الازرار ، ماسكات الريش وماسكات القلم الرصاص ، الاصناف المعدة للمدخنين .. .. ..
86 Works of art and articles for collection	2	14	1	8	٨٦ التحف الفنية وتحف المجموعات
Total { Tons	772,555	207,850	555,130	313,340	المجموع { اطنان
Total { '000 Piastres...	875		303		المجموع { الف الرؤوس

FOREIGN TRADE

أهم البضائع المستوردة الى سورية خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)●

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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 جدول رقم ٧

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953			الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value		
4b	Rice, husked, whole ...	338	6,375	338	6,805	٤/ب	الشلبي ، الشرلان ، الشماع (الوف الرؤوس) ..
5b	Ho-gants and sho-gants *	20	303	24	282	٥/ب	الهوجنت والشوغانت (الوف الرؤوس)
18a	Fish, canned, water	367	165	157	68	١٨/أ	اسماك المياه العذبة ..
21/2	Milk powder, not for industrial purposes	215	340	151	267	٢١/٢	مسحوق الحليب غير المعد للصناعة .. .. ..
25c2	Cheese of all kinds other than gruyere, roquefort, and traditional	176	220	196	353	٢٥/ج/٢	الجبن بالواعه المختلفة غير الغروير والروكفور والتقليدي
46b	Olives, salted	195	102	186	98	٤٦/ب	الزيتون والكبر (الشبار) المالحة
47	Tomatoes	6,548	1,086	5,196	720	٤٧	البندورة .. ..
48a	Onions	1,341	136	976	98	٤٨/أ	البصل والكرات .. ..
49	Potatoes	8,471	1,264	10,532	1,586	٤٩	البطاطا .. .. ..
50c	Cabbages	1,086	171	127	17	٥٠/ج	جميع انواع الكنة والقرنبيط الاخرى .. .. ..
50 f2	Haricot beans and broad beans	1,126	243	1,317	283	٥٠/و/٢	الفاصوليا وفول الترمس
50g	Cucumbers, pumpkins, marrows and similar vegetables	1,716	400	2,303	437	٥٠/ز	الخيار ، خيار المثلل ، القرع الكوسا وما يماثلها ..
50h	Other fresh vegetables, n.e.s.	3,610	612	4,131	668	٥٠/ح	الخضر الاخرى الطازجة غير المذكورة .. .. ..
54a2	Dates, other than in packets of 1 kilo or less	21,827	2,349	22,770	2,332	٥٤/أ/٢	التمور الاخرى غير المعلبة كيلو او اقل .. .. ..
54b	Bananas	4,294	1,454	4,113	1,281	٥٤/ب	الموز .. .. ..
55a	Oranges and mandarines	19,611	3,640	[illegible]	4,127	٥٥/أ	البرتقال والكلمنتينة (يوسف افندي) .. .. ..
55b	Lemons	2,080	508	3,251	306	٥٥/ب	الليمون الحامض .. ..
56a	Almonds, husked	146	328	128	254	٥٦/أ	اللوز بقشره .. ..
56c	Pistachio, shelled	41	141	45	167	٥٦/ج	الفستق الاخضر .. ..
56e	Apples and quinces	2,381	779	1,548	414	٥٦/هـ	التفاح والسفرجل ..
56c	Plums	1,855	278	1,400	242	٥٦/ج	الخوخ (برقوق) .. ..
56d	Mulberries	977	331	1,236	328	٥٦/د	التوت .. .. ..
61c	Watermelons	11,151	1,266	9,287	909	٦١/ج	البطيخ الاخضر (الجبس)
61d	Other fresh fruits, n.e.s.	745	120	813	131	٦١/د	الاثمار الاخرى الطازجة غير المذكورة
63a	Coffee, not roasted ...	1,049	2,838	1,136	2,785	٦٣/أ	البن غير المحمص ..
64	Tea	824	2,075	617	1,341	٦٤	الشاي .. .. ..
65	Pepper and allspice ...	87	115	141	146	٦٥	الفلفل (بهار) والقرفة (بسطه) (حتى المطحون منها) ..

● البضاعة التي زادت قيمتها عن ١٠٠ الف ليرة سورية خلال عام ١٩٥٣

* Commodities whose value exceeded L.S. 100,000 during 1953

التجارة الخارجية

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اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي	
67d	Cardamom	19	127	10	108	القاقلة (حب الهال) ..	٦٧/د
70b	Rice, husked	5,812	3,052	8,298	3,609	الارز المقشور	٧٠/ب
83a	Copra, castor seeds and linseeds	1,633	777	3,306	1,580	الكوبرا وحب الخروع وبزر الكتان	٨٣/أ
83b1	Sesame seeds	372	213	1,007	583	حب السمسم	٨٣/ب/١
83b2	Cottonseed	750	221	1,384	812	بزر القطن	٨٣/ب/٢
84a	Seeds and fruits for sowing	209	102	127	87	الحبوب والاثمار المعدة للبذار	٨٤/أ
84b1	Melonseeds	755	258	829	283	بزور البطيخ الاخضر والاصفر	٨٤/ب/١
84b2	Seeds for sowing pumpkin gourd and marrows ...	401	269	808	514	بزر اليقطين والقرع والكوسا	٨٤/ب/٢
85	Sugar beet	5,077	309	2,377	160	الشوندر السكري	٨٥
86c	Liquorice	985	177	354	56	السوس	٨٨/ج
89	Plants and parts of plants n.e.s. (indeed, cuttings etc.)	265	294	333	319	النباتات واجزاؤها ، البذور والاثمار غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر (بذور الباذنجان والكمون وما يماثلها) ..	٨٩
92c	Henna (lawsonia), in leaves and ground	350	257	132	67	الحناء ورقا ومسحوقة ..	٩٢/ج
92d	Other barks used for tanning or dyeing	290	182	140	65	النباتات واجزاؤها ، الاثمار الاخرى الصالحة للدباغة والصباغة	٩٢/د
92e	Other gums	110	1.8	110	100	الصموغ الاخرى	٩٢/ه
105ga	Olive oil for soap making	442	472	353	353	زيت الزيتون المعد لصناعة الصابون	١٠٥/ز/أ
105gb	Olive oil other than for soap making	1,361	1,986	780	1,250	زيت الزيتون غير صناعة الصابون	١٠٥/ز/ب
105i	Palm oil	3,077	1,402	2,522	1,544	زيت نخلة الجوز	١٠٥/ط
107a	Linseed oil	130	120	84	97	زيت الكتان المطبوخ او المؤكسد	١٠٧/أ
109	Fatty acids for the soap industry	1,125	509	1,472	706	الحموض الدسمة المحتوية على ٣٠٪ ونيف من الحمض الحر المعد صراحة لصناعة الصابون	١٠٩

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اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.) جدول رقم (٧) تابع

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
117b	Other preparations and preserves of meat other than ham	137	237	123	216	١١٧/ب الانواع الاخرى من محضرات اللحوم المحفوظة غير الجمبون
120	Fish preserved	244	288	197	273	١٢٠ الاسماك المحضرة المحفوظة والاسماك المحضرة بصورة بسيطة .. .. ..
122a	Sugar, raw	23,836	4,950	21,730	5,567	٦/١٢٢ السكر الخام .. ...
122b	Glucose	3,030	1,032	4,148	1,550	١٢٢/ب الكلوكوز .. .. ..
130	Cocoa butter	40	144	29	87	١٣٠ زبدة الكاكاو .. ..
136a	Biscuits, sweetened ...	142	192	133	229	٦/١٣٦ البسكوت المحلى بالسكر ..
152b	Beer in bottles	302	211	912	503	١٥٢/ب البيرة في قناني .. ..
171b	Tobacco leaves	511	2,175	351	1,038	١٧١/ب التبغ ورقا .. .. ..
172c	Cigarettes	29	251	36	279	١٧٢/ج الغلائف العادية .. ..
179	Matches	628	123	432	132	١٧٩ الكبريت .. .. ..
183a	Marble	1,481	200	1,188	206	٦/١٨٣ الرخام خاما او منشورا بصورة بسيطة .. .. ..
192a	Cement, portland	11,961	645	41,200	2,503	١/١٩٢ الاسمنت المطحون او غير المطحون الطبيعي او الصنعي
192b	Cement, white or coloured	3,074	371	4,362	400	١٩٢/ب الاسمنت المطحون او غير المطحون الابيض او الملون ..
198a	Pit coal and anthracite...	1,608	118	606	80	١/١٩٨ الفحم الحجري والانتراسيت
198b	Pit coal and anthracite ...	2,050	219	2,160	283	١٩٨/ب الفحم الحجري والانتراسيت
201	Coke of coal, lignite and coke of petroleum	1,318	206	888	101	٢٠١ كوك الفحم الحجري والليغنيت كوك النفط .. .. ..
203a	Asphalt for roads	803	121	1,900	203	٦/٢٠٣ الزفت لتزفيت الطرق ..
206	Petroleum, 12P in barrels or tins	7,770	1,100	8,223	1,148	١/٦/٢/٢٠٦ النفط في براميل او صفائح درجة ١٢ .. ..
206/2a3	Petroleum, 12P in other containers	43,048	4,068	39,330	3,722	٢/٦/٢/٢٠٦ النفط في [illegible] مغلفة درجة ١٢ .. ..
206/3/1	Benzine in barrels or cases	9,230	1,551	8,354	1,419	١/٣/٢٠٦ البنزين في براميل وصناديق
206/3/2	Benzine in other containers	73,798	9,107	71,186	9,180	٢/٣/٢٠٦ البنزين في اوعية اخرى ..
206/4/1	Mineral oils in barrels ...	4,188	1,444	3,544	1,225	١/٤/٢٠٦ الزيوت المعدنية الثقيلة للتشحيم في براميل .. .. ..
206/4/2	Mineral oils in other containers	2,968	1,268	1,988	857	٢/٤/٢٠٦ الزيوت المعدنية الثقيلة للتشحيم مستوردة في اوعية اخرى
206/5/1	Mazout oil, crude	117949	4,808	100,233	4,402	١/٥/٢٠٦ الزيوت الغاز الكثيف المدفحرق
206/5/2	Mazout oil, distilled ...	141234	14,245	118,067	11,318	٢/٥/٢٠٦ الزيوت المقطر .. ..

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اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
208/8	Other mineral oils	255	150	554	323	زيوت النفط الاخرى .. ..
211a	Asphalt for roads	5,338	626	1,132	470	مخاليط الزفت المعدة لتزفيت الطرق .. .. ..
211b	Mixtures and emulsions of asphalt for other purposes	216	191	12	46	مخاليط الزفت الاخرى ..
223ab	Tartaric acid, not for pharmaceutical purposes ...	198	222	157	228	حمض الطرطر غير الصيدلاني
224	Sodium hydroxide (Caustic soda)	1,746	317	1,190	353	مادات الصوديوم (الصودا الكاوي)
224a	Sodium carbonate in all its forms	1,796	208	1,717	271	كربونات الصوديوم بجميع اشكالها .. .. ..
275	Active carbon and animal carbon	169	107	112	86	الفحوم الفعالة ، فحوم العظام
281a	Disinfectants for agricultural purposes	233	362	1,189	1,053	محاصيل معدة لمكافحة الحشرات خاصة للاستعمال الزراعي
287b	Chemical products and chemical Preparations, n.e.s....	190	300	139	283	المحاصيل الكيماوية والمحضرات الكيماوية الاخرى غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. .. ..
292a1	Streptomycine and penicilline and their derivatives, chloromycetine and aureomycine	...	1,381	...	1,525	الستربتومسين والبنسلين ومشتقاتهما والكلورمسيتين والاوروميسين .. ..
292a4	Medical and pharmaceutical preparations, other ...	380	2,948	318	2,674	المحاصيل الصيدلانية الاخرى
292a2	Cinematographic films, synchronized with sonorous films	24	485	8	550	الافلام السينمائية المتوافقة مع افلام صائتة .. ..
296	Films and sensitive plates for photography	11	135	9	100	الافلام والصفائح الحساسة والمواد المماثلة المعدة للاستعمال في التصوير الشمسي
298	Papers and cards for photography	29	133	23	88	الاوراق والبطاقات المعدة للتصوير
298	Tanning extracts of vegetable origin	1,516	907	1,227	850	الخلاصات النباتية الدباغية .. .. ..
302	Colouring materials derived from coal-tar	263	1,242	133	700	المواد الصباغية المشتقة من قطران الفحم الحجري .. ..

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أهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
308b	Lithopone	336	133	134	74	٣/ب الصبغ المعروف (بالليثوبون) والكبريت الترسيب .. ..
308	Prepared colours of all kinds	445	629	417	581	٣ الاصباغ المحضرة بانواعها المختلفة
310	Varnishes, concentrated or otherwise	161	169	76	87	٣ الاطلية (فرنيش) المركزة او غير المركزة .. .. ..
314	Pencils and leads	40	140	32	114	٣ اقلام الرصاص ، رصاص اقلام الرسم الملونة والطباشير
315b	Perfumery	46	206	34	188	٣/ب الروائح العطرية والكحولية في قناني من الزجاج او البللور استيعابها ليترين او اقل ..
315g	Other perfumes	18	100	—	—	٣/د الروائح الاخرى
321	Washing powders including soap-free powders	139	155	20	17	٣ المحضرات المسحوقة المعدة للغسيل حتى الخالية من الصابون
323	Greasing materials from oils and fats	650	360	443	244	٣ المواد المرققة (للتشحيم) المجهزة من الزيوت والدهون ..
324	Waxes, emulsions, creams, pastes and similars preparations, for leather and metal polishing	91	106	69	67	٣ الاطلية الشمعية ، الاطلية القسمة ، المعاجين والمحضرات المماثلة المعدة لتنظيف الجلود والاحذية والمصنوعات المعدنية الخ.. واستقلاوطيحماو حفظها
326	Explosives	84	114	—	—	٣ المتفجرات .. .. ..
343	Nitrogenous mineral or chemical fertilisers ...	7,540	1,218	4,088	770	٣ الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيمياوية الازوتية .. .. ..
344	Phosphated mineral or chemical fertilisers	2,921	233	718	67	٣ الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيمياوية الفسفاتية .. .. ..
346	Mineral fertilisers containing at least two of the following : Nitrates, phosphoric acid and potassium, admixture of mineral and animal fertilisers or vegetable fertilisers	710	115	7	1	٣ الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيماوية المركبة من مادتين على الاقل من المواد المخصبة التالية : الازوت وحمض الفسفور والبوتاس ، امزجة الاسمدة المعدنية او الكيماوية مع الاسمدة الحيوانية النشا او الاسمدة النباتية النشا ..
348a	Hides, sheep	289	491	365	812	٣/أ صلال الغنم بصوفها ..
348b	Hides, goats	438	496	221	328	٣/ب صلال الماعز بشعرها ..
348c	Hides, other	1,814	2,172	1,630	2,416	٣/ج الصلال الخام الاخرى ..
351	Skins, calves tanned or prepared	63	404	33	448	٣ جلود العجول المدبوغة او المجهزة

اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي	
362	Leather, polished or glazed-silver or bronze	25	211	9	136	الجلود المصمة او المدهبة او المفضضة او الصفرية ..	٣٥٢
370	Waste, powder and scrap of rubber and gutta-percha	1,491	182	932	104	نفايات ومساحيق وجزاز المطاط والطبرشي	٣٧٠
372	Pipes and tubes of rubber	77	157	49	121	الانابيب (الترابيج) والمواسير المصنوعة من المطاط ..	٣٧٢
376	Articles of unhardened rubber for use in machinery	55	302	36	319	اصناف المطاط المعدة للاستعمالات الفنية الصناعية	٣٧٦
376b	Rubber tubes and tyres for automobiles, motor cycles bicycles and other transport vehicles	1,408	4,382	1,479	4 974	اطارات المطاط الداخلية والخارجية	٣٧٥/ب
377	Other articles made of unhardened rubber	292	309	79	184	الحاجات الاخرى المصنوعة من المطاط	٣٧٧
381	Charcoal	6,498	1,326	6,085	1 335	الفحم الخشبي	٣٨١
382b	White deal wood, round and rough	2,318	331	787	110	الخشب المستدير الخام — النوح	٣٨٢/ب
382c	Pine wood	717	102	396	68	الزان	٣٨٢/ج
382h	Poplar wood, round and rough	3,335	413	4,114	514	خشب الحور المستدير والخام	٣٨٢/ح
384a1	Timber, cut squared «Qatrani»	546	108	—	—	الاخشاب المنشورة قدما القطراني	٣٨٤/أ/١
384b	Poplar wood, sawn lengthwise	13,985	2,860	17,886	3,715	النوب (النوح) المنشور قدما	٣٨٤/ب
384c	Pine wood, simply sawn lengthwise	4,139	718	2,836	363	الزان المنشور قدما ..	٣٨٤/ج
384d	Other woods, sawn lengthwise	3,779	1,484	6,220	1,267	الاخشاب الاخرى المنشورة قدما	٣٨٤/د
392c	Veneering sheets, other...	42	103	28	73	اوراق التلبيس من الاخشاب الاخرى	٣٩٢/ج
393	Plywood	1,026	391	1,023	911	الخشب المعاكس	٣٩٣
398c	Electricity poles of wood	505	109	256	64	اعمدة الكهرباء من الخشب	٣٩٨/ج
417	Cardboard, not worked in rolls or sheets	900	261	700	264	الورق المقوى غير المشغول وغير المزين قالب او طبعات ..	٤١٧
420a	Packing paper, not decorated nor sulphured nor glazed or glazed on one side.	806	435	509	333	اوراق الصر الغفلية غير المزخرفة ولا المكبرتة ولا المصمة او المصمة من وجه واحد	٤٢٠/أ

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
420b	Kraft paper destined to be used exclusively for the making of bags to contain cement, ochre, asphalt, carbon, salts, fertilizers of animal origin and similar products	407	192	10	8	ورق « كرافت » المعد فقط لصنع الاكياس المستعملة لتعبئة الاسمنت والمغرة والاسفلت والفحم والاملاح والاسمدة الحيوانية المنشأ وما يماثلها من المحاصيل
420c	Newsprint	646	308	436	349	ورق الصحف .. ..
420d	Newsprint paper destined to be used for other printed matter or for other purposes. Printed paper other than newsprint.	467	193	134	76	ورق الصحف المعد لمطبوعات اخرى او لاستعمالات اخرى، الورق المعد للطبع غير ورق الصحف .. .. ..
420e	Cigarette paper, not prepared	71	212	188	424	ورق لفائف التبغ (سكاير)
420f	Letter paper and copying paper	223	226	38	70	ورق الرسائل، وورق الاستنساخ
420h	Other paper of natural colour or all of one colour	429	278	450	338	الانواع الاخرى من الورق ذات اللون الطبيعي الابيض او الملونة بكاملها مما لم يذكر ولم يدخل في مكان آخر .. ..
421b	Ruled, lined or chequered paper	301	207	202	173	الورق المجدول والمسطر والمشطرج .. .. ..
421a1	Cellophane and parchment paper, greasy paper ...	142	230	107	237	ورق السلوفان ، وورق البركامين الورق المشحم .. ..
421a2	Other paper, n.e.s.	1,085	660	332	491	الانواع الاخرى من الورق مما لم يذكر ولم يدخل في مكان آخر وغيرها .. .. ..
420b	Duplicating paper	141	120	81	111	ورق الاستنساخ ..
427	Cigarette paper	105	214	185	411	ورق لفائف التبغ .. ..
420a1	Cement paper bags ...	1,094	464	731	655	الاكياس من الورق المعدة لتعبئة الاسمنت .. ..
431	Exercise-books, registers and note books	67	106	28	40	الدفاتر ، السجلات ، دفاتر الجيب الصغيرة المفكرات التقاويم والاصناف المماثلة
430a	Books	36	120	20	57	الكتب .. .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي	
444	Silk yarns of floss or silk waste, for industrial purposes	8	112	5	51	خيوط مشاقة الحرير وخيوط نفايات ، المستوردة صراحة لاستعمالها في الصناعة ..	٤٤٤
462	Artificial silk thread, pure or mixed with wool not put for retail sale	6,456	15,136	1,687	13,141	خيوط الحرير الصنعي صرفا او مخلوطا بالصوف وغير محضر للبيع بالمفرق	٤٦٢
465	Artificial textile fibres ...	2,966	3,815	1,915	3,417	الياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية حزما او كتلا	٤٦٥
467	Thread of artificial silk waste, pure or mixed with wool not put for retail sale	116	325	64	225	الخيوط المصنوعة من نفايات الحرير الصنعي صرفا او مخلوطة بالصوف وغير محضرة للبيع بالمفرق	٤٦٧
470	Velvet and plushes of pure artificial silk.	32	188	36	338	المخمل العادي والمخمل الطويل الوبر المصنوعان من الحرير الصنعي الصرف	٤٧٠
471a	Crepes of artificial silk, raw	25	292	35	450	كريب الحرير الصنعي خاما	٤٧١/أ
471b	Crepes of artificial silk, printed	17	133	6	106	كريب الحرير الصنعي مطبوعا	٤٧١/ب
472a2	Other fabrics n.e.s. of pure artificial silk; poplins, gauzes, grenadines, voiles, gauze, etamines etc., 75 grs. and less; printed, ornamented of fashioned.	11	195	5	90	النسج الاخرى من الحرير الصنعي الصرف غير المذكورة في مكان آخر ؛ بوبلين ، موصلين ، غرنادين ، فوال ، غوزي ، التلمين الخ .. ٧٥ غراما واقل	٤٧٢/٢/أ
472b1	Other fabrics of artificial silk, raw over 75 grs. ...	122	218	32	300	النسج الاخرى من الحرير الصنعي اكثر من ٧٥ غراما خاما	٤٧٢/ب/١
472b2	Other fabrics of artificial silk, printed over 75 grs.	25	349	29	402	النسج من الحرير الصنعي اكثر من ٧٥ غراما مطبوعا ..	٤٧٢/ب/٢
474	Velvet and plushes of artificial silk yarn mixed with other textile materials ...	30	183	23	185	المخمل العادي والمخمل الطويل الوبر من الحرير الصنعي ممزوج بمواد نسيجية اخرى ..	٤٧٤
476	Other fabrics n.e.s.; of pure artificial silk; poplins, muslins, grenadines, voiles, gauze, etamines etc. ...	8	165	5	31	النسج الاخرى من الحرير الصنعي مخلوطا بمواد نسيجية اخرى ؛ غير المذكورة في مكان آخر ؛ بوبلين ؛ موصلين ، غرنادين ، فوال ؛ غوزي ، التلمين الخ	٤٧٦

FOREIGN TRADE

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
480c	Other fabrics of artificial silk waste and pure artificial textile material, 180 grs. n.e.s.	89	556	112	697	٤٨٠/ج النسج الاخرى غير المذكورة المصنوعة من فضلات الحرير الصنعي والياف المواد النسجية الصنعية التي يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ١٨٠ غراما ..
484c	Other fabrics n.e.s.; of pure artificial silk waste & fibre of artificial textiles mixed with other textile material	11	101	--	—	٤٨٤/ج النسج الاخرى من فضلات الحرير الصنعي والياف المواد النسجية الصنعية مخلوطة بمواد نسجية اخرى بيوبلين، موصلين ، فرنسادين ، فوال ، فري ، اللمين الخ .. ..
485a	Tulle and webbed tissues made of artificial silk or of artificial waste or fibre of artificial textile materials.	53	249	3	43	٤٨٥/أ النسج المرونة بالخيوط والنسج الشبكية من الحرير الصنعي او من فضلاته ومن الياف المواد النسجية الصنعية
491a	Metal threads, silver-plated or gold-plated	16	165	10	80	٤٩١/أ الخيوط المعدنية المفرغة مفضضة او مذهبة
491b	Metal threads combined with textile thread	28	499	16	326	٤٩١/ب الخيوط المعدنية المضمومة الى الخيوط النسجية ..
493	Wool in the mass	410	803	328	616	٤٩٣ الصوف كتلا .. ..
495a	Goats hair	335	245	186	147	٤٩٥/أ وبر الماعز .. .. ..
502	Woollen thread and yarn, combed	371	3,030	(2)	3,593	٥٠٢ خيوط الصوف الممشطة ..
506b	Thread and yarn of wool, for retail sale	11	146	4	25	٥٠٦/ب خيوط الصوف المحضرة للبيع بالمفرق .. ..
507a1	Fabrics of pure wool, 200 grs. and less per m2 ...	22	282	37	380	٥٠٧/أ/١ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بحاشيتها ٢٠٠ غرام او اقل
507a2	Fabrics of pure wool, 200—300 grs. per m2	339	3,614	343	4,282	٥٠٧/أ/٢ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بحاشيتها اكثر من ٢٠٠ غرام ولا يزيد عن ٣٥٠ غ ..
507a3	Fabrics of pure wool, 350—500 grs. per m2.	209	1,297	248	2,429	٥٠٧/أ/٣ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بحاشيتها اكثر من ٣٥٠ غ ولا يزيد عن ٥٠٠ غ ..
507a4	Fabrics of pure wool, over 500 grs. per m2.	29	276	33	238	٥٠٧/أ/٤ النسج المصنوعة من الصوف الصرف والتي يزن المتر المربع منها بحاشيتها اكثر من ٥٠٠ غ

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
507b1	Woollen fabrics mixed with cotton	25	255	27	321	النسج المصنوعة من الصوف المزوج بالقطن .. .. ..
507b2	Woollen fabrics mixed with textile material other than cotton	68	460	32	269	النسج المصنوعة من الصوف المزوج بمواد نسيجية اخرى
509a	Blankets of pure wool ...	33	117	163	1,283	الاغطية (الحرامات) الصوفية
509b	Blankets of mixed wool...	75	197	35	99	الاغطية المصنوعة من الصوف المخلوط .. .. ..
511a1	Carpets, 350 rows and less	62	406	38	354	بسط الاقدام ذات الغمائل المتقدة (سجاد) الموافقة من ٣٥٠ صفا واقل من المتقد .. ..
511a2	Carpets, 351—450 rows	119	1,023	113	882	بسط الاقدام ذات الغمائل المتقدة الموافقة من ٣٥٠ الى ٤٥٠ صفا .. .. ..
511a3	Carpets, over 450 rows ...	19	307	14	210	بسط الاقدام ذات الغمائل المتقدة من ٤٥٠ صفا
522a3	Cotton yarn, single counts 24 — 40	24	121	22	128	خيوط القطن الوحيدة الفتل خلفا ما فوق الرقم ٢٤/١ الى الرقم ٤٠/١ .. ..
523/3	Cotton yarn, twisted double or more, over count 24 up to 40	77	374	32	180	خيوط القطن المفتولة بطاقين او اكثر ما فوق الرقم ٢٤ الى ٤٠
523/4a	Cotton yarn, twisted double or more, over 40 counts...	223	1,232	188	1,125	خيوط القطن المفتولة بطاقين او اكثر ما فوق الرقم ٤٠ ملحمة او مصقولة (مرسلريزة)
524a	Cables made of cotton ...	151	140	168	181	الامراس المصنوعة من القطن
526	Cotton yarn prepared for retail sale	48	339	48	311	خيوط القطن المعدة للبيع بالمفرق
527a4	Cotton fabrics, unbleached more than 150 grs. ...	45	130	17	55	خيوط القطن خلفا ، اكثر من ١٥٠ غراما .. .. ..
527b1	Cotton tissue, bleached not figured 50 grs. and less per m2	24	271	38	1,310	النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن مقصورة مما يزن المتر المربع منها ٥٠غ واقل ..
527b2	Cotton tissues, bleached not figured 50 — 100 grs. per m2	47	480	61	775	النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن مقصورة مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ٥٠ ولا يزيد من ١٠٠ غرام .. ..

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COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
527b3	Cotton tissues, bleached not figured 100 — 150 grs. per m2	58	313	28	250	٥٢٧/ب/٣ النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن مقصورة مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ١٠٠ غ ولا يزيد عن ١٥٠ غرام ..
527b4	Cotton tissues, bleached not figured over 150 grs. per m2	140	456	106	322	٥٢٧/ب/٤ النسج غير المقنة المصنوعة من القطن مقصورة اكثر من ١٥٠ غ
527c2	Cotton tissues, dyed after fabrication or made of dyed yarn not figured over 50 grs and not exceeding 100 grs per m2	45	420	42	324	٥٢٧/ج/٢ النسج القطنية المصبوغة من ٥٠ الى ١٠٠ غ .. ..
527c3	Cotton tissues, dyed after fabrication or made of dyed yarn not figured over 100 grs. and not exceeding 150 grs. per m2	129	1,046	110	810	٥٢٧/ج/٣ النسج القطنية المصبوغة من (١٠٠) الى (١٥٠) غ
527c4	Cotton tissues, dyed over 150 grs. per m2	386	1,928	263	1,377	٥٢٧/ج/٤ النسج القطنية المصبوغة لاكثر من (١٥٠) غرام .. ..
527d2	Cotton tissues, printed over 50 grs. and not exceeding 100 grs.	23	163	30	211	٥٢٧/د/٢ النسج القطنية المطبوعة من (٥٠) الى (١٠٠) غرام
527d3	Cotton tissues, printed over 100 grs. and not exceeding 150 grs.	488	2,403	508	3,008	٥٢٧/د/٣ النسج القطنية المطبوعة من (١٠٠) الى (١٥٠) غ ..
527d4	Cotton tissues, printed over 150 grs. per m2	402	2,014	105	389	٥٢٧/د/٤ النسج القطنية المطبوعة لاكثر من (١٥٠) غرام ..
528	Cotton fabrics, figured ...	28	118	14	120	٥٢٨ النسج المقنة المطبوعة من القطن الصرف .. ..
533/1b	Velvet and plush of dyed cotton	67	565	39	360	٥٣٣/١/ب المخمل العادي والمخمل الطويل الوبر المصنوعان من القطن مصبوغا .. .. ..
533/2	Plushes, imitating furs in mohair, with a cotton base exceeding 20% of the weight of the fabric	13	117	5	45	٥٣٣/٢ المخمل الطويل الوبر المصنوع تقليدا لفراء المعروف بالموهير على سدى من القطن يتجاوز وزنها ٢٠ ٪ من وزن النسج
534	Cotton carpets	45	271	30	187	٥٣٤ بسط الاقمشة القطنية ..

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321/2a1	Fabrics of jute not figured 36 threads and less ...	169	170	440	361	٥٥٢/١/١/٢ النسج غير المقلمة المصنوعة من الجوت الصرف خاما (٣٥) خيطا واقل .. ..
322b	Waxed cloths and fabrics of felts other than that used against insects ...	352	391	146	236	٥٧٢/ب النسج المشمعة غير المعدة لكافحة الحشرات الضارة
329	Handkerchiefs and neckerchiefs	7	143	7	148	٥٩٠ مناديل الجيب، مناديل الراس مناديل الرقبة .. ..
332b	Corsets and corset-belts	13	139	11	157	٥٩٣/ب الشدات والحزم المصنوعة من النسج المطاطة ..
334a	Bags or sacks for packing, of jute fabrics	9,735	5,957	5,388	3,054	٥٩٤/أ الاكياس المعدة للصر المصنوعة من النسج الجوتية (خيش)
334b	Sacks and bags of cotton fabrics	304	118	—	—	٥٩٤/ب الاكياس المعدة للصر المصنوعة من النسج القطنية ..
335b	Covers, tents, sails for vessels and other shelter materials	123	143	118	73	٥٩٥/ب الاغطية ، الخيام ، الاشرعة المعدة للسفن والاصناف المماثلة الاخرى .. .. ..
336a	Worn clothing and underwear	1,853	3,207	2,172	3,953	٥٩٦/أ الملابس والشعار البالية ..
641	Articles made of asbestos	562	133	388	129	٦٤١ الحاجات المصنوعة من الاسبست الهش .. .. ..
650	Fireproof bricks	1,281	380	1,250	321	٦٥٠ الاجر وقطع البناء المتحملة للحرارة .. .. ..
655	Paving and facing tiles of stoneware	610	207	395	177	٦٥٥ الرصفات المستعملة لتبليط وتغطية الجدران المصنوعة من الصلصال الرملي او القيشاني او الفخار الناعم .. ..
657	Fixed appliances for sanitary or hygienic purposes of ceramic material ...	238	157	123	125	٦٥٧ الاجهزة الثابتة المعدة للاستعمالات الصحية من الخزف ..
660a	Wares of fireclay, n.e.s. ...	164	169	116	101	٦٦٠/أ الحاجات المصنوعة من القيشاني
662a	Wares of porcelain ...	463	452	319	432	٦٦٢/أ الحاجات المصنوعة من الصيني
667a2	Glass sheets; drawn up by the Libbey-Owens or Pittsburg methods, polished on both sides	470	380	134	67	٦٦٧/أ/٢ الواح الزجاج المسحوب بطريقة ليبي — اوينز او تسبورغ والمصقولة على وجهيها ..
672a	Electric tubes and bulbs	68	102	65	105	٦٧٢/أ المصابيح الكهربائية والعبات

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) — جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value		الوضع الجمركي
672b	Other illuminating glassware	118	433	69	245	٦٧٢/ب	الحاجات الزجاجية للتنوير غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر وغيرها ..
675a	Table and ornamental glassware	791	530	567	408	٦٧٥/أ	اصناف صناعة الزجاج ..
684	Silver : unworked ingots, bars, powder & scrap (kg.)	3,714	179	2,215	60	٦٨٤	الفضة الخام ، كتلا وسبائك وقضبانا مصبوبة ومسحوقة فضلات الفضة ونفاياتها ورمادها (بالكيلو) .. ..
685	Gold; unworked ingots, bars, powder, waste and scrap (kilos)	5,297	20,109	3,266	9,969	٦٨٥	الذهب الخام كتلا وسبائك وقضبانا ومسحوقا فضلات الذهب ونفاياته ورماده (بالكيلو)
686	Gold coins (kilos)	107	534	4	16	٦٨٦	النقود الذهبية (بالكيلو)
701a	Iron and steel in bars diameter 4 — 25 mm. ...	22,250	5,189	19,023	5,734	٧٠١/أ	الحديد والفولاذ قضبانا مدورة بقطر من ٤ مم حتى ٢٥ مم (٢٥ مم غير داخلة) ..
701b	Iron and steel in bars in other dimensions	1,142	305	876	290	٧٠١/ب	الحديد والفولاذ بقياسات اخرى .. .. ..
701c	Iron & steel in shape T or I	1,008	269	1,079	346	٧٠١/ج	الحديد والفولاذ قضبانا باحد الشكلين T او I
701d	Iron & steel in other shapes	5,437	1,539	6,083	1,943	٧٠١/د	الحديد والفولاذ قضبانا باشكال اخرى .. .. ..
702a1	Iron and steel wire, simply drawn in plain threads of diametre 1 mm. and less	632	174	169	70	٧٠٢/أ/١	الحديد والفولاذ ، اسلاكا مسحوبة بصورة بسيطة خيوطا واضحة بقطر مليمتر واحد او اقل .. ..
702b1	Iron and steel wire forged or coated with zinc or tin, diameter not exceeding 6mm	494	179	608	244	٧٠٢/ب/١	الحديد والفولاذ اسلاكا محماة او مطلية بالتوتيا (مثلثة) او مطلية بالقصدير (مبيضة) بقطر لايتجاوز (٦) مم ..
702b2	Iron and steel wire, copper coated, diametre not exceeding 6 mm.	289	112	145	65	٧٠٢/ب/٢	الحديد والفولاذ ، اسلاكا مطلية بالنحاس بقطر لا يتجاوز ٦ مم
703a	Sheet iron or steel, flat unworked, thickness more than 1mm.	2,368	790	1,677	750	٧٠٣/أ	الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية المستوية وغير المشغولة بسمك يزيد عن مم واحد ..
703b	Sheet iron or steel flat unworked, thickness 1mm. and less	1,175	445	850	450	٧٠٣/ب	الصفائح الحديدية الفولاذية وغير المشغولة بسمك (١) مم او اقل .. .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
706a Iron and steel sheets varnished or lagquered not exceeding 4/10 mm. in thickness	646	251	713	374	٧٠٦/أ الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية المدهونة ومشغولة السطح المطلية بالقصدير او بالقصدير وورنيش اللكما والتي لا تزيد سماكتها عن ٤/١٠ الملمتر ولم يلحق بها أي شغل ..
706/1a Sheet iron or steel, corrugated and galvanised ...	431	271	1,045	797	٧٠٦/١/أ الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية الاخرى المطلية بالتوتياء المموجة
706/1b Sheet iron or steel, galvanised uncorrugated ...	251	159	179	112	٧٠٦/١/ب الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية الاخرى المطلية بالتوتياء غير المموجة .. .. ..
708/1 Pipes of cast iron	2,081	667	3,132	946	٧٠٨/١ المواسير المصنوعة من الحديد الصب .. .. ..
708/2a Joints of malleable cast iron diameter more than 5 cm.	345	184	291	183	٧٠٨/٢/أ الوصل المصنوعة من الحديد الصب بقطر يزيد عن (٥)سم
708/2b Joints of malleable cast iron diameter 5 cm. and less.	110	100	83	103	٧٠٨/٢/ب الوصل المصنوعة من الحديد الصب بقطر (٥) سم او اقل
708a Tubes and pipes untarred or slightly covered with tar, diameter 5 cm. and less ...	693	344	482	265	٧٠٩/أ الانابيب او المواسير المستقيمة بقطر (٥)سم او اقل خاما او مقطرنة .. .. ..
708b Tubes and pipes, other unworked	505	261	1,260	567	٧٠٩/ب الانابيب او المواسير الاخرى
710a Tubes and pipes; worked galvanised	1,012	544	514	387	٧١٠/أ الانابيب او المواسير من الحديد او الفولاذ مطلية او مدهونة بالتوتياء .. .. ..
710b Tubes and pipes, worked other	348	156	186	144	٧١٠/ب الانابيب او المواسير الاخرى من الحديد او الفولاذ على شكل خاص او مشغولة
711 Tubes and pipes of sheet iron; bolted studed or clamped	224	184	54	32	٧١١ الانابيب والمواسير المصنوعة من الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية ، محواة او مسمرة او مخلبة .. .. ..
712 Iron or steel rails for railway tracks, including those drilled or bent	305	303	27	9	٧١٢ الخطوط الحديدية او الفولاذية المعدة لسكك الحديدية حتى المثقبة او المقوسة .. ..

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
720b	Tanks, casks, tubs & other large receptacles without mechanical devices; other than tubs used for the disinfection of sheep	149	142	58	45	٧٢٠/ب الخوانات ، الدنان والطسوت وغيرها من الاوعية الكبيرة ، دون اجهزة آلية ، غير مغاطس لتطهير الغنم .. ..
721	Cylindrical tanks for transport, made of steel or iron sheets	703	162	185	43	٧٢١ الدنان ، الاوعية الاسطوانية المعدة للنقل والمصنوعة من الصفائح الحديدية او الفولاذية
722	Receptacles, iron or steel for compressed or liquified gas	295	206	277	217	٧٢٢ الآنية المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ لحفظ الغازات المضغوطة او المميعة ..
725	Wire netting lattice work and trellis of iron or steel	132	137	60	70	٧٢٥ النسج المعدنية والاقفاص والشبك ، المصنوعة من الاسلاك الحديدية او الفولاذية
727/1a...	Wire-nails of iron or steel diameter 2mm. and over	327	117	201	114	٧٢٧/١/أ المسامير الاسطوانية المصنوعة من الاسلاك الحديدية او الفولاذية بقطر ٢ مم او اكثر
727/2c	Conical nails of iron or steel other	174	140	82	67	٧٢٧/٢/ج المسامير المخروطية الاخرى
728	Bolts and screw-makers wares	357	295	253	243	٧٢٨ اصناف صناعتي القبلات والبراغي المحواة .. ..
733b	Locks other than used for bags	123	249	110	244	٧٣٣/ب الاقفال غير المستعملة في الحقائب والاكياس .. .. ..
734	Fittings and mountings of iron or steel n.e.s., for furniture, doors and windows	323	482	197	297	٧٣٤ الادوات والقطع غير المذكورة ، المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ او الحديد الصب القابل للتصفيح المستعملة للاثاث والابواب والنوافذ وصناعة العجلات الخ
735	Stoves and heaters ...	159	442	278	329	٧٣٥ الوانات والمدافئ غير الكهربائية
735a	Cooking stoves and heaters mazout	48	136	—	—	٧٣٥/أ افران الطبخ والمدافئ العاملة بالمازوت .. .. ..
735b	Other cooking stoves and heaters	190	292	—	—	٧٣٥/ب غيرها من الافران والمدافئ والكوانين .. .. ..
736	Boilers, iron or steel ...	168	119	187	114	٧٣٦ المراجل الحديدية والفولاذية المعدة للتدفئة المركزية ..

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جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
737	Radiators for central heating and their component parts	290	129	132	79	٧٣٧ الشمعات المدفئة للتدفئة المركزية ومناصرها .. .. ..
738b	Furniture and parts thereof, of cast iron, iron and steel, other than from tubes	138	218	47	71	٧٣٨/ب الاثاث واجزاؤه المصنوعة من الحديد الصب او الحديد او الفولاذ او الحديد الصب القابل للتصفيح غير المصنوع من الانابيب
740	Kitchen and other utensils for domestic uses	180	284	193	324	٧٤٠ الاواني والادوات المنزلية والصحية من الفولاذ او الحديد
752b	Casting, n.e.s.	219	152	109	82	٧٥٢/ب الحاجيات الاخرى المصنوعة من الحديد الصب غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
755	Articles of iron and steel, n.e.s.	168	133	65	77	٧٥٥ الحاجيات المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ او الحديد الصب القابل التصفيح ، غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
758	Copper, unworked	223	172	100	163	٧٥٦ النحاس الخام وغيره من انواع النحاس كتلا او غيره ..
758a1	Copper, sheets	66	136	28	60	١/١/٧٥٨ الصفائح والالواح والاوراق المصنوعة من النحاس (باستثناء الاوراق الرقيقة)
758a2	Brass sheets, plates and leaves, squared or rectangular	109	211	55	135	٢/١/٧٥٨ الصفائح والالواح والاوراق المصنوعة من النحاس المربعة او المستطيلة الشكل المصفحة او المطرقة من النحاس الاصفر
758b1	Brass slabs	53	122	32	85	١/٧٥٨/ب الاقراص المصنوعة من النحاس الاحمر .. .. ..
764	Ropes, cordage and wire, twisted and made of copper not coated with insulating material	49	108	110	288	٧٦٤ الاسراس والحبال والاشرطة المفتولة المصنوعة من الاسلاك النحاسية غير ملبسة بمواد عازلة .. .. ..
765	Kitchen and other utensils for domestic uses, copper	80	430	72	418	٧٦٥ ادوات المطبخ المصنوعة من النحاس غير المذكورة في مكان آخر ... .
774	Aluminium, unworked ...	180	160	148	83	٧٧٤ الالمنيوم الخام .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
776	Sheets, slabs of aluminium	68	122	6	15	الصفائح والالواح المصنوعة من الالمنيوم .. ..
780	Unworked pieces of aluminium	303	614	127	320	القطع الخام من الالمنيوم
794	Tin unworked	91	457	31	183	القصدير الخام المصبوب كتلا او قطعا او الواحا او حبات
805b2	Razor blades	34	275	17	178	الشفرات المعدة لآلات الحلاقة نامة الصنع .. ..
809a	Spoon and forks of ordinary metal	48	127	25	83	الملاعق والشوكات من جميع الاجناس المصنوعة من المعادن العادية .. .. ..
812a	Lighting apparatus, metal	76	298	82	341	اجهزة الانارة اصناف صناعة المصابيح والثريات واجزاؤها المعدنية .. .. ..
819	Articles of adornment made of ordinary metal or ordinary metal plated with gold silver or other precious metals	165	641	97	680	الاصناف المعدة للزخرفة المصنوعة من المعادن العادية او المعادن العادية الملبسة او المفضضة او الملبسة بمعادن ثمينة .. .. ..
820	Steam boilers and economisers	880	1,301	100	332	المراجل البخارية ، الموفرات
822	Steam engines without their boilers	24	113	40	82	الآلات البخارية المفصولة عن مراجلها : ذوات المكبس او مقيمة المكبس واجزاؤها وقطعها
823a	Motors for watercrafts...	33	631	25	25	المحركات المعدة للسفن ..
823b	Internal combustion engines for automobiles	68	215	63	181	المحركات ذات الاحتراق الداخلي المعدة للسيارات
823d	Other motors	1,341	3,582	2,496	5,639	المحركات الاخرى .. ..
827c	Static pumps run by wind blowers	331	1,022	508	1,151	المضخات الثابتة المعدة لرفع الماء وتوزيعه بدواليب هوائية
832	Presses, n.e.s. and component and detachable part thereof	51	120	195	361	المكابس غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
833	Machinery and apparatus for handling, lifting, loading and filling and parts thereof	150	319	151	280	الآلات والاجهزة المعدة للنقل والرفع والتعبئة والتفريغ واجزاؤها .. .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
834 Machinery and apparatus for agricultural purpose, ploughing, preparation and cultivation, together with component and detachable parts	2,906	5,789	2,636	6,964	٨٣٤ الآلات والادوات الزراعية المعدة للفلاحة الارض وتحضيرها وزرعها واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
835 Machines and apparatus for the harvesting, threshing, sorting and picking of agricultural produce, together with component and detachable parts	968	2,647	565	1,619	٨٣٥ الآلات والادوات المعدة لحصاد المحاصيل الزراعية والدراسات وغاسلات الحبوب والمنقيات الزراعية الخ .. واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
837 Machinery and apparatus for flour milling and parts thereof	163	217	72	108	٨٣٧ الآلات والادوات المعدة للطواحين واجزاؤها .. .. ..
838d1 Other apparatus for heating and cooling etc.... for industrial purposes	32	229	141	365	٨٣٨/د/١ الاجهزة الاخرى المعدة للتسخين والتبريد الخ .. الاستعمال الصناعي واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
838d2 Other apparatus for heating, cooling or cooking etc. other than for soap-making wines and beverages, pastries, water-softeners ...	48	214	6	40	٨٣٨/د/٢ الاجهزة الاخرى المعدة للتسخين والتبريد والطبخ الخ .. عدا عن الاجهزة المعدة لصناعة الصابون والزيوت والجعة والخمر والمعجنات والشكولاته ومطفئات الماء
838b Machines for the production of cold, other than for industry	374	1,497	289	1,137	٨٣٨/ب الآلات المعدة لاحداث البرودة لغير الاستعمال الصناعي
840 Machinery and apparatus for treating earth & stone	354	252	491	321	٨٤٠ الآلات والاجهزة المعدة لمعالجة الاتربة والاحجار والفلزات واجزاؤها .. .. ..
842 Machinery for the making of paper paste, paper and board; including book binding machines and parts thereof	75	214	25	96	٨٤٢ الآلات المعدة لصنع معجن الورق ولشغل الورق والورق المقوى بما فيها الآلات التجليد واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
843	Machinery and apparatus for printing & for graphic arts, including printing presses	84	233	53	151	٨٤٣ الات الطباعة والفنون الخطية بما فيها مكابس الطبع ..
844	Machinery and apparatus for the preparation of textile material	834	1,582	95	382	٨٤٤ الات المعدة لتحضير المواد النسجية وصنع الخيوط وغلها .. .. ..
845	Looms for weaving and hosiery	1,306	2,983	485	1,854	٨٤٥ انوال النسيج والصنارة والتريكو
845a2	Machines for the washing of textile material, other than for industry	212	776	121	431	٨٤٥/٢/أ الات المعدة لغسل النسج لغير الاستعمال الصناعي
846	Machinery and apparatus for the dressing and finishing of thread, n.e.s. ...	230	852	81	305	٨٤٦ الات والاجهزة المعدة لتهيئة النسج والخيوط غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
847a	Sewing machines, special	12	144	16	102	٨٤٧/أ الات الخياطة من جميع الانواع المعدة للاستعمالات الخاصة
847b	Sewing machines and component parts, n.e.s. ...	204	662	193	710	٨٤٧/ب الات الخياطة الاخرى من جميع الانواع وقطعها المنفصلة
849	Machines for packing goods or opening, rinsing, filling, closing, labelling etc. ...	319	928	329	884	٨٤٩ الات العاملة واجراؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
852	Typewriters and detached parts thereof	13	174	7	107	٨٥٢ الات الكتابة واجراؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
853	Calculating and accounting machines	4	157	4	97	٨٥٣ الات الحساب والمحاسبة
855a	Machinery and apparatus for mineral work and the cement and other building materials industries ...	427	548	235	236	٨٥٥/٢ الات والاجهزة المعدة لشغل المعادن وصناعة الاسمنت وغيره من مواد البناء ..
855b	Machinery and appliances for the soap and oils industries, and component and detached parts thereof ...	141	481	98	289	٨٥٥/ب الات والاجهزة المعدة لصناعة الصابون والزيوت والجعة والخمر واجراؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..
855b2	Machinery and apparatus n.e.s. for industrial purposes	62	257	161	406	٨٥٥/ب/٢ الات والاجهزة الاخرى المعدة للاستعمال الصناعي

التجارة الخارجية

اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
855b3	Other machinery and apparatus n.e.s.	108	423	165	565	٨٥٥/ح/٣ الآلات والاجهزة الاخرى غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر .. .. ..
856	Taps, cocks and valves ...	77	206	143	321	٨٥٦ اصناف صنابة الحنفيات
857	Bearings of all types ...	23	156	49	172	٨٥٧ المدحرجات على اختلاف انواعها سواء كانت مولدات الخروق او الحادل والبكرات واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة ..
858	Component and detachable parts, n.e.s. for mechanical machines and tools ...	29	151	65	188	٨٥٨ الاجزاء والقطع المنفصلة غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ، العائدة للآلات والاجهزة والادوات الآلية .. ..
859	Electric dynamoes and converters, transformers and choking coils	429	1,345	428	1 446	٨٥٩ المهيجات الكهربائية ومعدلاتها
860a	Battery dry cells, pocket size	147	217	98	163	٨٦٠/أ النابضات الكهربائية لجافة الجيب (بيل) .. .. ..
860b	Battery dry cells, other...	218	292	85	131	٨٦٠/ب النابضات الكهربائية (بيل) وغيرها .. .. ..
861	Electro-mechanical tool and apparatus	220	349	38	64	٨٦١ المدخرات الكهربائية والواحها
862	Electro-mechanical tool and apparatus for domestic purposes weight not exceeding 15 kgs n.e.s.	48	308	35	233	٨٦٢ الادوات الكهربائية الآلية الصغيرة والاجهزة الكهربائية الآلية المعدة للاستعمال المنزلي مما لم يذكر في مكان آخر والتي لا يزيد وزنها عن ١٥ كيلو غرام .. .. ..
863	Electric appliances for starting, lighting and signalling	60	398	164	544	٨٦٣ التجهيزات الكهربائية المعدة للانطلاق او التنوير المستعملة للمركبات ذات المحرك والقراجات
865c	Electrothermic apparatus, excluding medical, other	48	113	58	186	٨٦٥/ج الاجهزة الكهربائية الحرارية الاخرى (باستثناء الاجهزة الكهربائية الطبية) ..
866a1	Lamps not exceeding 50 watts	23	138	14	105	٨٦٦/ب/٦/١ المصابيح ذات الاسلاك الدقيقة لتنوير الكهربائي ولا تزيد عن ٥٠ واطا .. ..

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اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
867	Electric apparatus for medical purposes & radiology	30	409	19	252	٨٦ الاجهزة الكهربائية الطبية واجهزة الاشعة .. .. ..
868a	Wireless receiving apparatus	225	2,073	181	1 655	٨٦/أ الاجهزة اللاسلكية الآخذة
868b	Valves tubes and lamps for telegraph and telephone	2	101	4	157	٨٦/ب الصمامات والانابيب المعدة للبرق والهاتف
868d	Other wireless apparatus	98	187	—	—	٨٦/د الاجهزة اللاسلكية الاخرى
869	Electric telegraph and telephone apparatus	54	854	22	219	٨٦٥ الاجهزة الكهربائية المعدة للبرق والهاتف .. .. ..
872	Electric meters	17	364	29	197	٨٧٢ العدادات الكهربائية ..
874	Insulating cables and wire for electric energy	643	1 155	497	1 045	٨٧٤ الامراس والاسلاك المعزولة المعدة للكهرباء .. ..
875	Parts made of carbon or graphite for electric use	127	106	111	109	٨٧٥ قطع الفحم العادي المعد للكهرباء
877	Instalating tubes	223	286	204	312	٨٧٧ الانابيب العازلة .. ..
878	Apparatus & detached parts of electric machinery n.e.a.	161	774	113	523	٨٧٨ الاجهزة والقطع الكهربائية الاخرى لتنظيم التيار وقطعه غير المذكورة في مكان آخر
887	Components and detached parts of railway rolling stock	86	103	43	72	٨٨٧ الاجزاء والقطع المنفصلة من وسائط النقل المعدة للسكك الحديدية غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ..
890a2	Automobiles, less than 1500 kgs., 7 H.P. less than 15HP.	178	537	148	437	٢/٦/٨٩٠ السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من (٧) حتى (١٥) حصانا . (١٥) غير داخل
890a3	Automobiles, less than 1500 kgs. 15 HP. less than 20 HP.	185	576	220	572	٣/٦/٨٩٠ السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من (١٥) حتى (٢٠) حصانا (٢٠) غير داخل
890a4	Automobiles, less than 1500 kgs. 20 HP. less than 25 HP.	115	325	54	141	٤/٦/٨٩٠ السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من (٢٠) حتى (٢٥) حصانا (٢٥) غير داخل .. .. ..
890a5	Automobilec, less than 1500 kgs. 25 H.P. and over ...	511	1,361	484	1,300	٥/٦/٨٩٠ السيارات اقل من (١٥٠٠) كيلو لنقل الركاب من (٢٥) حصانا فاكثر .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 7 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٧ التابع

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
8904	Automobiles 1500 kgs. and less than 2000 kgs., over 25 H.P.	307	1,142	304	914	٨٩٠/ب/٤ السيارات المعدة لنقل الركاب التي تزيد من (١٥٠٠) كيلو غرام واقل من (٢٠٠٠) ومن (٢٥) حصانا فاكثر ..
8904	Automobiles over 2000 kgs. and over 25 H.P. ...	57	176	20	74	٨٩٠/ج/٤ من ٢٥ حصانا فاكثر ..
8904/1	Other vehicles with chassis	543	1,162	1,126	1,064	٨٩٠/د/١ الانواع الاخرى من السيارات المستوردة هياكل مجردة او مرفقة بقرية السائق ..
881	Chassis for passenger vehicles	2,819	8,184	1,542	4,000	٨٩١ هياكل (شاسي) السيارات المعدة لنقل الركاب ..
882	Coachwork for automobiles	170	438	125	221	٨٩٢ عربات السيارات .. ..
883/1	Components and parts of transmission of steering gear	176	164	37	46	٨٩٣/١ معدل المحركات (طبلات الاجم، التوابض ، انابيب عطريات
883/2	Component and parts of vehicles, other	457	2,045	622	1,801	٨٩٣/٢ اجزاء السيارات والعجلات وقطعها الاخرى غير المذكورة
884	Motorcycles	74	305	44	212	٨٩٤ الدراجات النارية والدراجات العادية المجهزة بمحركات
885	Cycles without engines ...	167	504	215	647	٨٩٥ الدراجات العادية بدون محرك
896b	Non automobile vehicles for goods transport	80	120	61	112	٨٩٦/ب اجزاء الدراجات العادية واجزاؤها المنفصلة ..
898	Vehicles non automobile for use in the transport of goods and for other purposes ...	139	167	111	141	٨٩٨ الركبات الروادف غير السيارة المعدة لنقل البضائع والاستعمالات الاخرى .. .. ..
902	Component and detached parts of airships n.e.s. balloons and aeroplanes other than engines	30	628	21	360	٩٠٢ اجزاء المناطيد والطيارات وقطعها باستثناء المحركات
918	Gas and water meters ...	48	400	33	291	٩١٨ عدادات الغاز والماء واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة .. ..
933	Medical and surgical instruments n.e.s.	19	301	11	250	٩٣٣ الآلات والاجهزة المستعملة في الطب والجراحة غير المذكورة في مكان آخر .. ..

FOREIGN TRADE

اهم البضائع المستوردة الى سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO SYRIA DURING 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

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Table No. 7 (Contd.) جدول رقم ٧ (تتمة)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
928c	Watches with cases of base metal, gold plated (kilo)	617	507	1	550	ساعات اليد والجيب المصنوعة من مواد عادية مزخرفة بالتزيينات من الذهب (كيلو) .. ..
928e	Watches, other (kilo) ...	457	213	1	230	ساعات اليد والجيب المصنوعة من المواد غير المزخرفة بالتزيينات من الذهب او الفضة (كيلو)
934	Other clocks	13,883	170	21	142	الميقاتيات الاخرى وساعات الجدران حتى المتحرك منها بالكهرباء بما فيها الموقظات (المنبهات) .. ..
943	Gramophones and similar talking machines and parts thereof	10	113	18	161	المعالي (غرامونون) والآلات الناطقة المماثلة وقطعها المنفصلة
956a	Loaded cartridges	50	124	29	134	الخراطيش المشحونة (المدكوكة)
965b	Artificial plastic materials	125	324	105	306	المواد الصنعية البلاستيكية التي اساسها الجبس والبلاستين والشلولويد اخرى مصنوعة من هذه المواد .. ..
978	Other toys, n.e.s.	95	239	72	260	الالعاب ولعب الاطفال غير المسماة
981	Buttons, ordinary	49	234	22	145	الازرار العادية للثياب والملابس
982	Fountain pens and stylographic pens	8	172	9	249	اقلام الحبر ذات الخزان وغيرها ومسكات الرصاص وقطعها المنفصلة .. .. ..

التجارة الخارجية

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية) *

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8

جدول رقم ٨

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
1	Horses ... ...(Heads)	718	117	767	176	الخيول والامهار وفحول الخيل
3	Cows ... ... «	38,480	2,250	29,726	2143	والحصن والافراس (رؤوس) ..
						نوع البقر (رؤوس) ..
4b	Rams, ewes & wethers «	441,468	18,563	388,202	16,685	الكباش والخرفان والنعاج
5b	He-goats & she-goats «	54,767	1,473	43,937	1,156	(رؤوس) .. ..
8	Poultry	401	340	425	379	التيوس والعنز (رؤوس) ..
19b	Sea fish	124	173	52	57	الطيور ، الدواجن ..
25b	Butter, melted «Samneh»	1,109	5,282	125	747	اسماك البحر .. ..
26a	Cheese, soft white	1,160	1,970	838	1,702	السمنة .. .. ..
27b	Eggs in the shell	1,766	2,513	1,653	2,569	الجبن الابيض .. ..
						البيض بقشره .. ..
31a	Guts, bladders & stomachs of animals	77	1,738	65	1,639	مصارين الحيوانات (ومثانتها) ومعدها الطازجة او المملحة او الجافة وتوابع السجول حتى المقطعة والمجففة ..
46a	Olives, fresh	265	114	91	41	الزيتون والكبر (القبل) الطازجة
47	Tomatoes	946	104	264	224	البندورة .. ..
48a	Onions	12,735	1,129	9,796	1,174	البصل والكراث .. ..
49	Potatoes	954	191	2,891	789	البطاطا .. .. ..
50b	Other vegetables, n.e.s....	1,348	114	1,554	102	الخضر الاخرى غير المذكورة
51a	Haricot beans and broad beans, dried	2,964	933	1,715	675	الفاصوليا والفول - يابس
51b	Peas and lentils	18,280	6,747	5,426	2,270	البزلياء والعدس .. ..
51 c	Vetch and lupins	6,517	1,479	3,034	999	الترمس والبيقية (كرسنة)
55a	Oranges and mandarines	1,241	227	496	111	البرتقال والمندرينة ..
57a	Grapes, fresh	4,164	460	2,687	676	العنب الطازج .. ..
57b	Raisins	341	184	129	121	الزبيب .. .. ..
58c	Pistachio, shelled	24	178	11	81	الفستق المقشر .. ..
58d	Pistachio-nut in the shell	80	133	67	286	الفستق بقشره .. ..
58e	Walnuts, shelled	253	510	174	455	الجوز المقشر .. ..
58 f	Walnuts, in the shell ...	704	582	154	152	الجوز بقشره .. ..
58 i	Chestnuts	472	417	664	561	الكستنة .. .. ..
59a	Apples	1,572	307	899	257	التفاح .. .. ..
61b	Melons	838	103	611	99	البطيخ الاصفر (الشمام)
61c	Watermelons	6,769	400	6,883	480	البطيخ الاخضر ..

* البضاعة التي زادت قيمتها عن ١٠٠ الف ليرة سورية خلال عام ١٩٥٣ حسب القيم المصرح عنها بالبيانات الجمركية

* Commodities whose value exceeded L.S. 100,000 during 1953 as declared in the manifest.

FOREIGN TRADE

اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
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PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953

(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
68	Wheat	190,195	[illegible],035	100,227	29,758	٦٨ الحنطة .. ..
70a	Rice, unhusked	283	145	—	—	٧٠/أ الارز بقشره .. ..
70b	Rice, husked	247	193	...	...	٧٠/ب الارز مقشورا .. .. ..
71	Barley	153,268	24,790	149,135	29,400	٧١ الشعير .. ..
73	Maize	3,482	789	401	114	٧٣ الذرة الصفراء .. .. ..
74a	Buckwheat	500	105	—	—	٧٤/أ الحنطة السوداء .. .. ..
74b	Millet	43,389	9,388	14,494	3,318	٧٤/ب الدخن (الذرة البيضاء)
74c	Darnell and other grains	1,372	277	800	126	٧٤/ج الزؤان والحبوب الاخرى
75a1	Flour, wheat hard	22,286	6,311	9,347	3,603	٧٥/أ/١ دقيق الحنطة القاسية ..
75b	Flour, rye	3,921	615	—	—	٧٥/ب دقيق الشيلم والشعير والشوفان الخ.. .. ..
76a	Grains; washed and hulled; semolina of wheat & other grains	787	270	238	92	٧٦/أ حبوب الفلال المقشورة المغسولة وسميد الحنطة والحبوب الاخرى النامم والخشن ..
76b	Wheat, crushed	1,694	548	1,028	368	٧٦/ب جريش الحنطة .. ..
77	Bran	17,908	2,327	10,875	1,781	٧٧ النخالة .. ..
83b1	Sesame	924	562	243	195	٨٣/ب/١ بزر السمسم .. ..
83b2	Cottonseed	28,418	5,506	32 853	6,882	٨٣/ب/٢ بزر القطن .. ..
83c	Groundnuts and other seeds	500	560	148	139	٨٣/ج فستق العبيد وغيره ..
84a	Seeds and fruits for sowing	2,848	784	268	325	٨٤/أ الحبوب والاثمار المعدة للبذار
84b3	Seeds for sowing, other	463	101	44	31	٨٤/ب/٣ الحبوب المعدة للبذار غير المذكورة .. .. ..
88c	Liquorice, powder & extract	3,008	1,004	1,863	568	٨٨/ج جذور السوس والسوس المسحوق وخلاصة السوس
89	Plants and parts of plants, n.e.s. (aniseed, cumins etc.)	827	675	712	696	٨٩ النباتات واجزاؤها ، البذور والاثمار غير المذكورة والداخلة في مكان آخر (بذور اليانسون والكمون وما يماثلها) ..
90	Straw of cereals	24,421	765	13,197	374	٩٠ قش الحبوب الخام حتى المهشم منه ومصافاتها .. ..
92d	Plants, fruits, roots and seeds for dyeing & tanning other than barks and henna	424	289	661	198	٩٢/د النباتات والاثمار والقرون النباتية والبذور الصباغة والدباغة غير القشور والحناء ..
105d	Cotton seed oil	1,223	1,414	7	9	١٠٥/د زيت القطن .. ..
105gb	Olive oil for use other than for soap making	440	817	25	54	١٠٥/ز/ب زيت الزيتون غير المستعمل للصابون .. .. ..
125	Sugar manufactures ...	146	167	96	132	١٢٥ مصنوعات السكر ..

التجارة الخارجية

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
142a1	Jams, jellies, pastes, marmalades; without sugar	498	633	15	10	المربيات ، الهلمات المعرونات غير محلاة بالسكر .. ..
142a2	Apricot paste	868	1,104	2,289	2,400	قمر الدين .. ..
150b	Other food preparations n.e.s.	314	196	400	256	المحضرات الغذائية غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر
165	Oil cake & other residues from the extraction of vegetable oils	24,303	4,190	13,534	2,291	الكسب وغيره من بقايا استخلاص الزيوت النباتية ..
171a	Tombac	222	547	127	383	التنباك .. .. ..
171b	Tobacco leaves	1,201	1,845	2,769	4,192	التبغ ورقا .. ..
192a	Cement uncolored ...	24,103	2,019	10,213	953	الاسمنت المطحون او غير المطحون، الطبيعي او الصنعي
200a	Asphalt, natural for roads	3,003	141	3,579	153	الاسفلت الطبيعي المعد لتزفيت الطرق .. .. ..
206/5/1	Masout fuel	7,811	588	6,576	502	المازوت الخام الكثيف المعد للحرق
293a3	Cinematographic film s, synchronized with sonorous films	27	211	4	214	الافلام السينمائية المصورة المتوائمة مع افلام صائتة
320b	Soap, ordinary	1,919	2,614	1,790	3,377	الصابون العادي ..
348a	Hides, sheep	366	1,003	273	806	صلال الغنم بصوفها ..
348b	Hides, goat	219	454	73	169	صلال المعز بشعرها ..
352	Sheep skins and goats skins tanned or prepared ...	298	1,150	308	1,290	جلود الغنم والمعز المدبوغة او المجهزة .. .. ..
360	Articles made of Morocco leather or sheaths, and leather articles for travel ...	36	151	30	133	السختيان والغلف واصناف صناعة السفر المصنوعة من الجلد .. .. ..
396	Wooden cases for packing, even if in pieces	1,095	145	472	41	الصناديق الخشبية المعدة للتغليف ولو كانت مفككة ..
398a	Doors and windows of wood	181	129	63	50	الابواب والنوافذ الخشبية
403	Furniture, other	359	404	226	297	انواع اخرى من الاثاث واجزاؤه
404a	Mosaic works in wood ...	17	107	14	88	مصنوعات خشب الموزاييك
427	Cigarette paper	401	831	277	579	ورق لفائف التبغ ..
443a	Yarns of raw natural silk	10	221	10	268	خيوط الحرير من الحرير الخام الطبيعي حتى المكبب او المكرو التكبيب .. .. ..

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
449b	Crepes, 50 - 100 grs per m2	6	242	—	—	٤٤٩/ب النسج المعروف بالكريب مما يزن المتر المربع منه اكثر من ٥٠ غراما حتى ١٠٠ .. ..
450b	Other tissues of close warp (Foulards, toiles, satins, taffetas, etc. of natural silk	7	461	...	36	٤٥٠/ب النسج الاخرى الموضونة (فولار ، توال ، ساتان ، تافته الخ ..) المصنوعة من الحرير الطبيعي .. ...
462	Yarns of artificial silk, not for retail sale	379	1,515	195	989	٤٦٢ خيوط الحرير الصنعي صرفا او مخلوطا بالصوف وغير المحضر للبيع بالمفرق .. ..
471a	Crepes of artificial silk, unbleached or bleached or dyed	303	3,674	420	4,267	٤٧١/أ النسج المعروفة بالكريب المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف خاما او مقصورة او مصبوغة
471b	Crepes of artificial silk, printed goffered or figured	162	1,456	177	1,935	٤٧١/ب النسج المعروفة بالكريب المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف مزينة او مفتنة .. ..
472a2	Other fabrics of artificial silk raw over 75 grs. ...	15	125	—	—	٤٧٢/أ/٢ النسج الاخرى مطبوعة او مزينة او مفتنة .. ..
472b1	Other fabrics of pure, artificial silk; unbleached or bleached or dyed over 75grs per m2	161	1,383	85	747	٤٧٢/ب/١ النسج الموضونة والمنوجة المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ٧٥ غ (خاما اومقصورة اومصبوغة) ..
472b2	Other fabrics of pure artificial silk; printed, goffered or figured over 75 grs per m2	761	6,717	589	5,785	٤٧٢/ب/٢ النسج الموضونة والمنوجة المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي الصرف مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ٧٥ غ (مطبوعة او مزينة او مفتنة) ..
476	Other fabrics of pure artificial silk, n.e.s. (poplines, muslins, grenadines and voiles)	238	1,901	170	1,546	٤٧٦ النسج الموضونة والمنوجة المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي مخلوطا بمواد نسيجية اخرى
480b2	Fabrics of artificial silk waste and artificial textile fibres 75—150 grs. per m2, printed, goffred or figured	19	140	16	156	٤٨٠/ب/٢ النسج الموضونة والمنوجة المصنوعة من نفايات الحرير الصنعي ومن الياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية مطبوعة او مزينة او مفتنة ..

اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

	COMMODITY	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953 القيمة Value	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 الكمية Quant.	عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952 القيمة Value	الوضع الجمركي
487a	Trimmings of artificial silk	18	101	15	134	١/٤٨٧ اصناف المقادة المصنوعة من الحرير الصنعي او من فضلاته من الياف المواد النسيجية الصناعية صرفة .. ..
491a	Metal threads of base metal or gilt or silvered	27	109	—	—	٢/٤٩١ الخيوط المعدنية الصرفة او المدعمة او المفضضة ..
492b2	Fabrics, ribbons and trimmings of metal thread, mixed with thread other than cotton	12	125	7	123	٢/٤٩٢/ب النسج والاشرطة واصناف المقادة المصنوعة من الخيوط المعدنية او المعدنية المضمومة الى الخيوط النسيجية والمعدة للاثاث ..
493	Wool in the mass	4,501	21,540	3,192	14,723	٤٩٣ الصوف كلا .. ..
511b	Curtains of wool, pure or mixed	28	108	26	113	٥١١/ب بسط الاقدام المستعملة ستائر ابواب مصنوعة من الصوف الصرف او الممزوج من النوع المسمى كليم او شوساق او قرماني .. .. ..
513	Woollen trimmings ...	51	282	41	241	٥١٣ اصناف المقادة المصنوعة من الصوف .. ..
518	Cotton, raw	53,946	134,703	57,786	124,323	٥١٨ القطن الخام .. ..
519	Cotton waste and lint ...	114	264	197	162	٥١٩ فضلات القطن والقطن المنسول سجاجا .. .. ..
526	Cotton thread or yarn put up for retail sale	21	157	18	151	٥٢٦ خيوط القطن المعدة للبيع بالمفرق .. .. ..
527a3	Cotton fabrics, unworked 100—150 grs. per m2	71	387	203	1,391	٣/أ/٥٢٧ النسج غير المفتنة المصنوعة من القطن (خاما) مما يزن المتر المربع منها ١٠٠ ـ ١٥٠ غ
527a4	Cotton fabrics, unworked over 150 grs. per m2. ...	167	921	22	147	٤/أ/٥٢٧ النسج غير المفتنة المصنوعة من القطن (خاما) مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ١٥٠ غرام
527c3	Cotton tissues, dyed after fabrication, or made of dyed yarn not figured, 100—150 grs. per m2.	53	317	319	2,970	٣/ج/٥٢٧ النسج غير المفتنة المصنوعة من القطن (مصبوغة بعد نسجها) مما يزن المتر المربع منها ١٠٠ـ ١٥٠ غرام .. ..
527c4	Cotton tissues, dyed after fabrication or made of dyed yarn not figured, over 150 grs. per m2	113	746	31	500	٤/ج/٥٢٧ النسج غير المفتنة المصنوعة من القطن (مصبوغة بعد نسجها) مما يزن المتر المربع منها اكثر من ١٥٠ غ .. ..

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ – ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
528	Cotton fabrics, figured ...	36	316	68	743	٥٢٨ النسج الملتفة المصنوعة من من القطن الصرف .. ..
566	Cablage twine	484	1,078	478	927	٥٦٦ الامراس والحبال والخيوط الثقيلة ولو كانت مضفورة
581a2a	Stockings & socks of pure artificial silk, and of artificial textile fibres, lenght more than 22 cms	15	211	8	157	٥٨١/٢/٢/أ الجوارب المعدة للرجال من الحرير الصنعي او من الالياف النسيجية الصنعية الصرفة .. .. ..
582a2	Hosiery of pure wool, other than stockings...	48	707	35	1,237	٥٨٢/٢/أ مصنوعات شغل الصنارة من الصوف الصرف غير الجوارب
583a3a	Stockings for men, made of pure or mixed cotton, length more than 17 cms	57	500	97	1,164	٥٨٣/٢/٢/أ الجوارب المعدة للرجال من القطن الصرف او الممزوج يزيد طول قدمها على ١٧ سم ..
583a3b	Stockings for women, made of pure or mixed cotton, length more than 17 cms.	13	125	10	140	٥٨٣/٢/٢/ب الجوارب المعدة للنساء من القطن الصرف اوالممزوج يزيد طول قدمها على ١٧ سم
533a4a	Other hosiery of cotton or vegetable textile material, n.e.s.	171	1,006	120	1,049	٥٨٣/٢/٤/أ الالبسة الخارجية والداخلية والالبسة غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من القطن الصرف
584a	Underwear for men, n.e.s. of natural silk	4	112	...	4	٥٨٤/أ الالبسة الداخلية المعدة للرجال ، غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من نسج الحرير الطبيعي .. .. ..
584b	Men's clothing made of artificial silk or other artificial fibre, n.e.s.	68	679	50	502	٥٨٤/ب الالبسة المعدة للرجال غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من نسج الحرير الصنعي اوالياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية
584c	Men's clothing made of wool n.e.s.	52	717	63	754	٥٨٤/ج الالبسة المعدة للرجال غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من النسج الصوفية .. ..
584d	Men's clothing made of cotton, n.e.s.	148	1,152	109	1,199	٥٨٤/د الالبسة المعدة للرجال غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من النسج القطنية .. ..
585b	Women's clothing of artificial silk yarns or of other artificial fibre, n.e.s.	39	382	15	226	٥٨٥/ب الالبسة النسائية غير المذكورة في مكان آخر من نسج الحرير الصنعي اوالياف المواد النسيجية الصنعية .. ..

التجارة الخارجية 439

اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Contd.)

جدول رقم ٨ (تابع)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
589b	Table linens and bed covers made of artificial silk yarns and other tissues	75	409	*22	*178	البياضات المعدة للمائدة والفراش والزينة المصنوعة من نسج الحرير الصنعي او الالياف النسجية الصنعية .. ٥٨٩/ب
589d	Table linens and bed covers made of cotton	59	335	43	330	البياضات المعدة للمائدة والفراش والزينة المصنوعة من النسج القطنية ٥٨٩/د
590	Handkerchiefs and neckerchiefs	343	2,535	321	2,963	مناديل الجيب ومناديل الرأس ومناديل الرقبة ٥٩٠
591	Shawls and scarves ...	74	629	*67	*671	الشالات والاوشحة .. ٥٩١
597d3	Other wear, sewn and ready-made, n.e.s. of cotton textiles	38	108	29	92	الاصناف الاخرى الخياطة او الجاهزة وغير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر المصنوعة من النسج القطنية ٥٩٧/د/٣
602	Shoes of leather uppers and soles of leather or rubber, other than slippers & house shoes.	20	193	17	168	الاحذية المصنوعة من الجلد وينعل من الجلد او المطاط غير الاحذية العادية المعروفة بالبرودوكان وغير البوابيج والاحذية البيتية .. ٦٠٢
681	Gold coins (kilos) ...	758	3,777	...	...	النقود الذهبية .. (كيلو) ٦٩٢
722	Receptacles : iron or steel not soldered, for compressed or liquified gas ...	227	153	289	236	الآنية المصنوعة من الحديد او الفولاذ غير المحومة والمعدة لحفظ الغازات المضغوطة او المميعة ٧٢٢
768	Kitchen and other utensils for domestic uses, copper n.e.s.	133	480	94	394	مجموعة ادوات المطبخ والآنية الخاصة بالاستعمالات المنزلية المصنوعة من النحاس ، غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر ٧٦٨
819b	Articles intended for adornment	10	105	8	176	الاصناف المعدة للزخرفة ٨١٩/ب
823d	Explosion motors, other than for cars and motor cycles	51	135	55	123	المحركات الانفجارية وذوات الاحتراق الداخلي واجزاؤها وقطعها المنفصلة غير المعدة للطائرات والسيارات والدرجات ٨٢٣/د

* Corrected figure

وقع معدل

FOREIGN TRADE

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اهم البضائع المصدرة من سوريا خلال عامي ١٩٥٢ و ١٩٥٣
(الكمية بالاطنان والقيمة بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM SYRIA DURING THE YEAR 1952 AND 1953
(Quantity in tons and value in L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 (Concld.)

جدول رقم A (تتمة)

COMMODITY		عام ١٩٥٣ Year 1953		عام ١٩٥٢ Year 1952		الوضع الجمركي
		الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	الكمية Quant.	القيمة Value	
634	Agricultural machinery & appliances for soil work...	51	151	153	280	٨٢١ الآلات والادوات الزراعية المعدة لفلاحة الارض وتحضيرها وزرعها واجرائها وتطهيرها المنفصلة .. .. ..
890d1	Other vehicles with chassis	457	359	20	28	٨٩٠/د/١ الانواع الاخرى من السيارات المستوردة .. .. .. — هياكل (شاسي) مجردة او مرتقة بغريفة السائق فقط
823	Medical and surgical instruments n.e.s.	6	160	—	—	٩٢٢ الآلات والاجهزة المستعملة في الطب والجراحة غير المذكورة ولا الداخلة في مكان آخر

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON MEI
SYRIA MDI

near Aleppo, and at Rayaq and there are many emergency landing fields.

Sea Ports. Since 1950 Beirut has handled over 2 million tonnage of ships a year; an increase of about a quarter of a million over the pre-war figures. The port has a free zone through which goods are shipped to Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. But the Syrian Government hopes to divert some of the transit trade from Beirut and has, with the assistance of a loan of $6 million from Saudi Arabia, formed a company to develop Latakia in order to handle about a million tons of goods a year (in 1952 431,593 tons were handled). Work on the extension of the port was begun by a Yugoslav firm in April 1953. Tripoli, Sidon, and Banias are ports handling the oil from the pipelines[1] and are little used for other purposes.

Wireless and Telephones. An automatic telephone exchange system covers most of Syria and an automatic exchange is planned for Beirut. Telephone links with Europe and America are available through Beirut and normal cable facilities exist. The Syrian state broadcasting authority has two large transmitters and broadcasts in Arabic, French, English, and Hebrew. Near Beirut there is a station which broadcasts in Arabic, French, and English.

The 'Common Interests'

Under the Mandate, Syria and Lebanon formed an economic and customs union, the Higher Council of Common Interests, under the direct control of France, which administered customs and excise and controlled concessionary companies, antiquities, and some other services. On 1 January 1944 the control was transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The currencies were linked and interchangeable, and both the Syrian and Lebanese pounds were largely backed by French francs based on a rate of 8·83 to the pound sterling (then worth $4·03). In order to maintain a good profit on the exchange brought in by oil companies the Lebanese and Syrian pounds were not devalued in 1949 to follow sterling. Exchange was controlled by one department for both countries and the note issue is in the hands of the French Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

But these links were incompatible with the differences that developed in the economic policies of the two countries when they became independent. Syria, in normal years, has a large exportable surplus of agricultural products and little transit trade, whereas the debtor trade balance of Lebanon is com-

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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cultivated area. Holdings of 25–250 acres are estimated to take 423
up 33 per cent of the area and holdings over 250 acres 29 per cent. State land is estimated to represent 23 per cent of the total cultivated area. Decrees for the distribution of state lands were issued in 1952: their implementation, at the time of writing, is still under review. Legislation to prevent the subdivision of plots by succession inheritances is also under consideration; at present a four-acre plot may have thirty-seven owners, and its management is profitable only to lawyers.

The approximate acreage and crop and yield of the main 241
products are shown in the following table. 433

MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)			*Production* (000 metric tons)			*Yield* (100 kg. per ha.)	
	1950	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1950*	*1951*
Cotton (lint)	78	217	145	35	49	49	4·6	2·3
Wheat	992	1,037	900*	830	510	850*	8·4	4·9
Barley	416	344	400*	322	155	350*	7·7	4·5
Vegetables	68	66	..	47	40	142	..	..
Tobacco†	10	11	..	9	9	..	8·7	..
Rice (paddy)	7	..	..	24	6	6	19·3‡	..

.. = not available.

* The Banque de Syrie et du Liban (*Exercice 1952*) quotes the following figures for 1952 (in thousands):

Wheat: area = 1,180, production = 805.
Barley: area = 396, production = 467.

† Including Lebanon (annual production about 2,000–3,000 tons). ‡ 1949.

(SOURCES: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952* and *Monthly Bulletins of Statistics*, 1953; vegetable figures from Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952*, Paris, 1953.)

Wheat is the traditional staple crop of Syria and in a normal 245
year a quarter of a million tons can be exported. But the poor 439
harvest of 1951 necessitated wheat imports of about 50,000 241
tons. The 1952 wheat crop, however, once more increased to 433
over 800,000 tons. Barley is also grown and exported and, though the acreage has diminished somewhat since 1949, the crop is adequate.

In 1950 fortunes were made from cotton which fetched a high 248
price for the abundant harvest. The acreage sown to cotton 433
trebled between 1949 and 1950 and again in 1951. But while in 1950 the cotton yield was high, the 1951 harvest proved disappointing because of drought and attacks of the boll weevil. Despite a fall in cotton acreage in 1952—due chiefly to the downward trend in cotton prices—that year's output was maintained at the 1951 level, thanks largely to better methods

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248 of cultivation. Syrian cotton is a 'Lone Star' medium-staple
433 variety and is of better quality than is needed for some locally-made clothes, which accounts for the fact that Syria both exports and imports cotton. There is still a long way to go before the country's cotton cultivation is as efficient as in Egypt or the Sudan, but cotton has become Syria's most important export commodity and the cotton acreage increased by no less than 800 per cent between 1945 and 1951, compared with an increase of 60 per cent and 70 per cent in Egypt and the Sudan.

241 Both 1951 and 1952 were bad years for olives; in the north,
433 thousands of trees have been blighted by frost. Syria produces good fruit, especially in the oasis of Damascus, and peaches, apples, figs, plums, pears, grapes, apricots, and pistachio nuts are all grown. The most prolific vegetable crops are lentils, beans, and peas. The area under rice has been reduced by drainage schemes and Syria does not grow enough for her own needs. The famous tobacco of Latakia is grown under a monopoly which has recently been transferred from the concessionary company to the state. Silk and hemp are also cultivated and a start has been made in growing beet for the Homs sugar refinery.

231 Nearly 3 million sheep are estimated to graze in Syria with
● 439 goats numbering over a million. Over 7,000 tons a year of
234 coarse wool are exported, including about 2,000 tons a year suitable for rug-making. Cattle are of two types and, in 1950, numbered about 429,000.[1] Yoghurt and cheese and milk are consumed within the country. It is estimated that there are still over 72,000 camels in Syria and they are an important part of nomad economy. The Syrian horse and mule are still bred but in declining numbers.

185 The forests of Syria, as of the Mediterranean in general, are a survival from a period of greater rainfall coeval with the last glacial period of northern Europe. The woodcutter and the goat, war and erosion have taken their toll and trees are no longer an important part of Syrian wealth. An effort at re-afforestation is being made, and there is also a project to produce reeds for paper-making on the banks of the Euphrates.

Industry and Commerce[2]

377 In 1951 the output of electric energy was over 86 million kilowatt hours used mostly in Aleppo and Damascus. New

[1] *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2* (Damascus, 1952).
[2] For further details, see UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2.*

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433 is a modern glass factory for window and mirror glass and for glass containers, with a total estimated annual capacity of over 14,000 tons. This enterprise has suffered from the fact that the sand has to be imported and also from being built before the necessary export market had been secured to keep its three ovens working. Flour mills are plentiful and more are to be constructed; the production of flour is about 400,000 tons a year. In Damascus there are two spaghetti factories and starch is also produced. Tinned fruit, jam, chocolates, and sweets are also produced in Damascus and there are factories for matches (output 45 million boxes in 1952), margarine, soft drinks, and shoes as well as a number of tanneries and workshops in Aleppo and Damascus. A paper mill has recently begun production, with an output of 4 million square metres of corrugated paper and cardboard boxes in 1952.

SYRIAN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

(Estimates for 1952)

Number of Factories	*Tons Capacity*
2 Cement	200,000
1 Sugar	10,000
1 Asphalt	variable
9 Edible oil*	12,000
68 Raw cotton ginning	600,000
3 Food preserving (major)	5,000
1 Glass (plate and rolled)	7,500
(containers)	8,000
3 Tobacco	2,000

* Olive and cotton seed.

(SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus 1952.)

Industry contributes only about a half as much as agriculture [186] to Syria's gross national product, but the spirit of nationalism has led the Government to give special support to local industries although not all are economically sound. As Syria lacks industrial raw materials, industries based on local agricultural produce should be encouraged rather than those which depend on imported raw materials and foreign markets.

Finance

436 The Syrian pound of 100 piastres (reputedly backed as to 648 60 per cent by gold and foreign currency) is linked to the French franc. Syria is a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a quota of $6½ million. War-time inflation subsided 435 by the end of 1948, but with the Korean boom in primary 439 product prices and the subsequent export surpluses and heavy

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investment in cotton growing, prices began to rise once more. 435
At the end of 1951 rising import prices, coupled with the poor 439
grain crop, were reflected in local retail prices, and prices continued to rise until mid-1952, when governmental action and steadier import prices had a salutary effect. Thus, generally speaking, the retail price of household goods has risen five or six times since before the war, and the currency in circulation has also risen despite the fact that the official credit policy has been restrictive; although the note issue is now only £S46 million higher than in 1946 (at 31 December 1951 it was £S248 million), bank deposits have increased from £S96·2 million at the end of 1949 to £S198·3 million at the end of 1951. At that date the currency was covered, as to gold 9·9 per cent, foreign exchange 6 per cent, commercial bonds 1·4 per cent, treasury bills 33·5 per cent, and state loans or guarantees 48·9 per cent.

Direct taxation on income and the land accounts for only 651
about a quarter of the Syrian budget;[1] this is less than before 652
the war, for the proportionate amount from the land has fallen from 30 per cent to about 14 per cent in 1950; the estimate for 1952 was 18 per cent. Receipts from customs duties have increased considerably and these, with other indirect taxes, have helped to make the burden less 'fairly' distributed. Indirect taxes are levied on sugar, petroleum, and other essential commodities. Budgetary expenditure since before the war has increased seventeenfold, and since 1949 the total annual expenditure has increased by more than a quarter; but whereas expenditure on health, education, and public works has increased only slightly, that on defence has trebled and accounts for over a third of total expenditure. Agriculture, with only 2 per cent of the budget, is insufficiently provided for and it is hoped that its share will be increased.

Banking is largely but not exclusively in the hands of foreign 453
banks; La Banque de Syrie et du Liban (French) has the concession for the note issue, but there is talk of starting a Syrian National Bank; among other commercial banks are La Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (French) and the British Bank of the Middle East. The foreign-exchange market 457
has always been less influential than that of Beirut, but in this respect Aleppo is growing in importance. There is a recognized free market for exchange[2] in which merchants and Government alike deal. The official rate of £S6·19 = £1, used mainly for Government transactions, was abolished in June 1953 for all purposes except Government transactions with petroleum com-

[1] See table 2, p. 502 below. [2] See table 3, p. 503 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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457 panies. It was replaced by a fixed rate to approximate closely to the prevailing free rate.

International Trade

439 In 1951 Syria had an adverse balance of trade of £S28 million but this was probably counterbalanced by the income from certain invisible exports which do not come within the knowledge of the official statisticians. The year 1951, however, was a particularly bad one for agriculture. In normal years Syria can expect to have a favourable balance of international trade; in 1950, for example, the country had a considerable trade surplus and by 1952 the large deficit of the previous year had been wiped out. Syria's best customers are usually Lebanon and Iraq (Lebanon's inter-Middle Eastern trade is higher still) but there is also reciprocal trade with Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. Trade with Western Germany has recovered and is now quite important although it is threatened by Syria's attitude to the German reparations to Israel.[1] Syria's main exports are agricultural; raw cotton has recently become the most important. Her chief imports are machinery, oil, and textiles.[2]

Up to 1947 almost all the external trade of Syria was done not only through Beirut but also by Lebanese firms; however, since then, Syrian merchants have set out to show that they can deal directly with the outside world. The Government are encouraging importers and exporters to use Latakia rather than Beirut and legislation aims at preventing foreign businesses from being represented in Syria by foreigners. This has the effect of cutting out the middleman in Beirut, but it also makes it very difficult for British, American, and French firms to have sufficient control over their affairs to encourage the investment in Syria of foreign skill and foreign capital. In 1951 some Belgian and French companies were nationalized and the commercial climate was unfavourable to foreign investment; but during 1952 Colonel Shishakli declared that the Government would welcome foreign capital and enterprise provided that they did not encroach on Syria's national sovereignty and interests, and towards this end exchange regulations were to be simplified and greater freedom was to be given in the transfer of capital.

Development Schemes

426 Interest rates in Syria and Lebanon are very high and even
454 a sound borrower may have to pay from 25 to 50 per cent

[1] See table 4, p. 503 below. [2] See ibid.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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MAIN CROPS

	Area (000 hectares)		Production (000 metric tons)		Yields (100 kg. per ha.)
	1951	1952	1951	1952	1950
Wheat	61	70	43	50	7·5
Barley	15	20	14	27	11·2
Cotton	5	2	1	..	..
Tobacco	..	..	3	2	..
Citrus fruit	..	..	75	90	..
Grapes	21	..	80	..	..

.. = not available.

(SOURCES: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Exercice 1952* (Paris 1953); except figures for yields, cotton production, and area and production of grapes, all of which have been taken from FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, 1952.)

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There is enough water for land to be used more intensively than in Syria but there is not enough room to grow all that the country needs. Improved methods have increased the yield of cereals per acre, but Lebanon will always have to import wheat. The crop of grapes is nearly double the weight of the wheat harvest and Lebanon exports grapes, wine, and the best quality araq. The citrus exports are high but the growers have not yet established the same name for quality as have the Israelis. Melons, water-melons, apples, onions, and potatoes are also important crops and vegetables are exported as far as the oil towns of Kuwait and Dahran. Cotton and tobacco are also grown in small quantities.

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The land is more evenly parcelled out amongst the people in Lebanon than in Syria but, despite the fact that there are many small holdings, there is a general shift from country to town, and Beirut and its immediate neighbourhood hold nearly half of the population. In the coastal regions of intensive cultivation small holdings predominate, while in the plain regions large estates worked by share-croppers are the most prevalent form of land tenure. Some estates owned by rich men are farmed under modern methods and equipment and there is less room for improvement or for expansion in agriculture than in Syria.

Industry

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Relative to its size, Lebanon is one of the most industrialized countries in the Middle East area. It is probable that nearly 50,000 persons are so employed, of whom over half are factory workers. However, Lebanese industry has only partly recovered from the loss of the Syrian market and some industries had either to move to Syria or to curtail production. The biggest industries are electricity, which produced 130 million kwh. in 1951, and the Cheks cement factory south of Tripoli, which produced 303,000 tons of cement in 1951. Cotton weaving and

3eRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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1950–1 amounted to £L215·5 million. Over half this deficit was met from 'invisible' earnings, such as the tourist trade and transportation, and the rest from private donations and capital movements. Indeed, during this period Lebanon's balance of payments showed a small surplus of £L2·7 million.[1] Most of Lebanon's trade (about 40 per cent) is with other Middle Eastern countries, but the foremost country in her trade is the United States (about 20 per cent). Europe and Great Britain are important sources of imports but not such large export markets. Lebanon's main imports are agricultural products, textiles, machinery, and oil, and her chief exports are agricultural products and textiles. The tourist industry is given full encouragement by the Government and, under certain circumstances, tourists' fares to Lebanon are subsidized.

Development

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On 24 February 1951 Lebanon signed a Point Four agreement with the United States and the work to be carried out is based on the report to the United Nations in 1949 by Mr Gordon Clapp.[2] Irrigation projects are under way at Akkar, Yamouna, and Qasmiya, and there is a proposal to use the Litani river to irrigate over 12,000 acres of land. In August 1953 the Lebanese Government announced a four-year development plan; the main projects under consideration concern road and hydro-electric power development.

Conclusion

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The future of Syria and Lebanon will obviously depend to some extent on the past, many aspects of which have not been fully discussed here because the independent political and economic development of the countries began only in 1946. In internal politics events have moved too rapidly for any record to keep pace with them, and there is not yet apparent any stability that would allow one to regard views and information on the political scene as being valid for more than a brief period. As regards their external policy, the two countries have yet to be convinced that there is a community of interest between them and the West. The Western Powers need the use of Syrian and Lebanese territory on which to base a line of defence, but it is not expected that these countries could or should bear a significant part of the burden of defence in men, materials, and money. The Levant wants greater security against Israel than

[1] See table 6, p. 505 below.
[2] UN, Conciliation Commission for Palestine (chairman: Gordon Clapp), *Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* (New York, December 1949).

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX

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Table 3
FOREIGN CURRENCY
(Selling rates in £L/£S)

Official*			Free Market Rates					
			1949	1950	1951	1952		
			Average	Average	Average	High	Low	Average
1,000 French francs	6·26	£L	8·04	9·44	9·49	9·63	8·74	9·15
		£S	8·75	10·19	9·49	9·70	9·09	9·16
US$	2·21	£L	3·26	3·47	3·73	3·85	3·54	3·66
		£S	3·48	3·72	3·64	3·86	3·58	3·65
Sterling £	6·19	£L	9·75	9·06	9·41	9·69	9·14	9·37
		£S	10·28	9·66	9·13	10·12	9·04	9·23

* Since 18 November 1948 for US$, others since 19 September 1949.

(Sources: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Commerce du Liban*; IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, 1953; Syrian Embassy.)

Table 4
VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1952
(a) By country

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	Lebanon* (£L000)		Syria (£S000)	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
USA	54,827	6,907	45,470	15,995
UK	38,333	4,279	39,245	77,161
France	33,837	3,666	29,573	49,166
Holland	15,226	117	7,519	..
Italy	12,497	3,361	20,472	16,605
Germany, W.	10,154	433	19,098	9,872
Switzerland	9,354	89	5,714	..
Belgium	7,599	567	13,777	3,799
Czechoslovakia	4,643	1,773	4,857	..
India	..	..	5,507	..
Lebanon	—	—	33,724	70,279
Syria	63,842	16,583	—	—
Iraq	17,741	2,732	8,526	17,176
Turkey	4,038	596	18,289	..
Saudi Arabia	4,270	7,284	7,912	10,332
Jordan	2,890	3,181	5,988	16,846
Egypt	2,310	7,082	1,371	4,510
Total:	347,049	77,430	313,340	319,573

.. = not available. — = nil.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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(b) By commodity group

	Lebanon* (£L000)		Syria (£S000)	
Animals and animal products	28,457	1,445	8,292	28,216
Agricultural products	94,839	32,057	54,580	89,533
Chemicals	14,810	1,793	16,775	4,063
Textiles (incl. raw cotton)	46,094	20,534	64,334	177,586
Base metals and goods	21,283	6,999	25,028	1,608
Machinery and instruments	29,856	4,053	38,568	809
Transport equipment	13,022	949	19,349	300
Mineral products†	23,754	542	38,791	1,797

* Transit trade excluded (£L1,238,607,000). Exports exclude re-exports (£L19,491,000). Imports include gold (£L38,569,000), and oil from Iraq refined at Tripoli (£L17,103,000).

† For Lebanon, crude oil and oil products only.

(Sources: Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, *Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel*, vol. 3, no. 4, Beirut, 1953; Bureau de Documentations Syriennes et Arabes, *Etude Mensuelle sur l'Economie et le Marché Syriens*, Damascus, May 1953; G.B., Board of Trade, Special Register Information Service.)

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Table 5

SYRIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1950–1*

(£S million)

		1950	1951
A.	Goods and Services		
	Exports, f.o.b.	270	292
	Imports, c.i.f.	−338	−418
	Trade balance	−68	−126
	Foreign travel	..	1
	Transportation	..	5
	Government, not included elsewhere	..	−1
	Other services	56	59
	Total	−12	−62
B.	Private donations and capital movements		
	Migrants' remittances	10	10
	Capital	9	12
	Total	19	22
C.	Special official financing		
	Saudi Arabian loan	—	15
	UN Relief and Works Administration	10	11
	Total	10	26
D.	Net errors and omissions		3
E.	Deficit (−) (A through D)		−11
F.	Compensatory official financing		
	Short-term assets, net (increase −)		5
	Monetary gold (increase −)		6
	Total		11

* No sign indicates credit; minus sign indicates debit.

(Source: IMF, *Balance of Payments Yearbook*, vol. 4, 1950–1, p. 255; based on official statistics.)

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COTTON IN SYRIA

Cotton in the past two years has become Syria's most important export. The country also exports wheat, barley, and other cereals, apricot paste, olive oil, wool, some cotton textiles, licorice root, tobacco, pistachio nuts, and livestock products. 241 439

Many types of manufactured articles are imported—petroleum products, minerals, pharmaceuticals, electric appliances, motor vehicles, machinery, tires, tubes, glassware, and hardware. 439

Table 20

SYRIA: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports
March 13 through December 31, 1950
Value

Item	1950
	Per Cent
Cotton	28.6
Wool and Hair	11.1
Silk, Artificial Silk, and Textile Fibers	6.9
Vegetables and Products	27.5
Animals and Products	6.6
Tobacco	1.3
Hides and Skins	1.1
Others	8.4
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	59

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

Table 21

SYRIA: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports
1951
Value

Country	1951
	Per Cent
Lebanon	21.5
France	18.9
United States	13.5
Lebanon Free Zone	8.2
Iraq	7.3
United Kingdom	7.0
Others	24.3
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

PRODUCTION

Syria is essentially an agricultural country. Its mineral resources have been exploited only slightly despite indications of the existence of phosphate, lead, copper, antimony, nickel, chrome, and gypsum. Manganese ore has been 316

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316 mined since 1914, and sodium chloride and bitumen deposits also are being worked. There is an abundance of good calcareous building stone and basalt.[29]

433 The most important industries produce flour, olive oil, soap, tanned hides, tobacco products, glass, alcohol, glucose, and textiles. New factories recently constructed include two cottonseed oil mills, two cotton spinning and weaving mills, porcelain and glass factories, and a beet sugar mill. Textiles is the most important single industry from the standpoint of employment and value of production.

315 Unlike many of the other countries in the Middle East, Syria has no oil in commercial quantities. A number of wells have been drilled, but without notable success. A pipeline from Iraq and the Persian Gulf crosses Syria to the Mediterranean, and a new line is being completed to Baniyas on the coast from Iraq. The pipelines provide a source of employment, but they do not produce a large amount of revenue for the government.

Table 22

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SYRIA: Specified Imports as Per Cent of Total Imports
March 15 through December 31, 1950
Value

Item	1950
	Per Cent
Textile Materials	29.1
Combustible Minerals	18.2
Electric Machinery and Apparatus	18.7
Common Metals	6.8
Precious Stones and Metals	5.8
Animals and Products	[illegible]
Others	[illegible]
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	90

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

Table 23

SYRIA: Imports from Specified Sources as Per Cent of Total Imports
1951
Value

Source	1951
	Per Cent
United States	18.2
United Kingdom	12.8
France	10.4
Lebanon	10.2
Italy	7.0
Germany	5.5
Others	35.9
Total	100.0
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	138

SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce.

[29] *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1951, p. 22.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

COTTON TEXTILES

Syria has nine small cotton textile mills centered around Aleppo and Damascus, with a total of 55,000 spindles and 2,000 looms and a number of knitting mills and garment factories. A large home industry, which not only weaves but also spins cotton yarn, has, according to trade representatives, a capacity almost as great as that of the commercial mills. 288

Until a few years ago the industry of Syria was complementary to that of Lebanon. Syria bought yarns from Lebanon and sold cloth there. The two countries together were able to produce about two-thirds of their total needs.[30] Acceding to nationalistic pressure, Syria dissolved the customs union in 1950 and set about not only to install more spindles to balance the weaving capacity, but actually to become self-sufficient in all cotton textiles. A number of mills have bought new equipment for rehabilitation and integration. [439]

Outstanding in this field is the new mill built at Damascus by a group of industrialists known as the "big five." The mill is small in size—only 10,000 spindles and 350 fully automatic looms—but it is a showplace, modern in every detail. The management is especially proud of the modern clinic which provides the workers with free medical attention—a new idea in this part of the world.

This mill has a well-trained engineering and administrative staff and good machinery. To increase efficiency, the management hopes to abandon the range of goods now made and concentrate on the production of only two or three constructions. The level of efficiency is high enough, based on the wage scale of roughly $1.25 per day, to permit the mill to compete on the world market. Approximately 20 per cent of the cloth production is exported.

The other industries are less efficient and are not in a position to compete on the export market.

COTTON CONSUMPTION

In Syria production of yarns was estimated by the government at 5,500 tons in 1951, double what it had been four years earlier and seven times the output ten years ago. Industry and government figures vary considerably, especially on output of the home industry, but they agree on the same sharp rise in production. 288

Cotton consumption, computed on the basis of yarn production estimates, is placed at approximately 33,000 bales and is in line with the sharp increase in yarn production.

PROTECTION

As in other Middle East countries, the cotton textile industry receives substantial tariff protection from imports. Syria is a free-money market, and foreign exchange can be bought for any purpose on any street corner. As a result, prices are reported to be going down, as they did in Lebanon when foreign exchange was freed several years ago. 288 651 457

Duties on cotton textiles were changed in 1949 from a specific rate base to an ad valorem base. The duties on most yarns in which the local industry is deficient average about 20 per cent ad valorem; on cotton textiles, about 651

[30] *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission*, op. cit., p. 1.

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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CLASSIFICATION

Seed cotton is bought on three grades: good, medium, and low. On taking delivery the ginner inspects the seed cotton for grade and staple and directs it to storage houses adjoining the gins where an attempt is made to sort into grades and to mix the lots thoroughly before ginning.

Lint cotton normally is sold on a basis of four grades: No. 1, corresponding roughly to good middling; No. 2, strict middling; No. 3, middling; and No. 4, low middling. In normal seasons, three-fourths of the crop grades middling and above. Export sales usually are made on the basis of sealed samples or types, and some exporters will have as many as eight different types.

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Table 25

SYRIA: Cotton Exports by Principal Destinations
September 1, 1951, through May 15, 1952

Country of Destination	Exports	Per Cent of Total
	Bales	Per Cent
France	66,900	48.1
United Kingdom	52,260	37.6
Italy	9,005	6.5
Spain	4,400	3.2
Poland	2,625	1.9
Germany	2,320	1.6
Belgium	658	.5
Sweden	610	.4
Netherlands	311	.2
Others	35	
Total	139,184	100.0

Source: Trade Reports.

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PRICES

During the period of world scarcity in 1950-51, prices of Syrian cotton on the local market advanced steadily to a high of slightly over 70 cents per pound. Export quotations were even higher. Prices declined during the 1951-52 season from approximately 50 cents a pound to 33 cents in the spring. Subsequently, the price firmed somewhat and during the summer cotton was selling in Europe for approximately the price of United States cotton on a dollar exchange basis. Syrian cottons, however, have been sold for soft currencies, and the discount must be taken into consideration.

Prices between grade 1 and grade 4 vary about 12 per cent.

Various producers expressed the view that a world price of about 30 cents a pound would be attractive to Syrian farmers and probably would stimulate further expansion. A world price much below this level, on the other hand, likely would discourage production.

A series of studies made by a large foreign firm interested in investing capital in cotton production and processing in Syria found that cost of production was below 20 cents per pound when normal yields were obtained but was much higher in poor years, such as 1951-52.

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

439 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

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Other measures for the protection and encouragement of industry were taken in September 1952, when new enterprises were exempted from customs duties on machinery and building materials; from property taxes on factory, offices and workers' houses for six years; from income tax on 10 per cent of reinvested profits; and from "tamattu" tax for six years. More direct assistance was provided through loans. In 1949, the Government advanced £S 16.9 million, for a period of three years, to nine industrial companies. In 1952, the loans were extended for another five years, and at the end of 1953 all but £S 220,000 were still outstanding. 1/ Another loan of £S 10 million was advanced to an electricity company. 433 656

As a counterpart to the assistance given by it, the Government has increasingly sought to regulate industrial activity. In 1952, the establishment of new factories, or expansion of existing ones, was made conditional on authorization from the Ministry of Economics, which was to be given only if the project were judged both viable and useful to the country's economy. All existing enterprises were also required to register with the Ministry. In 1953, minimum standards were set in the mechanical weaving, underwear, tile, confectionery, tanning, shoe, hosiery and match industries. The Government also intervened in the cotton spinning industry in 1951 and in the vegetable oil and cement industries in 1953 in order to prevent disproportionate rises in prices.

These various measures have been responsible for the survival of some of the newly established industries. Another important factor has been the rise in consumer purchasing power due to the increase in agricultural income. 2 It is unlikely that Syrian industry will be able to dispense with government assistance in the near future, and its further growth will continue to depend on agricultural development.

Foreign trade and balance of payments

The outstanding event in the field of foreign trade during the post-war period was the dissolution of the customs union between Lebanon and Syria. Termination of the French Mandate had not loosened the economic ties binding Lebanon and Syria. The customs union between them continued in force. Notes issued by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban circulated freely, at par, in both 439 457

1/ Etude sur la Syrie économique, 1953.

2 The poor grain crops and low cotton prices of 1951 had very unfavourable effects on industry.

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439 457 countries, and the railways and other monopolies in the two countries operated under the supervision of a joint board. In the post-war period, however, strains began to be felt, especially in regard to the allocation of customs revenues between the two countries. Conclusion of a financial agreement between Lebanon and France in 1948, and failure of Syria to conclude one until the following year, put the Lebanese pound at a premium over the Syrian pound. More important was the incompatibility between the desire of the Syrian Government to protect its agriculture and its developing industries and that of the Lebanese Government to reduce restrictions on trade and movement of capital and to lower the cost of living, and the consequent divergence in the fiscal policies of the two.

The breakup of the customs union, on 14 March 1950, was followed by considerable dislocation of trade. After prolonged negotiation, a temporary commercial agreement was signed in November 1950, removing prohibitions on the importation from either country of agricultural and domestic industrial goods, that is, goods containing local raw materials to the extent of 50 per cent of their value. Such goods were, however, subject to the usual custom duties and, like other goods imported into Syria, required licences. In the following years, several temporary agreements were concluded between the two countries, of which the most important was that of February 1952. This agreement contained lists of the products of each country which were to be admitted to the other free of duty or at reduced rates. Minimum duties were agreed upon for certain goods imported from other countries. The agreement, however, left certain loopholes, as a result of which Syria prohibited the export of certain agricultural goods to Lebanon, and the import of certain manufactured goods from it. Consequently, another agreement was concluded in March 1953, in which some of the loopholes were closed and transit facilities were mutually conceded.

These agreements achieved one of the main objects of Syrian policy, the protection of industry and of certain branches of agriculture. A further step in the same direction was the refusal, in August 1951, to renew the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This left Syria free to conclude bilateral agreements with certain Arab States, namely Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and with other States such as Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Japan and Yugoslavia; these agreements provide for most favoured nation treatment and, in certain cases, for tariff concessions. In May 1954, the Inter-Arab Trade and Transit Agreement and the Payments Agreement were ratified by Syria.

439 457 504 Another objective of the Syrian Government has been diversion of trade from the port of Beirut to Latakia and the replacing of Lebanese middlemen by Syrian. In 1950, the Government prohibited the import of certain goods, such as textiles, through Lebanon. In 1952, foreign firms operating in Syria were required to have Syrian managers, and companies established were required to have capital, more than half of which came from Syrian sources. Free zones were set up in Latakia and Damascus, and re-exporting was authorized. In 1952, a decree prohibited the exporting of major agricultural products, such as cotton, cotton-seed, wheat, barley, pulses and wool, except through Latakia; most products grown in the southern part of Syria 1/ were, however, exempted from this provision. Owing to

1/ The provinces of Hama, Homs, Damascus, Hauran and Jebel Druze.

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the inadequate condition of the port of Latakia and the unpreparedness of Syrian merchants, these restrictions caused a certain amount of hardship, the cost of imported merchandise was raised, 1/ and much capital was locked up in merchandise. However, improvement of the harbour (see below) and the expansion in Syria's foreign trade greatly increased the volume of merchandise passing through Latakia; imports rose from 19,000 tons in 1948 to 168,000 in 1953 and 207,000 in 1954, and exports from 6,000 tons to 336,000 and 630,000. In July 1954, exports through other routes were authorized, to relieve pressure on Latakia. The greater proportion of imports, and nearly half of all exports, still pass across the Lebanese frontier.

439 457 504

Table 52 shows the changes that have taken place in Syria's foreign trade. During the war years, the imports of the Lebano-Syrian Union declined greatly, while exports contracted still more sharply. 2/ After the war, imports recovered rapidly but exports lagged behind. The large import surplus, which was mainly accounted for by Lebanon but to which Syria also contributed, was covered by liquidating the greater part of the foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the war and by various invisible receipts. The breakup of the customs union coincided with expansion of cotton production in Syria and with an increase in the output of cereals. Consequently, Syria's foreign trade has, in recent years, shown a surplus. This, however, is due to the fact that imports are valued at the official rate of exchange, although they are actually paid for with currency purchased at the free rate. Table 53 shows the main items in Syria's balance of payments, valued at the respective free rates.

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A breakdown of exports in 1953 shows raw cotton to be by far the most important item, 3/ followed by wheat and barley; 4/ imports covered a wide range of products. 5/

1/ In 1951 it was estimated that the cost of importing goods through Latakia was 15 to 20 per cent higher than through Beirut.

2/ A quantum index of imports into Lebanon and Syria (1938 = 100) shows a decline to 27 in 1941, and a recovery to 53 in 1945, 107 in 1946, 122 in 1947, 178 in 1948 and 205 in 1949. The index of exports fell to 18 in 1941 and recovered to 30 in 1945, 70 in 1946, 84 in 1947, 80 in 1948 and 154 in 1949 (Musa J. Balabi, Terms of Trade for Syria and Lebanon, unpublished thesis, American University, Beirut, 1952).

3/ France has been the leading importer of Syrian cotton since large-scale production began, followed by the United Kingdom. In 1953, France took 20,000 tons, out of a total of 58,000, the United Kingdom 14,000, the Federal Republic of Germany 9,000, Italy 6,000 and Lebanon 2,000 (Bureau des documentations syriennes et arabes, Etude Mensuelle sur l'économie et le marché syriens). In 1952, exports totalled 38,000 tons, worth £S 124.5 million.

4/ In 1953, exports of wheat aggregated 180,000 tons, barley 153,000, millet 43,000 and flour 22,000. In 1952, the figures were 100,000 tons, 140,000 tons, 14,000 tons and 9,000 tons respectively.

5/ Ministry of National Economy, Summary of Foreign Trade, Fourth Quarter and Year 1953 (Damascus, 1954).

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Table 52. Syria: Quantity and Value of Imports and Exports, 1938, 1941, 1943 and 1945 to 1954 a/

Year	Imports		Exports and re-exports		Balance of trade
	Quantity (thousands of tons)	Value (millions of Syrian pounds)	Quantity (thousands of tons)	Value (millions of Syrian pounds)	(millions of Syrian pounds)
1938....	561	70.8	382	39.3	-31.5
1941....	274	40.5	29	11.2	-29.4
1943....	428	110.1	53	32.0	-78.1
1945....	515	130.6	146	43.8	-86.8
1946....	370	266.6	107	85.6	-181.0
1947....	414	362.8	150	83.6	-279.2
1948....	757	483.5	125	78.5	-405.0
1949....	957	516.2	308	111.1	-405.1
1950 b/.	259	116.9	112	37.7	-79.2
1950 c/.	458	197.8	435	207.9	10.1
1951....	727	394.0	212	277.1	-26.8
1952....	805	313.3	491	319.6	6.3
1953....	772	307.1	718	375.8	68.7
1954 d/.	424	169.6	345	169.2	-0.4

Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria; United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.

a/ Lebanon and Syria from 1938 to 13 March 1950; Syria only from 13 March 1950 to 1954.

b/ 1 January to 13 March.

c/ 13 March to 31 December.

d/ Six months.

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Table 53. Syria: Principal Items in Balance of Payments, 1951 to 1953

(Millions of Syrian pounds)

Item	1951	1952	1953[a]
Current accounts:			
Credit:			
Proceeds of exports[b]	292	337	408
Receipts from oil companies	54	50	49
Expenditure of United Nations Relief and Works Agency	11	11	10
Migrants' remittances	10	10	10
Other services	10	11	3
Total	377	419	480
Debit:			
Payments for imports[c]	418	444	484
Balance of current transactions	-41	-25	-4
Recorded capital items:[d]			
Private capital movements	15	24	20
Saudi Arabian loan	15	-	-
Debt to Lebanon	-	-37	-
Repurchase obligation towards the International Monetary Fund	-	-2	-4
Gold and official foreign exchange	-9	9	-52
Bank reserves	14	5	46
Balance of recorded capital items	35	-1	10
Unrecorded items:			
Balance of unrecorded items, errors and omissions	6	26	-6

Source: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Beirut).

a/ Preliminary.

b/ Valued f.o.b., at free rate of exchange.

c/ Valued c.i.f., at free rate of exchange.

d/ Minus sign indicates outflow of capital.

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Main export items:	Millions of Syrian pounds	Main import items:	Millions of Syrian pounds
Raw cotton	135.0	Petroleum products	39.5
Wheat	46.0	Machinery and parts	30.2
Barley	24.3	Gold ingots and bars	20.1
Livestock	23.0	Iron and steel products	18.0
Raw wool	21.5	Motor vehicles	17.8
Silk yarns and fabrics	17.3	Rayon thread	15.1
Other textile products	12.6	Other textile products	27.0

Available information on the terms of trade of Lebanon and Syria shows an improvement during the war years, a rapid deterioration from 1944 to 1949, a sharp improvement up to 1951 and a deterioration to 1953. By 1944, the export price index stood at 493 whereas the import price index had risen to 331 (1938 = 100), giving an export-import price ratio of 149. The export price index showed a further small rise to 498 in 1945, but thereafter fell rapidly to 246 in 1949, whereas import prices continued to rise to a peak of 533 in 1947 and thereafter fell to 466 in 1949. The export-import price ratio therefore declined to 118 in 1945, 92 in 1946, 64 in 1947 and 1948 and 53 in 1949. 1/ No subsequent indices are available, but the following table would seem to indicate a marked improvement in Syria's terms of trade in 1950 and 1951, a deterioration in 1952 and 1953, and a slight improvement in 1954. 2/

	Cotton	Wheat
	(Export price per ton, in Syrian pounds)	
1945	2,000	211
1950 (last three quarters)	3,750	210
1951	4,854	317
1952	3,288	297
1953	2,499	255
1954 (first half)	2,746	264

The following table shows Syria's trade with its principal clients and suppliers in 1954, each item as a percentage of the total:

1/ Musa J. Halabi, op. cit.

2/ Unit values computed from foreign trade returns.

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Exports to:		Imports from:	
Lebanon	24	United States	12
France	16	Lebanon	11
United Kingdom	13	United Kingdom	11
Italy	9	France	11
Federal Republic of Germany	7	Federal Republic of Germany	10
United States	6	Italy	7

As table 53 shows, most of Syria's import surplus has been covered by various invisible items. The most important of these were receipts from the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline in the form of direct payments for security charges, transit fees and other items; negotiations are under way to increase these payments. More significant in recent years have been other expenditures by oil companies building pipelines and other transport facilities in Syria, namely the Kirkuk-Tripoli pipeline and the Trans-Arabian pipeline, both of which were completed in 1949, and the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline and oil port, completed in 1952. Since then, local expenditures by oil companies have tended to diminish. Tourist expenditures in Syria in 1953 have been estimated at $6 million. 1/

There has been little change in Syria's capital accounts. In 1948 and 1949, an appreciable outflow to Lebanon seems to have taken place, but this was succeeded by some repatriation of capital and by an inflow of Lebanese private capital and to a smaller extent other foreign private capital, which was invested in the production, processing and marketing of cotton. A small amount of foreign capital was also invested in branches of banks and other foreign firms operating in Syria. On 29 January 1950, the Saudi Arabian Government granted to the Syrian Government a $6 million interest-free loan, to be used mainly for improvement of the port of Latakia; it also transferred to Syria the dredging equipment which had been used in the Saudi port of Jidda. The loan was to be repaid, in four equal instalments, between 1955 and 1958; repayment was to be made in Syrian products, such as grains, textiles and other specified articles. Most of the loan was drawn upon in 1951.

In 1952 and 1953 Syria repurchased from the International Monetary Fund Syrian currency of a value of $1,454,000 and repaid to Lebanon its debt of £S 44.6 million. 2/

1/ Le Commerce du Levant, 20 March 1954 (Beirut).

2/ Bulletin issued by the Money and Credit Board, 5 January 1954, reproduced in La Syrie économique, 1953.

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436 In May 1949 the Government decreed that the unit of currency would henceforth be the Syrian pound, equivalent to 405.512 milligrammes of fine gold, and began depositing gold and foreign exchange as note issue cover.

652 In July 1949 agreement was reached with Lebanon regarding Syria's debt
436 on account of the Lebanese bank-notes, previously circulating in Syria and now withdrawn by the Syrian Government. The amount was fixed at LL 44 million and it was agreed that settlement would be made by payment of 4,078 million francs to Lebanon; most of this was paid in 1952.

On 28 March 1953 a legislative decree was promulgated, regulating the monetary system of Syria. A Money and Credit Board was established to co-ordinate and direct the activity of monetary and credit institutions. A Central Bank is also to be established; it will be administered by the Money and Credit Board, which is also charged with supervising and orienting the private banks 1/.

The law is being applied in stages. The Money and Credit Board was established in May 1953, and negotiations were started with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which at present issues the currency and enjoys several of the prerogatives of a central bank, regarding eventual transfer to the proposed Central Bank of the government deposits held by it and the assets and liabilities of its Issue Department. The concession of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban lapses in 1964, but the Government has declared that it will not necessarily wait until then to establish the Central Bank. In the meantime, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban continues to perform its previous functions.

The legislative decree provided that the cover of the note issue may consist of gold, foreign exchange, government bills and bonds, and advances made by the Central Bank; the percentage of gold and foreign exchange is not to fall below 30 per cent. On 31 December 1953, the gold and foreign exchange cover of the note issue amounted to £S 97.9 million at the official exchange rate - £S 156.7 million at free market rates; the latter figure represented 56.6 per cent of the value of the note issue; 79 per cent of the gold and foreign exchange cover consisted of gold, United States dollars or Swiss francs 2/.

Foreign exchange

457 Concurrently with these developments in the monetary system, steps were
439 taken to relax restrictions on foreign exchange, to stabilize exchange rates, and to organize the exchange market. The exchange control system established in

1/ Ministry of Finance, Statut organique de la monnaie et crédits de la banque centrale de Syrie (Damascus, March 1953).

2/ Bulletin issued by the Money and Credit Board, 5 January 1954. The total amount of reserves of gold and of currencies convertible into gold rose from £S 3.0 million at the end of 1948 to £S 8.2 million in 1949, £S 17.9 million in 1950, £S 29.1 million in 1951, £S 49.2 million in 1952, and £S 77.2 million at the end of 1953 François Crouco and Assad Barakat, La reforme du marché des changes en Syrie, (Damascus, 1954).

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December 1939 continued virtually unmodified until August 1948 1/. Exporters were required to hand over the proceeds of exports to the Exchange Control, while imports required a licence specifying whether they were to be paid for in foreign exchange supplied by the Exchange Control or out of the importer's own balances of foreign exchange, held abroad, or in Syrian pounds. Transfers of capital abroad were prohibited.

The enforcement of this system proved difficult, and in August 1948 a free market was legalized. Exporters were required to surrender to the Exchange Control only part of the proceeds of exports 2/. Importers were still required to obtain licences but had to pay for imports in exchange obtained from the free market, except where the Government allocated the necessary foreign exchange, for example for fuel 3/.

In September 1949 exporters were authorized to dispose of the whole proceeds of their exports. Imports were to be effected through the free market, or out of the importer's own exchange holdings. The official rate (£S 2.20 to the dollar, against a free rate of about £S 3.00 to £S 3.80) was applied only to certain companies operating under contract (principally the oil companies), which were required to buy 80 per cent of their needs of Syrian currency at that rate 4/. An Exchange Stabilization Fund was established, in conjunction with Lebanon, to moderate exchange fluctuations 5/.

In May 1950 an "exportation exchange market" was created. Whereas the proceeds of certain exports could be disposed of freely, proceeds of the most important exports to specified countries had to be repatriated and recorded with a bank as "exportation exchange": the latter could be freely disposed of within the country but could be transferred abroad only in payment for licensed imports. Imports continued to be subjected to a licence, and could be paid for either in

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1/ In February 1948 transactions with the French franc area were made subject to exchange control.

2/ First fixed at 20 per cent, and reduced to 10 per cent in December 1948.

3/ Ministry of Finance, Exchange Office, Al taqrir al sanawi al awal, 1952 (Damascus, June 1953)

4/ International Monetary Fund, First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., 1 March 1950). In 1951 this proportion was reduced to 10 per cent.

5/ International Monetary Fund, International Financial News Survey (Washington, D C , 27 October [illegible]9).

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exchange obtained from the free market or in "exportation exchange", the rate of the latter being slightly lower. 1/

In April 1952 important changes were introduced. 2/ All restrictions were removed on transfer of capital to and from Syria, which were to take place on the free market. Exports of major products to most countries had to be paid for in prescribed currencies - in practice that of the importing country or a stronger currency - and repatriated. These proceeds could be retained by the exporter, but he was allowed to sell them only to an authorized bank, which recorded them as "exportation exchange". On the other hand, proceeds from invisibles could be freely disposed of on the free market. Imports continued to require licences and had to be paid for in exchange obtained on the free market.

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An Exchange Office, which buys and sells through authorized banks, was established as the final authority on exchange matters. The Office hands over to the note-issuing authorities its holdings of gold or foreign exchange, which are deposited as note issue cover, and these authorities supply it with Syrian currency with which to purchase gold or foreign exchange. This provides a direct link between the foreign exchange operations and the note issue. The principal aims of the Office, in addition to that of establishing a foreign exchange market which would meet Syria's needs, have been to eliminate multiple exchange rates and to reduce fluctuations in exchange rates. 3/ The elimination of multiple rates was achieved by abolishing all transactions at the official rate, except for purchases of Syrian currency by oil companies and certain governmental disbursements; 4/ by quoting a single rate for "free" and "exportation" exchange, supporting this parity by operations on both markets; and, finally, in March 1953, by requiring banks to charge a single rate. 5/

The fluctuation of exchange rates, which had previously shown large seasonal swings, 6/ was greatly reduced: whereas the average exchange rate with the United States dollar fluctuated between £S 3.52 and £S 4.00 in 1950, between

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1/ International Monetary Fund, Second Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., April 1951). Banks were allowed arbitrage between the free and exportation exchange markets.

2/ Crocco and Barakat, op. cit., and International Monetary Fund, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., 1954).

3/ Exchange Office, Al tagrir al sanawi al awal, 1952.

4/ These included foreign expenditure by diplomatic missions, students and some others; all such transactions were shifted to the free market rate in July 1953.

5/ International Monetary Fund, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, Page 290.

6/ The Syrian pound reaches its peak between June and September, when most crops are exported, and is at its lowest between December and March, when imports exceed exports.

IV. Telephone, Telegraph and Air Communication

206 In 1950 telephone communication became possible with
509 Jazirah for the first time on a commercial basis. Telegraph communication has long been established and an air service connectin Qamishli with Aleppo and Damascus started in 1946, then interrupted by the Palestinian War, has been resumed twice weekly. Fares from Qamishli to Aleppo and Damascus are LS 25 and 50, respectively.

V. Railway Line Projects

185 Railway lines wholly inside Syria from Jazirah to the interior cities have been suggested by the Gibb report and by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. They suggested a line from Tal Koshak to Hassakeh and from there to Rakka and Aleppo. Such a line would by-pass Qamishli which is the more important agricultural and commercial center, and would go in a district only newly developed, sparsely populated and not of the fertility of the Qamishli area. It seems that a line starting from Qamishli itself would be shorter and would service a more fertile and populated district. From Hassakeh the line could follow the Khabur as long as possible before veering to Deir Ezzor. This would be longer than the proposed line from Hassakeh to Rakka directly, but it would have the advantage of servicing the Khabur Valley and collecting its crops, whereas, the line Hassakeh-Rakka is completely desert. From Rakka there is only one route to Aleppo.

It is difficult to choose between a policy of road construction and railway lines without detailed study of the economics of both, but, whatever the result of the study, Jazirah needs cheap and easy means of communication.

COMMERCE OF JAZIRAH

438 It stands to reason that the commerce of Jazirah is mainly in its
441 staple prodcuts and in the goods required for the development of its essential industry which is agriculture.

The main crop being wheat, it forms the largest item both in bulk and in value. But the Jazirah merchant plays a secondary role in the handling of this crop. He is sometimes a partner, but more

often an agent of the Aleppo merchant who furnishes the capital 438
and has the necessary warehouses in Aleppo and the commercial 441
knowledge and connections in the Syrian market and abroad to dispose of the crop at the best terms.

I. The Problem of Storage and Warehouses

The dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo merchants is such that 438
until the present time there is not a single warehouse or silo to store 241
wheat for a few months in all Jazirah belonging to an individual merchant or big farmer. During harvest season, the wheat is stacked in the open near the railway stations and left without cover until it is shipped to Aleppo. The hangers of the stations can only hold a small part of the crop. The Mira built a few depots but it is not known whether they will be put at the disposal of merchants.

The special conditions of cultivation in Jazirah connected with the problem of credit and land ownership make the transport of wheat from the farms to the stations during harvest season a hectic affair. This is caused by two reasons: in the first place, the farmer is always in need of money and has to ship his crop quickly to Aleppo to sell it, and, secondly, even if the big farmer is not in need of money, he does not feel it is safe to keep his crop in the villages. In most cases, he is only a tenant and it does not pay for him to construct a depot on land, he does not own. Even if he owned the land, he would hesitate to keep his crop away from the market until the winter months when he might need money but might find himself unable to transport his crop because of bad roads.

The logical solution would be to construct warehouses in the towns or near the stations, but, here again, the lack of capital prevents the accomplishment of this job.

The Kurd is the only farmer who keeps a part of his crop on the 241
land. As a good and thrifty peasant, he stores his seeds, the pro- 251
visions for his family and usually an amount of wheat equal to the seeds he planted. If anything remains, he sells to buy clothes and foodstuffs. The Kurd keeps the extra wheat he has in holes dug in the ground called "jifr". The hole is usually two meters in diameter and 2-3 meters deep. It is lined with "tibn" to keep the moisture away and the wheat remains in a good condition in it for several months. The peasant has a number of these jifrs depending on the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

231 241 Mixed farming is rare. Except in limited areas adjoining the few large cities, no fodder is grown for livestock. None of the considerable volume of oil cake and meal and beet pulp produced in Syria is used for animal feed. On farms animals feed primarily on grain stubble and cereal straw. Most of the livestock is entrusted to Bedouins who take their flocks of sheep and goats into the Syrian desert or steppe for grazing after the rainy season and return them to the cultivated areas after the sparse vegetation of the desert again dries up. Insufficient water, feed and lack of shelter on these migratory routes often combine to inflict a rather high mortality rate on livestock. Inadequate nutrition also increases the susceptibility of livestock to parasites and diseases.

These conditions indicate a need to introduce fodder into the crop rotation scheme, to improve pastures and to provide shelter and wells corresponding to the carrying capacity of the desert. While better nutrition is most essential, an effective campaign against disease and improvement in livestock breeds would also make an important contribution to raising the standards of animal husbandry.

442 241 8. *The organization and methods of marketing are in many respects defective.*

High costs of transport and the weak bargaining position of the farmer depress farm prices; and the cost of distribution combined with inadequate grading and cleaning is beginning to threaten Syria's competitive position on the world cereals market. Lack of credit and high storage prices generally compel farmers to throw their products on the market immediately after harvest. The merchant who has access to credit and often finances the farmer can largely dictate prices to the cultivator who has no reserves.

A number of measures to cope with this problem are indicated. Proper cleaning and storage facilities for grain are needed to enable farmers to get better prices and assist Syria in maintaining its position in a declining cereals market. New and improved roads would help to reduce marketing costs, and the availability of more and cheaper credit would make the farmer less dependent on the merchant.

680 All these problems and indicated measures will now be discussed more fully under the following headings: irrigation and reclamation; land policies and land settlement; improvement in agricultural production; animal husbandry; agricultural credit, cooperatives, marketing and education.

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Marketing

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The mission now comes to a consideration of the last but by no means the least important agricultural problem, marketing. This subject has many aspects, including transport, storage and grading, quality control and price stabilization. Improved marketing practices can yield the producer better prices and the consumers a higher quality product.

Elsewhere the mission discusses the vital factor of transport, and it has already commented on the role cooperatives could play in the local marketing of agricultural products. Here the mission wishes in the first instance to focus on the great importance of better facilities for the storage, cleaning and fumigating of grain. The lack of these facilities and the consequences for Syria have already been emphasized. The mission found a widespread recognition of their need in Syria, except perhaps among the merchants, who naturally feel that public grain storage and the extension of credit on the basis of warehouse receipts will weaken their control of the market. The mission considers it imperative, however, that Syria proceed with a grain storage program in order to strengthen the farmers and to maintain Syria's position in an increasingly competitive world grain market.

It is estimated that in the next decade some 760,000 tons of grain, principally wheat and barley, will enter commercial channels annually, and that this volume will be distributed among the producing regions approximately as follows: Jezireh, 400,000 tons; Euphrates, 95,000; Aleppo, 95,000; Hauran, 60,000; Homs-Hama, 50,000.

The mission recommends that total storage capacity of about 230,000 tons be established by 1960 at an estimated cost of £S 21 million. In the grain port of Latakia a transit silo with a capacity of 20,000-40,000 tons should be built. In Aleppo new facilities with a capacity of 60,000 tons are needed to supplement existing warehouse space, serve the surrounding grain-producing areas and operate as a reservoir for the rapid replenishment of the Latakia silo. For the Jezireh the mission suggests storage capacity of about 150,000 tons. The Latakia and Aleppo facilities should be mechanized and furnished with cleaning and fumigating equipment. In the Jezireh, however, the mission suggests that provisionally only about a fifth be mechanized. The storage there would consist simply of covered sheds which could be economically built.

The Latakia and Aleppo storage will enable Syria to export clean grain,

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free of infestation, which will better be able to withstand competition on the world market and fetch higher prices. The Jezireh storage will make it unnecessary for farmers to dump their grain on the market immediately after the harvest, enable them to obtain credit on easier terms, and lower the cost of transport. All the facilities together will significantly reduce the substantial losses resulting at present from exposure to weather, infestation and rodents. The mission's estimate of the direct advantages resulting from the reduction of losses and the improvement in prices leads it to conclude that farmers and merchants would have ample incentive to utilize the storage facilities, even after taking into account the storage charges they would have to pay on the basis of operating costs and amortization.

We believe that the storage facilities, even when they have to be built by the government, should be operated by qualified private management under a long-term lease which would specify the maximum permissible storage charges. Farmers and merchants are unlikely to use facilities operated by the government itself.

Measures to improve the marketing of certain other products should also be taken. Large quantities of raw milk are now marketed in major cities without adequate quality control or veterinary inspection of dairy cattle. The UNICEF, concerned over milk supply for children, has apparently offered to provide equipment and assistance for the installation of a pasteurization plant in Damascus, and the mission urges that this project be carried out as promptly as possible. A similiar plant may be feasible for Aleppo. It is important that some control be established also over the source of supply. Periodic tuberculin and blood agglutination tests for the diagnosis of tuberculosis and brucellosis in dairy animals might, for example, be initiated. In Aleppo, where many dairy cows are kept in the city under unsanitary conditions which produce a high incidence of tuberculosis, the removal of dairy cattle to locations outside the city is strongly recommended.

Improvements in public abattoirs would also bring about better prices for producers and provide a better quality meat for the consumer. Existing abattoirs are for the most part old, unhygienic and possess no means for salvaging many of the valuable by-products of slaughtering which could be used for the manufacture of fertilizers, chemicals and drugs. While complete renovation is not feasible in the immediate future, the mission suggests that a start be made by erecting a modern abattoir in Damascus at an estimated cost of £S 600,000.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

248
442

Cotton bought in small lots from many farmers in various sections is thoroughly mixed in seed cotton storage bins in Aleppo, Syria, before ginning to get uniformity in the bale.

more neps, and often damage the fibers. Also, farmers have not been able to secure any higher price for their saw ginned cotton with less trash, but several dealers in Aleppo reported sales of saw ginned cotton at a premium, indicating that the market situation may be changing. 248 407

Whereas formerly ginners took the seed to cover the cost of ginning, with the increased value of the seed, ginners now are required to operate on a service basis for a fixed charge.

MARKETING

442 248

The concentration of ginning equipment in a few large towns creates a difficult and expensive transportation problem for the farmers in remote areas. Because of the distance to the gins, many farmers are forced to sell cotton in the seed to merchants or middlemen in the local communities. Merchants gin the cotton for their own account and then dispose of the lint and the seed. Most of the gins are owned by merchants, but by no means do all merchants own gins.

Aleppo is the cotton merchandising center, with 47 exporters operating in this market in 1951. About half a dozen merchants, of whom two or three do a small export business, operate in Damascus. More than half of all the exports are sold through the three leading firms; the others do a small volume of business largely as a sideline. 1366

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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

248 442

CLASSIFICATION

Seed cotton is bought on three grades: good, medium, and low. On taking delivery the ginner inspects the seed cotton for grade and staple and directs it to storage houses adjoining the gins where an attempt is made to sort into grades and to mix the lots thoroughly before ginning.

Lint cotton normally is sold on a basis of four grades: No. 1, corresponding roughly to good middling; No. 2, strict middling; No. 3, middling; and No. 4, low middling. In normal seasons, three-fourths of the crop grades middling and above. Export sales usually are made on the basis of sealed samples or types, and some exporters will have as many as eight different types.

439

Table 25

SYRIA: Cotton Exports by Principal Destinations
September 1, 1951, through May 15, 1952

Country of Destination	Exports	Per Cent of Total
	Bales	Per Cent
France	66,590	48.1
United Kingdom	42,260	37.6
Italy	9,005	6.5
Spain	4,460	3.2
Poland	2,625	1.9
Germany	2,320	1.6
Belgium	656	.5
Sweden	610	.4
Netherlands	311	.2
Others	35	
Total	139,194	100.0

SOURCE: Trade Reports.

435

PRICES

During the period of world scarcity in 1950-51, prices of Syrian cotton on the local market advanced steadily to a high of slightly over 70 cents per pound. Export quotations were even higher. Prices declined during the 1951-52 season from approximately 50 cents a pound to 33 cents in the spring. Subsequently, the price firmed somewhat and during the summer cotton was selling in Europe for approximately the price of United States cotton on a dollar exchange basis. Syrian cottons, however, have been sold for soft currencies, and the discount must be taken into consideration.

Prices between grade 1 and grade 4 vary about 12 per cent.

Various producers expressed the view that a world price of about 30 cents a pound would be attractive to Syrian farmers and probably would stimulate further expansion. A world price much below this level, on the other hand, likely would discourage production.

A series of studies made by a large foreign firm interested in investing capital in cotton production and processing in Syria found that cost of production was below 20 cents per pound when normal yields were obtained but was much higher in poor years, such as 1951-52.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

production, conserve water, concentrate cotton so as to facilitate insect control, and protect the cotton industry against the high costs and low prices that might result from over-extension of production. Farmers are required also to receive licenses to plant cotton from the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cotton Board. 656 647 248

The only marketing regulations issued to date require that all bales show the name of the ginner, the identity, and especially the moisture content of the cotton, which cannot be more than 9 per cent. If false claims are made, the government can take 30 per cent of the cotton as a penalty. [442]

It is obvious that the enforcement of so many scientific regulations and controls over a large area is going to be difficult without a large force of trained technicians and police.

The Director General appreciates that without adequate trained personnel it is not possible to make the regulations completely effective overnight, but he hopes, through education, to obtain the compliance of the producers.

Ambitious research and education programs, another responsibility of the board, are still in the planning stage. [654]

PROSPECTS

It appears unlikely to expect any significant expansion in production in Syria until yields can be stabilized. A start has been made, but a more intensive research and education program is required on cultural practices (particularly irrigation practices), mechanization, and especially insect control, before much improvement can be expected. Such efforts naturally take considerable time, even when funds and technical assistance are available. Both money and know-how are limited in Syria. 248

312



3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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TABLE 3

FOREIGN CURRENCY

(Selling rates in £L/£S)

Official*		Free Market Rates					
		1949	1950	1951	1952		
		Average	Average	Average	High	Low	Average
1,000 French francs 6·26	£L	8·04	9·44	9·49	9·63	8·74	9·13
	£S	8·73	10·19	9·49	9·70	9·09	9·16
US$ 2·21	£L	3·26	3·47	3·73	3·83	3·54	3·66
	£S	3·48	3·72	3·64	3·86	3·58	3·65
Sterling £ 6·19	£L	9·73	9·06	9·41	9·69	9·14	9·37
	£S	10·28	9·66	9·13	10·12	9·04	9·23

* Since 18 November 1948 for US$, others since 19 September 1949.

(SOURCES: Banque de Syrie et du Liban, *Commerce du Liban*; IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, 1953; Syrian Embassy.)

TABLE 4

VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1952

(a) By country

SL 439

	Lebanon* (£L000)		Syria (£S000)	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
USA	54,827	6,907	45,470	15,995
UK	38,333	4,279	39,245	77,161
France	33,837	3,666	29,573	49,166
Holland	15,226	117	7,519	..
Italy	12,497	3,361	20,472	16,605
Germany, W.	10,154	433	19,098	9,872
Switzerland	9,354	89	5,714	..
Belgium	7,599	567	13,777	3,799
Czechoslovakia	4,643	1,773	4,857	..
India	..	..	5,507	..
Lebanon	—	—	35,724	70,279
Syria	63,842	16,583	—	—
Iraq	17,741	2,732	8,526	17,176
Turkey	4,038	596	18,289	..
Saudi Arabia	4,270	7,284	7,912	10,332
Jordan	2,890	3,181	5,988	16,846
Egypt	2,310	7,082	1,371	4,510
TOTAL:	347,049	77,430	313,340	319,573

.. = not available. — = nil.

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II BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING

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In common with many other underdeveloped countries, Syria's most urgently needed fiscal reform is improvement of budgeting and government accounting. There is no unified and comprehensive budget or financial plan. Complete and accurate information on receipts, expenditures and cash balances is not available. In many instances cumbersome procedures and excessive centralization appear to cause unnecessary delays and inefficiency.

Types of Budgets and Financial Relations

There are, in principle, three types of budget: (a) the ordinary government budget; (b) the annexed budgets; and (c) the budgets of the independent entities. In addition, an important group of operations consists of extrabudgetary advances from available funds of the Treasury and of advances by the Issue Department of the BSL with government guarantee. Still another arrangement was the extraordinary defense budget of 1949, which provided for certain receipts and expenditures in 1949 and later years.

These financial operations are not brought together in a comprehensive budget or set of accounts. The complexity of financial relations and lack of unified accounts are partial explanations of the incomplete knowledge of government finances to which reference was made in the previous section.

The ordinary budget includes the regular receipts and expenditures of the central government departments. No distinction is made between current and capital items. As submitted, this budget is always nominally in exact balance. Receipts, however, may include expected withdrawals from the reserve fund and expenditures may include expected additions to that fund. On at least one occasion in recent years anticipated proceeds of new borrowing from the Issue Department were included in budget receipts. In view of these practices the nominal balance of the ordinary budget is misleading.

The annexed budgets include those of the Syrian University; Arab Academy; Department of Antiquities; Syrian Broadcasting System; Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones; Tobacco Monopoly; and Customs Bureau.

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652 451 The general budget is supposed to include appropriations for these agencies or the amount contributed by them to the Treasury after deduction of their operating expenses. This practice, however, does not seem to have been rigidly followed. The PTT, for example, has secured large extrabudgetary advances from the Treasury and has apparently used its operating surplus to repay part of these advances. Neither the advances nor the repayments entered the regular budget. Customs receipts, less administrative expenses, are recorded in the regular budget, but the Customs Bureau does not turn over the money to the Treasury until requested to do so. At the end of 1953, reported bank balances of the bureau amounted to well over one year's collections. The semi-autonomous position of the customs administration, which exempts its operations from usual budgetary and civil service rules, is unusual. It apparently is a carryover from the period of customs union with Lebanon.

The financially independent agencies or entities include the Ghab project; Latakia port; Agricultural Bank; Cereals Office; Council on Money and Credit; Exchange Office; electricity corporations; Aleppo water supply; Northern Railway; Hedjaz Railway; and the municipalities. These entities retain any surplus they may realize and they charge any deficit against their capital accounts. Some of the independent agencies have received large sums in the form of advances from the Treasury or government-guaranteed advances from the Issue Department of the BSL. Neither type of advance is entered in the general budget. Government-guaranteed loans to and repayments from private industrial companies also occur without any entry being made in the general budget accounts.

Budget and Accounting Agencies and Procedures

The principal budget and accounting agencies are the Department of Budget and Financial Control, the Department of Financial Affairs, the Treasury Department—all three located in the Ministry of Finance—and the independent General Accounting (Comptroller's) Office.

The Department of Budget and Financial Control is responsible for the preparation and, to some extent, execution of the ordinary budget. Requests for appropriations for the financial year beginning January 1 are supposed to be submitted to the Budget Department by the ministries about September 1 of the preceding year. The budget is expected to be presented to Parliament during December and adopted by it before the end

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of that month. In recent years, however, the budget process has often fallen behind this schedule. The Budget Department has an accountant in each agency who is supposed to preaudit expenditures. The financial control section is responsible for examination of proposed legislation with financial implications and for supervision of government personnel practices.

The Department of Financial Affairs is responsible for supervision of loans not itemized in the budget, including Treasury advances to government entities or government-guaranteed loans to industrial companies.

The Treasury Department handles actual receipts and disbursements. Expenditures and receipts which occur within three months after the end of the financial year to which they are attributable are recorded in the accounts of that year, the books being held open for that purpose.

The General Accounting Office has broad authority with respect to preaudit and postaudit of expenditures and personnel actions. The Office must approve in advance all contracts or purchases in excess of £S 5,000 and all contracts for rental of buildings extending beyond the current year. The examination concerns the legality of the action rather than its advisability. The Office must also give advance approval to hiring of government personnel to assure that there is budgetary provision for the position and that the candidate meets the legal requirements. It also approves increases in salaries and pensions. It is responsible for monthly and annual postaudits of accounts and for the closing of the budget. The annual budget is formally closed by an act of Parliament.

The General Accounting Office asserts that its preaudit functions have been kept up-to-date and that its procedures do not cause delay in making expenditures in conformity with the budget. A long delay is involved, however, in postaudit and final closing of the budget. The 1947 budget is the most recent one which has been formally closed. Accounts for 1948, 1949 and 1950-51 have been examined by the General Accounting Office but have not been passed on by Parliament. The mission was informed that the backlog of postaudit work was being reduced but that the General Accounting Office did not expect to be current in its postauditing until 1955.

The reserve fund is merely a bookkeeping device. The same budget may provide for additions to the reserve fund (recorded as budget expenditures) and for withdrawals from the fund (recorded as budget receipts). Although an increase in the reserve fund usually indicates a surplus in the ordinary budget, one substantial addition in recent years merely

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652 451 reflected a paper profit from the exchange advantage realized in liquidation of a debt to Lebanon for blocked Syrian currency formerly circulating in Lebanon. The fund therefore does not consist entirely of an accumulation of past surpluses. Even if this were true, drawing on the fund to cover a current deficit or an extrabudgetary expenditure would not represent a non-inflationary means of financing. An accounting system which relies on the reserve fund as a balancing item deprives the Parliament and the public of an easily understandable measure of current operations—the budget deficit or surplus—and may be somewhat misleading.

Criticisms

The most serious defect of these arrangements is the lack of a comprehensive budget covering all government receipts and expenditures. The ordinary budget gives an incomplete and misleading impression of the fiscal position of the government because it does not cover certain extraordinary defense expenditures and receipts and transfers of funds between the Treasury and independent agencies. Although it is appropriate for the independent agencies, especially those which are expected to be largely self-supporting, to have independent budgets, sound financial planning requires that the general budget clearly reflect the Treasury's relations with these agencies. The practice of authorizing advances from the available funds of the Treasury and from the Issue Department with Treasury guarantee for a diversity of projects which are not subject to unified review is unwise. Moreover, clear records of the status of outstanding authorizations for advances are lacking.

Provisions for preaudit of expenditures by the Budget Department and the General Accounting Office, together with the involved rules which individual agencies are expected to apply, result in a cumbersome procedure which places great stress on legal niceties but little emphasis on wise and economical use of resources.

Delay in accounting, postauditing and closing the budget means that no clear information on recent trends in receipts and expenditures is available to guide finance officials and the Parliament in preparing and approving the budget for a new year. Part of the difficulty arises out of the practice of attributing certain transactions occurring in the period January-March to the previous year. For purpose of control it is of course essential to match each disbursement with a valid authorization to spend, and it

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must be expected that a large proportion of payments made during the first months of any year will be under authority granted in the previous year. On the other hand, the essential requirements for purposes of treasury management and economic analysis are data on current cash payments, receipts, and balances of the government; from this point of view an exact allocation of all transactions to particular budget years is of secondary importance. In drawing up a new budget, furthermore, information on the recent past is needed in order to check on the rate at which authorized expenditures are going forward. Figures on total cash receipts and expenditures for the government as a whole and for each ministry can be prepared within a few days after the end of any calendar period. Such figures would be a highly useful supplement to information now available.

Partly as a result of lack of current information on resources and claims on them, the Treasury and other government agencies appear to have built up grossly excessive cash balances. Complete records on these balances are not available from government accounts but banking statistics on public deposits reveal the large size of the balances. As of December 31, 1953, public deposits denominated in local currency were as follows:[7]

	(Million £S)
Treasury	62.0
Customs service	55.6
Public administrations	21.9
Public services	49.2
Miscellaneous	.2
Total	188.9

Treasury deposits plus deposits of the customs service, which are at the disposal of the Treasury even prior to being transferred to it, were equal to more than half a year's ordinary budget expenditures. Public deposits as a whole have increased sharply since the end of 1951. They were built up at a time when the government was borrowing, directly and indirectly, large amounts from the Issue Department of the BSL. It is not possible fully to evaluate the adequacy of the balances because of lack of information. Treasury deposits, for example, include an unknown amount of third-party funds which do not legally belong to the government. This situation, of course, complicates financial planning. The possibility of an

[7] From data compiled by the Exchange Office. In addition, there were £S 5.3 million of foreign-currency deposits.

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inflationary situation developing out of an attempt of various government agencies to draw down their deposits at a rapid rate should not be overlooked.

Suggested Reforms

Some of the main lines of reform of the budget and accounting system are implied in the foregoing observations, but for the sake of clarity they will be repeated. No attempt will be made to outline a detailed program; for this, it is suggested that the government obtain the services of a qualified foreign advisor. The mission recommends the following:

1. A comprehensive budget including all receipts and disbursements of the Treasury should be instituted. Items now financed through extraordinary accounts or by drawing on the available funds of the Treasury should be included in the general budget. Annexed budgets may be continued for agencies such as Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the broadcasting system, and the University, but all subventions and loans to these agencies and all contributions or repayments from them should be reflected in the general budget. Loans or capital subscriptions to the port, railway and electricity companies and other independent enterprises, as well as any recoveries of funds from these enterprises, should also be entered in the general budget.

2. The general budget may appropriately be divided into three sections. On the expenditure side these would be: (a) current expenditures; (b) capital outlays; (c) loans and capital subscriptions. On the receipts side the three sections would be: (a) current revenues; (b) proceeds of sales of state property; (c) recoveries of loans and capital subscriptions. Such a classification would be helpful for purposes of economic and financial planning but it should not be assumed that expenditure items of types (b) and (c) should always be financed by borrowing, or type (a) items always by current revenues.

3. Although the independent public administrations and services should remain outside the general budget and should not be required to comply with the detailed budget procedures applicable to regular departments and agencies, each independent agency should be required to submit annually a statement of proposed capital outlays. The proposals should be subject to review by a competent body to assure their consistency with the general economic program of the government in the light of current conditions.

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Capital outlays of municipalities might be subjected to the same kind of examination. 652 451

4. Projects extending over several years should be authorized in advance by law but funds for the whole project should not be transferred to a separate account or otherwise set aside when the project is authorized. Instead, appropriations should be made annually to cover expected disbursements of that year and funds should be released by the Treasury only as needed to make payments to employees and contractors. Appropriations remaining unobligated at the end of any year should lapse. This system would permit the government to exercise continuous control over spending. The Treasury would borrow, under a general authorization, only when necessary to make payments, and an increase in the public debt would be avoided while cash balances were available.

5. The so-called reserve seems to serve no useful purpose and it does complicate and confuse budgeting. It should be eliminated.

6. Two types of accounting records should be maintained. First, for purposes of control, a continuous record should be kept to show at all times the unobligated balance of each outstanding appropriation and the cumulative disbursements made under authority of the appropriation. These accounts would serve as the basis for auditing and closing each budget. Second, accounts showing cash receipts, payments and balances should be maintained. Prompt reports should be prepared from these accounts at monthly intervals; these would supply essential information for improving treasury management and budgeting.

7. Each budget should include (a) estimates of receipts and expenditures for the year under consideration; (b) revised estimates for the year in progress; and (c) actual figures for the preceding year. The budget should also present information on the amount of new spending authority requested, on cash balances, the public debt and other relevant items. It should clearly indicate the proposed means of financing any deficit or the disposition of any surplus.

8. Preaudit of expenditures by the General Accounting Office should be discontinued and this function assumed by the various operating agencies under the general supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Preaudit is an administrative control essential to internal management. Postaudit is concerned solely with verification of the legality of past transactions; it enables the legislature to make sure that the executive agencies have not exceeded their authority. The combination in one agency of preaudit and

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652 postaudit functions is likely to lead to overcentralization, cumbersome pro-
451 cedures and operating delays.

9. The delay in postaudit should be reduced as fast as possible, by improving both accounting and auditing procedures, as well as by relieving the General Accounting Office of the preaudit function. Fraud and other crimes revealed by postaudit should be dealt with as provided by law but officials should no longer be held financially liable for procedural irregularities not involving fraud; in such cases attention should be directed to revising applicable procedures with the object of preventing a recurrence of the irregularities.

10. Cash balances of the Treasury and other agencies should be analyzed with a view to segregating public funds from third-party accounts. Excessive cash balances should be applied to reduction of the public debt.

651 III REVENUE SYSTEM

The most serious problems in the field of taxation arise from inefficient and inadequate administration and widespread evasion. The system is regressive and unequal in incidence. Although revenue has increased greatly in recent years—apparently more rapidly than national income—it will not be easy to assure a continuation of this trend. The system does not have a large degree of automatic flexibility of yield which would permit the government to capture a significant part of any increases in national income without changing tax rates.

Revenue Yield in Relation to Income and Population

The proportion of the national income collected in taxes and other government receipts appears to compare favorably with that in many other countries. In 1950 the ordinary budget receipts of the central government plus estimated receipts of all municipalities equalled 12% of estimated national income.[8] By 1953 central and municipal receipts appear to have

[8] In 1950 ordinary receipts of the central government were approximately £S 139 million (annualized estimate from 18-month fiscal period 1950-51). The total of municipal expenditure budgets in 1950 was £S 25.8 million, but the municipalities received Treasury-guaranteed advances of £S 4.8 million from the Issue Department of the BSL. This suggests that municipal budgets provided for approximately £S 21 million of financing from sources other than borrowing. It is not known whether municipalities added to or drew down reserve funds in 1950. The mission estimates the national income of Syria in 1950 at £S 1,380 million.

III The Shashans

163 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
463 Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
134 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

1621 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
439 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
452 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
439 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

1621 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
163 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
795 language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

6: Government of Syria--11 G-4 (no date) 1952 MD1 Syria MD1

CROPS AND AGRICULTURE IN JAZIRAH

I. Dry Farming

Dry farming is by far the most important activity of Jazirah. 241
The first tractor and combine were introduced in 1936 by Shahine 311
Bey Maluf of Zahleh. Before that time agriculture was the business of the peasants. The town inhabitants of Jazirah took no interest in it. The area cultivated was restricted to a few kilometers south of the railway line in what is called the Old Villages. The political troubles in 1936-37 and the low prices of wheat and barley before the War did not encourage capitalists inside Syria to invest their money in Jazirah. Furthermore, agricultural machinery was new to most people who did not understand its economics or how to run it.

a. Expansion in the Use of Machinery 1936-1952

The War doubled the price of wheat in its second year. The 407
crop of 1940 was sold for LS 50-55 a ton at Aleppo. The French 439
bought it for LS 120 in 1941. The Office des Cereales Panifiables (O. C. P.) fixed the price at LS 350 in 1943. During these years the dollar was available at the official rate of LS 2.20 and importation of machinery from the U. S. was possible. The number of tractors increased to about 60 in the winter of 1943.

The crop of 1943 was exceptionally good and the O. C. P. imported some 50 tractors and a similar number of combines which reached Jazirah during the harvest season. The machines were first rented to the farmers and then sold to them. They represented the first large-scale importation of machinery to Jazirah.

Importation of machinery in the following two years became difficult as a result both of limited availability and of dollar shortage. But by the end of the War dollars became again available at the official rate and large numbers of tractors were imported in 1945 and 1946. The importation of agricultural machinery has become a steady and continuous flow in spite of the sharp rise in the dollar rates and the price of wheat, though below 1943, still makes large-scale exploitation profitable. Recently the Government through 654
the Agricultural Bank has helped the farmers import and buy on [452

407 installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71.
439 This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300,
[654 respectively.
452] It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is
407 opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent
427 of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS . 90-1.10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusionis that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

311 The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli Amuda and Dirbassiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq.

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbassiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Rin. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers west of Dirbassiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

311 The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jasiratibn Amr was long
491 neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

361 At present, agriculture extends in an unbroken line from the
311 Turkish and Iraqi borders south to the Rad and Hassaksh, and west to
365 Ras el Ain and midway to Rakka. Qamishli has all the amenities of a fair-sized city with sewage, electricity, asphalted roads, running water, places of amusement, and modern office buildings and houses. The other towns of Jazirah show similar progress but in a smaller way.

454 All this development could not have been achieved without extensive use of capital. It was stated that the original emigrants to Jazirah whether Christians or Kurds, brought very little capital with them. Whatever they have now was made in Jazirah and not brought from outside.

I. Credit to the Bedouin and Kurd

4521 The nearest commercial market to Jazirah where credit was
438 available was Aleppo. Aleppo merchants first provided goods shipped to the towns of Jazirah to be smuggled into Turkey. And Jazirah merchants working on a commission or partnership basis made good profits. Some of them specialized in lending money to the Bedouins and Kurds and for them, also, credit was available at Aleppo. They borrowed at an interest rate of 9% and lent at 35-50%. Most of them, however, did not lend money outright as a general practice, but sold goods and especially textiles, coffee and sugar to the farmer against bills maturing at harvest time. The exorbitant interest was added over the price of the goods, and the peasant accepted it as a somewhat higher price and did not consider it as interest. Theis system still prevails at the present time.

II. Credit to the Machinery Owner

4521 With the expansion of agriculture and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, credit in much larger amounts became necessary. The farmer using machinery needed two kinds of credit. He needed credit to pay for his machines, and seasonal credit to cover a part of his expenses for wages, seed, fuel, and general expenditures.

In the first years of the War, dealers in agricultural machinery supplied a part of the need by selling on an installment basis for a period of 20 months. But between 1943 and 1948 they demanded cash payment before delivery. In the last four years, they have renewed their credit facilities.

III. The Role of the Banque de Syrie

The Banque de Syrie in Qamishli provided a part of the need for seasonal capital. The amount of its credit increased yearly with the development of the region until it reached the sum of LS 7,000,000 this year out of a total credit of LS 17,000,000. 452 453

But the influence of the Banque de Syrie in the economic life of Jazirah is not limited to the sum of LS 7 millions disbursed directly by its branch office in Qamishli to individual borrowers. Most of the remaining credit supplied to Jazirah by Aleppo finds its source in the Banque de Syrie.

In Qamishli the Banque extends two types of credit. Commercial credit in bills signed by the debtor and endorsed by two persons acceptable to the Banque, the last of whom should have a credit in his name free at the moment of discount for a sum at least equal to the sum discounted. The maximum duration of the bill is 90 days. The second type is agricultural credit. It used to be given against bills of the same type discussed above but renewable twice, but in the last five years a new and more elastic system was introduced whereby credit was given for a period of nine months for winter crops and six months for summer crops. The beneficiary has to sign an agreement with the Banque with two other persons as endorsers. During the period of the loan he can draw the amount agreed upon and refund it at the date of expiration.

The average amount allowed to the owner of an agricultural outfit is LS 15-20 000. The Banque does not worry about its loans because it usually accepts only the best signatures and it has always been able to recover its loans even in the worst years. Its interest rates are 9% while they are 7% in the other towns of Syria.

The seven million pounds credit of the Banque de Syrie is not given entirely to farmers and merchants for legitimate use. A good part of it goes to money lenders in Qamishli who lend it in turn to farmers at much higher rates reaching 24-60%.

IV. Credit by Aleppo Merchants

Since the Banque provides only about 45% of the credit needed, and that only to the best signatures, a large field is left to the private money lender. The merchants of Aleppo directly or through their agents in Qamishli provide the remaining percentage of credit. This credit is given in commercial bills for a duration of three 452

452 months but renewable to the harvest season. Depending on the condition of the crops and the financial situation of the borrower the interest varies from 18-36%. This Aleppo credit does not become available to the farmer however until after the month of March for winter crops when it becomes possible to judge the condition of the crop. In the last three years the firm of Ma'marbashi Bros. has opened an office in Qamishli for commerce and banking. Its loans are no different from the other private money lenders.

Many of the merchants who lend money are also wheat, rice and cotton merchants. They receive the produce of their debtors which they sell for a commission and thus deduct the amount of their loans. In this way they have a sort of collateral besides the bills and they also profit from the commissions.

V. Credit by the Agricultural Bank

452 652 The Agricultural Bank of the Syrian Government does not play effectively the role for which it was designed. Aside from all the excessive formalities required by the Bank regulations which make its operations slow, cumbersome, and onerous to the debtor as explained in the report of July 15 1952 on "The Agricultural Bank," the amounts allotted by the Bank to Jazirah are infinitesimal in proportion to the needs of the area. The amount of credit extended by the Bank for long and short term loans between the years 1944-1949 has averaged LS 150,000 yearly, i.e., 1%, out of the total credit of some LS 15 millions needed by Jazirah. Further, the Bank can grant loans over LS 600 only against mortgage of land, and since 70% of t the lands of Jazirah have no title, the activity of the Bank is accordingly restricted. A new decree, number 9, dated June 26, 1952, permits the Bank to give loans to users of land as well as owners, and puts at the disposal of the Bank the sum of two million pounds for all Syria. The share of Jazirah in this sum will not exceed LS 200,000 which will not change in any degree the credit situation in the region.

VI Credit and its Relation to the Land Problem

452 The problem of credit in Jazirah is tied up to a great extent with the stabilization and legalization of the land problem. The Banque de Syrie and the Aleppo merchant evaluate the borrowing capacity of the farmer by the machines he owns, the area of his

452 plantation and the value of his lands. Lands without title have no commercial value though the farmer may use them without opposition. This is apparent at the present time when lands with title and undisputed boundaries sell at ten times the price of occupied lands without title A survey and cadastration of Jazirah lands with a rapid and form settlement of boundary disputed and the grant of property deeds will expand the borrowing capacities of Jazirah enonously and may tend to reduce the exorbitant rates of interest demanded by the money lenders. On such a trable basis, other banking establishments may be induced to open business in the region and relieve its dependance on the greedy money lender.

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

491 During the French Mandate there was not a single paved or as-
496 phalted road in Jazirah. In winter road communications were out between the different towns and villages and the only means of travel was by train which passed through the more important centers of Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya For the rest of the year road transport became possible but expensive because of the absence of roads For this reason, the whole region of Deirik remained undeveloped until quite recently.

I. Roads Within Jazirah

491 The independent Government in Syria started building a
653 road in 1945 between Qamishli and Hassakeh which served at the same time as the arterial road to Aleppo. Though the distance between the two towns is only 85 kilometers, the funds alloted yearly for the road were so small that now, after seven years, only about 30 kilometers are asphalted and the rest is paved The maintenance does not keep up with the deterioration and the road is going to pieces. However, now at last, communication is assured in all weather while before trucks were stuck for days during the rainy season.

Another asphalted road joins Qamishli with Amuda, a distance of 30 kilometers. Here again deterioration is rapid. This road is to be projected another 30 kilometers to Dirbassiya and from there to Ras el Ain, a distance of 60 kilometers.

491 The road Qamishli-Hassakeh is extended for 50 kilometers south to Point 47 on the way to Deir Ezzor. This section is also asphalted.

passengers and goods are carried
mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most 489
part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads 491
satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to 452
economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; 454
foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not 436
in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long 433
as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, 439
their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MOI

648 Hama et Prolongement' (D.H.P.) company. Since 1925 this
471 company had had an agreement with the local Governments by which the latter made good any losses incurred by the company in the working of the railways, and received a progressive share of any profits which were made.

452 There were a number of French financial institutions with interests in the Mandated Territories. The bank of issue, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, had its headquarters in Paris, and of its 25½ million francs of share-capital over 20 millions were in French hands, while twelve out of its sixteen directors were French, the remainder being Syrians
[436] and Lebanese. By an agreement made in 1924 and subsequently renewed, the Banque was given the exclusive right of issuing Syro-Lebanese currency. It also performed the functions of an ordinary commercial bank. In addition, a great deal of commercial banking, mortgage and land-credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie and the Compagnie Algérienne.

439 In 1938 France imported goods of greater value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other country except Palestine; and she exported to them goods of greater value than did any other country except Great Britain. The total value of her imports from them was 105,894,000 francs. The main articles which she imported were vegetables and fruits; she did not obtain from the Levant States any important raw materials for her industries. She exported to them 197,818,000 francs worth of goods, including large quantities of iron and iron goods, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods.[1]

471 The Mandated Territories were also important for French
648 commerce as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions: the civil air-ports were used as stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China. Moreover, one of the two pipe-lines through which the oil of Iraq is conveyed to the Mediterranean passes through Syria and Lebanon to reach the sea at Tripoli. This was of dual importance to France: first because French interests owned 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and secondly because France obtained between one-third and one-half of her total oil-supply from Iraq, by

[1] For detailed figures, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, p. 203.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

TABLE 2 Monetary and Banking Data

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(Million £S) 436

	End of period				
				June	
	1951	1952	1953	1953	1954
Money supply					
1. Notes and coins (net)	236.1	234.7	271.5	249.0	298.5
2. Private and public enterprise deposits	58.9	76.0	104.8	97.8	123.4
3. Private and all public deposits	114.0	181.2	250.3	205.7	215.1
Total (1 and 2)	295.0	310.7	376.3	346.8	421.9
Total (1 and 3)	350.1	415.9	521.8	454.7	513.6
Monetary gold and foreign exchange					
Total at free rate	114.3	107.6	157.0	106.3	144.8
Percent of note issue	46.1	45.0	56.7	n.a.	n.a.
Deposits (sight and time)					
Public	111.9	128.3	188.9	149.4	181.0
Private	60.5	77.8	96.3	n.a.	115.0
Total	172.4	206.1	285.2	n.a.	296.0
Loans, discounts and advances	115.1	146.0	226.6	187.9	309.5

n.a. = not available.
SOURCE: Office des Changes.

In Syria, as in other underdeveloped countries of Asia, a considerable 452 volume of credit is extended outside the banking system by merchants, landowners and professional moneylenders. Some of these, particularly the merchants, rely in turn on regular bank credit. Most of the credit outside the banking system is extended in the agricultural sector of the economy and is a reflection partly of the inadequacy of such institutions as the Agricultural Bank and partly of the poor credit risk of the borrowers. Loans of this type generally carry high, usurious rates of interest.

Another feature of the credit system is the lack of any institution, outside the Agricultural Bank, for financing investment. There is no mortgage-financing institution for building, and no bank to provide investment capital for industry. The BSL has in the past extended investment credits to industry, but only with the guarantee of the government.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

244 piece of land for long and thus have virtually no incentive to improve the
423 land. Many large landowners do little beyond collecting their share of the
427 crop, leaving relations with their tenants in the hands of agents. They
[452] often stake their tenants to seed, livestock or implements or tide them over with food and clothing until the harvest comes in; and in the absence of adequate credit institutions they thus serve a useful function. In most cases, however, such assistance in cash or kind is given on terms which conceal extremely high rates of interest. In other cases credit may be furnished without interest by landlords conforming strictly to the Islamic code. It must be recognized also that some and probably a growing number of large landowners take a more active interest in the management of their land and have been instrumental in introducing new crops such as cotton. Progressively minded owners of large estates, when interested in improved crop rotation and methods of production, can become the means for more rapid advancement of agriculture.

244 The small peasant-owners and sharecroppers, who carry on most of the
423 agriculture, produce primarily for their own consumption. Their output is little influenced by market prices, for they must produce to eat and with the balance they buy such simple necessities as they can. Most of them wrest a bare living from the soil and are chronically in debt to the merchant, the professional moneylender or the landlord. Unable to bring their produce to the market or to wait for better prices, they must accept the price offered to them locally for whatever they produce in excess of their own needs. They till their land with methods hallowed by time, and their equipment for the most part consists only of a pair of draft animals and a wooden, iron-tipped plow.

Any program of assistance to agriculture must obviously focus largely on these cultivators. It must show them how to improve their methods of production, provide them with better seeds, equipment and animals. Through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of adequate agricultural credit it should help to free them gradually from excessive dependence on the landlord, merchant and moneylender. It must also pay attention to tenancy problems with the objective of establishing greater security of tenure, providing more incentive to cultivators and achieving a more equitable sharing of the produce of the land.

423 5. *The uncertainty and confusion surrounding land titles is another obstacle to land improvement.*

The uncertainty surrounding land titles has been largely inherited

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

232 wool or hair. Existing poultry breeds are largely nondescript and are
654 characterized by very low productivity.

To carry out experiments in breeding and animal husbandry, the government should push on with its program to establish a central livestock station near Damascus.[17] Within a few years two sub-stations might also be opened at Palmyra and Deir ez Zor, or at Hama, Selemiye or Raqqa. There is unfortunately a shortage of Syrians trained in such work, and at the outset it would probably be necessary to employ a foreign farm manager. A minimum of £S 1.2 million will be needed over the next five or six years to meet the necessary costs.

For sheep, the aim should be to develop a more productive animal, and to test the feasibility of breeding more specialized types by successive top-crossing of selected indigenous animals with such imported breeds as Merinos and Merino-Fleisch. For cattle, the task would be to improve the existing Julani and Damascus types by progressive selection and perhaps by a certain amount of crossing with such imported pure breeds as Brown Swiss. In the case of poultry, which is so important to the small farmer, there might be a gradual introduction of exotic blood by the issue to farmers of cockerels of the chosen exotic breeds, raised in the government breeding farm. In this breeding program great care will have to be taken to maintain adequate records on the production and hardiness of successive generations. It will also have to be accompanied by good animal husbandry to bring out the full potentialities of each genetic strain.

VI CREDIT, COOPERATIVES, EDUCATION AND MARKETING

Agricultural Credit

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An adequate volume of credit on reasonable terms is in many respects the key to an improvement in agriculture and animal husbandry. Farmers must have the means to buy better tools, livestock and seed and to introduce new crops. If settled on new land they must be provided with housing and the capital necessary to start production. Both peasant proprietors and tenant farmers must be helped to emancipate themselves gradually from excessive reliance on non-institutional lenders such as landlords and

[17] See Annex C, p. 312.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

merchants who often impose onerous terms and hold the whip hand over their debtors.

The magnitude of the credit problem is not easy to assess. The amount of existing agricultural indebtedness is unknown and future credit needs are correspondingly difficult to estimate. The government would be well advised to carry out a study of the outstanding volume, source and terms of indebtedness in a number of agricultural areas in order to acquire more dependable data as a basis for future action.

Credit at present comes from three sources: the Agricultural Bank, a government institution; the commercial banks; and landlords, merchants and professional money-lenders. The Agricultural Bank provides loans at 6% up to a maximum of £S 7,500 per borrower. At the end of 1953 its outstanding loans amounted to £S 42 million. The average size of loans—£S 264—indicates how the Bank must disperse its limited resources. Since well over half of its assets are represented by long-term and medium-term loans and its lending resources have been increasing rather slowly, the Bank has been able to make new credit available only at an average annual rate of a little over £S 6 million over the four-year period 1950-1953.

A few of the commercial banks, principally the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, have made seasonal production credit available in recent years. Such loans are extended to larger farmers with a good credit standing for a maximum period of 100 days and at an interest rate of 6% to 7½%. The total amount thus made available is probably between £S 10 million and £S 15 million. The banks, however, also finance agriculture indirectly by extending credits to dealers in machinery and irrigation pumps who in turn finance purchasers of such equipment at interest rates of 9% to 12% or even more.

Most farmers can get credit only from non-institutional lenders. Interest rates charged by these vary widely but are often extremely burdensome, ranging as high as 50% to 100%. Even larger farmers often have to rely on such sources and pay as much as 12% to 18% interest. The small peasant proprietors and tenant farmers are generally the poorest credit risk and the most exploited and therefore pay the highest interest rates.

The great need today is for more institutional credit. The regular commercial banks may be expected in time to provide more financing for agriculture. When and if properly supervised grain storage facilities are established in accordance with the mission's recommendations, the banks

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

will be willing and able to lend to farmers on the security of warehouse receipts. Thus within five or six years we may expect the volume of bank financing to rise to between £S 20 million and £S 25 million. Elsewhere the mission recommends the establishment of a predominantly privately-owned and entirely privately managed Investment Bank. Such a bank would not only invest in industry, but also make loans to farmers for the sinking of wells, the installation of irrigation pumps and the acquisition of machinery. Its lending to agriculture might reach £S 10 million, but its loans would presumably be made to the larger, more creditworthy farmers.

It is to the Agricultural Bank that most farmers must look for an expansion of institutional agricultural credit.[18] For this reason the mission strongly recommends that the existing capital and reserves of the Bank, amounting to £S 22.1 million at the end of 1953, be increased to £S 85 million. This should be accomplished by converting the Bank's indebtedness to the government and the government Cereals Office, totaling £S 12.4 million, into a permanent capital contribution and by making an additional government contribution of £S 50 million to the Bank's capital in installments over the next five years. If appropriate facilities for the rediscounting of the Bank's short-term paper are arranged with the projected Central Bank or, in the interim, with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, the Agricultural Bank should be able to increase the volume of its outstanding loans up to between £S 120 million and £S 130 million. If the volume of lending by all institutions expands as indicated, it will then be possible to meet the increasing credit needs of Syrian agriculture and probably relieve at least to some extent the farmers' bondage to non-institutional lenders.

The Agricultural Bank should continue to cater primarily to the small farmers. Some limit on the size of individual loans should therefore be enforced, although the present limit of £S 7,500 might well be raised to around £S 10,000 to £S 15,000, with the proviso that total loans above a certain figure, say £S 5,000, shall be no greater than one-quarter to one-third of all loans outstanding. This limitation would not apply to loans to cooperatives, thus giving farmers an additional incentive to band together for such purposes as the installation of an irrigation pump or the sinking of a well, which might require a larger investment.

[18] See Annex E, p. 340.

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عدد وقيمة القروض التي اسلفها المصرف الزراعي السوري ١٩٤٩ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER AND VALUE OF LOANS ADVANCED BY THE AGRICULTURAL BANK, 1949 — 1953.

Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat	Year	مجموع القروض Total loans		قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans		قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans		السنة	المحافظة
		العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000		
Total	1949	9,398	2,208	9,116	1,818	282	1,390	١٩٤٩	المجموع
	1950	3,930	6,942	—	—	3,930	6,942	١٩٥٠	
	1951	6,456	10,551	—	—	6,456	10,551	١٩٥١	
	1952	24,374	14,327	19,847	10,640	4,527	3,687	١٩٥٢	
	1953	20,325	12,466	15,403	8,318	4,922	4,148	١٩٥٣	
Damascus	1949	1,326	649	1,254	258	72	390	١٩٤٩	دمشق
	1950	814	1,080	—	—	814	1,080	١٩٥٠	
	1951	936	782	—	—	936	782	١٩٥١	
	1952	33,700	1,447	2,082	689	1,618	758	١٩٥٢	
	1953	2,379	1,449	737	438	1,642	1,011	١٩٥٣	
Homs	1949	546	249	543	234	3	15	١٩٤٩	حمص
	1950	215	501	—	—	215	501	١٩٥٠	
	1951	342	528	—	—	342	528	١٩٥١	
	1952	543	728	317	418	226	310	١٩٥٢	
	1953	755	715	323	381	432	334	١٩٥٣	
Hama	1949	1,324	482	1,294	297	30	185	١٩٤٩	حماة
	1950	190	667	—	—	190	667	١٩٥٠	
	1951	354	525	—	—	354	525	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,595	1,487	2,411	1,289	184	198	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,627	1,222	1,465	995	162	227	١٩٥٣	
Latakia	1949	265	274	234	169	22	105	١٩٤٩	اللاذقية
	1950	615	810	—	—	615	810	١٩٥٠	
	1951	754	793	—	—	754	793	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,690	2,048	1,849	1,193	841	855	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,580	1,759	636	1,041	944	718	١٩٥٣	
Aleppo	1949	3,777	872	3,702	477	75	395	١٩٤٩	حلب
	1950	1,411	1,451	—	—	1,411	1,457	١٩٥٠	
	1951	3,212	1,774	—	—	3,212	1,774	١٩٥١	
	1952	8,224	4,509	6,988	3,369	1,236	1,140	١٩٥٢	
	1953	3,897	2,454	2,939	1,337	958	1,117	١٩٥٣	
Al-Hasakeh	1949	112	144	67	4	45	140	١٩٤٩	الحسكة
	1950	176	1,173	—	—	176	1,173	١٩٥٠	
	1951	147	476	—	—	147	476	١٩٥١	
	1952	1,689	1,721	1,681	1,707	8	14	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,387	1,695	1,352	1,660	35	35	١٩٥٣	

Source : The Syrian Agricultural Bank

المصدر : المصرف الزراعي السوري

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عدد وقيمة القروض التي اسلفها المصرف الزراعي السوري ١٩٤٩ – ١٩٥٣

NUMBERS AND VALUE OF LOANS ADVANCED BY THE AGRICULTURAL BANK, 1949 — 1953.

Table No. 10 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١٠ (تتمة)

Mohafaza	Year	مجموع القروض Total loans		قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans		قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans		السنة	المحافظة
		العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S.'000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000		
Deir-ez-zor	1949	275	126	275	126	—	—	١٩٤٩	دير الزور
	1950	94	587	—	—	94	587	١٩٥٠	
	1951	73	244	—	—	73	244	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,005	1,217	1,811	1,010	194	207	١٩٥٢	
	1953	2,607	1,570	2,351	1,308	256	262	١٩٥٣	
Sweida	1949	35	22	35	22	—	—	١٩٤٩	السويداء
	1950	62	140	—	—	62	140	١٩٥٠	
	1951	203	1,431	—	—	203	1,431	١٩٥١	
	1952	410	1,367	1,294	1,229	120	138	١٩٥٢	
	1953	196	221	1	21	195	210	١٩٥٣	
Dir'a	1949	1,756	391	1,721	231	35	160	١٩٤٩	درعا
	1950	253	533	—	—	253	533	١٩٥٠	
	1951	435	4,018	—	—	435	4,018	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,518	803	2,424	736	94	67	١٩٥٢	
	1953	5,897	1,871	5,599	1,137	298	234	١٩٥٣	

Source : The Syrian Agricultural Bank.

المصدر المصرف الزراعي السوري

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and moneylenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [466]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

Another significant aspect of the land tenure problem is the financial arrangements between the landlords and tenants. 427 241

Although there are many variations throughout the country, there are three basic contracts.

In the first, where water is available by gravity flow for irrigation and the landowner furnishes only the land, he gets 50 per cent and the tenant gets 50 per cent of the gross yield. In the second type of contract, where the tenant installs pumps and operates them at his own expense and the landlord furnishes the land only, he gets 33⅓ per cent and the tenant gets the rest. In the third case, where the landowner furnishes only the land and the tenant drills artesian wells at his own expense, the landowner gets only 25 per cent of the gross yields. There are variations depending on the crops produced and on who furnishes seed, fertilizer, and equipment. With the growth of mechanization, there is a rising tendency for landowners to prepare the seed beds themselves with large tractors and to take a large share of the produce.

With the advent of mechanization, there is also a noticeable tendency to wage-crop arrangements, particularly in the remote areas like the Jezira where the population is sparse and where the only feasible arrangement for picking cotton is the employment of nomads by the day. 464 241

The greatest concentration of small cultivators who own and operate their own farms is in the older farming areas in the southern part of Syria around Damascus. Around Aleppo the farms are larger in size and owner-operators are fewer in number. 471 241

MECHANIZATION

Mechanization is changing rapidly the primitive practices which still dominate Syrian agriculture. The number of tractors has increased from 200 to almost 2,000 and more than 700 combines are in operation. 241 407

Most of the mechanical equipment is in the Jezira and the agricultural areas around Aleppo. Approximately half the tractors are being used in cotton areas.

To encourage further mechanization the government plans to extend loans to farmers on a five-year basis to finance the purchase of agricultural equipment. So far most of the equipment has been bought privately and for cash. [452]

The first few years have been difficult for the tractor farmers because of the lack of trained operators and the lack of adequate repair facilities, especially spare parts. Now the large manufacturers' agents are establishing modern service stations, repair stations, and mobile repair units. Consideration is even being given to organizing operator training programs.

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

All of the agricultural missions stress the need for improvement in basic research and educational programs. The United States-Syria Agricultural Mission has outlined a complete program for agricultural training, research, and extension. Some of the recommendations already have been adopted, such as the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 654

III. The Role of the Banque de Syrie

The Banque de Syrie in Qamishli provided a part of the need 452 for seasonal capital. The amount of its credit increased yearly with 453 the development of the region until it reached the sum of LS 7,000,-000 this year out of a total credit of LS 17,000,000.

But the influence of the Banque de Syrie in the economic life of Jazirah is not limited to the sum of LS 7 millions disbursed directly by its branch office in Qamishli to individual borrowers. Most of the remaining credit supplied to Jazirah by Aleppo finds its source in the Banque de Syrie.

In Qamishli the Banque extends two types of credit. Commercial credit in bills signed by the debtor and endorsed by two persons acceptable to the Banque, the last of whom should have a credit in his name free at the moment of discount for a sum at least equal to the sum discounted. The maximum duration of the bill is 90 days. The second type is agricultural credit. It used to be given against bills of the same type discussed above but renewable twice, but in the last five years a new and more elastic system was introduced whereby credit was given for a period of nine months for winter crops and six months for summer crops. The beneficiary has to sign an agreement with the Banque with two other persons as endorsers. During the period of the loan he can draw the amount agreed upon and refund it at the date of expiration.

The average amount allowed to the owner of an agricultural outfit is LS 15-20 000. The Banque does not worry about its loans because it usually accepts only the best signatures and it has always been able to recover its loans even in the worst years. Its interest rates are 9% while they are 7% in the other towns of Syria.

The seven million pounds credit of the Banque de Syrie is not given entirely to farmers and merchants for legitimate use. A good part of it goes to money lenders in Qamishli who lend it in turn to farmers at much higher rates reaching 24-60%.

IV. Credit by Aleppo Merchants

Since the Banque provides only about 45% of the credit needed, 452 and that only to the best signatures, a large field is left to the private money lender. The merchants of Aleppo directly or through their agents in Qamishli provide the remaining percentage of credit. This credit is given in commercial bills for a duration of three

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Office is responsible for enforcing foreign exchange controls and regulating 652
the foreign exchange market. Although it has no monopoly, the Office 457
is the principal buyer and seller of foreign exchange either via the commercial banks or directly. While recognizing the postwar depreciation of the Syrian pound from the nominal official rate of £S 2.20 to the dollar, it has intervened to smooth out the fluctuations in the *de facto* or free rate arising from the seasonal nature of the country's exports. Its stabilization operations were initiated at the end of 1952 when it began publishing a daily bulletin of the rates at which it was prepared to buy and sell. In 1953 it broadened its stabilization operations by setting rates for forward transactions. In the initial period it succeeded in narrowing the fluctuations, and since July 1953 it has kept the dollar rate at £S 3.575. Its operations were undoubtedly instrumental in preventing the favorable trend in the balance of payments during 1953 from resulting in a marked appreciation of the Syrian pound, which would have adversely affected Syria's exports. The Exchange Office has allowed rates of other currencies to fluctuate more widely, in accordance with their strength relative to the dollar as reflected in free markets.

Virtually all foreign exchange transactions now take place at the market rate as regulated by the Exchange Office. Foreign oil companies, however, are still required, pending the settlement of a conflict over oil transit payments, to buy Syrian pounds at the official rate for the purpose of meeting their local expenditures; and exchange required for imports of petroleum products is also furnished at the official rate.

Since 1948 foreign exchange restrictions have been progressively abandoned, so that all payments can now be freely made. Although imports are still subject to prior license, exchange is readily made available unless imports are restricted or prohibited for protectionist reasons. No restrictions exist on transfers of capital or payments of invisibles. Most exports are licensed partly to protect domestic consumers and partly to enforce repatriation of foreign exchange for shipments to all destinations except Arab countries. The requirement of repatriating foreign exchange was instituted to provide the Syrian market with a regular supply of foreign exchange.

The Syrian economy is served primarily by foreign banks. Of the 15 453
commercial banks accredited at the beginning of 1954, 10, including all the larger institutions, were foreign: five were French, two Jordanian, and one each Iraqi, British and Egyptian. The BSL, as the largest commercial

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453 bank, the principal depository of government funds and the bank of issue, dominates the banking system. There is only one government banking institution, the Agricultural Bank, which extends a limited amount of credit to agriculture. The banks engage principally in short-term financing of foreign and domestic trade. A few, particularly the BSL, now also grant seasonal credits for agricultural crop production up to a limit of 300 days. Competition among banks is keen. Interest rates on loans and advances have tended to decline and are now generally between 5% and 7%. As much as 2% to 3% is paid even on current deposits, with slightly higher rates on time deposits. Although the BSL, functioning in this respect as a central bank, is able and willing to provide ample rediscount facilities, other banks generally avoid rediscounting their paper with an institution they regard as their principal competitor. Foreign banks prefer to obtain any additional funds they may need from their parent institutions abroad. Thus, to meet the expanding credit needs in Syria, the commercial banks increased their liabilities abroad from £S 62 million at the end of 1952 to £S 98 million at the end of 1953; by June 30, 1954, such liabilities had risen to £S 117.9 million as compared with £S 95 million for the corresponding date of the preceding year. Because of their access to resources abroad most of the banks apparently do not consider it necessary to maintain a high proportion of liquid assets to short-term liabilities in Syria.

453 436 Although the use of checks has grown, internal payments are still predominantly effected in cash. This undoubtedly accounts for the fact that the proportion of private deposits to net note and coin circulation, although steadily growing, was still only 33% by the end of 1953. As of that time, as shown by Table 2, the total money supply[8] amounted to £S 376.3 million of which £S 271.5 million or about 72% represented notes and coins. The relatively small use of checking accounts also explains, at least in part, the high proportion of bank loans, advances and discounts for the private sector to total private deposits. At the end of 1953 the volume of such credit accommodation—£S 226.6 million—represented 247% of total private bank deposits. In most other countries the amount of bank credit to the private sector tends to be considerably less than the total of private deposits.

[8] Of the deposits, only the sight deposits of private persons and public enterprises have been included in money supply. The rate of turnover of deposits of the government and public administration is not very high.

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TABLE 2 Monetary and Banking Data

453

(Million £S) 436

	End of period				
				June	
	1951	1952	1953	1953	1954
Money supply					
1. Notes and coins (net)	236.1	234.7	271.5	249.0	298.5
2. Private and public enterprise deposits	58.9	76.0	104.8	97.8	123.4
3. Private and all public deposits	114.0	181.2	250.3	205.7	215.1
Total (1 and 2)	295.0	310.7	376.3	346.8	421.9
Total (1 and 3)	350.1	415.9	521.8	454.7	513.6
Monetary gold and foreign exchange					
Total at free rate	114.3	107.6	157.0	106.3	144.8
Percent of note issue	46.1	45.0	56.7	n.a.	n.a.
Deposits (sight and time)					
Public	111.9	128.3	188.9	149.4	181.0
Private	60.5	77.8	96.3	n.a.	115.0
Total	172.4	206.1	285.2	n.a.	296.0
Loans, discounts and advances	115.1	146.0	226.6	187.9	309.5

n.a. = not available.
SOURCE: Office des Changes.

In Syria, as in other underdeveloped countries of Asia, a considerable 452 volume of credit is extended outside the banking system by merchants, landowners and professional moneylenders. Some of these, particularly the merchants, rely in turn on regular bank credit. Most of the credit outside the banking system is extended in the agricultural sector of the economy and is a reflection partly of the inadequacy of such institutions as the Agricultural Bank and partly of the poor credit risk of the borrowers. Loans of this type generally carry high, usurious rates of interest.

Another feature of the credit system is the lack of any institution, outside the Agricultural Bank, for financing investment. There is no mortgage-financing institution for building, and no bank to provide investment capital for industry. The BSL has in the past extended investment credits to industry, but only with the guarantee of the government.

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merchants who often impose onerous terms and hold the whip hand over their debtors. 452

The magnitude of the credit problem is not easy to assess. The amount of existing agricultural indebtedness is unknown and future credit needs are correspondingly difficult to estimate. The government would be well advised to carry out a study of the outstanding volume, source and terms of indebtedness in a number of agricultural areas in order to acquire more dependable data as a basis for future action.

Credit at present comes from three sources: the Agricultural Bank, a government institution; the commercial banks; and landlords, merchants and professional money-lenders. The Agricultural Bank provides loans at 6% up to a maximum of £S 7,500 per borrower. At the end of 1953 its outstanding loans amounted to £S 42 million. The average size of loans—£S 264—indicates how the Bank must disperse its limited resources. Since well over half of its assets are represented by long-term and medium-term loans and its lending resources have been increasing rather slowly, the Bank has been able to make new credit available only at an average annual rate of a little over £S 6 million over the four-year period 1950-1953. 452 453

A few of the commercial banks, principally the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, have made seasonal production credit available in recent years. Such loans are extended to larger farmers with a good credit standing for a maximum period of 100 days and at an interest rate of 6% to 7½%. The total amount thus made available is probably between £S 10 million and £S 15 million. The banks, however, also finance agriculture indirectly by extending credits to dealers in machinery and irrigation pumps who in turn finance purchasers of such equipment at interest rates of 9% to 12% or even more.

Most farmers can get credit only from non-institutional lenders. Interest rates charged by these vary widely but are often extremely burdensome, ranging as high as 50% to 100%. Even larger farmers often have to rely on such sources and pay as much as 12% to 18% interest. The small peasant proprietors and tenant farmers are generally the poorest credit risk and the most exploited and therefore pay the highest interest rates.

The great need today is for more institutional credit. The regular commercial banks may be expected in time to provide more financing for agriculture. When and if properly supervised grain storage facilities are established in accordance with the mission's recommendations, the banks

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152 will be willing and able to lend to farmers on the security of warehouse
153 receipts. Thus within five or six years we may expect the volume of bank financing to rise to between £S 20 million and £S 25 million. Elsewhere the mission recommends the establishment of a predominantly privately-owned and entirely privately managed Investment Bank. Such a bank would not only invest in industry, but also make loans to farmers for the sinking of wells, the installation of irrigation pumps and the acquisition of machinery. Its lending to agriculture might reach £S 10 million, but its loans would presumably be made to the larger, more creditworthy farmers.

153 It is to the Agricultural Bank that most farmers must look for an expansion of institutional agricultural credit.[18] For this reason the mission strongly recommends that the existing capital and reserves of the Bank, amounting to £S 22.1 million at the end of 1953, be increased to £S 85 million. This should be accomplished by converting the Bank's indebtedness to the government and the government Cereals Office, totaling £S 12.4 million, into a permanent capital contribution and by making an additional government contribution of £S 50 million to the Bank's capital in installments over the next five years. If appropriate facilities for the rediscounting of the Bank's short-term paper are arranged with the projected Central Bank or, in the interim, with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, the Agricultural Bank should be able to increase the volume of its outstanding loans up to between £S 120 million and £S 130 million. If the volume of lending by all institutions expands as indicated, it will then be possible to meet the increasing credit needs of Syrian agriculture and probably relieve at least to some extent the farmers' bondage to non-institutional lenders.

The Agricultural Bank should continue to cater primarily to the small farmers. Some limit on the size of individual loans should therefore be enforced, although the present limit of £S 7,500 might well be raised to around £S 10,000 to £S 15,000, with the proviso that total loans above a certain figure, say £S 5,000, shall be no greater than one-quarter to one-third of all loans outstanding. This limitation would not apply to loans to cooperatives, thus giving farmers an additional incentive to band together for such purposes as the installation of an irrigation pump or the sinking of a well, which might require a larger investment.

[18] See Annex E, p. 340.

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It should be emphasized that when the Agricultural Bank lends to cooperatives for re-lending to their members, it should accept as security the joint and several liability of the cooperative (i.e., the signatures of the Committee of the cooperative on the bond). The Bank should not demand mortgage security from the cooperative as a whole or from its members individually.

It is the mission's considered judgment that the present 6% interest rate charged by the Bank should be raised to 8%. The latter rate is not unreasonably high considering the cost of capital in Syria and particularly the much higher average cost of non-institutional credit. Such a rate would enable the Bank to increase its earnings and thereby its resources for future lending. Certain exceptions to this higher rate should in our opinion be made. As a special incentive, loans to cooperatives might be made at 6%. The mission also suggests a rate of 4% to 5% on certain long-term loans, such as those for the construction of farm dwellings and buildings, and for the establishment of orchards and vineyards where the yield is long deferred and investment might be discouraged by a high interest rate.

It is idle to expect that a substantial increase in the resources of the Bank will of itself solve the problem of agricultural credit. Much depends on the wisdom with which its resources are used and on the effectiveness of the organization and operating methods of the Bank. In the past the procedure for obtaining a loan from the Bank has been so cumbersome that borrowers have often preferred to pay a much higher price for credit from other sources. In the future the Bank's operations must be considerably more flexible. Lending in the past has been governed almost wholly by the availability of formal security in the form of a mortgage or joint guarantee. In the future the purpose of the loan should increasingly become the governing factor. The economic soundness of any loan must be determined primarily in the light of its impact on the production of the borrower. To be sure, some lending will always be needed to tide farmers over temporary difficulties due to harvest failures, physical disabilities or other causes beyond their control. In the long run, however, an increase in agricultural indebtedness will be warranted only if it is instrumental in raising the output of farmers in such a way that they will have an ample margin for repayment of their loans. For instance, institutional credit on reasonable terms can hardly replace non-institutional credit at usurious rates of interest unless the borrowers can at the same

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463 time be made more creditworthy by ensuring that the proceeds of loans are really used to improve production.

Thus the Bank must work out with the farmer in the village the best application of credit.[19] What is needed is a system of supervised credit which will in effect combine lending with agricultural extension or educational work. For this task the Bank will need a staff of credit supervisors properly trained not only in credit techniques and problems, but also in agriculture, methods of cooperative organization and action among farmers, and similar subjects. The mission strongly urges that about 100 selected students at the secondary agricultural school at Kharabo be trained over the next five or six years as credit supervisors by adding another year of specialized instruction to the regular school course. In devising training courses and initiating the supervised government credit program the government might usefully enlist the cooperation of the Near East Foundation, which has acquired valuable experience in working with farmers in a number of villages. Limitations of staff will make it impossible to launch the program on a large scale at once. The work can begin in certain selected areas and then be extended as more staff becomes available and experience is acquired.

The credit supervisor would be an employee of the Bank but would act primarily as a counsellor to farmers. He would advise farmers on a program of improvement which would raise their output and therefore merit a credit. While he would not handle or process a loan application, he would facilitate access to the Bank in meritorious cases, and loans would be made in the area where he is active only on his recommendation. He should never prejudice his relations with the farmers by acting as a collector of loans. His concern would be primarily with the small farmers, particularly with those who organize themselves as cooperatives, or with individuals who are not creditworthy in the sense of being able to offer formal security for loans. In fact, a credit supervisor might usefully be attached to each cooperative to guide it in its early and most difficult years.

In its lending operations the Bank will frequently encounter cases where peasants labor under such a crushing debt burden that they have no hope of emancipation. Under such circumstances additional credits designed to improve the farmer's position become impossible unless the existing

[19] See Annex E, p. 345.

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debt can be reduced to manageable proportions. The mission recommends 453
therefore that Syria enact legislation establishing procedures under which the Bank can obtain an amicable and, if necessary, a compulsory adjustment of past indebtedness as a prerequisite to the extension of fresh credit calculated to set the farmer on his feet. The legislation adopted in Cyprus on this subject is likely to provide valuable guidance.

To carry out this expanded credit program the management of the Bank must be strengthened as much as possible. Competent management can be secured only if salaries comparable with those paid in commercial banks are offered. The board of directors should be carefully chosen from among citizens who have a genuine interest in agricultural credit. The inclusion of a qualified commercial banker would provide the board with valuable experience even though an agricultural credit institution should obviously not be operated just like a commercial bank. For the supervised credit program and the work with cooperatives it will be desirable to obtain the services of an expert foreign adviser. The bank management should be largely autonomous and free to determine its own operating procedures.

Cooperatives[20] 454

The mission has already indicated its belief that cooperatives should become an important vehicle for the extension of credit to farmers. Unfortunately few cooperatives now exist. Although 28 are officially registered, the great majority of them manifestly exist only on paper. Yet there are instances of successful cooperative organization, such as the olive growers' cooperative at Tartous. Nor is interest wholly lacking among farmers. In the past a considerable number of villages have appealed in vain to the government for assistance in the formation of cooperatives. The work carried on by the Near East Foundation in certain villages indicates that farmers are quick to respond when the advantages of cooperative action are pointed out to them.

In principle cooperatives can become important agencies of self-help. They can stimulate the development of a democratic community spirit and a sense of self-reliance among peasants who now feel helpless and excessively dependent on the landlord, merchant and money-lender.

[20] See Annex E, p. 348.

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ANNEX E *NOTES ON AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS*

1 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF SYRIA

General

453 652 Of the estimated £S 100 million–£S 120 million of agricultural credit outstanding in 1953, some 10-15% was furnished by the private commercial banks (including the Commercial Department of the BSL), probably 50% by moneylenders and merchants, and somewhat more than 35% by the Agricultural Bank of Syria. In view of its future role the mission adds the following note on the ABS. The other sources of credit are dealt with in the Main Report.

652 654 The Agricultural Bank operates throughout Syria. In addition to its central Damascus office it has three main branches, in Aleppo, Latakia and Deir ez Zor, and 27 sub-branches in the more important towns. The facilities, however, are not adequate to channel an adequate volume of loans down to the level of the small farmer.

The ABS is a governmental institution, administered by a General Director and a board of nine directors, six representing respectively the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and National Economy, and the Chambers of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and three selected by the Council of Ministers. Since 1950 the functions of the ABS have been considerably broadened. In addition to making loans to farmers, it now performs such extra-banking functions as purchasing and selling seeds, insecticides, and machinery, purchasing land and helping small farmers develop improved farm practices, and importing agricultural equipment. At present, it does not make loans directly to cooperatives. Loans have been granted to individual members with the joint guarantee of other members rather than to a cooperative association itself (the Bank Act, as redrafted (see below), would empower the ABS to lend directly to cooperatives). The limitations on extending loans for agricultural purposes are not to be found so much in the functions of the Bank as in the provisions dealing with the conditions under which loans may be granted. A principal objective should be the removal of burdensome restrictions and the substitution of desirable and sound loan policies.

الودائع (تحت الطلب ولاجل معين) والنقد في الصندوق وفي المصارف الاخرى لاهم المصارف العاملة في الجمهورية السورية
(بالوف الليرات)

DEMAND DEPOSITS AND TIME DEPOSITS CASH IN HAND AND CASH AT BANKERS FOR THE PRINCIPAL BANKS OPERATING IN SYRIA
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

As at the end of	Deposits الودائع: الجموع Total	تحت الطلب Demand deposits	لاجل معين Time deposits	النقد في الصندوق وفي المصارف الاخرى Cash in hand and at bankers	في نهاية
1951					**١٩٥١**
January	175,002	168,527	6,475	18,976	كانون الثاني
February	169,934	163,265	6,669	21,580	شباط
March	156,469	149,756	6,713	23,123	آذار
April	169,589	153,140	6,448	23,907	نيسان
May	158,845	151,528	7,317	26,674	ايار
June	165,463	157,931	7,532	27,800	حزيران
July	183,573	174,683	8,890	48,465	تموز
August	200,294	190,340	9,954	60,456	آب
September	195,039	184,218	10,821	48,213	ايلول
October	183,889	172,754	11,135	27,161	تشرين اول
November	200,532	187,553	12,979	29,770	تشرين الثاني
December	198,391	185,176	13,215	33,196	كانون اول
1952					**١٩٥٢**
January	202,966	193,670	9,296	28,270	كانون الثاني
February	205,645	175,221	30,424	33,648	شباط
March	220,073	189,914	30,159	40,681	آذار
April	223,991	188,523	35,468	43,514	نيسان
May	201,131	168,646	32,485	36,343	ايار
June	206,303	171,815	34,488	41,930	حزيران
July	215,096	180,511	34,585	37,192	تموز
August	221,809	193,935	27,874	29,081	آب
September	227,194	196,562	30,632	36,430	ايلول
October	223,594	193,012	30,582	34,829	تشرين اول
November	226,951	193,062	33,889	34,782	تشرين الثاني
December	241,955	198,617	43,338	45,017	كانون اول
1953					**١٩٥٣**
January	234,723	200,165	34,558	40,479	كانون الثاني
February	235,884	200,772	35,112	39,624	شباط
March	236,618	204,782	31,836	33,960	آذار
April	238,440	223,835	14,405	39,393	نيسان
May	227,550	211,542	16,008	28,969	ايار
June	231,156	210,916	20,240	34,951	حزيران
July	265,406	251,200	13,606	37,098	تموز
August	276,846	263,543	13,303	41,522	آب
September	278,647	263,787	14,860	36,525	ايلول
October	276,346	245,551	30,795	47,608	تشرين اول
November	289,878	263,260	26,618	37,967	تشرين الثاني
December	292,478	265,244	27,504	43,604	كانون اول

FINANCE

453

السلفات (الخاصة بالاستيراد والعامة) والسندات المحسومة لاهم المصارف العاملة في الجمهورية السورية
(بالوف الليرات)

ADVANCES AND BILLS DISCOUNTED FOR THE PRINCIPAL BANKS OPERATING IN SYRIA
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 8 — جدول رقم ٨

As at the end of	مجموع السندات المحسومة والسلفات Bills discounted and advances	السندات المحسومة Bills discounted	Advances السلفات			في نهاية
			الجموع Total	الخاصة بالاستيراد For imports	العام General	
1951						١٩٥١
January	104.636	30.276	71.360	10,737	63,625	كانون الثاني
February	106.452	33.194	73,258	13,888	59,370	شباط
March	99,403	32.924	66,479	13,501	52,978	آذار
April	101,201	30.512	70,689	11,028	59,661	نيسان
May	104.536	30.491	74,045	10,541	63,504	أيار
June	107,438	29.160	78,278	9,463	68,815	حزيران
July	104,865	24.787	80,078	9,975	70,103	تموز
August	106.600	30,438	78,162	8,059	70,103	آب
September	121.837	30.551	91,286	7,362	83,924	أيلول
October	141,036	34,678	106,358	8,790	97,568	تشرين اول
November	154.711	43.237	111,434	8,349	103,125	تشرين الثاني
December	142.852	33.650	109,202	8.322	100,880	كانون اول
1952						١٩٥٢
January	146.933	31.138	115,795	9,638	106,157	كانون الثاني
February	149,211	32.239	116,972	11,664	105,308	شباط
March	160.571	33.555	127,016	11.932	115,084	آذار
April	162.399	33.884	128,515	10.211	118,304	نيسان
May	146.29[illegible]	37.003	139,292	7.964	131.328	أيار
June	176,936	37,448	139,488	6,901	132,587	حزيران
July	185.967	34,570	151.417	7,922	143,495	تموز
August	168.550	34,199	134,351	8,031	126,320	آب
September	203,160	33,382	169.778	7,411	162,367	أيلول
October	211,343	34,927	176,416	8,149	168,236	تشرين اول
November	216,436	35.782	180,654	9,655	170,999	تشرين الثاني
December	214,187	34,633	179,554	8,688	170,866	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	223,892	33.600	190,292	10,201	180,091	كانون الثاني
February	217.908	32.929	184.979	11,588	173.391	شباط
March	228.347	35.219	193.128	11,360	181,768	آذار
April	239,126	42.039	197,037	7,082	190,005	نيسان
May	229.147	48.380	180.767	10,285	140.482	أيار
June	248.466	54.250	194,216	7,734	186,482	حزيران
July	197,223	64.751	132,472	—	—	تموز
August	199.526	63,431	136.093	—	—	آب
September	216,037	66.877	149,160	—	—	أيلول
October	234,352	65,873	168,479	—	—	تشرين اول
November	237,193	66.910	170,283	—	—	تشرين الثاني
December	218.994	74.626	144,368	—	—	كانون اول

Source : Credit and Currency Board — المصدر : مجلس النقد والتسليف

التالية

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نسبة مجموع السندات المحسومة والسلفات الى مجموع الودائع ونسبة مجموع السلفات الى مجموع الودائع

(المبالغ بالوف الليرات السورية)

RATIO OF TOTAL BILLS DISCOUNTED AND ADVANCES TO TOTAL DEPOSITS AND RATIO OF ADVANCES TO DEPOSITS

Table No. 9 (Amounts in L.S. '000) جدول رقم ٩

As at the end of	مجموع السندات المحسومة والسلفات Total bills discounted and advances	مجموع السلفات الخاصة والعامة Advances	مجموع الودائع Total Deposits	السلفات الى الودائع ٪ Advances and b/d to deposits %	مجموع السندات الى الودائع ٪ Ratio of abvances to deposit %	في نهاية
1951						١٩٥١
January	104,636	74,360	175,002	59,8	42,5	كانون الثاني
February	106,452	73,258	169,934	62,6	43,1	شباط
March	99,403	66,479	156,469	63,5	42,5	آذار
April	101,201	70,689	159,589	63,4	44,3	نيسان
May	104,536	74,045	158,845	65,8	46,6	أيار
June	107,438	78,278	165,463	64,9	47,3	حزيران
July	104,865	80,078	183,573	57,1	43,6	تموز
August	108,600	78,162	200,294	54,2	39,0	آب
September	121,837	91,286	195,039	62,5	46,8	أيلول
October	141,036	106,358	183,889	76,7	57,8	تشرين اول
November	154,711	111,474	200,532	77,2	55,6	تشرين الثاني
December	142,852	109,202	198,391	72,0	55,0	كانون اول
1952						١٩٥٢
January	146,933	115,795	202,966	72,4	57,1	كانون الثاني
February	149,211	116,972	205,645	72,6	56,9	شباط
March	160,571	127,016	220,073	73,0	57,7	آذار
April	162,399	128,515	223,991	72,5	57,4	نيسان
May	176,295	139,292	201,131	87,7	69,3	أيار
June	176,936	139,488	206,303	85,8	67,6	حزيران
July	185,987	151,417	215,096	86,5	70,4	تموز
August	168,550	134,351	221,809	76,0	60,6	آب
September	203,160	169,778	227,194	89,4	74,7	أيلول
October	211,343	176,416	223,594	94,6	78,9	تشرين اول
November	216,436	180,654	226,961	95,4	79,6	تشرين الثاني
December	214,187	179,554	241,955	88,5	74,2	كانون اول
1953						١٩٥٣
January	223,892	190,292	234,723	95,4	81,0	كانون الثاني
February	217,908	184,979	235,884	92,4	78,4	شباط
March	228,347	193,128	236,618	96,5	81,6	آذار
April	239,126	197,087	238,440	100,3	82,7	نيسان
May	229,147	180,767	227,550	100,7	79,4	أيار
June	248,466	194,216	231,156	107,5	84,0	حزيران
July	197,223	132,472	265,406	74,3	49,9	تموز
August	199,526	136,095	276,846	72,0	49,2	آب
September	216,037	149,160	278,647	77,5	53,5	أيلول
October	234,352	168,479	276,346	84,8	61,0	تشرين اول
November	237,193	170,283	289,878	81,8	58,7	تشرين الثاني
December	218,994	144,368	292,748	74,8	49,3	كانون اول

Source : Credit and Currency Board. المصدر : مجلس النقد والتسليف

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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investment in cotton growing, prices began to rise once more. 435
At the end of 1951 rising import prices, coupled with the poor 439
grain crop, were reflected in local retail prices, and prices continued to rise until mid-1952, when governmental action and steadier import prices had a salutary effect. Thus, generally speaking, the retail price of household goods has risen five or six times since before the war, and the currency in circulation has also risen despite the fact that the official credit policy has been restrictive; although the note issue is now only £S46 million higher than in 1946 (at 31 December 1951 it was £S248 million), bank deposits have increased from £S96·2 million at the end of 1949 to £S198·3 million at the end of 1951. At that date the currency was covered, as to gold 9·9 per cent, foreign exchange 6 per cent, commercial bonds 1·4 per cent, treasury bills 33·5 per cent, and state loans or guarantees 48·9 per cent.

Direct taxation on income and the land accounts for only 651
about a quarter of the Syrian budget;[1] this is less than before 652
the war, for the proportionate amount from the land has fallen from 30 per cent to about 14 per cent in 1950; the estimate for 1952 was 18 per cent. Receipts from customs duties have increased considerably and these, with other indirect taxes, have helped to make the burden less 'fairly' distributed. Indirect taxes are levied on sugar, petroleum, and other essential commodities. Budgetary expenditure since before the war has increased seventeenfold, and since 1949 the total annual expenditure has increased by more than a quarter; but whereas expenditure on health, education, and public works has increased only slightly, that on defence has trebled and accounts for over a third of total expenditure. Agriculture, with only 2 per cent of the budget, is insufficiently provided for and it is hoped that its share will be increased.

Banking is largely but not exclusively in the hands of foreign 453
banks; La Banque de Syrie et du Liban (French) has the concession for the note issue, but there is talk of starting a Syrian National Bank; among other commercial banks are La Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (French) and the British Bank of the Middle East. The foreign-exchange market 457
has always been less influential than that of Beirut, but in this respect Aleppo is growing in importance. There is a recognized free market for exchange[2] in which merchants and Government alike deal. The official rate of £S6·19 = £1, used mainly for Government transactions, was abolished in June 1953 for all purposes except Government transactions with petroleum com-

[1] See table 2, p. 502 below. [2] See table 3, p. 503 below.

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The banking system was developed, but this improvement was partly offset by the shocks caused by successive devaluations of the franc, to which the Syrian pound was linked on an exchange standard. Slight reforms were introduced in the fiscal system, and steps were taken to protect industry. Until 1924, the Ottoman tariff of 11 per cent on almost all goods had remained in force. In 1924, a distinction was made between members of the League of Nations and the United States, goods from which were subjected to the "normal" tariff of 15 per cent, and other countries, 1/ which paid the "maximum" of 30 per cent; industrial machinery was exempted from customs duties. In 1926, the normal rate was raised to 25 per cent and the maximum to 50 per cent. In 1928, duties on raw materials and fuels were reduced. In the nineteen thirties, the general level of the tariff was lowered, but protection to Syrian industry was increased. As a result, several modern factories were established, and there was also some modernization of the handicrafts, by the installation of improved tools and power driven machinery. 2/

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During the Second World War the large-scale expenditure of Allied troops raised incomes and prices, 3/ thus stimulating agricultural and industrial production, and the reduction of imports also aided local production. Owing to some mechanization, and to the fact that cultivation of marginal land became profitable, the area sown to major field crops increased by about 40 per cent between 1938 and 1945. This extension of acreage was, in some years, offset by a decline in yields, but the grain crop at the end of the war was distinctly greater than before the war. Industry expanded considerably, and communications were improved. The forced saving, due to inflation and the shift to profits, took the form of franc and sterling balances held by Syrian individuals and institutions.

1/ Owing to special arrangements, trade between Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan was exempt from duties on either side.

2/ Both the decline in handicrafts and the rise of modern industry are reflected in the following figures, covering Syria and Lebanon, presented by the Mandatory Government to the League of Nations in 1937: in 1913, there were 310,000 handicraft workers; by 1937, the number had declined to 171,000, most of whom were in Syria; on the other hand, there were 33,000 workers in "modern industries", of whom a little over 40 per cent were in Syria and the rest in Lebanon.

3/ From 1940 to 1944 inclusive, Allied expenditure in Lebanon and Syria totalled £76 million (sterling). In 1939 to 1945, inclusive, Lebanon and Syria had a surplus of 607 million Lebanese-Syrian pounds on current account. The index number of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus rose from 100 in 1938 to 831 in 1945.

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Finance and public finance

The post-war period witnessed some important changes in Syria's monetary and banking system, in its foreign exchange system and in its public finances. The large increase in production, investment and commerce noted above had its counterpart in the development of the banking system 1/ and expansion of the money supply (see table 10), most of which has taken the form of bank deposits.

This expansion of the money supply in the post-war period has not been matched by a rise in prices. Between 1945 and 1949 the trend was downward. The discontinuance of Allied military expenditure, together with a sharp increase in the import of surplus, led to a sizable deficit on current account. 2/ Moreover, the 1945 and 1946 budgets showed a surplus, and although the 1947 and 1948 budgets closed with a deficit the amount involved was small. Investment remained at a low level. The Arab-Israeli war led to a large budget deficit in 1949; this was, however, offset by the very low level of investment and the huge import surplus. The index of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus fell from its peak of 831 in 1945 (1938 = 100) to 478 in 1949. 3/

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During the period 1950 to 1954, on the other hand, prices rose. The large-scale investment in cotton, and the sharp increase in the quantity and value of exports of cotton and cereals, which led to a position approaching equilibrium in the balance of payments (see table 53), raised incomes. Subsidiary factors were pipeline construction, high building activity, 4/ and small budget deficits. The rise in import prices, aggravated by hoarding and speculation in 1950 and 1951, also played a part. The rise in prices remained, however, small in scale. The index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus, in which cotton has a heavy weight, rose from 100 in 1949 to 111 in 1950 and 136 in 1951; the fall in cotton prices led to a drop to 119 in 1952 and 110 in 1953. Improved cotton

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1/ Foreign banks account for the greater part of banking activities in Syria; in recent years several banks have opened branches in Syria and existing banks have set up new offices in the smaller towns. In the first half of 1954 seven new banks, mostly Syrian or Lebanese, were established, bringing the total to seventeen. The country is still, however, inadequately provided with long-term credit for agricultural and industrial development, a gap that has been only partly filled by the Government-owned Agricultural Bank and Government loans to industry (see above).

2/ It is difficult to distinguish between Syria's and Lebanon's shares in the trade of the customs union, but there is no doubt that Syria had a large import surplus. This was not covered by such receipts as revenue from petroleum companies and remittances sent by emigrants.

3/ Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract, 1953. There was no index of wholesale prices in Syria prior to 1949; the wholesale price index in Beirut fell from its peak of 1,038 in 1945 (1939 = 100) to 641 in 1949.

4/ Authorized floor space for new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945 to 166,000 in 1949, 209,000 in 1950, 162,000 in 1951, 210,000 in 1952 and 265,000 in 1953.

ries separated in 1950, and, in consequence, Syria regained free- 651
dom of action in directing her customs and economic policies and 648
in managing her economy on an independent basis.

11. The new Syrian government also had to face serious internal problems, that the Mandatory power with its "Laissez-faire" policy had not attempted to deal with. No factual study of the country was made nor any determined course of economic action undertaken. The following are the most serious of the defects of the economic system at that time :

First there was a lack of statistics and detailed studies upon 659
which to base a sound economic policy. Nor were there any technical and scientific studies of the country's economic resources, or plans for developing and exploiting them. Secondly, the bank- 453
ing system failed in meeting the country's need for agricultural 652
credit and for medium and long term credit. The majority of the banks were branches of foreign banks that specialized in commercial short-term credit operations, and which, with the exception of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, avoided seasonal agricultural lending. All the banks operated without any control or direction. Furthermore, no bank had up to that date been established to deal with industrial or mortgage credit. There was only the Agricultural Bank, established by the government to deal with medium-term agricultural loans, but its regulations, staffing and limited means did not enable it to play a major role in meeting the needs of agriculture. Thirdly there was no money market that 454
could attract national savings and invest them in development projects. People with savings have always preferred to hoard them in the form of gold, or else they invested them in real estate. In addition, foreign capital avoided entry into the country because of restrictions on exchange, and other reasons.

12. During the period 1945 to 1953 the government made a 656
great effort to regulate the Syrian economy in the fields of trade,[1]

1 Legislative Decree No. 14 of December 18, 1951 and its amendments concern the regulation of the possession of, and trade in, raw materials and products. Legislative Decree No. 151, of March 3, 1952 and its amendments concern company law and the law governing firms established outside Syria. Legislative Decree No. 60, of January 13, 1952 and its amendments regulate foreign trade etc.

185 ginning in solving many problems of agriculture, industry, and trade. There is not enough space here to give details of their achievements; it is enough to say that, by continuous and widespread effort, the Syrian government was able to remove external problems and to clear away many of the internal obstacles and restrictions that hampered the country's progress. Thus they prepared the way for the emergence of a policy of economic development, and created many of the essential conditions for its success.

15. Leaving aside particular and secondary problems, we can diagnose Syria's major development problems as follows : National production is still far below capacity ; a large part of national resources and wealth are not yet exploited. Many large-scale projects must be undertaken before any increase in productivity can take place. Such projects are : irrigation, the draining of marshes and extension of cultivable land ; improvement of agricultural methods, utilization of modern machinery and combatting of plant diseases and pests ; exploitation of natural resources such as minerals and mines, and the generation of electric energy and motive power ; the improvement and increase of livestock by better water supplies, shelter and pasturage ; re-afforestation and the preservation of existing forests ; the construction of roads, bridges, ports and airports, and the supplying of means of transport to facilitate communications ; the completion of land surveys and settlement operations in all districts; the construction of general warehouses; the supplying of drinking water and electricity to rural areas. But, whereas the country's needs are great, her financial means are not 454 adequate to cover them. National savings are low in themselves, as we noted above ; people prefer hoarding gold or investing in 652 real estate. There is as yet no financial market in Syria. State finances are necessarily weak so long as they depend on a weak economy. Thus, neither the state nor private individuals can be expected to finance big development.

16. It follows from the above that the economic development of Syria depends on a solution to the following problem : the Syrian economy needs capital and finance projects that will create conditions favourable to its growth ; but, as a result of its weakness and underdevelopment, it lacks the necessary financial means. In other words, the state's financial capacity is small and cannot expand unless national production grows ; and national production cannot grow unless the state's financial capacity expands. How

652 present level. The proportion of current taxes (approximately LS
[65] 200 million) to the national income (approximately LS 1250 million) is 16 per cent. This ratio may seem small if compared with that of other countries, but we should not forget that the national income of Syria is in itself small. What the average tax-payer pays in taxes is cut from his essential expenditure, since his income is not appreciably in excess of his essential expenditure. There is little surplus that the government can reasonably take in the form of taxation.

However, though we cannot depend on taxes to finance development projects, we should not neglect the improvement of methods of tax imposition and collection, and the need for strict inspection in applying taxation laws. It is not improbable that such improvements and inspection may lead to a 15 per cent rise in collected taxes, (about LS 30 million). This could very well be used to cover the desired expansion in ordinary government expenditure and to contribute towards development projects.

In any case, development expenditure tends in the long run to increase national income, thus forming in its turn a new source of public revenue that should not be neglected by the government, particularly since a greater taxation effort is essential to absorb the surplus purchasing power created by development projects and to combat inflation.

454 37. As to internal loans, we have seen that there is no financial
652 market in Syria and that individuals do not embark on such a form of investment. Though we realize the difficulty of creating a financial market in a short period of time, yet we believe that it is possible at the present time to establish a money market, and that, with adequate measures, a financial market dealing with medium term loans could be set up in a relatively short time. Considering that private capital invested in national companies since 1944 has amounted to about LS 100 million, and that the capital invested in individual enterprises, whether industrial, commercial or agricultural, was more than twice the funds spent by the government on development projects, it becomes clear that the possibility of creating a financial market is not out of the question.

The creation of a financial market in Syria is an essential condition for the success of any development policy. Without a financial and money market the authorities concerned will not be able to direct credit affairs effectively, nor to manage monetary policy in the country. The benefits that such a market would bring would

justify the government in adopting measures such as the following: 454 encouraging individuals to invest their funds in medium-term 652 loans yielding relatively high interest and carrying certain guarantees and exemption from taxes; requiring establishments such as insurance companies, social institutions and those individuals who are asked to pay reserve deposits (such as accountants and contractors) to hold their funds in the form of government bonds: in addition, the government could impose certain restrictions upon the activities of certain industries such as building, so as to divert capital towards the financial market. It is not our intention to deal with all measures that could be taken to encourage the financial market in Syria, but merely to indicate both the possibility of creating such a market, and the necessity of its creation as a condition for the success of the development policy, through the power it gives to the government to manipulate credit policy.

38. Another source of finance is borrowing from the Bank of 652 Issue. It is an easy method and attractive to governments, but it is fraught with dangers and pitfalls.

We do not believe that all borrowing from the Bank of Issue for the purpose of financing development projects is necessarily unwise; nor do we believe that it leads in all cases to inflation. The consequences that follow from this type of borrowing depend on the manner in which the loan is used, the economic conditions of the country, the position of the balance of payment and on several other factors.

An additional issue of paper currency for financing development projects can follow two channels: it can either flow abroad in payment for imports that are needed to implement the project, or it can be spent internally to meet local expenditure.

In the first case, paper bills are returned to the Bank of Issue to the same extent to which foreign currencies are drawn from it. Official foreign exchange and gold balances will be reduced, but the paper currency issued will have no impact on national income nor will it have any inflationary effect.

In the second case, the issued paper currency will lead to a rise in national income that may exceed the value of the issued paper. For part of the currency paper that reaches the workers and contractors of development projects will be transferred to other producers, thus giving them additional income and purchasing power, and so on continuously. Circulation of the newly issued paper

job. It is this mechanized farmer-investor who has produced the surplus wheat exportable from Jazirah. Any attempt to reduce his activity by limiting the area of land cultivated by him, or by artificially reducing the prices of his crops for the benefit of the State monopoly, or by ignoring his demands for low production costs, will result in his leaving the job for other occupations. It should be noted also that this type of farmer is in most cases not tied to the land. He usually rents the land he cultivates, and even if he owned land, it is only a small fraction of the area he plants annually. It is always easy for him to rent his lands to peasant farmers and go back to the city. 2441

3. Estimate of a Capitalist Agricultural Enterprise and the Area it needs: A complete outfit of agricultural machinery belonging to a farmer in Jazirah usually consists of the following. A fifty horsepower tractor, a disc plow, a cultivator, a drill, a combine either tractor drawn or self-propelled, a jeep, a truck , and a regular repair shop for immediate repairs in the field. He will have a mechanic and two drivers on an annual basis. The number will rise to about ten during the plowing, seeding, and harvest seasons. This means an outlay of LS 100, 000 in capital to which is added LS 25,-000 for the price of seed, fuel, and miscellaneous expenses. To meet the depreciation on the machinery, cover the annual expenses and interest, and earn a profit, the farmer must plant as large an area of land as his equipment can handle. It is found that he has to plant some 5, 000 dunums annually or better still 6, 000 in order to find his occupation remunerative. To do this, he has to own or rent land double this area since all cultivation in Jazirah is on a two year rotation basis. 407 454 2441

II. Irrigated Agriculture

The Encyclopedia Britannica relates that the region of Nisibin, i. e. Qamishli, was up to the eleventh century planted with fruit trees and that it lost its orchards due to forcible conversion to wheat imposed by the Caliph, as well as ravages by the Bedouin tribes. 2441

Irrigation by pump started with the rice boom in 1945 and expanded with the cotton boom of 1951. It was hit severly by the crop failure of last year and the flood of this spring, and the future of the Khabur appears dim. This is because as previously mentioned, the original amount of capital used to construct a fair sized project is large, amounting to about LS 150-200 thousand. Such a project can irrigate with two 10-inch pumps or their equivalent about 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and double the area in wheat and barley. The project will have one main canal 1 1/2-3 1/3 meters higher than ground level made entirely of earth or lined with cement to carry the water a distance of 1-3 kilometers depending on the lay of the ground, several subsidisary canals, buildings for the motors, the agricultural machinery, and the laborers. 8121 185

Evidently, in order to get the best returns on the capital invested, the farmer needs to exploit to the utmost the capacity of his pumps, otherwise he will be leaving his capital idle. In this case, he will need to cultivate, on a rotation basis, 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and 5, 000 dunums of wheat and barley. But on most of the irrigation projects of the size mentioned, the area of the lands which can be irrigated is less than 1, 500 dunums in all. The surrounding lands are all higher than the main leading canal and can not be reached except by a much greater outlay of capital. This means that the farmer has to extract from an area of 1, 500 dunums, of which one-third lies fallow every year, enough profit in five to eight years, which is the average duration of the lease, to compensate him for his yearly efforts, to pay interest on the capital and to regain his investment. This should mean a net annual profit of about 45, 000 LS or LS 45 per dunum, and experience has proved that it can not be done. 312 454

The alterntive to pump irrigation on the Khabur is irrigation by gravity in works similar to that of Tal Mughass. And the Khabur lends itself in many places to such project. Mr. Delbes, agricultural advisor to Syria during the French Mandate, knows at least of three projects studied by the French High Commissariat, to build dams and derivation canals between Ras el Ain and Hassakeh. The largest one among them is to carry the water west to the region of Jabal Abdel Aziz and irrigate a very large area. 312 654

Another dam site studied by the French is at Sab'Skour. Further south in the region of Fadghami a site was selected to store the

when the wheat crop fails, as it did last year, there is great hardship in all of the Jazirah. Debts remain largely unpaid, the value of land falls off sharply, and interest rates become unbearable

The failure of a crop in Jazirah brings more hardship than is the case in other Mohafazas because Jazirah, with all the money revenue which accrues to it in a good year, has not arrived yet at the stage where it can save a part of this income to use in bad years. All the money revenue is immediately reinvested in machinery and in expansion of the area planted with additonal sums borrowed from the banks or from Aleppo merchants.

The point is reached where further expansion has become difficult, and the situation will become more or less stabilized so that some of the income will be put aside for emergencies in the coming few years. But even when savings reach a high figure, the problem of monoculture is not solved.

Jazirah at present does not produce the necessary vegetables and fruit for its own consumption. It imports them from Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. That is why the cost of living in the town of the Jazirah is one of the highest in Syria. Aside from the price of meat and samneh, everything including room and house rents, is more expensive than in the other big towns of Syria. Even flour is sold to bakers by the town municipalities at the same price for which it is sold in Damascus.

In former times, however, Jazirah produced great amounts of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Its lands are very well suited to raising cattle and beef, an employment more profitable than wheat growing. A diversification in the use of land will make for a more balanced and prosperous economy in Jazirah. But the Jazirah farmers are not to be blamed entirely for the kind of agriculture prevailing. Circumstances beyond their control, connected primarily with the problems of land ownership and tenure, have largely imposed this type of monoculture upon them. These problems will be discussed in the following section, but it can be said in passing that the farmer cannot be expected to invest money in buildings for cattle raising, or in digging wells to provide irrigation for vegetable growing, or in planting orchards on lands to which he has no title or whose title is subject to constant disputes over boundaries with the neighbors and lately by decree-law 96 with the State.

361 At present, agriculture extends in an unbroken line from the
311 Turkish and Iraqi borders south to the Rad and Hassaksh, and west to
365 Ras el Ain and midway to Rakka. Qamishli has all the amenities of a fair-sized city with sewage, electricity, asphalted roads, running water, places of amusement, and modern office buildings and houses. The other towns of Jazirah show similar progress but in a smaller way.

454 All this development could not have been achieved without extensive use of capital. It was stated that the original emigrants to Jazirah whether Christians or Kurds, brought very little capital with them. Whatever they have now was made in Jazirah and not brought from outside.

I. Credit to the Bedouin and Kurd

4521 The nearest commercial market to Jazirah where credit was
438 available was Aleppo. Aleppo merchants first provided goods shipped to the towns of Jazirah to be smuggled into Turkey. And Jazirah merchants working on a commission or partnership basis made good profits. Some of them specialized in lending money to the Bedouins and Kurds and for them, also, credit was available at Aleppo. They borrowed at an interest rate of 9% and lent at 35-50%. Most of them, however, did not lend money outright as a general practice, but sold goods and especially textiles, coffee and sugar to the farmer against bills maturing at harvest time. The exorbitant interest was added over the price of the goods, and the peasant accepted it as a somewhat higher price and did not consider it as interest. Theis system still prevails at the present time.

II. Credit to the Machinery Owner

4521 With the expansion of agriculture and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, credit in much larger amounts became necessary. The farmer using machinery needed two kinds of credit. He needed credit to pay for his machines, and seasonal credit to cover a part of his expenses for wages, seed, fuel, and general expenditures.

In the first years of the War, dealers in agricultural machinery supplied a part of the need by selling on an installment basis for a period of 20 months. But between 1943 and 1948 they demanded cash payment before delivery. In the last four years, they have renewed their credit facilities.

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454 Savings institutions are virtually non-existent. There are no special savings banks and the regular commercial banks do not consider it worth while to make a particular effort to attract savings deposits. In fact, total savings deposits in commercial banks at the end of 1953 amounted to only £S 3.5 million. No postal savings system exists, and savings in the form of insurance are negligible. This does not mean that savings do not accrue, but rather that they do not take institutional form and are invested directly, not through the intermediary of institutions or a capital market. Syrians generally prefer types of investments which are tangible and visible, such as land and buildings, and over which they can exercise some personal control. In the past the habit of putting savings into hoards of precious metals or even currency has also been deeply ingrained. There is some evidence, incapable of statistical measurement, that the relative importance of savings in the form of hoards has declined in the postwar period as opportunities for profitable investment have grown. Investment in corporate securities has greatly increased during this period, but only by limited groups of people and under conditions assuring them control over the corporate enterprise. Shares in industrial companies are bought and sold in an unorganized and very limited market.

Economic Growth

241
311
433 One of the most noteworthy features of the Syrian economy has been its rapid growth over the last two decades, as indicated in Table 3. Agriculture and industry have both featured prominently in this development. The availability of idle land combined with the food shortages attributable to the war provided a tremendous incentive to an expansion of agricultural output. The area under cultivation, including fallow land, rose from about 1.75 million hectares in 1938 to 2.3 million in 1945 and has since continued to expand, reaching a total of around 3.65 million in 1953. The area actually planted to crops and orchards accordingly more than doubled during this entire period, rising from 1.16 million hectares to 2.44 million. By far the greatest part of the area put to the plow was dry farming land. According to official estimates, for example, the amount of land planted to winter wheat and barley increased from about 750,000 hectares in 1938 to 1.13 million in 1945 and 1.34 million in 1953, and the output of these cereals about doubled during the whole period. Following the war a considerable expansion of irrigation took place. By 1953 the irrigated area

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about £S 1,250 million in 1949 and £S 1,380 million in 1950 to perhaps 434 around £S 1,600 million in 1953. Over the whole period this would indicate an increase of about 28%. Since prices in 1953 were about the same as in 1949, the rise in real terms was apparently about the same. While these estimates, based on very inadequate data, are subject to a rather wide margin of error, it is not unlikely that real national income has been rising on the average at an annual rate of 5% to 6%.

Volume of Investment

The expansion of economic activity in the postwar period has entailed 454 a rather high level of investment (see Table 4). While accurate data are not available, the mission has made some rough estimates of gross investment in construction on the basis of building permits and building costs, and of equipment investment on the basis of imports of machinery, equipment and motor trucks. The indicated annual volume of gross private investment has apparently fluctuated between £S 160 million

TABLE 4 Gross Investment

(Million £S)

	1950	1951	1952	1953
Private investment				
Construction (housing, industrial, commercial)	122.0	116.0	127.0	138.0
Industrial machinery	20.0	33.0	28.0	30.3
Agricultural machinery	10.7	35.6	17.3	14.3
Truck transport	8.7	11.0	4.4	2.8
Sub-total	161.4	195.6	176.7	185.4
Public investment				
Irrigation	0.8	0.8	0.8	3.1
Transport and communications	8.1	8.7	6.4	10.1
Education and public health	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.9
Municipal services	12.5	17.1	17.3	22.2
Other construction, including administration buildings	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5
Sub-total	25.8	31.0	28.9	39.8
Total gross investment	187.2	226.6	205.6	225.2

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454 and £S 195 million in the four-year period 1950-53. The average has been about £S 180 million. Of this amount about 70% is accounted for by all building and probably 56% by housing construction. That investment in other sectors, notably agriculture, has not been heavier is undoubtedly due to the fact that most of the increase in farm output has been achieved simply by occupying and cultivating idle land which entailed relatively little investment.

454 652 Public investment has been much more modest. On this subject the data obtained by the mission from various government agencies were conflicting. The available information, reconciled as far as possible, points to an annual total ranging from £S 25 million to £S 40 million, with the average about £S 31 million.

454 The total gross investment, which the mission believes has been rather conservatively estimated, is undoubtedly surprisingly high. On the average, it has probably amounted, over the four years 1950-53, to 13-14% of the gross national product. By comparison with other underdeveloped countries in Asia, this rate of investment represents a remarkable record of achievement. There is no evidence either in the balance of international payments or in the price structure that this volume of investment over the four-year period as a whole was financed by inflationary means. It was apparently financed for the most part from genuine savings, supplemented by some inflow of capital from abroad. In the immediate postwar years much of the investment was probably financed from the enforced savings accumulated during the war. Wartime money incomes were high. Commerce profited heavily from the scarcity of goods, and Allied troop expenditures in Syria were substantial. Money circulation increased sharply, but against a French franc counterpart. At the same time the shortage of goods kept down spending. Assets abroad increased, as did savings in the form of gold and precious stones. One source estimates that foreign assets, quite apart from the French franc counterpart of domestic currency circulation and savings in gold and precious stones, rose during the war by £S 325 million.[6] Part of such savings was undoubtedly used for consumption after the war, but a significant portion was probably invested at home. A substantial part of the profits earned in the postwar expansion of agriculture, industry and commerce was evidently reinvested. The business

[6] Mohammed Thome, *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie depuis la première Guerre Mondiale jusqu'à nos Jours* (Madrid, Ediciones Castilla, S.A. 1953), pp. 217-18.

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community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing.

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads.

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the government to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network.

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its development at which the government must undertake a more important promotional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has

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and provide for a number of reciprocal tariff reductions and even exemptions, and has been considering the renewal in some form of the close economic ties with Lebanon which prevailed before 1950. All the Arab countries joined in 1953 in an Inter-Arab Economic Agreement providing for tariff reductions on a considerable number of industrial products without, however, affecting other barriers to trade.

The establishment of a common Arab market will undoubtedly take time. The history of the Benelux economic union demonstrates that it can only be achieved gradually and then only if there is a full understanding among the partners of each other's problems and a willingness to make concessions and sacrifices. A single market cannot be established simply by a progressive elimination of trade barriers; it entails also a gradual coordination of those economic policies and measures which govern the conditions under which enterprise in the various countries operates. To bring national cost and price structures into line with each other and to equalize the conditions of competition, it will be necessary to harmonize, step by step, fiscal, monetary and exchange policies, the terms governing access to raw materials and equipment and the legislation regulating labor conditions and providing assistance to industry. If this can be accomplished, the possibilities of further industrial development in the Arab world are likely to be significantly greater.

Establishment of an Investment Bank

The mission attaches great importance to the establishment of an institution capable of furnishing both technical and financial assistance to industry. When industrialists have insufficient capital for investment at present, they can turn only to the government; the banks provide only working capital. As already indicated, the government began in 1949 to guarantee loans for this purpose through the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. During the period June 1949-January 1952, 18 such loans totaling £S 23.6 million were made, although by the end of 1953 repayments had reduced the balance to £S 13.4 million. This guaranteed-loan scheme was suspended in 1952 but revived at the beginning of 1954, subject to a limitation of £S 15 million on the entire amount outstanding.

For a number of reasons we believe that this method of financial assistance ought to be abandoned. Although the interest rate of 3%, which has been made possible only because of the government guarantee and the

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454 large government deposits with the BSL, is undoubtedly attractive to the borrower, these loans entail a risk of inflation, unless at the same time there are offsetting deflationary factors operating in the economy. Moreover, the extension of loans to industry calls for judgments on the technical and economic soundness of business enterprises and the exclusion of all political considerations, which is very difficult for any government. It requires close scrutiny and supervision of borrowers, which can hardly be carried out by a government agency because private enterprise strongly resists such government control.

In our opinion, a privately managed and privately owned investment institution would be in a much better position than any government agency to give industry the type of assistance which it needs at its present stage of development. We have already stressed that under present conditions technical assistance is as much needed as financial assistance. On the basis of our consultations with Syrian businessmen we are convinced that the latter would hardly accept technical assistance from the government, not only because they would have no confidence in the government's ability to provide it but also because they would not countenance the detailed government inspection of their methods of doing business which might be involved.

The technical help which the institution we propose might give would take the form both of advising existing factories and shops on improving their methods of operation and of appraising the soundness of proposed new industrial ventures. For this purpose the bank would need a small technical staff, including a cost accountant, an economist and a few engineers who could advise on plant layout, work flow, costing, requirements for new machinery and equipment and the like. The bank's investment activities would be closely related to its technical services. It could finance both new equipment for existing plants where this is demonstrably necessary to improve efficiency and reduce costs, and also new enterprises judged by its expert staff to be economically and technically feasible. The bank should, however, be paid for technical services unrelated to projects which it would assist in financing.

Although the bank's primary function would be to assist manufacturing industries, we envisage that it might also help finance the tourist industry, particularly hotels, and the purchase of machinery, sinking of wells or installation of pumps by agriculturists who might be considered as engaged in commercial-farming operations and who are not among the

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small farmers principally served by the Agricultural Bank. The bank's 454 financing would presumably be largely in the form of loans, although its operations should be flexible enough to permit, in case of need, underwriting or equity participation. The interest rate on loans should be high enough to ensure that private capital will be invested in the bank and will for that reason have to be substantially higher than that of the BSL government-guaranteed loans. Moreover, new industrial investments in Syria should be able to earn a higher return, at least in the long run; and where the short-term return, as distinct from the long-term prospects, is likely to be less favorable, the bank could provide its financial assistance in the form of equity participation. As far as agricultural investment is concerned, most farm operators now pay a higher rate of interest when purchasing machinery on credit.

We suggest that the investment bank be capitalized at £S 15 million, of which £S 10 million might, if necessary, be paid up in installments within a few years. This capital would be subscribed by private individuals and institutions and would be matched by a contribution from the government which might take the form of a long-term advance. We believe it essential that the bank be privately owned and privately managed if it is to inspire confidence in the business community. At the same time, it will need supplemental resources from the government in order to ensure its success. The government contribution should be made on such terms that the net income of the institution would first be used to assure a minimum dividend on the privately-held share capital. Only under such an arrangement could sufficient private capital be attracted. We estimate that the bank should be able to earn an adequate return on its share capital when the amount of its investments approximates £S 15 million. In the first few years of its operations, the Bank might suffer small losses which would, however, be covered out of profits in ensuing years.

It might be argued that this proposal is not advantageous to the government. The real test, however, is whether the institution would make an important contribution to the economic development of the country which the government is anxious to stimulate. We believe that the proposed bank could play an important role in stimulating and directing sound private investment. In addition to mobilizing domestic private capital, it could become the means for attracting foreign capital to Syria. A number of Asiatic countries have perceived the advantage of government-assisted private investment institutions. Thus, India has organized an investment

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454 corporation on a basis similar to the one we recommend, and Pakistan is contemplating the establishment of such an institution.

We have little doubt that the suggested bank would find ample opportunities for investment. While there is no absolute assurance that private capital can be found for the bank, our preliminary exploration in Syria warrants some optimism on this score. Commercial banks might well subscribe a substantial part of this capital, and the balance could probably be obtained from private individuals and business concerns.

While the bank would not make loans for working capital, it might indirectly make it easier for companies to obtain working capital from the regular commercial banks. The mission found that a number of industrial enterprises do have difficulty in obtaining sufficient working capital, particularly to finance heavy seasonal purchases of such agricultural raw materials as cotton, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables for canning. The proposed bank might explore the possibility of financing the construction of bonded warehouses in Damascus and Aleppo where industrial enterprises could store raw materials and even finished goods in such a way as to furnish ample security for additional commercial bank credit.

Vocational Education

874 464 While appropriate technical and financial assistance can do much to raise industrial efficiency, the better training of labor is also important. At present vocational education is seriously inadequate. There is an urgent need to expand and improve vocational schooling so that it will effectively serve the requirements of industry and business and will be properly related to in-plant training. Specific recommendations on this subject are made in a subsequent chapter on education.

Projected Oil Refinery

491 382 With the exception of one ill-starred venture in which it went into partnership with private capital, the government has wisely left the ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises to private initiative. We are strongly convinced that this policy should continue to be followed. During the last few years it has been proposed from time to time that the government depart from this rule by establishing and operating a petro-

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652 advances made by the Exchange Office under international payments agreements; (4) Treasury notes that might eventually have to be remitted by the government to cover its subscription to the IMF and IBRD; and (5) Treasury certificates, bills and bonds issued or guaranteed by the state up to a limit of £S 60 million, provided their issuance is authorized by law. The operations contemplated under (1), (2), (3) and (4) would not apparently lead to the creation of additional money, except to the extent that advances might have to be made to the Exchange Office to finance a surplus of local payments under international payments agreements. Syria has, however, no payments agreements at present, and the problem is not likely to assume considerable magnitude in the future. Thus only under (5) could a real new money-creating debt develop, i.e., to a total of £S 60 million.

These provisions, which have already become effective, impress us as a salutary restraint on inflationary deficit financing. We urge, however, that the draft legislation already prepared for the consolidation and appropriate management of the direct and indirect state debt be enacted as promptly as possible.

Government securities must therefore be floated on terms attractive enough to ensure their sale to customers other than the central bank. Just what the terms should be can be only established by a survey of the potential market (commercial banks and individuals) conducted with expert advice. In any event it would be advisable to err on the generous side. Treasury bills would probably have to carry interest rates of at least 2½% and government bonds from 6-7% depending on the relative attractiveness of other investments and the maturity of the issue. Judging from the experience of the Port of Latakia, which sought to market shares with a guaranteed return of 5%, the latter rate is likely to be too low, at least initially. Long-term bonds are almost certainly unmarketable. At the beginning the maximum maturity would probably have to be 3-5 years. This is all the more true because commercial banks would presumably be the principal investors until the public became more accustomed to the idea of investing in government securities.

652 454 In most countries, savings are in large part mobilized by such institutional means as banks, special savings banks, insurance companies, and social insurance or provident funds. These institutionalized savings are then in turn largely invested in government bonds or other bonds. In Syria, as we have already pointed out, there are no institutions other than

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the regular banks which are capable of mobilizing funds in this way. 652 454
Thus one important element in the market for bonds is lacking.

Institutional savings obviously cannot be developed within a short period. For the longer run, however, it is important that steps be taken in the next few years to stimulate such savings. Among the steps that the mission would recommend are the following:

1. The government should start paying its government servants, at least those in the upper half of the civil service grades, by check, so as to familiarize them with the use of banks and thus indirectly encourage them to make deposits in banks. Such a measure, though not of great importance, could at least be quickly implemented.

2. The Council of Money and Credit should canvass with the commercial banks the possibility of stimulating the development of savings and time deposits. Among the measures that might be discussed for adoption are (1) the possibility of establishing a greater differential between interest rates on current deposits on the one hand and those on time and savings deposits on the other without necessarily increasing the over-all interest burden of the banks; (2) the possibility of attaching some lottery feature to time and savings deposits (this is done in some countries such as Japan); and (3) the inauguration of a joint government-bank campaign designed to show how deposits in banks for given periods can "grow."

3. The government should look to the gradual introduction of a postal savings system. Such a system might be inaugurated on a trial basis in one of the larger cities. It would necessitate a publicity campaign in which the cooperation of teachers, religious leaders and the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture should be enlisted.

4. The government should take various measures to encourage savings 652
through insurance. Among these are (1) the drafting, with expert foreign 456
assistance, of a modern insurance law designed to ensure that investors in life insurance are protected to the maximum extent possible and to lay down some stipulations regarding the portion of assets representing Syrian business that must be invested in Syria; (2) conferences with representatives of insurance companies doing business in Syria and neighboring countries, designed to explore the steps which might be taken to increase the volume of Syrian individual life and group insurance business through such measures as better training of agents and subagents, publicity campaigns, etc.; (3) exploration, with the help of ILO, of the possibility of introducing some forms of social insurance, particularly accident and

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652 old age insurance, on a modest scale in Syria; and (4) enlisting the support
456 of Moslem religious leaders for insurance in the form of a pronouncement that the taking out of insurance is not contrary to Koranic teachings. Regarding the latter, it should be noted that such a pronouncement was obtained in Egypt quite some time ago. Egypt is one Moslem country where life insurance has slowly developed. There the face value of life insurance policies has increased from £E 30 million, with premium payments of £E 1.25 million, in 1942, to £E 67.7 million, with premium payments of £E 3 million, in 1951.

652 Since rapid results cannot be expected from measures to foster "insti-
454 tutionalized savings", the question arises whether the government can be expected to find a market for its securities under the conditions to be anticipated over the next six years. We have had occasion to point out that the considerable savings in Syria flow for the most part directly into investments of various kinds without the intermediary of a market, and that tangible investments, particularly in real estate, are generally preferred. At the same time the success of industrial companies in the postwar period and the tendency toward greater dispersion of their shares point to an increasing willingness to invest in securities. Moreover, as we have indicated elsewhere, private investment opportunities may not increase in the future at the same rate as in the past. The provision of additional agricultural credit through such a public institution as the Agricultural Bank may also displace some private funds now devoted to such financing. In theory, therefore, private funds may become available for investment in public securities. It is always possible, of course, that they may go, instead, into hoards or increased consumption. However, there has been a marked tendency in Syria to save and invest, and if savers and investors can be persuaded that government securities offer an attractive return and are safe, they might be expected gradually to venture into public investment.

A rate of return of 6% on government bonds might be attractive, at least to those who have been investing in building, where the return has been comparatively modest and where it might be expected to decline in the future. Lack of confidence in the government, in its determination to repay and in its use of public funds, is no doubt the most important obstacle. Such confidence is likely to be established only gradually. The government may already have contributed somewhat to this confidence in the last two years by stabilizing the value of the Syrian pound in relation to other currencies and by maintaining internal financial equilibrium. Special bond

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issues for specific projects which have impressed the business community as specially worthwhile may be more successful than those intended to raise funds for general government purposes. 652 454

During the period when full confidence in the government is lacking, people may be reluctant to "freeze" their funds in government securities. In the absence of a market where securities can be readily traded, such funds do tend to be frozen until the maturity of the government security. This difficulty might be overcome by providing that government bonds, even though issued for a stated number of years, will in principle be redeemed at stated prices at intervals of six months. If the bonds are originally issued on a discount basis and the redemption prices fixed in such a way that the implied interest rate increases the longer the bond is retained, a definite incentive to longer retention is provided. At the same time the investor has the assurance that he will always be repaid at short notice. Such a bond may also be appealing for bank investment in view of its liquidity. For the government it admittedly has a disadvantage in that the volume of redemption payments cannot be anticipated. In emergencies the government can, however, borrow from the central bank to meet the redemption payments. Such recourse, except for temporary purposes, is not to be recommended, but if the very possibility of prompt repayment strengthens confidence, it may in the longer run make unnecessary net borrowing from the central bank to meet redemption payments. To increase the attractiveness of investment in government bonds, the incorporation of a lottery feature may also be considered.

Any prediction as to the amount of government securities the "public" may be expected to absorb is exceedingly hazardous. It might be noted here that even if only 2% of gross private investment in 1953 (which was about £S 185 million) were to be diverted annually to investment in government securities, this would amount to a total of £S 18.5 million over five years. It may not be unreasonable to expect that over this period public purchases of government securities might range between £S 10 million and £S 20 million. Some underdeveloped countries such as India and Ceylon have been surprised by the unexpectedly favorable response of private investors to issues of government bonds.

In a number of underdeveloped countries commercial banks have been persuaded to finance a substantial amount of public indebtedness. Syrian commercial banks might well become the major buyers of government bonds; this may or may not be economically advisable, depending on the 652

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258 The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury
402 export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the
433 majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

265 For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber
402 boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and
433 sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

472 The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises
454 was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

454 This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority
471 of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

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first postwar period, ample opportunities outside industry (trade, agriculture and real estate). 464 471

The main source of the capital which founded these new industries was commercial profits accumulated during the war by Syrians in and outside Syria; a certain amount of Lebanese capital seems to have been contributed. Many companies were able to operate with the capital originally subscribed, but in some cases the paid-up capital was mainly or entirely absorbed by land, buildings and equipment, leaving little or nothing for working capital. The mission encountered several instances in which working capital had been supplied by banks on an overdraft basis at a rate of 5% to 7%, but mostly for rather limited amounts only. In a number of cases, however, when larger amounts were required, industrial firms had recourse to a scheme of government-guaranteed industrial credits introduced in 1949. Although it was reserved for industrial corporations and thus did not cover the needs of the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises not organized in that form, it has been very helpful to the companies which were able to benefit from it while passing through a difficult initial period of inadequate financial resources. Such credits were made available by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban for three years (now renewable for an additional five years) at the low rate of 3%. 464

Most Syrian industrialists, hard working and thrifty as they are, prefer to forego paying dividends rather than remain indebted or incur new indebtedness with banks. In most cases loans for working capital are paid off as soon as possible; new machinery is generally purchased with plowed-back earnings and often reserve funds are formed with a view to making further extension or modernization. In several instances the originally subscribed capital has been increased by issuing new stock to the old shareholders. The government-guaranteed loans, on the other hand, are so exceptionally attractive that in the difficult circumstances at the time the plan was initiated there was a great readiness to apply for them and later to have them extended. However, during the last few years the government has become more reluctant to give this scheme a wider application. The total amount which can be guaranteed is now limited to £S 15 million. At the end of 1953 loans outstanding amounted to £S 13.4 million.

On the whole, the development of Syrian industry has been on a sound basis from the financial point of view. True, one frequently finds considerable amounts of loan debts on the balance sheet of industrial corpora- 499 454

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453 tions; these, however, often represent contributions to working capital by
454 members of the owner-family or an inner circle of controlling shareholders who for various reasons prefer this technique to accepting additional stock. This may be an unfortunate situation from the legal point of view, although in practice it does not seem substantially to weaken the continuity of the capitalization. The government-guaranteed loans may be subject to criticism, particularly with regard to the applicable interest rate, which is much below that reasonably to be expected in a country where capital is relatively scarce. However, thanks to the provision that in each case these loans may not exceed half the paid-up capital of the borrower, they have not dangerously affected the financial structure of the companies concerned. Yet the mission feels that the entire system of government-guaranteed industrial loans financed by the BSL does not at this stage provide an appropriate and adequate solution to the problem of supplementing the traditional means of financing industrial development.

433 Although the larger gaps in the main fields in which conditions for modern industrial production are reasonably favorable have either been filled or are rapidly being filled, the industrialization movement is far from being exhausted. All the evidence indicates that it will continue to spread, though probably at a slower rate than in the years immediately preceding 1952 and along more selective lines. With the limits of the home market within reach or already reached, further development of existing industries will depend largely on their success in attaining a higher degree of efficiency and reducing production costs. In view of these trends and requirements the mission is of the opinion that a specialized credit institution is needed to furnish both technical assistance and industrial banking facilities, to the extent that these are presently lacking, and to provide a firmer basis for further investment financing. A more detailed proposal for such an investment bank will be found in the Main Report.

Labor

464 According to an official estimate, the number of workers employed in Syrian industry (excluding electrical productions, commerce, etc. and enterprises employing only family members) is approximately 70,000. In some industries, particularly in the textile sector, the supply of skilled labor is barely sufficient for present needs, but unskilled labor is generally

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The recommendations of the mission with regard to agriculture and animal husbandry, including those concerning land tenure and irrigation, would, if accepted, open significant new perspectives to the farmer and farm laborers and tend to check the drift from rural areas. If it were possible to spend more on irrigation than has been recommended, the trend could perhaps be reversed. It is not likely, however, that the growing labor supply can be absorbed and unemployment avoided without further industrialization. Even on the highly optimistic assumption that migration towards the towns can be halted, Syria must contend with such factors as the natural increase in the industrial labor population and the gradual shift from handicraft to mechanization with the consequent release of manpower.

Although estimates in this field are particularly hazardous, the mission suggests that under the most favorable circumstances Syria will have to create at least 20,000-25,000 new industrial jobs during the next six years to keep its industrial labor market in reasonable balance.

Limiting Factors

It is often contended in Syrian official and business circles that shortage of local capital rather than lack of confidence is the principal factor limiting further industrialization. Assuming that this is so, it would follow that to advance development Syria should make a strenuous effort to create attractive conditions for foreign capital as a supplementary source of industrial financing. This conclusion does not seem to be generally acknowledged. At least the nationalization of foreign-owned public utilities without settling the matter of indemnification of their proprietors, and the regulations with respect to foreign companies working in Syria, do not indicate its acceptance.

There is, however, room for some doubt whether scarcity of capital should be considered as a major factor limiting development of Syrian industry. During the past eight years, investments in industry have supplied the country with an industrial capacity capable of meeting most of the need for manufactured articles, based on local primary production, which the population can afford; indeed, as already pointed out, in several branches of industry there is excess capacity. Generally speaking, Syrian industry appears to have attracted substantial amounts of capital. Even taking into account the fact that the sources of industrial investment

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

capital were enriched by accumulated war profits and repatriated capital, it seems likely that under generally favorable economic conditions and with improvement in the mechanism for mobilizing industrial capital, the supply of such capital will be adequate for a reasonable expansion.

The amount of capital required should not be overestimated. Some branches of industry are overequipped and could employ considerably more workers before reaching full capacity. In others, where there is a better balance between equipment and output, internal savings can probably go a long way toward furnishing the necessary capital for improvement and extension of the existing plant. For the near future, with perhaps one or two exceptions, the mission does not see promising prospects for new large industries requiring heavy investment. The best possibilities for expansion may rather be found in the field of light industries which can start on a relatively modest scale. It is for these industries that the proposed investment bank should be particularly useful.

The factors limiting further industrial expansion which the mission considers to be of real significance are: (1) Syria's natural resources; (2) the absorptive capacity of the Syrian market; (3) the competitive strength of Syrian industry as a supplier of more and a broader range of manufactured goods both at home and on accessible foreign markets; and (4) the government's contribution to creation of stronger incentives and better possibilities of enlarging foreign outlets.

1. Syria's natural resources are mainly agricultural. Investigations of possible mineral and oil resources have produced unsatisfactory or negative results. Syria has no natural advantages with regard to power and transportation facilities. The country has not achieved a reputation for high quality production except of some limited luxury goods. Some of these limiting factors, particularly the inadequacy of power and transportation and the human qualifications, can certainly be overcome but only by considerable investment in so-called national overhead, the rate of which is limited by the increase of the national income and the share of this income which can be devoted to industrial investment.

2. Syrian industry depends to a very large extent, sometimes exclusively, on the home market. Given the size of the population and the fact that for the bulk of industrial goods imports have already been replaced by local manufactures, the possibilities for expansion of industrial production depend largely on progress made outside the industrial field in raising the volume of purchasing power of the largest number of people. The relative

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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457 panies. It was replaced by a fixed rate to approximate closely to the prevailing free rate.

International Trade

439 In 1951 Syria had an adverse balance of trade of £S28 million but this was probably counterbalanced by the income from certain invisible exports which do not come within the knowledge of the official statisticians. The year 1951, however, was a particularly bad one for agriculture. In normal years Syria can expect to have a favourable balance of international trade; in 1950, for example, the country had a considerable trade surplus and by 1952 the large deficit of the previous year had been wiped out. Syria's best customers are usually Lebanon and Iraq (Lebanon's inter-Middle Eastern trade is higher still) but there is also reciprocal trade with Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. Trade with Western Germany has recovered and is now quite important although it is threatened by Syria's attitude to the German reparations to Israel.[1] Syria's main exports are agricultural; raw cotton has recently become the most important. Her chief imports are machinery, oil, and textiles.[2]

Up to 1947 almost all the external trade of Syria was done not only through Beirut but also by Lebanese firms; however, since then, Syrian merchants have set out to show that they can deal directly with the outside world. The Government are encouraging importers and exporters to use Latakia rather than Beirut and legislation aims at preventing foreign businesses from being represented in Syria by foreigners. This has the effect of cutting out the middleman in Beirut, but it also makes it very difficult for British, American, and French firms to have sufficient control over their affairs to encourage the investment in Syria of foreign skill and foreign capital. In 1951 some Belgian and French companies were nationalized and the commercial climate was unfavourable to foreign investment; but during 1952 Colonel Shishakli declared that the Government would welcome foreign capital and enterprise provided that they did not encroach on Syria's national sovereignty and interests, and towards this end exchange regulations were to be simplified and greater freedom was to be given in the transfer of capital.

Development Schemes

426 Interest rates in Syria and Lebanon are very high and even
454a sound borrower may have to pay from 25 to 50 per cent

[1] See table 4, p. 503 below. [2] See ibid.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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interest per annum. The Syrian private capitalist expects very large returns and the foreign private capitalist requires more security than is obtainable in the Middle East; thus the development of Syria must be financed either by the Syrian Government or by an international agency. Syria is one of the few countries to have refused American Point Four aid on principle, but she is a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and this organization has been studying some of the development schemes listed below.

1. *Drainage of the Ghab marshes.* Nearly 100,000 acres of land can be irrigated from the excess water of this area to improve agriculture and public health, and plans are well advanced.

2. *Euphrates barrage*, to provide 100,000 kws. of hydro-electric energy for irrigation and industrial needs. With this power it is hoped to irrigate half a million acres.

3. *Yarmuk and Barada rivers.* Hydro-electric schemes to give power to Damascus and the Hauran.[1]

4. *Latakia port.*[2] There have been complications over the award of the tender for this work, and construction had not effectively begun at the beginning of 1953.

5. *Khabur river.* Irrigation scheme for 22,000 acres.

6. Improvement of rail and road communications from Latakia to the hinterland and establishment of a network of all-weather roads in the Jezira.

7. *Rouj marshes.* Drainage to irrigate about 8,700 acres has already commenced.

If agreement can be reached to implement some of these schemes not only will Syria benefit but also the Arab refugees from Palestine may find employment and even homes.

(*b*) Lebanon

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Much that has been said about Syria also applies to Lebanon and, to avoid repetition, only points peculiar to Lebanon are here outlined.

Agriculture

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The table on p. 488 above gives the approximate division of the land in cultivable and uncultivable areas and the estimated acreage; the crop and yield of the main agricultural products are given in the following table.

[1] An agreement with Jordan was signed on 7 July 1953, but work has not yet begun.

[2] See above, p. 487.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
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241 Wheat yields are lower than the average for Syria, averaging 4 hundredweight to the acre.

Almost the whole of the estate is let to share-tenants who are 427 supervised by an agent, the landowners themselves rarely visiting the estate. The share of the crop taken by the landlord is 25 per cent on non-irrigated land and 42½ per cent on irrigated land. These shares are more favourable to the tenant than is usual, because it is desired to attract more labour to the estate which sixty years ago was quite uncultivated. As elsewhere, the tenants have no leases but live in fear of eviction.

The tenants are divided into five classes:[1]

1. Large tenants cultivating 6 feddans (225 acres) of non-irrigated land: 4 in number.
2. Medium sized tenants cultivating 4½ feddans (168¾ acres): 4 in number.
3. Small tenants cultivating 3 feddans (112½ acres): 60 in number.
4. Small tenants cultivating irrigated land and with an average area of 18 acres: 100 in number.
5. Wage labourers, who form the majority of the villagers. [464]

Of these classes, only the small groups of large and medium-484 sized tenants can live well, in the sense that the output of the 454 farm suffices to cover the essential needs of the family and also √11 provides a small cash surplus. The surplus is used to buy gold pounds and jewellery. But the other groups cannot achieve even a sufficient standard of food consumption. The standard consumption of wheat (barley in the case of the very poor peasants) is 14 kilogrammes of grain per month; to achieve this level it is necessary to crop about 45 acres. Thus with the present system of cultivation, the class of small tenants, who cultivate an area of 112 acres and would appear to have quite sufficient land, cannot attain the minimum because only one-third, 35 acres, can be cultivated owing to shortage of live-stock.

√11 These small tenants, who are typical of the farmers in the great plains of Syria, are very poor, living in one- or two-roomed [342] mud huts, and when there is only one room, sharing it with their animals.

[1] It must be said that the feddan in Syria is a variable measure and here is equivalent to 37½ acres.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East .
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471 186 648 a loan directly from another government. This attitude is illustrated clearly in the refusal of Syria to sign an agreement with Point Four.

A loan from an international body is another matter, and the country is seeking a loan of several million dollars from the International Bank for development of transportation, particularly roads in the Jezira, and port facilities at Latakia.

454 241 Without a large-scale public works program, only minor improvements can be made to the existing system. However, opportunities exist for increasing production through private investment.

The good crops of 1950, sold at exceptionally high prices, resulted in high profits and the accumulation of considerable capital. The hope of continued high profits caused much of this capital to be re-invested in equipment and farm improvements. The same incentive also brought out new capital which never before had been invested in agriculture. Judging from the number of tractors, combines and accessories, and irrigation pumps purchased during 1950 and 1951, the investment in agricultural equipment in these two years exceeded the total up to that time. Unprecedented expenditures for general farm improvements also were made, an exceptional step in a country without a history of investment in agricultural development beyond the acquisition of land and a few simple facilities. The capital base has been small. Production has about equaled consumption. There has been little surplus for savings. The few families with capital have used their funds in other ways, seldom for agriculture. But the experience of 1951 was not encouraging for long-continued investment in agricultural development. These investments were costly, many farmers paying double the United States prices for equip-

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These farmers are typical of those in northern Syria. All the tenants of one landlord usually live in villages like this one near Aleppo. Villages vary in size from a few hundred to several thousand depending on the size of the farm.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and moneylenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

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433 No over-all figures on the increase of capital, output or employment are available, but the following data are indicative. Between 1945 and 1953,
472 inclusive, a total of £S 70.7 million was invested in thirty-seven industrial joint-stock companies; of this £S 53.1 million was invested in 1945 and 1946. 1/
454 A considerable amount was also invested in unincorporated enterprises. Sales of electricity to industry increased from 15 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 28 million in 1951, 36 million in 1953 and 19 million during the first half of 1954. Imports of industrial machinery and equipment amounted to 9,100 tons in 1950, 19,500 in 1951, 10,800 in 1952 and 12,000 tons in 1953, with an aggregate value of £S 200 million. 2/ Table 51 shows available information on the principal Syrian industries.

433 The textile industry is by far the most important, as regards capital invested, employment and value of output. The rapid expansion of cotton growing
288 led to an increase in the number of cotton ginneries, from thirty in 1945 to 110 in 1953. Cotton spinning began in 1933; by 1939 there were 10,000 spindles and by 1954 some 92,000 with a capacity of 12,000 tons of cotton and rayon yarn. Output of cotton yarn rose from 1,700 tons in 1944 to 5,500 in 1950 and 6,600 tons in 1953; that of rayon yarn from 800 in 1950 to 1,200 in 1953; there was a further increase in 1954. Small factories also produce 40 tons of woollen yarn and 16 tons of silk yarn. Mechanical looms increased from 1,500 in 1939 to 5,500 in 1953; there are also 6,000 hand looms. Output of cloth, knitted goods and hosiery is shown in table 51. Dyeing and printing are done in well equipped factories established after the Second World War. The textile industry meets local requirements in most branches and provides an export surplus.

433 Food processing industries form the next most important group. A large-scale sugar refinery started production in 1950, on imported raw sugar; its output rose
258 to 30,000 tons in 1953, of which 23,000 were from imported raw sugar and 7,000 from locally grown beets; output in 1954 was about 38,000 tons. It also produces 1,000 tons of alcohol and some starch glucose as a by-product. The refinery, which fully meets Syria's demand, has not yet reached its full capacity. The vegetable oil industry produces, by means of modern presses established after the war as well as older hand presses, some 7,000 to 12,000 tons of olive oil, about 6,000 to 8,000 tons of cotton-seed oil and some 2,000 to 4,000 tons of other
655 oils. Other important food and beverage industries include the making of biscuits and macaroni, oleomargarine, confectionery and chocolates, and also brewing and canning. The tobacco industry is a State monopoly. 3/

1/ Of the total, £S 23 million was accounted for by six textile companies, 13.4 million by four food processing companies, 10.5 million by three vegetable oil and soap companies, 9.0 million by a cement and building materials company, 8.0 million by a glass and porcelain company, 3.3 million by seventeen electric power companies and 3.5 million by five other companies.

2/ Data from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ The Government took over the tobacco monopoly from a concessionary company in 1951, paying £S 2.5 million as compensation.

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Finance and public finance

453 652 454 The post-war period witnessed some important changes in Syria's monetary and banking system, in its foreign exchange system and in its public finances. The large increase in production, investment and commerce noted above had its counterpart in the development of the banking system 1/ and expansion of the money supply (see table 10), most of which has taken the form of bank deposits.

This expansion of the money supply in the post-war period has not been matched by a rise in prices. Between 1945 and 1949 the trend was downward. The discontinuance of Allied military expenditure, together with a sharp increase in the import of surplus, led to a sizable deficit on current account. 2/ Moreover, the 1945 and 1946 budgets showed a surplus, and although the 1947 and 1948 budgets closed with a deficit the amount involved was small. Investment remained at a low level. The Arab-Israeli war led to a large budget deficit in 1949; this was, however, offset by the very low level of investment and the huge import surplus. The index of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus fell from its peak of 831 in 1945 (1938 = 100) to 478 in 1949. 3/

435 [454 455] 434 During the period 1950 to 1954, on the other hand, prices rose. The large-scale investment in cotton, and the sharp increase in the quantity and value of exports of cotton and cereals, which led to a position approaching equilibrium in the balance of payments (see table 53), raised incomes. Subsidiary factors were pipeline construction, high building activity, 4/ and small budget deficits. The rise in import prices, aggravated by hoarding and speculation in 1950 and 1951, also played a part. The rise in prices remained, however, small in scale. The index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus, in which cotton has a heavy weight, rose from 100 in 1949 to 111 in 1950 and 136 in 1951; the fall in cotton prices led to a drop to 119 in 1952 and 110 in 1953. Improved cotton

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1/ Foreign banks account for the greater part of banking activities in Syria; in recent years several banks have opened branches in Syria and existing banks have set up new offices in the smaller towns. In the first half of 1954 seven new banks, mostly Syrian or Lebanese, were established, bringing the total to seventeen. The country is still, however, inadequately provided with long-term credit for agricultural and industrial development, a gap that has been only partly filled by the Government-owned Agricultural Bank and Government loans to industry (see above).

2/ It is difficult to distinguish between Syria's and Lebanon's shares in the trade of the customs union, but there is no doubt that Syria had a large import surplus. This was not covered by such receipts as revenue from petroleum companies and remittances sent by emigrants.

3/ Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract, 1953. There was no index of wholesale prices in Syria prior to 1949; the wholesale price index in Beirut fell from its peak of 1,038 in 1945 (1939 = 100) to 641 in 1949.

4/ Authorized floor space for new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945 to 166,000 in 1949, 209,000 in 1950, 162,000 in 1951, 210,000 in 1952 and 265,000 in 1953.

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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

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the regular banks which are capable of mobilizing funds in this way. Thus one important element in the market for bonds is lacking. 652 454

Institutional savings obviously cannot be developed within a short period. For the longer run, however, it is important that steps be taken in the next few years to stimulate such savings. Among the steps that the mission would recommend are the following:

1. The government should start paying its government servants, at least those in the upper half of the civil service grades, by check, so as to familiarize them with the use of banks and thus indirectly encourage them to make deposits in banks. Such a measure, though not of great importance, could at least be quickly implemented.

2. The Council of Money and Credit should canvass with the commercial banks the possibility of stimulating the development of savings and time deposits. Among the measures that might be discussed for adoption are (1) the possibility of establishing a greater differential between interest rates on current deposits on the one hand and those on time and savings deposits on the other without necessarily increasing the over-all interest burden of the banks; (2) the possibility of attaching some lottery feature to time and savings deposits (this is done in some countries such as Japan); and (3) the inauguration of a joint government-bank campaign designed to show how deposits in banks for given periods can "grow."

3. The government should look to the gradual introduction of a postal savings system. Such a system might be inaugurated on a trial basis in one of the larger cities. It would necessitate a publicity campaign in which the cooperation of teachers, religious leaders and the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture should be enlisted.

4. The government should take various measures to encourage savings through insurance. Among these are (1) the drafting, with expert foreign assistance, of a modern insurance law designed to ensure that investors in life insurance are protected to the maximum extent possible and to lay down some stipulations regarding the portion of assets representing Syrian business that must be invested in Syria; (2) conferences with representatives of insurance companies doing business in Syria and neighboring countries, designed to explore the steps which might be taken to increase the volume of Syrian individual life and group insurance business through such measures as better training of agents and subagents, publicity campaigns, etc.; (3) exploration, with the help of ILO, of the possibility of introducing some forms of social insurance, particularly accident and 652 456

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652 old age insurance, on a modest scale in Syria; and (4) enlisting the support
456 of Moslem religious leaders for insurance in the form of a pronouncement that the taking out of insurance is not contrary to Koranic teachings. Regarding the latter, it should be noted that such a pronouncement was obtained in Egypt quite some time ago. Egypt is one Moslem country where life insurance has slowly developed. There the face value of life insurance policies has increased from £E 30 million, with premium payments of £E 1.25 million, in 1942, to £E 67.7 million, with premium payments of £E 3 million, in 1951.

652 Since rapid results cannot be expected from measures to foster "insti-
457 tutionalized savings", the question arises whether the government can be expected to find a market for its securities under the conditions to be anticipated over the next six years. We have had occasion to point out that the considerable savings in Syria flow for the most part directly into investments of various kinds without the intermediary of a market, and that tangible investments, particularly in real estate, are generally preferred. At the same time the success of industrial companies in the postwar period and the tendency toward greater dispersion of their shares point to an increasing willingness to invest in securities. Moreover, as we have indicated elsewhere, private investment opportunities may not increase in the future at the same rate as in the past. The provision of additional agricultural credit through such a public institution as the Agricultural Bank may also displace some private funds now devoted to such financing. In theory, therefore, private funds may become available for investment in public securities. It is always possible, of course, that they may go, instead, into hoards or increased consumption. However, there has been a marked tendency in Syria to save and invest, and if savers and investors can be persuaded that government securities offer an attractive return and are safe, they might be expected gradually to venture into public investment.

A rate of return of 6% on government bonds might be attractive, at least to those who have been investing in building, where the return has been comparatively modest and where it might be expected to decline in the future. Lack of confidence in the government, in its determination to repay and in its use of public funds, is no doubt the most important obstacle. Such confidence is likely to be established only gradually. The government may already have contributed somewhat to this confidence in the last two years by stabilizing the value of the Syrian pound in relation to other currencies and by maintaining internal financial equilibrium. Special bond

The Syrian economy in 1945 was distinguished by its relatively low 433
production of a generally poor quality. It lay in a state of decadence and stagnation that could only have been remedied by energetic action by the authorities in power. It was a virgin country waiting for people willing to work hard to develop its resources in the fields of agriculture, industry and commerce.

Agriculture in Syria occupies first place, whether considered 433
from the point of view of production or the number of those who 241
earn a living from it. It produces the largest part of the country's exports and supplies the national industries with raw materials. But, despite its preponderance over other economic activities farmers remained up to 1945 dependent on ancient methods, and were ignorant of such modern techniques as the use of machines and fertilizers. Syrian agriculture suffered helplessly from the crop rotation system, from natural pests, insects and diseases, from rain variations and the unscrupulousness of money lenders.

As to industry, it was in its infancy, still feeling its way and 433
lacking encouragement, protection, adequate studies, knowledge and experience.

Nor was commerce in a better situation than agriculture and in- 439
dustry. During the second world war, Syrian trade lost its relations 457
with many of the belligerent countries, and emerged from the war crippled and hampered by the restrictions of exchange control. In addition, the direction of Syrian commerce was not in the hands of Syrian nationals; the larger part of foreign trade, both exports and imports, was handled through Beirut. As a result Syrian merchants lost direct touch with countries abroad and Syria became in effect an internal market dealing in retail with neighbouring markets. Commercial agencies were in the hands of non-Syrians up to the extent of 95 per cent of the total. To complete the picture we should mention that a large part of banking operations with foreign countries took place in banks situated outside Syria, and that the purchase and sale of foreign exchange accruing to Syria was effected in the Beirut market. To conclude, control of Syrian external trade was in non-Syrian hands and the Syrian economy, in consequence, was forced to lose large sums in the form of expenses, commissions, and profits which were paid abroad for mediation in purchase and sale transactions.

14. During the period under discussion the Syrian Govern- 185
ment exercised great effort with satisfactory results; it made a be-

The noticeable rise in the rates during 1951 and 1952 is largely due, we believe, to the conditions arising from the Korean war. 457

Planning and Administration of Projects

24. It is difficult to say that there existed in Syria a development policy with definite aims and worked-out plans during the period 1945-1952. Development projects were studied and approved piece-meal under pressure of need and circumstances, without reference to any general programme, and without being subjected in their administration, execution, or the management of their financial and economic effects, to one single authority that could direct the whole operation and create the conditions for its success. The projects had nothing in common except the great need felt for them and the necessity of finding the required funds. 652

25. Development projects were approved in one of two ways. First, by including them in the body of the state budget and making the necessary appropriations. As most of these projects could not be executed within one financial year, the Budget Law provided for the transfer of such appropriations to a special account outside the budget called the Development Programmes Account. The purpose was to prevent the cancellation of unused appropriations at the end of the financial period, as is normally done in a yearly budget. Secondly, the projects that were financed from available treasury funds or from Bank of Issue loans were approved individually by issuing for each project a special law, which established definite principles for its administration and execution and which authorized the government to borrow the necessary funds either from the available treasury funds or from the Bank of Issue.

26. The method followed up to now in approving, financing, and executing development projects is not free from certain defects and pitfalls. These are the main criticisms we have to make. First, it does not enable the government to have a complete picture of all the projects that the country needs, or of the cost and the period required for their execution, so that it can make a priority list and earmark definite financial sources for each one. Without such over-all comparison, the government cannot give each project the priority it deserves according to its productive value, the speed of its execution and the funds it requires. Moreover, without prior study of the projects, and a stock-taking of its financial

652 will not however be complete. For part of it will be saved and another part will find its way to the treasury in the form of taxes and dues ; a third part will be used to pay for imports from abroad, in which case it will find its way back to the Bank of Issue and will be withdrawn from circulation. In these three cases no inflationary effects follow from the new issue. But the remaining part, which is used to purchase consumption goods and services, will no doubt create additional demand for the goods and services that form the total national output. If the national economy has unemployed factors of production and is in a conditon to meet the extra demand, then no inflationary effects will appear. If the national economy, on the other hand, fails to increase production so as to meet the additional demand for goods and services, then the economy will move towards inflation.

From another angle, the effect of the extra purchasing power appears in the balance of payments, for the additional demand is not limited to national goods and services, but extends beyond them to foreign goods and services. It is therefore necessary to know whether the country's gold and foreign exchange reserve will allow the satisfaction of the extra demand for foreign currencies, both from the development projects and from the people whose incomes are increased by the new issue. It is also obvious that a rise in the consumption of local products may lead to a reduction in exports, if national production cannot meet all the new demands.

457 652 39. Foreign private capital can be utilized in two ways: in helping to establish or finance private projects ; and in paying in foreign exchange for imported equipment required for government development projects. In this case, foreign banks would give medium-term credit for purchasing equipment from their country and accept repayment by instalments over a period of three to five years. Thus the government can pay for its imports in instalments over five years rather than in one lump. The merit of this method in protecting the foreign exchange value of the national currency and in avoiding inflationary effects is obvious. Having recourse to foreign private capital for the purpose of financing expenditure on development projects undertaken by the government seems to us, however, unlikely to be adopted. For such funds could not be invested in the country except under strict guarantees and difficult conditions.

40. Foreign government loans on the other hand have a po-

litical aspect that we do not intend to deal with here. Limiting the discussion to the economic aspect, we have to distinguish between two situations: the use of foreign loans to finance expenditure abroad that has to be paid for in foreign exchange; the use of foreign loans to finance local expenditure due in local currency. 652 457

In the second case, the borrowed foreign exchange is put in the currency cover and an equal sum in currency bills is issued by the Bank of Issue and put into circulation as the need arises for covering local expenditure in national currency. Despite the fact that the issue of these paper bills is balanced by foreign exchange in the cover, its monetary effects are in no way different from the case of direct borrowing from the Bank of Issue for meeting local expenditure. Thus, what is said of financing development projects by borrowing from the Bank of Issue applies in full to foreign loans that are used to meet local expenditure. For this reason we think it unlikely that recourse would be made to foreign borrowing, because its financial and political conditions are generally more burdensome than those of direct borrowing from the Bank of Issue.

In the first case however, when foreign loans are used only to pay for that part of development expenditure due in foreign exchange, there is no doubt that the method has sound monetary effects; it completely solves the problem of securing foreign exchange needed for development projects, while at the same time saving the country from the dangers of inflation and preventing a fall in the external value of the national currency. Nevertheless, we do not recommend the use of foreign loans except to the extent that the country is in real need of foreign currencies. If the country has a sizeable amount of foreign exchange or if it can secure the necessary exchange through restricting its inessential imports, then there would be no necessity for foreign loans which, besides laying a burden of interest upon the national economy, may give rise to political difficulties.

41. It becomes clear from the above that the effects of a new issue of paper currency depend in the first place upon the proportion of the new issue saved and absorbed by the treasury, to the part that is used to pay for additional imports; secondly, upon the condition of the national economy and its capacity to expand production so as to satisfy the extra demand for goods and services; finally, they are dependent upon the balance of payments position 652

433 such goods as Syria's few modern factories produce, have
439 between them severely limited the Syrian and Lebanese export trade.

439 According to the official statistics for 1938, the latest year
457 for which detailed figures are available, the main countries to which the French Mandated Territories exported goods were Iraq, Palestine, France, Transjordan, Italy, the United States and Egypt, in that order.[1] Much the most important exports were vegetable products and textile materials and goods. The total value of exports and re-exports (excluding the oil of Iraq) was some 892,232,000 francs (£5,028,000).[1] The chief countries from which goods were imported were Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Germany, Italy and Roumania. The main goods imported were textile materials and goods, metals and metal work, vegetable and mineral products; and the total value of imports was 1,707,696,000 francs (£9,059,000).[2] There was thus an adverse trade balance of 815,464,000 francs (£4,031,000) which was largely offset by the revenue from certain types of invisible export. For example large sums were brought into the country by the many thousands of tourists who visited it, and by the Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and others who spent the summer in the hill-resorts of Lebanon. Again, considerable sums of money were sent home by emigrants in America and elsewhere; this item is now much less important than during the past, but it is still not negligible. A third type of invisible export was the foreign capital invested in the country, and foreign credit granted to merchants. In spite of these invisible exports, however, both the size of Syrian and Lebanese foreign trade and the discrepancy between imports and exports are unsatisfactory. The situation can be improved, first by an increase and diversification in production, and secondly by the discovery of external markets for the goods produced, either in the neighbouring countries or elsewhere.

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511 Syria and Lebanon are comparatively poor countries, and in spite of the changes which have taken place the standard of living in the countryside and among the poorer classes in

[1] For statistics of foreign trade, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, pp. 199-202.

[2] Calculated at the rate of 177.45 francs, to the pound sterling. This was the average rate for December, 1938.

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*EXCHANGE RATES**

457

1 Syrian £ = $0.28 U.S.
1 million £S = $280,000 U.S.
$1.00 U.S. = £S 3.575
1 million $U.S. = £S 3.575 million

* Free market rate, average for 1954, on which mission's calculations are based.

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Table 1,[3] reflects, of course, the general structure of the economy. As already indicated, raw cotton represents well over a third of Syria's exports, and cereals, livestock and raw wool almost another third. In recent years, however, textiles have accounted for nearly one-tenth of the value of exports. As might be expected, imports are more diverse in character. Textile materials and manufactures, machinery, petroleum products and fruits and vegetables are among the principal imports; iron and steel, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, precious metals, motor vehicles and timber are also important. 439

Despite the dissolution of the Syrian-Lebanese economic union, Lebanon has remained Syria's principal trading partner, taking almost a quarter of Syria's exports and contributing around 10% of its imports. Three countries—Lebanon, France and the United Kingdom—buy over half of Syria's exports; and five countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Lebanon and Western Germany—supply between 50% and 60% of its imports. In the three years 1951-53 about 41% of Syria's exports was marketed in other Arab countries which, however, supplied only 18% of Syria's imports. [448]

Syria's normal trade deficit is offset, on the current account of the balance of international payments, by local expenditures and oil transit payments made by foreign oil companies, by UNRWA[4] expenditures in Syria and by emigrant remittances. On capital account, there is evidently some continued net foreign investment, particularly by Lebanese, and some repatriation of capital by Syrians returning to their homeland. A considerable volume of bank funds has flowed to Syria partly because there has been a shift in the financing of Syria's foreign trade from Beirut to Aleppo and Damascus and partly because foreign banks have needed more funds to meet the credit needs of an expanding economy. Although the movement of these bank funds shows sharp seasonal fluctuations, there has apparently been a general upward trend in the amount of foreign banking advances in recent years. Total foreign exchange receipts and payments were not far out of balance in 1950, 1951 and 1952, but in 1953 Syrian gold and foreign exchange reserves, valued at the free rate, increased by £S 51 million. Foreign exchange and gold reserves at the free rate rose from £S 114.3 million at the end of 1951 to £S 157 million at 457

[3] See also Annex A, p. 213 *et seq.*

[4] United Nations Relief and Works Administration, charged with the care of Arab refugees from Palestine.

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457 the end of 1953, even though Syria paid off during these years all but £ 10.2 million of a £S 44.6 million debt to Lebanon and repaid $1,454,123 to the International Monetary Fund.

Transport

489 The transport system which carries the country's commerce reveals many deficiencies. Although Syria is served by three railways, all were built before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and therefore do not adequately serve the needs of an independent Syria. The gauges are not uniform, and there is no direct rail connection between Damascus and Aleppo. The port of Latakia, which handles most of Syria's overseas trade, is served only by roads. The railways in 1953 actually carried slightly less cargo than before the war. All of the substantial increase in traffic since the prewar period has been absorbed by motor transport. The number of all types of motor vehicles rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953, and the number of trucks from 873 to 4,742. Even such bulky commodities as cereals are now transported mostly by road. Yet the road system is also far from adequate and transport costs are very high.

504 Aside from Banias, which ships only oil transmitted by pipeline from Iraq, Syria has only one major port, Latakia. The volume of traffic at this port, which is still in process of development, has grown rapidly and amounted in 1953 to 90% of the overseas export and 46% of the overseas import trade of the country. The Lebanese ports of Beirut and Tripoli accounted for the balance. In the same year, however, almost half of the total volume of Syria's foreign trade went overland, principally to and from Lebanon.

Money and Credit

652 457 The monetary and banking system of Syria is still in the process of development. Although a new monetary statute enacted March 28, 1953 envisages the establishment of a government central bank within a few years, the note-issuing function meanwhile remains with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL) which first received the right to issue currency during the French mandatory regime. Gold and foreign exchange in the monetary cover is bought through the intermediary of the Exchange Office, an autonomous government agency established in April 1952. This

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Office is responsible for enforcing foreign exchange controls and regulating the foreign exchange market. Although it has no monopoly, the Office is the principal buyer and seller of foreign exchange either via the commercial banks or directly. While recognizing the postwar depreciation of the Syrian pound from the nominal official rate of £S 2.20 to the dollar, it has intervened to smooth out the fluctuations in the *de facto* or free rate arising from the seasonal nature of the country's exports. Its stabilization operations were initiated at the end of 1952 when it began publishing a daily bulletin of the rates at which it was prepared to buy and sell. In 1953 it broadened its stabilization operations by setting rates for forward transactions. In the initial period it succeeded in narrowing the fluctuations, and since July 1953 it has kept the dollar rate at £S 3.575. Its operations were undoubtedly instrumental in preventing the favorable trend in the balance of payments during 1953 from resulting in a marked appreciation of the Syrian pound, which would have adversely affected Syria's exports. The Exchange Office has allowed rates of other currencies to fluctuate more widely, in accordance with their strength relative to the dollar as reflected in free markets. 652 457

Virtually all foreign exchange transactions now take place at the market rate as regulated by the Exchange Office. Foreign oil companies, however, are still required, pending the settlement of a conflict over oil transit payments, to buy Syrian pounds at the official rate for the purpose of meeting their local expenditures; and exchange required for imports of petroleum products is also furnished at the official rate.

Since 1948 foreign exchange restrictions have been progressively abandoned, so that all payments can now be freely made. Although imports are still subject to prior license, exchange is readily made available unless imports are restricted or prohibited for protectionist reasons. No restrictions exist on transfers of capital or payments of invisibles. Most exports are licensed partly to protect domestic consumers and partly to enforce repatriation of foreign exchange for shipments to all destinations except Arab countries. The requirement of repatriating foreign exchange was instituted to provide the Syrian market with a regular supply of foreign exchange.

The Syrian economy is served primarily by foreign banks. Of the 15 commercial banks accredited at the beginning of 1954, 10, including all the larger institutions, were foreign: five were French, two Jordanian, and one each Iraqi, British and Egyptian. The BSL, as the largest commercial 453

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433 plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements which, in accordance with our proposals, might be developed for use on Syrian farms. It should be emphasized, however, that future industrial expansion will need to be more selective and that projects will require careful technical and economic scrutiny to establish their suitability for Syria.

We conclude, therefore, that improvement in efficiency and more careful, selective expansion are the principal problems which Syrian industry faces. To meet these problems we have a number of recommendations involving (1) increasing exposure of industry to foreign competition, (2) development of a larger market for industrial products, (3) establishment of an investment bank to provide technical and financial assistance to industry and (4) improvement in vocational education.

Protection of Industry

433 654 651 457 Syrian industry today is in many ways shielded against foreign competition. Protection of this type is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating only from 1949. Before that time industry had developed with little or no government assistance. Prewar tariffs were moderate and essentially revenue-producing in character. Virtually the only concessions to industry were lower duties on plant and equipment and raw materials. The rapid expansion of mechanical manufacturing occurred at a time when there was little competition from abroad. During the war imports were largely impossible and in the immediate postwar years the demand for manufactures was such that rising imports were not incompatible with the continued development of domestic output. With the relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions in 1948 and an increasingly abundant supply of manufactures in the world market, Syrian industry finally began to suffer from foreign competition. In 1949 the government came to the rescue by providing industrial establishments with facilities to obtain state-guaranteed loans at low interest rates from the issue department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. Pressure for more effective protection of industry was instrumental in terminating the customs union with Lebanon, which as a trading nation was interested in keeping tariffs moderate. Following the dissolution of this economic union in March 1950, import duties were generally raised and in many cases almost doubled. In 1951 tariffs on such articles as textiles, glass and soap were again sharply increased and the

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first import embargoes were imposed. In 1952 a large number of imports were prohibited and a *de facto* sugar trading and manufacturing monopoly was instituted. The following year, however, the Minister of Economics was deprived of discretionary authority to impose embargoes, and a number of prohibitions were subsequently lifted. Even so, import embargoes are still applied to such consumer goods as cotton hosiery, socks and stockings, "job lot cloth," second-hand cotton and silk clothing, men's shirts, vegetable oils, various soaps, margarine, canned vegetables and fruits, confectionery, glass and glass products, match boxes and match wood, matches, pins, wooden furniture and boots and shoes. These protective measures have been supplemented by controls over exports of certain raw materials designed to give domestic industry preferential access to available supplies. Importation of ginning machines was prohibited to safeguard existing enterprises, and imports of second-hand looms and knitting machines were stopped, to insure the installation of modern machinery. In 1952 the government also initiated licensing of industrial establishments for the purpose of preventing overexpansion and ill-considered ventures. During the same year more positive assistance was provided by enacting a law for the encouragement of industry which extended a number of benefits to new enterprises and extensions of existing plants.

The mission has no doubt that some protection of industry is justified, particularly in underdeveloped countries which need time to raise labor, technical and managerial skills to a level approximating those in the more advanced industrial countries. As we have already pointed out, the types of industry developed in Syria are generally of a character to warrant the expectation that they can ultimately stand on their own feet. This goal, however, will not be reached as long as production is as effectively insulated against outside competition as at present. The present system of exaggerated protection does not provide a sufficient incentive to raise efficiency and productivity. For Syrian consumers it involves excessive sacrifices in the form of higher prices and poorer quality. In recent years, for example, the Syrian government has found it necessary to protect consumers by controlling the prices of such articles as vegetable oils, yarn and cement.

In view of these considerations we recommend in particular that the present import embargoes be abolished. In some cases it may be necessary to substitute import duties higher than those now included in the tariff schedule, but in those instances prohibitive rates should be avoided and

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433 provision made for gradual reduction of the duties. At the same time we
654 suggest that the whole tariff schedule be re-examined. By and large it
651 cannot be said that the general level of tariffs is excessively high, particu-
457 larly since ad valorem rates are levied on imports valued at the official rate of exchange, and this entails an undervaluation of about 40% compared to the actual exchange rate. In fact, we recommend elsewhere that tariff rates be assessed on the basis of actual foreign exchange rates for the purpose of increasing government revenues. This should not be construed, however, as a proposal to raise all tariffs irrespective of their nature. On the contrary, we would suggest that, as part of the general revision of the schedule, those rates which are primarily protective in character should as far as possible be reduced for the purpose of encouraging outside competition and lowering prices. If necessary, such reductions could be graduated over a period of time.

434 *Possibilities of a Larger Market*
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The expansion and, above all, the diversification of industrial output in Syria is restricted by the rather small domestic market. In a country of only 3.6 million people with low purchasing power it is generally possible to manufacture only a limited range of articles which are used widely enough to warrant production on an economic scale. Broader industrial opportunities are likely to emerge only if a larger market is initially available. In the case of Syria it should be possible to establish such a market in cooperation with other Arab countries, all of which suffer from a similar handicap in the development of their industries. Over recent years the Arab countries have increasingly stressed their community of interest and the need for closer cooperation. The field of industrial development offers a particularly challenging opportunity for common endeavor. We do not suggest, of course, that the types of industrial enterprises to be developed by each country should be the subject of joint government decision. There should be consultation in cases where particular ventures are to be launched with special government assistance. In the main, however, the location and development of industry should be decided by the free play of competitive forces operating in a larger, common Arab market.

To a limited extent the Arab countries have already taken steps to develop such a market. Syria has concluded bilateral agreements with Lebanon and Jordan which free certain products from import restrictions

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466 to curb at least the abuse of child labor which exists in most small shops. This might be done by occasional spot checks. One of the difficulties, however, is the inadequacy of the enforcement staff of the Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs in the Ministry of Economics. At the beginning of 1954 there were apparently only eight inspectors assigned to the enforcement of the labor code. We urge that the number be increased and that for this purpose an additional £S 325,000 be made available to the Labor Directorate over the next six years.

The Tourist Industry

457 485 In the discussion of the proposed investment bank, we have already indicated that this institution might assist in financing hotels, as well as manufacturing industries and agriculture. Although this chapter focuses on the problem of developing manufacturing, it appears appropriate to mention here also the possibilities of the tourist industry. Syria has much to interest the tourist from the West. On its soil many civilizations and [172] cultures have flourished and left their imprint. There are countless archaeological sites which are still yielding up treasured relics of the past, numerous ancient Greco-Roman and early Christian cities, fascinating ruined Christian churches and imposing mosques, old Crusader castles and Arab forts. Both Aleppo and Damascus, which vie with each other in the claim to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, intrigue the tourist with their blend of the ancient, the picturesque and the modern.

In the postwar period the airplane has greatly extended the orbit of travel for the American and West European, and rising standards of living have enabled many more to travel abroad than before. In Greece, for example, the number of foreign tourists rose from about 33,000 in 1950 to almost 76,000 in 1953, and the per capita expenditure is said to have doubled during this period. Unfortunately, the mission was unable to obtain figures on the total of foreign travellers visiting Syria, but the number has undoubtedly increased significantly. Many travellers to the Holy Land now stop over in Syria. This tourist trade could be greatly expanded if a concerted attempt were made to advertise the attractions of Syria and to improve the inadequate accommodations available to foreigners.

More and better hotels, good communications and adequate preservation and presentation of historical and cultural monuments are all impor-

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tant element in a program to attract more tourists. At present Damascus is the only Syrian city with first class hotel accommodations and even here there is an acute shortage. Such cities and towns as Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra all urgently require good hotels for tourists and other travellers. Construction and operation of hotels should, of course, be left to private enterprise encouraged by the government and assisted by the projected investment bank. There are, however, a number of places of potential importance to the tourist trade where rest houses and restaurants rather than hotels are needed. Such facilities are not likely to be sufficiently profitable, at least in the beginning, to attract private investment. We suggest, therefore, that the government spend approximately £S 500,000 on the erection and operation of rest houses and restaurants at such locations as Ras Shamra (site of ancient city of Ugarit), Saint Simeon (ruins of old city and monastery-church in Djebel es Smaane), Al Rasafa (Christian monuments and Moslem palace), Doura Europos (ancient city), Krak des Chevaliers (crusaders' castle), Tartous and Soueida. As a UNESCO mission has suggested, some of these could probably be constructed inside existing historical buildings, thus leaving the appearance of the site undisturbed and enhancing their appeal to tourists.

The interest of tourists in the historical and archaeological treasures of Syria also provides a definite economic justification for increasing the expenditures of the Directorate General of Antiquities. This government department has jurisdiction over museums, historical monuments and archaeological excavations. It finances its operations in part from its own receipts, but the government has during the last two years contributed, on the average, £S 763,000 to its annual budget of a little over £S 1 million. In 1954 its total planned investment was about £S 450,000, of which £S 280,000 was devoted to museums, £S 120,000 to the reconstruction of monuments and £S 50,000 to excavations. Damascus possesses a notable museum of which the country can well be proud, but about £S 1 million is still required for its completion. The Aleppo museum, which houses many fine treasures, admittedly needs a new building at a cost of £S 1 million, and appropriate regional and local museums would help the visitor to visualize the cultural heritage and archaelogical finds of particular localities. Although all of this could not be realized within the 1955-60 period, we suggest that £S 2.4 million be provided to complete the Damascus museum, establish a few local museums in such places as Ras Shamra and Palmyra and at least start the new building in Aleppo.

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457 658 172 Proper maintenance and repair of monuments is perhaps even more urgent, since there is considerable deterioration at present. We accordingly recommend that expenditures for this purpose be raised, on the average, approximately 50% over the next six years. A similar increase might be contemplated for excavation work which, as in the past, will presumably be carried out in cooperation with foreign archaeological missions. All this will require an increase in the subsidies paid to the Directorate of Antiquities out of the government budget to an average annual amount of approximately £S 950,000. The gradual growth in the Directorate's own receipts will probably suffice to cover necessary increases in administrative outlays.

[491] Poor roads now impede access to many interesting historical monuments. In addition to the recommendations on the national road network made elsewhere, we believe Syria would be well advised to spend about £S 1.5 million on the improvement of local roads of importance to the tourist trade. The access roads to the Krak des Chevaliers and Saint Simeon should have the highest priority.

457 Within the not too distant future the government should contemplate the establishment of a special office charged with the promotion of tourism. The cooperation and financial support of business groups interested in the tourist trade might well be enlisted. It should not only seek to interest the foreign tourist in the attractions of Syria, but also to make the Syrian people and Syrian officials more aware of the importance of the tourist trade and of making the tourist genuinely welcome.

Government Expenditures on Industry

433 654 Although industry is preeminently a field for private enterprise, we have made in this chapter a number of recommendations entailing additional government expenditures. For the period 1955-60 these would total about £S 20.5 million, allocated as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Manufacturing		
Investment bank	10,500	1,750
Industrial zones and workshops	1,800	300
Enforcement of labor code[a]	325	54

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652 Treasury.[41] The other type of public deposits which has risen rapidly consists of various autonomous government enterprises and agencies. A breakdown of these, available only for the end of 1953, is given below (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Exchange Office	6.3
Council of Money and Credit	2.0
PTT	4.3
Power, tramway and water companies	4.5
Railways	1.2
Port of Latakia	0.9
Agricultural Bank	2.2
Cereals Office	19.7
Tobacco Monopoly	4.6
Others	2.9
Total	49.2

The drawing down of public deposits is likely to have the same effect as deficit financing, particularly since it is doubtful that a decline in public deposits would be accompanied by a contraction of bank credit to the private sector. The government should regard these Treasury balances as a resource in lieu of, rather than in addition to, borrowing from the banking system; it should approach their use with the same caution it employs in considering deficit financing. The use of the accumulated balances of autonomous public entities should also be carefully watched. Finally, it would be well to require that all public deposits be kept with the Central Bank or, in the interim, with the BSL, so that the government can, if necessary, take effective steps to ensure that they do not have an undue effect on bank credit. Recently there has been a tendency to shift public deposits to other banks where it will be less easy to control their impact on credit.

652 *Foreign Aid and Borrowing*

652 648 457 Our expectation that additional resources of £S 175 million to £S 215 million may be available from abroad rests on the assumption that Syria

[41] The mission was unable to obtain information on the extent to which the Treasury is holding funds for the account of others. The new monetary statute envisages the ultimate establishment of a special Caisse des Depots et Consignations under the central bank to hold such deposits held on behalf of third parties; it is certainly advisable to have a clearcut distinction between the Treasury's own funds and those held in trust for others.

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will be able to borrow for certain development projects and that the Syrian government will accept offers of foreign aid. 652 648

Certain projects are likely to merit foreign loans. General economic prospects warrant the expectation that Syria can contract some foreign debt and expect to serve it. At present there is no foreign debt except for the compensation due to the former foreign owners of the nationalized public utilities and a $6 million loan from Saudi-Arabia. Both the immediate and long-term prospects of the balance of international payments appear favorable. While there may be some decline in the price of exported cereals and cottons, continued expansion in the volume of exports, although at a lower rate than in the past, will probably more than offset it. A rapid rise in imports is unlikely to occur as long as monetary stability is maintained. Moreover, foreign exchange policy can be kept sufficiently flexible to enable the government to influence the volume of international payments and receipts. 457

The Syrian government has so far been reluctant to accept proffers of foreign aid. The United States in 1954 offered to include Syria in its economic aid program, and this offer presumably remains open. We have assumed here that Syria will ultimately consider it advantageous to accept. All other Arab countries have in recent years received such aid apparently without suffering any infringement of their independence. In the last five years the United States has allocated about $111 million in economic and technical assistance to the Arab countries. For 1954-55 alone almost $64 million has been assured to Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. If Syria does decline similar aid, it may well face the need of curtailing the development program we have outlined. 652 648

It might be appropriate to point out also that Syria signed an agreement with UNRWA in October 1952 under which $30 million was to become available for economic development projects that would assist in the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees from Palestine, who in Syria number some 85,000. Less than $2 million of these funds have actually been committed. Because of its insistence that the refugees be repatriated, the government has been reluctant to use the UNRWA development funds. At the same time it might be mentioned that the Director of UNRWA and his Advisory Commission, on which Syria is represented, agreed in a special report to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1954 that UNRWA should pursue its long-term task of "assisting the refugees

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as far as import and export licenses are concerned. The new agreement does not invalidate existing bilateral agreements nor does it prevent the conclusion of such agreements at future dates. The contracting parties undertake further to facilitate for each other the transit of goods, personal effects and of animals by all means of transportation foreseen by their respective customs regulations. 439

The Lebanese-Syrian trade agreement and the agreement between Syria and Jordan include certain items not included in the inter-Arab agreement and vice versa. There are also certain differences in the definition of industrial or agricultural goods. By and large, however, the Arab agreement is regarded as more favorable to Syrian trade than are the agreements with Lebanon or with Jordan. It may open the door to more exports of agricultural products and may allow an expansion of industrial exports, even though Syria itself may be faced by an increased inflow of some of Lebanon's industrial production. Both Syria and Lebanon, being comparatively more industrialized countries, are likely to benefit from the opening of Iraq's fairly extensive market.

The Inter-Arab Agreement on Payments and Capital Transfer provides for preferential treatment of transfers for mutual payments on current account and for transfer facilities with regard to capital participation in development projects on which the interested parties may agree. The partners more specifically guarantee each other certain minimum payment facilities which come very close to free convertibility of resident accounts for current transactions within their joint territories. They also guarantee each other freedom from fiscal discriminations with regard to all capital transferred under the provisions of the agreement as well as its free repatriation. Regulations for the prevention of capital flight from the Arab countries are left to the authority of the individual countries.

IV CONDITIONS AFFECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT

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General

Certain features of the Syrian economy should be attractive to foreign investment. The country still has undeveloped resources; profits are high; there is a degree of economic stability; free market rates of the Syrian pound have been stabilized for some time and the country has practically

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457 no foreign exchange restrictions; private ownership and initiative predominate; the country has an influential class of businessmen and entrepreneurs which maintains satisfactory relations with foreign business circles. Yet, apart from the banking sector (and even here most, if not all, the new foreign funds seem to have become available on a short-term basis), the inflow of medium- or long-term private investment from abroad has, so far, apparently not been very large, although accurate estimates are lacking. Part of the explanation may be the lack of political stability within the area and the discouraging effects of frequent changes of political organization and leadership in Syria itself. The question arises, however, whether certain recent Syrian legislative and administrative policies may not also have contributed to discourage potential foreign investors.

Legislation

457 471 Complaints are sometimes heard against Decree No. 151 of March 1952, relating to companies and commercial firms established outside Syria. Its principal provisions are that all kinds of companies established outside Syria may be represented in Syria only by Syrian nationals or by commercial companies established in Syria under applicable regulations. These regulations require that not less than two-thirds of the capital of such companies must be in Syrian hands and that a majority of the managers (in the case of cooperatives and partnerships) or the members of the board of directors (in the case of joint stock companies) must be Syrian. The law also imposes some fairly elaborate conditions under which branches of companies established abroad may be registered in Syria. Similar provisions apply also to Syrian agencies of companies established outside Syria.

About the same time, in April 1952, Decree No. 189 prohibited foreign ownership of agricultural land. Article 1 provides that "Non-Syrians, whether natural or legal persons, shall be prohibited from establishing, altering or transferring any right concerning real estate or concluding any agreement for rental and exploitation of agricultural land in Syria for a period in excess of three years." Exempted from these provisions are transfers of inherited rights to real estate, provided reciprocity is accorded in the country of the beneficiary, and transfers of real estate located within the limits of larger towns (provincial capitals). The law's preamble declares its purpose to be the retention of Syrian land in Syrian ownership, permitting Syrians alone to exploit it and to benefit from its resources. But

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while the intention of the law is thus apparently to prevent farm land from falling into the hands of foreigners, its terms would also exclude foreign acquisition of, for example, factory sites outside the limits of major towns, and land for oil prospecting and for construction of gasoline and service stations. At the time of this writing the Syrian Council of Ministers was considering a draft bill under which non-Syrians would be permitted through ordinary decree to own property outside city limits.

Government Policies

There is reason to believe that Decree No. 151 has not been inflexibly applied and that practically all requests for exemptions permitted by the law have been granted. Some harm by way of discouragement to foreign investment may have been done, nevertheless, because the harshness of the terms of the law are understandably but unfortunately better known and more widely publicized abroad than the leniency of its application in individual cases.

The nationalization of power and transport companies in January 1951 affected primarily the foreign owned companies in Aleppo and Damascus. In view of the fact that nationalization of public utilities is not limited to Syria, nationalization itself is unobjectionable. Statements issued by the Syrian Government at the time of the nationalization envisaged a just compensation. However, four years elapsed before the first agreement on compensation was reached with one of the two companies and a settlement with the other is still pending. Regardless of the causes of the delay and without in any way passing judgment as to which side may have been at fault, it should be observed that the fact of the long delay in reaching a final settlement has not passed unnoticed in financial circles outside of Syria and may well have had an adverse effect on prospects for foreign investment in the country.

Appraisal

A certain excess of zeal in trying to preclude a sharing of national resources with foreign entrepreneurs is not a unique phenomenon. It is not surprising that the postwar wave of economic nationalism did not by-pass Syria. There were, moreover, certain experiences in Syria's comparatively recent history which explain this reaction. But although the reasons for the adoption of such policies may be clear, their wisdom is open to dis-

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457 471 pute. Syria no longer need prove its determination to stave off unwanted external interference or infiltration. But it does stand to gain by demonstrating that the resourcefulness of its business community is matched by the government's mature understanding of the country's enlightened self-interest.

It is worth emphasizing that policies which discourage foreign investment are inconsistent with Syria's own record in other fields, such as that of foreign exchange. The free transfer out of Syria of capital and profits in itself creates a basic condition for the influx of funds from abroad. That it was obviously intended to have this effect is confirmed by the legislative motivation of Exchange Control Decree No. 637 of April 21, 1952, which explains that the new regulations aim at making it possible for nonresidents to open accounts with authorized Syrian banks in both foreign and local currency, without any restrictions or conditions. They are thus designed to foster, by means of free inflow and outflow of foreign capital, both short- and long-term foreign investment in Syria.

Finally, it can be pointed out that several underdeveloped countries whose position is not basically different from Syria's have been tending to remove all obstacles in the way of the inflow of capital and outside enterprise. This is true of Pakistan, India, Turkey, and Lebanon; particular reference should be made to recent changes in Egypt's legal and administrative treatment of foreign investors.

Syria's ratification of the Inter-Arab Payments and Capital Transfers Agreement was undoubtedly motivated by a very justified desire to facilitate the movement into Syria of investment funds from some of the oil-rich neighboring countries with limited domestic investment possibilities. Yet this capital is not likely to be attracted as long as legislation or practices discriminating against foreigners in Syrian business remain in force.

v FOREIGN DEBT

457 652 Syria's only external debt is an interest-free loan of U. S. $6 million made by Saudi Arabia in 1950, repayable in four equal annual installments beginning in 1955. The loan agreement was combined with a commercial agreement and provides for repayment in the form of Syrian exports.

Syria's debt to Lebanon, arising from the withdrawal by Lebanon in 1948 of £S 44.6 million circulating in Lebanese territory, has been settled

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by the aforementioned 1952 agreement, under which the Syrian Government ceded to Lebanon about 4 billion French francs which constituted part of the Syrian note cover and were held at the French Treasury. In other words, the Lebanese Government took the place of the Syrian Government in receiving French franc installments due from France to Syria according to 1949 financial agreements between the latter countries.

In 1952 and 1953 Syria repurchased certain amounts of its own currency[6] from the International Monetary Fund in gold and U. S. dollars, thereby adjusting its quota subscription to the IMF.

Obligations for external payments, hitherto unspecified, may arise from compensation to be paid to the former owners of the nationalized power companies.

VI THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION

History of Exchange Controls

Foreign exchange controls were introduced in Syria in the first months of World War II. After a number of changes, they were gradually relaxed and in April 1952 were completely recodified. A brief review of the main stages of this development follows.

The first stage lasted until August 1948. Although in April 1944 administration of the controls passed from the French mandatory authorities to Lebanese and Syrian offices,[7] the system itself remained largely unchanged. Under it, all foreign exchange transactions were subject to license. Export proceeds as well as foreign exchange receipts from invisibles had to be surrendered at official rates to the Exchange Office, which supplied a certain amount of exchange for licensed imports and other payments. Exports of both foreign exchange and domestic currency required authorization. Regulations for the French franc area continued to be applied even after independent Syrian authorities took over the operation of the system in February 1948.

During the second stage, from August 1948 until September 1949, controls were considerably relaxed and a free foreign exchange market was

[6] £S 916,000 in 1952 and £S 2.271 million in 1953, at official exchange rates.

[7] Which operated jointly until the dissolution in February 1948 of the de facto monetary union between the two states and separately thereafter.

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457 officially recognized. Exporters were obliged to cede only part of their receipts; imports continued to be licensed but were paid for mainly by foreign exchange obtained in the free market. Allocations of foreign exchange at the official rate were largely limited to imports by government agencies and to imports of petroleum products. Transfers of exchange not quoted by the Exchange Office or obtained in the free market could be freely effected. The Exchange Office continued its responsibility for exchange from all transfers of capital from abroad, but of receipts from specified invisibles at first 20% and later only 10% had to be surrendered to the Exchange Office at official rates. Some companies operating under special contract (oil companies, in practice) were obliged, however, to sell to the Exchange Office, at the official rates, 80% of specified currencies.

Beginning in September 1949 export proceeds were freed from restrictions and a newly created Foreign Exchange Fund began to purchase exchange in the free market to supplement the amounts of exchange acquired by the government at official rates.

With the end of the Customs Union with Lebanon in March 1950 an autonomous monetary policy was inaugurated. Experiments were undertaken with a new foreign exchange regime, adapted to the needs of the Syrian national economy. The foreign exchange market was split up into a completely free market and a market for "exportation exchange." The latter was supplied by exchange from the proceeds of certain exports to certain countries to be sold only to importers. Exchange earnings of Syria's most important exports were, in effect, earmarked for this market. Because of the somewhat limited disposability of the "exportation exchange," rates for this exchange were slightly lower than those for completely free exchange. For the first time foreign exchange restrictions were applied between Syria and Lebanon.

Based on the experiences of previous years, the exchange control legislation was recodified in April 1952 and the recodification, with a few subsequent amendments, is still in effect.

The Present System of Exchange Controls and Its Operation

Administration. The final authority on all matters pertaining to exchange policy and controls is the reorganized Exchange Office, which since 1952 has performed the functions of the former separate Government Commissariat, the Control Office and the Exchange Fund. The office is headed

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by a board consisting of a president, designated by the Minister of Finance, and one delegate each from the Ministries of Finance and of National Economy. It has considerable administrative and financial autonomy, making decisions with respect to all transactions; prior to April 1952 not only actual operations but also some of the policy decisions were the responsibility of the BSL. In the absence of a true central bank the Exchange Office also operates in the monetary field to a certain extent; it handles transfers resulting from the country's payments agreements, buys and sells assets for and from the note cover of the Syrian pound and tries to stabilize domestic currency. 457

The responsibility for recording the exchange proceeds of most exports lies with the authorized commercial banks.

Import licenses are issued by the Ministry of National Economy.

Exchange Rates. Syria has, at present, two foreign exchange rates: an official rate and a fluctuating free market rate (the official rate is £S 2.19 for buying and £S 2.21 for selling, per U. S. dollar).[8] Governmental transactions were shifted in July 1953 to the free market rate, so that almost the only foreign exchange transactions to which the official rate now applies are importations of petroleum products and purchases of local currency by an oil company.

With regard to the free market rates, the intervention of the reorganized Exchange Office brought about two important developments: the separate rate for "exportation exchange" has been eliminated and since February 1953 a single rate is applied to all exchanges not transacted at the official rate; the free market rate of the dollar has been de facto stabilized since August 1953 and the fluctuations of other principal exchange rates quoted in Syria have been reduced. Table 18 shows the average free market rates of the dollar since September 1949.

In Syria the exchange rate of the dollar, like the exchange rates of the other major currencies (sterling, French franc, Belgian franc, Swiss franc and Lebanese pound), is influenced seasonally by the greater concentration of exports in the second half of the calendar year. During this period, specifically between August and December, when advances from foreign importers begin to flow in, rates tend to be low. Syrian imports, on the other hand, are spread more evenly throughout the year; hence exchange rates tend to be higher during those months in which demand is not matched by an abundance of exchange from current export proceeds.

[8] Par value announced by the IMF on July 29, 1947 is £S 2.19148 per U. S. dollar.

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TABLE 18 Average Exchange Rates of U. S. Dollar, 1949–54

(*Piasters per $*)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
January	—	352	364	385	369	357.5
February	—	352	351	387	372	357.5
March	—	357	351	389	371	357.5
April	—	361	350	388	367	357.5
May	—	365	359	375	363	357.5
June	—	368	355	367	359	—
July	—	396	354	359	356.5	—
August	—	400	360	357	357.5	—
September	332	373	359	355	357.5	—
October	347	357	367	360	357.5	—
November	339	365	380	363	357.5	—
December	350	370	383	369	357.5	—

SOURCE: Rapport Officiel de l'Office des Changes (Avril 1953); Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes.

Apart from these internal trends, the Syrian free foreign exchange market of course also reflects international factors to a greater or lesser degree. Between July and October 1950, for instance, the increased demand for foreign exchange following the outbreak of the Korean war more than offset the normal seasonal fluctuations.

The intervention of the Syrian Exchange Office limited maximum annual fluctuations between August 1952 and July 1953 to 17 piasters per dollar (less than 5% of the average annual rate) as against 30 piasters (about 8%) during the preceding 12 months. Since August 1953 the rate has remained stable at 357.5.

Since the Exchange Office has stabilized the dollar rate in the light of the demand and supply situation, its buying and selling rates for other currencies have generally followed the free market rates, reflecting the relative strength of these currencies vis-à-vis the dollar. Official cross-rates are therefore not maintained, as illustrated in Table 19.

Regulations affecting foreign exchange. Although with a few exceptions all imports are still subject to prior license, foreign exchange for settlement of their payments is readily made available by approved banks at free market rates. Import licenses need the formal endorsement of the Exchange Office.

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TABLE 19 Average Exchange Rates of Selected Currencies

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Year	£[a]	Fr.Fr.[b]	Sw.Fr.[a]	B.Fr.[a]	£E[a]	£L[a]
1949						
October	910	901	82.80	6.50	881	109
1950						
January	838	882	82.70	6.83	891	109
April	923	894	84.57	6.82	928	112
July	1,093	1,098	90.81	7.78	982	108
October	936	941	83.08	6.78	977	101
1951						
January	941	959	86.46	6.80	953	106
April	910	946	81.88	6.69	938	105
July	883	933	81.78	6.93	905	102
October	882	860	84.20	6.96	909	101
1952						
January	919	914	88.50	7.50	910	101
April	980	932	89.60	7.72	960	103
July	923	936	84.00	7.05	833	101
October	955	924	85.50	6.90	885	101
1953						
January	1,000	946	86.10	7.18	—	103
April	998	975	85.30	7.14	—	104
July	970	967	83.25	6.85	—	106
October	973	952	83.40	6.92	—	109
1954						
January	—	—	—	—	—	—
April	997	980	83.28	7.08	—	111
July	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a] In piasters per unit of quoted currency.
[b] In piasters per 1,000 units of quoted currency.

SOURCE: Rapport Officiel de l'Office des Changes (Avril 1953); Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes.

Foreign exchange from exports must in principle be repatriated and sold to an approved bank. This is true of Syria's most important export goods, representing about 80% of the value of total exports. Proceeds must be obtained in currencies prescribed by the Exchange Office; in practice the currency of the country to which the goods are exported is usually requested or a stronger currency, at the exporter's choice. Proceeds from exports to Bahrein, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—all countries with which Syria habitually has a favorable trade balance, and to which some of Syria's "unrecorded" exports are directed—are not subject to this regulation.

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457 *Invisibles and capital movements.* No regulations apply at present to the proceeds from invisibles and such exchange may be held, sold in the free market, or otherwise disposed of. Exchange for invisible payments may be readily obtained at free market rates. Imports and exports of capital are free of all restrictions and may be dealt with in the free market without limitations.

Appraisal of the System

The continuation of strict foreign exchange regulations until 1948, three years after the termination of hostilities in the area, probably reflects the desire of the authorities to assist in a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. But actually in both Syria and Lebanon the gradual relaxation of controls seemed to have represented in many cases nothing more than a formal adaptation of the law to existing practices.

Syria developed its exchange regulations and policies on the basis of a realistic analysis of the conditions in which its foreign exchange market operates: the strong link with the neighboring Beirut market; the absence of a developed monetary and banking organization; the absence of adequate statistical information; the inadequacy of foreign exchange reserves.

Beirut is an important center of diverse banking and foreign exchange transactions and served both Lebanon and Syria until the separation of the two economies. It is generally more active than the markets of Aleppo and Damascus, draws its supplies from a greater variety of sources and is more speculative. The requirement that export proceeds be repatriated, reintroduced in Syria shortly after the end of the Customs Union, arose mainly from the desire to strengthen the domestic exchange market by breaking the habit of merchants of carrying out most of their financial operations in the neighboring countries. Although this purpose has apparently been achieved, the possibility of recourse to Beirut has been by no means eliminated and always looms in the background. This somewhat limits the freedom of Syrian policy makers and would undoubtedly act as a deterrent if a stricter currency regime were attempted in Syria. It is also fairly obvious that any attempts to eliminate the existing broken cross-rates in Syria would be of no avail, as long as such cross-rates are maintained in other countries and, in particular, in Lebanon.

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The new monetary and central banking legislation, which more or less paralleled the 1952 reorganization of the Syrian exchange controls and of the Exchange Office, was not fully implemented until 1954. Hence the necessity for the Exchange Office to substitute, in certain respects, for a Central Bank or for a Stabilization Fund. There is also apparently no prospect that private banks in Syria could now absorb seasonal surpluses of foreign exchange without substantial fluctuations of exchange rates. The Exchange Office which now acts, either directly or via banks, as the principal buyer and seller of foreign exchange has thus stepped into the role previously performed by financiers from abroad. Recently introduced forward buying of foreign exchange from exporters aims at a further limitation of the country's dependence on foreign importers and banks. 457

The Exchange Office started with very little experience and almost without any of the current information which normally provides the basis for policy decisions of institutions of this kind. The first somewhat timid interventions in the market are explained by their experimental nature. These difficulties have now been in part overcome, thanks to the successfully developed new system of banking statistics.

Finally, at the time of the reorganization of its exchange control system, Syria had only very limited reserves. The total official holdings of gold and of convertible foreign exchange amounted, as of June 30, 1952, to the equivalent of £S 40.3 million; at the official rate this corresponded to 16% of the currency in circulation and represented the value of approximately five weeks of average imports. The Exchange Office could therefore not be endowed with funds which would constitute a "masse de manoeuvre" sufficient to intervene forcefully and decisively in the market.

In view of all these difficulties, the record of the new Exchange Office and of its policies brings much credit to the combined efforts of Syrian talent and first-rate foreign advice responsible for its operations. The development of the domestic foreign exchange market brought the foreign exchange position and the domestic currency circulation into closer relation with the foreign trade of the country than it was before. The de facto stabilization of the U. S. dollar exchange rate is of immediate importance for the country's economic development, since it is a prerequisite for encouragement of domestic savings as well as for foreign credits and investment. The increase in Syria's foreign exchange reserves is also of special significance.

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Foreign Exchange Reserves

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The Exchange Office has actively intervened in the free exchange market since July 1952. Up to January 1953 it operated at the prevailing free rates apparently without retarding the Syrian pound's trend toward appreciation; since then, the Exchange Office has actually set the rate by announcing daily quotations at which it would be prepared to buy and sell foreign exchange.

While the operations of the Exchange Office in 1952 resulted in an insignificant net sale of foreign exchange (the sales amounting to £S 128 million as compared to purchases to the value of £S 127 million), the Office was in 1953 a net buyer of foreign exchange, as is shown in Table 20.

TABLE 20 Transactions of the Exchange Office in Principal Currencies, 1953

(*Million currency units*)

Currency	Purchases	Sales	Net purchases or net sales (−)
U.S. dollars	42.1	26.0	16.1
Pounds sterling	4.6	7.3	−2.7
French francs	6,625.9	4,931.7	1,694.2
Belgian francs	2,228.0	1,790.3	437.7
Lebanese pounds	35.8	17.5	18.3
Swiss francs	0.9	1.3	−0.4

SOURCE: Le Commerce du Levant, Beirut, Lebanon, June 28, 1954.

Table 21 indicates the changes in the official holdings of gold and foreign exchange of Syria during the last three years. A comparison of the totals (at the free foreign exchange rate) at the end of 1952 and the end of 1953 shows an increase of £S 49.3 million while an increase of £S 52 million is shown in the balance of payments estimate (see below). This discrepancy is due to the fact that the first figure is calculated on the basis of the foreign exchange rates prevailing at the end of each year while the second figure is derived from the net transactions of the Exchange Office effected through 1953 at current rates.

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TABLE 21 Official Holdings of Gold and Foreign Assets, 1951–53 457

(Millions £S)

End of year	Gold	U.S. $	Inconvertible currencies	Total: At official rate	Total: At free rate	% of total in gold & U.S. $
1951	24.7	4.0	44.7	73.4	114.1	39.1
1952	31.7	17.5	15.3	64.5	107.4	76.3
1953	31.7	45.5	20.7	97.9	156.7	78.8

SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit.

VII BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

No balance of payments estimates could be made before 1950, until which time, as already mentioned, not even national trade statistics were available. Since then estimates have been made regularly with an increasing degree of accuracy. Margins of error must be allowed for; they may be particularly large with regard to the adjustments of exports and imports for undervaluation and for smuggling, and on invisible items such as profits from transit trade, tourism, emigrant remittances and private capital movements outside banks.

Yet, the fact that the IMF has found it possible to include estimates of the Syrian balance of payments in its Balance of Payments Yearbook is one more indication that these estimates can be regarded with a certain confidence.

Trade Balance

Table 22 shows merchandise transactions of Syria during the last three years, indicating what adjustments have been made.

The reason for the undervaluation of the declared value of exports is to enable foreign importers to pay lower import duties in their countries, wherever ad valorem duties obtain. Undervaluation of imports arises obviously from the desire to pay lower customs duties under Syria's ad

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TABLE 22 Merchandise Transactions, 1951–53

(Millions £S)

	1951	1952	1953
Exports, f.o.b. in customs returns	277	320	376
Adjustment for undervaluation	15	17	19
Unrecorded exports (net)	—	—	13
Total adjusted exports	292	337	408
Imports, c.i.f. in customs returns	291	383	387
Addition for:			
Exchange rate adjustment	120	131	164
Undervaluation	5	6	12
UNRWA imports	—	—	1
Unrecorded imports (net)	2	4	—
Total adjusted imports	418	444	484
Trade deficit	−126	−117	−76

SOURCE: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook; Syrian Government.

valorem tariffs. In both cases adjustments are based on estimates by Syrian officials.

The same source provided the estimates for unrecorded trade, which are, of course, no more than rough guesses. It is apparently believed that in 1951 and 1952 more was smuggled into the country than out of it. For 1953 it was assumed that unrecorded trade roughly balanced in both directions except for gold. As Syrian customs figures record gold imports but do not reveal gold exports in 1953, when such exports were forbidden, and as all the gold imported during that year for non-monetary purposes (£S 13 million) is believed to have been re-exported, a corresponding amount has been included as unrecorded exports in the 1953 balance of payments estimate.

Recorded imports do not include armaments, on which information is not available. Nor do they include supplies for refugees donated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); in 1953 the value of the latter was recorded separately.

Since customs figures for imports are based on the official exchange rate, adjustments were made by applying the average annual exchange rates to imports from the various currency areas.

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TABLE 23 Syria's Balance of Payments, 1951–53

(Million £S)[a] 457

	1951		1952		1953	
	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit
A. *Goods and services*						
Merchandise (exports f.o.b.; imports c.i.f.)	292	418	337	444	408	484
Transit trade	5	—	5	—	6	—
Foreign travel	13	13	13	13	15	24
Oil companies	54	—	50	—	49	—
Miscellaneous receipts and expenditures	7	2	10	4	10	4
Total (A)	371	433	415	461	488	512
B. *Private donations and capital movements*						
Emigrant remittances	10	—	10	—	10	—
Private transfers (excluding banks)	15	—	24	—	20	—
Total (B)	25	—	34	—	30	—
C. *Miscellaneous official financing*						
UNRWA	11	—	11	—	10	—
Settlement of Government debt	—	—	—	37[b]	—	—
Total (C)	11	—	11	37	10	—
D. *Errors and omissions*	6	—	26	—	—	6
Total (A–D)	413	433	486	498	528	518
E. *Compensatory financing*						
Banks (net)	14	—	5	—	46	—
Government	15[c]	—	—	2[d]	—	4[d]
Monetary Reserves	—	9	9	—	—	52
Total (E)	29	9	14	2	46	56
Total (A–E)	442	442	500	500	574	574

[a] At free market rate.

[b] Settlement of debt with Lebanon. The total amount due to Lebanon over the period 1952 to 1954 inclusive was set aside in 1952 in a blocked account with the BSL and subtracted from the monetary reserves.

[c] Drawings on the Saudi Arabian loan.

[d] Repurchases with IMF.

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457 *Balance of Payments Estimates*

Table 23 attempts an analytical presentation of Syria's balance of payments during the last three years. It is based on studies of the Syrian Ministry of Finance.

The following is a more detailed analysis of the calculations underlying the estimates for foreign travel in 1953.

(*Million £S*)

Credit		Debit	
Foreign legations	8	Syrian students abroad	6
Foreign tourists	2	Syrian legations (net)	2
Lebanese visitors	5	Syrian tourists	1
	—	Syrian visitors to Lebanon	15
Total	15	Total	24

Restrictions on Syrian travel to Lebanon were greatly relaxed in 1953[9] which accounts for the large increase in expenditure for this item.

Receipts from oil companies shown in Table 23 include payments to the government under terms of concessions and rates of foreign exchange by the companies to cover local expenditures. The latter decreased with the completion of the new installation for transport of oil (TAP line and IPC pipelines and the oil port of Banias).

Miscellaneous receipts and expenditures include income from investment abroad and transfer of profits from foreign investment in Syria as well as various other non-recurrent receipts and expenditure.

As no data exist with respect to fluctuations of receipts from emigrant remittances, the original estimate is repeated.

What should be shown under UNRWA donations is the total of foreign currency imported into Syria by UNRWA during the calendar year, plus the value of goods imported into Syria and financed by UNRWA from outside funds. From this total should be deducted the value of supplies purchased in Syria with the aforementioned funds, re-exported by UNRWA to neighboring countries and therefore already counted under recorded export proceeds. A detailed investigation of these figures carried out for 1953 gave a result very close to the estimates for previous years.

No data are available on capital movements in the private sector outside banks. This position, being residual, can be considered jointly with

[9] And abolished in the spring of 1954.

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errors and omissions. Capital movements through banks are recorded with increasing accuracy thanks to the recently introduced new system of banking statistics. The remarkable increase of obligations in the banking sector in 1953 is explained by transactions connected with the financing of the crops which are now apparently carried out by Syrian banks, including Syrian branches of foreign banks, to a greater extent than in previous years.

Compensatory government financing includes drawings on the Saudi Arabian loan in 1951 and the settlement of a repurchase obligation with regard to the IMF in 1952 and 1953.

In 1951, monetary reserves increased despite a balance of accounts deficit. This was because drawings on the Saudi Arabian loan and a decrease in net foreign deposits with banks more than offset the balance of accounts deficit. In 1952 the balance of accounts deficit and a repurchase of Syrian pounds from the IMF were reflected in a decline in monetary reserves except for a minor increase in net external liabilities of banks. In 1953 the balance of accounts showed a surplus; the monetary reserves increased considerably, despite a further repurchase of Syrian pounds, thanks to a substantial increase in net foreign advances to banks. This importation of banking funds in 1953 was apparently occasioned by the credit needs of the expanding economy and represented, in part at least, a form of prepayment of the larger volume of exports which developed during the following year.

Future Trends

In Syria, not unlike other underdeveloped countries, an adverse balance of trade and a surplus of invisibles on current accounts have been recurrent features during the short period under observation.

If 1950 is disregarded (in view of the abnormal configuration of prices following the outbreak of the Korean war and that year's statistical shortcomings) the Syrian balance of trade shows a steady tendency to improve. This improvement is mainly due to increased exports; there is reason to expect that their growth will continue.

During the last three years, an average of 70-80% of the value of Syria's exports was represented by agricultural and livestock products. Unless present prices of these goods show further substantial decreases, a growth in the volume of exportable quantities should have a more or less direct impact on the value of exports.

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457 On the assumption that the development program recommended by the mission will be adopted, the rising trend in agricultural production may well continue, particularly because of increasing yields. The livestock population has been growing steadily since 1949. The carrying out of the mission's recommendations in this field may lead to an even greater increase in the value of livestock production.

The mission feels justified in anticipating that by 1960 Syria will have sufficient agricultural surpluses not only to close a trade gap of the magnitude estimated for 1953 but even to provide a small favorable balance. Such a balance might be somewhat increased by the growth of the industrial exports, perhaps stimulated by the opening of new markets within the Arab preferential trade area.

On the other hand, imports cannot be expected to remain at their present level at a time when both the population and average incomes are expected to grow. Import restrictions may be relaxed; equipment for development projects will have to be purchased from abroad. To attempt to weigh these possible import increases against the above-mentioned surpluses would be entering into the realm of pure speculation. It can be said, however, that barring any unexpected major unfavorable price movements, and given continued growth of the Syrian economy, exports may, generally speaking, tend to equilibrate with imports.

If Syria's considerable tourist assets can attract increasing numbers of foreign visitors, this would tend to offset expenditures resulting from the desire of Syrians to visit Lebanon. While UNRWA expenditures cannot be expected to continue indefinitely, emigrant remittances will presumably continue and revenues from oil companies will almost certainly increase. There is no reason to believe that invisible transactions on current accounts will cease to show net credit balances.

Thus, the general prospects of Syria's balance of payments on current account seem to be good and modest surpluses would appear to be more likely than deficits.

There is no basis on which to predict capital movements. Given political stability, an influx of funds from abroad could well take place; if so, this would of course accelerate the rhythm of Syria's economic growth.

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investment in cotton growing, prices began to rise once more. 435
At the end of 1951 rising import prices, coupled with the poor 439
grain crop, were reflected in local retail prices, and prices continued to rise until mid-1952, when governmental action and steadier import prices had a salutary effect. Thus, generally speaking, the retail price of household goods has risen five or six times since before the war, and the currency in circulation has also risen despite the fact that the official credit policy has been restrictive; although the note issue is now only £S46 million higher than in 1946 (at 31 December 1951 it was £S248 million), bank deposits have increased from £S96·2 million at the end of 1949 to £S198·3 million at the end of 1951. At that date the currency was covered, as to gold 9·9 per cent, foreign exchange 6 per cent, commercial bonds 1·4 per cent, treasury bills 33·5 per cent, and state loans or guarantees 48·9 per cent.

Direct taxation on income and the land accounts for only 651
about a quarter of the Syrian budget;[1] this is less than before 652
the war, for the proportionate amount from the land has fallen from 30 per cent to about 14 per cent in 1950; the estimate for 1952 was 18 per cent. Receipts from customs duties have increased considerably and these, with other indirect taxes, have helped to make the burden less 'fairly' distributed. Indirect taxes are levied on sugar, petroleum, and other essential commodities. Budgetary expenditure since before the war has increased seventeenfold, and since 1949 the total annual expenditure has increased by more than a quarter; but whereas expenditure on health, education, and public works has increased only slightly, that on defence has trebled and accounts for over a third of total expenditure. Agriculture, with only 2 per cent of the budget, is insufficiently provided for and it is hoped that its share will be increased.

Banking is largely but not exclusively in the hands of foreign 453
banks; La Banque de Syrie et du Liban (French) has the concession for the note issue, but there is talk of starting a Syrian National Bank; among other commercial banks are La Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (French) and the British Bank of the Middle East. The foreign-exchange market 457
has always been less influential than that of Beirut, but in this respect Aleppo is growing in importance. There is a recognized free market for exchange[2] in which merchants and Government alike deal. The official rate of £S6·19 = £1, used mainly for Government transactions, was abolished in June 1953 for all purposes except Government transactions with petroleum com-

[1] See table 2, p. 502 below. [2] See table 3, p. 503 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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457 panies. It was replaced by a fixed rate to approximate closely to the prevailing free rate.

International Trade

439 In 1951 Syria had an adverse balance of trade of £S28 million but this was probably counterbalanced by the income from certain invisible exports which do not come within the knowledge of the official statisticians. The year 1951, however, was a particularly bad one for agriculture. In normal years Syria can expect to have a favourable balance of international trade; in 1950, for example, the country had a considerable trade surplus and by 1952 the large deficit of the previous year had been wiped out. Syria's best customers are usually Lebanon and Iraq (Lebanon's inter-Middle Eastern trade is higher still) but there is also reciprocal trade with Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. Trade with Western Germany has recovered and is now quite important although it is threatened by Syria's attitude to the German reparations to Israel.[1] Syria's main exports are agricultural; raw cotton has recently become the most important. Her chief imports are machinery, oil, and textiles.[2]

Up to 1947 almost all the external trade of Syria was done not only through Beirut but also by Lebanese firms; however, since then, Syrian merchants have set out to show that they can deal directly with the outside world. The Government are encouraging importers and exporters to use Latakia rather than Beirut and legislation aims at preventing foreign businesses from being represented in Syria by foreigners. This has the effect of cutting out the middleman in Beirut, but it also makes it very difficult for British, American, and French firms to have sufficient control over their affairs to encourage the investment in Syria of foreign skill and foreign capital. In 1951 some Belgian and French companies were nationalized and the commercial climate was unfavourable to foreign investment; but during 1952 Colonel Shishakli declared that the Government would welcome foreign capital and enterprise provided that they did not encroach on Syria's national sovereignty and interests, and towards this end exchange regulations were to be simplified and greater freedom was to be given in the transfer of capital.

Development Schemes

426 454 Interest rates in Syria and Lebanon are very high and even a sound borrower may have to pay from 25 to 50 per cent

[1] See table 4, p. 503 below. [2] See ibid.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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figure until February 1953. The cost of living has likewise risen considerably; during the war it rose about sixfold, reaching a peak in 1945. It then decreased steadily until the autumn of 1950, when the Korean boom in raw material prices brought fresh inflationary pressures into Lebanon through her growing commercial and entrepôt trade, and persisted until early 1952. This fresh rise in prices was also caused by the rise in food prices (imported and home grown) following the bad harvest of 1951. Although early in 1953 prices had not resumed their pre-Korean level, they had declined steadily.

The following figures showing the indices of wholesale prices and the cost of living illustrate the salient movement in prices (1948 = 100).

	1939	*1945*	*1950 July*	*1951 March*	*1951 Dec.*	*1952 May*	*1952 Dec.*	*1953 May*
Wholesale prices	13	134	76	104	96	86	82	79
Cost of living	20	123	84	95	96	94	91	89

(SOURCE: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, September 1953.)

Budgetary expenditure and receipts have also increased considerably, partly resulting from the rise in prices but also from greater commitments. The main increase in expenditure has been for defence, for the Palestine conflict and its aftermath, and for education. The sources of revenue have undergone a marked change: whereas customs provided 60 per cent of the revenue in 1939, they now contribute only 25 per cent, and new indirect taxes on general consumption now provide the major share, about 50 per cent. A measure to increase direct taxation was introduced in September 1951 in the form of a tax on agricultural income based on a 'presumptive' assessment value at progressive rates of tax. As yet its full effect is not known. The budget estimates for 1952 were: expenditure £L94·25 million, and receipts £L94·16 million; further details are given in table 2 on p. 502 below. The 1953 budget was expected to be of the order of £L110 million.

The division between the Syrian and the Lebanese currencies became effective at the end of January 1948 and this introduced an agio between the two currencies. At first this favoured Lebanon, but in 1951 the Syrian pound was the higher and then, in 1952, the Lebanese pound returned to a premium of from 2·6 per cent to 0·7 per cent. The exchange rates of foreign currencies are given in table 3 on p. 503 below.

International Trade

In defiance of the gloomy prophecies of economists, Lebanon contrives to flourish with an adverse trade balance, which in

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

COTTON TEXTILES

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Syria has nine small cotton textile mills centered around Aleppo and Damascus, with a total of 55,000 spindles and 2,000 looms and a number of knitting mills and garment factories. A large home industry, which not only weaves but also spins cotton yarn, has, according to trade representatives, a capacity almost as great as that of the commercial mills.

[439]

Until a few years ago the industry of Syria was complementary to that of Lebanon. Syria bought yarns from Lebanon and sold cloth there. The two countries together were able to produce about two-thirds of their total needs.[30] Acceding to nationalistic pressure, Syria dissolved the customs union in 1950 and set about not only to install more spindles to balance the weaving capacity, but actually to become self-sufficient in all cotton textiles. A number of mills have bought new equipment for rehabilitation and integration.

Outstanding in this field is the new mill built at Damascus by a group of industrialists known as the "big five." The mill is small in size—only 10,000 spindles and 350 fully automatic looms—but it is a showplace, modern in every detail. The management is especially proud of the modern clinic which provides the workers with free medical attention—a new idea in this part of the world.

This mill has a well-trained engineering and administrative staff and good machinery. To increase efficiency, the management hopes to abandon the range of goods now made and concentrate on the production of only two or three constructions. The level of efficiency is high enough, based on the wage scale of roughly $1.25 per day, to permit the mill to compete on the world market. Approximately 20 per cent of the cloth production is exported.

The other industries are less efficient and are not in a position to compete on the export market.

COTTON CONSUMPTION

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In Syria production of yarns was estimated by the government at 5,500 tons in 1951, double what it had been four years earlier and seven times the output ten years ago. Industry and government figures vary considerably, especially on output of the home industry, but they agree on the same sharp rise in production.

Cotton consumption, computed on the basis of yarn production estimates, is placed at approximately 33,000 bales and is in line with the sharp increase in yarn production.

PROTECTION

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As in other Middle East countries, the cotton textile industry receives substantial tariff protection from imports. Syria is a free-money market, and foreign exchange can be bought for any purpose on any street corner. As a result, prices are reported to be going down, as they did in Lebanon when foreign exchange was freed several years ago.

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Duties on cotton textiles were changed in 1949 from a specific rate base to an ad valorem base. The duties on most yarns in which the local industry is deficient average about 20 per cent ad valorem; on cotton textiles, about

[30] *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission, op. cit.*, p. 3.

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Other measures for the protection and encouragement of industry were taken in September 1952, when new enterprises were exempted from customs duties on machinery and building materials; from property taxes on factory, offices and workers' houses for six years; from income tax on 10 per cent of reinvested profits; and from "tamattu" tax for six years. More direct assistance was provided through loans. In 1949, the Government advanced £S 16.9 million, for a period of three years, to nine industrial companies. In 1952, the loans were extended for another five years, and at the end of 1953 all but £S 220,000 were still outstanding. 1/ Another loan of £S 10 million was advanced to an electricity company.

As a counterpart to the assistance given by it, the Government has increasingly sought to regulate industrial activity. In 1952, the establishment of new factories, or expansion of existing ones, was made conditional on authorization from the Ministry of Economics, which was to be given only if the project were judged both viable and useful to the country's economy. All existing enterprises were also required to register with the Ministry. In 1953, minimum standards were set in the mechanical weaving, underwear, tile, confectionery, tanning, shoe, hosiery and match industries. The Government also intervened in the cotton spinning industry in 1951 and in the vegetable oil and cement industries in 1953 in order to prevent disproportionate rises in prices.

These various measures have been responsible for the survival of some of the newly established industries. Another important factor has been the rise in consumer purchasing power due to the increase in agricultural income. 2/ It is unlikely that Syrian industry will be able to dispense with government assistance in the near future, and its further growth will continue to depend on agricultural development.

Foreign trade and balance of payments

The outstanding event in the field of foreign trade during the post-war period was the dissolution of the customs union between Lebanon and Syria. Termination of the French Mandate had not loosened the economic ties binding Lebanon and Syria. The customs union between them continued in force. Notes issued by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban circulated freely, at par, in both

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1/ Etude sur la Syrie économique, 1953.

2/ The poor grain crops and low cotton prices of 1951 had very unfavourable effects on industry.

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439 457 countries, and the railways and other monopolies in the two countries operated under the supervision of a joint board. In the post-war period, however, strains began to be felt, especially in regard to the allocation of customs revenues between the two countries. Conclusion of a financial agreement between Lebanon and France in 1948, and failure of Syria to conclude one until the following year, put the Lebanese pound at a premium over the Syrian pound. More important was the incompatibility between the desire of the Syrian Government to protect its agriculture and its developing industries and that of the Lebanese Government to reduce restrictions on trade and movement of capital and to lower the cost of living, and the consequent divergence in the fiscal policies of the two.

The breakup of the customs union, on 14 March 1950, was followed by considerable dislocation of trade. After prolonged negotiation, a temporary commercial agreement was signed in November 1950, removing prohibitions on the importation from either country of agricultural and domestic industrial goods, that is, goods containing local raw materials to the extent of 50 per cent of their value. Such goods were, however, subject to the usual custom duties and, like other goods imported into Syria, required licences. In the following years, several temporary agreements were concluded between the two countries, of which the most important was that of February 1952. This agreement contained lists of the products of each country which were to be admitted to the other free of duty or at reduced rates. Minimum duties were agreed upon for certain goods imported from other countries. The agreement, however, left certain loopholes, as a result of which Syria prohibited the export of certain agricultural goods to Lebanon, and the import of certain manufactured goods from it. Consequently, another agreement was concluded in March 1953, in which some of the loopholes were closed and transit facilities were mutually conceded.

Those agreements achieved one of the main objects of Syrian policy, the protection of industry and of certain branches of agriculture. A further step in the same direction was the refusal, in August 1951, to renew the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This left Syria free to conclude bilateral agreements with certain Arab States, namely Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and with other States such as Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Japan and Yugoslavia; these agreements provide for most favoured nation treatment and, in certain cases, for tariff concessions. In May 1954, the Inter-Arab Trade and Transit Agreement and the Payments Agreement were ratified by Syria.

439 457 504 Another objective of the Syrian Government has been diversion of trade from the port of Beirut to Latakia and the replacing of Lebanese middlemen by Syrian. In 1950, the Government prohibited the import of certain goods, such as textiles, through Lebanon. In 1952, foreign firms operating in Syria were required to have Syrian managers, and companies established were required to have capital, more than half of which came from Syrian sources. Free zones were set up in Latakia and Damascus, and re-exporting was authorized. In 1952, a decree prohibited the exporting of major agricultural products, such as cotton, cotton-seed, wheat, barley, pulses and wool, except through Latakia; most products grown in the southern part of Syria 1/ were, however, exempted from this provision. Owing to

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1/ The provinces of Hama, Homs, Damascus, Hauran and Jebel Druze.

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the inadequate condition of the port of Latakia and the unpreparedness of Syrian merchants, these restrictions caused a certain amount of hardship, the cost of imported merchandise was raised, 1/ and much capital was locked up in merchandise. However, improvement of the harbour (see below) and the expansion in Syria's foreign trade greatly increased the volume of merchandise passing through Latakia; imports rose from 19,000 tons in 1948 to 168,000 in 1953 and 207,000 in 1954, and exports from 6,000 tons to 336,000 and 630,000. In July 1954, exports through other routes were authorized, to relieve pressure on Latakia. The greater proportion of imports, and nearly half of all exports, still pass across the Lebanese frontier.

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Table 52 shows the changes that have taken place in Syria's foreign trade. During the war years, the imports of the Lebano-Syrian Union declined greatly, while exports contracted still more sharply. 2/ After the war, imports recovered rapidly but exports lagged behind. The large import surplus, which was mainly accounted for by Lebanon but to which Syria also contributed, was covered by liquidating the greater part of the foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the war and by various invisible receipts. The breakup of the customs union coincided with expansion of cotton production in Syria and with an increase in the output of cereals. Consequently, Syria's foreign trade has, in recent years, shown a surplus. This, however, is due to the fact that imports are valued at the official rate of exchange, although they are actually paid for with currency purchased at the free rate. Table 53 shows the main items in Syria's balance of payments, valued at the respective free rates.

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A breakdown of exports in 1953 shows raw cotton to be by far the most important item, 3/ followed by wheat and barley; 4/ imports covered a wide range of products. 5/

1/ In 1951 it was estimated that the cost of importing goods through Latakia was 15 to 20 per cent higher than through Beirut.

2/ A quantum index of imports into Lebanon and Syria (1938 = 100) shows a decline to 27 in 1941, and a recovery to 53 in 1945, 107 in 1946, 122 in 1947, 178 in 1948 and 205 in 1949. The index of exports fell to 18 in 1941 and recovered to 30 in 1945, 70 in 1946, 84 in 1947, 80 in 1948 and 154 in 1949 (Musa J. Halabi, Terms of Trade for Syria and Lebanon, unpublished thesis, American University, Beirut, 1952).

3/ France has been the leading importer of Syrian cotton since large-scale production began, followed by the United Kingdom. In 1953, France took 20,000 tons, out of a total of 54,000, the United Kingdom 14,000, the Federal Republic of Germany 9,000, Italy 6,000 and Lebanon 2,000 (Bureau des documentations syriennes et arabes, Etude Mensuelle sur l'économie et le marché syriens). In 1952, exports totalled 38,000 tons, worth £S 124.3 million.

4/ In 1953, exports of wheat aggregated 180,000 tons, barley 153,000, millet 43,000 and flour 22,000. In 1952, the figures were 100,000 tons, 140,000 tons, 14,000 tons and 9,000 tons respectively.

5/ Ministry of National Economy, Summary of Foreign Trade, Fourth Quarter and Year 1953 (Damascus, 1954).

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Table 52. Syria: Quantity and Value of Imports and Exports, 1938, 1941, 1943 and 1945 to 1954 a/

Year	Imports		Exports and re-exports		Balance of trade (millions of Syrian pounds)
	Quantity (thousands of tons)	Value (millions of Syrian pounds)	Quantity (thousands of tons)	Value (millions of Syrian pounds)	
1938....	561	70.8	382	39.3	-31.5
1941....	274	40.5	29	11.2	-29.4
1943....	428	110.1	53	32.0	-78.1
1945....	515	130.6	146	43.8	-86.8
1946....	370	266.6	107	85.6	-181.0
1947....	414	362.8	150	83.6	-279.2
1948....	757	483.5	125	78.5	-405.0
1949....	957	516.2	308	111.1	-405.1
1950 b/.	239	116.9	112	37.7	-79.2
1950 c/.	458	197.8	435	207.9	10.1
1951....	727	304.0	212	277.1	-26.8
1952....	805	313.3	491	319.6	6.3
1953....	772	307.1	718	375.8	68.7
1954 d/.	424	169.6	345	169.2	-0.4

Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria; United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.

a/ Lebanon and Syria from 1938 to 13 March 1950; Syria only from 13 March 1950 to 1954.

b/ 1 January to 13 March.

c/ 13 March to 31 December.

d/ Six months.

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Table 53. Syria: Principal Items in Balance of Payments, 1951 to 1953
(Millions of Syrian pounds)

Item	1951	1952	1953 a/
Current accounts:			
Credit:			
Proceeds of exports b/	292	397	408
Receipts from oil companies	54	50	49
Expenditure of United Nations Relief and Works Agency	11	11	10
Refugees' remittances	10	10	10
Other services	10	11	3
Total	377	479	480
Debit:			
Payments for imports c/	418	444	485
Balance of current transactions	-41	-25	-4
Recorded capital items: d/			
Private capital movements	15	26	20
Saudi Arabian loan	15	-	-
Debt to Lebanon	-	-37	-
Repurchase obligation i towards the International Monetary Fund	-	-2	-4
Gold and official foreign exchange	-9	9	-52
Bank reserves	14	5	46
Balance of recorded capital items	35	-1	10
Unrecorded items:			
Balance of unrecorded items, errors and omissions	6	26	-6

Source: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Beirut).

a/ Preliminary.
b/ Valued f.o.b., at free rate of exchange.
c/ Valued c.i.f., at free rate of exchange.
d/ Minus sign indicates outflow of capital.

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Main export items:	Millions of Syrian pounds	Main import items:	Millions of Syrian pounds
Raw cotton	135.0	Petroleum products	39.5
Wheat	46.0	Machinery and parts	30.2
Barley	24.3	Gold ingots and bars	20.1
Livestock	23.0	Iron and steel products	18.0
Raw wool	21.5	Motor vehicles	17.8
Silk yarns and fabrics	17.3	Rayon thread	15.1
Other textile products	12.6	Other textile products	27.0

Available information on the terms of trade of Lebanon and Syria shows an improvement during the war years, a rapid deterioration from 1944 to 1949, a sharp improvement up to 1951 and a deterioration to 1953. By 1944, the export price index stood at 493 whereas the import price index had risen to 331 (1938 = 100), giving an export-import price ratio of 149. The export price index showed a further small rise to 498 in 1945, but thereafter fell rapidly to 246 in 1949, whereas import prices continued to rise to a peak of 533 in 1947 and thereafter fell to 466 in 1949. The export-import price ratio therefore declined to 118 in 1945, 92 in 1946, 64 in 1947 and 1948 and 53 in 1949. 1/ No subsequent indices are available, but the following table would seem to indicate a marked improvement in Syria's terms of trade in 1950 and 1951, a deterioration in 1952 and 1953, and a slight improvement in 1954. 2/

	Cotton	Wheat
	(Export price per ton, in Syrian pounds)	
1949	2,000	211
1950 (last three quarters)	3,750	210
1951	4,834	317
1952	3,288	297
1953	2,499	255
1954 (first half)	2,746	264

The following table shows Syria's trade with its principal clients and suppliers in 1954, each item as a percentage of the total:

1/ Musa J. Halabi, op. cit.

2/ Unit values computed from foreign trade returns.

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Exports to:		Imports from:	
Lebanon	24	United States	12
France	16	Lebanon	11
United Kingdom	13	United Kingdom	11
Italy	9	France	11
Federal Republic of Germany	7	Federal Republic of Germany	10
United States	6	Italy	7

As table 53 shows, most of Syria's import surplus has been covered by various invisible items. The most important of these were receipts from the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline in the form of direct payments for security charges, transit fees and other items; negotiations are under way to increase these payments. More significant in recent years have been other expenditures by oil companies building pipelines and other transport facilities in Syria, namely the Kirkuk-Tripoli pipeline and the Trans-Arabian pipeline, both of which were completed in 1949, and the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline and oil port, completed in 1952. Since then, local expenditures by oil companies have tended to diminish. Tourist expenditures in Syria in 1953 have been estimated at $6 million. 1/

There has been little change in Syria's capital accounts. In 1948 and 1949, an appreciable outflow to Lebanon seems to have taken place, but this was succeeded by some repatriation of capital and by an inflow of Lebanese private capital and to a smaller extent other foreign private capital, which was invested in the production, processing and marketing of cotton. A small amount of foreign capital was also invested in branches of banks and other foreign firms operating in Syria. On 29 January 1950, the Saudi Arabian Government granted to the Syrian Government a $6 million interest-free loan, to be used mainly for improvement of the port of Latakia; it also transferred to Syria the dredging equipment which had been used in the Saudi port of Jidda. The loan was to be repaid, in four equal instalments, between 1955 and 1958; repayment was to be made in Syrian products, such as grains, textiles and other specified articles. Most of the loan was drawn upon in 1951.

In 1952 and 1953 Syria repurchased from the International Monetary Fund Syrian currency of a value of $1,454,000 and repaid to Lebanon its debt of £S 44.6 million. 2/

1/ Le Commerce du Levant, 20 March 1954 (Beirut).

2/ Bulletin issued by the Money and Credit Board, 5 January 1954, reproduced in La Syrie économique, 1953.

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Finance and public finance

453 652 454 The post-war period witnessed some important changes in Syria's monetary and banking system, in its foreign exchange system and in its public finances. The large increase in production, investment and commerce noted above had its counterpart in the development of the banking system 1/ and expansion of the money supply (see table 10), most of which has taken the form of bank deposits.

This expansion of the money supply in the post-war period has not been matched by a rise in prices. Between 1945 and 1949 the trend was downward. The discontinuance of Allied military expenditure, together with a sharp increase in the import of surplus, led to a sizable deficit on current account. 2/ Moreover, the 1945 and 1946 budgets showed a surplus, and although the 1947 and 1948 budgets closed with a deficit the amount involved was small. Investment remained at a low level. The Arab-Israeli war led to a large budget deficit in 1949; this was, however, offset by the very low level of investment and the huge import surplus. The index of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus fell from its peak of 831 in 1945 (1938 = 100) to 478 in 1949. 3/

435 [454 455] 434 During the period 1950 to 1954, on the other hand, prices rose. The large-scale investment in cotton, and the sharp increase in the quantity and value of exports of cotton and cereals, which led to a position approaching equilibrium in the balance of payments (see table 53), raised incomes. Subsidiary factors were pipeline construction, high building activity, 4/ and small budget deficits. The rise in import prices, aggravated by hoarding and speculation in 1950 and 1951, also played a part. The rise in prices remained, however, small in scale. The index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus, in which cotton has a heavy weight, rose from 100 in 1949 to 111 in 1950 and 136 in 1951; the fall in cotton prices led to a drop to 119 in 1952 and 110 in 1953. Improved cotton

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1/ Foreign banks account for the greater part of banking activities in Syria; in recent years several banks have opened branches in Syria and existing banks have set up new offices in the smaller towns. In the first half of 1954 seven new banks, mostly Syrian or Lebanese, were established, bringing the total to seventeen. The country is still, however, inadequately provided with long-term credit for agricultural and industrial development, a gap that has been only partly filled by the Government-owned Agricultural Bank and Government loans to industry (see above).

2/ It is difficult to distinguish between Syria's and Lebanon's shares in the trade of the customs union, but there is no doubt that Syria had a large import surplus. This was not covered by such receipts as revenue from petroleum companies and remittances sent by emigrants.

3/ Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract, 1953. There was no index of wholesale prices in Syria prior to 1949; the wholesale price index in Beirut fell from its peak of 1,038 in 1945 (1939 = 100) to 641 in 1949.

4/ Authorized floor space for new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945 to 166,000 in 1949, 209,000 in 1950, 162,000 in 1951, 210,000 in 1952 and 265,000 in 1953.

435 prices and greatly increased exports of grain in the first half of 1954, however,
434 once more raised incomes and prices and at the end of October the index stood at 129. 1/

Currency

457 Syria remained in the franc area until 1949. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, two important measures affecting both Lebanon and Syria were taken by the Mandatory Authorities. First, an Exchange Control was established, to which all foreign exchange earned by residents of both countries was to be paid; this included the sterling and other payments made by the Allied troops stationed in Lebanon and Syria. Secondly, the proportion of franc bills and bonds held as cover against the notes issued by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban and its deposits increased sharply until, by the end of the war, it came to constitute over 95 per cent of their combined total 2/ However, from May 1943 until March 1946 sterling was made available in unlimited quantities to residents of both countries; and in 1944 the value of the franc holdings of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban was guaranteed against any depreciation of the franc in terms of sterling.

In the post-war period the inability of France to supply more than a small fraction of the non-franc foreign exchange requirements of Lebanon and Syria, together with its repudiation of its guarantee of the sterling value of their franc balances, 3/ caused the Syrian Government to take steps to establish an independent currency.

In February 1949 it left the franc area, and simultaneously an agreement was reached with France regarding the Syrian franc reserves held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. These holdings, which amounted to 10,204 million francs on 24 January 1948, were divided into two parts. The first, consisting of 7,015 million francs, used as cover for the note issue, was guaranteed in terms of sterling by the French Government for a period of ten years, starting in January 1948. Provision was also made for releasing this sum to Syria, in fourteen semi-annual instalments, by 1955. The balance of Syria's holdings, consisting of 3,189 million francs, was not guaranteed in terms of any other currency. After deduction of French claims on Syria, aggregating £E 23.2 million for property left in that country, the balance was to be deposited in a special temporary account, to be used for purchase of European currencies other than the franc, at the French official rates.

1/ United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. The retail price index shows the same general movement, with a lag. It remained unchanged in 1950, at 478, rose to 556 and 594 in 1951 and 1952, respectively, fell to 544 in 1953, and continued to decline during the first half of 1954, standing at 482 in June.

2/ Said Himadeh, "Tatawurat al naqd al suri al lubnani", Al Abath, September 1945 (Beirut).

3/ Said Himadeh, "Hawl nashru al itifaqia al malia al jadida", Al Abath, March 1948 (Beirut). The French Government did, however, pay to Lebanon and Syria the difference resulting from the depreciation of the franc in December 1945.

436 In May 1949 the Government decreed that the unit of currency would henceforth be the Syrian pound, equivalent to 405.512 milligrammes of fine gold, and began depositing gold and foreign exchange as note issue cover.

652 In July 1949 agreement was reached with Lebanon regarding Syria's debt
436 on account of the Lebanese bank-notes, previously circulating in Syria and now withdrawn by the Syrian Government. The amount was fixed at LL 44 million and it was agreed that settlement would be made by payment of 4,078 million francs to Lebanon; most of this was paid in 1952.

On 28 March 1953 a legislative decree was promulgated, regulating the monetary system of Syria. A Money and Credit Board was established to co-ordinate and direct the activity of monetary and credit institutions. A Central Bank is also to be established; it will be administered by the Money and Credit Board, which is also charged with supervising and orienting the private banks 1/.

The law is being applied in stages. The Money and Credit Board was established in May 1953, and negotiations were started with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which at present issues the currency and enjoys several of the prerogatives of a central bank, regarding eventual transfer to the proposed Central Bank of the government deposits held by it and the assets and liabilities of its Issue Department. The concession of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban lapses in 1964, but the Government has declared that it will not necessarily wait until then to establish the Central Bank. In the meantime, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban continues to perform its previous functions.

The legislative decree provided that the cover of the note issue may consist of gold, foreign exchange, government bills and bonds, and advances made by the Central Bank; the percentage of gold and foreign exchange is not to fall below 30 per cent. On 31 December 1953, the gold and foreign exchange cover of the note issue amounted to £S 97.9 million at the official exchange rate - £S 156.7 million at free market rates; the latter figure represented 56.6 per cent of the value of the note issue; 79 per cent of the gold and foreign exchange cover consisted of gold, United States dollars or Swiss francs 2/.

Foreign exchange

457 Concurrently with these developments in the monetary system, steps were
439 taken to relax restrictions on foreign exchange, to stabilize exchange rates, and to organize the exchange market. The exchange control system established in

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1/ Ministry of Finance, Statut organique de la monnaie et creation de la banque centrale de Syrie (Damascus, March 1953).

2/ Bulletin issued by the Money and Credit Board, 5 January 1954. The total amount of reserves of gold and of currencies convertible into gold rose from £S 3.0 million at the end of 1948 to £S 8.2 million in 1949, £S 17.9 million in 1950, £S 29.1 million in 1951, £S 49.2 million in 1952, and £S 77.2 million at the end of 1953 François Crecco and Awad Barakat, Le reforme du marché des changes en Syrie, (Damascus, 1954).

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December 1939 continued virtually unmodified until August 1948 1/. Exporters were required to hand over the proceeds of exports to the Exchange Control, while imports required a licence specifying whether they were to be paid for in foreign exchange supplied by the Exchange Control or out of the importer's own balances of foreign exchange, held abroad, or in Syrian pounds. Transfers of capital abroad were prohibited.

The enforcement of this system proved difficult, and in August 1948 a free market was legalized. Exporters were required to surrender to the Exchange Control only part of the proceeds of exports 2/. Importers were still required to obtain licences but had to pay for imports in exchange obtained from the free market, except where the Government allocated the necessary foreign exchange, for example for fuel 3/.

In September 1949 exporters were authorized to dispose of the whole proceeds of their exports. Imports were to be effected through the free market, or out of the importer's own exchange holdings. The official rate (£S 2.20 to the dollar, against a free rate of about £S 3.00 to £S 3.80) was applied only to certain companies operating under contract (principally the oil companies), which were required to buy 80 per cent of their needs of Syrian currency at that rate 4/. An Exchange Stabilization Fund was established, in conjunction with Lebanon, to moderate exchange fluctuations 5/.

In May 1950 an "exportation exchange market" was created. Whereas the proceeds of certain exports could be disposed of freely, proceeds of the most important exports to specified countries had to be repatriated and recorded with a bank as "exportation exchange"; the latter could be freely disposed of within the country but could be transferred abroad only in payment for licensed imports. Imports continued to be subjected to a licence, and could be paid for either in

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1/ In February 1948 transactions with the French franc area were made subject to exchange control.

2/ First fixed at 20 per cent, and reduced to 10 per cent in December 1948.

3/ Ministry of Finance, Exchange Office, Al taqrir al sanawi al awal, 1952 (Damascus, June 1953)

4/ International Monetary Fund, First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., 1 March 1950). In 1951 this proportion was reduced to 10 per cent.

5/ International Monetary Fund, International Financial News Survey (Washington, D C , 27 October . 9).

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exchange obtained from the free market or in "exportation exchange", the rate of the latter being slightly lower. 1/

In April 1952 important changes were introduced. 2/ All restrictions were removed on transfer of capital to and from Syria, which were to take place on the free market. Exports of major products to most countries had to be paid for in prescribed currencies - in practice that of the importing country or a stronger currency - and repatriated. These proceeds could be retained by the exporter, but he was allowed to sell them only to an authorized bank, which recorded them as "exportation exchange". On the other hand, proceeds from invisibles could be freely disposed of on the free market. Imports continued to require licences and had to be paid for in exchange obtained on the free market.

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An Exchange Office, which buys and sells through authorized banks, was established as the final authority on exchange matters. The Office hands over to the note-issuing authorities its holdings of gold or foreign exchange, which are deposited as note issue cover, and these authorities supply it with Syrian currency with which to purchase gold or foreign exchange. This provides a direct link between the foreign exchange operations and the note issue. The principal aims of the Office, in addition to that of establishing a foreign exchange market which would meet Syria's needs, have been to eliminate multiple exchange rates and to reduce fluctuations in exchange rates. 3/ The elimination of multiple rates was achieved by abolishing all transactions at the official rate, except for purchases of Syrian currency by oil companies and certain governmental disbursements; 4/ by quoting a single rate for "free" and "exportation" exchange, supporting this parity by operations in both markets; and, finally, in March 1953, by requiring banks to charge a single rate. 5/

The fluctuation of exchange rates, which had previously shown large seasonal swings, 6/ was greatly reduced: whereas the average exchange rate with the United States dollar fluctuated between £S 3.52 and £S 4.00 in 1950, between

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1/ International Monetary Fund, Second Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., April 1951). Banks were allowed arbitrage between the free and exportation exchange markets.

2/ Cracco and Barakat, op. cit., and International Monetary Fund, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., 1954).

3/ Exchange Office, Al taqrir al sanawi al awal, 1952.

4/ These included foreign expenditure by diplomatic missions, students and some others; all such transactions were shifted to the free market rate in July 1953.

5/ International Monetary Fund, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, Page 290.

6/ The Syrian pound reaches its peak between June and September, when most crops are exported, and is at its lowest between December and March, when imports exceed exports.

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£S 3.50 and £S 3.83 in 1951, and between £S 3.55 and £S 3.09 in 1952, in 1953 it fluctuated between £S 3.57 and £S 3.72 and during the last seven months of the year remained stable at £S 3.50. But while the Office has damped seasonal movements it does not seem to have attempted to oppose or mitigate longer-term trends. In addition, in the second half of 1953, two measures were taken to give the exchange market greater flexibility. In July the Exchange Office began to quote daily forward buying rates for United States dollars, pounds sterling, French francs and Belgian francs; these rates were limited to foreign exchange derived from exports. And in August non-resident accounts opened with authorized banks could be overdrawn within the limits and during the time required for the settlement of normal commercial transactions. 1/ Transactions carried out by the Exchange Office rose from £S 302.2 million in 1952 to £S 676.2 million in 1953. 2/ A breakdown of the Office's operations shows that it drew on the sterling accruing to the Government at the official rate - mainly from petroleum companies operating in Syria, which in 1953 supplied £ 4.6 million (sterling) - and on its French franc balances, and sold sterling and francs to the market, purchasing with the proceeds gold, dollars and other currencies for use as note issue cover. 3/

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Public finance

Both expenditure and revenue increased very rapidly during the war years, expenditure from £S 10.9 million in 1939 to £S 99.1 million in 1945, and revenue from £S 11.4 million to £S 118.2 million, the increase was therefore somewhat greater than the rise in prices. A surplus was registered in every one of the war years, and in 1945 the Government Reserve Fund stood at £S 49 million; in 1946 there was a further surplus of £S 8 million. The increase in expenditure in subsequent years, due mainly to the war in Palestine and to increased expenditure on defence, was not matched by revenue, and every budget except that of 1952 showed a deficit; from 1947 to 1949, £S 32 million were withdrawn from the Reserve Fund. The draft estimates for 1953 and 1954 also show deficits.

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1/ International Monetary Fund, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions.

2/ In 1952, £S 29.1 million of purchases and £S 18.4 million of sales and in 1953 £S 29.5 million and £S 31.8 million, respectively, were effected at the official rate, the remainder at free rates.

3/ Net sales to the market in 1952 totalled £ 4.3 million (sterling) and 62 million French francs; net purchases of United States dollars were 9.8 million, of Swiss francs 1.1 million, and of Belgian francs 23.7 million. Corresponding figures for 1953 were 698 million French francs, and $ 12.8 million; purchases of sterling equalled sales (Ministry of Finance, Exchange Office, Annual Report, 1952 and 1953 (in Arabic) Damascus).

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MD1

COTTON IN SYRIA

United States mission estimated that 50 per cent of the land was in fallow 311
during 1948.[31] Increased irrigation and high prices for agricultural com- 241
modities have reduced significantly the fallow in the past few years, and the
percentage may be less now.

PRODUCTION

Syria is normally self-sufficient in most foods. In fact, the country 433
exports fresh and dried fruits, lentils and other legumes, tobacco, wool, butter, hides, and meat. Occasional poor harvests make it necessary to import food grains.

The greatest deficiency is in rice, which has been displaced by cotton in recent years to such an extent that almost all of the country's requirements must be imported. Last year's bad cotton crop may prompt farmers to revert to rice and, if so, this will reduce the deficiency.

Government figures indicate that production of food has not kept pace 433
with the expansion in population and that the per capita food supply and 146
individual calorie intake are both declining.[32] These conclusions are based on highly conjectural statistics and are in conflict with opinions of the United States Agricultural Attache and Syrian officials who are intimately acquainted with the country's agricultural problems. These observers believe there has been no real decline in food consumption, except possibly for short periods of time. Certainly there is no shortage now, and the bumper cereal crop in 1952 should enable the country to fill domestic needs and export at least 30 per cent of its wheat and possibly 50 per cent of its barley.

The daily diet consists largely of starches, it is true, but this is due more 262
to habit than anything else. The resources of the country are ample to permit a much more balanced diet.

PRODUCTIVITY

Syrian agriculture often is characterized by the low productivity of the 461
agricultural worker. It is obvious that a great many more people are used on 241
each acre of land than is necessary. The low agricultural income is reflected 511
in the obvious poverty of the people. Yet, comparisons with other countries, and even detailed calculations, are of questionable value due to the unreliability of the statistics.

Government reports on average yields also are open to question. Official 241
figures show that wheat yields have dropped sharply, while cotton yields have tended upward, except for the extremely bad year in 1951-52. They also show very wide fluctuation. Experienced observers point out that the yields are especially questionable because both acreage and production figures are not reliable. On the basis of conversations with producers in various sections, it is apparent that yields are normally fairly high and that they fluctuate, depending on water availability and on insect devastation.

POTENTIALITIES

A number of missions which have studied the possibilities of agricultural development in Syria, especially in the last five or six years, all mention the

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31 *Activities of FAO, 1950-52*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1952, p. 58.

32 *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, November, 1951.

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

III The Shashans

163 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
463 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with
134 those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

162 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than
80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dir-
bassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
439 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns
mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders
and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In
a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas
prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The
tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important com-
modities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurd-
ish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns
ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
452 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission
439 or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years
many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate
and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning
their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact,
the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its
need for the credit of Aleppo.

162 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
163 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and
795 living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages 162
are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur 163
el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. 191
They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflict- 795
ed upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. 795
The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac 779
Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is consti- 162
tuted by the Assyrians aronnd Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following 167
the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from 657
that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League 463
of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. 648
Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the 662
memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all 182

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON MEI
SYRIA MDI

S L 181

In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trving to create one.

S L 565 463 511

Social Survey

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

S L 204 656

The Press

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

S L 871 [212] 658

Education

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
SYRIA MDI

*874 formed part of the plan for complementary education, which was of two kinds: general complementary, restricted to general cultural courses, and vocational complementary, combining cultural and trade education. A certificate known as the general *brevet* was given at the end of the general course after the student had passed a public examination, and "vocational *brevets*,"—Technical, Commercial, or Agricultural—were given at the end of the vocational courses after public examinations.

The attempt to make the vocational schools a part of the complementary education had resulted in a heavy overloading of the course of study, and the students were working and studying for forty-six periods a week in the technical schools besides which there were additional study periods that were compulsory for boarding students. After the abolition of the complementary system in the new educational organization the vocational schools were considered as independent schools, and an attempt was made to lighten their programs.

The number of students in the public vocational schools in 1943–44 was 1,024, and in the following year, 1,011. A summary description of the schools visited by the Commission will perhaps give the best picture of public vocational education in Syria.

THE TECHNICAL SCHOOL FOR BOYS

[736] The Technical School for boys at Aleppo dated back to 1900 when it was founded in connection with an orphanage, with the idea of providing trade education for orphans. Its connection with the orphanage was severed in 1924–25.[7] It had 148 students in 1945–46, of whom 73 were boarders. Eleven of these paid annually a sum of £S240 (about $108.00) for their board, and the other 62 had free board at the expense of the state. The boarding students come from the outer districts of the governorate of Aleppo as well as from the governorates of Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Dayr al-Zur. Thus, about one-half of the student body is from outside Aleppo, and an attempt is being made to give opportunity for vocational education to students from the smaller towns. No tuition fee is charged.

The new program of study, issued in November 1945, covers four years and combines general cultural with vocational work. It includes religion, civics, Arabic, a foreign language, mathematics, physics, history, geography, physical education, industrial drawing, technology, and shopwork. In the first year, which is a preparatory year, the shopwork is common for all

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7/3

[7] This conception of technical education as primarily suited to orphans is of long standing and has persisted until lately in the Damascus technical schools for boys and for girls. In recent years steps have been taken to separate the orphanages from the technical schools in that city.

of the babies treated at the maternity and child health center in Damascus suffer from intestinal infections. Epidemics of diarrheal disease often coincide with the ripening of the apricot crop. The ready contamination of this thin-skinned fruit by flies and other insects accounts for the local designation of the early summer diarrheas in the fruit-growing districts as *mish mish* (apricot) disease. 164 164 262

Cholera. Serious outbreaks have accompanied the introduction of cholera in the past, but the disease was absent from Syria from 1928 to 1947, shortly after the epidemic in Egypt. On December 19, 1947, cholera was reported from 2 adjacent villages in the province of Hauran, on the road from Palestine to Damascus. At the same time, cases occurred in 3 villages in the irrigated plain of the Al Ghouta, within 3 or 4 miles of Damascus. Although 45 cases, with 18 deaths, were reported officially, it was generally believed that the actual incidence totaled at least 77 cases. 164

Quarantine measures were promptly imposed in Hauran and Damascus provinces, and all persons entering or leaving those regions were required to possess certificates of immunization against cholera. Over one and one half million individuals were inoculated with cholera vaccine in the vicinity of Damascus, as well as in the affected districts of Hauran and in the city of Aleppo. Supplies and assistance were furnished the Ministry of Health by the World Health Organization, the Near East Foundation and the Egyptian and Lebanese governments. Vaccine was also provided jointly by the Arabian American Oil Company and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. No cases were reported after the initial outbreaks, and on January 17, 1948, Syria was declared free from the disease. The exact origin of the epidemic was never definitely established. 744 164 645 747

Helminthiases. ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Hookworm infection, caused by *Ancylostoma duodenale*, is prevalent among the agricultural workers in foci along the banks of the 164 463 369

p. 149(B)

164 Orontes River and in the irrigated districts
463 of the Euphrates river basin, especially in
369 the Al Jazira region. In a survey of representative population groups in Syria and Lebanon, reported in 1934,[35] hookworm ova were found in fecal specimens from 25 to 36 per cent of the farmers examined in the vicinity of Homs and Hama. Surveys in the Euphrates area suggest comparable infection rates. In the examination of 306 presumably healthy Arabs, from 9 to 60 years of age, who were engaged on excavations near Salihiye on the river about 60 miles south of Deir ez Zor in 1933,[18] slightly over 38 per cent were found to harbor hook-
164 worms. The prevalence of infection in the
369 agricultural communities along the Eu-
514 phrates and its tributaries probably aver-
515 ages from 25 to 35 per cent. Promiscuous defecation is widely practiced, and the children, running barefoot around the dwellings and in the fields, are particularly exposed to infection. No data are available regarding the degree of infection, but most observers believe that it is usually moderate. Similar studies undertaken in the areas around Damascus and Aleppo, in an Alawite village on the northern plateau and among Bedouin tribesmen south of the Euphrates yielded no evidence of infection.

164 SCHISTOSOMIASIS. Schistosomiasis is endemic in two localized areas near the Turkish border—the Tell Abiad district on the upper reaches of the Belikh River and

Distribution of Schistosomiasis in Syria

p. 150(A)

SYRIA MD1

SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number. 164 463

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda. 164 733 656 208

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent." 642 161 162

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases. 744 743

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex- 572

433, 162, 464, 439

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
● Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2
Israel	MF1

/For an account of the economic effects of industrialization after World War II and information on industrial output in countries of the Middle East, see 66: Bonne, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Egypt - pp. 293-298, p. 309, Turkey - pp. 298-300, 307-308, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 300-302, 309-310, Palestine - pp. 302-304, Israel - pp. 310-311./

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[10] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [10] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

241 433 trated in the fall and winter seasons. Thus around 70% of the area in crops is usually planted to wheat and barley, and these two cereals contributed £S 59.2 million and £S 70.8 million or approximately 19% of the total value of Syria's exports in 1952 and 1953. Although a considerable number of summer crops are grown, including sorghum, maize, rice, pulses and vegetables, by far the most important of these is cotton. The latter now rivals wheat as the most valuable crop of the country even though the 1953 acreage planted to cotton was only 10% of that sown to [439] wheat. Exports of cotton and cotton seed amounted in 1952 and 1953 to £S 131.2 million and £S 140.2 million, or 38% and 40% of the value of all exports. Orchard crops such as olives, nuts, apricots and other fruits also assume some importance in agricultural production, although they 233 take up less than 10% of the planted area. Animal husbandry, based prin- 439 cipally on sheep and goats, is primarily a pastoral industry without a close link with settled agriculture. Exports of livestock and livestock products including hides and skins, samneh (clarified butter), cheese and eggs, amounted in 1953 to almost £S 48 million or around 13% of the total value of exports. Live animals alone contributed £S 23 million, although such exports were offset by imports, primarily from Iraq, to a value of £S 7.1 million.

241 433 Much of Syria's agricultural output is consumed on the farm and therefore does not enter the market economy. From the returns of the agricultural production tax, which is levied only on produce brought to market, it may be estimated that only around 40% of the production of wheat, maize and sorghum and less than 30% of the output of lentils is sold.

Industry

438 464 During the postwar period industry has steadily forged ahead, although its contribution to national income is probably still only between one-fifth and one-fourth that of agriculture and animal husbandry. The number employed in manufacturing is difficult to estimate, since the 1947 census provided no occupational breakdown, and industrial enterprises required to register with the government generally understate the number of workers employed. Fragmentary data collected by the mission indicate that employment in more or less mechanized manufacturing establishments, many of which are very small, may be between 35,000 and 40,000. If

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handicraft workers and artisans are included, the number engaged in some form of manufacturing may approach or perhaps even exceed 100,000. 433 464

The textile industry, including spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing, and the manufacture of garments, is the most developed. It probably employs close to 20,000 people in more or less mechanical establishments and it was able, in 1953, to export goods to a value of about £S 25 million. Among other important industries are flour milling, the extraction of vegetable oils and making of soap, tanning, sugar refining, canning and preserving, and the manufacture of cement, glass, tobacco and matches. The production of utensils, implements, furniture and shoes, although on a considerable scale, is almost completely in the handicraft stage. [288]

Commerce

439

Commerce has always been one of the most profitable occupations in Syria. It has furnished much of the capital for the development of industry and even of agriculture. Aleppo and Damascus are the principal commercial centers of the country, the former being the more important. It handles most of Syria's exports, which emanate largely from the northern part of the country, and with the development of the port of Latakia it is also increasing its share of the import trade.

Foreign commerce is quite important in total trade. Over the three-year period 1951-53 the value of imports has averaged close to 30% of probable national income and exports about 22%. Exports have risen rather steadily in total value, and imports somewhat more slowly. Separate foreign trade figures for Syria have been available only since March 1950, when the economic union with Lebanon was terminated in order to give Syria more freedom in protecting its domestic manufacturing industry. Foreign trade has developed as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Year	Customs figures			Adjusted figures		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
1951	277	304	−27	292	418	−126
1952	320	313	+7	337	444	−117
1953	376	307	+69	408	484	−76

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454 corporation on a basis similar to the one we recommend, and Pakistan is contemplating the establishment of such an institution.

We have little doubt that the suggested bank would find ample opportunities for investment. While there is no absolute assurance that private capital can be found for the bank, our preliminary exploration in Syria warrants some optimism on this score. Commercial banks might well subscribe a substantial part of this capital, and the balance could probably be obtained from private individuals and business concerns.

While the bank would not make loans for working capital, it might indirectly make it easier for companies to obtain working capital from the regular commercial banks. The mission found that a number of industrial enterprises do have difficulty in obtaining sufficient working capital, particularly to finance heavy seasonal purchases of such agricultural raw materials as cotton, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables for canning. The proposed bank might explore the possibility of financing the construction of bonded warehouses in Damascus and Aleppo where industrial enterprises could store raw materials and even finished goods in such a way as to furnish ample security for additional commercial bank credit.

Vocational Education

874 464 While appropriate technical and financial assistance can do much to raise industrial efficiency, the better training of labor is also important. At present vocational education is seriously inadequate. There is an urgent need to expand and improve vocational schooling so that it will effectively serve the requirements of industry and business and will be properly related to in-plant training. Specific recommendations on this subject are made in a subsequent chapter on education.

Projected Oil Refinery

471 382 With the exception of one ill-starred venture in which it went into partnership with private capital, the government has wisely left the ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises to private initiative. We are strongly convinced that this policy should continue to be followed. During the last few years it has been proposed from time to time that the government depart from this rule by establishing and operating a petro-

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433 tions; these, however, often represent contributions to working capital by
434 members of the owner-family or an inner circle of controlling shareholders who for various reasons prefer this technique to accepting additional stock. This may be an unfortunate situation from the legal point of view, although in practice it does not seem substantially to weaken the continuity of the capitalization. The government-guaranteed loans may be subject to criticism, particularly with regard to the applicable interest rate, which is much below that reasonably to be expected in a country where capital is relatively scarce. However, thanks to the provision that in each case these loans may not exceed half the paid-up capital of the borrower, they have not dangerously affected the financial structure of the companies concerned. Yet the mission feels that the entire system of government-guaranteed industrial loans financed by the BSL does not at this stage provide an appropriate and adequate solution to the problem of supplementing the traditional means of financing industrial development.

433 Although the larger gaps in the main fields in which conditions for modern industrial production are reasonably favorable have either been filled or are rapidly being filled, the industrialization movement is far from being exhausted. All the evidence indicates that it will continue to spread, though probably at a slower rate than in the years immediately preceding 1952 and along more selective lines. With the limits of the home market within reach or already reached, further development of existing industries will depend largely on their success in attaining a higher degree of efficiency and reducing production costs. In view of these trends and requirements the mission is of the opinion that a specialized credit institution is needed to furnish both technical assistance and industrial banking facilities, to the extent that these are presently lacking, and to provide a firmer basis for further investment financing. A more detailed proposal for such an investment bank will be found in the Main Report.

Labor

464 According to an official estimate, the number of workers employed in Syrian industry (excluding electrical productions, commerce, etc. and enterprises employing only family members) is approximately 70,000. In some industries, particularly in the textile sector, the supply of skilled labor is barely sufficient for present needs, but unskilled labor is generally

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available as required. More women are to be found in modern industry 464
than formerly, especially in the hosiery and other textile factories.

The Syrian workman is on the whole better educated and more adaptable than his counterpart in most of the Middle Eastern countries. The availability of a large force of handicraft workers skilled in the fashioning of metals, wood, stone, textiles and other materials was of great value when the rapid expansion of industry began. As it proceeded, the government and the industrial leaders became increasingly conscious of the need for systematic vocational education and training in schools and factories; this has made considerable progress in recent years.

In Annex I an appraisal is made of the existing vocational (other than agricultural) schools in Syria; our recommendations regarding their extension and improvement are designed better to fit them to the requirements of industry as well as those of commerce and banking.

The private business world, as well as the government, has made its contribution. Most Syrian employers now recognize that successful plant operation demands an adequate supply and a small turnover of skilled labor. Some of the larger factories have instituted training schemes, some providing up to three months specialized training during which the apprentice is paid the full minimum wage. Most of the other factories and workshops have systems under which learners are gradually promoted from the simple to the more skilled operations.

There are nearly 200 industrial unions combined in federations in 467
Syria, with a total of about 25,000 members. The federations and also a large proportion of the trade unions have mutual funds, derived in part from normal subscriptions of members, and partly from government subsidies. They are used for grants to members for medical expenses, hospitalization, extension of the legal periods of sick pay, grants to aged workers, unemployment pay and the like.

The Directorate of Labor and Social Services in the Ministry of 466
National Economy is responsible for ensuring enforcement of the provi- 647
sions of Syria's rather liberal Labor Code, supervising the trade unions, establishing and operating public employment offices and encouraging the foundation of private ones.

Wages are comparatively low. Minimum wages are fixed by local 465
Minimum Wage Boards. A fairly representative sample of daily wages seems to be: boys and women, £S 1; unskilled men, £S 2-5; skilled men,

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465 £S 5-7. For exceptionally heavy work daily wages up to £S 9 are paid. Foremen and managers receive from £S 10 upwards. It is far from certain whether the smallness of the wage offsets the low labor productivity. Employer-employee relations appear to be fair and on a democratic basis.

Management

464 Industrial management presents some striking contrasts, as pointed 483 out in the Main Report. It is commendable that, in order to accommodate students who may serve as future industrial managers and top technical staff, the scope of the Engineering College of the Syrian University is being widened. In the past, only civil engineering has been offered but in the near future mechanical, electrical and chemical engineering will be included in the syllabus. In due course this will increase the local supply of trained personnel for industry and thus help overcome one of Syria's greatest deficiencies. Although this will make technical knowledge more readily available at lower cost, it would be very helpful if an institution were established to give technical, economical and financial advice on a consultant basis. This is one of the functions the mission has in mind to be performed by the proposed investment bank.

The mission observed that there are many weaknesses which could be avoided by more careful planning and by a better understanding of the various factors which make for higher efficiency. The proper estimation of the size of the market and the production capacity required to satisfy it, the quantity and quality of the necessary raw, or partly processed, materials and their sources and rate of supply, the utilization of waste products, quality control of the end products, analysis and control of costs and the application of budgeting could in many cases be introduced or greatly improved. Again, the great influence of working conditions on efficient production is often insufficiently recognized.

It was pointed out earlier that the basic industrial factors are, generally speaking, not unfavorable. It is the problem of raising the standard of efficiency generally that should receive primary consideration, preceding, in most cases, the provision of greater capacity. This conclusion stresses the urgent need for more and better qualified managing personnel, trained in modern industrial methods through frequent contacts with the West, and for intensified technical assistance.

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v INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

The Need for Further Industrialization

433 464 It is generally agreed—and the mission shares this opinion—that with a more rational distribution and better cultivation of the available land, and particularly with a gradual extension of the irrigated area, Syrian agriculture could for a considerable time to come easily absorb the expected natural population increase. With respect to the need for further industrialization, however, the relevant considerations seem rather to be the territorial and occupational distribution of the population and the evolution of this pattern. The principal question is whether—and if so, to what degree and in which direction—Syrian industry needs further expansion to absorb the present and immediately foreseeable effective labor supply.

464 369 166 Although reliable figures are not available there is no clear evidence that Syria is suffering from chronic unemployment. There are, however, some very overpopulated rural areas with considerable underemployment and there is a continuous flow of labor from the villages to the urban centers. During the postwar period of considerable building activity and rapid industrialization, these markets were able to absorb the increased labor supply. But at times, as for instance in 1948 in Aleppo, the urban workers have become alarmed by the influx of villagers competing with them and aggravating already existing unemployment, particularly in the textile industry. There were demonstrations and a request to the local authorities to bar villagers from applying for town employment; this in turn induced the government to encourage certain village industries—the decline of which is again contributing to urban labor pressure.

This illustrates the tensions which are bound to arise as a consequence of the existing imbalance between rural-urban social and economic conditions. Unless the village standard of living is greatly improved, there is little doubt that the trend toward the towns will continue strong and that the numbers seeking employment in industry will greatly exceed the natural increase in the industrial population. This tendency may even become more pronounced when, as is to be anticipated, illiteracy in the villages declines, transport and communications improve and the rural population becomes more aware of its poverty and social insecurity.

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The recommendations of the mission with regard to agriculture and animal husbandry, including those concerning land tenure and irrigation, would, if accepted, open significant new perspectives to the farmer and farm laborers and tend to check the drift from rural areas. If it were possible to spend more on irrigation than has been recommended, the trend could perhaps be reversed. It is not likely, however, that the growing labor supply can be absorbed and unemployment avoided without further industrialization. Even on the highly optimistic assumption that migration towards the towns can be halted, Syria must contend with such factors as the natural increase in the industrial labor population and the gradual shift from handicraft to mechanization with the consequent release of manpower.

Although estimates in this field are particularly hazardous, the mission suggests that under the most favorable circumstances Syria will have to create at least 20,000-25,000 new industrial jobs during the next six years to keep its industrial labor market in reasonable balance.

Limiting Factors

It is often contended in Syrian official and business circles that shortage of local capital rather than lack of confidence is the principal factor limiting further industrialization. Assuming that this is so, it would follow that to advance development Syria should make a strenuous effort to create attractive conditions for foreign capital as a supplementary source of industrial financing. This conclusion does not seem to be generally acknowledged. At least the nationalization of foreign-owned public utilities without settling the matter of indemnification of their proprietors, and the regulations with respect to foreign companies working in Syria, do not indicate its acceptance.

There is, however, room for some doubt whether scarcity of capital should be considered as a major factor limiting development of Syrian industry. During the past eight years, investments in industry have supplied the country with an industrial capacity capable of meeting most of the need for manufactured articles, based on local primary production, which the population can afford; indeed, as already pointed out, in several branches of industry there is excess capacity. Generally speaking, Syrian industry appears to have attracted substantial amounts of capital. Even taking into account the fact that the sources of industrial investment

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for the asphalted roads, and allowing £S 500 per kilometer for the macadamized routes and lesser amounts for others, the annual road maintenance budget should actually be around £S 6 million to £S 7 million.

This raises the question whether Syria should consider new road investment if existing ones cannot be properly maintained. For every kilometer of new construction the annual burden of upkeep increases. But current deficiencies in road maintenance are not simply a matter of money; the present annual expenditures are sufficient to keep the roads in far better condition than they are. The causes of neglect include several other factors.

Personnel

Some earlier studies[8] have referred to seasonal labor shortages in road maintenance. On this there are differences of opinion. In general, local authorities do not find difficulty on this score, although without question there are shortages of supervisory personnel in the middle rank and foreman grades. A more serious situation is evident at the engineering level, where a wider use of foreign consulting firms and contractors would be helpful. For the whole range of public works, including roads, the government has available about 50 qualified engineers. The detailed knowledge and skill of intensive specialization is difficult to achieve under these circumstances and the mission was therefore not surprised to observe occasional use of overheated asphalt, or of too chalky a sand in mending mixtures. The effectiveness of the small corps of engineers is further reduced by the inordinate burden of paper work and administrative detail, if not by an actual preference of many for office work at the expense of practical field supervision.

Organization

Road maintenance, as a responsibility of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Works, must compete for attention with all other types of public work activities and often fares poorly. This organizational problem may be partially responsible for a certain maldistribution of maintenance funds among the various districts, which often leaves a number of

[8] E.g., Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, *The Economic Development of Syria*, 1947.

LAND TENURE

241 Wheat yields are lower than the average for Syria, averaging 4 hundredweight to the acre.

Almost the whole of the estate is let to share-tenants who are 427 supervised by an agent, the landowners themselves rarely visiting the estate. The share of the crop taken by the landlord is 25 per cent on non-irrigated land and 42½ per cent on irrigated land. These shares are more favourable to the tenant than is usual, because it is desired to attract more labour to the estate which sixty years ago was quite uncultivated. As elsewhere, the tenants have no leases but live in fear of eviction.

The tenants are divided into five classes:[1]

1. Large tenants cultivating 6 feddans (225 acres) of non-irrigated land: 4 in number.
2. Medium sized tenants cultivating 4½ feddans (168¾ acres): 4 in number.
3. Small tenants cultivating 3 feddans (112½ acres): 60 in number.
4. Small tenants cultivating irrigated land and with an average area of 18 acres: 100 in number.
5. Wage labourers, who form the majority of the villagers. [464]

Of these classes, only the small groups of large and medium- 434 sized tenants can live well, in the sense that the output of the 454 farm suffices to cover the essential needs of the family and also √11 provides a small cash surplus. The surplus is used to buy gold pounds and jewellery. But the other groups cannot achieve even a sufficient standard of food consumption. The standard consumption of wheat (barley in the case of the very poor peasants) is 14 kilogrammes of grain per month; to achieve this level it is necessary to crop about 45 acres. Thus with the present system of cultivation, the class of small tenants, who cultivate an area of 112 acres and would appear to have quite sufficient land, cannot attain the minimum because only one-third, 35 acres, can be cultivated owing to shortage of live-stock.

√11 These small tenants, who are typical of the farmers in the great plains of Syria, are very poor, living in one- or two-roomed [342] mud huts, and when there is only one room, sharing it with their animals.

[1] It must be said that the feddan in Syria is a variable measure and here is equivalent to 37½ acres.

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511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

434 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944) (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means
262 that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultivation. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by
409 the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie, on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
427 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis, with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

i [The estate of Misherfe, near Homs --Analyst]

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SYRIA AND LEBANON

Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

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COTTON IN SYRIA

ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and money-lenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

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COTTON IN SYRIA

Another significant aspect of the land tenure problem is the financial arrangements between the landlords and tenants. 427 241

Although there are many variations throughout the country, there are three basic contracts.

In the first, where water is available by gravity flow for irrigation and the landowner furnishes only the land, he gets 50 per cent and the tenant gets 50 per cent of the gross yield. In the second type of contract, where the tenant installs pumps and operates them at his own expense and the landlord furnishes the land only, he gets 33⅓ per cent and the tenant gets the rest. In the third case, where the landowner furnishes only the land and the tenant drills artesian wells at his own expense, the landowner gets only 25 per cent of the gross yields. There are variations depending on the crops produced and on who furnishes seed, fertilizer, and equipment. With the growth of mechanization, there is a rising tendency for landowners to prepare the seed beds themselves with large tractors and to take a large share of the produce.

With the advent of mechanization, there is also a noticeable tendency to wage-crop arrangements, particularly in the remote areas like the Jezira where the population is sparse and where the only feasible arrangement for picking cotton is the employment of nomads by the day. 464 241

The greatest concentration of small cultivators who own and operate their own farms is in the older farming areas in the southern part of Syria around Damascus. Around Aleppo the farms are larger in size and owner-operators are fewer in number. 471 241

MECHANIZATION

Mechanization is changing rapidly the primitive practices which still dominate Syrian agriculture. The number of tractors has increased from 200 to almost 2,000 and more than 700 combines are in operation. 241 407

Most of the mechanical equipment is in the Jezira and the agricultural areas around Aleppo. Approximately half the tractors are being used in cotton areas.

To encourage further mechanization the government plans to extend loans to farmers on a five-year basis to finance the purchase of agricultural equipment. So far most of the equipment has been bought privately and for cash. [452]

The first few years have been difficult for the tractor farmers because of the lack of trained operators and the lack of adequate repair facilities, especially spare parts. Now the large manufacturers' agents are establishing modern service stations, repair stations, and mobile repair units. Consideration is even being given to organizing operator training programs.

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

All of the agricultural missions stress the need for improvement in basic research and educational programs. The United States-Syria Agricultural Mission has outlined a complete program for agricultural training, research, and extension. Some of the recommendations already have been adopted, such as the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 654

133 makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

8121 406 The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. 46 The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

241 The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was preferred to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

511 Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he 241 own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join 427 to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

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The private business world, as well as the government, has made its contribution. Most Syrian employers now recognize that successful plant operation demands an adequate supply and a small turnover of skilled labor. Some of the larger factories have instituted training schemes, some providing up to three months specialized training during which the apprentice is paid the full minimum wage. Most of the other factories and workshops have systems under which learners are gradually promoted from the simple to the more skilled operations.

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Syria, with a total of about 25,000 members. The federations and also a large proportion of the trade unions have mutual funds, derived in part from normal subscriptions of members, and partly from government subsidies. They are used for grants to members for medical expenses, hospitalization, extension of the legal periods of sick pay, grants to aged workers, unemployment pay and the like.

The Directorate of Labor and Social Services in the Ministry of 466
National Economy is responsible for ensuring enforcement of the provi- 447
sions of Syria's rather liberal Labor Code, supervising the trade unions, establishing and operating public employment offices and encouraging the foundation of private ones.

Wages are comparatively low. Minimum wages are fixed by local 465
Minimum Wage Boards. A fairly representative sample of daily wages seems to be: boys and women, £S 1; unskilled men, £S 2·5; skilled men,

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425 £S 5-7. For exceptionally heavy work daily wages up to £S 9 are paid. Foremen and managers receive from £S 10 upwards. It is far from certain whether the smallness of the wage offsets the low labor productivity. Employer-employee relations appear to be fair and on a democratic basis.

Management

424 Industrial management presents some striking contrasts, as pointed 423 out in the Main Report. It is commendable that, in order to accommodate students who may serve as future industrial managers and top technical staff, the scope of the Engineering College of the Syrian University is being widened. In the past, only civil engineering has been offered but in the near future mechanical, electrical and chemical engineering will be included in the syllabus. In due course this will increase the local supply of trained personnel for industry and thus help overcome one of Syria's greatest deficiencies. Although this will make technical knowledge more readily available at lower cost, it would be very helpful if an institution were established to give technical, economical and financial advice on a consultant basis. This is one of the functions the mission has in mind to be performed by the proposed investment bank.

The mission observed that there are many weaknesses which could be avoided by more careful planning and by a better understanding of the various factors which make for higher efficiency. The proper estimation of the size of the market and the production capacity required to satisfy it, the quantity and quality of the necessary raw, or partly processed, materials and their sources and rate of supply, the utilization of waste products, quality control of the end products, analysis and control of costs and the application of budgeting could in many cases be introduced or greatly improved. Again, the great influence of working conditions on efficient production is often insufficiently recognized.

It was pointed out earlier that the basic industrial factors are, generally speaking, not unfavorable. It is the problem of raising the standard of efficiency generally that should receive primary consideration, preceding, in most cases, the provision of greater capacity. This conclusion stresses the urgent need for more and better qualified managing personnel, trained in modern industrial methods through frequent contacts with the West, and for intensified technical assistance.

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special education tax levied by the local authorities.[8] This could be done in two stages, first by making the local communities pay for the erection of school buildings and later by making them bear all other expenses, including the salaries of teachers. Steps were being taken in 1946 to put the first stage into operation.

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Teachers' salaries

At the time of the visit of the American Council Commission in April 1946 the decree law governing the appointment, promotion, and salaries of teachers was on the point of being superseded by new decrees which were then in the making. A short sketch of the old decree law (No. 163, dated August 11, 1943) will be presented here in order to give an idea of the kind of practice which prevailed under French auspices and which is bound to leave its effect on the grading of teachers for some time. This will be followed by a summary of the new decrees defining the new cadres of the Ministry of Education.

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The old decree law differentiates between the categories of teachers and of principals of schools, giving the latter a separate scale which was higher than that of the teachers. Teachers proper were divided into two categories: secondary (called professors) and primary teachers.

Secondary teachers were classified into six groups: head professor, group one professor, group two professor, group three professor, associate professor, and assistant professor. Each of these groups was further subdivided into four grades —distinguished, first, second, and third. This made a total of twenty-four grades for secondary-school teachers, for which the monthly salaries of the lowest grade ranged from a minimum £S60 ($27.50) to a maximum of £S75 ($34.40), and of the highest grade, a minimum of £S185 ($84.80) to a maximum of £S215 ($99). Grades and professorial groups overlapped in the salaries assigned to them to such an extent that the maximums and the minimums of three out of four grades in every group were the same as those of three grades in the next higher or lower group. This made a very complicated system.

Secondary teachers' salaries and their classification were closely linked with French degrees and diplomas. Each of the types of professors had to have one or more of the certificates of higher education leading to the *Licence ès Lettres* or *ès Sciences*.[9] In order to be appointed to the lowest secondary-school teaching post—that of associate professor—a candidate had to possess one certificate. One additional certificate was added for each of the four higher posts mentioned above until five certificates and a state or university doctorate were required for the head professors. As no colleges of arts and sciences existed at the Syrian Uni-

[8] Al-Husri, *op. cit.*, pp. 263–65.

[9] The *Licences ès Lettres* and *ès Sciences* are the first French university degrees. An undergraduate student had to secure certificates in four fields before he became eligible automatically for the *licence*.

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versity, the medical and law degrees of this institution were equated to four and three certificates respectively. In order to occupy the three higher ranks of secondary-school teaching, therefore, a candidate had to go to France to secure the required certificates. Degrees from other countries were equated, by a special committee if necessary, but holders of French or Syrian degrees or certificates were given an advantage. Although the decree law was extremely detailed and explicit, it gave no bases for the equation of well-known degrees from other countries. The degree of Bachelor of Arts of the American University of Beirut (an institution recognized in America as a Class A institution) was recognized as equivalent only to the secondary-school *Baccalauréat*, Second Part, a fact which barred its holders from teaching in the public secondary schools.

The same method of classification and assignment of salaries was followed in the case of primary teachers. These teachers were grouped into seven groups of four grades each. The upper three groups were reserved for graduates of primary-, elementary-, and "practical" teachers colleges in descending order, while the lower four groups were open to candidates who had only the second *baccalauréat*, first *baccalauréat*, or the primary-school certificate with four years of secondary work, again in descending order. Each grade had its minimum and its maximum. The lowest grade carried a minimum salary of £S33 ($15) and a maximum of £S42 ($19), and the highest grade carried a minimum of £S97.5 ($44.70) and a maximum of £S120 ($55). Salaries of women teachers were fixed consistently one grade lower than those for the men even though they had the same qualifications.

A special cadre was drawn up for secondary- and primary-school principals, the former in four groups of four grades each, and the latter in two groups of four grades each. As in the case of the teachers, each grade for the principals had a maximum and a minimum. The lowest grade for a secondary-school principal carried a minimum of £S97.50 ($44.70) and a maximum of £S130 ($55), while the highest grade of principals received a minimum of £S205 ($94) and a maximum of £S247.50 ($113.50). Differentiation among principals was not on the basis of academic or professional qualifications, or on experience and length of service, or on tested ability, but on the type of school administered—whether a primary-, elementary-, or vocational-teachers college, a secondary or a vocational school, and whether it was a day or a boarding school, and if a day school whether it had more or less than 300 students.

Primary-school principals were classified into two groups of four grades each. The higher group was for principals of large schools of ten or more classrooms and the lower group was for smaller schools of at least five classrooms. The range in salaries was £S70 to £S100 ($32 to $45.80) for the lowest grade, and £S112.50 to £S150 ($51.60 to $68.80) for the highest grade. Like the grades and the salaries of the secondary-school teachers, those for primary teachers and for principals greatly overlap one another.

It would take too long to give even a summary of the rest of the decree law, the details of which fill seventeen large pages, each of two columns of small print, dealing with conditions of choice of teachers, the types of studies and combinations of studies recognized, the conditions and emoluments of part-time teaching and supervising of students in the schools, and so on.

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In his *Reports on the State of Education in Syria*[4] Sati' al-Husri levels a number of criticisms at the decree summarized above and makes certain recommendations. As his criticisms and suggestions point the direction which reform of this phase of the Syrian educational system is taking, a summary is given.

1. Exception is taken to the close tying-up of grades and salaries to the French type of diplomas and degrees on the ground that the French practice of accumulating certificates toward the degree of *licence* is not found in most other countries; indeed, it is the exception. To base teachers' appointments on it, therefore, is to create unnecessary difficulties in the way of dealing with degrees secured from other sources. Moreover, the certificates in French higher education have value only as leading to the degree of *licence* and should not be considered as separate entities or stages which would entitle a person to take teaching positions as laid down in the decree. In another connection the writer warns against blind imitation of one system of education (in this case the French) and declares that Syrian education had been for a quarter of a century under the monopoly of the French type of educational organization. He advocates a diversification of the sources of educational ideas from different countries with the idea ultimately of creating "a special Syrian-Arab type of educational organization."[5]

2. The decree, in overemphasizing certificates, gave little if any weight to the teacher's length of service and experience and to his ability and enthusiasm in his teaching. This tends to discourage the good teacher and creates a current of dissatisfaction among teachers. Any arrangement for the service of teachers should take account of these factors.

3. It makes a special classification for principals, distinct from teachers, with a considerable difference in salaries. This is not based on a sound educational principle and would tend to draw the best teachers toward school administration, to the detriment of good teaching and scholarship. Besides, to base the classification of principals on the sizes of the schools and not on ability and qualifications is not in the public interest, for a small but important school may require the appointment of one of the ablest men among principals.

4. There is no justification for setting the salaries of women teachers at a lower rate than those of the men. Salaries should be according to qualifications regardless of the teacher's sex. Otherwise, an injustice would be done to women at a time when more women are needed in teaching and should be encouraged to get into the profession.

5. The practice of promoting primary-school teachers into the field of teaching in secondary schools under the title of "assistant professors" is one of the main factors of weakness in this field, particularly when these are confirmed in their new positions. A better practice would be to keep them as teachers "delegated" from the primary schools until such time as the need for them ceases, or until special courses and classes are opened to enable them to raise their level.

6. Finally, the system of overlapping groups and grades is very confused and

[4] Al-Husri, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–32.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–49.

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confusing and should be replaced by a simpler system where the various grades meet end-on, providing a consecutive scale.

Sati' al-Husri's criticisms have provided some of the bases for the new cadres of the Ministry of Education. These were passed shortly after the Commission of the American Council on Education left the Near East.[6] They were based on the *Basic Officials' Law* which had been passed earlier in the year and which lays down a new basic salary scale for all officials.

The new law divides state officials into twelve levels, from the eleventh at the lowest to the first, with a "distinguished" level on top. Each of these levels is divided into three grades with a minimum and a maximum salary. The minimums and maximums for each level, however, usually do not overlap, but meet end to end. Thus, the lowest level, the eleventh, is divided into three grades as follows:

Grade	Monthly Salary	
Grade 3 (minimum)	£S30	($13.76)
Grade 2	35	(16.05)
Grade 1 (maximum)	40	(18.35)

This increment continues at the rate of £S5 for each grade up to the sixth level, then at the rate of £S10 through the fifth, at the rate of £S15 through the third, of £S25 in the second, of £S30 in the first, and £S40 in the "distinguished" level. The salaries for this last level are:

Grade	Monthly Salary	
Grade 3 (minimum)	£S420	($192.66)
Grade 2	460	(211.00)
Grade 1 (maximum)	500	(229.39)

Thus, the lowest official in the state receives a basic salary of £S30 ($13.76) a month, and the highest receives £S500 ($229.39) a month.

According to the new decrees embodying the education cadres mentioned above, primary-school teachers are classified into five ranks, of which the tenth level (minimum salary, £S45) is their lowest appointment, and they may reach up to the fourth level (maximum salary, £S175). Graduates of the primary-teachers colleges are first appointed in the middle grade of the eighth level (£S75), graduates of secondary schools in the lowest grade of the ninth level (£S55), and graduates of intermediate and vocational schools in the lowest grade of the tenth level (£S45). Only graduates of teachers colleges may be promoted beyond the eighth

[6] Legislative Decree No. 61, dated October 20, 1946, "Embodying the Cadre of the Officials of Primary and Secondary Education"; and Legislative Decree No. 62, dated October 21, 1946), "Embodying the Cadre of the Officials of Secondary and Vocational Education," *Official Gazette of the Syrian Republic*, Vol. XXIV, No. 44, October 21, 1945, pp. 1479–83.

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level without taking competitive examinations. The others must pass theoretical and practical professional examinations before they may be promoted beyond the eighth level. Salary scales are the same for men and women, and for teachers and principals. A principal, however, is given an additional allowance.

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Secondary- and vocational-school teachers are classified into seven ranks and may be appointed, depending on their qualifications, at the bottom of the seventh level (minimum salary £S85) and may reach up to the second level (maximum salary £S290). To be appointed to the secondary or vocational schools, a candidate must hold a university degree beyond a secondary-school certificate. The bearer of a doctorate in literature or in science based on a *licence*, or master's degree, in arts or science may be initially appointed in the middle grade of the fourth level (£S150). The holder of a *licence*, or a master's degree, in arts or science may be appointed in the lowest grade of the fourth level (£S145), while the holder of a B.A. honors degree from an American university is first appointed at the highest grade of the fifth level (£S130). Candidates without these qualifications may be appointed when need arises after passing a competitive examination, provided they are either graduates of secondary schools who have had at least two years of university studies or are graduates of primary-teachers colleges who have had at least five years of experience in teaching, or are secondary-school graduates with at least six years of teaching experience. These may be first appointed only in the lowest grade of the seventh level (£S85) and cannot be promoted beyond the sixth level except after passing a further examination. The same salary schedule prevails for men and women, and for principals and teachers. Principals of boarding schools and their assistants, however, receive an allowance for their added responsibilities.

Both primary- and secondary-school teachers may receive leave for study without pay in order to improve themselves professionally. Any diploma or degree which they might receive as a result entitles them to corresponding increases in salary. The two decrees provide for commissions which will study the individual cases of every teacher and regrade him or her according to the new scale.

Owing to the wartime inflation, however, teachers, like all government officials, were given cost-of-living allowances. In 1946 these were 180 percent for £S40 or below, 120 percent for salaries between £S41 and £S80, 90 percent for salaries between £S81 and £S150, and 45 percent for any salary of £S151 or above. In addition, there were allowances for a wife and children. Thus, the salary of £S40 rises to £S112, while the highest

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*875 salary paid, £S500, becomes £S912.5 ($418.57), not including allowances
•465 for the wife and children.

A system of pensions for government officials provides for a pension amounting to half the average final salary after thirty years of service. Teachers automatically fall under this plan.

Educational Legislation

*871 Five articles of the Syrian Constitution (Articles 19–23) deal with education. The freedom of education is guaranteed in so far as it is not contrary to public order and good morals and is not detrimental to the dignity of the country or of religion. Education is directed to raise the moral and intellectual standard of the people on lines best suited to the national characteristics, and to promote concord and a fraternal spirit among all citizens. Primary education is compulsory for all Syrians of both sexes and is free of charge in the public schools. The curriculum for public education is laid down by law in order to insure educational uniformity. All schools are placed under government supervision.

The provisional Ottoman Education Law of 1913 had never been completely superseded during the French mandate. The law of July 6, 1933, "Fixing the Orders and Stages of Public Education," and the various decrees and orders (*arrêtés*) issued during the mandate regime had determined the educational ladder, set down the curriculum, the public-examinations regulations, the internal administration of schools, the supervision of private and foreign schools, the sending of educational missions abroad, and various other aspects of education, repealing in each case the corresponding sections of the Ottoman law.[7]

The 1943 education law represents a somewhat radical departure from the law of 1933 and the collection of decrees and orders (*arrêtés*) which governed education under the mandate. Since it sets down the main provisions upon which the new educational structure has been and is being laid, a summary of it is given here.

The law defines the basic function of the Ministry of Education as "giving a good education to the new generation—in all aspects, physical, moral, and intellectual—in order that each of its individuals will grow with

[7] Excepting the orders regulating archeology (1933), the Syrian University (1926), and the Arab Academy (1943) which are to keep their force in so far as they do not conflict with the new law, until changed in their turn. The order regulating archeology was later superseded by Decree No. 352, "Embodying the Regulations of the Directorate of Archeology" (1945), while that regulating the University was superseded by Law No. 269 (1940) and Decree No. 40 (1945).

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would not only provide an incentive to the transfer of small manufactur- 433
ing shops and enterprises from the center of the city, but might well 654
incidentally stimulate new investment in modernization of their equipment. In this connection it is significant that the removal of tanneries from the center of Damascus to a special industrial zone has in fact been attended by the installation of a considerable amount of new machinery and a substantial improvement in working conditions. While it is possible that private enterprise might become interested in the establishment of such industrial zones and shops in cooperation with the municipalities, we have made allowance in our proposed development program for the expenditure of £S 1.8 million by the central government for this purpose.

In the expansion of new industry the question arises whether the gov- 433
ernment should exercise any control over the establishment of new enter- 656
prises or additions to existing plants. By instituting a licensing system in 1952 the government has in principle already assumed such powers. While they have apparently not been exercised in a restrictive fashion, we strongly doubt that any government under normal economic conditions should even assume such authority. Private enterprise will ordinarily better be able to determine the wisdom of proceeding with a particular venture than civil servants inexperienced in business. There may be special cases where excess capacity is so serious as to warrant government intervention but even then great caution is necessary lest the restriction of competition in the development of industry impair the possibility of attaining greater efficiency.

With respect to working conditions, the mission has a few observations. 466
Syria has a rather liberal labor code for industry, limiting the working week to 48 hours, prohibiting the employment of children under 12 years of age and containing stipulations regarding dismissal and death benefits and maternity and sick leave. Minimum wages are also set by regional wage boards. In the larger factories visited by the mission working conditions appeared for the most part satisfactory. In a number of plants, however, we observed a lack of safety precautions, notably inadequate protection of workers from the danger of moving parts and of dust and humidity. This problem calls for attention. Another deficiency is the lack of thorough enforcement of the labor code. The degree of compliance in the larger factories is not unsatisfactory. In the smaller factories and shops, however, enforcement is inadequate or virtually non-existent. While we do not suggest that the provisions of the labor code could be enforced in all of the small enterprises, we do recommend that some attempt be made

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466 to curb at least the abuse of child labor which exists in most small shops. This might be done by occasional spot checks. One of the difficulties, however, is the inadequacy of the enforcement staff of the Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs in the Ministry of Economics. At the beginning of 1954 there were apparently only eight inspectors assigned to the enforcement of the labor code. We urge that the number be increased and that for this purpose an additional £S 325,000 be made available to the Labor Directorate over the next six years.

The Tourist Industry

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485 In the discussion of the proposed investment bank, we have already indicated that this institution might assist in financing hotels, as well as manufacturing industries and agriculture. Although this chapter focuses on the problem of developing manufacturing, it appears appropriate to mention here also the possibilities of the tourist industry. Syria has much to interest the tourist from the West. On its soil many civilizations and [172] cultures have flourished and left their imprint. There are countless archaeological sites which are still yielding up treasured relics of the past, numerous ancient Greco-Roman and early Christian cities, fascinating ruined Christian churches and imposing mosques, old Crusader castles and Arab forts. Both Aleppo and Damascus, which vie with each other in the claim to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, intrigue the tourist with their blend of the ancient, the picturesque and the modern.

In the postwar period the airplane has greatly extended the orbit of travel for the American and West European, and rising standards of living have enabled many more to travel abroad than before. In Greece, for example, the number of foreign tourists rose from about 33,000 in 1950 to almost 76,000 in 1953, and the per capita expenditure is said to have doubled during this period. Unfortunately, the mission was unable to obtain figures on the total of foreign travellers visiting Syria, but the number has undoubtedly increased significantly. Many travellers to the Holy Land now stop over in Syria. This tourist trade could be greatly expanded if a concerted attempt were made to advertise the attractions of Syria and to improve the inadequate accommodations available to foreigners.

More and better hotels, good communications and adequate preservation and presentation of historical and cultural monuments are all impor-

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available as required. More women are to be found in modern industry 464
than formerly, especially in the hosiery and other textile factories.

The Syrian workman is on the whole better educated and more adaptable than his counterpart in most of the Middle Eastern countries. The availability of a large force of handicraft workers skilled in the fashioning of metals, wood, stone, textiles and other materials was of great value when the rapid expansion of industry began. As it proceeded, the government and the induscrial leaders became increasingly conscious of the need for systematic vocational education and training in schools and factories; this has made considerable progress in recent years.

In Annex I an appraisal is made of the existing vocational (other than agricultural) schools in Syria; our recommendations regarding their extension and improvement are designed better to fit them to the requirements of industry as well as those of commerce and banking.

The private business world, as well as the government, has made its contribution. Most Syrian employers now recognize that successful plant operation demands an adequate supply and a small turnover of skilled labor. Some of the larger factories have instituted training schemes, some providing up to three months specialized training during which the apprentice is paid the full minimum wage. Most of the other factories and workshops have systems under which learners are gradually promoted from the simple to the more skilled operations.

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worker who dies. Indemnities are paid in instalments on terms laid down by arbitration boards with reference to the status of the employee and employer.

Family Allowances

Legislative Decree No. 29 of 12 May 1943 requires each industrial and commercial employer in Lebanon to pay a family allowance to all family heads whom he employs. The amount of the allowance increases with the number of dependants. It rises from £L. 10 monthly for one child up to £L. 35 for five or more children; £L. 10 are also payable in respect of a wife living at home.

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There is no available information indicating the existence of social security legislation in Saudi Arabia.

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The Syrian Labour Code in Act No. 279 of 11 June 1946 establishes the liability of each employer to pay compensation in the event of employment injury, non-occupational sickness, confinement or dismissal.

Employment Injury

The employment injury provisions apply in general to all employees except agricultural workers not operating modern agricultural machinery; however, cash benefits are 50 per cent. smaller for employees of handicraft undertakings with four to nine workers and 80 per cent. smaller where such undertakings have only one to three workers. Compensation is payable by the employer for traumatic injuries and occupational diseases, the latter being defined in Order No. 2,459 of 22 November 1948. Insurance of his risk is optional for the employer.

Employers in Syria must provide first aid and pay all medical, pharmaceutical, hospital and transport expenses, except that a public hospital within 50 kilometres, if any, must provide victims with free hospital treatment. When incapacity lasts for more than three days, employers must also pay a cash temporary incapacity benefit equal to 50 per cent. of wages below specified maxima. This is payable from the date of the accident until recovery, death or certification of permanent incapacity.

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An injured person who is permanently incapable of carrying on any occupation receives a lump sum from his employer equal to 500 days of wages plus one month's wages for each year he is under 60, down to the age of 18. A lump sum reduced in proportion to remaining working capacity is payable in the event of permanent partial incapacity. In the event of death, one half of the permanent total incapacity benefit is paid if one dependant survives, plus 15 per cent. for each additional dependant up to 100 per cent.; this lump-sum payment is divided equally among specified surviving relatives. A funeral grant of up to one month's wages is also payable. Alien workers must receive the same treatment as Syrian workers if reciprocal arrangements have been made by international instrument. A survivor of an alien worker who is not in Syria at the time of the accident does not qualify for benefit, unless the survivor is a national of a country granting compensation to survivors of Syrian employees in like circumstances.

The Labour Code also authorises the Syrian Council of Ministers to establish a compulsory industrial accident insurance system by decree and to specify the scope and conditions of such a system.

Sickness and Dismissal

After six months of employment, Syrian wage earners are entitled to half a month's leave at full pay and half a month's leave at half pay in case of non-occupational sickness; salaried employees receive a month's leave at full pay and a month's leave at half pay. Women employed in large-scale industry, commerce or a liberal profession for three years receive full pay during 50 days of maternity leave preceding and following confinement, and those so employed for at least one year receive half pay for the same period.

Wage earners paid by the day must be paid a dismissal indemnity of one month's wages for each year of service up to three years, and half a month's wages for each additional year. All other employees receive an indemnity of one month's wages for each year of service. Full dismissal indemnity is payable in the event of death or the marriage of a female employee, and a half indemnity is payable upon voluntary retirement after 15 years of service.

The Syrian Labour Code also authorises the establishment by Ministerial Decree of compensation funds for payment of family allowances to some or all employees, and also provident funds financed by employer and employee contributions for payment of sickness and unemployment benefits and refunds in case of invalidity, old age or death.

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Wages are comparatively low. Minimum wages are fixed by local Minimum Wage Boards. A fairly representative sample of daily wages seems to be: boys and women, £S 1; unskilled men, £S 2·5; skilled men, 465

423 The large holdings are owned by the Agha of Koshar around
471 Deirik, the Sheiks of Shammar from Tal Koshak to Kubur el Bid and south to the Rad, the Sheik of Tay and several of Tay subdivision chiefs, Asfar-Najjar family of Qamishli, the Aghas of the Kurdish tribes (three in number), and two Sheiks of the Jubur. This list is not exhaustive but it is true that not more than fifty individuals in Jazirah have holdings of more than 5,000 hectares each. And since the great majority of them are tribal chiefs, the logical solution is to ask them to distribute these lands according to the laws in force since the Ottoman rule. No new legislation is necessary to fulfill the two aims of distribution of the public domain to needy peasants and the division of the big estates.

Such a solution will not mean that every estate will be only 1500 dunums but it will mean that perhaps 80% of Jazirah will be in holdings approximating 1500 dunums and some 20% in holdings of 10,000-15,000 dunums for tractor cultivation.

C. Shortcomings of the Decree

423 The basic defect of decree 96 is that it erred in diagnosing
676 the real problem of land ownership in Syria. As the United Nations
433 Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East aptly described the situation (part I page 34), "In the Middle East, most of the population--perhaps as much as 90%--lives virtually on the margin of subsistence. But while maldistribution of income obstructs economic progress in a variety of ways, it is secondary to the basic problem in each country of grossly inadequate output in relation to the total population. This is the central fact of economic life in the Middle East." Thus the real problem facing the Government in Jazirah is not that a few people own large tracts of land (though some of them do and should be controlled), but whether the present type of cultivation is not working [illegible]tter national economy than small holdings will be able to do. [illegible]his criticism of decree 96 does not mean that land abuses do not exist in Jazirah. Undoubtedly they do. But it is a long way between admitting this and trying to correct it by dividing the land indiscriminately into 1500 dunum lots.

The shortcomings of decree law 96 are numerous and without discussing them in detail since the law is being amended, it is necessary to recognize some of them.

423 In the first place, the law amounts in fact to confiscation of
656 property because it arbitrarily abolishes rights of individuals gained
433 over the land through the normal processes of established law.

Secondly, it allows a uniform area for every farmer whether he uses tractor or mule, and whether he allows dry cultivation in Jazirah or irrigated farming in the Euphrates or the Khabur. It is evident that an irrigated area of 1500 dunums is more than adequate even for a large farmer while the same area is too small for tractor dry farming.

Thirdly, the confiscatory provisions of the law are not limited to lands recently acquired from the public domain, but cover lands for which deeds have been in the hands of the owners for decades. Decree 96 achieves this by reversing the stipulations of the preceding laws and by stating that in unsurveyed lands every title should be limited by the area mentioned in it and not by the boundaries.

Fourthly, if social justice is the aim, why should the law be limited to control of the ownership of land and not extended to control commercial and industrial property as well as real estate in cities and cash money? Further, how can the law treat on the same basis five hundred dunums planted to orchards or olive trees and a neighboring area of the same dimensions planted to wheat?

V. Land Ownership Along the Khabur

471 There is more concentration of land ownership along the Khabur that in theother parts of Jazirah, though the concentration is less apparent because the cultivable lands are smaller.

In the north, around Ras el Ain, the Shashan tribe dominated the country. South of them are the Assyrian holdings. Around Hassakeh, some Christians have bought lands from the Juburs, but south of the town and down to Shaddadah, the Jubur Chiefs of the Milhem family own or control both banks of the river. They own all the naqourahs and work their lands by renting it to the members of their tribe on conditions described in the next chapter. One hardly finds a Jubur who is not of the Milhem, or a stranger from inside Syria, who owns property in the Jubur region of the Khabur.

Lately, the Milhem have begun renting land to irrigation projects by pumps. But unlike the Kurds and Tay people of upper Jazirah, the Milhem have never agreed to enter into partnership for the ownership of land.

471 The land problem along the Khabur is not to distribute land to the Jubur Bedouin who cannot use it because he cannot irrigate it, but to remove the hold of the Milhem family and to facilitate ownership by the entrepreneur who invests money in the land, installs pumps, and irrigates areas formerly arid. Unfortunately, the old laws and decree 96 work for the benefit of the river bank owner who, at the end of the lease, takes possession not only of his original strip of land which he leased, but also of all the new land brought under cultivation and irrigation by the lessee at his own expense.

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VI. Recapitulation

185 To recapitulation, the problem of land ownership in Jazirah is one of stabilizing the existing property rights for 57% of the area of the region, of distributing about 25% by the simple expedient of having the Sheik or Agha share his land with the members of his tribe in whose name he holds it, or passing legislation to enable the investor along the Khabur to gain ownership of the land he irrigates and reclaims, and of simplifying the processes of law so that all these functions can be performed and disputes between property owners settled and deeds granted within a short period. It becomes apparent that the success of such a policy is subject to a prior survey of the region. But this need not necessarily mean long delays because aerial survey at present is a quick operation.

The importance of the stabilization on the regularization of the land problem in Jazirah cannot be overemphasized. Besides all the advantages mentioned on page 27, land will come to have real value on the market and the wealth of the entire Jazirah will be increased tenfold. The famer will be enable to diversify his culture and escape the dangers of monoculture. After surveying the division of land, the farmer, working on his own lot in which he has no partners, will be induced to improve it with buildings, irrigation wells, fertilizers, and tree and vegetable gardens. There is no reason why the plains of Jazirah, wherever water is available, cannot be made to resemble the gardens of Damascus with time and an increase in agricultural knowledge among the population.

offices in the administration. The organization and procedure of the law-courts was based upon French models, and the system of laws which they dispensed, although basically Islamic, was deeply influenced by the French codes. French was the main foreign language taught in official schools, and the official system of examinations was adapted from that of France. (This was one of the considerations which led certain sections of French opinion to oppose the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. Although the exchange of letters attached to the Treaty contained guarantees for the preservation of French cultural influences and provided for the recruitment of foreign officials and advisers from France in preference to any other country, the critics regarded the termination of the Mandate as likely to bring to an end the supremacy of French culture in Syria and Lebanon.)

In spite of the efforts of the French Government, however, it is probable that twenty years of French rule harmed rather than helped the position of French culture. The political grievances and discontents of those years, and the almost continuous opposition of the greater part of the Syrian and Lebanese people to their French masters, shook the ascendancy of France over men's spirits. In 1939 there were more who spoke French than there had been in 1918, but perhaps fewer who loved and believed in France.

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France's economic interests in her Mandated Territories, although not of first-rate importance, nevertheless were not negligible. There were only a few thousand private French citizens resident in the country, and comparatively little landed property was in French hands; Syria and Lebanon had never been looked upon as regions for settlement. The total value of French investments was of the order of magnitude of one milliard francs; it had not increased to any great extent since before the War of 1914–1918. Most of it was invested in public utilities: the railways, the port of Beirut, electric power, waterworks and so on. A French company also held the monopoly for the production of tobacco. In fact, almost all public concessions of importance had been given to companies wholly or mainly French in ownership. About one-tenth of the total investment was sunk in the railways, almost all of which were controlled by the 'Damas-

648 Hama et Prolongement' (D.H.P.) company. Since 1925 this
471 company had had an agreement with the local Governments by which the latter made good any losses incurred by the company in the working of the railways, and received a progressive share of any profits which were made.

452 There were a number of French financial institutions with interests in the Mandated Territories. The bank of issue, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, had its headquarters in Paris, and of its 25½ million francs of share-capital over 20 millions were in French hands, while twelve out of its sixteen directors were French, the remainder being Syrians
[436] and Lebanese. By an agreement made in 1924 and subsequently renewed, the Banque was given the exclusive right of issuing Syro-Lebanese currency. It also performed the functions of an ordinary commercial bank. In addition, a great deal of commercial banking, mortgage and land-credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie and the Compagnie Algérienne.

439 In 1938 France imported goods of greater value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other country except Palestine; and she exported to them goods of greater value than did any other country except Great Britain. The total value of her imports from them was 105,894,000 francs. The main articles which she imported were vegetables and fruits; she did not obtain from the Levant States any important raw materials for her industries. She exported to them 197,818,000 francs worth of goods, including large quantities of iron and iron goods, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods.[1]

471 The Mandated Territories were also important for French
649 commerce as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions: the civil air-ports were used as stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China. Moreover, one of the two pipe-lines through which the oil of Iraq is conveyed to the Mediterranean passes through Syria and Lebanon to reach the sea at Tripoli. This was of dual importance to France: first because French interests owned 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and secondly because France obtained between one-third and one-half of her total oil-supply from Iraq, by

[1] For detailed figures, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 203.

way of Tripoli and Haifa. There was a possibility that Syria might in the future come to be more important still to France; oil-prospecting had been going on in the Jazirah for some years, and in 1940 an agreement was concluded for the exploitation of oil discovered there between the Syrian Government and Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

One more economic factor which could not be left out of account was the immense cost to France of her occupation of Syria and Lebanon. There was first the expense involved in installing herself in Syria and Lebanon: her participation in the Eastern Campaign during the last war and her conflict with Faisal after it. Even more important than these were the expenses of the civil and military administration of the Mandate. According to an official estimate, by 1936 the Mandate had cost France 4,843 million francs, of which the military expenditure accounted for 4,300 millions and the civil for 543.[1] By Article 15 of the Mandate France was entitled, once an organic law had been framed, to ask the national Government to whom she was handing over responsibility for repayment of the expenses she had incurred in performing her duties as Mandatory Power.

6

The primary strategic purposes which France hoped to fulfil by her presence in Syria and Lebanon were the maintenance of her position as a Mediterranean Power, on a level with Great Britain and Italy; the protection of her maritime and air routes to the Far East; and the defence of the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli, through which she derived a large proportion of the oil needed by her armed forces. None of these objects was capable of achievement by France alone, but only by France in conjunction with Great Britain, the dominant foreign Power in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq; the Levant States were only of first-class strategic value to France in so far as the possibility existed of a co-ordinated Franco-British strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus it was an essential French interest to pursue in the Levant a policy similar in the most important respects to that pursued by Great Britain; this was normally recognized by French

[1] G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre D'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939), p. 22.

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community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing.

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads.

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the government to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network.

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its development at which the government must undertake a more important promotional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has

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time to time, however, spot analysis will also be required to carry out special programs to improve soil fertility. 654 134

Cadastral Survey

Aerial photography should assist considerably in accelerating the cadastral survey work which was first initiated in 1923 but was still only 45% completed by the beginning of 1953. It is clearly in Syria's interest to finish the cadaster as soon as possible so that the uncertainty surrounding private property rights may be ended at long last and the extent of state domain may be clearly determined. Similarly, it is necessary to expedite the lagging program for converting *mucha'a* or village common land to individual peasant ownership. Experience with the accelerated survey for the Jezireh indicates the need for additional measures to speed up the work. This survey, originally scheduled for completion in the spring of 1955, is now unlikely to be finished before the end of 1956. Insufficient funds, shortages of trained personnel and cumbersome procedures have all contributed to delay this vital survey work. The mission urges that all possible measures to expedite the program be taken. Among the measures that might be considered are the contracting of necessary ground surveys to qualified private firms; the delimitation of properties in certain areas solely by means of aerial photographs rather than by ground surveys; and the possibility of shortcuts in the protracted legal procedures involved in the determination of titles. 654

State Domain

The aerial, cadastral and soil surveys outlined above will for the first time provide the government with approximately accurate information on the area and quality of state domain. At present the government claims ownership of 1,417,571 hectares of allegedly cultivable land of which 551,473 are leased for cultivation. This total, however, excludes the unoccupied or "dead" land (*mawat*) which was assimilated to state domain by Legislative Decree No. 135 of October 29, 1952. Nor does it include the land which may be "recaptured" by the state under other provisions of the same decree. For instance, this decree specified that prior occupation of land which had not yet been sanctioned by the acquisition of title would be recognized only up to 200 hectares per member of the occupier's 491 423

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471 immediate family. It also provided that in adjudicating title deeds in
423 which the area derived from the indicated boundaries of the property was greater than the area mentioned in the deed, the boundaries would govern at least to the extent that they gave each member of the titleholder's family a minimum of 200 hectares. The mission urges that these provisions, which have apparently not yet been applied, be enforced as rapidly as possible. Their application would inflict no undue hardship, and would increase significantly the amount of revenue-earning state domain. Above all, it would put at the government's disposal more good land to be retained as a reserve for the ultimate settlement of landless or virtually landless peasants. Much of the land now left to the state is too marginal for successful settlement.

471 Careful management of state domain is necessary to ensure that the
423 state derives from it the maximum revenue and that land not really
427 suitable for cultivation is reserved for pasture or forest. The government is not equipped at present to exercise adequate supervision. Land is often tilled without authorization, thus depriving the government of revenue and often encouraging the cultivation of land which can be expected to produce a satisfactory harvest only in years of exceptionally high rainfall. Until cultivable land is required for settlement, it should be leased, as at present, to private operators who have the necessary machinery to till it. Thus land in the Jezireh which is recaptured under the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 135 might well be leased to those who now cultivate it, so that existing units of exploitation are not disturbed until the land is needed for distribution. However, current rentals for state land, even though they have been rising in recent years, still seem unduly low. Judging from private rental arrangements prevailing in the Jezireh, for example, the state should be able to charge an average rental of at least £S 5·6 per hectare instead of only a little over £S 3 as at present. In this way the government can add to the funds available for financing development.

Forestry and State Domain

137 The management of state domain should look also to the preservation
659 and improvement of forest areas on government land. Syria has unfortunately been almost entirely denuded of forests. Although some 448,000 hectares are listed officially as "forest", 348,000 hectares consist either of

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454 corporation on a basis similar to the one we recommend, and Pakistan is contemplating the establishment of such an institution.

We have little doubt that the suggested bank would find ample opportunities for investment. While there is no absolute assurance that private capital can be found for the bank, our preliminary exploration in Syria warrants some optimism on this score. Commercial banks might well subscribe a substantial part of this capital, and the balance could probably be obtained from private individuals and business concerns.

While the bank would not make loans for working capital, it might indirectly make it easier for companies to obtain working capital from the regular commercial banks. The mission found that a number of industrial enterprises do have difficulty in obtaining sufficient working capital, particularly to finance heavy seasonal purchases of such agricultural raw materials as cotton, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables for canning. The proposed bank might explore the possibility of financing the construction of bonded warehouses in Damascus and Aleppo where industrial enterprises could store raw materials and even finished goods in such a way as to furnish ample security for additional commercial bank credit.

Vocational Education

874 464 While appropriate technical and financial assistance can do much to raise industrial efficiency, the better training of labor is also important. At present vocational education is seriously inadequate. There is an urgent need to expand and improve vocational schooling so that it will effectively serve the requirements of industry and business and will be properly related to in-plant training. Specific recommendations on this subject are made in a subsequent chapter on education.

Projected Oil Refinery

471 382 With the exception of one ill-starred venture in which it went into partnership with private capital, the government has wisely left the ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises to private initiative. We are strongly convinced that this policy should continue to be followed. During the last few years it has been proposed from time to time that the government depart from this rule by establishing and operating a petro-

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leum refinery. Syria now obtains its petroleum products, of which total consumption in 1953 amounted to around 450,000 metric tons, partly from the Tripoli refinery in Lebanon and partly from more distant sources of supply. By arrangements between the government and the distributing companies, prices in Syria are explicitly or implicitly based on ex-Tripoli prices plus transport costs. It is perhaps natural that Syria should want its own refinery, not only because a large volume of crude oil flows across its territory through the Trans-Arabian pipeline and the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipelines, but also because transport costs substantially increase the price of petroleum products.

A case for a government refinery might be made if there were no alternatives. Private companies, however, are apparently willing to erect such a refinery. The Iraq Petroleum Company, for instance, has offered to carry out its original pledge to construct and operate a refinery serving Syrian requirements. Its offer is apparently conditioned on an agreement with the government regarding pipeline transit dues and on the understanding that the refined products would be sold at the refinery site on the basis of the prices obtaining at the Tripoli refinery. The company has offered to raise the transit dues now paid but the desultory negotiations on this subject carried on over the past years have not produced an agreement. The mission does not necessarily suggest that an agreement for the construction of a refinery be made with the Iraq Petroleum Company but simply that the government avail itself of offers by private enterprise to build a refinery. Such a refinery together with appurtenant facilities would probably cost over £S 30 million, a sum which the government can ill afford to spend at a time when it is hard pressed to find all the resources required for projects for which private capital is not available. At the same time it is evident that the construction of a refinery in Syria would be advantageous to the economy. For example, if a Syrian refinery sold its products on the basis of the price formula proposed by the Iraq Petroleum Company, the cost of transport between Tripoli and Homs, the proposed site of the new refinery, would be saved. At present, the difference between the price of gas oil and fuel oil at Tripoli and Homs, for example, is £S 6.20 and £S 9.25 per metric ton respectively, or about 7% and 15% of the prices at Homs. The construction of the refinery would undoubtedly bring about a significant reduction in the prices of refined products throughout northern Syria, which consumes the bulk of the country's total requirements.

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no foreign exchange restrictions; private ownership and initiative predominate; the country has an influential class of businessmen and entrepreneurs which maintains satisfactory relations with foreign business circles. Yet, apart from the banking sector (and even here most, if not all, the new foreign funds seem to have become available on a short-term basis), the inflow of medium- or long-term private investment from abroad has, so far, apparently not been very large, although accurate estimates are lacking. Part of the explanation may be the lack of political stability within the area and the discouraging effects of frequent changes of political organization and leadership in Syria itself. The question arises, however, whether certain recent Syrian legislative and administrative policies may not also have contributed to discourage potential foreign investors.

Legislation

Complaints are sometimes heard against Decree No. 151 of March 1952, relating to companies and commercial firms established outside Syria. Its principal provisions are that all kinds of companies established outside Syria may be represented in Syria only by Syrian nationals or by commercial companies established in Syria under applicable regulations. These regulations require that not less than two-thirds of the capital of such companies must be in Syrian hands and that a majority of the managers (in the case of cooperatives and partnerships) or the members of the board of directors (in the case of joint stock companies) must be Syrian. The law also imposes some fairly elaborate conditions under which branches of companies established abroad may be registered in Syria. Similar provisions apply also to Syrian agencies of companies established outside Syria.

About the same time, in April 1952, Decree No. 189 prohibited foreign ownership of agricultural land. Article 1 provides that "Non-Syrians, whether natural or legal persons, shall be prohibited from establishing, altering or transferring any right concerning real estate or concluding any agreement for rental and exploitation of agricultural land in Syria for a period in excess of three years." Exempted from these provisions are transfers of inherited rights to real estate, provided reciprocity is accorded in the country of the beneficiary, and transfers of real estate located within the limits of larger towns (provincial capitals). The law's preamble declares its purpose to be the retention of Syrian land in Syrian ownership, permitting Syrians alone to exploit it and to benefit from its resources. But

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while the intention of the law is thus apparently to prevent farm land from 457
falling into the hands of foreigners, its terms would also exclude foreign 471
acquisition of, for example, factory sites outside the limits of major towns, and land for oil prospecting and for construction of gasoline and service stations. At the time of this writing the Syrian Council of Ministers was considering a draft bill under which non-Syrians would be permitted through ordinary decree to own property outside city limits.

Government Policies

There is reason to believe that Decree No. 151 has not been inflexibly applied and that practically all requests for exemptions permitted by the law have been granted. Some harm by way of discouragement to foreign investment may have been done, nevertheless, because the harshness of the terms of the law are understandably but unfortunately better known and more widely publicized abroad than the leniency of its application in individual cases.

The nationalization of power and transport companies in January 1951 affected primarily the foreign owned companies in Aleppo and Damascus. In view of the fact that nationalization of public utilities is not limited to Syria, nationalization itself is unobjectionable. Statements issued by the Syrian Government at the time of the nationalization envisaged a just compensation. However, four years elapsed before the first agreement on compensation was reached with one of the two companies and a settlement with the other is still pending. Regardless of the causes of the delay and without in any way passing judgment as to which side may have been at fault, it should be observed that the fact of the long delay in reaching a final settlement has not passed unnoticed in financial circles outside of Syria and may well have had an adverse effect on prospects for foreign investment in the country.

Appraisal

A certain excess of zeal in trying to preclude a sharing of national resources with foreign entrepreneurs is not a unique phenomenon. It is not surprising that the postwar wave of economic nationalism did not by-pass Syria. There were, moreover, certain experiences in Syria's comparatively recent history which explain this reaction. But although the reasons for the adoption of such policies may be clear, their wisdom is open to dis-

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457 471 pute. Syria no longer need prove its determination to stave off unwanted external interference or infiltration. But it does stand to gain by demonstrating that the resourcefulness of its business community is matched by the government's mature understanding of the country's enlightened self-interest.

It is worth emphasizing that policies which discourage foreign investment are inconsistent with Syria's own record in other fields, such as that of foreign exchange. The free transfer out of Syria of capital and profits in itself creates a basic condition for the influx of funds from abroad. That it was obviously intended to have this effect is confirmed by the legislative motivation of Exchange Control Decree No. 637 of April 21, 1952, which explains that the new regulations aim at making it possible for nonresidents to open accounts with authorized Syrian banks in both foreign and local currency, without any restrictions or conditions. They are thus designed to foster, by means of free inflow and outflow of foreign capital, both short- and long-term foreign investment in Syria.

Finally, it can be pointed out that several underdeveloped countries whose position is not basically different from Syria's have been tending to remove all obstacles in the way of the inflow of capital and outside enterprise. This is true of Pakistan, India, Turkey, and Lebanon; particular reference should be made to recent changes in Egypt's legal and administrative treatment of foreign investors.

Syria's ratification of the Inter-Arab Payments and Capital Transfers Agreement was undoubtedly motivated by a very justified desire to facilitate the movement into Syria of investment funds from some of the oil-rich neighboring countries with limited domestic investment possibilities. Yet this capital is not likely to be attracted as long as legislation or practices discriminating against foreigners in Syrian business remain in force.

v FOREIGN DEBT

457 652 Syria's only external debt is an interest-free loan of U. S. $6 million made by Saudi Arabia in 1950, repayable in four equal annual installments beginning in 1955. The loan agreement was combined with a commercial agreement and provides for repayment in the form of Syrian exports.

Syria's debt to Lebanon, arising from the withdrawal by Lebanon in 1948 of £S 44.6 million circulating in Lebanese territory, has been settled

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the neighborhood of 20-30% of the crop if he furnishes only his labor, and about one-half of the crop if he provides his own working capital. The distribution of the returns on privately irrigated lands is, however, often much affected by the person who controls the pump.

Land Ownership

As in other countries of the Middle East considerable uncertainty attaches to ownership rights in land. By no means all of the cultivated or cultivable land is listed in the official property registers, and titles which are registered are often imprecise or conflicting in stating the boundaries or the area. The validity of many land grants made in the past is also subject to challenge.

By far the greater part of the land unquestionably belongs to the state, if only because most of the land is uncultivable and therefore unutilized and all unoccupied or "dead land" has always in theory belonged to the state. State land has in the past fallen into two categories: "state domain" proper, which is officially registered as belonging to the state, and unoccupied or "dead land" (*mawat*) to which no title exists.

Land other than state domain is held under various traditional forms of ownership including *mulk*, *waqf*, *matroukah*, *amiri* and *mucha'a*. *Mulk* is the only form of absolute ownership and covers only a small proportion of state land. *Waqf* is property held in the form of a religious trust and is not particularly significant as far as agricultural land is concerned. *Matroukah* is land dedicated to public purposes and also has no significance for agriculture. Most land is *amiri*, a type of hereditary leasehold. Ultimate ownership in theory rests with the state which can legally recover *amiri* land if it is not cultivated for five years in succession. The latter right is, however, never exercised, and *amiri* land can be said to be in virtually unqualified private ownership. *Mucha'a* is village land held in common but cultivated in individual family plots periodically reallotted among the holders. This form of tenure has predominated in certain parts of the country such as the Hauran and obviously gives little or no incentive to permanent improvement of the land.

Recognizing that clear and undisputed private landownership is a prerequisite to land improvement, the government has been seeking over many years to terminate the *mucha'a* form of tenure and end the confusion in land titles. *Mucha'a* land is being gradually distributed and converted to

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The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

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first postwar period, ample opportunities outside industry (trade, agriculture and real estate). 464 471

The main source of the capital which founded these new industries was commercial profits accumulated during the war by Syrians in and outside Syria; a certain amount of Lebanese capital seems to have been contributed. Many companies were able to operate with the capital originally subscribed, but in some cases the paid-up capital was mainly or entirely absorbed by land, buildings and equipment, leaving little or nothing for working capital. The mission encountered several instances in which working capital had been supplied by banks on an overdraft basis at a rate of 5% to 7%, but mostly for rather limited amounts only. In a number of cases, however, when larger amounts were required, industrial firms had recourse to a scheme of government-guaranteed industrial credits introduced in 1949. Although it was reserved for industrial corporations and thus did not cover the needs of the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises not organized in that form, it has been very helpful to the companies which were able to benefit from it while passing through a difficult initial period of inadequate financial resources. Such credits were made available by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban for three years (now renewable for an additional five years) at the low rate of 3%. 464

Most Syrian industrialists, hard working and thrifty as they are, prefer to forego paying dividends rather than remain indebted or incur new indebtedness with banks. In most cases loans for working capital are paid off as soon as possible; new machinery is generally purchased with plowed-back earnings and often reserve funds are formed with a view to making further extension or modernization. In several instances the originally subscribed capital has been increased by issuing new stock to the old shareholders. The government-guaranteed loans, on the other hand, are so exceptionally attractive that in the difficult circumstances at the time the plan was initiated there was a great readiness to apply for them and later to have them extended. However, during the last few years the government has become more reluctant to give this scheme a wider application. The total amount which can be guaranteed is now limited to £S 15 million. At the end of 1953 loans outstanding amounted to £S 13.4 million.

On the whole, the development of Syrian industry has been on a sound basis from the financial point of view. True, one frequently finds considerable amounts of loan debts on the balance sheet of industrial corpora- 439 454

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

The recommendations of the mission with regard to agriculture and animal husbandry, including those concerning land tenure and irrigation, would, if accepted, open significant new perspectives to the farmer and farm laborers and tend to check the drift from rural areas. If it were possible to spend more on irrigation than has been recommended, the trend could perhaps be reversed. It is not likely, however, that the growing labor supply can be absorbed and unemployment avoided without further industrialization. Even on the highly optimistic assumption that migration towards the towns can be halted, Syria must contend with such factors as the natural increase in the industrial labor population and the gradual shift from handicraft to mechanization with the consequent release of manpower.

Although estimates in this field are particularly hazardous, the mission suggests that under the most favorable circumstances Syria will have to create at least 20,000-25,000 new industrial jobs during the next six years to keep its industrial labor market in reasonable balance.

Limiting Factors

It is often contended in Syrian official and business circles that shortage of local capital rather than lack of confidence is the principal factor limiting further industrialization. Assuming that this is so, it would follow that to advance development Syria should make a strenuous effort to create attractive conditions for foreign capital as a supplementary source of industrial financing. This conclusion does not seem to be generally acknowledged. At least the nationalization of foreign-owned public utilities without settling the matter of indemnification of their proprietors, and the regulations with respect to foreign companies working in Syria, do not indicate its acceptance.

There is, however, room for some doubt whether scarcity of capital should be considered as a major factor limiting development of Syrian industry. During the past eight years, investments in industry have supplied the country with an industrial capacity capable of meeting most of the need for manufactured articles, based on local primary production, which the population can afford; indeed, as already pointed out, in several branches of industry there is excess capacity. Generally speaking, Syrian industry appears to have attracted substantial amounts of capital. Even taking into account the fact that the sources of industrial investment

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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refinery is running on imported crude oil at about a quarter of its capacity. There exists an IPC refinery at Tripoli which treats over half a million tons of crude a year (10,000 barrels a day) for the needs of Syria and Lebanon which it cannot fully supply; accordingly, its extension has been under discussion. Construction has begun on a refinery for 7,000 barrels a day at Sidon for Mediterranean Refining Company (California Texas Corporation), but while the Syrian market is still too small to justify the erection of a refinery, the Syrian Government nevertheless wishes to have a refinery established in the country to meet its own needs, and negotiations to this end with IPC and with the World Bank have recently taken place.[1]

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Under the Barcelona Convention of 1921 dues are not leviable on transit trade, but the two countries draw, under their agreements with the pipeline companies, a sizable revenue from petroleum apart from the indirect benefits caused by employment by the oil companies. At the time of writing the agreements between the two Governments and the two oil companies are under review but no precise details are available, though the two Governments began by demanding that they should receive jointly a half share of the saving which the companies made by using the pipelines instead of having to transport their oil to the Mediterranean by tanker. Even if this principle were accepted, the difficulty would remain of establishing a satisfactory formula for calculating the saving. The agreement with Tapline is believed to provide Lebanon with about £L4½ million a year. The oil companies bring foreign exchange into Syria and the Lebanon and the currency is surrendered to the Governments at the official rate but can thereafter be resold at the rate applying to the free market which may bring to the Governments a profit of a third. The problem is that Syria and Lebanon are, in fact, not oil-producing states and, although their needs and desires for foreign money may be as great as Iraq's, it is difficult to see how they can expect to obtain from petroleum the same revenue as do the states where it is produced.

Communications

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In general, roads provide a cheaper and quicker means of transport than the railways which are mostly running at a loss. The railway lines are:

The Hejaz Railway. A narrow (3 ft 5 in.) gauge track runs from the centre of Damascus to Deraa (88 miles) and thence

[1] See *Petroleum Press Service*, February 1953, p. 53.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

15: Tannous N,G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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most in their minds. Furthermore, they put the new land under cultivation through an understanding with the local tribal chief. He guarantees them "protection" of the crop in return for a portion of the produce. Nowhere does the peasant figure in this deal other than as a laborer or a sharecropper. Nowhere do we see signs of the emergence of that badly needed class of small, independent, cultivator-owners.

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The situation in Lebanon presents a glaring and enlightening contrast between two systems. In the mountain area, the heart of the country, a strong tradition of private ownership by small independent farmers prevails. In most cases, the family farm averages about 10 acres. The soil is scanty and the terrain difficult; but the people have their hearts in what they own. They have blasted the rocks and built extensive terraces to prevent erosion; they have made the mountainsides produce abundantly of olives, grapes, figs, and apples. On the narrow coastal strips they have grown luxuriant orchards of citrus and bananas. More significant than all of this, we observe that the village folk in this area enjoy much higher standards of living. This is clearly manifested in their diet, health, housing, and a literacy rate of some 90 percent.

True, they have other sources of income, especially from emigrants residing abroad. Yet the independence they have gained through ownership of the land has endowed them with the initiative and the possibility to seek these other sources and better their living conditions. Unlike the sharecropper, who is doomed to his status, the small independent owner is free to move up the ladder.

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Our argument in this respect gains support from the situation that prevails in the rest of Lebanon — in the Akkar plain of the north, in the Bika valley of the interior, and in the mountain area of the south. Here we witness the predominance of the same feudal-absentee-sharecropping system that exists in Syria and Iraq. Here also we witness the same conditions of deprivation, lack of development and low levels of living. Our argument gains further support from a consideration of living conditions in those village communities of northern Iraq, of some sections of Syria and Jordan, where the people are independent and own

25c Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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S 241 311 crease the productivity per acre and also to expand the culti-
vated area per head.

L 311 241 434 In the Lebanon, however, with its steep hillsides under inten-
sive cultivation, there is a definite pressure on land resources.
The limits of intensification appear to have been reached, and a
large part of the village population supplements its income by
work in the towns, and by remittances from abroad. If the land
L S 511 167 tenure system in Syria were less oppressive, room might be
found on the land for settlers from the Lebanon, but as things
are, the standard of living and status of the Lebanese peasant is
higher; compared with the Syrian peasant he is a free man, and
there is no inducement to leave the Mountain for the under-
populated plains of central or northern Syria.

LAND TENURE

L 471 423 464 Corresponding to these different methods of farming, there
are different systems of land tenure.[1] In Lebanon individual
small ownership is well established, and the pattern of village
life, with its broad class of small peasant owners, few large
farmers, and a growing class of landless labourers, resembles
that of Europe.

S 471 427 423 In Syria, the greater part of the land is owned by city not-
ables—the ruling class—and cultivated by small share-tenants.
Though individual ownership exists in some districts, for instance
the Beqa Valley and the oasis of Damascus, the most usual
form of landownership in the plain districts of Syria is share-
tenancy. The villagers bring their corn to the village threshing
floor, and when the grain is threshed the landlord or his agent
stands by and takes one-half of the grain. Towards this result he
has contributed nothing; all labour, equipment, seeds, livestock,
have been supplied by the tenant, so that his share is rent
purely for the use of the land. The landlord is almost always an
absentee, a city notable who only visits the land to collect rent.

S 427 The share taken by the landlord varies from district to dis-
trict, and also varies with the condition of the land. According
to an inquiry made by the French authorities, the usual division
of the crop for non-irrigated cereals is 40–50 per cent to the

[1] The information which follows is mainly based on A. Latron, *La Vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, L'Institut Français de Damas, 1936). The brilliant and profound study by Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient*, is an indispensable authority which unfortunately was received only after going to press.

25: Warriner S-5 (w) 1948 M1 Middle East
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S landlord, and 60–50 per cent to the peasant. The landlord's
427 only charge is taxes. If, as in some districts, the tenant provides labour only, and the landowner bears other costs, the landowner's share may rise to 80 per cent. For irrigated cereals, the landlord's duty is to provide water, and his share of the crop is then 60 per cent. Other irrigated crops are usually farmed by the landowner direct.

The tenant has no protection against eviction because these tenancy agreements have no legal basis, and are not covered by the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code. The tenant may be evicted by the landlord without notice, and no compensation is paid him for improvements made or for losses incurred when he is evicted.

S How much of the land is owned by large proprietors in Syria
• 471 is not exactly known. Roughly one-half of the grain sold in the market comes from large proprietors, and it is believed that about 60 per cent of the land is owned by them. In northern Syria, big landowners own 70–80 per cent of the land, and in the Damascus region 60–75 per cent. In the district of Hama, out of 114 villages, 110 belong to landlords, and 4 landowners between them own 86 villages. Generally there is a great desire on the part of the peasants for individual ownership, but it is only where there is some form of intensive cultivation that it can be successfully maintained. In the village of Kesruwan, for example, banana growing has brought prosperity to the peasants and enabled them to purchase land.

S Thus the custom of share-cropping reflects the instability of
471 grain growing in arid climates with uncertain rainfall and great variations in yields. It is peasant indebtedness which supports
427 the large landowners. Two bad harvests in succession will mean
426 that the peasants become so much indebted that they will actually reduce the area sown for lack of seed, and will therefore be obliged to sell to a money-lender or city merchant. The majority of the big Christian merchants in the town have become rural landowners in this way, particularly in Latakia and round Homs and Hama. In the Syrian plain districts, entire villages have passed into the hands of merchants through indebtedness.

S Most of these large landowners are city families, who take no
L interest whatsoever in actual methods of cultivation. Some,
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probably few, of the estates are the properties of old, wealthy families of Ottoman times, which still exist in Lebanon, such as the lands belonging to the families of Arslan, Jumblatt, Chehab, Khazen, but many of these have been broken up by the Moslem laws of inheritance. Other estates have originated from direct grants made by Turkish Sultans to influential politicians, as for example the two very large estates in the Beqa and the Litani valley. Others too were formed at the time of the general registration of property undertaken by the Ottoman Government when chiefs of tribes or villages registered tribal land in their names as their private property. Uncertainty about legal title to land gives the educated classes frequent opportunity for ousting peasant owners, and whole villages have come into the possession of rival groups of city notables, as a result of litigation among the villagers who have sought their assistance in establishing their title.

While the land-tenure system is thus a result of peasant poverty, it also perpetuates poverty by standing in the way of any long-term investment. The high percentage of fallow in Syria suggests a great waste of land resources, and there could certainly be some improvement in yields, even in dry land farming, if green crops were introduced more generally into the rotation. But the share-cropper has little incentive to improve the fertility of the land, since he has no certainty of tenure, and since the landlord will take 50 per cent of any increase. Since the landlords are not as a rule directly interested in farming, they do not themselves undertake long-term improvements in the land.

Three case studies illustrate the ways in which the land-tenure system hinders advance.[1]

One study relates to the large estate of Misherfe, near Homs in central Syria. This is 24,000 acres in extent and includes five villages, with 2,500 inhabitants. It is very extensively cultivated, only one-third of the area, 8,000 acres, being cropped each year. The land is divided into three parts, one with wheat, barley or *qatani* (mixed grain), one ploughed but not sown, and one left fallow. A small area, 200 acres only, is irrigated, though water supplies are sufficient to irrigate much larger areas.

[1] These studies, which were prepared for the M.E.S.C., are not at present available in print.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

434 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
409 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie, on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie
421 has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

[The estate of Misherfe, near Homs --Analyst]

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LAND TENURE

S 471 Of the total 160 families in the village, 100 own some land and 60 own no land. The peasant owners are divided as follows

1. Rich farmers, owning about 10 hectares ..	5	families
2. Medium farmers, owning from 3 to 8 hectares	80	"
3. Poor farmers, owning between 1 and 3 hectares	15	"
4. Share-tenants	10	"
5. Labourers	50	"

S 241 As in Misherfe, two-thirds of the land is uncropped each year. The peasant divides the land into three plots, one sown with a crop, one ploughed but not sown, and one fallow. The wheat yield is slightly higher than the average for Syria, and amounts to 833 kilogrammes per hectare (6½ hundredweight per acre); barley yields are also slightly higher, being 8 hundredweight to the acre.

S 571 262 As a result of the more equal distribution of land, rather better yields, and more irrigation, the standard of living is better than in Misherfe. The first two classes, including half the families, can reach an adequate standard of consumption of food and other essentials, which is reckoned to be 25 kilogrammes of wheat per month, 1 kilogramme of meat per month (i.e. one sheep a year), 40 kilogrammes of olive oil and 20 kilogrammes of 'samn' per year, 4 tins of kerosene and a small quantity of clothing. The remainder of the village, about one-half of the total, that is the poor peasants, labourers, and share-tenants, are unable to reach this standard and live in great poverty, in one-roomed huts. The majority of these cultivators are heavily indebted, and the burden of indebtedness has doubled during the war years, because debts are usually incurred in gold.

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L 471 The third study relates to Kfer Sa'ab in the north Lebanon, a hill village of small owner-cultivators. Of the total area of 200 hectares, about 30 are owned by the sheikh of the village. The total number of families is 150 (1,200 people), of which 120 own land and 30 are landless. A few peasant owners are rich with 5 hectares of land; 60 are medium owners with 1·5 to 2·5 hectares of land, and 25 own 0·5 to 1·5. Here cultivation is much more intensive than in Syria, and half the land is irrigated.

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[Ashrafie, near Damascus -- Analyst]

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Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

COTTON IN SYRIA

is a very high figure, representing more than 50 per cent of the total land 241
under cultivation, and the United States Agricultural Attache is inclined to 312
believe that the Ministry's figures include the total area served by irrigation systems, whether or not all the land receives water each year.

There are no large-scale irrigation works in Syria. State and local 312
governments have constructed and now maintain a number of small dams, diversions, and canals, but the total area served by these public works in 1951 653
was only 100,000 acres. Several other projects, scheduled for completion within the next three or four years, will increase the area under public works another 100,000 acres. Most of these projects are being financed by the federal government out of its regular budget.

By far the largest area is served by small diversions operated by indi- 312
viduals. The next largest and fastest growing area under irrigation is that served by mechanical pumps. The number of pumps doubled from 1950 to 1951 and the area irrigated increased three times. These pumps are used mostly for drawing water from streams.

In the absence of detailed surveys, accurate estimates as to how much water might be available from all sources are impossible to obtain. Draining the Ghab Swamps on the Orontes River west of Aleppo to bring another 100,000 acres into cultivation is now being studied by a Dutch engineering firm, and a large dam on the Euphrates River to impound water in sufficient volume to serve an additional 750,000 acres is under consideration. Several million acres of land along the Euphrates River probably are suitable for cultivation from the standpoint of soil if water becomes available. At the present time irrigation along the Euphrates is limited to the low-lying land between the banks of the river. Through the centuries the river has cut a bed from a half mile to as much as 10 miles wide through the plain, which is now 30 to 50 feet above the water level. It has proved too expensive for individuals to use pumps to pull the water from the river for irrigation.

The same general condition prevails on the main tributary of the Euphrates, the Kabur. Numerous pumps have been installed along the Kabur, and a gravity system in the north, operated by a small dam and canals, is being extended under a current program. It is possible the water would be adequate to extend the gravity system slightly in the southern reaches of the river.

Water might be diverted also from the Tigris River which runs across the northeastern border of Syria. Extensive use of water from any of these international rivers, however, very likely would involve agreements with neighboring countries. Additional water might be provided also by the other rivers in the country. All of these proposals involve tremendously expensive projects beyond the means of the country to finance without outside help.

CAPITAL AND CREDIT

The highly nationalistic attitude of the Syrians damages the chances of 471
private industry's securing a foreign loan. A recent law requiring all foreign 186
operations to have Syrian managers and at least 50 per cent Syrian capital, 648
together with the questionable security, makes sizable foreign investments unlikely. Under these conditions any foreign loans probably will be made to the government. The Syrian Government has made an obvious point of not obligating itself to another foreign power, and it is unlikely it will accept

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

471 a loan directly from another government. This attitude is illustrated clearly in the refusal of Syria to sign an agreement with Point Four.
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A loan from an international body is another matter, and the country is seeking a loan of several million dollars from the International Bank for development of transportation, particularly roads in the Jezira, and port facilities at Latakia.

454 Without a large-scale public works program, only minor improvements
241 can be made to the existing system. However, opportunities exist for increasing production through private investment.

The good crops of 1950, sold at exceptionally high prices, resulted in high profits and the accumulation of considerable capital. The hope of continued high profits caused much of this capital to be re-invested in equipment and farm improvements. The same incentive also brought out new capital which never before had been invested in agriculture. Judging from the number of tractors, combines and accessories, and irrigation pumps purchased during 1950 and 1951, the investment in agricultural equipment in these two years exceeded the total up to that time. Unprecedented expenditures for general farm improvements also were made, an exceptional step in a country without a history of investment in agricultural development beyond the acquisition of land and a few simple facilities. The capital base has been small. Production has about equaled consumption. There has been little surplus for savings. The few families with capital have used their funds in other ways, seldom for agriculture. But the experience of 1951 was not encouraging for long-continued investment in agricultural development. These investments were costly, many farmers paying double the United States prices for equip-

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These farmers are typical of those in northern Syria. All the tenants of one landlord usually live in villages like this one near Aleppo. Villages vary in size from a few hundred to several thousand depending on the size of the farm.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Syria MDI

ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and money-lenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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

—*Photo Courtesy of Cotton Trade Journal*

All the cotton in the Aleppo region is ginned at this modern ginning center in Aleppo. Large gins (some have 10 saw gin stands) are located or are under construction on each corner of the square. Buildings are elaborate and usually cost about twice as much as the machinery. The grounds are landscaped like a campus.

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inhabited for centuries until a few years ago when farmers from the cities began developing them with mechanical equipment. Large landlords from Aleppo spent millions of dollars installing pumps, building roads, and in other ways developing these lands.

Although occupancy rights have been recognized for years, various government officials with whom the matter was discussed were strong in their views that these newcomers are squatters and should be evicted. They want to distribute the land among the landless peasants. The landlords who have made investments here are just as determined that they will not be evicted. The political strength of the landlords is given generally as the reason for the statement recently made by the head of the government to the effect that the new law will be studied for revision.

While the question of eviction is being debated, the government is proceeding to parcel out other public domains in small units to landless peasants. As this program is expanded, the large landowners are becoming more and more concerned for fear their own properties will be expropriated and subdivided, as has been done in neighboring countries.

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This dispute over the use of public land illustrates the struggle for power going on in Syria today between government bureaucrats and wealthy landlords. The government on one hand is attempting to force changes in all phases of the economy through its various control programs. These changes, however, are strongly resisted by the landowners who prefer to be free from regulations and regimentation. The outcome of this struggle may have a material bearing on the trend in agriculture for the next several years.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

Another significant aspect of the land tenure problem is the financial arrangements between the landlords and tenants. 427 241

Although there are many variations throughout the country, there are three basic contracts.

In the first, where water is available by gravity flow for irrigation and the landowner furnishes only the land, he gets 50 per cent and the tenant gets 50 per cent of the gross yield. In the second type of contract, where the tenant installs pumps and operates them at his own expense and the landlord furnishes the land only, he gets 33⅓ per cent and the tenant gets the rest. In the third case, where the landowner furnishes only the land and the tenant drills artesian wells at his own expense, the landowner gets only 25 per cent of the gross yields. There are variations depending on the crops produced and on who furnishes seed, fertilizer, and equipment. With the growth of mechanization, there is a rising tendency for landowners to prepare the seed beds themselves with large tractors and to take a large share of the produce.

With the advent of mechanization, there is also a noticeable tendency to wage-crop arrangements, particularly in the remote areas like the Jezira where the population is sparse and where the only feasible arrangement for picking cotton is the employment of nomads by the day. 464 241

The greatest concentration of small cultivators who own and operate their own farms is in the older farming areas in the southern part of Syria around Damascus. Around Aleppo the farms are larger in size and owner-operators are fewer in number. 471 241

MECHANIZATION

Mechanization is changing rapidly the primitive practices which still dominate Syrian agriculture. The number of tractors has increased from 200 to almost 2,000 and more than 700 combines are in operation. 241 407

Most of the mechanical equipment is in the Jezira and the agricultural areas around Aleppo. Approximately half the tractors are being used in cotton areas.

To encourage further mechanization the government plans to extend loans to farmers on a five-year basis to finance the purchase of agricultural equipment. So far most of the equipment has been bought privately and for cash. [452]

The first few years have been difficult for the tractor farmers because of the lack of trained operators and the lack of adequate repair facilities, especially spare parts. Now the large manufacturers' agents are establishing modern service stations, repair stations, and mobile repair units. Consideration is even being given to organizing operator training programs.

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

All of the agricultural missions stress the need for improvement in basic research and educational programs. The United States-Syria Agricultural Mission has outlined a complete program for agricultural training, research, and extension. Some of the recommendations already have been adopted, such as the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 654

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

439 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 M1 Middle East
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£80,000; royalty was to be 4 shillings (gold) per ton. The concession could not be cancelled for ten years unless the Company was released by the Transjordan Government.[24] In April 1948, just prior to the expiration of the Palestine Mandate, the High Commissioner for Palestine granted the Transjordan Petroleum Company free passage through Palestine to the Mediterranean for any oil discovered in Transjordan.[25] In the middle of 1954 the Company decided to give up its concession and it began to negotiate with the Jordan Government for release; in November the Government signed an agreement with the Company to terminate the concession. The agreement provided for a final payment of £400,000, bringing the total amount paid by the Company since it was granted its concession in 1947 to £717,000.[26]

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PIPELINES

The I.P.C. pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean, built in the early 'thirties, ran about 267 miles in Syria, and as in the case of Palestine and Transjordan, the agreement signed in 1931 between the Government of Syria and the I.P.C. provided for no payment for transit rights. After the war, when Syria emerged as an independent country, her Premier, Jamil Mardam, announced in Damascus in the middle of May 1947 that the I.P.C. had agreed to pay the Syrian Government LS 750,000 annually (about $336,000) for the right of passage and protection of the pipeline.[27] This was increased in 1950 to £108,000.[28] The 1949 agreement between Syria and Tapline is outlined above.[29]

[24] Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 250; *The New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

[25] This was later repudiated by the Israel Government. For an official British summary of the various concessions granted by the British Administration in Palestine and Transjordan, see Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry*, II, 969-972.

[26] *Middle Eastern Affairs*, V, 408, Dec., 1954. Some American experts did not share the pessimistic view of the I.P.C. about oil possibilities in Jordan. See, for instance, L. S. Gardner, "Oil Possibilities in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," *The Oil Forum*, VIII, 448-450, 454, November, 1954.

[27] *The New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

[28] Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 243. Actually it was no increase, only an adjustment for the devaluation of the £.

[29] See above, Chap. XIII.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 M1 Middle East
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Premier Fawzi Selo stated at the end of 1952 that the annual royalties from Tapline totaled about $490,000 and that the Syrian Government found that sum inadequate as compared with the advantages the Company enjoyed in Syria. The Government had therefore asked the Company for an increase, and after negotiations a new agreement was signed in May 1952 which raised the royalty to about $1 million, and which provided that the parent companies of Tapline were to supply Syria with increased amounts of crude oil to meet part of her internal need, at the most favorable prices prevailing in the eastern Mediterranean area.[30]

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Soon the Syrian Government felt that even the increased royalties and crude supplies were not sufficient and it demanded from I.P.C. and Tapline one-half of all savings from the transit of oil through Syria, based on what the cost would be if the oil had to be moved by tanker. It also demanded that the crude oil be supplied free to the Government.[31]

EXPLORATION

Syria having been included in the Red Line Agreement, I.P.C. obtained, early in 1934, a four-year exploration permit in the Shamiyah desert; this was later extended to other areas. In 1936 the subsidiary Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon) Ltd. was organized. Two years later the Syrian Government signed an agreement with this Company granting it a 75-year concession covering all the Syrian territory (except the Alexandretta district) north of Damascus. It provided for an immediate payment of £50,000, a rental rising from £15,000 to £80,000 in ten years, and a lump sum of £100,000 when oil began to be exported. Royalty was to be 4 shillings per ton. The Company was to build a refinery to supply Syria's internal petroleum needs. If oil was not discovered within ten years, or no commercial export was under way within fifteen years, the concession was to be cancelled. The agreement was not ratified until 1940, but in the meantime the Company carried on exploration and drilling. The outbreak of World War II

[30] *Middle Eastern Affairs*, IV, 20, Jan., 1953.

[31] Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 244; *Le Commerce du Levant-Beyrouth Express*, Mar. 5, 1955. It was calculated by the Syrian press that the oil companies saved through the pipelines over $220 million, while the payments to Syria were no more than LS 6 million.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 M1 Middle East
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interfered with operations, which were resumed in 1947. The Company gave up its concession in August, 1951.[32]

In 1954 it was reported in Damascus that the annual internal consumption of petroleum was about 350,000 tons and that the Government was negotiating with Tapline and I.P.C. to build two refineries near Damascus, the cost of which was to be deducted from the Government's revenue from the two companies.

So far Syria has failed to discover oil in her territory, but the Tapline and I.P.C. pipelines have become important sources of income to the Government and the cause of constant friction between it and the oil companies. From 1947 to 1952 the increase in the income from pipelines was considerable, but the local agitation for higher royalties has been continuous and, in the spirit of the prevailing practice in the area, a demand for a 50 per cent profit-sharing arrangement is constantly being echoed.

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Lebanon signed an agreement with I.P.C. in 1931 under the same conditions as the other countries. The first pipeline ran through her territory for only seventeen miles. The northern branch of the line terminated at Tripoli where a farm of fifteen 93,000-barrel tanks was built. The loading fee at Tripoli was 2 pennies per ton.

In 1947 Lebanon signed the agreement with Tapline mentioned above, and that same year I.P.C. agreed to pay Lebanon transit fees amounting to £45,000 annually. A new agreement with I.P.C. was signed in 1952, raising the transit fees to about £450,000 annually. A new agreement was also signed with Tapline in 1952; it provided for a basic increase in transit fees, for $3 per ton up to 200,000 tons for petroleum products consumed in the country; an increase in the loading fee at Sidon; and annual contributions of $21,000 for the maintenance of the public highways used by the Company's vehicles and $17,000 to the municipalities of Beirut and Sidon in consideration of services.[33]

[32] A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1946), 155; Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 91-93.

[33] United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52*, 59, henceforth cited U. N. *Review* or

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433 The building industry expanded considerably during the post-war period.
339 Authorized floor space in new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945, to 209,000 in 1950 and 265,000 in 1953. Output of cement rose
323 correspondingly, from 35,000 tons in 1945 to 68,000 in 1950, 224,000 in 1953 and 114,000 tons during the first half of 1954. This fully meets local demand. A glass factory, with a capacity of 10,000 tons, established in the post-war period, reached a maximum production of 5,500 tons in 1954; it exports small amounts to neighbouring countries.

377 Output of electricity showed little increase during the war, but after the war demand rose rapidly. The inability of the foreign concessionary companies
471 operating in Damascus and Aleppo to expand capacity sufficiently fast led the Government, in 1951, to nationalize them, for compensation, and to instal
433 additional equipment; 1/ in 1954, the Homs-Hama electricity company was also nationalized. Output by public utilities has risen considerably in recent years, from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 81 million in 1950, 114 million in 1953 and 80 million in the first eight months of 1954; output by industrial power plants is probably over 40 million kilowatt-hours per annum.

433 Other important industries include tanning, and the making of matches, cardboard, soap, nails, pins and plastics.

433 Government assistance to industry has taken four main forms: tariff protection, tax exemption, financial aid and regulation of standards and prices.
656 In the early post-war years foreign competition weighed heavily on the Syrian market. The ending of the customs union with Lebanon in 1950 (see below) led to a decrease in competition in some industries, notably spinning; but other industries, such as weaving and canning, which marketed a substantial proportion of their output in Lebanon, suffered. In recent years, protection has been greatly increased by the raising of customs duties on competing goods 2/ or by prohibiting the importing of such goods: among the prohibited articles were matches, soap, shoes, socks and stockings, glass products, canned fruits and vegetables, wooden furniture and alcoholic drinks. These measures seem to have greatly decreased foreign competition; nevertheless, in recent years, prices of local manufactures have tended to decline. 3/

1/ Between the autumn of 1951 and the end of 1953, a total capacity of 6,450 kilowatts was installed in Damascus (Al Nazar, special issue on Syrian industry, Damascus 1954); a total of £S 9.5 million was advanced by the Government to the nationalized firms for expansion and improvements. At the end of 1953, the total capacity of public utilities was 34,000 kilowatts and that of industrial power plants was over 20,000 kilowatts. Two plants with a capacity of 17,000 kilowatts were scheduled for completion at the end of 1954.

2/ For example, in 1952, duties on several types of woollen and cotton goods were raised by 25 to 50 per cent.

3/ The index of wholesale prices of domestic industrial products rose from 93 in 1950 (1949 = 100) to 111 in 1951, but declined to 103 in 1952, 88 in 1953 and 79 in the first nine months of 1954.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

The manufacture of silk and artificial silk brocade, mainly as a luxury export, employs only a few mechanical looms; hand looms are still in the majority. The existing capacity seems to be adequate to meet the demand which, because of the high price of the goods produced, is bound to be fairly restricted. Trade figures, however, reveal a trend towards increasing exports of the less expensive types of cloth made from cotton or rayon or a combination of both materials. Recent export and import figures are given in the Appendix.

For one of the factories in the new and continuously expanding rubber boots and shoes industry, most of the machinery (except the cutting and sewing machines) was made in small local engineering shops and assembled at the factory by the company's own labor. It is somewhat primitive, although the goods produced are of reasonable quality. The installation of modern foreign machinery would considerably increase production and reduce labor costs. This industry is protected by an embargo and has a small export trade with surrounding countries. Shortage of capital seems to be the main impediment to faster modernization.

Capital

The original capital of most of the larger Syrian industrial enterprises was put up either by a single family or a small partnership and in general the expansion reflected the amount of earnings retained in the firm. Even in the rather exceptional case in which an enterprise was corporate in form (*société anonyme*), it usually maintained in substance a privately owned and privately financed character.

This pattern of organization and growth is equally true of the majority of industrial firms created since 1945, among them the largest in Syria. Some of these began on a large modern scale, requiring both heavy investments and several million £S of original capital for their financing, and although generally incorporated with a certain spreading of stock in some cases, the company much more often was owned or largely controlled by one or a very few persons. This situation reflects the prevailing distribution of wealth, the reluctance to participate in business without control, the unfamiliarity with stock, the lack of a well organized capital market, particularly for equity investments, and last but not least the preference for large and quick returns on savings, for which there were, at least in the

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The extension of cereal and cotton cultivation has been carried out by private enterprise. Most of the initial capital was provided by landlords, but merchants and banks soon started financing the crops; in 1951 it was estimated that some £S 200 million to £S 300 million had been required to finance the planting and moving of the cotton crop, of which all but £S 50 million came from outside agriculture. In recent years, the volume of advances granted and bills discounted by the principal banks rose by about £S 50 million between the seasonal low of July or August and the peak of the cotton season, in November. But the bulk of the capital needs are still supplied by non-banking sources. Private initiative also set up the 31 saw gins and 1,767 smaller gins which were operating in 1952 and which can handle about 300,000 tons of unginned cotton. It has been responsible for the introduction of the various types of American cotton seeds, of which the most widely used is the Lone Star variety, which produces cotton very similar to Egyptian Ashmuni. Private enterprise also took the lead in utilizing chemical fertilizers, imports of which increased from a negligible amount in 1950 to 5,000 tons in 1952, 11,000 in 1953 and 13,000 tons in the first nine months of 1954.

Another field in which private initiative has taken the lead is that of beet growing. The sugar refining company extended advances to growers, supplied them with free seeds and instruction, sold them fertilizers and offered them high prices for their output. By 1953, as a result, 4,500 hectares had been planted to beets, giving a crop of 60,000 tons; 1/ a crop of 80,000 tons was anticipated for 1954. 2/

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The Government has rendered valuable assistance to agriculture, especially to cotton growers. Following the very poor crop of 1951, then over-extension and pests combined to reduce cotton yields sharply, a Cotton Office was established in January 1952. On its staff it had Egyptian experts recruited directly by the Government or sent by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Several decree laws of 1952 fixed cotton acreage and subjected its cultivation to Government authorization; they limited the number of authorized varieties to six and forbade the mixing of varieties; regulated ginning, in order to disinfect, select and classify seeds; made obligatory the spraying of cotton plants with pesticides, which in case of negligence is to be carried out by the Government at the farmer's expense; set minimum standards and established grades for the classification of cotton. 3/ In 1953, the Government forbade the use of seeds not

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1/ Average yield of irrigated land is two to three tons per hectare, and of non-irrigated, 0.5 to 0.75.

2/ Information supplied by Ministry of National Economy. Output of fruits and vegetables has also increased in recent years, but little progress has been made in livestock breeding. An estimate of agricultural income in 1953 put the value of the wheat crop at £S 305 million (a figure based on an estimated production of 1,355,000 tons against a final estimate of 870,000 tons); of barley at £S 7 million; of cotton at £S 121 million; and of other crops at £S 200 million, giving a total of £S 633 million. Livestock and livestock products were put at £S 240 million (La Syrie économique, 1953).

3/ Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien.

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purchased from the Agricultural Bank. There is no doubt that these measures have helped to raise cotton yields and quality. 654 241

Some help has also been given to growers of cereals, by the importing and sale at half price of seed wheat from France and Italy; 1,500 tons were imported in 1953. The Government has set up five experiment stations, for fruits, cereals and cotton, has expanded agricultural education and has begun extension work among farmers.

The Government has also helped growers financially, by purchasing spraying equipment and pesticides, reselling them to farmers and advancing loans for the purchase of pesticides. The capital of the Agricultural Bank was raised from £S 5.8 million in 1940 to £S 7.2 million in 1945, and £S 21.6 million in 1953. Loans advanced by it increased from £S 268,000 in 1940 to £S 1.6 million in 1945, and £S 12.5 million in 1953. In 1953, the number of borrowers was 20,300 and the recovery rate was 93 per cent. The bank also made loans in kind - cotton and rice seeds, spraying equipment, pesticides, tractors, ploughs and pumps. 1/

On the other hand, some government measures concerning marketing and exports have had adverse effects on growers. The Cereals Office's attempt to collect grain for the use of the urban population, at below market prices during the winter of 1951/52, following a very poor crop, led to hoarding, and wheat had to be imported at high prices. In 1952, the Government ordered growers to deliver to the Cereals Office one ton of wheat, at £S 250, for every two tons exported; this led to a rise in the export price to above the world level, hampering exports. In 1953, this arrangement was replaced by a lower export tax on wheat and barley. It would appear that these taxes were borne by growers, not by merchants or foreign consumers, and hence that they constituted a subsidy from rural areas to the towns. With the fall in world prices of wheat, the Government abolished the taxes in May 1954. Similarly, it would seem as though the tax on cotton exports introduced in 1952 has been shifted to growers. 656

Industry

The rapid post-war industrial growth was chiefly due to private initiative but much government protection and some financial assistance were required by several industries. Most of the new capital was provided by merchants, but there was also an appreciable amount of reinvestment of industrial profits. 433 472

1/ Statistical Abstract and La Syrie économique, 1953. In 1953, the bank was authorized to make loans against warehouse receipts issued by the Cereals Office for barley and wheat delivered to it. A rate of 6 per cent is charged on these and all other loans.

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433 No over-all figures on the increase of capital, output or employment are available, but the following data are indicative. Between 1945 and 1953, 472 inclusive, a total of £S 70.7 million was invested in thirty-seven industrial joint-stock companies; of this £S 53.1 million was invested in 1945 and 1946. 1/ 454 A considerable amount was also invested in unincorporated enterprises. Sales of electricity to industry increased from 15 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 28 million in 1951, 36 million in 1953 and 19 million during the first half of 1954. Imports of industrial machinery and equipment amounted to 9,100 tons in 1950, 19,500 in 1951, 10,800 in 1952 and 12,000 tons in 1953, with an aggregate value of £S 200 million. 2/ Table 51 shows available information on the principal Syrian industries.

433 The textile industry is by far the most important, as regards capital invested, employment and value of output. The rapid expansion of cotton growing 288 led to an increase in the number of cotton ginneries, from thirty in 1945 to 110 in 1953. Cotton spinning began in 1933; by 1939 there were 10,000 spindles and by 1954 some 92,000 with a capacity of 12,000 tons of cotton and rayon yarn. Output of cotton yarn rose from 1,700 tons in 1944 to 5,500 in 1950 and 6,600 tons in 1953; that of rayon yarn from 800 in 1950 to 1,200 in 1953; there was a further increase in 1954. Small factories also produce 40 tons of woollen yarn and 16 tons of silk yarn. Mechanical looms increased from 1,500 in 1939 to 5,500 in 1953; there are also 6,000 hand looms. Output of cloth, knitted goods and hosiery is shown in table 51. Dyeing and printing are done in well equipped factories established after the Second World War. The textile industry meets local requirements in most branches and provides an export surplus.

433 Food processing industries form the next most important group. A large-scale sugar refinery started production in 1950, on imported raw sugar; its output rose 258 to 30,000 tons in 1953, of which 23,000 were from imported raw sugar and 7,000 from locally grown beets; output in 1954 was about 38,000 tons. It also produces 1,000 tons of alcohol and some starch glucose as a by-product. The refinery, which fully meets Syria's demand, has not yet reached its full capacity. The vegetable oil industry produces, by means of modern presses established after the war as well as older hand presses, some 7,000 to 12,000 tons of olive oil, about 6,000 to 8,000 tons of cotton-seed oil and some 2,000 to 4,000 tons of other oils. Other important food and beverage industries include the making of biscuits 655 and macaroni, oleomargarine, confectionery and chocolates, and also brewing and canning. The tobacco industry is a State monopoly. 3/

1/ Of the total, £S 23 million was accounted for by six textile companies, 13.4 million by four food processing companies, 10.5 million by three vegetable oil and soap companies, 9.0 million by a cement and building materials company, 8.0 million by a glass and porcelain company, 3.3 million by seventeen electric power companies and 3.5 million by five other companies.

2/ Data from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ The Government took over the tobacco monopoly from a concessionary company in 1951, paying £S 2.5 million as compensation.

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CHAPTER 4 *INDUSTRY*

433 Considering its size and general level of development, Syria already has a considerable manufacturing industry.[22] While Syria can hardly be called an "industrialized" country as yet, the growth of manufacturing during the last decade would undoubtedly have outpaced that of agriculture if certain special circumstances, such as the availability of idle land and a great demand for agricultural commodities, had not produced an equally rapid expansion of agricultural output. Most of the industrial production is for the home market, although in 1953 manufactures, particularly those of the textile industry, contributed about 15% of the country's exports.

Modern factory production in Syria is a relatively recent development. While a few textile factories and a cement plant were established before the last war, prewar manufacturing was predominantly handicraft. In certain branches, such as the weaving of brocades and the working of metals, Syrian artisans had established a world-wide reputation. However, methods of production and even volume of output in the handicraft industries had long been rather static and had even deteriorated somewhat under the impact of the competition of foreign machine-made goods.

The scarcity and high prices of foreign manufactures during the war and immediate postwar years greatly favored an expansion of Syrian industrial production. Many new factories were established. The abnormally high profits earned in commerce during these years caused merchants to turn to industry as an investment outlet for their surplus capital. Once the profitability of industry was demonstrated, additional capital was attracted. Many industrial enterprises reinvested a substantial portion of their profits in further expansion. The opportunities for profit also stimulated some influx of foreign capital, particularly from Lebanon. [473] Nearly all of the new enterprises took the form of joint stock companies. Although in each case a limited number of businessmen took the initiative in founding the company and retained the controlling interest, the fact that at least some of the stock ownership became rather widely dis-

[22] See Annex F, p. 357.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

likely to decline somewhat when the survey is completed for the Hauran and Djebel Druze where small peasant ownership predominates. 241 423

Water for irrigation is supplied chiefly by merchants and wealthy landowners who have the means to install pumps. Similarly, the ownership and operation of modern agricultural machinery are primarily confined to large operators in the Jezireh.

Ownership of the critical factors of production carries with it the ability to demand a large share of the output. In areas where rainfall is inadequate the pump owner, who is frequently not the landowner, can exact from 45% to 60% of the crop simply for the water he supplies. Where labor is plentiful and rainfall adequate, the landowner can get up to half of the crop simply by allowing others to cultivate his land. On the other hand, in the Jezireh land is plentiful by comparison with labor and rents for only a 10-15% share of the crop. Here the owners of tractors and combines control the central factor of production and can command the lion's share of the output.

The small cultivators have no capital or access to capital that would enable them to acquire more land, better machinery and livestock, pumps and other means of production by which to raise their standard of living and make themselves independent. Nor are they organized in cooperatives to undertake these things collectively. Even the larger farmer frequently has great difficulty in getting necessary capital on reasonable terms.

One of the most important objectives of an agricultural program is therefore to provide an adequate volume of credit on equitable terms in order to make the needed means of production more generally accessible. The organization of cooperatives to facilitate group action among small farmers should be another aim. No single peasant, for example, has enough resources to sink a well or install a pump, but a group of peasants could pool their resources to this end. Finally, it would appear vital to conserve the good land remaining in state domain for the purpose of settling landless peasants and Bedouins and thus gradually increasing proprietorship.

4. *Despite the existence of many large properties, land is predominantly tilled in small holdings by tenants or peasant-owners who earn a rather precarious livelihood.* 241 423 427

Large-scale exploitation prevails only in the Jezireh and to some extent in Aleppo where land is farmed in big units with mechanized equipment and paid labor. Even the large estates are for the most part farmed in small units by sharecroppers who are tenants at will, seldom cultivate the same

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

gests, therefore, that this tax be complemented by a new land tax. The rate of such a tax should increase with the size of landholdings, and small holdings should be entirely exempt. The rates must also be in accordance with the yield of the land, but the mission suggests that they be kept rather low (e.g., not more than £S 2-3 per hectare on the average) so that a detailed, complex classification of land in accordance with productivity may be avoided. In another section of this report the mission proposes that the present schedular income taxes be supplemented by a global income tax levied at a moderate rate. In our opinion, income from agriculture should be included in the scope of such a global tax. The ascertainment of income from land is by no means as difficult as is generally supposed.

In addition to taking these steps, the government should pay special attention to the improvement of the lot of tenant farmers. In general, measures should be adopted to increase the tenant's share of the output, to give him greater security of tenure and to make him less dependent on the landlord as a source of credit and supplies.

The economic bargaining power of the landlord vis-à-vis the tenant and of the pump owner vis-à-vis the cultivator is so great that the landlord and pump owner obtain a rather excessive share of the output of the land. It would be desirable to establish a commission to study the various forms of association in the exploitation of agricultural land which prevail in different parts of Syria and to make recommendations designed not only to make these arrangements more equitable but also to put them on a basis which would give the actual cultivator of the land more incentive to improve his agricultural methods. Such a commission could work out the terms of written contracts which would be applicable to various types of association. It could also devise ways of giving greater security of tenure to the tenants. The latter can generally be ousted at will by landlords and the land they receive for cultivation is so frequently reallotted that they acquire no interest in its permanent improvement. Finally, it would be appropriate to consider the establishment of local land tenure commissions to settle, in a manner comparable to settlement of labor conflicts, disputes among the parties sharing in the exploitation of the land.

A number of measures to foster cooperatives, provide more ample credit and establish machinery for assisting the farmer at the village level are recommended elsewhere in this report. It is important that these measures

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

focus not only on the farmer-owner, but also on the tenant, for only in that way can the latter's economic bargaining power be strengthened and his independence and security enhanced.

IV IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTION

The mission approaches a discussion of this subject with some diffidence. Generalities are difficult to avoid. It is easy to point out deficiencies in agricultural practices, but much more difficult to suggest a concrete and practicable program to improve them. Effective action is made difficult by the ignorance and inherent conservatism of farmers. It requires a larger, better trained and better organized government service to carry out the necessary trials and experiments and to work with farmers at the village level. Obviously, no miraculous increase in productivity can be expected within a short time.

Nevertheless, the subject is too important to neglect. In too many countries the undeniable difficulty of carrying out a program to raise yields has caused governments to shrink from such an undertaking. We have already indicated why much more attention must be paid to this problem in Syria. Although land in Syria is more plentiful than in many other Asiatic countries, the population pressure on good land is bound to grow. If the country is to support an increasing population on higher living standards, the task of obtaining more output from cultivated land cannot be postponed.

The mission can only point out some of the potentialities and indicate in a rather general way how they might be realized. More detailed programs must be worked out by the Ministry of Agriculture with the help of the FAO or other sources of technical assistance.

Crop Rotation and Diversification

Improvement in existing patterns of crop rotation is one of the most important methods of improving the fertility and structure of the soil and permitting a gradual diminution in the use of fallow. The aim should be to reduce customary fallow in the rainfed areas by at least 50% and to the greatest extent practicable in the irrigated areas. The much more extensive use of leguminous plants for both winter and summer

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debt can be reduced to manageable proportions. The mission recommends therefore that Syria enact legislation establishing procedures under which the Bank can obtain an amicable and, if necessary, a compulsory adjustment of past indebtedness as a prerequisite to the extension of fresh credit calculated to set the farmer on his feet. The legislation adopted in Cyprus on this subject is likely to provide valuable guidance.

To carry out this expanded credit program the management of the Bank must be strengthened as much as possible. Competent management can be secured only if salaries comparable with those paid in commercial banks are offered. The board of directors should be carefully chosen from among citizens who have a genuine interest in agricultural credit. The inclusion of a qualified commercial banker would provide the board with valuable experience even though an agricultural credit institution should obviously not be operated just like a commercial bank. For the supervised credit program and the work with cooperatives it will be desirable to obtain the services of an expert foreign adviser. The bank management should be largely autonomous and free to determine its own operating procedures.

Cooperatives[20]

The mission has already indicated its belief that cooperatives should become an important vehicle for the extension of credit to farmers. Unfortunately few cooperatives now exist. Although 28 are officially registered, the great majority of them manifestly exist only on paper. Yet there are instances of successful cooperative organization, such as the olive growers' cooperative at Tartous. Nor is interest wholly lacking among farmers. In the past a considerable number of villages have appealed in vain to the government for assistance in the formation of cooperatives. The work carried on by the Near East Foundation in certain villages indicates that farmers are quick to respond when the advantages of cooperative action are pointed out to them.

In principle cooperatives can become important agencies of self-help. They can stimulate the development of a democratic community spirit and a sense of self-reliance among peasants who now feel helpless and excessively dependent on the landlord, merchant and money-lender.

[20] See Annex E, p. 348.

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474 Farmers are often able to do collectively what they cannot accomplish as individuals. Cooperatively they can bring their products to the nearest market where they will fetch better prices, or sink a well and install a pump to provide irrigation on terms far more attractive than those imposed by a private pump owner. Collectively they can also get access to more credit and to some extent pool equipment such as dusters and sprayers which individual members cannot afford to own. Local roads can be built and other village improvements initiated by cooperative community action.

With the present level of social organization and education in the villages, however, it can hardly be expected that villagers themselves will generally take the initiative in forming cooperatives. Cooperatives must be encouraged, nurtured, guided and supervised by the government. In theory the government is in favor of cooperatives and has even accorded them sweeping tax exemptions. In practice, however, it has taken almost no action to encourage them and has on occasion even displayed a rather negative attitude. Only one officer in the Ministry of Agriculture is concerned full time with cooperatives. The basic statute governing cooperatives is needlessly complicated and must be virtually incomprehensible to farmers. The protracted consideration preceding registration of cooperatives appears to indicate a rather deep-seated distrust of cooperative action on the part of at least some government officials.

The first steps which must be taken are to simplify the cooperative statute and to organize and staff an adequate section in the Ministry of Agriculture to deal with cooperatives. Some of the personnel will no doubt require training abroad. The principal functions of this section would be to organize and guide cooperatives, train their leaders and managers and audit their accounts. The effective discharge of all of these functions is essential to the success of the cooperative movement. In the field work of organization and guidance the cooperative section could obtain considerable assistance from credit supervisors on the staff of the Agricultural Bank. Rapid progress, particularly in the initial years, cannot be expected, but the formation of a hundred cooperatives over the next five years might be set as the target. For this program the mission suggests a government allocation of £S 500,000. The FAO or some other agency should also be invited to provide technical assistance in training and getting the program off to a good start.

The type of cooperative most suitable for Syria is one that would dis-

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charge a number of closely related functions such as the purchase and sale of farm supplies, the procurement and extension of credit and the marketing of farm products. The granting of loans and the sale of farm supplies are closely linked, and cooperative marketing would facilitate the collection of loans. For certain special functions such as irrigation, single-purpose cooperatives would be more appropriate. On balance the mission thinks it best that cooperatives be organized on the basis of unlimited liability, for only in this way will all the members have the greatest incentive to see that all the credit is effectively utilized and repaid. The mission has already indicated its view that cooperatives should be given credit at 6% rather than 8% interest. The cooperative's own lending, however, should be done at 8% to provide a margin for meeting operating costs and building up reserves.

Agricultural Extension and Community Work[21]

In most underdeveloped countries, programs to improve agricultural practices and yields founder because there is no organization and staff to work continuously with farmers, educating and assisting them and demonstrating to them the practical utility of better methods and techniques. In Syria, too, there exists no agricultural extension or educational service in that sense. To be sure, the various departments of the Ministry of Agriculture have representatives in the *mohafazats* or provinces dealing with such subjects as agricultural production, veterinary matters, plant protection and the like. But the time of these men is largely monopolized by various administrative tasks such as the enforcement of government regulations, crop reporting, locust control and similar matters. They do not have the opportunity, and sometimes not even the inclination, to work with individual farmers. Their contacts with villages are brief, sporadic and infrequent.

The mission has given considerable thought to the problem of organizing effective work among the agricultural population in the villages. Our conclusion is that this work would best be entrusted to a special rural community development organization. Other countries faced with a similar problem, like India and Pakistan, have launched such an organization; in India, where one has now been functioning for some years,

[21] See Annex C, p. 322.

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ing of old debts in relation to a new loan must be carefully considered. It should be obvious that supervision may be necessary throughout the period of the loan. Furthermore, it may be desirable to extend the repayment of certain old debts over a period of years. 652

We have emphasized in the Main Report that legislation should be considered to provide for the relief of old agricultural indebtedness. Many capable farmers cannot be made creditworthy under any system of credit until they are in a position to make a new start in life.

Loans should be made in kind only when it is necessary to insure their use for a specific purpose and when the government has found it necessary to monopolize the supply of certain farmers' requisites, e.g., cottonseed. Such loans must be in first-rate products.

In order to carry out the type of credit program envisaged by the government, the ABS will need to bring its services to the farmer. Thus the regional banks should have a number of field credit offices from which, in cooperation with the regional banks, loans will be made, serviced and collected. Part of this task might well be done by opening up temporary field offices in larger villages before the planting season and again during and following the harvest period.

Ultimately the ABS and the village cooperatives should be owned and operated by farmers. These institutions must therefore accumulate their own capital if they are not to remain merely channels for the extension of government credit to farmers. The ABS itself could do much to promote additional savings through credit cooperatives. Over a period of years the development of practices of thrift will lead to substantial capital accumulation for the use of farmers. The capital of a cooperative credit society should be invested in capital expansion or deposited in the ABS. When a credit society is a part of a multi-purpose cooperative, it can use any earnings or savings to best advantage within its own organization. It may be desirable, and in fact necessary, for the ABS to establish some local credit societies as an arm of its organization in the extension of loans to farmers. In the latter case, savings and earnings for use of members would presumably be under the control of the ABS, but should be, insofar as possible, administered by an independent organization. 652 474

It is also desirable that cooperative associations retain their earnings and investments by restrictions on declarations of dividends, and by not permitting ready refunding of membership stock. The 2% profit made by cooperatives on loans would be another source of capital and credit.

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II COOPERATIVES

494 *Organization*

A Syrian statute prescribes the manner of organizing cooperatives; by-laws are likewise prescribed. Both are rather involved and somewhat confusing. Without analyzing these laws in detail, we may point out certain of their defects. For example, in regard to reserves there are a number of lengthy provisions dealing with "ordinary reserve", "obligatory reserve" and "exceptional reserve" in terms of percentages. Most technicians would have considerable difficulty construing them and they are impossible for farmers to comprehend. The drawn-out procedure to be followed in the registration of a cooperative appears to indicate some government distrust of cooperative organization. The basic cooperative laws should make it relatively simple for farmers to follow required procedure and to proceed on a sound basis.

In the Main Report the mission has recommended a revision of the legislation pertaining to cooperatives. There is much valuable and useful experience to draw upon from the many countries which have had a considerable measure of success with cooperative societies. The Arab League is giving attention to this matter and is now in process of setting up a permanent training center for cooperative work of the member states. The discussions for the implementation of such a program are promising. The FAO has also sponsored a training program in cooperatives, dealing in part with legislative matters.

In Syria, a cooperative may be organized by seven or more persons to promote mutual interest in marketing agricultural products, extending credit, encouraging savings, purchasing domestic and farm furnishings, and a host of similar purposes. Funds are provided through capital share subscription of members, payment of membership fees, and from loans. Each member has one vote. A cooperative may be organized either on the principle of limited liability or unlimited liability. Cooperatives are registered in the Division of Cooperatives and Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture. This division is intended to supervise the activities of cooperatives but has not been able to do so because it lacks the personnel and an adequate organizational framework for serving and promoting cooperative organizations.

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In organizing a cooperative it is necessary to determine carefully the function to be performed. The greater the number of functions which the cooperative is to perform, the more complex becomes the task of management and the more difficult the financing and accounting. These problems must be met and not be permitted to hinder the successful development of cooperatives.

In the Syrian villages it would seem best to organize cooperatives around a single function when such a function is an end in itself, as for example providing a pump for irrigation. However, needed services are often interrelated, as is the situation when agricultural production credit is an integral part of a cooperative marketing and purchasing program. Several functions should be undertaken if: (1) they do not conflict; (2) they do not make the operations too complex; (3) the accounts of each can be kept quite separate; (4) the members understand clearly what the association or society is doing; and (5) the functions provide a service to most of the members. Under these conditions the multi-purpose cooperative is a superior type of organization since it can coordinate in a single efficient management unit such allied functions as the purchase and sale of farm supplies, marketing of farm products, granting of credit and the performance of other special services.

The recent experience of the Near East Foundation in organizing cooperatives in Syria indicates that farmers are very responsive to pilot cooperative organization when the aims and methods are properly explained to them. In one case, for instance, considerable enthusiasm was engendered by the cooperative sinking of an irrigation well which increased production and quadrupled the value of the land. The Foundation has found that such demonstrations, when preceded by preliminary discussions of the elementary principles of cooperation, caught the farmers' imagination. Under these circumstances, farmers respond readily and show by their willingness to subscribe shares a strong belief and confidence in cooperative association.

Clearly such projects offer a nucleus for expansion. They also have shown that: (1) farmers are interested in joining together to do things for their mutual benefit; (2) organization of a cooperative involves a great deal of educational effort; (3) regular assistance and guidance must be provided; (4) capital is necessary; and (5) the job cannot be done without guidance by the Agricultural Bank and the Division of Cooperatives.

ill-considered plans and avoid abrupt changes". A separate section in the Labour and Social Affairs Department of the Ministry of National Economy will run and supervise the centres, introduce local industries, study local conditions and implement a programme to raise the standard of living and promote local welfare. The Department will be assisted by an Advisory Committee comprising representatives from all agencies interested. Three bodies participate in the conduct of each model centre: one will consist of the staff members of the centre; the second the advisors to the staff members and the representatives of local administrative authorities; the third will be not one single committee but five committees of local residents, each to be responsible for a particular aspect of the centre. All will work under the supervision of the staff. The Decree defines the several units to be constituted for each centre and their respective responsibilities. 649 657 185

65. It is intended that when the Government has established a model centre in each province, the example will be followed in other districts by villagers who (as in the Egyptian prototype) will contribute to and share with the Government the expenses of maintaining a sufficient number of centres to cover the whole country.

66. The scheme which was inspired by the Cairo Seminar of 1950 had, we were informed, been discussed and agreed with other Ministries concerned and tentative arrangements had been made with the University authorities for their co-operation in providing the necessary personnel for the centres. Unfortunately, however, the project-law had not received the approval of the Ministers and Dr. Joukhadar gave no indication of any date for its operation. 242 185 474

67. On the introduction of Mr. Carroll Deyoe, FAO representative in Syria, members of the mission had the opportunity of meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture Mr. Akram Rakabi, the newly-appointed Secretary-General, who gave an account of agricultural extension work in Syria and of the development of agricultural co-operatives in the country. He foreshadowed a possible eventual use of the profits of these societies for community welfare purposes, but the movement is in its infancy.

68. Thanks also to the courtesy of Mr. Deyoe, the mission was put in touch with the local representatives of the Near East Foundation. In the absence in Beirut of the Programme Director, Mr. Eyer, his Deputy (Mr. Khoury) gave us the statement of the work of the Foundation in Syria which had been prepared for the recent Damascus Seminar which we had hoped to attend. Mr. Khoury accompanied us on his visit to Nashabeyeh one of the four villages in which the Foundation operates demonstration centres in agriculture and sanitation and in home-making, respectively. Mr. Sivaswamy has prepared a detailed account (Appendix V) of his impressions of the work done at Nashabeyeh. 242 185 744

69. The centre has been in existence one year. Its premises are in adobe houses such as are to be found in many villages in these parts. They have been simply adapted for their present purposes and the standard of cleanliness was pleasantly surprising. The staff consists of: (1) a sanitary inspector who looks after general sanitation, including mosquito control by insecticides and by drainage. (He makes a point of talking to the village people about water supply, latrines, etc.); (2) a nurse-midwife, whose duties are: ante- and post-natal care, examination of pregnant women, education of local midwives, regular supervision of the infants in the village. (There is no maternity clinic; the women are delivered in their homes); (3) a doctor, paid by the Foundation, who visits the centre once a week.

III The Baghdad Railway

The Baghdad Railway which runs 247 kilometers in Syria is 496
the principal means of transport for goods. It handles about 200,000 648
tons of goods every year. The bulk of Jazirah wheat is transported over it. But it has had in recent years keen competition from trucks in spite of the bad roads for several reasons. The Qamishli-Aleppo line passes for 70% of its length through Turkish territory and is under Turkish control. When the Turks choose to irritate the Syrians they restrict the entrance to the stations and in numerous other ways frustrate the Syrians and cause them hardship. Whole trains are unaccountably delayed for days in the Turkish stations.

Already passenger traffic is handled almost entirely by planes, 484
cars and busses, except in winter months when the roads are unsafe. A bus charges LS 10 from Qamishli to Aleppo and makes the trip in 12 hours. A small car charges LS 20 and makes the trip in 8 hours. It takes the "Express" 20-22 hours to reach Aleppo from Qamishli and the fare is LS 30 in second-class "wagon lit" with tips.

For merchandise the train rate is LS 23.5 per ton from Qamishli 489
to Aleppo. It costs the farmer an additional LS 6-12 depending on the distance to transport a ton of wheat from the field to the station. There is also an amount of about LS 4 involved in handling, all of which makes the actual rate by train about LS 35.

The truck charges LS 35 from Qamishli to Aleppo during the wheat season but it carries the wheat directly from the combine in the field to the merchant's store in Aleppo thus reducing the handling expenses to a minimum and transporting the goods in the shortest time. If the farmer is not hard pressed for money, which is rather rare, and can wait until the winter months and spring, he can transport his wheat for a rate as low as LS 10-15 per ton by truck. Inversely, the cost of tranport from Aleppo to Jazirah rises in winter and spring and decreases in summer and autumn.

Though truck transport is more advantageous in many ways than transport by train, the number of trucks available and the condition of the roads make the transport of a whole crop by trucks impossible. To achieve that, a complete road network needs to be constructed, diesel trucks would have to be imported and the discriminatory tariffs against them abolished.

have seen the constant stream of visitors, often quite humble people, gazing at the showcases of exhibits from Mari, Ras-Shamra and Raqqa; while they are there, these visitors also go round the museum and have an opportunity of admiring its treasures. In addition, it would be very helpful if the government, which furthers the training of scientific specialists by providing fellowships for study abroad, and does so much to develop the schools, were to introduce courses on the history of Syrian art and antiquities into the curricula of Syrian secondary schools and higher educational establishments, both in Damascus and Aleppo.

Tourist development could also do much to help in the protection of historic monuments by showing the population that they can provide a steady source of income. From this point of view, Syria's art treasures have, as yet, scarcely been exploited. In the absence of suitable facilities and adequate publicity, there is still very little tourist traffic in Syria. A great deal of extremely useful work could be done in this field by an active organization, supported by the State. In order to attract foreigners to a country so rich both in natural beauties and impressive remains, it should only be necessary to improve certain sections of roads and establish one or two conveniently situated and unpretentious but well-run hotels or rest-houses, where visitors can eat and sleep in pleasant surroundings. It is astonishing that sites as fascinating as Palmyra, St. Simeon or the Krak des Chevaliers should still be so hard to reach when it would be relatively simple to organize tours either by road or air. In this respect, Greece, where the tourist trade has advanced by leaps and bounds in the space of a few years, and is now making a considerable contribution to the country's economic resources, seems to us to provide a particularly good example of what can be done in this way.

We shall have to consider town planning in greater detail

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466 to curb at least the abuse of child labor which exists in most small shops. This might be done by occasional spot checks. One of the difficulties, however, is the inadequacy of the enforcement staff of the Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs in the Ministry of Economics. At the beginning of 1954 there were apparently only eight inspectors assigned to the enforcement of the labor code. We urge that the number be increased and that for this purpose an additional £S 325,000 be made available to the Labor Directorate over the next six years.

The Tourist Industry

457 485 In the discussion of the proposed investment bank, we have already indicated that this institution might assist in financing hotels, as well as manufacturing industries and agriculture. Although this chapter focuses on the problem of developing manufacturing, it appears appropriate to mention here also the possibilities of the tourist industry. Syria has much to interest the tourist from the West. On its soil many civilizations and [172] cultures have flourished and left their imprint. There are countless archaeological sites which are still yielding up treasured relics of the past, numerous ancient Greco-Roman and early Christian cities, fascinating ruined Christian churches and imposing mosques, old Crusader castles and Arab forts. Both Aleppo and Damascus, which vie with each other in the claim to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, intrigue the tourist with their blend of the ancient, the picturesque and the modern.

In the postwar period the airplane has greatly extended the orbit of travel for the American and West European, and rising standards of living have enabled many more to travel abroad than before. In Greece, for example, the number of foreign tourists rose from about 33,000 in 1950 to almost 76,000 in 1953, and the per capita expenditure is said to have doubled during this period. Unfortunately, the mission was unable to obtain figures on the total of foreign travellers visiting Syria, but the number has undoubtedly increased significantly. Many travellers to the Holy Land now stop over in Syria. This tourist trade could be greatly expanded if a concerted attempt were made to advertise the attractions of Syria and to improve the inadequate accommodations available to foreigners.

More and better hotels, good communications and adequate preservation and presentation of historical and cultural monuments are all impor-

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tant elements in a program to attract more tourists. At present Damascus is the only Syrian city with first class hotel accommodations and even here there is an acute shortage. Such cities and towns as Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra all urgently require good hotels for tourists and other travellers. Construction and operation of hotels should, of course, be left to private enterprise encouraged by the government and assisted by the projected investment bank. There are, however, a number of places of potential importance to the tourist trade where rest houses and restaurants rather than hotels are needed. Such facilities are not likely to be sufficiently profitable, at least in the beginning, to attract private investment. We suggest, therefore, that the government spend approximately £S 500,000 on the erection and operation of rest houses and restaurants at such locations as Ras Shamra (site of ancient city of Ugarit), Saint Simeon (ruins of old city and monastery-church in Djebel es Smaane), Al Rasafa (Christian monuments and Moslem palace), Doura Europos (ancient city), Krak des Chevaliers (crusaders' castle), Tartous and Soueida. As a UNESCO mission has suggested, some of these could probably be constructed inside existing historical buildings, thus leaving the appearance of the site undisturbed and enhancing their appeal to tourists.

The interest of tourists in the historical and archaeological treasures of Syria also provides a definite economic justification for increasing the expenditures of the Directorate General of Antiquities. This government department has jurisdiction over museums, historical monuments and archaeological excavations. It finances its operations in part from its own receipts, but the government has during the last two years contributed, on the average, £S 763,000 to its annual budget of a little over £S 1 million. In 1954 its total planned investment was about £S 450,000, of which £S 280,000 was devoted to museums, £S 120,000 to the reconstruction of monuments and £S 50,000 to excavations. Damascus possesses a notable museum of which the country can well be proud, but about £S 1 million is still required for its completion. The Aleppo museum, which houses many fine treasures, admittedly needs a new building at a cost of £S 1 million, and appropriate regional and local museums would help the visitor to visualize the cultural heritage and archaelogical finds of particular localities. Although all of this could not be realized within the 1955-60 period, we suggest that £S 2.4 million be provided to complete the Damascus museum, establish a few local museums in such places as Ras Shamra and Palmyra and at least start the new building in Aleppo.

have seen the constant stream of visitors, often quite humble people, gazing at the showcases of exhibits from Mari, Ras-Shamra and Raqqa; while they are there, these visitors also go round the museum and have an opportunity of admiring its treasures. In addition, it would be very helpful if the government, which furthers the training of scientific specialists by providing fellowships for study abroad, and does so much to develop the schools, were to introduce courses on the history of Syrian art and antiquities into the curricula of Syrian secondary schools and higher educational establishments, both in Damascus and Aleppo.

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We shall have to consider town planning in greater detail

441 It used to be one of the worst roads in Jazirah. At the end of this stretch begins the desert of Deir Ezzor 100 kilometers wide. Some sections of it where rainwater prevents the passage of cars are paved. Nevertheless, the road closes during several weeks in winter.

Another road built crudely by the British Army stretches from Qamishli to Kuber el Bid-Talkoshak-Mosul. It is paved with rough stones and it is only used by cars in winter. Beyond Tel Abu a road branches to Deirik and Ain Diwar.

[487] Aside from these, all Jazirah roads are tracks. There are no roads between Amuda, Derbassiya and Hassakeh, nor between Ras el Ain and Hasseheh, nor between the more important villages clustering around the several towns.

The absence of bridges across the Jagjag renders communication more difficult especially in winter when the waters of the river rise. There is a bridge at Qamishli, another one at Tal Brak 40 kilometers south and a third one at Hassakeh. In the relatively crowded villages near Qamishli along both sides of the river, crossings are effected with great hardship by loaded trucks especially in winter.

II Roads Between Jazirah and Aleppo

361 Aleppo is the nearest commercial center to Jazirah. It is
438 the market for Jazirah grains, wool, samneh and hides. It provides
491 Jazirah with all its needs of cement, textiles and all kinds of imported goods. That is why daily communication between the two regions is vital to Jazirah, but the Government has not judged it yet necessary to construct an all-weather road. Such a road exists in
491 more or less good shape from Qamishli to Hassakeh and to Point 47. From there on, the road to Rakka is closed all during the winter months and travel to Deir Ezzor is interrupted whenever there is heavy rain. The northern and shorter road Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo is also closed in winter for goods and passengers. The shortest road and that which passes through the best developed areas is the one which follows the railway line Qamishli-Amuda-Dirbassiya-Ras el Ain-Tal Abiad-Jarablus-Aleppo. It is 420 kilometers long as contrasted with 465 kilometers for Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo, and 485 kilometers for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Rakka-Aleppo and 565 for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Deir Ezzor-Aleppo which is the usual route followed in winter.

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the nomads of the Syrian and Arabian deserts, who have gone 439
to the great towns of the Syrian interior to sell their products and supply their needs. In the economic as in every other sphere of life, the Arab hinterland has given a special colour to Syrian life.

Trade has tended to follow a limited number of routes, 439
which have not varied much in principle from one generation 487
to another. For the trade with Egypt there was the great route which went along the coast of Palestine by way of Gaza. For that with western Arabia, the route ran on the east of the Dead Sea by way of Maan or Petra, in what is now Transjordan ; this was also the path taken by the Pilgrims' caravan which went yearly from Damascus to Mecca. The caravans for central Arabia went down the Wadi Sirhan to the oases of Nejd. In the other direction, routes went north-west from northern Syria through Cilicia into Asia Minor, and north-east through Urfa, Diarbekr and Mosul into Kurdistan, Persia and central Asia. Among the most important routes were those which linked the Mediterranean with India and farther Asia. There were a number of alternative routes. Goods might come by sea to southern Arabia, then by land up the western Arabian route to Damascus or some other centre. They might go up the Persian Gulf, and be landed at or near what is now Basra. From Basra several possibilities lay open : the caravans might make for Aleppo or its equivalent in north Syria, or for Damascus, Homs, or some other town in the centre. If they chose the former route, they could go on the west of the Euphrates and then across the Little Desert ; or else up the Tigris to Baghdad or even Mosul, then across Mesopotamia to the Euphrates and on as before. If their destination was Damascus, at first they would take a similar path to that of the Aleppo caravan, and then skirt the southern edge of the Little Desert and pass through Palmyra to the great towns of central Syria. Once arrived in the towns of the Syrian interior, the goods would be carried down to the coast and shipped to the West : in northern Syria they would go by way of Latakia or the Gulf of Alexandretta ; in central Syria by way of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon or Tyre.

Not all these routes were in full use at the same time. The noon of one was often the twilight of others. Their rise and decline was determined largely by political conditions both in Syria and in the neighbouring countries ; but except in times

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

T U R K
HATAY
A L E P P O
E U P H
HAMA
LATAKIA
H O M S
D A M A S C U S
HAURAN
JEBEL DRUZE
TRANSJORDA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
PALESTINE

END MAP (A)

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946

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END MAP (B)

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494 rail facilities on the principal routes along which commodities had to be moved in growing volume, such as from the Jezireh to Aleppo and Latakia. Unquestionably, also, transport over poor roads has been costly, entailing heavy depreciation and not infrequent interruptions of traffic.

II PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES

487 489 For an understanding of the transport problems confronting Syria it is also necessary to outline the principal routes over which traffic must move. One of the main transport lines is the north-south axis connecting Damascus with Homs, Hama and Aleppo to the north and with the Hauran, Djebel Druze and Jordan to the south. Crossing this axis in a west-easterly direction are three principal communication lines running from the three ports serving Syria—Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon and Latakia in north-western Syria. Of these three ports Tripoli is by far the least important, serving only the region immediately around Homs. Beirut is still an important port of entry for Syrian imports, although the volume handled by Latakia has been rising steadily. Through Latakia, however, goes the bulk of Syria's exports.

The west-east communications lines continue in a generally easterly direction after crossing the north-south axis at Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. Those continuing east of Aleppo and serving the Jezireh and the narrow but fertile irrigated lands of the Euphrates are by far the most important. On the other hand, the road or track running east from Homs through the Syrian desert is of little importance except for serving and patrolling the pipelines conveying oil from Iraq to the port of Banias in Syria and to Tripoli. Of somewhat greater significance is the trans-desert route from Damascus to Baghdad. Although for the most part only a track, it provides an all-weather route over which traffic can move between Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and Iraq and even Iran and Kuwait on the other hand. Over this route the well-known Nairo Transport Company carries on an active international passenger traffic with modern buses and a number of trucking concerns haul high cost products such as fruits and vegetables, machinery and rugs. No special urgency attaches to the improvement of the two routes running eastward from Homs and Damascus, however, and no further consideration will be given to them in this report.

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+39 dom. France is the only country in this group with which Syria has regular surpluses.

Syria's trade balance with Lebanon has always been favorable. Syria's chief exports are cereals, live animals and dairy products, vegetables and fruits, wool and cotton; imports consist largely of products of the Tripoli oil refinery, citrus fruits and bananas.

Syrian exports to Iraq are mainly textiles and soap; sheep, wool and dates are imported. The trade balance is strongly in favor of Syria.

Exports to Jordan include, apart from wheat, textiles and other manufactured goods; imports consist largely of vegetables, fruits, wool and hides.

The trade balance with Saudi Arabia is also favorable; exports are similar to those for Jordan, but imports include only two larger items, petroleum and cattle hides.

Trade with Egypt is more balanced and includes, among exports, apricot paste, dried fruits and onions; rice, asphalt, shoes and films are the main imports.

In contrast to trade with its neighboring Arab countries, Syria has a very unfavorable trade balance with Turkey, from which it imports large quantities of live animals, as well as hides, tobacco leaves and timber. Syria's 1951-52 wheat deficit was covered by imports from Turkey.

Syria's trade with countries of the Soviet bloc is comparatively insignificant. In 1953 imports from Czechoslovakia (which, because of the nature of its trade, has been listed with Western industrial countries), China and Romania amounted to about £S 6.7 million at official rates and about £S 9.9 million at free market rates. Few exports went to these countries.

Trade Routes

+39 +87 Table 17 shows the routes along which Syrian foreign trade moves. It indicates that over 50% of export tonnage goes overseas and that 40-50% of imports arrives through Latakia or through Lebanese ports.

In spite of the rapid increase in the absolute tonnage handled by the port of Latakia, which was favored by government regulations limiting the use of other ports, Lebanese ports were able to hold their own in proportion to total Syrian import tonnage. This is explained by the fact that Beirut is the logical port for imports destined for the important Damascus area, while at the same time exports from northern Syria, which have been increasing considerably, have gone mainly through Latakia.

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The large tonnages shown in overland imports from Lebanon are chiefly due to petroleum products from the Tripoli oil refinery.

TABLE 17 Syria's Trade Routes, 1951–53

(*Thousand metric tons*)

	1951	%	1952	%	1953	%
Overseas through						
Latakia						
export	90	43	265	54	353	49
import	163	23	167	21	176	23
Beirut and Tripoli						
export	24	11	30	6	38	5
import	170	23	210	26	205	26
Overland to and from						
Lebanon						
export	64	30	161	33	249	35
import	306	42	332	41	323	42
Jordan						
export	25	12	29	6	69	10
import	14	2	25	3	30	4
Iraq						
export	5	2	5	1	7	1
import	46	6	37	5	25	3
Turkey						
export	4	2	1	—	2	—
import	28	4	34	4	13	2
Total						
exports	212	100	491	100	718	100
imports	727	100	805	100	773	100

SOURCE: Calculated by Syrian government officials.

II TRANSIT TRADE

During various periods in its long history, Syria has played a prominent part both as a transit country and as a country of middlemen in East-West trade. Within the present pattern of world trade and trade routes Syria again has a role to play as a country of transit and perhaps entrepot trade. It has a natural advantage in its location across the shortest route between

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439 the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard and on the one hand, Iraq, on the
487 other, Jordan, given the boycott of Israel.

In neither of these trade routes has Syria a monopoly. Iraq, which at present is moving about 100,000 tons of goods through northern Syria by way of the Northern Railway and unspecified quantities of goods through the desert road and Damascus, has the choice of directing these commodities to Turkish, Syrian or Lebanese port terminals. If transport to the Mediterranean ports should prove too expensive or cumbersome, Basra (Iraq) will be used even for the northern provinces of Iraq. Jordan can shift more of its trade to Aqaba and there are indications that this may happen.

In these circumstances, it is clearly in the interests of Syria to make transit through Syria attractive and profitable; it would be ill advised to sacrifice the long-term interest in transit trade to doubtful immediate gains. From that standpoint, it seems rather short-sighted to require that most goods to and from Jordan be moved by rail, irrespective of the wishes and interests of the shippers, and that goods moved from Beirut to Iraq across the desert must first be reloaded into Syrian trucks.[1] It is also inconsistent with the efforts to develop free trade zones in Syria and to encourage the use of Latakia for transit.

III FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES

439
651 *Licensing*
652

Exports. The government may impose restrictions on the exports of specific goods, including a license requirement. As of the beginning of 1954 exports of some 30 items in the tariff schedule, including various types of metals, glycerine, sulphur, fertilizers, jute cloth and sacks, and lambs, were prohibited, and the country's most important exports, (wheat, barley, flour, cotton and cottonseed, wool, sheep and certain types of cattle) were subject to license. Trade with Israel is prohibited.

These export restrictions were instituted for various reasons—to safeguard domestic supplies and to control the re-export of imported items, particularly those of strategic importance. Other regulations are designed

[1] The total volume of Syria's transit trade is presently estimated at 300,000–400,000 tons annually.

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GENERAL

SYRIA AND HER HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

488 175 By geographical position Syria is a corridor and a meeting-place. From east to west and north to south, it is traversed by two natural highways, one winding through the valleys of the Euphrates and Orontes to link the East with the Mediterranean world, and the other carrying the northern peoples southwards to Africa. Through the ages the country has been occupied for short or long periods by Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders and Ottomans. In Syria—at Kadesh and the Yarmuk—some of the great clashes in history have taken place. Today, with her fate in her own hands, Syria's past provides the varied and fertile sources of her culture, and her present, the vigour necessary for the remarkable progress she is now making.

172 Syria's wealth of historical remains is the visible embodiment of her age-long history and, from that point of view, is to be considered as a national heritage. It has a lesson to give the present generation, for such tangible evidence of their country's greatness in the past is a challenge to the young to prove themselves worthy heirs. For that reason alone, these buildings and monuments deserve to be preserved and maintained. Very often, however, they also have an aesthetic or cultural value, being of importance as works of art or bearing witness to the greatest periods of a civilization. As such, they are of importance beyond the national boundaries and their preservation is a matter of concern not only to the country which possesses them, but to all civilized nations.

For Syria, owing to the vast number and diversity of her historical monuments and the particular conditions in which they are situated, their preservation raises complicated problems. The treatment they require varies according to their present state, for only some of them have remained intact and still serve their original purpose, so that their maintenance is a regular, routine matter. Many of them, on the other hand, are used for a different purpose, never contemplated by their builders, for which they have been more or less satisfactorily adapted

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THE SYRIAN DESERT

311 The Syrian desert is not uniformly barren. There are enormous
361 stretches of steppeland, where life is not impossible, or at least not permanently so. The winter rains, rare though they are, make the pastures green and fill the water-holes. The wandering Bedouins manage to feed their flocks all the year round; and their camps are found here and there in the desert solitudes. In some places indeed, there is sedentary as well as nomadic life; near a well or a spring a group of dwellings may be built, palm trees grow up and crops are cultivated.

The necessary conditions for the transitory development of certain sites, when circumstances are favourable, may thus be found. At certain times in history, irrigation work has been undertaken to assist crop growing and reservoirs have been dug to make permanent settlement possible. Trade has provided means of livelihood for a larger population than the products of the earth would have sufficed to maintain. Military defence requirements have led to the building of forts and castles, and the necessary supplies for those who manned them have had to be found.

489 This accounts for the establishment of the great desert routes,
361 with their chains of halting-places at the only spots where the existence of natural or artificial resources made life possible. The natural route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, via the Euphrates valley to Aleppo and Antioch, was shortened by the short cut across the desert which of necessity passed through Palmyra, either continuing straight to the Homs Gap or turning south towards Damascus and Palestine. Settlements grew up, at each end of the desert route or at oases along it, or again at strategic points such as river crossings or mountain gorges, some places, indeed, fulfilling several of these conditions (e.g. Dura and Palmyra).

PALMYRA

361 Palmyra has a considerable and well-deserved fame, first for its natural beauty—abundant sulphur springs, transparent blue

p. 248

314 variation exists between the living conditions of the more prosperous farmers and of the peasants, many of the latter possessing little beyond the barest necessities.

487 The larger cities, as Damascus and
177 Aleppo, have been important junctions on
342 trade routes from India to the Mediterranean for centuries, and reflect the influence of both Eastern and Western civilizations. They are a combination of the old Arab-type city and the modern, with most of the amenities of urban life. The older sections are usually made up of several quarters, dominated by different racial or religious groups. The houses are constructed of stone, brick or reinforced concrete and stucco, with flat or tiled roofs. In Damascus, about one third of the inhabitants live within the limits of the ancient city and a third in the modern residential developments.

342 The Bedouin follow essentially the same
511 pattern of life in Syria as in other countries of the Near and Middle East. The nomadic tribes dwell in tents made of goats' hair, usually in close association with their livestock. Their standards of living are primitive, both in the tent encampments and the semipastoral settlements.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

312 Water supplies are deficient in many sections of the country, and acute shortages may be experienced during the dry season. In the rural areas, domestic supplies are obtained from deep or shallow wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from rain-water cisterns. *Korazes*, or wells connected by underground conduits which often extend for several miles, and waterholes, dug in the plains or near watercourses, are used
[314] in some districts. The village supplies are frequently polluted and responsible for the spread of intestinal infections.

The water supply of Damascus is taken from an underground reservoir at 'Ain el Fije, which is fed by springs in the Anti-

p. 142(A)

often an agent of the Aleppo merchant who furnishes the capital 438
and has the necessary warehouses in Aleppo and the commercial 441
knowledge and connections in the Syrian market and abroad to dispose of the crop at the best terms.

I. The Problem of Storage and Warehouses

The dependance of Jazirah on Aleppo merchants is such that 438
until the present time there is not a single warehouse or silo to store 241
wheat for a few months in all Jazirah belonging to an individual merchant or big farmer. During harvest season, the wheat is stacked in the open near the railway stations and left without cover until it is shipped to Aleppo. The hangers of the stations can only hold a small part of the crop. The Mira built a few depots but it is not known whether they will be put at the disposal of merchants.

The special conditions of cultivation in Jazirah connected with the problem of credit and land ownership make the transport of wheat from the farms to the stations during harvest season a hectic affair. This is caused by two reasons: in the first place, the farmer is always in need of money and has to ship his crop quickly to Aleppo to sell it, and, secondly, even if the big farmer is not in need of money, he does not feel it is safe to keep his crop in the villages. In most cases, he is only a tenant and it does not pay for him to construct a depot on land, he does not own. Even if he owned the land, he would hesitate to keep his crop away from the market until the winter months when he might need money but might find himself unable to transport his crop because of bad roads.

The logical solution would be to construct warehouses in the towns or near the stations, but, here again, the lack of capital prevents the accomplishment of this job.

The Kurd is the only farmer who keeps a part of his crop on the 241
land. As a good and thrifty peasant, he stores his seeds, the pro- 251
visions for his family and usually an amount of wheat equal to the seeds he planted. If anything remains, he sells to buy clothes and foodstuffs. The Kurd keeps the extra wheat he has in holes dug in the ground called "jifr". The hole is usually two meters in diameter and 2-3 meters deep. It is lined with "tibn" to keep the moisture away and the wheat remains in a good condition in it for several months. The peasant has a number of these jifrs depending on the

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Marketing

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The mission now comes to a consideration of the last but by no means the least important agricultural problem, marketing. This subject has many aspects, including transport, storage and grading, quality control and price stabilization. Improved marketing practices can yield the producer better prices and the consumers a higher quality product.

Elsewhere the mission discusses the vital factor of transport, and it has already commented on the role cooperatives could play in the local marketing of agricultural products. Here the mission wishes in the first instance to focus on the great importance of better facilities for the storage, cleaning and fumigating of grain. The lack of these facilities and the consequences for Syria have already been emphasized. The mission found a widespread recognition of their need in Syria, except perhaps among the merchants, who naturally feel that public grain storage and the extension of credit on the basis of warehouse receipts will weaken their control of the market. The mission considers it imperative, however, that Syria proceed with a grain storage program in order to strengthen the farmers and to maintain Syria's position in an increasingly competitive world grain market.

It is estimated that in the next decade some 760,000 tons of grain, principally wheat and barley, will enter commercial channels annually, and that this volume will be distributed among the producing regions approximately as follows: Jezireh, 400,000 tons; Euphrates, 95,000; Aleppo, 95,000; Hauran, 60,000; Homs-Hama, 50,000.

The mission recommends that total storage capacity of about 230,000 tons be established by 1960 at an estimated cost of £S 21 million. In the grain port of Latakia a transit silo with a capacity of 20,000-40,000 tons should be built. In Aleppo new facilities with a capacity of 60,000 tons are needed to supplement existing warehouse space, serve the surrounding grain-producing areas and operate as a reservoir for the rapid replenishment of the Latakia silo. For the Jezireh the mission suggests storage capacity of about 150,000 tons. The Latakia and Aleppo facilities should be mechanized and furnished with cleaning and fumigating equipment. In the Jezireh, however, the mission suggests that provisionally only about a fifth be mechanized. The storage there would consist simply of covered sheds which could be economically built.

The Latakia and Aleppo storage will enable Syria to export clean grain,

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free of infestation, which will better be able to withstand competition on the world market and fetch higher prices. The Jezireh storage will make it unnecessary for farmers to dump their grain on the market immediately after the harvest, enable them to obtain credit on easier terms, and lower the cost of transport. All the facilities together will significantly reduce the substantial losses resulting at present from exposure to weather, infestation and rodents. The mission's estimate of the direct advantages resulting from the reduction of losses and the improvement in prices leads it to conclude that farmers and merchants would have ample incentive to utilize the storage facilities, even after taking into account the storage charges they would have to pay on the basis of operating costs and amortization.

We believe that the storage facilities, even when they have to be built by the government, should be operated by qualified private management under a long-term lease which would specify the maximum permissible storage charges. Farmers and merchants are unlikely to use facilities operated by the government itself.

Measures to improve the marketing of certain other products should also be taken. Large quantities of raw milk are now marketed in major cities without adequate quality control or veterinary inspection of dairy cattle. The UNICEF, concerned over milk supply for children, has apparently offered to provide equipment and assistance for the installation of a pasteurization plant in Damascus, and the mission urges that this project be carried out as promptly as possible. A similiar plant may be feasible for Aleppo. It is important that some control be established also over the source of supply. Periodic tuberculin and blood agglutination tests for the diagnosis of tuberculosis and brucellosis in dairy animals might, for example, be initiated. In Aleppo, where many dairy cows are kept in the city under unsanitary conditions which produce a high incidence of tuberculosis, the removal of dairy cattle to locations outside the city is strongly recommended.

Improvements in public abattoirs would also bring about better prices for producers and provide a better quality meat for the consumer. Existing abattoirs are for the most part old, unhygienic and possess no means for salvaging many of the valuable by-products of slaughtering which could be used for the manufacture of fertilizers, chemicals and drugs. While complete renovation is not feasible in the immediate future, the mission suggests that a start be made by erecting a modern abattoir in Damascus at an estimated cost of £S 600,000.

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444 capacity significantly, the restrictive policy may have contributed to higher trucking charges. Recently there has been some relaxation of the restrictions. The mission concedes that in principle it might be desirable to regulate the number of trucks in order to prevent excessive investment in road transport. The government, however, has little knowledge about the adequacy of the number of trucks to guide it in applying such a regulation, and it would be better to achieve the objective indirectly by charging a high fee for new truck licenses, as is done in the case of tank trucks.

III PORTS

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One of the most important transport projects undertaken by the Syrian government in recent years is the construction of the port of Latakia. This is Syria's only real port other than Banias, which handles just the oil coming in over the pipeline from the oilfields in northern Iraq. The decision to create a port at Latakia was formally taken early in 1950 when a company, capitalized at £S 24 million, was formed to establish and operate the port. Nearly all of the capital has been furnished by the government; private capital has subscribed only 10%, despite a government guarantee of a 5% dividend.

Natural conditions at Latakia, as indeed along most of the eastern Mediterranean coast, are not particularly favorable to a port. There is no natural harbor and heavy winds from January to March impede port operations. For this reason, the principal feature of the port program is the construction of a breakwater and the deepening of the basin behind it. Other features call for the construction of quays and warehouses with a capacity of 15,000 cubic meters and the installation of cargo-handling equipment. Work on the breakwater and quays is proceeding and plans for the equipment of the port are being perfected. The breakwater and quays should be finished in 1956 and the remainder of the work in the following year. To complete these plans will probably entail a further outlay [448] of £S 38 million over the coming years. Plans at this stage do not provide for the building of a grain silo. The mission's sole recommendation is that this omission be remedied, since in our opinion the installation of mechanized grain handling equipment is imperative in a port where the bulk of the traffic consists of cereals.

Meanwhile, as previously indicated, the volume of cargo handled by

185 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i.e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 489 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

III The Baghdad Railway

The Baghdad Railway which runs 247 kilometers in Syria is the principal means of transport for goods. It handles about 200,000 tons of goods every year. The bulk of Jazirah wheat is transported over it. But it has had in recent years keen competition from trucks in spite of the bad roads for several reasons. The Qamishli-Aleppo line passes for 70% of its length through Turkish territory and is under Turkish control. When the Turks choose to irritate the Syrians they restrict the entrance to the stations and in numerous other ways frustrate the Syrians and cause them hardship. Whole trains are unaccountably delayed for days in the Turkish stations. 496 648

Already passenger traffic is handled almost entirely by planes, cars and busses, except in winter months when the roads are unsafe. A bus charges LS 10 from Qamishli to Aleppo and makes the trip in 12 hours. A small car charges LS 20 and makes the trip in 8 hours. It takes the "Express" 20-22 hours to reach Aleppo from Qamishli and the fare is LS 30 in second-class "wagon lit" with tips. 484

For merchandise the train rate is LS 23.5 per ton from Qamishli to Aleppo. It costs the farmer an additional LS 6-12 depending on the distance to transport a ton of wheat from the field to the station. There is also an amount of about LS 4 involved in handling, all of which makes the actual rate by train about LS 35. 489

The truck charges LS 35 from Qamishli to Aleppo during the wheat season but it carries the wheat directly from the combine in the field to the merchant's store in Aleppo thus reducing the handling expenses to a minimum and transporting the goods in the shortest time. If the farmer is not hard pressed for money, which is rather rare, and can wait until the winter months and spring, he can transport his wheat for a rate as low as LS 10-15 per ton by truck. Inversely, the cost of tranport from Aleppo to Jazirah rises in winter and spring and decreases in summer and autumn.

Though truck transport is more advantageous in many ways than transport by train, the number of trucks available and the condition of the roads make the transport of a whole crop by trucks impossible. To achieve that, a complete road network needs to be constructed, diesel trucks would have to be imported and the discriminatory tariffs against them abolished.

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

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457 the end of 1953, even though Syria paid off during these years all but £ 10.2 million of a £S 44.6 million debt to Lebanon and repaid $1,454,123 to the International Monetary Fund.

Transport

489 The transport system which carries the country's commerce reveals many deficiencies. Although Syria is served by three railways, all were built before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and therefore do not adequately serve the needs of an independent Syria. The gauges are not uniform, and there is no direct rail connection between Damascus and Aleppo. The port of Latakia, which handles most of Syria's overseas trade, is served only by roads. The railways in 1953 actually carried slightly less cargo than before the war. All of the substantial increase in traffic since the prewar period has been absorbed by motor transport. The number of all types of motor vehicles rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953, and the number of trucks from 873 to 4,742. Even such bulky commodities as cereals are now transported mostly by road. Yet the road system is also far from adequate and transport costs are very high.

504 Aside from Banias, which ships only oil transmitted by pipeline from Iraq, Syria has only one major port, Latakia. The volume of traffic at this port, which is still in process of development, has grown rapidly and amounted in 1953 to 90% of the overseas export and 46% of the overseas import trade of the country. The Lebanese ports of Beirut and Tripoli accounted for the balance. In the same year, however, almost half of the total volume of Syria's foreign trade went overland, principally to and from Lebanon.

Money and Credit

652 457 The monetary and banking system of Syria is still in the process of development. Although a new monetary statute enacted March 28, 1953 envisages the establishment of a government central bank within a few years, the note-issuing function meanwhile remains with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL) which first received the right to issue currency during the French mandatory regime. Gold and foreign exchange in the monetary cover is bought through the intermediary of the Exchange Office, an autonomous government agency established in April 1952. This

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CHAPTER 6 *TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS*

It is generally recognized that the development of transport and communications is one of the most urgent needs of Syria. Transport facilities have not kept pace with the expansion of production and particularly with shifts in the geographic pattern of agricultural output. Transport is generally costly and subject to interruption, and needs to be made cheaper and more dependable. The railways were all constructed before Syria became independent and are ill-adapted to serve the national economy. The roads are in part badly maintained, and the great majority are dirt roads or tracks, which in the rainy season can be used only with difficulty or not at all. The northeastern part of Syria, particularly the Jezireh, is most poorly provided with roads despite the fact that it has become the country's principal granary and source of exportable cereals. Domestic civil aviation is in its infancy, although Syria is rather well served by international airlines. With respect to telecommunications the country is in a better position. The telephone network has been considerably expanded and, although it has not kept up with the developing needs of certain rapidly growing commercial centers, a program to remedy the principal deficiencies is well in hand.

The transport and communications system must, of course, be developed primarily to facilitate the country's internal and external commerce. Syria, however, also serves as a transit country. In the past, before the opening of the Suez canal, its transit trade was undoubtedly much more important. In Syria, the goods of the East met those coming from Europe. A number of the principal cities, such as Aleppo and Damascus, owe to this trade their early commercial importance. They were the terminal points of the camel caravans from the East and the places where goods were transshipped to donkeys and mules to start the arduous trip across the mountain ranges to the Mediterranean. Even now, Syria has not wholly lost its importance as an avenue of international traffic. The Northern Railway carries traffic for both Turkey and Iraq, and the trans-Syrian desert road from Damascus conveys a considerable number of passengers and

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489 modest quantities of goods between Beirut and Baghdad. Above all, most of the foreign trade of Jordan flows through Syria to and from Beirut.

1 EXISTING TRANSPORT FACILITIES

A brief inventory of the principal transport facilities is an essential preliminary to a discussion of the problems and methods of coping with them.

496 *The Railways*[20]

Three railways operate in Syria—the Northern Railway, the Hedjaz Railway and the DHP (Chemin de Fer Damas, Hama et Prolongements).

The Northern Railway is the Syrian section of that international railway which achieved fame as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Coming from Baghdad and Mosul in Iraq, it traverses a portion of northeastern Syria from Tell Kotchek to Kamichliye, then enters Turkey, proceeding just along the boundary until it turns south to Aleppo and finally once again north to Turkey where one branch runs to the port of Iskenderun and the [665] other to Istanbul. The Syrian sections are owned by the government and managed by a Director of Railways and Council Administration under the Ministry of Public Works. Out of approximately 400,000 tons of cargo carried in 1952, the Northern Railway transported about 101,000 tons for Iraq, mostly in transit, and some 106,000 tons, principally grain and coal, in transit for Turkey. Although the traffic is modest, the development of agricultural production in the Syrian Jezireh and the adjoining portions of Turkey have been instrumental in raising it from about 22 million ton-kilometers in 1938 to 55 million in 1953.

The Northern Railway links at Aleppo with the DHP, operated by a private French company under an 1893 concession and serving both Syria and Lebanon. The DHP system consists of both narrow- and standard-gauge lines. The most important standard-gauge line runs from Aleppo via Hama and Homs to the Lebanese port of Tripoli and thence along the Lebanese coast. Aside from agricultural commodities produced in the Homs-Hama region, it carries the bulk of transit traffic to and from Iraq coming over the Northern Railway. It also carries Syrian cereals and

[20] See Annex H, p. 425.

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494 rail facilities on the principal routes along which commodities had to be moved in growing volume, such as from the Jezireh to Aleppo and Latakia. Unquestionably, also, transport over poor roads has been costly, entailing heavy depreciation and not infrequent interruptions of traffic.

II PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES

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For an understanding of the transport problems confronting Syria it is also necessary to outline the principal routes over which traffic must move. One of the main transport lines is the north-south axis connecting Damascus with Homs, Hama and Aleppo to the north and with the Hauran, Djebel Druze and Jordan to the south. Crossing this axis in a west-easterly direction are three principal communication lines running from the three ports serving Syria—Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon and Latakia in northwestern Syria. Of these three ports Tripoli is by far the least important, serving only the region immediately around Homs. Beirut is still an important port of entry for Syrian imports, although the volume handled by Latakia has been rising steadily. Through Latakia, however, goes the bulk of Syria's exports.

The west-east communications lines continue in a generally easterly direction after crossing the north-south axis at Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. Those continuing east of Aleppo and serving the Jezireh and the narrow but fertile irrigated lands of the Euphrates are by far the most important. On the other hand, the road or track running east from Homs through the Syrian desert is of little importance except for serving and patrolling the pipelines conveying oil from Iraq to the port of Banias in Syria and to Tripoli. Of somewhat greater significance is the trans-desert route from Damascus to Baghdad. Although for the most part only a track, it provides an all-weather route over which traffic can move between Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and Iraq and even Iran and Kuwait on the other hand. Over this route the well-known Nairo Transport Company carries on an active international passenger traffic with modern buses and a number of trucking concerns haul high cost products such as fruits and vegetables, machinery and rugs. No special urgency attaches to the improvement of the two routes running eastward from Homs and Damascus, however, and no further consideration will be given to them in this report.

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The First Priority: Latakia-Aleppo-Jezireh

The most urgent transport problem centers around the improvement of communications between Latakia and Aleppo and the Jezireh. The rapid development of northern and particularly northeastern Syria has made the east-west communication lines across this part of the country by far the most important arteries for the movement of bulk commodities. The Jezireh produces most of Syria's wheat export surplus, and the Jezireh, the Euphrates valley, and the Aleppo-Hama-Homs region contribute together nearly all of the country's barley exports. The same areas produce virtually all Syria's cotton, which has attained considerable volume over the last four years. Finally, northern Syria is to some extent, and can become even more, a transit zone between the Mediterranean and Iraq.

Some indication of the importance of the communications lines across northern Syria is given by the volume of goods handled in Latakia. Export traffic through this port rose from 13,700 tons in 1947 to 353,396 tons in 1953; in 1954 it was 630,720 tons. Of the 1953 tonnage, 62% consisted of wheat and barley and 21% of cotton, cottonseeds and cotton meal. The volume of imports has also grown rapidly—from 5,200 tons in 1947 to 176,364 tons in 1953 and to 208,343 tons in 1954.

From the east, principally the Jezireh, the volume of transport is even greater, approximating probably 500,000 tons annually in recent years. In the reverse direction, however, freight movement is much more modest—apparently less than 50,000 tons.

Transport conditions over these vital arteries are far from satisfactory. Latakia and Aleppo are linked by a metalled road over the Alaouit mountains which is much too narrow for the rapidly increasing truck traffic and is occasionally blocked by landslides. The road surface is not adapted to heavy truck traffic and is poorly maintained in many sections. From Aleppo an asphalt road runs eastward to Raqqa on the Euphrates river and continues down the river valley to Deir ez Zor, where it turns into a track leading to Abou Kemal on the Iraqi frontier. From Deir ez Zor there is a road north to Kamichliye via Hassetche, but the surface is for the most part so bad that traffic moves along parallel tracks. The truck route from the Jezireh does not, however, go through Deir ez Zor, but runs more directly from Km. 47 on the Hassetche-Deir ez Zor road along a cross-country track to Raqqa. The feeders to these main routes are also tracks which become impassable during the rainy season.

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As already indicated, the Jezireh is also served by the international railway which criss-crosses the frontier. It is difficult to use because the three railway administrations controlling it do not cooperate effectively, and crucial seasonal shortages of freight cars often hold up grain movements. By and large the railway assists only in the transport of commodities produced in a narrow belt along the frontier. While the railway annually transports between 150,000 and 200,000 tons of the Jezireh's agricultural output, much more moves by road.

The cost of transport across northern Syria is very burdensome and motor transport rates are subject to sharp seasonal fluctuations. In part, of course, this is caused by the unavoidably seasonal nature of the agricultural products traffic and the lack of adequate return cargo to the Jezireh. The very fact, however, that the Jezireh roads are impassable during much of the winter rainy season greatly accentuates the seasonal movement and necessitates a larger investment in trucks. Under such circumstances truck operators charge what the traffic will bear. During the harvest season it costs £S 40-50 per ton to transport grain from Kamichliye or Hassetche to Aleppo and about £S 25-30 from Ras el Ain to Aleppo. During the "dead season," such as the spring, following the rainy season, these rates are almost halved. The high rates are caused in part, of course, by the heavy maintenance and depreciation charges for trucks. On the railway the freight rate for grain from the Jezireh to Aleppo is the same the year around, about £S 25 per ton.

During most of the postwar period agricultural prices have been high, providing sufficient incentive to an expansion of production in areas remote from the port despite high transport costs. With the marked decline in prices during the last few years, however, the burden on the producers has become progressively more severe. Since transport and handling charges remained the same, they received a smaller proportion of the falling export price at the port. In 1953 transport charges of £S 50-60 per ton from the Jezireh to Latakia represented about a third of the f.o.b. export price of barley and somewhat more than a fifth of that of wheat. At the same time transport adds to the cost of production. Thus in the Jezireh gas oil for tractors and irrigation pumps is about 75-100% more expensive than at Homs and gasoline for harvesting combines is 20-25% higher.

The mission has given much thought to the question of how the transport problem in the north of Syria might most effectively be solved. Since the construction of a railway linking the Jezireh with Aleppo and Latakia

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has many proponents and a number of railway projects have been proposed in the past, we carefully considered the advisability of a railway line.[29] Railroads between Aleppo and Latakia on the one hand and Aleppo and the Jezireh on the other hand have generally been independently projected, but the mission believes one should not in the long run be contemplated without the other, for otherwise the maximum advantage of a through line to the port, avoiding costly transshipment at Aleppo, would not be realized.

The volume of traffic moving between the Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia appears to make a railway economically attractive. In the westerly direction toward Aleppo there is an actual or potential flow of around 700,000 tons per year, if Iraqi transit trade is included, and from Aleppo to Latakia probably about 500,000 tons. In the reverse direction the volume might be 150,000 and 250,000 tons respectively. Of course, by no means all of this traffic would necessarily be captured by a new railway line. Some would continue to be carried by the existing railway, and some, particularly the higher cost "import cargo" and the "export cargo" originating at points more or less remote from the railway, would no doubt still be transported by truck. A new railway might count on carrying perhaps two-thirds of the available cargo. On this assumption the traffic handled by a new Jezireh railway, linked with the Iraqi railway at, say, Tell Kotchek, might well be somewhat over 400 million ton-kilometers per year, or about three times as much as the traffic on all railways in Syria during 1935.

The construction of a railway, however, requires a heavy capital investment. To build and equip a railway from Aleppo to Latakia over difficult terrain would probably cost about £S 80 million, and a line from Aleppo to Tell Kotchek might cost approximately £S 90 million, a total of about £S 170 million. On the other hand, the cost of improving and partially realigning the Aleppo-Latakia highway is estimated at £S 7.4 million; a proper road network linking the Jezireh with Aleppo would cost, according to Syrian government estimates, about £S 50 million (including £S 3.4 million for widening the existing Aleppo-Raqqa road); and an investment of £S 40 million would be required to handle by truck the volume of traffic indicated for the railway. Thus the investment in a railway would be about £S 73 million more than would be required for

[29] See Annex H, p. 430.

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489 corresponding road facilities. Actually, the difference is likely to be greater, for the need to build feeder roads to the railway and to improve the trunk highways would probably make a considerable investment in roads necessary in any event. However, investment in road vehicles which would be required to handle the rail traffic would be saved. Thus the additional investment entailed by the construction of a railway might be in the neighborhood of £S 100 to 110 million.

In terms of depreciation, maintenance and fuel, railway transport would cost the economy substantially less than road transport. On the basis of the anticipated traffic volume, the mission has estimated the annual savings in cost at between £S 15 million and £S 20 million. The additional investment of £S 100 million to £S 110 million might therefore be said to contribute between £S 15 million and £S 20 million to national income annually. A railway could no doubt reduce transport charges below existing levels and still earn some return on the investment.

Nevertheless, the mission is strongly convinced that it would be unwise to undertake the construction of a railway within the next five or six years. Our principal reason is that the government could find the necessary capital only at the expense of other needed investments likely to make a greater contribution to national income. We have sought in this report to recommend a balanced development program within the limits of the financial resources available. If provision is to be made for the construction of a railway, it would be necessary to curtail drastically proposed outlays in other fields of development. For instance, it would probably be necessary to eliminate a considerable amount of the irrigation program we have proposed. The substitution of a railway project for irrigation works could only result in a loss to the Syrian economy. The mission estimates that, on the average, irrigation projects would make almost twice as large a direct contribution to national income as would the proposed railway. Moreover, an increase in primary production through irrigation and reclamation is likely to bring about a larger indirect expansion in national income, particularly in the commercial and transport sectors. A secondary reason for the mission's view is that private enterprise is willing to undertake the necessary investment in road transport, other than for the roads themselves, whereas the government would have to shoulder the entire burden of a railway investment. In a country where it is very difficult for the government to mobilize private capital for the financing of public investments, this is an important consideration. If and when it becomes easier

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to do so, and alternative investment opportunities become less attractive, the question of building a railway might well be reviewed.

The mission would be more favorably disposed to a railway if there were no alternative means of reducing the present high transport rates between the Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia. However, the building of good, all-weather roads, supplemented by the construction of grain storage facilities in the Jezireh, should make it possible to lower transport charges significantly by reducing truck maintenance and depreciation costs and somewhat diminishing seasonal transport peaks. The mission recommends, therefore, that the government undertake this task as a matter of high priority.

To this end the following program should be carried out within the next five or six years:

1. *Improvement and partial realignment of the Aleppo-Latakia road.* The improvement and widening of this road is imperative, and since topographic conditions make widening of certain sections impossible, an entirely new road must be built in part. A new road, for example, will be necessary for a distance of some 30 kilometers west of Jisr ech Choghour. Improvement of the section south of Idlib and crossing the Djebel Zâouiye would also be extremely difficult. The mission recommends strongly that this stretch be replaced by a north-south road running through the Roudj. Such a road would not only avoid most of the mountainous terrain but would simultaneously serve the new agricultural district of the Roudj. The cost of the entire project, including the new road construction, is tentatively estimated at £S 7.37 million.

2. *Improvement and widening of the Aleppo-Raqqa road.* This road, 190 kilometers long and part of the trunk highway to the Jezireh, has an asphalt surface only four to five meters wide. In line with recent proposals made by the Syrian government, the mission suggests its widening to six meters, with a two-meter berth on each side. The government has estimated the cost at £S 3.38 million.

3. *Construction of a new road connecting Raqqa with Kamichliye, via Kantari, Tell Tamer and Tloul Mohammed, and continuing from Kamichliye, via Demir Kapu and Deirik, to Ain Divar on the Syrian-Turkish frontier* (total length: 362 km). Unlike earlier proposals, the road we recommend would not follow the present truck route between Raqqa and Km. 47 on the Hassetche-Deir ez Zor road, but would run north of the Djebel Aabd el Aaziz. In this way it would tap a much larger agricultural

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region, including the dry-farming area south of Ras el Ain and the irrigated area in the Khabour river valley. It would be advisable to start the construction of the Kamichliye-Ain Divar section first, because this rich agricultural region of heavy rainfall is now the most inaccessible part of the Jezireh. To feed the trunk highway the mission also recommends the construction of the following roads: (1) Ras el Ain-Hassetche, crossing the main highway at or near Tell Tamer (73 km); (2) Hassetche-Tloul Mohammed (60 km), thus linking the provincial capital with Kamichliye, the region's commercial center; (3) Derbassiye-main road (30 km); (4) Demir Kapu-Tell Kotchek (30 km); and (5) much farther to the west, Tell Abiad-Kantari (46 km). The first two are considered the more important. In general this proposed road network conforms to the most recently expressed views of the Syrian government, which has tentatively estimated the cost, pending engineering surveys, at about £S 46 million.

North-South Communications

We turn now to a consideration of the other principal transport routes. With respect to the north-south transport axis, improvement of communications between Aleppo and Damascus is most important. A direct standard-gauge railway link between these cities has often been proposed, either by the laying of an additional rail on the narrow-gauge line from Damascus to the junction with the standard-gauge line at Rayak in Lebanon or by the building of a new railway from Damascus to Homs, where it would connect with the DHP line to Aleppo. The mission is convinced, however, that the volume of bulk goods suitable for rail transport moving between Aleppo and Damascus is far too small to justify the large investment required, at least £S 18 million for the former and £S 36 million for the latter project. The solution is rather to improve and widen the Aleppo-Damascus road. The section between Hama and Aleppo urgently demands improvement, and the entire road should be widened by at least one meter to permit easier flow of two-way vehicular traffic. The cost of widening would probably be about £S 10,000 per kilometer or a total of about £S 4 million.

The transport route south from Damascus to Dera'a and the Jordanian frontier is served both by road and the Hedjaz Railway. The problems of the latter have already been discussed. The road, although not as well

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travelled as the one to Aleppo, is still important for the transport of Syrian agricultural products and petroleum products destined for Jordan. The very bad section between Cheikh Meskine and Dera'a requires early attention, and the entire road should be widened by one meter after the completion of the Damascus-Aleppo road project. The mission estimates the total cost involved at £S 1.3 million.

Other Road Projects

Together with the Latakia-Aleppo-Jezireh road, the route between Damascus and Beirut is the most important to the Syrian economy. In fact the traffic on the Beirut-Damascus road is denser and steadier than that on the Latakia-Aleppo road. An urgent program to improve the surface of this road should be undertaken by the two countries concerned. For the improvement of the 35-kilometer section in Syrian territory, the mission anticipates that £S 1.05 million will need to be spent. It can be expected, however, that before many years more thorough-going measures will be necessary to accommodate the constantly growing traffic. To meet this longer-term need, proposals have been made to build a new road paralleling the old one and to construct a long tunnel at Hamana to bypass the most dangerous section across the Lebanon range, where traffic is often held up by fog and snow. The total cost has been estimated at £S 29 million, presumably to be shared by Syria and Lebanon. Parallel highways would certainly permit a great increase in traffic and would considerably reduce the prevailing high accident rate, by making possible the accommodation of slow-moving truck traffic and high-speed vehicular traffic on separate roads. Since the problem is not immediately urgent and the best solution remains to be worked out in detail, the mission considers it unnecessary to make specific proposals. It suggests, instead, that over the next five years the two governments jointly finance an engineering survey of the problem in order to prepare definite plans; an expenditure of £S 100,000 by each government should suffice.

The third most important transversal connection with the Mediterranean is that between Homs and Tripoli, served both by the DHP railway and by road. The road is of some importance, but several sections are in bad condition, particularly the 10-15 kilometer section just west of Homs and a shorter section passing through Lebanon before coming to Tell Kalakh. Improvement of this road, however, can probably be handled

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489 within the framework of the maintenance program proposed below. It is
491 important that the Syrian and Lebanese governments come to an agree-
499 ment on better maintenance of the section before Tell Kalakh.

Aside from the trunk highways discussed above, the mission has considered certain special road projects, including two which would provide better links between Homs and Hama on the one hand and the Syrian coast and Latakia on the other. Fundamental improvement of the road from Hama to Banias whence a road runs north to Latakia has sometimes been proposed. The mission believes a more economical solution would be to build a link between Hama and the main north-south road running through the Ghab for which provision has already been made in the Ghab project. The Ghab road would in turn connect with the Aleppo-Latakia highway. We have accordingly included £S 1.5 million for the building of this link in the program recommended for the next five or six years. Homs is now linked with the Syrian coast by a poor and rather circuitous road which branches off from the Homs-Tripoli highway at Tell Kalakh and passes through difficult terrain. It has been proposed, instead, to construct a shortcut between Akkari and Hamidiye which would connect with the coastal highway to Latakia and would cost about £S 1.8 million. In the mission's opinion, however, construction of this road is not very urgent, particularly since the Homs area is fairly well served by the port of Tripoli. The mission suggests, therefore, that it be built only toward the end of the program if funds are available.

Elsewhere the mission has pointed to the potential importance of the tourist trade. In order to stimulate this trade some of Syria's principal historical monuments such as the Krak des Chevaliers, the ruins of Saint Simeon, etc., should be made more accessible by road. The mission accordingly suggests that £S 1.5 million be allocated to construct such roads.

Road Maintenance[30]

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The construction of new roads will be of little avail if they are allowed to deteriorate quickly. By and large maintenance has been poor in the past, although apparently not because of inadequate appropriations. Over the five-year period 1949-1953 an average of £S 3.3 million annually was allocated for maintenance; in 1954 £S 5.8 million was so allocated. The

[30] See Annex H, p. 439.

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tence to appraise this program. In view of the many other claims on public funds, however, it suggests that the program be reviewed to reduce the target expenditures to about £S 10 million. In this review the highest priority might be given to the expansion of the telephone network in cities which are experiencing a rapid growth such as Kamichliye, Aleppo and Latakia, and to the improvement of interurban connections. The contemplated construction and equipment of a new transmitter for international communications might be given a lower priority.

VII PROPOSED EXPENDITURES

Table 7 provides a projection of government expenditures on transport and communications over the six-year period 1955-1960. This projection takes into account not only the recommendations of the mission but also expenditures, such as those on railways and on road maintenance, which are determined by force of circumstance or the declared intentions of the Syrian government. The heavy increase in expenditures proposed reflects in major part the need to overcome the lag in transport facilities which handicaps the Syrian economy today.

TABLE 7 Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Roads (total)	5,078	5,380	9,278	17,125	102,750
Construction and improvement (total)				11,008	66,050
Latakia-Aleppo				1,228	7,370
Aleppo-Raqqa				580	3,480
Raqqa-Jezireh				7,625	45,750
Hama-Ghab				250	1,500
Aleppo-Damascus				667	4,000
Damascus-Dera'a				217	1,300

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TABLE 7 Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Continued from page 147)

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Damascus-Beirut				192	1,150
Tourist roads				[a]	[a]
Maintenance	3,233	3,600	5,800	6,117	36,700
Latakia port	373	500	10,000[c]	6,333	38,000
Railways (total)	641	750	1,209	2,833	17,000
Subventions	641	750	1,209	2,000	12,000
Purchase of DHP lines				833	5,000
Telecommunications	4,114	2,350[b]	4,700[c]	1,667	10,000
Grand total	10,206	8,980	25,187[c]	28,875	173,250

[a] Included in tourist program.
[b] Actual.
[c] Amounts include authorizations unlikely to be spent and are thus not comparable with preceding years.

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496 mated to cost about £S 36 million and was preferred, but neither project was carried out. There have also been proposals for converting the Hedjaz Railway to standard gauge as far as the border (£S 11 million) and for building an entirely new line south of Damascus at a cost of about £S 34 million.

It is difficult to justify the cost of any of these projects today on the basis of traffic analysis. At present the most important freight movement over the narrow-gauge lines is between Beirut and Jordan, and for this reason the conversion of any part of the system without the rest would only create an obstacle. For pilgrim traffic the same is true, especially in view of current plans to restore the Hedjaz line to Medina. Indeed, the mission feels that when the government acquires the DHP system it may prove more advantageous to turn its narrow-gauge trackage over to the connecting Hedjaz Railway as a natural extension of that line.

Electrification

On a number of occasions it has been asked whether electrification of the Syrian railroads would help to reduce operating losses. The problem has been studied carefully in the case of the DHP narrow-gauge line, both for its entire length and from Beirut to Rayak. Calculations have shown the cost to be prohibitive.

Electrified railways call for expensive installations and high maintenance costs. Under ordinary circumstances economical operation of such lines requires not only cheap power but a dense traffic pattern. Short hauls and frequent schedules with small units (as in metropolitan suburban service) or high-revenue transport on longer hauls are among the favorable factors sought. Perhaps in time these conditions may develop in appropriate Syrian localities. Within the near future, however, it is unlikely that circumstances in any part of Syria will permit railway electrification on an economic basis.

489 D RAILWAY VS. ROAD DEVELOPMENT

Syria's principal transport problem is how to provide the most efficient and economical method for moving the large volume of goods across northern Syria between Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia. Since at present neither the existing railway nor the highway systems can cope with this

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problem satisfactorily, the question is posed whether a new railway should be built or a new highway network constructed. 489

A comparison of the economic advantages of rail and road transport today, in any part of the world, is valid only for a specific situation. Both transport media have their distinctive merits, whose relative significance in a given case may tip the scales one way or the other. Their costs, likewise, depend upon local conditions. Thus in examining this problem with respect to Syria—and more especially to the movement of goods between the Jezireh and Latakia—the mission stresses that its calculations and conclusions are offered for this particular situation and not as a universal answer to the "rail vs. road" question.

For the same reason we do not include an exhaustive review of the classical arguments favoring one mode of transport over the other. While taking these abstract comparisons into account, we feel that they are generally recognized and in any event adequately presented in the current technical literature. Those which are mentioned here are chosen for their special interest to the Syrian problem.

General Considerations

A railroad requires a large capital investment but is characterized by long amortization and low operating costs. The initial cost of a road may be much less, especially if the simpler types of construction are acceptable, but its maintenance is proportionately more expensive. How these figures compare for northern Syria will be examined in later pages.

Apart from costs a railway offers a somewhat better guarantee of year-around transport regardless of seasons or weather conditions. This is partly inherent in its construction, but a contributing factor is that railway maintenance is necessarily more exacting, is less likely to be entrusted to crews lacking technical skill, and must be performed promptly if schedules are to be maintained. In a railway, the same entity has responsibility for scheduled transport and for maintenance-of-way; in trucking these responsibilities are separate. Thus we might conclude that a railway affords greater security in meeting shipping connections if these are critical.

All of this presupposes, of course, a railroad which tries to and does maintain a high record of scheduled performance. Even with an efficient administration there may be strikes and similar interruptions beyond the administration's control. In highway transport these are less likely to

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occur, or if they do they seldom cause complete stoppages, for trucking is carried on by many independent operators, while railway labor, under a single employer, is apt to be tightly organized. By the same token railway labor may enjoy certain social benefits (wage levels, security, medical care, pensions, etc.) which are not so easily provided for independent truckers. This is partly because of organization and partly because a railroad requires less manpower to move a given tonnage. Viewed another way, however, this means less employment in the transport sector.

Rail freight rates are more easily stabilized and controlled, in contrast to the wide seasonal variations in rates now demanded by Syrian truckers. On the other hand the higher free-market truck rates may, on a year-round average, reflect more closely the actual cost of the service. As long as the Syrian railways operate at heavy losses which must be made up in taxes, their lower rates are misleading.

Ability of the government to control the rates of a railroad (especially of a government-owned one) permits manipulation of transport charges in favor of specific commodities, producing areas or shipping points. This power is often cited as an advantage, and when reasonably employed can be a useful implement to assist economic stability or development. Unfortunately it may just as readily be used for political purposes to stimulate production at economically unsound locations.

A popular general argument for trucks is that they permit continuous "door to door" transport without reloading. Under many circumstances this factor can be decisive but only if transshipment is not otherwise required by reason of trade patterns (as now at Aleppo), customs inspection, or restrictive legislation (see Road Transport). In any event its importance to Jezireh agricultural exports is questionable. In most cases crops must be transported separately from field to collection point, whether the later long-distance hauling be done by rail or road, and either form of transport can deliver as easily to shipside if its line runs to the port.

Roads, of course, are more readily adaptable to changing patterns of production. Countries in transition, especially, must keep in mind that economic planning cannot be omniscient and that development may take place in ways other than expected. There have been instances of costly railway construction, seemingly justified at the time, afterward left without revenue because of some unforeseen new development, shift in productive areas, or depletion of a local natural resource. But usually it is a feeder line that is most vulnerable to such misfortune. Here the question is one

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of a trunk route linking a broad productive region with centers of trade and export shipping; the gamble is smaller. Syria's feeder lines, for some years into the future, will certainly be roads rather than branch railways. 489

One great distinction between railway and highway development lies in the construction schedule. If necessary a workable road can be built quickly as a mere earthen track. Thereafter year by year it can be progressively gravelled, widened, oiled, paved, perhaps widened again, equipped with stronger bridges,[4] and so on as the need arises and resources become available. With a railroad this principle of gradual construction is possible in certain limited respects, such as later double-tracking a single-track line, installing heavier rails or adding to the rolling stock. But to be workable a railway must be installed as a more or less complete unit, with rolling stock and an operating staff, and its construction should be good for at least 50 years of service with normal maintenance.

Special Syrian Conditions

Cargo from the Jezireh being so seasonal, it is sometimes argued that trucks have the advantage of being usable in other regions during the off-season. But this argument ignores the fact that the demand for transport in other parts of Syria is likewise governed by the harvest.

Of greater significance is the prospect of transporting commodities such as grains in bulk rather than in sacks. The cost of imported sacks and the extra labor of filling them cut appreciably into the profit on local produce. Here the advantage lies with railways. Bulk shipment by truck is technically feasible but calls for a higher degree of responsible organization than now exists in most of the Syrian trucking industry. Moreover, bulk transport requires particular types of vehicles, limiting their usefulness for alternative cargo and accentuating the need for a more constant year-round movement of commodities to keep them profitably occupied.

For the transport sector, as for the Syrian economy as a whole, one of the broad aims of development must be to reduce the exaggerated seasonal character of the country's economic life. Neither rail nor road transport can be operated cheaply with costly equipment and facilities idle a large part of the year. Accordingly the mission's recommendations for crop storage facilities in the Jezireh and at Aleppo and Latakia (see the section

[4] In some countries today an initially narrow road is built with wide bridges and culverts, saving costly replacement and traffic interruptions when the road is widened.

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489 on Ports in this Annex) are no less essential to a solution of the east-west transportation problem than they are to improvement of the farmer's marketing position.

Comparative Cost of Rail and Road Transport

497 494 In the specific case of transport across northern Syria, we have tried to determine the comparative cost to the economy of road and rail transport in terms of depreciation of the capital investment, maintenance, fuel and supplies. Depreciation on railway rolling stock has been figured on the basis of 30 years' life, on motor vehicles on the basis of 7 years' life. No allowance has been made for depreciation of the investment in permanent way for the projected railway because the life of the rail roadway may be considered virtually indefinite with normal maintenance and renewals. (The latter are included under "Maintenance" in Table 5.) We have assumed, however, that with the development of heavier and speedier motor vehicles, a highway would be obsolescent within 30 years and require complete reconstruction. As already indicated in the mission's Main Report, we have assumed a freight movement of about 700,000 tons from Jezireh to Aleppo, of 150,000 tons from Aleppo to Jezireh, of 500,000 tons from Aleppo to Latakia and of 250,000 tons from Latakia to Aleppo. Of this total traffic of somewhat over 400 million ton-kilometers annually, a new railway might be expected to carry about two-thirds. The comparative investment would be about £S 170 million, including £S 24 million for rolling stock, for a railway and perhaps £S 97 million, including £S 40 million for some 800 12.5-ton trucks, for road transport.

Table 5 shows the results of our calculations. They leave no doubt that rail transport would be much more economical than road transport. The estimates are, of course, subject to a margin of error; and the annual savings in costs might best be stated within a range of £S 15 to £S 20 million.

The real question, however, is whether this saving, which is equivalent to an increase in real national income, is sufficient to justify the additional capital investment required by a railway. We have previously estimated this difference in capital cost at £S 73 million. The actual difference, however, is likely to be greater. Even if a railway were built, it would still be necessary to undertake some investment in roads, not only for the construction of feeder roads for the railway, but also for the improvement of existing main routes. The alternative is not rail investment or road invest-

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21:Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

407 installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71.
439 This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300,
[654] respectively.
452 It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is
407 opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent
427 of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS . 90-1.10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

311 The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli Amuda and Dirbasiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq.

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbasiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Ain. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers [illegible] of Dirbasiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

311 The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jaziratibn Amr was long
491 neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but 311
which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed [166]
into the region following the opening of the road and began popular- 491
ing it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and
Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region.

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" bar- 242
ley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat 432
are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita.

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances 185
which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and 654
planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below:

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the [132]
month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new

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a. The Region of Deirik

241 In the region of Deirik, the Zarkan river and numerous springs in the villages make irrigation possible over vast areas. The region began to be developed recently when the road was partly constructed. Rice is an old staple, but in the last two years it have given place to cotton. However, rice may resume its former place since cotton diseases have become so widespread.

[49] 312

b. The Jarrah

The Jarrah river flows through Kubur el Bid and irrigates the country around it. Its waters were used for rice plantations, and recently for cotton. In winter its waters flow into the Rad.

c. The Jagjag

133 The main river of northern Jazirah is the Jagjag. Its sources are about thirty kilometers north of Kamishli, in a gorge in Turkey. It flows through Nisibin and Kamishli, crosses the Jazirah plain and empties in the Khabur at Hassakeh. Its total length is about 100 kms. and its average flow is 3 cubic meters per second.

3121 In Turkey and Kamishli, the river has several beds. The Turks, unable to exploit it fully in their country because of its short flow there, follow the practice of changing the river from bed to bed in the summer months, so that farmers in Jazirah do not know when the water will be available to them. This uncertainty has lead the villages which have a right to the water to sell their rights for one or more years to individuals on good terms with the Turkish authorities. These individuals in their turn bribe the Turks to direct the waters in the bed which leads to their lands. One family in particular has obtained a sort of monopoly on the waters of the Jagjag in Qamishli. The Asfar-Najjars buy the water rights from the villages for nominal sums and then try to reach an understanding with the Turks. Since they have one or two competing groups in Qamishli, the Turks usually get paid by both parties and satisfy none entirely. The Asfars manage however to get the biggest share.

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3121 Such an unstable situation does not lead to steady irrigation development along the lines of orchard planting. The farmer is lucky if he can grow one crop of rice or cotton with the present

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452 plantation and the value of his lands. Lands without title have no commercial value though the farmer may use them without opposition. This is apparent at the present time when lands with title and undisputed boundaries sell at ten times the price of occupied lands without title A survey and cadastration of Jazirah lands with a rapid and form settlement of boundary disputed and the grant of property deeds will expand the borrowing capacities of Jazirah enonously and may tend to reduce the exorbitant rates of interest demanded by the money lenders. On such a trable basis, other banking establishments may be induced to open business in the region and relieve its dependance on the greedy money lender.

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

491 496 During the French Mandate there was not a single paved or asphalted road in Jazirah. In winter road communications were out between the different towns and villages and the only means of travel was by train which passed through the more important centers of Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya For the rest of the year road transport became possible but expensive because of the absence of roads For this reason, the whole region of Deirik remained undeveloped until quite recently.

I. Roads Within Jazirah

491 653 The independent Government in Syria started building a road in 1945 between Qamishli and Hassakeh which served at the same time as the arterial road to Aleppo. Though the distance between the two towns is only 85 kilometers, the funds alloted yearly for the road were so small that now, after seven years, only about 30 kilometers are asphalted and the rest is paved The maintenance does not keep up with the deterioration and the road is going to pieces. However, now at last, communication is assured in all weather while before trucks were stuck for days during the rainy season.

Another asphalted road joins Qamishli with Amuda, a distance of 30 kilometers. Here again deterioration is rapid. This road is to be projected another 30 kilometers to Dirbassiya and from there to Ras el Ain, a distance of 60 kilometers.

491 The road Qamishli-Hassakeh is extended for 50 kilometers south to Point 47 on the way to Deir Ezzor. This section is also asphalted.

491 It used to be one of the worst roads in Jazirah. At the end of this stretch begins the desert of Deir Ezzor 100 kilometers wide. Some sections of it where rainwater prevents the passage of cars are paved. Nevertheless, the road closes during several weeks in winter.

Another road built crudely by the British Army stretches from Qamishli to Kubur el Bid-Talkoshak-Mosul. It is paved with rough stones and it is only used by cars in winter. Beyond Tel Abu a road branches to Deirik and Ain Diwar.

[487] Aside from these, all Jazirah roads are tracks. There are no roads between Amuda, Derbassiya and Hassakeh, nor between Ras el Ain and Hassekeh, nor between the more important villages clustering around the several towns.

The absence of bridges across the Jagjag renders communication more difficult especially in winter when the waters of the river rise. There is a bridge at Qamishli, another one at Tal Brak 40 kilometers south and a third one at Hassakeh. In the relatively crowded villages near Qamishli along both sides of the river, crossings are effected with great hardship by loaded trucks especially in winter.

II Roads Between Jazirah and Aleppo

361 Aleppo is the nearest commercial center to Jazirah. It is
438 the market for Jazirah grains, wool, samneh and hides. It provides
491 Jazirah with all its needs of cement, textiles and all kinds of imported goods. That is why daily communication between the two regions is vital to Jazirah, but the Government has not judged it yet necessary to construct an all-weather road. Such a road exists in
491 more or less good shape from Qamishli to Hassakeh and to Point 47. From there on, the road to Rakka is closed all during the winter months and travel to Deir Ezzor is interrupted whenever there is heavy rain. The northern and shorter road Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo is also closed in winter for goods and passengers. The shortest road and that which passes through the best developed areas is the one which follows the railway line Qamishli-Amuda-Dirbassiya-Ras el Ain-Tal Abiad-Jarablus-Aleppo. It is 420 kilometers long as contrasted with 465 kilometers for Qamishli-Ras el Ain-Rakka-Aleppo, and 485 kilometers for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Rakka-Aleppo and 565 for Qamishli-Hassakeh-Deir Ezzor-Aleppo which is the usual route followed in winter.

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
Distribution of Jazirah tribes with principal towns, roads and rivers.
Iraq
Shammar
Shammar
Shammar

passengers and goods are carried

mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most 489
part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads 491
satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to 452
economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate; 454
foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not 436
in industry; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

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In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long 433
as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, 439
their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

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courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

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The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

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SYRIA: the Campaign of 1941 8th June — 15th July

SCALE:—Km. 0 50 100

Roads & Tracks.....

Main Railways.....

T U R K
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ALEPPO
EUPH
HAMA
LATAKIA
HOMS
DAMASCUS
JEBEL DRUZE
TRANSJORDAN
PALESTINE

EFO MAP (A)

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

END MAP (8)

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457 Proper maintenance and repair of monuments is perhaps even more urgent,
658 since there is considerable deterioration at present. We accordingly recom-
172 mend that expenditures for this purpose be raised, on the average, approximately 50% over the next six years. A similar increase might be contemplated for excavation work which, as in the past, will presumably be carried out in cooperation with foreign archaeological missions. All this will require an increase in the subsidies paid to the Directorate of Antiquities out of the government budget to an average annual amount of approximately £S 950,000. The gradual growth in the Directorate's own receipts will probably suffice to cover necessary increases in administrative outlays.

[491] Poor roads now impede access to many interesting historical monuments. In addition to the recommendations on the national road network made elsewhere, we believe Syria would be well advised to spend about £S 1.5 million on the improvement of local roads of importance to the tourist trade. The access roads to the Krak des Chevaliers and Saint Simeon should have the highest priority.

457 Within the not too distant future the government should contemplate the establishment of a special office charged with the promotion of tourism. The cooperation and financial support of business groups interested in the tourist trade might well be enlisted. It should not only seek to interest the foreign tourist in the attractions of Syria, but also to make the Syrian people and Syrian officials more aware of the importance of the tourist trade and of making the tourist genuinely welcome.

Government Expenditures on Industry

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654 Although industry is preeminently a field for private enterprise, we have made in this chapter a number of recommendations entailing additional government expenditures. For the period 1955-60 these would total about £S 20.5 million, allocated as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Manufacturing		
Investment bank	10,500	1,750
Industrial zones and workshops	1,800	300
Enforcement of labor code[a]	325	54

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omy. True, Jordanians have frequently complained of Syrian government 446
regulations which, in an effort to support the Hedjaz Railway, have prohibited transit traffic by truck of most goods. While some categories of goods, notably perishables and petroleum products, are exempt from this prohibition, there is little doubt that more traffic would move by road if the prohibition were entirely lifted. At the same time, Jordan may be able to import and export some bulky commodities more advantageously by rail; Jordan's own port an the Gulf of Akaba has no rail connection and is by no means as advantageously situated with respect to trade with Europe as Beirut. In the circumstances, we would suggest that the subject of transit and the relationship of the rail lines thereto be fully and frankly discussed by representatives of the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese governments. Their common interest in the maintenance of the railway lines and the possibilities of more efficient and economical operation can then be thoroughly examined. It may be feasible to reduce operating costs by agreed economies and to raise revenues through certain selective increases in freight rates. In some respects, for instance, freight rates on the Hedjaz Railway seem to be lower than those on the DHP line. In the long run it appears unwise to make shippers support the railway by insisting that they use it for transport of certain commodities. If the railway must be maintained owing to considerations which are partly non-economic, it would be better to have the governments concerned share the entire deficit resulting from its continued operation.

Road Transport[28]

With traffic on the railways no greater than prewar, it is apparent that 444
motor transport has captured all of the substantial increase in the amount of goods produced and traded in the Syrian economy over the last decade and a half. The Syrian road network increased from 4,500 kilometers in [491]
1939 to 8,200 in 1952, and the length of hard-surface (macadam and asphalt) from 1,500 to 3,800 kilometers. This includes only so-called "all-weather" roads; with the addition of those not traversable in the wet season the total length is over 10,000 kilometers. The number of motor vehicles of all [493]
kinds on the roads rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953; the number of trucks increased from 873 to 4,742 and of buses from 348 to 1,212. In part the rapid growth of road transport was caused by the lack of adequate

[28] See Annex H, p. 436.

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The First Priority: Latakia-Aleppo-Jezireh

The most urgent transport problem centers around the improvement of communications between Latakia and Aleppo and the Jezireh. The rapid development of northern and particularly northeastern Syria has made the east-west communication lines across this part of the country by far the most important arteries for the movement of bulk commodities. The Jezireh produces most of Syria's wheat export surplus, and the Jezireh, the Euphrates valley, and the Aleppo-Hama-Homs region contribute together nearly all of the country's barley exports. The same areas produce virtually all Syria's cotton, which has attained considerable volume over the last four years. Finally, northern Syria is to some extent, and can become even more, a transit zone between the Mediterranean and Iraq.

Some indication of the importance of the communications lines across northern Syria is given by the volume of goods handled in Latakia. Export traffic through this port rose from 13,700 tons in 1947 to 353,396 tons in 1953; in 1954 it was 630,720 tons. Of the 1953 tonnage, 62% consisted of wheat and barley and 21% of cotton, cottonseeds and cotton meal. The volume of imports has also grown rapidly—from 5,200 tons in 1947 to 176,364 tons in 1953 and to 208,343 tons in 1954.

From the east, principally the Jezireh, the volume of transport is even greater, approximating probably 500,000 tons annually in recent years. In the reverse direction, however, freight movement is much more modest—apparently less than 50,000 tons.

Transport conditions over these vital arteries are far from satisfactory. Latakia and Aleppo are linked by a metalled road over the Alaouit mountains which is much too narrow for the rapidly increasing truck traffic and is occasionally blocked by landslides. The road surface is not adapted to heavy truck traffic and is poorly maintained in many sections. From Aleppo an asphalt road runs eastward to Raqqa on the Euphrates river and continues down the river valley to Deir ez Zor, where it turns into a track leading to Abou Kemal on the Iraqi frontier. From Deir ez Zor there is a road north to Kamichliye via Hassetche, but the surface is for the most part so bad that traffic moves along parallel tracks. The truck route from the Jezireh does not, however, go through Deir ez Zor, but runs more directly from Km. 47 on the Hassetche-Deir ez Zor road along a cross-country track to Raqqa. The feeders to these main routes are also tracks which become impassable during the rainy season.

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region, including the dry-farming area south of Ras el Ain and the irrigated area in the Khabour river valley. It would be advisable to start the construction of the Kamichliye-Ain Divar section first, because this rich agricultural region of heavy rainfall is now the most inaccessible part of the Jezireh. To feed the trunk highway the mission also recommends the construction of the following roads: (1) Ras el Ain-Hassetche, crossing the main highway at or near Tell Tamer (73 km); (2) Hassetche-Tloul Mohammed (60 km), thus linking the provincial capital with Kamichliye, the region's commercial center; (3) Derbassiye-main road (30 km); (4) Demir Kapu-Tell Kotchek (30 km); and (5) much farther to the west, Tell Abiad-Kantari (46 km). The first two are considered the more important. In general this proposed road network conforms to the most recently expressed views of the Syrian government, which has tentatively estimated the cost, pending engineering surveys, at about £S 46 million.

North-South Communications

We turn now to a consideration of the other principal transport routes. With respect to the north-south transport axis, improvement of communications between Aleppo and Damascus is most important. A direct standard-gauge railway link between these cities has often been proposed, either by the laying of an additional rail on the narrow-gauge line from Damascus to the junction with the standard-gauge line at Rayak in Lebanon or by the building of a new railway from Damascus to Homs, where it would connect with the DHP line to Aleppo. The mission is convinced, however, that the volume of bulk goods suitable for rail transport moving between Aleppo and Damascus is far too small to justify the large investment required, at least £S 18 million for the former and £S 36 million for the latter project. The solution is rather to improve and widen the Aleppo-Damascus road. The section between Hama and Aleppo urgently demands improvement, and the entire road should be widened by at least one meter to permit easier flow of two-way vehicular traffic. The cost of widening would probably be about £S 10,000 per kilometer or a total of about £S 4 million.

The transport route south from Damascus to Dera'a and the Jordanian frontier is served both by road and the Hedjaz Railway. The problems of the latter have already been discussed. The road, although not as well

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

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

FOLLOWING P. 140 (B)

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travelled as the one to Aleppo, is still important for the transport of Syrian agricultural products and petroleum products destined for Jordan. The very bad section between Cheikh Meskine and Dera'a requires early attention, and the entire road should be widened by one meter after the completion of the Damascus-Aleppo road project. The mission estimates the total cost involved at £S 1.3 million.

Other Road Projects

Together with the Latakia-Aleppo-Jezireh road, the route between Damascus and Beirut is the most important to the Syrian economy. In fact the traffic on the Beirut-Damascus road is denser and steadier than that on the Latakia-Aleppo road. An urgent program to improve the surface of this road should be undertaken by the two countries concerned. For the improvement of the 35-kilometer section in Syrian territory, the mission anticipates that £S 1.05 million will need to be spent. It can be expected, however, that before many years more thorough-going measures will be necessary to accommodate the constantly growing traffic. To meet this longer-term need, proposals have been made to build a new road paralleling the old one and to construct a long tunnel at Hamana to bypass the most dangerous section across the Lebanon range, where traffic is often held up by fog and snow. The total cost has been estimated at £S 29 million, presumably to be shared by Syria and Lebanon. Parallel highways would certainly permit a great increase in traffic and would considerably reduce the prevailing high accident rate, by making possible the accommodation of slow-moving truck traffic and high-speed vehicular traffic on separate roads. Since the problem is not immediately urgent and the best solution remains to be worked out in detail, the mission considers it unnecessary to make specific proposals. It suggests, instead, that over the next five years the two governments jointly finance an engineering survey of the problem in order to prepare definite plans; an expenditure of £S 100,000 by each government should suffice.

The third most important transversal connection with the Mediterranean is that between Homs and Tripoli, served both by the DHP railway and by road. The road is of some importance, but several sections are in bad condition, particularly the 10-15 kilometer section just west of Homs and a shorter section passing through Lebanon before coming to Tell Kalakh. Improvement of this road, however, can probably be handled

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within the framework of the maintenance program proposed below. It is important that the Syrian and Lebanese governments come to an agreement on better maintenance of the section before Tell Kalakh.

Aside from the trunk highways discussed above, the mission has considered certain special road projects, including two which would provide better links between Homs and Hama on the one hand and the Syrian coast and Latakia on the other. Fundamental improvement of the road from Hama to Banias whence a road runs north to Latakia has sometimes been proposed. The mission believes a more economical solution would be to build a link between Hama and the main north-south road running through the Ghab for which provision has already been made in the Ghab project. The Ghab road would in turn connect with the Aleppo-Latakia highway. We have accordingly included £S 1.5 million for the building of this link in the program recommended for the next five or six years. Homs is now linked with the Syrian coast by a poor and rather circuitous road which branches off from the Homs-Tripoli highway at Tell Kalakh and passes through difficult terrain. It has been proposed, instead, to construct a shortcut between Akkari and Hamidiye which would connect with the coastal highway to Latakia and would cost about £S 1.8 million. In the mission's opinion, however, construction of this road is not very urgent, particularly since the Homs area is fairly well served by the port of Tripoli. The mission suggests, therefore, that it be built only toward the end of the program if funds are available.

Elsewhere the mission has pointed to the potential importance of the tourist trade. In order to stimulate this trade some of Syria's principal historical monuments such as the Krak des Chevaliers, the ruins of Saint Simeon, etc., should be made more accessible by road. The mission accordingly suggests that £S 1.5 million be allocated to construct such roads.

Road Maintenance[20]

The construction of new roads will be of little avail if they are allowed to deteriorate quickly. By and large maintenance has been poor in the past, although apparently not because of inadequate appropriations. Over the five-year period 1949-1953 an average of £S 3.3 million annually was allocated for maintenance; in 1954 £S 5.8 million was so allocated. The

[20] See Annex H, p. 439.

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latter amount, supplemented by increasing allowances for maintenance of the new roads recommended, should basically be adequate for the future as well. Poor organization, inadequate supervision and dispersal of effort seem to have been responsible for the past unsatisfactory results. Maintenance work is not the responsibility of the Director of Transport, but falls under that of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Works, who is too preoccupied to give it adequate attention. Supervision in the field is inadequate, partly because of insufficient engineers and partly because engineers are reluctant to leave their desks. Maintenance crews are too small and their work is seldom concentrated in such a way as to effect visible improvement. This aspect of road work certainly demands the urgent attention of the Syrian government, which might well seek foreign technical advice on better organization of maintenance. We urge the establishment of a special highway department in the Ministry of Public Works to look after both maintenance and new construction.

Some increase in the availability of maintenance machinery appears desirable. The machinery park now includes 59 rollers, 62 boilers and 24 mixers, but no graders or bulldozers. Many of the rollers are old and some are defective and too light. The mission has accordingly allowed £S 1 million for new machinery in its recommended program.

Regulation of Road Traffic

Better regulation of road traffic is another requirement for the improvement of motor transport. A comprehensive road code exists, but there is virtually no policing to enforce it. Reckless driving is a common occurrence, and the accident rate appears to be excessive although no record is kept. Above all, chronic overloading of trucks wreaks havoc with road surfaces. As a minimum it is desirable to install a few weighing stations at key traffic centers to enforce loading regulations. Another cause for concern is the restrictive policy, originating with the French mandatory regime, which the government pursues in licensing common carrier trucks. Basically this policy provides that no new truck (other than tank trucks) will be licensed unless an old one is retired. Truck licenses, which are negotiable, therefore sell at a premium of £S 10,000 and more, and the number of commercial or common carrier trucks has tended to remain stationary while the number of private trucks has greatly increased. While the tendency toward even larger trucks has undoubtedly increased over-all

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program to a rail program as a solution of the Jezireh's transport problem. In the case of a railway all the investment funds would have to be furnished by the government, for private capital in such magnitude will simply not be available. On the other hand, private investment is and will be available for truck transport, so that government investment can be confined to road construction. In a country where it is difficult to transfer private savings to public hands this is an important consideration.

The mission has noted a report that a foreign firm would be willing to build a railway on the basis of payments spread over a period of 10 years following completion of construction. It should be pointed out, however, that the contraction of a foreign debt for this purpose might well impair Syria's capacity to borrow for other projects. The mission's proposed development program has already assumed a certain amount of external borrowing. Thus the contraction of foreign credits for railway construction is unlikely to provide Syria with more resources for financing a development program than we have envisaged.

It is sometimes argued that the operation of a railway would require fewer imports on a continuing basis than road transport, and that this would be advantageous for Syria's balance of payments and would also make transport less subject to interruption of foreign supplies in the event of war. There is no doubt that fewer imports would be required for rail transport. However, the savings in foreign exchange thus achieved would be smaller than the foreign exchange earned by the agricultural commodities that could be produced on land which could be irrigated if the additional capital required for a railway were devoted to irrigation projects. Moreover, the fact that a railway would be relatively less dependent on foreign supplies would be an advantage in time of war only if Syria itself were not involved in hostilities; if the war extended to Syrian territory, railway transport would be more susceptible to interruption by bombing than road transport.

II ROAD TRANSPORT

A ROAD SYSTEM AND TRAFFIC DEMANDS

Distribution of Syrian roads by use and type, in 1953, was as shown in Table 6.

The number of motor vehicles in the country has grown about 3½

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TABLE 6 Syrian All-Weather Roads, 1953

(Kilometers)

Type	Asphalted	Metalled	Earthen	Total
International and main highways	1,700	290	1,010	3,000
Others of economic importance	600	640	1,000	2,240
Local roads	300	270	2,390	2,960
Total	2,600	1,200	4,400	8,200

times since just before the war, and has nearly doubled since 1948 (see Table 7). Of special significance are trucks and buses, which not only have become more numerous but are constantly increasing in individual size and weight.

TABLE 7 Motor Vehicles in Circulation, 1937–53

Type	1937	1948	1951	1952	1953	1953 as % of 1937
Trucks	873	3,443	4,557	4,594	4,742	544
Buses	348	1,081	1,126	1,129	1,212	348
Passenger cars	2,515	3,101	5,444	6,065	7,192	285
Total	3,736	7,625	11,127	11,788	13,146	352

Of the 4,742 trucks registered in 1953, 158 were tankers and 623 were diesels. No statistics are available on sizes, but most of the newly imported ones are from 7 to 12 tons capacity. The aggregate capacity of trucks on the road is probably in excess of 33,000 tons. These figures do not indicate the true tonnage in circulation; a census during the month of August 1953 showed only about 30% of the 24,137 motor vehicles passing the frontier between Beirut and Damascus to be of Syrian registration.

Data of this kind, if carefully and systematically collected, can be a most useful guide in determining where road improvement funds should be invested for greatest public benefit. Only a few local traffic census figures were available to the mission, and while they appear to contain a number of serious discrepancies, they do indicate the order of magnitude

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This is one of the best-known types of "low cost" roads.[6] The success 499
of the method depends largely upon the climate and the soil characteristics. A firm, sandy soil which does not require stabilization is best, for when a soil-stabilizing treatment must be applied the construction cost is no longer low. Costs are also affected by the necessity of hauling sand or stone long distances. Syrian conditions in general are less favorable to the method than might be expected, and in the extreme northeast are definitely unsuitable.

The mission has studied carefully the question of using low-cost road-building methods in certain parts of Syria. Apart from the factors mentioned, on the main routes it is evident that the traffic wear is too great even for the stone-based macadam with 15 cm. of block, 12 cm. of gravel and three cm. of asphalt pre-mix topping. It must be noted also that in popular usage "low-cost roads" mean low in construction cost only, not necessarily in expense of maintenance. The costs of material, labor, haulage, etc., add to the costs of maintenance as well as road-building. Where provision of adequate maintenance is difficult, it is often better to invest in a better road initially.

Mix-in-place or similar methods may hold promise in raising the standards of the desert roads or *pistes* (tracks). The mission did not find these in as bad a condition as so often reported; it appears that many instances of mired vehicles result from careless driving rather than from unavoidable road hazards. Nevertheless, some improvement of these routes must eventually be considered. At the moment it might best be confined to proper signposting, construction of Irish bridges, and repairs in the very worst places. In view of the limitation on development funds, road-building efforts just now should be focused mainly upon the several projects of greater urgency than these.

C ROAD MAINTENANCE

Close to the capital city, the roads appear to be rather well maintained; 491
elsewhere the difference is at once noticeable. Toward the east many of the

[6] See: Landbouwwegen, Reports of a Congress of the Royal (Netherlands) Institute of Engineers, 1953; D. W. Lister, Bituminous Soil Stabilization for Road Foundations (Cairo), 1953; Low Cost Roads and Runways (Cairo), The Shell Company, 1947; Bituminous Products for Roads and Runways (supplement), The Shell Company, 1950; Stabilisation des Sols, Bulletin Intérieur Shell; Wet Sand Mix, Een voordelig procede voor de verharding van wegdekken enz. (Shell); etc.

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441 roads show evidence of neglect and some have been virtually ruined through lack of attention.

Expenditures

Financial provisions for road maintenance in the regular budget (shown in Table 8) during 1948-54 have averaged £S 3.23 million per year, or about as much as the average allowance for new road construction. During 1954 the original provision of £S 3.8 million was increased by a supplementary appropriation of £S 2 million, because of extraordinarily heavy rainfall damage, bringing the 1948-54 average to £S 3.51 million. On the basis of 8,200 kilometers of all-weather roads, this represents a maintenance allowance of £S 428 per kilometer.

TABLE 8 Budgetary Provisions for Syrian Roadbuilding and Maintenance in Recent Years

(*Thousand £S*)

Year	For new construction	For maintenance[a]
1948	7,216	2,300
1949	5,718	3,200
1950	2,907	3,200
1951	875	3,100
1952	1,752	3,400
1953	1,780	3,600
1954	3,478	5,300[b]

[a] Includes £S 300,000 each year for maintenance and depreciation of trucks, rollers and asphalting equipment.
[b] Includes a supplementary appropriation of £S 2 million during the year.

While this compares not unfavorably with that of some other countries[7] in similiar stages of development, only the increased 1954 figure approximates the needs of Syrian roads. The present 2,600 kilometers of asphalted road require, in addition to ordinary upkeep, a new three cm. covering of pre-mix every five years, at an estimated £S 10,000 per kilometer. Including this in a total maintenance estimate of £S 2,260 per kilometer per year

[7] Some comparative annual expenditures per kilometer for maintenance, expressed in Syrian currency, are: Iran, £S 250–440; Egypt, £S 200–400; Surinam, £S 600; French West Africa, about £S 420.

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for the asphalted roads, and allowing £S 500 per kilometer for the macadamized routes and lesser amounts for others, the annual road maintenance budget should actually be around £S 6 million to £S 7 million.

This raises the question whether Syria should consider new road investment if existing ones cannot be properly maintained. For every kilometer of new construction the annual burden of upkeep increases. But current deficiencies in road maintenance are not simply a matter of money; the present annual expenditures are sufficient to keep the roads in far better condition than they are. The causes of neglect include several other factors.

Personnel

Some earlier studies[8] have referred to seasonal labor shortages in road maintenance. On this there are differences of opinion. In general, local authorities do not find difficulty on this score, although without question there are shortages of supervisory personnel in the middle rank and foreman grades. A more serious situation is evident at the engineering level, where a wider use of foreign consulting firms and contractors would be helpful. For the whole range of public works, including roads, the government has available about 50 qualified engineers. The detailed knowledge and skill of intensive specialization is difficult to achieve under these circumstances and the mission was therefore not surprised to observe occasional use of overheated asphalt, or of too chalky a sand in mending mixtures. The effectiveness of the small corps of engineers is further reduced by the inordinate burden of paper work and administrative detail, if not by an actual preference of many for office work at the expense of practical field supervision.

Organization

Road maintenance, as a responsibility of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Works, must compete for attention with all other types of public work activities and often fares poorly. This organizational problem may be partially responsible for a certain maldistribution of maintenance funds among the various districts, which often leaves a number of

[8] E.g., Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, *The Economic Development of Syria*, 1947.

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491 653 districts without the resources necessary for the most ordinary upkeep.

A wider use of road gangs would achieve far better maintenance, for the same expenditure, than is possible with the prevailing "one-man" system. A team concentrating upon a section at a time can often effect repairs which one man alone cannot do at all; gangs also permit closer technical supervision and more efficient use of equipment—valuable considerations when the supply of both is limited.

Road Maintenance Equipment

491 406 The country as a whole has far too little road-building and maintenance machinery for effective work. Mechanization must of course be introduced gradually where so much of the work is now done by hand. The present stock of equipment cannot meet even current needs. Half the mixers in the Damascus area are unusable, for example. There are no graders or bulldozers for maintenance purposes, although at least ten are needed for the tracks alone.

It is not enough to expect that construction machinery will be assigned to maintenance afterward; much of it will be worn out on the contemplated road-building program. Maintenance machinery should be bought separately. For one or more stone-crushing plants, the necessary bulldozers and graders, new rollers and other equipment needed currently, the mission foresees an expenditure of £S 1 million in the first five-year period and twice this amount in the second five years.

D LEGISLATION ON THE USE OF ROADS

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Traffic Laws

Syria enacted a modern, comprehensive traffic code in 1953, which contains the usual detailed regulations on vehicle dimensions, maximum wheel loading, weight limits for certain types of roads and bridges, and similiar provisions for protection of the roads. It also provides for periodic inspection of vehicles for mechanical fitness. Rules of the road for safe and courteous driving are prescribed, as well as the knowledge required for obtaining a driver's permit.

The code is essentially a good one, and it is regrettable that most of its provisions are ineffective because of poor enforcement. Apart from the danger to human life, unless better measures are taken to enforce the

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شبكة الطرق في الجمهورية السورية
(الطول بالكيلومترات)

LENGTH OF ROADS IN THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC
(Length in kilometers)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Type of roads (1) and name of district	As at the end of 1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	نوع الطرق واسم المناطق (١)	في نهاية السنة
	١٩٤٧	١٩٤٨	١٩٤٩	١٩٥٠	١٩٥١	١٩٥٢	١٩٥٣		
Asphalted Roads Total	**2,174**	**2,431**	**2,405**	**2,496**	**2,561**	**2,593**	**2,584**	**الطرق الزفتة المجموع**	
Southern District	859	980	1,016	1,051	1,087	1,091	1,138	المنطقة الجنوبية	
Northern « (2)	1,050	841	715	723	726	715	715	المنطقة الشمالية (٢)	
Western «	265	278	305	320	337	371	371	المنطقة الغربية	
Eastern « (2)	—	332	369	402	411	416	360	المنطقة الشرقية (٢)	
Metalled Roads Total	**1,014**	**1,037**	**1,196**	**1,155**	**1,151**	**1,163**	**1,262**	**الطرق المعبدة المجموع**	
Southern District	414	476	590	570	552	576	616	المنطقة الجنوبية	
Northern « (2)	480	285	290	306	317	353	353	المنطقة الشمالية (٢)	
Western «	120	108	97	102	99	69	71	المنطقة الغربية	
Eastern « (2)	—	188	179	175	183	165	222	المنطقة الشرقية (٢)	
Subsidiary Roads Total	**3,382**	**4,349**	**5,873**	**6,396**	**6,415**	**6,511**	**6,182**	**الطرق التمهيدية المجموع**	
Southern District	1,092	1,930	1,885	1,910	1,950	1,989	1,999	المنطقة الجنوبية	
Northern « (2)	1,020	152	871	815	833	825	830	المنطقة الشمالية (٢)	
Western «	1,250	1,360	1,360	1,388	1,394	1,450	1,150	المنطقة الغربية	
Eastern « (2)	—	907	1,757	2,255	2,238	2,247	2,203	المنطقة الشرقية (٢)	
Grand Total	**6,550**	**7,857**	**8,484**	**10,049**	**10,127**	**10,267**	**10,028**	الجموع العام	

Sources : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

ملاحظة :

(١) تقسم وزارة الاشغال العامة البلاد الى ثلاث مناطق
(١) المنطقة الجنوبية — تشمل محافظات دمشق وحمص وحماة ودرعا والسويداء
(٢) المنطقة الشمالية — « « حلب والحسكة ودير الزور
(٣) المنطقة الغربية — « محافظة اللاذقية
(٢) اعتبارا من اوائل سنة ١٩٤٨ جرى تغيير في المنطقة الشمالية فقط اذ سلخت منها محافظتي الحسكة ودير الزور وسميت المنطقة الشرقية

Note :

(1) The Ministry of Public Works devides the Country into the following districts :
1 - The Southern District – comprising the mohafazat of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Dir'a and Sweida.
2 - The Northern District — comprising the mohafazat of Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, and Deir-es-Zor.
3 - The Western District — comprising the mohafaza of Latakia.

(2) As from the beginning of 1948, the mohafazat of Al-Hasakeh and Deir-es-Zor were excluded from the Northern District to make up the new Eastern District.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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into Jordan. There is a branch line from Deraa to Suwaida, but another branch, to Haifa, is out of use.

Damas-Hama et Prolongements. (*a*) From Beirut to Damascus there is a narrow-gauge track running for 91 miles via Rayaq; rack and pinion are used to traverse the mountains, and this slow haul is now employed for freight only. (*b*) From Rayaq to Aleppo there is a 4 ft 8 in. gauge track for 270 miles which passes through Homs and Hama. (*c*) The stretch of the Cairo–Turkey line from Ras an-Naqura on the Lebano–Israel border to Beirut is out of commission but the section of 64 miles in standard gauge from Beirut to Tripoli and Homs is used.

Syrian state Railways. This is the part (164 miles) of the Turkey–Mosul line that runs inside Syrian territory.

S L 491

Roads

Main arterial roads in Lebanon are considered adequate, but the network of secondary and feeder roads is poor. In Syria the road system is generally inadequate, and only the asphalted roads are usable for heavy traffic throughout the year. The following figures give some indication of the position:

Syria, 1951	Miles	Lebanon, 1949	Miles
1st class, asphalted	2,917	Surfaced	1,811
2nd class, macadamized	1,268	Unimproved	414
Tracks	5,218		

(Sources: *Statesman's Year-Book, 1953*; US Dept. of Commerce.)

S 494

There are over 11,000 vehicles registered in Syria. Trans-desert passenger and goods services to Iraq are in regular use and goods are also moved, including refrigerated vegetables, to Kuwait and Dahran. The authorities are restricting the registration of new lorries to the estimated needs of the countries, but more vehicles are required, particularly diesel lorries for long hauls of heavy loads.

S L 509

Aerodromes. The new airport of Beirut (Khaldeh) receives the Comet, and is beginning to rival Cairo as a gateway to the East, and that of Damascus (Mezzeh) has long been in use by Constellations. Many international airlines stage at Khaldeh or Mezzeh; the approach to Khaldeh is better and, with between twenty and thirty aircraft a day, it has since 1951 outstripped Mezzeh, which has five to ten aircraft a day. For some years plans have been under consideration for moving the Damascus airport to the east of the city. There are two private Lebanese airlines. A national airline in Syria was a financial failure and was taken over by the army. Smaller airfields exist near Tripoli,

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

439 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

441 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

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omy. True, Jordanians have frequently complained of Syrian government 496
regulations which, in an effort to support the Hedjaz Railway, have prohibited transit traffic by truck of most goods. While some categories of goods, notably perishables and petroleum products, are exempt from this prohibition, there is little doubt that more traffic would move by road if the prohibition were entirely lifted. At the same time, Jordan may be able to import and export some bulky commodities more advantageously by rail; Jordan's own port an the Gulf of Akaba has no rail connection and is by no means as advantageously situated with respect to trade with Europe as Beirut. In the circumstances, we would suggest that the subject of transit and the relationship of the rail lines thereto be fully and frankly discussed by representatives of the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese governments. Their common interest in the maintenance of the railway lines and the possibilities of more efficient and economical operation can then be thoroughly examined. It may be feasible to reduce operating costs by agreed economies and to raise revenues through certain selective increases in freight rates. In some respects, for instance, freight rates on the Hedjaz Railway seem to be lower than those on the DHP line. In the long run it appears unwise to make shippers support the railway by insisting that they use it for transport of certain commodities. If the railway must be maintained owing to considerations which are partly non-economic, it would be better to have the governments concerned share the entire deficit resulting from its continued operation.

Road Transport[28]

With traffic on the railways no greater than prewar, it is apparent that 444
motor transport has captured all of the substantial increase in the amount of goods produced and traded in the Syrian economy over the last decade and a half. The Syrian road network increased from 4,500 kilometers in [491]
1939 to 8,200 in 1952, and the length of hard-surface (macadam and asphalt) from 1,500 to 3,800 kilometers. This includes only so-called "all-weather" roads; with the addition of those not traversable in the wet season the total length is over 10,000 kilometers. The number of motor vehicles of all [493]
kinds on the roads rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953; the number of trucks increased from 873 to 4,742 and of buses from 348 to 1,212. In part the rapid growth of road transport was caused by the lack of adequate

[28] See Annex H, p. 436.

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ANNEX H

NOTES ON TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

1 RAILWAYS

A RAILWAY SYSTEMS

The Northern Railway consists of 248 km. of trackage, 19 aged locomotives and other rolling stock as shown in Table 1.[1] Traffic is rather light, 55 million ton-kilometers in 1953, including goods in transit. 497 [493]

TABLE 1 Rolling Stock of the Northern Railway

Year built	Locomotives		Passenger luggage		Freight wagons			
	Line	Yard	Cars	Vans	Closed	Open	Special	Total
1901–15	13	2	4	4	345	162	96	603
1916–30	—	—	5	1	—	—	—	—
1931–45	4	—	2	—	—	46	—	46
1946–53	—	—	—	5	17	—	—	17
Total	17	2	11	10	362	208	96	666

Under an agreed system, settlements are made by Turkey for carriage of her goods over the Syrian portions of the line and vice versa. With so much of the route in Turkish territory, Syria's heaviest shipments, between the Jezireh and Aleppo, represent comparatively little revenue for the Northern Railway. For example, the tariff for transporting a ton of grain from Kamichliye to Aleppo is £S 24.50, of which about £S 19 accrues to the Turkish railway administration. While this debit is partially offset by reciprocal credits for Syrian transport of Turkish goods, the exchange rates used in the settlement of accounts between the two railways operate to the disadvantage of Syria, causing the Northern Railway a net loss, for

[1] To handle the peak harvest load, for which its rolling stock is insufficient, the Northern Railway has made a practice of hiring 100 extra wagons seasonally from the Iraqi railways. These are further supplemented by an average of some 200 Turkish wagons borrowed at frontier stations for temporary Syrian service.

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route-kilometers, comprising 545 kilometers of standard-gauge line and 307 kilometers of narrow-gauge. Except for the necessity of reloading where the track gauges change, passage is possible from any part of the system to any other, although not without leaving Syrian territory. The combined Syrian rolling stock on this network at the end of 1953 included 147 locomotives and 2,150 cars of all types, distributed as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Rolling Stock of Syrian Railways, 1953

	Standard-gauge			Narrow-gauge		
	DHP	NR	Total	DHP	Hedjaz	Total
Locomotives	66	19	85	36	26	62
Passenger and luggage cars	58	24	82	84	33	117
Goods wagons	518	607	1,125	343	327	670
Tank wagons	15	58	73	4	23	27
Other wagons	5	43	48	3	5	8

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953. For the Northern Railway figures differ slightly from those of Table 1 because of different inventory dates.

B FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC

The volume of freight traffic handled by the three railways declined from 138.56 million ton-kilometers in 1938 to 86.54 million in 1949, but recovered to 130.44 million by 1953. The composition of the cargo transported in recent years is given in Table 3. The importance of agricultural

TABLE 3 Freight Carried by Syrian Railways, 1951–53

	Tons			% of total		
	1951	1952	1953	1951	1952	1953
Cereals and flour	380,406	460,650	462,295	38.6	45.1	45.7
Livestock	63,922	45,054	56,381	6.5	4.4	5.6
Other agricultural produce	48,653	44,254	53,874	4.9	4.3	5.3
Petroleum products	86,082	95,753	110,588	8.7	9.4	10.9
Cement and other building materials	109,224	66,357	83,422	11.1	6.5	8.2
Other	298,228	308,188	245,495	30.2	30.3	24.3
Total	986,515	1,020,256	1,012,055	100.0	100.0	100.0

NOTE: The total tonnage carried is exaggerated to the extent that a portion of the cargo is handled by several railways.

النقل والمواصلات

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عدد السيارات المسجلة في سوريا حسب المناطق ونوع السيارة في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN SYRIA AS AT THE END OF 1952

Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

TYPE OF VEHICLE	المجموع Total	المنطقة الجنوبية Southern Area	المنطقة الشمالية Northern Area	المنطقة الغربية Western Area	نوع السيارة
Trucks — Public	2,584	979	1,475	130	سيارات شحن عمومية
Private	1,556	862	599	95	سيارات شحن خصوصية
Government	454	202	230	22	سيارات شحن حكومية
Buses — Public	1,049	435	558	56	سيارات ركوب كبيرة عمومية (باص)
Private	78	40	29	9	سيارات ركوب كبيرة خصوصية (باص)
Government	2	2	—	—	سيارات ركوب كبيرة حكومية (باص)
Cars — Public (taxi)	829	278	483	59	سيارات ركوب صغيرة عمومية (تكسي)
Private	4,840	2,513	1,826	201	سيارات ركوب صغيرة خصوصية
Government	278	81	178	19	سيارات ركوب صغيرة حكومية
Diplomatic corps in Syria	92	92	—	—	سيارات البعثات السياسية الاجنبية في سوريا
Consular corp in Syria	7	7	—	—	سيارات البعثات القنصلية الاجنبية في سوريا
United Nations in Syria	19	19	—	—	سيارات هيئة الامم المتحدة في سوريا
Total	11,788	5,819	5,378	591	المجموع

عدد السيارات المسجلة في سوريا حسب المناطق ونوع السيارة في نهاية عام ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN SYRIA AS AT THE END OF 1953

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

TYPE OF VEHICLE	المجموع Total	المنطقة الجنوبية Southern Area	المنطقة الشمالية Northern Area	المنطقة الغربية Western Area	نوع السيارة
Trucks — Public	2,589	1,041	1,469	89	سيارات شحن عمومية
Private	1,820	931	804	85	سيارات شحن خصوصية
Government	323	246	55	22	سيارات شحن حكومية
Buses — Public	1,102	427	628	47	سيارات ركوب كبيرة عمومية (باص)
Private	108	52	44	12	سيارات ركوب كبيرة خصوصية (باص)
Government	2	2	—	—	سيارات ركوب كبيرة حكومية (باص)
Cars — Public (taxi)	825	290	479	56	سيارات ركوب صغيرة عمومية (تكسي)
Private	5,879	3,185	2,464	230	سيارات ركوب صغيرة خصوصية
Government	309	251	38	20	سيارات ركوب صغيرة حكومية
Diplomatic corps in Syria	136	136	—	—	سيارات البعثات السياسية الاجنبية في سوريا
Consular corp in Syria	10	5	5	—	سيارات البعثات القنصلية الاجنبية في سوريا
United Nations in Syria	33	33	—	—	سيارات هيئة الامم المتحدة في سوريا
Total	13,146	6,599	5,986	561	المجموع

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طول خطوط السكك الحديدية المستعملة في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢ (بالكيلو مترات)

LENGTH OF RAILWAY TRACKS IN USE AS AT THE END OF 1952 (in kms)

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

Railway System	الطول الاجمالي Total Length		طول الخط الذي بسوريا Length within Syrian territory		شبكة الخطوط الحديدية
	خط ضيق Narrow gauge	خط عادي Ordinary gauge	خط ضيق Narrow gauge	خط عادي Ordinary gauge	
Damascus Hama Railway Line and Extensions (D.H.P.)	149	430	67	297	سكة حديد دمشق حماة وتمديداتها (ش.ح.ح)
The Hijaz Railways (C.F.H.)	240	—	240	—	سكة حديد الحجاز (س.ح)
The Northern Railways (N.R.)	—	248	—	248	الخطوط الشمالية (خ.ش)
Total	389	687	307	545	المجموع

عدد القاطرات والعربات المستعملة في شبكة خطوط السكك الحديدية في نهاية ١٩٥٢

NUMBER OF LOCOMOTIVES AND WAGONS USED BY THE RAILWAY SYSTEMS, AS AT THE END OF 1952.

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

Locomotives and Wagons	مجموع الخطوط All lines	الخط الضيق Narrow gauge			الخط العادي Ordinary gauge			القاطرات وانواع العربات
		المجموع Total	ش.ح.ح D.H.P.	س.ح C.F.H.	المجموع Total	ش.ح.ح D.H.P.	خ.ش N.R.	
Locomotives	147	62	38	26	85	66	19	قاطرات
Passenger and luggage wagons	199	117	84	33	82	58	24	عربات الركاب وامتعتهم
Goods wagons	1,795	670	343	327	1,125	518	607	شاحنات بضائع
Fuel wagons	100	27	4	23	73	35	38	شاحنات مهارج
Other wagons	56	3	3	5	43	5	43	عربات اخرى

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

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omy. True, Jordanians have frequently complained of Syrian government regulations which, in an effort to support the Hedjaz Railway, have prohibited transit traffic by truck of most goods. While some categories of goods, notably perishables and petroleum products, are exempt from this prohibition, there is little doubt that more traffic would move by road if the prohibition were entirely lifted. At the same time, Jordan may be able to import and export some bulky commodities more advantageously by rail; Jordan's own port an the Gulf of Akaba has no rail connection and is by no means as advantageously situated with respect to trade with Europe as Beirut. In the circumstances, we would suggest that the subject of transit and the relationship of the rail lines thereto be fully and frankly discussed by representatives of the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese governments. Their common interest in the maintenance of the railway lines and the possibilities of more efficient and economical operation can then be thoroughly examined. It may be feasible to reduce operating costs by agreed economies and to raise revenues through certain selective increases in freight rates. In some respects, for instance, freight rates on the Hedjaz Railway seem to be lower than those on the DHP line. In the long run it appears unwise to make shippers support the railway by insisting that they use it for transport of certain commodities. If the railway must be maintained owing to considerations which are partly non-economic, it would be better to have the governments concerned share the entire deficit resulting from its continued operation.

Road Transport[28]

With traffic on the railways no greater than prewar, it is apparent that motor transport has captured all of the substantial increase in the amount of goods produced and traded in the Syrian economy over the last decade and a half. The Syrian road network increased from 4,500 kilometers in 1939 to 8,200 in 1952, and the length of hard-surface (macadam and asphalt) from 1,500 to 3,800 kilometers. This includes only so-called "all-weather" roads; with the addition of those not traversable in the wet season the total length is over 10,000 kilometers. The number of motor vehicles of all kinds on the roads rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953; the number of trucks increased from 873 to 4,742 and of buses from 348 to 1,212. In part the rapid growth of road transport was caused by the lack of adequate

[28] See Annex H, p. 436.

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494 rail facilities on the principal routes along which commodities had to be moved in growing volume, such as from the Jezireh to Aleppo and Latakia. Unquestionably, also, transport over poor roads has been costly, entailing heavy depreciation and not infrequent interruptions of traffic.

II PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT ROUTES

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For an understanding of the transport problems confronting Syria it is also necessary to outline the principal routes over which traffic must move. One of the main transport lines is the north-south axis connecting Damascus with Homs, Hama and Aleppo to the north and with the Hauran, Djebel Druze and Jordan to the south. Crossing this axis in a west-easterly direction are three principal communication lines running from the three ports serving Syria—Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon and Latakia in northwestern Syria. Of these three ports Tripoli is by far the least important, serving only the region immediately around Homs. Beirut is still an important port of entry for Syrian imports, although the volume handled by Latakia has been rising steadily. Through Latakia, however, goes the bulk of Syria's exports.

The west-east communications lines continue in a generally easterly direction after crossing the north-south axis at Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. Those continuing east of Aleppo and serving the Jezireh and the narrow but fertile irrigated lands of the Euphrates are by far the most important. On the other hand, the road or track running east from Homs through the Syrian desert is of little importance except for serving and patrolling the pipelines conveying oil from Iraq to the port of Banias in Syria and to Tripoli. Of somewhat greater significance is the trans-desert route from Damascus to Baghdad. Although for the most part only a track, it provides an all-weather route over which traffic can move between Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and Iraq and even Iran and Kuwait on the other hand. Over this route the well-known Nairo Transport Company carries on an active international passenger traffic with modern buses and a number of trucking concerns haul high cost products such as fruits and vegetables, machinery and rugs. No special urgency attaches to the improvement of the two routes running eastward from Homs and Damascus, however, and no further consideration will be given to them in this report.

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latter amount, supplemented by increasing allowances for maintenance of the new roads recommended, should basically be adequate for the future as well. Poor organization, inadequate supervision and dispersal of effort seem to have been responsible for the past unsatisfactory results. Maintenance work is not the responsibility of the Director of Transport, but falls under that of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Works, who is too preoccupied to give it adequate attention. Supervision in the field is inadequate, partly because of insufficient engineers and partly because engineers are reluctant to leave their desks. Maintenance crews are too small and their work is seldom concentrated in such a way as to effect visible improvement. This aspect of road work certainly demands the urgent attention of the Syrian government, which might well seek foreign technical advice on better organization of maintenance. We urge the establishment of a special highway department in the Ministry of Public Works to look after both maintenance and new construction.

Some increase in the availability of maintenance machinery appears desirable. The machinery park now includes 59 rollers, 62 boilers and 24 mixers, but no graders or bulldozers. Many of the rollers are old and some are defective and too light. The mission has accordingly allowed £S 1 million for new machinery in its recommended program.

Regulation of Road Traffic

Better regulation of road traffic is another requirement for the improvement of motor transport. A comprehensive road code exists, but there is virtually no policing to enforce it. Reckless driving is a common occurrence, and the accident rate appears to be excessive although no record is kept. Above all, chronic overloading of trucks wreaks havoc with road surfaces. As a minimum it is desirable to install a few weighing stations at key traffic centers to enforce loading regulations. Another cause for concern is the restrictive policy, originating with the French mandatory regime, which the government pursues in licensing common carrier trucks. Basically this policy provides that no new truck (other than tank trucks) will be licensed unless an old one is retired. Truck licenses, which are negotiable, therefore sell at a premium of £S 10,000 and more, and the number of commercial or common carrier trucks has tended to remain stationary while the number of private trucks has greatly increased. While the tendency toward even larger trucks has undoubtedly increased over-all

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494 capacity significantly, the restrictive policy may have contributed to higher trucking charges. Recently there has been some relaxation of the restrictions. The mission concedes that in principle it might be desirable to regulate the number of trucks in order to prevent excessive investment in road transport. The government, however, has little knowledge about the adequacy of the number of trucks to guide it in applying such a regulation, and it would be better to achieve the objective indirectly by charging a high fee for new truck licenses, as is done in the case of tank trucks.

504 III PORTS

One of the most important transport projects undertaken by the Syrian government in recent years is the construction of the port of Latakia. This is Syria's only real port other than Banias, which handles just the oil coming in over the pipeline from the oilfields in northern Iraq. The decision to create a port at Latakia was formally taken early in 1950 when a company, capitalized at £S 24 million, was formed to establish and operate the port. Nearly all of the capital has been furnished by the government; private capital has subscribed only 10%, despite a government guarantee of a 5% dividend.

Natural conditions at Latakia, as indeed along most of the eastern Mediterranean coast, are not particularly favorable to a port. There is no natural harbor and heavy winds from January to March impede port operations. For this reason, the principal feature of the port program is the construction of a breakwater and the deepening of the basin behind it. Other features call for the construction of quays and warehouses with a capacity of 15,000 cubic meters and the installation of cargo-handling equipment. Work on the breakwater and quays is proceeding and plans for the equipment of the port are being perfected. The breakwater and quays should be finished in 1956 and the remainder of the work in the following year. To complete these plans will probably entail a further outlay [488] of £S 38 million over the coming years. Plans at this stage do not provide for the building of a grain silo. The mission's sole recommendation is that this omission be remedied, since in our opinion the installation of mechanized grain handling equipment is imperative in a port where the bulk of the traffic consists of cereals.

Meanwhile, as previously indicated, the volume of cargo handled by

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on Ports in this Annex) are no less essential to a solution of the east-west transportation problem than they are to improvement of the farmer's marketing position.

Comparative Cost of Rail and Road Transport

In the specific case of transport across northern Syria, we have tried to determine the comparative cost to the economy of road and rail transport in terms of depreciation of the capital investment, maintenance, fuel and supplies. Depreciation on railway rolling stock has been figured on the basis of 30 years' life, on motor vehicles on the basis of 7 years' life. No allowance has been made for depreciation of the investment in permanent way for the projected railway because the life of the rail roadway may be considered virtually indefinite with normal maintenance and renewals. (The latter are included under "Maintenance" in Table 5.) We have assumed, however, that with the development of heavier and speedier motor vehicles, a highway would be obsolescent within 30 years and require complete reconstruction. As already indicated in the mission's Main Report, we have assumed a freight movement of about 700,000 tons from Jezireh to Aleppo, of 150,000 tons from Aleppo to Jezireh, of 500,000 tons from Aleppo to Latakia and of 250,000 tons from Latakia to Aleppo. Of this total traffic of somewhat over 400 million ton-kilometers annually, a new railway might be expected to carry about two-thirds. The comparative investment would be about £S 170 million, including £S 24 million for rolling stock, for a railway and perhaps £S 97 million, including £S 40 million for some 800 12.5-ton trucks, for road transport.

Table 5 shows the results of our calculations. They leave no doubt that rail transport would be much more economical than road transport. The estimates are, of course, subject to a margin of error; and the annual savings in costs might best be stated within a range of £S 15 to £S 20 million.

The real question, however, is whether this saving, which is equivalent to an increase in real national income, is sufficient to justify the additional capital investment required by a railway. We have previously estimated this difference in capital cost at £S 73 million. The actual difference, however, is likely to be greater. Even if a railway were built, it would still be necessary to undertake some investment in roads, not only for the construction of feeder roads for the railway, but also for the improvement of existing main routes. The alternative is not rail investment or road invest-

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ment but investment in a railway plus some roads or an investment in roads alone. On this basis the first alternative is likely to require a capital outlay of around £S 100 million more than the second.

An amount of £S 100 million could only be found at the expense of other development projects, and probably, in particular, at the expense of irrigation projects which also require much capital. In our opinion, an equivalent investment in irrigation works is likely to contribute almost

TABLE 5 Annual Cost to the Economy of Rail and Road Transport

(Thousand £S)

	Rail	Road
Depreciation		
Roadway	—	1,900
Rolling stock or vehicles	800	5,714
Maintenance		
Rolling stock or vehicles	1,484	8,200[b]
Roadway	2,380[a]	700[c]
Fuel and oil	600	5,590[d]
Total	5,264	22,104

[a] Including renewals.
[b] Calculated at 17 piasters per vehicle-kilometer.
[c] Calculated at £S 1,000 per kilometer.
[d] Calculated at 18 piasters per vehicle-kilometer.

£S 30 million to national income. Moreover, the increase in primary output as the result of this investment would also bring about an expansion of income in the commercial and transport sectors of the economy which might well be between £S 10 and £S 15 million. Thus the total direct and indirect contribution to national income might reach £S 40 to £S 45 million. It seems to us therefore that the capital investment required for a railway would yield much higher returns to the economy if it were employed for irrigation. In other words, the mission could have found place for a railway in the development program it has recommended only by eliminating a substantial part of the proposed outlays on irrigation and reclamation. A program so altered would have made a smaller total contribution to the economy and was rejected for that reason.

There is still another, though secondary, reason for preferring a road

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program to a rail program as a solution of the Jezireh's transport problem. In the case of a railway all the investment funds would have to be furnished by the government, for private capital in such magnitude will simply not be available. On the other hand, private investment is and will be available for truck transport, so that government investment can be confined to road construction. In a country where it is difficult to transfer private savings to public hands this is an important consideration.

The mission has noted a report that a foreign firm would be willing to build a railway on the basis of payments spread over a period of 10 years following completion of construction. It should be pointed out, however, that the contraction of a foreign debt for this purpose might well impair Syria's capacity to borrow for other projects. The mission's proposed development program has already assumed a certain amount of external borrowing. Thus the contraction of foreign credits for railway construction is unlikely to provide Syria with more resources for financing a development program than we have envisaged.

It is sometimes argued that the operation of a railway would require fewer imports on a continuing basis than road transport, and that this would be advantageous for Syria's balance of payments and would also make transport less subject to interruption of foreign supplies in the event of war. There is no doubt that fewer imports would be required for rail transport. However, the savings in foreign exchange thus achieved would be smaller than the foreign exchange earned by the agricultural commodities that could be produced on land which could be irrigated if the additional capital required for a railway were devoted to irrigation projects. Moreover, the fact that a railway would be relatively less dependent on foreign supplies would be an advantage in time of war only if Syria itself were not involved in hostilities; if the war extended to Syrian territory, railway transport would be more susceptible to interruption by bombing than road transport.

II ROAD TRANSPORT

A ROAD SYSTEM AND TRAFFIC DEMANDS

Distribution of Syrian roads by use and type, in 1953, was as shown in Table 6.

The number of motor vehicles in the country has grown about 3½

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TABLE 6 Syrian All-Weather Roads, 1953

(*Kilometers*)

Type	Asphalted	Metalled	Earthen	Total
International and main highways	1,700	290	1,010	3,000
Others of economic importance	600	640	1,000	2,240
Local roads	300	270	2,390	2,960
Total	2,600	1,200	4,400	8,200

times since just before the war, and has nearly doubled since 1948 (see Table 7). Of special significance are trucks and buses, which not only have become more numerous but are constantly increasing in individual size and weight.

TABLE 7 Motor Vehicles in Circulation, 1937–53

Type	1937	1948	1951	1952	1953	1953 as % of 1937
Trucks	873	3,443	4,557	4,594	4,742	544
Buses	348	1,081	1,126	1,129	1,212	348
Passenger cars	2,515	3,101	5,444	6,065	7,192	285
Total	3,736	7,625	11,127	11,788	13,146	352

Of the 4,742 trucks registered in 1953, 158 were tankers and 623 were diesels. No statistics are available on sizes, but most of the newly imported ones are from 7 to 12 tons capacity. The aggregate capacity of trucks on the road is probably in excess of 33,000 tons. These figures do not indicate the true tonnage in circulation; a census during the month of August 1953 showed only about 30% of the 24,137 motor vehicles passing the frontier between Beirut and Damascus to be of Syrian registration.

Data of this kind, if carefully and systematically collected, can be a most useful guide in determining where road improvement funds should be invested for greatest public benefit. Only a few local traffic census figures were available to the mission, and while they appear to contain a number of serious discrepancies, they do indicate the order of magnitude

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of the traffic load on various routes at certain times of the year. As an aid to sound future development, it will be to the advantage of the Syrian government to place the collection of traffic statistics on an organized scientific basis as soon as possible.

B ROAD CONSTRUCTION

Most of the main surfaced roads in western Syria are of 5.5-meter width; in the east the five-meter type is more common. Neither is sufficient for safety under present or anticipated traffic conditions. More satisfactory specifications for general use would call for not less than six meters of finished surface and a firm shoulder of 1-1.5 meters on each side. The mission strongly recommends that hereafter this basic design be used for all new construction, repair or reconstruction of major roads.

A number of road surface materials and methods have been used or considered. The most common construction is of waterbound macadam, both with and without an asphalt covering.

Except for such purposes as the construction of "Irish bridges",[3] concrete is seldom used as a road surface in Syria, cement being considered too expensive. The local delivered price was said to be £S 90 per ton in 1953, although the mission was informed that in 1954 cement could be obtained for £S 80 per ton.

The cement industry is protected by the government and enjoys substantial profit margins. Moreover, the prices quoted include excise taxes of £S 15 per ton, from which public bodies might reasonably be exempt. But the basis of present prices Syria can hardly afford to make greater use of this superior roadbuilding material in meeting the specifications required for the growing commercial trucking.

Recently the possibility of constructing low-cost mix-in-place bituminous roads, with or without soil stabilization, has attracted much attention. The method has been used successfully in several countries of the Middle East, but to date it has not been tried in Syria, partly because the local asphalts of Kfarie and Djebel Bichri have not proven adaptable to the process but also because of some doubt that roads so constructed can withstand heavy truck traffic.

[3] Actually not a bridge but a type of ford, useful where traffic density is moderate and the small or infrequent water flow does not justify a real bridge. The road dips down to streambed level and is strongly paved with reinforced concrete, providing a firm crossing even when inundated.

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491 653 districts without the resources necessary for the most ordinary upkeep.

A wider use of road gangs would achieve far better maintenance, for the same expenditure, than is possible with the prevailing "one-man" system. A team concentrating upon a section at a time can often effect repairs which one man alone cannot do at all; gangs also permit closer technical supervision and more efficient use of equipment—valuable considerations when the supply of both is limited.

Road Maintenance Equipment

491 406 The country as a whole has far too little road-building and maintenance machinery for effective work. Mechanization must of course be introduced gradually where so much of the work is now done by hand. The present stock of equipment cannot meet even current needs. Half the mixers in the Damascus area are unusable, for example. There are no graders or bulldozers for maintenance purposes, although at least ten are needed for the tracks alone.

It is not enough to expect that construction machinery will be assigned to maintenance afterward; much of it will be worn out on the contemplated road-building program. Maintenance machinery should be bought separately. For one or more stone-crushing plants, the necessary bulldozers and graders, new rollers and other equipment needed currently, the mission foresees an expenditure of £S 1 million in the first five-year period and twice this amount in the second five years.

494 D LEGISLATION ON THE USE OF ROADS

Traffic Laws

Syria enacted a modern, comprehensive traffic code in 1953, which contains the usual detailed regulations on vehicle dimensions, maximum wheel loading, weight limits for certain types of roads and bridges, and similiar provisions for protection of the roads. It also provides for periodic inspection of vehicles for mechanical fitness. Rules of the road for safe and courteous driving are prescribed, as well as the knowledge required for obtaining a driver's permit.

The code is essentially a good one, and it is regrettable that most of its provisions are ineffective because of poor enforcement. Apart from the danger to human life, unless better measures are taken to enforce the

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regulations Syria faces a heavy loss of investment in road construction and maintenance. Besides establishment of a number of portable weighing stations, penalties should be imposed against unnecessary driving on the side of the road, which damages the edges, shoulders and adjacent crop land. Farmers should be severely penalized for plowing on the road right-of-way. Heavy traffic should be barred from certain roads and tracks during and just after heavy rains when the ground is soft.

Public Transport

Motor vehicles rendering services for public hire, buses, taxis and certain trucks, are subject to special regulation.

Until 1953, the individual bus owner could operate when, where and under such conditions as he wished. The new law[9] limits his operations to a duly franchised route and permits the government to control the number of buses on a given route, with the aim of preventing uneconomic congestion on popular routes and shortage on others. New bus owners are entitled to be licensed for those routes whose quota is not filled. In this respect the law presupposes a better statistical knowledge of the traffic demand than the government has. There are other valuable provisions, however, and already the legislation has introduced greater cleanliness, uniform rates, and responsibility of the carrier for liability insurance.

Trucks owned and operated by merchants, industrial concerns, farmers and others for the hauling of their own goods are classified as private vehicles. The number of these is not restricted and is increasing rapidly. There were 1,820 licensed private trucks in 1953, compared with 1,556 the year before and only 667 in 1948.

Special regulation of public trucks (those licensed to engage in the public transport business for hire) was introduced during the French mandate to protect the railways from excessive competition. The number of public trucks was limited and, in 1935, the sacrifice of two or more trucks was required as a condition for obtaining a license for a new one. Elsewhere we have mentioned more recent provisions for protection of the railway which prohibit carriage by road of certain classes of goods.

The principle of restricting the total number of public trucks has persisted, although the outmoded original justification has been replaced. The present purpose is to prevent excessive competition among the truckers

[9] Legislative Decree No. 122, October 5, 1953.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Svria MD1

444 themselves. Possibly it may be helpful to regulate the number of trucks in this way, if only to avoid an overinvestment in them by the public. The matter is debatable. There is at least a basic conflict of purpose if on the one hand the government seeks to lower existing highway freight rates, and on the other restricts competition specifically to prevent them from falling. Again, for the government to adjust the supply of trucks nicely to the demand requires statistical data which is certainly not now available.

The system is open to abuse, whether or not it occurs. In any event the cost of licensing a new truck is greatly increased, for the owner must first purchase from another the license of an old truck to be decommissioned. For this freely negotiable right he may have to pay £S 10,000 or more—a price which in itself suggests that rigid restriction is not entirely in the best public interest.

Since 1953 these restrictions have not applied to tank trucks, any number of which may be licensed upon payment of a fee of £S 1,500 per vehicle. The mission suggests that a similar arrangement for other types of trucks would have a restraining influence, while at the same time adding appreciably to government revenues.

International Truck Transport

Reference has been made to the added costs of transport of Syrian goods, particularly on certain seaward routes,[10] occasioned by one or more border crossings.

This problem cannot be viewed as a difficulty unique to Syria, but must be recognized as an inconvenience which raises transport costs for each of the several countries of the region. One study in 1952 reported that it took a truckload of merchandise seven days to travel the 975 kilometers from Beirut to Teheran. The trip was found to involve six sets of customs formalities and documents, loading and reloading the goods onto four different trucks, and four successive drivers—a Lebanese, a Syrian, an Iraqi and an Iranian. Under these circumstances freight rates are unavoidably high, in addition to the breakage and loss occasioned by repeated handling.

Such a self-imposed handicap can be removed only by supplanting the present narrow protective regulations of the individual countries by reciprocal concessions for mutual economic advantage.

[10] For example, from Damascus to Beirut or from Homs to Tripoli.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Lebanon MEI
Syria MDI

S L 496

into Jordan. There is a branch line from Deraa to Suwaida, but another branch, to Haifa, is out of use.

Damas-Hama et Prolongements. (*a*) From Beirut to Damascus there is a narrow-gauge track running for 91 miles via Rayaq; rack and pinion are used to traverse the mountains, and this slow haul is now employed for freight only. (*b*) From Rayaq to Aleppo there is a 4 ft 8 in. gauge track for 270 miles which passes through Homs and Hama. (*c*) The stretch of the Cairo–Turkey line from Ras an-Naqura on the Lebano–Israel border to Beirut is out of commission but the section of 64 miles in standard gauge from Beirut to Tripoli and Homs is used.

Syrian state Railways. This is the part (164 miles) of the Turkey–Mosul line that runs inside Syrian territory.

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Roads

Main arterial roads in Lebanon are considered adequate, but the network of secondary and feeder roads is poor. In Syria the road system is generally inadequate, and only the asphalted roads are usable for heavy traffic throughout the year. The following figures give some indication of the position:

Syria, 1951	Miles	Lebanon, 1949	Miles
1st class, asphalted	2,917	Surfaced	1,811
2nd class, macadamized	1,268	Unimproved	414
Tracks	5,218		

(Sources: *Statesman's Year-Book, 1953*; US Dept. of Commerce.)

S 494

There are over 11,000 vehicles registered in Syria. Trans-desert passenger and goods services to Iraq are in regular use and goods are also moved, including refrigerated vegetables, to Kuwait and Dahran. The authorities are restricting the registration of new lorries to the estimated needs of the countries, but more vehicles are required, particularly diesel lorries for long hauls of heavy loads.

S L 509

Aerodromes. The new airport of Beirut (Khaldeh) receives the Comet, and is beginning to rival Cairo as a gateway to the East, and that of Damascus (Mezzeh) has long been in use by Constellations. Many international airlines stage at Khaldeh or Mezzeh; the approach to Khaldeh is better and, with between twenty and thirty aircraft a day, it has since 1951 outstripped Mezzeh, which has five to ten aircraft a day. For some years plans have been under consideration for moving the Damascus airport to the east of the city. There are two private Lebanese airlines. A national airline in Syria was a financial failure and was taken over by the army. Smaller airfields exist near Tripoli,

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Syria MD1

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21:Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

452 plantation and the value of his lands. Lands without title have no commercial value though the farmer may use them without opposition. This is apparent at the present time when lands with title and undisputed boundaries sell at ten times the price of occupied lands without title A survey and cadastration of Jazirah lands with a rapid and form settlement of boundary disputed and the grant of property deeds will expand the borrowing capacities of Jazirah enonously and may tend to reduce the exorbitant rates of interest demanded by the money lenders. On such a trable basis, other banking establishments may be induced to open business in the region and relieve its dependance on the greedy money lender.

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

491 During the French Mandate there was not a single paved or asphalted road in Jazirah. In winter road communications were out
496 between the different towns and villages and the only means of travel was by train which passed through the more important centers of Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya For the rest of the year road transport became possible but expensive because of the absence of roads For this reason, the whole region of Deirik remained undeveloped until quite recently.

I. Roads Within Jazirah

491 The independent Government in Syria started building a
653 road in 1945 between Qamishli and Hassakeh which served at the same time as the arterial road to Aleppo. Though the distance between the two towns is only 85 kilometers, the funds alloted yearly for the road were so small that now, after seven years, only about 30 kilometers are asphalted and the rest is paved The maintenance does not keep up with the deterioration and the road is going to pieces. However, now at last, communication is assured in all weather while before trucks were stuck for days during the rainy season.

Another asphalted road joins Qamishli with Amuda, a distance of 30 kilometers. Here again deterioration is rapid. This road is to be projected another 30 kilometers to Dirbassiya and from there to Ras el Ain, a distance of 60 kilometers.

491 The road Qamishli-Hassakeh is extended for 50 kilometers south to Point 47 on the way to Deir Ezzor. This section is also asphalted.

III The Baghdad Railway

The Baghdad Railway which runs 247 kilometers in Syria is the principal means of transport for goods. It handles about 200,000 tons of goods every year. The bulk of Jazirah wheat is transported over it. But it has had in recent years keen competition from trucks in spite of the bad roads for several reasons. The Qamishli-Aleppo line passes for 70% of its length through Turkish territory and is under Turkish control. When the Turks choose to irritate the Syrians they restrict the entrance to the stations and in numerous other ways frustrate the Syrians and cause them hardship. Whole trains are unaccountably delayed for days in the Turkish stations. 496 648

Already passenger traffic is handled almost entirely by planes, cars and busses, except in winter months when the roads are unsafe. A bus charges LS 10 from Qamishli to Aleppo and makes the trip in 12 hours. A small car charges LS 20 and makes the trip in 8 hours. It takes the "Express" 20-22 hours to reach Aleppo from Qamishli and the fare is LS 30 in second-class "wagon lit" with tips. 484

For merchandise the train rate is LS 23.5 per ton from Qamishli to Aleppo. It costs the farmer an additional LS 6-12 depending on the distance to transport a ton of wheat from the field to the station. There is also an amount of about LS 4 involved in handling, all of which makes the actual rate by train about LS 35. 489

The truck charges LS 35 from Qamishli to Aleppo during the wheat season but it carries the wheat directly from the combine in the field to the merchant's store in Aleppo thus reducing the handling expenses to a minimum and transporting the goods in the shortest time. If the farmer is not hard pressed for money, which is rather rare, and can wait until the winter months and spring, he can transport his wheat for a rate as low as LS 10-15 per ton by truck. Inversely, the cost of tranport from Aleppo to Jazirah rises in winter and spring and decreases in summer and autumn.

Though truck transport is more advantageous in many ways than transport by train, the number of trucks available and the condition of the roads make the transport of a whole crop by trucks impossible. To achieve that, a complete road network needs to be constructed, diesel trucks would have to be imported and the discriminatory tariffs against them abolished.

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

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SYRIA: the Campaign of 1941 8th June — 12th July

SCALE:— Km. 0 100 200

Roads & Tracks.....

Main Railways.....

T U R K
HATAY
A L E P P O
E U P H
HAMA
LATAKIA
H O M S
D A M A S C U S
HAURAN
JEBEL DRUZE
PALESTINE
TRANSJORDAN

END MAP (A)

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1 LEBANON MD1

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END MAP (B)

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

489 modest quantities of goods between Beirut and Baghdad. Above all, most of the foreign trade of Jordan flows through Syria to and from Beirut.

1 EXISTING TRANSPORT FACILITIES

A brief inventory of the principal transport facilities is an essential preliminary to a discussion of the problems and methods of coping with them.

496 *The Railways*[28]

Three railways operate in Syria—the Northern Railway, the Hedjaz Railway and the DHP (Chemin de Fer Damas, Hama et Prolongements).

The Northern Railway is the Syrian section of that international railway which achieved fame as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Coming from Baghdad and Mosul in Iraq, it traverses a portion of northeastern Syria from Tell Kotchek to Kamichliye, then enters Turkey, proceeding just along the boundary until it turns south to Aleppo and finally once again north to Turkey where one branch runs to the port of Iskenderun and the other to Istanbul. The Syrian sections are owned by the government and managed by a Director of Railways and Council Administration under the Ministry of Public Works. Out of approximately 400,000 tons of cargo carried in 1952, the Northern Railway transported about 101,000 tons for Iraq, mostly in transit, and some 106,000 tons, principally grain and coal, in transit for Turkey. Although the traffic is modest, the development of agricultural production in the Syrian Jezireh and the adjoining portions of Turkey have been instrumental in raising it from about 22 million ton-kilometers in 1938 to 55 million in 1953.

[665]

The Northern Railway links at Aleppo with the DHP, operated by a private French company under an 1893 concession and serving both Syria and Lebanon. The DHP system consists of both narrow- and standard-gauge lines. The most important standard-gauge line runs from Aleppo via Hama and Homs to the Lebanese port of Tripoli and thence along the Lebanese coast. Aside from agricultural commodities produced in the Homs-Hama region, it carries the bulk of transit traffic to and from Iraq coming over the Northern Railway. It also carries Syrian cereals and

[28] See Annex H, p. 425.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

other products to Lebanon, imported raw sugar for processing at the Homs refinery, and, to some extent, petroleum products from the oil refinery at Tripoli. At Homs another standard-gauge line runs south into Lebanon to Rayak where it links up with the DHP's narrow-gauge railway connecting Beirut with Damascus. For Syria this narrow-gauge line has little economic importance; it handles transit traffic for Jordan almost exclusively. In 1952 it carried approximately 129,000 tons compared to 385,000 tons for the standard-gauge portion of the system, and of this total well over 100,000 tons was for Jordanian account. The DHP transports more passengers than either of the other two railways, but most of this is local traffic and in recent postwar years, in terms of passenger-kilometers, it has been only 11% to 17% of prewar levels.

At Damascus the DHP narrow-gauge line joins the narrow-gauge railway of the Hedjaz which runs south to Amman, the Jordanian capital, and some distance beyond. The Hedjaz Railway is a *waqf* or Moslem religious endowment, administered by the Syrian government through the agency of a director-general and a Council of Administration responsible to the Prime Minister. It was built to handle the pilgrim traffic and originally ran over a distance of 3,159 kilometers to Medina in Saudi Arabia. During the first World War most of the line was dismantled and has never been rebuilt. In January 1954, however, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to reconstruct the entire line to Medina, with Saudi Arabia apparently undertaking to finance the greater part of the cost. Despite the disruption of the rail connection with the Moslem Holy Places, pilgrim traffic over the Hedjaz Railway has shown a tendency to revive in recent years, because the Syrian government has come to the rescue of the railway by prohibiting pilgrimages by sea from Latakia, and steps have been taken to organize the transport of pilgrims by sea from the Jordanian port of Aqaba to Jidda. The goods traffic of the railway is, as in the case of the Damascus-Beirut line, almost all transit trade for Jordan. In fact, the volume of Syrian goods transported internally represents less than 10% of the total.

The nadir of traffic on all the Syrian railways combined was reached in 1949 and 1950. In recent years there has been a recovery, but the volume of goods traffic handled in 1953 barely reached prewar levels, while passenger traffic was only about one-third of the prewar volume.[27] It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the railways should be operating at a deficit. The

[27] See Annex H, p. 427.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

446 Syrian government has been sharing the deficit of the DHP Railway with the Lebanese government on a fifty-fifty basis and also defraying the losses of the Hedjaz and Northern Railways. Government outlays on this account have been rising—from an average of £S 641,000 in 1950-52 to an estimated £S 750,000 in 1953 and £S 1.209 million in 1954. Unfortunately a further substantial increase must be anticipated. The Turkish government is expected to complete in 1955 or 1956 a railway shortcut which will make it unnecessary for export grain produced in southern Turkey, as well as other commodities, to transit through Syria on the way to Iskenderun. This will probably mean an annual loss in gross revenues of a little over £S 2 million for the Northern Railway. Even though the loss may be partially offset by a decline in operating expenses and it may prove feasible to recoup some revenue by increasing freight rates for Syrian goods, it is probable that the government will have to meet an additional deficit of at least £S 1 million a year.

Besides these operating subventions to the railways, the government will apparently be spending some £S 5 million for the acquisition of the Syrian portions of the DHP network. Negotiations for the purchase of these lines and a corresponding amount of rolling stock have been in [455] progress for some time and will probably be completed before long. They were dictated partly by the government's desire to own all the railways on Syrian soil and partly by its belief that Syrian operation would result in economies, particularly by reduction of overhead expenses. The latter objective may well be realized for the standard-gauge lines which are to be incorporated into the Northern Railway. It is more doubtful that significant economies will be achieved by taking over the Syrian portion of the narrow-gauge Damascus-Beirut line, which should logically be turned over to the Hedjaz Railway for operation.

In view of the rather low volume of traffic and the deficit character of the railway operation, the mission has considered whether it would not be advisable to abandon certain railway lines, particularly the Beirut-Damascus and Hedjaz Railways. For a number of reasons we have concluded that such a course would be unwise. Abandonment of the Beirut-Damascus line would increase by about 5-10% truck traffic on the parallel road, which is already becoming overburdened. Local passenger traffic would also have to be transferred to the road. It has already been pointed out that the two lines mentioned serve primarily as a transit artery for Jordan; their closing might therefore seriously affect the Jordanian econ-

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omy. True, Jordanians have frequently complained of Syrian government regulations which, in an effort to support the Hedjaz Railway, have prohibited transit traffic by truck of most goods. While some categories of goods, notably perishables and petroleum products, are exempt from this prohibition, there is little doubt that more traffic would move by road if the prohibition were entirely lifted. At the same time, Jordan may be able to import and export some bulky commodities more advantageously by rail; Jordan's own port an the Gulf of Akaba has no rail connection and is by no means as advantageously situated with respect to trade with Europe as Beirut. In the circumstances, we would suggest that the subject of transit and the relationship of the rail lines thereto be fully and frankly discussed by representatives of the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese governments. Their common interest in the maintenance of the railway lines and the possibilities of more efficient and economical operation can then be thoroughly examined. It may be feasible to reduce operating costs by agreed economies and to raise revenues through certain selective increases in freight rates. In some respects, for instance, freight rates on the Hedjaz Railway seem to be lower than those on the DHP line. In the long run it appears unwise to make shippers support the railway by insisting that they use it for transport of certain commodities. If the railway must be maintained owing to considerations which are partly non-economic, it would be better to have the governments concerned share the entire deficit resulting from its continued operation.

Road Transport[28]

With traffic on the railways no greater than prewar, it is apparent that motor transport has captured all of the substantial increase in the amount of goods produced and traded in the Syrian economy over the last decade and a half. The Syrian road network increased from 4,500 kilometers in 1939 to 8,200 in 1952, and the length of hard-surface (macadam and asphalt) from 1,500 to 3,800 kilometers. This includes only so-called "all-weather" roads; with the addition of those not traversable in the wet season the total length is over 10,000 kilometers. The number of motor vehicles of all kinds on the roads rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953; the number of trucks increased from 873 to 4,742 and of buses from 348 to 1,212. In part the rapid growth of road transport was caused by the lack of adequate

[28] See Annex H, p. 436.

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As already indicated, the Jezireh is also served by the international railway which criss-crosses the frontier. It is difficult to use because the three railway administrations controlling it do not cooperate effectively, and crucial seasonal shortages of freight cars often hold up grain movements. By and large the railway assists only in the transport of commodities produced in a narrow belt along the frontier. While the railway annually transports between 150,000 and 200,000 tons of the Jezireh's agricultural output, much more moves by road.

The cost of transport across northern Syria is very burdensome and motor transport rates are subject to sharp seasonal fluctuations. In part, of course, this is caused by the unavoidably seasonal nature of the agricultural products traffic and the lack of adequate return cargo to the Jezireh. The very fact, however, that the Jezireh roads are impassable during much of the winter rainy season greatly accentuates the seasonal movement and necessitates a larger investment in trucks. Under such circumstances truck operators charge what the traffic will bear. During the harvest season it costs £S 40-50 per ton to transport grain from Kamichliye or Hassetche to Aleppo and about £S 25-30 from Ras el Ain to Aleppo. During the "dead season," such as the spring, following the rainy season, these rates are almost halved. The high rates are caused in part, of course, by the heavy maintenance and depreciation charges for trucks. On the railway the freight rate for grain from the Jezireh to Aleppo is the same the year around, about £S 25 per ton.

During most of the postwar period agricultural prices have been high, providing sufficient incentive to an expansion of production in areas remote from the port despite high transport costs. With the marked decline in prices during the last few years, however, the burden on the producers has become progressively more severe. Since transport and handling charges remained the same, they received a smaller proportion of the falling export price at the port. In 1953 transport charges of £S 50-60 per ton from the Jezireh to Latakia represented about a third of the f.o.b. export price of barley and somewhat more than a fifth of that of wheat. At the same time transport adds to the cost of production. Thus in the Jezireh gas oil for tractors and irrigation pumps is about 75-100% more expensive than at Homs and gasoline for harvesting combines is 20-25% higher.

The mission has given much thought to the question of how the transport problem in the north of Syria might most effectively be solved. Since the construction of a railway linking the Jezireh with Aleppo and Latakia

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

FOLLOWING P. 140(A)

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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

FOLLOWING P. 140 (B)

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commodities is reflected in the seasonal fluctuations of the traffic as shown in Figure 1.

The volume of passenger traffic, after reaching a record low in 1950, has also recovered slightly in recent years, as shown by Table 4. In 1953, however, it was still only a little over one-third of the prewar traffic. All of the losses have been suffered by the DHP system.

TABLE 4 Railway Transport of Passengers

(*Million passenger-kilometers*)

Year	DHP	Hedjaz	Northern	Total
1938	100.8	13.0	4.7	118.5
1947	40.2	7.6	10.1	57.9
1948	38.8	7.5	5.2	51.5
1949	17.0	7.6	5.1	29.7
1950	11.2	5.4	5.3	21.9
1951	12.5	6.0	6.3	24.8
1952	13.4	10.6	5.8	29.8
1953	16.2	15.2	5.6	37.0
1953 as % of 1938	16.0%	116.7%	119.3%	31.2%

C RAILWAY PROPOSALS

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Conversion of Gauges

Several proposals aimed at unification of the rail network have involved the conversion of narrow-gauge lines to standard width. A 1907 project called for standard-gauge construction from Beirut to Rayak, with a 5,360-meter tunnel near Hammana, at a cost of 61 million gold francs. Rejected because of its expense, this scheme was revived in 1932 in connection with a proposed electrification. A similar scheme, but with a shorter tunnel (3,985 meters), envisaged a standard-gauge line from Beirut to Damascus, whose cost today would be at least £L 140 million.

In 1945 the Syrian government studied the possibility of adding a third rail to the narrow-gauge line from Rayak to Damascus and found the cost to be £S 18 million to £S 23 million. An alternative Damascus-Homs railway through Syrian territory, via Kariatein and Forqloss, was esti-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

496 mated to cost about £S 36 million and was preferred, but neither project was carried out. There have also been proposals for converting the Hedjaz Railway to standard gauge as far as the border (£S 11 million) and for building an entirely new line south of Damascus at a cost of about £S 34 million.

It is difficult to justify the cost of any of these projects today on the basis of traffic analysis. At present the most important freight movement over the narrow-gauge lines is between Beirut and Jordan, and for this reason the conversion of any part of the system without the rest would only create an obstacle. For pilgrim traffic the same is true, especially in view of current plans to restore the Hedjaz line to Medina. Indeed, the mission feels that when the government acquires the DHP system it may prove more advantageous to turn its narrow-gauge trackage over to the connecting Hedjaz Railway as a natural extension of that line.

Electrification

On a number of occasions it has been asked whether electrification of the Syrian railroads would help to reduce operating losses. The problem has been studied carefully in the case of the DHP narrow-gauge line, both for its entire length and from Beirut to Rayak. Calculations have shown the cost to be prohibitive.

Electrified railways call for expensive installations and high maintenance costs. Under ordinary circumstances economical operation of such lines requires not only cheap power but a dense traffic pattern. Short hauls and frequent schedules with small units (as in metropolitan suburban service) or high-revenue transport on longer hauls are among the favorable factors sought. Perhaps in time these conditions may develop in appropriate Syrian localities. Within the near future, however, it is unlikely that circumstances in any part of Syria will permit railway electrification on an economic basis.

489 D RAILWAY VS. ROAD DEVELOPMENT

Syria's principal transport problem is how to provide the most efficient and economical method for moving the large volume of goods across northern Syria between Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia. Since at present neither the existing railway nor the highway systems can cope with this

TRANSPORTATION

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1953

طول خطوط السكك الحديدية المستعملة في نهاية عام ١٩٥٣ (بالكيلو مترات)

LENGTH OF RAILWAY TRACKS IN USE AS AT THE END OF 1953 (in kms)

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

Railway System	الطول الاجمالي Total Length		طول الخط المار بسوريا Length within Syrian territory		شبكة الخطوط الحديدية
	خط ضيق Narrow gauge	خط عادي Ordinary gauge	خط ضيق Narrow gauge	خط عادي Ordinary gauge	
Damascus Hama Railway Line and Extensions (D.H.P.)	149	439	67	297	سكة حديد شام حماة وتمديداتها (ش ح ت)
The Hijaz Railways (C.F.H.)	240	—	240	—	سكة حديد الحجاز (س ح)
The Northern Railways (N.R.)	—	248	—	248	الخطوط الشمالية (خ ش)
Total	389	687	307	545	المجموع

عدد القاطرات والعربات المستعملة في شبكة خطوط السكك الحديدية في نهاية ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF LOCOMOTIVES AND WAGONS USED BY THE RAILWAY SYSTEMS, AS AT THE END OF 1953.

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

Locomotives and Wagons	مجموع الخطوط All lines	الخط الضيق Narrow gauge			الخط العادي Ordinary gauge			القاطرات وانواع العربات
		المجموع Total	ش ح ت D.H.P.	س ح C.F.H.	المجموع Total	ش ح ت D.H.P.	خ ش N.R.	
Locomotives	147	62	36	26	85	66	19	قاطرات
Passenger and luggage wagons	199	117	84	33	82	58	24	عربات الركاب وامتعتهم
Goods wagons	1,795	670	343	327	1,125	518	607	شاحنات بضائع
Fuel wagons	100	27	4	23	73	15	58	شاحنات صهاريج
Other wagons	56	8	3	5	48	5	43	عربات اخرى

Source : Ministry of Public Works

المصدر : وزارة الاشغال العامة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON ME1
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refinery is running on imported crude oil at about a quarter of its capacity. There exists an IPC refinery at Tripoli which treats over half a million tons of crude a year (10,000 barrels a day) for the needs of Syria and Lebanon which it cannot fully supply; accordingly, its extension has been under discussion. Construction has begun on a refinery for 7,000 barrels a day at Sidon for Mediterranean Refining Company (California Texas Corporation), but while the Syrian market is still too small to justify the erection of a refinery, the Syrian Government nevertheless wishes to have a refinery established in the country to meet its own needs, and negotiations to this end with IPC and with the World Bank have recently taken place.[1]

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Under the Barcelona Convention of 1921 dues are not leviable on transit trade, but the two countries draw, under their agreements with the pipeline companies, a sizable revenue from petroleum apart from the indirect benefits caused by employment by the oil companies. At the time of writing the agreements between the two Governments and the two oil companies are under review but no precise details are available, though the two Governments began by demanding that they should receive jointly a half share of the saving which the companies made by using the pipelines instead of having to transport their oil to the Mediterranean by tanker. Even if this principle were accepted, the difficulty would remain of establishing a satisfactory formula for calculating the saving. The agreement with Tapline is believed to provide Lebanon with about £L4½ million a year. The oil companies bring foreign exchange into Syria and the Lebanon and the currency is surrendered to the Governments at the official rate but can thereafter be resold at the rate applying to the free market which may bring to the Governments a profit of a third. The problem is that Syria and Lebanon are, in fact, not oil-producing states and, although their needs and desires for foreign money may be as great as Iraq's, it is difficult to see how they can expect to obtain from petroleum the same revenue as do the states where it is produced.

Communications

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In general, roads provide a cheaper and quicker means of transport than the railways which are mostly running at a loss. The railway lines are:

The Hejaz Railway. A narrow (3 ft 5 in.) gauge track runs from the centre of Damascus to Deraa (88 miles) and thence

[1] See *Petroleum Press Service*, February 1953, p. 53.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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into Jordan. There is a branch line from Deraa to Suwaida, but another branch, to Haifa, is out of use.

Damas-Hama et Prolongements. (*a*) From Beirut to Damascus there is a narrow-gauge track running for 91 miles via Rayaq; rack and pinion are used to traverse the mountains, and this slow haul is now employed for freight only. (*b*) From Rayaq to Aleppo there is a 4 ft 8 in. gauge track for 270 miles which passes through Homs and Hama. (*c*) The stretch of the Cairo–Turkey line from Ras an-Naqura on the Lebano–Israel border to Beirut is out of commission but the section of 64 miles in standard gauge from Beirut to Tripoli and Homs is used.

Syrian state Railways. This is the part (164 miles) of the Turkey–Mosul line that runs inside Syrian territory.

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Roads

Main arterial roads in Lebanon are considered adequate, but the network of secondary and feeder roads is poor. In Syria the road system is generally inadequate, and only the asphalted roads are usable for heavy traffic throughout the year. The following figures give some indication of the position:

Syria, 1951	Miles	Lebanon, 1949	Miles
1st class, asphalted	2,917	Surfaced	1,811
2nd class, macadamized	1,268	Unimproved	414
Tracks	5,218		

(Sources: *Statesman's Year-Book, 1953*; US Dept. of Commerce.)

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There are over 11,000 vehicles registered in Syria. Trans-desert passenger and goods services to Iraq are in regular use and goods are also moved, including refrigerated vegetables, to Kuwait and Dahran. The authorities are restricting the registration of new lorries to the estimated needs of the countries, but more vehicles are required, particularly diesel lorries for long hauls of heavy loads.

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Aerodromes. The new airport of Beirut (Khaldeh) receives the Comet, and is beginning to rival Cairo as a gateway to the East, and that of Damascus (Mezzeh) has long been in use by Constellations. Many international airlines stage at Khaldeh or Mezzeh; the approach to Khaldeh is better and, with between twenty and thirty aircraft a day, it has since 1951 outstripped Mezzeh, which has five to ten aircraft a day. For some years plans have been under consideration for moving the Damascus airport to the east of the city. There are two private Lebanese airlines. A national airline in Syria was a financial failure and was taken over by the army. Smaller airfields exist near Tripoli,

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

489 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

441 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

p. 146 (B)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

bul to Baghdad. A railroad also runs from Beirut to Damascus via Rayak. A second line from Damascus to Amman and Ma'an, in Jordan, forms part of the so-called "pilgrim" railway, opened in 1904-06. Air services are available from Damascus and, to a lesser extent, from Aleppo to Beirut and Baghdad, thence to Europe, Africa and the Far East. 496 509

Food and Nutrition

The nutritional standards of the people vary markedly in different regions, being highest in the vicinity of Damascus and lowest among the Alawites of Latakia province and the peasants of Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Undernutrition is common, but generally it is more widespread in the rural villages than in the urban areas. Due to the lack of adequate storage and transportation facilities, local food shortages are frequent, particularly during poor crop years. Up to the present, there has been little organized effort to promote better nutrition among the different population groups. It is expected that such a program will be initiated by the nutrition division created within the governmental health services in 1952. 146 369 [262] 146 654

Cereals constitute the staple foods, and, with certain root vegetables, contribute 70 to 80 per cent of the caloric content of the average diet. Breads prepared from wheat flour are consumed in all parts of the country. Barley is sometimes employed, while maize and sorghum millet are used in the southeast. Rice is universally popular: it is grown in the Al Jazira region, and large amounts are also imported. Broad beans, chick-peas and lentils are basic food items in most areas. Other vegetables, including onions, potatoes, beets, tomatoes, eggplant and the leafy spinach and French lettuce, are abundant in Damascus and Al Jazira provinces, but scarce in Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Numerous fruits are consumed in season, but the supply is scanty in the Euphrates valley and in the southern provinces. Olives and olive oil are important among most population groups. Milk is 262

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ANNEX H

NOTES ON TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

1 RAILWAYS

A RAILWAY SYSTEMS

The Northern Railway consists of 248 km. of trackage, 19 aged locomotives and other rolling stock as shown in Table 1.[1] Traffic is rather light, 55 million ton-kilometers in 1953, including goods in transit. 497 [493]

TABLE 1 Rolling Stock of the Northern Railway

Year built	Locomotives		Passenger luggage		Freight wagons			
	Line	Yard	Cars	Vans	Closed	Open	Special	Total
1901–15	13	2	4	4	345	162	96	603
1916–30	—	—	5	1	—	—	—	—
1931–45	4	—	2	—	—	46	—	46
1946–53	—	—	—	5	17	—	—	17
Total	17	2	11	10	362	208	96	666

Under an agreed system, settlements are made by Turkey for carriage of her goods over the Syrian portions of the line and vice versa. With so much of the route in Turkish territory, Syria's heaviest shipments, between the Jezireh and Aleppo, represent comparatively little revenue for the Northern Railway. For example, the tariff for transporting a ton of grain from Kamichliye to Aleppo is £S 24.50, of which about £S 19 accrues to the Turkish railway administration. While this debit is partially offset by reciprocal credits for Syrian transport of Turkish goods, the exchange rates used in the settlement of accounts between the two railways operate to the disadvantage of Syria, causing the Northern Railway a net loss, for

[1] To handle the peak harvest load, for which its rolling stock is insufficient, the Northern Railway has made a practice of hiring 100 extra wagons seasonally from the Iraqi railways. These are further supplemented by an average of some 200 Turkish wagons borrowed at frontier stations for temporary Syrian service.

497 instance, of £S 462,000 in net operating income during the year 1953.

The DHP railway network has been operating at a loss for some time. In accordance with agreements between the railway company and the Lebanese and Syrian governments, the latter two must cover such losses equally. In 1952 Syrian payments on this account amounted to £S 500,000 or roughly one piaster per ton-kilometer of freight carried.

The Hedjaz Railway now serves mainly to link Amman, the Jordanian capital, with Damascus and, via the DHP line, with Beirut. The Syrian portion, 140 kilometers long, passes through Dera'a, where there are two short lateral branches on Syrian soil. One of these goes eastward to Basra. The other parallels the border westward and once continued to the coast at Haifa, but now ends near the Israeli frontier, where its bridge was destroyed in 1948.

In 1953 the Syrian portion carried 6,742 pilgrims over 951,000 passenger-kilometers, but other passenger traffic brought the total to 15.218 million passenger-kilometers, two-thirds of which was local internal travel. Freight transport during 1953 amounted to 23.406 million ton-kilometers, of which about 93% was in transit internationally and nearly 80% came over the DHP connection.

While many of the rates on all Syrian railways are below cost, those on the Hedjaz line are exceptionally low. This fact, together with a less-than-optimum volume of traffic, has undoubtedly contributed to the growing operating deficit in postwar years. From March 1945 until the beginning of 1954 the Syrian government had met or assumed obligations of this railway aggregating £S 2 million.[2]

Besides taking steps to bolster passenger revenue, the government has tried to support rail freight since 1953 by prohibiting transport by road of a considerable variety of commodities in transit to and from Jordan.[3]

Taken together, the three Syrian railways provide a network of 852

[2] In addition to paying the operating deficits, the government guaranteed a loan from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban to the Hedjaz Railway for reconstruction of its spacious Ain Building in the center of Damascus.

[3] By agreement with Jordan, truck transport must be permitted for: (1) goods from Syria to a third country via Jordan; (2) goods, except wheat and phosphates, from Jordan to a third country via Syria; (3) Syrian imports via Jordan; (4) perishables from Lebanon to Jordan; (5) perishable imports for Jordan through Lebanese ports; (6) machinery and spares in transit via Lebanon; (7) petroleum products; (8) all imports for Jordan via Syrian ports; (9) supplies for refugees; (10) motor vehicles; (11) Syrian exports to Jordan and vice versa; (12) any freight to or from Jordan via Lebanon for which the railway cannot provide proper service; and (13) any other categories on which the customs of both countries may agree.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

route-kilometers, comprising 545 kilometers of standard-gauge line and 307 kilometers of narrow-gauge. Except for the necessity of reloading where the track gauges change, passage is possible from any part of the system to any other, although not without leaving Syrian territory. The combined Syrian rolling stock on this network at the end of 1953 included 147 locomotives and 2,150 cars of all types, distributed as shown in Table 2. #497

TABLE 2 Rolling Stock of Syrian Railways, 1953 #493

	Standard-gauge			Narrow-gauge		
	DHP	NR	Total	DHP	Hedjaz	Total
Locomotives	66	19	85	36	26	62
Passenger and luggage cars	58	24	82	84	33	117
Goods wagons	518	607	1,125	343	327	670
Tank wagons	15	58	73	4	23	27
Other wagons	5	43	48	3	5	8

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953. For the Northern Railway figures differ slightly from those of Table 1 because of different inventory dates.

B FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC #497

The volume of freight traffic handled by the three railways declined from 138.56 million ton-kilometers in 1938 to 86.54 million in 1949, but recovered to 130.44 million by 1953. The composition of the cargo transported in recent years is given in Table 3. The importance of agricultural

TABLE 3 Freight Carried by Syrian Railways, 1951–53

	Tons			% of total		
	1951	1952	1953	1951	1952	1953
Cereals and flour	380,406	460,650	462,295	38.6	45.1	45.7
Livestock	63,922	45,054	56,381	6.5	4.4	5.6
Other agricultural produce	48,653	44,254	53,874	4.9	4.3	5.3
Petroleum products	86,082	95,753	110,588	8.7	9.4	10.9
Cement and other building materials	109,224	66,357	83,422	11.1	6.5	8.2
Other	298,228	308,188	245,495	30.2	30.3	24.3
Total	986,515	1,020,256	1,012,055	100.0	100.0	100.0

NOTE: The total tonnage carried is exaggerated to the extent that a portion of the cargo is handled by several railways.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

447 commodities is reflected in the seasonal fluctuations of the traffic as shown in Figure 1.

The volume of passenger traffic, after reaching a record low in 1950, has also recovered slightly in recent years, as shown by Table 4. In 1953, however, it was still only a little over one-third of the prewar traffic. All of the losses have been suffered by the DHP system.

TABLE 4 Railway Transport of Passengers

(*Million passenger-kilometers*)

Year	DHP	Hedjaz	Northern	Total
1938	100.8	13.0	4.7	118.5
1947	40.2	7.6	10.1	57.9
1948	38.8	7.5	5.2	51.5
1949	17.0	7.6	5.1	29.7
1950	11.2	5.4	5.3	21.9
1951	12.5	6.0	6.3	24.8
1952	13.4	10.6	5.8	29.8
1953	16.2	15.2	5.6	37.0
1953 as % of 1938	16.0%	116.7%	119.3%	31.2%

C RAILWAY PROPOSALS

446 *Conversion of Gauges*

Several proposals aimed at unification of the rail network have involved the conversion of narrow-gauge lines to standard width. A 1907 project called for standard-gauge construction from Beirut to Rayak, with a 5,360-meter tunnel near Hammana, at a cost of 61 million gold francs. Rejected because of its expense, this scheme was revived in 1932 in connection with a proposed electrification. A similar scheme, but with a shorter tunnel (3,985 meters), envisaged a standard-gauge line from Beirut to Damascus, whose cost today would be at least £L 140 million.

In 1945 the Syrian government studied the possibility of adding a third rail to the narrow-gauge line from Rayak to Damascus and found the cost to be £S 18 million to £S 23 million. An alternative Damascus-Homs railway through Syrian territory, via Kariatein and Forqloss, was esti-

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1



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14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

489 on Ports in this Annex) are no less essential to a solution of the east-west transportation problem than they are to improvement of the farmer's marketing position.

Comparative Cost of Rail and Road Transport

497 494 In the specific case of transport across northern Syria, we have tried to determine the comparative cost to the economy of road and rail transport in terms of depreciation of the capital investment, maintenance, fuel and supplies. Depreciation on railway rolling stock has been figured on the basis of 30 years' life, on motor vehicles on the basis of 7 years' life. No allowance has been made for depreciation of the investment in permanent way for the projected railway because the life of the rail roadway may be considered virtually indefinite with normal maintenance and renewals. (The latter are included under "Maintenance" in Table 5.) We have assumed, however, that with the development of heavier and speedier motor vehicles, a highway would be obsolescent within 30 years and require complete reconstruction. As already indicated in the mission's Main Report, we have assumed a freight movement of about 700,000 tons from Jezireh to Aleppo, of 150,000 tons from Aleppo to Jezireh, of 500,000 tons from Aleppo to Latakia and of 250,000 tons from Latakia to Aleppo. Of this total traffic of somewhat over 400 million ton-kilometers annually, a new railway might be expected to carry about two-thirds. The comparative investment would be about £S 170 million, including £S 24 million for rolling stock, for a railway and perhaps £S 97 million, including £S 40 million for some 800 12.5-ton trucks, for road transport.

Table 5 shows the results of our calculations. They leave no doubt that rail transport would be much more economical than road transport. The estimates are, of course, subject to a margin of error; and the annual savings in costs might best be stated within a range of £S 15 to £S 20 million.

The real question, however, is whether this saving, which is equivalent to an increase in real national income, is sufficient to justify the additional capital investment required by a railway. We have previously estimated this difference in capital cost at £S 73 million. The actual difference, however, is likely to be greater. Even if a railway were built, it would still be necessary to undertake some investment in roads, not only for the construction of feeder roads for the railway, but also for the improvement of existing main routes. The alternative is not rail investment or road invest-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ment but investment in a railway plus some roads or an investment in roads alone. On this basis the first alternative is likely to require a capital outlay of around £S 100 million more than the second.

An amount of £S 100 million could only be found at the expense of other development projects, and probably, in particular, at the expense of irrigation projects which also require much capital. In our opinion, an equivalent investment in irrigation works is likely to contribute almost

TABLE 5 Annual Cost to the Economy of Rail and Road Transport

(*Thousand £S*)

	Rail	Road
Depreciation		
Roadway	—	1,900
Rolling stock or vehicles	800	5,714
Maintenance		
Rolling stock or vehicles	1,484	8,200[b]
Roadway	2,380[a]	700[c]
Fuel and oil	600	5,590[d]
Total	5,264	22,104

[a] Including renewals.
[b] Calculated at 17 piasters per vehicle-kilometer.
[c] Calculated at £S 1,000 per kilometer.
[d] Calculated at 19 piasters per vehicle-kilometer.

£S 30 million to national income. Moreover, the increase in primary output as the result of this investment would also bring about an expansion of income in the commercial and transport sectors of the economy which might well be between £S 10 and £S 15 million. Thus the total direct and indirect contribution to national income might reach £S 40 to £S 45 million. It seems to us therefore that the capital investment required for a railway would yield much higher returns to the economy if it were employed for irrigation. In other words, the mission could have found place for a railway in the development program it has recommended only by eliminating a substantial part of the proposed outlays on irrigation and reclamation. A program so altered would have made a smaller total contribution to the economy and was rejected for that reason.

There is still another, though secondary, reason for preferring a road

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

497 program to a rail program as a solution of the Jezireh's transport problem.
497 In the case of a railway all the investment funds would have to be furnished by the government, for private capital in such magnitude will simply not be available. On the other hand, private investment is and will be available for truck transport, so that government investment can be confined to road construction. In a country where it is difficult to transfer private savings to public hands this is an important consideration.

The mission has noted a report that a foreign firm would be willing to build a railway on the basis of payments spread over a period of 10 years following completion of construction. It should be pointed out, however, that the contraction of a foreign debt for this purpose might well impair Syria's capacity to borrow for other projects. The mission's proposed development program has already assumed a certain amount of external borrowing. Thus the contraction of foreign credits for railway construction is unlikely to provide Syria with more resources for financing a development program than we have envisaged.

It is sometimes argued that the operation of a railway would require fewer imports on a continuing basis than road transport, and that this would be advantageous for Syria's balance of payments and would also make transport less subject to interruption of foreign supplies in the event of war. There is no doubt that fewer imports would be required for rail transport. However, the savings in foreign exchange thus achieved would be smaller than the foreign exchange earned by the agricultural commodities that could be produced on land which could be irrigated if the additional capital required for a railway were devoted to irrigation projects. Moreover, the fact that a railway would be relatively less dependent on foreign supplies would be an advantage in time of war only if Syria itself were not involved in hostilities; if the war extended to Syrian territory, railway transport would be more susceptible to interruption by bombing than road transport.

494 491 II ROAD TRANSPORT

A ROAD SYSTEM AND TRAFFIC DEMANDS

Distribution of Syrian roads by use and type, in 1953, was as shown in Table 6.

The number of motor vehicles in the country has grown about 3½

النقل والمواصلات

نقليات السكك الحديدية للركاب ، ١٩٣٨ ، ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

RAILWAY TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS 1938, 1947 — 1953

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Table No. 6 جدول رقم ٦

Year or month	عدد الركاب الكيلومتري (بالالوف) Passenger — kilometers ('000)				السنة والشهور
	المجموع Total	ش.ح.ت.(١) D.H.F. (1)	س.ح.(٢) C.F.P. (2)	ش.ن.(٣) N.R. (3)	
Year 1938	118,652	100,757	13,037	4,858	سنة ١٩٣٨
« 1947	57,927	40,220	7,560	10,147	« ١٩٤٧
« 1948	51,482	38,777	7,539	5,166	« ١٩٤٨
« 1949	29,715	17,000	7,628	5,087	« ١٩٤٩
« 1950	21,876	11,178	5,389	5,289	« ١٩٥٠
« 1951	24,825	12,504	6,023	6,298	« ١٩٥١
« 1952	29,782	13,391	10,562	5,829	« ١٩٥٢
« 1953	36,982	16,189	15,218	5,575	« ١٩٥٣
Months 1952					شهور ١٩٥٢
January	2,015	834	468	713	كانون ثاني
February	1,906	825	558	523	شباط
March	2,250	893	846	511	آذار
April	2,545	1,185	894	366	نيسان
May	2,022	834	837	351	أيار
June	2,125	1,054	675	396	حزيران
July	2,648	1,363	869	416	تموز
August	3,524	1,551	1,306	667	آب
September	3,608	1,691	1,301	616	أيلول
October	2,779	1,223	1,118	438	تشرين اول
November	1,979	977	745	257	تشرين ثاني
December	2,381	961	845	575	كانون اول
Months 1953					شهور ١٩٥٣
January	2,049	893	685	471	كانون ثاني
February	2,043	790	759	485	شباط
March	3,253	1,098	1,742	413	آذار
April	3,902	1,352	2,110	440	نيسان
May	2,549	1,361	1,122	396	أيار
June	3,084	1,515	1152	417	حزيران
July	3,024	1,667	1,045	312	تموز
August	4,197	2,022	1,546	629	آب
September	4,845	1,727	2,313	805	أيلول
October	3,016	1505	1,032	479	تشرين اول
November	2,357	1,070	896	391	تشرين ثاني
December	2,363	1,200	816	347	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy

(1) Damascus - Hama Railway Lines & Extensions

(2) The Hijaz Railways

(3) The Northern Railways.

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

(١) سكة حديد شام — حماة وتمديداتها

(٢) الخط الحديدي الحجازي

(٣) الخط الشمالي

TRANSPORTATION

نقليات السكك الحديدية لسوم البضائع ، ١٩٣٨ ، ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٣

RAILWAY TRANSPORT OF ALL GOODS, 1938, 1947 — 1953

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Table No. 7 جدول رقم ٧

Year or month	Ton kilometres ('000) الجموع Total	ش.ح.ت.(١) D.H.F. (1)	س.ح.(٢) C.F.H. (2)	ش.ن.(٣) N.R. (3)	السنة والشهور
Year 1938	138,560	102,769	15,769	20,022	سنة ١٩٣٨
" 1947	113,976	80,771	4,764	28,441	" ١٩٤٧
" 1948	117,512	77,731	12,588	27,193	" ١٩٤٨
" 1949	96,543	33,659	16,389	31,492	" ١٩٤٩
" 1950	115,768	52,549	20,364	42,855	" ١٩٥٠
" 1951	113,846	57,999	16,681	39,166	" ١٩٥١
" 1952	134,447	52,991	21,772	49,684	" ١٩٥٢
" 1953	139,440	51,757	23,406	55,277	" ١٩٥٣
Months 1952					شهور ١٩٥٢
January	12,281	3,948	1,807	4,526	كانون ثاني
February	12,690	5,108	2,858	4,733	شباط
March	8,933	3,472	2,578	2,883	آذار
April	5,787	2,721	1,703	1,663	نيسان
May	4,188	1,604	828	1,756	أيار
June	9,681	3,892	849	4,940	حزيران
July	14,338	4,874	1,144	8,320	تموز
August	12,357	4,932	1,564	5,861	آب
Septembre	10,092	5,174	1,467	3,447	أيلول
October	11,285	4,779	2,221	4,285	تشرين اول
November	12,038	5,369	2,536	4,133	تشرين ثاني
December	10,768	5,114	2,157	3,137	كانون اول
Months 1953					شهور ١٩٥٣
January	8,774	3,806	1,841	3,137	كانون ثاني
February	8,677	3,969	2,010	2,798	شباط
March	7,208	3,345	1,406	2,457	آذار
April	9,159	3,797	2,465	2,897	نيسان
May	9,016	4,758	1,841	2,417	أيار
June	11,566	3,505	1,607	6,454	حزيران
July	14,750	4,670	2,234	7,846	تموز
August	14,774	4,689	2,137	7,948	آب
Septembre	13,570	4,350	2,013	7,207	أيلول
October	13,197	5,819	3,200	4,178	تشرين اول
November	10,557	5,418	1,122	4,017	تشرين ثاني
December	9,192	3,731	1,530	3,931	كانون اول

Source : Ministry of National Economy

(1) Damascus Hama Railway Lines and Extensions

(2) The Hijaz Railways

(3) Northern Railways

المصدر : وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني

(١) سكة حديد شام — حماة وتمديداتها

(٢) الخط الحديدي الحجازي

(٣) الخط الشمالي

النقل والمواصلات

كمية البضائع الرئيسية المشحونة بواسطة الخط الحديدي الحجازي ، ١٩٥١-١٩٥٣

(بالاطنان)

QUANTITY OF PRINCIPAL GOODS TRANSPORTED BY THE HIJAZ RAILWAYS (C.F.H.)

1951 — 1953.

(Tons)

Table No. 8

جدول رقم ٨

ITEMS	١٩٥١ 1951		١٩٥٢ 1952		١٩٥٣ 1953		نوع البضاعة
	مجمل النقليات Total transportation	النقليات الداخلية Internal transportation	مجمل النقليات Total transportation	النقليات الداخلية Internal transportation	مجمل النقليات Total transportation	النقليات الداخلية Internal transportation	
Total	129,313	13,314	172,401	22,446	188,893	20,710	المجموع
Straw	488	211	668	330	3,003	1,759	تبن
Livestocks	2,269	2,225	141	54	133	120	حيوانات
Grains	25,665	319	55,923	16,193	25,435	12,692	حبوب
Flour	15,065	4	22,650	8	38,772	13	طحين
Chikpeas and lentils	335	312	1,369	849	2,529	1,604	حمص وعدس
Vegetables and fruits	4,248	74	2,202	137	1,296	149	خضار وفاكهة
Military	1,287	1,287	3,231	3,231	2,462	2,463	عسكرية
Phosphate manures	4,910	15	17,039	4	26,712	—	فوسفات
Empties	139	70	1,167	136	835	149	فوارغ
Building Materials	24,963	4	19,730	26	33,586	43	مواد البناء
Colonial goods	—	—	4,900	—	—	—	مال قبان
Rice and sugar	15,256	—	10,236	—	10,144	—	ارز وسكر
Fuel oils	3,483	23	8,331	71	10,204	84	محروقات سائلة
Tools & implements	867	139	1,090	277	706	328	ادوات
Water	7,657	7,657	328	328	241	241	ماء
Miscellaneous	22,661	974	23,402	763	27,400	1,016	بضائع مختلفة
Petroleum Company transport	...	...	...	...	...	...	نقليات لشركة البترول
Asphalt	...	...	...	...	4,244	...	اسفلت
Chemical fertilisers	...	...	...	...	1,190	1	سماد كيماوي

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كمية البضائع المنقولة على خط حديد شام ـ حماة وتعديناتها ، ١٩٥١ ـ ١٩٥٣

(بالاطنان)

QUANTITY OF PRINCIPAL GOODS TRANSPORTED BY THE D.H.P. RAILWAYS 1951 — 1953

(Tons)

Table No. 9 — جدول رقم ٩

ITEMS	الكمية المنقولة على الخطين العادي والضيق Quantity transported over the ordinary and narrow gauges			الكمية المنقولة على الخط الضيق Quantity transported over over the narrow gauge			نوع البضاعة
	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢٠ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	
Total	557,626	478,136	415,623	131,435	161,764	166,252	المجموع
Cereals and seeds	79,109	111,508	59,113	23,631	52,755	13,114	الحبوب والبذور المختلفة
Flour, bran and burghul	16,012	30,606	36,273	15,579	22,428	31,733	الدقيق والنخالة والبرغل
Onions	11,157	8,808	13,112	1,872	2,819	2,786	البصل
Fresh fruits and vegetables	5,286	4,063	5,357	4,505	1,547	984	الفاكهة وخضار طازجة
Colonial goods	28,388	51,131	70,786	15,073	11,937	9,965	مال لبان
Fat, grease and dried meat	—	—	—	—	—	—	دهن وشحم ومقددات الخ
Apricot paiste and apricots	—	—	—	—	—	—	قمر الدين وبزور المشمش
Cement and building materials	79.150	38,109	45,242	22,092	17,373	29,577	ترابة وأدوات البناء
Timber for building, boards and square cut	9,053	5,056	8,086	4,305	3,490	4,961	خشب البناء والواح وعواميد
Products of tubes and iron rails	99,848	3,221	12,374	606	851	2,397	منتوجات انابيب وقضبان حديدية
Machines and parts thereof	18,972	12,825	—	666	432	—	ماكينات وقطع ماكينات
Stones, tiles, sand and gravel	69	1,126	—	—	120	—	احجار وبلاط ورمل وبحص
Wool, hides and skins	4,170	5,498	2,947	280	81	2	اصواف وجلود
Cotton	1,828	1,019	978	60	10	256	قطن
Hay and straw	1,096	4,594	10,996	405	511	2,962	تبن وقش
Fuel oils	76,849	77,140	89,089	1,350	970	2,179	محروقات سائلة
Salt	—	—	—	—	—	—	ملح
Dates	22,700	16,808	2,075	2,322	1,535	282	بلح (تمر)
Liquors	123	133	—	8	7	—	مشروبات
Fire wood	—	—	—	—	—	—	حطب
Living animals	36,890	30,915	37,520	4,920	1,020	1,285	حيوانات حية
Other items, including Army supplies	66,924	74,586	81,645	33,761	43,878	63,783	مواد اخرى وعسكرية

النقل والمواصلات

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كمية البضاعة المنقولة على الخطوط الشمالية ، ١٩٥٠ — ١٩٥٣
(بالطن)

QUANTITY OF GOODS TRANSPORTED BY THE NORTHERN RAILWAYS, 1950 —1953
(Tons)

Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

ITEMS	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	نوع البضاعة
Total	351,757	299,576	369,719	407,539	المجموع
Wheat	211,549	121,748	186,087	224,931	حنطة
Barley	29,326	14,441	44,891	72,495	شعير
Flour	852	890	1,032	1,049	طحين
Grains	1,533	7,609	7,641	3,153	حبوب
Rice	1,275	667	312	1,074	ارز
Dates	13,550	57,277	3,651	14,063	تمر
Dried or conserved fruits & vegetables	—	275	1,340	1,514	خضار وفواكه يابسة او محفوظة
Salt	1,271	1,706	2,325	1,292	ملح
Soap	801	1,140	1,190	1,160	صابون
Animals, alive	25,329	24,763	13,998	18,728	حيوانات حية
Wool	4,792	3,008	3,261	1,909	صوف
Cotton	1,155	1,779	1,636	1,603	قطن
Textiles	1,265	2,002	2,277	3,212	منسوجات
Leather	1,330	1,016	1,090	895	جلود
Pipes	1,922	2,038	932	338	انابيب
Building Materials	3,363	2,719	5,066	3,480	مواد بناء
Tools	4,165	4,085	4,387	4,724	ادوات
Agricultural implements	1,604	1,656	3,306	3,113	ادوات زراعية
Cement	2,002	2,323	2,326	1,114	ترابة واسمنت
Coal	21,060	19,358	22,964	30,176	فحم معدني
Charcoal and wood	2,716	2,193	326	214	فحم وحطب
Fuel oil	6,665	5,750	10,282	11,295	محروقات سائلة
Military transport	217	218	1,272	220	تنقلات عسكرية
Other items	14,015	20,915	48,127	5,776	« مختلفة

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architects to design certain major projects independently or in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Works. A number of standard types of buildings should be developed and studied as a guide for future projects. For example, two or three tested types of classrooms should be available, suited to the differing climatic regions of Syria. 653

Commercial Buildings

653 366

With respect to commercial buildings, the government's problems include provision of town and village markets. For centuries these have been built on a traditional oriental design, with a network of covered passages on which the various shops open. Such construction has permitted market activity under conditions of severe heat or heavy rain, and has lent itself to the prevalence of small shops appropriate to the country's economic standards. Although this form of market is still the most common, new ones of the type are no longer being built. In some settlements of the Jezireh, in Kamichliye and Hassetche, the new *souks* borrow something from the old design, combining it with regular narrow streets covered with temporary roofing. Elsewhere markets are following the western pattern.

As part of the general development program the government might well finance a special study of the type of market that will most economically offer protected shopping, small-size shops, sanitary conditions and better ventilation. Thereafter municipalities should proceed to plan for their own requirements.

Transportation Structures

653 498

Most buildings related to transportation services are the responsibility of the railways and port authorities, and provision has been made for them in the transport program. Yet one category of building usually neglected in planning is that serving bus and truck transportation, which is of greatest importance in a country like Syria with its many small settlements. What is needed is something equivalent to the caravanserai of earlier times—perhaps a combination of a big courtyard, a service garage, a storehouse and a small hostel. Here too, the government might undertake a study of an appropriate prototype, leaving construction to the municipalities and private business.

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to do so, and alternative investment opportunities become less attractive, the question of building a railway might well be reviewed.

The mission would be more favorably disposed to a railway if there were no alternative means of reducing the present high transport rates between the Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia. However, the building of good, all-weather roads, supplemented by the construction of grain storage facilities in the Jezireh, should make it possible to lower transport charges significantly by reducing truck maintenance and depreciation costs and somewhat diminishing seasonal transport peaks. The mission recommends, therefore, that the government undertake this task as a matter of high priority.

To this end the following program should be carried out within the next five or six years:

1. *Improvement and partial realignment of the Aleppo-Latakia road.* The improvement and widening of this road is imperative, and since topographic conditions make widening of certain sections impossible, an entirely new road must be built in part. A new road, for example, will be necessary for a distance of some 30 kilometers west of Jisr ech Choghour. Improvement of the section south of Idlib and crossing the Djebel Zâouiye would also be extremely difficult. The mission recommends strongly that this stretch be replaced by a north-south road running through the Roudj. Such a road would not only avoid most of the mountainous terrain but would simultaneously serve the new agricultural district of the Roudj. The cost of the entire project, including the new road construction, is tentatively estimated at £S 7.37 million.

2. *Improvement and widening of the Aleppo-Raqqa road.* This road, 190 kilometers long and part of the trunk highway to the Jezireh, has an asphalt surface only four to five meters wide. In line with recent proposals made by the Syrian government, the mission suggests its widening to six meters, with a two-meter berth on each side. The government has estimated the cost at £S 3.38 million.

3. *Construction of a new road connecting Raqqa with Kamichliye, via Kantari, Tell Tamer and Tloul Mohammed, and continuing from Kamichliye, via Demir Kapu and Deirik, to Ain Divar on the Syrian-Turkish frontier* (total length: 362 km). Unlike earlier proposals, the road we recommend would not follow the present truck route between Raqqa and Km. 47 on the Hassetche-Deir ez Zor road, but would run north of the Djebel Aabd el Aaziz. In this way it would tap a much larger agricultural

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region, including the dry-farming area south of Ras el Ain and the irrigated area in the Khabour river valley. It would be advisable to start the construction of the Kamichliye-Ain Divar section first, because this rich agricultural region of heavy rainfall is now the most inaccessible part of the Jezireh. To feed the trunk highway the mission also recommends the construction of the following roads: (1) Ras el Ain-Hassetche, crossing the main highway at or near Tell Tamer (73 km); (2) Hassetche-Tloul Mohammed (60 km), thus linking the provincial capital with Kamichliye, the region's commercial center; (3) Derbassiye-main road (30 km); (4) Demir Kapu-Tell Kotchek (30 km); and (5) much farther to the west, Tell Abiad-Kantari (46 km). The first two are considered the more important. In general this proposed road network conforms to the most recently expressed views of the Syrian government, which has tentatively estimated the cost, pending engineering surveys, at about £S 46 million.

North-South Communications

We turn now to a consideration of the other principal transport routes. With respect to the north-south transport axis, improvement of communications between Aleppo and Damascus is most important. A direct standard-gauge railway link between these cities has often been proposed, either by the laying of an additional rail on the narrow-gauge line from Damascus to the junction with the standard-gauge line at Rayak in Lebanon or by the building of a new railway from Damascus to Homs, where it would connect with the DHP line to Aleppo. The mission is convinced, however, that the volume of bulk goods suitable for rail transport moving between Aleppo and Damascus is far too small to justify the large investment required, at least £S 18 million for the former and £S 36 million for the latter project. The solution is rather to improve and widen the Aleppo-Damascus road. The section between Hama and Aleppo urgently demands improvement, and the entire road should be widened by at least one meter to permit easier flow of two-way vehicular traffic. The cost of widening would probably be about £S 10,000 per kilometer or a total of about £S 4 million.

The transport route south from Damascus to Dera'a and the Jordanian frontier is served both by road and the Hedjaz Railway. The problems of the latter have already been discussed. The road, although not as well

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travelled as the one to Aleppo, is still important for the transport of Syrian agricultural products and petroleum products destined for Jordan. The very bad section between Cheikh Meskine and Dera'a requires early attention, and the entire road should be widened by one meter after the completion of the Damascus-Aleppo road project. The mission estimates the total cost involved at £S 1.3 million.

Other Road Projects

Together with the Latakia-Aleppo-Jezireh road, the route between Damascus and Beirut is the most important to the Syrian economy. In fact the traffic on the Beirut-Damascus road is denser and steadier than that on the Latakia-Aleppo road. An urgent program to improve the surface of this road should be undertaken by the two countries concerned. For the improvement of the 35-kilometer section in Syrian territory, the mission anticipates that £S 1.05 million will need to be spent. It can be expected, however, that before many years more thorough-going measures will be necessary to accommodate the constantly growing traffic. To meet this longer-term need, proposals have been made to build a new road paralleling the old one and to construct a long tunnel at Hamana to bypass the most dangerous section across the Lebanon range, where traffic is often held up by fog and snow. The total cost has been estimated at £S 29 million, presumably to be shared by Syria and Lebanon. Parallel highways would certainly permit a great increase in traffic and would considerably reduce the prevailing high accident rate, by making possible the accommodation of slow-moving truck traffic and high-speed vehicular traffic on separate roads. Since the problem is not immediately urgent and the best solution remains to be worked out in detail, the mission considers it unnecessary to make specific proposals. It suggests, instead, that over the next five years the two governments jointly finance an engineering survey of the problem in order to prepare definite plans; an expenditure of £S 100,000 by each government should suffice.

The third most important transversal connection with the Mediterranean is that between Homs and Tripoli, served both by the DHP railway and by road. The road is of some importance, but several sections are in bad condition, particularly the 10-15 kilometer section just west of Homs and a shorter section passing through Lebanon before coming to Tell Kalakh. Improvement of this road, however, can probably be handled

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within the framework of the maintenance program proposed below. It is important that the Syrian and Lebanese governments come to an agreement on better maintenance of the section before Tell Kalakh.

Aside from the trunk highways discussed above, the mission has considered certain special road projects, including two which would provide better links between Homs and Hama on the one hand and the Syrian coast and Latakia on the other. Fundamental improvement of the road from Hama to Banias whence a road runs north to Latakia has sometimes been proposed. The mission believes a more economical solution would be to build a link between Hama and the main north-south road running through the Ghab for which provision has already been made in the Ghab project. The Ghab road would in turn connect with the Aleppo-Latakia highway. We have accordingly included £S 1.5 million for the building of this link in the program recommended for the next five or six years. Homs is now linked with the Syrian coast by a poor and rather circuitous road which branches off from the Homs-Tripoli highway at Tell Kalakh and passes through difficult terrain. It has been proposed, instead, to construct a shortcut between Akkari and Hamidiye which would connect with the coastal highway to Latakia and would cost about £S 1.8 million. In the mission's opinion, however, construction of this road is not very urgent, particularly since the Homs area is fairly well served by the port of Tripoli. The mission suggests, therefore, that it be built only toward the end of the program if funds are available.

Elsewhere the mission has pointed to the potential importance of the tourist trade. In order to stimulate this trade some of Syria's principal historical monuments such as the Krak des Chevaliers, the ruins of Saint Simeon, etc., should be made more accessible by road. The mission accordingly suggests that £S 1.5 million be allocated to construct such roads.

Road Maintenance[30]

The construction of new roads will be of little avail if they are allowed to deteriorate quickly. By and large maintenance has been poor in the past, although apparently not because of inadequate appropriations. Over the five-year period 1949-1953 an average of £S 3.3 million annually was allocated for maintenance; in 1954 £S 5.8 million was so allocated. The

[30] See Annex H, p. 439.

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of the traffic load on various routes at certain times of the year. As an aid to sound future development, it will be to the advantage of the Syrian government to place the collection of traffic statistics on an organized scientific basis as soon as possible.

B ROAD CONSTRUCTION

Most of the main surfaced roads in western Syria are of 5.5-meter width; in the east the five-meter type is more common. Neither is sufficient for safety under present or anticipated traffic conditions. More satisfactory specifications for general use would call for not less than six meters of finished surface and a firm shoulder of 1-1.5 meters on each side. The mission strongly recommends that hereafter this basic design be used for all new construction, repair or reconstruction of major roads.

A number of road surface materials and methods have been used or considered. The most common construction is of waterbound macadam, both with and without an asphalt covering.

Except for such purposes as the construction of "Irish bridges",[8] concrete is seldom used as a road surface in Syria, cement being considered too expensive. The local delivered price was said to be £S 90 per ton in 1953, although the mission was informed that in 1954 cement could be obtained for £S 80 per ton.

The cement industry is protected by the government and enjoys substantial profit margins. Moreover, the prices quoted include excise taxes of £S 15 per ton, from which public bodies might reasonably be exempt. But the basis of present prices Syria can hardly afford to make greater use of this superior roadbuilding material in meeting the specifications required for the growing commercial trucking.

Recently the possibility of constructing low-cost mix-in-place bituminous roads, with or without soil stabilization, has attracted much attention. The method has been used successfully in several countries of the Middle East, but to date it has not been tried in Syria, partly because the local asphalts of Kfarie and Djebel Bichri have not proven adaptable to the process but also because of some doubt that roads so constructed can withstand heavy truck traffic.

[8] Actually not a bridge but a type of ford, useful where traffic density is moderate and the small or infrequent water flow does not justify a real bridge. The road dips down to streambed level and is strongly paved with reinforced concrete, providing a firm crossing even when inundated.

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This is one of the best-known types of "low cost" roads.[8] The success of the method depends largely upon the climate and the soil characteristics. A firm, sandy soil which does not require stabilization is best, for when a soil-stabilizing treatment must be applied the construction cost is no longer low. Costs are also affected by the necessity of hauling sand or stone long distances. Syrian conditions in general are less favorable to the method than might be expected, and in the extreme northeast are definitely unsuitable.

The mission has studied carefully the question of using low-cost road-building methods in certain parts of Syria. Apart from the factors mentioned, on the main routes it is evident that the traffic wear is too great even for the stone-based macadam with 15 cm. of block, 12 cm. of gravel and three cm. of asphalt pre-mix topping. It must be noted also that in popular usage "low-cost roads" mean low in construction cost only, not necessarily in expense of maintenance. The costs of material, labor, haulage, etc., add to the costs of maintenance as well as road-building. Where provision of adequate maintenance is difficult, it is often better to invest in a better road initially.

Mix-in-place or similar methods may hold promise in raising the standards of the desert roads or *pistes* (tracks). The mission did not find these in as bad a condition as so often reported; it appears that many instances of mired vehicles result from careless driving rather than from unavoidable road hazards. Nevertheless, some improvement of these routes must eventually be considered. At the moment it might best be confined to proper signposting, construction of Irish bridges, and repairs in the very worst places. In view of the limitation on development funds, road-building efforts just now should be focused mainly upon the several projects of greater urgency than these.

C ROAD MAINTENANCE

Close to the capital city, the roads appear to be rather well maintained; elsewhere the difference is at once noticeable. Toward the east many of the

[8] See: Landbouwwegen, Reports of a Congress of the Royal (Netherlands) Institute of Engineers, 1953; D. W. Lister, Bituminous Soil Stabilization for Road Foundations (Cairo), 1953; Low Cost Roads and Runways (Cairo), The Shell Company, 1947; Bituminous Products for Roads and Runways (supplement), The Shell Company, 1950; Stabilisation des Sols, Bulletin Intérieur Shell; Wet Sand Mix, Een voordelig procede voor de verharding van wegdekken enz. (Shell); etc.

131 Thus the boundaries of Syria may be defined as the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Mediterranean to the west, Sinai and Hejaz to the south, and northern Mesopotamia and the Syrian Desert to the east. Its length is rather more than 500 miles, and the breadth of its cultivable area varies between 100 and 150 miles.

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133 It is itself split up into several regions clearly marked off from one another by main lines of division running roughly from north to south, with subsidiary lines running from east to west. The first region is the Mediterranean coastal belt, in some places broad enough to be called a plain, for example the plain of Akkar, but in others no more than a narrow strip; [504] in general, it broadens as it goes south. Although it has few good natural harbours, it is studded with famous ports: Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Haifa and Jaffa. East of it is a highland belt: the Amanus in the north, then the Jebel Ansariyah, rising to some 5,000 ft., then Lebanon, of which the peaks reach 10,000 ft., and then the Palestinian hills, bounded on the south by the arid district of the Negeb. This belt is scarred with the valleys of streams flowing westwards to the sea, and cut across by a number of gaps, through some of which rivers flow: the plain of Antioch, the gap between Tripoli and Homs and the plain of Esdraelon. East of these ranges runs a line of comparatively narrow depressions varying in character from north to south. In the north there are the plain of al-Amq, the Orontes valley and the Ghab marshes; south of them lies the Biqa' valley; then the broken country in which lie the sources of the Jordan; then the swampy district of Hulah; then the narrow valley of the Jordan, lying below sea-level, opening out at one point into the Sea of Galilee and ending in the Dead Sea; and finally the Wadi Araba, leading down to the Red Sea at Aqaba. A number of important rivers run for part of their courses along these depressions: the Orontes flowing north and then west, the Litani south and then west, and the Jordan south. Here also lie the important lakes of Syria: those of Homs and Hulah, the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. The line of depressions is interrupted by the ridge of Baalbek, the watershed between the Orontes and Litani; and farther south is linked with the coastal plain by the Esdraelon Gap.

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

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Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

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457 the end of 1953, even though Syria paid off during these years all but £ 10.2 million of a £S 44.6 million debt to Lebanon and repaid $1,454,123 to the International Monetary Fund.

Transport

489 The transport system which carries the country's commerce reveals many deficiencies. Although Syria is served by three railways, all were built before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and therefore do not adequately serve the needs of an independent Syria. The gauges are not uniform, and there is no direct rail connection between Damascus and Aleppo. The port of Latakia, which handles most of Syria's overseas trade, is served only by roads. The railways in 1953 actually carried slightly less cargo than before the war. All of the substantial increase in traffic since the prewar period has been absorbed by motor transport. The number of all types of motor vehicles rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953, and the number of trucks from 873 to 4,742. Even such bulky commodities as cereals are now transported mostly by road. Yet the road system is also far from adequate and transport costs are very high.

504 Aside from Banias, which ships only oil transmitted by pipeline from Iraq, Syria has only one major port, Latakia. The volume of traffic at this port, which is still in process of development, has grown rapidly and amounted in 1953 to 90% of the overseas export and 46% of the overseas import trade of the country. The Lebanese ports of Beirut and Tripoli accounted for the balance. In the same year, however, almost half of the total volume of Syria's foreign trade went overland, principally to and from Lebanon.

Money and Credit

652 The monetary and banking system of Syria is still in the process of
457 development. Although a new monetary statute enacted March 28, 1953 envisages the establishment of a government central bank within a few years, the note-issuing function meanwhile remains with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL) which first received the right to issue currency during the French mandatory regime. Gold and foreign exchange in the monetary cover is bought through the intermediary of the Exchange Office, an autonomous government agency established in April 1952. This

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494 capacity significantly, the restrictive policy may have contributed to higher trucking charges. Recently there has been some relaxation of the restrictions. The mission concedes that in principle it might be desirable to regulate the number of trucks in order to prevent excessive investment in road transport. The government, however, has little knowledge about the adequacy of the number of trucks to guide it in applying such a regulation, and it would be better to achieve the objective indirectly by charging a high fee for new truck licenses, as is done in the case of tank trucks.

504 III PORTS

One of the most important transport projects undertaken by the Syrian government in recent years is the construction of the port of Latakia. This is Syria's only real port other than Banias, which handles just the oil coming in over the pipeline from the oilfields in northern Iraq. The decision to create a port at Latakia was formally taken early in 1950 when a company, capitalized at £S 24 million, was formed to establish and operate the port. Nearly all of the capital has been furnished by the government; private capital has subscribed only 10%, despite a government guarantee of a 5% dividend.

Natural conditions at Latakia, as indeed along most of the eastern Mediterranean coast, are not particularly favorable to a port. There is no natural harbor and heavy winds from January to March impede port operations. For this reason, the principal feature of the port program is the construction of a breakwater and the deepening of the basin behind it. Other features call for the construction of quays and warehouses with a capacity of 15,000 cubic meters and the installation of cargo-handling equipment. Work on the breakwater and quays is proceeding and plans for the equipment of the port are being perfected. The breakwater and quays should be finished in 1956 and the remainder of the work in the following year. To complete these plans will probably entail a further outlay [498] of £S 38 million over the coming years. Plans at this stage do not provide for the building of a grain silo. The mission's sole recommendation is that this omission be remedied, since in our opinion the installation of mechanized grain handling equipment is imperative in a port where the bulk of the traffic consists of cereals.

Meanwhile, as previously indicated, the volume of cargo handled by

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the port has been increasing rapidly. To some extent this has been promoted by government regulations which direct certain classes of imports and exports via Latakia. It should be noted, however, that these have not seriously interfered with the traditional traffic between Beirut and Damascus and southern Syria. For the most part they buttress a traffic flow which would in any event tend via Latakia as the natural port for northern Syria. At present cargo must still be lightered but, considering this circumstance, cargo handling is fairly rapid. The port company appears to be well managed and in recent years has earned, on its paid-in capital, a modest profit which rose to over 5% in 1953. With the completion of the port, it should prove possible to reduce handling costs substantially.

IV CIVIL AVIATION

Supplementing rail and road transport, there is a domestic air service linking Damascus with Aleppo, Kamichliye and Latakia. It is operated with a DC-3 by the Syrian Airways, an autonomous government enterprise dependent on the Ministry of Finance. The financial results of this operation have not been divulged publicly, but it is evidently not self-supporting. The government regards it primarily as a promotional venture and the tariffs are correspondingly low. It must be recognized that occasional rapid air communication between the principal cities is desirable, and the mission accordingly anticipates that a new twin-motor plane, costing perhaps £S 600,000 may soon be needed to maintain this service.

Damascus is the country's principal airport and is served by a number of international airlines. Considerable amounts have been spent on the improvement and equipment of this airport which has been given a Class B designation by the ICAO. Of the £S 1.075 million provided in the 1954 budget for airport construction, equipment and maintenance, over 70% was destined for Damascus. In view of the many more urgent tasks confronting the government, we see no justification for the proposal to construct an entirely new airport for Damascus. By continuing about the same level of expenditures in the future as in recent years, the government should be able to make the requisite improvements in existing airports, which include, besides Damascus, a Class C airport at Aleppo, a Class G airfield at Kamichliye and an airport as yet unclassified at Deir ez Zor.

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III PORTS

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A MEDITERRANEAN OUTLETS

The east coast of the Mediterranean is not particularly favored with port sites. Most of the natural bays lie open toward the west and provide poor shelter without artificial breakwaters. There is also a high submarine shelf, comparatively unbroken by estuaries, so that along much of the Syrian-Lebanese coast the shallow waters prevent large ships from anchoring closer than several miles offshore. To add to the difficulties, on the landward side the mountain ranges parallel to the coast afford very few easy routes to the interior, and these generally over fairly high passes.

Conditions are somewhat better to the south, where the Palestine ports of Haifa and Jaffa (Tel Aviv) have been established. But for that length of coast more readily accessible to Syria natural port locations are scarce, and only a few deserve mention here. Even fewer are in Syrian territory, for although western Syria extends over some five degrees of latitude from north to south, its actual seacoast is confined to about 1½ degrees between Turkey and Lebanon.

At the extreme north Syrian goods can reach the Turkish port of Iskenderun, which has been considerably improved since 1921 and is growing in importance. This is connected by road to Aleppo and is also served by the continuation of the Northern Railway. Another Turkish port accessible by road is the once-important Antioch on the river Orontes; in recent times the silting of the river has destroyed its value for shipping.

Below the Turkish border is Syria's own port of Latakia, on which national development efforts are now concentrated and about which more will be said. Farther southward are the Syrian coastal towns of Djeble, Banias and Tartous, all three usable to some extent as ports. Djeble has been put forward at times as a possible future national port, but is of no significance at present. Banias is economically important as the terminus of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, but for other commodities is rather inconveniently situated. Tartous is best known as a fishing port, and is occasionally visited by sailing ships and coasters.

The three Lebanese ports of Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon must be included in the list, although only the first two are important to Syria today. Sidon is chiefly of historic interest, although just south of it tankers now load petroleum from the Trans-Arabian pipeline.

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504 Tripoli, with both rail and road connections to Homs and beyond, handles certain cargo from nearby regions of Syria, including raw sugar imports for the Homs refinery. A free zone was established in 1952. However, the depth of water is only two meters at quayside and six along the jetty. This limits the usefulness of the port, as larger vessels must anchor in the roadstead at least a mile offshore.

Of the ports mentioned, the most important of all in recent times has been Beirut. Historically the outlet for much of the caravan trade, its modern development dates from a concession granted in 1857 for exploitation of a Beirut-Damascus road, and subsequently transferred to the Compagnie Ottomane du Port, des Quais et Entrepots de Beyrouth (a later outgrowth of which was the DHP Railway). By 1924 the company had installed modern port facilities and had obtained a protective monopoly for the construction of all ports along the Syrian coast.

The port introduced free warehousing in 1923 and in 1934 created a free zone. Partially inspired by the competitive development of the port of Haifa, a considerable extension of facilities was undertaken during 1934-38. The port area was enlarged to 19 hectares, with 1,420 meters of quays of which 415 meters offered deep water. Other works were extended to include 12,000 square meters of sheds, 3,000 cubic meters of refrigerated storage and 17,000 square meters of warehouse space.

As far as Syria is concerned, the port of Beirut is convenient to Damascus and the southern region and will probably continue to serve this area to a great extent. It is also the rail connection for Jordanian cargo passing through Syria. It seems probable that the Latakia port will draw more of its cargo volume from the new productive areas than from existing ports, and that the effect upon Beirut will be less than commonly supposed.

B THE NATIONAL PORT OF LATAKIA

Early Background

Latakia, until recently a modest coastal town of 35,000 inhabitants, has long been a fishing port. It has a small shallow natural harbor suitable for light craft, although it suffers heavy winds from January to March. There are some quays and sheds, but the depth of water alongside the quays

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range from 0.70 to five meters, averaging about two, and the depth of the harbor entrance is only six to seven meters. The larger ships must anchor in the roadstead (depth, five to six fathoms) and be served by lighters. 504

Although at various times in the past steps were initiated to improve the port facilities at Latakia, it was not until 1950 that the government decided definitely to proceed with the development of a modern national port. In the mission's opinion the decision was reasonable and realistic, despite the various theoretical arguments in favor of other courses. At all events, the course being chosen, the mission has viewed the present development problem as simply one of integrating Latakia most effectively into the national transport pattern.

New Construction

The new port is designed to handle one million tons of cargo per year, about double the 1953 volume, but is calculated to show a satisfactory investment return at slightly above 800,000 tons. This volume was actually reached in 1954, before completion of the port construction. Recently the dispatch of the lighter service itself has improved considerably and this, together with the growing volume of regular cargo, has recently made it possible for international shipping companies to remove the former Latakia port surcharge of $9.25 per ton.

The mission has recommended construction of a grain silo, not provided for in the plans. A silo capacity of about 20,000-40,000 tons, equipped for mechanized delivery, will be required to regularize the harvest flow of export cereals when combined with the inland storage, cleaning and grading facilities discussed in the Main Report.

Promotion and Regulation

A number of artificial measures have been invoked by the government as part of its effort to encourage the use of Latakia. A 1953 decree, for example, prohibited the importation of brown sugar, cement, asphalt, wood or iron via ports other than Latakia. There are also provisions with regard to exports. Since July 1952, exports of Syria's most important agricultural products are not allowed to use ports other than Latakia. The mission recognizes that such measures can serve a purpose at times, but they also can have serious drawbacks and are seldom the most desirable 654 504

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means of promotion. Indeed, in the first example given it was necessary to exempt certain materials for southern public works, sugar for the Homs refinery (by special license) and various other large imports, so that much of the remaining cargo affected by the decree would have entered through Latakia in any event. It is questionable whether the actual benefit to Latakia is enough to offset the domestic and international resentment engendered.

Favorable adjustment of the various port charges, such as those for anchorage, mooring, cargo handling and storage, offers a more satisfactory means of promotion. In these the Syrian government has already shown a flexible policy, readjusting the rate schedule from time to time; we feel that this policy should be continued. Inducements of this kind, together with constantly improving service to shippers, will in general meet the competition of other ports with greater benefit to the Syrian economy than negative restrictive measures.

IV CIVIL AVIATION

In a period of a few years Syria has made appreciable progress in the development of her civil aviation. Wisely, at this early stage, she has concentrated on the most-needed domestic services and the educational steps to popularize air transport, while at the same time providing suitable airport facilities to insure good connection with international lines. Domestic air mail service was inaugurated in April 1954.

International Services

By the end of 1953 nine international airlines provided Syria with direct service to all parts of the world. These call primarily at Damascus, although the Class C airport at Aleppo is used internationally to some extent.

The Damascus airport is situated only 10 kilometers southwest of the center of the city on an excellent road, at an altitude of 715 meters. It has a main runway of 2,550 meters and a cross-wind runway of 1,000 meters, both paved. Runways, taxiways and aprons will take aircraft of up to 50 tons. Equipment includes full lighting to ICAO specifications,

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near Aleppo, and at Rayaq and there are many emergency landing fields.

Sea Ports. Since 1950 Beirut has handled over 2 million tonnage of ships a year; an increase of about a quarter of a million over the pre-war figures. The port has a free zone through which goods are shipped to Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. But the Syrian Government hopes to divert some of the transit trade from Beirut and has, with the assistance of a loan of $6 million from Saudi Arabia, formed a company to develop Latakia in order to handle about a million tons of goods a year (in 1952 431,593 tons were handled). Work on the extension of the port was begun by a Yugoslav firm in April 1953. Tripoli, Sidon, and Banias are ports handling the oil from the pipelines[1] and are little used for other purposes.

Wireless and Telephones. An automatic telephone exchange system covers most of Syria and an automatic exchange is planned for Beirut. Telephone links with Europe and America are available through Beirut and normal cable facilities exist. The Syrian state broadcasting authority has two large transmitters and broadcasts in Arabic, French, English, and Hebrew. Near Beirut there is a station which broadcasts in Arabic, French, and English.

The 'Common Interests'

Under the Mandate, Syria and Lebanon formed an economic and customs union, the Higher Council of Common Interests, under the direct control of France, which administered customs and excise and controlled concessionary companies, antiquities, and some other services. On 1 January 1944 the control was transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The currencies were linked and interchangeable, and both the Syrian and Lebanese pounds were largely backed by French francs based on a rate of 8·83 to the pound sterling (then worth $4·03). In order to maintain a good profit on the exchange brought in by oil companies the Lebanese and Syrian pounds were not devalued in 1949 to follow sterling. Exchange was controlled by one department for both countries and the note issue is in the hands of the French Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

But these links were incompatible with the differences that developed in the economic policies of the two countries when they became independent. Syria, in normal years, has a large exportable surplus of agricultural products and little transit trade, whereas the debtor trade balance of Lebanon is com-

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

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countries, and the railways and other monopolies in the two countries operated under the supervision of a joint board. In the post-war period, however, strains began to be felt, especially in regard to the allocation of customs revenues between the two countries. Conclusion of a financial agreement between Lebanon and France in 1948, and failure of Syria to conclude one until the following year, put the Lebanese pound at a premium over the Syrian pound. More important was the incompatibility between the desire of the Syrian Government to protect its agriculture and its developing industries and that of the Lebanese Government to reduce restrictions on trade and movement of capital and to lower the cost of living, and the consequent divergence in the fiscal policies of the two.

The breakup of the customs union, on 14 March 1950, was followed by considerable dislocation of trade. After prolonged negotiation, a temporary commercial agreement was signed in November 1950, removing prohibitions on the importation from either country of agricultural and domestic industrial goods, that is, goods containing local raw materials to the extent of 30 per cent of their value. Such goods were, however, subject to the usual custom duties and, like other goods imported into Syria, required licences. In the following years, several temporary agreements were concluded between the two countries, of which the most important was that of February 1952. This agreement contained lists of the products of each country which were to be admitted to the other free of duty or at reduced rates. Minimum duties were agreed upon for certain goods imported from other countries. The agreement, however, left certain loopholes, as a result of which Syria prohibited the export of certain agricultural goods to Lebanon, and the import of certain manufactured goods from it. Consequently, another agreement was concluded in March 1953, in which some of the loopholes were closed and transit facilities were mutually conceded.

These agreements achieved one of the main objects of Syrian policy, the protection of industry and of certain branches of agriculture. A further step in the same direction was the refusal, in August 1951, to renew the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This left Syria free to conclude bilateral agreements with certain Arab States, namely Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and with other States such as Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Japan and Yugoslavia; these agreements provide for most favoured nation treatment and, in certain cases, for tariff concessions. In May 1954, the Inter-Arab Trade and Transit Agreement and the Payments Agreement were ratified by Syria.

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Another objective of the Syrian Government has been diversion of trade from the port of Beirut to Latakia and the replacing of Lebanese middlemen by Syrian. In 1950, the Government prohibited the import of certain goods, such as textiles, through Lebanon. In 1952, foreign firms operating in Syria were required to have Syrian managers, and companies established were required to have capital, more than half of which came from Syrian sources. Free zones were set up in Latakia and Damascus, and re-exporting was authorized. In 1952, a decree prohibited the exporting of major agricultural products, such as cotton, cotton-seed, wheat, barley, pulses and wool, except through Latakia; most products grown in the southern part of Syria 1/ were, however, exempted from this provision. Owing to

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1/ The provinces of Hama, Homs, Damascus, Hauran and Jebel Druze.

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the inadequate condition of the port of Latakia and the unpreparedness of Syrian merchants, these restrictions caused a certain amount of hardship, the cost of imported merchandise was raised, 1/ and much capital was locked up in merchandise. However, improvement of the harbour (see below) and the expansion in Syria's foreign trade greatly increased the volume of merchandise passing through Latakia; imports rose from 19,000 tons in 1948 to 168,000 in 1953 and 207,000 in 1954, and exports from 6,000 tons to 336,000 and 630,000. In July 1954, exports through other routes were authorized, to relieve pressure on Latakia. The greater proportion of imports, and nearly half of all exports, still pass across the Lebanese frontier.

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Table 52 shows the changes that have taken place in Syria's foreign trade. During the war years, the imports of the Lebano-Syrian Union declined greatly, while exports contracted still more sharply. 2/ After the war, imports recovered rapidly but exports lagged behind. The large import surplus, which was mainly accounted for by Lebanon but to which Syria also contributed, was covered by liquidating the greater part of the foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the war and by various invisible receipts. The breakup of the customs union coincided with expansion of cotton production in Syria and with an increase in the output of cereals. Consequently, Syria's foreign trade has, in recent years, shown a surplus. This, however, is due to the fact that imports are valued at the official rate of exchange, although they are actually paid for with currency purchased at the free rate. Table 53 shows the main items in Syria's balance of payments, valued at the respective free rates.

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A breakdown of exports in 1953 shows raw cotton to be by far the most important item, 3/ followed by wheat and barley; 4/ imports covered a wide range of products. 5/

1/ In 1951 it was estimated that the cost of importing goods through Latakia was 15 to 20 per cent higher than through Beirut.

2/ A quantum index of imports into Lebanon and Syria (1938 = 100) shows a decline to 27 in 1941, and a recovery to 53 in 1945, 107 in 1946, 122 in 1947, 178 in 1948 and 205 in 1949. The index of exports fell to 18 in 1941 and recovered to 30 in 1945, 70 in 1946, 84 in 1947, 80 in 1948 and 154 in 1949 (Musa J. Balabi, Terms of Trade for Syria and Lebanon, unpublished thesis, American University, Beirut, 1952).

3/ France has been the leading importer of Syrian cotton since large-scale production began, followed by the United Kingdom. In 1953, France took 20,000 tons, out of a total of 54,000, the United Kingdom 14,000, the Federal Republic of Germany 9,000, Italy 6,000 and Lebanon 2,000 (Bureau des documentations syriennes et arabes, Etude Mensuelle sur l'économie et le marché syriens). In 1952, exports totalled 38,000 tons, worth £S 124.5 million.

4/ In 1953, exports of wheat aggregated 180,000 tons, barley 153,000, millet 43,000 and flour 22,000. In 1952, the figures were 100,000 tons, 140,000 tons, 14,000 tons and 9,000 tons respectively.

5/ Ministry of National Economy, Summary of Foreign Trade, Fourth Quarter and Year 1953 (Damascus, 1954).

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[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture and commercial crops, irrigation, stock raising, natural resources, production and supply, waterways, railways, and roads of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, discussed as one geographical unit, rather than by political boundary, see, M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 340-370.]

[For information on the topography, climate, agriculture, mineral wealth, railways, settlement pattern, productive capacity of the economy, and trade of the Levant coastland, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 371-414.]

[For information on the topography, occupations and relative productivity of the desert plateau, and of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole, see M1 Middle East, cat. 116, 21: Fisher, pp. 427-449.]

TRANSPORTATION

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SHIPPING ACTIVITIES AT LATAKIA HARBOUR, 1951 — 1953

Table No. 11

Year or month	Steam Vessels — Entered (الداخلة)			Steam Vessels — Cleared (الخارجة)		
	عدد السفن No. of Vessels	صافي الحمولة النسبية طن * N.R.T.	وزن البضاعة طن Weight of cargo in tons	عدد السفن No. of Vessels	صافي الحمولة النسبية طن * N.R.T.	وزن البضاعة طن Weight of cargo in tons
1951	328	472,057	146,034	328	445,406	74,886
1952	496	818,258	147,391	497	814,494	246,172
1953	754	1,055,856	167,747	741	1,041,935	335,859
1952						
January	34	53,538	11,179	36	58,786	10,007
February	28	54,819	5,276	28	54,819	8,896
March	28	49,212	10,716	28	49,212	5,772
April	30	51,279	9,528	29	49,516	3,564
May	37	77,380	17,194	35	67,839	3,122
June	39	60,017	13,265	40	68,404	2,328
July	54	82,916	14,066	54	83,344	40,678
August	45	77,961	10,798	47	75,104	60,729
September	58	90,696	19,569	56	91,358	38,795
October	46	76,465	14,532	47	75,165	19,421
November	53	83,273	10,825	47	71,436	38,031
December	41	60,672	10,443	48	72,509	14,827
1953						
January	47	60,418	8,394	40	53,906	17,809
February	43	57,740	8,004	42	53,916	15,839
March	43	62,072	8,499	49	69,812	12,378
April	57	79,171	12,007	57	81,626	7,133
May	68	100,682	22,568	66	94,010	20,499
June	70	89,786	17,171	68	89,394	28,142
July	72	98,827	16,126	73	102,576	40,706
August	66	93,863	14,184	66	92,006	36,071
September	80	110,500	22,806	73	103,441	38,359
October	71	106,348	12,587	74	111,167	39,618
November	66	93,610	11,923	63	88,151	37,620
December	71	102,861	12,478	70	101,920	41,685

* A ton of 100 ft.3 equivalent to 2,83 m3

النقل والمواصلات

حركة السفن البخارية والشراعية في ميناء اللاذقية ، ١٩٥١ ـ ١٩٥٣

جدول رقم ١١

السنة والشهور	السفن الشراعية Sailing Vessels					
	الخارجة Cleared			الداخلة Entered		
	وزن البضاعة طن Weight of cargo in tons	صافي الحمولة المسجلة طن N.R.T.	عدد السفن No. of Vessels	وزن البضاعة طن Weight of cargo in tons	صافي الحمولة المسجلة طن N.R.T.	عدد السفن No. of Vessels
١٩٥١	14,791	24,926	853	16,585	25,023	884
١٩٥٢	18,758	26,025	627	19,196	25,545	618
١٩٥٣	16,152	18,571	404	8,650	20,387	418
١٩٥٢						
كانون ثاني	301	1,988	32	2,567	1,808	32
شباط	296	1,563	25	2,573	1,832	25
آذار	713	2,423	41	3,741	2,370	39
نيسان	3,385	2,606	60	1,262	2,594	63
ايار	3,668	3,612	93	1,709	2,706	85
حزيران	3,823	4,030	85	2,154	4,225	89
تموز	3,147	2,992	71	599	3,282	71
آب	1,771	2,647	87	1,695	2,213	82
ايلول	1,010	1,700	46	1,156	1,616	46
تشرين اول	824	833	50	334	1,126	53
تشرين ثاني	305	631	25	150	362	16
كانون اول	13	1,000	12	1,256	1,141	15
١٩٥٣						
كانون ثاني	—	572	9	516	668	9
شباط	1	835	12	669	608	10
آذار	—	669	14	924	770	15
نيسان	2,011	2,224	39	915	2,268	40
ايار	3,442	2,699	52	480	3,742	58
حزيران	3,340	2,836	55	504	3,246	62
تموز	2,808	2,565	64	1,003	2,300	62
آب	—	1,177	36	1,619	1,313	38
ايلول	250	1,128	49	175	1,490	50
تشرين اول	1,176	1,314	32	1,305	1,705	35
تشرين ثاني	2,331	1,731	26	540	1,522	22
كانون اول	799	801	16	—	746	17

(*) ١٠٠ قدم مكعب يعادل ٢,٨٢ متر مكعب

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

489 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the pro-
cessing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

p. 140 (B)

T U R K
HATAY
A L E P P O
E U P H
HAMA
LATAKIA
H O M S
D A M A S C U S
HAURAN
JEBEL DRUZE
PALESTINE
TRANSJORDA

END MAP (A)

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria MDI
LEBANON MEI

S
L
133
131
491
487
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END MAP (B)

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

the port has been increasing rapidly. To some extent this has been promoted by government regulations which direct certain classes of imports and exports via Latakia. It should be noted, however, that these have not seriously interfered with the traditional traffic between Beirut and Damascus and southern Syria. For the most part they buttress a traffic flow which would in any event tend via Latakia as the natural port for northern Syria. At present cargo must still be lightered but, considering this circumstance, cargo handling is fairly rapid. The port company appears to be well managed and in recent years has earned, on its paid-in capital, a modest profit which rose to over 5% in 1953. With the completion of the port, it should prove possible to reduce handling costs substantially. 504

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Supplementing rail and road transport, there is a domestic air service linking Damascus with Aleppo, Kamichliye and Latakia. It is operated with a DC-3 by the Syrian Airways, an autonomous government enterprise dependent on the Ministry of Finance. The financial results of this operation have not been divulged publicly, but it is evidently not self-supporting. The government regards it primarily as a promotional venture and the tariffs are correspondingly low. It must be recognized that occasional rapid air communication between the principal cities is desirable, and the mission accordingly anticipates that a new twin-motor plane, costing perhaps £S 600,000 may soon be needed to maintain this service. 509 655

Damascus is the country's principal airport and is served by a number of international airlines. Considerable amounts have been spent on the improvement and equipment of this airport which has been given a Class B designation by the ICAO. Of the £S 1.075 million provided in the 1954 budget for airport construction, equipment and maintenance, over 70% was destined for Damascus. In view of the many more urgent tasks confronting the government, we see no justification for the proposal to construct an entirely new airport for Damascus. By continuing about the same level of expenditures in the future as in recent years, the government should be able to make the requisite improvements in existing airports, which include, besides Damascus, a Class C airport at Aleppo, a Class G airfield at Kamichliye and an airport as yet unclassified at Deir ez Zor. 508

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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Favorable adjustment of the various port charges, such as those for anchorage, mooring, cargo handling and storage, offers a more satisfactory means of promotion. In these the Syrian government has already shown a flexible policy, readjusting the rate schedule from time to time; we feel that this policy should be continued. Inducements of this kind, together with constantly improving service to shippers, will in general meet the competition of other ports with greater benefit to the Syrian economy than negative or restrictive measures.

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In a period of a few years Syria has made appreciable progress in the development of her civil aviation. Wisely, at this early stage, she has concentrated on the most-needed domestic services and the educational steps to popularize air transport, while at the same time providing suitable airport facilities to insure good connection with international lines. Domestic air mail service was inaugurated in April 1954.

International Services

By the end of 1953 nine international airlines provided Syria with direct service to all parts of the world. These call primarily at Damascus, although the Class C airport at Aleppo is used internationally to some extent.

The Damascus airport is situated only 10 kilometers southwest of the center of the city on an excellent road, at an altitude of 715 meters. It has a main runway of 2,550 meters and a cross-wind runway of 1,000 meters, both paved. Runways, taxiways and aprons will take aircraft of up to 50 tons. Equipment includes full lighting to ICAO specifications,

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a high-power non-directional radio beacon, VHF direction finder for bad weather, and its own 150 KW diesel power generating plant. Radio communication is maintained with Aleppo, Amsterdam, Athens, Baghdad, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Istanbul, Djeddah, Jerusalem, Karachi, Nicosia, Paris, Rome and Teheran. 508

Both in the interest of international service and for the development of qualified domestic personnel the Syrian government has made good use of international technical assistance. Since 1953 it has had a team of ICAO experts in the country to train Syrian staff for the various ground services. In addition the government has sent a number of young Syrians overseas on fellowships to study aeronautical engineering, radio, air navigation, meteorology and aviation legislation.

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At present no attempt is made to operate on an economic basis. Passenger rates range between £S 0.07 and £S 0.18 per kilometer. Freight is carried for as little as £S 0.67 per ton-kilometer on certain routes (against an estimated average cost of at least £S 1.60 and probably much more). Deficits are met by the government, while revenue may be used by the line for development purposes. The objective at this time is mainly to promote air transport by all available means. Landing fees are kept low, the tax on aviation gasoline is only 18 piasters per 100 liters, and Syria imposes no income tax on airline operations.

As accounts are now kept the actual expenditures for civil aviation, and for Syrian Airways in particular, are not easily separated from the national defense budget. The mission feels that the time has come to set up an independent accounting system for Syrian Airways, to enable the government to measure its progress against costs from year to year. Only in this way can the domestic line develop eventually into an economically sound business. Undoubtedly government financial support will be needed for some time, but the government must be in a position to evaluate its effectiveness.

For extensions and replacements it is very likely that more DC-3 airplanes can be acquired at favorable prices. Although this type is no longer

IV. Telephone, Telegraph and Air Communication

206 In 1950 telephone communication became possible with
509 Jazirah for the first time on a commercial basis. Telegraph communication has long been established and an air service connectin Qamishli with Aleppo and Damascus started in 1946, then interrupted by the Palestinian War, has been resumed twice weekly. Fares from Qamishli to Aleppo and Damascus are LS 25 and 50, respectively.

V. Railway Line Projects

185 Railway lines wholly inside Syria from Jazirah to the interior cities have been suggested by the Gibb report and by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. They suggested a line from Tal Koshak to Hassakeh and from there to Rakka and Aleppo. Such a line would by-pass Qamishli which is the more important agricultural and commercial center, and would go in a district only newly developed, sparsely populated and not of the fertility of the Qamishli area. It seems that a line starting from Qamishli itself would be shorter and would service a more fertile and populated district. From Hassakeh the line could follow the Khabur as long as possible before veering to Deir Ezzor. This would be longer than the proposed line from Hassakeh to Rakka directly, but it would have the advantage of servicing the Khabur Valley and collecting its crops, whereas, the line Hassakeh-Rakka is completely desert. From Rakka there is only one route to Aleppo.

It is difficult to choose between a policy of road construction and railway lines without detailed study of the economics of both, but, whatever the result of the study, Jazirah needs cheap and easy means of communication.

COMMERCE OF JAZIRAH

438 It stands to reason that the commerce of Jazirah is mainly in its
441 staple prodcuts and in the goods required for the development of its essential industry which is agriculture.

The main crop being wheat, it forms the largest item both in bulk and in value. But the Jazirah merchant plays a secondary role in the handling of this crop. He is sometimes a partner, but more

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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509 built, many still in service are being retired by larger airlines whose increased traffic requires greater unit capacity. The mission recommends allocating possibly £S 600,000 to be used for this purpose over the next five years.

365 MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT

Both Aleppo and Damascus are served by city tram and bus systems. As in many other parts of the world, the buses are gradually replacing the tramways.

Aleppo

The tramway system of Aleppo was established in 1929 by a French company under a monopoly concession to provide the city with public transport. In 1951 the company was nationalized, continuing operations under the same concession. There was no bus service until 1952, when it was launched by the tramway company itself under a broadened interpretation of the original monopoly.

Both forms of transport are now operated at a small profit. While tramway development is static, new buses are being financed out of reserves set aside earlier for renewals on the tramway system. A gradual replacement will undoubtedly take place until the tramway system finally becomes uneconomical, but no immediate need to accelerate the process or to alter the policy is evident.

Damascus

Although older (1907) the Damascus tramway system has a similar history. Started by a Belgian company, it too was nationalized in 1951. In this case, however, the growth of bus competition has taken a different course.

In 1946 the tramways introduced three buses which they operated experimentally for about eight months. The fare was set at 15 piasters, but private buses made their appearance also, with a 10-piaster fare, and their competition caused the tramways' experiment to show an operating

حركة الطيران المدني في ميناء دمشق الجوي

CIVIL AVIATION TRAFFIC AT DAMASCUS AIRPORT

509

Table No. 12 — جدول رقم ١٢

Year and month	No. of aeroplanes: Arrivals	No. of aeroplanes: Departures	No. of Passengers: Departures	No. of Passengers: Arrivals	No. of Passengers: Transit	السنة والشهور
	عدد الطائرات: الهابطة	عدد الطائرات: المقلعة	عدد الركاب: المسافرين	عدد الركاب: القادمين	عدد الركاب: المسافرين ترانزيت	
1952						**١٩٥٢**
January	172	171	606	534	1,505	كانون ثاني
February	154	153	490	606	1,483	شباط
March	175	177	599	645	1,568	آذار
April	197	195	864	853	1,944	نيسان
May	190	193	769	903	3,125	ايار
June	174	172	624	884	2,260	حزيران
July	212	213	1,090	1,090	2,779	تموز
August	295	294	5,361	719	2,388	آب
September	326	326	818	6,912	2,753	ايلول
October	343	346	1,038	1,441	3,091	تشرين اول
November	206	205	894	781	2,145	تشرين ثاني
December	192	192	932	778	2,374	كانون اول
Total	2,536	2,537	14,085	16,174	27,450	المجموع
1953						**١٩٥٣**
January	173	173	518	410	1,918	كانون ثاني
February	161	160	542	511	1,924	شباط
March	188	191	726	694	2,214	آذار
April	209	206	809	937	2,592	نيسان
May	213	211	800	1,002	2,978	ايار
June	172	171	752	886	2,609	حزيران
July	204	205	1,110	1,031	2,815	تموز
August	215	214	1,481	1,643	2,421	آب
September	234	234	1,135	2,350	2,522	ايلول
October	184	184	1,094	977	2,525	تشرين اول
November	180	179	921	850	1,778	تشرين ثاني
December	167	168	787	744	1,648	كانون اول
Total	2,300	2,296	10,675	12,035	28,244	المجموع

حركة الطيران المدني في مطار النيرب — حلب

CIVIL AVIATION TRAFFIC AT NAIRAB AIRPORT, ALEPPO

Table No. 13

جدول رقم ١٣

Year and month	عدد الطائرات No. of aeroplanes		عدد الركاب No. of Passengers			السنة والشهور
	الهابطة Arrivals	القائمة Departures	المسافرين Departures	القادمين Arrivals	مسافرين ترانزيت Transit	
1952						**١٩٥٢**
January	36	36	308	333	79	كانون ثاني
February	32	32	342	291	67	شباط
March	39	39	410	387	88	آذار
April	40	40	597	496	88	نيسان
May	39	39	453	470	93	ايار
June	32	32	376	362	155	حزيران
July	35	35	500	512	134	تموز
August	21	21	212	179	66	آب
September	20	20	236	213	—	ايلول
October	34	34	434	463	141	تشرين اول
November	33	33	336	345	105	تشرين ثاني
December	22	22	252	255	58	كانون اول
Total	383	383	4,426	4,306	1,077	المجموع
1953						**١٩٥٣**
January	29	29	108	80	16	كانون ثاني
February	26	26	155	146	16	شباط
March	19	19	135	146	21	آذار
April	29	29	334	314	43	نيسان
May	32	32	298	310	76	ايار
June	30	30	271	330	35	حزيران
July	36	36	391	406	63	تموز
August	21	21	223	191	—	آب
September	35	35	287	299	49	ايلول
October	44	44	360	325	82	تشرين اول
November	45	45	344	318	64	تشرين ثاني
December	41	41	287	293	51	كانون اول
Total	387	387	3,173	3,160	507	المجموع

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON MEI
SYRIA MDI

S L 496

into Jordan. There is a branch line from Deraa to Suwaida, but another branch, to Haifa, is out of use.

Damas-Hama et Prolongements. (*a*) From Beirut to Damascus there is a narrow-gauge track running for 91 miles via Rayaq; rack and pinion are used to traverse the mountains, and this slow haul is now employed for freight only. (*b*) From Rayaq to Aleppo there is a 4 ft 8 in. gauge track for 270 miles which passes through Homs and Hama. (*c*) The stretch of the Cairo–Turkey line from Ras an-Naqura on the Lebano–Israel border to Beirut is out of commission but the section of 64 miles in standard gauge from Beirut to Tripoli and Homs is used.

Syrian state Railways. This is the part (164 miles) of the Turkey–Mosul line that runs inside Syrian territory.

S L 491

Roads

Main arterial roads in Lebanon are considered adequate, but the network of secondary and feeder roads is poor. In Syria the road system is generally inadequate, and only the asphalted roads are usable for heavy traffic throughout the year. The following figures give some indication of the position:

Syria, 1951	Miles	Lebanon, 1949	Miles
1st class, asphalted	2,917	Surfaced	1,811
2nd class, macadamized	1,268	Unimproved	414
Tracks	5,218		

(Sources: *Statesman's Year-Book, 1953*; US Dept. of Commerce.)

S 494

There are over 11,000 vehicles registered in Syria. Trans-desert passenger and goods services to Iraq are in regular use and goods are also moved, including refrigerated vegetables, to Kuwait and Dahran. The authorities are restricting the registration of new lorries to the estimated needs of the countries, but more vehicles are required, particularly diesel lorries for long hauls of heavy loads.

S L 509

Aerodromes. The new airport of Beirut (Khaldeh) receives the Comet, and is beginning to rival Cairo as a gateway to the East, and that of Damascus (Mezzeh) has long been in use by Constellations. Many international airlines stage at Khaldeh or Mezzeh; the approach to Khaldeh is better and, with between twenty and thirty aircraft a day, it has since 1951 outstripped Mezzeh, which has five to ten aircraft a day. For some years plans have been under consideration for moving the Damascus airport to the east of the city. There are two private Lebanese airlines. A national airline in Syria was a financial failure and was taken over by the army. Smaller airfields exist near Tripoli,

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON MEI
SYRIA MDI

near Aleppo, and at Rayaq and there are many emergency landing fields.

Sea Ports. Since 1950 Beirut has handled over 2 million tonnage of ships a year; an increase of about a quarter of a million over the pre-war figures. The port has a free zone through which goods are shipped to Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. But the Syrian Government hopes to divert some of the transit trade from Beirut and has, with the assistance of a loan of $6 million from Saudi Arabia, formed a company to develop Latakia in order to handle about a million tons of goods a year (in 1952 431,593 tons were handled). Work on the extension of the port was begun by a Yugoslav firm in April 1953. Tripoli, Sidon, and Banias are ports handling the oil from the pipelines[1] and are little used for other purposes.

Wireless and Telephones. An automatic telephone exchange system covers most of Syria and an automatic exchange is planned for Beirut. Telephone links with Europe and America are available through Beirut and normal cable facilities exist. The Syrian state broadcasting authority has two large transmitters and broadcasts in Arabic, French, English, and Hebrew. Near Beirut there is a station which broadcasts in Arabic, French, and English.

The 'Common Interests'

Under the Mandate, Syria and Lebanon formed an economic and customs union, the Higher Council of Common Interests, under the direct control of France, which administered customs and excise and controlled concessionary companies, antiquities, and some other services. On 1 January 1944 the control was transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The currencies were linked and interchangeable, and both the Syrian and Lebanese pounds were largely backed by French francs based on a rate of 8·83 to the pound sterling (then worth $4·03). In order to maintain a good profit on the exchange brought in by oil companies the Lebanese and Syrian pounds were not devalued in 1949 to follow sterling. Exchange was controlled by one department for both countries and the note issue is in the hands of the French Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

But these links were incompatible with the differences that developed in the economic policies of the two countries when they became independent. Syria, in normal years, has a large exportable surplus of agricultural products and little transit trade, whereas the debtor trade balance of Lebanon is com-

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

bul to Baghdad. A railroad also runs from Beirut to Damascus via Rayak. A second line from Damascus to Amman and Ma'an, in Jordan, forms part of the so-called "pilgrim" railway, opened in 1904-06. Air services are available from Damascus and, to a lesser extent, from Aleppo to Beirut and Baghdad, thence to Europe, Africa and the Far East. 496 509

Food and Nutrition

The nutritional standards of the people vary markedly in different regions, being highest in the vicinity of Damascus and lowest among the Alawites of Latakia province and the peasants of Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Undernutrition is common, but generally it is more widespread in the rural villages than in the urban areas. Due to the lack of adequate storage and transportation facilities, local food shortages are frequent, particularly during poor crop years. Up to the present, there has been little organized effort to promote better nutrition among the different population groups. It is expected that such a program will be initiated by the nutrition division created within the governmental health services in 1952. 146 369 [262] 146 654

Cereals constitute the staple foods, and, with certain root vegetables, contribute 70 to 80 per cent of the caloric content of the average diet. Breads prepared from wheat flour are consumed in all parts of the country. Barley is sometimes employed, while maize and sorghum millet are used in the southeast. Rice is universally popular: it is grown in the Al Jazira region, and large amounts are also imported. Broad beans, chick-peas and lentils are basic food items in most areas. Other vegetables, including onions, potatoes, beets, tomatoes, eggplant and the leafy spinach and French lettuce, are abundant in Damascus and Al Jazira provinces, but scarce in Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Numerous fruits are consumed in season, but the supply is scanty in the Euphrates valley and in the southern provinces. Olives and olive oil are important among most population groups. Milk is 262

563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
361 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.
[291 Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
361 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.
[134 This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
577 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
511 ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

133 makes it the biggest river in Syria after the Euphrates. A short description of the Khabur valley was given earlier and the great possibilities of the river remain undeveloped. Unlike the Euphrates, especially in its lower reached, the Khabur valley is narrow. The alluvial plain does not extend more than five hundred meters on each bank in most places and then the land rises to a height of 10-50 meters over a distance of severl kilometers.

812 406 The alluvial plain along each bank has been more or less irrigated and planted by primitive methods such as the kard and the naqourah or dulab since old times. The kard can irrigate about fifteen dunums and the naqourah, if in good condition, can produce a flow of less than two inches of water and raise it to a height of a maximum six meters which is the diameter of the wheel. More prosperous Bedouins combine two or three naqourahs on the same axis and got a flow of about 3-5 inches. The naqourah is evidently a cheap way to raise water, but its construction is costly. Assuming that a Bedouin wants to build a naqourah on a new site, he has to erect a sort of a dam with stones on about half the river's width to raise the river's level and direct its flow towards his naqourah. Since stone is not abundant along the Khabur and has to be carried long distances, it becomes the job of specialized carpenters to construct the wheel, erect its supports, and balance it. This may cost another LS 1,500. 46 The carpenter who constructs the wheel or naqourah becomes responsible for its maintenance and is paid yearly 11 percent of the yield of the land irrigated in lieu of wages.

241 The staple crops of the Khabur were formerly wheat in winter and sorghum in summer. Sorghum was preferred to every other summer crop because it provides food for both man and beast. Lately, the naqourah peasants began planting sesame and in the last two years cotton, but reverted this year to sorghum and sesame as the main summer crops.

571 Unlike the Kurdish or even the Bedouin peasant of northern Jazirah, the Khabur peasant is very poor and primitive. Rarely does he 241 own one cow to use for plowing. Usually two or more farmers join 427 to provide one team. For this reason the strip of land which he can cultivate for wheat or sesame does not exceed 20-30 dunums, of which half the yield goes to the owner of the land who provides water. This is to compare with 250-300 dunums cultivated by the Kurdish farmer, of which he has to pay only the rent of the combine for the harvest.

3121 654 flood waters and distribute them in summer. All these studies, and it is not known how detailed they are, are believed to be kept at the French Legation in Beirut.

Such projects cost a lot of money, and Syria may not be able to construct them for many years. A quicker and less expensive policy is to combine elements from the system of irrigation by pumps and the system of gravity irrigation. This is the policy followed in Egypt, to dig canals conveying water from the river to areas ten or more kilometers removed and ten to twenty meters higher than the water level. Such dirt canals can be dug cheaply by modern machinery, and the farmers will then be authorized to install pumps on the canals. Since the greatest cost of an irrigation project is the construction of the main canal above the ground level, the method recommended removes the need for the elevated canals and the farmer can install his pump directly on the land to be irrigated. In this way, the farmer is spared also the loss due to evaporation and absorption on the elevated canal.

This is the quickest method to expand irrigated agriculture along the Khabur, and it may also prove in the long run cheaper to the country and the farmer than the elaborate dams and derivation canals contemplated by the Government. Such a conclusion needs, of course, more detailed engineering studies and comparison of costs before it becomes final.

III. The Problem of Monoculture

2443 Wheat and barley are by far the main crops of the Jazirah and with the exception of the Khabur valley, they are practically the only crops. What the irrigated lands of Kubur el Bid and Qamishli produce in summer crops does not compare in quantity or in value with the wheat crop.

2443 571 For this reason, Jazirah suffers from all the defects of monoculture. When the wheat crop is good and the prices are high land values increase, the farmers are enabled to pay most of their debts and to raise their standard of living by building better residences, buying furniture, making more trips with their families to the interior cities of Syria and Lebanon, sending their children to schools in Aleppo and Beirut, and increasing their welfare in general. But

when the wheat crop fails, as it did last year, there is great hardship in all of the Jazirah. Debts remain largely unpaid, the value of land falls off sharply, and interest rates become unbearable 243 511

The failure of a crop in Jazirah brings more hardship than is the case in other Mohafazas because Jazirah, with all the money revenue which accrues to it in a good year, has not arrived yet at the stage where it can save a part of this income to use in bad years. All the money revenue is immediately reinvested in machinery and in expansion of the area planted with additonal sums borrowed from the banks or from Aleppo merchants. 454

The point is reached where further expansion has become difficult, and the situation will become more or less stabilized so that some of the income will be put aside for emergencies in the coming few years. But even when savings reach a high figure, the problem of monoculture is not solved.

Jazirah at present does not produce the necessary vegetables and fruit for its own consumption. It imports them from Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. That is why the cost of living in the town of the Jazirah is one of the highest in Syria. Aside from the price of meat and samneh, everything including room and house rents, is more expensive than in the other big towns of Syria. Even flour is sold to bakers by the town municipalities at the same price for which it is sold in Damascus. 511 241 488

In former times, however, Jazirah produced great amounts of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Its lands are very well suited to raising cattle and beef, an employment more profitable than wheat growing. A diversification in the use of land will make for a more balanced and prosperous economy in Jazirah. But the Jazirah farmers are not to be blamed entirely for the kind of agriculture prevailing. Circumstances beyond their control, connected primarily with the problems of land ownership and tenure, have largely imposed this type of monoculture upon them. These problems will be discussed in the following section, but it can be said in passing that the farmer cannot be expected to invest money in buildings for cattle raising, or in digging wells to provide irrigation for vegetable growing, or in planting orchards on lands to which he has no title or whose title is subject to constant disputes over boundaries with the neighbors and lately by decree-law 96 with the State. 433 241 454

433 such goods as Syria's few modern factories produce, have
439 between them severely limited the Syrian and Lebanese export trade.

439 According to the official statistics for 1938, the latest year
457 for which detailed figures are available, the main countries to which the French Mandated Territories exported goods were Iraq, Palestine, France, Transjordan, Italy, the United States and Egypt, in that order.[1] Much the most important exports were vegetable products and textile materials and goods. The total value of exports and re-exports (excluding the oil of Iraq) was some 892,232,000 francs (£5,028,000).[1] The chief countries from which goods were imported were Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Germany, Italy and Roumania. The main goods imported were textile materials and goods, metals and metal work, vegetable and mineral products; and the total value of imports was 1,707,696,000 francs (£9,059,000).[2] There was thus an adverse trade balance of 815,464,000 francs (£4,031,000) which was largely offset by the revenue from certain types of invisible export. For example large sums were brought into the country by the many thousands of tourists who visited it, and by the Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and others who spent the summer in the hill-resorts of Lebanon. Again, considerable sums of money were sent home by emigrants in America and elsewhere; this item is now much less important than during the past, but it is still not negligible. A third type of invisible export was the foreign capital invested in the country, and foreign credit granted to merchants. In spite of these invisible exports, however, both the size of Syrian and Lebanese foreign trade and the discrepancy between imports and exports are unsatisfactory. The situation can be improved, first by an increase and diversification in production, and secondly by the discovery of external markets for the goods produced, either in the neighbouring countries or elsewhere.

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511 Syria and Lebanon are comparatively poor countries, and in spite of the changes which have taken place the standard of living in the countryside and among the poorer classes in

[1] For statistics of foreign trade, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, pp. 199-202.

[2] Calculated at the rate of 177.45 francs, to the pound sterling. This was the average rate for December, 1938.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

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The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ment will need to help private enterprise achieve these goals by collaborating, for instance, in the establishment of an institution to furnish technical and financial assistance, revising policies for the protection of industry from foreign competition and working towards the creation of a larger market for manufactured products, particularly through an intensification of economic cooperation among Arab countries.

To service the economy new and better roads and a larger supply of electric power are clearly necessary. Both of these call for a substantial increase in public investment. Transport is the most important bottleneck in the economy today; the acute shortage of power in major centers such as Aleppo and Damascus is already receiving government attention.

While expansion of the production base of the economy is the paramount task of the future, education, public health and the social services will also make greater claims on the government's resources. A further extension of educational facilities is undoubtedly necessary, but at the same time more stress must be placed on improving the quality and content of education. The condition of public health still leaves much to be desired. While the most urgent deficiencies in hospital accommodations must be remedied, the most pressing need is to concentrate increasingly on the prevention of disease by such measures as an anti-malarial campaign, improvements in sanitation and provision of pure water supplies. A marked and general improvement in housing conditions is likely to result only from a substantial increase in production and improvement of living standards but the government should at least assist the larger municipalities to initiate a program to cope with the worst conditions of housing congestion, a by-product of rapid but uneven economic growth.

A program of this type, which we shall elaborate in subsequent chapters of this report, should lay the foundation for a renewed and continued economic advance. It will serve not simply to compensate for a possible slackening of private investment but above all to create ultimately increased opportunities for greater private investment and enterprise which will expand production and raise standards of living.

The government has become increasingly aware of the task that lies ahead. Its request for an International Bank mission to work out recommendations for development testifies in part to its concern. It realizes that despite the economic progress of the past, the country cannot be satisfied with the current state of development and the standard of living it sustains. National income is still only around £S 440 per capita. Moreover,

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

654 511 with the wide disparities in income, the great majority of people have an income substantially under this average. The bulk of the rural population remains impoverished and does not share adequately in the fruits of its toil. In the urban areas many people earn only a bare livelihood and live in wretched, overcrowded conditions. In industry the daily wage of unskilled labor is no more than £S 3 to £S 4. In the future, therefore, the aim should be not simply to raise production and national income but to ensure that all elements in the population share equitably in the benefits of economic development.

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242 encouraging results have been achieved. The justification for a special organization rests primarily on the fact that a properly conceived village improvement program transcends the bounds of agriculture. Its principal task, of course, will always be to raise the standards of agriculture [511] and animal husbandry, the source of livelihood of the villagers. Yet the living conditions of the 2,000,000 people living in villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants must be improved as a whole. Standards of housing, health and sanitation, and adult education must be raised, and better roads and community facilities provided. Moreover, the need for special techniques in approaching this entire problem argues in favor of a special organization. The government has neither the staff nor the funds to carry out all the urgent village improvements itself. Its task must be rather to stimulate and assist the villagers in mobilizing their resources for self-help. Only in this way can a development program achieve worthwhile results at the village level.

242 The program the mission has in mind calls for the progressive intro-
657 duction of rural community leaders or workers into the villages. One community worker for about 4,000 people should suffice, and if on this basis he must cover a number of villages over an extended area, he should have an assistant, selected preferably from among the rural school teachers. The community worker, though a government employee, should have no administrative duties. His sole function should be to encourage and crystallize the villagers' desire for improvement. His training should be primarily agricultural, but he should also have sufficient knowledge of the other aspects of village life to suggest what can be done. Most of the things which can or should be done to better living conditions are rather elementary. The knowledge of the community worker, therefore, need not be profound. Moreover, he would be able to call upon the specialized services of the government for advice and assistance in dealing with problems with which he himself cannot cope. For instance, he should know enough to identify and prescribe measures for most of the prevalent diseases and pests which attack crops and livestock, but he may need help from the veterinarian or pathological service to deal with difficult cases or extensive outbreaks of disease. If he can awaken an interest in cooperatives he will then need to call in a credit supervisor from the Agricultural Bank or an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture to launch one. He may get the villagers to start a program of constructing latrines, but need advice from the sanitation experts of the Ministry of Health on methods of construc-

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ANNEX C *NOTES ON AGRICULTURE*

1 POPULATION, REGIONS AND SOILS

Rural Population

162 619 Syria's agricultural population can be divided into groups differentiated by their social order.

233 *Nomadic tribes.* Bedouin tribespeople form an important unit of the rural population, numbering an estimated 150,000 and living in various stages of settlement from pure pastoral nomadism to almost permanent agricultural communities. Among the larger tribes the Tay and part of the Jubur have become practically sedentary, the Shammar and Shashans remaining nomadic or semi-nomadic. There are also numerous small nomadic tribes roaming the desert between the cultivated belt and the Jordan border. These harvest the scanty desert grass with their flocks of sheep and goats and their herds of camel and a few cattle, and contribute considerably to the country's livestock production. A large part of Syria's meat, wool and dairy products is produced by the Bedouins. Their standards of living and education are quite low.

The increasing exploitation of arable land for crop production during recent decades correspondingly reduced the grazing area and, may, if continued, threaten a considerable reduction in livestock.

162 241 511 *Settled villagers.* The nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500 compact villages form the most important segment of the agricultural population. They are the true cultivators of the soil whether they own the land or work on it as tenants or laborers. A large number farm entirely for subsistence. Even where there are large community pasture lands, the farms are usually small, frequently too small to give an economic return. Consequently incomes are generally low and many landowners, tenants and sharecroppers are constantly indebted to moneylenders. Although illiteracy among the villagers is on the decrease, education remains at a low standard.

The village people produce most of the crops, raise part of the livestock and supply the country with the bulk of its food and raw materials. Their agricultural activity as a rule is dominated by manual and draft animal

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

operation, in striking contrast to large private holdings where the most 162
modern machinery is used. Measures to raise the standard of living of this 241
group must be one of the main objectives of any development program; in 511
the first instance this must be effected through education, improved systems of land tenure, and better credit facilities.

Lessees and landlords. Some city dwellers have interests in agriculture 244
as leasehold operators of tracts of state domain, or as absentee landlords. 427
Although their interests rarely coincide with the demands of sound long-term farming practices, this segment of the population has been instrumental in opening new farm tracts (such as the Jezireh) and in introducing new crops, thereby contributing much to the national economy. The cultivation of the large absentee holdings is generally left to sharecroppers.

Sharecroppers. Each sharecropper is assigned a parcel of land from which, after the apportionment of the crop, he can hope to gain little more than a bare subsistence. In rainfed areas the sharecropper customarily receives rather less than 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor and around 70–75% if he also supplies the working capital; the percentages may be slightly higher in sparsely populated areas, and lower where population pressure is heavier. On irrigated lands the landlord takes 65–75% of the crop if he provides seed and water, and about half if the sharecropper provides the working capital.

In the long run, the position of the sharecropper would be more tolerable if the productivity of the land and his share of it were raised. At present, yearly land assignments may vary, with the result that the cropper has no incentive to improve the land. The restricted area of the assignment and lack of proper equipment, draft animals and money capital contribute to the permanent indebtedness of sharecroppers and their very low standard of living. Measures to improve their lot should include improved tenure status, Agricultural Bank and cooperative assistance in providing working and fixed capital, and resettlement schemes to relieve local land pressure.[1]

Agricultural Regions

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In terms of natural conditions and the types of agriculture practiced, 438
Syria can be divided in nine main agricultural regions. 311

The Hauran and the Djebel Druze. The Hauran and the Djebel Druze includes the mountains of the Djebel Druze and the Julani in the south-

[1] See Chapter 3, Sections III and VI, of the Main Report.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S L 181

In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trying to create one.

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Social Survey

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

S L 204 656

The Press

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

S L 871 [212] 658

Education

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

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S 241 crease the productivity per acre and also to expand the culti-
311 vated area per head.

L In the Lebanon, however, with its steep hillsides under inten-
311 sive cultivation, there is a definite pressure on land resources.
241 The limits of intensification appear to have been reached, and a
434 large part of the village population supplements its income by work in the towns, and by remittances from abroad. If the land
L tenure system in Syria were less oppressive, room might be
S found on the land for settlers from the Lebanon, but as things
571 are, the standard of living and status of the Lebanese peasant is higher; compared with the Syrian peasant he is a free man, and
167 there is no inducement to leave the Mountain for the under-populated plains of central or northern Syria.

LAND TENURE

L Corresponding to these different methods of farming, there
471 are different systems of land tenure.[1] In Lebanon individual small ownership is well established, and the pattern of village
423 life, with its broad class of small peasant owners, few large
464 farmers, and a growing class of landless labourers, resembles that of Europe.

S In Syria, the greater part of the land is owned by city not-
471 ables—the ruling class—and cultivated by small share-tenants. Though individual ownership exists in some districts, for instance
427 the Beqa Valley and the oasis of Damascus, the most usual
423 form of landownership in the plain districts of Syria is share-tenancy. The villagers bring their corn to the village threshing floor, and when the grain is threshed the landlord or his agent stands by and takes one-half of the grain. Towards this result he has contributed nothing; all labour, equipment, seeds, livestock, have been supplied by the tenant, so that his share is rent purely for the use of the land. The landlord is almost always an absentee, a city notable who only visits the land to collect rent.

S The share taken by the landlord varies from district to dis-
427 trict, and also varies with the condition of the land. According to an inquiry made by the French authorities, the usual division of the crop for non-irrigated cereals is 40–50 per cent to the

[1] The information which follows is mainly based on A. Latron, *La Vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, L'Institut Français de Damas, 1936). The brilliant and profound study by Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient*, is an indispensable authority which unfortunately was received only after going to press.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

241 Wheat yields are lower than the average for Syria, averaging 4 hundredweight to the acre.

Almost the whole of the estate is let to share-tenants who are 427 supervised by an agent, the landowners themselves rarely visiting the estate. The share of the crop taken by the landlord is 25 per cent on non-irrigated land and 42½ per cent on irrigated land. These shares are more favourable to the tenant than is usual, because it is desired to attract more labour to the estate which sixty years ago was quite uncultivated. As elsewhere, the tenants have no leases but live in fear of eviction.

The tenants are divided into five classes:[1]

1. Large tenants cultivating 6 feddans (225 acres) of non-irrigated land: 4 in number.
2. Medium sized tenants cultivating 4½ feddans (168¾ acres): 4 in number.
3. Small tenants cultivating 3 feddans (112½ acres): 60 in number.
4. Small tenants cultivating irrigated land and with an average area of 18 acres: 100 in number.
5. Wage labourers, who form the majority of the villagers. [464]

Of these classes, only the small groups of large and medium-484 sized tenants can live well, in the sense that the output of the 454 farm suffices to cover the essential needs of the family and also √11 provides a small cash surplus. The surplus is used to buy gold pounds and jewellery. But the other groups cannot achieve even a sufficient standard of food consumption. The standard consumption of wheat (barley in the case of the very poor peasants) is 14 kilogrammes of grain per month; to achieve this level it is necessary to crop about 45 acres. Thus with the present system of cultivation, the class of small tenants, who cultivate an area of 112 acres and would appear to have quite sufficient land, cannot attain the minimum because only one-third, 35 acres, can be cultivated owing to shortage of live-stock.

√11 These small tenants, who are typical of the farmers in the great plains of Syria, are very poor, living in one- or two-roomed [342] mud huts, and when there is only one room, sharing it with their animals.

[1] It must be said that the feddan in Syria is a variable measure and here is equivalent to 37½ acres.

511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

434 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
409 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie: on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
421 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

i [The estate of Misherfe, near Homs -- Analysis]

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LAND TENURE

S 471 Of the total 160 families in the village, 100 own some land and 60 own no land. The peasant owners are divided as follows

1. Rich farmers, owning about 10 hectares ..	5	families
2. Medium farmers, owning from 3 to 8 hectares	80	"
3. Poor farmers, owning between 1 and 3 hectares	15	"
4. Share-tenants	10	"
5. Labourers	50	"

S 241 As in Misherfe, two-thirds of the land is uncropped each year. The peasant divides the land into three plots, one sown with a crop, one ploughed but not sown, and one fallow. The wheat yield is slightly higher than the average for Syria, and amounts to 833 kilogrammes per hectare (6½ hundredweight per acre); barley yields are also slightly higher, being 8 hundredweight to the acre.

S 571 As a result of the more equal distribution of land, rather better yields, and more irrigation, the standard of living is better than in Misherfe. The first two classes, including half the 267 families, can reach an adequate standard of consumption of food and other essentials, which is reckoned to be 25 kilogrammes of wheat per month, 1 kilogramme of meat per month (i.e. one sheep a year), 40 kilogrammes of olive oil and 20 kilogrammes of 'samn' per year, 4 tins of kerosene and a small quantity of clothing. The remainder of the village, about one-half of the total, that is the poor peasants, labourers, and share-tenants, are unable to reach this standard and live in great S poverty, in one-roomed huts. The majority of these cultivators 426 are heavily indebted, and the burden of indebtedness has doubled during the war years, because debts are usually incurred in gold.

L 471 The third study relates to Kfer Sa'ab in the north Lebanon, a hill village of small owner-cultivators. Of the total area of 200 hectares, about 30 are owned by the sheikh of the village. The total number of families is 150 (1,200 people), of which 120 own land and 30 are landless. A few peasant owners are rich with 5 hectares of land; 60 are medium owners with 1·5 to 2·5 L 241 hectares of land, and 25 own 0·5 to 1·5. Here cultivation [312] is much more intensive than in Syria, and half the land is irrigated.

[Ashrafie, near Damascus -- Analyst]

35: Warriner S-5 1948 MI Middle East
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There are some possibilities of raising yields in dry farming, but they are limited, and the main hope for increasing farm incomes is a better use of water supplies.

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The second conclusion is that in every district half or more than half of the population live in extreme poverty, due to the low proportion of land cultivated, low yields, and the unequal distribution of land. In Lebanon, surplus rural population is the major cause of poverty. There is no motive-power making for progress: even richer peasants do not invest, but spend unproductively: the landlords are pure rent-receivers: and the poorer peasants are entangled in a network of debt without hope of escape.

FRENCH LAND POLICY

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In regard to the *mushaa* system, which was widely prevalent at the time the French took over, the French authorities have hastened the process of disintegration. By decrees passed in 1925 and 1926 the periodical re-allotment of holdings (i.e., the *mushaa* custom) was forbidden. Since the work of survey and settlement did not keep pace with the legislative enactment, this law meant an abrupt interference with village custom which contributed to agrarian unrest, particularly in the Hauran, where the *mushaa* custom was general. It appears to have been largely disregarded, and not to have been put into force by the Bureau de Cadastre (the French Survey Office, which is a private concession and not a government department), which undertook the work of land settlement.

M. Duraffourd, the Director of the Bureau de Cadastre, considered that the *mushaa* custom had a real basis in the social life of the country and should not be abolished. Moreover it had often happened in Turkish times that title to land had been granted in divided holdings, but the titles were disregarded by the occupiers of the land, who continued to exchange their shares as before. The Bureau de Cadastre, therefore, when establishing title to land in a *mushaa* village have followed the practice of registering each villager's share in the land as a fraction of the total area, without attaching the title to any specific piece of land. This method tends to preserve the *mushaa* system. When title is registered to definite pieces of land, the Bureau de Cadastre have attempted in some cases to re-group the holdings

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the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled. Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

In several respects the French authorities have modified the Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the extensive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation concessions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the peasant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were started, but produced more water than could be used. The educational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessitates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

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Within this belt there is a large area of cultivable land still uncultivated, mainly for reasons of shortage of labour, lack of means of communication, and political insecurity. Uncultivated land is generally used for grazing, and in the 'Duck's Bill' the grass grows high enough for hay cutting. At present the cultivated area is some 481,500 hectares (1,188,000 acres), and it is estimated that an area about as large again remains uncultivated.

The population at present numbers 111,300, of which half are Kurds. Owing to its remoteness and unsettled state, there has been no survey and settlement of land title. New land is taken under cultivation under the old Ottoman right by which ownership is acquired if cultivation can be proved for ten consecutive years.

In the Jezira most of the land is held by large cultivators. In the Euphrates province much of the land has until recently been owned by the villagers, but now the land is passing into the hands of city landowners as pump irrigation is introduced (as in Iraq). The pumps and buckets are supplied against payment in kind by the town merchant or moneyed class; wherever irrigation brings more lands under cultivation, the ownership of the extra land is divided equally between the villagers and the suppliers of water.

The system of tenure is the usual share-tenancy; in the Jezira, according to local custom, the landlord takes one-eighth of the crop to pay taxes, and the remainder is shared equally between landlord and cultivator, the proportion being determined by the supply of labour. With the introduction of machinery—there were about thirty tractors in the area in 1942—the division into employer and labourers has developed: the landowner using the tractor on the land and employing wage labour.

Owing to the scarcity of labour, the position of the agricultural labourer in the Jezira area is better than in the rest of Syria. Health conditions, however, are bad: the Kurds suffer from trachoma and villagers in the Kamichlia district from malaria. In the Euphrates region, the position is worse: the agricultural labourer is weak and underfed, living a hand to mouth existence and exploited by all.

Both in the Jezira and in the Euphrates region there is scope

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COTTON IN SYRIA

United States mission estimated that 50 per cent of the land was in fallow 311
during 1948.[31] Increased irrigation and high prices for agricultural com- 241
modities have reduced significantly the fallow in the past few years, and the percentage may be less now.

PRODUCTION

Syria is normally self-sufficient in most foods. In fact, the country 433
exports fresh and dried fruits, lentils and other legumes, tobacco, wool, butter, hides, and meat. Occasional poor harvests make it necessary to import food grains.

The greatest deficiency is in rice, which has been displaced by cotton in recent years to such an extent that almost all of the country's requirements must be imported. Last year's bad cotton crop may prompt farmers to revert to rice and, if so, this will reduce the deficiency.

Government figures indicate that production of food has not kept pace 433
with the expansion in population and that the per capita food supply and 146
individual calorie intake are both declining.[32] These conclusions are based on highly conjectural statistics and are in conflict with opinions of the United States Agricultural Attache and Syrian officials who are intimately acquainted with the country's agricultural problems. These observers believe there has been no real decline in food consumption, except possibly for short periods of time. Certainly there is no shortage now, and the bumper cereal crop in 1952 should enable the country to fill domestic needs and export at least 30 per cent of its wheat and possibly 50 per cent of its barley.

The daily diet consists largely of starches, it is true, but this is due more 262
to habit than anything else. The resources of the country are ample to permit a much more balanced diet.

PRODUCTIVITY

Syrian agriculture often is characterized by the low productivity of the 461
agricultural worker. It is obvious that a great many more people are used on 241
each acre of land than is necessary. The low agricultural income is reflected 511
in the obvious poverty of the people. Yet, comparisons with other countries, and even detailed calculations, are of questionable value due to the unreliability of the statistics.

Government reports on average yields also are open to question. Official 241
figures show that wheat yields have dropped sharply, while cotton yields have tended upward, except for the extremely bad year in 1951-52. They also show very wide fluctuation. Experienced observers point out that the yields are especially questionable because both acreage and production figures are not reliable. On the basis of conversations with producers in various sections, it is apparent that yields are normally fairly high and that they fluctuate, depending on water availability and on insect devastation.

POTENTIALITIES

A number of missions which have studied the possibilities of agricultural development in Syria, especially in the last five or six years, all mention the

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[31] *Activities of FAO, 1950-52*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1952, p. 58.

[32] *Development of Food and Agricultural Resources in the Near East*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, November, 1951.

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[511] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
364 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

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340 variation exists between the living conditions of the more prosperous farmers and of the peasants, many of the latter possessing little beyond the barest necessities.

487 The larger cities, as Damascus and
177 Aleppo, have been important junctions on
342 trade routes from India to the Mediterranean for centuries, and reflect the influence of both Eastern and Western civilizations. They are a combination of the old Arab-type city and the modern, with most of the amenities of urban life. The older sections are usually made up of several quarters, dominated by different racial or religious groups. The houses are constructed of stone, brick or reinforced concrete and stucco, with flat or tiled roofs. In Damascus, about one third of the inhabitants live within the limits of the ancient city and a third in the modern residential developments.

342 The Bedouin follow essentially the same
511 pattern of life in Syria as in other countries of the Near and Middle East. The nomadic tribes dwell in tents made of goats' hair, usually in close association with their livestock. Their standards of living are primitive, both in the tent encampments and the semipastoral settlements.

ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION

Water Supplies

312 Water supplies are deficient in many sections of the country, and acute shortages may be experienced during the dry season. In the rural areas, domestic supplies are obtained from deep or shallow wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from rain-water cisterns. *Kowazes*, or wells connected by underground conduits which often extend for several miles, and waterholes, dug in the plains or near watercourses, are used
[364] in some districts. The village supplies are frequently polluted and responsible for the spread of intestinal infections.

The water supply of Damascus is taken from an underground reservoir at 'Ain el Fije, which is fed by springs in the Anti-

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144 co-operation with the Near East Foundation and other agencies. Similar operations have also been conducted by the Ministry in the town of Latakia and in the administrative center and the adjacent farms in the Jebel ed Druz area. In 1950, the government program covered a total of 224 villages, with an aggregate population of slightly over 180,000. A shortage of DDT necessitated the curtailment of the program in 1951, but the Ministry proposes to expand its activities to other malarious districts throughout the country as rapidly as possible. A demonstration control program was started in 1952 in the vicinity of Homs under the auspices of the World Health Organization. Anopheline control measures are carried on by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in and around the refugee camps situated in malarious regions.

136 164 FLIES. Flies of the family MUSCIDAE are numerous, including *Musca domestica vicina*, *M. tempestiva*, *M. sorbens*, *M. vitripennis* and *Muscina stabulans*. They are abundant around markets, food shops and dwellings, and are undoubtedly implicated in the spread of intestinal infections. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, is prevalent. The myiasis-producing flies, *Chrysomyia albiceps*, *Calliphora erythrocephala*, *Oestris ovis*, *Lucilia sericata*, *Gasterophilus haemorrhoidalis*, *Wohlfahrtia magnifica* and species of *Sarcophaga* are known to be present, and are probably responsible for occasional cases of infection in man.

At least 6 species of sandflies are found in Syria. *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti* are involved in the transmission of cutaneous leishmaniasis, which is endemic in many parts of the country, particularly in the vicinity of Aleppo. *P. chinensis* and *P. major* occur and are potential vectors of visceral leishmaniasis, although the extent of indigenous infection is uncertain. *P. papatasii* is also the vector of sandfly fever, which is sporadic in this region.

144 136 571 A fly-control campaign was inaugurated in Damascus in 1946. The dwellings in the poorer sections of the city and the tanneries,

p. 144(A)

144 the refuse dumps and other breeding sites
136 are sprayed with DDT preparations at in-
511 tervals between May and October.

136 Lice. Infestation with lice is common
511 among the inhabitants in the congested
361 quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

136 Fleas. Numerous species of fleas para-
164 sitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The sticktight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

136 Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

136 Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks,
232 including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and
164 several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

136 The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventri-*
164 *cosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of
752 scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings
[135] are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

136 The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

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age about 5 per cent. Pulmonary complications are generally responsible for a high mortality among the Bedouin children. Mumps, whooping cough and chickenpox are endemic, and often epidemic. 165 164 361

Meningococcus meningitis is sporadic. In the 12 years 1939-50, from 14 to 58 cases were reported annually, except in 1944, when the known incidence totaled 135 cases. 164

Occasional cases of diphtheria are observed, usually among children in the preschool and the school age groups. A high rate of subclinical infection undoubtedly exists, however, as demonstrated by Schick test studies.[25] Scarlet fever is relatively rare, although a few cases are reported each year. Streptococcus infections of the throat are common.

Poliomyelitis is seldom reported. No outbreaks have been recorded, but sporadic cases are sometimes encountered.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Contact

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal disease are present, but little information is available from which to determine their actual prevalence. Syphilis is widely distributed, while gonorrhea occurs primarily in the cities and the towns. Soft chancre is sometimes seen among the poorer inhabitants, but lymphogranuloma inguinale is comparatively rare. [511]

The nonvenereal treponemal infection, usually designated by the Arab term *bejel*, is common among the nomadic and the seminomadic populations in the Euphrates and the Al Jazira regions. The most prominent endemic foci are probably in the vicinity of Deir ez Zor, Raqqa and Meyadin. The disease is associated with low standards of living, and in the majority of cases infection is acquired in early childhood. Surveys have indicated that roughly 60 per cent of the above peoples in Euphrates and Al Jazira provinces are affected, while among some Bedouin tribes the infection rates approach 90 to 100 per cent. In different clinical and serologic studies, made at the mis- 164 361

164 563 Alawites and 68 per cent among the Ismailites. Trachoma is one of the principal causes of blindness, in spite of the fact that, in the opinion of many local observers, a large percentage of uncomplicated cases exhibit a tendency to spontaneous cure.

164 Gonococcal and other types of infectious conjunctivitis are common. In a series of 315 conjunctival examinations, reported in 1931,[19] from the mission hospital at Deir ez Zor, *Hemophilus lacunatus* (Morax-Axenfeld bacillus) was identified in 34 per cent, *H. conjunctivitidis* (Koch-Weeks bacillus) in about 10 per cent and *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* in 5 per cent, while different pyogenic cocci were found in the remainder.

164 515 758 Diseases of the Skin. As is to be expected, in view of the widespread ignorance of the principles of personal hygiene and the scarcity of water in many areas, skin diseases are prevalent. They represented almost 10 per cent of the total cases treated in government hospitals and clinics in 1949.

164 361 511 Mycotic infections are numerous, with ringworm of the scalp predominating in most localities. Impetigo and scabies are widespread, particularly among children in the rural villages. Pediculosis is almost universal among the inhabitants of the poorer, congested communities, both urban and rural. Occasional cases of human myiasis are encountered. A form of dermatitis, caused by the bite of *Phlebotomus papatasii* and other sandflies, is sometimes encountered among susceptible individuals in the summer months.

164 Leprosy. Endemic foci of leprosy exist in various parts of the country, but primarily in Hauran and Latakia provinces. The extent of infection is not accurately known, and estimates of prevalence range from 90 to 250 cases. A few new cases are reported each year. Theoretically, isolation [743] is compulsory, and the Ministry of Health maintains a leprosarium at Douma, near Damascus, which has facilities for the care of about 75 lepers.

752 164 Rabies. Sporadic cases of rabies are reported. The majority result from the bites

164 369 October, when the vector sandflies, *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti*, are abundant.

164 Kala-azar is seldom specifically reported from Syria, but occasional suspected cases have been described from the Jebel ed Druz region. A canine reservoir undoubtedly exists: the causative organisms have been demonstrated in a stray dog captured at el Bab, near Aleppo.[30]

Other Infections. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the western provinces where the vector, *Aedes aegypti*, is indigenous. Sandfly fever, transmitted by *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is endemic and sometimes epidemic.

Nutritional Diseases

106 364 511 Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are prevalent, particularly in the rural villages, where poverty and parasitic infections influence the nutritional standards of the people to a greater extent than in the urban areas. Serious nutritional conditions are most obvious among the children of the Bedouin tribes. Minor vitamin C deficiencies are widespread among the inhabitants of the grain-producing areas in the northeastern and the southern provinces. Occasional borderline cases of pellagra are encountered, but beriberi and ariboflavinosis are unusual. Cases of rickets are numerous, especially in the cities and the towns. Protein edema and overt vitamin A deficiencies are relatively rare.

Miscellaneous Conditions

164 232 Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and epidemics are sometimes reported. Q fever is enzootic among the sheep and the goats, but the extent of human infection is not known. In a series of complement fixation tests recently performed on blood serums taken from sheep and goats in different parts of the country, positive reactions were obtained in 13 to 63 per cent.[40]

Silicosis and benign pneumoconiosis are

SYRIA MDI

Post-War Period, 1945 to 1954

Agriculture

During the post-war period both agricultural and industrial output increased rapidly, and although population growth was fairly large there seems little doubt that per capita output rose significantly. 1/ Similarly, although data are very scanty, there is evidence of an increase in consumption and an improvement in the standard of living. 2/ 433 511

In agriculture, the increase in output was achieved by extending the acreage of cereals and greatly expanding that of cotton; there was also some improvement in methods of cultivation, especially in cotton. The total cultivated area increased from 2,314,000 hectares in 1946/47 to 3,668,000 in 1952/53. 3/ the irrigated area increased more rapidly, from 237,000 hectares 4/ to 400,000 hectares. 5/ The proportion of fallow land seems to have remained unchanged, at one-third of the total. It may therefore be taken that the crop area increased by about 60 per cent. 241 311

The increase in the irrigated area was achieved partly by the irrigation projects discussed below, partly by installation by farmers of pumps drawing on river or underground water. In 1953, there were 7,500 pumps, of which 40 per cent were for river water and 60 per cent for underground water. The extension of rainfed crops was achieved mainly by mechanization. In 1953 there were 1,200 tractors, compared with 860 in 1951 and about 300 in 1948; 1,307 tractor ploughs, compared 312 241

1/ National income is estimated to have risen from 1,250 million Syrian pounds in 1950 to £1,410 million in 1953; during that period, the index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus (1949 = 100) fell from 111 to 110. See Saad Wafa el Dajani, "al dakhl al Qaumi fi Suria", Al Abhath, (Beirut, December 1953); Ministry of Agriculture, A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria, and Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1953 (Damascus, 1954). A breakdown for 1950 shows that 44 per cent of the total was contributed by agriculture and animal husbandry, 13 per cent by commerce, 10 per cent by industry, 9 per cent by transport and communications, 7 per cent by government services, 5 per cent by rents and 11 per cent by other activities (Dajani, op.cit.).

2/ Per capita annual consumption of cotton, woollen and rayon fibres is estimated to have risen from 4.2 kilogrammes in 1951 to 4.6 kilogrammes in 1952 and 5.1 in 1953; the figure for Lebanon and Syria combined had previously risen from 3.9 kilogrammes in 1948 to 4.8 kilogrammes in 1950 (Food and Agriculture Organization, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Rome, January 1955). Output of tobacco products increased from an average of 1,638 tons in 1945-47 to 2,075 tons in 1950, 2,448 in 1952 and 2,699 in 1953.

3/ Bureau des documentations Syriennes et Arabes, La Syrie économique, 1953 (Damascus, 1954), mimeographed.

4/ Sir Alexander Gibb, Economic Development of Syria (London, 1947).

5/ Of these, some 250,000 hectares were irrigated by flow and 150,000 hectares by pumps.

164 Orontes River and in the irrigated districts
163 of the Euphrates river basin, especially in
369 the Al Jazira region. In a survey of representative population groups in Syria and Lebanon, reported in 1934,[88] hookworm ova were found in fecal specimens from 25 to 36 per cent of the farmers examined in the vicinity of Homs and Hama. Surveys in the Euphrates area suggest comparable infection rates. In the examination of 306 presumably healthy Arabs, from 9 to 60 years of age, who were engaged on excavations near Salihiye on the river about 60 miles south of Deir ez Zor in 1933,[38] slightly over 38 per cent were found to harbor hook-
164 worms. The prevalence of infection in the
369 agricultural communities along the Eu-
514 phrates and its tributaries probably aver-
515 ages from 25 to 35 per cent. Promiscuous defecation is widely practiced, and the children, running barefoot around the dwellings and in the fields, are particularly exposed to infection. No data are available regarding the degree of infection, but most observers believe that it is usually moderate. Similar studies undertaken in the areas around Damascus and Aleppo, in an Alawite village on the northern plateau and among Bedouin tribesmen south of the Euphrates yielded no evidence of infection.

164 Schistosomiasis. Schistosomiasis is endemic in two localized areas near the Turkish border—the Tell Abiad district on the upper reaches of the Belikh River and

Distribution of Schistosomiasis in Syria

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highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 744 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[40] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 282 164

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71: Dirini Y-5 (no date) 1958
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Homs

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539

Zuleikha gathered her brothers' swords and tools and led them out of the forest. They traveled through cities and villages, until at last they settled in a big city. Her fascinating beauty, and her majestic behaviour adorned with noble grief, earned her the prince of the city as a husband.

* * * * *

The witches, however, did not leave her to live in peace. So when she gave birth to three beautiful sons, the witches substituted three small dogs for them and stole the children from the cradle. So it was believed that the princess Zuleikha had given birth to dogs. The prince did not mind for the first two times; but when she gave birth to a dog for the third time, he determined to suppress his love and desert the bewitched Zuleikha. So she was imprisoned in a cell.

Days passed by, and Zuleikha became used to her cell, and spent her days in praying and begging God to help her. One day, the prince determined to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He passed by his deserted wife and asked if she would like him to bring her anything from Mecca. She answered that she would like to have "The Case of Patience."

Months passed by, and the prince came back with "The Case of Patience." When Zuleikha took the case which was believed to have magic power, she entreated it to redress the wrongs she had suffered, and to punish those who caused her to suffer. The Case flew towards the witches who reared the three sons of Zuleikha, and killed them. As soon as the witches died, the seven bears turned back into men, the sons were restored to their mother, and the prince reconciled himself to his wife.

JOKES ABOUT HOMS

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71: Dirini Y-5 (no date) 1958
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Syria MD1
Homs

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2. Once a citizen of Hama and a Homsian were spending their week-end on the bank of Al-Aasi. The river flowed towards the citizen of Hama. When he filled a pail of water from the river, the Homsain shouted at him, "Why do you take water from OUR river, you rogue?" The other was wise, and so they agreed to divide the river between them.

At noon it was hot. They both slept. A little later the citizen of Hama awoke to see the Homsian steal water from his part of the river, and pour it into his own part, that is, the Homsian's; yet the water flowed towards the part of the citizen of Hama. The man from Hama did not shout. He only looked and laughed.

3. Once a woman from Homs was cleaning the head of a sheep in the river. The head slipped into the water, and in order to bring it back she gathered a bunch of grass, stood at the bank of the river and beckoned to the head saying: "Come on, come on and eat."

4. Once a Homsian heard a shot in the yard of his house. It was night and he was so afraid that he did not dare to leave his bed. In the early morning he went down to the yard. He found his shirt, which was hung on the rope, pierced by the shot. He shook with fear; then he knelt and prayed. His wife followed him to the yard and when she looked astonished by his movements he caught her hand and pulled her saying, "Come and pray and thank God; for if I had been putting on this shirt the shot would have killed me."

5. Once a Homsian quarrelled with a citizen of Hama. The Homsian shouted at his antagonist, "Shut up. I say shut up or. . ."He shouted so much that his antagonist cried at him ironically, "And if I do not shut up, what will you do, you fool?"

The Homsian quickly answered, "Then I'll shut up!"

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Benghazi, Libya

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI
LEBANON MEI

Chapter Ten

SYRIA AND LEBANON

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

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THE area of the present Syria and Lebanon lies to the north of Arabia Deserta and is the western horn of the Fertile Crescent. The two republics do not enclose within their boundaries a natural geographic entity and their climate and topography are best studied in relation to the surrounding countries;[1] but within the political boundaries of the two states, the following geographical divisions may roughly be distinguished:

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(1) *The Coastal Strip*. This is about twenty miles wide near Latakia and rather less just north of Tripoli, but in some places disappears and the mountains meet the sea. Olives, bananas, citrus, and vegetables are cultivated intensively near Beirut.

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(2) *The Mountains*. Starting from the north, the first coastal mountains are the Jebel Ansariya (also known as the Alawi Mountains) which average 4,000 feet and are well populated on the western slopes. To the south is the Homs–Tripoli gap and then starts the Lebanon range with peaks of over 10,000 feet. Even on the upper slopes of this range water is plentiful, there is close cultivation, and the villages and towns are prosperous. Near Beirut are situated the mountain resorts to which most of the city workers move each night when the summer brings its humid heat. The interior ranges of mountains lying parallel to that of the Lebanon are the Anti-Lebanon (between Homs and Zahle) reaching over 7,000 feet and the range of Hermon (between Zahle and the Israel border) which reaches 9,200 feet. Water and cultivation are far less plentiful on these than on the coastal mountains. Farther inland still and to the south of Damascus lie the Leja, a bleak area of igneous rock, and the Jebel Druze, which reaches 5,000–6,000 feet and lies north of the Jordan border.

(3) *Plains and Plateaux*. Hardly any of the territory of Syria and Lebanon lies less than 700 feet above sea-level and south of Hama almost all the land is over 1,600 feet. The richest agricultural land is on fairly high ground and forms part of a

[1] See W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East; a Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (London, Methuen, 1950).

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria #01

question of Islam and modern civilization, and a greater caution in accepting ideas and innovations from Europe.

These two groups, and smaller, less important groups in other towns, have laid the foundations of a new Arabic literature. To a great extent their work has been preparatory. The Arabic language has been rendered more adequate and flexible, for example by the adoption or invention of technical terms. Western ideas have been spread through translations and works of popularization. New literary forms have been introduced—the poetic drama, the novel, the romantic autobiography—and at the same time old forms have been revived. In addition to the advances in form, the subject-matter of literature has been extended. Different groups have set themselves to expound subjects not hitherto treated : the relations between religion and secular culture, the position of women, the method of empirical science, and so on. In all this preparatory work, the influence of French and English thought and literature has been great and obvious.

Modern Arabic literature has so far produced nothing of great originality, nothing of much interest to the outer world. But there have been a number of honest, hard-working and courageous writers, who have deserved well of the Arabic-speaking peoples : for example, the religious thinker Muhammad Abdu, the social reformer Qasim Amin, the essayist al-Manfaluti, the poets Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, the playwright and novelist Tawfiq al-Hakim and the scholar Taha Husain.

These names are all those of Egyptians, and Cairo is the unquestioned centre of Arabic literature. But there have been very important Syrian and Lebanese writers, many of whom it is true worked for most of their lives in Egypt, although others remained in their own country. They include the scholars and poets of the Bustani and Yaziji families ; the religious reformer Rashid Rida ; the fathers of Arabic journalism Shidiaq, Nimr, Sarruf, Zaidan and Taqla ; the poet Khalil Mutran ; the best of women writers in Arabic, May Ziadah ; the traveller Amin Rihani ; and the mystic Khalil Jibran. The last two spent many years in the United States and wrote much of their work in English. They are the most distinguished of a group of Syrian-American writers who have planted in the new world a root of Arabic literature, which in spite of its qualities can hardly hope to survive a generation.

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

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The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

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The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

71: Dirini Y-5 (no date) 1958
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Zuleikha gathered her brothers' swords and tools and led them out of the forest. They traveled through cities and villages, until at last they settled in a big city. Her fascinating beauty, and her majestic behaviour adorned with noble grief, earned her the prince of the city as a husband.

* * * * *

The witches, however, did not leave her to live in peace. So when she gave birth to three beautiful sons, the witches substituted three small dogs for them and stole the children from the cradle. So it was believed that the princess Zuleikha had given birth to dogs. The prince did not mind for the first two times; but when she gave birth to a dog for the third time, he determined to suppress his love and desert the bewitched Zuleikha. So she was imprisoned in a cell.

Days passed by, and Zuleikha became used to her cell, and spent her days in praying and begging God to help her. One day, the prince determined to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He passed by his deserted wife and asked if she would like him to bring her anything from Mecca. She answered that she would like to have "The Case of Patience."

Months passed by, and the prince came back with "The Case of Patience." When Zuleikha took the case which was believed to have magic power, she entreated it to redress the wrongs she had suffered, and to punish those who caused her to suffer. The Case flew towards the witches who reared the three sons of Zuleikha, and killed them. As soon as the witches died, the seven bears turned back into men, the sons were restored to their mother, and the prince reconciled himself to his wife.

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Benghazi, Libya

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Wells

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Wells may belong to private individuals, or they may be the property of the tribe. Ownership is based on the construction of the wells. The custom varies from place to place but, generally speaking, the person or tribe who has dug the well has primary rights over it. Should he not be using it, other people may do so.

Natural and Artificial Basins

Natural basins are freely used by all. Artificial basins are owned by a person or tribe. Persons other than the owners may be authorized to use these basins against the payment of a fee.

SYRIA

Water Rights

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Water generally belongs to the owner of the land on which it is located. In areas where water is scarce, however, land and water can be sold and rented separately.

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In Soukhne, along the Euphrates, water sellers may be paid in money or in goods. The owners of small hydraulic enterprises (motor pumps, etc.) on the Euphrates are often paid by the farmers with half of their harvest for the water they furnish even though the cost of irrigation amounts to no more than 8 to 10 percent of the yield.

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According to custom, important personalities have water rights superior to those of the common people. Such rights, sometimes taken by force, are often no more than usage rights which do not imply the real ownership of a spring or a river.

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Ownership of water can be private or collective. Private ownership is rare and applies only to springs or wells of no great importance. It is to be found in densely-populated districts of the Mediterranean slope or in the cultivated steppes. Small gardens irrigated in this way are often individually set up by farmers or wealthy citizens as an investment of their capital. Such gardens are called <u>boustins</u>.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

565 class of importance nor an organized urban proletariat (although there are the beginnings of a trade-union movement). There does, it is true, exist a large commercial middle class in the towns, but it is not an autonomous class capable of challenging the social power of the landowners. For this there are a number of reasons: many of the merchants are Christians or Jews, and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interest from them.

565 Although the power of the landowners has not yet been
178 challenged, almost certainly the coming generation will see its decline. The conditions which made it possible are ceasing to exist. Land is no longer the only source of wealth, nor is subsistence-agriculture by ignorant peasants the only practicable means of using it. The landlords have lost not only their economic but also their political function: their services as leaders of a feudal army and as tax-collectors have long since been dispensed with. It is not yet clear, however, which class will take their place. The processes which have taken place in parts of Europe—the transfer of power from landowners to capitalists, and the division of large estates into small freeholdings—may occur, but it is not necessary and perhaps not altogether desirable that they should. It is at least arguable for example that it would be better, economically and socially, to revive and develop the village community than to try to create a class of small farmers. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that great changes in the structure of classes are to be expected.

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Again, the patriarchal family system remains in existence,
178 but its days are probably numbered. The claims of the family
621 are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the ways of modern urban life and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village.

178 The structure of the family is being radically transformed
562 by the change in the status of women. The change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 901

enter an ever-increasing number of occupations, including the liberal professions. But so far only the edge has been touched of the great problem, which like all great problems in this country is closely bound up with religion: how far is it possible in a modern society to retain the traditional Islamic view of women's status—seclusion and the veil, the theory and in a minority of cases the practice of polygamy, the divorce laws and so on? Of all the difficult questions which the process of Westernization raises, this is perhaps the most difficult; and its difficulty and urgency are likely to increase. The process of change is being speeded by one manifestation of Western civilization above all: the film which expresses a way of feminine life, and a conception of the relations between men and women, which are far from those prevalent in the Islamic world.

The local and sectarian loyalties of the past also preserve something of their strength, but on the whole they are declining in force and are likely to continue to do so, with the spread of Western ideas, the introduction of new means of communication and above all the development of schools, in which the adherents of different religions grow up side by side.

8

The growth of education is indeed one of the most important, as it is one of the most obvious, changes of the last few generations. Landowner, merchant and peasant alike are eager to send their sons and daughters to school, as the first and essential step towards entering the free professions or Government service. Syria and Lebanon now possess the framework of a complete educational system, from elementary schools up to technical institutes and three universities: the American University of Beirut, the Jesuit Université de S. Joseph, also in Beirut, and the State University, in Damascus.

The table on page 94 shows the number of schools of different types, and of scholars in them, in 1938.

From these figures it will be clear that education is further advanced in Lebanon than in Syria. It is also further advanced in the mainly Christian districts of Lebanon than in the others; among the Christians of Syria than among the Moslems; and in Syria as a whole than in Jebel Druze and Latakia. The percentage of literacy is probably rather

B: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

regime. Both Iraq and Jordan, arguing that a union with Syria would strengthen their position against Israel, opened negotiations with Za'im. Pressed by an immediate need to strengthen his position in the forthcoming armistice negotiations with Israel, Za'im offered to conclude an immediate military alliance with a pledge to consider the larger scheme of future cooperation with the Hashimi Kingdoms later on. He refused, however, to commit himself on whether he favored a republican or monarchical regime.[21]

Za'im's move toward negotiation with the Hashimi Kingdoms aroused the fear of the Saudi-Egyptian bloc that a rapprochement would lead to an extension of Hashimi rule to Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia therefore countered with promises of recognition and assurances of military and financial aid. This Saudi-Egyptian intervention was so successful that it not only doomed a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy (with possible extension to Jordan) but inspired Za'im to reach for the highest position of his country — an ambition which sowed the seeds of disagreement between him and his supporters, both civil and military, who now argued that Za'im had betrayed the cause for which they had instigated the coup, namely to rid the country of the Quwwatli regime.

In April 1949 Za'im dismissed Parliament and ordered new elections on the basis of universal suffrage, including women — the first to be thus held in an Arab country. After Za'im's election to the Presidency, preparations were made to promulgate a new Constitution into which liberal principles were to be introduced, especially relating to land reform. This Constitution, though completed, was never promulgated; but a new civil code, bearing the stamp of the Egyptian jurist Sanhuri Pasha (who had already started research along this line at the initiation of the Iraqi Government), was issued. Although based on both European models and the principles of Islamic law, this code materially restricted the authority of the latter. It is regarded as one of the permanent contributions of Za'im's short-lived regime.

[21] The relations of the Syrian coups d'état to the schemes of unity with Iraq and Jordan are discussed in detail in a paper by the present writer entitled "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity" contributed to a volume to be published shortly by the Harvard University Press.

44
Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
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TABLE 60

SYRIAN SCHOOLS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPE OF SCHOOL AND TYPE OF CONTROL, 1944–45*

871*

Type of School	Number of Schools				Enrollment			
	Boys	Girls	Coeducational	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Percent
Primary and intermediate:								
Public	542	116	...	658	63,755	21,785	85,540	57.6
Private	158	40	89	287	28,800	14,210	43,010	29.0
Foreign	50	38	39	127	9,942	9,936	19,878	13.4
Total	750	194	128	1,072	102,497	45,931	148,428	91.1
Secondary:								
Public	14	8	...	22	4,557	1,490	6,047	52.2
Private	8	7	2	17	1,283	460	1,743	15.0
Foreign	9	14	7	30	2,639	1,163	3,802	32.8
Total	31	29	9	69	8,479	3,113	11,592	7.2
Vocational								
Public	4	1	...	5	812	199	1,011	60.2
Private	6	1	...	7	444	17	461	27.4
Foreign	2	1	...	3	101	106	207	12.3
Total	12	3	...	15	1,357	322	1,679	1.0
Teachers College (public)	2	2	...	4	153	131	284	0.2
Syrian University (public)	4	1	...	5	766	69	835	0.5
GRAND TOTAL	799	229	137	1,165	113,252	49,566	162,818	100.0
Summary:								
All public schools	566	128	...	694	70,043	23,674	93,717	57.5
All private schools	172	48	91	311	30,527	14,687	45,214	27.8
All foreign schools	61	53	46	160	12,682	11,205	23,887	14.7

* Figures supplied by Ministry of Education.

dents (15 percent), and foreign schools, 3,802 (32.8 percent). Public schools were either for boys or for girls, but a few private and foreign schools were coeducational. Government schools, with an average enrollment of 275, were larger on the whole than either private schools (with an enrollment per school of 102 students), or foreign schools (with an enrollment of 127 per school). One of the reasons for that situation is probably that the public schools charge much lower fees and have a substantial percentage of exempted students.

A further scrutiny of Table 60 shows an interesting fact about the relative number of boys and girls in public, private, and foreign schools. In the public schools the ratio of girls to boys is roughly 1 to 3, while in the private schools it is approximately 1 to 2, and in foreign schools the two sexes are almost equally represented. It is interesting to speculate

871* 562

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
SYRIA MDI

*871 upon the reason for this phenomenon. One reason is the fact that there
●562 are a number of French Catholic orders of nuns which maintain schools patronized by Christians and non-Christians owing to the strict education and discipline exercised over the girls. Another reason lies in the fact that most of the pupils of foreign schools (77 percent) in 1942–43 were Christians and Jews, and it is a well-known fact that the education of girls is the more popular among these two groups—primary education among them is, in fact, almost universal, particularly in the cities where most of the foreign schools are located. This fact is further supported by the figures for foreign primary schools, which show that 19,878 pupils are almost equally divided between the two sexes—the difference is only six pupils—a phenomenon familiar where universal education prevails. Secondary education for girls, however, is much less popular, the girls forming only 30 percent of the total number of students in foreign secondary schools.

*871 In addition to the regular graded schools, there were in Syria, according to Ministry of Education statistics, 1,229 ungraded schools, or *kuttabs*, enrolling 34,440 children. Of these 292 were for girls, enrolling 6,190 pupils. Presumably these figures are for the year 1943–44.[23]

In the vocational-education field the public schools lead with 1,011 students, or 60.2 percent, in 5 schools. Of the 7 private schools with a total enrollment of 461, or 27.4 percent, 5 schools are not, strictly speaking, vocational. They are religious and Muhammadan law schools, enrolling 424 students. This leaves 2 vocational schools with a total enrollment of 37 pupils. Three foreign schools give vocational training to 206 pupils, or 12.3 percent of the total.

There were 4 teachers colleges for educating teachers for the primary and elementary schools—2 for men and 2 for women—enrolling 284 students. This is a great advance over the previous year when there were only 78 students.[24]

Finally there is the Syrian University with its Schools of Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy, Nursing, and Law, with 834 students, of whom 69 are women in the School of Nursing.

Teachers

*875 As has already been mentioned, statistics for teachers are difficult to secure. Only figures for primary public-school teachers in the year 1944–45 were available to the American Council Commission. These numbered 2,140 and were distributed as follows:

[23] Al-Husri, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

2: Belgrave G-S (1945) 1946 MD1-Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A VISIT TO SHEIKH SULAIMAN MURSHID, THE ALAWITE "LORD"

By SQUADRON-LEADER RICHARD BELGRAVE

S 648

IN June, 1945, the Alawite province of Syria was in an explosive state. To Major B—— and myself the arrival of H.M. Destroyer *Musketeer* was welcome in the extreme. With half a dozen Signals personnel we had been the only British "forces" in the area. No time was lost in putting her Captain, Commander S——, in the picture, and very swiftly and surely did he grasp the essentials of a highly complex political situation. It was clear that we had to take steps to keep the Alawites quiescent in this quarrel between the Syrian Nationalists and the French, or our efforts to prevent bloodshed could not have been successful for much longer. The story of our doings in this little-known corner of the Levant is recounted as an example of an unusual combined political operation by representatives of all three branches of the Service.

A 101 131 195 S 162 563

The Alawites constitute a religious sect of Islam, numbering some 350,000, and inhabiting the mountains just inland of Syria's 100 miles of Mediterranean coast. They are a minority to be reckoned with in Syrian politics, as they amount to roughly 10 per cent. of the population. In the main division of Islam into the two great sects, Sunni and Shiah, the Alawites are nearer to the Shiahs, while the great majority of the population of Syria are Sunni and nearly all the Nationalist leaders belonged to that sect. It was, therefore, inevitable that the Alawites should be somewhat suspicious of the Damascus Government. Alawite social life is still feudal and their religion secret: a curious blend, largely Islamic, but deriving certain characteristics from Christianity—for example, the belief in a Trinity—and from pagan and pre-Christian cults—for example, belief in reincarnation and the use of groves of trees for places of worship. Their prophets include Christ, Muhammad and Ali. Their women are not admitted to religious rites and are not regarded as possessing souls. The Alawites have the mountaineers' fondness for fighting, and have been enabled by their mountain country to preserve their identity through centuries of alien rule. Their standard of living is low and all but their feudal chiefs are poor. Perhaps the most important of these chiefs at the time of Syria's latest struggle for independence was Sulaiman Murshid, often referred to by the Europeans as "god."

A [362 774 721] A 622 [511]

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Sulaiman Murshid has never to me claimed to be in any sense a "god." On the other hand, it is estimated that some 50,000 people regard him as the incarnation of the divine and can be said to worship him in the sense that he is their absolute master. The Sulaiman Effendi, as he is known locally, is a shrewd man and knew that I had stated on several occasions that it was a "shame" for a man to pretend to any of the attributes of Allah. He later explained to me that he was the "Rabb" or "Lord" in the sense that he was "lord of the manor." I think, however, that he has on occasion found it profitable to be "the Lord" in as omnipotent a

prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands.

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years.

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

563 361 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 221 619 721 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. [291 191] Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 361 [134] Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 241 577 511 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 423 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

III The Shashans

563 The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete
167 the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the
463 Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good
134 at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

1621 The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-or-
361 dinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

361 As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christ-
167 ians in Merdin and the mountainous country around it started their
463 migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without proper-
429 ty or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

438 The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants
463 of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds
452 or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profit-
439 able to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

164 This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete
563 without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the
191 mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their
795 language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflicted upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is constituted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all

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the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

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The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

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Uniate Churches: that is, those Churches whose members formerly belonged to one or other of the non-Catholic Churches, and at some time in the past acknowledged the papal supremacy and gave up doctrines which the Roman Catholic Church regards as heretical, but retained their own liturgies and certain distinctive features of discipline and organization. There are five Uniate Churches with important bodies of adherents in Syria and Lebanon: the Greek Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic and Chaldaean Catholic Churches, which split off from the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Nestorian Churches respectively; and the Maronite Church, which originally held the Monothelete doctrine that Christ has two Natures but one Will, and which returned to Rome finally and as a whole in the twelfth century. The Maronites, like the Syrian Orthodox and Assyrians, have a Syriac liturgy, and a Patriarch of Antioch, resident in Lebanon, as their spiritual head. There are comparatively few Roman Catholics of the Latin or Western rite.

S 795 L 795

(v) The Protestants are the fruits of the labours of American and other missionaries during the nineteenth and present centuries.

The Jews are mainly Arabic-speaking and long-settled in the country.

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Of these religious communities, the Armenians (Orthodox and Catholic), the Assyrians and some of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics are not Arabic-speaking and have, for the most part, come recently into the Levant States. The Armenians came originally from the Caucasus and have their own language and national traditions. Most of those now resident in Syria and Lebanon have entered the country during the last half-century, in consequence of the great massacres in Asia Minor (1895–1915), and more recently of the annexation of Alexandretta by Turkey.[1]

C 795 563 L 795 563

Most of the Assyrians have been settled in Iraq since the

[1] See Chapter XI.

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S 795 563 last war, when they were dislodged from their original homes in the Kurdish mountains; the Chaldaeans have lived in L 795 563 the Mosul area of Iraq for many centuries. In 1933 a period of tension between a section of the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government ended with the killing of some hundreds of them by Iraqi troops. Several thousands in consequence crossed the frontier into Syria, and although some of them later returned to Iraq, others were settled in the Jazirah with assistance from the League of Nations. Their settlement became an integral part of the Syrian State in 1942.

A large part of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics still speak Syriac. They have been settled since before the coming of Islam in north Syria and south Turkey, in and around the Taurus hills, against which the wave of Arab influence exhausted itself. Thus they have been able to preserve their S Syriac dialect which farther south has been replaced almost L everywhere by Arabic. Many are, however, bilingual in [191] Arabic and Syriac, and others have abandoned Syriac and are now Arabic-speaking.

S There are certain other groups which resemble the L Armenians and Assyrians in not being Arabic-speaking, but 563 unlike them are orthodox Moslems. The most important of them are:

(i) The Kurds, of whom there are perhaps 200,000.[1] They are mountaineers from the high country which links the Anatolian and Persian plateaux, and speak a dialect akin to Persian. Some of them have long been resident in the country, but others have emigrated in the last twenty years from their homes in the mountains of eastern Turkey, in order to escape the repressive measures of the Turkish Government. There are small numbers of Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Alawis and Christians, but most of those who speak Kurdish as their native language are Sunnis.

(ii) The Turcomans, who number perhaps 30,000. They came originally from Central Asia, and their language is a dialect of Turkish. Originally nomads, they have now become semi-sedentary or wholly sedentary cultivators of the soil.

[1] These figures are only rough estimates; there are no official statistics for national and racial minorities.

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(iii) The Circassians, who are by origin Moslems from the Caucasus. They fled from their homes after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, and were settled by the Ottoman Government along the western edge of the Syrian Desert, to prevent the encroachments of the tribes. There are about 20,000 of them.

(iv) There are also a number of Yazidis, adherents of a secret dualistic religion and with a dialect of their own; but they are only a small offshoot of the main community in Iraq.

5

With these exceptions the minorities are Arabic-speaking and have lived in Syria and Lebanon for many generations; akin to the majority in many things, their basic difference is one of religious loyalties.

The general nature of the problem which they raise can be stated briefly. It is a product of two factors: first, of certain traditional differences which linger on in a new age; secondly, of the varying relations of the different elements in the population to the process of Westernization.

Serious at any time, religious differences were made more serious in the past by the prevalence of the theocratic view of life; differences of religious belief involved different political loyalties and principles of social conduct. The theocratic view was the basis of the 'millet-system', which, while it allowed a certain autonomy to the minorities, also increased the completeness of their separation from one another and from the majority. This was particularly true of those minorities of which a large proportion lived compactly in a single area; they came to regard themselves, if they had not always regarded themselves, as a 'peculiar people' linked by no moral or political tie with their neighbours. To complete their isolation there was added the memory of injustices, real or imagined, which they had suffered at the hands of the majority.

The persistence of these divergences in the present age adds a new and complicating factor to the problem of Westernization. It is not only that different communities have different paths to tread if they are to Westernize themselves: for example, the problems of social organization

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In the State of Syria two different types of minority problem exist. First, there are problems in regard to the protection and the rights of the 'scattered' minorities, which are in a minority in all parts of the country. Secondly, there are the problems raised by the existence of a number of 'compact' minorities: communities which, while forming a minority of the population of Syria as a whole, nevertheless possess a local predominance in certain regions of it. Here the question is not simply how to guarantee the security and rights of these communities, but what should be the political status and administrative organization of the regions in which they are predominant. There are two districts, those of Latakia and Jebel Druze, in which this question is important; and there is a third, the Jazirah, in which the position is similar in some respects, although very different in others. It will be convenient in the pages which follow to treat the situation in these three districts separately from that in the remainder of Syria.

Jebel Druze was mainly settled in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Druzes coming from Lebanon as a consequence of internecine disputes, changes in the traditional balance of social power and increased interference by the Turkish Government and the Western Powers. They sought in the Jebel freedom to manage their own affairs without control or interference. They now constitute an overwhelming majority of the population; in 1938 there were approximately 62,000 Druzes out of a total population of 70,000, the remainder being mainly Greek Catholics and Orthodox.[1]

Before the War of 1914–1918 the Druzes were almost completely autonomous; Turkish attempts to subdue them had at most a temporary success, and Turkish suzerainty existed only in name. They held aloof from the Sunni Arabs, and preserved in their isolation certain traits which might otherwise have been modified: suspicion of orthodox Moslems, resentment of all interference and attachment to their feudal organization and customary law. It is the persistence of these traits which has given rise to the political

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 220–1. The figures for Latakia, the Jazirah and the rest of Syria, given in the following sections, are from the same source.

563 problem of Jebel Druze. What degree of control should the French or Syrian authorities attempt to impose? How is the social system of the Druzes to be adapted to the needs of the present?

One answer to such questions (and it is that given by most French officials during the mandatory period) starts from the premise that the Druzes cannot be treated as ordinary members of the Syrian Arab people. What they need, it is said, is firm and enlightened administration which, while taking into account the strength of their conservatism, will aim at the same time at softening such of their customs as are incompatible with modern civilization. Such administration can best be given by officials drawn from their own great families, fortified by European advisers and modern education; it would be useless and dangerous to attempt prematurely either to assimilate them to the rest of the population or to modernize their social system.

The Arab nationalists start from the opposite assumption, that the Druzes are Arabs who by reason of their history and geographical isolation have developed distinctive customs and a particularist spirit; this spirit will only be strengthened by the grant of autonomy and may become so intense that the Druze resentment of interference will act as a permanent obstacle to unity and good government in Syria. What they need, say the nationalists, is to be given a consciousness of their solidarity with the Arab nation, into which they must be reabsorbed socially and politically. Either their claim to self-government should be denied, or else such administrative privileges as are given them should be limited both in duration and in extent.

Among the Druzes themselves there are parties which adhere to both these schools of thought, some who feel themselves Arabs and support the aspirations of the nationalists for unity and independence, and a smaller number who desire autonomy under European control and protection. But the majority probably have an equal fear of Arab and European interference, since both must ultimately lead to the break-up of their traditional and uncontrolled way of life.

563 621 The Druzes may be able to defend their isolation against the nationalists and against European powers for a time; but their conservatism has other more formidable enemies. The whole feudal organization of their society is breaking up:

the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, 562
the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but 621
powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

10

The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known 162
as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is 795
in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants 795
of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors 631
but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a large proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said 795
about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the 648
Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

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and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land. ooo

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was 162
almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 103,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.[1]

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose 563
native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other 798
part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a 563
conflict between the greater number of French officials/ 86
who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds 565
have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups 619
being the Barazi and Milli; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the 'Hoybun' party. It aims at the

[1] Another estimate for 1937 was as follows: Arab Moslems 41,900; Kurds 81,430; Christians 31,050; others 4,150; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

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563 619 formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

12

162 795 In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

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184 The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual,

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795 individuals who are sympathetic to Arab nationalism. Such
116 sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox. (One reason for this may be that since the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Greek Orthodox have had no external 'protector' and so have had to understand the necessity of being on good terms with their neighbours.) Nationalist ideas are particularly strong in the younger generation, who imbibe them in school and elsewhere. The Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab traditions; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missionaries and teachers; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that any relaxation of French control would mean the loss of their privileged position.

The leaders of the nationalist movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians, and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of national feeling have often been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders springs from a genuine desire to create a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; and also from the wish not to alienate Western opinion. While, however, the more moderate and responsible nationalists are tolerant on principle and by sentiment, there is a certain suspicion of Christians among their less enlightened followers.

14

563 The Druzes and Alawis in the six provinces are outlying sections of the larger communities in Jebel Druze and the district of Latakia respectively, and do not require separate discussion here. The Isma'ilis form a compact community in the province of Hama; they keep much to themselves and want only to be left alone. The Circassians are to be found in the Hauran, on the northern frontier and on the Euphrates; they still constitute a separate entity with their own language and customs. During the Syrian revolt of 1925 they were used as irregulars by the French authorities, and this made them more unpopular with the Arabs than before. Some of them have at times demanded local autonomy, but

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without success. Being Sunnis and living in mainly Arab regions, they will probably in time become assimilated. The Turcomans in the province of Aleppo have on occasion caused trouble to the authorities by their turbulence, but do not raise any special political problem. Kurds are also to be found in the province of Aleppo and there is a colony of several thousands in Damascus. From here and Beirut, the Kurdish nationalist movement is directed. Its main weight comes from the Jazirah, but it is strong in other parts of Syria, though by no means all Kurds are nationalists. Some of these scattered Kurds are nomads, others semi-sedentary or sedentary. There are several thousands of Jews in Damascus and Aleppo. They have been treated with tolerance broken by occasional incidents: in 1840, for example, the Jews of Damascus were accused of ritual murder. Like the Arabized Jews in general, they openly repudiate Zionism, and events in Palestine have not gravely affected their position; but in recent years many of them have emigrated to Palestine.

Finally, much of what was said about the Armenians in Lebanon applies to those in Syria. They are of particular importance in Aleppo, where more than 65,000 of them live; a large proportion of these have been settled there for several generations. They are prominent in many branches of trade and industry. Their failure to become Arabized is resented by many Arab nationalists; while the fact that as Christians they help to increase the Christian element in the population of the town arouses the hostility of some Moslems. But Aleppo is not a fanatical town; it is primarily a commercial centre, and much more tolerant of diversity and less liable to be carried away by political enthusiasms or hatreds than is Damascus.

Memories of the past have embittered the feelings of practically all Armenians towards Turkey. At the time of the Alexandretta affair,[1] the rumour that Turkey intended to claim the district of Aleppo caused a great stir among the Armenians of northern Syria. Had Aleppo been ceded to Turkey, this would probably have been followed by the emigration of large numbers of Armenians southwards.

[1] See Chapter XI.

7

In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more sud- 648
denly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power 631
so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the 621
agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was 563
established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller landowners against the great families of the Jebel; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables 649
elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He 668
initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

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In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash. 000

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afterwards the Governor found his position impossible and 631
was compelled to abandon it. He was not replaced, his 664
powers being assumed in July by the High Commissioner's 186
Delegate.

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The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 effected no formal change in the status of the Jazirah, but its signature was followed by the replacement of the French officials who had ruled it until then, by Syrian administrators. Here as in Jebel Druze and the Alawi region discontent soon showed itself. There were some who felt and expressed loyalty to the new national Government. But there was an important element which demanded that the ties between the Jazirah and the central Government in Damascus should be as loose as possible, or should be severed altogether. Their minimum demand was that the local officials should be chosen from among the local population; their maximum, for complete separation from Syria. Their discontent was increased by the lack of wisdom shown by some of the more irresponsible nationalists, although the Government itself acted on the whole in a conciliatory manner. The autonomists appear to have been encouraged by certain of the local French officials; the nationalists claimed, indeed, that here as among the Alawis and Druzes the minorities would have acquiesced in their rule had it not been for the activities of French agents. The separatists were themselves divided on everything except their dislike of being ruled by the nationalists of Damascus. Some were Kurds, who objected mainly to being ruled by Arabs; others Christians, who objected also to being ruled by Moslems. These two groups sometimes but not always acted together during the years from 1936 to 1939.

Serious trouble first broke out in June, 1937, when the 669
Kurds of Hassetche revolted against the appointment of 563
nationalist officials from outside the Jazirah. The rising was 631
quelled with the aid of the French military authorities, but it was soon taken up in Qamishli and elsewhere by the Christians, who demanded a special statute similar to that of Alexandretta, an administration which would give equal weight to the rights of all sects and races, and the withdrawal from the province of officials who had not been chosen from the local population.

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The disturbances reached their height in August, when a number of Christians in Amudah were killed in an altercation with a group of Kurds instigated by a Kurdish chieftain who supported the nationalist Government. The intervention of French troops and the removal of certain unpopular officials restored order for a time. But beneath the surface discontent continued, and the separatists began to form themselves into societies for the defence of their rights, with a central committee to co-ordinate their activities. In December, 1937, some separatists from Hassetche kidnapped the Governor of the Jazirah, Tawfiq Shamiyyah, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus; he was released after a few days, and his kidnappers were arrested.

The Governor was shortly afterwards replaced by a new one, a Moslem, who made a conciliatory statement of policy. It did not, however, appease the separatists. They demanded the release of those who had been arrested for kidnapping the former Governor, and also the dismissal of certain officials. When the new Governor failed to persuade the Syrian Government to yield to these demands, he was chased from the province. The separatists then drove out other nationalist officials, boycotted the administration and reaffirmed their demand for a separate government under French control.

While these events were occurring in the Jazirah, the separatist case was being urged in Paris and Rome by Cardinal Tappouni, the head of the Syrian Catholic Church, who had constituted himself the spokesman of those Christian minorities who were opposed to nationalist rule. In a memorandum submitted to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November, 1937, he spoke of the possibility of a massacre of the Christians in the Jazirah and elsewhere, and made various proposals for avoiding it: that the religious communities should be given complete equality in religious and personal matters; that an equitable number of Christian officials should be appointed; that the Syrian Government should maintain, in districts where the Christians might be menaced, adequate means for their protection; and that a régime of decentralization should be introduced, such as to safeguard the interests of the minorities. The French Government, which was then negotiating with the Syrian Prime Minister in order to obtain more explicit guarantees, replied in a vague and conciliatory fashion.

11: Houzani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

The situation remained as it was until the beginning of 1939, when agitation for the release of the kidnappers of the former Governor occurred. In June organized manifestations on a large scale took place in all the towns of the province; but the French authorities intervened and restored order.

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No sooner had the Franco-Syrian Treaty been signed than criticism of it began to appear in France. In part this criticism came from those who opposed the whole idea of a treaty, believing the Syrians to be still unfit for self-government. Others, while admitting a treaty of some sort to be desirable, were doubtful of the adequacy of the existing Treaty: because it aimed at creating a unitary State in a country so divided as Syria; or because its guarantees for minorities and its provisions for the maintenance of French military forces upon Syrian soil were insufficient; or else because it did not stipulate for the repayment to France of the expenses incurred in the administration of the Mandate.

These doubts were reinforced by the events of 1937: the Alexandretta question, and the growth of the separatist movements in Jebel Druze, the province of Latakia and the Jazirah. It was obvious that the French Chamber and Senate would only ratify the Treaty provided that they were reassured on these and certain other points. The Syrian Prime Minister therefore went to Paris in order to negotiate with the French Government an agreement upon the points at issue. He left Syria in November, 1937, and returned towards the end of December. The result of his visit was an exchange of letters between him and M. de Tessan, Under-Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated December 11th, 1937. The letters included a further guarantee by the Syrian Government of its intention to respect all the rights granted by the Treaty to the minorities living under its sway; and an undertaking by the Government to accept the technical experts recommended to it by the French Government. The letters closed with a statement of the desire of both parties to continue the policy of co-operation.[1]

These undertakings were accepted by nationalist opinion as being inevitable in the circumstances, and ratification of the Treaty was eagerly awaited. In March, 1938, indeed, Mardam

[1] See Appendix A4.

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Chapter Ten

SYRIA

Distribution of Minorities

THE table on page 76 shows the distribution of the Syrian population by religious confessions and provinces. 000

Written Guarantees

The Syrian Constitution issued in 1930 contains formal guarantees for the good treatment of minorities. Article 6 states that all Syrians are equal before the law, enjoy the same civil and political rights and shall not suffer discrimination on grounds of religion, race or language. Article 15 guarantees liberty of conscience and worship, and respect for the religious interests and personal status of all sects. Their educational and other rights are guaranteed by Article 28. Article 26 states that all Syrians are eligible for public offices without distinction. Finally, Article 37 lays down that the electoral law shall provide for the representation of confessional minorities. (This has in fact been done: every Chamber elected since the issue of the Constitution has contained an appropriate number of representatives of the minorities.) 641 563

Personal Status and Communal Organization

Until 1938, the law of personal status underwent much the same changes in Syria as in Lebanon. The same attempts were made to reform it, and met with the same obstacles. The most recent attempt was made in November 1938, when the High Commissioner issued a decree modifying and completing the decree issued in 1936 but never applied.

It met with bitter opposition, both religious and political. The Ulema objected to it on the ground that it contravened the Shariah. It allowed conversion from one sect to another, while the Shariah condemned apostasy. It gave to the heads of the communities the right of representing their communities *vis-à-vis* the authorities; but the Shariah recognised no such rights of representation. It laid down that the son should follow the

[text continues on page 77 -- Analyst]

religion of his father in certain cases in which the two parents belonged to different sects, whereas the Shariah required him to follow the religion of his Moslem parent. 641 563

The Ulema presented a memorandum to the Nationalist Government of Jamil Mardam Bey, setting forth these and other theological objections and protesting against the decree. The Government was sympathetic to them, not only because of its desire to keep on good terms with orthodox Islam, but also because of the political circumstances of the moment. Franco-Syrian relations were strained, owing to the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty of 1936. The Syrian Ministry resented the way in which the decree had been issued by the High Commissioner, over its own head and that of the Chamber. When the Ulema presented their memorandum to the Prime Minister, he replied that his Government was not willing to accept the decree, and soon afterwards the Minister of Justice issued instructions to the Courts not to apply it.

Shortly afterwards, for this and other reasons, the Government resigned. The High Commissioner had triumphed on the constitutional question. Subsequently, however, in view of the passions which the decree had aroused, he issued a new one excluding Moslems from the application of the laws of 1936 and 1938. No further step to regularize the situation has been taken since then.

Divisions of the Country

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The figures given in the first section show that there are three districts of Syria in which the Arab Sunnis do not possess a majority: they are Jebel Druze, where the Druzes are in the majority, Latakia, with a majority of Alawis, and the Jazirah, which is divided between Kurds, Arab Moslems and Christians of different kinds. It will be convenient to describe each of these districts separately before dealing with the remainder of the country. 563

Jebel Druze

Jebel Druze was settled in the course of the nineteenth century by Druzes coming from Lebanon in order to escape Turkish government, military service, foreign interference, Christian rivalry and in general all restrictions upon their liberty to follow 563

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●563 their traditional customs and manage their own affairs. The Druzes now constitute the overwhelming majority in the Jebel.

Before the First World War, the Druzes were almost completely autonomous. Turkish attempts to subdue them were not successful, and Turkish suzerainty was no more than a name. Their relations with the Sunni Arabs were equally distant. The isolation in which the Druzes lived throughout the nineteenth century helped to preserve certain elements in their society which might otherwise have been modified: dislike of all kinds of interference and attachment to their feudal organization.

The particularism of the Druzes would be a problem for any form of government. The nature of the problem, however, has been in some ways modified during the present generation. On the one hand the French encouraged the particularist spirit throughout the Mandatory period. They maintained that the Druzes could not be treated like the other sections of the Syrian population, but needed a special regime which, while taking into account the strength of their conservatism, would aim at modifying such of their customs as did not conform to modern ideas of civilization. Such an administration, they claimed, could best be given them by officials drawn from their own great families, controlled by French advisers and fortified by French education.

On the other hand, the rising nationalist movement starts from the assumption that the Druzes are Arabs who have developed peculiar customs and traditions by reason of their history and isolation. They need to be re-absorbed into the Arab nation, politically and socially, and to be made conscious of themselves as Arabs. Whatever special regime be granted them must therefore be limited in extent and temporary.

Among the Druzes themselves there are parties which support each of these two policies. There are those who desired and still desire formal autonomy under French protection, and others who want Jebel Druze to become fully a part of a Syrian or Arab State; there is also a very large group who want protection and interference from no one and wish only to be left alone. This conflict of ideas is related in various complex ways to the social conflict which is now beginning in the Jebel. The lesser land-owners are restless under the domination of the Atrash, the leading family of the region; and for the first time the peasants are beginning to question the feudal system under which they have lived for so long.

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The Territory of the Alawis

The province or territory of the Alawis, also known as the Province of Latakia (its official name has been changed several times) includes the Jebel Ansariya and the coastal plain at its foot. It is in many ways a natural unit, and the greater part of the population which inhabits it possesses a distinctive character. Sixty per cent of the population are Alawis, and the others are in more or less equal parts Sunni Moslems and Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In and around the town of Latakia itself, the Sunnis form the largest single community.

The Alawis are probably descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors and have managed to preserve their individuality, with various accretions from the cultures and religions of their overlords. Under the Turks they possessed local autonomy while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan, until the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Government succeeded in imposing its authority upon them. In practice, however, local autonomy meant local tyranny, since the region, like the rest of Syria, was organized on a feudal basis and the peasants suffered the unrestrained rule of their lords.

The problem of the Alawis is in some ways similar to that of the Druzes: an isolated, backward peasantry, tenacious of its individuality, ruled by feudal lords and brought into contact, during the present generation, with a Western power having interest in Syria and with the forces of Arab nationalism. The divisions of opinion expounded in the preceding section exist here also. There are, however, certain additional factors which do not exist in Jebel Druze and which complicate the situation. First, the Alawis are divided among themselves into a number of sects; largely because of this, there is no ruling family as powerful among them as the Atrash among the Druzes, but a number of great families at rivalry with one another. Secondly, the existence of large Sunni and Christian communities gives rise to difficulties. In general they are more advanced than the Alawis; they form a large part of the town population, and in addition much of the land is owned by Sunnis. The Sunnis would never submit to be a minority in an autonomous Alawi region, the more so since nationalist governments in Damascus would probably favour them above any other section of the population. All the Sunnis and many Greek Orthodox desire

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563 the complete incorporation of the district in Syria; but others of the Christians would prefer it either to be autonomous or to be incorporated in Lebanon.

The Jazirah

Before the First World War, the Jazirah, the north-eastern province of Syria, was empty except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was thinly cultivated, and the standard of living low; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria, they established a certain measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already had by virtue of its fertility. The Mandatory authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian minorities who had been dislodged from their homes in Turkey by persecution. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites, Syrian Catholics and Assyrians, and in addition some thousands of Kurdish Moslems have moved into the province. New towns and villages have been created, new crops introduced and the district opened up to commerce.

The present population of the Jazirah falls into three main divisions. First there are the Arab tribes, of which the most important is the Shammar. Some of them breed camels and are fully nomadic; others have taken to raising sheep and become semi-nomadic, or else have turned into wholly sedentary farmers. Secondly, there are the Kurds, who are themselves split up in various ways. They are divided into tribes; in addition some are nomadic, others semi-nomadic and others again sedentary. There is a further distinction between those Kurds who have long been settled in the district and who are largely Arabized, and those who have come in during the present generation and still preserve their Kurdish language and characteristics. Among these, Kurdish nationalism is strong, and has been encouraged by French officials.

Thirdly, there are the Christian immigrants, who are divided among a number of sects. Some of them are Arabic-speaking Greek Orthodox and Catholics, others Armenians; in addition, there are Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, Assyrians and Chaldaeans who either speak Syriac or have abandoned it too recently for Arabic to have acquired any Arab national sentiment. Of them all, the Assyrians are those who have aroused the most interest

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in the outer world. About 9,000 of them have settled in the Jazirah since they crossed the frontier from Iraq during the troubles of 1933.[1] A Board of Trustees, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations and administering funds contributed by the Governments concerned and by the League, built villages and bought land for them. At the beginning of 1941, when their economic position was satisfactory, their special administrative and fiscal regime came to an end and they became an integral part of the Syrian State. Since then their economy has been dislocated by the enlistment of a large proportion of their members in the Iraq levies. 563

Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of which dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which would be furnished by a long-settled population, the Jazirah presents a complex problem which is intensified by a number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems and between Arabs and Kurds; the eternal enmity of Beduin and settled folk; the influence of the clergy and particularly of French missionaries; and interference by Turkey from just across the frontier. 563 578

During the years of Mandatory rule, French policy was to give the Jazirah strong and sympathetic administration, and so enable the immigrants to settle down in their new homes, and also to keep the Jazirah separate from the rest of Syria. The nationalists, on the other hand, wish to avoid at all costs the creation of another problem similar to that of Jebel Druze or the Alawis; they therefore insist that the district must be ruled from Damascus, sympathetically but without any concession to separatist feeling. Of the inhabitants, some of the Beduin, Kurds, Greek Orthodox and other Christians are in favour of the rule of Damascus, but a large number both of Kurds and of Christians would prefer autonomy under Western protection. The most important advocate of autonomy is the Syrian Catholic Patriarch, Cardinal Tappouni. The Kurdish and Christian autonomists, however, although united in opposition to Arab nationalism, are not in agreement on many other questions. 563

The Arab Christians

Most of what has been said about the social and economic position of the Christians in the other Arabic countries applies

[1] See Chapter Eleven.

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•563 equally to Syria. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of inter-connected social units, the relations of which with the Moslem community are largely formal. This is especially true of the older generation brought up under the Ottoman regime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of the nation between them are helping to make the younger generation less conscious of its confessional ties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects.

Western ideas and forces have so far made little impression outside the few large towns. In the smaller towns and the villages, traditions still rule unchecked, and the old social exclusiveness of the sects still persists. But on the other hand the very nature of life in small towns or villages tends to the assimilation of the social characteristics of the minorities to those of the majority. Moreover, it encourages economic interdependence and co-operation. Economically, the Christian do not differ much from the Moslem peasants. It is only in the large towns that the economic structure of the Christian communities diverges
563 from that of the majority. The educational progress of the
871 Christians has been swifter than that of the Moslems, and has diverged from it in some ways. In 1938 the Christians accounted for about 32 per cent of the total school population, although they form only 19 per cent of the population as a whole. They account for an even larger proportion of the pupils of secondary schools; and although only 20 per cent of the students of the University in Damascus are Christians, many others are studying at the Universities in Beirut, or in Europe.

It must be noticed also that 32 per cent of the Christian students attend foreign schools, 61 per cent private schools and only 7 per cent official ones. Almost all the foreign schools are controlled by Christian missions, although some are owned by the French 'Mission Laïque', and about 170 out of the 294 private schools are controlled by Christian communities. Thus, the Christians are not only obtaining more education than the Moslems, but
563 it is education of a different sort. Individual Christians play an
668 important part in the national movement, in Syria as elsewhere. The most prominent of them in recent times have been the brothers Faris and Faiz al-Khuri, the former of whom was President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1936 to 1939 and again in 1943–4, and became Prime Minister in 1944.

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It is not simply isolated individuals who feel sympathy with the national movement. Sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox, who are altogether Arab in culture and feeling. This is true of the clergy as well as the laity, and of the higher clergy as well as the lower: the Bishop of Hama was Vice-President of the Pan-Arab Conference of Bludan in 1937. The younger generation, brought up under the influence of nationalistic ideas in school and out of it, tend to be as wholly devoted to the Arab cause as their Moslem contemporaries. 563 668

Roman Catholics and Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab tradition; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missions and schools; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that the relaxation of French control means loss of their privileged position. 563 668 177

The leaders of the national movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of nationalistic feeling have been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders often arises from a genuine desire to build a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; or else from a desire not to alienate Western opinion, which tends to care more for minorities than for majorities. 563 668

Although the more enlightened nationalists are tolerant, among those who are less enlightened there still exists considerable suspicion of the Christians as a whole. It springs not only from ancient prejudice; it is due to the fact that certain of the Christians, not wholly against their will, have been used by the French as instruments of domination and as a pretext for delaying the grant of independence. Once the problem of Franco-Arab relations is definitely settled, the tension between Moslems and Christians will gradually be relaxed.

The Armenians

In general, the Armenians in Syria do not need special attention. Most of what has been said about their fellow-countrymen in Lebanon is true of them also. It is necessary only to call attention to the special situation existing in Aleppo, where the Armenian 563

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element is particularly large and important. It numbers 60,000; many of these have long been resident in the town, while others came in during the period of persecution. Their economic position is strong. Almost wholly urban in occupation, they are particularly prominent in certain branches of trade and industry and a number of crafts. They are also numerous in the free professions, but there are few of them in government service because of their general ignorance of Arabic. As the largest unassimilated element in the population, their presence was at first resented by the nationalists, who regarded them as a complicated problem and an instrument of foreign interference; the more reasonable nationalists understand, however, that the only possible policy is not to treat them as enemies but to help them to become loyal citizens and to be at least outwardly assimilated to the majority. There are some of the 'Tashnak', the Armenian nationalists, who are opposed to any degree of assimilation and wish to preserve their culture and customs until such time as they can return to an independent Armenia. Others, however, and perhaps the larger part, are willing to co-operate with the majority and sacrifice something of their individuality, either permanently or at least until they can return to their own country. They are the more willing to work with the Arabs because of their fear of Turkey, which has increased greatly since the cession of Alexandretta. During the Franco-Syrian crisis of 1945, the Armenians as a whole threw in their lot with the nationalists and resisted all attempts of the French authorities to make use of them.

In recent years they have been much influenced by the U.S.S.R. and the favourable treatment which is being given to its smaller nationalities in political and cultural matters, and now in foreign affairs as well. It is probable that the majority of them would want to emigrate to Soviet Armenia if they were given the opportunity.

Other Minorities

Most of the minorities are of no great importance. Thus, the Jews in Damascus and Aleppo are small communities of craftsmen and traders, Arabic-speaking and externally assimilated. Many of them have emigrated to the New World and in general they are becoming Europeanized quickly. Although for the most part they are not Zionists, Zionism has affected them; very many

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of them have settled in Palestine, and those who are left cannot be wholly unaffected by the rising wave of Arab hostility to Zionism. 563

The Isma'ilis form a compact community, backward and without any political claims except to be left alone. The Turcomans also raise no problem in themselves. Originally a nomadic community, they have now become agricultural, and in some regions they have been completely Arabized. The Circassians, however, have resisted assimilation more successfully. They still remain as a separate entity with their own language and customs, and have even at times claimed autonomy. Both in Turkish times and under the Mandate they have been used by the authorities to hold down the population; the French for example used them to suppress the Syrian Revolution of 1925. This has made them disliked by the Arabs; but there is no obstacle to their ultimate assimilation.

The Kurds are of much greater importance. There are over 100,000 of them in the north of the country, mainly in the foothills of the Taurus north of Aleppo, and 20,000 in Damascus. Most of them have been in the country for generations, but some have fled from Turkey in the last twenty years. Almost all are Sunni Moslems, but there are some Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Christians and Alawis. The language of the majority is Kurdish, but many are bi-lingual in Kurdish and Arabic, and some, particularly in Damascus, speak only Arabic. There is a gradual process of assimilation going on among them, helped by their backward cultural state; they have practically no facilities for education ex[illegible] Arabic.

Originally no[illegible]ds, they have now mostly settled on the land as peasants. They are dominated by their land-owning class, but less so than formerly. Although sedentary, they still preserve their tribal organization, and on the whole tribal loyalty is still much stronger among them than national loyalty.

In general, they are whole-heartedly opposed to Turkey, are suspicious of Arab nationalism, friendly to the U.S.S.R. and grateful to France for the favourable treatment they have received. Kurdish nationalism is strong among some groups of them, particularly those in Damascus. Damascus and Beirut, indeed, have become the main centres of the Kurdish national and cultural movement, directed largely by the Badr Khan brothers. The nationalists do not for the most part expect independence, 563 668

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563 but they claim autonomy in the Jazirah or at least the right
668 to live as Kurds, immune from attempts to force them to assimilate.

French Policy

648 France's hostility to Arab nationalism led her to show special
563 favour to the minorities in Syria. This policy revealed itself in numerous administrative acts, and in such military acts as the recruitment of special detachments from Circassians, Kurds and other minorities, but it is most clearly shown and has had the most important consequences in regard to the two compact minorities, the Druzes and Alawis.

648 In 1921 an agreement was concluded between the French
563 authorities and some of the Druze leaders, providing for a national
631 government assisted by French advisers. From this time until 1936 there existed a 'Government of Jebel Druze' independent of Syria and under all-pervasive French control. At first, French policy ran counter to local susceptibilities, and this led to the Druze Revolt of 1925, which became a Syrian national revolt. After the suppression of the revolt, the same system was continued, and was formalized by the Organic Law of 1930. Its effect was to encourage the particularist feeling of the Druzes and to arouse among certain of them a feeling of gratitude to France.

Another autonomous territory was created in the 'Territory' or 'Government' of the Alawis, set up in 1920. It possessed an administrative system similar to that of Jebel Druze, formalized in a similar organic law issued in 1930, and under a still stricter French control. The administration did something to improve the very backward condition of the Alawis and to arouse among them a corporate self-consciousness and a feeling of attachment to France. In general, the district was peaceful after unrest at the beginning; the only disturbances came from the Sunnis and Greek Orthodox, who believed their interests were being neglected and demanded the attachment of the district to Syria.

Nationalism and the Minorities

563 The leaders of Arab nationalism in Syria recognize the import-
668 ance of the minority problem and have made considerable efforts to win the confidence of the minorities. In principle they regard Arab Christians as on a level with Moslems inside the Arab community, once they are willing to accept their obligations as

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members of the Arab nation. As for the linguistic minorities, they insist on a certain degree of assimilation, but there is no question of treating them as inferiors because of their racial origins. 563 668

They are opposed, however, to the grant of a special regime to minorities, since it would only perpetuate their difference; and even more strongly would they oppose any foreign intervention or influence in support of the minorities. In regard to the compact minorities, while they recognize the need for careful and tactful administration, they believe they are capable of giving such administration, and wholly reject the claims of the autonomists, both because the grant of autonomy would play into the hands of foreign powers eager to intervene, and because, so long as they remained autonomous, the minorities would never learn how to live with their fellow-nationals.

The Treaty of 1936 *and the Minorities*

The autonomy of Jebel Druze and the Alawis was brought to an end by the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. In December of that year decrees were issued annexing the two Governments to the Syrian Republic as the Provinces of Jebel Druze and Latakia respectively. Certain safeguards were, however, provided for the special position of the two provinces. On the one hand, they were given a special administration and financial regime. On the other, the military convention attached to the Treaty stipulated for the maintenance of French troops in both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty. 648 563 631

At the same time, the administration of the Jazirah was placed under the control of the Government of Damascus; it had never been formally autonomous but in practice had been under direct French administration since the establishment of civil government there.

In each of these three districts there was a group which welcomed the union with Syria, and others who thought it in their interest to side with the nationalists who seemed to be the rising power. Others again did not object to incorporation in Syria, so long as the special position of the provinces was respected and they were fairly treated in such matters as government appointments. There were some, however, who desired to return to complete autonomy under French protection. From 1937 648 563 668

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to 1939 this last group grew stronger, and more or less brought administration to a standstill. There were a number of reasons for this. The Government was hasty and tactless; some of its supporters were intolerant. The fears and suspicions of the minorities were too strong to be overcome in a few months, and there can be no doubt that they were played upon by some of the French officials who refused to accept the change of policy laid down in the Treaty of 1936.

In 1937 and again in 1939, Jebel Druze was disturbed. In Latakia discontent grew gradually but did not become serious until the rising of a section of the Alawis led by Suleiman Murshid, a self-made notable and self-styled god. In 1937 a section of the Kurds and of the Christians of the Jazirah caused disturbances. Their case was strengthened by the support of Cardinal Tappouni, the Syrian Orthodox Patriarch. Again in 1939, there were manifestations on a large scale.

Meanwhile, relations between the French Government and the nationalists had been growing worse, owing to the reluctance of the former to secure the ratification of the Treaty. By 1939, France had reversed the policy inaugurated in 1936. In July 1939, the Constitution was suspended. Almost simultaneously decrees were issued restoring the autonomy of the Jebel Druze and the Alawis. At the same time the Jazirah was placed once more under direct French rule; but by December 1940, matters had returned to normal and, once more, the authority of the Syrian Government was imposed in the Jazirah.

It was not only the compact minorities which had been restless during these years. The scattered minorities also had been apprehensive of nationalist policy towards them. They had not been persecuted on any large scale, and officially the Government had frequently declared its desire to treat all citizens equally; but there had been enough acts of discrimination to appear to justify the pre-conceived fears of the minorities. It was partly to allay these fears that the Syrian Government concluded supplementary agreements with the French Government in 1937 and 1938, containing among other things guarantees for the position of communities and individuals.

The difficulties of the situation must not, however, be exaggerated. Not all minorities were equally hostile to nationalism. Those which were most hostile were the Catholics, who had profited most from French rule; others, like the Greek Orthodox

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and a section of the Armenians, were able to maintain good relations with the Government. In general, what troubles occurred were no more than were inevitable in a period of transition.

Developments since 1941

In September 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria. His proclamation contained the following statement about minorities:

> Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural, and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled.
>
> It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.[1]

In accordance with these principles, the two autonomous territories were re-attached to the rest of Syria. Thus, the first Government formed after the proclamation contained a Druze and an Alawi Minister; and in February 1942, the two provinces were once more formally annexed to Syria, with provisions for a special administrative and financial regime. In September 1944 the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze voted unanimously for the abrogation of its special regime and complete incorporation in the Syrian State.

In the summer of 1943, elections were held and subsequently a nationalist government took office. As formerly, the Chamber contained representatives of the minorities and the Cabinet a Christian minister. The Government made clear its intention of treating all members of the community on a footing of complete

[1] General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28, 1941. *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9, 1941.

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

641 equality but, at the same time, of making its authority respected
563 by all alike. In spite of these declarations, however, there were a series of petty incidents in 1944 which aroused the fears of some of the minorities: for example, local disorders and alleged injustices in government appointments. In some parts of the country, moreover, the Government had difficulty in imposing its authority. This was particularly true of the Alawi district, where Suleiman Murshid and his associates caused trouble; the Jazirah also was not quiet. There were a number of reasons for these difficulties: it was inevitable that the minorities should still retain their old fears of Sunni domination; it was no less natural that in a time of administrative changes certain local officials should abuse their powers and indulge their prejudices; it was unavoidable that families and groups should be disappointed when official appointments were made, and should blame the Government's choice on religious prejudice. None of these, however, was the most important reason. That was to be found
648 in the strained state of relations between the French and the
563 nationalists in Syria. So long as France continued to deny the claim of the nationalists to full independence, they could not help feeling a certain resentment against the minorities who had so often been used as tools of French policy.

In 1945, after the Franco-Syrian crisis in the course of which Damascus was bombarded, Franco-Syrian political relations were at last regulated, and agreement was reached for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syrian soil. The withdrawal took place in 1946, and thus the essential condition for the establishment of normal relations between majority and minorities was fulfilled.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
SYRIA MDI

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of the property, the finances, and the philanthropic and educational activities of the church. A board of five men, all laymen, is chosen by the council to have charge of the schools. These 6 schools make a complete kindergarten, primary, and secondary ladder by themselves, consisting of 2 boys primary schools, 2 girls primary schools (1 of which is topped by an intermediate section), a coeducational primary school, and a complete secondary school for boys. Girls leaving the girls intermediate may join the secondary classes at the boys secondary school, and in 1945–46 there were 5 girls who had done this.

The schools are supported by fees, by income from the church endowment and property, by grants from the government, and by contributions. The buildings are owned by the Greek Orthodox church and community. The student body, though predominately Greek Orthodox, has students from other denominations. The boys secondary school, for example, has about 40 Muslims, 25 Jews, and 20 Catholics. The teaching staff of the school is also mixed: 16 Greek Orthodox, 5 Muslims, 2 Jews, and 3 Catholics. Fees are £S6 to £S90 in the primary schools and £S20 to £S200 in the secondary schools.

All pupils whose families receive help from the welfare society of the Greek Orthodox community are exempt from fees. Other pupils pay according to ability after inquiry by the priests and the committee.

In general, the curriculum follows that of the government, but with two important differences. French is begun in the first primary grade, and English in the first secondary grade. Arabic reading is begun toward the end of the first kindergarten year and continued in the second kindergarten year. By the time the children enter first grade, they know how to read. The first grade is, therefore, in reality equivalent to the second grade of the government schools; and, although the primary school is nominally five years, it is in actual fact six years. The first-grade children appear to be above the average age. This procedure may perhaps have been necessitated by the early teaching of French.

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[191]

The problem of teaching a multiplicity of languages in primary schools is found in an extreme form in Armenian schools. The largest Armenian community in Syria is in Aleppo where Armenians took refuge after the Armenian massacres in Turkey during the First World War. Anxious to preserve their national language and to know the language of the country of their adoption, they have had to teach both Arabic and Armenian. At the same time the advantages that accrued to those who knew French under the mandate made them introduce that language into their schools, while the fact that most Armenian youth who wanted to continue their

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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education preferred an American school forced them to teach English as well. 563 873x

This situation is well illustrated by the 2 Giligian primary schools in Aleppo—1 for boys and 1 for girls. Both are under the same principal. The boys school had in 1945–46 an attendance of 254 boys, while the girls school had 228 girls. The kindergarten department in connection with the latter had 240 boys and girls in four sections, one section of which had 72 children. Naturally, the teacher could do little more than watch over the children. In these schools Armenian is begun in the upper section of the kindergarten, Arabic in the first grade, English in the second grade, and French in the third. Previously, however, it was the practice to begin French in the first grade.

In order to provide for a program so heavily loaded with languages, each grade has an average of thirty-six to thirty-seven periods a week. The program also extends over six years instead of the usual five years of the public schools. The schools are housed in rented houses, and are supported mostly by fees ranging from £S30–£S60 a year. About 65 boys and girls are exempted. The government pays a grant of £S750 a year and the salary of one teacher which it supplies. The other teachers are graduates of American secondary schools, holders of the second *baccalauréat*, or women who have had some secondary studies. Two are from the Armenian secondary school in Istanbul, Turkey, while five men and women are graduates of the Armenian teachers college in Nicosia, Cyprus. This is an institution offering a course of three years above the secondary school for the education of teachers for Armenian schools.

While Orthodox schools are mostly controlled by laymen's councils of the community with the clergy in the background, the Catholic schools are controlled to a considerable extent and often directly by the clergy. The 3 Catholic private schools visited by the Commission in Syria were of this nature. A Catholic primary school in Aleppo was under the supervision of the Bishop of Aleppo and supported by him. The Maronite school for boys is headed by a priest and housed in a building belonging to the church. Its deficit is met by the Maronite welfare committee. A Maronite girls school in Latakia is conducted by the Maronite nuns of the Holy Family commonly known as the "nuns of 'Ibrin," a village in Lebanon where the mother convent is located. In all these schools French is stressed, except that the latter school by agreement with the government begins the teaching of French in the fourth grade. 795 873x

The final type of private school is the nonsectarian school maintained either by groups and societies or by individuals. 873x 872x

sion hospital clinic in Deir ez Zor,[14, 18] the prevalence among the Bedouin has been estimated at 50 to 90 per cent and among the seminomadic Arab townsmen at 20 to 35 per cent. 164 361

The facilities for the diagnosis and the treatment of venereal diseases are meager. As of 1951, the Ministry of Health operated special venereal disease hospitals and outpatient clinics in Damascus and Aleppo. It also maintained 2 mobile dispensaries for the treatment of syphilis and bejel in the eastern provinces. A campaign for the mass treatment of bejel and syphilis was initiated in 1952 by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The findings of the various field units should eventually provide a comprehensive picture of the distribution and the prevalence of these diseases in eastern Syria. 758 743

Diseases of the Eyes. Trachoma is a major public health problem in all parts of the country, although it varies in prominence under urban and rural conditions. The infection rates usually average less than 10 per cent in the cities, but approximate 40 to 60 per cent in the rural areas, where over two thirds of the people live. Repeated surveys among school groups in northern Syria[21] indicate that slightly more than 5 per cent of the children in Aleppo are affected, in contrast with 30 to 40 per cent in the environs of the city and 60 per cent in the rural villages. The disease exists at all levels of society, but is less frequent among the nomadic tribes than among the settled communities in the same general region. Differences in prevalence, influenced by local customs, are also noted among the various racial and religious groups. In a survey covering mountainous and coastal areas of Latakia *muhafazat*, reported in 1933,[20] the highest infection rates were found in the predominantly Alawite districts. The index of infection averaged 44 per cent. It ranged from 25 per cent among the Armenians to 61 per cent among the 164 369 164 563

p. 153(B)

164 Alawites and 68 per cent among the Ismail-
563 ites. Trachoma is one of the principal causes of blindness, in spite of the fact that, in the opinion of many local observers, a large percentage of uncomplicated cases exhibit a tendency to spontaneous cure.

164 Gonococcal and other types of infectious conjunctivitis are common. In a series of 315 conjunctival examinations, reported in 1931,[18] from the mission hospital at Deir ez Zor, *Hemophilus lacunatus* (Morax-Axenfeld bacillus) was identified in 34 per cent, *H. conjunctivitidis* (Koch-Weeks bacillus) in about 10 per cent and *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* in 5 per cent, while different pyogenic cocci were found in the remainder.

164 Diseases of the Skin. As is to be ex-
515 pected, in view of the widespread ignorance
758 of the principles of personal hygiene and the scarcity of water in many areas, skin diseases are prevalent. They represented almost 10 per cent of the total cases treated in government hospitals and clinics in 1949.

164 Mycotic infections are numerous, with ring-
361 worm of the scalp predominating in most
511 localities. Impetigo and scabies are widespread, particularly among children in the rural villages. Pediculosis is almost universal among the inhabitants of the poorer, congested communities, both urban and rural. Occasional cases of human myiasis are encountered. A form of dermatitis, caused by the bite of *Phlebotomus papatasii* and other sandflies, is sometimes encountered among susceptible individuals in the summer months.

164 Leprosy. Endemic foci of leprosy exist in various parts of the country, but primarily in Hauran and Latakia provinces. The extent of infection is not accurately known, and estimates of prevalence range from 90 to 250 cases. A few new cases are
[743] reported each year. Theoretically, isolation is compulsory, and the Ministry of Health maintains a leprosarium at Douma, near Damascus, which has facilities for the care of about 75 lepers.

752 Rabies. Sporadic cases of rabies are re-
164 ported. The majority result from the bites

p. 154(A)

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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CHAPTER V

SYRIA

In Syria, where the idea of Arab independence found some of its earliest protagonists, nationalism has been marked by a special degree of ill-temper, perhaps because the masses of the larger towns—Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, etc.—at an early stage became an object of political manœuvring. 186 668

Anti-foreign feelings had been aroused as early as 1925, when clashes with the French Mandatory régime led to the bombardment of Damascus. After the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936, Syria became a refuge for Palestinian Arab terrorists on the run. Fawzi Kaukji—an Albanian adventurer specialising in gun-running and gang warfare on behalf of Arab extremists—Amin al Husseini—the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem—and many other "wanted" disturbers of the peace found fertile soil for their activities in Syria.

Here the connection between Arab nationalism and Muslim fanaticism was particularly close, and even sermons in the Mosques frequently descended to the level of vicious and inflammatory diatribes against non-believers. As early as October, 1945, the leader of the "Young Muslims' Association," Sheikh Mustafa al-Sibaj, in a violent speech after the Friday midday prayers in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, threatened the Jews in Arab countries with disaster "if the Palestine problem is not solved in favour of the Arabs."

These characteristics of Arab nationalism in Syria have had their effect not only on the Jews but on the Christian minority also. Hence the attractiveness of neighbouring Lebanon, with its security of life for minorities, as a goal for Christian emigration. The same was true as regards the Jews of Syria, a steady stream of whom has been moving to Lebanon for the last 25 years. The early trickle has recently become so great in volume that, by now, it is believed that only a few remnants of the Jewish population are left in the two big towns of Aleppo and Damascus. 568 668

The last census—that of 1943—gave the number of Jews in Syria as 29,770 out of a total population of 2,860,411 (of whom 2,424,817 were Muslims). The majority of the Jews used to live in Aleppo and Damascus, with about 17,000 in Aleppo (compared with 35,000 in 1910) and 11,000 in Damascus. The remainder, rather isolated, dwelt mostly in the north-eastern province of Jezirah, where they had settled in 1924, along with Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians from Turkey and Iraq. 162 167

Of the 29,000 Jews in Syria in 1943, about 15,000 had left the country by 1947. At that time, there still remained about 10,000-11,000 in Aleppo and about 2,500-3,000 in Damascus. Less than 1,000

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

162 were left in the Jezirah district. An additional 5,000-6,000 Jews
167 emigrated at the beginning of 1948, leaving a total of about 9,000, with 4,500 in Aleppo, 4,000 in Damascus, and 500 in the Jezirah district. Further emigration took place that year; and it is estimated that there are now fewer than 6,000 left in the whole country.

This exodus was the culmination of many years of intimidation, material decline, and moral isolation. The smaller community in Damascus had always been poor. About 80 per cent earned their living as labourers and pedlars; approximately 15 per cent were able to maintain a slightly higher standard; while only 5 per cent were able to make a good living, mostly in commerce. The Aleppo community had in bygone days been prosperous and had been an active and important element of the city's once flourishing commerce. The rapid deterioration of conditions, however, made itself felt particularly strongly among the Jews of Aleppo; and since the wealthy were the first to leave the country, the remainder were impoverished even more swiftly.

197 Although knowledge of French is widespread among educated
563 Jews, the every-day language of the majority is either Arabic or Ladino. There are two *Alliance Israélite Universelle* schools, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus. Since the convocation of the first Parliament in December, 1936, there has been one Jewish representative in the Chamber of Deputies. He was, it is true, allowed to retain his seat even when persecution of the Jews reached its height. But, isolated as he was in a sea of feverish hostility, there was little he could do to alleviate the situation.

In 1945, a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Damascus, presided over by the Mufti of Damascus, sent a telegram to the Allied Governments, threatening that a Holy War against the Jews would be declared by all Islamic countries if Jewish immigration into Palestine continued. Within a month, this action and similar incitement from high quarters, coupled as they were with a violent anti-Jewish press campaign, bore fruit.

[579] On the Muslim holiday of Qurban Bairam, on November 18, an
563 infuriated mob, goaded on by a group of students, broke into the Great
668 Synagogue in Aleppo, smashed the candle burning in front of the Ark, battered some old Jews who were praying, and burnt the prayer books.

This was the signal for the outbreak of a general anti-Jewish campaign, made the worse by the incessant agitation carried on by nationalist orators among the Arab masses. There was the ugly murder of Jacques Franco, Assistant Headmaster of the *Alliance* School in Damascus. Suspicion that his death was the result of the prevailing unrest has never been entirely removed, even though there is insufficient evidence to prove it. There was the forcing of Rabbi Moshe Nahum, of the Jewish community of Jezirah, to make a statement protesting against Jewish immigration into Palestine. There was the humiliating spectacle of the heads of all three Jewish communities

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MDI

being compelled, in November, 1945, to take part in the demonstrations 563
against the Balfour Declaration, and Jewish shopkeepers being ordered 668
to close their shops as a sign of solidarity with the Muslims. However little concerned Syrian Jewry may have been with Zionist aspirations in Palestine, its feelings on the subject could hardly have been strong enough to cause its leaders—"of their own free will"—to announce that they intended to hold a banquet in honour of the notorious Fawzi Kaukji—a wartime officer of the German Waffen S.S.

Not even in Egypt did public hysteria against the helpless and isolated Jewish minority go to such lengths as it did in Syria. Doubtless this fact is due to the combination of a half-educated university youth and an illiterate, hungry, and disease-ridden urban populace. In Syria, as in Egypt, such a combination has given an extraordinarily explosive character to the nationalist movement.

When the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the Palestine 648
issue visited Syria, its members were struck by the cowed and 563
intimidated manner of the heads of the Jewish community. One member of the committee, Mr. Bartley Crum, in his book *Behind the Silken Curtain* (p. 239), gives the following description of the scene when three representatives of the Jewish community arrived to give evidence:

> The committee of three chosen Jews appeared. Only one spoke. There had been testimony in Jerusalem before us by Oriental Jews charging that Jews in the Oriental countries were given only second-class citizenship. Our sub-committee expected the Jewish spokesman they now heard on the scene to need far more than 20 minutes to tell his story. Instead, he used 45 seconds of his allotted time. He raced through a one-sentence written statement, in which he said that the Jews of Syria were happy and not discriminated against; that their situation was excellent under the present Syrian Government; and that they had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Zionism. The three presented a picture of terrified men. . . .

The tragic farce of the repeated declarations of solidarity with the Muslims forced on the leaders of the Jewish community did not diminish the flood of persecution. Thus Shukri al-Quwatli, the President of the Syrian Republic, made no effort to halt anti-Jewish discrimination, even though in 1946 a Jewish delegation made special representations to him. On the contrary, in 1947, the Syrian Government promulgated new restrictions, prohibiting Jewish inhabitants from leaving their areas of residence.

The effect of this order was to paralyse even what remained of Jewish economic activity; and it should be noted that the order appeared even before the partition of Palestine was decided on by the United Nations.

Within four days of the United Nations decision being made 648
public, the mob was sufficiently worked up for anti-Jewish rioting to 563
break out in Aleppo. On December 2, 1947, a crowd, spurred on 579
by agitators, burnt down the four big synagogues in the city plus

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

648 14 smaller ones, and destroyed 150 houses. An unknown number of
● 563 Jews was butchered to death.
579 By the time Palestine was invaded by the Arab States, the Jewish communities in Syria were completely isolated. No Jew dared to have any contacts abroad or, for that matter, with any foreigners resident in the country. Commercial activity came practically to a standstill, since Jews were forbidden to open their shops or to carry on with their employment.

The property of a transport company, owned by an Iraqi Jew, was confiscated, and the entire Jewish staff arrested. Fifteen Jewish girls who worked in the telephone exchanges in Aleppo and Damascus were dismissed. The Chief Engineer of Damascus, who had held this position for 12 years, suffered the same fate, together with five Jewish school teachers. The school building of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* in Damascus was requisitioned for the military. The already impoverished community was forced under threat to donate about £S10,000 (at that time equivalent to £1,100) to the Arab funds.

Throughout the months of fighting, a relentless campaign demanding the confiscation of all Jewish property went on. The Damascus Jews felt themselves fortunate in being spared a repetition of the earlier Aleppo riots, though in August, 1949, 11 were killed when a bomb was thrown into a synagogue.

563 For some time the situation of the Jews in Damascus was extremely grave. Being prevented from earning a living, the community was so impoverished that it was feared that many would die of hunger and disease. Had it not been for the assistance of the Jewish community in Beirut, the Damascus community might well have perished. Later, their straits were further relieved by American help.

563 With the overthrow of the Syrian Government by Husni Zaim in
669 March, 1949, all restrictions on the movements of Jews, as well as on the sale of property, were abolished. The new ruler declared that he would deal severely with any person attempting to discriminate against the Jews. The lifting of the travel ban was immediately followed
[167] by a new wave of Jewish emigration to Lebanon.

The confused situation arising out of Zaim's murder, and the succession of political *coups* which followed, make the prospects of the Jewish community uncertain. But even if the new Government were to abstain from any official discrimination against the Jews of Syria, the atmosphere has been poisoned to such an extent that a return to normal conditions and peaceful relations seems most unlikely. On the face of it, nothing will alter the passionate wish of practically every Jew in Syria to shake the country's dust off his feet.

642, 728, 177, 565

X Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of [1511] the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud- 342 brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest 262 necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale 731 since the First World War; but malnutrition is very wide- 146 spread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other 164 diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in 511 Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

6

The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause 178 far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in 565 changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

545 class of importance nor an organized urban proletariat (although there are the beginnings of a trade-union movement). There does, it is true, exist a large commercial middle class in the towns, but it is not an autonomous class capable of challenging the social power of the landowners. For this there are a number of reasons: many of the merchants are Christians or Jews, and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interest from them.

545 Although the power of the landowners has not yet been
178 challenged, almost certainly the coming generation will see its decline. The conditions which made it possible are ceasing to exist. Land is no longer the only source of wealth, nor is subsistence-agriculture by ignorant peasants the only practicable means of using it. The landlords have lost not only their economic but also their political function: their services as leaders of a feudal army and as tax-collectors have long since been dispensed with. It is not yet clear, however, which class will take their place. The processes which have taken place in parts of Europe—the transfer of power from landowners to capitalists, and the division of large estates into small freeholdings—may occur, but it is not necessary and perhaps not altogether desirable that they should. It is at least arguable for example that it would be better, economically and socially, to revive and develop the village community than to try to create a class of small farmers. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that great changes in the structure of classes are to be expected.

7

Again, the patriarchal family system remains in existence,
178 but its days are probably numbered. The claims of the family
621 are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the ways of modern urban life and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village.

178 The structure of the family is being radically transformed
562 by the change in the status of women. The change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON MEI
SYRIA MDI

S L 181

In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trving to create one.

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Social Survey

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

S L 204 656

The Press

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

S L 871 [212] 658

Education

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

S the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares
166 were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating
S much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled.
311 Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

S In several respects the French authorities have modified the
L Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners
656 against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the exten-
423 sive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation conces-
565 sions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

S Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural
L credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the pea-
185 sant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were
565 started, but produced more water than could be used. The edu-
511 cational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

S So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of
L improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessi-
244 tates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

A We jolted our way through the narrow pass commanded by the ruined
342 Crusader castle of Qalaat Mehelbeh, one of the chain of Frankish forts
712 that cover these mountains. Sulaiman Effendi's front drive, though under 30 miles long, climbs 4,000 feet and is only just passable for cars, in spite of forced labour. Muhammad Ali regaled me with tales of past skirmishes, and pointed out the time-honoured defensive positions in the rocks. He knew Sulaiman Murshid well, having once come up to arrest him, and made him walk the whole way down. Presently Major B—— halted on a sharp crest, and a wonderful view lay spread out at our feet.
A We could see the houses of Jobit Burghal at the bottom of a huge bowl of
133 cultivated and terraced land; they straggled up the further slope, with the
311 Lord's house, white-painted and boxlike, higher than the rest. On all sides rose rock-covered hills, culminating in the summit of the Alawite mountain ridge about 500 feet above the village. It was almost like a "Shangri La" vision in the clear still air, but possessed a far more savage and stony grandeur than my imaginings of that ideal valley.

A Major B——, who had visited Jobit before, told us it was as well to
712 halt at this point, as Sulaiman kept a watcher permanently stationed on his roof with field-glasses, and the track winding steeply down at our feet was covered from the village at every yard of its length. Having given the Lord time to recognize us, down we went and soon came to our "tentacle," Captain N——, camped in an idyllic spot amid trees and rocks a few hundred yards short of the village. He told us that Sulaiman
000 was expecting us and that the French had been informed of our visit. We decided to pay a courtesy call on the latter first, as they were camped in the ruined houses of a rival chief at the bottom of the village, who had unwisely sided with the gendarmes and had had his houses burnt by the Lord's men and his people driven out for his pains. We were met by some junior French officers as frigidly as could be, and after they had told us that their O.C. the Commandant was away we took our leave. Recollecting scores of happy and fraternal occasions I had spent with my
A French friends, I regretted this extremely stilted meeting. We drove off
363 up the village "street," a succession of hairpin bends and steep rocky slopes more like a river-bed than a road, and, rounding a sharp corner, pulled up in the courtyard of the Lord's house.

A Sulaiman Murshid, flanked by his son Fatteh and some of their hench-
609 men, was on the steps and greeted us with the usual Syrian welcome,
576 "Ahlan wa sahlan." His eighteen stone of bulk and rubicund fleshy face
S bore witness to his enjoyment of the good things of life and his small
[576] evasive eyes reflected a somewhat puzzled frame of mind. Indeed, it took over an hour for him to relax an extreme caution as to which way the wind was blowing for him politically. I introduced Commander S—— as the captain of the "mudammera" which was lying in Latakia harbour below, and gave a few indications of her size and power and of the purpose of her visit to Alawite territory. I found later that Sulaiman Murshid became convinced from local rumour that *Musketeer* could land a stream of shells plumb on his house in Jobit, a happy illusion which I forbore to dispel.

000 We were shown into a salon with nineteenth-century French pro-

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

no less important an element in the common consciousness than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

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Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization. Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Syria MDI

in the outer world. About 9,000 of them have settled in the Jazirah since they crossed the frontier from Iraq during the troubles of 1933.[1] A Board of Trustees, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations and administering funds contributed by the Governments concerned and by the League, built villages and bought land for them. At the beginning of 1941, when their economic position was satisfactory, their special administrative and fiscal regime came to an end and they became an integral part of the Syrian State. Since then their economy has been dislocated by the enlistment of a large proportion of their members in the Iraq levies. 563

Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of which dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which would be furnished by a long-settled population, the Jazirah presents a complex problem which is intensified by a number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems and between Arabs and Kurds; the eternal enmity of Beduin and settled folk; the influence of the clergy and particularly of French missionaries; and interference by Turkey from just across the frontier. 563 578

During the years of Mandatory rule, French policy was to give the Jazirah strong and sympathetic administration, and so enable the immigrants to settle down in their new homes, and also to keep the Jazirah separate from the rest of Syria. The nationalists, on the other hand, wish to avoid at all costs the creation of another problem similar to that of Jebel Druze or the Alawis; they therefore insist that the district must be ruled from Damascus, sympathetically but without any concession to separatist feeling. Of the inhabitants, some of the Beduin, Kurds, Greek Orthodox and other Christians are in favour of the rule of Damascus, but a large number both of Kurds and of Christians would prefer autonomy under Western protection. The most important advocate of autonomy is the Syrian Catholic Patriarch, Cardinal Tappouni. The Kurdish and Christian autonomists, however, although united in opposition to Arab nationalism, are not in agreement on many other questions. 563

The Arab Christians

Most of what has been said about the social and economic position of the Christians in the other Arabic countries applies

[1] See Chapter Eleven.

71: Dirini Y-5 (no date) 1958
M1 Middle East M1
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Homs

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Zuleikha gathered her brothers' swords and tools and led them out of the forest. They traveled through cities and villages, until at last they settled in a big city. Her fascinating beauty, and her majestic behaviour adorned with noble grief, earned her the prince of the city as a husband.

* * * * *

The witches, however, did not leave her to live in peace. So when she gave birth to three beautiful sons, the witches substituted three small dogs for them and stole the children from the cradle. So it was believed that the princess Zuleikha had given birth to dogs. The prince did not mind for the first two times; but when she gave birth to a dog for the third time, he determined to suppress his love and desert the bewitched Zuleikha. So she was imprisoned in a cell.

Days passed by, and Zuleikha became used to her cell, and spent her days in praying and begging God to help her. One day, the prince determined to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He passed by his deserted wife and asked if she would like him to bring her anything from Mecca. She answered that she would like to have "The Case of Patience."

Months passed by, and the prince came back with "The Case of Patience." When Zuleikha took the case which was believed to have magic power, she entreated it to redress the wrongs she had suffered, and to punish those who caused her to suffer. The Case flew towards the witches who reared the three sons of Zuleikha, and killed them. As soon as the witches died, the seven bears turned back into men, the sons were restored to their mother, and the prince reconciled himself to his wife.

JOKES ABOUT HOMS

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The people of Homs in Syria are known for their humour and ridiculous simplicity. There is a kind of rivalry betweeen them and the people of Hama, a city nearby, and they make jokes and tales about each other. The following are some of these jests.

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1. Once a citizen of Homs and another of Hama bought two fans. They were friends. That from Hama visited his friend in Homs. It was hot, and so the Homsian brought the fan for his friend to cool himself with. The friend wondered that the fan was still new. The Homsian ex-

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not.

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short.

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah.

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts:

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions.

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating

[79] it because of bloody disputes between the Shammar and Tay tribes. 311 The land is poorer than in the north and the rainfall is much scarcer. 241 Farmers who managed to plant barley on the fringes of the disputed 182 land in the bad year of 1951 lost heavily. It is improbable that an average year would give much hope of profit.

Ras el Ain, though on the railway line, has less rainfall than Kamishli, Amuda, or Dirbassiya because the mountains recede north into Turkey. Dry farming is profitable less than 20 kms. south of Ras el Ain.

IV. The Khabur Valley

123 The Khabur river, though rising in Turkey, is fed by springs in Ras el Ain and flows southward for about 150 kms. within the Jazirah before it enters the Mohafaza of the Euphrates below Markada.

241 For about 20-30 kms. below Ras el Ain, the land is used for 811 cereals, mainly barley, with varying degrees of success. But south of this area and down to Hassakeh, dry cultivation becomes risky. South of Hassakeh and to the east and west, dry cultivation becomes entirely out of the question because rainfall, already insufficient at Hassakeh, falls off sharply.

312 The inadequate rainfall is offset to a certain extent by the possibility of irrigation from the Khabur. Traces of old dams are apparent in several places, and canals which carried the waters from the dams are visible. History and legend leave no doubt that the valley was much more extensively exploited in former times than it is now.

312 Recently, when the price of rice rose during the War, farmers 406 from the cities of Jazirah in search of irrigated land, began renting lands along the Khabur and installing motors and pumps. The necessary outlay of capital for any project of adequate size was substantial, not less than LS 150,000, and the price of rice fell after 1946, so that perhaps not more than fifty irrigation projects existed up to 1949. It remained for the cotton boom of 1951 to boost this number to around 200 pumps.

The average size of pumps is 8" and the area irrigated by a pump of this size is around 500 dunums (125 acres). On some 312 projects, where land is available, this area for summer crops is 241 supplemented by an area twice this size in wheat and barley. 242 But lands on both sides of the river rise steeply and rarely can an owner of an irrigation project find enough lands to use the pumps

65:Landshut 3-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

162 were left in the Jezirah district. An additional 5,000-6,000 Jews
167 emigrated at the beginning of 1948, leaving a total of about 9,000, with 4,500 in Aleppo, 4,000 in Damascus, and 500 in the Jezirah district. Further emigration took place that year; and it is estimated that there are now fewer than 6,000 left in the whole country.

This exodus was the culmination of many years of intimidation, material decline, and moral isolation. The smaller community in Damascus had always been poor. About 80 per cent earned their living as labourers and pedlars; approximately 15 per cent were able to maintain a slightly higher standard; while only 5 per cent were able to make a good living, mostly in commerce. The Aleppo community had in bygone days been prosperous and had been an active and important element of the city's once flourishing commerce. The rapid deterioration of conditions, however, made itself felt particularly strongly among the Jews of Aleppo; and since the wealthy were the first to leave the country, the remainder were impoverished even more swiftly.

197 Although knowledge of French is widespread among educated
563 Jews, the every-day language of the majority is either Arabic or Ladino. There are two *Alliance Israélite Universelle* schools, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus. Since the convocation of the first Parliament in December, 1936, there has been one Jewish representative in the Chamber of Deputies. He was, it is true, allowed to retain his seat even when persecution of the Jews reached its height. But, isolated as he was in a sea of feverish hostility, there was little he could do to alleviate the situation.

In 1945, a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Damascus, presided over by the Mufti of Damascus, sent a telegram to the Allied Governments, threatening that a Holy War against the Jews would be declared by all Islamic countries if Jewish immigration into Palestine continued. Within a month, this action and similar incitement from high quarters, coupled as they were with a violent anti-Jewish press campaign, bore fruit.

[579] On the Muslim holiday of Qurban Bairam, on November 18, an
563 infuriated mob, goaded on by a group of students, broke into the Great Synagogue in Aleppo, smashed the candle burning in front of the Ark,
668 battered some old Jews who were praying, and burnt the prayer books.

This was the signal for the outbreak of a general anti-Jewish campaign, made the worse by the incessant agitation carried on by nationalist orators among the Arab masses. There was the ugly murder of Jacques Franco, Assistant Headmaster of the *Alliance* School in Damascus. Suspicion that his death was the result of the prevailing unrest has never been entirely removed, even though there is insufficient evidence to prove it. There was the forcing of Rabbi Moshe Nahum, of the Jewish community of Jezirah, to make a statement protesting against Jewish immigration into Palestine. There was the humiliating spectacle of the heads of all three Jewish communities

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MDI

being compelled, in November, 1945, to take part in the demonstrations 563
against the Balfour Declaration, and Jewish shopkeepers being ordered 668
to close their shops as a sign of solidarity with the Muslims. However little concerned Syrian Jewry may have been with Zionist aspirations in Palestine, its feelings on the subject could hardly have been strong enough to cause its leaders—"of their own free will"—to announce that they intended to hold a banquet in honour of the notorious Fawzi Kaukji—a wartime officer of the German Waffen S.S.

Not even in Egypt did public hysteria against the helpless and isolated Jewish minority go to such lengths as it did in Syria. Doubtless this fact is due to the combination of a half-educated university youth and an illiterate, hungry, and disease-ridden urban populace. In Syria, as in Egypt, such a combination has given an extraordinarily explosive character to the nationalist movement.

When the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the Palestine 648
issue visited Syria, its members were struck by the cowed and 563
intimidated manner of the heads of the Jewish community. One member of the committee, Mr. Bartley Crum, in his book *Behind the Silken Curtain* (p. 239), gives the following description of the scene when three representatives of the Jewish community arrived to give evidence:

> The committee of three chosen Jews appeared. Only one spoke. There had been testimony in Jerusalem before us by Oriental Jews charging that Jews in the Oriental countries were given only second-class citizenship. Our sub-committee expected the Jewish spokesman they now heard on the scene to need far more than 20 minutes to tell his story. Instead, he used 45 seconds of his allotted time. He raced through a one-sentence written statement, in which he said that the Jews of Syria were happy and not discriminated against; that their situation was excellent under the present Syrian Government; and that they had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Zionism. The three presented a picture of terrified men. . . .

The tragic farce of the repeated declarations of solidarity with the Muslims forced on the leaders of the Jewish community did not diminish the flood of persecution. Thus Shukri al-Quwatli, the President of the Syrian Republic, made no effort to halt anti-Jewish discrimination, even though in 1946 a Jewish delegation made special representations to him. On the contrary, in 1947, the Syrian Government promulgated new restrictions, prohibiting Jewish inhabitants from leaving their areas of residence.

The effect of this order was to paralyse even what remained of Jewish economic activity; and it should be noted that the order appeared even before the partition of Palestine was decided on by the United Nations.

Within four days of the United Nations decision being made 648
public, the mob was sufficiently worked up for anti-Jewish rioting to 563
break out in Aleppo. On December 2, 1947, a crowd, spurred on 579
by agitators, burnt down the four big synagogues in the city plus

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

648 14 smaller ones, and destroyed 150 houses. An unknown number of
563 Jews was butchered to death.
579 By the time Palestine was invaded by the Arab States, the Jewish communities in Syria were completely isolated. No Jew dared to have any contacts abroad or, for that matter, with any foreigners resident in the country. Commercial activity came practically to a standstill, since Jews were forbidden to open their shops or to carry on with their employment.

The property of a transport company, owned by an Iraqi Jew, was confiscated, and the entire Jewish staff arrested. Fifteen Jewish girls who worked in the telephone exchanges in Aleppo and Damascus were dismissed. The Chief Engineer of Damascus, who had held this position for 12 years, suffered the same fate, together with five Jewish school teachers. The school building of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* in Damascus was requisitioned for the military. The already impoverished community was forced under threat to donate about £S10,000 (at that time equivalent to £1,100) to the Arab funds.

Throughout the months of fighting, a relentless campaign demanding the confiscation of all Jewish property went on. The Damascus Jews felt themselves fortunate in being spared a repetition of the earlier Aleppo riots, though in August, 1949, 11 were killed when a bomb was thrown into a synagogue.

563 For some time the situation of the Jews in Damascus was extremely grave. Being prevented from earning a living, the community was so impoverished that it was feared that many would die of hunger and disease. Had it not been for the assistance of the Jewish community in Beirut, the Damascus community might well have perished. Later, their straits were further relieved by American help.

563 With the overthrow of the Syrian Government by Husni Zaim in
669 March, 1949, all restrictions on the movements of Jews, as well as on the sale of property, were abolished. The new ruler declared that he would deal severely with any person attempting to discriminate
[167] against the Jews. The lifting of the travel ban was immediately followed by a new wave of Jewish emigration to Lebanon.

The confused situation arising out of Zaim's murder, and the succession of political *coups* which followed, make the prospects of the Jewish community uncertain. But even if the new Government were to abstain from any official discrimination against the Jews of Syria, the atmosphere has been poisoned to such an extent that a return to normal conditions and peaceful relations seems most unlikely. On the face of it, nothing will alter the passionate wish of practically every Jew in Syria to shake the country's dust off his feet.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties 642
and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with 871
the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formulate programs to be applied in the various stages of training. The State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the 642
defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is 702
the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society 581
and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that 642
within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be 212
eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the 166
formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be 642
made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence 642
of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of 178
Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

عدد عقود الزواج وشهادات الطلاق المسجلة حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٤٨ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES REGISTERED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1948 — 1953.

Table No. 15 — جدول رقم ١٥

MOHAFAZAT	عدد عقود الزواج المسجلة Number of Marriages Registered						عدد شهادات الطلاق المسجلة Number of Divorces Registered						المحافظات
	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	
All Mohafazat	12,401	17,628	24,876	20,944	22,547	25,483	2,147	2,286	2,469	2,357	2,477	2,718	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus City	2,843	3,597	3,740	4,218	4,207	4,794	772	854	830	760	904	938	مدينة دمشق المنارة
Damascus Mohafaza	934	1,169	1,965	1,807	1,669	2,206	263	276	267	246	245	238	محافظة دمشق
Homs	1,376	1,397	1,583	1,475	1,518	2,286	168	161	190	165	159	171	« حمص
Hama	883	1,822	1,288	1,238	1,634	1,731	113	116	140	137	130	143	« حماة
Latakia	1,258	1,456	5,681	2,276	2,269	2,447	107	97	190	158	195	149	« اللاذقية
Aleppo	5,086	6,456	7,644	7,295	8,003	7,751	539	582	597	683	656	642	« حلب
Al-Hassakeh	168	553	691	438	926	786	34	51	8	34	8	130	« الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	582	342	715	634	854	639	106	2	65	75	47	43	« دير الزور
Sweida	130	135	494	435	656	1,560	26	42	69	64	76	208	« السويداء
Dir'a	196	679	905	898	821	1,283	29	45	53	42	55	66	« درعا

Source : Ministry of Interior.

المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

نسبة عقود الزواج وشهادات الطلاق بالآلاف من السكان ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٢

MARRIAGES AND DIVORCE RATES, 1947 — 1952

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

MOHAFAZAT	نسبة عقود الزواج بالآلاف من عدد السكان Marriage rate per thousand of population						نسبة شهادات الطلاق بالآلاف من عدد السكان Divorce rate per thousand of population						المحافظات
	١٩٤٧ 1947*	١٩٤٨ 1948*	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٨ 1948*	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	
All Mohafazat	4.3	4.4	5.6	7.7	6.46	6.56	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus City	6.3	9.1	11.3	11.3	12.21	11.28	1.6	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.42	مدينة دمشق المنارة
Damascus Mohafaza		2.7	3.3	5.5	4.94	4.55		0.8	0.8	0.7	0.65	0.66	محافظة دمشق
Homs «	5.0	6.0	5.9	6.6	5.87	5.79	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.65	0.5	« حمص
Hama «	5.3	5.1	10.3	6.9	7.03	8.3	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.66	« حماة
Latakia «	2.3	2.6	3.0	11.5	4.39	4.17	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.36	« اللاذقية
Aleppo «	5.3	5.5	6.5	7.9	7.42	7.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.66	0.64	« حلب
Al-Hasakah «	1.0	1.1	3.6	4.4	2.63	5.22	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.05	0.18	0.04	« الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor «	2.6	2.5	1.4	2.9	2.54	3.39	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.15	« دير الزور
Sweida «	1.2	1.4	1.4	5.2	4.45	6.64	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.66	0.76	« السويداء
Dir'a «	1.6	1.6	5.3	7.0	6.55	5.78	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.36	« درعا

* Corrected figure

(*) أرقام معدلة

السكان والأحوال المدنية

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عدد عقود الزواج وشهادات الطلاق المسجلة حسب المحافظات ، ١٩٤٨ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES REGISTERED, BY MOHAFAZAT, 1948 — 1953.

Table No. 15 — جدول رقم ١٥

MOHAFAZAT	عدد عقود الزواج المسجلة Number of Marriages Registered						عدد شهادات الطلاق المسجلة Number of Divorces Registered						المحافظات
	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٤٨ 1948	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٥٣ 1953	
All Mohafazat	13,461	17,828	24,876	20,944	23,547	25,483	2,147	2,298	2,469	2,337	2,477	2,718	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus City	2,843	3,597	3,740	4,218	4,207	4,794	772	854	830	760	904	938	مدينة دمشق المنارة
Damascus Mohafaza	934	1,169	1,965	1,857	1,669	2,306	263	276	267	246	245	238	محافظة دمشق
Homs	1,376	1,397	1,563	1,475	1,518	2,286	165	161	190	165	159	171	« حمص
Hama	862	1,832	1,259	1,328	1,634	1,731	113	116	140	137	130	143	« حماة
Latakia	1,365	1,486	5,881	2,276	2,269	2,447	107	97	190	156	195	149	« اللاذقية
Aleppo	5,085	6,458	7,644	7,996	8,003	7,751	530	592	597	668	656	642	« حلب
Al-Hassakeh	168	553	691	438	926	786	34	51	8	34	5	130	« الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	592	342	715	634	854	639	106	2	65	75	47	43	« دير الزور
Sweida	130	125	494	435	686	1,560	26	42	69	64	76	206	« السويداء
Dir'a	196	679	905	828	821	1,283	29	45	53	42	55	66	« درعا

Source : Ministry of Interior. — المصدر : وزارة الداخلية

نسبة عقود الزواج وشهادات الطلاق بالآلاف من السكان ١٩٤٧ — ١٩٥٢

MARRIAGES AND DIVORCE RATES, 1947 — 1952

Table No. 16

جدول رقم ١٦

MOHAFAZAT	نسبة عقود الزواج بالآلاف من عدد السكان Marriage rate per thousand of population						نسبة شهادات الطلاق بالآلاف من عدد السكان Divorce rate per thousand of population						المحافظات
	١٩٤٧ 1947*	١٩٤٨ 1948*	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	١٩٤٧ 1947	١٩٤٨ 1948*	١٩٤٩ 1949	١٩٥٠ 1950	١٩٥١ 1951	١٩٥٢ 1952	
All Mohafazat	4.3	4.4	5.6	7.7	6.46	6.56	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus City	6.2	9.1	11.2	11.3	12.21	11.26	1.6	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.42	مدينة دمشق العتيقة
Damascus Mohafaza		2.7	3.3	5.5	4.94	4.55		0.8	0.8	0.7	0.65	0.66	محافظة دمشق
Homs «	5.0	6.0	5.9	6.6	5.87	5.79	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.65	0.6	« حمص
Hama «	5.3	5.1	10.3	6.9	7.03	8.3	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.66	« حماة
Latakia «	2.2	2.6	3.0	11.5	4.29	4.17	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.38	« اللاذقية
Aleppo «	5.3	5.5	6.8	7.9	7.42	7.5	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.66	0.64	« حلب
Al-Hasakah «	1.0	1.1	3.6	4.4	2.63	5.22	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.05	0.18	0.04	« الحسكة
Deir-es-Zor «	2.6	2.5	1.4	2.9	2.54	3.39	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.15	« دير الزور
Suweida «	1.2	1.4	1.4	5.2	4.48	6.64	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.66	0.76	« السويداء
Dir'a «	1.6	1.6	5.3	7.0	6.55	5.78	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.38	« درعا

* Corrected figure

(*) ارقام معدلة

السكان والاحوال المدنية
5512

609 In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash. In August they defeated a large French force which had been sent against them. In September they were joined by a number of Damascene nationalists of whom Dr. Shahbandar was the most conspicuous, and who proclaimed a general Syrian rebellion and the formation of a national Government. The rising now spread beyond Jebel Druze to several parts of Syria. The insurgents secured a foothold in Damascus; and in October General Sarrail ordered the bombardment of the city. Parts of it were laid in ruins, and many people were killed. This incident led to the recall of Sarrail, but did not quell the revolt, which spread in November to the Druze portions of Lebanon. Only the French defence of Rashaya prevented the insurgents from dominating a large part of southern Lebanon and even threatening Beirut.

By the end of 1925 the conflict had reached its greatest extension. It covered Jebel Druze, the district of Damascus, part of the district of Homs and part of southern Lebanon; apart from the activities of guerilla bands, it never spread to northern Syria. But in the early months of 1926 the power of the insurgents began to wane. The French forces, which had been considerably strengthened, re-occupied most of the discontented parts of Lebanon, while in the interior the war tended to become a guerilla conflict between the insurgents and the Circassian and Armenian auxiliary forces raised by the French authorities. After an attempt to come to terms with the leaders of the rising had failed, a French army attacked the centre of the revolt in Jebel Druze and captured Suwaida, the capital, in April. In May an attempt was made to clear Damascus of the rebels; for the second time the city was bombarded and great damage was done. By July the pacification of the region of Damascus was complete; and from August onwards the last strongholds of insurrection in Jebel Druze and the districts of Lebanon at the foot of Mount Hermon were gradually reduced. By the end of 1926 the revolt was virtually over, except for scattered bands in remote parts. Even these were finally dispersed in 1927. The more intransigent of the insurgents went into exile, the largest group of these being Druzes who crossed with Sultan al-Atrash into Transjordan. But most of them made their submission; and in February, 1928, a general amnesty was proclaimed, excluding however a number of leaders.

619

619 TRIBE AND NATION--presence or absence of groups larger than the community to which people think they "belong" in an extended kinship sense; basis of identification (e.g., common name, common language, contiguous territory, common culture, tradition of common descent); intratribal intercourse and communication (e.g., trade, intermarriage); degree of development of nationalistic aspirations; etc. See also:

Tribal or national political organization . . . 64
Affiliation with a culture area or subarea . . . 101
Ethnocentrism 186
Intercommunity relationships 628
Intertribal or international relationships 648
Nationalistic movements 668
Ideas about race 829

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available.

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers.

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal.

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families.

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

221 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
622 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
361 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.
[291 Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
861 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.
[134 This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
577 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
511 ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 182

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conslusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1621 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

6: Government of Syria--47 G-4 (no date) 1952 MD1 Syria MD1

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
Map
Distribution of Jazirah
tribes with principal towns,
roads and rivers.
Shammar
Shammar
Shammar

621 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
241 from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
427 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power
423

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

619 that process which has been going on since the beginning of
221 history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing
621 is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

162 Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns.
361 There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

453 The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

504 Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-
496 works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand
469 kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land. 000

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was 162
almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 103,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.[1]

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose 563
native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other 798
part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a 563
conflict between the greater number of French officials/ 86
who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds 563
have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups 619
being the Barazi and Milli; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the 'Hoybun' party. It aims at the

[1] Another estimate for 1937 was as follows: Arab Moslems 41,900; Kurds 81,450; Christians 31,050; others 4,150; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

563 619 formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

12

162 795 In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

13

184 The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ANNEX C *NOTES ON AGRICULTURE*

1 POPULATION, REGIONS AND SOILS

Rural Population

162 Syria's agricultural population can be divided into groups differentiated
● 619 by their social order.

233 *Nomadic tribes.* Bedouin tribespeople form an important unit of the rural population, numbering an estimated 150,000 and living in various stages of settlement from pure pastoral nomadism to almost permanent agricultural communities. Among the larger tribes the Tay and part of the Jubur have become practically sedentary, the Shammar and Shashans remaining nomadic or semi-nomadic. There are also numerous small nomadic tribes roaming the desert between the cultivated belt and the Jordan border. These harvest the scanty desert grass with their flocks of sheep and goats and their herds of camel and a few cattle, and contribute considerably to the country's livestock production. A large part of Syria's meat, wool and dairy products is produced by the Bedouins. Their standards of living and education are quite low.

The increasing exploitation of arable land for crop production during recent decades correspondingly reduced the grazing area and, may, if continued, threaten a considerable reduction in livestock.

162 *Settled villagers.* The nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500
241 compact villages form the most important segment of the agricultural
511 population. They are the true cultivators of the soil whether they own the land or work on it as tenants or laborers. A large number farm entirely for subsistence. Even where there are large community pasture lands, the farms are usually small, frequently too small to give an economic return. Consequently incomes are generally low and many landowners, tenants and sharecroppers are constantly indebted to moneylenders. Although illiteracy among the villagers is on the decrease, education remains at a low standard.

The village people produce most of the crops, raise part of the livestock and supply the country with the bulk of its food and raw materials. Their agricultural activity as a rule is dominated by manual and draft animal

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
221 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the summer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in
721 Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

221 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

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721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
6221 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
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But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

9: Hitti S-5 (ca. 1926) 1928 MD1 Syria MD1
Druze MD6

Other Secret Sects:—The Druze people constitute one of the two leading secret sects found only in Syria, the other being the Nuṣayriyyah inhabiting the mountains north of Tripoli. The Ismā'iliyyah of the Ḥimṣ and Ḥamāh district, another secret sect, are descended from the Assassins,[1] who for two centuries or so struck awe and terror into the hearts of the Crusaders, and are represented today by a few other sectarians in Persia and India. The Yezīdis, so-called devil worshipers, practice their hidden rites in the out-of-the-way hills between Antioch and Aleppo and have coreligionists in Kurdistān and Armenia.

Special Interest of this Study:—But of all these sects Druzism is perhaps the most interesting and important. It is still a living force. Its followers form to the present day a vigorous and flourishing community in the Lebanon. Its learned system has not changed since it was first inaugurated in the early part of the eleventh century. The Islam of the Near East has changed and adapted itself to the requirements of the varying conditions. The Christianity of the Near East has changed. But the Druze system has been and still is the same.

The modernizing influence has in late years brought within its sphere quite a large number of the young and uninitiated Druzes. The report of the American University of Beirūt for last year indicates that there are in that institution alone thirty-six Druze students and five Druze teachers. But no one with first-hand knowledge of the situation would go so far as even to recognize the existence of a "modernist movement" alleged to be aiming at divulging the Druze beliefs, much less to declare "It is understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirūt will be the probable intermediary of communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place."[2]

In fact the outside world knows so little about the contents of this religion that in a recent session of the Permanent Mandates

[1] Arabic *Ḥashīshīn* = those addicted to the use of a stupefying weed.

[2] De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1923), p. 244. Dr. Bliss died in 1920.

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778 no less important an element in the common consciousness
186 than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

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779 Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant
181 creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization.
577 Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

631 The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

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the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability. 538

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. 181 Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

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The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the 177 successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few 186 generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which 177 were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 563 which at a later period had established themselves in the 184 northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

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The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic 621 conditions which the tribes found when they reached the 241 Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

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621 241 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 721 221 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 427 651 423 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 423 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power

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threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

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Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

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The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

The Turks performed also another function. Their military strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

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565 class of importance nor an organized urban proletariat (although there are the beginnings of a trade-union movement). There does, it is true, exist a large commercial middle class in the towns, but it is not an autonomous class capable of challenging the social power of the landowners. For this there are a number of reasons: many of the merchants are Christians or Jews, and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interest from them.

565 Although the power of the landowners has not yet been
178 challenged, almost certainly the coming generation will see its decline. The conditions which made it possible are ceasing to exist. Land is no longer the only source of wealth, nor is subsistence-agriculture by ignorant peasants the only practicable means of using it. The landlords have lost not only their economic but also their political function: their services as leaders of a feudal army and as tax-collectors have long since been dispensed with. It is not yet clear, however, which class will take their place. The processes which have taken place in parts of Europe—the transfer of power from landowners to capitalists, and the division of large estates into small freeholdings—may occur, but it is not necessary and perhaps not altogether desirable that they should. It is at least arguable for example that it would be better, economically and socially, to revive and develop the village community than to try to create a class of small farmers. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that great changes in the structure of classes are to be expected.

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Again, the patriarchal family system remains in existence,
178 but its days are probably numbered. The claims of the family
621 are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the ways of modern urban life and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village.

178 The structure of the family is being radically transformed
562 by the change in the status of women. The change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to

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563 problem of Jebel Druze. What degree of control should the French or Syrian authorities attempt to impose? How is the social system of the Druzes to be adapted to the needs of the present?

One answer to such questions (and it is that given by most French officials during the mandatory period) starts from the premise that the Druzes cannot be treated as ordinary members of the Syrian Arab people. What they need, it is said, is firm and enlightened administration which, while taking into account the strength of their conservatism, will aim at the same time at softening such of their customs as are incompatible with modern civilization. Such administration can best be given by officials drawn from their own great families, fortified by European advisers and modern education; it would be useless and dangerous to attempt prematurely either to assimilate them to the rest of the population or to modernize their social system.

The Arab nationalists start from the opposite assumption, that the Druzes are Arabs who by reason of their history and geographical isolation have developed distinctive customs and a particularist spirit; this spirit will only be strengthened by the grant of autonomy and may become so intense that the Druze resentment of interference will act as a permanent obstacle to unity and good government in Syria. What they need, say the nationalists, is to be given a consciousness of their solidarity with the Arab nation, into which they must be reabsorbed socially and politically. Either their claim to self-government should be denied, or else such administrative privileges as are given them should be limited both in duration and in extent.

Among the Druzes themselves there are parties which adhere to both these schools of thought, some who feel themselves Arabs and support the aspirations of the nationalists for unity and independence, and a smaller number who desire autonomy under European control and protection. But the majority probably have an equal fear of Arab and European interference, since both must ultimately lead to the break-up of their traditional and uncontrolled way of life.

563 The Druzes may be able to defend their isolation against
621 the nationalists and against European powers for a time; but their conservatism has other more formidable enemies. The whole feudal organization of their society is breaking up:

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the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

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The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a larger proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

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In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more suddenly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller landowners against the great families of the Jebel; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

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In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash.

312 805 hours, that is the twelfth part of an addîna. During the equinox, the local day hour is equal to the local night hour and corresponds to a 60 minute flow of water. In winter, however, the local hour is equivalent to more than three and one-half night hours and to less than two and one-half day hours.

In Damascus Ghouta water distribution is particularly complicated.

Water Policy

312 A very strict discipline generally rules water diversions for gardens. The communities elect a "water master," generally the moukhar who has administrative functions in the village and who is assisted by water guards called ghaouis. These latter supervise the draining system, control the barrages and make certain that no owner abuses his water rights.

Among Different Villages

312 621 Such distribution is accomplished in numerous ways. Occasionally each village uses the water according to its own wishes without considering the damage possibly caused to the villages downstream. Such is the case with the water of the El-Awadj (Wadi el-Ajam) near Damascus. Here an enormous amount of water is lost to the villages downstream because of the intense evaporation in summer and the infiltrations into the basaltic regions upstream. The same thing occurs in the villages of Khasrajié and Mekroussa.

In other cases, custom assigns the whole or part of the water to each village during a certain period only. In such cases a rotation period is set up between the villages similar to that within the communities. Thus, the water of the Mnîn is assigned for four days to Mnîn, six days to Tell, one day to Hourné and four days to Barsé.

Modern Water Distribution

312 804 Water is distributed with mathematical precisioness only in those regions which are being irrigated according to modern irrigation plans. Territories thus irrigated with the water of the Orontes are those in the communities north of Homs such as Doueir, Deir Malbé, etc.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the summer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in
721 Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

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prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands. 424 425 427

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years. 563 167 661 651

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
361 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.
[291 Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
361 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.
[134 This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
577 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
511 ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

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iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. S L 648 625

iv. The control of the Beduin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.) S L 648 204

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed : S L 648

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions : an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole sources of legislation ; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments ; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of S L 648 186

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the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

10

The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a large proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

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648 they were attached and not as members of the High Commissioner's staff. These Governments had legislative as well as executive powers, subject to the control of the High Commissioner and his Delegates, and within limits of the 'conseillers': a control which at times deprived the Governments of almost all freedom of action.

648 642 631 That the Mandatory Power decided to establish several indigenous Governments instead of one for the whole territory was officially explained as being due to the separatist feelings of various sections of the population and their different levels of development. The first of them to be set up was the State of Greater Lebanon, which was created in August, 1920, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of the towns and surrounding districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Sur and Saida; the wheat-producing regions of Baalbek and the Biqa'; and the districts of Rashaya and Hasbaya, stretching southwards from the foot of Mount Hermon to the Palestinian frontier. Its independence was proclaimed in September, 1920. In the same month, the Territory of the Alawis was established in the region around Latakia. It was given the name of 'State' in July, 1922. In April, 1922, the independence of Jebel Druze was proclaimed, in consequence of an agreement for the establishment of a Druze national Government, signed in March, 1921, by a number of Druze notables and a representative of the High Commissioner. The remainder of Syria had been divided after the expulsion of Faisal into the two States of Aleppo and Damascus, created in September, 1920. Within the State of Aleppo, the Sanjaq of Alexandretta was given a special régime, in accordance with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. Legislatively the Sanjaq formed part of the State, but administratively it possessed a large degree of autonomy, it had a special budget, and Turkish was recognized as an official language side by side with French and Arabic.

This organization was intended to be provisional only. Although in the first instance the personnel of the Governments was appointed by the High Commissioner and many of the most important posts were filled by French officers and officials, it was anticipated that self-governing institutions would be established as soon as possible, and that some permanent and regular system of co-operation between the governments would be created. In 1922, a Representative Council was established in Lebanon. In June of that year a

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further step was taken with the creation of a Syrian Federation which included the States of Damascus, Aleppo and the Alawis, but not those of Greater Lebanon and Jebel Druze. The Federation was given wide legislative powers, exercised through a Federal Council composed of delegations elected by the Representative Councils which were established in the member-states. At its first meeting the Council elected as its President Subhi Barakat, an Antiochene of Turkish origin.

The Federation did not work satisfactorily. The States of Damascus and Aleppo desired a closer form of union, and certain elements in that of the Alawis one less close. In December, 1924, General Weygand, who had succeeded General Gouraud as High Commissioner in April, 1923, dissolved the Federation. As from January, 1925, the two States of Damascus and Aleppo were combined into a single State of Syria, of which the capital was Damascus and within which the Sanjaq of Alexandretta continued to possess a special régime. The State of the Alawis resumed its separate existence without any direct connexion with the new Syrian State.

Thus from the beginning of 1925 onwards the Mandated Territories were divided into four different political units: the State of Greater Lebanon, known later as the Lebanese Republic; the State of Syria, later called the Syrian Republic and including the partly-autonomous Sanjaq of Alexandretta; the State of the Alawis, known from 1930 as the Government of Latakia; and the Government of Jebel Druze. This organization continued unchanged until 1936, when Latakia and Jebel Druze were formally annexed to Syria; in 1939 they were again given almost complete autonomy, but in 1942 were once more attached to the Syrian State.

The judicial system was complex and not altogether satisfactory. Many although by no means all matters of personal status—for example, marriage and divorce—continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the religious communities. All other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, administering a system of law based partly upon Islamic jurisprudence and partly upon modern European codes. In cases in which only citizens of the Mandated Territories were concerned, the personnel of the courts was almost wholly indigenous. But cases involving citizens of foreign States or their interests were taken before the 'mixed

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independence, and less disposed to establish close relations with Syria and other Arab countries than the latter.[1]

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The State of the Alawis also remained tranquil, once the rising of 1919-1921 had been suppressed. The effort of the Mandatory authorities was directed mainly to encouraging the communal consciousness of the inhabitants (often by playing on their fears); and to raising their material and intellectual level through such measures as the creation of educational and medical services and the giving of assistance to agriculture. In these tasks they had considerable success; socially and economically the district progressed. Further, a greater degree of equality than had previously existed was established between the Alawis, Sunnis and Christians. The administration was mainly in French hands, although there was a Representative Council and efforts were made to increase the share of the inhabitants in the government, as trained and suitable administrators became available. In 1930 an Organic Law was promulgated defining the nature and activities of the political institutions of the State, whose name was then changed to 'the Government of Latakia'.

The Alawis and many of the Christians were content to have no direct connection with the State of Syria, and among the former there developed a more conscious particularist spirit than they had previously possessed. But the Sunnis, here as in Lebanon, disapproved of a situation in which from being the dominant class they became a minority, and accused the Mandatory Power of neglecting their interests in favour of those of the Alawis; they, and all those who held Arab nationalist views, saw clearly the dangers in France's policy of encouraging the separatism of the Alawis and teaching them to rely on foreign support. They demanded the reincorporation of the region in the State of Syria, and their demand was supported by the Sunnis and Arab nationalists in Syria.

6

The history of the other two States was not so tranquil. Alike in Syria and Jebel Druze unrest and discontent appeared in the early years of the Mandate, and issued finally in the revolt of 1925-1926.

[1] For recent changes in Lebanese feeling, see Postscript.

7

In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more suddenly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller landowners against the great families of the Jebel; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

8

In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash.

9

The insurrection had many consequences in the Jebel. It prevented any further attempts to interfere with the customs and social structure of the Jebel. Its administration was placed under stricter French control, but its separation from the State of Syria was maintained. The administrative system was formalized by an Organic Law issued in 1930. Under this Law, the region was to be administered by a Governor, appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner, and possessed of considerable legislative and financial as well as executive powers. In practice he was always a Frenchman. He was to be assisted by a Council of Government, composed partly of heads of administrative departments and partly of appointed members chosen from among the notables. All important acts of the Government would require the approval of the High Commissioner, who was also to exercise such sovereign powers as did not belong to the local Government.[1]

The administration of the Jebel followed a policy the effect of which, whether deliberate or not, was to drive a wedge between the Druzes and the Arab nationalists, whose temporary alliance had given the revolt of 1925 its strength. The separatist spirit so deeply grounded in Druze tradition was encouraged, and there was grafted on to it among a certain section a feeling of dependence upon France. There remained, however, another section who wished for union with Syria.

10

In the State of Syria, the process of pacification was accompanied by one of political change, with the aim of improving the state of feeling and removing some of the grievances of the nationalists: grievances which had been partly endorsed by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its special session to investigate the revolt, held at Rome in February-March, 1926. The change was initiated by M. Henri de Jouvenel, who replaced General Sarrail in November, 1925. He took the first steps which were designed to lead ultimately to self-government. In Lebanon he allowed the Representative Council to draft a Constitution for the State; in the State of the Alawis he held elections for a Constituent Council to draft an Organic Law; and in the State of Syria he ordered elections for

[1] For text, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 694-7.

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before 1914; and was it not ridiculous, as well as expensive, for so small a region to have so grandiose and complex a constitution?

As a further consequence, the movement of discontent with sectarianism was greatly strengthened, and many Lebanese, especially among the young, began to look for an alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges Libanaises', the party of Lebanese nationalism, received much support. So too did the 'Syrian National Party', with its doctrine of the total separation of Church and State; while the Arab Nationalists pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself.

4

In Syria, the first steps towards the execution of the Treaty were taken immediately after the return of the Syrian delegation from Paris. Arrangements were made for the holding of Parliamentary elections; the Chamber was to consist of 86 members, 16 of them representing the religious minorities and 7 the Beduin tribes. The elections, which took place in November, 1936, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the candidates of the National Bloc; and when the Chamber met, on December 21st, its first important act was to choose Faris al-Khuri as its President, and its second to accept the resignation of Muhammad Ali al-Abid from the Presidency of the Republic and to elect Hashim al-Atasi in his place. The Ayyubi Ministry having resigned, the President entrusted the formation of a new one to Jamil Mardam Bey. All the members of his Ministry were drawn from the National Bloc.

This Ministry found no difficulty in securing the confidence of the Chamber, which unanimously approved the Treaty in December, 1936. It was formally signed by the High Commissioner and the members of the Ministry on December 22nd.

In the same month, after consultations with notables of the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, their annexation to the Syrian State was proclaimed. This proclamation was accompanied by special Statutes granting a measure of administrative autonomy to the two regions. Despite protests from separatist groups against the concept of a unitary Syria, the régime envisaged in these Statutes was inaugurated by the appointment in January, 1937, of two prominent members of the

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631 National Bloc, Mazhar Raslan as Governor of Latakia and Nasib al-Bakri as Governor of Jebel Druze.

648 Although the Treaty had not yet been ratified by the French
642 Parliament, it was agreed that the transitional period should be regarded as starting on January 1st, 1937. A beginning was made with the transfer to the Syrian Government of functions hitherto exercised by the French authorities. The Government was given the right freely to prepare and carry out its budget, and a certain control over the police; in principle the High Commissioner ceased to exercise his right to veto legislation, and the 'conseillers' to control ministerial acts. But the Mandatory Power still retained the conduct of foreign relations, the ultimate responsibility for public order and certain administrative services such as the supervision of the Beduin tribes.

665 These events seemed to show that the policy of the Bloc was
186 successful. It was still united; it had an overwhelming majority in the Chamber; its adherents filled the offices of the Government; it commanded a large measure of support in the country, especially among the younger generation.

Opposition to the Bloc existed, but it was so far largely inarticulate and undirected. It consisted of a handful of Deputies; of some extreme Arab nationalist organizations, which refused to recognize the Mandate and regarded co-operation with the French as treason; and of the separatist movements among the Alawis and Druzes and in the Jazirah.

The hopes of Syrian independence reached their climax in the celebrations which marked the return to Syria of the newly-amnestied exiles, Dr. Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash in May, 1937, the Amir Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in June. It seemed as if the country were entering upon a new period of national construction under leaders whose patriotic energy had only been strengthened by disappointment, imprisonment, and long years of exile.

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648 The next two years saw the collapse of these hopes. The claims of Turkey to Alexandretta, the growth of separatist movements, the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty, the unrest caused by the disturbances in Palestine, the administrative failure of the Nationalist Government and finally the growth of an internal

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between Turkey and France, including an engagement by France not to alienate her rights in Syria to any third Power. Simultaneously, the agreement for the cession of the Hatay was signed in Ankara, Turkey recognizing the inviolable nature of her frontier with Syria, and promising not to interfere in any way in the affairs of Syria, by propaganda or by any other means.[1]

One month later, the last French troops having left the Hatay, it was finally assimilated to Turkey, becoming Vilayet No. 63 of the Turkish State.

In Syria the cession aroused protests and disturbances. The indignation which these expressed was not so spontaneous as it had been in previous years, because the cession had been so long expected and took no one by surprise; but it was no less real for that.

8

The union of Jebel Druze and the Alawi Territory with Syria, which was agreed upon when the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 was concluded, was effected by decree in December of the same year. Each was to possess a special administrative and financial régime, but otherwise was to be subject to the constitution and laws of the Syrian State. This new system was to come fully into force with the ratification of the Treaty. The statute defining the special régime for each of the districts provided for the appointment of the Governor by the President of the Republic, of other officials in part by the President and in part by the Governor. The latter was to have the power of issuing ordinances, and was to be assisted by an administrative council with an elected majority. Each district was to have its special budget, but was also to make an annual contribution to the State of Syria.[2] Subsequent decrees provided for the representation of the two districts in the Syrian Chamber: Jebel Druze by five Deputies (three Druzes, one Christian and one Beduin), and the Alawi district by 16 (ten representing the Alawis and six the other communities).

In addition to these administrative privileges, a further guarantee for the good treatment of the two districts was contained in the military convention attached to the Treaty of 1936. It provided for the maintenance of French troops in

[1] See Appendix A9. [2] See Appendix A2.

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631 648 both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty.

631 664 186 The Treaty and the new régime were received with approval by a number of the Druzes and Alawis; even former autonomists expressed their loyalty to the Syrian Government. This reaction, however, was transient and deceptive. In Jebel Druze discord began to arise early in 1937, after the appointment of Nasib al-Bakri, a Damascene Moslem, as first Governor of the province. A powerful party demanded the appointment of a Druze notable, Hasan al-Atrash, and also a large measure of autonomy; the nationalists asserted that it was encouraged to go to extremes by local French officials. There were also, however, many Druzes who supported the nationalist Government and the Governor whom it had appointed. Attempts were made with no more than a temporary success to reconcile the advocates of separatism with those of unity. The disturbances were not ended until the Governor resigned and was replaced after an interval by Hasan al-Atrash. By the end of 1937 the Jebel was quiet enough to enable Parliamentary elections to be held. The calm continued throughout 1938, but at the beginning of 1939 [669] disturbances began once more. The separatist group accused the Syrian Government of bad faith, expelled Syrian officials from the province and declared the independence of Jebel Druze under the protection of France.

A similar process had meanwhile been occurring in the Alawi district, which was known under the new régime as the Province of Latakia. Here, as in Jebel Druze, there was tranquillity at first, and Parliamentary elections were held in 1937. But the calm was short-lived. The Alawi notables protested against the appointment of Syrian Moslem officials, and more especially of nationalist Governors, first Mazhar Raslan from Homs and then Ihsan al-Jabiri, a Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. The nationalist policy of assimilation was perhaps carried out hastily and tactlessly, the Governor alienated large sections of the population, and at the beginning of 1939 armed bands rose in revolt under the leadership of the deputy Sulaiman Murshid, a brigand who had proclaimed himself 'God' and had secured considerable local influence with the help of certain French officials. At about the same time the visit of the High Commissioner, M. Puaux, was made the occasion for demonstrations in favour of autonomy. Soon

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afterwards the Governor found his position impossible and was compelled to abandon it. He was not replaced, his powers being assumed in July by the High Commissioner's Delegate.

9

The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 effected no formal change in the status of the Jazirah, but its signature was followed by the replacement of the French officials who had ruled it until then, by Syrian administrators. Here as in Jebel Druze and the Alawi region discontent soon showed itself. There were some who felt and expressed loyalty to the new national Government. But there was an important element which demanded that the ties between the Jazirah and the central Government in Damascus should be as loose as possible, or should be severed altogether. Their minimum demand was that the local officials should be chosen from among the local population; their maximum, for complete separation from Syria. Their discontent was increased by the lack of wisdom shown by some of the more irresponsible nationalists, although the Government itself acted on the whole in a conciliatory manner. The autonomists appear to have been encouraged by certain of the local French officials; the nationalists claimed, indeed, that here as among the Alawis and Druzes the minorities would have acquiesced in their rule had it not been for the activities of French agents. The separatists were themselves divided on everything except their dislike of being ruled by the nationalists of Damascus. Some were Kurds, who objected mainly to being ruled by Arabs; others Christians, who objected also to being ruled by Moslems. These two groups sometimes but not always acted together during the years from 1936 to 1939.

Serious trouble first broke out in June, 1937, when the Kurds of Hassetche revolted against the appointment of nationalist officials from outside the Jazirah. The rising was quelled with the aid of the French military authorities, but it was soon taken up in Qamishli and elsewhere by the Christians, who demanded a special statute similar to that of Alexandretta, an administration which would give equal weight to the rights of all sects and races, and the withdrawal from the province of officials who had not been chosen from the local population.

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The disturbances reached their height in August, when a number of Christians in Amudah were killed in an altercation with a group of Kurds instigated by a Kurdish chieftain who supported the nationalist Government. The intervention of French troops and the removal of certain unpopular officials restored order for a time. But beneath the surface discontent continued, and the separatists began to form themselves into societies for the defence of their rights, with a central committee to co-ordinate their activities. In December, 1937, some separatists from Hassetche kidnapped the Governor of the Jazirah, Tawfiq Shamiyyah, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus; he was released after a few days, and his kidnappers were arrested.

The Governor was shortly afterwards replaced by a new one, a Moslem, who made a conciliatory statement of policy. It did not, however, appease the separatists. They demanded the release of those who had been arrested for kidnapping the former Governor, and also the dismissal of certain officials. When the new Governor failed to persuade the Syrian Government to yield to these demands, he was chased from the province. The separatists then drove out other nationalist officials, boycotted the administration and reaffirmed their demand for a separate government under French control.

While these events were occurring in the Jazirah, the separatist case was being urged in Paris and Rome by Cardinal Tappouni, the head of the Syrian Catholic Church, who had constituted himself the spokesman of those Christian minorities who were opposed to nationalist rule. In a memorandum submitted to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November, 1937, he spoke of the possibility of a massacre of the Christians in the Jazirah and elsewhere, and made various proposals for avoiding it: that the religious communities should be given complete equality in religious and personal matters; that an equitable number of Christian officials should be appointed; that the Syrian Government should maintain, in districts where the Christians might be menaced, adequate means for their protection; and that a régime of decentralization should be introduced, such as to safeguard the interests of the minorities. The French Government, which was then negotiating with the Syrian Prime Minister in order to obtain more explicit guarantees, replied in a vague and conciliatory fashion.

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The situation remained as it was until the beginning of 1939, when agitation for the release of the kidnappers of the former Governor occurred. In June organized manifestations on a large scale took place in all the towns of the province; but the French authorities intervened and restored order.

10

No sooner had the Franco-Syrian Treaty been signed than criticism of it began to appear in France. In part this criticism came from those who opposed the whole idea of a treaty, believing the Syrians to be still unfit for self-government. Others, while admitting a treaty of some sort to be desirable, were doubtful of the adequacy of the existing Treaty: because it aimed at creating a unitary State in a country so divided as Syria; or because its guarantees for minorities and its provisions for the maintenance of French military forces upon Syrian soil were insufficient; or else because it did not stipulate for the repayment to France of the expenses incurred in the administration of the Mandate.

These doubts were reinforced by the events of 1937: the Alexandretta question, and the growth of the separatist movements in Jebel Druze, the province of Latakia and the Jazirah. It was obvious that the French Chamber and Senate would only ratify the Treaty provided that they were reassured on these and certain other points. The Syrian Prime Minister therefore went to Paris in order to negotiate with the French Government an agreement upon the points at issue. He left Syria in November, 1937, and returned towards the end of December. The result of his visit was an exchange of letters between him and M. de Tessan, Under-Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated December 11th, 1937. The letters included a further guarantee by the Syrian Government of its intention to respect all the rights granted by the Treaty to the minorities living under its sway; and an undertaking by the Government to accept the technical experts recommended to it by the French Government. The letters closed with a statement of the desire of both parties to continue the policy of co-operation.[1]

These undertakings were accepted by nationalist opinion as being inevitable in the circumstances, and ratification of the Treaty was eagerly awaited. In March, 1938, indeed, Mardam

[1] See Appendix A4.

suspension of the Constitution and the complete breakdown 648
of the policy of 1936.

II

The Bloc was the more incapable of weathering such a 665
crisis, because by now there had appeared a strong nationalist opposition to it. Already in 1936 such a potential opposition had existed ready to take shape so soon as, on the one hand, the Bloc disappointed hopes, and on the other an alternative leader or group of leaders appeared. At the time neither of the two conditions was fulfilled. The Bloc was at the height of its success; and the few Deputies who opposed it were neither prominent nor strong enough to become popular leaders.

During the next few years, however, matters changed. The Bloc gradually lost a great part of its popularity, on account of its failure to secure the ratification of the Treaty and its impotence in the face of Turkish designs upon Alexandretta. The natural tendency of Governments in office to disappoint individual hopes and create individual grievances worked in the same direction.

The discontent was increased by the comparative failure of 631
the Government in internal administration. Among the 642
causes of failure were the inadequate powers of the Govern- 648
ment, the widespread belief that it did not enjoy the backing of the French authorities, its own lack of experience and the absence of an efficient civil service; but it was nevertheless discouraging to its supporters and irritating to ordinary citizens. On the whole the departments were no better administered than they had been; and there was a succession of petty acts of discrimination against members of minorities. The relations between the central and local authorities were often difficult, the tendency to excessive centralization conflicting with the innate localism of some of the provinces. This conflict had indeed existed before the nationalists came to power, and in order to end it, the High Commissioner had issued a decree on provincial organization in January, 1936. Besides altering the number and boundaries of the provinces, this decree had defined the scope of the central and local authorities and provided for the establishment of provincial councils. In spite of declarations, this decree was never fully applied.

648 reach an agreement with Syria on the basis of the 1936 Treaty with the amendments of November, 1938, but that due satisfaction must be given to the legitimate aspirations of the minorities. Moreover, the international situation necessitated new military arrangements between Syria and France. He ended with an appeal for the maintenance of law and order.

The nationalists saw in this statement a determination to strengthen France's hold over Syria in preparation for the imminent world war. The last hope of the ratification of the Treaty was now extinguished.

648 On May 15th the Bukhari Ministry resigned. On May 645 23rd the Syrian Chamber voted unanimously an order of the day, affirming Syria's sympathy for French democracy in the hour of its peril, but at the same time emphasizing its attachment to the unamended Treaty of 1936 as the only firm basis for Franco-Syrian co-operation.

This time there was no way out of the deadlock. All attempts to form a new Ministry failed. Finally, the President of the Republic resigned (July 7th). A few days later M. Puaux took the extreme step of dissolving the Chamber, suspending the Constitution, and appointing a non-political Council of Directors to govern by decree-laws under his own direction (July 10th). The Council was composed of permanent officials, with Bahij al-Khatib as its President.

14

631 At the same time the High Commissioner issued decrees 648 re-establishing in Jebel Druze and the Territory of Latakia separate administrations similar to those which had existed until 1936, and providing for the special administration of the Jazirah.

The decree for Latakia stated that the Organic Law promulgated in 1936 was to be replaced by a new one, to come into force immediately. The new law provided for the government of the region by a Governor, assisted by a council of heads of departments and by the Council of the Territory. He was to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the Council of the Territory, was to hold office for five years and might be re-appointed. His powers were executive, financial and within limits legislative. The Council was to consist of at least seventeen elected members, to hold two ordinary sessions a year and to discuss financial and

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 401

other matters, without, however, possessing much power of independent decision. The Territory was to enjoy financial autonomy, apart from a contribution to the expenses of general administration of the State of Syria. It was also to have judicial autonomy, except for the provisions that the Presidents of the High Court and the Court of First Instance at Latakia, both of them French magistrates, were to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the French Government; and that conflicts of competence between the Courts of the Territory and those of other parts of the French Mandated area were to be decided by the Court of Cassation at Damascus.

The provisions of the decree relating to the Jebel Druze were virtually the same, with a few minor variations. That for the Jazirah removed the province from the control of the Syrian Government, and placed it under the direct rule of the High Commissioner's Delegate at Hassetche. (This measure was enough to end the disturbances. By December, 1940, life in the Jazirah had returned to normal, and it was possible for an agreement to be reached between the Mandatory authorities and the Syrian Government, under the terms of which the functions of Governor were once more transferred from the High Commissioner's Delegate to a Syrian official.)[1]

[1] See Appendix A6.

Thus, in October the Ministry of Saadullah al-Jabiri in Syria was replaced by that of Faris al-Khuri, who had previously been President of the Chamber; the change was made for internal political reasons, and the new Government was composed largely of the same Ministers and followed the same general policy as its predecessor. In April, 1945, the Ministry was reconstructed. In Lebanon, too, there was a ministerial change: in January, 1945, the Government of Riyadh as-Sulh was replaced by that of Abdul-Hamid al-Karami, a Sunni Moslem deputy from Tripoli.

A change affecting the structure of the Syrian Republic took place in September, with the incorporation of the province of Jebel Druze fully in the Syrian State. It had already been formally incorporated in February, 1942, but had preserved a special administrative and financial régime which was now abolished. This step was taken at the request of the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze. A similar step was not taken in the Alawi province; although there was a party in favour of it, the forces of separatism were still strong, and the situation was complicated by the existence of disorder and unrest fomented by Sulaiman Murshid and his associates.

Other changes of greater importance, because they affected more immediately the problem of Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian relations, were the transfer of power to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and the financial agreement of February, 1944:

(i) In accordance with the agreement made by General Catroux with the two Governments on December 22nd, 1943, a series of particular agreements was negotiated during 1944, and by the end of the year almost all the services in question had been formally handed over, including the Customs Administration, the Financial and Economic Services, the control of the tobacco monopoly and concessionary companies, the Press Censorship, the Beduin control and the 'Sûreté Générale' (although a French 'Sûreté aux Armées' was retained). These transfers gave the two Governments almost all the attributes of independent governments. At the end of 1944 the only important attribute which had not been transferred was the control of the local levies, the 'Troupes Spéciales'.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

311 rainfall is supplemented by the water brought down from the mountains
133 by its rivers. The principal of these is the Euphrates which has its headwaters in Turkey and flows in a generally southeasterly direction across Syria into Iraq. Together with its most important tributary, the Khabour, which also rises in Turkey, it accounts for 90% of the total annual flow of all Syrian rivers. In the west the largest river is the Orontes which is fed by springs from the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges and flows northward through the marshy area known as the Ghab into Turkey. Farther south the Barada river, rising in the Anti-Lebanon, supplies life-giving water to the fertile Ghouta oasis around Damascus. In the extreme south the Yarmuk river flows along the Jordanian frontier into the Jordan river. Although the flow of these rivers is highly seasonal, it is on the effective utilization of their waters that much of the future development of Syria's agriculture depends.

Principal Regions

● 631 Administratively Syria is divided into nine *mohafazats* or provinces, each in charge of a *mohafez* or governor; the province is in turn divided into *qadas* or counties headed by a *kaimakam;* and the county is further subdivided into *nahiyes* or townships in charge of a *mudir*.

241 Of greater significance, however, are the principal economic regions.
438 Farthest south are the adjoining regions of the Hauran and Djebel Druze.
311 The Hauran plain, an area of rather high but apparently declining fertility, has long been known as a granary, even in Roman times. Its principal crop is wheat, but barley, maize, sorghum and pulses are also important. To the east rises the Djebel Druze, a basaltic dome, where the Druzes, a proud and independent people, eke a bare living from the pockets of fertile soil in their mountains. Here the pressure of population on the land is acute. Agricultural holdings in the Hauran and Djebel Druze are predominantly small. There is little irrigation, and annual rainfall, averaging less than 12 inches, is barely adequate for dry farming. Sharp fluctuations in rainfall frequently make farming precarious. One of the principal problems of this region is the scant supply of underground water even for drinking.

To the northwest of the Hauran lies the higher, rolling Julani plateau stretching toward the Hermon range. This stony region is suitable only for grazing and, to some extent, for orchards. To the north a narrow band

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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foundations for commercial and intellectual progress were less firmly established than in Lebanon, and the Muslim leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to acquire the technique of government. The root of the trouble was that the French were opposed to self-government and tended to refuse office to nationalist political leaders, except for short, self-defeating periods. But though they failed to foster self-government, the French did much good in both Syria and Lebanon as engineers, doctors, educators, and archaeologists, and performed a valuable service in training at least a cadre of competent civil servants.

With the end of the French Mandate there emerged two sovereign and independent Republics with many mutual and some conflicting interests. For some years the rest of the world failed to distinguish between the two, and it is still possible to find educated persons who suppose that Beirut is the capital of Syria. Syria and Lebanon are, to some extent, mutually dependent or complementary, but they are distinct and their political development will be considered separately.

Government and Politics

(a) Syria

Under her constitution Syria is a Republic in which the legislative power is in the hands of a Chamber of Deputies numbering 114 members in 1949. The deputies are elected by direct suffrage granted to all men and to women of a certain educational standard. The representation of religious minorities is shown in the table on p. 466 above. The President of the Republic must be a Muslim and is elected for a term of five years by the Parliament; he nominates the Prime Minister who appoints his cabinet ministers. The Parliament is elected for four years but may be dissolved by the President. The constitution was suspended in 1952 by the military dictatorship and a new one on the Presidential model adopted in July 1953.

Damascus is the seat of government and there are ten provinces, each under a Governor who is assisted by a staff of civil servants representing most of the ministries. The provinces (*muhafaza*) are divided in *qazas*, each under a *qaimaqam*, who is a civil servant under the Ministry of Interior; the *qazas* are divided into *nahiyas* under *mudirs*. Within a *nahiya* may be several villages, each of which is rather loosely under the control of the *mukhtar* who may be elected by the village or appointed by the ministry. The judiciary are independent of the legislature and

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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religion of his father in certain cases in which the two parents belonged to different sects, whereas the Shariah required him to follow the religion of his Moslem parent. 641 563

The Ulema presented a memorandum to the Nationalist Government of Jamil Mardam Bey, setting forth these and other theological objections and protesting against the decree. The Government was sympathetic to them, not only because of its desire to keep on good terms with orthodox Islam, but also because of the political circumstances of the moment. Franco-Syrian relations were strained, owing to the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty of 1936. The Syrian Ministry resented the way in which the decree had been issued by the High Commissioner, over its own head and that of the Chamber. When the Ulema presented their memorandum to the Prime Minister, he replied that his Government was not willing to accept the decree, and soon afterwards the Minister of Justice issued instructions to the Courts not to apply it.

Shortly afterwards, for this and other reasons, the Government resigned. The High Commissioner had triumphed on the constitutional question. Subsequently, however, in view of the passions which the decree had aroused, he issued a new one excluding Moslems from the application of the laws of 1936 and 1938. No further step to regularize the situation has been taken since then.

Divisions of the Country

631 ●

The figures given in the first section show that there are three districts of Syria in which the Arab Sunnis do not possess a majority: they are Jebel Druze, where the Druzes are in the majority, Latakia, with a majority of Alawis, and the Jazirah, which is divided between Kurds, Arab Moslems and Christians of different kinds. It will be convenient to describe each of these districts separately before dealing with the remainder of the country. 563

Jebel Druze

Jebel Druze was settled in the course of the nineteenth century by Druzes coming from Lebanon in order to escape Turkish government, military service, foreign interference, Christian rivalry and in general all restrictions upon their liberty to follow 563

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

563 but they claim autonomy in the Jazirah or at least the right
668 to live as Kurds, immune from attempts to force them to assimilate.

French Policy

648 France's hostility to Arab nationalism led her to show special
563 favour to the minorities in Syria. This policy revealed itself in numerous administrative acts, and in such military acts as the recruitment of special detachments from Circassians, Kurds and other minorities, but it is most clearly shown and has had the most important consequences in regard to the two compact minorities, the Druzes and Alawis.

648 In 1921 an agreement was concluded between the French
563 authorities and some of the Druze leaders, providing for a national government assisted by French advisers. From this time until
631 1936 there existed a 'Government of Jebel Druze' independent of Syria and under all-pervasive French control. At first, French policy ran counter to local susceptibilities, and this led to the Druze Revolt of 1925, which became a Syrian national revolt. After the suppression of the revolt, the same system was continued, and was formalized by the Organic Law of 1930. Its effect was to encourage the particularist feeling of the Druzes and to arouse among certain of them a feeling of gratitude to France.

Another autonomous territory was created in the 'Territory' or 'Government' of the Alawis, set up in 1920. It possessed an administrative system similar to that of Jebel Druze, formalized in a similar organic law issued in 1930, and under a still stricter French control. The administration did something to improve the very backward condition of the Alawis and to arouse among them a corporate self-consciousness and a feeling of attachment to France. In general, the district was peaceful after unrest at the beginning; the only disturbances came from the Sunnis and Greek Orthodox, who believed their interests were being neglected and demanded the attachment of the district to Syria.

Nationalism and the Minorities

563 The leaders of Arab nationalism in Syria recognize the import-
668 ance of the minority problem and have made considerable efforts to win the confidence of the minorities. In principle they regard Arab Christians as on a level with Moslems inside the Arab community, once they are willing to accept their obligations as

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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members of the Arab nation. As for the linguistic minorities, 563
they insist on a certain degree of assimilation, but there is no 668
question of treating them as inferiors because of their racial origins.

They are opposed, however, to the grant of a special regime to minorities, since it would only perpetuate their difference; and even more strongly would they oppose any foreign intervention or influence in support of the minorities. In regard to the compact minorities, while they recognize the need for careful and tactful administration, they believe they are capable of giving such administration, and wholly reject the claims of the autonomists, both because the grant of autonomy would play into the hands of foreign powers eager to intervene, and because, so long as they remained autonomous, the minorities would never learn how to live with their fellow-nationals.

The Treaty of 1936 *and the Minorities*

The autonomy of Jebel Druze and the Alawis was brought to 648
an end by the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. In December of 563
that year decrees were issued annexing the two Governments to 631
the Syrian Republic as the Provinces of Jebel Druze and Latakia respectively. Certain safeguards were, however, provided for the special position of the two provinces. On the one hand, they were given a special administration and financial regime. On the other, the military convention attached to the Treaty stipulated for the maintenance of French troops in both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty.

At the same time, the administration of the Jazirah was placed under the control of the Government of Damascus; it had never been formally autonomous but in practice had been under direct French administration since the establishment of civil government there.

In each of these three districts there was a group which wel- 648
comed the union with Syria, and others who thought it in their 563
interest to side with the nationalists who seemed to be the rising 668
power. Others again did not object to incorporation in Syria, so long as the special position of the provinces was respected and they were fairly treated in such matters as government appointments. There were some, however, who desired to return to complete autonomy under French protection. From 1937

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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and a section of the Armenians, were able to maintain good relations with the Government. In general, what troubles occurred were no more than were inevitable in a period of transition. 648 563 668

Developments since 1941

In September 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria. His proclamation contained the following statement about minorities: 648

> Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural, and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled.
>
> It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.[1]

In accordance with these principles, the two autonomous territories were re-attached to the rest of Syria. Thus, the first Government formed after the proclamation contained a Druze and an Alawi Minister; and in February 1942, the two provinces were once more formally annexed to Syria, with provisions for a special administrative and financial regime. In September 1944 the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze voted unanimously for the abrogation of its special regime and complete incorporation in the Syrian State. 631 563

In the summer of 1943, elections were held and subsequently a nationalist government took office. As formerly, the Chamber contained representatives of the minorities and the Cabinet a Christian minister. The Government made clear its intention of treating all members of the community on a footing of complete 642 641 563

[1] General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28, 1941. *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9, 1941.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 M1 Middle East
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642 shall propose to this Council the nomination, promotion, transfer,
692 dismissal of judges and disciplinary measures to be taken against any of them when necessary in accordance with law. The Council shall decide on such proposals by a vote to be taken by its absolute majority.

(2) The President shall draft and sign decrees upon decisions taken by the Supreme Judicial Council, and refer such decrees to the Minister of Justice in accordance with the stipulations of Article 80 hereof.

Art. 125. The Supreme Judicial Council shall propose bills concerning the immunity of judges, the procedure for their appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary measures against them.

Chapter VI

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

642 Art. 126. The Republic of Syria shall be divided into Muh-
631 afazats; their number, sub-divisions and boundaries shall be determined by a law.

Art. 127. Laws shall be based on the principle of decentralization for heads of administrative units and chiefs of departments in the Capital and in the Muhafazats.

Art. 128. (1) There shall be established a Council in each Muhafazat; three-quarters of its members shall be elected and the other quarter shall be appointed.

(2) The term of the Council, the number and eligibility of its members, and its electoral procedure shall be determined by law.

(3) The Muhafazat Council shall elect its President and an Executive Secretariat whose term of office, powers and procedure shall be determined by law.

Art. 129. The main tasks of the Muhafazat Council shall be to contribute towards promoting the following objectives:

(1) To fight disease by expanding free medical care and by protecting motherhood and childhood.

(2) To combat ignorance by establishing nurseries, primary, elementary and vocational schools, by teaching illiterates and by promoting education.

(3) To secure potable waters in villages and cities. To open local roads and to spread the use of electricity.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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(4) To define the limits of municipal districts in the Muhafazats. 642 631

(5) To institute and organize exhibitions.

(6) To encourage tourism, summer resorts and to supervise hotels.

(7) To organize local communications.

(8) To utilize mineral waters.

(9) To promote a forestation and planting of trees.

(10) To protect beneficiary works and contribute to them.

(11) To organize and exploit hunting and fishing in the sea and rivers.

Art. 130. (1) The special revenues of the Muhafazat necessary for the implementation of its projects shall consist of—

(a) A percentage to be determined by law, such percentage to be taken from general taxes collected in the Muhafazat or added thereto.

(b) Local duties which the Muhafazat Council shall impose within the limits of law. These duties shall in no way delay the movement of persons or the transfer of capital between the various Muhafazats and shall not restrict the right of citizens to practice their professions and perform their work in the country.

(2) The special accountability of the Councils of the Muhafazats shall be regulated by a law.

Art. 131. The Muhafazat Council shall determine disbursements in questions falling under its jurisdiction.

Art. 132. The Rules of Procedure for the Councils of the Muhafazats, adoption of decisions and supervision of their actions shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VII

FINANCES

Art. 133. (1) The Government shall prepare the general budget. 642

(2) The Chamber of Deputies alone shall have the right to adopt it. 652

Art. 134. (1) There shall be for each fiscal year one general budget containing the receipts and expenditures. No special, independent or additional budget may be created except by virtue of a law.

irrigated, and the Jagjag and the Khabur could never irrigate such an area. Irrigation is the second factor involved in determining whether the land is cultivable or not.

II. Qada of Dijla

Turning to the Qada of Dijla, we find that the entire region has sufficient rainfall, two rivers and many springs in the villages. In fact, the abundance of rainfall in the northeastern part of the Qada known as Jazirat ibn Amr, makes the growing of summer crops hazardous because the hot, dry period is too short.

The lower part of the Qada, from Tal Koshak to Dāmir Kapu, is similar to the Qada of Qamishli. The land is flat and precipitation, though relatively abundant, does not compare with the more mountainous regions of Dijla.

III. Qada of Qamishli

The Qada of Qamishli with the lower part of Dijla, extends from Tal Koshak on the Iraki border, comprising the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Derbassiya, to Ras el Ain on the Khabur which belongs administratively to Hassakeh. This region, some 200 kms. in length along the railway line and the Turkish border, is the best developed and most productive of the Jazirah.

In point of cultivability, it is divided into two parts:

1. A region bounded by the railway and a line running about forty kms. south and parallel to it, from the river Rad to Tal Brak to Tal Tamr on the Khabur.
2. The region south of this fictitious line.

This division is based on the amount of rainfall and the experience of farmers during the last twelve years. It is certain that the further one goes from the Turkish mountains, the less is the rainfall. That is why Tal Brak, about 40 kms. south of Qamishli, is considered the last profitable area for rain-fed farming. In the last few years when tractor cultivation expanded greatly and lands became scarce, new farmers cultivated the lands south of the parallel line down to Hassakeh and to a point about 40 kms. north of Rakka, and learned at their own expense that it does not pay unless the crop is barley and is carried on as a sideline to a principal enterprise in the northern regions.

A vast area lies south of the Rad to the Iraki border toward the Sinjar Mountains. Farmers have been prevented from cultivating

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 744 THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133 The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312 The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113 Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

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114 > MR. LEWIS, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

p. 278

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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who is the administrative head of all the departments of the Ministry and supervises the work of all the department officials and the proper operation of the schools. He appoints the officials of the central office and specialists in secondary and vocational education belonging to the second and third grades in the salary scale, and recommends to the Minister the appointment of officials of the higher grades. He is empowered to issue general notices and administrative instructions to help clarify ministerial instructions and to facilitate the running of his departments. 871k 647

The Director General is assisted by three directors: the Director of Secondary Education who has charge of the affairs of all intermediate, preparatory, and vocational schools; the Director of Primary Education, who supervises primary and elementary schools; and the Director of Physical Education, who assists the Director General in organizing physical education, including scouting activities, sports, and organized games in and out of school.

Seven divisions and bureaus conduct the everyday business of the Ministry. The Division of Personnel keeps a complete register of all that pertains to the officials and teachers of the Ministry of Education. The Division of Accounts supervises the accounts of all departments, prepares budget estimates and is responsible for the execution of the budget law. The Division of Buildings, headed by an architect, draws the plans for school buildings and supervises all construction, repairs, and maintenance work in schools belonging to the Ministry. The Division of Equipment has charge of the central stores of the Ministry, of keeping textbooks and school furniture and equipment until they are distributed to the schools. In addition, there are the three bureaus of Correspondence, Archives, and Statistics, the functions of which are sufficiently indicated by their titles.

There are ten provincial directors of education, one each for the city of Damascus, Damascus Province (excluding the city), Hawran, Jabal Druze, Homs, Hama, Latakia, Aleppo, Jazirah, and Euphrates Provinces. These directors have charge mainly of primary education in their provinces and of supervising private schools. They are under the double jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, from which they receive their instructions and approval of their proposals, and of the governor of their province, through whom they issue their orders and conduct their correspondence with higher authorities. The powers of the provincial directors of education during the regime of the French mandate were very limited. They were then called inspectors of education. Even the appointment of a janitor to a post already provided for in the budget needed to be referred through the governor to the Ministries of Education and Finance and was not final [635]

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M DI

abandoning their own religious codes. Law was personal. Not simply was there no concept of equality before the law; there was no idea of sameness.

For these reasons, throughout the period of Arab and Ottoman rule the Christians and Jews were allowed a certain autonomy. Each sect formed a community, or as it was called in Arabic a 'millah' and in Turkish a 'millet', within the State and co-terminous with it. In matters affecting the community, the Government treated with it as a whole through its heads, and not with the members of it individually. Certain civil functions were devolved upon the spiritual heads and representative bodies of the communities. They were allowed to administer the property and institutions of their communities and to decide matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on—in accordance with the tenets of their faith.

This system originated long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It developed gradually and was only formalized in the nineteenth century by a series of Imperial edicts. Throughout the period of Moslem ascendancy it succeeded in preserving self-respect and a sense of community among the religious minorities, although it may also have helped to perpetuate bitterness and suspicion between them.

The heterodox sects which clung to the fringes of Islam were in a more ambiguous position. Officially they were regarded as parts of the general body of Islam; but in fact the cleavage between them and the orthodox was almost as great as that between Moslems and Christians, and they like the Christians were usually left to direct their internal affairs in accordance with customary law and the precepts of their religions.

5

Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belonging to other communities; and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. This was true also of every Christian sect in its relations with the others, for each sect formed a separate 'millet'; and of the orthodox Moslems in their relations with the heterodox. Difference of sect was

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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Chapter Ten

SYRIA

Distribution of Minorities

THE table on page 76 shows the distribution of the Syrian population by religious confessions and provinces. 000

Written Guarantees

The Syrian Constitution issued in 1930 contains formal guarantees for the good treatment of minorities. Article 6 states that all Syrians are equal before the law, enjoy the same civil and political rights and shall not suffer discrimination on grounds of religion, race or language. Article 15 guarantees liberty of conscience and worship, and respect for the religious interests and personal status of all sects. Their educational and other rights are guaranteed by Article 28. Article 26 states that all Syrians are eligible for public offices without distinction. Finally, Article 37 lays down that the electoral law shall provide for the representation of confessional minorities. (This has in fact been done: every Chamber elected since the issue of the Constitution has contained an appropriate number of representatives of the minorities.) 641 563

Personal Status and Communal Organization

Until 1938, the law of personal status underwent much the same changes in Syria as in Lebanon. The same attempts were made to reform it, and met with the same obstacles. The most recent attempt was made in November 1938, when the High Commissioner issued a decree modifying and completing the decree issued in 1936 but never applied.

It met with bitter opposition, both religious and political. The Ulema objected to it on the ground that it contravened the Shariah. It allowed conversion from one sect to another, while the Shariah condemned apostasy. It gave to the heads of the communities the right of representing their communities *vis-à-vis* the authorities; but the Shariah recognised no such rights of representation. It laid down that the son should follow the

[text continues on page 77 -- Analyst]

religion of his father in certain cases in which the two parents 641
belonged to different sects, whereas the Shariah required him to 563
follow the religion of his Moslem parent.

The Ulema presented a memorandum to the Nationalist Government of Jamil Mardam Bey, setting forth these and other theological objections and protesting against the decree. The Government was sympathetic to them, not only because of its desire to keep on good terms with orthodox Islam, but also because of the political circumstances of the moment. Franco-Syrian relations were strained, owing to the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty of 1936. The Syrian Ministry resented the way in which the decree had been issued by the High Commissioner, over its own head and that of the Chamber. When the Ulema presented their memorandum to the Prime Minister, he replied that his Government was not willing to accept the decree, and soon afterwards the Minister of Justice issued instructions to the Courts not to apply it.

Shortly afterwards, for this and other reasons, the Government resigned. The High Commissioner had triumphed on the constitutional question. Subsequently, however, in view of the passions which the decree had aroused, he issued a new one excluding Moslems from the application of the laws of 1936 and 1938. No further step to regularize the situation has been taken since then.

Divisions of the Country

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The figures given in the first section show that there are three 563
districts of Syria in which the Arab Sunnis do not possess a majority: they are Jebel Druze, where the Druzes are in the majority, Latakia, with a majority of Alawis, and the Jazirah, which is divided between Kurds, Arab Moslems and Christians of different kinds. It will be convenient to describe each of these districts separately before dealing with the remainder of the country.

Jebel Druze

Jebel Druze was settled in the course of the nineteenth century 563
by Druzes coming from Lebanon in order to escape Turkish government, military service, foreign interference, Christian rivalry and in general all restrictions upon their liberty to follow

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

and a section of the Armenians, were able to maintain good relations with the Government. In general, what troubles occurred were no more than were inevitable in a period of transition. 648 563 668

Developments since 1941

In September 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria. His proclamation contained the following statement about minorities: 648

> Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural, and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled.
>
> It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.[1]

In accordance with these principles, the two autonomous territories were re-attached to the rest of Syria. Thus, the first Government formed after the proclamation contained a Druze and an Alawi Minister; and in February 1942, the two provinces were once more formally annexed to Syria, with provisions for a special administrative and financial regime. In September 1944 the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze voted unanimously for the abrogation of its special regime and complete incorporation in the Syrian State. 631 563

In the summer of 1943, elections were held and subsequently a nationalist government took office. As formerly, the Chamber contained representatives of the minorities and the Cabinet a Christian minister. The Government made clear its intention of treating all members of the community on a footing of complete 642 641 563

[1] General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28, 1941. *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9, 1941.

20: Hourani 8-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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equality but, at the same time, of making its authority respected by all alike. In spite of these declarations, however, there were a series of petty incidents in 1944 which aroused the fears of some of the minorities: for example, local disorders and alleged injustices in government appointments. In some parts of the country, moreover, the Government had difficulty in imposing its authority. This was particularly true of the Alawi district, where Suleiman Murshid and his associates caused trouble; the Jazirah also was not quiet. There were a number of reasons for these difficulties: it was inevitable that the minorities should still retain their old fears of Sunni domination; it was no less natural that in a time of administrative changes certain local officials should abuse their powers and indulge their prejudices; it was unavoidable that families and groups should be disappointed when official appointments were made, and should blame the Government's choice on religious prejudice. None of these, however, was the most important reason. That was to be found in the strained state of relations between the French and the nationalists in Syria. So long as France continued to deny the claim of the nationalists to full independence, they could not help feeling a certain resentment against the minorities who had so often been used as tools of French policy.

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In 1945, after the Franco-Syrian crisis in the course of which Damascus was bombarded, Franco-Syrian political relations were at last regulated, and agreement was reached for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syrian soil. The withdrawal took place in 1946, and thus the essential condition for the establishment of normal relations between majority and minorities was fulfilled.

● 642, 728, 177, 565

× Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

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Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

they were attached and not as members of the High Commissioner's staff. These Governments had legislative as well as executive powers, subject to the control of the High Commissioner and his Delegates, and within limits of the 'conseillers': a control which at times deprived the Governments of almost all freedom of action.

That the Mandatory Power decided to establish several indigenous Governments instead of one for the whole territory was officially explained as being due to the separatist feelings of various sections of the population and their different levels of development. The first of them to be set up was the State of Greater Lebanon, which was created in August, 1920, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of the towns and surrounding districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Sur and Saida; the wheat-producing regions of Baalbek and the Biqa'; and the districts of Rashaya and Hasbaya, stretching southwards from the foot of Mount Hermon to the Palestinian frontier. Its independence was proclaimed in September, 1920. In the same month, the Territory of the Alawis was established in the region around Latakia. It was given the name of 'State' in July, 1922. In April, 1922, the independence of Jebel Druze was proclaimed, in consequence of an agreement for the establishment of a Druze national Government, signed in March, 1921, by a number of Druze notables and a representative of the High Commissioner. The remainder of Syria had been divided after the expulsion of Faisal into the two States of Aleppo and Damascus, created in September, 1920. Within the State of Aleppo, the Sanjaq of Alexandretta was given a special régime, in accordance with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. Legislatively the Sanjaq formed part of the State, but administratively it possessed a large degree of autonomy, it had a special budget, and Turkish was recognized as an official language side by side with French and Arabic.

This organization was intended to be provisional only. Although in the first instance the personnel of the Governments was appointed by the High Commissioner and many of the most important posts were filled by French officers and officials, it was anticipated that self-governing institutions would be established as soon as possible, and that some permanent and regular system of co-operation between the governments would be created. In 1922, a Representative Council was established in Lebanon. In June of that year a

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

further step was taken with the creation of a Syrian Federation which included the States of Damascus, Aleppo and the Alawis, but not those of Greater Lebanon and Jebel Druze. The Federation was given wide legislative powers, exercised through a Federal Council composed of delegations elected by the Representative Councils which were established in the member-states. At its first meeting the Council elected as its President Subhi Barakat, an Antiochene of Turkish origin.

The Federation did not work satisfactorily. The States of Damascus and Aleppo desired a closer form of union, and certain elements in that of the Alawis one less close. In December, 1924, General Weygand, who had succeeded General Gouraud as High Commissioner in April, 1923, dissolved the Federation. As from January, 1925, the two States of Damascus and Aleppo were combined into a single State of Syria, of which the capital was Damascus and within which the Sanjaq of Alexandretta continued to possess a special régime. The State of the Alawis resumed its separate existence without any direct connexion with the new Syrian State.

Thus from the beginning of 1925 onwards the Mandated Territories were divided into four different political units: the State of Greater Lebanon, known later as the Lebanese Republic; the State of Syria, later called the Syrian Republic and including the partly-autonomous Sanjaq of Alexandretta; the State of the Alawis, known from 1930 as the Government of Latakia; and the Government of Jebel Druze. This organization continued unchanged until 1936, when Latakia and Jebel Druze were formally annexed to Syria; in 1939 they were again given almost complete autonomy, but in 1942 were once more attached to the Syrian State.

The judicial system was complex and not altogether satisfactory. Many although by no means all matters of personal status—for example, marriage and divorce—continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the religious communities. All other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, administering a system of law based partly upon Islamic jurisprudence and partly upon modern European codes. In cases in which only citizens of the Mandated Territories were concerned, the personnel of the courts was almost wholly indigenous. But cases involving citizens of foreign States or their interests were taken before the 'mixed

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

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The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

665 was supported by several groups which preserved something of their individuality inside the alliance. The most important of them was the 'Istiqeal' group, descended from one of the secret societies of the years before 1914. It advocated the complete independence of the Arab countries and tended to be more uncompromising than the other constituent elements of the Bloc. Its leader was Shukri al-Quwatli. Among its other prominent members were Nabih al-Azmah, the Amir Adil Arslan, and Riyadh as-Sulh, perhaps the most important Arab nationalist leader in Lebanon.

646 One of the most prominent of the members of the Bloc,
642 Hashim al-Atasi, was elected President of the Assembly when it met in Damascus in June, 1928; while Ibrahim Hananu became President of the Commission set up to draft the Constitution. The Commission completed its work by August,
642 and laid its draft before the Assembly. The Constitution which it had drawn up was modelled on those of Western democratic countries, and provided for the exercise of legislative powers by a single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, and of executive powers by an elected President and a responsible Ministry. In addition it contained guarantees for the rights of individuals and communities. Thus Article 6 stipulated that all Syrians should be equal before the law, and there should be no inequality of treatment on grounds of religion, sect, race or language. Article 15 guaranteed liberty of conscience, the free exercise of all forms of worship, and the safeguarding of the religious interests and personal status of every sect. Article 28 guaranteed the rights of the religious communities, including their right to establish schools, teaching in their own language, subject to the principles laid down by law; and Article 37 declared that the electoral law to be issued subsequently would provide for the representation of religious minorities. (This provision was carried out. Each Parliament elected since 1930 has contained a number of representatives of the minorities, roughly proportionate to their size.)

648 In general the draft was acceptable to the High Com-
642 missioner, but there were certain articles to the inclusion of which he objected. Thus Article 2 declared that the Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity, which was unaffected by the divisions which had arisen between the end of the war and the

present time. This was a denial of the separate existence of Jebel Druze, the Alawi district, the Lebanese Republic, Palestine and Transjordan; and M. Ponsot judged it to be irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law. Again, four other Articles asserted the right of the President of the Republic to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad and proclaim martial law (73, 74, 75 and 112); and Article 110 declared that the organization of the army would form the subject of a special law. These five Articles also the High Commissioner thought to be incompatible with the obligations of France. He therefore asked that the Articles concerned should be separated from the general body of the draft. The Assembly refused, and M. Ponsot thereupon adjourned it for three months in August, 1928, and for a further three in November. He made an alternative suggestion, that the Assembly should modify the wording of Article 2 and should retain the other offending articles but add to the draft a general reservation safeguarding France's international obligations. This also proved abortive, since he and the Assembly could not agree upon a text for the reservation.

In February, 1929, the work of the Assembly was prorogued *sine die*. During this period and throughout 1929 the split between the National Bloc and 'moderates' grew ever wider. The former, while remaining tranquil, demanded the negotiation of a Treaty to replace the Mandate; the latter continued to advocate a policy of co-operation with France, and attempted without much success to form an effective political organization. The High Commissioner found it impossible to reach an agreement with the nationalists on the constitutional question, while the 'moderates' were too weak and divided for their support to be of value to him; he therefore felt himself bound to give up the attempt to entrust to the Syrian people the responsibility for the elaboration of their own constitution. Accordingly he dissolved the Constituent Assembly in May, 1930, and on his own initiative issued a Constitution for the State of Syria. It was to come into force after the election of the members of a Chamber of Deputies, at a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner.

This Constitution was virtually the same as that drafted by the Assembly, except for such changes as were necessary to

642 enable the Mandatory Power to carry out its obligations
648 under the Covenant. Thus Article 2 was modified, and stated merely that 'Syria forms an indivisible political unity'; and an additional article (116) was added to the effect that 'the provisions of the present Constitution are not, and cannot be, in opposition to the obligations undertaken by France in regard to Syria, particularly obligations towards the League of Nations. . . . So long as the international obligations of France in regard to Syria remain in force, any provisions of the present Constitution which are of a nature to affect those obligations will be applicable only under conditions to be determined by agreement between the French and Syrian Governments'.

Simultaneously a number of other decrees were promulgated. In addition to the Organic Laws for the Governments of Latakia and Jebel Druze, already mentioned, they included laws for the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and for a Conference of Common Interests composed of Delegations from the States and Governments, and charged with the management of their common financial and economic affairs.[1]

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646 The elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in January, 1932, and the Chamber met in June. More than three-quarters of its members were 'moderates'. Only a quarter were 'extreme' nationalists demanding full and immediate independence; but as had happened in the Constituent Assembly, the minority soon showed itself to be the dominant element. Its hopes were raised and its case strengthened by the recent conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the termination of the Mandate and the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations (1930-1932).

643 The first task of the Chamber was to choose the President
645 of the Republic. It elected Muhammad Ali al-Abid, son of
646 Izzat Pasha al-Abid who had been secretary to the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. He entrusted the construction of a Cabinet to a prominent moderate, Haqqi al-Azm, who formed a Ministry of which half the members were 'moderates' and half 'extreme' nationalists. Negotiations were opened between the Ministry and the High Commissioner for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

[1] For texts of these documents, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 676–98.

631 National Bloc, Mazhar Raslan as Governor of Latakia and Nasib al-Bakri as Governor of Jebel Druze.

648 Although the Treaty had not yet been ratified by the French
642 Parliament, it was agreed that the transitional period should be regarded as starting on January 1st, 1937. A beginning was made with the transfer to the Syrian Government of functions hitherto exercised by the French authorities. The Government was given the right freely to prepare and carry out its budget, and a certain control over the police; in principle the High Commissioner ceased to exercise his right to veto legislation, and the 'conseillers' to control ministerial acts. But the Mandatory Power still retained the conduct of foreign relations, the ultimate responsibility for public order and certain administrative services such as the supervision of the Beduin tribes.

665 These events seemed to show that the policy of the Bloc was
186 successful. It was still united; it had an overwhelming majority in the Chamber; its adherents filled the offices of the Government; it commanded a large measure of support in the country, especially among the younger generation.

Opposition to the Bloc existed, but it was so far largely inarticulate and undirected. It consisted of a handful of Deputies; of some extreme Arab nationalist organizations, which refused to recognize the Mandate and regarded co-operation with the French as treason; and of the separatist movements among the Alawis and Druzes and in the Jazirah.

The hopes of Syrian independence reached their climax in the celebrations which marked the return to Syria of the newly-amnestied exiles, Dr. Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash in May, 1937, the Amir Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in June. It seemed as if the country were entering upon a new period of national construction under leaders whose patriotic energy had only been strengthened by disappointment, imprisonment, and long years of exile.

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648 The next two years saw the collapse of these hopes. The claims of Turkey to Alexandretta, the growth of separatist movements, the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty, the unrest caused by the disturbances in Palestine, the administrative failure of the Nationalist Government and finally the growth of an internal

suspension of the Constitution and the complete breakdown 648
of the policy of 1936.

II

The Bloc was the more incapable of weathering such a 665
crisis, because by now there had appeared a strong nationalist opposition to it. Already in 1936 such a potential opposition had existed ready to take shape so soon as, on the one hand, the Bloc disappointed hopes, and on the other an alternative leader or group of leaders appeared. At the time neither of the two conditions was fulfilled. The Bloc was at the height of its success; and the few Deputies who opposed it were neither prominent nor strong enough to become popular leaders.

During the next few years, however, matters changed. The Bloc gradually lost a great part of its popularity, on account of its failure to secure the ratification of the Treaty and its impotence in the face of Turkish designs upon Alexandretta. The natural tendency of Governments in office to disappoint individual hopes and create individual grievances worked in the same direction.

The discontent was increased by the comparative failure of 631
the Government in internal administration. Among the 642
causes of failure were the inadequate powers of the Govern- 648
ment, the widespread belief that it did not enjoy the backing of the French authorities, its own lack of experience and the absence of an efficient civil service; but it was nevertheless discouraging to its supporters and irritating to ordinary citizens. On the whole the departments were no better administered than they had been; and there was a succession of petty acts of discrimination against members of minorities. The relations between the central and local authorities were often difficult, the tendency to excessive centralization conflicting with the innate localism of some of the provinces. This conflict had indeed existed before the nationalists came to power, and in order to end it, the High Commissioner had issued a decree on provincial organization in January, 1936. Besides altering the number and boundaries of the provinces, this decree had defined the scope of the central and local authorities and provided for the establishment of provincial councils. In spite of declarations, this decree was never fully applied.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 1101

In addition to Great Britain, the independence of Syria 648
and Lebanon was recognized by a number of the Allied Governments in exile. That of Syria, but not of Lebanon, was recognized by Sa'udi Arabia; while Egypt recognized the independence of the Syrian State but not its present form of government. The other Arab Governments, however, withheld their recognition, preferring to make no move until the form of independence should acquire reality through the re-establishment of constitutional government. Turkey, too, gave no recognition, not having official relations with the Free French. Most important of all, the United States Government maintained a reserved attitude. Mr. Cordell Hull, in a statement issued on November 29th, 1941, stressed the sympathy which the American Government and people had always felt for the 'natural and legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Syria and Lebanon'. The convention of 1924, in which the U.S. Government gave its consent to the Mandate, clearly embodied the principle of Syrian and Lebanese independence. It must be regarded as continuing in effect until new instruments of a mutually satisfactory nature could be negotiated and ratified. The U.S. Government was hopeful that as soon as international conditions permitted such negotiations would take place, enabling the Government to extend formal recognition to Syria and Lebanon.[1] In October, 1942, Mr. George Wadsworth was appointed U.S. Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

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In spite of the declarations of independence, the French 648
authorities showed no eagerness either to restore constitutional 642
life or to transfer powers to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. In August, 1942, indeed, General de Gaulle stated categorically in a speech made during his visit to the Levant that elections could not yet be held. The only progress made was the issue in February, 1942, of decrees once more incorporating Jebel Druze and the Alawi district in the Syrian State, while at the same time endowing them with special administrative and financial régimes similar to those which had existed from 1936 to 1939.[2] Apart from this, the only political events of the years were changes of Ministries. In 000

[1] For text, see P. W. Ireland (ed.), *The Near East, Problems and Prospects* (Chicago, 1942), p. 236. [2] See Chapter XI.

722 been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

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648 After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to
642 restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

666 In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was
646 decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies,
665 including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

643 On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected
645 Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SYRIA

With Emphasis on the Constitution of 1950

Majid Khadduri

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SYRIA HAS experienced a number of constitutional vicissitudes since its separation from the Ottoman Empire after World War I. A monarchy for a short period under Faysal, it then passed, against its will, into the position of a mandated territory under French administration. Another eight years elapsed before the struggle between the Mandatory and the Syrian nationalists was sufficiently resolved to permit the formulation of a constitution even remotely agreeable to both parties, and never during the period of the mandate was any constitution consistently in full force. This record might be attributed to the conflict between an unbending French colonial policy and an equally uncompromising Syrian nationalism, but after Syria attained its independence in 1945–46, it still experienced a series of coups and counter-coups. Finally, a completely revised consti-

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15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MEJ Syria MEJ

642 648 tution was drafted and promulgated in September 1950 with high hopes that it might prove to be the panacea for all of the country's ills.

This process, however, should not be regarded as evidence of inherent insecurity in Syria's political life, but rather as a transitory stage in its constitutional evolution. In it can be seen the gradual ironing out of doubts and conflicts over the nature of the Syrian state, the proper functions of its government, and its relations with the outside world, social and economic as well as political. Syria has freed itself too recently from foreign influence for it to have adjusted fully to both national and international circumstances.

FROM A NATIONAL MONARCHY TO A MANDATORY ADMINISTRATION

642 Amir Faysal, at the head of an Arab army, entered Damascus in October 1918 with the avowed intention of establishing an Arab government. But before he had time to organize a constitutional regime, he was caught up in the larger issue of the peace settlement regarding the whole Arab world. The Syrians, too impatient to wait for the final decisions of the Peace Conference and suspicious of what these decisions would be, called a Syrian Congress representing "Greater Syria" (including Lebanon and Palestine), on the basis of the old Ottoman Electoral Law.[1] This Congress, functioning as both Legislative Assembly and National Convention, considered all matters related to national and foreign policy as well as the drafting of a constitution. It held three main sessions between June 3, 1919, and July 19, 1920. It prepared, during its last session, a draft constitution of 148 articles which, though no formal final vote was taken, had been accepted in principle.[2] The Congress was still considering the second reading when the crisis with the French authorities

666 [1] Elections were actually held only in the interior of Syria; the deputies from Lebanon and Palestine, owing to the objection of the French and British military authorities to the elections, were chosen on the basis of petitions signed by voters in support of their candidates. See Philippe David, *Un Gouvernement Arabe à Damas: Le Congrès Syrien* (Paris, 1923), pp. 51–63.

[2] Cf. Philippe David, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

developed and it adjourned on July 19, 1920, never to meet again.[3]

The Constitution of 1920 provided for a limited monarchy, a bicameral legislature, and a responsible ministry: provisions for the structure of the central government followed the normal pattern of West-European constitutional monarchies. Syria was to be an indivisible political unit, but its boundaries were left undefined. The Syrian Government was to be an Arab Government, its capital Damascus, and its religion Islam. The Constitution included a Bill of Rights guaranteeing civil liberties and freedom of thought and of religion. The monarchy was to be vested in the Hashimi family, with Faysal the first king. Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies were to be elected bodies; the deputies by secret ballot in two degrees, and the Senators by the Chamber of Deputies of each province. The administration of the country was to be on a "decentralized" basis: each province was to have its own local administration with a single legislative body called the Chamber of Deputies. The judiciary was to be independent, with a High Court appointed by the King as the supreme judicial organ.[4]

The work of the Syrian Congress was cut short by French action. At a meeting of the San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920, the mandate over Syria and Lebanon was given to France. On July 14 General Gouraud sent an ultimatum to Faysal demanding, *inter alia*, the acceptance of the French mandate and dismissal of the Syrian national army.[5] Faysal's reply, accepting the terms of the ultimatum, was sent a few hours before the expiration of the time limit but did not arrive in time.[6] French troops at once proceeded to establish their authority. Faysal's

[3] On the work of the Syrian Congress, see Philippe David, *op. cit.*, Chapters 6 and 8; Amin Sa'id, *Al-thawra al-arabiyyah al-kubra* [*The Great Arab Revolt*] (Cairo, 1934), Vol. II, pp. 18–23, 130–32; Sati' al-Hasri, *Yawm Maysalun* [*The Day of Maysalun*] (Beirut, 1947), pp. 245–60.

[4] For text of the Constitution, see Appendix to Philippe David, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–53.

[5] For the text of the ultimatum and the events leading to it, see Sati' al-Hasri, *op. cit.*, pp. 96ff.; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), pp. 306–309; J. de V. Loder, *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria* (London, 1923), pp. 77–79; Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 167–74.

[6] The Congress was adamant in its opposition, but the Cabinet approved the acceptance of the ultimatum. See Sati' al-Hasri, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 124, 127.

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Hasani, Qadi of Damascus and a moderate nationalist, as head of a provisional Government charged with holding general elections and calling a Constituent Assembly. Recent insurgents and political prisoners were released.[9]

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1930

The elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in April 1928 and the Assembly met at Damascus on June 9. M. Ponsot, in his inaugural address, declared that once the Assembly had completed its work the time would have come for placing the relations between France and Syria on the basis of a treaty. Sheikh Taj al-Din declared that the Assembly "will have full freedom in the drafting of the Constitution."[10] The Assembly elected Hashim al-Atasi, leader of the Syrian nationalists, as its president; and appointed a drafting committee of 27 members, with Ibrahim Hananu as its chairman and Fawzi al-Ghazzi as rapporteur.

The drafting of the Constitution was primarily the work of a subcommittee of three, Fawzi al-Ghazzi, Fa'iz al-Khuri, and Zaki al-Khattib, under the chairmanship of al-Ghazzi. Studying in detail the constitutions of Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, France, and Belgium, as well as the old Ottoman Constitution of Midhat Pasha, the committee submitted its draft to the Constituent Assembly for discussion on August 2. As finally accepted in principle, the draft stipulated that Syria within its natural boundaries is an indivisible political unit and an independent sovereign state; its form of government is republican; and the religion of its head is Islam. The capital of the state is the city of Damascus. The Constitution provided, likewise, a Bill of Rights, in which the principles of liberty, equality, private property, etc., are all guaranteed

The form of government is parliamentary, but the head of the executive power is the President of the Republic. He is elected by Parliament for a period of five years, but he is not eligible for re-election until the lapse of five years from the

[9] With the exception of 39 persons whom the High Commissioner refused to set free.
[10] *Jalsat al-majlis al-ta'sisi al-suri* [*Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*] (Damascus, 1928), pp. 1–3.

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expiration of his term. The President selects the Prime Minister and appoints the ministers upon the latter's recommendation. He sanctions legislation and signs treaties; but treaties and contracts having to do with the security of the State and its financial policy must be approved by Parliament. The President is not responsible, since every decision or decree made by him should be countersigned by the Minister or Ministers concerned, except the decree for appointing a Prime Minister. The President calls, prorogues, and dissolves Parliament upon the recommendation of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is composed of not more than seven members who are individually, as well as jointly, responsible to Parliament. The Ministers need not be members of Parliament, but they can attend and take part in Parliamentary debate.

Parliament is made up of one House (the *Majlis*, or Chamber of Deputies), which is freely elected every four years and sits in two sessions each year — from mid-March to the end of May, and from mid-October to the end of December. The Chamber of Deputies meets in public as well as in secret session and its members enjoy full parliamentary immunity during the session. Every male Syrian who has attained his twentieth year can vote. Parliament can initiate legislation, except perhaps financial bills, and can ask questions regarding the conduct of any Ministry. The Constitution provided also for the establishment of a High Court composed of 15 members to be chosen from Parliament and from among competent judges. This Court is regarded as the supreme judicial organ of the State. Finally, the Constitution might be amended by two-thirds of the members of Parliament or at the request of the President of the Republic in agreement with the Council of Ministers and with the approval of two-thirds of the Parliament.

The draft constitution may be regarded as expressing the free will of the Syrian people. It ignored entirely France's obligations as a Mandatory Power toward the League of Nations, since the Constituent Assembly regarded Syria both as fully independent and as an indivisible political unity; that is, to include Lebanon and Palestine. The High Commissioner, placed in an impossible position, informed the Assembly that certain articles in the draft called for express reservations on his part, some be-

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cause they were in formal contradiction with France's international obligations as a Mandatory Power, others because they could not be given practical effect without a previous agreement with France. The following articles were specifically objected to:

Article 73. The President exercises the right of pardon. Amnesties can only be granted by law.

Article 74. The President concludes and signs treaties; but treaties concerning the security of the state or the public finances, treaties of commerce, and, in general, all treaties which cannot be denounced at the expiration of each year do not become definitive until they have been voted by Parliament.

Article 75. The President of the Republic nominates representatives abroad and receives foreign representatives.

Article 110. The organization of the future army will form the subject of a special law.

Article 112. The President of the Republic may, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, proclaim a state of siege in disturbed districts, on condition that he inform Parliament immediately. If Parliament is not in session, the President will proceed to summon it without delay.

Further, Article 2, declaring Syria to be both indivisible and fully sovereign, the High Commissioner stated, was in conflict not only with international agreements, but with a "situation of fact and of law" which could not be modified by a unilateral decision.[11] He suggested that the Assembly should separate (*disjonction*) the foregoing six articles. Sheikh Taj al-Din, the Prime Minister, endorsed the request of the High Commissioner and asked the Assembly to delete these articles until the question of relations with France was settled by a treaty of alliance.[12]

The High Commissioner's message and Sheikh Taj al-Din's statement aroused the indignation of the Assembly. The unanimous opinion of the members was that those six articles were the only ones that mattered and that their separation would virtually "leave nothing significant" in the constitution. The Assembly therefore handed the High Commissioner a formal note of rejection. The High Commissioner retorted by adjourning the Assembly for three months; but the Assembly, meeting for the

[11] *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, p. 16. See also *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, p. 278.

[12] For the Assembly's reactions, see *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, p. 279-308 passim.

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last time on August 10, 1928, passed a resolution empowering its President to negotiate on its behalf with the authorities "for the fulfilment of the country's [national] aspirations." But negotiations between the leading Syrian nationalists and the High Commissioner led to no agreement. Following an exchange of a number of proposals and counter-proposals, the High Commissioner, by a decree issued on February 5, 1929, prorogued the Constituent Assembly *sine die*.[11] It was over a year later, on May 14, 1930, that M. Ponsot, after consultations in Paris, surprised the nationalists by promulgating the Constitution. The text included Article 2 as altered by a previous proposal of his to reduce it to "Syria is an indivisible political unity," but the other articles in question remained unchanged. There appeared also a new provision (Article 116) withholding from application all provisions which infringed upon France's international obligations relative to Syria, or dealt with the maintenance of security or with foreign relations. Such provisions would become applicable only after special agreement between Syria and the French Government. The Nationalists somewhat grudgingly decided to take part in the elections on this basis, but another eighteen months elapsed before M. Ponsot issued orders for holding them. The elections were finally completed on March 30, 1932, and resulted in a victory for the moderates rather than the nationalist elements.

When Parliament met on June 7, 1932, there was considerable discussion regarding the election of the President. The Nationalists' candidate, Hashim al-Atasi, could muster only 17 votes; nevertheless they declared their intention of withdrawing from Parliament if the Government insisted upon the election of one of its two candidates: Subhi Barakat or Haqqi al-Azm. A compromise was finally reached by electing Muhammad Ali al-Abid, who was *persona grata* to both groups, on the understanding that he would select Haqqi al-Azm, candidate of the moderates, as Prime Minister. In this way the first republican administration was established by the French in cooperation with the Syrian

[11] For these proposals and counter-proposals, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 550-51. For the French version, see *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, pp. 20-21.

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nationalists. And it was thus that the long period of "provisional" administrations, under the direct control of the French High Commissioner, came to an end.

THE FIRST REPUBLIC

Constitutional evolution during the first republic largely involved attempts to formulate treaty relations with France. There were two major efforts in this direction and both were unsuccessful. The main obstacle to successful treaty negotiations in 1933 was France's disregard of Syrian unity.[14] Not only did the French insist that Lebanon be excluded from any future Syrian state — even Jabal Druze and Latakia were to remain semi-independent.[15] The Nationalists also objected to the uncertainty over the abolition of the capitulatory regime, the unlimited rights given to France to maintain forces on Syrian territory, and the creation of a department of common interests for the regulation and control of the economic resources in which France was to have a preponderant position.[16]

A draft treaty was in fact signed on November 16, 1933. Following a brief and inconclusive debate, during which the principal objections raised by the Nationalists were reiterated, the High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Two days later, on November 26, the President of the Syrian Republic withdrew the treaty from Parliament at the High Commissioner's request. Parliament was suspended, and a year later dissolved *sine die*, with the President of the Republic authorized to govern by decrees. In 1934 the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Sheikh Taj al-Din, who remained in office for about two years. Thus the first attempt at solving relations between France and Syria failed, with consequential impairment of the constitutional organization which had just been set up.

France's second attempt to come to an agreement with the

[14] The two Nationalist Cabinet members resigned in protest on April 12. For text of the manifesto giving their reasons, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 575–76.

[15] For a discussion of the policy of division in Syria compared with the unitary policy of Britain in Iraq, see A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), pp. 284–88, 292–96.

[16] For a discussion of the Principal Syrian objections to the treaty and its comparison with the British treaty with Iraq, see George Antonius, "Syria and the French Mandate," *International Affairs*, XIII (1934), pp. 532 ff.

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which was followed by that of President Hashim al-Atasi, and the French High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Thus the second attempt to come to an understanding with Syria failed.

NATIONAL REGIME: THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The outbreak of World War II brought renewed hopes for independence. Upon France's defeat in 1940 the Syrian Nationalists began to agitate for the immediate formation of a national Government; indeed some of them went so far as to contact secretly the Iraqi nationalists, inviting them to intervene and unite the two countries under the Crown of Iraq. A few urged cooperation with the Axis, but the failure of the Rashid Ali movement in Iraq raised doubts as to the feasibility of achieving Arab national aspirations along this path, and on the whole the moderate elements began to come to the fore.

The joint Anglo-French occupation of Syria and Lebanon in 1941 brought with it a promise of independence. A Provisional Government was appointed, and on September 28, 1941, General Catroux formally proclaimed the independence of Syria. The Constitution, however, was not at once restored, and the Nationalists, led by Shukri al-Quwwatli, revived their activities. They pledged cooperation with the democratic powers, but demanded either the immediate restoration of the Majlis of 1936–39 or the holding of new elections. Finally, in January 1943 M. Helleu, representing General Catroux, French Delegate-General, announced the restoration of the Constitution and initiated arrangements for general elections. These were held on July 26, with the Nationalist Party (al-Kutla) overwhelmingly victorious.

The Majlis met on August 17, 1943, and elected Shukri al-Quwwatli, who had emerged as the unrivaled leader of the Nationalists, President of the Republic, and Faris al-Khuri President of the Majlis. On August 19 the President invited Sa'dullah al-Jabiri to form a new Cabinet, drawn almost wholly from the Kutla, and the Government began immediately afterward to negotiate with the French authorities for the transfer of such controls as the French still exercised.

Syria's struggle against foreign control was thus fully re-

warded. Not only did it emerge as a sovereign state, but it successfully avoided entering into any such special treaty relations with France as Great Britain had managed to establish with Iraq. The Nationalists' cause was won, the *amour propre* of the Syrian people was gratified. Syria became, of all the Arab states, the first to shape freely its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs.

Independence, however, was not coupled with that full political unity which the Nationalists held almost as dear. Not only did Palestine remain completely beyond the bounds of a possible Syrian state: Lebanon has definitely refused to join Syria in any form of union which would destroy or encroach on its sovereign attributes, and Jordan has accepted union only on its own terms. The dismemberment of Syria after World War I has not been repaired by the mere withdrawal of foreign control, and the "Greater Syria" plan, designed to regroup the various fragments into a sort of federal union has raised the complex problem of adjusting the internal differences and vested interests which were partially submerged in the struggle against foreign control. Thus the question of Syrian unity, whether in the form of a Greater Syria, Syro-Iraqi unity, or Fertile Crescent scheme, remains one of the factors influencing Syria's constitutional evolution.

Probably far more disrupting to the present Syrian state than the question of unity is the lack of cohesion among the various political forces. Stability in government presupposes the development of constitutional traditions. Frequent changes of regime, a prolonged program of noncooperation with, and at times violence against, foreign rule hardly afforded an opportunity of developing the tradition of responsibility necessary for stable government.

It was not until August 1947, when the term of office of President Quwwatli was due to expire, that a formal amendment of the 1930 Constitution was proposed, and not until November that any action was taken. Article 68, which prohibited the eligibility of the President for re-election was to be amended to permit a second term, but a third term was made possible only after the lapse of a period of five years. Articles 85 and 86, dealing with the procedure and time of the election of the President,

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were to be carried out by a special decree. Article 89, which specified that the number of ministers was not to exceed 7, was amended to read 12. Finally, Articles 71 and 115, specifying the procedure of electing the first President of the Republic, were deleted.[28]

THE MILITARY COUPS D'ÉTAT

The Quwwatli regime, which could flatter itself on having achieved full independence for Syria, failed to inaugurate the reforms which were so badly needed. The criticism levelled against the Government — that it was corrupt and permitted the aggrandizement of its Ministers — might have been exaggerated, but it will be noted that the Government's "constitutional reform" merely amended those articles which related to the re-election of Quwwatli to the Presidency and to the Cabinet membership, ignoring many other gaps and defects in the constitutional organization of the State. This fact lent substance to the criticism that the Government paid attention only to matters that served the interests of the ruling oligarchy.[29]

Matters came to a head when the Syrian Government (jointly with the other Arab Governments) failed to forestall the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The Quwwatli regime's attempt to shift the responsibility of defeat to the Army precipitated a reaction. Colonel Husni al-Za'im, secretly encouraged by the opposition parties, raised a military coup d'état on March 30, 1949, which overthrew the Quwwatli regime amidst popular enthusiasm and approval.[30]

Za'im's coup, by eliminating the party which was so avowedly opposed to uniting or even cooperating with the two neighboring Hashimi Kingdoms, at once reopened the question of the future organization of Syria: whether it would be monarchical, by joining a union with Iraq, or maintain a separate republican

[28] For text of the Amendment Law, see the Syrian *Official Gazette*, Vol. 30 (March 25, 1948), p. 756. For further details on the Amendment of the Constitution, see Wajih al-Haffar, *Al-dastur wa al-hukm* [*The Constitution and the Government*] (Damascus, 1948), pp. 123–30.

[29] Wajih al-Haffar, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–34; M. Kurd Ali, *Al-Mudhakkirat* [*Memoirs*] (Damascus, 1948), Vol. II, p. 530.

[30] For the background of this movement, see Alford Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949" *Middle East Journal*, IV (Jan. 1950), pp. 1–11.

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regime. Both Iraq and Jordan, arguing that a union with Syria would strengthen their position against Israel, opened negotiations with Za'im. Pressed by an immediate need to strengthen his position in the forthcoming armistice negotiations with Israel, Za'im offered to conclude an immediate military alliance with a pledge to consider the larger scheme of future cooperation with the Hashimi Kingdoms later on. He refused, however, to commit himself on whether he favored a republican or monarchical regime.[21]

Za'im's move toward negotiation with the Hashimi Kingdoms aroused the fear of the Saudi-Egyptian bloc that a rapprochement would lead to an extension of Hashimi rule to Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia therefore countered with promises of recognition and assurances of military and financial aid. This Saudi-Egyptian intervention was so successful that it not only doomed a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy (with possible extension to Jordan) but inspired Za'im to reach for the highest position of his country — an ambition which sowed the seeds of disagreement between him and his supporters, both civil and military, who now argued that Za'im had betrayed the cause for which they had instigated the coup, namely to rid the country of the Quwwatli regime.

In April 1949 Za'im dismissed Parliament and ordered new elections on the basis of universal suffrage, including women — the first to be thus held in an Arab country. After Za'im's election to the Presidency, preparations were made to promulgate a new Constitution into which liberal principles were to be introduced, especially relating to land reform. This Constitution, though completed, was never promulgated; but a new civil code, bearing the stamp of the Egyptian jurist Sanhuri Pasha (who had already started research along this line at the initiation of the Iraqi Government), was issued. Although based on both European models and the principles of Islamic law, this code materially restricted the authority of the latter. It is regarded as one of the permanent contributions of Za'im's short-lived regime.

[21] The relations of the Syrian coups d'état to the schemes of unity with Iraq and Jordan are discussed in detail in a paper by the present writer entitled "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity" contributed to a volume to be published shortly by the Harvard University Press.

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Za'im was overthrown by his opponents on August 14, 1949, 669 having remained in power only four and a half months. Colonel 646 Sami al-Hinnawi, who led this second coup and executed Za'im, reversed the policy of friendly relations with the Saudi-Egyptian bloc and again opened negotiations with Iraq for a Syro-Iraqi union. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in November, but when the Assembly met on December 12 and was about to approve a project for union with Iraq, a third army move on December 14, led by Colonel Adib Shishakli, sealed the fate of unity with Iraq under a dual monarchy. Shishakli declared that the Army would no longer interfere in politics and that government by civilians would be maintained; but it remained clear that the Army would continue to resist any policy which ran counter to its wishes.

The Constituent Assembly elected Rushdi al-Kikhya, leader 646 of the People's Party which won the elections, as its President, 643 and Hashim al-Atasi, an old member of the Nationalist Party, as the temporary head of the State. On January 7, 1950, after a long cabinet crisis attributed to the intervention of the Army in politics, President Atasi took an oath of office and the Constituent Assembly gave temporary legislative and executive powers to the Government, subject to its control, until the promulgation of a Constitution. In the meantime a committee of 33 members, 642 under the chairmanship of Nazim al-Qudsi, was appointed to prepare a draft constitution for the Assembly. The Committee began its meetings on January 4 and completed its work three months later. As its chairman stated in his report to the Assembly, the Committee made use of no less than fifteen European and Asiatic (including Arab) constitutions, and received proposals from individuals and organizations either directly or through the press.[22] The draft Constitution, consisting of 177 articles, was communicated to the President of the Assembly on April 15, 1950, but debate did not get underway until July 7. After prolonged discussion, first on the draft generally and then article by article, the Constitution was approved with considerable changes (including reduction to 166 articles) on September 5,

[22] See text of the Report in the *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (June 22, 1950), Appendix, pp. 1–2.

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642 1950, and was formally promulgated on the same day by the President of the Assembly.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1950

The new Syrian Constitution has made no fundamental changes in the form or structure of the Government as it existed in the Constitution of 1930. The most interesting innovations are to be found rather in the general articles expressing the hopes and aspirations of the Syrian nation, in the detailed Bill of Rights, and in those provisions relating to land resources and education. The Constitution opens with a long preamble stressing principles of justice, fundamental civil liberties, fraternity and social consciousness; the liberation of citizens from the miseries of poverty, disease, ignorance, and fear; the principle of equality, defence of the Republic and the Constitution, and the development of individual responsibility and pride in the State. The preamble pays lip service to Arab unity in deference to the Pan-Arabs, and to Islam as the religion of the majority of the people.[23]

As did the Constitution of 1930, that of 1950 declares Syria to be "an indivisible political unity"; but it adds that it forms "a part of the Arab nation" (Article 1). The draft Constitution stated that Syria is "a representative and sovereign Arab Republic," but to this the Constituent Assembly added that it is also "democratic" and "fully" sovereign.[24] Islam was treated as a state religion in the draft constitution, while the other "heavenly religions" were declared "respected" and "sacred"; but the arguments of Christian and liberal Muslim quarters finally prevailed upon the Assembly and the formula of the Constitution of 1930, declaring merely that "the religion of the President of the Republic is Islam," was reinstated. But it was also asserted, prob-

[23] The deference to Islam in the Preamble did not appear in the original draft, but was added later by the Constituent Assembly, in conjunction with its decision to remove the clause declaring Islam to be a state religion, in order to satisfy the religious-minded section of the Assembly.

[24] For text of the draft Constitution as it was taken up by the Constituent Assembly, see *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (June 22, 1950), Appendix, pp. 12–27. For the final text as approved by the Assembly, see *ibid.*, Vol. 32 (September 7, 1950), pp. 3159–3175. For the debate on the draft Constitution, beginning with the meeting of July 7, see *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, in the *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (1950), pp. 630 ff.

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ably in deference to the feelings of pious Muslims, that "Islamic Law shall be the main source of legislation." (Article 3.) 642

The new Constitution provides that the President, following the pattern of the Constitution of 1930 before its amendment, is elected by Parliament for a term of five years but is not eligible for re-election until an interval of like duration. The President is given certain exclusive powers, such as the right of suspensory veto, the dissolution of Parliament under certain circumstances, the right of appointing the Prime Minister and the other Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and the right to communicate directly with Parliament by messages addressed to its President. He is also held responsible for violation of the Constitution, for high treason, and for ordinary offenses, but he cannot be tried except by the Supreme Court. For other powers which the President exercises in conjunction with the Prime Minister or Minister concerned he is obviously not held responsible. Among such are the powers of appointment of Government officials and judges, sending and receiving diplomats, ratifying treaties with the approval of Parliament, and declaring war and signing peace treaties with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the High Defense Council, and Parliament. If the President is incapacitated from exercising his power for reasons other than death or resignation, the President of the Parliament temporarily exercises these powers. In case of death or resignation, Parliament must meet within ten days to elect another President.

The Cabinet is composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers, the number and functions of whom are to be defined by a special law. The Ministers may or may not be members of Parliament. The Cabinet prepares a platform on the basis of which the Prime Minister asks for a vote of confidence in Parliament; lack of confidence compels the Cabinet to resign. The Cabinet is jointly responsible to Parliament for its general policy, and each Minister is individually responsible for the work of his Ministry. The Ministers are not permitted directly or indirectly to enter into any business transactions with the Government during their terms of office, and they are held liable for indictment and trial 642 645

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642 by the Supreme Court on the accusation of such activity at-
645 tributed to them.

642 Parliament is composed of one Chamber of Deputies (Majlis),
646 elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage (including women) for a term of four years. It convenes from October 1 to December 31 and from March 1 to May 15, and each year elects its President on the basis of absolute majority. The Deputies represent the entire nation and not their own constituencies. As in the case of the Ministers, the Deputies are not permitted to exploit their positions in any business transaction with the Government. Legislation, other than financial bills, may be initiated by Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet; but financial bills which involve reduction of taxes or expenditures of funds must be proposed either by 20 members of Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet. Article 59 stipulates that Parliament "shall not cede its legislative powers." This article, it seems, was inserted to ensure that Parliament would not follow the example of the Constituent Assembly in delegating legislative, in addition to executive, powers to the Government and thus pave the way toward the realization of a dictatorial regime. If one-fourth of the members of Parliament object to the constitutionality of a bill before its promulgation, or if the President does so, then it is suspended until the Supreme Court passes a decision regarding its constitutionality. If the Supreme Court decides within 10 days that the bill is unconstitutional, it is returned to Parliament for reconsideration.

642 The judicial system is designed to be free from interference
622 by any other governmental agency. "The honor, conscience, and integrity of the judges are guaranteed for the right and freedom of the people." (Article 105.) The judicial power is exercised by three types of courts: (1) the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Cassation; (3) ordinary tribunals. The Supreme Court is composed of 7 members to be elected by Parliament from a list of 14 nominees chosen from among highly qualified judges. The members of the Supreme Court are elected for 5 years and are eligible for re-election. They are independent and cannot be discharged except by a decision of the Supreme Court itself.

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The functions of the Court are: (1) to consider the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and any administrative decisions; (2) to conduct the trial of the President of the Republic and the Ministers; and (3) to examine the validity of elections.

For the purpose of the appointment, promotion, transfer, and discharge of judges or the various courts other than the Supreme Court, a High Council of Judges is provided, composed of the President of the Supreme Court, two members of the Supreme Court, and the highest ranking four judges of the Court of Cassation. The Council is set up to ensure that the judicial authority is kept independent of the influence of the Government.

The Constitution provides, likewise, detailed provisions for the division of the country into administrative units and for local provincial government and municipal administration. It also provides rules for the preparation of the budget and the procedure of its introduction to Parliament, as well as other measures related to financial policy. An interesting provision related to the economic development of the country is the establishment of a Permanent Economic Council for the purpose of formulating plans for the development and exploitation of the economic potentialities of Syria.

Probably the most interesting innovation of the Constitution is its Bill of Rights comprising 28 articles which define with considerable detail the fundamental principles of freedom and the social and economic rights of the individual citizen. The numerous provisions stressing liberty and equality of the individual and the freedom of the press may seem superfluous, but they are deemed worthy of emphasis in view of the authoritarian tendency in the administration since the establishment of the national regime.

Article 21 marks a radical departure from the principle of the existing social-economic system. In this article, property is defined as both "public" and "private"; and the State like the individual may possess property within the limits of the law. As to private ownership, "the method of its possession and disposal shall be specified by law in such a manner as to make it perform its social function." Further, no individual is to be permitted to "utilize his private ownership in a manner inconsistent

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642 with public welfare." All subsoil minerals, solid or liquid, are
423 declared the property of the State; and the State, in the general interest, is permitted to expropriate private property in accordance with a law providing for just compensation. But Article 23 ensures that no "general confiscation" shall be permitted.

The Constitution provides in like manner the way of utilizing the land. It stipulates that land "shall be cultivated and not neglected"; and that should it be left unexploited within a certain period to be specified by law, the right of usufruct is alienated. The Constitution provides, likewise, that "a maximum limit for land ownership shall be prescribed by law," and that small and medium ownership is to be encouraged: "The State shall distribute State lands to peasants to whom land is not available sufficient to their living, against small rents to be repaid in installments." (Article 22.)[28]

642 Labor is regarded as "the most basic factor in social life," and
659 is "the right of all citizens." "The State shall provide work to citizens and shall guarantee it by directing and promoting the national economy." (Article 26.) The State undertakes to protect labor and provide legislation for the regulation of wages, hours of labor, allowances, and the improvement of social and health conditions. Trade unions are permitted to be formed within the limits of the law. Forced labor is prohibited except by law aimed at certain specific social and constructional services, and in case of war and emergencies.

642 Education is declared a right of every citizen. Elementary
871 education is compulsory and free in all Government schools. Secondary and professional education, though not compulsory, is also free in all Government schools. "The State shall give priority in the budget for the spread and expansion of elementary, rural, and professional education." The aim of education is defined as "the creation of a generation strong in body and mind, full of faith in God, endowed with moral virtues, proud in the

425 [28] On February 15, 1951, the Minister of Agriculture announced a plan for the distribution of 166,000 dunams (app. 41,500 acres) of State land in the Jazirah area among 554 Bedouin families of the Shammar Zor tribe. Each family will receive 300 dunams (75 acres), and each peasant, after paying the State LS 1.5 annually for 3 years, will own his share of the land. The State land is to be distributed among several villages, each village to receive 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres).

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties 642
and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with 871
the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formulate programs to be applied in the various stages of training. The State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the 642
defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is 702
the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society 581
and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that 642
within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be 212
eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the 166
formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be 642
made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence 642
of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of 178
Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

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been long neglected owing to the preoccupation of Syrian nationalists with the more urgent political problem of achieving independence. When independence had been achieved, the Nationalist regime failed to command respect because of its reliance on the oligarchic and feudal groups held over from the old Ottoman period. It was still necessary, once the leaders of the national regime were overthrown, to adopt new social and economic measures before a truly democratic system of government would come into being. These socialistic provisions, however, are not of a Marxist nature, since they maintain almost intact the principles of private property and free enterprise.

One would expect a strong Arab nationalist tinge to the constitution of the country which had been, from the very beginning of the nationalist movement, the hot-bed of Pan-Arabism. Failure to achieve Arab unity following World War I did not quench the ardor for it as a nationalist goal. The establishment of the Arab League was hailed as an important step toward that end; but the League's failure to save Palestine from the Zionists again gave rise to a desire for a closer unity. The establishment of Israel, regarded as a threat to the Arab states, has aggravated this intense Pan-Arab feeling. Loyalty to the Pan-Arab ideal has made it difficult for Syria to make up its mind, in an Arab world divided into two camps, which of the two it should join, or whether it should join either. The new Constitution of 1950 has also been characterized as "spiritual" in that it requires religious teaching of all denominations and stresses ethical and spiritual values in life.[28] Relaxation in Government administration and wartime conditions have brought a noticeable deterioration in public morality not only in Syria but throughout the Arab world. The emphasis on religious and ethical values is partly to repair this decadence but probably more to create confidence in the new regime.

Finally, it is to be noted that the new Constitution is both extremely detailed in its provisions and rigid in the procedure of its amendment. Such provisions reflect the apprehension of the new group in power lest the elder politicians and vested interests

[28] See a lecture by the Rapporteur of the drafting committee, Dr. 'Abd al-Wahhab Hawmad, *Hawl al-dastur al-jadid* [*On the New Constitution*] (Damascus, 1950), pp. 8–9.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

work the administration to their advantage. But such detailed provisions are likely to call for frequent amendment under the rapid changes of modern life, while the procedure of amendment is difficult and discourages change. Certainly Syria needs to avoid further revolutionary change, but the new Constitution, with its detailed provisions and rigidity, has not adequately provided legal means for peaceful evolution.

The rapid changes in Syria's regimes during the last two years since Colonel Husni al-Za'im precipitated the first coup d'état are not an accidental phenomenon when considered in the light of Syria's constitutional development since World War I. These changes, however, have been accelerated and in certain respects rendered dangerous by the introduction of the Army into the play of political forces. The Army's declarations that its interference was merely to rid the country of an undesirable administration and to maintain the republican regime have been taken by the Syrian people only at their face value; and far-sighted Syrians as well as disinterested foreign observers are still gravely concerned about what the future will have in store for Syria if the Army continues to interfere in politics whenever the civilian leaders advocate policies which run contrary to the wishes of the military. Judging by the recent experiences of Iraq with a similar situation, it would seem that either the Army will eventually take full control of political activities or it must be crushed as a political force.

Closely connected with Syria's internal struggle between the Army and the civilian politicians is the division of the Arab world into two rival camps; Syria is inevitably, though perhaps unwillingly, drawn into the resultant conflict. Each of these two camps has aggravated Syria's internal changes by supporting certain influential politicians and parties, hoping to orientate Syria in its direction. This political struggle in the Arab world has raised such issues as that of monarchy and republicanism, and has intensified the struggle among ambitious politicians who advocated such plans as those of Greater Syria, a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy, and general Arab collective security.

Syria's most urgent need, it seems, is a stable government; but this depends now less upon Syria itself than upon external inter-

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

ference in its affairs. If left alone, Syria may still be able to solve the Army-civilian struggle for supreme authority which is essential for internal stability. If, however, foreign interference — direct or inspired — continues, the future of Syria will depend accordingly on the larger problem of the stability and social-economic reorganization of the whole Arab world.

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S L 666 643 Bishara al-Khouri, became President with the pan-Arab Riyad as-Sulh as Prime Minister; these nationalists were not satisfied with mere titular sovereignty but claimed the reality of independence, and in November 1943 a Free French resort to force against them was reversed only by a British intervention, endorsed by the United States Government. The Free French were thus constrained to transfer most branches of the administration to the Syrian and Lebanese Parliaments, but retained control of the local 'Troupes Spéciales' and obstructed the proper equipping of the Syrian gendarmerie. The French intention was to make this vital concession of authority conditional upon the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty which would give France much the same strategic, economic, and cultural advantages as Britain had retained in Iraq by the already obsolescent Treaty of 1930. In March 1945 Syria and Lebanon had been admitted as sovereign states to membership both of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States. The Syrian nationalists were not prepared to subordinate their sovereignty to an imposed alliance with France, and the landing of a contingent of Senegalese troops immediately after VE-day (in disregard of a personal appeal of Churchill to de Gaulle) was regarded in both Syria and Lebanon as clear evidence of a French resort to coercion. Sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Syrian gendarmerie and the local nationalists on the one hand and the French garrison on the other became general, and when, at the end of May 1945, the local French Commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus the British Government ordered their Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene, by force if necessary, to restore order in a region whose security was vital for British communications in the still-continuing war in the Far East. The crisis accelerated the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, concerning which the demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were supported by the Security Council; the process was completed in Syria by 15 April 1946 and in Lebanon by the end of the year.

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S L 648 642 Between the wars, the French Mandate had allowed political development in Lebanon to produce at least a façade of parliamentary democracy, with arrangements between the Muslim and Christian leaders on the division of political power and prerogatives, and the active commercial and intellectual life of Lebanon made progress with a minimum of government interference. In Syria, however, local separatisms which French policy had encouraged made it very difficult for any Syrian Government to knit the people together from Damascus; the

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foundations for commercial and intellectual progress were less firmly established than in Lebanon, and the Muslim leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to acquire the technique of government. The root of the trouble was that the French were opposed to self-government and tended to refuse office to nationalist political leaders, except for short, self-defeating periods. But though they failed to foster self-government, the French did much good in both Syria and Lebanon as engineers, doctors, educators, and archaeologists, and performed a valuable service in training at least a cadre of competent civil servants.

With the end of the French Mandate there emerged two sovereign and independent Republics with many mutual and some conflicting interests. For some years the rest of the world failed to distinguish between the two, and it is still possible to find educated persons who suppose that Beirut is the capital of Syria. Syria and Lebanon are, to some extent, mutually dependent or complementary, but they are distinct and their political development will be considered separately.

Government and Politics

(a) Syria

Under her constitution Syria is a Republic in which the legislative power is in the hands of a Chamber of Deputies numbering 114 members in 1949. The deputies are elected by direct suffrage granted to all men and to women of a certain educational standard. The representation of religious minorities is shown in the table on p. 466 above. The President of the Republic must be a Muslim and is elected for a term of five years by the Parliament; he nominates the Prime Minister who appoints his cabinet ministers. The Parliament is elected for four years but may be dissolved by the President. The constitution was suspended in 1952 by the military dictatorship and a new one on the Presidential model adopted in July 1953.

Damascus is the seat of government and there are ten provinces, each under a Governor who is assisted by a staff of civil servants representing most of the ministries. The provinces (*muhafaza*) are divided in *qazas*, each under a *qaimaqam*, who is a civil servant under the Ministry of Interior; the *qazas* are divided into *nahiyas* under *mudirs*. Within a *nahiya* may be several villages, each of which is rather loosely under the control of the *mukhtar* who may be elected by the village or appointed by the ministry. The judiciary are independent of the legislature and

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642 are not removable except by the action of the Supreme Court of Justice.

Political Parties

665 668 Since 1946 political parties in Syria have been little more than côteries grouped temporarily around individual leaders. It is hard to distinguish between the personalities and the policies of the Nationalist and the Populist Parties, for individuals and groups divided differently on different matters. In fact, there have been only two main parties, those in power and those waiting to accede to power. The two chief parties in opposition have been the Nationalist Bloc and the People's Party, groups of men who also called themselves Liberals or Constitutionalists. These two parties' main concern has been to maintain or to establish themselves in power; both have naturally been nationalist in sentiment but no distinctive programmes or tendencies are to be seen except in the more extreme political groups.

The Communist Party and its leader, Khaled Baqdash, went underground in 1947 and since then the interests of Communism have best been served in Syria by those who, while not adopting the theories of the Communists, share with them a dislike for the Western Powers. Chief in this category is the Muslim Brotherhood, one of whose leaders, Shaikh Maarouf Dawalibi, has said that he would prefer Russian to Western domination. In 1947 an attempt was made by the Brotherhood to obtain sufficient weight in Parliament to resist the encroachment of Western ideas and amusements, but in January 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood and all political parties were suspended. Although nationalist politicians can claim much of the credit for the achievement of independence, to the 'man in the street' politicians have since been discredited, and it may be that a slower approach towards parliamentary democracy will yield results that were denied to the post-war precipitancy.

Political History since 1945

The Nationalist Party came into office in 1943 to wrest independence from the French, whose withdrawal removed also the only plank in the party's political platform. Their stock declined more rapidly when the conduct of the Palestine war and internal government aroused general disapproval. In 1947 the Populist Party came into power but Jamil Mardam, the Nationalist Party Premier, retained his place; from 1946–8 Mardam showed his skill as a tactician in controlling a Chamber in which his supporters were in a minority. In 1948 President

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665 or retiring officers who showed signs of becoming dangerous.
668 In 1952 he played a large part in endeavouring to give a firm foundation to the new Umma Party and has also made rather more public appearances than at first.[1]

Khaled al-Azm's Cabinet had no common policy to bind them together and resigned in June 1950 to give way to a wholly Populist Cabinet in which Colonel Fawzi Silu took the Defence portfolio as the army's nominee. The rest of the year saw minor constitutional changes and there were stirrings of dissent amongst the military leaders which came to light in the murder of the Commander of the army air force and in an attempt on the life of Shishakli. In the autumn of 1950 pro-Hashimite politicians were out of favour and most of the time in prison. In March 1951 the premiership changed hands; al-Azm was succeeded by Nazim Qudsi, a Populist with no hatred for the Western Powers. Qudsi tried, but failed, to limit the authority of the army; al-Azm again took office, but he, too, found no support in the Parliament. With Shishakli's backing, a new Government was formed in August 1951 by Hasan al-Hakim who could not, however, agree with the attack on the proposals for a Middle East defence organization made by his Foreign Minister, Faidi al-Atasi. Hakim resigned and, in November, a period of muddle was resolved by another coup by Shishakli, as the result of which many of the politicians who had recently held office were imprisoned. At the end of 1951 Parliament was dissolved and Colonel Silu was appointed Chief of State *ad interim* and the government carried on by the senior civil servants.

In January 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood, and in April all political parties, were dissolved and the military rulers passed legislation to forbid students, trade unions, and sports clubs from taking part in any political activity. At the end of the year General Shishakli, now Vice-Premier and Chief of Staff, supported the formation of a new political party known as the Arab Liberation Movement, in the hope that parliamentary
[642] life could gradually be restored. In the following summer (21 June 1953) he announced a new constitution on the presidential model, based on 'the aims and aspirations of the people', giving executive power to the President but 'permanent power of control' to the Chamber of Deputies. A referendum held on 10 July resulted in the adoption of the new constitution and the election for a period of five years of Shishakli as President and
666 Premier. A new electoral law, promulgated on 1 August, prepared the way for elections on 9 October, and at the beginning

[1] See Alford Carlton, 'Syria Today', *International Affairs*, January 1954.

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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and a section of the Armenians, were able to maintain good 648
relations with the Government. In general, what troubles 563
occurred were no more than were inevitable in a period of 668
transition.

Developments since 1941

In September 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the inde- 648
pendence of Syria. His proclamation contained the following statement about minorities:

> Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural, and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled.
>
> It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.[1]

In accordance with these principles, the two autonomous 631
territories were re-attached to the rest of Syria. Thus, the first 563
Government formed after the proclamation contained a Druze and an Alawi Minister; and in February 1942, the two provinces were once more formally annexed to Syria, with provisions for a special administrative and financial regime. In September 1944 the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze voted unanimously for the abrogation of its special regime and complete incorporation in the Syrian State.

In the summer of 1943, elections were held and subsequently 642
a nationalist government took office. As formerly, the Chamber contained representatives of the minorities and the Cabinet a Christian minister. The Government made clear its intention 641
of treating all members of the community on a footing of complete 563

[1] General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28, 1941. *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9, 1941.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 M1 Middle East
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THE CONSTITUTION OF SYRIA[1]

OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1950

PREAMBLE

642 We, the Representatives of the Syrian Arab People, meeting in a Constituent Assembly, by the will of God and the free wish of the people, declare that we have ordained this Constitution in order to achieve the following sacred aims:

To establish justice on firm foundations by strengthening the judicial power and strengthening its independence under a free democratic regime, so that the right of every individual shall be guaranteed without fear or discrimination.

To safeguard fundamental public freedoms for all citizens and to ensure the enjoyment of those freedoms under law and order, public freedoms being the most noble expressions of individuality, dignity and humanity.

To promote the spirit of brotherhood and social consciousness among citizens, so that every individual may feel that he is an integral part of the structure of the country and that the country is in need of him.

To strengthen the sense of duty towards the defense of the country, the Republic and the Constitution for whose maintenance every citizen should contribute his life, effort, wealth and knowledge.

To liberate citizens from the miseries of poverty, disease, ignorance and fear by establishing a sound economic and social system which achieves social justice, protects worker and peasant, offers security to the weak and the fearful and enables every citizen to have free access to the benefits of the country.

To guarantee equality in public duties and the rights proclaimed by the Constitution and confirmed by laws, especially taxation on a progressive basis, so that there may be equality in sacrifice and ability to contribute.

[1] English translation prepared by Dr. George J. Tomeh, Secretary, Syrian Legation, Washington.

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To develop, educate and protect the individual in order that every citizen may feel that he is responsible for the safety of the country and for its present and future; that the country is the immortal and eternal truth; that all Syrians are its guardians until they hand it over to their sons in dignity and high mindedness. This aim shall be achieved by giving the people a sound and patriotic culture, by providing widespread education and creating facilities for this purpose and by promoting the spirit of sacrifice for the good of the community. 642

And, whereas the majority of the people are believers in the Islamic religion, the Government declares its attachment to Islam, and its ideals.

We also declare that our people are determined to cement the ties of friendship and cooperation with the peoples of the Moslem and the Arab World, and to build their modern state on those sound ethical bases advocated by Islam and the other Theistic Religions and to combat atheism and moral decadence.

And, furthermore, we declare that our people is a part of the whole Arab nation, bound to it with its past, present and future, and is looking forward to the day when our Arab nation shall be united in one State. Our people shall, therefore, assiduously strive to fulfil this sacred desire in freedom and independence.

We finally declare that this Preamble is an indivisible part of this Constitution made to remind all citizens of the principles upon which their basic law is founded.

We, the Representatives of the Syrian Arab people, pray to Almighty God to preserve our nation and people, to guard against all calamities, to guide our steps so that our ideals may become living realities thus enabling us to restore the magnificence and glory which our great ancestors have built, and to inaugurate for our sons the path to dignity and splendor.

Chapter I

THE REPUBLIC OF SYRIA

Art. 1. (1) Syria is a fully sovereign Arab Republic with a democratic parliamentary regime.

(2) It constitutes an indivisible political unit. No part of its territory may be alienated or ceded.

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(3) The people of Syria is a part of the Arab nation.

Art. 2. (1) Sovereignty is vested in the people. No individual or group may claim it.

(2) Sovereignty is based on the principle of the rule of the people, by the people, for the people.

(3) The people shall exercise sovereignty within the forms defined by the Constitution and the limits assigned by it.

Art. 3. (1) The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam.

(2) Islamic law shall be the main source of legislation.

(3) Freedom of belief shall be guaranteed. The State shall respect all theistic religions and shall protect the free exercise of all forms of worship consistent with public order.

(4) Personal rights of religious communities shall be respected and observed.

Art. 4. Arabic is the official language.

Art. 5. Damascus is the capital of the Republic.

Art. 6. (1) The Syrian flag shall be composed as follows:

The length shall be double the height. It shall contain three bands of equal dimensions: the upper being green, then white and black respectively. The white portion of the flag shall bear three red stars in line, having five points each.

(2) The emblem of the Republic and its National Anthem shall be designated by a law.

Chapter II

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Art. 7. All citizens shall be equal before the law in obligations, rights, [illegible]y and social status.

Art. 8. The State shall guarantee freedom, security and equal opportunities for all citizens.

Art. 9. Everyone shall have the right to petition the courts within the limits of law. Trials shall be held in public unless the law provides otherwise.

Art. 10. Personal freedom shall be guaranteed.

(1) Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a verdict according to law.

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(2) No one may be investigated or kept in custody except in accordance with an order or a warrant emanating from judicial authorities, or except in the case of *flagrante delicto* of committing an offence, or except for the purpose of bringing him before the judicial authorities on a charge of having committed a crime or a penal offence. 642

(3) No one shall be subjected to torture or degrading treatment. The penalty for contraventions of this provision shall be prescribed by law.

(4) Administrative authorities shall not have the right to arrest any person as a security measure except in accordance with a law passed in conjunction with the declaration of a state of emergency or martial law or war.

(5) Every person who is arrested or detained in custody shall be informed in writing within twenty-four hours of the grounds for such detention or arrest, and the legal text in accordance with which he was arrested; furthermore, he shall be brought before the judicial authorities within forty-eight hours of his arrest.

(6) Every person who is detained has the right, either personally or through a lawyer or a relative, by application to the appropriate judge to question the legality of his arrest. The judge shall consider the application without delay and may summon the officer who ordered the arrest and question him about the case. If he finds that the detention is unlawful, the detainee shall be released immediately.

(7) The right of defense shall be guaranteed throughout all the stages of investigation and legal proceedings before all courts and in conformity with the law.

(8) There shall not be established extraordinary criminal courts; a special procedure for trial in a state of emergency shall be prescribed.

(9) Nobody shall be tried by Military Courts except persons subject to military law. Exceptions to this rule shall be determined by law.

(10) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence

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642 under the law in effect when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the offence was committed.

(11) Every person against whom a final sentence was passed and executed shall have the right to demand indemnity for harm inflicted upon him should it be proved that the sentence was erroneous.

Art. 11. The prison is a place of punishment, but it is also a means to reform the criminal and to educate him properly. The law shall guarantee the implementation of this principle.

Art. 12. Dwellings shall be inviolable; no one may enter or search them except in the case of *flagrante delicto*, or by permission of their owners or in accordance with a judicial warrant.

Art. 13. Postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications shall be inviolable and may not be confiscated, delayed or censored, except as provided by law.

Art. 14 (1) The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion and all Syrians shall be entitled to express their views freely in writing, speeches, graphically, or by any other means of expression.

(2) No person shall be prosecuted on account of his opinions, except when he has transgressed the limits of the law.

Art. 15. (1) Freedom of the press and of printing shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law.

(2) Newspapers shall not be suspended nor shall their licenses be revoked, except in accordance with the law.

(3) In a state of emergency or of martial law, a limited censorship on matters related to public safety or national defense, may be imposed on newspapers, publications, books and broadcasts.

(4) The procedure for supervising the financial resources of the press shall be determined by law.

Art. 16. Syrians shall have the right to freedom of assembly and of peaceful demonstration without arms subject to the conditions laid down by law.

Art. 17. (1) Syrians shall have the right to form and belong to societies provided their objectives are not forbidden by law.

(2) The law shall determine the procedure for informing ad-

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ministrative authorities of the formation of societies and the supervision of their financial resources. 642

Art. 18. (1) Syrians shall have the right to form political parties provided their objectives are legitimate, their methods are peaceful and their regulations are democratic.

(2) The law shall determine the procedure for informing administrative authorities about the formation of such parties and the supervision of their financial resources.

Art. 19. (1) Syrians shall not be deported from their national territory.

(2) Every Syrian shall have the right to reside and move within the territory of Syria, unless forbidden to do so as a result of a judicial order or in execution of laws related to health and public safety.

Art. 20. (1) Refugees shall not be extradited because of their political beliefs or because of their defence of freedom.

(2) The extradition of ordinary criminals shall be determined by laws and international agreements.

Art. 21. Property is public and private.

(1) The State, legal persons and individuals have the right of ownership, subject to the limitations provided by the law.

(2) The law shall determine the conditions and limits of ownership by aliens.

(3) Private property shall be guaranteed. The law shall determine the means whereby the possession and disposal of property shall fulfil its social function.

(4) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

(5) Nobody shall be permitted to use private property in such a way as to conflict with public interest.

(6) Expropriation on grounds of public utility shall be allowed and shall be effected in accordance with a law giving the right to a fair compensation.

(7) Mines, minerals—solid, liquid, radiant, and similar substances—subterranean wealth, mineral waters, water falls, public

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642 forests and roads and all other sources of natural wealth are the property of the State.

(8) The law shall determine the conditions under which permits may be granted to explore for minerals and similar substances.

(9) The right to exploit minerals and similar substances shall be granted by a law provided considerations concerning the defence of the country and the safeguarding of its independence are given priority.

Art. 22. (1) In order to secure the most productive utilization of the land of the country, and in order to establish just social relationships among citizens, special legislation shall be enacted based on the following principles:

(a) The obligation to utilize the land shall be laid down and, if the land is neglected for a period of time to be fixed by law, one's right of user shall be forfeited.

(b) The maximum area of land that may be owned, exploited and disposed of, according to districts, shall be determined by a law provided that it shall not have a retroactive effect.

(c) Productivity shall be improved.

(d) Small and medium properties shall be encouraged.

(e) The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood.

(2) The State shall encourage the establishment of cooperative societies and supervise them.

(3) The State shall endeavor to build model villages and provide sanitary housing for peasants.

(4) A law to protect the peasant and to raise his standard of living shall be promulgated.

Art. 23. (1) General confiscation of property is forbidden.

(2) Special confiscation may not be imposed except in accordance with a judicial order.

(3) Special confiscation by law shall be permitted in cases of necessity in time of war or public catastrophes.

Art. 24. The State may, subject to payment of fair compensation, nationalize any institution or project on the grounds of public utility.

Art. 25. Taxes shall be levied on a just and progressive basis and in such a way as to ensure equality and social justice.

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Art. 26. (1) Work is the right of all citizens and a duty dictated by law. 642

It is the most important of the basic factors in social life. The State shall secure work for its citizens and guarantee it by directing and developing national economy.

(2) The State shall protect employment and enact for that purpose special legislation based on the following principles:

(a) To give the workers wages proportional to the volume and quality of their work.

(b) To limit working hours per week, and to grant workers weekly holidays and annual leave with pay.

(c) To establish special compensation of workers with large families and in cases of discharge, sickness, disability and accidents caused by work.

(d) to determine special conditions for the employment of women and adolescents.

(e) to ensure the compliance of factories with the rules of hygiene and sanitation.

(3) The State shall secure for workers sanitary housing through means to be defined by the law.

(4) The organization of trade unions shall be free, subject to the conditions laid down by law.

A trade union shall be considered as possessing juridical personality.

Art. 27. (1) Everyone has the right to be insured for himself and his family by the State against sickness, disability, orphanhood, old age and such unemployment as is beyond his control.

In order to realize this objective, social security shall be established in which the State, institutions and individuals shall cooperate to secure the necessary funds.

(2) The State shall protect the health of citizens, build for them hospitals, convalescent and maternity homes and shall facilitate means of treatment and care for pregnant women, nursing mothers and babies.

Art. 28. (1) Every citizen has the right to education and instruction.

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642 Primary education shall be compulsory, free and uniform in the State schools.

Private primary schools shall be required to apply the educational programs adopted by the State; they may teach such additional material as may be defined by law.

Secondary and vocational education shall be free in the State schools.

The law shall determine the obligatory subjects to be taught by private secondary schools in conformity with the educational program adopted by the State.

Religious instruction for each religion in accordance with its faith shall be compulsory in primary and secondary stages.

The State shall give priority in the budget for appropriations to spread primary, vocational and rural education and make it available to all. This shall be pursued in order to realize equality among Syrians, to establish national awakening on sound foundations and to facilitate the utilization of the land.

The State shall make higher education accessible and its institutions shall enjoy financial and administrative independence.

(2) Education shall be directed at creating a generation strong physically and mentally, believing in God, morality and virtue, proud of the Arab legacy, equipped with knowledge, conscious of its duties and rights, working for the public interest and full of the spirit of solidarity and brotherhood that should prevail among all citizens.

Any teaching that conflicts with the aims stated in the previous paragraph shall be forbidden.

(3) Education shall be directed at the full development of the human personality and fundamental freedoms.

(4) The State may supervise all institutions of learning in the country. The procedure for such supervision shall be determined by law.

(5) The State alone shall have the right to grant school certificates and to establish equivalent standards.

(6) The State shall adopt scout and youth movements and shall endeavour to strengthen, to protect and to promote them.

(7) In order to realize the aims of education and instruction and to bring into operation a stable educational policy, there shall

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be established a "Council of Education"; the law shall determine the 642
number of its members, their qualifications and the procedure for appointing them.

The task of this Council shall be the purpose to propose plans and programs so that education in all its stages may achieve its objectives.

The Council of Education shall submit its reports to the Government.

(8) The State shall protect and promote the arts and sciences, and encourage scientific research.

(9) The State shall protect all historical sites, monuments and all objects that have an artistic, historical or cultural value.

Art. 29. Compulsory work shall not be imposed on anyone except in accordance with a law and in the following situations:

(1) To render cultural, constructional and health services.

(2) To combat public catastrophes.

(3) In a state of war and emergency.

Art. 30. (1) The defence of the country and of the Constitution is a sacred duty binding on all citizens.

(2) Military service is compulsory and shall be regulated by a special law.

(3) The army is the guardian of the country entrusted with the sole task of defending its frontiers and insuring its safety.

(4) There shall be established a "Council of National Defense."

A law shall determine its powers and the number of its members.

Art. 31. (1) The conditions for the acquisition of Syrian nationality shall be determined by law; special facilities shall be accorded to Syrian emigrants, their descendants and to citizens of the Arab countries.

(2) The legal status of aliens shall be defined by a law in accordance with international customs and international agreements.

Art. 32. (1) The family is the fundamental unit of society and is entitled to the protection of the State.

(2) The State shall protect and encourage marriage, and shall remove material and social obstacles that hinder it.

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642 Art. 33. (1) Every Syrian has the right of access to public service, subject to the conditions laid down by the law.

(2) Appointment to public offices, either temporary or permanent, in the State, the departments attached to it and its municipalities shall be effected by public competition. The law shall determine the exceptions to this rule.

Art. 34. Islamic wakfs belong exclusively to Moslems; they constitute one of the public institutions of the State and enjoy financial and administrative independence. Their status shall be regulated by law.

Chapter III

THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

642 646 Art. 35. The legislative power shall be exercised by the Chamber of Deputies. Elections for this Chamber shall be public, secret, direct, uniform and in conformity with the provisions of the Electoral Law.

Art. 36. The duration of the Chamber shall be for a period of four years beginning from the date of the decree declaring the final results of elections; this period shall not be extended except by law in a state of war.

Art. 37. Every deputy shall represent the whole of the nation and may not accept any restriction on his mandate; he shall discharge his responsibilities guided by the dictates of his honour and conscience.

Art. 38. Electors are Syrian men and women who have completed the eighteenth year of their age, who are listed in the civil census register and who have all other qualifications specified in the Electoral Law.

Art. 39. Any Syrian *(Souri)* may stand for election as a deputy if he qualifies as an elector; provided that he is educated, has completed his thirtieth year of age and has fulfilled all other conditions specified by the Electoral Law.

Art. 40. The Electoral Law shall include provisions to guarantee the following:

(1) The validity of elections.

(2) The right of candidates to take part in the supervision of the electoral procedure.

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(3) The punishment of those who interfere with the will of electors.

Art. 41. (1) General elections shall take place within sixty days preceding the expiration of the term of the Chamber; if elections are not completed when the term of the Chamber expires, or are delayed for some reason, the Chamber of Deputies shall continue to function until the new Chamber is elected. In all cases, the authority of the Chamber of Deputies shall remain effective until the final results of the general elections are declared.

(2) If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, general elections shall take place within sixty days from the date of the decree dissolving the Chamber.

If elections are not held accordingly, the dissolved Chamber shall regain its full constitutional authority and shall convene immediately as though it had never been dissolved.

(3) Should general elections be delayed beyond the specified date, the Chamber shall investigate the reasons and determine the responsibility for such delay.

Art. 42. (1) The Chamber of Deputies shall be invited by a decree to convene within twenty days beginning from the second day of elections. If the necessary decree inviting the Chamber to convene is not promulgated, the Chamber shall definitely meet on the twenty-first day.

(2) The Chamber shall elect at the first meeting, its president and the members of its Bureau.

Art. 43. (1) The Chamber of Deputies shall be considered as being in permanent session.

(2) The Chamber shall definitely convene from October first until the end of December, and from March first until the middle of May.

(3) The President of the Chamber shall fix dates of meetings outside these two periods either by a decision of his Bureau, or upon a written request from a quarter of the deputies or from the Government.

Art. 44. Deputies shall not be prosecuted by civil or criminal courts for stating facts, expressing opinions or for voting in public and secret sessions or in committees.

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642 Art. 45. Deputies shall enjoy immunity while the Chamber is
646 meeting; they shall not be liable to criminal prosecution, nor shall a criminal sentence be enforced against them without the assent of the Assembly, except in the case of *flagrante delicto* and, in such a case, the Chamber of Deputies shall be promptly informed.

Art. 46. Before assuming his duty, every deputy shall take publicly in the presence of the Assembly the following oath:

> "I swear by Almighty God to be loyal to the Constitution, to defend it, to maintain the independence of the country, the freedoms, interest, wealth and dignity of the people. I also swear to observe the laws of the country, to discharge my parliamentary responsibility in honor, truthfulness and sincerity and to work for the achievement of the unity of the Arab countries."

Art. 47. The remuneration of members of the Chamber shall be determined by a law.

Art. 48. (1) No deputy shall exploit his parliamentary office in any work.

(2) Incompatibilities between the office of a deputy and other functions shall be determined by law.

Art. 49. In the event of a vacancy occurring for some reason, the seat shall be filled within two months, provided the remaining period for mandate of the Chamber is not less than six months. The new member's term of office shall terminate with the mandate of the legislature.

Art. 50. The Chamber of Deputies shall have the right to grant a general amnesty for crimes committed before the amnesty was proposed, provided an absolute majority of the members of the Chamber vote for it.

Art. 51. Treaties affecting the safety of the State or its public finances, commercial agreements and, in general, every other treaty entered into for more than one year, shall not come finally into force except after being adopted by the Chamber.

Art. 52. The Chamber shall have the right at all times to form committees, or to delegate one or more of its members for investigation of any matter; ministers and all officers of the State shall co-

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operate by testifying, submitting documents and giving statements that may be asked of them. 642 646

Art. 53. (1) Every year at the opening of the October session, the Chamber, under the Presidency of its oldest member and the two youngest members acting as Secretaries, shall proceed immediately to elect a President and the members of its Bureau in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber.

(2) The President of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected by an absolute majority of the total number of the Deputies. A relative majority shall be sufficient at the second ballot.

Art. 54. (1) The President shall maintain order inside the Parliament.

(2) The Parliament shall have a special guard obeying the orders of the President. No armed forces may enter the Assembly buildings, nor be posted in their neighborhood, except at the demand of the President.

Art. 55. (1) The meetings of the Assembly shall be public.

(2) The Assembly may, however, decide to hold secret meetings to discuss specific matters at the request of the Government or of ten of its members.

Art. 56. (1) The Assembly cannot meet unless an absolute majority of the members composing it are present.

(2) The Rules of Procedure shall determine the responsibility of any member who does not attend a meeting without a reasonable excuse.

Art. 57. (1) Voting in the Chamber shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of Procedure.

(2) Deputies may only vote if they are present at a meeting.

(3) Elections shall be decided by secret ballot.

(4) Decisions shall be taken by the majority of those present and voting, except where otherwise provided by the Constitution or the Rules of Procedure. Should the votes be equal, the proposal under discussion shall be rejected.

Art. 58. (1) The President of the Republic, with the approval of the Cabinet, and every deputy shall have the right to introduce bills.

(2) Financial bills proposing to abolish or decrease a tax, or remit a part of it, or involving appropriations from the State budget

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to a certain project, or proposing the floating of a loan, its guarantee or payment, may only be introduced by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Cabinet, or by twenty deputies or more.

Art. 59. The Chamber of Deputies shall never abandon its legislative power.

Art. 60. No bill which has been rejected by the Chamber may be reintroduced before the lapse of six months.

Art. 61. (1) If the Chamber of Deputies passes a bill, the President of the Republic shall promulgate it within fifteen days from the date thereof.

(2) However, if an absolute majority of the members of the Chamber vote that a bill is of an urgent nature, the President of the Republic shall promulgate it within the time prescribed in it; if he fails to do so, the President of the Chamber shall then promulgate it immediately.

Art. 62. (1) Within the time allowed for promulgation, the President of the Republic may return to the Chamber non-urgent bills for reconsideration. This shall be done in accordance with a decree issued by the Cabinet and giving the justification thereof.

(2) Should the Chamber confirm its former vote by an absolute majority of its members, the law shall be promulgated immediately.

Art. 63. (1) If a quarter of the Deputies object to a bill as unconstitutional prior to its promulgation, or if the President of the Republic sends it to the Supreme Court for the same reason, such a bill shall not be promulgated until the Supreme Court gives its decision within ten days. If the bill is urgent, the Supreme Court shall decide within three days.

(2) If the Supreme Court decides that it conflicts with the Constitution, it shall be returned to the Chamber for rectification.

(3) Should the Supreme Court refrain from giving its decision within the period fixed in this Article, the President of the Republic shall promulgate the law.

Art. 64 (1) The Cabinet shall be represented in the meetings of the Chamber either by the Prime Minister or by some of the Ministers.

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(2) The Prime Minister and the Ministers may attend meetings of the Chamber, may address the Chamber and may obtain assistance and benefit from the experience of the officials of the Government during the debates. 642 646

(3) Any minister shall attend the meetings of the Chamber when asked by its President to do so.

Art. 65. Any member of the Chamber is entitled to introduce an interpellation, or to submit questions to the Government and to obtain a reply within the period fixed by the Rules of Procedure.

Art. 66. (1) The Rules of Procedure shall determine for the Chamber the method for conducting discussions, debates, interpellations, interrogations, voting, the powers of the office and the committees and all other work of the Chamber.

(2) The Rules of Procedure shall have the power of a law and shall not be amended except in accordance with their own provisions.

Art. 67 (1) The Chamber shall not consider a motion of non-confidence against the Cabinet or any one of its members unless presented by fifteen deputies or more, and shall not be discussed except two days after its presentation.

(2) If the absolute majority of the total number of the Deputies adopt a motion of non-confidence, the entire Cabinet shall resign.

(3) A Minister against whom a vote of non-confidence has been adopted by the Chamber shall resign.

Art. 68. The Chamber shall choose a committee to consider and investigate all petitions submitted by an individual or a group of citizens. The committee shall inquire into every complaint and shall inform the petitioner accordingly.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXECUTIVE POWER

Art. 69. The Executive Power shall be vested, on behalf of the People, in the President of the Republic and the Cabinet, within the limits assigned by this Constitution. 642 643

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I.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

642 Art. 70. The President of the Republic is the Chief of State.
643 The law shall determine the privileges and honors due to his office.

Art. 71. (1) The Chamber shall elect the President of the Republic by secret ballot.

(2) A two-thirds majority of the number of Deputies shall be necessary at the first ballot.

(3) An absolute majority shall be sufficient at the second ballot.

(4) A relative majority shall be sufficient at the third ballot.

Art. 72. No person shall be eligible for the Presidency of the Republic who does not fulfil the following conditions:

(1) He must have been a Syrian national for the last ten years.

(2) He must have all qualifications of eligibility for the Chamber of Deputies.

(3) He must have completed his fortieth year.

Art. 73. (1) The President shall hold office for a term of five years. He may be re-elected only after an interval of similar duration.

(2) If the period of office of the President expires simultaneously with that of the Chamber, the President of the Republic shall remain in office until a new Chamber is elected and meets. This additional period shall not exceed three months.

Art. 74. The offices of President of the Republic and of Deputy may not be held simultaneously.

Art. 75. Before assuming office, the President shall take, in the presence of the Chamber of Deputies, the following oath:

"I swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and laws of the country, to be loyal to the freedoms, the public good and the wealth of the people, and to the Republican Regime, and to strive to the best of my ability to safeguard the independence of the country, defend its territorial integrity and work for the achievement of the unity of the Arab countries."

Art. 76. One month at most and fifteen days at least before the

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expiration of the term of office of the President of the Republic, the Chamber shall elect a new President. 642 643

Art. 77. (1) The Government shall keep the President of the Republic advised of the development of international negotiations.

(2) The President shall conclude and sign treaties after their approval by the Chamber.

(3) The President shall accredit heads of Diplomatic Missions abroad and receive the representatives of foreign countries.

Art. 78. The President may call the Cabinet to meet under his chairmanship and order that a record of such meetings be made and preserved.

Art. 79. All instruments issued by the President, such as decrees, documents and letters concerning the affairs of State, with the exception of those relating to the appointment or resignation of the Prime Minister, must be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the Minister concerned.

Art. 80. The President shall sign the warrants of appointment of magistrates and officials who, according to the law, must be appointed by warrant. He shall also sign all decrees concerning organization and all other decrees which may be referred to him in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Art. 81. (1) If the President does not sign decrees or does not refer them to the Supreme Court within ten days of their transmission to him because they conflict with the Constitution or a law, the Prime Minister shall promulgate them and they shall be considered effective.

(2) If the Supreme Court does not decide on the decrees referred to it within ten days of their receipt, the Prime Minister shall promulgate them and they shall be considered effective.

(3) An exception shall be made of the decree dissolving the Chamber of Deputies which the President can reject without stating his reasons for so doing, and also the decrees confirming the death penalty.

Art. 82. The President shall have power to declare war and conclude peace, upon a decision of the Cabinet and after consultation with the Council of National Defense and the approval of the Chamber of Deputies.

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642 Art. 83. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army
643 and Chairman of the Council of National Defense.

Art. 84. The President shall communicate with the Chamber of Deputies by means of messages addressed to the President of the Chamber.

Art. 85. (1) The President of the Republic may issue a decree dissolving the Chamber; such a decree must be taken by the Cabinet and state the grounds on which the dissolution was decided.

(2) The Chamber shall not be dissolved before the expiration of eighteen months of the date of its election.

(3) When the Chamber is dissolved the Cabinet shall resign and the President of the Republic shall appoint a cabinet of new members to supervise the elections.

Art. 86. (1) The President shall be held responsible for violating the Constitution and for high treason.

(2) He shall also be held responsible for ordinary offences.

(3) The President shall not be tried except by the Supreme Court.

(4) A motion to impeach the President and to try him by the Supreme Court shall only be discussed when a quarter of the number of Deputies submit a written request to the President of the Chamber giving the reasons for their motion. The request shall be referred, before its discussion, to the legal and constitutional committees meeting jointly. The two committees shall submit their report within three days of the receipt of the request.

A special session shall then be fixed to discuss the impeachment of the President.

No other business may be discussed during that meeting.

(5) For the impeachment of the President of the Republic in any circumstance whatsoever and his trial by the Supreme Court, the approval of the absolute majority of the total number of Deputies shall be required.

(6) When the President of the Republic is impeached, the Presidency shall be considered vacant until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision.

(7) A law of a constitutional nature shall determine the procedure for impeachment and trial by the Supreme Court.

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Art. 87. The President shall exercise the prerogatives of pardon. 642

Art. 88. (1) When the President of the Republic is unable to discharge the duty of his office, the President of the Chamber of Deputies shall assume that duty provided he yields, during this time, the Presidency of the Chamber to its Vice President. 643

(2) Should the Presidency become vacant through the death or resignation of the President, the Chamber shall be summoned by its President within ten days therefrom for the purpose of electing the new President. Should it not be thus summoned, the Chamber shall meet of its own accord on the eleventh day.

(3) If the Chamber is dissolved at the time the vacancy occurs or two months only are left before its mandate expires, the President of the Chamber shall continue to assume the above-mentioned duties until the new Chamber meets.

Art. 89. The emoluments of the President shall be fixed by a law.

2.

THE CABINET

Art. 90. At the opening of each term of the Legislature, or after the election of a new President of the Republic, or after a vote of non-confidence for the Cabinet, or its resignation, or if the Presidency of the Cabinet becomes vacant for some reasons, the President of the Republic shall appoint a Prime Minister and upon the proposal of the Prime Minister the members of the Cabinet. 642 645

Art. 91. (1) The Cabinet shall submit its programme to the Chamber for a vote of confidence.

(2) A vote of confidence shall be considered granted if approved by a majority of the Deputies present.

Art. 92. (1) The Cabinet shall direct the policy of the State.

(2) The Cabinet shall meet, presided over by the Prime Minister, to consider the following matters:

(a) Bills
(b) Decrees concerning organization
(c) The State budget and the special budgets
(d) Internal and foreign policy
(e) Cases which the Prime Minister, or any Minister, with the approval of the former, submits to the Cabinet for consideration.

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(f) All other questions provided for by law.

(3) The decisions of the Cabinet shall be adopted by a majority of votes. Any opposing minister shall be considered as having approved of the decisions unless he resigns.

Art. 93. The organization of the Presidency of the Cabinet, the Cabinet and the powers of each Minister shall be determined by law.

Art. 94 (1) The Prime Minister shall direct the meetings of the Cabinet which he presides over.

(2) He shall harmonize the works among the various Ministries.

(3) He alone can ask for a vote of confidence for the Cabinet from the Chamber of Deputies.

(4) He may entrust some of his functions to one of the Ministers.

Art. 95. The President of the Republic, with the approval of the Cabinet, shall promulgate decrees necessary for the execution of various laws. These Decrees shall not repeal, exempt from the operation, or amend the provisions of the laws in question.

Art. 96. When the Cabinet resigns, or a motion of non-confidence is passed, the Ministers shall continue to discharge their responsibilities until a new Cabinet is formed.

Art. 97. No Minister while in office may directly or indirectly buy or rent anything which is the property of the State, even at a public auction. He may not participate in contracts for supplies entered into by public departments, or any institution attached to the Government or under its control, nor may he be on the board of any firm, or its agent or lawyer, or take part in any business.

Art. 98. The Ministers shall be jointly responsible to Parliament for the general policy of the Government. They shall be individually responsible in respect to matters arising in their respective departments.

Art. 99. The civil, financial and penal responsibility of the Ministers shall be determined by law.

Art. 100. A Minister shall leave office when indicted and until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its judgment. The Minister's resignation shall not prevent proceedings being taken or continued against him.

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Art. 101. The offices of a Deputy and a Minister may be held simultaneously. 642 645

Art. 102. The emoluments of the Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be fixed by a law.

Art. 103. (1) There shall be established a "Bureau of Inspection" attached to the Presidency of the Cabinet.

(2) This Bureau shall communicate to the Presidency of the Chamber copies of the reports of its inspectors and their conclusions together with its own observations.

(3) The classification of the members of this Bureau, their prerogatives and immunities shall be defined by a law.

Chapter V

THE JUDICIAL POWER

Art. 104. The Judiciary is an independent authority. 642

Art. 105. (1) Judges are independent. The only authority above them in the exercise of their power is Law. 692

(2) The honour of the judges and their moral conscience and integrity constitute a guarantee for the rights of the people and their freedoms.

Art. 106. Before assuming office a judge shall swear that he will mete out justice to the people and that he will observe the law.

Art. 107. Judgments shall be rendered in the name of the People of Syria and shall state the grounds on which they were reached.

Art. 108. Judicial powers shall be exercised by:

(1) The Supreme Court

(2) The High Court of Appeal

(3) All other Courts

Art. 109. All judges shall be appointed by a decision of the "Supreme Judiciary Council" and in accordance with the law.

Art. 110. The promotion of judges, their transfer, disciplinary measures to be taken against them and their dismissal shall be governed by a decision of the Supreme Judiciary Council in accordance with the law.

Art. 111. The institution of public prosecutions is a judicial function. It shall be headed by the Minister of Justice.

Art. 112. The public prosecutor shall be the guardian of justice,

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alert to enforce laws, to pursue those who violate them and to enforce penal sentences against them.

Art. 113. The appointment of public prosecutors, their promotion, their transfer, disciplinary measures to be taken against them, and their dismissal shall be fixed by law.

Art. 114. The classification of Civil and Military Courts, their grades and salaries of judges shall be fixed by a law.

Art. 115. The classification of clerks and officers of the Courts shall be fixed by a law. Their appointment, promotion and dismissal shall come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.

I.

THE SUPREME COURT

Art. 116. (1) The Supreme Court shall consist of seven members elected by the Chamber of Deputies from a list containing fourteen names.

The President of the Republic shall select the candidates for this office from highly qualified individuals who have high university degrees and have completed the fortieth year of their age.

(2) Election shall take place in a special session of the Chamber of Deputies and within ten days of the receipt of the list by the Chamber. Each voting paper shall contain seven names.

(3) At the first ballot, he who receives an absolute majority of the total members of the Chamber shall be considered elected.

(4) At the second ballot, the majority of those present shall be sufficient.

(5) At the third ballot, a relative majority shall be sufficient.

Art. 117. Incompatibilities between the office of members of the Supreme Court and other functions shall be determined by law.

Art. 118. (1) A member of the Supreme Court shall be elected for a five-year term and may be re-elected.

(2) A member of the Supreme Court may not be dismissed except by virtue of a decree approved by four or more of its members.

Art. 119. The Supreme Court shall elect from its members and by a vote of its absolute majority a President for a five-year term.

Art. 120. (1) Should a seat in the Supreme Court become vacant

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for some reason, the Chamber of Deputies shall elect a successor from a list containing three times the number of vacancies. The President of the Republic shall select that list.

(2) Selection and election shall be made in accordance with the stipulations of Article 116 hereof.

Art. 121. Before entering into office, the President and members of the Supreme Court shall take solemnly in the presence of the Chamber of Deputies and in a special session attended by the President of the Republic the following oath:

> "I swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and laws of the country and to discharge my duties in equity and integrity."

Art. 122. (1) The Supreme Court shall consider and decide definitively on the following matters:

(a) The constitutionality of laws referred to it in accordance with Article 63.

(b) The constitutionality and legality of draft decrees referred to it from the President of the Republic.

(c) The impeachment of the President of the Republic and of the Ministers.

(d) Petitions against the validity of elections.

(e) Petitions to suspend or to nullify administrative acts, decisions or decrees inconsistent with the Constitution, with laws, or with organizational decrees, when such petitions are submitted by individuals who may suffer loss from the application thereof.

(2) The procedure for investigating and deciding on the hereinbefore mentioned matters shall be determined by law.

2.

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Art. 123. The Supreme Judicial Council shall be formed of seven members as follows:

(a) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as President.

(b) Two members of the Supreme Court.

(c) The four highest ranking judges from the High Court of Appeal.

Art. 124. (1) The President of the Supreme Judicial Council

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642 shall propose to this Council the nomination, promotion, transfer,
692 dismissal of judges and disciplinary measures to be taken against any of them when necessary in accordance with law. The Council shall decide on such proposals by a vote to be taken by its absolute majority.

(2) The President shall draft and sign decrees upon decisions taken by the Supreme Judicial Council, and refer such decrees to the Minister of Justice in accordance with the stipulations of Article 80 hereof.

Art. 125. The Supreme Judicial Council shall propose bills concerning the immunity of judges, the procedure for their appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary measures against them.

Chapter VI

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

642 Art. 126. The Republic of Syria shall be divided into Muh-
631 afazats; their number, sub-divisions and boundaries shall be determined by a law.

Art. 127. Laws shall be based on the principle of decentralization for heads of administrative units and chiefs of departments in the Capital and in the Muhafazats.

Art. 128. (1) There shall be established a Council in each Muhafazat; three-quarters of its members shall be elected and the other quarter shall be appointed.

(2) The term of the Council, the number and eligibility of its members, and its electoral procedure shall be determined by law.

(3) The Muhafazat Council shall elect its President and an Executive Secretariat whose term of office, powers and procedure shall be determined by law.

Art. 129. The main tasks of the Muhafazat Council shall be to contribute towards promoting the following objectives:

(1) To fight disease by expanding free medical care and by protecting motherhood and childhood.

(2) To combat ignorance by establishing nurseries, primary, elementary and vocational schools, by teaching illiterates and by promoting education.

(3) To secure potable waters in villages and cities. To open local roads and to spread the use of electricity.

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(4) To define the limits of municipal districts in the Muhafazats. 642 631

(5) To institute and organize exhibitions.

(6) To encourage tourism, summer resorts and to supervise hotels.

(7) To organize local communications.

(8) To utilize mineral waters.

(9) To promote a forestation and planting of trees.

(10) To protect beneficiary works and contribute to them.

(11) To organize and exploit hunting and fishing in the sea and rivers.

Art. 130. (1) The special revenues of the Muhafazat necessary for the implementation of its projects shall consist of—

(a) A percentage to be determined by law, such percentage to be taken from general taxes collected in the Muhafazat or added thereto.

(b) Local duties which the Muhafazat Council shall impose within the limits of law. These duties shall in no way delay the movement of persons or the transfer of capital between the various Muhafazats and shall not restrict the right of citizens to practice their professions and perform their work in the country.

(2) The special accountability of the Councils of the Muhafazats shall be regulated by a law.

Art. 131. The Muhafazat Council shall determine disbursements in questions falling under its jurisdiction.

Art. 132. The Rules of Procedure for the Councils of the Muhafazats, adoption of decisions and supervision of their actions shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VII

FINANCES

Art. 133. (1) The Government shall prepare the general budget. 642

(2) The Chamber of Deputies alone shall have the right to adopt it. 652

Art. 134. (1) There shall be for each fiscal year one general budget containing the receipts and expenditures. No special, independent or additional budget may be created except by virtue of a law.

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(2) The Government may, when necessary, submit the project of an extraordinary budget for more than one year including extraordinary receipts and expenditures. Such a budget shall not come into force except when approved by the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 135. The procedure for organizing, approving, implementing and closing the accounts of local budgets shall be determined by a law.

Art. 136. (1) The beginning of a fiscal year shall be fixed by a law.

(2) Three months at least before the beginning of each fiscal year, the Government shall submit to the Chamber of Deputies a project for the general budget of that year.

Art. 137. The Deputies shall vote on ordinary and extraordinary budgets article by article.

Art. 138. (1) The budget law shall include only pure financial provisions.

(2) No taxes shall be levied or services created which may necessitate new expenditures in the budget law.

(3) The provisions of the budget law shall only be implemented within the fiscal year for which that budget was designated.

Art. 139. (1) During the discussion of the budget the Chamber may not increase the proposed total of receipts and expenditures.

(2) The budget committee shall be entitled to modify the project of the budget provided consideration is taken of paragraph one of this Article.

(3) The Deputies shall not propose an increase in expenditure or the creation of a new item of expenditure once the budget committee completes its report on the project of the budget.

(4) After approving the budget, the Chamber of Deputies may adopt laws approving further expenditures and creating new receipts to meet them.

Art. 140. If the Chamber of Deputies has not given a final decision on the project of the budget before the beginning of the fiscal year for which that budget was designated, provisional monthly credits, calculated on the basis of one-twelfth of the preceding fiscal year, shall be opened in virtue of a decree taken by the Council of

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Ministers. During this period, income shall be collected in conformity with the laws in force at the end of the previous fiscal year. 642 652

Art. 141. (1) The Government shall not exceed in expenditure the maximum limit estimated for each public administration. The budget law must not include a provision enabling the Government to exceed that limit.

(2) No new, additional or transferred credits shall be opened except by virtue of a law.

Art. 142. The final accounts for the fiscal year shall be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies within a time limit not exceeding two years reckoned from the end of the budgetary year in question. These accounts shall be closed by virtue of a law.

Art. 143. (1) Taxes shall be levied only for purposes of common utility.

(2) Taxes shall be fixed in currency. The law shall not impose a tax in kind except under extraordinary circumstances.

Art. 144. (1) No taxes may be levied, modified or abolished except by virtue of a law.

(2) No person may be exempted from the whole or part of a tax except in cases determined by law.

(3) No person may be required to pay a tax except in accordance with the method described by law.

Art. 145. (1) No public or private loan may be contracted except by virtue of a law determining its conditions, the rate of interest and the method of repayment.

(2) The Government shall not grant or guarantee a loan except by virtue of a law.

(3) The procedure for tenders and contracts involving a charge upon public funds shall be determined by a law.

Art. 146. No monopoly or concession to exploit any of the natural resources of the country, or any service of a public utility, may be granted except by virtue of a law and only for a limited period.

Art. 147. (1) A Board of Auditors shall, on behalf of the Chamber of Deputies, examine the accounts of the Government and submit to the Chamber a general report containing its views and observations and indicating any violations committed and fixing the responsibility for them.

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642 652 (2) The Chamber of Deputies shall elect the members of the Board of Auditors by an absolute majority of the Deputies present. If such a majority is not obtained, a relative majority shall be sufficient at the second ballot. The election shall be made from a list of candidates prepared by the office of the Chamber containing double the number of vacancies for the Board.

(3) This Board shall be attached directly to the Chamber of Deputies.

(4) The office of the Chamber of Deputies shall draft a bill determining the classification, prerogatives and immunities of the members of the Auditing Board as well as the method of auditing.

(5) The budget of the Board of Auditors shall be a part of the budget of the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 148. The Chamber of Deputies may charge the Auditing Board with any audit of or studies concerning receipts and expenditure or the administration of the budget.

Art. 149. Once or more each year, the Government shall submit to the Chamber of Deputies a report on the financial situation of the State.

Art. 150. The monetary system shall be regulated by a law.

Chapter VIII

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

642 634 Art. 151. The State shall supervise and organize the national economy in order to secure a high standard of living for the people by utilizing the land, promoting industry and trade and providing work for all citizens.

Art. 152. (1) There shall be established in the State a permanent Economic Council entrusted with the task of proposing economic plans and programs to develop the potentialities of the country in the various economic fields.

(2) The Council shall submit its reports and the results of its work to the Government and to the Chamber of Deputies.

(3) The number of the members of the Economic Council and the procedure for selecting them shall be determined by a law in such a way as to ensure the realization of its task.

Art. 153. Institutions enjoying financial and administrative inde-

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pendence may be created for the execution and administration of specific projects. This shall be in accordance with a law determining the number of the members of such institutions, the method of selecting them and supervising their work. 642 654

Art. 154. Funds which the Government may spend on irrigation and land development projects shall be repaid by those who benefit from them in such periods of time proportional to their financial ability as shall be defined by law.

Chapter IX

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Art. 155. (1) The President of the Republic, with the assent of the Council of Ministers, as well as the Deputies may request the amendment of one or more of the Articles of the Constitution provided: 642

(a) The request for amendment shall specify the Articles which it is desired to amend and the reasons for such amendment.

(b) If the request is submitted by Deputies, one-third or more of their total number must sign the application.

(c) The Chamber shall discuss the request for amendment which shall be adopted only when an absolute majority of the total number of Deputies vote in its favor. If rejected, such a rejection shall be considered final. A request to amend the same Articles again may not be presented within one year.

(d) If an absolute majority of the total number of Deputies approve of the request for amendment, such an approval shall be considered as a motion for amendment.

(e) Six months after the adoption of a motion of amendment, the Chamber of Deputies shall discuss the amendment proposed. The amendment shall be adopted and become effective if two-thirds of the total number of Deputies vote for it.

(2) The Deputies shall take a new oath of allegiance to the amended Constitution within two weeks of its adoption.

Chapter X

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Art. 156. This Constitution shall not be amended before two years of its execution.

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642 Art. 157. There shall be issued within six months of the execution of this Constitution a law defining the duties of the President of the Republic, the Ministers and the procedure for their impeachment.

Art. 158. (1) The Government shall take necessary steps for the settlement of the Bedouins.

(2) A special law shall be issued taking into consideration the tribal traditions among nomadic tribes and specifying the tribes that shall come within its provisions until such time as their settlement is achieved.

(3) A special program shall be instituted to secure the settlement of Bedouins gradually. This program, together with the appropriations necessary for its implementation, shall be ascertained by law.

(4) The Electoral Law shall include special provisions concerning the conduct of elections among Bedouins and shall take into consideration their civil registration and the voting procedure.

Art. 159. (1) Primary education shall be made available in all parts of the State within ten years at most of the execution of this Constitution.

(2) A detailed program, to be executed by degrees, shall be initiated for that purpose. This program, with the necessary appropriations for its implementation, shall be ascertained by law.

(3) All governments that may come to power within the period specified above shall be bound to implement the program initiated for the achievement of this objective.

Art. 160. (1) Illiteracy must be eradicated in the country within ten years at the most of the coming into force of the provisions of this Constitution.

(2) A detailed program shall be instituted for this purpose. This program, with the necessary appropriations for its implementation, shall be ascertained by law.

(3) All governments that may come to power within the period specified above shall be bound to execute the program for the achievement of this objective.

Art. 161. Within two years of the execution of this Constitution,

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the Civil Census Register shall be organized and all citizens shall be duly registered. 642

Art. 162. (1) After the adoption of this Constitution, the Chamber of Deputies shall immediately elect from its members a special committee, which may obtain assistance from a sufficient number of specialists and experts, to introduce the necessary bills in order to coordinate existing legislation with the provisions of this Constitution.

(2) The Chamber of Deputies and this Commitee shall achieve this task within two years of the adoption of this Constitution.

Art. 163. Existing legislation which may be inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain temporarily effective until amended in conformity with the provisions of this Constitution.

Art. 164. (1) The constituent status of the present Assembly shall be terminated immediately upon the adoption of this Constitution. The Assembly shall then become a Chamber of Deputies which shall exercise the powers set forth in this Constitution; its period of mandate shall start with January first 1949.

(2) The Office of the Constituent Assembly shall continue its work until a new office is elected in accordance with Article 53 of this Constitution.

Art. 165. For the first election of the Supreme Court, the President of the Republic shall submit, within four months of his election, a list of candidates nominated by him in accordance with Article 116.

Art. 166. This Constitution shall become effective following its adoption and shall be promulgated by the President of the Constituent Assembly.

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
433 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[511] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
361 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

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SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number. 164 463

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda. 164 733 656 208

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent." 642 161 162

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases. 744 743

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex- 312

similar Councils to be held in all parts of the country not under martial law. In spite of a boycott by the nationalists, the Syrian elections were held, but the Representative Councils which resulted from them proved ineffective.

The next step was to form a Government which should be more acceptable to public opinion than that which had been presided over by Subhi Barakat since the creation of the Syrian State, and which resigned in December, 1925. The Presidency of the State was offered to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, the son of one of the most respected religious leaders in Damascus. He laid down certain conditions of his taking office. The High Commissioner could not, however, accept them, and after some delay appointed as provisional President Damad Ahmad Nami, a Circassian by origin. He formed a Ministry which for a short time included members of the 'People's Party'; its programme envisaged the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty and the attainment of Syrian unity by negotiation with the other States included in the French Mandate.

II

In June, 1926, M. de Jouvenel declared to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the French Government intended to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Next month he resigned and was succeeded by M. Ponsot. The new High Commissioner took the first step towards the establishment of the self-government which had been foreseen by his predecessor, by preparing for the elaboration of an Organic Law. A beginning had indeed already been made with this: M. de Jouvenel had consulted various notables on the form which the future political organization of the country should take.

In July, 1927, M. Ponsot made a declaration in which he explicitly identified himself with the policy approved by the French Government and the League of Nations and defined by his predecessors. Regard for the wishes of the people concerned had, he maintained, been the idea which had throughout inspired French policy. In accordance with this idea, the framing of the definitive constitution of the countries under French Mandate was to be the work of those peoples. The Mandatory Power would exert itself to bring about a general agreement and to arbitrate in any differences which

642 enable the Mandatory Power to carry out its obligations
648 under the Covenant. Thus Article 2 was modified, and stated merely that 'Syria forms an indivisible political unity'; and an additional article (116) was added to the effect that 'the provisions of the present Constitution are not, and cannot be, in opposition to the obligations undertaken by France in regard to Syria, particularly obligations towards the League of Nations. . . . So long as the international obligations of France in regard to Syria remain in force, any provisions of the present Constitution which are of a nature to affect those obligations will be applicable only under conditions to be determined by agreement between the French and Syrian Governments'.

Simultaneously a number of other decrees were promulgated. In addition to the Organic Laws for the Governments of Latakia and Jebel Druze, already mentioned, they included laws for the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and for a Conference of Common Interests composed of Delegations from the States and Governments, and charged with the management of their common financial and economic affairs.[1]

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646 The elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in January, 1932, and the Chamber met in June. More than three-quarters of its members were 'moderates'. Only a quarter were 'extreme' nationalists demanding full and immediate independence; but as had happened in the Constituent Assembly, the minority soon showed itself to be the dominant element. Its hopes were raised and its case strengthened by the recent conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the termination of the Mandate and the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations (1930-1932).

643 The first task of the Chamber was to choose the President
645 of the Republic. It elected Muhammad Ali al-Abid, son of
648 Izzat Pasha al-Abid who had been secretary to the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. He entrusted the construction of a Cabinet to a prominent moderate, Haqqi al-Azm, who formed a Ministry of which half the members were 'moderates' and half 'extreme' nationalists. Negotiations were opened between the Ministry and the High Commissioner for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

[1] For texts of these documents, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 676–98.

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

722 been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

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648 After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to
642 restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

666 In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was
646 decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies,
665 including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

643 On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected
645 Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

The decision on the form of political organization to be adopted was reached sooner in Syria than in Lebanon. In September, 1941, there was published a letter from General Catroux to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani. In this letter the General stated that, after having diligently consulted public opinion and having no object in view but the good of the country, he considered Shaikh Taj ad-Din to be better qualified than any one else to organize the new independent and sovereign Syrian State., 'I propose therefore to Your Excellency that you take in hand the destinies of Syria with the title, the prerogatives and the privileges attached to the office of President of the Syrian Republic, and as such set up the government of the State with the shortest possible delay. If, as I hope, you accept this offer, you can be certain of my entire support and full collaboration.'[1]

The new President was the son of a Moslem divine of Damascus, Shaikh Badr ad-Din. He himself had been prominent in Syrian politics in the years between the two wars, as an advocate of collaboration with the Mandatory Power who had at the same time always regarded himself as a nationalist. He had twice been Prime Minister: from 1928 to 1931 and again from 1934 to 1935. Since 1935 he had taken no active part in Syrian political life and his reputation for wisdom and probity was by no means high.

A few days later, on September 28th, 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria:

'Syrians,

'On June 8th last, at the time of the entry into the Levant of the Allied Armies, in a manifesto which I addressed to you in the name of Free France and of her Chief, General de Gaulle, I recognized Syria as a sovereign and independent State, under the promise of a treaty guaranteeing our reciprocal relations.

'The British Government, the Ally of Free France, acting in accord with her, associated itself by a simultaneous declaration with this important political act. On the 16th of this month, I put my declaration of June 8th into effect by translating into established fact the principle there enunciated.

'Thus the era is begun in which independent and sovereign Syria will herself control her destinies.

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne* (Cairo), September 17th, 1941.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDI Syria MDI

last time on August 10, 1928, passed a resolution empowering its President to negotiate on its behalf with the authorities "for the fulfilment of the country's [national] aspirations." But negotiations between the leading Syrian nationalists and the High Commissioner led to no agreement. Following an exchange of a number of proposals and counter-proposals, the High Commissioner, by a decree issued on February 5, 1929, prorogued the Constituent Assembly *sine die*.[12] It was over a year later, on May 14, 1930, that M. Ponsot, after consultations in Paris, surprised the nationalists by promulgating the Constitution. The text included Article 2 as altered by a previous proposal of his to reduce it to "Syria is an indivisible political unity," but the other articles in question remained unchanged. There appeared also a new provision (Article 116) withholding from application all provisions which infringed upon France's international obligations relative to Syria, or dealt with the maintenance of security or with foreign relations. Such provisions would become applicable only after special agreement between Syria and the French Government. The Nationalists somewhat grudgingly decided to take part in the elections on this basis, but another eighteen months elapsed before M. Ponsot issued orders for holding them. The elections were finally completed on March 30, 1932, and resulted in a victory for the moderates rather than the nationalist elements.

When Parliament met on June 7, 1932, there was considerable discussion regarding the election of the President. The Nationalists' candidate, Hashim al-Atasi, could muster only 17 votes; nevertheless they declared their intention of withdrawing from Parliament if the Government insisted upon the election of one of its two candidates: Subhi Barakat or Haqqi al-Azm. A compromise was finally reached by electing Muhammad Ali al-Abid, who was *persona grata* to both groups, on the understanding that he would select Haqqi al-Azm, candidate of the moderates, as Prime Minister. In this way the first republican administration was established by the French in cooperation with the Syrian

[12] For these proposals and counter-proposals, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 550-51. For the French version, see *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, pp. 20-21.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

Za'im was overthrown by his opponents on August 14, 1949, having remained in power only four and a half months. Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led this second coup and executed Za'im, reversed the policy of friendly relations with the Saudi-Egyptian bloc and again opened negotiations with Iraq for a Syro-Iraqi union. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in November, but when the Assembly met on December 12 and was about to approve a project for union with Iraq, a third army move on December 14, led by Colonel Adib Shishakli, sealed the fate of unity with Iraq under a dual monarchy. Shishakli declared that the Army would no longer interfere in politics and that government by civilians would be maintained; but it remained clear that the Army would continue to resist any policy which ran counter to its wishes.

The Constituent Assembly elected Rushdi al-Kikhya, leader of the People's Party which won the elections, as its President, and Hashim al-Atasi, an old member of the Nationalist Party, as the temporary head of the State. On January 7, 1950, after a long cabinet crisis attributed to the intervention of the Army in politics, President Atasi took an oath of office and the Constituent Assembly gave temporary legislative and executive powers to the Government, subject to its control, until the promulgation of a Constitution. In the meantime a committee of 33 members, under the chairmanship of Nazim al-Qudsi, was appointed to prepare a draft constitution for the Assembly. The Committee began its meetings on January 4 and completed its work three months later. As its chairman stated in his report to the Assembly, the Committee made use of no less than fifteen European and Asiatic (including Arab) constitutions, and received proposals from individuals and organizations either directly or through the press.[22] The draft Constitution, consisting of 177 articles, was communicated to the President of the Assembly on April 15, 1950, but debate did not get underway until July 7. After prolonged discussion, first on the draft generally and then article by article, the Constitution was approved with considerable changes (including reduction to 166 articles) on September 5,

[22] See text of the Report in the *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (June 22, 1950), Appendix, pp. 1–2.

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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

History

Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria an

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ness on both sides. In Syria (and to a lesser degree, in Lebanon) the possibility of long-term co-operation between the nationalist politicians and the Mandatary was frustrated alike by the attitude of most French officials and by that of the local urban populations who, though they later signed the 1936 treaty, desired full self-government.[1] The advent to power in France of the Front Populaire in 1936 eased the situation: treaties with Syria and Lebanon were negotiated whereby the Mandate was to be transformed into an alliance with independent states, but under which France could still maintain troops in the Levant. However, the French Parliament was unwilling to ratify the Syrian treaty under the lengthening shadow of the impending Second World War, and Syrian indignation was increased when the need for Turkey's friendship led France in 1939 to cede to Turkey the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, afterwards renamed Hatay. Leading Syrian politicians refused to co-operate with the French on these terms, and on the eve of the outbreak of war the French High Commissioner once again suspended the Syrian constitution and governed the country through French and Syrian officials; the same procedure was applied to Lebanon after the outbreak of war.

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When metropolitan France fell in 1940 the Mandate was carried on by the Vichy Government until the latter's acquiescence in the use of the Levant airfields by the German air force necessitated the intervention of British and Free French forces in June 1941. After a short but bitter campaign, the Vichy forces signed an armistice in July 1941. In the struggle between the Allies and the Axis and between Vichy and de Gaulle the Syrians and Lebanese took no part, but their independence had been promised by the Allied Command. On behalf of the Free French, General Catroux, in a statement on 8 June 1941, proclaimed the end of the Mandate, but in fact the Free French regarded themselves as trustees for France's position, seeking to maintain them by installing Syrian and Lebanese supporters of France in the seats of authority. The Free French had, however, eventually to yield to the demand for popular elections, which was supported by the British Government as soon as the victory at al-Alamain (October 1942) had finally removed the threat of Axis invasion from the Middle East. In Syria the elections of 1943 brought into office the National Bloc with Shukri al-Quwatli as President of the Republic and Saadullah Jabri, Jamil Mardam, and Faris al-Khouri as parliamentary leaders. In the Lebanon also nationalists were successful and the leader of the 'Constitutional Bloc',

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[1] For details, see A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, RIIA, 1946).

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Bishara al-Khouri, became President with the pan-Arab Riyad as-Sulh as Prime Minister; these nationalists were not satisfied with mere titular sovereignty but claimed the reality of independence, and in November 1943 a Free French resort to force against them was reversed only by a British intervention, endorsed by the United States Government. The Free French were thus constrained to transfer most branches of the administration to the Syrian and Lebanese Parliaments, but retained control of the local 'Troupes Spéciales' and obstructed the proper equipping of the Syrian gendarmerie. The French intention was to make this vital concession of authority conditional upon the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty which would give France much the same strategic, economic, and cultural advantages as Britain had retained in Iraq by the already obsolescent Treaty of 1930. In March 1945 Syria and Lebanon had been admitted as sovereign states to membership both of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States. The Syrian nationalists were not prepared to subordinate their sovereignty to an imposed alliance with France, and the landing of a contingent of Senegalese troops immediately after VE-day (in disregard of a personal appeal of Churchill to de Gaulle) was regarded in both Syria and Lebanon as clear evidence of a French resort to coercion. Sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Syrian gendarmerie and the local nationalists on the one hand and the French garrison on the other became general, and when, at the end of May 1945, the local French Commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus the British Government ordered their Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene, by force if necessary, to restore order in a region whose security was vital for British communications in the still-continuing war in the Far East. The crisis accelerated the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, concerning which the demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were supported by the Security Council; the process was completed in Syria by 15 April 1946 and in Lebanon by the end of the year.

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Between the wars, the French Mandate had allowed political development in Lebanon to produce at least a façade of parliamentary democracy, with arrangements between the Muslim and Christian leaders on the division of political power and prerogatives, and the active commercial and intellectual life of Lebanon made progress with a minimum of government interference. In Syria, however, local separatisms which French policy had encouraged made it very difficult for any Syrian Government to knit the people together from Damascus; the

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foundations for commercial and intellectual progress were less firmly established than in Lebanon, and the Muslim leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to acquire the technique of government. The root of the trouble was that the French were opposed to self-government and tended to refuse office to nationalist political leaders, except for short, self-defeating periods. But though they failed to foster self-government, the French did much good in both Syria and Lebanon as engineers, doctors, educators, and archaeologists, and performed a valuable service in training at least a cadre of competent civil servants.

With the end of the French Mandate there emerged two sovereign and independent Republics with many mutual and some conflicting interests. For some years the rest of the world failed to distinguish between the two, and it is still possible to find educated persons who suppose that Beirut is the capital of Syria. Syria and Lebanon are, to some extent, mutually dependent or complementary, but they are distinct and their political development will be considered separately.

Government and Politics

(a) Syria

Under her constitution Syria is a Republic in which the legislative power is in the hands of a Chamber of Deputies numbering 114 members in 1949. The deputies are elected by direct suffrage granted to all men and to women of a certain educational standard. The representation of religious minorities is shown in the table on p. 466 above. The President of the Republic must be a Muslim and is elected for a term of five years by the Parliament; he nominates the Prime Minister who appoints his cabinet ministers. The Parliament is elected for four years but may be dissolved by the President. The constitution was suspended in 1952 by the military dictatorship and a new one on the Presidential model adopted in July 1953.

Damascus is the seat of government and there are ten provinces, each under a Governor who is assisted by a staff of civil servants representing most of the ministries. The provinces (*muhafaza*) are divided in *qazas*, each under a *qaimaqam*, who is a civil servant under the Ministry of Interior; the *qazas* are divided into *nahiyas* under *mudirs*. Within a *nahiya* may be several villages, each of which is rather loosely under the control of the *mukhtar* who may be elected by the village or appointed by the ministry. The judiciary are independent of the legislature and

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(2) The Prime Minister and the Ministers may attend meetings of the Chamber, may address the Chamber and may obtain assistance and benefit from the experience of the officials of the Government during the debates. 642 646

(3) Any minister shall attend the meetings of the Chamber when asked by its President to do so.

Art. 65. Any member of the Chamber is entitled to introduce an interpellation, or to submit questions to the Government and to obtain a reply within the period fixed by the Rules of Procedure.

Art. 66. (1) The Rules of Procedure shall determine for the Chamber the method for conducting discussions, debates, interpellations, interrogations, voting, the powers of the office and the committees and all other work of the Chamber.

(2) The Rules of Procedure shall have the power of a law and shall not be amended except in accordance with their own provisions.

Art. 67 (1) The Chamber shall not consider a motion of non-confidence against the Cabinet or any one of its members unless presented by fifteen deputies or more, and shall not be discussed except two days after its presentation.

(2) If the absolute majority of the total number of the Deputies adopt a motion of non-confidence, the entire Cabinet shall resign.

(3) A Minister against whom a vote of non-confidence has been adopted by the Chamber shall resign.

Art. 68. The Chamber shall choose a committee to consider and investigate all petitions submitted by an individual or a group of citizens. The committee shall inquire into every complaint and shall inform the petitioner accordingly.

Chapter IV

THE EXECUTIVE POWER

Art. 69. The Executive Power shall be vested, on behalf of the People, in the President of the Republic and the Cabinet, within the limits assigned by this Constitution. 642 643

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I.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

642 Art. 70. The President of the Republic is the Chief of State.
643 The law shall determine the privileges and honors due to his office.

Art. 71. (1) The Chamber shall elect the President of the Republic by secret ballot.

(2) A two-thirds majority of the number of Deputies shall be necessary at the first ballot.

(3) An absolute majority shall be sufficient at the second ballot.

(4) A relative majority shall be sufficient at the third ballot.

Art. 72. No person shall be eligible for the Presidency of the Republic who does not fulfil the following conditions:

(1) He must have been a Syrian national for the last ten years.

(2) He must have all qualifications of eligibility for the Chamber of Deputies.

(3) He must have completed his fortieth year.

Art. 73. (1) The President shall hold office for a term of five years. He may be re-elected only after an interval of similar duration.

(2) If the period of office of the President expires simultaneously with that of the Chamber, the President of the Republic shall remain in office until a new Chamber is elected and meets. This additional period shall not exceed three months.

Art. 74. The offices of President of the Republic and of Deputy may not be held simultaneously.

Art. 75. Before assuming office, the President shall take, in the presence of the Chamber of Deputies, the following oath:

"I swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and laws of the country, to be loyal to the freedoms, the public good and the wealth of the people, and to the Republican Regime, and to strive to the best of my ability to safeguard the independence of the country, defend its territorial integrity and work for the achievement of the unity of the Arab countries."

Art. 76. One month at most and fifteen days at least before the

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expiration of the term of office of the President of the Republic, the Chamber shall elect a new President. 642 643

Art. 77. (1) The Government shall keep the President of the Republic advised of the development of international negotiations.

(2) The President shall conclude and sign treaties after their approval by the Chamber.

(3) The President shall accredit heads of Diplomatic Missions abroad and receive the representatives of foreign countries.

Art. 78. The President may call the Cabinet to meet under his chairmanship and order that a record of such meetings be made and preserved.

Art. 79. All instruments issued by the President, such as decrees, documents and letters concerning the affairs of State, with the exception of those relating to the appointment or resignation of the Prime Minister, must be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the Minister concerned.

Art. 80. The President shall sign the warrants of appointment of magistrates and officials who, according to the law, must be appointed by warrant. He shall also sign all decrees concerning organization and all other decrees which may be referred to him in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Art. 81. (1) If the President does not sign decrees or does not refer them to the Supreme Court within ten days of their transmission to him because they conflict with the Constitution or a law, the Prime Minister shall promulgate them and they shall be considered effective.

(2) If the Supreme Court does not decide on the decrees referred to it within ten days of their receipt, the Prime Minister shall promulgate them and they shall be considered effective.

(3) An exception shall be made of the decree dissolving the Chamber of Deputies which the President can reject without stating his reasons for so doing, and also the decrees confirming the death penalty.

Art. 82. The President shall have power to declare war and conclude peace, upon a decision of the Cabinet and after consultation with the Council of National Defense and the approval of the Chamber of Deputies.

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642 Art. 83. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army
643 and Chairman of the Council of National Defense.

Art. 84. The President shall communicate with the Chamber of Deputies by means of messages addressed to the President of the Chamber.

Art. 85. (1) The President of the Republic may issue a decree dissolving the Chamber; such a decree must be taken by the Cabinet and state the grounds on which the dissolution was decided.

(2) The Chamber shall not be dissolved before the expiration of eighteen months of the date of its election.

(3) When the Chamber is dissolved the Cabinet shall resign and the President of the Republic shall appoint a cabinet of new members to supervise the elections.

Art. 86. (1) The President shall be held responsible for violating the Constitution and for high treason.

(2) He shall also be held responsible for ordinary offences.

(3) The President shall not be tried except by the Supreme Court.

(4) A motion to impeach the President and to try him by the Supreme Court shall only be discussed when a quarter of the number of Deputies submit a written request to the President of the Chamber giving the reasons for their motion. The request shall be referred, before its discussion, to the legal and constitutional committees meeting jointly. The two committees shall submit their report within three days of the receipt of the request.

A special session shall then be fixed to discuss the impeachment of the President.

No other business may be discussed during that meeting.

(5) For the impeachment of the President of the Republic in any circumstance whatsoever and his trial by the Supreme Court, the approval of the absolute majority of the total number of Deputies shall be required.

(6) When the President of the Republic is impeached, the Presidency shall be considered vacant until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision.

(7) A law of a constitutional nature shall determine the procedure for impeachment and trial by the Supreme Court.

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Art. 87. The President shall exercise the prerogatives of pardon. 642

Art. 88. (1) When the President of the Republic is unable to discharge the duty of his office, the President of the Chamber of Deputies shall assume that duty provided he yields, during this time, the Presidency of the Chamber to its Vice President. 643

(2) Should the Presidency become vacant through the death or resignation of the President, the Chamber shall be summoned by its President within ten days therefrom for the purpose of electing the new President. Should it not be thus summoned, the Chamber shall meet of its own accord on the eleventh day.

(3) If the Chamber is dissolved at the time the vacancy occurs or two months only are left before its mandate expires, the President of the Chamber shall continue to assume the above-mentioned duties until the new Chamber meets.

Art. 89. The emoluments of the President shall be fixed by a law.

2.

THE CABINET

Art. 90. At the opening of each term of the Legislature, or after the election of a new President of the Republic, or after a vote of non-confidence for the Cabinet, or its resignation, or if the Presidency of the Cabinet becomes vacant for some reasons, the President of the Republic shall appoint a Prime Minister and upon the proposal of the Prime Minister the members of the Cabinet. 642 645

Art. 91. (1) The Cabinet shall submit its programme to the Chamber for a vote of confidence.

(2) A vote of confidence shall be considered granted if approved by a majority of the Deputies present.

Art. 92. (1) The Cabinet shall direct the policy of the State.

(2) The Cabinet shall meet, presided over by the Prime Minister, to consider the following matters:

(a) Bills

(b) Decrees concerning organization

(c) The State budget and the special budgets

(d) Internal and foreign policy

(e) Cases which the Prime Minister, or any Minister, with the approval of the former, submits to the Cabinet for consideration.

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similar Councils to be held in all parts of the country not under martial law. In spite of a boycott by the nationalists, the Syrian elections were held, but the Representative Councils which resulted from them proved ineffective.

The next step was to form a Government which should be more acceptable to public opinion than that which had been presided over by Subhi Barakat since the creation of the Syrian State, and which resigned in December, 1925. The Presidency of the State was offered to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, the son of one of the most respected religious leaders in Damascus. He laid down certain conditions of his taking office. The High Commissioner could not, however, accept them, and after some delay appointed as provisional President Damad Ahmad Nami, a Circassian by origin. He formed a Ministry which for a short time included members of the 'People's Party'; its programme envisaged the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty and the attainment of Syrian unity by negotiation with the other States included in the French Mandate.

II

In June, 1926, M. de Jouvenel declared to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the French Government intended to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Next month he resigned and was succeeded by M. Ponsot. The new High Commissioner took the first step towards the establishment of the self-government which had been foreseen by his predecessor, by preparing for the elaboration of an Organic Law. A beginning had indeed already been made with this: M. de Jouvenel had consulted various notables on the form which the future political organization of the country should take.

In July, 1927, M. Ponsot made a declaration in which he explicitly identified himself with the policy approved by the French Government and the League of Nations and defined by his predecessors. Regard for the wishes of the people concerned had, he maintained, been the idea which had throughout inspired French policy. In accordance with this idea, the framing of the definitive constitution of the countries under French Mandate was to be the work of those peoples. The Mandatory Power would exert itself to bring about a general agreement and to arbitrate in any differences which

might arise; in default of an agreement, it would take appropriate measures to maintain order and to guarantee peace. The Mandatory Power desired to favour and hasten the political evolution of the States under its protection, and to Interests', the High Commissioner would continue to administer them with the active and ever-increasing assistance of the representatives of the States.[1]

A few months later, in February, 1928, M. Ponsot judged that the time had come for the election of a Constituent Assembly. In that month the state of siege declared at the beginning of the revolt was finally raised, the censorship suppressed, the special tribunals established during the revolt abolished, and a general amnesty issued. At the same time Damad Ahmad Nami's Ministry was replaced by a new provisional Government of 'moderate' politicians presided over by Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, with the task of preparing the way for the creation of regular institutions to which it could hand over its functions.

The elections were held in April of the same year. In the towns, most of those elected belonged to the more uncompromising section of the nationalists, the opponents of Shaikh Taj ad-Din's Ministry; in the countryside, however, they were mainly moderates. Of the seventy members of the Assembly, over two-thirds supported the Government; but owing to their lack of cohesion and the decision of the Government not to intervene in the proceedings, it was the so-called 'extreme' nationalists who dominated the discussions. They were the more powerful in that they had recovered from the confusion caused by the collapse of the revolt, and had succeeded once more in organizing themselves in a party, the 'National Bloc'. In so far as it had a founder he was Ibrahim Hananu, an Aleppine and a man respected even by his opponents. The Bloc was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It included leading members of important landowning families, like Jamil Mardam Bey from Damascus, Saadullah al-Jabiri from Aleppo, and Hashim al-Atasi, the President of the Bloc. It included also individuals important rather for character and intellect than for representing large sections of opinion, like Faris al-Khuri, a Protestant lawyer, law-teacher and financier. It

[1] For text, see *Oriente Moderno*, September, 1927, pp. 409–11.

642 enable the Mandatory Power to carry out its obligations
648 under the Covenant. Thus Article 2 was modified, and stated merely that 'Syria forms an indivisible political unity'; and an additional article (116) was added to the effect that 'the provisions of the present Constitution are not, and cannot be, in opposition to the obligations undertaken by France in regard to Syria, particularly obligations towards the League of France in regard to Syria remain in force, any provisions of the present Constitution which are of a nature to affect those obligations will be applicable only under conditions to be determined by agreement between the French and Syrian Governments'.

Simultaneously a number of other decrees were promulgated. In addition to the Organic Laws for the Governments of Latakia and Jebel Druze, already mentioned, they included laws for the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and for a Conference of Common Interests composed of Delegations from the States and Governments, and charged with the management of their common financial and economic affairs.[1]

12

646 The elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in January, 1932, and the Chamber met in June. More than three-quarters of its members were 'moderates'. Only a quarter were 'extreme' nationalists demanding full and immediate independence; but as had happened in the Constituent Assembly, the minority soon showed itself to be the dominant element. Its hopes were raised and its case strengthened by the recent conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the termination of the Mandate and the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations (1930-1932).

643 The first task of the Chamber was to choose the President
645 of the Republic. It elected Muhammad Ali al-Abid, son of
646 Izzat Pasha al-Abid who had been secretary to the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. He entrusted the construction of a Cabinet to a prominent moderate, Haqqi al-Azm, who formed a Ministry of which half the members were 'moderates' and half 'extreme' nationalists. Negotiations were opened between the Ministry and the High Commissioner for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

[1] For texts of these documents, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 676–98.

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before 1914; and was it not ridiculous, as well as expensive, for so small a region to have so grandiose and complex a constitution? L 642

As a further consequence, the movement of discontent with especially among the young, began to look for an alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges Libanaises', the party of Lebanese nationalism, received much support. So too did the 'Syrian National Party', with its doctrine of the total separation of Church and State; while the Arab Nationalists pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself. L 642

4

In Syria, the first steps towards the execution of the Treaty were taken immediately after the return of the Syrian delegation from Paris. Arrangements were made for the holding of Parliamentary elections; the Chamber was to consist of 86 members, 16 of them representing the religious minorities and 7 the Beduin tribes. The elections, which took place in November, 1936, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the candidates of the National Bloc; and when the Chamber met, on December 21st, its first important act was to choose Faris al-Khuri as its President, and its second to accept the resignation of Muhammad Ali al-Abid from the Presidency of the Republic and to elect Hashim al-Atasi in his place. The Ayyubi Ministry having resigned, the President entrusted the formation of a new one to Jamil Mardam Bey. All the members of his Ministry were drawn from the National Bloc. S 666 646 645

This Ministry found no difficulty in securing the confidence of the Chamber, which unanimously approved the Treaty in December, 1936. It was formally signed by the High Commissioner and the members of the Ministry on December 22nd. 648 S

In the same month, after consultations with notables of the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, their annexation to the Syrian State was proclaimed. This proclamation was accompanied by special Statutes granting a measure of administrative autonomy to the two regions. Despite protests from separatist groups against the concept of a unitary Syria, the régime envisaged in these Statutes was inaugurated by the appointment in January, 1937, of two prominent members of the 631

among many, and thus struck at the root of the traditional Moslem conception of the State. Its application was temporarily suspended, pending the issue of a revised law by the Syrian Government. The Government having failed to pass such a law, in November, 1938, the High Commissioner issued a decree modifying and completing the previous one. The new decree, officially published in December, met with no greater favour from the religious leaders.

[illegible] the decree grew in intensity. Pressure was put upon the Government to suspend it. This the Government was the more willing to do because it resented the issue of the decree on the High Commissioner's own authority, over the head of the legislative organs of the Syrian State. In February it issued an order to the Courts not to apply the decree. At the same time it sent a memorandum to the High Commissioner, declaring its intention to apply the order of the day passed by the Chamber on December 31st, 1938, and to take over the functions previously exercised by the Mandatory authorities; accusing the French of encouraging the separatist movements; and asserting that since all legislative power belonged to the Chamber, decrees issued by the High Commissioner could have no validity in Syria.

On February 18th, the High Commissioner demanded that the Ministry should withdraw its order to the Courts and its memorandum, on the ground that decrees issued by him could not be suspended by any authority other than his own. The Ministry refused and resigned. A number of important officials resigned with it. The National Bloc continued formally in existence, but the resignation of the Mardam Ministry made its temporary decline inevitable. In April a group of prominent members left it.

13

Jamil Mardam Bey was succeeded as Prime Minister by Lutfi al-Haffar, his former colleague; with one exception, all the members of the new Ministry were members of the Bloc; and their policy, like that of their predecessors, was to maintain the Treaty of 1936, and to conclude an agreement with France on the basis of it. This, together with the continued deadlock over the communities question and further troubles among the minorities, did not allow the Ministry

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to last long. It resigned on March 16th, in circumstances 648
somewhat similar to those in which the Mardam Ministry had 645
fallen. Its resignation was accompanied by further disturbances.

The unrest, and the difficulty of finding anybody willing and able to form a new Ministry, impelled the Mandatory authorities to take over, by decree of the High Commissioner, the powers necessary for the maintenance of public order. The disturbances were quelled by the use of French troops; several prominent leaders were arrested, including Nabih al-Azmah. New and severe restrictions were also placed upon the press. But at the same time a concession to popular feeling was made by the decision of the High Commissioner, at the beginning of April, to suspend the application of the Communities Statute to the Sunni Moslem community.

A few days later, on April 6th, the Ministerial crisis was ended by the formation of a non-political Ministry, headed by Nasuhi al-Bukhari. Although its members did not belong to the Bloc, this Ministry was as firmly attached as its predecessors had been to the Treaty of 1936; and it was generally felt that it offered the French Government its last chance of concluding an agreement that could satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Syrians. If it failed to take this opportunity, there would be no alternative for the nationalists except to resort once more to the methods of the first months of 1936.

Shortly after the formation of the Bukhari Ministry, M. 648
Puaux left Syria for France. It was known that he had gone in order to discuss with the French Government the policy to be adopted in Syria. Speculation ranged over the alternatives among which a choice would have to be made: the negotiation of a new Treaty, the return to direct rule by the French, the establishment of a monarchy. This last possibility especially was the subject of much excited controversy and the names of various possible candidates were put forward: the Amir Abdullah, the Amir Abdul Munim, son of the ex-Khedive of Egypt, a Sa'udi or a Tunisian prince. Even the possibility of a personal union of Syria and Iraq under King Faisal II was entertained.

On May 10th, the High Commissioner returned from France and three days later delivered a radio speech, in which he declared that the French Government was determined to

648 reach an agreement with Syria on the basis of the 1936 Treaty with the amendments of November, 1938, but that due satisfaction must be given to the legitimate aspirations of the minorities. Moreover, the international situation necessitated new military arrangements between Syria and France. He ended with an appeal for the maintenance of law and order.

The nationalists saw in this statement a determination to strengthen France's hold over Syria in preparation for the imminent world war. The last hope of the ratification of the Treaty was now extinguished.

648 On May 15th the Bukhari Ministry resigned. On May 18th the Syrian Chamber voted unanimously an order of the day, affirming Syria's sympathy for French democracy in the hour of its peril, but at the same time emphasizing its attachment to the unamended Treaty of 1936 as the only firm basis for Franco-Syrian co-operation.

This time there was no way out of the deadlock. All attempts to form a new Ministry failed. Finally, the President of the Republic resigned (July 7th). A few days later M. Puaux took the extreme step of dissolving the Chamber, suspending the Constitution, and appointing a non-political Council of Directors to govern by decree-laws under his own direction (July 10th). The Council was composed of permanent officials, with Bahij al-Khatib as its President.

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631 648 At the same time the High Commissioner issued decrees re-establishing in Jebel Druze and the Territory of Latakia separate administrations similar to those which had existed until 1936, and providing for the special administration of the Jazirah.

The decree for Latakia stated that the Organic Law promulgated in 1936 was to be replaced by a new one, to come into force immediately. The new law provided for the government of the region by a Governor, assisted by a council of heads of departments and by the Council of the Territory. He was to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the Council of the Territory, was to hold office for five years and might be re-appointed. His powers were executive, financial and within limits legislative. The Council was to consist of at least seventeen elected members, to hold two ordinary sessions a year and to discuss financial and

At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so long latent came to a head. Strikes and demonstrations began in the Syrian towns in February, in protest against the dearth of essential foodstuffs and the failure of the authorities to stop profiteering. They very soon turned into political disturbances, directed by a number of nationalist committees and leaders, and above all by Shukri al-Quwatli, who in March issued a manifesto setting forth their objectives. He condemned the existing Government of Bahij al-Khatib as a group of men whose sentiments were not those of the population; he declared that the legal basis of French rule no longer existed since the League of Nations had ceased to function; and he therefore demanded the immediate formation of a national Government. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of the continuation of the disturbances, which indeed spread for a few days from Syria to the towns of the Lebanese coast, the Government of Bahij al-Khatib resigned. There was a temporary cessation of unrest while the High Commissioner negotiated with Shukri al-Quwatli and others for the formation of a more representative Government; but disturbances broke out once more after the failure of the negotiations.

The recrudescence of the troubles appears to have convinced General Dentz of the necessity of making further concessions. At the beginning of April he broadcast a statement to the Syrian people, setting forth the conclusions to which his conversations with Syrian leaders had led him. First, the independence of Syria remained the aim towards which the Syrians were striving; France was in agreement with this, but the present international situation made it impossible to contemplate a definitive settlement of the problem of the form of government in Syria. Secondly, Syrian public opinion was demanding the establishment of a Government endowed with wider powers. Thirdly, there was a need for an economic and social programme which would help to solve the problems of unemployment, the food supply, agriculture and commerce. In the light of these conclusions the High Commissioner had decided upon the following measures: the replacement of the Council of Directors by a Ministry presided over by a 'Head of the Government'; the formation of an Advisory Assembly, to be composed of representatives of the political, cultural and economic life of the country and of the younger generation, and in which the Druzes and Alawis would also be represented

648 while retaining their special Statutes; the establishment of a
668 Council of State to draft legislation; the participation of the Syrian Government in the organization of the food supply for Syria and Lebanon; and the execution of an important programme of public works. 'The day of fulfilment is at hand and existing difficulties will be resolved by the co-operation of all and not by demonstrations in the streets. The Syrian nation wishes to carry on its work in an orderly and peaceful manner. Order and peace shall be safeguarded.'[1]

645 A few days later a prominent business man and member of a leading Damascene family, Khalid al-Azm, was appointed Prime Minister, with a Ministry most of the members of which, like the Prime Minister himself, had not previously taken a prominent part in the political life of Syria. In its programme the new Government promised to reform the administration, to develop external trade, to pay special attention to the problems of education and youth, to ameliorate the lot of the workers and officials, and to preserve strict non-partisanship in all political matters.

Shortly afterwards a similar change took place in Lebanon. The President of the Republic and the Secretary of State resigned their offices, and were replaced by a politically neutral Ministry headed by Alfred Naccache, a Maronite judge who had hitherto played no important part in politics.

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648 During these uncertain months the true centre of Syrian
668 political life was Baghdad. It has already been made clear how united is political feeling in the different centres of the Fertile Crescent. The Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939 had received encouragement and help from the neighbouring Arab countries; and after it subsided the thought persisted that the sorrows of Palestine, and also the sorrows of Syria, could only be ended by a united effort of the whole Arab people. It was also widely believed that in this effort Iraq would have to play the leading part, since it possessed greater freedom of action than most of the other Arab regions, and also the nucleus of a trained army. The sense that the destiny of their nation depended on them exalted the spirits of a certain group among the Iraqi Arabs; and their enthusiasm was further increased by the teaching of the

[1] See Appendix A10.

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S 648 sterling bloc. Syria, having now entered the sterling bloc, will in the economic and financial sphere and especially in that of exchange take the necessary measures to follow the general policy of the sterling bloc.

'The preceding stipulations reconcile respect for Syrian independence and sovereignty with the necessities of war. They are inspired by a single thought, that of winning the war and by this means assuring to Syria the future of a free people. They give the Franco-Syrian problem a solution which springs from the desire of Free France not to retard, in spite of the war, the accomplishment of Syrian national aspirations and the fulfilment of the undertakings of the Allies. But it is necessary that a final settlement should be substituted for them as soon as possible, in the form of a Franco-Syrian Treaty which will definitively guarantee the independence of the country.

'Long live independent Syria! Long live England! Long live France!'[1]

S 645 648 At the same time the new President of the Syrian Republic took up his duties. In October Shaikh Taj was able to announce the formation of a Government, at the head of which was Hasan al-Hakim, a well-known financial expert and a former collaborator of Dr. Shahbandar. Among the members of the Ministry were an Alawi and a Druze, but none of the leaders of the Bloc.

The declaration of independence and the formation of a Government aroused no enthusiasm among the population. The nationalists preferred to wait before giving their approval, to see what steps Free France would take to render her undertakings effective. They also objected to the appointment of the President instead of his choice by a freely elected Chamber; and in particular they disapproved of the appointment of Shaikh Taj.

II

L 648 The independence of Lebanon was proclaimed two months later, on November 26th, 1941. General Catroux's proclamation ran as follows:

'Lebanese,

'The proclamation which I addressed to you on June 8th in the name of General de Gaulle, Chief of Free France, and

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A14.

000 Lebanon the Government of Sami as-Sulh succeeded that of
645 Ahmad ad-Da'uq. In Syria, Hasan al-Hakim resigned in April, 1942, and was succeeded by Husni al-Barazi, who himself gave way in January, 1943, to Jamil al-Ulshi. These changes had only a very limited significance.

648 This failure to restore the constitutional Government
186 increased the discontent which had already been caused in both Syria and Lebanon by the way in which their independence had been proclaimed. The administrative methods of the Free French officials were also much criticized; more particularly, a general contempt was felt for the many officials who had served Vichy and had only gone over to Free France after the occupation of the country in 1941. Thus the belief grew up that Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing by their change of masters. It was a belief held not only by the political classes but by ordinary citizens who resented the inefficiency of the French administration; not only by Arab nationalists but even by many of the Lebanese Christians, who could not feel towards the Free French the admiration, gratitude and trust which they had had for France as a great Power. In the circumstances it was natural that Great Britain should be largely blamed for the actions of her ally.

645 One consequence of the discontent was a revival in the
665 power of the National Bloc. The dissensions between its leaders were patched up, and the Bloc united in its demand for the restoration of the Chamber of 1936-1939 or else the holding of fresh elections. Its spokesman was Shukri al-Quwatli, whose reputation had grown steadily throughout the years. In October, 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation, he absented himself from Syria on a visit to Arabia and Iraq; but after his return to Damascus in September, 1942, he became once more the dominant figure of the political scene. Side by side with the revival of the Bloc there went a growth in the size and influence of the Socialist and Communist movements; this was due not so much to the spread of Marxist doctrines as to the universal discontent with the existing order and the eagerness to snatch at any hope of change.

14

722 In Syria and Lebanon alike, the attention of the greater part of the population was concentrated upon the economic problems of the war. Two of them were peculiarly important.

722 been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

15

648 After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to
642 restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

666 In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was
646 decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies,
665 including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

643 On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected
645 Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

L 648 of November 11th with the exception of that which declared
L 649 the constitutional amendments null and void.

5

S 648 The acute crisis was now over, but the problem from which it had sprung was still unsolved. When the Lebanese Chamber
L 648 re-assembled, the Premier asserted his Government's view that the reforms of November 8th were still in force. Moreover, the Syrian authorities lost no time, once the tension in Lebanon was relaxed, in taking parallel action. At an extraordinary session of the Syrian Chamber on January 24th, 1944, the President of the Republic and the Deputies took an oath of allegiance to a new Constitution which comprised Articles 1-115 of the existing text. The effect of this was to annul Article 116. Earlier, on December 1st, the Syrian Premier had declared that Syria did not recognize the Mandate, and was not willing to conclude a Treaty as a condition of the transfer of powers which properly belonged to her; had demanded the surrender by the French of all the attributes of sovereignty, under those limitations only which were necessitated by the state of war; and had affirmed that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were in agreement on the administration of the common interests.

The C.F.L.N. left these claims and assertions unchallenged, and announced that General Catroux would again go to Beirut, this time for the purpose of negotiating with the two Governments on the transfer of powers. The negotiations resulted in an agreement, concluded on December 22nd, which provided that the powers previously exercised by French authorities in the name of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should be transferred to their control. They would take over the services included in the category of Common Interests as from January 1st, and other powers by specific agreements still to be concluded. Thus, by the beginning of 1944, the two States had survived a sharp test of their will to independence and had extended the range of their autonomous administration.

6

S L 645 In the course of the year 1944 there were a number of changes in the political situation in Syria and Lebanon. Some of these changes were of no more than local importance.

Thus, in October the Ministry of Saadullah al-Jabiri in Syria was replaced by that of Faris al-Khuri, who had previously been President of the Chamber; the change was made for internal political reasons, and the new Government was composed largely of the same Ministers and followed the same general policy as its predecessor. In April, 1945, the Ministry was reconstructed. In Lebanon, too, there was a ministerial change: in January, 1945, the Government of Riyadh as-Sulh was replaced by that of Abdul-Hamid al-Karami, a Sunni Moslem deputy from Tripoli.

A change affecting the structure of the Syrian Republic took place in September, with the incorporation of the province of Jebel Druze fully in the Syrian State. It had already been formally incorporated in February, 1942, but had preserved a special administrative and financial régime which was now abolished. This step was taken at the request of the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze. A similar step was not taken in the Alawi province; although there was a party in favour of it, the forces of separatism were still strong, and the situation was complicated by the existence of disorder and unrest fomented by Sulaiman Murshid and his associates.

Other changes of greater importance, because they affected more immediately the problem of Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian relations, were the transfer of power to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and the financial agreement of February, 1944:

(i) In accordance with the agreement made by General Catroux with the two Governments on December 22nd, 1943, a series of particular agreements was negotiated during 1944, and by the end of the year almost all the services in question had been formally handed over, including the Customs Administration, the Financial and Economic Services, the control of the tobacco monopoly and concessionary companies, the Press Censorship, the Beduin control and the 'Sûreté Générale' (although a French 'Sûreté aux Armées' was retained). These transfers gave the two Governments almost all the attributes of independent governments. At the end of 1944 the only important attribute which had not been transferred was the control of the local levies, the 'Troupes Spéciales'.

15: Khadduri 5-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

648 Syrian nationalists took place in 1936 when the international situation had become critical in consequence of Mussolini's occupation of Ethiopia. Prompted by his threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, and inspired by Britain's successful move in the same year to appease the Egyptian nationalists, France once more offered to negotiate a treaty which would give Syria full independence. There was at this time the more liberal Popular Front Government in Paris, with Leon Blum as Prime Minister and Yvon Delbos as Foreign Minister, both of whom were more sympathetic toward Syria's national aspirations than their predecessors. The resulting treaty of September 9, 1936, negotiated by a Syrian Nationalist delegation in Paris, provided for the replacement of the Mandate by a Treaty of Alliance with France on the basis of full independence. While Lebanon was to remain outside of Syria, the autonomous districts (Jabal Druze and Latakia) were to join a unitary Syrian state. France was to receive certain rights regarding its military position in the Levant (as in the case of Britain in Iraq) and the two countries were to consult each other in all matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests. The Treaty was to last for 25 years and to come into force, as in the case of Iraq, when Syria was admitted to membership in the League of Nations as an independent state.

[646] Elections for a new Parliament which was to ratify the Treaty
645 were held in November 1936, and resulted in an overwhelming
648 majority for the Nationalists (Kutla Party). Parliament met on December 21 and elected Hashim al-Atasi, leader of the Kutla, President of the Republic in place of Muhammad Ali al-Abid. Faris al-Khuri, a member of the Kutla, was elected President of the Majlis (Parliament), while Jamil Mardam, another Kutla leader, formed the new Government. All members of the Cabinet were drawn from the Kutla Party. The Treaty with France, regarded as a victory for the Kutla, was approved by Parliament and formally signed by the Government and the High Commissioner on December 22, 1936. But it was never ratified by France owing to criticism leveled against it from military and conservative quarters.[17] In 1938 Jamil Mardam tendered his resignation,

[17] For a discussion of France's failure to ratify the treaty, see Charles-André Julien, "French Difficulties in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (1946), pp. 327 ff.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

which was followed by that of President Hashim al-Atasi, and the French High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Thus the second attempt to come to an understanding with Syria failed.

NATIONAL REGIME: THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The outbreak of World War II brought renewed hopes for independence. Upon France's defeat in 1940 the Syrian Nationalists began to agitate for the immediate formation of a national Government; indeed some of them went so far as to contact secretly the Iraqi nationalists, inviting them to intervene and unite the two countries under the Crown of Iraq. A few urged cooperation with the Axis, but the failure of the Rashid Ali movement in Iraq raised doubts as to the feasibility of achieving Arab national aspirations along this path, and on the whole the moderate elements began to come to the fore.

The joint Anglo-French occupation of Syria and Lebanon in 1941 brought with it a promise of independence. A Provisional Government was appointed, and on September 28, 1941, General Catroux formally proclaimed the independence of Syria. The Constitution, however, was not at once restored, and the Nationalists, led by Shukri al-Quwwatli, revived their activities. They pledged cooperation with the democratic powers, but demanded either the immediate restoration of the Majlis of 1936–39 or the holding of new elections. Finally, in January 1943 M. Helleu, representing General Catroux, French Delegate-General, announced the restoration of the Constitution and initiated arrangements for general elections. These were held on July 26, with the Nationalist Party (al-Kutla) overwhelmingly victorious.

The Majlis met on August 17, 1943, and elected Shukri al-Quwwatli, who had emerged as the unrivaled leader of the Nationalists, President of the Republic, and Faris al-Khuri President of the Majlis. On August 19 the President invited Sa'dullah al-Jabiri to form a new Cabinet, drawn almost wholly from the Kutla, and the Government began immediately afterward to negotiate with the French authorities for the transfer of such controls as the French still exercised.

Syria's struggle against foreign control was thus fully re-

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

ably in deference to the feelings of pious Muslims, that "Islamic Law shall be the main source of legislation." (Article 3.) 642

The new Constitution provides that the President, following the pattern of the Constitution of 1930 before its amendment, is elected by Parliament for a term of five years but is not eligible for re-election until an interval of like duration. The President is given certain exclusive powers, such as the right of suspensory veto, the dissolution of Parliament under certain circumstances, the right of appointing the Prime Minister and the other Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and the right to communicate directly with Parliament by messages addressed to its President. He is also held responsible for violation of the Constitution, for high treason, and for ordinary offenses, but he cannot be tried except by the Supreme Court. For other powers which the President exercises in conjunction with the Prime Minister or Minister concerned he is obviously not held responsible. Among such are the powers of appointment of Government officials and judges, sending and receiving diplomats, ratifying treaties with the approval of Parliament, and declaring war and signing peace treaties with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the High Defense Council, and Parliament. If the President is incapacitated from exercising his power for reasons other than death or resignation, the President of the Parliament temporarily exercises these powers. In case of death or resignation, Parliament must meet within ten days to elect another President.

The Cabinet is composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers, the number and functions of whom are to be defined by a special law. The Ministers may or may not be members of Parliament. The Cabinet prepares a platform on the basis of which the Prime Minister asks for a vote of confidence in Parliament; lack of confidence compels the Cabinet to resign. The Cabinet is jointly responsible to Parliament for its general policy, and each Minister is individually responsible for the work of his Ministry. The Ministers are not permitted directly or indirectly to enter into any business transactions with the Government during their terms of office, and they are held liable for indictment and trial 642 645

642 by the Supreme Court on the accusation of such activity at-
645 tributed to them.

642 Parliament is composed of one Chamber of Deputies (Majlis),
646 elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage (including women) for a term of four years. It convenes from October 1 to December 31 and from March 1 to May 15, and each year elects its President on the basis of absolute majority. The Deputies represent the entire nation and not their own constituencies. As in the case of the Ministers, the Deputies are not permitted to exploit their positions in any business transaction with the Government. Legislation, other than financial bills, may be initiated by Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet; but financial bills which involve reduction of taxes or expenditures of funds must be proposed either by 20 members of Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet. Article 59 stipulates that Parliament "shall not cede its legislative powers." This article, it seems, was inserted to ensure that Parliament would not follow the example of the Constituent Assembly in delegating legislative, in addition to executive, powers to the Government and thus pave the way toward the realization of a dictatorial regime. If one-fourth of the members of Parliament object to the constitutionality of a bill before its promulgation, or if the President does so, then it is suspended until the Supreme Court passes a decision regarding its constitutionality. If the Supreme Court decides within 10 days that the bill is unconstitutional, it is returned to Parliament for reconsideration.

642 The judicial system is designed to be free from interference
692 by any other governmental agency. "The honor, conscience, and integrity of the judges are guaranteed for the right and freedom of the people." (Article 105.) The judicial power is exercised by three types of courts: (1) the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Cassation; (3) ordinary tribunals. The Supreme Court is composed of 7 members to be elected by Parliament from a list of 14 nominees chosen from among highly qualified judges. The members of the Supreme Court are elected for 5 years and are eligible for re-election. They are independent and cannot be discharged except by a decision of the Supreme Court itself.

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Art. 87. The President shall exercise the prerogatives of pardon. 642

Art. 88. (1) When the President of the Republic is unable to 643
discharge the duty of his office, the President of the Chamber of Deputies shall assume that duty provided he yields, during this time, the Presidency of the Chamber to its Vice President.

(2) Should the Presidency become vacant through the death or resignation of the President, the Chamber shall be summoned by its President within ten days therefrom for the purpose of electing the new President. Should it not be thus summoned, the Chamber shall meet of its own accord on the eleventh day.

(3) If the Chamber is dissolved at the time the vacancy occurs or two months only are left before its mandate expires, the President of the Chamber shall continue to assume the above-mentioned duties until the new Chamber meets.

Art. 89. The emoluments of the President shall be fixed by a law.

2.

THE CABINET

Art. 90. At the opening of each term of the Legislature, or after 642
the election of a new President of the Republic, or after a vote of 645
non-confidence for the Cabinet, or its resignation, or if the Presidency of the Cabinet becomes vacant for some reasons, the President of the Republic shall appoint a Prime Minister and upon the proposal of the Prime Minister the members of the Cabinet.

Art. 91. (1) The Cabinet shall submit its programme to the Chamber for a vote of confidence.

(2) A vote of confidence shall be considered granted if approved by a majority of the Deputies present.

Art. 92. (1) The Cabinet shall direct the policy of the State.

(2) The Cabinet shall meet, presided over by the Prime Minister, to consider the following matters:

(a) Bills
(b) Decrees concerning organization
(c) The State budget and the special budgets
(d) Internal and foreign policy
(e) Cases which the Prime Minister, or any Minister, with the approval of the former, submits to the Cabinet for consideration.

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(f) All other questions provided for by law.

(3) The decisions of the Cabinet shall be adopted by a majority of votes. Any opposing minister shall be considered as having approved of the decisions unless he resigns.

Art. 93. The organization of the Presidency of the Cabinet, the Cabinet and the powers of each Minister shall be determined by law.

Art. 94 (1) The Prime Minister shall direct the meetings of the Cabinet which he presides over.

(2) He shall harmonize the works among the various Ministries.

(3) He alone can ask for a vote of confidence for the Cabinet from the Chamber of Deputies.

(4) He may entrust some of his functions to one of the Ministers.

Art. 95. The President of the Republic, with the approval of the Cabinet, shall promulgate decrees necessary for the execution of various laws. These Decrees shall not repeal, exempt from the operation, or amend the provisions of the laws in question.

Art. 96. When the Cabinet resigns, or a motion of non-confidence is passed, the Ministers shall continue to discharge their responsibilities until a new Cabinet is formed.

Art. 97. No Minister while in office may directly or indirectly buy or rent anything which is the property of the State, even at a public auction. He may not participate in contracts for supplies entered into by public departments, or any institution attached to the Government or under its control, nor may he be on the board of any firm, or its agent or lawyer, or take part in any business.

Art. 98. The Ministers shall be jointly responsible to Parliament for the general policy of the Government. They shall be individually responsible in respect to matters arising in their respective departments.

Art. 99. The civil, financial and penal responsibility of the Ministers shall be determined by law.

Art. 100. A Minister shall leave office when indicted and until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its judgment. The Minister's resignation shall not prevent proceedings being taken or continued against him.

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Art. 101. The offices of a Deputy and a Minister may be held simultaneously. 642 645

Art. 102. The emoluments of the Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be fixed by a law.

Art. 103. (1) There shall be established a "Bureau of Inspection" attached to the Presidency of the Cabinet.

(2) This Bureau shall communicate to the Presidency of the Chamber copies of the reports of its inspectors and their conclusions together with its own observations.

(3) The classification of the members of this Bureau, their prerogatives and immunities shall be defined by a law.

Chapter V

THE JUDICIAL POWER

Art. 104. The Judiciary is an independent authority. 642

Art. 105. (1) Judges are independent. The only authority above them in the exercise of their power is Law. 692

(2) The honour of the judges and their moral conscience and integrity constitute a guarantee for the rights of the people and their freedoms.

Art. 106. Before assuming office a judge shall swear that he will mete out justice to the people and that he will observe the law.

Art. 107. Judgments shall be rendered in the name of the People of Syria and shall state the grounds on which they were reached.

Art. 108. Judicial powers shall be exercised by:

(1) The Supreme Court

(2) The High Court of Appeal

(3) All other Courts

Art. 109. All judges shall be appointed by a decision of the "Supreme Judiciary Council" and in accordance with the law.

Art. 110. The promotion of judges, their transfer, disciplinary measures to be taken against them and their dismissal shall be governed by a decision of the Supreme Judiciary Council in accordance with the law.

Art. 111. The institution of public prosecutions is a judicial function. It shall be headed by the Minister of Justice.

Art. 112. The public prosecutor shall be the guardian of justice,

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might arise; in default of an agreement, it would take appropriate measures to maintain order and to guarantee peace. The Mandatory Power desired to favour and hasten the political evolution of the States under its protection, and to promote their economic development. As for the 'Common Interests', the High Commissioner would continue to administer them with the active and ever-increasing assistance of the representatives of the States.[1]

A few months later, in February, 1928, M. Ponsot judged that the time had come for the election of a Constituent Assembly. In that month the state of siege declared at the beginning of the revolt was finally raised, the censorship suppressed, the special tribunals established during the revolt abolished, and a general amnesty issued. At the same time Damad Ahmad Nami's Ministry was replaced by a new provisional Government of 'moderate' politicians presided over by Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, with the task of preparing the way for the creation of regular institutions to which it could hand over its functions.

The elections were held in April of the same year. In the towns, most of those elected belonged to the more uncompromising section of the nationalists, the opponents of Shaikh Taj ad-Din's Ministry; in the countryside, however, they were mainly moderates. Of the seventy members of the Assembly, over two-thirds supported the Government, but owing to their lack of cohesion and the decision of the Government not to intervene in the proceedings, it was the so-called 'extreme' nationalists who dominated the discussions. They were the more powerful in that they had recovered from the confusion caused by the collapse of the revolt, and had succeeded once more in organizing themselves in a party, the 'National Bloc'. In so far as it had a founder he was Ibrahim Hananu, an Aleppine and a man respected even by his opponents. The Bloc was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It included leading members of important landowning families, like Jamil Mardam Bey from Damascus, Saadullah al-Jabiri from Aleppo, and Hashim al-Atasi, the President of the Bloc. It included also individuals important rather for character and intellect than for representing large sections of opinion, like Faris al-Khuri, a Protestant lawyer, law-teacher and financier. It

[1] For text, see *Orients Moderne*, September, 1927, pp. 409–11.

665 was supported by several groups which preserved something of their individuality inside the alliance. The most important of them was the 'Istiqeal' group, descended from one of the secret societies of the years before 1914. It advocated the complete independence of the Arab countries and tended to be more uncompromising than the other constituent elements of the Bloc. Its leader was Shukri al-Quwatli. Among its other prominent members were Nabih al-Azmah, the Amir Adil Arslan, and Riyadh as-Sulh, perhaps the most important Arab nationalist leader in Lebanon.

646 One of the most prominent of the members of the Bloc,
642 Hashim al-Atasi, was elected President of the Assembly when it met in Damascus in June, 1928; while Ibrahim Hananu became President of the Commission set up to draft the Constitution. The Commission completed its work by August,
642 and laid its draft before the Assembly. The Constitution which it had drawn up was modelled on those of Western democratic countries, and provided for the exercise of legislative powers by a single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, and of executive powers by an elected President and a responsible Ministry. In addition it contained guarantees for the rights of individuals and communities. Thus Article 6 stipulated that all Syrians should be equal before the law, and there should be no inequality of treatment on grounds of religion, sect, race or language. Article 15 guaranteed liberty of conscience, the free exercise of all forms of worship, and the safeguarding of the religious interests and personal status of every sect. Article 28 guaranteed the rights of the religious communities, including their right to establish schools, teaching in their own language, subject to the principles laid down by law; and Article 37 declared that the electoral law to be issued subsequently would provide for the representation of religious minorities. (This provision was carried out. Each Parliament elected since 1930 has contained a number of representatives of the minorities, roughly proportionate to their size.)

648 In general the draft was acceptable to the High Com-
642 missioner, but there were certain articles to the inclusion of which he objected. Thus Article 2 declared that the Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity, which was unaffected by the divisions which had arisen between the end of the war and the

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present time. This was a denial of the separate existence of Jebel Druze, the Alawi district, the Lebanese Republic, Palestine and Transjordan; and M. Ponsot judged it to be irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law. Again, four other Articles asserted the right of the President of the Republic to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad and proclaim martial law (73, 74, 75 and 112); and Article 110 declared that the organization of the army would form the subject of a special law. These five Articles also the High Commissioner thought to be incompatible with the obligations of France. He therefore asked that the Articles concerned should be separated from the general body of the draft. The Assembly refused, and M. Ponsot thereupon adjourned it for three months in August, 1928, and for a further three in November. He made an alternative suggestion, that the Assembly should modify the wording of Article 2 and should retain the other offending articles but add to the draft a general reservation safeguarding France's international obligations. This also proved abortive, since he and the Assembly could not agree upon a text for the reservation.

In February, 1929, the work of the Assembly was prorogued *sine die*. During this period and throughout 1929 the split between the National Bloc and 'moderates' grew ever wider. The former, while remaining tranquil, demanded the negotiation of a Treaty to replace the Mandate; the latter continued to advocate a policy of co-operation with France, and attempted without much success to form an effective political organization. The High Commissioner found it impossible to reach an agreement with the nationalists on the constitutional question, while the 'moderates' were too weak and divided for their support to be of value to him; he therefore felt himself bound to give up the attempt to entrust to the Syrian people the responsibility for the elaboration of their own constitution. Accordingly he dissolved the Constituent Assembly in May, 1930, and on his own initiative issued a Constitution for the State of Syria. It was to come into force after the election of the members of a Chamber of Deputies, at a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner.

This Constitution was virtually the same as that drafted by the Assembly, except for such changes as were necessary to

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642 enable the Mandatory Power to carry out its obligations
648 under the Covenant. Thus Article 2 was modified, and stated merely that 'Syria forms an indivisible political unity'; and an additional article (116) was added to the effect that 'the provisions of the present Constitution are not, and cannot be, in opposition to the obligations undertaken by France in regard to Syria, particularly obligations towards the League of Nations. . . . So long as the international obligations of France in regard to Syria remain in force, any provisions of the present Constitution which are of a nature to affect those obligations will be applicable only under conditions to be determined by agreement between the French and Syrian Governments'.

Simultaneously a number of other decrees were promulgated. In addition to the Organic Laws for the Governments of Latakia and Jebel Druze, already mentioned, they included laws for the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and for a Conference of Common Interests composed of Delegations from the States and Governments, and charged with the management of their common financial and economic affairs.[1]

12

646 The elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in January, 1932, and the Chamber met in June. More than three-quarters of its members were 'moderates'. Only a quarter were 'extreme' nationalists demanding full and immediate independence; but as had happened in the Constituent Assembly, the minority soon showed itself to be the dominant element. Its hopes were raised and its case strengthened by the recent conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the termination of the Mandate and the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations (1930-1932).

643 The first task of the Chamber was to choose the President
645 of the Republic. It elected Muhammad Ali al-Abid, son of
648 Izzat Pasha al-Abid who had been secretary to the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. He entrusted the construction of a Cabinet to a prominent moderate, Haqqi al-Azm, who formed a Ministry of which half the members were 'moderates' and half 'extreme' nationalists. Negotiations were opened between the Ministry and the High Commissioner for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

[1] For texts of these documents, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 676–98.

648 from the Mandatory Power to the Syrian Government being completed within four years.[1]

648 The Treaty was immediately laid before the Chamber. Its
646 reception by the nationalists inside and outside the Chamber was so unfavourable as to make it clear that it had no chance of acceptance. Accordingly the High Commissioner suspended the sittings of the Chamber, withdrew from its cognizance the terms of the Treaty, and authorized the President of the Republic to govern provisionally by means of decree-laws. A year later, in November, 1934, he suspended the Chamber *sine die*. These acts aroused the resentment and indignation of the nationalists, but in general the country remained quiet, apart from local and ephemeral disturbances, throughout 1934 and 1935. In March, 1934, the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, which continued in office for practically two years.

13

665 Perhaps the most important development of the early 1930's
186 was the growth of a number of political parties with a special appeal to the educated youth of the towns, and therefore of great significance in a country whose political circumstances gave peculiar weight to the actions of the young. Very different from one another in their doctrines and their aims, these parties were alike in that they endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older parties had not for the most part possessed ; alike, too, in that they tried to base their activities not upon gusts of feeling or some immediate objective, but upon systematic and reasoned doctrines. They expressed and attempted to direct the spirit of the youth of Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and the other towns : a restless youth, discontented both with its foreign masters and with its own older generation, conscious of talents and ideas and cramped by lack of opportunity, drawn simultaneously towards and away from the West, eager and suspicious, hasty and thoughtful. Even when the youth-movements took a paramilitary form, that does not necessarily mean that they were Fascist ; they were merely endeavouring to satisfy certain human needs which in more fortunate

[1] For text, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1933* (Paris, 1934), pp. 189–95.

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before 1914; and was it not ridiculous, as well as expensive, for so small a region to have so grandiose and complex a constitution?

As a further consequence, the movement of discontent with sectarianism was greatly strengthened, and many Lebanese, especially among the young, began to look for an alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges Libanaises', the party of Lebanese nationalism, received much support. So too did the 'Syrian National Party', with its doctrine of the total separation of Church and State; while the Arab Nationalists pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself.

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In Syria, the first steps towards the execution of the Treaty were taken immediately after the return of the Syrian delegation from Paris. Arrangements were made for the holding of Parliamentary elections; the Chamber was to consist of 86 members, 16 of them representing the religious minorities and 7 the Beduin tribes. The elections, which took place in November, 1936, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the candidates of the National Bloc; and when the Chamber met, on December 21st, its first important act was to choose Faris al-Khuri as its President, and its second to accept the resignation of Muhammad Ali al-Abid from the Presidency of the Republic and to elect Hashim al-Atasi in his place. The Ayyubi Ministry having resigned, the President entrusted the formation of a new one to Jamil Mardam Bey. All the members of his Ministry were drawn from the National Bloc.

This Ministry found no difficulty in securing the confidence of the Chamber, which unanimously approved the Treaty in December, 1936. It was formally signed by the High Commissioner and the members of the Ministry on December 22nd.

In the same month, after consultations with notables of the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, their annexation to the Syrian State was proclaimed. This proclamation was accompanied by special Statutes granting a measure of administrative autonomy to the two regions. Despite protests from separatist groups against the concept of a unitary Syria, the régime envisaged in these Statutes was inaugurated by the appointment in January, 1937, of two prominent members of the

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

722 been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

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648 After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to
642 restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

666 In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was
646 decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies,
665 including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

643 On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected
645 Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Za'im was overthrown by his opponents on August 14, 1949, 649 having remained in power only four and a half months. Colonel 646 Sami al-Hinnawi, who led this second coup and executed Za'im, reversed the policy of friendly relations with the Saudi-Egyptian bloc and again opened negotiations with Iraq for a Syro-Iraqi union. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in November, but when the Assembly met on December 12 and was about to approve a project for union with Iraq, a third army move on December 14, led by Colonel Adib Shishakli, sealed the fate of unity with Iraq under a dual monarchy. Shishakli declared that the Army would no longer interfere in politics and that government by civilians would be maintained; but it remained clear that the Army would continue to resist any policy which ran counter to its wishes.

The Constituent Assembly elected Rushdi al-Kikhya, leader 646 of the People's Party which won the elections, as its President, 643 and Hashim al-Atasi, an old member of the Nationalist Party, as the temporary head of the State. On January 7, 1950, after a long cabinet crisis attributed to the intervention of the Army in politics, President Atasi took an oath of office and the Constituent Assembly gave temporary legislative and executive powers to the Government, subject to its control, until the promulgation of a Constitution. In the meantime a committee of 33 members, 642 under the chairmanship of Nazim al-Qudsi, was appointed to prepare a draft constitution for the Assembly. The Committee began its meetings on January 4 and completed its work three months later. As its chairman stated in his report to the Assembly, the Committee made use of no less than fifteen European and Asiatic (including Arab) constitutions, and received proposals from individuals and organizations either directly or through the press.[22] The draft Constitution, consisting of 177 articles, was communicated to the President of the Assembly on April 15, 1950, but debate did not get underway until July 7. After prolonged discussion, first on the draft generally and then article by article, the Constitution was approved with considerable changes (including reduction to 166 articles) on September 5,

[22] See text of the Report in the *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (June 22, 1950), Appendix, pp. 1–2.

642 by the Supreme Court on the accusation of such activity at-
645 tributed to them.

642 Parliament is composed of one Chamber of Deputies (Majlis),
646 elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage (including women) for a term of four years. It convenes from October 1 to December 31 and from March 1 to May 15, and each year elects its President on the basis of absolute majority. The Deputies represent the entire nation and not their own constituencies. As in the case of the Ministers, the Deputies are not permitted to exploit their positions in any business transaction with the Government. Legislation, other than financial bills, may be initiated by Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet; but financial bills which involve reduction of taxes or expenditures of funds must be proposed either by 20 members of Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet. Article 59 stipulates that Parliament "shall not cede its legislative powers." This article, it seems, was inserted to ensure that Parliament would not follow the example of the Constituent Assembly in delegating legislative, in addition to executive, powers to the Government and thus pave the way toward the realization of a dictatorial regime. If one-fourth of the members of Parliament object to the constitutionality of a bill before its promulgation, or if the President does so, then it is suspended until the Supreme Court passes a decision regarding its constitutionality. If the Supreme Court decides within 10 days that the bill is unconstitutional, it is returned to Parliament for reconsideration.

642 The judicial system is designed to be free from interference
692 by any other governmental agency. "The honor, conscience, and integrity of the judges are guaranteed for the right and freedom of the people." (Article 105.) The judicial power is exercised by three types of courts: (1) the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Cassation; (3) ordinary tribunals. The Supreme Court is composed of 7 members to be elected by Parliament from a list of 14 nominees chosen from among highly qualified judges. The members of the Supreme Court are elected for 5 years and are eligible for re-election. They are independent and cannot be discharged except by a decision of the Supreme Court itself.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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foundations for commercial and intellectual progress were less firmly established than in Lebanon, and the Muslim leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to acquire the technique of government. The root of the trouble was that the French were opposed to self-government and tended to refuse office to nationalist political leaders, except for short, self-defeating periods. But though they failed to foster self-government, the French did much good in both Syria and Lebanon as engineers, doctors, educators, and archaeologists, and performed a valuable service in training at least a cadre of competent civil servants.

With the end of the French Mandate there emerged two sovereign and independent Republics with many mutual and some conflicting interests. For some years the rest of the world failed to distinguish between the two, and it is still possible to find educated persons who suppose that Beirut is the capital of Syria. Syria and Lebanon are, to some extent, mutually dependent or complementary, but they are distinct and their political development will be considered separately.

Government and Politics

(a) Syria

Under her constitution Syria is a Republic in which the legislative power is in the hands of a Chamber of Deputies numbering 114 members in 1949. The deputies are elected by direct suffrage granted to all men and to women of a certain educational standard. The representation of religious minorities is shown in the table on p. 466 above. The President of the Republic must be a Muslim and is elected for a term of five years by the Parliament; he nominates the Prime Minister who appoints his cabinet ministers. The Parliament is elected for four years but may be dissolved by the President. The constitution was suspended in 1952 by the military dictatorship and a new one on the Presidential model adopted in July 1953.

Damascus is the seat of government and there are ten provinces, each under a Governor who is assisted by a staff of civil servants representing most of the ministries. The provinces (*muhafaza*) are divided in *qazas*, each under a *qaimaqam*, who is a civil servant under the Ministry of Interior; the *qazas* are divided into *nahiyas* under *mudirs*. Within a *nahiya* may be several villages, each of which is rather loosely under the control of the *mukhtar* who may be elected by the village or appointed by the ministry. The judiciary are independent of the legislature and

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642 Art. 33. (1) Every Syrian has the right of access to public service, subject to the conditions laid down by the law.

(2) Appointment to public offices, either temporary or permanent, in the State, the departments attached to it and its municipalities shall be effected by public competition. The law shall determine the exceptions to this rule.

Art. 34. Islamic wakfs belong exclusively to Moslems; they constitute one of the public institutions of the State and enjoy financial and administrative independence. Their status shall be regulated by law.

Chapter III

THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

642 646 Art. 35. The legislative power shall be exercised by the Chamber of Deputies. Elections for this Chamber shall be public, secret, direct, uniform and in conformity with the provisions of the Electoral Law.

Art. 36. The duration of the Chamber shall be for a period of four years beginning from the date of the decree declaring the final results of elections; this period shall not be extended except by law in a state of war.

Art. 37. Every deputy shall represent the whole of the nation and may not accept any restriction on his mandate; he shall discharge his responsibilities guided by the dictates of his honour and conscience.

Art. 38. Electors are Syrian men and women who have completed the eighteenth year of their age, who are listed in the civil census register and who have all other qualifications specified in the Electoral Law.

Art. 39. Any Syrian *(Souri)* may stand for election as a deputy if he qualifies as an elector; provided that he is educated, has completed his thirtieth year of age and has fulfilled all other conditions specified by the Electoral Law.

Art. 40. The Electoral Law shall include provisions to guarantee the following:

(1) The validity of elections.

(2) The right of candidates to take part in the supervision of the electoral procedure.

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(3) The punishment of those who interfere with the will of electors. 642 646

Art. 41. (1) General elections shall take place within sixty days preceding the expiration of the term of the Chamber; if elections are not completed when the term of the Chamber expires, or are delayed for some reason, the Chamber of Deputies shall continue to function until the new Chamber is elected. In all cases, the authority of the Chamber of Deputies shall remain effective until the final results of the general elections are declared.

(2) If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, general elections shall take place within sixty days from the date of the decree dissolving the Chamber.

If elections are not held accordingly, the dissolved Chamber shall regain its full constitutional authority and shall convene immediately as though it had never been dissolved.

(3) Should general elections be delayed beyond the specified date, the Chamber shall investigate the reasons and determine the responsibility for such delay.

Art. 42. (1) The Chamber of Deputies shall be invited by a decree to convene within twenty days beginning from the second day of elections. If the necessary decree inviting the Chamber to convene is not promulgated, the Chamber shall definitely meet on the twenty-first day.

(2) The Chamber shall elect at the first meeting, its president and the members of its Bureau.

Art. 43. (1) The Chamber of Deputies shall be considered as being in permanent session.

(2) The Chamber shall definitely convene from October first until the end of December, and from March first until the middle of May.

(3) The President of the Chamber shall fix dates of meetings outside these two periods either by a decision of his Bureau, or upon a written request from a quarter of the deputies or from the Government.

Art. 44. Deputies shall not be prosecuted by civil or criminal courts for stating facts, expressing opinions or for voting in public and secret sessions or in committees.

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642 Art. 45. Deputies shall enjoy immunity while the Chamber is
646 meeting; they shall not be liable to criminal prosecution, nor shall a criminal sentence be enforced against them without the assent of the Assembly, except in the case of *flagrante delicto* and, in such a case, the Chamber of Deputies shall be promptly informed.

Art. 46. Before assuming his duty, every deputy shall take publicly in the presence of the Assembly the following oath:

> "I swear by Almighty God to be loyal to the Constitution, to defend it, to maintain the independence of the country, the freedoms, interest, wealth and dignity of the people. I also swear to observe the laws of the country, to discharge my parliamentary responsibility in honor, truthfulness and sincerity and to work for the achievement of the unity of the Arab countries."

Art. 47. The remuneration of members of the Chamber shall be determined by a law.

Art. 48. (1) No deputy shall exploit his parliamentary office in any work.

(2) Incompatibilities between the office of a deputy and other functions shall be determined by law.

Art. 49. In the event of a vacancy occurring for some reason, the seat shall be filled within two months, provided the remaining period for mandate of the Chamber is not less than six months. The new member's term of office shall terminate with the mandate of the legislature.

Art. 50. The Chamber of Deputies shall have the right to grant a general amnesty for crimes committed before the amnesty was proposed, provided an absolute majority of the members of the Chamber vote for it.

Art. 51. Treaties affecting the safety of the State or its public finances, commercial agreements and, in general, every other treaty entered into for more than one year, shall not come finally into force except after being adopted by the Chamber.

Art. 52. The Chamber shall have the right at all times to form committees, or to delegate one or more of its members for investigation of any matter; ministers and all officers of the State shall co-

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operate by testifying, submitting documents and giving statements that may be asked of them. 642 646

Art. 53. (1) Every year at the opening of the October session, the Chamber, under the Presidency of its oldest member and the two youngest members acting as Secretaries, shall proceed immediately to elect a President and the members of its Bureau in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber.

(2) The President of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected by an absolute majority of the total number of the Deputies. A relative majority shall be sufficient at the second ballot.

Art. 54. (1) The President shall maintain order inside the Parliament.

(2) The Parliament shall have a special guard obeying the orders of the President. No armed forces may enter the Assembly buildings, nor be posted in their neighborhood, except at the demand of the President.

Art. 55. (1) The meetings of the Assembly shall be public.

(2) The Assembly may, however, decide to hold secret meetings to discuss specific matters at the request of the Government or of ten of its members.

Art. 56. (1) The Assembly cannot meet unless an absolute majority of the members composing it are present.

(2) The Rules of Procedure shall determine the responsibility of any member who does not attend a meeting without a reasonable excuse.

Art. 57. (1) Voting in the Chamber shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of Procedure.

(2) Deputies may only vote if they are present at a meeting.

(3) Elections shall be decided by secret ballot.

(4) Decisions shall be taken by the majority of those present and voting, except where otherwise provided by the Constitution or the Rules of Procedure. Should the votes be equal, the proposal under discussion shall be rejected.

Art. 58. (1) The President of the Republic, with the approval of the Cabinet, and every deputy shall have the right to introduce bills.

(2) Financial bills proposing to abolish or decrease a tax, or remit a part of it, or involving appropriations from the State budget

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642 to a certain project, or proposing the floating of a loan, its guarantee
646 or payment, may only be introduced by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Cabinet, or by twenty deputies or more.

Art. 59. The Chamber of Deputies shall never abandon its legislative power.

Art. 60. No bill which has been rejected by the Chamber may be reintroduced before the lapse of six months.

Art. 61. (1) If the Chamber of Deputies passes a bill, the President of the Republic shall promulgate it within fifteen days from the date thereof.

(2) However, if an absolute majority of the members of the Chamber vote that a bill is of an urgent nature, the President of the Republic shall promulgate it within the time prescribed in it; if he fails to do so, the President of the Chamber shall then promulgate it immediately.

Art. 62. (1) Within the time allowed for promulgation, the President of the Republic may return to the Chamber non-urgent bills for reconsideration. This shall be done in accordance with a decree issued by the Cabinet and giving the justification thereof.

(2) Should the Chamber confirm its former vote by an absolute majority of its members, the law shall be promulgated immediately.

Art. 63. (1) If a quarter of the Deputies object to a bill as unconstitutional prior to its promulgation, or if the President of the Republic sends it to the Supreme Court for the same reason, such a bill shall not be promulgated until the Supreme Court gives its decision within ten days. If the bill is urgent, the Supreme Court shall decide within three days.

(2) If the Supreme Court decides that it conflicts with the Constitution, it shall be returned to the Chamber for rectification.

(3) Should the Supreme Court refrain from giving its decision within the period fixed in this Article, the President of the Republic shall promulgate the law.

Art. 64 (1) The Cabinet shall be represented in the meetings of the Chamber either by the Prime Minister or by some of the Ministers.

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(2) The Prime Minister and the Ministers may attend meetings of the Chamber, may address the Chamber and may obtain assistance and benefit from the experience of the officials of the Government during the debates. 642 646

(3) Any minister shall attend the meetings of the Chamber when asked by its President to do so.

Art. 65. Any member of the Chamber is entitled to introduce an interpellation, or to submit questions to the Government and to obtain a reply within the period fixed by the Rules of Procedure.

Art. 66. (1) The Rules of Procedure shall determine for the Chamber the method for conducting discussions, debates, interpellations, interrogations, voting, the powers of the office and the committees and all other work of the Chamber.

(2) The Rules of Procedure shall have the power of a law and shall not be amended except in accordance with their own provisions.

Art. 67 (1) The Chamber shall not consider a motion of non-confidence against the Cabinet or any one of its members unless presented by fifteen deputies or more, and shall not be discussed except two days after its presentation.

(2) If the absolute majority of the total number of the Deputies adopt a motion of non-confidence, the entire Cabinet shall resign.

(3) A Minister against whom a vote of non-confidence has been adopted by the Chamber shall resign.

Art. 68. The Chamber shall choose a committee to consider and investigate all petitions submitted by an individual or a group of citizens. The committee shall inquire into every complaint and shall inform the petitioner accordingly.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXECUTIVE POWER

Art. 69. The Executive Power shall be vested, on behalf of the People, in the President of the Republic and the Cabinet, within the limits assigned by this Constitution. 642 643

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ELECTORAL LAW OF SYRIA[1]

Decree No. 17 of September 10, 1949

Chapter I

NUMBER OF DEPUTIES

Art. 1. The headquarters of each Muhafazat,[2] with every Nahiya and village under its jurisdiction, as well as every Qadha, shall form an electoral district.

Art. 2. The electoral district shall elect one deputy for every 30,000 Syrian inhabitants or for a fraction of population exceeding half that number.

An electoral district which does not contain 30,000 but not less than 15,000 shall elect one deputy.

The Qadha which does not contain 15,000 shall be joined to the nearest neighboring Qadha headquarters in the Muhafazat, or to the Muhafazat headquarters itself. These sections joined together shall then constitute one electoral district.

Art. 3. A number of parliamentary seats shall be assigned to non-Moslems in proportion to their number in each electoral district and as specified in the previous article.

Art. 4. Nomadic tribes shall be represented by six deputies. The "Special Consultative Council for Nomadic Tribes" shall elect these six deputies from its literate members.

[1] Arabic text in *Official Journal of the Syrian Republic*, no. 46, September 12, 1949, text through the courtesy of Mr. Faiz El-Khouri, Minister of Syria, Washington. English translation prepared by Dr. George J. Tomeh, Second Secretary to the Syrian Legation, upon request of the *Middle East Journal* (Washington), where it also appears (IV [October, 1950], 476-481). The Syrian electoral law of March 28, 1928, reproduced in the first edition of this volume (pp. 277-295), and its amendment of April 21, 1928 (*ibid.*, p. 295) were superseded by a new electoral law of May 21, 1947. The Arabic text of the law of 1947 is to be found in *Official Journal of the Syrian Republic*, no. 23, May 24, 1947. An English translation of substantial parts of the law of 1947 appears in *Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947*, United Nations, 1949, pp. 295-297.

[2] Syria has various administrative divisions and subdivisions; a *Muhafazat* (province) is governed by a *Muhafez*, a *Qadha* (district) by a *Qaimmaqam*, and a *Nahiya* (subdistrict) by a *Mudir*. Throughout this translation the Arabic terms will be used (*Translator's note*).

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Art. 5. The date for parliamentary elections shall be fixed by a decree upon the proposal of the Minister of the Interior and the approval of the cabinet. This decree ought to be published at least one month prior to the fixed date for elections.

Art. 6. At least twenty days before elections, a decree shall be issued, upon the proposal of the Minister of the Interior, and the approval of the cabinet, fixing the number of deputies for each electoral district and according to Articles 2 and 3 of this Law. This decree remains effective during the period of parliament.

Chapter II

ELECTORS

Section I. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ELECTOR

Art. 7. Every Syrian, male and female, who completes the 18th year of his or her age in the beginning of January of the year of elections, shall have the right of suffrage. Each person shall vote in the electoral district where he is listed in the census register, provided that he enjoys his civil and political rights and that he is not deprived of his electoral competence.

Moreover, women must have at least a certificate of primary education in order to be allowed to vote. Separate polling centers shall be established for women voters.

Art. 8. All persons deprived of their right to suffrage, according to Articles 63 and 66 of the Criminal Law, shall be prevented from voting.

Art. 9. The right of suffrage shall be suspended for the following persons:

(a) Those under inhibition who have not been released.

(b) The mentally ill, during their period of sickness.

(c) Those persons convicted according to Article 65 of the Criminal Law.

Art. 10. Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the army, the gendarmerie, the police, the forces of security and persons attached to any organization of a military nature in all ranks, shall refrain from voting.

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Section II. ELECTORAL REGISTERS

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Art. 11. During the first half of January of each year, a "census committee" for each electoral district shall arrange an electoral register containing the names of electors at that district.

Art. 12. This committee shall be composed of:

(a) The director of municipality, or his deputy, as president.

(b) The officer of the census register, or the clerk of this office.

(c) A member to be delegated by the municipal council.

(d) A member to be delegated by the Qadha council.

Art. 13. In arranging the above-mentioned registers, the census committee shall base its work on the census register and can seek the assistance of the Mudirs, the bodies of elders, and any other person or body whose help is deemed necessary.

Art. 14. This committee shall put out, not later than the 15th of January, a unified register of electors containing their names, surnames and residence.

Art. 15. These registers must not include persons described in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of this Law.

Art. 16. The registers shall then be forwarded to the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam who will post them in public places (government buildings, places of worship, public circles, Nahiya seats and villages) and publish them till the 15th of January.

Art. 17. Any person whose name was omitted from the electoral list without justification, or because of an error occurring in his census register, has the right to ask that his name be listed or to object to the undue registration of any other person.

Art. 18. The petition of objection shall be submitted to the committee of inspection not later than the end of January.

This committee shall be formed in the headquarters of the Muhafazat with the Muhafez as chairman and the district attorney and the director of finance as two members; when formed in the headquarters of the Qadha, the Qaimmaqam shall act as chairman of the committee, and the justice of the peace and the director of finance as the two members.

Art. 19. The committee of inspection must decide on the petitions within five days of their submission to it; the decisions of the commit-

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tee can be appealed within three days to the court of the region. The court must, within five days, decide finally on the matter. Petitions of objections are exempt from all fees.

Art. 20. The committee of inspection shall put out final and comprehensive lists of all electors of an electoral district. These lists shall be published as specified in Article 16 of this Law.

Art. 21. Every Syrian whose name was omitted from the electoral lists has the right, within five days after the declaration and fixing of the date for elections, to request the justice of the peace to register his name.

The justice of the peace has to decide within five days at most whether to order the registration of the applicant or not, after checking on the qualifications mentioned in Article 7, and disqualifications mentioned in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of this Law.

Petitions and decisions shall be exempt from fees and stamps.

Chapter III

CANDIDACY FOR PARLIAMENT

Section I. QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES

Art. 22. A candidate for parliament must fulfil the following conditions:

(a) He ought to have been a Syrian national for the last ten years at least.

(b) He must be a male elector listed in the electoral registers.

(c) He must have completed his 30th year of age at the beginning of January of the year of elections.

(d) He must have passed the fifth primary grade, or obtained a certificate of primary education, or completed a course of study equivalent to either of them.

(e) He must stand for elections in one electoral district only.

Art. 23. Government staff defined in the "basic law of officials" who receive their salaries from the Government treasury or from other public treasuries under its jurisdiction, cannot become candidates in the electoral district where they perform their functions, except after three months of their resignation from office.

If a government official stands for elections in another electoral district from where his office is and succeeds, he must cease to work.

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666 An interim official shall be appointed for the vacancy until the elec-
646 tion of the former official has been finally pronounced valid.

The elected official has then to choose, within five days of his election, either to remain in the government service or to become a deputy. If he chooses the latter, his right to his government office ceases to exist, and if not, he shall be returned to his office necessarily.

Art. 24. Under-Secretaries and directors-general of the various ministries, presidents, advisers, members and attorney-generals of the Higher Court of Appeal, the *conseil d'état*, the Auditing Board and directors of municipalities in every Qadha and Muhafazat cannot qualify for candidacy unless they resign from their offices three months prior to the publication of the decree fixing the date for elections.

Art. 25. It is not permissible to hold simultaneously a deputy seat and a public office in which the salary is paid from the government treasury or from municipalities. Exception, however, is made of the members of the teaching faculty of the Syrian University who do not have an administrative function in it.

Art. 26. A deputy shall be considered to have resigned from parliament if he accepts an office in the government.

It is, however, possible to delegate a deputy to an unclassified, temporary foreign mission for a period not exceeding six months, and not renewable.

Section II. PROCEDURE FOR CANDIDACY

Art. 27. A candidate ought to submit a written declaration to the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam within five days of the publication of the decree fixing the number of deputies and get a temporary receipt of acknowledgement for it.

The Muhafez or the Qaimmaqam ought to ascertain that the applying candidate fulfils the conditions for candidacy mentioned in Article 22.

Thereupon, the candidate shall get, within five days at the most, a final receipt of acknowledgement in which the day and hour of his application are to be mentioned.

If the Muhafez or the Qaimmaqam refrain from giving such a receipt within the specified period, the candidate has the right to

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object by petition—exempt from fees—to the highest court in the Muhafazat or Qadha headquarters and to the First Court of Appeal in the capital. The court must render a final judgement on such objections within five days.

Art. 28. Every elector has the right to object on the validity of candidacy. These objections cannot be submitted except to a special appellate court described in Article 53 of this Law, which has the right to decide finally on cases arising from the election of deputies.

Section III. CAMPAIGN LITERATURE

Art. 29. An officially acknowledged candidate can issue pamphlets announcing candidacy, explaining his aims, plans and everything that concerns the program of his work. All such pamphlets are to be signed by the candidate, and three copies of each ought to be submitted to the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam.

Political parties and organizations can issue such publications rovided they are duly signed by their legal representatives.

Art. 30. Announcements, writings, pictures and photographs of sort for propaganda purposes during the electoral campaign annot be posted on the walls of public or private buildings. Persons who violate these instructions shall be prosecuted according to Article 737 of the Criminal Law.

Art. 31. Campaign literature shall be exempt from stamps.

CHAPTER IV

PROCEDURE FOR ELECTIONS

Art. 32. Deputies shall be elected directly by the people and by a secret ballot.

Art. 33. Quarters in cities and towns, and Nahiyas in Qadhas shall be considered polling centers, provided the number of electors in each center does not exceed 1,000. If a polling center contains more than 1,000, it should be divided provided the number of electors in each is not less than 500. If one village or more contain less than 500 electors, and if the distance between these villages and the nearest polling center exceeds fifty kilometers, the Minister of the Interior can establish in them a separate polling center.

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666 The Muhafez and the Qaimmaqam shall issue in their respective
646 headquarters, and within fifteen days at least before elections, decrees designating the polling centers and containing lists of electors for each of them.

Candidates have the right to object on the decrees of the Muhafez to the Minister of the Interior, and on the decrees of the Qaimmaqam to the Muhafez.

In a small Qadha which is not subdivided into Nahiyas, polling centers shall be established in its villages in proportion to electors, as specified above.

Art. 34. Polling centers, in the headquarters of each Muhafazat, Qadha and Nahiya, shall be supervised by a committee composed of three persons: the chairman, who will be nominated by the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam, the Mukhtar, a member and another member to be chosen from the municipal council, or the Qadha council or officials council. Judges, their aides and teachers shall be given preference to others. The members of these electoral committees shall swear to the justice of the peace to deliver their task in honesty, equity and absolute neutrality.

If a member of the committee is absent, its chairman chooses from the electors a new member. If all the committee is absent, the Muhafez or the Qaimmaqam must proceed immediately to nominate another committee, and its newly appointed members shall be sworn in by the highest administrative chief in the region.

Art. 35. There ought not to exist between the chairman of the committee or anyone of its members on the one hand and a candidate of the electoral district on the other, a kinship below the fourth degree.

Art. 36. The chairman of the committee shall ensure the maintenance of order. He shall have judicial authority within the polling center and may seek the assistance of security forces when necessary. The Muhafez or Qaimmaqam has the right to inspect the elections.

Art. 37. Every candidate, or one who represents him by virtue of a signed letter legalized by the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam, is entitled to attend and watch the voting operation and counting of votes. Nobody else has this right.

Art. 38. Voting begins at 7:00 A.M. and ends at 7:00 P.M. if

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voters cease to arrive. Otherwise voting will go on, but not later than 10:00 P.M. under any circumstances. 666 646

Art. 39. If the total number of electors in all polling centers of one electoral district reaches 60 per cent, voting in that district is considered completed; if not, the voting boxes shall be sealed by the seal of the electoral committee and the representatives of candidates; the latter, along with security officers, will guard the voting boxes.

Next day the boxes will be unsealed at 7:00 A.M. in the presence of the electoral committee and the representatives of candidates. Voting will be resumed till 4:00 P.M. and the number of electors who so far have exercised their right to vote will be considered enough.

Art. 40. Each elector comes to the polling center where his name is registered. The chairman of the electoral committee verifies the elector's name from the electoral register and from his identity card. Thereafter the chairman signs the identity card of the elector and gives him a white paper carrying the seal of the Muhafazat or Qadha, upon which the elector writes the names of the candidates for whom he is voting. If an elector is illiterate, he shall employ a member of the committee to write for him under the supervision of the chairman of the committee, and he himself casts the paper in the voting box. Thereupon, the chairman checks his name on the register.

Contrary to the ruling of the previous paragraph, officials outside their electoral district can vote in the polling center of the seat of their offices; similarly, members of an electoral committee can vote in the polling center to which they have been assigned. In both cases, the names of these electors ought to be added to the electoral register of the center where they vote, as specified in the previous paragraph.

Art. 41. The voting paper shall contain on one of its two pages the names of candidates as they appear in the receipts of acknowledgement for candidacy described in Article 27 hereof.

Art. 42. Voting shall take place on the basis of the list of candidates. The elector must choose a number of them equal to the number of seats in the electoral district, as limited in the decree mentioned in Article 6 hereof.

Art. 43. When voting is completed, the electoral committee shall count the voting papers publicly without reading them. If there

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found that the number of the papers is 5 per cent more or less than those who actually voted, election in that center shall not be considered valid and shall be repeated the next day.

If there be found that the excess is below 5 per cent, a number of voting papers proportionate to this excess must be withdrawn without reading the contents.

No deficiency will, however, be taken into consideration if it is below 5 per cent of the total number of electors noted in the register as having voted.

Art. 44. Voting papers that are empty, absolutely illegible or do not carry the seal of the committee shall be considered void and cannot be included in the total of votes. They must, nevertheless, be attached to the minutes.

If a voting paper shall contain more names of candidates than is decided by the decree fixing the number of deputies, the excess shall be cancelled from the bottom of the list in proportion to each category in the electoral district.[1]

If the voting paper shall contain less names of candidates than is required, it shall be considered in favor of those voted for. If any lists contain the name of a non-candidate, this name shall be disregarded only; and if the same name be written more than once, it shall be reckoned once only. In either case the voting paper is valid.

The voting papers which do not state clearly the name of a candidate, but contain enough indications to remove any ambiguity, shall be considered valid.

Art. 45. The electoral committee shall render judgement on all objections submitted to it with regard to the voting operations.

The decisions of the electoral committees can be appealed to the central electoral committee which gives a final judgment. Such objections shall not cause a delay in the progress of elections.

If the central electoral committee decides that election in one of the polling centers is not valid because it violates the rules of this law, the Minister of the Interior shall issue an order fixing a date for reelections in that center.

[1] In one electoral district there might be Moslem and non-Moslem candidates. If, for instance, the required number of deputies in one electoral district is 3 for Moslems and 2 for non-Moslems and the voting paper contains names of 5 Moslem candidates and 3 non-Moslems, the chairman of the Electoral committee must cancel the last two names of Moslems and the last name of non-Moslems [*Translator's note*].

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Art. 46. The counting of votes shall take place continuously in the polling center. Results shall be declared publicly. Then the electoral committees shall draw up statements recording in particular the names of candidates, the number of votes which every one of them obtained, and the decisions and measures taken during the elections. These will be referred immediately to the central electoral committe of the electoral district.

Art. 47. In the Muhafazat this committee is to be composed of the Muhafez as chairman, the attorney general and two judges as members; in the Qadha, the Qaimmaqam as chairman, the justice of the peace and a member of the municipal council as two members.

Art. 48. Upon receipt of the statements from all polling centers, the central committee immediately meets; its task shall be to add the results in the presence of candidates or their representatives, to draw up a comprehensive statement, to declare those final results and to submit a copy of its statement to the Minister of the Interior.

Art. 49. Candidates shall be classified according to the number of valid votes which they obtain. The candidate who obtains more votes than others, provided that the number of those votes is not less than 40 per cent of the valid votes cast, shall be considered successful.

If one seat or more remain vacant, elections shall be repeated one week later among the candidates who received more than 10 per cent from the total of valid votes cast. The candidate who this time receives a majority of votes shall be considered successful.

Art. 50. If two candidates receive an equal number of votes, the decision shall be by lot.

Art. 51. If the number of candidates in one district does not exceed the number of deputies which are to be elected for that district, no voting takes place and the candidates shall be elected.

Art. 52. The final results shall be announced by a decree, as they were recorded in the statements, within three days at most after the Minister of the Interior has received all the records of elections.

Art. 53. The validity of elections shall be decided upon by a special appellate court presided by the first judge of the higher court of appeal or any one who takes his place, and composed of four other judges following him in grade as members, together with three

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deputies elected from the parliament by secret ballot and on whose elections no objections exist.

Art. 54. The president of parliament shall call this special court to meet as soon as the three deputies, who are to be members of this court, have been elected. The court then investigates all charges laid against elections of deputies within three months at most of their submission. This court shall have all authority necessary for its action, and its decisions shall be irrevocable.

Chapter V

CRIMES CONNECTED WITH ELECTIONS

Art. 55. Persons committing crimes because of elections shall be prosecuted according to Articles 319-324 of the Criminal Law.

Art. 56. Every person who has been asked to cooperate in one body, or requested to help in the execution of electoral operations and refuses to cooperate shall be punished in accordance with Article 756 of the Criminal Law.

Chapter VI

TRANSITORY AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Art. 57. Contrary to the stipulations of Article 24 hereof, the presidents, the advisers, the members and attorney generals of the higher court of appeal, the "*conseil d'état*," and the Auditing Board who have been prevented from exercising their right to candidacy in accordance with this law, can, nevertheless, enjoy this right if they resign their offices one week after its publication. This exception to Article 24 shall be effective only during the first electoral session which follows the publication of this law.

Art. 58. The present electoral registers shall be modified in accordance with this law.

Art. 59. The Minister of the Interior shall issue all decisions and instructions necessary for the execution of this law.

Art. 60. All previous texts contrary to this law and, in particular, the previous electoral Law No. 325 of May 21, 1947, and its modifications,[1] shall be considered void.

Art. 61. This law is to be published and communicated to all concerned for execution.

[1] See above, p. 434, n. 1.

656 industry,[1] and agriculture,[2] and to establish stable principles of economic policy.[3]

647 To remedy the above mentioned defects and to fill the gaps in the country's economic structure the government established a Directorate of Statistics[4] and directed its attention to the preparation of scientific and technical studies of the country's resour-
652 ces.[5] Finally, the government reformed the country's banking and
453 monetary systems by creating, in accordance with the Basic Monetary Law,[6] the Money and Credit Council with the function of exercising monetary control ; it laid down new monetary regulations inspired by the needs of the country and regulated the operations of bankers and money-changers. Reform included also the expansion of the Agricultural Bank's capital, the strengthening of its financial means and the extension of its operations to meet seasonal credit needs.[7] The question of medium and long-term credit remains however still unsolved.

433 13. To complete this brief survey of Syria's economic position in 1945, when the new national government came to power, it is necessary to give some account of general economic conditions.

1 Legislative Decree No. 47, of August 7, 1952 and amendments regulating Syrian industry.
Legislative Decree No. 138, of November 6, 1952 regulating industrial, commercial and free professions.
Legislative Decree No. 103, of September 27, 1952 relating to the encouragement of industry.

2 Legislative Decree No. 135, of October 29, 1952 and Regulatory Decree No. 768 of November 3, 1952 concerning the distribution of state lands.
Legislative Decrees No. 50, 51 and 52 dated January 9, 1952 and No. 81, 82 and 83 dated January 23, 1952 and No. 125 and 126, dated January 20, 1952 relating to the planting and export of cotton ; Legislative Decrees No. 27, 80 and 106 of 1952 concerning the sale of Agricultural machinery and the combatting of agricultural pests and insects etc.

3 *Vide Syrian Economy 1953* - Government Press, Damascus.

4 Legislative Decrees No. 130 and 35 dated June 11, 1949.

5 Report by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, 1947 ; studies of irrigation projects, the Ghab project, Lattakia port project and the Aleppo water scheme ; Mission of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

6 Legislative Decree No. 87, of March 28, 1953.

7 Law 77, dated June 28, 1951 which provides for the addition of LS 10 million to the capital of the Agricultural Bank ; Law 126 which grants LS 5.5 million to farmers affected by losses ; Legislative Decree No. 9 amending the Agricultural Bank Law ; and Legislative Decree No. 97 which empowers the Agricultural Bank to extend seasonal loans etc.

operation of world trade in a way that has always worked to the detriment of the farmer. The Government has adopted and persists in the view that the farmers as a class are alone responsible for feeding the town population at reduced prices. The Government and its organizations like the O. C. P. and later the Mira have always forced the farmers to hand over large quantities of wheat at prices below the market level. Even the present Grains Office is doing the same thing in a different way. It stipulates that exporters of wheat should deliver to the Office half the quantity exported at 23 piasters per kilo in Aleppo, i. e., at a rate 25% cheaper than the market price. This reflects in the end on the price paid by the merchant to the farmer. This unjust imposition of the Office is in fact borne by the farmer and not by the merchant. If the Government feels its responsibility for the provision of enough wheat for the population at reduced prices, the burden should be shared by all tax-payers without distinction. The farmer should get the full market price and the deficit should be covered from the general tax receipts. This solution, while freeing the farmer from a chronic injustice, is not the answer to the price problems. Since the Grains Office has become a permanent institution, the farmer needs to know as far in advance as practicable what prices he is to expect for his crops. The major function of the Office should be not to devise means for collecting wheat from the farmer at reduced prices, nor to provide revenue for the Government by creating a monopoly of wheat export, but to stabilize prices and guard the farmer against sharp fluctuations from one year to another. This it must do by announcing its readiness to buy wheat at fixed prices for the next two crops, at least without claiming a monopoly. That is, the farmer should be guaranteed a minimum price for his next two crops and left to profit from free prices if the market situation allows it.

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A concrete example of how Government policy is reducing the prices for the farmer, is the new decree authorizing the export of 200,000 tons of wheat against delivery of 100,000 tons to the Grains Office at LS 230 in Aleppo.

The exporter will proceed to do his account, in the following manner. The price paid by Italy is said to be $98 which amounts to LS 350. For three tons of wheat of which two are exported and one delivered to the Grains Office, the merchant will receive LS 930 or an average of LS 310 per ton. In order to make a profit of

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312 653 under way are completed, Syria would have under irrigation an area of 89,100 hectares additional to that already irrigated. Certain projects, including the Ghab, Barada and El Taf, will, of course, not be completed in the period 1955-60 covered by the mission's suggested program. Under that program, the total newly irrigated area will have increased by about 40,000 hectares by the end of 1960.

Planning of Irrigation Schemes

312 653 647 The planning, construction, maintenance and operation of all irrigation projects (except the Ghab for which a special office has been created) is the responsibility of the Hydraulics Branch of the Ministry of Public Works. At present the staffing of this branch is far from adequate to carry out a greatly expanded program. While the technical staff is supposed to number 78, including 19 engineers, the number actually employed is only 36, of which 11 are engineers. Temporary appointees totalling 23 bridge only part of the gap. The staff must ultimately be greatly expanded. It will take time, however, to train additional technicians; and the goal will never be reached unless the present inadequate salary scale is raised so as to attract competent recruits. Meanwhile, the Ministry will be unable to carry out the suggested irrigation program unless it utilizes every opportunity to delegate the planning and execution of projects to properly qualified private firms.

In discussing the Euphrates projects, the mission has already emphasized the importance of adequate planning and recommended the allocation of £S 3 million for the necessary preparatory work. Part of this sum should be used for the construction of a hydraulics laboratory which would be useful in testing models of all proposed irrigation structures. Through model testing it will be possible properly to design such structures as weirs, canal intakes and sluices so as to anticipate subsequent damage and to achieve maximum economies in construction. It would also be highly desirable to experiment with different types of canal linings. The concrete linings used up to the present are expensive and not wholly satisfactory. It may be possible to use the asphalt available in Syria to devise a lining which would neither crack nor be too fluid and would at the same time be more economical. The mission urges that a qualified foreign firm be engaged to make laboratory tests with this material under conditions simulating those in Syria.

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returning to become squatters among the ruins and cultivate patches of stony but fertile soil. Organization of this rather haphazard settlement and the establishment of a planned community based again on orchards and vineyards may prove a worthwhile undertaking. In the Djebel Druze, where living standards are low and emigration is difficult for religious reasons, a similar settlement should be tried, provided a suitable tract of land can be found. Here, too, conditions are favorable for the establishment of orchards and vineyards.

At present responsibility for settlement is dispersed. The Ghab Administration is entrusted with settlement in the Ghab; the Irrigation Service has the task in other newly reclaimed and irrigated areas; and the Ministry of Agriculture has the initiative for the dry-farming areas. The mission strongly recommends that responsibility for planning and coordinating all the work be vested in a single, independent Settlements Administration, which would also discharge certain governmental functions relating to housing, town planning and similar subjects. The settlement program will require a great organizational effort and a staff which only a single agency would be capable of mobilizing. One administration is also much more likely to apply the experience gained in the initial settlement work to subsequent ventures. The mission urges that such an agency be established promptly, so that the necessary planning may be immediately initiated. The assistance of a number of foreign experts will need to be enlisted to carry out the program.

If the four settlements the mission has recommended are established and the Roudj and a portion of the Ghab are settled, the total cost would probably be around £S 10 million. Under the mission's proposals, £S 5.5 million would be financed by the Agricultural Bank, and the balance met directly by the government. With these funds it should be possible to settle some 2,300 families or between 12,000 and 14,000 people.

Land Reform

While the settlement of state domain may gradually increase the number of peasant proprietors, Syria will also have to work out policies relating to land ownership and tenancy in the areas already under cultivation. In this connection it should be noted that Article 22 of the 1950 constitution calls for legislation to determine, without retroactive effect, "the maximum area of land that may be owned, exploited and disposed of, according to

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Latakia, which now has only an old diesel plant with a capacity of 800 KW, must have additional capacity to meet its rapidly growing requirements. The most immediate need can be met by the construction of a 2,500 KVA diesel plant. This can later be supplemented by the installation of a hydroelectric plant at the site of the dam on the Nahr el Kebir which the mission has recommended as part of the irrigation program. 377

Deir ez Zor, the center of the developing Euphrates river valley and the fifth largest city in the country, also urgently needs a new 2,000 KVA diesel plant. The existing plant has a capacity of only 915 KVA.

The reclamation of the Ghab will generate a considerable increase in general activity in that region and an attendant expansion of power requirements. To meet this need the mission suggests the installation of new diesel plants of 2,500 KVA each in both Hama and Jisr ech Choghour. It would be advisable to connect these plants with a transmission line running through the Ghab and capable of supplying power for construction throughout this area and for the villages en route. Jisr ech Choghour in particular will become the center of construction activity. The mission is aware that plans for the Ghab call for the installation of a 6,250 KVA hydroelectric works at this location. The power from this plant, however, will not be firm and is in any event not likely to become available soon. The mission considers therefore that a diesel plant which can be quickly constructed is necessary to meet the immediate requirements.

For the smaller towns and villages the mission has proposed only a modest program involving some improvements in existing plants to raise their capacity, and the installation of 25 small diesel units with an individual capacity of 200 or 250 KVA. The more rapid electrification of villages and small towns should, in our opinion, be postponed for the time being in favor of more urgent programs. 377 365

Government Direction and Supervision

To carry out the recommended expansion program it will be necessary to strengthen the Directorate of Electricity in the Ministry of Public Works. This directorate was established in 1953 to coordinate the development of electricity in Syria and supervise the construction and operation of power plants. The mission recommends that the directorate be provided with a staff of 10 trained engineers to enable it to carry out its functions adequately. Separate sections should be organized for the technical 377 447

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377 and administrative supervision of public utilities. Supervision ought to be
647 concentrated primarily on the utilities of the small towns and villages which are often substandard in their equipment and operation and are most in need of technical guidance in standardizing and improving their equipment. In addition to discharging its supervisory functions, the directorate should work out long-range plans, including a properly phased plan for the establishment of a power network which would be helpful in determining the location and size of power plants to be established in the future.

Electricity Rates[25]

365 As power production increases, there will no doubt be considerable
435 pressure to lower the rates now charged for electricity. The mission
655 encountered much complaint about their present level and structure. The rates charged for lighting in the principal cities do not, however, appear excessive by comparison with other countries. Electricity prices in the small towns and villages, on the other hand, are very high, but the generation of electricity by small diesel units and exclusively for lighting is inevitably rather expensive. The rates charged for electricity used as power are definitely higher than in many other countries. In Syria the power rates are often compared unfavorably with those in Lebanon in particular.

Nevertheless, the mission strongly advises against a general reduction of electricity rates over the next five or six years. An adequate supply of electricity is more important at this time than lower prices for electricity. The profits of the public utilities must be safeguarded so that the needed expansion program can be financed from their own resources. This is particularly true of the nationalized utilities of Damascus and Aleppo which have been earning considerable profits. With the anticipated increase in power generation and some reduction in costs of production, the mission anticipates that the net operating income of these utilities exclusive of depreciation allowances may reach a total of £S 60 million over the six-year period 1955-60. Most of this sum will be needed to finance expansion and pay the indemnities for nationalization. In this way the government will be able to conserve the resources derived from taxation and to borrow for other urgent requirements.

[25] See Annex G, p. 422.

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II ADMINISTRATION

The substantial public investment and development program we have proposed will not only strain the financial resources of the government, but also impose an onerous and challenging task upon administrative resources. In our opinion this task can be accomplished only if there is considerable improvement in the organization, methods and personnel of the government service. It is no disparagement of Syria to conclude that the existing government organization cannot undertake a greatly expanded public investment and development program without a marked increase in the efficiency of its operations. Syria became independent only at the close of the last war and has therefore had only a relatively short period in which to organize an efficient government service. The government has already made significant progress, particularly in the fields of education and public health. To analyze its current shortcomings is not to depreciate its past achievements, but has been done to help work out recommendations which may better equip it for the larger tasks of the future.

These shortcomings may be enumerated as follows: (1) failure to attract sufficient competent people to the government service; (2) deficiencies in methods of operation, exemplified by excessive centralization; (3) inadequate planning and coordination; and (4) distrust and suspicion of the government on the part of the public. Each of these requires some discussion.

Considering its size, Syria has a considerable government apparatus. Excluding the army and gendarmerie, as well as day laborers, about 20,000 government employees were paid out of the regular government budget in 1952. Of these, a little over 15,000 were in the civil service cadre. In addition, various independent or semi-autonomous public agencies employed between 3,000 and 4,000 people. The total number of employees (excluding those of the municipalities) may thus be estimated at approximately 24,000.

Government salaries are very low. Even in the top grade of the civil service—a grade held by only 27 persons—the monthly salary ranged from a minimum of only £S 708 (about $198) to a maximum of £S 819.50 ($229). Only 4.7% of all the employees in the regular civil service enjoyed a minimum monthly salary in excess of £S 378.50 (about $106). Average

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647 annual salaries in the civil service were only £S 2,130 or about $600 per year. The salaries of permanent employees outside the civil service are even lower. Family allowances add somewhat to the compensation, but apparently no more than 10% on the average. At this level the government cannot expect to attract many capable people or to stimulate much zeal on the part of its employees.

High government officials often find some means of supplementing their salaries by serving on various government committees and boards for which extra compensation is given. Many government employees eke out a living by taking outside jobs. Some find it difficult to resist the temptation to use their official position as an opportunity for illicit gain. In recent years the government has recruited some promising younger men, primarily by the device of paying their study abroad in return for an undertaking to serve the government for a period twice as long as the years of subsidized study. Often, however, these people are waiting impatiently for the end of their government service to explore the opportunities for private employment. In many cases, too, they are not placed in positions for which their training and education have especially suited them.

Syria, like many other Middle Eastern countries, suffers from excessive centralization of government responsibilities. This tendency toward centralization is historically deep rooted. There is a great reluctance on the part of senior officials to delegate responsibility; and officials of the middle and lower grades have in turn been unwilling to assume responsibility whenever hesitant steps in the direction of decentralization have been taken. The fact that in Syria, government officials are held personally liable for expenditures, no matter how justifiable, which have not been properly authorized is frequently an additional deterrent to rapid, effective action. The inevitable result is that high government officials are excessively preoccupied with administrative minutiae and have little time for policy formulation and planning. The consummation of any official business generally requires a considerable number of signatures or approvals. Undoubtedly many of these cumbersome procedures were devised to prevent abuses but they certainly tend to inhibit action and their efficacy in accomplishing their original purpose may also be questioned.

Inadequate planning and coordination, as already indicated, are in part a by-product of excessive administrative centralization. In part, how-

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ever, the lack of planning results also from the fact that government officials have not been schooled or accustomed to look ahead and relate what is being done today to what must be undertaken tomorrow. The instability of government in the past has undoubtedly contributed to this tendency, and the fact that the government has been unable to anticipate the financial resources available has also discouraged longer range planning. Every ministry lacks a planning staff which can study the requirements in its field of action and devise a program to meet it. The Ministries of Education and Public Health, for example, were unable to formulate their requirements for consideration by the mission as part of an over-all development program. The Ministry of Agriculture has not had a staff adequate to weld many "ideas for action" into a practical action program. For the government as a whole there is as yet no machinery for planning, coordinating and supervising an investment and development program. Coordination among government ministries and agencies is often defective. Hospitals, for example, are erected by the Ministry of Public Works without consultation with the Ministry of Public Health. The Hydraulics Department of the Ministry of Public Works, which is in charge of irrigation, has inadequate contact with the Ministry of Agriculture.

In carrying out an investment and development program designed to raise living standards and improve public welfare, the government must overcome deep-rooted distrust and suspicion of its activities on the part of the population. Centuries of government neglect, indifference and even exploitation have bred this feeling of distrust which even an independent Syrian government has not yet been able to overcome. People tend generally to regard government as a negative force which taxes, polices and demands compliance with laws and regulations the purpose of which is frequently not understood. Government officials themselves often contribute to this attitude by acting as masters rather than as servants of the people. Officials at the local level, who have most contact with the people, are often indifferent and, where they are well-intentioned and anxious to do something, they are often insufficiently conversant with the problems or inadequately trained to contribute effectively to the welfare of the public. Thus most people are incapable of realizing that the government can and does operate in their interest. Any government effort to assist them in improving their lot is apt to encounter much suspicion and frequently, at least initially, an uncooperative attitude.

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Recommendations for Improvement

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In the light of the above analysis the following recommendations might be considered:

1. A commission should be established to make a thorough study of government organization, personnel practices and procedures. Among its principal functions should be to undertake a reclassification of positions with appropriate salary revisions and conditions of service, and recommend changes in procedures which would promote more expeditious transaction of government business. It should also pay special attention to staffing requirements, particularly since the government appears to be understaffed in the upper ranks of the service and considerably overstaffed in the lower ranks.[43] The personnel of the commission should certainly be partly drawn from outstanding persons in private life, and consideration might be given to enlisting the assistance of a few experienced foreign experts in public administration. Pending the outcome of the commission's work it may well be necessary to grant some interim salary increases, particularly in order to retain the services of government officials in the upper grades.

2. Since any fundamental reform and improvement of the government service will inevitably take a long time, the government will need to resort in certain instances to the establishment of special independent agencies. Such agencies should have their own salary scales and administrative regulations designed to ensure competent personnel and efficient operation. To an increasing extent the government is already utilizing this device as, for example, in setting up the Latakia Port Corporation, the Ghab Administration and the Council of Money and Credit with its Foreign Exchange Office. Even in these agencies, however, the salary limitations in key posts have tended to be too low to attract and keep enough able people.

3. At least as an interim measure, the government should consider contracting out as much work as possible. For certain major public works this is already being done. The Ministry of Public Works still has a tendency, however, to undertake too much itself. In the future, new road construction and even definite projects for road improvement might well be contracted out. If additional irrigation projects are to be undertaken, these works, too, might best be carried out by a private contractor. Even

[43] 80% of government servants appear to be concentrated in the three lowest grades of the service.

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certain programs which do not fall in the category of public works projects 647 might be expedited with the assistance of private enterprise. Thus the government might consider contracting the more technical parts of the cadastral survey, which under government operation is taking far too long to accomplish.

4. A small commission should be established to plan, coordinate and 647 supervise the execution of a development program. A draft law has already 654 been prepared to establish a Permanent Economic Council and a Commission for Economic Development. The Commission would include a chairman and two economic and financial experts, all of whom would devote their full time to its work, and the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of National Economy, Agriculture, Public Works and Finance. Its functions would be to prepare a development program, frame annual or biennial development budgets and supervise and coordinate the carrying out of the program. The Economic Council, which would include the Minister of Economics, a representative of the central bank, members of the Commission and representatives of the business community, would review the Commission's plans and budgets and pass them to the Council of Ministers with its observations, and would also advise the government generally on economic questions. This scheme of organizing the work impresses us as sound and we suggest that a law along these lines be enacted. It brings the business community into the task of economic and development planning; it promises the creation of a professional group to do the actual programming and day-to-day supervision and control; and it enlists the cooperation of the established ministries primarily concerned with development, instead of superseding them.

The Housing and Settlements Administration we have proposed might well be fitted into this organizational scheme. It must be remembered, however, that the proposed development budget should be drawn up in close coordination with the regular government budget, since both must be fitted into the global financial resources available. Moreover, as we have pointed out, the capital or investment projects which would presumably be included in the development budget should in themselves be closely related to recurring expenditures of a developmental character in the ordinary budget.

Great care will need to be taken to ensure adequate supervision of the execution of an approved program in all its phases. The Development Commission, for instance, should be empowered to ask for periodic (at

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least quarterly) progress reports from the agencies charged with the execution of various parts of the program. These reports should contain information on rates of disbursement, physical progress of the work, difficulties experienced, etc. The commission should be enabled to deal directly with the various agencies involved and also to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers regarding the removal of any obstacles to smooth progress which may have been encountered. It should, above all, be responsible for ensuring that coordinate action is taken whenever several agencies are concerned with the carrying out of a project or program.

5. Gaining the confidence and enlisting the cooperation of people is vital to the success of any development program. Government officials must exercise considerable tact and patience in overcoming distrust and persuading the people that the government is really intent on helping them improve their conditions of life. The officials who carry out the programs at the local level, in immediate contact with the people, must have a sympathetic but not patronizing attitude and will have to be selected for their devotion to public service as well as their technical competence. Over the years many young officials will have to be trained to work among the people on such tasks as supervising agricultural credit, organizing cooperatives, providing advice on agricultural methods, etc. In large part, however, their work must be supplemented and aided by existing officials ranging from the village *moukhtar* to the *mohafez*, from the village teacher to the provincial health officer.

The new officials introduced to help carry out certain programs must be able to count on the positive cooperation of the existing officials. The latter in turn could provide more intelligent assistance and undertake more on their own initiative if they could be given a better understanding of local problems and the means of coping with them. In part this could be accomplished by requiring these officials to make more frequent tours and placing adequate transport at their disposal for this purpose. In part it could be achieved also by organizing periodic regional meetings at which problems would be discussed and competent technicians could provide information on measures that could be undertaken to improve village and town sanitation, agriculture, housing, transport and the like. At these meetings local officials could be briefed on what the government is seeking to accomplish and their positive participation in the program could be mobilized. This might help to avoid the tendency, apparent in a number

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of underdeveloped countries, of regarding a development program as 647
simply a series of big projects or as something which the center imposes 654
or confers on both the people and the officials at the local level without enlisting their active participation.

Conclusion

If financial and administrative difficulties can be overcome, successful 654
achievement of the development program we have outlined should lay the basis for another period of economic expansion. The Syrian economy is fundamentally sound. Under the primary stimulus of private enterprise it has grown at a gratifying rate. Development has now reached a stage, however, where a program of government action on a large scale is necessary to provide the opportunities for further economic progress.

With the shrinkage of available new land, the government will have to carry out reclamation and irrigation projects at an accelerated pace and concentrate much more effort on assisting farmers to raise their yields. To increase productivity and enable the small farmers to share more extensively in the advancing prosperity of the country, it is necessary to carry out certain land reforms, organize cooperatives, provide much more agricultural credit and make government services available at the village level. The remaining public domain must be set aside for the progressive settlement of landless peasants in properly organized rural communities.

Storage facilities are required to improve the quality and reduce the cost of handling grain. New roads, improved road maintenance and better port facilities are needed to lower the cost of marketing agricultural commodities, and, to a lesser extent, of industrial products.

In industry, where development in the past has gone forward on a rather wide front, a period of consolidation has set in. The government must now adopt policies calculated to make manufacturing more competitive and must assist private enterprise in becoming more efficient and continuing its expansion on a more selective basis.

In the field of education, the emphasis in the future needs to be less on a further rapid extension of general educational opportunities and more on the adaptation of educational training to modern requirements and on the improvement of facilities for the acquisition of necessary vocational skills. In public health, where progress has been much less satisfactory than in education, the primary stress should be on remedying the uneven geo-

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Economic Benefits

The mission estimates that the gross value of the produce of the Ghab 312
area will be in the neighborhood of £S 63 million annually, or about £S 47 653
million after deducting the amount already produced in the area in 185
question. The production of cotton, maize, sorghum, rice and sugar beets 241
is particularly likely to have a marked impact on Syria's balance of trade. 166
It may be assumed that the output of cotton and cottonseed will in effect be added to the country's exportable surplus; the additional rice production may make Syria fully self-sufficient in that commodity; and the sugar beet production should permit a considerable import saving.

In addition to the project's contribution to an increase in national income and an improvement in the balance of payments, the settlement of farmers in the area made possible by the project will assist in relieving the present population pressure in the province of Latakia and particularly in the Alaouit mountains. In Latakia, for example, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% of the average for Syria as a whole. Settlers in the Ghab will be able to earn substantially more than the bare living they have been able to eke from the soil in the past.

Organization

The "Administrative Office of the Drainage and Irrigation Works of 647
the Ghab Lands" was created in 1951, to be attached to the Ministry of 653
Public Works until the technical work is completed. It will be responsible 185
for the design of the works, award of contracts, supervision of construction, 312
payment of expenses and for sale of the land. As parts of the project are completed, the Office will take care of the operation and maintenance of the dams and of the irrigation and drainage networks and will collect water charges. During the planning and construction period the Office should recruit and train staff to carry out the continuing operation and management of the project.

It is important that the policy, and the attendant operating and budget delegations, provide for the establishment and operation of the agricultural research centers and for a long-range educational and farm demonstration program; otherwise, it will be practically impossible to achieve acceptable land use in the area.

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available as required. More women are to be found in modern industry than formerly, especially in the hosiery and other textile factories.

The Syrian workman is on the whole better educated and more adaptable than his counterpart in most of the Middle Eastern countries. The availability of a large force of handicraft workers skilled in the fashioning of metals, wood, stone, textiles and other materials was of great value when the rapid expansion of industry began. As it proceeded, the government and the industrial leaders became increasingly conscious of the need for systematic vocational education and training in schools and factories; this has made considerable progress in recent years.

In Annex I an appraisal is made of the existing vocational (other than agricultural) schools in Syria; our recommendations regarding their extension and improvement are designed better to fit them to the requirements of industry as well as those of commerce and banking.

The private business world, as well as the government, has made its contribution. Most Syrian employers now recognize that successful plant operation demands an adequate supply and a small turnover of skilled labor. Some of the larger factories have instituted training schemes, some providing up to three months specialized training during which the apprentice is paid the full minimum wage. Most of the other factories and workshops have systems under which learners are gradually promoted from the simple to the more skilled operations.

There are nearly 200 industrial unions combined in federations in Syria, with a total of about 25,000 members. The federations and also a large proportion of the trade unions have mutual funds, derived in part from normal subscriptions of members, and partly from government subsidies. They are used for grants to members for medical expenses, hospitalization, extension of the legal periods of sick pay, grants to aged workers, unemployment pay and the like.

The Directorate of Labor and Social Services in the Ministry of National Economy is responsible for ensuring enforcement of the provisions of Syria's rather liberal Labor Code, supervising the trade unions, establishing and operating public employment offices and encouraging the foundation of private ones.

Wages are comparatively low. Minimum wages are fixed by local Minimum Wage Boards. A fairly representative sample of daily wages seems to be: boys and women, £S 1; unskilled men, £S 2-5; skilled men,

The functions of the Court are: (1) to consider the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and any administrative decisions; (2) to conduct the trial of the President of the Republic and the Ministers; and (3) to examine the validity of elections.

For the purpose of the appointment, promotion, transfer, and discharge of judges or the various courts other than the Supreme Court, a High Council of Judges is provided, composed of the President of the Supreme Court, two members of the Supreme Court, and the highest ranking four judges of the Court of Cassation. The Council is set up to ensure that the judicial authority is kept independent of the influence of the Government.

The Constitution provides, likewise, detailed provisions for the division of the country into administrative units and for local provincial government and municipal administration. It also provides rules for the preparation of the budget and the procedure of its introduction to Parliament, as well as other measures related to financial policy. An interesting provision related to the economic development of the country is the establishment of a Permanent Economic Council for the purpose of formulating plans for the development and exploitation of the economic potentialities of Syria.

Probably the most interesting innovation of the Constitution is its Bill of Rights comprising 28 articles which define with considerable detail the fundamental principles of freedom and the social and economic rights of the individual citizen. The numerous provisions stressing liberty and equality of the individual and the freedom of the press may seem superfluous, but they are deemed worthy of emphasis in view of the authoritarian tendency in the administration since the establishment of the national regime.

Article 21 marks a radical departure from the principle of the existing social-economic system. In this article, property is defined as both "public" and "private"; and the State like the individual may possess property within the limits of the law. As to private ownership, "the method of its possession and disposal shall be specified by law in such a manner as to make it perform its social function." Further, no individual is to be permitted to "utilize his private ownership in a manner inconsistent

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242 tributed a 50 per cent decline in yields to insect damage.

248 In an effort to reduce this damage, the Ministry has employed an Egyptian entomologist and has bought 4,000 tons of insecticides and a large number of tractor-mounted, horse-drawn, and walking dusting units.

[656] The Ministry also has promulgated numerous regulations for controlling insects, calling for mandatory destruction of stalks after harvesting and a host-free period until May 1. All ginning must be completed by the end of April and all the gin trash burned. Planting seed must be sterilized by one of the oil mills through contract with the government. The government also requires all farmers to apply the recommended insecticides. If farmers do not comply, the government applies the poison and charges them for it.

CONTROLS

656 The government has appointed a Cotton Control Board, with headquarters in Aleppo, charged with the broad responsibility of stabilizing production. The board is responsible for the enforcement of programs in seed distribution, insect control, crop control, ginning and marketing, and new regulations promulgated recently by the Ministry.

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Probably the most significant of these many regulations is one limiting the land which may be planted to cotton. In irrigated areas from 40 to 70 per cent of the crop land may be planted to cotton and in dry-land farming areas, only 25 to 33 per cent. The Aleppo area is limited to 50 per cent of the non-irrigated land. The purposes of this regulation, according to the Director General of Agriculture, are to preserve a balance in agricultural

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Syria's newest cotton mill is an ultra modern integrated plant just completed in Damascus. The level of efficiency here is far above the average and as a result this mill is exporting about 28 per cent of its production.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

production, conserve water, concentrate cotton so as to facilitate insect control, and protect the cotton industry against the high costs and low prices that might result from over-extension of production. Farmers are required also to receive licenses to plant cotton from the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cotton Board. 656 647 248

The only marketing regulations issued to date require that all bales show the name of the ginner, the identity, and especially the moisture content of the cotton, which cannot be more than 9 per cent. If false claims are made, the government can take 30 per cent of the cotton as a penalty. [442]

It is obvious that the enforcement of so many scientific regulations and controls over a large area is going to be difficult without a large force of trained technicians and police.

The Director General appreciates that without adequate trained personnel it is not possible to make the regulations completely effective overnight, but he hopes, through education, to obtain the compliance of the producers.

Ambitious research and education programs, another responsibility of the board, are still in the planning stage. [654]

PROSPECTS

It appears unlikely to expect any significant expansion in production in Syria until yields can be stabilized. A start has been made, but a more intensive research and education program is required on cultural practices (particularly irrigation practices), mechanization, and especially insect control, before much improvement can be expected. Such efforts naturally take considerable time, even when funds and technical assistance are available. Both money and know-how are limited in Syria. 248



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elementary schools are opened throughout the country. In addition, new classes and divisions were opened in the existing schools. Private schools were encouraged to open new classes, and special financial aid was offered for the opening of new private schools. Naturally, most of this effort was spent in the larger cities where most of the French schools had existed. Public secondary-school enrollment increased by 1,930 students in the six cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Homs, Hama, and Tartus. Public primary schools had an increase of 6,718 pupils in the same cities, excepting Tartus. Private schools also registered large increases, an increase of 2,458 pupils taking place in the private primary schools of Damascus alone.

It is claimed that these measures dealt with the situation effectively enough to accommodate almost all the children who applied. Some secondary-school students, uncertain of being admitted to schools in Syria, arranged early to go to school in Lebanon. Because many of the measures were hastily improvised, they left something to be desired, but the emergency created by the closing of the French schools was met. It is with this state of emergency and the radical departure from French methods and influence in mind that the following description of the Syrian school system should be read.

Administration

The administration of public education in Syria, as in the other Arab countries, is centralized and is controlled by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry provides almost all the money for public schools, educates and appoints the teachers, establishes the curriculum, prescribes the textbooks, and holds public examinations at the end of the primary, intermediate, and secondary courses.

The organization of the Ministry of Education and its departments is set down in a special decree (No. 224, "Embodying the Organization of the Ministry of Education") and a special law (No. 202, "Limiting the Number of Officials of the Ministry of Education"), both of which were issued in 1945. The organization is shown in Chart XI. At the head is the Minister of Education, who is a member of the Cabinet and is responsible to Parliament for the educational policies of his Ministry, and, with the aid of the Director General of Education, for the proper execution of the laws and regulations. All decisions and instructions are issued in his name and executed under his supervision. The Minister has his own Private Bureau which handles his appointments, correspondence, and controls all papers and documents entering or leaving his office.

Next in authority to the Minister is a Director General of Education,

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Chart XI

SYRIA: ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, 1946



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who is the administrative head of all the departments of the Ministry and supervises the work of all the department officials and the proper operation of the schools. He appoints the officials of the central office and specialists in secondary and vocational education belonging to the second and third grades in the salary scale, and recommends to the Minister the appointment of officials of the higher grades. He is empowered to issue general notices and administrative instructions to help clarify ministerial instructions and to facilitate the running of his departments.

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The Director General is assisted by three directors: the Director of Secondary Education who has charge of the affairs of all intermediate, preparatory, and vocational schools; the Director of Primary Education, who supervises primary and elementary schools; and the Director of Physical Education, who assists the Director General in organizing physical education, including scouting activities, sports, and organized games in and out of school.

Seven divisions and bureaus conduct the everyday business of the Ministry. The Division of Personnel keeps a complete register of all that pertains to the officials and teachers of the Ministry of Education. The Division of Accounts supervises the accounts of all departments, prepares budget estimates and is responsible for the execution of the budget law. The Division of Buildings, headed by an architect, draws the plans for school buildings and supervises all construction, repairs, and maintenance work in schools belonging to the Ministry. The Division of Equipment has charge of the central stores of the Ministry, of keeping textbooks and school furniture and equipment until they are distributed to the schools. In addition, there are the three bureaus of Correspondence, Archives, and Statistics, the functions of which are sufficiently indicated by their titles.

There are ten provincial directors of education, one each for the city of Damascus, Damascus Province (excluding the city), Hawran, Jabal Druze, Homs, Hama, Latakia, Aleppo, Jazirah, and Euphrates Provinces. These directors have charge mainly of primary education in their provinces and of supervising private schools. They are under the double jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, from which they receive their instructions and approval of their proposals, and of the governor of their province, through whom they issue their orders and conduct their correspondence with higher authorities. The powers of the provincial directors of education during the regime of the French mandate were very limited. They were then called inspectors of education. Even the appointment of a janitor to a post already provided for in the budget needed to be referred through the governor to the Ministries of Education and Finance and was not final

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until taken cognizance of by them and published in the Official Journal. Even the salary of the janitor was not paid until this publication took place, which sometimes stretched into months. This procedure resulted in delays in the appointment of teachers and was detrimental to their financial position and their morale. Efforts are now being made to expedite this procedure.

Side by side with the administrative machinery stands the inspectoral staff. Headed by a chief inspector, it consists of two types of inspectors—secondary and primary. The basic duties of inspectors are defined as supervising the work of principals and teachers of schools, guiding them into the better interpretation and application of programs and curriculum, showing them better methods of teaching, correcting their mistakes, and orienting their activities. They are further charged with keeping the Ministry informed of the conditions of teaching in the schools, the needs of the schools, and the activities and abilities of teachers and principals. They study the educational needs of the cities and villages and do publicity work for education among the people.

Secondary inspectors are appointed on the basis of the subjects in which they have specialized. They have their headquarters in Damascus and are sent to inspect schools according to a plan worked out by the central office. At the time of the visit of the American Council Commission, the inspectors of secondary schools were visiting schools as a team, each inspecting his own subject or subjects in the same school.

Primary inspectors are not expected to be specialists in any one school subject. One or more are attached to each province and inspect the schools of that province according to a program worked out with the director of education of the province. Special inspectors may be appointed for the special subjects—for example, physical education, manual arts, agriculture—and for private and foreign schools in the larger towns where these abound. Inspectors' reports are submitted in two copies, one for the provincial director of education, and one for the chief inspector's office at the Ministry. The provincial director then takes such action as he sees fit, based upon the report.

A third department of the Ministry under the Director General is the Committee on Education and Instruction. It is made up of a chairman and three permanent members, with power to elect other workers from among the officials, inspectors, and teaching staff of the Ministry. The committee is a professional body which is put in charge of making school curriculums, laying down educational policies and plans as well as school regulations; selecting suitable textbooks and books for school and public libraries;

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writing and translating books and articles and issuing educational periodicals; collecting information about educational systems abroad for the benefit of the Ministry and the school system and for the purpose of establishing the equivalence of degrees and diplomas; preparing and studying statistics about the school system; preparing plans and courses for teachers institutes and conferences; conducting educational experiments; and, finally, studying any professional question laid before it by the Ministry. The committee is supposed to include a representative of each of the important fields of specialization, each mastering "one of the languages of world culture to ensure that the committee shall have access to the most important cultural and educational publications appearing in Europe or America." Each member is required to teach no more than four periods a week in one of the teachers colleges and is empowered to visit schools. The committee is divided into three sections: one on curriculum, one on educational research, and one on translation and authorship.

In addition to the three main divisions of the Ministry of Education there are two councils and two committees provided for in the decree, with other committees to be formed by administrative order when necessary. These are the Education Council, the Council of Directors of Education, the Committee on the Equivalence of Degrees, and the Committee on Purchases.

The Education Council is composed of the Director General of Education as chairman, the chairman of the Committee on Education and Instruction, the Inspector General, and the section Directors of Primary, Secondary, and Physical Education. Its function is to pass on proposals coming from the appropriate departments with regard to curriculum, textbooks, the budget, proposed laws and regulations, and any other matter submitted to it by the Minister.

The Council of Directors of Education meets under the chairmanship of the Director General of Education and is made up of the Inspector General, the Directors of Primary, Secondary, and Physical Education, and the provincial directors of education. It meets once a year to discuss the school staffs and the educational needs of the provinces, to pass on proposals for opening new schools and expanding existing ones, distribution of teachers, and allocation of the budget among the provinces.

The Committee on the Equivalence of Degrees meets under the chairmanship of the Director General, and has as its members the chairman of the Committee on Education and Instruction, the Inspector General, the Director of Secondary Education, and a representative of the Syrian Uni-

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versity. The committee makes its decisions on the basis of reports submitted to it by the Section of Educational Research of the Committee on Education and Instruction.

The Committee on Purchases is under the chairmanship of the accountant of the Ministry, with two other members appointed by the Director General of Education. It has charge of all buying of equipment, of receiving bids, and of preparing the contracts of the Ministry.

Beside the Directorate General of Education and its branches covering the system of public education for the entire country, three other institutions and agencies are connected directly with the Minister of Education:

1. The Department of Antiquities is headed by a director who is under the jurisdiction of the Minister. It has charge of the museum of antiquities, supervises all excavations, and preserves archeological sites. Its regulations are incorporated in Decree No. 352 (1945) "Embodying the Regulations of the Directorate of Antiquities."

2. The Syrian University, which until 1946 consisted of the Faculties of Medicine and Law, was in the process of reorganization at the time of the visit of the American Council Commission. It is described in chapter 22.

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3. The Arab Academy, which was founded during the Arab government regime following World War I, is a body of learned Arabists, which has its own assembly of members in Syria and corresponding members in other Arabic and Islamic countries as well as among orientalists. It holds public lectures, issues a magazine known as the *Review of the Arab Academy* which appeared first in 1920 and in which are published the researches and studies of its members. It also maintains a public library which contains about 20,000 printed books and more than 4,000 Arabic manuscripts. The Academy has at times attempted to lay down Arabic equivalents to modern scientific terms.

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Educational Finance

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Educational finance in Syria is centralized. The bulk of the expenditure on the schools and their equipment, on the salaries of teachers and janitors, comes from the budget of the Ministry of Education, which is a part of the general budget of the Syrian Republic. The Ottoman Education Laws of 1869 and 1913, which had remained the basic education laws during the French-mandate period, had provided that the expenditures of elementary schools should be borne by the local authorities. This, however, remained more a theoretical than a practical possibility in most of the Ottoman Empire. In Syria, some school buildings were provided—in Turkish, as in French, days—by the central governments, some by the localities or

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SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticised on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organization.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

● 647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

ill-considered plans and avoid abrupt changes". A separate section in the Labour and Social Affairs Department of the Ministry of National Economy will run and supervise the centres, introduce local industries, study local conditions and implement a programme to raise the standard of living and promote local welfare. The Department will be assisted by an Advisory Committee comprising representatives from all agencies interested. Three bodies participate in the conduct of each model centre: one will consist of the staff members of the centre; the second the advisors to the staff members and the representatives of local administrative authorities; the third will be not one single committee but five committees of local residents, each to be responsible for a particular aspect of the centre. All will work under the supervision of the staff. The Decree defines the several units to be constituted for each centre and their respective responsibilities. 641 657 185

65. It is intended that when the Government has established a model centre in each province, the example will be followed in other districts by villagers who (as in the Egyptian prototype) will contribute to and share with the Government the expenses of maintaining a sufficient number of centres to cover the whole country.

66. The scheme which was inspired by the Cairo Seminar of 1950 had, we were informed, been discussed and agreed with other Ministries concerned and tentative arrangements had been made with the University authorities for their co-operation in providing the necessary personnel for the centres. Unfortunately, however, the project-law had not received the approval of the Ministers and Dr. Joukhadar gave no indication of any date for its operation. 242 185 474

67. On the introduction of Mr. Carroll Deyoe, FAO representative in Syria, members of the mission had the opportunity of meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture Mr. Akram Rakabi, the newly-appointed Secretary-General, who gave an account of agricultural extension work in Syria and of the development of agricultural co-operatives in the country. He foreshadowed a possible eventual use of the profits of these societies for community welfare purposes, but the movement is in its infancy.

68. Thanks also to the courtesy of Mr. Deyoe, the mission was put in touch with the local representatives of the Near East Foundation. In the absence in Beirut of the Programme Director, Mr. Eyer, his Deputy (Mr. Khoury) gave us the statement of the work of the Foundation in Syria which had been prepared for the recent Damascus Seminar which we had hoped to attend. Mr. Khoury accompanied us on his visit to Nashabeyeh one of the four villages in which the Foundation operates demonstration centres in agriculture and sanitation and in home-making, respectively. Mr. Sivaswamy has prepared a detailed account (Appendix V) of his impressions of the work done at Nashabeyeh. 242 185 744

69. The centre has been in existence one year. Its premises are in adobe houses such as are to be found in many villages in these parts. They have been simply adapted for their present purposes and the standard of cleanliness was pleasantly surprising. The staff consists of: (1) a sanitary inspector who looks after general sanitation, including mosquito control by irrigation and by drainage. (He makes a point of talking to the village people about water supply, latrines, etc.); (2) a nurse-midwife, whose duties are: ante- and post-natal care, examination of pregnant women, education of local midwives, regular supervision of the infants in the village. (There is no maternity clinic; the women are delivered in their homes); (3) a doctor, paid by the Foundation, who visits the centre once a week.

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Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

● 648 Syria MD1

[For the text in French of General Catroux' Declaration of 1941, see 57: Davis, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 320-321.]

2: Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A VISIT TO SHEIKH SULAIMAN MURSHID, THE ALAWITE "LORD"

By SQUADRON-LEADER RICHARD BELGRAVE

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IN June, 1945, the Alawite province of Syria was in an explosive state. To Major B—— and myself the arrival of H.M. Destroyer *Musketeer* was welcome in the extreme. With half a dozen Signals personnel we had been the only British "forces" in the area. No time was lost in putting her Captain, Commander S——, in the picture, and very swiftly and surely did he grasp the essentials of a highly complex political situation. It was clear that we had to take steps to keep the Alawites quiescent in this quarrel between the Syrian Nationalists and the French, or our efforts to prevent bloodshed could not have been successful for much longer. The story of our doings in this little-known corner of the Levant is recounted as an example of an unusual combined political operation by representatives of all three branches of the Service.

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The Alawites constitute a religious sect of Islam, numbering some 350,000, and inhabiting the mountains just inland of Syria's 100 miles of Mediterranean coast. They are a minority to be reckoned with in Syrian politics, as they amount to roughly 10 per cent. of the population. In the main division of Islam into the two great sects, Sunni and Shiah, the Alawites are nearer to the Shiahs, while the great majority of the population of Syria are Sunni and nearly all the Nationalist leaders belonged to that sect. It was, therefore, inevitable that the Alawites should be somewhat suspicious of the Damascus Government. Alawite social life is still feudal and their religion secret: a curious blend, largely Islamic, but deriving certain characteristics from Christianity—for example, the belief in a Trinity—and from pagan and pre-Christian cults—for example, belief in reincarnation and the use of groves of trees for places of worship.

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Their prophets include Christ, Muhammad and Ali. Their women are not admitted to religious rites and are not regarded as possessing souls. The Alawites have the mountaineers' fondness for fighting, and have been enabled by their mountain country to preserve their identity through centuries of alien rule. Their standard of living is low and all but their feudal chiefs are poor. Perhaps the most important of these chiefs at the time of Syria's latest struggle for independence was Sulaiman Murshid, often referred to by the Europeans as "god."

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Sulaiman Murshid has never to me claimed to be in any sense a "god." On the other hand, it is estimated that some 50,000 people regard him as the incarnation of the divine and can be said to worship him in the sense that he is their absolute master. The Sulaiman Effendi, as he is known locally, is a shrewd man and knew that I had stated on several occasions that it was a "shame" for a man to pretend to any of the attributes of Allah. He later explained to me that he was the "Rabb" or "Lord" in the sense that he was "lord of the manor." I think, however, that he has on occasion found it profitable to be "the Lord" in as omnipotent a

Part One

Problems of Economic Development

6. At the beginning of independence, when a Syrian Government assumed power, the country's economy was in a relatively primitive state. It was burdened by many restrictions, it faced difficult problems and it needed a great deal of care and order. The government had very little to build on, and it was faced, into the bargain, with a huge legacy of problems left to it by the previous régime. 652

7. We will first examine the problems arising from outside sources. The most important of these lay in the monetary and exchange system, customs policy, and the customs and economic union with Lebanon.

8. The monetary system was governed by a contractual agreement with a foreign bank, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which managed the Issue Department and which took decisions on matters of issue and credit quite independently of the Syrian Government, which thus had no power of direction or control whatsoever. Syrian currency was tied to the French franc and the greater part of the cover was in French francs. These balances were the subject of disagreement between the Syrian and French Governments, both on the question of their guaranteed value in terms of sterling and the question of their free use. Negotiations with the French Government resulted in an agreement [1] which solved the question of the guarantee and granted Syria the right of gradually liquidating the franc balances. The break of the Syrian pound away from the French was agreed to and Syria became free to exercise the right of legislating in monetary matters. Subsequent to the agreement, Syria issued a series of laws that regulated the issue of currency, its circulation and cover, and which provided for the control of the Department of Issue and the direction of the monetary and credit policies. The last of these laws was Legislative Decree No. 87, of March 28, 1953, which covers the basic monetary law and the establishment of the Syrian Central Bank. 652 648

[1] The Agreement of 7 February, 1949, including liquidation, settlement, and payments agreements.

652 9. The exchange system was subject to the control of the
648 Mandatory authority which directed it in accordance with its own interests, and the exchange control was a department administered directly by the High Commissioner's Office. In 1944 the exchange control was transferred to a joint Syro-Lebanese committee, headed by a delegate from the Central Exchange Control Office of the franc area, of which both Syria and Lebanon were members. In 1948 Syria declared its withdrawal from the franc bloc and be-
652 came independent in dealing with exchange questions. The Exchange Office in Syria thus became a purely Syrian institution. Subsequently the Government initiated several reforms that aimed at removing war-time restrictions. The exchange system became gradually freer and adapted itself to the needs of the Syrian economy. The last and most important of these reforms was Legislative Decree No. 208 of April 21st, 1952, which allowed the free entry and transfer of capital and created conditions facilitating commercial transactions ; it also worked towards achieving stability in the foreign exchange rates and bolstering the cover to the currency. In this manner the Decree inspired confidence in the national currency and prepared the right atmosphere for the entry of foreign capital and its investment in the country. [1]

651 10. As to the customs policy, this also was directed by the
648 Mandatory authority. It was formed by financial considerations, the first aim of which was to cover the expenditures of the Mandate and collect revenues for the treasury. When the Syro-Lebanese authorities took over the customs administration, the customs tariff and regulations moved gradually towards facilitating commercial transactions and encouraging national industry by exempting machinery and raw materials, needed by industry and agriculture, from duty. However, the establishment of a customs union between the two contries and the existence of an actual economic union, which took the form of free movement of goods, capital and persons between them, led to disagreements as to the customs and economic policies that each country thought should be followed. The disagreement reached its peak on the questions of import and export policies and the protection of national industry, and as a result of their faillure to agree on a common policy, the two count-

1 *Vide The First Annual Report on the Activities of the Exchange Office in 1952*, Damascus, 1953.

ries separated in 1950, and, in consequence, Syria regained free- 651
dom of action in directing her customs and economic policies and 648
in managing her economy on an independent basis.

11. The new Syrian government also had to face serious internal problems, that the Mandatory power with its "Laissez-faire" policy had not attempted to deal with. No factual study of the country was made nor any determined course of economic action undertaken. The following are the most serious of the defects of the economic system at that time :

First there was a lack of statistics and detailed studies upon 659
which to base a sound economic policy. Nor were there any technical and scientific studies of the country's economic resources, or plans for developing and exploiting them. Secondly, the bank- 453
ing system failed in meeting the country's need for agricultural 652
credit and for medium and long term credit. The majority of the banks were branches of foreign banks that specialized in commercial short-term credit operations, and which, with the exception of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, avoided seasonal agricultural lending. All the banks operated without any control or direction. Furthermore, no bank had up to that date been established to deal with industrial or mortgage credit. There was only the Agricultural Bank, established by the government to deal with medium-term agricultural loans, but its regulations, staffing and limited means did not enable it to play a major role in meeting the needs of agriculture. Thirdly there was no money market that 454
could attract national savings and invest them in development projects. People with savings have always preferred to hoard them in the form of gold, or else they invested them in real estate. In addition, foreign capital avoided entry into the country because of restrictions on exchange, and other reasons.

12. During the period 1945 to 1953 the government made a 656
great effort to regulate the Syrian economy in the fields of trade,[1]

[1] Legislative Decree No. 14 of December 18, 1951 and its amendments concern the regulation of the possession of, and trade in, raw materials and products. Legislative Decree No. 151, of March 3, 1952 and its amendments concern company law and the law governing firms established outside Syria. Legislative Decree No. 60, of January 13, 1952 and its amendments regulate foreign trade etc.

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages 162
are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur 163
el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. 191
They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflict- 795
ed upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. 795
The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac 779
Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is consti- 162
tuted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following 167
the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from 657
that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League 463
of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. 648
Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the 662
memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all 182

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 1821

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conslusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1621 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

435 656 15 percent he must buy his wheat at the port of export for LS 203-5. This means about LS 252 at Aleppo for the farmer of Jazirah. And this is the price at which the market is stabilized at present, while if this imposition did not exist the farmer would have sold his wheat for LS 300-350.

648 439 7. The discussion of prices brings about a consideration of markets for the surplus Syrian wheat. During the French Mandate, and up to March 1949, Syria and Lebanon formed one economic unit. The first independent regime under Shukri Quwatly, which lasted until the first coup d'etat in 1949, preserved this unity though some friction did exist between the two Governments. President Quwatly was emphatic about the necessity of this union. Then politicians mentioned to him the alleged advantages which Lebanon had over Syria in the partnership, he invariably replied that the benefit from the partnership to the national Arab idea transcends in importance any material disadvantage resulting to Syria.

But aside from this political consideration, the union did present specific advantages to the Syrian farmer. Lebanon imports yearly about 80,000 tons of wheat. This is approximately one-third the quantity exported by Syria. Further, Lebanon had a customs duty of 50 per cent on foreign wheat other than Syrian. This meant that the Syrian farmer was assured a market for part of his crop at prices higher than world prices, besides selling Lebanon cheese, samneh, vegetables and fruit.

Whatever the economic advantages according to Syria in its new policy of separation from Lebanon, and they are highly doubtful, the Syrian farmer has lost a sure market.

In fact, the question of economic separation between Syria and Lebanon has never been examined as a purely economic propositon, but has always been mixed with considerations of national prestige and alleged Syrian economic subservience to Lebanon. This highly emotional language was designed to confuse the issue for the benefit of industrial groups, especially textile manufacturers who were crowded by Lebanese competition.

435 439 8. Another misconception shared by the Government and most of the people is that Syrian prices of wheat should be governed by world prices. The fact is that Jazirah wheat can never normally

fluctuations in water flow. Up to 1950, all the water of Jagjag was used for growing rice. In 1950-51, more emphasis was given to cotton. This year it is half cotton and half rice. 312 241

The Turks started a project for diverting all the waters of the Jagjag from Syria to Turkey. They began building tunnels to carry one quarter of the waters cast above Kubur el Bid, and the rest to the plains above Amuda and Dirbassiya. The Syrian Government objected and negotiations began in Ankara. The Syrians believe that they have reached an understanding with the Turkish authorities to divide the river waters equally. The Turks did not sign the agreement, claiming that they want a full agreement on water rights covering all common rivers and especially the Orontes. They are afraid that Syria might use all the waters of the Orontes in its irrigation projects. Since Syria holds this arm, the Jagjag dispute will be solved equitably. 312 648

It is difficult to estimate the area irrigated yearly by the Jagjag. The waters are used only for summer crops, and last year about thirty thousand dunums were planted to cotton. When the plantation is rice the area is nearer to ten thousand dunums. There is of course always a certain amount of land devoted to vegetable growing for the needs of the city. 312 241

d. Underground Water

Recently a few enterprising farmers tried to solve the problem of dependency upon Turkey for irrigation water by digging for water on their own lands. An Armenian outfit from Aleppo with a boring machine of local construction dug several wells in the region of Qamishli and Amuda. Three of the wells in the villages of Tal Ahmad and Tal Anbar near Kamishli were successful. Water to run a 4-inch pump was found at a depth of 18 meters. The other holes around Amuda were not so successful. Water was not found at a depth of 70 meters. These experiments are of course inconclusive and sufficient underground water may be found to be abundant in Jazirah. Further studies are needed. 312

a. The Khabur

The largest source of irrigation water in Jazirah is undoubtedly the Khabur. Its average flow is 52 cubic meters per second which 132

III The Baghdad Railway

The Baghdad Railway which runs 247 kilometers in Syria is the principal means of transport for goods. It handles about 200,000 tons of goods every year. The bulk of Jazirah wheat is transported over it. But it has had in recent years keen competition from trucks in spite of the bad roads for several reasons. The Qamishli-Aleppo line passes for 70% of its length through Turkish territory and is under Turkish control. When the Turks choose to irritate the Syrians they restrict the entrance to the stations and in numerous other ways frustrate the Syrians and cause them hardship. Whole trains are unaccountably delayed for days in the Turkish stations. 496 648

Already passenger traffic is handled almost entirely by planes, cars and busses, except in winter months when the roads are unsafe. A bus charges LS 10 from Qamishli to Aleppo and makes the trip in 12 hours. A small car charges LS 20 and makes the trip in 8 hours. It takes the "Express" 20-22 hours to reach Aleppo from Qamishli and the fare is LS 30 in second-class "wagon lit" with tips. 484

For merchandise the train rate is LS 23.5 per ton from Qamishli to Aleppo. It costs the farmer an additional LS 6-12 depending on the distance to transport a ton of wheat from the field to the station. There is also an amount of about LS 4 involved in handling, all of which makes the actual rate by train about LS 35. 489

The truck charges LS 35 from Qamishli to Aleppo during the wheat season but it carries the wheat directly from the combine in the field to the merchant's store in Aleppo thus reducing the handling expenses to a minimum and transporting the goods in the shortest time. If the farmer is not hard pressed for money, which is rather rare, and can wait until the winter months and spring, he can transport his wheat for a rate as low as LS 10-15 per ton by truck. Inversely, the cost of tranport from Aleppo to Jazirah rises in winter and spring and decreases in summer and autumn.

Though truck transport is more advantageous in many ways than transport by train, the number of trucks available and the condition of the roads make the transport of a whole crop by trucks impossible. To achieve that, a complete road network needs to be constructed, diesel trucks would have to be imported and the discriminatory tariffs against them abolished.

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MD1 Syria MD1

[For data on international relations leading to the independence of Syria and observations on nationalistic movements within Syria during the French Mandate, see Category 116, pp. 78-129; 272-306.]

the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, 562
the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but 621
powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

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The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known 162
as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is 795
in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants 795
of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors 631
but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a large proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said 795
about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the 648
Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

795 the standard of living and education among the Alawis and
648 to develop their corporate consciousness; and who believe that if this is to be done the Alawis must be given a separate administration specially adapted to their needs and under benevolent foreign tutelage. There are others who admit the importance of these tasks but who emphasize that it is equally necessary to give the Alawis a consciousness of being part of the Arab nation as an alternative to sectarianism and to a paralysing localism. Among the Alawis themselves, one party adheres to the former school of thought, a second to the latter, but the greater number are suspicious of all interference from outside and wish only to be left alone.

Here, as in Jebel Druze, great social and intellectual processes are beginning of which the results have yet to appear. But it will probably take longer to bring Alawi society to a point where it becomes possible to face the problem of its definitive political status.

II

311 The problem of the Jazirah, the north-eastern province
169 of Syria, is in many ways different from that of Jebel Druze and the Alawi territory. Before the War of 1914–1918 it was largely an empty district, except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was sparsely cultivated where it was cultivated at all; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria they established a considerable measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already possessed by virtue of its fertility. The French authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian and other minorities who had been forced to leave their dwellings in Turkey, or who preferred not to live in the predominantly Moslem parts of Syria. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, together with Assyrians from Iraq after the events of 1933, have moved into the province; and even larger numbers of Kurdish Moslems, dislodged from their homes in Eastern Turkey by the policy of forcible assimilation
361 adopted by the Turkish Government. The new towns of
311 Hassetche and Qamishli and new villages have been created and new crops introduced, and the district has been opened up to regular commerce. The Beduin have been controlled
AND CERTAIN TRIBES AMONG THEM PERSUADED TO SETTLE ON THE LAND.

VIII. FOREIGN INTERESTS

I

648 OTHER difficulties which the nationalist movement has to face arise from the existence of important foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon. This chapter summarizes those interests as they stood at the outbreak of the war of 1939; it is clearly impossible to state with any precision the state of affairs which will come into existence after the war.

648 Before 1939, the interests of France far exceeded those
175 of other States. That the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon should have been conferred upon her rather than any of the other Great Powers was due immediately to the war-time agreement between the Allies for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but more fundamentally to the long-standing French connexions with the Ottoman Empire in general and Syria and Lebanon in particular, and to the sentiment which that connexion had aroused in certain quarters in France. French writers sometimes trace it back to Charlemagne, who conducted obscure negotiations with the Abbasid Caliph, Harun ar-Rashid, and is said to have obtained, after an exchange of letters and presents, the custody of the Christian Holy Places. They are on firmer ground when they emphasize the part played by Frenchmen in the Crusades. It is true that the Crusades were by no means an exclusively French enterprise. But French Kings, priests, nobles and knights were prominent in the organization of the Crusading States in geographical Syria. The ruling-class of the States was largely French in origin and language. They left their mark upon Syria in the castles and churches which they built and of which the ruins still survive; and equally the Crusaders and the land which they had conquered and for a time ruled made a deep impression upon the imagination of France. It is unwise to ignore the historic imagination of peoples, even when its content is partly legend and only partly history.

175 The Crusades were an isolated episode. During the two centuries which succeeded the fall of Acre in 1291, no particularly close connexion existed between France and geographical Syria: commerce between the Levant and Western Europe was largely in the hands of the Italian merchants, while cultural and political relations scarcely existed. The modern French connexion with the countries of the Eastern

The foremost interest of France was to preserve the sympathy and affection which her long protection of the Christians had won for her among them. The Catholic Christians were the only wholeheartedly pro-French element in the population of the Mandated Territories, and their friendship was an asset too valuable to be given up. It was largely in order to strengthen their position and to reward their fidelity that the State of Greater Lebanon was created at the beginning of the period of French occupation;[1] this may or may not have been a wise method of attaining the desired end, but the considerations which led to its adoption must always have had weight with any French Government, whatever its political complexion and its general policy in regard to the Mandated Territories.

In the years between the two wars, France came to regard herself as having special obligations not only to the Catholic Christians but to all the minorities, and especially to the Druze and Alawi communities and the mixed population of the Jazirah. She had made articulate the corporate consciousness of these groups, where she had not created it; and she had given expression to it in her administrative organization. She could not therefore ignore the effects which her policy might have upon their relations with the remainder of the population. More particularly, she had to take into account that the nationalists suspected her of having fostered particularist feelings both in order to weaken the sentiment of national unity and to use them as an excuse for delaying the grant of independence. Some of the resentment which they felt towards France was directed towards the minorities, and especially those of them who were traditionally attached to France. Frenchmen who realized this feared that should French influence be wholly withdrawn, this might have had serious consequences for some at least of the minorities, and maintained that it was therefore both an interest and an obligation for France so far as possible to ensure the safety of her protégés and friends after the termination of the Mandate no less than while it was still in force.

It must be added that not all these minorities reciprocated the feelings which France had or claimed to have for them;

[1] See Chapter IX.

648 some recognized 'foreign protection' as a gift too dangerous to be accepted.

4

648 Sympathy for France depended not only upon her special
177 links with certain elements in the population, but also upon the hold of French culture over the educated classes. Most educated people of whatever religion speak French; many know it as well as they know Arabic, and there are some, mainly among the Catholics, for whom it has replaced Arabic as their native language. French books are widely read, French social customs copied, and there are many who have travelled or studied in France and have a profound affection for the country, its people and its way of life.

177 It is the Catholic missions, working through schools and
871 other institutions, which have played the largest part in
799 winning Syria and Lebanon for French civilization. The mission-schools and colleges and the Université de S. Joseph in Beirut have always concentrated on imparting to their students a mastery of the French language, even if that should involve neglect of the teaching of Arabic. The majority of those who possess any understanding of European culture have been trained by the Jesuits, the Franciscans or other missionaries; and so long as the Catholic schools continue to provide the best intellectual education which the country can offer, there is no need to fear for the position of French culture. The social work carried out by the missions must also be mentioned; they have borne on their shoulders a great part of the work of alleviating social conditions, and have deserved the gratitude of those who care for social justice. Thus all French Governments, clerical or anti-clerical, regarded it as essential to maintain for the missions their right of unrestricted activity.

177 Long before the beginning of the French occupation, the
648 Governments of France, seeing more clearly than some others the political significance of cultural ties, set themselves to preserve and extend the predominance of French civilization. The institution of the Mandate gave greater freedom for their efforts. In some ways the position of French culture was improved in the years between the two wars. French was one of the official languages and knowledge of it was an indispensable qualification for holding most of the higher

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

offices in the administration. The organization and procedure of the law-courts was based upon French models, and the system of laws which they dispensed, although basically Islamic, was deeply influenced by the French codes. French was the main foreign language taught in official schools, and the official system of examinations was adapted from that of France. (This was one of the considerations which led certain sections of French opinion to oppose the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. Although the exchange of letters attached to the Treaty contained guarantees for the preservation of French cultural influences and provided for the recruitment of foreign officials and advisers from France in preference to any other country, the critics regarded the termination of the Mandate as likely to bring to an end the supremacy of French culture in Syria and Lebanon.)

In spite of the efforts of the French Government, however, it is probable that twenty years of French rule harmed rather than helped the position of French culture. The political grievances and discontents of those years, and the almost continuous opposition of the greater part of the Syrian and Lebanese people to their French masters, shook the ascendancy of France over men's spirits. In 1939 there were more who spoke French than there had been in 1918, but perhaps fewer who loved and believed in France.

5

France's economic interests in her Mandated Territories, although not of first-rate importance, nevertheless were not negligible. There were only a few thousand private French citizens resident in the country, and comparatively little landed property was in French hands; Syria and Lebanon had never been looked upon as regions for settlement. The total value of French investments was of the order of magnitude of one milliard francs; it had not increased to any great extent since before the War of 1914-1918. Most of it was invested in public utilities: the railways, the port of Beirut, electric power, waterworks and so on. A French company also held the monopoly for the production of tobacco. In fact, almost all public concessions of importance had been given to companies wholly or mainly French in ownership. About one-tenth of the total investment was sunk in the railways, almost all of which were controlled by the 'Damas-

648 Hama et Prolongement' (D.H.P.) company. Since 1925 this
471 company had had an agreement with the local Governments by which the latter made good any losses incurred by the company in the working of the railways, and received a progressive share of any profits which were made.

432 There were a number of French financial institutions with interests in the Mandated Territories. The bank of issue, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, had its headquarters in Paris, and of its 25¼ million francs of share-capital over 20 millions were in French hands, while twelve out of its sixteen directors were French, the remainder being Syrians
[436] and Lebanese. By an agreement made in 1924 and subsequently renewed, the Banque was given the exclusive right of issuing Syro-Lebanese currency. It also performed the functions of an ordinary commercial bank. In addition, a great deal of commercial banking, mortgage and land-credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie and the Compagnie Algérienne.

439 In 1938 France imported goods of greater value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other country except Palestine; and she exported to them goods of greater value than did any other country except Great Britain. The total value of her imports from them was 105,894,000 francs. The main articles which she imported were vegetables and fruits; she did not obtain from the Levant States any important raw materials for her industries. She exported to them 197,818,000 francs worth of goods, including large quantities of iron and iron goods, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods.[1]

471 The Mandated Territories were also important for French
648 commerce as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions: the civil air-ports were used as stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China. Moreover, one of the two pipe-lines through which the oil of Iraq is conveyed to the Mediterranean passes through Syria and Lebanon to reach the sea at Tripoli. This was of dual importance to France: first because French interests owned 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and secondly because France obtained between one-third and one-half of her total oil-supply from Iraq, by

[1] For detailed figures, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 203.

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way of Tripoli and Haifa. There was a possibility that Syria might in the future come to be more important still to France; oil-prospecting had been going on in the Jazirah for some years, and in 1940 an agreement was concluded for the exploitation of oil discovered there between the Syrian Government and Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

One more economic factor which could not be left out of account was the immense cost to France of her occupation of Syria and Lebanon. There was first the expense involved in installing herself in Syria and Lebanon: her participation in the Eastern Campaign during the last war and her conflict with Faisal after it. Even more important than these were the expenses of the civil and military administration of the Mandate. According to an official estimate, by 1936 the Mandate had cost France 4,843 million francs, of which the military expenditure accounted for 4,300 millions and the civil for 543.[1] By Article 15 of the Mandate France was entitled, once an organic law had been framed, to ask the national Government to whom she was handing over responsibility for repayment of the expenses she had incurred in performing her duties as Mandatory Power.

6

The primary strategic purposes which France hoped to fulfil by her presence in Syria and Lebanon were the maintenance of her position as a Mediterranean Power, on a level with Great Britain and Italy; the protection of her maritime and air routes to the Far East; and the defence of the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli, through which she derived a large proportion of the oil needed by her armed forces. None of these objects was capable of achievement by France alone, but only by France in conjunction with Great Britain, the dominant foreign Power in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq; the Levant States were only of first-class strategic value to France in so far as the possibility existed of a co-ordinated Franco-British strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus it was an essential French interest to pursue in the Levant a policy similar in the most important respects to that pursued by Great Britain; this was normally recognized by French

[1] G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre D'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939), p. 22.

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Governments, however suspicious their representatives in the East might be of the activities of the British in the neighbouring countries.

The attainment of the strategic objects mentioned above did not necessarily involve the permanent military occupation of the whole of the Mandated Territories. This was recognized by the French Government in the Treaties of 1936, which provided for the unrestricted use of Lebanese territory and waters by French forces, but also for the complete withdrawal of land-forces from Syria after a transitional period, and the retention on Syrian soil of two air-bases alone. Even this was perhaps more than was absolutely essential. It would perhaps have been enough for France to retain control of the naval base of Beirut, the terminus of the pipe-line at Tripoli and an air-base, and to have in addition the assurance of the alliance and co-operation of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should war break out.

7

One other political interest of France must be mentioned. She was the dominant Power in North West Africa, of which the majority of the inhabitants are Arabic-speaking Moslems. One of her motives for occupying Syria had been the desire to control so important a centre of Arab and Moslem opinion; and in framing her policy in Syria and Lebanon, she had always to take into account the repercussions it was likely to have in Morocco, Algeria and Tunis. To repress nationalism in the Levant might have caused unrest in North Africa; but to concede everything to nationalism in the Levant might have strengthened the demand for similar concessions in North Africa, where it would have been more difficult for France to grant them.

8

Thus any French Government which wished to preserve the essential interests of France felt bound to pursue a policy in Syria and Lebanon which would serve: (i) to protect the Catholic and other Christian communities, in accordance with the French tradition in the Levant, and also the other minorities; (ii) to safeguard the work of the missions and the position of French culture in Syria and Lebanon; (iii) to assure her control over at least one naval and one air base, and

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perhaps over other strategic points as well ; (iv) to conform with her general policy in the other Arab and Moslem territories which she controlled ; (v) to conform with British policy in the surrounding Arab countries ; and (vi) to safeguard her investments, her commercial interests, and her access to the oil of Iraq, by means of the pipe-line to Tripoli, and also to the oil of Syria itself if it should prove to be worth exploiting.

9

Great Britain had no direct interests of great significance in Syria and Lebanon. Her trade with those countries was important for them, but only of small value for her ; and her investments were negligible. There were a few British missionary schools, but for the most part British missions had restricted their activities to the British Mandated Territories, leaving Protestant missionary work in the French area to the Americans. The British Government had never in recent times regarded the country as falling within its sphere of interest, although during the Eastern crisis of the 1870's Disraeli had considered the possibility of occupying Alexandretta, but rejected it in favour of Cyprus.

Such interest as Great Britain possessed in Syria and Lebanon sprang from her position first as a Mediterranean Power and secondly as the Western Power having the closest connexion with a great part of the Arab world. An unfriendly Power in possession of naval, military and air bases in Syria or Lebanon would have been able to threaten the key points of the British strategic system in the Eastern Mediterranean : the naval bases at Haifa and Alexandria, the Suez Canal, the air and land routes from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, the oil-wells of Iraq and Persia and the pipe-line from Kirkuk to Haifa. For Great Britain it was therefore necessary either that the strong points in Syria and Lebanon should be under British control or that they should be in the hands of a Government, indigenous or foreign, which was likely to be on the same side as the British Government in any major international issue which might arise.

Her position, both as a Mediterranean sea-power and as paramount Power in India, had led Great Britain to extend her political influence over the greater part of Arab Asia as well as Egypt. She had therefore been brought face to

648 face with Arab nationalism, and had been compelled to work out a policy towards it. Thus she could not be indifferent to trends of political opinion and activity in Damascus and Beirut, two of the main centres of Arab nationalism; the more so because of the part which Syrian and Lebanese teachers were playing in moulding the minds of the young and spreading the nationalist gospel in all parts of Arab Asia. Further, Great Britain's interests were affected by the policy adopted towards Arab nationalism by the Government or Governments in control of Syria and Lebanon. If that Government was a national one or if, although foreign, it was favourable to the nationalist aspirations in those respects in which they were at variance with British policy, nationalist discontent in countries under British control might receive encouragement and help from Syria or Lebanon. During the years of the Arab revolt against British policy in Palestine, for example, not only individual Syrians and Lebanese but also the Syrian Government, although not the French authorities, gave support to the insurrection; the leaders of the revolt found a refuge in Beirut and Damascus after they were compelled to leave Palestine, and continued to direct the revolt from there. If on the other hand the controlling Power in Syria and Lebanon showed itself less favourable to Arab nationalism than Great Britain, then there would be discontent and unrest in those countries; and this state of mind might communicate itself to the regions in the British sphere of influence. If the Power in control of Syria and Lebanon were allied to Great Britain, it was possible that the latter would receive part of the blame for the shortcomings of her ally's policy.

Thus Great Britain was concerned to ensure first that the strategic points in Syria and Lebanon should be in friendly hands, and secondly that if those countries should be under foreign control, the policy adopted by the controlling Power in regard to Arab nationalism should be in general conformity with that adopted by Great Britain.

10

Of other Western Powers, the United States had a certain interest in Syria and Lebanon. She wished to safeguard the property and unrestricted activity of the American religious, educational and philanthropic institutions: the missions, the

schools, the University of Beirut and the hospitals. These 648 institutions had been built up by American talent and devotion, and millions of dollars had been sunk in them; they were largely responsible for the respect with which America was regarded in the Levant.

Moreover, there are in the United States some hundreds of thousands of American citizens of Syrian and Lebanese birth and descent, most of whom still have a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and many of whom still possess property there. Apart from such property, American economic interests were not large; the most important of them arose from the American ownership of 23¾ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company. An American Government which was concerned to look after the American foreign investments could not be indifferent to the political fate of a country so near to the oil-fields of Iraq, and through which runs the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli.

For many years the Italian Government had been attempting to create interests in Syria and Lebanon, presumably with a view to using them as pretexts for an extension of its political influence in the Levant. At the beginning of the present century an attempt had been made to challenge the French protectorate over the Catholics. Schools and hospitals had been built, which, with the help of subsidies from the Italian Government, continued to function until the entry of Italy into the war. In the last few years before the war, attempts were made to increase Italian trade with Syria and Lebanon. Those attempts were partly successful; and there were also some important Italian economic enterprises in the country, the most important of them the Banco di Roma. But the main object of these measures, as of more obvious and direct measures of propaganda, was not achieved. Apart from a few individuals, there was no section of the population which was Italophil or with which the Italian Government had succeeded in establishing particularly close relations. This was perhaps due to the belief that the Italian Government regarded Syria and Lebanon as possible fields for Italian settlement.

The German Government had no direct interests in Syria and Lebanon, except in so far as it had been able during recent years to use Arab discontent as a means of weakening

L48 the position of Great Britain and France. The Russian Government had shown no special interest in the area since the Revolution of 1917 ended the traditional connection of Russia with the Greek Orthodox.

11

The Vatican also had an interest in Syria and Lebanon arising out of the existence of large Uniate communities. This interest is looked after by an Apostolic Delegate; the seat of the Delegacy is Beirut, and in the past it has been filled alternately by French and Italian clerics. The Uniate Churches, which cling tenaciously to their privileges and traditions, have direct contact with the Vatican, where there exists a special Eastern Congregation charged with the affairs of the Eastern Uniate communities. The Vatican was concerned to safeguard the position of the Churches and the rights of individual members of them, and thus was interested in the nature of the régime existing in Syria and Lebanon. It was also anxious to protect the interests of the Catholic missions which undertook so many activities in the country and exercised a profound influence upon large sections of its population.

12

The main Turkish interest in Syria sprang from geographical proximity. The southern frontier of Turkey adjoins northern Syria. For the most part it is an arbitrary line, following the Baghdad Railway. On the Turkish side of the frontier there are many thousands of Arabs; on the Syrian side, there are not only a large number of Turks and Turcomans, but also Kurds and Armenians who have emigrated from Turkey for political reasons during the last two generations. In these circumstances, frontier incidents and complications are always to be feared. It was therefore in the interest of Turkey that whatever Government controlled Syria should be strong enough to maintain order in the frontier regions and at the same time should have no desire to embarrass its neighbour by stirring up frontier troubles.

There had always existed among the nationalists in Syria a suspicion that as Turkey grew stronger she would attempt to revive the glories of Ottoman days and to expand southwards. This suspicion was intensified when, after the signature

of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, Turkey revived her claim to Alexandretta and Antioch. She finally obtained them in 1939[1]; and although in return she gave for the first time a guarantee of the Turco-Syrian frontier, it was widely believed in Syria that Turkey only wanted the Hatay as a first step to the seizure of Aleppo, which before the war of 1914–1918 had been the economic centre of a large region which included much of what is now southern Turkey as well as what is now northern Syria. There has, however, been no indication that this belief was justified, or that Turkey possessed any desire to extend her rule over non-Turkish populations. Turkey was not in principle hostile to Syrian independence, so long as a Syrian or Arab national Government would be neither able nor willing to threaten Turkish security, or to attempt to win back the Hatay. It was possible, however, that at some time in the future she would demand a rectification of the Turco-Syrian frontier, on the ground that the present frontier hampered trade on the railway, which more than once crosses from the Turkish to the Syrian side and back again.

13

Of the other Near Eastern States, Egypt's interest in the fate of Syria and Lebanon sprang partly from the bonds of religion and language which link her people with theirs, partly from her anxiety to see the strategic strong points in friendly hands, whether indigenous or foreign, and partly from her economic connexions with them, actual or potential. In Egypt alone of the Arab countries was it possible to see the beginnings of an indigenous capitalism: the industrial and other enterprises affiliated to the Banque Misr were rapidly expanding, and in the future they and similar groups would probably look more and more to the surrounding Arab countries, and Syria and Lebanon among them, as markets for their products and fields for investment. Already there was a subsidiary of Banque Misr working in the French Mandated Territories, the Banque Misr-Syrie-Liban. About half the share-capital in it was owned by Egyptian interests, the other half by Syrian and Lebanese. So far it had devoted itself to commercial business rather than to the financing of industry.

Iraq shared with Egypt the desire to see the strong points

[1] See Chapter X.

in Syria and Lebanon in friendly hands. Even more than Egypt she was conscious of the ties of religion and nationality which bind the Iraqis to the Syrians and Lebanese; indeed, the independence of the whole of geographical Syria, as a first step to Arab union, was one of the cardinal points in the foreign policy of Iraq, whose Government had been sympathetic to every movement of Arab unrest or revolt in Syria or Palestine. Its sympathy was due largely to genuine Pan-Arab feeling, which is strong among the ruling elements in Baghdad, but also to Iraq's need for an outlet on the Mediterranean.

PART THREE

IX. THE FRENCH MANDATE

I

THE principle of the Mandate system was formulated in 648 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stated that:

'To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

'The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. . . .

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory . . .

'In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

'The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

'A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.'

648 The preamble of the Mandate recorded the decision of the Principal Allied Powers to entrust Syria and Lebanon to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population in accordance with the provisions of Article 22. France had undertaken to exercise the Mandate on behalf of the League of Nations. Within three years she was to frame an organic law for Syria and Lebanon in agreement with the native authorities and taking into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population. She was further to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent States, and so far as circumstances permitted to encourage local autonomy (Article 1). She was empowered to maintain troops in the territory for its defence; to recruit local forces from the inhabitants for defence and the maintenance of order; and to use the ports and communications for the passage and maintenance of her troops and materials. Once the organic law entered into force, the local forces would be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and control of the Mandatory. Syria and Lebanon might contribute to the cost of maintaining the forces of the Mandatory (Article 2). The Mandatory was entrusted with exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and Lebanon and the protection of their nationals abroad (3). She was to ensure that no part of the territory was ceded, leased or placed under the control of a foreign Power (4). For the duration of the Mandate the privileges and immunities which foreigners had enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire would not be applicable in Syria and Lebanon (5). The Mandatory was to establish a judicial system which should assure to natives as well as foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights (6). Guarantees should be given for the personal status, religious interests and endowments of the various peoples, and for freedom of conscience and worship; and no discrimination of any kind should be made on grounds of differences in race, religion or language (6, 8). The Mandatory was charged to encourage public instruction in the native languages and to safeguard the right of each community to maintain its own schools, teaching in its own language (8). It was to refrain from interfering in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines,

and to limit its supervision of religious missions to the maintenance of public order and good government. The activity of these missions should not be restricted provided it was confined to the domain of religion; they were also to be entitled to conserve themselves with education and [illegible] (9-10). In economic matters there should be no discrimination against the nationals or goods of any state member of the League of Nations, as compared with those of the Mandatory or any other foreign State; subject to this condition, the Mandatory might impose such taxes and duties as it thought necessary. Again subject to the condition, it was suggested to take such steps as it might think best to secure the development of the natural resources of the territory and safeguard the interests of the local population. There should be no distinction of nationality as between state members of the League in the grant of concessions for the development of natural resources. General monopolies should not be granted; those of a purely local nature could however be granted, provided they did not involve a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor infringe the minimum equality guaranteed above (11). Further articles dealt with the origins of nationality, with the adherence of Syria and Lebanon to international agreements in a number of spheres and to measures of common utility adopted by the League for preventing and combating disease; and with the establishment of a list of antiquities (7, 12, 13, 14). Article 15 empowered the Mandatory, once the organic law referred to in Article 1 should come into force, to arrange with the local Governments for the establishment of the organism to be created.

French and Arabic were to be the official languages (16). The Mandatory was obliged to make an annual report to the Council of the League of Nations on the measures taken to carry out the provisions of the Mandate (17). The Council's consent would be required for any modification to the terms of the Mandate (18). On the termination of the Mandate the Council would use its influence to safeguard the fulfilment by the Governments of Syria and Lebanon of financial obligations regularly assumed during the period of the Mandate (19). Finally, the Mandatory agreed that any dispute between it and another member of the League in regard to the interpretation or application of the Mandate should be submitted

648 to the Permanent Court of International Justice if it could not be settled by negotiation (20).

3

The Permanent Mandates Commission provided for in Article 22 of the Covenant was duly set up, and met regularly until the outbreak of the present war. It was composed at the beginning of nine members, but in later years the number varied; they were appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, and a majority of them was drawn from countries other than those to which Mandates had been entrusted; the members sat as private individuals and not as representatives of Governments.

Its business was to examine the report on the political, social and economic development of the Mandated Territories submitted annually to the Council of the League of Nations by the French Government; to record its comments, recommendations and criticisms in regard to the matters dealt with in the report; and to receive and examine petitions addressed to the League by inhabitants of the Mandated Territories or other interested parties. In the performance of these tasks it was helped by the presence at its meetings of a representative of the Mandatory Power, and sometimes of the High Commissioner himself, who in statements and in answers to questions endeavoured to explain his Government's policy.

The Commission on the whole performed its functions with great skill and honesty. It was never unwilling to record its frank but responsible criticisms of French policy and to suggest improvements. Its activities were beneficial in so far as they upheld the principle that the Mandatory Power had been given the Mandate as a sacred trust of civilization, and also in so far as they gave publicity to the way in which the Mandate was being exercised. But its usefulness was limited by various factors. Its operations were slow; it had no direct contacts with the population of the territories with which it was dealing; all petitions had to come to it by way of the Mandatory authorities; and it was handicapped, as it occasionally had reason to complain, by the unwillingness of the French Government to provide full information on controversial subjects. Moreover, it had no power except that of sending observations to the Council of the League.

That the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon was entrusted to France was due mainly to her claiming special interests in the Levant. It was therefore natural that her policy during the Mandatory period should be determined only partly by her conception of the Mandate, and partly by her conception of her own interests. In so far as her policy was based upon the second factor, it was directed to two ends: firstly to opposing and weakening the growing tide of Arab nationalism, with its claim for complete independence; and secondly to strengthening the traditionally or potentially Francophil elements, the Christians, Alawis, Kurds and other minorities, and especially to strengthening the position of Lebanon *vis à vis* the interior. This second aim was partly a means of achieving the first, but partly an end in itself, arising out of France's traditional friendship with certain of the Christians

The claim to independence was opposed for various reasons. There were some who, while not opposed to Arab nationalism as such, were reluctant to make any concessions which would, as they believed, weaken the position of France in the world; their thought, like that of almost all Frenchmen, was dominated by the fear of a world war and the need to build up the strength of France. Others, in those circles where suspicion of British intentions was current, regarded Arab nationalism as inspired by and allied with Great Britain; or at least its success was regarded as likely to lead to an expansion of British at the expense of French influence in Syria and Lebanon, since if they became part of an Arab union they would also become part of the sterling bloc, and English would tend to replace French as the main foreign language in business and education. By some, Arab nationalism was thought to be essentially a movement against the West, a reaction of Asiatic obscurantism and traditionalism against the forces of light and progress, and therefore an enemy of France's tutelary mission. By many Catholics it was regarded as a movement of Moslem fanaticism and necessarily opposed to Christianity, and more particularly to the work of Christian missions in the Levant and to those Syrian Christians who had for so long relied upon French protection.

Others again, while not opposed to the grant of independence in principle, believed that the time was not ripe for it, since the Arabs had not yet learned to rule themselves

648 wisely and efficiently, and more particularly to treat their minorities with discretion. This school of thought was critical of Great Britain's premature withdrawal from Iraq, partly because it forced France's hand in Syria and Lebanon, and partly because the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was not thought to provide adequate guarantees for minorities. Its fears were increased by the killing of the Assyrians in 1933. Opposition was strengthened by the tendency of French statesmen, soldiers and officials to look at Syria and Lebanon with North African eyes: not simply to regard the Arabs of the Levant as similar to those of French North Africa, but to frame their policy in the Mandated Territories with an eye to its repercussions in Morocco, Algeria and Tunis.

Nevertheless it must not be thought that French opinion was universally opposed to the independence of the Mandated Territories. There were many on the Left who were opposed to imperialism, who had a guilty conscience about French policy in the Mandated Territories and who wished to make amends for the injustices of the past. There were others who realized that French policy in Syria and Lebanon was bound to keep in line with British policy in the other Arab countries; and if Great Britain chose, wisely or unwisely, to negotiate treaties of independence with those countries, then France could not do otherwise in Syria and Lebanon. There were advocates of an "enlightened imperialism," who started from the assumption that sooner or later nationalism was going to achieve its objectives in some form or other, and that it lay in the power of France only to help to determine the form, and in particular to determine whether nationalism triumphant would be friendly or hostile to France. They hoped to win the friendship of nationalism while there was yet time by concluding a definitive agreement in which France's essential interests would be preserved but everything else freely and sincerely given up. Finally, there were those who believed that France ought to concentrate upon strengthening her position in Europe and not to incur heavy commitments in the outside world.

Perhaps the best statement of the case against orthodox French policy was made by M. Pierre Viénot, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Popular Front Government of 1936, in a lecture in March, 1939. The Mandated Territories, he insisted, could not be regarded as a colony. For one thing,

there had been practically no French settlement in them, and 648 their economic links with France were only tenuous. What was more important, their population could not be treated as a backward people incapable of governing itself. This had been recognized in the text of the Mandate. According to the conception of the Mandate, " the Mandatory Power commands and governs only to educate. Its role is that of a tutor, its authority provisional and transitory." This idea was not simply a theory. It was accepted by the population of the Mandated Territories, whose desire for independence was strong and of long standing. Unless French policy conformed to that envisaged in the Mandate, there was a danger that French influence in the Levant would decline, to be replaced by that of Italy, of Great Britain or of Turkey.[1]

5

The conception of the Mandate held by the French Government was defined by its accredited representative, M. de Caix, at a session of the Permanent Mandates Commission in February, 1926 :

' The idea which has governed, if not the whole exercise of the Mandate, at any rate all the efforts made to organize it, is the following : the Mandate is a provisional system designed to enable populations which, politically speaking, are still minors to educate themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-government. This presupposes that the Mandatory Power will gradually create native organizations in the mandated territory, such as may, when complete, be able to ensure entirely the government of the country and such as may, if they carry out their duties in a proper manner, render the intervention of the Mandatory unnecessary. It appears from this that there should not be any intervention on the part of the organizations of the Mandatory Power in the internal affairs of the native governments. . . .

' In conformity with this conception, countries like Syria and the Lebanon, which have not one but several governments, must be provided with a native organization, not only for the government of the various States but also for the purpose of internal relations between them.

' Since the populations under mandate are endowed with a

[1] G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939).

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government including the necessary organizations to make them self-supporting, provided that they perform their duties in a normal manner, it is necessary, on the other hand, that the Mandatory Power should be in a position not only to give advice but also to correct the working of the native governments and even to make up for their deficiencies. . . .

'Consequently, the mandate system calls for a complete native organization, but side by side with it an organization of a tutelary nature, possessing the necessary authority to ensure the good government and progress of the country.'[1]

6

It was in the light of this conception that the political organization of the Mandated Territories was framed during the first years of the Mandatory period. It may be described as a dual organization. On the one side stood the High Commissioner, the representative of the Mandatory Power. His was the ultimate responsibility for the administration of Syria and Lebanon; but in principle (which was, however, often contravened in practice) his functions were restricted in normal times to advice and supervision. To assist him he had at his headquarters in Beirut a political and a military 'cabinet', and a number of departments, staffed in the upper ranks by officials from France or the French Empire, and under the control of the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner's principal administrative assistant; they included departments of public security, education, public works, antiquities, etc., and the organization for Beduin affairs. He also had an information service composed of army officers acting under his direct control and charged with the function of keeping him in touch with movements of political feeling, thought and action throughout the country. These officials of the 'Services Spéciaux' were to be found in every district and in practice exercised an almost unlimited influence over the local administration and political life. A special group of them was in charge of the Beduin, whose affairs were thus brought under the direct control of the High Commissioner.

This was the 'organization of a tutelary nature' of which M. de Caix spoke; its expenses were paid from the French Budget. But in addition to it, there were certain other

[1] *Minutes of the eighth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, February-March, 1926*, p. 45.

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departments under the immediate control of the High Commissioner. The most important of them were the customs administration, the posts and telegraphs, and the control of concessionary companies (this was important because the railways, most public utilities, and the production of tobacco were in the hands of such companies). These departments dealt with matters of common interest to all parts of the Mandated Territories, and could not therefore be wholly controlled by the Governments of the different regions into which, as will be shown below, the Territories were divided. When some organization representative of all those Governments should be established, it would take over the control of these departments; but until that should occur, they were provisionally administered by the High Commissioner. Known collectively as the 'Common Interests', they had their own budget, with funds drawn almost wholly from the customs revenues; from it their expenses were defrayed, and the surplus was distributed between the indigenous Governments.

When the High Commissioner was a soldier, he was himself Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Syria and Lebanon, which were mainly French and colonial but included a number of units, the 'Troupes spéciales du Levant', raised from different sections of the population. When he was a civilian, the forces were under a separate Commander-in-Chief, who was himself, however, subordinate to the High Commissioner. A large part of the expenses of the army of occupation was a charge upon the French Budget; but the 'Troupes spéciales' were paid for out of the budget of common services.

7

The High Commissioner, as has been said, exercised general functions of advice and supervision; but in principle the actual work of administration was performed by indigenous Governments, established by the High Commissioner and controlled by him through his Delegates or representatives in the main administrative centres of the country. They were staffed mainly by local officials, when competent ones could be found, but in the earlier years the governors were often French. A number of French administrative 'conseillers' and technical advisers were attached to the various departments; they ranked as officials of the Governments to which

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648 they were attached and not as members of the High Commissioner's staff. These Governments had legislative as well as executive powers, subject to the control of the High Commissioner and his Delegates, and within limits of the 'conseillers': a control which at times deprived the Governments of almost all freedom of action.

648 642 631 That the Mandatory Power decided to establish several indigenous Governments instead of one for the whole territory was officially explained as being due to the separatist feelings of various sections of the population and their different levels of development. The first of them to be set up was the State of Greater Lebanon, which was created in August, 1920, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of the towns and surrounding districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Sur and Saida; the wheat-producing regions of Baalbek and the Biqa'; and the districts of Rashaya and Hasbaya, stretching southwards from the foot of Mount Hermon to the Palestinian frontier. Its independence was proclaimed in September, 1920. In the same month, the Territory of the Alawis was established in the region around Latakia. It was given the name of 'State' in July, 1922. In April, 1922, the independence of Jebel Druze was proclaimed, in consequence of an agreement for the establishment of a Druze national Government, signed in March, 1921, by a number of Druze notables and a representative of the High Commissioner. The remainder of Syria had been divided after the expulsion of Faisal into the two States of Aleppo and Damascus, created in September, 1920. Within the State of Aleppo, the Sanjaq of Alexandretta was given a special régime, in accordance with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. Legislatively the Sanjaq formed part of the State, but administratively it possessed a large degree of autonomy, it had a special budget, and Turkish was recognized as an official language side by side with French and Arabic.

This organization was intended to be provisional only. Although in the first instance the personnel of the Governments was appointed by the High Commissioner and many of the most important posts were filled by French officers and officials, it was anticipated that self-governing institutions would be established as soon as possible, and that some permanent and regular system of co-operation between the governments would be created. In 1922, a Representative Council was established in Lebanon. In June of that year a

further step was taken with the creation of a Syrian Federation which included the States of Damascus, Aleppo and the Alawis, but not those of Greater Lebanon and Jebel Druze. The Federation was given wide legislative powers, exercised through a Federal Council composed of delegations elected by the Representative Councils which were established in the member-states. At its first meeting the Council elected as its President Subhi Barakat, an Antiochene of Turkish origin.

The Federation did not work satisfactorily. The States of Damascus and Aleppo desired a closer form of union, and certain elements in that of the Alawis one less close. In December, 1924, General Weygand, who had succeeded General Gouraud as High Commissioner in April, 1923, dissolved the Federation. As from January, 1925, the two States of Damascus and Aleppo were combined into a single State of Syria, of which the capital was Damascus and within which the Sanjaq of Alexandretta continued to possess a special régime. The State of the Alawis resumed its separate existence without any direct connexion with the new Syrian State.

Thus from the beginning of 1925 onwards the Mandated Territories were divided into four different political units: the State of Greater Lebanon, known later as the Lebanese Republic; the State of Syria, later called the Syrian Republic and including the partly-autonomous Sanjaq of Alexandretta; the State of the Alawis, known from 1930 as the Government of Latakia; and the Government of Jebel Druze. This organization continued unchanged until 1936, when Latakia and Jebel Druze were formally annexed to Syria; in 1939 they were again given almost complete autonomy, but in 1942 were once more attached to the Syrian State.

The judicial system was complex and not altogether satisfactory. Many although by no means all matters of personal status—for example, marriage and divorce—continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the religious communities. All other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, administering a system of law based partly upon Islamic jurisprudence and partly upon modern European codes. In cases in which only citizens of the Mandated Territories were concerned, the personnel of the courts was almost wholly indigenous. But cases involving citizens of foreign States or their interests were taken before the 'mixed

courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

8

The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

648 The great failure of French rule was to win the approval
186 and co-operation of the Syrian and the bulk of the Lebanese people. A large part of the population, and especially of the more articulate elements in it, was from the very beginning highly critical of French rule if not irreconcilably opposed to it; and criticism and opposition did not grow less with the passing of time.

To a great extent this attitude was based upon particular grievances, real or imagined. It was complained that France had failed to provide a reasonable standard of administration. The French officials were too often corrupt, avaricious and arbitrary; while the Syrian and Lebanese officials were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of responsibility. In consequence of this, the development of public services, even in spheres far removed from controversy and where the necessity of advance is generally recognized, was unsatisfactory, and Syria and Lebanon fell behind the neighbouring countries in providing amenities of life and opportunities of work.

The French officials, the indictment continues, not only proved themselves inefficient, but adopted a harmful attitude towards those whom they ruled. They did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated the country as if it were a French colony, and the inhabitants as on a level with France's African subjects; and at least in the early part of the Mandatory period they did not hesitate to express their contempt for the Arabs. The use of Sengalese troops first to expel Faisal and then on garrison duty seems to the Syrians and Lebanese to be a sign of this contempt.

It was further alleged that the elementary rights of the individual were denied: there was no freedom of speech, of assembly or of publication; imprisonment without trial was frequent. A particularly widespread complaint was of the activities of the officials of the 'Services Spéciaux', who, it is claimed, far exceeded their duties and often became petty despots in their districts, and even fomented disorder for their own or for France's benefit.

There were also various economic and financial grievances. It was said that the tariff-system did not give adequate protection to local enterprise; and often the extent to which France's hands were tied in this regard by the provisions of

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the Mandate was ignored. The grant of all the more important concessions to French companies was widely resented. The terms of the contracts between the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were criticized as being too favourable to the Banque; and the linking of the currency to the fluctuating franc was resented as introducing into the country a factor of economic instability which might have been avoided. The arrangements by which French military and civil personnel could obtain imported goods duty-free, and the abuses which sprang from it, formed another common grievance. Finally, there was the widely-believed accusation that the French deliberately drained the country of the gold which it possessed in Ottoman times.

The inadequacies of the French administration were resented by almost all in both Syria and Lebanon, whatever their general political views. But there was also a large section of the population which opposes French rule on grounds of principle. The majority of the nationalists always refused to recognize the Mandate, which they regarded as contrary alike to the 'natural right' of nations to independence, to the promises made by the Allies during the first world war, and to the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provides for administrative advice and assistance, but not for semi-colonial rule. Besides opposing the Mandate as such, they resented the way in which it was imposed upon the Syrian people, and still more the way in which it was carried out. Not only was no independent Government established, but no appreciable progress was made towards that end. Only half-hearted attempts were made to set up representative institutions; little was done to create an efficient civil service; what was more important still, the division of the country into a number of States, and the encouragement given to separatism and to the intransigence of the minorities, seriously diminished the possibility of establishing a stable and representative Government. In the light of these facts, the nationalists believed that France never made a sincere attempt to fulfil the obligations imposed upon her by the Mandate in virtue of which she ruled Syria and Lebanon. They believed also that the longer France remained in the Levant, the more she would gradually destroy the possibility of national revival and self-government.

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648 Underlying all these grievances was resentment at the division of geographical Syria into French and British Mandated Territories: a division which was criticized both on grounds of principle and because of the economic and administrative dislocation which it caused. It is true that France was not wholly to blame for this, but it was an additional reason why the nationalists wished to obtain freedom of action.

10

The ultimate political objectives of Arab nationalists in Syria and Lebanon are the same as those of the nationalists in other parts of Arab Asia: the unity and independence of the Arab people. But in so far as the political fate of Syria and Lebanon has been different from that of the other Arab regions, the immediate objectives of the Arab nationalist movement in the French Mandated Territories have differed from its objectives elsewhere. From 1918 to 1941 these immediate objectives were to bring about a radical change in French policy and to replace Mandatory rule by genuine self-government.

Although Arab nationalists were united in desiring the attainment of these objectives, they differed upon the means by which and the speed with which they hoped to attain them. Some of them did not consider that Syria and Lebanon were yet fit for complete independence, and advocated co-operation with the Mandatory Power, the gradual extension of self-government, the creation of a modern administrative machine and an educated ruling-class and electorate, and thus the achievement of independence by gradual stages. They included some considerable personalities but were never able to organize themselves into an effective political group. Others, who refused to recognize either the Mandate or the administrative partition of the French Mandated Territories, demanded immediate independence and unity.

The adoption of one or other of these attitudes did not necessarily imply friendship or hostility towards France as such. Even among so-called 'extremists' there was a widespread admiration for French culture, and a recognition that without the influence of that culture the Arab literary and political revivals would have been impossible. Those who opposed French policy were not necessarily hostile to France; and those who were Francophil were not necessarily free from

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all distrust of French policy in the Levant. To call the nationalist opposition anti-French or xenophobe would be misleading, although it does contain elements to which those terms could be applied.

Nor would it be correct to regard the 'moderate' and 'extremist' groups as sharply differentiated from one another. They differed not on fundamental questions but on questions of means; they were akin to one another in sympathies, and individuals from the two often worked together. In so far as they were groups at all, they were groups of which the membership was constantly shifting. This was true also of the differences inside the 'extremist' section. There were some who saw no hope of obtaining independence except by the use of force. There were others who hoped to obtain it by the negotiation with France of a treaty similar in its nature and its terms to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which terminated Great Britain's Mandate over Iraq. There might be a few who disapproved of methods of violence on principle, and at the other extreme a few who disapproved of negotiating a treaty which would involve compromise and concession. But the majority would have supported negotiations for a treaty when they seemed likely to be fruitful, and have been willing to resort to violence if that should seem the most hopeful or the only way of attaining their objectives. As Chapters X-XII will show, the history of the years between 1920 and 1941 saw several changes of attitude on the part of the nationalists.

During those years, however, the nationalist movement was always essentially one of opposition. In Iraq, nationalism achieved its first objective, independence, comparatively early, and was brought face to face with practical problems of administration and construction. But in Syria and Lebanon the first objective was not so easily achieved, and in 1941, after more than twenty years of effort, the nationalists were still striving towards self-government, which obsessed them to the exclusion of other aims.[1]

[1] Although the declarations of independence made in 1941 changed the formal nature of French rule in Syria and Lebanon, they did not materially alter the attitude of the population to France. The complaints which were made during the earlier period are still made, and the Syrians and Lebanese are less willing than ever to acquiesce in French predominance. See Chapter XII and Postscript.

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independence, and less disposed to establish close relations with Syria and other Arab countries than the latter.[1]

5

The State of the Alawis also remained tranquil, once the rising of 1919-1921 had been suppressed. The effort of the Mandatory authorities was directed mainly to encouraging the communal consciousness of the inhabitants (often by playing on their fears); and to raising their material and intellectual level through such measures as the creation of educational and medical services and the giving of assistance to agriculture. In these tasks they had considerable success; socially and economically the district progressed. Further, a greater degree of equality than had previously existed was established between the Alawis, Sunnis and Christians. The administration was mainly in French hands, although there was a Representative Council and efforts were made to increase the share of the inhabitants in the government, as trained and suitable administrators became available. In 1930 an Organic Law was promulgated defining the nature and activities of the political institutions of the State, whose name was then changed to 'the Government of Latakia'.

The Alawis and many of the Christians were content to have no direct connection with the State of Syria, and among the former there developed a more conscious particularist spirit than they had previously possessed. But the Sunnis, here as in Lebanon, disapproved of a situation in which from being the dominant class they became a minority, and accused the Mandatory Power of neglecting their interests in favour of those of the Alawis; they, and all those who held Arab nationalist views, saw clearly the dangers in France's policy of encouraging the separatism of the Alawis and teaching them to rely on foreign support. They demanded the reincorporation of the region in the State of Syria, and their demand was supported by the Sunnis and Arab nationalists in Syria.

6

The history of the other two States was not so tranquil. Alike in Syria and Jebel Druze unrest and discontent appeared in the early years of the Mandate, and issued finally in the revolt of 1925-1926.

[1] For recent changes in Lebanese feeling, see Postscript.

648 In the State of Syria the disquiet may be traced back to
667 that opposition to the general policy of the Mandatory Power
668 which has been analyzed in Chapter IX. The opposition was strengthened by the many administrative and economic grievances which have also been dealt with. It found expression in a number of local disturbances and risings at the very beginning of the French occupation, the most notable of them the revolt of Ibrahim Hananu in North Syria and the rising in the Hauran. As time went on the restlessness was increased still further by the instability of French policy: the appointment and recall of a number of High Commissioners; the consequent changes in the higher personnel of the mandatory administration; the creation and then the dissolution of a Federation. These were further causes of disquiet: the repercussion in Syria of the growing hostility of the Palestinian Arabs to Zionism and to British policy, and the activities of Syrian emigrants, particularly of the Syro-Palestinian Committees in Cairo and in Geneva. Of the group in Geneva the leading spirit was the Amir Shakib Arslan, a distinguished writer and publicist, by origin a Lebanese Druze, who had given all his life to the spread first of Pan-Islamic and then of Pan-Arab ideas.

668 All these factors contributed to create a strong opposition
[665] to French rule; it was led and organized by the 'People's
648 Party', which grew rapidly in the years prior to the revolt. The nationalist opposition was to some extent concerned with general Arab problems: the independence and union of the whole Arab world. In local matters, its main purposes were two. First, it advocated the union of the French Mandated Territories. Jebel Druze and the Alawi region, it was claimed, should be wholly incorporated in the State of Syria; Lebanon was to be at most autonomous within a Syrian or Arab State, and was to be shorn of the territories assigned to it in 1920. Secondly, Syria should be given genuine self-government immediately, and complete independence as soon as possible. This would involve on the one hand the relaxation of French control over the administration; on the other a rigid definition of the points at which and the period for which French armed forces could be maintained in Syria, and ultimately their complete withdrawal. It was around these two points that Franco-Syrian relations revolved throughout the period of the Mandate.

7

In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more sud- 648
denly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power 631
so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the 621
agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was 563
established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller landowners against the great families of the Jebel; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables 648
elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He 668
initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

8

In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash. 000

9

The insurrection had many consequences in the Jebel. It prevented any further attempts to interfere with the customs and social structure of the Jebel. Its administration was placed under stricter French control, but its separation from the State of Syria was maintained. The administrative system was formalized by an Organic Law issued in 1930. Under this Law, the region was to be administered by a Governor, appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner, and possessed of considerable legislative and financial as well as executive powers. In practice he was always a Frenchman. He was to be assisted by a Council of Government, composed partly of heads of administrative departments and partly of appointed members chosen from among the notables. All important acts of the Government would require the approval of the High Commissioner, who was also to exercise such sovereign powers as did not belong to the local Government.[1]

The administration of the Jebel followed a policy the effect of which, whether deliberate or not, was to drive a wedge between the Druzes and the Arab nationalists, whose temporary alliance had given the revolt of 1925 its strength. The separatist spirit so deeply grounded in Druze tradition was encouraged, and there was grafted on to it among a certain section a feeling of dependence upon France. There remained, however, another section who wished for union with Syria.

10

In the State of Syria, the process of pacification was accompanied by one of political change, with the aim of improving the state of feeling and removing some of the grievances of the nationalists: grievances which had been partly endorsed by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its special session to investigate the revolt, held at Rome in February-March, 1926. The change was initiated by M. Henri de Jouvenel, who replaced General Sarrail in November, 1925. He took the first steps which were designed to lead ultimately to self-government. In Lebanon he allowed the Representative Council to draft a Constitution for the State; in the State of the Alawis he held elections for a Constituent Council to draft an Organic Law; and in the State of Syria he ordered elections for

[1] For text, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 694–7.

similar Councils to be held in all parts of the country not under martial law. In spite of a boycott by the nationalists, the Syrian elections were held, but the Representative Councils which resulted from them proved ineffective.

The next step was to form a Government which should be more acceptable to public opinion than that which had been presided over by Subhi Barakat since the creation of the Syrian State, and which resigned in December, 1925. The Presidency of the State was offered to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, the son of one of the most respected religious leaders in Damascus. He laid down certain conditions of his taking office. The High Commissioner could not, however, accept them, and after some delay appointed as provisional President Damad Ahmad Nami, a Circassian by origin. He formed a Ministry which for a short time included members of the 'People's Party'; its programme envisaged the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty and the attainment of Syrian unity by negotiation with the other States included in the French Mandate.

II

In June, 1926, M. de Jouvenel declared to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the French Government intended to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Next month he resigned and was succeeded by M. Ponsot. The new High Commissioner took the first step towards the establishment of the self-government which had been foreseen by his predecessor, by preparing for the elaboration of an Organic Law. A beginning had indeed already been made with this: M. de Jouvenel had consulted various notables on the form which the future political organization of the country should take.

In July, 1927, M. Ponsot made a declaration in which he explicitly identified himself with the policy approved by the French Government and the League of Nations and defined by his predecessors. Regard for the wishes of the people concerned had, he maintained, been the idea which had throughout inspired French policy. In accordance with this idea, the framing of the definitive constitution of the countries under French Mandate was to be the work of those peoples. The Mandatory Power would exert itself to bring about a general agreement and to arbitrate in any differences which

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might arise ; in default of an agreement, it would take appropriate measures to maintain order and to guarantee peace. The Mandatory Power desired to favour and hasten the political evolution of the States under its protection, and to promote their economic development. As for the 'Common Interests', the High Commissioner would continue to administer them with the active and ever-increasing assistance of the representatives of the States.[1]

A few months later, in February, 1928, M. Ponsot judged that the time had come for the election of a Constituent Assembly. In that month the state of siege declared at the beginning of the revolt was finally raised, the censorship suppressed, the special tribunals established during the revolt abolished, and a general amnesty issued. At the same time Damad Ahmad Nami's Ministry was replaced by a new provisional Government of 'moderate' politicians presided over by Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, with the task of preparing the way for the creation of regular institutions to which it could hand over its functions.

The elections were held in April of the same year. In the towns, most of those elected belonged to the more uncompromising section of the nationalists, the opponents of Shaikh Taj ad-Din's Ministry ; in the countryside, however, they were mainly moderates. Of the seventy members of the Assembly, over two-thirds supported the Government, but owing to their lack of cohesion and the decision of the Government not to intervene in the proceedings, it was the so-called 'extreme' nationalists who dominated the discussions. They were the more powerful in that they had recovered from the confusion caused by the collapse of the revolt, and had succeeded once more in organizing themselves in a party, the 'National Bloc'. In so far as it had a founder he was Ibrahim Hananu, an Aleppine and a man respected even by his opponents. The Bloc was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It included leading members of important landowning families, like Jamil Mardam Bey from Damascus, Saadullah al-Jabiri from Aleppo, and Hashim al-Atasi, the President of the Bloc. It included also individuals important rather for character and intellect than for representing large sections of opinion, like Faris al-Khuri, a Protestant lawyer, law-teacher and financier. It

[1] For text, see *Oriente Moderno*, September, 1927, pp. 409-11.

665 was supported by several groups which preserved something of their individuality inside the alliance. The most important of them was the 'Istiqeal' group, descended from one of the secret societies of the years before 1914. It advocated the complete independence of the Arab countries and tended to be more uncompromising than the other constituent elements of the Bloc. Its leader was Shukri al-Quwatli. Among its other prominent members were Nabih al-Azmah, the Amir Adil Arslan, and Riyadh as-Sulh, perhaps the most important Arab nationalist leader in Lebanon.

646 One of the most prominent of the members of the Bloc,
642 Hashim al-Atasi, was elected President of the Assembly when it met in Damascus in June, 1928; while Ibrahim Hananu became President of the Commission set up to draft the Constitution. The Commission completed its work by August,
642 and laid its draft before the Assembly. The Constitution which it had drawn up was modelled on those of Western democratic countries, and provided for the exercise of legislative powers by a single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, and of executive powers by an elected President and a responsible Ministry. In addition it contained guarantees for the rights of individuals and communities. Thus Article 6 stipulated that all Syrians should be equal before the law, and there should be no inequality of treatment on grounds of religion, sect, race or language. Article 15 guaranteed liberty of conscience, the free exercise of all forms of worship, and the safeguarding of the religious interests and personal status of every sect. Article 28 guaranteed the rights of the religious communities, including their right to establish schools, teaching in their own language, subject to the principles laid down by law; and Article 37 declared that the electoral law to be issued subsequently would provide for the representation of religious minorities. (This provision was carried out. Each Parliament elected since 1930 has contained a number of representatives of the minorities, roughly proportionate to their size.)

648 In general the draft was acceptable to the High Com-
642 missioner, but there were certain articles to the inclusion of which he objected. Thus Article 2 declared that the Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity, which was unaffected by the divisions which had arisen between the end of the war and the

present time. This was a denial of the separate existence of Jebel Druze, the Alawi district, the Lebanese Republic, Palestine and Transjordan; and M. Poincaré judged it to be irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law. Special four other Articles asserted the right of the President of the Republic to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad and proclaim martial law (Arts. [illegible] and 112); and Article 110 declared that the organization of the army would form the subject of a special law. These five Articles also the High Commissioner thought to be incompatible with the obligations of France. He therefore asked that the Articles concerned should be separated from the general body of the draft. The Assembly refused, and M. Ponsot thereupon adjourned it for three months in August, 1928, and for a further three in November. He made an alternative suggestion, that the Assembly should modify the wording of Article 2 and should retain the other offending articles but add to the draft a general reservation safeguarding France's international obligations. This also proved abortive, since he and the Assembly could not agree upon a text for the reservation.

In February, 1929, the work of the Assembly was prorogued *sine die*. During this period and throughout 1929 the split between the National Bloc and "moderates" grew ever wider. The former, while remaining tranquil, demanded the acceptation of a Treaty to replace the Mandate; the latter continued to advocate a policy of co-operation with France, and attempted without much success to form an effective political organization. The High Commissioner found it impossible to reach an agreement with the nationalists on the constitutional question, while the "moderates" were too weak and divided for their support to be of value to him; he therefore felt himself bound to give up the attempt to entrust to the Syrian people the responsibility for the elaboration of their own constitution. Accordingly he dissolved the Constituent Assembly in May, 1930, and on his own initiative issued a Constitution for the State of Syria. It was to come into force after the election of the members of a Chamber of Deputies, at a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner.

This Constitution was virtually the same as that drafted by the Assembly, except for such changes as were necessary to [illegible]

642 enable the Mandatory Power to carry out its obligations
648 under the Covenant. Thus Article 2 was modified, and stated merely that 'Syria forms an indivisible political unity'; and an additional article (116) was added to the effect that 'the provisions of the present Constitution are not, and cannot be, in opposition to the obligations undertaken by France in regard to Syria, particularly obligations towards the League of Nations. . . . So long as the international obligations of France in regard to Syria remain in force, any provisions of the present Constitution which are of a nature to affect those obligations will be applicable only under conditions to be determined by agreement between the French and Syrian Governments'.

Simultaneously a number of other decrees were promulgated. In addition to the Organic Laws for the Governments of Latakia and Jebel Druze, already mentioned, they included laws for the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and for a Conference of Common Interests composed of Delegations from the States and Governments, and charged with the management of their common financial and economic affairs.[1]

12

646 The elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in January, 1932, and the Chamber met in June. More than three-quarters of its members were 'moderates'. Only a quarter were 'extreme' nationalists demanding full and immediate independence; but as had happened in the Constituent Assembly, the minority soon showed itself to be the dominant element. Its hopes were raised and its case strengthened by the recent conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the termination of the Mandate and the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations (1930-1932).

643 The first task of the Chamber was to choose the President
645 of the Republic. It elected Muhammad Ali al-Abid, son of
648 Izzat Pasha al-Abid who had been secretary to the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. He entrusted the construction of a Cabinet to a prominent moderate, Haqqi al-Azm, who formed a Ministry of which half the members were 'moderates' and half 'extreme' nationalists. Negotiations were opened between the Ministry and the High Commissioner for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

[1] For texts of these documents, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 676–98.

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The negotiations had not gone far before it became clear that there existed divergences of views between the High Commissioner and the nationalists. The latter claimed that the Treaty should provide for the inclusion in Syria of the Governments of Jebel Druze and Latakia; while the High Commissioner asserted that, although there was no question of granting those regions independence, they were still in need of a special régime, and had not yet reached the stage of development at which it would be possible to come to a final decision upon their political destiny. A large proportion of the inhabitants of the two Governments supported the High Commissioner's contention and opposed their incorporation in Syria. Further, there was disagreement whether, as the French authorities demanded, the Treaty should impose no restrictions upon the occupation of Syria by French forces, or whether, as the nationalists desired, the occupation should be limited in space and time. There were also differences of opinion upon the questions of Syro-Lebanese relations and the retention of French control over the administration of the Common Interests. Deadlock having been reached on these issues, the nationalist ministers resigned in April, 1933, and their places were taken by 'moderates'. The reconstructed Government carried to a conclusion the negotiations for the Treaty, which was signed in November of the same year by the Ministry and by the Comte de Martel, who had succeeded M. Ponsot as High Commissioner. The Treaty declared that France and Syria agreed, once the Mandate should be terminated, to consult one another on foreign policy whenever necessary; to collaborate in the peaceful settlement of any quarrel between Syria and a third state and, if need be, in defensive measures. The French Government undertook to maintain forces in Syria; to help in the organization and equipment of the Syrian army and police; to lend such technical advisers and civil servants as might be required; and to facilitate the admission of Syria to the League of Nations. The Syrian Government undertook to guarantee the rights accorded to individuals and communities in the Syrian Constitution, and to respect the rights of racial and religious minorities. The two States further agreed to maintain the economic unity of the Mandated Territory. The Treaty was to be concluded for twenty-five years, the transfer of authority

648 from the Mandatory Power to the Syrian Government being completed within four years.[1]

648 The Treaty was immediately laid before the Chamber. Its
646 reception by the nationalists inside and outside the Chamber was so unfavourable as to make it clear that it had no chance of acceptance. Accordingly the High Commissioner suspended the sittings of the Chamber, withdrew from its cognizance the terms of the Treaty, and authorized the President of the Republic to govern provisionally by means of decree-laws. A year later, in November, 1934, he suspended the Chamber *sine die*. These acts aroused the resentment and indignation of the nationalists, but in general the country remained quiet, apart from local and ephemeral disturbances, throughout 1934 and 1935. In March, 1934, the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, which continued in office for practically two years.

13

665 Perhaps the most important development of the early 1930's
186 was the growth of a number of political parties with a special appeal to the educated youth of the towns, and therefore of great significance in a country whose political circumstances gave peculiar weight to the actions of the young. Very different from one another in their doctrines and their aims, these parties were alike in that they endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older parties had not for the most part possessed ; alike, too, in that they tried to base their activities not upon gusts of feeling or some immediate objective, but upon systematic and reasoned doctrines. They expressed and attempted to direct the spirit of the youth of Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and the other towns : a restless youth, discontented both with its foreign masters and with its own older generation, conscious of talents and ideas and cramped by lack of opportunity, drawn simultaneously towards and away from the West, eager and suspicious, hasty and thoughtful. Even when the youth-movements took a paramilitary form, that does not necessarily mean that they were Fascist ; they were merely endeavouring to satisfy certain human needs which in more fortunate

[1] For text, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1933* (Paris, 1934), pp. 189–95.

XI. THE TREATIES, 1936-1939

I

AT the end of 1935 nationalist feeling in Syria came once more 648 668
to a head. This was due not so much to internal events as to the general unrest in the Eastern Mediterranean, arising out of the Italo-Abyssinian War; this unrest appeared also in Palestine and in Egypt, where it led to the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, a measure which stimulated the demand for the conclusion of a similar treaty between Syria and France. The immediate occasion of the outburst was the death at the end of 1935 of Ibrahim Hananu, the leader of the National Bloc. At his funeral, incendiary speeches were made; and in the first days of 1936 a general strike broke out in Damascus in protest against the failure of the French Government to grant Syria her independence. The strike spread rapidly to the other towns, and soon took on an organized character. It was directed by the National Bloc, which issued a 'National Pact', demanding independence, equality of rights between members of all sects, national unity and co-operation with nationalist movements in other Arab countries, and the raising of social, economic, moral and cultural standards among all classes, as well as the abandonment of the policy of the Balfour Declaration in Palestine.

At first the High Commissioner attempted to break the strike by measures of repression; for example, several of the leaders of the disturbances were arrested. But gradually he took up a more conciliatory attitude. In February he replaced Shaikh Taj ad-Din as Prime Minister by Ata al-Ayyubi, a moderate politician who was more acceptable than his predecessor to the nationalists. At the beginning of March he took a further step, by making a provisional agreement with the nationalists: a Syrian delegation was to go to Paris in order to conduct negotiations with the French Government for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

The delegation reached Paris at the end of March. It was 648
composed of six members, four of them, including the President, drawn from the National Bloc, and two of them from the Ayyubi Ministry. At first its negotiations with the French Government did not proceed smoothly, since they came up against the same obstacles as had proved fatal to the Treaty of 1933: first, the question of the inclusion of Jebel Druze

and Latakia in the Syrian State, and secondly that of the degree of control which France should retain. The doubts of the French Government upon the first point were increased by the uneasiness of a large section of the Alawis and Druzes at the prospect of being incorporated in Syria.

In June the situation was changed by the accession to power in France of the first Popular Front Government. MM. Yvon Delbos and Pierre Viénot, respectively Minister and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were more friendly to Syrian aspirations than their predecessors had been. The negotiations were resumed on a new basis and it was not long before agreement was reached. On September 9th, the Franco-Syrian Treaty was initialled.

The news of the initialling of the Treaty had repercussions in Lebanon, where the Maronites and other supporters of Lebanese independence demanded the negotiation of a similar treaty with France, both as a sign of equality with Syria and as an additional guarantee that the placing of relations between France and Syria on a new and more friendly basis would not involve any change in the status of the Lebanese Republic. The French Government was immediately responsive to this demand. Negotiations were opened in Beirut between the High Commissioner and a Lebanese delegation representative of all important elements in the population and headed by Emile Edde, who had been elected President of the Republic at the beginning of 1936. The negotiations met with no serious obstacle, and in November a Franco-Lebanese Treaty was initialled; it was approved by the Lebanese Chamber in the same month.

2

The preamble of the Franco-Syrian Treaty recited the progress towards independent nationhood made by Syria, and the agreement of the two Governments to fulfil the requisite conditions for the admission of Syria into the League of Nations. The Governments had decided to conclude a Treaty of friendship and alliance in order to define the relations which would exist between the two States after the cessation of the Mandate, and to settle, through agreements which would form an integral part of the Treaty, the method of executing it.

The text of the Treaty provided for peace, friendship and

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alliance between France and Syria (Article 1). The two 648 Governments were to consult one another in all matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests, and to adopt towards foreign Powers an attitude consistent with their alliance (2). They agreed to take steps to ensure, when the Mandate should cease, the transfer to the Syrian Government of the rights and obligations resulting from agreements concluded by the French Government in the name of Syria (3). The two countries would act together to settle peacefully any difference between either of them and a third state; and if either found itself involved in a conflict, the other would immediately come to its aid. The Syrian Government would give the French Government all requisite assistance and facilities, including the use of communications (4). The Syrian Government was to be responsible for maintaining order and defending its territory and would ensure the permanent maintenance and protection of French air-routes crossing Syrian territory (5).

The Treaty was to last for twenty-five years, with the possibility of renewal should the parties so desire; to be ratified as soon as possible and communicated to the League of Nations; and to enter into force when Syria should be admitted to the League of Nations (6-7). On the Treaty's entry into force, the Syrian Government was to take over from the French all responsibilities and obligations arising out of international decisions or acts of the League (8).

A number of subsidiary agreements and letters defined the military position of France, also her rights and interests, and the relations of the Syrian Government towards Lebanon, the Druzes and Alawis and the minorities in general. The military convention provided for the formation of a Syrian army with the help of a French military mission and with equipment on the French model. It stipulated in addition that two sites for air bases should be put at the disposal of France for the duration of the alliance; until they should be ready she should be accorded the use of the existing airfields near Damascus and Aleppo. Moreover, for five years from the coming into force of the Treaty, France was to maintain troops in the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, but this was not to be regarded as constituting an occupation. The Syrian Government was to give all facilities required

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641 by the French forces; and to permit the use of Syrian waters and ports by French vessels.

Exchanges of letters laid it down that Syria would normally recruit foreign advisers and officials from France; that the French Government would protect Syrian nationals and interests in places where the Syrian Government was not directly represented; that the representative of France was to have the rank of Ambassador and to take precedence over representatives of other powers; that the Syrian Government would respect the rights acquired in the name of or for Syria by French real and corporate persons; and that the existing monetary parity between the two countries would be maintained (Exchanges of letters Nos. 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9). Furthermore, the French Government waived its right to demand repayment of the military and civil expenses of the Mandate (11).

In another exchange of letters the Syrian Government undertook to maintain the existing régime in regard to foreign institutions (7); while a protocol provided for the establishment of a judicial régime which should protect foreign interests and at the same time take into account the progress made by the Syrian Government in judicial organization.

A safeguard for the scattered minorities was contained in Exchange No. 5, in which the Syrian Government undertook to carry out the guarantees for individuals and communities laid down in the Constitution. As for the compact Druze and Alawi minorities, their districts were to be annexed to the Syrian State, but to be granted a special administrative and financial régime (6). The maintenance of French troops in those districts would also in fact constitute another guarantee for them.

The Treaty contained no formal recognition by the Syrian Government of the separate existence of the Lebanese Republic, but such recognition was implied by a protocol which declared the readiness of the Syrian Government to enter into negotiations with Lebanon for the regulation of all outstanding questions; the French Government would transfer the administration of the Common Interests either to whatever new organization the two Governments decided to establish, or, if they decide not to set up such a common organization, to the Governments themselves.

The Treaty and its attached documents, as has already been

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mentioned, were to enter into force when Syria should be admitted to the League of Nations. But there was a long process to be accomplished before that should happen. First the Treaty must be signed by whatever Government issued from the elections shortly to be held in Syria. Then it would need to be ratified by the French and Syrian Parliaments. After ratification would come a transitional period of three years, during which the machinery of an independent State would gradually be constructed. Only when that period had ended would Syria apply for admission to the League of Nations.[1]

The Lebanese Treaty was in principle similar to the Syrian. The only important differences were that it was to be renewed by tacit consent at the end of twenty-five years; that the military convention placed no limits upon the employment of French forces; that the exchanges of letters contained explicit guarantees for equality of civil and political rights between all nationals, and for the equitable representation of the different sections of the population in the Government service; and that the Lebanese Government undertook to carry out a programme of administrative and fiscal reform.[2]

The signature of the Treaty was received with approval by a certain body of opinion in France. The view of the parties forming the Popular Front was expressed by M. Pierre Viénot, who had played a leading part in the negotiations. In a speech made at the ceremony of signing the Treaty, he stated that the new alliance between France and Syria did not represent a fundamental change in policy so much as a new form which the traditional relations between the two countries had taken. The Treaty defined the international position of Syria, and at the same time ensured the maintenance of France's collaboration in the economic and cultural life of the Syrian people. In another statement on the same day, he declared that while the Treaty was modelled on that between Great Britain and Iraq, in one respect France had learned by Britain's mistakes, and had provided for the protection of the minorities.

Nor was approval confined to the Left Wing. *Le Temps*, for example, in a leading article published on September 8th, declared that by the conclusion of the Treaty France had fulfilled her whole duty as Mandatory Power. The solution

[1] For the text of the Treaty, see Appendix A2.
[2] See Appendix A3.

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L 648 of the minority problem contained in it was satisfactory. 6 648 When the Treaty was ratified, it would firmly establish on a contractual basis a French influence which the too-long maintenance of an authoritarian régime might in the long run compromise.

3

L 649 In Lebanon the signature of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty 668 was welcomed by the Maronites and some other sections of the population. The Sunnis, however, regarded it as a blow to their aim of reunion with Syria; their anger found expression in communal clashes in Beirut and elsewhere at the end of 1936. In spite of their opposition, however, steps were immediately taken to carry out the policy of the Treaty L [645] by re-establishing self-governing institutions. The Constitution of 1926 was restored in January, 1937; the Chamber met, and Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, a Sunni, formed a Ministry. But it soon became apparent that the signature of the Treaty and the revival of constitutional forms had not affected the essential nature of Lebanese political life, which continued to be dominated by sectarian issues.

L A new electoral law was passed in 1937, replacing the 666 existing Chamber by a new and larger one, two-thirds elected 646 on a sectarian basis and one-third nominated. The elections 645 of November, 1937, were marked by corruption on an extensive scale; and the Chamber which resulted from them, and which remained in being until 1939, was remarkable only for the bitterness and complexity of its internal dissensions. The Ministries of the Amir Khalid Shihab and Abdullah al-Yafi succeeded those of Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, and none of them had any notable legislative or other advance to show.

L The consequence of this was a general loss of interest and 642 faith in the constitutional system as it existed in Lebanon. It was not simply that the established leaders and the parliamentary parties, the Unionists, Constitutionalists and so on, ceased to possess even so limited a hold over public opinion as they had perhaps had; more than that, Lebanese began to ask themselves what purpose was served by the existence of a costly Parliament, filled with landowners and lawyers, wasting its time in internecine quarrels and showing no effective interest in the country's welfare. Had not Lebanon been better ruled under the simple system which had existed

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before 1914; and was it not ridiculous, as well as expensive, for so small a region to have so grandiose and complex a constitution?

As a further consequence, the movement of discontent with sectarianism was greatly strengthened, and many Lebanese, especially among the young, began to look for an alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges Libanaises', the party of Lebanese nationalism, received much support. So too did the 'Syrian National Party', with its doctrine of the total separation of Church and State; while the Arab Nationalists pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself.

4

In Syria, the first steps towards the execution of the Treaty were taken immediately after the return of the Syrian delegation from Paris. Arrangements were made for the holding of Parliamentary elections; the Chamber was to consist of 86 members, 16 of them representing the religious minorities and 7 the Beduin tribes. The elections, which took place in November, 1936, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the candidates of the National Bloc; and when the Chamber met, on December 21st, its first important act was to choose Faris al-Khuri as its President, and its second to accept the resignation of Muhammad Ali al-Abid from the Presidency of the Republic and to elect Hashim al-Atasi in his place. The Ayyubi Ministry having resigned, the President entrusted the formation of a new one to Jamil Mardam Bey. All the members of his Ministry were drawn from the National Bloc.

This Ministry found no difficulty in securing the confidence of the Chamber, which unanimously approved the Treaty in December, 1936. It was formally signed by the High Commissioner and the members of the Ministry on December 22nd.

In the same month, after consultations with notables of the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, their annexation to the Syrian State was proclaimed. This proclamation was accompanied by special Statutes granting a measure of administrative autonomy to the two regions. Despite protests from separatist groups against the concept of a unitary Syria, the régime envisaged in these Statutes was inaugurated by the appointment in January, 1937, of two prominent members of the

631 National Bloc, Mazhar Raslan as Governor of Latakia and Nasib al-Bakri as Governor of Jebel Druze.

648 642 Although the Treaty had not yet been ratified by the French Parliament, it was agreed that the transitional period should be regarded as starting on January 1st, 1937. A beginning was made with the transfer to the Syrian Government of functions hitherto exercised by the French authorities. The Government was given the right freely to prepare and carry out its budget, and a certain control over the police; in principle the High Commissioner ceased to exercise his right to veto legislation, and the 'conseillers' to control ministerial acts. But the Mandatory Power still retained the conduct of foreign relations, the ultimate responsibility for public order and certain administrative services such as the supervision of the Beduin tribes.

665 186 These events seemed to show that the policy of the Bloc was successful. It was still united; it had an overwhelming majority in the Chamber; its adherents filled the offices of the Government; it commanded a large measure of support in the country, especially among the younger generation.

Opposition to the Bloc existed, but it was so far largely inarticulate and undirected. It consisted of a handful of Deputies; of some extreme Arab nationalist organizations, which refused to recognize the Mandate and regarded co-operation with the French as treason; and of the separatist movements among the Alawis and Druzes and in the Jazirah.

The hopes of Syrian independence reached their climax in the celebrations which marked the return to Syria of the newly-amnestied exiles, Dr. Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash in May, 1937, the Amir Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in June. It seemed as if the country were entering upon a new period of national construction under leaders whose patriotic energy had only been strengthened by disappointment, imprisonment, and long years of exile.

5

648 The next two years saw the collapse of these hopes. The claims of Turkey to Alexandretta, the growth of separatist movements, the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty, the unrest caused by the disturbances in Palestine, the administrative failure of the Nationalist Government and finally the growth of an internal

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opposition: these factors between them brought to an end the experiment in national government which had been initiated in 1936.

The first blow to Syrian hopes came almost immediately. It has been described how the Turkish Government had consented in 1921, under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, to the inclusion of the district of Alexandretta (called in Turkish the 'Hatay') in the French Mandated Territories, on the understanding that it should be granted a special régime.[1] The special régime was set up, and worked on the whole satisfactorily. But the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, which contemplated the establishment of a unitary Syrian State presumably including Alexandretta, impelled the Turks to raise the question once more in September, 1936. The district of Alexandretta, they claimed, contained a Turkish majority, which could not be left to the mercy of an inexperienced Arab nationalist Government in Damascus. They therefore demanded that a separate treaty should be concluded with the Sanjaq. This demand the French Government twice rejected, but it was agreed that the matter should be brought before the League Council in December, 1936. The Council heard both sides of the case but postponed any decision, meanwhile appointing M. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, *rapporteur* on the question and dispatching three neutral observers to Alexandretta.

After a period of considerable tension and prolonged and difficult negotiations between the French, Turkish and other interested Governments, an agreement was reached, and embodied in the report presented to the Council of the League of Nations by M. Sandler. This report was adopted by the Council on January 27th, 1937. Under its terms, the Sanjaq was recognized to be a distinct entity; it was to enjoy full autonomy in its internal affairs; but its foreign relations were to be conducted by the Syrian Government, and it was to have a fiscal and monetary union with Syria. Turkish was to be an official language, and the Council might determine the conditions of employment of another official language. No international agreement entered into by the Syrian Government, and of such a nature as to affect the independence and sovereignty of Syria, was to apply to the Sanjaq except with the formal consent of the League Council. There was to be

[1] See Chapter II.

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641 resident in the Sanjaq a delegate nominated by the Council and of French nationality; he was to have the power to suspend for four months, and to refer to the League Council for its definitive decision, governmental acts contrary to the Statute or Fundamental Law of the Sanjaq. The Turkish and French Governments were to be responsible for enforcing, where necessary, the decisions of the League Council. The Sanjaq was to be demilitarized, except for a local police force. There were to be special rights for Turkey in the port of Alexandretta. The report also envisaged a Franco-Turkish treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Sanjaq; and an agreement between France, Turkey and Syria, guaranteeing the inviolability of the Turco-Syrian frontier and prohibiting, in the territories of Syria and of Turkey respectively, all activities directed against the régimes of the other country.[1]

A committee of experts was set up in February, 1937, to draft a Statute and Fundamental Law for the Sanjaq. It presented its report to the Council in May. Among the various points in the draft Statute and Fundamental Law may be noticed the recommendation that Arabic as well as Turkish should be an official language, and the vesting of legislative power in an Assembly of 40 members, to be elected in two stages by the different communities of the Sanjaq—Turkish, Alawi, Arab,[2] Armenian, Greek Orthodox and Kurdish. The task of devising and controlling the procedure for the registration of electors was to be entrusted to an international commission for the organization and supervision of the first elections.[3]

After some objections on the part of the Turkish Government had been disposed of, the report was accepted by the Council on May 29th, 1937. It was decided that the new régime should come into operation on November 29th. At the same time a Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed guaranteeing the integrity of the Sanjaq, and an Agreement guaranteeing the Turco-Syrian frontier.[4]

The régime duly entered into force on November. 29th Even before that, the international commission appointed by the President of the League Council to supervise the elections had begun its labours. After two months spent in studying

[1] See Appendix A7. [2] i.e. Sunni Moslem Arab.
[3] Texts in *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, May–June, 1937, pp. 580–9.
[4] Text in *Official Journal*, May–June, 1937, pp. 838 ff.

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the situation on the spot, it returned to Geneva at the end of November, 1937, and set about preparing its report. 648

These events did not pass unnoticed in Syria. The immediate reaction was a series of Turco-Arab conflicts in the Sanjaq, which continued throughout the year, more than once leading to the intervention of French troops and to loss of life. Throughout Syria the affair gave rise to protests and widespread indignation. It was realized that sooner or later Turkey would ask for the cession of the Sanjaq; this, it was claimed, would mean a permanent threat to Aleppo and the whole of North Syria. Again, the loss of Alexandretta was a blow to national pride and self-respect, which had been exalted by the Treaty of 1936. Above all, the Alexandretta question was regarded as a test of the policy of Franco-Syrian co-operation. Nationalists, supporters of the Bloc and its opponents alike, watched eagerly to see how France would deal with Turkish demands and threats. Would she be true to her Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with Syria and reject such demands? Or would she secure the friendship of Turkey, which was so important to her in view of a possible Franco-Italian conflict, by a concession made at Syria's expense? The settlement of 1937 was regarded throughout Syria as a betrayal by France; the mood of enthusiasm and co-operation began to pass into one of disillusionment and suspicion; and the power of the National Bloc began to decline.

The Government had, indeed, done all that it could to defend the rights of the country; but it could do nothing except protest. Speaking in the Chamber on April 19th, the Prime Minister stated that the League settlement of the Alexandretta question was unacceptable to Syria, but at the same time emphasized the importance for Syria of good relations with its northern neighbour, and of the conclusion of a Franco-Turco-Syrian agreement. Turco-Syrian conversations with a view to making such agreement did indeed begin, but had no positive result.

In May, and again in December, the Syrian Chamber formally refused to recognize the new Statute of the Sanjaq. To this, and to other signs of Syrian dissatisfaction, the Turkish Government replied at the beginning of December by denouncing the Turco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Non-Aggression, signed in 1926.

648 Even before the end of 1937 it was obvious that the Turkish Government, having won its first victory by the establishment of a special régime in the Sanjaq, was determined to take a second step and to secure for the Turkish element a dominant position under that régime. Thus on December 15th, and again on the 24th, it protested to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations against the electoral law drafted by the Commission of experts appointed for that purpose, and more especially against the law's provisions for the registration of voters. According to these provisions, an elector was to be registered in one or other of the recognized communities not simply on the ground of his own unsupported declaration but also in accordance with the evidence furnished by the particulars of his language and religion, which he had to provide. The allotment of seats in the Legislative Assembly was to be proportional to the number of voters registered in the different communities. For the Turks to obtain a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly, a majority of the voters would have to be registered as Turks. This would not be possible if the recommendations of the Commission were adopted, since those who could by language, religion, and so on, be registered as Turks only amounted to about 39 per cent according to the 1936 figures of the population of the Sanjaq. But if registration were to be by declaration only, and if the Turks could obtain control of the police and of the electoral machinery, a Turkish majority would be possible.

As a consequence of Turkish protests, the League Council on January 28th, 1938, appointed a Committee to consider the Commission's draft law and the Turkish objections to it. This Committee issued the definitive text of the electoral law on March 19th, 1938. It provided that every elector 'shall be presumed to be a member of the community to which he declares himself to belong'. The provisions against intimidation were also set aside. (The English representative on the Commission resigned immediately in protest.)

In May the international commission began to register electors under the revised electoral law. The process was marked by tension, disturbances and bloodshed. By the end of May the Turks had still not succeeded in obtaining a majority. Direct pressure was then brought to bear by the Turkish Government upon the French Government. The

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latter was in no mood to resist. On June 3rd Franco-Turkish negotiations upon the subject began in Paris, and on the same day martial law was proclaimed in the Sanjaq. b48

The negotiations in Paris soon led to an agreement that Turkish troops should be allowed to enter the Sanjaq to co-operate with the French in maintaining order. The details of this co-operation were fixed in military conversations held at Antioch during June. In the same month, the Turkish Government announced that it could no longer recognize the status of the electoral commission, and on June 26th the commission abandoned work, accusing the French Mandatory authorities of systematic efforts, by means of arrests and other methods of intimidation, to deprive the non-Turkish part of the population of its freedom of election.

Shortly afterwards, on July 3rd, the conversations at Antioch ended in an agreement for the joint policing of the Sanjaq by Turkish and French troops, until the new régime should be working normally. On July 4th a new Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was initialled in Ankara. It provided not only for mutual non-aggression but for active co-operation in the Eastern Mediterranean.[1] It was to be followed by a tripartite agreement between Turkey, France and Syria. Discussions upon this agreement began in Ankara on July 7th, but after a few days were suspended.

On July 5th Turkish troops marched into the Sanjaq, and towards the end of the month preparations for the election were resumed, under joint Franco-Turkish control. The final electoral lists showed the Turks as constituting 63 per cent of the total number of electors. It was accordingly decided that the Turks should have 22 out of the 40 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

The elections were held, and the new Assembly met for the first time on September 2nd. It elected a Turk as its President and another Turk as head of the State. A third Turk became Prime Minister, and formed a Cabinet composed entirely of Turks. The Sanjaq was now known as the 'Hatay'.

The effects of these events upon Syrian opinion were mixed. There were some who deduced from it the necessity of attachment to France, and of France's maintaining her hold upon the country as the only bulwark against a Turkish invasion. But others believed that France, now that she had made

[1] See Appendix A8.

friends with Turkey, would be less desirous of coming to terms with the Syrian nationalists. In internal politics, the effect was to weaken the position of the Bloc. It was criticized both for not making sufficient efforts to defend Syrian rights, and for not resigning when its efforts proved unsuccessful. The disturbances throughout the country which marked the year were directed as much against the Government as against France, and in June an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate the Prime Minister.

7

In 1937 Turkey obtained the establishment of a special régime for Alexandretta. In 1938 she secured a dominant voice for the Turkish element under that régime. In 1939 she took the third and last stage and annexed the Sanjaq.

It was indeed obvious that the Turks would not be satisfied with anything short of annexation; and the French Government was not opposed to it in principle; it merely wanted to delay it until the termination of the Mandate over Syria. Turkey, however, demanded an immediate and final settlement of the question.

The first steps towards such a settlement were taken almost immediately after the opening of the Legislative Assembly. With a Turkish Ministry, a Turkish majority in the Assembly, a Turkish army in occupation of the territory, and Turkish officials holding the key positions in the police and the administration, there was no obstacle to the Hatay's adopting the Turkish criminal and civil codes in January, 1939, and the Turkish fiscal, currency and postal systems in the course of the next few weeks. Many of the Arabs and Armenians preferred to abandon their houses and cross the frontier into Syria rather than live any longer under Turkish rule.

The French Government was now more than ever in need of Turkish support in view of the increasing dangers of the international situation. Consequently, when the Turkish Government hinted that only the Alexandretta question prevented the speedy conclusion of such a pact, it met with no opposition in Paris. Negotiations began in April and continued, despite a certain tension when a large Turkish army was reported to be concentrated on the Syrian frontier, until their successful conclusion on June 23rd. On that day there was signed in Paris a Declaration of Mutual Assistance

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between Turkey and France, including an engagement by France not to alienate her rights in Syria to any third Power. Simultaneously, the agreement for the cession of the Hatay was signed in Ankara, Turkey recognizing the inviolable nature of her frontier with Syria, and promising not to interfere in any way in the affairs of Syria, by propaganda or by any other means.[1]

One month later, the last French troops having left the Hatay, it was finally assimilated to Turkey, becoming Vilayet No. 63 of the Turkish State.

In Syria the cession aroused protests and disturbances. The indignation which these expressed was not so spontaneous as it had been in previous years, because the cession had been so long expected and took no one by surprise; but it was no less real for that.

8

The union of Jebel Druze and the Alawi Territory with Syria, which was agreed upon when the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 was concluded, was effected by decree in December of the same year. Each was to possess a special administrative and financial régime, but otherwise was to be subject to the constitution and laws of the Syrian State. This new system was to come fully into force with the ratification of the Treaty. The statute defining the special régime for each of the districts provided for the appointment of the Governor by the President of the Republic, of other officials in part by the President and in part by the Governor. The latter was to have the power of issuing ordinances, and was to be assisted by an administrative council with an elected majority. Each district was to have its special budget, but was also to make an annual contribution to the State of Syria.[2] Subsequent decrees provided for the representation of the two districts in the Syrian Chamber: Jebel Druze by five Deputies (three Druzes, one Christian and one Beduin), and the Alawi district by 16 (ten representing the Alawis and six the other communities).

In addition to these administrative privileges, a further guarantee for the good treatment of the two districts was contained in the military convention attached to the Treaty of 1936. It provided for the maintenance of French troops in

[1] See Appendix A9. [2] See Appendix A2.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria [illegible]

631 648 both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty.

631 664 186 The Treaty and the new régime were received with approval by a number of the Druzes and Alawis; even former autonomists expressed their loyalty to the Syrian Government. This reaction, however, was transient and deceptive. In Jebel Druze discord began to arise early in 1937, after the appointment of Nasib al-Bakri, a Damascene Moslem, as first Governor of the province. A powerful party demanded the appointment of a Druze notable, Hasan al-Atrash, and also a large measure of autonomy; the nationalists asserted that it was encouraged to go to extremes by local French officials. There were also, however, many Druzes who supported the nationalist Government and the Governor whom it had appointed. Attempts were made with no more than a temporary success to reconcile the advocates of separatism with those of unity. The disturbances were not ended until the Governor resigned and was replaced after an interval by Hasan al-Atrash. By the end of 1937 the Jebel was quiet enough to enable Parliamentary elections to be held. The calm continued throughout 1938, but at the beginning of 1939 [669] disturbances began once more. The separatist group accused the Syrian Government of bad faith, expelled Syrian officials from the province and declared the independence of Jebel Druze under the protection of France.

A similar process had meanwhile been occurring in the Alawi district, which was known under the new régime as the Province of Latakia. Here, as in Jebel Druze, there was tranquillity at first, and Parliamentary elections were held in 1937. But the calm was short-lived. The Alawi notables protested against the appointment of Syrian Moslem officials, and more especially of nationalist Governors, first Mazhar Raslan from Homs and then Ihsan al-Jabiri, a Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. The nationalist policy of assimilation was perhaps carried out hastily and tactlessly, the Governor alienated large sections of the population, and at the beginning of 1939 armed bands rose in revolt under the leadership of the deputy Sulaiman Murshid, a brigand who had proclaimed himself 'God' and had secured considerable local influence with the help of certain French officials. At about the same time the visit of the High Commissioner, M. Puaux, was made the occasion for demonstrations in favour of autonomy. Soon

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The situation remained as it was until the beginning of 1939, when agitation for the release of the kidnappers of the former Governor occurred. In June organized manifestations on a large scale took place in all the towns of the province; but the French authorities intervened and restored order. 669 563 631

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No sooner had the Franco-Syrian Treaty been signed than criticism of it began to appear in France. In part this criticism came from those who opposed the whole idea of a treaty, believing the Syrians to be still unfit for self-government. Others, while admitting a treaty of some sort to be desirable, were doubtful of the adequacy of the existing Treaty: because it aimed at creating a unitary State in a country so divided as Syria; or because its guarantees for minorities and its provisions for the maintenance of French military forces upon Syrian soil were insufficient; or else because it did not stipulate for the repayment to France of the expenses incurred in the administration of the Mandate. 648

These doubts were reinforced by the events of 1937: the Alexandretta question, and the growth of the separatist movements in Jebel Druze, the province of Latakia and the Jazirah. It was obvious that the French Chamber and Senate would only ratify the Treaty provided that they were reassured on these and certain other points. The Syrian Prime Minister therefore went to Paris in order to negotiate with the French Government an agreement upon the points at issue. He left Syria in November, 1937, and returned towards the end of December. The result of his visit was an exchange of letters between him and M. de Tessan, Under-Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated December 11th, 1937. The letters included a further guarantee by the Syrian Government of its intention to respect all the rights granted by the Treaty to the minorities living under its sway; and an undertaking by the Government to accept the technical experts recommended to it by the French Government. The letters closed with a statement of the desire of both parties to continue the policy of co-operation.[1]

These undertakings were accepted by nationalist opinion as being inevitable in the circumstances, and ratification of the Treaty was eagerly awaited. In March, 1938, indeed, Mardam

[1] See Appendix A4.

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Bey declared to the Chamber that ratification could be expected soon, and received a unanimous vote of confidence in the policy he was pursuing. But as the year grew older, it became more and more obvious that the opposition to the Treaty in France was becoming stronger. Some of the reasons for this were local. The persistence of trouble among the minorities, especially in the Jazirah, aroused the fear of those who were mindful of France's special connexion with the Christians. (Similar fears were expressed on several occasions by members of the Permanent Mandates Commission, who had been deeply affected by the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq, and blamed themselves for having consented to what they now regarded as a premature termination of the Iraqi Mandate.) Again, the possibility that oil would be discovered in the Jazirah influenced the opinion of those groups which had not forgotten the abandonment of the French claim to Mosul and did not wish to see it repeated in Syria. But the main reasons were not local. On the one hand, the Popular Front Government was replaced by one further to the Right, and including members of groups among whom the main enemies of the Treaty were to be found. On the other, the international situation was growing increasingly dangerous, and it was imperative for France not to weaken her military position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The attitude of Turkey in regard to Alexandretta had shown what dangers might fall upon Syria should France's control be at all relaxed.

Once more Jamil Mardam Bey went to Paris, in an endeavour to save the Treaty even at the price of serious emendations. He left Syria in August, 1938, and, after three months spent in Paris and Geneva, finally signed an agreement with M. Bonnet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on November 14th.

The text of the agreement was not revealed at the time, but it was published in full next year by a number of newspapers. It consisted of a 'Protocol' and a 'Joint Declaration'. In the former, the Syrian Government stated the measures by which it proposed to give full effect to the previous agreement of December 11th, 1937. It undertook to guarantee effective liberty of conscience to all, and in particular to recognize the rights of the Christians in matters of personal status. It promised also to safeguard the position of the

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French language in the schools; and declared that it had made satisfactory arrangements in regard to the renewal of the concession of the Banque de Syrie and the investigation and exploitation of the country's oil deposits (two matters in which France had an important economic interest). Steps were to be taken to develop Franco-Syrian commerce, and French financial help to be given to the Syrian Government. In view of the interest of both Governments in putting the Treaty into effect as soon as possible, the French Government was willing to fix the end of the period of transition at September 30th, 1939, and would submit this proposal to Parliament. In the 'Joint Declaration', the two signatories expressed their hope that the Syrian Government would give its approval to the amended Treaty by January 20th, 1939, at the latest; and that the French Chamber and Senate would receive the reports of their Foreign Affairs Commission before December 10th, 1938, and would authorize the ratification of the Treaty before January 31st, 1939.[1] There were also military discussions in which General Huntziger, Commander of the French forces in the Levant, participated.

It was too late to save the Treaty, however. In Syria the concessions made by Jamil Mardam Bey were widely regarded as inacceptable, by his own followers as well as by those of Dr. Shahbandar and Shukri al-Quwatli. In France there were some, like M. Bonnet, who supported the amended Treaty on the ground that France could not afford to throw away Syrian friendship and many on the Left who had not abandoned the original Treaty of 1936. A powerful body of opinion, however, was opposed to ratification. The Syrian and Lebanese Treaties were now submitted to the Foreign Affairs Commissions of Chamber and Senate. On December 9th, 1938, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate received the reports of its two 'rapporteurs' on the Treaty. One of them, M. Bergeon, warned against the dangers of a premature ratification; while the other, M. Henry-Haye, went further and declared that the very basis of the Treaty seemed to him incompatible with the interests of France. He proposed, therefore, that France should denounce the Syrian Treaty (as also the Lebanese) and the later agreements, and assume once more the direct administration of the country, until the bases of a new treaty could be thought out. After discussion the

[1] See Appendix A5.

11: Hourani 3-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria/10'

Commission decided that a letter should be sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, emphasizing the importance of interrupting the process of transition provided for in the agreements.

Later in the same month M. Gaston Riou, the 'rapporteur' on the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber, made a statement on the Treaties to a Beirut newspaper. He did not, he said, object to the Lebanese Treaty in principle, and such changes in it as were necessary could easily be made; but the whole conception of the Syrian Treaty was wrong. France had tried to make a unitary treaty with the least unitary nation in the world; Syria was a 'League of Nations' and needed a confederation.

In the face of such signs of Parliamentary opposition, M. Bonnet abandoned his intention of submitting the Treaty to Parliament. On December 14th, 1938, he declared to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber that the Government did not intend for the present to ask Parliament to ratify the Syrian Treaty. France, he stated, did not wish to modify the situation in the Mediterranean at the moment. (It was exactly a month since he had signed the 'Joint Declaration' with the Syrian Prime Minister.)

Such statements made it clear that even with the additional undertakings the Treaty had very little chance of ratification in France. On December 31st, 1938, the Syrian Chamber adopted unanimously an order of the day defining its attitude to France. While desirous of an alliance with France, it stood firm by the Treaty of 1936; it regarded as null and void any agreements not submitted to it for ratification; it regretted the failure of the French Government to stand by its commitments and charged the Syrian Government to watch over the rights, independence and unity of Syria, and to take full powers into its hands without delay; it took note of the Prime Minister's declaration that he did not consider himself bound by any agreement that he had signed; it asked the Syrians not to co-operate with any commission which might be sent out by the French Government; and it called upon the Government to deal promptly with the acts of rebellion against law and order that were occurring in the Jebel Druze, Latakia and the Jazirah.[1]

This motion marked the beginning of the political crisis of 1939, which led to the dissolution of the National Bloc, the

[1] For text, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 3-4.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M01

suspension of the Constitution and the complete breakdown 648
of the policy of 1936.

II

The Bloc was the more incapable of weathering such a 665
crisis, because by now there had appeared a strong nationalist opposition to it. Already in 1936 such a potential opposition had existed ready to take shape so soon as, on the one hand, the Bloc disappointed hopes, and on the other an alternative leader or group of leaders appeared. At the time neither of the two conditions was fulfilled. The Bloc was at the height of its success; and the few Deputies who opposed it were neither prominent nor strong enough to become popular leaders.

During the next few years, however, matters changed. The Bloc gradually lost a great part of its popularity, on account of its failure to secure the ratification of the Treaty and its impotence in the face of Turkish designs upon Alexandretta. The natural tendency of Governments in office to disappoint individual hopes and create individual grievances worked in the same direction.

The discontent was increased by the comparative failure of 631
the Government in internal administration. Among the 642
causes of failure were the inadequate powers of the Govern- 648
ment, the widespread belief that it did not enjoy the backing of the French authorities, its own lack of experience and the absence of an efficient civil service; but it was nevertheless discouraging to its supporters and irritating to ordinary citizens. On the whole the departments were no better administered than they had been; and there was a succession of petty acts of discrimination against members of minorities. The relations between the central and local authorities were often difficult, the tendency to excessive centralization conflicting with the innate localism of some of the provinces. This conflict had indeed existed before the nationalists came to power, and in order to end it, the High Commissioner had issued a decree on provincial organization in January, 1936. Besides altering the number and boundaries of the provinces, this decree had defined the scope of the central and local authorities and provided for the establishment of provincial councils. In spite of declarations, this decree was never fully applied.

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648 Another failure, for which however the Syrian Government was by no means exclusively to blame, was the breakdown of negotiations with Lebanon on the future of the customs and other departments known collectively as the 'Common Interests' and at the time administered by the High Commissioner. The Treaties, it will be recalled, anticipated negotiations between the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on the disposal of these interests when the Mandate should come to an end. The Governments might either set up a joint organization to administer them or agree each to retain its liberty of action; and the Mandatory Power bound itself to act in conformity with the decision of the Governments, and transfer the interests either to whatever new organization was set up or to the two Governments.

Syro-Lebanese negotiations on the subject took place in August, 1937. The two Governments agreed on the principle of separate customs administrations, without prejudice to the close economic relations existing between Syria and Lebanon. In later discussions, however, they failed to agree on the method of applying this principle and in particular on the proportion of the customs revenues to be allotted to each of the two Governments. In 1938, as a consequence of this failure to agree, the Syrian Government decided to impose a tax on Lebanese products, and the Lebanese Government retaliated. These measures were much opposed by business interests, and were never effectively carried out; but the disagreement continued until after the outbreak of the war.

To these particular grievances was added the general unrest caused on the one hand by the economic dislocations resulting from successive devaluations of the franc, and on the other by the Arab revolt in Palestine (1936-1939). This revolt aroused great enthusiasm in Syria, and helped to drive the nationalist movement along the path of extremism and violence, both because of the close links between Syria and Palestine and because of the presence in Syria and Lebanon of a large number of Arab nationalist refugees who had found it impossible to remain in Palestine. It was in Syria that the Pan-Arab Conference of 1937 was held. Lebanon became the home of the Mufti of Jerusalem after the suppression of the Arab High Committee in 1938; and to a great extent the revolt in its later stages was directed by Palestinian refugees and Syrian sympathizers through the Committee for

the Defence of Palestine, in Damascus. Nationalists in Syria 648 regarded the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs as their own struggle; and their opposition to French policy was strengthened and sustained by the constant thought of the battle which their fellow-countrymen were waging against Zionism and the policy of the Balfour Declaration.

The conditions for the growth of an opposition now existed. 665 Its leader was found in Dr. Abdur-Rahman Shahbandar. A well-educated, intelligent and masterful Damascene, he had been Foreign Minister under Faisal, and had played an important part in the revolt of 1925-1926. Sentenced to death by the French, he had taken up residence in Egypt. He returned to Syria after the amnesty to the political exiles in May, 1937. This first visit of his lasted only a month, but he found time publicly to declare his opposition to the party of the National Bloc—an opposition due partly perhaps to his disbelief in the policy of co-operation with the French, but partly also, there can be no doubt, to pique at seeing the leadership of the nationalist movement in other hands than his.

He was absent from Syria for the rest of the year 1937, but at the end of the year he came out into the open with a manifesto accusing Jamil Mardam Bey of having made inacceptable concessions to the French Government during his recent visit to Paris, and of having done nothing to defend Syrian rights in Alexandretta. He soon gathered around him a number of those who for one reason or another were dissatisfied with the Government of the Bloc.

In February, 1938, the Government replied to Dr. Shahbandar's memorandum by arresting his leading supporters, on the charge of having distributed a seditious manifesto repeating his accusations. Despite their denial of the charge, they were all sentenced to several months' detention, but the sentences were reduced after a re-trial.

Two months later, the crystallization of Dr. Shahbandar's supporters into a definite political group was marked by the issue of a manifesto, signed by Zaki al-Khatib in the name of the 'Free National Front'. It stated that any interference in the internal affairs of Syria on the pretext of defending minorities would be regarded as an infringement of national sovereignty; that any detachment of Syrian territory in order to transfer it to another State or to retain it under the Mandate would be considered an infraction of the Treaty;

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Against the opposition of these two youth-movements, the 665 Bloc's own organization, the Nationalist Youth, was almost powerless. It had taken a leading part in the disturbances of 1936, but when the leaders of the Bloc came to power it proved more of a nuisance than an asset and was quietly silenced by them.

12

The final crisis was delayed for a time by the arrival of the 648 new French High Commissioner, M. Gabriel Puaux, who had been chosen to succeed M. de Martel in the previous October. M. Puaux left France for Syria at the beginning of January, 1930. The belief that he was coming to bury the Treaty explains why, when M. Puaux landed at Beirut on January 8th, his arrival was marked by some enthusiasm in Lebanon, but by hostility and manifestations in favour of Syrian unity in the cities of the interior. The tension was heightened rather than relieved by a broadcast speech of the High Commissioner on January 11th, in which he reminded the nationalists that France had a mission to maintain order and justice in the Levant, and that 'were she to withdraw or her forces to be weakened, Syrian patriots would see their dearest dreams disappear.'

Shortly afterwards M. Puaux made his first visit to Damascus. It was marked by strikes, and other measures of protest against the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the Treaty. A ministerial crisis seemed imminent; but after heated discussions in the Chamber, it was agreed that the Ministry should remain in office and no steps be taken until M. Puaux had had time to study the situation and form his opinion upon it.

M. Puaux spent the remainder of January visiting the different parts of the country. Disturbances and tension continued, and he had hardly completed his travels when a crisis occurred.

In March, 1936, the High Commissioner had issued a decree determining the rights of the officially recognized religious communities in matters of personal status, and the relations between the communities. It aroused considerable opposition in orthodox Moslem circles, partly because they believed its provisions to be contrary to those of Islamic law, but more fundamentally because it treated the Moslems as one sect

among many, and thus struck at the root of the traditional Moslem conception of the State. Its application was temporarily suspended, pending the issue of a revised law by the Syrian Government. The Government having failed to pass such a law, in November, 1938, the High Commissioner issued a decree modifying and completing the previous one. The new decree, officially published in December, met with no greater favour from the religious leaders.

Throughout the first weeks of 1939 Moslem opposition to the decree grew in intensity. Pressure was put upon the Government to suspend it. This the Government was the more willing to do because it resented the issue of the decree on the High Commissioner's own authority, over the head of the legislative organs of the Syrian State. In February it issued an order to the Courts not to apply the decree. At the same time it sent a memorandum to the High Commissioner, declaring its intention to apply the order of the day passed by the Chamber on December 31st, 1938, and to take over the functions previously exercised by the Mandatory authorities; accusing the French of encouraging the separatist movements; and asserting that since all legislative power belonged to the Chamber, decrees issued by the High Commissioner could have no validity in Syria.

On February 18th, the High Commissioner demanded that the Ministry should withdraw its order to the Courts and its memorandum, on the ground that decrees issued by him could not be suspended by any authority other than his own. The Ministry refused and resigned. A number of important officials resigned with it. The National Bloc continued formally in existence, but the resignation of the Mardam Ministry made its temporary decline inevitable. In April a group of prominent members left it.

13

Jamil Mardam Bey was succeeded as Prime Minister by Lutfi al-Haffar, his former colleague; with one exception, all the members of the new Ministry were members of the Bloc; and their policy, like that of their predecessors, was to maintain the Treaty of 1936, and to conclude an agreement with France on the basis of it. This, together with the continued deadlock over the communities question and further troubles among the minorities, did not allow the Ministry

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to last long. It resigned on March 16th, in circumstances 648 somewhat similar to those in which the Mardam Ministry had 646 fallen. Its resignation was accompanied by further disturbances.

The unrest, and the difficulty of finding anybody willing and able to form a new Ministry, impelled the Mandatory authorities to take over, by decree of the High Commissioner, the powers necessary for the maintenance of public order. The disturbances were quelled by the use of French troops; several prominent leaders were arrested, including Nabih al-Azmah. New and severe restrictions were also placed upon the press. But at the same time a concession to popular feeling was made by the decision of the High Commissioner, at the beginning of April, to suspend the application of the Communities Statute to the Sunni Moslem community.

A few days later, on April 6th, the Ministerial crisis was ended by the formation of a non-political Ministry, headed by Nasuhi al-Bukhari. Although its members did not belong to the Bloc, this Ministry was as firmly attached as its predecessors had been to the Treaty of 1936; and it was generally felt that it offered the French Government its last chance of concluding an agreement that could satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Syrians. If it failed to take this opportunity, there would be no alternative for the nationalists except to resort once more to the methods of the first months of 1936.

Shortly after the formation of the Bukhari Ministry, M. 648 Puaux left Syria for France. It was known that he had gone in order to discuss with the French Government the policy to be adopted in Syria. Speculation ranged over the alternatives among which a choice would have to be made: the negotiation of a new Treaty, the return to direct rule by the French, the establishment of a monarchy. This last possibility especially was the subject of much excited controversy and the names of various possible candidates were put forward: the Amir Abdullah, the Amir Abdul Munim, son of the ex-Khedive of Egypt, a Sa'udi or a Tunisian prince. Even the possibility of a personal union of Syria and Iraq under King Faisal II was entertained.

On May 10th, the High Commissioner returned from France and three days later delivered a radio speech, in which he declared that the French Government was determined to

648 reach an agreement with Syria on the basis of the 1936 Treaty with the amendments of November, 1938, but that due satisfaction must be given to the legitimate aspirations of the minorities. Moreover, the international situation necessitated new military arrangements between Syria and France. He ended with an appeal for the maintenance of law and order.

The nationalists saw in this statement a determination to strengthen France's hold over Syria in preparation for the imminent world war. The last hope of the ratification of the Treaty was now extinguished.

648 On May 15th the Bukhari Ministry resigned. On May
645 23rd the Syrian Chamber voted unanimously an order of the day, affirming Syria's sympathy for French democracy in the hour of its peril, but at the same time emphasizing its attachment to the unamended Treaty of 1936 as the only firm basis for Franco-Syrian co-operation.

This time there was no way out of the deadlock. All attempts to form a new Ministry failed. Finally, the President of the Republic resigned (July 7th). A few days later M. Puaux took the extreme step of dissolving the Chamber, suspending the Constitution, and appointing a non-political Council of Directors to govern by decree-laws under his own direction (July 10th). The Council was composed of permanent officials, with Bahij al-Khatib as its President.

14

631 At the same time the High Commissioner issued decrees
648 re-establishing in Jebel Druze and the Territory of Latakia separate administrations similar to those which had existed until 1936, and providing for the special administration of the Jazirah.

The decree for Latakia stated that the Organic Law promulgated in 1936 was to be replaced by a new one, to come into force immediately. The new law provided for the government of the region by a Governor, assisted by a council of heads of departments and by the Council of the Territory. He was to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the Council of the Territory, was to hold office for five years and might be re-appointed. His powers were executive, financial and within limits legislative. The Council was to consist of at least seventeen elected members, to hold two ordinary sessions a year and to discuss financial and

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other matters, without, however, possessing much power of independent decision. The Territory was to enjoy financial autonomy, apart from a contribution to the expenses of general administration of the State of Syria. It was also to have judicial autonomy, except for the provisions that the Presidents of the High Court and the Court of First Instance at Latakia, both of them French magistrates, were to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the French Government; and that conflicts of competence between the Courts of the Territory and those of other parts of the French Mandated area were to be decided by the Court of Cassation at Damascus.

The provisions of the decree relating to the Jebel Druze were virtually the same, with a few minor variations. That for the Jazirah removed the province from the control of the Syrian Government, and placed it under the direct rule of the High Commissioner's Delegate at Hassetche. (This measure was enough to end the disturbances. By December, 1940, life in the Jazirah had returned to normal, and it was possible for an agreement to be reached between the Mandatory authorities and the Syrian Government, under the terms of which the functions of Governor were once more transferred from the High Commissioner's Delegate to a Syrian official.)[1]

[1] See Appendix A6.

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XII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1943

I

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THE outbreak of war brought immediate changes in every sphere of life, in Syria and Lebanon as in the other countries involved. For months past reinforcements had been arriving for the French army of occupation. At the beginning of the war the important part for which the forces in the Mandated Territories were cast was shown by the appointment of General Weygand as Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant. Other measures were taken to place the Territories in a state of defence. The urgency of the situation was somewhat eased, however, by the decision of the Italian Government to remain neutral.

Various political measures were also taken to ensure the safety of the country. In Lebanon the High Commissioner dissolved the Chamber, dismissed the Ministry, suspended the Constitution and confided the administration to a Secretary of State directly responsible to the President of the Republic. In Syria, a number of political organizations believed to be favourable to the enemies of France were dissolved, and some of their leading members were arrested. During the next few months many of them were sentenced by military tribunals to terms of imprisonment, in some cases exceedingly long, on charges of subversive action and conspiracy. Those affected were mainly members of uncompromising nationalist organizations or of the Communist Party; no leader either of the National Bloc or of the Shahbandarist group was touched. Most leading personalities indeed gave formal expression to their attachment to France and to democracy, and their unwillingness to do anything which might hinder the victory of the Allied arms.

In spite of formal statements by political leaders, the general attitude of the population towards the war seems to have been one not of enthusiasm but of mingled fear and apathy. There was fear of a repetition of the terrible experiences of the war of 1914-1918: famine, disease and the reign of terror. Except among the Francophil elements, people tended to think that, although the belligerents might invoke the noblest of principles to justify their taking up arms, in reality all were equally moved by self-interest, and that from the point of view of the exploited nations of the East there was nothing to choose

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between the oppression exercised in the name of democracy and that exercised in the name of Fascism. This tendency was encouraged by the efforts of the competing propaganda services, each of which purported to unmask the true face of the other party. Moreover, painful memories remained of the conduct of the Allies during the last war. The Arabs had trusted to Allied promises then and had been, as they saw it, cheated. They were therefore sceptical, and afraid to give their full trust to either side. Still more bitter were the memories of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war: the cession of Alexandretta, the failure to ratify the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties, and above all the Arab revolt in Palestine, which had aroused intense feeling throughout Arab Asia, and had done more than anything else to alienate the Arabs from the Allied Powers.

These and other currents of political feeling existed beneath the surface, but there was little overt political activity during the first nine months of the war. The High Commissioner and the Syrian and Lebanese authorities confined themselves mainly to measures of administrative reform and economic and financial control; the safeguarding of the food supply against the activities of hoarders and profiteers was their constant preoccupation. In external affairs one source of anxiety was removed by the conclusion in November, 1939, of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact, and in March, 1940, of a Turco-Syrian Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. But a new anxiety grew up, with the German offensive on the Western front in May, 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war in June; it reflected itself in the additional measures of precaution taken in the Mandated Territories.

2

After the capitulation of France there was some doubt about the attitude which the French authorities in the Levant would adopt. It was resolved by the order of the day issued on June 27th by General Mittelhauser, who had succeeded Weygand after the latter had been recalled to take command of the Allied Forces in France. 'According to the terms of the French armistice', he announced, 'there will be no change in the status of the Mandated Territories. Consequently, the cessation of hostilities has been ordered. The French flag

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria A01

72/ will continue to be flown in these territories, and France will
64 carry on her mission in the Levant.'

The cessation of hostilities had the gravest effect upon the Allied position in the Middle East, and occasioned great anxiety to the British Government. At the beginning of July the Foreign Office issued the following statement:

'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand that General Mittelhauser, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant, has stated that hostilities have ceased in Syria. His Majesty's Government assume that this does not mean that if Germany or Italy sought to occupy Syria or the Lebanon and were to try to do so in the face of British command of the sea, no attempt would be made by the French forces to oppose them. In order, however, to set at rest doubts which may be felt in any quarter, His Majesty's Government declare that they could not allow Syria or the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile Power or to be used as a base for attacks upon those countries in the Middle East which they are pledged to defend, or to become the scene of such disorder as to constitute a danger to those countries.

'They therefore hold themselves free to take whatever measures they may in such circumstances consider necessary in their own interests. Any action which they may hereafter be obliged to take in fulfilment of this declaration will be entirely without prejudice to the future status of the territories now under French Mandate.'[1]

Subsequent developments increased the anxiety of the British Government. In August an Italian Armistice Commission arrived in Beirut; in spite of official disclaimers, its object was generally believed to be to prepare the way for the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the Axis Powers. It was generally unpopular and had little success; by the end of the year it had practically faded out of the picture. More important was the unobtrusive extension of German influence throughout the country; and also the gradual replacement of officials believed to have democratic or pro-British sympathies by others thought to be in agreement with the 'New Order' in France and Europe. In November the High Commissioner himself was recalled and replaced first by M. Chiappe and then, after his death when the aeroplane carrying him to the East was shot down in the

[1] *The Times*, July 2nd, 1941.

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Mediterranean, by General Dentz. These measures could not, however, prevent the spread of pro-Allied sympathies both in the army and in the civil administration; towards the end of 1940 a number of those suspected of having such sympathies were arrested and interned. 648

While Axis interference was increasing, Franco-British relations in the Levant as elsewhere were becoming ever more strained. The British blockade was extended to Syria and Lebanon, trade between which and the neighbouring Arab countries greatly diminished in consequence. Travel between Palestine and the French Mandated Territories was severely restricted. The French authorities prohibited public listening to British radio programmes. From time to time, moreover, the French authorities issued statements to the effect that the French army of the Levant still existed and was prepared to defend French territory against aggression from whatever direction it might come.

3

Among the population, the effect of the French capitulation and of subsequent events was not so much to bring new tendencies into existence as to encourage those which already existed. The growth of Axis influence and of British determination to oppose it increased the fear that the country would become a battleground. The restriction of trade with Palestine, Iraq and Egypt, and the persistence of hoarding and profiteering in spite of all measures taken to stop them, brought nearer the spectre of famine. The ambiguous position of France after the Armistice made it even more difficult than before for Syrians and Lebanese to take sides in the war. There were, it is true, a small number who approved of the New Order in France, and extreme nationalists who desired a German victory; there were others who, from principle or interest, desired a British occupation of the country. But for the majority of politically conscious Syrians, the collapse of France and her subsequent difficulties served not so much to throw them into the arms of her former ally or her former enemy, as to make them more than ever eager to rid themselves of French and all foreign domination. They felt it a humiliation to be subjected to a defeated and weak nation; and with the withdrawal of France from the League 648 /96

648 of Nations on April 18th, 1941, they regarded the juridical
186 basis of French Mandatory rule as having disappeared.

Political meetings and demonstrations being forbidden, nationalist uneasiness remained for the most part beneath the surface throughout 1940. But it revealed itself in the press of other Arab countries and the activities of their Governments; this was especially true of Iraq. Thus in July, 1940, Nuri as-Said, then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara, Beirut and Damascus in order to discuss with the Turkish and French authorities and with prominent Syrians and Lebanese the future of the French Mandated Territories. At the conclusion of his journey he issued a statement to the effect that both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments thought that Syria should be for the Syrians and that the country should enjoy complete independence.

665 A symptom of the prevalent unrest was the murder of Dr.
662 Shahbandar in Damascus in the same month, while his political influence was at its height. Within a few days his assassins were arrested. After the preliminary investigation had been completed a special tribunal was set up to try them and certain other persons believed to be implicated in the crime. Among the latter were three of the leaders of the National Bloc, Jamil Mardam Bey, Saadullah al-Jabiri and Lutfi al-Haffar. They were accused of deliberate complicity in the assassination. Almost at the same time as the accusation against them was published, all three left Syria for Baghdad.

The trial of the accused persons began in December, 1940. In the course of it the leader of the assassins made a complete confession: their motive in deciding to kill Dr. Shahbandar had been religious, since they regarded him as one of those responsible for the decay of Islam; they had tried to throw the blame for their crime upon the leaders of the Bloc, who in reality had had nothing to do with it. The trial ended at the beginning of January, with the condemnation of six persons to death and several others to imprisonment, and the complete exoneration of Jamil Mardam Bey, Lutfi al-Haffar and Saadullah al-Jabiri. The sentences were carried out immediately.

4

000 At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so

At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so long latent came to a head. Strikes and demonstrations began in the Syrian towns in February, in protest against the dearth of essential foodstuffs and the failure of the authorities to stop profiteering. They very soon turned into political disturbances, directed by a number of nationalist committees and leaders, and above all by Shukri al-Quwatli, who in March issued a manifesto setting forth their objectives. He condemned the existing Government of Bahij al-Khatib as a group of men whose sentiments were not those of the population; he declared that the legal basis of French rule no longer existed since the League of Nations had ceased to function; and he therefore demanded the immediate formation of a national Government. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of the continuation of the disturbances, which indeed spread for a few days from Syria to the towns of the Lebanese coast, the Government of Bahij al-Khatib resigned. There was a temporary cessation of unrest while the High Commissioner negotiated with Shukri al-Quwatli and others for the formation of a more representative Government; but disturbances broke out once more after the failure of the negotiations.

The recrudescence of the troubles appears to have convinced General Dentz of the necessity of making further concessions. At the beginning of April he broadcast a statement to the Syrian people, setting forth the conclusions to which his conversations with Syrian leaders had led him. First, the independence of Syria remained the aim towards which the Syrians were striving; France was in agreement with this, but the present international situation made it impossible to contemplate a definitive settlement of the problem of the form of government in Syria. Secondly, Syrian public opinion was demanding the establishment of a Government endowed with wider powers. Thirdly, there was a need for an economic and social programme which would help to solve the problems of unemployment, the food supply, agriculture and commerce. In the light of these conclusions the High Commissioner had decided upon the following measures: the replacement of the Council of Directors by a Ministry presided over by a 'Head of the Government'; the formation of an Advisory Assembly, to be composed of representatives of the political, cultural and economic life of the country and of the younger generation, and in which the Druzes and Alawis would also be represented

648 while retaining their special Statutes; the establishment of a
668 Council of State to draft legislation; the participation of the Syrian Government in the organization of the food supply for Syria and Lebanon; and the execution of an important programme of public works. 'The day of fulfilment is at hand and existing difficulties will be resolved by the co-operation of all and not by demonstrations in the streets. The Syrian nation wishes to carry on its work in an orderly and peaceful manner. Order and peace shall be safeguarded.'[1]

645 A few days later a prominent business man and member of a leading Damascene family, Khalid al-Azm, was appointed Prime Minister, with a Ministry most of the members of which, like the Prime Minister himself, had not previously taken a prominent part in the political life of Syria. In its programme the new Government promised to reform the administration, to develop external trade, to pay special attention to the problems of education and youth, to ameliorate the lot of the workers and officials, and to preserve strict non-partisanship in all political matters.

Shortly afterwards a similar change took place in Lebanon. The President of the Republic and the Secretary of State resigned their offices, and were replaced by a politically neutral Ministry headed by Alfred Naccache, a Maronite judge who had hitherto played no important part in politics.

5

648 During these uncertain months the true centre of Syrian
668 political life was Baghdad. It has already been made clear how united is political feeling in the different centres of the Fertile Crescent. The Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939 had received encouragement and help from the neighbouring Arab countries; and after it subsided the thought persisted that the sorrows of Palestine, and also the sorrows of Syria, could only be ended by a united effort of the whole Arab people. It was also widely believed that in this effort Iraq would have to play the leading part, since it possessed greater freedom of action than most of the other Arab regions, and also the nucleus of a trained army. The sense that the destiny of their nation depended on them exalted the spirits of a certain group among the Iraqi Arabs; and their enthusiasm was further increased by the teaching of the

[1] See Appendix A10.

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many Syrians and Palestinians, teachers, government officials 648
and political exiles, who thronged Baghdad in the first years 668
of the war. To the general Arab unrest there were added particular Iraqi grievances; and both were encouraged to express themselves violently by the comparative failure of British arms in 1940 and 1941 and the great though temporary influence of German propaganda. Finally, when the general position of the war seemed most propitious, Rashid Ali raised the banner of revolt. He was supported by some, although by no means all, of the nationalists in other Arab countries; in imagination they saw the revolt not as a seizure of power by the Army but as a protest of the Arabs against British policy in Palestine and French in Syria. When the revolt failed, a wave of doubt and self-criticism swept over the nationalist ranks, in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, no less than in Iraq.

6

These events were swiftly followed by others of even greater 648
import. Ever since the French capitulation German agents 926
had been active in Syria and Lebanon. In the first months of 1941 German influence was thought to be increasing rapidly and alarmingly; and it was believed that the completion of her Balkan campaign had brought nearer the possibility of a gradual infiltration of German troops and agents into the French Mandated Territories, until finally Germany would be able to obtain complete control of them. Her forces would then be in a position to threaten the British armies in Palestine and Egypt, and Turkey to the north.

The danger was brought to a head by the outbreak of the Iraqi insurrection in May. German aircraft were permitted by the Government of Vichy to use Syrian air-bases as stages on their journey to Iraq; and it was obvious to those who had studied German methods of infiltration that this was the beginning of a process which would, unless forestalled, soon take on such proportions that to check it would be of the greatest difficulty.

It therefore came as no surprise to the general public when June 8th, 1941, a mixed force of Imperial, Free French and other Allied troops crossed the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon; the whole force was under the command of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and the Free French contingent under that

648 726 of General Catroux. General Dentz's troops put up an unexpectedly strong resistance. It had been generally hoped that it would be nominal or else would be overcome without much difficulty, on account of the supposed bad state of morale among the French troops, the alleged poor condition of their equipment, the repatriation of a large part of the army of the Levant to France after the Armistice, the defection of a number of officers and men to the Free French cause, and the pro-British sympathies of certain elements in the population. This hope was not fulfilled. General Dentz's troops resisted strongly, for a number of reasons: because of hostility to Great Britain and Free France and suspicion of their intentions; from professional pride and the desire to wipe out the shame of the French capitulation of 1940; because the policy of Vichy included the defence of the Empire against all attacks upon it; and because of severe disciplinary measures taken by General Dentz in the weeks preceding the attack.

The Allied advance was made in several columns, some of which entered the country from Palestine and Transjordan in the south, and the others from Iraq in the east. Of the columns advancing from the south, one took the coastal road, with Beirut as its goal; a second went northwards from Metullah into the region beneath the western slopes of Hermon, heading towards the Biqa', the valley between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, in which lies the air-base of Rayaq; a third advanced towards Damascus by way of Quneitra; and others towards Damascus through the Hauran. Of the columns which invaded Syria from Iraq, one struck across the desert towards Palmyra and then towards Homs and the roads and railway which run north and south connecting the great towns of the interior; another moved up the course of the Euphrates towards Dair az-Zor and then south-west to Palmyra; and a third westwards along the northern frontier, towards Aleppo. The northward and westward movements tended to converge as the columns moved forward, pushing the enemy forces before them towards the north-western section of the country. In the first days of the campaign the forces from the south captured Sur, Dera' and Merjayun and advanced beyond them. But the further they went the fiercer the resistance to them grew; they captured Kiswe, a few miles south of Damascus, but there they were halted, while the French forces launched a counter-attack and on June 16th recaptured

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726 648 Quneitra and Merjayun. They were dislodged from the former in a few hours, but from the latter only after more than a week of heavy fighting on June 24th. By that time the other columns had made considerable progress; on June 20th the deciding battle for Damascus was fought. An Indian brigade penetrated after hard fighting into the suburbs of Mezze to the west of Damascus; the Australians following in support took Fort Gouraud. In the face of this threat from the west and pressure from Free French columns to the south and east General Dentz ordered the evacuation of the city. Free French troops under Colonel Collet led the Allied entry of June 21st. In the next few days a rapid advance was made north of Damascus by Allied troops, while those moving westwards through the desert drew nearer to the railway and Aleppo, Homs and Hama; and those on the coastal road continued their approach upon Beirut, in spite of heavy resistance at Damur and elsewhere.

By the beginning of July the end of the campaign was in sight. On July 8th General Dentz was forced to ask for terms; and after several days of negotiations, an Armistice Convention was initialled at Acre on July 12th and signed on the 14th. Allied forces were to occupy Syrian and Lebanese territory; the French forces were to be accorded the full honours of war; all war material was either to be transferred to the British authorities or to be destroyed under their supervision; prisoners of war were to be released; the free choice between rallying to the Allied cause and being repatriated was to be left to individuals on the French side; the rights of French cultural institutions were to be respected; all public services, means of communication, port installations, naval establishments, ships, aircraft, air installations, and equipment and fuel stocks were to be handed over intact; and no reprisals were to be taken by the British authorities against Syrians or Lebanese who had been involved in the recent hostilities in a military or official capacity. The execution of the Convention was to be supervised by a commission of control, of which three members, including the President, were to be nominated by the British authorities and the other two by the Vichy French authorities.[1]

[1] See Appendix A13.

In the period which has elapsed between the Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon and the present day, a number of statements have been issued for the purpose of defining the policy which Free France should follow in the Mandated Territories, her attitude to the inhabitants and her relations with Great Britain. 648

The intentions of the Free French towards the Syrians and Lebanese were stated on the day on which the invasion began, in the proclamation issued by General Catroux :

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon !

'At the moment when the forces of Free France, united to the forces of the British Empire, her ally, are entering your territory, I declare that I assume the powers, responsibilities and duties of the representative of France in the Levant. I do this in the name of Free France, which is the traditional and real France, and in the name of her Chief, General de Gaulle. In this capacity I come to put an end to the mandatory régime and to proclaim you free and independent.

'You will therefore be from henceforward sovereign and independent peoples, and you will be able either to form yourselves into separate States or to unite into a single State. In either event, your independent and sovereign status will be guaranteed by a Treaty in which our mutual relations will be defined. This Treaty will be negotiated as soon as possible between your representatives and myself. Pending its conclusion our mutual position will be one of close unity in pursuit of a common ideal and common aims.

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon, you will see from this declaration that if the Free French and British forces cross your frontier, it is not to take away your liberty, it is to ensure it. It is to drive out of Syria the forces of Hitler. It is to prevent the Levant from becoming an enemy base directed against the British and against ourselves.

'We who are fighting for the liberty of peoples cannot allow the enemy to subjugate your country step by step, obtain control of your persons and your belongings, and turn you into slaves. We cannot allow the populations which France has promised to defend to fall into the hands of the

648 most wanton and pitiless master that history has known. We cannot allow the age-long interests of France in the Levant to be handed over to the enemy.

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon! If, in answer to our appeal, you rally to us, you should know that the British Government in agreement with Free France has promised to grant you all the advantages enjoyed by the free countries which are associated with them. Thus the blockade will be lifted and you will enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous advantages from the point of view of your imports and exports. You will be able to buy and sell freely with all the free countries.

'Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon! A great hour in your history has struck. France declares you independent by the voice of her sons who are fighting for her life and for the liberty of the world.'[1]

Simultaneously, the British Ambassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson, made the following statement in the name of the British Government:

'General Catroux, on behalf of General de Gaulle, Chief of the Free French, has issued a declaration to the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon before advancing with the object of expelling the Germans. In this he declares the liberty and independence of Syria and Lebanon. He undertakes to negotiate a treaty to ensure these objects.

'I am authorized by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to declare that they support and associate themselves with the assurance of independence given by General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon.

'I am also authorized to give you the assurance that should you support and join the Allies, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom offer you all the advantages enjoyed by free countries who are associated with them. The blockade will be lifted and you may enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous, besides immediate, advantages from the point of view of your exports and imports. You will be able to sell your products and to buy freely in all the free countries.'[2]

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A11. [2] *The Times*, June 9th, 1941.

8

On June 24th, after the capture of Damascus, General de Gaulle issued two decrees, the one nominating General Catroux Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the Levant, and the other appointing him 'Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary' of the Chief of the Free French for the States of the Levant. (This title was to replace that of High Commissioner.) In a letter to General Catroux announcing these appointments, General de Gaulle laid down the main lines of the policy which he was to adopt in regard to Syrian and Lebanese independence. 648

'You are going to exercise your powers and functions in my name and in that of the Council of Defence of the French Empire. Your mission will consist particularly in restoring the economic situation in the Levant as rapidly and completely as the circumstances of the war permit; in negotiating with the qualified representatives of the interested peoples treaties establishing the independence and sovereignty of the Levant States, while guaranteeing their alliance with France and safeguarding the rights and interests of France; in assuring the defence of the territories against the enemy and co-operating with the Allies in the military operations in the East.

'Until the régime resulting from the treaties to be concluded is established—and this ought to take place as soon as possible—you should assume all the powers hitherto exercised by the High Commissioner of France in the Levant and all the responsibilities incumbent upon him.

'Furthermore, your powers will include that of representing France so far as treaties are concerned, and you will be at the same time Commander-in-Chief of our forces.

'You will bring about, whenever it shall be possible, the establishment of assemblies fully representative of the whole of the population and the formation of Governments having the confidence of those assemblies. You will immediately enter into negotiations with these Governments, so as to bring about the conclusion of treaties of alliance. These treaties will be signed by those Governments and by me.

'In spite of the confusion and chaos resulting from the temporary reverses of the French armies and in spite of the intrigues of the invader in our country, the Mandate of

648 France, which was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1923, should be exercised up to the moment when it is effectively ended, and until then the work of France ought to continue.

'In consequence, you will take as the point of departure for the negotiations with the Levant States the treaties of alliance concluded with them in 1936. You will suggest to the Governments of the Levant States the temporary measures which should be taken in common in order to meet the needs of our common defence in this war, and which therefore will form the subject of special conventions.

'I take it upon myself to bring to the knowledge of the League of Nations, at the appropriate time, the replacement of the mandatory régime in the Levant by a new régime which will pursue the aims for which the Mandate was established.'[1]

9

Although since the armistice the Free French have been in territorial control of Syria and Lebanon and responsible for the civil administration, the country has been mainly garrisoned by British and Imperial troops of the Ninth Army, and supreme military authority has been in British hands. Economically and financially it has become part of the bloc of British-controlled Middle Eastern territories. In September, 1941, for example, it was admitted to the sterling area. Thus Free French policy in the Mandated Territories has affected not only Franco-Arab but also Franco-British relations.

The attitude of the British Government towards the future political régime in Syria and Lebanon was made clear from the beginning of the Free French administration. First, it desired to see these States given their independence; but secondly, subject to the fulfilment of that condition, it acknowledged the priority of France's position over that of any other European Power in Syria and Lebanon. This attitude was defined in an interchange of letters between Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, the Minister of State in the Middle East, and General de Gaulle on August 15th, 1941. Mr. Lyttelton wrote:

'At the conclusion of our talk to-day I am happy to repeat to you the assurance that Great Britain has no

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A12.

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interest in Syria or the Lebanon, except to win the war. 148 We have no desire to encroach in any way upon the position of France. Both Free France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. When this essential step has been taken, and without prejudice to it, we freely admit that France should have the predominant position in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power. It is in this spirit that we have always acted. You will have seen recent utterances of the Prime Minister in this sense. I am glad to reaffirm them now to our friends and allies, who have our full sympathy and support.

'On our side, I am happy again to receive your assurances of the determination of Free France, as friend and ally of Great Britain and in accordance with the agreements and declarations which you have already made, to pursue relentlessly to the finish the war against the common enemy. I am happy that we should thus reaffirm our complete understanding and agreement.'

General de Gaulle replied:

'I have received the letter which you have been kind enough to send me following our interview of to-day. I am happy to note your renewed assurances regarding the disinterestedness of Great Britain in Syria and Lebanon, and the fact that Great Britain admits as a basic principle the pre-eminent and privileged position of France when these shall have attained independence in conformity with the undertaking which Free France has taken with regard to them.

'I take this opportunity of repeating that Free France, that is to say, France, is resolved to pursue the war at the side of Great Britain, her friend and ally, until the attainment of complete victory against our common enemies.'[1]

The British guarantees were repeated with even greater authority by the Prime Minister. Speaking in the House of Commons on September 9th, 1941, he said:

'We have no ambitions in Syria. We do not seek to replace or supplant France, or substitute British for French interests in any part of Syria. We are only in Syria in order to win the war. However, I must make it quite clear that our policy, to which our Free French Allies

[1] *Bulletin of International News*, XVIII, No. 17, p. 1,115.

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have subscribed, is that Syria shall be handed back to the Syrians, who will assume at the earliest possible moment their independent sovereign rights. We do not propose that this process of creating an independent Syrian Government or Governments—because it may be that they will not be one Government—shall wait until the end of the war. We contemplate constantly increasing the Syrian share in the administration. There is no question of France maintaining the same position which she exercised in Syria before the war, but which the French Government had realized must come to an end. On the other hand, we recognize that among all the nations of Europe the position of France in Syria is one of special privilege, and that in so far as any European countries have influence in Syria, that of France will be pre-eminent.' (Hon. Members: 'Why?') 'Because that is the policy which we have decided to adopt. We did not go there in order to deprive France of her historic position in Syria, except in so far as is necessary to fulfil our obligations and pledges to the Syrian population. There must be no question, even in wartime, of a mere substitution of Free French interests for Vichy French interests. The Syrian peoples are to come back into their own. This is fully recognized in the documents which have been exchanged between the Minister of State and the representatives of the Free French.

'I was asked a question about our relations with Iraq. They are special; our relations with Egypt are special, and, in the same way, I conceive that France will have special arrangements with Syria. The independence of Syria is a prime feature in our policy.'[1]

10

There followed a period of negotiations and discussions, during which the Government of Khalid al-Azm in Syria and that of Alfred Naccache in Lebanon remained in office. General Catroux, in the letter in which he asked the Syrian Prime Minister to remain in office, stated that the Mandatory régime could not be terminated until the occupation of the country was complete; after that a régime of independence would be inaugurated, to be guaranteed by a treaty negotiated on a footing of equality.

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, Vol. 374, col. 76.

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The decision on the form of political organization to be adopted was reached sooner in Syria than in Lebanon. In September, 1941, there was published a letter from General Catroux to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani. In this letter the General stated that, after having diligently consulted public opinion and having no object in view but the good of the country, he considered Shaikh Taj ad-Din to be better qualified than any one else to organize the new independent and sovereign Syrian State., 'I propose therefore to Your Excellency that you take in hand the destinies of Syria with the title, the prerogatives and the privileges attached to the office of President of the Syrian Republic, and as such set up the government of the State with the shortest possible delay. If, as I hope, you accept this offer, you can be certain of my entire support and full collaboration.'[1]

The new President was the son of a Moslem divine of Damascus, Shaikh Badr ad-Din. He himself had been prominent in Syrian politics in the years between the two wars, as an advocate of collaboration with the Mandatory Power who had at the same time always regarded himself as a nationalist. He had twice been Prime Minister: from 1928 to 1931 and again from 1934 to 1935. Since 1935 he had taken no active part in Syrian political life and his reputation for wisdom and probity was by no means high.

A few days later, on September 28th, 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria:

'Syrians,

'On June 8th last, at the time of the entry into the Levant of the Allied Armies, in a manifesto which I addressed to you in the name of Free France and of her Chief, General de Gaulle, I recognized Syria as a sovereign and independent State, under the promise of a treaty guaranteeing our reciprocal relations.

'The British Government, the Ally of Free France, acting in accord with her, associated itself by a simultaneous declaration with this important political act. On the 16th of this month, I put my declaration of June 8th into effect by translating into established fact the principle there enunciated.

'Thus the era is begun in which independent and sovereign Syria will herself control her destinies.

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne* (Cairo), September 17th, 1941.

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648 'His Excellency Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani has consented to organize the new régime of independence. His experience of affairs and his profound understanding of the country's needs mark him out for this high mission. I assure him as well as the whole Syrian nation of my support and of my loyal collaboration.

'In this collaboration I shall be guided by the following principles:

'The Syrian State will enjoy from now onwards the rights and prerogatives of an independent and sovereign State. These will be subject only to the restrictions imposed by the present state of war and the security of the territory.

'Her position as *de facto* Ally of Free France and of Great Britain necessitates a strict conformity of her policy with that of the Allies.

'With her accession to independent international life, Syria assumes naturally the rights and obligations hitherto undertaken in her name.

'She has the power to appoint diplomatic representatives in countries where she judges that her interests demand such representation. Everywhere else, the authorities of Free France will lend her their good offices in order to ensure the defence of her general rights and interests as well as the protection of her nationals.

'The Syrian State is empowered to organize its national military forces. Free France will lend it all help to this end.

'Great Britain having already committed herself on several occasions to the recognition of the independence of Syria, Free France will intervene without delay with other allied or friendly Powers, so that they also should recognize the independence of the Syrian State.

'Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be

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politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled. 648

'It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.

'Free France undertakes to act as intermediary between Syria and Lebanon for the purpose of seeking and establishing the basis of economic collaboration between the two countries, and of removing the difficulties which this collaboration encounters at present.

'This "entente", necessary between two countries which are both brothers and neighbours, must guarantee the respective rights of the two parties, and establish their relations on the basis of reciprocal confidence.

'To safeguard the independence and sovereignty of Syria and bring the common struggle to a successful issue, the Allies will undertake the defence of the country during the period of war. To this end, the Syrian Government will put the Syrian national forces at the disposal of the Allied Command, in order to co-operate in the defence of the territory. Further, the Allied Command will make use from now onwards, as far as military necessities demand, of the resources and public services of Syria, particularly of means of communication, aerodromes and coastal establishments. The defence of the territory demands also that a strict collaboration should exist at all times between the Commander-in-Chief and Delegate-General, and the gendarmerie, police and security services of the Syrian State. Syria must indeed be defended in time of war not only against her enemies without but also against those within.

'By reason of the inclusion of Syria in the war-zone and in the economic and financial system of the Allies, the strictest collaboration between the Syrian Government and the Allies is also necessary in order to ensure, for the duration of hostilities and in the common interest, the observance of all measures taken to conduct the economic war satisfactorily.

'To this end, for the duration of the war the widest facilities will be accorded to assure the greatest possible freedom of exchange between Syria and the countries of the

S 648 sterling bloc. Syria, having now entered the sterling bloc, will in the economic and financial sphere and especially in that of exchange take the necessary measures to follow the general policy of the sterling bloc.

'The preceding stipulations reconcile respect for Syrian independence and sovereignty with the necessities of war. They are inspired by a single thought, that of winning the war and by this means assuring to Syria the future of a free people. They give the Franco-Syrian problem a solution which springs from the desire of Free France not to retard, in spite of the war, the accomplishment of Syrian national aspirations and the fulfilment of the undertakings of the Allies. But it is necessary that a final settlement should be substituted for them as soon as possible, in the form of a Franco-Syrian Treaty which will definitively guarantee the independence of the country.

'Long live independent Syria! Long live England! Long live France!'[1]

S 645 648 At the same time the new President of the Syrian Republic took up his duties. In October Shaikh Taj was able to announce the formation of a Government, at the head of which was Hasan al-Hakim, a well-known financial expert and a former collaborator of Dr. Shahbandar. Among the members of the Ministry were an Alawi and a Druze, but none of the leaders of the Bloc.

The declaration of independence and the formation of a Government aroused no enthusiasm among the population. The nationalists preferred to wait before giving their approval, to see what steps Free France would take to render her undertakings effective. They also objected to the appointment of the President instead of his choice by a freely elected Chamber; and in particular they disapproved of the appointment of Shaikh Taj.

II

L 648 The independence of Lebanon was proclaimed two months later, on November 26th, 1941. General Catroux's proclamation ran as follows:

'Lebanese,

'The proclamation which I addressed to you on June 8th in the name of General de Gaulle, Chief of Free France, and

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A14.

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L 648 There flow from this a certain number of rights and obligations, among them in particular those stipulated below.'

The remainder of the proclamation was substantially the same, with minor and verbal variations, as the proclamation of Syrian independence.[1]

This declaration was received lukewarmly by the greater part of the population. It was open to objection on various grounds. Those who advocated the union of Lebanon with Syria regarded the proclamation as a repudiation of the promise contained in Catroux's statement of June 8th, that the Syrians and Lebanese would be free to form themselves into separate States or to unite into a single State. They objected also to the assertion that Lebanon was politically and territorially an indivisible unit. A similar statement had appeared in the Syrian proclamation and had there been open to no objection; but in the Lebanese proclamation it was taken to imply that any modification of the frontiers between Syria and Lebanon was out of the question.

Furthermore, all those who were opposed to the maintenance of French control, whether they were believers in Lebanese, in Syrian or in Arab nationalism, resented the references to France's 'mission' in the Levant and the statement that the future treaty would be negotiated on the basis of the Treaty of 1936.

L 645 These criticisms were not lessened when it was announced that a Ministry had been formed, with Ahmad ad-Da'uq as Prime Minister, and composed of colourless personalities without any claim to represent the population.

12

S 648 The British Government approved of the Free French policy of proclaiming Syrian and Lebanese independence, and gave its formal recognition to both the newly independent States, in the shape of letters of congratulation sent by His Majesty King George VI, to the Syrian President on October 27th, 1941, and to the Lebanese on December 26th.

In February, 1942, Major-General Sir Edward Spears, who had been connected with the Free French movement since its beginning, and had been in the Levant as head of the 'Spears Mission' since 1941, was appointed first British Minister to the Syrian and Lebanese Republics.

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A15.

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In addition to Great Britain, the independence of Syria and Lebanon was recognized by a number of the Allied Governments in exile. That of Syria, but not of Lebanon, was recognized by Sa'udi Arabia; while Egypt recognized the independence of the Syrian State but not its present form of government. The other Arab Governments, however, withheld their recognition, preferring to make no move until the form of independence should acquire reality through the re-establishment of constitutional government. Turkey, too, gave no recognition, not having official relations with the Free French. Most important of all, the United States Government maintained a reserved attitude. Mr. Cordell Hull, in a statement issued on November 29th, 1941, stressed the sympathy which the American Government and people had always felt for the 'natural and legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Syria and Lebanon'. The convention of 1924, in which the U.S. Government gave its consent to the Mandate, clearly embodied the principle of Syrian and Lebanese independence. It must be regarded as continuing in effect until new instruments of a mutually satisfactory nature could be negotiated and ratified. The U.S. Government was hopeful that as soon as international conditions permitted such negotiations would take place, enabling the Government to extend formal recognition to Syria and Lebanon.[1] In October, 1942, Mr. George Wadsworth was appointed U.S. Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

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In spite of the declarations of independence, the French authorities showed no eagerness either to restore constitutional life or to transfer powers to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. In August, 1942, indeed, General de Gaulle stated categorically in a speech made during his visit to the Levant that elections could not yet be held. The only progress made was the issue in February, 1942, of decrees once more incorporating Jebel Druze and the Alawi district in the Syrian State, while at the same time endowing them with special administrative and financial régimes similar to those which had existed from 1936 to 1939.[2] Apart from this, the only political events of the years were changes of Ministries. In

[1] For text, see P. W. Ireland (ed.), *The Near East, Problems and Prospects* (Chicago, 1942), p. 236. [2] See Chapter XI.

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Lebanon the Government of Sami as-Sulh succeeded that of Ahmad ad-Da'uq. In Syria, Hasan al-Hakim resigned in April, 1942, and was succeeded by Husni al-Barazi, who himself gave way in January, 1943, to Jamil al-Ulshi. These changes had only a very limited significance.

This failure to restore the constitutional Government increased the discontent which had already been caused in both Syria and Lebanon by the way in which their independence had been proclaimed. The administrative methods of the Free French officials were also much criticized; more particularly, a general contempt was felt for the many officials who had served Vichy and had only gone over to Free France after the occupation of the country in 1941. Thus the belief grew up that Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing by their change of masters. It was a belief held not only by the political classes but by ordinary citizens who resented the inefficiency of the French administration; not only by Arab nationalists but even by many of the Lebanese Christians, who could not feel towards the Free French the admiration, gratitude and trust which they had had for France as a great Power. In the circumstances it was natural that Great Britain should be largely blamed for the actions of her ally.

One consequence of the discontent was a revival in the power of the National Bloc. The dissensions between its leaders were patched up, and the Bloc united in its demand for the restoration of the Chamber of 1936-1939 or else the holding of fresh elections. Its spokesman was Shukri al-Quwatli, whose reputation had grown steadily throughout the years. In October, 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation, he absented himself from Syria on a visit to Arabia and Iraq; but after his return to Damascus in September, 1942, he became once more the dominant figure of the political scene. Side by side with the revival of the Bloc there went a growth in the size and influence of the Socialist and Communist movements; this was due not so much to the spread of Marxist doctrines as to the universal discontent with the existing order and the eagerness to snatch at any hope of change.

14

In Syria and Lebanon alike, the attention of the greater part of the population was concentrated upon the economic problems of the war. Two of them were peculiarly important.

been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

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After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies, including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

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The members of the Ministry were respectively Sunni Moslem, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Greek Catholic, Druze and Shi'i. Thus the convention which had grown up that the Cabinet should include representatives of all the more important sects was respected. The Ministers, however divided though they might be in religious allegiance, were united in desiring on the one hand a greater measure of self-government for Lebanon, and on the other closer relations between Lebanon and Syria.

17

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Iraq recognized the independence of Syria in August and of Lebanon in October. In September the Egyptian Government announced its decision to recognize Lebanese independence and to establish legations in Damascus and Beirut. The Sa'udi Arabian Government also declared its intention to set up a legation in Damascus. These three Governments showed in this and in other ways their satisfaction with the restoration of constitutional rule in the Levant States.

These steps made possible a serious attempt by the Syrians and Lebanese to define their relations with each other, with France, with the other Arab countries and with the United Nations.[1]

[1] More recent events are summarised in the Postscript.

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POSTSCRIPT: THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER, 1943, TO APRIL, 1945

I

CHAPTER XII carried the political history of Syria and Lebanon down to the restoration of constitutional forms and the assumption of office by national Governments (in Damascus in August, 1943, and in Beirut in September).[1] From the first it was clear that the nationalists did not regard their accession to power as the end of the national struggle. Syria and Lebanon had been formally recognized as independent in 1941, and the restoration of the constitutions could be regarded as the first step towards making self-government a reality; but there were still other steps to be taken. Some of them could not, it is true, be taken before the end of the war. In his proclamations of independence, General Catroux had explicitly stated that the needs of war required Syria and Lebanon to conduct their policy in accordance with that of the Allies. The Allies must assume responsibility for the defence of the country and its war production, and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should place their armed forces at the Allies' disposal for those purposes, as well as aerodromes, harbours and communications; and the closest collaboration should exist between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Free French Delegate-General on the one hand and the Syrian and Lebanese police and gendarmerie on the other. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments should also collaborate with the Allies in matters concerning the economic war, and should follow the general policy of the sterling bloc in the economic and financial spheres.[2]

Such restrictions were recognized to be necessary by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, which looked on them as a contribution they could make to the Allied war-effort. There were, however, other limitations upon their freedom of action.

First, there were limitations upon the legislative power of the two Governments, imposed on the one hand by the power of the Delegate-General to legislate by summary decree, and on the other by certain general reservations contained in the Syrian and Lebanese Constitutions. Thus Article 116 of the Syrian Constitution stated:—

'Aucune disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et

[1] See pp. 256, 257. [2] See pp. 247, 250.

S 648 L 648 ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et de la défense du pays, et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront pas applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervener entre les gouvernements français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ses responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord. Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux gouvernements.'

Secondly, there were a number of important administrative services which were wholly removed from the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and placed under direct supervision of the Delegate-General, who administered them through a staff which was largely French in the upper ranks, but Syrian and Lebanese in the lower. They included :

S L 652 648 i. The 'Common Interests', a number of departments dealing with matters of concern to both Syria and Lebanon. The most important of them were the customs administration, the control of concessionary companies and certain economic, financial and social services. They were financed out of the 'Funds of Common Interest', consisting almost entirely of customs receipts, which were sufficient not only to pay for these services but to provide a large surplus which was in principle divided between the two Governments.

S L 648 701 ii. The 'Troupes Spéciales', the local Syrian and Lebanese levies. Some thousands strong, they had been in existence throughout the Mandatory period as an integral part of the French Army of the Levant, and until the outbreak of war they had been wholly paid for out of the 'Funds of Common Interest'. They now formed part of the French territorial command.

000 iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for

iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. S L 648 625

iv. The control of the Beduin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.) S L 648 204

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed : S L 648

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions : an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole sources of legislation ; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments ; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of S L 648 186

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revenue. Control of concessionary companies would give them authority over the railway administration, the ports, the water and electricity companies and the tobacco monopoly, all of them in the hands of French companies and between them covering an important section of the country's economic life. The transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' would make possible the creation of Syrian and Lebanese Armies.

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Faced with these demands the Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (C.F.L.N.) defined its attitude sharply. In the first place, it claimed that it had inherited the Mandate from the French Republic; the Mandate conferred upon France certain obligations which neither she nor the Syrians and Lebanese were entitled to repudiate; they could only be ended or modified by the League of Nations or whatever organization might replace it. No definitive change of a radical kind could therefore be made until the League were revived or a successor to it established.

Secondly, the Committee, while admitting the possibility of a transfer of powers, sought to make it conditional on the willingness of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to conclude with them Treaties guaranteeing on the one hand the independence of the two States and on the other the special position and interests of France. The declarations of independence had foreshadowed the conclusion of such Treaties: and it was therefore claimed that the grant of independence had been conditional upon it.

Subsequently, under the pressure of events, the Committee admitted the right of the two Governments to demand immediate legislative and administrative concessions, but emphasized that the transfer of powers should take place in a correct way. In view of the importance of the issues involved, it should only take place after negotiation and agreement with the representatives of France. Any attempt to modify the present situation by unilateral action, without such formal agreement, could only be regarded as a deliberate insult to France.

To each of these theses the Syrians and Lebanese had an answer. To the first, they replied that they had never recognized the Mandate, which had been imposed upon them against their will and without their consent being asked.

Furthermore, they did not recognize the Algiers Committee as the legitimate inheritor of the Mandatory obligations of France. Even granting, however, that Free France had inherited the Mandate, General Catroux had proclaimed the independence of the two States, not as something to be granted in the future, but as something to take effect from the moment of his proclamation. It might be that technically Free France had had no authority to end the Mandate, but in practice the Mandate had ceased to exist on the day of his declaration; and unless Free France wished to go back upon the declaration and the proclamations of independence, she was bound henceforth to treat the Mandate as virtually a dead letter.

To the second argument, that the C.F.L.N. could only make the desired concessions in return for the conclusion of treaties, they replied that the declarations of independence, while envisaging the possibility of such treaties, had in no way made the grant of independence conditional upon their being negotiated. Independence had been given unconditionally (except for the limitations made necessary by the state of war); and if Syria and Lebanon were really independent, they had a right to decide for themselves whether or not to make treaties with a foreign State, and could not be forced into it by the threat that powers which were already theirs by right would otherwise be withheld. Furthermore, they had no intention of signing Treaties if at all, until after the war, since they had no reason to believe that France would then necessarily honour treaties concluded in her name by the C.F.L.N.

As for the third argument, that the concessions demanded could only be made by means of agreements, they, too, preferred that the questions at issue should be settled if possible through agreement with the C.F.L.N. But if the Committee were unwilling, as it at first seemed to be, they could not give up their right to take matters into their own hands. What did the independence of a State mean, if it could not unilaterally alter its constitution and establish its own administrative services?

Beneath these arguments and replies there lay an intense mutual distrust and suspicion, which were the real cause of the crisis. The nationalists of Syria and Lebanon had no confidence in the willingness of France ever to grant them genuine self-government. They were afraid that unless they

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exerted pressure nothing would be done; and that after the war, if France's strength revived, she would attempt to re-establish her position by force. It was therefore vital for them, while it was possible, to put themselves in a position in which the opposition of France to their aspirations could no longer harm them. It was particularly important to obtain possession of those administrative services which had always been used as instruments of French policy, and might still be used to obstruct the new Nationalist governments during the war and subsequently to overthrow them: the Sûreté Générale and the Services Spéciaux, the Funds of Common Interest, the Troupes Spéciales.

The French on their side regarded the claims of the Syrians and Lebanese as part of a movement which was primarily and deliberately anti-French, and of which the purpose was to take advantage of France's weakness in order to destroy French influence in the Levant. They would have preferred to make no concessions to Arab nationalism at all; but since they were bound to do so in virtue of promises already made, they would only do so in return for a guarantee of their position and interests. To give up the Common Interests and other services, the one bargaining counter they had, without obtaining such a guarantee would be a severe blow to French national prestige and to the movement of revival which since 1941 had placed a symbolic value upon Syria and Lebanon.

3

The neighbouring Arab States were deeply concerned in the struggle of Syria and Lebanon for self-government. They had always been interested in it because of ties of language and sentiment; but in 1943 the matter became even more important because of the current discussions on Arab unity. Reference has already been made to these discussions in Chapters XII and XIII. It has been mentioned that after the re-establishment of constitutional forms in Syria, Nahhas Pasha invited the Syrian Government to send representatives to discuss the Arab question with him. The Syrian delegation visited Cairo in October and held conversations on Arab unity with the Egyptian Premier; its visit aroused much public attention in Egypt, and it was generally expected that a Lebanese delegation would soon follow it to Cairo. Thus the Levant States were drawn into the movement for unity; for

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political, strategic and economic reasons it was impossible to conceive of an Arab union in which they were not included; but it was clear that they could not take an effective part in that movement until they possessed self-government and effective freedom of political action. It was therefore a general Arab interest to see Syria and Lebanon possessed of self-government. More than that, if a crisis should arise over the grant of self-government, it would be vital for the other Arab countries to give what help they could to the Syrians and Lebanese, because such a crisis would be a test of the effective strength of Arab unity. In regard to Lebanon there was a special reason for going to her help: Lebanon was only half-heartedly Arab nationalist, and nothing would strengthen her Arab sentiment so much as a practical demonstration of the concern of the other Arab countries for her welfare and of the benefits she could obtain from their assistance.

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It was in fact the Lebanese Government which first challenged the French on the issue of the transfer of powers. The new Prime Minister, Riyadh as-Sulh, made a statement of policy to the Chamber on October 7th, 1943, announcing the Government's intention to propose a revision of the Constitution. This, he said, would be purged of all provisions inconsistent with the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, so that henceforward no authorities other than the legitimate representatives of the nation would participate in its government. During the following weeks the Government, while preparing its constitutional measure, was also engaged in controversy with the French authorities as to its right to modify the Constitution without previous agreement with the Mandatory Power. The controversy was made public by C.F.L.N. in a communiqué dated November 5th. This stated that the Committee could not recognize the validity of a unilateral revision of the Constitution; but that this decision did not affect the determination of France 'to accord Lebanon complete independence by means of negotiations conducted between the two parties in the spirit of loyal and friendly collaboration which must continue as in the past to inspire the special relations uniting Lebanon and France'. The Lebanese Government proceeded with the arrangements they

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L 648 669 of November 11th with the exception of that which declared the constitutional amendments null and void.

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S 648 L 648 The acute crisis was now over, but the problem from which it had sprung was still unsolved. When the Lebanese Chamber re-assembled, the Premier asserted his Government's view that the reforms of November 8th were still in force. Moreover, the Syrian authorities lost no time, once the tension in Lebanon was relaxed, in taking parallel action. At an extraordinary session of the Syrian Chamber on January 24th, 1944, the President of the Republic and the Deputies took an oath of allegiance to a new Constitution which comprised Articles 1-115 of the existing text. The effect of this was to annul Article 116. Earlier, on December 1st, the Syrian Premier had declared that Syria did not recognize the Mandate, and was not willing to conclude a Treaty as a condition of the transfer of powers which properly belonged to her; had demanded the surrender by the French of all the attributes of sovereignty, under those limitations only which were necessitated by the state of war; and had affirmed that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were in agreement on the administration of the common interests.

The C.F.L.N. left these claims and assertions unchallenged, and announced that General Catroux would again go to Beirut, this time for the purpose of negotiating with the two Governments on the transfer of powers. The negotiations resulted in an agreement, concluded on December 22nd, which provided that the powers previously exercised by French authorities in the name of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should be transferred to their control. They would take over the services included in the category of Common Interests as from January 1st, and other powers by specific agreements still to be concluded. Thus, by the beginning of 1944, the two States had survived a sharp test of their will to independence and had extended the range of their autonomous administration.

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S L 645 In the course of the year 1944 there were a number of changes in the political situation in Syria and Lebanon. Some of these changes were of no more than local importance.

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L 648 In regard to the 'Services Economiques' and certain other departments, the experiment was tried S 648 of administering them by joint Syro-Lebanese commissions; but for the most part the transferred services were administered separately by the two Governments. To the more ardent nationalists, this was an unsatisfactory element in a transfer which was otherwise to be welcomed. They complained also that the transfer was more in name than in reality, since for reasons of efficiency the French personnel of the services was retained temporarily.

S (ii) In February, 1944, an Anglo-French financial agreement was signed. It named a 'franc area' composed 648 436 of all territories under the control of the French Committee of National Liberation, and fixed the rate L of exchange at 200 francs to the pound sterling. With 648 the agreement of the Syrian and Lebanese Govern- 436 ments, a special area fixed the rate of exchange of the Syro-Lebanese pound at 22.65 francs (it had previously been 20 francs), and thus prevented any change in the present rate of 8.83 Syro-Lebanese pounds to the pound sterling. The French Committee also agreed to revalue certain franc assets of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, to restore the gold formerly held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, and, should there be any further modification in the value of the franc, to guarantee the Syro-Lebanese pound against any resulting loss.

The agreement was widely criticized in Syria and Lebanon. It was regarded as contravening the allied declarations of June, 1941, which promised Syria and Lebanon full membership of the sterling bloc. Moreover, by weakening the link between the pound sterling and the currency of the two States, it created barriers between them and the other Arab States at a time when the movement for closer association between the Arab countries was gathering renewed strength. More important still, it was observed that the agreement was only temporary, and could be terminated by either party at three months' notice. When it should come to an end, there was a danger

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that the Syro-Lebanese currency would once more share in the precarious fortunes of the franc; and its reserves would be under the control of the French Government, which might be tempted to use this control in order to strike a hard political or financial bargain.

7

It has already been mentioned that by the end of 1944 all important services administered by the Delegation-General had been transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, with the exception of the 'Troupes Spéciales'. These troops, whose numbers had been considerably augmented since the allied occupation in 1941, and who now formed a reasonably well-disciplined and well-armed force of several thousands, were under the French territorial command. Throughout the year the two Governments pressed for their formal transfer, while making it clear that for the duration of the war they would, of course, remain at the disposal of the Allied Command. The French Government was unwilling to transfer them until the end of the war, or at least until a later stage in it, and was not prepared to give them up unconditionally but only in exchange for the conclusion of treaties of alliance with France by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the possession of the 'Troupes' was, in fact, their only direct bargaining-counter in their attempt to persuade the two Governments to sign such treaties.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments for their part did not admit that the question of the 'Troupes' had anything to do with the question of the treaties. In their eyes the transfer of the 'Troupes' was a logical consequence of promises and declarations already made by the French: General Catroux, in his declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941, had stated that the two States were at liberty to raise national armies. Moreover, the transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' was a necessary preliminary to any negotiations for a treaty; such negotiations could only take place on a footing of complete equality, and equality could not exist so long as the Syrian and Lebanese Governments did not possess armed forces and so long as the French held over their heads the threat of refusal to transfer the 'Troupes'.

In addition to insisting on their right to control the

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'Troupes,' the two Governments emphasized their need for them. The experience of 1936-1939 had shown what a mockery was self-government so long as the Government had not sufficient forces at its disposal to assert its will. No Government could expect obedience and respect so long as it was not able to curb the pretensions of the overmighty subject; this was particularly true of a country like Syria, where semi-feudal tenures were still to be found, localism was so strong a force, and there existed large Beduin tribes traditionally recalcitrant to civil government and having had full opportunity to arm themselves during the war. Local disorders had already taken place among the Beduin in the Jazirah and in the area dominated by Sulaiman Murshid. It was impossible to rely entirely upon French-controlled forces to prevent disorder, since that would be to admit that France was still the real power in the country and the Government only a façade; loyalty and obedience would only be given where real authority lay.

There was another reason for the attitude of the Syrian Government. They remembered that in 1920 the French had occupied Damascus and overturned the national Government by force; and that in 1925 the national revolt had been suppressed with the help of local levies drawn from the Circassian and other minorities. They were afraid that at some time in the future the French Government might be tempted to repeat its action and to restore its authority in Damascus with the help of the 'Troupes Spéciales', who included a large number of Circassians, Kurds and other minorities organized in separate units. Since the 'Troupes' were the only considerable armed force under French command in the Levant, their transfer to the local Governments would remove this weapon from the hands of the French.

For all these reasons the Syrian and Lebanese Governments demanded the immediate and unconditional transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales', or else, if this were refused, their disbandment. Otherwise they would proceed with the formation of national armies. Both Governments made special appropriations for this purpose in their 1944 and 1945 budgets.

With this fundamental difference of opinion between the French point of view and that of the Syrians and Lebanese, it is not surprising that when discussions on the subject opened in the early months of 1944 they led to little result. A draft

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agreement was, it is true, reached between the Syrian Government and the Delegate-General, General Beynet, but negotiations were then broken off by the French Committee in Algiers. With Lebanon a limited agreement was reached; in June it was arranged that a battalion wholly officered by Lebanese would be placed at the disposal of the Lebanese Government pending the conclusion of a general agreement. By the end of the year no further progress had been made, and the new year opened with demonstrations in Damascus in favour of the formation of an army and against what was believed to be the too indulgent attitude of the Government towards French delays.

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A still more fundamental question, that of the conclusion of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese Treaties, became urgent during 1944.

The French Government claimed that, in spite of the declarations of independence made in 1941 and the subsequent transfer of powers, legally the Mandate still remained in force and would remain until a restored League of Nations or another international authority should bring it to an end; as in the case of Iraq, a necessary preliminary to its being brought to an end was the conclusion of treaties of alliance and friendship with the Mandatory Power. They pointed out that the declarations of independence had referred to the negotiation of such treaties, and even claimed that independence had not been granted unconditionally but only on condition that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments entered into treaties with France. They referred further to Great Britain's recognition of France's pre-eminent and privileged position in the Levant, and maintained that treaties were necessary in order to define and safeguard her position.

France's insistence on the signature of treaties had several motives. There was first her desire to preserve her political, economic and other interests in the Levant States themselves. Again, there was the fear that a withdrawal from the Levant would lower her prestige in North Africa and encourage the demands of the nationalists there. Moreover, so long as Metropolitan France was not liberated, the Fighting French were naturally reluctant to give up a particle of their position anywhere in the world where they still retained it. The

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liberation of France in the course of 1944 deprived this factor of its importance, and there were signs that those who had worked in the movement of resistance inside France were less interested in the Levant and less insistent on retaining their rights there than those who had been associated with General de Gaulle. (The liberation also worked in the other direction, however; it enormously strengthened the bargaining position of the French Government in their dealings with the Levant States and with the great Powers.)

There was another factor of great importance in determining France's attitude. For more than twenty years a natural process of events had been tending to draw Syria and Lebanon into the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence, economically and culturally, no less than politically. In part this was an aspect of a world-process, the gradual extension of Anglo-Saxon influence everywhere; in part, however, it was due to local conditions, to the fact that Syria and Lebanon were integral parts of the Eastern Arab world in which British influence was dominant. The war had strengthened this tendency: on the one hand, France's power in the world had declined in proportion to that of the Anglo-Saxon powers, and on the other, the movement for Arab unity was drawing close the ties between Syria and Lebanon and their neighbours. It was, therefore, possible that if France withdrew from the Levant States her place would be taken by Great Britain, inevitably and without any deliberate British intention. France would thus have withdrawn, not in favour of Syrian and Lebanese independence, but in favour of another world Power. Even a Frenchman who believed in Anglo-French friendship and had no suspicion of British intentions could not regard this prospect with pleasure.

The treaties which the French Government contemplated were similar in principle to the Anglo-Iraqi agreement, but rather more onerous in some ways. It wanted a military convention giving it the right to use a number of naval, military and air bases, and to send a military mission to organize the Syrian and Lebanese armies; a diplomatic and consular convention giving France's representative in the Levant States precedence over other members of the diplomatic corps, and providing for the care of Syrian and Lebanese interests by France's representatives in those countries in which the States were not directly represented; a cultural agreement

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safeguarding the position of the French language and culture in education; a financial agreement perpetuating the connexion between the Syro-Lebanese currency and the franc; an undertaking by the two Governments to employ French advisers and technicians in preference to nationals of other States; and adequate guarantees for the position of French schools, concessionary companies and other institutions. It is probable, however, that the more far-sighted and moderate members of the French Government did not believe they had any chance of obtaining a settlement so favourable as this, and would have been satisfied with any agreement, however tenuous, which would enable them to save their faces.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments, for their part, were unwilling to bind themselves to France by such comprehensive treaties. They denied the French assertions that the Mandate was still in force, that it could only be extinguished after the conclusion of treaties and that the declarations of independence had been conditional on such treaties being made. Their attitude sprang partly from distrust based upon twenty years' experience of Mandatory rule, the memories of 1920 and 1925, past attempts to negotiate treaties and the cession of Alexandretta. It was due also to the belief that Syria and Lebanon had nothing to gain from such a close alliance with France. Their independence was already recognized by the world and did not need protecting. Moreover, France would not be in a position to protect them effectively, and they had not sufficient common interests with her to justify their linking their fate with hers permanently. The Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iraqi Treaties were 'points of equilibrium', based upon and expressing essential common interests, not creating a new situation so much as formalizing one which already existed. But a Franco-Syrian or Franco-Lebanese treaty on the same model would not be a 'point of equilibrium', but an obstacle in the way of the natural development of the Levant States and could not therefore constitute a definitive settlement.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments were unwilling, therefore, to sign an exclusive military convention with France; to link their currency permanently with the franc; to bind themselves to employ only French officials in their administrations; to give such cultural undertakings as would limit their freedom of action to plan their educational systems as

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they thought fit; or in general to enter into any engagements which would place obstacles in the way of their closer association with their neighbours. Nor would they give a privileged position to any other Power. It was clear, however, that they would be willing to negotiate treaties of alliance and friendship with all the major Powers, France among them, and to take their full share in the task of guaranteeing international security, under the supervision of whatever international authority might be established. They would also be willing to recognize the position of French cultural and economic institutions functioning in the Levant States and to give guarantees for their freedom of action; for example, they would give assurances for the position of French concessionary companies and French schools, always provided that they confined themselves to their proper functions and did not use their freedom for political ends. They would also give guarantees to French officials and advisers in their service.

In the course of 1944, tentative discussions but not official negotiations took place with a view to clarifying the position of the two parties. They led, however, to no agreement between the two points of view, and at the end of 1944 the question of the treaty was no nearer settlement than it had been at the beginning.

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The great mass of Syrian political opinion was behind the Government in its attitude towards the Army and the Treaty; if it differed from the Government, it differed in being more intransigent and less inclined to endure delays or make concessions. It was clear that, should a clash come, the French authorities could not fall back upon their old expedient of installing a 'moderate' ministry of puppets. The present governing group indeed was the most moderate that could be expected. It had already lost some of its popular support and had been severely criticized in the Chamber on account of its efforts to restrain the impatience of the people, and was only kept in power by the absence of any alternative and the personal ascendancy of the President.

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In Lebanon, too, the attitude defined in the preceding section was held by the greater part of the Government and of the political public, but not so unanimously and unreservedly

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L 648 /86 greater natural increase had given the Moslems a majority in Lebanon, they would be able to destroy the independence of Lebanon and incorporate it in Syria.

Between these two extremes there was a more balanced and moderate group. Although many of its members had opposed the independence and enlargement of Lebanon in the past, they were now willing to accept Lebanese independence within its present frontiers, but only on two conditions: the first that Lebanon followed a policy of real independence and was not subservient to France or any other Power, and the second that she co-operated closely with the other Arab States. This group included both Moslems and Christians. Its policy was based upon a number of considerations. Some of the Christians wanted an independent Arab Lebanon as a centre of Arab Christian civilization, others because they no longer believed in the possibility of French or other foreign protection and wanted an alternative. Some of the Moslems advocated Lebanese independence inside an Arab union as a means of gradually teaching the Christians to forget their fears of Arab nationalism. Others again, both Christians and Moslems, hoped that Lebanon might play a special part in the Arab world, as a centre of Western civilization and lay nationalism.

The possibility of a stable Lebanon depended entirely on this intermediate group. The success of this group, in its turn, depended on its discovering some basis of unity sufficient to neutralize the centrifugal force of sectarianism. The need for such unity led to an attempt to develop a specifically Lebanese Arab nationalism. It was also one of the causes, although by no means the only one, for the spread of Communism which was one of the features of the year in Lebanon, and also to a smaller extent in Syria.

None of these groups was fully organized or articulate, and the Lebanese political scene changed continuously and rapidly. One factor however remained stable: the majority of the population no longer wanted or believed in French protection, and any attempts by France to split Lebanon from Syria on the question of the treaty were bound to fail.

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S L 648 The question of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations was complicated by its connexion with the question of Anglo-French relations in the Levant. Great Britain's policy

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in the Levant States was based upon two commitments undertaken in 1941: first, her endorsement of General Catroux's declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence, and secondly, the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, by which Great Britain recognized France's privileged and pre-eminent position over any other European power in the Levant, subject to the essential condition that Syria and Lebanon should be given independence. Behind these two undertakings there lay two interests. On the one hand, Great Britain was vitally interested in securing stable, friendly and contented régimes in Syria and Lebanon. The experience of the last decades had shown that any movement of unrest or discontent in the Levant States would have immediate repercussions in other Arab regions in which Great Britain was more directly interested. There was, moreover, a new consideration involved: as the Power which had occupied the Levant in 1941 and restored French rule there, Great Britain would be held responsible for what France did, and her intentions towards the Arab world as a whole would be largely judged by what happened in Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, Great Britain urgently needed the friendship of France in Europe and the world; Anglo-French dissension in the Levant might react upon Anglo-French relations in the world; and such dissension was likely to arise if the French suspected that Great Britain was anxious for them to withdraw from the Levant in order to take their place. It was, therefore, of great importance for Great Britain to avoid giving any ground for this suspicion; this was the more difficult because of that natural tendency to the spread of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Levant which has already been mentioned. Syrian and Lebanese independence would in fact, and even with the severest of self-denying ordinances on the part of Great Britain, mean an extension of Anglo-Saxon influence; it was, therefore, essential for Great Britain to avoid giving the impression that she approved of this tendency and was trying to accelerate it.

It was clear from the beginning that, although it might be possible to reconcile these two interests, it would at least be difficult. From 1941 to the end of 1943, however, the need to try to reconcile them did not arise in an acute form, because the essential condition laid down in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement—the establishment of Syrian and Lebanese independence—had not yet been properly fulfilled. British efforts

were therefore directed to persuading the Free French to make their declarations of independence a reality by the restoration of self-governing institutions. These efforts led to considerable tension between Great Britain and Free France. Many Frenchmen refused to believe that British insistence on the independence of the two States was due only to a desire to fulfil the promises made in 1941. Their suspicions were directed particularly against the British Minister, Sir E. L. Spears, who continued to champion the cause of the Levant States with force and enthusiasm even after he was succeeded as Minister by Mr. T. A. Shone in December, 1944. Apart from the disagreement on general policy, there were other causes of tension: the difficulties arising from the combination of a British supreme command with a French territorial command, the existence of a network of British political and security officers, the inevitable clash of two very different temperaments and administrative systems.

This phase came to an end with the restoration of national government, the Lebanese crisis of November, 1943, and the subsequent agreement for the transfer of powers. In 1944 a new phase opened: the search for a definitive settlement of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations. In this new phase it was no longer possible to delay the attempt to reconcile the two aspects of British policy. Short of denouncing one or other of her undertakings, only one course was possible for her. She must try to persuade both sides to make some sort of definitive agreement on paper. The exact terms of the agreement were secondary, so long as France secured such concessions as might be regarded as constituting a privileged position. What was important was that an agreement of some kind should be made and neither side should feel it had been forced out of its position or had lost prestige. To this end it was important to prevent a conflict or another crisis like that of November, 1943; and an essential means of preventing conflict was to refrain from leading either side to believe that, should a crisis come, it was certain of British support.

A definitive solution could only be reached, if at all, by free agreement; there was no question of forcing the Syrians and Lebanese to make a treaty. Nor, if a treaty was not made, could there be any question of abrogating the declarations of independence or a repetition of what had happened in 1920. On the other hand, should the French fail to secure a guarantee

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of their position, there was no question of Great Britain's trying to usurp their place or profit from the wreckage of their hopes.

Finally, in all this complex situation, Great Britain must remember that she was only one of a number of interested Powers, who had their own views on the question and who had not endorsed the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. While trying to secure the fulfilment of that agreement, Great Britain could not allow her policy to drift too far from that of her Allies.

This general line of policy was authoritatively defined by Mr. Churchill in his speech in the House of Commons on February 27th, 1945. Reporting on the Crimea Conference, and his subsequent meetings with Arab leaders in Egypt, he said:

> 'Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri of Syria, in which we did our utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude towards the French and to encourage negotiation for a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but also the Lebanon. I must make clear once and for all the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, and in relation to our French Allies. That position is governed by the statements made in 1941, in which the independence of these Levant States was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time, and ever since, the British Government has made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant States. We are determined also to respect the independence of these States and to use our best endeavours to preserve a special position for France, in view of the many cultural and historic connexions which France has so long established with Syria. We hope it may be possible for the French to preserve that special position. We trust that these States will be firmly established by the authority of the world organization, and that French privilege will also be recognized.
>
> 'However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian and Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both and we do not believe that they are incompatible. Too much must not therefore be placed on the shoulders of Great Britain alone.

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We have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States recognize and favour Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favour any special position for any other foreign country. All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are fitting and necessary subjects for the Peace Conference, at which we must resolutely strive for final settlements of lasting peace between all the States and races comprised in the Middle East and in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean."[1]

II

The last sentence of Mr. Churchill's statement referred to a new factor which had made itself felt in the past year. Since 1941, the United States of America had refrained from recognizing the independence of Syria and Lebanon, and had made it clear that she would not give recognition until the independence of the two States became a reality. By 1944, the transfer of powers had reached a point where the U.S. Government felt itself justified in changing its attitude. In September, it formally recognized the independence of the two States. Mr. George Wadsworth, who had previously been American Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent, was appointed the first U.S. Minister to the two States.

Already, in July, the Government of the U.S.S.R. had accorded its recognition. It appointed M. Solod as its first Minister in October.

Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., at the time of that recognition and subsequently, made it clear that they recognized Syrian and Lebanese independence unconditionally and that they did not accept the privileged and pre-eminent position of France or any other Power in the Levant. In other words, they did not endorse the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement of 1941.

A number of the States also gave their recognition, and by the end of the year the only important Allied or neutral State which had not yet done so was Turkey. A consequence of this change in the international status of the two countries was the appointment of a number of Syrian and Lebanese diplomatic and Consular representatives in foreign countries. The formal sovereignty of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments was further emphasized by their declaration of war on Germany and Japan in February, 1945, their signature of the declaration

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 408, col. 1,290.

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of the United Nations in April and their invitation to the San Francisco Conference.

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Another development which greatly strengthened the position of the two States was the establishment of the Arab League. In the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1944 the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa an-Nahhas Pasha, had held a series of conversations on Arab unity with the representatives of other Arab Governments. On their completion, he decided to summon a preparatory conference or committee to draw a plan of union. The Committee met in Alexandria on September 28th, 1944. It was attended by representatives of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian, Sa'udi-Arabian and Yemeni Governments, and by a representative of the Palestinian-Arab parties. Its work was completed by the publication on October 7th of a 'Protocol', signed by the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq, and later adhered to by Sa'udi-Arabia and Yemen; the Palestinian, as not representing a Government, did not sign it.

The Protocol proclaimed the formation of a League of Arab States, composed of the independent Arab States which agreed to join it. It was to have a Council, on which the States would be represented on an equal footing. Its task would be to supervise the execution of agreements concluded between these States, to organize periodical meetings and to co-ordinate their political policies. The Council's decisions would be applicable to those who accepted them, but would be executory and obligatory in cases where disagreement arose between two members of the League and they sought the Council's intervention for its settlement. It would be forbidden to have recourse to force for the settlement of any dispute between members. Each State would have the right to conclude with other States, members or non-members of the League, treaties which were not in contradiction with the text or spirit of this agreement; no member was to follow a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League or any of its members. The Council would offer its mediation in any conflict that might arise between members of the League or with non-members.

A Commission was to be formed immediately by members of the Preparatory Committee with a view to drawing up the

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statutes of the Council and examining political questions which might form the subject of agreements between the Arab States. Arab States represented on the Committee would co-operate closely on economic, financial, cultural, social and other matters. Commissions of experts for each type of question would be set up to draft plans for co-operation in these matters. When all the commissions should have concluded their work, the Preparatory Committee would meet to examine the results of their studies with a view to convening the general Arab Congress.

The Committee hoped that in the future the Arab countries would consolidate these first results with others, particularly if, after the conclusion of the war, institutions were created which would unite the nations with closer and stronger ties.

The Protocol also contained two special decisions, the one relating to Lebanon and the other to Palestine. The former stated that 'the Arab States represented in the Preparatory Committee affirm unanimously their respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers, which have already been recognized by their Governments after Lebanon had followed a policy of independence as proclaimed by her Government in its ministerial programme, which was unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on October 7th, 1943.'

The decision in regard to Palestine stated that Palestine constituted one of the important elements in the Arab world; the rights of the Arabs could not be touched without danger to the peace and stability of the Arab world. The Committee considered that the engagements entered into by Great Britain, comprising the cessation of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of lands belonging to Arabs and the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence, represented acquired rights of the Arabs and their execution would be a step towards the desired aim. The Committee proclaimed its support for the cause of Palestine. While sympathizing with the sufferings of the Jews, it thought that nothing could be more arbitrary and unjust than to settle the question of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, the victims of which would be the Arabs of Palestine.

The political sub-committee of the Preparatory Committee met in Cairo in February, 1945, to draft the constitution of the Arab League. After its work was completed, the Preparatory

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Committee met once more in Cairo on March 17th. It included representations of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian and Sa'udi-Arabian Governments and of the Arabs of Palestine. On March 22nd the representatives of these six Governments signed the 'Pact of the Arab League' at the first meeting of the Plenary Arab Congress. It was not signed by the Palestinian delegate, since he did not represent an Arab Government. A copy was sent to the Imam of Yemen for his adherence.

The Pact, which differed considerably from the Protocol of Alexandria and in general was less binding upon the signatories, stated that the Arab League was composed of the independent Arab States signatory to the Pact; any independent Arab State could join the League on application. The object of the League was to draw closer the relations between member-States, to co-ordinate their political action, safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and interest itself in general in questions concerning the Arab countries; also to ensure that, within the framework of the régime and the conditions prevailing in each State, a close co-operation should exist in economic and financial questions, matters of communications, cultural matters, questions connected with nationality, passports and extradition, social affairs and public health. The League would have a Council on which each member-State would have one vote. The Council would try to realize the objects of the League, supervise the execution of agreements concluded between members, and determine the means by which the League would collaborate with such international organizations as might be formed in future. There would also be special commissions for each of the questions enumerated above; representatives of other Arab States would be able to participate in these commissions on conditions to be determined by the Council.

The Pact forbade the use of force to settle disputes between member-States. Decisions of the Council would be binding in disputes not affecting the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the States and in which the contending parties sought settlement by the Council. The Council would mediate in any dispute likely to lead to war between two member-States or a member-State and a third State. Decisions in cases of arbitration and mediation would be by a majority vote. In the case of aggression or the threat of it, the

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State attacked could demand the immediate summoning of the Council, which would decide on the necessary steps by unanimous vote. Unanimous decisions of the Council would be binding on all members of the League, majority decisions only on those States which accepted them.

Each member-State undertook to respect the system of government of the other members and to abstain from any action tending to change that system. Member-States wishing to establish closer relations than those envisaged in the Pact might conclude agreements to this end.

The permanent seat of the League was to be Cairo, but the Council could decide to meet elsewhere. The Council would meet in ordinary session twice a year, in extraordinary session when necessary. The League would have a permanent Secretariat-General. (An Egyptian, Abdur-Rahman Azzam Bey, was appointed the first Secretary-General.) The expenses of the League would be shared by the member-States. The presidency of the Council would rotate among the representatives of the member-States.

Any member-State might withdraw from the League after a year's notice, and the Council might exclude any member which had not fulfilled its obligations, by unanimous vote. The Pact could be modified by a two-thirds majority of the member-States. The Pact was to come into force after four States had ratified it.

An annex to the Pact declared that the *de jure* international existence and independence of Palestine since her liberation from Ottoman rule could not be questioned. If, for reasons independent of her will, the external attributes of independence had not yet materialized, this could not constitute an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the Council. In these circumstances, and until she should enjoy the attributes of independence, the Council would choose an Arab representative from Palestine to participate in its work.

A further annex dealt with the participation of Arab countries not members of the Council in the work of the commissions to be set up under the Pact. The signatory States recommended the Council to go as far as possible in cooperating with them, and to make all efforts to learn their needs and understand their aspirations, and to use all political means possible to improve their conditions and secure their future.

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A week later, on March 31st, the Syrian Chamber ratified the Pact. It was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber on April 7th.

The formation of an Arab League, however loose, had immediate repercussions on the situation in the Levant States and will probably have further repercussions in the future. It made clear that in any conflict which might arise over the independence of Syria and Lebanon, they would have the full support of the Arab world; at the same time it provided another reason why the two States should keep their hands free and not undertake any commitments which might prevent their fulfilling their new obligations as members of the League.

The establishment of the Arab League may have particularly far-reaching consequences for Lebanon. Both at Alexandria and at Cairo the Arab States made it clear that they were prepared to go a long way to allay the fears which the thought of Arab union aroused in the minds of a section of the Lebanese Christians. The Lebanese article of the Alexandria Protocol emphasized that so long as Lebanon was willing to align her policy with that of the other Arab States she need not fear any demands upon her or claims for frontier revision, and could hope (as had been proved in November, 1943) for their support and help in her struggle for independence; while there is reason to believe that the clauses inserted into the Cairo Pact safeguarding sovereignty and freedom of action of the member-States were due to the anxiety of the Arab States to do anything possible to win the adherence of Lebanon. If their efforts should be vain, they would no doubt be forced to reconsider their attitude towards Lebanon.

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APPENDIX A

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS

000 1. The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.
2. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 22nd, 1936.
3. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Lebanon, November 13th, 1936.
4. Exchange of Letters between Jamil Mardam Bey and M. de Tessan, December 11th, 1937.
5. Bonnet-Mardam Declaration and Protocol, November 14th, 1938.
6. Decrees of the High Commissioner in regard to the autonomy of Jebel Druze, the Alawis and the Jazirah, 1939.
7. Fundamental Principles of Future Status of Alexandretta, adopted by the League Council, January 27th, 1937.
8. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, July 4th, 1938.
9. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the cession of Alexandretta, June 23rd, 1939.
10. Proclamation of General Dentz concerning the Syrian Constitution, April 2nd, 1941.
11. General Catroux's Proclamation to the Syrians and Lebanese, June 8th, 1941.
12. General de Gaulle's Letter to General Catroux, June 24th, 1941.
13. Convention on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, July 12th, 1941.
14. General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28th, 1941.
15. General Catroux's Proclamation of Lebanese Independence, November 26th, 1941.
16. Agreement and Protocols on the Transfer of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests, December 22nd, 1943-January 5th, 1944.

S No. 1: *The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.*[1]

● 648 *The Council of the League of Nations,*

L 648 WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, shall, within such boundaries as may be fixed by the said Powers, be entrusted to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population, in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 (paragraph 4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

[1] Q. Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 607-11.

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WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for the territory referred to above should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it; and

WHEREAS, The terms of this mandate, which are defined in the articles below, have also been accepted by the Government of the French Republic and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

WHEREAS, The Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions; and

WHEREAS, By the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Article 1: The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 2: The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organize such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.

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The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel.

Article 3: The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the Mandatory.

Article 4: The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

Article 5: The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organization provided for in Article 6.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1924, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Article 6: The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the disposition of the founders.

Article 7: Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 8: The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

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The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 9: The Mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Councils of management (Conseils de fabrique) or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

Article 10: The supervision exercised by the Mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the Mandatory or the local government, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.

Article 11: The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any state member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign state in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships, or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said states; there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the Mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. The Mandatory, or the local governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of contiguity any special customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The Mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

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Concessions for the development of these natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all states members of the League of Nations, but on condition that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local government. Concessions in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the fiscal resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or, in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources either directly by the state or through an organization under its control, provided that this does not involve either directly or indirectly the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preferential treatment which would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.

Article 12: The Mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreements already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and ammunition, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literature, art or industries.

Article 13: The Mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

Article 14: The Mandatory shall draw up and put into force within twelve months from this date a law of antiquities in conformity with the following provisions. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archeological research to the nationals of all states members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent

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department, unless this department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The administration of Syria and the Lebanon shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Article 15: Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in Article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the Mandatory in organizing the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 16: French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 17: The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

Article 18: The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 19: On the termination of the mandate, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of the financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

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Article 20: The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London on the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

No. 2: *The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 22nd, 1936.*[1]

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne, Vu l'intention exprimée par le Gouvernement français devant la Société des Nations de conclure, en tenant compte de l'évolution déjà accomplie, un traité avec le Gouvernement syrien ;

Considérant les progrès réalisés dans la voie de l'affermissement de la Syrie comme nation indépendante ;

Vu l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour réaliser, suivant un programme bien précisé, toutes conditions propres à assurer l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, dans un délai de trois ans, à dater des formalités de ratification ;

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance, les relations qui subsisteront entre les deux États après la cessation du mandat, et d'en fixer, dans les conventions, protocoles et lettres annexes qui font partie intégrante du traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin, Son Excellence le Président de la République française et Son Excellence le Président de la République syrienne, ont délégué comme leurs plénipotentiaires :

S. E. le Comte de Martel, ambassadeur, Haut-Commissaire ; LL. El Djemil bey Mardam, Président du Conseil, Sadallah bey El Djabri, Ministre de l'Intérieur et des Affaires étrangères, Choucri bey Kouatli, Ministre des Finances et de la Défense ;

qui, s'étant communiqué leurs pouvoirs et les ayant trouvés en due forme, ont conclu ce qui suit :

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères : *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1936* (Paris, 1937), pp. 201-28.

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Table 1,[3] reflects, of course, the general structure of the economy. As already indicated, raw cotton represents well over a third of Syria's exports, and cereals, livestock and raw wool almost another third. In recent years, however, textiles have accounted for nearly one-tenth of the value of exports. As might be expected, imports are more diverse in character. Textile materials and manufactures, machinery, petroleum products and fruits and vegetables are among the principal imports; iron and steel, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, precious metals, motor vehicles and timber are also important. 439

Despite the dissolution of the Syrian-Lebanese economic union, Lebanon has remained Syria's principal trading partner, taking almost a quarter of Syria's exports and contributing around 10% of its imports. Three countries—Lebanon, France and the United Kingdom—buy over half of Syria's exports; and five countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Lebanon and Western Germany—supply between 50% and 60% of its imports. In the three years 1951-53 about 41% of Syria's exports was marketed in other Arab countries which, however, supplied only 18% of Syria's imports. [448]

Syria's normal trade deficit is offset, on the current account of the balance of international payments, by local expenditures and oil transit payments made by foreign oil companies, by UNRWA[4] expenditures in Syria and by emigrant remittances. On capital account, there is evidently some continued net foreign investment, particularly by Lebanese, and some repatriation of capital by Syrians returning to their homeland. A considerable volume of bank funds has flowed to Syria partly because there has been a shift in the financing of Syria's foreign trade from Beirut to Aleppo and Damascus and partly because foreign banks have needed more funds to meet the credit needs of an expanding economy. Although the movement of these bank funds shows sharp seasonal fluctuations, there has apparently been a general upward trend in the amount of foreign banking advances in recent years. Total foreign exchange receipts and payments were not far out of balance in 1950, 1951 and 1952, but in 1953 Syrian gold and foreign exchange reserves, valued at the free rate, increased by £S 51 million. Foreign exchange and gold reserves at the free rate rose from £S 114.3 million at the end of 1951 to £S 157 million at 457

[3] See also Annex A, p. 213 *et seq.*

[4] United Nations Relief and Works Administration, charged with the care of Arab refugees from Palestine.

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433 provision made for gradual reduction of the duties. At the same time we
654 suggest that the whole tariff schedule be re-examined. By and large it
651 cannot be said that the general level of tariffs is excessively high, particu-
457 larly since ad valorem rates are levied on imports valued at the official rate of exchange, and this entails an undervaluation of about 40% compared to the actual exchange rate. In fact, we recommend elsewhere that tariff rates be assessed on the basis of actual foreign exchange rates for the purpose of increasing government revenues. This should not be construed, however, as a proposal to raise all tariffs irrespective of their nature. On the contrary, we would suggest that, as part of the general revision of the schedule, those rates which are primarily protective in character should as far as possible be reduced for the purpose of encouraging outside competition and lowering prices. If necessary, such reductions could be graduated over a period of time.

434 *Possibilities of a Larger Market*
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The expansion and, above all, the diversification of industrial output in Syria is restricted by the rather small domestic market. In a country of only 3.6 million people with low purchasing power it is generally possible to manufacture only a limited range of articles which are used widely enough to warrant production on an economic scale. Broader industrial opportunities are likely to emerge only if a larger market is initially available. In the case of Syria it should be possible to establish such a market in cooperation with other Arab countries, all of which suffer from a similar handicap in the development of their industries. Over recent years the Arab countries have increasingly stressed their community of interest and the need for closer cooperation. The field of industrial development offers a particularly challenging opportunity for common endeavor. We do not suggest, of course, that the types of industrial enterprises to be developed by each country should be the subject of joint government decision. There should be consultation in cases where particular ventures are to be launched with special government assistance. In the main, however, the location and development of industry should be decided by the free play of competitive forces operating in a larger, common Arab market.

To a limited extent the Arab countries have already taken steps to develop such a market. Syria has concluded bilateral agreements with Lebanon and Jordan which free certain products from import restrictions

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and provide for a number of reciprocal tariff reductions and even exemptions, and has been considering the renewal in some form of the close economic ties with Lebanon which prevailed before 1950. All the Arab countries joined in 1953 in an Inter-Arab Economic Agreement providing for tariff reductions on a considerable number of industrial products without, however, affecting other barriers to trade.

The establishment of a common Arab market will undoubtedly take time. The history of the Benelux economic union demonstrates that it can only be achieved gradually and then only if there is a full understanding among the partners of each other's problems and a willingness to make concessions and sacrifices. A single market cannot be established simply by a progressive elimination of trade barriers; it entails also a gradual coordination of those economic policies and measures which govern the conditions under which enterprise in the various countries operates. To bring national cost and price structures into line with each other and to equalize the conditions of competition, it will be necessary to harmonize, step by step, fiscal, monetary and exchange policies, the terms governing access to raw materials and equipment and the legislation regulating labor conditions and providing assistance to industry. If this can be accomplished, the possibilities of further industrial development in the Arab world are likely to be significantly greater.

Establishment of an Investment Bank

The mission attaches great importance to the establishment of an institution capable of furnishing both technical and financial assistance to industry. When industrialists have insufficient capital for investment at present, they can turn only to the government; the banks provide only working capital. As already indicated, the government began in 1949 to guarantee loans for this purpose through the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. During the period June 1949-January 1952, 18 such loans totaling £S 23.6 million were made, although by the end of 1953 repayments had reduced the balance to £S 13.4 million. This guaranteed-loan scheme was suspended in 1952 but revived at the beginning of 1954, subject to a limitation of £S 15 million on the entire amount outstanding.

For a number of reasons we believe that this method of financial assistance ought to be abandoned. Although the interest rate of 3%, which has been made possible only because of the government guarantee and the

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652 Treasury.[41] The other type of public deposits which has risen rapidly consists of various autonomous government enterprises and agencies. A breakdown of these, available only for the end of 1953, is given below (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Exchange Office	6.9
Council of Money and Credit	2.0
PTT	4.3
Power, tramway and water companies	4.5
Railways	1.2
Port of Latakia	0.9
Agricultural Bank	2.2
Certain Office	19.7
Tobacco Monopoly	4.6
Others	2.9
Total	49.2

The drawing down of public deposits is likely to have the same effect as deficit financing, particularly since it is doubtful that a decline in public deposits would be accompanied by a contraction of bank credit to the private sector. The government should regard these Treasury balances as a resource in lieu of, rather than in addition to, borrowing from the banking system; it should approach their use with the same caution it employs in considering deficit financing. The use of the accumulated balances of autonomous public entities should also be carefully watched. Finally, it would be well to require that all public deposits be kept with the Central Bank or, in the interim, with the BSL, so that the government can, if necessary, take effective steps to ensure that they do not have an undue effect on bank credit. Recently there has been a tendency to shift public deposits to other banks where it will be less easy to control their impact on credit.

652 *Foreign Aid and Borrowing*

648 459 Our expectation that additional resources of £S 175 million to £S 215 million may be available from abroad rests on the assumption that Syria

[41] The mission was unable to obtain information on the extent to which the Treasury is holding funds for the account of others. The new monetary statute envisages the ultimate establishment of a special Caisse des Depots et Consignations under the central bank to hold such deposits held on behalf of third parties; it is certainly advisable to have a clearcut distinction between the Treasury's own funds and those held in trust for others.

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will be able to borrow for certain development projects and that the Syrian government will accept offers of foreign aid. 652 648 457

Certain projects are likely to merit foreign loans. General economic prospects warrant the expectation that Syria can contract some foreign debt and expect to serve it. At present there is no foreign debt except for the compensation due to the former foreign owners of the nationalized public utilities and a $6 million loan from Saudi-Arabia. Both the immediate and long-term prospects of the balance of international payments appear favorable. While there may be some decline in the price of exported cereals and cottons, continued expansion in the volume of exports, although at a lower rate than in the past, will probably more than offset it. A rapid rise in imports is unlikely to occur as long as monetary stability is maintained. Moreover, foreign exchange policy can be kept sufficiently flexible to enable the government to influence the volume of international payments and receipts.

The Syrian government has so far been reluctant to accept proffers of foreign aid. The United States in 1954 offered to include Syria in its economic aid program, and this offer presumably remains open. We have assumed here that Syria will ultimately consider it advantageous to accept. All other Arab countries have in recent years received such aid apparently without suffering any infringement of their independence. In the last five years the United States has allocated about $111 million in economic and technical assistance to the Arab countries. For 1954-55 alone almost $64 million has been assured to Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. If Syria does decline similar aid, it may well face the need of curtailing the development program we have outlined. 652 648

It might be appropriate to point out also that Syria signed an agreement with UNRWA in October 1952 under which $30 million was to become available for economic development projects that would assist in the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees from Palestine, who in Syria number some 85,000. Less than $2 million of these funds have actually been committed. Because of its insistence that the refugees be repatriated, the government has been reluctant to use the UNRWA development funds. At the same time it might be mentioned that the Director of UNRWA and his Advisory Commission, on which Syria is represented, agreed in a special report to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1954 that UNRWA should pursue its long-term task of "assisting the refugees

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652 to become self-supporting," involving particularly UNRWA participation
648 "in the economic development of the host countries, thus making it possible for the refugees and the countries in which they live to benefit jointly by the combination of available rehabilitation funds and those from other sources."[42] The uncertainties regarding Syria's acceptance of these UNRWA funds are such, however, that we have not assumed that they will actually be used.

Municipal Financing

361 A brief word should be said regarding the financing of development
652 expenditures by the municipalities. In a number of places in this report we have suggested that certain expenditures be shouldered by municipalities. We have envisaged municipal investment expenditures in housing, schools and community facilities totaling about £S 103 million for the six-year period. This implies an annual outlay of around £S 17 million, compared to a probable average of some £S 12 million in recent years (exclusive of expenditures on Aleppo water supply). We have provided for part of this sum by recommending that the central government allocate £S 8 million for community water supplies (exclusive of Aleppo). Thus the municipalities will have to find a net sum of between £S 4 million and £S 5 million per year for additional investment.

Unfortunately no comprehensive information was available in Syria on actual municipal expenditures and receipts. The budgets of all municipalities were reported to have risen from £S 24.4 million in 1949 to £S 29.6 million in 1952 and further to £S 37.6 million in 1953. Data obtained by the mission from a scattering of municipalities indicate that municipal revenues—which are derived both from local taxes and surcharges on certain national taxes—have increased rather rapidly. This lends support to the tentative belief that the municipalities can bear the additional proposed expenditures, although probably only if they are not required to reduce the outstanding amount of existing indebtedness. We strongly recommend, however, that the government undertake a survey of municipal finances with a view to determining whether the municipalities can actually meet their future requirements.

[42] See U.N. General Assembly A/2717/Add. 1, 5 November 1954.

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ANNEX A *INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION*

1 FOREIGN TRADE

Statistical Limitations

429 [448] Until March 13, 1950, Syria and Lebanon were joined in a Customs Union and separate trade data for the two countries were not collected. Statistics for Syrian trade first appeared in 1950 but do not cover the full year. They are also less reliable than those for succeeding years in view of the understandable lack of experience on the part of Syrian customs officers with enforcement of tariffs and recording trade.

Customs statistics record the value of imports at official rates of exchange of the Syrian pound, which differ from the prevailing free market exchange rates at which import transactions are conducted. This in itself necessitates adjustments for every currency used. On the basis of certain broad assumptions, such adjustments have been made by the mission for balance of payments estimates, but could not be made in the foreign trade statistics because of the lack of data on which to base an adjustment of the value of specific items.

The extended land frontiers, particularly in some of the more sparsely inhabited parts of the country, facilitate smuggling. Re-exports of gold were not recorded as such prior to 1954 because gold exports were forbidden.

Finally, there is believed to be a certain amount of both under- and over-estimation of the value of goods as declared to the customs authorities, especially in trade with neighboring countries, and not all these statements can be corrected.

It follows that Syria's pre-1951 foreign trade cannot be properly assessed at all and the analysis of data for the last three years must allow for margins of error due to the many adjustments based largely on estimates.

Foreign Trade of the Customs Union

Table 1 records the total value, in Syrian-Lebanese pounds, of the trade of the Syrian-Lebanese Customs Union since 1945.

[p. 212 CONTAINS NO TEXTUAL MATERIAL]

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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SYRIA

With Emphasis on the Constitution of 1950

Majid Khadduri

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SYRIA HAS experienced a number of constitutional vicissitudes since its separation from the Ottoman Empire after World War I. A monarchy for a short period under Faysal, it then passed, against its will, into the position of a mandated territory under French administration. Another eight years elapsed before the struggle between the Mandatory and the Syrian nationalists was sufficiently resolved to permit the formulation of a constitution even remotely agreeable to both parties, and never during the period of the mandate was any constitution consistently in full force. This record might be attributed to the conflict between an unbending French colonial policy and an equally uncompromising Syrian nationalism, but after Syria attained its independence in 1945–46, it still experienced a series of coups and counter-coups. Finally, a completely revised consti-

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642 tution was drafted and promulgated in September 1950 with high
648 hopes that it might prove to be the panacea for all of the country's ills.

This process, however, should not be regarded as evidence of inherent insecurity in Syria's political life, but rather as a transitory stage in its constitutional evolution. In it can be seen the gradual ironing out of doubts and conflicts over the nature of the Syrian state, the proper functions of its government, and its relations with the outside world, social and economic as well as political. Syria has freed itself too recently from foreign influence for it to have adjusted fully to both national and international circumstances.

FROM A NATIONAL MONARCHY TO A MANDATORY ADMINISTRATION

642 Amir Faysal, at the head of an Arab army, entered Damascus in October 1918 with the avowed intention of establishing an Arab government. But before he had time to organize a constitutional regime, he was caught up in the larger issue of the peace settlement regarding the whole Arab world. The Syrians, too impatient to wait for the final decisions of the Peace Conference and suspicious of what these decisions would be, called a Syrian Congress representing "Greater Syria" (including Lebanon and Palestine), on the basis of the old Ottoman Electoral Law.[1] This Congress, functioning as both Legislative Assembly and National Convention, considered all matters related to national and foreign policy as well as the drafting of a constitution. It held three main sessions between June 3, 1919, and July 19, 1920. It prepared, during its last session, a draft constitution of 148 articles which, though no formal final vote was taken, had been accepted in principle.[2] The Congress was still considering the second reading when the crisis with the French authorities

666 [1] Elections were actually held only in the interior of Syria; the deputies from Lebanon and Palestine, owing to the objection of the French and British military authorities to the elections, were chosen on the basis of petitions signed by voters in support of their candidates. See Philippe David, *Un Gouvernement Arabe à Damas: Le Congrès Syrien* (Paris, 1923), pp. 51–63.

[2] Cf. Philippe David, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

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developed and it adjourned on July 19, 1920, never to meet again.[3] 648

The Constitution of 1920 provided for a limited monarchy, a bicameral legislature, and a responsible ministry: provisions for the structure of the central government followed the normal pattern of West-European constitutional monarchies. Syria was to be an indivisible political unit, but its boundaries were left undefined. The Syrian Government was to be an Arab Government, its capital Damascus, and its religion Islam. The Constitution included a Bill of Rights guaranteeing civil liberties and freedom of thought and of religion. The monarchy was to be vested in the Hashimi family, with Faysal the first king. Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies were to be elected bodies; the deputies by secret ballot in two degrees, and the Senators by the Chamber of Deputies of each province. The administration of the country was to be on a "decentralized" basis: each province was to have its own local administration with a single legislative body called the Chamber of Deputies. The judiciary was to be independent, with a High Court appointed by the King as the supreme judicial organ.[4]

The work of the Syrian Congress was cut short by French action. At a meeting of the San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920, the mandate over Syria and Lebanon was given to France. On July 14 General Gouraud sent an ultimatum to Faysal demanding, *inter alia*, the acceptance of the French mandate and dismissal of the Syrian national army.[5] Faysal's reply, accepting the terms of the ultimatum, was sent a few hours before the expiration of the time limit but did not arrive in time.[6] French troops at once proceeded to establish their authority. Faysal's 648

[3] On the work of the Syrian Congress, see Philippe David, *op. cit.*, Chapters 6 and 8; Amin Sa'id, *Al-thawra al-arabiyyah al-kubra* [*The Great Arab Revolt*] (Cairo, 1934), Vol. II, pp. 18–23, 130–32; Sati' al-Hasri, *Yawm Maysalun* [*The Day of Maysalun*] (Beirut, 1947), pp. 243–60.

[4] For text of the Constitution, see Appendix to Philippe David, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–53.

[5] For the text of the ultimatum and the events leading to it, see Sati' al-Hasri, *op. cit.*, pp. 96ff.; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), pp. 306–309; J. de V. Loder, *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria* (London, 1923), pp. 77–79; Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 167–74.

[6] The Congress was adamant in its opposition, but the Cabinet approved the acceptance of the ultimatum. See Sati' al-Hasri, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 114, 121.

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648 meagre forces were shattered at Maysalun (July 24, 1920), and his Arab regime went to pieces.

The elimination of the Arab Government was no difficult problem to France, but its replacement by another proved to be a problem of great complexity since the Syrian nationalists, humiliated by France at Maysalun, now were unprepared to accept anything short of complete independence. They not only refused to cooperate with France in the administration of the mandate, but also began actively to oppose French rule by petitions to the League of Nations, strikes and demonstrations, and eventually armed uprisings. The most serious action was the general Syrian revolt of 1925–27 which came very near to liberating Syria from French rule.

The Syrian revolt taught both France and Syria that a compromise must be sought. In the fall of 1926 the Syrian nationalists submitted to M. Ponsot, the new High Commissioner, a memorandum in which they asked France (1) to "forget the past" and inaugurate a period of cooperation; (2) to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly and promulgate a constitution; (3) to achieve Syrian unity; (4) to organize a national army; (5) to conclude a treaty of alliance between Syria and France which would replace the mandate; (6) to admit Syria to membership in the League of Nations; and (7) to proclaim a general amnesty.[7] On July 26, 1927, M. Ponsot issued a statement in which he conceded certain national demands, such as the preparation of a constitution and eventual transformation of Syria's mandatory status to one of full independence.[8] After further negotiations between M. Ponsot and such leading Syrian nationalists as Hashim al-Atasi and Ibrahim Hananu, it was finally agreed to hold general elections for a Constituent Assembly.

In accordance with Article I of the mandate, France was required to promulgate within three years an organic law for Syria. It had, however, taken no less than six years from the coming into force of the mandate in 1922 to persuade the Syrian nationalists to accept a compromise on a national regime. On February 12, 1928, M. Ponsot appointed Sheikh Taj al-Din al-

[7] Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 522.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 527–31. For French text, see *Le Temps*, July 31, 1927.

Hasani, Qadi of Damascus and a moderate nationalist, as head of a provisional Government charged with holding general elections and calling a Constituent Assembly. Recent insurgents and political prisoners were released.[9]

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1930

The elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in April 1928 and the Assembly met at Damascus on June 9. M. Ponsot, in his inaugural address, declared that once the Assembly had completed its work the time would have come for placing the relations between France and Syria on the basis of a treaty. Sheikh Taj al-Din declared that the Assembly "will have full freedom in the drafting of the Constitution."[10] The Assembly elected Hashim al-Atasi, leader of the Syrian nationalists, as its president; and appointed a drafting committee of 27 members, with Ibrahim Hananu as its chairman and Fawzi al-Ghazzi as rapporteur.

The drafting of the Constitution was primarily the work of a subcommittee of three, Fawzi al-Ghazzi, Fa'iz al-Khuri, and Zaki al-Khattib, under the chairmanship of al-Ghazzi. Studying in detail the constitutions of Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, France, and Belgium, as well as the old Ottoman Constitution of Midhat Pasha, the committee submitted its draft to the Constituent Assembly for discussion on August 2. As finally accepted in principle, the draft stipulated that Syria within its natural boundaries is an indivisible political unit and an independent sovereign state; its form of government is republican; and the religion of its head is Islam. The capital of the state is the city of Damascus. The Constitution provided, likewise, a Bill of Rights, in which the principles of liberty, equality, private property, etc., are all guaranteed

The form of government is parliamentary, but the head of the executive power is the President of the Republic. He is elected by Parliament for a period of five years, but he is not eligible for re-election until the lapse of five years from the

[9] With the exception of 39 persons whom the High Commissioner refused to set free.

[10] *Jalsat al-majlis al-ta'sisi al-suri* [*Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*] (Damascus, 1928), pp. 2–3.

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expiration of his term. The President selects the Prime Minister and appoints the ministers upon the latter's recommendation. He sanctions legislation and signs treaties; but treaties and contracts having to do with the security of the State and its financial policy must be approved by Parliament. The President is not responsible, since every decision or decree made by him should be countersigned by the Minister or Ministers concerned, except the decree for appointing a Prime Minister. The President calls, prorogues, and dissolves Parliament upon the recommendation of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is composed of not more than seven members who are individually, as well as jointly, responsible to Parliament. The Ministers need not be members of Parliament, but they can attend and take part in Parliamentary debate.

Parliament is made up of one House (the *Majlis,* or Chamber of Deputies), which is freely elected every four years and sits in two sessions each year — from mid-March to the end of May, and from mid-October to the end of December. The Chamber of Deputies meets in public as well as in secret session and its members enjoy full parliamentary immunity during the session. Every male Syrian who has attained his twentieth year can vote. Parliament can initiate legislation, except perhaps financial bills, and can ask questions regarding the conduct of any Ministry. The Constitution provided also for the establishment of a High Court composed of 15 members to be chosen from Parliament and from among competent judges. This Court is regarded as the supreme judicial organ of the State. Finally, the Constitution might be amended by two-thirds of the members of Parliament or at the request of the President of the Republic in agreement with the Council of Ministers and with the approval of two-thirds of the Parliament.

The draft constitution may be regarded as expressing the free will of the Syrian people. It ignored entirely France's obligations as a Mandatory Power toward the League of Nations, since the Constituent Assembly regarded Syria both as fully independent and as an indivisible political unity; that is, to include Lebanon and Palestine. The High Commissioner, placed in an impossible position, informed the Assembly that certain articles in the draft called for express reservations on his part, some be-

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cause they were in formal contradiction with France's international obligations as a Mandatory Power, others because they could not be given practical effect without a previous agreement with France. The following articles were specifically objected to:

Article 73. The President exercises the right of pardon. Amnesties can only be granted by law.

Article 74. The President concludes and signs treaties; but treaties concerning the security of the state or the public finances, treaties of commerce, and, in general, all treaties which cannot be denounced at the expiration of each year do not become definitive until they have been voted by Parliament.

Article 75. The President of the Republic nominates representatives abroad and receives foreign representatives.

Article 110. The organization of the future army will form the subject of a special law.

Article 112. The President of the Republic may, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, proclaim a state of siege in disturbed districts, on condition that he inform Parliament immediately. If Parliament is not in session, the President will proceed to summon it without delay.

Further, Article 2, declaring Syria to be both indivisible and fully sovereign, the High Commissioner stated, was in conflict not only with international agreements, but with a "situation of fact and of law" which could not be modified by a unilateral decision.[11] He suggested that the Assembly should separate (*disjonction*) the foregoing six articles. Sheikh Taj al-Din, the Prime Minister, endorsed the request of the High Commissioner and asked the Assembly to delete these articles until the question of relations with France was settled by a treaty of alliance.[12]

The High Commissioner's message and Sheikh Taj al-Din's statement aroused the indignation of the Assembly. The unanimous opinion of the members was that those six articles were the only ones that mattered and that their separation would virtually "leave nothing significant" in the constitution. The Assembly therefore handed the High Commissioner a formal note of rejection. The High Commissioner retorted by adjourning the Assembly for three months; but the Assembly, meeting for the

[11] *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, p. 16. See also *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, p. 278.

[12] For the Assembly's reactions, see *Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly*, p. 279–308 passim.

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last time on August 10, 1928, passed a resolution empowering its President to negotiate on its behalf with the authorities "for the fulfilment of the country's [national] aspirations." But negotiations between the leading Syrian nationalists and the High Commissioner led to no agreement. Following an exchange of a number of proposals and counter-proposals, the High Commissioner, by a decree issued on February 5, 1929, prorogued the Constituent Assembly *sine die*.[12] It was over a year later, on May 14, 1930, that M. Ponsot, after consultations in Paris, surprised the nationalists by promulgating the Constitution. The text included Article 2 as altered by a previous proposal of his to reduce it to "Syria is an indivisible political unity," but the other articles in question remained unchanged. There appeared also a new provision (Article 116) withholding from application all provisions which infringed upon France's international obligations relative to Syria, or dealt with the maintenance of security or with foreign relations. Such provisions would become applicable only after special agreement between Syria and the French Government. The Nationalists somewhat grudgingly decided to take part in the elections on this basis, but another eighteen months elapsed before M. Ponsot issued orders for holding them. The elections were finally completed on March 30, 1932, and resulted in a victory for the moderates rather than the nationalist elements.

When Parliament met on June 7, 1932, there was considerable discussion regarding the election of the President. The Nationalists' candidate, Hashim al-Atasi, could muster only 17 votes; nevertheless they declared their intention of withdrawing from Parliament if the Government insisted upon the election of one of its two candidates: Subhi Barakat or Haqqi al-Azm. A compromise was finally reached by electing Muhammad Ali al-Abid, who was *persona grata* to both groups, on the understanding that he would select Haqqi al-Azm, candidate of the moderates, as Prime Minister. In this way the first republican administration was established by the French in cooperation with the Syrian

[12] For these proposals and counter-proposals, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 550-51. For the French version, see *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, pp. 20-21.

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nationalists. And it was thus that the long period of "provisional" administrations, under the direct control of the French High Commissioner, came to an end.

THE FIRST REPUBLIC

Constitutional evolution during the first republic largely involved attempts to formulate treaty relations with France. There were two major efforts in this direction and both were unsuccessful. The main obstacle to successful treaty negotiations in 1933 was France's disregard of Syrian unity.[14] Not only did the French insist that Lebanon be excluded from any future Syrian state — even Jabal Druze and Latakia were to remain semi-independent.[15] The Nationalists also objected to the uncertainty over the abolition of the capitulatory regime, the unlimited rights given to France to maintain forces on Syrian territory, and the creation of a department of common interests for the regulation and control of the economic resources in which France was to have a preponderant position.[16]

A draft treaty was in fact signed on November 16, 1933. Following a brief and inconclusive debate, during which the principal objections raised by the Nationalists were reiterated, the High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Two days later, on November 26, the President of the Syrian Republic withdrew the treaty from Parliament at the High Commissioner's request. Parliament was suspended, and a year later dissolved *sine die*, with the President of the Republic authorized to govern by decrees. In 1934 the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Sheikh Taj al-Din, who remained in office for about two years. Thus the first attempt at solving relations between France and Syria failed, with consequential impairment of the constitutional organization which had just been set up.

France's second attempt to come to an agreement with the

[14] The two Nationalist Cabinet members resigned in protest on April 12. For text of the manifesto giving their reasons, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 575–76.

[15] For a discussion of the policy of division in Syria compared with the unitary policy of Britain in Iraq, see A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), pp. 284–88, 292–96.

[16] For a discussion of the Principal Syrian objections to the treaty and its comparison with the British treaty with Iraq, see George Antonius, "Syria and the French Mandate," *International Affairs*, XIII (1934), pp. 332 ff.

Syrian nationalists took place in 1936 when the international situation had become critical in consequence of Mussolini's occupation of Ethiopia. Prompted by his threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, and inspired by Britain's successful move in the same year to appease the Egyptian nationalists, France once more offered to negotiate a treaty which would give Syria full independence. There was at this time the more liberal Popular Front Government in Paris, with Leon Blum as Prime Minister and Yvon Delbos as Foreign Minister, both of whom were more sympathetic toward Syria's national aspirations than their predecessors. The resulting treaty of September 9, 1936, negotiated by a Syrian Nationalist delegation in Paris, provided for the replacement of the Mandate by a Treaty of Alliance with France on the basis of full independence. While Lebanon was to remain outside of Syria, the autonomous districts (Jabal Druze and Latakia) were to join a unitary Syrian state. France was to receive certain rights regarding its military position in the Levant (as in the case of Britain in Iraq) and the two countries were to consult each other in all matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests. The Treaty was to last for 25 years and to come into force, as in the case of Iraq, when Syria was admitted to membership in the League of Nations as an independent state.

Elections for a new Parliament which was to ratify the Treaty were held in November 1936, and resulted in an overwhelming majority for the Nationalists (Kutla Party). Parliament met on December 21 and elected Hashim al-Atasi, leader of the Kutla, President of the Republic in place of Muhammad Ali al-Abid. Faris al-Khuri, a member of the Kutla, was elected President of the Majlis (Parliament), while Jamil Mardam, another Kutla leader, formed the new Government. All members of the Cabinet were drawn from the Kutla Party. The Treaty with France, regarded as a victory for the Kutla, was approved by Parliament and formally signed by the Government and the High Commissioner on December 22, 1936. But it was never ratified by France owing to criticism leveled against it from military and conservative quarters.[17] In 1938 Jamil Mardam tendered his resignation,

[17] For a discussion of France's failure to ratify the treaty, see Charles-André Julien, "French Difficulties in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (1946), pp. 327 ff.

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which was followed by that of President Hashim al-Atasi, and the French High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Thus the second attempt to come to an understanding with Syria failed.

NATIONAL REGIME: THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The outbreak of World War II brought renewed hopes for independence. Upon France's defeat in 1940 the Syrian Nationalists began to agitate for the immediate formation of a national Government; indeed some of them went so far as to contact secretly the Iraqi nationalists, inviting them to intervene and unite the two countries under the Crown of Iraq. A few urged cooperation with the Axis, but the failure of the Rashid Ali movement in Iraq raised doubts as to the feasibility of achieving Arab national aspirations along this path, and on the whole the moderate elements began to come to the fore.

The joint Anglo-French occupation of Syria and Lebanon in 1941 brought with it a promise of independence. A Provisional Government was appointed, and on September 28, 1941, General Catroux formally proclaimed the independence of Syria. The Constitution, however, was not at once restored, and the Nationalists, led by Shukri al-Quwwatli, revived their activities. They pledged cooperation with the democratic powers, but demanded either the immediate restoration of the Majlis of 1936–39 or the holding of new elections. Finally, in January 1943 M. Helleu, representing General Catroux, French Delegate-General, announced the restoration of the Constitution and initiated arrangements for general elections. These were held on July 26, with the Nationalist Party (al-Kutla) overwhelmingly victorious.

The Majlis met on August 17, 1943, and elected Shukri al-Quwwatli, who had emerged as the unrivaled leader of the Nationalists, President of the Republic, and Faris al-Khuri President of the Majlis. On August 19 the President invited Sa'dullah al-Jabiri to form a new Cabinet, drawn almost wholly from the Kutla, and the Government began immediately afterward to negotiate with the French authorities for the transfer of such controls as the French still exercised.

Syria's struggle against foreign control was thus fully re-

648 warded. Not only did it emerge as a sovereign state, but it successfully avoided entering into any such special treaty relations with France as Great Britain had managed to establish with Iraq. The Nationalists' cause was won, the *amour propre* of the Syrian people was gratified. Syria became, of all the Arab states, the first to shape freely its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs.

648 Independence, however, was not coupled with that full po-
642 litical unity which the Nationalists held almost as dear. Not only did Palestine remain completely beyond the bounds of a possible Syrian state: Lebanon has definitely refused to join Syria in any form of union which would destroy or encroach on its sovereign attributes, and Jordan has accepted union only on its own terms. The dismemberment of Syria after World War I has not been repaired by the mere withdrawal of foreign control, and the "Greater Syria" plan, designed to regroup the various fragments into a sort of federal union has raised the complex problem of adjusting the internal differences and vested interests which were partially submerged in the struggle against foreign control. Thus the question of Syrian unity, whether in the form of a Greater Syria, Syro-Iraqi unity, or Fertile Crescent scheme, remains one of the factors influencing Syria's constitutional evolution.

642 Probably far more disrupting to the present Syrian state than the question of unity is the lack of cohesion among the various political forces. Stability in government presupposes the development of constitutional traditions. Frequent changes of regime, a prolonged program of noncooperation with, and at times violence against, foreign rule hardly afforded an opportunity of developing the tradition of responsibility necessary for stable government.

It was not until August 1947, when the term of office of President Quwwatli was due to expire, that a formal amendment of the 1930 Constitution was proposed, and not until November that any action was taken. Article 68, which prohibited the eligibility of the President for re-election was to be amended to permit a second term, but a third term was made possible only after the lapse of a period of five years. Articles 85 and 86, dealing with the procedure and time of the election of the President,

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were to be carried out by a special decree. Article 89, which 642
specified that the number of ministers was not to exceed 7, was amended to read 12. Finally, Articles 71 and 115, specifying the procedure of electing the first President of the Republic, were deleted.[18]

THE MILITARY COUPS D'ÉTAT

The Quwwatli regime, which could flatter itself on having 669
achieved full independence for Syria, failed to inaugurate the reforms which were so badly needed. The criticism levelled against the Government — that it was corrupt and permitted the aggrandizement of its Ministers — might have been exaggerated, but it will be noted that the Government's "constitutional reform" merely amended those articles which related to the re-election of Quwwatli to the Presidency and to the Cabinet membership, ignoring many other gaps and defects in the constitutional organization of the State. This fact lent substance to the criticism that the Government paid attention only to matters that served the interests of the ruling oligarchy.[19]

Matters came to a head when the Syrian Government (jointly with the other Arab Governments) failed to forestall the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The Quwwatli regime's attempt to shift the responsibility of defeat to the Army precipitated a reaction. Colonel Husni al-Za'im, secretly encouraged by the opposition parties, raised a military coup d'état on March 30, 1949, which overthrew the Quwwatli regime amidst popular enthusiasm and approval.[20]

Za'im's coup, by eliminating the party which was so avowedly 648
opposed to uniting or even cooperating with the two neighboring 642
Hashimi Kingdoms, at once reopened the question of the future organization of Syria: whether it would be monarchical, by joining a union with Iraq, or maintain a separate republican

[18] For text of the Amendment Law, see the Syrian *Official Gazette*, Vol. 30 (March 25, 1948), p. 756. For further details on the Amendment of the Constitution, see Wajih al-Haffar, *Al-dastur wa al-hukm* [*The Constitution and the Government*] (Damascus, 1948), pp. 123–30.

[19] Wajih al-Haffar, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–34; M. Kurd Ali, *Al-Mudhakkirat* [*Memoirs*] (Damascus, 1948), Vol. II, p. 550.

[20] For the background of this movement, see Alford Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949" *Middle East Journal*, IV (Jan. 1950), pp. 1–11.

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regime. Both Iraq and Jordan, arguing that a union with Syria would strengthen their position against Israel, opened negotiations with Za'im. Pressed by an immediate need to strengthen his position in the forthcoming armistice negotiations with Israel, Za'im offered to conclude an immediate military alliance with a pledge to consider the larger scheme of future cooperation with the Hashimi Kingdoms later on. He refused, however, to commit himself on whether he favored a republican or monarchical regime.[21]

Za'im's move toward negotiation with the Hashimi Kingdoms aroused the fear of the Saudi-Egyptian bloc that a rapprochement would lead to an extension of Hashimi rule to Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia therefore countered with promises of recognition and assurances of military and financial aid. This Saudi-Egyptian intervention was so successful that it not only doomed a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy (with possible extension to Jordan) but inspired Za'im to reach for the highest position of his country — an ambition which sowed the seeds of disagreement between him and his supporters, both civil and military, who now argued that Za'im had betrayed the cause for which they had instigated the coup, namely to rid the country of the Quwwatli regime.

In April 1949 Za'im dismissed Parliament and ordered new elections on the basis of universal suffrage, including women — the first to be thus held in an Arab country. After Za'im's election to the Presidency, preparations were made to promulgate a new Constitution into which liberal principles were to be introduced, especially relating to land reform. This Constitution, though completed, was never promulgated; but a new civil code, bearing the stamp of the Egyptian jurist Sanhuri Pasha (who had already started research along this line at the initiation of the Iraqi Government), was issued. Although based on both European models and the principles of Islamic law, this code materially restricted the authority of the latter. It is regarded as one of the permanent contributions of Za'im's short-lived regime.

[21] The relations of the Syrian coups d'état to the schemes of unity with Iraq and Jordan are discussed in detail in a paper by the present writer entitled "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity" contributed to a volume to be published shortly by the Harvard University Press.

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ness on both sides. In Syria (and to a lesser degree, in Lebanon) the possibility of long-term co-operation between the nationalist politicians and the Mandatary was frustrated alike by the attitude of most French officials and by that of the local urban populations who, though they later signed the 1936 treaty, desired full self-government.[1] The advent to power in France of the Front Populaire in 1936 eased the situation: treaties with Syria and Lebanon were negotiated whereby the Mandate was to be transformed into an alliance with independent states, but under which France could still maintain troops in the Levant. However, the French Parliament was unwilling to ratify the Syrian treaty under the lengthening shadow of the impending Second World War, and Syrian indignation was increased when the need for Turkey's friendship led France in 1939 to cede to Turkey the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, afterwards renamed Hatay. Leading Syrian politicians refused to co-operate with the French on these terms, and on the eve of the outbreak of war the French High Commissioner once again suspended the Syrian constitution and governed the country through French and Syrian officials; the same procedure was applied to Lebanon after the outbreak of war.

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When metropolitan France fell in 1940 the Mandate was carried on by the Vichy Government until the latter's acquiescence in the use of the Levant airfields by the German air force necessitated the intervention of British and Free French forces in June 1941. After a short but bitter campaign, the Vichy forces signed an armistice in July 1941. In the struggle between the Allies and the Axis and between Vichy and de Gaulle the Syrians and Lebanese took no part, but their independence had been promised by the Allied Command. On behalf of the Free French, General Catroux, in a statement on 8 June 1941, proclaimed the end of the Mandate, but in fact the Free French regarded themselves as trustees for France's position, seeking to maintain them by installing Syrian and Lebanese supporters of France in the seats of authority. The Free French had, however, eventually to yield to the demand for popular elections, which was supported by the British Government as soon as the victory at al-Alamain (October 1942) had finally removed the threat of Axis invasion from the Middle East. In Syria the elections of 1943 brought into office the National Bloc with Shukri al-Quwatli as President of the Republic and Saadullah Jabri, Jamil Mardam, and Faris al-Khouri as parliamentary leaders. In the Lebanon also nationalists were successful and the leader of the 'Constitutional Bloc',

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[1] For details, see A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, RIIA, 1946).

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Bishara al-Khouri, became President with the pan-Arab Riyad as-Sulh as Prime Minister; these nationalists were not satisfied with mere titular sovereignty but claimed the reality of independence, and in November 1943 a Free French resort to force against them was reversed only by a British intervention, endorsed by the United States Government. The Free French were thus constrained to transfer most branches of the administration to the Syrian and Lebanese Parliaments, but retained control of the local 'Troupes Spéciales' and obstructed the proper equipping of the Syrian gendarmerie. The French intention was to make this vital concession of authority conditional upon the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty which would give France much the same strategic, economic, and cultural advantages as Britain had retained in Iraq by the already obsolescent Treaty of 1930. In March 1945 Syria and Lebanon had been admitted as sovereign states to membership both of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States. The Syrian nationalists were not prepared to subordinate their sovereignty to an imposed alliance with France, and the landing of a contingent of Senegalese troops immediately after VE-day (in disregard of a personal appeal of Churchill to de Gaulle) was regarded in both Syria and Lebanon as clear evidence of a French resort to coercion. Sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Syrian gendarmerie and the local nationalists on the one hand and the French garrison on the other became general, and when, at the end of May 1945, the local French Commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus the British Government ordered their Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene, by force if necessary, to restore order in a region whose security was vital for British communications in the still-continuing war in the Far East. The crisis accelerated the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, concerning which the demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were supported by the Security Council; the process was completed in Syria by 15 April 1946 and in Lebanon by the end of the year.

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Between the wars, the French Mandate had allowed political development in Lebanon to produce at least a façade of parliamentary democracy, with arrangements between the Muslim and Christian leaders on the division of political power and prerogatives, and the active commercial and intellectual life of Lebanon made progress with a minimum of government interference. In Syria, however, local separatisms which French policy had encouraged made it very difficult for any Syrian Government to knit the people together from Damascus; the

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foundations for commercial and intellectual progress were less firmly established than in Lebanon, and the Muslim leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to acquire the technique of government. The root of the trouble was that the French were opposed to self-government and tended to refuse office to nationalist political leaders, except for short, self-defeating periods. But though they failed to foster self-government, the French did much good in both Syria and Lebanon as engineers, doctors, educators, and archaeologists, and performed a valuable service in training at least a cadre of competent civil servants.

With the end of the French Mandate there emerged two sovereign and independent Republics with many mutual and some conflicting interests. For some years the rest of the world failed to distinguish between the two, and it is still possible to find educated persons who suppose that Beirut is the capital of Syria. Syria and Lebanon are, to some extent, mutually dependent or complementary, but they are distinct and their political development will be considered separately.

Government and Politics

(a) Syria

Under her constitution Syria is a Republic in which the legislative power is in the hands of a Chamber of Deputies numbering 114 members in 1949. The deputies are elected by direct suffrage granted to all men and to women of a certain educational standard. The representation of religious minorities is shown in the table on p. 466 above. The President of the Republic must be a Muslim and is elected for a term of five years by the Parliament; he nominates the Prime Minister who appoints his cabinet ministers. The Parliament is elected for four years but may be dissolved by the President. The constitution was suspended in 1952 by the military dictatorship and a new one on the Presidential model adopted in July 1953.

Damascus is the seat of government and there are ten provinces, each under a Governor who is assisted by a staff of civil servants representing most of the ministries. The provinces (*muhafaza*) are divided in *qazas*, each under a *qaimaqam*, who is a civil servant under the Ministry of Interior; the *qazas* are divided into *nahiyas* under *mudirs*. Within a *nahiya* may be several villages, each of which is rather loosely under the control of the *mukhtar* who may be elected by the village or appointed by the ministry. The judiciary are independent of the legislature and

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of September the ban on political parties, which had been in force since the end of 1952, was lifted. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the new party, sponsored by the President. As in 1947, voting was by direct suffrage and in 1953 women voted for the first time; there were five women candidates, who were not, however, elected.

External Problems and Relationships

Syria's relations with Great Britain were good after 1941, although not perhaps as good as might have been expected from Britain's record of support for Syrian independence; the credit for this was soon forgotten when Britain did not take the Arab part in the struggle with Zionism. Both Britain and the United States incurred distrust and dislike for their support of Zionism; Syria is one of the few countries to have refused Point Four aid and there have been incidents, not discouraged by the Syrian Government, in which Americans or American property have been attacked. Of the 'imperial' Western Powers, France was in 1952 the least unpopular, partly in view of her long association with the country and partly because she has supplied Syria with the arms which have not been forthcoming from Britain or the United States; but western Germany was rapidly gaining esteem until the Bonn Government undertook to make reparation to Israel for the massacres of European Jews during the Second World War.

Syria has no affinity with Russia or love of Communism but has enjoyed playing East against West in bargaining for favours. Shishakli has the backing of the nation in his desire for neutrality but, if Syria cannot avoid being involved in any war that may break out between Russia and the West, then Syria naturally prefers to be on the winning side. For Syria, picking the winner is a difficult choice requiring deliberation, and any signs that she may be coming down on the Western side of the fence are only recent.

In the struggle between the Hashimis[1] and the alliance of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Syria usually sided with the latter. This has been due to the devotion of Shukri Kuwatli to the late Ibn Saud and to the fear of Syrian political and military leaders (especially Zaim and Akram Haurani) that they might be submerged by Iraqis and Jordanians in any form of Greater Syria. Under Hinnawi, Syria quarrelled with Egypt and at times there have been signs that she was not prepared blindly to follow Egypt's lead. But, under Shishakli, Syria has tried to keep the peace with both parties; he met Nuri Said in July

[1] See above, p. 31.

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S 648 1952 and he has obvious affinities with General Neguib of Egypt whom he visited later in the year.

The threat of Zionism is considered very real in Syria and Shishakli has declared that Syria has not given up hope of a revision of the present position. Between March and May 1951 a flare-up over Lake Huleh brought an offer of Iraqi aid to Syria, but hostilities between Syria and Israel were localized and stifled without leading to a general outbreak of war. All Syrians wish Israel ill; fear of Israeli expansion remains and is fostered by the Government.

S 185 186 In internal politics, the most progressive measures which have yet been considered are land reform and the partition of state lands. There is little unrest among the people, who generally want to live their lives without undue government interference. Nationalism of two kinds exists: a nascent patriotism that has for the first time the support of the rulers, and a narrow xenophobia that, while less extreme than in Egypt, is more pronounced in Syria than in Lebanon.

(b) Lebanon

L 642 646 643 Lebanon is a republic of which the Chamber of Deputies was till 1953 elected by direct manhood suffrage but in that year women were permitted to vote in the election. By convention, the President of the Republic must be a Christian and is normally a Maronite, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim and the President of the Chamber a Shii Muslim. The table on p. 466 above shows the division of parliamentary seats between the religious sects; a scrupulous observance of these quotas is evident even in the civil service establishments. The existence of a Christian majority is held to be essential for the survival of Lebanon as a separate state and so, in June 1950, it was found convenient to extend the franchise to Lebanese abroad (of whom the majority are Christian) and to increase the number of deputies from 55 to 77, but in November 1952, under a new electoral law, the number was reduced to 44. The Muslim rate of natural increase is higher than that of the Christians and it is probably for this reason that no census has been taken since. In other ways the constitution and administration are similar to those of Syria already described.

Internal Politics

L 665 668 As in Syria, a European type of political party system has not yet evolved and the struggle has been not only between different cliques of ruling families backed by great commercial wealth, but also between these rich groups on the one hand and

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Europe and with the United States; but Lebanon has not moved out of step with the Muslim states around her, and she has followed the Arab League line over Palestine and in Egypt's quarrel with Britain and has not agreed to join a Middle East defence organization. She has, however, received arms and military training from Britain and has gladly accepted Point Four aid from the United States.

The main issue of external policy which exercises the Lebanese is the extent of the country's co-operation with Syria and the other Arab states. Some Christians advocate withdrawing the frontiers of the Republic to those of the old Sanjaq of Lebanon together with Beirut; some Muslims want Lebanon to reunite with Syria, and between these extremes discussion still continues. The disagreement with Syria is economic rather than political, but it might gain political significance if Lebanon were to feel isolated to the point at which she felt compelled to come to terms with Israel. At the moment, this is unlikely because Lebanon's friendship with the NATO Powers is good security against possible incursions of enemies or friends.

Armed Forces[1]

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Syria has compulsory military service of eighteen months and, since Shishakli's advent, the draft net is being cast over many who previously escaped. The armed services consume each year a growing share of the budget—in 1951–2 they took 40 per cent of the total—and in 1952 there were compulsory collections for the army. The army is grouped in five brigades, each of rather less than 10,000 men, and has tanks, armoured cars, and light, medium, and anti-aircraft artillery and searchlights. Much of the equipment came from France and, though the best then obtainable, is of doubtful serviceableness. However, Colonel Shishakli is determined to give the army good equipment, and a factory for minor armaments exists near Damascus. German instructors are used by the army and air force and are helping to produce light armaments. The air force is part of the army; jet aircraft have been received from Britain and the air force still operates two Dakotas taken over from Syrian airways. The armed gendarmerie had its own esprit and fought well in Palestine; it is now under army control as are the police and the force used for bedouin control.

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The Lebanese army is about a brigade strong and includes a regiment of chasseurs-ski troops. Lebanese officers have had instruction with the British Army and there is an RAF mission with the Lebanese air force who are using jet trainers.

[1] In the following sections the two countries are considered together.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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near Aleppo, and at Rayaq and there are many emergency landing fields.

Sea Ports. Since 1950 Beirut has handled over 2 million tonnage of ships a year; an increase of about a quarter of a million over the pre-war figures. The port has a free zone through which goods are shipped to Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. But the Syrian Government hopes to divert some of the transit trade from Beirut and has, with the assistance of a loan of $6 million from Saudi Arabia, formed a company to develop Latakia in order to handle about a million tons of goods a year (in 1952 431,593 tons were handled). Work on the extension of the port was begun by a Yugoslav firm in April 1953. Tripoli, Sidon, and Banias are ports handling the oil from the pipelines[1] and are little used for other purposes.

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Wireless and Telephones. An automatic telephone exchange system covers most of Syria and an automatic exchange is planned for Beirut. Telephone links with Europe and America are available through Beirut and normal cable facilities exist. The Syrian state broadcasting authority has two large transmitters and broadcasts in Arabic, French, English, and Hebrew. Near Beirut there is a station which broadcasts in Arabic, French, and English.

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The 'Common Interests'

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Under the Mandate, Syria and Lebanon formed an economic and customs union, the Higher Council of Common Interests, under the direct control of France, which administered customs and excise and controlled concessionary companies, antiquities, and some other services. On 1 January 1944 the control was transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The currencies were linked and interchangeable, and both the Syrian and Lebanese pounds were largely backed by French francs based on a rate of 8·83 to the pound sterling (then worth $4·03). In order to maintain a good profit on the exchange brought in by oil companies the Lebanese and Syrian pounds were not devalued in 1949 to follow sterling. Exchange was controlled by one department for both countries and the note issue is in the hands of the French Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

But these links were incompatible with the differences that developed in the economic policies of the two countries when they became independent. Syria, in normal years, has a large exportable surplus of agricultural products and little transit trade, whereas the debtor trade balance of Lebanon is com-

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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pensated partly by her transit trade in goods and partly by her gold and currencies market. Syria wanted a controlled economy with import restrictions, protection of Syrian industries, and independence from French financial policy, but Lebanon's interest was to encourage all trade movements and to rely on franc support: moreover, the two countries could not agree on the division of customs dues. After years of arguments and negotiations the economic partnership was finally terminated on 14 March 1950 and customs posts were established along the common frontier. Since then agreements have been drawn up despite Syrian reluctance, but little has been achieved towards the re-establishment of economic union. It is therefore necessary to consider the economies of the two countries separately.

(a) Syria

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Agriculture

Over half but less than three-quarters of the cultivable area of Syria is, in fact, under cultivation. Since 1946 there has been a great increase in the number of pumps and tractors in use (there were 300 tractors in 1948 and 1,342 in 1951) but, as the following table shows, the cultivated area can still be extended.

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ESTIMATES OF THE USE OF LAND, 1950

	Syria		Lebanon	
	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total	(sq. miles)	Percentage of Total
Cultivable				
Cultivated under rainfall	8,400	12	803	20
Cultivated with irrigation	1,400	2	115	3
Potentially cultivable	14,000	20	700	17
Uncultivable				
Forests	1,600	2	285	7
Pasture	21,000	30	27	1
Desert, mountain and marsh	23,600	34	2,085	52
Total Area:	70,000	100	4,015	100

(Sources: FAO, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952*; UN, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951–2*.)

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Some progress in mechanized farming has been made in recent years, but much of the land is tilled as it was 2,000 years ago. The predominant form of land tenure is share-cropping by tenants on estates of large and medium size. Small holdings under 25 acres prevail in areas of intensive cultivation, and at present are estimated to constitute only 15 per cent of the total

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433 is a modern glass factory for window and mirror glass and for glass containers, with a total estimated annual capacity of over 14,000 tons. This enterprise has suffered from the fact that the sand has to be imported and also from being built before the necessary export market had been secured to keep its three ovens working. Flour mills are plentiful and more are to be constructed; the production of flour is about 400,000 tons a year. In Damascus there are two spaghetti factories and starch is also produced. Tinned fruit, jam, chocolates, and sweets are also produced in Damascus and there are factories for matches (output 45 million boxes in 1952), margarine, soft drinks, and shoes as well as a number of tanneries and workshops in Aleppo and Damascus. A paper mill has recently begun production, with an output of 4 million square metres of corrugated paper and cardboard boxes in 1952.

SYRIAN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY
(Estimates for 1952)

Number of Factories	*Tons Capacity*
2 Cement	200,000
1 Sugar	10,000
1 Asphalt	variable
9 Edible oil*	12,000
68 Raw cotton ginning	600,000
3 Food preserving (major)	5,000
1 Glass (plate and rolled)	7,500
(containers)	8,000
3 Tobacco	2,000

* Olive and cotton seed.

(SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus 1952.)

Industry contributes only about a half as much as agriculture [186] to Syria's gross national product, but the spirit of nationalism has led the Government to give special support to local industries although not all are economically sound. As Syria lacks industrial raw materials, industries based on local agricultural produce should be encouraged rather than those which depend on imported raw materials and foreign markets.

Finance

436 The Syrian pound of 100 piastres (reputedly backed as to 648 60 per cent by gold and foreign currency) is linked to the French franc. Syria is a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a quota of $6½ million. War-time inflation subsided 435 439 by the end of 1948, but with the Korean boom in primary product prices and the subsequent export surpluses and heavy

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interest per annum. The Syrian private capitalist expects very large returns and the foreign private capitalist requires more security than is obtainable in the Middle East; thus the development of Syria must be financed either by the Syrian Government or by an international agency. Syria is one of the few countries to have refused American Point Four aid on principle, but she is a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and this organization has been studying some of the development schemes listed below. 426 454 S 648 185

1. *Drainage of the Ghab marshes.* Nearly 100,000 acres of land can be irrigated from the excess water of this area to improve agriculture and public health, and plans are well advanced.

2. *Euphrates barrage,* to provide 100,000 kws. of hydro-electric energy for irrigation and industrial needs. With this power it is hoped to irrigate half a million acres.

3. *Yarmuk and Barada rivers.* Hydro-electric schemes to give power to Damascus and the Hauran.[1]

4. *Latakia port.*[2] There have been complications over the award of the tender for this work, and construction had not effectively begun at the beginning of 1953.

5. *Khabur river.* Irrigation scheme for 22,000 acres.

6. Improvement of rail and road communications from Latakia to the hinterland and establishment of a network of all-weather roads in the Jezira.

7. *Rouj marshes.* Drainage to irrigate about 8,700 acres has already commenced.

If agreement can be reached to implement some of these schemes not only will Syria benefit but also the Arab refugees from Palestine may find employment and even homes.

(*b*) Lebanon

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Much that has been said about Syria also applies to Lebanon and, to avoid repetition, only points peculiar to Lebanon are here outlined.

Agriculture

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The table on p. 488 above gives the approximate division of the land in cultivable and uncultivable areas and the estimated acreage; the crop and yield of the main agricultural products are given in the following table.

[1] An agreement with Jordan was signed on 7 July 1953, but work has not yet begun.

[2] See above, p. 487.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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figure until February 1953. The cost of living has likewise risen considerably; during the war it rose about sixfold, reaching a peak in 1945. It then decreased steadily until the autumn of 1950, when the Korean boom in raw material prices brought fresh inflationary pressures into Lebanon through her growing commercial and entrepôt trade, and persisted until early 1952. This fresh rise in prices was also caused by the rise in food prices (imported and home grown) following the bad harvest of 1951. Although early in 1953 prices had not resumed their pre-Korean level, they had declined steadily.

The following figures showing the indices of wholesale prices and the cost of living illustrate the salient movement in prices (1948 = 100).

	1939	*1945*	*1950 July*	*1951 March*	*1951 Dec.*	*1952 May*	*1952 Dec.*	*1953 May*
Wholesale prices	13	134	76	104	96	86	82	79
Cost of living	20	123	84	95	96	94	91	89

(SOURCE: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, September 1953.)

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Budgetary expenditure and receipts have also increased considerably, partly resulting from the rise in prices but also from greater commitments. The main increase in expenditure has been for defence, for the Palestine conflict and its aftermath, and for education. The sources of revenue have undergone a marked change: whereas customs provided 60 per cent of the revenue in 1939, they now contribute only 25 per cent, and new indirect taxes on general consumption now provide the major share, about 50 per cent. A measure to increase direct taxation was introduced in September 1951 in the form of a tax on agricultural income based on a 'presumptive' assessment value at progressive rates of tax. As yet its full effect is not known. The budget estimates for 1952 were: expenditure £L94·25 million, and receipts £L94·16 million; further details are given in table 2 on p. 502 below. The 1953 budget was expected to be of the order of £L110 million.

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The division between the Syrian and the Lebanese currencies became effective at the end of January 1948 and this introduced an agio between the two currencies. At first this favoured Lebanon, but in 1951 the Syrian pound was the higher and then, in 1952, the Lebanese pound returned to a premium of from 2·6 per cent to 0·7 per cent. The exchange rates of foreign currencies are given in table 3 on p. 503 below.

International Trade

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In defiance of the gloomy prophecies of economists, Lebanon contrives to flourish with an adverse trade balance, which in

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1950–1 amounted to £L215·5 million. Over half this deficit was met from 'invisible' earnings, such as the tourist trade and transportation, and the rest from private donations and capital movements. Indeed, during this period Lebanon's balance of payments showed a small surplus of £L2·7 million.[1] Most of Lebanon's trade (about 40 per cent) is with other Middle Eastern countries, but the foremost country in her trade is the United States (about 20 per cent). Europe and Great Britain are important sources of imports but not such large export markets. Lebanon's main imports are agricultural products, textiles, machinery, and oil, and her chief exports are agricultural products and textiles. The tourist industry is given full encouragement by the Government and, under certain circumstances, tourists' fares to Lebanon are subsidized.

Development

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On 24 February 1951 Lebanon signed a Point Four agreement with the United States and the work to be carried out is based on the report to the United Nations in 1949 by Mr Gordon Clapp.[2] Irrigation projects are under way at Akkar, Yamouna, and Qasmiya, and there is a proposal to use the Litani river to irrigate over 12,000 acres of land. In August 1953 the Lebanese Government announced a four-year development plan; the main projects under consideration concern road and hydro-electric power development.

Conclusion

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The future of Syria and Lebanon will obviously depend to some extent on the past, many aspects of which have not been fully discussed here because the independent political and economic development of the countries began only in 1946. In internal politics events have moved too rapidly for any record to keep pace with them, and there is not yet apparent any stability that would allow one to regard views and information on the political scene as being valid for more than a brief period. As regards their external policy, the two countries have yet to be convinced that there is a community of interest between them and the West. The Western Powers need the use of Syrian and Lebanese territory on which to base a line of defence, but it is not expected that these countries could or should bear a significant part of the burden of defence in men, materials, and money. The Levant wants greater security against Israel than

[1] See table 6, p. 505 below.

[2] UN, Conciliation Commission for Palestine (chairman: Gordon Clapp), *Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* (New York, December 1949).

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Syria MDI

563 but they claim autonomy in the Jazirah or at least the right
668 to live as Kurds, immune from attempts to force them to assimilate.

French Policy

648 France's hostility to Arab nationalism led her to show special
563 favour to the minorities in Syria. This policy revealed itself in numerous administrative acts, and in such military acts as the recruitment of special detachments from Circassians, Kurds and other minorities, but it is most clearly shown and has had the most important consequences in regard to the two compact minorities, the Druzes and Alawis.

648 In 1921 an agreement was concluded between the French
563 authorities and some of the Druze leaders, providing for a national
631 government assisted by French advisers. From this time until 1936 there existed a 'Government of Jebel Druze' independent of Syria and under all-pervasive French control. At first, French policy ran counter to local susceptibilities, and this led to the Druze Revolt of 1925, which became a Syrian national revolt. After the suppression of the revolt, the same system was continued, and was formalized by the Organic Law of 1930. Its effect was to encourage the particularist feeling of the Druzes and to arouse among certain of them a feeling of gratitude to France.

Another autonomous territory was created in the 'Territory' or 'Government' of the Alawis, set up in 1920. It possessed an administrative system similar to that of Jebel Druze, formalized in a similar organic law issued in 1930, and under a still stricter French control. The administration did something to improve the very backward condition of the Alawis and to arouse among them a corporate self-consciousness and a feeling of attachment to France. In general, the district was peaceful after unrest at the beginning; the only disturbances came from the Sunnis and Greek Orthodox, who believed their interests were being neglected and demanded the attachment of the district to Syria.

Nationalism and the Minorities

563 The leaders of Arab nationalism in Syria recognize the import-
668 ance of the minority problem and have made considerable efforts to win the confidence of the minorities. In principle they regard Arab Christians as on a level with Moslems inside the Arab community, once they are willing to accept their obligations as

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members of the Arab nation. As for the linguistic minorities, they insist on a certain degree of assimilation, but there is no question of treating them as inferiors because of their racial origins. 563 668

They are opposed, however, to the grant of a special regime to minorities, since it would only perpetuate their difference; and even more strongly would they oppose any foreign intervention or influence in support of the minorities. In regard to the compact minorities, while they recognize the need for careful and tactful administration, they believe they are capable of giving such administration, and wholly reject the claims of the autonomists, both because the grant of autonomy would play into the hands of foreign powers eager to intervene, and because, so long as they remained autonomous, the minorities would never learn how to live with their fellow-nationals.

The Treaty of 1936 *and the Minorities*

The autonomy of Jebel Druze and the Alawis was brought to an end by the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. In December of that year decrees were issued annexing the two Governments to the Syrian Republic as the Provinces of Jebel Druze and Latakia respectively. Certain safeguards were, however, provided for the special position of the two provinces. On the one hand, they were given a special administration and financial regime. On the other, the military convention attached to the Treaty stipulated for the maintenance of French troops in both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty. 648 563 631

At the same time, the administration of the Jazirah was placed under the control of the Government of Damascus; it had never been formally autonomous but in practice had been under direct French administration since the establishment of civil government there.

In each of these three districts there was a group which welcomed the union with Syria, and others who thought it in their interest to side with the nationalists who seemed to be the rising power. Others again did not object to incorporation in Syria, so long as the special position of the provinces was respected and they were fairly treated in such matters as government appointments. There were some, however, who desired to return to complete autonomy under French protection. From 1937 648 563 668

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to 1939 this last group grew stronger, and more or less brought administration to a standstill. There were a number of reasons for this. The Government was hasty and tactless; some of its supporters were intolerant. The fears and suspicions of the minorities were too strong to be overcome in a few months, and there can be no doubt that they were played upon by some of the French officials who refused to accept the change of policy laid down in the Treaty of 1936.

In 1937 and again in 1939, Jebel Druze was disturbed. In Latakia discontent grew gradually but did not become serious until the rising of a section of the Alawis led by Suleiman Murshid, a self-made notable and self-styled god. In 1937 a section of the Kurds and of the Christians of the Jazirah caused disturbances. Their case was strengthened by the support of Cardinal Tappouni, the Syrian Orthodox Patriarch. Again in 1939, there were manifestations on a large scale.

Meanwhile, relations between the French Government and the nationalists had been growing worse, owing to the reluctance of the former to secure the ratification of the Treaty. By 1939, France had reversed the policy inaugurated in 1936. In July 1939, the Constitution was suspended. Almost simultaneously decrees were issued restoring the autonomy of the Jebel Druze and the Alawis. At the same time the Jazirah was placed once more under direct French rule; but by December 1940, matters had returned to normal and, once more, the authority of the Syrian Government was imposed in the Jazirah.

It was not only the compact minorities which had been restless during these years. The scattered minorities also had been apprehensive of nationalist policy towards them. They had not been persecuted on any large scale, and officially the Government had frequently declared its desire to treat all citizens equally; but there had been enough acts of discrimination to appear to justify the pre-conceived fears of the minorities. It was partly to allay these fears that the Syrian Government concluded supplementary agreements with the French Government in 1937 and 1938, containing among other things guarantees for the position of communities and individuals.

The difficulties of the situation must not, however, be exaggerated. Not all minorities were equally hostile to nationalism. Those which were most hostile were the Catholics, who had profited most from French rule; others, like the Greek Orthodox

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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and a section of the Armenians, were able to maintain good 648
relations with the Government. In general, what troubles 563
occurred were no more than were inevitable in a period of 668
transition.

Developments since 1941

In September 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria. His proclamation contained the following statement about minorities: 648

> Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural, and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled.
>
> It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.[1]

In accordance with these principles, the two autonomous 631
territories were re-attached to the rest of Syria. Thus, the first 563
Government formed after the proclamation contained a Druze and an Alawi Minister; and in February 1942, the two provinces were once more formally annexed to Syria, with provisions for a special administrative and financial regime. In September 1944 the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze voted unanimously for the abrogation of its special regime and complete incorporation in the Syrian State.

In the summer of 1943, elections were held and subsequently 642
a nationalist government took office. As formerly, the Chamber contained representatives of the minorities and the Cabinet a Christian minister. The Government made clear its intention 641
of treating all members of the community on a footing of complete 563

[1] General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28, 1941. *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9, 1941.

20: Hourani 8-5 (1949) 1947 M1 Middle East
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equality but, at the same time, of making its authority respected by all alike. In spite of these declarations, however, there were a series of petty incidents in 1944 which aroused the fears of some of the minorities: for example, local disorders and alleged injustices in government appointments. In some parts of the country, moreover, the Government had difficulty in imposing its authority. This was particularly true of the Alawi district, where Suleiman Murshid and his associates caused trouble; the Jazirah also was not quiet. There were a number of reasons for these difficulties: it was inevitable that the minorities should still retain their old fears of Sunni domination; it was no less natural that in a time of administrative changes certain local officials should abuse their powers and indulge their prejudices; it was unavoidable that families and groups should be disappointed when official appointments were made, and should blame the Government's choice on religious prejudice. None of these, however, was the most important reason. That was to be found in the strained state of relations between the French and the nationalists in Syria. So long as France continued to deny the claim of the nationalists to full independence, they could not help feeling a certain resentment against the minorities who had so often been used as tools of French policy.

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In 1945, after the Franco-Syrian crisis in the course of which Damascus was bombarded, Franco-Syrian political relations were at last regulated, and agreement was reached for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syrian soil. The withdrawal took place in 1946, and thus the essential condition for the establishment of normal relations between majority and minorities was fulfilled.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

is a very high figure, representing more than 50 per cent of the total land under cultivation, and the United States Agricultural Attache is inclined to believe that the Ministry's figures include the total area served by irrigation systems, whether or not all the land receives water each year. 241 312

There are no large-scale irrigation works in Syria. State and local governments have constructed and now maintain a number of small dams, diversions, and canals, but the total area served by these public works in 1951 was only 100,000 acres. Several other projects, scheduled for completion within the next three or four years, will increase the area under public works another 100,000 acres. Most of these projects are being financed by the federal government out of its regular budget. 312 653

By far the largest area is served by small diversions operated by individuals. The next largest and fastest growing area under irrigation is that served by mechanical pumps. The number of pumps doubled from 1950 to 1951 and the area irrigated increased three times. These pumps are used mostly for drawing water from streams. 312

In the absence of detailed surveys, accurate estimates as to how much water might be available from all sources are impossible to obtain. Draining the Ghab Swamps on the Orontes River west of Aleppo to bring another 100,000 acres into cultivation is now being studied by a Dutch engineering firm, and a large dam on the Euphrates River to impound water in sufficient volume to serve an additional 750,000 acres is under consideration. Several million acres of land along the Euphrates River probably are suitable for cultivation from the standpoint of soil if water becomes available. At the present time irrigation along the Euphrates is limited to the low-lying land between the banks of the river. Through the centuries the river has cut a bed from a half mile to as much as 10 miles wide through the plain, which is now 30 to 50 feet above the water level. It has proved too expensive for individuals to use pumps to pull the water from the river for irrigation.

The same general condition prevails on the main tributary of the Euphrates, the Kabur. Numerous pumps have been installed along the Kabur, and a gravity system in the north, operated by a small dam and canals, is being extended under a current program. It is possible the water would be adequate to extend the gravity system slightly in the southern reaches of the river.

Water might be diverted also from the Tigris River which runs across the northeastern border of Syria. Extensive use of water from any of these international rivers, however, very likely would involve agreements with neighboring countries. Additional water might be provided also by the other rivers in the country. All of these proposals involve tremendously expensive projects beyond the means of the country to finance without outside help.

CAPITAL AND CREDIT

The highly nationalistic attitude of the Syrians damages the chances of private industry's securing a foreign loan. A recent law requiring all foreign operations to have Syrian managers and at least 50 per cent Syrian capital, together with the questionable security, makes sizable foreign investments unlikely. Under these conditions any foreign loans probably will be made to the government. The Syrian Government has made an obvious point of not obligating itself to another foreign power, and it is unlikely it will accept 471 186 648

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a loan directly from another government. This attitude is illustrated clearly in the refusal of Syria to sign an agreement with Point Four.

A loan from an international body is another matter, and the country is seeking a loan of several million dollars from the International Bank for development of transportation, particularly roads in the Jezira, and port facilities at Latakia.

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Without a large-scale public works program, only minor improvements can be made to the existing system. However, opportunities exist for increasing production through private investment.

The good crops of 1950, sold at exceptionally high prices, resulted in high profits and the accumulation of considerable capital. The hope of continued high profits caused much of this capital to be re-invested in equipment and farm improvements. The same incentive also brought out new capital which never before had been invested in agriculture. Judging from the number of tractors, combines and accessories, and irrigation pumps purchased during 1950 and 1951, the investment in agricultural equipment in these two years exceeded the total up to that time. Unprecedented expenditures for general farm improvements also were made, an exceptional step in a country without a history of investment in agricultural development beyond the acquisition of land and a few simple facilities. The capital base has been small. Production has about equaled consumption. There has been little surplus for savings. The few families with capital have used their funds in other ways, seldom for agriculture. But the experience of 1951 was not encouraging for long-continued investment in agricultural development. These investments were costly, many farmers paying double the United States prices for equip-

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These farmers are typical of those in northern Syria. All the tenants of one landlord usually live in villages like this one near Aleppo. Villages vary in size from a few hundred to several thousand depending on the size of the farm.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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654 training schools have been placed under the department and their budget increased some four to five times. Staffs of the research institutions have been expanded and the over-all program coordinated. It should be emphasized that these programs still are in the early stages of development.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

648 242 Syria is not eligible for Mutual Security aid and so far has not seen fit to accept Point Four assistance. The United Nations, being international in character, is permitted to operate, and the Food and Agriculture Organization has a fairly large staff and an extensive program concentrated in the fields of cotton, home economics, veterinary science, farm machinery maintenance, and forestry. An FAO pathologist is working on problems of cotton diseases and insect controls.

A special FAO cotton mission, under the direction of an outstanding cotton technician, Dr. M. A. El Kilany Bey, former Under Secretary of State of the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture, last year made a detailed study of cotton production and marketing problems and submitted a list of specific recommendations to the government. The recommendations called for rigid controls over production by areas; sterilization and controlled distribution of planting seed; an improved insect control program, including mandatory use of insecticides and destruction of stalks; tighter control over ginning and distribution of the products; and improved classification. Most of these recommendations have been adopted.

One of the most effective foreign organizations working in the country is the Near East Foundation, a small philanthropic agency with headquarters

Roller gins like these in Aleppo, Syria, are rapidly being replaced by the faster and more efficient saw gins. However, total capacity of all roller gins in Syria is still double that of the saw gins.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

in New York. The Foundation is engaged in research and education along the same general lines as in Iran, Lebanon, and Greece. With a small budget the Foundation has in its research learned many practical and useful ways of improving agricultural production. The methods they have devised in teaching simple home economics, such as canning, and principles of sanitation are exemplary. As a result, many villages in the area in which the Foundation operates have bought sewing machines and pressure cookers either with their own funds or with money given by the landlords. Particularly impressive is the practical nature of the work and the absence of a large administrative budget.

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COTTON

Statistics on the area planted to cotton are also of questionable accuracy. For what they are worth, the figures show that cotton acreage declined almost 50 per cent from a prewar average of about 85,000 acres. It increased to about 60,000 acres during the five years after the war, and, with high prices, expanded further to almost 200,000 acres in 1950-51 and to about 450,000 acres in 1951-52. In 1952-53 it is expected acreage will be down, possibly just above the 1950-51 level.

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Table 24

SYRIA: Statistics on Cotton Production and Distribution
Specified Years, 1920-1951

Year Beginning August 1	Acreage	Yield per Acre	Production	Consumption	Exports
	Acres	Pounds	Bales		
Average 1920-24	NA	NA	5,700	NA	NA
Average 1925-29	58,825	82	9,951	NA	NA
Average 1930-34	42,358	116	16,199	NA	NA
Average 1935-39	84,477	157	28,022	NA	NA
Average 1940-44	47,465	152	15,350	NA	NA
Average 1945-49	56,876	234	31,111	22,100[1]	NA
1950	192,442	406	163,639	31,700	135,000
1951	450,000	220	206,661	22,400	139,000[2]

[1] Average for 1947-49.
[2] Exports September 1, 1951, through May 15, 1952.

Source: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture.

YIELDS

Average yield figures are even more conjectural than acreage. The government's records indicate that the average yield increased from about 160 pounds in 1935-39 to better than half a bale in 1944-49 and to more than 400 pounds per acre in 1949-50 and 1950-51. Because of the large number of inexperienced cultivators, cold weather in the spring, lack of moisture and inadequate irrigation, and heavy insect damage, the 1951-52 yields were poor everywhere and the national average dropped to about 220 pounds per acre. Farmers in the new mechanized area of the Jezira reported losing 90 per cent of their crop. There is no doubt that cotton yields have been erratic.

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Lone Star was the only American Upland variety planted until Coker and Acala seeds were imported in recent years. These have produced good

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AN ACCORD BRINGING ABOUT THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN SYRIA AND LEBANON[1]

Anglo-French Agreement on Syria

July 15, 1941

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I. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., commander in chief of the Allied forces in Palestine and Syria, acting in the name of the commander in chief of the Middle East for the first part; and

General de Verdilhac, Legion of Honor, assistant to the commander in chief of the troops of the Levant, acting in the name of the French high command for the second part, have reached an agreement bringing about the end of hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, by which the hostilities stopped July 11, 1941, at 9:01 p.m. (Greenwich mean time).

II. The Allied forces will occupy the Syrian and Lebanon territories. The French forces will be concentrated in certain zones fixed by the committee composed of representatives of the two parties. This concentration should be achieved by Tuesday, July 15, 1941, at the noon hour, at which the Allied forces will move toward the occupation of certain strategic points.

Until their repatriation the French troops will remain with reduced officer personnel under the French command, which will see after their supply and with that purpose keep the existing quartermaster stocks. Special dispositions are foreseen for the Jebel el Druz, where for reasons of security French troops will stay in their garrisons until relieved by British troops.

III. In order to insure the public security, the occupation of the principal Syrian and Lebanese localities will be carried out according to a program which will permit the immediate replacement of the French forces by the occupying forces.

IV. Sea and land mine fields will be disclosed to the occupying authorities.

[1] English text in New York *Herald Tribune*, July 16, 1941.

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V. All the honors of war will be rendered the French forces. These will withdraw to the concentration zones which have been designated, with all arms, including cannons, machine guns, tanks, automatic rifles and all their ammunition. All necessary measures will be taken by the French command to avoid arms and munitions being left abandoned on the field of battle wherever they are. The French military authorities will give all necessary assistance toward retrieving arms which may be found in the hands of the population.

VI. In consideration of the honors of war accorded the French forces, officers and noncommissioned officers and French soldiers are authorized to keep their individual arms (rifles or carbines, revolvers, bayonets, swords or sabers). Soldiers are to keep no munitions. In each unit, for security reasons, a reduced amount of munitions are to be left. The police will keep its arms and a reduced quantity of munitions. All other war material, including guns of the coastal batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, as well as military vehicles, are to be stocked under control of the British authorities. These will proceed with inspection of the material and will have the right to take over material which is necessary for them. The rest is to be destroyed by the French authorities under the control of the British authorities.

VII. Prisoners of the Allied forces are to be immediately freed, including those who have been transferred to France. As far as the latter are concerned, the British authorities reserve the right to hold in captivity an equal number of French officers as far as possible of the same grade until the prisoners transferred to France have been liberated.

French prisoners are to be liberated when all Syrian and Lebanon territory will have been occupied and the clauses of the present accord fully executed. They are to be given an opportunity to rejoin their units with a view toward their repatriation.

VIII. The alternative of joining the Allied cause or being repatriated is to be left to the free choice of each individual, civilian as well as military. Civilians who do not join the Allied cause may on their demand be permitted by the British authorities to remain in the Levant.

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IX. Administrative officials and officials of the technical services and officers of special services are to remain in office a necessary amount of time to assure continuity of the administration of the country until they are able to be replaced. They then are to be repatriated if they express the desire. They can be dismissed for a reprehensible attitude or insufficient service.

X. British authorities agree that the repatriation of French troops is to be carried out by French sea transports, provided this repatriation concerns only persons who opted for repatriation. British authorities have the right to control repatriation operations.

XI. Monetary possessions of repatriated French citizens are to be transferred according to methods to be established.

Those concerned are to receive payment no less favorable than that applied to British subjects who recently left the Levant.

XII. French institutions (hospitals, schools, religious missions, etc.) are assured that their rights will be respected.

XIII. Administrations of public services and public utilities, including railroads, municipal transportation, electric installations and water systems, will be kept in functioning condition with their personnel and turned over intact.

XIV. All means of telephone, telegraph and radio telegraphic communications, including submarine cable, to be turned over intact to the occupying authorities. The use of telegraph connections with France is to be assured for the French command on the same conditions as for other users.

XV. All port installations, naval establishments and all ships, including British vessels in Syrian and Lebanese territorial waters, are to be turned over intact to the occupying authorities.

XVI. All airplanes, all equipment and all aeronautic installations in Syrian and Lebanese territory to be turned over intact immediately after signature of the present convention.

The British are to be given an opportunity to utilize all airdromes and landing fields existing in Syria and Lebanon.

XVII. Stocks of fuel oil are to be delivered intact. Necessary quantities for military transportation are to be placed at the disposition of the French command.

XVIII. Money and other means of payment in circulation or

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reserve in banking establishments and public funds are not to be destroyed or diverted.

XIX. British military authorities reserve the right to take in their service special troops of the Levant as fast as they are released by the French authorities. The arms of these troops must be turned over to the British authorities.

XX. The British authorities are not to impose any sanctions against Syrian and Lebanese natives who took part in the recent hostilities either as soldiers or administrators.

XXI. The execution of the present accord is to be regulated and controlled by "a control commission," which will have headquarters at Beirut and which will be composed of five members. Three of these members, including the president, are to be designated by the British authorities, the other two by the French authorities.

This commission may name as many subcommissions and take advice from as many experts as necessary.

XXII. The present accord is done in two languages (French and English). In case of disagreement the English text is to be followed.

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FRANCO-TURKISH ARRANGEMENT OF JUNE 23, 1939 ARRANGEMENT FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA[1]

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PREAMBLE

The President of the French Republic and the President of the Turkish Republic,

Having regard to the provisions set forth in Article 7 of the Agreement of October 20th, 1921, and in the letter supplementary to Articles 7 and 8 of that Agreement,

Being convinced of the importance attaching to a territorial settlement which, by finally determining the frontier between Syria and Turkey, will have the effect of removing all possibility of misunderstanding between the two countries and, thereby, of placing their mutual relations on a sound basis,

Have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: . . .

Who, having exchanged their powers and found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Art. 1. France, in so far as she is concerned, consents to the line described in the Protocols of May 30th, 1926, June 22nd, 1929, and May 3rd, 1930, being rectified:

(a) From the point where the Kara-Sou crosses the present frontier as far as the boundary pillar bearing the number 230, so as to

[1] English text in League of Nations, *Official Journal*, July-August, 1939, pp. 356-361. For references to earlier agreements, protocols, etc., cf. *Organic Regulations of the Sanjak of Alexandretta* (C.352.1930.VI) (C.P.M. 1075) (*Series of League of Nations Publications*, VI.A. Mandates.1930.VI.A.3), pp. 24-25; *Questions of Alexandretta and Antioch* (C.538.M.348.1936) (*Series of League of Nations Publications*. General. 1936.8); "Settlement of Question of Alexandretta and Antioch," *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, January, 1937, pp. 2-4; *Collection of Texts Concerning the Sanjak of Alexandretta* (C.282.M.183.1937); Franco-Turkish Agreement, Oct. 20, 1921 (League of Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 54 no. 1284, p. 177; Franco-Turkish Convention, May 30, 1926, with protocols (*ibid.*, no. 1285, p. 197; Protocol of June 22, 1929. G. F. von Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités* . . . 3rd ser., vol. 30, p. 92); Protocol of May 3, 1930 (France, Haut Commissariat en Syrie et au Liban, *Les Actes diplomatiques en vigueur*. Beyrouth, 1935, p. 244).—Ed.

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648 coincide with the boundary of which the delimitation on the ground is recorded in the Protocol signed at Antioch on May 19th, 1939, it being understood that the village of Guemid between pillars 17 and 20 will be entirely allotted to Turkey and that from pillar No. 224 the line will run direct to pillar No. 230, leaving in Turkish territory the road from Yeni Chéhir to Antioch;

(b) And from the pillar bearing the number 419 following a line running in a north-easterly direction to a point about 1,200 metres south-west of Askorane, and from that point, passing to the east of Askorane and Godja-Qairaq, it will run northwards to a point situated about one kilometre north-east of Godja-Qairaq.

From that point the line will run in a westerly direction to a point situated about one kilometre north of the ruined castle and will then run to the south-west as far as point 1010 (west of the ruined castle); it will then follow in a south-westerly direction the bottom of the ravine to the north of Bachourte which opens out towards the stream of Kara-Dourane and will then follow that stream as far as the sea.

In the three sectors specified above, the Commission which completed its operations on May 19th, 1939, will be given the duty of determining the new line on the ground.

The territories situated beyond the line thus described will be evacuated by the French forces by July 23rd, 1939, at latest, by which date there will also be completed the transference by the French authorities of the powers remaining in their hands.

Art. 2. Citizens of the Sanjak of Alexandretta established in the territories referred to in the last paragraph of Article 1 will *ipso facto* acquire Turkish nationality.

Art. 3. Persons over 18 years of age who under Article 2 acquire Turkish nationality shall be entitled, within a period of six months from the coming into force of the present Arrangement, to opt for Syrian or Lebanese nationality.

Persons desiring to exercise the right provided for above shall deliver a declaration to that effect to the administrative authority of their place of residence. An acknowledgment shall be issued to them. The list of optants shall be communicated at as frequent intervals as possible to the French consular authority.

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Art. 4. Persons who have exercised the right to opt in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 must, within the succeeding eighteen months, transfer their place of residence out of Turkey. 648

They must liquidate their immovable property and they will be entitled to dispose of or take with them their movable property of every description and also their live-stock.

The proceeds of the liquidation referred to above shall be paid into a blocked account in the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic at Alexandretta and shall, in regard to the method of their transfer, be the subject of a special Arrangement between the French and Turkish Governments.

Any sums in currencies other than Turkish currency that may be in the possession of the persons referred to in the first paragraph of the present article may be exported in accordance with the arrangements provided for in the *procès-verbal* annexed to the present Arrangement.

Art. 5. For the purposes of the provisions embodied in Articles 2, 3 and 4, the status of a married woman will be governed by that of her husband, and the status of children under 18 years of age by that of their parents.

Art. 6. The French Government shall have the right to appoint a custodian for the maintenance and protection of the military cemetery of Alexandretta, which is situated on land belonging to the French State and which shall be maintained in its present condition.

Art. 7. Turkey recognises as constituting the definitive boundary of her territory the line described in the Convention of May 30th, 1926, the Protocol of June 22nd, 1929, and the Protocol of May 3rd, 1930, as rectified in virtue of the present Arrangement.

Accordingly, Turkey condemns any action of such a kind as to infringe the territorial integrity or endanger or compromise the internal tranquillity of Syria or such as might conduce to the same ends, and she undertakes to prohibit and, should occasion arise, to suppress and punish in her territory any action of this nature.

Art. 8. No provision of earlier treaties and agreements may be interpreted as being contrary to the undertakings embodied in Article 7.

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Art. 9. The High Contracting Parties shall, in the case of France in Syrian territory and in the case of Turkey in her own territory, take all measures of such a kind as to prevent the preparation or perpetration of acts directed against the respective security or regime of the two neighboring countries.

Art. 10. With a view to making possible the conclusion of a new agreement, the Convention of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations, dated May 30th, 1926, and the agreements supplementary thereto shall continue in force until March 15th, 1940.

The provisions of the above-mentioned instruments shall be valid in respect of the whole of the Turkish-Syrian frontier as determined by the Protocols of May 30th, 1926, June 22nd, 1929, and May 3rd, 1930, and by the rectification provided for in the present Arrangement.

It is, however, understood that the provisions relating to rights of pasturage and change of pasture are deemed to be annulled.

Art. 11. The present Arrangement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Paris as soon as possible and at latest by July 22nd, 1939. It shall enter into force on the date on which the exchange of ratifications takes place.[1]

[1] This Arrangement is followed by a Protocol, two Annexes, a *procès-verbal*, and an exchange of letters.—Ed.

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NOTE ON TREATIES

1. Syria is a party to the Pact of the Arab League[1] and to the Cultural Treaty of the Arab League.[2]

2. Armistice agreement between Israel and Syria.[3]

3. Syria is an original member of the United Nations. It deposited its ratification on October 19, 1945.

[1] See below, p. 527.
[2] See below, p. 534.
[3] See the Note on Armistice Agreements, p. 367.

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MANDATE FOR SYRIA AND THE LEBANON[1]

JULY 24, 1922

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The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and Lebanon, which formerly belonged to the Turkish

[1] English text in League of Nations, *Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon*, July 24, 1922, Geneva, 1922 (C. 528.M.313.1922.VI).

The Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon was not formally abrogated. However, General Catroux, on entering Syria on June 8, 1941, proclaimed, in the name of Free France and her Chief, General de Gaulle, that he came "to end the régime of the mandate" and that "your status of independence and sovereignty will be guaranteed by a treaty in which our mutual relations will be defined." (Proclamation printed below, pp. 320-321.) In a declaration of support, Sir Miles Lampson, British Ambassador in Cairo, declared himself "authorized by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to declare that they support and associate themselves, with the assurance of independence given by General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon."

On September 27, 1941, General Catroux issued a "Déclaration française portant proclamation de l'indépendance de la Syrie" (*Journal Officiel de la République Syrienne*, no. 40 bis, October 14, 1941, pp. 8-9); a similar proclamation announcing Lebanese independence was issued on November 26, 1941. Both declarations conclude by saying that "it is necessary that a final settlement be substituted for these stipulations as quickly as possible by a Franco-Syrian (Franco-Lebanese) treaty which will guarantee definitively the independence of the country."

In pursuance of these proclamations, a convention was concluded December 22, 1943, between Free France and Syria and the Lebanon referring to the transfer of the Services of the "Intérêts Communs" to both States (*Bulletin Officiel des Actes Administratifs de la Délégation*, no. 1, of February 15, 1944, p. 3); on January 3, 1944, a Protocol was published referring to the transfer of the General Customs Administration to both States (*ibid.*). No treaty defining the mutual relations between France and Syria and the Lebanon and guaranteeing the independence of both States was concluded. Both, however, were invited to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, have ratified the Charter, and thus have become members of the United Nations.

The former mandatory powers were bound by agreements with the League of Nations, agreements which are considered by the Secretary General of the United Nations as suspended owing to the dissolution of the League. (See the remark on "International Mandates" in the United Nations document, "Study of the legal validity of the undertakings concerning minorities," *Economic and Social Council*, General E/CN 4/367, April 7, 1950, p. 15). The trusteeship system of the United Nations, on the other hand, applicable under the United Nations Charter to "Territories now held under mandate" (art. 77 a) was not applicable to Syria and Lebanon under art. 78: "The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality." The independence of Syria and Lebanon has thus been implicitly or explicitly recognized by all members of the United Nations as well as the nonmember states. (*Continued on next page.*)

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Empire shall, within such boundaries as may be fixed by the said Powers, be entrusted to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population, in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 (paragraph 4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for the territory referred to above should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it;[1] and

Whereas the terms of this mandate, which are defined in the articles below, have also been accepted by the Government of the French Republic and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas the Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Art. 1. The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests, and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory

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With regard to the French and British troops which were still on Syrian and Lebanese soil an agreement was reached on December 13, 1945, by the governments of France and Great Britain providing for the evacuation of these troops from Syria and the Lebanon. On February 5, 1946, the Syrian and Lebanese delegations to the United Nations brought to the attention of the United Nations the fact that French and British troops were still being maintained in Syria and the Lebanon and asked for their withdrawal. After the matter had been discussed by the United Nations, a direct accord was reached between the interested parties as to the date of the withdrawal of these troops.

The text of the Mandate is reproduced here because of its historical interest. —Ed.

[1] Cf. also the Convention between the United States and France, signed at Paris, April 4, 1924. *Rights in Syria and the Lebanon.* Treaty Series No. 695, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1924.—Ed.

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shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent States. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Art. 2. The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organise such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.

The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel.

Art. 3. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the Mandatory.

Art. 4. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

Art. 5. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable

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in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organisation provided for in Article 6.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Art. 6. The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon, a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

Art. 7. Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

Art. 8. The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Art. 9. The Mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Councils of management (Conseils de fabrique) or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines

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belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

Art. 10. The supervision exercised by the Mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the Mandatory or of the local government, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.

Art. 11. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any State Member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign State in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States; there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the Mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and Customs duties as it may consider necessary. The Mandatory, or the local governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of contiguity any special Customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The Mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

Concessions for the development of these natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations, but on condition

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that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local government. Concessions in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the fiscal resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or, in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources either directly by the State or through an organisation under its control, provided that this does not involve either directly or indirectly the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preferential treatment which would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.

Art. 12. The Mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreement already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and ammunition, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literature, art or industries.

Art. 13. The Mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

Art. 14. The Mandatory shall draw up and put into force within twelve months from this date a law of antiquities in conformity with the following provisions. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports

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the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Mandatory shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Art. 15. Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in Article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the Mandatory in organising the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

Art. 16. French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

Art. 17. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

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Art. 18. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Art. 19. On the termination of the mandate, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

Art. 20. The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.

Done at London on the twenty-fourth of July, 1922.

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323.

AN ACCORD BRINGING ABOUT THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN SYRIA AND LEBANON[1]

Anglo-French Agreement on Syria

July 15, 1941

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I. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., commander in chief of the Allied forces in Palestine and Syria, acting in the name of the commander in chief of the Middle East for the first part; and

General de Verdilhac, Legion of Honor, assistant to the commander in chief of the troops of the Levant, acting in the name of the French high command for the second part, have reached an agreement bringing about the end of hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, by which the hostilities stopped July 11, 1941, at 9:01 p.m. (Greenwich mean time).

II. The Allied forces will occupy the Syrian and Lebanon territories. The French forces will be concentrated in certain zones fixed by the committee composed of representatives of the two parties. This concentration should be achieved by Tuesday, July 15, 1941, at the noon hour, at which the Allied forces will move toward the occupation of certain strategic points.

Until their repatriation the French troops will remain with reduced officer personnel under the French command, which will see after their supply and with that purpose keep the existing quartermaster stocks. Special dispositions are foreseen for the Jebel el Druz, where for reasons of security French troops will stay in their garrisons until relieved by British troops.

III. In order to insure the public security, the occupation of the principal Syrian and Lebanese localities will be carried out according to a program which will permit the immediate replacement of the French forces by the occupying forces.

IV. Sea and land mine fields will be disclosed to the occupying authorities.

[1] English text in New York *Herald Tribune*, July 16, 1941.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 M1 Middle East
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£80,000; royalty was to be 4 shillings (gold) per ton. The concession could not be cancelled for ten years unless the Company was released by the Transjordan Government.[24] In April 1948, just prior to the expiration of the Palestine Mandate, the High Commissioner for Palestine granted the Transjordan Petroleum Company free passage through Palestine to the Mediterranean for any oil discovered in Transjordan.[25] In the middle of 1954 the Company decided to give up its concession and it began to negotiate with the Jordan Government for release; in November the Government signed an agreement with the Company to terminate the concession. The agreement provided for a final payment of £400,000, bringing the total amount paid by the Company since it was granted its concession in 1947 to £717,000.[26]

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PIPELINES

The I.P.C. pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean, built in the early 'thirties, ran about 267 miles in Syria, and as in the case of Palestine and Transjordan, the agreement signed in 1931 between the Government of Syria and the I.P.C. provided for no payment for transit rights. After the war, when Syria emerged as an independent country, her Premier, Jamil Mardam, announced in Damascus in the middle of May 1947 that the I.P.C. had agreed to pay the Syrian Government LS 750,000 annually (about $336,000) for the right of passage and protection of the pipeline.[27] This was increased in 1950 to £108,000.[28] The 1949 agreement between Syria and Tapline is outlined above.[29]

[24] Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 250; *The New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

[25] This was later repudiated by the Israel Government. For an official British summary of the various concessions granted by the British Administration in Palestine and Transjordan, see Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry*, II, 969-972.

[26] *Middle Eastern Affairs*, V, 408, Dec., 1954. Some American experts did not share the pessimistic view of the I.P.C. about oil possibilities in Jordan. See, for instance, L. S. Gardner, "Oil Possibilities in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," *The Oil Forum*, VIII, 448-450, 454, November, 1954.

[27] *The New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

[28] Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 243. Actually it was no increase, only an adjustment for the devaluation of the £.

[29] See above, Chap. XIII.

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ed a governor for Lebanon before the latter was displaced by the French (whose historic interests in Lebanon had been recognized by the British Government in the correspondence with the Sharif Hussain). While Faisal and Lawrence were presenting the Arab case to the Paris Peace Conference, the French were consolidating their military hold on the Levant. Eventually Faisal and Clemenceau came to a provisional agreement for an autonomous Syrian state under the tutelage of France (as conceded by Britain in the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, which had not been communicated at the time to the Sharif and his sons); but French tutelage was not acceptable to the Damascus politicians who in March 1920 proclaimed Faisal King of an independent Syrian state. In the following month, however, the French obtained Britain's agreement, at the San Remo Conference, to their exercising a Mandate over Syria as well as Lebanon; the new Mandatary defeated Faisal's little army at Maisalun on 25 July 1920 and entered into possession of Damascus, from which Faisal fled into exile.

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The French Mandate, 1920–45

Since Crusader times, France had been interested in protecting the Christians of the Levant, and the twentieth century gave her the added incentive of creating a counter-balance to Britain's growing influence in the Middle East. The Maronites welcomed the French, and the latter accordingly expanded the small area of the Sanjaq of Lebanon to include the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, as well as the Biqaa, so as to give this 'Greater Lebanon' the largest possible area in which there would be no danger of a Muslim majority. The French applied to Syria the principle of *divide et impera* and four separate states were set up: that of the Alawis (Jebel Ansariya, including Latakia), that of the Jebel Druze, and Damascus and Aleppo (in 1925 combined into a single state of Syria). The French further encouraged separatism in the Jezira, and designated the area of Antioch and Alexandretta (in which the largest linguistic community was the Turkish) as an autonomous sanjaq.

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The majority of Syrians never readily accepted French rule and risings occurred in the Ansariya, near Aleppo, and near Dair az-Zor; these were soon put down but a greater rebellion began in the Jebel Druze in 1925 and spread to Damascus and to Hama. The French bombarded Damascus in October 1925 and in May 1926 but did not succeed in completely quelling the revolt until August 1927. Thereafter negotiations for a treaty stumbled through the years, punctuated by disturbances, broken off from time to time and marked throughout by bitter-

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

The Republic of Syria was constituted in 1943, when France relinquished control over the mandated territories of Lebanon and Syria. Geographically and ethnically Syria forms an integral part of the eastern Mediterranean region, but politically it has undergone progressive modification since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Considerable confusion in terminology arises from the fact that the entire area was then designated as Syria. It was mandated to France by the League of Nations in 1923 as the separate territories of Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently, for a brief period the region was divided into the autonomous "Levant States" of Lebanon, Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. With the annexation of Latakia and Jebel ed Druz as provincial units in 1936, and the cession of the Alexandretta district to Turkey in 1939, the present boundaries of Syria were established. The country now includes an area of approximately 71,000 square miles. In the west, it has a coastline of about 104 miles on the Mediterranean Sea and, to the south, common frontiers with Lebanon and northern Israel. Inland, it is surrounded by Turkey on the north, Iraq on the east and the southeast, and Jordan on the south.

The interior of the country is essentially a semiarid plateau, sloping to the basins of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and backed by chains of mountains in the north and the west. The highlands on the Turkish border are not well defined, but those in the west differentiate distinct geographic regions. In the north, the Nusairiyeh mountains, with elevations up to 5,000 feet,

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747 The Red Crescent Society carries on a campaign against tuberculosis throughout the country, and operates a tuberculosis dispensary in Damascus. The Goutte de Lait Society of Damascus supports infant welfare services in association with the government's maternal and child health center.

The Near East Foundation initiated a comprehensive rural demonstration program in villages near Damascus in 1946, in conjunction with the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health. In addition to activities for the improvement of agriculture, it operates 5 child health centers, each serving 10 to 20 villages. Courses are conducted at the largest center for the training of local village midwives in improved technics of midwifery. When the program was expanded in 1951, the Foundation planned for the development of co-ordinated maternity and child health services, including well-child clinics and home visiting, in the village centers and the organization of a special course for the training of rural sanitarians. Since 1949, it has participated with the government health authorities and the successive agencies working for the relief of the Palestinian refugees in a malaria control program, based on residual spraying with DDT preparations, or Gammexane, in villages in the Damascus region. In 1950, it co-operated with the Ministry and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company in residual spraying operations in villages and refugee camps around Der'a, in Hauran *muhafazat*.

747 744

747 648 Hospitals and related health work are conducted by various mission societies in Damascus, Aleppo and Deir ez Zor. Health and medical care services are also provided by the larger industries for the benefit of their employees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency carries on public health and medical programs in the refugee centers in southern and western Syria.

MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

743 Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1951,

p. 146(b)

of the babies treated at the maternity and child health center in Damascus suffer from intestinal infections. Epidemics of diarrheal disease often coincide with the ripening of the apricot crop. The ready contamination of this thin-skinned fruit by flies and other insects accounts for the local designation of the early summer diarrheas in the fruit-growing districts as *mish mish* (apricot) disease. 164 164 262

Cholera. Serious outbreaks have accompanied the introduction of cholera in the past, but the disease was absent from Syria from 1928 to 1947, shortly after the epidemic in Egypt. On December 19, 1947, cholera was reported from 2 adjacent villages in the province of Hauran, on the road from Palestine to Damascus. At the same time, cases occurred in 3 villages in the irrigated plain of the Al Ghouta, within 3 or 4 miles of Damascus. Although 45 cases, with 18 deaths, were reported officially, it was generally believed that the actual incidence totaled at least 77 cases. 164

Quarantine measures were promptly imposed in Hauran and Damascus provinces, and all persons entering or leaving those regions were required to possess certificates of immunization against cholera. Over one and one half million individuals were inoculated with cholera vaccine in the vicinity of Damascus, as well as in the affected districts of Hauran and in the city of Aleppo. Supplies and assistance were furnished the Ministry of Health by the World Health Organization, the Near East Foundation and the Egyptian and Lebanese governments. Vaccine was also provided jointly by the Arabian American Oil Company and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. No cases were reported after the initial outbreaks, and on January 17, 1948, Syria was declared free from the disease. The exact origin of the epidemic was never definitely established. 744 164 647 747

Helminthiases. ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Hookworm infection, caused by *Ancylostoma duodenale*, is prevalent among the agricultural workers in foci along the banks of the 164 463 369

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65: Landshut S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
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being compelled, in November, 1945, to take part in the demonstrations 563
against the Balfour Declaration, and Jewish shopkeepers being ordered 668
to close their shops as a sign of solidarity with the Muslims. However little concerned Syrian Jewry may have been with Zionist aspirations in Palestine, its feelings on the subject could hardly have been strong enough to cause its leaders—"of their own free will"—to announce that they intended to hold a banquet in honour of the notorious Fawzi Kaukji—a wartime officer of the German Waffen S.S.

Not even in Egypt did public hysteria against the helpless and isolated Jewish minority go to such lengths as it did in Syria. Doubtless this fact is due to the combination of a half-educated university youth and an illiterate, hungry, and disease-ridden urban populace. In Syria, as in Egypt, such a combination has given an extraordinarily explosive character to the nationalist movement.

When the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the Palestine 648
issue visited Syria, its members were struck by the cowed and 563
intimidated manner of the heads of the Jewish community. One member of the committee, Mr. Bartley Crum, in his book *Behind the Silken Curtain* (p. 239), gives the following description of the scene when three representatives of the Jewish community arrived to give evidence:

> The committee of three chosen Jews appeared. Only one spoke. There had been testimony in Jerusalem before us by Oriental Jews charging that Jews in the Oriental countries were given only second-class citizenship. Our sub-committee expected the Jewish spokesman they now heard on the scene to need far more than 20 minutes to tell his story. Instead, he used 45 seconds of his allotted time. He raced through a one-sentence written statement, in which he said that the Jews of Syria were happy and not discriminated against; that their situation was excellent under the present Syrian Government; and that they had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Zionism. The three presented a picture of terrified men. . . .

The tragic farce of the repeated declarations of solidarity with the Muslims forced on the leaders of the Jewish community did not diminish the flood of persecution. Thus Shukri al-Quwatli, the President of the Syrian Republic, made no effort to halt anti-Jewish discrimination, even though in 1946 a Jewish delegation made special representations to him. On the contrary, in 1947, the Syrian Government promulgated new restrictions, prohibiting Jewish inhabitants from leaving their areas of residence.

The effect of this order was to paralyse even what remained of Jewish economic activity; and it should be noted that the order appeared even before the partition of Palestine was decided on by the United Nations.

Within four days of the United Nations decision being made 648
public, the mob was sufficiently worked up for anti-Jewish rioting to 563
break out in Aleppo. On December 2, 1947, a crowd, spurred on 579
by agitators, burnt down the four big synagogues in the city plus

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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648 14 smaller ones, and destroyed 150 houses. An unknown number of
563 Jews was butchered to death.
579 By the time Palestine was invaded by the Arab States, the Jewish communities in Syria were completely isolated. No Jew dared to have any contacts abroad or, for that matter, with any foreigners resident in the country. Commercial activity came practically to a standstill, since Jews were forbidden to open their shops or to carry on with their employment.

The property of a transport company, owned by an Iraqi Jew, was confiscated, and the entire Jewish staff arrested. Fifteen Jewish girls who worked in the telephone exchanges in Aleppo and Damascus were dismissed. The Chief Engineer of Damascus, who had held this position for 12 years, suffered the same fate, together with five Jewish school teachers. The school building of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* in Damascus was requisitioned for the military. The already impoverished community was forced under threat to donate about £S10,000 (at that time equivalent to £1,100) to the Arab funds.

Throughout the months of fighting, a relentless campaign demanding the confiscation of all Jewish property went on. The Damascus Jews felt themselves fortunate in being spared a repetition of the earlier Aleppo riots, though in August, 1949, 11 were killed when a bomb was thrown into a synagogue.

563 For some time the situation of the Jews in Damascus was extremely grave. Being prevented from earning a living, the community was so impoverished that it was feared that many would die of hunger and disease. Had it not been for the assistance of the Jewish community in Beirut, the Damascus community might well have perished. Later, their straits were further relieved by American help.

563 With the overthrow of the Syrian Government by Husni Zaim in
669 March, 1949, all restrictions on the movements of Jews, as well as on the sale of property, were abolished. The new ruler declared that he would deal severely with any person attempting to discriminate against the Jews. The lifting of the travel ban was immediately followed
[167] by a new wave of Jewish emigration to Lebanon.

The confused situation arising out of Zaim's murder, and the succession of political *coups* which followed, make the prospects of the Jewish community uncertain. But even if the new Government were to abstain from any official discrimination against the Jews of Syria, the atmosphere has been poisoned to such an extent that a return to normal conditions and peaceful relations seems most unlikely. On the face of it, nothing will alter the passionate wish of practically every Jew in Syria to shake the country's dust off his feet.

652 9. The exchange system was subject to the control of the
648 Mandatory authority which directed it in accordance with its own interests, and the exchange control was a department administered directly by the High Commissioner's Office. In 1944 the exchange control was transferred to a joint Syro-Lebanese committee, headed by a delegate from the Central Exchange Control Office of the franc area, of which both Syria and Lebanon were members. In 1948 Syria declared its withdrawal from the franc bloc and be-
652 came independent in dealing with exchange questions. The Exchange Office in Syria thus became a purely Syrian institution. Subsequently the Government initiated several reforms that aimed at removing war-time restrictions. The exchange system became gradually freer and adapted itself to the needs of the Syrian economy. The last and most important of these reforms was Legislative Decree No. 208 of April 21st, 1952, which allowed the free entry and transfer of capital and created conditions facilitating commercial transactions ; it also worked towards achieving stability in the foreign exchange rates and bolstering the cover to the currency. In this manner the Decree inspired confidence in the national currency and prepared the right atmosphere for the entry of foreign capital and its investment in the country. [1]

•651 10. As to the customs policy, this also was directed by the
648 Mandatory authority. It was formed by financial considerations, the first aim of which was to cover the expenditures of the Mandate and collect revenues for the treasury. When the Syro-Lebanese authorities took over the customs administration, the customs tariff and regulations moved gradually towards facilitating commercial transactions and encouraging national industry by exempting machinery and raw materials, needed by industry and agriculture, from duty. However, the establishment of a customs union between the two contries and the existence of an actual economic union, which took the form of free movement of goods, capital and persons between them, led to disagreements as to the customs and economic policies that each country thought should be followed. The disagreement reached its peak on the questions of import and export policies and the protection of national industry, and as a result of their faillure to agree on a common policy, the two count-

1 *Vide The First Annual Report on the Activities of the Exchange Office in 1952*, Damascus, 1953.

ries separated in 1950, and, in consequence, Syria regained free- 651
dom of action in directing her customs and economic policies and 648
in managing her economy on an independent basis.

11. The new Syrian government also had to face serious internal problems, that the Mandatory power with its "Laissez-faire" policy had not attempted to deal with. No factual study of the country was made nor any determined course of economic action undertaken. The following are the most serious of the defects of the economic system at that time :

First there was a lack of statistics and detailed studies upon 659
which to base a sound economic policy. Nor were there any technical and scientific studies of the country's economic resources, or plans for developing and exploiting them. Secondly, the bank- 453
ing system failed in meeting the country's need for agricultural 652
credit and for medium and long term credit. The majority of the banks were branches of foreign banks that specialized in commercial short-term credit operations, and which, with the exception of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, avoided seasonal agricultural lending. All the banks operated without any control or direction. Furthermore, no bank had up to that date been established to deal with industrial or mortgage credit. There was only the Agricultural Bank, established by the government to deal with medium-term agricultural loans, but its regulations, staffing and limited means did not enable it to play a major role in meeting the needs of agriculture. Thirdly there was no money market that 454
could attract national savings and invest them in development projects. People with savings have always preferred to hoard them in the form of gold, or else they invested them in real estate. In addition, foreign capital avoided entry into the country because of restrictions on exchange, and other reasons.

12. During the period 1945 to 1953 the government made a 656
great effort to regulate the Syrian economy in the fields of trade,[1]

1 Legislative Decree No. 14 of December 18, 1951 and its amendments concern the regulation of the possession of, and trade in, raw materials and products. Legislative Decree No. 151, of March 3, 1952 and its amendments concern company law and the law governing firms established outside Syria. Legislative Decree No. 60, of January 13, 1952 and its amendments regulate foreign trade etc.

652 present level. The proportion of current taxes (approximately LS
[651] 200 million) to the national income (approximately LS 1250 million) is 16 per cent. This ratio may seem small if compared with that of other countries, but we should not forget that the national income of Syria is in itself small. What the average tax-payer pays in taxes is cut from his essential expenditure, since his income is not appreciably in excess of his essential expenditure. There is little surplus that the government can reasonably take in the form of taxation.

However, though we cannot depend on taxes to finance development projects, we should not neglect the improvement of methods of tax imposition and collection, and the need for strict inspection in applying taxation laws. It is not improbable that such improvements and inspection may lead to a 15 per cent rise in collected taxes, (about LS 30 million). This could very well be used to cover the desired expansion in ordinary government expenditure and to contribute towards development projects.

In any case, development expenditure tends in the long run to increase national income, thus forming in its turn a new source of public revenue that should not be neglected by the government, particularly since a greater taxation effort is essential to absorb the surplus purchasing power created by development projects and to combat inflation.

454 37. As to internal loans, we have seen that there is no financial
652 market in Syria and that individuals do not embark on such a form of investment. Though we realize the difficulty of creating a financial market in a short period of time, yet we believe that it is possible at the present time to establish a money market, and that, with adequate measures, a financial market dealing with medium term loans could be set up in a relatively short time. Considering that private capital invested in national companies since 1944 has amounted to about LS 100 million, and that the capital invested in individual enterprises, whether industrial, commercial or agricultural, was more than twice the funds spent by the government on development projects, it becomes clear that the possibility of creating a financial market is not out of the question.

The creation of a financial market in Syria is an essential condition for the success of any development policy. Without a financial and money market the authorities concerned will not be able to direct credit affairs effectively, nor to manage monetary policy in the country. The benefits that such a market would bring would

prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands. 622 425 427

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years. 563 167 661 651

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

185 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i.e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 489 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

LAND TENURE IN JAZIRAH

427 The custom in Jazirah is for the tenant to pay the rent in a percentage of the crop delivered to the owner free of all expense.

I. Land Tenure for the Peasant

427 651 Under Ottoman rule and because land was abundant and peasants scarce, the rent was fixed at 7L. The owner and the tenant were each responsible for the Government taxes on his own share of the produce.

The Ottoman Government collected the tithe and the werko as taxes on the land. The title, as its name implies, was 10% of the produce to which was added later 2-1/2% as special revenue for public instruction.

Because the peasant wanted to be as far away from Government officials as possible he paid the landowner 19-1/2%, including the tithe and the rent, and did not care how much of that the landowner actually paid so long as he remained unmolested by the public officials. This percentage of 19-1/2% is still prevailing and is known by the name of "Hassil and Tabo".

In 1924 the French found the collection of the tithe cumbersome and adopted a modified system. They took the average tax paid by the land in the preceding four years and made the sum obligatory. In practice, this meant light taxation on the land, but the landowner still received from the peasant the same percentage as when the tithe was actually paid. Later, when the tax of 7% on agricultural produce took the place of all land taxes and the peasant had to pay it when he transported his crop for sale, he kept paying the landowner 19-1/2% so that his percentage has come to mean rent to the landowner without the obligation on his part to pay the taxes of the peasant. What made the situation acceptable to the peasant was that the increase in population would have raised the rent anyway. He now pays this rent for the use of land and house. If the house is not included for his, he constructs his own house of sun-baked bricks, but retains the right to remove the wooden roof when he leaves the village.

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621 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
241 from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
427 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power
423

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Recovery of Costs

The capital cost of irrigation and reclamation schemes can and should be recovered from the beneficiaries. In principle it makes little difference how these costs are recovered—whether through sales of government-owned land that is reclaimed or irrigated, through improvement levies on newly irrigated privately owned land, through irrigation dues, or through a combination of any of these. The state should, however, appropriate most of the benefits for the community at large and to this end impose levies on the direct beneficiaries proportionate to the benefits derived. This is not only socially equitable but it enables the government to recover the cost as rapidly as possible and thus acquire the means to undertake additional projects. The direct beneficiaries must, of course, be allowed to retain some of the benefit, but there is no justification for allowing private landowners whose land is irrigated by the government to enjoy a windfall or for settling farmers on newly irrigated or reclaimed land on terms which enable them to live on a standard far exceeding that of their counterparts elsewhere in the country.

In the past the government has sought to recover the cost through irrigation dues. In 1953 the government collected on this account £S 473,000, which left a margin of £S 268,000 over the amount appropriated to maintain existing irrigation schemes. Early in 1954 the government introduced a new scale of charges increasing progressively with the size of the landholding. The prospective yield of these charges is difficult to assess. While the scale takes into account differences in the benefits accruing from various schemes, the mission considers that the fees instituted for the Tell Maghass, Mzerib and El Senn projects, while higher than those in others, are still rather low in proportion to the benefits enjoyed by cultivators and landowners. A review of these charges therefore appears desirable. If and when the government adopts the mission's recommendation for a progressive land tax, the progressive feature of the irrigation charges may also have to be modified.

Maintenance

Adequate provision for maintenance of irrigation schemes after completion is, of course, essential. Current appropriations for maintenance appear rather low. In 1954 they were raised to £S 350,000 from a total of

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423 districts"; to provide for the forfeiture of land "neglected for a period of
425 time"; to encourage "small and medium properties"; and "to protect the peasant and raise his standard of living".

In recent years several countries have taken steps to break up large estates and distribute them among landless tenants. Where large estates are farmed in small plots by tenants operating with rather primitive methods, the economic advantages resulting from well-managed large-scale exploitation certainly do not accrue. On the contrary, farming by impoverished tenants may be regarded as a social liability and an actual or potential cause of discontent. In the last analysis only the Syrian people acting through their government are competent to determine what course to pursue regarding large landholdings. The mission would only point out that expropriation on a considerable scale would entail large outlays for compensation and would be more disruptive than constructive, unless adequate measures were simultaneously taken to provide new peasant owners with sufficient supplies of seed, draft animals and tools and to guide them in their agricultural practices. Where labor is scarce and land is cultivated on a large scale by machinery, as in the Jezireh, expropriation would manifestly serve no useful purpose and would result, instead, in a substantial reduction in output.

There are, however, certain measures the mission would recommend for serious consideration. One would be to prevent aggravation of the problem by enacting legislation to prohibit individual families who already own a certain amount of land—say, 1,000 hectares—from increasing their holdings still further. Another would be to enforce, as a minimum, the existing legislation, which provides that land not tilled for five years should revert to the state. In cases where land is utilized or exploited in a manner which is not in accordance with the standards prevailing in Syria, the
423 government would be justified in depriving the owner of his land. Finally,
651 the mission suggests that the larger landowners should be more heavily taxed in the interest of raising more money for development and of promoting greater social equity. Income derived from agriculture does not fall at present under any of the existing schedular income taxes. Instead, most agricultural produce brought to market is taxed at 7%. While this tax does not bear heavily on peasants who produce primarily for their own consumption, it is not progressive in its application to landowners or pump owners who sell their share of the output on the market. The mission sug-

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gests, therefore, that this tax be complemented by a new land tax. The rate of such a tax should increase with the size of landholdings, and small holdings should be entirely exempt. The rates must also be in accordance with the yield of the land, but the mission suggests that they be kept rather low (e.g., not more than £S 2-3 per hectare on the average) so that a detailed, complex classification of land in accordance with productivity may be avoided. In another section of this report the mission proposes that the present schedular income taxes be supplemented by a global income tax levied at a moderate rate. In our opinion, income from agriculture should be included in the scope of such a global tax. The ascertainment of income from land is by no means as difficult as is generally supposed.

In addition to taking these steps, the government should pay special attention to the improvement of the lot of tenant farmers. In general, measures should be adopted to increase the tenant's share of the output, to give him greater security of tenure and to make him less dependent on the landlord as a source of credit and supplies.

The economic bargaining power of the landlord vis-à-vis the tenant and of the pump owner vis-à-vis the cultivator is so great that the landlord and pump owner obtain a rather excessive share of the output of the land. It would be desirable to establish a commission to study the various forms of association in the exploitation of agricultural land which prevail in different parts of Syria and to make recommendations designed not only to make these arrangements more equitable but also to put them on a basis which would give the actual cultivator of the land more incentive to improve his agricultural methods. Such a commission could work out the terms of written contracts which would be applicable to various types of association. It could also devise ways of giving greater security of tenure to the tenants. The latter can generally be ousted at will by landlords and the land they receive for cultivation is so frequently reallotted that they acquire no interest in its permanent improvement. Finally, it would be appropriate to consider the establishment of local land tenure commissions to settle, in a manner comparable to settlement of labor conflicts, disputes among the parties sharing in the exploitation of the land.

A number of measures to foster cooperatives, provide more ample credit and establish machinery for assisting the farmer at the village level are recommended elsewhere in this report. It is important that these measures

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433 plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements which, in accordance with our proposals, might be developed for use on Syrian farms. It should be emphasized, however, that future industrial expansion will need to be more selective and that projects will require careful technical and economic scrutiny to establish their suitability for Syria.

We conclude, therefore, that improvement in efficiency and more careful, selective expansion are the principal problems which Syrian industry faces. To meet these problems we have a number of recommendations involving (1) increasing exposure of industry to foreign competition, (2) development of a larger market for industrial products, (3) establishment of an investment bank to provide technical and financial assistance to industry and (4) improvement in vocational education.

Protection of Industry

433 654 651 457 Syrian industry today is in many ways shielded against foreign competition. Protection of this type is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating only from 1949. Before that time industry had developed with little or no government assistance. Prewar tariffs were moderate and essentially revenue-producing in character. Virtually the only concessions to industry were lower duties on plant and equipment and raw materials. The rapid expansion of mechanical manufacturing occurred at a time when there was little competition from abroad. During the war imports were largely impossible and in the immediate postwar years the demand for manufactures was such that rising imports were not incompatible with the continued development of domestic output. With the relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions in 1948 and an increasingly abundant supply of manufactures in the world market, Syrian industry finally began to suffer from foreign competition. In 1949 the government came to the rescue by providing industrial establishments with facilities to obtain state-guaranteed loans at low interest rates from the issue department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. Pressure for more effective protection of industry was instrumental in terminating the customs union with Lebanon, which as a trading nation was interested in keeping tariffs moderate. Following the dissolution of this economic union in March 1950, import duties were generally raised and in many cases almost doubled. In 1951 tariffs on such articles as textiles, glass and soap were again sharply increased and the

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first import embargoes were imposed. In 1952 a large number of imports were prohibited and a *de facto* sugar trading and manufacturing monopoly was instituted. The following year, however, the Minister of Economics was deprived of discretionary authority to impose embargoes, and a number of prohibitions were subsequently lifted. Even so, import embargoes are still applied to such consumer goods as cotton hosiery, socks and stockings, "job lot cloth," second-hand cotton and silk clothing, men's shirts, vegetable oils, various soaps, margarine, canned vegetables and fruits, confectionery, glass and glass products, match boxes and match wood, matches, pins, wooden furniture and boots and shoes. These protective measures have been supplemented by controls over exports of certain raw materials designed to give domestic industry preferential access to available supplies. Importation of ginning machines was prohibited to safeguard existing enterprises, and imports of second-hand looms and knitting machines were stopped, to insure the installation of modern machinery. In 1952 the government also initiated licensing of industrial establishments for the purpose of preventing overexpansion and ill-considered ventures. During the same year more positive assistance was provided by enacting a law for the encouragement of industry which extended a number of benefits to new enterprises and extensions of existing plants.

The mission has no doubt that some protection of industry is justified, particularly in underdeveloped countries which need time to raise labor, technical and managerial skills to a level approximating those in the more advanced industrial countries. As we have already pointed out, the types of industry developed in Syria are generally of a character to warrant the expectation that they can ultimately stand on their own feet. This goal, however, will not be reached as long as production is as effectively insulated against outside competition as at present. The present system of exaggerated protection does not provide a sufficient incentive to raise efficiency and productivity. For Syrian consumers it involves excessive sacrifices in the form of higher prices and poorer quality. In recent years, for example, the Syrian government has found it necessary to protect consumers by controlling the prices of such articles as vegetable oils, yarn and cement.

In view of these considerations we recommend in particular that the present import embargoes be abolished. In some cases it may be necessary to substitute import duties higher than those now included in the tariff schedule, but in those instances prohibitive rates should be avoided and

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433 provision made for gradual reduction of the duties. At the same time we
654 suggest that the whole tariff schedule be re-examined. By and large it
651 cannot be said that the general level of tariffs is excessively high, particu-
457 larly since ad valorem rates are levied on imports valued at the official rate of exchange, and this entails an undervaluation of about 40% compared to the actual exchange rate. In fact, we recommend elsewhere that tariff rates be assessed on the basis of actual foreign exchange rates for the purpose of increasing government revenues. This should not be construed, however, as a proposal to raise all tariffs irrespective of their nature. On the contrary, we would suggest that, as part of the general revision of the schedule, those rates which are primarily protective in character should as far as possible be reduced for the purpose of encouraging outside competition and lowering prices. If necessary, such reductions could be graduated over a period of time.

434 *Possibilities of a Larger Market*
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The expansion and, above all, the diversification of industrial output in Syria is restricted by the rather small domestic market. In a country of only 3.6 million people with low purchasing power it is generally possible to manufacture only a limited range of articles which are used widely enough to warrant production on an economic scale. Broader industrial opportunities are likely to emerge only if a larger market is initially available. In the case of Syria it should be possible to establish such a market in cooperation with other Arab countries, all of which suffer from a similar handicap in the development of their industries. Over recent years the Arab countries have increasingly stressed their community of interest and the need for closer cooperation. The field of industrial development offers a particularly challenging opportunity for common endeavor. We do not suggest, of course, that the types of industrial enterprises to be developed by each country should be the subject of joint government decision. There should be consultation in cases where particular ventures are to be launched with special government assistance. In the main, however, the location and development of industry should be decided by the free play of competitive forces operating in a larger, common Arab market.

To a limited extent the Arab countries have already taken steps to develop such a market. Syria has concluded bilateral agreements with Lebanon and Jordan which free certain products from import restrictions

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TABLE 9 Financial Resources, 1955–60

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(Million £S)

Existing revenues, with anticipated growth*		1,315–1,360
Additional taxes and revenues		
Change in base for application of ad valorem import duties	20.0	
Excises, import duties and fees	25.0	
Institution of global income tax	24.0	
Tax on large landholdings	10.0	
Additional revenues from state domain	11.0	
		90.0
Improved tax administration		40.0
Income from Aleppo and Damascus public utilities		60.0
Oil transit revenues		73.0
Domestic borrowing		85–120
Foreign aid and foreign borrowing		175–215
Total		1,838–1,958

* Annual increase of 3% and 4% respectively. The estimates exclude oil revenues and take into account the repeal of the export tax on cereals and the effect of the proposed adjustment in the livestock tax.

about £S 11 million per year, a loss which Syria can ill afford, and while the tax may well have discouraged the cultivation of cotton on unsuitable land, there is no reason to believe that it has worked undue hardship on efficient cotton producers. We recommend, however, that the existing specific duty be replaced by one levied on a sliding scale graduated according to the price of raw cotton. In addition we suggest that the present head tax on animals, which is difficult to administer, be repealed and that instead the sale of animals, wool, hides and skins be subjected to the regular 7% agricultural production tax. This would probably entail some loss of revenue which, together with the consequences of the elimination of the export levy on cereals, has already been taken into account in the projection of government receipts mentioned above.

Since the proposed tax and revenue increases recommended by the 651
mission are discussed in previous sections of this report and in the Annex 652
on public finance, they will be mentioned only briefly below:

1. *Assessment of import duties at the actual instead of the official exchange rate.* This would increase significantly the yield of existing ad valorem tariffs, many of which are very low in terms of valuations at the

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651 de facto exchange rate. We have already indicated in the chapter on in-
652 dustry, however, that this measure should be accompanied by a review of the entire tariff schedule so that the incidence of all ad valorem duties would not be raised arbitrarily.

2. *Higher excises, customs duties and fees.* Quite apart from the proposal in the preceding paragraph, it should be possible to impose additional excise taxes or, alternatively, customs duties on luxuries and semi-luxuries. The rates at which certain fees are collected on business transactions, including stamp duties, judicial and property transfer fees and the like, could also be raised.

3. *Imposition of a global income tax.* Existing income taxes are schedular in character, that is, levied separately on income derived from business and professions, salaries or wages, circulating capital, and urban real property. These taxes are not sufficiently progressive in their incidence on persons drawing their income from two or more sources. We recommend, therefore, that they be complemented by a global income tax, which would be more closely related to ability to pay. Income from agriculture which is not subject to any of the schedular taxes should in our view be included in this global tax. It has often been argued that taxation of income from agriculture is administratively impracticable. We propose, however, that only the high incomes derived from agriculture be included in the tax, and we do not believe that these are by and large more difficult to estimate than those derived from other sources.

4. *Tax on large landholdings.* The essential features of this proposed tax, which is recommended primarily as a measure of land policy, have already been outlined in Chapter 3.

5. *Additional revenues from state domain.* We have suggested that the income now derived from state domain that is already leased for agricultural purposes can be increased by gradually raising the rentals to a level conforming more closely to that prevailing for private land, for instance in the Jezireh. In addition, the recapture of land under the provisions of Law No. 135 of October 29, 1952, recommended elsewhere, should ultimately make considerable additional state land available for leasing.

The total amount of additional revenue we anticipate from these proposals is only £S 90 million over the six-year period. The eventual annual yield is likely to be much more than £S 15 million, but we have allowed for the probability that the proposed increases will not be fully effective for some time.

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The more efficient collection of taxes is already receiving attention from the government. Syrian officials have estimated that receipts from all sources might be increased by as much as 40% if all liabilities under existing taxes were enforced. To be conservative we have merely assumed that more effective collection could ultimately raise the yield of direct and indirect taxes, now amounting to about £S 160 million per year (average of 1953 and 1954), by about 10%. For the period as a whole we have estimated increased receipts on this account at only £S 40 million.

In the chapter on electric power we have pointed out that the net operating income of the nationalized public utility companies of Aleppo and Damascus, which is already high, is likely to rise still further. If this income is not dissipated by lowering power rates, against which we strongly advise at this time, it should suffice to finance the entire power expansion program and also to pay compensation to the former owners of these companies.

Foreign oil companies now pay certain fees on crude oil passing through Syria by pipeline. Receipts of £S 6.5 million were budgeted on this account in 1954. New and higher transit rates have been periodically under negotiation, and there remains no doubt that new rates will go into effect some time during the next few years. We have conservatively estimated the increased receipts on the basis of the most recent proposals made by the Iraq Petroleum Company, although this does not, of course, imply a judgment on our part as to the merits of the offer.

Prospects of Domestic Borrowing

The possibility of domestic borrowing without serious inflationary consequences must now be examined. As a preliminary it is useful to note how much the government has borrowed in the past. Over the five-year period 1949-53 the government raised a net sum of £S 157.1 million (according to figures on the public debt) by domestic borrowing, all of it from the BSL, which, it will be recalled, has some of the functions of a central bank. In the two-year period 1952-53 funds raised by net borrowing amounted to £S 71.1 million.

This increase was offset by a sharp rise in public deposits, as indicated below (in millions of Syrian pounds):

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439 the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard and on the one hand, Iraq, on the
487 other, Jordan, given the boycott of Israel.

In neither of these trade routes has Syria a monopoly. Iraq, which at present is moving about 100,000 tons of goods through northern Syria by way of the Northern Railway and unspecified quantities of goods through the desert road and Damascus, has the choice of directing these commodities to Turkish, Syrian or Lebanese port terminals. If transport to the Mediterranean ports should prove too expensive or cumbersome, Basra (Iraq) will be used even for the northern provinces of Iraq. Jordan can shift more of its trade to Aqaba and there are indications that this may happen.

In these circumstances, it is clearly in the interests of Syria to make transit through Syria attractive and profitable; it would be ill advised to sacrifice the long-term interest in transit trade to doubtful immediate gains. From that standpoint, it seems rather short-sighted to require that most goods to and from Jordan be moved by rail, irrespective of the wishes and interests of the shippers, and that goods moved from Beirut to Iraq across the desert must first be reloaded into Syrian trucks.[1] It is also inconsistent with the efforts to develop free trade zones in Syria and to encourage the use of Latakia for transit.

III FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES

439
651 *Licensing*
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Exports. The government may impose restrictions on the exports of specific goods, including a license requirement. As of the beginning of 1954 exports of some 30 items in the tariff schedule, including various types of metals, glycerine, sulphur, fertilizers, jute cloth and sacks, and lambs, were prohibited, and the country's most important exports, (wheat, barley, flour, cotton and cottonseed, wool, sheep and certain types of cattle) were subject to license. Trade with Israel is prohibited.

These export restrictions were instituted for various reasons—to safeguard domestic supplies and to control the re-export of imported items, particularly those of strategic importance. Other regulations are designed

[1] The total volume of Syria's transit trade is presently estimated at 300,000–400,000 tons annually.

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to safeguard quality. Among efforts aiming at improving and standardizing the quality of exported cereals the following may be mentioned: in May 1954 the Ministry of National Economy submitted for study to the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture a proposed order which would require cereal exports to be accompanied by certificates as to their weight, degree of impurity and humidity. To the best of the mission's knowledge, these certificates are to be issued by reputable firms, specializing in this kind of job and cooperating with similar firms in the importing countries. This seems to be an excellent project and we recommend that it be carried out. 439 651 656

Several of the chief export products, such as cotton, wheat, barley, lentils, vetch, wool and hides, can be exported only through Latakia, with exceptions provided for the southern and central provinces.

Imports. Unlike exports, all imports must in principle be licensed. The only exceptions are personal effects of travellers, gifts and commercial samples up to a certain value, gold, certain commercial imports not exceeding £S 200 in value carried by travellers, and some articles imported directly across the frontier into the Jezireh and Euphrates provinces. It should be pointed out, however, that import licenses are freely issued, except with respect to items on the proscribed list.

Certain products, such as sugar, cement, timber, iron and asphalt, can be imported only through the port of Latakia, although the regulations in this respect are rather flexible and in general do not direct through Latakia a significant amount of trade that would not otherwise have gone through this port.

Trade and Payments Agreements

Bilateral. Since its independence, Syria has concluded several trade agreements, about half of which are with the principal countries of the Arab League (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon). Agreements were also concluded with Greece, India, Japan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and a payments agreement has been made with France. Some of the trade agreements simply formalize existing trade relations. The most-favored-nation clause is included in nearly all agreements. In the Japanese agreement, however, it was instead provided that both partners might, when necessary, take measures to protect the production of their local industries. 439

Provisions relating to the volume of exchange are incorporated into the

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652 postaudit functions is likely to lead to overcentralization, cumbersome pro-
451 cedures and operating delays.

9. The delay in postaudit should be reduced as fast as possible, by improving both accounting and auditing procedures, as well as by relieving the General Accounting Office of the preaudit function. Fraud and other crimes revealed by postaudit should be dealt with as provided by law but officials should no longer be held financially liable for procedural irregularities not involving fraud; in such cases attention should be directed to revising applicable procedures with the object of preventing a recurrence of the irregularities.

10. Cash balances of the Treasury and other agencies should be analyzed with a view to segregating public funds from third-party accounts. Excessive cash balances should be applied to reduction of the public debt.

651 III REVENUE SYSTEM

The most serious problems in the field of taxation arise from inefficient and inadequate administration and widespread evasion. The system is regressive and unequal in incidence. Although revenue has increased greatly in recent years—apparently more rapidly than national income—it will not be easy to assure a continuation of this trend. The system does not have a large degree of automatic flexibility of yield which would permit the government to capture a significant part of any increases in national income without changing tax rates.

Revenue Yield in Relation to Income and Population

The proportion of the national income collected in taxes and other government receipts appears to compare favorably with that in many other countries. In 1950 the ordinary budget receipts of the central government plus estimated receipts of all municipalities equalled 12% of estimated national income.[8] By 1953 central and municipal receipts appear to have

[8] In 1950 ordinary receipts of the central government were approximately £S 139 million (annualized estimate from 18-month fiscal period 1950-51). The total of municipal expenditure budgets in 1950 was £S 25.8 million, but the municipalities received Treasury-guaranteed advances of £S 4.8 million from the Issue Department of the BSL. This suggests that municipal budgets provided for approximately £S 21 million of financing from sources other than borrowing. It is not known whether municipalities added to or drew down reserve funds in 1950. The mission estimates the national income of Syria in 1950 at £S 1,080 million.

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increased by almost 60% and to have reached approximately 16% of national income.[9] This ratio is higher than in many other Asian countries, such as India, where the ratio is only about 7%, and compares favorably with that in several of the larger Latin American countries which collect around one-sixth of national income in taxes. On the other hand, the ratio of taxes to national income is substantially higher in most of the industrialized countries of the west.

After a period of approximate stability from 1945 through 1948, central government revenues have since increased fairly rapidly.[10] In 1953 ordinary receipts were 84% greater than in 1945 (£S 217 million as compared with £S 118 million). During this period the population probably increased no more than 20%.[11] Thus ordinary central receipts increased from roughly £S 40 per head in 1945-46 to more than £S 60 in 1953. Even though 1953 receipts probably included some non-recurrent items, this is an impressive record.

Although the foregoing figures represent revenues in current prices, there is no evidence that, if the statistics could be stated in constant prices, the apparent increase in revenues would be diminished. On the contrary, the scanty evidence available suggests that in the period 1945-53 the trend of prices in Syria was on the whole downward (see Table 7). It may be, therefore, that the increase in the real purchasing power of government revenue was greater than the rise in nominal receipts.

The increase in revenue attained in the past few years appears to be due in large part to revisions of tax rates. It is by no means clear that under existing law, the marginal tax rate applicable to an increment of national income is higher than the average rate. If the additional income accrued in agriculture, the only taxes on the production side would be the 7% agricultural production tax and, on exported raw cotton, an additional tax amounting to roughly 8% of the value (at 1953-54 prices). Moreover, the application of the income tax on non-agricultural incomes is so limited

[9] Ordinary receipts of the central government were £S 216.7 million (preliminary). Total expenditure budgets of municipalities were £S 37.6 million, and Treasury-guaranteed advances to municipalities amounted to only £S 0.5 million. Estimated national income was £S 1,600 million in 1953.

[10] See Table 1, page 255, but note that preliminary figures place actual revenue for 1953 considerably above the budget estimate shown in this Table.

[11] The increase in estimated population from the end of 1946 to the end of 1952 was 14.3% (*Statistical Abstract*, 1951-52, p. 17; *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Nov.-Dec. 1953, p. 2).

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651 and erratic that it seems unlikely that it would claim a large fraction of an increase from this source either. Additional taxes would of course apply on the consumption side, but some of the principal excise taxes are applicable to such commodities as tobacco, for which the demand may not be highly responsive to income changes. As for imported consumption goods, many are subject to customs duties of 15% ad valorem or less.

435 TABLE 7 Price Indices for Damascus and Beirut, 1945–53

(*1952 = 100*)

Year	Prices in Damascus		Prices in Beirut	
	Retail[a]	Wholesale, local manufactures[b]	Cost of living	Wholesale[c]
1945	140	—	131	156
1946	129	—	119	133
1947	118	—	109	120
1948	112	—	106	116
1949	95	97	100	95
1950	81	90	93	88
1951	94	107	100	110
1952	100	100	100	100
1953 (Jan.–Sept.)	93	85	95	92

[a] 19 foods, soap, kerosene and cigarettes.
[b] 16 locally manufactured commodities.
[c] Prior to 1950 foodstuffs represented about 98% of the total weight, of which wheat and barley alone accounted for 61%. Beginning in 1950, foodstuffs represent 48% of total weight.

SOURCE: Derived from data in *Statistical Abstract of Syria*, 1951–52, pp. 149, 152; *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (Syria), Nov.–Dec. 1953, p. 35; International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, February 1954.

651 Commodities for which it seems plausible to assume that import demand is fairly sensitive to income changes, and which are subject to duties of 15.3% ad valorem or less, include jewelry, watches and clocks, meat, milk, butter, cheese, oleomargarine, photographic films and papers and musical instruments. To be sure, certain other commodities are subject to higher rates, but it seems unlikely that taxes on these items would yield enough to add an important degree of flexibility.

The lack of automatic flexibility of revenue yield is a disadvantage to a country undertaking a program of economic development. Such a pro-

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gram nearly always requires the government to gain command over an increasing fraction of national income, to finance investment and expand current services. In the absence of automatic flexibility, frequent revisions of statutory rates and perhaps the application of new taxes are necessary if the government is to finance its expenditures in a non-inflationary way.

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The Present Revenue System

The principal sources of central government revenue, in order of yield, are customs duties and excise taxes, which together account for about one-half of total revenue, the agricultural production tax, registration fees and income from public services (Table 8). Income and property taxes are

TABLE 8 - Percentage Composition of Ordinary Budget Receipts of Central Government, Selected Years

Source	1945	1948	1951-52[a]	1954[b]
Schedular income taxes	6.7	4.3	5.3	6.6
Tax on non-agricultural real estate	1.8	2.0	2.6	2.7
Business and professional license tax (temettu)	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.5
Miscellaneous direct taxes[c]	1.8	0.9	1.1	1.5
Agricultural production tax	7.8	10.7	12.8	10.9
Livestock tax	7.1	5.5	5.5	4.5
Excise taxes[d]	35.0	29.3	22.0	29.6
Customs duties	7.7	30.0	23.6	18.7[e]
Registration fees	1.3	7.7	10.6	10.4
Proceeds of state property	1.6	1.3	3.0	2.9
Industries	3.2	0.3	0.2	0.4
Income from public services	24.1[f]	5.1	10.4	10.0
All other	0.9	1.5	1.5	0.4
Total[g]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a] July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.
[b] Budget estimates.
[c] Includes payment for guard services.
[d] Includes revenues from tobacco monopoly.
[e] Includes export duties, 7.4% of total revenue.
[f] Includes certain non-recurring items associated with wartime food program.
[g] Figures for the various items have been rounded.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of withdrawals from reserve fund and loans from Issue Department.
SOURCE: Derived from data provided by Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance.

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651 comparatively minor in importance at present, accounting for less than 10% of revenue. Over the past decade customs duties and registration fees have shown the greatest relative increase in yield, owing to increased rates and greater economic activity. For a more detailed statement of receipts, see Appendix B, p. 291.

Income Taxes

Schedular income taxes at varying rates are imposed on (a) income from industrial, commercial and non-commercial trades and professions; (b) salaries and wages; and (c) income from circulating capital. There is no global tax to supplement the schedular taxes. Agricultural income is not subject to net income tax. The tax on non-agricultural real estate is in the form of an income tax, but in actual application it appears to have many of the characteristics ordinarily associated with a property tax. The tax on income from industrial, commercial and non-commercial trades and professions applies to net income from virtually all businesses and professions except agriculture. The first £S 1,500 of income is exempt. Rates range from 6% on income between £S 1,500 and £S 10,000 to a maximum of 36% on income in excess of £S 750,000. Personal exemptions are £S 480 for one wife and £S 480 for the first child. For each additional child after the first the basic exemption increases by £S 20; it is £S 500 for the second child, £S 520 for the third, and so on. The tax is based on net income after deductions for business expenses, depreciation and other Syrian taxes. Net losses may be carried forward five years.

Partnerships, joint stock companies and corporations (*sociétés en nom collectif, sociétés à responsabilité limitée,* and *sociétés par actions*) are taxed at the same rates as individuals, but, in the case of partnerships, personal exemptions are allowed for the partners, subject to a maximum limit for each firm. Corporations with registered shares (*sociétés par actions dont les actions sont nominales*) and whose main office is in Syria are granted a 25% reduction in the tax computed at the regular rates, but it is understood that only two corporations now qualify for this special treatment.

Taxation of industrial enterprises is discussed in Annex F.

In lieu of the regular income tax, business enterprises with gross receipts below £S 25,000 and professional men whose gross compensation for services is less than £S 15,000 pay an annual amount equal to 50%

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of the license tax (temettu).[12] Because of the complexity and variability of the temettu, it is difficult to compare this arrangement with the regular income tax. In a large number of other cases the income tax is assessed on the basis of more or less arbitrary evidence of presumed income. Taxpayers are required by law to file returns but the degree of compliance is low. No official return form is furnished or prescribed by the government. In one of the principal mohafazats, the mission was informed that only about 30% of the cases were assessed on the basis of returns or accounting records.

Salaries and wages in excess of £S 100 per month are subject to tax at rates ranging from 4% on amounts between £S 100 and £S 1,000 per month to 12% on amounts over £S 4,000. No allowance is made for the first two children, but for the third child an exemption of £S 40 per month is granted. The exemption increases by £S 10 for each successive child. The tax is withheld by the employer.

Income from stocks, bonds, notes and other items of circulating capital is subject to a flat rate of 6%. No personal exemption is allowed. The tax does not apply to interest received by banks if subject to the schedular tax on business profits.

Tax on non-agricultural real estate. The annual value (actual or estimated rental value) of buildings and associated sites is subject to tax at rates ranging from 7% on the first £S 2,000 per year to 20% on amounts in excess of £S 20,000. These rates are applied separately to each parcel, that is, the total income of the owner from all real property is not aggregated to determine the applicable rate. A shift to a personal basis of assessment is contemplated, however, after completion of a general reassessment of real estate. Unoccupied non-agricultural land is subject to tax on capital value at rates ranging from 0.5% on the first £S 20,000 to 1% on amounts in excess of £S 100,000. Agricultural land and buildings are exempt.

General reassessments are made only once each 10 years except that it is provided that a property whose value increases or decreases by more than 25% in the interim shall thereupon be reassessed. In practice, it appears that this is not usually done. A general reassessment of property was under way at the time of the mission's visit and was expected to be completed in 1954 or 1955.

New factories, administrative buildings, and residences for employees and workers are exempt for the first six years. Temporary exemptions are

[12] This surcharge is reported in government accounts as part of income tax collections.

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651 also allowed for new construction to encourage tourism, urbanism, settlement of nomadic tribes and other purposes.

Business and professional license tax. A license tax is imposed on industry, commerce and the professions. The rather involved calculation of the tax takes into account such factors as the rental value of the place of business, number of employees and gross receipts, and also includes a fixed element for different trades and professions. In general the tax is heavier in large cities than in small towns. Large tourist hotels and factories established after September 1952 are exempt for the first five years.

Miscellaneous direct taxes and fees. The other principal direct taxes and fees are the fee for guard services (night watchmen), irrigation tax, cadastral registration fee and inheritance tax. Most important of these from the revenue standpoint is the fee for guard service, which takes the form of a surcharge to the tax on non-agricultural real estate. The inheritance tax is rather elaborate in form, being graduated according to the degree of consanguinity and the size of the transfer. It yielded only £S 370,000 in 1953; the budget estimate for 1954 is £S 100,000. The irrigation tax was extensively revised in January 1954 and may in future yield more than the comparatively small sums obtained from other sources in the past (£S 473,000 in 1953).

Registration fees. In addition to fees for registration of real estate titles, judicial fees and stamps on legal documents, this category includes motor vehicle license fees, the army tax on electricity (a stamp tax on electricity bills) and consular and foreign trade fees.

Agricultural taxes. The agricultural production tax is a flat 7% of the wholesale value of marketed agricultural produce other than livestock, which is taxed separately. Commodities consumed at home or in the village are exempt; so are certain other comparatively minor items. Liability accrues when the commodities are moved outside the village, the tax usually being collected at posts along the roads on the basis of price lists prepared for each consumption center by local commissions. An annual head tax is imposed on livestock at the following rates:

Sheep and goats	£S 1.50
Camels	£S 2.20
Water buffaloes	£S 5.20
Hogs	£S 8.20

Sheep, goats and pigs less than one year old and camels less than two

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years old are exempt. Cows, oxen, horses, asses, mules and other animals not listed above are not taxed.

Excise taxes. 1. Tobacco and tombac:[18] The production and sale of these products are a state monopoly. In recent years profits of the monopoly have equaled approximately one-half of gross sales, which is equivalent to an excise tax of approximately 100% ad valorem.

2. Petroleum products: Taxes on the consumption of petroleum products are 14.5 piasters per liter on gasoline and 5.0 piasters per liter on fuel oil. In addition there are municipal consumption taxes and customs duties on petroleum products.

3. Refined sugar: This commodity is taxed at a rate of 23.5 piasters per kilo. Products containing sugar are taxed proportionately to their presumed sugar content.

4. Cement: Cement is subject to a tax of £S 15 per ton.

5. Miscellaneous: Specific taxes are levied on various types of alcoholic beverages and on certain minor goods and services.

Import duties. Import duties appear to be about equally divided by yield between ad valorem and specific taxes. A rough estimate for the period 1950-52 suggests that the weighted average of all import duties was equivalent to about 9-10% of the value of imports. Imports subject to ad valorem duties are valued at the official exchange rate (£S 2.19 = U. S. $1.00). In early 1954 this resulted in a valuation about 40% lower than that which would have been obtained by application of the free exchange rate (£S 3.575 = U. S. $1.00) at which payment for most imports except petroleum is made. Ad valorem rates tend to be fairly low even on luxury items. For example, effective rates on distilled spirits range between 18.4% and 36.8%. An effective rate of 24.5% applies to items such as many cosmetics, radios, phonographs and records, and coffee. Effective rates of 15.3% or less apply to items such as tea, most spices, oleomargarine, wines, photographic film and papers, jewelry, electric bulbs, watches and clocks and musical instruments.

Export duties. During the boom in raw materials' prices after the beginning of the Korean war, many countries imposed or increased export duties. Syria joined this movement rather belatedly, adopting export taxes on raw cotton in 1952 and on cereals in 1953. The tax on cotton is still in effect, but the taxes on cereal exports were repealed in mid-1954. The tax on cotton is 9 piasters per kilo on unginned cotton and 20 piasters per kilo

[18] A preparation of tobacco and other materials smoked in a hookah (water pipe).

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651 on ginned cotton. This tax applies in addition to the 7% agricultural production tax. In August-September 1953, the export duty on ginned cotton amounted to about 8% of the wholesale price in Aleppo.

Other revenues. Proceeds of state property are composed mainly of receipts from rent or sale of real and personal property and income from salt mining. The most important items of income from "public services" are petroleum revenues, which arise out of agreements with the pipeline companies, profits of the Exchange Office and receipts in lieu of compulsory military service. Negotiations now under way are expected to result in an increase in petroleum revenues.

Municipal revenues. The municipalities, generally speaking, are allowed to levy taxes within maximum limits specified by central government legislation. Municipal taxes comprise surcharges to national taxes, collected by the central government on behalf of municipalities, and taxes administered entirely by the municipalities themselves. The principal surcharges include those on the schedular income taxes (10% of the national taxes), on the tax on non-agricultural real estate (maximum of 40%) and on the temettu (maximum of 30%). The central government also collects for the benefit of municipalities excises on petroleum consumption (1.5 piasters per liter of fuel oil and 3.5 piasters per liter of gasoline), and a 5% ad valorem tax on imported articles. The latter tax is reduced to 1% on items which are either exempt from import duties or subject to rates not in excess of 1%. Taxes collected by the municipalities themselves include levies on motor vehicles, retailers of alcoholic beverages, places of amusement, the sale and slaughter of animals and public utilities. Cities are also allowed to levy special assessments equal to one-half of the increase in value of property due to the construction of streets and other public works. No details are available regarding the amount of revenue obtained from various sources by the cities. Officials of Damascus and Aleppo, however, estimate that about one-third of the revenue of these cities comes from taxes administered by the central government and about two-thirds from taxes and fees collected by the cities.

General Appraisal

Although Syria's revenue system provides fairly adequately for present functions of government, it needs to be strengthened to meet the demands

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of an expanding economy. The mission believes that the time has come for a re-examination of the system as a whole. 651

The mission's survey has revealed no glaring cases in which it can be shown that the tax system is now seriously interfering with economic development. It is by no means certain, however, that this would continue to be true if rates of existing taxes were appreciably increased and administration tightened.

But, although the present tax system does not interpose major barriers to development, it is open to the criticism that it is not designed to exercise certain desirable influences on economic activity. For example, the absence of a tax on agricultural land makes it easier to hold large blocks of land for speculative purposes than it would be if the land were subject to an annual tax even if the land yielded no current income. In the cities, income from real estate is probably subject in most instances to a lower rate of taxation than income from trade and industry. This tax differential may to some extent reinforce the non-economic preference for investment in real estate rather than in more active enterprises characteristic of most underdeveloped countries. The complete absence of progressive taxes on agricultural income and wealth tends to favor the large landowner over other investors or entrepreneurs who may contribute more to economic development.

Another major consideration in evaluating the tax system is that it appears to be highly regressive in the sense that taxes take a much larger fraction of the incomes of the poor than of the wealthy. This is characteristic of many of the principal excises and import duties, which together account for over two-fifths of total revenue in the 1954 ordinary budget and which come to a large extent from articles of mass consumption. Taxes on agricultural production, livestock and exports, which contributed almost one-fourth of estimated total revenue in 1954, are more difficult to assign to income groups but it seems likely that these taxes are regressive or at best proportional to income for the majority of the agricultural population. To be sure, the fact that neither the production tax nor the export duties applies to articles consumed at home or in the village offers a significant degree of relief to the poorest farmers, provided they grow grain and other crops for local consumption rather than cotton or other commercial crops. This feature, however, is partly offset by the livestock tax, which, being specific in amount and generally applicable, imposes a heavier load

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651 on the owner of low-quality animals than on the owner of the better grades. In the non-agricultural sector, regressivity is to some extent mitigated by the direct taxes on income and non-agricultural real estate but, owing to low rates and ineffective administration, these taxes produce less than one-tenth of total ordinary revenues (1954 budget).

The regressive nature of the Syrian tax system must be considered objectionable in the light of ideals of justice and political principles that have been accepted in many parts of the world. Admittedly, however, there are wide differences of opinion as to the feasibility of dispensing with regressive taxes and concerning the degree to which it is appropriate to impose taxes designed to exact contributions increasing progressively with the taxpayer's income or wealth. An economic objection to steeply progressive taxes is that they are likely to fall with particular severity on savings, because middle and upper income groups account for the greater part of total savings. In a capital-poor country, where productive investment is limited by lack of savings, this consideration is especially important. On the other hand, low taxes on the wealthy allow luxurious consumption and hoarding of gold and foreign exchange, as well as saving for productive investment. Furthermore, regressive taxation is economically harmful if the system presses so heavily on the poor that their consumption is reduced to the point of impairing their health and working efficiency, or if it leaves no margin for a gradual raising of their standard of living. It should also be noted that taxes on non-essential consumption and on net income exhibit more automatic flexibility of yield than do taxes on essentials, and hence claim a larger proportion of national income as production grows, even though tax rates are not altered. The weight to be attached to the various considerations is a matter of judgment on which no general agreement can be expected. The mission is not inclined to urge adoption of rigid standards in this controversial area but it does believe that the regressiveness of the Syrian tax system could be sensibly lessened and even reversed by measures that would interfere little if at all with economic development.

As a final point of general appraisal, informed opinion holds that tax administration in Syria is in many respects ineffective and that tax evasion is widespread. Administration and compliance are especially weak in the case of the schedular income taxes and the inheritance tax. The majority of income tax assessments appears to be made in a rather arbitrary manner on the basis of fragmentary evidence with respect to volume of business,

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living standard of the taxpayer, opinions of others in the business or profession, and other presumed indications of net income. This is unsatisfactory from both the government's and the taxpayer's point of view. The inheritance tax in practice applies mainly to real estate. Even the application of other comparatively simple taxes is hindered by lack of trained personnel and modern procedures and equipment.

Suggested Reforms

Administration. The administrative side of the revenue service urgently requires revision. Many of the present defects could be eliminated by wider recruitment and by offering better compensation to revenue officers, while imposing a higher standard of technical competence and personal probity. The adoption of modern office methods, opening the way to prompt and decisive action to collect delinquent taxes, could also have far-reaching effects which would more than justify any small increases in personnel which may be required. Although the attitude of taxpayers cannot be changed overnight, improved administration, together with the strict and impartial punishment of fraud and evasion, can be expected in time to induce voluntary compliance. By these methods considerably more revenue could be collected under the existing tax schedules, with a commensurate increase in equity and without initiating inadvisable experiments with new taxes which the government might be unable to enforce effectively.

Income taxes. With the growth of industry and commerce and improved tax-collecting machinery, income taxes can assume a larger role in the Syrian tax system. Under present conditions, however, it would be unwise to count on a major increase in revenue from such taxes in the near future. The immediate problem is rather to rationalize the structure and improve the administrative procedures. Under the schedular income taxes there are now wide differences in tax liabilities on any given amount of income, depending on the source from which it comes (see Table 9), although the rationale of these differences is frequently obscure.

The mission recommends that Syria follow present world trends by substantially reducing, if not completely eliminating, differences in tax liability based on source of income. This would require—(a) adoption of similar rates and exemptions for the existing schedular taxes; (b) transformation of the tax on non-agricultural real estate into a true schedular

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651 tax on net income; and (c) adoption of a global complementary surtax on large incomes from all sources. It may be considered equitable to tax earned income less heavily than property income. If so, a special credit or reduced rate could be provided for earned income up to a reasonable maximum. A favorable schedule for salaries and wages alone would not be adequate for this purpose since the arguments commonly advanced in

TABLE 9 Comparison of Income Tax Liabilities on Incomes of Selected Amounts from Different Sources[a]

(Tax liability according to source of income[b]) (£S)

Annual[c] net income	Business or profession[d]		Salary or wages[e]		Circulating capital	
	Amount	% of income	Amount	% of income	Amount	%
1,200 . . .	—	—	—	—	72	6
2,500 . . .	31	1	33	1	150	6
5,000 . . .	181	3	133	3	300	6
10,000 . . .	481	5	333	3	600	6
15,000 . . .	931	6	593	4	900	6
20,000 . . .	1,381	7	893	4	1,200	6
50,000 . . .	6,181	12	3,533	7	3,000	6
100,000 . . .	17,431	17	9,533	10	6,000	6
200,000 . . .	44,431	22	21,533	11	12,000	6
500,000 . . .	132,931	27	57,533	12	30,000	6

[a] Not including surcharges for municipalities and schools.
[b] For married man with wife and three dependent children.
[c] After allowing deductions for business expenses and other Syrian taxes.
[d] No account is taken of the provision fixing the income tax liability at one-half of the license tax (temettu) in the case of a business enterprise with gross receipts below £S 25,000 and of a professional man whose gross compensation for services is less than £S 15,000.
[e] Assumed to be received in equal monthly instalments.

support of differentiation apply to income attributable to the personal efforts of business proprietors and professional men as well as to salaries and wages.

Transformation of the tax on non-agricultural real estate would be accomplished by requiring all individual income from taxable real estate to be aggregated in order to determine the applicable tax bracket, having regard to customary personal exemptions. This should be administratively feasible; income from real estate is comparatively easy to detect in view of its association with tangible property and the possibility of using title

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records to verify ownership. A modest beginning has already been made 651 in at least one revenue office in bringing together assessment data for different properties owned by the same person. The tax base should continue to include both receipts from rented property and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied property, but both components should be assessed more frequently than once in 10 years. Ideally, all income should be assessed annually, although this may not be feasible as regards imputed income from owner-occupied real estate. The tax on capital value of vacant urban land should be retained as a separate levy.[14]

It is stated in the Main Report that a global complementary tax applicable to income from all sources is urgently needed to round out the tax system. As long as separate graduated rate schedules apply to income from different sources, a person receiving income from two or more sources will pay less tax than one receiving the same total amount of income from a single source. Even if the rates and exemptions in the various schedules are identical, the person with income from two or more sources will enjoy the benefit of the low first-bracket rates on each type of income and will be subject to a lower top rate than the person who receives all of his income from one source. The global tax should be designed to adapt the income tax more closely to ability to pay and to introduce a greater element of progressivity. It should therefore apply to agricultural income as well as to income subject to schedular income taxes. Initially, this tax should apply only to a small minority of taxpayers. At this stage major reliance would still be placed on graduated schedular taxes, which are easier to administer and more familiar to Syrian taxpayers than a global complementary tax. As administrative efficiency and taxpayer cooperation improve, coverage of the global tax could be broadened. Ultimately, graduation of income tax rates could be accomplished mainly through the global complementary tax, and the schedular taxes would incorporate either a uniform flat rate or only a few brackets. This type of arrangement has been found to be most convenient in many countries.

Application of the same graduated rates to joint stock companies or corporations and to partnerships as well as to sole proprietorships, which

[14] The fee for night watchmen's services (a national revenue) and the surcharge for municipalities might continue to be based on the assessed income or capital value of each parcel of property without allowance for personal exemptions or the application of graduated rates. *In rem* taxes of this nature are levied in many parts of the world to help finance local governments and to pay special costs of property protection.

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651 is now the general rule in Syria, is questionable, because the system makes no allowance for the number of owners of the enterprise. An arrangement more logical than the present practice would be to collect a flat-rate tax on the income of companies and partnerships, to be treated as a withholding tax against the personal tax liabilities of resident shareholders and partners. This arrangement, however, does not appear to be administratively feasible at the present time.

The authorities should prepare and distribute standard income tax forms and every effort should be made to increase the proportion of cases assessed on the basis of systematic records. Steps in this direction might include imposition of a financial penalty on taxpayers who fail to file proper returns[18] and adoption of a policy of setting high presumptive assessments.

Agricultural taxation. The agricultural production tax is by no means an ideal measure, but it is established and yields large amounts of revenue. The tax will probably have to continue for some time as the principal means of taxing agriculture. The desirability of instituting an annual tax on large holdings of agricultural land has already been stressed.

It would not be feasible to subject the mass of small farmers to a schedular income tax and it would be unfair to do so, even if feasible, as long as the agricultural production tax is maintained. But it would be appropriate to apply the global complementary tax to the relatively small number who receive large amounts of income from agriculture and from ownership of agricultural land. It might be desirable, however, in computing the global income tax to allow a deduction or a partial credit for the agricultural production tax. The difficulties of determining net agricultural income of large operators from agriculture, although admittedly great, are probably no greater than those of assessing income tax in many lines of business and the professions. Reliance would probably have to be placed at the outset mainly on indirect evidences of presumed income, such as area and quality of cultivated land, volume of marketed crops, ownership of irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery, and so on. The taxpayer should, however, always be encouraged to furnish adequate accounting records to contest a presumptive assessment.

The mission earlier commented that in view of the fact that the livestock head tax (about 5% of ordinary revenue) is so arbitrary and difficult

[18] An exception to this requirement might appropriately be made for wage earners subject to withholding tax.

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to apply, it seems desirable to abolish it and to subject sales of livestock 651
and wool, hides and skins to the 7% agricultural production tax applied to marketed produce. Milk, butter and cheese might be exempt for social reasons.

Export taxes. The mission believes that at present prices cotton cultivation is still sufficiently profitable to warrant continuation of the existing export tax. We have, however, recommended that the tax should be revised to make its rate responsive to price changes. We are not prepared to formulate a precise schedule of rates, but we do recommend that the principle of the sliding scale be adopted and put into effect at once. Early action is desirable so that cotton growers may make their plans with the assurance that the export tax will be automatically adjusted if prices have fallen by the time the crop is marketed. This revision would introduce a desirable element of flexibility in the tax and would thereby minimize adverse effects on production. In selecting the schedule of rates it would be advisable to bear in mind the revenue needs of the state and to avoid going too far in the direction of flexibility, however desirable that characteristic may be from the point of view of production incentives.

Excises and import duties. Increased taxes on non-essential consumption items should be regarded as one of the principal sources of the additional revenue required to finance an expanded development program. In the absence of an efficient personal income tax, excises and import duties on non-essentials can also help to offset the regressive bias of the tax system.

It has already been stressed that valuations for purposes of ad valorem import duties should be based on the free exchange rate rather than the official rate. Under the present arrangement duties appear to be much higher than they actually are and it is by no means certain that the combination of high nominal rates of duty and artificially low valuations always results in a tax liability which reflects a considered policy. Where the change in valuation method produces a higher effective duty than is desired, nominal rates of duty could be adjusted.

Revenue from state domain. The mission believes that Syria should 651
obtain more revenue from state domain lands. According to figures sup- 427
plied by the Ministry of Agriculture, the government is obtaining £S 1.8 million annually from rental of 551,000 hectares of state land, or approximately £S 3.30 per hectare. We think that rentals should be increased to at least £S 5 per hectare. At current prices of wheat and barley this would equal about 10% of net yield (that is, gross yield less seed). The

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651 increase would add approximately £S 1 million per year to revenues. 427 Existing contracts and administrative problems would doubtless cause some delay in putting this recommendation into effect. Nevertheless, a significant increase in receipts could be obtained over the next few years.

IV PUBLIC DEBT

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Present Situation

The Syrian public debt amounted to £S 312 million at the end of 1953.[18] There is no considered public debt policy. Borrowing is not closely correlated with the government's need for funds, and in the past large amounts have sometimes been borrowed when the Treasury had available to it cash balances far in excess of immediate needs. In addition, no provision is made for regular service or retirement of the debt. The entire internal debt is held at low rates of interest by the BSL and the government has not attempted to develop a market for its securities among private investors. Moreover, the government does not seem to be fully aware that Treasury-guaranteed loans from the Issue Department to government entities and industrial companies are as much a use of the government's credit as direct government borrowing from the Issue Department and that the economic significance of the two types of transaction is the same.

The practice of financing expenditures by borrowing from the Issue Department is always potentially inflationary, but it can be acceptable and helpful when used in moderation and adjusted to economic conditions. It is objectionable if the volume of such financing is not based on a careful appraisal of over-all monetary conditions as well as financial needs of the government. Syria has so far largely escaped the inflationary consequences of resort to the Issue Department mainly because a considerable part of the borrowing in recent years has been offset by increases in cash balances. But borrowing when large cash balances exist is not only unnecessary but dangerous, since there is always the possibility that the various government entities might try to use their balances at a greater rate than the economy could absorb without risking inflation or the depletion of foreign exchange reserves.

[18] See page 261.

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larger, and exceed exports which have been falling off. On the other hand, exports of knitted, cotton and rayon goods and other articles of clothing, garments, underwear and socks exceed imports by far.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the entire cotton textile industry is well protected. Imports of yarn and cloth are subject to rather high import duties: 45% ad valorem (about 33% at the free rate of the Syrian pound); duties on fine cotton yarns are substantially lower. In contrast, rayon and woolen yarns are duty free. Socks and stockings (except those made from woolen yarns), men's shirts and pyjamas for men and women may not be imported. This protection, though helpful to the home market, hampers the export trade, particularly in finished goods. This is especially so of those goods requiring use of imported materials in their production; no adequate tariff rebate is given on foreign materials in the exported finished goods. Syrian shirt manufacturers, for instance, claim that with existing machinery they could easily double their production and compete in the export market but for these unfavorable conditions. Although most of the surrounding countries heavily protect their own textile industries, some of Syria's finished textile goods seem to be in a position to compete on the international market to the extent that the component materials are not burdened with protective duties.

In the dyeing, printing and finishing industry—which for a long time lagged behind—a considerable expansion is still anticipated and seems fully justified. Additional machinery was being installed to make possible a full three shifts.

The worsted and woolen cloth industry is not as well equipped with modern machinery as the cotton textile industry. Although the existing plant operates little below capacity and imports of cloth are rather significant, the industry shows no great inclination to expand. Despite the fact that imported yarn is duty free and imported cloth is subject to a rather high tariff, there is keen foreign competition by Italian cloth in the cheaper ranges, British cloth in the higher class and by second-hand suits from the United States. Complaints were heard that the transport charges on the bulkier imported yarns weigh heavily on the industry in comparison to the cost of transporting imported cloth. This drawback seems difficult to overcome. Exports of woolen yarns and cloth have been running well under 7% by value, of imported yarns and cloth, and in view of the factors mentioned above, no large expansion of exports is to be expected. For recent figures, see Table 1 of the Appendix.

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The vegetable oils and soap industries have not generally been very profitable. One of the larger Damascus companies had substantial losses in 1949 and 1952. In 1950 and 1951, however, it earned 20% and 30% on its paid-in capital. One of the more important companies in Aleppo apparently barely broke even in 1951 and 1952 and suffered severe losses in 1953, so that it was reported to have gone into liquidation in 1954. A new Aleppo company which started operating in 1952 apparently has been somewhat more successful to date.

The large glass factory near Damascus earned profits of about £S 200,000 on £S 7 million paid-in capital in both 1952 and 1953. Prior to these years of modest profits it consistently suffered losses except for the year 1950 when it showed a net profit of £S 183,140.

On the profitability of tanneries there is little information, although one evidently earned almost 7% in 1952 and 14% in 1953 on its paid-in capital.

The rubber shoe industry is apparently highly profitable, if one can judge from the data available on one company which earned almost 55% on its paid-in capital in 1952, and approximately 85% in 1953.

The match industry is suffering from overcapacity and, owing to keen competition, seems to have made little profit in recent years.

For other industries, such as milling, beverage, paints, etc., no information is available on profits.

III GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

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The relations between government and industry in Syria will be discussed under the following headings: (1) tariff policy and embargoes, (2) credit facilities, (3) fiscal privileges, and (4) other controls and incentives.

Tariff Policy and Embargoes

Syria achieved customs autonomy for the first time in recent centuries in March 1950, with the termination of the Customs Union with Lebanon. As a natural consequence, each country began to apply its normal tariffs to imports from its former partner. Only a few days later, the Syrian tariff on imports of certain foreign products which competed with local industry

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was increased from 25% ad valorem to 40% or 50%. This was true of canned vegetables and fruits, fruit juices, jams, candy, woolen and mixed cotton cloth and various kinds of glass. In estimating the amount of protection thus provided it should be kept in mind that the tariff duties are based on the import prices at the official rate of exchange, but as the goods are actually paid for at the free rate (with the exception of mineral oil products) the incidence of the duties is less than two-thirds of the apparent rate. 651

In 1950 also a special customs duty of 5% was introduced, as a so-called "consumption tax" on imported products, substituting for various municipal taxes previously collected. Although largely revenue-producing in character, this measure somewhat increased the protective effect of the tariff.

Shortly after ending the Customs Union the Syrian government enacted legislation bringing import licensing, until then a matter for joint decision, under its control. In view of the favorable development of business conditions following the outbreak of the Korean war, application of licensing was deferred.

By early 1951, however, several factories appeared to be overstocked with raw materials purchased at boom prices and certain weaknesses inherent in the Syrian industrial structure became more apparent. Several industries seemed to be overexpanded in relation to internal consumption and insufficiently prepared to meet foreign competition both at home and in the international market. They requested the government to give them a preferential position with respect to the supply of essential local raw materials, to impose import restrictions on competitive foreign goods and to adjust importation of industrial machinery to the needs and absorptive capacity of the country.

As a result, between March and June 1951 the tariff on a large number of finished textile goods (hosiery, men's and women's clothing, etc.) was raised from 40% to 50%, and an embargo was introduced on "job lots of cloth" (cloth damaged, or of inferior quality or otherwise not suitable for sale through normal channels), imported in considerable quantity and greatly in demand by the poorer groups of the population. Imports of looms and knitting machines were brought under special control. The export of several materials in short supply (e.g., certain metals, fertilizers, jute sacks, paper and paperboard, and glycerine) was forbidden.

Thereafter, the protectionist policy with regard to industry became

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651 more pronounced and systematic. The regulations regarding the licensing of imports were more strictly applied. The normal tariff on glass was raised to 70% and on various sorts of soap to 40% or 50%. The export of a large number of important raw materials, raw cotton, cotton seed, oil cakes, raw wool, all fruits and vegetables, was subjected to licensing. Shoes and boots were added to the embargo list. Although the embargo on "job lot cloth" was strongly protested, it was not lifted, and instead it was extended to second-hand cotton and silk clothing.

651 656 439 The year 1952 was characterized by a policy of rigorous industrial protectionism. The Minister of National Economy, given almost discretionary power to institute export and import embargoes and licensing requirements, used these powers with little restraint, particularly as to import embargoes, which were imposed on four principal categories of imports: (1) goods locally produced in quantity adequate to meet domestic requirement; (2) goods for which similar local products could be substituted; (3) luxury goods; and (4) machinery which would increase the capacity of an already overequipped industry.

The restrictions and controls on exports were somewhat extended and a de facto monopoly was established with regard to import, export and wholesale trading of sugar.

These measures of extreme protectionism, supplemented by a stricter enforcement of the control on the utilization of foreign exchange by importers and various other measures which will be discussed later, made it possible for many months to charge local customers relatively high prices, compared to those prevailing in the surrounding markets, and to make substantial profits. It also facilitated agreements among manufacturers in defense of their common interests and to reduce internal competition. Complaints from those whose interests were particularly affected and a more general dissatisfaction created by a rise in the cost of living induced the government to take steps to reduce prices. Acting under general legislation enacted in 1951, and specific legislation with respect to sugar and cement, the government fixed lower prices for goods such as cement, yarns and vegetable oils and reduced the tax on sugar.

However, it was thought even in government circles that the import prohibitions had gone too far. Not only was the cost of living increasing but the income from customs duties began to drop, and smuggling and evasion of price-fixing rules became a most profitable activity. In April 1953 action of the Minister of National Economy with respect to imports

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and exports was subjected to the approval of the Council of Ministers. This was followed by the withdrawal of embargoes on various non-competitive imports, higher tariffs being substituted in some cases.

As of autumn 1954 all embargoes on imported goods which directly compete with national products were still in effect, with the exception of the embargo on men's shirts, underwear and pyjamas. Imports of cotton gins are forbidden, to prevent further overexpansion of the ginning industry, and the importation of second-hand looms and knitting machines is prohibited, to ensure the installation of new and modern machinery; importation of almost all items, including machinery, is still subject to licensing. There has been almost no change in the list of prohibited exports or of those which must be licensed. Although the export tax on wheat has been repealed, cotton exports are still taxed; there were certainly good financial reasons for this, but it means in fact a continuation of the element of protection which this duty represents, in favor of the local cotton processing industry. On the other hand, products subject to an embargo or high protective duties are no longer subject to price control. The government is now relying on the effect of internal competition.

Credit Facilities

During the mandate, in 1929, the Syrian Government instructed the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture to establish an industrial bank with a capital of £S 500,000, in which the government was to participate; this was never done.[8]

Not until 20 years later, in June 1949, was the Minister of Finance authorized to guarantee loans to Syrian industrial corporations (*sociétés par actions*) for their first installation or to enable them to continue operations. The amount to be reimbursed under the guarantee could not exceed half the paid-up capital of the corporation and the period of repayment was not to be longer than three years. Eligibility of applicants, their needs and the conditions of both loan and guarantee were to be determined by a special committee; the Minister of Finance was authorized to require a mortgage on the property of the corporation, the mortgage to have preferred position.

Of the 18 loans totalling £S 23.627 million made by January 1952,

[8] *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie*, Mich. Thome, Madrid, 1953, p. 157.

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quantities to be exempted have been made by government officials. The mission suggests that for the system of individual decisions involving political judgment there be substituted in the law itself a general exemption provision on as liberal a basis as possible. 654 433

We cannot endorse the temporary exemption from income tax for new firms and for profits on new investment by existing firms. Our chief objection to these provisions is that an income tax exemption leads to rather irrational and sometimes inequitable results. It is obviously most important to the companies realizing the highest profits and it is of no value to those making no profits during the period of exemption. Furthermore, with a graduated tax such as Syria's, large firms benefit more from the exemption than do the small- and medium-sized firms. The exemption of profits derived from expansion of existing businesses, as distinguished from exemption of new firms, presents serious administrative difficulty in connection with the allocation of total profits between the new and the old part of the business. No fully satisfactory solution for this problem can be found even when both administrators and taxpayers are highly skilled and sophisticated in accounting techniques. Yet it would be undesirable to confine the concession to new firms, since additional investment in an established business may often be more productive than the same investment in a new business, especially where, as in Syria, there is a shortage of experienced managers. 654 433 651

The simplest way to achieve most of the benefits of temporary income tax exemption without its disadvantages and difficulties appears to be through liberalization of the depreciation or amortization allowances under the income and profits tax. In other words, the taxpayer should be allowed to write off against taxable income the original cost of plant and equipment in a period shorter than the normal useful life. For any given asset, accelerated depreciation results in a postponement, rather than a complete cancellation, of income tax liability but the investor can extend this postponement indefinitely by acquiring new assets when the first group has been written off for tax purposes.

Accelerated depreciation reduces or eliminates the chance that the income tax will prevent recovery of the capital outlay. For a rapidly growing firm it may offset taxable income and thus be virtually equivalent to exemption. The concession is automatically cancelled if the firm ceases to expand. Accelerated depreciation puts the emphasis on new investment, whereas tax exemption may grant unnecessarily large benefits to highly

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654 profitable firms which do not choose to expand. Furthermore, depreciation
433 raises no great administrative difficulties.

651 Our recommendation would provide a fairly effective substitute for income tax exemption, especially the recommendation that the tax on non-agricultural real estate be transformed into a tax on a true net income is also adopted. We realize, however, that a special problem arises in adapting the accelerated depreciation approach to Syrian conditions. Businesses with gross receipts of less than £S 25,000 per year pay an amount equal to 50% of the temettu tax in lieu of the regular income tax. Since these firms do not compute net income or depreciation allowances they could hardly be brought under the general scheme. It is suggested that these smaller firms be allowed to deduct from their tax liability a credit related to the amount of any new investment in buildings, machinery or other industrial equipment.

The present exemption of reserves up to 10% of annual profits which, within two years, are devoted to expansion of the enterprises would seem to be extremely difficult to administer satisfactorily; proper administration would call for careful supervision to assure compliance. This provision could well be eliminated. The law might provide, however, that if deduction of accelerated depreciation after an investment has actually been made produces an accounting loss, the loss might be carried back against income of the two preceeding years. The present law allows losses to be carried forward against income for five years but does not provide for a carry-back of losses.

652 *Credit facilities.* Our principal objections against the scheme of gov-
433 ernment-guaranteed industrial credits can be summarized as follows: (1) It applies only to corporations, thus excluding the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises, which are not organized in this form, and in effect reserving its benefits to a small group of large companies, although there is no reason to assume that all credit needs outside this group can be met by other means. (2) The limitation of the life of the guaranteed loans to three years (later extended to eight) does not sufficiently allow for adapting the maturity of these loans to the requirements of the projects. As an instrument to facilitate long-term industrial financing the provision may in some cases be too rigid. (3) The 3% interest rate, appreciably below the prevailing market rate, puts the beneficiaries in an exceptionally favorable competitive position as again non-beneficiaries, and may stimu-

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652 total which reasonable expectations indicate can be raised. In the Main
433 Report we have suggested capitalization of £S 30 million, and suggested the respective ratio of government and private capital.

The cost of necessary managerial and technical staff might run up to £S 300,000 per year and other costs might rise to the same figure with an increase in the volume of business. Possibly half of the cost of the technical staff might in the long run be recouped from fees for technical services. To economize on operating costs it would be advisable to have the commercial banks act as the bank's agents in receiving applications for loans and disbursing and servicing loans in return for a small commission.

654 *Tariff policy and embargoes.* It is far from clear that the trend toward
439 almost complete protection of industry from the impact of foreign com-
651 petition, qualified to only a limited extent by certain provisions of various commercial agreements, has reached its limits.

We have previously recommended reconsideration of this policy. Protection of many industries has gone too far in the direction of national isolation; the balance should be restored by giving more weight to international integration. Liberalization of external trade should be one of the items on Syria's economic program.

In making this suggestion the mission is mindful of the fact that Syria's balance of payments position is not very strong and that the condition of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves obliges the government to proceed with caution. Yet, as long as internal monetary equilibrium is preserved and the foreign exchange policy remains sound, the significance of these limitations ought not to be exaggerated.

We do not recommend immediate termination of the system of licensing imports since it enables the authorities to register at an early date the expected inflow of foreign goods. This may be considered a legitimate precaution, especially if the restriction of licenses is reserved to times when the balance of payments position is endangered. Under licensing, however, discrimination among imports is unavoidable. It should be realized that the need for such a measure indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the factors which determine external equilibrium; rather than continuously applying the palliative of direct import restrictions, Syria should try to remedy this situation. Even if direct import restrictions are temporarily unavoidable, they should not preclude remedial action; on the contrary, they should as far as possible contribute to bringing about an improvement in the basic conditions.

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The licensing of certain local raw material exports in order to give preference to the home market can have several objectives. If its purpose is to permit the local consumer to purchase the raw materials at prices lower than those at which they can be sold in foreign markets, it deprives the suppliers of a price differential; this is difficult to justify. But to a large extent the measure appears to have been inspired by the consideration that many Syrian industrial enterprises lack sufficient working capital and credit facilities to enable them to finance large seasonal raw materials purchases. In that case, the objective would then be to assist local industry in overcoming a competitive handicap, as against financially stronger foreign buyers, by temporarily restricting local raw material exports, without primarily intending to create a preferential price. There may also have been a desire to protect the local raw material suppliers from being forced, for liquidity reasons, to sell out at whatever prices they could obtain at the earliest time, thus endangering steady employment in the local processing industries. If these are the purposes of the licensing measures, provision of adequate storage and credit facilities for both local consumers and suppliers would make such licensing less urgent or even superfluous. Various of our recommendations relate to such facilities, and we suggest that if and when these are adopted the system of export licensing should be discontinued.

The mission has considerable objection to the imposition of embargoes. Import embargoes tend to prevent direct foreign influence on the local prices and qualities of the commodities involved. All the arguments previously advanced against an overstressing of the concept of development in isolation as opposed to development in an international economy apply here. Granted that Syrian industry needs some protection, the mission believes that such stringent measures are not called for, especially since they make it impossible for enterprise and consumers to purchase the particular foreign goods however urgently they may need or want them.

In a limited number of cases the government itself has already substituted higher tariffs for embargoes. Unless such duties are completely prohibitive, this means in principle a reintroduction of international competition, even though in a limited form. The mission considers this a step in the right direction and recommends a total abolition of the remaining import embargoes, even if accompanied by an upward revision of the relevant tariff rates.

With respect to the embargoes on exports the mission does not believe

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656 that the supply of the materials covered by this measure would be seriously
● 651 endangered if their export were permitted, particularly if the industrialists
+39 were given free access to the international raw material markets.

At the time of the termination of the economic union, Syria's tariff structure was rather simple, with little diversification in rates. For most industrial products, excluding primary materials or semi-finished goods essential for local industry, the normal tariff rates (specific and ad valorem) approximated 25%. Since then, even in those instances in which the tariff was raised, the ad valorem duties, at least those expressed in a percentage of free rate prices, are still under 35%, exclusive of the consumption tax on imported goods. Only a few specific duties exceed that level.

Elsewhere in this report the mission recommends that for fiscal reasons the valuation of imported goods at the fictitious official rate prices be replaced by a tariff based on actual free rate prices, and that at the same time the entire schedule of tariff duties, both ad valorem and specific, be subjected to a careful re-examination governed by both revenue and economic considerations. This would undoubtedly result in a more diversified tariff. Certain rates, for instance on some semi-finished and finished goods, would have to be lowered; others could remain as they are. To the extent that duties must remain protective in nature (for infant industries or those subjected to foreign dumping practices), they should not be so high as to safeguard local industries from all foreign competition and thereby weaken the incentive to lowering costs. Moreover, due attention should be given not only to the interests of the producers of the "protected goods", including the industrial workers, but also to the interests of the local consumer, be it a further processing industry or the consuming public. The mission has the definite impression that with respect to the protectionist measures the voice of the industries demanding them has in many cases prevailed over the voice of the other interested groups. It is therefore recommended that in revising the tariff the government should take a broader view than it has done hitherto and pay more attention to keeping the cost of industrial necessities down for the large majority of the population.

We have mentioned that the decisions of the Minister of National Economy to impose a licensing requirement and embargoes on imports and exports now require the approval of the Council of Ministers. If the government follows the mission's recommendations, the administration of

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industrial protection through measures affecting foreign trade would be 656
largely the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. We therefore suggest 651
some procedure to assure that the Minister of National Economy also has 439
some responsibility in this connection insofar as the interests under his jurisdiction are involved. It would also seem desirable that the Council of Ministers continue to exercise its ultimate control over measures of this character so that possible conflicting considerations may be resolved in terms of the public interest in its broadest sense.

Export promotion. The priority given by the Syrian government to 654
attaining national self-sufficiency with regard to industrial products which 439
can be locally manufactured has been combined with a growing effort 433
to open up additional markets for Syrian industry, particularly in the other Near Eastern countries. Syria's execution of several bilateral trade agreements [illegible]d participation in the inter-Arab economic agreement aiming at liberalizing mutual trade exchange are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. The possibilities for further industrial export promotion, however, are not being fully exploited.

First, the mission recommends that Syrian export industries be given every possible assistance in the procurement of foreign raw and auxiliary materials without fiscal charges, specifically that they be given a full rebate of such charges commensurate with actual exports, and that the system of rebates be so administered that the rebate can be quickly and easily obtained.

Secondly, it is recommended that the policy of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with Syria's main commercial partners be systematically pursued. The considerable increase in recent years in exports of silk and artificial silk cloth, knitwear and other articles of clothing and soap, particularly to the markets of Jordan and Iraq, indicates that there are industrial export possibilities worth while consolidating and expanding.

Thirdly, it is suggested that Syria which, so far as is known, lacks natural oil deposits, has an even greater interest than its oil-producing neighbors in the creation, on a multilateral basis, of a market among the countries of the Arab League; the amount of purchasing power generated by these other countries would contribute far more to the joint total than would Syria's contribution. It therefore seems to be particularly in Syria's interest to promote further inter-Arab economic integration. If this could be achieved, conditions would also become more favorable for the re-establishment of the economic union with Lebanon.

المالية

واردات الحكومة ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥٤ ، تقديرات الموازنة

(بالوف الليرات السورية)

GOVERNMENT REVENUE, 1950/51 — 1954

(Budget Estimates)

(L.S. '000)

Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

Item of Revenue	(1) 1950/1951 (١) ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١	(2) 1951/1952 (٢) ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٤ 1954	[illegible]
Total revenue	215,720	265,000	207,992	208,000	مجموع الواردات
Direct taxation and duties	27,312	46,215	37,675	33,800	ضرائب المباشرة والرسوم المماثلة لها
Indirect taxation and duties	126,778	151,338	114,554	119,591	رسوم والضرائب غير المباشرة
Registration fees	16,500	22,124	18,610	21,000	رسوم التسجيلية
Income from Government property	6,360	6,490	5,730	5,800	حاصلات املاك الدولة
Income from investments in industries	713	788	375	800	حاصلات الاستثمار الصناعي
Miscellaneous revenue and revenue from public services	31,902	31,048	17,089	20,151	ارداد مختلفة وواردات المصالح العامة
Receipt in attention to expenditure	975	950	857	857	ارداد مخفضة للنفقات
Extra-ordinary revenue	4,580	6,047	13,102	6,002	ارداد استثنائية

Soures : Ministry of Finance.

المصدر : وزارة المالية

1 — For the period 1st January 1950 — 30 June 1951

2 — For the period 1st July 1951 — 31 Dec. 1952

١) للمدة الواقعة بين ١ كانون الثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١

٢) للمدة الواقعة بين ١ تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

اهم واردات الحكومة من مختلف الضرائب والرسوم ، ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ - ١٩٥٤
حسب تقديرات الموازنة (بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM TAXES AND FEES, 1950/51 — 1954
Budget Estimates
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

TAXES AND FEES	١٩٥٠/٥١ (١) 1950/51 (1)	١٩٥١/٥٢ (٢) 1951/52 (2)	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٤ 1954	الضرائب والرسوم
Total	170,890	219,677	160,589	164,924	المجموع
Tax on income from house property	6,000	8,000	4,500	5,000	ضريبة ريع العقارات
Tax on land property	150	500	400	500	ضريبة العرصات والاراضي
Tax on trades and industries	6,500	11,500	15,000	9,750	ضريبة المهن والحرف الصناعية والتجارية وغير التجارية
Tax on salaries and wages	3,450	4,500	3,500	3,400	ضريبة الرواتب والاجور
Tax on capital funds in circulation	195	150	200	200	ضريبة دخل رؤوس الاموال المتداولة
« Tamatu' » tax	3,000	4,000	2,400	2,975	ضريبة التمتع
Animal tax	6,000	13,400	9,000	9,000	ضريبة المواشي
Tithe	75	75	50	50	ضريبة الاعشار
Passage and personal tax	195	265	100	100	ضريبة بدل الطريق والرسم الشخصي
Mineral tax	37	37	25	25	ضريبة المعادن
Security tax	1,312	3,000	1,800	2,000	ضريبة الحراسة
Registration of property tax	75	125	200	200	ضريبة التسجيل العقاري
Fees on lands irrigated by the Government network	113	363	400	500	رسوم على الاراضي المسقاة بشبكات الري الحكومية
Fees on transfer for movable property	300	300	100	100	رسوم النقل على الاموال المنقولة
Duties on fuel	18,750	20,000	12,500	15,000	ضريبة المواد المشتعلة
Duties on alcoholic drinks	1,200	1,200	1,300	1,300	ضريبة المسكرات
Duties on sugar	15,000	15,000	7,750	8,000	ضريبة حاصلات حصر السكر
Duties on salt	—	—	2,750	2,900	ضريبة حاصلات الملح

1 — Period 1st January, 1950 — 30th June 1951.
2 — Period 1st July, 1951 — 31st December, 1952.

(١) المدة الواقعة بين ١ كانون الثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١
(٢) المدة الواقعة بين ١ تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

أهم واردات الحكومة من مختلف الضرائب والرسوم ، ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥٤
حسب تقديرات الموازنة (بالوف الليرات السورية)

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM TAXES AND FEES, 1950/51 — 1954.
Budget Estimates
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 3 (concld.)

جدول رقم ٣ (تتمة)

TAXES AND FEES	(١)١٩٥٠/٥١ 1950/51 (1)	(٢)١٩٥١/٥٢ 1951/52 (2)	1953	1954	الضرائب والرسوم
Duties on tobacco and tombac	22,500	22,000	16,500	19,000	واردات جمرك التبغ والتنباك
Duties on cement consumption	1,800	3,600	2,400	3,000	رسم الاستهلاك على الاسمنت
Duties on entertainments	600	750	100	410	رسم اللاهي
Duties on game shooting, fishing and boat sailing	38	38	45	40	رسم الصيد البري والبحري والسفن
Tax on agricultural production.	21,390	32,750	23,000	22,000	ضريبة الانتاج الزراعي
Revenue from the «Common Interests» (Customs)	45,500	56,000	37,050	38,465	واردات المصالح المشتركة (الجمارك)
Judicial fees	2,025	2,175	1,710	2,000	الرسوم القضائية
Fees on the Notary Public	375	525	400	400	رسوم كتاب العدل
Fees on sale, transfer and registration of property	4,050	5,000	4,000	4,100	رسوم الفراغ والانتقال والتسجيل العقاري
Stamp duties	6,375	8,440	7,000	7,500	رسوم الطوابع
Receipts from motor vehicle traffic control	1,800	2,750	2,750	2,750	حاصلات مراقبة سير السيارات
Army stamp duty on electricity consumption	975	1,175	1,000	1,200	رسم الجيش على كشوف مقطوعية القوة الكهربائية
Revenue from General Security Offices.	375	375	400	500	حاصلات الامن العام
Consular fees	450	1,000	850	1,800	حاصلات القنصليات
Receipts from foreign trade permits.	375	675	500	750	حاصلات تصاريح التجارة الخارجية

Source : Ministry of Finance
1 — Period 1st January, 1950 — 30th June, 1951
2 — Period 1st July, 1951 — 31st December, 1952.

المصدر : وزارة المالية
(١) المدة الواقعة بين ١ كانون ثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١
(٢) المدة الواقعة بين ١ تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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refinery is running on imported crude oil at about a quarter of its capacity. There exists an IPC refinery at Tripoli which treats over half a million tons of crude a year (10,000 barrels a day) for the needs of Syria and Lebanon which it cannot fully supply; accordingly, its extension has been under discussion. Construction has begun on a refinery for 7,000 barrels a day at Sidon for Mediterranean Refining Company (California Texas Corporation), but while the Syrian market is still too small to justify the erection of a refinery, the Syrian Government nevertheless wishes to have a refinery established in the country to meet its own needs, and negotiations to this end with IPC and with the World Bank have recently taken place.[1]

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Under the Barcelona Convention of 1921 dues are not leviable on transit trade, but the two countries draw, under their agreements with the pipeline companies, a sizable revenue from petroleum apart from the indirect benefits caused by employment by the oil companies. At the time of writing the agreements between the two Governments and the two oil companies are under review but no precise details are available, though the two Governments began by demanding that they should receive jointly a half share of the saving which the companies made by using the pipelines instead of having to transport their oil to the Mediterranean by tanker. Even if this principle were accepted, the difficulty would remain of establishing a satisfactory formula for calculating the saving. The agreement with Tapline is believed to provide Lebanon with about £L4½ million a year. The oil companies bring foreign exchange into Syria and the Lebanon and the currency is surrendered to the Governments at the official rate but can thereafter be resold at the rate applying to the free market which may bring to the Governments a profit of a third. The problem is that Syria and Lebanon are, in fact, not oil-producing states and, although their needs and desires for foreign money may be as great as Iraq's, it is difficult to see how they can expect to obtain from petroleum the same revenue as do the states where it is produced.

Communications

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In general, roads provide a cheaper and quicker means of transport than the railways which are mostly running at a loss. The railway lines are:

The Hejaz Railway. A narrow (3 ft 5 in.) gauge track runs from the centre of Damascus to Deraa (88 miles) and thence

[1] See *Petroleum Press Service*, February 1953, p. 53.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

investment in cotton growing, prices began to rise once more. 435
At the end of 1951 rising import prices, coupled with the poor 439
grain crop, were reflected in local retail prices, and prices continued to rise until mid-1952, when governmental action and steadier import prices had a salutary effect. Thus, generally speaking, the retail price of household goods has risen five or six times since before the war, and the currency in circulation has also risen despite the fact that the official credit policy has been restrictive; although the note issue is now only £S46 million higher than in 1946 (at 31 December 1951 it was £S248 million), bank deposits have increased from £S96·2 million at the end of 1949 to £S198·3 million at the end of 1951. At that date the currency was covered, as to gold 9·9 per cent, foreign exchange 6 per cent, commercial bonds 1·4 per cent, treasury bills 33·5 per cent, and state loans or guarantees 48·9 per cent.

Direct taxation on income and the land accounts for only 651
about a quarter of the Syrian budget;[1] this is less than before 652
the war, for the proportionate amount from the land has fallen from 30 per cent to about 14 per cent in 1950; the estimate for 1952 was 18 per cent. Receipts from customs duties have increased considerably and these, with other indirect taxes, have helped to make the burden less 'fairly' distributed. Indirect taxes are levied on sugar, petroleum, and other essential commodities. Budgetary expenditure since before the war has increased seventeenfold, and since 1949 the total annual expenditure has increased by more than a quarter; but whereas expenditure on health, education, and public works has increased only slightly, that on defence has trebled and accounts for over a third of total expenditure. Agriculture, with only 2 per cent of the budget, is insufficiently provided for and it is hoped that its share will be increased.

Banking is largely but not exclusively in the hands of foreign 453
banks; La Banque de Syrie et du Liban (French) has the concession for the note issue, but there is talk of starting a Syrian National Bank; among other commercial banks are La Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (French) and the British Bank of the Middle East. The foreign-exchange market 457
has always been less influential than that of Beirut, but in this respect Aleppo is growing in importance. There is a recognized free market for exchange[2] in which merchants and Government alike deal. The official rate of £S6·19 = £1, used mainly for Government transactions, was abolished in June 1953 for all purposes except Government transactions with petroleum com-

[1] See table 2, p. 502 below. [2] See table 3, p. 503 below.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

COTTON TEXTILES

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Syria has nine small cotton textile mills centered around Aleppo and Damascus, with a total of 55,000 spindles and 2,000 looms and a number of knitting mills and garment factories. A large home industry, which not only weaves but also spins cotton yarn, has, according to trade representatives, a capacity almost as great as that of the commercial mills.

[439]

Until a few years ago the industry of Syria was complementary to that of Lebanon. Syria bought yarns from Lebanon and sold cloth there. The two countries together were able to produce about two-thirds of their total needs.[30] Acceding to nationalistic pressure, Syria dissolved the customs union in 1950 and set about not only to install more spindles to balance the weaving capacity, but actually to become self-sufficient in all cotton textiles. A number of mills have bought new equipment for rehabilitation and integration.

Outstanding in this field is the new mill built at Damascus by a group of industrialists known as the "big five." The mill is small in size—only 10,000 spindles and 350 fully automatic looms—but it is a showplace, modern in every detail. The management is especially proud of the modern clinic which provides the workers with free medical attention—a new idea in this part of the world.

This mill has a well-trained engineering and administrative staff and good machinery. To increase efficiency, the management hopes to abandon the range of goods now made and concentrate on the production of only two or three constructions. The level of efficiency is high enough, based on the wage scale of roughly $1.25 per day, to permit the mill to compete on the world market. Approximately 20 per cent of the cloth production is exported.

The other industries are less efficient and are not in a position to compete on the export market.

COTTON CONSUMPTION

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In Syria production of yarns was estimated by the government at 5,500 tons in 1951, double what it had been four years earlier and seven times the output ten years ago. Industry and government figures vary considerably, especially on output of the home industry, but they agree on the same sharp rise in production.

Cotton consumption, computed on the basis of yarn production estimates, is placed at approximately 33,000 bales and is in line with the sharp increase in yarn production.

PROTECTION

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As in other Middle East countries, the cotton textile industry receives substantial tariff protection from imports. Syria is a free-money market, and foreign exchange can be bought for any purpose on any street corner. As a result, prices are reported to be going down, as they did in Lebanon when foreign exchange was freed several years ago.

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Duties on cotton textiles were changed in 1949 from a specific rate base to an ad valorem base. The duties on most yarns in which the local industry is deficient average about 20 per cent ad valorem; on cotton textiles, about

[30] *Report of the United States-Syria Agricultural Mission*, op. cit., p. 3.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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651 30 per cent; and on garments, from 40 to 50 per cent. Syria, along with many Middle Eastern countries, has retained a war-time regulation assessing double duty on goods from Japan, a former enemy.

AGRICULTURE

311 241 Accurate figures on the present land use or possible uses are lacking. Government estimates on the area under cultivation and acreage are considered unreliable by the United States Agricultural Attache, and he suggests using them only as general indications of trends.

These rough calculations indicate that about 45 per cent of the country—approximately 20 million acres—is suitable for agricultural purposes, including grasslands. The rest is waste land. About half of the 20 million acres are thought to be suitable for cultivation, out of which between 4 and 5 million acres are estimated to be in crops and orchards at the present time.

At least three-fourths of the crop land appears to be devoted to cereals, primarily wheat and barley. Cotton has been expanded in recent years to about 10 per cent of the planted land. Dry legumes, vegetables and other minor food crops, as well as several less important industrial crops such as tobacco, hemp, and silk cocoons, are also produced.

Orchards and vineyards are significant in Syrian agriculture; and, although they have not been fully developed, occupy possibly 10 per cent of the cultivated land. Olives, citrus, walnuts, and pistachios are commonly grown.

Because of the lack of moisture, inadequate rotation, and insufficient use of fertilizer, a large part of the cultivated land is fallowed each year. A

—Photo Courtesy of Near East Foundation

Near East Foundation officials inspect one of their experimental cotton fields near Damascus which produced over a bale and a half to the acre.

"Anyone who intentionally dirties any drinking water source is to be imprisoned for from one to three years and shall pay a fine of from 25 to 300 Syrian pounds" (Article 735). 671 312 681

New Taxation on Irrigated Lands

A new legislative decree, No. 34 dated 30 December 1951, amends Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of law No. 467 dated 21 February 1949 which imposed an annual tax on land irrigated by state irrigation systems. The new decree reads as follows: 312 651

"This tax is applied per hectare in the following manner:

Area of Irrigated Land	Khabour Hsérib and Senn Irrigation System	Homs and Hama Irrigation System	Matkh Irrigation System
	L.S.	L.S.	L.S.
Up to 5 hectares	20	15	5
From 5 to 25 hectares	25	20	7.5
From 25 to 50 hectares	40	30	10
Over 50 hectares	50	40	15

"Such tax shall be reduced by half after a lapse of ten years from its first year of application.

"It should be calculated on the whole area held by the taxpayer, whether individually or in partnership with others, with reference to the land irrigated by one and the same irrigation system. The tax on a fraction of a hectare shall be proportionate to the tax on a whole hectare.

"The tax shall take effect on the first day of the year following the year in which the water is brought to the land subject to the tax, even though such water has not been used.

"The term 'Engineer-in-Chief of the region' in Article 8 of Law No. 467 shall be replaced by 'Engineer-in-chief of the hydraulics service of the region' (Article 2).

"The following paragraph is added to Article 6 of Law 467:

61: Capsules S-4 (no date) 1964 M1 Middle East
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"In regions where there has been neither delimitations nor survey, the areas to be taxed shall be determined on the basis of the taxpayers' declarations and the investigations by such services. Investigation expenses shall be fixed, where necessary, by decision of the Ministry of Finance." (Article 3).

"The provisions of this legislative decree shall come into force on 1 January 1952 and shall have effect as of that date with respect to land exempted by previous legislation (Article 4).

"This legislative decree shall be published and communicated as and where necessary" (Article 5).

TUNISIA

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The basic Tunisian legislation actually in force on water is the following:

1. The decree of 24 September 1885 defining public domain.

2. The decree of 24 May 1920 setting up a special water service with an agricultural and industrial hydraulic fund and a water committee.

3. The decree of 5 August 1933 definitely codifying the conservation and utilization of waters of the public domain and its succeeding amendments (the decrees of 11 May 1935 and 26 November 1936).

4. Other provisions concerning the fees due for the utilization of public domain waters (the orders of 5 June 1935 and 21 February 1938) and concerning the organization of hydraulic associations (the decrees of 30 July 1936 and 17 March 1939).

According to the decree of 24 September 1885, the public domain consists of:

1. watercourses of all types and the lands included in their embankments;

2. springs of all kinds;

874 conducts an experimental farm, and co-
operates with the government in a compre-
hensive educational program.

489 Syria produces a variety of items for ex-
port, the principal products being cereals,
textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral re-
sources, although rich deposits of asphalt
exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins
in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the
northeast under a concession acquired in
1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company,
an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the
country derives some income from pipelines
which traverse it, leading from the oil fields
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is
slowly emerging from the handicraft stage,
and numerous modern plants for the proc-
essing of local materials have been estab-
lished, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo.
They include the manufacture of textiles,
soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food prod-
ucts, shoes, cement and other consumer
goods. The promotion of industry is handi-
capped, however, by the shortage of raw
materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria
are linked with each other and with the ad-
joining territories by a system of motor
roads. Communications in the interior are
poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable
rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and
steamer traffic with the Mediterranean
countries is at present conducted largely
through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon.
The construction of modern port facilities
at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil
fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to
the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with
both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an impor-
tant junction on the trunk line from Istan-

p. 140 (B)

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 M1 Middle East
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Premier Fawzi Selo stated at the end of 1952 that the annual royalties from Tapline totaled about $490,000 and that the Syrian Government found that sum inadequate as compared with the advantages the Company enjoyed in Syria. The Government had therefore asked the Company for an increase, and after negotiations a new agreement was signed in May 1952 which raised the royalty to about $1 million, and which provided that the parent companies of Tapline were to supply Syria with increased amounts of crude oil to meet part of her internal need, at the most favorable prices prevailing in the eastern Mediterranean area.[30]

Soon the Syrian Government felt that even the increased royalties and crude supplies were not sufficient and it demanded from I.P.C. and Tapline one-half of all savings from the transit of oil through Syria, based on what the cost would be if the oil had to be moved by tanker. It also demanded that the crude oil be supplied free to the Government.[31]

EXPLORATION

Syria having been included in the Red Line Agreement, I.P.C. obtained, early in 1934, a four-year exploration permit in the Shamiyah desert; this was later extended to other areas. In 1936 the subsidiary Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon) Ltd. was organized. Two years later the Syrian Government signed an agreement with this Company granting it a 75-year concession covering all the Syrian territory (except the Alexandretta district) north of Damascus. It provided for an immediate payment of £50,000, a rental rising from £15,000 to £80,000 in ten years, and a lump sum of £100,000 when oil began to be exported. Royalty was to be 4 shillings per ton. The Company was to build a refinery to supply Syria's internal petroleum needs. If oil was not discovered within ten years, or no commercial export was under way within fifteen years, the concession was to be cancelled. The agreement was not ratified until 1940, but in the meantime the Company carried on exploration and drilling. The outbreak of World War II

[30] *Middle Eastern Affairs*, IV, 20, Jan., 1953.

[31] Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 244; *Le Commerce du Levant-Beyrouth Express*, Mar. 5, 1955. It was calculated by the Syrian press that the oil companies saved through the pipelines over $220 million, while the payments to Syria were no more than LS 6 million.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 M1 Middle East
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interfered with operations, which were resumed in 1947. The Company gave up its concession in August, 1951.[32]

In 1954 it was reported in Damascus that the annual internal consumption of petroleum was about 350,000 tons and that the Government was negotiating with Tapline and I.P.C. to build two refineries near Damascus, the cost of which was to be deducted from the Government's revenue from the two companies.

So far Syria has failed to discover oil in her territory, but the Tapline and I.P.C. pipelines have become important sources of income to the Government and the cause of constant friction between it and the oil companies. From 1947 to 1952 the increase in the income from pipelines was considerable, but the local agitation for higher royalties has been continuous and, in the spirit of the prevailing practice in the area, a demand for a 50 per cent profit-sharing arrangement is constantly being echoed.

Lebanon

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Lebanon signed an agreement with I.P.C. in 1931 under the same conditions as the other countries. The first pipeline ran through her territory for only seventeen miles. The northern branch of the line terminated at Tripoli where a farm of fifteen 93,000-barrel tanks was built. The loading fee at Tripoli was 2 pennies per ton.

In 1947 Lebanon signed the agreement with Tapline mentioned above, and that same year I.P.C. agreed to pay Lebanon transit fees amounting to £45,000 annually. A new agreement with I.P.C. was signed in 1952, raising the transit fees to about £450,000 annually. A new agreement was also signed with Tapline in 1952; it provided for a basic increase in transit fees, for $3 per ton up to 200,000 tons for petroleum products consumed in the country; an increase in the loading fee at Sidon; and annual contributions of $21,000 for the maintenance of the public highways used by the Company's vehicles and $17,000 to the municipalities of Beirut and Sidon in consideration of services.[33]

[32] A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1946), 155; Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, 91-95.

[33] United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52*, 59, henceforth cited U. N. *Review* or

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The banking system was developed, but this improvement was partly offset by the shocks caused by successive devaluations of the franc, to which the Syrian pound was linked on an exchange standard. Slight reforms were introduced in the fiscal system, and steps were taken to protect industry. Until 1924, the Ottoman tariff of 11 per cent on almost all goods had remained in force. In 1924, a distinction was made between members of the League of Nations and the United States, goods from which were subjected to the "normal" tariff of 15 per cent, and other countries, 1/ which paid the "maximum" of 30 per cent; industrial machinery was exempted from customs duties. In 1926, the normal rate was raised to 25 per cent and the maximum to 50 per cent. In 1928, duties on raw materials and fuels were reduced. In the nineteen thirties, the general level of the tariff was lowered, but protection to Syrian industry was increased. As a result, several modern factories were established, and there was also some modernization of the handicrafts, by the installation of improved tools and power driven machinery. 2/

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During the Second World War the large-scale expenditure of Allied troops raised incomes and prices, 3/ thus stimulating agricultural and industrial production, and the reduction of imports also aided local production. Owing to some mechanization, and to the fact that cultivation of marginal land became profitable, the area sown to major field crops increased by about 40 per cent between 1938 and 1945. This extension of acreage was, in some years, offset by a decline in yields, but the grain crop at the end of the war was distinctly greater than before the war. Industry expanded considerably, and communications were improved. The forced saving, due to inflation and the shift to profits, took the form of franc and sterling balances held by Syrian individuals and institutions.

1/ Owing to special arrangements, trade between Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan was exempt from duties on either side.

2/ Both the decline in handicrafts and the rise of modern industry are reflected in the following figures, covering Syria and Lebanon, presented by the Mandatory Government to the League of Nations in 1937: in 1913, there were 310,000 handicraft workers; by 1937, the number had declined to 171,000, most of whom were in Syria; on the other hand, there were 33,000 workers in "modern industries", of whom a little over 40 per cent were in Syria and the rest in Lebanon.

3/ From 1940 to 1944 inclusive, Allied expenditure in Lebanon and Syria totalled £76 million (sterling). In 1939 to 1945, inclusive, Lebanon and Syria had a surplus of 637 million Lebanese-Syrian pounds on current account. The index number of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus rose from 100 in 1938 to 831 in 1945.

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£S 3.50 and £S 3.85 in 1951, and between £S 3.55 and £S 3.89 in 1952, in 1953 it fluctuated between £S 3.57 and £S 3.72 and during the last seven months of the year remained stable at £S 3.50. But while the Office has damped seasonal movements it does not seem to have attempted to oppose or mitigate longer-term trends. In addition, in the second half of 1953, two measures were taken to give the exchange market greater flexibility. In July the Exchange Office began to quote daily forward buying rates for United States dollars, pounds sterling, French francs and Belgian francs; these rates were limited to foreign exchange derived from exports. And in August non-resident accounts opened with authorized banks could be overdrawn within the limits and during the time required for the settlement of normal commercial transactions. 1/ Transactions carried out by the Exchange Office rose from £S 302.2 million in 1952 to £S 676.2 million in 1953. 2/ A breakdown of the office's operations shows that it drew on the sterling accruing to the Government at the official rate - mainly from petroleum companies operating in Syria, which in 1953 supplied £ 4.6 million (sterling) - and on its French franc balances, and sold sterling and francs to the market, purchasing with the proceeds gold, dollars and other currencies for use as note issue cover. 3/ 457

Public finance

Both expenditure and revenue increased very rapidly during the war years, expenditure from £S 10.9 million in 1939 to £S 99.2 million in 1945, and revenue from £S 11.4 million to £S 118.2 million; the increase was therefore somewhat greater than the rise in prices. A surplus was registered in every one of the war years, and in 1945 the Government Reserve Fund stood at £S 49 million; in 1946 there was a further surplus of £S 8 million. The increase in expenditure in subsequent years, due mainly to the war in Palestine and to increased expenditure on defence, was not matched by revenue, and every budget except that of 1952 showed a deficit; from 1947 to 1949, £S 32 million were withdrawn from the Reserve Fund. The draft estimates for 1953 and 1954 also show deficits. 652 651

1/ International Monetary Fund, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions.

2/ In 1952, £S 29.1 million of purchases and £S 13.4 million of sales and in 1953 £S 29.5 million and £S 31.8 million, respectively, were effected at the official rate, the remainder at free rates.

3/ Net sales to the market in 1952 totalled £ 4.3 million (sterling) and 62 million French francs; net purchases of United States dollars were 9.8 million, of Swiss francs 1.1 million, and of Belgian francs 23.7 million. Corresponding figures for 1953 were 698 million French francs, and $ 12.8 million; purchases of sterling equalled sales (Ministry of Finance, Exchange Office, Annual Report, 1952 and 1953 (in Arabic) Damascus).

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652 651 The Government's debt to the Banque de Syrie et du Liban 1/ rose from £S 158.3 million at the end of 1948 to £S 241.7 million at the end of 1951 and £S 312.4 million at the end of 1953; there had been no debt prior to 1948. The only external debt was the $6 million loan from Saudi Arabia mentioned above.

Important tax reforms were carried out during the war years. In 1942 an income tax was levied on incomes earned in industry, commerce and the professions, on wages and salaries and on dividends, interest and other earnings on capital; rates were raised in subsequent years. 2/ In 1944 a tax of 7 per cent was levied on marketed agricultural produce; this replaced the previously levied tithe and land tax. Buildings and land lying within towns or villages continued to be taxed on their capital value. In 1952 an inheritance tax was imposed, with rates ranging from 1.5 to 40 per cent.

The increase in revenue in recent years has come mainly from increased yield of income taxes, registration fees, excise duties on sugar and petroleum and the profits of the tobacco monopoly (see table 54). On the expenditure side, the most striking change in recent years has been the increase in defence expenditure, which rose from 16.5 per cent of the total in 1945 to 43.7 in 1951/52, declining to 36.3 in the 1954 estimates. Other important items are education, which rose from 8.8 per cent to 17.6 and 17.8, respectively, and health, from 2.9 per cent to 2.8 and 4.2. Expenditure on public works increased little, and its relative importance declined from 12.4 per cent to 6.3 and 8.3. However, some of the most important projects, such as the Ghab drainage, Latakia harbour, Aleppo water project and others, are not included in the budget, being financed by loans or other extra-budgetary sources.

1/ This includes such items as the difference on the French franc cover of the note issue (£S 65.8 million in 1952) and the debts of the Cereals Office (£S 46.8 million), the Exchange Office (£S 26 million), the Agricultural Bank, the railways, electricity administration and other government administrations (£S 59.4 million) and loans to industrial companies guaranteed by the Government (£S 13.4 million), as well as the direct debt of the Government of £S 96.9 million, and other minor items.

2/ In 1952 rates ranged from 6 per cent on incomes between £S 3,000 and 10,000 to 18 per cent on those between £S 30,000 and 50,000 and 36 per cent on those above £S 750,000.

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Table 54. Syria: Principal Items in Government Budgets, 1939 and 1948 to 1954

(Millions of Syrian pounds)

Item	1939	1948	1949	1951 a/	1952 b/	1953 c/	1954 c/
Revenue:							
Direct taxes on income and wealth d/	1.2	9.4	12.2	19.3	27.1	27.8	23.8
Taxes on property transfers	0.4	8.9	9.3	16.7	22.5	18.6	21.0
Taxes on land, animals and agricultural produce	3.5	18.9	18.9	26.8	49.7	32.0	31.0
Customs duties	0.1	34.9	41.5	49.6	62.3	37.7	37.8
Other indirect taxes	3.6	34.3	39.1	36.9	60.9	54.8	60.7
Other receipts	2.6	9.5	15.2	40.3	41.4	24.1	27.6
Total e/	11.4	116.1	136.1	209.7	270.1	194.9	202.0
Expenditure:							
Education	1.7	20.5	22.8	36.3	47.2	36.8	37.1
Health	0.3	3.4	3.9	5.3	7.5	9.4	8.8
Defence	-	44.8	49.3	102.5	104.6	66.0	73.4
Public works	2.0	16.9	16.4	16.9	16.8	17.5	17.2
Other expenditures	6.8	50.6	58.7	73.8	91.6	78.3	69.5
Total	10.9	136.3	141.1	234.8	287.7	208.0	208.0
Balance	0.6	-20.2	-5.0	-25.1	2.4	-13.0	-6.0

Source: United Nations, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Fiscal and Financial Branch.

a/ January 1950 to June 1951.

b/ July 1951 to December 1952.

c/ Estimates.

d/ Taxes on income and wealth consist of income tax on income from real estate, industrial, commercial and other concerns, income on salaries, etc., and also taxes on capital transfers and other receipts.

e/ Total receipts, excluding transfer from reserve funds.

Part One

Problems of Economic Development

6. At the beginning of independence, when a Syrian Government assumed power, the country's economy was in a relatively primitive state. It was burdened by many restrictions, it faced difficult problems and it needed a great deal of care and order. The government had very little to build on, and it was faced, into the bargain, with a huge legacy of problems left to it by the previous régime. 652

7. We will first examine the problems arising from outside sources. The most important of these lay in the monetary and exchange system, customs policy, and the customs and economic union with Lebanon.

8. The monetary system was governed by a contractual agreement with a foreign bank, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which managed the Issue Department and which took decisions on matters of issue and credit quite independently of the Syrian Government, which thus had no power of direction or control whatsoever. Syrian currency was tied to the French franc and the greater part of the cover was in French francs. These balances were the subject of disagreement between the Syrian and French Governments, both on the question of their guaranteed value in terms of sterling and the question of their free use. Negotiations with the French Government resulted in an agreement [1] which solved the question of the guarantee and granted Syria the right of gradually liquidating the franc balances. The break of the Syrian pound away from the French was agreed to and Syria became free to exercise the right of legislating in monetary matters. Subsequent to the agreement, Syria issued a series of laws that regulated the issue of currency, its circulation and cover, and which provided for the control of the Department of Issue and the direction of the monetary and credit policies. The last of these laws was Legislative Decree No. 87, of March 28, 1953, which covers the basic monetary law and the establishment of the Syrian Central Bank. 652 648

[1] The Agreement of 7 February, 1949, including liquidation, settlement, and payments agreements.

652 648 9. The exchange system was subject to the control of the Mandatory authority which directed it in accordance with its own interests, and the exchange control was a department administered directly by the High Commissioner's Office. In 1944 the exchange control was transferred to a joint Syro-Lebanese committee, headed by a delegate from the Central Exchange Control Office of the franc area, of which both Syria and Lebanon were members. In 1948 Syria declared its withdrawal from the franc bloc and became independent in dealing with exchange questions. The Exchange Office in Syria thus became a purely Syrian institution. Subsequently the Government initiated several reforms that aimed at removing war-time restrictions. The exchange system became gradually freer and adapted itself to the needs of the Syrian economy. The last and most important of these reforms was Legislative Decree No. 208 of April 21st, 1952, which allowed the free entry and transfer of capital and created conditions facilitating commercial transactions ; it also worked towards achieving stability in the foreign exchange rates and bolstering the cover to the currency. In this manner the Decree inspired confidence in the national currency and prepared the right atmosphere for the entry of foreign capital and its investment in the country. [1]

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651 648 10. As to the customs policy, this also was directed by the Mandatory authority. It was formed by financial considerations, the first aim of which was to cover the expenditures of the Mandate and collect revenues for the treasury. When the Syro-Lebanese authorities took over the customs administration, the customs tariff and regulations moved gradually towards facilitating commercial transactions and encouraging national industry by exempting machinery and raw materials, needed by industry and agriculture, from duty. However, the establishment of a customs union between the two contries and the existence of an actual economic union, which took the form of free movement of goods, capital and persons between them, led to disagreements as to the customs and economic policies that each country thought should be followed. The disagreement reached its peak on the questions of import and export policies and the protection of national industry, and as a result of their faillure to agree on a common policy, the two count-

1 *Vide The First Annual Report on the Activities of the Exchange Office in 1952*, Damascus, 1953.

ries separated in 1950, and, in consequence, Syria regained free- 661
dom of action in directing her customs and economic policies and 648
in managing her economy on an independent basis.

11. The new Syrian government also had to face serious internal problems, that the Mandatory power with its "Laissez-faire" policy had not attempted to deal with. No factual study of the country was made nor any determined course of economic action undertaken. The following are the most serious of the defects of the economic system at that time :

First there was a lack of statistics and detailed studies upon 659
which to base a sound economic policy. Nor were there any technical and scientific studies of the country's economic resources, or plans for developing and exploiting them. Secondly, the bank- 453
ing system failed in meeting the country's need for agricultural 652
credit and for medium and long term credit. The majority of the banks were branches of foreign banks that specialized in commercial short-term credit operations, and which, with the exception of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, avoided seasonal agricultural lending. All the banks operated without any control or direction. Furthermore, no bank had up to that date been established to deal with industrial or mortgage credit. There was only the Agricultural Bank, established by the government to deal with medium-term agricultural loans, but its regulations, staffing and limited means did not enable it to play a major role in meeting the needs of agriculture. Thirdly there was no money market that 454
could attract national savings and invest them in development projects. People with savings have always preferred to hoard them in the form of gold, or else they invested them in real estate. In addition, foreign capital avoided entry into the country because of restrictions on exchange, and other reasons.

12. During the period 1945 to 1953 the government made a 656
great effort to regulate the Syrian economy in the fields of trade,[1]

1 Legislative Decree No. 14 of December 18, 1951 and its amendments concern the regulation of the possession of, and trade in, raw materials and products. Legislative Decree No. 151, of March 3, 1952 and its amendments concern company law and the law governing firms established outside Syria. Legislative Decree No. 60, of January 12, 1952 and its amendments regulate foreign trade etc.

656 industry,[1] and agriculture,[2] and to establish stable principles of economic policy.[3]

647 To remedy the above mentioned defects and to fill the gaps in the country's economic structure the government established a Directorate of Statistics[4] and directed its attention to the preparation of scientific and technical studies of the country's resour-
652 ces.[5] Finally, the government reformed the country's banking and
453 monetary systems by creating, in accordance with the Basic Monetary Law,[6] the Money and Credit Council with the function of exercising monetary control ; it laid down new monetary regulations inspired by the needs of the country and regulated the operations of bankers and money-changers. Reform included also the expansion of the Agricultural Bank's capital, the strengthening of its financial means and the extension of its operations to meet seasonal credit needs.[7] The question of medium and long-term credit remains however still unsolved.

433 13. To complete this brief survey of Syria's economic position in 1945, when the new national government came to power, it is necessary to give some account of general economic conditions.

1 Legislative Decree No. 47, of August 7, 1952 and amendments regulating Syrian industry.
Legislative Decree No. 138, of November 6, 1952 regulating industrial, commercial and free professions.
Legislative Decree No. 103, of September 27, 1952 relating to the encouragement of industry.

2 Legislative Decree No. 135, of October 29, 1952 and Regulatory Decree No. 768 of November 3, 1952 concerning the distribution of state lands.
Legislative Decrees No. 50, 51 and 52 dated January 9, 1952 and No. 81, 82 and 83 dated January 23, 1952 and No. 125 and 126, dated January 20, 1952 relating to the planting and export of cotton ; Legislative Decrees No. 27, 80 and 106 of 1952 concerning the sale of Agricultural machinery and the combatting of agricultural pests and insects etc.

3 *Vide Syrian Economy 1953* - Government Press, Damascus.

4 Legislative Decrees No. 130 and 35 dated June 11, 1949.

5 Report by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, 1947 ; studies of irrigation projects, the Ghab project, Lattakia port project and the Aleppo water scheme ; Mission of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

6 Legislative Decree No. 87, of March 28, 1953.

7 Law 77, dated June 28, 1951 which provides for the addition of LS 10 million to the capital of the Agricultural Bank ; Law 126 which grants LS 5.5 million to farmers affected by losses ; Legislative Decree No. 9 amending the Agricultural Bank Law ; and Legislative Decree No. 97 which empowers the Agricultural Bank to extend seasonal loans etc.

185 ginning in solving many problems of agriculture, industry, and trade. There is not enough space here to give details of their achievements; it is enough to say that, by continuous and widespread effort, the Syrian government was able to remove external problems and to clear away many of the internal obstacles and restrictions that hampered the country's progress. Thus they prepared the way for the emergence of a policy of economic development, and created many of the essential conditions for its success.

15. Leaving aside particular and secondary problems, we can diagnose Syria's major development problems as follows : National production is still far below capacity ; a large part of national resources and wealth are not yet exploited. Many large-scale projects must be undertaken before any increase in productivity can take place. Such projects are : irrigation, the draining of marshes and extension of cultivable land ; improvement of agricultural methods, utilization of modern machinery and combatting of plant diseases and pests ; exploitation of natural resources such as minerals and mines, and the generation of electric energy and motive power ; the improvement and increase of livestock by better water supplies, shelter and pasturage ; re-afforestation and the preservation of existing forests ; the construction of roads, bridges, ports and airports, and the supplying of means of transport to facilitate communications ; the completion of land surveys and settlement operations in all districts; the construction of general warehouses; the supplying of drinking water and electricity to rural areas. But, whereas the country's needs are great, her financial means are not 454 adequate to cover them. National savings are low in themselves, as we noted above ; people prefer hoarding gold or investing in 652 real estate. There is as yet no financial market in Syria. State finances are necessarily weak so long as they depend on a weak economy. Thus, neither the state nor private individuals can be expected to finance big development.

16. It follows from the above that the economic development of Syria depends on a solution to the following problem : the Syrian economy needs capital and finance projects that will create conditions favourable to its growth ; but, as a result of its weakness and underdevelopment, it lacks the necessary financial means. In other words, the state's financial capacity is small and cannot expand unless national production grows ; and national production cannot grow unless the state's financial capacity expands. How

then, are we to get out of this vicious circle? It is worth our while, before we attempt to answer the question to review the development policy that was followed during the period 1945-1953. 652

Part Two

Economic Development During the Period 1945-1953

17. Credits allocated to development projects and approved by the Syrian government from 1945 up to the end of 1952 totalled approximately LS 420 million, of which LS 301 million were actually spent during that period; that is, at an average rate of LS 37.7 million per year.

In what follows we shall briefly describe the projects that have been executed, and the means by which they were financed and administered.

Projects Executed

18. The effort exerted has covered constructional, economic and social aspects. Expenditure was distributed as follows:

Table 1

Expenditure on Development Projects 1945-1952
(in LS Millions)

Government buildings	25,728
Schools	11,500
Hospitals & Clinics	8,500
Irrigation	41,000
Communications (roads, bridges, ports and airports)	39,120
Railway lines	8,287
Automatic telephone	33,000
Electricity	10,000
Agricultural & veterinary schools, centers & nurseries	4,000
Agriculture & agricultural credit	29,300
Cereals Office	40,000
National Industrial companies	16,927
Survey and settlement	6,500
Municipalities (drinking water & electricity)	27,500
Total :	301,362

652 The distribution of this expenditure over the years 1945-1952 gives us the following approximate figures:

Table 2

Expenditure on Development Projects for the years 1945-52
(in LS Millions)

Year	Expenditure
1945	9,300
1946	13,150
1947	26,367
1948	67,750[1]
1949	45,015
1950	40,512
1951	54,820
1952	44,448
Total:	301,362

The Financing of Projects

19. Development projects were financed from three sources. First, from appropriations allocated from the general state budget; secondly, from available treasury funds, most of which consisted of the budgetary surpluses that went to form the reserve fund; and thirdly, from loans from the Bank of Issue. The following Table indicates the relative importance of each of the three sources of finance.

Table 3

Source of funds	LS Millions
From budget appropriations	115,000
From available Treasury funds	59,537
From the Bank of Issue	126,825
Total:	301,362

[1] The amount allocated to the Cereals Office ranged between LS 25 and LS 50 million in different years. The sum of LS 40 million appears only in the year 1948 although allocations were made in the following years as well.

Table 4 below gives a division of the funds according to source and year. 652

Table 4

Development Funds According to Source and Year
(in LS Millions)

Year	Budget Appropriations	Drawn from Available Treasury Funds	Taken from Bank of Issue	Total
1945	7,500	1,800	—	9,300
1946	8,250	3,500	1,400	13,150
1947	12,250	7,617	6,500	26,367
1948	17,500	7,500	42,750	67,750
1949	21,500	9,620	13,895	45,015
1950	17,250	11,500	11,762	40,512
1951	15,500	10,500	28,820	54,820
1952	15,250	7,500	21,698	44,448
Total:	115,000	59,537	126,825	301,362

In general, we notice that budget expenditures were made on general projects, such as communications, government buildings and schools, that do not yield direct revenue. On the other hand, financing from treasury funds or from the Bank of Issue took the form of loans given to projects that yield returns and are thus able to repay them. Electricity installations, national industrial companies, the automatic telephone, and loans to municipalities are examples of the second type. Out of the loans made for these purposes the following amounts were repaid during the period under review:

Repaid out of the amounts drawn from the available treasury funds.	LS 12 million
Repaid out of the amounts advanced by the Bank of Issue.	» 12 »
Total:	LS 24 million

20. We have no comment to make on the method of financing from the budget or from available Treasury funds; for these finan-

652 cial sources are derived from national savings and were drawn from taxes that fed both the budget and the reserve fund. Average expenditure per year reached LS 22 million. Since the state budgets ranged between LS 99 million in 1945 and LS 200 million in 1952 this represents about 10 per cent of the total budget.

21. The method of financing from the Bank of Issue requires some clarification and discussion. When the government had recourse to Bank of Issue loans to finance a part of her development projects, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban used to secure the necessary funds in one of two ways: either by placing the loan in the currency cover and issuing new currency paper; or else by utilizing the public deposits in its commercial department. For, besides undertaking normal banking operations, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban was at the same time in charge of currency issue. By virtue of its concessionary position it acted as the financial agent of the government, and was the bank in which were deposited the treasury's funds and those of all public departments and institutions, such as the Waqf, municipalities, railways, and electric-power establishments. These public deposits were placed in the Bank's commercial department and in recent years ranged in amount between LS 100 and LS 120 million. The Banque de Syrie et du Liban often used these public deposits to finance the larger part of the loans on the understanding that, if funds were later drawn from public deposits, it could call on its Issue Department to obtain the funds required and place in the currency cover the loans drawn from the deposits. It can therefore be said that a large part (about 65 per cent) of the Bank of Issue loans originated from public deposits placed with the commercial department. Government borrowing, for this reason, did not necessarily lead to a direct increase in the currency in circulation.

22. The loans from the Bank of Issue that were used during the period under review to finance development projects reached LS 126.8 million, of which LS 40 million were used by the Cereals Office to buy cereals from the farmers which it later sold gradually both in internal and external markets. This operation was not in fact more than a short-term commercial credit operation of seven to ten months duration, and it can therefore be said that the financial operations of the Cereals Office had no inflationary impact on the Syrian economy.

The remaining sum of LS 86.8 million (126.8 - 40) was invested for periods ranging between 5 and 10 years, in projects which are likely to have a quick effect in terms of expanded national production and economic activity. The Bank of Issue loans, which amounted to LS 86.8 million, invested in development projects, did not, considered apart from other loans and inflationary factors, have an inflationary effect upon the Syrian economy, for the following reasons: the sum of LS 86.8 million was spread over eight years at an average rate of LS 11 million per year. This amounted to only 5 per cent of the money in circulation which reached LS 197 million at the beginning of 1945 and LS 239 million at end of 1952. During the same period there appeared several factors that had a deflationary impact, counterbalancing or modifying the effect of the Bank of Issue loans. On the one hand, as we pointed out earlier, LS 24 million out of the funds invested in development projects were repaid within the same period. On the other hand, the Reserve Fund rose from LS 27.9 million at the end of 1944 to LS 45.2 million at the end of 1952, the source of the increase being an excess of budget revenue over expenditure. Thirdly, part of the expenditure was made in foreign exchange, thus leading to a contraction in monetary circulation equal to the amount of foreign exchange drawn for that purpose from the currency cover. Fourthly, the greater part of the loans were financed, as we have seen, by drawing on the public deposits placed in the Commercial Department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. Finally, it is well known that the velocity of monetary circulation in agricultural countries is lower than in industrial countries. In countries that lack developed means of capital transfer, the effects of monetary inflation do not therefore appear as strongly or as fast as with a highly developed banking and deposit currency system. 452

23. Changes that took place in internal prices and exchange rates during the period under review* support this view. Internal prices — except during the Korean war emergency — did not rise, despite the existence of other inflationary factors due to loans spent on nonproductive projects, and despite the lack of any set monetary policy to control credit. This phenomenon can be explained only in terms of a growth of national production during the period under consideration and by appreciable expansion in economic activity. The following Tables support our observations: 435

*[1945 - 1952 -- Analyst]

The noticeable rise in the rates during 1951 and 1952 is largely due, we believe, to the conditions arising from the Korean war. 457

Planning and Administration of Projects

24. It is difficult to say that there existed in Syria a development policy with definite aims and worked-out plans during the period 1945-1952. Development projects were studied and approved piece-meal under pressure of need and circumstances, without reference to any general programme, and without being subjected in their administration, execution, or the management of their financial and economic effects, to one single authority that could direct the whole operation and create the conditions for its success. The projects had nothing in common except the great need felt for them and the necessity of finding the required funds. 652

25. Development projects were approved in one of two ways. First, by including them in the body of the state budget and making the necessary appropriations. As most of these projects could not be executed within one financial year, the Budget Law provided for the transfer of such appropriations to a special account outside the budget called the Development Programmes Account. The purpose was to prevent the cancellation of unused appropriations at the end of the financial period, as is normally done in a yearly budget. Secondly, the projects that were financed from available treasury funds or from Bank of Issue loans were approved individually by issuing for each project a special law, which established definite principles for its administration and execution and which authorized the government to borrow the necessary funds either from the available treasury funds or from the Bank of Issue.

26. The method followed up to now in approving, financing, and executing development projects is not free from certain defects and pitfalls. These are the main criticisms we have to make. First, it does not enable the government to have a complete picture of all the projects that the country needs, or of the cost and the period required for their execution, so that it can make a priority list and earmark definite financial sources for each one. Without such over-all comparison, the government cannot give each project the priority it deserves according to its productive value, the speed of its execution and the funds it requires. Moreover, without prior study of the projects, and a stock-taking of its financial

5:Barakat S-5 (no date)1954 MD1 Syria MD1

652 capacity, the government cannot establish a clear principle of economic development; nor can it expect to have a long-term, integrated policy, characterized by stability and permanence, and guaranteeing the execution of the projects free from interruption, vacillation and the interference of personal interests. Finally, the government has not evolved a unified policy that can integrate financial and monetary considerations on the one hand, and the requirements of economic policy on the other. If no general development programme is adopted, the authorities concerned will not be able to handle the monetary, financial and economic problems that are bound to be raised by the application of parts of the programme. The prerequisite for the solution of any problems that may arise is a planned integration of ends and means.

Part Three

185 The State of Economic Development at the Present Time

27. By the end of 1953,[1] following an initial period of experimentation that lasted for nine years, Syria had covered a good distance on the road of economic development. In addition to the efforts made to execute a considerable part of the development project, the Syrian government has succeeded in creating many of the conditions necessary for further development. There remains before it the new, critical stage of determining and implementing a complete balanced development policy.

28. The Syrian government managed, in this period, to remove some of the obstacles, both external and internal, that stood in the way of the success of any development policy. It also started to make studies of the country's potentialities and began to organize the collecting of statistics and data concerning the country's condition. It strengthened the mainstays of the national economy and organized it on a firm basis. Then it turned to its monetary and banking system and established a supreme authority to undertake its administration. This authority was given the powers and means necessary for managing monetary, exchange, credit and banking

[1] At the time of writing in the autumn of 1953, the final figures for 1953 were not available. This leaves a gap of one year in the survey of the period 1945-53 made in Part Two of this paper. However, no change in trends appeared in 1953.

5:Barakat S-5 -(no date)1954 MD1 Syria MD1

Ensuring Harmony

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31. The execution of the development programme will have serious financial, monetary and economic effects upon the country. For it diverts a section of productive powers towards projects that do not necessarily lead to an immediate expansion in national production. On the contrary, it deprives production, for the period during which development projects are executed, of some of the factors that would normally be employed in producing consumption goods. Since a development programme leads to the creation of additional purchasing power, as a result of its putting into circulation amounts of money in excess of what the economy is accustomed to, there are bound to be repercussions upon prices and wages. Production of consumption goods falls but purchasing power expands. This situation will demand careful attention from the government, which can counterbalance its inflationary effects in the following ways: by regulation of the amounts that can be spent at each stage on development projects ; by attempting to divert certain productive elements (such as the building industry) towards development projects ; by directing the additional purchasing power towards investment projects, or by absorbing it back into the national funds through encouraging savings, through taxation, or through imposing rationing on consumption.

32. On the monetary side, a development programme raises several problems, of which the most important are securing foreign exchange and the adaptation of credit policy to the new conditions created by the programme.

As to foreign exchange, the development programme is bound to create extra demand for foreign currencies. If the exchange available is not sufficient to meet the needs of the programme in addition to the other normal needs of the country, then the Planning Board will have to evolve a means of counterbalancing the tendency such a situation will have, to depreciate the national currency. It would be necessary to : limit the importation of luxuries and inessential goods ; borrow externally to secure the required exchange ; increase the country's exports so as to obtain extra exchange. This is difficult to achieve however, for the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Credit policy can play a major role in leading development policy to success, and in counterbalancing some of its short-term

effects. Thus, credit may be contracted with the aim of fighting inflationary symptoms, or discount rates may be raised so as to encourage investment of private funds. Shortage of investment that may be found in certain consumption industries can be remedied by directing credit towards them, and by advancing the money they need at favourable terms. 652 185

33. As to financial policy, it plays the major role in determining the monetary or economic effects of the development project. It is well known that these monetary and economic effects differ with the different methods used to finance the development programme. It is also clear that the ease with which development policy problems can be solved depends on whether the state budget is in a state of deficit, balance or surplus. This also applies to expansion or contraction in ordinary budget expenditures and to the ways in which appropriations are spent.

34. It is not our purpose here to analyse the interaction and interrelation between each of the budgetary, monetary and economic policies on the one hand, and development policy on the other. We intend only to point out the basic fact, that no development policy should be prepared or implemented unless it harmonizes and co-ordinates with the general economic policy in all its aspects. Each element should have a planned reaction upon the others; thus all will cooperate in securing the maximum general welfare.

Securing the Funds Needed for Development Projects 652

35. Syria's urgent development projects will cost in total some LS 400 million. Their execution will require from five to six years, which will make it necessary to secure annually a sum of LS 66 million.

The following sources of finance may be considered: taxes and reserve funds, internal and external loans, the investment of national and foreign capital.

36. There is no doubt that dependence on taxes and reserve funds is the soundest and safest method of financing development projects. Syria can allocate its available reserve funds for development projects, but cannot depend at present on taxes, since ordinary revenues are only sufficient to meet ordinary expenditure. It is neither possible nor desirable to raise taxation rates or to impose new taxes so long as the national income remains at its

652 present level. The proportion of current taxes (approximately LS
[651] 200 million) to the national income (approximately LS 1250 million) is 16 per cent. This ratio may seem small if compared with that of other countries, but we should not forget that the national income of Syria is in itself small. What the average tax-payer pays in taxes is cut from his essential expenditure, since his income is not appreciably in excess of his essential expenditure. There is little surplus that the government can reasonably take in the form of taxation.

However, though we cannot depend on taxes to finance development projects, we should not neglect the improvement of methods of tax imposition and collection, and the need for strict inspection in applying taxation laws. It is not improbable that such improvements and inspection may lead to a 15 per cent rise in collected taxes, (about LS 30 million). This could very well be used to cover the desired expansion in ordinary government expenditure and to contribute towards development projects.

In any case, development expenditure tends in the long run to increase national income, thus forming in its turn a new source of public revenue that should not be neglected by the government, particularly since a greater taxation effort is essential to absorb the surplus purchasing power created by development projects and to combat inflation.

454 37. As to internal loans, we have seen that there is no financial
652 market in Syria and that individuals do not embark on such a form of investment. Though we realize the difficulty of creating a financial market in a short period of time, yet we believe that it is possible at the present time to establish a money market, and that, with adequate measures, a financial market dealing with medium term loans could be set up in a relatively short time. Considering that private capital invested in national companies since 1944 has amounted to about LS 100 million, and that the capital invested in individual enterprises, whether industrial, commercial or agricultural, was more than twice the funds spent by the government on development projects, it becomes clear that the possibility of creating a financial market is not out of the question.

The creation of a financial market in Syria is an essential condition for the success of any development policy. Without a financial and money market the authorities concerned will not be able to direct credit affairs effectively, nor to manage monetary policy in the country. The benefits that such a market would bring would

justify the government in adopting measures such as the following: 454 652
encouraging individuals to invest their funds in medium-term loans yielding relatively high interest and carrying certain guarantees and exemption from taxes; requiring establishments such as insurance companies, social institutions and those individuals who are asked to pay reserve deposits (such as accountants and contractors) to hold their funds in the form of government bonds: in addition, the government could impose certain restrictions upon the activities of certain industries such as building, so as to divert capital towards the financial market. It is not our intention to deal with all measures that could be taken to encourage the financial market in Syria, but merely to indicate both the possibility of creating such a market, and the necessity of its creation as a condition for the success of the development policy, through the power it gives to the government to manipulate credit policy.

38. Another source of finance is borrowing from the Bank of 652
Issue. It is an easy method and attractive to governments, but it is fraught with dangers and pitfalls.

We do not believe that all borrowing from the Bank of Issue for the purpose of financing development projects is necessarily unwise; nor do we believe that it leads in all cases to inflation. The consequences that follow from this type of borrowing depend on the manner in which the loan is used, the economic conditions of the country, the position of the balance of payment and on several other factors.

An additional issue of paper currency for financing development projects can follow two channels: it can either flow abroad in payment for imports that are needed to implement the project, or it can be spent internally to meet local expenditure.

In the first case, paper bills are returned to the Bank of Issue to the same extent to which foreign currencies are drawn from it. Official foreign exchange and gold balances will be reduced, but the paper currency issued will have no impact on national income nor will it have any inflationary effect.

In the second case, the issued paper currency will lead to a rise in national income that may exceed the value of the issued paper. For part of the currency paper that reaches the workers and contractors of development projects will be transferred to other producers, thus giving them additional income and purchasing power, and so on continuously. Circulation of the newly issued paper

652 will not however be complete. For part of it will be saved and another part will find its way to the treasury in the form of taxes and dues ; a third part will be used to pay for imports from abroad, in which case it will find its way back to the Bank of Issue and will be withdrawn from circulation. In these three cases no inflationary effects follow from the new issue. But the remaining part, which is used to purchase consumption goods and services, will no doubt create additional demand for the goods and services that form the total national output. If the national economy has unemployed factors of production and is in a conditon to meet the extra demand, then no inflationary effects will appear. If the national economy, on the other hand, fails to increase production so as to meet the additional demand for goods and services, then the economy will move towards inflation.

From another angle, the effect of the extra purchasing power appears in the balance of payments, for the additional demand is not limited to national goods and services, but extends beyond them to foreign goods and services. It is therefore necessary to know whether the country's gold and foreign exchange reserve will allow the satisfaction of the extra demand for foreign currencies, both from the development projects and from the people whose incomes are increased by the new issue. It is also obvious that a rise in the consumption of local products may lead to a reduction in exports, if national production cannot meet all the new demands.

457 652 39. Foreign private capital can be utilized in two ways: in helping to establish or finance private projects ; and in paying in foreign exchange for imported equipment required for government development projects. In this case, foreign banks would give medium-term credit for purchasing equipment from their country and accept repayment by instalments over a period of three to five years. Thus the government can pay for its imports in instalments over five years rather than in one lump. The merit of this method in protecting the foreign exchange value of the national currency and in avoiding inflationary effects is obvious. Having recourse to foreign private capital for the purpose of financing expenditure on development projects undertaken by the government seems to us, however, unlikely to be adopted. For such funds could not be invested in the country except under strict guarantees and difficult conditions.

40. Foreign government loans on the other hand have a po-

litical aspect that we do not intend to deal with here. Limiting the discussion to the economic aspect, we have to distinguish between two situations: the use of foreign loans to finance expenditure abroad that has to be paid for in foreign exchange; the use of foreign loans to finance local expenditure due in local currency. 452 457

In the second case, the borrowed foreign exchange is put in the currency cover and an equal sum in currency bills is issued by the Bank of Issue and put into circulation as the need arises for covering local expenditure in national currency. Despite the fact that the issue of these paper bills is balanced by foreign exchange in the cover, its monetary effects are in no way different from the case of direct borrowing from the Bank of Issue for meeting local expenditure. Thus, what is said of financing development projects by borrowing from the Bank of Issue applies in full to foreign loans that are used to meet local expenditure. For this reason we think it unlikely that recourse would be made to foreign borrowing, because its financial and political conditions are generally more burdensome than those of direct borrowing from the Bank of Issue.

In the first case however, when foreign loans are used only to pay for that part of development expenditure due in foreign exchange, there is no doubt that the method has sound monetary effects; it completely solves the problem of securing foreign exchange needed for development projects, while at the same time saving the country from the dangers of inflation and preventing a fall in the external value of the national currency. Nevertheless, we do not recommend the use of foreign loans except to the extent that the country is in real need of foreign currencies. If the country has a sizeable amount of foreign exchange or if it can secure the necessary exchange through restricting its inessential imports, then there would be no necessity for foreign loans which, besides laying a burden of interest upon the national economy, may give rise to political difficulties.

41. It becomes clear from the above that the effects of a new issue of paper currency depend in the first place upon the proportion of the new issue saved and absorbed by the treasury, to the part that is used to pay for additional imports; secondly, upon the condition of the national economy and its capacity to expand production so as to satisfy the extra demand for goods and services; finally, they are dependent upon the balance of payments position 652

652 and on the volume of the country's foreign exchange reserves.

In the light of these considerations, it can be said that, in an agricultural country such as Syria, whose economy has not reached the stage of development in which currency exchange methods and velocity of circulation are well advanced, and in which all the factors of production are employed, it is feasible to rely on loans from the Bank of Issue to finance development, subject to the following limitations and conditions: that recourse to issuing paper currency is kept within reasonable limits so that it may not lead to an excessive rise in purchasing power compared to the rest of the national income; that it should be used on projects that will lead quickly to an expansion in national production; that it should be accompanied by the control of economic activities to ensure that production for local consumption and production for export do not fall; that it should be accompanied by a monetary policy that directs credit activity so as to limit inflationary effects, and a financial policy that will adjust ordinary budget expenditure to the needs of the development programme; that it should be accompanied by administrative measures to raise the collection of taxes and dues; and finally that it should only be resorted to after the exhaustion of all other methods.

42. At present, Syria has a number of potentialities, all of which must be used wisely if the success of its development programme is to be achieved in full. Its reserve funds must be utilized. Great efforts must be exerted to improve the principles of tax imposition, collection and inspection. All instalments due on previous loans from the Bank of Issue should be allocated to the development programme. These loans have exhausted their impact and have become part of the Syrian economy.

The measures necessary to create a money and financial market should be taken as quickly as possible. Foreign capital should be sought to finance imported equipment, and, if that is called for by the balance of payments position, recourse should be had to foreign government loans. Loans from the Bank of Issue should be applied for within the limits and subject to the conditions set out above.

Summary

000 43. We deduce from the above study of the present and future economic development of Syria certain general principles that

452 months but renewable to the harvest season. Depending on the condition of the crops and the financial situation of the borrower the interest varies from 18-36%. This Aleppo credit does not become available to the farmer however until after the month of March for winter crops when it becomes possible to judge the condition of the crop. In the last three years the firm of Ma'marbashi Bros. has opened an office in Qamishli for commerce and banking. Its loans are no different from the other private money lenders.

Many of the merchants who lend money are also wheat, rice and cotton merchants. They receive the produce of their debtors which they sell for a commission and thus deduct the amount of their loans. In this way they have a sort of collateral besides the bills and they also profit from the commissions.

V. Credit by the Agricultural Bank

4521 652 The Agricultural Bank of the Syrian Government does not play effectively the role for which it was designed. Aside from all the excessive formalities required by the Bank regulations which make its operations slow, cumbersome, and onerous to the debtor as explained in the report of July 15 1952 on "The Agricultural Bank," the amounts allotted by the Bank to Jazirah are infinitesimal in proportion to the needs of the area. The amount of credit extended by the Bank for long and short term loans between the years 1944-1949 has averaged LS 150,000 yearly, i.e., 1%, out of the total credit of some LS 15 millions needed by Jazirah. Further, the Bank can grant loans over LS 600 only against mortgage of land, and since 70% of t the lands of Jazirah have no title, the activity of the Bank is accordingly restricted. A new decree, number 9, dated June 26, 1952, permits the Bank to give loans to users of land as well as owners, and puts at the disposal of the Bank the sum of two million pounds for all Syria. The share of Jazirah in this sum will not exceed LS 200,000 which will not change in any degree the credit situation in the region.

VI Credit and its Relation to the Land Problem

452 The problem of credit in Jazirah is tied up to a great extent with the stabilization and legalization of the land problem. The Banque de Syrie and the Aleppo merchant evaluate the borrowing capacity of the farmer by the machines he owns, the area of his

courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

8

The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

S 648 L 648 ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et de la défense du pays, et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront pas applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les gouvernements français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ses responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord. Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux gouvernements.'

Secondly, there were a number of important administrative services which were wholly removed from the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and placed under direct supervision of the Delegate-General, who administered them through a staff which was largely French in the upper ranks, but Syrian and Lebanese in the lower. They included :

S L 652 648 i. The 'Common Interests', a number of departments dealing with matters of concern to both Syria and Lebanon. The most important of them were the customs administration, the control of concessionary companies and certain economic, financial and social services. They were financed out of the 'Funds of Common Interest', consisting almost entirely of customs receipts, which were sufficient not only to pay for these services but to provide a large surplus which was in principle divided between the two Governments.

S L 648 701 ii. The 'Troupes Spéciales', the local Syrian and Lebanese levies. Some thousands strong, they had been in existence throughout the Mandatory period as an integral part of the French Army of the Levant, and until the outbreak of war they had been wholly paid for out of the 'Funds of Common Interest'. They now formed part of the French territorial command.

000 iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for

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457 the end of 1953, even though Syria paid off during these years all but £ 10.2 million of a £S 44.6 million debt to Lebanon and repaid $1,454,123 to the International Monetary Fund.

Transport

489 The transport system which carries the country's commerce reveals many deficiencies. Although Syria is served by three railways, all were built before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and therefore do not adequately serve the needs of an independent Syria. The gauges are not uniform, and there is no direct rail connection between Damascus and Aleppo. The port of Latakia, which handles most of Syria's overseas trade, is served only by roads. The railways in 1953 actually carried slightly less cargo than before the war. All of the substantial increase in traffic since the prewar period has been absorbed by motor transport. The number of all types of motor vehicles rose from 3,736 in 1939 to 13,146 in 1953, and the number of trucks from 873 to 4,742. Even such bulky commodities as cereals are now transported mostly by road. Yet the road system is also far from adequate and transport costs are very high.

504 Aside from Banias, which ships only oil transmitted by pipeline from Iraq, Syria has only one major port, Latakia. The volume of traffic at this port, which is still in process of development, has grown rapidly and amounted in 1953 to 90% of the overseas export and 46% of the overseas import trade of the country. The Lebanese ports of Beirut and Tripoli accounted for the balance. In the same year, however, almost half of the total volume of Syria's foreign trade went overland, principally to and from Lebanon.

Money and Credit

652 457 The monetary and banking system of Syria is still in the process of development. Although a new monetary statute enacted March 28, 1953 envisages the establishment of a government central bank within a few years, the note-issuing function meanwhile remains with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL) which first received the right to issue currency during the French mandatory regime. Gold and foreign exchange in the monetary cover is bought through the intermediary of the Exchange Office, an autonomous government agency established in April 1952. This

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Office is responsible for enforcing foreign exchange controls and regulating the foreign exchange market. Although it has no monopoly, the Office is the principal buyer and seller of foreign exchange either via the commercial banks or directly. While recognizing the postwar depreciation of the Syrian pound from the nominal official rate of £S 2.20 to the dollar, it has intervened to smooth out the fluctuations in the *de facto* or free rate arising from the seasonal nature of the country's exports. Its stabilization operations were initiated at the end of 1952 when it began publishing a daily bulletin of the rates at which it was prepared to buy and sell. In 1953 it broadened its stabilization operations by setting rates for forward transactions. In the initial period it succeeded in narrowing the fluctuations, and since July 1953 it has kept the dollar rate at £S 3.575. Its operations were undoubtedly instrumental in preventing the favorable trend in the balance of payments during 1953 from resulting in a marked appreciation of the Syrian pound, which would have adversely affected Syria's exports. The Exchange Office has allowed rates of other currencies to fluctuate more widely, in accordance with their strength relative to the dollar as reflected in free markets. 652 457

Virtually all foreign exchange transactions now take place at the market rate as regulated by the Exchange Office. Foreign oil companies, however, are still required, pending the settlement of a conflict over oil transit payments, to buy Syrian pounds at the official rate for the purpose of meeting their local expenditures; and exchange required for imports of petroleum products is also furnished at the official rate.

Since 1948 foreign exchange restrictions have been progressively abandoned, so that all payments can now be freely made. Although imports are still subject to prior license, exchange is readily made available unless imports are restricted or prohibited for protectionist reasons. No restrictions exist on transfers of capital or payments of invisibles. Most exports are licensed partly to protect domestic consumers and partly to enforce repatriation of foreign exchange for shipments to all destinations except Arab countries. The requirement of repatriating foreign exchange was instituted to provide the Syrian market with a regular supply of foreign exchange.

The Syrian economy is served primarily by foreign banks. Of the 15 commercial banks accredited at the beginning of 1954, 10, including all the larger institutions, were foreign: five were French, two Jordanian, and one each Iraqi, British and Egyptian. The BSL, as the largest commercial 453

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454 and £S 195 million in the four-year period 1950-53. The average has been about £S 180 million. Of this amount about 70% is accounted for by all building and probably 56% by housing construction. That investment in other sectors, notably agriculture, has not been heavier is undoubtedly due to the fact that most of the increase in farm output has been achieved simply by occupying and cultivating idle land which entailed relatively little investment.

454 Public investment has been much more modest. On this subject the
652 data obtained by the mission from various government agencies were conflicting. The available information, reconciled as far as possible, points to an annual total ranging from £S 25 million to £S 40 million, with the average about £S 31 million.

454 The total gross investment, which the mission believes has been rather conservatively estimated, is undoubtedly surprisingly high. On the average, it has probably amounted, over the four years 1950-53, to 13-14% of the gross national product. By comparison with other underdeveloped countries in Asia, this rate of investment represents a remarkable record of achievement. There is no evidence either in the balance of international payments or in the price structure that this volume of investment over the four-year period as a whole was financed by inflationary means. It was apparently financed for the most part from genuine savings, supplemented by some inflow of capital from abroad. In the immediate postwar years much of the investment was probably financed from the enforced savings accumulated during the war. Wartime money incomes were high. Commerce profited heavily from the scarcity of goods, and Allied troop expenditures in Syria were substantial. Money circulation increased sharply, but against a French franc counterpart. At the same time the shortage of goods kept down spending. Assets abroad increased, as did savings in the form of gold and precious stones. One source estimates that foreign assets, quite apart from the French franc counterpart of domestic currency circulation and savings in gold and precious stones, rose during the war by £S 325 million.[6] Part of such savings was undoubtedly used for consumption after the war, but a significant portion was probably invested at home. A substantial part of the profits earned in the postwar expansion of agriculture, industry and commerce was evidently reinvested. The business

[6] Mohammed Thome, *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie depuis la première Guerre Mondiale jusqu'à nos Jours* (Madrid, Ediciones Castilla, S.A. 1953), pp. 217-18.

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Recovery of Costs

The capital cost of irrigation and reclamation schemes can and should be recovered from the beneficiaries. In principle it makes little difference how these costs are recovered—whether through sales of government-owned land that is reclaimed or irrigated, through improvement levies on newly irrigated privately owned land, through irrigation dues, or through a combination of any of these. The state should, however, appropriate most of the benefits for the community at large and to this end impose levies on the direct beneficiaries proportionate to the benefits derived. This is not only socially equitable but it enables the government to recover the cost as rapidly as possible and thus acquire the means to undertake additional projects. The direct beneficiaries must, of course, be allowed to retain some of the benefit, but there is no justification for allowing private landowners whose land is irrigated by the government to enjoy a windfall or for settling farmers on newly irrigated or reclaimed land on terms which enable them to live on a standard far exceeding that of their counterparts elsewhere in the country.

In the past the government has sought to recover the cost through irrigation dues. In 1953 the government collected on this account £S 473,000, which left a margin of £S 268,000 over the amount appropriated to maintain existing irrigation schemes. Early in 1954 the government introduced a new scale of charges increasing progressively with the size of the landholding. The prospective yield of these charges is difficult to assess. While the scale takes into account differences in the benefits accruing from various schemes, the mission considers that the fees instituted for the Tell Maghass, Mzerib and El Senn projects, while higher than those in others, are still rather low in proportion to the benefits enjoyed by cultivators and landowners. A review of these charges therefore appears desirable. If and when the government adopts the mission's recommendation for a progressive land tax, the progressive feature of the irrigation charges may also have to be modified.

Maintenance

Adequate provision for maintenance of irrigation schemes after completion is, of course, essential. Current appropriations for maintenance appear rather low. In 1954 they were raised to £S 350,000 from a total of

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312 652 £S 205,000 the year before, but even this amount provides only a little over £S 7 per hectare. The mission suggests that the maintenance allowance be increased gradually to £S 10 per hectare.

Water Conservation

312 While new irrigation schemes must obviously be carried out, it is also important that measures be taken to ensure that the limited supply of water available on existing irrigated areas is used to maximum advantage. Much water is being wasted because of inadequate knowledge of irrigation techniques and of the water requirements of various crops in different parts of the country. The mission has already pointed to the necessity of undertaking certain experiments to determine the appropriate irrigation duty as part of the preparatory work for the Euphrates irrigation projects. Quite apart from this, the Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with the irrigation service should launch a series of experiments to determine the appropriate irrigation duty and irrigation techniques in areas which are already being irrigated. Such experiments, for instance, might well show that furrow irrigation makes better use of the available water supply than the customary basin irrigation. Demonstrations in water conservation might also be usefully undertaken. The mission has noted, for example, that improved levelling of land would produce a much more economical distribution of water. It is also evident that farmers in many places can be assisted in initiating small irrigation schemes of their own by storing runoff water in simply constructed catchment basins. To start work along these lines, the mission recommends a total expenditure of £S 1.2 million in the period 1956-60.

Proposed Outlays

312 652 The commitments already undertaken by the government and the additional recommendations made by the mission would entail a very large increase in expenditures on irrigation and reclamation. The cost of the proposed program is shown in Table 5. The mission firmly believes that the projected outlays are necessary and can easily be justified by the increase in production that will be achieved.

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TABLE 5 Expenditures on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1950–60

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(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Future outlays	
	1950–52 average	1953 estimate	1954 estimate	1955–60 total	Annual average
Projects—total	2,368	3,130[a]	3,380[a]	197,000	32,833
Completion of works	—	—	—	9,000	1,500
Ghab	—	—	—	102,000[b]	17,000
Other new works	—	—	—	83,000	13,833
Euphrates valley studies	—	—	—	3,000	500
Maintenance	113	205	350	3,000	500
Research and demonstration	—	—	—	1,200	200
Grand total	2,481	3,335	3,730	201,200	33,533

[a] Budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures. The 1954 total excludes an £S 5 million authorization for the Ghab of which probably only a negligible portion was spent.
[b] After allowance for receipts from sale of land and water.

III LAND POLICIES AND LAND SETTLEMENT[9]

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A fuller knowledge of the available land resources is essential not only to plan better utilization of land already under exploitation, but also to determine how much land remains for expansion of cultivation and what must be done to make it productive. Even the existing pattern of land utilization is hardly known. Data on the total cultivated area, on the acreage planted to individual crops and on production are at best only rough estimates which are often quite wide of the mark. Little is known as yet about various types of soils, their deficiencies and potentialities. Widely varying opinions are expressed regarding the area which can still be put to the plow or can be irrigated by gravity flow.

Aerial Survey Program

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Aerial photography can be of great assistance in planning land utilization and public works of importance to agriculture. Up to the present it

[9] See Annex E, p. 351.

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tence to appraise this program. In view of the many other claims on public 206
funds, however, it suggests that the program be reviewed to reduce the target expenditures to about £S 10 million. In this review the highest priority might be given to the expansion of the telephone network in cities which are experiencing a rapid growth such as Kamichliye, Aleppo and Latakia, and to the improvement of interurban connections. The contemplated construction and equipment of a new transmitter for international communications might be given a lower priority.

VII PROPOSED EXPENDITURES

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Table 7 provides a projection of government expenditures on transport and communications over the six-year period 1955-1960. This projection takes into account not only the recommendations of the mission but also expenditures, such as those on railways and on road maintenance, which are determined by force of circumstance or the declared intentions of the Syrian government. The heavy increase in expenditures proposed reflects in major part the need to overcome the lag in transport facilities which handicaps the Syrian economy today.

TABLE 7 Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Roads (total)	5,078	5,380	9,278	17,125	102,750
Construction and improvement (total)				11,008	66,050
Latakia-Aleppo				1,228	7,370
Aleppo-Raqqa				580	3,480
Raqqa-Jezireh				7,625	45,750
Hama-Ghab				250	1,500
Aleppo-Damascus				667	4,000
Damascus-Dera'a				217	1,300

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TABLE 7 Past and Projected Expenditures on Transport and Communications

(Continued from page 147)

(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Projected outlays, 1955–60	
	Av. 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (estimate)	1954 (estimate)	Annual average	Total
Damascus-Beirut				192	1,150
Tourist roads				[a]	[a]
Maintenance	3,233	3,600	5,800	6,117	36,700
Latakia port	373	500	10,000[c]	6,333	38,000
Railways (total)	641	750	1,209	2,833	17,000
Subventions	641	750	1,209	2,000	12,000
Purchase of DHP lines				833	5,000
Telecommunications	4,114	2,350[b]	4,700[c]	1,667	10,000
Grand total	10,206	8,980	25,187[c]	28,875	173,250

[a] Included in tourist program.
[b] Actual.
[c] Amounts include authorizations unlikely to be spent and are thus not comparable with preceding years.

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CHAPTER 9

FINANCING AND EXECUTION OF THE PROGRAM

•652. 1 FINANCING

We must now examine how future government expenditures as affected by our recommendations can be financed. First we shall review the total expenditures and then we shall analyze the available financial resources.

Projected Expenditures

Table 8 recapitulates under the heading "Development" the outlays envisaged in preceding chapters. The only additions to those previously discussed are items of £S 10 million for the capital of the proposed central bank and of £S 2.5 million for a development commission which is mentioned later in this chapter. It should be noted that not all of these expenditures are, strictly speaking, related to development. They include, for example, provision for the compensation of stockholders in nationalized public utilities and for the payment of additional subsidies to the railways. The average annual total of "development" expenditures is undoubtedly large—about double that of previous years.

To this total must be added the non-development outlays. Non-defense expenditures have been included in Table 8 under the heading "General Administration". We have projected these at a level which on the average would be 12% higher than was budgeted in 1953 and 1954 and 36% higher than actual annual expenditures in the three-year period 1950-52. By far the greater part of this increase has been attributed to the Ministry of Finance, whose budget will have to expand significantly to cover larger expenditures on debt service, tax collection and petroleum subsidies.[38]

[38] The cost of subsidizing imports of petroleum products arising out of the provision of foreign exchange for such imports at the official rate is borne by the Ministry's budget. It should be noted that the present subsidy on petroleum products may be abandoned but in that case there may be a corresponding reduction of taxes on petroleum products and therefore an offsetting loss in government revenues.

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TABLE 8 Comparison of Past and Proposed Government Expenditures 652

(Millions £S)

	Past expenditures			Projected expenditure for 1955–60	
	Average 1950–52 (actual)	1953 (budget estimates)	1954	Average annual	Total[a]
Development					
Irrigation and reclamation				33.5	201.2
Other agriculture				23.2	139.1
Industry				2.0	12.0
Tourist trade	[Accurate breakdown of total			1.3	7.9
Electric power	past expenditures not available]			10.1	60.7
Transport or communications				28.9	173.3
Education				45.3	271.8
Public health				12.4	74.2
Community planning and services[b]				4.2	25.0
Housing				1.3	7.5
Miscellaneous[c]				2.3	13.5
Sub-total	76.0	88.3[e]	n.a.	164.3	986.1
General administration[d]	53.7	64.4[e]	66.4	73.2	439.3
Defense	69.0	66.0[f]	75.4	75.5	453.0
Increase in government salaries				4.2	25.0
Grand total	198.7	221.7	n.a.	317.2	1,903.4

[a] Totals do not check because of rounding.

[b] Including public administration buildings.

[c] Included in the six-year total are £S 10 million for capital of the projected central bank, £S 2.5 million for a development commission, and £S 1 million for the expansion of statistical services.

[d] Expenditures of the Presidency of the Council, Parliament, Supreme Court, and the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, and National Economy insofar as they are not included under development outlays.

[e] Actual expenditures under these two headings were apparently £S 11 million lower than the budgeted totals.

[f] Actual expenditures.

We have also envisaged a rise in the "overhead" expenditures of the Ministry of Public Works, which will be responsible for carrying out many of the projects provided for in the development program. For the remaining ministries and agencies, however, little or no increase has been anticipated. The development program can be financed only if the govern-

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652 ment is determined to exercise the strictest economy in its other expenditures, which have already been raised significantly in recent years. At the same time we do recognize that the salaries of government servants will need to be raised and have accordingly provided £S 25 million up to the end of 1960 for this purpose. We shall revert to this subject later in this chapter.

Expenditures on defense have been projected at the level obtaining in the last few years. This should obviously be considered an assumption only and not a judgment or recommendation by the mission as to their actual or desirable future magnitude. However, any substantial increase in such expenditures is likely to be possible only at the expense of development.

Means of Financing

We believe that the total expenditure of around £S 1,900 million for the period 1955-60 can be financed without risking the danger of inflation. Table 9 sets forth the possible sources of financing which include (1) anticipated growth in existing revenues, (2) recommended revisions in taxes and revenues, (3) improved tax collection, (4) public utilities' income, (5) oil transit revenues, (6) domestic borrowing and (7) foreign aid and borrowing. Each of these will now be discussed in turn.

With the normal growth of the economy the yield of present taxes and revenues, other than oil transit receipts, can be expected to rise at an annual rate of 3% to 4%. From 1949 to 1953 government revenues rose by 67% or a little over 13% per year. A considerable part of this increase, however, was undoubtedly due to changes in the tax structure and tax rates. While national income probably went up about 25% during this period, the share absorbed by the central government apparently rose from about 11% in 1949 to approximately 13.5% in 1953. Since we anticipate a decline in the rate at which the economy has been expanding, we have not counted on an increase in the tax base of more than 3% to 4% per year.

It should be possible, however, to raise a modest amount of additional revenue by changes in rates and imposition of new taxes. Before discussing these increases, a decline in certain receipts should be noted. The mission fully endorses the abolition in 1954 of the export tax on cereals but we hope that the government will be able to resist pressure to eliminate the export duty on raw cotton as well. To do so would reduce revenues by

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TABLE 9 Financial Resources, 1955–60 652

(Million £S)

Existing revenues, with anticipated growth[a]		1,315–1,360
Additional taxes and revenues		
Change in base for application of ad valorem import duties	20.0	
Excises, import duties and fees	25.0	
Institution of global income tax	24.0	
Tax on large landholdings	10.0	
Additional revenues from state domain	11.0	
		90.0
Improved tax administration		40.0
Income from Aleppo and Damascus public utilities		60.0
Oil transit revenues		73.0
Domestic borrowing		85–120
Foreign aid and foreign borrowing		175–215
Total		1,838–1,958

[a] Annual increase of 3% and 4% respectively. The estimates exclude oil revenues and take into account the repeal of the export tax on cereals and the effect of the proposed adjustment in the livestock tax.

about £S 11 million per year, a loss which Syria can ill afford, and while the tax may well have discouraged the cultivation of cotton on unsuitable land, there is no reason to believe that it has worked undue hardship on efficient cotton producers. We recommend, however, that the existing specific duty be replaced by one levied on a sliding scale graduated according to the price of raw cotton. In addition we suggest that the present head tax on animals, which is difficult to administer, be repealed and that instead the sale of animals, wool, hides and skins be subjected to the regular 7% agricultural production tax. This would probably entail some loss of revenue which, together with the consequences of the elimination of the export levy on cereals, has already been taken into account in the projection of government receipts mentioned above.

Since the proposed tax and revenue increases recommended by the 651
mission are discussed in previous sections of this report and in the Annex 652
on public finance, they will be mentioned only briefly below:

1. *Assessment of import duties at the actual instead of the official exchange rate.* This would increase significantly the yield of existing ad valorem tariffs, many of which are very low in terms of valuations at the

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651 de facto exchange rate. We have already indicated in the chapter on in-
652 dustry, however, that this measure should be accompanied by a review of the entire tariff schedule so that the incidence of all ad valorem duties would not be raised arbitrarily.

2. *Higher excises, customs duties and fees.* Quite apart from the proposal in the preceding paragraph, it should be possible to impose additional excise taxes or, alternatively, customs duties on luxuries and semi-luxuries. The rates at which certain fees are collected on business transactions, including stamp duties, judicial and property transfer fees and the like, could also be raised.

3. *Imposition of a global income tax.* Existing income taxes are schedular in character, that is, levied separately on income derived from business and professions, salaries or wages, circulating capital, and urban real property. These taxes are not sufficiently progressive in their incidence on persons drawing their income from two or more sources. We recommend, therefore, that they be complemented by a global income tax, which would be more closely related to ability to pay. Income from agriculture which is not subject to any of the schedular taxes should in our view be included in this global tax. It has often been argued that taxation of income from agriculture is administratively impracticable. We propose, however, that only the high incomes derived from agriculture be included in the tax, and we do not believe that these are by and large more difficult to estimate than those derived from other sources.

4. *Tax on large landholdings.* The essential features of this proposed tax, which is recommended primarily as a measure of land policy, have already been outlined in Chapter 3.

5. *Additional revenues from state domain.* We have suggested that the income now derived from state domain that is already leased for agricultural purposes can be increased by gradually raising the rentals to a level conforming more closely to that prevailing for private land, for instance in the Jezireh. In addition, the recapture of land under the provisions of Law No. 135 of October 29, 1952, recommended elsewhere, should ultimately make considerable additional state land available for leasing.

The total amount of additional revenue we anticipate from these proposals is only £S 90 million over the six-year period. The eventual annual yield is likely to be much more than £S 15 million, but we have allowed for the probability that the proposed increases will not be fully effective for some time.

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The more efficient collection of taxes is already receiving attention 651
from the government. Syrian officials have estimated that receipts from 652
all sources might be increased by as much as 40% if all liabilities under existing taxes were enforced. To be conservative we have merely assumed that more effective collection could ultimately raise the yield of direct and indirect taxes, now amounting to about £S 160 million per year (average of 1953 and 1954), by about 10%. For the period as a whole we have estimated increased receipts on this account at only £S 40 million.

In the chapter on electric power we have pointed out that the net 652
operating income of the nationalized public utility companies of Aleppo and Damascus, which is already high, is likely to rise still further. If this income is not dissipated by lowering power rates, against which we strongly advise at this time, it should suffice to finance the entire power expansion program and also to pay compensation to the former owners of these companies.

Foreign oil companies now pay certain fees on crude oil passing through Syria by pipeline. Receipts of £S 6.5 million were budgeted on this account in 1954. New and higher transit rates have been periodically under negotiation, and there remains no doubt that new rates will go into effect some time during the next few years. We have conservatively estimated the increased receipts on the basis of the most recent proposals made by the Iraq Petroleum Company, although this does not, of course, imply a judgment on our part as to the merits of the offer.

Prospects of Domestic Borrowing

The possibility of domestic borrowing without serious inflationary consequences must now be examined. As a preliminary it is useful to note how much the government has borrowed in the past. Over the five-year period 1949-53 the government raised a net sum of £S 157.1 million (according to figures on the public debt) by domestic borrowing, all of it from the BSL, which, it will be recalled, has some of the functions of a central bank. In the two-year period 1952-53 funds raised by net borrowing amounted to £S 71.1 million.

This increase was offset by a sharp rise in public deposits, as indicated below (in millions of Syrian pounds):

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	1949–53	1949–51	1952–53
Net new public borrowing*	130.6	85.5	45.1
Less rise in public deposits	151.6	17.2	134.4
Of which public treasury	45.5	4.0	49.5
Difference	−21.0	+68.3	−89.3

* Changes in the public debt, excluding obligations which did not give rise to cash payments or receipts.

Over the entire five-year period, the increase in public deposits exceeded the amount of funds raised through borrowing by £S 21 million. In the first three years of the period, however, borrowing was much greater than the rise in public deposits, thus permitting an excess of public spending over revenues. In the last five years of the period, on the other hand, the increase in public deposits was far greater than the total amount raised by new borrowing.

Excess spending in the initial three-year period may have created some inflationary pressures. Whether deficit financing actually had any inflationary impact is almost impossible to determine in view of the dearth of reliable economic indicators and the additional difficulties of interpretation created by the termination of the Syrian-Lebanese economic union in 1950. It seems probable, however, that the continued expansion of production and trade during this period made it relatively easy to absorb the additional money supply injected into the economy by deficit financing.

The increase in public deposits during the years 1952 and 1953 was apparently not an important factor in the expansion of bank credit to the private sector. Bank credit did almost double during this period, rising from £S 115.1 million at the end of 1951 to £S 226.8 million at the end of 1953, and in 1954 there was a further expansion. The BSL, which held 93% of the public deposits at the end of 1953, accounted, however, for only £S 16.8 million of the increase in bank credit during the two-year period. In part the BSL was prevented from expanding credit by the requirement of the Ministry of Finance that foreign exchange transferred to the Bank by the Office des Changes be put into the monetary cover, thus necessitating a shift of the Bank's holdings of public debt from the issue to the banking department. Despite the over-all expansion in bank credit, which was financed to the extent of £S 51 million by an increase

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in banking advances from abroad, no inflation took place in 1952 and 1953. In fact prices were falling and, after the impact of the bad harvest of 1951 was overcome, the balance of trade and payments became progressively more favorable. Foreign exchange reserves during the whole two-year period rose from £S 73.7 million to £S 97.9 million at official rates and from £S 114.3 million to £S 157 million at free rates.

In the future it would obviously be unwise to rely extensively on borrowing from the proposed central bank or, in the interim, from the issue department of the BSL. Such borrowing leads directly to the issue of additional money which, unless offset by either the curtailment of private credit or a corresponding increase in national income, would produce inflationary forces causing a price increase or an unfavorable trend in the balance of international payments. In the first instance, therefore, the government must attempt to borrow in a manner which would be clearly non-inflationary.

This means that the government must be able to issue securities and establish a market for them. In the past, the government has not issued marketable securities either in the form of Treasury bills or government bonds. Some preparations for the issue of Treasury bills are apparently going forward, but no steps have been taken looking toward the marketing of government bonds.

The marketing of government bonds meets with three obstacles: (1) reluctance on the part of the government to offer attractive terms; (2) the lack of a capital market and institutions for the mobilization of savings; and (3) lack of confidence in the government.

Direct borrowing from the central bank (in this case the BSL) is appealing to the government because it is cheap. The interest rate is only 1% and some advances are even non-interest bearing. The dangers of this course of action, however, must be stressed. They are recognized in the Organic Monetary Statute providing for the creation of a central bank, enacted by Legislative Decree No. 87 of March 28, 1953. This legislation, contrary to previous law and practice, placed a limit on government access to the central bank. Under Title II of the law the amount of public debt acceptable as monetary cover was limited to (1) a consolidated advance to the state of £S 220 million; (2) cash facilities during any one budget year and repayable in that year of up to one-tenth of the budget receipts of the preceding year; (3) Treasury bills issued to cover foreign exchange and gold losses as a result of changes in rates or parities and

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652 advances made by the Exchange Office under international payments agreements; (4) Treasury notes that might eventually have to be remitted by the government to cover its subscription to the IMF and IBRD; and (5) Treasury certificates, bills and bonds issued or guaranteed by the state up to a limit of £S 60 million, provided their issuance is authorized by law. The operations contemplated under (1), (2), (3) and (4) would not apparently lead to the creation of additional money, except to the extent that advances might have to be made to the Exchange Office to finance a surplus of local payments under international payments agreements. Syria has, however, no payments agreements at present, and the problem is not likely to assume considerable magnitude in the future. Thus only under (5) could a real new money-creating debt develop, i.e., to a total of £S 60 million.

These provisions, which have already become effective, impress us as a salutary restraint on inflationary deficit financing. We urge, however, that the draft legislation already prepared for the consolidation and appropriate management of the direct and indirect state debt be enacted as promptly as possible.

Government securities must therefore be floated on terms attractive enough to ensure their sale to customers other than the central bank. Just what the terms should be can be only established by a survey of the potential market (commercial banks and individuals) conducted with expert advice. In any event it would be advisable to err on the generous side. Treasury bills would probably have to carry interest rates of at least 2½% and government bonds from 6-7% depending on the relative attractiveness of other investments and the maturity of the issue. Judging from the experience of the Port of Latakia, which sought to market shares with a guaranteed return of 5%, the latter rate is likely to be too low, at least initially. Long-term bonds are almost certainly unmarketable. At the beginning the maximum maturity would probably have to be 3-5 years. This is all the more true because commercial banks would presumably be the principal investors until the public became more accustomed to the idea of investing in government securities.

652 454 In most countries, savings are in large part mobilized by such institutional means as banks, special savings banks, insurance companies, and social insurance or provident funds. These institutionalized savings are then in turn largely invested in government bonds or other bonds. In Syria, as we have already pointed out, there are no institutions other than

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the regular banks which are capable of mobilizing funds in this way. Thus one important element in the market for bonds is lacking. 652 454

Institutional savings obviously cannot be developed within a short period. For the longer run, however, it is important that steps be taken in the next few years to stimulate such savings. Among the steps that the mission would recommend are the following:

1. The government should start paying its government servants, at least those in the upper half of the civil service grades, by check, so as to familiarize them with the use of banks and thus indirectly encourage them to make deposits in banks. Such a measure, though not of great importance, could at least be quickly implemented.

2. The Council of Money and Credit should canvass with the commercial banks the possibility of stimulating the development of savings and time deposits. Among the measures that might be discussed for adoption are (1) the possibility of establishing a greater differential between interest rates on current deposits on the one hand and those on time and savings deposits on the other without necessarily increasing the over-all interest burden of the banks; (2) the possibility of attaching some lottery feature to time and savings deposits (this is done in some countries such as Japan); and (3) the inauguration of a joint government-bank campaign designed to show how deposits in banks for given periods can "grow."

3. The government should look to the gradual introduction of a postal savings system. Such a system might be inaugurated on a trial basis in one of the larger cities. It would necessitate a publicity campaign in which the cooperation of teachers, religious leaders and the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture should be enlisted.

4. The government should take various measures to encourage savings through insurance. Among these are (1) the drafting, with expert foreign assistance, of a modern insurance law designed to ensure that investors in life insurance are protected to the maximum extent possible and to lay down some stipulations regarding the portion of assets representing Syrian business that must be invested in Syria; (2) conferences with representatives of insurance companies doing business in Syria and neighboring countries, designed to explore the steps which might be taken to increase the volume of Syrian individual life and group insurance business through such measures as better training of agents and subagents, publicity campaigns, etc.; (3) exploration, with the help of ILO, of the possibility of introducing some forms of social insurance, particularly accident and 652 456

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652 456 old age insurance, on a modest scale in Syria; and (4) enlisting the support of Moslem religious leaders for insurance in the form of a pronouncement that the taking out of insurance is not contrary to Koranic teachings. Regarding the latter, it should be noted that such a pronouncement was obtained in Egypt quite some time ago. Egypt is one Moslem country where life insurance has slowly developed. There the face value of life insurance policies has increased from £E 30 million, with premium payments of £E 1.25 million, in 1942, to £E 67.7 million, with premium payments of £E 3 million, in 1951.

652 454 Since rapid results cannot be expected from measures to foster "institutionalized savings", the question arises whether the government can be expected to find a market for its securities under the conditions to be anticipated over the next six years. We have had occasion to point out that the considerable savings in Syria flow for the most part directly into investments of various kinds without the intermediary of a market, and that tangible investments, particularly in real estate, are generally preferred. At the same time the success of industrial companies in the postwar period and the tendency toward greater dispersion of their shares point to an increasing willingness to invest in securities. Moreover, as we have indicated elsewhere, private investment opportunities may not increase in the future at the same rate as in the past. The provision of additional agricultural credit through such a public institution as the Agricultural Bank may also displace some private funds now devoted to such financing. In theory, therefore, private funds may become available for investment in public securities. It is always possible, of course, that they may go, instead, into hoards or increased consumption. However, there has been a marked tendency in Syria to save and invest, and if savers and investors can be persuaded that government securities offer an attractive return and are safe, they might be expected gradually to venture into public investment.

A rate of return of 6% on government bonds might be attractive, at least to those who have been investing in building, where the return has been comparatively modest and where it might be expected to decline in the future. Lack of confidence in the government, in its determination to repay and in its use of public funds, is no doubt the most important obstacle. Such confidence is likely to be established only gradually. The government may already have contributed somewhat to this confidence in the last two years by stabilizing the value of the Syrian pound in relation to other currencies and by maintaining internal financial equilibrium. Special bond

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issues for specific projects which have impressed the business community as specially worthwhile may be more successful than those intended to raise funds for general government purposes. 652 454

During the period when full confidence in the government is lacking, people may be reluctant to "freeze" their funds in government securities. In the absence of a market where securities can be readily traded, such funds do tend to be frozen until the maturity of the government security. This difficulty might be overcome by providing that government bonds, even though issued for a stated number of years, will in principle be redeemed at stated prices at intervals of six months. If the bonds are originally issued on a discount basis and the redemption prices fixed in such a way that the implied interest rate increases the longer the bond is retained, a definite incentive to longer retention is provided. At the same time the investor has the assurance that he will always be repaid at short notice. Such a bond may also be appealing for bank investment in view of its liquidity. For the government it admittedly has a disadvantage in that the volume of redemption payments cannot be anticipated. In emergencies the government can, however, borrow from the central bank to meet the redemption payments. Such recourse, except for temporary purposes, is not to be recommended, but if the very possibility of prompt repayment strengthens confidence, it may in the longer run make unnecessary net borrowing from the central bank to meet redemption payments. To increase the attractiveness of investment in government bonds, the incorporation of a lottery feature may also be considered.

Any prediction as to the amount of government securities the "public" may be expected to absorb is exceedingly hazardous. It might be noted here that even if only 2% of gross private investment in 1953 (which was about £S 185 million) were to be diverted annually to investment in government securities, this would amount to a total of £S 18.5 million over five years. It may not be unreasonable to expect that over this period public purchases of government securities might range between £S 10 million and £S 20 million. Some underdeveloped countries such as India and Ceylon have been surprised by the unexpectedly favorable response of private investors to issues of government bonds.

In a number of underdeveloped countries commercial banks have been persuaded to finance a substantial amount of public indebtedness. Syrian commercial banks might well become the major buyers of government bonds; this may or may not be economically advisable, depending on the 652

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652 circumstances. It will tend to be inflationary if the banks acquire funds for such investment simply by rediscounting more commercial paper with the central bank, and it will have undesirable consequences for the private sector of the economy if the investment takes place at the expense of private credit. On the other hand, there would be no inflationary effect if foreign banks operating in Syria brought in additional funds from abroad to take care of investment in government paper as well as ordinary private credit needs. We have already noted that commercial banks do call upon their foreign branches or parent institutions for additional funds as credit needs arise. If the new central bank is established in Syria within a few years, as is envisaged, the commercial banks may prefer to obtain additional funds by rediscounting their paper with such a bank rather than by getting advances from abroad. This may not necessarily be the case if they wish to maintain their independence or if they consider investment in government securities attractive both because of the yield and the assurance that capital transfers in and out of Syria are permitted freely. To the extent that the demand for private credit falls off relative to the rise in private deposits, bank investment in government bonds also need not be harmful. With the probable diminution of private investment opportunities, deposits may rise more rapidly than bank credit. The increase in private deposits may then be a reflection of the rise in non-invested savings. Under these circumstances bank investment in government bonds may be a means indirectly of making this idle money available for public investment.

Government deficit financing—that is, borrowing from the central bank or the banking system as a whole in a manner that injects additional money into the economy—is not necessarily harmful under all circumstances. Its consequence depends on the conditions of production and trade and on the balance of international payments. If production and exports remain high and private investment and import of investment goods fall off, some deficit financing may be possible. The same will be true if production and exports continue to expand without an equally rapid rise in imports. If the private economy experiences some deflation, pointing to the existence of idle resources which could be quickly brought into production again, some offsetting inflationary financing by the government may not be out of place. At no time, however, will a rather haphazard approach to inflationary borrowing be justified. The timing and magnitude of such borrowing must be well considered. A careful watch will need to be kept on pertinent economic indicators such as the volume of production and exports, the volume of imports of consumer and investment goods,

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the trend in the over-all balance of international payments and the development of prices. 652

It would be dangerous to consider any extensive government borrowing from the banking system until proper control of money and credit can be assured through a central bank. The BSL is not in a position to exercise such effective control, in part because it is primarily a commercial bank and in part because it does not have the requisite powers. The necessary legislation for establishing a central bank has been enacted and the proposed institution has been endowed with ample powers over the supply of money and credit. Although it is to be established within a few years, as soon as the requisite staff can be trained with help from the BSL, few concrete steps have apparently been taken. If for one reason or another it proves impracticable to establish the central bank within the next two years, it would be well for Syria to consider concluding a transitional agreement with the BSL whereby the bank's issue and commercial departments are clearly divorced, under conditions which give the commercial departments of the BSL and all other commercial banks equal access to the issue department to the extent they can present paper eligible as monetary cover. This does not eliminate, however, the need for as much speed as possible in the establishment of a central bank with the full powers given it by the Organic Monetary Statute. If necessary, the Syrian government should engage the services of foreign central bank experts to assist in the establishment and management of the institution in its early years and to supplement the help in the training of staff already offered by the BSL.

After considering the possibility of new borrowing, it is necessary also to examine the volume of repayments on loans which the government has extended or guaranteed for its own agencies and enterprises or for third parties. These include the following loans by the BSL (in millions of Syrian pounds) outstanding at the end of 1953:

Public administrations and institutions . . .		59.4
Municipalities	12.8	
Aleppo Water Project	20.0	
Agricultural Bank	15.0	
Electric power authorities	10.1	
Railways	1.5	
Cereals Office		46.8
Industrial companies		13.4

In addition the government has made considerable funds available out of its own resources for investment by the PTT[30] with the evident ex-

[30] Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs.

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652 pectation that they would be repaid out of the profits of this enterprise.

Unfortunately the mission does not have much information on the terms of repayment. Loans to the municipalities are apparently for a 10-year period, so that we could expect over the next six years repayment of the amount outstanding at the end of 1949, namely £S 9.9 million. This may well be offset, however, by new municipal borrowing. It is doubtful that repayments on the Aleppo water loan will be significant within the next five years. Of the loans to the power companies, apparently £S 3.6 million will fall due before the end of 1959. We do not expect repayments by the Agricultural Bank since we have assumed, in making provision for additional capital for this institution, that it will retain its existing funds. The Cereals Office does not have sufficient assets to repay its entire debt to the BSL, so that the government will have to assume part of it. The Office should, however, be able to repay £S 10 million to £S 16 million out of its receivables and the liquidation of its inventories, and to this extent the government can safely reborrow from the central bank.[40] The loans to the industrial companies will all have to be repaid within the next five years unless they are again renewed. As for the investment advances to the PTT, it should be noted that the PTT budget for 1954 provides for the repayment of past advances of £S 3 million out of an anticipated excess of receipts on current account. While this may be over-optimistic in view of the past record of the PTT, we should undoubtedly take into account repayments of past advances if we include in the development program all the gross investment needs of the PTT. Perhaps we can anticipate repayments of £S 10 million to £S 15 million which can be credited against gross advances for new investment.

Thus we can anticipate the following non-inflationary sources of revenue or borrowing as the result of the repayments of the loans and advances discussed above (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Power companies	3.6
Cereals Office	10.0–16.0
Industrial companies	10.0
PTT	10.0–15.0
Total	33.6–44.6 (say 35–45)

[40] Repayments could also be made out of its bank deposits, but since the withdrawal of these deposits is not likely to produce a contraction of bank credit, the government could presumably not reborrow and spend an equivalent sum without inflationary consequences.

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Recapitulating, it would appear not unreasonable to expect the following sources of public funds other than ordinary government revenues from taxes, etc., over the next six years (in millions of Syrian pounds): 652

New domestic borrowing	
From the public	10–20
From the banking system	40–55
Reborrowing and repayments of government advances	35–45
Total	85–120

Part of the contemplated borrowing from the banking system may be inflationary in character. Significant unfavorable effects, however, need hardly be expected in view of the magnitude of the borrowing, the probable continued favorable development of the balance of international payments and the prospective diminution of private investment.

One final question calls for discussion: to what extent the government can draw down the balances in existing public deposits to defray its expenditures either in addition to or in lieu of the borrowing contemplated above. In this connection it is well to note first how these public deposits have developed over the last two years; this is shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10 Development of Public Deposits

(Million £S)

	End '51	End '53
Public Treasury	12.5	65.6
Public Administrations	47.7	73.9
(of which Customs)		(52.0)
Public Services (industrial, commercial, agricultural and financial)	7.2	49.2
(of which Cereals Office)		(19.7)
Other		0.2
Total	67.3	188.9

NOTE: Foreign exchange deposits of the Office des Changes are not included.

The largest increase has taken place in Treasury balances, particularly when it is considered that the Customs Administration was holding a very large deposit at the end of 1953 pending the transfer of these funds to the

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652 Treasury.[41] The other type of public deposits which has risen rapidly consists of various autonomous government enterprises and agencies. A breakdown of these, available only for the end of 1953, is given below (in millions of Syrian pounds):

Exchange Office	6.9
Council of Money and Credit	2.0
PTT	4.3
Power, tramway and water companies	4.5
Railways	1.2
Port of Latakia	0.9
Agricultural Bank	2.2
Cereals Office	19.7
Tobacco Monopoly	4.6
Others	2.9
Total	49.2

The drawing down of public deposits is likely to have the same effect as deficit financing, particularly since it is doubtful that a decline in public deposits would be accompanied by a contraction of bank credit to the private sector. The government should regard these Treasury balances as a resource in lieu of, rather than in addition to, borrowing from the banking system; it should approach their use with the same caution it employs in considering deficit financing. The use of the accumulated balances of autonomous public entities should also be carefully watched. Finally, it would be well to require that all public deposits be kept with the Central Bank or, in the interim, with the BSL, so that the government can, if necessary, take effective steps to ensure that they do not have an undue effect on bank credit. Recently there has been a tendency to shift public deposits to other banks where it will be less easy to control their impact on credit.

652 *Foreign Aid and Borrowing*

648 Our expectation that additional resources of £S 175 million to £S 215
459 million may be available from abroad rests on the assumption that Syria

[41] The mission was unable to obtain information on the extent to which the Treasury is holding funds for the account of others. The new monetary statute envisages the ultimate establishment of a special Caisse des Depots et Consignations under the central bank to hold such deposits held on behalf of third parties; it is certainly advisable to have a clearcut distinction between the Treasury's own funds and those held in trust for others.

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will be able to borrow for certain development projects and that the Syrian government will accept offers of foreign aid. 652 648 457

Certain projects are likely to merit foreign loans. General economic prospects warrant the expectation that Syria can contract some foreign debt and expect to serve it. At present there is no foreign debt except for the compensation due to the former foreign owners of the nationalized public utilities and a $6 million loan from Saudi-Arabia. Both the immediate and long-term prospects of the balance of international payments appear favorable. While there may be some decline in the price of exported cereals and cottons, continued expansion in the volume of exports, although at a lower rate than in the past, will probably more than offset it. A rapid rise in imports is unlikely to occur as long as monetary stability is maintained. Moreover, foreign exchange policy can be kept sufficiently flexible to enable the government to influence the volume of international payments and receipts.

The Syrian government has so far been reluctant to accept proffers of foreign aid. The United States in 1954 offered to include Syria in its economic aid program, and this offer presumably remains open. We have assumed here that Syria will ultimately consider it advantageous to accept. All other Arab countries have in recent years received such aid apparently without suffering any infringement of their independence. In the last five years the United States has allocated about $111 million in economic and technical assistance to the Arab countries. For 1954-55 alone almost $64 million has been assured to Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. If Syria does decline similar aid, it may well face the need of curtailing the development program we have outlined. 652 648

It might be appropriate to point out also that Syria signed an agreement with UNRWA in October 1952 under which $30 million was to become available for economic development projects that would assist in the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees from Palestine, who in Syria number some 85,000. Less than $2 million of these funds have actually been committed. Because of its insistence that the refugees be repatriated, the government has been reluctant to use the UNRWA development funds. At the same time it might be mentioned that the Director of UNRWA and his Advisory Commission, on which Syria is represented, agreed in a special report to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1954 that UNRWA should pursue its long-term task of "assisting the refugees

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652 648 to become self-supporting," involving particularly UNRWA participation "in the economic development of the host countries, thus making it possible for the refugees and the countries in which they live to benefit jointly by the combination of available rehabilitation funds and those from other sources."[42] The uncertainties regarding Syria's acceptance of these UNRWA funds are such, however, that we have not assumed that they will actually be used.

Municipal Financing

361 652 A brief word should be said regarding the financing of development expenditures by the municipalities. In a number of places in this report we have suggested that certain expenditures be shouldered by municipalities. We have envisaged municipal investment expenditures in housing, schools and community facilities totaling about £S 103 million for the six-year period. This implies an annual outlay of around £S 17 million, compared to a probable average of some £S 12 million in recent years (exclusive of expenditures on Aleppo water supply). We have provided for part of this sum by recommending that the central government allocate £S 8 million for community water supplies (exclusive of Aleppo). Thus the municipalities will have to find a net sum of between £S 4 million and £S 5 million per year for additional investment.

Unfortunately no comprehensive information was available in Syria on actual municipal expenditures and receipts. The budgets of all municipalities were reported to have risen from £S 24.4 million in 1949 to £S 29.6 million in 1952 and further to £S 37.6 million in 1953. Data obtained by the mission from a scattering of municipalities indicate that municipal revenues—which are derived both from local taxes and surcharges on certain national taxes—have increased rather rapidly. This lends support to the tentative belief that the municipalities can bear the additional proposed expenditures, although probably only if they are not required to reduce the outstanding amount of existing indebtedness. We strongly recommend, however, that the government undertake a survey of municipal finances with a view to determining whether the municipalities can actually meet their future requirements.

[42] See U.N. General Assembly A/2717/Add. 1, 5 November 1954.

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457 471 pute. Syria no longer need prove its determination to stave off unwanted external interference or infiltration. But it does stand to gain by demonstrating that the resourcefulness of its business community is matched by the government's mature understanding of the country's enlightened self-interest.

It is worth emphasizing that policies which discourage foreign investment are inconsistent with Syria's own record in other fields, such as that of foreign exchange. The free transfer out of Syria of capital and profits in itself creates a basic condition for the influx of funds from abroad. That it was obviously intended to have this effect is confirmed by the legislative motivation of Exchange Control Decree No. 637 of April 21, 1952, which explains that the new regulations aim at making it possible for nonresidents to open accounts with authorized Syrian banks in both foreign and local currency, without any restrictions or conditions. They are thus designed to foster, by means of free inflow and outflow of foreign capital, both short- and long-term foreign investment in Syria.

Finally, it can be pointed out that several underdeveloped countries whose position is not basically different from Syria's have been tending to remove all obstacles in the way of the inflow of capital and outside enterprise. This is true of Pakistan, India, Turkey, and Lebanon; particular reference should be made to recent changes in Egypt's legal and administrative treatment of foreign investors.

Syria's ratification of the Inter-Arab Payments and Capital Transfers Agreement was undoubtedly motivated by a very justified desire to facilitate the movement into Syria of investment funds from some of the oil-rich neighboring countries with limited domestic investment possibilities. Yet this capital is not likely to be attracted as long as legislation or practices discriminating against foreigners in Syrian business remain in force.

v FOREIGN DEBT

457 652 Syria's only external debt is an interest-free loan of U. S. $6 million made by Saudi Arabia in 1950, repayable in four equal annual installments beginning in 1955. The loan agreement was combined with a commercial agreement and provides for repayment in the form of Syrian exports.

Syria's debt to Lebanon, arising from the withdrawal by Lebanon in 1948 of £S 44.6 million circulating in Lebanese territory, has been settled

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by the aforementioned 1952 agreement, under which the Syrian Government ceded to Lebanon about 4 billion French francs which constituted part of the Syrian note cover and were held at the French Treasury. In other words, the Lebanese Government took the place of the Syrian Government in receiving French franc installments due from France to Syria according to 1949 financial agreements between the latter countries.

In 1952 and 1953 Syria repurchased certain amounts of its own currency[6] from the International Monetary Fund in gold and U. S. dollars, thereby adjusting its quota subscription to the IMF.

Obligations for external payments, hitherto unspecified, may arise from compensation to be paid to the former owners of the nationalized power companies.

VI THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION

History of Exchange Controls

Foreign exchange controls were introduced in Syria in the first months of World War II. After a number of changes, they were gradually relaxed and in April 1952 were completely recodified. A brief review of the main stages of this development follows.

The first stage lasted until August 1948. Although in April 1944 administration of the controls passed from the French mandatory authorities to Lebanese and Syrian offices,[7] the system itself remained largely unchanged. Under it, all foreign exchange transactions were subject to license. Export proceeds as well as foreign exchange receipts from invisibles had to be surrendered at official rates to the Exchange Office, which supplied a certain amount of exchange for licensed imports and other payments. Exports of both foreign exchange and domestic currency required authorization. Regulations for the French franc area continued to be applied even after independent Syrian authorities took over the operation of the system in February 1948.

During the second stage, from August 1948 until September 1949, controls were considerably relaxed and a free foreign exchange market was

[6] £S 916,000 in 1952 and £S 2.271 million in 1953, at official exchange rates.

[7] Which operated jointly until the dissolution in February 1948 of the de facto monetary union between the two states and separately thereafter.

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ANNEX B *PUBLIC FINANCE*

I SUMMARY STATISTICS ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE

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It is difficult to obtain from Syrian statistics a clear and complete picture of the government's fiscal operations. Inadequacies in government budgeting and accounting handicapped the mission in making a full appraisal of past accomplishments and tend to make difficult careful planning for the future.[1] This Annex has therefore been written within the limitations of the data available.

TABLE 1 Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945–54[a]

(*Million £S*)

Period[b]	Expenditures			Receipts	Surplus (+) or deficit (−)
	Defense	Other	Total		
1945	16.4	82.7	99.1	118.3	+19.2
1946	27.8	84.7	112.5	120.7	+8.2
1947	20.8	102.4	123.2	116.2	−7.0
1948	44.8	91.5	136.3	116.1	−20.2
1949	49.3	91.8	141.1	136.1	−5.0
1950–51	102.5	131.6	234.1	208.3	−25.8
Annualized[c]	68.4	87.8	156.1	138.9	−17.2
1951–52	104.6	161.4	266.0	271.7	+5.7
Annualized[c]	69.8	107.7	177.4	181.2	+3.8
1953	66.0	131.0	197.0	216.7	+19.7
1954	75.4	133.7	209.1	202.0	−7.1
1945–54	507.6	1,010.8	1,518.4	1,506.1	−12.3

[a] Closed accounts, 1945, 1946, 1947; provisionally closed accounts, 1948, 1949, 1950–51; preliminary figures, 1951–52 and 1953 budget estimates, 1954.

[b] Calendar years except for two 18-month periods: January 1, 1950–June 30, 1951; and July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.

[c] Arbitrarily.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of additions to, and withdrawals from, reserve fund and loans from Issue Department.

SOURCE: Derived from data provided by Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance.

[1] See p. 263 et seq.

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Central Government Expenditures and Receipts

Over the decade 1945-54 expenditures recorded in the ordinary budget of the central government doubled (Table 1). Receipts also increased and over the period as a whole were almost as large as ordinary budget expenditures. Sizable budget deficits were incurred, however, in the years 1947-51, whereas substantial surpluses were realized in 1945 and again in 1953. The 1954 budget contemplates a deficit, but it may be noted that the 1953 budget also forecast a deficit while, according to preliminary figures, there was a large surplus. Roughly one-half of the growth in ordinary budget expenditures from 1945 to 1954 was attributable to larger spending for national defense and one-half to other programs. The mission has restricted its analysis and comments to the non-defense sector but of course has had to take defense expenditures into consideration in its general appraisal of government finance.

Among non-defense expenditures, outlays for general government functions—combining the Presidency, Parliament, and Supreme Court and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, and Justice—declined from 38% of total non-defense costs in 1945 to 32% in the 1954 budget (Table 2). The functions of the Ministries of Agriculture and National Economy accounted for around 5% of non-defense expenditures at the beginning and end of the decade. On the other hand, expenditures on education, health and public welfare rose spectacularly from 16.7% of total non-defense costs in 1945 to 34.4% in the 1954 budget. Ordinary budget expenditures on public works and pensions and subsidies increased in absolute amount but not so rapidly as expenditures on other non-defense functions and hence constituted a significantly smaller percentage of the total at the end of the period than at the beginning. Somewhat more detailed figures on expenditures appear in Appendix A.[3]

The ordinary budget does not include certain advances to autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies or certain extraordinary defense expenditures and receipts. The extrabudgetary advances have covered a substantial volume of development expenditures in recent years. These outlays were financed from available funds of the Treasury and by government-guaranteed advances from the Issue Department of the privately owned Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL), (Tables 3 and 4).

[3] See p. 289.

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TABLE 2 Non-defense Expenditures in Ordinary Budget of Central Government

(Thousand £S)

Item	1945		1948		1951–52[a]		1954[b]	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Presidency, Parliament, and Supreme Court	3,141	3.8	3,146	3.4	3,295	3.1	5,137	3.8
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,520	1.8	2,925	3.2	3,166	2.0	4,303	3.2
Ministry of Finance[c]	4,016	4.9	5,809	6.4	7,600	7.1	8,572	6.4
Ministry of Interior	18,607	22.5	20,035	21.9	18,168	16.9	17,102	12.8
Ministry of Justice	4,022	4.9	5,426	5.9	5,823	5.4	7,422	5.6
Ministry of Education	10,401	12.6	20,536	22.5	31,264	29.1	37,097	27.8
Ministry of Public Health	3,413	4.1	3,444	3.8	4,975	4.6	8,764	6.6
Ministry of National Economy	871[d]	1.1	1,315	1.4	995	.9	1,527	1.1
Ministry of Agriculture	2,929	3.5	3,894	4.3	3,676	3.4	5,781	4.3
Ministry of Public Works	14,667	17.7	16,889	18.5	11,196	10.4	17,243	12.9
Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones	1,507[e]	1.8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pensions, subsidies, and other financial obligations	17,569	21.3	8,028	8.8	17,519	16.3	20,700	15.5
Total	82,663	100.0	91,447	100.0	107,678	100.0	133,648	100.0

[a] Annual rate arbitrarily derived from figures for 18 months July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.
[b] Budget estimates.
[c] Excludes pensions, subsidies, and miscellaneous financial obligations. Includes Office of Printing and Official Gazette.
[d] Excludes bread subsidies, which are included in item "Pensions, subsidies and other financial obligations."
[e] Gross expenditures. Beginning in 1947 these outlays were transferred to an autonomous budget.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of additions to reserve fund.
SOURCE: Derived from data provided by Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance.

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TABLE 3 Financing Outside Ordinary Budget, 1945–53

(Million £S)

Calendar year	From available Treasury funds	From Issue Department	Total
1945	1.9	—	1.9
1946	4.1	1.0	5.1
1947	8.1	5.4	13.5
1948	7.0	50.7	57.7
1949	9.4	13.9	23.3
1950	10.9	11.7	22.6
1951	13.3	28.7	42.0
1952	7.5	21.6	29.1
1953	10.2	10.5	20.7
Total	72.4	143.5	215.9

SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit.

TABLE 4 Outlays Financed Outside Ordinary Budget, 1945–53

(Million £S)

Item	From available Treasury funds	From Issue Department	Total
Automatic telephones	34.5	—	34.5
Major irrigation projects	8.4	—	8.4
Railways	7.0	2.0	9.0
Aleppo water supply	—	20.0	20.0
Electricity corporations	—	10.0	10.0
Port of Latakia	1.6	—	1.6
Fuel storage	.7	—	.7
Ghab Project Administration	1.0	—	1.0
Mira (Wheat Office), capital	—	50.0	50.0
Cereals Office, purchase of insecticides	—	6.0	6.0
Agricultural Bank	9.9	19.4	29.3
Municipalities	4.0	19.2	23.2
Supply deficit	5.2	—	5.2
Loans to guaranteed companies	—	16.9	16.9
Total	72.4	143.5	215.9

SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit.

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In the period 1949-52, defense expenditures outside the ordinary budget totalled £S 89 million. Special receipts for national defense not included in the ordinary budget amounted to £S 18 million. A breakdown of these items year by year is not available. 652

Expenditures and receipts in the ordinary budget, extrabudgetary advances and repayments, and extraordinary defense expenditures and receipts are summarized in Table 5. This Table covers only the advances received by the autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies from the Treasury and the Issue Department and does not include funds derived by these

TABLE 5 Budgetary and Extrabudgetary Expenditures and Receipts of Central Government, 1945–53

(Million £S)

Item	1945–48	1949–52	1953[a]	1945–53
Ordinary budget expenditures	471.2	641.3	197.0	1,309.5
Extrabudgetary outlays	78.2	117.0	20.7	215.9
Extraordinary defense expenditures	—	89.0	—	89.0
Total expenditures	549.4	847.3	217.7	1,614.4
Ordinary budget receipts	471.3	616.1	216.7	1,304.1
Extraordinary defense receipts	—	18.0	—	18.0
Repayments of extrabudgetary advances[b]	—	15.2	5.7	20.9
Total receipts	471.3	649.3	222.4	1,343.0
Apparent excess of expenditures	78.1	198.0	−4.7	271.4

[a] Preliminary.

[b] Crude estimates based on year-end figures for major classes of indirect debt of government to Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

SOURCE: Derived from Tables 1 and 3 and data provided by Ministry of Finance and Council on Money and Credit.

agencies from their own operations or expenditures financed from such operating receipts. The figures on repayments of extrabudgetary advances are crude estimates of amounts paid to the BSL by autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies to retire government-guaranteed advances. Neither the original advances nor the repayments involved Treasury cash transactions, but they did involve changes in contingent liabilities of the Treasury and for this reason are here included in extrabudgetary expenditures and receipts of the central government.

The figures, moreover, are unsatisfactory in that it is uncertain to what extent they represent actual expenditures as distinguished from amounts

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authorized for expenditure. In general, it appears that recorded "actual expenditures" of the ordinary budget represent sums in fact disbursed, but it is known that in a few instances ordinary budget appropriations which were carried forward to later years were reported as actual expenditures of the year in which the projects were authorized. There are also indications that expenditures by autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies have sometimes lagged behind the receipt of advances from the Treasury and the Issue Department. It would be desirable for purposes of economic analysis and administrative control to have figures that distinguish precisely between plans for the future (authorizations or appropriations) and past accomplishments (actual disbursements).

The figures in Table 5 indicate a substantial excess of government outlays over current receipts in the period 1945-53. Although these figures cannot be considered a precise measure of the deficit, they do show that the government had to borrow and perhaps also to draw down its cash balances in order to finance its expenditures.

Government Debt

The government did borrow substantial amounts beginning in 1948. Inasmuch as the entire internal debt is owed to the BSL, the volume of net borrowing can be ascertained from figures on government indebtedness to that bank (Table 6). The credits were all originally extended by the Issue Department, but the bank has shifted some of the government obligations to its Commercial Department. Approximately one-half of the direct debt, it should be noted, represents obligations incurred by the government without corresponding cash payments to the public or entries in government expenditure accounts.[3] The "indirect debt" is composed of government guarantees of advances made by the Issue Department to autonomous or semi-autonomous public agencies and to certain privately owned industrial companies.[4] The external debt consists of a non-interest-bearing loan of U. S. $6 million from Saudi Arabia.

[3] This category includes: £S 65.8 million to reimburse the bank for losses due to depreciation of French franc assets included in the currency cover; £S 17.2 million of ordinary debt incurred to cover payments to the former mandatory power for buildings and other facilities; and £S 4.1 million for the Syrian subscription to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

[4] The mission's recommendations regarding the government debt will be found in the Main Report and on p. 287 et seq.

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TABLE 6 Government Indebtedness to Banque de Syrie et du Liban, 1948–53

(Million £S)

Item	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Direct debt	*104.2*	*109.0*	*131.5*	*131.0*	*164.1*	*166.8*
Difference on French franc currency cover[a]	103.0	65.8	65.8	65.8	65.8	65.8
Ordinary debt	—	40.0	57.3	76.8	91.2	92.0
Subscription in IMF and IBRD	—	—	1.5	1.5	2.1	4.1
Advances without interest	1.2	3.2	6.9	6.9	4.9	4.9
Indirect debt	*54.1*	*67.1*	*66.6*	*90.7*	*122.6*	*145.6*
Public administrations and institutions[b]	4.1	5.5	9.9	38.6	51.6	59.4
Cereals Office and MIRA	50.0	49.0	42.1	35.7	46.3	46.8
Guaranteed industrial companies	—	12.6	14.6	16.4	16.2	13.4
Exchange Office	—	—	—	—	8.5	26.0
Total	*158.3*	*176.1*	*198.1*	*241.7*	*286.7*	*312.4*

[a] Obligations issued by the government to reimburse the bank for depreciation of French franc assets held as legal cover for currency.

[b] Includes municipalities, Aleppo water supply, Agricultural Bank, electricity corporations and railways.

NOTE: Figures apply to end of calendar years.
SOURCE: Council on Money and Credit and Ministry of Finance.

Problem of Reconciliation

In order to verify the consistency and completeness of the figures and to lay the basis for further economic analysis, it would be desirable to construct a consolidated statement of government expenditures and sources of finance. To this end a year-to-year comparison would be made between (1) total budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures and (2) total current receipts plus net proceeds of borrowing. Any difference between these two totals should be reflected in an equal change in the government's cash balances. Unfortunately, such a reconciliation is not possible in the case of the Syrian data. The most recent available figures indicate, for example, that, over the period 1949–52, outlays financed by the Treasury[a] exceeded current receipts plus borrowing by £S 13.4 million. Yet in this same period reported cash balances of the Treasury increased by £S 36.6 million. This leaves a discrepancy of £S 50 million. This discrepancy was explained to

[a] Excluding government-guaranteed advances from the Issue Department of the BSL.

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652 the mission as being due to the fact that current receipts and expenditures of the Treasury may be recorded on budget accounts for preceding years, that certain receipts are only provisionally deposited with the Treasury (these being collected by the government for the account of municipalities, special agencies or separate funds to which they are to be later transferred), that certain expenditures are actually advances which will subsequently be repaid or compensated, etc. The difficulty of precisely reconciling the figures indicates, nevertheless, that there is a need for better accounting.

Municipal Finance

Apart from the central government the 175 municipalities are the only units which have taxing and spending power in their own right, the *mohafazats* (provinces) being agencies of the central government without financial independence. In the Main Report* we have recommended that the government undertake a survey of municipal finances with a view to supplementing the scanty information currently available.

Information Assembled for the Mission

Unsatisfactory as these data on government finance may be, it is significant that the material summarized in the preceding pages is much more complete and reliable than that which has heretofore been available to responsible Syrian officials and the public. Much information was specially compiled for the mission. For example, published information on ordinary receipts and expenditures of the central government for 1946 and later years had been confined to budget estimates without any indication of the extent to which actual results differed from the budget. In the municipal finance field, the Ministry of the Interior made special tabulations of budget figures for the mission. Although municipal budgets must be approved by the Ministry and copies of all municipal budget documents are filed with it, it has never prepared any analyses of these budgets. Indeed, some idea of the lack of regard for statistical data may be inferred from the fact that prior to the mission's request the simple total of budgeted expenditures of the municipalities had been ascertained for only one year. In the circumstances it is clearly not possible to draw more than very general conclusions from the figures quoted in this report.

* See p. 192.

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II BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING

In common with many other underdeveloped countries, Syria's most urgently needed fiscal reform is improvement of budgeting and government accounting. There is no unified and comprehensive budget or financial plan. Complete and accurate information on receipts, expenditures and cash balances is not available. In many instances cumbersome procedures and excessive centralization appear to cause unnecessary delays and inefficiency.

Types of Budgets and Financial Relations

There are, in principle, three types of budget: (a) the ordinary government budget; (b) the annexed budgets; and (c) the budgets of the independent entities. In addition, an important group of operations consists of extrabudgetary advances from available funds of the Treasury and of advances by the Issue Department of the BSL with government guarantee. Still another arrangement was the extraordinary defense budget of 1949, which provided for certain receipts and expenditures in 1949 and later years.

These financial operations are not brought together in a comprehensive budget or set of accounts. The complexity of financial relations and lack of unified accounts are partial explanations of the incomplete knowledge of government finances to which reference was made in the previous section.

The ordinary budget includes the regular receipts and expenditures of the central government departments. No distinction is made between current and capital items. As submitted, this budget is always nominally in exact balance. Receipts, however, may include expected withdrawals from the reserve fund and expenditures may include expected additions to that fund. On at least one occasion in recent years anticipated proceeds of new borrowing from the Issue Department were included in budget receipts. In view of these practices the nominal balance of the ordinary budget is misleading.

The annexed budgets include those of the Syrian University; Arab Academy; Department of Antiquities; Syrian Broadcasting System; Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones; Tobacco Monopoly; and Customs Bureau.

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652 451 The general budget is supposed to include appropriations for these agencies or the amount contributed by them to the Treasury after deduction of their operating expenses. This practice, however, does not seem to have been rigidly followed. The PTT, for example, has secured large extrabudgetary advances from the Treasury and has apparently used its operating surplus to repay part of these advances. Neither the advances nor the repayments entered the regular budget. Customs receipts, less administrative expenses, are recorded in the regular budget, but the Customs Bureau does not turn over the money to the Treasury until requested to do so. At the end of 1953, reported bank balances of the bureau amounted to well over one year's collections. The semi-autonomous position of the customs administration, which exempts its operations from usual budgetary and civil service rules, is unusual. It apparently is a carryover from the period of customs union with Lebanon.

The financially independent agencies or entities include the Ghab project; Latakia port; Agricultural Bank; Cereals Office; Council on Money and Credit; Exchange Office; electricity corporations; Aleppo water supply; Northern Railway; Hedjaz Railway; and the municipalities. These entities retain any surplus they may realize and they charge any deficit against their capital accounts. Some of the independent agencies have received large sums in the form of advances from the Treasury or government-guaranteed advances from the Issue Department of the BSL. Neither type of advance is entered in the general budget. Government-guaranteed loans to and repayments from private industrial companies also occur without any entry being made in the general budget accounts.

Budget and Accounting Agencies and Procedures

The principal budget and accounting agencies are the Department of Budget and Financial Control, the Department of Financial Affairs, the Treasury Department—all three located in the Ministry of Finance—and the independent General Accounting (Comptroller's) Office.

The Department of Budget and Financial Control is responsible for the preparation and, to some extent, execution of the ordinary budget. Requests for appropriations for the financial year beginning January 1 are supposed to be submitted to the Budget Department by the ministries about September 1 of the preceding year. The budget is expected to be presented to Parliament during December and adopted by it before the end

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of that month. In recent years, however, the budget process has often fallen behind this schedule. The Budget Department has an accountant in each agency who is supposed to preaudit expenditures. The financial control section is responsible for examination of proposed legislation with financial implications and for supervision of government personnel practices.

The Department of Financial Affairs is responsible for supervision of loans not itemized in the budget, including Treasury advances to government entities or government-guaranteed loans to industrial companies.

The Treasury Department handles actual receipts and disbursements. Expenditures and receipts which occur within three months after the end of the financial year to which they are attributable are recorded in the accounts of that year, the books being held open for that purpose.

The General Accounting Office has broad authority with respect to preaudit and postaudit of expenditures and personnel actions. The Office must approve in advance all contracts or purchases in excess of £S 5,000 and all contracts for rental of buildings extending beyond the current year. The examination concerns the legality of the action rather than its advisability. The Office must also give advance approval to hiring of government personnel to assure that there is budgetary provision for the position and that the candidate meets the legal requirements. It also approves increases in salaries and pensions. It is responsible for monthly and annual postaudits of accounts and for the closing of the budget. The annual budget is formally closed by an act of Parliament.

The General Accounting Office asserts that its preaudit functions have been kept up-to-date and that its procedures do not cause delay in making expenditures in conformity with the budget. A long delay is involved, however, in postaudit and final closing of the budget. The 1947 budget is the most recent one which has been formally closed. Accounts for 1948, 1949 and 1950-51 have been examined by the General Accounting Office but have not been passed on by Parliament. The mission was informed that the backlog of postaudit work was being reduced but that the General Accounting Office did not expect to be current in its postauditing until 1955.

The reserve fund is merely a bookkeeping device. The same budget may provide for additions to the reserve fund (recorded as budget expenditures) and for withdrawals from the fund (recorded as budget receipts). Although an increase in the reserve fund usually indicates a surplus in the ordinary budget, one substantial addition in recent years merely

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652 451 reflected a paper profit from the exchange advantage realized in liquidation of a debt to Lebanon for blocked Syrian currency formerly circulating in Lebanon. The fund therefore does not consist entirely of an accumulation of past surpluses. Even if this were true, drawing on the fund to cover a current deficit or an extrabudgetary expenditure would not represent a non-inflationary means of financing. An accounting system which relies on the reserve fund as a balancing item deprives the Parliament and the public of an easily understandable measure of current operations—the budget deficit or surplus—and may be somewhat misleading.

Criticisms

The most serious defect of these arrangements is the lack of a comprehensive budget covering all government receipts and expenditures. The ordinary budget gives an incomplete and misleading impression of the fiscal position of the government because it does not cover certain extraordinary defense expenditures and receipts and transfers of funds between the Treasury and independent agencies. Although it is appropriate for the independent agencies, especially those which are expected to be largely self-supporting, to have independent budgets, sound financial planning requires that the general budget clearly reflect the Treasury's relations with these agencies. The practice of authorizing advances from the available funds of the Treasury and from the Issue Department with Treasury guarantee for a diversity of projects which are not subject to unified review is unwise. Moreover, clear records of the status of outstanding authorizations for advances are lacking.

Provisions for preaudit of expenditures by the Budget Department and the General Accounting Office, together with the involved rules which individual agencies are expected to apply, result in a cumbersome procedure which places great stress on legal niceties but little emphasis on wise and economical use of resources.

Delay in accounting, postauditing and closing the budget means that no clear information on recent trends in receipts and expenditures is available to guide finance officials and the Parliament in preparing and approving the budget for a new year. Part of the difficulty arises out of the practice of attributing certain transactions occurring in the period January-March to the previous year. For purpose of control it is of course essential to match each disbursement with a valid authorization to spend, and it

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must be expected that a large proportion of payments made during the first months of any year will be under authority granted in the previous year. On the other hand, the essential requirements for purposes of treasury management and economic analysis are data on current cash payments, receipts, and balances of the government; from this point of view an exact allocation of all transactions to particular budget years is of secondary importance. In drawing up a new budget, furthermore, information on the recent past is needed in order to check on the rate at which authorized expenditures are going forward. Figures on total cash receipts and expenditures for the government as a whole and for each ministry can be prepared within a few days after the end of any calendar period. Such figures would be a highly useful supplement to information now available.

Partly as a result of lack of current information on resources and claims on them, the Treasury and other government agencies appear to have built up grossly excessive cash balances. Complete records on these balances are not available from government accounts but banking statistics on public deposits reveal the large size of the balances. As of December 31, 1953, public deposits denominated in local currency were as follows:[7]

	(*Million £S*)
Treasury	62.0
Customs service	55.6
Public administrations	21.9
Public services	49.2
Miscellaneous	.2
Total	188.9

Treasury deposits plus deposits of the customs service, which are at the disposal of the Treasury even prior to being transferred to it, were equal to more than half a year's ordinary budget expenditures. Public deposits as a whole have increased sharply since the end of 1951. They were built up at a time when the government was borrowing, directly and indirectly, large amounts from the Issue Department of the BSL. It is not possible fully to evaluate the adequacy of the balances because of lack of information. Treasury deposits, for example, include an unknown amount of third-party funds which do not legally belong to the government. This situation, of course, complicates financial planning. The possibility of an

[7] From data compiled by the Exchange Office. In addition, there were £S 5.3 million of foreign-currency deposits.

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652 457 inflationary situation developing out of an attempt of various government agencies to draw down their deposits at a rapid rate should not be overlooked.

Suggested Reforms

Some of the main lines of reform of the budget and accounting system are implied in the foregoing observations, but for the sake of clarity they will be repeated. No attempt will be made to outline a detailed program; for this, it is suggested that the government obtain the services of a qualified foreign advisor. The mission recommends the following:

1. A comprehensive budget including all receipts and disbursements of the Treasury should be instituted. Items now financed through extraordinary accounts or by drawing on the available funds of the Treasury should be included in the general budget. Annexed budgets may be continued for agencies such as Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the broadcasting system, and the University, but all subventions and loans to these agencies and all contributions or repayments from them should be reflected in the general budget. Loans or capital subscriptions to the port, railway and electricity companies and other independent enterprises, as well as any recoveries of funds from these enterprises, should also be entered in the general budget.

2. The general budget may appropriately be divided into three sections. On the expenditure side these would be: (a) current expenditures; (b) capital outlays; (c) loans and capital subscriptions. On the receipts side the three sections would be: (a) current revenues; (b) proceeds of sales of state property; (c) recoveries of loans and capital subscriptions. Such a classification would be helpful for purposes of economic and financial planning but it should not be assumed that expenditure items of types (b) and (c) should always be financed by borrowing, or type (a) items always by current revenues.

3. Although the independent public administrations and services should remain outside the general budget and should not be required to comply with the detailed budget procedures applicable to regular departments and agencies, each independent agency should be required to submit annually a statement of proposed capital outlays. The proposals should be subject to review by a competent body to assure their consistency with the general economic program of the government in the light of current conditions.

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Capital outlays of municipalities might be subjected to the same kind of examination. 652 451

4. Projects extending over several years should be authorized in advance by law but funds for the whole project should not be transferred to a separate account or otherwise set aside when the project is authorized. Instead, appropriations should be made annually to cover expected disbursements of that year and funds should be released by the Treasury only as needed to make payments to employees and contractors. Appropriations remaining unobligated at the end of any year should lapse. This system would permit the government to exercise continuous control over spending. The Treasury would borrow, under a general authorization, only when necessary to make payments, and an increase in the public debt would be avoided while cash balances were available.

5. The so-called reserve seems to serve no useful purpose and it does complicate and confuse budgeting. It should be eliminated.

6. Two types of accounting records should be maintained. First, for purposes of control, a continuous record should be kept to show at all times the unobligated balance of each outstanding appropriation and the cumulative disbursements made under authority of the appropriation. These accounts would serve as the basis for auditing and closing each budget. Second, accounts showing cash receipts, payments and balances should be maintained. Prompt reports should be prepared from these accounts at monthly intervals; these would supply essential information for improving treasury management and budgeting.

7. Each budget should include (a) estimates of receipts and expenditures for the year under consideration; (b) revised estimates for the year in progress; and (c) actual figures for the preceding year. The budget should also present information on the amount of new spending authority requested, on cash balances, the public debt and other relevant items. It should clearly indicate the proposed means of financing any deficit or the disposition of any surplus.

8. Preaudit of expenditures by the General Accounting Office should be discontinued and this function assumed by the various operating agencies under the general supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Preaudit is an administrative control essential to internal management. Postaudit is concerned solely with verification of the legality of past transactions; it enables the legislature to make sure that the executive agencies have not exceeded their authority. The combination in one agency of preaudit and

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652 451 postaudit functions is likely to lead to overcentralization, cumbersome procedures and operating delays.

9. The delay in postaudit should be reduced as fast as possible, by improving both accounting and auditing procedures, as well as by relieving the General Accounting Office of the preaudit function. Fraud and other crimes revealed by postaudit should be dealt with as provided by law but officials should no longer be held financially liable for procedural irregularities not involving fraud; in such cases attention should be directed to revising applicable procedures with the object of preventing a recurrence of the irregularities.

10. Cash balances of the Treasury and other agencies should be analyzed with a view to segregating public funds from third-party accounts. Excessive cash balances should be applied to reduction of the public debt.

651 III REVENUE SYSTEM

The most serious problems in the field of taxation arise from inefficient and inadequate administration and widespread evasion. The system is regressive and unequal in incidence. Although revenue has increased greatly in recent years—apparently more rapidly than national income—it will not be easy to assure a continuation of this trend. The system does not have a large degree of automatic flexibility of yield which would permit the government to capture a significant part of any increases in national income without changing tax rates.

Revenue Yield in Relation to Income and Population

The proportion of the national income collected in taxes and other government receipts appears to compare favorably with that in many other countries. In 1950 the ordinary budget receipts of the central government plus estimated receipts of all municipalities equalled 12% of estimated national income.[8] By 1953 central and municipal receipts appear to have

[8] In 1950 ordinary receipts of the central government were approximately £S 139 million (annualized estimate from 18-month fiscal period 1950-51). The total of municipal expenditure budgets in 1950 was £S 25.8 million, but the municipalities received Treasury-guaranteed advances of £S 4.8 million from the Issue Department of the BSL. This suggests that municipal budgets provided for approximately £S 21 million of financing from sources other than borrowing. It is not known whether municipalities added to or drew down reserve funds in 1950. The mission estimates the national income of Syria in 1950 at £S 1,380 million.

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651 increase would add approximately £S 1 million per year to revenues.
427 Existing contracts and administrative problems would doubtless cause some delay in putting this recommendation into effect. Nevertheless, a significant increase in receipts could be obtained over the next few years.

IV PUBLIC DEBT

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Present Situation

The Syrian public debt amounted to £S 312 million at the end of 1953.[16] There is no considered public debt policy. Borrowing is not closely correlated with the government's need for funds, and in the past large amounts have sometimes been borrowed when the Treasury had available to it cash balances far in excess of immediate needs. In addition, no provision is made for regular service or retirement of the debt. The entire internal debt is held at low rates of interest by the BSL and the government has not attempted to develop a market for its securities among private investors. Moreover, the government does not seem to be fully aware that Treasury-guaranteed loans from the Issue Department to government entities and industrial companies are as much a use of the government's credit as direct government borrowing from the Issue Department and that the economic significance of the two types of transaction is the same.

The practice of financing expenditures by borrowing from the Issue Department is always potentially inflationary, but it can be acceptable and helpful when used in moderation and adjusted to economic conditions. It is objectionable if the volume of such financing is not based on a careful appraisal of over-all monetary conditions as well as financial needs of the government. Syria has so far largely escaped the inflationary consequences of resort to the Issue Department mainly because a considerable part of the borrowing in recent years has been offset by increases in cash balances. But borrowing when large cash balances exist is not only unnecessary but dangerous, since there is always the possibility that the various government entities might try to use their balances at a greater rate than the economy could absorb without risking inflation or the depletion of foreign exchange reserves.

[16] See page 261.

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The conscious development of marketable public debt instruments would help stimulate and mobilize private saving in Syria and at the same time establish a channel for future government loans which may be required to finance development projects. Possibilities along these lines will probably be limited for the next few years, but they are sufficiently promising to warrant the necessary effort. The fact that the purchasing power of the Syrian pound has been well maintained in the period since independence should lead to opportunities for borrowing not enjoyed by countries which have been experiencing chronic inflation. This advantage should be maintained and exploited. 652

Recommendations

The monetary effects of public debt operations are discussed elsewhere in the report.[17] We here summarize our recommendations for improvement of public debt management and for the initiation of a borrowing program designed to tap savings of the public. The main points are as follows:

1. The structure of the outstanding direct and guaranteed debt should be revised, and the debt should be divided into short-term and intermediate maturities, and permanent debt.

2. For the sake of improved budgeting and a clearer understanding of financial operations, direct loans from the Treasury should replace the present practice of government-guaranteed loans to municipalities, independent agencies and industrial companies.

3. Annual provision for payment of interest on the public debt should be made through an appropriation in the regular budget. Budget surpluses and Treasury balances in excess of current needs could be applied to reduction of the principal of the debt. The establishment of a rigid sinking fund is not recommended.

4. Treasury bills should be issued, and the government should require independent agencies to hold surplus funds in them.

5. The possibilities of establishing a wider market for short- and medium-term government securities should be investigated, particularly among banks operating in Syria. Attractive interest rates would have to be offered.

[17] See Main Report, p. 179 et seq.

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652 6. The general public should be encouraged to purchase government securities. Bonds could be issued in small denominations and with varying maturities. It is important that they bear interest at rates approaching yields on alternative uses of capital—say 6%-10%—though to minimize conflict with religious traditions regarding usury the bonds should probably be in discount form. Consideration might be given to a lottery feature as a means of increasing the attractiveness of the securities.

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APPENDIX A Expenditures, Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945-54[a]

(Thousand £S)

Item	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950-51[b]	1951-52[b]	1953	1954
Presidency	291	356	271	241	176	324	391	2,060	429
Council of Ministers									
Presidency of Council of Ministers	873	1,735	2,810	672	645	709	2,248	[illegible]	1,571
Office of Inspection	—	—	—	—	—	—	148	95	128
Disciplinary Council	—	—	—	—	—	73	74	45	56
Directorate of Propaganda & News	—	—	—	—	353	534	254	269	441
Division of "Fatwa" and Religious Instruction	225	223	288	336	338	532	597	610	444
Administrative Council	79	67	73	59	57	70	—	—	—
Legislative bodies									
Chamber of Deputies	1,586	1,479	1,312	1,703	941	2,182	824	499	1,500
Office of Accounts	96	93	120	135	165	261	346	322	400
Supreme Court	—	—	—	—	—	93	58	—	168
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,520	2,518	2,850	2,925	2,486	2,700	4,747	4,097	4,385
Ministry of National Defense	16,444	27,814	28,785	44,839	49,319	182,494	104,507	63,997	75,427
Ministry of Finance									
Ministry proper	3,822	5,013	5,708	5,582	5,446	8,632	10,811	7,765	7,839
Govt. Printing Press and Official Gazette	194	176	295	227	451	462	583	547	748
Public debt[d]	5,329	7,968	6,540	8,028	10,130	16,191	26,245	15,110	28,700
Ministry of the Interior									
Ministry proper	1,982	1,932	1,385	1,836	1,736	2,639	2,589	2,127	2,120
Gendarmerie	11,782	10,670	11,201	12,675	11,688	15,633	16,523	21,339	9,000
Police and public security	3,663	3,564	4,342	5,342	4,381	7,114	8,084	5,882	5,985
Directorate of Tribes	1,170	3,125	2,081	182	161	227	123	107	117
Ministry of Public Health	3,413	2,638	4,220	3,444	3,885	5,291	7,459	6,374	8,764
Ministry of Justice									
Ministry proper	2,739	3,078	3,559	3,753	3,754	5,624	6,205	4,489	4,435
Directorate of Real Estate Registration	1,283	1,303	1,483	1,673	1,535	2,235	2,525	2,757	2,749
Juvenile reformatories	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	238

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APPENDIX A (CONT.) Expenditures, Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945-54[a]

(Thousand £S)

Item	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950-51[b]	1951-52[b]	1953	1954
Ministry of National Economy									
Ministry proper	13,111[c]	412	117	1,315	385	804	1,822	726	962
Directorate of Labor and Social Affairs	—	—	—	—	279	333	471	446	565
Ministry of Agriculture									
Ministry proper	2,848	3,561	4,096	3,384	3,986	5,440	5,025	4,208	4,523
Agriculture and veterinary schools	81	145	264	510	585	414	487	894	1,258
Ministry of Public Works									
Ministry proper	14,667	19,718	31,100	16,889	16,429	16,860	16,786	14,500	17,243
PTT	1,507	1,783	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ministry of Education	10,401	12,790	17,797	20,536	22,749	36,224	46,872	35,903	37,097
Total	99,107	112,552	123,232	136,286	141,120	234,144	266,024	196,976	209,075

[a] For 1945, 1946, and 1947, closed accounts; for 1948, 1949 and 1950-51, provisionally closed accounts; for 1951-52 and 1953 preliminary figures available at the General Accounts Section, Department of Budget and Financial Control; for 1954, budget estimates. Items are grouped as they are in the corrected budget of 1954.
[b] Calendar years except for two 18-month periods: January 1, 1950-June 30, 1951; and July 1, 1951-December 31, 1952.
[c] Merged with the Presidency.
[d] Includes pensions, indemnities, subsidies, etc., and in 1954 £S 7,850 thousand to cover exchange differential on petroleum imports at official exchange rate.
[e] Includes losses on distribution of bread at reduced prices as follows: 1945, £S 12,340 thousand.

NOTE: Figures are exclusive of additions to reserve fund.
SOURCE: Department of Budget and Control, Ministry of Finance.

APPENDIX B Receipts, Ordinary Budget of Central Government, 1945-54[a] (Thousand £S)

Item	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950-51[b]	1951-52[b]	1953	1954
Schedule income taxes									
Industrial, commercial, and non-commercial trades and professions	6,574	4,090	3,681	2,948	4,574	6,863	10,172	11,808	9,750
Salaries and wages	1,353	1,339	1,540	1,951	2,384	3,115	4,864	3,255	3,400
Circulating capital	26	76	37	83	70	131	147	157	200
Tax on non-agricultural real estate	2,095	2,170	2,217	2,266	2,621	4,710	6,997	5,626	5,500
Business and professional license tax (temetu)	1,290	1,304	1,434	1,599	1,838	2,931	3,513	2,887	2,975
Miscellaneous direct taxes	2,181	2,259	2,273	1,019	1,149	1,881	3,097	2,857	2,975
Agricultural production tax	9,256	12,983	9,131	12,435	12,901	20,410	34,795	22,138	22,000
Livestock tax	8,441	9,532	7,041	6,438	6,821	6,397	14,877	8,065	9,000
Excise taxes									
Consumption of petroleum products	6,839	7,823	10,236	8,270	11,010	16,509	20,600	14,860	15,000
Sugar	8,905	11,200	6,693	7,857	9,226	14,025	11,064	9,295	8,000
Tobacco monopoly	16,480	14,855	3,814	8,870	13,087	18,147	22,213	19,243	17,000
Other	9,948	13,439	13,437	9,095	4,838	8,214	6,008	19,047	19,750
Customs duties	9,053	25,540	35,854	34,046	41,517	49,634	60,141	42,224	37,832
Registration fees	1,544	2,133	8,941	8,941	9,261	16,756	28,855	24,134	21,000
Proceeds of state property	1,861	1,900	1,629	1,694	1,444	2,696	8,160	6,782	5,800
Industries	3,747	4,638	434	396	293	500	615	711	800
Revenues from public services									
Exchange office	—	—	785	250	100	9,830	8,310	[c]	4,150
Petroleum revenue	297	305	305	305	1,982	2,451	4,475	12,134	6,500
Other	28,211	4,136	9,362	5,325	10,592	21,825	15,590	10,312	9,501
All other	1,056	932	1,325	1,746	760	1,219	3,993	935	850
Total	118,287	120,732	116,189	116,084	136,097	208,314	271,687	216,651	282,000

[a] For 1945, 1946 and 1947, closed accounts; for 1948 and 1949, provisionally closed accounts; for 1950-51 and 1951-52, and 1953, preliminary figures available in the General Accounts Section, Department of Budget and Financial Control; for 1954, budget estimates.

[b] Calendar years except for two 18-month periods: January 1, 1950-June 30, 1951; and July 1, 1951-December 31, 1952.

[c] Included with "Other revenues from public services."

NOTE: Figures exclusive of withdrawals from reserve fund and loans from Issue Department.

SOURCE: Department of Budget and Financial Control, Ministry of Finance, and Directorate of National Revenue, Ministry of Finance.

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ANNEX E *NOTES ON AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS*

1 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF SYRIA

General

453 652 Of the estimated £S 100 million–£S 120 million of agricultural credit outstanding in 1953, some 10-15% was furnished by the private commercial banks (including the Commercial Department of the BSL), probably 50% by moneylenders and merchants, and somewhat more than 35% by the Agricultural Bank of Syria. In view of its future role the mission adds the following note on the ABS. The other sources of credit are dealt with in the Main Report.

652 654 The Agricultural Bank operates throughout Syria. In addition to its central Damascus office it has three main branches, in Aleppo, Latakia and Deir ez Zor, and 27 sub-branches in the more important towns. The facilities, however, are not adequate to channel an adequate volume of loans down to the level of the small farmer.

The ABS is a governmental institution, administered by a General Director and a board of nine directors, six representing respectively the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and National Economy, and the Chambers of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and three selected by the Council of Ministers. Since 1950 the functions of the ABS have been considerably broadened. In addition to making loans to farmers, it now performs such extra-banking functions as purchasing and selling seeds, insecticides, and machinery, purchasing land and helping small farmers develop improved farm practices, and importing agricultural equipment. At present, it does not make loans directly to cooperatives. Loans have been granted to individual members with the joint guarantee of other members rather than to a cooperative association itself (the Bank Act, as redrafted (see below), would empower the ABS to lend directly to cooperatives). The limitations on extending loans for agricultural purposes are not to be found so much in the functions of the Bank as in the provisions dealing with the conditions under which loans may be granted. A principal objective should be the removal of burdensome restrictions and the substitution of desirable and sound loan policies.

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Resources for Lending

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The resources of the ABS available for lending are derived from the capital and reserve of the Bank, borrowings and, to a minor extent, deposits. In Table 1 these resources are shown for the period 1947-1953. The capital was derived from the 4% share of the agricultural production tax turned over to ABS until 1950, and the £S 10.2 million which the government gave the Bank on June 30, 1950. The latter amount represented the proceeds of a loan from the BSL, which the government undertook to repay in lieu of turning over a part of the agricultural production tax to the ABS. This transaction, together with earnings, increased the capital and reserve of the Bank to £S 22 million by 1952.

TABLE 1 Sources of Funds Available to the Agricultural Bank of Syria, 1947–1953

(Million £S)[a]

End of financial year[b]	Capital and reserve	Borrowing from			Deposits	Total
		Govt.	MIRA	BSL		
1947	9.0	3.9	2.9	—	.1	15.9
1948	9.5	2.9	2.3	—	.1	14.8
1949	10.2	2.3	2.8	—	.1	15.4
1950–1951	10.9	5.6	2.3	1.6	.2	20.6
1951–1952	22.0	3.2	—	8.6	.7	34.5
1953	22.1	10.7	1.7	5.9	.8	41.2

[a] The figures in this and the following tables which deal with the operations of ABS are from official records of the Bank.

[b] Calendar years except for two 18-months periods, viz: January 1, 1950–June 30, 1951, and July 1, 1951–December 31, 1952.

The loans from the government agency MIRA (now the Cereals Office) and from the BSL were for the specific purposes indicated in Table 2. For instance, in 1949 seed wheat was secured by MIRA and in 1950 and 1952 agricultural machinery and cotton dust were handled for this agency. In the case of farm machinery the ABS by decree was authorized to take over machinery that MIRA was unable to sell at auction, the value of the machinery being considered an interest-free loan. In its transactions with MIRA the ABS acted as agent, receiving a commission of 4%.

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652 TABLE 2 Loans by Agricultural Bank for Special Programs
654 Authorized by Government, 1950–53

	1950–1951		1951–1952		1953	
	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)
Machinery loans (MIRA)	809	3,710	42	175	4	6
Relief to olive growers	2,757	1,183	3,067	508	—	—
Cotton seed advance	—	—	—	—	233	131
Combating cotton worm	—	—	5,923	2,745	1,115	512
Seasonal loans	—	—	1,394	1,150	6,440	6,123
Relief to drought-stricken areas in South	—	—	13,977	5,287	—	—
Machinery loans (Agricultural Bank)*	—	—	670	5,213	124	544

* These loans are for machinery purchased and sold directly by ABS in contrast to the MIRA machinery loans shown above.

The short-term or seasonal loans from BSL are at 2½% interest, the amount outstanding at the end of 1953 being £S 5.9 million. The BSL functions as a central bank in its transactions with the ABS, there being no national central bank in Syria at the present time.

Machinery loans have been of most aid to large farmers, while the seed, insecticide and relief loans have been helpful to all types of farmers.

Lending Practices and Policies

652

The Agricultural Bank may make loans against the security of a real estate mortgage, a joint guarantee of several individuals, a chattel mortgage on crops, Treasury bonds, gold and certain types of commercial paper. In practice, however, loans have been advanced only on real estate mortgages and joint guarantees. This has meant a restricted loan policy. For instance, the ABS has not been in a position to make direct loans on crops or chattels, to finance cooperatives effectively, to extend credit to new land settlers, or adequately to meet the credit needs of the small farmer.

Table 3 shows the loans of the ABS by type of security for the period 1947-1953. It reveals no marked trend in the use of the mortgage or the

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guarantee as security, except that recently the number of joint guarantee loans has increased. These outnumber the real estate mortgages, although the latter are still the predominant form of security from the point of view of amount involved. Emphasis on formal security for loans, rather than on supervision of loans and their devotion to purposes that would improve the economic position and creditworthiness of the farmer, militates against the small owner and tenant farmer, who cannot provide adequate security. This emphasis is inevitable as long as there is no system of supervised credit.

TABLE 3 Loans Made by the Agricultural Bank of Syria According to Type of Security, 1947–1953

Year	Real estate mortgage		Joint guarantee	
	Number	Value (thousand £S)	Number	Value (thousand £S)
1947	4,484	3,684	9,000	2,124
1948	2,240	1,664	2,556	473
1949	1,982	1,577	2,216	350
1950–51*	5,057	3,980	7,960	1,347
1951–52*	7,213	6,398	10,344	1,880
1953	4,922	4,149	8,541	1,483

* 18-month periods.

The record of collection on loans is excellent; foreclosures are rare. From 1947-1953, the net profit of the Bank increased from £S 227,986 to £S 1,239,071, and for 1953 it was slightly more than 6% on the outstanding capital and reserve.

The loans of the ABS outstanding at the end of the fiscal year from 1947 to 1953 are shown in Table 4. Long-term loans, from 3 to 15 years, increased by about £S 7 million during this period. These loans were made for land purchases and improvements, building of dwellings and purchase of farm machinery and livestock. Loans for the latter purpose have been provided for a period not exceeding five years and account for a large part of the increase.

Farm machinery loans also account for a considerable increase in medium-term loans, from one to three years. Short-term or seasonal loans,

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653 up to 12 months, are for seeds, tools, fertilizer and working funds. It was not until after 1950 that the ABS undertook to extend this type of credit.

It is to the small- and medium-sized farmer with good security that most of the loans are granted. No one borrower may receive more than £S 7,500, and for loans in excess of £S 3,000 it is necessary to secure approval from the main office at Damascus—an involved and time-consuming procedure. This often deters large landowners from applying for loans.

ABS credit for the sharecropper and the very small landowner with only moderate security is also difficult. Loans may be made on only 60% of the

TABLE 4 Kind, Number and Value of Agricultural Bank Loans Outstanding at End of Selected Financial Years

Kind of loans	1947	1949	1951	1953
Long-term loans				
Number outstanding	38,642	39,613	21,778	47,642
Amount of loans outstanding	13,378	13,773	12,435	20,453
Medium-term loans				
Number outstanding	16,680	17,847	24,135	35,374
Amount of loans outstanding	3,092	2,931	3,717	4,971
Short-term loans				
Number outstanding	—	—	21,496	29,413
Amount of loans outstanding	—	—	7,630	16,754
All loans				
Number outstanding	55,322	57,460	67,409	112,429
Amount of loans outstanding	16,470	16,704	23,782	42,178

NOTE: All value figures in thousand £S.

value of land (40% if planted to trees). This class of potential borrower cannot afford the loss of time and the cost of spending several days in the city to negotiate a small loan on the low value of his property. It is much more convenient to turn to the moneylender for credit.

Loans to cooperatives are made only with the guarantee of individual members and may not exceed £S 30,000. Such loans as have been granted are for altogether too short a period to be of effective use. However, the ABS hopes to grant much more credit to cooperatives and to enable them over a period of time to take over the bulk of the seasonal and medium-term loans to farmers. It is recognized, however, that cooperatives will develop only slowly.

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Effectiveness of Operations

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One of the outstanding weaknesses of the ABS is that an adequate volume of credit is not getting down to the level of the small- and medium-sized farm operators who could profit most by the wise use of credit. Although the difficulties arise in part from restrictions on lending practices and policies, it is also true that the ABS is not set up to service this group of farmers effectively. Remedial action lies largely in a revitalization of the Bank's charter, the active support of farmers' cooperatives and a program of supervised agricultural credit. This calls for an organization closer to the village level.

More of the funds of the ABS should be used for loans which would increase agricultural production and strengthen the position of the small farmer. But loans must be kept on a sound basis and the rate of expansion should not impair this policy. Seasonal or short-term working capital resulting in increasing farm income is a highly desirable phase of a program of supervised agricultural credit. Under the present system the advisability of the plan for using the loan is left to the judgment of the farmer. Under a system of supervised credit, the loan would be granted in relation to a farm and home plan developed jointly with the farmer. The prospect of repayment would be greater than it is when loans are granted merely on collateral or collective guarantee.

The ABS practice of engaging in the purchase and sale of machinery, seed and insecticides should be judged in the light of the situation in Syria. The arguments advanced in favor of these transactions are that private machinery dealers have a very high price mark-up, while the ABS's is much less, and that the practice has insured better seeds and adequate insecticides. On the other hand, these are services which, over a period of time, might better be taken over by private enterprise. The ABS might then concentrate on its main function—the making, servicing and collection of loans.

Recommendations

The mission adds the following to the observations and recommendations in the Main Report.

The basic Agricultural Bank Act should be re-enacted along the lines proposed by the Committee to Redraft the Bank Act. As redrafted, the Act

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652 stresses the establishment of credit cooperative societies or associations, the granting of loans directly through cooperatives, the making of loans against warehouse receipts, the extension of more seasonal loans for productive purposes, and the making of intermediate- and long-term loans for land reclamation and development. Loans could be made without mortgage or joint guarantee security. Another significant proposal is that the Board of Management of the ABS would enjoy, within a legal framework far less restrictive than the present act, the "widest authority in the management of the bank." For instance, the Board would have wide powers in issuing its own by-laws. The mission recommends that the by-laws include procedures for a program of supervised agricultural credit and for the fostering of cooperative agricultural credit. The operational requirements for a sound and dynamic credit program must be clearly set forth, otherwise the hazards of losses would be great.

Loans to a farmer should be based on the size of his farm, the type of farming practices he follows, his personal characteristics and the degree of farm planning as reflected in the income of the farm. In addition, loans should be extended at the appropriate time and with due consideration to outstanding indebtedness. To maintain the farmers' income-producing ability credit must be available when needed, as at the appropriate time during the planting season, to meet recurring needs during the growing season, and to provide emergency funds for unforeseen severe attacks of insects, bad harvests, and other similar emergencies. In the case of supervised loans the time required to prepare farm plans, and to submit loan applications and secure their approval will determine the period that must be devoted to advance planning, so that farmers will receive their loans on time and a schedule of advances may be set up to meet the farmers' needs. For supervised loans a schedule should be prepared of both the amount and time of the receipt of income. The time of repayment should then be set in relation to this schedule. If for good reasons loans become delinquent the repayment schedule may be modified.

With the exception of emergency loans the making of loans to farmers with outstanding indebtedness may result in pyramiding the debt structure on an unsound basis. However, it is sound policy to assure or take over a reasonable amount of outstanding indebtedness, particularly in the case of members of a cooperative association. Not to refund a reasonable amount of old indebtedness of a borrower may well place him at the mercy of moneylenders, and thus undermine his creditworthiness. But the refund-

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ing of old debts in relation to a new loan must be carefully considered. It should be obvious that supervision may be necessary throughout the period of the loan. Furthermore, it may be desirable to extend the repayment of certain old debts over a period of years. 652

We have emphasized in the Main Report that legislation should be considered to provide for the relief of old agricultural indebtedness. Many capable farmers cannot be made creditworthy under any system of credit until they are in a position to make a new start in life.

Loans should be made in kind only when it is necessary to insure their use for a specific purpose and when the government has found it necessary to monopolize the supply of certain farmers' requisites, e.g., cottonseed. Such loans must be in first-rate products.

In order to carry out the type of credit program envisaged by the government, the ABS will need to bring its services to the farmer. Thus the regional banks should have a number of field credit offices from which, in cooperation with the regional banks, loans will be made, serviced and collected. Part of this task might well be done by opening up temporary field offices in larger villages before the planting season and again during and following the harvest period.

Ultimately the ABS and the village cooperatives should be owned and operated by farmers. These institutions must therefore accumulate their own capital if they are not to remain merely channels for the extension of government credit to farmers. The ABS itself could do much to promote additional savings through credit cooperatives. Over a period of years the development of practices of thrift will lead to substantial capital accumulation for the use of farmers. The capital of a cooperative credit society should be invested in capital expansion or deposited in the ABS. When a credit society is a part of a multi-purpose cooperative, it can use any earnings or savings to best advantage within its own organization. It may be desirable, and in fact necessary, for the ABS to establish some local credit societies as an arm of its organization in the extension of loans to farmers. In the latter case, savings and earnings for use of members would presumably be under the control of the ABS, but should be, insofar as possible, administered by an independent organization. 652 474

It is also desirable that cooperative associations retain their earnings and investments by restrictions on declarations of dividends, and by not permitting ready refunding of membership stock. The 2% profit made by cooperatives on loans would be another source of capital and credit.

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and exports was subjected to the approval of the Council of Ministers. This was followed by the withdrawal of embargoes on various non-competitive imports, higher tariffs being substituted in some cases.

As of autumn 1954 all embargoes on imported goods which directly compete with national products were still in effect, with the exception of the embargo on men's shirts, underwear and pyjamas. Imports of cotton gins are forbidden, to prevent further overexpansion of the ginning industry, and the importation of second-hand looms and knitting machines is prohibited, to ensure the installation of new and modern machinery; importation of almost all items, including machinery, is still subject to licensing. There has been almost no change in the list of prohibited exports or of those which must be licensed. Although the export tax on wheat has been repealed, cotton exports are still taxed; there were certainly good financial reasons for this, but it means in fact a continuation of the element of protection which this duty represents, in favor of the local cotton processing industry. On the other hand, products subject to an embargo or high protective duties are no longer subject to price control. The government is now relying on the effect of internal competition.

Credit Facilities

During the mandate, in 1929, the Syrian Government instructed the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture to establish an industrial bank with a capital of £S 500,000, in which the government was to participate; this was never done.[8]

Not until 20 years later, in June 1949, was the Minister of Finance authorized to guarantee loans to Syrian industrial corporations (*sociétés par actions*) for their first installation or to enable them to continue operations. The amount to be reimbursed under the guarantee could not exceed half the paid-up capital of the corporation and the period of repayment was not to be longer than three years. Eligibility of applicants, their needs and the conditions of both loan and guarantee were to be determined by a special committee; the Minister of Finance was authorized to require a mortgage on the property of the corporation, the mortgage to have preferred position.

Of the 18 loans totalling £S 23.627 million made by January 1952,

[8] *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie.* Moh. Thome, Madrid, 1953, p. 157.

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652 seven were for over £S 1 million to 10 corporations. One large Damascus
433 corporation received two loans totalling £S 7 million. The sectors of industry to which loans were made were, in order of magnitude, textiles, sugar refining, vegetable and fruit canning and glass; a minor amount was loaned for manufacture of liquid gas and mechanical equipment. The terms on which all of these loans were made were considerably easier than those prevailing on the capital market, the rate of interest being only 3%.

By the time repayment was due, the general attitude of the government towards industry had become so favorable that beneficiaries, if they wished it, had little difficulty in securing an extension.[6] In 1952, extension of the period of repayment for five additional years was authorized, and "guaranteed companies" might thereafter be allowed to distribute dividends out of net profits in stated circumstances. Any guaranteeing of new industrial loans was forbidden.

By legislation in January 1954, the scheme was revived and even extended to include loans for the financing of big hotels, provided, however, that the total amount of the loans outstanding and guaranteed to industry and hotels should not exceed £S 15 million.

Fiscal Privileges

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433 Until 1949 fiscal facilities favoring industry were restricted to special customs provision applying to imported tools, machinery, apparatus and materials for industrial requirements; in stated circumstances, they might be subject to a tariff of only 1%.

An act of 1945 exempted new construction, for two years, from the tax on income from real property. In 1950, the exemption was explicitly applied to new factories and workshops, beginning with the financial year following the completion of the projects.

On September 27, 1952, Legislative Decree No. 103 (on the encouragement of industry) granted to all registered industrial establishments, effective with the 1953 fiscal year, the following privileges under certain conditions:

1. exemption from customs duties on machinery, tools and equipment

[6] It is noteworthy that at that time the large Damascus corporation mentioned above had converted its £S 7 million guaranteed loan in an overdraft of the commercial type with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. As a result, the total guaranteed amount outstanding had dropped to £S 16.627 million.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

654 profitable firms which do not choose to expand. Furthermore, depreciation
433 raises no great administrative difficulties.

651 Our recommendation would provide a fairly effective substitute for income tax exemption, especially the recommendation that the tax on non-agricultural real estate be transformed into a tax on a true net income is also adopted. We realize, however, that a special problem arises in adapting the accelerated depreciation approach to Syrian conditions. Businesses with gross receipts of less than £S 25,000 per year pay an amount equal to 50% of the temettu tax in lieu of the regular income tax. Since these firms do not compute net income or depreciation allowances they could hardly be brought under the general scheme. It is suggested that these smaller firms be allowed to deduct from their tax liability a credit related to the amount of any new investment in buildings, machinery or other industrial equipment.

The present exemption of reserves up to 10% of annual profits which, within two years, are devoted to expansion of the enterprises would seem to be extremely difficult to administer satisfactorily; proper administration would call for careful supervision to assure compliance. This provision could well be eliminated. The law might provide, however, that if deduction of accelerated depreciation after an investment has actually been made produces an accounting loss, the loss might be carried back against income of the two preceeding years. The present law allows losses to be carried forward against income for five years but does not provide for a carry-back of losses.

652 *Credit facilities.* Our principal objections against the scheme of gov-
433 ernment-guaranteed industrial credits can be summarized as follows: (1) It applies only to corporations, thus excluding the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises, which are not organized in this form, and in effect reserving its benefits to a small group of large companies, although there is no reason to assume that all credit needs outside this group can be met by other means. (2) The limitation of the life of the guaranteed loans to three years (later extended to eight) does not sufficiently allow for adapting the maturity of these loans to the requirements of the projects. As an instrument to facilitate long-term industrial financing the provision may in some cases be too rigid. (3) The 3% interest rate, appreciably below the prevailing market rate, puts the beneficiaries in an exceptionally favorable competitive position as again non-beneficiaries, and may stimu-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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late projects less sound than those which must be financed on a truly competitive basis.

In the Main Report we have set forth the more fundamental objections which point to the desirability of completely abandoning this device rather than merely amending the law. In summary, they are: (1) the inability of a government agency to determine technical and economic soundness of proposed new projects; (2) the inflationary character of the scheme; and (3) the need for an independent institution to provide capital and technical assistance.

Most of the obvious or "natural" industries have been established. What is needed henceforth is (1) expansion of a more selective character, and (2) improvement in the efficiency or a lowering of the production costs in existing industries. There are possibilities for new ventures but they require careful investigation before being initiated. There is accordingly a need for an institution which through its own technical staff or through foreign consulting technicians can investigate such possible new enterprises either on its own initiative or upon request. There are still a number of enterprises, primarily small- or medium-sized, which lag behind in efficiency. It is important that there be a general reduction of costs and prices in order to increase the market at home and abroad. The less efficient enterprises often lack the resources to hire competent engineers and technicians on a permanent basis and they may suffer from deficiencies in machinery and equipment or management. An institution equipped to give or obtain technical advice on the problems of these enterprises could play a useful role. Its technicians might well be able to improve efficiency considerably by analyzing plant layout and working methods, by making time and cost studies and by examining the needs for improved machinery and equipment.

Considering the need of additional facilities to assist the financing of certain investments in agriculture and in modern hotels as well, the mission has recommended in the Main Report the establishment of a predominantly privately owned and independently managed investment bank for industry, agriculture and hotels and for providing technical assistance, primarily to industrial enterprises.

The capitalization of the bank should: (a) bear some relation to the investment possibilities of the institution; (b) permit operations on a scale enabling the earning of sufficient profits; and (c) not exceed the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

652 total which reasonable expectations indicate can be raised. In the Main
433 Report we have suggested capitalization of £S 30 million, and suggested the respective ratio of government and private capital.

The cost of necessary managerial and technical staff might run up to £S 300,000 per year and other costs might rise to the same figure with an increase in the volume of business. Possibly half of the cost of the technical staff might in the long run be recouped from fees for technical services. To economize on operating costs it would be advisable to have the commercial banks act as the bank's agents in receiving applications for loans and disbursing and servicing loans in return for a small commission.

656 *Tariff policy and embargoes.* It is far from clear that the trend toward
439 almost complete protection of industry from the impact of foreign com-
651 petition, qualified to only a limited extent by certain provisions of various commercial agreements, has reached its limits.

We have previously recommended reconsideration of this policy. Protection of many industries has gone too far in the direction of national isolation; the balance should be restored by giving more weight to international integration. Liberalization of external trade should be one of the items on Syria's economic program.

In making this suggestion the mission is mindful of the fact that Syria's balance of payments position is not very strong and that the condition of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves obliges the government to proceed with caution. Yet, as long as internal monetary equilibrium is preserved and the foreign exchange policy remains sound, the significance of these limitations ought not to be exaggerated.

We do not recommend immediate termination of the system of licensing imports since it enables the authorities to register at an early date the expected inflow of foreign goods. This may be considered a legitimate precaution, especially if the restriction of licenses is reserved to times when the balance of payments position is endangered. Under licensing, however, discrimination among imports is unavoidable. It should be realized that the need for such a measure indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the factors which determine external equilibrium; rather than continuously applying the palliative of direct import restrictions, Syria should try to remedy this situation. Even if direct import restrictions are temporarily unavoidable, they should not preclude remedial action; on the contrary, they should as far as possible contribute to bringing about an improvement in the basic conditions.

EDUCATION

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نسبة موازنة المعارف الى الموازنة العامة ، ١٩٢٣ — ١٩٥٣

RATIO OF THE EDUCATION BUDGET TO THE GENERAL BUDGET, 1923 — 1953

Table No. 1

جدول رقم ١

Year	الموازنة العامه بالليرات السورية General Budget L.S.	موازنة المعارف بالليرات السورية Education Budget L.S.	النسبة المئوية Ratio per cent	السنة
1923	1,653,673	177,974	10.76	١٩٢٣
1924	4,306,717	384,620	8.87	١٩٢٤
1925	5,641,140	441,272	7.82	١٩٢٥
1926	8,041,055	663,922	8.26	١٩٢٦
1927	1,508,630	136,959	9.08	١٩٢٧
1928	3,343,606	194,442	5.82	١٩٢٨
1929	11,259,518	986,141	8.76	١٩٢٩
1930	9,449,066	1,064,669	11.27	١٩٣٠
1931	10,168,744	1,053,299	10.36	١٩٣١
1932	9,502,657	1,048,289	11.03	١٩٣٢
1933	8,464,587	1,077,295	12.73	١٩٣٣
1934	6,932,100	949,287	13.69	١٩٣٤
1935	7,232,365	996,346	13.36	١٩٣٥
1936	7,532,276	954,920	12.68	١٩٣٦
1937	8,353,500	1,229,185	14.71	١٩٣٧
1938	10,247,047	1,613,135	15.74	١٩٣٨
1939	11,352,470	1,842,223	16.23	١٩٣٩
1940	11,884,600	1,911,730	16.09	١٩٤٠
1941	13,603,100	2,272,623	16.71	١٩٤١
1942	22,500,000	3,838,591	17.06	١٩٤٢
1943	36,680,500	6,032,178	16.45	١٩٤٣
1944	69,945,946	7,488,922	10.71	١٩٤٤
1945	103,678,000	9,888,588	9.60	١٩٤٥
1946	129,704,000	14,127,388	10.89	١٩٤٦
1947	125,830,530	16,968,450	13.48	١٩٤٧
1948	137,909,000	20,459,400	16.00	١٩٤٨
1949	130,710,000	22,278,200	17.04	١٩٤٩
1950/51 (1)	215,730,000	38,783,000	17.98	(١) ١٩٥١/١٩٥٠
1951/52 (2)	265,000,000	49,769,000	18.78	(٢) ١٩٥٢/١٩٥١
1953	205,000,000	36,604,000	17.85	١٩٥٣

(1) Period 1.1.50 — 30.6.51
(2) Period 1.7.51 — 31.12.52

(١) المدة ١٩٥٠/١/١ — ١٩٥١/٦/٣٠
(٢) المدة ١٩٥١/٧/١ — ١٩٥٢/١٢/٣١

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واردات ونفقات الحكومة ١٩٣١ — ١٩٥٤
(بالوف الليرات السورية)

GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 1931 — 1954.
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

Year	نسبة الواردات الفعلية الى التقديرية Ratio of actual Revenue to estimates	الواردات التقديرية Revenue estimates	الواردات الفعلية Actual revenue	نسبة النفقات الفعلية الى التقديرية ٪ Ratio of actual Expenditure to estimates ٪	النفقات التقديرية Expenditure estimates	النفقات الفعلية Actual Expenditure	الوفر (+) العجز (—) Surplus deficit	السنة
1931	100,1	10,169	10,176	98,4	10,169	10,002	(+) 147	١٩٣١
1932	91,4	9,247	8,454	91,4	9,247	8,453	(+) 1	١٩٣٢
1933	80,2	8,465	6,787	83,9	8,465	7,103	(—) 316	١٩٣٣
1934	95	6,932	6,584	98,4	6,932	6,684	(—) 100	١٩٣٤
1935	95,4	7,232	6,902	94,7	7,232	6,851	(+) 51	١٩٣٥
1936	88,4	7,532	6,661	80,9	7,532	6,773	(—) 112	١٩٣٦
1937 (1)	100,3	9,638	9,665	90,7	9,638	8,747	(+) 918	(١) ١٩٣٧
1938	91,3	12,587	11,490	87,7	12,584	11,041	(+) 450	١٩٣٨
1939	103,8	12,966	13,484	94,8	12,966	21,323	(+) 1,161	١٩٣٩
1940	139,5	13,613	18,990	112,1	13,613	15,257	(+) 3,733	١٩٤٠
1941	106,4	15,614	16,617	90,4	15,614	14,127	(+) 2,490	١٩٤١
1942	116,5	25,786	30,050	96,7	25,786	25,459	(+) 4,591	١٩٤٢
1943	119,4	46,129	55,095	83	46,129	38,301	(+) 16,794	١٩٤٣
1944	119,2	65,584	78,173	99,1	65,584	64,993	(+) 13,180	١٩٤٤
1945	105,5	121,609	128,320	87,9	121,609	106,967	(+) 21,353	١٩٤٥
1946	97,7	132,722	129,866	84,8	132,722	112,545	(+) 17,121	١٩٤٦
1947	99	130,148	128,841	94,7	130,148	123,232	(+) 5,609	١٩٤٧
1948	87	141,827	123,402	96,1	141,827	136,287	(—) 12,885	١٩٤٨
1949	99,6	153,071	152,397	92,2	153,071	141,120	(+) 11,277	١٩٤٩
1950—51	98,9	249,730	246,895	94	249,730	234,841	(+) 12,054	٥١/١٩٥٠
1951—52 (2)	102,1	290,615	296,789	91,4	290,615	265,642	(+) 31,147	(٢)٥٢/١٩٥١
1953 (2)	103,7	207,992	215,725	94,9	207,992	197,390	(+) 18,335	(٢) ١٩٥٣
1954	—	208,000	—	—	208,000	—	—	١٩٥٤

(1) — As from 1937 revenue and expenditure is in respect of the whole Syrian Republic, including the Mohafazat of Sweida and Alawites.

(2) — Approximate actual revenue and expenditure together with the surplus or deficit.

(١) اعتبارا من ١٩٣٧ اصبحت الواردات والنفقات لكافة الجمهورية السورية بما فيها محافظتي السويداء والعلويين .

(٢) اعتبر النفقات والواردات الفعلية والفرق بصورة تقريبية .

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نفقات الحكومة موزعة حسب الابواب الرئيسية ، ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ - ١٩٥٤
تقديرات الموازنة (بالوف الليرات السورية)

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BY MAIN ITEMS, 1950/1951 — 1954
Budget Estimates
(L.S. '000)

Table No. 4 — جدول رقم ٤

ITEMS OF EXPENDITURE	١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ (٢) 1950/51 (3)	١٩٥١/١٩٥٢ (٤) 1951/52 (4)	١٩٥٣ 1953	١٩٥٤ 1954	ابواب النفقات
Total expenditure	215,720	265,000	207,991	208,000	مجموع النفقات
Presidency of the Republic	322	403	(6) 2,997	(6) 2,584	رئاسة الجمهورية
Parliament	(2)2,628	(2)2,400	1,000	1,300	مجلس النواب
Account Office.	—	—	430	400	ديوان المحاسبات
Presidency of the Council of Ministers	1,678	2,502	—	—	رئاسة مجلس الوزراء
Religious edict and teaching	548	625	435	444	الفتوى والتدريس الديني
The Directorate-General of propaganda and News	207	237	392	441	المديرية العامة للدعاية والانباء
Legislative Council	67	—	—	—	مجلس الشورى
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3,716	4,521	4,530	4,303	وزارة الشؤون الخارجية
Ministry of National Defence	91,323	104,076	77,357	*73,540	وزارة الدفاع الوطني
Public debt	15,215	27,343	13,480	20,700	الدين العام
Ministry of Finance	8,113	10,370	9,252	8,572	وزارة المالية
Ministry of the Interior	3,045	3,669	2,705	2,237	وزارة الداخلية
Gendarms (5)	17,426	18,313	9,670	9,387	الدرك (٥)
Police	7,479	8,390	6,900	5,865	الشرطة
Ministry of Health	6,175	8,640	9,276	8,764	وزارة الصحة
Ministry of Justice	5,807	6,363	4,880	4,673	وزارة العدلية
Registration of real estate	2,285	2,609	3,250	2,749	المصالح العقارية
Ministry of National Economy	1,407	1,876	1,660	1,527	وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني
Ministry of Agriculture	5,229	5,567	6,288	5,781	وزارة الزراعة
Ministry of Public Works	17,392	20,974	17,446	17,243	وزارة الاشغال العامة
Ministry of Education	38,783	49,769	36,804	37,097	وزارة المعارف
Reserves	4,116	187		25	اعتمادات احتياطية
Miscellaneous (1)	175	410	—	168	مختلفة (١)
	—	—	—	—	المحكمة العليا

Source : Ministry of Finance.

1 — Including expenditure of the High Court, Civil Service and the Audit Office

2 — Including expenditure of the Accounts Office.

3 — Covering the period January, 1950 — June 1951

4 — Covering the period July, 1951 - December, 1952

5 — As from 1950 the budget of the gendarm force was merged with the budget of the Ministry of National Defence.

6 — As from 1953 the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers has been merged with the budget of the Presidency of the Republic.

المصدر : وزارة المالية

(١) تشمل نفقات المحكمة العليا ومجلس التاديب ومكتب تفتيش الدولة .

(٢) بما فيها نفقات ديوان المحاسبات .

(٣) تشمل المدة الواقعة ما بين كانون ثاني ١٩٥٠ لغاية حزيران ١٩٥١

(٤) تشمل المدة الواقعة ما بين تموز ١٩٥١ لغاية كانون اول ١٩٥٢

(٥) اعتبارا من سنة ١٩٥٠ ادمجت موازنة الدرك مع موازنة وزارة الدفاع الوطني .

(٦) اعتبارا من سنة ١٩٥٣ ادمجت ميزانية رئاسة الوزراء مع رئاسة الجمهورية

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عدد وقيمة القروض التي اسلفها المصرف الزراعي السوري ١٩٤٩ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER AND VALUE OF LOANS ADVANCED BY THE AGRICULTURAL BANK, 1949 — 1953.

Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat	Year	مجموع القروض Total loans: العدد No.	مجموع القروض Total loans: المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans: العدد No.	قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans: المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans: العدد No.	قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans: المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	السنة	المحافظة
Total	1949	9,398	3,208	9,116	1,818	282	1,390	١٩٤٩	المجموع
	1950	3,930	6,942	—	—	3,930	6,942	١٩٥٠	
	1951	6,456	10,551	—	—	6,456	10,551	١٩٥١	
	1952	24,374	14,327	19,847	10,640	4,527	3,687	١٩٥٢	
	1953	20,325	12,466	15,403	8,318	4,922	4,148	١٩٥٣	
Damascus	1949	1,326	648	1,254	258	72	390	١٩٤٩	دمشق
	1950	814	1,080	—	—	814	1,080	١٩٥٠	
	1951	936	782	—	—	936	782	١٩٥١	
	1952	33,700	1,447	2,082	689	1,618	758	١٩٥٢	
	1953	2,379	1,449	737	438	1,642	1,011	١٩٥٣	
Homs	1949	546	349	543	234	3	15	١٩٤٩	حمص
	1950	215	501	—	—	215	501	١٩٥٠	
	1951	342	528	—	—	342	528	١٩٥١	
	1952	543	728	317	418	226	310	١٩٥٢	
	1953	755	715	323	381	432	334	١٩٥٣	
Hama	1949	1,324	482	1,294	297	30	185	١٩٤٩	حماة
	1950	190	667	—	—	190	667	١٩٥٠	
	1951	354	525	—	—	354	525	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,595	1,487	2,411	1,289	184	198	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,627	1,222	1,465	995	162	227	١٩٥٣	
Latakia	1949	365	274	204	169	22	105	١٩٤٩	اللاذقية
	1950	615	810	—	—	615	810	١٩٥٠	
	1951	754	793	—	—	754	793	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,690	2,048	1,849	1,193	841	855	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,580	1,759	636	1,041	944	718	١٩٥٣	
Aleppo	1949	3,777	872	3,702	477	75	395	١٩٤٩	حلب
	1950	1,411	1,451	—	—	1,411	1,457	١٩٥٠	
	1951	3,212	1,774	—	—	3,212	1,774	١٩٥١	
	1952	8,224	4,509	6,988	3,369	1,236	1,140	١٩٥٢	
	1953	3,897	2,454	2,939	1,337	958	1,117	١٩٥٣	
Al-Hasakah	1949	112	144	67	4	45	140	١٩٤٩	الحسكة
	1950	176	1,173	—	—	176	1,173	١٩٥٠	
	1951	147	476	—	—	147	476	١٩٥١	
	1952	1,689	1,721	1,681	1,707	8	14	١٩٥٢	
	1953	1,387	1,695	1,352	1,660	35	35	١٩٥٣	

Source : The Syrian Agricultural Bank

المصدر : المصرف الزراعي السوري

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عدد وقيمة القروض التي اسلفها المصرف الزراعي السوري ١٩٤٩ – ١٩٥٣

NUMBERS AND VALUE OF LOANS ADVANCED
BY THE AGRICULTURAL BANK, 1949 — 1953.

Table No. 10 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١٠ (تتمة)

Mohafazat	Year	مجموع القروض Total loans		قروض قصيرة الاجل Short-term loans		قروض طويلة الاجل Long-term loans		السنة	المحافظة
		العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000	العدد No.	المبلغ بالوف الليرات Value L.S. '000		
Deir-ez-zor	1949	275	126	275	126	—	—	١٩٤٩	دير الزور
	1950	94	587	—	—	94	587	١٩٥٠	
	1951	73	244	—	—	73	244	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,005	1,217	1,811	1,010	194	207	١٩٥٢	
	1953	2,607	1,570	2,351	1,308	256	262	١٩٥٣	
Suweida	1949	35	22	35	22	—	—	١٩٤٩	السويداء
	1950	62	140	—	—	62	140	١٩٥٠	
	1951	203	1,431	—	—	203	1,431	١٩٥١	
	1952	410	1,367	1,254	1,229	120	138	١٩٥٢	
	1953	196	231	1	21	195	210	١٩٥٣	
Dir'a	1949	1,756	391	1,721	231	35	160	١٩٤٩	درعا
	1950	353	533	—	—	353	533	١٩٥٠	
	1951	435	4,018	—	—	435	4,018	١٩٥١	
	1952	2,518	803	2,424	736	94	67	١٩٥٢	
	1953	5,897	1,371	5,599	1,137	298	234	١٩٥٣	

Source : The Syrian Agricultural Bank.

المصدر المصرف الزراعي السوري

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MDI
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Europe and with the United States; but Lebanon has not moved out of step with the Muslim states around her, and she has followed the Arab League line over Palestine and in Egypt's quarrel with Britain and has not agreed to join a Middle East defence organization. She has, however, received arms and military training from Britain and has gladly accepted Point Four aid from the United States.

The main issue of external policy which exercises the Lebanese is the extent of the country's co-operation with Syria and the other Arab states. Some Christians advocate withdrawing the frontiers of the Republic to those of the old Sanjaq of Lebanon together with Beirut; some Muslims want Lebanon to reunite with Syria, and between these extremes discussion still continues. The disagreement with Syria is economic rather than political, but it might gain political significance if Lebanon were to feel isolated to the point at which she felt compelled to come to terms with Israel. At the moment, this is unlikely because Lebanon's friendship with the NATO Powers is good security against possible incursions of enemies or friends.

Armed Forces[1]

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Syria has compulsory military service of eighteen months and, since Shishakli's advent, the draft net is being cast over many who previously escaped. The armed services consume each year a growing share of the budget—in 1951–2 they took 40 per cent of the total—and in 1952 there were compulsory collections for the army. The army is grouped in five brigades, each of rather less than 10,000 men, and has tanks, armoured cars, and light, medium, and anti-aircraft artillery and searchlights. Much of the equipment came from France and, though the best then obtainable, is of doubtful serviceableness. However, Colonel Shishakli is determined to give the army good equipment, and a factory for minor armaments exists near Damascus. German instructors are used by the army and air force and are helping to produce light armaments. The air force is part of the army; jet aircraft have been received from Britain and the air force still operates two Dakotas taken over from Syrian airways. The armed gendarmerie had its own esprit and fought well in Palestine; it is now under army control as are the police and the force used for bedouin control.

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The Lebanese army is about a brigade strong and includes a regiment of chasseurs-ski troops. Lebanese officers have had instruction with the British Army and there is an RAF mission with the Lebanese air force who are using jet trainers.

[1] In the following sections the two countries are considered together.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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investment in cotton growing, prices began to rise once more. 435
At the end of 1951 rising import prices, coupled with the poor 439
grain crop, were reflected in local retail prices, and prices continued to rise until mid-1952, when governmental action and steadier import prices had a salutary effect. Thus, generally speaking, the retail price of household goods has risen five or six times since before the war, and the currency in circulation has also risen despite the fact that the official credit policy has been restrictive; although the note issue is now only £S46 million higher than in 1946 (at 31 December 1951 it was £S248 million), bank deposits have increased from £S96·2 million at the end of 1949 to £S198·3 million at the end of 1951. At that date the currency was covered, as to gold 9·9 per cent, foreign exchange 6 per cent, commercial bonds 1·4 per cent, treasury bills 33·5 per cent, and state loans or guarantees 48·9 per cent.

Direct taxation on income and the land accounts for only 651
about a quarter of the Syrian budget;[1] this is less than before 652
the war, for the proportionate amount from the land has fallen from 30 per cent to about 14 per cent in 1950; the estimate for 1952 was 18 per cent. Receipts from customs duties have increased considerably and these, with other indirect taxes, have helped to make the burden less 'fairly' distributed. Indirect taxes are levied on sugar, petroleum, and other essential commodities. Budgetary expenditure since before the war has increased seventeenfold, and since 1949 the total annual expenditure has increased by more than a quarter; but whereas expenditure on health, education, and public works has increased only slightly, that on defence has trebled and accounts for over a third of total expenditure. Agriculture, with only 2 per cent of the budget, is insufficiently provided for and it is hoped that its share will be increased.

Banking is largely but not exclusively in the hands of foreign 453
banks; La Banque de Syrie et du Liban (French) has the concession for the note issue, but there is talk of starting a Syrian National Bank; among other commercial banks are La Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (French) and the British Bank of the Middle East. The foreign-exchange market 457
has always been less influential than that of Beirut, but in this respect Aleppo is growing in importance. There is a recognized free market for exchange[2] in which merchants and Government alike deal. The official rate of £S6·19 = £1, used mainly for Government transactions, was abolished in June 1953 for all purposes except Government transactions with petroleum com-

[1] See table 2, p. 502 below. [2] See table 3, p. 503 below.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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TABLE 2

GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE AND RECEIPTS

(Years end 31 December; Syria: 1951 only 6 months ending 30 June; 1952, 18 months)

	Syria (£S million)				Lebanon (£L million)			
	1939	*1950**	*1951**	*1952**	*1939*	*1950*	*1951**	*1952**
Expenditure	10·85	142·80	67·75	265·00	6·37	84·52	89·45	94·25
Receipts	11·43	138·00	67·75	259·00	7·20	83·21	89·23	94·16
Surplus or deficit	0·58	−4·80	—	−6·00	0·83	−1·31	−0·22	−0·09
Major Components of Receipts as Percentage of Total								
Direct taxes on income and wealth	10	11	8	12	17	15	16	15
Direct taxes on land, produce, and livestock	30	14	10	18		1	1	1
Customs†	1	20	26	22	60	25	24	24
Other taxes‡	36	38	39	34		50	48	48
Total tax receipts	77	83	83	86	77	91	89	88
Other revenue§	23	17	17	14	23	9	11	12
Major Components of Expenditure as Percentage of Total								
Education	15	17	19	19	8	9	12	12
Health	3	3	3	3	4	6	5	5
Defence	—	33	33	42	—	17	20	17
Other current expenditure	63	36	42	29	70	44	43	48
Capital expenditure	19	11	3	7	18	24	20	18

* Estimates. † Until 1943 Syria and Lebanon administered by Mandate authorities; 1944 until early 1950, net receipts divided 56 per cent for Syria and 44 per cent for Lebanon.

‡ General consumption taxes, fees and stamp duties, etc.; indirect. § Includes receipts from public domain and State industrial enterprises.

(SOURCE: UN, *Statistical Yearbook, 1952*.)

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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(b) By commodity group

	Lebanon* (£L000)		Syria (£S000)	
Animals and animal products	28,457	1,445	8,232	28,216
Agricultural products	94,839	32,057	54,580	89,533
Chemicals	14,810	1,793	16,775	4,063
Textiles (incl. raw cotton)	46,094	20,534	64,334	177,586
Base metals and goods	21,283	6,999	25,028	1,608
Machinery and instruments	29,856	4,053	38,568	809
Transport equipment	13,022	949	19,349	300
Mineral products†	23,754	542	38,791	1,797

* Transit trade excluded (£L1,238,607,000). Exports exclude re-exports (£L19,491,000). Imports include gold (£L38,569,000), and oil from Iraq refined at Tripoli (£L17,103,000).

† For Lebanon, crude oil and oil products only.

(Sources: Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, *Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel*, vol. 3, no. 4, Beirut, 1953; Bureau de Documentations Syriennes et Arabes, *Etude Mensuelle sur l'Economie et le Marché Syriens*, Damascus, May 1953; G.B., Board of Trade, Special Register Information Service.)

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Table 5

SYRIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1950–1*

(£S million)

		1950	1951
A.	Goods and Services		
	Exports, f.o.b.	270	292
	Imports, c.i.f.	−338	−418
	Trade balance	−68	−126
	Foreign travel	..	1
	Transportation	..	5
	Government, not included elsewhere	..	−1
	Other services	56	59
	Total	−12	−62
B.	Private donations and capital movements		
	Migrants' remittances	10	10
	Capital	9	12
	Total	19	22
C.	Special official financing		
	Saudi Arabian loan	—	15
	UN Relief and Works Administration	10	11
	Total	10	26
D.	Net errors and omissions		3
E.	Deficit (−) (A through D)		−11
F.	Compensatory official financing		
	Short-term assets, net (increase −)		5
	Monetary gold (increase −)		6
	Total		11

* No sign indicates credit; minus sign indicates debit.

(Source: IMF, *Balance of Payments Yearbook*, vol. 4, 1950–1, p. 255; based on official statistics.)

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
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ment, and the investors, inexperienced in farming and unequipped to deal with adverse weather, lack of water, and heavy insect infestation, obtained low yields. Many lost their own capital and borrowed money. 454 241

Some investors, who realize that their only chance of coming out on their original investment is to continue their operations and even to make additional investments, plan to expand operations. Future investment naturally will depend on current earnings which will be determined by production and world market prices.

Farmers who may be in a position to continue investing in agricultural development out of their own capital, however, will be a small minority. The need for credit will be great.

Limited credit usually is given to tenants by the landlords during the spring and summer, but most farmers need more. In the past, additional production credit has been extended largely by the merchants and moneylenders at rates from 15 to 50 per cent annually. A few large landlords borrow money from banks at rates as low as 7 and 8 per cent, but only against excellent securities. Interest rates to the tenants who have less collateral are usually higher. Merchants are discontinuing the practice of buying cotton before the crop is made at prices from 50 to 70 per cent of the future market price because in many cases the farmers do not make enough cotton to fulfill their contract. 452 426 [455]

The government has sought to meet the need for credit by creating an agricultural bank, but the capital is limited and size and volume of loans are small. In 1951, for instance, the bank loaned a total of only $5 million to 57,000 cultivators. Private groups are said to have loaned as much on cotton in the Jezira alone. 652 452

LAND TENURE

Land available for cultivation is plentiful, but confused titles, excessive concentration of ownership, and insufficient or restricted use of the state domains hamper development. 423

The government has a major interest in agriculture and the tenure problem. The Ministry of Justice reports that 23 per cent of the farm land is owned by the state and in some of the larger farming areas the percentage runs as high as 69 per cent. There is also a heavy concentration of land in large units owned and operated by a few wealthy landlords, with 29 per cent of the farm land in farms over 250 acres. Most of the large farms in the old agricultural areas are operated on a tenancy system, but many of the farms now being established in the new areas of the Jezira are operated on a day-wage basis with mechanical equipment. This is especially true of wheat farms. A strong middle class of farmers owns about one-third of the land in farms from 25 to 250 acres, and many of them cultivate their land with the help of tenants. Only 15 per cent of the farm land is owned in lots less than 25 acres. 423 471 241 [427] [464]

In an effort to encourage landownership, stability of tenure, and an interest in improvement of the land, a law was passed recently under which state lands are to be sold on long-term, easy-payment plans to landless farmers with a limit of 123 acres to a farmer. The plan was designed especially to settle the nomads. The principal areas concerned are the state domains in the valleys of the Euphrates and Kabur Rivers, which were un- 425 471 311 [166]

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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municipalities, and the majority were, and are still, rented buildings, the rent being paid from the central budget. Salaries and other expenses are also paid from the funds of the Ministry of Education.

Table 56 gives a picture of the growth of the educational budget since

TABLE 56

GROWTH OF THE EDUCATIONAL BUDGET, SYRIA, 1923–46

Year	General Budget	Educational Budget*	Percent of General Budget	Number of Government Schools	Enrollment in Government Schools
1923*.....	£S 3,970,640†	£S 361,914	9.1	310	22,443
1931*.....	11,932,693	1,170,892	9.8	479	45,491
1941†.....	13,603,100	2,272,623	16.7	...	...
1945‡.....	103,678,000	9,953,568	9.6	694	93,727
1946‡.....	129,704,000	14,127,388	10.9	...	...

* Actual expenditure. Figures from the annual *Rapports sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban* (published by the French Government).
† The rate of exchange of the Syro-Lebanese pound was £S2.18 to the dollar in 1946.
‡ Estimates. Figures from the Ministry of Education.

the early days of the French mandate. Although the table shows a very large increase in budget allotments for education from £S361,914 in 1923 to £S14,127,388 in 1946, these figures should not be taken at their face value. The Syro-Lebanese currency, being based on the franc, had fluctuated in value along with the franc until 1943. Moreover, the increased amounts for 1945 and 1946 show clearly the influence of inflation. The budgetary provisions, therefore, are not based on the same rates of value. For this reason it would not be correct to say that the budgetary provision for education in 1946 was about thirty-nine times that of 1923. About the only thing that can be said is that the Syrian government, anxious in this era of independence to expand public education, is giving generously to the Ministry of Education. A budget of about £S16,000,000 was planned for 1947.

It will be seen from Table 56 that the percentage of the educational budget to the general budget has fluctuated from 9.1 to 16.7. In spite of the rapid increase in the general budget, the educational budget, while growing remarkably in the last four years, did not keep pace with the general budget. The percentages declined from 16.7 in 1941 to 9.6 in 1945 and picked up somewhat in 1946. This is a phenomenon that has been common in most of the other Arab states in the last few years. The 1945 budget was supporting 694 public schools of all types and 93,727 pupils in these schools, representing respectively 2.2 and 4.2 times the number of public schools and number of pupils in 1923.

The distribution of the budget over the various fields of public education in 1945 is shown in Table 57.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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*871 In the year 1944–45 there were 85,540 pupils in the public primary schools and 6,331 in the public secondary and teacher-training institutions. Thus, the average per pupil cost of a public primary school was £S61 (about $28) while that for a secondary or teachers-college pupil was £S278.6 (about $127.30). The latter figure includes the expenditure for boarding students both in some of the secondary schools and in the teach-

TABLE 57

BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SYRIA, 1945

Allocated to	Amount	Percent
Administration	£S 402,052	4.0
Primary education	5,220,000	52.5
Secondary and teacher education	1,763,720	17.7
Vocational education	630,596	6.3
Higher education and other cultural institutions	1,937,200	19.5
Total	£S9,953,568	100.0

ers colleges. Primary education is free. In secondary education fees are charged at the rate of £S48 for intermediate schools and £S60 for secondary schools (upper two classes) with exemptions to be detailed later. Boarding students pay a fee of £S300 in addition. In vocational schools no tuition fees are charged, but boarding students pay a boarding fee of £S240 per year, although some students receive free board and lodging. Education in the teachers colleges is entirely free, students not only receiving free board and room, but also £S15 a month for pocket expenses. Day students receive £S50 a month toward their board and lodging and £15 for pocket expenses. In the Syrian University tuition fees of £S120 are charged, but with about 25 percent of the students exempted. Additional fees are levied for the library and for physical education.

• [652] Revenue from fees goes to the Treasury and cannot be used directly by the schools or the Ministry of Education. Expenditure follows strictly the provisions of the budget.

The financial problem which public education in Syria faces is the same as that of the other Arab countries—to find the funds necessary to put into effect a program of universal education. So long as almost total reliance is placed on the central government budget, little hope can be entertained of reaching that goal. With the budget of the central government so pressed by the requirements of the various departments and agencies of the state, it is not possible to expect more than a limited increase in the budget provisions for education. The proposal, therefore, has been made that the way out of this situation is by the imposition of a

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
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(4) To define the limits of municipal districts in the Muhafazats. 642 631

(5) To institute and organize exhibitions.

(6) To encourage tourism, summer resorts and to supervise hotels.

(7) To organize local communications.

(8) To utilize mineral waters.

(9) To promote a forestation and planting of trees.

(10) To protect beneficiary works and contribute to them.

(11) To organize and exploit hunting and fishing in the sea and rivers.

Art. 130. (1) The special revenues of the Muhafazat necessary for the implementation of its projects shall consist of—

(a) A percentage to be determined by law, such percentage to be taken from general taxes collected in the Muhafazat or added thereto.

(b) Local duties which the Muhafazat Council shall impose within the limits of law. These duties shall in no way delay the movement of persons or the transfer of capital between the various Muhafazats and shall not restrict the right of citizens to practice their professions and perform their work in the country.

(2) The special accountability of the Councils of the Muhafazats shall be regulated by a law.

Art. 131. The Muhafazat Council shall determine disbursements in questions falling under its jurisdiction.

Art. 132. The Rules of Procedure for the Councils of the Muhafazats, adoption of decisions and supervision of their actions shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VII

FINANCES

Art. 133. (1) The Government shall prepare the general budget. 642

(2) The Chamber of Deputies alone shall have the right to adopt it. 652

Art. 134. (1) There shall be for each fiscal year one general budget containing the receipts and expenditures. No special, independent or additional budget may be created except by virtue of a law.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 M1 Middle East
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(2) The Government may, when necessary, submit the project of an extraordinary budget for more than one year including extraordinary receipts and expenditures. Such a budget shall not come into force except when approved by the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 135. The procedure for organizing, approving, implementing and closing the accounts of local budgets shall be determined by a law.

Art. 136. (1) The beginning of a fiscal year shall be fixed by a law.

(2) Three months at least before the beginning of each fiscal year, the Government shall submit to the Chamber of Deputies a project for the general budget of that year.

Art. 137. The Deputies shall vote on ordinary and extraordinary budgets article by article.

Art. 138. (1) The budget law shall include only pure financial provisions.

(2) No taxes shall be levied or services created which may necessitate new expenditures in the budget law.

(3) The provisions of the budget law shall only be implemented within the fiscal year for which that budget was designated.

Art. 139. (1) During the discussion of the budget the Chamber may not increase the proposed total of receipts and expenditures.

(2) The budget committee shall be entitled to modify the project of the budget provided consideration is taken of paragraph one of this Article.

(3) The Deputies shall not propose an increase in expenditure or the creation of a new item of expenditure once the budget committee completes its report on the project of the budget.

(4) After approving the budget, the Chamber of Deputies may adopt laws approving further expenditures and creating new receipts to meet them.

Art. 140. If the Chamber of Deputies has not given a final decision on the project of the budget before the beginning of the fiscal year for which that budget was designated, provisional monthly credits, calculated on the basis of one-twelfth of the preceding fiscal year, shall be opened in virtue of a decree taken by the Council of

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 M1 Middle East
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Ministers. During this period, income shall be collected in conformity with the laws in force at the end of the previous fiscal year. 642 652

Art. 141. (1) The Government shall not exceed in expenditure the maximum limit estimated for each public administration. The budget law must not include a provision enabling the Government to exceed that limit.

(2) No new, additional or transferred credits shall be opened except by virtue of a law.

Art. 142. The final accounts for the fiscal year shall be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies within a time limit not exceeding two years reckoned from the end of the budgetary year in question. These accounts shall be closed by virtue of a law.

Art. 143. (1) Taxes shall be levied only for purposes of common utility.

(2) Taxes shall be fixed in currency. The law shall not impose a tax in kind except under extraordinary circumstances.

Art. 144. (1) No taxes may be levied, modified or abolished except by virtue of a law.

(2) No person may be exempted from the whole or part of a tax except in cases determined by law.

(3) No person may be required to pay a tax except in accordance with the method described by law.

Art. 145. (1) No public or private loan may be contracted except by virtue of a law determining its conditions, the rate of interest and the method of repayment.

(2) The Government shall not grant or guarantee a loan except by virtue of a law.

(3) The procedure for tenders and contracts involving a charge upon public funds shall be determined by a law.

Art. 146. No monopoly or concession to exploit any of the natural resources of the country, or any service of a public utility, may be granted except by virtue of a law and only for a limited period.

Art. 147. (1) A Board of Auditors shall, on behalf of the Chamber of Deputies, examine the accounts of the Government and submit to the Chamber a general report containing its views and observations and indicating any violations committed and fixing the responsibility for them.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
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642 652 (2) The Chamber of Deputies shall elect the members of the Board of Auditors by an absolute majority of the Deputies present. If such a majority is not obtained, a relative majority shall be sufficient at the second ballot. The election shall be made from a list of candidates prepared by the office of the Chamber containing double the number of vacancies for the Board.

(3) This Board shall be attached directly to the Chamber of Deputies.

(4) The office of the Chamber of Deputies shall draft a bill determining the classification, prerogatives and immunities of the members of the Auditing Board as well as the method of auditing.

(5) The budget of the Board of Auditors shall be a part of the budget of the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 148. The Chamber of Deputies may charge the Auditing Board with any audit of or studies concerning receipts and expenditure or the administration of the budget.

Art. 149. Once or more each year, the Government shall submit to the Chamber of Deputies a report on the financial situation of the State.

Art. 150. The monetary system shall be regulated by a law.

Chapter VIII

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

642 654 Art. 151. The State shall supervise and organize the national economy in order to secure a high standard of living for the people by utilizing the land, promoting industry and trade and providing work for all citizens.

Art. 152. (1) There shall be established in the State a permanent Economic Council entrusted with the task of proposing economic plans and programs to develop the potentialities of the country in the various economic fields.

(2) The Council shall submit its reports and the results of its work to the Government and to the Chamber of Deputies.

(3) The number of the members of the Economic Council and the procedure for selecting them shall be determined by a law in such a way as to ensure the realization of its task.

Art. 153. Institutions enjoying financial and administrative inde-

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Finance and public finance

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The post-war period witnessed some important changes in Syria's monetary and banking system, in its foreign exchange system and in its public finances. The large increase in production, investment and commerce noted above had its counterpart in the development of the banking system 1/ and expansion of the money supply (see table 10), most of which has taken the form of bank deposits.

This expansion of the money supply in the post-war period has not been matched by a rise in prices. Between 1945 and 1949 the trend was downward. The discontinuance of Allied military expenditure, together with a sharp increase in the import of surplus, led to a sizable deficit on current account. 2/ Moreover, the 1945 and 1946 budgets showed a surplus, and although the 1947 and 1948 budgets closed with a deficit the amount involved was small. Investment remained at a low level. The Arab-Israeli war led to a large budget deficit in 1949; this was, however, offset by the very low level of investment and the huge import surplus. The index of retail prices of twenty-two essential commodities in Damascus fell from its peak of 831 in 1945 (1938 = 100) to 478 in 1949. 3/

435 [454 457] 434

During the period 1950 to 1954, on the other hand, prices rose. The large-scale investment in cotton, and the sharp increase in the quantity and value of exports of cotton and cereals, which led to a position approaching equilibrium in the balance of payments (see table 53), raised incomes. Subsidiary factors were pipeline construction, high building activity, 4/ and small budget deficits. The rise in import prices, aggravated by hoarding and speculation in 1950 and 1951, also played a part. The rise in prices remained, however, small in scale. The index of wholesale prices of raw materials in Damascus, in which cotton has a heavy weight, rose from 100 in 1949 to 111 in 1950 and 136 in 1951; the fall in cotton prices led to a drop to 119 in 1952 and 110 in 1953. Improved cotton

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1/ Foreign banks account for the greater part of banking activities in Syria; in recent years several banks have opened branches in Syria and existing banks have set up new offices in the smaller towns. In the first half of 1954 seven new banks, mostly Syrian or Lebanese, were established, bringing the total to seventeen. The country is still, however, inadequately provided with long-term credit for agricultural and industrial development, a gap that has been only partly filled by the Government-owned Agricultural Bank and Government loans to industry (see above).

2/ It is difficult to distinguish between Syria's and Lebanon's shares in the trade of the customs union, but there is no doubt that Syria had a large import surplus. This was not covered by such receipts as revenue from petroleum companies and remittances sent by emigrants.

3/ Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract, 1953. There was no index of wholesale prices in Syria prior to 1949; the wholesale price index in Beirut fell from its peak of 1,038 in 1945 (1939 = 100) to 641 in 1949.

4/ Authorized floor space for new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square metres in 1945 to 166,000 in 1949, 209,000 in 1950, 162,000 in 1951, 210,000 in 1952 and 265,000 in 1953.

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436 In May 1949 the Government decreed that the unit of currency would henceforth be the Syrian pound, equivalent to 405.512 milligrammes of fine gold, and began depositing gold and foreign exchange as note issue cover.

652 In July 1949 agreement was reached with Lebanon regarding Syria's debt
436 on account of the Lebanese bank-notes, previously circulating in Syria and now withdrawn by the Syrian Government. The amount was fixed at LL 44 million and it was agreed that settlement would be made by payment of 4,078 million francs to Lebanon; most of this was paid in 1952.

On 28 March 1953 a legislative decree was promulgated, regulating the monetary system of Syria. A Money and Credit Board was established to co-ordinate and direct the activity of monetary and credit institutions. A Central Bank is also to be established; it will be administered by the Money and Credit Board, which is also charged with supervising and orienting the private banks 1/.

The law is being applied in stages. The Money and Credit Board was established in May 1953, and negotiations were started with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which at present issues the currency and enjoys several of the prerogatives of a central bank, regarding eventual transfer to the proposed Central Bank of the government deposits held by it and the assets and liabilities of its Issue Department. The concession of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban lapses in 1964, but the Government has declared that it will not necessarily wait until then to establish the Central Bank. In the meantime, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban continues to perform its previous functions.

The legislative decree provided that the cover of the note issue may consist of gold, foreign exchange, government bills and bonds, and advances made by the Central Bank; the percentage of gold and foreign exchange is not to fall below 30 per cent. On 31 December 1953, the gold and foreign exchange cover of the note issue amounted to £S 97.9 million at the official exchange rate - £S 156.7 million at free market rates; the latter figure represented 56.6 per cent of the value of the note issue; 79 per cent of the gold and foreign exchange cover consisted of gold, United States dollars or Swiss francs 2/.

Foreign exchange

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439 Concurrently with these developments in the monetary system, steps were taken to relax restrictions on foreign exchange, to stabilize exchange rates, and to organize the exchange market. The exchange control system established in

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1/ Ministry of Finance, Statut organique de la monnaie et creation de la banque centrale de Syrie (Damascus, March 1953).

2/ Bulletin issued by the Money and Credit Board, 5 January 1954. The total amount of reserves of gold and of currencies convertible into gold rose from £S 3.0 million at the end of 1948 to £S 8.2 million in 1949, £S 17.9 million in 1950, £S 29.1 million in 1951, £S 49.2 million in 1952, and £S 77.2 million at the end of 1953 François Crecco and Awad Barakat, Le reforme du marché des changes en Syrie, (Damascus, 1954).

£S 3.50 and £S 3.83 in 1951, and between £S 3.55 and £S 3.89 in 1952, in 1953 it fluctuated between £S 3.57 and £S 3.72 and during the last seven months of the year remained stable at £S 3.50. But while the Office has damped seasonal movements it does not seem to have attempted to close or mitigate longer-term trends. In addition, in the second half of 1953, two measures were taken to give the exchange market greater flexibility. In July the Exchange Office began to quote daily forward buying rates for United States dollars, pounds sterling, French francs and Belgian francs; these rates were limited to foreign exchange derived from exports. And in August non-resident accounts opened with authorized banks could be overdrawn within the limits and during the time required for the settlement of normal commercial transactions. 1/ Transactions carried out by the Exchange Office rose from £S 302.3 million in 1952 to £S 676.2 million in 1953. 2/ A breakdown of the Office's operations shows that it drew on the sterling accruing to the Government at the official rate - mainly from petroleum companies operating in Syria, which in 1953 supplied £ 4.6 million (sterling) - and on its French franc balances, and sold sterling and francs to the market, purchasing with the proceeds gold, dollars and other currencies for use as note issue cover. 3/ 457

Public finance

Both expenditure and revenue increased very rapidly during the war years, expenditure from £S 10.9 million in 1939 to £S 99.1 million in 1945, and revenue from £S 11.4 million to £S 118.2 million. the increase was therefore somewhat greater than the rise in prices. A surplus was registered in every one of the war years, and in 1945 the Government Reserve Fund stood at £S 49 million; in 1946 there was a further surplus of £S 8 million. The increase in expenditure in subsequent years, due mainly to the war in Palestine and to increased expenditure on defence, was not matched by revenue, and every budget except that of 1952 showed a deficit; from 1947 to 1949, £S 32 million were withdrawn from the Reserve Fund. The draft estimates for 1953 and 1954 also show deficits. 652 651

1/ International Monetary Fund, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions.

2/ In 1952, £S 29.1 million of purchases and £S 18.4 million of sales and in 1953 £S 29.5 million and £S 31.8 million, respectively, were effected at the official rate, the remainder at free rates.

3/ Net sales to the market in 1952 totalled £ 4.3 million (sterling) and 62 million French francs; net purchases of United States dollars were 9.8 million, of Swiss francs 1.1 million, and of Belgian francs 23.7 million. Corresponding figures for 1953 were 698 million French francs, and $ 12.8 million; purchases of sterling equalled sales (Ministry of Finance, Exchange Office, Annual Report, 1952 and 1953 (in Arabic) Damascus).

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652 651 The Government's debt to the Banque de Syrie et du Liban 1/ rose from £S 158.3 million at the end of 1948 to £S 241.7 million at the end of 1951 and £S 312.4 million at the end of 1953; there had been no debt prior to 1948. The only external debt was the $6 million loan from Saudi Arabia mentioned above.

Important tax reforms were carried out during the war years. In 1942 an income tax was levied on incomes earned in industry, commerce and the professions, on wages and salaries and on dividends, interest and other earnings on capital; rates were raised in subsequent years. 2/ In 1944 a tax of 7 per cent was levied on marketed agricultural produce; this replaced the previously levied tithe and land tax. Buildings and land lying within towns or villages continued to be taxed on their capital value. In 1952 an inheritance tax was imposed, with rates ranging from 1.5 to 40 per cent.

The increase in revenue in recent years has come mainly from increased yield of income taxes, registration fees, excise duties on sugar and petroleum and the profits of the tobacco monopoly (see table 54). On the expenditure side, the most striking change in recent years has been the increase in defence expenditure, which rose from 16.5 per cent of the total in 1945 to 43.7 in 1951/52, declining to 36.3 in the 1954 estimates. Other important items are education, which rose from 8.8 per cent to 17.6 and 17.8, respectively, and health, from 2.9 per cent to 2.8 and 4.2. Expenditure on public works increased little, and its relative importance declined from 12.4 per cent to 6.3 and 8.3. However, some of the most important projects, such as the Ghab drainage, Latakia harbour, Aleppo water project and others, are not included in the budget, being financed by loans or other extra-budgetary sources.

1/ This includes such items as the difference on the French franc cover of the note issue (£S 65.8 million in 1952) and the debts of the Cereals Office (£S 46.8 million), the Exchange Office (£S 26 million), the Agricultural Bank, the railways, electricity administration and other government administrations (£S 59.4 million) and loans to industrial companies guaranteed by the Government (£S 13.4 million), as well as the direct debt of the Government of £S 96.9 million, and other minor items.

2/ In 1952 rates ranged from 6 per cent on incomes between £S 3,000 and 10,000 to 18 per cent on those between £S 30,000 and 50,000 and 36 per cent on those above £S 750,000.

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 Mi Middle East
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Table 54. Syria: Principal Items in Government Budgets, 1939 and 1948 to 1954

(Millions of Syrian pounds)

Item	1939	1948	1949	1951 a/	1952 b/	1953 c/	1954 c/
Revenue:							
Direct taxes on income and wealth d/	1.2	9.4	12.2	19.3	27.1	27.8	23.8
Taxes on property transfers	0.4	8.9	9.3	16.7	28.8	18.6	21.0
Taxes on land, animals and agricultural produce	3.5	18.9	18.9	26.8	49.7	32.0	31.0
Customs duties	0.1	34.9	41.5	49.6	62.3	37.7	37.8
Other indirect taxes	3.5	34.5	39.1	56.9	60.9	54.8	60.7
Other receipts	2.6	9.5	15.2	40.3	41.4	24.1	27.6
Total e/	11.4	116.1	136.1	209.7	270.1	194.9	202.0
Expenditure:							
Education	1.7	20.5	22.8	36.3	47.2	36.8	37.1
Health	0.3	3.4	3.9	5.3	7.5	9.4	8.8
Defence	-	44.8	49.3	102.5	104.6	66.0	75.4
Public works	2.0	16.9	16.4	16.9	16.8	17.5	17.2
Other expenditures	6.8	50.6	58.7	73.8	91.6	78.3	69.5
Total	10.9	136.3	141.1	234.8	267.7	208.0	208.0
Balance	0.6	-20.2	-5.0	-25.1	2.4	-13.0	-6.0

Source: United Nations, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Fiscal and Financial Branch.

a/ January 1950 to June 1951.

b/ July 1951 to December 1952.

c/ Estimates.

d/ Taxes on income and wealth consist of income tax on income from real estate, industrial, commercial and other concerns, income on salaries, etc., and also taxes on capital transfers and other receipts.

e/ Total receipts, excluding transfer from reserve funds.

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Development projects

During the period 1945 to 1952, inclusive, Government expenditure on development totalled £S 301.4 million. Of this £S 115 million was spent through the budget, £S 59.5 million was provided from the Reserve Fund, and £S 126.8 million came from loans made by the bank of issue. 1/ The 1954 budget provided £S 71.6 million for development, of which £S 17.2 million were to be spent through the ordinary budget and the balance to come from various extra-budgetary sources. The preliminary cost of projects under study was put at £S 400 million. 1/ Budget appropriations have been spent by Government departments, but projects financed by extra-budgetary expenditure have generally been carried out by special boards created for the purpose. 2/ No foreign financial assistance has been received by Syria.

Agriculture, irrigation and power

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Budgetary expenditure on agriculture and irrigation from 1945 to 1952 totalled £S 37.9 million, of which £S 25.3 million went to irrigation and the balance to land survey, agricultural schools, model farms, agricultural and veterinary centres and other projects. Extra-budgetary expenditures included £S 5.7 million for irrigation, £S 21.3 million for increasing the capital of the Agricultural Bank, and £S 6.0 million for pest control.

The largest completed irrigation project is that on the Orontes River, in the Homs-Hama region, which irrigates 22,000 hectares. Further works are under study to irrigate an additional 20,000 hectares upstream; their cost has been estimated at about £S 20 million. Other recently completed projects include that on the Quwaiq River, south of Aleppo, which irrigates 15,000 hectares and provides flood control, and the project on the Mzerib, a tributary of the Yarmuk River, which irrigates 2,500 hectares; possibilities for extending both schemes are under study. Irrigation works on the Khabur River, in El Jezira, are very near completion; they have cost £S 9 million and will irrigate 9,000 hectares; considerable further expansion in this scheme is possible and preliminary studies have been made.

Other projects nearing completion include the drainage of the Rouj swamps, near Idlib; the project also provides for the irrigation of 4,000 hectares and the generation of electric power; total costs are put at £S 4 million and completion is scheduled for 1956. The Sinn River project, on the coast south of

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1/ Awad Barakat "Recent Economic Developments in Syria", Middle East Economic Papers, 1954 (Beirut, 1954).

2/ The most important items of expenditure not discussed in this section are £S 33 million for supplying Aleppo with drinking water from the Euphrates, a project which was scheduled for completion in 1954; £S 33 million advanced to municipalities, for water, electricity and public buildings; £S 9.5 million advanced to nationalized electricity companies; £S 26.7 million for Government buildings; £S 8 million for hospitals and clinics, and £S 5.4 million for schools.

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Latakia, is to irrigate 5,000 hectares at a cost of £S 2.6 million; the scheme should be completed by the end of 1955. Projects under study include a scheme on the Barada River, near Damascus, to irrigate 5,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 1[illegible],000 kilowatts, at a total estimated cost of £S 12 million; the Yusef Pasha dam, on the Euphrates, which would extend irrigation by 100,000 hectares and provide a capacity of 45,000 kilowatts, at an estimated cost of £S 150 million; and a small multi-purpose project on the Kabir River, north of Latakia. 652 241 312

The most important project under way is that on the Ghab, on the Orontes north of Hama. The objective is to reclaim by drainage some 26,000 hectares of land and to irrigate by gravity a total area of 65,000 hectares, 43,000 of which had not been irrigated before.

The project also includes the building of four hydroelectric stations, with a capacity of 20,600 kilowatts and an estimated annual output of 80 million kilowatt hours; a thermic generator with a capacity of 9,500 kilowatts; and 700 kilometres of roads. Total costs, exclusive of electric installations, are estimated at £S 140 million, of which £S 45 million are for drainage, £S 55 million for irrigation and £S 37 million for roads and bridges. The hydroelectric plants are estimated to cost another £S 17 million and the thermic plant £S 7.6 million. The Government expects to recover its outlay on the scheme by selling, for an estimated £S 150 million, 30,000 hectares of land which it owns in the region and by levying a small irrigation fee. The scheme is expected to raise gross agricultural income by £S 91 million and net income by £S 78 million. Completion is scheduled for 1960. 1/ 652 312 377 241

The Ghab Project Administration was established in 1951, and in 1953 it was authorized to borrow £S 25 million from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, at 2 per cent interest. A firm of Netherlands consultants, hired by the Government to prepare an over-all plan for the Ghab, presented its report in May 1953. In September 1953 a contract was awarded to a Yugoslav firm for the deepening of the Orontes channel, at a cost of £S 3.3 million. It is expected that contracts for other parts of the project will be awarded soon.

The total area of irrigation projects recently completed or approaching completion is 57,000 hectares and that of schemes planned but not yet begun is 278,000. The total irrigable area, including that at present irrigated, is estimated at 750,000 hectares. 2/.

The total cultivable area in Syria is put at 5 million hectares, of which one million are at present not cultivated, while 1.6 million are left fallow each year under the prevailing triennial rotation. Present plans call for intensifying production by using leguminous crops to replace the period of fallow, 311

1/ "The Ghab Project", by Abdel Basit Khatib, Director General of the Ghab Project Administration (mimeographed document, Damascus, October 23, 1954). See also Abdel Basit Khatib Mashru al Ghab (Damascus, October 1953).

2/ Soubhi Marloum, "Les Irrigations en Syrie", Annual Bulletin of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1955, and "Al mashari al maia fi Suria", Al Hayat, 31 July 1954 (Beirut).

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available. 812 241 242

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital. 812 NB.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers. 811

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal. 311 619

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families. 619 231 233 428 423

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

452a plantation and the value of his lands. Lands without title have no commercial value though the farmer may use them without opposition. This is apparent at the present time when lands with title and undisputed boundaries sell at ten times the price of occupied lands without title A survey and cadastration of Jazirah lands with a rapid and form settlement of boundary disputed and the grant of property deeds will expand the borrowing capacities of Jazirah enonously and may tend to reduce the exorbitant rates of interest demanded by the money lenders. On such a trable basis, other banking establishments may be induced to open business in the region and relieve its dependance on the greedy money lender.

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

491 496 During the French Mandate there was not a single paved or asphalted road in Jazirah. In winter road communications were out between the different towns and villages and the only means of travel was by train which passed through the more important centers of Qamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya For the rest of the year road transport became possible but expensive because of the absence of roads For this reason, the whole region of Deirik remained undeveloped until quite recently.

I. Roads Within Jazirah

491 653 The independent Government in Syria started building a road in 1945 between Qamishli and Hassakeh which served at the same time as the arterial road to Aleppo. Though the distance between the two towns is only 85 kilometers, the funds alloted yearly for the road were so small that now, after seven years, only about 30 kilometers are asphalted and the rest is paved The maintenance does not keep up with the deterioration and the road is going to pieces. However, now at last, communication is assured in all weather while before trucks were stuck for days during the rainy season.

Another asphalted road joins Qamishli with Amuda, a distance of 30 kilometers. Here again deterioration is rapid. This road is to be projected another 30 kilometers to Dirbassiya and from there to Ras el Ain, a distance of 60 kilometers.

491 The road Qamishli-Hassakeh is extended for 50 kilometers south to Point 47 on the way to Deir Ezzor. This section is also asphalted.

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

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312 process of expanding considerably the area irrigated from that river.

Government projects based on the use of river water will have to be the principal means of extending irrigation in the future. Private pump irrigation from rivers or wells cannot be expected to increase rapidly. Additional privately operated pumps could in theory put more land under irrigation, but the land still available for such irrigation would for the most part require higher-lift pumps which are much more expensive to operate. In fact, few new pumps have been installed in the last few years. Moreover, the extension of private pump irrigation on terms which are very burdensome to cultivators appears socially undesirable. Nor is the prospect of expanding irrigation with underground water, particularly through wells, very promising. Underground water in the drier areas of the country is quite limited in supply and often contains harmful sodium and magnesium salts. More extensive investigation of underground water is unquestionably needed, but this should focus in the first instance on finding adequate supplies of drinking water in such areas as the Hauran and Djebel Druze where supplies for human consumption are seriously inadequate and in the Syrian desert where water for livestock is sorely needed. The many wells sunk in certain parts of the country have generally been shallow and have, in one district at least, tended to lower the water table; and the extension of wells to deeper water-bearing strata capable of providing a more plentiful and stable supply may well entail such a heavy investment and high operating costs as to be justified only for crops, such as vegetables, having a high return per hectare.

Completion of Projects Under Way

312 653 Any program must, of course, provide for the completion of government projects already under way. Tell Maghass remains unfinished even though it has been under construction for 10 years, and it is imperative that the remaining part of the canal system be completed rapidly and that the necessary funds—£S 4 million—be provided. The El Senn project, designed to irrigate 5,000 hectares south of Latakia, is over half finished. In the Roudj, a swamp of about 4,000 hectares in Aleppo province, facilities for drainage have just been completed, but an irrigation system must still be planned and laid out. The completion of the latter two projects will require a further expenditure of about £S 4 million.

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Reclamation of the Ghab[7]

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By far the most ambitious project undertaken by the government is the reclamation of the Ghab. This large marsh, stretching north and south along the borders of Latakia and Aleppo provinces, was created by the Orontes river whose flow has been impeded by the existence of a hard basaltic sill at Kfarie. The plan is to reclaim an area of 35,000 hectares by lowering the sill, deepening the river bed and constructing a network of drainage canals. Two reservoirs to be constructed at Halfaya and Rastane will regulate the flow of the Orontes river and store water sufficient to irrigate not only the Ghab, but also the Acharneh plain—a total area of 65,000 hectares. However, of this area, 22,000 hectares are now irrigated by pump. The permanently submerged part of the Ghab—some 29,000 hectares—belongs in the public domain and will after reclamation be available for distribution among settlers drawn from landless or virtually landless peasants in nearby areas.

The cost of the project was originally estimated at £S 136.5 million including £S 8.5 million for interest during construction, £S 38.2 million for a main road through the Ghab and £S 2.65 million for the construction of a central village. A recent special study sponsored by the International Bank indicates, however, that this estimate will probably have to be increased to about £S 171 million. Because of the numerous works which must be constructed in successive stages, the whole project is unlikely to be completed before 1965. As the drainage works progress, however, new land, totaling 10,000 hectares by 1960, will gradually become available for cultivation. The first stage of the construction work—the lowering of the sill—was begun in the latter part of 1954.

Other Irrigation Projects[8]

In selecting other irrigation projects which might be carried out over the next five or six years, the mission was beset by many difficulties. With one exception, all the projects considered were only in the conceptual stage. Exact data on the areas which might be irrigated by each project, or on the quality of the soils of the irrigable land, were for the most part unavail-

[7] See Annex D, p. 327.
[8] See Annex D, p. 330.

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able. With one exception, detailed planning of the various projects had not been undertaken. 312 653

Nevertheless, the mission believes it necessary to recommend a tentative program subject to alteration upon the completion of more detailed studies. In selecting projects for inclusion in this program the mission has taken into account not only the indicated relationship of cost and benefits, but also the location of the projects and the relative needs of various parts of the country.

1 EUPHRATES VALLEY SCHEME

The Euphrates river undoubtedly offers the greatest possibility of extending the irrigated area in Syria. At present, however, a considerable amount of water is already used for pump irrigation; if much more is to be withdrawn it will be necessary not only to reach an agreement with Iraq regarding the division of the water but also to provide facilities for the storage of water during the flood season. A project for a storage dam at Youssef Pasha has already been worked out; this would increase the minimum flow of the Euphrates during the dry season from about 300 cubic meters per second (m 3/sec) to around 400 m 3/sec. With a long canal starting from the dam it may be possible to irrigate about 185,000 hectares of the so-called Raqqa plateau on the left bank of the river and approximately 54,000 hectares in the Resafe area on the right bank. In addition, the construction of a diversion weir at the Halabiye gorge between Raqqa and Deir ez Zor would probably permit the irrigation of 165,000 hectares farther down in the Euphrates valley. Of the total area thus to be irrigated by projects dependent on the Youssef Pasha dam—404,000 hectares—over one-third or approximately 152,000 hectares are already irrigated by private pumps.

For a number of reasons the mission has reluctantly concluded that this entire group of projects should be deferred until after 1960. First of all, the capital investment required is very large and the benefits will not accrue for a long time. The Youssef Pasha dam itself would cost £S 150 million and the irrigation works would entail an additional outlay of probably £S 560 million. The dam could hardly be completed before 1963, and the construction of all the irrigation works would probably take longer even if it proceeded simultaneously. The financing of the Euphrates and Ghab projects at one and the same time would impose an excessive

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burden on the resources available to the government; and it would require substantial expenditures over a long period without an attendant increase in production, thus leading to inflationary pressures.

The second reason for deferring the Euphrates projects is the fact that much preparatory work must in any event be undertaken before they can be launched. Estimates of the areas that can feasibly be irrigated must, for example, remain largely conjectural until topographic and soil surveys and land classification can be undertaken. Plans for the irrigation systems should not be drawn up until experiments are carried out to determine the proper irrigation duty (i.e., water to be used per hectare) in the light of soil conditions and projected cropping patterns. While plans for the Youssef Pasha dam have already been drawn up, additional borings to explore the foundation conditions of the dam are still necessary. The mission recommends that all this preparatory work be undertaken over the next few years and it has included £S 3 million in the program for this purpose. Meanwhile the government should also seek to reach an agreement with Iraq regarding the allocation of the Euphrates water.

2 RECOMMENDED PROJECTS

The mission would perhaps be more favorably inclined toward an early start on the Euphrates projects if there were no other possibilities of expanding the irrigated area. But there are a number of small projects which can be undertaken at a lower cost and can be completed more rapidly. After considering the various possibilities, the mission recommends that the following schemes be carried out in the years 1955-60:

Project and location	Estimated cost (in million £S)	Area to be irrigated (in thousand hectares)		
		Total	Newly irrigated	Already irrigated
Mzerib, in the Hauran	8	4.6	4.6	0
Nahr el Kebir, in Latakia	15	4.0	3.5	0.5
Barada, near Damascus	30	15.0	15.0	0
El Taf, on the Khabour	30	ca.20.0	ca.10.0	ca.10.0
Total	83	43.6	33.1	10.5

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The first of these is really an extension of the existing Mzerib project and calls for the irrigation by pump of 4,500 hectares with water from the springs at the headwaters of the Yarmuk. It is the only project ready for immediate execution and has the advantage of extending the irrigated area in a province which suffers from a chronic shortage of water.

The Nahr el Kebir project is included despite its rather high cost because it is a multiple-purpose project with diverse benefits. It involves the construction of a storage dam on the Nahr el Kebir, which will not only serve irrigation but also control periodic floods and supply water and power to the growing port city of Latakia.

The Barada river project entails the construction of two dams—one at Hameh and the other farther upstream near Makaren—to provide water for both power and irrigation. This scheme appears particularly attractive because it would permit the irrigation of 15,000 hectares of good land in the vicinity of Damascus, an area of dense population, and would help to meet the growing power needs of the nation's capital.

The El Taf project requires the construction of an earth fill dam across the Khabour river on the site of an old Roman dam. The water thus diverted might irrigate about 10,000-15,000 hectares on the right bank, and 6,000 hectares on the left bank of El Taf river. The land in this area is rather good but cultivable only if irrigated. While there are other possible projects on the Khabour, the mission considers all of them less promising. Farthest upstream and south of Ras el Ain, some 20,000 hectares could be irrigated, but this is in an area of relatively abundant rainfall where winter crops can be grown without irrigation and where landowners are already installing pumps at their own cost for summer irrigation. The Saba Skour project, 12 kilometers downstream from Hassetche, could irrigate about 15,000 hectares, but the dam which would have to be constructed would flood a considerable area of rich alluvial land now under cultivation. Farther downstream from El Taf, additional irrigation would probably be feasible only if the limited supply of water available in the Khabour during the dry season were supplemented by storage during the flood season. The only possible site for a storage dam appears to be at Markada; but a dam in this location would have to be very long and would provide only a very shallow reservoir with attendant dangers of excessive evaporation and silting. The feasibility of the Markada dam should first be carefully investigated.

If the new projects recommended above are carried out and those now

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312 653 under way are completed, Syria would have under irrigation an area of 89,100 hectares additional to that already irrigated. Certain projects, including the Ghab, Barada and El Taf, will, of course, not be completed in the period 1955-60 covered by the mission's suggested program. Under that program, the total newly irrigated area will have increased by about 40,000 hectares by the end of 1960.

Planning of Irrigation Schemes

312 653 647 The planning, construction, maintenance and operation of all irrigation projects (except the Ghab for which a special office has been created) is the responsibility of the Hydraulics Branch of the Ministry of Public Works. At present the staffing of this branch is far from adequate to carry out a greatly expanded program. While the technical staff is supposed to number 78, including 19 engineers, the number actually employed is only 36, of which 11 are engineers. Temporary appointees totalling 23 bridge only part of the gap. The staff must ultimately be greatly expanded. It will take time, however, to train additional technicians; and the goal will never be reached unless the present inadequate salary scale is raised so as to attract competent recruits. Meanwhile, the Ministry will be unable to carry out the suggested irrigation program unless it utilizes every opportunity to delegate the planning and execution of projects to properly qualified private firms.

In discussing the Euphrates projects, the mission has already emphasized the importance of adequate planning and recommended the allocation of £S 3 million for the necessary preparatory work. Part of this sum should be used for the construction of a hydraulics laboratory which would be useful in testing models of all proposed irrigation structures. Through model testing it will be possible properly to design such structures as weirs, canal intakes and sluices so as to anticipate subsequent damage and to achieve maximum economies in construction. It would also be highly desirable to experiment with different types of canal linings. The concrete linings used up to the present are expensive and not wholly satisfactory. It may be possible to use the asphalt available in Syria to devise a lining which would neither crack nor be too fluid and would at the same time be more economical. The mission urges that a qualified foreign firm be engaged to make laboratory tests with this material under conditions simulating those in Syria.

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to do so, and alternative investment opportunities become less attractive, the question of building a railway might well be reviewed.

The mission would be more favorably disposed to a railway if there were no alternative means of reducing the present high transport rates between the Jezireh and Aleppo and Latakia. However, the building of good, all-weather roads, supplemented by the construction of grain storage facilities in the Jezireh, should make it possible to lower transport charges significantly by reducing truck maintenance and depreciation costs and somewhat diminishing seasonal transport peaks. The mission recommends, therefore, that the government undertake this task as a matter of high priority.

To this end the following program should be carried out within the next five or six years:

1. *Improvement and partial realignment of the Aleppo-Latakia road.* The improvement and widening of this road is imperative, and since topographic conditions make widening of certain sections impossible, an entirely new road must be built in part. A new road, for example, will be necessary for a distance of some 30 kilometers west of Jisr ech Choghour. Improvement of the section south of Idlib and crossing the Djebel Zâouiye would also be extremely difficult. The mission recommends strongly that this stretch be replaced by a north-south road running through the Roudj. Such a road would not only avoid most of the mountainous terrain but would simultaneously serve the new agricultural district of the Roudj. The cost of the entire project, including the new road construction, is tentatively estimated at £S 7.37 million.

2. *Improvement and widening of the Aleppo-Raqqa road.* This road, 190 kilometers long and part of the trunk highway to the Jezireh, has an asphalt surface only four to five meters wide. In line with recent proposals made by the Syrian government, the mission suggests its widening to six meters, with a two-meter berth on each side. The government has estimated the cost at £S 3.38 million.

3. *Construction of a new road connecting Raqqa with Kamichliye, via Kantari, Tell Tamer and Tloul Mohammed, and continuing from Kamichliye, via Demir Kapu and Deirik, to Ain Divar on the Syrian-Turkish frontier* (total length: 362 km). Unlike earlier proposals, the road we recommend would not follow the present truck route between Raqqa and Km. 47 on the Hassetche-Deir ez Zor road, but would run north of the Djebel Aabd el Aaziz. In this way it would tap a much larger agricultural

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region, including the dry-farming area south of Ras el Ain and the irrigated area in the Khabour river valley. It would be advisable to start the construction of the Kamichliye-Ain Divar section first, because this rich agricultural region of heavy rainfall is now the most inaccessible part of the Jezireh. To feed the trunk highway the mission also recommends the construction of the following roads: (1) Ras el Ain-Hassetche, crossing the main highway at or near Tell Tamer (73 km); (2) Hassetche-Tloul Mohammed (60 km), thus linking the provincial capital with Kamichliye, the region's commercial center; (3) Derbassiye-main road (30 km); (4) Demir Kapu-Tell Kotchek (30 km); and (5) much farther to the west, Tell Abiad-Kantari (46 km). The first two are considered the more important. In general this proposed road network conforms to the most recently expressed views of the Syrian government, which has tentatively estimated the cost, pending engineering surveys, at about £S 46 million.

North-South Communications

We turn now to a consideration of the other principal transport routes. With respect to the north-south transport axis, improvement of communications between Aleppo and Damascus is most important. A direct standard-gauge railway link between these cities has often been proposed, either by the laying of an additional rail on the narrow-gauge line from Damascus to the junction with the standard-gauge line at Rayak in Lebanon or by the building of a new railway from Damascus to Homs, where it would connect with the DHP line to Aleppo. The mission is convinced, however, that the volume of bulk goods suitable for rail transport moving between Aleppo and Damascus is far too small to justify the large investment required, at least £S 18 million for the former and £S 36 million for the latter project. The solution is rather to improve and widen the Aleppo-Damascus road. The section between Hama and Aleppo urgently demands improvement, and the entire road should be widened by at least one meter to permit easier flow of two-way vehicular traffic. The cost of widening would probably be about £S 10,000 per kilometer or a total of about £S 4 million.

The transport route south from Damascus to Dera'a and the Jordanian frontier is served both by road and the Hedjaz Railway. The problems of the latter have already been discussed. The road, although not as well

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Urban Social Welfare

368 It seems desirable in the near future to inaugurate some social welfare work in the urban areas as a counterpart of the proposed community work in the rural areas. Initially this will have to be on a modest and experimental scale. We suggest that over the next six years 8 to 10 centers be established to serve as focal points for voluntary community activities. About £S 350,000 might be allocated for investment in such centers, and £S 120,000 for operating expenditures. The centers would provide facilities for reading, radio listening, community meetings, adult education courses and eventually even for community baths. It would be advisable to combine the community hall as far as possible with the traditional school building; we therefore recommend that all new schools be constructed as all-purpose buildings which can serve children during the day and adults at night. The centers might well be put in the charge of selected teachers who would receive some special training in social work.

We would stress particularly that this modest program is experimental in character. Experience with the first centers will demonstrate how useful they can be, what needs they must serve and how they can best meet these needs.

Public Buildings[37]

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Public buildings are, of course, prominent features in most settlements of any size. They must be properly planned and fitted into town planning schemes so that they will be of maximum service to the government and the community. Elsewhere in this report we have discussed building requirements for agriculture, education, health and similiar special purposes. Any development program should also take into account the probable outlays on buildings of a general administrative character. The mission, however, had very little basis on which to project investment expenditures on government buildings of this kind. During the period 1949-53 the Ministry of Public Works spent on an average about £S 1 million on the construction of public buildings for purposes other than agriculture, education and health. The mission thought it advisable to assume that such expenditures would rise in the future and has accord-

[37] See Annex I, p. 472.

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ingly allowed for construction amounting to £S 8.5 million during the years 1955-60, or a little over £S 1.4 million annually. 653 361

The mission has one general observation to make regarding the responsibility for planning and constructing government buildings of all types. We believe that the Ministry of Public Works should in the future, as in the past, be responsible for designing and constructing public buildings. On the other hand, the various ministries and government agencies for which the buildings are to be built should be in the position of programming their own requirements. We have already had occasion to stress this in connection with public health facilities but it applies generally. Each ministry or independent government agency which requires a more or less continuous building program should have at least one or two officers charged with the task of anticipating building requirements. Proposals for new construction and appropriate budget allocations should come from the ministries concerned. Once they are approved, it is the task of the Ministry of Public Works to design and construct the building. Final approval of the design should also rest with the initiating ministries or agencies since only they will be able to judge whether the proposed design meets their needs.

A Housing and Settlements Administration

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In this and previous chapters we have envisaged that the government will play an increasingly prominent role with respect to the establishment of new rural settlements, urban housing and town planning. These are in the main new functions for the Syrian government and at present it is hardly equipped to discharge them. A new organization with a specially trained staff will be necessary. An independent agency set up for this purpose would have the task of (1) providing technical assistance to municipalities in town planning and related fields, and (2) planning and coordinating the work in housing and settlement.

The planning must be on two levels: on a broad national and regional scale, keeping in mind population trends and the interaction between economic development and the geographic distribution of population, and on a more detailed local scale, involving particular settlement projects.

Regarding the first of these planning functions, we do not suggest that the agency should be charged with drawing up the economic development program. It must keep under constant study, however, the impact which

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ANNEX D *NOTES ON IRRIGATION*

1 THE GHAB PROJECT

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The Ghab valley, part of the Orontes river valley, is about 50 kilometers long from south to north and about 10 kilometers wide. There is in the valley a marshy area of about 35,000 hectares, which cannot be cultivated at present, although it consists mostly of good alluvial soil. If drained and irrigated the reclaimed land would probably be suitable for rice, cotton, sugar beet and pulses as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter vetch or clover during the winter. It has the great advantage of being near both the important domestic market of Aleppo and the port of Latakia, permitting ready export of products in excess of local needs.

The marsh would be drained by excavation of a basaltic sill at Kfeir that now prevents the out-flow of water, and by construction of a system of drainage canals. Included in the area to be developed for agricultural use is the Acharneh plain just upstream from the Ghab valley in a bend of the Orontes. The Orontes river is now unable to drain the plain because its bed has been raised by silting. An extensive network of irrigation canals would be constructed for the irrigation of the plain and the valley. Including the reclaimed land, the total irrigated area would be about 65,000 hectares. A reservoir with a storage capacity of about 68 million cubic meters would be constructed behind a dam near Halfaya to control the Orontes flood, and a second dam located near Rastane would provide a reservoir of about 180-265 million cubic meters for irrigation purposes. About 20,000 KW of electric power would eventually be developed in hydroelectric plants at Rastane, Maharda and Jisr ech Choghour. The last two plants, however, could be operated only during the off-season for irrigation.

Of the 65,000 hectares, 43,000 have not previously been irrigated and of these 29,000 hectares are government-owned. The project would further provide for the settlement of a large number of farmers in the latter area.

It is anticipated that completion of the entire project will require about 10 years, proceeding in overlapping stages as follows: (a) drainage of the Orontes valley; (b) the Halfaya flood control dam; (c) a part of the road system; (d) a soil improvement program; (e) about 75% of the irrigation

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network. If an early start is made on (a), (b) and (c), then the soil improvement program and irrigation network might be initiated in 1956 and 1957 respectively.

The later work, mainly in the Acharneh plain, will be done after 1960. It will include drainage of the plain, construction of the Halfaya tunnels, completion of the road system, construction of the irrigation network of the Acharneh plain and Rastane dam, and the relocation of the Amir Ghajar hydro plant. The entire project could be completed by the end of 1963.

In the Ghab area, 41,680 hectares will be irrigated by a system of three main canals, one on each bank of the Orontes, branching from an intake to be constructed near Acharneh, and a third, made from the present bed of the Orontes, originating five kilometers downstream near Ammourine from an intake built in the new Orontes. This will irrigate the lands between the river and the two other main canals. The total area brought under irrigation in the Ghab, taking into account the 13,600 hectares now under partial irrigation, will not exceed 28,000 hectares until about 1963. If temporary limitations on summer irrigation are to be avoided, the work will have to proceed according to a closely coordinated schedule.

Cost

The preliminary cost estimate made in 1952 and later brought up to date at the request of the International Bank forms the basis of the following estimate, which includes engineering and supervision expenses, and which assumes that the major proposed technical revisions of the provisional plans will be adopted. On this basis the total cost of the full program is estimated at £S 130.85 million, exclusive of the cost of local and national roads, or £S 169.85 if these are included.[1] The foreign exchange requirement would be about one-third of these totals. During the term of the mission's program (to December 1960) disbursements are likely to be £S 84.25 million without roads or £S 110.25 million if roads are included. Additional funds required for indirect consequences of the project have not been included in the costs for the main project.

[1] All figures are exclusive of any margin for contingencies.

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Economic Benefits

The mission estimates that the gross value of the produce of the Ghab 312
area will be in the neighborhood of £S 63 million annually, or about £S 47 653
million after deducting the amount already produced in the area in 185
question. The production of cotton, maize, sorghum, rice and sugar beets 241
is particularly likely to have a marked impact on Syria's balance of trade. 166
It may be assumed that the output of cotton and cottonseed will in effect be added to the country's exportable surplus; the additional rice production may make Syria fully self-sufficient in that commodity; and the sugar beet production should permit a considerable import saving.

In addition to the project's contribution to an increase in national income and an improvement in the balance of payments, the settlement of farmers in the area made possible by the project will assist in relieving the present population pressure in the province of Latakia and particularly in the Alaouit mountains. In Latakia, for example, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% of the average for Syria as a whole. Settlers in the Ghab will be able to earn substantially more than the bare living they have been able to eke from the soil in the past.

Organization

The "Administrative Office of the Drainage and Irrigation Works of 647
the Ghab Lands" was created in 1951, to be attached to the Ministry of 653
Public Works until the technical work is completed. It will be responsible 185
for the design of the works, award of contracts, supervision of construction, 312
payment of expenses and for sale of the land. As parts of the project are completed, the Office will take care of the operation and maintenance of the dams and of the irrigation and drainage networks and will collect water charges. During the planning and construction period the Office should recruit and train staff to carry out the continuing operation and management of the project.

It is important that the policy, and the attendant operating and budget delegations, provide for the establishment and operation of the agricultural research centers and for a long-range educational and farm demonstration program; otherwise, it will be practically impossible to achieve acceptable land use in the area.

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II PROJECTED SCHEMES

185 312 653 The Youssef Pasha project is the most important of those under consideration, but it is still at the planning stage. No decision has been taken with regard to the irrigation of the Euphrates valley as a whole.

Euphrates Valley—Youssef Pasha Dam[2]

In Syria the long narrow Euphrates valley stretches generally northwest to southeast from Djerablous at the Turkish border to Abou Kemal at the Iraqi border. It is about 450 kilometers long; its average width is about 7.5 kilometers, its maximum 16.

The soils of the valley proper are mainly alluvial, varying from silt to sandy loam and clay. With irrigation, they would be suitable for cotton, rice, sugar beet, peanuts, sorghum, etc. as summer crops, and wheat, barley and winter legumes as the main winter crops.

Irrigation of the whole Euphrates valley, on the assumption that about 85% of the land can be cultivated, would require about 170 cubic meters per second, more than can be assumed to be Syria's share of the natural flow of the Euphrates. Irrigation could probably profitably be extended to an additional area of about 130,000 hectares on the left bank in the vicinity of Raqqa. All in all, a total supply of about 226 cubic meters per second would be needed, about 75% of the maximum of 300 cubic meters per second utilizable for irrigation from the river's natural flow, which would leave only 25% for Iraq. For this reason, and because of the power potential, it was thought desirable to construct a storage dam on the Euphrates; Youssef Pasha was selected as the site. British engineering consultants recommended a concrete dam of the pierced type, 650 meters long with 52 sluice gates, and a power plant capable of producing about 45,000 KW of firm power or a yearly output of about 400 million KWH, plus about 120 million KWH of secondary power.

The consultant firm originally estimated the project cost, including a transmission line to Aleppo, at about £S 114 million; a revaluation made in 1953 raised the estimate to £S 150 million. The capacity of the reservoir behind the dam would increase the flow of the river utilizable for irriga-

[2] Since studies of the valley have not advanced to the point of a draft project, the figures which follow are only indications of the order of magnitude of possible development.

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tion by about 100 cubic meters per second; this, added to Syria's assumed share of the natural flow, would provide sufficient water to irrigate the valley, including the area on the left bank.

Until recently it was thought that the length of head canal needed to connect Youssef Pasha with the irrigable areas would, because of difficult topography, preclude construction of an economic gravity irrigation system. The mission, taking account of experts' reports, has the following comments:

About 48,000 hectares on the river's right bank, between Youssef Pasha and Halabiye gorge, could be irrigated by pumping, at a cost of about £S 50 million; but this would not be an economic method of irrigating the fertile Ressafe plain. Both the valley and about 6,000 hectares of the plain could be irrigated by constructing a gravity canal branching from Youssef Pasha, at a cost of about £S 100 million. Whether it is worthwhile to spend an additional £S 50 million to irrigate a portion of the plain is a question to be considered.

On the left bank, however, a gravity canal branching from the Euphrates at the foot of Youssef Pasha dam could reach the plateau west of Raqqa, 100,000 hectares of which are now without any possibility of being irrigated, and could provide wide-scale irrigation between Ressafe and Halabiye gorge. About 185,000 hectares of excellent soils could be irrigated, about 155,000 by gravity flow and about 30,000 by pumping from the canal.

The possibilities of such a project should be investigated. We have made provision for such a study in our allocation for Euphrates valley studies; the aerial survey and mapping of the area are allowed for elsewhere. The gravity irrigation portion should cost roughly £S 266 million, of which £S 150 million (55%) represents the cost of the head canal. The pumping facilities would cost about £S 34 million. The construction cost of the project would thus be about £S 1,700 per hectare, less than that of the Ghab project.

Halabiye Project

Halabiye gorge offers an excellent site for a diversion weir: inundations would be restricted to the gorge itself. The weir could feed two irrigation canals, one on each bank of the Euphrates, extending 250 kilometers to Abou Kemal near the Iraqi border, and these could supply gravity irriga-

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185 tion to about 165,000 hectares, leaving about 50,000 to be irrigated by
312 pumps.
653 The cost of such a project would be about £S 165 million, or £S 1,000 per irrigated hectare. But although it would irrigate the fertile Meyadine area and foster development of the Abou Kemal locality, we do not recommend its construction during the next five years. Halabiye is rather far down the Syrian Euphrates valley; much of the area is already under pump irrigation; and for the limited capital expendable the Youssef Pasha site offers wider potentialities, particularly in the generation of hydroelectric power for the Aleppo area.

Khabour Valley

The Khabour valley has possibilities for projects in addition to the Tell Maghass scheme. None has been fully investigated. The soils are generally of good quality, ranging from loamy sand to medium clay, suitable for cultivation of cotton, rice, peanuts and (in the northern parts) sugar-beet. All summer crops must be fully irrigated, and although rainfall is more plentiful here than in many parts of Syria, partial irrigation of winter crops is advisable in some areas.

A diversion weir could be constructed across the Khabour downstream from Ras el Ain to feed an irrigation canal on each bank. Areas of 13,300 and 7,400 hectares, on the right and left banks, respectively, could be irrigated. Rainfall in this area is adequate for winter crops and several large estate owners have installed pumps for summer cultivation.

A canal could be excavated on the right bank of the river, from Tell Maghass, but no more than 3,800 hectares would be irrigated; moreover, the soil is not very good, being sometimes excessively salted with gypsum.

About 12 kilometers downstream from Hassetche a dam could be built on the site of the ruined Roman dam of Saba Skour. Although this would permit the irrigation of about 15,000 hectares, it would unfortunately reflood the site of the previous reservoir whose fertile alluvium is now under cultivation.[3]

Sixteen kilometers downstream from Saba Skour another ruined Roman dam formerly supplied two large canals, one on each bank of the Taf river, a tributary of the Khabour. Here could be built an earth-fill dam,

[3] The area of this site is difficult to determine owing to the flatness of the surrounding country.

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about 760 meters long and 15 meters high, to feed a 14-kilometer canal on the right bank, irrigating about 8,000 hectares (a longer canal might irrigate 10,000-15,000 hectares) and a shorter left-bank canal, irrigating about 6,000 hectares. The soil is fairly good, and the mission considers this the best project that could be started in the Khabour area. A rough cost estimate is about £S 30 million, or £S 1,500 to £S 2,000 per hectare, depending on the area irrigated.

All told, these projects would irrigate 62,000-69,000 hectares, including the 8,500 now irrigated by the left bank canal of Tell Maghass. With a duty[4] of 0.6 liters per hectare per second, about 40 cubic meters per second would be needed. Since that is the total discharge of the Khabour utilizable for irrigation, no water would remain for dry season cultivation downstream from the Taf. Accordingly, consideration has been given to storage of the Khabour flood. The downstream portion of the valley is very flat, with the exception of the right bank where it is bordered by an eroded plateau. The plateau is nearest to the river at Markada, and here a dam could be built to form a reservoir. About 800 million cubic meters could be stored behind a dam about 20 meters high; even after loss through evaporation from the large surface area, about 700 million cubic meters would remain, or about 45 cubic meters per second for a six-month irrigation season. This discharge could irrigate about 75,000 hectares out of a possible 250,000 along both banks. The sandy and loamy alluvial soils of this area would be suitable, under irrigation, for the cultivation of rice, cotton, peanuts, pulses, sorghum and maize.

The site's disadvantage is that the gentle slope of the left bank would require construction of a long levee, although there is an easy abutment for the dam on the right bank. Moreover, because the height of the dam would necessarily mean a very shallow reservoir, it would be difficult to prevent siltation. In the circumstances, the government has made no study, survey or cost estimate of the project. The mission recommends that aerial and ground surveys and mapping be undertaken to determine whether the site is satisfactory or whether an alternative must be found. As a first step, the ground survey should be limited to five or six profiles in the area contemplated for the reservoir. This should take about three days, at a cost not in excess of £S 1,000, to be charged to the study of the Euphrates valley, where most of the stored water would be utilized.

[4] The average quantity of irrigation water which must be applied annually to the land to bring the crops to maturity.

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Upper Orontes Valley

312 653 185 In the area of Homs two projects are under consideration to expand cultivation in the upper Orontes valley, where cotton and sugar beet can be grown as summer crops and wheat, barley and clover as winter crops: a canal branching from Homs Lake to irrigate about 3,000 hectares on the left bank of the Orontes, and one branching from a diversion weir to be constructed about 23 kilometers upstream of the south end of Homs Lake. Here the dry season flow of the Orontes is at least 10 cubic meters per second, sufficient to irrigate about 15,000 hectares on the right bank, so that the Ghab project would not be adversely affected. However, the Orontes rises in Lebanon, where a project to irrigate the Kaa area is being considered. This would reduce the available flow at the Syrian border, correspondingly reducing the irrigable area in Syria. Since the project is estimated to cost about £S 15 million, an agreement with Lebanon on the partition of the Orontes should be concluded first. We also recommend a more accurate geological survey of the Rastane reservoir area, to ascertain whether potential capacity has been overestimated. Meantime, the two projects should be deferred.

Barada Valley

Consideration has been given to regulating the flow of the Barada river, to increase the irrigated area of the Ghouta in the vicinity of Damascus where soils toward the valley bottoms are suitable for the growing of vegetables.

Two dams across the Barada river at Hameh and near Makaren, each about 50 meters high, would provide a total storage capacity of about 180 million cubic meters, thus increasing the utilizable irrigation flow from 7 to about 15 cubic meters per second and permitting dry season irrigation of about 15,000 hectares of new fertile land in the vicinity of Damascus. A hydroelectric power plant could be built at the foot of each dam to develop a total power of about 10,000 KW.[8]

Surveys and studies have not progressed to the point of a draft project. A rough cost estimate is about £S 10 million for each dam, plus not more than £S 10 million for the development of the canal system, making a total

[8] These are recommended in Annex G.

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of about £S 30 million for the project (exclusive of the hydroelectric plants), or about £S 2,000 per hectare. The mission recommends that studies of the two sites be completed and that construction of the dams and hydro plants begin as soon as possible.

Yarmuk Valley

Cultivation on the alluvial and sometimes very fertile soils[8] of the Mzerib area irrigated from the upper springs of the Yarmuk river could be extended by pumping water to a new area of 4,500 hectares. This second phase of the Mzerib irrigation project has been fully investigated and is ready to be started; the first phase is already in operation. The pumps would be driven by diesel motors unless and until it is decided to build a hydroelectric power plant on the Yarmuk. The cost is estimated at about £S 7 million, approximately £S 1,500 per hectare. In view of the interest in developing irrigation in the Hauran mohafazat, which is in general not well provided with water, the mission recommends that this project be started without delay.

Nahr el Kebir Valley

The Nahr el Kebir, a short river flowing from the mountains bordering on Turkey, empties into the Mediterranean in the vicinity of Latakia. It has heavy floods, but in dry season the flow is no more than 0.5 to 0.6 cubic meters per second. A regulated flow would permit irrigation of about 4,000 hectares in the vicinity of Latakia for vegetable growing, thus making a significant contribution to the general development expected with the improvement of the port.

The construction of a dam of about 60 meters is projected, with sufficient capacity to permit flood control, irrigation, power and water for the port of Latakia. Site surveys are already under way. Additional cost studies must be made, but the cost will probably be of the order of £S 15 million. Although this is rather expensive for a single project, the mission feels that in view of its multi-purpose nature and the great importance of the development of the port of Latakia, studies should promptly be completed and the project constructed during the next five years.

[8] Suitable for cotton, with peanuts and citrus on the lighter soils.

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The new irrigation projects recommended by the mission, together with those under way, call for a total expenditure of £S 193 million over the next five years, to which must be added £S 3 million for maintenance and £S 1.2 million for research and demonstration, giving a grand total of £S 197.2 million. Table 1 shows the allocations among projects, together with an indication of the areas to be irrigated. Appendix Table II sets forth the irrigation schemes.

TABLE 1 Mission's Proposed Irrigation Program, 1955–60

Irrigated area							
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Projects	Functions	Total	Already spent	To be spent in the program
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	103[a]	1	102
0	0	0	Euphrates valley studies		3	—	3
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghas (LB) . .	GI	12	10	2
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	5	2	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	3	2	1
4.6	0	4.6	Muzrib	PI	7	0	7
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	30	0	30
15.0	0	15.0	Barada	HEP + GI	30	0	30
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	15	0	15
89.1	37.5	126.6			208	15	193

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; LB – Left Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

[a] Including £S 47 million to be spent in a later program.

NOTE: Area figures in thousand hectares; expenditure figure in million £S.

185 III PLANNING
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There are two stages of planning for irrigation projects. The first, the agricultural phase, entails a preliminary study of the soils and the computation of water duties. The technical phase includes planning of the civil engineering works necessary to divert, convey and distribute the water in the selected area. In the Main Report the mission has discussed the second

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The low fee for the Makt project is justified by the restricted nature of the facilities provided, but the fees assessed for the Tell Maghass, Mzerib and Senn projects appear low in proportion to the money value of the benefits to the landowners or cultivators, and are considerably less than the cost of pumping irrigation provided by private owners. Accordingly, we have recommended review of these fees.

APPENDIX

TABLE II Irrigation Schemes Under Construction or Projected

Irrigated area (thousand hectares)					Expenditures (million £S)		
New area	Already irrigated	Total	Location	Functions	Already spent	To be spent	Total
43.0	22.0	65.0	El Ghab	D + GI	1	170	171[a]
252.0	152.0	404.0	Youssef Pasha		—	150	150
140.0	45.0	185.0	Raqqa Plateau	GI + PI	—	300	300
85.0	80.0	165.0	Halabiye	GI	—	160	160
27.0	27.0	54.0	Resafe	GI or PI	—	100	100
4.0	0.5	4.5	Roudj	D + GI	2	3	5
4.6	2.2	6.8	Mzerib	GI + PI	2	7	9
15.6	5.1	20.7	Ras el Ain	GI	—	30	30
4.5	4.0	8.5	Tell Maghass (LB)	GI	10	2	12
2.8	1.0	3.8	Tell Maghass (RB)	GI	—	6	6
8.0	7.2	15.2	Seba Skour	GI	—	25	25
10.0	10.0	20.0	El Taf	GI	—	30	30
53.0	22.0	75.0	Markada	GI	—	100	100
8.0	7.0	15.0	Upstream Homs Lake	GI	—	15	15
3.0	—	3.0	Homs Lake (LB)	GI	—	3	3
4.5	0.5	5.0	El Senn	GI + PI	2	2	4
3.5	0.5	4.0	Nahr el Kebir	HEP + GI	—	15	15
15.0	—	15.0	Barada	HEP + GI	—	30	30
431.5	235.0	665.5			17	1,148	1,165

Key: GI – Gravity Irrigation; HEP – Hydroelectric Power; RB – Right Bank; PI – Pumping Irrigation; FC – Flood Control; LB – Left Bank; D – Drainage; R – Regulation

[a] Including local and national roads.

NOTE: The figures given above are only rough estimates. Accurate figures are not available because most of these irrigation schemes have not yet reached the draft stage. The purpose of this Table is to give an idea of the order of magnitude of the investment, extending beyond the scope of the mission's program, to be made for the development of irrigation in Syria.

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for the asphalted roads, and allowing £S 500 per kilometer for the macadamized routes and lesser amounts for others, the annual road maintenance budget should actually be around £S 6 million to £S 7 million. 491

This raises the question whether Syria should consider new road investment if existing ones cannot be properly maintained. For every kilometer of new construction the annual burden of upkeep increases. But current deficiencies in road maintenance are not simply a matter of money; the present annual expenditures are sufficient to keep the roads in far better condition than they are. The causes of neglect include several other factors.

Personnel

Some earlier studies[8] have referred to seasonal labor shortages in road maintenance. On this there are differences of opinion. In general, local authorities do not find difficulty on this score, although without question there are shortages of supervisory personnel in the middle rank and foreman grades. A more serious situation is evident at the engineering level, where a wider use of foreign consulting firms and contractors would be helpful. For the whole range of public works, including roads, the government has available about 50 qualified engineers. The detailed knowledge and skill of intensive specialization is difficult to achieve under these circumstances and the mission was therefore not surprised to observe occasional use of overheated asphalt, or of too chalky a sand in mending mixtures. The effectiveness of the small corps of engineers is further reduced by the inordinate burden of paper work and administrative detail, if not by an actual preference of many for office work at the expense of practical field supervision. 491 464

Organization

Road maintenance, as a responsibility of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Works, must compete for attention with all other types of public work activities and often fares poorly. This organizational problem may be partially responsible for a certain maldistribution of maintenance funds among the various districts, which often leaves a number of 491 653

[8] E.g., Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, *The Economic Development of Syria*, 1947.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

491 653 districts without the resources necessary for the most ordinary upkeep.

A wider use of road gangs would achieve far better maintenance, for the same expenditure, than is possible with the prevailing "one-man" system. A team concentrating upon a section at a time can often effect repairs which one man alone cannot do at all; gangs also permit closer technical supervision and more efficient use of equipment—valuable considerations when the supply of both is limited.

Road Maintenance Equipment

491 494 The country as a whole has far too little road-building and maintenance machinery for effective work. Mechanization must of course be introduced gradually where so much of the work is now done by hand. The present stock of equipment cannot meet even current needs. Half the mixers in the Damascus area are unusable, for example. There are no graders or bulldozers for maintenance purposes, although at least ten are needed for the tracks alone.

It is not enough to expect that construction machinery will be assigned to maintenance afterward; much of it will be worn out on the contemplated road-building program. Maintenance machinery should be bought separately. For one or more stone-crushing plants, the necessary bulldozers and graders, new rollers and other equipment needed currently, the mission foresees an expenditure of £S 1 million in the first five-year period and twice this amount in the second five years.

494 D LEGISLATION ON THE USE OF ROADS

Traffic Laws

Syria enacted a modern, comprehensive traffic code in 1953, which contains the usual detailed regulations on vehicle dimensions, maximum wheel loading, weight limits for certain types of roads and bridges, and similiar provisions for protection of the roads. It also provides for periodic inspection of vehicles for mechanical fitness. Rules of the road for safe and courteous driving are prescribed, as well as the knowledge required for obtaining a driver's permit.

The code is essentially a good one, and it is regrettable that most of its provisions are ineffective because of poor enforcement. Apart from the danger to human life, unless better measures are taken to enforce the

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

261 trees and not built upon. Possibly in this way the broad, deserted unpaved streets, swept by the winter winds and burning under the summer sun, can be transformed into long garden avenues without any heavy expenditure by the local authorities.

VI PUBLIC BUILDINGS

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Direction of Investment

Out of a total of about £S 25 million expended on public buildings between 1948 and 1954, £S 9 million was for public health structures while more than £S 7.5 million was invested in schools and a like sum on administrative buildings.[7]

The proportion spent for administrative buildings has been high and is attributable to the organizational needs of the newly independent country. We have assumed that the rate of construction of such buildings is likely to increase, but we suggest that no more than £S 750,000 be expended during 1955-56 while a critical survey of the most urgent requirements in this category is being prepared. In 1957 the expenditure may reach £S 1 million, rising to £S 2.5 million in 1960 and making a total of £S 8.5 million over the six years. The resulting average of £S 1.417 million would in fact be about 50% higher than the average of recent years.

The total expenditure for public buildings, including schools, public health buildings and other types, is likely to average £S 7 million annually, assuming that the municipalities and other authorities share the cost of schools. Compared with the effort of the past few years, which was at a level of £S 4.5 million a year, this would be an increase of about 60% to 70% per year.

Policy

In the Main Report the mission has recommended that in future the Ministry of Public Works be responsible for design and construction of all public buildings, relying on each government agency to specify and draw up its own special requirements. It may be necessary, especially at the beginning of the program, to engage a private firm of Syrian or foreign

[7] Including buildings for the judicial and security services.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

architects to design certain major projects independently or in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Works. A number of standard types of buildings should be developed and studied as a guide for future projects. For example, two or three tested types of classrooms should be available, suited to the differing climatic regions of Syria.

Commercial Buildings

With respect to commercial buildings, the government's problems include provision of town and village markets. For centuries these have been built on a traditional oriental design, with a network of covered passages on which the various shops open. Such construction has permitted market activity under conditions of severe heat or heavy rain, and has lent itself to the prevalence of small shops appropriate to the country's economic standards. Although this form of market is still the most common, new ones of the type are no longer being built. In some settlements of the Jezireh, in Kamichliye and Hassetche, the new *souks* borrow something from the old design, combining it with regular narrow streets covered with temporary roofing. Elsewhere markets are following the western pattern.

As part of the general development program the government might well finance a special study of the type of market that will most economically offer protected shopping, small-size shops, sanitary conditions and better ventilation. Thereafter municipalities should proceed to plan for their own requirements.

Transportation Structures

Most buildings related to transportation services are the responsibility of the railways and port authorities, and provision has been made for them in the transport program. Yet one category of building usually neglected in planning is that serving bus and truck transportation, which is of greatest importance in a country like Syria with its many small settlements. What is needed is something equivalent to the caravanserai of earlier times—perhaps a combination of a big courtyard, a service garage, a storehouse and a small hostel. Here too, the government might undertake a study of an appropriate prototype, leaving construction to the municipalities and private business.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

Miscellaneous Buildings

653 [341] There are, of course, various other types of public and special-purpose buildings with which the government is concerned. Among these are agricultural structures, workshops, museums, monuments and resthouses, to whatever extent they are not privately financed. The mission has made suitable allowances for these in the six-year program, under the appropriate headings elsewhere in this report.

[341] Although they are financed and constructed entirely by private endeavor, the religious buildings deserve special mention. This is a field in which Syria excels. Some of the mosques, minarets and churches, whether in large towns or small villages, are outstanding illustrations of the way in which architectural design and construction can be adapted to the needs of the people, their economic resources, and the materials and skills available locally.

657 VII COST OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES PROGRAM

Table 5 summarizes the mission's proposed six-year program in the field of settlements and social services.

TABLE 5 Proposed Six-Year Program for Settlements and Social Services Financed by the Public Sector (*Thousand £S*)

Sector	Total	Annual average
Housing	28,076	4,679
Education	271,780	45,297
Public health	74,150	12,358
Social welfare	450	75
Community development	2,687	448
Buildings for other purposes	8,500	1,417
Community services	86,000	14,333
Planning—Administration	3,600	600
Total	475,243	79,207
Share of		
Central government	372,643	62,107
Municipalities	102,600	17,100

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
Syria MDI

is a very high figure, representing more than 50 per cent of the total land under cultivation, and the United States Agricultural Attache is inclined to believe that the Ministry's figures include the total area served by irrigation systems, whether or not all the land receives water each year. 241 312

There are no large-scale irrigation works in Syria. State and local governments have constructed and now maintain a number of small dams, diversions, and canals, but the total area served by these public works in 1951 was only 100,000 acres. Several other projects, scheduled for completion within the next three or four years, will increase the area under public works another 100,000 acres. Most of these projects are being financed by the federal government out of its regular budget. 312 653

By far the largest area is served by small diversions operated by individuals. The next largest and fastest growing area under irrigation is that served by mechanical pumps. The number of pumps doubled from 1950 to 1951 and the area irrigated increased three times. These pumps are used mostly for drawing water from streams. 312

In the absence of detailed surveys, accurate estimates as to how much water might be available from all sources are impossible to obtain. Draining the Ghab Swamps on the Orontes River west of Aleppo to bring another 100,000 acres into cultivation is now being studied by a Dutch engineering firm, and a large dam on the Euphrates River to impound water in sufficient volume to serve an additional 750,000 acres is under consideration. Several million acres of land along the Euphrates River probably are suitable for cultivation from the standpoint of soil if water becomes available. At the present time irrigation along the Euphrates is limited to the low-lying land between the banks of the river. Through the centuries the river has cut a bed from a half mile to as much as 10 miles wide through the plain, which is now 30 to 50 feet above the water level. It has proved too expensive for individuals to use pumps to pull the water from the river for irrigation.

The same general condition prevails on the main tributary of the Euphrates, the Kabur. Numerous pumps have been installed along the Kabur, and a gravity system in the north, operated by a small dam and canals, is being extended under a current program. It is possible the water would be adequate to extend the gravity system slightly in the southern reaches of the river.

Water might be diverted also from the Tigris River which runs across the northeastern border of Syria. Extensive use of water from any of these international rivers, however, very likely would involve agreements with neighboring countries. Additional water might be provided also by the other rivers in the country. All of these proposals involve tremendously expensive projects beyond the means of the country to finance without outside help.

CAPITAL AND CREDIT

The highly nationalistic attitude of the Syrians damages the chances of private industry's securing a foreign loan. A recent law requiring all foreign operations to have Syrian managers and at least 50 per cent Syrian capital, together with the questionable security, makes sizable foreign investments unlikely. Under these conditions any foreign loans probably will be made to the government. The Syrian Government has made an obvious point of not obligating itself to another foreign power, and it is unlikely it will accept 471 186 648

758 743 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The de-
743 velopment of increased medical facilities has recently been undertaken by the Ministry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital near Damascus, to provide a total of 350 beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo were under construction. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed hospital in Latakia province, which would bring the total number of beds available for the isolation and the treatment of tuberculous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 A tuberculosis demonstration and training
874 center was established in Damascus in 1952 under the direction of the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Ministry and the Syrian University. It provides a regional headquarters for the training of doctors, nurses and social workers in the public health, the therapeutic and the social aspects of the disease.

164 Smallpox. Vaccination against smallpox
751 is compulsory, but enforcement is neces-
361 sarily incomplete in the more remote areas and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks occur from time to time, with sporadic cases reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to 1941 only occasional cases were observed. In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from Iraq, where an epidemic focus had developed in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were recorded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The outbreaks subsided in 1944, and again no more than sporadic cases were noted until 1948, when 894 cases were reported. The known incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influenza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

Chapter 7

SYRIA

Developments to the End of the Second World War

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Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Syrian economy rested on agriculture, handicrafts and commerce. Then, as now, most of the land was planted to wheat and barley, whose yield was low, owing to the primitive methods employed and the inadequacy of the rainfall, but whose output usually left a small export surplus. Cultivation of fruits and tobacco was more intensive, and an appreciable amount was exported. Syrian handicrafts, such as cotton, silk and wool weaving, leather tanning and soap making, enjoyed a high reputation and supplied the Egyptian, Anatolian, Mesopotamian, North Arabian and Palestinian markets, as well as most of Syria and Lebanon. Commerce was a leading activity, Syria being the distributing centre for most of Arab Asia as well as southern Anatolia. 1/

In the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries some important changes took place. Owing to greater security, the margin of cultivation shifted eastwards and the sown area expanded. Handicrafts, on the other hand, began to decline owing to the competition of foreign machine-made goods. This decline was, however, more than offset by the rapid growth of commerce, which was stimulated by the building of railways and ports by foreign capital.

The First World War was a period of intense disorganization. Mobilization reduced manpower in agriculture, and the handicrafts and commerce were paralysed by the loss of supplies and markets. In the post-war years, the handicrafts declined rapidly, owing to a shift in taste to foreign goods, a general decline in purchasing power and intensified competition of foreign goods, against which the tariff gave little protection. Commerce was crippled by the breakup of the Ottoman Empire into several States with different tariffs, currencies and economic policies. Agriculture was handicapped by the very unsettled conditions prevailing until 1927, after which it was affected by the world depression; at the outbreak of the Second World War the area planted to cereals was not appreciably greater than it had been before the First World War.

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Nevertheless, in this period, part of the groundwork of future progress was laid. Communications were improved by the construction of a good network of roads and by the building or enlarging of ports. Some irrigation schemes were carried out. Property rights in land were settled over a large area, thus removing a major obstacle to development.

1/ The French High Commission's report, La Syrie et le Liban en 1922, stated that until the First World War "Syria lived on its trade; it has lived almost exclusively on it; it has lived on it for many centuries" (quoted in S.B. Himadeh (editor), The Economic Organization of Syria (Beirut, 1936) page 119).

185, 433, 654

Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the program of industrialization in countries of the Middle East after World War I up to 1945, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Turkey - pp. 274-284, Egypt - pp. 285-286, Iraq - pp. 287-289, Palestine - 289-290, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 290-291./

CROPS AND AGRICULTURE IN JAZIRAH

I. Dry Farming

Dry farming is by far the most important activity of Jazirah. 241
The first tractor and combine were introduced in 1936 by Shahine 311
Bey Maluf of Zahleh. Before that time agriculture was the business of the peasants. The town inhabitants of Jazirah took no interest in it. The area cultivated was restricted to a few kilometers south of the railway line in what is called the Old Villages. The political troubles in 1936-37 and the low prices of wheat and barley before the War did not encourage capitalists inside Syria to invest their money in Jazirah. Furthermore, agricultural machinery was new to most people who did not understand its economics or how to run it.

a. Expansion in the Use of Machinery 1936-1952

The War doubled the price of wheat in its second year. The 407
crop of 1940 was sold for LS 50-55 a ton at Aleppo. The French 459
bought it for LS 120 in 1941. The Office des Cereales Panifiables (O. C. P.) fixed the price at LS 350 in 1943. During these years the dollar was available at the official rate of LS 2.20 and importation of machinery from the U. S. was possible. The number of tractors increased to about 60 in the winter of 1943.

The crop of 1943 was exceptionally good and the O. C. P. imported some 50 tractors and a similar number of combines which reached Jazirah during the harvest season. The machines were first rented to the farmers and then sold to them. They represented the first large-scale importation of machinery to Jazirah.

Importation of machinery in the following two years became difficult as a result both of limited availability and of dollar shortage. But by the end of the War dollars became again available at the official rate and large numbers of tractors were imported in 1945 and 1946. The importation of agricultural machinery has become a steady and continuous flow in spite of the sharp rise in the dollar rates and the price of wheat, though below 1943, still makes large-scale exploitation profitable. Recently the Government through 654
the Agricultural Bank has helped the farmers import and buy on [452

407 installments some 200 tractors of which the share for Jazirah was 71.
439 This brings the number of tractors and combines to about 400 and 300,
● 654 respectively.
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It appears that the present number of tractors and combines fulfills the demands of the Jazirah if no new region such as the Rad is
407 opened for cultivation. This is demonstrated by the fall in the rent
427 of agricultural machinery, for whereas rent of the combine cost 33% of the crop in 1936 and between 22-25% from 1940 to 1948, the charge dropped to less than 20% in 1949 and 1950 and to 15% in 1952. This last share leaves a moderate and reasonable profit to the combine owner and it will not be possible for him to reduce prices greatly.

The same is true of tractor rents. The average charge for disc plowing a dunum at present is LS. 90-1.10 in the region of Qamishli. This is a competitive charge and cannot be much reduced.

Therefore, the conclusionis that the number of agricultural machines in Jazirah is likely to remain stable with importation every year to replace those machines which become obsolete.

b. Expansion in the Area Cultivated

311 The first regions to be tilled by tractors in Jazirah were Qamishli Amuda and Dirbassiya. When no more lands were available around them farmers after 1946 went east to Tal Koshak on the border of Iraq.

After 1949 all the region from Tal Koshak to Dirbassiya became cultivated and farmers had to move to less productive areas around the Rad, south of Tel Brak, and in Ras el Rin. At the present time, taking Tal Koshak on the east and 30 kilometers west of Dirbassiya as the western boundary and south to the Rad and to Hassakeh, there is not a single patch uncultivated on a two year basis. In the first two years the region between Ras el Ain and Rakka was opened for cultivation by Asfar and Najjar family. This year the first crop grown on lands midway between the two towns appeared. The yield of barley was 5 to 6 times the amount planted. Around Qamishli the barley yield was 10 to 12.

311 The region of Deirik and Ain Divar or Jasiratibn Amr was long
491 neglected despite its fertility because of impossible communications. No roads existed and the abundant rainfall stopped all transport for six months of the year. Within the last two years the Government

has started the construction of a road which is not yet finished, but which permits trucks to reach Deirik in all seasons. Farmers flowed into the region following the opening of the road and began populating it. The present Minister of National Economy, Munir Diab, and Mr. Amin Nazif, formerly Secretary General of the Ministry of agriculture, own lands in the region. 311 [166] 1491

c. Volume of Seeds and Crops

The main dry farming crop in Jazirah is wheat with "black" barley a poor second. It is estimated that about 50-60,000 tons of wheat are planted every year and some five thousand tons of barley. The average yield of wheat is 6-7 times per unit planted which gives a yearly crop of some 350-400,000 tons, of this quantity, 85-100,000 tons are needed for local consumption and for seed. This leaves about 250-300,000 tons available for export in an average year. Calculating this quantity at the price of LS 170 in the field free of all expenses, it means a revenue of LS 51 million per year to Jazirah with seeds and provisions already accounted for or about LS 250 per capita. 24½ 43⅔

d. Difficulties in the Way of Agricultural Development

Agriculture in Jazirah suffers from many obstacles and hindrances which the Government can remedy with some careful thought and planning. The difficulties connected with land ownership and tenure and with credit and transport will be discussed separately, but other obstacles will be mentioned here below: 185 654

1. There is no agricultural station in the important wheat growing centers of Jazirah to record the amount of rainfall and the mean temperatures to guide the farmers.

2. The Jazirah is subject in most years to a heat wave during the month of May which destroys 25-35% of the crop. The only remedy is to introduce strains of wheat which mature before the period of the heat wave. Although the problem and the remedy are known to the Government, no effort has yet been made either to import new [132]

185 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i.e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 469 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

Irrigation by pump started with the rice boom in 1945 and expanded with the cotton boom of 1951. It was hit severly by the crop failure of last year and the flood of this spring, and the future of the Khabur appears dim. This is because as previously mentioned, the original amount of capital used to construct a fair sized project is large, amounting to about LS 150-200 thousand. Such a project can irrigate with two 10-inch pumps or their equivalent about 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and double the area in wheat and barley. The project will have one main canal 1 1/2-3 1/3 meters higher than ground level made entirely of earth or lined with cement to carry the water a distance of 1-3 kilometers depending on the lay of the ground, several subsidisary canals, buildings for the motors, the agricultural machinery, and the laborers. 312 185

Evidently, in order to get the best returns on the capital invested, the farmer needs to exploit to the utmost the capacity of his pumps, otherwise he will be leaving his capital idle. In this case, he will need to cultivate, on a rotation basis, 2, 500 dunums of summer crops and 5, 000 dunums of wheat and barley. But on most of the irrigation projects of the size mentioned, the area of the lands which can be irrigated is less than 1, 500 dunums in all. The surrounding lands are all higher than the main leading canal and can not be reached except by a much greater outlay of capital. This means that the farmer has to extract from an area of 1, 500 dunums, of which one-third lies fallow every year, enough profit in five to eight years, which is the average duration of the lease, to compensate him for his yearly efforts, to pay interest on the capital and to regain his investment. This should mean a net annual profit of about 45, 000 LS or LS 45 per dunum, and experience has proved that it can not be done. 312 454

The alterntive to pump irrigation on the Khabur is irrigation by gravity in works similar to that of Tal Mughass. And the Khabur lends itself in many places to such project. Mr. Delbes, agricultural advisor to Syria during the French Mandate, knows at least of three projects studied by the French High Commissariat, to build dams and derivation canals between Ras el Ain and Hassakeh. The largest one among them is to carry the water west to the region of Jabal Abdel Aziz and irrigate a very large area. 312 654

Another dam site studied by the French is at Sab'Skour. Further south in the region of Fadghami a site was selected to store the

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flood waters and distribute them in summer. All these studies, and it is not known how detailed they are, are believed to be kept at the French Legation in Beirut.

Such projects cost a lot of money, and Syria may not be able to construct them for many years. A quicker and less expensive policy is to combine elements from the system of irrigation by pumps and the system of gravity irrigation. This is the policy followed in Egypt, to dig canals conveying water from the river to areas ten or more kilometers removed and ten to twenty meters higher than the water level. Such dirt canals can be dug cheaply by modern machinery, and the farmers will then be authorized to install pumps on the canals. Since the greatest cost of an irrigation project is the construction of the main canal above the ground level, the method recommended removes the need for the elevated canals and the farmer can install his pump directly on the land to be irrigated. In this way, the farmer is spared also the loss due to evaporation and absorption on the elevated canal.

This is the quickest method to expand irrigated agriculture along the Khabur, and it may also prove in the long run cheaper to the country and the farmer than the elaborate dams and derivation canals contemplated by the Government. Such a conclusion needs, of course, more detailed engineering studies and comparison of costs before it becomes final.

III. The Problem of Monoculture

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Wheat and barley are by far the main crops of the Jazirah and with the exception of the Khabur valley, they are practically the only crops. What the irrigated lands of Kubur el Bid and Qamishli produce in summer crops does not compare in quantity or in value with the wheat crop.

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For this reason, Jazirah suffers from all the defects of monoculture. When the wheat crop is good and the prices are high land values increase, the farmers are enabled to pay most of their debts and to raise their standard of living by building better residences, buying furniture, making more trips with their families to the interior cities of Syria and Lebanon, sending their children to schools in Aleppo and Beirut, and increasing their welfare in general. But

14: International Bank MD1 Syria MD1

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[For recommendations by an International Bank Mission on a program of long-term development of Syrian resources and specific measures to be undertaken by the government, see category 116, pp. 27-209.]

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little 454
conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing.

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that 471
it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent 654
changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads.

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the gov- 658
ernment to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which [212]
compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network.

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its develop- 654
ment at which the government must undertake a more important pro- 433
motional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be 311
able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

654 severely diminished, and agricultural prices no longer afford such a power-
433 ful stimulus to the expansion of acreage. Extension of the irrigated area
311 must depend increasingly on public investment, particularly since the area which can be economically irrigated by privately installed pumps cannot be greatly expanded.

654 High transport costs and the low quality of grain are becoming serious
433 handicaps to Syria in an increasingly competitive world grain market. In other sectors economic activity seems also to be slackening. The future growth of industry is likely to be less rapid now that the more obvious manufacturing industries have been established. In construction it is also quite possible that the postwar boom has passed or will shortly pass its peak. Thus in the absence of a well-considered government program to stimulate the economy, the rapid increase in production and private investment may well taper off.

654 In agriculture the government now faces the need to make a careful
241 inventory of remaining land resources, to carry out irrigation projects on a greatly increased scale and to initiate settlement schemes for state lands. Steps must be taken to maintain and stimulate Syria's grain exports by providing better and cheaper transport and establishing facilities for the storage, grading and cleaning of cereals, thereby reducing losses and improving quality. In the future more emphasis will need to be placed on raising agricultural and livestock yields. The government will have to stimulate farmers to use better seeds and implements and to improve their crop rotation in the direction of soil-building crops and greater diversification. Livestock yields must be raised by undertaking a program of selection and cross-breeding, by building livestock shelters and providing more water for migrating livestock, and by initiating a more effective campaign against pests and diseases. To achieve these objectives the government must also expand and improve agricultural education, make available extension services at the village level and furnish much more agricultural credit on reasonable terms. Special efforts are required to assist the small peasant proprietor and the tenant who have not in the past fully shared in the rising prosperity. They must be helped to achieve greater economic independence and security and enabled to acquire the means of production with which to increase their incomes.

654 Although further expansion in industry should prove possible, greater
433 emphasis will have to be placed on selective expansion and on increasing efficiency so as to lower prices and broaden the market. Here the govern-

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ment will need to help private enterprise achieve these goals by collaborating, for instance, in the establishment of an institution to furnish technical and financial assistance, revising policies for the protection of industry from foreign competition and working towards the creation of a larger market for manufactured products, particularly through an intensification of economic cooperation among Arab countries.

To service the economy new and better roads and a larger supply of electric power are clearly necessary. Both of these call for a substantial increase in public investment. Transport is the most important bottleneck in the economy today; the acute shortage of power in major centers such as Aleppo and Damascus is already receiving government attention.

While expansion of the production base of the economy is the paramount task of the future, education, public health and the social services will also make greater claims on the government's resources. A further extension of educational facilities is undoubtedly necessary, but at the same time more stress must be placed on improving the quality and content of education. The condition of public health still leaves much to be desired. While the most urgent deficiencies in hospital accommodations must be remedied, the most pressing need is to concentrate increasingly on the prevention of disease by such measures as an anti-malarial campaign, improvements in sanitation and provision of pure water supplies. A marked and general improvement in housing conditions is likely to result only from a substantial increase in production and improvement of living standards but the government should at least assist the larger municipalities to initiate a program to cope with the worst conditions of housing congestion, a by-product of rapid but uneven economic growth.

A program of this type, which we shall elaborate in subsequent chapters of this report, should lay the foundation for a renewed and continued economic advance. It will serve not simply to compensate for a possible slackening of private investment but above all to create ultimately increased opportunities for greater private investment and enterprise which will expand production and raise standards of living.

The government has become increasingly aware of the task that lies ahead. Its request for an International Bank mission to work out recommendations for development testifies in part to its concern. It realizes that despite the economic progress of the past, the country cannot be satisfied with the current state of development and the standard of living it sustains. National income is still only around £S 440 per capita. Moreover,

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654 511 with the wide disparities in income, the great majority of people have an income substantially under this average. The bulk of the rural population remains impoverished and does not share adequately in the fruits of its toil. In the urban areas many people earn only a bare livelihood and live in wretched, overcrowded conditions. In industry the daily wage of unskilled labor is no more than £S 3 to £S 4. In the future, therefore, the aim should be not simply to raise production and national income but to ensure that all elements in the population share equitably in the benefits of economic development.

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TABLE 5 Expenditures on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1950–60

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(Thousand £S)

	Past outlays			Future outlays	
	1950–52 average	1953 estimate	1954 estimate	1955–60 total	Annual average
Projects—total	2,360[a]	3,130[a]	3,380[a]	197,000	32,833
Completion of works	—	—	—	9,000	1,500
Ghab	—	—	—	102,000[b]	17,000
Other new works	—	—	—	83,000	13,833
Euphrates valley studies	—	—	—	3,000	500
Maintenance	113	205	350	3,000	500
Research and demonstration	—	—	—	1,200	200
Grand total	2,481	3,335	3,730	201,200	33,533

[a] Budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures. The 1954 total excludes an £S 5 million authorization for the Ghab of which probably only a negligible portion was spent.
[b] After allowance for receipts from sale of land and water.

III LAND POLICIES AND LAND SETTLEMENT[9]

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A fuller knowledge of the available land resources is essential not only to plan better utilization of land already under exploitation, but also to determine how much land remains for expansion of cultivation and what must be done to make it productive. Even the existing pattern of land utilization is hardly known. Data on the total cultivated area, on the acreage planted to individual crops and on production are at best only rough estimates which are often quite wide of the mark. Little is known as yet about various types of soils, their deficiencies and potentialities. Widely varying opinions are expressed regarding the area which can still be put to the plow or can be irrigated by gravity flow.

Aerial Survey Program

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Aerial photography can be of great assistance in planning land utilization and public works of importance to agriculture. Up to the present it

[9] See Annex E, p. 351.

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311 has been used in Syria to obtain topographic data necessary for certain irrigation projects and, in formulating an accelerated program for a cadastral survey of the Jezireh in 1952, the government provided for a photographic survey of this entire region. An aerial survey of all of Syria except waste desert areas would no doubt be desirable, but the mission realizes that financial considerations make a more limited objective necessary. For the period ending in 1960 the mission suggests accordingly that the following areas be surveyed (see Map 5):

1. An area of about 2,250 square kilometers in the provinces of Latakia and Aleppo.

The purpose would be to facilitate (1) a delimitation and assessment of the forest area in Latakia which constitutes the most important timber resource of the country, (2) the location of an appropriate dam site on the Nahr el Kebir, and (3) the planning of irrigation for the Roudj.

For nearly the entire area mapping on a scale of 1:20,000 with 5-meter contours would be sufficient, but for the Roudj and the area of the dam site mapping at 1:5,000 with 1-meter contours would be necessary.

2. An area of approximately 7,000 square kilometers east of the Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus highway.

Here the object would be to determine what part of this area might be still available for cultivation. At present conflicting opinions are held regarding the potentialities of the area.

Aerial photography, coupled with the preparation of a controlled photomosaic, would suffice.

3. An area of about 4,600 square kilometers north of Raqqa and extending to the Turkish frontier.

This area is also claimed to contain much unutilized but cultivable land. Aerial photography would permit a rapid delimitation and analysis of the area in relation to the land already under cultivation.

4. An area of approximately 6,000 square kilometers in the Euphrates valley region, comprising the Raqqa and Resafe plains and extending to the Halibiye-Zalebiye gorge.

This survey, as already indicated, is an essential part of the planning work for the irrigation system dependent on the projected Youssef Pasha reservoir.

Mapping at a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours would suffice for

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

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most of the region; a scale of 1:10,000 with 2-meter contours for a narrow band running along the Euphrates; and a scale of 1:5,000 with identical contours for the area immediately around the gorge.

5. An area of about 970 square kilometers in the Khabour river valley upstream from Markada.

   Aerial photography is already covered by an existing contract. Mapping is necessary to facilitate irrigation planning and to investigate the possibility of a dam at Markada. Mapping on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours would be sufficient except for the proposed dam site where the scale would need to be 1:5,000.

6. An area of some 3,400 square kilometers on the left banks of the Khabour and Euphrates rivers.

   Mapping of this area on a scale of 1:20,000 with 2-meter contours appears necessary to determine the possibilities of gravity irrigation and to expedite needed soil surveys.

These surveys, which together would cost approximately £S 4 million, would cover most of the land potentially available for cultivation and the greater part of the irrigable area.

Soil Surveys

The aerial reconnaissance the mission has suggested would greatly expedite the soil survey already started under the direction of an FAO specialist. Soils can be classified into broad types on the basis of aerial photographs. With additional work on the ground it is possible to proceed to more detailed agrogeological soil mapping, which is necessary to determine how the land already under cultivation can better be employed and how land still unoccupied can best be utilized. This type of mapping is now being undertaken for the Jezireh as an adjunct to the cadastral survey. While all the detailed soil mapping required can obviously not be completed in a few years, the mission urges that the present soil survey be expedited and broadened. A soils department with a budget of £S 60,000 for 1954 has been established in the Ministry of Agriculture. Its budget will have to be raised to at least £S 100,000. The work on soils should concentrate primarily on areas which will or can be opened to settlement such as the Ghab, the Roudj and certain rainfed regions. From

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time to time, however, spot analysis will also be required to carry out special programs to improve soil fertility. 654 134

Cadastral Survey

Aerial photography should assist considerably in accelerating the cadastral survey work which was first initiated in 1923 but was still only 45% completed by the beginning of 1953. It is clearly in Syria's interest to finish the cadaster as soon as possible so that the uncertainty surrounding private property rights may be ended at long last and the extent of state domain may be clearly determined. Similarly, it is necessary to expedite the lagging program for converting *mucha'a* or village common land to individual peasant ownership. Experience with the accelerated survey for the Jezireh indicates the need for additional measures to speed up the work. This survey, originally scheduled for completion in the spring of 1955, is now unlikely to be finished before the end of 1956. Insufficient funds, shortages of trained personnel and cumbersome procedures have all contributed to delay this vital survey work. The mission urges that all possible measures to expedite the program be taken. Among the measures that might be considered are the contracting of necessary ground surveys to qualified private firms; the delimitation of properties in certain areas solely by means of aerial photographs rather than by ground surveys; and the possibility of shortcuts in the protracted legal procedures involved in the determination of titles. 654

State Domain

The aerial, cadastral and soil surveys outlined above will for the first time provide the government with approximately accurate information on the area and quality of state domain. At present the government claims ownership of 1,417,571 hectares of allegedly cultivable land of which 551,473 are leased for cultivation. This total, however, excludes the unoccupied or "dead" land (*mawat*) which was assimilated to state domain by Legislative Decree No. 135 of October 29, 1952. Nor does it include the land which may be "recaptured" by the state under other provisions of the same decree. For instance, this decree specified that prior occupation of land which had not yet been sanctioned by the acquisition of title would be recognized only up to 200 hectares per member of the occupier's 491 423

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Veterinary Services[16]

Syria is fortunate in being free of the major animal plagues, but such 232
controllable conditions as helminthiasis and the pox diseases are allowed to take a heavy annual toll of sheep and goats, while Newcastle disease in poultry rages almost unchecked over the greater part of the country, in spite of the fact that the laboratory in Damascus can produce an almost unlimited supply of a completely efficacious freeze-dried vaccine at an exceedingly low cost.

It is true that until relatively recently difficulty was experienced in producing locally a satisfactory vaccine for the control of sheep-pox but these difficulties have now been overcome by the loan of FAO personnel; production capacity for sheep-pox vaccine is now sufficient for the annual vaccination of the entire sheep population.

A rising incidence of brucellosis and tuberculosis in cattle, particularly in the urban and suburban dairying herds, may give rise to serious losses unless checked in an early stage. The services of the expert in field diagnosis provided by FAO should be especially valuable in this connection.

The Veterinary Department of the Ministry of Agriculture employs 232
some 16 veterinarians, of whom five have been trained in Europe, four in 654
Turkey, and seven in Egypt. Of the 16, two are at Headquarters in Damascus, four at the school for veterinary assistants, one at the laboratory in Damascus, and nine at field stations. There are said to be about 10 training as veterinarians in Europe, America and Egypt. Experience elsewhere suggests that a fully-qualified professional staff of the present size, strengthened gradually by the accession of young graduates returning from overseas training, ought to provide disease control services adequate for Syria's needs during the next few years, particularly if full use is made of the veterinary assistants trained in the technical school at Damascus.

If the mission's proposals for a program of livestock improvement are adopted, animal diseases will assume a greater importance, since the improved stock is likely to be less tolerant than the low-producing Balady types. More emphasis will then have to be placed on disease control services, and the cadre of veterinarians in government employ will need to be enlarged.

At the present stage, indeed at any stage, quality is undoubtedly much more important than numbers. Professional qualifications of the present

[16] See Annex C, p. 315.

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232 654 staff vary a great deal in standard, and an effort should be made to ensure that staff for replacement and further recruitment is trained to the highest professional standards overseas. The Department should review the position, scrutinize the academic careers of students now abroad, and offer scholarships for short periods, say one year, of postgraduate training in some particular field of activity that will be useful to the government on the candidate's return. This postgraduate training should be entirely practical and the scholar should not be allowed to utilize it mainly for the purpose of obtaining a further degree. Experience in the field, either in government service or in private practice, in some country of similar climatic and stock-raising conditions, but with a much more advanced livestock industry and a highly developed state veterinary service, would be the ideal type of training for such men. FAO would no doubt be able to arrange to place these men in countries suited to the purpose and might even be prepared to offer fellowships, upon condition that the recipient will return to government employment in Syria. The laboratory staff needs relatively little reinforcement at the professional level for the moment. The posting of one additional veterinarian with some overseas laboratory experience would be sufficient; it would be useful if this were done while the FAO experts are at the laboratory to pass on their practical experience.

The technical school for veterinary assistants in Damascus has been giving a two-year course of training in Arabic; it is likely that the course will be lengthened to three years. The school should turn out highly trained assistants whose employment in the Department should enable each government veterinarian considerably to extend his coverage in terms of both numbers of animals and territorial area.

Communications are generally poor and the inadequacy of transport has apparently been one of the greatest handicaps of the field service. It is essential that jeeps or pick-ups should be available in sufficient numbers to enable the veterinarian and his assistants to get round the district, to respond promptly to reports of outbreaks of disease and requests for assistance, and to perform systematic mass-vaccinations where appropriate. Government-owned transport is often unduly costly and inefficiently maintained; if this is true in Syria, consideration might be given to the hiring of transport on a contract basis or to payment of mileage to an officer providing his own transport.

The entire budget allocation for veterinary services in 1954 was £S 188,000, or approximately £S 11,750 for each veterinarian in the

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Department, to cover all charges incidental to his activities, including the salaries of assistants and laborers, the provision of drugs, instruments and laboratory supplies, feed of animals, preparation of vaccines and sera. It is obvious that in relation to the environment the salaries paid to veterinarians are insufficient to attract and hold properly qualified intelligent men, and that the sum available to meet other expenses must be so inadequate that the professional man's abilities cannot be utilized to anything like their full extent. As a consequence in many cases there is a tendency to supplement the government income from commercial sources and eventually to regard the government post as part-time employment.

The mission recommends that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available up to the end of 1960 to defray the cost of a veterinary service, improved and expanded on the lines that are broadly indicated here and in Annex C. It is strongly recommended that a small committee, to which the FAO veterinarians should be coopted, be appointed to consider methods of improving the service, with particular attention to salaries, better communications and transport, assistance adequate to permit of the carrying out of mass-vaccination campaigns against Newcastle disease of poultry, sheep-pox, and the control of helminths, etc., along the lines indicated in Annex C. Alternatively, the government might prefer to seek the services of an experienced veterinary administrator to inquire into these matters and make recommendations. Such an inquiry need not take more than perhaps three months. Staff meetings should be arranged and it would be a great advantage to hold at least one joint staff meeting with the services in Lebanon and Jordan. The measures should raise the morale of the service, which at present is regrettably low.

Breeding

The development of higher yielding types of livestock through selection and cross-breeding would be a great boon, assuming that it could be accomplished without sacrificing the hardiness under unfavorable conditions which much of the livestock in Syria has acquired, or that a parallel improvement were made in the environment of the animals. There are certain promising indigenous types which could be used as the starting point of a program to improve breeds. Among these are the Damascus dairy cow, the Julani beef cattle and the Damascus milk goat. Most of the sheep and goats are multi-purpose animals, raised for meat, milk,

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232 wool or hair. Existing poultry breeds are largely nondescript and are
654 characterized by very low productivity.

To carry out experiments in breeding and animal husbandry, the government should push on with its program to establish a central livestock station near Damascus.[17] Within a few years two sub-stations might also be opened at Palmyra and Deir ez Zor, or at Hama, Selemiye or Raqqa. There is unfortunately a shortage of Syrians trained in such work, and at the outset it would probably be necessary to employ a foreign farm manager. A minimum of £S 1.2 million will be needed over the next five or six years to meet the necessary costs.

For sheep, the aim should be to develop a more productive animal, and to test the feasibility of breeding more specialized types by successive top-crossing of selected indigenous animals with such imported breeds as Merinos and Merino-Fleisch. For cattle, the task would be to improve the existing Julani and Damascus types by progressive selection and perhaps by a certain amount of crossing with such imported pure breeds as Brown Swiss. In the case of poultry, which is so important to the small farmer, there might be a gradual introduction of exotic blood by the issue to farmers of cockerels of the chosen exotic breeds, raised in the government breeding farm. In this breeding program great care will have to be taken to maintain adequate records on the production and hardiness of successive generations. It will also have to be accompanied by good animal husbandry to bring out the full potentialities of each genetic strain.

VI CREDIT, COOPERATIVES, EDUCATION AND MARKETING

Agricultural Credit

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An adequate volume of credit on reasonable terms is in many respects the key to an improvement in agriculture and animal husbandry. Farmers must have the means to buy better tools, livestock and seed and to introduce new crops. If settled on new land they must be provided with housing and the capital necessary to start production. Both peasant proprietors and tenant farmers must be helped to emancipate themselves gradually from excessive reliance on non-institutional lenders such as landlords and

[17] See Annex C, p. 312.

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656 435 A final comment must be made on price stabilization operations. At times in the past the government has intervened in the marketing of cereals in order to support the price or to protect the home market from the consequences of threatened shortages and excessive prices. Through the Cereals Office and its predecessor agencies it has engaged in buying and selling grain, and occasionally it has resorted to export prohibitions to safeguard domestic supplies. Under emergency conditions when the world supply of cereals is short, as in time of war or threat of war, such measures may be justified. Normally, however, it is better to allow the market forces free play. The history of government intervention in the market demonstrates that the government has often acted on the basis of information which subsequently proved erroneous in whole or in part. Frequently information on impending government measures has leaked out, giving windfall profits to privileged speculators. Above all, it is impossible in the long run to insulate the Syrian grain market from the world market. If there is a shortage in Syria and prices rise, some merchants will quickly seize the opportunity to import grain, and if world market prices decline, Syrian prices will inevitably have to follow if exports are not to be lost. On the whole it would be far better for the government to concentrate on the task of improving its crop statistics and to publish frequent and more reliable information on production and prices for the guidance of farmers and merchants. If emergency conditions arise, it will always be possible to authorize government intervention by special decree.

Projected Expenditures

654 241 231 We can now recapitulate the government expenditures in the field of agriculture and animal husbandry which are envisaged over the six years up to the end of 1960. Total projected outlays amount to around £S 336 million, or about £S 56 million per year. This represents a very substantial increase over expenditures in recent years which the mission has found difficult to ascertain but which probably have not averaged much more than £S 11 million a year.

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TABLE 6 Expenditures on Agriculture for the Six-Year Period 1955-60

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(Thousand £S)

		Total	Average annual
Irrigation and reclamation		197,200	32,866
Aerial and soil surveys and mapping		4,500	750
Credit, cooperatives, education and marketing			
Capital for Agricultural Bank	50,000		
Cooperatives	500[a]		
Rural Community Improvement Program	2,700		
Agricultural schools	2,750[a]		
Stipends for foreign study	750[a]		
Grain storage	21,000		
Damascus abattoir	600		
		78,300	13,050
Research and experimentation			
Central direction	1,800[a]		
Seed selection and propagation	2,700[a]		
Crop rotation research and trials	1,000[a]		
Livestock breeding	1,200[a]		
		6,700[a]	1,117
Encouragement of better agricultural practices			
Fertilizer	500		
Forage and green manuring	500		
Improvement and establishment of pastures	500		
		1,500	250
Special livestock program			
Veterinary services	1,200[a]		
Livestock shelters	1,720		
Reseeding of grazing land	200		
Development of desert water supplies	2,250		
		5,370	895
Agricultural settlements		4,500[b]	750
Miscellaneous			
Small implements center	525		
Special instructions on operation and maintenance of agricultural machinery	500		
Forestry service	500[a]		
		1,525	254
Continuing expenditures of Ministry of Agriculture		36,700[c]	6,117
Grand total		336,295	56,049

[a] Additional expenditures beyond levels of recent years.
[b] Other than those financed by the Agricultural Bank.
[c] Excluding special and additional expenditures specified elsewhere, but including about £S 700,000 for extra overhead expenditures.

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433 plant might be able to undertake the production of these items as well as the improved types of agricultural implements which, in accordance with our proposals, might be developed for use on Syrian farms. It should be emphasized, however, that future industrial expansion will need to be more selective and that projects will require careful technical and economic scrutiny to establish their suitability for Syria.

We conclude, therefore, that improvement in efficiency and more careful, selective expansion are the principal problems which Syrian industry faces. To meet these problems we have a number of recommendations involving (1) increasing exposure of industry to foreign competition, (2) development of a larger market for industrial products, (3) establishment of an investment bank to provide technical and financial assistance to industry and (4) improvement in vocational education.

Protection of Industry

433 Syrian industry today is in many ways shielded against foreign compe-
654 tition. Protection of this type is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating
651 only from 1949. Before that time industry had developed with little or no
457 government assistance. Prewar tariffs were moderate and essentially revenue-producing in character. Virtually the only concessions to industry were lower duties on plant and equipment and raw materials. The rapid expansion of mechanical manufacturing occurred at a time when there was little competition from abroad. During the war imports were largely impossible and in the immediate postwar years the demand for manufactures was such that rising imports were not incompatible with the continued development of domestic output. With the relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions in 1948 and an increasingly abundant supply of manufactures in the world market, Syrian industry finally began to suffer from foreign competition. In 1949 the government came to the rescue by providing industrial establishments with facilities to obtain state-guaranteed loans at low interest rates from the issue department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. Pressure for more effective protection of industry was instrumental in terminating the customs union with Lebanon, which as a trading nation was interested in keeping tariffs moderate. Following the dissolution of this economic union in March 1950, import duties were generally raised and in many cases almost doubled. In 1951 tariffs on such articles as textiles, glass and soap were again sharply increased and the

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first import embargoes were imposed. In 1952 a large number of imports were prohibited and a *de facto* sugar trading and manufacturing monopoly was instituted. The following year, however, the Minister of Economics was deprived of discretionary authority to impose embargoes, and a number of prohibitions were subsequently lifted. Even so, import embargoes are still applied to such consumer goods as cotton hosiery, socks and stockings, "job lot cloth," second-hand cotton and silk clothing, men's shirts, vegetable oils, various soaps, margarine, canned vegetables and fruits, confectionery, glass and glass products, match boxes and match wood, matches, pins, wooden furniture and boots and shoes. These protective measures have been supplemented by controls over exports of certain raw materials designed to give domestic industry preferential access to available supplies. Importation of ginning machines was prohibited to safeguard existing enterprises, and imports of second-hand looms and knitting machines were stopped, to insure the installation of modern machinery. In 1952 the government also initiated licensing of industrial establishments for the purpose of preventing overexpansion and ill-considered ventures. During the same year more positive assistance was provided by enacting a law for the encouragement of industry which extended a number of benefits to new enterprises and extensions of existing plants.

The mission has no doubt that some protection of industry is justified, particularly in underdeveloped countries which need time to raise labor, technical and managerial skills to a level approximating those in the more advanced industrial countries. As we have already pointed out, the types of industry developed in Syria are generally of a character to warrant the expectation that they can ultimately stand on their own feet. This goal, however, will not be reached as long as production is as effectively insulated against outside competition as at present. The present system of exaggerated protection does not provide a sufficient incentive to raise efficiency and productivity. For Syrian consumers it involves excessive sacrifices in the form of higher prices and poorer quality. In recent years, for example, the Syrian government has found it necessary to protect consumers by controlling the prices of such articles as vegetable oils, yarn and cement.

In view of these considerations we recommend in particular that the present import embargoes be abolished. In some cases it may be necessary to substitute import duties higher than those now included in the tariff schedule, but in those instances prohibitive rates should be avoided and

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433 provision made for gradual reduction of the duties. At the same time we
654 suggest that the whole tariff schedule be re-examined. By and large it
651 cannot be said that the general level of tariffs is excessively high, particu-
457 larly since ad valorem rates are levied on imports valued at the official rate of exchange, and this entails an undervaluation of about 40% compared to the actual exchange rate. In fact, we recommend elsewhere that tariff rates be assessed on the basis of actual foreign exchange rates for the purpose of increasing government revenues. This should not be construed, however, as a proposal to raise all tariffs irrespective of their nature. On the contrary, we would suggest that, as part of the general revision of the schedule, those rates which are primarily protective in character should as far as possible be reduced for the purpose of encouraging outside competition and lowering prices. If necessary, such reductions could be graduated over a period of time.

434 *Possibilities of a Larger Market*
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The expansion and, above all, the diversification of industrial output in Syria is restricted by the rather small domestic market. In a country of only 3.6 million people with low purchasing power it is generally possible to manufacture only a limited range of articles which are used widely enough to warrant production on an economic scale. Broader industrial opportunities are likely to emerge only if a larger market is initially available. In the case of Syria it should be possible to establish such a market in cooperation with other Arab countries, all of which suffer from a similar handicap in the development of their industries. Over recent years the Arab countries have increasingly stressed their community of interest and the need for closer cooperation. The field of industrial development offers a particularly challenging opportunity for common endeavor. We do not suggest, of course, that the types of industrial enterprises to be developed by each country should be the subject of joint government decision. There should be consultation in cases where particular ventures are to be launched with special government assistance. In the main, however, the location and development of industry should be decided by the free play of competitive forces operating in a larger, common Arab market.

To a limited extent the Arab countries have already taken steps to develop such a market. Syria has concluded bilateral agreements with Lebanon and Jordan which free certain products from import restrictions

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Other Industrial Policies

433 654 We now come to a consideration of certain other government policies relating to industry. One of these pertains to the special benefits extended to new plants or extensions of existing plants under the law for the encouragement of industry enacted in 1952 and first applied in 1953. Among these benefits are a six-year exemption from the so-called "temettu" or license tax and from the tax on income from real property, and exemption from income tax for profits up to 10% allocated to reserves and used within two years for further expansion. Certain additional assistance is available for industries specially determined to be useful, namely a three-year exemption from all income taxes and exemption from customs duties on required machinery, tools and construction materials.

In general, we consider it appropriate to give such incentives to the establishment or expansion of industrial plants in a country like Syria, where industrial development is still subject to considerable risks. We suggest, however, that the government replace the exemptions from the real property and income taxes with a scheme permitting industrial enterprises more rapid depreciation of plant and equipment for tax purposes. Some such scheme, coupled with a provision allowing accounting losses resulting from accelerated depreciation to be charged against taxable income for a limited number of years in the past and the future, would relate the amount of assistance more closely to capital needs than the proposed scheme does. It would provide an incentive for continuing expansion of industrial enterprises. In addition, we believe it would be easier to administer than the present provisions, which require tax authorities to determine what portion of the tax on income from real property and the tax on total profits is to be allocated to new plant and equipment as distinct from the previously existing investment.

The establishment of new industrial plants and the transfer of existing enterprises from congested urban districts might be considerably facilitated by the creation of industrial zones on the outskirts of the major cities. It would be desirable to develop a number of such zones in locations convenient both to labor residing in the city and to workers coming from the country. Normally it should be sufficient to provide land and public utilities in these zones on reasonable terms. To attract the smaller enterprises and shops, however, we suggest that small blocks of suitable workshop buildings might be erected for rent or for sale in at least one zone. This

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would not only provide an incentive to the transfer of small manufacturing shops and enterprises from the center of the city, but might well incidentally stimulate new investment in modernization of their equipment. In this connection it is significant that the removal of tanneries from the center of Damascus to a special industrial zone has in fact been attended by the installation of a considerable amount of new machinery and a substantial improvement in working conditions. While it is possible that private enterprise might become interested in the establishment of such industrial zones and shops in cooperation with the municipalities, we have made allowance in our proposed development program for the expenditure of £S 1.8 million by the central government for this purpose.

In the expansion of new industry the question arises whether the government should exercise any control over the establishment of new enterprises or additions to existing plants. By instituting a licensing system in 1952 the government has in principle already assumed such powers. While they have apparently not been exercised in a restrictive fashion, we strongly doubt that any government under normal economic conditions should even assume such authority. Private enterprise will ordinarily better be able to determine the wisdom of proceeding with a particular venture than civil servants inexperienced in business. There may be special cases where excess capacity is so serious as to warrant government intervention but even then great caution is necessary lest the restriction of competition in the development of industry impair the possibility of attaining greater efficiency.

With respect to working conditions, the mission has a few observations. Syria has a rather liberal labor code for industry, limiting the working week to 48 hours, prohibiting the employment of children under 12 years of age and containing stipulations regarding dismissal and death benefits and maternity and sick leave. Minimum wages are also set by regional wage boards. In the larger factories visited by the mission working conditions appeared for the most part satisfactory. In a number of plants, however, we observed a lack of safety precautions, notably inadequate protection of workers from the danger of moving parts and of dust and humidity. This problem calls for attention. Another deficiency is the lack of thorough enforcement of the labor code. The degree of compliance in the larger factories is not unsatisfactory. In the smaller factories and shops, however, enforcement is inadequate or virtually non-existent. While we do not suggest that the provisions of the labor code could be enforced in all of the small enterprises, we do recommend that some attempt be made

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457 Proper maintenance and repair of monuments is perhaps even more urgent,
658 since there is considerable deterioration at present. We accordingly recom-
172 mend that expenditures for this purpose be raised, on the average, approximately 50% over the next six years. A similar increase might be contemplated for excavation work which, as in the past, will presumably be carried out in cooperation with foreign archaeological missions. All this will require an increase in the subsidies paid to the Directorate of Antiquities out of the government budget to an average annual amount of approximately £S 950,000. The gradual growth in the Directorate's own receipts will probably suffice to cover necessary increases in administrative outlays.

[491] Poor roads now impede access to many interesting historical monuments. In addition to the recommendations on the national road network made elsewhere, we believe Syria would be well advised to spend about £S 1.5 million on the improvement of local roads of importance to the tourist trade. The access roads to the Krak des Chevaliers and Saint Simeon should have the highest priority.

457 Within the not too distant future the government should contemplate the establishment of a special office charged with the promotion of tourism. The cooperation and financial support of business groups interested in the tourist trade might well be enlisted. It should not only seek to interest the foreign tourist in the attractions of Syria, but also to make the Syrian people and Syrian officials more aware of the importance of the tourist trade and of making the tourist genuinely welcome.

Government Expenditures on Industry

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654 Although industry is preeminently a field for private enterprise, we have made in this chapter a number of recommendations entailing additional government expenditures. For the period 1955-60 these would total about £S 20.5 million, allocated as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Manufacturing		
Investment bank	10,500	1,750
Industrial zones and workshops	1,800	300
Enforcement of labor code[a]	325	54

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	Total	Average annual
Tourism		
Rest houses and restaurants[a]	500	83
Directorate of Antiquities[b]	5,700	950
Tourist roads	1,500	250
Tourist office	200	33
Total	20,525	3,420

[a] Additional expenditures beyond present levels.

[b] Including the entire government subvention to the Department of Antiquities as increased under our recommendations.

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certain programs which do not fall in the category of public works projects 647 might be expedited with the assistance of private enterprise. Thus the government might consider contracting the more technical parts of the cadastral survey, which under government operation is taking far too long to accomplish.

4. A small commission should be established to plan, coordinate and 647 supervise the execution of a development program. A draft law has already 654 been prepared to establish a Permanent Economic Council and a Commission for Economic Development. The Commission would include a chairman and two economic and financial experts, all of whom would devote their full time to its work, and the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of National Economy, Agriculture, Public Works and Finance. Its functions would be to prepare a development program, frame annual or biennial development budgets and supervise and coordinate the carrying out of the program. The Economic Council, which would include the Minister of Economics, a representative of the central bank, members of the Commission and representatives of the business community, would review the Commission's plans and budgets and pass them to the Council of Ministers with its observations, and would also advise the government generally on economic questions. This scheme of organizing the work impresses us as sound and we suggest that a law along these lines be enacted. It brings the business community into the task of economic and development planning; it promises the creation of a professional group to do the actual programming and day-to-day supervision and control; and it enlists the cooperation of the established ministries primarily concerned with development, instead of superseding them.

The Housing and Settlements Administration we have proposed might well be fitted into this organizational scheme. It must be remembered, however, that the proposed development budget should be drawn up in close coordination with the regular government budget, since both must be fitted into the global financial resources available. Moreover, as we have pointed out, the capital or investment projects which would presumably be included in the development budget should in themselves be closely related to recurring expenditures of a developmental character in the ordinary budget.

Great care will need to be taken to ensure adequate supervision of the execution of an approved program in all its phases. The Development Commission, for instance, should be empowered to ask for periodic (at

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647 654 least quarterly) progress reports from the agencies charged with the execution of various parts of the program. These reports should contain information on rates of disbursement, physical progress of the work, difficulties experienced, etc. The commission should be enabled to deal directly with the various agencies involved and also to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers regarding the removal of any obstacles to smooth progress which may have been encountered. It should, above all, be responsible for ensuring that coordinate action is taken whenever several agencies are concerned with the carrying out of a project or program.

5. Gaining the confidence and enlisting the cooperation of people is vital to the success of any development program. Government officials must exercise considerable tact and patience in overcoming distrust and persuading the people that the government is really intent on helping them improve their conditions of life. The officials who carry out the programs at the local level, in immediate contact with the people, must have a sympathetic but not patronizing attitude and will have to be selected for their devotion to public service as well as their technical competence. Over the years many young officials will have to be trained to work among the people on such tasks as supervising agricultural credit, organizing cooperatives, providing advice on agricultural methods, etc. In large part, however, their work must be supplemented and aided by existing officials ranging from the village *moukhtar* to the *mohafez*, from the village teacher to the provincial health officer.

The new officials introduced to help carry out certain programs must be able to count on the positive cooperation of the existing officials. The latter in turn could provide more intelligent assistance and undertake more on their own initiative if they could be given a better understanding of local problems and the means of coping with them. In part this could be accomplished by requiring these officials to make more frequent tours and placing adequate transport at their disposal for this purpose. In part it could be achieved also by organizing periodic regional meetings at which problems would be discussed and competent technicians could provide information on measures that could be undertaken to improve village and town sanitation, agriculture, housing, transport and the like. At these meetings local officials could be briefed on what the government is seeking to accomplish and their positive participation in the program could be mobilized. This might help to avoid the tendency, apparent in a number

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of underdeveloped countries, of regarding a development program as simply a series of big projects or as something which the center imposes or confers on both the people and the officials at the local level without enlisting their active participation.

Conclusion

If financial and administrative difficulties can be overcome, successful achievement of the development program we have outlined should lay the basis for another period of economic expansion. The Syrian economy is fundamentally sound. Under the primary stimulus of private enterprise it has grown at a gratifying rate. Development has now reached a stage, however, where a program of government action on a large scale is necessary to provide the opportunities for further economic progress.

With the shrinkage of available new land, the government will have to carry out reclamation and irrigation projects at an accelerated pace and concentrate much more effort on assisting farmers to raise their yields. To increase productivity and enable the small farmers to share more extensively in the advancing prosperity of the country, it is necessary to carry out certain land reforms, organize cooperatives, provide much more agricultural credit and make government services available at the village level. The remaining public domain must be set aside for the progressive settlement of landless peasants in properly organized rural communities.

Storage facilities are required to improve the quality and reduce the cost of handling grain. New roads, improved road maintenance and better port facilities are needed to lower the cost of marketing agricultural commodities, and, to a lesser extent, of industrial products.

In industry, where development in the past has gone forward on a rather wide front, a period of consolidation has set in. The government must now adopt policies calculated to make manufacturing more competitive and must assist private enterprise in becoming more efficient and continuing its expansion on a more selective basis.

In the field of education, the emphasis in the future needs to be less on a further rapid extension of general educational opportunities and more on the adaptation of educational training to modern requirements and on the improvement of facilities for the acquisition of necessary vocational skills. In public health, where progress has been much less satisfactory than in education, the primary stress should be on remedying the uneven geo-

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654 graphic distribution of hospitals and on preventing disease through better sanitation, anti-malarial measures and the provision of safe water supplies. In urban development, the government faces the need of providing more guidance in municipal planning and assisting some of the rapidly growing cities to make at least a start in relieving slum congestion and anticipating acute housing shortages.

To cope with these tasks, the government must be able to rely on the support and participation of the entire Syrian population. The carrying out of a development program as a truly national effort will be instrumental not only in lifting the standards of living of the nation but also in promoting national unity and strength.

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tion, maintenance and elementary repair of machinery. These courses could be organized with the help of an FAO expert and in cooperation with farm machinery dealers. They might be given under the aegis of the agricultural school at Aleppo and the proposed school at Kamichliye.

Certificates of competence should be awarded after suitable tests; if employers were to increase the pay of holders of such certificates, this might provide an incentive to workers to take such courses.

University level. Syria has no agricultural college or faculty; all the top staff of the Ministry of Agriculture have been trained abroad. The government and the Ministry send students to Egypt, Europe and the United States; the FAO and other organizations grant fellowships to Syrians. In 1953, 58 agricultural students were studying abroad in various fields—37 in Egypt, 11 in France and 10 in the United States.

Syria will be in great need of agronomists, agriculturists and veterinarians in the coming years. For the time being the total of fellowships should be increased to permit foreign study by 15-20 more students each year. The curriculum of the secondary school should also be expanded, as indicated above, to include one or two years of special work, for immediate and pressing needs.

Research

Syria had 18 experimental stations in 1954. They are well dispersed throughout the provinces and have reasonably good facilities and adequate grounds. Eight of the stations, in the provinces of Damascus, Hauran, Homs, Hama, Euphrates and the Jezireh, are engaged mainly in cereal and field crop research; the rest in horticultural work. Unfortunately, the stations work more or less independently of each other and this lack of coordination, coupled with staff and budgetary deficiencies, greatly impairs their effectiveness.

Despite the government's commendable efforts to offer Syrian personnel courses of study abroad, well-trained agronomists, horticulturists, agricultural engineers, zoological technicians and veterinarians will be lacking for some years to come. This suggests the advisability of limiting the extent of experimentation in the 18 understaffed stations.

Coordinated and central programming for future research is essential; this should be the task of one station, which may become the nucleus of a future Central Research Station. For the time being, we suggest that

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242 activities be allocated among five departments which might later be in-
454 corporated into such a central station: soil; farm crop and horticulture; plant pathology and entomology; agricultural engineering; and rural economics. It has already been indicated that there should be a separate livestock center.

The embryo Central Research Station should assemble and evaluate research work already done in such fields as cereals and cotton; it should engage in intensive rather than extensive research. Existing stations should undertake seed selection and propagation. In the course of time some of these stations might become sub-stations of the C.R.S. with responsibility for carrying out the experimental and demonstration programs to be planned each year by the C.R.S. But this stage cannot be reached until the sub-stations are adequately staffed with competent research and field personnel.

The mission recommends consideration of:

1. the establishment of a Central Research Station, preferably in the Damascus area, with ample experimental grounds for future expansion;
2. the recruiting of foreign experts (with the help of interested international institutions) to head the proposed departments;
3. provision for training abroad of future Syrian staff; and
4. a decision on priorities for the building program in connection with the experimental program.

Extension Service

Annex E refers to the inadequacy of the present extension service in furnishing guidance to the farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture has provided technical information in the form of pamphlets and films and has also arranged training courses for guidance officers, especially in cotton cultivation and the control of pests and diseases. In this regard more can be done and the mission strongly recommends that short training courses, of the kind recommended earlier, should be offered to farmers. The distribution of more posters, particularly relating to livestock, designed to be understood even by those who cannot read, should be encouraged. Extension officers could also be instrumental in furthering the adult education program mentioned above. More guidance could be given by private organizations, such as the Chamber of Agriculture already set up in each mohafazat, and farmers' cooperatives could be instrumental in providing

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and financing facilities for the presentation of pertinent information to farmers, and in organizing agricultural exhibitions. 242 654

The Chambers of Agriculture could also participate in regional programs for agricultural guidance, improvement of the care and breeding of sheep, goats and cattle, etc., and promotion of the various cottage industries. Close cooperation with the guidance department of the Ministry of Agriculture would make possible a national program to improve agricultural conditions, establish youth organizations, and stimulate growers' associations for cereals, cotton, sugar beet, tobacco, olive, fruits and other crops.

APPENDIX

TABLE 3 Nurseries and Research Stations

	Specialty	Approximate area (hectares)	Province
Damascus	horticulture	25	Damascus
Ezra	field crops	200	Hauran
Tell Chehab	horticulture	20	Hauran
Soueida	horticulture	25	Soueida
Homs	horticulture and field crops	45	Homs
Hama	horticulture and field crops	40	Hama
Aleppo	horticulture cotton breeding	40	Aleppo
Latakia	horticulture	30	Latakia
Sin	citrus	48	Latakia
Tartous	horticulture	20	Latakia
Harem	horticulture	20	Aleppo
Madrah	horticulture olives pistachios	20	Aleppo
Deir ez Zor	mixed	27	Euphrates
Hassetche	mixed	100	Jezireh

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ANNEX E *NOTES ON AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS*

1 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF SYRIA

General

Of the estimated £S 100 million–£S 120 million of agricultural credit outstanding in 1953, some 10-15% was furnished by the private commercial banks (including the Commercial Department of the BSL), probably 50% by moneylenders and merchants, and somewhat more than 35% by the Agricultural Bank of Syria. In view of its future role the mission adds the following note on the ABS. The other sources of credit are dealt with in the Main Report.

The Agricultural Bank operates throughout Syria. In addition to its central Damascus office it has three main branches, in Aleppo, Latakia and Deir ez Zor, and 27 sub-branches in the more important towns. The facilities, however, are not adequate to channel an adequate volume of loans down to the level of the small farmer.

The ABS is a governmental institution, administered by a General Director and a board of nine directors, six representing respectively the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and National Economy, and the Chambers of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and three selected by the Council of Ministers. Since 1950 the functions of the ABS have been considerably broadened. In addition to making loans to farmers, it now performs such extra-banking functions as purchasing and selling seeds, insecticides, and machinery, purchasing land and helping small farmers develop improved farm practices, and importing agricultural equipment. At present, it does not make loans directly to cooperatives. Loans have been granted to individual members with the joint guarantee of other members rather than to a cooperative association itself (the Bank Act, as redrafted (see below), would empower the ABS to lend directly to cooperatives). The limitations on extending loans for agricultural purposes are not to be found so much in the functions of the Bank as in the provisions dealing with the conditions under which loans may be granted. A principal objective should be the removal of burdensome restrictions and the substitution of desirable and sound loan policies.

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652 TABLE 2 Loans by Agricultural Bank for Special Programs
654 Authorized by Government, 1950–53

	1950–1951		1951–1952		1953	
	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)	Number of loans	Value (thousand £S)
Machinery loans (MIRA)	809	3,710	42	175	4	6
Relief to olive growers	2,757	1,183	3,067	508	—	—
Cotton seed advance	—	—	—	—	233	131
Combating cotton worm	—	—	5,923	2,745	1,115	512
Seasonal loans	—	—	1,394	1,150	6,440	6,123
Relief to drought-stricken areas in South	—	—	13,977	5,287	—	—
Machinery loans (Agricultural Bank)*	—	—	670	5,213	124	544

* These loans are for machinery purchased and sold directly by ABS in contrast to the MIRA machinery loans shown above.

The short-term or seasonal loans from BSL are at 2½% interest, the amount outstanding at the end of 1953 being £S 5.9 million. The BSL functions as a central bank in its transactions with the ABS, there being no national central bank in Syria at the present time.

Machinery loans have been of most aid to large farmers, while the seed, insecticide and relief loans have been helpful to all types of farmers.

Lending Practices and Policies

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The Agricultural Bank may make loans against the security of a real estate mortgage, a joint guarantee of several individuals, a chattel mortgage on crops, Treasury bonds, gold and certain types of commercial paper. In practice, however, loans have been advanced only on real estate mortgages and joint guarantees. This has meant a restricted loan policy. For instance, the ABS has not been in a position to make direct loans on crops or chattels, to finance cooperatives effectively, to extend credit to new land settlers, or adequately to meet the credit needs of the small farmer.

Table 3 shows the loans of the ABS by type of security for the period 1947-1953. It reveals no marked trend in the use of the mortgage or the

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III RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A SUPERVISED AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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The organization of the agricultural extension service should be such as to permit its ultimate development into the central agricultural agency through which educational activities relative to improved techniques in agriculture and rural living are channeled. In its particular sphere of activity the Extension Service should coordinate the findings of all departments within the Ministry of Agriculture. It should become eventually one of the three or four principal departments of the Ministry of Agriculture, separated from the research control or administrative work of the Ministry. For the present, however, it would seem desirable to retain the Division of Cooperatives and the Extension Service on the joint basis. The Extension Service should not have regulatory or police power functions, for this would involve education in the pleading of special causes or the enforcement of sanctions. Education and extension rather involve training on the basis of voluntary participation by farmers. At the national and regional level the Service should be staffed adequately to serve the village communities. It is recommended that an additional amount of £S 250,000 be provided during the next five years for personnel, travel and general operating expenses of the Extension Service.

There is a shortage of trained agriculturists. Steps should be taken to improve the teaching and research facilities of the four intermediate agricultural schools at Aleppo, Deir ez Zor, Latakia and Selemiye, and also at the secondary agricultural school at Kharabo. The extension worker needs a broad but well-grounded training in the technical aspects of agriculture, a good knowledge of social and economic problems in rural communities, and special training in extension methods and the philosophy underlying good extension work. In addition to pre-service training centers, it is essential that in-service and refresher courses be provided for extension personnel. The Food and Agriculture Organization should be requested to assist in the development of a training center for extension workers. This activity might well be supplemented by a cooperative arrangement between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Near East Foundation for the training of village community workers. The work of this Foundation provides a useful example of an effective method of reaching the small farmer. Scholarships

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for study abroad should be a necessary part of the training of the senior staff. 654 242

The findings of research, experimentation and the experiences of farmers give support to extension programs. Much information is already available and should be transmitted to farmers, but more systematic and better coordinated practical research should be the aim in the future. The two functions of research and extension should be coordinated within the Ministry of Agriculture so that each performs its specialized service, in a manner that supplements and complements the other. Research must focus on the key needs and concerns of farmers and anticipate future problems. For instance, one of the emerging needs is to know more about good crop rotation practices, including better use of land now fallow.

Chart 1 indicates the mission's conception of a desirable organizational framework for the agricultural credit and rural development program it has recommended.

IV LAND TENURE

In Syria, the landowner group is composed of full owners, part owners, debt-encumbered owners, and owners with undetermined title. Owners range from operators of large commercial farms to small subsistence farmers. The tenant group is composed of farmers who rent or make some payment for the use of land, and comprises most of the farmers who live on the land and cultivate it. Most of the large owners do not live permanently on their land but operate through some type of sharecropper system. There are very few cash tenants. The sharecropper usually works under the direction of the landlord or his agent and is dependent upon him for farm supplies and operating capital. Often he contributes toward crop production little but his own and his family's labor. His status is more nearly that of a laborer than of a tenant. A true tenant has rights of occupancy and land use that are protected by law, while the sharecropper is very much subject to the will of the landlord. 423 427

In general, it appears that in the rainfed areas the sharecropper receives about 30% of the crop if he provides only his labor, and around 70% if he provides the working capital. In areas sparsely settled he receives a slightly higher percentage of the crop, and in heavily populated areas he may receive somewhat less. On the irrigated lands the sharecropper receives in

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

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657 seven were for over £S 1 million to 10 corporations. One large Damascus
433 corporation received two loans totalling £S 7 million. The sectors of industry to which loans were made were, in order of magnitude, textiles, sugar refining, vegetable and fruit canning and glass; a minor amount was loaned for manufacture of liquid gas and mechanical equipment. The terms on which all of these loans were made were considerably easier than those prevailing on the capital market, the rate of interest being only 3%.

By the time repayment was due, the general attitude of the government towards industry had become so favorable that beneficiaries, if they wished it, had little difficulty in securing an extension.[6] In 1952, extension of the period of repayment for five additional years was authorized, and "guaranteed companies" might thereafter be allowed to distribute dividends out of net profits in stated circumstances. Any guaranteeing of new industrial loans was forbidden.

By legislation in January 1954, the scheme was revived and even extended to include loans for the financing of big hotels, provided, however, that the total amount of the loans outstanding and guaranteed to industry and hotels should not exceed £S 15 million.

Fiscal Privileges

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433 Until 1949 fiscal facilities favoring industry were restricted to special customs provision applying to imported tools, machinery, apparatus and materials for industrial requirements; in stated circumstances, they might be subject to a tariff of only 1%.

An act of 1945 exempted new construction, for two years, from the tax on income from real property. In 1950, the exemption was explicitly applied to new factories and workshops, beginning with the financial year following the completion of the projects.

On September 27, 1952, Legislative Decree No. 103 (on the encouragement of industry) granted to all registered industrial establishments, effective with the 1953 fiscal year, the following privileges under certain conditions:

1. exemption from customs duties on machinery, tools and equipment

[6] It is noteworthy that at that time the large Damascus corporation mentioned above had converted its £S 7 million guaranteed loan in an overdraft of the commercial type with the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. As a result, the total guaranteed amount outstanding had dropped to £S 16.627 million.

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imported for the requirements of the enterprises; the industries and the imports as well as the quantities benefitting from this provision are determined by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Ministry of National Economy; 654 433

2. exemption for six years from the tax on income from real property, for new construction in factories, administrative buildings and housing for workers and employees connected with the establishment, and industrial machines and equipment housed in these installations; the existing two-year exemption of new factories and workshops was extended for the same six-year period;

3. exemption from income tax for reserves up to 10% of annual profits, devoted within two years to the further expansion of the industrial establishment;

4. exemption from the "temettu" tax for six years from the beginning of operation; and

5. exemption from the income tax for three years from the beginning of operation in the case of industries needed by Syria or which had not been established there on the specified date.

These privileges are also applicable to additions to existing factories and industrial plants. On the other hand, an industrial establishment which suspends operations for more than a year and a half without an excuse accepted by the Ministry of National Economy loses its exemptions.

Proprietors of beneficiary industrial establishments must, among other things, furnish complete information and accounts of their enterprises, and must use the machines, equipment and construction materials which qualify their enterprises for the exemptions.

The granting of the privileges under (1) and (5) calls for a decision of the government, which can be based on the preceding appraisal of the project as required under the law on the regulation of industry, discussed in the following paragraph. The other privileges are extended automatically.

Other Controls and Incentives

The registration of industry. Following the opening of a general public register of manufacturing enterprises in 1949, a 1951 decree introduced a system of special registers for every local industry. Anyone starting an industrial establishment in Syria must present within one month 656 433

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authorities. The mission was informed, however, that practically every 656
handicraft application for an industrial license is approved. With regard 433
to industry proper, applications have been turned down for various reasons. The main criteria seem to be whether the local market can absorb the additional production and whether the new or expanded industry can be expected to increase exports, especially to the Arab countries.

Facilities with regard to industrial sites. By the decree on the encouragement of industry, the government opened facilities for settlement on state domain land. The proprietor of an industrial establishment who wishes to construct a building for industrial exploitation may rent up to 25,000 square meters with a five-year option to purchase land belonging to state domain, on conditions to be determined by the Directorate of State Domain. The beneficiary is not allowed to sell or utilize this land for non-industrial purposes and the State may recover ownership of land not used for industrial construction or expansion within five years.

These provisions represent a real contribution to a reduction of the cost of establishing new industrial enterprises and to the better siting of existing ones.

Export promotion. The laws on the regulation and the encouragement 654
of industry contain several provisions, already mentioned, which permit 433
the authorities in their discretion to grant certain privileges and other 439
facilities to industrial enterprises in the interest of the national economy. We understand that the authorities have several more specific objectives in mind, including the promotion of industrial exports.

Besides these measures, which have been in existence for only two years, the Syrian Government has for several years been actively engaged in negotiating foreign trade agreements with Arab and other countries[8] with a view to promoting exports generally. Since gaining its independence Syria has made commercial agreements with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon among the Arab countries, and with India, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Japan. Several of these treaties include special privileges for Syrian industrial exports, either assuring them most-favored-nation treatment or exempting specific Syrian products from import restrictions or allowing them tariff reductions or exemptions. Agreements in 1953 with Lebanon and Jordan exempt some local industrial products from customs duties or apply reduced tariffs, and provide

[8] Formerly, under the mandate, commercial treaties could be concluded only with neighboring countries and countries not members of the League of Nations.

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654 for the exchange of other industrial products subject to ordinary duties.
433 The inter-Arab economic agreements of September 9, 1953, between Leba-
439 non, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, list a considerable number of industrial products to which a tariff rate of 25% of the normal tariff of these countries will be applied. But they do not exempt trade among the signatory countries from existing import and export licenses and embargoes, nor do they rule out the institution of new ones. Only in the special commercial agreements between Syria and Jordan, and Syria and Lebanon, are certain industrial products, originating in these countries, exempt from all import restrictions.

IV AN APPRAISAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS INDUSTRY

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A country like Syria, with a preponderantly agrarian economy, no important mineral deposits and little power resources, still rather underdeveloped from the point of view of national income per capita and the dissemination of technical skills, is likely to have a natural advantage in the following branches of mechanized industrial production: (1) the processing—at least up to a certain stage—of indigenous crops which are exported; (2) the production of building materials and other bulky goods for local needs; (3) the manufacture in light industries of commodities for general consumption and some durable goods to meet a more or less special national or regional requirement, even with imported raw materials; (4) the production of simple tools and the repair (eventually the assembly) of locally used machines; and (5) the semi-handicraft production of some luxury goods requiring those special skills for which the country has traditionally been well known. These are in fact the main fields on which modern Syria's industry has concentrated and there is nothing fundamentally unsound about this.

On the other hand, it could not have been expected that the progress made in the period of relative isolation followed by the postwar boom would make Syria proof against the competition of long established and highly efficient foreign concerns, quite apart from the dumping of cheap surplus stocks and large imports of modern machine-made luxury goods with which it was confronted by the end of the forties. The customs tariff of the Syrian-Lebanese Union offered only a modest protection for local

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656 on the introduction or continuation of these measures with regard to a
433 branch of industry the government take the advice of a standing commission in which, besides various occupational groups, independent economic experts would ensure a well-balanced opinion with due consideration of all the aspects involved. Finally, it seems desirable that decisions on the issuance and cancellation of licenses by the Ministry of National Economy should be governed as much as possible by general and public directives applied without discrimination.

654 *The encouragement of industry.* In many underdeveloped countries
433 it is believed that acceleration of economic progress demands at least a shift in emphasis from primary production in favor of basic and manufacturing industry, to lessen dependence upon the already developed countries. When private initiative seems to be insufficiently vigorous, it sometimes happens that the government takes the lead by establishing publicly financed state factories and other state economic enterprises. This was done in Turkey, for instance.

The Syrian government has, however, taken a different course. Although it nationalized the foreign-owned public utilities it did not, except in one ill-fated case, itself enter the field of industrial operations by establishing factories. Instead, in various ways it encouraged private industrial enterprise, which, after all, had demonstrated its energy in promoting industrialization. Moreover, most of these measures, particularly those aimed at stimulating new industrial establishments and expansion of existing ones, were introduced only when industrial development began to show signs of stagnation during 1952.

The mission takes a favorable view of the basic principle of Legislative Decree No. 103 of 1952. In many countries at an early stage of development, a considerable and often disproportionate part of national savings tends to be invested in residential real estate or to flow into commercial or financial enterprise. Under such circumstances special incentives to induce a larger portion to be invested in industry, where they would probably make a greater contribution to the productivity of the economy, are certainly justified. We have no special comment with regard to the provisions for industrial sites. With respect to the fiscal privileges, however, we have some specific recommendations.

It seems reasonable for an underdeveloped country to exempt from customs duty imports of machinery, tools, equipment and construction materials not locally produced. In Syria decisions as to the industries and

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quantities to be exempted have been made by government officials. The mission suggests that for the system of individual decisions involving political judgment there be substituted in the law itself a general exemption provision on as liberal a basis as possible.

We cannot endorse the temporary exemption from income tax for new firms and for profits on new investment by existing firms. Our chief objection to these provisions is that an income tax exemption leads to rather irrational and sometimes inequitable results. It is obviously most important to the companies realizing the highest profits and it is of no value to those making no profits during the period of exemption. Furthermore, with a graduated tax such as Syria's, large firms benefit more from the exemption than do the small- and medium-sized firms. The exemption of profits derived from expansion of existing businesses, as distinguished from exemption of new firms, presents serious administrative difficulty in connection with the allocation of total profits between the new and the old part of the business. No fully satisfactory solution for this problem can be found even when both administrators and taxpayers are highly skilled and sophisticated in accounting techniques. Yet it would be undesirable to confine the concession to new firms, since additional investment in an established business may often be more productive than the same investment in a new business, especially where, as in Syria, there is a shortage of experienced managers.

The simplest way to achieve most of the benefits of temporary income tax exemption without its disadvantages and difficulties appears to be through liberalization of the depreciation or amortization allowances under the income and profits tax. In other words, the taxpayer should be allowed to write off against taxable income the original cost of plant and equipment in a period shorter than the normal useful life. For any given asset, accelerated depreciation results in a postponement, rather than a complete cancellation, of income tax liability but the investor can extend this postponement indefinitely by acquiring new assets when the first group has been written off for tax purposes.

Accelerated depreciation reduces or eliminates the chance that the income tax will prevent recovery of the capital outlay. For a rapidly growing firm it may offset taxable income and thus be virtually equivalent to exemption. The concession is automatically cancelled if the firm ceases to expand. Accelerated depreciation puts the emphasis on new investment, whereas tax exemption may grant unnecessarily large benefits to highly

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654 profitable firms which do not choose to expand. Furthermore, depreciation
433 raises no great administrative difficulties.

651 Our recommendation would provide a fairly effective substitute for income tax exemption, especially the recommendation that the tax on non-agricultural real estate be transformed into a tax on a true net income is also adopted. We realize, however, that a special problem arises in adapting the accelerated depreciation approach to Syrian conditions. Businesses with gross receipts of less than £S 25,000 per year pay an amount equal to 50% of the temettu tax in lieu of the regular income tax. Since these firms do not compute net income or depreciation allowances they could hardly be brought under the general scheme. It is suggested that these smaller firms be allowed to deduct from their tax liability a credit related to the amount of any new investment in buildings, machinery or other industrial equipment.

The present exemption of reserves up to 10% of annual profits which, within two years, are devoted to expansion of the enterprises would seem to be extremely difficult to administer satisfactorily; proper administration would call for careful supervision to assure compliance. This provision could well be eliminated. The law might provide, however, that if deduction of accelerated depreciation after an investment has actually been made produces an accounting loss, the loss might be carried back against income of the two preceeding years. The present law allows losses to be carried forward against income for five years but does not provide for a carry-back of losses.

652 *Credit facilities.* Our principal objections against the scheme of gov-
433 ernment-guaranteed industrial credits can be summarized as follows: (1) It applies only to corporations, thus excluding the large majority of Syrian industrial enterprises, which are not organized in this form, and in effect reserving its benefits to a small group of large companies, although there is no reason to assume that all credit needs outside this group can be met by other means. (2) The limitation of the life of the guaranteed loans to three years (later extended to eight) does not sufficiently allow for adapting the maturity of these loans to the requirements of the projects. As an instrument to facilitate long-term industrial financing the provision may in some cases be too rigid. (3) The 3% interest rate, appreciably below the prevailing market rate, puts the beneficiaries in an exceptionally favorable competitive position as again non-beneficiaries, and may stimu-

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industrial protection through measures affecting foreign trade would be 656
largely the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. We therefore suggest 651
some procedure to assure that the Minister of National Economy also has 439
some responsibility in this connection insofar as the interests under his jurisdiction are involved. It would also seem desirable that the Council of Ministers continue to exercise its ultimate control over measures of this character so that possible conflicting considerations may be resolved in terms of the public interest in its broadest sense.

Export promotion. The priority given by the Syrian government to 654
attaining national self-sufficiency with regard to industrial products which 439
can be locally manufactured has been combined with a growing effort 433
to open up additional markets for Syrian industry, particularly in the other Near Eastern countries. Syria's execution of several bilateral trade agreements and participation in the inter-Arab economic agreement aiming at liberalizing mutual trade exchange are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. The possibilities for further industrial export promotion, however, are not being fully exploited.

First, the mission recommends that Syrian export industries be given every possible assistance in the procurement of foreign raw and auxiliary materials without fiscal charges, specifically that they be given a full rebate of such charges commensurate with actual exports, and that the system of rebates be so administered that the rebate can be quickly and easily obtained.

Secondly, it is recommended that the policy of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with Syria's main commercial partners be systematically pursued. The considerable increase in recent years in exports of silk and artificial silk cloth, knitwear and other articles of clothing and soap, particularly to the markets of Jordan and Iraq, indicates that there are industrial export possibilities worth while consolidating and expanding.

Thirdly, it is suggested that Syria which, so far as is known, lacks natural oil deposits, has an even greater interest than its oil-producing neighbors in the creation, on a multilateral basis, of a market among the countries of the Arab League; the amount of purchasing power generated by these other countries would contribute far more to the joint total than would Syria's contribution. It therefore seems to be particularly in Syria's interest to promote further inter-Arab economic integration. If this could be achieved, conditions would also become more favorable for the re-establishment of the economic union with Lebanon.

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range from 0.70 to five meters, averaging about two, and the depth of the harbor entrance is only six to seven meters. The larger ships must anchor in the roadstead (depth, five to six fathoms) and be served by lighters. 504

Although at various times in the past steps were initiated to improve the port facilities at Latakia, it was not until 1950 that the government decided definitely to proceed with the development of a modern national port. In the mission's opinion the decision was reasonable and realistic, despite the various theoretical arguments in favor of other courses. At all events, the course being chosen, the mission has viewed the present development problem as simply one of integrating Latakia most effectively into the national transport pattern.

New Construction

The new port is designed to handle one million tons of cargo per year, about double the 1953 volume, but is calculated to show a satisfactory investment return at slightly above 800,000 tons. This volume was actually reached in 1954, before completion of the port construction. Recently the dispatch of the lighter service itself has improved considerably and this, together with the growing volume of regular cargo, has recently made it possible for international shipping companies to remove the former Latakia port surcharge of $9.25 per ton.

The mission has recommended construction of a grain silo, not provided for in the plans. A silo capacity of about 20,000-40,000 tons, equipped for mechanized delivery, will be required to regularize the harvest flow of export cereals when combined with the inland storage, cleaning and grading facilities discussed in the Main Report.

Promotion and Regulation

A number of artificial measures have been invoked by the government as part of its effort to encourage the use of Latakia. A 1953 decree, for example, prohibited the importation of brown sugar, cement, asphalt, wood or iron via ports other than Latakia. There are also provisions with regard to exports. Since July 1952, exports of Syria's most important agricultural products are not allowed to use ports other than Latakia. The mission recognizes that such measures can serve a purpose at times, but they also can have serious drawbacks and are seldom the most desirable 654 504

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654 504 means of promotion. Indeed, in the first example given it was necessary to exempt certain materials for southern public works, sugar for the Homs refinery (by special license) and various other large imports, so that much of the remaining cargo affected by the decree would have entered through Latakia in any event. It is questionable whether the actual benefit to Latakia is enough to offset the domestic and international resentment engendered.

Favorable adjustment of the various port charges, such as those for anchorage, mooring, cargo handling and storage, offers a more satisfactory means of promotion. In these the Syrian government has already shown a flexible policy, readjusting the rate schedule from time to time; we feel that this policy should be continued. Inducements of this kind, together with constantly improving service to shippers, will in general meet the competition of other ports with greater benefit to the Syrian economy than negative or restrictive measures.

509 IV CIVIL AVIATION

In a period of a few years Syria has made appreciable progress in the development of her civil aviation. Wisely, at this early stage, she has concentrated on the most-needed domestic services and the educational steps to popularize air transport, while at the same time providing suitable airport facilities to insure good connection with international lines. Domestic air mail service was inaugurated in April 1954.

508 *International Services*

By the end of 1953 nine international airlines provided Syria with direct service to all parts of the world. These call primarily at Damascus, although the Class C airport at Aleppo is used internationally to some extent.

The Damascus airport is situated only 10 kilometers southwest of the center of the city on an excellent road, at an altitude of 715 meters. It has a main runway of 2,550 meters and a cross-wind runway of 1,000 meters, both paved. Runways, taxiways and aprons will take aircraft of up to 50 tons. Equipment includes full lighting to ICAO specifications,

MISCELLANEOUS.

حالة اعمال التحديد والتحرير حسب الاقضية ، في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

EXTENT OF LAND SURVEYED AS AT THE END OF 1952, BY QADAS.

Table No. 1 — جدول رقم ١

MOHAFAZAT AND QADAS	المساحة المحدودة (بالهكتار) Area surveyed (Hectars)	المساحة المتبقية للتحديد (بالهكتار) Area to be surveyed (hectars)	المساحة الغير قابلة للزراعة (بالهكتار) Uncultivable Area (hectars)	المساحة الكلية (بالهكتار) Total Area (Hectars)	المحافظة والقضاء
TOTAL	3,544,383	4,272,605	10,630,298	18,447,286	المجموع العام
DAMASCUS MOHAFAZA					محافظة دمشق
and Damascus city	286,568	562,542	1,103,408	1,952,753	ومدينة دمشق الممتازة
Mohafaza centre	44,842	6,500	—	51,342	مركز المحافظة
Quneitra	5,230	124,770	—	130,000	قضاء القنيطرة
Duma	116,792	100,000	989,208	1,206,000	« دوما
Zebadani	—	56,800	8,200	65,000	« الزبداني
Al-Qutteifeh & Nabek	—	250,000	106,000	356,000	قضائي القطيفة والنبك
Qatana	119,639	24,772	—	144,411	قضاء قطنا
HOMS MOHAFAZA	921,008	278,200	2,965,792	4,165,000	محافظة حمص
Mohafaza centre	921,008	278,200	2,965,792	4,165,000	مركز المحافظة
HAMA MOHAFAZA	632,185	100,000	—	732,185	محافظة حماه
Mohafaza centre	280,865	—	—	280,865	مركز المحافظة
Salamiya	351,320	100,000	—	451,320	قضاء السلمية
LATAKIA MOHAFAZA	294,164	349,997	53,839	6[illegible]	محافظة اللاذقية
Banias	5,342	49,976	16,682	7[illegible],000	قضاء بانياس
Talkhalakh	9,701	43,931	368	54,000	« تلكلخ
Jableh	22,989	50,000	5,011	78,000	« جبلة
Al-Hiffeh	47,506	26,544	12,950	87,000	« الحفة
Safita	7,334	49,955	3,211	61,000	« صافيتا
Tartus	23,753	29,978	2,269	56,000	« طرطوس
Latakia	45,759	49,613	4,628	100,000	« اللاذقية
Misiaf	41,280	50,000	8,720	100,000	« مصياف

متنوعة

حالة اعمال التحديد والتحرير حسب الاقضية ، في نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

EXTENT OF LAND SURVEYED AS AT THE END OF 1952, BY QADAS.

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Table No. 1 (Concld.)

جدول رقم ١ (تتمة)

MOHAFAZAT AND QADAS	المساحة المحدودة (بالهكتار) Area surveyed (Hectars)	المساحة المتبقية للتحديد (بالهكتار) Area to be surveyed (hectars)	المساحة الغير قابلة للزراعة (بالهكتار) Uncultivable Area (hectars)	المساحة الكلية (بالهكتار) Total Area (Hectars)	المحافظة والقضاء
ALEPPO MOHAFAZA	**1,292,858**	**999,089**	—	**2,291,948**	**محافظة حلب**
Idleb	110,395	60,457	—	170,852	قضاء ادلب
I'naz	—	145,000	—	154,000	« اعزاز
Al-Bab	165,997	—	—	165,997	« الباب
Ifrin	—	205,000	—	205,000	« عفرين
Jabal Sam'an incl. Aleppo	429,249	—	—	429,249	« جبل سمعان بما فيه مدينة حلب
Jarabius	36,557	73,972	—	110,529	قضاء جرابلس
Jisr-esh-Shughour	25,732	100,660	—	126,392	« جسر الشغور
Harem	—	82,000	—	82,000	« حارم
Ein-al-Arab	—	273,000	—	273,000	« عين العرب
Ma'arrat-an-Na'man	248,520	50,000	—	298,520	« معرة النعمان
Minbej	276,409	—	—	276,409	« منبج
HASAKEH MOHAFAZA	**95,725**	**796,275**	**1,325,000**	**2,217,000**	**محافظة الحسكة**
Mohafaza centre	95,725	204,275	1,225,000	1,525,000	مركز المحافظة
Dajla	—	200,000	100,000	300,000	قضاء الدجلة
Qamishli	—	392,000	—	392,000	« القامشلي
DEIR-EZ-ZOR MOHAFAZA	**8,641**	**500,000**	**4,997,359**	**5,506,000**	**محافظة دير الزور**
Mohafaza centre	8,641	100,000	1,251,359	1,360,000	مركز المحافظة
Abu Kamal	—	75,000	276,000	351,000	قضاء البوكمال
Ar-Riqqa	—	250,000	1,950,000	2,200,000	« الرقة
Al-Mayadin	—	75,000	1,520,000	1,595,000	« الميادين
SWEIDA MOHAFAZA	—	**370,000**	**185,000**	**555,000**	**محافظة السويداء**
Mohafaza centre	—	80,000	67,000	147,000	مركز المحافظة
Shahba'	—	150,000	51,000	201,000	قضاء الشهباء
Salkhad	—	140,000	67,000	207,000	« صلخد
DER'A MOHAFAZA	**103,798**	**316,202**	—	**420,000**	**محافظة درعا**
Mohafaza centre	70,172	76,828	—	147,000	مركز المحافظة
Izra'	27,194	186,806	—	214,000	قضاء ازرع
Fiq	6,432	52,568	—	59,000	« فيق

Source : Directorate General of Land Survey.

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better cultivation, if more machinery were available, to reduce the fallow to one year out of two, instead of two out of three in the districts where this is customary; it would also be possible, by machine cultivation, to keep weeds under control. (See Chapter VIII.)

The main possibilities of development, however, depend on irrigation. At present an area of some 500,000 acres is irrigated, and even under the existing scheme much water is wasted. How much additional land could be irrigated is a subject for controversy. Mr Soubhi Mazloum, a Syrian irrigation engineer, suggests that the total area which could be irrigated, including the use of the Euphrates water, may be as large as 1,200,000 hectares (2,960,000 acres):[1] but this figure refers to the area which it is *physically* possible to irrigate, not the area which could be irrigated with any prospect of economic return.

A more exact and detailed estimate was prepared by Professor Addison, the irrigation expert, who surveyed existing schemes in 1943 and considered that the extension of these which was then economically practicable would irrigate some 68,000 hectares (168,000 acres) in addition to the area already irrigated. The difference between these two estimates indicates how wide a range of opinion there is. A survey is now being prepared by a British irrigation firm on behalf of the Syrian Government, to provide the basis of development projects, and pending its publication it is impossible to quote any more satisfactory estimates.

The Jezira and Euphrates Provinces. In inner Syria, the Jezira area and part of the Euphrates province in the north-eastern corner of the country, there are quite large possibilities of extending cultivation both in the rain-fed zone, and by irrigation. North of a line from Tiyne to Sheikh Saleh there is sufficient rainfall to water the winter crops. In the 'Duck's Bill' and along the Turkish frontier to a depth of about 12 miles to Derbisiye, the rainfall is 50 to 100 centimetres per year (20–40 inches), and south of this there is another belt with rainfall of 25 to 50 centimetres (10–20 inches), about 50 miles wide.[2]

[1] 'Le Problème de l'Eau au Liban et en Syrie', in *L'Agriculture, Richesse Nationale*, (Beirut, 1942).

[2] This information is based on an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. in 1944.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

Another significant aspect of the land tenure problem is the financial arrangements between the landlords and tenants. 427

Although there are many variations throughout the country, there are three basic contracts. 241

In the first, where water is available by gravity flow for irrigation and the landowner furnishes only the land, he gets 50 per cent and the tenant gets 50 per cent of the gross yield. In the second type of contract, where the tenant installs pumps and operates them at his own expense and the landlord furnishes the land only, he gets 33⅓ per cent and the tenant gets the rest. In the third case, where the landowner furnishes only the land and the tenant drills artesian wells at his own expense, the landowner gets only 25 per cent of the gross yields. There are variations depending on the crops produced and on who furnishes seed, fertilizer, and equipment. With the growth of mechanization, there is a rising tendency for landowners to prepare the seed beds themselves with large tractors and to take a large share of the produce.

With the advent of mechanization, there is also a noticeable tendency to wage-crop arrangements, particularly in the remote areas like the Jezira where the population is sparse and where the only feasible arrangement for picking cotton is the employment of nomads by the day. 464 241

The greatest concentration of small cultivators who own and operate their own farms is in the older farming areas in the southern part of Syria around Damascus. Around Aleppo the farms are larger in size and owner-operators are fewer in number. 471 241

MECHANIZATION

Mechanization is changing rapidly the primitive practices which still dominate Syrian agriculture. The number of tractors has increased from 200 to almost 2,000 and more than 700 combines are in operation. 241 407

Most of the mechanical equipment is in the Jezira and the agricultural areas around Aleppo. Approximately half the tractors are being used in cotton areas.

To encourage further mechanization the government plans to extend loans to farmers on a five-year basis to finance the purchase of agricultural equipment. So far most of the equipment has been bought privately and for cash. [452]

The first few years have been difficult for the tractor farmers because of the lack of trained operators and the lack of adequate repair facilities, especially spare parts. Now the large manufacturers' agents are establishing modern service stations, repair stations, and mobile repair units. Consideration is even being given to organizing operator training programs.

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

All of the agricultural missions stress the need for improvement in basic research and educational programs. The United States-Syria Agricultural Mission has outlined a complete program for agricultural training, research, and extension. Some of the recommendations already have been adopted, such as the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 654

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654 training schools have been placed under the department and their budget increased some four to five times. Staffs of the research institutions have been expanded and the over-all program coordinated. It should be emphasized that these programs still are in the early stages of development.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

648 Syria is not eligible for Mutual Security aid and so far has not seen fit
242 to accept Point Four assistance. The United Nations, being international in character, is permitted to operate, and the Food and Agriculture Organization has a fairly large staff and an extensive program concentrated in the fields of cotton, home economics, veterinary science, farm machinery maintenance, and forestry. An FAO pathologist is working on problems of cotton diseases and insect controls.

A special FAO cotton mission, under the direction of an outstanding cotton technician, Dr. M. A. El Kilany Bey, former Under Secretary of State of the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture, last year made a detailed study of cotton production and marketing problems and submitted a list of specific recommendations to the government. The recommendations called for rigid controls over production by areas; sterilization and controlled distribution of planting seed; an improved insect control program, including mandatory use of insecticides and destruction of stalks; tighter control over ginning and distribution of the products; and improved classification. Most of these recommendations have been adopted.

One of the most effective foreign organizations working in the country is the Near East Foundation, a small philanthropic agency with headquarters

Roller gins like these in Aleppo, Syria, are rapidly being replaced by the faster and more efficient saw gins. However, total capacity of all roller gins in Syria is still double that of the saw gins.

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COTTON IN SYRIA

production, conserve water, concentrate cotton so as to facilitate insect control, and protect the cotton industry against the high costs and low prices that might result from over-extension of production. Farmers are required also to receive licenses to plant cotton from the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cotton Board. 656 647 248

The only marketing regulations issued to date require that all bales show the name of the ginner, the identity, and especially the moisture content of the cotton, which cannot be more than 9 per cent. If false claims are made, the government can take 30 per cent of the cotton as a penalty. [442]

It is obvious that the enforcement of so many scientific regulations and controls over a large area is going to be difficult without a large force of trained technicians and police.

The Director General appreciates that without adequate trained personnel it is not possible to make the regulations completely effective overnight, but he hopes, through education, to obtain the compliance of the producers.

Ambitious research and education programs, another responsibility of the board, are still in the planning stage. [654]

PROSPECTS

It appears unlikely to expect any significant expansion in production in Syria until yields can be stabilized. A start has been made, but a more intensive research and education program is required on cultural practices (particularly irrigation practices), mechanization, and especially insect control, before much improvement can be expected. Such efforts naturally take considerable time, even when funds and technical assistance are available. Both money and know-how are limited in Syria. 248

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642 652 (2) The Chamber of Deputies shall elect the members of the Board of Auditors by an absolute majority of the Deputies present. If such a majority is not obtained, a relative majority shall be sufficient at the second ballot. The election shall be made from a list of candidates prepared by the office of the Chamber containing double the number of vacancies for the Board.

(3) This Board shall be attached directly to the Chamber of Deputies.

(4) The office of the Chamber of Deputies shall draft a bill determining the classification, prerogatives and immunities of the members of the Auditing Board as well as the method of auditing.

(5) The budget of the Board of Auditors shall be a part of the budget of the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 148. The Chamber of Deputies may charge the Auditing Board with any audit of or studies concerning receipts and expenditure or the administration of the budget.

Art. 149. Once or more each year, the Government shall submit to the Chamber of Deputies a report on the financial situation of the State.

Art. 150. The monetary system shall be regulated by a law.

Chapter VIII

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

642 654 Art. 151. The State shall supervise and organize the national economy in order to secure a high standard of living for the people by utilizing the land, promoting industry and trade and providing work for all citizens.

Art. 152. (1) There shall be established in the State a permanent Economic Council entrusted with the task of proposing economic plans and programs to develop the potentialities of the country in the various economic fields.

(2) The Council shall submit its reports and the results of its work to the Government and to the Chamber of Deputies.

(3) The number of the members of the Economic Council and the procedure for selecting them shall be determined by a law in such a way as to ensure the realization of its task.

Art. 153. Institutions enjoying financial and administrative inde-

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pendence may be created for the execution and administration of specific projects. This shall be in accordance with a law determining the number of the members of such institutions, the method of selecting them and supervising their work. 642 654

Art. 154. Funds which the Government may spend on irrigation and land development projects shall be repaid by those who benefit from them in such periods of time proportional to their financial ability as shall be defined by law.

Chapter IX

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Art. 155. (1) The President of the Republic, with the assent of the Council of Ministers, as well as the Deputies may request the amendment of one or more of the Articles of the Constitution provided: 642

(a) The request for amendment shall specify the Articles which it is desired to amend and the reasons for such amendment.

(b) If the request is submitted by Deputies, one-third or more of their total number must sign the application.

(c) The Chamber shall discuss the request for amendment which shall be adopted only when an absolute majority of the total number of Deputies vote in its favor. If rejected, such a rejection shall be considered final. A request to amend the same Articles again may not be presented within one year.

(d) If an absolute majority of the total number of Deputies approve of the request for amendment, such an approval shall be considered as a motion for amendment.

(e) Six months after the adoption of a motion of amendment, the Chamber of Deputies shall discuss the amendment proposed. The amendment shall be adopted and become effective if two-thirds of the total number of Deputies vote for it.

(2) The Deputies shall take a new oath of allegiance to the amended Constitution within two weeks of its adoption.

Chapter X

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Art. 156. This Constitution shall not be amended before two years of its execution.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[611] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
361 Within recent years attempts have been
166 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

bul to Baghdad. A railroad also runs from Beirut to Damascus via Rayak. A second line from Damascus to Amman and Ma'an, in Jordan, forms part of the so-called "pilgrim" railway, opened in 1904-06. Air services are available from Damascus and, to a lesser extent, from Aleppo to Beirut and Baghdad, thence to Europe, Africa and the Far East. 496 509

Food and Nutrition

The nutritional standards of the people vary markedly in different regions, being highest in the vicinity of Damascus and lowest among the Alawites of Latakia province and the peasants of Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Undernutrition is common, but generally it is more widespread in the rural villages than in the urban areas. Due to the lack of adequate storage and transportation facilities, local food shortages are frequent, particularly during poor crop years. Up to the present, there has been little organized effort to promote better nutrition among the different population groups. It is expected that such a program will be initiated by the nutrition division created within the governmental health services in 1952. 146 369 [262] 146 654

Cereals constitute the staple foods, and, with certain root vegetables, contribute 70 to 80 per cent of the caloric content of the average diet. Breads prepared from wheat flour are consumed in all parts of the country. Barley is sometimes employed, while maize and sorghum millet are used in the southeast. Rice is universally popular: it is grown in the Al Jazira region, and large amounts are also imported. Broad beans, chick-peas and lentils are basic food items in most areas. Other vegetables, including onions, potatoes, beets, tomatoes, eggplant and the leafy spinach and French lettuce, are abundant in Damascus and Al Jazira provinces, but scarce in Hauran and Jebel ed Druz. Numerous fruits are consumed in season, but the supply is scanty in the Euphrates valley and in the southern provinces. Olives and olive oil are important among most population groups. Milk is 262

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The extension of cereal and cotton cultivation has been carried out by private enterprise. Most of the initial capital was provided by landlords, but merchants and banks soon started financing the crops; in 1951 it was estimated that some £S 200 million to £S 300 million had been required to finance the planting and moving of the cotton crop, of which all but £S 50 million came from outside agriculture. In recent years, the volume of advances granted and bills discounted by the principal banks rose by about £S 50 million between the seasonal low of July or August and the peak of the cotton season, in November. But the bulk of the capital needs are still supplied by non-banking sources. Private initiative also set up the 31 saw gins and 1,767 smaller gins which were operating in 1952 and which can handle about 300,000 tons of unginned cotton. It has been responsible for the introduction of the various types of American cotton seeds, of which the most widely used is the Lone Star variety, which produces cotton very similar to Egyptian Ashmuni. Private enterprise also took the lead in utilizing chemical fertilizers, imports of which increased from a negligible amount in 1950 to 5,000 tons in 1952, 11,000 in 1953 and 13,000 tons in the first nine months of 1954.

Another field in which private initiative has taken the lead is that of beet growing. The sugar refining company extended advances to growers, supplied them with free seeds and instruction, sold them fertilizers and offered them high prices for their output. By 1953, as a result, 4,500 hectares had been planted to beets, giving a crop of 60,000 tons; 1/ a crop of 80,000 tons was anticipated for 1954. 2/

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The Government has rendered valuable assistance to agriculture, especially to cotton growers. Following the very poor crop of 1951, when over-extension and pests combined to reduce cotton yields sharply, a Cotton Office was established in January 1952. On its staff it had Egyptian experts recruited directly by the Government or sent by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Several decree laws of 1952 fixed cotton acreage and subjected its cultivation to Government authorization; they limited the number of authorized varieties to six and forbade the mixing of varieties; regulated ginning, in order to disinfect, select and classify seeds; made obligatory the spraying of cotton plants with pesticides, which in case of negligence is to be carried out by the Government at the farmer's expense; set minimum standards and established grades for the classification of cotton. 3/ In 1953, the Government forbade the use of seeds not

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1/ Average yield of irrigated land is two to three tons per hectare, and of non-irrigated, 0.5 to 0.75.

2/ Information supplied by Ministry of National Economy. Output of fruits and vegetables has also increased in recent years, but little progress has been made in livestock breeding. An estimate of agricultural income in 1953 put the value of the wheat crop at £S 305 million (a figure based on an estimated production of 1,355,000 tons against a final estimate of 870,000 tons); of barley at £S 7 million; of cotton at £S 121 million; and of other crops at £S 200 million, giving a total of £S 633 million. Livestock and livestock products were put at £S 240 million (La Syrie économique, 1953).

3/ Etude spéciale sur le coton syrien.

purchased from the Agricultural Bank. There is no doubt that these measures have helped to raise cotton yields and quality. 654 241

Some help has also been given to growers of cereals, by the importing and sale at half price of seed wheat from France and Italy; 1,300 tons were imported in 1953. The Government has set up five experiment stations, for fruits, cereals and cotton, has expanded agricultural education and has begun extension work among farmers.

The Government has also helped growers financially, by purchasing spraying equipment and pesticides, reselling them to farmers and advancing loans for the purchase of pesticides. The capital of the Agricultural Bank was raised from £S 5.8 million in 1940 to £S 7.2 million in 1945, and £S 21.6 million in 1953. Loans advanced by it increased from £S 268,000 in 1940 to £S 1.6 million in 1945, and £S 12.5 million in 1953. In 1953, the number of borrowers was 20,300 and the recovery rate was 93 per cent. The bank also made loans in kind - cotton and rice seeds, spraying equipment, pesticides, tractors, ploughs and pumps. 1/

On the other hand, some government measures concerning marketing and exports have had adverse effects on growers. The Cereals Office's attempt to collect grain for the use of the urban population, at below market prices during the winter of 1951/52, following a very poor crop, led to hoarding, and wheat had to be imported at high prices. In 1952, the Government ordered growers to deliver to the Cereals Office one ton of wheat, at £S 250, for every two tons exported; this led to a rise in the export price to above the world level, hampering exports. In 1953, this arrangement was replaced by a lower export tax on wheat and barley. It would appear that these taxes were borne by growers, not by merchants or foreign consumers, and hence that they constituted a subsidy from rural areas to the towns. With the fall in world prices of wheat, the Government abolished the taxes in May 1954. Similarly, it would seem as though the tax on cotton exports introduced in 1952 has been shifted to growers. 656

Industry

The rapid post-war industrial growth was chiefly due to private initiative but much government protection and some financial assistance were required by several industries. Most of the new capital was provided by merchants, but there was also an appreciable amount of reinvestment of industrial profits. 433 472

1/ Statistical Abstract and La Syrie économique, 1953. In 1953, the bank was authorised to make loans against warehouse receipts issued by the Cereals Office for barley and wheat delivered to it. A rate of 6 per cent is charged on these and all other loans.

311 by planting forage crops, and by increasing the use of fertilizers and improved seeds. 1/ The Government is planning to increase its distribution of selected wheat and other seeds, to expand its agricultural schools and its student missions to foreign universities, and to intensify the activity of its experimental stations and its extension services.

*654 Among the obstacles to expansion of output are high production costs,
241 owing to shortage of labour in certain areas and to high fuel prices and maintenance charges for machinery, and also high transport costs. 2/ Various measures are being taken to improve communications, provide storage and reduce the purchase and operating costs of agricultural machinery. 3/

241 Another great obstacle to agricultural development is the system of land
423 tenure. In 1947 it was officially estimated that of 6.1 million hectares of privately owned land, 38 per cent was in holdings of over 100 hectares, 43 per cent in holdings of 10 to 99 hectares and 19 per cent in holdings of under 10 hectares. 4/ The greater part of large holdings is rented on short leases to sharecroppers, whose poverty and insecurity make it difficult for them to improve methods and increase output. The Government is preparing a law regulating relations between landlords and tenants and between farmers and labourers. 5/ In 1952 and 1953 decrees were passed regarding the distribution of lands in the State domain to cultivators with small farms and the expropriation of occupied areas on such land in excess of a certain figure. 6/ This land was to be available for cultivation by farmers, in lots of 10 hectares of irrigated or 50 hectares of non-irrigated land, on very generous terms. A start has been made in distributing land in El Jezira to landless farmers and nomads; by March 1954 some 25,000 hectares had been distributed.

1/ It is estimated that the yield of wheat could be fairly easily raised by 60 to 70 per cent and that of barley by 50 to 60 per cent. The discrepancy between the average yield of olives, 20 kilogrammes per tree, and that of high yielding trees, 50 to 60 kilogrammes, also points to possibilities in that field; it is, moreover, believed that the average oil content of olives could be raised from 11.5 per cent to 15 per cent (unpublished study by the Ministry of National Economy).

2/ In 1953, transport costs of a ton of barley from El Jezira to Latakia were £S 50, a figure equal to the cost of production. High transport costs also greatly raise the price of petroleum products used in agriculture.

3/ Ministry of Agriculture, "A Report on the Development of Agricultural Production and Marketing in Syria" (mimeographed document, Damascus, 1954).

4/ By the end of 1954 half the area of Syria had been surveyed; the corresponding figures within that area were 49 per cent, 38 per cent and 13 per cent. Conditions vary greatly: in Damascus, Latakia, Jebal Druze and Hauran provinces, small and medium properties prevail; in the Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Jezira and Euphrates provinces large properties and State domain account for the greater part of the land.

5/ Ministry of Agriculture, op cit.

6/ This was fixed, in the 1952 decree, at 150 hectares in the Jezira, Euphrates and desert areas and 50 hectares in other parts of Syria. In 1953 the limit was raised to 200 hectares, irrespective of location.

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Sugar Beet[14]

Sugar beet, though introduced only recently, is becoming an increasingly important crop. The sugar factory established in Homs has brought in seed from the Netherlands and Germany and distributed it to farmers. The reclamation and irrigation of the Roudj and the Ghab will undoubtedly give a great fillip to sugar beet cultivation and raise average yields, for beets do best on irrigated land. At present yields are still disappointingly low compared to those achieved in Western Europe and the United States. The mission suggests that efforts be particularly devoted to selecting a series of varieties with a wide range in maturity, so that the operating season at the Homs factory can be considerably prolonged. In the Euphrates and Khabour river valleys there are areas suitable for beet cultivation which can obviously not be served by the Homs plant. Ultimately the establishment of additional factories in these areas may prove worthwhile. Although the cost of producing beet sugar in Syria is undoubtedly higher than the cost of importing raw sugar (which is principally if not wholly cane sugar), the cultivation of beets has beneficial effects on the soil which appear to warrant its encouragement.

Tobacco

Tobacco is a minor crop, though important as a source of government revenue and of farm income in the province of Latakia, where it is predominantly grown. It is one of the crops, however, which is most in need of improvement. Seed selection, curing and grading all leave much to be desired. The entire plant, rather than selected leaves, is often harvested at one time. The Tobacco Monopoly, which licenses the growers, has paid little attention to the improvement of methods. The mission suggests that the Monopoly devote an additional sum of at least £S 75,000 annually to this purpose. At present three varieties of tobacco are grown: Abou Riha, the so-called "Latakia tobacco," which is bought almost entirely by a single American cigarette manufacturer for blending; Chek-el-Bint, used in the manufacture of Syrian cigarettes; and Tombac, produced for water-pipe smoking. In view of the rather uncertain market for Abou Riha, it would appear wise to develop the production of high-aromatic tobacco of the Turkish or Macedonian type for which a more durable market seems

[14] See Annex C, p. 308.

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377 and administrative supervision of public utilities. Supervision ought to be
447 concentrated primarily on the utilities of the small towns and villages which are often substandard in their equipment and operation and are most in need of technical guidance in standardizing and improving their equipment. In addition to discharging its supervisory functions, the directorate should work out long-range plans, including a properly phased plan for the establishment of a power network which would be helpful in determining the location and size of power plants to be established in the future.

Electricity Rates[25]

365 As power production increases, there will no doubt be considerable
435 pressure to lower the rates now charged for electricity. The mission
655 encountered much complaint about their present level and structure. The rates charged for lighting in the principal cities do not, however, appear excessive by comparison with other countries. Electricity prices in the small towns and villages, on the other hand, are very high, but the generation of electricity by small diesel units and exclusively for lighting is inevitably rather expensive. The rates charged for electricity used as power are definitely higher than in many other countries. In Syria the power rates are often compared unfavorably with those in Lebanon in particular.

Nevertheless, the mission strongly advises against a general reduction of electricity rates over the next five or six years. An adequate supply of electricity is more important at this time than lower prices for electricity. The profits of the public utilities must be safeguarded so that the needed expansion program can be financed from their own resources. This is particularly true of the nationalized utilities of Damascus and Aleppo which have been earning considerable profits. With the anticipated increase in power generation and some reduction in costs of production, the mission anticipates that the net operating income of these utilities exclusive of depreciation allowances may reach a total of £S 60 million over the six-year period 1955-60. Most of this sum will be needed to finance expansion and pay the indemnities for nationalization. In this way the government will be able to conserve the resources derived from taxation and to borrow for other urgent requirements.

[25] See Annex G, p. 422.

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489 modest quantities of goods between Beirut and Baghdad. Above all, most of the foreign trade of Jordan flows through Syria to and from Beirut.

1 EXISTING TRANSPORT FACILITIES

A brief inventory of the principal transport facilities is an essential preliminary to a discussion of the problems and methods of coping with them.

496 *The Railways*[26]

Three railways operate in Syria—the Northern Railway, the Hedjaz Railway and the DHP (Chemin de Fer Damas, Hama et Prolongements).

The Northern Railway is the Syrian section of that international railway which achieved fame as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Coming from Baghdad and Mosul in Iraq, it traverses a portion of northeastern Syria from Tell Kotchek to Kamichliye, then enters Turkey, proceeding just along the boundary until it turns south to Aleppo and finally once again north to Turkey where one branch runs to the port of Iskenderun and the other to Istanbul. The Syrian sections are owned by the government and managed by a Director of Railways and Council Administration under the Ministry of Public Works. Out of approximately 400,000 tons of cargo carried in 1952, the Northern Railway transported about 101,000 tons for Iraq, mostly in transit, and some 106,000 tons, principally grain and coal, in transit for Turkey. Although the traffic is modest, the development of agricultural production in the Syrian Jezireh and the adjoining portions of Turkey have been instrumental in raising it from about 22 million ton-kilometers in 1938 to 55 million in 1953.

The Northern Railway links at Aleppo with the DHP, operated by a private French company under an 1893 concession and serving both Syria and Lebanon. The DHP system consists of both narrow- and standard-gauge lines. The most important standard-gauge line runs from Aleppo via Hama and Homs to the Lebanese port of Tripoli and thence along the Lebanese coast. Aside from agricultural commodities produced in the Homs-Hama region, it carries the bulk of transit traffic to and from Iraq coming over the Northern Railway. It also carries Syrian cereals and

[26] See Annex H, p. 425.

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446 Syrian government has been sharing the deficit of the DHP Railway with the Lebanese government on a fifty-fifty basis and also defraying the losses of the Hedjaz and Northern Railways. Government outlays on this account have been rising—from an average of £S 641,000 in 1950-52 to an estimated £S 750,000 in 1953 and £S 1.209 million in 1954. Unfortunately a further substantial increase must be anticipated. The Turkish government is expected to complete in 1955 or 1956 a railway shortcut which will make it unnecessary for export grain produced in southern Turkey, as well as other commodities, to transit through Syria on the way to Iskenderun. This will probably mean an annual loss in gross revenues of a little over £S 2 million for the Northern Railway. Even though the loss may be partially offset by a decline in operating expenses and it may prove feasible to recoup some revenue by increasing freight rates for Syrian goods, it is probable that the government will have to meet an additional deficit of at least £S 1 million a year.

Besides these operating subventions to the railways, the government will apparently be spending some £S 5 million for the acquisition of the Syrian portions of the DHP network. Negotiations for the purchase of these lines and a corresponding amount of rolling stock have been in [455] progress for some time and will probably be completed before long. They were dictated partly by the government's desire to own all the railways on Syrian soil and partly by its belief that Syrian operation would result in economies, particularly by reduction of overhead expenses. The latter objective may well be realized for the standard-gauge lines which are to be incorporated into the Northern Railway. It is more doubtful that significant economies will be achieved by taking over the Syrian portion of the narrow-gauge Damascus-Beirut line, which should logically be turned over to the Hedjaz Railway for operation.

In view of the rather low volume of traffic and the deficit character of the railway operation, the mission has considered whether it would not be advisable to abandon certain railway lines, particularly the Beirut-Damascus and Hedjaz Railways. For a number of reasons we have concluded that such a course would be unwise. Abandonment of the Beirut-Damascus line would increase by about 5-10% truck traffic on the parallel road, which is already becoming overburdened. Local passenger traffic would also have to be transferred to the road. It has already been pointed out that the two lines mentioned serve primarily as a transit artery for Jordan; their closing might therefore seriously affect the Jordanian econ-

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the port has been increasing rapidly. To some extent this has been promoted by government regulations which direct certain classes of imports and exports via Latakia. It should be noted, however, that these have not seriously interfered with the traditional traffic between Beirut and Damascus and southern Syria. For the most part they buttress a traffic flow which would in any event tend via Latakia as the natural port for northern Syria. At present cargo must still be lightered but, considering this circumstance, cargo handling is fairly rapid. The port company appears to be well managed and in recent years has earned, on its paid-in capital, a modest profit which rose to over 5% in 1953. With the completion of the port, it should prove possible to reduce handling costs substantially. 504

IV CIVIL AVIATION

Supplementing rail and road transport, there is a domestic air service linking Damascus with Aleppo, Kamichliye and Latakia. It is operated with a DC-3 by the Syrian Airways, an autonomous government enterprise dependent on the Ministry of Finance. The financial results of this operation have not been divulged publicly, but it is evidently not self-supporting. The government regards it primarily as a promotional venture and the tariffs are correspondingly low. It must be recognized that occasional rapid air communication between the principal cities is desirable, and the mission accordingly anticipates that a new twin-motor plane, costing perhaps £S 600,000 may soon be needed to maintain this service. 509 655

Damascus is the country's principal airport and is served by a number of international airlines. Considerable amounts have been spent on the improvement and equipment of this airport which has been given a Class B designation by the ICAO. Of the £S 1.075 million provided in the 1954 budget for airport construction, equipment and maintenance, over 70% was destined for Damascus. In view of the many more urgent tasks confronting the government, we see no justification for the proposal to construct an entirely new airport for Damascus. By continuing about the same level of expenditures in the future as in recent years, the government should be able to make the requisite improvements in existing airports, which include, besides Damascus, a Class C airport at Aleppo, a Class G airfield at Kamichliye and an airport as yet unclassified at Deir ez Zor. 508

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v MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT

365 655 Brief mention should be made of the urban transport services in Damascus and Aleppo. In Damascus the tramways are operated by a company nationalized in 1951, whose principal business is the generation and distribution of electric power. The tram service, plagued by low fares and relatively high operating costs, has been running heavy deficits and steadily losing ground to buses, which are operated on a coordinated basis by a large number of owners who pool their receipts for the purpose of meeting certain common expenses. For this reason the company has advanced proposals to buy out the private buses at a cost of about £S 2 million and gradually to substitute new buses at an additional cost of £S 2 million. The mission, however, strongly advises against the use of basically public funds for this purpose, since the buses now appear to be efficiently operated by private enterprise.

In Aleppo the power company, likewise nationalized in 1951, has a monopoly on the operation of both buses and trams. In contrast to the Damascus company, however, it is operating both these services at a modest profit while maintaining moderate fares.

206 VI TELECOMMUNICATIONS

It is, of course, important that not only transport but also communications facilities expand with a growing economy. In Syria a program for the improvement of telecommunications has long been under way. During the eight-year period 1946-1953, almost £S 31 million was invested in telecommunications, particularly in the expansion of the telephone network and the installation of automatic telephones. In fact, the amount invested for this purpose might be said to be disproportionate to most other fields of public investment. The results, however, have been conspicuous. The number of telephone subscribers has risen from 9,000 in 1949 to 21,218 in 1953, the number of telephone offices from 100 to 132, and the number of telephone circuits from 161 to 379. The Syrian telephone system is now substantially better than that of most neighboring countries.

The postal, telegraph and telephone administration plans to spend a sum of £S 14.317 million over the next five years on the further improvement of telecommunications. The mission had no one of special compe-

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295 Damascus to manufacture rubber boots, canvas and rubber shoes, and felt and rubber shoes by the hot molding process, using imported crude rubber, imported and local waste rubber and canvas, and locally made felt. Production is said to be about 300,000 pairs per year and about 200 workers are employed. Other factories in Damascus and Aleppo produce rubber soles and heels. About 1,600 tons of rubber and rubber waste were imported in 1953, but it is not known how much was used in the boots and shoes industry in addition to local scrap rubber. The importation of boots and shoes is prohibited.

Matches

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372 Syria's first match factory started production in Damascus in 1930. By 1952, six more had been built. Damascus has the three largest, Aleppo the other four. Supplies are drawn mostly from local timber, though some additional wood, as well as chemicals, is imported.

An improved layout of machines and the introduction of small conveyors would increase efficiency and assist in lowering costs.

Together the factories employ about 350 whole or part time workers. The three Damascus factories produced about 25.6 million boxes in 1952 and 32.2 million in 1953. Production figures for the Aleppo factories are not available. The importation of matches is prohibited.

Tobacco

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655 A number of enterprises grade and prepare tobacco for export, but the manufacture and importation of cigarettes and tobacco has, since 1951, been confined to the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration.

The monopoly operates a cigarette factory in Damascus and one in Aleppo, and a factory in Latakia which manufactures and packs tobacco for retail sale. The tobacco for manufacture is partly Syrian (from the Latakia region) and partly imported. Cigarettes, tobacco and cigars are also imported from Europe and the United States.

The Damascus branch is in a new factory where tobacco is sorted, damped, stripped by hand only, and cut. The cigarettes are made on a number of old German machines and a few new American ones.

The tobacco monopoly employs 2,300 workers; total production of all three factories amounted to 2.7 million kg. in 1953.

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377 Table 4 shows actual increases for the years 1947-52 and 1947-53.

It should be noted that consumption of electricity for lighting has risen more rapidly than that for power. Owing to this factor and the installation of additional equipment, the peak load has risen and the load factor has declined. This is particularly true of the small towns and villages where electricity is consumed almost exclusively for lighting.

TABLE 4 Increases in Power Consumption

(Percent)

	1947 to 1952		1947 to 1953	
	Total	Yearly average	Total	Yearly average
Light	147.3	19.9	190.9	19.5
Power	105.5	15.5	138.1	15.5
Losses and miscellaneous	95.2	14.3	120.5	14.1
Total	110.0	16.0	140.9	15.7

377 655 *Investment in Public Utilities*

No accurate data are available on the sources of financing during the period 1946-54, but it seems that before the Nationalization Law of 1951 the large power companies financed their development projects from their own resources and with foreign capital, whereas the government helped the smaller municipalities and villages with loans. Since 1950 progress has depended exclusively on government financing and the current revenues and accumulated resources of the power companies, but it is difficult to trace in the total loans to municipalities those amounts actually used for power development. The list of loans made by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban with the authorization of the government during the last five years includes a specific loan of £S 10 million allocated to public utilities, and the financial statements of the Damascus and Aleppo public utilities each mention loans to £S 7 million, although in the latter case the loan was for all four of the utilities' operating branches—electric power, water supply, streetcars and buses.

Moreover, although in addition to the equipment purchased abroad, a

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quantity of used and army surplus equipment was utilized in the smaller towns and villages, complete records of these operations are not available. 377 655

The best assessment the mission can make of power investment in Syria is to start with the conservative cost estimate of £S 450 per KVA for diesel-driven sets, and £S 7.5 million for the only steam plant in Syria with transmission lines and transformer stations. On this basis the cost of the 46,000 KVA of the former and 12,500 KVA of the latter, added to £S 1 million for the Amir Ghajar hydro turbine generators and £S 2 million for development of the networks, give a figure of about £S 25 million. This should, however, be taken as an indication of the order of magnitude rather than as an approximation of actual investment.

II INDUSTRIAL POWER 377

A statement of present and expected power consumption in the leading Syrian industries is necessary for an assessment of the anticipated power requirements of the country as a whole. The factories discussed below rely mainly upon their private power supplies, a situation which is likely to change somewhat as additional public utility projects are completed.

Cement

The two cement factories at Damascus and Aleppo are among the most important industrial power consumers. In 1953 their output was 171,000 and 72,000 tons, respectively; it is expected that output will rise to 253,000 and 150,000 tons by 1955. At an average consumption rate of 90 KWH per ton, this total of 403,000 tons would require about 36 million KWH. 377 339

To meet the 1953 demand for about 22 million KWH the two factories had plants of 4,600 and 3,000 KW capacity, respectively. The Damascus factory, unlike that in Aleppo, is connected with the public utilities network, thus permitting the future transfer of cheap hydroelectric power from the projected Barada plant. The Aleppo plant may insure itself against a breakdown of its own equipment through a link with the steam plant now under construction, but as soon as cheap hydro power becomes available from the Youssef Pasha project, it can be assumed that the factory will turn to the public utilities network for at least part of its power requirements.

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433 No over-all figures on the increase of capital, output or employment are available, but the following data are indicative. Between 1945 and 1953, 472 inclusive, a total of £S 70.7 million was invested in thirty-seven industrial joint-stock companies; of this £S 53.1 million was invested in 1945 and 1946. 1/ 454 A considerable amount was also invested in unincorporated enterprises. Sales of electricity to industry increased from 15 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 28 million in 1951, 36 million in 1953 and 19 million during the first half of 1954. Imports of industrial machinery and equipment amounted to 9,100 tons in 1950, 19,500 in 1951, 10,800 in 1952 and 12,000 tons in 1953, with an aggregate value of £S 200 million. 2/ Table 51 shows available information on the principal Syrian industries.

433 The textile industry is by far the most important, as regards capital invested, employment and value of output. The rapid expansion of cotton growing 288 led to an increase in the number of cotton ginneries, from thirty in 1945 to 110 in 1953. Cotton spinning began in 1933; by 1939 there were 10,000 spindles and by 1954 some 92,000 with a capacity of 12,000 tons of cotton and rayon yarn. Output of cotton yarn rose from 1,700 tons in 1944 to 5,500 in 1950 and 6,600 tons in 1953; that of rayon yarn from 800 in 1950 to 1,200 in 1953; there was a further increase in 1954. Small factories also produce 40 tons of woollen yarn and 16 tons of silk yarn. Mechanical looms increased from 1,500 in 1939 to 5,500 in 1953; there are also 6,000 hand looms. Output of cloth, knitted goods and hosiery is shown in table 51. Dyeing and printing are done in well equipped factories established after the Second World War. The textile industry meets local requirements in most branches and provides an export surplus.

433 Food processing industries form the next most important group. A large-scale sugar refinery started production in 1950, on imported raw sugar; its output rose 258 to 30,000 tons in 1953, of which 23,000 were from imported raw sugar and 7,000 from locally grown beets; output in 1954 was about 38,000 tons. It also produces 1,000 tons of alcohol and some starch glucose as a by-product. The refinery, which fully meets Syria's demand, has not yet reached its full capacity. The vegetable oil industry produces, by means of modern presses established after the war as well as older hand presses, some 7,000 to 12,000 tons of olive oil, about 6,000 to 8,000 tons of cotton-seed oil and some 2,000 to 4,000 tons of other oils. Other important food and beverage industries include the making of biscuits 655 and macaroni, oleomargarine, confectionery and chocolate, and also brewing and canning. The tobacco industry is a State monopoly. 3/

1/ Of the total, £S 23 million was accounted for by six textile companies, 13.4 million by four food processing companies, 10.5 million by three vegetable oil and soap companies, 9.0 million by a cement and building materials company, 8.0 million by a glass and porcelain company, 3.3 million by seventeen electric power companies and 3.5 million by five other companies.

2/ Data from Ministry of National Economy.

3/ The Government took over the tobacco monopoly from a concessionary company in 1951, paying £S 2.5 million as compensation.

ries separated in 1950, and, in consequence, Syria regained free- 651
dom of action in directing her customs and economic policies and 648
in managing her economy on an independent basis.

11. The new Syrian government also had to face serious internal problems, that the Mandatory power with its "Laissez-faire" policy had not attempted to deal with. No factual study of the country was made nor any determined course of economic action undertaken. The following are the most serious of the defects of the economic system at that time :

First there was a lack of statistics and detailed studies upon 659
which to base a sound economic policy. Nor were there any technical and scientific studies of the country's economic resources, or plans for developing and exploiting them. Secondly, the bank- 453
ing system failed in meeting the country's need for agricultural 652
credit and for medium and long term credit. The majority of the banks were branches of foreign banks that specialized in commercial short-term credit operations, and which, with the exception of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, avoided seasonal agricultural lending. All the banks operated without any control or direction. Furthermore, no bank had up to that date been established to deal with industrial or mortgage credit. There was only the Agricultural Bank, established by the government to deal with medium-term agricultural loans, but its regulations, staffing and limited means did not enable it to play a major role in meeting the needs of agriculture. Thirdly there was no money market that 454
could attract national savings and invest them in development projects. People with savings have always preferred to hoard them in the form of gold, or else they invested them in real estate. In addition, foreign capital avoided entry into the country because of restrictions on exchange, and other reasons.

12. During the period 1945 to 1953 the government made a 656
great effort to regulate the Syrian economy in the fields of trade,[1]

1 Legislative Decree No. 14 of December 18, 1951 and its amendments concern the regulation of the possession of, and trade in, raw materials and products. Legislative Decree No. 151, of March 3, 1952 and its amendments concern company law and the law governing firms established outside Syria. Legislative Decree No. 60, of January 13, 1952 and its amendments regulate foreign trade etc.

656 industry,[1] and agriculture,[2] and to establish stable principles of economic policy.[3]

647 To remedy the above mentioned defects and to fill the gaps in the country's economic structure the government established a Directorate of Statistics[4] and directed its attention to the preparation of scientific and technical studies of the country's resour-
652 ces.[5] Finally, the government reformed the country's banking and
453 monetary systems by creating, in accordance with the Basic Monetary Law,[6] the Money and Credit Council with the function of exercising monetary control ; it laid down new monetary regulations inspired by the needs of the country and regulated the operations of bankers and money-changers. Reform included also the expansion of the Agricultural Bank's capital, the strengthening of its financial means and the extension of its operations to meet seasonal credit needs.[7] The question of medium and long-term credit remains however still unsolved.

433 13. To complete this brief survey of Syria's economic position in 1945, when the new national government came to power, it is necessary to give some account of general economic conditions.

1 Legislative Decree No. 47, of August 7, 1952 and amendments regulating Syrian industry.
Legislative Decree No. 138, of November 6, 1952 regulating industrial, commercial and free professions.
Legislative Decree No. 103, of September 27, 1952 relating to the encouragement of industry.

2 Legislative Decree No. 135, of October 29, 1952 and Regulatory Decree No. 768 of November 3, 1952 concerning the distribution of state lands.
Legislative Decrees No. 50, 51 and 52 dated January 9, 1952 and No. 81, 82 and 83 dated January 23, 1952 and No. 125 and 126, dated January 20, 1952 relating to the planting and export of cotton ; Legislative Decrees No. 27, 80 and 106 of 1952 concerning the sale of Agricultural machinery and the combatting of agricultural pests and insects etc.

3 *Vide Syrian Economy 1953* - Government Press, Damascus.

4 Legislative Decrees No. 130 and 35 dated June 11, 1949.

5 Report by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, 1947 ; studies of irrigation projects, the Ghab project, Lattakia port project and the Aleppo water scheme ; Mission of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

6 Legislative Decree No. 87, of March 28, 1953.

7 Law 77, dated June 28, 1951 which provides for the addition of LS 10 million to the capital of the Agricultural Bank ; Law 126 which grants LS 5.5 million to farmers affected by losses ; Legislative Decree No. 9 amending the Agricultural Bank Law ; and Legislative Decree No. 97 which empowers the Agricultural Bank to extend seasonal loans etc.

165 654 strains or to cultivate them in the Government stations in Syria.

435 651 185 654 3. The price of fuel is a major obstacle to agriculture and to the possibility of competing on the world market. While the price of a ton of mazut in the Euphrates area in Iraq is LS 21 its price in Kamishli is LS 175, i.e., more than eight times as much. The same is true to a lesser degree of the price of gasoline and kerosene due to excessive Government taxation. The Government used to refund to farmers a part of the taxes on gasoline and kerosene used in agricultural machinery, but it has recently abolished even this meager help.

407 435 4. The sale of agricultural machinery and especially of its spare parts needs supervision. Agents deliberately create scarcities during the period of greatest need so as to get the highest prices possible.

435 489 5. The system of transport from the combine to the stations needs complete revision. At the present time, farmers are obliged to use jute bags on the combines to fill with wheat. The bag is bought for LS 2 but is sold as wheat in Aleppo. Since the bag weighs 1.25 kilograms and the price of a kilogram of wheat is 26 piasters, the farmer gets less than 30 piasters for every 200 he invests in a bag. This means a loss of LS 14 per ton, without counting all the extra expense of handling on the combine, then on to the truck, then to the railway station, then on the railway and, lastly, discharging at Aleppo Station, then transporting by truck to the merchant's store. All this handling, necessitated by the use of jute bags is paid by the farmer to the amount of LS 4 per ton. Added to the loss on the bag it makes a total loss of LS 15. All this could be saved if transport could be so organized as to eliminate the need for jute bags.

435 656 6. The fluctuation and uncertainty of prices is a major obstacle to the continued progress of agriculture in Jazirah. The farmer who plants his seeds in October does not know whether he will sell his crop in July for ten piasters a kilo or for thirty. He lacks information on world prices and merchants take advantage of that and of the fact that he is constantly in need of money to buy a major share of the crop at low prices. But even if the farmer were informed about world markets, Government regulations constantly hamper the free opera-

operation of world trade in a way that has always worked to the detriment of the farmer. The Government has adopted and persists in the view that the farmers as a class are alone responsible for feeding the town population at reduced prices. The Government and its organizations like the O. C. P. and later the Mira have always forced the farmers to hand over large quantities of wheat at prices below the market level. Even the present Grains Office is doing the same thing in a different way. It stipulates that exporters of wheat should deliver to the Office half the quantity exported at 23 piasters per kilo in Aleppo, i. e., at a rate 25% cheaper than the market price. This reflects in the end on the price paid by the merchant to the farmer. This unjust imposition of the Office is in fact borne by the farmer and not by the merchant. If the Government feels its responsibility for the provision of enough wheat for the population at reduced prices, the burden should be shared by all tax-payers without distinction. The farmer should get the full market price and the deficit should be covered from the general tax receipts. This solution, while freeing the farmer from a chronic injustice, is not the answer to the price problems. Since the Grains Office has become a permanent institution, the farmer needs to know as far in advance as practicable what prices he is to expect for his crops. The major function of the Office should be not to devise means for collecting wheat from the farmer at reduced prices, nor to provide revenue for the Government by creating a monopoly of wheat export, but to stabilize prices and guard the farmer against sharp fluctuations from one year to another. This it must do by announcing its readiness to buy wheat at fixed prices for the next two crops, at least without claiming a monopoly. That is, the farmer should be guaranteed a minimum price for his next two crops and left to profit from free prices if the market situation allows it.

435 656 [647]

A concrete example of how Government policy is reducing the prices for the farmer, is the new decree authorizing the export of 200,000 tons of wheat against delivery of 100,000 tons to the Grains Office at LS 230 in Aleppo.

The exporter will proceed to do his account, in the following manner. The price paid by Italy is said to be $98 which amounts to LS 350. For three tons of wheat of which two are exported and one delivered to the Grains Office, the merchant will receive LS 930 or an average of LS 310 per ton. In order to make a profit of

435 15 percent he must buy his wheat at the port of export for LS 203-5.
656 This means about LS 252 at Aleppo for the farmer of Jazirah. And this is the price at which the market is stabilized at present, while if this imposition did not exist the farmer would have sold his wheat for LS 300-350.

648 7. The discussion of prices brings about a consideration of mar-
489 kets for the surplus Syrian wheat. During the French Mandate, and up to March 1949, Syria and Lebanon formed one economic unit. The first independent regime under Shukri Quwatly, which lasted until the first coup d'etat in 1949, preserved this unity though some friction did exist between the two Governments. President Quwatly was emphatic about the necessity of this union. Then politicians mentioned to him the alleged advantages which Lebanon had over Syria in the partnership, he invariably replied that the benefit from the partnership to the national Arab idea transcends in importance any material disadvantage resulting to Syria.

But aside from this political consideration, the union did present specific advantages to the Syrian farmer. Lebanon imports yearly about 80,000 tons of wheat. This is approximately one-third the quantity exported by Syria. Further, Lebanon had a customs duty of 50 per cent on foreign wheat other than Syrian. This meant that the Syrian farmer was assured a market for part of his crop at prices higher than world prices, besides selling Lebanon cheese, samneh, vegetables and fruit.

Whatever the economic advantages according to Syria in its new policy of separation from Lebanon, and they are highly doubtful, the Syrian farmer has lost a sure market.

In fact, the question of economic separation between Syria and Lebanon has never been examined as a purely economic propositon, but has always been mixed with considerations of national prestige and alleged Syrian economic subservience to Lebanon. This highly emotional language was designed to confuse the issue for the benefit of industrial groups, especially textile manufacturers who were crowded by Lebanese competition.

435 8. Another misconception shared by the Government and most
439 of the people is that Syrian prices of wheat should be governed by world prices. The fact is that Jazirah wheat can never normally

III. Lands With Title Cover Only 30% of Jazirah

It should not be understood from the above discussion that all the lands of Jazirah are occupied by persons having title to them. Perhaps as much as 70% of the lands are occupied by persons claiming ownership but having no legal title. And here resides the great problem of Jazirah which continues to retard its development and prosperity. 428 185

There is nothing that can stabilize conditions in an agricultural society, increase confidence, improve credit, diversify the types of cultivation, increase property values, and encourage the improvement of land by long-term projects of irrigation and farm construction, like a secure and stable system of land ownership.

It is the misfortune of Jazirah that successive Governments since Syrian independence have not only ignored this basic fact, but have done everything in their power to make the stabilization of the land problem in Jazirah more remote.

Before the beginning of 1952 land registration in Jazirah suffered from all the delays, expenses, corruption, and hindrances prevalent in other parts of Syria. Moreover, as a frontier zone, land registration was subject to an authorization by the Chief of State, and in the last three years registration of land acquired through cultivation for a period of ten years was stopped by decision of the Council of Ministers.

The governing idea behind all these restrictions is that individuals are usurping the public domain illegally. While this may be true in some cases, the measures taken to correct the situation are out of proportion to the problem at hand and are applied not only to usurpers out to land owners of good faith as well. The result is that three-quarters of the lands of Jazirah belonging mostly to peasants and medium owners are unregistered.

IV. Decree-law 96

Decree-law 96 starts with this idea of correcting the usurpations of the public domain, and adds to it the concept of social justice as exemplified by the policy of encouraging small land holdings and dividing the large estates. 428 185 656

A. Contradictory Policies of the Government

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The decree is interesting in its application to Jazirah and it seems that the Government there follows two contradictory policies diametrically opposed and antagonistic to each other. On the one hand, decree No. 510, dated March 23, 1950, and decree No. 80, dated January 23, 1952, facilitate the importation and distribution of powerful agricultural machinery among the farmers in general and those in particular of Jazirah. The use of agricultural machinery goes hand-in-hand with the extensive cultivation of large areas of land to make their employment economic. On the other hand, and surprisingly, only eight days after the promulgation of the decree for the distribution of agricultural machinery, decree-law 90 dated January 31, 1952, prevents the farmer from owning or renting (in its interpretative communique) more than 1500 dunums in Jazirah an acreage which does not lend itself to economic tractor cultivation.

The decree has been in operation now for seven months and its application should have vindicated the two principles on which it depends, viz 1 to correct the usurpations of the public domain, and to divide the big estates among the needy farmers.

Assuming that the policy of the State is to encourage small ownership of land to be tilled by the farmer using cows or mules, and that the importation of heavy agricultural machinery was a mistake not to be repeated, the logical procedure by the Government would have been to establish simplified processes and register in the name of peasants pieces of 1500 dunums each to which they have a right both in the old and the new law. The Government has had ample time during these eight months to enforce its own decree-law and register tens of thousands of 1500 dunum pieces and give their users legal title to them. Had the Government done that, it would have found the problem greatly simplified. The Kurdish and Bedouin family has in general three to four adult members working on the common land. According to decree 96, each member has a right to 1500 dunums. The Government would have to grant them extra land to reach its quota.

B. Size of Land Holdings in Jazirah

The point is that, had the Government proceeded in this manner, the practical result would have been the stabilization and legalization of the present small and medium ownership.

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This, according to the following table borrowed from Gib Report, page 20, would have legalized the situation in 57% of the Jazirah lands, leaving 9% as public domain, and only 34% not complying with the terms of the decree.

Small Holdings Less than 10 hectares	Medium Holdings 10-100 hectares	Large Holdings Over 100 hectares	State-Owned Lands
56,000	528,000	343,000	96,000
5%	52%	34%	9%

Instead, the Government's only contribution to the solution of the land problem was to prohibit entirely the registration of any land from January 1952 to the present time.

If the Gibb statistics are correct, and they are presumably taken from Government sources, the land reform in Jazirah contemplated by decree 96 concerns only 34% of the region's entire area.

In dealing with this portion of Jazirah, the Syrian Government has to decide on its agricultural policy. It must make up its mind whether it wants to divide the big estates, with or without compensation, and distribute them in small lots to farmer families using mules, thus increasing the population of Jazirah greatly, so that its production of wheat will not much exceed its local consumption, and depriving Syria of the income derived from its present yearly export. Alternatively it must decide that Syria wants to increase its exports of wheat by extending the use of agricultural machinery whose effective use requires holdings of more than 1,000 hectares.

Coming back to the discussion of the 34% of Jazirah lands in holdings of over 100 hectares, the Government should have proceeded immediately, after the promulgation of the law, to their surveying and delimitation to get a clear picture of the situation. Without venturing into exact statistics, the following description is to the point. It endeavors to show that excessive land ownership is limited to relatively few individuals and that the problem is better solved by the Government by considering each case on its merits. The problem of the Government is further facilitated because the tribal Sheiks claim that they hold the lands for their tribe and not for themselves. The Government should have asked the Sheiks to proceed to the distribution of these lands under its supervision.

423 The large holdings are owned by the Agha of Koshar around
47 Deirik, the Sheiks of Shammar from Tal Koshak to Kubur el Bid and south to the Rad, the Sheik of Tay and several of Tay subdivision chiefs, Asfar-Najjar family of Qamishli, the Aghas of the Kurdish tribes (three in number), and two Sheiks of the Jubur. This list is not exhaustive but it is true that not more than fifty individuals in Jazirah have holdings of more than 5,000 hectares each. And since the great majority of them are tribal chiefs, the logical solution is to ask them to distribute these lands according to the laws in force since the Ottoman rule. No new legislation is necessary to fulfill the two aims of distribution of the public domain to needy peasants and the division of the big estates.

Such a solution will not mean that every estate will be only 1500 dunums but it will mean that perhaps 80% of Jazirah will be in holdings approximating 1500 dunums and some 20% in holdings of 10,000-15,000 dunums for tractor cultivation.

C. Shortcomings of the Decree

423 The basic defect of decree 96 is that it erred in diagnosing
• 65 the real problem of land ownership in Syria. As the United Nations
433 Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East aptly described the situation (part I page 34). "In the Middle East, most of the population--perhaps as much as 90%--lives virtually on the margin of subsistence. But while maldistribution of income obstructs economic progress in a variety of ways, it is secondary to the basic problem in each country of grossly inadequate output in relation to the total population. This is the central fact of economic life in the Middle East." Thus the real problem facing the Government in Jazirah is not that a few people own large tracts of land (though some of them do and should be controlled), but whether the present type of cultivation is not working for a better national economy than small holdings will be able to do.

This criticism of decree 96 does not mean that land abuses do not exist in Jazirah. Undoubtedly they do. But it is a long way between admitting this and trying to correct it by dividing the land indiscriminately into 1500 dunum lots.

The shortcomings of decree law 96 are numerous and without discussing them in detail since the law is being amended, it is necessary to recognize some of them.

423 In the first place, the law amounts in fact to confiscation of
• 68 property because it arbitrarily abolishes rights of individuals gained
433 over the land through the normal processes of established law.

Secondly, it allows a uniform area for every farmer whether he uses tractor or mule, and whether he allows dry cultivation in Jazirah or irrigated farming in the Euphrates or the Khabur. It is evident that an irrigated area of 1500 dunums is more than adequate even for a large farmer while the same area is too small for tractor dry farming.

Thirdly, the confiscatory provisions of the law are not limited to lands recently acquired from the public domain, but cover lands for which deeds have been in the hands of the owners for decades. Decree 96 achieves this by reversing the stipulations of the preceding laws and by stating that in unsurveyed lands every title should be limited by the area mentioned in it and not by the boundaries.

Fourthly, if social justice is the aim, why should the law be limited to control of the ownership of land and not extended to control commercial and industrial property as well as real estate in cities and cash money? Further, how can the law treat on the same basis five hundred dunums planted to orchards or olive trees and a neighboring area of the same dimensions planted to wheat?

V. Land Ownership Along the Khabur

471 There is more concentration of land ownership along the Khabur that in theother parts of Jazirah, though the concentration is less apparent because the cultivable lands are smaller.

In the north, around Ras el Ain, the Shashan tribe dominated the country. South of them are the Assyrian holdings. Around Hassakeh, some Christians have bought lands from the Juburs, but south of the town and down to Shaddadah, the Jubur Chiefs of the Milhem family own or control both banks of the river. They own all the naqourahs and work their lands by renting it to the members of their tribe on conditions described in the next chapter. One hardly finds a Jubur who is not of the Milhem, or a stranger from inside Syria, who owns property in the Jubur region of the Khabur.

Lately, the Milhem have begun renting land to irrigation projects by pumps. But unlike the Kurds and Tay people of upper Jazirah, the Milhem have never agreed to enter into partnership for the ownership of land.

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A final comment must be made on price stabilization operations. At times in the past the government has intervened in the marketing of cereals in order to support the price or to protect the home market from the consequences of threatened shortages and excessive prices. Through the Cereals Office and its predecessor agencies it has engaged in buying and selling grain, and occasionally it has resorted to export prohibitions to safeguard domestic supplies. Under emergency conditions when the world supply of cereals is short, as in time of war or threat of war, such measures may be justified. Normally, however, it is better to allow the market forces free play. The history of government intervention in the market demonstrates that the government has often acted on the basis of information which subsequently proved erroneous in whole or in part. Frequently information on impending government measures has leaked out, giving windfall profits to privileged speculators. Above all, it is impossible in the long run to insulate the Syrian grain market from the world market. If there is a shortage in Syria and prices rise, some merchants will quickly seize the opportunity to import grain, and if world market prices decline, Syrian prices will inevitably have to follow if exports are not to be lost. On the whole it would be far better for the government to concentrate on the task of improving its crop statistics and to publish frequent and more reliable information on production and prices for the guidance of farmers and merchants. If emergency conditions arise, it will always be possible to authorize government intervention by special decree.

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Projected Expenditures

We can now recapitulate the government expenditures in the field of agriculture and animal husbandry which are envisaged over the six years up to the end of 1960. Total projected outlays amount to around £S 336 million, or about £S 56 million per year. This represents a very substantial increase over expenditures in recent years which the mission has found difficult to ascertain but which probably have not averaged much more than £S 11 million a year.

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would not only provide an incentive to the transfer of small manufacturing shops and enterprises from the center of the city, but might well incidentally stimulate new investment in modernization of their equipment. In this connection it is significant that the removal of tanneries from the center of Damascus to a special industrial zone has in fact been attended by the installation of a considerable amount of new machinery and a substantial improvement in working conditions. While it is possible that private enterprise might become interested in the establishment of such industrial zones and shops in cooperation with the municipalities, we have made allowance in our proposed development program for the expenditure of £S 1.8 million by the central government for this purpose.

In the expansion of new industry the question arises whether the government should exercise any control over the establishment of new enterprises or additions to existing plants. By instituting a licensing system in 1952 the government has in principle already assumed such powers. While they have apparently not been exercised in a restrictive fashion, we strongly doubt that any government under normal economic conditions should even assume such authority. Private enterprise will ordinarily better be able to determine the wisdom of proceeding with a particular venture than civil servants inexperienced in business. There may be special cases where excess capacity is so serious as to warrant government intervention but even then great caution is necessary lest the restriction of competition in the development of industry impair the possibility of attaining greater efficiency.

With respect to working conditions, the mission has a few observations. Syria has a rather liberal labor code for industry, limiting the working week to 48 hours, prohibiting the employment of children under 12 years of age and containing stipulations regarding dismissal and death benefits and maternity and sick leave. Minimum wages are also set by regional wage boards. In the larger factories visited by the mission working conditions appeared for the most part satisfactory. In a number of plants, however, we observed a lack of safety precautions, notably inadequate protection of workers from the danger of moving parts and of dust and humidity. This problem calls for attention. Another deficiency is the lack of thorough enforcement of the labor code. The degree of compliance in the larger factories is not unsatisfactory. In the smaller factories and shops, however, enforcement is inadequate or virtually non-existent. While we do not suggest that the provisions of the labor code could be enforced in all of the small enterprises, we do recommend that some attempt be made

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439 the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard and on the one hand, Iraq, on the
487 other, Jordan, given the boycott of Israel.

In neither of these trade routes has Syria a monopoly. Iraq, which at present is moving about 100,000 tons of goods through northern Syria by way of the Northern Railway and unspecified quantities of goods through the desert road and Damascus, has the choice of directing these commodities to Turkish, Syrian or Lebanese port terminals. If transport to the Mediterranean ports should prove too expensive or cumbersome, Basra (Iraq) will be used even for the northern provinces of Iraq. Jordan can shift more of its trade to Aqaba and there are indications that this may happen.

In these circumstances, it is clearly in the interests of Syria to make transit through Syria attractive and profitable; it would be ill advised to sacrifice the long-term interest in transit trade to doubtful immediate gains. From that standpoint, it seems rather short-sighted to require that most goods to and from Jordan be moved by rail, irrespective of the wishes and interests of the shippers, and that goods moved from Beirut to Iraq across the desert must first be reloaded into Syrian trucks.[1] It is also inconsistent with the efforts to develop free trade zones in Syria and to encourage the use of Latakia for transit.

III FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES

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651 *Licensing*
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Exports. The government may impose restrictions on the exports of specific goods, including a license requirement. As of the beginning of 1954 exports of some 30 items in the tariff schedule, including various types of metals, glycerine, sulphur, fertilizers, jute cloth and sacks, and lambs, were prohibited, and the country's most important exports, (wheat, barley, flour, cotton and cottonseed, wool, sheep and certain types of cattle) were subject to license. Trade with Israel is prohibited.

These export restrictions were instituted for various reasons—to safeguard domestic supplies and to control the re-export of imported items, particularly those of strategic importance. Other regulations are designed

[1] The total volume of Syria's transit trade is presently estimated at 300,000–400,000 tons annually.

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to safeguard quality. Among efforts aiming at improving and standardizing the quality of exported cereals the following may be mentioned: in May 1954 the Ministry of National Economy submitted for study to the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture a proposed order which would require cereal exports to be accompanied by certificates as to their weight, degree of impurity and humidity. To the best of the mission's knowledge, these certificates are to be issued by reputable firms, specializing in this kind of job and cooperating with similar firms in the importing countries. This seems to be an excellent project and we recommend that it be carried out. 439 651 656

Several of the chief export products, such as cotton, wheat, barley, lentils, vetch, wool and hides, can be exported only through Latakia, with exceptions provided for the southern and central provinces.

Imports. Unlike exports, all imports must in principle be licensed. The only exceptions are personal effects of travellers, gifts and commercial samples up to a certain value, gold, certain commercial imports not exceeding £S 200 in value carried by travellers, and some articles imported directly across the frontier into the Jezireh and Euphrates provinces. It should be pointed out, however, that import licenses are freely issued, except with respect to items on the proscribed list.

Certain products, such as sugar, cement, timber, iron and asphalt, can be imported only through the port of Latakia, although the regulations in this respect are rather flexible and in general do not direct through Latakia a significant amount of trade that would not otherwise have gone through this port.

Trade and Payments Agreements

Bilateral. Since its independence, Syria has concluded several trade agreements, about half of which are with the principal countries of the Arab League (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon). Agreements were also concluded with Greece, India, Japan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and a payments agreement has been made with France. Some of the trade agreements simply formalize existing trade relations. The most-favored-nation clause is included in nearly all agreements. In the Japanese agreement, however, it was instead provided that both partners might, when necessary, take measures to protect the production of their local industries. 439

Provisions relating to the volume of exchange are incorporated into the

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651 more pronounced and systematic. The regulations regarding the licensing of imports were more strictly applied. The normal tariff on glass was raised to 70% and on various sorts of soap to 40% or 50%. The export of a large number of important raw materials, raw cotton, cotton seed, oil cakes, raw wool, all fruits and vegetables, was subjected to licensing. Shoes and boots were added to the embargo list. Although the embargo on "job lot cloth" was strongly protested, it was not lifted, and instead it was extended to second-hand cotton and silk clothing.

651 The year 1952 was characterized by a policy of rigorous industrial 652 protectionism. The Minister of National Economy, given almost discre- 439 tionary power to institute export and import embargoes and licensing requirements, used these powers with little restraint, particularly as to import embargoes, which were imposed on four principal categories of imports: (1) goods locally produced in quantity adequate to meet domestic requirement; (2) goods for which similar local products could be substituted; (3) luxury goods; and (4) machinery which would increase the capacity of an already overequipped industry.

The restrictions and controls on exports were somewhat extended and a de facto monopoly was established with regard to import, export and wholesale trading of sugar.

These measures of extreme protectionism, supplemented by a stricter enforcement of the control on the utilization of foreign exchange by importers and various other measures which will be discussed later, made it possible for many months to charge local customers relatively high prices, compared to those prevailing in the surrounding markets, and to make substantial profits. It also facilitated agreements among manufacturers in defense of their common interests and to reduce internal competition. Complaints from those whose interests were particularly affected and a more general dissatisfaction created by a rise in the cost of living induced the government to take steps to reduce prices. Acting under general legislation enacted in 1951, and specific legislation with respect to sugar and cement, the government fixed lower prices for goods such as cement, yarns and vegetable oils and reduced the tax on sugar.

However, it was thought even in government circles that the import prohibitions had gone too far. Not only was the cost of living increasing but the income from customs duties began to drop, and smuggling and evasion of price-fixing rules became a most profitable activity. In April 1953 action of the Minister of National Economy with respect to imports

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and exports was subjected to the approval of the Council of Ministers. This was followed by the withdrawal of embargoes on various non-competitive imports, higher tariffs being substituted in some cases.

As of autumn 1954 all embargoes on imported goods which directly compete with national products were still in effect, with the exception of the embargo on men's shirts, underwear and pyjamas. Imports of cotton gins are forbidden, to prevent further overexpansion of the ginning industry, and the importation of second-hand looms and knitting machines is prohibited, to ensure the installation of new and modern machinery; importation of almost all items, including machinery, is still subject to licensing. There has been almost no change in the list of prohibited exports or of those which must be licensed. Although the export tax on wheat has been repealed, cotton exports are still taxed; there were certainly good financial reasons for this, but it means in fact a continuation of the element of protection which this duty represents, in favor of the local cotton processing industry. On the other hand, products subject to an embargo or high protective duties are no longer subject to price control. The government is now relying on the effect of internal competition.

Credit Facilities

During the mandate, in 1929, the Syrian Government instructed the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture to establish an industrial bank with a capital of £S 500,000, in which the government was to participate; this was never done.[8]

Not until 20 years later, in June 1949, was the Minister of Finance authorized to guarantee loans to Syrian industrial corporations (*sociétés par actions*) for their first installation or to enable them to continue operations. The amount to be reimbursed under the guarantee could not exceed half the paid-up capital of the corporation and the period of repayment was not to be longer than three years. Eligibility of applicants, their needs and the conditions of both loan and guarantee were to be determined by a special committee; the Minister of Finance was authorized to require a mortgage on the property of the corporation, the mortgage to have preferred position.

Of the 18 loans totalling £S 23.627 million made by January 1952,

[8] *Le Rôle du Crédit dans le Développement Economique de la Syrie*. Moh. Thome, Madrid, 1953, p. 157.

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imported for the requirements of the enterprises; the industries and the imports as well as the quantities benefitting from this provision are determined by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Ministry of National Economy; 654 433

2. exemption for six years from the tax on income from real property, for new construction in factories, administrative buildings and housing for workers and employees connected with the establishment, and industrial machines and equipment housed in these installations; the existing two-year exemption of new factories and workshops was extended for the same six-year period;

3. exemption from income tax for reserves up to 10% of annual profits, devoted within two years to the further expansion of the industrial establishment;

4. exemption from the "temettu" tax for six years from the beginning of operation; and

5. exemption from the income tax for three years from the beginning of operation in the case of industries needed by Syria or which had not been established there on the specified date.

These privileges are also applicable to additions to existing factories and industrial plants. On the other hand, an industrial establishment which suspends operations for more than a year and a half without an excuse accepted by the Ministry of National Economy loses its exemptions.

Proprietors of beneficiary industrial establishments must, among other things, furnish complete information and accounts of their enterprises, and must use the machines, equipment and construction materials which qualify their enterprises for the exemptions.

The granting of the privileges under (1) and (5) calls for a decision of the government, which can be based on the preceding appraisal of the project as required under the law on the regulation of industry, discussed in the following paragraph. The other privileges are extended automatically.

Other Controls and Incentives

The registration of industry. Following the opening of a general public register of manufacturing enterprises in 1949, a 1951 decree introduced a system of special registers for every local industry. Anyone starting an industrial establishment in Syria must present within one month 656 433

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656 433 after beginning operations to the Directorate of Industry of the Ministry of National Economy or its local representative in the mohafazat, information on (a) the legal status of the establishment, its address and that of its main office; (b) the goods it produces; (c) the nature, number and power of its motors; (d) the nature, number and capacity of its productive equipment; (e) the number of working hours per day and week; (f) the number of workers employed; and (g) all other information which the Ministry may require. All industrial enterprises established at the time were required to register within three months. Every change or modification taking place in the stated data has to be indicated within one month.

The mission was informed that the registration has encountered considerable difficulties because of a wide-spread reluctance to disclose to the authorities the required data, even though they are confidential and for statistical purposes only. As a result the statistics based on the registration are not considered to be fully reliable.

The regulation of industry. The year 1952, when protectionism reached its peak, also brought a thorough regulation of industrial enterprises as such, with a view to orienting industrial activity toward the needs and interest of the country.

The establishment of any form of industrial enterprise is subject to licensing.[7] The applicant is required to submit a detailed report on his project covering (a) the name, nationality and residence of the owner; (b) the type and location of the proposed establishment; (c) the capital to be devoted to the enterprise; (d) the type, number and power of the proposed machines and their capacity; (e) the number of employees and workers; (f) the study made by the applicant underlying his decision to establish the enterprise; and (g) any other information required by the Ministry. Owners of industrial enterprises who wish to expand their establishments either by adding to the machine park or by extending their operations to other lines of production must also obtain a license. Industrial establishments in existence when the decree was issued are considered to be authorized, but have to obtain a certificate of registration from the Ministry of National Economy within six months, or thereafter apply for a license.

No detailed information is available on the manner in which the regulations are applied or as to the principles governing the decisions of the

[7] Corporations (*sociétés anonymes*) require a special authorization by the Ministry of National Economy.

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authorities. The mission was informed, however, that practically every 656
handicraft application for an industrial license is approved. With regard 433
to industry proper, applications have been turned down for various reasons. The main criteria seem to be whether the local market can absorb the additional production and whether the new or expanded industry can be expected to increase exports, especially to the Arab countries.

Facilities with regard to industrial sites. By the decree on the encouragement of industry, the government opened facilities for settlement on state domain land. The proprietor of an industrial establishment who wishes to construct a building for industrial exploitation may rent up to 25,000 square meters with a five-year option to purchase land belonging to state domain, on conditions to be determined by the Directorate of State Domain. The beneficiary is not allowed to sell or utilize this land for non-industrial purposes and the State may recover ownership of land not used for industrial construction or expansion within five years.

These provisions represent a real contribution to a reduction of the cost of establishing new industrial enterprises and to the better siting of existing ones.

Export promotion. The laws on the regulation and the encouragement 654
of industry contain several provisions, already mentioned, which permit 433
the authorities in their discretion to grant certain privileges and other 439
facilities to industrial enterprises in the interest of the national economy. We understand that the authorities have several more specific objectives in mind, including the promotion of industrial exports.

Besides these measures, which have been in existence for only two years, the Syrian Government has for several years been actively engaged in negotiating foreign trade agreements with Arab and other countries[8] with a view to promoting exports generally. Since gaining its independence Syria has made commercial agreements with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon among the Arab countries, and with India, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Japan. Several of these treaties include special privileges for Syrian industrial exports, either assuring them most-favored-nation treatment or exempting specific Syrian products from import restrictions or allowing them tariff reductions or exemptions. Agreements in 1953 with Lebanon and Jordan exempt some local industrial products from customs duties or apply reduced tariffs, and provide

[8] Formerly, under the mandate, commercial treaties could be concluded only with neighboring countries and countries not members of the League of Nations.

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654 for the exchange of other industrial products subject to ordinary duties.
433 The inter-Arab economic agreements of September 9, 1953, between Leba-
439 non, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, list a considerable number of industrial products to which a tariff rate of 25% of the normal tariff of these countries will be applied. But they do not exempt trade among the signatory countries from existing import and export licenses and embargoes, nor do they rule out the institution of new ones. Only in the special commercial agreements between Syria and Jordan, and Syria and Lebanon, are certain industrial products, originating in these countries, exempt from all import restrictions.

IV AN APPRAISAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS INDUSTRY

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A country like Syria, with a preponderantly agrarian economy, no important mineral deposits and little power resources, still rather underdeveloped from the point of view of national income per capita and the dissemination of technical skills, is likely to have a natural advantage in the following branches of mechanized industrial production: (1) the processing—at least up to a certain stage—of indigenous crops which are exported; (2) the production of building materials and other bulky goods for local needs; (3) the manufacture in light industries of commodities for general consumption and some durable goods to meet a more or less special national or regional requirement, even with imported raw materials; (4) the production of simple tools and the repair (eventually the assembly) of locally used machines; and (5) the semi-handicraft production of some luxury goods requiring those special skills for which the country has traditionally been well known. These are in fact the main fields on which modern Syria's industry has concentrated and there is nothing fundamentally unsound about this.

On the other hand, it could not have been expected that the progress made in the period of relative isolation followed by the postwar boom would make Syria proof against the competition of long established and highly efficient foreign concerns, quite apart from the dumping of cheap surplus stocks and large imports of modern machine-made luxury goods with which it was confronted by the end of the forties. The customs tariff of the Syrian-Lebanese Union offered only a modest protection for local

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industry. It is not surprising that the exposure to strong foreign competition created a serious situation for various new industrial enterprises, or that the government began to give industry greater protection and encouragement. It appears, however, that since the middle of 1951 government policy toward industry, particularly—but not only—in the field of foreign trade, has tended more and more toward the aim of national self-sufficiency in products which can be locally manufactured rather than toward development in an international economy. We think that the former opens definitely less perspective both for a rise in the standard of living and for the future of Syrian industry itself. Therefore we recommend a reconsideration of the policy and the measures under discussion.

The priority given to national self-sufficiency has resulted in extensive public control over industry. The Syrian home market is relatively small and it has already been pointed out that several industries have reached a productive capacity which meets or even surpasses the effective domestic demand. The measures of "restriction" and "reservation" tend to make Syrian industry dependent on internal controls which are very difficult to administer and carry the danger of submitting the government to pressure groups. The exclusion of foreign competition which frequently accompanies this policy weakens the stimulus to increased efficiency and lower costs, to the detriment of the consumer and the competitive position of Syrian industry in the outside markets. Internal competition, even if it remains free, can only be a poor substitute, being affected by internal cost factors and their elasticity in a protected economy.

The mission feels that industrial policy should be reoriented toward freer, rather than centrally controlled and protected development, with a view to achieving further progress in an international economy. Only thus will Syrian industry become a supplier of manufactured goods of satisfactory quality at reasonable prices, able to expand beyond the limits set by the internal market and to earn foreign exchange by the value it adds to indigenous and imported materials.

The reorientation which we have in mind does not require the government to withdraw all regulation, protection or other encouragement of industrial enterprise, leaving free competition and international prices to organize and guide Syrian industrial production. Even in more advanced countries, with a much more diversified and stronger economy, such a policy is now rarely applied. Infant industry protection, as a means of assisting well-chosen industries to overcome temporary disadvantages and

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allowing them time to build up an international competitive position, has long been considered a legitimate instrument of economic development. Even well-established industries may require a certain safeguarding against specific forms of internal and foreign competition which do not make for sound and resistant economies with a sufficiently diversified economic and social structure. On the other hand, making due allowance for social and cultural considerations, industrialization should not be an objective in itself to be pursued irrespective of its economic cost to the national community, or without regard to its impact on the subtle balance between economic freedom and economic control.

On the basis of these general considerations the mission makes the following more specific comments on the government's present policy towards industry.

The registration of industry. Up-to-date and reliable information on the structure and operation of industry for statistical purposes is indispensable as a source of instruction and a means of guiding important decisions for the business community itself as well as for the government. In Syria there were until recently no industrial statistics, and the government deserves credit for having tried to remedy this deficiency.

The extensive procedure instituted by the 1951 law, however, is difficult for industrialists to accept, overestimates the capacity of the administration responsible for its execution and seems to fall short of reaching the objective. The relations between government and industry in this regard would be better served and a more fruitful cooperation could probably be expected if the information were to be filed with, elaborated and made available by the Central Bureau of Statistics in a form which does not disclose individual data even to the Ministry of National Economy. The Bureau should enjoy a large amount of autonomy and be so organized and equipped as to win the full confidence of both the government and the business world. Such a system exists and operates very satisfactorily in many other countries and the mission recommends that Syria draw on their experience.

This does not mean that if a particular industry or industrial enterprise requires special government assistance or control, it should not provide the responsible authorities with all the information which they may require.

With regard to the statistics concerning industry, which are particularly necessary, a distinction can be made between those requiring current

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information (e.g., industrial output, raw materials consumed, workers employed, the amounts invested and their sources (internally or externally financed)), and such data as the number and size of establishments, their capacities, their technical and financial structures, and their organization within the framework of existing legislation. It is suggested that it is not equally essential that the latter data should be available annually and it should be sufficient to require their collection and elaboration every few years only. The mission recommends that such a distinction be made, that those statistics which have a direct bearing on policy decisions be given priority and the reliability of statistical information be given more weight than its extensiveness.

The regulation of industry. Although special conditions, such as rapidly changing techniques and market conditions, sometimes necessitate limitations on freedom of industrial establishment and industrial investment, if the benefits accruing from actual achievements are not to be offset by high costs from a social point of view, the mission is of the opinion that under present conditions freedom of enterprise should be the rule and regulation the exception. Before industrial licensing was introduced Syrian industry had, generally speaking, done a reasonably good job and shown a considerable degree of sound initiative, fair judgment and flexibility. It is true that in certain branches there had been overexpansion and mismanagement, but under a system of private enterprise such things cannot altogether be avoided. The danger is great, on the other hand, that the licensing decree will reduce initiative by substituting far-reaching control on establishment and expansion by public officials, devoted and faithful as they may be, for decisions by risk-bearing private entrepreneurs. Moreover, quite apart from the advisability of such a policy, it is doubtful whether the government [illegible]xperience necessary for judicious control of the entire field of Syrian ind[illegible]ial enterprise and regulation of all industrial investment activities according to the needs and interests of the country.

The mission therefore recommends a return to the principle of freedom of industrial enterprise and that the licensing of new industrial establishments and the control of industrial investments be limited to special cases[9] in which the public interest requires such exceptional provisions. Furthermore, such provisions should be temporary, permitting periodic re-examination of the need to continue them. It is also suggested that before deciding

[9] Such as excessive over-capacity which would perpetuate itself even under free competition.

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656 on the introduction or continuation of these measures with regard to a
433 branch of industry the government take the advice of a standing commission in which, besides various occupational groups, independent economic experts would ensure a well-balanced opinion with due consideration of all the aspects involved. Finally, it seems desirable that decisions on the issuance and cancellation of licenses by the Ministry of National Economy should be governed as much as possible by general and public directives applied without discrimination.

654 *The encouragement of industry.* In many underdeveloped countries
433 it is believed that acceleration of economic progress demands at least a shift in emphasis from primary production in favor of basic and manufacturing industry, to lessen dependence upon the already developed countries. When private initiative seems to be insufficiently vigorous, it sometimes happens that the government takes the lead by establishing publicly financed state factories and other state economic enterprises. This was done in Turkey, for instance.

The Syrian government has, however, taken a different course. Although it nationalized the foreign-owned public utilities it did not, except in one ill-fated case, itself enter the field of industrial operations by establishing factories. Instead, in various ways it encouraged private industrial enterprise, which, after all, had demonstrated its energy in promoting industrialization. Moreover, most of these measures, particularly those aimed at stimulating new industrial establishments and expansion of existing ones, were introduced only when industrial development began to show signs of stagnation during 1952.

The mission takes a favorable view of the basic principle of Legislative Decree No. 103 of 1952. In many countries at an early stage of development, a considerable and often disproportionate part of national savings tends to be invested in residential real estate or to flow into commercial or financial enterprise. Under such circumstances special incentives to induce a larger portion to be invested in industry, where they would probably make a greater contribution to the productivity of the economy, are certainly justified. We have no special comment with regard to the provisions for industrial sites. With respect to the fiscal privileges, however, we have some specific recommendations.

It seems reasonable for an underdeveloped country to exempt from customs duty imports of machinery, tools, equipment and construction materials not locally produced. In Syria decisions as to the industries and

652 total which reasonable expectations indicate can be raised. In the Main
433 Report we have suggested capitalization of £S 30 million, and suggested the respective ratio of government and private capital.

The cost of necessary managerial and technical staff might run up to £S 300,000 per year and other costs might rise to the same figure with an increase in the volume of business. Possibly half of the cost of the technical staff might in the long run be recouped from fees for technical services. To economize on operating costs it would be advisable to have the commercial banks act as the bank's agents in receiving applications for loans and disbursing and servicing loans in return for a small commission.

654 *Tariff policy and embargoes.* It is far from clear that the trend toward
439 almost complete protection of industry from the impact of foreign com-
651 petition, qualified to only a limited extent by certain provisions of various commercial agreements, has reached its limits.

We have previously recommended reconsideration of this policy. Protection of many industries has gone too far in the direction of national isolation; the balance should be restored by giving more weight to international integration. Liberalization of external trade should be one of the items on Syria's economic program.

In making this suggestion the mission is mindful of the fact that Syria's balance of payments position is not very strong and that the condition of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves obliges the government to proceed with caution. Yet, as long as internal monetary equilibrium is preserved and the foreign exchange policy remains sound, the significance of these limitations ought not to be exaggerated.

We do not recommend immediate termination of the system of licensing imports since it enables the authorities to register at an early date the expected inflow of foreign goods. This may be considered a legitimate precaution, especially if the restriction of licenses is reserved to times when the balance of payments position is endangered. Under licensing, however, discrimination among imports is unavoidable. It should be realized that the need for such a measure indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the factors which determine external equilibrium; rather than continuously applying the palliative of direct import restrictions, Syria should try to remedy this situation. Even if direct import restrictions are temporarily unavoidable, they should not preclude remedial action; on the contrary, they should as far as possible contribute to bringing about an improvement in the basic conditions.

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The licensing of certain local raw material exports in order to give preference to the home market can have several objectives. If its purpose is to permit the local consumer to purchase the raw materials at prices lower than those at which they can be sold in foreign markets, it deprives the suppliers of a price differential; this is difficult to justify. But to a large extent the measure appears to have been inspired by the consideration that many Syrian industrial enterprises lack sufficient working capital and credit facilities to enable them to finance large seasonal raw materials purchases. In that case, the objective would then be to assist local industry in overcoming a competitive handicap, as against financially stronger foreign buyers, by temporarily restricting local raw material exports, without primarily intending to create a preferential price. There may also have been a desire to protect the local raw material suppliers from being forced, for liquidity reasons, to sell out at whatever prices they could obtain at the earliest time, thus endangering steady employment in the local processing industries. If these are the purposes of the licensing measures, provision of adequate storage and credit facilities for both local consumers and suppliers would make such licensing less urgent or even superfluous. Various of our recommendations relate to such facilities, and we suggest that if and when these are adopted the system of export licensing should be discontinued.

The mission has considerable objection to the imposition of embargoes. Import embargoes tend to prevent direct foreign influence on the local prices and qualities of the commodities involved. All the arguments previously advanced against an overstressing of the concept of development in isolation as opposed to development in an international economy apply here. Granted that Syrian industry needs some protection, the mission believes that such stringent measures are not called for, especially since they make it impossible for enterprise and consumers to purchase the particular foreign goods however urgently they may need or want them.

In a limited number of cases the government itself has already substituted higher tariffs for embargoes. Unless such duties are completely prohibitive, this means in principle a reintroduction of international competition, even though in a limited form. The mission considers this a step in the right direction and recommends a total abolition of the remaining import embargoes, even if accompanied by an upward revision of the relevant tariff rates.

With respect to the embargoes on exports the mission does not believe

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656 that the supply of the materials covered by this measure would be seriously
651 endangered if their export were permitted, particularly if the industrialists
439 were given free access to the international raw material markets.

At the time of the termination of the economic union, Syria's tariff structure was rather simple, with little diversification in rates. For most industrial products, excluding primary materials or semi-finished goods essential for local industry, the normal tariff rates (specific and ad valorem) approximated 25%. Since then, even in those instances in which the tariff was raised, the ad valorem duties, at least those expressed in a percentage of free rate prices, are still under 35%, exclusive of the consumption tax on imported goods. Only a few specific duties exceed that level.

Elsewhere in this report the mission recommends that for fiscal reasons the valuation of imported goods at the fictitious official rate prices be replaced by a tariff based on actual free rate prices, and that at the same time the entire schedule of tariff duties, both ad valorem and specific, be subjected to a careful re-examination governed by both revenue and economic considerations. This would undoubtedly result in a more diversified tariff. Certain rates, for instance on some semi-finished and finished goods, would have to be lowered; others could remain as they are. To the extent that duties must remain protective in nature (for infant industries or those subjected to foreign dumping practices), they should not be so high as to safeguard local industries from all foreign competition and thereby weaken the incentive to lowering costs. Moreover, due attention should be given not only to the interests of the producers of the "protected goods", including the industrial workers, but also to the interests of the local consumer, be it a further processing industry or the consuming public. The mission has the definite impression that with respect to the protectionist measures the voice of the industries demanding them has in many cases prevailed over the voice of the other interested groups. It is therefore recommended that in revising the tariff the government should take a broader view than it has done hitherto and pay more attention to keeping the cost of industrial necessities down for the large majority of the population.

We have mentioned that the decisions of the Minister of National Economy to impose a licensing requirement and embargoes on imports and exports now require the approval of the Council of Ministers. If the government follows the mission's recommendations, the administration of

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industrial protection through measures affecting foreign trade would be 656
largely the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. We therefore suggest 651
some procedure to assure that the Minister of National Economy also has 439
some responsibility in this connection insofar as the interests under his jurisdiction are involved. It would also seem desirable that the Council of Ministers continue to exercise its ultimate control over measures of this character so that possible conflicting considerations may be resolved in terms of the public interest in its broadest sense.

Export promotion. The priority given by the Syrian government to 654
attaining national self-sufficiency with regard to industrial products which 439
can be locally manufactured has been combined with a growing effort 433
to open up additional markets for Syrian industry, particularly in the other Near Eastern countries. Syria's execution of several bilateral trade agreements and participation in the inter-Arab economic agreement aiming at liberalizing mutual trade exchange are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. The possibilities for further industrial export promotion, however, are not being fully exploited.

First, the mission recommends that Syrian export industries be given every possible assistance in the procurement of foreign raw and auxiliary materials without fiscal charges, specifically that they be given a full rebate of such charges commensurate with actual exports, and that the system of rebates be so administered that the rebate can be quickly and easily obtained.

Secondly, it is recommended that the policy of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with Syria's main commercial partners be systematically pursued. The considerable increase in recent years in exports of silk and artificial silk cloth, knitwear and other articles of clothing and soap, particularly to the markets of Jordan and Iraq, indicates that there are industrial export possibilities worth while consolidating and expanding.

Thirdly, it is suggested that Syria which, so far as is known, lacks natural oil deposits, has an even greater interest than its oil-producing neighbors in the creation, on a multilateral basis, of a market among the countries of the Arab League; the amount of purchasing power generated by these other countries would contribute far more to the joint total than would Syria's contribution. It therefore seems to be particularly in Syria's interest to promote further inter-Arab economic integration. If this could be achieved, conditions would also become more favorable for the re-establishment of the economic union with Lebanon.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON ME1
SYRIA MD1

S L 181

In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trving to create one.

Social Survey

S L 565 463 511

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

The Press

S L 204 ●656

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

Education

S L 871 [212] 658

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

25: Warriner S-S (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Lebanon ME1
Syria MD1

the land. In 1926–31, 182 villages comprising 181,000 hectares were colonized in small properties by 6,000 families. The Government of Latakia compelled large proprietors in the region of Homs to give up their villages in the district of Masyaf in 1929; the land was distributed among the occupying peasants and sold to them at a price to be paid for in ten annual instalments. The village of Jib Ramle was also settled in 1929, in part by occupying peasants, in part by refugee Armenians.

But the French administration did not complete the settlement of these areas. In some regions the Turks settled these lands with nomad tribes, who were themselves averse to cultivation and either rented the land to Alawi villagers or continued to live themselves as nomads on the land without cultivating much of it. Consequently this land is now very sparsely settled. Round Homs there are said to be 2,000 to 4,000 hectares with only 10 per cent of the land cultivated: this is some of the most fertile and best situated land in the country, and could be developed by colonization schemes.

In several respects the French authorities have modified the Turkish system in ways which strengthen the landowners against the cultivators. One of these was the sale of the extensive *Waqf* properties to business enterprises, irrigation concessions, or landowners. Another was the abrogation of the right of ownership acquired by ten years cultivation which benefited the small cultivators in enabling them to acquire new land.

Efforts were made to start co-operative and agricultural credit banks, but these never succeeded in breaking the peasant's indebtedness. Several large-scale irrigation schemes were started, but produced more water than could be used. The educational system did not extend to the villages. Within the framework of the existing system, these reforms did little to raise the standard of the peasants. As a mandatory Power the French relied on the collaboration of the wealthy upper class, that is, on the landowners, and so could make no fundamental reforms in the land system.

POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPMENT

So far as dry land farming is concerned the possibilities of improvement are hampered by the dry summer, which necessitates a long period of fallow. However, it would be possible by

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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

—Photo Courtesy of Cotton Trade Journal

All the cotton in the Aleppo region is ginned at this modern ginning center in Aleppo. Large gins (some have 10 saw gin stands) are located or are under construction on each corner of the square. Buildings are elaborate and usually cost about twice as much as the machinery. The grounds are landscaped like a campus.

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inhabited for centuries until a few years ago when farmers from the cities began developing them with mechanical equipment. Large landlords from Aleppo spent millions of dollars installing pumps, building roads, and in other ways developing these lands.

Although occupancy rights have been recognized for years, various government officials with whom the matter was discussed were strong in their views that these newcomers are squatters and should be evicted. They want to distribute the land among the landless peasants. The landlords who have made investments here are just as determined that they will not be evicted. The political strength of the landlords is given generally as the reason for the statement recently made by the head of the government to the effect that the new law will be studied for revision.

While the question of eviction is being debated, the government is proceeding to parcel out other public domains in small units to landless peasants. As this program is expanded, the large landowners are becoming more and more concerned for fear their own properties will be expropriated and subdivided, as has been done in neighboring countries.

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This dispute over the use of public land illustrates the struggle for power going on in Syria today between government bureaucrats and wealthy landlords. The government on one hand is attempting to force changes in all phases of the economy through its various control programs. These changes, however, are strongly resisted by the landowners who prefer to be free from regulations and regimentation. The outcome of this struggle may have a material bearing on the trend in agriculture for the next several years.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Syria MDI

COTTON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

242 tributed a 50 per cent decline in yields to insect damage.

248 In an effort to reduce this damage, the Ministry has employed an Egyptian entomologist and has bought 4,000 tons of insecticides and a large number of tractor-mounted, horse-drawn, and walking dusting units.

[656] The Ministry also has promulgated numerous regulations for controlling insects, calling for mandatory destruction of stalks after harvesting and a host-free period until May 1. All ginning must be completed by the end of April and all the gin trash burned. Planting seed must be sterilized by one of the oil mills through contract with the government. The government also requires all farmers to apply the recommended insecticides. If farmers do not comply, the government applies the poison and charges them for it.

CONTROLS

656 The government has appointed a Cotton Control Board, with headquarters in Aleppo, charged with the broad responsibility of stabilizing production. The board is responsible for the enforcement of programs in seed
647 distribution, insect control, crop control, ginning and marketing, and new
248 regulations promulgated recently by the Ministry.

Probably the most significant of these many regulations is one limiting the land which may be planted to cotton. In irrigated areas from 40 to 70 per cent of the crop land may be planted to cotton and in dry-land farming areas, only 25 to 33 per cent. The Aleppo area is limited to 50 per cent of the non-irrigated land. The purposes of this regulation, according to the Director General of Agriculture, are to preserve a balance in agricultural

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Syria's newest cotton mill is an ultra modern integrated plant just completed in Damascus. The level of efficiency here is far above the average and as a result this mill is exporting about 20 per cent of the production.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
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COTTON IN SYRIA

production, conserve water, concentrate cotton so as to facilitate insect control, and protect the cotton industry against the high costs and low prices that might result from over-extension of production. Farmers are required also to receive licenses to plant cotton from the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cotton Board. 656 647 248

The only marketing regulations issued to date require that all bales show the name of the ginner, the identity, and especially the moisture content of the cotton, which cannot be more than 9 per cent. If false claims are made, the government can take 30 per cent of the cotton as a penalty. [442]

It is obvious that the enforcement of so many scientific regulations and controls over a large area is going to be difficult without a large force of trained technicians and police.

The Director General appreciates that without adequate trained personnel it is not possible to make the regulations completely effective overnight, but he hopes, through education, to obtain the compliance of the producers.

Ambitious research and education programs, another responsibility of the board, are still in the planning stage. [654]

PROSPECTS

It appears unlikely to expect any significant expansion in production in Syria until yields can be stabilized. A start has been made, but a more intensive research and education program is required on cultural practices (particularly irrigation practices), mechanization, and especially insect control, before much improvement can be expected. Such efforts naturally take considerable time, even when funds and technical assistance are available. Both money and know-how are limited in Syria. 248

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

of agriculture are the present forms of land tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also common in some areas. The constitution of Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty. Within recent years attempts have been made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest. Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government. Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

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SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number. 164 463

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda. 164 733 656 208

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent." 642 161 162

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases. 744 743

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex- 512

p. 157(A)

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purchased from the Agricultural Bank. There is no doubt that these measures have helped to raise cotton yields and quality. 654 241

Some help has also been given to growers of cereals, by the importing and sale at half price of seed wheat from France and Italy; 1,500 tons were imported in 1953. The Government has set up five experiment stations, for fruits, cereals and cotton, has expanded agricultural education and has begun extension work among farmers.

The Government has also helped growers financially, by purchasing spraying equipment and pesticides, reselling them to farmers and advancing loans for the purchase of pesticides. The capital of the Agricultural Bank was raised from £S 5.8 million in 1940 to £S 7.2 million in 1945, and £S 21.6 million in 1953. Loans advanced by it increased from £S 268,000 in 1940 to £S 1.6 million in 1945, and £S 12.5 million in 1953. In 1953, the number of borrowers was 20,300 and the recovery rate was 93 per cent. The bank also made loans in kind - cotton and rice seeds, spraying equipment, pesticides, tractors, ploughs and pumps. 1/

On the other hand, some government measures concerning marketing and exports have had adverse effects on growers. The Cereals Office's attempt to collect grain for the use of the urban population, at below market prices during the winter of 1951/52, following a very poor crop, led to hoarding, and wheat had to be imported at high prices. In 1952, the Government ordered growers to deliver to the Cereals Office one ton of wheat, at £S 250, for every two tons exported; this led to a rise in the export price to above the world level, hampering exports. In 1953, this arrangement was replaced by a lower export tax on wheat and barley. It would appear that these taxes were borne by growers, not by merchants or foreign consumers, and hence that they constituted a subsidy from rural areas to the towns. With the fall in world prices of wheat, the Government abolished the taxes in May 1954. Similarly, it would seem as though the tax on cotton exports introduced in 1952 has been shifted to growers. 656

Industry

The rapid post-war industrial growth was chiefly due to private initiative but much government protection and some financial assistance were required by several industries. Most of the new capital was provided by merchants, but there was also an appreciable amount of reinvestment of industrial profits. 433 472

1/ Statistical Abstract and La Syrie économique, 1953. In 1953, the bank was authorized to make loans against warehouse receipts issued by the Cereals Office for barley and wheat delivered to it. A rate of 6 per cent is charged on these and all other loans.

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433 The building industry expanded considerably during the post-war period.
339 Authorized floor space in new buildings in Damascus increased from 56,000 square
323 metres in 1945, to 209,000 in 1950 and 265,000 in 1953. Output of cement rose correspondingly, from 35,000 tons in 1945 to 68,000 in 1950, 224,000 in 1953 and 114,000 tons during the first half of 1954. This fully meets local demand. A glass factory, with a capacity of 10,000 tons, established in the post-war period, reached a maximum production of 5,500 tons in 1954; it exports small amounts to neighbouring countries.

377 Output of electricity showed little increase during the war, but after the
471 war demand rose rapidly. The inability of the foreign concessionary companies
433 operating in Damascus and Aleppo to expand capacity sufficiently fast led the Government, in 1951, to nationalize them, for compensation, and to instal additional equipment; 1/ in 1954, the Homs-Hama electricity company was also nationalized. Output by public utilities has risen considerably in recent years, from 47 million kilowatt-hours in 1947 to 81 million in 1950, 114 million in 1953 and 80 million in the first eight months of 1954; output by industrial power plants is probably over 40 million kilowatt-hours per annum.

433 Other important industries include tanning, and the making of matches, cardboard, soap, nails, pins and plastics.

433 Government assistance to industry has taken four main forms: tariff
656 protection, tax exemption, financial aid and regulation of standards and prices. In the early post-war years foreign competition weighed heavily on the Syrian market. The ending of the customs union with Lebanon in 1950 (see below) led to a decrease in competition in some industries, notably spinning; but other industries, such as weaving and canning, which marketed a substantial proportion of their output in Lebanon, suffered. In recent years, protection has been greatly increased by the raising of customs duties on competing goods 2/ or by prohibiting the importing of such goods: among the prohibited articles were matches, soap, shoes, socks and stockings, glass products, canned fruits and vegetables, wooden furniture and alcoholic drinks. These measures seem to have greatly decreased foreign competition; nevertheless, in recent years, prices of local manufactures have tended to decline. 3/

1/ Between the autumn of 1951 and the end of 1953, a total capacity of 6,450 kilowatts was installed in Damascus (Al Manar, special issue on Syrian industry, Damascus 1954); a total of £S 9.5 million was advanced by the Government to the nationalized firms for expansion and improvements. At the end of 1953, the total capacity of public utilities was 34,000 kilowatts and that of industrial power plants was over 20,000 kilowatts. Two plants with a capacity of 17,000 kilowatts were scheduled for completion at the end of 1954.

2/ For example, in 1952, duties on several types of woollen and cotton goods were raised by 25 to 50 per cent.

3/ The index of wholesale prices of domestic industrial products rose from 93 in 1950 (1949 = 100) to 111 in 1951, but declined to 103 in 1952, 88 in 1953 and 79 in the first nine months of 1954.

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Other measures for the protection and encouragement of industry were taken in September 1952, when new enterprises were exempted from customs duties on machinery and building materials; from property taxes on factory, offices and workers' houses for six years; from income tax on 10 per cent of reinvested profits; and from "tamattu" tax for six years. More direct assistance was provided through loans. In 1949, the Government advanced £S 16.9 million, for a period of three years, to nine industrial companies. In 1952, the loans were extended for another five years, and at the end of 1953 all but £S 220,000 were still outstanding. 1/ Another loan of £S 10 million was advanced to an electricity company. 433 656

As a counterpart to the assistance given by it, the Government has increasingly sought to regulate industrial activity. In 1952, the establishment of new factories, or expansion of existing ones, was made conditional on authorization from the Ministry of Economics, which was to be given only if the project were judged both viable and useful to the country's economy. All existing enterprises were also required to register with the Ministry. In 1953, minimum standards were set in the mechanical weaving, underwear, tile, confectionery, tanning, shoe, hosiery and match industries. The Government also intervened in the cotton spinning industry in 1951 and in the vegetable oil and cement industries in 1953 in order to prevent disproportionate rises in prices.

These various measures have been responsible for the survival of some of the newly established industries. Another important factor has been the rise in consumer purchasing power due to the increase in agricultural income. 2 It is unlikely that Syrian industry will be able to dispense with government assistance in the near future, and its further growth will continue to depend on agricultural development.

Foreign trade and balance of payments

The outstanding event in the field of foreign trade during the post-war period was the dissolution of the customs union between Lebanon and Syria. Termination of the French Mandate had not loosened the economic ties binding Lebanon and Syria. The customs union between them continued in force. Notes issued by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban circulated freely, at par, in both 439 457

1/ Etude sur la Syrie économique, 1953.

2/ The poor grain crops and low cotton prices of 1951 had very unfavourable effects on industry.

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflicted upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is constituted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[10] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 795 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [10] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

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ment will need to help private enterprise achieve these goals by collaborating, for instance, in the establishment of an institution to furnish technical and financial assistance, revising policies for the protection of industry from foreign competition and working towards the creation of a larger market for manufactured products, particularly through an intensification of economic cooperation among Arab countries.

To service the economy new and better roads and a larger supply of electric power are clearly necessary. Both of these call for a substantial increase in public investment. Transport is the most important bottleneck in the economy today; the acute shortage of power in major centers such as Aleppo and Damascus is already receiving government attention.

While expansion of the production base of the economy is the paramount task of the future, education, public health and the social services will also make greater claims on the government's resources. A further extension of educational facilities is undoubtedly necessary, but at the same time more stress must be placed on improving the quality and content of education. The condition of public health still leaves much to be desired. While the most urgent deficiencies in hospital accommodations must be remedied, the most pressing need is to concentrate increasingly on the prevention of disease by such measures as an anti-malarial campaign, improvements in sanitation and provision of pure water supplies. A marked and general improvement in housing conditions is likely to result only from a substantial increase in production and improvement of living standards but the government should at least assist the larger municipalities to initiate a program to cope with the worst conditions of housing congestion, a by-product of rapid but uneven economic growth.

A program of this type, which we shall elaborate in subsequent chapters of this report, should lay the foundation for a renewed and continued economic advance. It will serve not simply to compensate for a possible slackening of private investment but above all to create ultimately increased opportunities for greater private investment and enterprise which will expand production and raise standards of living.

The government has become increasingly aware of the task that lies ahead. Its request for an International Bank mission to work out recommendations for development testifies in part to its concern. It realizes that despite the economic progress of the past, the country cannot be satisfied with the current state of development and the standard of living it sustains. National income is still only around £S 440 per capita. Moreover,

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242 encouraging results have been achieved. The justification for a special organization rests primarily on the fact that a properly conceived village improvement program transcends the bounds of agriculture. Its principal task, of course, will always be to raise the standards of agriculture [511] and animal husbandry, the source of livelihood of the villagers. Yet the living conditions of the 2,000,000 people living in villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants must be improved as a whole. Standards of housing, health and sanitation, and adult education must be raised, and better roads and community facilities provided. Moreover, the need for special techniques in approaching this entire problem argues in favor of a special organization. The government has neither the staff nor the funds to carry out all the urgent village improvements itself. Its task must be rather to stimulate and assist the villagers in mobilizing their resources for self-help. Only in this way can a development program achieve worthwhile results at the village level.

242 The program the mission has in mind calls for the progressive intro- 657 duction of rural community leaders or workers into the villages. One community worker for about 4,000 people should suffice, and if on this basis he must cover a number of villages over an extended area, he should have an assistant, selected preferably from among the rural school teachers. The community worker, though a government employee, should have no administrative duties. His sole function should be to encourage and crystallize the villagers' desire for improvement. His training should be primarily agricultural, but he should also have sufficient knowledge of the other aspects of village life to suggest what can be done. Most of the things which can or should be done to better living conditions are rather elementary. The knowledge of the community worker, therefore, need not be profound. Moreover, he would be able to call upon the specialized services of the government for advice and assistance in dealing with problems with which he himself cannot cope. For instance, he should know enough to identify and prescribe measures for most of the prevalent diseases and pests which attack crops and livestock, but he may need help from the veterinarian or pathological service to deal with difficult cases or extensive outbreaks of disease. If he can awaken an interest in cooperatives, he will then need to call in a credit supervisor from the Agricultural Bank or an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture to launch one. He may get the villagers to start a program of constructing latrines, but need advice from the sanitation experts of the Ministry of Health on methods of construc-

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tion. Similarly, he may induce the villagers to work on improving village roads, but may have to go to the regional road engineer of the Ministry of Public Works for advice and the temporary loan of a truck. In many respects he will be the intermediary between the villagers and the government services which can assist them. In discharging his task he will obviously have to work closely with the regular local government officials such as the *moukhtar* of the village or the *mudir* of the *nahiye* or township. His success will largely depend on the support of these officials.

Ultimately there should be about 500 such community workers and 200 assistants. The extensive preparatory and organizational work involved in starting the program would be such, however, that only about 12 community workers would be operating at the end of six years. Thereafter, the program would gain momentum, with the number of workers doubling each year so that the target could be attained in another six years. For the first six years the mission envisages a total expenditure of £S 2.7 million, but by the end of 12 years annual expenditures of £S 7 million would be required.

The mission suggests that the rural community improvement organization be headed by a special administrator directly responsible to the prime minister and the council of ministers. He should recruit a number of foreign experts to help with the necessary training and planning and the initial implementation. This group would include persons experienced in general community work, public health, agriculture and housing. The FAO and such organizations as the Near East Foundation and the Ford Foundation might be asked to provide the necessary personnel. The experience of the Near East Foundation, which has been operating a number of pilot community projects along the same lines in the Ghouta around Damascus, would be particularly helpful. The foreign experts would be primarily responsible for planning and training. They should draw up a basic handbook which would be a compendium of practical measures which community workers can apply and would offer them guidance in techniques of stimulating and organizing community action. They would plan the necessary training courses for community workers in the secondary agricultural school and assist in introducing instruction on the elements of community development work in the university, teachers' training colleges and other schools. Their assistance will also be needed in holding regional seminars in which local officials would be acquainted with the objectives and methods of the program.

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244 657 Other government services must be effectively tied in with the community improvement program. At the national level, therefore, the administrator should be assisted by a coordinating and policy-making council on which the Ministries of Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Public Works and National Economy, and the Agricultural Bank would all be represented. Similarly, the work at the provincial or county level should be coordinated by a council representing the cooperating government services and chaired by the *mohafez* or the *kaimakam*. In fact, the community worker might best be attached to the office of the *mohafez* or *kaimakam*.

The inauguration and expansion of this rural community improvement organization will increase rather than diminish the demand for the services of the specialized officers of the Ministry of Agriculture. More agronomists, veterinarians and plant protection experts will be needed to make frequent visits to villages either on their own initiative or on request for the purpose of helping and advising community workers. In the beginning these specialists will serve a dual role, carrying out their present administrative tasks and giving technical supervision and guidance to the village workers. With further expansion of the community development system, however, the services of full-time technical specialists will be required. This will allow for the separation of administrative and regulatory functions from educational and demonstration activities, thus making it possible for the technical specialists to develop a closer personal working relationship with the villagers. The return of people now studying abroad will enable the Ministry to strengthen its staff in the provinces, but more personnel will also have to be recruited from the secondary agricultural school.

Agricultural Education and Staffing[22]

658 874 Repeatedly the mission has emphasized the vital need for more trained staff if the government is to discharge its responsibility for raising the standard of agriculture and animal husbandry. This points to the need for providing much greater facilities for education in agriculture at the secondary school and university levels. The mission has considered a suggestion to establish a faculty at the Syrian University to provide the higher education in agriculture and veterinary science for which students

[22] See Annex C, p. 318.

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II PUBLIC HEALTH

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The progress in public health has been much less spectacular and less steady than that in education. Expenditures on public health have increased sharply only in recent years. In 1954 the budget of the Ministry of Public Health amounted to £S 8.764 million or 4.2% of the regular budget, as compared with actual expenditures of £S 3.431 million or 3.4% of the total in 1945. Health facilities have been gradually expanding. The number of hospitals has risen from 35 with 1,785 beds at the end of 1945 to 61 with [749] 4,094 beds at the end of 1954. Over the last seven years the government has spent, on an average, £S 1.3 million on public health facilities, so that [759] government hospitals now have a total of 3,000 beds. The number of doctors in Syria has risen from 616 in 1945 to about 880 at present.

Yet it is generally recognized that the state of public health is far from satisfactory. This conclusion rests upon testimony and observation rather than health statistics. The statistics, indeed, are so inadequate as to provide little indication of health conditions. The number of deaths registered, for example, imply a death rate of but seven per thousand, but the record of deaths is evidently very incomplete and the actual death rate rather [164] high. There is still a high incidence of debilitating diseases. Malaria, for example, is prevalent in many parts of Syria. Diseases such as tuberculosis and the many varieties of intestinal infections, which are generally associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding and low standards [165] of living, are quite widespread. Infant mortality is particularly high. Thus 36% of the registered deaths in 1951-53 occurred among children less than five years old, and of these about the same percentage died of diarrhoea and enteritis.

An effective campaign to raise health standards would require resources which Syria will hardly be able to mobilize at its present stage of development. The health program will have to remain rather modest and should attempt primarily to remedy the more glaring deficiencies. These are, principally, the inadequate attention given to preventive medicine and the markedly unequal geographic distribution of existing health facilities.

744 *Preventive Medicine*

The prevention of disease is likely in the long run to be more economical than curative medicine. The mission believes that this aspect of

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743 In addition it would be desirable to build some new village dispensaries, which now number 96, at a cost of about £S 350,000, and to provide a similar sum for the construction of quarantine stations and minor health facilities.

To provide an adequate staff for the recommended additional medical and health facilities, the government must plan a training program. The faculty of medicine in Damascus may have to increase the enrollment of students to provide enough doctors for the new hospitals and health units. Many nurses would be needed for the hospitals, health units and dispensaries; nursing training facilities should therefore be increased. Midwives, laboratory technicians, sanitary inspectors and other medical health auxiliary personnel would also be needed to staff the new health services. The fellowships provided by WHO and the nursing education, maternal and child health and tuberculosis demonstration and training projects assisted by WHO should therefore be coordinated and if necessary expanded to meet the need for technical personnel.

In addition to the cost of the staff training program, some funds will no doubt be needed for reconstruction and expansion of hospitals; we have included £S 1 million in the recommended program for these purposes.

743 657 A revision in the methods of planning and building new health facilities appears necessary. In the past, new hospitals have frequently been built without any consultation with the Ministry of Public Health. Decisions to build have generally been made in response to local requests relayed through the Ministry of Interior, approved by the Ministry of Finance and carried out by the Ministry of Public Works. In the future the Ministry of Public Health should be enabled to plan for the construction of new facilities in accordance with a careful appraisal of the most urgent requirements. The Ministry of Public Works might well continue to do the actual construction, but in accordance with plans approved by the Ministry of Public Health and on a basis which would enable the latter Ministry to make timely preparations for the equipment and staffing of new hospitals.

Proposed Outlays

744 657 In proposing the construction program outlined above, the mission has kept in mind the need for providing additional funds for operation and administration. After taking this into account, it is expected that expendi-

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tures on public health, including new construction, would rise from a total of £S 10.052 million budgeted for 1954 to an average of £S 12.358 million in the six-year period 1955-60. The expenditures envisaged for the entire period 1955-60 would be distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Annual average
Anti-malarial campaign and dispensaries	3,100	517
Establishment of new hospitals and health units	8,350	1,392
Quarantine stations	300	50
Administration and operation of existing and new facilities including training of technical personnel	62,400	10,400
Total	74,150	12,358

III HOUSING

The postwar period has witnessed a considerable housing boom. In recent years construction has been on a scale double that of prewar years. The wartime backlog in housing, the increasing prosperity in the postwar period and the tendency toward a break-up of the larger family units have all contributed to this boom. Aside from a few houses built for civil servants, all of the construction has been private, and it has taken place without the help of a mortgage financing institution. In terms of value, probably over 80% of the new housing has been of the Western or European type, which is too costly for the vast majority of the people.

While the housing of the rural population and the lower classes in the cities is undoubtedly very bad, significant general improvement is likely to come about only as incomes and standards of living rise. It would be impractical for the government to direct substantial resources into housing for the masses which could not be supported by the present productivity of the economy. While the mission firmly believes that the state should take a greater interest in the improvement of housing, for the immediate future the government's role will have to be confined to (1) developing, through experimentation, methods of cheap and durable construction, (2) planning and assisting housing in new rural settlements, (3) constructing

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ingly allowed for construction amounting to £S 8.5 million during the years 1955-60, or a little over £S 1.4 million annually. 653 361

The mission has one general observation to make regarding the responsibility for planning and constructing government buildings of all types. We believe that the Ministry of Public Works should in the future, as in the past, be responsible for designing and constructing public buildings. On the other hand, the various ministries and government agencies for which the buildings are to be built should be in the position of programming their own requirements. We have already had occasion to stress this in connection with public health facilities but it applies generally. Each ministry or independent government agency which requires a more or less continuous building program should have at least one or two officers charged with the task of anticipating building requirements. Proposals for new construction and appropriate budget allocations should come from the ministries concerned. Once they are approved, it is the task of the Ministry of Public Works to design and construct the building. Final approval of the design should also rest with the initiating ministries or agencies since only they will be able to judge whether the proposed design meets their needs.

A Housing and Settlements Administration

361 657

In this and previous chapters we have envisaged that the government will play an increasingly prominent role with respect to the establishment of new rural settlements, urban housing and town planning. These are in the main new functions for the Syrian government and at present it is hardly equipped to discharge them. A new organization with a specially trained staff will be necessary. An independent agency set up for this purpose would have the task of (1) providing technical assistance to municipalities in town planning and related fields, and (2) planning and coordinating the work in housing and settlement.

The planning must be on two levels: on a broad national and regional scale, keeping in mind population trends and the interaction between economic development and the geographic distribution of population, and on a more detailed local scale, involving particular settlement projects.

Regarding the first of these planning functions, we do not suggest that the agency should be charged with drawing up the economic development program. It must keep under constant study, however, the impact which

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privately and publicly generated economic development will have on the distribution of the population and must anticipate what problems it will pose in terms of growth of municipalities and their needs, and in terms of regional transport and other requirements. It would also study comparative population pressures on the land and recommend how these might best be relieved through the development of idle or under-utilized land and the establishment of new settlements. Its findings and recommendations would permit timely revisions in the content and direction of a public development program.

With respect to the second planning function, the proposed agency would prepare in detail the settlement schemes for the Ghab, the Roudj and the dry-farming areas we have proposed. It is important that one organization have the responsibility for planning and coordinating this settlement work. Only in this way will it be possible to economize on the expert staff required and to apply the experience gained in one settlement scheme to subsequent projects. Thus the agency would plan in detail the layout of the settlement, the community facilities to be provided, the type and design of housing and methods of construction, the communications among the new settlements or between new settlements and existing communities, the principles governing the selection of settlers and the terms on which they would be settled, etc. Within the framework of such a plan, the actual carrying out of various phases of the settlement work should be left as far as possible to existing ministries and departments. Thus the Ministry of Interior in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture would select the settlers in accordance with the recommended criteria; the Ministry of Public Works would cooperate with the settlers in the construction of housing, community facilities and roads; and the Agricultural Bank would finance the necessary housing and equipment of the settlers. Even in the planning of the settlements, the proposed agency should consult freely with the ministries concerned. It would, however, retain over-all direction in order to ensure that the work by all interested parties is properly carried out and coordinated.

In the field of housing and town planning, the new agency's functions would be similar in character. It would lay down the general directions along which the proposed building research station would work. The housing funds made available by the government would be distributed among municipalities in accordance with the recommendations and terms and conditions which it would frame. It would provide technical assistance

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to municipalities in drawing up and revising town planning schemes. 341

For this agency we envisage a status comparable to that of the agency 657 in charge of the rural community development program. It should be headed by a competent, well-paid director directly responsible to the prime minister and the cabinet. A part of its top staff of experts initially would have to be recruited abroad. In view of its responsibility for a vital segment of the development program, it should have a budget of around £S 600,000 a year to which the government might contribute £S 500,000 and the municipalities £S 100,000.

Proposed Expenditures

The recommendations which we have made in this chapter would entail a total government outlay of £S 24.95 million over the six-year period 1955-60, distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annua
Water supply	13,000	2,167
Urban social welfare	450	75
Public buildings (general)	8,500	1,417
Housing and Settlements Administration	3,000	500
Total	24,950	4,159

These proposed expenditures are exclusive of those which would be undertaken by the municipalities.

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362 families requiring one dwelling each. While the need for a high and even higher rate of construction in the future is undeniable, it is doubtful that the factors which have operated to create an effective demand for housing will altogether be as effective in the future. Some decline in building over the coming years may well take place.

365 361 Community services have not kept pace with construction. Damascus and Aleppo have been most nearly provided with the essential streets, water supply and sewerage facilities, but the medium-sized and the small communities are very badly serviced. Except for water supply, this is not yet a problem for the small settlements, but it is serious for the medium-sized centers with their motorized transport and denser populations. The social services—education, public health, social welfare and community development—are likewise not yet adequately developed in Syria, but the country is commendably aware of the need and in the field of education, at least, has increased its expenditures impressively in the last few years. A few of the larger municipalities take care of their community services and have undertaken town-planning, but the central government, through the Ministry of Public Works, merely serves as technical advisor to the municipalities. There is no central government department with responsibility for housing. And while there are ministries for education and public health, no government department is responsible for social welfare or community development programs and no such programs exist. The administrative organizations in these fields clearly need strengthening.

Investment in Settlements

657 361 Over 60% of Syria's total annual investment is estimated to go into settlements, for housing, community and social services, and other purposes. During 1949-53 this type of investment averaged £S 138 million annually, of which £S 15 million (almost 11%) was from public funds and £S 123 million (89%) was private investment. On the basis of a 3.65 million population the annual investment in this sector was £S 39.4 per capita, of which £S 35.1 represents private funds.

[362] Perhaps as much as 80% of the private investment and about 72% of the total investment in settlements goes into housing; the balance is divided between industrial and commercial buildings, in that order. Private building activity reached an all-time high in 1953.

Of public investment in settlements, 80% is municipal and only 20%

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governmental, representing 1.7% and 2.2%, respectively, of total investment in settlements. Municipal investment is directed to water supply,[1] roads, power plants and distribution networks and sewerage facilities, in that order; very little goes for housing. Government investment is primarily in buildings, chiefly for education and public health purposes.

The mission has assumed, in preparing its proposed program for settlements and social services, that the estimated 1954 population of 3.65 million will increase over the next five years at a rate of only 1.5% annually, rather than the 2% rate of recent years. If the program is to be properly adjusted to Syria's needs, however, a population census and an improvement in the collection and organization of vital statistics are urgently needed. Better public health conditions, economic development, opening of new areas and new lines of transport and communications, changes in social patterns—all will bring about major changes in size and distribution of the population over the next few years. Any policy developed for the settlements should be planned with an eye not only to the immediate future but also to the longer term economic, social and cultural development of the country.

II EDUCATION

A PROGRESS TO DATE

For centuries, and especially during the years of foreign occupation, the only formal educational facilities were the Koranic schools, which concentrated on religious teaching. A decline in the number of these schools began about 150 years ago, and with it a gradual change in their curriculum; today about one-third of the time is devoted to religion. Meanwhile the number and significance of state primary schools has been increasing. In these, during the French occupation, the pattern of education was influenced by traditional French systems.

Since independence, Syria has started to develop its education at a faster rate and to give it a Syro-Arabic pattern. The effort of these few years and the success achieved is impressive. The budget of the Ministry of Education rose from almost £S 17 million in 1946 to £S 36.8 million in 1953, and its share of the total budget increased from 13.5% to 17.7% (in 1923 it had been only 9.1% and in 1931 9.8%). Between 1946 and 1953 the

[1] Water supplies in Damascus and Aleppo, however, are financed by government funds.

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Miscellaneous Buildings

653 [341] There are, of course, various other types of public and special-purpose buildings with which the government is concerned. Among these are agricultural structures, workshops, museums, monuments and resthouses, to whatever extent they are not privately financed. The mission has made suitable allowances for these in the six-year program, under the appropriate headings elsewhere in this report.

[342] Although they are financed and constructed entirely by private endeavor, the religious buildings deserve special mention. This is a field in which Syria excels. Some of the mosques, minarets and churches, whether in large towns or small villages, are outstanding illustrations of the way in which architectural design and construction can be adapted to the needs of the people, their economic resources, and the materials and skills available locally.

657 VII COST OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS AND SOCIAL SERVICES PROGRAM

Table 5 summarizes the mission's proposed six-year program in the field of settlements and social services.

TABLE 5 Proposed Six-Year Program for Settlements and Social Services Financed by the Public Sector (*Thousand £S*)

Sector	Total	Annual average
Housing	28,076	4,679
Education	271,780	45,297
Public health	74,150	12,358
Social welfare	450	75
Community development	2,687	448
Buildings for other purposes	8,500	1,417
Community services	86,000	14,333
Planning—Administration	3,600	600
Total	475,243	79,207
Share of		
Central government	372,643	62,107
Municipalities	102,600	17,100

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

642 with public welfare." All subsoil minerals, solid or liquid, are
423 declared the property of the State; and the State, in the general interest, is permitted to expropriate private property in accordance with a law providing for just compensation. But Article 23 ensures that no "general confiscation" shall be permitted.

The Constitution provides in like manner the way of utilizing the land. It stipulates that land "shall be cultivated and not neglected"; and that should it be left unexploited within a certain period to be specified by law, the right of usufruct is alienated. The Constitution provides, likewise, that "a maximum limit for land ownership shall be prescribed by law," and that small and medium ownership is to be encouraged: "The State shall distribute State lands to peasants to whom land is not available sufficient to their living, against small rents to be repaid in installments." (Article 22.)[25]

642 Labor is regarded as "the most basic factor in social life," and
651 is "the right of all citizens." "The State shall provide work to citizens and shall guarantee it by directing and promoting the national economy." (Article 26.) The State undertakes to protect labor and provide legislation for the regulation of wages, hours of labor, allowances, and the improvement of social and health conditions. Trade unions are permitted to be formed within the limits of the law. Forced labor is prohibited except by law aimed at certain specific social and constructional services, and in case of war and emergencies.

642 Education is declared a right of every citizen. Elementary
871 education is compulsory and free in all Government schools. Secondary and professional education, though not compulsory, is also free in all Government schools. "The State shall give priority in the budget for the spread and expansion of elementary, rural, and professional education." The aim of education is defined as "the creation of a generation strong in body and mind, full of faith in God, endowed with moral virtues, proud in the

425 [25] On February 15, 1952, the Minister of Agriculture announced a plan for the distribution of 166,000 dunams (app. 41,500 acres) of State land in the Jazirah area among 554 Bedouin families of the Shammar Zor tribe. Each family will receive 300 dunams (75 acres), and each peasant, after paying the State LS 1.5 annually for 3 years, will own his share of the land. The State land is to be distributed among several villages, each village to receive 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres).

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SYRIA

(Visited 13 - 19 January 1953)

131 162 132 58. The Republic of Syria covers approximately 55,700 square miles and has an estimated population of 2,900,000 (including nomads 3,200,000), Arabic speaking and mainly Moslems. There is at present no problem of over-population. Much of the country is at present rain-fed dry land.

311 312 The total cultivable area is 12,500,000 acres of which about 1/3 is under cultivation. Many irrigation projects have been started or are in contemplation. The systems of irrigation do not expose the peasantry in the same degree as in Egypt to bilharzia and the climate is invigorating for much of the year.

241 231 59. Agriculture and cattle breeding are the principal industries. A recent government decree laid down that land not registered must be put at the disposal of the State, who will sell it at a low price in lots of 50 hectares. The land which is thus to be acquired is State Domain which at various times has been appropriated and cultivated by the big land-owning families. The areas involved are said to be 2.3 million hectares of cultivable land and 3.6 million hectares of grazing.

423 185 The land which is to be redistributed must be exploited within 2 years from the date of purchase and must not be resold, although it may be mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank. The Bank will give financial help for the purchase and development of the land.

60. The scheme has been criticized on the ground that in order to avoid a fall in production from the large estates now being cultivated through private capital and a stop being put to the further exploitation of hitherto uncultivated land, the Government will require to make provision for the supply of capital and expert advice to new peasant owners. A scheme for the drainage of a considerable tract in the Jezirah area, known as the Ghab Swamp, is being drawn up as a result of a survey of the area by a foreign firm of engineers. This will also require large capital expenditure.

61. The financing of land redistribution schemes is outside the scope of our mission as is the furnishing of expert advice on new agricultural methods for the more successful exploitation of small estates, except in so far as agricultural extension services can be combined with health and other services appropriate to community welfare organisation.

62. The possibility of the Syrian Government's applying for outside technical assistance for any of the above-mentioned purposes is a matter of high policy which we did not feel justified in discussing with the officials whom we had occasion to meet during our visit to Damascus.

647 657 185 63. Dr. Joukhadar, the Director of Labour and Social Affairs, gave the mission the text of a project law (Appendix IV) that had been drafted in his department for establishing rural community centres, somewhat on the lines of those that exist in Egypt.

64. The Decree contemplates that in each province a model centre be established to provide all requisite economic, health, cultural, social and administrative services this being "the only institution that can undertake all the responsibilities and guarantee the success of a programme of village improvement which does not involve

ill-considered plans and avoid abrupt changes". A separate section in the Labour and Social Affairs Department of the Ministry of National Economy will run and supervise the centres, introduce local industries, study local conditions and implement a programme to raise the standard of living and promote local welfare. The Department will be assisted by an Advisory Committee comprising representatives from all agencies interested. Three bodies participate in the conduct of each model centre: one will consist of the staff members of the centre; the second the advisors to the staff members and the representatives of local administrative authorities; the third will be not one single committee but five committees of local residents, each to be responsible for a particular aspect of the centre. All will work under the supervision of the staff. The Decree defines the several units to be constituted for each centre and their respective responsibilities. 649 657 185

65. It is intended that when the Government has established a model centre in each province, the example will be followed in other districts by villagers who (as in the Egyptian prototype) will contribute to and share with the Government the expenses of maintaining a sufficient number of centres to cover the whole country.

66. The scheme which was inspired by the Cairo Seminar of 1950 had, we were informed, been discussed and agreed with other Ministries concerned and tentative arrangements had been made with the University authorities for their co-operation in providing the necessary personnel for the centres. Unfortunately, however, the project-law had not received the approval of the Ministers and Dr. Joukhadar gave no indication of any date for its operation. 242 185 474

67. On the introduction of Mr. Carroll Deyoe, FAO representative in Syria, members of the mission had the opportunity of meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture Mr. Akram Bakabi, the newly-appointed Secretary-General, who gave an account of agricultural extension work in Syria and of the development of agricultural co-operatives in the country. He foreshadowed a possible eventual use of the profits of these societies for community welfare purposes, but the movement is in its infancy.

68. Thanks also to the courtesy of Mr. Deyoe, the mission was put in touch with the local representatives of the Near East Foundation. In the absence in Beirut of the Programme Director, Mr. Eyer, his Deputy (Mr. Khoury) gave us the statement of the work of the Foundation in Syria which had been prepared for the recent Damascus Seminar which we had hoped to attend. Mr. Khoury accompanied us on his visit to Mashabeyeh one of the four villages in which the Foundation operates demonstration centres in agriculture and sanitation and in home-making, respectively. Mr. Sivasuamy has prepared a detailed account (Appendix V) of his impressions of the work done at Mashabeyeh. 242 185 744

69. The centre has been in existence one year. Its premises are in adobe houses such as are to be found in many villages in these parts. They have been simply adapted for their present purposes and the standard of cleanliness was pleasantly surprising. The staff consists of: (1) a sanitary inspector who looks after general sanitation, including mosquito control by insecticides and by drainage. (He makes a point of talking to the village people about water supply, latrines, etc.); (2) a nurse-midwife, whose duties are: ante- and post-natal care, examination of pregnant women, education of local midwives, regular supervision of the infants in the village. (There is no maternity clinic; the women are delivered in their homes); (3) a doctor, paid by the Foundation, who visits the centre once a week.

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community has been "investment conscious" and has engaged in little conspicuous spending except perhaps for housing.

Predominance of Private Enterprise

A characteristic feature of Syria's rapid economic development is that it has been almost wholly due to private enterprise. In spite of frequent changes in government, private enterprise has retained a buoyant outlook and continued to expand. Manufacturing industry developed with little or no government support, except that in recent years the government has provided some financial assistance and considerable protection against foreign competition. Although the government has slowly increased its services to agriculture and may be said to have contributed to its expansion by interposing no bars to the occupation and cultivation of new land, it did not play a significant role in the great increase in output. Even the development of irrigation has been left primarily to private enterprise, which has extended the irrigated area by sinking wells and, above all, by installing pumps on river banks. Thus only 48,000 hectares are irrigated by government schemes, whereas 250,000 hectares are irrigated by privately installed pumps. In the field of transport, as already indicated, private motor carriers have assumed the burden of increased traffic despite poor public roads.

The most significant, though indirect, contribution made by the government to development has been in the field of education. Increased outlays on education account for almost half of the total postwar expansion in non-defense ordinary budget expenditures, which rose from an actual total of £S 70.9 million in 1945 to an estimated figure of £S 125 million in 1954. During this period the number of schools and pupils more than doubled. The literacy rate has probably been lifted to around 40%, which compares favorably with most Arab countries. In the field of communications the government has been active, notably in the development of the port of Latakia and in the expansion and improvement of the telephone network.

The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its development at which the government must undertake a more important promotional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be able to maintain, unaided, the past rate of expansion. The amount of idle land that can be put to the plow without significant investment has

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244 657 Other government services must be effectively tied in with the community improvement program. At the national level, therefore, the administrator should be assisted by a coordinating and policy-making council on which the Ministries of Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Public Works and National Economy, and the Agricultural Bank would all be represented. Similarly, the work at the provincial or county level should be coordinated by a council representing the cooperating government services and chaired by the *mohafez* or the *kaimakam*. In fact, the community worker might best be attached to the office of the *mohafez* or *kaimakam*.

The inauguration and expansion of this rural community improvement organization will increase rather than diminish the demand for the services of the specialized officers of the Ministry of Agriculture. More agronomists, veterinarians and plant protection experts will be needed to make frequent visits to villages either on their own initiative or on request for the purpose of helping and advising community workers. In the beginning these specialists will serve a dual role, carrying out their present administrative tasks and giving technical supervision and guidance to the village workers. With further expansion of the community development system, however, the services of full-time technical specialists will be required. This will allow for the separation of administrative and regulatory functions from educational and demonstration activities, thus making it possible for the technical specialists to develop a closer personal working relationship with the villagers. The return of people now studying abroad will enable the Ministry to strengthen its staff in the provinces, but more personnel will also have to be recruited from the secondary agricultural school.

Agricultural Education and Staffing[22]

658 874 Repeatedly the mission has emphasized the vital need for more trained staff if the government is to discharge its responsibility for raising the standard of agriculture and animal husbandry. This points to the need for providing much greater facilities for education in agriculture at the secondary school and university levels. The mission has considered a suggestion to establish a faculty at the Syrian University to provide the higher education in agriculture and veterinary science for which students

[22] See Annex C, p. 318.

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must now go abroad. Ultimately such a faculty should be established, but we have concluded that for the time being it would be wiser to concentrate on the expansion of intermediate and secondary education, the more so since excellent facilities for higher education in these fields are available not far from Syria. The mission would recommend, however, that the government increase its stipends for study abroad by a total amount of £S 750,000 in the period up to the end of 1960.

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There are at present four agricultural schools of intermediate grade in the provinces and one secondary school at Kharabo, near Damascus. The mission has already recommended the establishment of an additional secondary school at Kamichliye which should provide some specialized training in agricultural engineering. The mission also proposes that the existing intermediate school at Aleppo be raised to secondary rank. Finally, the accommodation at other schools should be expanded. A program of this scope would entail additional capital expenditures of about £S 2 million and recurring operating expenses of £S 750,000 up to the end of 1960.

The Kharabo school will for some time have to be the principal means of training personnel for the various agricultural programs the mission has outlined. It has already been suggested that at least another year of specialized instruction should be added to the regular curriculum at that school for the training of agricultural credit supervisors and community workers.

The curriculum of agricultural schools will need to be reviewed and revised in order to produce graduates who are adequately equipped to enter government service or to engage in farming. The curriculum is too academic at present. It must focus more on the practical problems faced by Syrian agriculture. More emphasis must be put on manual training and shopwork so that students will know something about construction, the making and repair of implements, carpentry and other essential village crafts. More opportunity for specialization should be given in the final year of schooling. Finally, it is important that students be required to do more of the practical manual work on school farms. It is, after all, only by demonstrating their ability and willingness to do practical agricultural work that they can hope to make an impact in the villages.

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tant elements in a program to attract more tourists. At present Damascus is the only Syrian city with first class hotel accommodations and even here there is an acute shortage. Such cities and towns as Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra all urgently require good hotels for tourists and other travellers. Construction and operation of hotels should, of course, be left to private enterprise encouraged by the government and assisted by the projected investment bank. There are, however, a number of places of potential importance to the tourist trade where rest houses and restaurants rather than hotels are needed. Such facilities are not likely to be sufficiently profitable, at least in the beginning, to attract private investment. We suggest, therefore, that the government spend approximately £S 500,000 on the erection and operation of rest houses and restaurants at such locations as Ras Shamra (site of ancient city of Ugarit), Saint Simeon (ruins of old city and monastery-church in Djebel es Smaane), Al Rasafa (Christian monuments and Moslem palace), Doura Europos (ancient city), Krak des Chevaliers (crusaders' castle), Tartous and Soueida. As a UNESCO mission has suggested, some of these could probably be constructed inside existing historical buildings, thus leaving the appearance of the site undisturbed and enhancing their appeal to tourists.

The interest of tourists in the historical and archaeological treasures of Syria also provides a definite economic justification for increasing the expenditures of the Directorate General of Antiquities. This government department has jurisdiction over museums, historical monuments and archaeological excavations. It finances its operations in part from its own receipts, but the government has during the last two years contributed, on the average, £S 763,000 to its annual budget of a little over £S 1 million. In 1954 its total planned investment was about £S 450,000, of which £S 280,000 was devoted to museums, £S 120,000 to the reconstruction of monuments and £S 50,000 to excavations. Damascus possesses a notable museum of which the country can well be proud, but about £S 1 million is still required for its completion. The Aleppo museum, which houses many fine treasures, admittedly needs a new building at a cost of £S 1 million, and appropriate regional and local museums would help the visitor to visualize the cultural heritage and archaelogical finds of particular localities. Although all of this could not be realized within the 1955-60 period, we suggest that £S 2.4 million be provided to complete the Damascus museum, establish a few local museums in such places as Ras Shamra and Palmyra and at least start the new building in Aleppo.

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457 Proper maintenance and repair of monuments is perhaps even more urgent, 658 since there is considerable deterioration at present. We accordingly recom- 172 mend that expenditures for this purpose be raised, on the average, approximately 50% over the next six years. A similar increase might be contemplated for excavation work which, as in the past, will presumably be carried out in cooperation with foreign archaeological missions. All this will require an increase in the subsidies paid to the Directorate of Antiquities out of the government budget to an average annual amount of approximately £S 950,000. The gradual growth in the Directorate's own receipts will probably suffice to cover necessary increases in administrative outlays.

[491] Poor roads now impede access to many interesting historical monuments. In addition to the recommendations on the national road network made elsewhere, we believe Syria would be well advised to spend about £S 1.5 million on the improvement of local roads of importance to the tourist trade. The access roads to the Krak des Chevaliers and Saint Simeon should have the highest priority.

457 Within the not too distant future the government should contemplate the establishment of a special office charged with the promotion of tourism. The cooperation and financial support of business groups interested in the tourist trade might well be enlisted. It should not only seek to interest the foreign tourist in the attractions of Syria, but also to make the Syrian people and Syrian officials more aware of the importance of the tourist trade and of making the tourist genuinely welcome.

Government Expenditures on Industry

433 654 Although industry is preeminently a field for private enterprise, we have made in this chapter a number of recommendations entailing additional government expenditures. For the period 1955-60 these would total about £S 20.5 million, allocated as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
Manufacturing		
Investment bank	10,500	1,750
Industrial zones and workshops	1,800	300
Enforcement of labor code[a]	325	54

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873 program off to a good start the services of an expert or a small mission should be requested from UNESCO which has accumulated considerable experience in techniques of fundamental education and which was active in Syria during 1952 and 1953 in the field of vocational training.

Higher Education

Higher education has made substantial progress. The Syrian University, which started in 1919 with schools of medicine and law, now includes also faculties of letters and of sciences, schools of pharmacy, dentistry and engineering and a Higher Teachers' Training College. In 1952-53 the University had 2,580 students. In Aleppo a school of engineering has also been established. Yet a further expansion and improvement of facilities will undoubtedly be necessary since the development program will sharply increase the demand for well-trained teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants and other qualified personnel. The University will need more teachers, equipment, laboratories and libraries. Although many Syrians will inevitably have to go abroad for special types of training, Syria should be able gradually to provide broader opportunities for higher education at home. The mission suggests that the government appoint a special committee to draw up recommendations for improving and expanding the University in line with the requirements of the economic development program that might be adopted. Such recommendations will undoubtedly entail larger expenditures on higher education, which the mission has taken into account.

658 *School Building*

871 In recent years Syria has apparently been spending about £S 2.5 million annually on new schools. Of this amount, approximately £S 1.4 million has come from municipal or local funds. We do not think that the government should spend, on the average, more than this for school building over the next six years. More could be achieved with such an expenditure, however, by economizing on the cost of construction and requiring [346] more local self-help. Secondary schools built by the Ministry of Public Works, for example, have been excessively expensive owing to their monumental character, the use of costly building materials such as carved stone and other features of a luxury nature. The past cost of £S 150-200 per

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square meter could probably be reduced to £S 80 with simpler construction and the use of less costly local materials. More could also be achieved with central government funds allocated to school building if their availability were conditioned on a larger contribution by municipalities. The latter should be expected to provide the land and half the cost of construction either in cash or labor.

In the program priority should be given to (1) the construction and expansion of vocational schools, (2) the building of experimental multipurpose schools which can provide facilities not only for regular education, but also for adult and vocational training and for community activities, and (3) the needs of municipalities which demonstrate their desire for educational facilities by a willingness to contribute substantially to their construction. The construction of additional regular schools might well be preceded by a survey of the distribution of existing schools in relation to needs. Some parts of the country are now much better provided with schools than others.

Expenditures on Education[33]

The program outlined above would entail an increase in government expenditures on education from an estimated annual level of about £S 36.5 million in 1953 and 1954 to an average of a little over £S 45 million in the period 1955-60. The breakdown of the anticipated outlays over the six-year period would be as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
General education[a]	220.50	36.75
Vocational education[b]	3.25	0.54
Fundamental (adult) education	0.50	0.08
Higher education	37.53	6.25
School construction and equipment[c]	10.00	1.67
Total	271.78	45.29

[a] Including primary and secondary education.
[b] Additional expenditures only. Continuing expenditures at past levels are included under "General education."
[c] Excluding local contributions.

[33] See Annex I, p. 461.

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governmental, representing 8.7% and 2.2%, respectively, of total investment in settlements. Municipal investment is directed to water supply,[1] roads, power plants and distribution networks and sewerage facilities, in that order; very little goes for housing. Government investment is primarily in buildings, chiefly for education and public health purposes.

The mission has assumed, in preparing its proposed program for settlements and social services, that the estimated 1954 population of 3.65 million will increase over the next five years at a rate of only 1.5% annually, rather than the 2% rate of recent years. If the program is to be properly adjusted to Syria's needs, however, a population census and an improvement in the collection and organization of vital statistics are urgently needed. Better public health conditions, economic development, opening of new areas and new lines of transport and communications, changes in social patterns—all will bring about major changes in size and distribution of the population over the next few years. Any policy developed for the settlements should be planned with an eye not only to the immediate future but also to the longer term economic, social and cultural development of the country.

II EDUCATION

A PROGRESS TO DATE

For centuries, and especially during the years of foreign occupation, the only formal educational facilities were the Koranic schools, which concentrated on religious teaching. A decline in the number of these schools began about 150 years ago, and with it a gradual change in their curriculum; today about one-third of the time is devoted to religion. Meanwhile the number and significance of state primary schools has been increasing. In these, during the French occupation, the pattern of education was influenced by traditional French systems.

Since independence, Syria has started to develop its education at a faster rate and to give it a Syro-Arabic pattern. The effort of these few years and the success achieved is impressive. The budget of the Ministry of Education rose from almost £S 17 million in 1946 to £S 36.8 million in 1953, and its share of the total budget increased from 13.5% to 17.7% (in 1923 it had been only 9.1% and in 1931 9.8%). Between 1946 and 1953 the

[1] Water supplies in Damascus and Aleppo, however, are financed by government funds.

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871 number of primary, intermediate and secondary schools more than
L58 doubled.

871 The last five years alone have seen 939 new schools[2] established—an increase of 64% over the previously existing schools and an average increase of 11% per annum. Greatest gains occurred in the primary schools, the number of which rose by 81% or 11.4% per year. The number of children attending primary schools rose from about 150,000 in 1945-46 to 311,000 in 1952-53. Enrollment in intermediate and secondary schools increased even more rapidly—from 12,661 to 47,670. These advances, as well as those in the fields of technical education, teacher-training and higher education, are shown in Table 1.

872 *Primary Education*

In spite of the very large effort of the last few years, the remaining problems are enormous. According to the best available estimates, no more than 30-40% of the population is literate. It is customarily reckoned that, in a population similar in structure to Syria's, the number of children in every year of age from the 6th to the 12th is approximately equal to 2.6% of the total population. Six to eleven being the primary school age in Syria, there would be on this basis 546,000 children (6 × 2.6% = 15.6% of the 1952 population) of primary school age. Actually only 311,033, or presumably 56% of the eligibles, are in school.

The ratio is not the same for boys and girls. Assuming that the school-age population is divided equally between boys and girls—i.e., that there are 273,000 of each sex—then 18% of the boys and 68% of the girls do not attend school (the attendance figures are 222,779 and 88,254, respectively). Furthermore, many children do not remain in school long enough to receive a school certificate. The number who do finish has been increasing rapidly (from 624 in 1928, to 2,993 in 1940, 6,690 in 1946 and 19,850 in 1952) but it is still much lower than it should be.

There is one primary school for every 1,400 persons in Syria, with an average of 128 pupils and 3.6 teachers. Although only 13% of all primary schools are private schools, these have 18% of all primary school pupils and over 23% of the primary school teachers. The provinces of Damascus and Aleppo have the largest number of private schools; the Euphrates, Djebel Druze and Hauran have the fewest.

[2] Not new buildings, but new schools, most of which occupy rented buildings.

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Investment in Educational Facilities

For many centuries only a few school buildings or libraries were built in Syria, and those mainly for the Koranic schools. During the past years, particularly since the war, an effort has been made to provide enough school buildings, but only a small part of the requirements has been met. Although a special tax for school construction was levied by the government for the municipalities, it has not yielded enough for the purpose. Today most schools operate in rented structures which do not meet the physical requirements of a school building.

According to figures of the Ministry of Education, 416 school buildings were built between 1949 and 1954. These were mostly secondary schools, half of them in the Damascus and Aleppo mohafazats. The Ministry estimates the expenditure for these buildings at £S 8.28 million, averaging around £S 20,000 as the cost of each school of two to five classrooms.

The schools suffer from a lack of the appropriate type of furniture, equipment, books and other facilities such as projectors, slides, radios, etc. The fact that most of this equipment must be imported is largely responsible for its shortage, although the furniture and some other items can in fact be produced locally.

B THE SIX-YEAR PROGRAM IN EDUCATION

Our estimates of the cost of the education program are set out in Table 2.

The item for development of primary and secondary education assumes an average annual increase in attendance of 6%, the continuation of the present ratio between primary and secondary education, the same type of education, the same ratio of government to private schools, and no increase in teachers' salaries.

With respect to vocational training we have assumed an increase in attendance at existing and new schools from 1,676 in 1952-53 to 3,500 by 1960-61. This would necessitate a rise of £S 2.226 million in the operating expenditures of such schools over the six-year period. In addition, about £S 900,000 would be needed to cover the cost of a foreign expert (£S 50,000 a year) and of operating the first school to be used as a training center for teachers (£S 100,000 a year). For the operation of

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TABLE 2 Proposed Six-Year Program for Education

(Thousand £S)

Purpose of expenditure	Total
1. General program financed by the Ministry of Education—total budget covering primary and secondary education	220,200
2. Additional professional education—operation	2,226
3. Vocational education, foreign expert and training of teachers	900
4. Night schools	125
5. Fundamental education—regular program	99
6. Foreign expert and training program	400
7. Higher education and cultural institutions*	37,526
8. Total for operation	261,776
9. Construction of new schools	7,500
10. Equipment, etc.	2,500
11. Total government expenditure	271,776
12. Investment	10,000
13. Other expenses	261,776
14. Municipal expenditure for school buildings in addition to (9)	7,500
15. Total investment, public sector	17,500
16. Total program, public sector	269,276

* Excluding Department of Antiquities.

vocational night schools it is estimated that every student will cost £S 50 per year; the cost of this program is estimated at £S 5,000 for the first year, rising to £S 30,000 in the sixth year.

The cost of fundamental education has been reckoned at £S 3,000 per operating center annually. To this amount must be added the cost of a foreign expert and teacher-training, for which we have allowed £S 80,000 a year.

For higher education we have made provision for a modest increase in yearly allocations, pending development of future plans. A new type of all-purpose school building must be developed: one which will serve during the day for primary or secondary education, and in the evenings for professional and fundamental schools. We also propose that such buildings might be adapted to serve other community purposes as well.

If the school construction proceeds at the same rate as heretofore, and if the mission's recommendations respecting their construction, set forth in the Main Report, are adopted, five times more schoolrooms for primary

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or secondary education can be built. An expenditure of £S 3 million a 658
year would permit construction of 500 classrooms a year or about 100 new 871
schools, without auditorium and other facilities which can be built later. At such a rate, the country's estimated future requirement of about 4,000 schools (assuming that there are already 1,000) would be fulfilled in about 30 years. Meanwhile a considerable number of schools will undoubtedly have to continue in rented buildings.

The opening of new schools will have to be carefully planned in the light of the geographic distribution of existing facilities, conditions of overcrowding, the demand for schooling as influenced by economic factors, the distance of school-age children from existing schools and the availability of teachers. Now that a considerable portion of school-age children are in fact going to school, the location of new schools must be given more thought in order to ensure that they will meet a real need.

Thought should be given to standardization of desks and equipment and for their manufacture in Syria. There are also future possibilities for local production of some other items now imported, such as slides, maps, etc.

Finally, we recommend a reorganization of the Ministry of Education. In addition to a branch of general services with sections for planning, building, inspection, etc., there may be merit in creating five other branches, to correspond to the five major aspects of the educational program: primary education, secondary education, vocational education, fundamental education and higher education.

III PUBLIC HEALTH

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Hospitals and Dispensaries

The country's 24 public and 37 private hospitals have, as of the end of 1954, a total of 4,094 beds. This means only 1.19 beds[8] for over 1,000 inhabitants, as compared with 5 per 1,000 in England, the U. S. and New Zealand or the 15 per 1,000 which some authorities consider optimum for a really healthy population. Only 1,880 of the beds, or 0.56 per 1,000 inhabitants, are in general public hospitals.

[8] In this and subsequent comparisons the number of beds per 1,000 inhabitants has been calculated on the basis of the 1952 population.

FOREWORD

658 172 The Minister of Education of the Syrian Republic, drawing attention to the importance of the problem of historical remains in Syria, requested Unesco to send a mission of inquiry to prepare a detailed report on: (a) the general situation and importance of ancient buildings and historical and archaeological sites in Syria; (b) general measures which might be taken to preserve these buildings and sites and make best advantage of them; (c) special measures to be taken to preserve and restore buildings and sites considered particularly important or urgently in need of such preservation or restoration.

Syria is one of the countries richest in historical remains, but her very riches in this respect make heavy demands on her resources. The Syrian Government, well aware of its cultural responsibilities, shows an enlightened interest in its country's past by freely allocating the large sums needed yearly for the upkeep and enhancement of its monuments. In addition to making this financial contribution, the government also shows its interest by extending a generous welcome to expeditions of foreign scholars who wish to carry out excavations in Syria; international co-operation is thus being established and maintained, with good results, on archaeological excavation sites. The Directorate of Antiquities believes that such co-operation might well be extended to the restoration of monuments which, for their artistic value and historical importance, may be considered as belonging to all mankind. It hopes that the results of the first inquiry organized by Unesco may lead to more definite collaboration in this field. This report, marking the first step in this direction, may suggest where such collaboration is called for.

121 In conformity with our instructions, we have endeavoured to describe both the general situation as regards historical monuments and archaeological sites in Syria, and the state of individual sites and monuments. We have tried to indicate the difficulties that must be overcome in order to ensure their preservation, and to suggest certain measures which might help to expand the work already begun with such good results

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172 and transformed. Some have been abandoned and are falling into ruin, while yet others have sunk underground. Only the first group mentioned are still obviously useful and necessary. The others are exposed to dangers which threaten their fabric and their very survival. This must be fully appreciated if they are to be effectively protected.

All historical buildings were originally erected to meet some specific need, so that any given monument's existence is the result of some particular political, social, religious or military situation. Should that situation end or alter, the building may be abandoned or pulled down, having no further use in the eyes of a people aiming at a different kind of life, in which it has no place. The fate of a monument may also be threatened by clashes of economic interests; a building is an asset which may vary in value over the centuries, and some people consider it from that point of view alone; if they feel that it does not give enough return and costs too much to maintain, they will be tempted to let it fall into disuse or to pull it down. Lastly, a monument may be threatened by urban development; there are the quite legitimate needs of town planning to be considered, and a building may suddenly be found to be an obstacle to the execution of a development plan, solely designed to ease the traffic situation and improve the layout of the town.

In all the above cases, it must be shown that efforts to spare historical monuments are not incompatible with the requirements of modern life, and that the continued existence of an old building, even if it does not serve its original purpose or is disused, is nevertheless justifiable; that such a building is not just a "white elephant" but, skilfully restored and set off to proper advantage, still has a part to play in the life of the city and the country.

172 That is the task of the Directorate of Antiquities, which is
658 striving to make Syria's artistic and archaeological treasures ever more widely known. A few words must be said at this point about the very useful work the Directorate is doing in the three-fold field of scientific research, the restoration of monuments, and the organization of museums. We shall later have occasion to quote a number of examples.

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STUDY OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

172 Syria's wealth of historical remains is enriched each year by
● 68 the excavation of further treasures.

Since the old exploratory expeditions made by G. Ray, M. de Vogüé, R. Dussaud and others, the excavation of vast numbers of treasures by the two American archaeological expeditions at the beginning of the century, and the more recent aerial surveys carried out by Father Poidebard, a great many sites have been systematically studied and excavated. We shall not attempt to list them here, but shall confine ourselves to drawing attention to the excellent results achieved through Syria's policy of giving scholars from other countries a free hand in this field.

During the past thirty years or so, a great many foreign excavation parties have come to work in Syria. They have unearthed groups of buildings, sometimes covering large areas; discovered ancient cities; and collected much invaluable material. By extending a welcome to them, Syria has not only added to her archaeological and artistic heritage, discovered new facts about her own history and enriched her museums (the exhibition of finds made during 1952 alone shows how numerous and important they may be), but has also inaugurated successful and friendly international collaboration in disinterested research.

Satisfactory regulations governing such collaboration were set forth in Decree No. 89, of 30 June 1947, which provides all the necessary guarantees. At the present time, six archaeological sites in Syria, varying in importance, are being explored by groups of foreign scholars from four different countries: Ras-Shamra (France), Mari (France), Apamea (Belgium), Cyrrhus (France), Resafa (Germany) and Tell es-Salhiyah (Sweden). The Syrian Directorate of Antiquities, for its part, has undertaken excavations at Palmyra, Bosra, Jebla and Raqqa. We shall refer again to these various sites in the later chapters of our report.

At the appropriate point, we shall also have to mention the publications, some of them forming impressive collections, in which the results of excavations, as they proceed, have been presented, described, analysed and commented upon. In addition, there are many studies, relating to archaeology, history, the history of art or the history of religions, for which Syrian historical remains have provided essential data; there are also monographs on particular buildings, cities or regions and, lastly, directories and catalogues. We cannot speak too highly of all these interesting and useful works, without which the monuments would be known only to a few people, and which would never have come into being if the Syrian authorities had not made a point of encouraging such research. Through these works historical remains, many of which are important and some of which may in future undergo alterations or even disappear altogether, are now known far and wide; they are part of the material to which all countries can refer in making general studies. All this gives Syria effective and highly creditable publicity.

Among so many excellent publications, we shall, in this context, refer only to periodicals or series of works dealing principally with Syrian archaeology and monuments, such as the review *Syria* and the fine series of volumes in the *Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique* (hereafter referred to as BAH), published by the French Archaeological Institute in Beirut; the *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* published by the French Institute in Damascus; the *Annales Archéologiques de Syrie* and the various

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publications issued by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities. Here indeed is proof of the general interest in Syria's archaeological and artistic treasures, suggesting that any effort to safeguard the country's wonderful historical remains will be sympathetically received by the rest of the world.

PRESERVATION AND RESTORATION OF MONUMENTS

The Syrian Directorate of Antiquities devotes a large part of its activities and resources to the consolidation and restoration of monuments. In both Damascus and Aleppo, it has excellent technicians whose whole time is devoted to this work. The steady increase in the Directorate's annual budget, which rose from 623,000 Syrian pounds in 1949 to 1,007,000 Syrian pounds in 1952, is sufficient proof of the interest taken in this work by the country's high authorities.

This is a remarkable effort, to which attention must be drawn at the outset. It has made it possible to carry out an impressive list of restorations in all parts of the country during the last few years. The principal work done in Damascus has been on the Citadel, the gates and towers of the city walls, the Roman arch in the "Street called Straight", the mosaics in the Great Mosque, and a large number of other mosques and madrasahs; at Aleppo, on the Citadel, the city walls and the Matbakh el-Ajami; and at Bosra. Palmyra, Qasr el-Heir es-Charki, Homs, Latakia, St. Simeon-Stylites and the Krak des Chevaliers, on important ancient and medieval monuments.

Needs are such, however, that the responsible services are sometimes faced with very disturbing problems. The vast number of historical remains (in Damascus alone, there are 125 buildings classified as historic monuments), the fact that they are scattered over an enormous stretch of territory, the size of some and, in many cases, the complete failure to maintain them in the past, give rise to many difficulties. Work cannot be started simultaneously on all buildings; the only way is to prepare a long-term programme of work, spread over many years, and to attend to the most urgent cases first.

Other difficulties are due to the legal position. It is obvious that the State cannot bear the whole cost when the buildings to be restored are not its property. In many cases, the owners are too poor to undertake the necessary outlay; in others, the buildings belong to wealthy communities who neglect them quite wittingly because they do not bring in any profit. In the near future, however, the authorities will probably be in a better position to intervene, for we learnt with interest of a Bill, embodying the most up-to-date ideas, which is shortly to be submitted for ratification. One of its provisions (Article 5) is that the Wakfs (religious communities) and municipalities shall set aside a certain proportion of their income for the upkeep of monuments belonging to them, and that private owners may be obliged to bear maintenance costs, either by direct payment, or by means of a mortgage loan; the work, in all cases, is carried out by the Directorate of Antiquities.

There is an interesting clause (Article 8) in Decree No. 89 concerning antiquities, under which municipalities must take account of the position of historical monuments when preparing development plans and submit such plans to the Directorate of Antiquities for approval. It is to be hoped that this clause will be more strictly enforced, so as to prevent, in future, such demolition or mutilation as has been suffered by the

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mausoleum of Safwat al-Molk and the Mosque of Tingiz in Damascus, and the Mathakh el-Ajami and the Khan al-Wazir at Aleppo. 172 658

Measures should also be taken to prevent damage being caused to historic monuments through their conversion into dwellings for refugees and poor people, as is at present the case with many madrasahs and mausolea. This would help to ensure that the excellent and, in other respects, extremely efficient work done by the Directorate of Antiquities to safeguard Syria's historic buildings produces its full effect.

MUSEUMS

In Syria, still less than elsewhere, can museums be considered exclusively as galleries for the housing of permanent exhibitions. The finds from the various excavation sites require the attention of highly skilled, and therefore centralised, technical services. On the other hand, in order to avoid the loss of treasures discovered by chance, and to preserve certain excavated objects near the place where they have been discovered, there must be local museums, or at least archaeological depositories in every region—which means decentralization. 217

The Directorate of Antiquities has endeavoured to meet these contradictory requirements, which, incidentally, must also be taken into account in another connexion. It is a desirable and legitimate aim to have a large, rich national museum in the capital, but it is also necessary to interest other towns in the country in artistic and archaeological problems by helping them to develop their own museums.

The National Museum in Damascus has the somewhat rare advantage of having been built specially for the housing and exhibition of its treasures. In Europe, we are so accustomed to seeing old palaces, not intended for the purpose, converted into museums, that we are inevitably struck with wondering admiration at the setting and atmosphere which the Syrian authorities have managed to create for the reconstruction and presentation of three great structures of different periods and dissimilar character: the hypogeum of Yarhai from Palmyra, with its rich decorative sculpture; the synagogue of Dura-Europos, with its miraculously preserved frescoes; the Omayyad palace of Qasr el-Heir el-Gharbi, with its frescoes and extraordinary variety of stucco decoration in open-work panels and towers. The museum's other ancient and medieval galleries, although less spectacular in arrangement, contain many objects of rare quality and exceptional interest, such as an Aramaean stele from Sfire, a silvered bronze helmet from Homs, frescoes from Dura, white sculptures from Palmyra and black basalt sculptures from the Hauran, mosaics from Chabba, a carved wooden cenotaph from Tojanus, jewellery, intaglios, bronzes and pottery of various periods. Space is already inadequate and a new building, where the collections of Moslem art will be installed, is now nearing completion. When this building is in use, all departments will be less crowded and it will be possible to reserve some space for temporary exhibitions.

All finds earlier than the time of Alexander are, in principle, collected in the Aleppo Museum, which thus has a character and individuality of its own. Upon entering the museum, the visitor is immediately confronted by colossal basalt statues, lions and bulls, and huge bas-reliefs representing hunting and battle scenes; these are Hittite and Assyrian treasures from Tell

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Halaf, Tell Ahmar and Arslan Tash. The wonderful statues from Mari are more nearly life-size. There are also a great many objects from Ras-Shamra (Ugarit) and Mari which well repay examination. The present building is old and ill-fitted for use as a museum as regards both lighting and the size of the rooms. There are plans, however, for the building of a new museum where there will be ample room and the necessary facilities to display the collections to full advantage. 217

At the present time, there are local museums at Soeida and Palmyra. The former contains an interesting collection of basalt sculpture and mosaics; the latter is scarcely more than a depository crowded with statues and stone inscriptions. The Directorate of Antiquities intends to establish other small museums at Deir-es-Zor, Homs, Hama, and Tartus or Latakia. It is hoped to provide them with a library, where the principal publications relating to the region covered, together with a few general historical and archaeological works, would be available. The existing library at Damascus is extremely useful, but the one at Aleppo would be improved by the acquisition of some additional works.

In conclusion, the following list gives the titles of a few works relating to the collections referred to above: 217 113

ABDUL-HAK, S., "L'exposition au musée de Damas des découvertes archéologiques de l'année 1952", *Museum*, vol. VII, 1954 (not yet published).

ABDUL-HAK, S. and A., *Catalogue illustré du département des antiquités gréco-romaines au musée de Damas*, Damascus, 1951.

ECOCHARD, M., "Le nouveau musée de Damas", *Museum*, vol. 55-56, 1946, p. 107-44.

PEARSON, H. F., *A guide to the synagogue of Dura-Europos*, Beirut, 1939.

PLOIX DE ROTHOU, G., *Le musée national d'Alep*, Aleppo, 1932.

SAOUAF, S., *Alep, guide du visiteur*, Aleppo, 1931, p. 26-33.

MEANS OF PUBLICIZING MONUMENTS AND PRESENTING THEM TO BEST ADVANTAGE 172 658

The efforts made by the Syrian Directorate of Antiquities to promote the study and preservation of historical monuments might yield even better results if they were more widely understood and supported. By means of intelligent propaganda through the three channels of education, tourist development and town planning, it should be possible gradually to arouse general sympathy and interest. The important point is to show clearly that historic monuments are not merely an outdated and costly burden, but have a positive and lively interest for every individual. A publicity campaign on these lines has already been successfully undertaken, but in certain respects it might be amplified and developed.

In the field of education, interest in the country's artistic assets can be aroused by the distribution of illustrated publications and the organization of exhibitions and lectures. There are already some publications of this kind dealing with Damascus, Palmyra, Bosra and Aleppo and more could easily be produced; they should contain fine photographs and be translated into several languages. After organizing a few exhibitions of paintings and a brilliant ceremony to mark the opening of the Qasr el-Heir galleries in the Damascus Museum, the Directorate of Antiquities has recently made a conclusive experiment in this field. It has organized a wonderful exhibition of treasures discovered at archaeological sites in Syria during 1952, which has met with well-deserved success. We ourselves

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have seen the constant stream of visitors, often quite humble people, gazing at the showcases of exhibits from Mari, Ras-Shamra and Raqqa; while they are there, these visitors also go round the museum and have an opportunity of admiring its treasures. In addition, it would be very helpful if the government, which furthers the training of scientific specialists by providing fellowships for study abroad, and does so much to develop the schools, were to introduce courses on the history of Syrian art and antiquities into the curricula of Syrian secondary schools and higher educational establishments, both in Damascus and Aleppo.

Tourist development could also do much to help in the protection of historic monuments by showing the population that they can provide a steady source of income. From this point of view, Syria's art treasures have, as yet, scarcely been exploited. In the absence of suitable facilities and adequate publicity, there is still very little tourist traffic in Syria. A great deal of extremely useful work could be done in this field by an active organization, supported by the State. In order to attract foreigners to a country so rich both in natural beauties and impressive remains, it should only be necessary to improve certain sections of roads and establish one or two conveniently situated and unpretentious but well-run hotels or rest-houses, where visitors can eat and sleep in pleasant surroundings. It is astonishing that sites as fascinating as Palmyra, St. Simeon or the Krak des Chevaliers should still be so hard to reach when it would be relatively simple to organize tours either by road or air. In this respect, Greece, where the tourist trade has advanced by leaps and bounds in the space of a few years, and is now making a considerable contribution to the country's economic resources, seems to us to provide a particularly good example of what can be done in this way.

We shall have to consider town planning in greater detail

172 technical skill of their builders, but also by the admirable specimens of Gothic art to be found in them.
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The three great castles of Sahyun, Marqab and the Krak are most impressive of all, owing to their superb position, massive proportions and historical importance.

Sahyun (Sigon; Sadac of the Crusaders) is situated on a narrow ridge between two deep ravines, on which the Phoenicians and the Byzantines had also once established a foothold. It is a large and rather curious group of buildings, to which Byzantines, Crusaders and Arabs all in turn made their contribution. One of the most striking features is the extraordinary way the rock has been hewn out to isolate the castle, while leaving a slender pillar in the middle of the moat to support the drawbridge. Marqab (Margat of the Crusaders), like an eyrie dominating the coastal road above Baniyas, stands on a steep-sided triangular plateau, protected by its immense double sweep of fortifications. The chapel, with its undivided nave, has two beautiful arched doorways. The Krak des Chevaliers, most famous of all these castles, from its lonely vantage-point among the bare mountains, kept watch on the Homs gap. Its strong defensive works, with the double line of fortifications, round towers, curtains, machicolations, underground passages and great sloping glacis, seeming to continue the slopes outside the fortress, contrast not only with the architecture of the great hall and its portico, with their cross-ribbed vaults, pillared doorways, mullioned windows and carved ornamentation, but also with the austerer architecture of the chapel, with its undivided nave and pointed barrel vault. The surrender of the Knights Hospitallers to Beibars, and the fall of the Krak, in 1271, heralded the collapse of the Crusaders.

The same contrast between the exterior and interior architecture strikes the visitor to the stronghold of Safita (Castel-Blanc), around which modern houses have been built in such a way as to preserve the concentric ground plan of the medieval town. The great square tower, in whose walls there are only a few tiny apertures barely visible to the eye, contains a massive and beautiful church with an undivided nave and pointed barrel vault, and, on the upper storey, a high room with a groined vault, divided into two by a line of pillars. This contrast is also to be found at Tartus where the remains of two beautiful rooms with cross-ribbed vaulting are still to be seen inside the fortress of the Templars; surrounded by enormous ramparts. At some distance, inside the town, the almost completely preserved cathedral of Our Lady of Tortosa, an interesting example of a fortified church, with its austere and very unusual façade, its corner towers, its three vaulted naves and the curious and as yet unexplained structure of one of its pillars, still remains "one of the most beautiful monuments left on this coast by the Crusaders".

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS

172 The monuments of which we have been speaking call for two
658 observations.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that considerable expenditure is necessary for the upkeep and consolidation of these great groups of buildings, certain parts of which are in constant danger of collapse. The Directorate of Antiquities is doing valiant work, but its resources are limited and it is unable to take action everywhere at the same time. It first turned its attention to the urgent repairs needed by the Krak des Cheva-

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172 659 lien, which, since its restoration in 1936 (involving the removal of the village built within the ramparts and the repairing of the terraces) had suffered considerable damage. The new work of restoration included the rebuilding of walls, the repairing of vaults, the reconstruction of a stairway that had collapsed, and the replacing of the missing parts of the windows and doorways in the portico of the great hall. But other misfortunes are continually occurring: a tower is struck by lightning; plants grow upon the glacis. It is constantly necessary to set to again—and the castle concerned is only one of many.

We are well aware of the great interest which the Directorate of Antiquities is taking in this matter and of its determination to continue its efforts; it is deserving of the highest praise. It would be well, however, if the skilled technicians in charge of the work could have the advice of competent specialists whenever some delicate piece of architecture is in need of repair. The same applies to the present restoration of the minaret of the Great Mosque at Aleppo.

172 We are also of the opinion—and this is our second observation—that this work would be easier and less burdensome if the tourist attraction of these magnificent buildings were taken into account. At present they are almost inaccessible, as is shown by the ridiculously small number of visitors (the average is less than 120 a month at the Krak). The Krak or Marqab can be reached only by jeep and it is impossible to travel the whole distance to Sahyun by road. Nevertheless, there were once tracks leading to these castles and they simply need a few miles of repair and regular upkeep thereafter. If that were done, there is no doubt that there would be a tremendous increase in the number of tourists, and considerable funds for the work of restoration could be derived from admission fees.

From this point of view, the region offers real advantages which it would not be difficult to exploit. It is quite near the sea and, if the road were better, a visit to the Krak could be included in the programme of the numerous cruises calling along this coast, which already visit Baalbek and Damascus. The establishment of a suitable hotel at Tartus would make it possible for travellers with the necessary time at their disposal to make interesting excursions to Ruad, Safita and Marqab, just as they can from Latakia to Jebla, Ras-Shamra and Sahyun. This would also be a good opportunity of restoring the church at Tartus, which is at present being used by the municipality as a storehouse. Moreover, if a rest-house were fitted up inside the Krak it would be easier to visit the castle from Tartus, Tripoli, Homs, Hama or even Damascus.

This would permit the successful development of a region whose natural beauties vie in attraction with its incomparable monuments, to the advantage not only of the local population but of the country as a whole.

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172 constantly adding, year by year, to the heritage of historic monuments.

172 658 We have frequently had occasion to compliment the Directorate of Antiquities on the manner in which it is carrying out its manifold tasks by ensuring the preservation and supervision of monuments and archaeological sites, executing a substantial programme of restoration work each year, organizing museums and promoting investigations and learned publications. By its own efforts as well as by those which it has instigated or encouraged, it is achieving remarkable results over a very wide area. Tribute must also be paid to the understanding and generosity of the Syrian Government which is providing the Directorate with the necessary means for its work.

In proportion to its resources, Syria is devoting very substantial sums to its monuments. The importance of the latter warrants this policy, and also explains the interest they are arousing throughout the world, far beyond the boundaries of the country. It also justifies the desire of the Directorate of Antiquities for a better understanding and fuller support of its efforts. We have indicated a few of the means that we consider most apt to assist it in its efforts.

The importance of learned publications must once again be emphasized. The historic monuments described and commented upon therein can be studied by scholars of all countries and become more truly a part of the cultural treasures of mankind, so that, even if they are afterwards lost, the memory of them remains. It is not enough, however, to bring them to the notice of a small circle of experts in this way; interest can be aroused among a wider public by attractive "popular" works, exhibitions and lectures, by the introduction of special courses in schools, and, in other countries, by intelligent publicity calculated to attract tourists to Syria, thus benefiting the country in various ways. We have already indicated how helpful it would be to set up, at Damascus and Aleppo, local committees of artists and scholars to advise the authorities on all questions of town planning. We also feel that international missions of experts, particularly on architectural restoration, could, in suitable cases make detailed studies, in co-operation

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with the Directorate of Antiquities, of the measures to be taken for the better presentation of certain large and important buildings. 172 658

If the results of our survey help to make the artistic and archaeological treasures of Syria better known and appreciated

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abroad as well as in the country itself, if they can in any way make the work so well begun by the Directorate of Antiquities to promote the protection and study of historic monuments, and if they suggest new and useful forms of co-operation for that purpose, we shall feel that our work has been well worth while.

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3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trving to create one.

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Social Survey

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

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The Press

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

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Education

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

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mainly Christian) those run by foreigners are now finding it difficult to disarm the suspicions of the Government. In Lebanon, there are almost as many private as state schools and the foreign schools still work without difficulty. There are higher schools for teachers and for agriculture and engineering in Syria and for agriculture in Lebanon, but it is usual for a student to pass from a secondary school directly to a university. The following table shows the various types of schools and number of students.

Type	Lebanon, 1951		Syria, 1951–2	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
State:				
Primary	977	83,252	1,850	237,775
Secondary	..	..	57	26,237
Technical	30	2,381	11	2,146
Teachers	2	165	10	1,233
Reformatory	1	106	—	—
Private	601	84,788	387	65,936
Foreign	149	41,402	56	9,852
Total:	1,760	212,094	2,371	343,179

.. = not available.

(Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus, 1952; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1953).

The American University of Beirut is non-sectarian and has students from all over the Middle East. It encourages the use of Arabic as well as English, and its most renowned faculties are those of medicine and social sciences. The University of St Joseph in Beirut is run by the Society of Jesus. Attached to this university are schools of medicine, law, and theology, subsidized by the French Government and administered by the Society, in which teaching is carried on in the French language. A National University has recently been started by the Lebanese Government. The Syrian National University in Damascus teaches in Arabic and its most important faculties are those of law and medicine. A separate body for the study of the Arabic language is the Arab Academy of Damascus.

Health

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Malaria and amoebic dysentery are endemic and, though efforts are being made to drain breeding-grounds, preventive medicine is only in a rudimentary stage. Good hospitals exist in the cities and more are under construction; qualified doctors practise in all the towns, but in the villages there is still a lack

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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versity. The committee makes its decisions on the basis of reports submitted to it by the Section of Educational Research of the Committee on Education and Instruction.

The Committee on Purchases is under the chairmanship of the accountant of the Ministry, with two other members appointed by the Director General of Education. It has charge of all buying of equipment, of receiving bids, and of preparing the contracts of the Ministry.

Beside the Directorate General of Education and its branches covering the system of public education for the entire country, three other institutions and agencies are connected directly with the Minister of Education:

1. The Department of Antiquities is headed by a director who is under the jurisdiction of the Minister. It has charge of the museum of antiquities, supervises all excavations, and preserves archeological sites. Its regulations are incorporated in Decree No. 352 (1945) "Embodying the Regulations of the Directorate of Antiquities."

2. The Syrian University, which until 1946 consisted of the Faculties of Medicine and Law, was in the process of reorganization at the time of the visit of the American Council Commission. It is described in chapter 22.

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3. The Arab Academy, which was founded during the Arab government regime following World War I, is a body of learned Arabists, which has its own assembly of members in Syria and corresponding members in other Arabic and Islamic countries as well as among orientalists. It holds public lectures, issues a magazine known as the *Review of the Arab Academy* which appeared first in 1920 and in which are published the researches and studies of its members. It also maintains a public library which contains about 20,000 printed books and more than 4,000 Arabic manuscripts. The Academy has at times attempted to lay down Arabic equivalents to modern scientific terms.

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Educational Finance

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Educational finance in Syria is centralized. The bulk of the expenditure on the schools and their equipment, on the salaries of teachers and janitors, comes from the budget of the Ministry of Education, which is a part of the general budget of the Syrian Republic. The Ottoman Education Laws of 1869 and 1913, which had remained the basic education laws during the French-mandate period, had provided that the expenditures of elementary schools should be borne by the local authorities. This, however, remained more a theoretical than a practical possibility in most of the Ottoman Empire. In Syria, some school buildings were provided—in Turkish, as in French, days—by the central governments, some by the localities or

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
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municipalities, and the majority were, and are still, rented buildings, the rent being paid from the central budget. Salaries and other expenses are also paid from the funds of the Ministry of Education.

Table 56 gives a picture of the growth of the educational budget since

TABLE 56

GROWTH OF THE EDUCATIONAL BUDGET, SYRIA, 1923–46

Year	General Budget	Educational Budget	Percent of General Budget	Number of Government Schools	Enrollment in Government Schools
1923*.....	£S 3,970,640†	£S 361,914	9.1	310	22,443
1931*.....	11,932,693	1,170,892	9.8	479	45,491
1941†.....	13,603,100	2,272,623	16.7	...	...
1945‡.....	103,678,000	9,953,568	9.6	694	93,727
1946‡.....	129,704,000	14,127,388	10.9	...	...

* Actual expenditure. Figures from the annual *Rapports sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban* (published by the French Government).
† The rate of exchange of the Syro-Lebanese pound was £S2.18 to the dollar in 1946.
‡ Estimates. Figures from the Ministry of Education.

the early days of the French mandate. Although the table shows a very large increase in budget allotments for education from £S361,914 in 1923 to £S14,127,388 in 1946, these figures should not be taken at their face value. The Syro-Lebanese currency, being based on the franc, had fluctuated in value along with the franc until 1943. Moreover, the increased amounts for 1945 and 1946 show clearly the influence of inflation. The budgetary provisions, therefore, are not based on the same rates of value. For this reason it would not be correct to say that the budgetary provision for education in 1946 was about thirty-nine times that of 1923. About the only thing that can be said is that the Syrian government, anxious in this era of independence to expand public education, is giving generously to the Ministry of Education. A budget of about £S16,000,000 was planned for 1947.

It will be seen from Table 56 that the percentage of the educational budget to the general budget has fluctuated from 9.1 to 16.7. In spite of the rapid increase in the general budget, the educational budget, while growing remarkably in the last four years, did not keep pace with the general budget. The percentages declined from 16.7 in 1941 to 9.6 in 1945 and picked up somewhat in 1946. This is a phenomenon that has been common in most of the other Arab states in the last few years. The 1945 budget was supporting 694 public schools of all types and 93,727 pupils in these schools, representing respectively 2.2 and 4.2 times the number of public schools and number of pupils in 1923.

The distribution of the budget over the various fields of public education in 1945 is shown in Table 57.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S,G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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*874 About one-third of the student body was from other countries, mainly Arab.

[197] Teaching at the Syrian University is conducted entirely in Arabic. The Faculty of Medicine is the only such faculty in the Arabic world which teaches in Arabic.

Educational Missions

658 177 Educational missions were sent chiefly to France prior to World War II. With the French government as mandatary power, with French advisers to the Ministry of Education, and with the Syrian educational system following French educational methods and ideas, this was to be expected. As has already been said, graduates of French universities and institutions were shown a decided preference in appointments to posts in the Ministry of Education. The situation was not different in other departments of the government. It was only natural, therefore, that even students going abroad for study at their own expense usually preferred to go to France.

Even in 1943–44, when the French grip on Syria had loosened, 58 out of a toal of 101 students on educational missions were studying in France; most of them had begun their study in the prewar period. Of the other 43, there were 37 in Egypt and 6 in Beirut.

For the year 1946–47 it was planned to send 120 students abroad. None of these was being sent to France, partly because of the aversion to the French that has developed in Syria, and partly because the new Secondary-School Certificate is no longer recognized in France. Most of the students were being sent by the Ministry of Education. The remainder were being sent by other ministries. The countries to which the students are being sent are Belgium, Switzerland (evidently taking the place of France), Great Britain, the United States, and Egypt. Only a few are destined to study in Great Britain or the United States largely because of the difficulty of securing admission to American and British universities. The subjects to be studied cover a wide range and include the various branches of engineering, architecture, technical education, agriculture, irrigation, mathematics, the sciences, finance, medicine, public and school health, law, archeology, Semitics, history, English, education, commerce, and Arabic literature.

The Education of Teachers

*874 The education of teachers in Syria has gone through a number of stages.
*875 In the latest of these, two kinds of teachers colleges were maintained: the

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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*871 The non-French primary schools increased by 163 pupils, while the secondary schools decreased by 70. It can, therefore, be said that enrollment in the other foreign schools remained substantially the same and that these schools were unaffected. The reaction was entirely against the French schools.

As all three foreign vocational schools had been French and had closed, there were no foreign vocational schools in 1945–46.

The future of the French schools remains uncertain. It is probable that those French schools which were originally Syrian schools will be registered as private schools, as indeed some have already been. The others, or at least some of them, will probably reopen, but with much less prestige and with reduced enrollment. It is reported that a few French schools were allowed to reopen in 1946–47.

The Franco-Syrian crisis and the new plan of the Ministry of Education to abolish the teaching of a foreign language in the primary schools created a problem for some of the private schools. Christian schools especially, largely in response to the demands of parents who are usually keen on their children's learning foreign languages, frequently start the teaching of French in the first grade and often even in the kindergarten. This they did even at the time when government schools started French in the fourth grade.

With the coming of the new regime of independence and the abolition of the foreign language from the primary-school curriculum, pressure was brought to bear upon the private schools to follow the lead of the public schools—or at least to postpone the teaching of the foreign language until the two upper grades. This, however, would put the private schools at a disadvantage with the foreign schools, almost all of which begin the teaching of the foreign language, usually French or English, very early. Representations were, therefore, made by some schools that if such a course were followed, the private schools would lose a large number of their pupils to the foreign schools, owing to the insistence of parents on their children's learning a foreign language. The representations of the schools were successful, at least temporarily. How permanent such an arrangement can be, and how far there will be a shift from French, which prevailed in most of the private Christian schools, to the English language is a matter of the future.

Grants-in-Aid

●658 *871 A decree was passed in March 1945 setting down the conditions for giving grants-in-aid to private schools and other cultural institutions.[2] This

[2] Decree No. 261, dated March 25, 1945, "Embodying the Regulations for Grants-in-Aid to Private Schools and to Cultural, Artistic, and Sporting Institutions."

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decree, designed to encourage private individual and group effort "in the service of science, letters, fine arts, and physical education," provides that financial aid is to be given to private schools and educational institutions in proportion to their service to education and to their financial needs. Criteria are established to serve as a basis for the distribution of funds: (1) the level of the school and the number of its classes and pupils; (2) the standard of education provided; (3) the number of teachers, their qualifications and teaching ability; (4) the curriculum and the degree of its agreement with the public-school curriculum; (5) the number of students participating in the public examinations and the percentage of those passing; (6) the income and expenditures of the school; and (7) the fees levied upon students and the number of students exempted from the payment of fees.[3] Grants are to be allotted annually by the Education Council in the first half of August. The council's decisions in this matter must be based upon the reports of the inspectors and directors of education concerning each school. If necessary, the Ministry of Education may pay the grant in the form of salaries paid to teachers which it selects or appoints to the schools.

Bases are also laid down in the 1945 decree for the distribution of grants to cultural, artistic, and sporting societies and clubs.

This provision as to grants-in-aid was of great help to the Ministry of Education in its attempts to meet the crisis created by the closing of the French schools. The budgetary provisions for the grants were trebled by being increased from £S100,000 (about $45,450) to £S302,500 (about $137,500). Private schools were encouraged to open new classes to take in more pupils, and grants were given to stimulate the opening of new schools.

Private Schools

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Private primary schools are usually classified in Syria by the denomination of the authorities controlling them. Table 69 shows the denominational distribution of private primary schools in Syria for 1944–45.

The data for the 9 private secondary and 8 intermediate schools, which have an enrollment of 1,743 students, are not given by denominations.

It does not, however, follow that all the schools classed as controlled by denominations are actually so. Many of them are really secular and are simply classified according to the sect of the controlling authority, following a custom started during the French mandate which emphasized sectarian matters as a policy. In actual fact private schools are of three main categories:

[3] Compare with Iraq, pp. 128–29.

ries separated in 1950, and, in consequence, Syria regained free- 651
dom of action in directing her customs and economic policies and 648
in managing her economy on an independent basis.

11. The new Syrian government also had to face serious internal problems, that the Mandatory power with its "Laissez-faire" policy had not attempted to deal with. No factual study of the country was made nor any determined course of economic action undertaken. The following are the most serious of the defects of the economic system at that time :

First there was a lack of statistics and detailed studies upon 65
which to base a sound economic policy. Nor were there any technical and scientific studies of the country's economic resources, or plans for developing and exploiting them. Secondly, the bank- 453
ing system failed in meeting the country's need for agricultural 652
credit and for medium and long term credit. The majority of the banks were branches of foreign banks that specialized in commercial short-term credit operations, and which, with the exception of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, avoided seasonal agricultural lending. All the banks operated without any control or direction. Furthermore, no bank had up to that date been established to deal with industrial or mortgage credit. There was only the Agricultural Bank, established by the government to deal with medium-term agricultural loans, but its regulations, staffing and limited means did not enable it to play a major role in meeting the needs of agriculture. Thirdly there was no money market that 454
could attract national savings and invest them in development projects. People with savings have always preferred to hoard them in the form of gold, or else they invested them in real estate. In addition, foreign capital avoided entry into the country because of restrictions on exchange, and other reasons.

12. During the period 1945 to 1953 the government made a 656
great effort to regulate the Syrian economy in the fields of trade,[1]

1 Legislative Decree No. 14 of December 18, 1951 and its amendments concern the regulation of the possession of, and trade in, raw materials and products. Legislative Decree No. 151, of March 3, 1952 and its amendments concern company law and the law governing firms established outside Syria. Legislative Decree No. 60, of January 13, 1952 and its amendments regulate foreign trade etc.

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 662 182

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conclusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 624 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

411 immediate family. It also provided that in adjudicating title deeds in
423 which the area derived from the indicated boundaries of the property was greater than the area mentioned in the deed, the boundaries would govern at least to the extent that they gave each member of the titleholder's family a minimum of 200 hectares. The mission urges that these provisions, which have apparently not yet been applied, be enforced as rapidly as possible. Their application would inflict no undue hardship, and would increase significantly the amount of revenue-earning state domain. Above all, it would put at the government's disposal more good land to be retained as a reserve for the ultimate settlement of landless or virtually landless peasants. Much of the land now left to the state is too marginal for successful settlement.

411 Careful management of state domain is necessary to ensure that the
423 state derives from it the maximum revenue and that land not really
427 suitable for cultivation is reserved for pasture or forest. The government is not equipped at present to exercise adequate supervision. Land is often tilled without authorization, thus depriving the government of revenue and often encouraging the cultivation of land which can be expected to produce a satisfactory harvest only in years of exceptionally high rainfall. Until cultivable land is required for settlement, it should be leased, as at present, to private operators who have the necessary machinery to till it. Thus land in the Jezireh which is recaptured under the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 135 might well be leased to those who now cultivate it, so that existing units of exploitation are not disturbed until the land is needed for distribution. However, current rentals for state land, even though they have been rising in recent years, still seem unduly low. Judging from private rental arrangements prevailing in the Jezireh, for example, the state should be able to charge an average rental of at least £S 5-6 per hectare instead of only a little over £S 3 as at present. In this way the government can add to the funds available for financing development.

Forestry and State Domain

137 The management of state domain should look also to the preservation
459 and improvement of forest areas on government land. Syria has unfortunately been almost entirely denuded of forests. Although some 448,000 hectares are listed officially as "forest", 348,000 hectares consist either of

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wholly barren land or of range land with arboreous shrubs. Of the balance probably only about 60,000 hectares can be characterized as more or less dense forest.

The mission has already recommended an aerial survey of the forest areas in the province of Latakia. This would be a first step in the appraisal of existing resources and the delimitation and protection of forest reserves. An FAO specialist has for some time been advising the government on a forestry program. The mission can only recommend that action along the lines which he has proposed be undertaken as soon as possible. Any program should focus in the first instance on safeguarding forest areas against uncontrolled cutting, shifting cultivation, excessive grazing, fire, insects, erosion and other hazards which have inflicted considerable damage in the past. A more effective forestry law which was drafted by a committee in 1953 should be promptly enacted for this purpose. To protect the forests and supervise their exploitation a field service of four foresters and 42 rangers should be built up by 1960. The necessary forest rangers will have to be trained either at a secondary forestry school which may be established in cooperation with the FAO to serve the countries in the Near East or at a special training school which might be added to the existing Bugua Agricultural School near Latakia. Within the Ministry of Agriculture a staff of five foresters and 10 rangers should be available to direct the necessary survey, research and reforestation work; and two foresters will be necessary to supervise forest nurseries.

Once adequate protection of forests has been established, reforestation can proceed. The three existing nurseries and two new ones recently established should be able to produce about 3 million seedlings yearly. The mission considers it important, however, that government nurseries be also in a position to supply trees for planting in farming areas. Although such trees as poplars are extensively grown as cash crops in certain irrigated regions, most farming areas are virtually treeless. The planting of a belt of trees around new village settlements should be an integral part of any settlement program. Farmers should be assisted to establish their own wood lots and to plant trees along roads. This would help to meet the acute shortage of timber for fuel and building, provide some protection against wind and make settlements more attractive. The mission therefore suggests that five additional small nurseries be established, particularly in the provinces of Jezireh and Euphrates, to supply trees for such purposes.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

137 To meet the cost of this program over the next five or six years the
659 mission suggests that additional funds of £S 500,000 be made available
313 to the forestry service.

Settlement of State Domain

423 The employment of state land for the establishment of peasant pro-
166 prietors is already declared government policy. Article 22 of the 1950 constitution stipulates that "The State shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by instalments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood"; and decrees issued by the Minister of Agriculture on November 1, 1952 and January 15, 1953, provide for the sale of government land in parcels of 50 or 10 hectares, depending on whether the land is irrigated.

The immediate need for settlement arises from certain localized population pressures and from the growing desire of the Bedouins to adopt agri-
[161] culture. Population pressures are most marked in the provinces of Latakia and Djebel Druze where, according to rough estimates, the amount of cultivated land available per person is less than 50% and a little over 60% respectively, of the average for Syria as a whole. The reclaimed land in the Ghab and the Roudj should help in particular to relieve the overcrowding among the agricultural population of the Alaouit mountains in Latakia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Bedouins number about 150,000, half of whom, however, are said already to be engaged in some form of settled agriculture. Many Bedouins apparently tend to squat on unoccupied land which they cultivate more or less sporadically and often with extremely poor results. For them the availability of good land in such a province as the Jezireh is of paramount concern.

423 The mission has given special attention to the problems involved in
166 settling reclaimed and irrigated areas and of undertaking certain experi-
241 mental settlements in dry-farming regions. The government has not yet drawn up settlement plans for the Ghab and the Roudj, although this task is becoming urgent, particularly for the latter. For the settlement of the Bedouins certain initial steps have been taken. The government has set aside and divided into allotments 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jezireh and is in the process of dividing another area of 50,000 hectares in the same province. Part of the first area has already been allocated to Bedouins but is being leased to large operators for three years in order to

63.Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1952
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sory, according to law, but barely one half of the children are now registered in schools. Outside of Damascus, the literacy rates probably do not exceed 40 per cent among the men and 10 to 20 per cent among the women. Schools are maintained by the government and by private organizations, both national and foreign. The Syrian University, in Damascus, is one of the leading Arab institutions in the Middle East. It includes faculties of law, science, arts and medicine, with subordinate departments of dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, as well as an advanced school for teacher training. An engineering school is established at Aleppo, and, in 1952, a new school for the training of village teachers, with emphasis on home economics and agriculture, was under construction near Damascus.

Vital Statistics

Due to lack of demographic data among large segments of the population, few valid statistics are available. Theoretically, the registration of births and deaths is compulsory, but in the rural areas, away from centers of population, reporting is incomplete. Government officials estimate that the accuracy of the recorded statistics approximates 90 per cent in the cities, but 30 to 60 per cent in the villages, over one half of which have less than 200 inhabitants. Considering the country as a whole, probably 50 to 80 per cent of the births are recorded and, since certificates are required for burial, a slightly higher percentage of the deaths. According to published statistics for 1948, the birth rate for the entire country was calculated at 19.1 per 1,000 population; the death rate, at 6.5 per 1,000 population. The birth rates ranged from 35.3 in the city of Damascus to 9.0 in the rural province of Al Jazira; the death rates, from 13.2 to 2.3, respectively. Evidence derived from informal surveys in different localities, however, suggests that the true birth rates average 30 to 40 per 1,000 population and the death rates 15 to 30 per 1,000 population.

844 parts of the country. The graduate pharmacists totaled 214.

DISEASES

659 Widespread discrepancies in reporting de-
165 tract from the validity of the morbidity and the mortality statistics. Among the two thirds or more of the population living in the rural villages, not only is the reporting of cases of illness and death poor, but the accuracy of diagnosis is often questionable. In a total of 15,457 deaths officially recorded in 1949, almost 35 per cent were listed as due to "ill-defined, unknown or unspecified" causes. Facilities for laboratory confirmation are lacking outside the larger population centers, and confusion is frequently evident in the differentiation of related infections. Reporting is negligible in the more remote areas, and particularly
659 among the Bedouin tribes. Except in the
165 course of special surveys, or when abnor-
758 mal epidemic conditions necessitate the enforcement of preventive measures, medical treatment is seldom accessible to the in-
659 habitants of such regions. Even in cities,
165 where the degree of reporting is considerably higher than in the rural areas, the morbidity statistics reflect a general tendency to evade the reporting of certain infectious diseases for fear of isolation. The records of cases treated in the government hospitals, which cannot be regarded as representative, and the reports of particular investigations or surveys provide the most reliable data for the evaluation of the prevalence and the distribution of specific diseases.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Intestinal or Urinary Tract

164 **Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers.** Enteric fevers are endemic, and, in the opinion of the local authorities, a high degree of immunity resulting from repeated exposure to infection exists among the inhabitants.
164 Cases of typhoid fever occur throughout the
364 year, with the peak of incidence usually between June and December, when the con-

164 the Qoubour el Bid section of the Al Jazira, along branches of the Khabour River north-
136 east of Hasetché. *Schistosoma haematobium*
164 is the only species identified in confirmed cases, but rectal complications are sometimes recorded. At present, the disease is confined to circumscribed foci, but in view of the irrigation and the agricultural potentialities of the region, its control is of
164 major public health significance. The foci
361 are apparently of recent origin. Whether the
169 infection was introduced by Senegalese
944 troops stationed in the vicinity, as claimed by the local inhabitants, or by nomadic tribes from Iraq is a matter of conjecture. Surveys have been made within recent years, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and co-operating international organizations, and, although some discrepancies are evident in the determination of the infection rates in different villages, all emphasize the seriousness of the problem. Competent local authorities estimated in 1951 that the total incidence in that year approximated 12,000 cases.

659 In surveys undertaken in 1948,[24] the ex-
164 amination of urine samples collected from 545 persons in Qoubour el Bid and neighboring villages on the Gerahi branch of the Khabour River indicated general infection rates of about 62 per cent. They averaged 73 per cent among the men and the boys, and 49 per cent among the women and the girls. Moreover, they were consistently higher, in both sexes, in individuals under 20 years than in the older age groups.
[361] Equally high infection rates were found among the seminomadic peoples in the Tell Abiad area. A system of spot checking suggested probable infection rates of almost 100 per cent among males and of 60 per cent among females in 3 of the 5 villages visited.

164 A more exhaustive investigation in 1950[25]
659 revealed the presence of infection among
361 about 24 per cent of the inhabitants of 58 villages situated along 4 tributary streams in the Qoubour el Bid area. The infection rates ranged from 1 to 88 per cent: the most

highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 944 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[40] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 282 164

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in the same period, but the consumption of camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population. 232 164

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded. 164

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom used without boiling, but infection may result from the consumption of contaminated cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals. 232 164 262 252 164

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis is not compulsory in Syria, and the prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated, however, by the tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population. 164 165 164 183 164

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age. 659 751

761 Comparative rates in urban and rural com-
369 munities were determined in a series of tests
164 on unorganized groups in the city and two adjacent farming districts. In Damascus, positive reactions to tuberculin were given by 47.7 of the boys and 40.8 per cent of the girls tested at 15 years of age. At 20 to 25 years of age, positive reactions were obtained in 86.7 per cent and 77.4 per cent, respectively; at 40 to 45 years of age, in 95.6 and 86.6 per cent, respectively. In the rural communities the positive reaction rates were consistently lower, but approached the urban levels in the older age groups. Among individuals at 15 years of age, 51.6 per cent of the boys and 27.2 per cent of the girls reacted to tuberculin in one area, and 18.1 per cent of the boys and 21.2 per cent of the girls, in another. At 40 to 45 years of age, the proportion of positive reactors averaged 80 per cent in the first series and 50 to 100 per cent in the second.[48]

744 Within recent years the Ministry of
751 Health has embarked upon a tuberculosis
747 control program. In January, 1950, a tuberculin testing and BCG inoculation campaign was organized under the auspices of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and associated organizations, which was taken over by the Ministry
659 in September. Surveys have been carried
361 out in most of the provincial capitals and
751 surrounding rural districts, and the Ministry contemplates the gradual extension of the campaign to cover the populations in all parts of the country. In the course of the investigations completed in 7 provinces between January and September, 1950, almost 417,000 persons were tuberculin tested, and over 188,000 were inoculated with BCG vaccine. The majority were schoolchildren, although miscellaneous population groups of all ages were also included. The proportion of positive reactors in the different provinces ranged from 23 per cent in Jebel ed Druz (As Suwaydah) to 42 per cent in Aleppo.

758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
743

752 164 of rabid dogs, but wolves, hyenas, jackals, rats and other animals are sometimes implicated. Prophylactic treatment is provided by the Ministry, and a special division for the preparation of antirabic vaccines is incorporated in the central laboratory in Damascus. From 140 to 250 persons were treated annually in the 4 years 1948-51.

164 232 **Other Infections.** Tetanus is endemic, and occasional cases are observed. Anthrax is enzootic among the sheep, and human infections sometimes occur in the agricultural areas. Sporadic cases of Weil's disease are reported.

Diseases Spread by Arthropods

164 **Malaria.** Malaria is a disease of major public health and economic importance, since it is endemic or hyperendemic in all populous sections of the country. The prevalence of the disease is directly related not only to the physical geography of the different regions, but to the degree and the type of cultivation. The most seriously affected foci are the plains around Damascus and Aleppo, the Orontes valley from Hama to the Turkish frontier, the irrigated zones bordering the Belikh and the Khabour rivers and their tributaries, and the swampy districts of Hauran province. Universally high infection rates are experienced during epidemic years, even in areas of low endemicity.

659 164 744 No large-scale surveys have been attempted, but accumulated studies provide rough estimates of the extent of infection in localized areas. Prior to the development of a program for the control of malaria by the Ministry of Health and the Near East Foundation in 1949-50, the spleen index among children under 10 years of age in the villages around Damascus ranged from 40 to 80 per cent, with the highest rates in villages on the periphery of the Outaybeh swamps in the eastern part of the oasis. In the vicinity of Homs, the spleen rates normally average 50 to 70 per cent.

659 747 In the course of joint surveys made by the malariologists of the United Nations

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8, 9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the malaria problem has been aggravated by the introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages.

The malaria season extends from April to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plasmodium vivax* and *P. falciparum* infections varies according to the season and from place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general, *P. vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered.

Malaria control measures are undertaken by the municipal authorities in Damascus, Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten-

2: Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A 622 792 554 A [791]

sense as he could get away with. The story goes that two Alawite priests, whose fortunes were at a low ebb, proclaimed that a dying shepherd boy was the incarnation of Ali. Their idea was to build him a tomb and make it a specially notable shrine to attract large numbers of worshippers. However, the boy, Sulaiman Murshid, survived, and with the aid of one or two ingenious "miracles," which were to earn him the title of "phosphorous boots" in the Royal Navy, he began to build up his reputation as a divine incarnation. He is alleged to have brought forth water from a rock by a contraption of rubber tubes running down inside his sleeve and to have gained many adherents by such wonders. Subsequently the two priests disappear from the story and Sulaiman led a chequered life, during which he greatly increased his land-holdings and therefore his wealth—the Alawite mountains grow the once-famous Latakia tobacco—by somewhat forceful methods. At one time he was on the wrong side of the French Mandatory Authorities and suffered a period of banishment, but he later obtained their favour and in due course became a Deputy in the Syrian Parliament.

S [661] A [595] 660 S 669

When I was posted to Latakia in October, 1944, Sulaiman Effendi was still a Deputy, but very much in the opposition, as he was held in forced residence by the Syrian authorities in Damascus and not allowed to return to his native mountains. He has an agreeable number of wives, one in each of his various villages, but his chief wife, Umm Fatteh, was at that time acting for her absent "Lord" and entertaining lavishly in their mountain residence at Jobit Burghal. Then came an unfortunate difference of opinion between the followers of Umm Fatteh and the local government authorities, the latter's gendarmes suffering a reverse at the hands of the former, who were found to be exceedingly well-armed. Such open flouting of their authority was intolerable to the Damascus Government, and they sent up a large force of gendarmes under an experienced campaigner, Commandant Muhammed Ali. The subsequent proceedings were complicated and there was much political activity, but the French sent Alawite and North African troops to Jobit Burghal to prevent bloodshed and remained in occupation up there during the ensuing weeks, much to the disgust of Muhammed Ali, who was confident of defeating the rebels. Meanwhile Fatteh, eldest son of Sulaiman Effendi, had returned home and was able to practise his fluent French on the various French Political Officers whose duties took them to Jobit Burghal. When the fighting broke out in Damascus and it became clear that the Syrians were determined to stake all they had on a bid for complete independence, Sulaiman Murshid found himself in a most awkward position. After a certain amount of political bargaining, he stood up in the Syrian Parliament and announced a complete change of heart, admitted that he had been wrongly guided by foreign advice, and placed himself and all his followers at the disposal of the Syrian Nationalists. Having thus rallied to the cause of independence, he could no longer be detained in Damascus, and accordingly returned home to his mountain fastness. In addition to the French Moroccan force, this now contained a British "tentacle" in the shape of Captain N——, who was camping up there with Jeep and wireless and liaising with all and sundry, albeit finding his French

prosperity of the region during the last twelve years resulted in the benefit of the Sheiks who were quick to seize the meaning of the expansion in agriculture brought about by the introduction of the machines. They laid claim to vast areas of the best lands without opposition or control by the Government, and then rented these lands to machine owners, thereby getting rich at the expense of others and depriving the tribesmen of the possibility of tilling their own lands. 624 425 427

The concentration of land in the hands of the Sheik and his family is greatest in the Shammar tribe and in the Jubur whether though the Chiefs of the tribe own the best lands, but the Tay tribesmen took to agriculture earlier than either the Shammar or the Jubur and many Tay villages are owned by the peasants.

This short glimpse covers the Arab population of Jazirah, and we turn now to the other elements in the population.

II. The Kurds

The Kurds have been and are a vital element in the development of Jazirah. Their original country is the mountains north of the plain. Their language and customs have dominated the country so that even the city dwellers of Mardin and Nisibin speak Kurdish besides Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish migration to Jazirah started in earnest after the failure of the Kurdish rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kamal. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sentenced to death migrated with their tirbes to Syria. The French authorities welcomed them and they occupied the lands directly south of the border, greatly increasing in this way the number of Kurds already in the region. The Arab tribes saw their lands diminishing, but not being yet land conscious, they were satisfied to claim tribute from the Kurdish villages, which was paid for several years. 563 167 661 651

For the first time in perhaps nine hundred years, the French established law and order in Jazirah. The Kurds, farmers in their own country, began cultivating the plains. The land being fertile, the crops were good. The French authorities treated the Kurds well and the news of good crops and unbiased government treatment reached the Kurds just across the border. Migration became a continuous operation from the mountains to the villages of the plain. There were no obstacles to this movement either on the Turkish or the Syrian side, and the immigrants joined their cousins and relatives across the railway line. For this reason, and because a census was never taken, it is very difficult to estimate the number of Kurds in the Jazirah.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

241 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6241 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
6221 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflicted upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is constituted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 1824

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conclusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1624 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

648 of Nations on April 18th, 1941, they regarded the juridical
186 basis of French Mandatory rule as having disappeared.

Political meetings and demonstrations being forbidden, nationalist uneasiness remained for the most part beneath the surface throughout 1940. But it revealed itself in the press of other Arab countries and the activities of their Governments; this was especially true of Iraq. Thus in July, 1940, Nuri as-Said, then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara, Beirut and Damascus in order to discuss with the Turkish and French authorities and with prominent Syrians and Lebanese the future of the French Mandated Territories. At the conclusion of his journey he issued a statement to the effect that both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments thought that Syria should be for the Syrians and that the country should enjoy complete independence.

665 A symptom of the prevalent unrest was the murder of Dr.
662 Shahbandar in Damascus in the same month, while his political influence was at its height. Within a few days his assassins were arrested. After the preliminary investigation had been completed a special tribunal was set up to try them and certain other persons believed to be implicated in the crime. Among the latter were three of the leaders of the National Bloc, Jamil Mardam Bey, Saadullah al-Jabiri and Lutfi al-Haffar. They were accused of deliberate complicity in the assassination. Almost at the same time as the accusation against them was published, all three left Syria for Baghdad.

The trial of the accused persons began in December, 1940. In the course of it the leader of the assassins made a complete confession: their motive in deciding to kill Dr. Shahbandar had been religious, since they regarded him as one of those responsible for the decay of Islam; they had tried to throw the blame for their crime upon the leaders of the Bloc, who in reality had had nothing to do with it. The trial ended at the beginning of January, with the condemnation of six persons to death and several others to imprisonment, and the complete exoneration of Jamil Mardam Bey, Lutfi al-Haffar and Saadullah al-Jabiri. The sentences were carried out immediately.

4

000 At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria #101

621 both districts for a period of five years from the coming into
648 force of the Treaty.

621 The Treaty and the new régime were received with approval
664 by a number of the Druzes and Alawis; even former
186 autonomists expressed their loyalty to the Syrian Government. This reaction, however, was transient and deceptive. In Jebel Druze discord began to arise early in 1937, after the appointment of Nasib al-Bakri, a Damascene Moslem, as first Governor of the province. A powerful party demanded the appointment of a Druze notable, Hasan al-Atrash, and also a large measure of autonomy; the nationalists asserted that it was encouraged to go to extremes by local French officials. There were also, however, many Druzes who supported the nationalist Government and the Governor whom it had appointed. Attempts were made with no more than a temporary success to reconcile the advocates of separatism with those of unity. The disturbances were not ended until the Governor resigned and was replaced after an interval by Hasan al-Atrash. By the end of 1937 the Jebel was quiet enough to enable Parliamentary elections to be held. The calm continued throughout 1938, but at the beginning of 1939
[669] disturbances began once more. The separatist group accused the Syrian Government of bad faith, expelled Syrian officials from the province and declared the independence of Jebel Druze under the protection of France.

A similar process had meanwhile been occurring in the Alawi district, which was known under the new régime as the Province of Latakia. Here, as in Jebel Druze, there was tranquillity at first, and Parliamentary elections were held in 1937. But the calm was short-lived. The Alawi notables protested against the appointment of Syrian Moslem officials, and more especially of nationalist Governors, first Mazhar Raslan from Homs and then Ihsan al-Jabiri, a Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. The nationalist policy of assimilation was perhaps carried out hastily and tactlessly, the Governor alienated large sections of the population, and at the beginning of 1939 armed bands rose in revolt under the leadership of the deputy Sulaiman Murshid, a brigand who had proclaimed himself 'God' and had secured considerable local influence with the help of certain French officials. At about the same time the visit of the High Commissioner, M. Puaux, was made the occasion for demonstrations in favour of autonomy. Soon

II: Hourani 3-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 401

afterwards the Governor found his position impossible and 631
was compelled to abandon it. He was not replaced, his 644
powers being assumed in July by the High Commissioner's 136
Delegate.

9

The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 effected no formal change in the status of the Jazirah, but its signature was followed by the replacement of the French officials who had ruled it until then, by Syrian administrators. Here as in Jebel Druze and the Alawi region discontent soon showed itself. There were some who felt and expressed loyalty to the new national Government. But there was an important element which demanded that the ties between the Jazirah and the central Government in Damascus should be as loose as possible, or should be severed altogether. Their minimum demand was that the local officials should be chosen from among the local population; their maximum, for complete separation from Syria. Their discontent was increased by the lack of wisdom shown by some of the more irresponsible nationalists, although the Government itself acted on the whole in a conciliatory manner. The autonomists appear to have been encouraged by certain of the local French officials; the nationalists claimed, indeed, that here as among the Alawis and Druzes the minorities would have acquiesced in their rule had it not been for the activities of French agents. The separatists were themselves divided on everything except their dislike of being ruled by the nationalists of Damascus. Some were Kurds, who objected mainly to being ruled by Arabs; others Christians, who objected also to being ruled by Moslems. These two groups sometimes but not always acted together during the years from 1936 to 1939.

Serious trouble first broke out in June, 1937, when the 669
Kurds of Hassetche revolted against the appointment of 563
nationalist officials from outside the Jazirah. The rising was 631
quelled with the aid of the French military authorities, but it was soon taken up in Qamishli and elsewhere by the Christians, who demanded a special statute similar to that of Alexandretta, an administration which would give equal weight to the rights of all sects and races, and the withdrawal from the province of officials who had not been chosen from the local population.

At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so long latent came to a head. Strikes and demonstrations began in the Syrian towns in February, in protest against the dearth of essential foodstuffs and the failure of the authorities to stop profiteering. They very soon turned into political disturbances, directed by a number of nationalist committees and leaders, and above all by Shukri al-Quwatli, who in March issued a manifesto setting forth their objectives. He condemned the existing Government of Bahij al-Khatib as a group of men whose sentiments were not those of the population; he declared that the legal basis of French rule no longer existed since the League of Nations had ceased to function; and he therefore demanded the immediate formation of a national Government. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of the continuation of the disturbances, which indeed spread for a few days from Syria to the towns of the Lebanese coast, the Government of Bahij al-Khatib resigned. There was a temporary cessation of unrest while the High Commissioner negotiated with Shukri al-Quwatli and others for the formation of a more representative Government; but disturbances broke out once more after the failure of the negotiations.

The recrudescence of the troubles appears to have convinced General Dentz of the necessity of making further concessions. At the beginning of April he broadcast a statement to the Syrian people, setting forth the conclusions to which his conversations with Syrian leaders had led him. First, the independence of Syria remained the aim towards which the Syrians were striving; France was in agreement with this, but the present international situation made it impossible to contemplate a definitive settlement of the problem of the form of government in Syria. Secondly, Syrian public opinion was demanding the establishment of a Government endowed with wider powers. Thirdly, there was a need for an economic and social programme which would help to solve the problems of unemployment, the food supply, agriculture and commerce. In the light of these conclusions the High Commissioner had decided upon the following measures: the replacement of the Council of Directors by a Ministry presided over by a 'Head of the Government'; the formation of an Advisory Assembly, to be composed of representatives of the political, cultural and economic life of the country and of the younger generation, and in which the Druzes and Alawis would also be represented

648 In the State of Syria the disquiet may be traced back to
669 that opposition to the general policy of the Mandatory Power
668 which has been analyzed in Chapter IX. The opposition was strengthened by the many administrative and economic grievances which have also been dealt with. It found expression in a number of local disturbances and risings at the very beginning of the French occupation, the most notable of them the revolt of Ibrahim Hananu in North Syria and the rising in the Hauran. As time went on the restlessness was increased still further by the instability of French policy: the appointment and recall of a number of High Commissioners; the consequent changes in the higher personnel of the mandatory administration; the creation and then the dissolution of a Federation. These were further causes of disquiet: the repercussion in Syria of the growing hostility of the Palestinian Arabs to Zionism and to British policy, and the activities of Syrian emigrants, particularly of the Syro-Palestinian Committees in Cairo and in Geneva. Of the group in Geneva the leading spirit was the Amir Shakib Arslan, a distinguished writer and publicist, by origin a Lebanese Druze, who had given all his life to the spread first of Pan-Islamic and then of Pan-Arab ideas.

668 All these factors contributed to create a strong opposition
[665] to French rule; it was led and organized by the 'People's
648 Party', which grew rapidly in the years prior to the revolt. The nationalist opposition was to some extent concerned with general Arab problems: the independence and union of the whole Arab world. In local matters, its main purposes were two. First, it advocated the union of the French Mandated Territories. Jebel Druze and the Alawi region, it was claimed, should be wholly incorporated in the State of Syria; Lebanon was to be at most autonomous within a Syrian or Arab State, and was to be shorn of the territories assigned to it in 1920. Secondly, Syria should be given genuine self-government immediately, and complete independence as soon as possible. This would involve on the one hand the relaxation of French control over the administration; on the other a rigid definition of the points at which and the period for which French armed forces could be maintained in Syria, and ultimately their complete withdrawal. It was around these two points that Franco-Syrian relations revolved throughout the period of the Mandate.

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might arise; in default of an agreement, it would take appropriate measures to maintain order and to guarantee peace. The Mandatory Power desired to favour and hasten the political evolution of the States under its protection, and to promote their economic development. As for the 'Common Interests', the High Commissioner would continue to administer them with the active and ever-increasing assistance of the representatives of the States.[1]

A few months later, in February, 1928, M. Ponsot judged that the time had come for the election of a Constituent Assembly. In that month the state of siege declared at the beginning of the revolt was finally raised, the censorship suppressed, the special tribunals established during the revolt abolished, and a general amnesty issued. At the same time Damad Ahmad Nami's Ministry was replaced by a new provisional Government of 'moderate' politicians presided over by Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, with the task of preparing the way for the creation of regular institutions to which it could hand over its functions.

The elections were held in April of the same year. In the towns, most of those elected belonged to the more uncompromising section of the nationalists, the opponents of Shaikh Taj ad-Din's Ministry; in the countryside, however, they were mainly moderates. Of the seventy members of the Assembly, over two-thirds supported the Government, but owing to their lack of cohesion and the decision of the Government not to intervene in the proceedings, it was the so-called 'extreme' nationalists who dominated the discussions. They were the more powerful in that they had recovered from the confusion caused by the collapse of the revolt, and had succeeded once more in organizing themselves in a party, the 'National Bloc'. In so far as it had a founder he was Ibrahim Hananu, an Aleppine and a man respected even by his opponents. The Bloc was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It included leading members of important landowning families, like Jamil Mardam Bey from Damascus, Saadullah al-Jabiri from Aleppo, and Hashim al-Atasi, the President of the Bloc. It included also individuals important rather for character and intellect than for representing large sections of opinion, like Faris al-Khuri, a Protestant lawyer, law-teacher and financier. It

[1] For text, see *Orients Moderne*, September, 1927, pp. 409–11.

665 was supported by several groups which preserved something of their individuality inside the alliance. The most important of them was the 'Istiqeal' group, descended from one of the secret societies of the years before 1914. It advocated the complete independence of the Arab countries and tended to be more uncompromising than the other constituent elements of the Bloc. Its leader was Shukri al-Quwatli. Among its other prominent members were Nabih al-Azmah, the Amir Adil Arslan, and Riyadh as-Sulh, perhaps the most important Arab nationalist leader in Lebanon.

646 One of the most prominent of the members of the Bloc,
642 Hashim al-Atasi, was elected President of the Assembly when it met in Damascus in June, 1928; while Ibrahim Hananu became President of the Commission set up to draft the Constitution. The Commission completed its work by August,
642 and laid its draft before the Assembly. The Constitution which it had drawn up was modelled on those of Western democratic countries, and provided for the exercise of legislative powers by a single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, and of executive powers by an elected President and a responsible Ministry. In addition it contained guarantees for the rights of individuals and communities. Thus Article 6 stipulated that all Syrians should be equal before the law, and there should be no inequality of treatment on grounds of religion, sect, race or language. Article 15 guaranteed liberty of conscience, the free exercise of all forms of worship, and the safeguarding of the religious interests and personal status of every sect. Article 28 guaranteed the rights of the religious communities, including their right to establish schools, teaching in their own language, subject to the principles laid down by law; and Article 37 declared that the electoral law to be issued subsequently would provide for the representation of religious minorities. (This provision was carried out. Each Parliament elected since 1930 has contained a number of representatives of the minorities, roughly proportionate to their size.)

648 In general the draft was acceptable to the High Com-
642 missioner, but there were certain articles to the inclusion of which he objected. Thus Article 2 declared that the Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity, which was unaffected by the divisions which had arisen between the end of the war and the

present time. This was a denial of the separate existence of Jebel Druze, the Alawi district, the Lebanese Republic, Palestine and Transjordan; and M. Ponsot judged it to be irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law. Again, four other Articles asserted the right of the President of the Republic to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad and proclaim martial law (73, 74, 75 and 112); and Article 110 declared that the organization of the army would form the subject of a special law. These five Articles also the High Commissioner thought to be incompatible with the obligations of France. He therefore asked that the Articles concerned should be separated from the general body of the draft. The Assembly refused, and M. Ponsot thereupon adjourned it for three months in August, 1928, and for a further three in November. He made an alternative suggestion, that the Assembly should modify the wording of Article 2 and should retain the other offending articles but add to the draft a general reservation safeguarding France's international obligations. This also proved abortive, since he and the Assembly could not agree upon a text for the reservation.

In February, 1929, the work of the Assembly was prorogued *sine die*. During this period and throughout 1929 the split between the National Bloc and 'moderates' grew ever wider. The former, while remaining tranquil, demanded the negotiation of a Treaty to replace the Mandate; the latter continued to advocate a policy of co-operation with France, and attempted without much success to form an effective political organization. The High Commissioner found it impossible to reach an agreement with the nationalists on the constitutional question, while the 'moderates' were too weak and divided for their support to be of value to him; he therefore felt himself bound to give up the attempt to entrust to the Syrian people the responsibility for the elaboration of their own constitution. Accordingly he dissolved the Constituent Assembly in May, 1930, and on his own initiative issued a Constitution for the State of Syria. It was to come into force after the election of the members of a Chamber of Deputies, at a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner.

This Constitution was virtually the same as that drafted by the Assembly, except for such changes as were necessary to

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648 from the Mandatory Power to the Syrian Government being completed within four years.[1]

648 The Treaty was immediately laid before the Chamber. Its
646 reception by the nationalists inside and outside the Chamber was so unfavourable as to make it clear that it had no chance of acceptance. Accordingly the High Commissioner suspended the sittings of the Chamber, withdrew from its cognizance the terms of the Treaty, and authorized the President of the Republic to govern provisionally by means of decree-laws. A year later, in November, 1934, he suspended the Chamber *sine die*. These acts aroused the resentment and indignation of the nationalists, but in general the country remained quiet, apart from local and ephemeral disturbances, throughout 1934 and 1935. In March, 1934, the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, which continued in office for practically two years.

13

665 Perhaps the most important development of the early 1930's
186 was the growth of a number of political parties with a special appeal to the educated youth of the towns, and therefore of great significance in a country whose political circumstances gave peculiar weight to the actions of the young. Very different from one another in their doctrines and their aims, these parties were alike in that they endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older parties had not for the most part possessed ; alike, too, in that they tried to base their activities not upon gusts of feeling or some immediate objective, but upon systematic and reasoned doctrines. They expressed and attempted to direct the spirit of the youth of Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and the other towns : a restless youth, discontented both with its foreign masters and with its own older generation, conscious of talents and ideas and cramped by lack of opportunity, drawn simultaneously towards and away from the West, eager and suspicious, hasty and thoughtful. Even when the youth-movements took a paramilitary form, that does not necessarily mean that they were Fascist ; they were merely endeavouring to satisfy certain human needs which in more fortunate

[1] For text, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1933* (Paris, 1934), pp. 189–95.

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countries are satisfied by days of national celebration, by military service and voluntary organizations.

One of these organizations was the 'Syrian National Party', founded by Antun Saadeh, a Lebanese Christian brought up in South America. This Party professed or rather formulated the specific Syrian as distinct from Arab nationalism which has already been mentioned.[1] At first a secret society, it was discovered by the authorities in 1935, and its leading members imprisoned. From that time it grew in size and importance, in spite of the many obstacles in its path. These obstacles were of various types: the hostility of the authorities, who more than once dissolved the party; the opposition of the Arab nationalists, who regarded it as a separatist movement; and the widespread belief that the party was in too close touch with European Fascism. That it was able to hold its own was also due to several factors. First, it made a more determined effort than any other organization to think out the whole national problem in all its aspects, and to formulate a programme in the light of clear and valid political principles. Again, it was rigidly organized on the membership principle, with a hierarchy, a logical division of functions and a strict discipline. Finally, its leader was a man of courage, decision and powerful intellect.

The party reached its zenith a year or two before the beginning of the war. It had several thousand adherents, largely but not exclusively Lebanese Christians. With the departure of the leader for South America in 1938 a decline set in, but whether temporary or permanent has still to be seen.

Simultaneously there grew up a number of Arab nationalist youth organizations. The most influential of them was the League of National Action, which tried to weld into a unity the youth of all the Arab countries. Its form was that of a federation of local societies. It stood for the independence and union of the Arab world, and was not prepared to accept any agreement with the Western Powers unless they should completely renounce their imperialist designs. Its programme was formulated at a conference held in Lebanon in 1933, and for some years after that it flourished in the Syrian towns. But it was never important in the other Arab countries, and even in Syria it suffered an irreparable blow by the death of

[1] See Chapter VI.

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S 665 its first President and most important member, Abdur-Razzaq ad-Dandashi.

One of the principles of the League was to hold itself aloof from established Governments and leaders. In this it differed from the Nationalist Youth. An offshoot of the National Bloc, with a paramilitary organization, the Nationalist Youth rose to prominence in 1935 and 1936. Its doctrines were not greatly different from those of the League, but the two groups wasted much of their strength in conflict with one another.

L 665 In addition to the Syrian and Arab nationalist groups, there arose a Lebanese nationalist party, the 'Phalanges Libanaises'. It was not strictly a political organization, and indeed tried to remain independent of Governments and politicians. Its purpose was to arouse among all sections of Lebanese youth a consciousness of the separate existence and destiny of Lebanon, and of their duty to it; and to give them the discipline and opportunities of service without which they could not fulfil that duty. Although in principle open to members of all religious communities, in practice the majority of its adherents, like its leader, Pierre Jumayyil, were Maronites educated by the Jesuits. Its main rival in Lebanon was a Moslem organization with Pan-Arab doctrines, the 'Najjadah'.

S L 665 Finally, there was the Communist Party, which continued to work steadily and unobtrusively among the young intellectuals and the few groups of organized and class-conscious urban workers. Small in numbers, it had several able leaders and exercised a certain influence through its newspaper and its other publications.

631 National Bloc, Mazhar Raslan as Governor of Latakia and Nasib al-Bakri as Governor of Jebel Druze.

648 Although the Treaty had not yet been ratified by the French
642 Parliament, it was agreed that the transitional period should be regarded as starting on January 1st, 1937. A beginning was made with the transfer to the Syrian Government of functions hitherto exercised by the French authorities. The Government was given the right freely to prepare and carry out its budget, and a certain control over the police; in principle the High Commissioner ceased to exercise his right to veto legislation, and the 'conseillers' to control ministerial acts. But the Mandatory Power still retained the conduct of foreign relations, the ultimate responsibility for public order and certain administrative services such as the supervision of the Beduin tribes.

665 These events seemed to show that the policy of the Bloc was
186 successful. It was still united; it had an overwhelming majority in the Chamber; its adherents filled the offices of the Government; it commanded a large measure of support in the country, especially among the younger generation.

Opposition to the Bloc existed, but it was so far largely inarticulate and undirected. It consisted of a handful of Deputies; of some extreme Arab nationalist organizations, which refused to recognize the Mandate and regarded co-operation with the French as treason; and of the separatist movements among the Alawis and Druzes and in the Jazirah.

The hopes of Syrian independence reached their climax in the celebrations which marked the return to Syria of the newly-amnestied exiles, Dr. Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash in May, 1937, the Amir Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in June. It seemed as if the country were entering upon a new period of national construction under leaders whose patriotic energy had only been strengthened by disappointment, imprisonment, and long years of exile.

5

648 The next two years saw the collapse of these hopes. The claims of Turkey to Alexandretta, the growth of separatist movements, the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty, the unrest caused by the disturbances in Palestine, the administrative failure of the Nationalist Government and finally the growth of an internal

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suspension of the Constitution and the complete breakdown 648
of the policy of 1936.

II

The Bloc was the more incapable of weathering such a 665
crisis, because by now there had appeared a strong nationalist opposition to it. Already in 1936 such a potential opposition had existed ready to take shape so soon as, on the one hand, the Bloc disappointed hopes, and on the other an alternative leader or group of leaders appeared. At the time neither of the two conditions was fulfilled. The Bloc was at the height of its success; and the few Deputies who opposed it were neither prominent nor strong enough to become popular leaders.

During the next few years, however, matters changed. The Bloc gradually lost a great part of its popularity, on account of its failure to secure the ratification of the Treaty and its impotence in the face of Turkish designs upon Alexandretta. The natural tendency of Governments in office to disappoint individual hopes and create individual grievances worked in the same direction.

The discontent was increased by the comparative failure of 631
the Government in internal administration. Among the 642
causes of failure were the inadequate powers of the Govern- 648
ment, the widespread belief that it did not enjoy the backing of the French authorities, its own lack of experience and the absence of an efficient civil service; but it was nevertheless discouraging to its supporters and irritating to ordinary citizens. On the whole the departments were no better administered than they had been; and there was a succession of petty acts of discrimination against members of minorities. The relations between the central and local authorities were often difficult, the tendency to excessive centralization conflicting with the innate localism of some of the provinces. This conflict had indeed existed before the nationalists came to power, and in order to end it, the High Commissioner had issued a decree on provincial organization in January, 1936. Besides altering the number and boundaries of the provinces, this decree had defined the scope of the central and local authorities and provided for the establishment of provincial councils. In spite of declarations, this decree was never fully applied.

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the Defence of Palestine, in Damascus. Nationalists in Syria 648 regarded the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs as their own struggle; and their opposition to French policy was strengthened and sustained by the constant thought of the battle which their fellow-countrymen were waging against Zionism and the policy of the Balfour Declaration.

The conditions for the growth of an opposition now existed. 665 Its leader was found in Dr. Abdur-Rahman Shahbandar. A well-educated, intelligent and masterful Damascene, he had been Foreign Minister under Faisal, and had played an important part in the revolt of 1925-1926. Sentenced to death by the French, he had taken up residence in Egypt. He returned to Syria after the amnesty to the political exiles in May, 1937. This first visit of his lasted only a month, but he found time publicly to declare his opposition to the party of the National Bloc—an opposition due partly perhaps to his disbelief in the policy of co-operation with the French, but partly also, there can be no doubt, to pique at seeing the leadership of the nationalist movement in other hands than his.

He was absent from Syria for the rest of the year 1937, but at the end of the year he came out into the open with a manifesto accusing Jamil Mardam Bey of having made inacceptable concessions to the French Government during his recent visit to Paris, and of having done nothing to defend Syrian rights in Alexandretta. He soon gathered around him a number of those who for one reason or another were dissatisfied with the Government of the Bloc.

In February, 1938, the Government replied to Dr. Shahbandar's memorandum by arresting his leading supporters, on the charge of having distributed a seditious manifesto repeating his accusations. Despite their denial of the charge, they were all sentenced to several months' detention, but the sentences were reduced after a re-trial.

Two months later, the crystallization of Dr. Shahbandar's supporters into a definite political group was marked by the issue of a manifesto, signed by Zaki al-Khatib in the name of the 'Free National Front'. It stated that any interference in the internal affairs of Syria on the pretext of defending minorities would be regarded as an infringement of national sovereignty; that any detachment of Syrian territory in order to transfer it to another State or to retain it under the Mandate would be considered an infraction of the Treaty;

that all projects for retaining French preponderance in the Mixed Courts would be equivalent to maintaining the yoke of the Capitulations; that any partial removal of the schools from national control would be incompatible with national unity, and a danger to national culture; that any delay in handing over the control of the army would open Syria to the danger of aggression; and that any linking of the Syrian currency to a foreign currency, or any petroleum concession which did not assure to Syria a fair proportion of the proceeds, would be a menace to the country's prosperity. The manifesto, which was obviously an attack upon the concessions made or supposed to have been made by Jamil Mardam on his recent visit to France, ended by declaring that Syria would not accept any Treaty which gave it fewer rights than those possessed by Iraq.

The Government replied by confining Dr. Shahbandar to his house when he returned once more to Syria in July, 1938; by arresting once more those of his followers who had been arrested in February; and by suspending their newspaper. But the opposition continued and the end of the year saw the formation of a 'Constitutional Bloc' consisting of 27 deputies, including not only the immediate followers of Dr. Shahbandar but also some of the representatives of the Beduin, the Druzes, the Alawis and the inhabitants of the Jazirah.

Very many, however, of those who were discontented with the way in which things were going grouped themselves not around Dr. Shahbandar but around Shukri al-Quwatli, who had been a member of Mardam Bey's Ministry at first, but had resigned from it in March, 1938. From that time onwards he remained not indeed openly hostile to the Ministry, but critical of it, and voiced the opinion of those who would accept no compromise in the struggle for Arab unity and independence. He had the support, among others, of a section of the League of National Action, which had never shown more than an uneasy acquiescence in the rule of the Bloc. Another section of the League, however, held itself aloof from all established politicians and regarded even the unamended Treaty of 1936 as too great a sacrifice of the national interests. This independence of established powers was professed also by a new youth-organization, the 'Arab Club', of which the leaders, although not the rank and file, were suspected of too close a contact with Nazi ideas and agents.

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Against the opposition of these two youth-movements, the 665
Bloc's own organization, the Nationalist Youth, was almost powerless. It had taken a leading part in the disturbances of 1936, but when the leaders of the Bloc came to power it proved more of a nuisance than an asset and was quietly silenced by them.

12

The final crisis was delayed for a time by the arrival of the 648
new French High Commissioner, M. Gabriel Puaux, who had been chosen to succeed M. de Martel in the previous October. M. Puaux left France for Syria at the beginning of January, 1939. The belief that he was coming to bury the Treaty explains why, when M. Puaux landed at Beirut on January 8th, his arrival was marked by some enthusiasm in Lebanon, but by hostility and manifestations in favour of Syrian unity in the cities of the interior. The tension was heightened rather than relieved by a broadcast speech of the High Commissioner on January 11th, in which he reminded the nationalists that France had a mission to maintain order and justice in the Levant, and that 'were she to withdraw or her forces to be weakened, Syrian patriots would see their dearest dreams disappear.'

Shortly afterwards M. Puaux made his first visit to Damascus. It was marked by strikes, and other measures of protest against the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the Treaty. A ministerial crisis seemed imminent; but after heated discussions in the Chamber, it was agreed that the Ministry should remain in office and no steps be taken until M. Puaux had had time to study the situation and form his opinion upon it.

M. Puaux spent the remainder of January visiting the different parts of the country. Disturbances and tension continued, and he had hardly completed his travels when a crisis occurred.

In March, 1936, the High Commissioner had issued a decree determining the rights of the officially recognized religious communities in matters of personal status, and the relations between the communities. It aroused considerable opposition in orthodox Moslem circles, partly because they believed its provisions to be contrary to those of Islamic law, but more fundamentally because it treated the Moslems as one sect

648 of Nations on April 18th, 1941, they regarded the juridical
186 basis of French Mandatory rule as having disappeared.

Political meetings and demonstrations being forbidden, nationalist uneasiness remained for the most part beneath the surface throughout 1940. But it revealed itself in the press of other Arab countries and the activities of their Governments; this was especially true of Iraq. Thus in July, 1940, Nuri as-Said, then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara, Beirut and Damascus in order to discuss with the Turkish and French authorities and with prominent Syrians and Lebanese the future of the French Mandated Territories. At the conclusion of his journey he issued a statement to the effect that both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments thought that Syria should be for the Syrians and that the country should enjoy complete independence.

665 A symptom of the prevalent unrest was the murder of Dr.
662 Shahbandar in Damascus in the same month, while his political influence was at its height. Within a few days his assassins were arrested. After the preliminary investigation had been completed a special tribunal was set up to try them and certain other persons believed to be implicated in the crime. Among the latter were three of the leaders of the National Bloc, Jamil Mardam Bey, Saadullah al-Jabiri and Lutfi al-Haffar. They were accused of deliberate complicity in the assassination. Almost at the same time as the accusation against them was published, all three left Syria for Baghdad.

The trial of the accused persons began in December, 1940. In the course of it the leader of the assassins made a complete confession: their motive in deciding to kill Dr. Shahbandar had been religious, since they regarded him as one of those responsible for the decay of Islam; they had tried to throw the blame for their crime upon the leaders of the Bloc, who in reality had had nothing to do with it. The trial ended at the beginning of January, with the condemnation of six persons to death and several others to imprisonment, and the complete exoneration of Jamil Mardam Bey, Lutfi al-Haffar and Saadullah al-Jabiri. The sentences were carried out immediately.

4

000 At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so

000 Lebanon the Government of Sami as-Sulh succeeded that of
645 Ahmad ad-Da'uq. In Syria, Hasan al-Hakim resigned in April, 1942, and was succeeded by Husni al-Barazi, who himself gave way in January, 1943, to Jamil al-Ulshi. These changes had only a very limited significance.

648 This failure to restore the constitutional Government
186 increased the discontent which had already been caused in both Syria and Lebanon by the way in which their independence had been proclaimed. The administrative methods of the Free French officials were also much criticized; more particularly, a general contempt was felt for the many officials who had served Vichy and had only gone over to Free France after the occupation of the country in 1941. Thus the belief grew up that Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing by their change of masters. It was a belief held not only by the political classes but by ordinary citizens who resented the inefficiency of the French administration; not only by Arab nationalists but even by many of the Lebanese Christians, who could not feel towards the Free French the admiration, gratitude and trust which they had had for France as a great Power. In the circumstances it was natural that Great Britain should be largely blamed for the actions of her ally.

645 One consequence of the discontent was a revival in the
665 power of the National Bloc. The dissensions between its leaders were patched up, and the Bloc united in its demand for the restoration of the Chamber of 1936-1939 or else the holding of fresh elections. Its spokesman was Shukri al-Quwatli, whose reputation had grown steadily throughout the years. In October, 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation, he absented himself from Syria on a visit to Arabia and Iraq; but after his return to Damascus in September, 1942, he became once more the dominant figure of the political scene. Side by side with the revival of the Bloc there went a growth in the size and influence of the Socialist and Communist movements; this was due not so much to the spread of Marxist doctrines as to the universal discontent with the existing order and the eagerness to snatch at any hope of change.

14

722 In Syria and Lebanon alike, the attention of the greater part of the population was concentrated upon the economic problems of the war. Two of them were peculiarly important.

722 been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

15

648 After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to
642 restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

666 In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was
646 decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies,
665 including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

643 On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected
645 Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

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642 are not removable except by the action of the Supreme Court of Justice.

Political Parties

665 668 Since 1946 political parties in Syria have been little more than côteries grouped temporarily around individual leaders. It is hard to distinguish between the personalities and the policies of the Nationalist and the Populist Parties, for individuals and groups divided differently on different matters. In fact, there have been only two main parties, those in power and those waiting to accede to power. The two chief parties in opposition have been the Nationalist Bloc and the People's Party, groups of men who also called themselves Liberals or Constitutionalists. These two parties' main concern has been to maintain or to establish themselves in power; both have naturally been nationalist in sentiment but no distinctive programmes or tendencies are to be seen except in the more extreme political groups.

The Communist Party and its leader, Khaled Baqdash, went underground in 1947 and since then the interests of Communism have best been served in Syria by those who, while not adopting the theories of the Communists, share with them a dislike for the Western Powers. Chief in this category is the Muslim Brotherhood, one of whose leaders, Shaikh Maarouf Dawalibi, has said that he would prefer Russian to Western domination. In 1947 an attempt was made by the Brotherhood to obtain sufficient weight in Parliament to resist the encroachment of Western ideas and amusements, but in January 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood and all political parties were suspended. Although nationalist politicians can claim much of the credit for the achievement of independence, to the 'man in the street' politicians have since been discredited, and it may be that a slower approach towards parliamentary democracy will yield results that were denied to the post-war precipitancy.

Political History since 1945

The Nationalist Party came into office in 1943 to wrest independence from the French, whose withdrawal removed also the only plank in the party's political platform. Their stock declined more rapidly when the conduct of the Palestine war and internal government aroused general disapproval. In 1947 the Populist Party came into power but Jamil Mardam, the Nationalist Party Premier, retained his place; from 1946–8 Mardam showed his skill as a tactician in controlling a Chamber in which his supporters were in a minority. In 1948 President

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Quwatli received an extension of office, but the completeness of the military failure in Palestine and the rising cost of living at home increased dissensions among the politicians and dissatisfaction among the people and in the same year Khaled al-Azm, the Populist, took over the premiership. To most Syrians this change meant little, for Syria's material progress since the war has been achieved despite rather than because of the efforts of her politicians. The change of Government did nothing to reduce the people's dissatisfaction and the political atmosphere was only cleared by a coup d'état by Colonel Husni az-Zaim, a Kurd with long army service, on 3 March 1947. He took control and arrested the President and other politicians; finding insufficient support in the Parliament, he dissolved it and became himself first Prime Minister, then Marshal, and then President. When first he took power he won popular support by the spate of positive legislation he issued, but he was soon corrupted by power into becoming arrogant at home; and in quarrelling with the Hashimite neighbours, Iraq and Jordan, he showed himself too friendly with Egypt for the liking of some Syrians. Although nearly 90 per cent of the electorate had voted for Zaim, there was little public outcry when Colonel Sami Hinnawi, on 14 August 1949, overthrew and killed Zaim and his Prime Minister, Muhsin Barazi. Hinnawi ostensibly returned to his barracks leaving Hashim al-Atasi as President and Khaled al-Azm as Prime Minister, with a mixed Cabinet including Rushdi Kekhya of the Populist Party and Akram Haurani, leader of his own party. In November 1949 elections were held and these confirmed Atasi as President, but a dispute arose concerning the terms of the presidential oath. The bone of contention was, in fact, Hinnawi's leaning toward a pact with Iraq, and so to estrangement with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A pact with the Hashimis was anathema to Haurani and also to his associate Lieut.-Colonel Adib Shishakli, who brought about the third military coup on 19 December 1949. Hinnawi was allowed to leave the country but was later killed in Beirut by an avenger of Barazi.

Colonel Shishakli had fought against the Jews in Palestine and had been Chief of Police and Security under Marshal Zaim; he had been a member of the Syrian People's Party and so fell out with Zaim over the case of Antoun Saadeh.[1] He is a professional soldier with no strong family or political ties to those who had hitherto ruled Syria. Shishakli has kept in the background but retained a veto over the decisions of the politicians and a firm hand on the army, posting to distant stations

[1] See below, p. 479.

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665 or retiring officers who showed signs of becoming dangerous.
669 In 1952 he played a large part in endeavouring to give a firm foundation to the new Umma Party and has also made rather more public appearances than at first.[1]

Khaled al-Azm's Cabinet had no common policy to bind them together and resigned in June 1950 to give way to a wholly Populist Cabinet in which Colonel Fawzi Silu took the Defence portfolio as the army's nominee. The rest of the year saw minor constitutional changes and there were stirrings of dissent amongst the military leaders which came to light in the murder of the Commander of the army air force and in an attempt on the life of Shishakli. In the autumn of 1950 pro-Hashimite politicians were out of favour and most of the time in prison. In March 1951 the premiership changed hands; al-Azm was succeeded by Nazim Qudsi, a Populist with no hatred for the Western Powers. Qudsi tried, but failed, to limit the authority of the army; al-Azm again took office, but he, too, found no support in the Parliament. With Shishakli's backing, a new Government was formed in August 1951 by Hasan al-Hakim who could not, however, agree with the attack on the proposals for a Middle East defence organization made by his Foreign Minister, Faidi al-Atasi. Hakim resigned and, in November, a period of muddle was resolved by another coup by Shishakli, as the result of which many of the politicians who had recently held office were imprisoned. At the end of 1951 Parliament was dissolved and Colonel Silu was appointed Chief of State *ad interim* and the government carried on by the senior civil servants.

In January 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood, and in April all political parties, were dissolved and the military rulers passed legislation to forbid students, trade unions, and sports clubs from taking part in any political activity. At the end of the year General Shishakli, now Vice-Premier and Chief of Staff, supported the formation of a new political party known as the Arab Liberation Movement, in the hope that parliamentary
[642] life could gradually be restored. In the following summer (21 June 1953) he announced a new constitution on the presidential model, based on 'the aims and aspirations of the people', giving executive power to the President but 'permanent power of control' to the Chamber of Deputies. A referendum held on 10 July resulted in the adoption of the new constitution and the election for a period of five years of Shishakli as President and
666 Premier. A new electoral law, promulgated on 1 August, prepared the way for elections on 9 October, and at the beginning

[1] See Alford Carlton, 'Syria Today', *International Affairs*, January 1954.

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The insurrection had many consequences in the Jebel. It prevented any further attempts to interfere with the customs and social structure of the Jebel. Its administration was placed under stricter French control, but its separation from the State of Syria was maintained. The administrative system was formalized by an Organic Law issued in 1930. Under this Law, the region was to be administered by a Governor, appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner, and possessed of considerable legislative and financial as well as executive powers. In practice he was always a Frenchman. He was to be assisted by a Council of Government, composed partly of heads of administrative departments and partly of appointed members chosen from among the notables. All important acts of the Government would require the approval of the High Commissioner, who was also to exercise such sovereign powers as did not belong to the local Government.[1]

The administration of the Jebel followed a policy the effect of which, whether deliberate or not, was to drive a wedge between the Druzes and the Arab nationalists, whose temporary alliance had given the revolt of 1925 its strength. The separatist spirit so deeply grounded in Druze tradition was encouraged, and there was grafted on to it among a certain section a feeling of dependence upon France. There remained, however, another section who wished for union with Syria.

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In the State of Syria, the process of pacification was accompanied by one of political change, with the aim of improving the state of feeling and removing some of the grievances of the nationalists: grievances which had been partly endorsed by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its special session to investigate the revolt, held at Rome in February-March, 1926. The change was initiated by M. Henri de Jouvenel, who replaced General Sarrail in November, 1925. He took the first steps which were designed to lead ultimately to self-government. In Lebanon he allowed the Representative Council to draft a Constitution for the State; in the State of the Alawis he held elections for a Constituent Council to draft an Organic Law; and in the State of Syria he ordered elections for

[1] For text, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 694-7.

similar Councils to be held in all parts of the country not under martial law. In spite of a boycott by the nationalists, the Syrian elections were held, but the Representative Councils which resulted from them proved ineffective.

The next step was to form a Government which should be more acceptable to public opinion than that which had been presided over by Subhi Barakat since the creation of the Syrian State, and which resigned in December, 1925. The Presidency of the State was offered to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, the son of one of the most respected religious leaders in Damascus. He laid down certain conditions of his taking office. The High Commissioner could not, however, accept them, and after some delay appointed as provisional President Damad Ahmad Nami, a Circassian by origin. He formed a Ministry which for a short time included members of the 'People's Party'; its programme envisaged the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty and the attainment of Syrian unity by negotiation with the other States included in the French Mandate.

II

In June, 1926, M. de Jouvenel declared to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the French Government intended to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Next month he resigned and was succeeded by M. Ponsot. The new High Commissioner took the first step towards the establishment of the self-government which had been foreseen by his predecessor, by preparing for the elaboration of an Organic Law. A beginning had indeed already been made with this: M. de Jouvenel had consulted various notables on the form which the future political organization of the country should take.

In July, 1927, M. Ponsot made a declaration in which he explicitly identified himself with the policy approved by the French Government and the League of Nations and defined by his predecessors. Regard for the wishes of the people concerned had, he maintained, been the idea which had throughout inspired French policy. In accordance with this idea, the framing of the definitive constitution of the countries under French Mandate was to be the work of those peoples. The Mandatory Power would exert itself to bring about a general agreement and to arbitrate in any differences which

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

might arise; in default of an agreement, it would take appropriate measures to maintain order and to guarantee peace. The Mandatory Power desired to favour and hasten the political evolution of the States under its protection, and to promote their economic development. As for the 'Common Interests', the High Commissioner would continue to administer them with the active and ever-increasing assistance of the representatives of the States.[1]

A few months later, in February, 1928, M. Ponsot judged that the time had come for the election of a Constituent Assembly. In that month the state of siege declared at the beginning of the revolt was finally raised, the censorship suppressed, the special tribunals established during the revolt abolished, and a general amnesty issued. At the same time Damad Ahmad Nami's Ministry was replaced by a new provisional Government of 'moderate' politicians presided over by Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, with the task of preparing the way for the creation of regular institutions to which it could hand over its functions.

The elections were held in April of the same year. In the towns, most of those elected belonged to the more uncompromising section of the nationalists, the opponents of Shaikh Taj ad-Din's Ministry; in the countryside, however, they were mainly moderates. Of the seventy members of the Assembly, over two-thirds supported the Government, but owing to their lack of cohesion and the decision of the Government not to intervene in the proceedings, it was the so-called 'extreme' nationalists who dominated the discussions. They were the more powerful in that they had recovered from the confusion caused by the collapse of the revolt, and had succeeded once more in organizing themselves in a party, the 'National Bloc'. In so far as it had a founder he was Ibrahim Hananu, an Aleppine and a man respected even by his opponents. The Bloc was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It included leading members of important landowning families, like Jamil Mardam Bey from Damascus, Saadullah al-Jabiri from Aleppo, and Hashim al-Atasi, the President of the Bloc. It included also individuals important rather for character and intellect than for representing large sections of opinion, like Faris al-Khuri, a Protestant lawyer, law-teacher and financier. It

[1] For text, see *Orients Moderne*, September, 1927, pp. 409-11.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
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before 1914; and was it not ridiculous, as well as expensive, for so small a region to have so grandiose and complex a constitution? L 642

As a further consequence, the movement of discontent with sectarianism was greatly strengthened, and many Lebanese, especially among the young, began to look for an alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges Libanaises', the party of Lebanese nationalism, received much support. So too did the 'Syrian National Party', with its doctrine of the total separation of Church and State; while the Arab Nationalists pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself. L 642 666

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In Syria, the first steps towards the execution of the Treaty were taken immediately after the return of the Syrian delegation from Paris. Arrangements were made for the holding of Parliamentary elections; the Chamber was to consist of 86 members, 16 of them representing the religious minorities and 7 the Beduin tribes. The elections, which took place in November, 1936, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the candidates of the National Bloc; and when the Chamber met, on December 21st, its first important act was to choose Faris al-Khuri as its President, and its second to accept the resignation of Muhammad Ali al-Abid from the Presidency of the Republic and to elect Hashim al-Atasi in his place. The Ayyubi Ministry having resigned, the President entrusted the formation of a new one to Jamil Mardam Bey. All the members of his Ministry were drawn from the National Bloc. S 666 646 645

This Ministry found no difficulty in securing the confidence of the Chamber, which unanimously approved the Treaty in December, 1936. It was formally signed by the High Commissioner and the members of the Ministry on December 22nd. S 648

In the same month, after consultations with notables of the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, their annexation to the Syrian State was proclaimed. This proclamation was accompanied by special Statutes granting a measure of administrative autonomy to the two regions. Despite protests from separatist groups against the concept of a unitary Syria, the régime envisaged in these Statutes was inaugurated by the appointment in January, 1937, of two prominent members of the S 631

722 been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

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648 After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to
642 restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

666 In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was
646 decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies,
665 including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

643 On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected
645 Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

tution was drafted and promulgated in September 1950 with high hopes that it might prove to be the panacea for all of the country's ills.

This process, however, should not be regarded as evidence of inherent insecurity in Syria's political life, but rather as a transitory stage in its constitutional evolution. In it can be seen the gradual ironing out of doubts and conflicts over the nature of the Syrian state, the proper functions of its government, and its relations with the outside world, social and economic as well as political. Syria has freed itself too recently from foreign influence for it to have adjusted fully to both national and international circumstances.

FROM A NATIONAL MONARCHY TO A MANDATORY ADMINISTRATION

Amir Faysal, at the head of an Arab army, entered Damascus in October 1918 with the avowed intention of establishing an Arab government. But before he had time to organize a constitutional regime, he was caught up in the larger issue of the peace settlement regarding the whole Arab world. The Syrians, too impatient to wait for the final decisions of the Peace Conference and suspicious of what these decisions would be, called a Syrian Congress representing "Greater Syria" (including Lebanon and Palestine), on the basis of the old Ottoman Electoral Law.[1] This Congress, functioning as both Legislative Assembly and National Convention, considered all matters related to national and foreign policy as well as the drafting of a constitution. It held three main sessions between June 3, 1919, and July 19, 1920. It prepared, during its last session, a draft constitution of 148 articles which, though no formal final vote was taken, had been accepted in principle.[2] The Congress was still considering the second reading when the crisis with the French authorities

[1] Elections were actually held only in the interior of Syria; the deputies from Lebanon and Palestine, owing to the objection of the French and British military authorities to the elections, were chosen on the basis of petitions signed by voters in support of their candidates. See Philippe David, *Un Gouvernement Arabe à Damas: Le Congrès Syrien* (Paris, 1923), pp. 52–63.

[2] Cf. Philippe David, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

15: Khaddurī S-4 (no date) 1951 MDI Syria MDI

last time on August 10, 1928, passed a resolution empowering its President to negotiate on its behalf with the authorities "for the fulfilment of the country's [national] aspirations." But negotiations between the leading Syrian nationalists and the High Commissioner led to no agreement. Following an exchange of a number of proposals and counter-proposals, the High Commissioner, by a decree issued on February 5, 1929, prorogued the Constituent Assembly *sine die*.[12] It was over a year later, on May 14, 1930, that M. Ponsot, after consultations in Paris, surprised the nationalists by promulgating the Constitution. The text included Article 2 as altered by a previous proposal of his to reduce it to "Syria is an indivisible political unity," but the other articles in question remained unchanged. There appeared also a new provision (Article 116) withholding from application all provisions which infringed upon France's international obligations relative to Syria, or dealt with the maintenance of security or with foreign relations. Such provisions would become applicable only after special agreement between Syria and the French Government. The Nationalists somewhat grudgingly decided to take part in the elections on this basis, but another eighteen months elapsed before M. Ponsot issued orders for holding them. The elections were finally completed on March 30, 1932, and resulted in a victory for the moderates rather than the nationalist elements.

When Parliament met on June 7, 1932, there was considerable discussion regarding the election of the President. The Nationalists' candidate, Hashim al-Atasi, could muster only 17 votes; nevertheless they declared their intention of withdrawing from Parliament if the Government insisted upon the election of one of its two candidates: Subhi Barakat or Haqqi al-Azm. A compromise was finally reached by electing Muhammad Ali al-Abid, who was *persona grata* to both groups, on the understanding that he would select Haqqi al-Azm, candidate of the moderates, as Prime Minister. In this way the first republican administration was established by the French in cooperation with the Syrian

[12] For these proposals and counter-proposals, see Amin Sa'id, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 550-52. For the French version, see *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, pp. 20-21.

648 Syrian nationalists took place in 1936 when the international situation had become critical in consequence of Mussolini's occupation of Ethiopia. Prompted by his threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, and inspired by Britain's successful move in the same year to appease the Egyptian nationalists, France once more offered to negotiate a treaty which would give Syria full independence. There was at this time the more liberal Popular Front Government in Paris, with Leon Blum as Prime Minister and Yvon Delbos as Foreign Minister, both of whom were more sympathetic toward Syria's national aspirations than their predecessors. The resulting treaty of September 9, 1936, negotiated by a Syrian Nationalist delegation in Paris, provided for the replacement of the Mandate by a Treaty of Alliance with France on the basis of full independence. While Lebanon was to remain outside of Syria, the autonomous districts (Jabal Druze and Latakia) were to join a unitary Syrian state. France was to receive certain rights regarding its military position in the Levant (as in the case of Britain in Iraq) and the two countries were to consult each other in all matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests. The Treaty was to last for 25 years and to come into force, as in the case of Iraq, when Syria was admitted to membership in the League of Nations as an independent state.

[646] 645 648 Elections for a new Parliament which was to ratify the Treaty were held in November 1936, and resulted in an overwhelming majority for the Nationalists (Kutla Party). Parliament met on December 21 and elected Hashim al-Atasi, leader of the Kutla, President of the Republic in place of Muhammad Ali al-Abid. Faris al-Khuri, a member of the Kutla, was elected President of the Majlis (Parliament), while Jamil Mardam, another Kutla leader, formed the new Government. All members of the Cabinet were drawn from the Kutla Party. The Treaty with France, regarded as a victory for the Kutla, was approved by Parliament and formally signed by the Government and the High Commissioner on December 22, 1936. But it was never ratified by France owing to criticism leveled against it from military and conservative quarters.[17] In 1938 Jamil Mardam tendered his resignation,

[17] For a discussion of France's failure to ratify the treaty, see Charles-André Julien, "French Difficulties in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (1946), pp. 327 ff.

which was followed by that of President Hashim al-Atasi, and the French High Commissioner suspended Parliament. Thus the second attempt to come to an understanding with Syria failed.

NATIONAL REGIME: THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The outbreak of World War II brought renewed hopes for independence. Upon France's defeat in 1940 the Syrian Nationalists began to agitate for the immediate formation of a national Government; indeed some of them went so far as to contact secretly the Iraqi nationalists, inviting them to intervene and unite the two countries under the Crown of Iraq. A few urged cooperation with the Axis, but the failure of the Rashid Ali movement in Iraq raised doubts as to the feasibility of achieving Arab national aspirations along this path, and on the whole the moderate elements began to come to the fore.

The joint Anglo-French occupation of Syria and Lebanon in 1941 brought with it a promise of independence. A Provisional Government was appointed, and on September 28, 1941, General Catroux formally proclaimed the independence of Syria. The Constitution, however, was not at once restored, and the Nationalists, led by Shukri al-Quwwatli, revived their activities. They pledged cooperation with the democratic powers, but demanded either the immediate restoration of the Majlis of 1936–39 or the holding of new elections. Finally, in January 1943 M. Helleu, representing General Catroux, French Delegate-General, announced the restoration of the Constitution and initiated arrangements for general elections. These were held on July 26, with the Nationalist Party (al-Kutla) overwhelmingly victorious.

The Majlis met on August 17, 1943, and elected Shukri al-Quwwatli, who had emerged as the unrivaled leader of the Nationalists, President of the Republic, and Faris al-Khuri President of the Majlis. On August 19 the President invited Sa'dullah al-Jabiri to form a new Cabinet, drawn almost wholly from the Kutla, and the Government began immediately afterward to negotiate with the French authorities for the transfer of such controls as the French still exercised.

Syria's struggle against foreign control was thus fully re-

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

regime. Both Iraq and Jordan, arguing that a union with Syria would strengthen their position against Israel, opened negotiations with Za'im. Pressed by an immediate need to strengthen his position in the forthcoming armistice negotiations with Israel, Za'im offered to conclude an immediate military alliance with a pledge to consider the larger scheme of future cooperation with the Hashimi Kingdoms later on. He refused, however, to commit himself on whether he favored a republican or monarchical regime.[21]

Za'im's move toward negotiation with the Hashimi Kingdoms aroused the fear of the Saudi-Egyptian bloc that a rapprochement would lead to an extension of Hashimi rule to Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia therefore countered with promises of recognition and assurances of military and financial aid. This Saudi-Egyptian intervention was so successful that it not only doomed a Syro-Iraqi dual monarchy (with possible extension to Jordan) but inspired Za'im to reach for the highest position of his country — an ambition which sowed the seeds of disagreement between him and his supporters, both civil and military, who now argued that Za'im had betrayed the cause for which they had instigated the coup, namely to rid the country of the Quwwatli regime.

In April 1949 Za'im dismissed Parliament and ordered new elections on the basis of universal suffrage, including women — the first to be thus held in an Arab country. After Za'im's election to the Presidency, preparations were made to promulgate a new Constitution into which liberal principles were to be introduced, especially relating to land reform. This Constitution, though completed, was never promulgated; but a new civil code, bearing the stamp of the Egyptian jurist Sanhuri Pasha (who had already started research along this line at the initiation of the Iraqi Government), was issued. Although based on both European models and the principles of Islamic law, this code materially restricted the authority of the latter. It is regarded as one of the permanent contributions of Za'im's short-lived regime.

[21] The relations of the Syrian coups d'état to the schemes of unity with Iraq and Jordan are discussed in detail in a paper by the present writer entitled "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity" contributed to a volume to be published shortly by the Harvard University Press.

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ness on both sides. In Syria (and to a lesser degree, in Lebanon) the possibility of long-term co-operation between the nationalist politicians and the Mandatary was frustrated alike by the attitude of most French officials and by that of the local urban populations who, though they later signed the 1936 treaty, desired full self-government.[1] The advent to power in France of the Front Populaire in 1936 eased the situation: treaties with Syria and Lebanon were negotiated whereby the Mandate was to be transformed into an alliance with independent states, but under which France could still maintain troops in the Levant. However, the French Parliament was unwilling to ratify the Syrian treaty under the lengthening shadow of the impending Second World War, and Syrian indignation was increased when the need for Turkey's friendship led France in 1939 to cede to Turkey the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, afterwards renamed Hatay. Leading Syrian politicians refused to co-operate with the French on these terms, and on the eve of the outbreak of war the French High Commissioner once again suspended the Syrian constitution and governed the country through French and Syrian officials; the same procedure was applied to Lebanon after the outbreak of war.

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When metropolitan France fell in 1940 the Mandate was carried on by the Vichy Government until the latter's acquiescence in the use of the Levant airfields by the German air force necessitated the intervention of British and Free French forces in June 1941. After a short but bitter campaign, the Vichy forces signed an armistice in July 1941. In the struggle between the Allies and the Axis and between Vichy and de Gaulle the Syrians and Lebanese took no part, but their independence had been promised by the Allied Command. On behalf of the Free French, General Catroux, in a statement on 8 June 1941, proclaimed the end of the Mandate, but in fact the Free French regarded themselves as trustees for France's position, seeking to maintain them by installing Syrian and Lebanese supporters of France in the seats of authority. The Free French had, however, eventually to yield to the demand for popular elections, which was supported by the British Government as soon as the victory at al-Alamain (October 1942) had finally removed the threat of Axis invasion from the Middle East. In Syria the elections of 1943 brought into office the National Bloc with Shukri al-Quwatli as President of the Republic and Saadullah Jabri, Jamil Mardam, and Faris al-Khouri as parliamentary leaders. In the Lebanon also nationalists were successful and the leader of the 'Constitutional Bloc',

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[1] For details, see A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, RIIA, 1946).

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S L 666 643 Bishara al-Khouri, became President with the pan-Arab Riyad as-Sulh as Prime Minister; these nationalists were not satisfied with mere titular sovereignty but claimed the reality of independence, and in November 1943 a Free French resort to force against them was reversed only by a British intervention, endorsed by the United States Government. The Free French were thus constrained to transfer most branches of the administration to the Syrian and Lebanese Parliaments, but retained control of the local 'Troupes Spéciales' and obstructed the proper equipping of the Syrian gendarmerie. The French intention was to make this vital concession of authority conditional upon the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty which would give France much the same strategic, economic, and cultural advantages as Britain had retained in Iraq by the already obsolescent Treaty of 1930. In March 1945 Syria and Lebanon had been admitted as sovereign states to membership both of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States. The Syrian nationalists were not prepared to subordinate their sovereignty to an imposed alliance with France, and the landing of a contingent of Senegalese troops immediately after VE-day (in disregard of a personal appeal of Churchill to de Gaulle) was regarded in both Syria and Lebanon as clear evidence of a French resort to coercion. Sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Syrian gendarmerie and the local nationalists on the one hand and the French garrison on the other became general, and when, at the end of May 1945, the local French Commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus the British Government ordered their Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene, by force if necessary, to restore order in a region whose security was vital for British communications in the still-continuing war in the Far East. The crisis accelerated the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, concerning which the demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were supported by the Security Council; the process was completed in Syria by 15 April 1946 and in Lebanon by the end of the year.

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S L 648 642 Between the wars, the French Mandate had allowed political development in Lebanon to produce at least a façade of parliamentary democracy, with arrangements between the Muslim and Christian leaders on the division of political power and prerogatives, and the active commercial and intellectual life of Lebanon made progress with a minimum of government interference. In Syria, however, local separatisms which French policy had encouraged made it very difficult for any Syrian Government to knit the people together from Damascus; the

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665 or retiring officers who showed signs of becoming dangerous.
668 In 1952 he played a large part in endeavouring to give a firm foundation to the new Umma Party and has also made rather more public appearances than at first.[1]

Khaled al-Azm's Cabinet had no common policy to bind them together and resigned in June 1950 to give way to a wholly Populist Cabinet in which Colonel Fawzi Silu took the Defence portfolio as the army's nominee. The rest of the year saw minor constitutional changes and there were stirrings of dissent amongst the military leaders which came to light in the murder of the Commander of the army air force and in an attempt on the life of Shishakli. In the autumn of 1950 pro-Hashimite politicians were out of favour and most of the time in prison. In March 1951 the premiership changed hands; al-Azm was succeeded by Nazim Qudsi, a Populist with no hatred for the Western Powers. Qudsi tried, but failed, to limit the authority of the army; al-Azm again took office, but he, too, found no support in the Parliament. With Shishakli's backing, a new Government was formed in August 1951 by Hasan al-Hakim who could not, however, agree with the attack on the proposals for a Middle East defence organization made by his Foreign Minister, Faidi al-Atasi. Hakim resigned and, in November, a period of muddle was resolved by another coup by Shishakli, as the result of which many of the politicians who had recently held office were imprisoned. At the end of 1951 Parliament was dissolved and Colonel Silu was appointed Chief of State *ad interim* and the government carried on by the senior civil servants.

In January 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood, and in April all political parties, were dissolved and the military rulers passed legislation to forbid students, trade unions, and sports clubs from taking part in any political activity. At the end of the year General Shishakli, now Vice-Premier and Chief of Staff, supported the formation of a new political party known as the Arab Liberation Movement, in the hope that parliamentary
[642] life could gradually be restored. In the following summer (21 June 1953) he announced a new constitution on the presidential model, based on 'the aims and aspirations of the people', giving executive power to the President but 'permanent power of control' to the Chamber of Deputies. A referendum held on 10 July resulted in the adoption of the new constitution and the election for a period of five years of Shishakli as President and
•666 Premier. A new electoral law, promulgated on 1 August, prepared the way for elections on 9 October, and at the beginning

[1] See Alford Carlton, 'Syria Today', *International Affairs*, January 1954.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1964 M1 Middle East
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of September the ban on political parties, which had been in force since the end of 1952, was lifted. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the new party, sponsored by the President. As in 1947, voting was by direct suffrage and in 1953 women voted for the first time; there were five women candidates, who were not, however, elected.

External Problems and Relationships

Syria's relations with Great Britain were good after 1941, although not perhaps as good as might have been expected from Britain's record of support for Syrian independence; the credit for this was soon forgotten when Britain did not take the Arab part in the struggle with Zionism. Both Britain and the United States incurred distrust and dislike for their support of Zionism; Syria is one of the few countries to have refused Point Four aid and there have been incidents, not discouraged by the Syrian Government, in which Americans or American property have been attacked. Of the 'imperial' Western Powers, France was in 1952 the least unpopular, partly in view of her long association with the country and partly because she has supplied Syria with the arms which have not been forthcoming from Britain or the United States; but western Germany was rapidly gaining esteem until the Bonn Government undertook to make reparation to Israel for the massacres of European Jews during the Second World War.

Syria has no affinity with Russia or love of Communism but has enjoyed playing East against West in bargaining for favours. Shishakli has the backing of the nation in his desire for neutrality but, if Syria cannot avoid being involved in any war that may break out between Russia and the West, then Syria naturally prefers to be on the winning side. For Syria, picking the winner is a difficult choice requiring deliberation, and any signs that she may be coming down on the Western side of the fence are only recent.

In the struggle between the Hashimis[1] and the alliance of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Syria usually sided with the latter. This has been due to the devotion of Shukri Kuwatli to the late Ibn Saud and to the fear of Syrian political and military leaders (especially Zaim and Akram Haurani) that they might be submerged by Iraqis and Jordanians in any form of Greater Syria. Under Hinnawi, Syria quarrelled with Egypt and at times there have been signs that she was not prepared blindly to follow Egypt's lead. But, under Shishakli, Syria has tried to keep the peace with both parties; he met Nuri Said in July

[1] See above, p. 31.

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ELECTORAL LAW OF SYRIA[1]

Decree No. 17 of September 10, 1949

Chapter I

NUMBER OF DEPUTIES

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Art. 1. The headquarters of each Muhafazat,[2] with every Nahiya and village under its jurisdiction, as well as every Qadha, shall form an electoral district.

Art. 2. The electoral district shall elect one deputy for every 30,000 Syrian inhabitants or for a fraction of population exceeding half that number.

An electoral district which does not contain 30,000 but not less than 15,000 shall elect one deputy.

The Qadha which does not contain 15,000 shall be joined to the nearest neighboring Qadha headquarters in the Muhafazat, or to the Muhafazat headquarters itself. These sections joined together shall then constitute one electoral district.

Art. 3. A number of parliamentary seats shall be assigned to non-Moslems in proportion to their number in each electoral district and as specified in the previous article.

Art. 4. Nomadic tribes shall be represented by six deputies. The "Special Consultative Council for Nomadic Tribes" shall elect these six deputies from its literate members.

[1] Arabic text in *Official Journal of the Syrian Republic*, no. 46, September 12, 1949, text through the courtesy of Mr. Faiz El-Khouri, Minister of Syria, Washington. English translation prepared by Dr. George J. Tomeh, Second Secretary to the Syrian Legation, upon request of the *Middle East Journal* (Washington), where it also appears (IV [October, 1950], 476-481). The Syrian electoral law of March 28, 1928, reproduced in the first edition of this volume (pp. 277-295), and its amendment of April 21, 1928 (*ibid.*, p. 295) were superseded by a new electoral law of May 21, 1947. The Arabic text of the law of 1947 is to be found in *Official Journal of the Syrian Republic*, no. 23, May 24, 1947. An English translation of substantial parts of the law of 1947 appears in *Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947*, United Nations, 1949, pp. 295-297.

[2] Syria has various administrative divisions and subdivisions; a *Muhafazat* (province) is governed by a *Muhafez*, a *Qadha* (district) by a *Qaimmaqam*, and a *Nahiya* (subdistrict) by a *Mudir*. Throughout this translation the Arabic terms will be used (*Translator's note*).

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Art. 5. The date for parliamentary elections shall be fixed by a decree upon the proposal of the Minister of the Interior and the approval of the cabinet. This decree ought to be published at least one month prior to the fixed date for elections.

Art. 6. At least twenty days before elections, a decree shall be issued, upon the proposal of the Minister of the Interior, and the approval of the cabinet, fixing the number of deputies for each electoral district and according to Articles 2 and 3 of this Law. This decree remains effective during the period of parliament.

Chapter II

ELECTORS

Section 1. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ELECTOR

Art. 7. Every Syrian, male and female, who completes the 18th year of his or her age in the beginning of January of the year of elections, shall have the right of suffrage. Each person shall vote in the electoral district where he is listed in the census register, provided that he enjoys his civil and political rights and that he is not deprived of his electoral competence.

Moreover, women must have at least a certificate of primary education in order to be allowed to vote. Separate polling centers shall be established for women voters.

Art. 8. All persons deprived of their right to suffrage, according to Articles 63 and 66 of the Criminal Law, shall be prevented from voting.

Art. 9. The right of suffrage shall be suspended for the following persons:

(a) Those under inhibition who have not been released.

(b) The mentally ill, during their period of sickness.

(c) Those persons convicted according to Article 65 of the Criminal Law.

Art. 10. Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the army, the gendarmerie, the police, the forces of security and persons attached to any organization of a military nature in all ranks, shall refrain from voting.

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Section II. ELECTORAL REGISTERS

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Art. 11. During the first half of January of each year, a "census committee" for each electoral district shall arrange an electoral register containing the names of electors at that district.

Art. 12. This committee shall be composed of:

(a) The director of municipality, or his deputy, as president.

(b) The officer of the census register, or the clerk of this office.

(c) A member to be delegated by the municipal council.

(d) A member to be delegated by the Qadha council.

Art. 13. In arranging the above-mentioned registers, the census committee shall base its work on the census register and can seek the assistance of the Mudirs, the bodies of elders, and any other person or body whose help is deemed necessary.

Art. 14. This committee shall put out, not later than the 15th of January, a unified register of electors containing their names, surnames and residence.

Art. 15. These registers must not include persons described in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of this Law.

Art. 16. The registers shall then be forwarded to the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam who will post them in public places (government buildings, places of worship, public circles, Nahiya seats and villages) and publish them till the 15th of January.

Art. 17. Any person whose name was omitted from the electoral list without justification, or because of an error occurring in his census register, has the right to ask that his name be listed or to object to the undue registration of any other person.

Art. 18. The petition of objection shall be submitted to the committee of inspection not later than the end of January.

This committee shall be formed in the headquarters of the Muhafazat with the Muhafez as chairman and the district attorney and the director of finance as two members; when formed in the headquarters of the Qadha, the Qaimmaqam shall act as chairman of the committee, and the justice of the peace and the director of finance as the two members.

Art. 19. The committee of inspection must decide on the petitions within five days of their submission to it; the decisions of the commit-

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tee can be appealed within three days to the court of the region. The court must, within five days, decide finally on the matter. Petitions of objections are exempt from all fees.

Art. 20. The committee of inspection shall put out final and comprehensive lists of all electors of an electoral district. These lists shall be published as specified in Article 16 of this Law.

Art. 21. Every Syrian whose name was omitted from the electoral lists has the right, within five days after the declaration and fixing of the date for elections, to request the justice of the peace to register his name.

The justice of the peace has to decide within five days at most whether to order the registration of the applicant or not, after checking on the qualifications mentioned in Article 7, and disqualifications mentioned in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of this Law.

Petitions and decisions shall be exempt from fees and stamps.

Chapter III

CANDIDACY FOR PARLIAMENT

Section I. QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES

Art. 22. A candidate for parliament must fulfil the following conditions:

(a) He ought to have been a Syrian national for the last ten years at least.

(b) He must be a male elector listed in the electoral registers.

(c) He must have completed his 30th year of age at the beginning of January of the year of elections.

(d) He must have passed the fifth primary grade, or obtained a certificate of primary education, or completed a course of study equivalent to either of them.

(e) He must stand for elections in one electoral district only.

Art. 23. Government staff defined in the "basic law of officials" who receive their salaries from the Government treasury or from other public treasuries under its jurisdiction, cannot become candidates in the electoral district where they perform their functions, except after three months of their resignation from office.

If a government official stands for elections in another electoral district from where his office is and succeeds, he must cease to work.

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666 An interim official shall be appointed for the vacancy until the elec-
646 tion of the former official has been finally pronounced valid.

The elected official has then to choose, within five days of his election, either to remain in the government service or to become a deputy. If he chooses the latter, his right to his government office ceases to exist, and if not, he shall be returned to his office necessarily.

Art. 24. Under-Secretaries and directors-general of the various ministries, presidents, advisers, members and attorney-generals of the Higher Court of Appeal, the *conseil d'état*, the Auditing Board and directors of municipalities in every Qadha and Muhafazat cannot qualify for candidacy unless they resign from their offices three months prior to the publication of the decree fixing the date for elections.

Art. 25. It is not permissible to hold simultaneously a deputy seat and a public office in which the salary is paid from the government treasury or from municipalities. Exception, however, is made of the members of the teaching faculty of the Syrian University who do not have an administrative function in it.

Art. 26. A deputy shall be considered to have resigned from parliament if he accepts an office in the government.

It is, however, possible to delegate a deputy to an unclassified, temporary foreign mission for a period not exceeding six months, and not renewable.

Section II. PROCEDURE FOR CANDIDACY

Art. 27. A candidate ought to submit a written declaration to the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam within five days of the publication of the decree fixing the number of deputies and get a temporary receipt of acknowledgement for it.

The Muhafez or the Qaimmaqam ought to ascertain that the applying candidate fulfils the conditions for candidacy mentioned in Article 22.

Thereupon, the candidate shall get, within five days at the most, a final receipt of acknowledgement in which the day and hour of his application are to be mentioned.

If the Muhafez or the Qaimmaqam refrain from giving such a receipt within the specified period, the candidate has the right to

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object by petition—exempt from fees—to the highest court in the Muhafazat or Qadha headquarters and to the First Court of Appeal in the capital. The court must render a final judgement on such objections within five days.

Art. 28. Every elector has the right to object on the validity of candidacy. These objections cannot be submitted except to a special appellate court described in Article 53 of this Law, which has the right to decide finally on cases arising from the election of deputies.

Section III. CAMPAIGN LITERATURE

Art. 29. An officially acknowledged candidate can issue pamphlets announcing candidacy, explaining his aims, plans and everything that concerns the program of his work. All such pamphlets are to be signed by the candidate, and three copies of each ought to be submitted to the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam.

Political parties and organizations can issue such publications rovided they are duly signed by their legal representatives.

Art. 30. Announcements, writings, pictures and photographs of sort for propaganda purposes during the electoral campaign annot be posted on the walls of public or private buildings. Persons who violate these instructions shall be prosecuted according to Article 737 of the Criminal Law.

Art. 31. Campaign literature shall be exempt from stamps.

CHAPTER IV

PROCEDURE FOR ELECTIONS

Art. 32. Deputies shall be elected directly by the people and by a secret ballot.

Art. 33. Quarters in cities and towns, and Nahiyas in Qadhas shall be considered polling centers, provided the number of electors in each center does not exceed 1,000. If a polling center contains more than 1,000, it should be divided provided the number of electors in each is not less than 500. If one village or more contain less than 500 electors, and if the distance between these villages and the nearest polling center exceeds fifty kilometers, the Minister of the Interior can establish in them a separate polling center.

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666 The Muhafez and the Qaimmaqam shall issue in their respective
646 headquarters, and within fifteen days at least before elections, decrees designating the polling centers and containing lists of electors for each of them.

Candidates have the right to object on the decrees of the Muhafez to the Minister of the Interior, and on the decrees of the Qaimmaqam to the Muhafez.

In a small Qadha which is not subdivided into Nahiyas, polling centers shall be established in its villages in proportion to electors, as specified above.

Art. 34. Polling centers, in the headquarters of each Muhafazat, Qadha and Nahiya, shall be supervised by a committee composed of three persons: the chairman, who will be nominated by the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam, the Mukhtar, a member and another member to be chosen from the municipal council, or the Qadha council or officials council. Judges, their aides and teachers shall be given preference to others. The members of these electoral committees shall swear to the justice of the peace to deliver their task in honesty, equity and absolute neutrality.

If a member of the committee is absent, its chairman chooses from the electors a new member. If all the committee is absent, the Muhafez or the Qaimmaqam must proceed immediately to nominate another committee, and its newly appointed members shall be sworn in by the highest administrative chief in the region.

Art. 35. There ought not to exist between the chairman of the committee or anyone of its members on the one hand and a candidate of the electoral district on the other, a kinship below the fourth degree.

Art. 36. The chairman of the committee shall ensure the maintenance of order. He shall have judicial authority within the polling center and may seek the assistance of security forces when necessary. The Muhafez or Qaimmaqam has the right to inspect the elections.

Art. 37. Every candidate, or one who represents him by virtue of a signed letter legalized by the Muhafez or Qaimmaqam, is entitled to attend and watch the voting operation and counting of votes. Nobody else has this right.

Art. 38. Voting begins at 7:00 A.M. and ends at 7:00 P.M. if

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voters cease to arrive. Otherwise voting will go on, but not later than 10:00 P.M. under any circumstances. 666 646

Art. 39. If the total number of electors in all polling centers of one electoral district reaches 60 per cent, voting in that district is considered completed; if not, the voting boxes shall be sealed by the seal of the electoral committee and the representatives of candidates; the latter, along with security officers, will guard the voting boxes.

Next day the boxes will be unsealed at 7:00 A.M. in the presence of the electoral committee and the representatives of candidates. Voting will be resumed till 4:00 P.M. and the number of electors who so far have exercised their right to vote will be considered enough.

Art. 40. Each elector comes to the polling center where his name is registered. The chairman of the electoral committee verifies the elector's name from the electoral register and from his identity card. Thereafter the chairman signs the identity card of the elector and gives him a white paper carrying the seal of the Muhafazat or Qadha, upon which the elector writes the names of the candidates for whom he is voting. If an elector is illiterate, he shall employ a member of the committee to write for him under the supervision of the chairman of the committee, and he himself casts the paper in the voting box. Thereupon, the chairman checks his name on the register.

Contrary to the ruling of the previous paragraph, officials outside their electoral district can vote in the polling center of the seat of their offices; similarly, members of an electoral committee can vote in the polling center to which they have been assigned. In both cases, the names of these electors ought to be added to the electoral register of the center where they vote, as specified in the previous paragraph.

Art. 41. The voting paper shall contain on one of its two pages the names of candidates as they appear in the receipts of acknowledgement for candidacy described in Article 27 hereof.

Art. 42. Voting shall take place on the basis of the list of candidates. The elector must choose a number of them equal to the number of seats in the electoral district, as limited in the decree mentioned in Article 6 hereof.

Art. 43. When voting is completed, the electoral committee shall count the voting papers publicly without reading them. If there

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666 found that the number of the papers is 5 per cent more or less than
646 those who actually voted, election in that center shall not be considered valid and shall be repeated the next day.

If there be found that the excess is below 5 per cent, a number of voting papers proportionate to this excess must be withdrawn without reading the contents.

No deficiency will, however, be taken into consideration if it is below 5 per cent of the total number of electors noted in the register as having voted.

Art. 44. Voting papers that are empty, absolutely illegible or do not carry the seal of the committee shall be considered void and cannot be included in the total of votes. They must, nevertheless, be attached to the minutes.

If a voting paper shall contain more names of candidates than is decided by the decree fixing the number of deputies, the excess shall be cancelled from the bottom of the list in proportion to each category in the electoral district.[1]

If the voting paper shall contain less names of candidates than is required, it shall be considered in favor of those voted for. If any lists contain the name of a non-candidate, this name shall be disregarded only; and if the same name be written more than once, it shall be reckoned once only. In either case the voting paper is valid.

The voting papers which do not state clearly the name of a candidate, but contain enough indications to remove any ambiguity, shall be considered valid.

Art. 45. The electoral committee shall render judgement on all objections submitted to it with regard to the voting operations.

The decisions of the electoral committees can be appealed to the central electoral committee which gives a final judgment. Such objections shall not cause a delay in the progress of elections.

If the central electoral committee decides that election in one of the polling centers is not valid because it violates the rules of this law, the Minister of the Interior shall issue an order fixing a date for reelections in that center.

[1] In one electoral district there might be Moslem and non-Moslem candidates. If, for instance, the required number of deputies in one electoral district is 3 for Moslems and 2 for non-Moslems and the voting paper contains names of 5 Moslem candidates and 3 non-Moslems, the chairman of the Electoral committee must cancel the last two names of Moslems and the last name of non-Moslems [*Translator's note*].

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Art. 46. The counting of votes shall take place continuously in the polling center. Results shall be declared publicly. Then the electoral committees shall draw up statements recording in particular the names of candidates, the number of votes which every one of them obtained, and the decisions and measures taken during the elections. These will be referred immediately to the central electoral committe of the electoral district.

Art. 47. In the Muhafazat this committee is to be composed of the Muhafez as chairman, the attorney general and two judges as members; in the Qadha, the Qaimmaqam as chairman, the justice of the peace and a member of the municipal council as two members.

Art. 48. Upon receipt of the statements from all polling centers, the central committee immediately meets; its task shall be to add the results in the presence of candidates or their representatives, to draw up a comprehensive statement, to declare those final results and to submit a copy of its statement to the Minister of the Interior.

Art. 49. Candidates shall be classified according to the number of valid votes which they obtain. The candidate who obtains more votes than others, provided that the number of those votes is not less than 40 per cent of the valid votes cast, shall be considered successful.

If one seat or more remain vacant, elections shall be repeated one week later among the candidates who received more than 10 per cent from the total of valid votes cast. The candidate who this time receives a majority of votes shall be considered successful.

Art. 50. If two candidates receive an equal number of votes, the decision shall be by lot.

Art. 51. If the number of candidates in one district does not exceed the number of deputies which are to be elected for that district, no voting takes place and the candidates shall be elected.

Art. 52. The final results shall be announced by a decree, as they were recorded in the statements, within three days at most after the Minister of the Interior has received all the records of elections.

Art. 53. The validity of elections shall be decided upon by a special appellate court presided by the first judge of the higher court of appeal or any one who takes his place, and composed of four other judges following him in grade as members, together with three

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deputies elected from the parliament by secret ballot and on whose elections no objections exist.

Art. 54. The president of parliament shall call this special court to meet as soon as the three deputies, who are to be members of this court, have been elected. The court then investigates all charges laid against elections of deputies within three months at most of their submission. This court shall have all authority necessary for its action, and its decisions shall be irrevocable.

Chapter V

CRIMES CONNECTED WITH ELECTIONS

Art. 55. Persons committing crimes because of elections shall be prosecuted according to Articles 319-324 of the Criminal Law.

Art. 56. Every person who has been asked to cooperate in one body, or requested to help in the execution of electoral operations and refuses to cooperate shall be punished in accordance with Article 756 of the Criminal Law.

Chapter VI

TRANSITORY AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Art. 57. Contrary to the stipulations of Article 24 hereof, the presidents, the advisers, the members and attorney generals of the higher court of appeal, the "*conseil d'état*," and the Auditing Board who have been prevented from exercising their right to candidacy in accordance with this law, can, nevertheless, enjoy this right if they resign their offices one week after its publication. This exception to Article 24 shall be effective only during the first electoral session which follows the publication of this law.

Art. 58. The present electoral registers shall be modified in accordance with this law.

Art. 59. The Minister of the Interior shall issue all decisions and instructions necessary for the execution of this law.

Art. 60. All previous texts contrary to this law and, in particular, the previous electoral Law No. 325 of May 21, 1947, and its modifications,[1] shall be considered void.

Art. 61. This law is to be published and communicated to all concerned for execution.

[1] See above, p. 434, n. 1.

186, 728, 648, 668

x Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

186 The other is the will to work together for the attainment of a common aim in which all believe and for which all are willing to sacrifice something or everything. When this will derives its content from the consciousness of solidarity, and the members of the group take as their common aim the preservation both of that consciousness and of the characteristics on which it is based, nationalism arises. Political nationalism comes into existence when the attempt is made to achieve the common aim by means of the establishment of a State, which includes all the members of the group and of which the Government is imbued with the nationalist ideal.

000 In Europe, the idea of nationalism became an important political force during the nineteenth century. In one aspect it was a development of the idea that 'the people' can and should be master of its own destiny: that the ordinary citizens of a State have both the right, and if effectively organized, the power to set up and to pull down Governments; and that Governments are only entitled to demand the obedience of the community which they rule if and in so far as they emanate from the will of that community. In another aspect it was the child of Romanticism, which was, among other things, the attempt to discover in Time and History what for the Christian belongs only to eternity: an adequate object of sacrifice and worship, a supreme purpose and consummation of human life. One type of Romanticism found what it sought in the community and the life devoted to the service of the community; and it was especially attracted to that type of community which is based on common memories and a common history.

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186 Among the Arabs, nationalism in the sense defined above
668 did not emerge until the later part of the nineteenth century. The sense of solidarity and pride in the Arab tradition had long existed; but they did not form the basis of a coherent movement until the West began to impinge upon the Arab world. Its impact had two effects, both of which worked together to produce the Arab movement. On the one hand, the West brought new dangers to the Arabo-Islamic life. On the other hand, far from destroying the Arabs' faith in their having a special part to play in history, it gave them fresh vitality and the promise of new strength. Arab nationalism

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria #101

may be defined as the resurgence of the will to live of the Arab people, produced by the action of the West upon it, and with the object of combating the dangers and realizing the benefits of that action.

It is true that the explicit aim of the nationalist movement in its first phase was not to come to terms with the West but to shake off the rule of the Ottoman Turks. But it was not simply a movement of revolt against an oppressor. The Ottoman rule was resented so much more bitterly than in the past, not because it was so much worse, but because it prevented the attainment of that new life of which the Arabs were becoming aware, and made it impossible for them to take what they believed to be their rightful place in the world. The overthrow of the Turkish régime, in the conception at least of the more thoughtful of them, would only be the beginning of their national effort. It would create the conditions in which it would become possible to face the real problems of their community.

What those problems were has already been made clear in Chapters III and IV. Most fundamental of all was the danger of the complete destruction of the principles of loyalty upon which the traditional community had rested: membership of the family, the tribe and the religious community, respect for the past, the habit of obedience to the suzerain. Should they go and nothing take their place, the community might dissolve into a rabble of individuals without loyalties or the consciousness of belonging to a group. It was to avoid this danger that the nationalists endeavoured to arouse a consciousness of the common heritage of language, historical memories and customs shared by the Arabs; and to make that consciousness the basis of political action and ultimately of government.

A more immediate, although less fundamental, problem was raised by the penetration of Western goods and economic processes. This was beneficial in so far as it held out hopes of raising the standard of living of the people; but it dislocated the traditional structure of commerce and industry, and it threatened to place the economic life of the Arabs in the power of Western trading and concessionary companies. A similar process of dislocation was taking place in other aspects of social life. Here again much that was bad in the old order was being swept away, but also what was valuable

was threatened. The process had a further effect: it emphasized, and made more unbearable, injustices and inadequacies which had formerly been accepted as inevitable or had passed unremarked. Thus there grew up the belief that social and economic Westernization was undoubtedly beneficial, but needed to be controlled and directed, and that a controlling and directing agency could not exist so long as the government was in the hands of foreigners who neither understood the needs of the Arabs nor cared primarily for their welfare.

A further element was added to the movement by the wounded pride which most Arabs felt when they considered the attitude of the West towards them. The Western Powers in act if not in word treated the Arab countries as if the desires and wishes of their inhabitants were matters of minor importance; individual Westerners showed only too often their contempt for a people who dressed, believed and thought so differently from them, and were so backward in the material arts. The contempt was no less wounding when it was concealed beneath a romantic admiration for the primitive or the exotic. It was the more unbearable to the Arabs because of their conviction that in essentials they were not inferior to the West, no less than because of their suspicion that in many other things they were indeed far behind the West and had much to learn from it. It gave rise to a desire to equal the West in those things on which the West set value, and to be recognized by the West as equals. Since the West set value upon the independence and power of the national State, upon economic prosperity and a certain ordering of social life, the Arabs too must be independent and powerful, and modern in their social organization.

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Such were the factors which produced the nationalist movement. The movement was specifically Arab, aiming at the creation of an Arab nation and State which should include all branches of the Arab people, and not simply at the establishment of Syrian, Iraqi, Hejazi and other separate nations; and this for a number of reasons. The historic imagination of the Arab peoples had taken as its main and almost its only object the memories of the early Islamic period, of the orthodox Caliphs and their successors the Umayyads and

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Abbasids. Thus they were vividly aware that there had been a time when the Arabs had been conscious of themselves as a special community, and as a community had played a leading part in history. The thought of the solitary moment of history when the Arabs had been united in a single Empire, in which they had been the dominant element, overshadowed in their minds the memory of ages before and since. The revival of interest in Arabic literature in the course of the nineteenth century had a similar effect: coming to them through the medium of their own language, it aroused their pride and the sense of their own possibilities in a way which would have been impossible for the Greek culture of Syria or the pre-Islamic culture of Iraq. Then again the vision of a united Arab nation seemed to offer to a people becoming conscious of their weakness, and of the internal divisions which were the partial cause of it, a strength such as a Syrian or an Iraqi nation could never possess.

5

In the light of this analysis, it is possible to summarize the assumptions and aims of the movement.

The basic assumptions of Arab nationalism are: first, that there is or can be created an Arab nation, formed of all who share the Arabic language and cultural heritage; secondly, that this Arab nation ought to form a single independent political unit, both in the interests of the nation itself and in those of the world; and thirdly, that the creation of such a political unit presupposes the development among the members of the Arab nation of a consciousness, not simply that they are members of it, but that their being members is the factor which should determine their political decisions and loyalties.

The ultimate aim of Arab nationalism is to preserve and enrich the Arab heritage: to enable the Arabs to live in the modern world on an equal footing with other peoples, and to contribute to its civilization without being forced to break with their past. The political objectives of the nationalist movement are the independence of all the Arab lands; the establishment of some degree of unity between them; the encouragement of national consciousness; and the reorganization of the social and economic structure of the nation by means of a process of controlled and discriminate Westernization.

The movement of which these are the assumptions and aims is still at a comparatively early stage of development; and its ideals, although they have found their expression in patriotic rhetoric and poetry, have not yet achieved a reasoned and systematic exposition. But although Arab nationalism is still largely inarticulate and unformed, it does not spring only from passion and prejudice, nor is it confined only to the educated few who are its spokesmen. It is a movement with rational grounds and purposes, which, although they have not yet become fully explicit, exist implicitly and as motive forces alike in the mind of the peasant, who feels nothing but a vague unrest; of the educated townsman, in whom unrest has crystallized into definite emotions, desires and grievances; and of the politician, who expresses the emotions, desires and grievances in speeches and programmes. Although they might not be able to define and defend nationalism, they are all in some degree Arab nationalists.

Like all immature movements, Arab nationalism has not yet found its own authentic voice. It tends to imitate Western nationalism in its programme and its terminology. It is of great importance to make it clear that the spirit of the movement has not yet been definitely or adequately expressed. Its present form is not the only form which it could take. It is possible that if nationalism fails to obtain its explicit objectives, or even if it achieves them and its success is followed by disillusion, the feelings and desires which have given it birth will express themselves in different ways. Instead of a movement for an independent State and a modernized society there might be an outbreak of religious fanaticism, which would not help in the establishment of good relations between the Arabo-Islamic world and the West. Instead of a movement with rational purposes, there might arise one whose only ends were destruction and self-destruction.

6

Which of these paths Arab nationalism will take depends very largely upon the relationship which it establishes, on the one hand with Islam, and on the other with the West.

Although the movements of Arab and of Islamic revival lay emphasis upon different points it is impossible wholly to separate Arab nationalist feeling from Islamic feeling. In most Arabs the two tend to flow together; the movements

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of national and of religious revival are energized by the same complex of desires and emotions within the individuals who have created and who sustain them; and the ordinary Moslem Arab is not conscious of belonging in one aspect of his being to the Arab community, and in another to the Islamic, but rather of belonging to a single integrated 'Arabo-Islamic' community in which he does not clearly distinguish the Arab from the Islamic elements. Even in analysis it is impossible wholly to separate the two. On the one hand there is in Islam no sharp distinction between spiritual and temporal, Church and State; and in consequence a movement of religious reform will have its repercussions in every sphere of social and political life. On the other, many Arab nationalists, especially of the older generation, would define the Arab nation partly in terms of the Islamic religion, which most members of the nation profess, and of which the Holy Book is written in Arabic; and they would therefore regard the preservation and revival of Islam as being among the aims of the nationalist movement.

What has just been said must be qualified in two ways. First, the secular view of life is becoming ever more widespread, especially among the younger generation and among those educated in Europe and America; and it is giving rise to the belief that it is better both for religion and for political activity if the two are kept distinct from one another. Thus it is possible to see the beginning of the idea of a secular nationalism, which rests upon elements of unity other than participation in a common religion; which aims at building a Westernized laic State; and in which therefore Moslems, Christians and atheists alike can join on a footing of equality. This lay nationalism is not consciously hostile to religion, although it is opposed to theocracy; but it is possible that at some time in the future it will come into conflict with Islamic orthodoxy.

Secondly, the connexion between Islam and Arab nationalism is perhaps emphasized less in Syria and Lebanon than in the other parts of Arab Asia. This is so not only because Syrians and Lebanese have assimilated Western thought more deeply than other Arab peoples and are more inclined to adopt modern Western secularism, but also because of the existence of an Arabic-speaking Christian element in the Syrian and Lebanese population. Moslem Arab nationalists

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cannot leave the Christians out of account in their plans for the future of Syria and Lebanon, and many of them sincerely desire Christians and Moslems alike to participate in the national community of the future. There are many Christians too who share the ideals of Arab nationalism; and indeed Syrian and Lebanese Christians were among the founders of the national movement, since they saw in the spread of the ideal of national unity the only way of escape from the religious differences which had for so long weakened their country. It is natural that Christian Arab nationalists should define the Arab nation mainly in terms of language, history, and race, and should draw a distinction, perhaps too sharply, between it and the Islamic community.

7

The present attitude of nationalism towards the Western Powers was determined during the years of the First World War and the subsequent peace settlement. Those years were not without their gains. It was then that the Arabs became conscious of their unity and of the strength which might be theirs. They gained collective pride and a memory of things done in common, and also legends and martyrs.

But they were also years of bitterness and disappointment. Freedom and unity seemed for a moment to be within the grasp of the Arabs, but they were snatched away. It has been described in Chapter II how the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided from one another into several States, only the most backward of which was recognized as immediately independent, the others being placed under British or French control. This was all the more disappointing because it was Great Britain which had promised the Arabs independence and unity and had appeared to be the friend of Arab nationalism. Thus the movement took on in those years an anti-British and anti-French, and even in general an anti-Western, complexion; indeed the mere fact that Great Britain and France were now in control of the Arab countries would have been enough to give it such a complexion. The hostility was mingled with disappointment, since politically these two Powers had seemed for a moment to be the friends of the nationalists; but also with gratitude, since culturally the movement was deeply in debt to them. The attitude of Arab nationalists to Great Britain and France has therefore

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000 and the creation of the kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia, was followed with close attention throughout Arab Asia; the wisdom and energy of Ibn Sa'ud, no less than his success as a ruler of Beduin, deeply impressed the Arab imagination. The signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1930 and of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936 was also of great importance in stimulating the desire of other regions for independence.

Outside the Arab world the example of Turkey had a great influence on the Arab countries. By her own efforts Turkey had secured her independence and was trying to build up a wholly Westernized society. Arabs might not regard the path which Turkey had taken as one they could follow, but at least they were encouraged by her success.

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668 In none of the countries of Arab Asia is the nationalist movement more influential than in the Levant States. It was by Syrians and Lebanese that the idea of the Arab nation was first expounded; it was they who organized the first nationalist societies. Almost all political thought among the town-population of Syria, and among large sections of that of Lebanon, is Arab nationalist. Syrians and Lebanese have played a leading part in every phase of the movement's evolution. The schools of Beirut helped to revive the Arabic language, and their graduates to give it a modern literature. Syrians and Lebanese were active in the secret societies of the period before 1914. They participated in the Anglo-Arab negotiations during the war of 1914–1918. They gave the movement its martyrs, executed by Jemal Pasha in 1915. They supplied many of the officers and soldiers of the Arab army.

The nationalists claim that Syria and Lebanon are necessary to the Arab State which they desire. An Arab State which did not control the Mediterranean coast-line with its ports would be seriously handicapped in its trade, and strategically it would lie at the mercy of whatever Power controlled them. Culturally also an Arab State which did not include Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut would be at a serious disadvantage in the process of assimilating Western culture.

To the minds of Arab nationalists, the Arab State is as necessary for the Levant States as they for it. The bane of Syria and Lebanon has always been their internal divisions,

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and the separatist spirit to which these have given rise. They can only be overcome or at least be rendered harmless by the development of a consciousness of unity more powerful and more effective than the consciousness of those factors which create division. Such a consciousness of unity cannot be created out of nothing; use must be made of what already exists. At present there is little or no sense of Syrian unity, or even of the existence of geographical Syria as a separate country. But there does exist a consciousness of 'Arabism', with a richness of historical and literary association to which 'Syrianism' could never aspire. It is only, so the Arab nationalists claim, by developing this already existing consciousness that the forces of separatism can be overcome.

There are other advantages for which Syria and Lebanon can hope from Arab unity and independence. They can hope for a remedy for their present military and economic weakness. An independent Syria with four million inhabitants would always lie at the mercy of Turkey; but the danger would be less great if she were supported diplomatically and militarily by an Arab union. Equally, the technical and commercial skill of her inhabitants would be given greater scope if the Levant States were part of a larger economic unit of which the very large economic resources are in need of development.

Not only in the economic but in every sphere of life the Syrians and Lebanese need opportunities such as their land cannot give. There is in them a certain greatness, which has been too long asleep and is now awakening. For two generations the educated youth have sought opportunities in Egypt and in the New World. But both these spheres are now largely closed to them, and the second of them could at the best of times only be entered at a great price: the loss of their language and their native land, and acceptance of the life of a stranger and an exile. It is not strange therefore that the thoughts of young Syrians and Lebanese, especially of those among them who feel responsible for the future of their country, should be turning eastwards and southwards; and that they hope to find in the other regions of Arab Asia opportunities at once for the exercise of their talents and for the fulfilment of their duty to their people.

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668 The progress of the nationalist movement in Syria and Lebanon is obstructed both by its own weaknesses and by the existence of certain forces which are hostile to it, or else which place obstacles in the way of a full attainment of its objectives. One weakness is the lack of outstanding political leaders. Even the most distinguished figures have never had a following comparable to that of Zaghlul in Egypt. This may be partly because the Syrian populace is critical and intelligent and not prone to hero-worship, but it is also due to the lack of leaders of an heroic stature. One cause of this is the execution by Jemal Pasha in 1915 of a number of the most prominent members of Arab nationalist organizations. Another is the drain upon energy and ability caused by the movement of emigration. A third is the absence during the last twenty years of opportunities for training in responsibility. The élite of the country, which in Iraq was drawn at least partly into the orbit of government almost from the beginning of the Mandatory régime, has in Syria been for the most part in opposition to the authorities since the end of the war of 1914–1918, and has never lost the defects of an irresponsible and powerless opposition.

Another weakness of the movement is the absence of a long-term social and economic policy. Parties may at times make grandiose promises about the nature of the new world which they propose to build, but there is no evidence that any of them is undertaking a profound and realistic investigation of the country's vast social and economic problems. Nationalists sometimes argue that the political problem is prior to all others, and that it will be time to face other problems when independence has been won. To discuss them now would not only divert attention from the struggle for independence, but would cause a split in the ranks of the nationalist movement, which is united in wanting a free Arab State, but divided on the kind of free Arab State which it wants. The lack of a constructive social policy is due partly to most of the nationalist leaders coming from the landowning class, which is interested in preserving rather than altering the existing social system. This is inevitable at present, because education is still largely confined to a single class, and also because of the absence of any other class strong enough to challenge the power of

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the landowners; but it is a source of weakness now, and may be even more so in the future.

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Opposition to Arab nationalism comes from those who believe that the people of geographical Syria constitute a separate nation and not simply a part of the Arab nation. Geographical Syria, they maintain, must preserve its identity both against the imperialism of the Western Powers and against the ambitions of the Arab nationalists. Its destiny is to be neither wholly European nor wholly Arab. It is a link between the two worlds of which it forms the common frontier. But also it is more than a mere link; it has a spirit and civilization of its own, which it must preserve. Those who hold this belief regard the hopes of the Arab nationalists as no more than dreams, without foundation either in history or in national interest. The basis of a nation, they maintain, is not language or religion or any such characteristic, but the will to live together, and this will can only arise out of a living interest; but the interest of geographical Syria is not to merge with the other Arabic-speaking countries to the point where it loses its own power of independent decision. To do so would be to lose more than it would gain: not only in the economic and political spheres, but also because the other Arab regions are at a lower level of civilization and less inclined to accept the need for a fundamental modernization and reconstruction of society. Thus for Syria to enter an Arab State would be a retrograde step. While she should welcome co-operation with the surrounding countries in matters of common concern, it should be undertaken for a clear and reasonable purpose and not out of sentiment; and it could only be profitably undertaken once a strong efficient Government and centre of political decision had been created in geographical Syria.

For those of this way of thinking, the first essential is therefore to build up a strong Syrian Government, which will take in hand the reform of social and economic life and will conduct the relations of Syria with other countries, Arabic-speaking or not, on a footing of equality. The obstacles to this are both external and internal. The danger from outside comes from the ambitions of the Imperialist Powers. That from inside, which is equally insidious, arises from the strength of sectarian and other divisions, the

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448 domination of society by religious leaders, the weakness of national sentiment and the fascination of dreams of Arab Empire. These dangers can only be overcome by the activities of a carefully organized and disciplined party.

In its full and articulate form this is the doctrine of the 'Syrian National Party'.[1] But many who do not belong to that party and who indeed think of themselves as Arab nationalists would assent to some at least of these propositions, and insist that Syria has a special destiny inside the Arab world.

The young Socialist and Communist movements are potential opponents of nationalism, but so far no serious conflict between them has arisen. They are of very recent growth and have not yet acquired a large following. Of their adherents many are Armenians and thus not immediately concerned with the question of Arab nationalism; while most of the Arabs who profess Socialist principles are prepared to join forces with the nationalists for the attainment of self-government, either because of patriotic sentiment or else because self-government is a necessary condition for the social reforms they advocate. Once independence were achieved, however, a conflict might arise as it has arisen in other countries; and even now many of the nationalists disapprove of the Socialists and Communists, either because they dislike their social and economic ideas or else because they think it inopportune to raise such issues at the present time.

Other difficulties for the nationalist movement arise out of the existence of large religious and other minorities and of considerable foreign interests. The next two chapters will be given to an analysis of these factors.

[1] See Chapter X.

648 In the State of Syria the disquiet may be traced back to
669 that opposition to the general policy of the Mandatory Power
668 which has been analyzed in Chapter IX. The opposition was strengthened by the many administrative and economic grievances which have also been dealt with. It found expression in a number of local disturbances and risings at the very beginning of the French occupation, the most notable of them the revolt of Ibrahim Hananu in North Syria and the rising in the Hauran. As time went on the restlessness was increased still further by the instability of French policy: the appointment and recall of a number of High Commissioners; the consequent changes in the higher personnel of the mandatory administration; the creation and then the dissolution of a Federation. These were further causes of disquiet: the repercussion in Syria of the growing hostility of the Palestinian Arabs to Zionism and to British policy, and the activities of Syrian emigrants, particularly of the Syro-Palestinian Committees in Cairo and in Geneva. Of the group in Geneva the leading spirit was the Amir Shakib Arslan, a distinguished writer and publicist, by origin a Lebanese Druze, who had given all his life to the spread first of Pan-Islamic and then of Pan-Arab ideas.

668 All these factors contributed to create a strong opposition
[665] to French rule; it was led and organized by the 'People's
648 Party', which grew rapidly in the years prior to the revolt. The nationalist opposition was to some extent concerned with general Arab problems: the independence and union of the whole Arab world. In local matters, its main purposes were two. First, it advocated the union of the French Mandated Territories. Jebel Druze and the Alawi region, it was claimed, should be wholly incorporated in the State of Syria; Lebanon was to be at most autonomous within a Syrian or Arab State, and was to be shorn of the territories assigned to it in 1920. Secondly, Syria should be given genuine self-government immediately, and complete independence as soon as possible. This would involve on the one hand the relaxation of French control over the administration; on the other a rigid definition of the points at which and the period for which French armed forces could be maintained in Syria, and ultimately their complete withdrawal. It was around these two points that Franco-Syrian relations revolved throughout the period of the Mandate.

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In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more suddenly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller landowners against the great families of the Jebel; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

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In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash.

present time. This was a denial of the separate existence of Jebel Druze, the Alawi district, the Lebanese Republic, Palestine and Transjordan; and M. Ponsot judged it to be irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law. Again, four other Articles asserted the right of the President of the Republic to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad and proclaim martial law (73, 74, 75 and 112); and Article 110 declared that the organization of the army would form the subject of a special law. These five Articles also the High Commissioner thought to be incompatible with the obligations of France. He therefore asked that the Articles concerned should be separated from the general body of the draft. The Assembly refused, and M. Ponsot thereupon adjourned it for three months in August, 1928, and for a further three in November. He made an alternative suggestion, that the Assembly should modify the wording of Article 2 and should retain the other offending articles but add to the draft a general reservation safeguarding France's international obligations. This also proved abortive, since he and the Assembly could not agree upon a text for the reservation.

In February, 1929, the work of the Assembly was prorogued *sine die*. During this period and throughout 1929 the split between the National Bloc and 'moderates' grew ever wider. The former, while remaining tranquil, demanded the negotiation of a Treaty to replace the Mandate; the latter continued to advocate a policy of co-operation with France, and attempted without much success to form an effective political organization. The High Commissioner found it impossible to reach an agreement with the nationalists on the constitutional question, while the 'moderates' were too weak and divided for their support to be of value to him; he therefore felt himself bound to give up the attempt to entrust to the Syrian people the responsibility for the elaboration of their own constitution. Accordingly he dissolved the Constituent Assembly in May, 1930, and on his own initiative issued a Constitution for the State of Syria. It was to come into force after the election of the members of a Chamber of Deputies, at a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner.

This Constitution was virtually the same as that drafted by the Assembly, except for such changes as were necessary to

At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been for so long latent came to a head. Strikes and demonstrations began in the Syrian towns in February, in protest against the dearth of essential foodstuffs and the failure of the authorities to stop profiteering. They very soon turned into political disturbances, directed by a number of nationalist committees and leaders, and above all by Shukri al-Quwatli, who in March issued a manifesto setting forth their objectives. He condemned the existing Government of Bahij al-Khatib as a group of men whose sentiments were not those of the population; he declared that the legal basis of French rule no longer existed since the League of Nations had ceased to function; and he therefore demanded the immediate formation of a national Government. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of the continuation of the disturbances, which indeed spread for a few days from Syria to the towns of the Lebanese coast, the Government of Bahij al-Khatib resigned. There was a temporary cessation of unrest while the High Commissioner negotiated with Shukri al-Quwatli and others for the formation of a more representative Government; but disturbances broke out once more after the failure of the negotiations.

The recrudescence of the troubles appears to have convinced General Dentz of the necessity of making further concessions. At the beginning of April he broadcast a statement to the Syrian people, setting forth the conclusions to which his conversations with Syrian leaders had led him. First, the independence of Syria remained the aim towards which the Syrians were striving; France was in agreement with this, but the present international situation made it impossible to contemplate a definitive settlement of the problem of the form of government in Syria. Secondly, Syrian public opinion was demanding the establishment of a Government endowed with wider powers. Thirdly, there was a need for an economic and social programme which would help to solve the problems of unemployment, the food supply, agriculture and commerce. In the light of these conclusions the High Commissioner had decided upon the following measures: the replacement of the Council of Directors by a 'Head of the Government'; the formation of an Advisory Assembly, to be composed of representatives of the political, cultural and economic life of the country and of the younger generation, and in which the Druzes and Alawis would also be represented

648 while retaining their special Statutes; the establishment of a
668 Council of State to draft legislation; the participation of the Syrian Government in the organization of the food supply for Syria and Lebanon; and the execution of an important programme of public works. 'The day of fulfilment is at hand and existing difficulties will be resolved by the co-operation of all and not by demonstrations in the streets. The Syrian nation wishes to carry on its work in an orderly and peaceful manner. Order and peace shall be safeguarded.'[1]

645 A few days later a prominent business man and member of a leading Damascene family, Khalid al-Azm, was appointed Prime Minister, with a Ministry most of the members of which, like the Prime Minister himself, had not previously taken a prominent part in the political life of Syria. In its programme the new Government promised to reform the administration, to develop external trade, to pay special attention to the problems of education and youth, to ameliorate the lot of the workers and officials, and to preserve strict non-partisanship in all political matters.

Shortly afterwards a similar change took place in Lebanon. The President of the Republic and the Secretary of State resigned their offices, and were replaced by a politically neutral Ministry headed by Alfred Naccache, a Maronite judge who had hitherto played no important part in politics.

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648 During these uncertain months the true centre of Syrian
668 political life was Baghdad. It has already been made clear how united is political feeling in the different centres of the Fertile Crescent. The Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939 had received encouragement and help from the neighbouring Arab countries; and after it subsided the thought persisted that the sorrows of Palestine, and also the sorrows of Syria, could only be ended by a united effort of the whole Arab people. It was also widely believed that in this effort Iraq would have to play the leading part, since it possessed greater freedom of action than most of the other Arab regions, and also the nucleus of a trained army. The sense that the destiny of their nation depended on them exalted the spirits of a certain group among the Iraqi Arabs; and their enthusiasm was further increased by the teaching of the

[1] See Appendix A10.

many Syrians and Palestinians, teachers, government officials 648
and political exiles, who thronged Baghdad in the first years 668
of the war. To the general Arab unrest there were added particular Iraqi grievances; and both were encouraged to express themselves violently by the comparative failure of British arms in 1940 and 1941 and the great though temporary influence of German propaganda. Finally, when the general position of the war seemed most propitious, Rashid Ali raised the banner of revolt. He was supported by some, although by no means all, of the nationalists in other Arab countries; in imagination they saw the revolt not as a seizure of power by the Army but as a protest of the Arabs against British policy in Palestine and French in Syria. When the revolt failed, a wave of doubt and self-criticism swept over the nationalist ranks, in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, no less than in Iraq.

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These events were swiftly followed by others of even greater 648
import. Ever since the French capitulation German agents 926
had been active in Syria and Lebanon. In the first months of 1941 German influence was thought to be increasing rapidly and alarmingly; and it was believed that the completion of her Balkan campaign had brought nearer the possibility of a gradual infiltration of German troops and agents into the French Mandated Territories, until finally Germany would be able to obtain complete control of them. Her forces would then be in a position to threaten the British armies in Palestine and Egypt, and Turkey to the north.

The danger was brought to a head by the outbreak of the Iraqi insurrection in May. German aircraft were permitted by the Government of Vichy to use Syrian air-bases as stages on their journey to Iraq; and it was obvious to those who had studied German methods of infiltration that this was the beginning of a process which would, unless forestalled, soon take on such proportions that to check it would be of the greatest difficulty.

It therefore came as no surprise to the general public when June 8th, 1941, a mixed force of Imperial, Free French and other Allied troops crossed the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon; the whole force was under the command of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and the Free French contingent under that

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642 are not removable except by the action of the Supreme Court of Justice.

Political Parties

665 668 Since 1946 political parties in Syria have been little more than côteries grouped temporarily around individual leaders. It is hard to distinguish between the personalities and the policies of the Nationalist and the Populist Parties, for individuals and groups divided differently on different matters. In fact, there have been only two main parties, those in power and those waiting to accede to power. The two chief parties in opposition have been the Nationalist Bloc and the People's Party, groups of men who also called themselves Liberals or Constitutionalists. These two parties' main concern has been to maintain or to establish themselves in power; both have naturally been nationalist in sentiment but no distinctive programmes or tendencies are to be seen except in the more extreme political groups.

The Communist Party and its leader, Khaled Baqdash, went underground in 1947 and since then the interests of Communism have best been served in Syria by those who, while not adopting the theories of the Communists, share with them a dislike for the Western Powers. Chief in this category is the Muslim Brotherhood, one of whose leaders, Shaikh Maarouf Dawalibi, has said that he would prefer Russian to Western domination. In 1947 an attempt was made by the Brotherhood to obtain sufficient weight in Parliament to resist the encroachment of Western ideas and amusements, but in January 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood and all political parties were suspended. Although nationalist politicians can claim much of the credit for the achievement of independence, to the 'man in the street' politicians have since been discredited, and it may be that a slower approach towards parliamentary democracy will yield results that were denied to the post-war precipitancy.

Political History since 1945

The Nationalist Party came into office in 1943 to wrest independence from the French, whose withdrawal removed also the only plank in the party's political platform. Their stock declined more rapidly when the conduct of the Palestine war and internal government aroused general disapproval. In 1947 the Populist Party came into power but Jamil Mardam, the Nationalist Party Premier, retained his place; from 1946–8 Mardam showed his skill as a tactician in controlling a Chamber in which his supporters were in a minority. In 1948 President

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Quwatli received an extension of office, but the completeness of the military failure in Palestine and the rising cost of living at home increased dissensions among the politicians and dissatisfaction among the people and in the same year Khaled al-Azm, the Populist, took over the premiership. To most Syrians this change meant little, for Syria's material progress since the war has been achieved despite rather than because of the efforts of her politicians. The change of Government did nothing to reduce the people's dissatisfaction and the political atmosphere was only cleared by a coup d'état by Colonel Husni az-Zaim, a Kurd with long army service, on 3 March 1947. He took control and arrested the President and other politicians; finding insufficient support in the Parliament, he dissolved it and became himself first Prime Minister, then Marshal, and then President. When first he took power he won popular support by the spate of positive legislation he issued, but he was soon corrupted by power into becoming arrogant at home; and in quarrelling with the Hashimite neighbours, Iraq and Jordan, he showed himself too friendly with Egypt for the liking of some Syrians. Although nearly 90 per cent of the electorate had voted for Zaim, there was little public outcry when Colonel Sami Hinnawi, on 14 August 1949, overthrew and killed Zaim and his Prime Minister, Muhsin Barazi. Hinnawi ostensibly returned to his barracks leaving Hashim al-Atasi as President and Khaled al-Azm as Prime Minister, with a mixed Cabinet including Rushdi Kekhya of the Populist Party and Akram Haurani, leader of his own party. In November 1949 elections were held and these confirmed Atasi as President, but a dispute arose concerning the terms of the presidential oath. The bone of contention was, in fact, Hinnawi's leaning toward a pact with Iraq, and so to estrangement with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A pact with the Hashimis was anathema to Haurani and also to his associate Lieut.-Colonel Adib Shishakli, who brought about the third military coup on 19 December 1949. Hinnawi was allowed to leave the country but was later killed in Beirut by an avenger of Barazi.

Colonel Shishakli had fought against the Jews in Palestine and had been Chief of Police and Security under Marshal Zaim; he had been a member of the Syrian People's Party and so fell out with Zaim over the case of Antoun Saadeh.[1] He is a professional soldier with no strong family or political ties to those who had hitherto ruled Syria. Shishakli has kept in the background but retained a veto over the decisions of the politicians and a firm hand on the army, posting to distant stations

[1] See below, p. 479.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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665 or retiring officers who showed signs of becoming dangerous.
668 In 1952 he played a large part in endeavouring to give a firm foundation to the new Umma Party and has also made rather more public appearances than at first.[1]

Khaled al-Azm's Cabinet had no common policy to bind them together and resigned in June 1950 to give way to a wholly Populist Cabinet in which Colonel Fawzi Silu took the Defence portfolio as the army's nominee. The rest of the year saw minor constitutional changes and there were stirrings of dissent amongst the military leaders which came to light in the murder of the Commander of the army air force and in an attempt on the life of Shishakli. In the autumn of 1950 pro-Hashimite politicians were out of favour and most of the time in prison. In March 1951 the premiership changed hands; al-Azm was succeeded by Nazim Qudsi, a Populist with no hatred for the Western Powers. Qudsi tried, but failed, to limit the authority of the army; al-Azm again took office, but he, too, found no support in the Parliament. With Shishakli's backing, a new Government was formed in August 1951 by Hasan al-Hakim who could not, however, agree with the attack on the proposals for a Middle East defence organization made by his Foreign Minister, Faidi al-Atasi. Hakim resigned and, in November, a period of muddle was resolved by another coup by Shishakli, as the result of which many of the politicians who had recently held office were imprisoned. At the end of 1951 Parliament was dissolved and Colonel Silu was appointed Chief of State *ad interim* and the government carried on by the senior civil servants.

In January 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood, and in April all political parties, were dissolved and the military rulers passed legislation to forbid students, trade unions, and sports clubs from taking part in any political activity. At the end of the year General Shishakli, now Vice-Premier and Chief of Staff, supported the formation of a new political party known as the Arab Liberation Movement, in the hope that parliamentary
[642] life could gradually be restored. In the following summer (21 June 1953) he announced a new constitution on the presidential model, based on 'the aims and aspirations of the people', giving executive power to the President but 'permanent power of control' to the Chamber of Deputies. A referendum held on 10 July resulted in the adoption of the new constitution and the election for a period of five years of Shishakli as President and
666 Premier. A new electoral law, promulgated on 1 August, prepared the way for elections on 9 October, and at the beginning

[1] See Alford Carlton, 'Syria Today', *International Affairs*, January 1954.

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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563 equally to Syria. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of inter-connected social units, the relations of which with the Moslem community are largely formal. This is especially true of the older generation brought up under the Ottoman regime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of the nation between them are helping to make the younger generation less conscious of its confessional ties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects.

Western ideas and forces have so far made little impression outside the few large towns. In the smaller towns and the villages, traditions still rule unchecked, and the old social exclusiveness of the sects still persists. But on the other hand the very nature of life in small towns or villages tends to the assimilation of the social characteristics of the minorities to those of the majority. Moreover, it encourages economic interdependence and co-operation. Economically, the Christian do not differ much from the Moslem peasants. It is only in the large towns that the economic structure of the Christian communities diverges from that of the majority. The educational progress of the
563 871 Christians has been swifter than that of the Moslems, and has diverged from it in some ways. In 1938 the Christians accounted for about 32 per cent of the total school population, although they form only 19 per cent of the population as a whole. They account for an even larger proportion of the pupils of secondary schools; and although only 20 per cent of the students of the University in Damascus are Christians, many others are studying at the Universities in Beirut, or in Europe.

It must be noticed also that 32 per cent of the Christian students attend foreign schools, 61 per cent private schools and only 7 per cent official ones. Almost all the foreign schools are controlled by Christian missions, although some are owned by the French 'Mission Laïque', and about 170 out of the 294 private schools are controlled by Christian communities. Thus, the Christians are not only obtaining more education than the Moslems, but
563 it is education of a different sort. Individual Christians play an
668 important part in the national movement, in Syria as elsewhere. The most prominent of them in recent times have been the brothers Faris and Faiz al-Khuri, the former of whom was President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1936 to 1939 and again in 1943–4, and became Prime Minister in 1944.

It is not simply isolated individuals who feel sympathy with the national movement. Sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox, who are altogether Arab in culture and feeling. This is true of the clergy as well as the laity, and of the higher clergy as well as the lower: the Bishop of Hama was Vice-President of the Pan-Arab Conference of Bludan in 1937. The younger generation, brought up under the influence of nationalistic ideas in school and out of it, tend to be as wholly devoted to the Arab cause as their Moslem contemporaries. 563 668

Roman Catholics and Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab tradition; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missions and schools; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that the relaxation of French control means loss of their privileged position. 563 668 177

The leaders of the national movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of nationalistic feeling have been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders often arises from a genuine desire to build a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; or else from a desire not to alienate Western opinion, which tends to care more for minorities than for majorities. 563 668

Although the more enlightened nationalists are tolerant, among those who are less enlightened there still exists considerable suspicion of the Christians as a whole. It springs not only from ancient prejudice; it is due to the fact that certain of the Christians, not wholly against their will, have been used by the French as instruments of domination and as a pretext for delaying the grant of independence. Once the problem of Franco-Arab relations is definitely settled, the tension between Moslems and Christians will gradually be relaxed.

The Armenians

In general, the Armenians in Syria do not need special attention. Most of what has been said about their fellow-countrymen in Lebanon is true of them also. It is necessary only to call attention to the special situation existing in Aleppo, where the Armenian 563

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of them have settled in Palestine, and those who are left cannot be wholly unaffected by the rising wave of Arab hostility to Zionism. 563

The Isma'ilis form a compact community, backward and without any political claims except to be left alone. The Turcomans also raise no problem in themselves. Originally a nomadic community, they have now become agricultural, and in some regions they have been completely Arabized. The Circassians, however, have resisted assimilation more successfully. They still remain as a separate entity with their own language and customs, and have even at times claimed autonomy. Both in Turkish times and under the Mandate they have been used by the authorities to hold down the population; the French for example used them to suppress the Syrian Revolution of 1925. This has made them disliked by the Arabs; but there is no obstacle to their ultimate assimilation.

The Kurds are of much greater importance. There are over 100,000 of them in the north of the country, mainly in the foothills of the Taurus north of Aleppo, and 20,000 in Damascus. Most of them have been in the country for generations, but some have fled from Turkey in the last twenty years. Almost all are Sunni Moslems, but there are some Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Christians and Alawis. The language of the majority is Kurdish, but many are bi-lingual in Kurdish and Arabic, and some, particularly in Damascus, speak only Arabic. There is a gradual process of assimilation going on among them, helped by their backward cultural state; they have practically no facilities for education except in Arabic.

Originally nomads, they have now mostly settled on the land as peasants. They are dominated by their land-owning class, but less so than formerly. Although sedentary, they still preserve their tribal organization, and on the whole tribal loyalty is still much stronger among them than national loyalty.

In general, they are whole-heartedly opposed to Turkey, are suspicious of Arab nationalism, friendly to the U.S.S.R. and grateful to France for the favourable treatment they have received. Kurdish nationalism is strong among some groups of them, particularly those in Damascus. Damascus and Beirut, indeed, have become the main centres of the Kurdish national and cultural movement, directed largely by the Badr Khan brothers. The nationalists do not for the most part expect independence, 563 668

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563 but they claim autonomy in the Jazirah or at least the right
668 to live as Kurds, immune from attempts to force them to assimilate.

French Policy

648 France's hostility to Arab nationalism led her to show special
563 favour to the minorities in Syria. This policy revealed itself in numerous administrative acts, and in such military acts as the recruitment of special detachments from Circassians, Kurds and other minorities, but it is most clearly shown and has had the most important consequences in regard to the two compact minorities, the Druzes and Alawis.

648 In 1921 an agreement was concluded between the French
563 authorities and some of the Druze leaders, providing for a national
631 government assisted by French advisers. From this time until 1936 there existed a 'Government of Jebel Druze' independent of Syria and under all-pervasive French control. At first, French policy ran counter to local susceptibilities, and this led to the Druze Revolt of 1925, which became a Syrian national revolt. After the suppression of the revolt, the same system was continued, and was formalized by the Organic Law of 1930. Its effect was to encourage the particularist feeling of the Druzes and to arouse among certain of them a feeling of gratitude to France.

Another autonomous territory was created in the 'Territory' or 'Government' of the Alawis, set up in 1920. It possessed an administrative system similar to that of Jebel Druze, formalized in a similar organic law issued in 1930, and under a still stricter French control. The administration did something to improve the very backward condition of the Alawis and to arouse among them a corporate self-consciousness and a feeling of attachment to France. In general, the district was peaceful after unrest at the beginning; the only disturbances came from the Sunnis and Greek Orthodox, who believed their interests were being neglected and demanded the attachment of the district to Syria.

Nationalism and the Minorities

563 The leaders of Arab nationalism in Syria recognize the import-
668 ance of the minority problem and have made considerable efforts to win the confidence of the minorities. In principle they regard Arab Christians as on a level with Moslems inside the Arab community, once they are willing to accept their obligations as

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members of the Arab nation. As for the linguistic minorities, they insist on a certain degree of assimilation, but there is no question of treating them as inferiors because of their racial origins. 563 668

They are opposed, however, to the grant of a special regime to minorities, since it would only perpetuate their difference; and even more strongly would they oppose any foreign intervention or influence in support of the minorities. In regard to the compact minorities, while they recognize the need for careful and tactful administration, they believe they are capable of giving such administration, and wholly reject the claims of the autonomists, both because the grant of autonomy would play into the hands of foreign powers eager to intervene, and because, so long as they remained autonomous, the minorities would never learn how to live with their fellow-nationals.

The Treaty of 1936 *and the Minorities*

The autonomy of Jebel Druze and the Alawis was brought to an end by the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. In December of that year decrees were issued annexing the two Governments to the Syrian Republic as the Provinces of Jebel Druze and Latakia respectively. Certain safeguards were, however, provided for the special position of the two provinces. On the one hand, they were given a special administration and financial regime. On the other, the military convention attached to the Treaty stipulated for the maintenance of French troops in both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty. 648 563 631

At the same time, the administration of the Jazirah was placed under the control of the Government of Damascus; it had never been formally autonomous but in practice had been under direct French administration since the establishment of civil government there.

In each of these three districts there was a group which welcomed the union with Syria, and others who thought it in their interest to side with the nationalists who seemed to be the rising power. Others again did not object to incorporation in Syria, so long as the special position of the provinces was respected and they were fairly treated in such matters as government appointments. There were some, however, who desired to return to complete autonomy under French protection. From 1937 648 563 668

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to 1939 this last group grew stronger, and more or less brought administration to a standstill. There were a number of reasons for this. The Government was hasty and tactless; some of its supporters were intolerant. The fears and suspicions of the minorities were too strong to be overcome in a few months, and there can be no doubt that they were played upon by some of the French officials who refused to accept the change of policy laid down in the Treaty of 1936.

In 1937 and again in 1939, Jebel Druze was disturbed. In Latakia discontent grew gradually but did not become serious until the rising of a section of the Alawis led by Suleiman Murshid, a self-made notable and self-styled god. In 1937 a section of the Kurds and of the Christians of the Jazirah caused disturbances. Their case was strengthened by the support of Cardinal Tappouni, the Syrian Orthodox Patriarch. Again in 1939, there were manifestations on a large scale.

Meanwhile, relations between the French Government and the nationalists had been growing worse, owing to the reluctance of the former to secure the ratification of the Treaty. By 1939, France had reversed the policy inaugurated in 1936. In July 1939, the Constitution was suspended. Almost simultaneously decrees were issued restoring the autonomy of the Jebel Druze and the Alawis. At the same time the Jazirah was placed once more under direct French rule; but by December 1940, matters had returned to normal and, once more, the authority of the Syrian Government was imposed in the Jazirah.

It was not only the compact minorities which had been restless during these years. The scattered minorities also had been apprehensive of nationalist policy towards them. They had not been persecuted on any large scale, and officially the Government had frequently declared its desire to treat all citizens equally; but there had been enough acts of discrimination to appear to justify the pre-conceived fears of the minorities. It was partly to allay these fears that the Syrian Government concluded supplementary agreements with the French Government in 1937 and 1938, containing among other things guarantees for the position of communities and individuals.

The difficulties of the situation must not, however, be exaggerated. Not all minorities were equally hostile to nationalism. Those which were most hostile were the Catholics, who had profited most from French rule; others, like the Greek Orthodox

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and a section of the Armenians, were able to maintain good relations with the Government. In general, what troubles occurred were no more than were inevitable in a period of transition. 648 563 668

Developments since 1941

In September 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria. His proclamation contained the following statement about minorities: 648

> Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural, and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled.
>
> It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.[1]

In accordance with these principles, the two autonomous territories were re-attached to the rest of Syria. Thus, the first Government formed after the proclamation contained a Druze and an Alawi Minister; and in February 1942, the two provinces were once more formally annexed to Syria, with provisions for a special administrative and financial regime. In September 1944 the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze voted unanimously for the abrogation of its special regime and complete incorporation in the Syrian State. 631 563

In the summer of 1943, elections were held and subsequently a nationalist government took office. As formerly, the Chamber contained representatives of the minorities and the Cabinet a Christian minister. The Government made clear its intention of treating all members of the community on a footing of complete 642 641 563

[1] General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28, 1941. *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9, 1941.

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CHAPTER V

SYRIA

In Syria, where the idea of Arab independence found some of its earliest protagonists, nationalism has been marked by a special degree of ill-temper, perhaps because the masses of the larger towns—Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, etc.—at an early stage became an object of political manœuvring. 186 668

Anti-foreign feelings had been aroused as early as 1925, when clashes with the French Mandatory régime led to the bombardment of Damascus. After the Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936, Syria became a refuge for Palestinian Arab terrorists on the run. Fawzi Kaukji—an Albanian adventurer specialising in gun-running and gang warfare on behalf of Arab extremists—Amin al Husseini—the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem—and many other "wanted" disturbers of the peace found fertile soil for their activities in Syria.

Here the connection between Arab nationalism and Muslim fanaticism was particularly close, and even sermons in the Mosques frequently descended to the level of vicious and inflammatory diatribes against non-believers. As early as October, 1945, the leader of the "Young Muslims' Association," Sheikh Mustafa al-Sibaj, in a violent speech after the Friday midday prayers in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, threatened the Jews in Arab countries with disaster "if the Palestine problem is not solved in favour of the Arabs."

These characteristics of Arab nationalism in Syria have had their effect not only on the Jews but on the Christian minority also. Hence the attractiveness of neighbouring Lebanon, with its security of life for minorities, as a goal for Christian emigration. The same was true as regards the Jews of Syria, a steady stream of whom has been moving to Lebanon for the last 25 years. The early trickle has recently become so great in volume that, by now, it is believed that only a few remnants of the Jewish population are left in the two big towns of Aleppo and Damascus. 563 668

The last census—that of 1943—gave the number of Jews in Syria as 29,770 out of a total population of 2,860,411 (of whom 2,424,817 were Muslims). The majority of the Jews used to live in Aleppo and Damascus, with about 17,000 in Aleppo (compared with 35,000 in 1910) and 11,000 in Damascus. The remainder, rather isolated, dwelt mostly in the north-eastern province of Jezirah, where they had settled in 1924, along with Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians from Turkey and Iraq. 162 167

Of the 29,000 Jews in Syria in 1943, about 15,000 had left the country by 1947. At that time, there still remained about 10,000-11,000 in Aleppo and about 2,500-3,000 in Damascus. Less than 1,000

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162 were left in the Jezirah district. An additional 5,000-6,000 Jews
167 emigrated at the beginning of 1948, leaving a total of about 9,000, with 4,500 in Aleppo, 4,000 in Damascus, and 500 in the Jezirah district. Further emigration took place that year; and it is estimated that there are now fewer than 6,000 left in the whole country.

This exodus was the culmination of many years of intimidation, material decline, and moral isolation. The smaller community in Damascus had always been poor. About 80 per cent earned their living as labourers and pedlars; approximately 15 per cent were able to maintain a slightly higher standard; while only 5 per cent were able to make a good living, mostly in commerce. The Aleppo community had in bygone days been prosperous and had been an active and important element of the city's once flourishing commerce. The rapid deterioration of conditions, however, made itself felt particularly strongly among the Jews of Aleppo; and since the wealthy were the first to leave the country, the remainder were impoverished even more swiftly.

197 Although knowledge of French is widespread among educated
563 Jews, the every-day language of the majority is either Arabic or Ladino. There are two *Alliance Israélite Universelle* schools, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus. Since the convocation of the first Parliament in December, 1936, there has been one Jewish representative in the Chamber of Deputies. He was, it is true, allowed to retain his seat even when persecution of the Jews reached its height. But, isolated as he was in a sea of feverish hostility, there was little he could do to alleviate the situation.

In 1945, a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Damascus, presided over by the Mufti of Damascus, sent a telegram to the Allied Governments, threatening that a Holy War against the Jews would be declared by all Islamic countries if Jewish immigration into Palestine continued. Within a month, this action and similar incitement from high quarters, coupled as they were with a violent anti-Jewish press campaign, bore fruit.

[579] On the Muslim holiday of Qurban Bairam, on November 18, an
563 infuriated mob, goaded on by a group of students, broke into the Great Synagogue in Aleppo, smashed the candle burning in front of the Ark,
668 battered some old Jews who were praying, and burnt the prayer books.

This was the signal for the outbreak of a general anti-Jewish campaign, made the worse by the incessant agitation carried on by nationalist orators among the Arab masses. There was the ugly murder of Jacques Franco, Assistant Headmaster of the *Alliance* School in Damascus. Suspicion that his death was the result of the prevailing unrest has never been entirely removed, even though there is insufficient evidence to prove it. There was the forcing of Rabbi Moshe Nahum, of the Jewish community of Jezirah, to make a statement protesting against Jewish immigration into Palestine. There was the humiliating spectacle of the heads of all three Jewish communities

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being compelled, in November, 1945, to take part in the demonstrations against the Balfour Declaration, and Jewish shopkeepers being ordered to close their shops as a sign of solidarity with the Muslims. However little concerned Syrian Jewry may have been with Zionist aspirations in Palestine, its feelings on the subject could hardly have been strong enough to cause its leaders—"of their own free will"—to announce that they intended to hold a banquet in honour of the notorious Fawzi Kaukji—a wartime officer of the German Waffen S.S. 563 668

Not even in Egypt did public hysteria against the helpless and isolated Jewish minority go to such lengths as it did in Syria. Doubtless this fact is due to the combination of a half-educated university youth and an illiterate, hungry, and disease-ridden urban populace. In Syria, as in Egypt, such a combination has given an extraordinarily explosive character to the nationalist movement.

When the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the Palestine issue visited Syria, its members were struck by the cowed and intimidated manner of the heads of the Jewish community. One member of the committee, Mr. Bartley Crum, in his book *Behind the Silken Curtain* (p. 239), gives the following description of the scene when three representatives of the Jewish community arrived to give evidence: 648 563

> The committee of three chosen Jews appeared. Only one spoke. There had been testimony in Jerusalem before us by Oriental Jews charging that Jews in the Oriental countries were given only second-class citizenship. Our sub-committee expected the Jewish spokesman they now heard on the scene to need far more than 20 minutes to tell his story. Instead, he used 45 seconds of his allotted time. He raced through a one-sentence written statement, in which he said that the Jews of Syria were happy and not discriminated against; that their situation was excellent under the present Syrian Government; and that they had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Zionism. The three presented a picture of terrified men. . . .

The tragic farce of the repeated declarations of solidarity with the Muslims forced on the leaders of the Jewish community did not diminish the flood of persecution. Thus Shukri al-Quwatli, the President of the Syrian Republic, made no effort to halt anti-Jewish discrimination, even though in 1946 a Jewish delegation made special representations to him. On the contrary, in 1947, the Syrian Government promulgated new restrictions, prohibiting Jewish inhabitants from leaving their areas of residence.

The effect of this order was to paralyse even what remained of Jewish economic activity; and it should be noted that the order appeared even before the partition of Palestine was decided on by the United Nations.

Within four days of the United Nations decision being made public, the mob was sufficiently worked up for anti-Jewish rioting to break out in Aleppo. On December 2, 1947, a crowd, spurred on by agitators, burnt down the four big synagogues in the city plus 648 563 579

2: Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A 622 792 554 A [791] sense as he could get away with. The story goes that two Alawite priests, whose fortunes were at a low ebb, proclaimed that a dying shepherd boy was the incarnation of Ali. Their idea was to build him a tomb and make it a specially notable shrine to attract large numbers of worshippers. However, the boy, Sulaiman Murshid, survived, and with the aid of one or two ingenious "miracles," which were to earn him the title of "phosphorous boots" in the Royal Navy, he began to build up his reputation as a divine incarnation. He is alleged to have brought forth water from a rock by a contraption of rubber tubes running down inside his sleeve and to have gained many adherents by such wonders. Subsequently the two priests disappear from the story and Sulaiman led a chequered life, during which he greatly increased his land-holdings and therefore his wealth—the Alawite mountains grow the once-famous Latakia tobacco—by somewhat forceful methods. At one time he was on the wrong side of the French Mandatory Authorities and suffered a period of banishment, but he later obtained their favour and in due course became a Deputy in the Syrian Parliament.

S [661] A [595] 66 S 669 When I was posted to Latakia in October, 1944, Sulaiman Effendi was still a Deputy, but very much in the opposition, as he was held in forced residence by the Syrian authorities in Damascus and not allowed to return to his native mountains. He has an agreeable number of wives, one in each of his various villages, but his chief wife, Umm Fatteh, was at that time acting for her absent "Lord" and entertaining lavishly in their mountain residence at Jobit Burghal. Then came an unfortunate difference of opinion between the followers of Umm Fatteh and the local government authorities, the latter's gendarmes suffering a reverse at the hands of the former, who were found to be exceedingly well-armed. Such open flouting of their authority was intolerable to the Damascus Government, and they sent up a large force of gendarmes under an experienced campaigner, Commandant Muhammed Ali. The subsequent proceedings were complicated and there was much political activity, but the French sent Alawite and North African troops to Jobit Burghal to prevent bloodshed and remained in occupation up there during the ensuing weeks, much to the disgust of Muhammed Ali, who was confident of defeating the rebels. Meanwhile Fatteh, eldest son of Sulaiman Effendi, had returned home and was able to practise his fluent French on the various French Political Officers whose duties took them to Jobit Burghal. When the fighting broke out in Damascus and it became clear that the Syrians were determined to stake all they had on a bid for complete independence, Sulaiman Murshid found himself in a most awkward position. After a certain amount of political bargaining, he stood up in the Syrian Parliament and announced a complete change of heart, admitted that he had been wrongly guided by foreign advice, and placed himself and all his followers at the disposal of the Syrian Nationalists. Having thus rallied to the cause of independence, he could no longer be detained in Damascus, and accordingly returned home to his mountain fastness. In addition to the French Moroccan force, this now contained a British "tentacle" in the shape of Captain N——, who was camping up there with Jeep and wireless and liaising with all and sundry, albeit finding his French

2: Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1946 MD1-Syria MD1
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liaison duties less cheerful than they normally are. Sulaiman Effendi's explanations of his *volte face* to the various interested parties must have taxed even his considerable ingenuity. A 669 S 669

Such was the position as we held our conference in H.M.S. *Musketeer*, and our problem, since the British were now in the last resort responsible for maintaining law and order, was how to convince the Alawite leaders, and especially the biggest potential troublemaker, Sulaiman Murshid, that there was nothing to be gained by violent action. We could not be sure that he fully appreciated the realities of the situation, since news travels slowly into the Alawite mountains, and our French friends were hardly likely to tell him that the British had moved in in force to clear up the mess into which things had drifted. Neither could we be sure that his verbal adherence to the cause of independence had been more than a ruse to get out of Damascus—he had conveniently left just before the French shelled it. We were most anxious that he should support neither side by deeds, since he could put several thousand tough riflemen into the field and was even alleged by the Nationalists to possess automatics and grenades. We decided to go up to Jobit Burghal to visit the Lord in person and sent a wireless message to our tentacle to prepare him for our arrival.

We set off in two Jeeps before the heat of the day on Sunday morning. Major B—— of the British Security Mission drove Commander S—— in one, and I followed with Commandant Muhammad Ali, representing the local Syrian authorities. The French-commanded Syrian troops eyed us as we passed their defensive positions on the hill that dominates Latakia on the landward side. The summer heat was already beginning to burn the coastal plain to shades of yellow and brown as we branched off the main road and took the bumpy track that leads up into the Alawite hills. We climbed rapidly, past the spot where a truckload of Syrian gendarmerie had been forced to surrender to some of Murshid's "army" after a two-hour battle. I could not help agreeing with Muhammad Ali that it was a perfect spot for an ambush. Soon we were out of the damp heat of the coastal plain and breathing the cool mountain air redolent of the scrub oaks and aromatic trees and bushes whose smoke is used to give the Latakia tobacco its characteristic black colour. The story goes that about a hundred years ago, when Great Britain imported most of the Alawite tobacco, the villagers one year had a bumper crop, much in excess of the amount ordered for shipment. They stored the surplus, and as they were short of space, hung it in the roofs of their houses. The next year, having a bad crop, they decided to include their last year's surplus, but found it was completely black from the smoke of their wood fires. They therefore concealed it in the centre of their bales, leaving the blond tobacco on the outside. Great was their surprise when word came from England that a new kind of black tobacco had been found in the centre of the bales, was pronounced delicious by the pipe-smokers, and they were to send all they could of it. The smoking is now carried on in special buildings in the mountains, the tobacco being brought up on camel-back to the levels where the trees grow and treated there for several months before being carried down to Latakia for shipment. A 249 439

2: Belgrave G-3 (1945) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
Alawite MD7

A 262 A 622 619

coffee seated on a row of chairs along the edge of the verandah, while the dancers, who had been performing for at least two hours, redoubled their panting efforts. I took the opportunity of having a quiet conversation about the realities of the political situation with Sulaiman Murshid, who was sitting next to me and was now in a much more forthcoming mood. I found he possessed a pronounced sense of humour and was quick to seize any nuance in what I wished to convey to him. He agreed that his wisest plan would be to keep quiet in his mountains and maintain good relations with everyone, especially the Syrian local authorities, until the larger issues of the Syrian problem had been cleared up, after which I undertook to advise the Governor of the province to give sympathetic attention to the settlement of his affairs. I took it as a compliment when at the end of our talk he remarked: "You know, I think you and I ought to go into partnership; we should do well together." Muhammad Ali then got up and made a speech, in which he dealt wisely with ticklish local problems and assured Murshid's followers that the Syrian Government regarded them all as its children and had nothing against them provided they were loyal. They looked a trifle nonplussed at this sudden change from the status of rebels to children. However, when Murshid got up and said a few words to the effect that they must now follow the Syrian Government and struggle for independence, one could feel the extent of his power in their complete acceptance of the new situation. Someone handed the leading dancer a Syrian flag in place of the coloured kerchief she was waving, and we decided to take our leave, having no desire to back one side more than the other in this quarrel but only to prevent further bloodshed. We left Jobit Burghal and climbed up out of the bowl in the mountains somewhat weighed down with a too-large lunch but hopeful of tranquillity in the mountains and stored with memories of an unforgettable day.

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Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 662 182

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conclusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 162 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

648 In the State of Syria the disquiet may be traced back to
● 667 that opposition to the general policy of the Mandatory Power
668 which has been analyzed in Chapter IX. The opposition was strengthened by the many administrative and economic grievances which have also been dealt with. It found expression in a number of local disturbances and risings at the very beginning of the French occupation, the most notable of them the revolt of Ibrahim Hananu in North Syria and the rising in the Hauran. As time went on the restlessness was increased still further by the instability of French policy: the appointment and recall of a number of High Commissioners; the consequent changes in the higher personnel of the mandatory administration; the creation and then the dissolution of a Federation. These were further causes of disquiet: the repercussion in Syria of the growing hostility of the Palestinian Arabs to Zionism and to British policy, and the activities of Syrian emigrants, particularly of the Syro-Palestinian Committees in Cairo and in Geneva. Of the group in Geneva the leading spirit was the Amir Shakib Arslan, a distinguished writer and publicist, by origin a Lebanese Druze, who had given all his life to the spread first of Pan-Islamic and then of Pan-Arab ideas.

668 All these factors contributed to create a strong opposition
[665] to French rule; it was led and organized by the 'People's
648 Party', which grew rapidly in the years prior to the revolt. The nationalist opposition was to some extent concerned with general Arab problems: the independence and union of the whole Arab world. In local matters, its main purposes were two. First, it advocated the union of the French Mandated Territories. Jebel Druze and the Alawi region, it was claimed, should be wholly incorporated in the State of Syria; Lebanon was to be at most autonomous within a Syrian or Arab State, and was to be shorn of the territories assigned to it in 1920. Secondly, Syria should be given genuine self-government immediately, and complete independence as soon as possible. This would involve on the one hand the relaxation of French control over the administration; on the other a rigid definition of the points at which and the period for which French armed forces could be maintained in Syria, and ultimately their complete withdrawal. It was around these two points that Franco-Syrian relations revolved throughout the period of the Mandate.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria #101

631 648 both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty.

631 664 186 The Treaty and the new régime were received with approval by a number of the Druzes and Alawis; even former autonomists expressed their loyalty to the Syrian Government. This reaction, however, was transient and deceptive. In Jebel Druze discord began to arise early in 1937, after the appointment of Nasib al-Bakri, a Damascene Moslem, as first Governor of the province. A powerful party demanded the appointment of a Druze notable, Hasan al-Atrash, and also a large measure of autonomy; the nationalists asserted that it was encouraged to go to extremes by local French officials. There were also, however, many Druzes who supported the nationalist Government and the Governor whom it had appointed. Attempts were made with no more than a temporary success to reconcile the advocates of separatism with those of unity. The disturbances were not ended until the Governor resigned and was replaced after an interval by Hasan al-Atrash. By the end of 1937 the Jebel was quiet enough to enable Parliamentary elections to be held. The calm continued throughout 1938, but at the beginning of 1939 [669] disturbances began once more. The separatist group accused the Syrian Government of bad faith, expelled Syrian officials from the province and declared the independence of Jebel Druze under the protection of France.

A similar process had meanwhile been occurring in the Alawi district, which was known under the new régime as the Province of Latakia. Here, as in Jebel Druze, there was tranquillity at first, and Parliamentary elections were held in 1937. But the calm was short-lived. The Alawi notables protested against the appointment of Syrian Moslem officials, and more especially of nationalist Governors, first Mazhar Raslan from Homs and then Ihsan al-Jabiri, a Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. The nationalist policy of assimilation was perhaps carried out hastily and tactlessly, the Governor alienated large sections of the population, and at the beginning of 1939 armed bands rose in revolt under the leadership of the deputy Sulaiman Murshid, a brigand who had proclaimed himself 'God' and had secured considerable local influence with the help of certain French officials. At about the same time the visit of the High Commissioner, M. Puaux, was made the occasion for demonstrations in favour of autonomy. Soon

afterwards the Governor found his position impossible and 631
was compelled to abandon it. He was not replaced, his 664
powers being assumed in July by the High Commissioner's 186
Delegate.

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The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 effected no formal change in the status of the Jazirah, but its signature was followed by the replacement of the French officials who had ruled it until then, by Syrian administrators. Here as in Jebel Druze and the Alawi region discontent soon showed itself. There were some who felt and expressed loyalty to the new national Government. But there was an important element which demanded that the ties between the Jazirah and the central Government in Damascus should be as loose as possible, or should be severed altogether. Their minimum demand was that the local officials should be chosen from among the local population; their maximum, for complete separation from Syria. Their discontent was increased by the lack of wisdom shown by some of the more irresponsible nationalists, although the Government itself acted on the whole in a conciliatory manner. The autonomists appear to have been encouraged by certain of the local French officials; the nationalists claimed, indeed, that here as among the Alawis and Druzes the minorities would have acquiesced in their rule had it not been for the activities of French agents. The separatists were themselves divided on everything except their dislike of being ruled by the nationalists of Damascus. Some were Kurds, who objected mainly to being ruled by Arabs; others Christians, who objected also to being ruled by Moslems. These two groups sometimes but not always acted together during the years from 1936 to 1939.

Serious trouble first broke out in June, 1937, when the 669
Kurds of Hassetche revolted against the appointment of 563
nationalist officials from outside the Jazirah. The rising was 631
quelled with the aid of the French military authorities, but it was soon taken up in Qamishli and elsewhere by the Christians, who demanded a special statute similar to that of Alexandretta, an administration which would give equal weight to the rights of all sects and races, and the withdrawal from the province of officials who had not been chosen from the local population.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

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The disturbances reached their height in August, when a number of Christians in Amudah were killed in an altercation with a group of Kurds instigated by a Kurdish chieftain who supported the nationalist Government. The intervention of French troops and the removal of certain unpopular officials restored order for a time. But beneath the surface discontent continued, and the separatists began to form themselves into societies for the defence of their rights, with a central committee to co-ordinate their activities. In December, 1937, some separatists from Hassetche kidnapped the Governor of the Jazirah, Tawfiq Shamiyyah, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus; he was released after a few days, and his kidnappers were arrested.

The Governor was shortly afterwards replaced by a new one, a Moslem, who made a conciliatory statement of policy. It did not, however, appease the separatists. They demanded the release of those who had been arrested for kidnapping the former Governor, and also the dismissal of certain officials. When the new Governor failed to persuade the Syrian Government to yield to these demands, he was chased from the province. The separatists then drove out other nationalist officials, boycotted the administration and reaffirmed their demand for a separate government under French control.

While these events were occurring in the Jazirah, the separatist case was being urged in Paris and Rome by Cardinal Tappouni, the head of the Syrian Catholic Church, who had constituted himself the spokesman of those Christian minorities who were opposed to nationalist rule. In a memorandum submitted to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November, 1937, he spoke of the possibility of a massacre of the Christians in the Jazirah and elsewhere, and made various proposals for avoiding it: that the religious communities should be given complete equality in religious and personal matters; that an equitable number of Christian officials should be appointed; that the Syrian Government should maintain, in districts where the Christians might be menaced, adequate means for their protection; and that a régime of decentralization should be introduced, such as to safeguard the interests of the minorities. The French Government, which was then negotiating with the Syrian Prime Minister in order to obtain more explicit guarantees, replied in a vague and conciliatory fashion.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

The situation remained as it was until the beginning of 1939, when agitation for the release of the kidnappers of the former Governor occurred. In June organized manifestations on a large scale took place in all the towns of the province; but the French authorities intervened and restored order.

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No sooner had the Franco-Syrian Treaty been signed than criticism of it began to appear in France. In part this criticism came from those who opposed the whole idea of a treaty, believing the Syrians to be still unfit for self-government. Others, while admitting a treaty of some sort to be desirable, were doubtful of the adequacy of the existing Treaty: because it aimed at creating a unitary State in a country so divided as Syria; or because its guarantees for minorities and its provisions for the maintenance of French military forces upon Syrian soil were insufficient; or else because it did not stipulate for the repayment to France of the expenses incurred in the administration of the Mandate.

These doubts were reinforced by the events of 1937: the Alexandretta question, and the growth of the separatist movements in Jebel Druze, the province of Latakia and the Jazirah. It was obvious that the French Chamber and Senate would only ratify the Treaty provided that they were reassured on these and certain other points. The Syrian Prime Minister therefore went to Paris in order to negotiate with the French Government an agreement upon the points at issue. He left Syria in November, 1937, and returned towards the end of December. The result of his visit was an exchange of letters between him and M. de Tessan, Under-Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated December 11th, 1937. The letters included a further guarantee by the Syrian Government of its intention to respect all the rights granted by the Treaty to the minorities living under its sway; and an undertaking by the Government to accept the technical experts recommended to it by the French Government. The letters closed with a statement of the desire of both parties to continue the policy of co-operation.[1]

These undertakings were accepted by nationalist opinion as being inevitable in the circumstances, and ratification of the Treaty was eagerly awaited. In March, 1938, indeed, Mardam

[1] See Appendix A4.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

were to be carried out by a special decree. Article 89, which 642
specified that the number of ministers was not to exceed 7, was amended to read 12. Finally, Articles 71 and 115, specifying the procedure of electing the first President of the Republic, were deleted.[18]

THE MILITARY COUPS D'ÉTAT

The Quwwatli regime, which could flatter itself on having 669
achieved full independence for Syria, failed to inaugurate the reforms which were so badly needed. The criticism levelled against the Government — that it was corrupt and permitted the aggrandizement of its Ministers — might have been exaggerated, but it will be noted that the Government's "constitutional reform" merely amended those articles which related to the re-election of Quwwatli to the Presidency and to the Cabinet membership, ignoring many other gaps and defects in the constitutional organization of the State. This fact lent substance to the criticism that the Government paid attention only to matters that served the interests of the ruling oligarchy.[19]

Matters came to a head when the Syrian Government (jointly with the other Arab Governments) failed to forestall the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The Quwwatli regime's attempt to shift the responsibility of defeat to the Army precipitated a reaction. Colonel Husni al-Za'im, secretly encouraged by the opposition parties, raised a military coup d'état on March 30, 1949, which overthrew the Quwwatli regime amidst popular enthusiasm and approval.[20]

Za'im's coup, by eliminating the party which was so avowedly 648
opposed to uniting or even cooperating with the two neighboring 642
Hashimi Kingdoms, at once reopened the question of the future organization of Syria: whether it would be monarchical, by joining a union with Iraq, or maintain a separate republican

[18] For text of the Amendment Law, see the Syrian *Official Gazette*, Vol. 30 (March 25, 1948), p. 756. For further details on the Amendment of the Constitution, see Wajih al-Haffar, *Al-dastur wa al-hukm* [*The Constitution and the Government*] (Damascus, 1948), pp. 123–30.

[19] Wajih al-Haffar, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–54; M. Kurd Ali, *Al-Mudhakkirat* [*Memoirs*] (Damascus, 1948), Vol. II, p. 530.

[20] For the background of this movement, see Alford Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949" *Middle East Journal*, IV (Jan. 1950), pp. 1–11.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Za'im was overthrown by his opponents on August 14, 1949, having remained in power only four and a half months. Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led this second coup and executed Za'im, reversed the policy of friendly relations with the Saudi-Egyptian bloc and again opened negotiations with Iraq for a Syro-Iraqi union. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in November, but when the Assembly met on December 12 and was about to approve a project for union with Iraq, a third army move on December 14, led by Colonel Adib Shishakli, sealed the fate of unity with Iraq under a dual monarchy. Shishakli declared that the Army would no longer interfere in politics and that government by civilians would be maintained; but it remained clear that the Army would continue to resist any policy which ran counter to its wishes.

The Constituent Assembly elected Rushdi al-Kikhya, leader of the People's Party which won the elections, as its President, and Hashim al-Atasi, an old member of the Nationalist Party, as the temporary head of the State. On January 7, 1950, after a long cabinet crisis attributed to the intervention of the Army in politics, President Atasi took an oath of office and the Constituent Assembly gave temporary legislative and executive powers to the Government, subject to its control, until the promulgation of a Constitution. In the meantime a committee of 33 members, under the chairmanship of Nazim al-Qudsi, was appointed to prepare a draft constitution for the Assembly. The Committee began its meetings on January 4 and completed its work three months later. As its chairman stated in his report to the Assembly, the Committee made use of no less than fifteen European and Asiatic (including Arab) constitutions, and received proposals from individuals and organizations either directly or through the press.[22] The draft Constitution, consisting of 177 articles, was communicated to the President of the Assembly on April 15, 1950, but debate did not get underway until July 7. After prolonged discussion, first on the draft generally and then article by article, the Constitution was approved with considerable changes (including reduction to 166 articles) on September 5,

[22] See text of the Report in the *Official Gazette*, Vol. 32 (June 22, 1950), Appendix, pp. 1–2.

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ed a governor for Lebanon before the latter was displaced by the French (whose historic interests in Lebanon had been recognized by the British Government in the correspondence with the Sharif Hussain). While Faisal and Lawrence were presenting the Arab case to the Paris Peace Conference, the French were consolidating their military hold on the Levant. Eventually Faisal and Clemenceau came to a provisional agreement for an autonomous Syrian state under the tutelage of France (as conceded by Britain in the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, which had not been communicated at the time to the Sharif and his sons); but French tutelage was not acceptable to the Damascus politicians who in March 1920 proclaimed Faisal King of an independent Syrian state. In the following month, however, the French obtained Britain's agreement, at the San Remo Conference, to their exercising a Mandate over Syria as well as Lebanon; the new Mandatary defeated Faisal's little army at Maisalun on 25 July 1920 and entered into possession of Damascus, from which Faisal fled into exile.

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The French Mandate, 1920–45

Since Crusader times, France had been interested in protecting the Christians of the Levant, and the twentieth century gave her the added incentive of creating a counter-balance to Britain's growing influence in the Middle East. The Maronites welcomed the French, and the latter accordingly expanded the small area of the Sanjaq of Lebanon to include the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, as well as the Biqaa, so as to give this 'Greater Lebanon' the largest possible area in which there would be no danger of a Muslim majority. The French applied to Syria the principle of *divide et impera* and four separate states were set up: that of the Alawis (Jebel Ansariya, including Latakia), that of the Jebel Druze, and Damascus and Aleppo (in 1925 combined into a single state of Syria). The French further encouraged separatism in the Jezira, and designated the area of Antioch and Alexandretta (in which the largest linguistic community was the Turkish) as an autonomous sanjaq.

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The majority of Syrians never readily accepted French rule and risings occurred in the Ansariya, near Aleppo, and near Dair az-Zor; these were soon put down but a greater rebellion began in the Jebel Druze in 1925 and spread to Damascus and to Hama. The French bombarded Damascus in October 1925 and in May 1926 but did not succeed in completely quelling the revolt until August 1927. Thereafter negotiations for a treaty stumbled through the years, punctuated by disturbances, broken off from time to time and marked throughout by bitter-

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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ness on both sides. In Syria (and to a lesser degree, in Lebanon) the possibility of long-term co-operation between the nationalist politicians and the Mandatary was frustrated alike by the attitude of most French officials and by that of the local urban populations who, though they later signed the 1936 treaty, desired full self-government.[1] The advent to power in France of the Front Populaire in 1936 eased the situation: treaties with Syria and Lebanon were negotiated whereby the Mandate was to be transformed into an alliance with independent states, but under which France could still maintain troops in the Levant. However, the French Parliament was unwilling to ratify the Syrian treaty under the lengthening shadow of the impending Second World War, and Syrian indignation was increased when the need for Turkey's friendship led France in 1939 to cede to Turkey the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, afterwards renamed Hatay. Leading Syrian politicians refused to co-operate with the French on these terms, and on the eve of the outbreak of war the French High Commissioner once again suspended the Syrian constitution and governed the country through French and Syrian officials; the same procedure was applied to Lebanon after the outbreak of war.

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When metropolitan France fell in 1940 the Mandate was carried on by the Vichy Government until the latter's acquiescence in the use of the Levant airfields by the German air force necessitated the intervention of British and Free French forces in June 1941. After a short but bitter campaign, the Vichy forces signed an armistice in July 1941. In the struggle between the Allies and the Axis and between Vichy and de Gaulle the Syrians and Lebanese took no part, but their independence had been promised by the Allied Command. On behalf of the Free French, General Catroux, in a statement on 8 June 1941, proclaimed the end of the Mandate, but in fact the Free French regarded themselves as trustees for France's position, seeking to maintain them by installing Syrian and Lebanese supporters of France in the seats of authority. The Free French had, however, eventually to yield to the demand for popular elections, which was supported by the British Government as soon as the victory at al-Alamain (October 1942) had finally removed the threat of Axis invasion from the Middle East. In Syria the elections of 1943 brought into office the National Bloc with Shukri al-Quwatli as President of the Republic and Saadullah Jabri, Jamil Mardam, and Faris al-Khouri as parliamentary leaders. In the Lebanon also nationalists were successful and the leader of the 'Constitutional Bloc',

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[1] For details, see A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, RIIA, 1946).

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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648 14 smaller ones, and destroyed 150 houses. An unknown number of
563 Jews was butchered to death.
579 By the time Palestine was invaded by the Arab States, the Jewish communities in Syria were completely isolated. No Jew dared to have any contacts abroad or, for that matter, with any foreigners resident in the country. Commercial activity came practically to a standstill, since Jews were forbidden to open their shops or to carry on with their employment.

The property of a transport company, owned by an Iraqi Jew, was confiscated, and the entire Jewish staff arrested. Fifteen Jewish girls who worked in the telephone exchanges in Aleppo and Damascus were dismissed. The Chief Engineer of Damascus, who had held this position for 12 years, suffered the same fate, together with five Jewish school teachers. The school building of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* in Damascus was requisitioned for the military. The already impoverished community was forced under threat to donate about £S10,000 (at that time equivalent to £1,100) to the Arab funds.

Throughout the months of fighting, a relentless campaign demanding the confiscation of all Jewish property went on. The Damascus Jews felt themselves fortunate in being spared a repetition of the earlier Aleppo riots, though in August, 1949, 11 were killed when a bomb was thrown into a synagogue.

563 For some time the situation of the Jews in Damascus was extremely grave. Being prevented from earning a living, the community was so impoverished that it was feared that many would die of hunger and disease. Had it not been for the assistance of the Jewish community in Beirut, the Damascus community might well have perished. Later, their straits were further relieved by American help.

563 With the overthrow of the Syrian Government by Husni Zaim in
● 669 March, 1949, all restrictions on the movements of Jews, as well as on the sale of property, were abolished. The new ruler declared that he would deal severely with any person attempting to discriminate
[167] against the Jews. The lifting of the travel ban was immediately followed by a new wave of Jewish emigration to Lebanon.

The confused situation arising out of Zaim's murder, and the succession of political *coups* which followed, make the prospects of the Jewish community uncertain. But even if the new Government were to abstain from any official discrimination against the Jews of Syria, the atmosphere has been poisoned to such an extent that a return to normal conditions and peaceful relations seems most unlikely. On the face of it, nothing will alter the passionate wish of practically every Jew in Syria to shake the country's dust off his feet.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

further step was taken with the creation of a Syrian Federation which included the States of Damascus, Aleppo and the Alawis, but not those of Greater Lebanon and Jebel Druze. The Federation was given wide legislative powers, exercised through a Federal Council composed of delegations elected by the Representative Councils which were established in the member-states. At its first meeting the Council elected as its President Subhi Barakat, an Antiochene of Turkish origin.

The Federation did not work satisfactorily. The States of Damascus and Aleppo desired a closer form of union, and certain elements in that of the Alawis one less close. In December, 1924, General Weygand, who had succeeded General Gouraud as High Commissioner in April, 1923, dissolved the Federation. As from January, 1925, the two States of Damascus and Aleppo were combined into a single State of Syria, of which the capital was Damascus and within which the Sanjaq of Alexandretta continued to possess a special régime. The State of the Alawis resumed its separate existence without any direct connexion with the new Syrian State.

Thus from the beginning of 1925 onwards the Mandated Territories were divided into four different political units: the State of Greater Lebanon, known later as the Lebanese Republic; the State of Syria, later called the Syrian Republic and including the partly-autonomous Sanjaq of Alexandretta; the State of the Alawis, known from 1930 as the Government of Latakia; and the Government of Jebel Druze. This organization continued unchanged until 1936, when Latakia and Jebel Druze were formally annexed to Syria; in 1939 they were again given almost complete autonomy, but in 1942 were once more attached to the Syrian State.

The judicial system was complex and not altogether satisfactory. Many although by no means all matters of personal status—for example, marriage and divorce—continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the religious communities. All other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, administering a system of law based partly upon Islamic jurisprudence and partly upon modern European codes. In cases in which only citizens of the Mandated Territories were concerned, the personnel of the courts was almost wholly indigenous. But cases involving citizens of foreign States or their interests were taken before the 'mixed

courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

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The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

61: Capsules 1-4 (no date) 1964 MI Middle East
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This agency was set up by the law of 1939 to construct, maintain and use water conduits and to set up other operations relating to the water supply and sanitation facilities of population centers. Several banks were members of this body, and an annual government contribution of 20,000,000 lire was provided. Another decree of the same date approved the constitution of this organization.

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Syrian water legislation has followed the same evolution as that of Lebanon. During the period of the Ottoman Empire, the articles of the Mejelle Code governed waters. Under the period of the French mandate, the two orders concerning public domain - No. 144/S dated 10 June 1925 and No. 320/S dated 26 May 1926, as well as Legislative Decree No. 288 dated 28 November 1942 which amended Article 25 of No. 320/S - both applied to Syria and Lebanon. These two decrees are still in force in Syria and have already been analyzed in the section of this paper relating to Lebanon. Since Syria became completely independent, however, two new legislative decrees have partially amended or repealed a few articles of the preceding rules concerning water.

New Code of Liabilities

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This new code of liabilities, enacted by Legislative Decree No. 148 dated 22 June 1949, stipulates, in Articles 731 to 735, penalties for infraction of clauses on water and has supplemented the above-mentioned order No. 144/S. These articles state:

"Imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine up to 250 Syrian pounds, or both, is inflicted upon any person who, without special authorization, commits the following:

1. "the exploitation of underground water or artesian wells, unless it is intended to dig new wells on private property to a depth less than 150 meters;

2. "the execution of any excavations near water canal borders or any drainage systems at a distance less than

61: Capcoma 3-4 (no date) 1964 M1 Middle East
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the depth of those excavations, in any case at a distance less than three meters;

3. "the taking of any stones, earth, sand, trees, shrubs or plants from river banks, from permanent or temporary canals or from lakes, ponds or swamps;

4. "the planting of trees or seeds or the placing of anything on the shores of lakes, ponds or swamps, on permanent or temporary canal banks, on passages in between, on any drainage systems or on any authorized, constructed public utility pipes;

5. "the infraction of any sort on the shore of any water source, on permanent or temporary river canals, on swamps, ponds or lakes, on the river canal borders or on public utility drainage pipes;

6. "the prevention of the free flowing of public water;

7. "any permanent or temporary action affecting the quantity and flowing capacity of water (Article 731).

"Any person who, without authorization, organizes new permanent or temporary water canals, or deepens or fills in those already in existence shall be fined according to the provisions or the previous article (Article 732).

"Two years in prison and a fine of 250 Syrian pounds are imposed on any person who destroys or converts all or any of the permanent water establishments with the intent of benefiting from these public waters (Article 733).

"The same fine is imposed on any person who:

1. "throws into any authorized water canal any liquids or materials harmful to public health or the free flowing of the water;

2. "spreads animal manure on any of the land situated within the area delimited by the government for the safeguarding of any water source;

3. "causes any destructive action such as dirtying water sources used for drinking (Article 734).

"Anyone who intentionally pollutes any drinking water source is to be imprisoned for from one to three years and shall pay a fine of from 25 to 300 Syrian pounds" (Article 735). 671 312 681

New Taxation on Irrigated Lands

A new legislative decree, No. 34 dated 30 December 1951, amends Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of law No. 467 dated 21 February 1949 which imposed an annual tax on land irrigated by state irrigation systems. The new decree reads as follows: 312 651

"This tax is applied per hectare in the following manner:

Area of Irrigated Land	Khabour Mgérib and Senn Irrigation System	Homs and Hama Irrigation System	Matkh Irrigation System
	L.S.	L.S.	L.S.
Up to 5 hectares	20	15	5
From 5 to 25 hectares	25	20	7.5
From 25 to 50 hectares	40	30	10
Over 50 hectares	50	40	15

"Such tax shall be reduced by half after a lapse of ten years from its first year of application.

"It should be calculated on the whole area held by the taxpayer, whether individually or in partnership with others, with reference to the land irrigated by one and the same irrigation system. The tax on a fraction of a hectare shall be proportionate to the tax on a whole hectare.

"The tax shall take effect on the first day of the year following the year in which the water is brought to the land subject to the tax, even though such water has not been used.

"The term 'Engineer-in-Chief of the region' in Article 8 of Law No. 467 shall be replaced by 'Engineer-in-chief of the hydraulics service of the region' (Article 2).

"The following paragraph is added to Article 6 of Law 467:

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The Aqueduct Construction Agency in Italian East Africa

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further step was taken with the creation of a Syrian Federation 648 which included the States of Damascus, Aleppo and the 642 Alawis, but not those of Greater Lebanon and Jebel Druze. 631 The Federation was given wide legislative powers, exercised through a Federal Council composed of delegations elected by the Representative Councils which were established in the member-states. At its first meeting the Council elected as its President Subhi Barakat, an Antiochene of Turkish origin.

The Federation did not work satisfactorily. The States of Damascus and Aleppo desired a closer form of union, and certain elements in that of the Alawis one less close. In December, 1924, General Weygand, who had succeeded General Gouraud as High Commissioner in April, 1923, dissolved the Federation. As from January, 1925, the two States of Damascus and Aleppo were combined into a single State of Syria, of which the capital was Damascus and within which the Sanjaq of Alexandretta continued to possess a special régime. The State of the Alawis resumed its separate existence without any direct connexion with the new Syrian State.

Thus from the beginning of 1925 onwards the Mandated Territories were divided into four different political units: the State of Greater Lebanon, known later as the Lebanese Republic; the State of Syria, later called the Syrian Republic and including the partly-autonomous Sanjaq of Alexandretta; the State of the Alawis, known from 1930 as the Government of Latakia; and the Government of Jebel Druze. This organization continued unchanged until 1936, when Latakia and Jebel Druze were formally annexed to Syria; in 1939 they were again given almost complete autonomy, but in 1942 were once more attached to the Syrian State.

The judicial system was complex and not altogether satis- 671 factory. Many although by no means all matters of personal 692 status—for example, marriage and divorce—continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the religious communities. All other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, administering a system of law based partly upon Islamic jurisprudence and partly upon modern European codes. In cases in which only citizens of the Mandated Territories were concerned, the personnel of the courts was almost wholly indigenous. But cases involving citizens of foreign States or their interests were taken before the 'mixed

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courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

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The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

by the Supreme Court on the accusation of such activity attributed to them.

Parliament is composed of one Chamber of Deputies (Majlis), elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage (including women) for a term of four years. It convenes from October 1 to December 31 and from March 1 to May 15, and each year elects its President on the basis of absolute majority. The Deputies represent the entire nation and not their own constituencies. As in the case of the Ministers, the Deputies are not permitted to exploit their positions in any business transaction with the Government. Legislation, other than financial bills, may be initiated by Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet; but financial bills which involve reduction of taxes or expenditures of funds must be proposed either by 20 members of Parliament or by the President with the approval of the Cabinet. Article 59 stipulates that Parliament "shall not cede its legislative powers." This article, it seems, was inserted to ensure that Parliament would not follow the example of the Constituent Assembly in delegating legislative, in addition to executive, powers to the Government and thus pave the way toward the realization of a dictatorial regime. If one-fourth of the members of Parliament object to the constitutionality of a bill before its promulgation, or if the President does so, then it is suspended until the Supreme Court passes a decision regarding its constitutionality. If the Supreme Court decides within 10 days that the bill is unconstitutional, it is returned to Parliament for reconsideration.

The judicial system is designed to be free from interference by any other governmental agency. "The honor, conscience, and integrity of the judges are guaranteed for the right and freedom of the people." (Article 105.) The judicial power is exercised by three types of courts: (1) the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Cassation; (3) ordinary tribunals. The Supreme Court is composed of 7 members to be elected by Parliament from a list of 14 nominees chosen from among highly qualified judges. The members of the Supreme Court are elected for 5 years and are eligible for re-election. They are independent and cannot be discharged except by a decision of the Supreme Court itself.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

The functions of the Court are: (1) to consider the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and any administrative decisions; (2) to conduct the trial of the President of the Republic and the Ministers; and (3) to examine the validity of elections. 642 692

For the purpose of the appointment, promotion, transfer, and discharge of judges or the various courts other than the Supreme Court, a High Council of Judges is provided, composed of the President of the Supreme Court, two members of the Supreme Court, and the highest ranking four judges of the Court of Cassation. The Council is set up to ensure that the judicial authority is kept independent of the influence of the Government.

The Constitution provides, likewise, detailed provisions for the division of the country into administrative units and for local provincial government and municipal administration. It also provides rules for the preparation of the budget and the procedure of its introduction to Parliament, as well as other measures related to financial policy. An interesting provision related to the economic development of the country is the establishment of a Permanent Economic Council for the purpose of formulating plans for the development and exploitation of the economic potentialities of Syria. 642 [647]

Probably the most interesting innovation of the Constitution is its Bill of Rights comprising 28 articles which define with considerable detail the fundamental principles of freedom and the social and economic rights of the individual citizen. The numerous provisions stressing liberty and equality of the individual and the freedom of the press may seem superfluous, but they are deemed worthy of emphasis in view of the authoritarian tendency in the administration since the establishment of the national regime.

Article 21 marks a radical departure from the principle of the existing social-economic system. In this article, property is defined as both "public" and "private"; and the State like the individual may possess property within the limits of the law. As to private ownership, "the method of its possession and disposal shall be specified by law in such a manner as to make it perform its social function." Further, no individual is to be permitted to "utilize his private ownership in a manner inconsistent 642 423

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Mi Middle East
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*872 *873 sectarian schools, schools controlled by societies and groups, and schools controlled by individuals.

The first class of schools is that maintained by religious groups, the clergy, or by lay organizations having a religious motive. The second are conducted by groups having a philanthropic or national aim, often without regard to religious affiliation, and the last, those conducted by individuals, may be philanthropic or national in aim, but are often established to secure a livelihood or personal gain for the founder.

TABLE 69

DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE PRIMARY SCHOOLS ACCORDING TO RELIGIOUS CONTROL, SYRIA, 1944–45*

Denomination of Controlling Authority	No. of Schools				Enrollment		
	Boys	Girls	Coeducational	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
Muslim	53	15	9	77	11,146	3,518	14,664
Catholic (Greek, Syrian, Chaldean, Maronite, and Armenian)	49	12	10	71	5,128	2,673	7,801
Orthodox (Greek, Syrian, and Armenian)	50	11	50	111	10,129	6,542	16,671
Protestant (Syrian and Armenian)	2	...	15	17	942	754	1,696
Jewish	3	...	1	4	822	24	846
Miscellaneous	1	2	4	7	633	699	1,332
Total	158	40	89	287	28,800	14,210	43,010

* Figures from Sati' al-Husri, *Reports . . . 1945*, pp. 43–44.

*873 In the sectarian category fall the schools maintained by the Waqf de-
*795 partment for the training of Muslim religious teachers as well as judges
[692] and clerks for the Muhammadan law courts. There are 5 of these schools, enrolling 424 students. Such schools are, however, actually public schools since they are supported by Waqf funds. The Ministry of Education pays nothing toward their maintenance and consequently classes them as private.

Some of the schools are of hardly more than primary standard. Two, however—1 in Damascus and 1 in Aleppo—are of a higher standard. The *Shari'ah* college in Damascus was founded by the Body of 'Ulama in 1942. It is still in the process of development. In 1945–46, it had 140 students, of whom 85 were boarders from the various parts of Syria. Admission is from the primary school, and the plan is to have a series of three courses, one above the other. The first course of six years would be a kind of religious secondary course to prepare clerks for the Muhammadan law courts and teachers of religion for the elementary schools. A higher course of four years would aim at training higher clerks for the courts, preachers, minor judges, and teachers of Arabic and religion for secondary schools. Finally,

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Art. 101. The offices of a Deputy and a Minister may be held simultaneously. 642 645

Art. 102. The emoluments of the Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be fixed by a law.

Art. 103. (1) There shall be established a "Bureau of Inspection" attached to the Presidency of the Cabinet.

(2) This Bureau shall communicate to the Presidency of the Chamber copies of the reports of its inspectors and their conclusions together with its own observations.

(3) The classification of the members of this Bureau, their prerogatives and immunities shall be defined by a law.

Chapter V

THE JUDICIAL POWER

Art. 104. The Judiciary is an independent authority. 642

Art. 105. (1) Judges are independent. The only authority above them in the exercise of their power is Law. 692

(2) The honour of the judges and their moral conscience and integrity constitute a guarantee for the rights of the people and their freedoms.

Art. 106. Before assuming office a judge shall swear that he will mete out justice to the people and that he will observe the law.

Art. 107. Judgments shall be rendered in the name of the People of Syria and shall state the grounds on which they were reached.

Art. 108. Judicial powers shall be exercised by:

(1) The Supreme Court

(2) The High Court of Appeal

(3) All other Courts

Art. 109. All judges shall be appointed by a decision of the "Supreme Judiciary Council" and in accordance with the law.

Art. 110. The promotion of judges, their transfer, disciplinary measures to be taken against them and their dismissal shall be governed by a decision of the Supreme Judiciary Council in accordance with the law.

Art. 111. The institution of public prosecutions is a judicial function. It shall be headed by the Minister of Justice.

Art. 112. The public prosecutor shall be the guardian of justice,

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alert to enforce laws, to pursue those who violate them and to enforce penal sentences against them.

Art. 113. The appointment of public prosecutors, their promotion, their transfer, disciplinary measures to be taken against them, and their dismissal shall be fixed by law.

Art. 114. The classification of Civil and Military Courts, their grades and salaries of judges shall be fixed by a law.

Art. 115. The classification of clerks and officers of the Courts shall be fixed by a law. Their appointment, promotion and dismissal shall come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.

I.

THE SUPREME COURT

Art. 116. (1) The Supreme Court shall consist of seven members elected by the Chamber of Deputies from a list containing fourteen names.

The President of the Republic shall select the candidates for this office from highly qualified individuals who have high university degrees and have completed the fortieth year of their age.

(2) Election shall take place in a special session of the Chamber of Deputies and within ten days of the receipt of the list by the Chamber. Each voting paper shall contain seven names.

(3) At the first ballot, he who receives an absolute majority of the total members of the Chamber shall be considered elected.

(4) At the second ballot, the majority of those present shall be sufficient.

(5) At the third ballot, a relative majority shall be sufficient.

Art. 117. Incompatibilities between the office of members of the Supreme Court and other functions shall be determined by law.

Art. 118. (1) A member of the Supreme Court shall be elected for a five-year term and may be re-elected.

(2) A member of the Supreme Court may not be dismissed except by virtue of a decree approved by four or more of its members.

Art. 119. The Supreme Court shall elect from its members and by a vote of its absolute majority a President for a five-year term.

Art. 120. (1) Should a seat in the Supreme Court become vacant

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for some reason, the Chamber of Deputies shall elect a successor from 642
a list containing three times the number of vacancies. The President 692
of the Republic shall select that list.

(2) Selection and election shall be made in accordance with the stipulations of Article 116 hereof.

Art. 121. Before entering into office, the President and members of the Supreme Court shall take solemnly in the presence of the Chamber of Deputies and in a special session attended by the President of the Republic the following oath:

> "I swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and laws of the country and to discharge my duties in equity and integrity."

Art. 122. (1) The Supreme Court shall consider and decide definitively on the following matters:

(a) The constitutionality of laws referred to it in accordance with Article 63.

(b) The constitutionality and legality of draft decrees referred to it from the President of the Republic.

(c) The impeachment of the President of the Republic and of the Ministers.

(d) Petitions against the validity of elections.

(e) Petitions to suspend or to nullify administrative acts, decisions or decrees inconsistent with the Constitution, with laws, or with organizational decrees, when such petitions are submitted by individuals who may suffer loss from the application thereof.

(2) The procedure for investigating and deciding on the hereinbefore mentioned matters shall be determined by law.

2.

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Art. 123. The Supreme Judicial Council shall be formed of seven members as follows:

(a) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as President.

(b) Two members of the Supreme Court.

(c) The four highest ranking judges from the High Court of Appeal.

Art. 124. (1) The President of the Supreme Judicial Council

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642 shall propose to this Council the nomination, promotion, transfer,
692 dismissal of judges and disciplinary measures to be taken against any of them when necessary in accordance with law. The Council shall decide on such proposals by a vote to be taken by its absolute majority.

(2) The President shall draft and sign decrees upon decisions taken by the Supreme Judicial Council, and refer such decrees to the Minister of Justice in accordance with the stipulations of Article 80 hereof.

Art. 125. The Supreme Judicial Council shall propose bills concerning the immunity of judges, the procedure for their appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary measures against them.

Chapter VI

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

642 Art. 126. The Republic of Syria shall be divided into Muh-
631 afazats; their number, sub-divisions and boundaries shall be determined by a law.

Art. 127. Laws shall be based on the principle of decentralization for heads of administrative units and chiefs of departments in the Capital and in the Muhafazats.

Art. 128. (1) There shall be established a Council in each Muhafazat; three-quarters of its members shall be elected and the other quarter shall be appointed.

(2) The term of the Council, the number and eligibility of its members, and its electoral procedure shall be determined by law.

(3) The Muhafazat Council shall elect its President and an Executive Secretariat whose term of office, powers and procedure shall be determined by law.

Art. 129. The main tasks of the Muhafazat Council shall be to contribute towards promoting the following objectives:

(1) To fight disease by expanding free medical care and by protecting motherhood and childhood.

(2) To combat ignorance by establishing nurseries, primary, elementary and vocational schools, by teaching illiterates and by promoting education.

(3) To secure potable waters in villages and cities. To open local roads and to spread the use of electricity.

S 648 L 648 ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et de la défense du pays, et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront pas applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les gouvernements français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ses responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord. Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux gouvernements.'

Secondly, there were a number of important administrative services which were wholly removed from the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and placed under direct supervision of the Delegate-General, who administered them through a staff which was largely French in the upper ranks, but Syrian and Lebanese in the lower. They included:

S L 652 648 i. The 'Common Interests', a number of departments dealing with matters of concern to both Syria and Lebanon. The most important of them were the customs administration, the control of concessionary companies and certain economic, financial and social services. They were financed out of the 'Funds of Common Interest', consisting almost entirely of customs receipts, which were sufficient not only to pay for these services but to provide a large surplus which was in principle divided between the two Governments.

S L 648 701 ii. The 'Troupes Spéciales', the local Syrian and Lebanese levies. Some thousands strong, they had been in existence throughout the Mandatory period as an integral part of the French Army of the Levant, and until the outbreak of war they had been wholly paid for out of the 'Funds of Common Interest'. They now formed part of the French territorial command.

000 iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M01 LEBANON M21

that the Syro-Lebanese currency would once more share in the precarious fortunes of the franc; and its reserves would be under the control of the French Government, which might be tempted to use this control in order to strike a hard political or financial bargain.

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It has already been mentioned that by the end of 1944 all important services administered by the Delegation-General had been transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, with the exception of the 'Troupes Spéciales'. These troops, whose numbers had been considerably augmented since the allied occupation in 1941, and who now formed a reasonably well-disciplined and well-armed force of several thousands, were under the French territorial command. Throughout the year the two Governments pressed for their formal transfer, while making it clear that for the duration of the war they would, of course, remain at the disposal of the Allied Command. The French Government was unwilling to transfer them until the end of the war, or at least until a later stage in it, and was not prepared to give them up unconditionally but only in exchange for the conclusion of treaties of alliance with France by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the possession of the 'Troupes' was, in fact, their only direct bargaining-counter in their attempt to persuade the two Governments to sign such treaties.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments for their part did not admit that the question of the 'Troupes' had anything to do with the question of the treaties. In their eyes the transfer of the 'Troupes' was a logical consequence of promises and declarations already made by the French: General Catroux, in his declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941, had stated that the two States were at liberty to raise national armies. Moreover, the transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' was a necessary preliminary to any negotiations for a treaty; such negotiations could only take place on a footing of complete equality, and equality could not exist so long as the Syrian and Lebanese Governments did not possess armed forces and so long as the French held over their heads the threat of refusal to transfer the 'Troupes'.

In addition to insisting on their right to control the

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'Troupes,' the two Governments emphasised their need for them. The experience of 1936-1939 had shown what a mockery was self-government so long as the Government had not sufficient forces at its disposal to assert its will. No Government could expect obedience and respect so long as it was not able to curb the pretensions of the overmighty subject; this was particularly true of a country like Syria, where semi-feudal tenures were still to be found, localism was so strong a force, and there existed large Beduin tribes traditionally recalcitrant to civil government and having had full opportunity to arm themselves during the war. Local disorders had already taken place among the Beduin in the Jazirah and in the area dominated by Sulaiman Murshid. It was impossible to rely entirely upon French-controlled forces to prevent disorder, since that would be to admit that France was still the real power in the country and the Government only a façade; loyalty and obedience would only be given where real authority lay.

There was another reason for the attitude of the Syrian Government. They remembered that in 1920 the French had occupied Damascus and overturned the national Government by force; and that in 1925 the national revolt had been suppressed with the help of local levies drawn from the Circassian and other minorities. They were afraid that at some time in the future the French Government might be tempted to repeat its action and to restore its authority in Damascus with the help of the 'Troupes Spéciales', who included a large number of Circassians, Kurds and other minorities organized in separate units. Since the 'Troupes' were the only considerable armed force under French command in the Levant, their transfer to the local Governments would remove this weapon from the hands of the French.

For all these reasons the Syrian and Lebanese Governments demanded the immediate and unconditional transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales', or else, if this were refused, their disbandment. Otherwise they would proceed with the formation of national armies. Both Governments made special appropriations for this purpose in their 1944 and 1945 budgets.

With this fundamental difference of opinion between the French point of view and that of the Syrians and Lebanese, it is not surprising that when discussions on the subject opened in the early months of 1944 they led to little result. A draft

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1 Lebanon MD1

agreement was, it is true, reached between the Syrian Government and the Delegate-General, General Beynet, but negotiations were then broken off by the French Committee in Algiers. With Lebanon a limited agreement was reached; in June it was arranged that a battalion wholly officered by Lebanese would be placed at the disposal of the Lebanese Government pending the conclusion of a general agreement. By the end of the year no further progress had been made, and the new year opened with demonstrations in Damascus in favour of the formation of an army and against what was believed to be the too indulgent attitude of the Government towards French delays.

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A still more fundamental question, that of the conclusion of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese Treaties, became urgent during 1944.

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The French Government claimed that, in spite of the declarations of independence made in 1941 and the subsequent transfer of powers, legally the Mandate still remained in force and would remain until a restored League of Nations or another international authority should bring it to an end; as in the case of Iraq, a necessary preliminary to its being brought to an end was the conclusion of treaties of alliance and friendship with the Mandatory Power. They pointed out that the declarations of independence had referred to the negotiation of such treaties, and even claimed that independence had not been granted unconditionally but only on condition that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments entered into treaties with France. They referred further to Great Britain's recognition of France's pre-eminent and privileged position in the Levant, and maintained that treaties were necessary in order to define and safeguard her position.

France's insistence on the signature of treaties had several motives. There was first her desire to preserve her political, economic and other interests in the Levant States themselves. Again, there was the fear that a withdrawal from the Levant would lower her prestige in North Africa and encourage the demands of the nationalists there. Moreover, so long as Metropolitan France was not liberated, the Fighting French were naturally reluctant to give up a particle of their position anywhere in the world where they still retained it. The

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Europe and with the United States; but Lebanon has not moved out of step with the Muslim states around her, and she has followed the Arab League line over Palestine and in Egypt's quarrel with Britain and has not agreed to join a Middle East defence organization. She has, however, received arms and military training from Britain and has gladly accepted Point Four aid from the United States.

The main issue of external policy which exercises the Lebanese is the extent of the country's co-operation with Syria and the other Arab states. Some Christians advocate withdrawing the frontiers of the Republic to those of the old Sanjaq of Lebanon together with Beirut; some Muslims want Lebanon to reunite with Syria, and between these extremes discussion still continues. The disagreement with Syria is economic rather than political, but it might gain political significance if Lebanon were to feel isolated to the point at which she felt compelled to come to terms with Israel. At the moment, this is unlikely because Lebanon's friendship with the NATO Powers is good security against possible incursions of enemies or friends.

Armed Forces[1]

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Syria has compulsory military service of eighteen months and, since Shishakli's advent, the draft net is being cast over many who previously escaped. The armed services consume each year a growing share of the budget—in 1951–2 they took 40 per cent of the total—and in 1952 there were compulsory collections for the army. The army is grouped in five brigades, each of rather less than 10,000 men, and has tanks, armoured cars, and light, medium, and anti-aircraft artillery and searchlights. Much of the equipment came from France and, though the best then obtainable, is of doubtful serviceableness. However, Colonel Shishakli is determined to give the army good equipment, and a factory for minor armaments exists near Damascus. German instructors are used by the army and air force and are helping to produce light armaments. The air force is part of the army; jet aircraft have been received from Britain and the air force still operates two Dakotas taken over from Syrian airways. The armed gendarmerie had its own esprit and fought well in Palestine; it is now under army control as are the police and the force used for bedouin control.

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The Lebanese army is about a brigade strong and includes a regiment of chasseurs-ski troops. Lebanese officers have had instruction with the British Army and there is an RAF mission with the Lebanese air force who are using jet trainers.

[1] In the following sections the two countries are considered together.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formu-
State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Europe and with the United States; but Lebanon has not moved out of step with the Muslim states around her, and she has followed the Arab League line over Palestine and in Egypt's quarrel with Britain and has not agreed to join a Middle East [illegible] Four aid from the United States.

The main issue of external policy which exercises the Lebanese is the extent of the country's co-operation with Syria and the other Arab states. Some Christians advocate withdrawing the frontiers of the Republic to those of the old Sanjaq of Lebanon together with Beirut; some Muslims want Lebanon to reunite with Syria, and between these extremes discussion still continues. The disagreement with Syria is economic rather than political, but it might gain political significance if Lebanon were to feel isolated to the point at which she felt compelled to come to terms with Israel. At the moment, this is unlikely because Lebanon's friendship with the NATO Powers is good security against possible incursions of enemies or friends.

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[1] In the following sections the two countries are considered together.

*873 These are the highlights of the new secondary-school regulations. In
*876 addition, the regulations give detailed provisions for admission of pupils and their transfer from one school to another, duties of students, absences, courses of study, and methods of teaching. The teachers are exhorted to use "active" methods in teaching and not to have students be mere listeners, and to encourage them to engage in free activities, such as reading, art, ness. In girls schools, studies are directed toward domestic tasks and the "duties of motherhood." The regulations also set down provisions for the discipline of pupils, for the guidance of the administrative and teaching staffs as well as school committees and councils, and for relations with the parents. A staff council must meet at least three times a year, and subject committees must meet once a month. A disciplinary committee and a purchasing committee are also provided for.

●[702] A special decree prescribes compulsory military training for boys in the fifth and sixth years, and empowers the Ministry of Education to arrange for military training groups in nonpublic schools requesting it, and in the University.

Another decree abolishes the posts of special monitors (*surveillants*) for keeping order and discipline in the schools, which hitherto had been the practice borrowed from France, and puts the responsibility for discipline and order on the principals, their assistants, and the teachers.

Another decree fixes the maximum teaching load for teachers in secondary and vocational schools. Teachers of the special subjects, such as art, music, manual arts, physical education, domestic science, penmanship, and typing, teach up to twenty-four periods a week. Teachers of the other subjects in intermediate and vocational schools have a maximum load of twenty periods a week, while those teaching in preparatory classes and teachers colleges have a load of eighteen periods. Principals and their assistants are also required to teach a minimum ranging from three periods a week for a principal of a boarding school to ten periods for an assistant principal in a day intermediate or vocational school.

THE SECONDARY COURSE OF STUDY

*873 The time allotment for the various subjects of the secondary course of study is given in Table 63. A total of thirty-four periods a week is maintained throughout the six years. Each period is forty-five minutes. The program for the first four years is the same for all students except that girls receive instruction in domestic science whereas boys are allowed periods for free activities. A choice between French and English is allowed in foreign languages.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the summer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in
121 Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

241 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6241 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
624 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. [illegible] west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

621 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
241 from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
427 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power
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11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

between the oppression exercised in the name of democracy and that exercised in the name of Fascism. This tendency was encouraged by the efforts of the competing propaganda services, each of which purported to unmask the true face of the other party. Moreover, painful memories remained of the conduct of the Allies during the last war. The Arabs had trusted to Allied promises then and had been, as they saw it, cheated. They were therefore sceptical, and afraid to give their full trust to either side. Still more bitter were the memories of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war: the cession of Alexandretta, the failure to ratify the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties, and above all the Arab revolt in Palestine, which had aroused intense feeling throughout Arab Asia, and had done more than anything else to alienate the Arabs from the Allied Powers. 722-648

These and other currents of political feeling existed beneath the surface, but there was little overt political activity during the first nine months of the war. The High Commissioner and the Syrian and Lebanese authorities confined themselves mainly to measures of administrative reform and economic and financial control; the safeguarding of the food supply against the activities of hoarders and profiteers was their constant preoccupation. In external affairs one source of anxiety was removed by the conclusion in November, 1939, of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact, and in March, 1940, of a Turco-Syrian Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. But a new anxiety grew up, with the German offensive on the Western front in May, 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war in June; it reflected itself in the additional measures of precaution taken in the Mandated Territories.

2

After the capitulation of France there was some doubt about the attitude which the French authorities in the Levant would adopt. It was resolved by the order of the day issued on June 27th by General Mittelhauser, who had succeeded Weygand after the latter had been recalled to take command of the Allied Forces in France. 'According to the terms of the French armistice', he announced, 'there will be no change in the status of the Mandated Territories. Consequently, the cessation of hostilities has been ordered. The French flag 721 648

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

72/ 64 will continue to be flown in these territories, and France will carry on her mission in the Levant.'

The cessation of hostilities had the gravest effect upon the Allied position in the Middle East, and occasioned great anxiety to the British Government. At the beginning of July the Foreign Office issued the following statement:

'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand that General Mittelhauser, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant, has stated that hostilities have ceased in Syria. His Majesty's Government assume that this does not mean that if Germany or Italy sought to occupy Syria or the Lebanon and were to try to do so in the face of British command of the sea, no attempt would be made by the French forces to oppose them. In order, however, to set at rest doubts which may be felt in any quarter, His Majesty's Government declare that they could not allow Syria or the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile Power or to be used as a base for attacks upon those countries in the Middle East which they are pledged to defend, or to become the scene of such disorder as to constitute a danger to those countries.

'They therefore hold themselves free to take whatever measures they may in such circumstances consider necessary in their own interests. Any action which they may hereafter be obliged to take in fulfilment of this declaration will be entirely without prejudice to the future status of the territories now under French Mandate.'[1]

Subsequent developments increased the anxiety of the British Government. In August an Italian Armistice Commission arrived in Beirut; in spite of official disclaimers, its object was generally believed to be to prepare the way for the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the Axis Powers. It was generally unpopular and had little success; by the end of the year it had practically faded out of the picture. More important was the unobtrusive extension of German influence throughout the country; and also the gradual replacement of officials believed to have democratic or pro-British sympathies by others thought to be in agreement with the 'New Order' in France and Europe. In November the High Commissioner himself was recalled and replaced first by M. Chiappe and then, after his death when the aeroplane carrying him to the East was shot down in the

[1] *The Times*, July 2nd, 1941.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Lebanon ME1

S L 666 643 Bishara al-Khouri, became President with the pan-Arab Riyad as-Sulh as Prime Minister; these nationalists were not satisfied with mere titular sovereignty but claimed the reality of independence, and in November 1943 a Free French resort to force against them was reversed only by a British intervention, endorsed by the United States Government. The Free French were thus constrained to transfer most branches of the administration to the Syrian and Lebanese Parliaments, but retained control of the local 'Troupes Spéciales' and obstructed the proper equipping of the Syrian gendarmerie. The French intention was to make this vital concession of authority conditional upon the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty which would give France much the same strategic, economic, and cultural advantages as Britain had retained in Iraq by the already obsolescent Treaty of 1930. In March 1945 Syria and Lebanon had been admitted as sovereign states to membership both of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States. The Syrian nationalists were not prepared to subordinate their sovereignty to an imposed alliance with France, and the landing of a contingent of Senegalese troops immediately after VE-day (in disregard of a personal appeal of Churchill to de Gaulle) was regarded in both Syria and Lebanon as clear evidence of a French resort to coercion. Sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Syrian gendarmerie and the local nationalists on the one hand and the French garrison on the other became general, and when, at the end of May 1945, the local French Commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus the British Government ordered their Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene, by force if necessary, to restore order in a region whose security was vital for British communications in the still-continuing war in the Far East. The crisis accelerated the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, concerning which the demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were supported by the Security Council; the process was completed in Syria by 15 April 1946 and in Lebanon by the end of the year.

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S L 648 642 Between the wars, the French Mandate had allowed political development in Lebanon to produce at least a façade of parliamentary democracy, with arrangements between the Muslim and Christian leaders on the division of political power and prerogatives, and the active commercial and intellectual life of Lebanon made progress with a minimum of government interference. In Syria, however, local separatisms which French policy had encouraged made it very difficult for any Syrian Government to knit the people together from Damascus; the

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

XII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1943

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THE outbreak of war brought immediate changes in every sphere of life, in Syria and Lebanon as in the other countries involved. For months past reinforcements had been arriving for the French army of occupation. At the beginning of the war the important part for which the forces in the Mandated Territories were cast was shown by the appointment of General Weygand as Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant. Other measures were taken to place the Territories in a state of defence. The urgency of the situation was somewhat eased, however, by the decision of the Italian Government to remain neutral.

Various political measures were also taken to ensure the safety of the country. In Lebanon the High Commissioner dissolved the Chamber, dismissed the Ministry, suspended the Constitution and confided the administration to a Secretary of State directly responsible to the President of the Republic. In Syria, a number of political organizations believed to be favourable to the enemies of France were dissolved, and some of their leading members were arrested. During the next few months many of them were sentenced by military tribunals to terms of imprisonment, in some cases exceedingly long, on charges of subversive action and conspiracy. Those affected were mainly members of uncompromising nationalist organizations or of the Communist Party; no leader either of the National Bloc or of the Shahbandarist group was touched. Most leading personalities indeed gave formal expression to their attachment to France and to democracy, and their unwillingness to do anything which might hinder the victory of the Allied arms.

In spite of formal statements by political leaders, the general attitude of the population towards the war seems to have been one not of enthusiasm but of mingled fear and apathy. There was fear of a repetition of the terrible experiences of the war of 1914-1918: famine, disease and the reign of terror. Except among the Francophil elements, people tended to think that, although the belligerents might invoke the noblest of principles to justify their taking up arms, in reality all were equally moved by self-interest, and that from the point of view of the exploited nations of the East there was nothing to choose

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria #401

between the oppression exercised in the name of democracy and that exercised in the name of Fascism. This tendency was encouraged by the efforts of the competing propaganda services, each of which purported to unmask the true face of the other party. Moreover, painful memories remained of the conduct of the Allies during the last war. The Arabs had trusted to Allied promises then and had been, as they saw it, cheated. They were therefore sceptical, and afraid to give their full trust to either side. Still more bitter were the memories of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war: the cession of Alexandretta, the failure to ratify the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties, and above all the Arab revolt in Palestine, which had aroused intense feeling throughout Arab Asia, and had done more than anything else to alienate the Arabs from the Allied Powers.

These and other currents of political feeling existed beneath the surface, but there was little overt political activity during the first nine months of the war. The High Commissioner and the Syrian and Lebanese authorities confined themselves mainly to measures of administrative reform and economic and financial control; the safeguarding of the food supply against the activities of hoarders and profiteers was their constant preoccupation. In external affairs one source of anxiety was removed by the conclusion in November, 1939, of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact, and in March, 1940, of a Turco-Syrian Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. But a new anxiety grew up, with the German offensive on the Western front in May, 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war in June; it reflected itself in the additional measures of precaution taken in the Mandated Territories.

2

After the capitulation of France there was some doubt about the attitude which the French authorities in the Levant would adopt. It was resolved by the order of the day issued on June 27th by General Mittelhauser, who had succeeded Weygand after the latter had been recalled to take command of the Allied Forces in France. 'According to the terms of the French armistice', he announced, 'there will be no change in the status of the Mandated Territories. Consequently, the cessation of hostilities has been ordered. The French flag

000 Lebanon the Government of Sami as-Sulh succeeded that of
645 Ahmad ad-Da'uq. In Syria, Hasan al-Hakim resigned in April, 1942, and was succeeded by Husni al-Barazi, who himself gave way in January, 1943, to Jamil al-Ulshi. These changes had only a very limited significance.

648 This failure to restore the constitutional Government
186 increased the discontent which had already been caused in both Syria and Lebanon by the way in which their independence had been proclaimed. The administrative methods of the Free French officials were also much criticized; more particularly, a general contempt was felt for the many officials who had served Vichy and had only gone over to Free France after the occupation of the country in 1941. Thus the belief grew up that Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing by their change of masters. It was a belief held not only by the political classes but by ordinary citizens who resented the inefficiency of the French administration; not only by Arab nationalists but even by many of the Lebanese Christians, who could not feel towards the Free French the admiration, gratitude and trust which they had had for France as a great Power. In the circumstances it was natural that Great Britain should be largely blamed for the actions of her ally.

645 One consequence of the discontent was a revival in the
665 power of the National Bloc. The dissensions between its leaders were patched up, and the Bloc united in its demand for the restoration of the Chamber of 1936-1939 or else the holding of fresh elections. Its spokesman was Shukri al-Quwatli, whose reputation had grown steadily throughout the years. In October, 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation, he absented himself from Syria on a visit to Arabia and Iraq; but after his return to Damascus in September, 1942, he became once more the dominant figure of the political scene. Side by side with the revival of the Bloc there went a growth in the size and influence of the Socialist and Communist movements; this was due not so much to the spread of Marxist doctrines as to the universal discontent with the existing order and the eagerness to snatch at any hope of change.

14

722 In Syria and Lebanon alike, the attention of the greater part of the population was concentrated upon the economic problems of the war. Two of them were peculiarly important.

11: Hourani 3-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria #10 1

First, there was the problem of guaranteeing the supply of wheat, guarding against both the fear and the reality of shortage and putting an end to the hoarding of grain which had been going on since the beginning of the war. Shortly after the Allied occupation, a large quantity of wheat was brought into the country by the Allied authorities and sold to the wholesale merchants, for the purpose of making hoarders disgorge their stocks. Since many of the merchants either hoarded the wheat or else sold it to Turkey, this measure did not have the effect which had been hoped. For the harvest of 1942, a different plan was adopted. A Commission was appointed, with English, French, Syrian and Lebanese members, and under the ultimate control of the British and French authorities. Its task was to buy the whole wheat-crop, over and above the needs of the cultivator; it was then to be distributed directly to the population at fixed prices and in limited amounts. This scheme also did not work well at first. The population was unused to such interference by the Government in economic processes and suspicious of its motives; the various authorities concerned did not always agree; there was much hoarding, and not a little corruption. But gradually things improved. In spite of numerous temporary and local difficulties, the situation of the wheat supply is not unsatisfactory.

The other problem was that of the inflationary tendencies which appeared as a consequence of the shortage of supplies, the practice of hoarding, the excessive issue of paper-money, and the general lack of confidence in the future of France and even more of the Free French.

Measures have been taken to keep this tendency within limits; for example, in May, 1943, the restrictions upon the purchase of sterling were removed. But the danger is bound to remain so long as the war lasts. Perhaps the most important of the steps taken to improve the economic situation is the attempt which has been made through the Anglo-American Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo to increase the local production of goods which the Middle Eastern countries need, and to improve their distribution. Established to deal with the situation caused by the shortage of shipping, the Centre has tended more and more to become a planning organization for the economic life of the area which it serves.

Unemployment, too, might have been a danger, had it not

been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

15

After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies, including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior ..	Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance ..	Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and Public Instruction ..	Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice ..	Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce ..	Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

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many Syrians and Palestinians, teachers, government officials and political exiles, who thronged Baghdad in the first years of the war. To the general Arab unrest there were added particular Iraqi grievances; and both were encouraged to express themselves violently by the comparative failure of British arms in 1940 and 1941 and the great though temporary influence of German propaganda. Finally, when the general position of the war seemed most propitious, Rashid Ali raised the banner of revolt. He was supported by some, although by no means all, of the nationalists in other Arab countries; in imagination they saw the revolt not as a seizure of power by the Army but as a protest of the Arabs against British policy in Palestine and French in Syria. When the revolt failed, a wave of doubt and self-criticism swept over the nationalist ranks, in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, no less than in Iraq.

6

These events were swiftly followed by others of even greater import. Ever since the French capitulation German agents had been active in Syria and Lebanon. In the first months of 1941 German influence was thought to be increasing rapidly and alarmingly; and it was believed that the completion of her Balkan campaign had brought nearer the possibility of a gradual infiltration of German troops and agents into the French Mandated Territories, until finally Germany would be able to obtain complete control of them. Her forces would then be in a position to threaten the British armies in Palestine and Egypt, and Turkey to the north.

The danger was brought to a head by the outbreak of the Iraqi insurrection in May. German aircraft were permitted by the Government of Vichy to use Syrian air-bases as stages on their journey to Iraq; and it was obvious to those who had studied German methods of infiltration that this was the beginning of a process which would, unless forestalled, soon take on such proportions that to check it would be of the greatest difficulty.

It therefore came as no surprise to the general public when June 8th, 1941, a mixed force of Imperial, Free French and other Allied troops crossed the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon; the whole force was under the command of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and the Free French contingent under that

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD/

64% of General Catroux. General Dentz's troops put up an 726 unexpectedly strong resistance. It had been generally hoped that it would be nominal or else would be overcome without much difficulty, on account of the supposed bad state of morale among the French troops, the alleged poor condition of their equipment, the repatriation of a large part of the army of the Levant to France after the Armistice, the defection of a number of officers and men to the Free French cause, and the pro-British sympathies of certain elements in the population. This hope was not fulfilled. General Dentz's troops resisted strongly, for a number of reasons: because of hostility to Great Britain and Free France and suspicion of their intentions; from professional pride and the desire to wipe out the shame of the French capitulation of 1940; because the policy of Vichy included the defence of the Empire against all attacks upon it; and because of severe disciplinary measures taken by General Dentz in the weeks preceding the attack.

The Allied advance was made in several columns, some of which entered the country from Palestine and Transjordan in the south, and the others from Iraq in the east. Of the columns advancing from the south, one took the coastal road, with Beirut as its goal; a second went northwards from Metullah into the region beneath the western slopes of Hermon, heading towards the Biqa', the valley between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, in which lies the air-base of Rayaq; a third advanced towards Damascus by way of Quneitra; and others towards Damascus through the Hauran. Of the columns which invaded Syria from Iraq, one struck across the desert towards Palmyra and then towards Homs and the roads and railway which run north and south connecting the great towns of the interior; another moved up the course of the Euphrates towards Dair az-Zor and then south-west to Palmyra; and a third westwards along the northern frontier, towards Aleppo. The northward and westward movements tended to converge as the columns moved forward, pushing the enemy forces before them towards the north-western section of the country. In the first days of the campaign the forces from the south captured Sur, Dera' and Merjayun and advanced beyond them. But the further they went the fiercer the resistance to them grew; they captured Kiswe, a few miles south of Damascus, but there they were halted, while the French forces launched a counter-attack and on June 16th recaptured

SYRIA: the Campaign of 1941 8th June — 12th July

SCALE:—Km. 0 50 100

Roads & Tracks.....

Main Railways.....

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Quneitra and Merjayun. They were dislodged from the former in a few hours, but from the latter only after more than a week of heavy fighting on June 24th. By that time the other columns had made considerable progress; on June 20th the deciding battle for Damascus was fought. An Indian brigade penetrated after hard fighting into the suburbs of Mezze to the west of Damascus; the Australians following in support took Fort Gouraud. In the face of this threat from the west and pressure from Free French columns to the south and east General Dentz ordered the evacuation of the city. Free French troops under Colonel Collet led the Allied entry of June 21st. In the next few days a rapid advance was made north of Damascus by Allied troops, while those moving westwards through the desert drew nearer to the railway and Aleppo, Homs and Hama; and those on the coastal road continued their approach upon Beirut, in spite of heavy resistance at Damur and elsewhere.

By the beginning of July the end of the campaign was in sight. On July 8th General Dentz was forced to ask for terms; and after several days of negotiations, an Armistice Convention was initialled at Acre on July 12th and signed on the 14th. Allied forces were to occupy Syrian and Lebanese territory; the French forces were to be accorded the full honours of war; all war material was either to be transferred to the British authorities or to be destroyed under their supervision; prisoners of war were to be released; the free choice between rallying to the Allied cause and being repatriated was to be left to individuals on the French side; the rights of French cultural institutions were to be respected; all public services, means of communication, port installations, naval establishments, ships, aircraft, air installations, and equipment and fuel stocks were to be handed over intact; and no reprisals were to be taken by the British authorities against Syrians or Lebanese who had been involved in the recent hostilities in a military or official capacity. The execution of the Convention was to be supervised by a commission of control, of which three members, including the President, were to be nominated by the British authorities and the other two by the Vichy French authorities.[1]

[1] See Appendix A13.

642, 728, 177, 565

x Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the political regime, social stratification, and Westernizing of administration under the British and French Mandates following the First World War, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 88-101./

186, 728, 648, 668

✗ Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDI Syria MDI

necessity for health's sake alone, but should be part of a general *mise en valeur* of the region's resources. This is the type of approach which is most likely to succeed, because it is linked with the material interests of the landowners. They will lend their support and active participation if given technical advice, supervision, and material and financial help to defray part of the capital outlay.

Swamps, Floods, and Soil Erosion

Malaria-control measures were taken with a fair degree of success in 20 villages in 1944–1945. Various factors, however, combine to prevent a permanent reduction of the incidence of the disease. Among these are the necessity for constant supervision, the need for repeated cleanings of canals and ditches, and the improvidence of the inhabitants. Most important is the fact that floods will certainly undo much of the work.

Winter floods are frequently heavy enough to destroy or damage seriously the repair and maintenance works, which are of value to agriculture and malaria control alike. Malaria causes debility and apathy among the villagers, and the certainty that floods will recur reinforces this apathy, making everyone disinclined to expend energy and money in work which must be done again in a few years. The canals and watercourses at Moufaggar, for example, have been badly damaged in the past; in fact, damage by floods was the main reason for the modification of the old foggara system. The southern foggara and watercourse are now protected against torrents by a concrete wall at the upper end, but as the system lies in one of the main valleys coming from Jebel Bil'as, it is doubtful whether the device will be a great success. Although the broad, nearly flat valley north of Selemiya has benefited from its wide catchment area—it is built up of alluvium, as much as 10 feet deep—it is partly derelict because floods have created extensive swamps and ruined old foggaras. In 1945–1946 useful drainage work was undertaken here.

The floods are due in part to the occasional sudden and torrential rainstorms, characteristic of this as of other semiarid regions. Wadis are sometimes filled for a few hours with violent, detritus-laden torrents and are then left dry again. The steep slopes and absorptive limestones are contributing factors. English merchants, traveling in 1691, noted[11] that after a heavy rainstorm

those hollow Gutts which we passed over without the least appearance of Moisture, were, by the Cataracts which descended from the Mountains, become Rivers; . . . the next Morn-

[11] "An Extract of the Journals" (*op. cit.*), p. 144 [Miscellanes Curiosa, pp. 139–140].

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

ing all this great quantity of Water was past away, so that in about two Hour's Riding we could hardly perceive that there had been any Rain at all. 731

That floods are an old phenomenon in Selemiya is suggested by two traditional theories, repeated by the inhabitants today, regarding the derivation of the place name. The first theory makes the essential form Sal-Miah, "a flood of water." The other was recorded by Yaqut in 1225:

Ahmad ibn Yahyâ ibn Jîbir relates that there was a city in Syria, near Salamiyyah, called Al Mûtafikah [The Overturned], which was overwhelmed with all its inhabitants—all except one hundred souls. These left that place, and came and built one hundred houses, and they called the hamlet where they had made their houses Salâm Miyah (Peace for the Hundred), of which the people made Salamiyyah.[22]

As told today, the story is that the "overwhelming" agent was a flood.

The floods are greatly aggravated by soil erosion. Where the trees have been cut, the bushes torn up for fuel, and the grass overgrazed, and especially where slopes have been plowed, there the soil is eroded, and many slopes are now practically bare of soil and vegetation. In summer, soil is shifted by strong winds; in winter, rain washes it into gullies or wadis with steep, crumbling sides. These are tributary to the main streams which do so much damage when they reach the plain. The runoff from bare slopes is faster and more fully loaded than that from vegetated slopes. 731 134

Past and Present Vegetation Destruction

There is no doubt that the trees of Jebel Bil'as are a remnant of a denser and more extensive growth, though there are no very good grounds for the common assumption that all the Palmyrene ranges were forested in Roman days. The Tablet of Palmyra's fiscal laws of A.D. 137[23] gives reason to suppose that the locality may have furnished considerable quantities of wood and pistachio nuts, and in the same period Jebel Bil'as and neighboring ranges were used as grazing lands for sheep and horses.[24] The location of elaborate Romano-Byzantine foggara systems, as at Moufaqqar, directly in the paths of the floods might seem to indicate that, when the foggaras were constructed, floods were not as serious as they are now. 175 137 [172]

Old stumps and roots are found within and beyond the present wooded

[22] Le Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

[23] See J.-B. Chabot: Choix d'inscriptions de Palmyre, Paris, 1922, pp. 23-38.

[24] A. Poidebard: La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie.—Le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe.—Recherches aériennes (1925-1932) (Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Vol. 18), Paris, 1934; M. D. Schlumberger: Une campagne de fouilles au Djebel-el-Chaar en 1934, *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1935, pp. 250-256. 113

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

6

The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the landowners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

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SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number. 164 463

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda. 164 733 656 208

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent." 642 161 162

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases. 944 743

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex- 512

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

000 necessity for health's sake alone, but should be part of a general *mise en valeur* of the region's resources. This is the type of approach which is most likely to succeed, because it is linked with the material interests of the landowners. They will lend their support and active participation if given technical advice, supervision, and material and financial help to defray part of the capital outlay.

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probably few, of the estates are the properties of old, wealthy families of Ottoman times, which still exist in Lebanon, such as the lands belonging to the families of Aralan, Jumblatt, Chehab, Khazen, but many of these have been broken up by the Moslem laws of inheritance. Other estates have originated from direct grants made by Turkish Sultans to influential politicians, as for example the two very large estates in the Beqa and the Litani valley. Others too were formed at the time of the general registration of property undertaken by the Ottoman Government when chiefs of tribes or villages registered tribal land in their names as their private property. Uncertainty about legal title to land gives the educated classes frequent opportunity for ousting peasant owners, and whole villages have come into the possession of rival groups of city notables, as a result of litigation among the villagers who have sought their assistance in establishing their title.

While the land-tenure system is thus a result of peasant poverty, it also perpetuates poverty by standing in the way of any long-term investment. The high percentage of fallow in Syria suggests a great waste of land resources, and there could certainly be some improvement in yields, even in dry land farming, if green crops were introduced more generally into the rotation. But the share-cropper has little incentive to improve the fertility of the land, since he has no certainty of tenure, and since the landlord will take 50 per cent of any increase. Since the landlords are not as a rule directly interested in farming, they do not themselves undertake long-term improvements in the land.

Three case studies illustrate the ways in which the land-tenure system hinders advance.[1]

One study relates to the large estate of Misherfe, near Homs in central Syria. This is 24,000 acres in extent and includes five villages, with 2,500 inhabitants. It is very extensively cultivated, only one-third of the area, 8,000 acres, being cropped each year. The land is divided into three parts, one with wheat, barley or *qatani* (mixed grain), one ploughed but not sown, and one left fallow. A small area, 200 acres only, is irrigated, though water supplies are sufficient to irrigate much larger areas.

[1] These studies, which were prepared for the M.E.S.C., are not at present available in print.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S,G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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formed part of the plan for complementary education, which was of two kinds: general complementary, restricted to general cultural courses, and vocational complementary, combining cultural and trade education. A certificate known as the general *brevet* was given at the end of the general course after the student had passed a public examination, and "vocational *brevets*,"—Technical, Commercial, or Agricultural—were given at the end of the vocational courses after public examinations.

The attempt to make the vocational schools a part of the complementary education had resulted in a heavy overloading of the course of study, and the students were working and studying for forty-six periods a week in the technical schools besides which there were additional study periods that were compulsory for boarding students. After the abolition of the complementary system in the new educational organization the vocational schools were considered as independent schools, and an attempt was made to lighten their programs.

The number of students in the public vocational schools in 1943–44 was 1,024, and in the following year, 1,011. A summary description of the schools visited by the Commission will perhaps give the best picture of public vocational education in Syria.

THE TECHNICAL SCHOOL FOR BOYS

[736]

The Technical School for boys at Aleppo dated back to 1900 when it was founded in connection with an orphanage, with the idea of providing trade education for orphans. Its connection with the orphanage was severed in 1924–25.[1] It had 148 students in 1945–46, of whom 73 were boarders. Eleven of these paid annually a sum of £S240 (about $108.00) for their board, and the other 62 had free board at the expense of the state. The boarding students come from the outer districts of the governorate of Aleppo as well as from the governorates of Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Dayr al-Zur. Thus, about one-half of the student body is from outside Aleppo, and an attempt is being made to give opportunity for vocational education to students from the smaller towns. No tuition fee is charged.

The new program of study, issued in November 1945, covers four years and combines general cultural with vocational work. It includes religion, civics, Arabic, a foreign language, mathematics, physics, history, geography, physical education, industrial drawing, technology, and shopwork. In the first year, which is a preparatory year, the shopwork is common for all

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[1] This conception of technical education as primarily suited to orphans is of long standing and has persisted until lately in the Damascus technical schools for boys and for girls. In recent years steps have been taken to separate the orphanages from the technical schools in that city.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1948 Ml Middle East
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students. Specialization begins in the second year. Eight lines of specialization are provided: turning, fitting, foundry, auto and motor mechanics, blacksmithing, carpentry, wood-carving, and weaving. All students in the first six sections take welding as well. The auto-mechanics section is the most popular with the students, and most of them would take it up if allowed. Wood-carving is the least popular. In order to keep a balance between the various sections, therefore, the School has to apply some pressure on some of the students. Shopwork ranged from fourteen periods a week in the first year to twenty-two periods a week in the fourth year.

The School occupies a government building originally built as an elementary school by the Turks. It has fairly well-equipped fitting, turning, and carpentry shops. Most of the equipment was acquired twenty years ago, and few, if any, additions or replacements have been made. The new budget provided £S40,000 (about $18,200) for new equipment and raw materials. In addition, £S25,000 (about $11,400) was provided as working capital. Out of the profits from products sold or services rendered, it is planned to add a certain proportion to capital and to credit the remainder to the students. This would accumulate during their stay in school, and would be given to them at the time of their graduation to serve as their working capital. A law legalizing this procedure (Law No. 254) was passed on June 4, 1946.[8] In this way it is hoped to put the school and its other sister schools on a profit-making basis as far as that is compatible with instructional purposes.

Of the 12 students who were graduated from the Aleppo school in the previous year, 1 was working in the railways, 1 in the fire department, 1 in the Department of Supplies, 3 were primary-school teachers, 2 were working independently, and 4 were unemployed.

The Technical School for Girls

[736]

The Technical School for girls in Damascus was also originally started as an orphanage primary school. The Technical School proper began in 1938–39, and the first four of the primary grades were removed elsewhere. It was hoped to remove the fifth grade in 1946–47. Most of the students of the School still come from the orphanage, after having received their primary-school certificate. In 1945–46 the School had 118 students of whom 20 were free boarding students, and 2 were paying boarders. No

[8] Sati' al-Husri, *Reports on the Conditions of Education in Syria during the Year 1943* (Damascus: Government Press, 1946), p. 133. This is a sequel to his earlier reports already referred to, which were published in 1944. They attempt to show the progress made in the reorganization of Syrian education.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
SYRIA MDI

yearly and final examinations lead to the diploma in nursing or in nursing and midwifery. 874*

The Faculty of Medicine has one hospital of 160 beds and another with 60 beds in obstetrics. It has also an outpatient clinic. The School of Dentistry has 13 dental chairs. Laboratories in chemistry, physics, anatomy, biochemistry, histopathology, and other subjects are located mostly in the nearby old building of the religious school of Sultan Sulayman. The laboratories on the whole are of modest proportions and the building is unfit for them. [743] [742]

THE FACULTY OF LAW

The Faculty of Law gives a course of three years above the second *baccalauréat*. With the shortening of the secondary course it is hoped to lengthen the course to four years. Students are prepared to be lawyers, judges in civil courts, and judges in Shar' (Muslim law) courts. Many of the graduates become government officials. The examinations leading to the degree of *Licence* in Law are conducted by committees consisting usually of two professors and a prominent judge, lawyer, or government official for each of the subjects. These external examiners are appointed by the Minister of Education. Graduates must work in a law office for two years before being licensed to practice before the courts. The government when endeavoring to fill a legal office holds its own special examinations which in the case of filling a vacancy in the Shar' courts include examinations in Muslim law.

Study at the Faculty of Law relies heavily on lectures. A student is permitted to absent himself from up to 50 percent of the lectures. A long period is allowed at the end of the year for the final examinations. Naturally, cramming at the end of the year is the prevailing practice.

The University library consists of 12,000 volumes, mainly in Arabic, French, and English. Books may be read in the library and are lent outside the library only to members of the teaching staff.

Student registration in 1945–46 was as follows:

Faculty	Enrollment
Medicine	256
Pharmacy	59
Dentistry	32
Nursing and midwifery	49
P.C.B. class	103
Law	541
Total	1,040

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MO1

Outpatient clinics are connected with all the government hospitals. The clinics and the dispensaries maintained by the Ministry totaled 111 in 1951, including maternal and child health centers in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia; mobile dispensaries in 7 provinces; and 6 special mobile units, 2 each for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and bejel or syphilis. A demonstration center was established in connection with the maternal and child health clinic in Damascus in 1952 by the Ministry, in cooperation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The center provides training for district doctors, nurses and midwives, as well as courses for medical and nursing students and practitioners, in the various aspects of maternal and child health. A tuberculosis demonstration clinic and training center was also opened in Damascus by the Ministry, in conjunction with Syrian University and the World Health Organization. 743

Laboratories. The Ministry of Health operates a central laboratory in Damascus. It has divisions for the performance of bacteriologic, serologic, chemical and biochemical examinations; for the preparation of typhoid, cholera, smallpox and rabies vaccines; and for the analysis of foods and drugs. Small diagnostic laboratories are also established in the administrative centers of the other provinces. 742

The municipal health department in Damascus maintains a laboratory for the examination of water, milk, cheese and other foodstuffs. Research and diagnostic laboratories are connected with the technical departments of the medical school in Damascus, and clinical laboratory facilities are available in all the larger hospitals.

Schools. A medical school is affiliated with Syrian University in Damascus. The Faculty of Medicine was founded in 1901 under the Ottoman government and incorporated in the University in 1923. It confers the degree of Doctor of Medicine on the completion of a 6-year course of study, but 874

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

n PUBLIC HEALTH

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744

The progress in public health has been much less spectacular and less steady than that in education. Expenditures on public health have increased sharply only in recent years. In 1954 the budget of the Ministry of Public Health amounted to £S 8.764 million or 4.2% of the regular budget, as compared with actual expenditures of £S 3.431 million or 3.4% of the total in 1945. Health facilities have been gradually expanding. The number of hospitals has risen from 35 with 1,785 beds at the end of 1945 to 61 with [749] 4,094 beds at the end of 1954. Over the last seven years the government has spent, on an average, £S 1.3 million on public health facilities, so that [759] government hospitals now have a total of 3,000 beds. The number of doctors in Syria has risen from 616 in 1945 to about 880 at present.

Yet it is generally recognized that the state of public health is far from satisfactory. This conclusion rests upon testimony and observation rather than health statistics. The statistics, indeed, are so inadequate as to provide little indication of health conditions. The number of deaths registered, for example, imply a death rate of but seven per thousand, but the record of deaths is evidently very incomplete and the actual death rate rather [164] high. There is still a high incidence of debilitating diseases. Malaria, for example, is prevalent in many parts of Syria. Diseases such as tuberculosis and the many varieties of intestinal infections, which are generally associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding and low standards [165] of living, are quite widespread. Infant mortality is particularly high. Thus 36% of the registered deaths in 1951-53 occurred among children less than five years old, and of these about the same percentage died of diarrhoea and enteritis.

An effective campaign to raise health standards would require resources which Syria will hardly be able to mobilize at its present stage of development. The health program will have to remain rather modest and should attempt primarily to remedy the more glaring deficiencies. These are, principally, the inadequate attention given to preventive medicine and the markedly unequal geographic distribution of existing health facilities.

744 *Preventive Medicine*

The prevention of disease is likely in the long run to be more economical than curative medicine. The mission believes that this aspect of

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

744 advisable to initiate a pilot demonstration unit as a part of a community center in a rural district working in close coordination with other social and economic development projects in education, agricultural extension and social welfare. Particular emphasis should be placed on preventive health work, prenatal care and child health. This unit will also serve as a training center for the rural health workers to obtain their practical knowledge and experience in rural health work. One such pilot unit is planned by the government and WHO for 1956, utilizing TA funds.

If the demonstration proves to be successful, the present village dispensaries should gradually be grouped together and expanded to become rural health units. The existing staff in the dispensaries should be sent to the pilot unit to go through a course of training to prepare them for working in the new units.

As a start the mission recommends the construction and operation of one such experimental health unit. About £S 350,000 should suffice for construction of the necessary buildings and equipment, which need not be elaborate.

Hospital Facilities[34]

743 There is unquestionably a need for many more hospitals. The principal aim in the immediate future, however, should be to build hospitals in areas which now have virtually none. For the country as a whole, there are now, in terms of the population at the beginning of 1952, 1.23 hospital beds per thousand inhabitants. The number of beds per thousand varies widely, however, from a high of 2.88 in the city and province of Damascus to 0.9 and 0.92 in the provinces of Aleppo and Homs and a low of 0.25 and 0.44 in the Jezireh and the Euphrates. Out of 44 *qadas* or counties in the country, 28 do not have any hospitals at all. A large part of the rural population is in fact denied hospital service.

An adequate program for equalizing hospital facilities would involve the provision of 3,400 beds. Over the next six years only a start can be made, by providing an additional 1,000 beds at a total cost of £S 7 million. Of this total, we suggest that 250 be allocated to the Jezireh; 300 to the Euphrates; 400 to the province of Aleppo, with perhaps 100 in the town of Jisr ech Choghour, which is likely to grow rapidly with the development of the Ghab; and 50 to Palmyra.

[34] See Annex I, p. 463.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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

p. 161

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

743 In addition it would be desirable to build some new village dispensaries, which now number 96, at a cost of about £S 350,000, and to provide a similar sum for the construction of quarantine stations and minor health facilities.

To provide an adequate staff for the recommended additional medical and health facilities, the government must plan a training program. The faculty of medicine in Damascus may have to increase the enrollment of students to provide enough doctors for the new hospitals and health units. Many nurses would be needed for the hospitals, health units and dispensaries; nursing training facilities should therefore be increased. Midwives, laboratory technicians, sanitary inspectors and other medical health auxiliary personnel would also be needed to staff the new health services. The fellowships provided by WHO and the nursing education, maternal and child health and tuberculosis demonstration and training projects assisted by WHO should therefore be coordinated and if necessary expanded to meet the need for technical personnel.

In addition to the cost of the staff training program, some funds will no doubt be needed for reconstruction and expansion of hospitals; we have included £S 1 million in the recommended program for these purposes.

743 657 A revision in the methods of planning and building new health facilities appears necessary. In the past, new hospitals have frequently been built without any consultation with the Ministry of Public Health. Decisions to build have generally been made in response to local requests relayed through the Ministry of Interior, approved by the Ministry of Finance and carried out by the Ministry of Public Works. In the future the Ministry of Public Health should be enabled to plan for the construction of new facilities in accordance with a careful appraisal of the most urgent requirements. The Ministry of Public Works might well continue to do the actual construction, but in accordance with plans approved by the Ministry of Public Health and on a basis which would enable the latter Ministry to make timely preparations for the equipment and staffing of new hospitals.

Proposed Outlays

744 657 In proposing the construction program outlined above, the mission has kept in mind the need for providing additional funds for operation and administration. After taking this into account, it is expected that expendi-

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or secondary education can be built. An expenditure of £S 3 million a year would permit construction of 500 classrooms a year or about 100 new schools, without auditorium and other facilities which can be built later. At such a rate, the country's estimated future requirement of about 4,000 schools (assuming that there are already 1,000) would be fulfilled in about 30 years. Meanwhile a considerable number of schools will undoubtedly have to continue in rented buildings.

The opening of new schools will have to be carefully planned in the light of the geographic distribution of existing facilities, conditions of overcrowding, the demand for schooling as influenced by economic factors, the distance of school-age children from existing schools and the availability of teachers. Now that a considerable portion of school-age children are in fact going to school, the location of new schools must be given more thought in order to ensure that they will meet a real need.

Thought should be given to standardization of desks and equipment and for their manufacture in Syria. There are also future possibilities for local production of some other items now imported, such as slides, maps, etc.

Finally, we recommend a reorganization of the Ministry of Education. In addition to a branch of general services with sections for planning, building, inspection, etc., there may be merit in creating five other branches, to correspond to the five major aspects of the educational program: primary education, secondary education, vocational education, fundamental education and higher education.

III PUBLIC HEALTH

Hospitals and Dispensaries

The country's 24 public and 37 private hospitals have, as of the end of 1954, a total of 4,094 beds. This means only 1.19 beds[8] for over 1,000 inhabitants, as compared with 5 per 1,000 in England, the U. S. and New Zealand or the 15 per 1,000 which some authorities consider optimum for a really healthy population. Only 1,880 of the beds, or 0.56 per 1,000 inhabitants, are in general public hospitals.

[8] In this and subsequent comparisons the number of beds per 1,000 inhabitants has been calculated on the basis of the 1952 population.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

944 943 Worse than the low ratio of beds to population is their distribution. Syria is divided into 44 *qadas*, or administrative areas, the average population of which is 75,000. Twenty-eight of these have no hospitals, public or private, whereas others have as many as 4.35 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. The distribution of beds in general governmental hospitals alone is no better: 29 qadas have none at all, but in Damascus and the Hauran center the ratio is 1.67 beds per thousand inhabitants.

Some people, especially in the eastern parts of the country, are as much as 250 kilometers from the nearest hospital. Even by private automobile it would take them at least a day to reach it, and then there would be no assurance of a vacant bed. Among those who must rely on camels or donkeys, as in the rural areas, many people are at least five days' travel time from a hospital. Since a hospital is supposed to serve a population living no more than one hour away, as a practical matter a great many of the people may be said to have no access to a hospital. Thus in the two large provinces in northeastern Syria, the Jezireh and Euphrates, there is only one small public hospital at Hassetche and another at Deir ez Zor.

The inadequacy of the hospitals, especially the general ones for the most part government-owned, which serve the poorest people, is shown by the ratio between number of patients and the population of the provinces. The country-wide average for 1951 and 1952 was 8.8 patients per thousand inhabitants of each province but the proportion ranges from 18.3 for Damascus to 2.2 in the Euphrates. Recent figures for France and the United States indicate that 40-80 persons per thousand are cared for at hospitals.

Another significant factor in many of the hospitals is the small number of patients attended in relation to beds available. In the Euphrates province, for example, there were 6.8 patients per bed compared to 24.6 and 22.6 for the Damascus and Homs provinces, respectively, and a country-wide average of 15.5. If the Damascus bed-patient ratio were country-wide, the 1,880 beds in general government hospitals could serve 46,000 people annually instead of only about 29,000, thus achieving a 58% increase in service with no increase in beds. Where there is both a low ratio of hospital beds to population and a low ratio of patients to beds, as in the Euphrates province, this condition is presumably due not only to the fact that existing hospital facilities are inaccessible to most of the population, but perhaps also to the poor service provided by the hospitals.

Syria has 96 governmental dispensaries or about three per 100,000

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inhabitants.* Here again there is unequal distribution, ranging from 5.1 per 100,000 in the Hauran area and 3.6 in Damascus down to 2.0 in the Euphrates province. Present-day standards call for one rural hospital for every 20,000 inhabitants, yet here many areas which should, by that standard, have a hospital, lack even a dispensary.

The average number of visits at dispensaries is 202 for every thousand persons, varying from 372 in the Hauran and 363 in Damascus down to 60 in the Euphrates. Since the dispensaries operate for the most part in areas without doctors, the figures must be taken to include calls which in other circumstances would be made on private doctors. There are about 7,000 visits per year at each dispensary, or an average of 23 visits per working day.

Medical Staff

In all, the country has 880 doctors including 76 foreigners. Thus there is one doctor for every 3,800 persons. In this respect Syria's standing compared with other countries is not strikingly low. The United States, Europe and the USSR have one doctor for every 1,200 persons; Latin America, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have one for every 1,700. But Asia (excluding the USSR and Japan) and Africa (without South Africa) have only one doctor to 12,000 persons and Iraq has one per 7,000.

Yet while Syria may not be handicapped by an actual lack of doctors, their distribution over the country is as unbalanced as that of the hospital and dispensary facilities. There are some areas with populations of 25,000, without a single doctor. As for trained nurses, midwives and other auxiliary personnel, these are in fact scarcer than doctors and constitute a problem of major importance.

The mission's proposed program, as outlined in the Main Report, would place greater stress on the prevention of disease than in the past.

It is difficult to estimate the possible cost of a full disease-prevention program; it might mean an expenditure of £S 2 per person per year or £S 7 million annually, not including the large expenditures for water supply, drainage, sewerage and other major works. Obviously a program of this magnitude cannot be recommended for Syria in the near future. A

* In the provinces of Damascus and Homs three touring doctors provide the same type of services at the dispensaries.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

144 more realistic minimum program would call for improvement of the water supply, vaccination against tuberculosis and anti-malaria measures.

The first step in assuring a supply of pure water at minimum cost is a survey of present and potential sources. Thereafter there should be measures for the purification of supplies, storage, transportation of pure water to the settlements, distribution to the settlements and to individual properties, and finally the provision of piped water to every building. But for many Syrian communities the construction of a network to bring water to every property is not the best way to begin, since it slows the rate at which water can be provided to new consumers. The program at first might better be confined to the survey and exploitation of new sources, storage and transportation to settlements, and distribution to key points in the settlements; only thereafter should the next steps be taken in the larger settlements.

Disease-carrying mosquitoes can be combatted either by eliminating their breeding places or by a continuous spraying program. By itself the first is too costly and would take many years, although we recommend elimination of breeding grounds in connection with the irrigation and drainage projects. By spraying, however, it has been demonstrated in many countries that the incidence of malaria can be reduced by more than 95% at a yearly cost of no more than $0.25 per capita. In Syria such a program may cost $0.35 or £S 1.25 per person protected, which means about £S 810,000 annually on the assumption that 650,000 persons must be protected. Greece has effected a saving of $1 million annually in quinine alone. An equally successful program in Syria would mean a very substantial annual saving and this would be but a fraction of the economic gains from the increased labor productivity through freedom from disease.

143 *Additional Hospital Facilities*

Any ambitious hospital building program would overtax the financial resources of the country and the available medical and auxiliary staff. Even a program to build hospitals in areas now without them and to add beds to existing hospitals in such a way as to bring them up to the population-bed ratio of Damascus would cost about £S 24 million and probably result in acute operating difficulties. We have therefore suggested that only about 1,000 beds be added to meet the most urgent requirements. The suggested distribution—250 for the Jezireh, 300 for the Euphrates, 400 for

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

the province of Aleppo, and 50 for Palmyra—should be considered tentative. The new facilities should be so distributed as to make them accessible to the population which is in practice not now served by existing facilities. The location of new hospitals in the geographically extensive provinces of the Jezireh and Euphrates must be considered very carefully. Kamichliye should manifestly have a hospital, and other small hospitals might be located in both the eastern and western portions of the Jezireh. In the Euphrates province the needs of Raqqa and Abou Kemal should be considered. In the province of Aleppo a hospital will presumably be needed in Jisr ech Choghour, which will be the center of a rapidly developing region. In the location of all new hospitals the ability to provide staff must be a governing consideration.

Cost of the Six-Year Program

The mission's estimates of the cost of the various parts of the six-year public health program are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Proposed Six-Year Program for Public Health, 1955–60

(*Thousand £S*)

Projects	Total	Annual average
Anti-malaria	2,750	460
Water supply	*	—
Dispensaries	350	58
Total for preventive medicine	3,100	518
Alteration of existing hospitals	1,000	167
1,000 more beds	7,000	1,165
Health centers	350	58
Total for curative medicine	8,350	1,390
Minor health facilities	300	50
TOTAL PROGRAM	11,750	1,960
Total investment	10,250	1,710
Operation of new program	1,500	250
General administrative and operating expenditures, including training	62,400	10,400
TOTAL OPERATION	63,900	10,650
TOTAL OF EXPENDITURES	74,150	12,360

* The amounts necessary for pure water supply are included in the expenditures for the over-all water supply program.

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الامراض والمحافظات ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1951.

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total No. of patients	Diseases / الامراض: العين Eyes	القلب والصدر Heart and lungs	الهضمية والمعائية Digestive system	العصبية Nervous system	البولية التناسلية Urinary and genital	الجلدية Skin	الجراحية Surgical	الافرنجية Syphilis	الرمدية Malaria	الدرنية Tuberculosis	الثانوية Infections	الفاقرة Contagious	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	702,462	87,284	110,700	117,206	88,049	26,055	65,220	67,129	8,696	113,184	10,908	8,395	81,235	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	267,476	33,802	46,241	51,369	20,861	13,791	26,594	34,016	1,151	30,616	8,179	1,364	2,612	دمشق
Homs	109,686	10,526	10,749	8,416	5,806	1,582	7,284	9,054	401	14,128	2,149	867	27,448	حمص
Hama	30,157	1,343	5,152	6,244	3,781	2,149	1,981	2,194	915	5,247	130	69	375	حماة
Latakia	103,964	7,057	9,902	12,602	7,202	1,563	10,382	5,419	553	19,986	269	267	27,445	اللاذقية
Aleppo	136,299	21,018	22,791	20,710	8,677	4,035	10,063	6,497	4,331	22,082	2,154	1,521	8,965	حلب
Al-Hasakah	15,443	1,795	2,037	1,692	1,330	676	1,823	1,691	137	3,704	56	4	849	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	15,270	2,300	1,823	1,852	678	550	1,017	1,987	614	3,028	210	72	750	دير الزور
Swaida	20,910	3,096	4,869	6,386	4,080	693	2,520	1,136	196	2,966	90	737	1,583	السويداء
Dir'a	44,028	6,879	8,124	7,145	2,281	1,026	4,073	5,375	145	5,771	636	394	1,396	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

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المرضى المتلقين في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الأمراض والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES, BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1952.

Table No. 8.

جدول رقم ٨

All Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى Total of Patients	Diseases												الأمراض	المحافظات
		الحمى Fever	الحمى والصدرية Fever and Lungs	الحمى والقلاعية Digestive system	الحمى Nervous system	الحمى الكلوية Urinary and genital	الملاريا Malaria	الملاريا Surgical	الأمراض Digestive	الرئوية Nerves	الرئوية Tuberculosis	الجلدية Infectious	الجلدية Contagious		
Total	697,420	70,801	108,204	117,242	60,820	38,840	64,307	60,025	6,099	82,796	6,319	3,921	60,708	مجموع المحافظات	
Damascus	220,325	24,324	43,000	50,700	32,050	13,474	26,000	30,703	780	22,943	1,970	1,374	2,368	دمشق	
Homs	78,770	7,724	8,771	6,000	4,743	1,397	5,021	5,324	354	13,060	6	47	30,708	حمص	
Hama	34,021	3,703	6,000	10,300	4,030	2,307	2,043	2,314	320	5,170	67	9	827	حماة	
Latakia	110,770	7,070	16,300	10,000	5,030	3,071	13,027	6,213	760	22,033	473	801	25,023	اللاذقية	
Aleppo	109,000	6,000	18,000	16,000	8,797	8,130	7,000	6,970	3,970	17,700	3,427	1,000	2,01 0	حلب	
Al-Hassakah	2,000	204	213	400	103	67	170	156	4	790	2	20	400	الحسكة	
Deir-ez-Zor	18,700	2,200	1,700	1,770	804	410	1,400	2,105	544	2,303	407	88	2,101	دير الزور	
Swaida	22,304	4,000	3,207	4,700	3,067	942	2,042	1,300	40	1,917	115	141	770	السويداء	
Dir'a	16,000	3,000	7,304	9,400	4,001	1,011	4,096	6,033	120	10,001	131	212	1,204	درعا	

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والإسعاف العام

المرضى الداخلين في المستوصفات الصحية حسب الأمراض والمحافظات ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTERS, BY MOHAFAZAT AND DISEASES, 1952.

Table No. 9

جدول رقم ٩

Mohafazat	مجموع مداخلي Total of Patients	Diseases												
		العين Optical	القلب والصدر Heart and lungs	الهضمية والتناسلية Digestive system	العصبية Nervous system	البولية التناسلية Urinary and genital	الجلدية Skin	الرضية Surgical	الانزعاجية Hygienic	الأمراض الرئوية Diseases	الدرنية Tuberculosis	الثارية Infectious	الثارة Contagious	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	924,[illegible]	67,201	100,070	123,717	56,979	25,081	34,903	91,020	2,730	56,[illegible]	5,135	7,156	62,[illegible]	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	202,[illegible]	27,039	42,[illegible]	51,187	20,219	12,472	21,416	38,114	201	21,159	2,820	3,575	3,447	دمشق
Hama	81,437	7,210	10,681	7,487	5,717	1,896	5,137	7,208	54	13,213	7	114	22,336	حماة
Homs	43,311	1,836	5,772	11,576	5,489	2,494	2,716	2,520	695	5,050	88	212	3,103	حمص
Latakia	94,[illegible]	5,343	13,[illegible]	12,146	7,210	1,423	5,470	4,420	90	10,[illegible]	880	166	22,340	اللاذقية
Aleppo	105,[illegible]	7,221	18,[illegible]	20,[illegible]	5,301	4,910	7,105	5,890	1,181	25,210	2,974	2,896	6,300	حلب
Al-Hassakah	11,[illegible]	840	1,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	714	125	747	672	3	2,476	3	73	1,486	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	22,[illegible]	4,021	2,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	771	577	2,234	2,159	427	2,494	614	261	203	دير الزور
Suweida	15,[illegible]	2,440	2,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	1,457	413	1,677	301	1	[illegible]	17	13	1,677	السويداء
Der'a	87,[illegible]	10,590	5,734	9,[illegible]	4,941	893	5,205	6,496	24	9,110	221	197	2,728	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والإسعاف العام

الصحة والإسعاف العام
743
1954

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1951

Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	أطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	752,482	204,579	257,025	290,884	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	297,476	95,202	92,460	109,814	دمشق
Homs	109,866	31,799	36,950	41,117	حمص
Hama	30,187	8,590	11,057	12,540	حماة
Latakia	103,964	30,936	33,120	41,214	اللاذقية
Aleppo	136,395	34,441	52,852	49,104	حلب
Al-Hassakeh	18,643	4,913	8,010	5,720	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	18,370	4,966	8,371	5,013	دير الزور
Swaida	28,910	9,767	6,640	12,503	السويداء
Der'a	44,028	17,876	12,723	13,609	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

المرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1953

Table No. 11

جدول رقم ١١

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	اطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	697,429	186,799	205,606	305,023	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	209,225	61,329	48,849	100,047	دمشق
Homs	78,770	23,961	27,637	27,172	حمص
Hama	34,631	7,616	15,145	11,870	حماة
Latakia	119,779	30,974	33,314	44,452	اللاذقية
Aleppo	100,033	27,386	37,223	35,424	حلب
Al-Hassakeh	2,697	999	840	858	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	15,740	4,382	4,059	7,299	دير الزور
Suweida	22,504	7,495	6,111	8,898	السويداء
Dir'a	54,059	15,903	17,502	20,654	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

الصحة والاسعاف العام

1943
1944

HEALTH

الرضى المعالجون في المستوصفات الصحية حسب المحافظات والجنس ١٩٥٤

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT CLINICAL CENTRES BY MOHAFAZAT AND SEX, 1959

Table No. 13

جدول رقم ١٣

MOHAFAZAT	مجموع عدد المرضى Total number of patients	رجال Men	نساء Women	اطفال Children	المحافظات
All Mohafazat	694,034	185,454	298,690	209,890	مجموع المحافظات
Damascus	232,064	65,752	56,500	110,813	دمشق
Homs	81,437	24,500	29,069	27,868	حمص
Hama	43,211	9,666	18,251	15,294	حماة
Latakia	94,593	24,548	29,328	40,717	اللاذقية
Aleppo	105,703	28,224	42,422	34,957	حلب
Al-Hasakeh	11,065	3,990	3,972	4,098	الحسكة
Deir-ez-Zor	22,336	5,527	6,205	10,574	دير الزور
Sweida	15,123	5,548	5,796	3,789	السويداء
Dir'a	87,842	17,509	18,648	21,685	درعا

Source : Ministry of Health.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

حركة المرضى المعالجين في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الامراض ١٩٥١

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASE, 1951

Table No. 12 — جدول رقم ١٢

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Total No. of patients (1)	DISEASES الامراض: العادية (٤) Ordinary (4)	السارية Infectious	الجراحية Surgical	الرمدية والجلدية Opthalm. and skin	العقلية والعصبية Mental and Nervous	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	31,578	12,211	2,196	15,722	843	584	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	12,691	3,431	208	8,770	182	—	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	208	—	—	—	208	—	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	490	—	—	—	—	490	»	» ابن سينا
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	183	—	183	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	»	581	—	—	581	—	—	»	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	165	—	165	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن الوليد
Infectious disease hospital	»	213	—	213	—	—	—	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,272	957	107	408	—	—	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	901	428	116	356	1	—	» السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	2,362	1,233	151	977	1	—	» حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	3,078	1,446	341	1,271	20	—	» اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	1,821	1,237	213	254	17	—	» طرطوس	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,021	363	4	654	—	—	» حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	2,537	2,509	10	—	—	18	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Siphlis Hospital	»	311	—	—	—	311	—	»	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	»	2,119	30	—	2,089	—	—	»	» الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	233	—	233	—	—	—	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	»	230	—	144	—	—	86	»	» الحميات
Al-Sab Hospital	»	65	60	—	5	—	—	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-es-Zor Hospital	Deir-es-Zor	510	247	—	238	25	—	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al Hasak... Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	429	289	20	120	—	—	» الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.

1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.
4) Including optical cases at the Watani Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام

(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية : المجاليب والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة
(٤) وتشمل الامراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

743
1694
الصحة والاسعاف العام

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الأمراض ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASE, 1952

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

Name of Hospital	Mohafazat	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Total No. of patients (1)	DISEASES الأمراض: قاذفة (٢) Gastric (2)	سارية Infectious	الجراحية Surgical	الرمد والزهرية Syphilis and Skin	القلبية والعصبية Mental and Nervous	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total		32,474	12,469	3,107	14,236	1,671	572	—	المجموع
Wataní Hospital	Damascus	12,778	3,967	315	8,226	269	—	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	"	244	—	—	—	244	—	"	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	"	572	—	—	—	—	572	"	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious diseases hospital	"	517	—	517	—	—	—	"	مستشفى الأمراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatori.	"	403	—	403	—	—	—	"	(السنجر الصحي)
The Surgical Hospital	"	250	97	—	153	—	—	"	مصح ابن النفيس
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	"	158	—	158	—	—	—	"	المستشفى الجراحي
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,003	901	333	369	—	—	"	مصح ابن الوليد
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	506	258	71	186	2	—	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Hama Hospital	Hama	2,170	980	196	984	—	—	" السويداء	" السويداء
Lattakia Hospital	Lattakia	2,744	1,236	219	1,160	36	—	" حمص	" حمص
Tartus Hospital	"	1,468	1,275	97	118	3	—	" اللاذقية	" اللاذقية
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,190	489	38	653	—	—	" طرطوس	" طرطوس
Wataní Hospital (3)	Aleppo	2,291	2,291	—	—	—	—	" حماة	" حماة
Al-Hamiyat Hospital for infect. diseases	"	417	—	417	—	—	—	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٣)
Siphilis Hospital	"	469	—	—	—	469	—	"	مستشفى الجلدية للأمراض السارية
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	"	2,050	—	—	2,050	—	—	"	مستشفى الرازي
Ibn Rashd Hospital	"	334	—	334	—	—	—	"	" الرازي (٣)
Al-Bab Hospital	"	43	37	—	6	—	—	"	" ابن رشد
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	522	376	1	176	29	—	"	" قصر الباب
Al Hasakeh Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	630	452	5	166	14	—	دير الزور	" دير الزور
								الحسكة	" الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.
4) Including optical cases at the Wataní Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والإسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الأمراض العينية ، العقلية والأمراض الحلق والأذن والأنف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة
(٤) بما في ذلك الأمراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية حسب الامراض ١٩٥٣

PATIENTS ATTENDED TO AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS BY TYPE OF DISEASE, 1953

Table No. 15 — جدول رقم ١٥

Name of Hospital	Mohafaza	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Total No. of patients (1)	DISEASES الامراض: عادية (٤) Ordinary (4)	سارية Infectious	الجراحية Surgical	الزهرية والجلدية Venereal and Skin	العقلية والعصبية Mental and Nervous	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	22,049	11,808	2,410	14,907	1,213	731	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	13,190	3,353	179	8,408	250	—	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	289	—	—	—	289	—	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	615	—	—	—	—	615	»	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious diseases hospital	»								
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	506	—	506	—	—	—	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية
The Surgical Hospital	»	369	—	369	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن النفيس
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	190	39	—	151	—	—	»	المستشفى الجراحي
	»	190	—	190	—	—	—	»	مصح ابن الوليد
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	1,816	951	208	605	—	—	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Suwida Hospital	Suwida	625	281	88	256	—	—	السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	2,362	1,289	200	873	—	—	حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	3,197	1,696	283	1,205	23	—	اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	1,349	1,082	41	115	2	—	»	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	1,221	474	31	716	—	—	حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	1,752	1,719	7	27	—	—	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Haniyat Hospital	»	930	55	875	—	—	—	»	مستشفى الحميات
Biabia Hospital	»	607	—	—	—	607	—	»	مستشفى الزهري
A.-Rani Hospital (3)	»	2,175	14	—	2,161	—	—	»	مستشفى الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	373	—	373	—	—	—	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Dweirina Hospital	»	116	—	—	—	—	116	»	» الدويرينا
Al-Bab Hospital	»	1	1	—	—	—	—	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	634	389	—	226	39	—	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al Hasaheh Hospital	Al-Hasaheh	662	485	10	164	3	—	الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.
4) Including optical cases at the Watani Hospital.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : للامراض العينية ، والعقلية ، ولامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة
(٤) وتشمل امراض العينية في المستشفى الوطني

وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
743
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144

SECRET

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥١

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENTS HOSPITALS 1951

Table No. 16 — جدول رقم ١٦

Name of Hospital	Mohafaat	مجموع عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: شفاء Cured	وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون لسنة تالية Patients remaining next year	عدد أيام المكث No. of day in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total		1,890	31,578	29,006	1,112	1,458	669,654		المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	435	12,891	11,730	574	587	143,906	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	«	75	206	206	—	10	2,795	«	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	«	250	490	157	19	314	104,137	«	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious disease hospital	«	50	213	198	6	9	2,866	«	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	«	35	189	61	9	113	25,832	«	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	«	50	581	566	1	14	8,001	«	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	«	75	155	64	2	89	28,734	«	مصح ابن الوليد الجلاء
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	80	1,372	1,291	43	30	16,538	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	30	901	850	36	15	10,418	السويداء	« السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	75	2,362	2,237	59	66	22,860	حمص	« حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	150	3,078	2,890	110	78	32,085	اللاذقية	« اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	«	40	1,821	1,778	24	19	11,996	«	« طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	80	1,021	949	37	35	22,415	حماة	« حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	150	2,537	2,407	46	84	31,180	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Hamiyat Hospital	«	40	220	196	12	19	5,472	«	مستشفى الحميات
Siphlis Hospital	«	40	211	209	—	2	2,310	«	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	«	100	2,119	1,970	107	42	20,905	«	« الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	«	40	223	118	13	89	28,977	«	« ابن رشد
Al-Bab Hospital	«	10	65	65	—	—	1,084	«	« الباب
Deir-es-Zor Hospital	Deir-es-Zor	50	510	483	7	10	8,523	دير الزور	« دير الزور
Al Hassakeh Hospital	Al-Hassakeh	25	429	413	12	4	3,560	الحسكة	« الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى الباقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، العقليب والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS 1952

Table No. 17

جدول رقم ١٧

Name of Hospital	Mohafaat	مجموع عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع عدد المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: شفاء Cured	المرضى الخارجون Outgoing Patients: وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون في السنة الماضية Patients remaining end year	عدد أيام المكث No. of day in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	2,400	31,474	26,812	2,206	1,456	580,229	—	المجموع
Wataní Hospital	Damascus	435	12,778	11,790	641	347	171,337	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Sabr Hospital	«	25	244	240	—	4	2,943	«	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	«	320	572	190	25	357	120,923	«	« ابن سينا
Infectious diseases									مستشفى الأمراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium hospital	«	50	517	486	14	17	7,642	«	(السحر الصحي)
The Surgical Hospital	«	200	403	256	19	128	38,254	«	مصح ابن النفيس
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	«	100	250	242	—	—	2,654	«	المستشفى الجراحي
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	100	1,803	1,513	85	35	35,037	«	مصح ابن الوليد الجذامي
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	80	526	497	12	17	6,369	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Hama Hospital	Hama	100	3,170	2,827	70	63	21,356	السويداء	« السويداء
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	160	2,744	2,549	109	86	30,811	حمص	« « حمص
Tartus Hospital	«	80	1,493	1,459	11	23	10,176	اللاذقية	« « اللاذقية
Hama Hospital	Hama	80	1,190	1,130	33	28	14,816	«	« « طرطوس
Wataní Hospital (2)	Aleppo	120	2,391	2,186	74	81	26,318	حماة	« حماة
Al-Hamiyat Hospital for infect. diseases	«	40	417	383	15	22	8,861	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Sighia Hospital	«	20	459	456	—	3	2,736	«	مستشفى الحميات للأمراض السارية
Ar-Razi Hospital	«	100	2,060	1,969	97	44	20,977	«	مستشفى الأزهري
Ibn Rushd Hospital	«	120	334	322	17	95	31,934	«	مستشفى الرازي
Al-Bab Hospital	«	10	43	43	—	—	940	«	« ابن رشد
Deir-ez-Zor Hospital	Deir-ez-Zor	80	882	856	9	17	8,108	«	« قضاء الباب
Al Hasakah Hospital	Al-Hasakah	40	620	601	9	10	3,569	دير الزور	« دير الزور
								الحسكة	« الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والأسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الأمراض العينية ، العقليه ، وأمراض الحلق والأذن والأنف

وزارة الصحة والإسعاف العام

حركة المرضى في المستشفيات الحكومية ١٩٥٢

PATIENTS AT GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS 1953

Table No. 18 — جدول رقم ١٨

Name of Hospital	Mohafaat	عدد الأسرة Number of beds	مجموع المرضى (١) Number of patients (1)	المرضى الخارجيون Outpatient Patients: شفاء Cured	وفاة Deceased	المرضى الباقون لما بعد نهاية السنة Patients remaining end year	عدد أيام المكث No. of days in hospital	المحافظات	المستشفيات
Total	—	2,900	32,089	29,152	1,342	1,639	613,478	—	المجموع
Watani Hospital	Damascus	495	12,190	11,302	622	266	154,190	دمشق	المستشفى الوطني
Ibn Zahr Hospital	»	25	269	262	—	7	2,921	»	مستشفى ابن زهر
Ibn Sina Hospital	»	250	615	240	24	351	137,312	»	مستشفى ابن سينا
Infectious diseases hospital	»	50	506	476	24	6	5,336	»	مستشفى الامراض السارية
Ibn Nafis Sanatorium	»	200	269	196	18	175	50,810	»	مصح ابن النفيس
The Surgical Hospital	»	200	190	165	1	24	3,130	»	المستشفى الجراحي
Ibn-al-Walid Sanatorium	»	120	190	76	3	111	37,246	»	مصح ابن الوليد «الطلام»
Dir'a Hospital	Dir'a	100	1,814	1,735		30	13,702	درعا	مستشفى درعا
Sweida Hospital	Sweida	50	625	572	15	37	8,805	السويداء	» السويداء
Homs Hospital	Homs	100	2,362	2,225	51	86	22,000	حمص	» حمص
Latakia Hospital	Latakia	180	3,157	2,990	116	51	33,306	اللاذقية	» اللاذقية
Tartus Hospital	»	60	1,240	1,193	21	26	5,663	»	» طرطوس
Hama Hospital	Hama	80	1,221	1,150	43	28	16,377	حماة	» حماة
Watani Hospital (2)	Aleppo	120	1,783	1,605	63	85	21,300	حلب	المستشفى الوطني (٢)
Al-Hamdyat Hospital	»	40	930	906	16	6	11,826	»	» الحمدانية
Sighile Hospital	»	20	607	601	—	6	3,445	»	مستشفى الزهري
Ar-Razi Hospital (3)	»	100	2,175	2,022	100	53	19,974	»	مستشفى الرازي (٣)
Ibn Rushd Hospital	»	120	373	258	9	106	39,033	»	» ابن رشد
Al-Dweirina Hospital	»	100	116	42	7	67	12,880	»	» الدويرينا
Al-Bab Hospital	»	10	1	1	—	—	8	»	» قضاء الباب
Deir-es-Zor Hospital	Deir-es-Zor	80	634	606	9	19	8,182	دير الزور	» دير الزور
Al-Hasakeh Hospital	Al-Hasakeh	40	662	639	14	9	4,029	الحسكة	» الحسكة

Source : Ministry of Health.
1) Including patients of the previous year.
2) Including the three sections : Optical, mental, and throat, ear and nasal diseases.
3) Including the surgical section.

المصدر : وزارة الصحة والاسعاف العام
(١) بما في ذلك المرضى المتبقين من السنة الماضية
(٢) بما في ذلك فروع المستشفى الثلاثة : الامراض العينية ، والمجاليب ، والامراض الحلق والاذن والانف
(٣) بما في ذلك فرع الجراحة

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
SYRIA MDI

yearly and final examinations lead to the diploma in nursing or in nursing and midwifery. 874*

The Faculty of Medicine has one hospital of 160 beds and another with 60 beds in obstetrics. It has also an outpatient clinic. The School of Dentistry has 13 dental chairs. Laboratories in chemistry, physics, anatomy, biochemistry, histopathology, and other subjects are located mostly in the nearby old building of the religious school of Sultan Sulayman. The laboratories on the whole are of modest proportions and the building is unfit for them. [743] [742]

THE FACULTY OF LAW

The Faculty of Law gives a course of three years above the second *baccalauréat*. With the shortening of the secondary course it is hoped to lengthen the course to four years. Students are prepared to be lawyers, judges in civil courts, and judges in Shar' (Muslim law) courts. Many of the graduates become government officials. The examinations leading to the degree of *Licence* in Law are conducted by committees consisting usually of two professors and a prominent judge, lawyer, or government official for each of the subjects. These external examiners are appointed by the Minister of Education. Graduates must work in a law office for two years before being licensed to practice before the courts. The government when endeavoring to fill a legal office holds its own special examinations which in the case of filling a vacancy in the Shar' courts include examinations in Muslim law.

Study at the Faculty of Law relies heavily on lectures. A student is permitted to absent himself from up to 50 percent of the lectures. A long period is allowed at the end of the year for the final examinations. Naturally, cramming at the end of the year is the prevailing practice.

The University library consists of 12,000 volumes, mainly in Arabic, French, and English. Books may be read in the library and are lent outside the library only to members of the teaching staff.

Student registration in 1945–46 was as follows:

Faculty	Enrollment
Medicine	256
Pharmacy	59
Dentistry	32
Nursing and midwifery	49
P.C.B. class	103
Law	541
Total	1,040

744 The Department of Public Health Affairs has divisions dealing with the control of communicable diseases, endemic diseases, maternal and child health, community health education, nutritional problems and rural health. A subordinate branch concerned with the control of tuberculosis is
743 included under communicable diseases. Responsibility for the maintenance of hospitals and other medical care facilities, in both urban and rural areas, is centralized in the Department of Hospitals and Clinics, while the over-all supervision of government institutions is delegated to the Department of Inspections. The Department of Public Health Laboratories operates diagnostic, biologic and rabies control units. The activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces, are conducted by provincial health departments.

744 Health organizations which function under the municipal authorities, independently of the Ministry, exist in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. They are concerned primarily with the enforcement of sanitary measures and the control of communicable diseases, and do not support hospital or dispensary services.

Medical officers under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior are stationed in each of the municipalities, and furnish medical care to certain indigent population groups. The Ministry of Health co-operates in the provision of technical services when needed. The veterinary division of the Ministry of Agriculture maintains services for the inspection of meat and milk supplies in conjunction with the municipal health departments. The Ministry of National Economy supervises the health conditions in industry, and passes upon compensation regulations. The Department of Statistics in this Ministry is responsible for the compilation and the publication of vital and other statistics. The Ministry of Education sponsors an annual preregistration health examination of schoolchildren, and plans to organize a school health program in Damascus in the near future.

747 The Red Crescent Society carries on a campaign against tuberculosis throughout the country, and operates a tuberculosis dispensary in Damascus. The Goutte de Lait Society of Damascus supports infant welfare services in association with the government's maternal and child health center.

The Near East Foundation initiated a comprehensive rural demonstration program in villages near Damascus in 1946, in conjunction with the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health. In addition to activities for the improvement of agriculture, it operates 5 child health centers, each serving 10 to 20 villages. Courses are conducted at the largest center for the training of local village midwives in improved technics of midwifery. When the program was expanded in 1951, the Foundation planned for the development of co-ordinated maternity and child health services, including well-child clinics and home visiting, in the village centers and the organization of a special course for the training of rural sanitarians. Since 1949, it has participated with
747 744 the government health authorities and the successive agencies working for the relief of the Palestinian refugees in a malaria control program, based on residual spraying with DDT preparations, or Gammexane, in villages in the Damascus region. In 1950, it co-operated with the Ministry and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company in residual spraying operations in villages and refugee camps around Der'a, in Hauran *muhafazat*.

747 Hospitals and related health work are
648 conducted by various mission societies in Damascus, Aleppo and Deir ez Zor. Health and medical care services are also provided by the larger industries for the benefit of their employees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency carries on public health and medical programs in the refugee centers in southern and western Syria.

Medical Institutions

743 Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1951,

p. 446(a)

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD 1

there were 47 hospitals in Syria which provided a total of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 population. Of this number 22 hospitals, with an aggregate capacity of 1,535 beds, were supported by the government and 25 hospitals, with a capacity of 720 beds, by private or philanthropic organizations. The government hospitals included the National Hospital, a general hospital with 150 to 200 beds, and an associated maternity hospital of 50 beds, which were under the jurisdiction of the Medical Faculty of the Syrian University in Damascus.

The institutions operated by the Ministry of Health consisted of 14 general hospitals, ranging in size from 25 to 150 beds, located in the different provinces; a 25-bed communicable disease hospital in Damascus; venereal disease hospitals, of 75 beds in Damascus and 14 beds in Aleppo; and tuberculosis hospitals near Damascus and Aleppo, with 140 and 100 beds, respectively. Special wards for maternity cases were connected with the principal general hospitals in Damascus and Aleppo. In addition, the Ministry maintained a mental hospital with 300 beds and a leprosarium with facilities for 75 patients in the vicinity of Damascus. Under construction in 1951 were a new general hospital of about 500 beds in Damascus and 2 small hospitals of 25 beds each in the provinces. The tuberculosis hospital near Damascus was being enlarged to provide 350 beds, and a new 300-bed sanatorium was nearing completion in Aleppo. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed sanatorium in Latakia *waksfenat*.

The French Hospital in Damascus, with a capacity of 120 beds, was the largest of the private institutions. The majority averaged 10 to 20 beds in size: 11 were situated in Damascus, 8 in Aleppo and the remainder in different parts of the country. The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in America sponsors a 50-bed hospital at Deir ez Zor which serves a large rural population in the Euphrates river region.

p. 147 (A)

Outpatient clinics are connected with all the government hospitals. The clinics and the dispensaries maintained by the Ministry totaled 111 in 1951, including maternal and child health centers in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia; mobile dispensaries in 7 provinces; and 6 special mobile units, 2 each for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and bejel or syphilis. A demonstration center was established in connection with the maternal and child health clinic in Damascus in 1952 by the Ministry, in cooperation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The center provides training for district doctors, nurses and midwives, as well as courses for medical and nursing students and practitioners, in the various aspects of maternal and child health. A tuberculosis demonstration clinic and training center was also opened in Damascus by the Ministry, in conjunction with Syrian University and the World Health Organization. 743

Laboratories. The Ministry of Health operates a central laboratory in Damascus. It has divisions for the performance of bacteriologic, serologic, chemical and biochemical examinations; for the preparation of typhoid, cholera, smallpox and rabies vaccines; and for the analysis of foods and drugs. Small diagnostic laboratories are also established in the administrative centers of the other provinces. 742

The municipal health department in Damascus maintains a laboratory for the examination of water, milk, cheese and other foodstuffs. Research and diagnostic laboratories are connected with the technical departments of the medical school in Damascus, and clinical laboratory facilities are available in all the larger hospitals.

Schools. A medical school is affiliated with Syrian University in Damascus. The Faculty of Medicine was founded in 1901 under the Ottoman government and incorporated in the University in 1923. It confers the degree of Doctor of Medicine on the completion of a 6-year course of study, but 874

761 Comparative rates in urban and rural com-
369 munities were determined in a series of tests
164 on unorganized groups in the city and two adjacent farming districts. In Damascus, positive reactions to tuberculin were given by 47.7 of the boys and 40.8 per cent of the girls tested at 15 years of age. At 20 to 25 years of age, positive reactions were obtained in 86.7 per cent and 77.4 per cent, respectively; at 40 to 45 years of age, in 95.6 and 86.6 per cent, respectively. In the rural communities the positive reaction rates were consistently lower, but approached the urban levels in the older age groups. Among individuals at 15 years of age, 51.6 per cent of the boys and 27.2 per cent of the girls reacted to tuberculin in one area, and 18.1 per cent of the boys and 21.2 per cent of the girls, in another. At 40 to 45 years of age, the proportion of positive reactors averaged 80 per cent in the first series and 50 to 100 per cent in the second.[48]

744 Within recent years the Ministry of
751 Health has embarked upon a tuberculosis
747 control program. In January, 1950, a tuberculin testing and BCG inoculation campaign was organized under the auspices of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and associated organizations, which was taken over by the Ministry
659 in September. Surveys have been carried
361 out in most of the provincial capitals and
751 surrounding rural districts, and the Ministry contemplates the gradual extension of the campaign to cover the populations in all parts of the country. In the course of the investigations completed in 7 provinces between January and September, 1950, almost 417,000 persons were tuberculin tested, and over 188,000 were inoculated with BCG vaccine. The majority were schoolchildren, although miscellaneous population groups of all ages were also included. The proportion of positive reactors in the different provinces ranged from 23 per cent in Jebel ed Druz (As Suwaydah) to 42 per cent in Aleppo.

758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
743

758 743 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The de-
743 velopment of increased medical facilities has recently been undertaken by the Ministry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital near Damascus, to provide a total of 350 beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo were under construction. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed hospital in Latakia province, which would bring the total number of beds available for the isolation and the treatment of tuberculous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 A tuberculosis demonstration and training
874 center was established in Damascus in 1952 under the direction of the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Ministry and the Syrian University. It provides a regional headquarters for the training of doctors, nurses and social workers in the public health, the therapeutic and the social aspects of the disease.

164 Smallpox. Vaccination against smallpox
751 is compulsory, but enforcement is neces-
361 sarily incomplete in the more remote areas and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks occur from time to time, with sporadic cases reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to 1941 only occasional cases were observed. In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from Iraq, where an epidemic focus had developed in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were recorded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The outbreaks subsided in 1944, and again no more than sporadic cases were noted until 1948, when 894 cases were reported. The known incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influenza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

sion hospital clinic in Deir ez Zor,[14, 18] the prevalence among the Bedouin has been estimated at 50 to 90 per cent and among the seminomadic Arab townsmen at 20 to 35 per cent. 164 361

The facilities for the diagnosis and the treatment of venereal diseases are meager. As of 1951, the Ministry of Health operated special venereal disease hospitals and outpatient clinics in Damascus and Aleppo. It also maintained 2 mobile dispensaries for the treatment of syphilis and bejel in the eastern provinces. A campaign for the mass treatment of bejel and syphilis was initiated in 1952 by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The findings of the various field units should eventually provide a comprehensive picture of the distribution and the prevalence of these diseases in eastern Syria. 758 743

Diseases of the Eyes. Trachoma is a major public health problem in all parts of the country, although it varies in prominence under urban and rural conditions. The infection rates usually average less than 10 per cent in the cities, but approximate 40 to 60 per cent in the rural areas, where over two thirds of the people live. Repeated surveys among school groups in northern Syria[21] indicate that slightly more than 5 per cent of the children in Aleppo are affected, in contrast with 30 to 40 per cent in the environs of the city and 60 per cent in the rural villages. The disease exists at all levels of society, but is less frequent among the nomadic tribes than among the settled communities in the same general region. 164 369

Differences in prevalence, influenced by local customs, are also noted among the various racial and religious groups. In a survey covering mountainous and coastal areas of Latakia *muhafazat*, reported in 1933,[20] the highest infection rates were found in the predominantly Alawite districts. The index of infection averaged 44 per cent. It ranged from 25 per cent among the Armenians to 61 per cent among the 164 563

164 563 Alawites and 68 per cent among the Ismailites. Trachoma is one of the principal causes of blindness, in spite of the fact that, in the opinion of many local observers, a large percentage of uncomplicated cases exhibit a tendency to spontaneous cure.

164 Gonococcal and other types of infectious conjunctivitis are common. In a series of 315 conjunctival examinations, reported in 1931,[19] from the mission hospital at Deir ez Zor, *Hemophilus lacunatus* (Morax-Axenfeld bacillus) was identified in 34 per cent, *H. conjunctivitidis* (Koch-Weeks bacillus) in about 10 per cent and *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* in 5 per cent, while different pyogenic cocci were found in the remainder.

164 515 758 Diseases of the Skin. As is to be expected, in view of the widespread ignorance of the principles of personal hygiene and the scarcity of water in many areas, skin diseases are prevalent. They represented almost 10 per cent of the total cases treated in government hospitals and clinics in 1949.

164 361 511 Mycotic infections are numerous, with ringworm of the scalp predominating in most localities. Impetigo and scabies are widespread, particularly among children in the rural villages. Pediculosis is almost universal among the inhabitants of the poorer, congested communities, both urban and rural. Occasional cases of human myiasis are encountered. A form of dermatitis, caused by the bite of *Phlebotomus papatasii* and other sandflies, is sometimes encountered among susceptible individuals in the summer months.

164 Leprosy. Endemic foci of leprosy exist in various parts of the country, but primarily in Hauran and Latakia provinces. The extent of infection is not accurately known, and estimates of prevalence range from 90 to 250 cases. A few new cases are [743] reported each year. Theoretically, isolation is compulsory, and the Ministry of Health maintains a leprosarium at Douma, near Damascus, which has facilities for the care of about 75 lepers.

752 164 Rabies. Sporadic cases of rabies are reported. The majority result from the bites

p. 154(A)

SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number.

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda.

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent."

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases.

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex-

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

MALARIA, IRRIGATION, AND SOIL EROSION IN CENTRAL SYRIA

NORMAN N. LEWIS

101 164 744

THIS study of the Selemiya region of central Syria had its origin in a modest wartime public-health program. Hundreds of patients suffering from malaria in the villages of this district were regularly treated by a mobile clinic, and it soon became obvious that this work had to be supplemented if not replaced by swamp drainage and other measures of malaria control. The necessary investigations showed that soil erosion in the hills in the east of the region was partly responsible for the swamps on the plain. The swamps themselves were frequently associated with ancient irrigation works. Thus various problems of the region—agricultural, social, and medical—were closely linked in origin and development. It was found that attempts to solve any one of them alone could not be more than partially successful, and the conclusion reached was that the ideal solution would have to be radical, comprehensive, and on a large-scale regional basis.

THE LANDSCAPE

634 133

The greater part of the governmental subdistrict (caza) of Selemiya is a plain. Bounding it sharply on the west are low plateaus, capped by a level bed of basalt a few feet thick; to the southeast are ranges of hills, part of the Palmyrene group, to which the local collective name of Jebel Bil'as may be given.

[361] 133 312

The ground slope over much of the region is toward the town of Selemiya; drainage from an area of 620 square miles converges on the low flat land around the town. Because of the continuous subsurface flow, a perennial stream rises at Ain ez Zerqa, to flow 12 miles to the west to join the Orontes. All other perennial streams, however, are only a few hundred or thousand yards long and are used for irrigation; most of them rise in artificial underground channels. Most of the watercourses are wadis, dry or nearly dry for much of the year. In the hills these are steep, V-shaped valleys, on the plain generally wide, shallow, gravel-filled channels in gentle, open valleys.

113

Figure 2 gives a simplified indication of the configuration. Hydrologically, the strata may be simply grouped into the Cretaceous limestones

114

> MR. LEWIS, Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, was in Syria during the war and is now principal instructor at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon, a training center for British government officials in the Middle East.

p. 278

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

11 PUBLIC HEALTH

65 744

The progress in public health has been much less spectacular and less steady than that in education. Expenditures on public health have increased sharply only in recent years. In 1954 the budget of the Ministry of Public Health amounted to £S 8.764 million or 4.2% of the regular budget, as compared with actual expenditures of £S 3.431 million or 3.4% of the total in 1945. Health facilities have been gradually expanding. The number of hospitals has risen from 35 with 1,785 beds at the end of 1945 to 61 with [743] 4,094 beds at the end of 1954. Over the last seven years the government has spent, on an average, £S 1.3 million on public health facilities, so that [759] government hospitals now have a total of 3,000 beds. The number of doctors in Syria has risen from 616 in 1945 to about 880 at present.

Yet it is generally recognized that the state of public health is far from satisfactory. This conclusion rests upon testimony and observation rather than health statistics. The statistics, indeed, are so inadequate as to provide little indication of health conditions. The number of deaths registered, for example, imply a death rate of but seven per thousand, but the record of deaths is evidently very incomplete and the actual death rate rather [164] high. There is still a high incidence of debilitating diseases. Malaria, for example, is prevalent in many parts of Syria. Diseases such as tuberculosis and the many varieties of intestinal infections, which are generally associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding and low standards [165] of living, are quite widespread. Infant mortality is particularly high. Thus 36% of the registered deaths in 1951-53 occurred among children less than five years old, and of these about the same percentage died of diarrhoea and enteritis.

An effective campaign to raise health standards would require resources which Syria will hardly be able to mobilize at its present stage of development. The health program will have to remain rather modest and should attempt primarily to remedy the more glaring deficiencies. These are, principally, the inadequate attention given to preventive medicine and the markedly unequal geographic distribution of existing health facilities.

744 *Preventive Medicine*

The prevention of disease is likely in the long run to be more economical than curative medicine. The mission believes that this aspect of

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

public health should receive primary emphasis in the program over the next six years. To this end we recommend a campaign against the malarial mosquito, improvement of drinking water supplies, greater stress on health education and the construction of a number of health centers.

Enough experience has now been gained in many countries to demonstrate that the scourge of malaria can be virtually wiped out by effective spraying with DDT. Such a program is receiving attention in Syria. Two WHO and UNICEF projects dealing exclusively or partially with malaria control (one in Homs and Latakia and one in Kamichliye) were being carried on in 1954; the mission understands they are to be continued until countrywide coverage is achieved. In 1954, spraying operations carried out by the government, with and without assistance by international agencies, were designed to protect some 380,000 persons, more than half the population of the malarial areas. The cost of malarial control in Syria is relatively high, an estimated U. S. $0.35 per person; nation-wide coverage would cost something over £S 810,000 annually. The mission has made provision in its recommended program for expenditure of £S 2.75 million for malarial control, which should be sufficient for three sprayings, of full coverage, during the period of the program.

Polluted drinking water is apparently an important cause of disease. Many communities are without pure water supplies. It is well recognized in Syria that this is one of the central problems which must be tackled. A program for community water supplies will be discussed in the next chapter.

The relationship of personal hygiene and sanitation to disease is a subject which must obviously be constantly stressed not only in schools and in the army, but also among adults generally. Prevention of disease is at least in part a matter of overcoming ignorance. The mission suggests that an effective health education be initiated to emphasize the maintenance of positive health as well as the prevention of diseases, in connection with education programs in elementary and secondary schools and adult education in the rural community improvement programs already recommended.

In this connection, the mission considers it important to establish a number of rural health units in different localities according to the recommendation of the Second Expert Committee on Public Health Administration of the World Health Organization (WHO Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 83). This could probably best be planned in connection with any community development scheme to be initiated in the country. In this case it would be

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

744 advisable to initiate a pilot demonstration unit as a part of a community center in a rural district working in close coordination with other social and economic development projects in education, agricultural extension and social welfare. Particular emphasis should be placed on preventive health work, prenatal care and child health. This unit will also serve as a training center for the rural health workers to obtain their practical knowledge and experience in rural health work. One such pilot unit is planned by the government and WHO for 1956, utilizing TA funds.

If the demonstration proves to be successful, the present village dispensaries should gradually be grouped together and expanded to become rural health units. The existing staff in the dispensaries should be sent to the pilot unit to go through a course of training to prepare them for working in the new units.

As a start the mission recommends the construction and operation of one such experimental health unit. About £S 350,000 should suffice for construction of the necessary buildings and equipment, which need not be elaborate.

Hospital Facilities[34]

743

There is unquestionably a need for many more hospitals. The principal aim in the immediate future, however, should be to build hospitals in areas which now have virtually none. For the country as a whole, there are now, in terms of the population at the beginning of 1952, 1.23 hospital beds per thousand inhabitants. The number of beds per thousand varies widely, however, from a high of 2.88 in the city and province of Damascus to 0.9 and 0.92 in the provinces of Aleppo and Homs and a low of 0.25 and 0.44 in the Jezireh and the Euphrates. Out of 44 *qadas* or counties in the country, 28 do not have any hospitals at all. A large part of the rural population is in fact denied hospital service.

An adequate program for equalizing hospital facilities would involve the provision of 3,400 beds. Over the next six years only a start can be made, by providing an additional 1,000 beds at a total cost of £S 7 million. Of this total, we suggest that 250 be allocated to the Jezireh; 300 to the Euphrates; 400 to the province of Aleppo, with perhaps 100 in the town of Jisr ech Choghour, which is likely to grow rapidly with the development of the Ghab; and 50 to Palmyra.

[34] See Annex I, p. 463.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

743 In addition it would be desirable to build some new village dispensaries, which now number 96, at a cost of about £S 350,000, and to provide a similar sum for the construction of quarantine stations and minor health facilities.

To provide an adequate staff for the recommended additional medical and health facilities, the government must plan a training program. The faculty of medicine in Damascus may have to increase the enrollment of students to provide enough doctors for the new hospitals and health units. Many nurses would be needed for the hospitals, health units and dispensaries; nursing training facilities should therefore be increased. Midwives, laboratory technicians, sanitary inspectors and other medical health auxiliary personnel would also be needed to staff the new health services. The fellowships provided by WHO and the nursing education, maternal and child health and tuberculosis demonstration and training projects assisted by WHO should therefore be coordinated and if necessary expanded to meet the need for technical personnel.

In addition to the cost of the staff training program, some funds will no doubt be needed for reconstruction and expansion of hospitals; we have included £S 1 million in the recommended program for these purposes.

743 657 A revision in the methods of planning and building new health facilities appears necessary. In the past, new hospitals have frequently been built without any consultation with the Ministry of Public Health. Decisions to build have generally been made in response to local requests relayed through the Ministry of Interior, approved by the Ministry of Finance and carried out by the Ministry of Public Works. In the future the Ministry of Public Health should be enabled to plan for the construction of new facilities in accordance with a careful appraisal of the most urgent requirements. The Ministry of Public Works might well continue to do the actual construction, but in accordance with plans approved by the Ministry of Public Health and on a basis which would enable the latter Ministry to make timely preparations for the equipment and staffing of new hospitals.

Proposed Outlays

744 657 In proposing the construction program outlined above, the mission has kept in mind the need for providing additional funds for operation and administration. After taking this into account, it is expected that expendi-

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tures on public health, including new construction, would rise from a total of £S 10.052 million budgeted for 1954 to an average of £S 12.358 million in the six-year period 1955-60. The expenditures envisaged for the entire period 1955-60 would be distributed as follows (in thousands of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Annual average
Anti-malarial campaign and dispensaries	3,100	517
Establishment of new hospitals and health units	8,350	1,392
Quarantine stations	300	50
Administration and operation of existing and new facilities including training of technical personnel	62,400	10,400
Total	74,150	12,358

III HOUSING

The postwar period has witnessed a considerable housing boom. In recent years construction has been on a scale double that of prewar years. The wartime backlog in housing, the increasing prosperity in the postwar period and the tendency toward a break-up of the larger family units have all contributed to this boom. Aside from a few houses built for civil servants, all of the construction has been private, and it has taken place without the help of a mortgage financing institution. In terms of value, probably over 80% of the new housing has been of the Western or European type, which is too costly for the vast majority of the people.

While the housing of the rural population and the lower classes in the cities is undoubtedly very bad, significant general improvement is likely to come about only as incomes and standards of living rise. It would be impractical for the government to direct substantial resources into housing for the masses which could not be supported by the present productivity of the economy. While the mission firmly believes that the state should take a greater interest in the improvement of housing, for the immediate future the government's role will have to be confined to (1) developing, through experimentation, methods of cheap and durable construction, (2) planning and assisting housing in new rural settlements, (3) constructing

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would enable poultry to make a substantial contribution to family incomes 232
in the villages.

Very recently the Bedouin shepherds have apparently acquired confidence in the sheep pox vaccine, and the mission was informed that demands for vaccination in 1954 far outstripped the capacity of the field services. Sheep pox is a disease which annually causes considerable losses, but for which an efficient vaccine is available. It would seem incumbent on the government to insure that the service has the facilities for applying vaccination to the flocks.

It is recommended that with the assistance of the district veterinary staff the laboratory carry on seasonal surveys of blood mineral levels of sheep and cattle, and helminth burdens. Young veterinary assistants or science graduates should be trained to collect the blood samples in the one case and the parasitic worms in the other. The blood mineral determination and the determination of parasitic worms would be made at the laboratory. Therapeutic and control measures based upon these findings should be applied by the district veterinary staff in consultation with the laboratory. Some strengthening of laboratory staff at the veterinary assistant level will be required if systematic studies of this nature are to be undertaken.

The increasing incidence of brucellosis and tuberculosis in dairy cattle in the suburban areas to which reference has been made in the Main Report calls for investigation by biological tests and the application of control measures. The introduction or development of more productive types of livestock inevitably brings more problems for the veterinary service; unless the service can cope with these problems and meet increased demands for assistance the improved types of stock will not survive.

Artificial breeding methods, which are likely to be employed on an increasing scale as livestock farming methods advance, should be completely controlled by the service. The method can be as efficient in spreading certain diseases as it is in distributing the sperm of superior sires; the fullest possible measure of veterinary control must be exercised to guard against this danger.

The control of abattoirs and meat inspection is performed by veteri- 232
narians and veterinary assistants in the employ of the municipal authorities 744
of such cities as Damascus and Aleppo. The municipal abattoir of Damascus is about 130 years old and is now almost enclosed by the town. It is

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231 desirable that a modern abattoir be built in a more suitable location; the present problem of drainage disposal would alone warrant this measure. There should be no difficulty about the provision of capital for such a project, since the municipal authority can recoup its expenditures by the collection of fees.

232. The present budget of £S 188,000[8] for personnel and equipment bears no relation to the value of Syrian livestock or to preventable losses. For more effective disease control the mission has recommended that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available during the next six years.

242 IX EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

Education

Elementary agricultural education. Since 1949 the rural elementary schools have devoted the two final years (fourth and fifth grades) to theoretical and practical instruction in agriculture and hygiene. At present 111 offering this type of instruction, each with a field of five *donums*[9] for practical field training, are distributed through *mohafazats* as follows:

Damascus	37	Dera'a	13
Aleppo	9	Soueida	11
Latakia	11	Deir ez Zor	9
Hama	5	Hassetche	5
Homs	11		

The pupils (9,000 in 1954) learn the basic principles and techniques of agriculture, practicing them in the school gardens.

Clearly this number of schools cannot provide basic rural education for all the children of Syria's 5,500 villages. Apart from the need to build more schools and enlarge existing ones, a way must be found to train additional agricultural teachers; the teacher training and secondary agricultural schools in Dera'a and Kharabo do not turn out sufficient numbers.

The mission therefore makes the following recommendations:

[8] £S 50,000 for laborers at the Damascus veterinary research center and in the provinces; £S 40,000 for purchase of animals and feed; £S 98,000 for technical requirements (£S 20,000 for the Damascus laboratory; £S 58,000 for the preparation of vaccines and biologics material; and £S 20,000 for medicines in respect of the treatment of parasitical diseases).

[9] A donum = 0.1 hectare.

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or secondary education can be built. An expenditure of £S 3 million a 658
year would permit construction of 500 classrooms a year or about 100 new 871
schools, without auditorium and other facilities which can be built later. At such a rate, the country's estimated future requirement of about 4,000 schools (assuming that there are already 1,000) would be fulfilled in about 30 years. Meanwhile a considerable number of schools will undoubtedly have to continue in rented buildings.

The opening of new schools will have to be carefully planned in the light of the geographic distribution of existing facilities, conditions of overcrowding, the demand for schooling as influenced by economic factors, the distance of school-age children from existing schools and the availability of teachers. Now that a considerable portion of school-age children are in fact going to school, the location of new schools must be given more thought in order to ensure that they will meet a real need.

Thought should be given to standardization of desks and equipment and for their manufacture in Syria. There are also future possibilities for local production of some other items now imported, such as slides, maps, etc.

Finally, we recommend a reorganization of the Ministry of Education. In addition to a branch of general services with sections for planning, building, inspection, etc., there may be merit in creating five other branches, to correspond to the five major aspects of the educational program: primary education, secondary education, vocational education, fundamental education and higher education.

III PUBLIC HEALTH

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Hospitals and Dispensaries

The country's 24 public and 37 private hospitals have, as of the end of 1954, a total of 4,094 beds. This means only 1.19 beds[8] for over 1,000 inhabitants, as compared with 5 per 1,000 in England, the U. S. and New Zealand or the 15 per 1,000 which some authorities consider optimum for a really healthy population. Only 1,880 of the beds, or 0.56 per 1,000 inhabitants, are in general public hospitals.

[8] In this and subsequent comparisons the number of beds per 1,000 inhabitants has been calculated on the basis of the 1952 population.

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944 943 Worse than the low ratio of beds to population is their distribution. Syria is divided into 44 *qadas*, or administrative areas, the average population of which is 75,000. Twenty-eight of these have no hospitals, public or private, whereas others have as many as 4.35 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. The distribution of beds in general governmental hospitals alone is no better: 29 qadas have none at all, but in Damascus and the Hauran center the ratio is 1.67 beds per thousand inhabitants.

Some people, especially in the eastern parts of the country, are as much as 250 kilometers from the nearest hospital. Even by private automobile it would take them at least a day to reach it, and then there would be no assurance of a vacant bed. Among those who must rely on camels or donkeys, as in the rural areas, many people are at least five days' travel time from a hospital. Since a hospital is supposed to serve a population living no more than one hour away, as a practical matter a great many of the people may be said to have no access to a hospital. Thus in the two large provinces in northeastern Syria, the Jezireh and Euphrates, there is only one small public hospital at Hassetche and another at Deir ez Zor.

The inadequacy of the hospitals, especially the general ones for the most part government-owned, which serve the poorest people, is shown by the ratio between number of patients and the population of the provinces. The country-wide average for 1951 and 1952 was 8.8 patients per thousand inhabitants of each province but the proportion ranges from 18.3 for Damascus to 2.2 in the Euphrates. Recent figures for France and the United States indicate that 40-80 persons per thousand are cared for at hospitals.

Another significant factor in many of the hospitals is the small number of patients attended in relation to beds available. In the Euphrates province, for example, there were 6.8 patients per bed compared to 24.6 and 22.6 for the Damascus and Homs provinces, respectively, and a country-wide average of 15.5. If the Damascus bed-patient ratio were country-wide, the 1,880 beds in general government hospitals could serve 46,000 people annually instead of only about 29,000, thus achieving a 58% increase in service with no increase in beds. Where there is both a low ratio of hospital beds to population and a low ratio of patients to beds, as in the Euphrates province, this condition is presumably due not only to the fact that existing hospital facilities are inaccessible to most of the population, but perhaps also to the poor service provided by the hospitals.

Syria has 96 governmental dispensaries or about three per 100,000

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inhabitants.[6] Here again there is unequal distribution, ranging from 5.1 per 100,000 in the Hauran area and 3.6 in Damascus down to 2.0 in the Euphrates province. Present-day standards call for one rural hospital for every 20,000 inhabitants, yet here many areas which should, by that standard, have a hospital, lack even a dispensary.

The average number of visits at dispensaries is 202 for every thousand persons, varying from 372 in the Hauran and 363 in Damascus down to 60 in the Euphrates. Since the dispensaries operate for the most part in areas without doctors, the figures must be taken to include calls which in other circumstances would be made on private doctors. There are about 7,000 visits per year at each dispensary, or an average of 23 visits per working day.

Medical Staff

In all, the country has 880 doctors including 76 foreigners. Thus there is one doctor for every 3,800 persons. In this respect Syria's standing compared with other countries is not strikingly low. The United States, Europe and the USSR have one doctor for every 1,200 persons; Latin America, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have one for every 1,700. But Asia (excluding the USSR and Japan) and Africa (without South Africa) have only one doctor to 12,000 persons and Iraq has one per 7,000.

Yet while Syria may not be handicapped by an actual lack of doctors, their distribution over the country is as unbalanced as that of the hospital and dispensary facilities. There are some areas with populations of 25,000, without a single doctor. As for trained nurses, midwives and other auxiliary personnel, these are in fact scarcer than doctors and constitute a problem of major importance.

The mission's proposed program, as outlined in the Main Report, would place greater stress on the prevention of disease than in the past.

It is difficult to estimate the possible cost of a full disease-prevention program; it might mean an expenditure of £S 2 per person per year or £S 7 million annually, not including the large expenditures for water supply, drainage, sewerage and other major works. Obviously a program of this magnitude cannot be recommended for Syria in the near future. A

[6] In the provinces of Damascus and Homs three touring doctors provide the same type of services at the dispensaries.

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944 more realistic minimum program would call for improvement of the water supply, vaccination against tuberculosis and anti-malaria measures.

The first step in assuring a supply of pure water at minimum cost is a survey of present and potential sources. Thereafter there should be measures for the purification of supplies, storage, transportation of pure water to the settlements, distribution to the settlements and to individual properties, and finally the provision of piped water to every building. But for many Syrian communities the construction of a network to bring water to every property is not the best way to begin, since it slows the rate at which water can be provided to new consumers. The program at first might better be confined to the survey and exploitation of new sources, storage and transportation to settlements, and distribution to key points in the settlements; only thereafter should the next steps be taken in the larger settlements.

Disease-carrying mosquitoes can be combatted either by eliminating their breeding places or by a continuous spraying program. By itself the first is too costly and would take many years, although we recommend elimination of breeding grounds in connection with the irrigation and drainage projects. By spraying, however, it has been demonstrated in many countries that the incidence of malaria can be reduced by more than 95% at a yearly cost of no more than $0.25 per capita. In Syria such a program may cost $0.35 or £S 1.25 per person protected, which means about £S 810,000 annually on the assumption that 650,000 persons must be protected. Greece has effected a saving of $1 million annually in quinine alone. An equally successful program in Syria would mean a very substantial annual saving and this would be but a fraction of the economic gains from the increased labor productivity through freedom from disease.

943 *Additional Hospital Facilities*

Any ambitious hospital building program would overtax the financial resources of the country and the available medical and auxiliary staff. Even a program to build hospitals in areas now without them and to add beds to existing hospitals in such a way as to bring them up to the population-bed ratio of Damascus would cost about £S 24 million and probably result in acute operating difficulties. We have therefore suggested that only about 1,000 beds be added to meet the most urgent requirements. The suggested distribution—250 for the Jezireh, 300 for the Euphrates, 400 for

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the province of Aleppo, and 50 for Palmyra—should be considered tentative. The new facilities should be so distributed as to make them accessible to the population which is in practice not now served by existing facilities. The location of new hospitals in the geographically extensive provinces of the Jezireh and Euphrates must be considered very carefully. Kamichliye should manifestly have a hospital, and other small hospitals might be located in both the eastern and western portions of the Jezireh. In the Euphrates province the needs of Raqqa and Abou Kemal should be considered. In the province of Aleppo a hospital will presumably be needed in Jisr ech Choghour, which will be the center of a rapidly developing region. In the location of all new hospitals the ability to provide staff must be a governing consideration.

Cost of the Six-Year Program

The mission's estimates of the cost of the various parts of the six-year public health program are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Proposed Six-Year Program for Public Health, 1955–60

(*Thousand £S*)

Projects	Total	Annual average
Anti-malaria	2,750	460
Water supply	*	—
Dispensaries	350	58
Total for preventive medicine	3,100	518
Alteration of existing hospitals	1,000	167
1,000 more beds	7,000	1,165
Health centers	350	58
Total for curative medicine	8,350	1,390
Minor health facilities	300	50
TOTAL PROGRAM	11,750	1,960
Total investment	10,250	1,710
Operation of new program	1,500	250
General administrative and operating expenditures, including training	62,400	10,400
TOTAL OPERATION	63,900	10,650
TOTAL OF EXPENDITURES	74,150	12,360

* The amounts necessary for pure water supply are included in the expenditures for the over-all water supply program.

up to 4,000 feet elevation, in sunlit pools in 136
dried stream beds and in irrigation canals and seepages. Except at the higher altitudes, it is abundant from May to October, with peaks of activity between July and September. *A. sacharovi* is also a primary vector in many areas, breeding in swamps, irrigation canals and seepages, neglected water tanks and numerous other artificial collections of water. It is one of the principal vector species on the oasis of Damascus, where the miles of irrigation canals and numerous swampy depressions create favorable conditions for breeding. It is found breeding from March to November, but most prolifically in June and July. *A. claviger* is chiefly restricted to the towns and the surrounding villages, where it breeds in wells, cisterns and seepages, often even during the winter months. With *A. sacharovi*, [164]
it is responsible for the transmission of most of the malaria in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo. *A. sergenti* is a significant vector in the rice-growing areas in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. *A. pulcherrimus* is also plentiful in the river basins of the northeastern provinces, and is regarded primarily as a pest.

Two species of *Aedes* are known to be 136
present—*Aedes aegypti* and *A. mariae*. 164
A. aegypti is widespread in the western provinces, where it is the vector of dengue fever. Numerous species of *Culex* have been identified, but all are pests of no recognized medical importance.

Mosquito control work is carried on by 744
the antimalaria service of the Ministry of Health, and in the cities of Damascus and Aleppo by the municipal authorities. Larvicidal measures, using DDT or oil sprays, are undertaken in the cities and the larger towns; however, residual spraying, with DDT preparations or Gammexane, is the usual means of control in the rural villages. A mosquito control program, based upon the residual spraying of dwellings and other buildings, was initiated in the villages around Damascus in 1949, and in the Hauran region in 1950, by the Ministry, in

144 co-operation with the Near East Foundation and other agencies. Similar operations have also been conducted by the Ministry in the town of Latakia and in the administrative center and the adjacent farms in the Jebel ed Druz area. In 1950, the government program covered a total of 224 villages, with an aggregate population of slightly over 180,000. A shortage of DDT necessitated the curtailment of the program in 1951, but the Ministry proposes to expand its activities to other malarious districts throughout the country as rapidly as possible. A demonstration control program was started in 1952 in the vicinity of Homs under the auspices of the World Health Organization. Anopheline control measures are carried on by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in and around the refugee camps situated in malarious regions.

126 164 FLIES. Flies of the family MUSCIDAE are numerous, including *Musca domestica vicina*, *M. tempestiva*, *M. sorbens*, *M. vitripennis* and *Muscina stabulans*. They are abundant around markets, food shops and dwellings, and are undoubtedly implicated in the spread of intestinal infections. The stable fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, is prevalent. The myiasis-producing flies, *Chrysomyia albiceps*, *Calliphora erythrocephala*, *Oestris ovis*, *Lucilia sericata*, *Gasterophilus haemorrhoidalis*, *Wohlfahrtia magnifica* and species of *Sarcophaga* are known to be present, and are probably responsible for occasional cases of infection in man.

At least 6 species of sandflies are found in Syria. *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti* are involved in the transmission of cutaneous leishmaniasis, which is endemic in many parts of the country, particularly in the vicinity of Aleppo. *P. chinensis* and *P. major* occur and are potential vectors of visceral leishmaniasis, although the extent of indigenous infection is uncertain. *P. papatasii* is also the vector of sandfly fever, which is sporadic in this region.

144 136 571 A fly-control campaign was inaugurated in Damascus in 1946. The dwellings in the poorer sections of the city and the tanneries,

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744 the refuse dumps and other breeding sites
136 are sprayed with DDT preparations at in-
571 tervals between May and October.

136 Lice. Infestation with lice is common
571 among the inhabitants in the congested
361 quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

136 Fleas. Numerous species of fleas para-
164 sitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The sticktight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

136 Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

136 Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks,
232 including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and
164 several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

136 The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventri-*
164 *cosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of
752 scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings
[135] are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

136 The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

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Reptiles. Venomous snakes are not common, but at least 4 species of vipers are known to be present. The carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, exists only in the north, while *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, *V. lebetina xanthina* and *V. palaestina* are reported from many parts of the country. 126

Rodents. Rats and mice are numerous. The usual domestic rats are *Rattus rattus rattus* or *R. rattus alexandrinus*. *R. norvegicus* sometimes invades the port towns of Latakia.

Mollusks.* The fresh-water snail, *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), inhabits some of the tributaries of the Belikh and the Khabour rivers, near the Turkish border. It is the intermediate host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, which is reported from several foci in that region. 136 164

Plants. Various trees, weeds and grasses are capable of inducing allergic manifestations in susceptible individuals, but no precise information is available. 137 152

The broad bean, *Vicia fava*, which is grown extensively as a food, may be toxic to young children when it is eaten raw. A few deaths are observed each year, among children in both urban and rural communities. Occasional cases of lathyrism occur when the "Indian pea," *Lathyrus sativus*, a plant widely cultivated for fodder, is used for human consumption. [135]

Food Sanitation

Municipal regulations govern the sanitation of the food supplies in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Latakia. Restaurants, markets and other premises where food is sold are inspected at regular intervals by the municipal sanitary officers, and food handlers are required to register for examination at 6-month intervals. Municipal slaughterhouses are established in towns with populations of 20,000 and over, and are operated under the supervision of the health authorities. The meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter by veterinary officers of the Min- 744

* See footnote, page 10.

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istry of Agriculture, and all meats offered 744
for sale must carry an official stamp of
approval. Few controls exist over the pro- 744
duction of milk, however, except in some 234
of the larger cities. Cow's or goat's milk is
normally sold in bulk and peddled in don-
key carts. Herds of goats are frequently
driven through the streets, the animals
being milked while the customer waits. The
dairies and the herds which supply milk to
the cities of Damascus and Aleppo are sub-
ject to inspection by the municipal veteri-
narians. Samples collected from restaurants
and other food establishments may also be
submitted to the food control laboratories
of the Ministry of Health for bacteriologic
examination. There are no modern facilities
for pasteurization. A few dealers in Da-
mascus retail bottled milk which has been
pasteurized by submersion in boiling water
baths. Little milk is consumed raw, since [252]
boiling is the general practice, but butter
and cheese are frequent sources of infection.
Brucellosis is enzootic among both goats
and cattle, tuberculosis among the cattle.

HEALTH SERVICES AND MEDICAL FACILITIES

Health Organizations

The present health organization of the 744
Syrian government has evolved since 1943,
when the republic was established. The
health and the medical services are admin-
istered by the Ministry of Health (and
Public Assistance), with headquarters in
Damascus. Executive authority resides in
the Minister, who is advised on matters of
policy by a Supreme Public Health Council.
He is assisted by a Director General of
Health, who, in turn, is advised by a Public
Health Consultation Council made up of
experts in representative technical fields.
The functions of the Ministry are dis-
charged through 7 constituent departments
—public health affairs, public health labo-
ratories, hospitals and clinics, inspections,
pharmaceutical affairs, supplies and admin-
istration and records.

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744 The Department of Public Health Affairs has divisions dealing with the control of communicable diseases, endemic diseases, maternal and child health, community health education, nutritional problems and rural health. A subordinate branch concerned with the control of tuberculosis is
743 included under communicable diseases. Responsibility for the maintenance of hospitals and other medical care facilities, in both urban and rural areas, is centralized in the Department of Hospitals and Clinics, while the over-all supervision of government institutions is delegated to the Department of Inspections. The Department of Public Health Laboratories operates diagnostic, biologic and rabies control units. The activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces, are conducted by provincial health departments.

744 Health organizations which function under the municipal authorities, independently of the Ministry, exist in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. They are concerned primarily with the enforcement of sanitary measures and the control of communicable diseases, and do not support hospital or dispensary services.

Medical officers under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior are stationed in each of the municipalities, and furnish medical care to certain indigent population groups. The Ministry of Health co-operates in the provision of technical services when needed. The veterinary division of the Ministry of Agriculture maintains services for the inspection of meat and milk supplies in conjunction with the municipal health departments. The Ministry of National Economy supervises the health conditions in industry, and passes upon compensation regulations. The Department of Statistics in this Ministry is responsible for the compilation and the publication of vital and other statistics. The Ministry of Education sponsors an annual preregistration health examination of schoolchildren, and plans to organize a school health program in Damascus in the near future.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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747 The Red Crescent Society carries on a campaign against tuberculosis throughout the country, and operates a tuberculosis dispensary in Damascus. The Goutte de Lait Society of Damascus supports infant welfare services in association with the government's maternal and child health center.

The Near East Foundation initiated a comprehensive rural demonstration program in villages near Damascus in 1946, in conjunction with the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health. In addition to activities for the improvement of agriculture, it operates 5 child health centers, each serving 10 to 20 villages. Courses are conducted at the largest center for the training of local village midwives in improved technics of midwifery. When the program was expanded in 1951, the Foundation planned for the development of co-ordinated maternity and child health services, including well-child clinics and home visiting, in the village centers and the organization of a special course for the training of rural sanitarians. Since 1949, it has participated with the government health authorities and the successive agencies working for the relief of the Palestinian refugees in a malaria control program, based on residual spraying with DDT preparations, or Gammexane, in villages in the Damascus region. In 1950, it co-operated with the Ministry and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company in residual spraying operations in villages and refugee camps around Der'a, in Hauran *muhafazat*.

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Hospitals and related health work are conducted by various mission societies in Damascus, Aleppo and Deir ez Zor. Health and medical care services are also provided by the larger industries for the benefit of their employees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency carries on public health and medical programs in the refugee centers in southern and western Syria.

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Medical Institutions

743 **Hospitals and Dispensaries.** In 1951,

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of the babies treated at the maternity and 164
child health center in Damascus suffer from
intestinal infections. Epidemics of diarrheal 164
disease often coincide with the ripening of 262
the apricot crop. The ready contamination
of this thin-skinned fruit by flies and other
insects accounts for the local designation
of the early summer diarrheas in the fruit-
growing districts as *mish mish* (apricot)
disease.

Cholera. Serious outbreaks have accom- 164
panied the introduction of cholera in the
past, but the disease was absent from Syria
from 1928 to 1947, shortly after the epi-
demic in Egypt. On December 19, 1947,
cholera was reported from 2 adjacent vil-
lages in the province of Hauran, on the
road from Palestine to Damascus. At the
same time, cases occurred in 3 villages in
the irrigated plain of the Al Ghouta, within
3 or 4 miles of Damascus. Although 45
cases, with 18 deaths, were reported offi-
cially, it was generally believed that the
actual incidence totaled at least 77 cases.

Quarantine measures were promptly im- 744
posed in Hauran and Damascus provinces, 164
and all persons entering or leaving those 648
regions were required to possess certificates 747
of immunization against cholera. Over one
and one half million individuals were inocu-
lated with cholera vaccine in the vicinity of
Damascus, as well as in the affected dis-
tricts of Hauran and in the city of Aleppo.
Supplies and assistance were furnished the
Ministry of Health by the World Health
Organization, the Near East Foundation
and the Egyptian and Lebanese govern-
ments. Vaccine was also provided jointly
by the Arabian American Oil Company and
Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. No cases
were reported after the initial outbreaks,
and on January 17, 1948, Syria was declared
free from the disease. The exact origin of
the epidemic was never definitely estab-
lished.

Helminthiases. ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Hook- 164
worm infection, caused by *Ancylostoma* 463
duodenale, is prevalent among the agricul- 369
tural workers in foci along the banks of the

164 the Qoubour el Bid section of the Al Jazira, along branches of the Khabour River north-
136 east of Hassetché. *Schistosoma haemato-*
164 *bium* is the only species identified in confirmed cases, but rectal complications are sometimes recorded. At present, the disease is confined to circumscribed foci, but in view of the irrigation and the agricultural potentialities of the region, its control is of
164 major public health significance. The foci
361 are apparently of recent origin. Whether the
167 infection was introduced by Senegalese
744 troops stationed in the vicinity, as claimed by the local inhabitants, or by nomadic tribes from Iraq is a matter of conjecture. Surveys have been made within recent years, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and co-operating international organizations, and, although some discrepancies are evident in the determination of the infection rates in different villages, all emphasize the seriousness of the problem. Competent local authorities estimated in 1951 that the total incidence in that year approximated 12,000 cases.

659 In surveys undertaken in 1948,[24] the ex-
164 amination of urine samples collected from 545 persons in Qoubour el Bid and neighboring villages on the Gerahi branch of the Khabour River indicated general infection rates of about 62 per cent. They averaged 73 per cent among the men and the boys, and 49 per cent among the women and the girls. Moreover, they were consistently higher, in both sexes, in individuals under 20 years than in the older age groups.
[361] Equally high infection rates were found among the seminomadic peoples in the Tell Abiad area. A system of spot checking suggested probable infection rates of almost 100 per cent among males and of 60 per cent among females in 3 of the 5 villages visited.

164 A more exhaustive investigation in 1950[45]
659 revealed the presence of infection among
361 about 24 per cent of the inhabitants of 58 villages situated along 4 tributary streams in the Qoubour el Bid area. The infection rates ranged from 1 to 88 per cent: the most

highly infected villages were situated on the Gerahi and the Soublakh wadies. Similar surveys in 9 villages in the Tell Abiad area showed an average infection rate of 77 per cent, with the greatest prevalence in the villages on the Tell Abiad and the Slouq branches of the Belikh. Infection is apparently acquired early in life through swimming, washing or other contact with streams inhabited by infected snails. The intermediate host, *Bulinus truncatus*, has been collected from several localities. 164 659 361 164 312 136

Two mobile treatment teams were operated by the Ministry of Health in the infected areas in 1951. Plans for the inauguration of a snail eradication program were also under consideration. 744 164

Other Helminth Infections. Infection with one or more varieties of intestinal worms is prevalent in all parts of the country. The insanitary habits of the people and the frequent use of night soil as fertilizer promote the spread of the different species. Ascariasis is widely distributed. Infection rates ranging from 30 to 86 per cent have been demonstrated in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama, as well as in the surrounding villages. The infection is most prominent among the children, in both urban and rural areas. Trichuriasis is also widespread, but enterobiasis and strongyloidiasis tend to be sporadic. 164 515 241 164 361

Taeniasis is common. The beef tapeworm, *Taenia saginata*, is enzootic among the cattle, and the popularity of raw, or underdone, meat in certain national dishes is responsible for considerable human infection. The pork tapeworm, *T. solium*, is sometimes encountered among the Christian communities. Occasional infections with the dwarf tapeworm, *Hymenolepis nana*, are observed in most districts. 164 252

Hydatid disease is not unusual. *Echinococcus granulosus* is enzootic among dogs, sheep, goats, cattle and camels. In studies reported in 1936,[40] cysts were detected in 25 to 30 per cent of the sheep and the goats examined in slaughterhouses in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Infection was uni- 252 164

761 Comparative rates in urban and rural com-
369 munities were determined in a series of tests
164 on unorganized groups in the city and two adjacent farming districts. In Damascus, positive reactions to tuberculin were given by 47.7 of the boys and 40.8 per cent of the girls tested at 15 years of age. At 20 to 25 years of age, positive reactions were obtained in 86.7 per cent and 77.4 per cent, respectively; at 40 to 45 years of age, in 95.6 and 86.6 per cent, respectively. In the rural communities the positive reaction rates were consistently lower, but approached the urban levels in the older age groups. Among individuals at 15 years of age, 51.6 per cent of the boys and 27.2 per cent of the girls reacted to tuberculin in one area, and 18.1 per cent of the boys and 21.2 per cent of the girls, in another. At 40 to 45 years of age, the proportion of positive reactors averaged 80 per cent in the first series and 50 to 100 per cent in the second.[48]

744 Within recent years the Ministry of
751 Health has embarked upon a tuberculosis
747 control program. In January, 1950, a tuberculin testing and BCG inoculation campaign was organized under the auspices of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and associated organizations, which was taken over by the Ministry
659 in September. Surveys have been carried
361 out in most of the provincial capitals and
751 surrounding rural districts, and the Ministry contemplates the gradual extension of the campaign to cover the populations in all parts of the country. In the course of the investigations completed in 7 provinces between January and September, 1950, almost 417,000 persons were tuberculin tested, and over 188,000 were inoculated with BCG vaccine. The majority were schoolchildren, although miscellaneous population groups of all ages were also included. The proportion of positive reactors in the different provinces ranged from 23 per cent in Jebel ed Druz (As Suwaydah) to 42 per cent in Aleppo.

758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
743

152 164 of rabid dogs, but wolves, hyenas, jackals, rats and other animals are sometimes implicated. Prophylactic treatment is provided by the Ministry, and a special division for the preparation of antirabic vaccines is incorporated in the central laboratory in Damascus. From 140 to 250 persons were treated annually in the 4 years 1948-51.

164 232 Other Infections. Tetanus is endemic, and occasional cases are observed. Anthrax is enzootic among the sheep, and human infections sometimes occur in the agricultural areas. Sporadic cases of Weil's disease are reported.

Diseases Spread by Arthropods

164 Malaria. Malaria is a disease of major public health and economic importance, since it is endemic or hyperendemic in all populous sections of the country. The prevalence of the disease is directly related not only to the physical geography of the different regions, but to the degree and the type of cultivation. The most seriously affected foci are the plains around Damascus and Aleppo, the Orontes valley from Hama to the Turkish frontier, the irrigated zones bordering the Belikh and the Khabour rivers and their tributaries, and the swampy districts of Hauran province. Universally high infection rates are experienced during epidemic years, even in areas of low endemicity.

659 164 744 No large-scale surveys have been attempted, but accumulated studies provide rough estimates of the extent of infection in [illegible] areas. Prior to the development of a program for the control of malaria by the Ministry of Health and the Near East Foundation in 1949-50, the spleen index among children under 10 years of age in the villages around Damascus ranged from 40 to 80 per cent, with the highest rates in villages on the periphery of the Outaybeh swamps in the eastern part of the oasis. In the vicinity of Homs, the spleen rates normally average 50 to 70 per cent.

659 747 In the course of joint surveys made by the malariologists of the United Nations

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 659
Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour 747
and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8, 9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged 164
about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh 361
valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the 164
malaria problem has been aggravated by the 241
introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages.

The malaria season extends from April 161
to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plas-* 164
modium vivax and *P. falciparum* infections 136
varies according to the season and from place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general, *P. vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered.

Malaria control measures are undertaken 164
by the municipal authorities in Damascus, 744
Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten-

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Distribution of Malaria in Syria

sive work has been carried on, in co-operation with the Near East Foundation, in the agricultural districts around Damascus where 224 villages with over 180,000 inhabitants were protected in 1949-50. A marked reduction in the number of cases has been noted in all the areas treated. Successive examinations of over 500 children in 16 treated villages near Damascus revealed a decrease in spleen rates of from 78 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1951.[8] A malaria control program was inaugurated in the Homs district in 1952, under the auspices of the World Health Organization. *Anopheles sacharovi* and *A. claviger* are the principal vectors in the Damascus region; *A. sacharovi* and *A. superpictus*, in the river valleys in the northeast. 744 747 136

Rickettsial Infections. Localized outbreaks of louse-borne typhus are recurrent during the winter and the spring months, particularly in the congested quarters of the towns and the cities and among the nomadic tribes. Over 1,900 cases were reported in 1942, when the acute shortages associated with the war created conditions conducive to the spread of the infection. Since that date no more than 30 to 95 sporadic cases have been recorded in any one year. Control measures, including deverminization procedures and the immunization of the exposed populations, are enforced by the health authorities in affected areas. 146 362 361 744 757

No differentiation is made in the official 164

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SILICOSIS AND BENIGN PNEUMOCONIOSIS ARE among the most important occupational diseases, but recognized cases are relatively few in number. 164 463

The smoking of *Cannabis indica* (hashish) and other types of drug addiction were formerly common. Within recent years they have been combated with some success by restrictive regulations and educational propaganda. 164 733 656 208

SUMMARY

Modern Syria, an independent republic since 1943, encompasses three of the former Levant states—Syria, Latakia and Jebel ed Druz. It has a population of slightly less than 3.2 million which is predominantly Moslem and Arab, but which includes several important religious and racial minority groups. Over three quarters of the inhabitants live in the western and the northwestern provinces which form the western arm of the so-called "Fertile Crescent." 642 161 162

The Ministry of Health (and Public Assistance), with headquarters in Damascus, is responsible for the health and the medical care of the population. Subordinate provincial health departments carry on the activities of the Ministry in each of the 9 *muhafazats*, or provinces. Autonomous municipal organizations function in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. A limited number of philanthropic, mission and international agencies carry on health services in close co-operation with the Ministry. In 1951 there were 47 hospitals in Syria, with an aggregate capacity of 2,255 beds—approximately 0.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Of this number, 22 hospitals, with 1,525 beds, were supported by the government, and the remainder by private organizations. In the same year, the Ministry maintained 111 clinics and dispensaries scattered throughout the country, including 3 maternity and child welfare centers, 7 mobile dispensaries and 6 mobile units for the treatment of specific diseases. 744 743

Water supplies are usually deficient, ex- 512

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mainly Christian) those run by foreigners are now finding it difficult to disarm the suspicions of the Government. In Lebanon, there are almost as many private as state schools and the foreign schools still work without difficulty. There are higher schools for teachers and for agriculture and engineering in Syria and for agriculture in Lebanon, but it is usual for a student to pass from a secondary school directly to a university. The following table shows the various types of schools and number of students.

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Type	Lebanon, 1951		Syria, 1951–2	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
State:				
Primary	977	83,252	1,850	237,775
Secondary	..	..	57	26,237
Technical	30	2,381	11	2,146
Teachers	2	165	10	1,233
Reformatory	1	106	—	—
Private	601	84,788	387	65,936
Foreign	149	41,402	56	9,852
Total:	1,760	212,094	2,371	343,179

.. = not available.

(Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus, 1952; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1953).

The American University of Beirut is non-sectarian and has students from all over the Middle East. It encourages the use of Arabic as well as English, and its most renowned faculties are those of medicine and social sciences. The University of St Joseph in Beirut is run by the Society of Jesus. Attached to this university are schools of medicine, law, and theology, subsidized by the French Government and administered by the Society, in which teaching is carried on in the French language. A National University has recently been started by the Lebanese Government. The Syrian National University in Damascus teaches in Arabic and its most important faculties are those of law and medicine. A separate body for the study of the Arabic language is the Arab Academy of Damascus.

Health

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Malaria and amoebic dysentery are endemic and, though efforts are being made to drain breeding-grounds, preventive medicine is only in a rudimentary stage. Good hospitals exist in the cities and more are under construction; qualified doctors practise in all the towns, but in the villages there is still a lack

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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of clinics and in the cities a shortage of qualified staff to undertake massage, radiotherapy, and orthopædics, and there is special need to combat tuberculosis. Syrians and Lebanese are not addicted to hashish which, however, is grown in the Biqaa and smuggled to Egypt. The Lebanese Government periodically burns many of the plantations, which inflates the price of the surviving crop.

S L 433

Economic Survey

More than half the population of the two countries is engaged in agriculture which is the most important economic activity. Natural resources hardly exist; there is bitumen in Jebel Bishri in Syria but its production would not be economic; about 10,000 tons a year of asphalt is produced from the neighbourhood of Latakia; and salt is extracted in commercial quantities near Aleppo.

S L 315 382

Petroleum

For a number of years, associates of IPC searched for oil in Syria and Lebanon but without finding it in commercial quantities; in consequence, the areas held by these IPC associates have been given up. However, the two Governments are still anxious for further efforts to be made to find oil in commercial quantities. The importance of petroleum in the economy of Syria and Lebanon lies in the situation of the two republics athwart the pipelines from the fields of northern Iraq and Saudi Arabia which have outlets on the Mediterranean.[1] From Iraq a 12-inch and 16-inch line carry oil across Syria by way of Palmyra and Homs to Tripoli in the Lebanon. Together, these two lines can carry about 8 million tons of oil a year (160,000 barrels daily). A third IPC line from Kirkuk to Homs then bears north of the other two and reaches the sea at Banias, and so does not run through Lebanon at all. This new line is 26–30–32-inches in diameter and can deliver oil at about 16 million tons a year (320,000 barrels daily). From the fields of Saudi Arabia a 30–31 inch American pipeline (Tapline) travels over 1,000 miles on its way to Sidon in Lebanon, passing through Jordan and Syria. At present the line is pumping at a rate of about 15 million tons a year (300,000 barrels daily). It should be noted that these four lines all carry crude oil, some of which is refined on the Mediterranean shore for local requirements but the bulk is shipped as crude to the refineries of Europe and elsewhere.

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The line from Kirkuk to Haifa is not operating and the Haiaf

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 570 below.

25: Wardner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

484 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultivation. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by
409 the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
● 744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie, on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The
427 total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

i [The estate of Misherfe, near Homs -- Analyst]

ill-considered plans and avoid abrupt changes". A separate section in the Labour and Social Affairs Department of the Ministry of National Economy will run and supervise the centres, introduce local industries, study local conditions and implement a programme to raise the standard of living and promote local welfare. The Department will be assisted by an Advisory Committee comprising representatives from all agencies interested. Three bodies participate in the conduct of each model centre: one will consist of the staff members of the centre; the second the advisors to the staff members and the representatives of local administrative authorities; the third will be not one single committee but five committees of local residents, each to be responsible for a particular aspect of the centre. All will work under the supervision of the staff. The Decree defines the several units to be constituted for each centre and their respective responsibilities. 649 657 185

65. It is intended that when the Government has established a model centre in each province, the example will be followed in other districts by villagers who (as in the Egyptian prototype) will contribute to and share with the Government the expenses of maintaining a sufficient number of centres to cover the whole country.

66. The scheme which was inspired by the Cairo Seminar of 1950 had, we were informed, been discussed and agreed with other Ministries concerned and tentative arrangements had been made with the University authorities for their co-operation in providing the necessary personnel for the centres. Unfortunately, however, the project-law had not received the approval of the Ministers and Dr. Joukhadar gave no indication of any date for its operation. 242 185 474

67. On the introduction of Mr. Carroll Dejoe, FAO representative in Syria, members of the mission had the opportunity of meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture Mr. Akram Bakabi, the newly-appointed Secretary-General, who gave an account of agricultural extension work in Syria and of the development of agricultural co-operatives in the country. He foreshadowed a possible eventual use of the profits of these societies for community welfare purposes, but the movement is in its infancy.

68. Thanks also to the courtesy of Mr. Dejoe, the mission was put in touch with the local representatives of the Near East Foundation. In the absence in Beirut of the Programme Director, Mr. Ryer, his Deputy (Mr. Khoury) gave us the statement of the work of the Foundation in Syria which had been prepared for the recent Damascus Seminar which we had hoped to attend. Mr. Khoury accompanied us on his visit to Mashabeyeh one of the four villages in which the Foundation operates demonstration centres in agriculture and sanitation and in home-making, respectively. Mr. Sivaswamy has prepared a detailed account (Appendix V) of his impressions of the work done at Mashabeyeh. 242 185 744

69. The centre has been in existence one year. Its premises are in adobe houses such as are to be found in many villages in these parts. They have been simply adapted for their present purposes and the standard of cleanliness was pleasantly surprising. The staff consists of: (1) a sanitary inspector who looks after general sanitation, including mosquito control by insecticides and by drainage. (He makes a point of talking to the village people about water supply, latrines, etc.); (2) a nurse-midwife, whose duties are: ante- and post-natal care, examination of pregnant women, education of local midwives, regular supervision of the infants in the village. (There is no maternity clinic; the women are delivered in their homes); (3) a doctor, paid by the Foundation, who visits the centre once a week.

62: I. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 MI Middle East
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worker who dies. Indemnities are paid in instalments on terms laid down by arbitration boards with reference to the status of the employee and employer.

Family Allowances

Legislative Decree No. 29 of 12 May 1943 requires each industrial and commercial employer in Lebanon to pay a family allowance to all family heads whom he employs. The amount of the allowance increases with the number of dependants. It rises from £L. 10 monthly for one child up to £L. 35 for five or more children; £L. 10 are also payable in respect of a wife living at home.

Saudi Arabia

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There is no available information indicating the existence of social security legislation in Saudi Arabia.

Syria

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The Syrian Labour Code in Act No. 279 of 11 June 1946 establishes the liability of each employer to pay compensation in the event of employment injury, non-occupational sickness, confinement or dismissal.

Employment Injury

The employment injury provisions apply in general to all employees except agricultural workers not operating modern agricultural machinery; however, cash benefits are 50 per cent. smaller for employees of handicraft undertakings with four to nine workers and 80 per cent. smaller where such undertakings have only one to three workers. Compensation is payable by the employer for traumatic injuries and occupational diseases, the latter being defined in Order No. 2,459 of 22 November 1948. Insurance of his risk is optional for the employer.

Employers in Syria must provide first aid and pay all medical, pharmaceutical, hospital and transport expenses, except that a public hospital within 50 kilometres, if any, must provide victims with free hospital treatment. When incapacity lasts for more than three days, employers must also pay a cash temporary incapacity benefit equal to 50 per cent. of wages below specified maxima. This is payable from the date of the accident until recovery, death or certification of permanent incapacity.

62: L. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 M1 Middle East
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An injured person who is permanently incapable of carrying on any occupation receives a lump sum from his employer equal to 500 days of wages plus one month's wages for each year he is under 60, down to the age of 18. A lump sum reduced in proportion to remaining working capacity is payable in the event of permanent partial incapacity. In the event of death, one half of the permanent total incapacity benefit is paid if one dependant survives, plus 15 per cent. for each additional dependant up to 100 per cent.; this lump-sum payment is divided equally among specified surviving relatives. A funeral grant of up to one month's wages is also payable. Alien workers must receive the same treatment as Syrian workers if reciprocal arrangements have been made by international instrument. A survivor of an alien worker who is not in Syria at the time of the accident does not qualify for benefit, unless the survivor is a national of a country granting compensation to survivors of Syrian employees in like circumstances.

The Labour Code also authorises the Syrian Council of Ministers to establish a compulsory industrial accident insurance system by decree and to specify the scope and conditions of such a system.

Sickness and Dismissal

After six months of employment, Syrian wage earners are entitled to half a month's leave at full pay and half a month's leave at half pay in case of non-occupational sickness; salaried employees receive a month's leave at full pay and a month's leave at half pay. Women employed in large-scale industry, commerce or a liberal profession for three years receive full pay during 50 days of maternity leave preceding and following confinement, and those so employed for at least one year receive half pay for the same period.

Wage earners paid by the day must be paid a dismissal indemnity of one month's wages for each year of service up to three years, and half a month's wages for each additional year. All other employees receive an indemnity of one month's wages for each year of service. Full dismissal indemnity is payable in the event of death or the marriage of a female employee, and a half indemnity is payable upon voluntary retirement after 15 years of service.

The Syrian Labour Code also authorises the establishment by Ministerial Decree of compensation funds for payment of family allowances to some or all employees, and also provident funds financed by employer and employee contributions for payment of sickness and unemployment benefits and refunds in case of invalidity, old age or death.

62: I. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 M1 Middle East
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would contribute the remaining quarter of the cost. About half of the State contribution would take the form of hospitalisation which would be largely financed from public funds, including the maintenance of general hospitals by municipalities.

I 7/45 18/-

Social Security Bill for Lebanon

L 7/45 18/-

A Bill on social security prepared by the Ministry of Labour was receiving consideration by the Lebanese Government in 1950. The purpose of this Bill was to set up an autonomous national social security fund for workers which would eventually pay benefits in respect of employment injury, maternity, sickness, long illness, invalidity, dependants, unemployment and death. Various social charges which the law now imposes on invididual employers would be taken over by this fund.

The proposed scheme would apply on a compulsory basis, in general, to employees of all undertakings in Lebanon except non-mechanised undertakings employing less than five workers and having a capital of less than £L.5,000. Agricultural workers not operating machinery, family workers and domestic servants would be expressly excluded. Employers would contribute to the fund at an initial rate of 7 per cent. of wages and employees would pay a 4 per cent. rate. The additional revenue needed in each year would be provided by a Government subsidy.

The Bill provides for the introduction of the several types of benefit in three different stages. Payment of the first group of benefits would commence on promulgation of the law. These benefits would include employment injury benefits, family allowances, confinement allowances, and old-age and widows' benefits. To facilitate the financing of old-age benefits, employers would pay to the fund, either in a single lump sum or in instalments over a period of five years, certain amounts for which they were previously liable in respect of dismissal and related indemnities. The second group of benefits, including sickness and long-illness benefits and maternity care, would be introduced at the end of five years. The third group, consisting of invalidity and unemployment benefits, would be brought into force after 10 years.

The practicability of adopting the draft measure has been under study. The economic situation in Lebanon raises some difficult problems in this connection at the present time.

Developments in Syria

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The possibility of introducing certain types of social security legislation and the problems which would be encountered in doing so have

62: I. L. O. S-5 (1947-1950) 1950 M1 Middle East
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been the subject of some preliminary statistical investigations and other studies in Syria. The General Federation of Syrian Workers' Unions has urged the Government to institute a social insurance system as well as a scheme of free medical care and medicines.

TURKEY

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Turkey has by now largely completed the enactment of its basic social security legislation, and an important part of the scheme is already in operation. Apart from completion of the administrative organisation of the new measures, important problems of planning which lie ahead include the extension of the scope of persons covered, especially to employees in smaller establishments, who are at present not subject to compulsory social insurance, on the one hand, and the refinement of existing measures, on the other. The latter task will include the removal of such anomalies and inequalities as may appear in the actual application of the legislation, and the further extension of benefits as facilities and circumstances permit.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
SYRIA MD1

747 The Red Crescent Society carries on a campaign against tuberculosis throughout the country, and operates a tuberculosis dispensary in Damascus. The Goutte de Lait Society of Damascus supports infant welfare services in association with the government's maternal and child health center.

The Near East Foundation initiated a comprehensive rural demonstration program in villages near Damascus in 1946, in conjunction with the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health. In addition to activities for the improvement of agriculture, it operates 5 child health centers, each serving 10 to 20 villages. Courses are conducted at the largest center for the training of local village midwives in improved technics of midwifery. When the program was expanded in 1951, the Foundation planned for the development of co-ordinated maternity and child health services, including well-child clinics and home visiting, in the village centers and the organization of a special course for the training of rural sanitarians. Since 1949, it has participated with
747 744 the government health authorities and the successive agencies working for the relief of the Palestinian refugees in a malaria control program, based on residual spraying with DDT preparations, or Gammexane, in villages in the Damascus region. In 1950, it co-operated with the Ministry and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company in residual spraying operations in villages and refugee camps around Der'a, in Hauran *muhafazat*.

747 Hospitals and related health work are
648 conducted by various mission societies in Damascus, Aleppo and Deir ez Zor. Health and medical care services are also provided by the larger industries for the benefit of their employees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency carries on public health and medical programs in the refugee centers in southern and western Syria.

Medical Institutions

743 **Hospitals and Dispensaries.** In 1951,

p. 146(b)

of the babies treated at the maternity and child health center in Damascus suffer from intestinal infections. Epidemics of diarrheal disease often coincide with the ripening of the apricot crop. The ready contamination of this thin-skinned fruit by flies and other insects accounts for the local designation of the early summer diarrheas in the fruit-growing districts as *mish mish* (apricot) disease. 164 164 262

Cholera. Serious outbreaks have accompanied the introduction of cholera in the past, but the disease was absent from Syria from 1928 to 1947, shortly after the epidemic in Egypt. On December 19, 1947, cholera was reported from 2 adjacent villages in the province of Hauran, on the road from Palestine to Damascus. At the same time, cases occurred in 3 villages in the irrigated plain of the Al Ghouta, within 3 or 4 miles of Damascus. Although 45 cases, with 18 deaths, were reported officially, it was generally believed that the actual incidence totaled at least 77 cases. 164

Quaraptine measures were promptly imposed in Hauran and Damascus provinces, and all persons entering or leaving those regions were required to possess certificates of immunization against cholera. Over one and one half million individuals were inoculated with cholera vaccine in the vicinity of Damascus, as well as in the affected districts of Hauran and in the city of Aleppo. Supplies and assistance were furnished the Ministry of Health by the World Health Organization, the Near East Foundation and the Egyptian and Lebanese governments. Vaccine was also provided jointly by the Arabian American Oil Company and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. No cases were reported after the initial outbreaks, and on January 17, 1948, Syria was declared free from the disease. The exact origin of the epidemic was never definitely established. 744 164 645 747

Helminthiases. ANCYLOSTOMIASIS. Hookworm infection, caused by *Ancylostoma duodenale*, is prevalent among the agricultural workers in foci along the banks of the 164 463 369

761 Comparative rates in urban and rural com-
369 munities were determined in a series of tests
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Diseases Spread by Arthropods

164 Malaria. Malaria is a disease of major public health and economic importance, since it is endemic or hyperendemic in all populous sections of the country. The prevalence of the disease is directly related not only to the physical geography of the different regions, but to the degree and the type of cultivation. The most seriously affected foci are the plains around Damascus and Aleppo, the Orontes valley from Hama to the Turkish frontier, the irrigated zones bordering the Belikh and the Khabour rivers and their tributaries, and the swampy districts of Hauran province. Universally high infection rates are experienced during epidemic years, even in areas of low endemicity.

659 164 744 No large-scale surveys have been attempted, but accumulated studies provide rough estimates of the extent of infection in localized areas. Prior to the development of a program for the control of malaria by the Ministry of Health and the Near East Foundation in 1949-50, the spleen index among children under 10 years of age in the villages around Damascus ranged from 40 to 80 per cent, with the highest rates in villages on the periphery of the Outaybeh swamps in the eastern part of the oasis. In the vicinity of Homs, the spleen rates normally average 50 to 70 per cent.

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Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and the Ministry in the Khabour and the Belik river basins in 1950,[8, 9] blood examinations were performed on small representative samples of the population. All age groups were included, although the majority of persons tested were under 15 years of age. The parasite rates averaged about 33 per cent in villages in the Belikh valley, while in the areas under perennial irrigation along the Khabour River and its tributaries, they varied from 33 to 94 per cent. In the rain-irrigated districts northeast of Hassetché, the rates declined to from 12 to 16 per cent. In many localities the malaria problem has been aggravated by the introduction of rice cultivation. In some, as in Ajaja, cultivation had to be abandoned, and in others, it is prohibited within a 2-mile radius of the villages. 659 747 164 361 164 241

The malaria season extends from April to November, with peaks of prevalence in July and October, but some transmission occurs throughout the year in most malarious regions. The relative proportion of *Plasmodium vivax* and *P. falciparum* infections varies according to the season and from place to place. *P. vivax* is usually responsible for 75 to 80 per cent of the cases of malaria in the Damascus area. *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* were identified with about equal frequency, however, in the 1950 surveys in the Belikh and the Khabour valleys. In general, *P. vivax* predominates during spring and early summer, but is superseded by *P. falciparum* toward the end of the malaria season. *P. malariae* infections are rarely encountered. 161 164 136

Malaria control measures are undertaken by the municipal authorities in Damascus, Aleppo and a few other towns. Control programs, based upon residual spraying with DDT preparations or Gammexane, are conducted in towns and villages in limited areas by the Ministry of Health, often in conjunction with other agencies. In 1950, they covered villages in Damascus and Hauran provinces, the town of Latakia and a few localities in Jebel ed Druz. The most exten- 164 744

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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

Distribution of Malaria in Syria

sive work has been carried on, in co-operation with the Near East Foundation, in the agricultural districts around Damascus, where 224 villages with over 180,000 inhabitants were protected in 1949-50. A marked reduction in the number of cases has been noted in all the areas treated. Successive examinations of over 500 children in 16 treated villages near Damascus revealed a decrease in spleen rates of from 78 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1951.[8] A malaria control program was inaugurated in the Homs district in 1952, under the auspices of the World Health Organization. *Anopheles sacharovi* and *A. claviger* are the principal vectors in the Damascus region; *A. sacharovi* and *A. superpictus*, in the river valleys in the northeast. 744 747 136

Rickettsial Infections. Localized outbreaks of louse-borne typhus are recurrent during the winter and the spring months, particularly in the congested quarters of the towns and the cities and among the nomadic tribes. Over 1,900 cases were reported in 1942, when the acute shortages associated with the war created conditions conducive to the spread of the infection. Since that date no more than 30 to 95 sporadic cases have been recorded in any one year. Control measures, including deverminization procedures and the immunization of the exposed populations, are enforced by the health authorities in affected areas. 146 362 361 744 757

No differentiation is made in the official 164

p. 155(B)

sumption of fly-contaminated foods and of raw vegetables grown in polluted soils provides an important means of transmission. Water-borne outbreaks are frequent in the rural villages, but they have decreased within recent years with the improvement of the drinking water supplies in the larger cities. Reports for 1949 show that 495 cases of typhoid fever were treated in government hospitals throughout the country, 295 cases in institutions in Damascus *muhafazat*. Similarly, 671 cases were recorded in 1950. 164 364

The relative prevalence of the different paratyphoid infections is uncertain. Paratyphoid A fever predominates among the cases in which the differential diagnosis has been established, although paratyphoid B infections are undoubtedly more numerous. Paratyphoid C fever has been diagnosed in Lebanon, but its presence in Syria has not been determined. 164

Immunization with typhoid-paratyphoid A and B vaccine is carried on by the health authorities among the contacts of known cases. Immunization is also widely practiced in the urban areas. 751

Dysenteries. Dysentery is prominent among the causes of illness. The available data give little indication of the proportionate prevalence of amebic and bacillary infections. Amebiasis is widespread, and associated with a high percentage of chronic carriers. Contaminated foods constitute the chief sources of infection, and the maximum incidence is noted in spring and summer, when lettuce and other green, leafy vegetables are consumed in abundance. 164 [262]

Recognized *Shigella dysenteriae* infections are rare, but occasional bacteriologically confirmed cases are recorded. Strains of the Flexner group are probably responsible for the majority of cases of bacillary dysentery. The differentiation of types is made only in Damascus, and, since few cases are hospitalized, the existing records have little significance.

Diarrhea and enteritis are prevalent, especially in infancy and early childhood. Local authorities state that fully 85 per cent

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versal among the 15 camels slaughtered in the same period, but the consumption of camel's meat is normally restricted to small groups of the population. 232 164

Rare cases of trichinosis are reported among the Christian peoples. Canine infections with the fluke, *Heterophyes heterophyes*, are numerous, and one instance of infection in man has been recorded. 164

Brucellosis. Brucellosis is enzootic among the goats and the cattle. Sporadic cases of undulant fever, caused by *Brucella melitensis*, occur in man. However, infection with *Br. abortus* has not been reported. According to local custom, milk is seldom used without boiling, but infection may result from the consumption of contaminated cheese or butter, as well as from contact with infected animals. 232 164 262 252 164

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. The reporting of tuberculosis is not compulsory in Syria, and the prevalence of the disease is not accurately known. On the basis of mortality statistics for 1947 and 1949, about 1.8 to 2.0 per cent of the total recorded deaths were due to tuberculosis. The usual discrepancies in reporting are exaggerated, however, by the tendency to conceal the presence of tuberculosis because of the social stigma attached to the disease. From 80 to 90 per cent of the known deaths were attributed to pulmonary infection, but nonpulmonary forms of tuberculosis are common in most areas. Competent local authorities estimated that there were at least 32,000 cases of tuberculosis in the country in 1951, representing a morbidity rate of about 10 per 1,000 population. 164 165 164 183 164

In the survey carried on in Damascus in 1950, tuberculin tests were performed on 10,695 individuals between 6 and 24 years of age. The positive reaction rate rose progressively with age: 12 per cent of 563 children, 6 years of age, gave a positive reaction to tuberculin, and 46 to 51 per cent of 1,079 persons from 16 to 19 years of age. 659 751

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758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
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758 743 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The de-
743 velopment of increased medical facilities has recently been undertaken by the Ministry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital near Damascus, to provide a total of 350 beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo were under construction. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed hospital in Latakia province, which would bring the total number of beds available for the isolation and the treatment of tuberculous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 A tuberculosis demonstration and training
874 center was established in Damascus in 1952 under the direction of the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Ministry and the Syrian University. It provides a regional headquarters for the training of doctors, nurses and social workers in the public health, the therapeutic and the social aspects of the disease.

164 **Smallpox.** Vaccination against smallpox
751 is compulsory, but enforcement is neces-
361 sarily incomplete in the more remote areas and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks occur from time to time, with sporadic cases reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to 1941 only occasional cases were observed. In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from Iraq, where an epidemic focus had developed in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were recorded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The outbreaks subsided in 1944, and again no more than sporadic cases were noted until 1948, when 894 cases were reported. The known incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influenza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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

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p. 155(B)

cept in the vicinity of the principal rivers. 312
Domestic supplies are derived from wells, springs or rivers, and sometimes from water holes or rain-water cisterns. Untreated 312, 364
piped water supplies serve all or parts of the larger towns. The municipal supplies of Damascus and Aleppo are controlled for purity, but contamination is frequent in the smaller communities. Sewerage systems are available in the chief cities, but the methods of sewage disposal are generally primitive in towns and villages. The standards of nutrition vary, depending upon the economic 146
and the social conditions in different regions. Undernutrition and subclinical avitaminosis are widespread, but serious deficiency diseases are encountered only among limited population groups.

The most prominent disease problems are 164
malaria, trachoma and dysentery, both amebic and bacillary. Enteric fevers, tuberculosis, helminthiasis and skin infections are prevalent. Venereal diseases are widely distributed, while bejel is endemic among the nomadic and the seminomadic peoples of the northeastern provinces. Hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, caused by *Schistosoma haematobium*, and leprosy exist in scattered foci. Localized outbreaks of cholera were reported in 1947-48, the first in 20 years. Vaccination against smallpox is com- 751
pulsory, but sporadic cases and occasional epidemics are recorded. Outbreaks of louse- 164
borne typhus are recurrent, while sporadic cases are reported almost annually. Small outbreaks of louse-borne relapsing fever have coincided with regional epidemics. Measles and the common respiratory infections are endemic, and frequently epidemic. Cutaneous leishmaniasis, brucellosis, rabies, tetanus, anthrax, dengue fever and sandfly fever are endemic. Meningococcus meningitis, diphtheria, plague, tick-borne relapsing fever and murine typhus are sporadic. Recognized cases of scarlet fever and poliomyelitis are apparently rare. Doubtful cases of tick-borne typhus and kala-azar have been described.

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757 the refuse dumps and other breeding sites
136 are sprayed with DDT preparations at in-
571 tervals between May and October.

136 Lice. Infestation with lice is common
571 among the inhabitants in the congested
361 quarters of the towns and in the villages and the Bedouin encampments. *Pediculus humanus corporis* is important as the vector of typhus fever; cases are reported almost annually. *P. humanus capitis* and *Phthirus pubis* are somewhat less frequent.

136 Fleas. Numerous species of fleas para-
164 sitize the wild and the domestic rodents. The rat flea, *Xenopsylla cheopis*, is prevalent: it is the vector in sporadic cases of murine typhus, and in past decades it was implicated in the transmission of plague. The human flea, *Pulex irritans*, and the cat and the dog fleas, *Ctenocephalides felis* and *C. canis*, are widely distributed. The sticktight flea, *Echidnophaga gallinacea*, sometimes attacks man, but it is of no known medical significance.

136 Bedbugs. *Cimex lectularius* is an annoying pest in all parts of the country.

136 Ticks and Mites. A variety of ticks,
232 including *Rhipicephalus sanguineus* and
164 several species of *Hyalomma*, infest the livestock. *Ornithodorus tholozani* is found in the rural areas, where it is the local vector of tick-borne relapsing fever.

126 The grain itch mite, *Pediculoides ventri-*
164 *cosus*, is plentiful in the grain-producing regions. It frequently attacks man, causing a painful rash. The human itch mite, *Sarcoptes scabiei*, is widely distributed, but it is decreasing steadily in prevalence.

136 Scorpions and Spiders. Several species of
752 scorpions are present, including *Buthus quinquestriatus*, *B. judaicus*, *B. crassicauda* and *B. europeus*, and *Scorpio maurus propinquus* and *S. maurus fucus*. Serious systemic effects resulting from scorpion stings
[135] are rare, but deaths are sometimes recorded among young children, usually after attacks by *B. quinquestriatus*.

136 The poisonous black spider, *Latrodectus tredecimguttatus*, is found in some localities.

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Reptiles. Venomous snakes are not common, but at least 4 species of vipers are known to be present. The carpet viper, *Echis carinatus*, exists only in the north, while *Vipera lebetina lebetina*, *V. lebetina xanthina* and *V. palaestina* are reported from many parts of the country. 126

Rodents. Rats and mice are numerous. The usual domestic rats are *Rattus rattus rattus* or *R. rattus alexandrinus*. *R. norvegicus* sometimes invades the port towns of Latakia.

Molluscs.* The fresh-water snail, *Bulinus truncatus* (= *B. contortus*), inhabits some of the tributaries of the Belikh and the Khabour rivers, near the Turkish border. It is the intermediate host of *Schistosoma haematobium*, which is reported from several foci in that region. 136 164

Plants. Various trees, weeds and grasses are capable of inducing allergic manifestations in susceptible individuals, but no precise information is available. 137 152

The broad bean, *Vicia fava*, which is grown extensively as a food, may be toxic to young children when it is eaten raw. A few deaths are observed each year, among children in both urban and rural communities. Occasional cases of lathyrism occur when the "Indian pea," *Lathyrus sativus*, a plant widely cultivated for fodder, is used for human consumption. [135]

Food Sanitation

Municipal regulations govern the sanitation of the food supplies in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Latakia. Restaurants, markets and other premises where food is sold are inspected at regular intervals by the municipal sanitary officers, and food handlers are required to register for examination at 6-month intervals. Municipal slaughterhouses are established in towns with populations of 20,000 and over, and are operated under the supervision of the health authorities. The meat animals are inspected before and after slaughter by veterinary officers of the Min- 744

* See footnote, page 10.

p. 146(A)

164 Alawites and 68 per cent among the Ismail-
563 ites. Trachoma is one of the principal causes of blindness, in spite of the fact that, in the opinion of many local observers, a large percentage of uncomplicated cases exhibit a tendency to spontaneous cure.

164 Gonococcal and other types of infectious conjunctivitis are common. In a series of 315 conjunctival examinations, reported in 1931,[18] from the mission hospital at Deir ez Zor, *Hemophilus lacunatus* (Morax-Axenfeld bacillus) was identified in 34 per cent, *H. conjunctivitidis* (Koch-Weeks bacillus) in about 10 per cent and *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* in 5 per cent, while different pyogenic cocci were found in the remainder.

164 Diseases of the Skin. As is to be ex-
515 pected, in view of the widespread ignorance
758 of the principles of personal hygiene and the scarcity of water in many areas, skin diseases are prevalent. They represented almost 10 per cent of the total cases treated in government hospitals and clinics in 1949.

164 Mycotic infections are numerous, with ring-
361 worm of the scalp predominating in most
511 localities. Impetigo and scabies are widespread, particularly among children in the rural villages. Pediculosis is almost universal among the inhabitants of the poorer, congested communities, both urban and rural. Occasional cases of human myiasis are encountered. A form of dermatitis, caused by the bite of *Phlebotomus papatasii* and other sandflies, is sometimes encountered among susceptible individuals in the summer months.

164 Leprosy. Endemic foci of leprosy exist in various parts of the country, but primarily in Hauran and Latakia provinces. The extent of infection is not accurately known, and estimates of prevalence range from 90 to 250 cases. A few new cases are
[143] reported each year. Theoretically, isolation is compulsory, and the Ministry of Health maintains a leprosarium at Douma, near Damascus, which has facilities for the care of about 75 lepers.

752 Rabies. Sporadic cases of rabies are re-
164 ported. The majority result from the bites

p. 154(A)

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844 parts of the country. The graduate pharmacists totaled 214.

DISEASES

659 Widespread discrepancies in reporting de-
165 tract from the validity of the morbidity and the mortality statistics. Among the two thirds or more of the population living in the rural villages, not only is the reporting of cases of illness and death poor, but the accuracy of diagnosis is often questionable. In a total of 15,457 deaths officially recorded in 1949, almost 35 per cent were listed as due to "ill-defined, unknown or unspecified" causes. Facilities for laboratory confirmation are lacking outside the larger population centers, and confusion is frequently evident in the differentiation of related infections. Reporting is negligible in the more remote areas, and particularly
659 among the Bedouin tribes. Except in the
165 course of special surveys, or when abnor-
758 mal epidemic conditions necessitate the enforcement of preventive measures, medical treatment is seldom accessible to the in-
659 habitants of such regions. Even in cities,
165 where the degree of reporting is considerably higher than in the rural areas, the morbidity statistics reflect a general tendency to evade the reporting of certain infectious diseases for fear of isolation. The records of cases treated in the government hospitals, which cannot be regarded as representative, and the reports of particular investigations or surveys provide the most reliable data for the evaluation of the prevalence and the distribution of specific diseases.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Intestinal or Urinary Tract

164 **Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers.** Enteric fevers are endemic, and, in the opinion of the local authorities, a high degree of immunity resulting from repeated exposure to infection exists among the inhabitants.
164 Cases of typhoid fever occur throughout the
364 year, with the peak of incidence usually between June and December, when the con-

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744 Within recent years the Ministry of
751 Health has embarked upon a tuberculosis
747 control program. In January, 1950, a tuberculin testing and BCG inoculation campaign was organized under the auspices of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and associated organizations, which was taken over by the Ministry
659 in September. Surveys have been carried
361 out in most of the provincial capitals and
751 surrounding rural districts, and the Ministry contemplates the gradual extension of the campaign to cover the populations in all parts of the country. In the course of the investigations completed in 7 provinces between January and September, 1950, almost 417,000 persons were tuberculin tested, and over 188,000 were inoculated with BCG vaccine. The majority were schoolchildren, although miscellaneous population groups of all ages were also included. The proportion of positive reactors in the different provinces ranged from 23 per cent in Jebel ed Druz (As Suwaydah) to 42 per cent in Aleppo.

758 The diagnostic and the treatment facili-
743

758 743 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural
areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small
tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The de-
743 velopment of increased medical facilities
has recently been undertaken by the Min-
istry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital
near Damascus, to provide a total of 350
beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo
were under construction. Plans were also
projected for the erection of a 500-bed hos-
pital in Latakia province, which would
bring the total number of beds available
for the isolation and the treatment of tuber-
culous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 A tuberculosis demonstration and training
814 center was established in Damascus in 1952
under the direction of the World Health
Organization in collaboration with the Min-
istry and the Syrian University. It pro[illegible]
a regional headquarters for the training of
doctors, nurses and social workers in the
public health, the therapeutic and the social
aspects of the disease.

164 Smallpox. Vaccination against smallpox
751 is compulsory, but enforcement is neces-
361 sarily incomplete in the more remote areas
and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks
occur from time to time, with sporadic cases
reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria
and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to
1941 only occasional cases were observed.
In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from
Iraq, where an epidemic focus had devel-
oped in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were re-
corded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The out-
breaks subsided in 1944, and again no more
than sporadic cases were noted until 1948,
when 894 cases were reported. The known
incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and
subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influ-
enza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles
are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data
available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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sion hospital clinic in Deir ez Zor,[14, 18] the prevalence among the Bedouin has been estimated at 50 to 90 per cent and among the seminomadic Arab townsmen at 20 to 35 per cent. 164 361

The facilities for the diagnosis and the treatment of venereal diseases are meager. As of 1951, the Ministry of Health operated special venereal disease hospitals and outpatient clinics in Damascus and Aleppo. It also maintained 2 mobile dispensaries for the treatment of syphilis and bejel in the eastern provinces. A campaign for the mass treatment of bejel and syphilis was initiated in 1952 by the Ministry, in co-operation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The findings of the various field units should eventually provide a comprehensive picture of the distribution and the prevalence of these diseases in eastern Syria. 758 743

Diseases of the Eyes. Trachoma is a major public health problem in all parts of the country, although it varies in prominence under urban and rural conditions. The infection rates usually average less than 10 per cent in the cities, but approximate 40 to 60 per cent in the rural areas, where over two thirds of the people live. Repeated surveys among school groups in northern Syria[21] indicate that slightly more than 5 per cent of the children in Aleppo are affected, in contrast with 30 to 40 per cent in the environs of the city and 60 per cent in the rural villages. The disease exists at all levels of society, but is less frequent among the nomadic tribes than among the settled communities in the same general region. Differences in prevalence, influenced by local customs, are also noted among the various racial and religious groups. In a survey covering mountainous and coastal areas of Latakia *muhafazat*, reported in 1933,[28] the highest infection rates were found in the predominantly Alawite districts. The index of infection averaged 44 per cent. It ranged from 25 per cent among the Armenians to 61 per cent among the 164 369 164 563

164 Alawites and 68 per cent among the Ismail-
563 ites. Trachoma is one of the principal causes of blindness, in spite of the fact that, in the opinion of many local observers, a large percentage of uncomplicated cases exhibit a tendency to spontaneous cure.

164 Gonococcal and other types of infectious conjunctivitis are common. In a series of 315 conjunctival examinations, reported in 1931,[18] from the mission hospital at Deir ez Zor, *Hemophilus lacunatus* (Morax-Axenfeld bacillus) was identified in 34 per cent, *H. conjunctivitidis* (Koch-Weeks bacillus) in about 10 per cent and *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* in 5 per cent, while different pyogenic cocci were found in the remainder.

164 Diseases of the Skin. As is to be ex-
515 pected, in view of the widespread ignorance
758 of the principles of personal hygiene and the scarcity of water in many areas, skin diseases are prevalent. They represented almost 10 per cent of the total cases treated in government hospitals and clinics in 1949.

164 Mycotic infections are numerous, with ring-
361 worm of the scalp predominating in most
511 localities. Impetigo and scabies are widespread, particularly among children in the rural villages. Pediculosis is almost universal among the inhabitants of the poorer, congested communities, both urban and rural. Occasional cases of human myiasis are encountered. A form of dermatitis, caused by the bite of *Phlebotomus papatasii* and other sandflies, is sometimes encountered among susceptible individuals in the summer months.

164 Leprosy. Endemic foci of leprosy exist in various parts of the country, but primarily in Hauran and Latakia provinces. The extent of infection is not accurately known, and estimates of prevalence range from 90 to 250 cases. A few new cases are
[743] reported each year. Theoretically, isolation is compulsory, and the Ministry of Health maintains a leprosarium at Douma, near Damascus, which has facilities for the care of about 75 lepers.

752 Rabies. Sporadic cases of rabies are re-
164 ported. The majority result from the bites

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752 164 of rabid dogs, but wolves, hyenas, jackals, rats and other animals are sometimes implicated. Prophylactic treatment is provided 758 753 by the Ministry, and a special division for 164 the preparation of antirabic vaccines is incorporated in the central laboratory in Damascus. From 140 to 250 persons were treated annually in the 4 years 1948-51.

164 Other Infections. Tetanus is endemic, 232 and occasional cases are observed. Anthrax is enzootic among the sheep, and human infections sometimes occur in the agricultural areas. Sporadic cases of Weil's disease are reported.

Diseases Spread by Arthropods

164 **Malaria.** Malaria is a disease of major public health and economic importance, since it is endemic or hyperendemic in all populous sections of the country. The prevalence of the disease is directly related not only to the physical geography of the different regions, but to the degree and the type of cultivation. The most seriously affected foci are the plains around Damascus and Aleppo, the Orontes valley from Hama to the Turkish frontier, the irrigated zones bordering the Belikh and the Khabour rivers and their tributaries, and the swampy districts of Hauran province. Universally high infection rates are experienced during epidemic years, even in areas of low endemicity.

659 No large-scale surveys have been at- 164 tempted, but accumulated studies provide 744 rough estimates of the extent of infection in localized areas. Prior to the development of a program for the control of malaria by the Ministry of Health and the Near East Foundation in 1949-50, the spleen index among children under 10 years of age in the villages around Damascus ranged from 40 to 80 per cent, with the highest rates in villages on the periphery of the Outaybeh swamps in the eastern part of the oasis. In the vicinity of Homs, the spleen rates normally average 50 to 70 per cent.

659 In the course of joint surveys made by 747 the malariologists of the United Nations

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

n PUBLIC HEALTH

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The progress in public health has been much less spectacular and less steady than that in education. Expenditures on public health have increased sharply only in recent years. In 1954 the budget of the Ministry of Public Health amounted to £S 8.764 million or 4.2% of the regular budget, as compared with actual expenditures of £S 3.431 million or 3.4% of the total in 1945. Health facilities have been gradually expanding. The number of hospitals has risen from 35 with 1,785 beds at the end of 1945 to 61 with [743] 4,094 beds at the end of 1954. Over the last seven years the government has spent, on an average, £S 1.3 million on public health facilities, so that [759] government hospitals now have a total of 3,000 beds. The number of doctors in Syria has risen from 616 in 1945 to about 880 at present.

Yet it is generally recognized that the state of public health is far from satisfactory. This conclusion rests upon testimony and observation rather than health statistics. The statistics, indeed, are so inadequate as to provide little indication of health conditions. The number of deaths registered, for example, imply a death rate of but seven per thousand, but the record of deaths is evidently very incomplete and the actual death rate rather [164] high. There is still a high incidence of debilitating diseases. Malaria, for example, is prevalent in many parts of Syria. Diseases such as tuberculosis and the many varieties of intestinal infections, which are generally associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding and low standards [165] of living, are quite widespread. Infant mortality is particularly high. Thus 36% of the registered deaths in 1951-53 occurred among children less than five years old, and of these about the same percentage died of diarrhoea and enteritis.

An effective campaign to raise health standards would require resources which Syria will hardly be able to mobilize at its present stage of development. The health program will have to remain rather modest and should attempt primarily to remedy the more glaring deficiencies. These are, principally, the inadequate attention given to preventive medicine and the markedly unequal geographic distribution of existing health facilities.

744 *Preventive Medicine*

The prevention of disease is likely in the long run to be more economical than curative medicine. The mission believes that this aspect of

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

inhabitants.[6] Here again there is unequal distribution, ranging from 5.1 per 100,000 in the Hauran area and 3.6 in Damascus down to 2.0 in the Euphrates province. Present-day standards call for one rural hospital for every 20,000 inhabitants, yet here many areas which should, by that standard, have a hospital, lack even a dispensary.

The average number of visits at dispensaries is 202 for every thousand persons, varying from 372 in the Hauran and 363 in Damascus down to 60 in the Euphrates. Since the dispensaries operate for the most part in areas without doctors, the figures must be taken to include calls which in other circumstances would be made on private doctors. There are about 7,000 visits per year at each dispensary, or an average of 23 visits per working day.

Medical Staff

In all, the country has 880 doctors including 76 foreigners. Thus there is one doctor for every 3,800 persons. In this respect Syria's standing compared with other countries is not strikingly low. The United States, Europe and the USSR have one doctor for every 1,200 persons; Latin America, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have one for every 1,700. But Asia (excluding the USSR and Japan) and Africa (without South Africa) have only one doctor to 12,000 persons and Iraq has one per 7,000.

Yet while Syria may not be handicapped by an actual lack of doctors, their distribution over the country is as unbalanced as that of the hospital and dispensary facilities. There are some areas with populations of 25,000, without a single doctor. As for trained nurses, midwives and other auxiliary personnel, these are in fact scarcer than doctors and constitute a problem of major importance.

The mission's proposed program, as outlined in the Main Report, would place greater stress on the prevention of disease than in the past.

It is difficult to estimate the possible cost of a full disease-prevention program; it might mean an expenditure of £S 2 per person per year or £S 7 million annually, not including the large expenditures for water supply, drainage, sewerage and other major works. Obviously a program of this magnitude cannot be recommended for Syria in the near future. A

[6] In the provinces of Damascus and Homs three touring doctors provide the same type of services at the dispensaries.

874 graduates are required to serve an additional year in an approved hospital before they are registered to practice. The instruction in the University is in Arabic, although [191] French and English are employed in technical terms and phraseology.

Schools of dentistry, pharmacy and nursing also function within the Faculty of Medicine. The School of Nursing is associated with the National Hospital, which is operated by the medical faculty. The course of training covers three years, with provision for a fourth year in midwifery. Practical nurses' training programs for girls are carried on in a few private institutions. Courses for the training of male nurses are furnished in all the larger government hospitals.

Personnel

759 **Physicians.** Between 670 and 726 physicians were practicing in Syria in 1951. The majority were established in the larger towns and cities. Approximately one half of the total were located in the province of Damascus and over one quarter in the province of Aleppo. The medical personnel of the Ministry of Health numbered 135, including 6 doctors on the headquarters administrative staff and 7 or 8 in the government laboratories. Five doctors were connected with the municipal health organization in Damascus, 5 in Aleppo and 1 each in Homs and Hama.

Dentists. From 175 to 209 dentists were registered in the country. About 75 per cent resided in Damascus, the remainder in Aleppo.

Nurses. In 1951, also, there were 352 male and female nurses. About 62 female nurses and an equal number of male nurses were employed by the Ministry of Health.

844 **Others.** From 148 to 210 graduate midwives, the majority of whom had preliminary nursing training, were practicing in Syria. They were about equally divided between the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo. Large numbers of untrained midwives worked in the rural villages in all

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44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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874 formed part of the plan for complementary education, which was of two kinds: general complementary, restricted to general cultural courses, and vocational complementary, combining cultural and trade education. A certificate known as the general *brevet* was given at the end of the general course after the student had passed a public examination, and "vocational *brevets*,"—Technical, Commercial, or Agricultural—were given at the end of the vocational courses after public examinations.

The attempt to make the vocational schools a part of the complementary education had resulted in a heavy overloading of the course of study, and the students were working and studying for forty-six periods a week in the technical schools besides which there were additional study periods that were compulsory for boarding students. After the abolition of the complementary system in the new educational organization the vocational schools were considered as independent schools, and an attempt was made to lighten their programs.

The number of students in the public vocational schools in 1943–44 was 1,024, and in the following year, 1,011. A summary description of the schools visited by the Commission will perhaps give the best picture of public vocational education in Syria.

The technical school for boys

[736] The Technical School for boys at Aleppo dated back to 1900 when it was founded in connection with an orphanage, with the idea of providing trade education for orphans. Its connection with the orphanage was severed in 1924–25.[1] It had 148 students in 1945–46, of whom 73 were boarders. Eleven of these paid annually a sum of £S240 (about $108.00) for their board, and the other 62 had free board at the expense of the state. The boarding students come from the outer districts of the governorate of Aleppo as well as from the governorates of Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Dayr al-Zur. Thus, about one-half of the student body is from outside Aleppo, and an attempt is being made to give opportunity for vocational education to students from the smaller towns. No tuition fee is charged.

The new program of study, issued in November 1945, covers four years and combines general cultural with vocational work. It includes religion, civics, Arabic, a foreign language, mathematics, physics, history, geography, physical education, industrial drawing, technology, and shopwork. In the first year, which is a preparatory year, the shopwork is common for all

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[1] This conception of technical education as primarily suited to orphans is of long standing and has persisted until lately in the Damascus technical schools for boys and for girls. In recent years steps have been taken to separate the orphanages from the technical schools in that city.

172 genuine beautification, because the whole of its history is written in its splendid buildings. All that is needed would be to free the old buildings of the mean parasitic structures which cumber them, built against their walls or in empty spaces at a time when the authorities were negligent. It would only be necessary to restore to a seemly state and put to suitable use the numerous major monuments, such as "Sheikh Mohassin", the Nuri Maristan, the Zahiriya Madrasah—without the walls, the "Khanaqah Faraza" and that marvel of architecture, the hospital (maristan) built in 1354 by the Emir Arghun, which are either deserted or used as tenements for the poor.

764 In the cemetery of "Es-Salihin", which has been holy ground
172 for centuries, with a sacred rock traditionally associated with Abraham, there are many tombs dating back to the end of the twelfth century, some used as dwellings, others abandoned and half buried. The variety of their architecture and the beauty of the inscriptions on them make them of great interest, and it would be enough to rail them in, clear them and plant a few trees to convert a waste land into a formal park rich with monuments of the past.

The same is true of the tombs in the cemetery of the Maqamat, to the east of the Kamiliya Madrasah—without the walls; the madrasah too requires no more, by way of treatment, than the unbricking of the sanctuary door.

361 Other noteworthy structures which need clearing of the
172 parasitic buildings that have grown up in and around them are the lovely city gates (Bab Antakiya, Bab an-Nasr, "Bab el-Hadid") and the façades, entrances and courtyards of the Ulusamur, Es-Sahun and Qurd-Beg khans.

A proper layout of the approaches to the ramparts between Bab al-Jinan and Bab Qinnasrin, and the demolition of a few run-down shops, would create one of the finest promenades imaginable, with impressive views of the walls and façades of the Mamluke towers.

In any scheme of reconstruction and beautification, consideration must also be given to fine private houses. At present, the Ghazzalih House is being put to rather unsuitable use as a school and worse still, is threatened with demolition. In our view, a suitable use could be found for one or other of these lovely seventeenth- and eighteenth-century residences, as also, perhaps, for one of the khans, as a club or hotel providing amenities for tourists. Aleppo would thus offer its guests a combination of creature comforts and an incomparable artistic setting.

THE CITY IMPROVEMENT SCHEME

361

In 1931, at the request of the municipality of Aleppo, a French architect, Mr. A. Gustoe, of the Institut d'Urbanisme in Paris, submitted plans for improvements and new building in the city, with a report setting out the criteria followed.

In their present form, these plans must be regarded as the bare bones of a scheme to meet the requirements of the modern town and the wishes of its authorities. The real key is in the report, where we find the explanation of the ends sought and the means selected to achieve them. One of its most significant passages is that which points out that, while giving the fullest weight to new human and social requirements, it is essential to grasp "the historical value of each quarter or each particular building and, in terms of that, to decide either on its preservation as it stands or on its improvement and clearing"

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

6. Damascus. Cemetery of Bab Saghir.
7. Damascus. Darwish-Pasha Mosque (1571).
8. Damascus. Sahaniya Madrasah (1484).
9. Damascus. Rukniya Madrasah (1444).

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

27. Palmyra. Aerial view.
28. Palmyra. Colonnade of the courtyard of the Temple of Bel.
29. Palmyra. Tomb of Elabel.

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

35. Qalb'aun. The church.
36. Ruweiqa. Ancient villa.
37. El-Bara. Tomb.

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161 square mile; in the province of Hauran, 80 per square mile; and in the province of Hama, 77 per square mile. In contrast, the population density of Al Jazira, incorporating the potentially fertile plains of the Khabour river basin, was 18 per square
369 mile. The country is about 70 per cent rural,
162 with the inhabitants living in some 5,000 villages. There are 6 principal cities with populations of over 30,000 — Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Deir ez Zor. Damascus, the capital and a city of commercial and religious significance, had a population of almost 325,100 in 1949. Aleppo, an industrial and trade center, and the largest city in Syria, had a population of about 356,600. It disputes with Damascus the claim of being the oldest city of continued prominence in the world.

162
167 In addition to the older refugee communities, as the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Druzes, which have become established minority groups, Syria received an influx in 1948 of about 150,000 Arabs from northern Palestine. Approximately 80,000 located around Damascus; others in Hauran and the northern provinces. Their status and ultimate distribution were still undetermined in 1952, when the number on the roster of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees totaled 84,000. Over one third resided in special camps, but the remainder were living independently in the various towns and villages.

167 During the Ottoman regime, large numbers of Syrians emigrated to the Americas, and to Europe and Africa. Although they probably total almost 60,000, the Syrian colonies abroad are small in comparison with those of the Lebanese, and their influence on the cultural and the economic life of their homeland is proportionately slight.

891
185 The educational system has undergone revision since the founding of the republic in 1943, with increased emphasis on its adaptation to the culture and the needs of the
891 people. Elementary education is compul-

p. 138(B)

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages 1621
are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur 763
el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. 191
They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflict- 795
ed upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. 795
The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac 779
Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is consti- 1621
tuted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following 167
the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from 657
that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League 463
of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. 648
Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the 6621
memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all 1821

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria MD1

PART TWO

III. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION

1

AT this point it will be convenient to interrupt the narrative and to analyze the problem which first presented itself to the Syrians in the nineteenth century, and which underlies the political difficulties with which they are faced in the present generation. 178

This problem can be stated very briefly. An old way of thought and life, which has gone unchallenged and fundamentally unchanged for some hundreds of years, finds itself in some ways opposed, in others inescapably transformed by the new civilization of the West.

In consequence, the Syrians find themselves no longer living in a united and coherent world, but torn between two worlds, neither of which is altogether their own. How will it be possible for them, by preserving or modifying the old and accepting what is new, once more to form a unified world of thought and life which they can call their own?

2

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Syria formed part of a world which had a civilization of its own: a religion, a culture and a way of life. It was a unified civilization, in which every sphere of life was regulated by a system of generally accepted principles, themselves drawn from religion and from immemorial custom. This civilization may be called 'Arabo-Islamic', because its main characteristics were derived, with much borrowing from outside and with many adaptations to the peculiar conditions of Syria, from two main sources, themselves closely connected with one another: the Islamic religion and the life of the Arabian desert. 181

'Islam' means resignation, and the Moslem, the adherent of Islam, is he who resigns himself to the will of God: not in the sense of passive and fatalistic acceptance of anything which may come, but in that of the complete and voluntary submission of man's will to God's commandments. God is unique, the Creator of the Universe, all-wise and all-powerful; He has revealed His will to man, in a measure sufficient for all the purposes of life, through a long succession of Prophets, who include Moses, Jesus, and finally Muhammad, the Arabian of the seventh century, to whom was given the final revelation 179

11: Hamani 8-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria.mp1

which superseded and completed all previous ones. This final revelation is preserved for the use and knowledge of mankind in the Quran, the Moslem Holy Book.

The Quran embodies the principles in accordance with which a man's whole life should be lived; on the basis of those principles Moslem thinkers have erected a moral system covering every form of human activity, however seemingly unimportant. Thus the religious duties of a Moslem are unlimited and all-embracing; but certain of them are prior to others, and fulfilment of them is essential for every true Moslem. The most important of these are summarized in the so-called 'Pillars of Islam'. A true Moslem must testify that 'there is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God'. He must pray five times a day; give alms to the poor; fast during the month of Ramadan; and make the pilgrimage to Mecca, should circumstances permit him, at least once in his lifetime.

Men should perform these and other duties primarily because they emanate from the will of God, but also because on their obeying or disobeying God's will depends the fate of their immortal souls in the next world. God who created the world will some day bring it to an end; on the final Day of Judgement all will be held responsible for their actions. The virtuous will be granted eternal felicity in Paradise, but the vicious everlasting torment in Hell.

The moral system of Islam covers the life not only of individuals but also of human associations, and among them of that association called the State. Islam knows no Church, and therefore no distinction between Church and State, the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of this world. The Islamic State is an association of Moslems for the purpose of living in accordance with the tenets of their religion and of extending its sway throughout the world. The law of the State is the law of Islam; the function of the ruler is to defend the State against unbelievers, to administer Moslem law as defined by those learned in it, and himself to be bound by it in his relations with his subjects. They for their part owe him loyalty as a religious duty. In short, the Islamic community as it has traditionally been conceived is to its members all and more than all that the nation is to the modern Western man. Islam in its great days was a nation, transcending distinctions of race or colour. Although an

Arabic-speaking Moslem might take a special pride in the peculiar relation of the Arabs to Islam, and in the dimly-remembered splendours of the early Caliphates, it is safe to say that normally he did not distinguish his being an Arab from his being a Moslem, and even when he did so it was the latter which was foremost in his thought and life. 779 829

3

For over a thousand years the majority of the population of Syria had been Moslem. There was not, however, complete unanimity in matters of religious belief. On the one hand, besides the Sunni or orthodox Moslems there were several heterodox Islamic and semi-Islamic sects: Shi'is, Druzes, Alawis and Isma'ilis. On the other hand, there still survived a number of Christian sects, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and others, which had come into existence in the early centuries of the Church's history; and there were in addition a comparatively small number of Jews. 162 795

Some of these communities were scattered throughout the country, while others possessed a local predominance in certain parts of it. Most of the districts held by these compact minorities were mountainous. The Lebanese mountains in particular were the homes of dissident communities, either because it was easier for the long-established inhabitants of Lebanon than for their neighbours of the plains to resist the pressure of Islamization, or else because sects which had grown up in the plains migrated to the mountains as an asylum where they would not be molested, or if attacked could better defend themselves. These mountain communities were marked by an especially unbending particularism and resistance to influences from outside.

4

Christians and Jews were left to carry on their own communal life without disturbance. For this there were two main reasons. The first was the Islamic doctrine in regard to Christianity and Judaism. Just as the Moslem regulated his life in accordance with the principles of his faith, so he did not deny a similar right to the Christians. 779 798

Moslems are not taught by their faith to regard Christians as inherently inferior, since it is in their power to become Moslems, and so enter the community of true believers in

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

which the only distinction is that of piety; nor as adherents of a false religion, since Islam considers Jesus to have been one of the succession of true prophets. They regard them as having gone astray, first in taking the revelation of Jesus as the final and complete revelation, and secondly in looking upon Jesus not simply as a prophet, a man through whom God's word has come to mankind, but as God incarnate. It is the doctrine of the Incarnation, and therefore also the doctrine of the Trinity, which are for Moslems the stumbling-blocks in Christianity. As 'People of the Book', believers in God, in prophecy and in the Day of Judgement, Christians like Jews are to be tolerated and to be allowed a certain status by the side of the Islamic community. But they cannot be regarded as members of that community. Nor can a Moslem willingly acquiesce in subjection to a non-Moslem Government, although his own weakness may compel a temporary submission.

Such is the attitude towards Christians which Islam enjoins: an attitude of reasoned and well-defined tolerance. But it is not surprising that there should during the thousand years of almost unchallenged Moslem supremacy have been periods of persecution, nor that the ordinary Moslem should have come to feel a certain contempt for the Eastern Christians who were the only Christians he knew: the contempt which he who knows himself to be strong feels for those in his power, and which he who believes himself to possess the truth feels for those who have rejected it.

The other reason for the persistence of the Christian and Jewish communities was the existence of a certain view of the State: a view which was universally accepted in western Asia, and indeed far beyond it, until recent generations. According to this view the Government existed to defend the cultivated lands, to maintain order, to tax their populations, and for nothing more. The laws by which the life of the individual and of society was regulated sprang not from positive enactment of the ruler but from the religious doctrines and ancestral customs to which individual and society adhered. It is true that since the ruling power was Moslem by faith, the Moslem religious law and the courts had a special relation to the Government. But a Moslem would no more have thought of compelling Christians and Jews to conform to Moslem law in matters of personal life and relationships than they of

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria M D1

abandoning their own religious codes. Law was personal. Not simply was there no concept of equality before the law; there was no idea of sameness.

For these reasons, throughout the period of Arab and Ottoman rule the Christians and Jews were allowed a certain autonomy. Each sect formed a community, or as it was called in Arabic a 'millah' and in Turkish a 'millet', within the State and co-terminous with it. In matters affecting the community, the Government treated with it as a whole through its heads, and not with the members of it individually. Certain civil functions were devolved upon the spiritual heads and representative bodies of the communities. They were allowed to administer the property and institutions of their communities and to decide matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on—in accordance with the tenets of their faith.

This system originated long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It developed gradually and was only formalized in the nineteenth century by a series of Imperial edicts. Throughout the period of Moslem ascendancy it succeeded in preserving self-respect and a sense of community among the religious minorities, although it may also have helped to perpetuate bitterness and suspicion between them.

The heterodox sects which clung to the fringes of Islam were in a more ambiguous position. Officially they were regarded as parts of the general body of Islam; but in fact the cleavage between them and the orthodox was almost as great as that between Moslems and Christians, and they like the Christians were usually left to direct their internal affairs in accordance with customary law and the precepts of their religions.

5

Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belonging to other communities; and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. This was true also of every Christian sect in its relations with the others, for each sect formed a separate 'millet'; and of the orthodox Moslems in their relations with the heterodox. Difference of sect was

778 no less important an element in the common consciousness
186 than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

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779 Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant
181 creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization.
577 Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

631 The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria 901

enter an ever-increasing number of occupations, including the liberal professions. But so far only the edge has been touched of the great problem, which like all great problems in this country is closely bound up with religion: how far is it possible in a modern society to retain the traditional Islamic view of women's status—seclusion and the veil, the theory and in a minority of cases the practice of polygamy, the divorce laws and so on? Of all the difficult questions which the process of Westernization raises, this is perhaps the most difficult; and its difficulty and urgency are likely to increase. The process of change is being speeded by one manifestation of Western civilization above all: the film which expresses a way of feminine life, and a conception of the relations between men and women, which are far from those prevalent in the Islamic world.

The local and sectarian loyalties of the past also preserve something of their strength, but on the whole they are declining in force and are likely to continue to do so, with the spread of Western ideas, the introduction of new means of communication and above all the development of schools, in which the adherents of different religions grow up side by side.

8

The growth of education is indeed one of the most important, as it is one of the most obvious, changes of the last few generations. Landowner, merchant and peasant alike are eager to send their sons and daughters to school, as the first and essential step towards entering the free professions or Government service. Syria and Lebanon now possess the framework of a complete educational system, from elementary schools up to technical institutes and three universities: the American University of Beirut, the Jesuit Université de S. Joseph, also in Beirut, and the State University, in Damascus.

The table on page 94 shows the number of schools of different types, and of scholars in them, in 1938.

From these figures it will be clear that education is further advanced in Lebanon than in Syria. It is also further advanced in the mainly Christian districts of Lebanon than in the others; among the Christians of Syria than among the Moslems; and in Syria as a whole than in Jebel Druze and Latakia. The percentage of literacy is probably rather

4: Cummins D-4 (no date) 1937 MD1 Syria MD1

DERMATOGLYPHICS IN PEOPLES OF THE NEAR EAST

I. LEBANESE: MITWALI

HAROLD CUMMINS AND W. M. SHANKLIN
Tulane University and American University of Beirut, Syria

121 This report is presented as a record of data toward an eventual analysis of racial variation in dermatoglyphics. It is to be hoped that a broad comparison of races on this basis may be eventually possible, but it will be necessary to continue the accumulation of records on various populations, perhaps from time to time taking stock of progress as has been done recently by Steggerda, Steggerda and Lane for the palmar features (Middle American Research Series, publication 7, Tulane University, '36).

124 101 795 The material here treated represents a population not hitherto investigated from the standpoint of dermatoglyphics. The Mitwali are a Syrian mountain people, living in the southern Lebanon range. They are Moslems, but adhere to the Shiite sect rather than to the Sunni which is common to the region. There are 138 subjects in the series, males and females being in the proportion of about two to one; in view of the small numbers the sexes are combined. The subjects are mainly children in the government schools, the adult population having proved generally unsuitable for printing—on account of extensive callouses.

141 128 The palmar features, main lines and patterns, are tabulated in tables 1 and 2, their formulations following the methods of Cummins et al. (Am. J. Phys. Anthrop., XII, '29).

The data on lines A and D have been further analyzed, to determine the main-line index which has been suggested by Cummins (Middle American Research Series, Tulane University, publication 7, '36) as a value denoting the degree of slant of the general palmar configuration. For the 276 hands

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III The Shashans

The Shashans, a Circassian tribe around Ras el Ain, complete the rural population of Jazirah. They migrated to Syria during the Ottoman rule and settled as mercenary soldiers. They are not good at agriculture and their lands are not fertile and do not compare with those of the Kurds.

IV. The Christians

The cities and commercial centers of Jazirah are an extra-ordinary mixture of races and creeds, but they are perhaps more than 80% Christian. This is true of Kubur el Bid, Qamishli, Amunda, Dirbassiya and Hassakeh.

As in the case of the Kurds, the Turkish massacres of the Christians in Mardin and the mountainous country around it started their migration to Jazirah. The Christians reached Jazirah without property or capital with which to begin. They settled mostly in the towns mentioned. A few of them already owned lands, others were traders and had previous relations with the Bedouins and Kurdish tribes. In a relatively short time the towns grew and flourished. The Christinas prospered from commerce before the expansion of agriculture. The tariff differences between Syria and Turkey on such important commodities as sugar, tea, and coffee and the intermingling of the Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier, made the Jazirah towns ideal for an extensive smuggling business.

The town Christians also served as middlemen to the merchants of Aleppo, who provided the money to lend to the Bedouins and Kurds or to buy the sheep, cattle and crops. This work on a commission or partnership basis coupled with the smuggling business proved profitable to the merchants of Jazirah, so that during the last twenty years many of them have become wealthy and have come to own real estate and agricultural lands and machinery without, however, abandoning their commercial activities with the merchants of Aleppo. In fact, the general prosperity and development of Jazirah has increased its need for the credit of Aleppo.

This picture of the Christian population of Jazirah is not complete without mention of the Christian peasants who migrated from the mountain villages and settled in the country. Though Christian and living in villages 100% Christian, some of them are Kurdish in their language, dress and customs. Some other villages are populated

by Syriac Christians who speak Syriac and Arabic. A few villages are completely Armenian. Most of these villages are around Kubur el Bid and Qamishli. These Christian peasants are very devout. They are also conservative and always remember the injuries inflicted upon them in Turkey. There is hardly a Christian family in the towns or villages which did not lose a relative or a friend in the massacres. Therefore they are always on their guard against their Moslem neighbors and are always suspicious of the Government. Their bitterness is not likely to disappear for some time to come, and is a factor to be considered in the political development of Jazirah.

The Christians of Jazirah belong to all creeds and denominations. The largest community in numbers and in importance is the Syriac Orthodox, followed by the Armanian Orthodox. There are Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Armanian Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Nestorians. It should be mentioned that what determines the origin and affiliation of a man in Jazirah is not his language or dress, but his Church. Thus a Kurd who speaks only the Kurdish language, who lives like a Kurd on the same standard of living, and who dresses like one, is yet an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Jacobite because he belongs to one of these Churches. His original language and customs have been lost by living for ages in a foreign environment. That is why one finds in Jazirah and the mountains beyond it the only Christian Kurds in the world. But in reality they are not Kurds. They are Armenians or Syriacs or Chaldeans who have adopted the Kurdish language and their true nationality can be known only by referring to their Churches.

A more recent concentration of Christians in Jazirah is constituted by the Assyrians around Tal Tamr on the Khabur. Following the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and their expulsion from that country, the French in Syria gave them asylum, and the League of Nations appropriated funds to settle them along the Khabur. Lands were granted to them and villages were built in which motors and pumps were installed for irrigation. Nevertheless during these 19 years all the efforts appear to have been useless. The ten thousand Assyrians who migrated to Syria lead a wretched life. Their motors are not in a working condition, their crops are not abundant and they are now trying to sell their lands. The reasons for such a condition may be found in the fact that the Assyrians are not farmers and the lands given to them are of a poor quality.

During the French Mandate, the Christians of Jazirah, with the memory of the Turkish massacres still fresh, and considering all

7:Lewis S-5 (ca. 1940-45) 1948 MDI Syria MDI

175 Tamerlane's invasion and were dispersed in other parts of Syria. Of 3200 villages once on the tax rolls of the pashalik of Aleppo, only 400 were said to be inhabited when Volney visited the country in the 1780's.[28] Such peasants as remained in the west of our region suffered from misgovernment, extortion, and raiding by Arab tribes.

166 In the second half of the past century a movement of recolonization [231] started that is still in progress. Sheep-raising Arab tribes began to settle in 361 villages; peasants came from the districts of Hama and Homs; immigrant 195 Circassians established four villages north of the town of Selemiya. The 312 frontier began to move outward once more, and old foggaras were cleaned 241 and repaired to give irrigation water once again. The strongest and most energetic immigrant group, the pioneers, were Ismaili, led back to their land of a thousand years ago by a group of powerful leaders. They settled first on the site of Selemiya itself about 1870. Today they number 14,000 or more, the majority living in the town and in villages to the east. They chose village sites where old foggaras could be brought into use, and for 75 years they have been extending the area of irrigated land by the restoration of old canals and the digging of new ones. In the last 20 years subsistence agriculture, depending largely on unirrigated grain farming, has given way before a more intensive commercial system, typified by the growing of irrigated cash crops such as seed onions and cotton on individualized hold- [657] ings. The government has granted money for canal cleaning and swamp drainage. All these factors have contributed to extension of irrigation.

312 Some old canals, however, are still derelict. Some are so ruined that the [464] cost of repair would be prohibitive. Others may yet be brought back into use, but the will to work is weaker than in the early days of colonization, and now laborers' wages and other expenses have increased. Elsewhere village boundaries cut across old canals. Landowners of the village where a canal rises are loath to let the water flow away to the lands of another village, and thus ancient foggara systems which were perfectly related to the physical environment have been partly replaced by more local schemes of surface canal and ditch irrigation. For example, the canals that rise in Moufaqqar (Fig. 3) could irrigate land and drive mills in Moufaqqar, Tell et Tout, and Selemiya, but they have been so modified that the water is used only in Moufaqqar, and some of it runs to waste. A canal which rises in Tell et Tout but which formerly flowed on to Selemiya land has been blocked, so that its water irrigates Tell et Tout land only.

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113 [28] C.-F. Volney: Travels through Egypt and Syria, in the Years 1783, 1784 & 1785, translated from the French, 2 vols., New York, 1798; reference in Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

P. Hitti 3-5 (ca. 1926) 1928 MD1 Syria MD1
Druze MD6

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Chapter I

A UNIQUE AND SECRET SECT

Two Historical Fossils:—The Druzes of Syria and the Samaritans of Palestine are two unique communities not to be found elsewhere in the whole world. Like social fossils in an alien environment, these two peoples have survived for hundreds of years in that land rightly described as a "Babel of tongues" and a "museum of nationalities."

The Samaritans are the remnants of the tribes from Assyria and Persia who were transplanted by Sargon some seven hundred years before Christ to take the place of the "ten tribes" who were carried into captivity.[1] They figured in the life of Christ as is illustrated by the case of the "Samaritan woman" and the story of the "good Samaritan." Today they are represented by about one hundred and eighty persons who intermarry among themselves and are becoming rapidly extinct. Their habitat is modern Nāblus (biblical Shechem), and their religion is ancient Judaism mixed with pagan survivals.

The Druzes have no such clear record to show regarding their origin as a people and as a sect. Their ethnographical origins, no less than their ritual practices and religious beliefs, are shrouded in mystery. Appearing for the first time on the pages of history at Wādi-al-Taym near Mt. Hermon in anti-Lebanon, as professors of the divinity of the sixth Fāṭimite Caliph in Cairo (996–1020 A.D.), the Druzes have lived their semi-independent lives secluded in their mountain fastnesses of Lebanon, unmindful of the progress of the world around them, and almost entirely forgotten by the outside world.

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[1] *Cf.* James A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans, the Earliest Jewish Sect* (Philadelphia, 1907), pp. 46–57.

9: Hitti 8-5 (ca. 1928) 1928 MD1 Syria MD1
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Other Secret Sects:—The Druze people constitute one of the two leading secret sects found only in Syria, the other being the Nuṣayriyyah inhabiting the mountains north of Tripoli. The Ismā'īliyyah of the Ḥimṣ and Ḥamāh district, another secret sect, are descended from the Assassins,[1] who for two centuries or so struck awe and terror into the hearts of the Crusaders, and are represented today by a few other sectarians in Persia and India. The Yezīdis, so-called devil worshipers, practice their hidden rites in the out-of-the-way hills between Antioch and Aleppo and have coreligionists in Kurdistān and Armenia.

Special Interest of this Study:—But of all these sects Druzism is perhaps the most interesting and important. It is still a living force. Its followers form to the present day a vigorous and flourishing community in the Lebanon. Its learned system has not changed since it was first inaugurated in the early part of the eleventh century. The Islam of the Near East has changed and adapted itself to the requirements of the varying conditions. The Christianity of the Near East has changed. But the Druze system has been and still is the same.

The modernizing influence has in late years brought within its sphere quite a large number of the young and uninitiated Druzes. The report of the American University of Beirūt for last year indicates that there are in that institution alone thirty-six Druze students and five Druze teachers. But no one with first-hand knowledge of the situation would go so far as even to recognize the existence of a "modernist movement" alleged to be aiming at divulging the Druze beliefs, much less to declare "It is understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirūt will be the probable intermediary of communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place."[2]

In fact the outside world knows so little about the contents of this religion that in a recent session of the Permanent Mandates

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[1] Arabic *Ḥashīshīs* — those addicted to the use of a stupefying weed.

[2] De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1923), p. 244. Dr. Bliss died in 1920.

9. Hitti S-5 (ca. 1926) 1928 MD1 Syria MD1
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Commission of the League of Nations the question was raised as to whether there was anything in the Druze teachings that was inimical to organized government and to state authority.

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A study of Druzism is especially valuable and interesting not only because its adherents, unlike the adherents of the other sects, have shown remarkable vitality and thrust themselves repeatedly upon the attention of the world—as in the case of the current events in Syria—but because of its historic connection with Christianity and Oriental Christian sects. In its rise and development from Moslem soil, Druzism held close relationship to Christianity and became heir to a number of Zoroastrian and Judaeo-Christian sects, as well as to a body of Hellenistic and Persian philosophies. Many of those sects and schools of thought have since disappeared, but Druzism is still with us; and, through its medium, their ideas have survived to the present day. The religious and philosophical concepts of many Shī'ite Moslem, and a few semi-Christian, sects have been preserved to us through Druzism, though the original sects and their votaries have long become extinct.

As we shall, therefore, in the following pages analyze and investigate the apparently strange dogmas and tenets of Druze belief, we shall find in addition to Neo-Platonic and Manichaean influences, marked traces of Jewish and Christian influences which have trickled thereto through Moslem strata. The basic fundamentals of Druze theology, as we shall see, are paralleled by corresponding Christian dogmas. One of the founders of Druzism was a renegade Christian, and many of its early leading converts were tribes belonging to some one of the Oriental churches.

There is, after all, nothing mysterious in the "Asian mystery," and the "great enigma" does lend itself to solution.

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria MD 1

Arabic-speaking Moslem might take a special pride in the peculiar relation of the Arabs to Islam, and in the dimly-remembered splendours of the early Caliphates, it is safe to say that normally he did not distinguish his being an Arab from his being a Moslem, and even when he did so it was the latter which was foremost in his thought and life.

3

For over a thousand years the majority of the population of Syria had been Moslem. There was not, however, complete unanimity in matters of religious belief. On the one hand, besides the Sunni or orthodox Moslems there were several heterodox Islamic and semi-Islamic sects: Shi'is, Druzes, Alawis and Isma'ilis. On the other hand, there still survived a number of Christian sects, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and others, which had come into existence in the early centuries of the Church's history; and there were in addition a comparatively small number of Jews.

Some of these communities were scattered throughout the country, while others possessed a local predominance in certain parts of it. Most of the districts held by these compact minorities were mountainous. The Lebanese mountains in particular were the homes of dissident communities, either because it was easier for the long-established inhabitants of Lebanon than for their neighbours of the plains to resist the pressure of Islamization, or else because sects which had grown up in the plains migrated to the mountains as an asylum where they would not be molested, or if attacked could better defend themselves. These mountain communities were marked by an especially unbending particularism and resistance to influences from outside.

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Christians and Jews were left to carry on their own communal life without disturbance. For this there were two main reasons. The first was the Islamic doctrine in regard to Christianity and Judaism. Just as the Moslem regulated his life in accordance with the principles of his faith, so he did not deny a similar right to the Christians.

Moslems are not taught by their faith to regard Christians as inherently inferior, since it is in their power to become Moslems, and so enter the community of true believers in

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Among the Moslem communities the main line of division is that between the Sunnis and the rest;

(i) The Sunni Moslems regard themselves as exponents of the original and unadulterated Islamic orthodoxy, as set forth not only in the Holy Book of Islam, but also in the Traditions of the Prophet and the system of theology and jurisprudence built up by the great Islamic thinkers. They constitute the vast majority of believers not only in the Levant States but in the Islamic world as a whole.

The other sects diverged from the main body of Islam at different times on account of political or theological dissension.

(ii) The Shi'is (known in Lebanon as the Metawila) split off in the seventh century A.D., with the struggle for the Caliphate between Muawiya and Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law. Even after the death of Ali they clung to his cause; their breach with the Sunnis was widened and made permanent by the Battle of Kerbela (681), in which Ali's son Husain was killed after the defeat of his army by that of the Umayyads. The Shi'is regard the succession to the Prophet as having passed, not to the orthodox line of Caliphs whom the Sunnis recognize, but to a hereditary line of Imams who were both the spiritual and the temporal heads of Islam, and of whom the first was Ali. The majority of Shi'is recognize twelve such Imams, the last of whom disappeared during the ninth century but will, it is believed, some day reappear. (the Mahdi)

(iii) The Isma'ilis split off from the majority of Shi'is during the eighth century, over the question of the succession to the Imamate. They recognize the first six only of the Shi'i Imams, and regard as the seventh and last of the Imams the brother of the seventh Imam of the Shi'i line. They introduced into Islam a number of esoteric doctrines, such as the ideas of successive emanations or incarnations of God, and of the transmigration of souls. These esoteric doctrines they regard as placed above human discussion and

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1
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dispensed by the Imam to a chosen body of initiates. They look upon the Imam as infallible, and his followers as therefore owing absolute obedience to him. For a time during the Middle Ages part of Syria was ruled by the 'orthodox' Isma'ili Caliphs of Egypt, the Fatimids, but on their decline a heterodox branch was formed as a political secret society, which under the name of the 'Assassins' terrorized a large part of the Islamic world. To-day they owe religious allegiance to the Aga Khan.

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(iv) The Druze sect originated in the eleventh century, when some of the followers of the Fatimid Caliph Hakim, ruler of Egypt, put forward the claim that he was the last incarnation of the Deity. Forced to flee to Syria, they made converts among the adherents of Isma'ilism there, and in course of time those converts came to form a community distinct from the Isma'ilis. They preserved and in some ways developed the esoteric doctrines of Isma'ilism and the distinction between the initiates and the 'ignorant'. They are characterized by the cohesion of their social organization, the strength of their communal spirit and the rigour of their moral code.

(v) Finally, the Alawis, who are also known as the Nusairis, took over from Shi'ism and developed the cult of Ali, whom they regarded as an incarnation of God. From Isma'ilism they borrowed the idea of an esoteric teaching hidden from the masses; and their liturgy, the possession of which distinguishes them from other Islamic communities, seems to be largely Christian in origin. Their faith also contains elements derived from the pre-Christian worship of nature.

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There are five important groups of Christian sects in the country:

(i) The so-called Greek Orthodox are members of the Eastern Orthodox Church which broke finally with the Western Church in the eleventh century. The two Churches differ on a number of doctrinal points,

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the most important of them that concerning the Procession of the Holy Ghost. There are also divergences in ceremonial and discipline; and the Eastern Church rejects the papal claim to universal supremacy. The Greek Orthodox in Syria and Lebanon are subject to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch, who normally lives in Damascus. In the past the Patriarch and the upper hierarchy were Greek, while the lower clergy and the bulk of the laity were Arabs. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, the whole hierarchy became Arab, and Arabic is to-day the main liturgical language.

(ii) The Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) and the Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians) both adhere to the Monophysite doctrine that Christ has only a Divine and not also a human nature: a doctrine which was condemned by the Council of Chalcedon (451). The Syrian Orthodox Church has a Syriac liturgy; the head of the hierarchy is also entitled Patriarch of Antioch and resides at Homs. The Gregorian Church has an Armenian liturgy, and stands at the very centre of the Armenian national tradition. Of its five Patriarchs, the Catholicos of Eshmiadzin in Armenia is the most exalted.

(iii) The Assyrians are the remnants of the Nestorian Church which originated with the Christological controversies of the fifth century. The Nestorians so overemphasized the distinction between the Logos and the man Jesus that there was a tendency to prejudice the conception of a real union between them. Their doctrine was condemned by the Council of Ephesus (431); subsequently, those who adhered to it formed themselves into an independent Church, which spread eastwards and sent missions as far as China. It was almost entirely destroyed by the Mongols in the fourteenth century. It has a distinctive Syriac liturgy; and its spiritual head is the Mar Shimun, formerly resident in Iraq but now in exile.

(iv) The Roman Catholics are mostly members of the

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Uniate Churches: that is, those Churches whose members formerly belonged to one or other of the non-Catholic Churches, and at some time in the past acknowledged the papal supremacy and gave up doctrines which the Roman Catholic Church regards as heretical, but retained their own liturgies and certain distinctive features of discipline and organization. There are five Uniate Churches with important bodies of adherents in Syria and Lebanon: the Greek Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic and Chaldaean Catholic Churches, which split off from the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Nestorian Churches respectively; and the Maronite Church, which originally held the Monothelete doctrine that Christ has two Natures but one Will, and which returned to Rome finally and as a whole in the twelfth century. The Maronites, like the Syrian Orthodox and Assyrians, have a Syriac liturgy, and a Patriarch of Antioch, resident in Lebanon, as their spiritual head. There are comparatively few Roman Catholics of the Latin or Western rite.

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(v) The Protestants are the fruits of the labours of American and other missionaries during the nineteenth and present centuries.

The Jews are mainly Arabic-speaking and long-settled in the country.

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Of these religious communities, the Armenians (Orthodox and Catholic), the Assyrians and some of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics are not Arabic-speaking and have, for the most part, come recently into the Levant States. The Armenians came originally from the Caucasus and have their own language and national traditions. Most of those now resident in Syria and Lebanon have entered the country during the last half-century, in consequence of the great massacres in Asia Minor (1895–1915), and more recently of the annexation of Alexandretta by Turkey.[1]

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Most of the Assyrians have been settled in Iraq since the

[1] See Chapter XI.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1 Lebanon MC1

S 795 563 last war, when they were dislodged from their original homes in the Kurdish mountains; the Chaldaeans have lived in the Mosul area of Iraq for many centuries. In 1933 a period L 795 563 of tension between a section of the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government ended with the killing of some hundreds of them by Iraqi troops. Several thousands in consequence crossed the frontier into Syria, and although some of them later returned to Iraq, others were settled in the Jazirah with assistance from the League of Nations. Their settlement became an integral part of the Syrian State in 1942.

A large part of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics still speak Syriac. They have been settled since before the coming of Islam in north Syria and south Turkey, in and around the Taurus hills, against which the wave of Arab influence exhausted itself. Thus they have been able to preserve their S Syriac dialect which farther south has been replaced almost L everywhere by Arabic. Many are, however, bilingual in [191] Arabic and Syriac, and others have abandoned Syriac and are now Arabic-speaking.

S L 563 There are certain other groups which resemble the Armenians and Assyrians in not being Arabic-speaking, but unlike them are orthodox Moslems. The most important of them are:

(i) The Kurds, of whom there are perhaps 200,000.[1] They are mountaineers from the high country which links the Anatolian and Persian plateaux, and speak a dialect akin to Persian. Some of them have long been resident in the country, but others have emigrated in the last twenty years from their homes in the mountains of eastern Turkey, in order to escape the repressive measures of the Turkish Government. There are small numbers of Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Alawis and Christians, but most of those who speak Kurdish as their native language are Sunnis.

(ii) The Turcomans, who number perhaps 30,000. They came originally from Central Asia, and their language is a dialect of Turkish. Originally nomads, they have now become semi-sedentary or wholly sedentary cultivators of the soil.

[1] These figures are only rough estimates; there are no official statistics for national and racial minorities.

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(iii) The Circassians, who are by origin Moslems from the Caucasus. They fled from their homes after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, and were settled by the Ottoman Government along the western edge of the Syrian Desert, to prevent the encroachments of the tribes. There are about 20,000 of them.

(iv) There are also a number of Yazidis, adherents of a secret dualistic religion and with a dialect of their own; but they are only a small offshoot of the main community in Iraq.

5

With these exceptions the minorities are Arabic-speaking and have lived in Syria and Lebanon for many generations; akin to the majority in many things, their basic difference is one of religious loyalties.

The general nature of the problem which they raise can be stated briefly. It is a product of two factors: first, of certain traditional differences which linger on in a new age; secondly, of the varying relations of the different elements in the population to the process of Westernization.

Serious at any time, religious differences were made more serious in the past by the prevalence of the theocratic view of life; differences of religious belief involved different political loyalties and principles of social conduct. The theocratic view was the basis of the 'millet-system', which, while it allowed a certain autonomy to the minorities, also increased the completeness of their separation from one another and from the majority. This was particularly true of those minorities of which a large proportion lived compactly in a single area; they came to regard themselves, if they had not always regarded themselves, as a 'peculiar people' linked by no moral or political tie with their neighbours. To complete their isolation there was added the memory of injustices, real or imagined, which they had suffered at the hands of the majority.

The persistence of these divergences in the present age adds a new and complicating factor to the problem of Westernization. It is not only that different communities have different paths to tread if they are to Westernize themselves: for example, the problems of social organization

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among the Druzes of Jebel Druze are different from those among the Lebanese Christians. The growth of the Arab nationalist movement has also affected the problem of minorities. It is true that in principle Arab nationalism need not and indeed should not involve a problem of religious minorities. But there are several reasons why at the present day it does involve such a problem. The first reason is to be found in the immaturity of political thinking among the Arabs. Arabism, as the previous chapter made clear, has not yet determined its relationship with Islam; more generally, neither majority nor minorities have yet faced the problem of the connexion between religion and the State. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not their most thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs because they are heterodox Moslems or not Moslems at all; equally there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for unrestrained Sunni ascendancy. Among some of the Christian minorities there is a further tendency to regard the West as their spiritual home, to which they can belong in a way in which they could never belong to the Arabo-Islamic world to whose fringes they have so long clung.

The mutual suspicion has been increased in the last twenty-five years by the bad relations which have existed between the nationalists and the French authorities. In these years Arab nationalism has been largely a movement of opposition to France. Those whose nationalism is still coloured by religion draw from that an additional reason for suspecting the Christians as being of the same religion as the French. But quite apart from religious prejudice, suspicion has inevitably been aroused by the long-standing attachment of certain of the Christian communities to France. Many of the nationalists believe that this attachment has been used by her as an instrument in a policy of dividing, weakening and in other ways opposing the nationalist movement. Those of the minorities who have been used unwittingly in this way they regard as obstacles to the achievement of their aspirations; those who have lent themselves willingly to it they regard as traitors to the national cause.

Even when members of minorities become Arab nationalists, as many of them do, they often wear their nationalism with a difference. It is not only that they tend to emphasize

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the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

10

The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a large proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

795 the standard of living and education among the Alawis and
648 to develop their corporate consciousness; and who believe that if this is to be done the Alawis must be given a separate administration specially adapted to their needs and under benevolent foreign tutelage. There are others who admit the importance of these tasks but who emphasize that it is equally necessary to give the Alawis a consciousness of being part of the Arab nation as an alternative to sectarianism and to a paralysing localism. Among the Alawis themselves, one party adheres to the former school of thought, a second to the latter, but the greater number are suspicious of all interference from outside and wish only to be left alone.

Here, as in Jebel Druze, great social and intellectual processes are beginning of which the results have yet to appear. But it will probably take longer to bring Alawi society to a point where it becomes possible to face the problem of its definitive political status.

II

311 The problem of the Jazirah, the north-eastern province
167 of Syria, is in many ways different from that of Jebel Druze and the Alawi territory. Before the War of 1914–1918 it was largely an empty district, except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was sparsely cultivated where it was cultivated at all; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria they established a considerable measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already possessed by virtue of its fertility. The French authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian and other minorities who had been forced to leave their dwellings in Turkey, or who preferred not to live in the predominantly Moslem parts of Syria. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, together with Assyrians from Iraq after the events of 1933, have moved into the province; and even larger numbers of Kurdish Moslems, dislodged from their homes in Eastern Turkey by the policy of forcible assimilation
361 adopted by the Turkish Government. The new towns of
311 Hassetche and Qamishli and new villages have been created and new crops introduced, and the district has been opened up to regular commerce. The Beduin have been controlled
AND CERTAIN TRIBES AMONG THEM PERSUADED TO SETTLE ON THE LAND.

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563 619 formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

12

162 795 In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

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184 The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

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social and economic characteristics. For example, the Christians accounted in 1938 for about 32 per cent of the total school population, and for an even larger proportion of pupils in the secondary schools. It is important to notice that 32 per cent of the Christian students attended schools controlled mainly by foreign Christian missions, 61 per cent attended private schools mostly maintained by religious communities, and only 7 per cent attended official schools.[1] Since the education given in the first two types of school is sectarian, Christians are receiving a different kind of education from Moslems, a far larger proportion of whom attend official institutions.

Educational differences are reinforced by social ones. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of interconnected units, of which the relations with the Moslem community are peaceful and correct but not in normal circumstances cordial. This is especially true of the older people brought up under the Ottoman régime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of nationalism are helping to make the young less conscious than their elders of their confessional loyalties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects and religions. Economically, also, the Christians tend to constitute a more predominantly urban community than the Moslems, with all the differences which that involves, but there is a Christian peasantry in certain parts of the country, similar in many ways to the Moslem peasantry.

In spite of incidents like those of 1860, on the whole the history of Syria has not been one of religious persecution on a large scale, and the Christians have enjoyed long periods of toleration, although not of equality with the Moslems. Such toleration has existed partly because of the long residence of Christians in the country, partly because they were not numerous enough to constitute a serious threat to Moslem supremacy, and partly because clergy and laity alike were for the most part Arabic in language and culture.

On the whole the growth of the nationalist movement has not had unfavourable consequences for the Christians. Individual Christians have played an important part in the movement in Syria as elsewhere. Nor is it merely isolated

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 91.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria

individuals who are sympathetic to Arab nationalism. Such sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox. (One reason for this may be that since the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Greek Orthodox have had no external 'protector' and so have had to understand the necessity of being on good terms with their neighbours.) Nationalist ideas are particularly strong in the younger generation, who imbibe them in school and elsewhere. The Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab traditions; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missionaries and teachers; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that any relaxation of French control would mean the loss of their privileged position.

The leaders of the nationalist movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians, and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of national feeling have often been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders springs from a genuine desire to create a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; and also from the wish not to alienate Western opinion. While, however, the more moderate and responsible nationalists are tolerant on principle and by sentiment, there is a certain suspicion of Christians among their less enlightened followers.

14

The Druzes and Alawis in the six provinces are outlying sections of the larger communities in Jebel Druze and the district of Latakia respectively, and do not require separate discussion here. The Isma'ilis form a compact community in the province of Hama; they keep much to themselves and want only to be left alone. The Circassians are to be found in the Hauran, on the northern frontier and on the Euphrates; they still constitute a separate entity with their own language and customs. During the Syrian revolt of 1925 they were used as irregulars by the French authorities, and this made them more unpopular with the Arabs than before. Some of them have at times demanded local autonomy, but

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courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous; this system replaced that of the 'capitulations' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

8

The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria/MD/

of them indeed were better treated than the bulk of the population.) Special regard was paid to their needs and traditions, and opportunities were given for the development of their self-consciousness and self-respect. The effects of generations of inferiority cannot be wholly wiped out in the course of twenty years, but in those years Syria and Lebanon made a certain advance towards individual equality as the democratic countries of the West understand it.

Among the most urgent of the country's social problems is that of the archaic system of land-tenure. No direct assault, it is true, was made on the position of the great semi-feudal landowners. But the first step towards reform was taken by the establishment of a modern system of land-registration and the initiation of a land survey. Also the number of small freeholders was increased by the sale of public domain and the encouragement of the permanent partition of land held communally on the 'musha'' system.[1] In addition something was done to help foreign trade by the extension of harbour and other facilities.

A State system of schools was constructed almost from nothing; it is still very imperfect and not yet able to supply so good an education as is given by the best of the private schools, but at least it includes every grade of school, from primary up to the Syrian University in Damascus, an official institution set up in the early years of French Mandatory rule with the object of providing higher education in Arabic.

The foundations which have been laid are solid, but there is still much to be done before Syria and Lebanon possess even the framework of a modern society. Thus expenditure on public works and social services is still very small; the medical services are inadequate. No adequate census has been taken, although there has been a very elaborate and complete one in the neighbouring territory of Palestine. Labour legislation scarcely exists. Most serious gap of all, only inadequate measures to improve agricultural conditions have so far been adopted. Little provision has been made for agricultural education. Although excellent plans for irrigation have been drawn up, few of them were put into effect until the Allied occupation of 1941. The authorities had done little to provide facilities for agricultural credit, and nothing to encourage the formation of co-operative societies.

[1] See Chapter V.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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S L 161 162 chief towns of Syria and their populations are: Aleppo, 339,000 Damascus, the capital, 303,000; Hama, 134,000; Latakia, 90,000; Dair az-Zor, 65,000: of the Lebanon—Beirut, the capital, 247,000; Tripoli, 86,000; Sidon (Saida), 78,800; Zahle, 78,031. The population of each country is increasing by about 2 per cent a year. Between half a million and a million Syrians and Lebanese live abroad, mainly in the Americas and Africa; emigration continues; during 1952 about 100 Lebanese emigrated monthly, most of them to South America.

S L 162 *Religions*

RELIGIOUS SECTS AND PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

	Syria		Lebanon	
	Population in 1947	*Seats in 1947*	*Population in 1951*	*Seats in 1952*
Sunni	2,040,908	100	273,125	9
Shiis (incl. Alawis)	447,993	13	237,107	8
Druze	96,641	3	82,268	3
Maronite	14,133	1	377,544	13
Orthodox Greek	144,517	7	130,858	5
Orthodox Armenian	104,925	2	67,139	2
Orthodox Syrian (Jacobite)	43,081	2	4,562	
Catholic (Latin rite)	6,125		4,127	
Catholic (Greek rite)	49,543	2	81,764	3
Catholic (Syrian rite)	17,613	1	3,911	
Catholic (Armenian rite)	17,493	1	14,218	
Catholic (Chaldean rite)	4,991			
Protestants	11,959		12,641	
Nestorians	9,630			
Jews	30,873	1	5,993	
Others			6,684	
Minorities		3		1
Total:	3,043,310	136	1,303,441[1]	44

S L 197 162 The language of the great majority of Syrians and Lebanese is Arabic, and they think of themselves as Arabs. There are minorities of race, religion, and language:[1] the Kurds number between 100,000 and 200,000 and are mainly in northern Syria; most of them speak Kurdish but are progressively becoming less and less distinct from the Arabs. The Armenians, who live mainly in the three principal cities, now number about 140,000, although some 20,000 emigrated to Soviet Armenia in the 1940's. Most of them came as refugees from the Turks after the First World War. Other racial minorities are the Turkomans, Circassians, and Assyrians. Most of the religious sects

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795 [1] For further details see A. H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1947).

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shown in the table above are found in other parts of the Middle East but three indigenous sects need mention here: the Druzes, who are a mountain people professing a religion which derived from Islam in the eleventh century A.D., but became independent; the Alawis of the mountains behind Latakia, whose religion appears to be a dogmatic form of Shii Islam with some survivals of Christian ritual; and the Maronites, who are a Christian sect, living mainly in the north of Lebanon.

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The religion of the majority of Syrians and of the head of the Syrian state is Sunni Islam; in the Lebanon, Muslims and Christians are fairly evenly divided and the President of the Republic is a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. The Christians of the Arab Levant have provided the Middle East with great leaders in journalism, letters, politics, and science, but in present-day Syria the Christians are mainly prominent in commerce and industry. There is hardly any dangerous animosity between the sects, but sectarian bonds are a very real force in the lives of people who for so long lived under the Turkish *millet* system whereby each sect was an administrative unit, the head of which exercised considerable authority.

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So mixed a population living in a variety of environments naturally does not constitute one physical type, but some generalizations are hazarded for the sake of a fuller picture. Dark hair is almost universal but the skin of the town dweller is no darker than that of a Mediterranean European; the Syrians and Lebanese are not often as tall or as heavy as the average Englishman but they mature at an earlier age. The poorer nomad eats mainly bread, with milk and fruit and vegetables as less frequent additions and meat as an event, but in the towns and villages most people eat a full diet with rather more oil and spice than is used in Britain. The cultivator and the nomad wear local costumes but most townspeople wear European clothes; the tarbush or the head-cloth are usual but not universal headgear for men. Most Muslim women wear the veil, but in the towns the richer women are becoming more and more emancipated and, particularly in Beirut, many lead the same lives as Christian women. In Lebanon and in Damascus and Aleppo the way of life is very like that in southern Europe, and both countries make a pleasant home for a European.

History

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Semitic-speaking people have inhabited for four or five millennia the area which is known historically as Syria, and yet for much of this period the rulers of what is now Syria an

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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a special course of two years would prepare full judges and *muftis*. Eight of the proposed fourteen classes were in existence in 1945–46. The Aleppo school follows the same program. At the end of the first and second courses a public examination is held for which the questions are set by the professors of the 2 schools at Aleppo and Damascus sitting together.

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The Damascus school is run by a board composed of the *qadi* (a judge of the canon law of Islam) as chairman, the *mufti* of the Republic, the *naqib* (dean or registrar), the directors of Waqf of the Republic and of Damascus, two representatives of the Ministry of Education, and finally the director and the secretary of the school. Education is entirely free, including the board and lodging of the boarding students.

A sectarian Muslim school of a different kind is the Islamiyah College in Aleppo maintained by a society of Muslims who support the idea of a modern education but who also believe in a sound Islamic religious education. Its sponsors believe that the curriculum of the modern schools errs in giving too little attention to Muslim religious education and to Muslim character. At the same time it is felt that it is necessary "to counteract the effects of foreign schools." A group of citizens mostly connected with the Muslim Orphanage of Aleppo got together and solicited the help of a devout Aleppo lady who gave them the funds for erecting a large building for the school on the outskirts of the city in 1943. The school in 1945–46 had 238 boys enrolled in fifth primary through the sixth secondary. It had 30 boarding students of whom 8 were from the Orphanage and were given their education and living free after passing a competitive examination. The remainder came from the districts of Aleppo province and paid for their tuition, food, and lodging at the rate of £S700 (about $318.00). Tuition for day students ranges from £S50 to £S160 ($22.70 to $72.00) with full exemption for 10 boys and half-exemption for another 51 boys.

The curriculum of the government schools is followed with the addition of more hours for the study of the Koran, religion, and Muslim character. The school is supported by contributions from the public, by grants from the central government and the municipality of Aleppo, and by fees.

The Christian sectarian schools follow two main types—the Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholic.

The Orthodox schools are exemplified by the Greek Orthodox school in Damascus which was visited by the American Council Commission. This school and 5 other schools in Damascus are conducted by the denominational council of the Greek Orthodox church—a council which has control

44cMatthews and Akrawi S,G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Mi Middle East
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of the property, the finances, and the philanthropic and educational activities of the church. A board of five men, all laymen, is chosen by the council to have charge of the schools. These 6 schools make a complete kindergarten, primary, and secondary ladder by themselves, consisting of 2 boys primary schools, 2 girls primary schools (1 of which is topped by an intermediate section), a coeducational primary school, and a complete secondary school for boys. Girls leaving the girls intermediate may join the secondary classes at the boys secondary school, and in 1945–46 there were 5 girls who had done this.

The schools are supported by fees, by income from the church endowment and property, by grants from the government, and by contributions. The buildings are owned by the Greek Orthodox church and community. The student body, though predominately Greek Orthodox, has students from other denominations. The boys secondary school, for example, has about 40 Muslims, 25 Jews, and 20 Catholics. The teaching staff of the school is also mixed: 16 Greek Orthodox, 5 Muslims, 2 Jews, and 3 Catholics. Fees are £S6 to £S90 in the primary schools and £S20 to £S200 in the secondary schools.

All pupils whose families receive help from the welfare society of the Greek Orthodox community are exempt from fees. Other pupils pay according to ability after inquiry by the priests and the committee.

In general, the curriculum follows that of the government, but with two important differences. French is begun in the first primary grade, and English in the first secondary grade. Arabic reading is begun toward the end of the first kindergarten year and continued in the second kindergarten year. By the time the children enter first grade, they know how to read. The first grade is, therefore, in reality equivalent to the second grade of the government schools; and, although the primary school is nominally five years, it is in actual fact six years. The first-grade children appear to be above the average age. This procedure may perhaps have been necessitated by the early teaching of French.

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The problem of teaching a multiplicity of languages in primary schools is found in an extreme form in Armenian schools. The largest Armenian community in Syria is in Aleppo where Armenians took refuge after the Armenian massacres in Turkey during the First World War. Anxious to preserve their national language and to know the language of the country of their adoption, they have had to teach both Arabic and Armenian. At the same time the advantages that accrued to those who knew French under the mandate made them introduce that language into their schools, while the fact that most Armenian youth who wanted to continue their

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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education preferred an American school forced them to teach English as well. 563 873*

This situation is well illustrated by the 2 Giligian primary schools in Aleppo—1 for boys and 1 for girls. Both are under the same principal. The boys school had in 1945–46 an attendance of 254 boys, while the girls school had 228 girls. The kindergarten department in connection with the latter had 240 boys and girls in four sections, one section of which had 72 children. Naturally, the teacher could do little more than watch over the children. In these schools Armenian is begun in the upper section of the kindergarten, Arabic in the first grade, English in the second grade, and French in the third. Previously, however, it was the practice to begin French in the first grade.

In order to provide for a program so heavily loaded with languages, each grade has an average of thirty-six to thirty-seven periods a week. The program also extends over six years instead of the usual five years of the public schools. The schools are housed in rented houses, and are supported mostly by fees ranging from £S30–£S60 a year. About 65 boys and girls are exempted. The government pays a grant of £S750 a year and the salary of one teacher which it supplies. The other teachers are graduates of American secondary schools, holders of the second *baccalauréat*, or women who have had some secondary studies. Two are from the Armenian secondary school in Istanbul, Turkey, while five men and women are graduates of the Armenian teachers college in Nicosia, Cyprus. This is an institution offering a course of three years above the secondary school for the education of teachers for Armenian schools.

While Orthodox schools are mostly controlled by laymen's councils of the community with the clergy in the background, the Catholic schools are controlled to a considerable extent and often directly by the clergy. The 3 Catholic private schools visited by the Commission in Syria were of this nature. A Catholic primary school in Aleppo was under the supervision of the Bishop of Aleppo and supported by him. The Maronite school for boys is headed by a priest and housed in a building belonging to the church. Its deficit is met by the Maronite welfare committee. A Maronite girls school in Latakia is conducted by the Maronite nuns of the Holy Family commonly known as the "nuns of 'Ibrin," a village in Lebanon where the mother convent is located. In all these schools French is stressed, except that the latter school by agreement with the government begins the teaching of French in the fourth grade. 795 873*

The final type of private school is the nonsectarian school maintained either by groups and societies or by individuals. 873* 872*

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

162 186 The people of Syria are predominantly of ancient Semitic stock, modified by centuries of conquest, and Arabic in culture, language and religion. The population, however, includes numerous minority groups, some of which exist as compact communities with distinctive customs and traditions. The official method of enumeration is on the basis 161 of religious affiliation. In 1949, the population was estimated at about 3,177,700, exclusive of undetermined numbers of Bedouin, representing less than 10 per cent 162 of the total. Approximately 86 per cent of 185 the inhabitants were adherents of Islam; about 69 per cent belonged to the Sunni sect. The heterodox sects consisted of roughly 355,500 Alawites, 100,600 Druzes, 32,800 Ismaillites, 13,700 Shiites and 2,900 Yazides.

Syria, like Lebanon, has important indigenous Christian minorities, which together account for almost 14 per cent of the population. As of 1949, the Greek Orthodox Church claimed about 153,900 members; the Armenian Orthodox, 107,300; the Syrian Orthodox, 44,970; and the Greek Catholic, 51,500. Other church groups, comprising Armenian, Syrian and Roman Catholics, Maronites, Nestorians (Assyrians), Chaldeans and Protestants, each numbered from 5,000 to 18,000. In addition, there were slightly over 31,000 Jews, mainly of Sephardic origin and with a long history of residence in Syria. With the exception of about 125,300 Armenians and 10,200 Assyrians, the members of the Christian minorities are largely Arabic-speaking and closely re- 167 lated to their Moslem compatriots. Most of 162 the Armenians have come to Syria since 1894 as refugees from Turkish territory. The majority reside in the larger towns, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo, but considerable numbers have settled in the Al Jazira region. The Assyrians who fled to Syria from Iraq in 1933 and the Chaldeans

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162 dwell in the Khabour river basin. The Syrian
167 Orthodox and Catholic churches flourish in the north, where the inhabitants of many
[191] mountain villages employ Syriac dialects, preserved since pre-Islamic times.

● 795 Prominent among the Moslem minorities are the Alawites and the Druzes. Although both are scattered throughout the country, they are found primarily in the provinces, which, under the Mandate, were semi-autonomous units of the Levant. The Alawites inhabit the province of Latakia, comprising the coastal plain and a large part of the Orontes river valley, where they represent about 70 per cent of the population. The Druzes form a closely knit religious community which migrated to the Jebel ed Druz highlands from Lebanon in the last century.

162 Several racial and linguistic minority groups are contained in the orthodox Moslem majority. About 200,000 Kurds reside in Syria, chiefly in Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces and in the city of Damascus. A large proportion have lived for generations on the fringes of Kurdistan, within the pres-
[161] ent boundaries of Syria, but some are recent colonists from eastern Turkey to the Al Jazira area, where they constitute a considerable part of the population. Smaller non-Arabic-speaking groups include about 30,000 Turkomans, settled around Aleppo and in the Orontes river valley, and almost 20,000 Circassians, found along the northern frontier and in the Euphrates river basin.

Over three quarters of the population live in the western and the northwestern provinces, with the greatest concentration in the coastal region, in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo, and in the Homs and the Hama areas. In the interior, the settled districts are limited to the river valleys, while the steppe and the desert country to the east and the south constitute
161 the home of nomadic Bedouin tribes. In 1948, the density of population in Latakia was estimated at 215 per square mile. In the province of Aleppo it was 113 per square mile; in the province of Damascus, 90 per

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but those who have followed the other road, to North and South America, to Australia and to other of the more distant parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands. The great majority of them started as retail traders on a small scale, but many took to wholesale trade and to the manufacture of textiles and other goods. The process of taking root was harder for them than for those who went to Egypt, since it involved learning new languages and acquiring new ways of life; but they have already been assimilated to a considerable extent, and the large Syrian colonies in the United States, Brazil and the Argentine, with smaller ones in other countries, have become prosperous, loyal and respected elements in the communities in which they are living. Most of them have given up all but a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and there seems to be no obstacle to their ultimate complete assimilation, the more so since the flow of emigrants to the countries of the New World has greatly diminished during the last two decades. It has been partly diverted to British and French West Africa, much of the internal trade of which is now in Syrian hands.

The consequences of the emigration for Syria were both good and bad. They were bad in so far as it was the more talented and enterprising of the country's youth who went abroad, during the period of their greatest energy and often for ever. On the other hand, the level of prosperity was raised by the remittances which successful emigrants sent home to their relatives, and by the savings which they brought back with them. Also, they introduced new ideas, and, what was even more important, the example of a new and in many respects attractive way of life. These ideas, this example and the bare fact that Syrians were prosperous and happy in foreign lands, deeply influenced the attitude of Syria to the West. All this was especially true of Lebanon, since it supplied so large a proportion of the emigrants.

18

Western influences also came by way of education. Students began to go abroad, to seek the new learning in the schools of Europe and America; and Western schools became ever more numerous in the Near East. The greater number of them were established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the

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seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

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648 some recognized 'foreign protection' as a gift too dangerous to be accepted.

4

648 Sympathy for France depended not only upon her special
177 links with certain elements in the population, but also upon the hold of French culture over the educated classes. Most educated people of whatever religion speak French; many know it as well as they know Arabic, and there are some, mainly among the Catholics, for whom it has replaced Arabic as their native language. French books are widely read, French social customs copied, and there are many who have travelled or studied in France and have a profound affection for the country, its people and its way of life.

177 It is the Catholic missions, working through schools and
871 other institutions, which have played the largest part in
799 winning Syria and Lebanon for French civilization. The mission-schools and colleges and the Université de S. Joseph in Beirut have always concentrated on imparting to their students a mastery of the French language, even if that should involve neglect of the teaching of Arabic. The majority of those who possess any understanding of European culture have been trained by the Jesuits, the Franciscans or other missionaries; and so long as the Catholic schools continue to provide the best intellectual education which the country can offer, there is no need to fear for the position of French culture. The social work carried out by the missions must also be mentioned; they have borne on their shoulders a great part of the work of alleviating social conditions, and have deserved the gratitude of those who care for social justice. Thus all French Governments, clerical or anti-clerical, regarded it as essential to maintain for the missions their right of unrestricted activity.

177 Long before the beginning of the French occupation, the
649 Governments of France, seeing more clearly than some others the political significance of cultural ties, set themselves to preserve and extend the predominance of French civilization. The institution of the Mandate gave greater freedom for their efforts. In some ways the position of French culture was improved in the years between the two wars. French was one of the official languages and knowledge of it was an indispensable qualification for holding most of the higher

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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In summary, it may be said that, while there are some good private schools, the general impression left on the visitor is one of precarious finance leading to makeshift arrangements, such as poor accommodations, small rooms, crowded classes, and, often, poorly qualified teachers. On the other hand, they make a more determined effort to keep in touch with the parents than do the public schools and are more careful about the teaching of languages. There is little, if any, original or creative planning being done in the private schools with regard to curriculum, methods, or organization. If they are not following the government curriculum, they are usually imitating one or the other of the foreign-school systems in the country, generally either the French or the American schools. 872" 873"

Foreign Schools

Foreign schools in Syria belong to five different nationalities: French, American, British, Danish, and Greek, named in the order of their numerical importance. Greek and Danish schools could not be visited by the Commission, the latter lying in eastern Syria outside of the Commission's itinerary. French schools were entirely closed during the whole year of 1945–46 and could not, therefore, be visited. The visits of the Commission were confined to 5 American schools in Damascus, Aleppo, and Latakia, and to a British school at Idlib, which lies between Aleppo and Latakia.

One originally French school, the Lazarist school for boys in Damascus, was visited. It is one of the oldest, if not the oldest existing school in that city. The Lazarist mission had been founded in Damascus in 1755, and the school had followed about two decades later. After a very long service of a century and a half, it had become part of the Catholic community of Damascus. When the Franco-Syrian crisis of 1945 took place, therefore, it had been registered as a native school and allowed to remain open. (A separate school for girls was also open, which included boys in the first grade.) The school, however, was running on a reduced scale, as it had opened late and many students had gone elsewhere. The morale seemed to be low, and there was an atmosphere of uncertainty about future developments. [992]

The school consisted of five primary and four secondary grades. It had fourteen teachers, of whom eight were brothers. This is rather typical of French missionary schools in Syria and Lebanon run by the various Catholic orders of monks. In this way cost is reduced to a minimum. Teaching was being conducted in Arabic, except in science and mathematics in the upper classes, which were taught in French. The teaching of French started from

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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year—after many likely students had registered elsewhere. The school had a staff of four full-time and two part-time teachers and a registration of 33 full-time day students in the first two classes. In addition, there were the two special English classes, one of which was for adults. It is hoped that this school will eventually develop into a junior college, drawing away from the University at Beirut some of the pressure of student applications. Teaching is conducted in English, and the program is the same as that of the preparatory school of the University in Beirut. 872 873

The two American schools, one for boys and one for girls, in Latakia are maintained by the Reformed Presbyterian Mission of North America and are under one administration. They were founded in 1860 and occupy buildings belonging to the Mission erected in the late eighties. The boys school had an elementary section of six grades enrolling 332 boys and a secondary section with four grades enrolling 74 students. The eleventh grade, which is the highest grade, was missing in 1945–46. The school had twelve teachers, of whom two were American. The government contributes two teachers but no financial aid. The girls school had a kindergarten with 121 boys and girls, and a school ordinarily of eleven grades of which only eight existed during 1945–46, enrolling 313 girls. Girls finishing the eighth grade may continue in the boys school. Three girls were doing so. The girls school had twelve teachers, of whom one was American. Fees ranged from £S36 to £S180 a year. Boarding fees were £S500. There were 24 boarders in the boys school, but none in the girls school. [777]

The program is a modified American program of the college-preparatory type. English is begun in the fourth grade, and French in the third grade. All teaching is in Arabic in the first six grades and is changed to English at the beginning of the seventh grade. General and European history is taught. The schools have always prepared students for the government primary-school certificate examination. At one time they also prepared for the *brevet*, but this has been discontinued. The two schools aim to prepare students for Aleppo College and the American University of Beirut. The latter accepts their students upon examination. The schools have no laboratory. The boys school has a small library. A chapel service is held once a week. The student body is drawn from many of the religions and sects in Syria. Greek Orthodox students were the largest group (139), followed by Protestants (54), Muslims, Alawites, Maronites, Greek Catholics, Druzes, and Isma'iliyas.

The American High School for Girls in Aleppo is the combination of a Congregational Mission school at Marash, Turkey, before the First World War, and another Presbyterian school at Aleppo. Its educational policies

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Arabic-speaking Moslem might take a special pride in the peculiar relation of the Arabs to Islam, and in the dimly-remembered splendours of the early Caliphates, it is safe to say that normally he did not distinguish his being an Arab from his being a Moslem, and even when he did so it was the latter which was foremost in his thought and life.

3

For over a thousand years the majority of the population of Syria had been Moslem. There was not, however, complete unanimity in matters of religious belief. On the one hand, besides the Sunni or orthodox Moslems there were several heterodox Islamic and semi-Islamic sects: Shi'is, Druzes, Alawis and Isma'ilis. On the other hand, there still survived a number of Christian sects, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and others, which had come into existence in the early centuries of the Church's history; and there were in addition a comparatively small number of Jews.

Some of these communities were scattered throughout the country, while others possessed a local predominance in certain parts of it. Most of the districts held by these compact minorities were mountainous. The Lebanese mountains in particular were the homes of dissident communities, either because it was easier for the long-established inhabitants of Lebanon than for their neighbours of the plains to resist the pressure of Islamization, or else because sects which had grown up in the plains migrated to the mountains as an asylum where they would not be molested, or if attacked could better defend themselves. These mountain communities were marked by an especially unbending particularism and resistance to influences from outside.

4

Christians and Jews were left to carry on their own communal life without disturbance. For this there were two main reasons. The first was the Islamic doctrine in regard to Christianity and Judaism. Just as the Moslem regulated his life in accordance with the principles of his faith, so he did not deny a similar right to the Christians.

Moslems are not taught by their faith to regard Christians as inherently inferior, since it is in their power to become Moslems, and so enter the community of true believers in

which the only distinction is that of piety; nor as adherents of a false religion, since Islam considers Jesus to have been one of the succession of true prophets. They regard them as having gone astray, first in taking the revelation of Jesus as the final and complete revelation, and secondly in looking upon Jesus not simply as a prophet, a man through whom God's word has come to mankind, but as God incarnate. It is the doctrine of the Incarnation, and therefore also the doctrine of the Trinity, which are for Moslems the stumbling-blocks in Christianity. As 'People of the Book', believers in God, in prophecy and in the Day of Judgement, Christians like Jews are to be tolerated and to be allowed a certain status by the side of the Islamic community. But they cannot be regarded as members of that community. Nor can a Moslem willingly acquiesce in subjection to a non-Moslem Government, although his own weakness may compel a temporary submission.

Such is the attitude towards Christians which Islam enjoins: an attitude of reasoned and well-defined tolerance. But it is not surprising that there should during the thousand years of almost unchallenged Moslem supremacy have been periods of persecution, nor that the ordinary Moslem should have come to feel a certain contempt for the Eastern Christians who were the only Christians he knew: the contempt which he who knows himself to be strong feels for those in his power, and which he who believes himself to possess the truth feels for those who have rejected it.

The other reason for the persistence of the Christian and Jewish communities was the existence of a certain view of the State: a view which was universally accepted in western Asia, and indeed far beyond it, until recent generations. According to this view the Government existed to defend the cultivated lands, to maintain order, to tax their populations, and for nothing more. The laws by which the life of the individual and of society was regulated sprang not from positive enactment of the ruler but from the religious doctrines and ancestral customs to which individual and society adhered. It is true that since the ruling power was Moslem by faith, the Moslem religious law and the courts had a special relation to the Government. But a Moslem would no more have thought of compelling Christians and Jews to conform to Moslem law in matters of personal life and relationships than they of

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abandoning their own religious codes. Law was personal. Not simply was there no concept of equality before the law; there was no idea of sameness.

For these reasons, throughout the period of Arab and Ottoman rule the Christians and Jews were allowed a certain autonomy. Each sect formed a community, or as it was called in Arabic a 'millah' and in Turkish a 'millet', within the State and co-terminous with it. In matters affecting the community, the Government treated with it as a whole through its heads, and not with the members of it individually. Certain civil functions were devolved upon the spiritual heads and representative bodies of the communities. They were allowed to administer the property and institutions of their communities and to decide matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on—in accordance with the tenets of their faith.

This system originated long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It developed gradually and was only formalized in the nineteenth century by a series of Imperial edicts. Throughout the period of Moslem ascendancy it succeeded in preserving self-respect and a sense of community among the religious minorities, although it may also have helped to perpetuate bitterness and suspicion between them.

The heterodox sects which clung to the fringes of Islam were in a more ambiguous position. Officially they were regarded as parts of the general body of Islam; but in fact the cleavage between them and the orthodox was almost as great as that between Moslems and Christians, and they like the Christians were usually left to direct their internal affairs in accordance with customary law and the precepts of their religions.

5

Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belonging to other communities; and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. This was true also of every Christian sect in its relations with the others, for each sect formed a separate 'millet'; and of the orthodox Moslems in their relations with the heterodox. Difference of sect was

no less important an element in the common consciousness than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

6

Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization. Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

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(iii) The Circassians, who are by origin Moslems from the Caucasus. They fled from their homes after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, and were settled by the Ottoman Government along the western edge of the Syrian Desert, to prevent the encroachments of the tribes. There are about 20,000 of them. S L 563

(iv) There are also a number of Yazidis, adherents of a secret dualistic religion and with a dialect of their own; but they are only a small offshoot of the main community in Iraq.

5.

With these exceptions the minorities are Arabic-speaking and have lived in Syria and Lebanon for many generations; akin to the majority in many things, their basic difference is one of religious loyalties. S 563 L 563

The general nature of the problem which they raise can be stated briefly. It is a product of two factors: first, of certain traditional differences which linger on in a new age; secondly, of the varying relations of the different elements in the population to the process of Westernization.

Serious at any time, religious differences were made more serious in the past by the prevalence of the theocratic view of life; differences of religious belief involved different political loyalties and principles of social conduct. The theocratic view was the basis of the 'millet-system', which, while it allowed a certain autonomy to the minorities, also increased the completeness of their separation from one another and from the majority. This was particularly true of those minorities of which a large proportion lived compactly in a single area; they came to regard themselves, if they had not always regarded themselves, as a 'peculiar people' linked by no moral or political tie with their neighbours. To complete their isolation there was added the memory of injustices, real or imagined, which they had suffered at the hands of the majority. S 795 798

The persistence of these divergences in the present age adds a new and complicating factor to the problem of Westernization. It is not only that different communities have different paths to tread if they are to Westernize themselves: for example, the problems of social organization

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among the Druzes of Jebel Druze are different from those among the Lebanese Christians. The growth of the Arab nationalist movement has also affected the problem of minorities. It is true that in principle Arab nationalism need not and indeed should not involve a problem of religious minorities. But there are several reasons why at the present day it does involve such a problem. The first reason is to be found in the immaturity of political thinking among the Arabs. Arabism, as the previous chapter made clear, has not yet determined its relationship with Islam; more generally, neither majority nor minorities have yet faced the problem of the connexion between religion and the State. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not their most thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs because they are heterodox Moslems or not Moslems at all; equally there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for unrestrained Sunni ascendancy. Among some of the Christian minorities there is a further tendency to regard the West as their spiritual home, to which they can belong in a way in which they could never belong to the Arabo-Islamic world to whose fringes they have so long clung.

The mutual suspicion has been increased in the last twenty-five years by the bad relations which have existed between the nationalists and the French authorities. In these years Arab nationalism has been largely a movement of opposition to France. Those whose nationalism is still coloured by religion draw from that an additional reason for suspecting the Christians as being of the same religion as the French. But quite apart from religious prejudice, suspicion has inevitably been aroused by the long-standing attachment of certain of the Christian communities to France. Many of the nationalists believe that this attachment has been used by her as an instrument in a policy of dividing, weakening and in other ways opposing the nationalist movement. Those of the minorities who have been used unwittingly in this way they regard as obstacles to the achievement of their aspirations; those who have lent themselves willingly to it they regard as traitors to the national cause.

Even when members of minorities become Arab nationalists, as many of them do, they often wear their nationalism with a difference. It is not only that they tend to emphasize

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points in the nationalist programme other than those which are emphasized by the Moslems; they also sometimes conceive of themselves as having a special duty to perform in the movement. For example, some of the Christian nationalists regard it as their task to mediate Western civilization to the Arabs. This sense of a special duty makes for difference, if not for opposition.

6

This much can be said of the whole of Syria and Lebanon. But if a more detailed analysis is to be attempted, Lebanon must be separated from Syria. While in Syria, and in the Levant States taken as a whole, the Sunni Moslems have an overwhelming preponderance, in Lebanon neither they nor any other community forms an absolute majority of the population, and the number of Christians of different sects is slightly greater than that of Moslems, orthodox and heterodox.

Inside Lebanon also a distinction must be made. As will be described later,[1] the Lebanese Republic of to-day was formed after the First World War, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of Lebanon, which consisted mainly of Mount Lebanon itself, of certain towns and outlying districts. In the former, the population is almost entirely Christian (mainly Maronite) and Druze. The additions included the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Saida (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre), and the districts of the Biqa' in the east and Jebel Amil in the south. In the towns the population is largely Sunni Moslem, although there are also numerous Shi'is, Greek Catholics and Orthodox and Armenians (mainly in Beirut). In the Biqa' and Jebel Amil the Shi'i Moslems are predominant, but here again there are large Greek Orthodox and Catholic and other communities.

In Mount Lebanon the majority is Christian, but the Druze community is large and strong enough to have played at least an equal and sometimes a greater part in the history of the Mountain. Thus the sectarian composition of Mount Lebanon is very different from that of the rest of the Mandated Territories. To a great extent also its history has diverged from that of other parts of geographical Syria. This has given rise to a specific Lebanese tradition. It is a tradition of asylum: remnants of sects and tribes, driven for one reason or another

[1] See Chapter IX, p. 172.

and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land. ooo

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was 162
almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 109,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.[1]

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose 563
native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other 778
part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a 562
conflict between the greater number of French officials/ 86
who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds 563
have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups 619
being the Barazi and Milli; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the 'Hoybun' party. It aims at the

[1] Another estimate for 1937 was as follows: Arab Moslems 41,900; Kurds 81,450; Christians 31,050; others 4,150; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

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social and economic characteristics. For example, the Christians accounted in 1938 for about 32 per cent of the total school population, and for an even larger proportion of pupils in the secondary schools. It is important to notice that 32 per cent of the Christian students attended schools controlled mainly by foreign Christian missions, 61 per cent attended private schools mostly maintained by religious communities, and only 7 per cent attended official schools.[1] Since the education given in the first two types of school is sectarian, Christians are receiving a different kind of education from Moslems, a far larger proportion of whom attend official institutions.

Educational differences are reinforced by social ones. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of interconnected units, of which the relations with the Moslem community are peaceful and correct but not in normal circumstances cordial. This is especially true of the older people brought up under the Ottoman régime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of nationalism are helping to make the young less conscious than their elders of their confessional loyalties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects and religions. Economically, also, the Christians tend to constitute a more predominantly urban community than the Moslems, with all the differences which that involves, but there is a Christian peasantry in certain parts of the country, similar in many ways to the Moslem peasantry.

In spite of incidents like those of 1860, on the whole the history of Syria has not been one of religious persecution on a large scale, and the Christians have enjoyed long periods of toleration, although not of equality with the Moslems. Such toleration has existed partly because of the long residence of Christians in the country, partly because they were not numerous enough to constitute a serious threat to Moslem supremacy, and partly because clergy and laity alike were for the most part Arabic in language and culture.

On the whole the growth of the nationalist movement has not had unfavourable consequences for the Christians. Individual Christians have played an important part in the movement in Syria as elsewhere. Nor is it merely isolated

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 91.

312 805 hours, that is the twelfth part of an addina. During the equinox, the local day hour is equal to the local night hour and corresponds to a 60 minute flow of water. In winter, however, the local hour is equivalent to more than three and one-half night hours and to less than two and one-half day hours.

In Damascus Ghouta water distribution is particularly complicated.

Water Policy

312 A very strict discipline generally rules water diversions for gardens. The communities elect a "water master," generally the moukhar who has administrative functions in the village and who is assisted by water guards called chaouis. These latter supervise the draining system, control the barrages and make certain that no owner abuses his water rights.

Among Different Villages

312 621 Such distribution is accomplished in numerous ways. Occasionally each village uses the water according to its own wishes without considering the damage possibly caused to the villages downstream. Such is the case with the water of the El-Awadj (Wadi el-Ajam) near Damascus. Here an enormous amount of water is lost to the villages downstream because of the intense evaporation in summer and the infiltrations into the basaltic regions upstream. The same thing occurs in the villages of Khasrajié and Mkrousse.

In other cases, custom assigns the whole or part of the water to each village during a certain period only. In such cases a rotation period is set up between the villages similar to that within the communities. Thus, the water of the Mnin is assigned for four days to Mnin, six days to Tell, one day to Kourné and four days to Barzé.

Modern Water Distribution

312 804 Water is distributed with mathematical precisioness only in those regions which are being irrigated according to modern irrigation plans. Territories thus irrigated with the water of the Orontes are those in the communities north of Homs such as Deneir, Deir Bialbé, etc.

Since water supplies are precisely known and are constant throughout the year due to the regulating barrage of Homs Lake, it is possible to calculate exactly the quantity of water each hectare shall receive. This quantity is established at 0 liters 20 seconds per hectare. 312 804

The total rotation period consists of seven days, and each hectare of irrigated land receives every week about 01.20 x 60 x 60 x 24 x 7 or 121 m^3. More detailed sub-divisions are foreseen. The irrigation service determines the duration of the water turns. The official time is that shown by the town hall clock of Homs. This system, however, is complex and needs a qualified staff of engineers, controllers and canal guards. It is still the exception in Syria.

Water Rights in Palmyra

The district of Palmyra receives its water from deep thermal and surface springs. The water is transported by underground canals (foggaras) which have existed since Roman times and which are necessary to prevent evaporation due to the dryness of the air at Palmyra. They vary from two to six kilometers in length. 312

Water Distribution

This is on a time basis, rotation turns depending on the supply, the number of gardens which are to be watered and the number of persons entitled to water. In Palmyra the turns vary from 12 days in the summer to 18 days in the winter. 312 805

Water Rights

These may be sold. The origin of the water titles is lost in history due to the antiquity of the hydraulic works. 312 423

Since there was no effective government during the last century, water became the property of third parties independently of land ownership. Toward the end of the century the government received no taxes from Palmyra and ceded the main thermal spring to a certain El-Hissuan of the Sued family who lived at Homs and to whom persons drawing water paid 80 piasters per hour of watering. For a long time, water rights were the only type of communal property and

Collective property belongs to the state, to a village or a community. The present legislation provides that all water be owned by the state. Villages, however, also possess hydraulic resources. Occasionally a community is the sole owner of a spring or a water course, while in other cases such ownership is divided among neighboring communities. Old local customs which vary according to regions and communities regulate the distribution of such water. 312 421

Water Distribution

Among Members of the Same Community

If water is abundant with respect to the surface to be irrigated, each user takes what he needs with little consideration for his neighbor. The only limit set up by custom is that the water level on the irrigated surface may not exceed ankle height.

If the flow of water is insufficient with respect to the size of the land to be irrigated, the regulation becomes more complicated. In the rare case where custom does not apply, everyone protects his crops against drought as well as he can. Generally, however, custom guarantees every plot of land a portion of that quantity of water used by the community and which may vary during the year. This portion consists of water taken from a spring or a canal and supplied during a certain period of time (every week, every fortnight, etc.) according to the duration of the rotation period (addâne) which varies, according to the localities, between seven and 32 days.

Time Calculations

The methods of calculating time vary from region to region. Watches, sun dials and hour glasses (keilé) are used. At Kariattein the rotation period (addâne) lasts 15 days, and water agreements are concluded in "Roman hours." These correspond to three hours and are divided into 40 missriyes. The missriyé corresponds to four minutes and thirty seconds. 312 805

In Wabeck Ghouta there are two water turns, one during the day and the other at night. The entire rotation period lasts twelve days. Water portions are calculated in "local"

312 hours, that is the twelfth part of an addâna. During the
●805 equinox, the local day hour is equal to the local night hour and corresponds to a 60 minute flow of water. In winter, however, the local hour is equivalent to more than three and one-half night hours and to less than two and one-half day hours.

In Damascus Ghouta water distribution is particularly complicated.

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312 measured the financial well-being of the community.
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The number of owners of water rights increased in the course of time as the convergence of titles and the inheritance of rights increased. By 1922, two-thirds of the village owned water rights, with the remaining one-third having to purchase such rights.

S
312 In 1923, according to G. Carle, 1/ the time turns were cal-
805 culated by means of an hour glass which required almost one hour (actually 52 minutes) to empty, a special person being appointed to calculate the time of the turns.

TUNISIA

Water Rights at Tozeur 2/

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312 This oasis derives its water from one wadi and two springs. The water is first divided by a horizontally-placed trunk of a palm tree laid perpendicular to the current and notched with markings equal in number to the desired divisions of water. Further subdivisions are made for secondary redistribution. These vary greatly in number because they can be changed by arrangements made between the persons entitled to water rights following the sale, exchange or inheritance thereof. Only the main divisions of the wadi water turns, up to the twenty-first turn, are fixed, and they are the basis of the entire water distribution system.

Water Distribution

T
312 The system used is based on a time schedule. The unit of
805 time for the distribution (gadous) corresponds to the time required for a vase full of water, pierced with holes at the bottom, to be emptied (five minutes or one-twelfth of an hour). The hour is also often calculated from the length of a man's shadow which is measured in feet.

1/Carle, G., L'Hydraulique Agricole et Industrielle en Syrie.
2/Kasselot, F. "Les Dattiers des Oasis du Djerid." Bulletin de la Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, du Commerce, et de la Colonisation de la Régence de Tunis, pp. 137-142.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria

seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

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question of Islam and modern civilization, and a greater caution in accepting ideas and innovations from Europe.

These two groups, and smaller, less important groups in other towns, have laid the foundations of a new Arabic literature. To a great extent their work has been preparatory. The Arabic language has been rendered more adequate and flexible, for example by the adoption or invention of technical terms. Western ideas have been spread through translations and works of popularization. New literary forms have been introduced—the poetic drama, the novel, the romantic autobiography—and at the same time old forms have been revived. In addition to the advances in form, the subject-matter of literature has been extended. Different groups have set themselves to expound subjects not hitherto treated : the relations between religion and secular culture, the position of women, the method of empirical science, and so on. In all this preparatory work, the influence of French and English thought and literature has been great and obvious.

Modern Arabic literature has so far produced nothing of great originality, nothing of much interest to the outer world. But there have been a number of honest, hard-working and courageous writers, who have deserved well of the Arabic-speaking peoples : for example, the religious thinker Muhammad Abdu, the social reformer Qasim Amin, the essayist al-Manfaluti, the poets Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, the playwright and novelist Tawfiq al-Hakim and the scholar Taha Husain.

These names are all those of Egyptians, and Cairo is the unquestioned centre of Arabic literature. But there have been very important Syrian and Lebanese writers, many of whom it is true worked for most of their lives in Egypt, although others remained in their own country. They include the scholars and poets of the Bustani and Yaziji families ; the religious reformer Rashid Rida ; the fathers of Arabic journalism Shidiaq, Nimr, Sarruf, Zaidan and Taqla ; the poet Khalil Mutran ; the best of women writers in Arabic, May Ziadah ; the traveller Amin Rihani ; and the mystic Khalil Jibran. The last two spent many years in the United States and wrote much of their work in English. They are the most distinguished of a group of Syrian-American writers who have planted in the new world a root of Arabic literature, which in spite of its qualities can hardly hope to survive a generation.

Westernized as soon as possible. But the greater number of thoughtful Arabs have since the beginning of the Western penetration refused to go to either extreme. They realize that there is much that is good in Western civilization; that their own civilization is ill; and that its maladies would make it desirable, even did not its weakness make it inevitable, that it should be influenced and transformed by the West. But at the same time they can see clearly the faults in the West and the qualities of their own tradition; more fundamentally, they have faith that the Arab and Islamic peoples have creative gifts of their own and in consequence a special part to play in human history. Therefore their reaction to the impact of the West has been neither uncritical rejection nor uncritical acceptance, but a process of questioning which still continues: What can the Arabs become? What can they do in the world? What form and degree of Westernization will best serve to revive their creative spirit?

The paragraphs which follow will summarize some of the answers which different groups of Arabic thinkers give to these questions. It must however be made clear in advance that the explicit views of particular thinkers are only one among several factors which will determine the answer which the Arabs give to these questions. Men brought up in the Arabic language and the Moslem faith, and in unceasing contact with the West in their thoughts and their lives, are forced by the nature of their situation to make judgements and decisions about the acceptance or rejection of Western ideas and ways; these judgements and decisions are influenced or even determined by the Arab and Moslem standards of those who make them; and having been made they involve others which perhaps had not been foreseen. Thus by a process of unformulated and unsystematic thought the structure of society gradually changes. A thinker of genius may alter the direction of that process; but in the absence of genius, the explicit doctrines of the intellectual élite may have only a very limited effect.

2

The first task of the Arab thinkers was to understand the West. It was effectively begun in the days of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, has continued ever since and is still far from completion. Its methods are various: schools on the Western

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model or under Western control have been established; 177
students have sought foreign universities, on their own 814
initiative or as members of official missions; European languages have been studied and Western books translated into Arabic. At present the Arabs, at least in the more advanced of the Arab countries, have achieved a certain understanding of Western technology and natural science, and of the polite literature of England and France. But Christianity, European philosophy, music and art, the whole culture of Russia and central Europe and the literature of the ancient world are still very imperfectly known.

The study of the West has itself done something to Westernize the Arab mind. The student cannot be unaffected by the object of his thought. In so far as theories of Westernization have been formulated, they fall into two main categories, which may conveniently be called theories of Islamic revival and of secularization. As expounded below they are 'ideal types'; any particular Arab thinker will probably be found to hold not one of the theories in its pure form, but a distinctive blend of several.

3

The movement of Islamic revival springs from a vision of 185
an Arabo-Islamic society which neither apes the West nor 177
clings blindly to outworn forms: of which the animating spirit and the principles of judgement are derived from Islam, but the ways of life and thought largely approximate or correspond' to those of Western society; and which has a 'healthy' relationship to the Christian world, a relationship of mutual respect and influence, based upon the acknowledgement of equality.

This much would be generally agreed, but there is great difference of opinion about the methods by which such a state of affairs could be brought into existence. There are some who claim that what is necessary is not so much a regeneration of the spirit and thought of Islam as an effort to unify and direct the political efforts of the Islamic peoples in defence of the Islamic world against Western penetration. They wish to accept only the externals of Western civilization, the sources of its economic and military strength. This was the doctrine of the Pan-Islamic movement, originated by Jemal ad-Din al-Afghani in Egypt and elsewhere during the

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versity. The committee makes its decisions on the basis of reports submitted to it by the Section of Educational Research of the Committee on Education and Instruction.

The Committee on Purchases is under the chairmanship of the accountant of the Ministry, with two other members appointed by the Director General of Education. It has charge of all buying of equipment, of receiving bids, and of preparing the contracts of the Ministry.

Beside the Directorate General of Education and its branches covering the system of public education for the entire country, three other institutions and agencies are connected directly with the Minister of Education:

1. The Department of Antiquities is headed by a director who is under the jurisdiction of the Minister. It has charge of the museum of antiquities, supervises all excavations, and preserves archeological sites. Its regulations are incorporated in Decree No. 352 (1945) "Embodying the Regulations of the Directorate of Antiquities."

2. The Syrian University, which until 1946 consisted of the Faculties of Medicine and Law, was in the process of reorganization at the time of the visit of the American Council Commission. It is described in chapter 22.

•[814]

3. The Arab Academy, which was founded during the Arab government regime following World War I, is a body of learned Arabists, which has its own assembly of members in Syria and corresponding members in other Arabic and Islamic countries as well as among orientalists. It holds public lectures, issues a magazine known as the *Review of the Arab Academy* which appeared first in 1920 and in which are published the researches and studies of its members. It also maintains a public library which contains about 20,000 printed books and more than 4,000 Arabic manuscripts. The Academy has at times attempted to lay down Arabic equivalents to modern scientific terms.

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Educational Finance

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Educational finance in Syria is centralized. The bulk of the expenditure on the schools and their equipment, on the salaries of teachers and janitors, comes from the budget of the Ministry of Education, which is a part of the general budget of the Syrian Republic. The Ottoman Education Laws of 1869 and 1913, which had remained the basic education laws during the French-mandate period, had provided that the expenditures of elementary schools should be borne by the local authorities. This, however, remained more a theoretical than a practical possibility in most of the Ottoman Empire. In Syria, some school buildings were provided—in Turkish, as in French, days—by the central governments, some by the localities or

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*872 is the same for all students and consists of the study of English, Arabic,
*873 and Armenian (for Armenians), literature, a course in introductory college mathematics using an American text, a course in the history of the Arabs, and a course in religion.

The sophomore year is divided into three sections: arts, science, and engineering. All take philosophy and literature. The arts section takes, in addition, economics, political science, history (modern Europe), and religion. The science section takes mathematics (calculus), physics, and biology, the latter two with extensive laboratory work. The engineering section takes descriptive and solid geometry, calculus, physics, and drawing. The total number of hours are eighteen for the arts, twenty-three for science, and twenty-five for engineering.

The College occupies two fine buildings, one of which is for administration and instruction and the other for boarders. The campus, only recently established, affords a view of the city of Aleppo from the edge of the plateau on which the College is situated. Tuition fees, including health and laboratory fees, range from £S85 ($38.53) to £S455 ($206.82). The
• [816] boarding fee is £S700 ($318.18). The College is considered to have the best science laboratories of any school in Syria. It has a library of 8,000 volumes which is extensively used by the students and friends of the College.

The College encourages athletics and extracurricular activities. It has its own teams for football, basketball, and volleyball, and fosters tennis and swimming. A Scout troop has existed for some time. A choir and a small orchestra provide mediums for the development of student talent in music and singing. Many student clubs function on the campus—a fine-arts club, international-relations club, and a Christian Endeavor Society. Literary evenings are held. A campus paper, the *College Herald*, and two class papers are issued in English. A literary review is printed once a year in Arabic, English, and Armenian.

113, 824, 137 Syria MD1

[For information on the useful plants of Iran and Iraq, many of which are also used in Syria, see 35: Hooper and Field, MA1 Iran, category 116. --Analyst]

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which superseded and completed all previous ones. This final revelation is preserved for the use and knowledge of mankind in the Quran, the Moslem Holy Book.

The Quran embodies the principles in accordance with which a man's whole life should be lived; on the basis of those principles Moslem thinkers have erected a moral system covering every form of human activity, however seemingly unimportant. Thus the religious duties of a Moslem are unlimited and all-embracing; but certain of them are prior to others, and fulfilment of them is essential for every true Moslem. The most important of these are summarized in the so-called 'Pillars of Islam'. A true Moslem must testify that 'there is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God'. He must pray five times a day; give alms to the poor; fast during the month of Ramadan; and make the pilgrimage to Mecca, should circumstances permit him, at least once in his lifetime.

Men should perform these and other duties primarily because they emanate from the will of God, but also because on their obeying or disobeying God's will depends the fate of their immortal souls in the next world. God who created the world will some day bring it to an end; on the final Day of Judgement all will be held responsible for their actions. The virtuous will be granted eternal felicity in Paradise, but the vicious everlasting torment in Hell.

The moral system of Islam covers the life not only of individuals but also of human associations, and among them of that association called the State. Islam knows no Church, and therefore no distinction between Church and State, the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of this world. The Islamic State is an association of Moslems for the purpose of living in accordance with the tenets of their religion and of extending its sway throughout the world. The law of the State is the law of Islam; the function of the ruler is to defend the State against unbelievers, to administer Moslem law as defined by those learned in it, and himself to be bound by it in his relations with his subjects. They for their part owe him loyalty as a religious duty. In short, the Islamic community as it has traditionally been conceived is to its members all and more than all that the nation is to the modern Western man. Islam in its great days was a nation, transcending distinctions of race or colour. Although an

Arabic-speaking Moslem might take a special pride in the peculiar relation of the Arabs to Islam, and in the dimly-remembered splendours of the early Caliphates, it is safe to say that normally he did not distinguish his being an Arab from his being a Moslem, and even when he did so it was the latter which was foremost in his thought and life.

3

For over a thousand years the majority of the population of Syria had been Moslem. There was not, however, complete unanimity in matters of religious belief. On the one hand, besides the Sunni or orthodox Moslems there were several heterodox Islamic and semi-Islamic sects: Shi'is, Druzes, Alawis and Isma'ilis. On the other hand, there still survived a number of Christian sects, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and others, which had come into existence in the early centuries of the Church's history; and there were in addition a comparatively small number of Jews.

Some of these communities were scattered throughout the country, while others possessed a local predominance in certain parts of it. Most of the districts held by these compact minorities were mountainous. The Lebanese mountains in particular were the homes of dissident communities, either because it was easier for the long-established inhabitants of Lebanon than for their neighbours of the plains to resist the pressure of Islamization, or else because sects which had grown up in the plains migrated to the mountains as an asylum where they would not be molested, or if attacked could better defend themselves. These mountain communities were marked by an especially unbending particularism and resistance to influences from outside.

4

Christians and Jews were left to carry on their own communal life without disturbance. For this there were two main reasons. The first was the Islamic doctrine in regard to Christianity and Judaism. Just as the Moslem regulated his life in accordance with the principles of his faith, so he did not deny a similar right to the Christians.

Moslems are not taught by their faith to regard Christians as inherently inferior, since it is in their power to become Moslems, and so enter the community of true believers in

which the only distinction is that of piety; nor as adherents of a false religion, since Islam considers Jesus to have been one of the succession of true prophets. They regard them as having gone astray, first in taking the revelation of Jesus as the final and complete revelation, and secondly in looking upon Jesus not simply as a prophet, a man through whom God's word has come to mankind, but as God incarnate. It is the doctrine of the Incarnation, and therefore also the doctrine of the Trinity, which are for Moslems the stumbling-blocks in Christianity. As 'People of the Book', believers in God, in prophecy and in the Day of Judgement, Christians like Jews are to be tolerated and to be allowed a certain status by the side of the Islamic community. But they cannot be regarded as members of that community. Nor can a Moslem willingly acquiesce in subjection to a non-Moslem Government, although his own weakness may compel a temporary submission.

Such is the attitude towards Christians which Islam enjoins: an attitude of reasoned and well-defined tolerance. But it is not surprising that there should during the thousand years of almost unchallenged Moslem supremacy have been periods of persecution, nor that the ordinary Moslem should have come to feel a certain contempt for the Eastern Christians who were the only Christians he knew: the contempt which he who knows himself to be strong feels for those in his power, and which he who believes himself to possess the truth feels for those who have rejected it.

The other reason for the persistence of the Christian and Jewish communities was the existence of a certain view of the State: a view which was universally accepted in western Asia, and indeed far beyond it, until recent generations. According to this view the Government existed to defend the cultivated lands, to maintain order, to tax their populations, and for nothing more. The laws by which the life of the individual and of society was regulated sprang not from positive enactment of the ruler but from the religious doctrines and ancestral customs to which individual and society adhered. It is true that since the ruling power was Moslem by faith, the Moslem religious law and the courts had a special relation to the Government. But a Moslem would no more have thought of compelling Christians and Jews to conform to Moslem law in matters of personal life and relationships than they of

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abandoning their own religious codes. Law was personal. Not simply was there no concept of equality before the law; there was no idea of sameness.

For these reasons, throughout the period of Arab and Ottoman rule the Christians and Jews were allowed a certain autonomy. Each sect formed a community, or as it was called in Arabic a 'millah' and in Turkish a 'millet', within the State and co-terminous with it. In matters affecting the community, the Government treated with it as a whole through its heads, and not with the members of it individually. Certain civil functions were devolved upon the spiritual heads and representative bodies of the communities. They were allowed to administer the property and institutions of their communities and to decide matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on—in accordance with the tenets of their faith.

This system originated long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It developed gradually and was only formalized in the nineteenth century by a series of Imperial edicts. Throughout the period of Moslem ascendancy it succeeded in preserving self-respect and a sense of community among the religious minorities, although it may also have helped to perpetuate bitterness and suspicion between them.

The heterodox sects which clung to the fringes of Islam were in a more ambiguous position. Officially they were regarded as parts of the general body of Islam; but in fact the cleavage between them and the orthodox was almost as great as that between Moslems and Christians, and they like the Christians were usually left to direct their internal affairs in accordance with customary law and the precepts of their religions.

5

Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belonging to other communities; and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. This was true also of every Christian sect in its relations with the others, for each sect formed a separate 'millet'; and of the orthodox Moslems in their relations with the heterodox. Difference of sect was

IV. THE WESTERNIZATION OF IDEAS

I

THE coming of the West aroused a new process of thought 600
not only in Syria but in all the Arabic-speaking countries; this process originated earliest and has developed furthest in Cairo and Beirut, but exists in some form in the other centres of Arab life, and is a single process which does not admit of sharp regional divisions. Much of this chapter will therefore concern itself with the general movement of thought in Arabic. Moreover, it will be necessary for the sake of exposition to formulate theoretical standpoints more clearly, articulately and abstractly, and in sharper opposition to one another, than they are formulated by contemporary Arabic writers.

The civilization of the West revealed itself in many lights 177
to the Arabs. It came to them asserting, in act if not in word, its own superiority and its contempt for the East; thus it aroused a sense of humiliation, the more bitter because the Arabs had for so long regarded themselves as the source of true religion and civilization. It came to them as a Christian civilization, and thus it compelled them to take a new view of Christianity and of its relationship with Islam. Again, although it was Christian, it was also secular, denying the theocratic idea of life and politics; thus it stimulated thought about the place of religion in society. It preached and practised a new view of human relationships; it was based upon an undreamed-of mechanical power and an unknown economic organization; it was prosperous and unimaginably strong. In these aspects it was to be feared as a force of oppression and destruction; but also perhaps to be imitated, since it held out hopes of an equal prosperity and strength. Above all, it appeared as a revolutionary force, threatening or promising radical change for worse or for better.

Some Arabs, among them many of the religious leaders, 186
averted their gaze from the possibilities of the new world, 177
and regarded it simply as a hostile force to be resisted; 827
except in the remote places of the Arabian peninsula, this school of thought has now practically died out. There were and still are others who are so intoxicated with the splendour of the West that they are prepared to give up not only their own traditions but even their faith in a special destiny for the Arabs and Islam, and to become fully and uncritically

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Westernized as soon as possible. But the greater number of thoughtful Arabs have since the beginning of the Western penetration refused to go to either extreme. They realize that there is much that is good in Western civilization; that their own civilization is ill; and that its maladies would make it desirable, even did not its weakness make it inevitable, that it should be influenced and transformed by the West. But at the same time they can see clearly the faults in the West and the qualities of their own tradition; more fundamentally, they have faith that the Arab and Islamic peoples have creative gifts of their own and in consequence a special part to play in human history. Therefore their reaction to the impact of the West has been neither uncritical rejection nor uncritical acceptance, but a process of questioning which still continues: What can the Arabs become? What can they do in the world? What form and degree of Westernization will best serve to revive their creative spirit?

The paragraphs which follow will summarize some of the answers which different groups of Arabic thinkers give to these questions. It must however be made clear in advance that the explicit views of particular thinkers are only one among several factors which will determine the answer which the Arabs give to these questions. Men brought up in the Arabic language and the Moslem faith, and in unceasing contact with the West in their thoughts and their lives, are forced by the nature of their situation to make judgements and decisions about the acceptance or rejection of Western ideas and ways; these judgements and decisions are influenced or even determined by the Arab and Moslem standards of those who make them; and having been made they involve others which perhaps had not been foreseen. Thus by a process of unformulated and unsystematic thought the structure of society gradually changes. A thinker of genius may alter the direction of that process; but in the absence of genius, the explicit doctrines of the intellectual élite may have only a very limited effect.

2

The first task of the Arab thinkers was to understand the West. It was effectively begun in the days of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, has continued ever since and is still far from completion. Its methods are various: schools on the Western

874 graduates are required to serve an additional year in an approved hospital before they are registered to practice. The instruction in the University is in Arabic, although [191] French and English are employed in technical terms and phraseology.

Schools of dentistry, pharmacy and nursing also function within the Faculty of Medicine. The School of Nursing is associated with the National Hospital, which is operated by the medical faculty. The course of training covers three years, with provision for a fourth year in midwifery. Practical nurses' training programs for girls are carried on in a few private institutions. Courses for the training of male nurses are furnished in all the larger government hospitals.

Personnel

759 **Physicians.** Between 670 and 726 physicians were practicing in Syria in 1951. The majority were established in the larger towns and cities. Approximately one half of the total were located in the province of Damascus and over one quarter in the province of Aleppo. The medical personnel of the Ministry of Health numbered 135, including 6 doctors on the headquarters administrative staff and 7 or 8 in the government laboratories. Five doctors were connected with the municipal health organization in Damascus, 5 in Aleppo and 1 each in Homs and Hama.

Dentists. From 175 to 209 dentists were registered in the country. About 75 per cent resided in Damascus, the remainder in Aleppo.

Nurses. In 1951, also, there were 352 male and female nurses. About 62 female nurses and an equal number of male nurses were employed by the Ministry of Health.

344 **Others.** From 148 to 210 graduate midwives, the majority of whom had preliminary nursing training, were practicing in Syria. They were about equally divided between the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo. Large numbers of untrained midwives worked in the rural villages in all

p. 148 (A)

844 parts of the country. The graduate pharmacists totaled 214.

DISEASES

659 Widespread discrepancies in reporting de-
165 tract from the validity of the morbidity and the mortality statistics. Among the two thirds or more of the population living in the rural villages, not only is the reporting of cases of illness and death poor, but the accuracy of diagnosis is often questionable. In a total of 15,457 deaths officially recorded in 1949, almost 35 per cent were listed as due to "ill-defined, unknown or unspecified" causes. Facilities for laboratory confirmation are lacking outside the larger population centers, and confusion is frequently evident in the differentiation of related infections. Reporting is negligible in the more remote areas, and particularly
659 among the Bedouin tribes. Except in the
165 course of special surveys, or when abnor-
758 mal epidemic conditions necessitate the enforcement of preventive measures, medical treatment is seldom accessible to the in-
659 habitants of such regions. Even in cities,
165 where the degree of reporting is considerably higher than in the rural areas, the morbidity statistics reflect a general tendency to evade the reporting of certain infectious diseases for fear of isolation. The records of cases treated in the government hospitals, which cannot be regarded as representative, and the reports of particular investigations or surveys provide the most reliable data for the evaluation of the prevalence and the distribution of specific diseases.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Intestinal or Urinary Tract

164 **Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers.** Enteric fevers are endemic, and, in the opinion of the local authorities, a high degree of immunity resulting from repeated exposure to infection exists among the inhabitants.
164 Cases of typhoid fever occur throughout the
364 year, with the peak of incidence usually between June and December, when the con-

p. 148 (B)

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
SYRIA MDI

Chapter 21

PUBLIC PRIMARY, SECONDARY, AND VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS

The Kindergarten

872x

KINDERGARTEN education in Syria is still in its infancy. In 1944–45 there were 267 children—all girls—in the *classes enfantines* in connection with girls primary schools. These were in 4 schools, thus making an average of 47 children in each school.

In 1945–46 the Ministry of Education opened 2 new kindergartens, in Damascus and Aleppo. Both were visited briefly by the American Council Commission. They take children usually from four to six years of age, although the one at Aleppo was accepting children of two and one-half years of age. The children are kept busy with toys, singing and dancing, games, drawing, and similar activities. Care was being taken to teach the children habits of cleanliness. Some Montessori material, or an imitation of it, was being used. Some rudiments of reading without formal class teaching are included in the program. Each of the kindergartens had one teacher trained in France. The others were trained as primary teachers in the Teachers College for Women at Damascus.

[863]

Primary Education

Primary education is free in the public schools. It is also supposed to be compulsory, although this is more of a hope than a reality. The new education law, in setting down the principle of compulsion, provides that the principle may be applied in places decided upon by the Ministry of Education when adequate facilities exist. In his *Reports* Sati' al-Husri says that in drafting the new education law he was obliged to write the principle of compulsion into the law out of deference to the constitution which declares that primary education shall be compulsory. He knew, however, that the present number of schools is far from being adequate for requiring compulsory attendance in primary schools. Because the government budget will not be able to bear the expenses of compulsory primary schooling, he

87 Syria MD1

[For information on the Syrian educational system, schools, university facilities, teachers, etc. see 44: Matthews and Akrawi, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 323-404.]

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria/MD/

but those who have followed the other road, to North and South America, to Australia and to other of the more distant parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands. The great majority of them started as retail traders on a small scale, but many took to wholesale trade and to the manufacture of textiles and other goods. The process of taking root was harder for them than for those who went to Egypt, since it involved learning new languages and acquiring new ways of life; but they have already been assimilated to a considerable extent, and the large Syrian colonies in the United States, Brazil and the Argentine, with smaller ones in other countries, have become prosperous, loyal and respected elements in the communities in which they are living. Most of them have given up all but a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and there seems to be no obstacle to their ultimate complete assimilation, the more so since the flow of emigrants to the countries of the New World has greatly diminished during the last two decades. It has been partly diverted to British and French West Africa, much of the internal trade of which is now in Syrian hands.

The consequences of the emigration for Syria were both good and bad. They were bad in so far as it was the more talented and enterprising of the country's youth who went abroad, during the period of their greatest energy and often for ever. On the other hand, the level of prosperity was raised by the remittances which successful emigrants sent home to their relatives, and by the savings which they brought back with them. Also, they introduced new ideas, and, what was even more important, the example of a new and in many respects attractive way of life. These ideas, this example and the bare fact that Syrians were prosperous and happy in foreign lands, deeply influenced the attitude of Syria to the West. All this was especially true of Lebanon, since it supplied so large a proportion of the emigrants.

18

Western influences also came by way of education. Students began to go abroad, to seek the new learning in the schools of Europe and America; and Western schools became ever more numerous in the Near East. The greater number of them were established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the

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seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

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that which was established some years ago in the American University of Beirut. Its summer camps and other activities aim not so much at reforming the social life of the rural districts as at giving University students who will in future constitute an important element in the ruling class, an awareness and understanding of the problems of rural life. Around the Jesuit University also there is growing up a movement which aims at making the educated Catholic youth of Lebanon more conscious of the social doctrine of their religion.

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In addition to the problems inherent in the process of Westernization as such, there are others which are due to the particular phase which that process has reached. One such problem is created by the existence of two main streams of Western influence, French and Anglo-Saxon. The study of the French language and its culture has been stimulated by its being one of the official languages throughout the Mandatory period, by the teaching of it in almost all schools, both private and public, and by the long-standing connexion between France and certain elements in the population. The study of the English language is encouraged by commercial connexions with the Anglo-Saxon countries, by the existence of a number of American Protestant mission schools, by the movement of emigration and by the predominance of British influence in the neighbouring Arab countries.

Here as elsewhere, the exponents of French and Anglo-Saxon forms of Western culture have not always shown so great a solidarity with one another as might be desired; and they have often been estranged from one another, not only because of the conflict of British and French political interests and rivalry between Protestant and Catholic missions in the Levant, but also because of fundamental differences in the French and Anglo-Saxon concepts of culture and education.

The differences between the two are reflected in the two Universities to which they have given rise. The Université de S. Joseph is maintained and largely staffed by Jesuits and is Catholic in spirit; the American University was originally a Protestant college, but is now officially and so far as possible in practice unsectarian. The former has for many years been subsidized, at least in some of its faculties, by the French

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177 Government, while the latter is wholly unconnected with
871 any Western government. The former concentrates, so far as the majority of its students are concerned, upon mastery of the French language; while in the latter, although English is the medium of instruction, an attempt is made to teach Arabic thoroughly. The political spirit of the former is one of attachment to France and distrust of nationalism; while the latter has become in practice, and without the deliberate intention of its authorities, the intellectual centre of Arab nationalism. The former is perhaps a greater centre of research and scholarship, and has had prominent orientalists on its staff; while the latter, although it has an impressive record of scholarly and scientific work, has tended in the Anglo-Saxon manner to exalt character above intellect, and to concentrate upon the training of citizens and public servants.

Ultimately the fact that higher education is largely in the hands of foreign institutions and is given through the medium of foreign languages, and that the two main centres of it differ so widely from one another, may prove not to be a handicap to Arab culture. At present, although it may be unavoidable and in some ways advantageous, it undoubtedly causes difficulties. There is not always sufficient common ground of understanding between the graduates of the two universities; many of them are more at home in a foreign language than in their own; and many in the attempt to master two languages and two cultures fail to master either.

212 The percentage of literacy is probably rather over 40 per cent among men and under 20 per cent among women in Lebanon; in Syria it is considerably less.

871 There are four main types of school in the country. First there are the official schools maintained by the departments of education of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Secondly, there are a small number of privately-owned 'national' schools, so called because they are inter-sectarian and do not give religious instruction. Thirdly, there are schools maintained by the relligious communities indigenous to the country, sectarian in control and in the content of their instruction. They are the most numerous of all; and the majority of them are maintained by the Christian communities. Finally, there are schools controlled and subsidized by foreign organ-

Grade of Education	Institutions or Courses				Scholars			
	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria
Elementary education	1,877	90	194	839	131,512	5,534	15,981	101,056
Secondary and technical education and teachers' training courses ..	104	—	6	42	9,805	—	643	7,398
Higher education ..	288	—	—	5	1,228	—	—	356

(In addition, there were some hundreds of students studying abroad, in Egypt, in France and other European countries and in the United States.)[1]

izations. Practiically all of them, with the exception of those belonging to thee French 'Mission Laïque' and the 'Alliance Israélite', are maintained by Christian missionary societies. The majority of them are controlled by French Catholics of various religious orders; next in importance are those maintained by American Protestant missions. There are also British and other foreign schools. These foreign institutions are of parrticular importance because they include the two main centres of higher learning in the country, the two Universities in Beirut.

In 1938 the ffirst type of school accounted for 31 per cent of the total number of scholars; the second and third between them for 49 perr cent; and the fourth for 20 per cent. In

[1] For detailed educational statistics, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 2114-15.

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Syria the proportion of official to unofficial schools was larger, and in Lebanon it was smaller, than these figures indicate.

This diversity of schools may be a disadvantage in so far as it makes more difficult the creation of a common intellectual ground for the nation as a whole. There are other serious problems too which perplex the Syrian educationalist: the problem of making modern Arabic an adequate language for expressing modern scientific concepts, and of teaching it thoroughly while at the same time teaching European languages to a degree sufficient for professional and other purposes; the problem of widespread peasant illiteracy; and the problem of redirecting the schools to the production of farmers and technicians rather than of superfluous Government officials and lawyers.

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social and economic characteristics. For example, the Christians accounted in 1938 for about 32 per cent of the total school population, and for an even larger proportion of pupils in the secondary schools. It is important to notice that 32 per cent of the Christian students attended schools controlled mainly by foreign Christian missions, 61 per cent attended private schools mostly maintained by religious communities, and only 7 per cent attended official schools.[1] Since the education given in the first two types of school is sectarian, Christians are receiving a different kind of education from Moslems, a far larger proportion of whom attend official institutions.

Educational differences are reinforced by social ones. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of interconnected units, of which the relations with the Moslem community are peaceful and correct but not in normal circumstances cordial. This is especially true of the older people brought up under the Ottoman régime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of nationalism are helping to make the young less conscious than their elders of their confessional loyalties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects and religions. Economically, also, the Christians tend to constitute a more predominantly urban community than the Moslems, with all the differences which that involves, but there is a Christian peasantry in certain parts of the country, similar in many ways to the Moslem peasantry.

In spite of incidents like those of 1860, on the whole the history of Syria has not been one of religious persecution on a large scale, and the Christians have enjoyed long periods of toleration, although not of equality with the Moslems. Such toleration has existed partly because of the long residence of Christians in the country, partly because they were not numerous enough to constitute a serious threat to Moslem supremacy, and partly because clergy and laity alike were for the most part Arabic in language and culture.

On the whole the growth of the nationalist movement has not had unfavourable consequences for the Christians. Individual Christians have played an important part in the movement in Syria as elsewhere. Nor is it merely isolated

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 91.

648 some recognized 'foreign protection' as a gift too dangerous to be accepted.

4

648 Sympathy for France depended not only upon her special 177 links with certain elements in the population, but also upon the hold of French culture over the educated classes. Most educated people of whatever religion speak French; many know it as well as they know Arabic, and there are some, mainly among the Catholics, for whom it has replaced Arabic as their native language. French books are widely read, French social customs copied, and there are many who have travelled or studied in France and have a profound affection for the country, its people and its way of life.

177 It is the Catholic missions, working through schools and 871 other institutions, which have played the largest part in 799 winning Syria and Lebanon for French civilization. The mission-schools and colleges and the Université de S. Joseph in Beirut have always concentrated on imparting to their students a mastery of the French language, even if that should involve neglect of the teaching of Arabic. The majority of those who possess any understanding of European culture have been trained by the Jesuits, the Franciscans or other missionaries; and so long as the Catholic schools continue to provide the best intellectual education which the country can offer, there is no need to fear for the position of French culture. The social work carried out by the missions must also be mentioned; they have borne on their shoulders a great part of the work of alleviating social conditions, and have deserved the gratitude of those who care for social justice. Thus all French Governments, clerical or anti-clerical, regarded it as essential to maintain for the missions their right of unrestricted activity.

177 Long before the beginning of the French occupation, the 649 Governments of France, seeing more clearly than some others the political significance of cultural ties, set themselves to preserve and extend the predominance of French civilization. The institution of the Mandate gave greater freedom for their efforts. In some ways the position of French culture was improved in the years between the two wars. French was one of the official languages and knowledge of it was an indispensable qualification for holding most of the higher

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of them indeed were better treated than the bulk of the population.) Special regard was paid to their needs and traditions, and opportunities were given for the development of their self-consciousness and self-respect. The effects of generations of inferiority cannot be wholly wiped out in the course of twenty years, but in those years Syria and Lebanon made a certain advance towards individual equality as the democratic countries of the West understand it.

Among the most urgent of the country's social problems is that of the archaic system of land-tenure. No direct assault, it is true, was made on the position of the great semi-feudal landowners. But the first step towards reform was taken by the establishment of a modern system of land-registration and the initiation of a land survey. Also the number of small freeholders was increased by the sale of public domain and the encouragement of the permanent partition of land held communally on the 'musha'' system.[1] In addition something was done to help foreign trade by the extension of harbour and other facilities.

A State system of schools was constructed almost from nothing; it is still very imperfect and not yet able to supply so good an education as is given by the best of the private schools, but at least it includes every grade of school, from primary up to the Syrian University in Damascus, an official institution set up in the early years of French Mandatory rule with the object of providing higher education in Arabic.

The foundations which have been laid are solid, but there is still much to be done before Syria and Lebanon possess even the framework of a modern society. Thus expenditure on public works and social services is still very small; the medical services are inadequate. No adequate census has been taken, although there has been a very elaborate and complete one in the neighbouring territory of Palestine. Labour legislation scarcely exists. Most serious gap of all, only inadequate measures to improve agricultural conditions have so far been adopted. Little provision has been made for agricultural education. Although excellent plans for irrigation have been drawn up, few of them were put into effect until the Allied occupation of 1941. The authorities had done little to provide facilities for agricultural credit, and nothing to encourage the formation of co-operative societies.

[1] See Chapter V.

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CHAPTER 7

EDUCATION, PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING

The amount of resources which should be devoted in any development program to education, health, housing and related community services and facilities will always be a matter of controversy. Expenditures in these fields do not necessarily bear a direct or fixed relationship to outlays on agriculture, industry, transport and communications, and power. Their actual or proposed magnitude is largely a reflection of judgment and social philosophy. It is generally conceded, however, that better education, health and housing are not only in themselves objectives of development, but are also important means, however indirect, of raising production and standards of living. It is a truism that an expansion and improvement of educational opportunities is indispensable to economic progress as well as to the development of stable and free political institutions. Similarly, a healthy and vigorous population is better equipped to deal with the task of increasing production. At the same time, the cost of expanding education, health and other social services can be borne only if the production base of the economy is steadily broadened. Thus a reduction in mortality rates may create problems unless productive resources can be developed at a pace sufficient to support a more rapidly growing population, and substantial improvements in housing can be realized only if people can earn enough to afford them.

1 EDUCATION

Syria can view with pride the rapid expansion of education which has taken place during the period of independence since the war. From 1945-46 to 1952-53 the number of children attending primary schools more than doubled and the number of pupils in intermediate and secondary schools almost quadrupled. The proportion of literates in the population—probably around 40%—compares favorably with that of other Arabic countries as well as that in Asia generally, and with the existing school attendance

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871 literacy may be expected to improve significantly within the next generation.

There are, however, certain deficiencies in the educational system on which any future program must focus. More attention should be paid to the quality of education and particularly to improving the curriculum and methods of instruction. Better and more extensive facilities for vocational education ought to be provided, and a program of fundamental education for adults should be initiated.

Primary, Intermediate and Secondary Education[31]

The lack of data on the age composition of the population makes it impossible to estimate accurately the proportion of school-age children who actually go to school. One may hazard the guess that a little less than 60% of the children attend primary schools and probably about 10% go to intermediate and secondary schools. While perhaps 80% of the boys go to primary schools, the proportion of girls in such schools is still only about 30%, even though the prejudice against education of girls is being gradually overcome.

It is unlikely that school attendance will continue to increase as quickly as in the past. Prevailing low standards of living will undoubtedly keep many children out of school; economic pressure is probably responsible for the fact that perhaps 30% to 40% of children drop out of primary school before they finish. It will also be difficult to increase school attendance in areas where the population is rather sparse and scattered. Thus school attendance appears to be poorest in the rather thinly populated province of Jezireh.

In projecting expenditures on education the mission has accordingly adopted the assumption that the number of children attending primary, intermediate and secondary schools will increase at an average annual rate of 6% over the next six years. Initially the rate of increase may be higher than 6%, but toward the end of the period it may be expected to be lower. This compares with an average annual rate of 12% from 1945-46 to 1952-53, of 14% from 1950-51 to 1951-52, and of 6% from 1951-52 to 1952-53. On the basis of our assumption, total school attendance would rise from about 399,000 in 1955-56 to approximately 536,000 in 1960-61; and, if the

[31] See Annex I, p. 456 *et seq.*

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proportion of children attending private schools remains the same, public school attendance would increase from 307,000 to 413,000.

The rapid expansion of educational facilities has quite rightly received first priority in the past. In the future, however, further growth in school attendance will be somewhat less important than the task of improving the quality of education and adapting it to the country's needs.

In general the content of education in any developing society must be such as to equip people to cope more effectively with the practical, everyday problems of modern life. These relate not only to the task of earning a better living but also to the need for relating the curriculum of the school more closely to the activities of the community, and for improving its living conditions. According to the testimony of many Syrians there is an urgent need to give education a more practical content. The existing curriculum is too academic and general in character. Methods of teaching must be improved and more emphasis given to the sciences, economics and civics. Pupils must be given more knowledge and understanding about the economic, social and political problems of their environment. Without making education exclusively vocational, it can be given some vocational bias. In rural schools, for example, there can be more stress on agriculture, animal husbandry, sanitation and hygiene. In all schools—primary, intermediate and secondary—more attention might well be devoted to creative manual work, if only to inculcate a greater respect for manual labor. A legal training is still generally considered essential for government service, even though the operations of modern government demand much more technical and economic knowledge.

Current methods of instruction do not appear to stimulate the intellect sufficiently; the principal aim is evidently to impart enough knowledge to enable the student to pass examinations for school certificates or diplomas. There is an excessive emphasis on memorizing. Teaching is rather authoritarian in character: the teacher lectures, and the student is expected to accept what he is taught without challenge or discussion. Even in the University, little discussion and debate is invited. Thus independent inquiry and intellectual curiosity tend to be discouraged, and analytical ability is not sufficiently developed through discussion.

Any fundamental reform in both the curriculum and the methods of teaching will probably have to be effected largely through the teachers' training colleges. The mission can point to these problems but it is not competent to suggest how they might best be solved. It can only recom-

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871 mend that they be studied, perhaps in collaboration with experts supplied by UNESCO.

In one respect this problem has already received growing recognition in Syria. Since 1949, for example, the Ministry of Education has established 111 special rural elementary schools in various parts of the country. In the fourth and fifth grades of such schools, pupils receive some instruction in the basic principles and techniques of agriculture. Each school has a garden in which children can apply their knowledge. Specially trained instructors have been supplied by the Ministry of Education. While the mission had no opportunity to appraise these schools, it considers that they represent a commendable effort to relate education to the problems of rural life. In principle it would seem desirable to establish more schools of this type as educational facilities are expanded.

Vocational Education[22]

874 Vocational education has been comparatively neglected, even though the need for sound practical training in commerce, banking, industry and agriculture has greatly increased. Aside from the agricultural schools, the government operates six vocational schools: two technical schools of intermediate and secondary grade in Damascus and Aleppo; two intermediate technical schools at Hama and Deir ez Zor; and two secondary commercial schools in Damascus and Aleppo. In these and two private institutions, 1,676 students were enrolled in the year 1952-53. The government recently started, on an experimental basis, three apprenticeship schools designed to provide three years of purely vocational training to elementary school graduates. Two of these have been established, respectively for boys and for girls, in Damascus, and the third, for boys, in Aleppo.

Since the mission has dealt with agricultural schools elsewhere, the discussion here will be confined to other vocational schools. In general the vocational school system suffers from inadequate facilities and equipment, a lack of sufficiently trained teachers, and a failure to adapt the training and instruction to the requirements of industry and commerce. There is a tendency to look down on vocational education. Generally only those who for one reason or another cannot attend the regular schools turn to vocational institutions. At the same time the business community takes almost

[22] See Annex I, p. 459.

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873 program off to a good start the services of an expert or a small mission should be requested from UNESCO which has accumulated considerable experience in techniques of fundamental education and which was active in Syria during 1952 and 1953 in the field of vocational training.

Higher Education

Higher education has made substantial progress. The Syrian University, which started in 1919 with schools of medicine and law, now includes also faculties of letters and of sciences, schools of pharmacy, dentistry and engineering and a Higher Teachers' Training College. In 1952-53 the University had 2,580 students. In Aleppo a school of engineering has also been established. Yet a further expansion and improvement of facilities will undoubtedly be necessary since the development program will sharply increase the demand for well-trained teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants and other qualified personnel. The University will need more teachers, equipment, laboratories and libraries. Although many Syrians will inevitably have to go abroad for special types of training, Syria should be able gradually to provide broader opportunities for higher education at home. The mission suggests that the government appoint a special committee to draw up recommendations for improving and expanding the University in line with the requirements of the economic development program that might be adopted. Such recommendations will undoubtedly entail larger expenditures on higher education, which the mission has taken into account.

658 *School Building*

871 In recent years Syria has apparently been spending about £S 2.5 million annually on new schools. Of this amount, approximately £S 1.4 million has come from municipal or local funds. We do not think that the government should spend, on the average, more than this for school building over the next six years. More could be achieved with such an expenditure, however, by economizing on the cost of construction and requiring [346] more local self-help. Secondary schools built by the Ministry of Public Works, for example, have been excessively expensive owing to their monumental character, the use of costly building materials such as carved stone and other features of a luxury nature. The past cost of £S 150-200 per

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square meter could probably be reduced to £S 80 with simpler construction and the use of less costly local materials. More could also be achieved with central government funds allocated to school building if their availability were conditioned on a larger contribution by municipalities. The latter should be expected to provide the land and half the cost of construction either in cash or labor.

In the program priority should be given to (1) the construction and expansion of vocational schools, (2) the building of experimental multipurpose schools which can provide facilities not only for regular education, but also for adult and vocational training and for community activities, and (3) the needs of municipalities which demonstrate their desire for educational facilities by a willingness to contribute substantially to their construction. The construction of additional regular schools might well be preceded by a survey of the distribution of existing schools in relation to needs. Some parts of the country are now much better provided with schools than others.

Expenditures on Education[33]

The program outlined above would entail an increase in government expenditures on education from an estimated annual level of about £S 36.5 million in 1953 and 1954 to an average of a little over £S 45 million in the period 1955-60. The breakdown of the anticipated outlays over the six-year period would be as follows (in millions of Syrian pounds):

	Total	Average annual
General education[a]	220.50	36.75
Vocational education[b]	3.25	0.54
Fundamental (adult) education	0.50	0.08
Higher education	37.53	6.25
School construction and equipment[c]	10.00	1.67
Total	271.78	45.29

[a] Including primary and secondary education.
[b] Additional expenditures only. Continuing expenditures at past levels are included under "General education."
[c] Excluding local contributions.

[33] See Annex I, p. 461.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

232 desirable that a modern abattoir be built in a more suitable location; the 774 present problem of drainage disposal would alone warrant this measure. There should be no difficulty about the provision of capital for such a project, since the municipal authority can recoup its expenditures by the collection of fees.

232 The present budget of £S 188,000[8] for personnel and equipment bears no relation to the value of Syrian livestock or to preventable losses. For more effective disease control the mission has recommended that an additional £S 1.2 million be made available during the next six years.

242 871 IX EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

Education

Elementary agricultural education. Since 1949 the rural elementary schools have devoted the two final years (fourth and fifth grades) to theoretical and practical instruction in agriculture and hygiene. At present 111 offering this type of instruction, each with a field of five *donums*[9] for practical field training, are distributed through *mohafazats* as follows:

Damascus	37	Dera'a	13
Aleppo	9	Soueida	11
Latakia	11	Deir ez Zor	9
Hama	5	Hasetche	5
Homs	11		

The pupils (9,000 in 1954) learn the basic principles and techniques of agriculture, practicing them in the school gardens.

Clearly this number of schools cannot provide basic rural education for all the children of Syria's 5,500 villages. Apart from the need to build more schools and enlarge existing ones, a way must be found to train additional agricultural teachers; the teacher training and secondary agricultural schools in Dera'a and Kharabo do not turn out sufficient numbers.

The mission therefore makes the following recommendations:

[8] £S 50,000 for laborers at the Damascus veterinary research center and in the provinces; £S 40,000 for purchase of animals and feed; £S 98,000 for technical requirements (£S 20,000 for the Damascus laboratory; £S 58,000 for the preparation of vaccines and biologics material; and £S 20,000 for medicines in respect of the treatment of parasitical diseases).

[9] A donum = 0.1 hectare.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

1. A number of village school teachers should be given an intensive one-year course in agriculture. 242 971

2. Agricultural courses could be profitably substituted for some of the less essential subjects in the rural curricula, as teachers become available.

3. Night classes in agricultural education should be established in the rural elementary schools.

4. Rural elementary school pupils should be encouraged to organize societies to continue their activities outside school and school gardens.

5. Forest farm crops should be included in school gardens, and tree planting should be encouraged on national holidays. Each pupil could be responsible for a tree planted during his school training.

Secondary agricultural education. There is one agricultural vocational school in each of the provinces of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Latakia and Euphrates but of these four are intermediate schools and only the one at Kharabo (near Damascus) can be classified as a fully-rated secondary school. About 500 students are enrolled in all five schools. Some of the graduates subsequently engage in farming; the great majority apparently become government employees in the agricultural or in other services. 971 242

In the future these schools will be called upon to meet the growing personnel requirements of the government's agricultural, livestock, veterinary and forestry services. At Kharabo particularly, future technicians should be trained to assist in research and extension work. The present four-year curriculum includes all the elements necessary for a general understanding of today's agriculture and its future development, but students should be given an opportunity to specialize, at least during the third and fourth years, in such subjects as rural credit, crop production, livestock and animal husbandry, mechanization and techniques of industrial utilization of agricultural products, e.g., dairy products, fruit preservation, vegetable and meat marketing, tobacco curing, vegetable oil production, meat processing and curing, and the tanning of skins and hides. Better still, two or even three years of training should be added to give the students three or four years of specialization and bring them ultimately to the junior college level.

In the mission's opinion, the curricula of all agricultural schools emphasize theoretical studies too much and practical training too little. Effective farm managers and extension agents must be willing and able to demonstrate with their hands what should be done on the farm. To obtain the respect of the peasants they must be willing to get their hands dirty

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

governmental, representing 8.7% and 2.2%, respectively, of total investment in settlements. Municipal investment is directed to water supply,[1] roads, power plants and distribution networks and sewerage facilities, in that order; very little goes for housing. Government investment is primarily in buildings, chiefly for education and public health purposes.

The mission has assumed, in preparing its proposed program for settlements and social services, that the estimated 1954 population of 3.65 million will increase over the next five years at a rate of only 1.5% annually, rather than the 2% rate of recent years. If the program is to be properly adjusted to Syria's needs, however, a population census and an improvement in the collection and organization of vital statistics are urgently needed. Better public health conditions, economic development, opening of new areas and new lines of transport and communications, changes in social patterns—all will bring about major changes in size and distribution of the population over the next few years. Any policy developed for the settlements should be planned with an eye not only to the immediate future but also to the longer term economic, social and cultural development of the country.

II EDUCATION

A PROGRESS TO DATE

For centuries, and especially during the years of foreign occupation, the only formal educational facilities were the Koranic schools, which concentrated on religious teaching. A decline in the number of these schools began about 150 years ago, and with it a gradual change in their curriculum; today about one-third of the time is devoted to religion. Meanwhile the number and significance of state primary schools has been increasing. In these, during the French occupation, the pattern of education was influenced by traditional French systems.

Since independence, Syria has started to develop its education at a faster rate and to give it a Syro-Arabic pattern. The effort of these few years and the success achieved is impressive. The budget of the Ministry of Education rose from almost £S 17 million in 1946 to £S 36.8 million in 1953, and its share of the total budget increased from 13.5% to 17.7% (in 1923 it had been only 9.1% and in 1931 9.8%). Between 1946 and 1953 the

[1] Water supplies in Damascus and Aleppo, however, are financed by government funds.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

871 number of primary, intermediate and secondary schools more than doubled.

871 The last five years alone have seen 939 new schools[2] established—an increase of 64% over the previously existing schools and an average increase of 11% per annum. Greatest gains occurred in the primary schools, the number of which rose by 81% or 11.4% per year. The number of children attending primary schools rose from about 150,000 in 1945-46 to 311,000 in 1952-53. Enrollment in intermediate and secondary schools increased even more rapidly—from 12,661 to 47,670. These advances, as well as those in the fields of technical education, teacher-training and higher education, are shown in Table 1.

872 *Primary Education*

In spite of the very large effort of the last few years, the remaining problems are enormous. According to the best available estimates, no more than 30-40% of the population is literate. It is customarily reckoned that, in a population similar in structure to Syria's, the number of children in every year of age from the 6th to the 12th is approximately equal to 2.6% of the total population. Six to eleven being the primary school age in Syria, there would be on this basis 546,000 children ($6 \times 2.6\% = 15.6\%$ of the 1952 population) of primary school age. Actually only 311,033, or presumably 56% of the eligibles, are in school.

The ratio is not the same for boys and girls. Assuming that the school-age population is divided equally between boys and girls—i.e., that there are 273,000 of each sex—then 18% of the boys and 68% of the girls do not attend school (the attendance figures are 222,779 and 88,254, respectively). Furthermore, many children do not remain in school long enough to receive a school certificate. The number who do finish has been increasing rapidly (from 624 in 1928, to 2,993 in 1940, 6,690 in 1946 and 19,850 in 1952) but it is still much lower than it should be.

There is one primary school for every 1,400 persons in Syria, with an average of 128 pupils and 3.6 teachers. Although only 13% of all primary schools are private schools, these have 18% of all primary school pupils and over 23% of the primary school teachers. The provinces of Damascus and Aleppo have the largest number of private schools; the Euphrates, Djebel Druze and Hauran have the fewest.

[2] Not new buildings, but new schools, most of which occupy rented buildings.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

TABLE 1 Recent Educational Progress in Syria

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	1945–46	1950–51	1952–53
Budget of Ministry of Education[a]	16,967[b]	24,260[c]	36,804[d]
Percent of total ordinary budget	13.5	14.6	17.7
Primary education			
Number of schools	1,080	1,794	2,399
Government	737	1,472	2,064
Private	343	322	335
Number of pupils	150,134	261,862	311,033
Government	99,703	206,343	249,399
Private	50,431	55,519	61,634
Number of graduates	6,690	18,104	26,342
Intermediate and secondary education			
Number of schools	73	135	181
Government	28	47	57
Private	45	88	124
Number of pupils	12,661	34,874	47,670
Government	8,276	22,269	27,144
Private	4,385	12,595	20,526
Number of intermediate school graduates	1,039	3,630	4,610
Number of secondary school graduates	1,155	1,243	1,700
Technical schools			
Number of schools	7	15	8[e]
Government	5	11	6
Private	2	4	2
Number of pupils	916	2,277	1,676
Government	881	2,105	1,567
Private	35	172	109
Teacher training			
Number of schools	4	5	8
Number of students	388	955	1,255
Higher education			
Number of students	1,058	2,470	2,598

[a] In thousands of Syrian pounds.
[b] 1946 budget.
[c] Two-thirds of the 18-months budget ended June 30, 1951.
[d] 1953 budget.
[e] Excluding agricultural schools.

Assuming an equal percentage of school age children in the different 872
districts, it appears that the regional distribution of primary schools is very unbalanced. Thus the average number of primary school pupils is 91

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 LID1 Syria MD1

Investment in Educational Facilities

For many centuries only a few school buildings or libraries were built in Syria, and those mainly for the Koranic schools. During the past years, particularly since the war, an effort has been made to provide enough school buildings, but only a small part of the requirements has been met. Although a special tax for school construction was levied by the government for the municipalities, it has not yielded enough for the purpose. Today most schools operate in rented structures which do not meet the physical requirements of a school building.

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According to figures of the Ministry of Education, 416 school buildings were built between 1949 and 1954. These were mostly secondary schools, half of them in the Damascus and Aleppo mohafazats. The Ministry estimates the expenditure for these buildings at £S 8.28 million, averaging around £S 20,000 as the cost of each school of two to five classrooms.

The schools suffer from a lack of the appropriate type of furniture, equipment, books and other facilities such as projectors, slides, radios, etc. The fact that most of this equipment must be imported is largely responsible for its shortage, although the furniture and some other items can in fact be produced locally.

B THE SIX-YEAR PROGRAM IN EDUCATION

Our estimates of the cost of the education program are set out in Table 2.

The item for development of primary and secondary education assumes an average annual increase in attendance of 6%, the continuation of the present ratio between primary and secondary education, the same type of education, the same ratio of government to private schools, and no increase in teachers' salaries.

With respect to vocational training we have assumed an increase in attendance at existing and new schools from 1,676 in 1952-53 to 3,500 by 1960-61. This would necessitate a rise of £S 2.226 million in the operating expenditures of such schools over the six-year period. In addition, about £S 900,000 would be needed to cover the cost of a foreign expert (£S 50,000 a year) and of operating the first school to be used as a training center for teachers (£S 100,000 a year). For the operation of

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

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TABLE 2 Proposed Six-Year Program for Education

(Thousand £S)

Purpose of expenditure	Total
1. General program financed by the Ministry of Education—total budget covering primary and secondary education	220,200
2. Additional professional education—operation	2,226
3. Vocational education, foreign expert and training of teachers	900
4. Night schools	125
5. Fundamental education—regular program	99
6. Foreign expert and training program	400
7. Higher education and cultural institutions*	37,526
8. Total for operation	261,776
9. Construction of new schools	7,500
10. Equipment, etc.	2,500
11. Total government expenditure	271,776
12. Investment	10,000
13. Other expenses	261,776
14. Municipal expenditure for school buildings in addition to (9)	7,500
15. Total investment, public sector	17,500
16. Total program, public sector	269,276

* Excluding Department of Antiquities.

vocational night schools it is estimated that every student will cost £S 50 per year; the cost of this program is estimated at £S 5,000 for the first year, rising to £S 30,000 in the sixth year.

The cost of fundamental education has been reckoned at £S 3,000 per operating center annually. To this amount must be added the cost of a foreign expert and teacher-training, for which we have allowed £S 80,000 a year.

For higher education we have made provision for a modest increase in yearly allocations, pending development of future plans. A new type of all-purpose school building must be developed: one which will serve during the day for primary or secondary education, and in the evenings for professional and fundamental schools. We also propose that such buildings might be adapted to serve other community purposes as well.

If the school construction proceeds at the same rate as heretofore, and if the mission's recommendations respecting their construction, set forth in the Main Report, are adopted, five times more schoolrooms for primary

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

or secondary education can be built. An expenditure of £S 3 million a year would permit construction of 500 classrooms a year or about 100 new schools, without auditorium and other facilities which can be built later. At such a rate, the country's estimated future requirement of about 4,000 schools (assuming that there are already 1,000) would be fulfilled in about 30 years. Meanwhile a considerable number of schools will undoubtedly have to continue in rented buildings.

The opening of new schools will have to be carefully planned in the light of the geographic distribution of existing facilities, conditions of overcrowding, the demand for schooling as influenced by economic factors, the distance of school-age children from existing schools and the availability of teachers. Now that a considerable portion of school-age children are in fact going to school, the location of new schools must be given more thought in order to ensure that they will meet a real need.

Thought should be given to standardization of desks and equipment and for their manufacture in Syria. There are also future possibilities for local production of some other items now imported, such as slides, maps, etc.

Finally, we recommend a reorganization of the Ministry of Education. In addition to a branch of general services with sections for planning, building, inspection, etc., there may be merit in creating five other branches, to correspond to the five major aspects of the educational program: primary education, secondary education, vocational education, fundamental education and higher education.

III PUBLIC HEALTH

Hospitals and Dispensaries

The country's 24 public and 37 private hospitals have, as of the end of 1954, a total of 4,094 beds. This means only 1.19 beds[8] for over 1,000 inhabitants, as compared with 5 per 1,000 in England, the U. S. and New Zealand or the 15 per 1,000 which some authorities consider optimum for a really healthy population. Only 1,880 of the beds, or 0.56 per 1,000 inhabitants, are in general public hospitals.

[8] In this and subsequent comparisons the number of beds per 1,000 inhabitants has been calculated on the basis of the 1952 population.

15: Khadduri S-4 (no date) 1951 MD1 Syria MD1

642 with public welfare." All subsoil minerals, solid or liquid, are
423 declared the property of the State; and the State, in the general interest, is permitted to expropriate private property in accordance with a law providing for just compensation. But Article 23 ensures that no "general confiscation" shall be permitted.

The Constitution provides in like manner the way of utilizing the land. It stipulates that land "shall be cultivated and not neglected"; and that should it be left unexploited within a certain period to be specified by law, the right of usufruct is alienated. The Constitution provides, likewise, that "a maximum limit for land ownership shall be prescribed by law," and that small and medium ownership is to be encouraged: "The State shall distribute State lands to peasants to whom land is not available sufficient to their living, against small rents to be repaid in installments." (Article 22.)[25]

642 Labor is regarded as "the most basic factor in social life," and
659 is "the right of all citizens." "The State shall provide work to citizens and shall guarantee it by directing and promoting the national economy." (Article 26.) The State undertakes to protect labor and provide legislation for the regulation of wages, hours of labor, allowances, and the improvement of social and health conditions. Trade unions are permitted to be formed within the limits of the law. Forced labor is prohibited except by law aimed at certain specific social and constructional services, and in case of war and emergencies.

642 Education is declared a right of every citizen. Elementary
871 education is compulsory and free in all Government schools. Secondary and professional education, though not compulsory, is also free in all Government schools. "The State shall give priority in the budget for the spread and expansion of elementary, rural, and professional education." The aim of education is defined as "the creation of a generation strong in body and mind, full of faith in God, endowed with moral virtues, proud in the

425 [25] On February 15, 1951, the Minister of Agriculture announced a plan for the distribution of 164,000 dunams (app. 41,500 acres) of State land in the Jazirah area among 554 Bedouin families of the Shammar Zor tribe. Each family will receive 300 dunams (75 acres), and each peasant, after paying the State LS 1.5 annually for 3 years, will own his share of the land. The State land is to be distributed among several villages, each village to receive 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres).

15: Khaddurl S-4 (no date) 1951 MDl Syria MDl

Arab heritages, equipped with knowledge, aware of its duties and obligations, working for the general welfare, imbued with the spirit of collaboration and fraternity among all citizens." (Article 28.) To achieve these ends the State undertakes to supervise all educational institutions in the country and to formulate programs to be applied in the various stages of training. The State alone has the right to grant and to standardize school certificates. Further, a Board of Education is to be set up to formulate educational policy and plans, the composition and functions of which are to be defined by law.

Military service is compulsory, the justification being that the defense of the country is a "sacred duty" and that the Army is the guardian of the Fatherland. The family is the basis of society and is to be protected by the State. The State protects and encourages marriage and endeavors to remove the material and social obstacles which hinder it.

The transitional provisions of the Constitution specify that within ten years from its coming into force illiteracy must be eliminated from the country. Another provision relates to the formulation of a plan for the gradual settlement of the tribes.

Finally, the Constitution stipulates that no amendment is to be made for two years. Thereafter the Constitution may be amended either by a proposal from the President with the approval of the Cabinet and Parliament if one-third of its members submit an application to this effect. Parliament will then consider the proposed amendment; if approved by an absolute majority, it is considered approved as a motion. If it is rejected, the rejection is final and no application for the amendment of the same article can be submitted again for one year. Six months after the adoption of a motion in favor of amendment, Parliament can begin to discuss the proposed alteration. A two-thirds majority is required for approval.

APPRAISAL

The Syrian Constitution of 1950 clearly reflects the influence of both the new European constitutions and the recent course of Arab nationalism. The socialistic trends reflect a realization of the need of rebuilding the social-economic system, which had

EDUCATION

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نسبة موازنة المعارف الى الموازنة العامة ، ١٩٢٢ — ١٩٥٢

RATIO OF THE EDUCATION BUDGET TO THE GENERAL BUDGET, 1922 — 1952

Table No. 1

جدول رقم ١

Year	الموازنة العامة بالليرات السورية General Budget L.S.	موازنة المعارف بالليرات السورية Education Budget L.S.	النسبة المئوية Ratio per cent	السنة
1922	1,692,673	177,974	10.76	١٩٢٢
1924	4,208,717	364,630	8.67	١٩٢٤
1925	5,641,140	441,272	7.83	١٩٢٥
1926	5,041,055	463,922	9.20	١٩٢٦
1927	1,598,636	136,969	8.56	١٩٢٧
1928	2,343,608	194,443	8.29	١٩٢٨
1929	11,259,513	886,141	8.78	١٩٢٩
1930	9,449,096	1,064,099	11.27	١٩٣٠
1931	10,160,744	1,059,259	10.36	١٩٣١
1932	9,502,657	1,048,289	11.03	١٩٣٢
1933	8,464,567	1,077,389	12.73	١٩٣٣
1934	6,983,130	949,297	13.59	١٩٣٤
1935	7,252,365	995,346	13.73	١٩٣٥
1936	7,552,378	964,980	12.78	١٩٣٦
1937	8,365,500	1,229,185	14.71	١٩٣٧
1938	10,247,047	1,613,135	15.74	١٩٣٨
1939	11,352,479	1,942,223	16.23	١٩٣٩
1940	11,864,600	1,911,730	16.09	١٩٤٠
1941	13,602,100	2,372,623	16.71	١٩٤١
1942	22,500,000	3,936,561	17.06	١٩٤٢
1943	36,680,500	6,052,179	16.45	١٩٤٣
1944	69,945,945	7,488,823	10.71	١٩٤٤
1945	163,673,000	9,882,599	6.00	١٩٤٥
1946	129,704,000	14,127,398	10.89	١٩٤٦
1947	125,830,500	16,966,450	13.48	١٩٤٧
1948	137,908,000	20,439,400	14.80	١٩٤٨
1949	130,710,000	22,278,260	17.04	١٩٤٩
1950/51 (1)	218,720,000	38,752,000	17.56	(١) ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١
1951/52 (2)	269,000,000	49,799,000	18.78	(٢) ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢
1952	305,000,000	38,806,000	17.35	١٩٥٢

(1) Period 1.1.50 — 30.6.51
(2) Period 1.7.51 — 31.12.52

(١) المدة ١/١/١٩٥٠ — ٣٠/٦/١٩٥١
(٢) المدة ١/٧/١٩٥١ — ٣١/١٢/١٩٥٢

عدد المدارس الرسمية والاهلية والاجنبية ، سنوات ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL, AND FOREIGN SCHOOLS 1950/1951 — 1952/1953

Table No. 2

جدول رقم ٢

TYPE OF SCHOOL	1950/1951		١٩٥١/١٩٥٠		1951/1952		١٩٥٢/١٩٥١		1952/1953		١٩٥٣/١٩٥٢		نوع المدارس
	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	مختلطة Mixed	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	مختلطة Mixed	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	مختلطة Mixed	
Elementary Schools													**المدارس الابتدائية**
— Total	1,794	1224	310	160	2184	1635	369	180	2390	1610	394	395	ـ المجموع
— Government	1,472	1205	258	9	1850	1534	313	13	2064	1503	343	218	ـ الرسمية
— National	284	106	42	136	296	86	46	152	308	99	44	165	ـ الاهلية
— Foreign	38	13	10	15	38	13	10	15	37	8	7	12	ـ الاجنبية
Secondary Schools													**المدارس المتوسطة والاعدادية**
— Total	135	77	43	15	164	107	48	9	181	99	57	25	ـ المجموع
— Government	47	27	17	3	57	35	20	2	57	34	20	3	ـ الرسمية
— National	70	43	17	10	80	65	19	5	106	59	27	20	ـ الاهلية
— Foreign	18	7	9	2	18	7	9	2	18	6	10	2	ـ الاجنبية
Technical Schools (1)													**المدارس المهنية (١)**
— Total	15	11	4	—	13	11	2	—	14	12	1	1	ـ المجموع
— Government	11	10	1	—	11	10	1	—	12	11	1	—	ـ الرسمية
— National	3	1	2	—	2	1	1	—	2	1	—	1	ـ الاهلية
— Foreign	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ـ الاجنبية
Teachers Training College (Government) (2)	5	3	2	—	10	6	4	—	8	6	2	—	**دار المعلمين(٢) (الرسمية)**

Source : Ministry of Education.

(1) Including Agricultural Schools.

(2) In 1950 the Rural Teachers Training College was merged with the other Training Colleges

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(١) بما في ذلك المدارس الزراعية

(٢) ابتداء من عام ١٩٥٠ ادخلت دار المعلمين الريفية مع دور المعلمين الاخرى

عدد الطلاب في عموم المدارس الرسمية والأهلية والأجنبية ، ١٩٥٠/١٩٥١ — ١٩٥١/١٩٥٢ — ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PUPILS IN ALL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SCHOOLS, YEARS 1950/1951 — 1952/1953

Table No. 3

جدول رقم ٣

TYPE OF SCHOOL	1950 — 1951 ١٩٥١ ـ ١٩٥٠			1951 — 1952 ١٩٥٢ ـ ١٩٥١			1952 — 1953 ١٩٥٣ ـ ١٩٥٢			نوع المدارس
	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	الجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	
Elementary Schools										**المدارس الابتدائية**
— Total	261,862	188,823	73,039	297,185	214,684	82,501	311,033	222,779	88,954	ـ المجموع
— Government	206,343	154,430	51,913	237,775	178,250	59,525	249,399	185,275	64,124	ـ الرسمية
— National	48,804	30,885	17,919	52,270	32,614	19,656	54,856	20,641	34,215	ـ الاهلية
— Foreign	6,715	3,508	3,207	7,140	3,820	3,320	6,778	3,289	3,489	ـ الاجنبية
Secondary Schools										**المدارس الثانوية**
— Total	34,874	26,403	8,471	42,551	32,338	10,213	47,670	36,243	11,427	ـ المجموع
— Government	22,269	16,539	5,730	26,237	19,314	6,923	27,144	19,990	7,154	ـ الرسمية
— National	10,378	8,577	1,801	13,602	11,305	2,297	17,801	14,785	3,016	ـ الاهلية
— Foreign	2,227	1,287	940	2,712	1,719	993	2,725	1,468	1,257	ـ الاجنبية
Technical Schools (*)										**المدارس المهنية (*)**
— Total	2,277	1,945	332	2,310	1,998	312	2,191	1,995	196	ـ المجموع
— Government	2,185	1,875	310	2,146	1,942	204	2,082	1,896	186	ـ الرسمية
— National	92	50	42	64	56	8	109	99	10	ـ الاهلية
— Foreign	80	—	80	—	—	—	—	—	—	ـ الاجنبية
Teachers Training College (Government)	955	643	312	1,233	785	448	1,255	731	524	**دور المعلمين ـ الرسمية**

Source : Ministry of Education.
(*) Including pupils in Agricultural Schools

المصدر : وزارة المعارف
(*) اضيف اليهم طلاب المدارس الزراعية

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على الشهادات العلمية السورية منذ احداثها حتى نهاية عام ١٩٥٢

THE ACCUMULATIVE NUMBER OF PEPSONS HOLDING SYRIAN CERTIFICATES SINCE THEIR ISSUE UP TO THE END OF 1952

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Table No. 10

جدول رقم ١٠

Certificate	مجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	الشهادات
Elementary School Certificate	124,601	97,249	27,352	شهادة الدراسة الابتدائية
The « Brevet » Certificate	18,962	14,964	3,998	« « المتوسطة
The Secondary School Certificate	8,964	7,395	1,569	« « الثانوية
The Elementary Agricultural School Certificate	111	111	—	« الابتدائية الزراعية
The «2Brevet» Agricultural School Certificate	127	127	—	« « المتوسطة الزراعية
The Secondary Agricultural School Certificate	230	230	—	« « الثانوية الزراعية
The « Brevet » Trade School Certificate	797	583	214	« « المتوسطة الصناعية
The Secondary Trade School Certificate	82	82	—	« « الثانوية الصناعية
The «2Brevet» Commercial Certificate	315	315	—	« « المتوسطة التجارية
The Secondary Commercial School Certificate	144	144	—	« « الثانوية التجارية
The Shar'ia School Certificate	116	116	—	« « الشرعية
The Elementary School Teaching Certificate	1,718	1,065	563	« اهلية التعليم الابتدائي
Licence in Law	2,308	2,219	89	« الاجازة في الحقوق
Diploma in Finance and Economics	12	10	2	« الاختصاص في العلوم المالية والاقتصادية
Diploma in Law (Special)	14	13	1	« الاختصاص في الحقوق الخاصة
Diploma in Law (General)	20	15	5	« « في الحقوق العامة
Doctor in Medicine	597	587	10	شهادة دكتور في الطب
Doctor in Dentistry	168	167	1	« « في طب الاسنان
Licence in Pharmacy	231	223	8	« الاجازة في الصيدلة
Diploma in Nursery	72	—	72	« في فن التمريض
Diploma in Midwifery	238	—	238	« « القبالة
Licence in Engineering	32	32	—	« الاجازة في الهندسة
Licence of Natural Sciences	12	9	3	« « « العلوم الطبيعية
Licence in Mathematics	31	25	6	« « « العلوم الرياضية
Licence in Physics	33	22	11	« « « العلوم الفيزيائية
Certificate in Physics, Chemistry and Biology (P.C.B.)	146	131	15	« العلوم الفيزيائية والكيميائية والحيوية
Licence in Arabic Literature	58	40	18	« الاجازة في آداب اللغة العربية
Licence in Philosophy	39	23	16	« « « الفلسفة
Licence in History	79	50	29	« « « التاريخ
Licence in Geography	22	13	9	« « « الجغرافيا
Teacher's Diploma (H.T.T.C.)	260	192	68	« دبلوم في التربية من كلية التربية
Secondary Teachers' Certificate	270	199	71	« اهلية التعليم الثانوي

Source : Ministry of Education, The Syrian University, Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف
الجامعة السورية — وزارة الزراعة

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على الشهادات العلمية السورية خلال عام ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE SYRIAN EDUCATIONAL CERTIFICATES DURING 953 871

Table No. 15

جدول رقم ١٥

Certificate	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Fem.	الشهادات
Elementary School Certificate	26,342	20,556	5,786	شهادة الدراسة الابتدائية
The « Brevet » Certificate	4,610	3,565	1,045	« « المتوسطة
The Secondary School Certificate	1,700	1,383	317	« « الثانوية
The Elementary Agricultural School Certificate	...	...	...	« « الابتدائية الزراعية
The « Brevet » Agricultural School Certificate	62	62	—	« « المتوسطة الزراعية
The Secondary Agricultural School Certificate	14	14	—	« « الثانوية الزراعية
The « Brevet » Trade School Certificate	146	124	22	« « المتوسطة الصناعية
The Secondary Trade School Certificate	55	55	—	« « الثانوية الصناعية
The « Brevet » Commercial School Certificate	22	22	—	« « المتوسطة التجارية
The Secondary Commercial School Certificate	9	9	—	« « الثانوية التجارية
The Shari'a School Certificate	7	7	—	« « الثانوية الشرعية
The Elementary School Teaching Certificate	432	258	174	« اهلية التعليم الابتدائي
Licence in Law	104	100	4	« الاجازة في الحقوق
Diploma in Finance and Economics	23	23	—	« الاختصاص في العلوم المالية والاقتصادية
Diploma in Law (Special)	26	26	—	« الاختصاص في الحقوق الخاصة
Diploma in Law (General)	55	51	4	« « في الحقوق العامة
Doctor in Medicine	53	47	6	شهادة دكتور في الطب
Doctor in Dentistry	7	6	1	« « في طب الاسنان
Licence in Pharmacy	13	10	3	« الاجازة في الصيدلة
Diploma in Nursery	13	—	13	« في فن التمريض
Diploma in Midwifery	22	—	22	« « القبالة
Licence in Engineering	18	16	2	« الاجازة في الهندسة
Licence in Natural Sciences	8	6	2	« « « العلوم الطبيعية
Licence in Mathematics	7	4	3	« « « العلوم الرياضية
Licence in Physics	9	8	1	« « « العلوم الفيزيائية
Certificate in Physics, Chemistry and Biology (P.C.B.)	92	79	13	« العلوم الفيزيائية والكيميائية والحيوية
Licence in Arabic Literature	19	12	7	« الاجازة في آداب اللغة العربية
Licence in Philosophy	17	9	8	« « « الفلسفة
Licence in History	10	8	2	« « « التاريخ
Licence in Geography	12	11	1	« « « الجغرافيا
Teacher's Diploma (H.T.T.C.)	42	33	9	« دبلوم في التربية من كلية التربية
Secondary Teachers' Certificate (old system)	25	17	8	« « اهلية التعليم الثانوي نظام قديم
Secondary Teachers' Certificate (Specialising Class.)	9	4	5	صف الاختصاص

Source : Ministry of Education — The Syrian University — Ministry of Agriculture

المصدر : وزارة المعارف
الجامعة السورية — وزارة الزراعة

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LEBANON MEI
SYRIA MDI

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In neither country is there an officer caste or a strong military tradition, though the present Syrian regime is trving to create one.

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Social Survey

The ruling class in both countries is drawn from wealthy families; titles do not exist and the 'old' rich families, whose position and wealth come from land, mix freely with the 'new' rich families, whose money comes from commerce. There is no stigma in engaging in trade and even members of the upper class are merchants. A middle class of functionaries and employees has been growing up since 1948 in the three main cities. Their flats, between the splendour of the rich quarter and the huddle of the *suq*, are being built in quantities and their new, middle-class way of life is based on European standards. The mass of the people are artisans and labourers. The urban artisan approaches the middle class and the rural labourer approaches the hard life of the nomad; for the farm labourer the standard of living is generally low.

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The Press

The press of both countries is important but no one paper or group of papers has established an ascendancy. Damascus had at one time over twenty daily papers none of which could guarantee a circulation of over 3,000. The same state of affairs holds true in Beirut where most parties issue Arabic and in some cases French papers; there are also Armenian newspapers and one English daily.

Individual Lebanese have founded papers and *Le Commerce du Levant*, published in Beirut, has a standing comparable with *La Bourse Egyptienne*. In both countries press censorship has frequently closed down a paper only for it to re-emerge under another name, and in Syria the military dictatorship has reduced the press to a mere mouthpiece of official propaganda.

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Education

In both countries there are primary and secondary schools, and the number of schools and students increase each year. Primary education is compulsory, and although reliable figures of literacy are not available,[1] it may be assumed that the percentage of illiterates is decreasing in both countries, but is higher in Syria than in Lebanon. In Syria, most of the schools are run by the state and of the private schools (which are

[1] An estimate for Syria for 1947 given in UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, 1952, was 40–50 per cent.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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mainly Christian) those run by foreigners are now finding it difficult to disarm the suspicions of the Government. In Lebanon, there are almost as many private as state schools and the foreign schools still work without difficulty. There are higher schools for teachers and for agriculture and engineering in Syria and for agriculture in Lebanon, but it is usual for a student to pass from a secondary school directly to a university. The following table shows the various types of schools and number of students.

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Type	Lebanon, 1951		Syria, 1951–2	
	Schools	*Students*	*Schools*	*Students*
State:				
Primary	977	83,252	1,850	237,775
Secondary	..	..	57	26,237
Technical	30	2,381	11	2,146
Teachers	2	165	10	1,233
Reformatory	1	106	—	—
Private	601	84,788	387	65,936
Foreign	149	41,402	56	9,852
Total:	1,760	212,094	2,371	343,179

.. = not available.

(Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus, 1952; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1953).

The American University of Beirut is non-sectarian and has students from all over the Middle East. It encourages the use of Arabic as well as English, and its most renowned faculties are those of medicine and social sciences. The University of St Joseph in Beirut is run by the Society of Jesus. Attached to this university are schools of medicine, law, and theology, subsidized by the French Government and administered by the Society, in which teaching is carried on in the French language. A National University has recently been started by the Lebanese Government. The Syrian National University in Damascus teaches in Arabic and its most important faculties are those of law and medicine. A separate body for the study of the Arabic language is the Arab Academy of Damascus.

Health

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Malaria and amoebic dysentery are endemic and, though efforts are being made to drain breeding-grounds, preventive medicine is only in a rudimentary stage. Good hospitals exist in the cities and more are under construction; qualified doctors practise in all the towns, but in the villages there is still a lack

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Syria MD1

563 equally to Syria. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of inter-connected social units, the relations of which with the Moslem community are largely formal. This is especially true of the older generation brought up under the Ottoman regime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of the nation between them are helping to make the younger generation less conscious of its confessional ties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects.

Western ideas and forces have so far made little impression outside the few large towns. In the smaller towns and the villages, traditions still rule unchecked, and the old social exclusiveness of the sects still persists. But on the other hand the very nature of life in small towns or villages tends to the assimilation of the social characteristics of the minorities to those of the majority. Moreover, it encourages economic interdependence and co-operation. Economically, the Christian do not differ much from the Moslem peasants. It is only in the large towns that the economic structure of the Christian communities diverges
563 from that of the majority. The educational progress of the
871 Christians has been swifter than that of the Moslems, and has diverged from it in some ways. In 1938 the Christians accounted for about 32 per cent of the total school population, although they form only 19 per cent of the population as a whole. They account for an even larger proportion of the pupils of secondary schools; and although only 20 per cent of the students of the University in Damascus are Christians, many others are studying at the Universities in Beirut, or in Europe.

It must be noticed also that 32 per cent of the Christian students attend foreign schools, 61 per cent private schools and only 7 per cent official ones. Almost all the foreign schools are controlled by Christian missions, although some are owned by the French 'Mission Laïque', and about 170 out of the 294 private schools are controlled by Christian communities. Thus, the Christians are not only obtaining more education than the Moslems, but
563 it is education of a different sort. Individual Christians play an
668 important part in the national movement, in Syria as elsewhere. The most prominent of them in recent times have been the brothers Faris and Faiz al-Khuri, the former of whom was President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1936 to 1939 and again in 1943–4, and became Prime Minister in 1944.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

511 their animals. Malaria is prevalent. The majority are heavily
[164] indebted. The tenants on the irrigated land, with an average holding of 18 acres, are also poor but less heavily indebted, because they can depend on a more regular income.

434 The poorest class are the landless labourers whose income in
464 money and kind amounts to 530 Syrian pounds a year (1944)
262 (£10 at 1939 prices).[1] This is a starvation wage, which means that they can only eat enough in harvest time, and in winter must subsist on maize, bread, and grass.

311 The poverty on this estate is therefore a result of the low
241 productivity and the low proportion of the area under cultiva-
409 tion. One way of increasing the area cultivated would be by the use of machinery. Tractors were introduced some fifteen years ago, but proved too costly in relation to the low prices of Syrian grain; owing to lack of skilled drivers and proper maintenance they fell into disrepair. During the late war, however, as the price of grain rose, tractors were again used by some tenants who hired them from neighbouring estates.

312 Another way of raising production would be to increase irrigation since there is sufficient water to supply much more land. In this respect the estate is typical of the whole Homs–Hama plain, where much of the water which the French authorities have made available by irrigation goes to waste.

311 On this estate, therefore, the poverty of the cultivators is due
871 to the landowner's failure to increase the productivity of the
744 soil, rather than to his exploitation of the peasants; compared with other estates, this one is socially progressive, since the landowner's family have set up a school and also distribute medicines free of charge.

The second study covers a more intensively cultivated village,
312 Ashrafie, on the borders of the irrigated district of Damascus.
471 Less heavily supplied with water than El Ghuta itself, Ashrafie
421 has sufficient water to irrigate 10 per cent of the total land. The total area is 1,600 hectares or 4,000 acres, of which 2,400 are owned by four estate owners and the rest by peasants. The largest landowner is an absentee, letting his land on a 50 per cent share-tenancy basis; with definite three-year leases (by contrast with the usual custom under which the tenant has no lease).

[1] This is calculated on a rate of 9 Syrian pounds to £1, allowing for a six-fold increase in the Syrian cost of living between 1939 and 1944.

[The estate of Misherfe, near Homs --Analyst]

161 square mile; in the province of Hauran, 80 per square mile; and in the province of Hama, 77 per square mile. In contrast, the population density of Al Jazira, incorporating the potentially fertile plains of the Khabour river basin, was 18 per square
369 mile. The country is about 70 per cent rural,
162 with the inhabitants living in some 5,000 villages. There are 6 principal cities with populations of over 30,000 — Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Deir ez Zor. Damascus, the capital and a city of commercial and religious significance, had a population of almost 325,100 in 1949. Aleppo, an industrial and trade center, and the largest city in Syria, had a population of about 356,600. It disputes with Damascus the claim of being the oldest city of continued prominence in the world.

162
167 In addition to the older refugee communities, as the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Druzes, which have become established minority groups, Syria received an influx in 1948 of about 150,000 Arabs from northern Palestine. Approximately 80,000 located around Damascus; others in Hauran and the northern provinces. Their status and ultimate distribution were still undetermined in 1952, when the number on the roster of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees totaled 84,000. Over one third resided in special camps, but the remainder were living independently in the various towns and villages.

167 During the Ottoman regime, large numbers of Syrians emigrated to the Americas, and to Europe and Africa. Although they probably total almost 60,000, the Syrian colonies abroad are small in comparison with those of the Lebanese, and their influence on the cultural and the economic life of their homeland is proportionately slight.

811
185 The educational system has undergone revision since the founding of the republic in 1943, with increased emphasis on its adaptation to the culture and the needs of the
811 people. Elementary education is compul-

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sory, according to law, but barely one half 871
of the children are now registered in
schools. Outside of Damascus, the literacy 212
rates probably do not exceed 40 per cent
among the men and 10 to 20 per cent
among the women. Schools are maintained 871
by the government and by private organiza-
tions, both national and foreign. The Syrian 873
University, in Damascus, is one of the lead-
ing Arab institutions in the Middle East. It
includes faculties of law, science, arts and
medicine, with subordinate departments of
dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, as well as
an advanced school for teacher training.
An engineering school is established at 874
Aleppo, and, in 1952, a new school for the
training of village teachers, with emphasis
on home economics and agriculture, was
under construction near Damascus.

Vital Statistics

Due to lack of demographic data among 659
large segments of the population, few valid
statistics are available. Theoretically, the
registration of births and deaths is compul-
sory, but in the rural areas, away from
centers of population, reporting is incom-
plete. Government officials estimate that
the accuracy of the recorded statistics ap-
proximates 90 per cent in the cities, but
30 to 60 per cent in the villages, over one
half of which have less than 200 inhabitants.
Considering the country as a whole, prob-
ably 50 to 80 per cent of the births are
recorded and, since certificates are required
for burial, a slightly higher percentage of
the deaths. According to published statistics 163
for 1948, the birth rate for the entire coun- 165
try was calculated at 19.1 per 1,000 popu-
lation; the death rate, at 6.5 per 1,000 popu-
lation. The birth rates ranged from 35.3
in the city of Damascus to 9.0 in the rural
province of Al Jazira; the death rates, from
13.2 to 2.3, respectively. Evidence derived
from informal surveys in different localities,
however, suggests that the true birth rates
average 30 to 40 per 1,000 population and
the death rates 15 to 30 per 1,000 popu-
lation.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

871 L58 number of primary, intermediate and secondary schools more than doubled.

871 The last five years alone have seen 939 new schools[2] established—an increase of 64% over the previously existing schools and an average increase of 11% per annum. Greatest gains occurred in the primary schools, the number of which rose by 81% or 11.4% per year. The number of children attending primary schools rose from about 150,000 in 1945-46 to 311,000 in 1952-53. Enrollment in intermediate and secondary schools increased even more rapidly—from 12,661 to 47,670. These advances, as well as those in the fields of technical education, teacher-training and higher education, are shown in Table 1.

872 *Primary Education*

In spite of the very large effort of the last few years, the remaining problems are enormous. According to the best available estimates, no more than 30-40% of the population is literate. It is customarily reckoned that, in a population similar in structure to Syria's, the number of children in every year of age from the 6th to the 12th is approximately equal to 2.6% of the total population. Six to eleven being the primary school age in Syria, there would be on this basis 546,000 children ($6 \times 2.6\% = 15.6\%$ of the 1952 population) of primary school age. Actually only 311,033, or presumably 56% of the eligibles, are in school.

The ratio is not the same for boys and girls. Assuming that the school-age population is divided equally between boys and girls—i.e., that there are 273,000 of each sex—then 18% of the boys and 68% of the girls do not attend school (the attendance figures are 222,779 and 88,254, respectively). Furthermore, many children do not remain in school long enough to receive a school certificate. The number who do finish has been increasing rapidly (from 624 in 1928, to 2,993 in 1940, 6,690 in 1946 and 19,850 in 1952) but it is still much lower than it should be.

There is one primary school for every 1,400 persons in Syria, with an average of 128 pupils and 3.6 teachers. Although only 13% of all primary schools are private schools, these have 18% of all primary school pupils and over 23% of the primary school teachers. The provinces of Damascus and Aleppo have the largest number of private schools; the Euphrates, Djebel Druze and Hauran have the fewest.

[2] Not new buildings, but new schools, most of which occupy rented buildings.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

TABLE 1 Recent Educational Progress in Syria

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	1945–46	1950–51	1952–53
Budget of Ministry of Education[a]	16,967[b]	24,266[c]	36,804[d]
Percent of total ordinary budget	13.5	14.6	17.7
Primary education			
Number of schools	1,080	1,794	2,399
Government	737	1,472	2,064
Private	343	322	335
Number of pupils	150,134	261,862	311,033
Government	99,703	206,343	249,399
Private	50,431	55,519	61,634
Number of graduates	6,690	18,104	26,342
Intermediate and secondary education			
Number of schools	73	135	181
Government	28	47	57
Private	45	88	124
Number of pupils	12,661	34,874	47,670
Government	8,276	22,269	27,144
Private	4,385	12,595	20,526
Number of intermediate school graduates	1,039	3,630	4,610
Number of secondary school graduates	1,155	1,243	1,700
Technical schools			
Number of schools	7	15	8[e]
Government	5	11	6
Private	2	4	2
Number of pupils	916	2,277	1,676
Government	881	2,105	1,567
Private	35	172	109
Teacher training			
Number of schools	4	5	8
Number of students	388	955	1,255
Higher education			
Number of students	1,058	2,470	2,598

[a] In thousands of Syrian pounds.
[b] 1946 budget.
[c] Two-thirds of the 18-months budget ended June 30, 1951.
[d] 1953 budget.
[e] Excluding agricultural schools.

Assuming an equal percentage of school age children in the different 872
districts, it appears that the regional distribution of primary schools is very unbalanced. Thus the average number of primary school pupils is 91

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

872 per 1,000 of the population, but in the Jezireh it is only 53 while in the Djebel Druze it is 152. The number of schools, which for Syria as a whole averages 0.7 per thousand people, varies regionally from 0.53 in Aleppo to 1.62 in the Djebel Druze. Similarly, while the country has an average of 2.56 teachers per thousand people, Latakia has only 1.94 and the Djebel Druze 4.01. It is apparent that, proportionately, in some areas three times as many are receiving primary education as in other areas.

For 1952-53, there were 8,541 primary school teachers in Syria. The pupil-teacher ratio was 36 for Syria as a whole; it ranged from 26 in the Jezireh to 41 in the Hauran and 43 in Homs.

Many factors have affected the distribution of educational facilities and the extent of school attendance. There is naturally a better provision for schools in the older settled areas than in the Jezireh, which has been developed only in the last decade and a half. School attendance is higher in the more densely populated districts than in areas, like the Jezireh, where the population is sparse and scattered and children may be deterred from attending by the distance from the nearest school. Thus, while the Jezireh has the fewest schools in relation to the population, it also has the highest proportion of teachers to school attendance. Economic pressure also keeps children out of school or causes them to leave before finishing, although in areas where the educational tradition is strong, as is apparently the case in the Djebel Druze, school attendance may be high despite a rather low standard of living.

Intermediate and Secondary Schools

873 There is one secondary school for every 20,400 people, with an average of 276 pupils and 17 teachers per school. Records show that the number of children attending intermediate and secondary schools in 1952-53 was 47,670 out of an estimated 425,000 of school age. In other words, only 11.2% of school age children were attending secondary schools at all. Even if we include those receiving post-primary education in technical, agricultural and intermediate schools, the percentage does not rise above 12%. Thus less than one out of eight children in Syria receives any formal education beyond the primary grades.

Private schools represent 65% of all secondary schools, but they have only 40% of the secondary school pupils. Only in Latakia is the private school enrollment greater than that of governmental schools. On the other

التربية والتعليم

عدد الطلاب والاساتذة في المدارس الابتدائية الرسمية والاهلية والاجنبية في المحافظات السورية

للسنة الدراسية ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

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NUMBER OF PUPILS, SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS IN GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, 1952/1953

Table No. 4

جدول رقم ٤

Mohafazat	عدد التلاميذ Number of pupils: المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	عدد المدارس Number of Schools: المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	مختلطة Mixed	عدد الاساتذة No. of Teachers	المحافظات
Grand total	311,033	222,779	88,254	2,209	1,610	394	205	8,801	المجموع العام
Government Elementary School									الابتدائي الرسمي
— Total	249,399	185,273	64,124	2,064	1,503	343	218	6,328	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	70,259	46,199	24,060	368	229	106	31	1,774	ـ دمشق
— Homs	20,594	14,873	5,721	129	93	23	13	470	ـ حمص
— Hama	19,622	13,433	6,189	111	76	28	7	481	ـ حماة
— Latakia	35,523	27,563	7,960	431	291	48	92	839	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	55,451	43,816	11,635	439	376	59	4	1,557	ـ حلب
— Al-Hasakeh	8,074	6,863	1,211	195	170	11	14	333	ـ الحسكة
— Deir-es-Zor	10,861	8,633	2,128	117	99	17	1	345	ـ دير الزور
— Sweida	14,390	10,722	3,668	153	88	35	30	388	ـ السويداء
— Dir'a	14,505	12,953	1,552	121	83	14	24	342	ـ درعا
National Elementary School — total	54,856	34,215	20,641	308	99	44	165	2,013	الابتدائي الاهلي ـ المجموع
— Damascus	17,166	11,239	5,927	96	34	12	50	573	ـ دمشق
— Homs	4,753	3,365	1,388	24	11	5	8	134	ـ حمص
— Hama	2,374	1,764	610	14	4	1	9	76	ـ حماة
— Latakia	4,266	2,605	1,661	40	16	7	17	123	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	19,103	10,888	8,215	90	28	16	46	796	ـ حلب
— Al-Hasakeh	5,341	3,195	2,146	24	—	—	24	176	ـ الحسكة
— Deir-es-Zor	675	415	260	7	2	—	5	38	ـ دير الزور
— Sweida	222	167	156	4	1	1	2	16	ـ السويداء
— Dir'a	855	577	278	9	3	2	4	34	ـ درعا
Foreign Elementary School									الابتدائي الاجنبي
— total	6,778	3,289	3,489	27	8	7	12	260	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	3,287	1,332	1,975	9	2	3	4	106	ـ دمشق
— Homs	433	313	120	5	1	—	4	21	ـ حمص
— Latakia	676	361	315	5	3	2	—	27	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	2,324	1,274	1,050	6	2	2	2	104	ـ حلب
— Dir'a	58	29	29	2	—	—	2	2	ـ درعا

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على الشهادة الابتدائية (*) ١٩٢٨ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE (*) 1928—1953

892

Table No. 6

جدول رقم ٦

YEAR	الجمع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	السنة
1928	624	462	162	١٩٢٨
1929	640	498	142	١٩٢٩
1930	556	453	103	١٩٣٠
1931	721	558	163	١٩٣١
1932	885	699	186	١٩٣٢
1933	956	755	201	١٩٣٣
1934	870	688	182	١٩٣٤
1935	1,036	817	219	١٩٣٥
1936	1,605	1,372	233	١٩٣٦
1937	1,692	1,320	372	١٩٣٧
1938	2,611	1,940	671	١٩٣٨
1939	2,498	1,969	529	١٩٣٩
1940	2,993	2,221	772	١٩٤٠
1941	2,312	1,691	621	١٩٤١
1942	3,661	2,704	957	١٩٤٢
1943	3,743	2,790	953	١٩٤٣
1944	4,829	3,581	1,248	١٩٤٤
1945	4,011	3,188	823	١٩٤٥
1946	6,690	5,279	1,411	١٩٤٦
1947	8,535	6,533	2,002	١٩٤٧
1948	9,196	7,259	1,937	١٩٤٨
1949	10,729	8,407	2,321	١٩٤٩
1950	14,945	11,626	3,319	١٩٥٠
1951	18,104	14,297	3,807	١٩٥١
1952	19,840	15,832	4,008	١٩٥٢
1953	26,342	20,556	5,786	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(*) قبل عام ١٩٢٨ كانت شهادات الدراسة الابتدائية تعطى من قبل مدير المدرسة ، فاصبحت تمنح بعد ذلك من وزير المعارف

(*) Prior to 1928, this certificate was issued by the principals of schools but was thereafter granted by the Ministry of Education.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
LebanonMEI
SyriaMDI

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mainly Christian) those run by foreigners are now finding it difficult to disarm the suspicions of the Government. In Lebanon, there are almost as many private as state schools and the foreign schools still work without difficulty. There are higher schools for teachers and for agriculture and engineering in Syria and for agriculture in Lebanon, but it is usual for a student to pass from a secondary school directly to a university. The following table shows the various types of schools and number of students.

Type	Lebanon, 1951		Syria, 1951–2	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
State:				
Primary	977	83,252	1,850	237,775
Secondary	..	..	57	26,237
Technical	30	2,381	11	2,146
Teachers	2	165	10	1,233
Reformatory	1	106	—	—
Private	601	84,788	387	65,996
Foreign	149	41,402	56	9,852
Total:	1,760	212,094	2,371	343,179

.. = not available.

(Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus, 1952; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1953).

The American University of Beirut is non-sectarian and has students from all over the Middle East. It encourages the use of Arabic as well as English, and its most renowned faculties are those of medicine and social sciences. The University of St Joseph in Beirut is run by the Society of Jesus. Attached to this university are schools of medicine, law, and theology, subsidized by the French Government and administered by the Society, in which teaching is carried on in the French language. A National University has recently been started by the Lebanese Government. The Syrian National University in Damascus teaches in Arabic and its most important faculties are those of law and medicine. A separate body for the study of the Arabic language is the Arab Academy of Damascus.

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Health

Malaria and amoebic dysentery are endemic and, though efforts are being made to drain breeding-grounds, preventive medicine is only in a rudimentary stage. Good hospitals exist in the cities and more are under construction; qualified doctors practise in all the towns, but in the villages there is still a lack

Other Secret Sects:—The Druze people constitute one of the two leading secret sects found only in Syria, the other being the Nuṣayriyyah inhabiting the mountains north of Tripoli. The Ismā'iliyyah of the Ḥimṣ and Ḥamāh district, another secret sect, are descended from the Assassins,[1] who for two centuries or so struck awe and terror into the hearts of the Crusaders, and are represented today by a few other sectarians in Persia and India. The Yezidis, so-called devil worshipers, practice their hidden rites in the out-of-the-way hills between Antioch and Aleppo and have coreligionists in Kurdistān and Armenia. SD 795 101

Special Interest of this Study:—But of all these sects Druzism is perhaps the most interesting and important. It is still a living force. Its followers form to the present day a vigorous and flourishing community in the Lebanon. Its learned system has not changed since it was first inaugurated in the early part of the eleventh century. The Islam of the Near East has changed and adapted itself to the requirements of the varying conditions. The Christianity of the Near East has changed. But the Druze system has been and still is the same. SD 795 621

The modernizing influence has in late years brought within its sphere quite a large number of the young and uninitiated Druzes. The report of the American University of Beirūt for last year indicates that there are in that institution alone thirty-six Druze students and five Druze teachers. But no one with first-hand knowledge of the situation would go so far as even to recognize the existence of a "modernist movement" alleged to be aiming at divulging the Druze beliefs, much less to declare "It is understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirūt will be the probable intermediary of communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place."[2] SD 177 873 SD

In fact the outside world knows so little about the contents of this religion that in a recent session of the Permanent Mandates SD 795

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[1] Arabic *Ḥashīshīs*—those addicted to the use of a stupefying weed.

[2] De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1923), p. 244. Dr. Bliss died in 1920.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

nity. No effort is now made to determine what happens to school graduates and how useful their training has been. It is generally recognized that their education simply does not meet the requirements. The law on technical education originally provided for the establishment of a committee consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of National Economy, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and other economic interests. This committee was to determine the types of vocational education needed and generally to facilitate such training and the subsequent employment of school graduates. Unfortunately it met only once and was apparently allowed to die for want of interest on the part of the Ministry of Education. A continuing committee of this type should once more be established. Its functions should be to undertake a critical appraisal of curricula, equipment and teaching staff; to devise means of relating vocational school education to in-service training in factories, banks and commercial houses; to assist in establishing a check on graduates and the usefulness of their training; and to make periodic visits to vocational institutions. This committee should also be asked to review the utility of the apprenticeship schools. In our opinion these schools are unlikely to provide training which would not be better acquired in existing shops and factories.

Adult Education

Aside from the educational work carried on in the army and some literacy courses conducted by private societies, no facilities for adult education exist in Syria. The mission believes that a program of "fundamental" adult education should be started not simply to combat illiteracy, which is still high among adults, but especially to enable people to acquire the practical knowledge which will help them to improve living conditions through their own efforts. A program on a large scale would manifestly be impracticable in the near future. We suggest that it be initiated as part of the program for the gradual introduction of community workers into the villages, recommended elsewhere in this report. Existing school teachers can be used in the adult education program, although they would need special supplementary training, since the subject matter and methods of instruction would obviously be different from those in the regular schools. For this reason it would be necessary to introduce courses on fundamental education into the curriculum of teachers' training colleges. To get the

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873 program off to a good start the services of an expert or a small mission should be requested from UNESCO which has accumulated considerable experience in techniques of fundamental education and which was active in Syria during 1952 and 1953 in the field of vocational training.

Higher Education

Higher education has made substantial progress. The Syrian University, which started in 1919 with schools of medicine and law, now includes also faculties of letters and of sciences, schools of pharmacy, dentistry and engineering and a Higher Teachers' Training College. In 1952-53 the University had 2,580 students. In Aleppo a school of engineering has also been established. Yet a further expansion and improvement of facilities will undoubtedly be necessary since the development program will sharply increase the demand for well-trained teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants and other qualified personnel. The University will need more teachers, equipment, laboratories and libraries. Although many Syrians will inevitably have to go abroad for special types of training, Syria should be able gradually to provide broader opportunities for higher education at home. The mission suggests that the government appoint a special committee to draw up recommendations for improving and expanding the University in line with the requirements of the economic development program that might be adopted. Such recommendations will undoubtedly entail larger expenditures on higher education, which the mission has taken into account.

658 *School Building*
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In recent years Syria has apparently been spending about £S 2.5 million annually on new schools. Of this amount, approximately £S 1.4 million has come from municipal or local funds. We do not think that the government should spend, on the average, more than this for school building over the next six years. More could be achieved with such an expenditure, however, by economizing on the cost of construction and requiring [346] more local self-help. Secondary schools built by the Ministry of Public Works, for example, have been excessively expensive owing to their monumental character, the use of costly building materials such as carved stone and other features of a luxury nature. The past cost of £S 150-200 per

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and able to do the practical work on the farm themselves. We suggest therefore that the present curricula be reviewed by a committee consisting of representatives of the Ministry and agriculturists, with the object of putting greater stress on manual training and on practical problems.

There is need for a vocational agricultural school in the Djebel Druze and the Hauran. For the time being this need could be met by broadening the curriculum of the Dera'a school, including special courses in agriculture. Stress should be laid on horticulture and fruit processing. In addition, at least one other school, preferably at Aleppo, should be raised to the same standards as Kharabo.

Elsewhere we have recommended that the curriculum include a mechanical training course.

We have also recommended the establishment of a secondary agricultural vocational school in Kamichliye. It should be located on soil most typical of the region and should have grounds adequate for experimental and demonstration plots, including an irrigation area. This school should become the headquarters for all agricultural education and extension work in the Jezireh; its curriculum should include courses on farming systems and the economics of mechanized agriculture. The third and fourth year curriculum should permit a choice between a technical course of study oriented towards machinery, repairs and maintenance, and an administrative course of study emphasizing economics and administration. We would expect enrollment to be 100-150 from 1957 on.

Adult education. Farmers should have an opportunity for formal instruction in the principles of good farm management and animal husbandry. Elsewhere we have suggested a pilot fundamental education program which would, among other things, include agriculture in its scope. Quite apart from this we believe that the rural elementary schools which provide instruction in agriculture should offer evening courses in which, with the help of proper visual aids, farmers could learn about improved crop rotation, better cultivation and weed control, means of identifying and combating pests and diseases and the like. Mobile trailers equipped with slide and moving picture projectors might be useful. In addition, we suggest raising the standards of mechanical farming by starting special courses at Kamichliye and probably at Aleppo for machinery owners, operators and mechanics. The first would be taught how to select proper farm machinery, supervise its operation and would learn the economics of mechanical farming. The second would be given practical training in opera-

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tion, maintenance and elementary repair of machinery. These courses could be organized with the help of an FAO expert and in cooperation with farm machinery dealers. They might be given under the aegis of the agricultural school at Aleppo and the proposed school at Kamichliye.

Certificates of competence should be awarded after suitable tests; if employers were to increase the pay of holders of such certificates, this might provide an incentive to workers to take such courses.

University level. Syria has no agricultural college or faculty; all the top staff of the Ministry of Agriculture have been trained abroad. The government and the Ministry send students to Egypt, Europe and the United States; the FAO and other organizations grant fellowships to Syrians. In 1953, 58 agricultural students were studying abroad in various fields—37 in Egypt, 11 in France and 10 in the United States.

Syria will be in great need of agronomists, agriculturists and veterinarians in the coming years. For the time being the total of fellowships should be increased to permit foreign study by 15-20 more students each year. The curriculum of the secondary school should also be expanded, as indicated above, to include one or two years of special work, for immediate and pressing needs.

Research

Syria had 18 experimental stations in 1954. They are well dispersed throughout the provinces and have reasonably good facilities and adequate grounds. Eight of the stations, in the provinces of Damascus, Hauran, Homs, Hama, Euphrates and the Jezireh, are engaged mainly in cereal and field crop research; the rest in horticultural work. Unfortunately, the stations work more or less independently of each other and this lack of coordination, coupled with staff and budgetary deficiencies, greatly impairs their effectiveness.

Despite the government's commendable efforts to offer Syrian personnel courses of study abroad, well-trained agronomists, horticulturists, agricultural engineers, zoological technicians and veterinarians will be lacking for some years to come. This suggests the advisability of limiting the extent of experimentation in the 18 understaffed stations.

Coordinated and central programming for future research is essential; this should be the task of one station, which may become the nucleus of a future Central Research Station. For the time being, we suggest that

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872 per 1,000 of the population, but in the Jezireh it is only 53 while in the Djebel Druze it is 152. The number of schools, which for Syria as a whole averages 0.7 per thousand people, varies regionally from 0.53 in Aleppo to 1.62 in the Djebel Druze. Similarly, while the country has an average of 2.56 teachers per thousand people, Latakia has only 1.94 and the Djebel Druze 4.01. It is apparent that, proportionately, in some areas three times as many are receiving primary education as in other areas.

For 1952-53, there were 8,541 primary school teachers in Syria. The pupil-teacher ratio was 36 for Syria as a whole; it ranged from 26 in the Jezireh to 41 in the Hauran and 43 in Homs.

Many factors have affected the distribution of educational facilities and the extent of school attendance. There is naturally a better provision for schools in the older settled areas than in the Jezireh, which has been developed only in the last decade and a half. School attendance is higher in the more densely populated districts than in areas, like the Jezireh, where the population is sparse and scattered and children may be deterred from attending by the distance from the nearest school. Thus, while the Jezireh has the fewest schools in relation to the population, it also has the highest proportion of teachers to school attendance. Economic pressure also keeps children out of school or causes them to leave before finishing, although in areas where the educational tradition is strong, as is apparently the case in the Djebel Druze, school attendance may be high despite a rather low standard of living.

Intermediate and Secondary Schools

873 There is one secondary school for every 20,400 people, with an average of 276 pupils and 17 teachers per school. Records show that the number of children attending intermediate and secondary schools in 1952-53 was 47,670 out of an estimated 425,000 of school age. In other words, only 11.2% of school age children were attending secondary schools at all. Even if we include those receiving post-primary education in technical, agricultural and intermediate schools, the percentage does not rise above 12%. Thus less than one out of eight children in Syria receives any formal education beyond the primary grades.

Private schools represent 65% of all secondary schools, but they have only 40% of the secondary school pupils. Only in Latakia is the private school enrollment greater than that of governmental schools. On the other

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

hand, 54% of all secondary school teachers teach in private schools, whose financial resources for this purpose are greater.

Again assuming an equal percentage of school age children in each district, it appears that the secondary schools, like the primary schools, are unequally distributed. At this educational level there is an average of 13.5 pupils per 1,000 of the population; but in the Jezireh, as might be expected, the ratio is only 2.7 in contrast to 18.1 in the Djebel Druze, 19.5 in Damascus and 22.3 in Hama. The number of secondary schools, averaging 0.049 per thousand people, ranges from as low as 0.016 in the Jezireh to 0.068 in Damascus and 0.085 in Hama. The average number of teachers is 0.8 per thousand people; in the Jezireh it is 0.2, in Hama 1.1 and in Damascus 1.6. In 1952-53 the secondary pupil-teacher ratio for the country was 16, but varied from 12.1 in the Jezireh and 12.4 in Damascus to 23.7 in the Djebel Druze. As in the case of primary schools, it is clear that the number of teachers cannot be the only limiting factor on attendance, for some areas most deficient in teachers have more children in school than those better supplied.

Vocational Education

Syria has six vocational schools for boys, one for girls and one coeducational, as well as six schools for primary teacher training and two colleges for rural teachers, or a total of 16 schools giving some kind of professional education not of university level.[3] All except one in Deir ez Zor are on or west of the line Damascus-Aleppo; thus the entire eastern portion of Syria with a population of over half a million has just one professional school. Together these schools had 3,881 students in 1952-53,[4] a figure to be contrasted with the estimated 60,000 young people who enter the labor market each year.

The principal shortcoming of the present system of vocational education is the great gulf between the training and instruction given and that which is really required for skilled jobs. Unfortunately the Ministry and the schools maintain no liaison with the businessmen and industrialists for whom they are presumably turning out graduates. Nothing is done to place graduates in private employment; the Ministry of Education simply

[3] Agricultural schools above the primary level are discussed separately elsewhere; there are five of these.

[4] Including 1,670 in technical vocational schools and 2,202 in teacher-training.

EDUCATION

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عدد الطلاب والمدرس والمدرسين في المدارس الثانوية حسب انواع المدارس والمحافظات ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PUPILS, SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND MOHAFAZAT, 1952 — 1953

Table No. 5

جدول رقم ٥

MOHAFAZAT	الطلاب Pupils			المدارس Schools				المدرسون Teachers	المحافظات
	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	المجموع Total	الذكور Males	الاناث Females	مختلطة Mixed		
Grand total	44,670	36,243	11,427	181	99	57	25	3,150	المجموع العام
Government Schools									المدارس الرسمية
total	27,144	19,990	7,154	57	34	20	3	1,290	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	7,543	5,075	2,468	19	11	8	—	456	ـ دمشق
— Homs	2,145	1,482	663	4	3	1	—	92	ـ حمص
— Hama	2,940	2,233	707	6	4	2	—	129	ـ حماة
— Latakia	4,252	3,015	1,237	7	2	2	3	163	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	5,851	4,263	1,588	11	8	3	—	237	ـ حلب
— Al-Hasakeh	547	456	91	3	2	1	—	47	ـ الحسكة
— Deir-ez-Zor	1,252	1,059	193	3	2	1	—	66	ـ دير الزور
— Sweida	1,523	1,398	125	2	1	1	—	58	ـ السويداء
— Dir'a	1,091	1,009	82	2	1	1	—	42	ـ درعا
National Schools —									المدارس الاهلية
total	17,801	14,785	3,016	106	59	27	20	1,527	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	6,486	4,920	1,566	30	17	11	2	677	ـ دمشق
— Homs	1,762	1,537	225	9	6	2	1	146	ـ حمص
— Hama	1,382	1,074	308	10	7	3	—	82	ـ حماة
— Latakia	4,625	3,946	679	33	11	7	15	304	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	2,670	2,389	281	15	10	4	1	233	ـ حلب
— Al-Hasakeh	129	91	38	1	—	—	1	9	ـ الحسكة
— Deir-ez-Zor	225	225	—	5	5	—	—	25	ـ دير الزور
— Sweida	234	234	—	1	1	—	—	16	ـ السويداء
— Dir'a	385	369	16	2	2	—	—	34	ـ درعا
Foreign Schools —									المدارس الاجنبية
total	2,725	1,468	1,257	18	6	10	2	333	ـ المجموع
— Damascus	935	467	468	8	2	5	1	148	ـ دمشق
— Homs	55	55	—	1	1	—	—	12	ـ حمص
— Latakia	236	126	110	3	1	2	—	25	ـ اللاذقية
— Aleppo	1,499	820	679	6	2	3	1	148	ـ حلب

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر وزارة المعارف

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عدد الحاصلين على الشهادة المتوسطة حسب مراكز الامتحان ١٩٤٩ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE « BREVET » CERTIFICATE, BY EXAMINATION CENTRES 1949 — 1953

Table No. 7

جدول رقم ٧

END OF YEAR	مجموع المراكز Total All Centres	Examination Centres									مراكز الامتحان	في نهاية السنة
		دمشق Damascus	حمص Homs	حماة Hama	اللاذقية Latakia	حلب Aleppo	الحسكة Al Hasakeh	دير الزور Deir-ez-Zor	السويداء Sweida	درعا Dir'a		
1949 — Total	1,983	715	348	173	331	493	45		—	—		١٩٤٩ — المجموع
— Males	1,629	576	308	144	269	402	42		—	—		— ذكور
— Females	354	139	40	29	62	91	3		—	—		— اناث
1950 — Total	2,408	949	281	234	365	454	95		—	—		١٩٥٠ — المجموع
— Males	1,859	687	228	189	303	368	84		—	—		— ذكور
— Females	549	262	53	45	62	116	11		—	—		— اناث
1951 — Total	3,630	1,429	366	280	574	853	128		—	—		١٩٥١ — المجموع
— Males	2,869	1,091	296	224	460	688	110		—	—		— ذكور
— Females	761	338	70	56	114	165	18		—	—		— اناث
1952 — Total	3,897	1,519	568	369	676	665	106		—	—		١٩٥٢ — المجموع
— Males	3,123	1,169	473	310	532	546	93		—	—		— ذكور
— Females	774	350	95	59	136	119	13		—	—		— اناث
1953 (*) — Total	4,610	1,565	426	387	1,034	818	59	102	125	94		١٩٥٣ (*) — المجموع
— Males	3,565	1,171	350	307	811	586	43	91	113	81		— ذكور
— Females	1,045	394	76	80	223	230	16	11	12	13		— اناث

Source : Ministry of Education.

(*) As from 1953 an examination centre had been established for every Mohafazat.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(*) اعتبارا من عام ١٩٥٣ اصبح لكل مركز محافظة مركز امتحان

التربية والتعليم

عدد الحاصلين على شهادة الدراسة المتوسطة : ١٩٤١ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE « BREVET » CERTIFICATE 1941 — 1953

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Table No. 8

جدول رقم ٨

End of Year	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	نهاية السنة
1941	290	243	47	١٩٤١
1942	462	374	88	١٩٤٢
1943	556	394	162	١٩٤٣
1944	677	521	156	١٩٤٤
1945	810	645	165	١٩٤٥
1946	1,039	803	236	١٩٤٦
1947	1,375	1,083	292	١٩٤٧
1948	1,845	1,441	404	١٩٤٨
1949	1,993	1,629	364	١٩٤٩
1950	2,408	1,859	549	١٩٥٠
1951	3,630	2,869	761	١٩٥١
1952	3,893	3,125	768	١٩٥٢
1953	4,610	3,565	1,045	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

EDUCATION

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عدد الحاصلين على شهادة الدراسة الثانوية ، ١٩٢٨ — ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF PERSONS ACQUIRING THE SECONDARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE, 1928 — 1953

Table No. 9. جدول رقم ٩

End of Year	المجموع Total	ذكور Males	اناث Females	نهاية السنة
1928	24	24	—	١٩٢٨
1929	30	30	—	١٩٢٩
1930	40	39	1	١٩٣٠
1931	49	49	—	١٩٣١
1932	46	45	1	١٩٣٢
1933	61	58	3	١٩٣٣
1934	91	85	6	١٩٣٤
1935	81	79	2	١٩٣٥
1936	82	70	12	١٩٣٦
1937	105	98	7	١٩٣٧
1938	136	127	9	١٩٣٨
1939	89	83	6	١٩٣٩
1940	162	142	20	١٩٤٠
1941	143	134	9	١٩٤١
1942	156	144	12	١٩٤٢
1943	125	112	13	١٩٤٣
1944	216	202	14	١٩٤٤
1945	370	333	37	١٩٤٥
1946 (*)	1,155	979	176	(*)١٩٤٦
1947 (*)	666	521	145	(*)١٩٤٧
1948 (*)	750	568	182	(*)١٩٤٨
1949 (*)	749	606	143	(*)١٩٤٩
1950	968	732	236	١٩٥٠
1951	1,243	981	262	١٩٥١
1952	1,429	1,156	273	١٩٥٢
1953	1,700	1,383	317	١٩٥٣

Source : Ministry of Education.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(*) Prior to 1946, the Secondary School Certificate was the Baccalaureate 2nd Degree, and its issue continued up to 1949, while the new certificate was issued since 1946, to replace the old one.

(*) قبل عام ١٩٤٦ كانت الشهادة تسمى شهادة التعليم الثانوي القسم الثاني لم احدثت شهادة الدراسة الثانوية عام ١٩٤٦ حيث حلت محل الشهادة السابقة التي بقيت حتى عام ١٩٤٩

طلاب الجامعة السورية حسب الجنس والجنسية للسنة الدراسية ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

STUDENTS OF THE SYRIAN UNIVERSITY, BY SEX AND NATIONALITY, 1952/1953.

Table No. 13

جدول رقم ١٣

FACULTY	المجموع Total			Distribution of students by nationality توزيع الطلاب حسب الجنسيات												الكلية
				السورية Syrian		اللبنانية Lebanese		العراقية Iraqi		الاردنية Jordanian		الفلسطينية Palestinian		الاخرى Others		
	المجموع Total	ذكر Males	انثى Female	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	ذكر M.	انثى F.	
The Syrian University (*)	2,580	2,062	518	1,789	460	43	22	53	6	50	4	91	21	27	5	الجامعة السورية (*)
The Faculty of Law	734	690	44	589	39	22	2	12	1	31	2	26	—	8	—	كلية الحقوق
The Faculty of Medicine - Total	591	431	160	344	131	17	16	36	3	16	—	11	7	5	3	كلية الطب (المجموع)
— Medicine Department	350	321	29	261	23	14	2	26	2	10	—	7	2	3	—	– فرع الطب
— Pharmacy Department	62	50	12	39	11	1	—	—	—	4	—	4	1	2	—	– فرع الصيدلة
— Dentistry Department	72	60	12	44	6	2	—	10	1	4	—	—	2	—	3	– فرع طب الاسنان
School of Nursing & Midwifery	107	—	107	—	91	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	مدرسة القبالة والتمريض
The Faculty of Engineering	106	102	4	90	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	كلية الهندسة
The Faculty of Science (*)	438	379	69	340	64	1	—	3	1	6	1	22	2	7	1	كلية العلوم (*)
The Faculty of Arts (*)	702	470	232	427	213	1	4	2	1	4	1	29	12	7	1	كلية الآداب (*)
The Faculty of Pedagogy	351	289	62	281	60	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	2	—	—	كلية التربية (*)

Source : Syrian University.

المصدر : الجامعة السورية

(*) The Faculty of Pedagogy contains 234 students who attend the faculties of Sciences and Arts and whose number is already included under these Faculties. In addition there are 17 Syrian students (8 males and 9 females) who hold the degrees of BA or BSc., whose number is not included elsewhere.

(*) ان كلية التربية تضم ٢٣٤ طالبا وطالبة موزعين على كليتي العلوم والآداب وداخلين عددا ضمن هاتين الكليتين كما تضم ثمانية طلاب وتسع طالبات من حملة الاجازة من الكليتين المذكورتين لا يدخل عددهم في مكان آخر .

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عدد الطلاب والمتخرجين من الجامعة السورية سنة ١٩٥٢/١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND GRADUATES OF THE SYRIAN UNIVERSITY, 1952/1953

Table No. 14

جدول رقم ١٤

FACULTY	الطلاب Students			المتخرجون Graduates			الكلية
	المجموع Total	ذكر Males	انثى Fem.	المجموع Total	ذكر Males	انثى Fem.	
The Syrian University (1)	2,581	2,072	509	308	255	53	الجامعة السورية (١)
The Faculty of Law	734	690	44	104	100	4	كلية الحقوق
The Faculty of Medicine - Total	531	431	100	86	63	23	كلية الطب (المجموع)
— Medical Department	350	321	29	53	47	6	– فرع الطب
— Pharmacy Department	62	50	12	13	10	3	– فرع الصيدلة
— Dentistry Department	72	60	12	7	6	1	– فرع طب الاسنان
School of Nursing & Midwifery	107	—	107	13	—	13	مدرسة القابلة والتمريض
The Faculty of Engineering	106	102	4	18	16	2	كلية الهندسة
The Faculty of Science (1)	448	379	69	42	36	6	كلية العلوم (١)
The Faculty of Arts (1)	702	470	232	58	40	18	كلية الآداب (١)
The Faculty of Pedagogy (1)	401	328	74	76	54	22	كلية التربية (١)
Secondary Training-New system	17	8	9	9	4	5	اهلية التعليم الثانوي - نظام جديد
Secondary Training-Old system	334	281	53	25	17	8	» » » » »
Teachers Training - Diploma	50	38	12	42	33	9	دبلوم في التربية

Source : The Syrian University

المصدر : الجامعة السورية

(1) Holders of the Secondary Training «Old System» and of the Deploma are already included under the Faculties of Arts and Sciences and so they are not to be added. While the holders of the Secondary Training — «New System» are to be added, as these are holders of a BA or BSc. degrees.

(١) ان عدد حاملي اهلية التعليم الثانوي « النظام القديم » وحاملي دبلوم في التربية يدخل في عداد طلاب كلية العلوم وكلية الآداب ولذا فلا يجمع . اما عدد حاملي اهلية التعليم الثانوي « النظام الجديد » فلما كانوا حائزين على اجازة من كلية العلوم او من كلية الآداب فيجمع .

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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mainly Christian) those run by foreigners are now finding it difficult to disarm the suspicions of the Government. In Lebanon, there are almost as many private as state schools and the foreign schools still work without difficulty. There are higher schools for teachers and for agriculture and engineering in Syria and for agriculture in Lebanon, but it is usual for a student to pass from a secondary school directly to a university. The following table shows the various types of schools and number of students.

Type	Lebanon, 1951		Syria, 1951–2	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
State:				
Primary	977	83,252	1,850	237,775
Secondary	..	..	57	26,237
Technical	30	2,381	11	2,146
Teachers	2	165	10	1,233
Reformatory	1	106	—	—
Private	601	84,788	387	65,936
Foreign	149	41,402	56	9,852
Total:	1,760	212,094	2,371	343,179

.. = not available.

(Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus, 1952; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1953).

The American University of Beirut is non-sectarian and has students from all over the Middle East. It encourages the use of Arabic as well as English, and its most renowned faculties are those of medicine and social sciences. The University of St Joseph in Beirut is run by the Society of Jesus. Attached to this university are schools of medicine, law, and theology, subsidized by the French Government and administered by the Society, in which teaching is carried on in the French language. A National University has recently been started by the Lebanese Government. The Syrian National University in Damascus teaches in Arabic and its most important faculties are those of law and medicine. A separate body for the study of the Arabic language is the Arab Academy of Damascus.

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Health

Malaria and amoebic dysentery are endemic and, though efforts are being made to drain breeding-grounds, preventive medicine is only in a rudimentary stage. Good hospitals exist in the cities and more are under construction; qualified doctors practise in all the towns, but in the villages there is still a lack

63.Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
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sory, according to law, but barely one half 871
of the children are now registered in
schools. Outside of Damascus, the literacy 212
rates probably do not exceed 40 per cent
among the men and 10 to 20 per cent
among the women. Schools are maintained 871
by the government and by private organiza-
tions, both national and foreign. The Syrian 873
University, in Damascus, is one of the lead-
ing Arab institutions in the Middle East. It
includes faculties of law, science, arts and
medicine, with subordinate departments of
dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, as well as
an advanced school for teacher training.
An engineering school is established at 874
Aleppo, and, in 1952, a new school for the
training of village teachers, with emphasis
on home economics and agriculture, was
under construction near Damascus.

Vital Statistics

Due to lack of demographic data among 659
large segments of the population, few valid
statistics are available. Theoretically, the
registration of births and deaths is compul-
sory, but in the rural areas, away from
centers of population, reporting is incom-
plete. Government officials estimate that
the accuracy of the recorded statistics ap-
proximates 90 per cent in the cities, but
30 to 60 per cent in the villages, over one
half of which have less than 200 inhabitants.
Considering the country as a whole, prob-
ably 50 to 80 per cent of the births are
recorded and, since certificates are required
for burial, a slightly higher percentage of
the deaths. According to published statistics 163
for 1948, the birth rate for the entire coun- 165
try was calculated at 19.1 per 1,000 popu-
lation; the death rate, at 6.5 per 1,000 popu-
lation. The birth rates ranged from 35.3
in the city of Damascus to 9.0 in the rural
province of Al Jazira; the death rates, from
13.2 to 2.3, respectively. Evidence derived
from informal surveys in different localities,
however, suggests that the true birth rates
average 30 to 40 per 1,000 population and
the death rates 15 to 30 per 1,000 popu-
lation.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

244 657 Other government services must be effectively tied in with the community improvement program. At the national level, therefore, the administrator should be assisted by a coordinating and policy-making council on which the Ministries of Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Public Works and National Economy, and the Agricultural Bank would all be represented. Similarly, the work at the provincial or county level should be coordinated by a council representing the cooperating government services and chaired by the *mohafez* or the *kaimakam*. In fact, the community worker might best be attached to the office of the *mohafez* or *kaimakam*.

The inauguration and expansion of this rural community improvement organization will increase rather than diminish the demand for the services of the specialized officers of the Ministry of Agriculture. More agronomists, veterinarians and plant protection experts will be needed to make frequent visits to villages either on their own initiative or on request for the purpose of helping and advising community workers. In the beginning these specialists will serve a dual role, carrying out their present administrative tasks and giving technical supervision and guidance to the village workers. With further expansion of the community development system, however, the services of full-time technical specialists will be required. This will allow for the separation of administrative and regulatory functions from educational and demonstration activities, thus making it possible for the technical specialists to develop a closer personal working relationship with the villagers. The return of people now studying abroad will enable the Ministry to strengthen its staff in the provinces, but more personnel will also have to be recruited from the secondary agricultural school.

Agricultural Education and Staffing[22]

658 874 Repeatedly the mission has emphasized the vital need for more trained staff if the government is to discharge its responsibility for raising the standard of agriculture and animal husbandry. This points to the need for providing much greater facilities for education in agriculture at the secondary school and university levels. The mission has considered a suggestion to establish a faculty at the Syrian University to provide the higher education in agriculture and veterinary science for which students

[22] See Annex C, p. 318.

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

must now go abroad. Ultimately such a faculty should be established, but we have concluded that for the time being it would be wiser to concentrate on the expansion of intermediate and secondary education, the more so since excellent facilities for higher education in these fields are available not far from Syria. The mission would recommend, however, that the government increase its stipends for study abroad by a total amount of £S 750,000 in the period up to the end of 1960.

There are at present four agricultural schools of intermediate grade in the provinces and one secondary school at Kharabo, near Damascus. The mission has already recommended the establishment of an additional secondary school at Kamichliye which should provide some specialized training in agricultural engineering. The mission also proposes that the existing intermediate school at Aleppo be raised to secondary rank. Finally, the accommodation at other schools should be expanded. A program of this scope would entail additional capital expenditures of about £S 2 million and recurring operating expenses of £S 750,000 up to the end of 1960.

The Kharabo school will for some time have to be the principal means of training personnel for the various agricultural programs the mission has outlined. It has already been suggested that at least another year of specialized instruction should be added to the regular curriculum at that school for the training of agricultural credit supervisors and community workers.

The curriculum of agricultural schools will need to be reviewed and revised in order to produce graduates who are adequately equipped to enter government service or to engage in farming. The curriculum is too academic at present. It must focus more on the practical problems faced by Syrian agriculture. More emphasis must be put on manual training and shopwork so that students will know something about construction, the making and repair of implements, carpentry and other essential village crafts. More opportunity for specialization should be given in the final year of schooling. Finally, it is important that students be required to do more of the practical manual work on school farms. It is, after all, only by demonstrating their ability and willingness to do practical agricultural work that they can hope to make an impact in the villages.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

454 corporation on a basis similar to the one we recommend, and Pakistan is contemplating the establishment of such an institution.

We have little doubt that the suggested bank would find ample opportunities for investment. While there is no absolute assurance that private capital can be found for the bank, our preliminary exploration in Syria warrants some optimism on this score. Commercial banks might well subscribe a substantial part of this capital, and the balance could probably be obtained from private individuals and business concerns.

While the bank would not make loans for working capital, it might indirectly make it easier for companies to obtain working capital from the regular commercial banks. The mission found that a number of industrial enterprises do have difficulty in obtaining sufficient working capital, particularly to finance heavy seasonal purchases of such agricultural raw materials as cotton, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables for canning. The proposed bank might explore the possibility of financing the construction of bonded warehouses in Damascus and Aleppo where industrial enterprises could store raw materials and even finished goods in such a way as to furnish ample security for additional commercial bank credit.

Vocational Education

874 464 While appropriate technical and financial assistance can do much to raise industrial efficiency, the better training of labor is also important. At present vocational education is seriously inadequate. There is an urgent need to expand and improve vocational schooling so that it will effectively serve the requirements of industry and business and will be properly related to in-plant training. Specific recommendations on this subject are made in a subsequent chapter on education.

Projected Oil Refinery

471 362 With the exception of one ill-starred venture in which it went into partnership with private capital, the government has wisely left the ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises to private initiative. We are strongly convinced that this policy should continue to be followed. During the last few years it has been proposed from time to time that the government depart from this rule by establishing and operating a petro-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

871 mend that they be studied, perhaps in collaboration with experts supplied by UNESCO.

In one respect this problem has already received growing recognition in Syria. Since 1949, for example, the Ministry of Education has established 111 special rural elementary schools in various parts of the country. In the fourth and fifth grades of such schools, pupils receive some instruction in the basic principles and techniques of agriculture. Each school has a garden in which children can apply their knowledge. Specially trained instructors have been supplied by the Ministry of Education. While the mission had no opportunity to appraise these schools, it considers that they represent a commendable effort to relate education to the problems of rural life. In principle it would seem desirable to establish more schools of this type as educational facilities are expanded.

Vocational Education[22]

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Vocational education has been comparatively neglected, even though the need for sound practical training in commerce, banking, industry and agriculture has greatly increased. Aside from the agricultural schools, the government operates six vocational schools: two technical schools of intermediate and secondary grade in Damascus and Aleppo; two intermediate technical schools at Hama and Deir ez Zor; and two secondary commercial schools in Damascus and Aleppo. In these and two private institutions, 1,676 students were enrolled in the year 1952-53. The government recently started, on an experimental basis, three apprenticeship schools designed to provide three years of purely vocational training to elementary school graduates. Two of these have been established, respectively for boys and for girls, in Damascus, and the third, for boys, in Aleppo.

Since the mission has dealt with agricultural schools elsewhere, the discussion here will be confined to other vocational schools. In general the vocational school system suffers from inadequate facilities and equipment, a lack of sufficiently trained teachers, and a failure to adapt the training and instruction to the requirements of industry and commerce. There is a tendency to look down on vocational education. Generally only those who for one reason or another cannot attend the regular schools turn to vocational institutions. At the same time the business community takes almost

[22] See Annex I, p. 459.


DECEMBER, 1954
MAP 9
T U R K E Y
Kamichliye
Aleppo
Latakia
Hama
Homs
Deir ez Zor
I R A Q
LEBANON
Damascus
ISRAEL
J O R D A N
EXISTING & PROPOSED
VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS
IN SYRIA
EXISTING SCHOOLS
TECHNICAL, INTERMEDIATE AND TECHNICAL
TECHNICAL, INTERMEDIATE
APPRENTICESHIP
COMMERCIAL
PROPOSED SCHOOLS
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874 no interest in vocational schools, from which it has learned to expect very little.

Some improvement in the equipment of existing vocational schools should undoubtedly be undertaken. In recent years the budget has provided only between £S 100,000 and £S 150,000 annually for materials and equipment. The commercial school in Damascus is equipped only with typewriters; there are no other business machines, nor are class books provided. Many of the shops in the technical school at Damascus were found to be poorly equipped with machinery and tools. The acquisition of equipment, tools and textbooks must, however, be selective and accompanied by an improvement in the teaching staff and the type of instruction.

The mission recommends that two new secondary vocational schools be established, one at Homs and the other in Latakia. Both these cities are growing rapidly and are likely to witness a sharp increase in the demand for skilled workers and artisans. The institution at Homs is envisaged as not just another vocational school, but also as a center for training shop instructors and for experimenting in teaching techniques. For this reason the mission suggests that it be placed under a competent foreign director with wide experience in vocational training. Initially the staff of this school should exceed the long-term requirement, so that instructors may be trained for other schools, particularly for the one in Latakia which should open its doors about one year later than the Homs school. Many of the shop instructors in the existing schools might be given a period of training under expert supervision in the Homs school and be enabled to round out their experience in modern European factories. Many of these instructors are good, skilled workers, but they lack pedagogic training and in some cases sufficient experience with modern techniques.

It is important that people already working be enabled to get some vocational schooling at night. No opportunities for such schooling exist at present. We urge therefore that night classes be initiated at all the vocational schools and also, ultimately, at some of the regular schools in cities where vocational institutions are lacking. Facilities might initially be created for about 100 pupils and gradually extended to accommodate some 600 pupils by the sixth year.

Finally, the mission strongly recommends that a vocational education committee drawn largely from industry, commerce and banking be established to help ensure that the training and instruction imparted in the vocational schools really meets the requirements of the business commu-

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nity. No effort is now made to determine what happens to school graduates and how useful their training has been. It is generally recognized that their education simply does not meet the requirements. The law on technical education originally provided for the establishment of a committee consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of National Economy, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and other economic interests. This committee was to determine the types of vocational education needed and generally to facilitate such training and the subsequent employment of school graduates. Unfortunately it met only once and was apparently allowed to die for want of interest on the part of the Ministry of Education. A continuing committee of this type should once more be established. Its functions should be to undertake a critical appraisal of curricula, equipment and teaching staff; to devise means of relating vocational school education to in-service training in factories, banks and commercial houses; to assist in establishing a check on graduates and the usefulness of their training; and to make periodic visits to vocational institutions. This committee should also be asked to review the utility of the apprenticeship schools. In our opinion these schools are unlikely to provide training which would not be better acquired in existing shops and factories.

Adult Education

Aside from the educational work carried on in the army and some literacy courses conducted by private societies, no facilities for adult education exist in Syria. The mission believes that a program of "fundamental" adult education should be started not simply to combat illiteracy, which is still high among adults, but especially to enable people to acquire the practical knowledge which will help them to improve living conditions through their own efforts. A program on a large scale would manifestly be impracticable in the near future. We suggest that it be initiated as part of the program for the gradual introduction of community workers into the villages, recommended elsewhere in this report. Existing school teachers can be used in the adult education program, although they would need special supplementary training, since the subject matter and methods of instruction would obviously be different from those in the regular schools. For this reason it would be necessary to introduce courses on fundamental education into the curriculum of teachers' training colleges. To get the

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1. A number of village school teachers should be given an intensive one-year course in agriculture. 242 871

2. Agricultural courses could be profitably substituted for some of the less essential subjects in the rural curricula, as teachers become available.

3. Night classes in agricultural education should be established in the rural elementary schools.

4. Rural elementary school pupils should be encouraged to organize societies to continue their activities outside school and school gardens.

5. Forest farm crops should be included in school gardens, and tree planting should be encouraged on national holidays. Each pupil could be responsible for a tree planted during his school training.

Secondary agricultural education. There is one agricultural vocational school in each of the provinces of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Latakia and Euphrates but of these four are intermediate schools and only the one at Kharabo (near Damascus) can be classified as a fully-rated secondary school. About 500 students are enrolled in all five schools. Some of the graduates subsequently engage in farming; the great majority apparently become government employees in the agricultural or in other services. 871 242

In the future these schools will be called upon to meet the growing personnel requirements of the government's agricultural, livestock, veterinary and forestry services. At Kharabo particularly, future technicians should be trained to assist in research and extension work. The present four-year curriculum includes all the elements necessary for a general understanding of today's agriculture and its future development, but students should be given an opportunity to specialize, at least during the third and fourth years, in such subjects as rural credit, crop production, livestock and animal husbandry, mechanization and techniques of industrial utilization of agricultural products, e.g., dairy products, fruit preservation, vegetable and meat marketing, tobacco curing, vegetable oil production, meat processing and curing, and the tanning of skins and hides. Better still, two or even three years of training should be added to give the students three or four years of specialization and bring them ultimately to the junior college level.

In the mission's opinion, the curricula of all agricultural schools emphasize theoretical studies too much and practical training too little. Effective farm managers and extension agents must be willing and able to demonstrate with their hands what should be done on the farm. To obtain the respect of the peasants they must be willing to get their hands dirty

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and able to do the practical work on the farm themselves. We suggest therefore that the present curricula be reviewed by a committee consisting of representatives of the Ministry and agriculturists, with the object of putting greater stress on manual training and on practical problems.

There is need for a vocational agricultural school in the Djebel Druze and the Hauran. For the time being this need could be met by broadening the curriculum of the Dera'a school, including special courses in agriculture. Stress should be laid on horticulture and fruit processing. In addition, at least one other school, preferably at Aleppo, should be raised to the same standards as Kharabo.

Elsewhere we have recommended that the curriculum include a mechanical training course.

We have also recommended the establishment of a secondary agricultural vocational school in Kamichliye. It should be located on soil most typical of the region and should have grounds adequate for experimental and demonstration plots, including an irrigation area. This school should become the headquarters for all agricultural education and extension work in the Jezireh; its curriculum should include courses on farming systems and the economics of mechanized agriculture. The third and fourth year curriculum should permit a choice between a technical course of study oriented towards machinery, repairs and maintenance, and an administrative course of study emphasizing economics and administration. We would expect enrollment to be 100-150 from 1957 on.

Adult education. Farmers should have an opportunity for formal instruction in the principles of good farm management and animal husbandry. Elsewhere we have suggested a pilot fundamental education program which would, among other things, include agriculture in its scope. Quite apart from this we believe that the rural elementary schools which provide instruction in agriculture should offer evening courses in which, with the help of proper visual aids, farmers could learn about improved crop rotation, better cultivation and weed control, means of identifying and combating pests and diseases and the like. Mobile trailers equipped with slide and moving picture projectors might be useful. In addition, we suggest raising the standards of mechanical farming by starting special courses at Kamichliye and probably at Aleppo for machinery owners, operators and mechanics. The first would be taught how to select proper farm machinery, supervise its operation and would learn the economics of mechanical farming. The second would be given practical training in opera-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

hand, 54% of all secondary school teachers teach in private schools, whose 873
financial resources for this purpose are greater.

Again assuming an equal percentage of school age children in each district, it appears that the secondary schools, like the primary schools, are unequally distributed. At this educational level there is an average of 13.5 pupils per 1,000 of the population; but in the Jezireh, as might be expected, the ratio is only 2.7 in contrast to 18.1 in the Djebel Druze, 19.5 in Damascus and 22.3 in Hama. The number of secondary schools, averaging 0.049 per thousand people, ranges from as low as 0.016 in the Jezireh to 0.068 in Damascus and 0.085 in Hama. The average number of teachers is 0.8 per thousand people; in the Jezireh it is 0.2, in Hama 1.1 and in Damascus 1.6. In 1952-53 the secondary pupil-teacher ratio for the country was 16, but varied from 12.1 in the Jezireh and 12.4 in Damascus to 23.7 in the Djebel Druze. As in the case of primary schools, it is clear that the number of teachers cannot be the only limiting factor on attendance, for some areas most deficient in teachers have more children in school than those better supplied.

Vocational Education

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Syria has six vocational schools for boys, one for girls and one coeducational, as well as six schools for primary teacher training and two colleges for rural teachers, or a total of 16 schools giving some kind of professional education not of university level.[3] All except one in Deir ez Zor are on or west of the line Damascus-Aleppo; thus the entire eastern portion of Syria with a population of over half a million has just one professional school. Together these schools had 3,881 students in 1952-53,[4] a figure to be contrasted with the estimated 60,000 young people who enter the labor market each year.

The principal shortcoming of the present system of vocational education is the great gulf between the training and instruction given and that which is really required for skilled jobs. Unfortunately the Ministry and the schools maintain no liaison with the businessmen and industrialists for whom they are presumably turning out graduates. Nothing is done to place graduates in private employment; the Ministry of Education simply

[3] Agricultural schools above the primary level are discussed separately elsewhere; there are five of these.

[4] Including 1,670 in technical vocational schools and 2,202 in teacher-training.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

874 asks government agencies about job openings. Although the schools are theoretically required to keep a record of their graduates and the positions they have secured, no effort is actually made to determine whether the education they have obtained has met the requirements.

Most of the students at vocational schools are those who, for one reason or another, did not qualify for the general secondary schools. In large part this is due to a tendency to look down on all manual training and to emphasize general education at the expense of technical education. The attitude is reflected in the traditionally low pay scale for manual workers. Although the efficiency of government and business would be greatly increased if there were more skilled typists and secretaries, the low wages and social standing discourage many from this line of work. Many boys apparently are unwilling to go in for vocational training for fear that it will lead them into a blind alley—that they will be denied opportunities to better themselves which they would have as possessors of a regular secondary school certificate. To open up a wider future for technical school graduates the Ministry of Education is now considering a program of five years of primary schooling and five of intermediate education, followed by two years of intensive technical studies, with the object of qualifying graduates either as foremen or as university engineering students.

875 In addition to equipment inadequacies, the calibre of the teaching staff leaves something to be desired. The technical school teachers are of two types: the practically-trained shop instructors who are basically experienced workers but who often lack fully rounded experience and pedagogic training, and the instructors who teach the general education subjects and the more academic and theoretical side of the vocational training. The monthly salary of the first group starts at £S 175-200 and after many years of service may reach a maximum of £S 350. The second group earns the equivalent of a secondary school teacher's salary, starting with £S 260 per month, with the possibility, after 30 years of service, of earning £S 500. It is generally recognized that these salaries are seldom sufficient to attract really good people, but this problem probably cannot be solved without a general revision of government salary scales.

In 1951 Syria invited UNESCO to send a four-man mission to study the problem of professional education. The creation of a department for vocational education in the Ministry of Education was one outgrowth of its recommendations, but much more remains to be done.

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عدد طلاب المدارس الفنية وعدد المتخرجين منها والمدرسين فيها ، ١٩٥٢-١٩٥٣

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS — NUMBER OF STUDENTS, GRADUATES AND TEACHERS, 1952/1953

Table No. 11

جدول رقم ١١

Technical Schools	الطلاب Students	المتخرجين Graduates	المدرسون Teachers	المدارس الفنية
Industrial School for boys, Damascus	382	60	22	مدرسة صناعة البنين في دمشق
Industrial School for Girls, Damascus	186	22	12	« « البنات في دمشق
Industrial School for Boys, Aleppo	329	56	20	« « البنين في حلب
Industrial School for Boys, Hama	220	10	24	« « البنين في حماة
Industrial School for Boys, Deir-es-Zor	149	20	10	« « البنين في دير الزور
Commercial School, Damascus	331	31	.....	مدرسة التجارة في دمشق
Secondary Agricultural School, Salamiya	141	33	8	المدرسة الزراعية المتوسطة في السلمية
Agricultural School, Buga	110	20	7	« « في بوقا
Agricultural School, Maslamiya	91	(1) —	7	« « في السلمية
Secondary Agricultural School, Deir-es-Zor	49	(1) —	8	المدرسة الزراعية المتوسطة في دير الزور
Secondary Agricultural School, Damascus	93	14	9	المدرسة الزراعية الثانوية بدمشق
Secondary Veterinary School, Damascus	31	11	7	المدرسة الثانوية البيطرية بدمشق

Source : Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف ووزارة الزراعة

عدد طلاب دور المعلمين والمتخرجين منها والمدرسين، ١٩٥٢ / ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF STUDENTS GRADUTES AND INSTRUCTORS OF THE TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE, 1952 — 1953.

Table No. 12

جدول رقم ١٢

Teachers Training College	الطلاب Students	المتخرجون Graduates	المدرسون Instructors	دور المعلمين
Total				المجموع العام
Damascus College for Males	302	96	22	دار المعلمين بدمشق
Damascus College for Females	308	94	21	دار المعلمات بدمشق
Aleppo College for Males	266	81	20	دار المعلمين بحلب
Aleppo College for Females	216	80	14	دار المعلمات بحلب
Yabrud Rural College for Males	80	24	4	دار المعلمين الريفي بيبرود
Dir'a Rural College for Males (2)	38	13	—	دار المعلمين الريفي في درعا (٢)
Special Class for Males at Homs (2)	22	21	—	الصف الخاص لدار المعلمين في حمص (٢)
Special Class for Males at Latakia (2)	23	23	—	الصف الخاص لدار المعلمين في اللاذقية (٢)

Source : Ministry of Education.

(1) Graduates from Deir-es-Zor and Maslamya School continue their studies in Salamiya or Buga school.

(2) Included with Teachers of Secondary Schools

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(١) ان خريجي مدرستي دير الزور والسلمية يتابعون دراستهم في احدى مدرستي السلمية وبوقا

(٢) ان عدد الاساتذة المذكورين يدخل في احصاء مدرسي المدارس الثانوية

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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mainly Christian) those run by foreigners are now finding it difficult to disarm the suspicions of the Government. In Lebanon, there are almost as many private as state schools and the foreign schools still work without difficulty. There are higher schools for teachers and for agriculture and engineering in Syria and for agriculture in Lebanon, but it is usual for a student to pass from a secondary school directly to a university. The following table shows the various types of schools and number of students.

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Type	Lebanon, 1951		Syria, 1951–2	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
State:				
Primary	977	83,252	1,850	237,775
Secondary	..	..	57	26,237
Technical	30	2,381	11	2,146
Teachers	2	165	10	1,233
Reformatory	1	106	—	—
Private	601	84,788	387	65,936
Foreign	149	41,402	56	9,852
Total:	1,760	212,094	2,371	343,179

.. = not available.

(Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1951–2*, Damascus, 1952; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1953).

The American University of Beirut is non-sectarian and has students from all over the Middle East. It encourages the use of Arabic as well as English, and its most renowned faculties are those of medicine and social sciences. The University of St Joseph in Beirut is run by the Society of Jesus. Attached to this university are schools of medicine, law, and theology, subsidized by the French Government and administered by the Society, in which teaching is carried on in the French language. A National University has recently been started by the Lebanese Government. The Syrian National University in Damascus teaches in Arabic and its most important faculties are those of law and medicine. A separate body for the study of the Arabic language is the Arab Academy of Damascus.

Health

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Malaria and amoebic dysentery are endemic and, though efforts are being made to drain breeding-grounds, preventive medicine is only in a rudimentary stage. Good hospitals exist in the cities and more are under construction; qualified doctors practise in all the towns, but in the villages there is still a lack

sory, according to law, but barely one half 871
of the children are now registered in
schools. Outside of Damascus, the literacy 212
rates probably do not exceed 40 per cent
among the men and 10 to 20 per cent
among the women. Schools are maintained 871
by the government and by private organiza-
tions, both national and foreign. The Syrian 873
University, in Damascus, is one of the lead-
ing Arab institutions in the Middle East. It
includes faculties of law, science, arts and
medicine, with subordinate departments of
dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, as well as
an advanced school for teacher training.
An engineering school is established at 874
Aleppo, and, in 1952, a new school for the
training of village teachers, with emphasis
on home economics and agriculture, was
under construction near Damascus.

Vital Statistics

Due to lack of demographic data among 659
large segments of the population, few valid
statistics are available. Theoretically, the
registration of births and deaths is compul-
sory, but in the rural areas, away from
centers of population, reporting is incom-
plete. Government officials estimate that
the accuracy of the recorded statistics ap-
proximates 90 per cent in the cities, but
30 to 60 per cent in the villages, over one
half of which have less than 200 inhabitants.
Considering the country as a whole, prob-
ably 50 to 80 per cent of the births are
recorded and, since certificates are required
for burial, a slightly higher percentage of
the deaths. According to published statistics 163
for 1948, the birth rate for the entire coun- 165
try was calculated at 19.1 per 1,000 popu-
lation; the death rate, at 6.5 per 1,000 popu-
lation. The birth rates ranged from 35.3
in the city of Damascus to 9.0 in the rural
province of Al Jazira; the death rates, from
13.2 to 2.3, respectively. Evidence derived
from informal surveys in different localities,
however, suggests that the true birth rates
average 30 to 40 per 1,000 population and
the death rates 15 to 30 per 1,000 popu-
lation.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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421 of agriculture are the present forms of land
423 tenure. The proportion of large- and small-scale proprietors is not accurately known, but at least one half of the total farm acreage is owned by wealthy, and often absentee, landlords, and worked according to the share-tenancy system. In many northern districts, particularly in Latakia and Al Jazira provinces, the proportion is probably closer to 70 to 80 per cent. Communal ownership by tribes or villages is also com-
642 mon in some areas. The constitution of
656 Syria provides for the creation of a land-owning peasantry through the redistribution and the sale of state lands, but as yet the percentage of independent farmers is
[511] relatively small. Many tenant families and agricultural laborers live at subsistence levels under conditions of extreme poverty.
340 Within recent years attempts have been
116 made to encourage the settlement of the Bedouin tribes. Some now live in permanent villages, where they combine cultivation of cereals with the raising of sheep, migrating seasonally with their flocks in search of pasturage.

241 Wheat is the principal crop. Barley, maize and other cereals are also grown, especially in the areas of Homs, Hama, Hauran and Al Jazira. Olives, fruits and vegetables are important products on the oasis around Damascus and in the coastal region. Cotton is cultivated in Latakia, Aleppo and Al Jazira provinces, while tobacco flourishes in some sections of Latakia. Other industrial crops include sugar cane, sugar beets, sesame, castor oil beans and hemp. Sheep and goats are abundant in all parts of the country, but cattle are found chiefly in the coastal highlands, on the Damascus oasis and in the Hauran region in the southwest.
654 Limited programs for the improvement of methods of farming and animal husbandry are undertaken by the veterinary and the agricultural services of the government.
874 Four agricultural schools are operated by the Ministry of Agriculture—near Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. In the Damascus region, the Near East Foundation

p. 140 (A)

874 conducts an experimental farm, and cooperates with the government in a comprehensive educational program.

489 Syria produces a variety of items for export, the principal products being cereals, textiles, vegetables, cotton and wool and
135 hides. It is relatively poor in mineral resources, although rich deposits of asphalt exist in the Nusairiyeh range and salt basins in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
471 Explorations for oil have been made in the northeast under a concession acquired in 1940 by the Syrian Petroleum Company, an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum group.
315 After several years of unsuccessful borings,
651 the concession was relinquished, but the country derives some income from pipelines which traverse it, leading from the oil fields in Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Syrian and
433 Lebanese ports. Industrial development is slowly emerging from the handicraft stage, and numerous modern plants for the processing of local materials have been established, primarily in Damascus and Aleppo. They include the manufacture of textiles, soaps and oils, cigarettes, various food products, shoes, cement and other consumer goods. The promotion of industry is handicapped, however, by the shortage of raw materials, labor and cheap sources of power.

491 The cities and the towns of western Syria are linked with each other and with the adjoining territories by a system of motor roads. Communications in the interior are poor, and consist in many areas of tracks
505 across the desert. There are no navigable rivers. Latakia, the chief port, is small, and steamer traffic with the Mediterranean countries is at present conducted largely through Beirut and Tripoli, in Lebanon. The construction of modern port facilities at Latakia is scheduled, however, for 1953.
315 Banias has been developed as the terminal
505 of the new pipeline from the Kirkuk oil fields of the Iraq Petroleum Company to the Mediterranean. It was completed in
496 1952. Aleppo is connected by railways with both Beirut and Tripoli, and is an important junction on the trunk line from Istan-

p. 140 (B)

Outpatient clinics are connected with all the government hospitals. The clinics and the dispensaries maintained by the Ministry totaled 111 in 1951, including maternal and child health centers in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia; mobile dispensaries in 7 provinces; and 6 special mobile units, 2 each for the treatment of schistosomiasis, malaria and bejel or syphilis. A demonstration center was established in connection with the maternal and child health clinic in Damascus in 1952 by the Ministry, in cooperation with the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The center provides training for district doctors, nurses and midwives, as well as courses for medical and nursing students and practitioners, in the various aspects of maternal and child health. A tuberculosis demonstration clinic and training center was also opened in Damascus by the Ministry, in conjunction with Syrian University and the World Health Organization. 743

Laboratories. The Ministry of Health operates a central laboratory in Damascus. It has divisions for the performance of bacteriologic, serologic, chemical and biochemical examinations; for the preparation of typhoid, cholera, smallpox and rabies vaccines; and for the analysis of foods and drugs. Small diagnostic laboratories are also established in the administrative centers of the other provinces. 742

The municipal health department in Damascus maintains a laboratory for the examination of water, milk, cheese and other foodstuffs. Research and diagnostic laboratories are connected with the technical departments of the medical school in Damascus, and clinical laboratory facilities are available in all the larger hospitals.

Schools. A medical school is affiliated with Syrian University in Damascus. The Faculty of Medicine was founded in 1901 under the Ottoman government and incorporated in the University in 1923. It confers the degree of Doctor of Medicine on the completion of a 6-year course of study, but 874

63.Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
M1 Middle East
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874 graduates are required to serve an additional year in an approved hospital before they are registered to practice. The instruction in the University is in Arabic, although [191] French and English are employed in technical terms and phraseology.

Schools of dentistry, pharmacy and nursing also function within the Faculty of Medicine. The School of Nursing is associated with the National Hospital, which is operated by the medical faculty. The course of training covers three years, with provision for a fourth year in midwifery. Practical nurses' training programs for girls are carried on in a few private institutions. Courses for the training of male nurses are furnished in all the larger government hospitals.

Personnel

759 **Physicians.** Between 670 and 726 physicians were practicing in Syria in 1951. The majority were established in the larger towns and cities. Approximately one half of the total were located in the province of Damascus and over one quarter in the province of Aleppo. The medical personnel of the Ministry of Health numbered 135, including 6 doctors on the headquarters administrative staff and 7 or 8 in the government laboratories. Five doctors were connected with the municipal health organization in Damascus, 5 in Aleppo and 1 each in Homs and Hama.

Dentists. From 175 to 209 dentists were registered in the country. About 75 per cent resided in Damascus, the remainder in Aleppo.

Nurses. In 1951, also, there were 352 male and female nurses. About 62 female nurses and an equal number of male nurses were employed by the Ministry of Health.

344 **Others.** From 148 to 210 graduate midwives, the majority of whom had preliminary nursing training, were practicing in Syria. They were about equally divided between the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo. Large numbers of untrained midwives worked in the rural villages in all

758 743 ties are inadequate, especially in the rural areas. Up to 1949 there were only 2 small tuberculosis hospitals in the entire country
653 —near Damascus and near Aleppo. The de-
743 velopment of increased medical facilities has recently been undertaken by the Ministry, and, in 1951, additions to the hospital near Damascus, to provide a total of 350 beds, and a new 300-bed hospital at Aleppo were under construction. Plans were also projected for the erection of a 500-bed hospital in Latakia province, which would bring the total number of beds available for the isolation and the treatment of tuberculous patients to between 1,000 and 1,200.

758 A tuberculosis demonstration and training
814 center was established in Damascus in 1952 under the direction of the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Ministry and the Syrian University. It provides a regional headquarters for the training of doctors, nurses and social workers in the public health, the therapeutic and the social aspects of the disease.

164 **Smallpox.** Vaccination against smallpox
751 is compulsory, but enforcement is neces-
361 sarily incomplete in the more remote areas and among the nomadic tribes. Outbreaks occur from time to time, with sporadic cases reported almost annually in the intervening
164 years. The disease was epidemic in Syria and Lebanon in 1933-34, but from 1935 to 1941 only occasional cases were observed. In 1941, smallpox spread to Syria from Iraq, where an epidemic focus had developed in 1940. Over 1,980 cases were recorded in 1942 and 1,132 in 1943. The outbreaks subsided in 1944, and again no more than sporadic cases were noted until 1948, when 894 cases were reported. The known incidence declined to 643 cases in 1949 and subsequently to 15 cases in 1950-51.

Other Infections. Pneumonia and influenza are prevalent. Epidemics of measles are frequent, with the peak of prevalence
165 normally between January and May. The
164 majority of cases are not seen by the medi-
361 cal officers, but, from the fragmentary data available, the fatality rates appear to aver-

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

874 asks government agencies about job openings. Although the schools are theoretically required to keep a record of their graduates and the positions they have secured, no effort is actually made to determine whether the education they have obtained has met the requirements.

Most of the students at vocational schools are those who, for one reason or another, did not qualify for the general secondary schools. In large part this is due to a tendency to look down on all manual training and to emphasize general education at the expense of technical education. The attitude is reflected in the traditionally low pay scale for manual workers. Although the efficiency of government and business would be greatly increased if there were more skilled typists and secretaries, the low wages and social standing discourage many from this line of work. Many boys apparently are unwilling to go in for vocational training for fear that it will lead them into a blind alley—that they will be denied opportunities to better themselves which they would have as possessors of a regular secondary school certificate. To open up a wider future for technical school graduates the Ministry of Education is now considering a program of five years of primary schooling and five of intermediate education, followed by two years of intensive technical studies, with the object of qualifying graduates either as foremen or as university engineering students.

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In 1951 Syria invited UNESCO to send a four-man mission to study the problem of professional education. The creation of a department for vocational education in the Ministry of Education was one outgrowth of its recommendations, but much more remains to be done.

EDUCATION

عدد طلاب المدارس المهنية وعدد المتخرجين منها والمدرسين فيها ، ١٩٥٢-١٩٥٣

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS — NUMBER OF STUDENTS, GRADUATES AND TEACHERS, 1952/1953

Table No. 11

جدول رقم ١١

Technical Schools	الطلاب Students	المتخرجين Graduates	المدرسين Teachers	المدارس المهنية
Industrial School for boys, Damascus	262	66	22	مدرسة صناعة البنين في دمشق
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Industrial School for Boys, Aleppo	300	58	20	« « البنين في حلب
Industrial School for Boys, Hama	220	19	24	« « البنين في حماة
Industrial School for Boys, Deir-ez-Zor	149	30	10	« « البنين في دير الزور
Commercial School, Damascus	221	11	—	مدرسة التجارة في دمشق
Secondary Agricultural School, Sakaniya	141	32	6	المدرسة الزراعية المتوسطة في السلمية
Agricultural School, Bugs	110	30	7	« « في بوقا
Agricultural School, Maskaniya	91	(1) —	7	« « في القسلية
Secondary Agricultural School, Deir-ez-Zor	49	(1) —	5	المدرسة الزراعية المتوسطة في دير الزور
Secondary Agricultural School, Damascus	93	14	9	المدرسة الزراعية الثانوية بدمشق
Secondary Veterinary School, Damascus	31	11	7	المدرسة الثانوية البيطرية بدمشق

Source : Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Agriculture.

المصدر : وزارة المعارف ووزارة الزراعة

عدد طلاب دور المعلمين والمتخرجين منها والمدرسين ١٩٥٢ / ١٩٥٣

NUMBER OF STUDENTS GRADUTES AND INSTRUCTORS OF THE TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE, 1952 — 1953.

Table No. 12

جدول رقم ١٢

Teachers Training College	الطلاب Students	المتخرجون Graduates	المدرسون Instructors	دور المعلمين
Total				المجموع العام
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Dir'a Rural College for Males (2)	38	13	—	دار المعلمين الريفي في درعا (٢)
Special Class for Males at Homs (2)	22	22	—	الصف الخاص لدار المعلمين في حمص (٢)
Special Class for Males at Latakia (2)	23	23	—	الصف الخاص لدار المعلمين في اللاذقية (٢)

Source : Ministry of Education.

(1) Graduates from Deir-ez-Zor and Maskaniya School continue their studies in Sakaniya or Bugs school.

(2) Included with Teachers of Secondary Schools

المصدر : وزارة المعارف

(١) ان خريجي مدرستي دير الزور والسلمية يتابعون دراستهم في احدى مدرستي السلمية وبوقا

(٢) ان عدد الاساتذة المذكورين دخل في احصاء مدرسي المدارس الثانوية

14:International Bank S-5(1954)1955 MD1 Syria MD1

proportion of children attending private schools remains the same, public school attendance would increase from 307,000 to 413,000. 871

The rapid expansion of educational facilities has quite rightly received first priority in the past. In the future, however, further growth in school attendance will be somewhat less important than the task of improving the quality of education and adapting it to the country's needs.

In general the content of education in any developing society must be such as to equip people to cope more effectively with the practical, everyday problems of modern life. These relate not only to the task of earning a better living but also to the need for relating the curriculum of the school more closely to the activities of the community, and for improving its living conditions. According to the testimony of many Syrians there is an urgent need to give education a more practical content. The existing curriculum is too academic and general in character. Methods of teaching must be improved and more emphasis given to the sciences, economics and civics. Pupils must be given more knowledge and understanding about the economic, social and political problems of their environment. Without making education exclusively vocational, it can be given some vocational bias. In rural schools, for example, there can be more stress on agriculture, animal husbandry, sanitation and hygiene. In all schools—primary, intermediate and secondary—more attention might well be devoted to creative manual work, if only to inculcate a greater respect for manual labor. A legal training is still generally considered essential for government service, even though the operations of modern government demand much more technical and economic knowledge.

Current methods of instruction do not appear to stimulate the intellect sufficiently; the principal aim is evidently to impart enough knowledge to enable the student to pass examinations for school certificates or diplomas. There is an excessive emphasis on memorizing. Teaching is rather authoritarian in character: the teacher lectures, and the student is expected to accept what he is taught without challenge or discussion. Even in the University, little discussion and debate is invited. Thus independent inquiry and intellectual curiosity tend to be discouraged, and analytical ability is not sufficiently developed through discussion. 872

Any fundamental reform in both the curriculum and the methods of teaching will probably have to be effected largely through the teachers' training colleges. The mission can point to these problems but it is not competent to suggest how they might best be solved. It can only recom- 871